The Homelessness Industry: A Critique of US Social Policy 9781626377974

Citation preview

THE

HOMELESSNESS INDUSTRY

TH E

HOMELESSNESS INDUSTRY A Critique of US Social Policy Elizabeth Beck Pamela C. Twiss

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2018 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB

© 2018 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Beck, Elizabeth, author. | Twiss, Pamela, author. Title: The homelessness industry : a critique of US social policy / Elizabeth Beck, Ph.D., MSW, Pamela C. Twiss, Ph.D., MSW. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., [2018] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018020916 | ISBN 9781626377417 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Homelessness—United States—History. | Homelessness—Government policy—United States. | Homeless persons—Services for—United States. | United States—Social policy. Classification: LCC HV4505 .B439 2018 | DDC 362.5/9280973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018020916

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

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To those who acknowledge someone they see on the street —Elizabeth and Pamela

To Mitch

—Elizabeth

To Tom and Noah —Pamela

Contents

Acknowledgments

1 The Making of the Homelessness Industry

2 Homelessness Today and Its Historical Roots

3 Competing Values: Neoliberalism and Social Justice 4 From Social Problem to Psychiatry

5 Early Federal Policy and the Fight for the McKinney Act 6 Implementation in a Hostile Context: The First Two Years of the McKinney Act

7 Services, Not Justice

8 From Managing to Ending Homelessness

9 The Continuing Quest for Justice List of Acronyms References Index About the Book

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Acknowledgments

This book grew out of our experiences working with homeless women. It has been a privilege, and we remain beholden to them for all they taught us. This book is for them. It also grew out of our joint dismay that homelessness has been accepted as a “normal” phenomenon in the United States. Many of our students have never known a time when homelessness was not a common feature in society. This book is also for them. We are grateful to Elizabeth Beck’s dear friends Rachel Chmiel, Sarah Higinbotham, and Ruth Richardson, who read early versions and provided keen insights. We are thankful to students Claire Kiefer, William Lane, and Carmen Naomi Shaw for reading drafts for both content and typos, as well as for the hours and hours they worked on references. We are humbled by and obliged to Maria Foscarinis and Carol Fennelly for the time that they spent with Elizabeth sharing their wisdom and experience; we also want to acknowledge all that they continue doing to promote justice and humanity through their work at the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and at Hope House. We were incredibly fortunate to have Lynne Rienner as our editor, and we appreciate her diligence and thoughtfulness. We are grateful to Lynne Rienner Publishers and those we worked with there, especially Andrew Berzanskis, Nicole Moore, and Allie Schellong. We extend our thanks to Jason Cook for his attention to detail. We are solely responsible for any mistakes in the manuscript. —Elizabeth Beck and Pamela Twiss For my time at the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), I am grateful for all I learned from Carol Fennelly, Mary Ellen Hombs, Mitch Snyder, and Lou. I honor their presence in my life. Cliff Newman, Diane Doherty, and Craig Nelson brought laughter and joy to those years in the shelter.

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To my mother Isabel Beck, I owe a large debt of gratitude. Having a daughter whose work and volunteer life involve living in a massive homeless shelter through hunger strikes, threats of eviction, civil disobedience, and nonstop work is not without worry. While I am sorry that I was not an easier daughter, I am the better for it, and I am the better for all that she has given me and continues to give each day. Special thanks to Isabel again and Susan Talburt for believing in this project, well before I began. Thank you Agni Ma Mushkin. I also send my gratitude for their love and support to Mustafa Alara, Ferdoos Al-Issa, Susan Bridges, Nicholas Forge, Marie Hamblett, Sita Ranchod-Nilsson, Pia Orellana, Orkan Utkan, and Lorraine Vullo. And to Mark and Ethan goes my love always. —Elizabeth

For my many teachers, in the classroom and in the community. I will always be grateful to Morton Coleman, James Cunningham, and Barbara Shore of the University of Pittsburgh’s School of Social Work for their tireless commitment to teaching and community service and for ensuring that the classroom always extended into the community. I am indebted to my church community and its ongoing pursuit of social justice; my colleagues in social work, human services, housing, and community development who offered their time and the wisdom of their experiences; and my university community. Words are insufficient to thank my family, especially Tom, partner and extraordinary librarian, and Noah, my bighearted questioner of all things unjust. —Pamela

1 The Making of the Homelessness Industry

From the late 1970s to mid-1980s, the word homeless shifted its function from an adjective to a noun. As an adjective, homeless describes people affected by such extreme social and economic hardship that they lack their own housing or a place to live. But as we will show, as a noun, the concept of the homeless became the target of academic studies, the basis for psychiatric and behavioral diagnoses, and the rationale for professional social services based on a medical model of intervention. These interventions diagnosed and labeled individual pathology, then tailored medically based solutions (informed by psychiatry), paying little or no attention to addressing issues of poverty and housing. The literature on homelessness describes an “artificial relief industry,” a “sheltering industry,” and a “homelessness management complex” (see Hopper 2003; Lyon-Callo 2004; Steffen 2012; Wagner with Gilman 2012) that includes the institutionalized services for diagnosed categories of homeless people. Many now use the term homelessness industry to refer to this phenomenon. A simple online search of the term yields over a thousand hits. We find this conceptualization useful but limiting. We use the term homelessness industry to represent a production system in which neoliberal policies continuously generate new homeless people, much as a factory churns out widgets, and support the industry of social services and criminal justice facilities receiving them. Neoliberalism in policy refers to an ideological position that embraces free market ideals and economic and social policies that systematically disadvantage the poor and working class, support deregulation, provide tax cuts to the wealthy, and drastically cut safety net programs. Neoliberal policies supported major economic changes including deindustrialization and globalization and austerity measures in social services, both of which are

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associated with the reoccurrence of mass homelessness. Together these policy choices and responses, undertaken in a society affected by racism, resulted in the normalization of homelessness in the United States—that is, the widespread acceptance of homelessness as an ordinary feature of our society. Arguments can be made that there is insufficient evidence to definitively prove that policy choices and structural issues are the root causes of homelessness. We argue that history offers sufficient opportunities to detect meaningful patterns over time. The United States has experienced episodes of large-scale homelessness before, particularly in times of severe economic panic and depression, and in the context of insufficient social welfare supports and public investments. The nation has also witnessed prior periods in which industrial and technological changes have displaced workers or made entry into the labor force difficult for working-age adults. Both types of phenomena require resources to help those affected and ease their adjustment that are not supported in a neoliberal social and economic policy agenda. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the context of structural economic change, a more laissez-faire approach to the market, and devolution of social welfare burdens to the local and state levels, the reemergence and recurrence of extreme poverty and homelessness was a logical outcome. Gentrification and deinstitutionalization in the absence of adequate mental health services have also been raised repeatedly as factors in producing homelessness. In addition to driving up housing prices, gentrification led to the loss of a number of different housing options for low-income and poor people, which included single-room occupancy hotels and boarding houses as they were renovated or removed for development. In general, deinstitutionalization involved moving people with mental illness out of institutional care into the community. This process was justified by the development of psychotropic medicines that allowed people to live in the community and media exposés of the horrific conditions found in large psychiatric hospitals where people with mental illness lived for years on end. Because of these developments, the decision was made to empty beds and close large psychiatric facilities. While money was supposed to be allocated for community-based care, the amount given was woefully inadequate. We will also show that developments such as deinstitutionalization and gentrification were further supported by neoliberal policies that value private, profit-making interests in medicine and housing over social needs. In addition to structural changes, central to our understanding of the normalization of homelessness that has occurred is the passage of the Stewart B. McKinney Act in 1987, the first major federal legislation designed to address the needs of the homeless. The McKinney Act was a compromise positioned between two dichotomous views of homelessness. On one side, a powerful anti-homelessness advocacy movement held that homelessness was a social justice issue. This movement was opposed by the Reagan administration,

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whose stance discounted the legitimate existence of homeless people. As with many compromises, the legislation has not been able to reach its potential in addressing the problem of homelessness. In part, this stemmed from the limitations of the legislation. But the failure was also the consequence of our nation’s willingness to accept the status quo and not advocate for real social and economic change. We are not the first authors to identify the normalization of homelessness, and we build on an existing literature that explored the ways in which public policy contributed to that normalization (e.g., Hopper 2003; Lyon-Callo 2004; Wagner with Gilman 2012). The following work provided important insights that stimulated our thinking. Vincent Lyon-Callo, in Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance: Activist Ethnography in the Homeless Sheltering Industry (2004), used the term “sheltering industry” to highlight the proliferation of services for homeless people—a bureaucratized social service sector that offers minimal support to homeless people. David Wagner, in his book Confronting Homelessness: Poverty, Politics, and the Failure of Social Policy (Wagner with Gilman 2012), also stated that homelessness shifted from a social problem to an enduring bureaucratic one. Although Lyon-Callo and Wagner reached the same conclusion, they offered different explanations for the change. Lyon-Callo emphasized the sheltering industry’s use of a medical model to address homelessness, pointing out two problems with this approach. First, pathology was not the only reason for everyone’s homelessness. Second, the medical model did not ensure that homeless people would have access to the social and economic supports needed to acquire housing. Wagner placed a large portion of the blame for the permanent nature of homelessness on advocates who, he said, focused their attention on emergency shelter at the expense of housing-related solutions. Wagner used the term “institutionalization” to describe the way in which the problem of homelessness became entrenched. Citing the example of Michael Lipsky, Wagner noted that former advocates often became street-level bureaucrats whose interests morphed into securing money for their departments. Kim Hopper, in Reckoning with Homelessness (2003), also described the permanent nature of homelessness. Rather than focusing on the institutionalization of homelessness, he asked, “What does the advocacy record look like?” and concluded that although important gains were made, homelessness remained alive and well. Hopper, like Lyon-Callo, supported the idea of a sheltering industry, though Hopper used the term “artificial relief industry” (p. 216). Lyon-Callo, Wagner, and Hopper each noted that race and poverty were largely excluded from discussions of homelessness. The scholarship of each of the authors, even taken together, has limitations. Significant issues are unexplored and questions unanswered. LyonCallo’s book provided an excellent description of the sheltering industry, but he did not explore how the industry emerged and its relationship to

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social justice, thereby constructing a narrow pathway for ending homelessness. Hopper asked important questions about where we as a nation are in relationship to homelessness, but his solutions were based on his beliefs about the need for a broad coalition with labor and the development of lowincome housing stock. These solutions are critically important, but do not build on the work presently being done by advocates to establish a human rights agenda. Because Wagner’s only antagonists in the creation of the bureaucratized view of homelessness were the advocates, the other actors and processes (such as neoliberalism) that went into bureaucratizing homelessness were held unaccountable. Lyon-Callo explored policy toward the homeless through the lens of neoliberalism, but he did not examine homelessness and its normalization as a consequence of neoliberal policies. A second strand of scholarship that stimulated our thinking involved the ways in which the issue of homelessness was originally framed. Here, we especially drew on the work of scholars Cynthia Bogard (2003) and Jimmie Reeves (1999). Bogard, a sociologist, is the author of the 2003 book Seasons Such as These: How Homelessness Took Shape in America, and Reeves studied the media’s coverage of homelessness as well as several other social problems. Neither of the authors specifically pointed to the entrenched nature of homelessness; rather they described the evolution of homelessness, its placement on the social agenda by claims-makers, and the ways in which the problem of homelessness was framed. Claims-making is a term used in sociology that involves attention to the framing of an issue and the formulation of the claims that will be used to address it. Bogard’s claims-makers were advocates, media, government, and, to a lesser extent, experts. Like us, she placed the anti-homelessness advocacy movement in Washington, D.C., and New York with two powerful advocacy organizations: the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) in D.C. and the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) in New York. Her book ended with the two organizations teaming up to support federal legislation for the homeless. In 1999 Reeves analyzed media coverage to describe the life history of the issue of homelessness, from 1983 to 1987, as historical drama. He identified four stages in the drama. The first stage, the breach stage, occurred between 1981 and 1982, when the phenomenon of not seeing homeless people on the street was breached. In the years 1983–1986, homelessness was constructed by the advocates as a national crisis and it was during this stage that the advocates first had success. In the redress stage, 1986, solutions to homelessness became redefined in terms that were consistent with Reaganomics—that is, consistent with individual volunteerism rather than a public collective struggle. In the last stage, 1986–1988, homelessness changed status from a social problem to a danger to the public (Reeves 1999). The arc of our narrative is similar to that of Reeves, but we provide more depth to previous discussions to explore how homelessness changed from a

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social problem to a normalized condition. One of the ways in which we do so is by extending our discussion of claims-makers and framing to include a variety of actors, such as members of the Reagan administration. Then we move from framing to explore the way in which the problem of homelessness was redefined and repositioned in the halls of Congress. We examine the ways in which those frames changed in what political scientist Charles Jones (1984) called the “problem-definition” stage of the public policy process (when a given problem is defined, its scope is established, and causes are identified). In the case of homelessness, two competing and irreconcilable frames—provided by the advocates and the Reagan administration—required a redefinition to achieve compromise legislation. Although the extant scholarship explored the issue of framing, it did not include a discussion of the problemdefinition, nor an in-depth review of the McKinney Act that assessed its implementation to understand the ways in which practice and policy helped to normalize homelessness. In this book, we address pieces we view as missing from the literature and present five conditions that, we argue, led to the normalization of homelessness and the growth of the homelessness industry:

1. Cultural and policy adoption of historical views of the poor in which individuals are blamed for their position. 2. Support of neoliberal economic and social policies that disadvantaged the poor, the working class, and African Americans. 3. Compromises in public policy that responded to homelessness as an emergency situation and a social service problem rather than a predictable outcome of neoliberal economic and social policies. 4. Focus in public policy on homelessness as a psychiatric problem rather than a housing problem. 5. Creation of a large social service sector we refer to as the homelessness social service industry.

We believe that homelessness can end, and recent research suggests that ending homelessness may be possible if we adopt an effective perspective and a national willingness to make needed investments. However, in order to avoid the problems of the past we must understand how the issue of homelessness was historically constructed and reconstructed, and although this history does constitute the bulk of our research, we also explore present-day solutions later in the book. Sources Our primary data sources were written materials. These included government documents such as congressional hearings, committee reports, reports

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from the General Accounting Office (GAO), and notices in the Federal Register. We read many of the articles that dealt with issues related to homelessness in the Washington Post and the New York Times published between 1979 to 1986, and 130 journal articles written about homelessness during the same time period. We reviewed a plethora of monographs and edited volumes, as well as reports from relevant organizations including the National Alliance to End Homelessness, the National Coalition for the Homeless, and the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP). Some of the sources just noted as well as additional material, such as correspondence and memos, came to our attention as we worked in the George Washington University Estelle and Melvin Gelman Special Collections Library, where the papers of CCNV members Mitch Snyder, Mary Ellen Hombs, and Carol Fennelly are housed. Beyond written materials, we conducted several structured interviews with key informants—advocates engaged at the federal level with the passage and implementation of the McKinney Act. Much of the work in the passage of the McKinney Act rested with Maria Foscarinis (then with the National Coalition for the Homeless) and involved Carol Fennelly of the CCNV, both of whom were interviewed and had the option to be anonymous, but chose to be named. There was one anonymous interview. To address later parts of the history and to check on findings from primary and secondary sources we consulted with people engaged in ground-level implementation of the McKinney Act and the transition to efforts to end homelessness, and reviewed documents and reports on local implementation. Those with whom we consulted were familiar with implementation efforts from their work in the places in which we currently live, Atlanta and southwestern Pennsylvania, places once cited for meanness toward homeless people (National Coalition for the Homeless and National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2006). Our final data point was our own experiences. We have included boxed sidebars in which we offer our personal reflections or experiences with the issue being discussed. Elizabeth Beck was a member of the CCNV from 1984 to 1987, living with activists and formally homeless people in Washington, D.C., in specific quarters in two large shelters. Most of her worklife then was centered on coordinating the shelter and working eight- to ten-hour shifts, six to seven times per week. Along with other staff, she helped to meet the women’s daily needs. When possible, she engaged in case management and referral types of activities and advocated for individual women. Elizabeth also participated with a group of women’s shelter providers, in a coalition of individuals serving homeless women throughout D.C. Her day-to-day work was not focused on the CCNV’s broader activism and policy efforts, but when time allowed she participated. As part of that community she never forgot that the work she was doing was part of a larger social justice agenda. After leaving the CCNV, she also was

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employed at a large community action agency in southwestern Pennsylvania where her work included issues related to homelessness and affordable housing. Although Elizabeth had often thought of writing about this period, this book emerged partly as a reaction to recently published literature on the advocacy movement that suggested that the issue of homelessness and public policy might be raised anew. While pursuing graduate studies, Pamela Twiss engaged in communitybased research on massive unemployment and deindustrialization in southwestern Pennsylvania’s Monongahela Valley mill towns in the middle to late 1980s. She also worked for a small, specialized emergency shelter and transitional housing program for women with mental health issues funded by McKinney Act programs during the early 1990s. Witnessing widespread economic distress and its prolonged effects on the social fabric and economic well-being of people and their communities motivated her interest in community development as an area of study and social work practice. Experiencing the constraints of housing and homelessness policies, and their inadequacies in the face of the nation’s extensive housing affordability problems, motivated her interest in the McKinney Act. Both of us remain concerned about the ways in which homelessness has become, as Hopper (2003) described, an accepted, or normalized, condition in the United States. Structure of the Book In the design of the structure of this book, we took seriously the warning that without learning from history, the failures of the past will be repeated. Thus, in Chapter 2, we deal with history, but we do not do so in chronological order. That is, we start with relevant modern history, mostly the political struggle that preceded the McKinney Act. Then we go back as far as biblical times to show how old views of the poor have persistently shaped modern thinking. Chapter 3 begins with the breach stage, which was then followed by the crisis stage, in which the problem appeared in the middle of a social drama between ideas and values associated with human rights and social justice and those associated with individualism and neoliberalism. We summarize this social drama through the history, values, and interactions of the major adversaries: the Reagan administration versus the advocates for the homeless. The chapter ends when the advocates, along with their insistence on structural explanations for homelessness, have the upper hand. In Chapter 4 we explore broader perspectives on the causes of and solutions to homelessness of the advocates, the administration, social scientists, physicians, and the nonprofit sector that influenced how the problem was framed. We explore the implications of structural versus individual

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explanations for homelessness. We examine how would-be allies of grassroots advocates helped to reframe homelessness from a social justice issue to one assuming the primacy of individual pathology. In Chapter 5 we examine the drive for federal attention to the problem of homelessness, tracing the development of legislative efforts leading up to passage of the McKinney Act. We describe early federal efforts to provide emergency relief and their limitations. We present the final passage of the McKinney Act and its provisions in three distinct ways: a win for advocates, a compromise, and a reflection of the dominance of neoliberal ideology. There is some historical overlap across Chapters 3, 4, and 5, as each have content from 1980 to 1986. In Chapters 3 and 4 the overlap involves the major players in this narrative: the administration and the advocates. Chapter 3 focuses on the history, philosophy, and values of each, and Chapter 4 compares their understanding of the problem of homelessness and ideas about solutions. Chapter 5 also extends backward to 1980 in order to catalog legislation involving homelessness passed before the McKinney Act. Chapter 6 presents the first two years of implementation of the McKinney Act, as the law was passed into the hands of a hostile administration charged with putting the law’s provisions into action. It details implementation efforts across major federal agencies. This chapter also examines the administration’s efforts to impede implementation of the act. Chapter 7 covers what we call the liminal period post passage of the McKinney Act, in which there was the possibility for homelessness to be addressed as a social justice issue or a psychiatric issue. When we conclude Chapter 7 the efforts to solve the problem rest squarely with a social service approach that helps individuals, and manages the problem rather than ameliorating it. Chapter 8 introduces three strategies that are used post passage of the McKinney Act to manage the problem of homelessness. The first is the management of exclusion in which jails become shelters; the second is the management of behavior that relies on diagnosing homeless people’s behavior and linking housing to changes in behavior. The third was sold, in part, as a costsaving effort and here certain groups of people are targeted for permanent housing. This chapter follows the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama years. Finally, in Chapter 9 we revisit the factors that we argue perpetuate the normalization of homelessness and discuss what current efforts to manage homelessness look like. We also present an alternative way forward. This book can be viewed as both a stand-alone investigation into homelessness as well as a discussion of extreme poverty and social policy that uses homelessness as a case study. We hope that in the pages that follow we answer the root question: How did homelessness go from an issue of public outrage to what Hopper called an “all-but-expected feature of the landscape”? (2003, p. 193).

2 Homelessness Today and Its Historical Roots

In the twentieth century, multiple iterations of homelessness appeared in the United States, with waves of visibly poor people without housing. The Great Depression of the 1930s produced itinerant workers, known as “tramps” and “hobos.” In the 1960s and early 1970s homeless people were associated with neighborhoods such as Skid Row and the Bowery. A new version of mass homelessness emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s when people living on the street became visible in the nation’s major cities. By the 1980s, there was significant consensus that this phenomenon was growing, and the number of homeless individuals was larger and more diverse than in past years, including more single women as well as women with children and families (Blau 1992; Hopper 2003; Miller 1991; Wagner with Gilman 2012). As the numbers of homeless people grew, so did an advocacy movement for their support. 1 At the same time, the Reagan administration worked to downplay the issue, as the emergence of greater poverty could be seen as contradicting the administration’s favored neoliberal policies and its efforts to project a narrative that celebrated the country as entering a time of prosperity. Without the support of the administration, in the early 1980s Congress was able to pass small measures focused on emergency relief for homeless people. But given the scale of the problem, the emerging programs were clearly insufficient to meet the need. Moving beyond the meager assistance then offered to poor and homeless people opened a political tug-of-war over the nature of the homelessness problem and its causes, and, secondarily, over its size and scope. Specific debates focused on such questions as whether homelessness merited federal intervention or was a matter for

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First Encounters with Homelessness

When I was fifteen in the 1970s my mother took me to New York City. Before we went she warned me that in a specific neighborhood I might see something shocking and saddening—people living on the street. It is difficult for people born in the middle to late 1970s and after to know that homelessness was not a part of our everyday world. The number of homeless people then was so sparse it was invisible or only existed in some areas. About seven years after that trip the landscape changed. The experience was so new that we as a nation grappled with what to call these people. Street People, Bag Ladies. . . . I began volunteering at Luther Place Shelter in Washington, D.C., largely due to curiosity. The idea of homeless people was so foreign that I wanted to know more about them. My questions were not based on who they were or how they became homeless, I just simply could not imagine what their day-to-day life was like, and how they survived it. —Elizabeth Beck

localities and states; and, if it did merit intervention, whether that should be addressed by governmental or nongovernmental funds; whether cuts to the social welfare safety net or a crisis in the availability of affordable housing were chiefly to blame (Blau 1992). Concurrently, long-held beliefs about the nature of poverty in the United States played out in the discussion about homelessness. Were people without housing poor and homeless for individual or behavioral reasons, or were there environmental or structural explanations? If homelessness arose from behavioral failings, then the individuals were responsible for the mistakes they made that resulted in the loss of housing. Thus, solutions were based on their ability to pull themselves up through personal hard work and resilience. However, if poverty was a structural problem embedded in an economic system and its consequences—consequences that included the lack of a livable wage, unemployment, and unregulated costs for human requirements, such as housing—then different solutions were appropriate. When economic policies are overlaid with racism, sexism, and other discriminatory policies, the complexity of the issues makes them exponentially more difficult to sort out in the political arena. Addressing these issues would require structural changes, threatening the ascendancy of those who fared well and the neoliberal policies that favored them.

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While this tug-of-war took place about the scope, solutions, and size of the problem, a third group—the experts—emerged. These were academics who largely addressed the issue of homelessness as a problem centered on mental health and the need for additional services to deal with the consequences of mental health problems. In the mid-1980s, advocacy organizations turned their attention to gaining federal support for more comprehensive measures to meet the needs of homeless people. They demanded that the federal government and the Reagan administration address the social issues of homelessness by solving the underlying problems that caused people to experience it in the first place (Blau 1992; Bogard 2003; Wagner with Gilman 2012). By 1986 and 1987, advocates had organized a strong national coalition in support of federal money being allocated to the problem of homelessness and had significant backing in Congress. However, any federal legislation that could pass Congress was threatened by the likelihood of Reagan’s use of the presidential veto. In 1987, advocates succeeded in pushing through a compromise version of legislation in the form of the Stewart B. McKinney Act, renamed the McKinney-Vento Act in 2000 (PL 106-400). The McKinney Act was passed close to seven years after the first congressional hearing on the issue was held in 1980, years after the problem first emerged in the 1970s. Once the act was signed, $712 million dollars was appropriated for two years (significantly less than the approximately $1 billion authorized) (National Coalition for the Homeless 2006). The bill identified homeless families with children, those with physical and mental disabilities, older adults, Native Americans, and veterans as populations in special need of support. Although the funding of the bill, and perhaps more important its focus on emergency relief, fell far short of the advocates’ desires, the bill’s passage was seen as a tremendous success. Given that public policy in the United States operates largely through incremental changes to existing policy, by prying open the space for federal funding for the homeless, advocates had succeeded in creating a legislative starting point for support of homeless people that could then be a foundation for more substantial aid (Foscarinis 1996). As we will show, however, following passage of the McKinney Act, hopes for much more expansive prevention and permanent housing efforts were not realized. Instead, a growing bureaucracy developed to administer emergency relief; most people involved with it supported the use of a medical model2 to approach the problems of homeless people. Thus, medical language and processes (e.g., diagnosis, prognosis, pathology, treatment plan) emerged and became the default approach to addressing the problem. As an omnibus bill, the McKinney Act authorized a variety of programs, which were assigned to multiple cabinet-level federal agencies for implementation, including the Department of Education, the Department of

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Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was charged with rapidly moving funds for emergency food and shelter to the local level. In the early years of implementation, it had the largest and best-funded of the McKinney Act programs. In terms of allocated funds and significant programming, HUD ranked next in line. HUD was given responsibility for multiple housing initiatives including its own expanded emergency shelter program, supportive housing demonstration programs (providing housing with supportive services), as well as funds to rehabilitate single-room-occupancy housing (often small units with shared bath and/or kitchen facilities) for homeless adults. The role of HUD, as an executive-level agency charged with implementing new policy, included developing the regulations and processes to distribute funds for programs and awarding these funds to competing organizations (Peters 2013). Given that then–HUD secretary Samuel Pierce defined his job as moving the government out of the housing business, it was no surprise that before any money had been distributed, the potential reach of the McKinney Act was diminished by HUD’s development of problematic implementation policies. Other Reagan-era agencies also engaged in efforts that thwarted or negatively affected implementation of the act. Concurrent with the availability of McKinney Act monies and the growth of emergency services and a medical model to address the needs of homeless people, the advocacy movement, with its focus on structural disparities, entered a period of decline. Throughout the 1990s and into the new century, homelessness continued, largely unabated. As a social problem, it shifted from a new and alarming anomaly in an affluent country to a normal feature of life. Anthropologist Kim Hopper, who researched homelessness for decades, explained: “Something remarkable has happened to the spectacle of the street-dwelling poor in the two decades since it reappeared on the public stage: Homelessness became domesticated, routine, an all-butexpected feature of the urban landscape. No longer cause for vocal concern, let alone outrage, it has been integrated into that cheerless diorama of unabashed wealth and relentless poverty that now passes for ‘normalcy’ in American cities” (2003, p. 193). More than ten years after Hopper’s reflection, many have noted both signs of hope for more effective policy and real concerns that we may be moving backward. On the positive side, research-based practices that focus on housing needs began making a dent in homelessness under the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Specifically, prior to the election of Donald Trump, the country had entered a new phase, the Housing First model phase, which worked to rapidly rehouse categories of homeless people (we return to this model in later chapters), based on the position that housing is the fundamental need. Significant reductions in

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homelessness were reported between 2009 and 2017, particularly among the chronically homeless and homeless veterans (Henry, Watt, Rosenthal, and Shivji 2017). Aspects of Housing First link to the advocacy work of the 1970s and 1980s. Hearings held in 2007 on reauthorization of McKinneyVento provide evidence that early advocates never stopped fighting for broader, more permanent solutions to homelessness. In testimony, Maria Foscarinis, executive director of the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP) (an essential actor in the struggle for the original McKinney Act), outlined the history of the struggle and the necessity to realize the vision of the early advocates to end homelessness and prevent its recurrence. She reminded those gathered that the original legislative proposal behind McKinney was broader and that only its emergency programs were passed. According to Foscarinis: At the time that McKinney-Vento was passed, Congress explicitly stated— and there are many statements in the Congressional Record by many Members, bipartisan statements, about this being a first step only, and it was a first step to respond to the immediate crisis. It was never intended to be the final step. It was to be followed by longer term solutions. In fact, the McKinneyVento Act has been the major response to homelessness since that time. And the remaining steps have yet to be enacted. (Reauthorization of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, Part I, 2008, pp. 15–16)

While these developments make it clear that ending homelessness is possible for many, the solution requires significant federal investment in affordable housing subsidies, support for the creation of new affordable housing, and funds for needed services and support systems. At the close of the book we discuss these issues in the context of the current federal administration and federal legislature, led by, respectively, President Donald Trump, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and House Speaker Paul Ryan. We examine the proposed draconian cuts to domestic spending in the president’s budget, coupled with the appointment of a secretary of HUD, Ben Carson, with no professional experience in housing and community development policy, to raise questions about the future of national homelessness policy. As we will discuss in the last chapter, the parallels to the Reagan administration are striking, and the current government’s policy agenda is more fiercely neoliberal in orientation. Historical Perspectives on Poverty and Social Welfare In the West our thinking about poverty and modern homelessness has been influenced by structural and individual perspectives. Although these orientations produce different analyses and solutions, historical and contemporary

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The Homelessness Industry

social welfare policy in the United States has been influenced by both. During periods of real dramatic reform, in which social welfare provisions have been expanded, the structural understanding of poverty has been more influential, but these periods have occurred in the context of national progressive movements and crises (for example, the Great Depression, the Great Society, and the War on Poverty). During periods of social welfare contraction, an understanding of poverty as a personal failing has prevailed, and this understanding has dominated discourse on poverty in the United States. Our historical review is not intended to be a full history of social welfare policy in the West.3 We use it to illustrate the historical orientations to the poor that bleed into modern thinking and strategies for addressing poverty and homelessness today. Moreover, we illustrate the ways in which policies that address poverty generally eschew structural solutions in favor of stringent, need-based relief that keeps people poor. We examine the basis for the nation’s punitive and inadequate responses to poverty. American views on poverty and the poor have been shaped by many factors, including pre- and postcolonial religious doctrines, poor laws, and the advent of laissez-faire capitalism. In the following section we examine the influence of religion, poor laws, and economic change as fundamental to understanding the values and perspectives that inform US social welfare policy. Poverty as Normal and a Social Responsibility

In pre-capitalist European societies, poverty was accepted as a normal condition affecting the majority of people. Based on a shared understanding that people were typically poor due to circumstances beyond their control (Mencher 1967), early writings and religious doctrines on poverty favored charitable impulses and provided directives for the collective support of the poor. For example, the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, one of the oldest and best-preserved early legal codes, called for the protection of the weak against the strong (Trattner 1999). In the United States, Judeo-Christian moral teachings have had a major influence on social understandings of poverty. Judaism and Christianity both provide instruction on the personal moral response to poverty and the requirements of a just society. Both teach their adherents that they are obligated to protect the most vulnerable in society, including forgiving debt and redistributing wealth to ensure that it does not become concentrated in the hands of the few. Both of these monotheistic religions developed as responses to oppressive regimes in which poverty, forced labor, and indebtedness were common, and the rural, landless poor were especially vulnerable to exploitation (Borg 2013; Crossan 1998).4 The prescriptions for justice for the poor in both theologies include acts of personal charity and the creation of civil laws that organize society to

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redistribute wealth and redress social and economic loss. Deuteronomy5 in the Torah and the Gospel of Matthew6 are frequently cited as examples. Deuteronomy 15 states that one of God’s commandments, translated in Hebrew as Mitzvah, is not to be hardhearted toward the poor or people in need. Other passages in Deuteronomy also admonish people to provide for categories of the poor who are especially vulnerable given their social status in a patriarchy. Special care was to be given to the widow and orphan and the stranger lacking tribal protection (Crossan 2007, p. 72). Every seven years one was to forgive debts owed (Deuteronomy 15). The social gospel reported in the New Testament is a natural extension of these earlier teachings; the poor are also embraced here as favored by God. A famous parable in the Gospel of Matthew emphasizes compassion as the basis for being judged favorably as a person (Borg 2006, pp. 178–179), teaching one should provide food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, clothing for the naked, welcome to the stranger, and should visit the sick and those in prison (Matthew 25:35–39 English Standard Version), as “Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brothers and sisters, you did it to me” (Matthew 25:40 English Standard Version), with an emphasis on caring for the “least of these.” In keeping with religious tenets, in pre-capitalist medieval Europe, where the ability to grow food was essential to life, land for the poor was provided. The feudal estate embodied a status-based society (Mencher 1967) in which nobles were obligated to care for the poor within their estate; the system ensured that many were provided with shelter and a small plot of land in exchange for work. Additionally, productive land was set aside as common space that could be used by all. The practice of giving alms (aid) to the poor was widespread (Mencher 1967; Trattner 1999; Wagner 2005). None of this means that life was easy, nor that oppression was uncommon. Life for medieval rural peasants was exceedingly difficult. Though the nobility bore responsibilities for their care, they were still vulnerable to disease and the ravages of warfare, as well as locked into a subordinate status (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013). Unemployment to Crime: The Advent of Laissez-Faire Capitalism

In the wake of the plague, as the feudal order dissolved, and market economies grew in Europe in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, notions of poverty became inextricably bound up in views about labor and laborers (Mencher 1967). Labor scarcity brought migration of workers away from agricultural areas (and the obligations of landholding nobles) to urban areas; increased demands for wages improved the position of labor as the power of the nobility declined (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013). No longer the

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The Homelessness Industry

responsibility of the nobility, the poor became the responsibility of the state and localities with roles formally established through emerging poor laws. Views of the poor grew increasingly negative and punitive. As the development of a money-based economy became more pronounced, so too did private control of property and production. Unemployment, inflation, and poverty grew; hunger and homelessness became commonplace (Mencher 1967; Trattner 1999). Michael Katz (1986) discussed the ways in which the wealthy in England grew to fear and disparage the increased numbers of people in search of work, using words like “savage” to describe what they saw as “unruly mobs.” In response, laws were passed that made it more difficult for the poor by controlling the movement of workers, fixing maximum wages, and compelling work. In the latter part of this period, a series of “enclosure” laws were passed in England that supported those with means while adding to the ranks of the poor and homeless. From the 1500s on, the enclosure movement in England expanded private property by sealing off community land that had been farmed by nonlandowners. Historians view the enclosure and privatization of formerly public lands as contributing to the creation of a class of landless individuals, many of whom fell into poverty and vagrancy: early homelessness. As noted by Edward Palmer Thompson, following enclosure individual tenants or former small landowners were “left with a parcel of land inadequate for substance” (1966, p. 217), thus forcing many of the rural poor to move to cities where they might find work in support of the newly forming practice of industrialization. The enlarged work force helped to keep wages low, with the unemployed competing with each other for work. Failing to participate in work became a crime meriting harsh punishment for those poor individuals viewed as “able-bodied” (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013). The “Worthy” Poor and the “Unworthy” Poor

The shift from a feudal order to an industrial Europe engaged in Western colonial conquest brought further changes in the views of the poor. The state responded by developing policies that would distinguish the poor who merited relief from those who should be engaged in labor. In Britain, Parliament’s passage of a series of poor laws in the sixteenth century culminated in the Act for the Relief of the Poor, commonly known as the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, which incorporated a developing view of poverty as both a problem of unemployment and a personal problem. This created a basic framework for understanding poverty and profoundly influenced orientations to the poor and their subsequent relief in the American colonies and the United States (Mencher 1967; Trattner 1999). The Elizabethan Poor Law acknowledged that poverty was essentially a societal problem of lack of

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employment opportunity, yet prescribed categorical diagnoses that led to the investigation of need at an individual level.7 The poor were to be investigated and categorized as either “worthy” poor (unable to work and deserving of aid) or “unworthy” (unemployed, able-bodied individuals undeserving of aid). The overarching emphasis of relief-giving was to ensure work for all, with relief so meager that no relief recipient could be in a better situation than the lowest-paid worker.8 The stranger, and anyone who might become a drain on public resources, was “warned out” of the early colonial communities in the Americas (Mencher 1967). Administration of the poor laws at the local level (using local “overseers of the poor”) and taxation for relief were incentives to keep strangers away, lest they become a public burden.9 In this new context, colonization provided English society with a relief valve. The nation’s poor, seeking opportunity, could transform from potential liabilities on community purses to settlers in the new world. They could escape the workhouse, the threat of debtor prisons, or even death by hanging in their homeland by serving as indentured servants with the prospect of eventual freedom in the British colonies (Day 2009). Indeed, with indigenous lands to be taken and plundered, opportunities for work and perhaps even wealth abounded, especially for whites who ventured to the colonies. While colonization harmed and changed every aspect of Native Americans’ lives, it also set a norm that individuals of European descent were superior and continued the practice of violent conquest as acceptable in pursuit of wealth. Indigenous people in Western colonial lands were viewed as outsiders to be conquered. The local colonial community cared for its own, not outsiders. Whether by treaty or not, Native Americans literally lost their homes to colonial expansion, making them the first in the emerging colonies displaced by development. Others considered noncitizens included enslaved workers, who began to be brought to the colonies in 1619, and whose numbers increased exponentially in concert with the expanding colonial empire in the New World. Ripped from their homes of origin, sold into slavery, and shipped to the colonies, they did not always remain in the hands of their purchasers. From the beginning of US slavery, runaway slaves lived in “maroon” colonies, in hiding, or, as northern states began to end slavery, were free in the north but often lived without homes (Johnson 2010; Lockley and Doddington 2012). Poverty as a Moral Failing Versus a Structural Problem

Settlement patterns in the early United States brought influences from multiple countries and peoples: the Spanish in Florida, the southwest, and the west; the French from the Great Lakes down the Mississippi to Louisiana; and people from Great Britain all along the eastern shores. Great Britain had tremendous influence on social welfare policy, with its thirteen British

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The Homelessness Industry

colonies establishing themselves as the early United States of America. Britain’s white settlers were deeply influenced by Judeo-Christian values, notably concern for a subset of those without economic protection: the aged and infirm, the widow, and the orphan. The stranger and the jailed were not favored in the early United States or in Great Britain. The newest settlers also brought with them Britain’s past responses to poverty, the poor laws. Although the American colonies and emerging United States adopted British poor law practices, they had to be changed to suit the needs of a new continent with a great deal of land and labor demands that would help to fuel the slave trade (Day 2009; Stern and Axinn 2012). The abundance of land in the early colonial period provided no shortage of work and no sympathy for the able-bodied unemployed (Mencher 1967; Stern and Axinn 2012). The rural British social welfare experiment of the late 1700s known as the Speenhamland system, which supplemented inadequate wages and functioned like a very low-level guaranteed income to address the gap between workmen’s wages and the cost of food, was not brought to the colonies (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013);10 the early understanding that unemployment and poverty resulted from lack of opportunity was supplanted by a far more punitive outlook toward the poor that was consonant with Protestantism, the vastness and opportunities of an abundant and large continent, and the harsh challenges of its settlement. Developing American values, influenced by Puritanism and the Protestant work ethic as well as chronic labor shortages, combined to create a particularly harsh view of individuals thought to be able-bodied and without work. Poor women without children were also viewed negatively because women’s worth was linked to their fulfillment of expected reproductive roles (Abramovitz 1996). Increasingly, poverty was interpreted as a personal moral failing, an unwillingness to do one’s duty, and a crime against the community. Support for the poor in the United States continued to be tempered by such punitive ideology (Stern and Axinn 2012), so that public aid was always a source of shame and a resource of last resort. For example, in 1734, in what would become New York City, the first shelter was erected as a multipurpose house of corrections, workhouse, and poorhouse. In addition to providing space for people called “vagrants” and “trespassers,” it served as a prison, and slaves were sent there for discipline, rendering all equally outcast. While runaway slaves often had few options other than the poorhouses and workhouses that were created in the north, some of these institutions would not open their doors to blacks (Hopper 2003; Johnson 2010). The southern colonies developed an economic system highly dependent upon first indentured and later enslaved labor from Africa (Stern and Axinn 2012). Although slavery was more common in the south, there were slaves living in northern states in the 1800s; just before the Civil War, there were

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also significant pockets of free blacks in the north and south, primarily in urban areas, building communities and social and cultural organizations in a fiercely segregated society in which they had to rely on self-help. Local public relief as a measure of last resort was designed for use by needy whites (Day 2009; Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013). Following the Civil War, and a relatively brief period of Reconstruction, “Black Codes” were passed in the south to keep landless, freed blacks available as cheap agricultural labor and living in a kind of limbo between slavery and full citizenship in which they were technically free but unable to be socially or economically mobile (Day 2009; Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013). Indeed, author Ta-Nehisi Coates referred to this time as a “second slavery” (2014, p. 21). With a hostile police force, Black Codes dictating where they could and could not move and work, and the possibility of being forced into a chain gang, African Americans had little recourse for work other than sharecropping. At the same time, sharecropping ensured indentured servitude through a system of inescapable debt.11 During the late 1800s, the United States grew more urban and industrial, and mass immigration brought new people to the nation’s cities. Social and economic problems also became more glaring. Working-class slums developed where poorly paid industrial workers, many of them recent immigrants, lived in overcrowded tenement apartments, lacking access to clean water. About a quarter of a million freed blacks migrated to the north and, as they did, joined others in overcrowded poor districts with limited affordable housing. Because it was not uncommon for black people in Philadelphia to spend 75 percent of their income on housing, Roberta Johnson concluded that for black people “the housing situation was a recipe for widespread homelessness” (2010, p. 53). Segregated housing patterns were commonplace in the north (Day 2009; Stern and Axinn 2012). Supported by practice and policy, these patterns created an intergenerational wealth disparity that has likely impacted African American homelessness today. Post–Civil War recessions and large-scale economic panics in 1873, 1885, and 1892 (Stern and Axinn 2012) brought widespread unemployment. While a punitive orientation toward the poor remained even as the wage structure became more repressive and opportunities for work diminished, the associated misery of white and black low-income northern neighborhoods fostered concern within the upper classes about social unrest (Katz 1986). Urbanization, industrialization, and immigration, in the context of unpredictable market downturns, provided the backdrop for the development of new strategies of relief and reform, new venues for charitable acts, and social study (Katz 1986). They also furnished the context for a call for more systematic, structural reforms, however limited. Again, these reforms tended to be segregated, with much of the organized reform work and research focusing on white immigrant communities.

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New Strategies for Relief and Reform In the late 1800s and early 1900s, those who worked with the poor were often from elite backgrounds, educated and cultured, and frequently motivated by their Protestant Christian faith. However well-intentioned, for the most part they had limited (if any) experience with economic hardship and the lives of those they sought to aid, particularly immigrants from unfamiliar foreign cultures. Initial efforts, those of both the agents of charitable organizations and settlement-house workers (who chose to live and work among the poor), focused on cultural interventions that would heal class relations and provide moral teaching to the poor. Starting in the late 1800s, investigation into the moral character of the poor became increasingly systematic and professional. Scientific charity emerged as an approach to understanding and treating the poor that was professional but characterized by efforts to address their clients’ flaws by changing their values and behaviors. Scientific charity was based on four assumptions: (1) poverty was a result of flaws in one’s moral character; (2) providing relief to the poor enabled dependency and would encourage idleness and deceit; (3) the causes of one’s poverty (i.e., the flaws in one’s character) needed to be “investigated”; and (4) interaction between the classes could provide the moral example (“uplift”) that the poor needed.12 The Charity Organization Society, which was based out of New York City but had offices across the nation, worked to support the poor by implementing this “scientific” charity (Trattner 1999). In this context, indiscriminate almsgiving as a solution was discouraged. This extended to citizens’ groups in New York City who gave food and clothing to the poor and homeless (Hopper 2003). From the late 1800s into the early 1900s, scientific charity social workers and volunteers investigating the poor became increasingly professionalized as they obtained positions in hospitals and began to be influenced by developments in medicine and psychiatry. Mary Richmond’s landmark book Social Diagnosis presented these workers with a professional process, the “case method” (Katz 1986), that encouraged them to study personal social problems much as a medical doctor would study the signs and symptoms of a disease. In her book, Richmond (1917) stated that it was social work’s responsibility to investigate the social and personal causes of poverty, and her book described how this investigation should occur, applying the principles of scientific charity. An important contribution of her work was studying people in the context of their environments. This was a concern she shared with those launching a new form of social care called the settlement house. Whereas scientific charity workers entered and left poor neighborhoods as they investigated their clients, settlement-house workers purposefully

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Shelter During the Turn of the Nineteenth Century

By the 1890s several phenomena came into place that resulted in cities and charitable organizations creating shelters to address a significant growth in homelessness. First was the economic downturn that created a rise in “tramping workers” and homeless people. Second was a reform movement in the area of housing led by photographer Jacob Riis, who documented the appalling conditions of the city jails and police stations that in many municipalities were used as shelter for homeless people (Schneider 1989). With the goal of getting homeless people out of the police stations in 1879, the city of Boston opened the Wayfarers lodge. Casework principles were used to support the “honestly homeless,” addressing what was considered their social pathology. One was deemed honestly homeless after passing a work test that involved chopping wood for several hours a day (Hopper 2003). The Boston model expanded into other regions in the northeastern United States to become the “municipal housing movement” (Schneider 1989). Sometimes the shelters were run by municipalities or they were begun by the Charity Organization Society as well as other charitable institutions. Kim Hopper (2003) explained that decisions to open shelters were not necessarily benevolent; rather, in some cities such as New York the shelters were used to mask homelessness from residents who grew weary of the unpleasant smells and other nuisances made by homeless people, and to mitigate threats to property. As the economic conditions worsened so did the conditions inside many of the shelters. Charles Hoch (1986) explained that in New York City in 1894, during the worst recession in US history, the city provided “almshouse lodging” to 16,000 homeless people. Again, reformers were appalled by the conditions that they described as “unventilated and unsanitary flophouses that they felt created indolent subsistence” (p. 21). As shelter conditions declined, in a number of areas policies also became more punitive. Chicago began what was called a model lodging house in 1904, which did not even have a work requirement and provided a system for job referral. Within ten years of its opening, two hours of work was required in the wood yard, and “to discourage ‘bums’” administrators required lodgers seeking more than one night’s stay to sleep on the floor (Schneider 1989, p. 96).

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lived and worked among the poor in the nation’s urban slums. Living among the poor, these workers developed a different perspective on the problem of poverty. While settlement-house workers also focused on cultural and educational models for helping people, they rapidly shifted to support more systematic reforms to the environment and working conditions (Katz 1986). They very often came to view poverty as a problem of unemployment and exploitation through low wages, and therefore a structural problem. A structural argument was thus made more frequently in many of the nation’s cities and endorsed by Progressive reformers.13 Progressive reformers focused on economic security by calling for increased wages and employment protections. Moreover, they sought broad reforms for the elderly, disabled, widows, and children. They added calls for aid for the unemployed and those injured on the job. They also advocated for laws and regulations to promote cleaner and healthier living environments and an end to child labor (Trattner 1999). Settlement-house workers, while associated with Progressive reforms, were also a product of their times. The difficulties faced by northern blacks were frequently not addressed by white settlement workers, and few integrated settlement houses existed. Throughout the country some settlement houses for blacks were called settlement houses, and others were embedded in churches and schools (Luker 1984). Black reformers and leaders of mutual aid societies and black women’s clubs continued the mutual aid work of their forebears (Day 2009). During the Progressive era, localities and states took on greater roles in social welfare. Phyllis Day (2009) notes that twenty states had mothers’ pensions by 1911—that is, programs to provide cash relief to poor widows of dependent children. The number doubled within another decade. Statelevel aid to the blind was also quite common by 1925 (Day 2009). These state-level experiments helped to pave the way for the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. Federalizing Aid and the Quest for Civil Rights The Social Security Act was landmark legislation that brought the federal government into the direct provision of relief. The Social Security Act successfully established federal social programs that kept many of those deemed “worthy” from absolute poverty, specifically those who had worked in covered employment and could no longer be expected to work due to old age or disability. To ensure its passage, however, a compromise with southern legislators kept approximately three-fifths of all black workers uncovered by the unemployment and old age insurance programs of the act, by excluding agricultural and domestic workers (Johnson 2010; Quadagno 1984).

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Federal cash assistance for mothers with children was made part of the Social Security Act of 1935 as a federal grant to the states through the Aid to Dependent Children program, later Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The program was originally envisioned as a way to help worthy, white, married women who had lost their husbands through industrial accidents (Day 2009). Over time, as programs under Social Security were broadened to apply to more workers, more and more of these dependent women and their children were served by less stigmatizing social insurance programs for widows and orphans of covered workers. The categorical public aid programs, including Aid to Dependent Children, reflected old Elizabethan Poor Law notions of relief. Those who could not work (the aged, blind, and disabled) and those who should not work (mothers of young children) would receive means-tested aid on a case-by-case basis. States controlled eligibility for these relief programs. Investigations at the individual case level determined who was worthy for relief and who was not. Allowing the states to control eligibility for cash relief was critically important to southern legislators concerned about any program that might serve as a disincentive to participation in farm labor or be used to support African Americans (Quadagno 1984). Following the Depression and World War II, in the context of an expanding economy and a housing crisis, the country worked to support the achievement of the “American Dream” through homeownership. For example, the G.I. Bill of 1944 gave veterans the opportunity to access low-interest loans as a reparation for their service. The rapid construction of highways and massproduced single-family housing developments (such as Levittown), built exclusively for whites, offered white veterans who qualified the opportunity to move in quickly (Twiss and Martin 1999). However, the obstacles placed before African American veterans were substantial and included needing to apply for the loans through local Veterans Administration (VA) offices, including those in the south. Of much wider consequence was the second obstacle placed before veterans: the banks’ refusals to make loans. By creating the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the New Deal had allowed people to buy houses with only 10 percent down, which opened up the possibility of homeownership to many. The codification of subsequent laws and bank policy worked to ensure that the program was largely closed to African Americans (Coates 2014). Coates explained: “The FHA had adopted a system of maps that rated neighborhoods according to their perceived stability. . . . Neighborhoods where black people lived were rated ‘D’ and were usually ineligible for FHA backing. They were colored in red” (2014, p. 8), hence the term “redlining,” which then became the industry standard. In 1968, the Fair Housing Act was signed into law, making the practice of redlining illegal. By 1968, however, the damage done by redlining was widespread. Deprived of loans, African Americans were unable to

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accumulate the kind of wealth that supported intergenerational economic stability and guarded against temporary financial hardships (Oliver and Shapiro 1989). The harsh disparities in well-being across the nation were visible to politicians and made an impression on the nation’s youngest elected president. In his inauguration address in 1961, John F. Kennedy delivered a call to engage in a different type of battle—“against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself” (Kennedy 1961). Kennedy’s inclusion of poverty was significant, signaling a rediscovery of the country’s poor amid its relative affluence. The 1960s, of course, were a time marked not only by the rediscovery of poverty, but also by civil rights legislation. Following Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon Johnson used the nation’s grief as an opportunity to push through a set of major civil rights laws and anti-poverty programs that became known as the War on Poverty and the Great Society programs. Between 1964 and 1968, numerous civil rights and social welfare reforms were passed into law. The Johnson program pushed through the Food Stamp program. Medicaid and Medicare were added to the Social Security Act. The Head Start program for children and job training programs were enacted (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013; Trattner 1999). In the context of the civil rights movement, a national welfare rights movement also developed. This major effort to organize mothers in need of aid developed into a national organization largely composed of African American mothers from northern and more urban centers seeking “bread and justice” (Reese and Newcombe 2003). African American women, who frequently encountered discrimination when they sought access to the AFDC program, organized to ensure that all mothers of children had adequate means to support themselves. Ellen Reese and Garnett Newcombe (2003) described their organized demands for a guaranteed minimum income and access to employment. Having documented local and state discriminatory practices in welfare relief, poor black women who had needed cash relief began gaining improved access to the AFDC program over time, leading to increasing numbers of women receiving aid. Although the welfare rights movement initially developed at a time when national culture still expected women with young children to care for them in their own homes, this norm was beginning to change. Expansion of the rolls was occurring as the nation witnessed a dramatic surge in the number of white women entering the paid work force (Bureau of Women, US Department of Labor, n.d.). Many of the new female workers had children. As more women entered the work force, American attitudes changed regarding how children should be cared for. When the Social Security Act was passed, the view had been without question that children would benefit

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from having their mothers able to stay at home with them. Now that more women were in the paid work force, the view became that everyone should be in the paid work force, including mothers. Reforms to AFDC coincided with the racialization of those receiving aid. As more black women joined the rolls, aid was portrayed more critically by the media and journalists. Martin Gilens’s research (2003) and that of others has documented that historically, when images of poor whites were portrayed, public support for social welfare programs grew and programs were expanded. When images of African American recipients were shown, public sympathy diminished, and programs were contracted. Summary Our historical review has uncovered a number of important themes. With the exception of the Progressive period, the first theme is the disconnect in American thinking between structural explanations for poverty and solutions that are individually based, such as character-building interventions and institutions. The second theme is the imperative to categorize the poor into worthy and unworthy according to our cultural agreement about their ability to participate in paid employment. The third theme is that categorization is often based on the practice of investigation or medicalization or both by professionals. Fourth, we see the criminalization of the poor. Fifth, African Americans have been systematically excluded from programs that offer protections from economic vulnerability, such as the Social Security Act and home loans. We will revisit these themes throughout the book as the current treatment of homelessness within the American tradition and the nation’s historical perspectives on poverty provide necessary context for the normalization of homelessness. Consider Robert Bremner’s From the Depths: Discovery of Poverty in the United States (1956). He wrote that within the United States, we periodically discover poverty within our borders, and having made that discovery, embark on reform efforts at the informal, voluntary level as well as through state and federal governments. Since the late 1800s, the United States has experienced cycles of harrowing economic downturn—that is, structural change producing mass unemployment and social disruption, including homelessness. Despite these experiences, and even as understanding grew that the poor were disadvantaged by structural causes of poverty, the dominant culture in the United States was and remains characterized by a belief that anyone can make it economically here (Katz 1986). Not only do the nation’s historical views of the poor inform the US response to the most modern iteration of homelessness, but also there is significant overlap between historical orientations to the poor and the modern disposition toward the homeless. We show that these orientations are

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rooted in and perpetuated by the discourse of individual failings as a cause of poverty. We begin our next chapter with the clash of values between those advocating for collective responsibility for the poor and social justice versus those advocating for individualism and neoliberalism. Notes 1. We use the term “advocates” to describe those organizations and people who committed their work or themselves to address the problem of homelessness, and in so doing worked to build an anti-homelessness social movement. While self-organization was not absent among homeless individuals as we will see with the Union of the Homeless, the movement building in the 1980s was comprised largely of constituents of conscience. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977) explain that this concept refers to participants who will see no direct benefit of the goal. Thus, we can say that this movement had as its base people who dedicated their lives to a single issue: the ending of homelessness. 2. Coined by R. D. Laing (1971), the “medical model” is the application of a set of medical procedures (complaint, history, examination and investigation, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment) to social situations. For our purposes, we are most concerned with the isolating tendency that results from this application in relation to causality. The medical model locates the cause of homelessness within the individual. History and context are recorded and assessed, but as the problem itself is assumed to be within the individual, social factors are disregarded as appropriate sites of intervention. The term “medicalization” is used to encompass all aspects of the medical model. 3. For those interested in a deep treatment of the history of social welfare in the United states, see Abramovitz 1996, 2000; Blau and Abramovitz 2014; Katz 1986; Lubove 1968; Mencher 1967; Piven and Cloward 1993; and Trattner 1999. 4. While there are many examples in the Torah, the first five chapters of the Hebrew Bible, of the equality of all before God, in the Book of Job (34:18–19) we find this reference to God’s justice: “Who says to a king, ‘Worthless one,’ To nobles, ‘Wicked ones’; Who shows no partiality to princes nor regards the rich above the poor, For they all are the work of His hands?” 5. In Deuteronomy 15:11 (English Standard Version), we find: “For there will never cease to be poor in the land. Therefore I command you, ‘You shall open wide your hand to your brother, to the needy and to the poor, in your Land.’” 6. In Matthew 19:23–24 (English Standard Version), Jesus tells his disciples: “Truly I say to you, only with difficulty will a rich person enter the kingdom of heaven. . . . Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God.” 7. Samuel Mencher noted: “The provisions for employment in the Elizabethan poor laws indicated one of the prevailing sixteenth- and seventeenth-century beliefs— that unemployment and its consequent poverty were due to insufficiency of available employment” (1967, p. 11). The law included collective charitable responsibility and individually focused measures to ensure that all who could work would be engaged in labor. On the collective level, the law established the responsibility of the state (not the church) to provide for relief through taxation. Relief was to be administered at the most local level and families were to provide support for their relatives. 8. During the transition from agrarian feudalism to industrial development and capitalism in England, communities could provide public work with pay and private

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employers could be charged with providing work to those left idle during economic downturns. But these arrangements fell into disfavor and were viewed as unnecessary in the colonies, where work opportunities were viewed as abundant. In fact, in the early colonial period, workhouses and poorhouses were viewed as unnecessary because workers were in demand and were paid better than those in England due to a limited labor supply (Mencher 1967). The building of institutions for indoor relief in the United States occurred later, as population and industrialization increased. 9. While this differentiation of people into categories for aid might sound tidy and inclusive, that was not always the case. Clearly many people fell through the cracks, as social welfare histories of England and later the United States included descriptions of vagrants and vagabonds, and beggars (Mencher 1967; Trattner 1999). 10. The Speenhamland system of wage supplements for working people was controversial and it was abandoned; while critics argued it would decrease production and increase the birthrate, others found it increased production and that the birthrate was not dramatically affected (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2013). 11. Blacks were required to buy seed or other supplies from the landowners to plant crops, placing them in debt, or they were paid in script rather than dollars, which could only be used to pay the landowner (Johnson 2010). 12. The practice of scientific charity was largely the responsibility of a large national initiative called the Charity Organization Society. The Charity Organization Societies would first hire male staff members to investigate why an individual or family was poor. Next, “friendly visitors”—middle-class women—were dispatched to the homes of the poor to remediate the issues uncovered in the investigation. Friendly visitors would then work to redress the moral flaws in the individuals whom they served, and often spent their time reading Bible verses with the poor. Actual relief was to be given only in extreme circumstances (Katz 1986; Trattner 1999). 13. The Progressive period occurred between the late 1800s and early 1900s. It marked a turn away from the Elizabethan Poor Laws and toward structural explanations of poverty. With respect to social welfare history, the period is notable for the practices of the Settlement House workers, and legislative changes designed to strengthen health, safety, and labor practices through regulation; provide support to the poor and older adults in the areas of housing, child care, work, welfare programs, and health insurance; and restrain corporations through antitrust legislation and regulations in labor and the environment. Notable during this period is the approach of the Settlement House workers, exemplified by Chicago’s Hull House. Hull House’s model concerned itself primarily with service provision regardless of worthy/unworthy categorization. Further, some in the Settlement House movement turned established investigative methods upside down. Settlement House workers emphasized structural causes, such as unemployment and low wages, over character defects and individual behavior when advocating for social welfare policies (Trattner 1999). However, this approach was not universal. When it came to work with women, workers largely focused on promoting the cult of domesticity; deterrence from social protest, alcohol, and nightclubs; as well as an emphasis on what were considered women’s proper roles (Abramovitz 1996, p. 187). The Settlement House movement is noted as an important moment in time and effort, albeit shortlived. Walter Trattner (1999) attributed the limited lifetime of the Settlement House movement to a number of international and economic factors but also to the rise of professionalization within the field of social work.

3 Competing Values: Neoliberalism and Social Justice

Significantly divergent values on the part of the Reagan administration and advocates for homeless people influenced the development of the McKinney Act. Some years before the drive for federal legislation, the differences in values began to be played out on the national stage. To understand the limitations and significance of the McKinney Act it is important to consider the history of early advocates’ efforts and the clash of their values with the administration’s. In this chapter, we provide a rich description of the values and thinking underpinning the Reagan Revolution as well as those of a number of advocacy organizations and entities that emerged in the early to middle 1980s to advocate for homeless people. We argue that the wholesale adoption of neoliberal values that helped to bring Reagan into the White House, and the administration’s rapid implementation of austerity in social welfare and pro-market policies reflecting these positions, created harsher social conditions during a recession, making extreme poverty and homelessness far more common. In response to the growing numbers of poor people, antihomelessness advocates emerged who embraced different values. We begin the chapter by examining the origins of neoliberalism, its influence on the Reagan administration, and the resulting policies that slashed supports for workers and poor Americans. We then describe the origins and the value positions of emerging advocacy organizations in the anti-homelessness movement and their leadership, focusing attention on the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) and the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH). We also introduce the Union of the Homeless. We introduce the organizations’ leadership and advocates whose names often became synonymous with the movement to end homelessness. Their

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organized accomplishments prior to 1986 are also described as prelude to a discussion of their joint drive for federal legislation in Chapter 4. As mentioned earlier, Cynthia Bogard (2003) located the start of the anti-homelessness movement in Washington, D.C., with the CCNV and in New York City with the NCH. Following examination of these organizations and select leaders, we explore multiple encounters between the advocates—particularly those associated with the D.C.-based CCNV—and the Reagan administration. We argue that these encounters—rife with hostilities, moments of cooperation, and broken promises—affected the bill that became the McKinney Act. Neoliberalism and the Reagan Administration The popular terms “Reagan Revolution” and “Reaganomics” emerged in the 1980s to describe neoliberal values and policy priorities that were foundational to the administration. These terms reflected Adam Smith’s notion of an invisible hand as a prime mover of the economy, and an unregulated, free market, as offering the best conditions for a free society (Harvey 2005; Mont Pelerin Society n.d.). The election of Reagan moved neoliberal thinking to a new position of power within the United States, buoyed its perspective, and affected policies toward the poor for decades to come. The landslide election of Reagan and the subsequent support for the Reagan Revolution were also a testament to the activism of neoliberalism’s founders and supporters. The origins of neoliberalism date to the 1940s, when a group of conservative intellectuals became deeply disturbed by what they saw as “creeping collectivism” and the declining importance of classical liberalism, as defined in part by the significance of personal freedom in the United States and Europe. New Deal policies and progressive legislation that created regulations (for example in the areas of food and drugs), in the context of Cold War–inspired fears of communism, further fueled their concerns (Harvey 2005; Jones 2012; Steger and Roy 2010). Collectivist notions associated with totalitarianism were connected to the very real terror of fascism in Europe and Stalinism in post–World War II’s Soviet Union, adding urgency to the cause of global neoliberalism. At the same time, the neoliberal political movement exploited the fear of totalitarianism by conflating it with any state involvement in social welfare and regulation. Early leaders in the anti-collectivist movement included Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek (a student of von Mises). Although Popper, von Mises, and Hayek all supported the mutually reinforcing ideas of a market free of government regulation and the primacy of individual freedom, they each brought a unique contribution to what we now refer to as neoliberalism.

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Popper contributed to neoliberalism both in the philosophy of science and in his advocacy for individual liberty. In his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1968), Popper argued for positivism in science. He reached his conclusions by exploring the question “What is, or how does one prove, scientific truth?” He determined that it was not possible to prove something to be true. Instead one could only falsify, through scientific methods, that which is not true. Popper thus developed his theory of falsification, in which scientific knowing is contingent on being able to identify, through careful observation, what is not true (i.e., falsifiable). To Popper, the scientific method involved gathering evidence that something appeared to exist in real or experimental conditions, and then continually testing and accumulating evidence for its truth/reality, until or unless the phenomenon was falsified through subsequent experimentation or observation (Jones 2012). Toward answering a question about scientific truth, Popper embraced an empirical approach to developing knowledge that married theory, logic, and observation. In this view of scientific discovery, hypotheses derived from theory were tested through observation and experimentation, and resulting patterns in data were examined to determine whether there was support for the hypothesis, which was then supported or rejected. Popper’s emphasis on empiricism was adopted across the social sciences, including economics. The association between economics and empiricism was brought to life in the Chicago School of Economics, beginning in the mid-1940s. Faculty such as Milton Friedman, whose name became synonymous with neoliberalism, sought to test hypotheses associated with deep cuts in social welfare programs and pro-market policies, and used countries in the global South as laboratories to do so (Klein 2007). Popper, a Hungarian Jew, wrote his influential two-volume book The Open Society and Its Enemies between 1938 and 1944 against the backdrop of Hitler’s expansionism. His work during that time was appropriately an indictment of totalitarianism. The book was also a treatise in support of individual liberty, which he placed in a binary with government. In this binary, government involvement was treated as a threat to liberty. Popper was not alone in his deep support of individual liberality and concern about its erosion to collectivism. Ludwig von Mises, a libertarian, saw bureaucracy and regulation as the greatest threat to liberty (Jones 2012). Fredrick Hayek also opposed collectivism and regulation, and further believed that strategies designed to lower unemployment perpetuated collectivism. For Hayek, those living in collectivist countries were on their way to becoming the equivalent of serfs, and government intervention became reframed as a “slippery slope to communism” (Jones 2012). All three of these men were deeply concerned about the future of the United States and global economic and social developments; they believed that it was not enough to produce and support intellectual ideas; rather

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action needed to be taken to ensure individual liberty. Thus, Hayek began to develop an intellectual and organizational strategy to support his views. He founded the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, when he invited like-minded thinkers to Switzerland. Members of the society included intellectuals, journalists, and Nobel laureates; among the attendees at the first meeting of the society was Milton Friedman (Jones 2012; Mont Pelerin Society n.d.). In its statement of aims, the group provided its rationale by stating that civilization itself, voluntary groups, and individuals seeking freedom of thought and freedom of expression, were all endangered by “creeds” seeking the power to oppress their views (Mont Pelerin Society n.d.). To stem the impending disaster just described, members of the society developed multiple mechanisms to strengthen their perspectives and thwart collectivism and market interference. Within twenty years, members of the Mont Pelerin Society had created an infrastructure of think tanks and media-savvy experts to support neoliberal views in the United States. Pointing to such entities as the magazine National Review, founded in 1955, and think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, founded in 1973; the Cato Institute, founded in 1977; and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, founded in 1978, Daniel Jones described these organizations as run by “ideological entrepreneurs who made neoliberal thought accessible and helped to turn neoliberal ideals into a political program” (2012, p. 135). Moreover, these institutions appealed to wealthy individuals and the corporate leaders who helped to finance them (Harvey 2005). Acting on their concerns about collectivism and their support of free market ideals, members of the Mont Pelerin Society and other ideological entrepreneurs helped to disseminate negative views of social welfare and poor people. View of the Poor

Oddly enough, neoliberals and classical economic liberals presented themselves as champions of the poor. They argued that their social and economic policies, based on limited government, low taxes, low inflation, and elimination of social welfare spending, offered the best hope for eradicating poverty. They vested their greatest confidence in the marketplace uplifting the poor. Neoliberals argued that a free market, which they defined as operating with as little regulation as possible, offered sufficient employment opportunities and a low tax structure that allowed families and individuals to keep as much of their income as possible. The formula was and remains simple: market opportunities plus family stability and support equal social and economic progress. Put in the vernacular of the 1980s, “a rising tide lifted all boats.” The poor were viewed by neoliberals as rational actors responding to incentives. In this understanding, the market and existing social welfare systems should be designed to increase the likelihood that poor people

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would choose to participate in the work force rather than developing dependency on welfare assistance. Instead of arguing for higher wages as an incentive to work (a policy orientation that would run counter to their commitment to low inflation), neoliberals argued for austerity programming by government that would make choosing not to work more painful than working at the lowest possible wage (a principle embedded in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601) (Gilder 1981; Murray 1984). Some neoliberals, including Friedman, acknowledged that the marketplace alone was an imperfect solution to the problems of the poor. To enjoy the benefits of the market, limited income redistribution by government that facilitated economic demand and choice might be needed. A guaranteed minimum income or negative income tax was proposed as an alternative to existing income supports in the 1960s (Rossi, Rosenbaum, and Cibola Investment Consultants Inc. 1983); subsidies for housing and educational access (such as vouchers) were also discussed (Friedman and Friedman 1990). While these alternatives to existing social welfare programs were only partially embraced by other conservatives, specific programs based on these ideas were endorsed by presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan (Trattner 1999). In the 1980s, Mont Pelerin Society members George Gilder and Charles Murray were prominent among those offering neoliberal views and policy on poverty. Gilder’s Wealth and Poverty (1981) and Murray’s Losing Ground (1984) provided arguments supportive of Reagan’s views on welfare and influenced conservative thinking about social welfare. Although Murray’s and Gilder’s views shared much in common, they offered somewhat different perspectives on poor people as well as diverging solutions to the problems of poverty. George Gilder, educated at Exeter Academy and Harvard, a member of the Republican Ripon Society, and advocate of supplyside economics, wrote on many topics, including poverty and technology. In his most popular work on poverty, the aforementioned Wealth and Poverty, Gilder argued that the pain and discomfort of poverty provided the poor with the impetus they needed to move out of poverty. Moreover, Gilder noted that doing anything to ameliorate the pain of poverty was a form of social engineering that would keep people trapped in that state and cause more harm than good, both socially and economically. Like many other social conservatives, he viewed the breakdown of the family in the United States as central to many social problems, and viewed the role of the male as breadwinner as critically important (Gilder 1973). Similarly, Charles Murray, a libertarian and political scientist, with degrees from Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argued in Losing Ground that years of US anti-poverty programs had created a disincentive to work and that the entire social welfare system should be dismantled so that the poor would be forced to rely upon family and the market and nothing else for support. 1 Losing Ground—supported

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and promoted by the Manhattan Institute—was said to have strongly influenced the Reagan administration. Murray disputed its influence on the president and executive branch as mythology in his introduction to the tenth-anniversary edition of the book, but acknowledged that writers across the political spectrum regarded the book as having significantly influenced the debate on social welfare. Both Gilder and Murray offered a model for understanding poverty in which the poor were individuals who had been influenced by a bureaucratized welfare system to choose welfare over work. Taking a page from Murray’s Losing Ground, Reagan specifically argued that assistance to the poor trapped people in poverty. In a radio address to the nation in 1986, he offered the following assessment of welfare programs in the United States: We’re in danger of creating a permanent culture of poverty as inescapable as any chain or bond; a second and separate America, an America of lost dreams and stunted lives. The irony is that misguided welfare programs instituted in the name of compassion have actually helped turn a shrinking problem into a national tragedy. From the 1950’s on, poverty in America was declining. American society, an opportunity society, was doing its wonders. Economic growth was providing a ladder for millions to climb up out of poverty and into prosperity. In 1964 the famous War on Poverty was declared, and a funny thing happened. Poverty, as measured by dependency, stopped shrinking and then actually began to grow worse. I guess you could say, poverty won the war. Poverty won in part because instead of helping the poor, government programs ruptured the bonds holding poor families together. (Reagan, February 15, 1986)

Reagan also promoted the idea that government aid supported criminals, painting their need as illegitimate and stigmatizing their character. He liked to share anecdotes during speeches, and his stories illustrated important policy directions. Early in his candidacy for the presidency, he found and repeated a story that captured his favorite views and vilified welfare recipients. He told a story about a “welfare queen” from Illinois who defrauded multiple federal aid programs and lived lavishly, driving a Cadillac. She was portrayed as African American, with multiple relationships and children. She provided a compelling case for slashing social welfare programs. Although the story of the “welfare queen” was delivered at the beginning of the Reagan candidacy, she remained a potent reference point for Reagan’s views on poverty and welfare throughout his presidency and, indeed, beyond (Levin 2013). While the real story and the president’s anecdotal version (which was exaggerated) had little to do with the lived experiences of most welfare recipients, it served to support negative and racially charged images of poor people and the programs that offered them assistance (DeParle 2004; Levin 2013). It specifically sent a message to the working poor and middle class that people receiving assistance enjoyed a

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more affluent lifestyle than they actually did, using criminal behavior to prosper at the expense of taxpayers. Neoliberalism in Action

One of the first major turns to social neoliberalism occurred with the election of President Richard Nixon in 1968. Nixon embraced Friedman’s concept of a negative income tax and housing vouchers. While the negative income tax was not passed into law, housing certificates and vouchers were piloted and continue to be important housing affordability subsidies (Trattner 1999). On the economic policy side, Nixon attempted to address rising inflation through price and wage controls, rather than through tightening the flow of money. Rising inflation continued to be a problem throughout his presidency and into the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Carter confronted a new and alarming economic development, however, that garnered its own name: stagflation. The term described a stagnant economy with both high rates of unemployment and high inflation, conditions that should not occur together. The Carter administration was also confronted by an energy crisis that crippled the economy and dramatically affected the US population. In this context, a real shift in economic policy occurred. President Carter appointed Paul Volcker as chair of the Federal Reserve (Harvey 2005). Volcker ended Keynesian-based policies and exchanged them for Friedman’s policy of monetarism (Harvey 2005; Steger and Roy 2010). Rather than letting the Keynesian processes of taxation and redistribution affect the direction of the economy, monetarism gave power to the Federal Reserve to affect the supply of money and, as such, the economic direction of the country (Steger and Roy 2010). Volcker’s monetarism privileged declining interest rates over high rates of employment. To bring down inflation, Volcker imposed a deep tightening of the money supply. Reflecting on Volcker’s tenure, first as a Carter appointee and then as Reagan’s, David Harvey wrote that Volker’s restrictions resulted in such austerity that a “long deep recession that would empty factories and break unions” ensued (2005, p. 23). While neoliberal social policy was supported by Nixon, and monetarism was implemented under Carter, the far-reaching programs of the Reagan administration ushered in a new phase of neoliberal policies. Reagan implemented tax cuts, welfare program cuts, deregulation, and privatization as he pursued enhancing corporate profits, decimating unions, and attacking civil rights gains (Duggan 2003; Harvey 2005; Jones 2012). Reagan’s policy direction was put succinctly by Noam Chomsky in the title of his 1999 book Profit over People. Against the backdrop of massive layoffs stemming from deindustrialization, it can be instructive to look at Reagan’s landslide victory and the

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ease with which he implemented his far-reaching neoliberal policies through the work of Naomi Klein. In a 2004 documentary made with Avi Lewis called The Take, and then in print in her 2007 book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Klein looked at the link between large-scale negative events and neoliberalism. She described these events as “disaster capitalism,” which leads to an orchestrated raid “on the public sphere” and opens up space for unfettered market opportunities. One example she provided was the pro-market and privatization policies that were implemented in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Klein (2007) explained that in disaster capitalism, as citizens reeled from the shock of disaster, neoliberal policies were quickly introduced, affirming Friedman’s argument that real change is only possible following a crisis. While Klein did not point to the loss of manufacturing as a catastrophic event, in many ways the loss of jobs in the United States between 1979 and 1984 qualified for that description. Specifically, 11.5 million workers lost their jobs, and the growth in service industry jobs could not compensate for the jobs lost or the wages and security associated with manufacturing positions (Phillips 1990). Significant losses in heavy manufacturing (such as in steel) eliminated good-paying jobs. Areas of the country like the Rust Belt experienced high unemployment and the shuttering of business districts in older mill towns (Bensman and Lynch 1988; Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Buss and Redburn 1983). Between 1980 and 1983, the number of people living below the poverty level increased from 11.7 million to 15.3 million (Piven et al. 1987; Trattner 1999). Moreover, the effects extended beyond individuals and families, as whole communities, municipalities, and states were losing corporate and individual tax revenue. The economic conditions were so difficult in some places that vital services such as police stopped operating due to lack of funds. In keeping with Klein’s argument, it can be asserted that the loss of industry and increased poverty created another moment that Milton Friedman would consider an ideal opening for neoliberalism. Reaganomics

Ronald Reagan did not begin his political career as an ardent conservative, but he did move to an idealized conservative vision and he did read the works of thinkers important to the Mont Pelerin Society. As a candidate, Reagan surrounded himself with neoliberals. Twenty-two economic advisers for his 1980 campaign were members of the Mont Pelerin Society (Peterson 1996), and he credited the economist Hayek as one of the people who most influenced his thought. Speaking at a dinner during a Conservative Political Action Conference in 1981, Reagan acknowledged the “intellectual leaders” behind his recent conservative political success, including in his list Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, and others (Reagan

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1981). In this and other talks he made, he celebrated the decline of intellectual defenders of the “state” and the totalitarianism of the left and viewed his victory in the United States and Margaret Thatcher’s in Great Britain as representing a new and important opportunity to transform society economically, socially, and spiritually. The first rung of Reagan’s platform included the phrase “free individuals in a free society,” in which society fosters “a climate of individual liberty and freedom of choice” (Republican National Committee 1980, p. 2). More specifically, the platform called for a reduction in taxes and a balanced budget through reductions in government spending. Once Reagan was elected, his “revolution” took hold quickly and strongly, and at its center were changes in taxes, corporate profits, and spending. Early in his presidency, Reagan initiated and signed the Tax Equality and Fiscal Responsibility Act, which offered across-the-board tax cuts that passed speedily into law. Although the cuts were for all income levels, the impacts were disproportionate. On balance the wealthy saw about a 20 percent decrease in their taxes, while the poor’s tax cut came to about 4 percent. Through the structure of the tax cut, the administration made clear its endorsement of supply-side economics (the notion that the wealthy will use their money, including money saved by tax cuts, to spur job growth also known as “trickledown economics”). By the time Reagan completed his second term in office, the tax rate for the wealthy had dropped from about 70 percent to about 28 percent (Barlett and Steele 1992; Meeropol 2000; Phillips 1990). To address neoliberals’ fears about government’s encroachment on industry, Reagan also implemented several policies designed to give industry free rein. One such policy was his 1981 Executive Order 12291, requiring that a cost-benefit analysis be conducted when looking at new regulations or reviewing existing ones (Meeropol 2000). Additionally, there was much support in his administration for privatizing social programs such as Social Security (though that did not occur). Although dismantling trade unions was not an explicit plank in the platform, and Reagan historically supported the rights of workers to organize, when the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) went on strike, his actions significantly weakened the power of labor and its unions. Citing national security and the Taft-Hartley Act, Reagan ordered 11,345 striking air traffic controllers back to work and told them if they did not return to work they would be fired. The fear induced by the subsequent firing of the air traffic controllers served to invalidate much of labor’s gains (Jones 2012; McCartin 2011). In an editorial, historian Joseph McCartin explained, “Over time the rightward-shifting Republican Party has come to view Reagan’s mass firings not as a focused effort to stop one union from breaking the law—as Reagan portrayed it—but rather as a blow against public sector unionism itself” (2011, p. A25).

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Of greatest direct consequence to the rising numbers of the poor during the Reagan Revolution was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. As indicated, while a candidate Reagan promised to balance the budget, which, of course, is a difficult thing to do when one has implemented significant tax breaks and increased military spending. To many, it appeared that Reagan was balancing the budget “on the backs of the poor” (Piven et al. 1987). For example, due to changes in eligibility requirements (e.g., the ratio between the money or assets one might have and the amount below which one is eligible for benefits), 408,000 families collecting Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits were cut from the rolls. Additionally, 299,000 families experienced a reduction in their monthly check. Although the loss of income was often devastating for families (working and not), perhaps more problematic was the concatenate loss of Medicaid (subsidized health care) for families or individuals who became eligible for Medicaid when they became eligible for AFDC. In those cases, the loss of AFDC led to the loss of Medicaid, leaving these people without any health insurance. The total savings to the budget from cuts to AFDC was $1.1 billion (Hombs and Snyder 1983; Piven et al. 1987). Furthering a policy of austerity measures, cuts were enacted in a variety of social service programs (such as Head Start and Women and Infant Feeding programs). Specifically, the services were moved into a blockgrant funding mechanism, which began with a 25 percent cut. The total savings in this area was $25 billion. Although not attached to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, eligibility requirements began to be tightened for the Food Stamp program. Between 1982 and 1985 the Food Stamp program, funded through the Department of Agriculture, represented a $7 billion savings to the budget. Kevin Phillips (1990) noted that at the same time that efforts were made to shift the costs associated with caring for the poor away from the federal government, the tax policy changed to provide fewer tax incentives for charitable donations. Ending the nation’s public housing program was one of the priorities of the Reagan administration (Jones 2012). Reagan focused on public housing because it supported his budgetary agenda and because public housing did not comport with the neoliberal direction of the country. Not only was public housing a symbol of government waste and redistribution, it was also viewed as unfair government competition with the private rental market. Reagan and his administration also supported cuts to housing subsidies and low-cost financing programs that supported the production of new units of affordable housing. He favored leaving development of housing to the private sector, a new direction in housing noted by journalists (e.g., Shashaty 1981). Over the Reagan years, the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) percentage of the budget dropped from 4.59 to 1.31 percent, and the support its beneficiaries received was largely given in the

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form of vouchers to support private housing over public. Jason DeParle (1996) reported in the New York Times on Reagan-era curtailment of growth in housing support; the number of new families receiving housing support was slashed from 400,000 to 40,000 per year. Limiting program expansion was consistent with Reagan’s stated position that housing assistance would only be given to the most needy. Reagan’s use of “most needy” was problematic, as it furthered the perception that there was a large pool of individuals who took advantage of or cheated the welfare and housing systems. President Reagan’s discussion of the “most needy” supported his campaign use of the phrase “welfare queen.” This imagery provided Reagan with an additional layer of support for cutting benefits, as he could position himself as no longer subsidizing people who were lazy, cheating the system, or enjoying more luxuries than an average working family. Moreover, he was able to echo a paternalistic view that government subsidies undermined people’s willingness to work. Neoliberalism and the States: General Assistance The trends that brought Reagan into the White House affected state governments as well. Governors promising lower taxes and spending cuts were elected to lead in a number of states. The nationwide movement in the 1980s to cut General Assistance (GA), a state-funded entity, clearly aligned with a neoliberal agenda. A program associated with the New Deal, GA provided meager cash benefits to individuals not historically eligible for AFDC or Social Security insurance programs. According to Anderson, Halter, and Gryzlak (2002), between 1984 and 1989 the number of people receiving GA was reduced from 1.1 million to 916,000. Because GA had only been given to individuals without other options for financial support, cutting GA harmed the poorest of the poor (Halter 1996). Although Massachusetts was the first state to change its GA policy, Pennsylvania was known for its major GA shift. In 1982, Pennsylvania governor Richard Thornburgh initiated changes in the GA program that were then sarcastically dubbed “Thornfare.” The changes to GA were rooted in historical and neoliberal notions that welfare undermined the work ethic, that the market could and would provide employment, and that among the poor there were both deserving and undeserving people. The Pennsylvania policy divided people into two groups: those who were viewed as able to work and those who had a condition that precluded their ability to work. Pennsylvania’s changes thus represented the US debate about whether those receiving state public assistance were actually capable of working and were motivated by the belief that if given a choice, people would choose welfare over work (Anderson, Halter, and Gryzlak 2002).

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Those deemed able-bodied were only given assistance three months out of twelve. This work-based model was implemented in other states. Although not directly linked to homelessness in Washington, D.C., or New York City, Michael Katz (1990) noted that following cuts to Pennsylvania’s GA program, shelter use in Philadelphia rose significantly, as measured by average length of stay and the number of nights used, underscoring the argument that neoliberal policy decisions were exacerbating homelessness. The specific neoliberal policies and orientations of the Reagan administration and like-minded state-level leaders, in the context of a national recession, increasing unemployment, deindustrialization, and increasing poverty, presented an emerging anti-homelessness movement with readymade targets for criticism. Neoliberal values, however, particularly the valuing of free markets and profits over the collective well-being of the working class and the poor, were a fundamental affront to the advocates’ sense of rights and justice. Community for Creative Non-Violence and the Violence of Wasted Lives We begin our discussion of the advocates with the CCNV, as its history has been well documented and its leaders were particularly prominent in the struggle to make homelessness a matter of conscience in the nation. Leadership The founder: Ed Guinan. In 1972, Paulist priest Ed Guinan founded a

community of individuals who, together, would address “the violence of wasted lives” (Rader 1986). Guinan’s path to the CCNV and Washington, D.C., began in San Francisco when he, then a successful stock trader, volunteered to distribute food to the poor. Guinan was moved by his interactions with the people he served and by the priests with whom he volunteered. The priests introduced Guinan to the ideas associated with and writings of the historical figures Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, as well as to the movement that they started, the Catholic Worker Movement (Rader 1986). The movement’s members believed in daily acts of mercy as well as radical social justice (Day 1963). In keeping with the teachings of the Catholic Worker Movement, Guinan wanted to find a way to transform society. In his late twenties, he quit his job to study theology at St. Paul’s College in Washington, D.C. As a student, Guinan was influenced by a web of social justice advocates and movements: Vietnamese teacher, author, poet, Buddhist monk, and peace

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activist Thich Nhat Hanh; the Freedom Summer; Martin Luther King’s Poor People’s Campaign; and the antiwar activist priests Phillip and Dan Berrigan (Rader 1986). Guinan also used his time in school to further explore the Catholic Worker Movement, taking Peter Maurin as the subject of his thesis (McCarthy 2015). Upon ordination, Guinan became an associate to the Newman Center (a catholic ministry) at George Washington University, where his passionate sermons on social justice attracted a large number of students. Motivated by his time with student activists, Guinan wrote to the Paulist Council to ask if he could “establish a new community with ‘common goods,’ shared responsibility, and service-oriented to live poorly simply, to make ourselves available to others and see if it works” (as cited in Rader 1986, p. 56). Even with the understanding that the new community would hold no religious affiliation, Guinan received permission. Thus, along with several George Washington University students, including longtime member Mary Ellen Hombs, the CCNV was established (Rader 1986). Initially the “common good” that threaded through the community was its antiwar activism. In opposition to the war in Vietnam, CCNV members engaged in civil disobedience, conducted teach-ins, and helped to build a movement against the war among religious institutions and the faith community. Moreover, the house where the members lived served as a resource center for individuals who opposed the war or objected to the draft (Hombs and Snyder 1983; Rader 1986). To support themselves, CCNV members held jobs outside of the community, with many painting houses. As the CCNV grew and community members’ activism expanded, the group began to rely more and more on donations, expired food, and the service of community members who, in the Catholic Worker tradition, lived simply and therefore did not receive money (Hombs and Snyder 1983). The mission of the CCNV broadened when Guinan, in jail for civil disobedience, came in contact with many black and poor people, whom he recognized had little hope for opportunities after release. He realized then that “one needn’t visit Vietnam to witness the violence of wasted lives.” He explained, “with all of the intense international focus, we were blindly stepping over the bodies here in DC” (as cited in Rader 1986, p. 57). To address the violence at home, in 1972 the CCNV opened Zacchaeus Soup Kitchen, thereby expanding its mission to include direct service to the poor. Through their own interactions and experiences with the people they served, Guinan and the other CCNV members were beginning to redirect the community’s theoretical orientation to the issue of poverty. To gain a better sense of Guinan and the CCNV, one can look to his writings and see two strands of the foundational values associated with the CCNV: service and nonviolent radical activism. When speaking about Zacchaeus Kitchen, in a National Catholic Reporter article, Guinan explained the CCNV’s orientation to

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service. The CCNV “does not,” he began, “bestow food on their guests. Rather they simply prepare and serve what already belongs to those guests. As a man has a right to life, he has a right to food, and to put conditions on its delivery is to do horrible violence to the hungry” (Guinan 1973; McCarthy 2015; as cited in Rader 1986, p. 59). When writing about the soup kitchen, Victoria Rader (1986) noted the importance of its namesake: Zacchaeus, the Roman tax collector. Accused of taking money from the poor and giving it to the wealthy, Zacchaeus repented his wrongdoings to Jesus and returned the money four times over (Luke 19:8; Rader 1986). As Rader points out, Zacchaeus’s actions speak both to service and to nonviolent social justice. For Guinan, violence included “hunger, poverty, squalor, privilege, powerlessness, riches, despair, and vicarious living,” all of which “society approves and perpetuates” (1973, p. 8). In a piece written for courses provided by the Center for Teaching Peace (Peaceful Schools International 2018), Guinan described the violence directed to the poor by those with power. He stated that we as a society “have been unwilling to direct our attention to the more pathological types of violence that are acceptable— the types that daily crush the humanity and life from untold millions of brothers and sisters” (pp. 1–2). He further added that there were a number of types of violence, such as the violence of the “powerful that seeks personal gain and privilege by maintaining inhuman conditions.” He made it clear that it was only by dismantling violence that “the future is to hold any possibilities for peace and . . . where all men and women have a right to live and develop and participate by reason of their humanity.” To Guinan, nonviolence means “an active opposition to those acts and attitudes that demean and brutalize another” (p. 3).

The inciter: Mitch Snyder. In 1972, Mitch Snyder joined the CCNV. If Guinan’s founding was the first chapter of the CCNV story, Snyder’s highprofile and outspoken advocacy, combined with his relentless search for justice, gave rise to the next chapter. Snyder’s history included his father’s work as a vaudeville singer, his own dropping out of high school, and juvenile arrests. Snyder held a number of private-sector jobs and started a family. At age twenty-six he reported that he woke up “in a cold sweat” convinced that there was more to life. At this point Snyder left his family to take to the road in search of meaning (Mitch Snyder Papers; Rader 1986). While hitchhiking, Snyder was given a lift by a man who picked him up in what Snyder did not know to be a stolen car. In 1970, Snyder was arrested for crossing state lines in said stolen vehicle. He served two years in federal prison, most of the time in Danbury Prison. On his first day in Danbury, Snyder introduced himself to antiwar activist Father Philip Berrigan. Philip Berrigan and his brother Father Daniel Berrigan were in prison as two of the

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Catonsville Nine. In opposition to the war in Vietnam the Catonsville Nine had entered the Selective Service Office located in Catonsville, Maryland, taken 378 draft files, and burned them in the parking lot. During Snyder’s initial meeting with Philip Berrigan, Snyder asked if they could spend time together, because he believed that the priest had knowledge about things that would be helpful (Mitch Snyder Papers; Rader 1986). While the Berrigans were the most well-known of draft resisters in Danbury, there were others, and informal study groups were a part of life in the prison. Danbury offered Snyder and other emerging activists the opportunity to learn about nonviolence and social justice, but it was also a place in which the tools of activism were taught and practiced. For example, in protest of the parole board’s treatment of the Berrigan brothers, Snyder and others went on a thirty-day hunger strike. Later they initiated a work stoppage because they did not want to participate in the prison’s building of military submarines (Mitch Snyder Papers; Rader, 1986). In a letter written from Danbury describing the impact of time in prison, Snyder said that when he emerged from prison it would be with a commitment to “non-violence as a life style as well as tactics [that] is unshakable.” Once released Snyder wrote another letter to a friend explaining that “something happened to me while I was in prison. . . . I began to feel the pain and suffering of others. . . . I feel the pain of the poor, the oppressed, the victims of war, or racism. . . . I began to envision a world at peace” (Mitch Snyder Papers). After his release from prison, Snyder continued his antiwar work in New York and moved to Washington, D.C., in 1972 when one of the Catonsville Nine invited him to the CCNV. Rader (1986) discussed the different priorities and styles of Guinan and Snyder. She noted that when they first met, Guinan was more worried about the violence to the poor in the United States, and Snyder was more concerned about the war in Vietnam. Both men had strong personalities. Guinan has been described as strong and dignified, and Snyder as having chutzpah and a preference for living life on the edge. Both men had excellent organizing skills, and both were leaders with different visions for the community. In 1974 the community split into two houses, and Guinan eventually left the CCNV and the priesthood for a family, but he never left working with the dispossessed. Although the CCNV was described as a leaderless organization, it had leaders. But without titles, the roles could change from campaign to campaign or day to day. One of the roles that Snyder always held was that of organizer. Saul Alinsky, a highly influential writer on organizing, wrote in 1989 that an organizer needed to have the following traits: curiosity, irreverence, imagination, a sense of humor, and “a bit of blurred vision of a better world” (p. 75), all of which Snyder held. Snyder also had a profound sense of empathy.

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Reflection on Snyder

When I think about Snyder I see his essential nature as an organizer captured in Alinsky’s description: “I believed that the basic quality that an organizer needed was a deep sense of anger against injustice . . . now I know that [there] is something else: This abnormal imagination that sweeps him into a close identification with mankind and projects him into its plight. He suffers with them and becomes angry at the injustice and begins to organize the rebellion” (Alinsky 1989, p. 74). —Elizabeth Beck

The CCNV’s Move to Homelessness

With the CCNV’s division into two houses, Snyder and seven other members of the community, including Mary Ellen Hombs, moved to a house on Euclid Street in northwest Washington, D.C. Hombs, as described by Rader (1986), was a gifted writer and researcher, and had a keen sense of strategy and public policy. Not long after the group moved into the Euclid Street house, the war in Vietnam ended, and together Snyder, Hombs, and the other members of the house worked to reestablish their purpose. Determining that they would continue to focus on international issues, they read Gandhi and participated in anti-apartheid activities for South Africa as well as activities designed to stop the US intervention in Central America (Mary Ellen Hombs Papers; Rader 1986). When their landlord placed their house on the market, the community members dedicated themselves to working seven days a week earning money so that they could buy and renovate the house themselves. Rader explained that during this time period two important things happened. First, the members paid more attention to their own neighborhood, which had been destroyed by the riots of the 1960s and was populated by mostly lowincome African American residents, many of whom were being served with eviction notices. CCNV members saw the devastation and “violence” of the forced evictions and, like Guinan before them, became more attentive to issues at home (Rader 1986). The second important development was the addition of three new and deeply committed individuals to the community. One was Carol Fennelly, who excelled in public relations, nurtured relationships with people including well-placed individuals, and eventually became Snyder’s partner. Rader noted that within the CCNV’s core leadership, Carol Fennelly became “an

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exceptionally effective lobbyist on Capitol Hill” who developed relationships inside the legislature as well as with members of the press (1986, pp. 37–38). Fennelly’s warmth and tireless commitment helped to develop a large network of CCNV supporters. The other new members were Harold Moss and Lyn Romano. After hearing Snyder speak, Romano dropped out of college to join the CCNV, believing it provided a place in which she could live her values. When Moss joined, he became the only African American person in a sustained position of leadership. Moss sought the company of the homeless and was deeply committed to them as individuals and as a group (Rader 1986). The first sustained organizing effort by the Euclid Street residents involved a nearly year-long, and ultimately unsuccessful, campaign to get the city to purchase a property that they could use to shelter individuals who needed it, including the 2,300 families evicted in Washington, D.C., during the previous year (Carol Fennelly Papers; Rader 1986). During this year the community members opened their own home to people in need. The question of directly opening their house to the homeless was first raised by Snyder in a community meeting, when he suggested that the group had a responsibility to open its doors to people who would otherwise be on the street. This decision and the implications of it were described by Hombs and Snyder in their 1983 book Homelessness in America: A Forced March to Nowhere. The authors wrote: “In more fully sharing our lives with the poor, we were able to discern quickly some of their other obvious needs and respond to them. The woman or man who comes in for a bowl of soup is also the person who lacks shelter or adequate medical care” (p. 92). Indicating that service was not enough, they also wrote: “We see the sharing of bread with the victims of injustice as a responsibility born of faith and common humanity. Because we see the equivalent need to resist values, institutions, and policies, which victimize all, we have aggressively involved ourselves in the shaping of public policy and consciousness” (p. 92). Since the Euclid Street house was too small for the number of homeless people needing shelter, something else needed to be done. In 1975, anticipating winter and the hazards of the cold, the members wrote to 1,100 faith-based organizations in D.C. to ask them to make shelter space available. Luther Place Memorial Church and St. Stephen and the Incarnation Episcopal Church joined the effort. When three men froze to death in the winter of 1977–1978, the CCNV worked with the D.C. government to open a 250-bed shelter for the rest of the cold season. While the additional shelter space operated by D.C. was important for many homeless men, CCNV members worried about the inadequate staffing of the shelter and the fact that a punitive approach was taken toward the men—an approach that including locking the men’s shoes up for the night. Moreover, community members knew that the 250 beds were not enough to meet the needs of the

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population, and they recognized that space was also needed for women (Rader 1986; Valentine 1978). When the winter of 1978–1979 approached, Snyder and the CCNV took on their first high-profile advocacy initiative for homeless people. In November of 1978, Snyder and Ann Spalin, a woman whose physical disabilities kept her in a wheelchair, moved to the streets for an intended period of two weeks. But before they did, Snyder wrote a letter to the secretary of the Department of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, telling him that he would be ending his two weeks on the street by moving into the then cavernous and empty National Visitor Center2 with his homeless friends. Although the Visitor Center was under the care of the federal government’s Department of the Interior, CCNV members did not view their occupation of the building as an action specifically directed to federal intervention (Rader 1986). Rather the Visitor Center was chosen for its location, structure, and ability to show the potential of vacant structures to house the homeless. Moreover, CCNV members placed the need for shelter space clearly on the city, stating that they planned to stay in the building through the winter or until the city provided adequate shelter (Valentine 1978). By the time Snyder and Spalin moved to the streets on November 19, CCNV members had already initiated a press campaign, and their activities—from their movement to the streets to their entry into the National Visitor Center—were designed to garner press support. For example, Snyder and Spalin took up residence in Lafayette Park, located directly across the street from the White House. Moreover, their time in the park overlapped with Thanksgiving Day, which offered another press opportunity as CCNV members served Thanksgiving dinner to homeless individuals in the park. Working another front, CCNV members pitched an idea to the Washington Post for a human-interest story. When Snyder and Spalin moved to the streets, writers were working on what would become a well-placed story on Snyder and his perspective on homelessness (Valentine 1978). Recognizing that the CCNV was serious about taking over the National Visitor Center, representatives from the Department of the Interior began negotiations about the building with Snyder and Spalin, who participated in talks from their temporary home on a heat grate. By the time December 1 came and the demand for additional shelter space was not met, Snyder, Spalin, and scores of homeless people entered the Visitor Center. The media was also there in full force (Valentine 1978). On December 1, the day that Jim Baumohl (1996) calls the start of the American anti-homelessness movement, the Washington Post wrote that eighty “street people” had moved into the National Visitor Center. The Department of the Interior also issued a statement that what it termed an “experiment” could be tried on a very temporary basis (Valentine 1978). On December 10, the temporary experiment ended when government officials

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blocked access to the building. In protest of the government’s action, about a hundred CCNV members and supporters blocked the nearby intersection of First Street and Massachusetts Avenue in an act of civil disobedience. As they refused to move, by 1 A.M. the police became involved. Snyder and Spalin were beaten by the police, and twenty-four individuals were arrested (Rader 1986; Valentine 1978). The press and public watched the events of December 10, and enough pressure was put on the city for it to agree to open a second shelter (the first being its 250-bed winter shelter that that year entered its second year of operation). Building on strategic advantage, as a result of the public support gained from their activism, CCNV members were able to negotiate with D.C. to ensure that the second shelter would not carry the same punitive policies they had observed in the first. For example, individuals would not be required to participate in lengthy intakes or show proof of identification. Thus, the lack of an ID or fear of providing personal information would not keep someone from having a warm place to spend the night. By the time the Visitor Center campaign ended, the CCNV had helped to establish 500 additional winter beds for homeless individuals. Moreover, the CCNV received a nod from deputy assistant secretary of the interior, Richard Hite, and the director of the Department of Human Resources, Albert Russo. Acknowledging the unorthodox tactics used by the CCNV, the two men credited CCNV members and their media campaign with bringing attention to the important issue of homelessness (Valentine 1978). With about a dozen articles covering its work in the Washington Post alone, the CCNV had established its effectiveness in the use of pressure tactics and the media in order to bring homelessness the national attention it deserved. While the CCNV approached the growing issue of homelessness from a moral stance and engaged in civil disobedience to make the issue visible, other strategies were developing by the late 1970s. In New York City, a legal fight began to unfold that eventually led to a landmark decision on the right to housing and the creation of a national coalition that mobilized resources to aid homeless people and fight for their human rights. National Coalition for the Homeless: Pro Bono Lawyers and Social Scientist-Activists In the late 1970s, Robert Hayes, a young attorney with a Catholic school background, chose to stay in New York after completing his law degree at New York University. He was working at the well-established law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, a firm known for its corporate and finance expertise. Accounts of his entry into advocacy on behalf of the homeless have emphasized his encounters with homeless people on the streets and through

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a mission serving the poor (Daley 1987; Frazier 2013). Hayes was reported to have grown angry after learning that shelter options available were “filthy, dangerous and overcrowded” (Daley 1987). Ian Frazier (2013) noted Hayes’s determination that local and state governments were derelict in their constitutional duties to the poor. He decided to use his legal skills to help address a problem he viewed as both structural and moral in nature. In an interview for the Chicago Tribune on the topic of the real causes and cures of homelessness, he was quoted as saying: “The homeless are indeed the most egregious symbol of a cruel economy, an unresponsive government, a festering value system” (Chapman 1987). Hayes drew his conclusions from his own observations and close connections to others working to document the problem and serve those suffering. Frazier (2013) reported that Hayes met Mr. Callahan, a homeless man, and other homeless men, through a local mission. Hayes filed a class action lawsuit on their behalf in 1979, though he was noted by journalists to have been relatively inexperienced in the courtroom at the time. The lawsuit was against the state governor, Hugh Carey, and other officials, for failure to “provide aid, care, and support to the needy in New York City” (Callahan v. Carey 1979). With this suit Hayes helped launch a legal strategy to help homeless people that rapidly contributed to developing a broader movement. The suit, which was settled through a 1981 consent decree, became a landmark victory, enshrining a right to shelter that has been chronicled in books and articles on homelessness and in stories about advocacy work (e.g., Caton 2017; Daley 1987; Frazier 2013). Although Mr. Callahan, who was known to suffer from alcoholism, was unable to benefit from the decree because he died prior to the settlement (Caton 2017; Frazier 2017), contemporary articles on homelessness continue to cite the importance of the case. For example, a 2013 article by Frazier in The New Yorker noted how the Callahan decision set an important precedent: “other suits continued, including those which eventually confirmed the right to shelter for women, families, and people with AIDS.” Hayes also knew that with the consent decree there would be the need for additional legal work in order to ensure that it would be followed. Moreover, there were additional lawsuits to be sought and the needs of homeless people went beyond the right to shelter. In 1981 he founded the Coalition for the Homeless in New York (a forerunner to the NCH) with a budget of $75,000. His motivation was described in a 1987 interview with the New York Times: Hayes said he was following an outsider’s strategy for social change. First, he said, “You have to do enough preaching for people to care.” Second, “You have to get something concrete—legislation or a court order.” And third, “You have to keep at it. If they miss a deadline, you sue” (Daley 1987). Hayes added that in the past the problem was that people did not follow through to complete the third step (Daley 1987).

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The newly emerging New York Coalition became a model for similar organizations across the country, providing assistance to those interested in pursuing similar legal strategies (Mary Ellen Hombs Papers). Speaking to attendees at the National Conference on Social Welfare in April of 1982, Hayes noted that the New York Coalition was a group representing many organizations with differing agendas. But they shared a primary focus: “decent housing is a fundamental right in a civilized society” (Mary Ellen Hombs Papers). He described the work of the coalition at that point as making homelessness “not merely visible, but recognizably human—a scandal which neither the public nor their elected officials can afford to ignore” (Mary Ellen Hombs Papers). Detailing the accomplishments of those who were coming together to act collectively on behalf of the homeless in the nation’s large cities, Hayes called for the formation of a national coalition for the homeless, which was the start of the NCH. As part of its work the NCH sought to broaden the right to shelter to other populations and sued various levels of government when laws were not enforced or rights were violated. Along with Robert Hayes, legal advocates working with the NCH were named as counsel for the Coalition for the Homeless in New York City in multiple cases (e.g., Cannady v. Valentin 1985; Canaday v. Koch 1985; Pitts v. Black 1984). In keeping with the focus of the organization, the cases addressed issues such as the denial of emergency shelter, provision of shelter that was not up to standards, and homeless citizens’ voting rights. The NCH was also involved in a case that was brought on behalf of the CCNV when the federal government closed a shelter. Although legal advocacy was an important aim of the NCH, providing access to food, housing, and services was also on their agenda (Caton 2017; Mary Ellen Hombs Papers), as reflected in the organization’s mission statement. The mission included preventing and ending homelessness; addressing the “immediate needs” of the homeless; protecting the civil rights of homeless people; and offering programs focused on civil rights and securing justice in the areas of housing, economics, and health care (National Coalition for the Homeless 2018). In 1985 Hayes was named as a MacArthur Fellow, which meant he won what is commonly known as the MacArthur Genius Award. At the time the award was $175,000, and he used it to pay his $30,000 salary for five years. Hayes did not work alone in founding the Coalition for the Homeless in New York; the founding board included Ellen Baxter and Kim Hopper (Caton 2017; Frazier 2013). Baxter and Hopper were both graduate students at Columbia and trained in social science research; they interviewed homeless people in New York City for a report for the Community Service Society of New York. Their work was highly influential and is discussed in Chapter 4.

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Robert Hayes was not the only lawyer working on behalf of the homeless, nor the only lawyer to take on a leadership role in advocacy. Another lawyer at Sullivan and Cromwell, Maria Foscarinis, also volunteered in New York, representing homeless families pro bono (Caton 2017; National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2017). Foscarinis quit her position as litigation associate with Sullivan and Cromwell to work with the National Coalition for the Homeless, which was formally incorporated in 1984 and recognized by the Internal Revenue Service in 1988 as a not-forprofit corporation following passage of the McKinney Act (National Coalition for the Homeless 2018). Her legal work on behalf of the NCH involved establishing a Washington, D.C., office to advocate for federal legislation and to litigate against the federal agencies. Foscarinis became the leading architect of what passed into law as the McKinney Act (Caton 2017), and served as counsel on behalf of the NCH in a number of court cases. Foscarinis has acknowledged that she brought to the fight against homelessness a personal understanding of the hardships of poverty and oppression through her parents’ experiences in Greece under German occupation during World War II (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2017). Her writing and testimony before Congress made it clear that she saw homelessness as a manifestation of extreme poverty that did not have to exist in our nation, a life-threatening violation of human rights, and a policy choice illustrating our lack of willingness to act to end homelessness. In 2007, twenty years after passage of the McKinney Act, at a hearing on reauthorization of the act, Foscarinis stated: Homelessness is a crisis that has not always been with us. It began to explode in the early 1980’s, in a very dramatic fashion, affecting not only the single men in inner cities that it had affected previously, but also affecting many families, many children, in suburban areas and rural communities, as well. So, this is a crisis that not only does not have to be in a country with our resources, it also has not always been with us. We need to remember that, because I think we need to keep focused on ending and preventing homelessness. (Reauthorization of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, Part 1, 2008, p. 15)

Members of the NCH included those advocating for and working to provide housing and food to homeless people, homeless people themselves, academics, and others. While the coalition emphasized its inclusion of homeless people, the leadership of the organization and those speaking on its behalf were nonhomeless advocates (Ferguson 1990). During the 1982 Homelessness in America hearing before Congress, Kim Hopper and Ellen Baxter testified jointly, with both appearing as members of the National Coalition for the Homeless. In their written statement, they reported that at the time they were doctoral students at Columbia University and had been

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working together on research and advocacy efforts for approximately three and a half years. They made it clear that while their work began with the research behind their early ethnography of homeless people in New York, they could not stop with the research. Their findings spurred them into advocacy. Ellen Baxter went on to be a leader in residential and social services to help homeless people and is the founding director of Broadway Housing Communities in New York City. Kim Hopper became an academic expert on homelessness and continued to engage in advocacy. Both held a long tenure on the homeless coalition boards of directors. Another early member of the NCH, Michael Stoops, was engaged in work on behalf of homeless people in Portland, Oregon, and served as chair of the Burnside Community Council, an organization that operated a shelter when the NCH was formally started. Like many others moved to serve homeless people, he came from a religious background. Sources refer to him as having had either a Quaker or a Mennonite background prior to his work in Portland (Redden 2017). Stoops left Oregon to move to the District of Columbia, where he was visibly involved in work to end homelessness. Stoops worked closely with CCNV leader Snyder and others. The NCH viewed the problem of homelessness as a violation of human rights and viewed individuals who were homeless as people whose civil rights needed protection. The NCH’s orientation to the problem centered on two questions. First, were an individual’s or class of individuals’ rights violated? And second, could existing laws or underutilized policies be used to benefit homeless individuals (Hombs 2011)? The Union of the Homeless A different approach to advocacy emerged in Philadelphia as a union of homeless people, speaking for themselves, took shape. Emily McNeill and Crystal Hall (2011) credit Chris Sprowal and two other homeless men, Tex Howard and Franklin Smith, with founding the Union of the Homeless in 1985. Modeled in part after the national welfare rights movement of the late 1960s,3 the union was developed so that homeless people could represent themselves for their own interests (McNeil and Hall 2011). Like with the national welfare rights movement, leaders of the union were African Americans who had experienced great hardship and viewed self-help and indigenous leadership as critical elements in their movement. They valued and championed the right of the poor to speak for themselves, to be respected as the most valid voices to be heard on the plight of poor people who became homeless. Sprowal was a former union organizer who founded the Committee for Dignity and Fairness in 1983 (the precursor to the Union of the Homeless).

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Sprowal and other homeless and formerly homeless people in the union were highly critical of the NCH and other organizations and advocates purporting to speak on behalf of homeless people. Although he served as a member of the board of the NCH, Sprowal expressed his concerns about white, middle-class, and more affluent people attempting to represent the plight of homeless people (Ferguson 1990). He and other leaders of the union, such as Renaldo Casanova of New York City, also viewed with alarm social workers and others engaged in efforts to control homeless people while they were essentially paid money from the suffering of others, developing jobs for themselves. Casanova explained his viewpoint: “The homeless have become a billion-dollar business. There’s no way the poverty pimps are going to give up the shelter systems and the welfare systems. They don’t want anybody to be independent” (Ferguson 1990). One of the first actions of the Committee for Dignity and Fairness was to address mistreatment in a city-run Philadelphia drop-in center whose homeless men and women complained that they were abused and ridiculed by staff, even “treated as subhuman species” (Landriscina 2005, p. 46). Sprowal, who led the campaign against the drop-in center, was then given a subcontract to open his own shelter based on self-empowerment and dignity. It was reported to be the first shelter operated under self-governance by homeless people (Russ 2001). However, Sprowal and other members and leaders of the Union of the Homeless knew that shelters were not a solution and therefore worked to create broader structural change, using a union-based membership model to raise money and empower voices. A founding convention was held for the first union in the greater Philadelphia area in 1985, and a constitution was drafted (McNeill and Hall 2011). McNeill and Hall chronicled the development of the union, including its creation of a six-week training session for activists and an organizing campaign called the Winter Offensive in 1986 that sought to organize chapters of the union across the nation. The mission statement then adopted made it clear that union members viewed the struggles of the homeless as part of a larger struggle for social justice, which included an end to all forms of exploitation, seeking “economic justice, human rights, and full liberation” (McNeill and Hall 2011). The union’s history as documented by McNeill and Hall (2011) and Willie Baptist and Jan Rehmann (2011) credits the national organization with having over twenty chapters and estimated peak membership as high as 15,000. As a union run by and for homeless and formerly homeless members, it provided a voice for those with firsthand experience of shelters. Union members viewed shelter life as humiliating, so they focused on securing affordable housing. In an analysis of grassroots advocacy efforts, Daniel Cress and David Snow (2000) found that while the national union tried to coordinate actions across the country, the real work of the union

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was carried out by locals based in cities, with more or less success depending on a variety of factors. Unions organized a variety of activities including direct, disruptive action. The union in Philadelphia, where the larger organization began, was markedly successful in getting homeless people speaking for themselves on an important decisionmaking body. Instead of getting a single representative on the city’s task force charged with addressing issues related to homelessness, they succeeded in getting fifteen elected (Cress and Snow 2000). Perhaps the union’s greatest success involved a coordinated takeover of abandoned HUD buildings in seven cities. The action resulted in $2 million in property set aside for the construction of low-income housing in Oakland, California; government-provided funds for a shelter run by the homeless in Minnesota; and the mayor of Philadelphia stopping the eviction of homeless families from HUD properties (Cress and Snow 2000). In an interview on the national union, member Willie Baptist reported that in 1987, USA Today named Sprowal as “one of the top 10 leaders to watch” (Baptist and Rehmann 2011, p. 103). Union representatives joined in advocacy efforts with NCH attorneys to push Congress to open access to foreclosed properties for redevelopment as housing for homeless people. They were actively involved in joint efforts to protest for federal funding for affordable housing, though they desired a more militant approach to action than that promoted by other advocacy groups. These efforts and other collaborations are discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. At least one member went on to become actively involved in documenting mistreatment of the poor under welfare reform across the United States. Like the leaders of the national welfare rights movement of the 1960s after whom they modeled themselves, the unions of homeless people that developed in the nation’s cities insisted on the poor speaking for themselves, rather than being represented by others. Although the members and leaders of the union were homeless or formerly homeless men and women, and notably African American where many other anti-homelessness advocates were white, the union also attracted allies and supporters, including city council members, religious organizations (such as a Friends Service Committee in one city), and student affiliate organizations (Cress and Snow 2000; McNeil and Hall 2011). An example of the latter can be found in the work of then–Boston College graduate student Dennis Culhane, who worked as an organizer for the Union of the Homeless as it launched a chapter in Boston, Massachusetts. An article in The Heights, a college paper, reported on Culhane’s efforts, stating that he decried the way that homeless people were treated in shelters and the lack of assistance that would move them out of poverty and homelessness. In the article, quotes attributed to Culhane highlighted the union’s emphasis on self-organization and self-advocacy as promising and called

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for students from a college rooted in Christianity to support the union’s work (Wilenski 1986). Culhane went on to do his doctoral work on the topic of homelessness and became a highly influential researcher whose work is discussed in later chapters. In response to growing economic difficulties, increasing poverty, and the federal government’s adoption of neoliberal values and policies, these three advocacy organizations, the CCNV, the NCH, and the National Union of the Homeless, were poised to use different strengths, skills, and strategies to bring their values to confront the Reagan administration. They knew how to engage the media, had experience in civil disobedience, and had legal counsel. They were motivated and, in many cases, also had great moral conviction. While these groups were visible and influential, they were not alone. For example, at the same time and with similar values and convictions, ACORN, a membership-based community organization, was engaged in a squatting campaign that pushed for housing reform and the enactment of legislation that would allow families to acquire tax-delinquent properties from cities (Fisher 2009). The Adversaries Clash: The CCNV and the Reagan Administration In New York, while the NCH was using a legal strategy to support homeless people, in Washington, D.C., the CCNV and the Reagan administration were engaged in an embittered struggle about public policy, responsibility, and homelessness in the United States. In a broader sense, both the CCNV and the administration believed that their own side was fighting for the future direction of the country. Each saw their mission as zealously furthering their ideological orientations to influence the philosophical, religious, and economic direction of the country, and each hoped to affect the hearts and minds of the public as well. While the administration relied on the implementation of large-scale and diffuse neoliberal policies, CCNV members attempted to communicate their perspective, in part, by targeting the administration and its policies. At the same time, CCNV members were engaged in a broader and softer campaign for the hearts of the American public. The CCNV used the media and any other mode available to raise awareness about the suffering of homeless people and the need for individuals to act. Often the two campaigns—against the administration’s policies and for the support of the public—intersected. In the next two sections we provide examples of activities and events that occurred. We selected these examples because they highlight the growing strength of the CCNV as a player in federal policy and the level of involvement between the administration and advocates.

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Conflict Organizing

In their fight for social justice, CCNV members used strategies reminiscent of Saul Alinsky’s concept of conflict organizing. Alinsky believed that social justice involved a redistribution of power, in which an entity with power is forced to give at least some of it up because a group of organized individuals targets it and demands change. Alinsky instructed, “Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it” (1989, p. 130). In keeping with Alinsky’s model, the CCNV chose the administration as its target. Toward this end, the papers of CCNV members Carol Fennelly, Mary Ellen Hombs, and Mitch Snyder are replete with flyers and press releases describing protests against the administration as well as letters requesting donations to the CCNV in support of its continuing campaign to discredit and counteract the administration’s policies. CCNV members’ views of the administration were well articulated in Mary Ellen Hombs and Mitch Snyder’s book Homelessness in America: A Forced March to Nowhere (1983). For example, the book featured a picture of a sign that said, “Welcome to Reaganville: Population Growing Daily— Reaganomics at Work” (p. 17). The photograph preserved the record of a symbolic tent city that CCNV members erected in Lafayette Park. The book additionally contained a chapter about the Reagan administration titled “Policies That Kill” (p. 18). The chapter included statements by Reagan saying that budgets would not be cut and people would not be harmed. Following was an excerpt from a speech Reagan gave in February 1982: “Now you’re hearing all kinds of horrible stories about the people that are going to be thrown out in the snow to hunger and die of cold and so forth. . . . We have not cut a single budget” (p. 18). Given that the speech was delivered in February 1982, following the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the ground was set for one dimension of the fight between the CCNV and the administration: who owned the truth. Although the spirit of the president’s statement may not have been true, it was technically accurate. The tax cuts were signed into law in 1981 but were not implemented until July 1982. Program cuts supporting housing development are not experienced immediately; in the early Reagan years, funds appropriated under Carter continued to bring new housing online (Kondratas 1986). To support their truth, Hombs and Snyder documented the administration’s implemented cuts to AFDC and Medicaid, food stamps, low-income energy assistance programs, housing assistance, health care, food and nutrition programs, child care and education programs, employment and unemployment programs, and Medicare and Social Security. A predominant theme in Hombs and Snyder’s “Policies That Kill” chapter, and in CCNV-led protests, was the callous nature of the administration. This theme was introduced on the first page of the chapter, which

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contained the following quote by David Stockman, then director of the Office of Management and Budget: “I don’t think people are entitled to services. I don’t believe that there is any entitlement, any basic right to legal services or any other kind of services. . . . I don’t accept that equality is a moral principle” (p. 18). Networks and Relationships

One of the chores associated with community life at the CCNV was making the very early morning trip to Jessop, Maryland, where members scavenged food from dumpsters at a food distribution site used by wholesale markets. Given the presence of rodents, broken glass, and other sharp edges, at times the work was dangerous, but the food was necessary as it fed community members as well as the people whom they served. Scavenging food by what is often called “dumpster diving” was prohibited by law. To seek changes to the law and to show the hypocrisy of hunger in a land of plenty, the CCNV organized a luncheon for congressional leaders with two members of the House of Representatives, Mary Oakar and Tony Hall (Bogard 2003). Dubbed the “Beggars Banquet,” the ingredients were from scavenged food, and the menu included crab quiches and boysenberry short cake that had been scavenged from dumpsters. A rule of effective organizing is that actions should always help to grow the organization. This was certainly true of the banquet, which fostered relationships with the media and Congress. The action created strong supporters among key members of Congress, including Representative Pete Stark from California. Stark, along with multiple media sources and his peers in Congress, took the CCNV up on their offer to try their hand at scavenging in a dumpster in downtown Washington, D.C. Stark received additional positive attention for his willingness to jump into a dumpster and scrounge for food. Once again, the CCNV delivered to the media an opportunity for strong footage and text, and Stark received support in his home district for his actions (Bogard 2003; Carol Fennelly Papers). In a life-or-death situation, the CCNV’s relationship with the media and Congress came into play. The CCNV’s next national and nontraditional battle was joined in response to the administrations’ decision to cut the amount of surplus food appropriated for the poor.4 To protest the cuts, in March 1983 about a dozen CCNV members took up temporary residence in Kansas City, Missouri, for a “fast for food” campaign. Independence was chosen because it was home to large limestone caves used throughout the country to store about 200 million pounds of the government’s estimated 569 million pounds of surplus food, most of it cheese. At the time, the total cost for surplus food storage, including transport, ran to about $100 million in public monies (Bogard 2003; Fennelly personal communication, August 12, 2017).

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With ninety organizational signatories in support of the campaign, a core group of individuals, most of whom had established temporary residence in Independence, began a hunger strike. Fourteen individuals drank juice and broth, and three drank only water. A congressional delegation attempted to tour the limestone caves to call attention to the waste in terms of both actual food and associated costs (e.g., storage and transportation expenditures), but the owner of the caves would not grant them permission. Washington Post columnist Coleman McCarthy wrote about the issue, as did writers from the Kansas City Star, Time Magazine, and the New York Times. On the twenty-ninth day of the fast, a CCNV member, Eddie Bloomer, became deathly ill, at which point CCNV members and supporters led by Carol Fennelly effectively mobilized the groups’ media and legislative networks. Under pressure from House Speaker Tip O’Neill, the media’s general support for the cause, and the impending death of Bloomer, then–secretary of agriculture John Block announced in a speech that the administration would release additional food. The fast ended, and Bloomer was given immediate care (Carol Fennelly Papers; Rader 1986). Victoria Rader’s (1986) account of this event noted that in the wake of Block’s announcement Reagan said that he was “perplexed about news stories and other accounts of growing food lines in America” (p. 78). Again, reiterating that the United States was a land of plenty, the president’s statement highlighted the gulf between the perspectives of the two groups. The different perspectives about hunger in the United States in 1983 were summed up in the following report by the Congressional Quarterly Researcher: “The main problem today for the nation’s poor appears to be hunger. In the last year evidence has accumulated from a variety of sources . . . that hunger is a significant and growing problem in the United States. Reagan Administration officials and others say that reports of hunger in America are exaggerated, arguing that all the people crowding into food kitchens may not be destitute, but may simply want to take advantage of free meals” (Leepson 1983). While the CCNV was worried about hunger, the administration was concerned about the economic wisdom of releasing surplus goods. Specifically, they were uneasy about interfering with the free market and alienating the dairy industry, with its strong and abiding presence in legislative circles. Thus, as Rader (1986) noted, when the dairy industry announced in 1983 a 6.6 percent drop in the sale of cheese, a US Department of Agriculture (USDA) official, Robert Leard, claimed that there was a negative relationship between the distribution of cheese and the strength of the industry. Given the privileged position of industry, it is not surprising that in the end, the amount of surplus food released was, as the CCNV noted, negligible. The total amount of food released increased from 13 to 13.5 percent (Rader 1986). This small win set up a pattern of engagement between the

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CCNV and the administration, in which members of the CCNV would fast, and when someone approached the point of death, the administration capitulated, finding loopholes to implement the agreement without seeming to concede. This pattern resumed in the waning days of Reagan’s reelection campaign, but the largest conflict between the CCNV and the administration was in the wings: the fight for a building on the corner of 2nd and D Streets, NW, in Washington, D.C. The Conflict Escalates Based on the joint belief in service and advocacy, CCNV members provided support in the day-to-day lives of homeless people, and every year they sought additional winter shelter space for homeless people in Washington, D.C. Given Washington’s status as a district and the CCNV’s strategy of targeting the administration, the CCNV determined that the federal government had a responsibility to provide shelter beds to District residents in the winter. Thus, CCNV members began searching for a potential space. The search ended when a homeless man nicknamed Reverend Keys—because of the large key ring that he carried and his deeply held religious belief—pointed out a potential building to CCNV member Justin Brown. Brown, in turn, showed the building at the corner of 2nd and D Streets to the CCNV’s leadership. Still divided into classrooms, the large and centrally located vacant building turned out to be part of the Federal City College. CCNV leadership then reached out to the federal government in an attempt to secure its use as a shelter (Carol Fennelly Papers; Heffron and Campion 1986). As a vacant, federally owned structure, the Federal City College building fell under the purview of a task force set up by Reagan’s chief of staff, James Baker, whose job it was to address surplus buildings. CCNV members began a conversation with representatives from the administration. With James Baker, the CCNV had an important ally in the form of his wife, Susan. Concerned about the homeless, Mrs. Baker encouraged her husband to use the building as a winter shelter. Also on the side of Mrs. Baker and the CCNV was the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Margaret Heckler (Carol Fennelly Papers; Rader 1986). Given both the potential of the prime real estate (two blocks from the Capitol building) and the cost of running the shelter, other officials in the administration hesitated to allow the use of the building as a shelter. However, not long before winter, a deal was reached. The building could be used for shelter through the winter, and the CCNV would both run it and incur all of the associated costs. But the building had to be vacated in the spring. As Rader (1986) noted, the CCNV saw this win as multiform. First,

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there was a building that would keep people from freezing to death in the winter, and second, in their efforts to change hearts and minds, the CCNV was proud to have reached accommodation with the administration. That accommodation, however, was short-lived. As members of the CCNV spent more time with the homeless, it became clear that the homeless needed more than shelter from the cold. Shelter began to take on multiple purposes. For example, if operating year-round, it could keep people safe in the heat of summer and from the other hazards associated with life on the streets. It could provide basic needs such as toilets, water, and food. Additionally, for some individuals, it could be a stabilizing force that could help them transition out of homelessness. Thus, the shelter provided an unmistakable illustration of the existence of and needs of homeless people (Rader 1986).5 As the spring approached, CCNV members agreed that they would leave the shelter as promised, but their exit involved a protest in which residents moved to the Lafayette Park across from the White House. The exit from the shelter and protest was guaranteed national attention as television correspondent Mike Wallace had already begun filming Snyder and the community for a segment on 60 Minutes, a CBS weekly news magazine television broadcast. Against this backdrop, the administration called the CCNV to say that it had concerns about the people living in the shelter, and it offered the CCNV the building on a permanent basis. However, for all intents and purposes, the building was uninhabitable. It provided, for example, about five working toilets for approximately 900 residents. Walls were crumbling. The heating was old and expensive. In the summer, the building reached sweltering temperatures. There were roaches everywhere, and the back exit, which was only used by CCNV members, teemed with rats (Rader 1986). The CCNV found itself in a predicament. Not only was the building problematic, but also the cost of running it, in terms of both people power and utilities, was overwhelming. Maintaining the building as a shelter was nearly impossible. At the same time, community members had grown to know and care about the residents, so closing the shelter and asking the residents to leave for the inhumanity and violence of the streets seemed unconscionable. Moreover, if the CCNV vacated the building, they would likely lose a great deal of the moral and media power they had amassed (Rader 1986). In the spring, at wit’s end, Snyder called a community meeting to address the issue of the shelter. In this meeting, he announced that the administration needed to provide about $5 million to turn the shelter into a national model. As a model, the building would include health care, social services, job training, and an adequate kitchen. If the administration did not respond by August 15, 1984, Snyder stated that he would start a fast and that during the fast the community should engage in a series of

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protests outside of the White House. The middle of September was chosen as the first day of the fast as it would coincide with the coming of winter (Rader 1986).6 Starting on the forty-fifth day of the fast, the month of October brought a series of protests called the “Harvest of Shame.” One protest involved the arrest of a number of Catholic nuns. Other actions included CCNV members nailing a number of crosses on the White House lawn to represent each known individual who died from exposure (Carol Fennelly Papers). Toward the end of the month, Snyder’s health deteriorated. On the fiftieth day of the fast, Snyder was close to death. Wanting to make a statement, he held a press conference from his room. In and out of consciousness and emaciated, he agreed to answer two questions. The question posed by Mike Wallace went something like this: “Snyder, it is likely that when the 60 Minutes segment about you is aired in just two days time, you may not be alive. If this is to be your last public statement, what would you like people to know?” Snyder’s answer hangs outside of the CCNV shelter today: “The next time you see someone out on the street, don’t pass them by. Say Hello. Ask how they’re doing. Get them something to eat. Just tell them that you care. Tell them that they are human beings. And I think that is what I would ask of anyone” (Carol Fennelly Papers; Heffron and Campion 1986). Before airing the segment, Wallace let it be known that he would be doing a live update during the broadcast, which could include the death of Snyder. Not wanting to see the popular Snyder die days before the election, administration representatives reached out to the CCNV leadership, and after a long night of bargaining, an agreement was reached. The segment aired the Sunday before what would be the reelection of President Reagan. Fifty million people watched, and the live update said that Snyder was recovering, as a written agreement for the building’s renovation into a model shelter had been reached (Carol Fennelly Papers; Rader 1986). However, the pattern of give and take that began with the surplus food distribution continued as the administration and the CCNV wrangled for several years about the building’s renovation. The administration’s proposal of four large sleeping rooms could not have been more different from the CCNV’s vision, which included some private rooms and lockers. Several court cases, threats of eviction, hunger strikes, and high-profile media events resulted in a renovation, about three years later, that was close to the terms of the initial agreement. In response to the wrangling, Snyder noted that the administration was not concerned as much about the several million dollars that would be needed to renovate the shelter; rather, he believed that the issue was that other cities would begin to expect the same for their federal buildings. Thus, a model shelter suggested that the administration’s efforts to cut services for the poor with one hand could give way to costly fixes in other places (Carol Fennelly Papers).

Shelter

The literature states that the CCNV characterized the population of homeless people who were served within their shelters as “service resistant” (Bogard 2003) and that the advocates’ focus on shelter helped to institutionalize and normalize homelessness (Wagner with Gilman 2012). Following is my take on these issues from my very up-close and personal position within the shelter. My time on staff with the CCNV began at the shelter at 2nd and D Streets (which was the old Federal City College building). The building was sweltering in the summer and always overcrowded. I cannot imagine it passing any public health test. Later I moved with about a hundred homeless women to an abandoned school building that was used as a temporary space when the shelter at 2nd and D Streets was renovated. Along with the rest of the CCNV shelter staff, many of whom began as residents of the shelter, I lived in the respective buildings, albeit in a separate staff area. The staff area had adequate shared bathrooms, but no cooling in the summer. I generally worked over sixty hours in the course of a week within the shelter. My primary responsibility, as I saw it, was to provide women with a safe place to sleep and to treat them with kindness. I could make referrals to soup kitchens, day centers, and any other service that could be found, but they were few and virtually always had wait lists. As staff, we coordinated efforts with other women’s shelter providers across the District to get “our women” into one of the smaller shelters that had social workers and, in contrast to us, an adequate supply of tampons or sanitary pads. When we were able to get someone into such a program, it was considered a victory. It was also a victory when someone got on the wait list for public housing, because the list was seldom open. There were few ways we could actually help someone. But sometimes we did. Sometimes a woman just needed shelter for a few nights before she received her first paycheck and we were a stopgap. Rarely, despite many hours of consistent advocacy on the part of staff, we were able to help residents secure a spot in a twenty-eightday treatment program for addiction, but the lack of aftercare often resulted in relapse. Occasionally we were able to help women transition from the shelter after working with them for a very long time to get their disability and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) checks. My general feelings of helplessness were such that I became an expert in delousing, as this allowed me to make a real difference in the quality of someone’s life. continues

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Continued

We had next to no requirements for individuals seeking shelter, although we had basic rules. Given members’ beliefs that people must be kept from dying on the street, the shelter at 2nd and D Streets kept its doors open to people who did not comply with the rules or requirements of other shelters. It was not believed that these people were the norm; rather, it was believed that they needed a bed. Moreover, it was not believed that these people resisted services, but that they consistently fell through cracks. I think of “Alice,” who was in her forties or fifties and had, what I now assume, was a severe case of Tourette’s syndrome. I say “assume” because frankly I and other members of the CCNV, people who worked in other shelters, and the mental health professionals who came to the shelter were perplexed by the sounds she made, which included swearing and guttural noises. Alice was unable to stay in smaller shelters because of her disruptive ticks. She was not eligible for psychiatric care, as it would have had to be involuntary and she was not a danger to herself and others, nor was her ailment most likely psychiatric but rather neurological. She seldom talked and never really engaged with anyone, so it was difficult to even imagine ways that we might help. When I think about women like Alice, I think about the dangers and vulnerabilities that she would face on the streets, be they human-made or natural. I think about how jails are used to house the dispossessed. For people like Alice, our shelter was the only alternative. Yes, it is true that we advocated for shelter space, but it is also true that we believed that we were a better alternative to jail, street violence, and death. —Elizabeth Beck

Summary By the mid-1980s, the adoption of neoliberal economic and social values and thinking, made manifest in policy, was being tied to the rise of homelessness by a nascent advocacy movement. A major clash of values was apparent. The president and his administration viewed the path toward economic well-being for all as one that required severely limiting the safety net and adopting policies to return greater profits to businesses and more income to high-earners and owners of wealth. Those living on the street were presumed to be making rational personal choices. Prosperity for those doing well in society would

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“trickle down” to those who were not, through business investment and job creation. High profit margins would benefit all. Emerging leaders in the antihomelessness movement decried the valuing of profits over people during the same time period. They valued a different kind of social contract, one that prized human well-being and human rights over corporate profits and rights. By the mid-1980s, three distinctly different advocacy organizations had been established at the national level. The CCNV focused on direct service, civil disobedience, media campaigns, and more in the name of the poor and homeless people. This group worked to raise the issue of homelessness as one rooted in economic and social justice, and the values of a nation. The NCH focused on human rights and legal advocacy to seek help for poor and homeless people, while not losing sight of the fact that homelessness was primarily a housing issue. For the Union of the Homeless, its work was based on the premise of rights and dignity. Using a union-based membership model, homeless people represented themselves in their quest for affordable housing. These groups were augmented by myriad other religious and secular organizations, and efforts, found at the national, state, and local levels. The diverse leadership and skill sets of the CCNV, NCH, and Union of the Homeless, combined with those of other organizations, would eventually focus on a push for federal attention to the problem. Notes 1. Murray was second author on a book on intelligence with Richard Herrnstein, The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American life (1994), that discussed intelligence as a predictor of success and its relationship to race and class. In many ways, his views hearkened back to ideas promulgated by Social Darwinists in earlier times in the United States. Lest one think that these decades-old ideas have died, it should be noted that the American Enterprise Institute hosted an event featuring George Gilder as a speaker in August of 2015 on the topic “Darwinism and Conservatism: Friends or Foes?” 2. The National Visitor Center was a large empty space that linked to Union Station (the city’s rail train terminal). Today it is a high-end mall. 3. Phyllis Day (2009, pp. 350–351) noted that the National Welfare Rights Organization was developed in 1967 and that by 1969 there were more than 523 locals with “more than 22,000 dues-paying members.” The organization advocated for a guaranteed minimum income. 4. Amassing food surpluses was a New Deal policy that sought to keep prices competitive and farmers solvent by paying farmers to grow or produce items that were not brought to market. 5. General Assistance was implemented by the states, with each setting the mechanism and levels of support offered. For example, in 1980, before any changes occurred, monthly GA ranged from $259.35 in Hawaii, to $99.09 in California, and $5.50 in Mississippi (Albritton and Brown 1986). 6. Victoria Rader (1986) does an excellent job of describing the contentious nature of the meeting and how little support Snyder had for the fast.

4 From Social Problem to Psychiatry

Charles Jones (1984) posited three questions as essential to the shape and direction of public policy. What are the different perceptions or definitions of a problem? What are the ideas that can solve the problem? How many people are affected by the problem?1 Given that these questions are used to craft policy solutions, the responses to them hold significant consequences for affected populations. While these questions may sound relatively straightforward, in the case of homelessness the answers to these questions were anything but. As we will show, divergent views among advocates, academics, and policymakers affected both the policy decisions and programs found in the McKinney Act, and the ways in which homelessness lost its standing as a social justice issue. Between 1980 and early 1984, questions regarding the nature of the problem, solutions, and scope of homelessness were dichotomized. The administration answered the questions from the lens of the individual perspective and the belief that the issue as a general concern was overblown, while advocates argued that the 1–2 million homeless people were homeless primarily for structural reasons. Work done by academics between 1984 and 1987 introduced alternative perspectives. The scholarship made it possible to recast the problem of homelessness as neither primarily structural nor a fabricated issue, but rather one requiring emergency support for worthy, vulnerable individuals. The size and scope of the problem were represented in a 1984 report of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which concluded that there were between 200,000–400,000 homeless people across the nation, rather than the catastrophic 1–2 million people estimated by advocates (Bogard 2003; Hombs and Snyder 1983). The report served only to heighten the adversarial relationship between the advocates and the administration.

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We begin this chapter in the period 1980–1984 with the positions of the administration and advocates about the nature of the problem and its solutions. We then move to 1984–1987 and introduce the voices of academics and their research to illustrate how their analyses enabled a reframing of problems and solutions. Next, we consider Jones’s question regarding how many people were affected by the problem. In this regard, we use the HUD report produced by the administration, which became a target of the advocates. Generally, from a policy perspective, the first question to be addressed is the size of the problem; however, in the case of homelessness, solutions were proposed and developed at the same time that national leaders, academics, and advocates argued about the number of people affected. Thus, we begin with the problem and solutions. Binary Perspectives on Homelessness, 1980–1984 Reflecting on the early 1980s, media analyst Jimmie Reeves wrote “the antagonisms made visible in the [media’s] coverage of homelessness would place Reagan and his minions on one side of the line, and the Reagan detractors on the other. As might be expected, the latter faction promoted homelessness as a national disgrace for which Reagan was responsible” (1999, p. 55). Here we explore these binary perspectives using the underlying themes associated with each camp: the individual is responsible for his or her poverty, or society is responsible. The Individual Perspective on Causes of and Solutions to Homelessness

The most punitive views toward homelessness came from the president and some of his policy advisors inside the administration (e.g., Attorney General Edwin Meese). Reagan’s approach to identifying the causes of homelessness was consistent with his perspectives on poverty and social issues and did not vary throughout his two-term presidency. In 1988 Reagan summed up his long-held beliefs in an interview with news anchor David Brinkley. In referring to homeless people Reagan was quoted as saying, “They make it their own choice for staying out there.” Steven Roberts’s introduction to his December 23, 1988, article in the New York Times on the president’s remarks highlighted the administration’s denial of a federal role in homelessness when he wrote, “President Reagan dismissed the idea that his Administration bears any responsibility for the problem of homelessness.” Reagan carried the issue of choice further, asserting that people also had a choice to leave psychiatric institutions. In the same interview, he is quoted as saying the following about deinstitutionalization: “And the result

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was that all across this country . . . people particularly in—you call it retarded—walked away from those institutions, they wanted freedom, but they walked out to where there was nothing for them” (Roberts 1988). The implication of this statement is that people could have chosen to stay in state mental health hospitals (despite state government interest in closing them down) and that the patients should have known that nothing was available to them on the outside. Reagan’s description of people walking out of institutions is particularly egregious. Indeed, while living in the community would have been preferable to hospitalization for most, “expelled” is a more fitting phrase than “walking out.” More problematic is the evidence that Reagan knew people did not just decide to leave state mental hospitals, and that some former residents did end up on the streets. As governor of California from 1967 to 1975, he was the chief executive of a state that was a pioneer in deinstitutionalization, a process begun under prior governors and continued under him. Reagan should have seen that deinstitutionalization resulted in people ending up in the street (Torrey 2013). Rather than focusing on the cost to individuals, Reagan instead joined many other governors in recognizing the state-level economic and political benefits of shutting down state-run mental health hospitals, promising to close those in California (Torrey et al. 2010). The economic cost of maintaining such institutions was high. The political cost of maintaining them in the wake of stories of poor conditions and abuse was also high. Because closing the doors benefited state budgets, there was significant support for moving people out of large-scale institutions. Medical and mental health experts touted the benefits of medicine and community care; civil libertarians supported the rights of disabled people to live with minimal restrictions. Deinstitutionalization was also a money-maker for corporate owners of for-profit group housing sites, some of whom were known to Governor Reagan through their donations and work for the Republican Party in California (Torrey 2013). The president’s remarks about the issue in the 1980s appeared even more ironic given his administration’s decisions regarding support for community mental health care and safety net supports. It was widely recognized that federal support for community mental health centers and their professional staffing was inadequate and that formerly institutionalized individuals were not well-served by such places; Reagan’s administration worsened the situation by cutting direct federal support for community mental health centers, shifting federal mental health funding into flexible block grants to states, and undoing the Mental Health Systems Act (Cutler, Bevilacqua, and McFarland 2003; Humphreys and Rappaport 1993). Closing state institutions without adequately funding community care and affordable housing created a context in which there were limited

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options. The Reagan administration’s efforts to cut the number of people receiving disability payments also negatively affected this population, leaving them with inadequate resources to maintain themselves in the community (Bloche and Cournos 1990). Reagan’s views on poverty and homelessness, as discussed in Chapter 2, also focused on government assistance programs as causes of poverty and lack of economic progress for the poor. Building on Reagan’s example of the “welfare queen” as deceptive and lazy, on September 10, 1983, Edwin Meese, then holding a cabinet position as counselor to the president for policy, commented as follows on the rising number of people going to soup kitchens: “Well, I think some people are going to soup kitchens voluntarily. I know we’ve had considerable information that people go to soup kitchens because the food is free, and that that’s easier than paying for it” (quoted in McFadden 1983). Statements like these highlighted personal choice and questionable, if not immoral, behavior as causal to homelessness and poverty. The administration’s view of the problem of homelessness was articulated by the director of the Office of Management and Budget, James Miller, who said, “The Federal Government had no responsibility at all for the homeless problem, and will do nothing to assist homeless men, women, and children” (quoted in Fuerbringer 1986). HUD secretary Samuel Pierce shared the president’s rhetoric of personal choice and argued that those facing deindustrialization needed to make the choice to follow the jobs. He explained, “In some cities people must move whether they like it or not. That is what is going on. If they can’t get jobs where they are, they should go elsewhere to look for them” (Homelessness in America II 1984, p. 207). The statement not only showed callousness toward communities, kinship networks, and the like, but also deliberately overlooked evidence that countered moving as a solution.2 It was not surprising, however, that Pierce took a perspective on homelessness that was removed from his area of housing, as this was also a time in which the HUD budget was being slashed, with his support. As Jonathan Kozol reported, HUD was moving to get out of the housing business in the 1980s (1988). Even within such harsh rhetoric there was a small space in which there was some acknowledgment that solutions to poverty and homelessness might be required. Although Reagan and his administration believed in the “Free to Choose” doctrine, they also recognized that a small number of people might legitimately fall through the cracks and have real need. In these cases, Reagan supported a “New Federalism” in which the federal government would partner with state and local entities to address issues, with the latter taking the lead in a public-private partnership with charitable organizations. Before taking office and early in his presidency, Reagan argued for transferring responsibility for many safety net programs to states and localities (Reagan 1982). In so doing he made it clear that there was little differ-

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ence between his view and President Herbert Hoover’s approach during the Great Depression. Like Hoover, he believed that religious and charitable organizations, working at the community level, were in a better position to address human social needs. In one of his last speeches, Reagan affirmed his confidence in this approach on January 13, 1989, when he stated: “By the way, I suspect that a dollar that comes from our churches and synagogues goes farther to help those in need than one that comes from the Government. And I don’t mean just because the Government’s overhead is higher. No, it’s that the state’s power is, at its root, the power to coerce, for example, to demand taxes. The power of the church is the power of love. And that makes all the difference.” In this neoliberal view, the economy would right itself and everyone would prosper in a society with minimal government interference. Many representatives of the Reagan administration echoed these ideas. Some administration leaders within the highest levels of government were less strident in their views. Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), responsibility for addressing homelessness could not be readily ignored. Whatever the causes, the presence of people living on the streets raised myriad concerns involving such matters as their health, their physical vulnerability to the elements, violence, and possible death, which then forced HHS to take some type of action. In 1983, Secretary of HHS Margaret Heckler established the Federal Interagency Task Force on Food and Shelter, as a strategy to coordinate the federal, state, local, public, and private resources for homeless people. Under the umbrella of Reagan’s New Federalism, the task force would partner with state and local entities to help them solve their homelessness crises. The purpose of the task force was to assist local communities in securing federal facilities or resources. For example, the work of the task force supported the Community for Creative Non-Violence’s (CCNV) use of the Federal City College Building in Washington, D.C., in the winter months and helped to enable local access to federal surplus food and property. The task force also supported federal funds being directed to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and the Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) for research-related grants to enhance mental health services and other initiatives. Designed as a temporary stopgap measure, the task force merely helped to funnel existing resources, be they surplus food, research dollars, or a portion of HUD’s vacant (foreclosed) housing stock, to the issue of homelessness. Moreover, by giving money to institutes studying alcohol and drug abuse and mental health, the task force helped to further the notion that homelessness was a consequence of individual failings or diseases involving mental illness or addiction (General Accounting Office, April 1985). Jo Anne Ross, associate commissioner for Family Assistance, Social Security Administration, in HHS, explained the department’s response to

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the issue of homeless families in congressional testimony. She noted that HHS had an emergency assistance program with the statutory mission “to help children and their families meet crisis needs” (Emergency Aid to Families Program 1986 p. 24). Although the program began prior to the epidemic of homelessness, its funding increased from $125 million per year to $156 million with an estimated rise to $161 million to accommodate extra demand (Emergency Aid to Families Program 1986). Perhaps because states needed to match the federal monies on a one-to-one ratio, only twenty-six states and two jurisdictions engaged with the emergency assistance program. The rules for the program also limited the funding each family could obtain, whether for a shelter or a hotel, to a thirty-day period within any given year. Thus, if a family needed help for longer than a month, emergency assistance dollars could not be used. In Congress, on the Republican side of the aisle, conservatives aligned with the Reagan Revolution and New Federalism viewed homelessness and lack of affordable housing as problems rooted in a combination of individuallevel addiction and illness and local and state policies. Much as the president viewed social welfare programs as a trap for the poor, conservatives in the House and Senate viewed local and state policies as producing homelessness. Republican congressman Dick Armey from Texas (later the House majority leader) provided insight into the conservative view of homelessness. In written testimony provided in a hearing in 1986, Armey acknowledged that society had an obligation to be compassionate and care for those truly in need. He explained that as an economist, he viewed most problems as issues of proper incentives for rational actors. However, homelessness was a more difficult problem to solve because those suffering from mental illness and substance abuse would not be making rational choices, and he regarded drugs and mental illness as primary drivers of homelessness. On the mental health front, he laid blame on the states. Armey argued that it was their responsibility “to provide adequate mental health care to patients released from state institutions” (Emergency Aid to Families Program 1986, p. 17). Moreover, Armey maintained that solutions to homelessness were available through the private sector and praised the private sector for its valiant efforts in addressing the problem. To deal with unemployment, Armey supported enterprise zones, a program that provided funds to qualifying geographic areas, as a reasonable federal response.3 Regarding low-income housing, Armey espoused a view popular among conservative housing policy writers: rent control was making the affordable housing problem worse because it failed to establish incentives for the private sector to invest in low-income housing. Rather than building a case for federal support of affordable housing, the blame could be laid with localities and developers who participated in rent control (Emergency Aid to Families Program 1986, pp. 15–17).

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Along with these shared perspectives among Republican leaders, the belief prevailed that it was important for the country to view itself as becoming economically prosperous again. This allowed the administration and its supporters to claim credit for turning the economy around, something that the prior Democratic administration had been unable to do. More important, the conservative neoliberal agenda for tax cuts and deregulation could be marketed as good for the country and its people if it produced prosperity. But if the administration’s neoliberal reforms and New Federalism (including downsizing safety net and housing programs and decreasing taxes) were implicated in people becoming homeless, then the administration’s promises of prosperity were hollow, and the goals of the Reagan Revolution, which included additional tax cuts and budget cuts to HUD, were in jeopardy. Structural Perspectives on Causes of and Solutions to Homelessness

Whereas the federal government was driven by a prosperity narrative and support for neoliberal policies, structural explanations and desires for structural change were promoted by advocates, members of state and local governments and their professional organizations, service providers, and some researchers. Whether by coincidence or design, these groups tended to carry the same general message in opposition to the administration, but often focused on different angles. One of the most important ways in which advocates could share their views was through congressional hearings, and in this regard some members of the advocacy community worked with congressional leaders to craft hearings. However, the CCNV’s participation in their first hearing before Congress in 1980 was the result of a cold call made to the CCNV (Rader 1986). During their 1980 congressional testimony and in their 1983 book, CCNV members Mary Ellen Hombs and Mitch Snyder laid out an analysis of who was homeless and why by specifying seven primarily structural factors that contributed to homelessness: (1) inflation, (2) lack of affordable housing, (3) failure of deinstitutionalization, (4) racism and sexism, (5) Reaganomics, (6) unemployment, and (7) breakdown of traditional social structures. They further noted that these problems were occurring within a weak economy (Hombs and Snyder 1983). This analysis was again offered by Snyder and others in December of 1982 during a hearing titled Homelessness in America. The hearing was called by Henry Gonzales, a Democrat in the House of Representatives from Texas, and chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development. Gonzales was one of a number of legislators who cared deeply about the issue. The hearing offered an opportunity for these legislators and experts, including advocates, to provide their understanding of

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the causes of and solutions to homelessness. Structural arguments figured prominently in the testimony of each, as did jabs at the administration. Gonzalez’s opening remarks were as follows: The evidence is that a great many of the homeless were just a few months ago stable, responsible people who had homes and jobs—but whose world collapsed around them. . . . We have read accounts of mass evictions within the shadow of this building. Even in yesterday’s paper we read the latest decree from the crown prince at HUD, about the removal of the present Congressional imposed constraints on the process of eviction of tenants of public housing. (Homelessness in America 1983, p. 2)

Subcommittee member Bruce Vento, who was already working to get funding for emergency shelter, referred in his opening statement to homeless people as “victims of our economy” (Homelessness in America 1983, p. 8). Subcommittee member Mary Rose Oakar agreed and added that many people were losing their disability insurance as a result of changes in eligibility and what she described as the administration’s “overzealous” review of disabled people receiving benefits under Social Security programs. Indeed, Kim Hopper testified that between passage of the administration’s 1980 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which changed eligibility rules, and the date of the hearing, 158,000 people had been removed from the disability aid rolls (p. 26). Members Chuck Schumer of New York and Oakar of Ohio talked about the way in which the subcommittee’s efforts to address the problem had been “thwarted” by the administration’s actions. CCNV member Hombs, in her testimony, described what it meant to be a victim of the economy. She cited the official unemployment rate of 10.8 percent (and an unofficial unemployment rate of at least 5 percentage points higher)4 and the consequences of deindustrialization as equating to “teachers, factory workers, and executives living under bridges” (Homelessness in America 1982, p. 13). Thus, “the victims of congenital poverty are joined by the sufferers of a harsh economic reality and mental incapacity” (p. 14). While supporting many of the other perspectives already discussed, Robert Hayes of the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) concentrated on the housing needs of homeless people, as well as the role of the federal government and its neoliberal approach to policy as creating the problem. He stated that “the Federal Government’s increasing abdication of its role in creating low-income housing can only produce massive homelessness in the years ahead” (Homelessness in America 1983, pp. 58–59). Hayes explained that homelessness was a function of a profit-driven housing market that was not providing housing for the poor, and other witnesses reminded the subcommittee of the national estimate that about 2 million people had lost their homes due to revitalization, evictions, economic development programs, and rent inflation (pp. 23–60).

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To Snyder it mattered less why a person was homeless and more that a person was homeless. For him the issue was humanity and its opposite, inhumanity. In his testimony, he implored the subcommittee members to go to the shelters to see who was there, to actually witness what it truly means to be homeless. In this way, Snyder focused on the personal and individual characteristics of political leaders and members of society as the targets for intervention, rather than the characteristics and personal troubles of those experiencing homelessness. The hearts and minds of those living in comfort needed to be afflicted with the pain being experienced by the homeless. Snyder held that once members of Congress saw for themselves the sense of urgency among homeless people, they would find a way to address the issue. Additional testimony was offered by Ellen Baxter and Kim Hopper, based on their research (including their highly influential 1981 ethnography about homelessness in New York City, Private Lives/Public Spaces: Homeless Adults on the Streets of New York City), and their firsthand experiences. In testimony and in their written submission, they focused on four major causes of homelessness: lack of low-income housing; deinstitutionalization in the context of a grossly inadequate community mental health system; unemployment; and cuts to social services (including cuts to disability income made through review processes that disproportionately affected those with mental illnesses). The researchers highlighted both the dramatic growth in the number of people without homes and their increased heterogeneity, including women, families, and disproportionate numbers of African American and Latino males. When discussing deinstitutionalization in their longer report, Baxter and Hopper did not argue in favor of reopening public mental hospitals. Instead they noted that many who left public mental hospitals had been shifted into different kinds of institutions (in effect experiencing reinstitutionalization) where they were not receiving proper care, whether they were in nursing homes, in private board and care homes, or within the criminal justice system (Homelessness in America 1983, pp. 23–57). They noted that increasing numbers of people who would have been treated in public mental hospitals were now falling into the criminal justice system. Echoing the findings of their 1981 manuscript, they argued: “Homelessness today, we should be clear, is not primarily a problem of deficient services, nor one of people ‘slipping through the cracks,’ but rather one of fundamental needs going unmet. The root of contemporary homelessness is an economy that is slowly marginalizing an ever-growing segment of our citizenry” (Homelessness in America 1983, p. 34). Put simply, Baxter and Hopper argued that the real issue behind homelessness was extreme poverty. As they had noted in their 1981 report, “for a great majority, the little money that they had just ran out” (Baxter and Hopper 1981, p. 42). In some cases, jobs and benefits were lost, and at times money was stolen. In

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many cases, there was a precipitating event, but not always. They had found that some people who had spent a lifetime of living on the margins seemed to drift into homelessness as their lives unraveled or broke. Despite the testimony of advocates, the stark nature of the need, and support of some members of Congress, little assistance was forthcoming. In 1984, frustrated by the growing need and the total lack of response by the government to the problem of homelessness, Gonzales called a second hearing, appropriately titled Homelessness in America II. This hearing was notable because the voices supporting structural change became more passionate and expanded to include local advocates and local government, as well as representatives of the National Governors Association and the US Conference of Mayors. This hearing was also notable for its location. It took place in January in the Federal City College in Washington, D.C., then being operated as a winter emergency shelter by the CCNV. Hayes and Snyder’s 1984 testimony followed the same themes that each presented in 1982, but their frustration with the lack of action on the part of the government emerged in their acerbic language. Hayes was unable to be present for the 1984 hearing, but Hopper was there to represent the National Coalition for the Homeless and read Hayes’s statement into the record. Hayes’s testimony emphasized the lack of compassion and care, the “callousness” of the administration. The statement as submitted asked, “What do we think, what do we hope, our children and grandchildren will say of our complicity in watching the slow suffering—and in due time, death—of the weakest and frailest of our fellow citizens” (Homelessness in America II 1984, p. 198). Hayes went on to call for a national right to shelter, modeled after New York City policy. This was, of course, consistent with the NCH’s human rights orientation. Hayes’s statement included the coalition’s focus: “The coalition’s credo is a simple one: Decent shelter, sufficient food and affordable housing are fundamental rights in any civilized society” (p. 192). Snyder again argued that only a reduction of the distance between the homeless and the housed could offer any real hope (p. 178). In his statement, Snyder reiterated that the problem was not with who homeless people were and how they got that way, but rather that the problem lay with society’s unwillingness, as a nation and as individuals, “to accept the responsibilities attached to citizenship and our common humanity” (p. 178). In the 1984 hearing, the national advocates were joined by a cadre of local organizers that included affiliates of the NCH across the country. Among these was Les Brown of the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless. Brown testified about the needs in Chicago, where each day hundreds of people were turned away from shelters due to lack of capacity. He also spoke to the causes of homelessness, including “rental increases, coupled with totally inadequate welfare grant levels . . . in addition to unemployment” (Homelessness in America II 1984, p. 345). Brown noted that evictions, loss of single-

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room-occupancy housing, and lack of affordable housing (including insufficient public housing) were also causing homelessness. He explained that in 1983, eviction suits numbered 60,369 (with landlords winning 80 percent of the cases that were contested). Five thousand single-room-occupancy units were also lost to urban renewal projects from 1970 to the time of his testimony. And the wait list for Chicago public housing was 30,000 people. Brown argued for the federal government to make a long-term commitment to the problem, as the $60 million appropriated by the federal government to meet the needs of the homeless did not go nearly far enough (p. 345). The testimonies of Governor Mario Cuomo on behalf of the National Governors Association and Mayor Marion Barry of Washington, D.C., representing the US Conference of Mayors, were based on reports that each organization developed. Although the reports echoed many of the same perspectives as the advocates, they provided highly specific information that had not previously been addressed. For example, the National Governors Association report indicated that the historical patterns of homelessness among young and poor people of color were being maintained, which made the report one of the few documents that acknowledged race. The report also questioned the popular perception that the majority of homeless people had mental illness. Rather, it argued that seriously mentally disabled people were not the majority of the population. Moreover, it warned that for those individuals with mental health conditions, simplistic understandings of cause and effect should be avoided (Homelessness in America II 1984, pp. 27–49). Finally, the report addressed youth homelessness and interpersonal violence as a risk factor for homelessness. The US Conference of Mayors based its report on a survey of service needs for twenty member cities. The findings included that 95 percent of these cities had experienced an aggregate 71 percent rise in the need for food and an 89 percent increase in demand for shelter. Moreover, 53 percent of the cities could not meet the needs of everyone who requested and was eligible for assistance. The report further indicated that 70 percent of the cities identified in the report expected to see the demand for emergency services increase during the next year (Homelessness in America II 1984, pp. 53–70). The Homelessness in America hearings were not the only ones held, as additional committees sought more information and used congressional hearings to make a public statement. For example, in 1984 the Select Committee on Aging of the House of Representatives held a hearing titled Homeless Older Americans. Also in 1984, a Special Committee on Aging of the Senate held a hearing titled Living Between the Cracks: America’s Chronic Homelessness. And in 1985, the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development held a field hearing in Queens county titled Housing for the Elderly and Homeless. A central theme of the Queens hearing was the way in which older adults’ access to affordable housing had

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become more and more limited due to the mismatch between the cost of housing and their fixed incomes, as well as cuts to subsidized housing; loss of affordable housing units through gentrification was exacerbating their problems (Queens County Field Hearing 1985). Members of Congress did not limit their involvement with the problem of homelessness to fact-finding hearings. Some particularly strong supporters of homeless people in the House and Senate introduced legislation prior to passage of the McKinney Act. In the House, Representative Mary Rose Oakar from Ohio introduced bills to provide housing and supportive services to the homeless, and Mike Lowry of Washington state presented an urgent relief measure to provide funds for emergency shelter and to develop a formal interagency office on homelessness in HHS. Mickey Leland from Texas introduced bills to expand availability of shelter for parents with infants and to provide shelter and training for homeless youth as well as to get homeless people access to existing social insurances and welfare programs. He and Tennessee Senator Gore both introduced “survival” acts for homeless people (discussed at length in the next chapter). Leland also submitted a bill to establish a national right to shelter. New York senator Daniel Moynihan introduced legislation to provide permanent housing for homeless families. Legislation introduced by Democrats had two common features: a common belief that the federal government had a role to play in addressing homelessness, and a failure to be passed into law. But as we will see in the next chapter, these Democrats were joined by some Republicans, including Connecticut senator Stewart McKinney, who served on the House Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Development, and for whom the McKinney Act was named. He supported federal efforts to produce affordable housing and objected to the administration’s severe cuts to low-income housing, cuts that he understood were making matters worse for the poor and contributing to homelessness. He was also critical of state and local governments for not using more of their community development block-grant funds to help address the problem of homelessness (Homelessness in America 1983, p. 7). Another Republican supporter of legislation to aid the homeless was Senator Pete Domenici, who felt close to the issue as he had a family member with mental illness (Sontag 2002). Despite some Republican support, the understanding of the problem of homelessness remained polarized, and solutions were not forthcoming. While not participating in hearings, the National Union of the Homeless did participate in the debate about causes and solutions as the organization began receiving significant media attention at the local level when their protests, takeovers of vacant buildings, and other direct actions brought changes in local policies affecting the homeless. The national and

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local unions believed that services for homeless people should be delivered by homeless people. The leadership of the National Union of the Homeless provided the union’s perspectives on causes and solutions through media interviews and in speeches at demonstrations (Russ 2001). The union and its chapters viewed homelessness as a human rights issue, an outcome of extreme poverty in a context of decreasing economic opportunities. Union leaders had themselves experienced how disadvantages disproportionately affected poor blacks and women. While supportive of other advocacy organizations focused on expanding access to affordable housing, union leaders were equally focused on access to jobs and income as a solution. Union leaders were also keenly aware of the impact of drugs on the poor living in inner city neighborhoods in the early 1980s, particularly the effects of crack cocaine. They insisted that the understanding of the problem and the proposed solutions needed to be represented to government and other parties by the homeless themselves (Ferguson 1990; Russ 2001; Wilensky 1986). Academics Forge a Third Way, 1984–1987 In 1966, political insider and academic Adam Yarmolinsky stated that the academic community was the most common source for solutions to public problems; homelessness was no exception. By 1984, academics from a variety of disciplines were engaged in research on homelessness, with a number of them testifying before Congress on their findings. Although work on homelessness emerged from the disciplines of sociology, history, and anthropology, most of the research was dominated by people within medicine, psychology, and related health and social sciences. Academics naturally developed their studies from the perspectives of their disciplines and their own areas of expertise. For example, psychiatrists looked at the experiences and needs of homeless people from a mental health perspective, while sociologists considered the societal forces affecting homeless people. At the time, research was beginning to be funded by the National Institutes of Health and Mental Health to examine issues related to mental health, which skewed the literature in favor of an emphasis on mental health.5 Because the funded academics largely represented disciplines that used medical models for interventions, the solutions they promoted mostly involved psychiatric or behavioral interventions rather than redistribution of goods, such as financial assistance or subsidized housing. Although the literature across disciplines acknowledged in background material that homelessness was a consequence of structural problems, with housing costs and unemployment among the most prominent, the focus of the articles and their proposed solutions tended to be on mental

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health and service needs. Researchers James Wright and Julie Lam called attention to this phenomenon, stating in a report submitted to Congress that “homelessness is a housing problem. This perhaps seems too obvious to mention . . . except that much that has been written about homelessness makes reference to the housing problem only in passing” (Crisis in Homelessness 1987, pp. 211–212). We similarly found in our reading of 131 articles written between 1980 and 1987 that although the vast majority mentioned structural issues as causal to homelessness, studies focused upon the characteristics of homeless people, and aspects of their human service needs and experiences (see, for example, Fischer et al. 1986; Roth, Toomey and First, 1987; Stoner 1983).6 Our findings were consistent with the earlier work of Marybeth Shinn and Beth Weitzman (Shinn and Weitzman 1990; Shinn 1992), who reported on the tendency of the homelessness literature to focus on the characteristics of homeless people. They called attention to the way in which this shifted attention away from structural issues, supported misguided analysis, and reinforced negative stereotypes about those without homes. Based on her own review of the literature, Shinn summarized the binary that developed in the literature as “person-centered” versus “structural explanations.” She noted the prevalence of such person-centered research in the academic study of social problems and discussed the methodological issues leading to a person-centered focus. Shinn described the relatively weak research designs that were common at the time (nonrandom samples; one-group cross-sectional designs in specific locations, in which the characteristics of people would vary but the structural factors would be constants). The designs were inappropriate to a dynamic phenomenon like homelessness (Shinn 1992). That the lines of inquiry were influenced by academic disciplines also helped to create a new way to think about the problem definition for homelessness, one focused on separate definitions for subpopulations such as families, children, veterans, and older adults. Researchers began to advocate for addressing the specific problems and needs of the subpopulations on which their research focused. In many cases researchers appeared to be constructing their study subpopulations as among the “worthy” poor, which supported crafting solutions for categories of people historically deemed worthy of aid in the country. The academics’ more focused solutions gave the government a way to reconcile its promotion of a neoliberal agenda with attention to smaller subpopulations in need of assistance (see, for example, Fischer et al. 1986; Stoner 1983). For example, in the McKinney Act the focus was limited to six specific categories of homeless people, who by their appearance in the act emerged as the worthy homeless: the mentally ill and physically disabled, families with children, children, older adults, veterans, and Native Americans.

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In the following sections, we examine specific populations that attracted significant attention on the part of researchers and three other groups—veterans, older adults, and Native Americans—for which the related literature was quite limited at that time. We found no literature, for example, on homeless Native Americans, though they were mentioned as affected in hearing testimony focused on the southwest (e.g., Phoenix, Arizona) (Homelessness in America II 1984, p. 203). The designation of these groups as worthy of and meriting aid was, however, already wellestablished in preexisting federal social welfare agencies such as HHS, the Veterans Administration (VA), the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and extant congressional committees (e.g., the House Select Committee on Aging). Within each of the categories we provide a review of the literature with the goal of illustrating the group’s emergence as worthy, the strategies presented to address the needs of the population, and, when possible, critical viewpoints. We also explore the absence of additional study variables, on gender and race, and discuss how that absence helped to reinforce the conception of homelessness as an emergency situation that required support for the worthy poor. The Worthy Poor Mental illness and homelessness. Early in the 1980s new and known lead-

ers in psychiatry saw a need to address the plight of those they termed the homeless mentally ill. These leaders engaged in studies, some of which were funded by the federal government. From 1983 on, the field of psychiatry was at the forefront in identifying mental illness as a significant risk factor for homelessness and in promoting service and treatment-oriented solutions. One of the more dramatic examples of this work emerged in Boston in 1984. Harvard psychiatrist Ellen Bassuk (1984) published an article in Scientific American titled “The Homelessness Problem” in which she reported that 90 percent of those in a recent study at one men’s shelter in Boston were mentally ill, thereby pointing to deinstitutionalization as a major cause of homelessness. Late that year, in December of 1984, Ellen Bassuk, Lenore Rubin, and Alison Lauriat (1984), published findings from the same study in the American Journal of Psychiatry. Hailed by some as proof that deinstitutionalization was the root cause of most homelessness and reinstitutionalization its solution (Krauthammer 1985), and criticized by advocates and researchers for its very limited and nongeneralizable study design (Baxter and Hopper 1984), this work marked the public start of Bassuk’s long career of research on homelessness. With Bassuk as member, in 1983 the American Psychiatric Association responded to the extremity of homeless people with mental health

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problems and created a task force to evaluate the needs of homeless people who were mentally ill. The chairperson of the task force, Richard Lamb, along with his colleague John Talbott (later president of the association), both medical doctors, explained that “the plight of the homeless mentally ill is so desperate, that we were asked to have our report and recommendations completed and ready for publication within a year” (quoted in Lamb 1984, p. xvii). To support its investigation the task force was given funds from the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (presently known as the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration) to visit programs across the country. Lamb was no stranger to these issues, as he had previously authored a critical report on quality of care found in board and care homes housing the mentally ill in California as early as 1969 (Torrey 2013). Not only did the task force study make recommendations on the issue of homeless people with mental illness, but its members also saw their role as calling attention to the suffering of its subjects as a means to generate support for the public’s and government’s will to effect change. In addition to wanting to respond to the humanitarian crisis, task force member Leona Bachrach recognized that mental health professionals needed to articulate their responsibilities to the homeless, stating that if they did not, the media would speak for them (Bachrach 1984). The findings of the task force were released as a “special communication” in the Journal of the American Medical Association (Lamb and Talbott 1986) and in a book titled The Homeless Mentally Ill (Lamb 1984) that was edited by Lamb and published by the American Psychiatric Association. Task force members contributed to the edited volume. Each of the chapters in the book addressed the question of who was homeless and why through the lens of the chronically mentally ill. Again, in the report, the urgency of the issue was raised by Lamb: “The experience of seeing the patients themselves was a grim reminder that the chronically mentally ill have been cast adrift under conditions that most persons think can no longer exist in this country” (1984, p. xviii). In their special communication, Lamb and Talbott (1986) explained that while the needs of homeless people across the board were profound, this task force was best suited to explore the 40 percent (an estimate based on cross-sectional studies) of homeless people with major mental illness.7 The authors claimed that their group’s expertise with this population provided them with a credible voice for those homeless people who suffered from mental illness, writing, “if in fact, we are able to make a contribution to lessening the degree of homelessness among the chronically and severely mentally ill, we think our efforts will be worthwhile” (Lamb and Talbott 1986, p. 498). Task force members worried that reinstitutionalization could be considered an appropriate solution to the problem of homelessness, so they focused on the

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development of community-based care for people with mental illness (Lamb 1984, 1985; Lamb and Talbott 1986). This theme also presented itself throughout the 1984 book, as chapter authors emphasized the government’s failure to spend what was needed to ensure adequate community support for those leaving hospitals (Lamb 1984). In describing the ways in which individuals with mental illness became homeless, Lamb and Talbott explained that some were evicted, in part, based on their inability to deal with landlord-tenant situations or because of “a circumstance in which they play a leading role” (p. 499). Unlike Baxter and Hopper, who saw the loss of housing as a result of structural conditions, Talbott and Lamb (1984) ascribed the loss of housing to individual behavior. This was also the case for their explanation of youth homelessness, as they noted that people, especially the young, drifted from families, or “they may want more freedom to drink or use street drugs” (p. 499). Moving forward, Lamb and Talbott explained that once without shelter, individuals often lost their Social Security benefits, essentially losing their only source of income that might allow them to purchase housing in the future, and their mental health deteriorated because of the stress of the street, and they then ended up in hospitals or jails. Lamb and Talbott (1986) raised the question of causality, which was a major feature of debates about why the homeless who are mentally ill are homeless. That is, the writers questioned whether the stress of homelessness caused the symptoms of mental illness to appear or whether mental illness caused the homelessness. As individuals’ mental health deteriorated with time on the streets, a second aspect of deinstitutionalization emerged as a problem. While deinstitutionalization is often thought of as a process of opening the back door to institutions to let everyone out, that is only half of the process. To truly deinstitutionalize, the front door must be locked so that an institution can be emptied. Chapter author Leona Bachrach (1984) described the process of closing the front door. That is, she called attention to policies that limited access to appropriate psychiatric hospitalization. She specifically noted that hospitals worked to divert would-be patients through mental health referrals. Bachrach (1984) also wrote about the ways in which people who carried dual diagnoses (i.e., those with mental illness and substance abuse problems) were denied treatment, as these individuals failed to meet admissions criteria for services. For example, someone needing mental health care might be denied mental health services if carrying a primary diagnosis of substance abuse. Specifically, the inability of these men and women to maintain one exclusive diagnosis of either of their dual occurring problems made them ineligible for services, including residential services, related to

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Closing the Front Door

Before joining the CCNV and years before my education in social work, I worked at a day center that was part of a church. The day center was located in a part of Washington, D.C., then known for sex work/prostitution and drug activity. A woman whom I will call “Jane” began showing up at the center. She appeared to have cognitive difficulties and stated that she experienced auditory hallucinations. It was not unusual for her to take off her clothes in the middle of the street. We all saw this as a sign she was a danger to herself, as the behavior would send a message about how vulnerable she was. I talked to Jane about hospitalization, and she agreed to go to the hospital with me as she said her voices encouraged her to dance in the street. After a long wait and assessment, Jane was denied admission. In a moment of exasperation, I made it clear to the hospital that I would like a second opinion. I was initially denied. Then in a move I would never encourage a social work student to make, I said that I would be going outside, to the foot of the driveway, and begin taking off my clothes and yelling. One way or another a bed would be taken. Luckily for me, Jane was admitted to the hospital. —Elizabeth Beck

either half of their dual diagnoses (see also Kaufmann 1984). Thus, for Bachrach, homelessness was less about behavior and more a consequence of individuals falling through large service cracks (Lamb 1984). The American Psychiatric Association task force members unanimously agreed upon the recommendations that they collectively put forward, and that were included in their manuscripts. The recommendations were divided into one major recommendation and fourteen derivative recommendations. The major recommendation was: “to address the problems of the homeless mentally ill in America, a comprehensive and integrated system of care for this vulnerable population of the mentally ill, with designated responsibility, with accountability, and with adequate fiscal resources must be established” (Talbott and Lamb 1984, p. 5). The first derivative recommendation stated the importance of meeting the basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing. Pointing to the inadequacy of the community services in the deinstitutionalization process, the second recommendation involved the establishment of community housing settings. The third and fourth recommendations covered the necessity of ade-

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Dually Disserviced

Like so many others, in the 1980s and 1990s we both witnessed the pain of those who suffered from both substance abuse and mental health issues. Elizabeth remembers “Kate” as kind, helpful, and very funny. When Kate, who was then homeless, was concerned about her depression, those who worked with her in Washington, D.C., were too. Staff from the CCNV tried to get her into a psychiatric hospital but were told her primary diagnosis was alcoholism, and when we tried to get her in substance abuse treatment we were told the opposite. Today Kate would have a dual or co-occurring diagnosis. Then, Kate was dually disserved. Kate fell through the cracks and took her life. It is difficult to express how disheartening and frustrating it was to see people in need turned away from care because they had the wrong primary diagnosis. Were they depressed secondary to alcoholism, with alcohol acting as a depressant? Or were they self-medicating with alcohol and drugs secondary to a mental health diagnosis? For those affected and all who cared about them, it was hard to understand why we lacked truly holistic, integrative health systems capable of responding to those seeking help, rather than isolated care silos. Significant progress has been made on these issues over the years, but people still encounter barriers to care and community-based support, particularly when they lack financial resources or live in resourcepoor areas. All people regardless of their diagnostic labels need to be able to access appropriate and needed care that treats them respectfully and holistically. —Elizabeth Beck and Pamela Twiss

quate, comprehensive psychiatric, rehabilitative, and medical care. A system to address individuals’ psychiatric crises was found in the fifth recommendation. The sixth presented the requirement that each chronically mentally ill person have one community person responsible for his or her care. In order to meet the goals found in the recommendations, the seventh recommendation involved changes in legal and administrative procedures to ensure care. The eighth, ninth, and tenth recommendations dealt with the delivery of care, noting the importance of a coordinated funding system and the need for greater numbers of trained professionals and para-professionals to support case management and social services. The eleventh involved the provision of some sort of ongoing structured care for people who were not

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able to respond positively to community life. The twelfth and thirteenth recommendations pointed to the need for more research on the causes and treatment of chronic mental illness, as well as gathering more epidemiological data. The fourteenth called for additional monies for expanded longerterm solutions, and here the authors emphasized the importance of ensuring the continuation of existing mainstream federal programs including Medicaid (Talbott and Lamb 1984). In 1985 in his presidential address to the American Psychiatric Association, John Talbott followed up on the recommendations by asserting that psychiatry must become more actively involved in public policy debates and decisions (Talbott 1985). Baxter and Hopper were not part of the task force, but they were asked to submit a chapter for the accompanying book. In their chapter, these authors restated their 1982 argument that homelessness among mentally ill individuals resulted from changes in the economy and the loss of affordable housing. They noted that case management and supportive services could help but would not address the issue of homelessness for those unable to secure affordable housing. Therefore, services to the homeless had to address issues of rights and entitlements. They also stated that the thenexisting social service model of stabilizing people and then finding permanent housing was at times counterproductive, as the notion of stabilizing mental health within the destabilizing experience of being homeless was questionable. Moreover, the cost of shelter became an ongoing public expense (Baxter and Hopper 1984). In addition to Baxter and Hopper’s disagreements with aspects of the overall report, there were other published criticisms of it. A number of these critiques were found in a special issue of the Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal.8 Some of these articles questioned the effects of privileging the mentally ill among the homeless population. For example, Sue Estroff (1985) offered a prescient view of the impact of the report. She noted that the report divided the population into those who deserved help because of their illness, and those who did not. She postulated that with limited public or legislative will to effect social change, some homeless people would benefit from the medicalization of homelessness, but at the price of creating an industry of researchers and clinicians, directing the focus away from social justice. “Medicalizing those on the margins,” she wrote, “may be the best way at present to get them the resources they so desperately need, but what would be the long-term social consequences of such an action?” (p. 17). In her comment in the same journal, Pamela Hyde (1985) warned that although the fourteen recommendations had substance, the ability to implement them was hindered by policymakers and a public who looked for quick and short-term solutions, thus suggesting that the real needs—affordable housing, community mental health care, and income supports—might not fit with the will of policymakers and the public.

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The ideas raised in these critiques continued being developed, and in 1986 a group of academics from Harvard and the University of Massachusetts gathered to discuss the problem of homelessness. Journalist Constance Holden wrote about some particulars of the meeting in a 1986 article, “Homelessness: Experts Differ on Root Causes,” that was published in the news and comments section in the magazine Science. Holden summarized the position of conference participant Leona Bachrach, who noted that if the cause of homelessness was a result of structural issues, then the answer was housing; if, however, most of the homeless had mental health issues, then the answer was comprehensive health and social services. Bachrach’s comments were particularly interesting as they supported a binary in which structural explanations equaled housing, and individual explanations equaled mental health services. Based on the direction of research funding, it seemed clear that mental health strategies would eclipse housing solutions. The linkage between housing and mental health needs was not addressed. Louisa Stark, an anthropologist and chair of the NCH, who was a conference participant, reflected on the ascendancy of individual explanations for homelessness. Holden, in her Science article (1986), noted Stark’s statement that the disproportionate amount of attention going to mental health and substance abuse issues among the homeless was overshadowing structural problems and the need to support economic equality. This view was supported by Marian Jones in her article “Creating a Science of Homelessness During the Reagan Era” (2015). Jones concluded not only that federal funding on homelessness during Reagan’s presidency was focused on mental illness and substance abuse, but also that the administration’s opposition to social research ensured that there was no academic counternarrative. By the mid-1980s it was clear that the impact of the combined power of the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, and the NIMH had privileged discussions of the homeless mentally ill and, in doing so, service delivery as a strategy to address homelessness. This point was not lost on Marybeth Shinn (1992), nor on David Snow and his colleagues. In an insightful article written in 1986, Snow and his colleagues explored the shift from homelessness as a social condition to one that had been medicalized. These researchers wrote about ways in which medicalization led to a discourse on causes and solutions that used the medical model and was therefore depoliticized. They provided a review of the literature to explain that “attention has been focused primarily on ‘flaws’ and ‘impediments’ within individuals and the mental health system, rather than on larger social structures” (Snow et al. 1986, p. 420). Families. Among special categories of homeless people, one that gained

prominence in the academic literature in the mid-1980s was homeless families with children, and the author whose voice dominated discussions was

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Ellen Bassuk. In addition to overrepresenting the mentally ill, Bassuk’s earlier work on homeless men was also criticized for overlooking an emerging category of homeless people, families with children (Baxter and Hopper 1984). Following lines of investigation that led her to recognize the increasing heterogeneity of the homeless population and the special needs of families, Bassuk shifted the focus of her work toward families in subsequent years. At the time of her early investigation into the issue of homeless families, Bassuk, an associate professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, was active with the Division of Health Policy Research and Education in the Kennedy School of Public Policy. In 1988 she and David Jordan, editor-in-chief of Better Homes and Gardens magazine, teamed up to start a project with the Better Homes and Gardens Foundation—today named the National Center on Family Homelessness. The center’s website described Bassuk as conducting “ground-breaking research in the mid-1980s, first documenting the devastating effect of homelessness on mothers and children” (National Center on Family Homelessness n.d.). Prior to passage of the McKinney Act, Bassuk, along with colleagues Lenore Rubin and Alison Lauriat, authored several well-placed articles on homeless families (Bassuk, Rubin, and Lauriat 1984, 1986; Bassuk and Rubin 1987). Bassuk’s eight-chapter 1986 edited book The Mental Health Needs of Homeless Persons included three chapters about families, and she and her colleague Lauriat testified before Congress (Emergency Aid to Families Program 1986). Bassuk’s research can be seen as supporting two targets for intervention. The first involved the experiences and poor outcomes of homeless children within families. This body of work documented the emotional and psychological toll of homelessness on children and included a warning that without intervention these youths would become the homeless adults of tomorrow. Research findings included that 51 percent of homeless children older than five years were depressed, that most had suicidal thoughts, that 60 percent of this population had anxiety, and that the combined psychological impacts of homelessness on these children must be numbered among the factors that contributed to having to repeat grades in school. Additionally, the authors described developmental lags in language skills as well as motor and social development. Moreover, the findings indicated that nearly all of the children qualified for a psychiatric referral (Bassuk and Rubin 1987; Bassuk, Rubin, and Lauriat 1984). The authors argued that the children’s problems were exacerbated by disruptions and the overcrowded and chaotic nature of shelter life. The work included what could be considered an advocacy component. For example, Bassuk wrote: “Our major goal should be rescuing these families, particularly the children, from a lifetime of deprivation and violence and to interfere with a newly emergent cycle of intergenerational homelessness” (1986, p. 52).

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Bassuk and colleagues’ second target for intervention was the needs of mothers in homeless families. The research incorporated a combination of structural and individual perspectives, echoing those explored earlier in the present chapter. Bassuk used the then-emerging term “feminization of poverty” to explain how women’s work was undervalued in the marketplace, which exacerbated the financial burdens that women assumed with the “breakdown of the family.” In testimony, she described the breakdown of the family as including “divorce, illegitimacy, and single-parent child rearing practices” (Emergency Aid to Families Program 1986, p. 73). The 1983 report of the National Governors Association also found that the lack of funding and infrastructure for domestic violence services, combined with policies that often only allowed for limited stays at domestic violence shelters, was another cause of homelessness among families and women. Moreover, these short timeframes did not provide enough of a reprieve to build necessary community stability (reliable employment, affordable housing, benefits) to escape abuser control (Cuomo 1983). No matter what the cause of the women’s homelessness, based on Bassuk’s interviews with mothers she reported that the population had a high prevalence of personality problems and emotional disturbances, which she argued interfered with their functioning, as well as their ability to take on the role of “autonomous adult.” In her recommendations, Bassuk made clear that “attention to housing alone is not enough. We also must be aware of the social welfare and mental health needs of homeless persons,” thus reinforcing a paternalistic and mental health orientation to the needs of women (Emergency Aid to Families Program 1986, p. 98).

Children. The literature related to children and youth (individuals under twenty-one years of age) had several themes. In addition to the issues explored by Bassuk and others related to children of homeless families/mothers, some literature addressed homeless youth among runaways, and others included youth who were estranged from their families, but not runaways. In 1974, Congress signed into law the National Runaway Youth Act with the goal of providing services to runaways and homeless youth. In a 1982 study, the US General Accounting Office surveyed programs that were serving the then-estimated 350,000 homeless youth. The report indicated that only a fraction of these youths were receiving help, because of funding constraints. Moreover, it warned that the number of young people in need of services would likely increase (General Accounting Office 1982). As followup, in 1985 an oversight hearing on runaway and homeless youth was held before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Education and Labor in the House of Representatives. Chairperson Dale Kildee set the tone for the hearing when he said that most children who ran away were

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not running to something (as suggested earlier by Lamb) but rather from something. June Bucy, the executive director of the National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, estimated that there were about 500,000 homeless youth, of whom only about 40 percent received any type of service in 1984, which could be as limited as a phone call to a hotline. She ended her testimony by stating that the programs that did work to support runaway and homeless youth were crippled by a lack of funding (Oversight Hearing on Runaway and Homeless Youth 1985, pp. 30–34). The academic literature that explored homeless and runaway youth used words like “castaway,” “throwaway,” and “nomads” to describe the youths and society’s attitude toward them. Journal articles talked about the horrific trauma often experienced by these youths and the young peoples’ needs to stay hidden to avoid such entities as the police or child protective services (Freudenberger and Torkelsen 1984; Luna 1987). In describing the causes of homelessness among youth, Cajetan Luna (1987) wrote that poverty was significant, as were neglect and physical and sexual abuse. As part of the Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal’s special issue on homelessness, Stephen Crystal (1986) reported that homeless youth made up 7 percent of the shelter population in New York City. Seventy percent of the youth in question were African American and 21 percent were Hispanic. Crystal placed a portion of the blame for the rise of homeless youth on poverty, as he found that a number of older juveniles were forced out of their familial homes due to overcrowded conditions. Moreover, he noted that rather than having mental health issues, these youths had “a pattern of multiple disadvantage” (1986, p. 19) that included poverty, low educational skills, and a history of involvement in the justice system. Youths surveyed indicated that they wanted to be employed and independent, and Crystal advocated for employment support for them. He additionally noted that, given the trajectory of these youths, without such support they would likely extract a social cost through such entities as welfare or prison. Veterans. Much of the research on homeless veterans during this period

was limited to discovering them as a category among the homeless, rather than focusing upon them as a subpopulation of special interest. For example, several studies exploring mental illness and homelessness indicated that veterans were included in the study population (see Roth and Bean 1986). Other studies pointed out that between 32 and 47 percent of the population of homeless men were veterans, and that many of these men had service-related psychiatric illness, as well as substance abuse issues, viewed as causal to their homelessness (Wright 1988). Marjorie Robertson’s 1987 work was different, as it focused on the experiences of veterans who were homeless, recruited for study from food programs, shelters, and the streets. She reported that veterans tended to be

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older, white, and better-educated than the total population of homeless men whom she studied. She also noted that veterans with health and mental health needs were not given appropriate supports. Robertson argued that one of the major causes of homelessness among veterans was their inability to access benefits through the VA that they should have been eligible to receive; she laid blame with the VA for not providing adequate outreach. Moreover, she noted that when veterans did receive benefits or services, this was often insufficient to support independent living. Robertson’s perspective was provocative, as the VA prided itself on its efforts to reach homeless vets, yet advocates and Robertson’s data suggested otherwise (Barbanel 1987). The differences in the views of advocates, Robertson, and the VA were starkly obvious earlier in the decade, when Jesse Carpenter, a decorated World War II veteran, froze to death while sleeping across the street from the White House in Lafayette Park. Journalists reported that Carpenter was found dead at the foot of his friend John Lam’s wheelchair. The two men had a twenty-year friendship, and after his Parkinson’s disease left Lam in a wheelchair, witnesses reported that Carpenter never left his side. Given the lack of handicap-accessible city shelters, Carpenter chose to spend the nights outside with his friend, which led to his death by hypothermia. After he died it was learned that Carpenter had been awarded the Bronze Star for “braving unabated fire” to carry wounded men to an aid station on September 17, 1944. Carpenter was buried with full military honors at Arlington Cemetery (Hochman 1984; Saperstein 1984). However, even Carpenter’s death became a point of contention between the advocates (as the CCNV organized his funeral) and the administration. A representative from the VA suggested that perhaps Carpenter was to blame for his homelessness as there was no need for him to freeze to death given that he received an Army pension of $495 a month. While this pension placed Carpenter above the official federal poverty threshold of $4,980 for one person for 1984, he was still within 125 percent of that poverty line (Social Security Bulletin 1984). It is unlikely he would have been able to find housing he could afford in a tight housing market with rising rental costs, and even if he would have been able to find an apartment or room, he would have had little money for anything else. US Census data documented that median gross rents more than doubled in the period 1980 to 1990 in the District of Columbia, increasing from a median of $224 to $479 (US Census Bureau 2011). Academic James Wright provided a view in-between those of the advocates and the administration in his 1988 article “The Worthy and Unworthy Homeless.” Wright found that between 32 and 47 percent of homeless men were veterans; many of these men had service-related psychiatric illness, and very often substance abuse issues. In the article Wright discussed the ways in which these veterans were constructed by the public as both worthy

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and unworthy poor from different perspectives. Specifically, mental illness and fighting for one’s country evoked worthiness; however, the high rates of substance abuse could be viewed by the public as suggesting otherwise. He concluded his discussion by saying, “Whatever their current problems and disabilities, these men were there when the nation needed them. Do they not deserve a return of the favor?” (Wright 1988 p. 6). Older adults. A small literature described the vulnerability to homelessness

of older adults and their needs. Their problems were also the focus of congressional concern. Researcher Jennifer Boondas (1985) described the isolation of homeless older adults and asked who bore responsibility for them. She explained that changes in housing related to gentrification and the loss of single-room-occupancy housing were particularly related to homelessness for older adults, whose ability to move was limited by their finances and access. Joseph Doolin (1986) provided an example of useful service linkage through which older adults living in public shelters could participate in existing day centers and thereby access medical services and food. In May of 1984, Don Bonker, chair of the Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests of the Select Committee on Aging in the House of Representatives, called to order a hearing titled Homeless Older Americans. Speaking on behalf of the US Conference of Mayors, Philadelphia’s Mayor Wilson Goode addressed the increase in older adults among the shelter population. He reported that in the three months prior to the hearing, the proportion of older adults in Philadelphia’s shelter population grew from 4 to 13 percent, and that in Nashville older adults made up 20 percent of the shelter population. Mayor Goode talked about the limitations of living on Social Security and the cost of housing, and noted that individuals relying solely on Social Security had $11.50 per day for shelter, food, transportation, and medical care (Homeless Older Americans 1984). The cuts to the federal housing budget (68 percent) were an important subtext of the hearings, with experts talking about the appropriateness of Section 8 housing and single-room-occupancy housing for older adults, and the loss of such stock due to cuts. Mary Rose Oaker, a member of the subcommittee from Ohio, and Carol Bauer, HUD’s representative to the hearing, had an exchange about the availability of affordable housing for older adults. Bauer stated that there was an “incremental” projection of an increase in HUD housing in 1985. Oaker responded that the claim was not true, stating instead that in 1981, 19,000 units were provided for Section 8 housing, a program “identified as elderly housing” (Homeless Older Americans 1984, p. 44), and that despite the increased need, the housing recommendation for 1985 was for 10,000 units, a loss of 9,000. The source of their disagreement may have been housing units coming online from appropriations made prior to the Reagan administration (Federal Response to the

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Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 199). Nonetheless, there were valid concerns reflected in the increase of homelessness across all ages, with older adults in competition with all other poor for affordable units. Further exploring the loss of affordable housing for older adults was Roberta Youmans from the National Housing Law Project. Youmans elaborated in her testimony that by 1985, 1.1 million units of low-income single-room-occupancy dwelling would be lost to condominium conversions, with older adults hardest hit. Echoing Boondas, Youmans explained that older adults were disproportionately represented as single-room-occupancy residents. Moreover, their housing options were significantly constrained by their incomes and the complexities involved in relocation (Homeless Older Americans 1984). The Unworthy Poor Women. In their 1985–1986 Chicago study, Peter Rossi and colleagues (1987) found that 25 percent of the homeless people in Chicago were women. Several scholars specialized in studying homeless women and advocated for their needs. These authors included Madeleine Stoner, whose 1983 article published in the prestigious Social Service Review began with the death of Rebecca Smith, a homeless woman. Smith’s case received a great deal of national news coverage after she was found frozen in a box at the age of sixty-one in New York City. Addressing the particular needs of women, Stoner (1983) wrote that the shelter system for women was proportionately smaller than that for men, had fewer social workers, and offered a lower standard of care. Jan Hagen (1987) reported on the ways that the “feminization of poverty” made poor women particularly vulnerable to homelessness, and that poor women, once homeless, had increased difficulty finding housing. Dee Roth, Beverly Toomey, and Richard First (1987) also wrote about economic issues women faced. They argued that women needed thorough assessment and rehabilitation plans that addressed social and vocational skills, as well as mental health, substance abuse, and counseling services to reduce family conflict; they also argued that they needed intensive case management. Several authors also addressed the significant percentage of women who became homeless because they were fleeing interpersonal violence; their solutions included additional shelter space for women experiencing domestic violence. Single homeless women were never really elevated to the status of worthy poor during this time period. Stephanie Golden (1992) and Mimi Abramovitz (1996) have offered arguments that may explain this. The authors argued that single women appeared to be among the most ostracized of the poor. Abramovitz attributed this to the idea that these women did not comply with their productive and reproductive responsibilities, and

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therefore never gained the status of worthy poor. Golden described the way in which single women, who did not participate in the dominant heteronormative narrative in which women marry and have children and are economically cared for by their male partners, were viewed with suspicion and fear. Indeed, one line of reporting had constructed Rebecca Smith as willful—she declined help from mental health outreach teams— and someone to be viewed with suspicion and fear because she had been seen making a fire on the street to boil eggs (Herman 1982).

African Americans. Racist imagery of low-income African American women and men was used by candidate and president Reagan to shift public policy. For women he constructed the nefarious “welfare queen” to support cuts to human services, while black men were constructed as criminals and drug dealers, in support of the war on drugs. As Michelle Alexander explained, “By waging a war on drug users and dealers, Reagan made good on his promise to crack down on the racially defined ‘others’—the undeserving” (2012, p. 49), thus creating a context not only in which African American women and men were undeserving poor, but also in which their poverty could be viewed as “just deserts.” Moreover, as the war on drugs intensified, so did the notion that unattached African American men and later women belonged in jail, be it for drugs or engaging in activities associated with being homeless such as urinating in public. In his 1985–1986 study of the homeless in Chicago, Peter Rossi (1988) found that 53 percent of the homeless in his sample were African American, despite constituting only 35.5 percent of the population of the study area. Anne Shlay and Rossi (1992) also sampled from fifty-two existing studies conducted across the country and again found a significant over-representation of blacks, who made up 44 percent of the homeless. This over-representation was somewhat predictable, given that African Americans were always over-represented among the poor, which interacted with the ill effects of redlining and their lack of access to housing outside of low-income areas (Shinn and Weitzman 1990). Despite these findings, we conducted a thorough review of the literature and were unable to find one article or book chapter that specifically focused on the issue of race and homelessness during the time period. This omission was also noted by others (see Roth, Toomey, and First 1992; Wasson 1995). Additionally, we pored over congressional testimony on homelessness and found that while statements and reports documented racial disparities in the distribution of homelessness, race was not a focus of congressional concern. Reflecting on the same phenomenon, Kim Hopper (2003) simply stated that in the 1980s advocates and analysts overlooked race, and that this practice persisted. In addition to highlighting how writers on the issue of homelessness have overlooked race, we also point to a whitening of the problem.

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Lucie White (1990) used Jonathan Kozol’s Rachel and Her Children (1988) to illustrate the construction of worthy/white homeless people and families. Kozol spent two and a half years with homeless families in New York City who were housed in the Martinique Hotel, one of many such fallback solutions used across the city and country when shelters were full. Although in many cities some families were not able to access hotels or shelters, New York was required to provide shelter due to the consent decree reached between the city and the New York Coalition for the Homeless. While Kozol’s book was published the year after the McKinney Act was passed, the imagery it employed portrayed homeless families as ordinary and white close to the bill’s passage. To indicate the importance of the book, it received the Robert F. Kennedy Book Award and the Conscience in Media Award from the American Society of Journalists and Authors. If one chose not to read the entire book, it was still easy to get a glimpse into the lives of homeless children and families, as the book was reviewed in multiple well-regarded and widely read publications, including the New York Times Book Review, the New Yorker, the New York Review of Books, the LA Times, and multiple academic journals. Although not all reviews were completely positive, many shared with readers aspects of the heart-wrenching experiences of being homeless and sheltered in a dilapidated and overcrowded hotel. A number of reviews told the story that began the book, that of Peter and Megan, who were described as ordinary people until a fire destroyed their home. Peter was a carpenter and Megan a stay-at-home mom who cooked, cleaned, and took loving care of their five children (Kozol 1988). They were both white. In addition to Peter and Megan, the book featured other ordinary families, who did things like paint their daughters’ room pink. Once the families were inside the Martinique Hotel, their lives began to unravel. Kozol chronicled the hotel’s smell, its lack of working toilets, rats, and the way in which it all too often robbed children and their families of hope, all at great expense to the city at $3,000 per month per family. In a chance meeting, one year later, Kozol saw Peter on the street panhandling and learned that the children were in foster care, which led Peter to tell Kozol that white children had value in the foster care system. White’s analysis of Kozol’s book took on the unintended consequences of the description of the families as “ordinary,” as that term not only privileged homeless families as objects of sympathy, but also privileged patriarchy and whiteness. In projecting a normative image of the “ordinary” family as racially white, with a working father and a mother at home caring for her children, White argued that they were indeed constructed as the worthy poor, and that this, in effect, further narrowed notions about who deserved help. White (1990) argued that the complex social, economic, and racebased reasons that led to homelessness were removed from the discussion

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and the solutions. Similarly, Hopper (2003) pointed out that the major changes to cities, housing, and the labor market that further marginalized African Americans did not enter most discussions about the causes of homelessness. In fact, the associations between race, poverty, and homelessness were largely erased. Had race been given the importance it was due (and that remains due), advocates and academics might have been able to make a much stronger case for the economic and structural issues that disproportionately affected African Americans and contributed to the rise in homelessness. For example, in 1984 the discrepancy between the white unemployment rate, at greater than 11 percent, and the unemployment rate for African Americans, at greater than 14 percent (Monthly Labor Review 1985) had implications for the poverty rates of African Americans and helped to explain the racially disproportionate role of the recession in the rise of homelessness. Additionally, given a 10-percentage-point jump in the poverty rate for African American children between 1969 and 1984, additional data clearly were there to be mined about the relationship between unemployment and homelessness, the relationship between loss of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and homelessness, and the role of racism in poverty and homelessness. Moreover, an analysis of the relationship between the destruction of private market low-income housing, segregated housing patterns, and race could have allowed for important findings. An overarching question for White was what it meant that homelessness subsumed poverty as a social issue. When thinking about this question the argument could be made that because of the singular nature of the attention given to homelessness, the moral outrage associated with the very high rate of poor African American children (48 percent) was never harnessed (Rexroat 1994). Rather, White explains, “When Peter and Megan became one’s mental image of those homeless families whom the citizenry should feel moved to help, one is likely to resist poverty policies that shift goods and power to groups that depart from the imagined ways.” White concluded that social policy then “subtly rewards ‘whiteness,’ nondeviance, the ‘worthy’ poor” (p. 306). It is important to question the long-term effect of whitewashing the problem of homelessness. In asking how this whitewashing occurred, Hopper and White both wrote that a belief prevailed that the construction of the homeless as ordinary and the construction of ordinary people as one paycheck away from homelessness would support public sympathy and action (Hopper 2003; White 1990). Historical evidence supports that notion. Social welfare benefits have expanded when the imagery of poverty (and its discovery and rediscovery) focused the nation’s attention upon whites; images of poor African Americans as recipients have in fact been associated with contraction of benefits (Gilens 2003). Images of white farmers fleeing

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the Dust Bowl and white Appalachians confronting the mechanization of coal mining spurred Americans to support expanded benefits in the 1930s and in the 1960s. Given that the “welfare queen” and crack-dealer images supported cuts to benefits in the 1980s, it may well be the case that the whitewashing of the image of homeless Americans helped to secure passage of the McKinney Act and funding of services. We will never know whether offering a more complete and accurate image of who was homeless and why, including a focus on single black males, would have helped to address the structural explanations of homelessness. Because race is systemically related to well-being in the United States, with African Americans disproportionately likely to face poor economic and housing situations, a focus on race in homelessness data would have pointed more directly to economic conditions as causal to homelessness. Indeed, the economic conditions that disproportionately harmed African Americans and placed many “ordinary” workers in the position of being one paycheck away from homelessness were exacerbated between 1980 and 1998 with deindustrialization. The role of racism in supporting economic disparity was neglected, so that what might have been a national conversation about race and employment did not occur in the homelessness literature of this time period. The inclusion of data regarding homelessness and race should have also pointed to the ways in which African Americans were systematically blocked from accruing wealth in the housing market and exploited by landlords and rent-to-own schemes, increasing their economic vulnerability, which likely played a role in homelessness. As Ta-Nehisi Coates (2014) makes clear, without the assets associated with owning one’s home, one is less likely to weather an economic downturn without experiencing catastrophic events. Craig Willse (2015) argued that we should focus on the effects of racism that disproportionately disadvantaged African Americans (such as disparate education, lack of employment opportunities, exploitation, and environmental injustice), and increased poverty among blacks. Willse asserted that what matters is the economic exploitation that stems from systematic state racism. He explained that state racism was and remains deliberate and often results in death. Pointing to the health effects and violence associated with life on the streets, Willse argued that homeless people were being killed directly or indirectly through social abandonment. Building on the work of Michel Foucault, Willse concluded that the deaths associated with state racism helped to maintain the capitalist, neoliberal, patriarchal order. Thus, as noted in the subtitle of his book, homelessness was a system for “managing surplus life in the United States.” Willse wrote that “housing insecurity can be understood as one of the key forms of antiblack racism in the United States” (2015, p. 34).

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Numbers At the beginning of this chapter, we made the point that from a public policy vantage, the first question that should be asked and addressed is: What is the size of the problem? But we deferred the question because in the case of the problem of homelessness, solutions were proposed and developed, while national leaders, academics, and advocates argued about how large the problem was. We began with the problem and solutions. Now we consider the size of the problem. Throughout the literature of the 1980s, one of the persistent issues was that no one could say with certainty how many homeless people there were. In 1980, Mary Ellen Hombs and Mitch Snyder estimated that 1 percent of the population, or 2.2 million people, were without homes. The estimate was developed in response to a D.C. oversight congressional committee’s request in preparation for a hearing. The number was derived from Hombs’s phone calls to over a hundred agencies in twenty-five cities (Mary Ellen Hombs Papers). Years later, on April 23, 1984, Benjamin Bobo submitted a report titled Homeless and Emergency Shelters as a response to a request from Secretary Samuel Pierce at HUD. The report found 250,000–500,000 people to be homeless on any given night (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984). The serious and contentious debate that followed the report included two congressional hearings, a lawsuit to block the distribution of the report, Freedom of Information Act requests, and accusations of perjury (Carol Fennelly Papers; Homelessness in America II 1984). The HUD report represented another chapter in the relationship between the advocates for the homeless and the administration. In an interesting turn, the methodology used to count the homeless emerged as the single most important issue in the report. Rather than looking at the positions of the advocates and the government, including the administration, we use the HUD report to guide our discussion. Following our review of the conflict between the administration and advocates, we explore efforts by an academic Peter Rossi to conduct his own count, and we trace the controversies that followed. We end the section with varying viewpoints about the intent to collect numbers. The HUD Report

In the forward to the HUD report, Secretary Pierce wrote that the report was generated in response to his department’s concerns about the needs of homeless people (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984). To address individuals’ needs, HUD took the position that it was essential to know how many homeless people there were on any given night and to define what was meant by the term “homeless.”

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HUD chose a narrow definition of homelessness, one that excluded people who were living with friends or family on a temporary basis and people who were spending the night in such places as hospitals or jails only to be released to the streets. Rather, according to HUD’s definition, homeless people were people in a shelter or on the streets (including public spaces like bus terminals that were not designed for shelter) (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984). HUD’s approach to defining homelessness would become very significant as legislation was developed to address the problem. As explained in the HUD report, subsequent hearings, and the academic literature, HUD officials employed four strategies to estimate the number of homeless people and contracted with Westat, a well-known private research firm with experience with federal contracts, to collect some of the data. The first strategy involved use of published homeless estimates in various localities. Here the HUD report explained that the highest documented estimate for thirty-seven localities relied on sources such as newspapers or the National Governors’ Report. The thirty-seven localities were selected because each of the areas had existing published research in which the number of homeless people was estimated. Those estimates were then “summed over the total metropolitan population in these areas.” The report went on to say that the subsequent estimate derived from this method would be high, because most homeless people are in urban areas; therefore the resulting number of 586,000 published in the HUD report was likely exaggerated (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984). It is important to note that a tool called the Ranally Metropolitan Area (RMA) was used to determine the boundaries for each metropolitan area. The marketing group Rand McNally created the Ranally areas to aid in its marketing work; they are not commonly used among demographers or other researchers (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 167). The government’s use of Ranally Metropolitan Areas became a central issue in the ensuing debate. The second strategy involved interviews with local experts in a national sample of metropolitan communities. In contrast to the thirtyseven localities, HUD analysts chose what they described as a valid sample of sixty metropolitan areas. Unlike the thirty-seven localities, this sample was not based on those places where published information existed. Over the sixty areas selected, 500 telephone surveys were to be made to people, such as shelter providers and government workers, who were thought to be able to estimate the size of the homeless population. HUD then sampled the number of estimates given over the phone, and weighted the validity of the estimates based on HUD-created criteria. For example, actual street counts were considered the most valid and given the most weight, while individuals who did not come into contact with homeless people were seen as providing the least-valid of the estimates, and their numbers were given less weight. The lowest and highest estimates were recorded and the “most

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reliable range” was calculated for the selected cities. The small-town part of the metropolitan area was calculated based on estimates provided for the small metropolitan areas contained within the original sample of sixty. Thus, an estimate derived from a small metropolitan area would be plugged into the small-town area for a specific metropolitan area under review. Using this strategy, there were thought to be 44,000 homeless outside of urban areas and 210,000 in cities or large metropolitan areas. This strategy resulted in a figure of 254,000 people without homes nationwide (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984). The third strategy, national figures based on extrapolation of estimates provided by shelter operators, closely resembled the second strategy, but involved only estimates given by shelter providers, who were assumed knowledgeable, and therefore all numbers derived from the third strategy were given an equal weight. This method led to a national figure of 309,000 homeless people in cities and the same figure of 44,000 for noncities, equaling 353,000. The last strategy involved developing a ratio of shelter to street dwellers and then applying that number to the number of people sleeping in shelters nationwide. The ratio was determined by actual counts of homeless people taken in the cities of Phoenix, Pittsburgh, and Boston. Specifically, the number of sheltered individuals and nonsheltered individuals found during the cities’ counts were used to create a figure that would represent a national ratio. In Phoenix, 273 people were found living on the street for every 100 people in a shelter. The Pittsburgh number was 130, and the Boston number was 129.9 As a result of these numbers, HUD calculated that 198,000 people were estimated to be without homes nationally (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984). The rest of the report addressed regional differences among the number of people who were homeless, characteristics of homeless people, and the size, rules, costs, funding sources, and the like, for existing shelters. Rather than offering recommendations, the report echoed Reagan’s New Federalism and pointed to work being done by nonprofit organizations, states, and the federal government in addressing the needs of the homeless. The final paragraph concluded that the importance of housing was second to addressing social service needs. Additionally, the report said that social service needs arose from individuals’ problems with alcohol, substance abuse, and mental illness. The appendix provided more information about the sampling methods and expanded on the decision to use the list of 364 metropolitan areas identified by Rand McNally (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984). Upon the report’s 1984 release, the Washington Post headline read, “Agency Disputes 2 Million Figure: H.U.D. Says Number of U.S. Homeless Falls Well Below Private Estimates” (Kurtz 1984). By May 18 the New York Times reported that the CCNV was seeking a court-ordered injunction to stop Secretary Pierce from distributing the report, finding issue with its

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“veracity, fairness, objectivity and reliability” (Gailey and Weaver 1984). On May 24, a congressional hearing titled HUD Report on Homeless—as a joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs and the Subcommittee on Manpower and Housing of the Committee on Government Operations in the House of Representatives—was called. Following additional information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, a second hearing was held on December 4, 1985, by the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development. The theme of the hearings was the soundness of the methodology found in the report. Each of the hearings is explored here in turn. Representatives from HUD and Westat provided testimony in the May 24 hearing about the methods and reliability of the data. Taking the lead was Benjamin Bobo, acting general deputy assistant secretary for policy, development, and research. The deputy director of the division, Kathleen Peroff, spoke as well, and her name reemerged as the confrontation moved forward. The remainder of the testimony involved academics and advocates who disputed the HUD numbers and the methodology used to obtain them. Kim Hopper, in his testimony, showed how HUD’s low estimate of 12,000 homeless people for New York City was impossible and ill-informed. He pointed out that on any given night there were 5,374 men and 736 women, 2,300 families (with at least two members), and 200 youth in public shelters, with at least an additional 1,600 people in private shelters. Even with a very conservative estimate of two people per family, the total number provided by Hopper exceeded the lower estimate provided by the HUD report. Moreover, zero people were estimated to be living in public spaces; yet despite the erroneous nature of this estimate, Hopper pointed out that it was used in the calculation (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 41). Louisa Stark testified that indeed she was called and asked to estimate the number of homeless people in Phoenix by a HUD representative named Kathleen Peroff. Of grave concern to Stark were discrepancies between her interactions on the phone with Peroff and the way the phone interviews were reported and used in the data calculation. For example, the report stated that every person contacted by phone was read a confidentiality statement. Not concerned about her confidentiality, but rather the discrepancy in study protocol, Stark made clear that neither she, nor the other people she knew who were contacted by a HUD representative, were told anything about confidentiality (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 54). Of even greater importance to Stark was the discrepancy between the area she had been asked to use for her estimate and the area being used by HUD for its calculations. Here we get into the sticky issue and its significance that was associated with the use of Rand McNally’s Ranally Metropolitan Areas. In explaining the RMA quagmire, sociologist Richard Appelbaum indicated that one RMA can include several large cities. For example, the RMA

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that includes New York City also includes Westchester, Rockland, parts of southern New York state, Long Island, and (because RMAs cross states), Fairfield County in Connecticut and parts of northern New Jersey. In other words, RMAs can be very large. Appelbaum then said that it appeared to him as if the population for the entire RMA was used as the denominator (the base) in calculations, while the estimated counts of homeless persons provided by those called and used for the numerators were for cities within RMAs. Appelbaum suggested, for example, that in the case of the New York RMA, the number of people who live in Westchester are included in the denominator, but the number of homeless people in the area were never provided as part of the estimate. Stark’s experience with Peroff provided additional insight. Stark testified that when Peroff called her for an estimate, she (Stark), was asked to provide an estimate for the city of Phoenix. Stark did not know that her estimate would be for the metropolitan area, let alone the larger RMA, which most people have never heard of (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 163). Given that the numerator appeared to represent only some of the areas and the denominator represented the entire RMA, including other large areas/cities, the calculation was deemed likely invalid. However, Appelbaum could not say definitively that this was what occurred, as the methods section of the report offered scant details. Appelbaum’s suspicions were confirmed following a Freedom of Information Act request. Based on this new information and the administration’s continued cuts to housing, Representative Gonzalez then called yet another hearing. During this hearing, Appelbaum provided testimony regarding the problems inherent in using HUD’s data for a national estimate of the problem of homelessness. Appelbaum explained that interviews were done only for a subset of areas within an RMA, and that the people interviewed believed that they were answering for the city, rather than the RMA (HUD Report on Homelessness II 1986, p. 18). The raw data obtained and records indicated that Kathleen Peroff was not accurate/truthful in describing her role in collecting data for the HUD report (HUD Report on Homelessness II 1986, p. 13). An accusation of perjury was a result of the discrepancy between Peroff’s testimony regarding her call to Stark and the records. Specifically, the obtained interview read, “How serious a problem is homelessness in your city?” The answer then was used to represent the RMA.10 Although HUD and Westat representatives spoke at the hearing about the validity of their methods, the general consensus held that the advocates succeeded in discrediting the HUD report. In an article titled “Body Count: How the Reagan Administration Hides the Homeless” the Village Voice reported that the conservative and generally administration-aligned Heritage Foundation questioned the report’s credibility as well as representatives from local and state government. The article concluded that “no one on Capitol Hill, in the

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press or even in the White House has dared to cite the Report as a policy guide” (Conason 1985 p. 169).11 While the report was therefore largely shunned, it had several longterm effects. First it called into question the accuracy of the advocates’ numbers and, along with their estimates, their positions. Second, it shifted the discourse on homelessness from an unwieldy economic and housing issue to an issue that could be contained and managed. Moreover, it brought the discussion of the size of the homeless population to the academics. The Chicago Study

Sociologist Peter Rossi began counting the homeless in Chicago in 1985, and his experience provided additional insight on both the HUD report and the political nature of counts. In response to the release of his 1986 report Homeless in Chicago, in 1987 Rossi published an article titled “No Good Applied Research Goes Unpunished.” At issue was the significant discrepancy between Rossi’s finding of 2,344 homeless people in the city of Chicago and the estimate of the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless of between 20,000 and 25,000 homeless in the city. In his article Rossi laid out his methodology as well as his concerns about advocates and his experiences with them. But before he began with his discussion of homelessness, he also made clear that he was and had always been left-leaning politically and saw homelessness as abhorrent and a “disgrace to civilized society” (Rossi 1987, p. 75). The first step in Rossi’s sampling procedure was to select a group of city blocks that were determined through several measures to be unbiased. These blocks were then used to represent the city. Rossi’s study used two types of data-collection teams to make observations about the size of the sheltered and unsheltered homeless populations. In some teams, researchers went to city shelters. In others, two people joined by a plainclothes police officer walked the streets between midnight and 6 A.M. looking for homeless people. Both types of teams gathered their data over a two-week period. Rossi told the teams to find people who could be anywhere. They were advised to look in basements, on roofs, and in vacant buildings. Once a person was found, a survey was administered in which, among other questions, the individual was asked where he or she slept over the past seven days. The purpose of this question was to begin to estimate the number of people who might in be in jail or a hospital on a specific night and subsequently homeless (Rossi 1987; Rossi et al. 1987; Rossi and Wright 1989). Rossi’s numbers were much smaller than even he had assumed they might be, but he stood by them, and concluded that the “generalization holds: the more rigorous the attempt, the more likely it is that the resulting estimates of the homeless population are far smaller than those asserted by

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local advocacy communities” (Rossi 1987, p. 79). The advocates, according to Rossi, were driven by an ideological imperative to show that the public and policymakers underestimated the problem, and that this moral imperative allowed them to “play fast and loose with the facts” (p. 76). Additionally, Rossi asserted that advocates were suspicious of nonadvocates, and in what can be read as support for the HUD report, he stated: “Anything federal agencies have done, are doing, or intend to do about the problem is either wrong, counterproductive or shortsighted” (p. 76). Following the release of his report, Rossi claimed that he became “persona non grata” to the other advocates for the homeless. He talked about being ignored during conferences, and when he reported his findings to the Mayor’s Committee on the Homeless in Chicago, he was “greeted by a torrent of criticism” (p. 79). Of concern to Rossi was the way in which disagreements about the actual numbers obscured important findings within the HUD report. For example, the study revealed that many individuals were not receiving the welfare benefits to which they were eligible. Rather than fighting about the estimates of homeless people contained in the report, Rossi believed that people could have been working to help the homeless receive the benefits to which they were entitled. Rossi’s structural view of homelessness was taken a step further in his 1989 article with James Wright. In this article, as in all his work, Rossi defined homelessness as a manifestation of extreme poverty. The researchers explored the macro forces that left few employment opportunities, cut benefits to people with disabilities, and created market conditions that drove up the cost of housing (Rossi and Wright 1989). One of Rossi’s concerns, also shared by other social scientists, involved why and how the media, without questions, latched on to the advocates’ estimates (see also Hewitt 1996). Do Numbers Matter?

Rossi, like social policy analysts, argued that in order to solve a social problem there needed to be a clear understanding of it. He argued that effective programs were based on knowing how many people had been affected by a particular problem and what their needs were, as this would allow a proper amount of resources to be allocated, and programs could be tailored to needs. Among those who argued that numbers did not matter was Republican representative Stewart McKinney, who stated that his committee’s discussion about numbers in the face of suffering people was a disgrace. Rather, McKinney maintained that the focus needed to be kept on the problem of homelessness and doing something to end it. To make his point, during a hearing, McKinney quoted Mayor Wilson Goode of Philadelphia: “Let’s not

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play the numbers game with the homeless. The last thing that Congress, the Administration, mayors, and community groups should be doing . . . is arguing about the size of the homeless population.” (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 8). Likewise, during the same hearing, Hopper argued that efforts to count the homeless had been used to mask needs and issues related to poverty. Hopper explained that “the artificial barriers thrown up by a perceived need to measure homelessness often means that the essential humanity of persons ravaged by homelessness, disability, unemployment and poverty is neglected” (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 85). Although agreeing that human need should guide the solution, Mitch Snyder did not agree with those such as Representative McKinney who downplayed the significance of the HUD report. Rather, Snyder believed that the undercount was a political tool to minimize the problem and worked to deprive homeless people of the one thing that each could be sure of, his or her very existence. Believing that the HUD report’s numbers were wrong, he explained this position and argued that resources should be allocated on “minimally accurate and honest information” (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 14) from government. He held that for government not to supply this was dishonest. He characterized the report as a sham that “misinforms, misdirects, and manipulates” (HUD Report on Homelessness 1984, p. 15), and urged HUD to release the names of their sources and the specific questions asked. Summary As we ended Chapter 3, the advocates’ point of view was the dominant discourse, and indeed the American public was with them on the social drama of homelessness. The advocates’ power was clearly demonstrated on the eve of the 1984 election when the Reagan administration capitulated to CCNV demands regarding the 2nd and D Streets shelter. In this chapter we have traced the debates in which the advocates’ position was weakened when academics and others constructed the problem of homelessness as one that affected specific categories of people whose needs could be addressed by social services. For Jimmie Reeves (1999) the emergent category was the homeless mentally ill, while Lucie White (1990) stated that by 1986 families were the only category of worthy homeless. This period also holds significance because we begin to see the overwhelming support of the medical model among experts shifting the discourse from structural explanations of homelessness to explanations based on individual pathology and illness. The new narrative diverted attention from the impact of neoliberal economic policies on the suffering of individuals and groups, particularly those suffering the burdens of racial disparity.

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When HUD released a report with significantly smaller estimates of homeless people than the advocates stated, the confrontation between the two groups continued. Using Freedom of Information Act requests, the advocates were able to show discrepancies in the methods used by HUD to obtain its count. The fight over the numbers established a debate on the scale of the problem that continues to the present. The smaller numbers indicated by HUD sowed doubts about advocates’ claim that there were 1– 2 million homeless people, making it easier for those already inclined to do so to dismiss the scale and gravity of the problem and, by extension, other claims made by advocates. The methodological issues uncovered in the HUD report also furthered suspicions of federal motives and efforts in documenting the problem. Most present-day efforts to count homeless people acknowledge that any number obtained is likely to be an undercount. With the discourse about the causes of homelessness changing and a lack of agreement about the definition of the problem, its cause, solutions, or scope, the one thing advocates and many academics agreed on was that something needed to be done. The action needed to come from the federal government, as only it had the resources to address the need and, as many thought, the responsibility. Notes 1. These questions are of great importance given that they are typically used by social policy analysts, who find that solutions emerge (or should emerge) from how a problem is perceived and defined, and from knowledge of its size and scope. The size and scope of the problem determine how broadly populations are affected and whether the issue is appropriate to deal with at the national, regional, state, or local level. 2. Pete Stark testified that homelessness in some southwestern cities, such as Phoenix, increased when people moved into the region in search of work for jobs that were not forthcoming. 3. Enterprise zones were a neoliberal response to unemployment in which specific low-income communities were able to apply for tax incentives and infrastructure monies to promote job creation. Enterprise zones also allowed for reductions in regulations. 4. Because the official unemployment rate only counts active job seekers, it does not include people who have given up searching for work. At the time, it was believed that when discouraged nonactive job seekers were added, the number would be significantly higher. 5. An additional study funded by HHS began but was not published until the passage of the McKinney Act; it examined an initiative funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and Pew Charitable Trust in conjunction with the US Conference on Mayors called Health Care for the Homeless. The program provided $1.4 million to eighteen cities to provide resources to meet the health and social service needs of the homeless. The findings from congressional testimony suggested that the program was largely an important vehicle for health care triage and did not widely contribute to housing for homeless people.

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6. Over half of the articles we reviewed included structural explanations for homelessness in their causes, but most of the solutions were limited to individual interventions only, or had a greater emphasis on individual situations. For example, Pamela Fischer and colleagues (1986) wrote that the increase in homelessness was related to high unemployment, decreased public support, changes in the structure of families, the high cost of housing, and deinstitutionalization. The findings, however, pointed to psychopathology and alienation as the characteristics that separated homeless men from men who were not homeless; the authors noted that additional research was needed on the homeless in order to “develop more appropriate models of delivering services” (p. 523). Madeleine Stoner (1983) identified four structural antecedents for homelessness. Despite her leanings toward structural causality and recognition of the positive impact of dignity and privacy for homeless people, Stoner’s policy recommendations support a problem orientation resting on the individual and calling for greater complexity of service access. 7. Cross-sectional studies can be problematic as they tend to capture “chronic cases” well and tend to miss the underlying dynamics of a problem. Scholars and policymakers alike relied upon cross-sectional studies for most of the 1980s. Marybeth Shinn (1992) offered an excellent critique of the methodological issues affecting early research on homeless people. 8. The Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation published two special issues highlighting the findings from the research sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health Administration and the Alcohol, Drug, and Mental Health Administration. 9. The city of Boston’s Emergency Shelter Commission issued a report stating that the results of the Boston count were not representative of the problem, as a number of people had been missed, specifically noting that surveyors did not go into abandoned buildings, dumpsters, parking garages, and other such places. The city count in Pittsburgh may have also overlooked people hiding in places not designed for shelter. The city is divided by three rivers, with numerous bridges and highways offering underpasses and areas hidden from view. It is important to note that Pittsburgh steadily lost population throughout the 1980s. While the county that Pittsburgh sits within, Allegheny County, had point-in-time homeless counts ranging from 1,265 to 1,573 between 2010 and 2014 (Allegheny County Department of Human Services 2015), in the most recent annual homeless point-in-time count, Pittsburgh was classified as a smaller city with among the lowest counts of chronically homeless at 117 (Henry et al. 2017), a figure not far from the count of homeless people reported in the mid-1980s. 10. In addition, Sharon Bell testified before the committee as a whistleblower. Bell was hired to conduct interviews. In her instructions she was told to define a metropolitan area as a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), rather than a Ranally Metropolitan Area. In a letter to Jack Brooks, chairman of the Committee on Government Operations of the 99th House of Representatives, lawyers representing the Community for Creative Non-Violence asked that Peroff be investigated for perjury and contempt of the Congress. The letter cited numerous examples of inconsistency between the testimony and the actual research protocol. For example, Peroff made clear that HUD did not mislead respondents. Yet testimony by Bell and Stark (as well as an individual not previously mentioned in this text—Reverend Ronald Pouge from Houston) indicated otherwise (Carol Fennelly Papers). 11. A report by the General Accounting Office in 1985 noted that the reliability of both the CCNV numbers and the HUD numbers was questionable.

5 Early Federal Policy and the Fight for the McKinney Act

By the mid-1980s, employees and volunteers in the nonprofit sector and municipal government were exhausted from working in a context of high need and few resources for homeless people while lack of shelter space across the country contributed to additional deaths.1 Moreover, those workers along with advocates were deeply concerned by the actions of the federal government as it continued to minimize, ignore, and distance itself from the problem of homelessness. Not only did the government’s position result in meager resources, but it also signaled the strength of the administration’s commitment to a neoliberal approach to poverty. In this chapter we explore the drive for federal legislation and its result: the Stewart B. McKinney Act itself. The historical record is clear: the McKinney Act was a compromise between what advocates knew was needed for immediate relief, what was needed to end homelessness, as well as what could be passed legislatively. Immediate relief got through, but measures to end homelessness were largely held back in hope that they would emerge at another time, in a more supportive environment. On the positive side, the act released money, but more important it made clear that the federal government had a responsibility to address homelessness (Foscarinis 1991, 2004, 2018). In recognition of the incremental nature of policy in the United States, the advocates knew that by getting aid to homeless people into the purview of federal appropriations, the act might then serve as a wedge to further open the policy process. The administration’s position was also affirmed through the McKinney Act, which endorsed a view of homelessness as a short-term emergency (largely stemming from deinstitutionalization), rather than a structural problem exacerbated by neoliberal policies. Moreover, the act prioritized aid for

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the traditionally worthy poor, over structural reforms. Finally, the act served to dilute the support of those engaged in broader advocacy by the single focus on the emergency nature of homelessness. Consider Frances Piven and Richard Cloward’s seminal work on poverty, Regulating the Poor (1993), in which they argued that during times of crisis, relief is provided by the government in order to maintain civil order, or just enough action is taken to take the edge off an issue for the purposes of quelling public concern. We also find that within the history of the McKinney Act, particularly advocacy to fund prevention efforts and affordable housing, there was the potential to reorient society away from the continued production and normalization of homelessness. Through the omnibus nature of the act, and its creation of a coordinating body to promote interagency collaboration, there was also the possibility of a broad reach. To contextualize the federal response, we begin by tracing federal legislation enacted between 1983, when money was first allocated to the problem of homelessness, and the passage of the McKinney Act in 1987. Federal Policies, 1983–1986 As discussed in earlier chapters, by the early 1980s it had been established beyond doubt that homelessness was increasing in the nation’s large cities. Advocates and those engaged in early efforts to provide emergency assistance were banging on the doors of Congress to gain support for federal acknowledgment of the problem and a federal response to what appeared to be a growing crisis. Congress seemed the most likely entity for federal support, as Democrats held a majority in the House in 1983 and had a history of backing federal social welfare programs, including housing programs. But Republicans held a majority in the Senate, which in addition to its own limitations made a presidential veto difficult to overcome. By 1983, Congress was able to pass some piecemeal efforts to respond to homelessness. But implementation of these efforts was the responsibility of the president’s administrative appointees across multiple agencies, with leaders loyal to the president’s neoliberal agenda. The implementation of the initial federal responses foreshadowed the latter McKinney Act and its implementation in the hands of Reagan administration agency leaders. Federal Emergency Management Agency

From the beginning of the crisis, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) played a critical role in addressing homelessness. Between 1983 and 1986, three different appropriations totaling $210 million were granted to FEMA for food and shelter to homeless people. The first appropriation dated

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to 1983, when Congress passed Public Law 98-8, the Emergency Jobs Appropriation Act. Title I of the act was called “Meeting Our Economic Problems with Essential and Productive Jobs” and included a section titled “Food Distribution and Emergency Shelters,” which appropriated $100 million for an emergency food and shelter program. By inserting the word “emergency” into the act’s provisions, the architects of the law underscored the idea that homelessness was an emergency and reinforced the notion that homelessness was a temporary phenomenon. Statements within the act’s provisions also supported the inference that homelessness was a temporary problem for society. For example, the money could be used by nonprofit organizations to expand services or purchase supplies such as blankets, but it could not be used for more permanent and much needed measures such as staff or buildings. When that act first passed, funds were split, and two strategies for disbursing monies for food and shelter programs as quickly as possible were tested. Congress appropriated half of the funds for a model supported by the Senate and the other half for a model supported by the House. In the Senate’s version money was distributed to the states, and the amount that went to each state was determined by the community development block grant (CDBG) formula (which was related to the size of the poverty population and unemployment). States then decided how to allocate the funds at the local level. The House’s version used a public-private-sector partnership model for the distribution of money in which the nation’s large charitable organizations had significant power. Under the House-designed program, FEMA had to create a national board of seven members with a FEMA representative chairing the board. The other six members were nominated (one each) by the United Way of America, Salvation Army, National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, Catholic Charities USA, Council of Jewish Federations, and the American Red Cross. The FEMA director was required to move appropriated funds as grants to the national board. The national board then decided how the monies were disbursed to the local level. To receive FEMA funds at the local level, the money had to go to a local board (constituted in the same way as the national board). Consistent with the Reagan administration’s focus on federalism and local responsibility for social welfare, the local boards determined how funds were distributed, and were charged with monitoring their progress, and reporting to the national board on planned spending (General Accounting Office, May 1991). The same amount of money ($50 million) was given to each approach (McCarthy 2012). Within a year, the House approach became the preferred approach, with established charities, including religious charities, exerting significant control over public expenditures (McCarthy 2012). Although private charities advocated for giving the program to FEMA rather than to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (due to HUD’s

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disinterest in addressing homelessness) (McCarthy 2012), and lauded the program as a model public-private partnership that got funds out effectively and quickly (Homelessness in America II 1984, pp. 141–142, 305), there were some issues. The restrictions prohibiting its use of money for staff, and insufficient funding for the need, were issues frequently mentioned by providers (Homelessness in America II 1984). With respect to concerns about insufficient resources, FEMA board member Mark Talisman spoke to the difficult allocation choices the board faced given a $70 million budget for “a multibillion problem” (Homelessness in America 1987, p. 63). This was underscored in Lillian Gelberg’s discussion of FEMA funding; she cited a House Committee on Government Operations finding that all of FEMA’s emergency food and shelter funds for homeless assistance for fiscal years 1983 to 1985 would not have met the need for fiscal year 1985 in New York City alone (Gelberg 1993). Religious and nonprofit providers, as well as state and local governments, appreciated FEMA funds, but repeatedly noted the program was a “Band-Aid,” not an adequate replacement for federal funding of permanent housing, income maintenance, and economic opportunity (Homelessness in America II 1984). Nor was this approach necessarily the most economical in all locations. Louisa Stark, of Phoenix, testified that as a result of the funding strategy the local board in Phoenix was sending significant sums to “large costly programs administered by large social service agencies” (Homelessness in America II 1984, pp. 206–207). Smaller, potentially less costly programs lacking “national representation” were “passed over” (p. 207). Despite the Reagan administration’s view that the problem of homelessness was a short-term emergency, FEMA leadership and administrative staff seemed to have a more realistic view. In 1985, FEMA representatives specifically did not ask for additional funds. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report (April 1985) noted that FEMA representatives did not want to be engaged in long-term administration of programs, and that the response to homelessness seemed to call for this. While reluctant, the FEMA board found itself in the position of providing services to homeless people as additional money was allocated to the agency for that purpose. But the FEMA board remained clear that based on the agency’s mission and resources, FEMA was not an appropriate agency to address the problems of homelessness. Senator John Heinz testified that FEMA was saying: “We don’t want to help the homeless. We just want big natural disasters. People disasters are not our business” (Homelessness in America 1987, p. 4). Department of Defense

In the wake of the Vietnam War, as the military reduced its forces significantly, the Department of Defense (DOD) began the work of downsizing

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and consolidating its publicly owned real estate by realigning and closing bases, a development that was carried out for years (Twiss and Martin 1999). With the DOD being the largest public landlord in the country (Hartman and Drayer 1990), advocates viewed its need to unload significant amounts of property as an opportunity to create shelter and affordable housing. Repurposing military facilities to serve homeless people, however, required investment to renovate buildings, as well as to undertake environmental cleanup (Congressional Budget Office 1996). The DOD received $8 million through Public Law 98-94 to make military facilities and other services available to shelter homeless people. Under the law, the DOD was directed to partner with local governments or nonprofit organizations, which would have to address the operations of the shelter, as the program provided money only for building and rehabilitation. The law also specified that the process of decommissioning DOD property could not interfere with military functions. Of the $8 million appropriated, only $900,000 ended up being set aside to establish shelters. Although the DOD had reported that it had 600 military housing installations in about 382 communities that might offer needed shelter, only two communities had funds set aside for projects by the fall of 1984, one in California and one in Philadelphia (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, pp. 200–201). In early October of 1984, some members of the House of Representatives learned that the rest of the $8 million appropriated had been “reprogrammed” by the DOD for purposes that offered no benefit to homeless people. Testifying before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Joseph Delfico of the General Accounting Office and a program evaluator accompanying him reported on the DOD shelter program. The evaluator, Paul Wright, reported that the balance of the shelter money went to “reserve fix-up operations” (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1984, p. 201). Wright noted that the appropriated funds had been placed in an Army reserve account because reserve centers would be likely targets for conversion to shelter use. Under questioning by Congressman Ted Weiss, Delfico reported that the DOD had notified the defense-related authorizations and appropriations committees of the House and Senate of its intent to use the funds for other purposes; hearing no objections within the required period, the DOD was free to repurpose the remaining $7.1 million (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, pp. 201–202). In written and verbal testimony in 1984 and in a subsequent General Accounting Office report (April 1985), multiple reasons were given for the lack of community interest in the DOD shelter program. First, local governments or nonprofit organizations did not have the funds to operate the facilities, as participation would mean taking on significant costs without additional resources (General Accounting Office, April 1985). Second, the geographical position of the sites offered were far from ideal, as they were

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often located in remote areas (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 202). Third, as others have found, base commanders have significant control of property under their command (Barrera and Maldonado 1990), and the requirements that some base commanders put in place for use of their facilities seemed overly restrictive to potential shelter providers (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1984, p. 202). House members expressed concern about the program. Speaking late in a hearing, on the nineteenth day of a fast, Mitch Snyder from the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) went beyond concern and skepticism to outrage over federal action on surplus property stating: “DOD let that money slip through its hands because DOD has absolutely no desire or intention of housing homeless people because the President of the United States has absolutely no desire or intention of housing homeless people” (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 306). Concerns with the program continued after the 1984 hearing. A lawsuit was filed against the DOD for failure to establish regulations to implement its homeless shelter program years after its passage. The plaintiffs in the case included a homeless man, Barry Bruce; a nonprofit shelter for homeless people, Columbus House; and the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH). The court memorandum noted: “Plaintiffs complain that the absence of implementing regulations has resulted in ad hoc and ineffective administration of the shelter program” (Bruce et al. v. United States Department of Defense et al., June 16, 1987, as corrected June 26, 1987). In the memorandum the judge noted that the DOD had more than three years to develop needed regulations to implement the law yet prior to the lawsuit “there was no evidence that defendants intended to adopt them.” In June of 1987, shortly before passage of the McKinney Act, the court ordered the DOD to issue final regulations and for proposed regulations to serve in their absence until they were issued. Through the DOD’s participation in the Task Force on Food and Shelter for the Homeless, of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the DOD also agreed to help ease access to surplus military food for local food banks (Gelberg 1993). Delfico and Wright reported limited success on this front. Of over 125 contracts, the GAO had information indicating that some 25 surplus military food arrangements had been fulfilled (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 204). Department of Housing and Urban Development

The Housing and Urban Recovery Act of 1983 authorized $60 million to HUD for an emergency shelter program. However, according to the GAO, HUD representatives did not seek this money, nor did they have an interest in launching this program. Instead, HUD representatives indicated that

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homeless people were best served through local efforts, using existing programs, such as community development block grants, and not by the development of a new federal program. To enable CDBG funds to be used to support homeless people HUD first issued a notice of its intent to expedite funds for homeless people; second, it initiated a procedural change to allow local governments to use their CDBG money for services to homeless people. Secretary Pierce reminded grantees that money could also be used to coordinate local volunteers to “augment and leverage” funds to address the problem of homelessness, lease some vacant single-family housing, and use HUD property for emergency shelter. Perhaps due to the secretary’s reluctance to take on the emergency shelter program, HUD’s shelter program appropriation was moved to FEMA. In 1985, HUD reported to the GAO that from 1983 to 1985, $53 million from the CDBG program had gone to addressing homelessness (General Accounting Office, April 1985). Not all efforts to target these funds to help homeless people were successful. Hearing testimony in 1984 on supplemental CDBG funds from a 1983 jobs bill indicated that in at least one city in the nation, the funds went to a construction project that may have displaced homeless people from a park they frequented (Homelessness in America II 1984, p. 206). As discussed by Gelberg (1993), as a member of the HHS-headed Federal Task Force on Food and Shelter (discussed later), HUD made program changes between 1983 and 1985 to ease access to housing for homeless people. The agency approved having its public housing authorities grant priority access for emergency admissions to homeless people, giving them a better spot in line on years-long waiting lists. As noted by researcher Dennis Culhane (1992), prioritizing homeless people could incentivize use of emergency shelters to gain access to limited public housing units. HUD also agreed to have its regional directors offer $1-per-year leases on its stock of vacant (foreclosed) single-family housing units to mayors and nonprofits if used to house homeless people (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 290). These efforts did not result in much use of HUD’s vacant single-family housing stock for emergency housing for homeless people (Gelberg 1993). The agency also agreed to consider waivers of Section 8 housing program regulations so that federal assistance could be used to develop single-room-occupancy housing. Department of Health and Human Services

As advocates scanned government departments seeking allies who could provide meaningful help to homeless people, HHS was a logical partner because it administered the nation’s mainstream social welfare and human service programs. “Mainstream” is the term used for those programs that homeless people and nonhomeless people utilize as well. These programs

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included medical insurances for frail, disabled, and poor people (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid) as well as important income support programs (e.g., Supplemental Security Income [SSI] and Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]). For those people who are eligible for mainstream programs, they can play a critical role in moving them into housing. In addition to functioning as a mainstream program, AFDC also included an emergency assistance program that could be used for homeless families. The program could pay for housing for poor children and their families in existing shelters. As Gelberg noted (1993), however, not all states participated in the program, it was not sufficient to meet the needs of homeless families, and HHS was not providing sufficient oversight of the state-run programs. Like HUD, HHS also administered an important block grant, the community services block grant, which helped to meet the needs of some homeless people. Local governments reported targeting 20 percent of their 1983 fiscal year community services block-grant funds to emergency services, including services that would provide assistance to homeless people (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis, 1985, p. 191). Although HHS was not given a new program in the early 1980s specific to homeless people, it was asked to create and oversee the Federal Interagency Task Force on Food and Shelter, chaired by Harvey Vieth. Given its role in the task force, HHS had an important leadership role in promoting solutions to problems of homelessness, including reducing barriers to HHS’s existing programs, as well as those of the other federal member agencies. At the same time, the task force’s underlying assumptions were clearly in keeping with the president’s neoliberal framework. The task force’s job was to act as a broker between the public and private sector to support the use of existing federal resources, including buildings, to aid homeless people. One example of such a partnership developed between HHS and the CCNV in regard to the 2nd and D Streets shelter (Rader 1986). One of the first things that the Interagency Task Force did was to develop a working group to put together a briefing paper on homelessness for the president. The administrative response to the paper within HHS garnered critical questions for Chairperson Vieth during a congressional hearing. The full text of the paper was made part of the hearing record. The findings in the paper contradicted the administration’s position that homelessness was an exaggerated problem and that those living on the street were there by choice. The report used a broad definition of homelessness, acknowledging homeless people were in many places other than on the street. Having consulted with a variety of interests, the working group’s briefing paper stated that homelessness had “structural” and “individual” causes (specifically using these terms) that were “highly interactive” (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 227). Included under structural causes were economic change and “urban reconstruction,” which led to dislocation.

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The paper reported that a percentage of homeless people used existing programs and benefits, including income supports, food stamps, veteran pensions, and emergency cash assistance. It raised the prospect that many more people either were not eligible for benefits (due to insufficient work histories, hence among the unworthy poor), or were barred from participation because they were institutionalized (e.g., in a shelter or transitional housing). Education, outreach, and changes to policy to ease access to needed resources were recommended. This was significant as it contradicted administrative efforts to cut program rolls. While the briefing paper’s recommendations offered a variety of federal options for action, an HHS analysis of the paper characterized it as “initial thinking” and called for more analysis and discussion prior to “implementing any particular option” (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 264). Congressman Ted Weiss characterized the disconnect between the original briefing paper and later HHS communication as representing “at the very least ambivalence, perhaps bordering on schizophrenia, as to what in fact HHS thinks ought to be done about the problem” (Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis 1985, p. 264). He also raised critical questions about support and staffing for the HHS task force. Beyond producing the briefing paper, the Interagency Task Force developed agreements with other federal agencies to make their programs and properties more useful in aiding homeless people. As discussed earlier, agencies developed agreements to offer surplus food to pantries and to ease access to affordable and vacant property. In addition to DOD and HUD agreements, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) agreed to offer $1per-year leases on its vacant Farmer’s Home Administration single-family housing units to provide shelters, resulting in a limited pilot program (Gelberg 1993). An agreement was also developed with the General Services Administration to make available its surplus property, launching a program that while adopted later as part of the McKinney Act, was known for its failures rather than its successes. Health Care for the Homeless

Although issues of health were within the mission of HHS, the leadership on delivering accessible health care to homeless people emerged elsewhere. As late as December of 1986, in a hearing titled Health Care for the Homeless, Congressman Henry Waxman noted federal inaction on the issue and congressional failure to pass the Health Care for the Homeless Act, introduced by Mickey Leland. Changes to Medicaid were signed into law to help eligible homeless people access the important health insurance program (Health Care for the Homeless 1987). But efforts to fund actual development and delivery of services were lacking.

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Instead, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trust led the way on funding the actual delivery of health care as well as testing methods to do so (Health Care for the Homeless 1986). Like experts in the field, leaders from these private funders and city mayors understood how essential medical care was for homeless people, given their vulnerability to exposure-based illnesses and their lack of health insurance and access to care (Brickner et al. 1986; Robertson and Cousineau 1986). The foundation and the trust issued a request for proposals in 1984 to fifty large cities and to Puerto Rico for coalition-based programs to address the health care needs of homeless people, ultimately investing $25 million in a public-private partnership called the Health Care for the Homeless Demonstration Project (Health Care for the Homeless 1987, p. 14). The coalition-based projects were “to encourage existing agencies and groups within each of the cities to build a network of resources that will deliver hands-on health and social services to homeless people” (Brickner et al. 1986). In 1985, nineteen cities received grants of up to $1.4 million each, providing care to many in cities across the country. The GAO noted that the early demonstration projects were developed to demonstrate that homeless people needed health services and accepted them when delivered in ways that promoted dignity and in settings where homeless people were already located (General Accounting Office, February 1990, p. 50). These successful projects informed legislators and provided a framework for a federally funded health care service project that later became part of the McKinney Act (Health Care for the Homeless 1990; National Health Care for the Homeless Council 2008). During the 1986 Health Care for the Homeless hearing, members of Congress heard from homeless people who had suffered trying to get needed care. They heard from leaders of projects funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and Pew Charitable Trust on what was working and what the federal government could and should be doing. They heard from prominent citizens engaged in mental health advocacy about why mental health care was needed and how it might best be delivered. They also heard from legal advocate Maria Foscarinis, who figured prominently in the development of the McKinney Act, that people were literally dying from environmental exposure, and that they needed accessible health and mental health care and affordable housing to get them off the streets and out of the shelters (Health Care for the Homeless 1987). Veterans Administration, Volunteers in Service to America, and Department of Agriculture

These agencies developed some small initiatives to support homeless people prior to 1987. For example, the Veterans Administration (VA) began an

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outreach program in New York City to help homeless veterans apply for benefits. The Volunteers in Service to America program by 1985 had placed close to 200 volunteers in programs working with homeless people. The USDA made surplus food available for use in homeless shelters and soup kitchens through its Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP). Additionally, the Department of Agriculture made it easier for homeless people to access food stamps by loosening up residency requirements for benefits. The Advocates’ Campaign for a Comprehensive Federal Response By the mid-1980s, Robert Hayes and the NCH decided it was time to push for federal attention to the issue of homelessness. As the fight for serious federal aid began, Hayes was quoted as saying, “If the politicians understand that people want something done, that’s better than a court order” (Daley 1987, p. B1). Foscarinis then left her law firm position to go to Washington, D.C., to establish an office for the NCH and to spearhead a campaign for a federal response. She began working with a group of legal service providers to craft their list of needs and ideas into a legislative proposal (Foscarinis personal communication, April 30, 2016). She retained many of the original ideas formulated within the group of advisers and added pieces that reflected additional viewpoints. For example, there was agreement that legislation needed to contain a provision for a national right to shelter (Foscarinis personal communication, April 30, 2016). Homeless Persons’ Survival Act: A Bill Before Congress, 1985–1986

Foscarinis’s work resulted in a bill called the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act of 1986. The legislation was designed to provide comprehensive “immediate and responsible federal action . . . to alleviate the immediate misery of homelessness while also addressing its precipitating and longterm causes.” The structure of the bill was particularly innovative. First, it was distinctive for its omnibus approach, which meant that its provisions affected a number of administrative agencies including HHS (under which the Social Security Administration falls), HUD, the DOD, the Department of Education, and the Department of Labor. The inclusion of multiple departments allowed the bill to take a holistic approach that covered a swathe of needs that homeless people had, and avoided placing all of the power with any one department or agency, including HUD and FEMA, that were not invested in taking on the problem. Second, knowing that the

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country’s preference for legislation involved incremental changes to existing statutes being applied to a new social problem or population, rather than the development of entirely different approaches, most of the proposal involved amendments to standing legislation. As the following discussion shows, the Survival Act comprised three components or titles: emergency relief, preventive measures, and long-term solutions.

Title I: Urgent relief to the homeless. Title I declared that every homeless person and family was entitled to decent overnight shelter. Each emergency shelter would have or could provide access to a number of services, including health and mental health care and access to outreach workers who could assist with securing benefits. Title I also sought to amend existing programs under the Social Security Act. For example, barriers to receiving benefits would be removed. A permanent address would no longer be required to receive benefits from AFDC, the VA, and Medicaid. The existing benefits programs would be expanded to include emergency assistance for homeless people and families. The Food Stamp Act would be expanded so that programs that fed homeless people could redeem food stamps. The Educational Provisions Act would be amended so that all schools receiving federal funding must provide access to education for all homeless children. The Job Training Partnership Act would be expanded to include homeless people in its definition for eligibility to participate in its programs (Hombs 2011). Title II: Preventive measures. Prevention measures were cast as both cost-

effective and important for the well-being of individuals and families. Prevention efforts saved on service costs and allowed individuals and families to avoid a number of the deleterious effects of homelessness. The first prevention strategy was designed to help people avoid eviction from both public and private housing. Public housing regulations would be changed so that a set of conditions had to be met before eviction. In the private sector, eviction prevention involved a grant fund within HUD that could be used to make rent payments to landlords to avoid eviction. Another prevention strategy provided for funds such as the CDBG monies to preserve low-income housing (such as single-room-occupancy units and appropriate rural alternatives). Additionally, in an attempt to prevent homelessness among families receiving AFDC, the AFDC rules would be modified so that families could retain benefits if they moved in with extended families. The third prevention strategy fell under the prevention of homelessness for disabled and institutionalized persons. This subtitle sought to open public housing to individuals with mental illness as well as to amend the Social Security Act to provide immediate payments to people with chronic mental illness, and to limit disruptions to Social Security benefits by allowing indi-

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viduals to collect them while institutionalized (for up to three months). To place the importance of this provision in context, when Social Security payments are disrupted, in many cases the lengthy process of reapplication begins anew, leaving the person without income until benefits are restored. Additionally, the bill introduced procedures to protect people discharged from psychiatric hospitals from ending up on the street; it required patients to have a discharge plan. Without a discharge plan, people leaving psychiatric hospitals experienced what advocates, and others at times called “dumping” (Hombs 2011).

Title III: Long-term solutions. This title, covering increased access to lowincome housing, is in our view the most important part of the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act, as it was the part of the bill that provided housing and a longer-term solution to the problem of homelessness. Specifically, additional public housing units and subsidized housing vouchers would be

Dumping

To place the bill’s requirement for discharge planning in context, on multiple occasions I or another shelter provider received someone in the middle of the night, dropped off in a taxi procured by a psychiatric facility, as part of discharge. I remember one such occasion vividly. The taxi driver walked to the front door of the shelter with a woman, still wearing hospital clothing, including slippers. The woman had three days of medicine, typically given upon release, and prescriptions. At the time, none of the D.C. shelters had a health care clinic to help homeless people fill prescriptions. The woman had been in the hospital for an extended period of time, and therefore, to collect Social Security Disability, she had to reenroll in the program. In the best-case scenario, there would be records of her past participation in the program, and the reinstatement would only take a matter of months. In the worst-case scenario, she would have to receive a new diagnosis, which required us to get her an appointment with a psychiatrist who volunteered at a D.C. drop-in center for homeless women. I do not recall what ultimately happened to the woman, but I do remember the next day making phone calls to find a volunteer who would accompany her to the Social Security office to begin the process of connecting her with mainstream programs. —Elizabeth Beck

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created and used to address the scarcity of low-income housing. Properties that had been foreclosed due to unpaid taxes could be used for housing. Additionally, residences would be created for the chronically mentally ill, to address the lack of support and planning for deinstitutionalization. A Legislative Strategy and a Win

With the content of the bill agreed on, it was time for Foscarinis to get the bill before Congress. Without question, Foscarinis and the NCH set a very high bar when they sought passage of the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act. Not only did the act violate the neoliberal agenda of small government and less spending, but also its passage would stop the evisceration of lowincome housing and require significant resources. As Foscarinis worked to develop and coordinate the legislative strategy for passage, she began establishing relationships in Congress and lobbying. Initially, Foscarinis explained, she found it very hard to get anyone to take the legislation seriously: “Even people who I thought were friends. Liberal Democrats would say that they were sympathetic, it was great I was doing this, they wished me the best of luck, but they had an election coming up and homeless people did not vote” (Foscarinis personal communication, April 30, 2016; see also Foscarinis 1991; Ifill 1990). In testimony, she reflected on the response she received, stating, “again and again in visiting the offices of Members of Congress I have been struck by a dichotomy, a dichotomy between sympathy for the homeless privately expressed and a willingness to publicly take a stand for the homeless. I have been told that political reality prevents Members of this Congress from publicly taking a position” (Homelessness in America 1987, p. 73). Rather than giving in to barriers to congressional support, Foscarinis focused on people who voted (Foscarinis 1991). Specifically, she activated the voting and the lobbying power found within the NCH. At the time, the NCH had a large national board and a strong network of supporters. She knew that if homeless people did not vote, then people who worked with them or cared about the issue did (Foscarinis personal communication, April 30, 2016). Using the network of NCH members and affiliates, Foscarinis reached out to service providers, volunteers, and concerned individuals across the country, asking them to support the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act. Local coalitions for homeless people had opened across the country. In fact, the New York Times noted that the coalition started in New York City in 1981 with a budget of $75,000 had grown and by the fall of 1987 was described as a $1.2 million enterprise (Daley 1987). Letters were written, calls were made, and these individuals got others (including influential people) to do the same. That, according to Foscarinis, “made a difference,” and eventually she was able to convince Mickey Leland of Texas,

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well known for his work on hunger issues at home and abroad, to become the first person to sign on as sponsor2 (Foscarinis personal communication, April 30, 2016; Foscarinis 1991). Then slowly, and with more ease, she was able to get another sponsor, and another, until sixty people in the House supported the bill. In the Senate, Al Gore and Patrick Moynihan sponsored the bill, and there was even some bipartisan support. Republican Pete Domenici from New Mexico was described by Foscarinis as an instrumental supporter of the bill, whose concern about the issue of homelessness was personal as he had a family member with mental health needs (Foscarinis personal communication, April 30, 2016; Sontag 2002).3 Although these efforts won some support for the bill, passage was essentially far off. But Foscarinis’s strategy was to push for action on pieces of the bill while also promoting the bill as a whole. This strategy was successful. Within less than a year of her move to Washington, D.C., Foscarinis was able to usher through several pieces of the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act, in a bill called the Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act (1986). At the same time, the Homeless Housing Act (1986) was also passed. Although each of these carried very little cost, they could potentially make a real difference for some homeless people. The Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act was passed early in the legislative session as a change to existing law. The act stated that individuals no longer needed a permanent address in order to receive Social Security benefits, AFDC, veterans’ benefits, food stamps, and Medicaid (Foscarinis 1996). This administrative change had the potential to lift out of homelessness those people who were otherwise eligible for benefits. The smaller act also worked to help prevent indigent individuals leaving institutions such as psychiatric facilities, jails, and prisons from becoming homeless by creating a pre-release program that allowed eligible people in such institutions to apply for food stamps and federal disability benefits prior to their release (Foscarinis 1996). Thus, the act had the potential to end the pattern of releases in which hospital personnel gave a taxi driver the name of a shelter as an address and the person was discharged with three days of medicine and a prescription. The Homeless Housing Act created two small grant programs, the Emergency Shelter Grant Program, located within HUD and funded at $10 million, and the Transitional Housing Demonstration Program. Through the use of a formula-funding process, HUD allocated monies to local governments that could be used to establish new shelters or support existing shelters. In the latter, nonprofit organizations or local governments engaged in a competitive-grant program to develop transitional housing. However, everyone involved in the passage of the bills knew that much more was needed, and these individuals included a number of sympathetic members of Congress.

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Not Enough

The incremental wins of 1986 also caught the attention of Mitch Snyder and the CCNV. As the winter of 1986–1987 approached, Foscarinis and Snyder began to explore the possibility of teaming up to begin a campaign for federal legislation. As Foscarinis explained, Mitch believed that it was important to pass, if nothing else, emergency measures, and proposed mounting a joint winter campaign. Foscarinis had to make a difficult and calculated decision: to join with Snyder in a winter campaign for emergency relief or to continue with her original strategy of incrementally pushing pieces of the larger, more comprehensive bill. Foscarinis noted the ramifications of the choice: “a winter campaign focusing on immediate crisis needs would have more political currency; however, this same calculation risked perpetuating the notion that emergency relief—such as shelter—could serve as a solution to homelessness” (2004, p. 6). She also feared that any short-term win risked coming at the expense of a long-term strategy. But Foscarinis also thought she could try to do both: to work for immediate, emergency relief while also keeping a focus on the need for a longer-term, comprehensive response. While Foscarinis and Snyder agreed to focus on emergency relief, Foscarinis also made sure that bills were crafted in ways that would leave open the potential for expansion. In this regard, the bill on emergency measures also included small provisions for prevention and permanent housing, and it retained both the Survival Act’s omnibus orientation and its focus on amending existing provisions. She made sure that the Survival Act was reintroduced in the new Congress in its entirety, with Mickey Leland again as lead sponsor in the House, and Gore in the Senate. Title I of the Survival Act would also constitute the new emergency initiative. The decision that confronted the advocates is common in the US policy context. Compromises often have to be made between getting what is desired and getting anything at all. Choosing to address homelessness as an emergency in the context of potential loss of life also supported the logic of the decision. Even though both Foscarinis and Snyder were dedicated to all of the original provisions in the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act, they agreed to pull out aspects of it and divide it into separate bills for separate action. For example, one of the provisions supported a national right to shelter, while another ensured shelter only for homeless parents and their infants. Also, the prevention aspects of the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act were separated into a stand-alone bill. Other small bills supported transitional living programs for homeless youth, as well as education and job training for homeless youth. Additional bills addressed the issue of health care for homeless people and food assistance. Although these bills did not get the lobbying attention of Title I, the assumption was that through their

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exposure, they would help to educate members of Congress about the issues so that support could be garnered for future action. Urgent Relief for the Homeless: A Winter Campaign

With the 100th Congress approaching, Foscarinis and Snyder threw themselves into action for passage of the bill titled Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act (formerly Title 1 of the larger Survival Act). In the fall of 1986, Foscarinis and Snyder worked to secure a coalition of organizations that would sign on to the passage of the bill, while the NCH and CCNV led the effort and committed staff support. In November a press conference was held in front of the 2nd and D Streets shelter to introduce the bill to the public and to announce that the CCNV and NCH would be leading a winter campaign to support its passage. Hayes and other advocates came from across the country to support the cause, and Snyder announced that on Thanksgiving he would take up residence on a heat grate located near the

Lobbying

Lobbying is a cooperative endeavor that involves specific skills and tools. In his book How to Lobby Congress: A Guide for the Citizen Lobbyist, Donald deKieffer (1982) provides his own set of what reads like rules for lobbying. These include: know your issue and know your enemy as well as your friends; develop an action plan to include press contacts; and recruit members of Congress to support your effort. Today many organizations, including the NCH, have tool kits for citizen lobbyists that include fact sheets about the current issue as well as information on how to contact members of Congress, how to write a letter to a representative, and how to write an editorial. The tool kits often note that once contact has been made with a representative of Congress, follow-up is important. They also note the importance of staff. For example, deKieffer explains, “Staffers are the backbone of the Hill. No legislation is defeated or passed without their agreement or at least acquiescence” (1982, p. 100). Effective lobbying involves these activities at the federal level by lobbyists and individuals traveling to D.C. to meet with representatives. At the same time, local events ranging from marches to teach-ins are often held to encourage community members to become involved in the effort and to lobby their members of Congress.

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Capitol to call attention to the needs of homeless people and the importance of the bill. Moving forward, Snyder, the CCNV, Foscarinis, and the NCH worked together, with each focusing on what they knew best. For Foscarinis it was gaining support through a sophisticated lobbying effort. For Snyder and the CCNV this meant engaging in a direct action campaign. Fennelly worked the phones in support of each effort.

Gaining support: An unlikely pair. Between the fall of 1986 when they

first turned their attention to the bill (Urgent Relief for the Homeless) and the start of the 100th legislative session in January 1987, the alliance of activists in the winter campaign visited congressional offices. On January 8, the start of the 100th session of Congress, the bill was introduced in the House by Democratic representative Thomas Foley of Washington state with fifty-four original cosponsors, including seven Republicans. Among the original Republican cosponsors, Stewart B. McKinney of Connecticut was listed first. A moderate Republican, he was the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. By March 3 of 1987, the bill had 111 cosponsors. Fennelly remembers making calls to every member of Congress, between the fall of 1986 and the passage of the bill in 1987, to set up office visits for Synder and Foscarinis (Fennelly personal communication, June 8, 2016). Although Foscarinis cannot say for sure that they visited every member of Congress, she knows that it was at least very close. Foscarinis would wear a tailored suit and a proper winter coat when the weather required. Snyder had on jeans and his army jacket, with a blanket wrapped around himself for warmth. As Foscarinis said, “We were an odd pair, and it worked quite well. We presented really differently, but we had the same message, and that was very powerful” (Foscarinis personal communication, July 16, 2016). In addition to doing their own lobbying, Foscarinis and Snyder developed a team of supporters. Foscarinis secured pro bono support from the governmental relations office of the Covington and Burling legal firm, which included a former staff member for then–Republican Senate majority leader Bob Dole. This individual was very helpful in gaining bipartisan support and accompanied Foscarinis and Snyder on a number of their visits. Also helpful was a group of congressional staff members who formed a group titled Hill Staffers for the Hungry and Homeless. This group not only volunteered for programs that helped homeless people, but also kept the representatives for whom they worked abreast of the issue and need. Moreover, long-term congressional friends of Snyder’s and members with whom Foscarinis forged relationships during her work the previous year became strong advocates for the bill (Foscarinis personal communication, July 16, 2016). Toward cementing this set of relationships, Fennelly tells a story in which House majority whip Tony Coelho from California was invited to a

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CCNV house for dinner with herself and Snyder. Coelho was already a supporter of the bill, but Snyder always thought it would be helpful to strengthen their relationship. In Fennelly’s rush to prepare dinner, she realized that there were no wine glasses in the house, so she ran out and quickly bought a cheap set. At dinner, as they raised their glasses, Fennelly saw that she had forgotten to remove the price tags. Even with that faux pas, Fennelly remembers the night as successful (Fennelly personal communication, June 8, 2016). In a section titled “Friends in High Places” in her 2003 book Seasons Such As These, Cynthia Bogard discussed the increasing importance of James Wright—a Democrat from Texas who was elected Speaker of the House for the 100th Congress—in building a strong coalition and momentum for the passage of the bill in the House. In fact, Wright’s support included attending a hearing on the bill, and visiting the 2nd and D Streets shelter with Snyder. Having friends in high places extended to the Senate. The 1986 elections brought a Democratic majority to the Senate. The Democrats now had majorities in the House and Senate, but neither were veto-proof. Previous work yielded the support of the now–Senate minority leader, Republican Bob Dole from Kansas, who was the second senator to sign on to the bill following the signing of the lead sponsor, Robert Byrd, the Senate majority leader, on March 24.

Goal Now: Millions of Dollars

In the fall of 1986, I saw a performance in the House Rayburn Building in which former steelworkers told their stories. A box for donations was passed, and when I saw a $100 bill among the other donations, I thought about how many tampons we could buy with that money. I told Carol and Mitch, and not long afterward Carol secured a playwright and director to meld people’s stories into a performance piece titled Voice from the Streets. The timing was happenstance, but the performance was used to support passage of the bill. The first performance was at the Capitol and included actor Martin Sheen. Senator Edward Kennedy was a strong supporter. A second performance, hosted by Ethel Kennedy, was also geared to gaining legislative support. As for our need in the women’s shelter for petty cash to purchase necessary supplies, that would have to be addressed elsewhere, as the play was now a piece of the drive for millions of dollars in federal aid. —Elizabeth Beck

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Beyond political friends, Snyder’s and the CCNV’s circles extended into Hollywood. In May of 1986 CBS aired the movie Samaritan: The Mitch Snyder Story, staring Martin Sheen. Although celebrities had begun to gravitate to Snyder, Snyder’s relationship with Sheen developed into a deep friendship, which extended to Sheen using his connections and celebrity to build support for the bill. The CCNV’s name was informed by its choice of methods for direct action. Having studied nonviolence, Snyder and the community chose disruptive activities that were deliberately provocative and nonviolent in nature. Contemporary scholarship in the field of peace and conflict studies has documented the efficacy of nonviolent approaches to conflict and the potential for “constructive conflict engagement” built upon conflict resolution skills, nonviolent struggle, and a focus on achieving justice and peace (Coy 2009). On Thanksgiving Day of 1986 Snyder, accompanied by Michael Stoops, an advocate from Oregon, moved to a heat grate very near the Capitol, but that was not the only move to occur that day. Every year, the CCNV organized a large outdoor Thanksgiving dinner for homeless people, across the street from the White House. In 1986 the dinner was moved from the White House area to the Capitol lawn, where it became a part of the winter campaign as the CCNV began to serve a daily meal on the Capitol lawn. At the time, the Capitol was easily accessed and a popular spot for many tourists, which allowed the CCNV to play out its ideas about hunger in the land of plenty to large and diverse audiences. In 1986, Snyder and the CCNV commissioned Baltimore artist James Earl Reid to create a modern-day nativity scene in the form of a life-size sculpture of a man, woman, and infant on a heat grate. The heat grate was on top of a pedestal that allowed for the placement of dry ice that would create the appearance of steam emanating from the grate. The sculpture, titled, Third World America,4 was intended to be a part of the annual National Pageant of Peace and Christmas celebration held on the Ellipse, a small park behind the White House. The Pageant of Peace included the national Christmas tree and a large crèche. While the Park Service did not agree to the statue being a part of the Pageant of Peace, the CCNV was given a permit to place it on the Capitol lawn for a two-week period around the Christmas holiday. The permit expired on December 30, but each day forward it was renewed by a hill staffer for a twenty-four-hour period. As one might imagine, there were a host of reasons why the statue profoundly irritated some members of Congress. On January 9, 1987, Speaker Wright moved what would become the McKinney Act to the House floor and announced that it would be fast-tracked for voting. It is difficult to say whether there was an agreement, but Speaker Wright then got word to Snyder that the legislation was moving forward, and perhaps now the statue could be removed. Snyder made sure the heavy statue was removed the

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“Direct action” describes an approach common to social movements or social change efforts in which one group seeks to gain power from another to redistribute power and attain social justice (Alinsky 1989; Bobo, Kendall, and Max 2010). It has been argued that for this form of advocacy to work, one must be willing to employ tactics that disrupt the entrenched system. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward (1993) provided a powerful argument for the importance of disruptive tactics, noting that the few periods of industrialization in which major social change occurred happened against a backdrop of disruption. The first was during the period of the Great Depression, with the signing of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the landmark Social Security Act as well as other social welfare provisions. The second occurred in the period 1963–1967, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act, voting rights advancements, and Medicare and Medicaid legislation. These time periods were rich with strikes, civil disobedience, and boycotts, as well as violent encounters that emanated both from those who sought control (i.e., the police) and those who sought change. Piven and Cloward (1993) stated that nondisruptive social action happens all the time through lobbying, litigation, demonstrations, and unionized strikes, but that it is only with the inclusion of disruption that dramatic change occurs. Hoping to provide organizers with the tools to spur disruption, community organizer Saul Alinsky (1989) wrote his “rules for radicals” in a book of the same name. Alinsky believed that his rules could move “impulsive passions” into “calculated, purposeful, and effective” actions for justice and radical change (p. 5). In today’s language Alinsky’s ideas fall into the category of conflict organizing or direct action, and these ideas are both an orientation to power and a skill set taught in community-organizing training sessions, schools of social work, sociology, and a host of other university departments. In this form of organizing, one of the central aspects of any strategy involves targeting an entity or individual to which disruptive tactics will be applied. As Alinsky explained, when organizing it is imperative to “pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it” (p. 3). A number of Alinsky’s rules focused on using disruptive tactics. Here Alinsky argued that the disruptive action needed to make the target of the action uncomfortable—to include the use of ridicule. continues

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Continued

He also suggested mixing up the types of actions to keep things relevant, interesting, and enjoyable for members. He warned to never lessen the pressure until victory has been achieved. Alinsky also reminded people that violence perpetrated by the other side can help win support for one’s own side (think the Edmund Pettis Bridge on Bloody Sunday).

next morning, but the overall effort continued (Blakely 1987; Fennelly personal communication, June 8, 2016). Snyder and Stoops issued an invitation for people to join them outside on March 4, 1987, for what was called “The Grate American Sleep Out.” Like many good ideas, the origin of the action is not clear. Fennelly believes that its impetus came from actor Martin Sheen’s experience spending time on the heat grate visiting with Snyder and Stoops. Fennelly explained that Sheen found it poignant that despite his celebrity, the instant he joined the men on the grate he became invisible. From Sheen’s telling of his experience on the streets, someone involved in the effort recognized that the powerfulness of Sheen’s experience could be shared with others, including members of Congress (Fennelly personal communication, June 8, 2016). Over a hundred people participated in the sleep-out, including thirteen members of Congress, a handful of celebrities, and the mayor of D.C., as well as stockbrokers and bankers. The temperature was 30 degrees, and the participants reported being cold, disoriented, uncomfortable, and knowing that at best they got what Reprehensive John Conyers called a “smidgen” of what it meant to sleep on the street. In describing the purpose of the night Snyder was quoted as saying, “This [night] is to guarantee that we will get that money. This is to guarantee that people across this country will wake up tomorrow and think a little more about the homeless” (New York Times, March 5, 1987). Passage of the bill. By the time of the sleep-out, the bill’s passage was effectively guaranteed in the House, but the Senate was much more difficult to persuade. On March 30, 1987, Foscarinis testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, where she shared her concerns about the opposition to the bill in the Senate, and the large difference in funding authorization between the House and Senate versions (with less proposed from the Senate). She attempted to allay senators’ spoken fears that the bill

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would create another federal bureaucracy, saying that rather than a bureaucratic institution the bill would create the Interagency Council on the Homeless (later known as the Interagency Council on Homelessness) as an oversight body. Foscarinis expressed dismay about the Senate bill’s removal of money to support surplus property use: “The need is so great, so desperate, and the request is so almost pitifully modest, it should be, although apparently it is not, a matter of some embarrassment for the United States Senate to be seeking to cut corners by taking away those basic resources from those most desperately poor Americans, and from those most politically powerless as Americans” (US Senate, Urgent Relief for the Homeless 1987, p. 21). The Senate was eventually persuaded, albeit with a much smaller amount of money allocated than the advocates had the hoped for or the House supported. Summing up the losses, Foscarinis said that although there certainly were trade-offs in the bill’s passage, “it was a very good thing that the McKinney Act was passed. It has helped and continues to help a lot of people.” She noted that the act “also provides a basis that can be built upon.” Regarding the effort put into the act’s passage she stated: We worked extremely hard. We visited lots of people. We tried a lot of different strategies, and I think it was the combination of strategies that really made the difference. We were facing long political odds in getting this enacted. But I think it was really making that joint effort. Using all of these different types of strategies: Sleep out, camping out, having Mitch living outside . . . [s]traight-up lobbying work getting the constituents to weigh in, and to write and call their members of Congress. Being able to recruit the pro bono help, especially a Republican lobbyist, that made a huge difference. (Foscarinis personal communication, April 30, 2016)

From the time of its introduction, The Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act evolved from one with a primary target group of families with children to a bill with multiple target groups: the elderly, people with disabilities (particularly the deinstitutionalized mentally ill and people with mental illness), families with children, and veterans. Although it was primarily an emergency, ameliorative measure, the act as passed included close to twenty programs to be administered by multiple federal departments. Supporters in Congress, advocates, and local government representatives consistently emphasized that the act would not end homelessness. Rather, it was to begin to address immediate needs. In this form, the bill was finally signed into law by Reagan in July of 1987. As noted in the introduction to the book, the president signed the bill into law reluctantly, choosing to take the action in the evening (Foscarinis 1991). The mood of the signing stood in stark contrast to the support of the measure in the House of Representatives and among the nation’s mayors, social service providers, and other advocates.

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Urgent Relief for the Homeless: The Stewart B. McKinney Act On May 7, 1987, Stewart B. McKinney died at age fifty-six from pneumonia and complications from HIV/AIDS. He contracted the pneumonia following his participation in the “Grate American Sleep Out” earlier in March 1987. The importance of McKinney’s role as a Republican member of the House in getting the Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act passed, and his decision to participate in the sleep-out on a cold night, knowing the risks he faced due to his already compromised immune system, were recognized by activists and fellow legislators (Keyes 2014). Representative McKinney was a passionate supporter of homeless people who believed, like Snyder, that fighting over the number of homeless people was an unconscionable distraction from addressing their needs. The name of the Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act was changed in his honor to the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act. The structure and coverage of the final McKinney Act was both broad (in terms of numbers of agencies covered) and narrow (in terms of what was offered). Under Title I of the McKinney Act, Congress provided its rationale for passage of the new law. Six findings were listed, and three purposes were identified. The first finding was that there was a national crisis due to the lack of shelter for many individuals and families, “including elderly persons, handicapped persons, families with children, Native Americans, and veterans.” This finding is noteworthy for its willingness to admit a fullscale crisis and its purposeful inclusion of groups the United States has historically regarded as worthy or meriting assistance. The language included both those historically viewed as incapable of working to support themselves (older adults, people with disabilities, and children) and those who have merited assistance through service to their country (veterans). The second finding was that the problem had worsened and was expected to continue to worsen, potentially jeopardizing the safety of those affected. And the third finding gestured toward the causes of the problem, stating that they were “many and complex.” Similarly, the fourth finding concluded that no “single, simple solution” would do due to the complexity of causation and varied needs of the diverse population. The fifth finding restated what governors and mayors had reported for years: local and state governments and private organizations could not meet the needs due to the increasing size of the problem. The sixth finding stated that the federal government had “a clear responsibility and an existing capacity to fulfill a more effective and responsible role to meet the basic human needs and to engender respect for the human dignity of the homeless.” Among the stated purposes, the first was to establish the Interagency Council on the Homeless. The second was “to use public resources and pro-

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grams in a more coordinated manner to meet the critically urgent needs of the homeless of the Nation.” This purpose related to the first, in that the Interagency Council was charged with coordinating the nation’s efforts to address homelessness and enhancing intergovernmental cooperation across federal agencies. The third purpose listed was to provide funds for programs to assist the homeless, with special emphasis on elderly persons, handicapped persons, families with children, Native Americans, and veterans. In keeping with the emphasis on populations the nation traditionally viewed as worthy, and in keeping with the existing structure of social welfare in the country, vulnerable poor people viewed as incapable of working to support themselves were again highlighted. The McKinney Act as passed included nine titles, involving seventeen programs administered by six agencies (Kusserow 1990): • Title I covered general provisions, including a general definition of homelessness affecting all programs under the new law. • Title II set up the Interagency Council on the Homeless. • Title III provided additional sums for the Federal Emergency Management Food and Shelter Program launched earlier in the 1980s, to be administered by FEMA, and reestablished a national and local board structure to award funds. • Title IV provided housing assistance and was assigned to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Title IV required states and localities to develop HUD-approved comprehensive homeless assistance plans to receive funding. This title also included additional funds for existing and new programs of assistance. It reauthorized HUD’s Emergency Shelter Grants Program. It created a Supportive Housing Demonstration Program that continued prior efforts established under a transitional housing program and added a permanent housing program for adults with disabilities. Title IV also established a program for supplemental assistance for facilities serving the homeless that could be used in conjunction with funds under other programs or alone. Under its miscellaneous provisions the title provided funding for Section 8 moderate rehabilitation assistance for single-room-occupancy housing. • Title V established a surplus property program through which governmentowned properties (including military facilities) that were not in use would be available for use to serve homeless persons. • Title VI provided funding for primary health care, substance abuse, and community mental health services to be administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. • Title VII addressed education, training, and community services needs of homeless people, including adult education needs of homeless persons and education of homeless children and youth. This portion of the act was to be administered by the Departments of Education and Labor.

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• Title VIII covered the Food Assistance for the Homeless portion of the law. It amended the Food Stamp Act and the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP). These provisions were to be administered by the Department of Agriculture. • Title IX extended the Veterans’ Job Training Act. Summary Between 1983 and 1986, Congress was able to pass legislation that amounted to small-scale emergency relief for homeless people. As advocates, service providers, elected officials, civic leaders, and others noted that the amount provided was nowhere near enough, and because most of the money was given to FEMA, the view that homelessness was both a temporary problem and not a housing problem was further reinforced. Money not given to FEMA was given to HHS, the DOD, and HUD, but in each of these executive branch agencies the implementation of the programs was lackluster and the full extent of their potential benefit far from realized. Instead of giving the federal government a pass on its efforts, it was determined that the federal government needed to be pushed much harder to do much more. In the 99th Congress the NCH introduced and gained support for a piece of comprehensive legislation titled the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act. However, the sweeping scope and price tag of the bill basically ensured its impassability. The decision was made that in preparation for the next legislative session, the NCH and CCNV would team up to create a coalition with other organizations that would seek passage of a bill called the Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act. The bill was introduced in the 100th congress, and advocacy in support of the bill included sophisticated lobbying, direct action, and efforts to raise awareness. In an event hosted by the CCNV and Snyder, 100 people including congressional leaders slept outside for what was called the “Grate American Sleep Out.” The work done by the NCH, CCNV, and other supporters resulted in the passage of the bill titled the Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act. The bill was shortly thereafter renamed the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, after the death of republican cosponsor Stewart B. McKinney, who participated in the sleep-out. McKinney’s death shortly after the bill’s passage was attributed to AIDS-related pneumonia and complications that were brought on by his spending a cold night outside. Because the McKinney Act was much smaller in scope than advocates wanted or homeless people needed, it was created with the intention that once passed it could be expanded. The legislation included nine titles, involving seventeen programs administered by six agencies. The act included monies for emergency services and shelter; creation of a small amount of affordable

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housing; additional supports for adults with disabilities, veterans, and families; access to health care; and education for homeless children and adults. While the McKinney Act ensured that much more money would be available for services, the amount of money provided did not come close to addressing the myriad needs of multitudes of homeless people across the country. As we will see in the next chapter, the lackluster implementation of pre–McKinney Act money for homeless people foreshadowed the implementation of the act and its ability to reach its potential. Prevention and permanent solutions that were deferred to get McKinney in place provided the focus for battles on other days. Notes 1. Annual tallies of deaths of homeless people started later but provide some insight into the frequency of the occurrence. New York City reported that at least 212 homeless people died in fiscal year 2015 (and this figure included at least one infant); Sacramento reported that 81 died (Cohen 2017; Nahmias and Cheney 2016). 2. Mickey Leland died in 1989 in a plane crash in Africa. His work on hunger was well documented by those who praised his work, as well as his critics, as documented in obituaries (Belkin 1989; Chapman 1989). 3. Domenici was known to care deeply about mental health issues. Newspaper accounts covering his fight alongside Paul Wellstone for mental health parity legislation noted that Domenici had a daughter with a mental health diagnosis. See, for example, Sontag 2002 or James 2008. 4. Ownership of the statue became a protracted legal issue, along with its copyright. Snyder conceived of the idea of the statue and Baltimore sculptor James Earl Reid brought it to life.

6 Implementation in a Hostile Context: The First Two Years of the McKinney Act

In the United States, bills passed by Congress and signed into law by the president are placed in the hands of administrators within executive branch departments and agencies. The administrators then create rules and regulations to implement the law and offer opportunities for public comment. In the case of the McKinney Act this largely meant creating guidelines and rules for getting funds to states, cities, and organizations to provide emergency relief to homeless people. Given the administration’s hostility to the act, its implementation was politicized. In this chapter, we trace the first two years after passage of the act. We document legislative language and administrative decisions that increased barriers to participation of local governments and nonprofit organizations in McKinney programs, as well as administrative delays in funding and implementation of important programs. We do not follow here implementation of McKinney Act provisions related to the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs (Food Stamps and the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program [TEFAP]), as these were not the subject of later McKinney Act reauthorizations. While major problems with the law were political and involved decisions made prior to its introduction (e.g., eliminating proposed prevention efforts and programs aimed at ending homelessness), there were also statutory problems—that is, problems embedded in the law’s language that made it easy for the administration to delay and to establish stringent rules. Under congressional directives to get “urgent relief” to people as quickly as possible, local governments and organizations had to move grant proposals forward quickly to meet difficult deadlines. One agency barred direct funding of religious organizations while another moved quickly to get them money. Program requirements written into the law by Congress (and within existing programs

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amended by the law) were sometimes made more onerous, making it difficult for nonprofits and religious groups to access needed financial support. The administration would have been more successful in thwarting implementation of the act without advocates within and outside Congress acting as “fixers” (Bardach 1977). Fixers actively track implementation processes and act when necessary to force the administration to comply with congressional intent. Within Congress, fixers call for special hearings, question administrative leaders during the appropriations process, send letters to agencies, call for implementation studies, and take other actions to call attention to problems. Outside of Congress, advocates comment on agency progress and efforts; call, meet with, and write letters to administrators and congressional leaders in relevant committees; provide testimony at hearings; and, when all else fails, file lawsuits. In the case of the McKinney Act, the political power of the president and his executive branch was balanced, in part, by the efforts of strong advocates outside of Congress working on behalf of homeless people, as well as concerned congressional leaders. Advocates knew that monitoring implementation was necessary in the political climate. Because the act was a compromise offering emergency relief, with an assumption that additional housing and prevention efforts would be forthcoming, the McKinney Act would not end homelessness. Moreover, because the nation was continuing along a neoliberal policy path of cuts in domestic spending and safety net provisions, while jobs were moved offshore, the United States would continue producing and normalizing homelessness. In our analysis of implementation, we draw on the work of Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier (1989) and other social scientists who examined the importance of the social, economic, political, and technological contexts for implementation. We emphasize the impact of politics in this chapter because we found that political leadership was profoundly important to implementation in the case of the McKinney Act. As with Mazmanian and Sabatier’s framework, our discussion follows implementation through the stages of executive agency action, responses from affected groups, actual and perceived impacts, and resulting legislative changes in law (Bardach 1977; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). A Hostile Executive Branch As discussed in Chapter 5, the McKinney Act’s primary focus was emergency assistance. Populations targeted for help included families with children, the disabled (including mental health and physical disability), older adults, veterans, and Native Americans. Providing “urgent relief” for these target groups allowed the Reagan administration to intervene in a manner consistent with its general stance toward social problems. This stance was

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articulated repeatedly by the president. His response to a question about the federal role in addressing homelessness at a high school in Virginia clearly presented his thoughts on the subject: Frankly, I think the problem of the homeless, like so many other problems, actually belongs at the local community and State level, with the Federal Government ready to help in any way that it might be able to in which something would come properly under the Federal Government’s province. . . . [T]he problem of the homeless, is best known by the people in the community where it’s taking place—why they’re homeless, can see them as individuals instead of a mass of faceless people that the Federal Government just thinks of in numbers. So, as I say, if there is a way in which the Federal Government’s help can be used, whether it is in financing or what else, actually the administering of this belongs right back where the people are. (Reagan 1988, emphasis added)

With passage of the McKinney Act, the power of the president was brought to bear. Reagan’s appointed agency leaders would implement the act’s provisions through their agencies, and they (or their designees) would serve on the newly created Interagency Council on the Homeless, put in place to coordinate and monitor efforts. In essence, leadership hostile to the act was in charge of implementation and monitoring its own efforts. The Leadership Team Although the McKinney Act required action on the part of multiple federal agencies, some had much bigger responsibilities than others. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was charged with developing multiple programs and had a leadership role on the new Interagency Council. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) played a critical role in shaping Reagan’s approach to homelessness through its role in chairing and developing the predecessor to the Interagency Council. It also had authority over mainstream programs homeless people needed and agencies charged with developing needed health and mental health services for homeless people. The Department of Education was charged with helping homeless children and youth receive free and appropriate education and helping adults with literacy and education needs. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had to manage an existing and expanded emergency food and shelter program. The General Services Administration had a key role to play in making surplus federal property available for use under the act (working in concert with HUD and HHS). While there were other modest programs housed within the Department of Labor and limited attention to veterans, most dollars were made available through FEMA and HUD programs.

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For conservatives like Reagan, HUD represented everything wrong with big government and was ripe for major cuts; for liberals concerned about homelessness, it was a department that should have received large appropriations to prevent and end homelessness through expansion of lowincome housing subsidies and the stock of affordable housing. Reagan made a controversial appointment with the choice of Samuel Pierce as secretary of HUD. Pierce did not have experience in housing and community development. Rather, journalists reported that he hoped his service would lead to a Supreme Court appointment (Jackson 2000; Shenon 2000). Pierce defended cuts to HUD’s programs, noting that he was proud of his agency’s efforts to reduce the deficit (Shenon 2000). HUD’s recalcitrance in addressing homelessness was established prior to passage of the McKinney Act. For example, HUD’s opposition to administering an emergency shelter program resulted in Congress shifting funds from HUD to FEMA in fiscal year 1985.1 HUD was represented at a Senate hearing on homelessness in 1987 by James Stimpson, who spoke directly to HUD’s position on the bill that became the McKinney Act. He stated that HUD would request an additional $5 million for transitional housing for 1988, to add to the $5 million allocated for that purpose in 1987. He described transitional housing in a positive manner, but also made clear that funds allocated for this program under the McKinney proposal were too expensive: “I can’t speak to the Foley-McKinney bill, except to the extent that it is a very large amount of money, and I think the administration’s [present] budget reflects the level of funding for categorical homeless programs that is appropriate under the current budget constraints” (Homelessness in America 1987, p. 149). HUD’s lack of support for the bill and other efforts to restore funding for affordable housing made for an adverse relationship with Congress. This became more pronounced as Democrats gained control of both the House and the Senate, and Reagan moved into “lame duck” status near the end of his second term. Pierce’s leadership of HUD did not help either. Hearings and court proceedings followed accusations of extensive misuse of HUD programs to deliver financial benefits to Republican friends (Chicago Tribune 2000; Shenon 1990). It was clear by the time of Secretary Pierce’s departure in January 1989 that extensive reform efforts were needed at HUD. At the HHS, Otis Bowen was responsible for the first two years of implementation of the McKinney Act, succeeding two prior Reagan appointees to HHS, Margaret Heckler (1983–1985) and Richard Schweiker (1981–1983). A doctor and experienced former governor, Secretary Bowen prioritized dealing with catastrophic illness bankrupting elderly people. As head of HHS, he would administer the nation’s social welfare programs, including social insurances and categorical aid to special populations. HHS

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also administers federal health insurance programs, the Public Health Service, and major medical research and treatment centers including the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (which includes institutes focused on alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental health). The president gave Bowen the authority to work on catastrophic illness but called for an end to welfare programs (including those many would view as necessary to preventing homelessness in the first place). In arguing against welfare programs, Reagan stated that the United States could ignore this terrible truth no longer, as Franklin Roosevelt had warned fifty-one years earlier: Welfare is “a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit”—and that the nation must now escape the “spider’s web of dependency” (Reagan, February 15, 1986). In response to questions submitted to the secretary of HHS by an appropriations subcommittee on funding for fiscal year 1988, the response made it clear that HHS would be implementing Reagan’s New Federalism. HHS did not see a need for increases in funding so much as “better State targeting of available assistance” (Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies for Appropriations 1988, p. 631). In the context of the McKinney Act, HHS was charged with implementing relatively uncontroversial programs. Several of the programs were block grants, which were consonant with federalism, attractive to states, and left much of the responsibility for implementation up to the states. A program of critical importance involved making funds available to develop health care for the homeless. Some competitive grants on issues of interest (mental illness and substance abuse)—again, programs that were not controversial—were also given to HHS. The program role that lent itself to controversy and potential for implementation issues was HHS’s cooperating role with HUD and the General Services Administration to make surplus property available. Like HUD, the Department of Education was on the conservative hit list of federal agencies ripe for downsizing or elimination. The department was newly created and viewed by the right as an unnecessary federal intervention into education. If the Reagan administration had completely succeeded in its neoliberal agenda, there would have been no Department of Education when McKinney was passed (Los Angeles Times 1985). The president appointed conservative reformers to the department—Terrence Bell and William Bennett—and journalists noted that they understood they were to oversee its elimination (Johnston 1996). William Bennett was responsible for the first two years of implementation of the McKinney Act. He favored a diminished role for the federal government and voiced support for eliminating his department (Manegold 1995). He viewed the United States as a “do-it-yourself society” where individuals solved their own problems. He decried the assumption of government responsibility for addressing human needs (McGuigan 1993). Under his leadership, the

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agency’s response to McKinney was delay and inaction on the education of homeless youth (Job Training and Education for the Homeless 1990). The Department of Labor had three different secretaries during the Reagan years. Ann McLaughlin was appointed its leader in December of 1987, about five months after passage of the McKinney Act. Newspaper accounts noted that she had no background in labor and was expected to support President Reagan’s anti-labor stance and conservative agenda (e.g., Bernstein 1987). McKinney programs assigned to Labor offered relatively uncontroversial grants targeted to homeless veterans and homeless people in need of job training. Leadership for veterans also changed hands during the Reagan years. The Veterans Administration (VA) was not a cabinet-level agency during Reagan’s years in office, but he signed a law that would bring a VA secretary into the cabinet under George H. W. Bush’s administration (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1988). Despite Reagan’s vocal support for the VA, his record on supporting veterans was mixed (New York Times, November 11, 1987). Harry Walters served as Reagan’s administrator of the VA, and journalists reported that he was well respected by veterans’ organizations. Reagan sought cuts on the order of a “couple hundred million dollars” in medical aid for veterans while building a budget that included $1.8 trillion in military spending over five years and money to support a civil war in Nicaragua (Franklin 1986; Pear 1985). Veterans earning over $15,000 who had no service-related medical conditions were affected by the cuts in VA medical care. A New York Times writer reported that Walters resisted the cuts and was ordered not to appear before a congressional committee looking at budget issues by the Office of Management and Budget (Franklin 1986). Walters resigned in 1986 and Thomas Turnage, a retired Army general, took over; he was expected to support budget cuts sought by the Office of Management and Budget (Franklin 1986). Turnage headed the VA at the time that the McKinney Act was passed into law. Two other non-cabinet-level agencies had significant roles to play in the implementation of the McKinney Act: FEMA and the General Services Administration. Reagan chose military men to head the newly created FEMA in both of his terms in office. He appointed Julius Becton Jr., a highly decorated military leader, to the post following investigation into prior misuse of funds. Secretary Becton did not view “food for the homeless” as an appropriate FEMA program (Mulrooney 1989, p. 18). Ironically, FEMA’s Emergency Food and Shelter Program ended up being by far the largest of the McKinney programs in its early years of implementation, receiving the largest appropriations of any single program authorized under the act. Terrence Golden was appointed to head the General Services Administration in June of 1985 and continued through the passage of the McKinney Act until March of 1988. The agency had an important role to play in mak-

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ing federal surplus property available for use to help the homeless. Golden came to the General Services Administration with some federal government experience, having served as assistant secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. By education, he had a background in real estate and degrees in nuclear engineering and business administration. Implementation of the surplus property program under the McKinney Act, which required interagency cooperation, was more than disappointing to advocates. Very few of the nation’s large real estate holdings were made available for use by those serving the homeless. This program’s lackluster implementation yielded more than one lawsuit (e.g., Lee v. Pierce 1988; National Coalition for the Homeless v. Veterans Administration 1988; Lee v. Kemp 1989). Because the McKinney Act was designed as an omnibus measure, amending and creating programs through multiple agencies in the name of helping a large target population, the law included a required coordinating body called the Interagency Council. This body brought together the members of the leadership team discussed earlier, and others, in an effort to maximize coordination, enhance use of existing resources, and develop needed new initiatives. Unfortunately, in the early years of implementation, the council reflected the administration’s disinterest and lack of commitment to the McKinney Act.

The Leadership Team as Council: A Study in Administrative Neglect Purpose of the Interagency Council

Under Title I of the McKinney Act, the Interagency Council on the Homeless was charged with reviewing all existing programs and activities that assisted homeless people and reducing duplication of services. The Interagency Council was also to provide “professional and technical assistance” to states, local governments, and public and private nonprofits in enhancing coordination and making the best use of existing programs and services, and developing new and innovative programs and services. The Interagency Council was also charged with disseminating information on homelessness and preparing an annual report to Congress on its efforts (and those of each participating department or agency). Dissemination could involve different approaches such as conferences, workshops, and newsletters. The Interagency Council replaced the Federal Task Force on the Homeless, which had been operating within HHS (discussed in Chapter 5) and moved its leadership to HUD. Representatives of the executive branch and related agencies (or their designees) were required to serve without additional pay (beyond what they already received for their government roles).2

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The council had to appoint a paid executive director and hire other staff, as they were needed.3 The McKinney Act authorized $200,000 for fiscal year 1987 and $2.5 million for fiscal year 1988 (PL 100-77, Title II, Sec. 208). These authorizations did not materialize as appropriated funds. No funds were appropriated for 1987, and in fiscal year 1988 funds for the council were cobbled together from a HUD McKinney Act program and from money left over from the former HHS task force (General Accounting Office, May 1991). A Lackluster Start

In its early years, the Interagency Council was characterized as ineffective, producing little for the dollars spent (Hombs 1989; Implementation of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act 1989). To answer questions about the council for a hearing on HUD appropriations, Secretary Pierce submitted written responses reporting that its $950,000 in fiscal year 1988 was being used for workshops, contracts, and services to produce the annual report, and to pay people working for the council; a brochure with contact information had been prepared (Department of Housing and Urban Development and Certain Independent Agencies: Appropriations 1988, p. 976). Demonstrating its disinterest in fulfilling a monitoring role, HUD had not participated in an Office of Management and Budget review of programs serving the homeless (pp. 1016–1017). In a 1988 hearing on surplus property, Maria Foscarinis testified about the Interagency Council and its inaction, noting that the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) had to monitor McKinney Act implementation because the council was not doing the job. In her words: I think what is symbolic of this general disregard for the provisions of the law is the performance of the Inter-Agency Council for the Homeless, which is not present here, I understand, today. The Inter-Agency Council for the Homeless was created by the law in order to monitor the agencies’ implementation of the law. The Inter-Agency Council, which was created for this purpose, has taken absolutely no action during the past year. Specifically directed by Congress to monitor the agencies, specifically directed to take action to enforce the law, it has done absolutely nothing. As a result that function has been left to us. (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, pp. 7–8)

In a written statement Foscarinis submitted for the hearing record, she noted that the Interagency Council waited six months post-passage of the McKinney Act to appoint a director and that not only was the council not monitoring implementation, but that it had “no plans to do so” (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, pp. 2,

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11). During the same hearing, the Democratic chairwoman, Cardiss Collins from Illinois, reported that the then–executive director of the Interagency Council, Cassandra Moore, was invited to testify but was reportedly too busy. Acting as “fixers,” members of Congress sent a formal request from the subcommittee leadership to the General Accounting Office (GAO) asking it to investigate implementation of the council’s McKinney Act responsibilities (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, p. 15). Collins also spoke out about the Interagency Council and its role in implementing McKinney programs in a hearing held in March of 1989. She reported that the Interagency Council’s director, Moore, was told not to visit homeless shelters by HUD officials, that the director did not take the lead in meeting with national homeless organizations, and that the director made efforts to moderate the voices of advocates at public meetings. Collins stated that council staff ideas on policies and programs were quashed before they were ever presented to the full council by HUD and the Office of Management and Budget. Collins laid bare an essential problem in the early years of implementation: “It [the council] did not address the relationship of affordable housing and homelessness because that could have been seen as going against current administrative policy” (Implementation of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act 1989, p. 3). Representative Tom Lantos, speaking at the same hearing, stated that while the council was supposed to be independent, it seemed HUD officials called the shots and directed its inaction (p. 9). If it had not been clear before, oversight hearings were making it clear that the administration was obstructing congressional intent and advocates and members of Congress were acting as “fixers.” In the sections that follow, we look at each agency’s implementation efforts, beginning with major cabinet-level agencies and ending with noncabinet activities. Housing and Urban Development Despite HUD’s reluctance to take on new programs for homeless people and its controversial role in the undercount of homeless people, some preferred it to FEMA for administering homeless program funds. The National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), for example, supported having Congress give HUD more, not less, program authority: “The ‘emergency’ organizational status of federal homeless assistance (under FEMA) should be recognized as inadequate, and responsibility placed in one permanent federal department, the Department of Housing and Urban Development” (National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials 1987).

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Implementation: How It Is Supposed to Work

After laws are passed and placed in the hands of the executive branch for implementation, all federal actions are documented. For example, after appropriations are made and federal agencies receive funds for new or existing programs, a notice of fund availability is published by the agency charged with implementation. This alerts the public that applications for funding can now be made. Before funds are made available for new programs, however, federal agencies typically have to establish rules and regulations governing the distribution of the funds. Federal agencies follow a number of basic approaches to rulemaking (Peters 2013). The process most relevant to the McKinney Act involved the publication of proposed rules and regulations through the Federal Register for “notice and comment” by the public before they became finalized and carried the weight of law. The Federal Register is a government publication and reports on all actions coming out of the executive branch of the federal government, including actions of the president and the federal agencies. Notices of proposed rules must be published in the Federal Register and must state where and when rulemaking proceedings will take place, the law (statute) and authority the rules pertain to, and some description of the “terms or substance of the proposed rule” or the “subjects and issues involved” (U.S. Code, Title V, Sec. 553[b]). Those affected, including members of the public, can then voice their opinions on proposed regulations through the comment process: “submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation” (U.S. Code, Title V, Sec. 553[c]). After agencies review the comments submitted by the public and other information and revise initial rules, they must publish them, again, in the Federal Register. The Administrative Procedures Act requires the publication of final rules at least thirty days before they take effect (U.S. Code, Title V, Sec. 553[d]). The final rules carry the weight of law. The process does not end here, however, as the rules may be challenged. Even at this stage, members of Congress, the executive branch, the courts, and the public may attempt to intervene to enhance, reshape, restructure, or thwart policy objectives. Even as legitimation is still being settled, however, the work of program administration, implementation, has already begun.

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HUD represented the only logical choice for the placement of housing programs. Homelessness, in addition to being a housing problem, was very much an urban-areas problem (though not exclusively). HUD was critical to the successful implementation of the McKinney Act. The agency was charged with:

1. Developing the requirements for state and local entities to access money, which included the development of Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plans (CHAPs) (Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan, HUD Notice, 1987). 2. Continuing implementation of HUD’s existing Emergency Shelter Grant Program, and its expanding Supportive Housing Demonstration Program. 3. Launching two new programs, the Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless (SAFAH), and Section 8 assistance for single-room-occupancy housing.

Among federal agencies, HUD rapidly became identified as one that created and published rules and regulations that went beyond statutory requirements, creating additional barriers to the participation of some nonprofit organizations in funding opportunities. Comprehensive Homelessness Assistance Plan Purpose of the program. Requiring a coordinated plan of action is an

appropriate requirement for receiving federal funding. Plans are routinely required for mental health funding, for emergency management, and for other purposes. In the case of the McKinney Act, Congress established planning requirements to try to ensure state and local coordination of efforts to address homelessness. The CHAP had to document area needs (typically at the level of a state, metro city, or urban county level). The plans also had to report on how needs were being addressed, and how each housing program under the McKinney Act would “complement and enhance available services.” Additionally, the CHAP document had to include an inventory of facilities and services already serving the homeless in the area, and state how the area was to meet the needs of the categories of “worthy poor” identified in the McKinney Act (Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan, HUD Notice, 1987). The McKinney Act required HUD to publish requirements within thirty days of passage (PL 100-77, Sec. 401[e], 42 USC 11361). Problem: No time no money. The problem was that the plan had to be devel-

oped and submitted to the appropriate HUD field office (or postmarked) no

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later than September 28, 1987, forty-five days from the date of the Federal Register notice (Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act; Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan, HUD Notice Correction, 1987). HUD argued that this was in keeping with congressional interest in making appropriated funds available quickly (McKinney Act; Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan, HUD Notice, 1987). To support HUD’s argument, the act did stipulate that to be eligible to receive emergency shelter funds, a city or county had to have an approved CHAP within ninety days of fund availability. Developing the CHAP document within this timeframe would be difficult even in states and cities already well-organized in their response to homelessness, and much harder in others. Requests for funds under the McKinney Act had to include certification that the request was consistent with the area’s CHAP. Emergency Shelter Grants Program Purpose of the program. HUD’s Emergency Shelter Grants Program was

designed by Congress to move funds to metropolitan cities, urban counties, and states (for distribution to local governments in the states) to rehab buildings for use as shelter space for homeless people and for needed services (PL 100-77, Sec. 413 [a]). Local governments receiving funds could in turn provide any or all of the money to nonprofit organizations (PL 100-77, Sec. 413[c]). A stated purpose of the Emergency Shelter Grants Program was to improve homeless shelter quality to make them safe and sanitary. Another was to increase the absolute number of emergency shelters available. Another was to make funds available to help with operating costs and to pay for essential and supportive services (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Notice, 1987; Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Notice of Funding Availability, 1988). HUD’s Program was created prior to passage of the McKinney Act.4 Under the McKinney Act changes were made to an existing program HUD had not wanted. Some of the changes were implemented immediately, while others went through a full notice and comment period,5 with the notice and comment process yielding some positive changes on HUD’s part. One potentially helpful change for service providers was HUD’s agreement to expand its definition of “essential services” to include mental health services. Originally, the definition included services concerned with employment, health, substance abuse, education or food and expenses in connection with emergency shelters for the homeless (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Proposed Rule and Program Requirements, 1986). Another favorable change for service providers related to a cap on the percentage of funds that could be used to fund essential services. The original

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Emergency Shelter Grants Program that was expanded and continued by the McKinney Act included a cap of 15 percent on money for those services, an unpopular requirement at the local level. In the McKinney Act, Congress provided a waiver of the cap, when local resources were funding other eligible Emergency Shelter Grants Program activities. After passage of the act, HUD tried to delay implementing the waiver provision pending a full notice and comment period. Following public comments, HUD reversed itself and notified the public that it would implement the waiver option (McKinney Act; Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Notice, 1987).6

Problems: Paying staff and matching funds. The language in the McKinney Act and HUD’s use of its discretion in interpreting the new law raised potential issues and created barriers to accessing needed Emergency Shelter Grants Program money for people at the local level. Barriers included barring funding of staff, matching-funds requirements, and requirements related to continued use of shelters. HUD also used its discretion to require religious organizations to create or work through secular organizations to receive funds. HUD acknowledged opposition to the rule on barring use of funds to pay for staff. But the prohibition against paying staff to operate shelters was embedded in the law and not something HUD could change (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Final Rule, 1987). In terms of matching requirements, applicants had to demonstrate that they could match the funds being requested with other resources. What this meant in practice was that organizations applying for funds had to have other sources of revenue. This made pursuit of funding difficult for everyone, particularly newer, less experienced nonprofits launched to address the crisis of homelessness. Congress tried to soften this requirement in the McKinney Act by specifically allowing applicants to use in-kind donations as matching resources. That way, localities did not have to have a hard dollar-for-dollar sum in cash. To count toward in-kind donations applicants could use “the value of any donated material or building, the value of any lease on a building, any salary paid to staff to carry out the program of the recipient, and the value of the time and services contributed by volunteers to carry out the program of the recipient at a rate determined by the Secretary” (PL 100-77, Sec. 415[a][2]). Because Congress included this language, HUD reluctantly had to allow for this in published requirements. Problem: A relatively permanent emergency. Early in the implementation of the Emergency Shelter Grants Program, there was concern about proposed requirements published in the Federal Register for “continued use” that were burdensome and seemed contradictory to an emergency. Applicants for emergency shelter funds had to certify that they would operate the

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space as an emergency shelter for at least three years and for not less than a ten-year period if such assistance were used for the major rehabilitation or conversion of such buildings (PL 100-77, Sec. 415[c][1]). HUD’s published final rules for the 1986 version of the program addressed comments on the continued-use rules. As reported by HUD: “The 10-year continued use requirement was objected to by a commenter on the ground that it severely restricts the number of not-for-profit agencies willing to provide emergency shelter to the homeless. The commenter observed that even fewer nonsectarian organizations have the financial means to acquire such long-term control over property which can then be feasibly adapted for program use” (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Final Rule, 1987). It seemed contradictory for Congress and HUD to both claim that the problem being addressed was an emergency and to insist on continued shelter provision for no less than ten years, but such requirements are typical when federal money has been used to improve property for a specific public purpose. If property were improved to shelter homeless people and soon after converted to another use, the public would rightly ask whether public funds were abused. When the final rules for the Emergency Shelter Grants Program under the McKinney Act were published, the continued-use clause was still an issue. This time, however, HUD budged a bit. Commenters argued that those receiving funds solely for essential services or a mix of services and select operating costs should not be subject to a continued-use provision at all. They also argued that the continued-use provisions (for three years and for ten years) should apply only to grantees making capital expenditures (building improvements) from grant funds. HUD assented and changed the rule. The three-year continued-use requirement would apply to funds for renovation and the ten-year requirement would apply only for major rehabilitation. Revisiting the potential contradiction in the use of the term “emergency,” HUD’s response to a comment was instructive: “The Emergency Shelter Grants program is intended to provide temporary shelter for the homeless, without any requirement that the shelter itself be of a temporary nature. In fact, the continued use requirements established in this rule are designed to ensure a certain degree of continuity and permanency in the provisions of shelter services to the homeless” (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Final Rule, 1988). The statement could not have been clearer. The intention was seemingly permanent provision of emergency shelter. Problem: Funding religious organizations. A completely different admin-

istrative requirement set up an ongoing dilemma and differential treatment of local groups seeking funds depending on whether they pursued funding from FEMA or HUD. HUD’s proposed rules for its Emergency Shelter Grants Program barred religious and religion-affiliated entities from receiving funds to make changes or improvements to their buildings for shelter.

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Congress and homeless advocates knew that religious groups were providing emergency relief. Congress intended for these groups to have access to McKinney Act program funds and questioned the administration’s intentions (as well as its ability to interpret the Constitution). Speaking at the opening of the hearing called to address the issue, Chairman Lantos stated: “An administration which, since 1982, has intervened in more than 300 court cases, seeking to breach the barrier between church and state, is aghast at the notion of Federal funds helping to house homeless people in church buildings” (HUD’s Proposed Regulations Denying Funds 1987, p. 2). HUD’s final program rules, issued after the hearing, still included a prohibition against funding renovations, rehabilitation, or conversion of buildings owned by primarily religious organizations or entities. HUD’s commentary on the issue was lengthy, making reference not only to the Constitution but also to its interpretation through court cases. HUD sought guidance from the Department of Justice and noted in the final rule that “the administrative oversight which would be necessary to assure avoidance of impermissible religious influences in the use of such [religiousaffiliated] buildings would most certainly involve an ‘excessive government entanglement’ with religion” (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Final Rule, 1987). In a nod to religious groups and those favoring their inclusion within and outside the halls of Congress, HUD crafted a legal compromise that would slow access to funds but not shut the door. Affected groups could lease buildings or portions of buildings they owned to a secular nonprofit (even one they created themselves). The nonprofit would receive the McKinney funds. The shelter had to be operated as “wholly secular” and available to any in need without regard for their religion for a period equivalent to the “useful life of the improvements” made to the property. The religious organization could even manage and provide the services under a management contract, as long as it promised to offer the services “in a manner free from religious influences pursuant to conditions prescribed by HUD” (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Final Rule, 1987).

Program in action. Created prior to passage of the McKinney Act, HUD was slow to implement the Emergency Shelter Grants Program and the administration did not support it. The National Coalition for the Homeless had to file a lawsuit against HUD in October of 1987 to force it to release supplemental funds by the required date (Hombs 1989; Implementation of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act 1989, p. 106). For fiscal year 1987, HUD received $50 million for the emergency shelter program, but with no indication that homelessness was declining, the funding level dropped dramatically to $8 million for fiscal year 1988 (excluding late supplemental appropriations). Collins, a representative in the House, noted that the

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administration tried to eliminate funding for the Emergency Shelter Grants Program for fiscal year 1988 and proposed major cuts to other McKinney Act programs; she also commented that Congress was “able to soften, but not eliminate” the cuts (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, pp. 1–2). The president’s proposed budget for fiscal year 1989 included no funding for the Emergency Shelter Grants Program (Wasem 1988). In testimony for an appropriations hearing, Secretary Pierce was asked why HUD had “zeroed out” funding for the program. Pierce argued that localities should be using their community development block-grant (CDBG) funds for those purposes. HUD viewed CDBG funds as sufficiently flexible to meet the need for shelter, provided that local governments prioritized their use for those purposes. CDBG monies were supposed to help the poor but could be used for a variety of activities, including support for economic development projects, infrastructure repair, and so on. There was concern that local governments were not adequately targeting those funds to the needs of the poor. The advent of widespread homelessness created a perfect context for this fight. Not coincidentally, Pierce’s response coincided with the Interagency Council’s recommendations in its first report. The council supported integrating McKinney Act programs into existing programs, with primary responsibility for the homeless at the local level; this was interpreted by Maria Foscarinis as a recommendation to eliminate the McKinney Act programs (Implementation of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act 1989, pp. 106, 125). Foscarinis made it clear that based on the administration’s lack of support for the programs and past behavior, she had cause to believe that program merger would equal program abolition (pp. 128–129). Despite the administration’s lack of support, an evaluation report on the Emergency Shelter Grants Program by Abt Associates found that in the early years of implementation, the program funded projects in hundreds of locations with funds going to about 3,000 providers, mostly in more populous cities and counties. The report also found that federal dollars were largely matched by state and local government funding.7 When Congress reauthorized the McKinney Act in 1988, it included funding for the program. Supportive Housing Demonstration Program: Housing for the “Worthy” Poor Purpose of the program. The McKinney Act included a demonstration program to offer supported housing to special populations. Supported housing is housing infused with services. The McKinney Act defined “supportive services” as those the secretary of HUD determined would address: “the spe-

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cial needs of persons, such as deinstitutionalized homeless individuals, homeless families with children, and homeless individuals with mental disabilities and other handicapped homeless persons, intended to be serviced by a project” (PL 100-77, Sec. 422, 19 USC 11382). As noted in Chapter 5, the Transitional Housing Demonstration Program had already been created and was being implemented, but with less funding. The Independent Agencies Appropriation Act of 1986 had authorized funds for a small transitional housing program, with $5 million for 1986 and $15 million for 1987 and 1988 ($30 million over two years). The McKinney Act added another $65 million. Additionally, the act created a new program to offer permanent housing for physically, mentally, or otherwise disabled people who had been deinstitutionalized, with $15 million appropriated for this program. Existing rules were to be used for the transitional program to facilitate rapid funding; the creation of rules and funding for the permanent housing program would follow the typical notice and comment period for a new program. Of funds appropriated for transitional housing, HUD made $20 million available to help homeless families with children, $30 million to serve deinstitutionalized people and others with mental health issues, and the remaining $15 million for other homeless people or families (Transitional Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Notice of Funds Availability, 1987). The focus on mental illness found in the legislation was in keeping with the goals of congressional supporters. For example, Senator Pete Domenici noted he personally fought for a block grant focused on the homeless mentally ill that would have funded transitional housing for the mentally ill as well as mental health outreach and treatment programs that would have been assigned to HHS. He highlighted language in the bill’s definition of transitional housing that made it primarily for those who had been deinstitutionalized and those with mental illness. He stated his expectation that HHS and HUD would work closely together to ensure that homeless people with mental illness received all the support that was needed and granted under the McKinney Act (US Senate 1987). As was the case with HUD’s Emergency Shelter Grants Program, both the language of the McKinney Act and HUD’s use of its interpretive powers and discretionary authority created barriers to program use. Before discussing these barriers, it is important to note that HUD also took positive actions in the early years of implementation. HUD noticed an oversight in McKinney language related to eligible applicants. The McKinney Act left “government entities” out of the list of eligible applicants. Public housing authorities and government bodies previously eligible to participate would be excluded from funding. HUD correctly assumed that Congress had not intended this and called attention to it in the proposed rules for the revised

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program. Congress then addressed the problem, passing a revision to the McKinney Act in 1988 that added “governmental entities.” A second improvement made by HUD in the final rules for the program was a broader definition for “family,” including a child or children with a guardian (rather than a parent) (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Final Rule, 1988). These positive changes and actions accompanied others perceived as creating barriers to accessing funds. For example, to take advantage of the program, one had to move fast and probably needed a project proposal in hand. HUD’s September 1987 notice of fund availability stated that applicants had to use a new HUDdeveloped application. Those who submitted proposals under the last round of funding would have to redo their proposals on the new forms to compete under the September notice. The deadline for receipt of applications at HUD was less than two full months from the date of the notice. Anyone who has ever prepared a federal grant application knows that time is a precious commodity and a short deadline can be a serious barrier. Applicants also had to demonstrate that they had (and could maintain) site control for prospective projects for approximately six months. Problem: Housing and community resources. Congress intended for this

program to offer temporary assistance. In fact, Congress originally defined transitional housing as supporting people who could move to independent living within six months (Conference Report on H.R. 3038 1985). The McKinney Act offered more latitude, referring to the capacity to live independently within a “reasonable time,” to be determined by the secretary of HUD. HUD’s rules for its pilot transitional housing program required homeless participants to be able to live independently within eighteen months (with adequate community resources to support their exit from supported housing) (Transitional Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Notice of Final Guidelines, 1987). Eighteen months could and arguably should have been “reasonable,” but challenges could arise in locations with very tight housing markets and limited affordable housing. Making matters worse, HUD chose to delink access to a most critical resource for successful transition to permanent housing, the coveted housing voucher. Under the much smaller pilot transitional housing program, graduates were automatically given Section 8 vouchers. HUD announced in September of 1987 that because the transitional program was expanded under the McKinney Act (without comparable expansion of the Section 8 program), this practice would end. Eligible applicants could seek Section 8 vouchers from local public housing authorities, which often meant being put on a years-long waitlist, but HUD would no longer provide a direct link between graduates and Section 8 vouchers.

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HUD received comments on the voucher change when it published the final rules for the program, acknowledged the concerns, but made no change. HUD argued again that its decision was due to the significant expansion of the supported housing program in the absence of increased funds for the Section 8 voucher program. HUD had a point: more vouchers would have helped poor and homeless people. They were also creating a problem: the vouchers were needed for successful transition from a program designed to offer transitional housing. HUD appeared to be using its discretion to communicate displeasure over the lack of new money for its priorities.8 Other problems. Other issues raised in the Emergency Shelter Grants Pro-

gram also made their way into the Supportive Housing Demonstration Program. HUD’s opposition to directly funding religious and religion-affiliated organizations was revisited with the same resolution.9 Matching requirements were made more onerous than required under the law.10 HUD also used its discretion to set higher match requirements for operating costs.11 The agency also strictly limited what could be considered as in-kind contributions in lieu of hard-cash matching funds.12 The issue of continued use and funding of services also reemerged. Under the original pilot transitional housing program, applicants were expected to commit themselves to continued operation of HUD-funded projects for five years. Congress extended the requirement for continued operation of supported housing programs under the McKinney Act to ten years and allowed for the possibility of federal funding for the additional five years. But HUD used its discretionary authority to impose a five-year limit on receipt of HUD funds for operating expenses. In practice, this meant that successful applicants would have to find other funds to finance the added five years of required operation.13 HUD also used its discretion to set higher match requirements for operating costs. The program prohibited use of other federal funds as a match, making it yet harder for some to meet the requirements (General Accounting Office, December 1990). Site control, flood plain restrictions, environmental review, zoning, and other requirements were viewed as excessively burdensome by those inexperienced in housing development issues. Applicants leasing space for projects and seeking money only for operations found some of these issues particularly difficult to understand. Although public comments made it clear that many of the requirements negatively affected interested nonprofits, the requirements remained in place. HUD stood by requiring proof of site control with the submission of applications, and maintenance of site control throughout the application process. An administrator involved in implementing the programs later noted that there were significant gaps in ability and experience that made it difficult for providers to deal with the requirements (Kondratas 1991).

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Given the short deadline for funding and onerous requirements, it is not surprising that funding allocations were slow. On February 16, 1988, approximately seven months after passage of McKinney, HUD issued another notice of fund availability for the supported housing program that included information on the pace of implementation. Over $10 million of the $30 million set aside for transitional projects for deinstitutionalized or mentally disabled homeless persons was still available. None of the $15 million targeted for permanent housing for disabled homeless individuals had been awarded. Now that an additional $15 million in 1988 appropriations had been authorized by Congress, there was a pool of $30 million in permanent housing available. In its funding notice, HUD once again set a deadline that probably could not be met, this time for permanent supported housing. Applications had to be submitted no later than March 31, 1988, less than two months from the date of the notice. Transitional housing applicants were given until May 17, 1988.14 During hearings on appropriations, HUD’s Secretary Pierce outlined the slow progress and the administration’s views of the problems. He stated that 129 projects were funded under the supported housing program, serving 1,855 individuals and 825 families (Department of Housing and Urban Development and Certain Independent Agencies: Appropriations 1988, p. 949). He reported that the lack of awards to projects for transitional housing for the mentally ill was due to (1) the short timeframe to get the dollars awarded under the law; (2) the problem with negative attitudes toward target populations—NIMBYism (Not in My Back Yard)—at the local level; and (3) applicants with experience serving people with mental illness who had no housing experience submitting applications that were not fundable (p. 947). Complaints about barriers to accessing funds were known to Congress. When reauthorizing the McKinney Act programs in 1988, Congress tried to address some of the concerns raised by advocates and providers. When the General Accounting Office (GAO), a nonpartisan agency that provides Congress with studies on use of tax dollars and important issues, examined barriers to use of McKinney Act programs, it reported that HUD made changes to address site control, matching funds, and environmental reviews. Transitional housing projects could change locations after applying for funds; applicants could start counting community development and community services block-grant funds as nonfederal matching funds; and projects that received operating funds only would no longer have to go through environmental review. There were efforts within Congress to consolidate HUD McKinney programs into a single block grant (General Accounting Office, February 1990). While these efforts failed, they signaled an interest in increasing flexibility at the state and local levels.

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While slow to start, transitional and permanent housing did emerge to serve homeless people. HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research reported that from 1987 through 1990, the supported housing program awarded $372 million under transitional and permanent housing. The vast majority of the funds ($340 million) went to 496 transitional housing projects, with $32 million going to 236 permanent housing projects. HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research reported that projects were successfully implemented and quickly became operational. The transitional projects funded during the 1987–1990 timeframe were found to be serving close to 7,000 family units (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 1995). While a beginning, as demonstration programs they could not come close to serving the population in need. Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless “Worthy” Poor Purpose of the program. The McKinney Act included a separate title that

created the SAFAH program. The program provided extra money for projects where costs exceeded what was available under the Emergency Shelter Grants Program funds or Supportive Housing Demonstration Program and project sponsors had exhausted other options. The grants funded supportive services for several categories of “worthy” poor: families with children, the elderly, and handicapped homeless people. Funds were also available for “comprehensive assistance for particularly innovative programs for, or alternative methods of, meeting the immediate and long-term needs of homeless individuals and families” (PL 100-77, Sec. 432). Supplemental money could also be used to get a public building being transferred for use to help the homeless up to code, or to buy, lease, or convert buildings for use to help homeless people. The McKinney Act defined the types of services it anticipated being offered through the program as food, child care, assistance in obtaining permanent housing, outpatient health services, employment counseling, nutritional counseling, security arrangements necessary for the protection of residents of facilities to assist the homeless, and such other services essential for maintaining independent living as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. Such term includes the provisions of assistance to homeless individuals in obtaining other Federal, State, and local assistance available for such individuals, including mental health benefits, employment counseling, and medical assistance. (PL 100-77, Sec. 431, 42 USC 11391)

This program included a clause requiring coordination with HHS on projects offering outpatient health care. It also included a set-aside: “To the

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maximum extent practicable,” HUD would use at least 50 percent of the supplemental assistance funds for facilities serving homeless older adults and for homeless families with children. An unspecified portion of the setaside was specifically for child care (PL 100-77, Sec. 432[d][4]). Problems: Move fast. HUD published a notice in the Federal Register on

October 19, 1987, on program guidelines. Within the notice HUD alerted the public that $15 million was available from the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1987 (Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless, HUD Program Guidelines and Notice of Funds, 1987). The McKinney Act set up a short window for action. HUD had to issue a notice of fund availability within thirty days of funds becoming available. HUD had to set an application due date for those applying of no greater than sixty days from the publication of the notice of fund availability. HUD was required to make a decision on applications received within ninety days of publication of the notice of fund availability (PL 100-77, Sec. 433, 42 USC 1193). As noted earlier, tight timeframes can be problematic. In January of 1989, a HUD notice in the Federal Register on the SAFAH program made it clear that the program might be short-lived because no funds “are available for obligation for the program for FY 1989 as of the date of this notice” (Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless, HUD Notice of Amendments to Program Guidelines, 1989). Indeed, as was the case with HUD’s Emergency Shelter Grants Program, the president’s budget proposal for fiscal year 1989 included a zerodollar request for the supplemental program’s funding (Wasem 1988). Again, as was the case with the Emergency Shelter Grants Program, the administration viewed SAFAH as duplicative and unnecessary. The view on the ground and within Congress was different. Congress included new funding for SAFAH when it reauthorized the McKinney Act in 1988. Program evaluation data indicated that SAFAH met real needs. HUD reported that the program was serving targeted groups and that many were finding permanent housing. The Urban Institute’s Center for Public Finance and Housing found that in its two rounds of funding (fiscal years 1987 and 1990), HUD made sixty-five grant awards under the program for a total of $25.8 million dollars, primarily (70 percent) to nonprofit organizations experienced in residential sites for homeless people. HUD reported that the program was operating like a block grant in that it offered grantees significant flexibility. The supplemental program provided funds for projects that served approximately 11,500 homeless individuals and 10,200 homeless families, with homeless families more likely to achieve permanent housing after they had been in shelter or transitional housing (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 1995).

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Single-Room-Occupancy Housing: “Miscellaneous” Help for Less Worthy, Single Poor Purpose of the program. It is more than ironic that an important McKin-

ney HUD program ended up under “miscellaneous provisions.” It was clear when the act was passed that homeless people were disproportionately single men. Advocates and academics repeatedly found that a major contributor to the problem of homelessness in the United States was the loss of affordable single-room-occupancy housing. Of course, historically, unemployed and underemployed single men were not classified as “worthy” of aid unless they were too old or too disabled to work. Section 8’s Moderate Rehabilitation Program provided funds for public housing authorities to support the rehabilitation of single-room-occupancy housing units. As reported by the GAO (May 1991), someone owning a building that could offer single-room-occupancy units could get guaranteed Section 8 rental payments for ten years. Tenants receiving Section 8 pay 30 percent of their adjusted income for their housing. Section 8 rental assistance makes up the difference between what tenants pay and the actual or fair market rental cost for the unit (whichever is lower). The cost of rent in a single-room-occupancy project rehabilitated under this program included the costs of rehabilitation, which were limited to no more than $14,000 per unit (unless the work was done in a high-construction-cost area or “stringent fire or building codes” were an issue). Homeless adults had to have priority access to the units available under this program. On October 15, 1987, HUD published program requirements in the Federal Register. The Section 8 single-room-occupancy Moderate Rehabilitation Program was a national competition. In the notice, HUD estimated that the $35 million dollars appropriated for the program would provide support for 600–800 units over a ten-year period. For this program, HUD chose to use the McKinney Act definition of homeless persons but added that those eligible had to be capable of living independently (as a person or family) with needed supportive services (Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program 1987).

Program shutdown averted. This program was not favored by the administration. After the $35 million appropriation in fiscal year 1987, the program received zero dollars in fiscal year 1988, and the president’s budget proposal for fiscal year 1989 included a request for no funding for this program (Wasem 1988). Congress had other ideas. The program was reauthorized with increased funding when the McKinney Act was reauthorized in 1988. HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research (1995) found that the program was successful. Reports from the HUD office stated that twenty-one public housing authorities were awarded grants through the

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1988 appropriation for thirty projects. These projects created 1,024 singleroom-occupancy units. The public housing authorities receiving the funds contracted with experienced nonprofits and for-profit organizations to develop and operate the housing. It was reported that the program served the target population, finding that residents were representative of homeless people in terms of gender but not for race. Program residents were 70 percent male and 30 percent female; 54 percent were white and 34 percent were African American. The residents were poor and came directly from living on the streets or from emergency or transitional shelters. When the GAO studied early barriers across HUD’s McKinney Act programs, it reported that the agency was making progress in addressing concerns. HUD streamlined management of its programs and eased some barriers to participation in them. In the fall of 1989, HUD centralized management for three of its four McKinney programs under the Office of Special Needs Assistance Programs. Department of Education The Department of Education had an important role to play in implementing the McKinney Act. Title VII of the act made homeless adults eligible for adult literacy initiatives and made funds available to state education agencies to help homeless children and youth access public education. This title also included a provision to disseminate information on “exemplary” projects serving children in elementary and secondary school. The Department of Education’s response to the legislation was anything but enthusiastic, particularly where the education of homeless youth were concerned. It delayed funding and implementation of the homeless youth section of the act; states were also slow to carry out their responsibilities, with some still not in compliance with the law by 1990 (Job Training and Education for the Homeless 1990). Administration of Adult Education Funds: No Estimates of Size, No Money

The McKinney Act amended the Adult Education Act to add “homeless adults” to the list of people to be considered in state plans, research, and demonstration efforts. It also made funds available for literacy programming for adults and basic skills training. This was a straightforward change to existing law. There was a hitch, however, when it came to allocating funds. The secretary of education was charged with allocating funds to states “on the basis of the assessments of the homeless population in the States made in the comprehensive plans submitted under this Act, except that no State shall receive less than $75,000 under this section” (PL 100-77,

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Sec. 702[c][2]). The problem was that the requirements for the comprehensive plans in the McKinney Act did not require states to develop estimates of the size of their homeless population. Approximately seven months after passage of the McKinney Act, in February of 1988, the Department of Education issued a funding procedure for the Adult Literacy Program. The notice indicated that Secretary Bennett had reviewed state CHAP plans looking for included data on homelessness and found the data provided to be relatively useless: “The Secretary believes that it is not possible to allocate funds to the States on a consistent, principled, and defensible basis based upon the assessments contained in the CHAPs” (Adult Education for the Homeless Program, Department of Education Notice of Proposed Funding Procedure, 1988). The notice reported on plans to distribute funds based on the ratio of those aged sixteen who were not in school (and had not graduated or obtained a graduation equivalency certificate) to the number of people in the state, with no state getting less than $75,000. The same day, the Department of Education published an invitation to apply for funds from 1987 and 1988 using an application that would become available on February 12, 1988 (Invitation for Applications 1988). In May of 1988, the proposed distribution formula was adopted for the 1987 funds. For fiscal year 1988 monies, a new law resolved the CHAP estimate issue, the Augustus F. Hawkins–Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments Act of 1988 (PL 100-297) (Adult Education for the Homeless Program, Department of Education Notice of Final Funding Procedure, 1988), which severed the relationship between the allocation of Adult Literacy funds for homeless people and CHAPs.15 With passage of the Hawkins-Stafford law, funding for educating homeless adults shifted from a formula-based grant program to a discretionary one (Elementary and Secondary Education 1988). The Adult Education for the Homeless Program was awarded $6.9 million for fiscal year 1987. It received only slightly more in fiscal year 1988 ($7.2 million) as a department spending target from a lump sum appropriation (General Accounting Office, May 1991). As was the case with some other McKinney HUD programs, the president’s proposed fiscal year 1989 budget had no funding for this program (Wasem 1988), but Congress authorized funds anyway, with the department setting a target of $7.1 million for 1989. In the first year of funding, most states used funds for services inside local shelters. Specific populations were targeted by some states, for example single mothers living within shelters (Job Training and Education for the Homeless 1990, p. 10). Education for Homeless Children

Recognizing that residency laws made it hard for homeless children on the move to obtain an education, the McKinney Act called upon states to

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review and modify residency requirements, as needed, to make sure that homeless children still had access to a “free and appropriate public education.” Another section of the law provided grants for “state activities for the education of homeless children and youth.” While this sounds like it would involve using funds to pay for educational programming, the Department of Education decided that funds were limited to administrative uses (Job Training and Education for the Homeless 1990, p. 49). State education agencies were to develop plans to address the educational placement of homeless children. Options for educational placement included having the child remain in his or her “district of origin” or enrolling where the child was currently living, in keeping with the “best interests” of the child (PL 100-77, Sec. 722[e][3]). The provisions were supposed to promote stability for children, preventing them from automatically being torn from the school they last attended before their family became homeless. For children moving to another school, school records were to be made readily available to promote an easy transfer. An authorized activity under this section was the development or designation of a state-level coordination office for education of homeless children and youth. This office would collect information on numbers of homeless children in the state and their location, develop and implement the state’s plan for educating homeless youth, and prepare and submit interim and final reports on activities to the secretary of education. For each of fiscal years 1987, 1988, and 1989, $5 million was authorized, and funds could be carried over to the next fiscal year. In 1987 and 1988, $4.6 million was appropriated, with a slight increase to $4.8 million in 1989. For this program, funding levels were set by formula. States just had to apply for the funds and promise to use them appropriately (General Accounting Office, May 1991). But first, the Department of Education had to make money available. Failing to Implement Education of Homeless Children

About five months after the act was passed, Secretary Bennett and the Department of Education were sued by the NCH and homeless students for defying congressional intent by failing to rapidly disperse $5 million to help homeless youths continue their schooling. News coverage of the lawsuit noted that the department planned to distribute the funds in May of 1988 “at the earliest” for legislation passed in July of 1987, leaving young people at risk of losing as much as a year of schooling (United Press International 1987). A concern was also raised about how funds could be spent. The GAO (December 1990) noted in its study of McKinney Act barriers that “an advocacy group” wanted states to be able to use McKinney youth education funds to pay directly for education for children and youth. In June of 1989,

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the Department of Education alerted states that they could use unspent monies to pilot education programs for children and youth; this important step occurred almost two years after passage of the McKinney Act. The McKinney Act included another section focused on developing innovative projects for homeless youth in elementary and secondary schools. Funding was authorized for fiscal year 1988 but the Department of Education chose neither to target funds for that purpose in 1988, nor in 1989. Once again, the president’s budget proposal for fiscal year 1989 requested no funding for this program (Wasem 1988). Almost three full years after passage of the McKinney Act, Foscarinis testified before a Senate subcommittee as director of the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP). She provided stark findings from a report produced by her center titled Shut Out: Denial of Education to Homeless Children that documented high percentages of students still facing serious barriers to education based on residency requirements, transfers of records, and guardianship requirements. She reported that despite a successful lawsuit, the Department of Education was not faithfully implementing the law, that states were also failing to comply with the law, and that homeless children continued to be deprived of appropriate education (Job Training and Education for the Homeless 1990, pp. 48–50). The Senate subcommittee also heard from a young person affected by the failure to implement the program. Kendrick Williams testified that he faced teasing in school because he was homeless, struggled to get to school because no school bus came to the shelter, and lost a month of schooling because of lost immunization records (pp. 50–51). A GAO report on access to McKinney programs published in December of 1990 noted that the Department of Education had not evaluated its programs under the act. While the agency planned to contract for an evaluation of its Adult Education for the Homeless programs that were up and running in 1990, it was not planning to evaluate its homeless children program (General Accounting Office, December 1990). The agency’s disinterest in evaluating the program seems consistent with its efforts to thwart funding of the program. Department of Health and Human Services Consistent with a neoliberal approach and New Federalism, under the McKinney Act the Department of Health and Human Services was responsible for implementing a mix of uncontroversial and relatively flexible block grants and competitive research-grant programs that offered opportunities for development and delivery of services at the local level. Block grants distribute funds based on a formula or parameters and a set of general purposes.

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Competitive research grants use rigorous screening criteria to ensure proposals merit funding. HHS was thus charged with implementing a set of programs likely to be well received by potential applicants, that were easier to access (in the case of block grants), and that were less likely to draw complaints about selection criteria (in the case of faculty at research universities). Well-Received Block Grants

Block-grant programs included the Community Mental Health Services for the Homeless Block Grant and the Emergency Community Services Homeless Grant Program. The mental health block grant built on National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) demonstration-project findings supporting comprehensive services (Levine and Rog 1990). The grant funded a mix of services that had to include outreach, crisis intervention, care referrals, diagnosis and rehabilitation, case management (including help with needed services and income supports), and residential services; training for outreach workers and homeless service providers was also to be part of the mix (PL 100-77; General Accounting Office, February 1990, May 1991). Those at-risk of homelessness could also be served. Speaking to the program’s design, Pete Domenici affirmed its roots in funded research: The case for using these five service elements has been made over a 4year period in the Community Support Program at the National Institute of Mental Health. . . . I am glad to report that the conference agreed to expand this NIMH demonstration program for the homeless mentally ill by adding $10 million in new authority, available through fiscal year 1988. It is our hope that new and more effective treatment methods can be found and disseminated to local service providers. (Statement of Senator Domenici 1987)

As with other block grants, funds would flow provided applications came in and promises were made to provide the required set of services (General Accounting Office, February 1990). The grants could cover only 75 percent of the costs of services, so applicants had to have either a 25 percent match in other funds or be able to contribute $1 in nonfederal dollars for every $3 received in funding (PL 100-77, Sec. 521[a][1–2]). In most states, grants were distributed by a state-level agency to other agencies or programs to provide local services. In the first years of implementation, the GAO found significant diversity in delivery of services (General Accounting Office, February 1990). Mary Fleming, executive vice president of a state mental health board, representing a number of mental health advocacy organizations, testified before a House subcommittee about the importance of this block grant, its accomplishments, and serious unmet needs. Appearing in 1990, she stated

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that mental health professionals viewed the block grant positively and supported its continuation. She reported that a survey of 49 states found that about 69,267 homeless people with mental illness were served by the grant, and over 200,000 were estimated as unserved. She also identified problems Congress could address. She recommended eliminating a McKinney Act restriction on using grant funds for services in HUD-supported housing and endorsed adding language to prohibit discrimination against those who suffered from both mental illness and substance abuse (Health Care for the Homeless 1990, pp. 29–30). The Emergency Community Services Homeless Grant Program was to expand comprehensive services to help homeless people move out of poverty, including long-term services (PL 100-77, Sec. 752[a], 42 USC 11462). Funds were supposed to go from states to eligible community action agencies, as well as organizations assisting migrant or seasonal farm workers and other entities eligible to get Community Services Block Grant funds. Funds could be used to help homeless people access mainstream income support programs. Another purpose of the program was to “promote private-sector and other assistance to homeless individuals” (General Accounting Office, May 1991). Funds were formula-based, using the existing Community Services Block Grant formula. This meant that all fiftyseven states and territories were eligible and that at least 1.5 percent of funds had to be set aside for native tribes (General Accounting Office, February 1990). Congress included a stipulation that not less than 90 percent of funds had to go to entities already servicing the “critically urgent needs of homeless individuals” (PL 100-77, Sec. 753, 42 USC 11463). There were requirements to ensure that states did not abuse funds. States and territories had to “agree that funds will not be used to defray state administrative costs and that not more than 25 percent of the funds will be used for activities to prevent homelessness” (General Accounting Office, February 1990, p. 47). The limited amounts for prevention could be used under certain conditions (e.g., for impending eviction, loss of home, or loss of utility services). A conference report on 1988 McKinney Act amendments included content on the failure of “many” states to make timely releases of these block-grant funds to community action agencies. To respond to the issue, Congress added a requirement for states to release these funds within sixty days of receipt (R. Conf. Rep. 1089, October 13, 1988). The GAO (February 1990) reported that in fiscal year 1987, $36.6 million was appropriated (of $40 million authorized), with $250,000 transferred to the Interagency Council. The following year, funds for this program were part of a lump sum appropriated to HHS, with the agency determining what would be spent on the program. It is important to note that there were no earmarks set specifically for this program within the lump sum appropriation, leaving its funding level to the discretion of HHS. In fiscal years

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1988 and 1989, HHS set spending targets for the program at less than half the sums Congress authorized ($19.1 million for 1988 and $18.9 million for 1989). Underfunded Competitive Grants for Dramatic Needs

Consistent with the administration’s focus on substance abuse and mental illness as causes for homelessness and appropriate areas for federal intervention, as well as concerns raised by researchers, advocates, providers, and others about deinstitutionalization and lack of community services, the competitive-grant programs included the Community Demonstration Grant Projects for Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment of Homeless Individuals and the Community Mental Health Services Demonstration Projects for Homeless Individuals Who Are Chronically Mentally Ill. There was also a critically important program titled the Health Care for the Homeless Program. The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, working with the National Institute on Drug Abuse, implemented the substance abuse grant. The GAO noted that the project was to represent “a collaborative effort between primarily university-based researchers responsible for the overall project design and program evaluation, and community-based service providers who offer alcohol and other drug treatment and rehabilitation services” (General Accounting Office, May 1991, p. 44). Funds were available for up to ten two-year grants in fiscal year 1988 (Community Demonstration Grant Projects for Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment 1987). Like other large, competitive national grants, funding decisions were based on scores, reviewer comments, and site-visit findings; the GAO reported that they tried to get sites from across the country and diversity in the populations served (General Accounting Office, May 1991). Funds for these grants were part of lump sum appropriations to HHS; the agency set target funding levels, with $9.2 million made available in fiscal year 1987, zero monies in 1988, and only $4.5 million for fiscal year 1989. Nine grants were awarded in fiscal year 1988. At the time of the GAO’s May 1991 publication, evaluative data were anticipated but not yet available. The Community Mental Health Services Demonstration Projects for Homeless Individuals Who Are Chronically Mentally Ill was also competitive and administered by NIMH, which quickly announced fund availability for a project with ambitious goals, including developing services for the homeless mentally ill that were comprehensive and systematically linked to needed supportive services (Mental Health Services Demonstration Grants 1987). NIMH announced its intention to fund twelve grants for comprehensive community-based demonstrations for the chronically mentally ill (at a cost of approximately $7.7 million) and four grants for

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projects for children and adolescents who were homeless and experiencing “severe emotional disturbance” (at a cost of approximately $1 million). Only state mental health authorities could apply, because of their abilities in state-level coordination and resources, and their needed continued involvement. The GAO reported that twelve state mental health authorities received two-year grants in fiscal year 1987 and that eight of these projects were renewed for a third year in fiscal year 1989 (General Accounting Office, May 1991). HHS targeted $9.3 million dollars from a lump sum appropriation for these grants in fiscal year 1987 and $4.6 million in fiscal year 1989. Comprehensive evaluations of these efforts and their findings were not yet available during the first two years of McKinney Act funding (Levine and Rog 1990). A significantly larger competitive grant focused on health care. Using the national demonstration Health Care for the Homeless Program previously funded by the Robert Woods Johnson and Pew Charitable Trust as its model (General Accounting Office, May 1991), this section of the McKinney Act amended the Public Health Services Act to provide a grant program that would provide health care to homeless people. The Health Resources and Services Administration was charged with implementation and moved quickly to announce funding availability. Proposed projects needed to make health care accessible to homeless people, provide twenty-four-hour emergency care access, provide outreach and referrals for health and mental health care, and, when eligible, help people gain access to entitlements and services (General Accounting Office, May 1991). Public and nonprofit organizations in areas with concentrations of homeless people could apply if they had local institutional and community support (to ensure adequate service linkage) and were members of a community coalition. Applicants had to have significant financial support as well. To receive funding, projects had to match funds from nonfederal sources at a rate of 25 percent the first year and 33.3 percent for any additional years. The GAO found that projects were typically “administered by local public health departments, community and migrant health centers, inner-city hospitals, and local community coalitions” (General Accounting Office, May 1991, pp. 58–59). For fiscal year 1987, $50 million was authorized, with $46 million awarded through 109 grants. Another $30 million was authorized for fiscal year 1988, but only $14.3 million was targeted to fund this project from the relevant lump sum appropriation to Health Resources and Services Administration. For fiscal year 1989, $14.8 million was the target spending level for this program. Because of the limited funds available, the Health Resources and Services Administration chose to make continuing grants available to those funded in fiscal year 1987 (Availability of Funds for Project Grants 1988; General Accounting Office, May 1991).

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In a 1991 report, the GAO reported that the program appeared to be serving targeted populations and in significant numbers. For fiscal year 1989, the 109 projects funded “served over 352,000 homeless persons, of which 43 percent were single adults, 21 percent were families and runaway/homeless youths, and 13 percent were children 14 years and under. About 53 percent of the total were minorities” (General Accounting Office, May 1991, p. 59). As Congress considered reauthorization of the McKinney Act in 1990, researcher James Wright and others testified on the dramatic need for these funds and the inadequacy of the appropriation compared to actual need. Wright reported that homeless people bore much higher disease rates for all illnesses, including tuberculosis and HIV infection, with research finding that their average life expectancy was cut by about two decades compared to the normal average for the US population. He reported that they lacked access to health care, lacked health insurance, and encountered discrimination in health care settings, much as the mentally ill faced NIMBYism in the community: “Absent money and health care insurance, most of the health care delivery systems are effectively beyond their reach. More perhaps to the point homeless people are often considered undesirable patients. They are often disheveled, alcohol impaired, substance abusive, mentally ill. They are the frequent victims of the ‘Gomer’ syndrome—get out of my emergency room” (Health Care for the Homeless 1990, p. 15). The funded projects were providing needed care, yet, as reported by Wright, 115 cities were not participating in the program because of inadequate funding, and 22 programs were “approved but unfunded” (p. 15). He acknowledged that the programs were expensive and that even a doubling of funds would be inadequate to address the need, but argued they were worth the price based on their accomplishments and the needs they addressed (p. 17). Another speaker at the same hearing, Lynn Clothier, echoed Wright’s comments based on her experiences in Indiana. One line of her testimony put the cost issue in perspective. She reported that on her flight to Washington, D.C., she had spoken with an Army lieutenant-colonel about her upcoming testimony. As she put it: “He was staggered to find that we do not appropriate for health care for the homeless program in America funding equally even to the cost of one B-2 bomber. I didn’t know what they cost but he did” (p. 20). Both Wright and Clothier recommended providing more adequate and more stable funding for the program. Across the HHS block grants and competitive grants there are recurrent themes. There were relatively few administrative implementation barriers. The grants offered funding that was needed under programs that garnered support at the state and local levels. They offered an inadequate level of funding, however, compared to the serious suffering of homeless people. Further, the competitive grants did not offer sustained funding for worthy projects.

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Veterans While the McKinney Act included veterans as a target population, programs specifically designed for veterans were limited to the reintegration program assigned to the Department of Labor and the extension of the Veterans Job Training Act under Title IX of the McKinney Act. Advocates looking for a coordinated, systematic effort to provide outreach to homeless veterans, to get them access to needed veterans’ benefits, were frustrated in the 1980s. As noted in Chapter 5, legislation early in the 1980s eliminated requirements for a permanent residence for applying for and receiving benefits under a variety of programs, including veterans’ benefits, and required relevant agencies to engage in outreach to vulnerable populations. Advocates wanted to see the VA implement minimum standards for veteran outreach, based on a model program carried out in New York City. In January of 1988, two homeless veterans living in shelters and organizations representing the interests of homeless people (including the National Coalition for the Homeless, Friends of the Homeless, and the Vietnam Veterans of America) sued Thomas Turnage, head of the VA, for failing to establish “systematic, nationwide guidelines” to provide outreach to and meet the needs of homeless veterans. The court ruled that the VA was not obligated by law to develop the type of minimal standards sought by the advocates. The written summary of the decision made it clear that while the judge was sympathetic to the advocates, he found no legal basis in existing law to force the VA to use its limited resources to develop and implement such standards, so long as it was making efforts to engage in outreach (Younger v. Turnage 1988). Discussion of veterans was somewhat limited in the early years of House-run congressional hearings on homelessness, nor were veterans discussed a great deal in the early literature on homelessness. Those serving the homeless were aware of veterans among the homeless, however, and discussions took place within congressional committees charged with oversight of veterans’ programs, where there were serious concerns about their mental health and well-being. When the conference report for the McKinney Act was reported to Congress, Republican senator Alan Cranston spoke at some length about what was and was not included in the McKinney Act for veterans. He expressed hope that the House would consider and pass a bill like his Homeless Veterans Assistance Act (Statement of Senator Cranston 1987). Senator Cranston’s bill, which passed the Senate, focused on providing veterans outreach services as well as shelter space, health and mental health care, and rehabilitative and supportive services to homeless veterans. After the McKinney Act was passed, the VA was charged with implementing two other programs to help homeless veterans, the Homeless Chronically Mentally Ill Veterans Program and the Domiciliary Care for

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Homeless Veterans Program (General Accounting Office, May 1991). The program for veterans who were chronically mentally ill came through separate legislation in May of 1988 titled the Veterans Benefits and Services Act (PL 100-322). Section 115 of the law was titled “Pilot Program of Community-Based Residential Care for Homeless Chronically Mentally Ill and Other Veterans.” Under this program, $6 million was authorized for 1988 and 1989. The McKinney Act amendments of 1988 (PL 100-628) authorized additional funds for this program. Funding for veterans with chronic mental illness, however, was made as a lump sum for veterans’ medical care, with the VA setting spending targets. For fiscal year 1988, no funds were appropriated for this program (as the VA set a target for spending for this program at zero dollars). Despite this, by 1990 there were approximately forty-three centers in twenty-six states and Washington, D.C., under the Homeless Chronically Mentally Ill Program, with congressional testimony placing the number of those served by the programs in their startup period at about 19,000 (Department of Veterans Affairs Homeless Programs 1990, p. 9). The VA had a program to provide domiciliary care for veterans prior to the McKinney Act. In the wake of the McKinney Act, the VA set aside beds in existing domiciliary care facilities for homeless veterans and those at risk of homelessness and created new facilities for the target group; twenty veterans’ medical centers received funds in 1987 and funding was continued in 1988 and 1989, providing approximately a thousand beds for homeless vets (Department of Veterans Affairs Homeless Programs 1990, p. 10; General Accounting Office, May 1991). The clinical care provided was at a level in-between community residential settings and hospital or skilled nursing facilities (General Accounting Office, May 1991, p. 70). Congressional testimony provided strong statements of support for the program but noted less success with veterans who were homeless for more than a year (Department of Veterans Affairs Homeless Programs 1990, p. 24). The GAO reported that following the initial congressional appropriation in 1987, the VA continued to allocate funds for the program from the lump sum it received for medical care for veterans. This program was funded at $15 million in 1987, with an additional $10.4 million in fiscal years 1988 and 1989. By 1990 there was recognition that while the veterans’ initiatives were helping homeless vets, there were at least two serious problems that affected vets and all other homeless people. One was the limited number of people who could be helped with the funding available, even as the population needing help was growing. The other was the lack of affordable housing and service-enriched residential options. Members of Congress were crafting legislation to address some issues, focusing on supported housing and a VA-financed Section 8 subsidy program. They recognized

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that while these options would help, they would not offer the expanded supply of affordable housing that was needed (Department of Veterans Affairs Homeless Programs 1990, pp. 4, 17). Department of Labor The Department of Labor was charged with implementing the Homeless Veterans Reintegration Project and the Job Training for the Homeless Demonstration Program under the McKinney Act. Compared to the programs to be managed by FEMA and HUD, these programs were relatively small. No funds were authorized or appropriated for either of them for 1987. For 1988, $1.9 million was appropriated for the reintegration project and $7.6 million was appropriated for the job-training demonstration (General Accounting Office, May 1991). The design for the reintegration project was established in an earlier, one-year demonstration program funded under the Job Training Partnership Act that focused on improving outreach and access to needed services for homeless veterans to get them back into the labor force by providing job counseling, resume preparation, job search assistance, remedial and vocational education, on-the-job training, and job placement. In addition, supportive services deemed necessary to assist a veteran to enter the workforce and to regain self-sufficiency may be provided directly by the project, or by referral to other resources. Such Assistance may be for transportation, clothes, or tools needed for employment; or alcohol and drug treatment referrals and psychiatric counseling. (General Accounting Office, May 1991, p. 84)

Improved access to housing was also a focus of funded projects. The GAO reported that fifteen projects were funded in fiscal year 1988; twelve of those received continued funding in fiscal year 1990 while another six new programs were funded that year (General Accounting Office, May 1991). Senators Kennedy, a Democrat, and Hatch, a Republican, were credited with getting the job-training demonstration project into the McKinney Act by an assistant secretary for the Department of Labor (Job Training and Education for the Homeless 1990, pp. 3–4). Demonstration-grant funds could be used to develop various skills, including but not limited to basic skills, remedial education and literacy skills, job search skills, job counseling, and preparation (General Accounting Office, May 1991). Under the program, the Department of Labor paid the federal share of projects developed through contracts with states, local public agencies, and Native American tribes. Private businesses and private industry councils (set up to respond to deindustrialization in the 1980s) were also eligible to apply for funds

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(Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, Notice of Availability of Funds, 1989). Like other McKinney Act programs, funds under this project had to have a cash or in-kind match of 10 to 50 percent of the costs, specifically from nonfederal sources. No state in the nation could receive more than 15 percent of the total appropriated for the program (General Accounting Office, May 1991). The grant competition was designed to provide guidance for policy and programs on the best way to go about getting homeless people needed job training. Robert Jones, assistant secretary for the Employment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor, reported to Congress that thirty-three awards were made totaling $7.7 million that provided services to 7,400 homeless people, and got 4,600 into job training and 2,400 into jobs between October of 1988 and September of 1989. Among the lessons learned was that substance abuse histories affected far more people than expected. Taylor reported another $15.5 million in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 had been awarded to start thirty-one new and to continue fifteen existing programs. He commented on how competitive the grant process was, with some 300 applicants in the last round; the resulting awards would offer more services focused on youth and those with mental illness (Job Training and Education for the Homeless 1990, pp. 3–4). After examining how these funds were used, the GAO found that “most providers offer a variety of services to help homeless persons, focusing on job employment skills (i.e., vocational training) as well as job services (i.e., counseling and job search techniques). In addition, basic skills courses such as remedial math and reading courses are also provided by many programs. Typically projects incorporated a support services component . . . some provided housing” (General Accounting Office, May 1991, p. 87). While getting people into jobs would seem to be critical to ending homelessness, the president’s budget proposal for fiscal year 1989, like so many other executive recommendations related to McKinney Act programs, requested no funding for either program (Wasem 1988), while Congress supported the programs. A barrier to providing services under the job-training grant noted by the GAO was a limit of two years on spending awards. The Department of Labor lifted that restriction because it found programs often needed longer periods to make use of award funds. While Labor wanted to lift this restriction, other cabinet-level agencies were expressing concerns about awards made under the McKinney Act where funds were sitting unspent (General Accounting Office, May 1991). Federal Emergency Management Agency When academics, activists, and others decried the emphasis on emergency shelter in the McKinney Act provisions, they were usually talking about a

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program administered by FEMA. A noncabinet level agency, FEMA ended up administering the biggest and best-funded of the McKinney Act’s programs, the Emergency Food and Shelter Program (discussed in Chapter 5). Title III of the McKinney Act significantly expanded FEMA’s existing Emergency Food and Shelter Program. This title required FEMA 16 to establish a new national board to make program awards, dissolving its prior national board (PL 100-77, Sec. 301[e][1]). In practice, this did not mean changes to the program or its oversight.17 The FEMA experiment in public-private partnership with a set of the nation’s large charities and religious organizations would continue the practice of awarding federal funds to religion-affiliated entities, while HUD deemed this inappropriate for its Emergency Shelter Grants Program. FEMA made it clear post-McKinney that it questioned whether homelessness was still an “emergency” the agency should be addressing in the late 1980s. In judging the response of FEMA to the McKinney Act, it is important to remember that FEMA’s role in providing relief to homeless persons began in 1983, with passage of the Jobs Stimulus Bill (PL 98-8). A FEMA notice of March 4, 1988, in the Federal Register included the following: “The National Board would like to reiterate that grant awards from this program are designed to address emergency needs which have become evident in recent years. This program is not intended to address or correct structural poverty or long-standing problems” (National Board Plan for Carrying Out the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, FEMA Notice, 1988). In the “background and Introduction” section of the notice, a summary of the history of appropriations since 1983 appeared.18 A quick modern version of this might read: We’re required to implement this program for emergency relief, but for the record, we’d like to state that homelessness is looking more and more like a chronic problem that might really reflect underlying structural problems resulting in persistent poverty. As the federal-level agency charged with implementing the new law, having hinted at its concerns, FEMA in its published notice presented the national board’s plan for distributing $10 million and $114 million to local public and nonprofit organizations to deliver emergency food and shelter between the date of the notice and September 30, 1988.19 The allocation formula was based on unemployment, poverty, and population data. Local boards would certify local recipient organizations. The target population was identified simply as “needy individuals” and the national board left it to the local boards or their local grant recipient organizations to set criteria for client eligibility for program services (National Board Plan for Carrying Out the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, FEMA Notice, 1988). Funds for FEMA’s Emergency Food and Shelter Program were quite flexible. They could be used for a variety of functions beyond providing meals. They could be used to help avoid evictions by paying no more than

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one month’s rent, mortgage, or utilities. They could also be used to renovate facilities or provide operating costs for new or expanded facilities (General Accounting Office, May 1989). FEMA received an appropriation of $125 million for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program for fiscal year 1987 (with $45 million from its Disaster Relief Program) (General Accounting Office, May 1991). In fiscal year 1988, $114 was appropriated for the program. Reagan’s budget request for fiscal year 1989 included $80 million for the program (Wasem 1988), but total funding appropriated ended up being $126 million (McCarthy 2012). Across the period 1987– 1989, FEMA received a total of $365 million in appropriations for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. This represented approximately 32 percent of the total funding appropriated for all McKinney Act programs and the largest sum spent on any single program under the act, surpassing funding for HUD’s Emergency Shelter Grants Program ($115 million) and its Supported Housing Demonstration Program ($229 million) (General Accounting Office, May 1991). McKinney’s FEMA program succeeded in getting money to the local level to feed and shelter homeless people. Focusing on appropriations made pre-McKinney, the GAO found that the Emergency Food and Shelter Program supported thousands of organizations aiding homeless people using fiscal year 1987 funds: “This program received two separate appropriations totaling $115 million early in fiscal year 1987. Each appropriation was allocated separately by the national and state boards to about 2,000 local boards, which in turn distributed the funds among over 8,000 service providers, including shelters. The National Board required the funds to be spent by September 30, 1987” (General Accounting Office, December 1987, p. 18). Among the concerns raised by the GAO in the early phase of implementation were: (1) whether funds were being prioritized for the target groups identified in the McKinney Act; (2) different approaches for allocating funds used by FEMA and HUD programs (although many agencies would apply for funds through both agencies); and (3) different approaches to funding religious organizations across federal agencies. FEMA’s Emergency Food and Shelter Program was giving money for building renovations to religious organizations, while HUD would not directly fund religious organizations. A 1989 report by the GAO included a national survey of providers who received funding under the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. The report indicated that close to half found that the program helped them to serve the homeless poor but that the program was not without issues.20 One issue was first identified pre-McKinney. Emergency Food and Shelter Program funds had to be spent by September 30 of the fiscal year, leaving organizations without funds to supply relief in the winter months. The General Accounting Office (May 1989) recommended action on this and the national board lengthened the period for spending funds to the end of Decem-

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ber; the national board also established procedures to speed disbursement of funds so that they could send funds to agencies by January 1. The GAO reported on this progress to the Congress but cautioned that if FEMA received appropriations too late in the year, agencies still might face winters without funds to provide aid (General Accounting Office, May 1989). Another issue was the allocation formula that was used to distribute money to states and localities. The formula used data on poverty and unemployment. While poverty and unemployment should be associated with homelessness, unemployment figures, as discussed earlier, often grossly underrepresent joblessness in a community. Workers who used to have fulltime jobs that allowed them to pay for housing often end up taking parttime work or lower pay that does not cover their expenses. While “underemployed,” they are not classified as unemployed. As noted by the GAO: “Regarding FEMA’s program, for the needy and near-homeless as well as the homeless, there is a major concern that there are persons unemployed so long they no longer appear on unemployment data, do not yet appear on poverty data, and are therefore not counted when determining allocations. To date, however, a better basis for allocation that addresses these problems has not been devised” (General Accounting Office, May 1989, p. 4). The 1988 amendments to the McKinney Act acknowledged the problems with the allocation formulas and called upon FEMA and HUD to study the potential for different allocation formulas for their affected programs; the GAO also recommended allocating more of the Emergency Food and Shelter funding at the state level, believing that states would have a better understanding of community needs (General Accounting Office, May 1989). Another issue raised by the GAO was the differential treatment of religious organizations by FEMA and HUD (General Accounting Office, May 1989). While the federal government was not making direct transfers of federal funds from the federal government to religious bodies, federal funds from the FEMA program could make their way to religious organizations. The GAO noted that Congress intended for religious organizations to receive assistance because they were at the forefront of helping the homeless. At the local level, the differential treatment of religious groups by the two federal agencies—FEMA and HUD—was very confusing, particularly since many of the same organizations pursued funding under both FEMA and HUD programs. In its early years of implementation, the Emergency Food and Shelter Program was providing funds to thousands of food and shelter operations nationally and those receiving aid seemed satisfied with FEMA’s management of the funds. There were questions about whether funded projects were serving the groups the McKinney Act hoped to prioritize for aid. Serious concerns about lack of funding during the coldest months of the year were being addressed at the level of the national board (though the timing

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of federal appropriations could still create problems). Religious organizations were more satisfied with their treatment under this program than under the programs administered by HUD. The McKinney Act’s Bermuda Triangle: What Happened to the Surplus Property? As discussed in Chapter 5, the federal government is a very large landlord, with many types of property in its portfolio, including military housing, singlefamily homes, office buildings, and recruitment training facilities. Advocates of low-income housing and scholars of housing policy knew the scale of the government’s holdings (Hartman and Drayer 1990). They hoped that in the context of military downsizing and base realignments and closures, defenseowned properties would be made available for use by homeless people. As noted in Chapter 4, early in its efforts to help homeless people, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) argued that federal property that was not in use should be used to house people in need, and that there was a major conflict over the building on 2nd and D Streets in Washington, D.C. In fiscal year 1984 the Department of Defense (DOD) was charged with making its surplus property available for homeless people through a special DOD program (General Accounting Office, February 1990). In addition to large vacant buildings in Washington, D.C., and military properties, advocates were also interested in the large stock of some 50,000 vacant single-family properties owned by HUD, thousands of which were acquired and sold by HUD on a monthly basis (Lee et al. v. Samuel R. Pierce Jr. 1988). Under Section 501 of Title V of the McKinney Act, on “use of underutilized public buildings and property for facilities to assist the homeless,” HUD was charged with collecting information on federally owned but underused public buildings and property. HUD would determine which buildings and property were “suitable” and work with HHS and the Department of General Services to develop criteria for making these decisions. Once a building or property was identified as underutilized by HUD, the departments and agencies holding the underused property had thirty days to tell HUD whether the property was deemed “excess.” Once a property was deemed “suitable” and “excess” the secretary of HHS and the administrator of General Services would make it available to private nonprofits, local governments, and states for use in assisting homeless people, under a lease agreement. The federal government maintained ownership. Section 502 of this title made surplus personal property (such as file cabinets, other office supplies, and equipment) available to nonprofit homeless service providers (PL 100-77, Sec. 502[c][2]). Regulations were published in the Federal Register on December 14, 1987, and November 22, 1988. In March of 1988 the

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regulations were modified to allow entities to lease personal property (as well as underutilized facilities and real property). In February of 1989 a list of unutilized and underutilized property appeared in the Federal Register (Unutilized and Underutilized Federal Buildings and Real Property 1989). The program as implemented bore no relation to the aims of legislators or advocates. Hombs of the CCNV referred to this portion of the McKinney Act as “perhaps the most egregious example of inaction” (1989, p. 3). Very few properties were made available. There was no effort to let organizations providing services to homeless people know that properties were available. And there was confusion over agency-level responsibilities, including receiving applications from providers and developing leases for properties. A House hearing was held in October of 1988 on providing shelter for the homeless on underutilized federal properties pursuant to the McKinney Act. Having a special hearing called to discuss recent legislation is often an indication that Congress is exercising its oversight responsibilities to influence implementation. The opening statement from the chair, Cardis Collins, made it clear that implementation was not going well. Collins noted that allies of the homeless had to sue the Department of Education, HUD, and other agencies to implement McKinney-funded programs, including the surplus property program. She commented on a US District Court decision of September 30, 1988, that found that five executive-level agencies had not faithfully implemented the McKinney Act. Collins noted: “Indeed, in the 14 months since the President signed the McKinney Act into law, only 12 Federal properties have been identified as appropriate for aiding the homeless. Of those, only four have been made available for that purpose as yet another winter approaches” (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, p. 2). While the General Services Administration was represented at the hearing, HUD and HHS were not. Their absence was commented upon by Congressman Dennis Hastert. Maria Foscarinis provided testimony at the hearing, as did the director of an interfaith group seeking surplus property to house homeless families and a representative of the Union of the Homeless. Foscarinis provided a stinging indictment of executive branch efforts to implement Title V (and other McKinney programs). She testified that while the federal government had large property holdings sitting vacant or underutilized, only two were made available to homeless people in the prior year (with twelve deemed eligible). She clearly outlined the efforts of the NCH to push implementation forward by reaching out to agencies, to no avail, resulting ultimately in lawsuits (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, p. 8). In fact, frustration with implementation of the surplus property program produced multiple lawsuits. They were filed to stop HUD from selling its vacant (foreclosed) single-family housing holdings for purposes other

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than serving homeless and poor people, and to require HUD to use the rules for notice and comment in the Federal Register for disposition of those properties (for example, Lee et al. v. Samuel R. Pierce Jr. 1988; Lee et al. v. Jack Kemp 1989). There were victories and losses. Temporary restraining orders on property disposal were won at the state and national levels, and HUD was found to be violating rules for notice and comment in its disposition of property. While advocates had hoped that vacant single-family properties would help homeless people, a decision was made that they were not subject to the McKinney Act. Other legal action was taken against the VA to prevent disposal of its property eligible for use under the McKinney Act (National Coalition for the Homeless et al. v. United States Veterans Administration et al. 1988). The facts discussed by the court in rendering its decisions provided stark examples of efforts to delay and ultimately thwart the law. In these cases, and the Bruce v. Department of Defense case cited in Chapter 5, it was clear that nonprofit organizations attempting to access surplus federal property to help homeless people were getting nowhere. Hombs (1989) described the administration’s strange semantics-based argument in one case, in which it argued that vacant properties were not underutilized and thus not eligible for lease under the program; only partially empty buildings were underutilized. Robert Nasdor, director of the Middlesex Interfaith Partners with the Homeless, from Edison, New Jersey, illustrated the Orwellian frustrations they experienced in congressional testimony. His organization tried to obtain a parcel of land owned by the General Services Administration to provide modular housing for homeless families living in welfare hotels. Nasdor said that Jim Kearns of the General Services Administration explained that the property could not be made available to us because it was on the surplus property list and therefore could not be considered underutilized. When asked if the property could have been made available prior to its being declared surplus on July 21, he said it could not because it was on the excess property list and was not covered by the McKinney Act. When we pointed out that the act refers to property which is “in excess to the agency’s need,” he explained that the word excess in the act began with a lower case “e” rather than an upper case “e” and was not intended to apply to excess property. When asked exactly when property becomes “underutilized” and covered under the McKinney act, he did not know but felt that Congress would have to say what it meant. (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, p. 17)

The Union of the Homeless had similar experiences. Victoria Luna, regional coordinator for the union, testified at the same hearing. She reported on the union’s past successes in self-help, with homeless people eager to use their skills to improve their lives. She described the union’s frustrated efforts to locate surplus properties under this McKinney Act program:

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Both the National Coalition for the Homeless and the Union of the Homeless has been given a list of various personnel in the GSA [General Services Administration] who we were told would be the appropriate agency to handle requests for information and applications for leasing bidding on the properties. We have made numerous long-distance calls, both to Philadelphia and Atlanta, and have written letters to the homeless coordinator in Philadelphia to the region 3 offices. We were then directed to the Atlanta offices to the Director of Real Estate for GSA. So far no information has been provided. We also contacted several Congressmen to assist us in simply getting on the GSA application list. (Providing Shelter for the Homeless on Underutilized Federal Properties 1989, p. 23)

Clearly, implementation of Title V was not going well. HUD’s large stock of single-family properties was not going to be turned over for use by homeless people. Very few defense-controlled properties were being turned over and the DOD had the largest holdings. The General Services Administration’s significant holdings were not being turned over either. When the McKinney Act was reauthorized in 1988, Congress made modifications to the title to overcome semantics and other reasons for blocking use of unutilized or excess property. The word “unused” was added to “underutilized” as an adjective also describing properties covered under the act (Conference Report on Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act 1988). Anna Kondratas, who became responsible for implementing HUD homeless assistance in the early 1990s, noted that the Title V surplus property program was “a bureaucratic nightmare from the very beginning” that provided few buildings for use by the homeless (1991, p. 1230). Summary The McKinney Act was designed to be a comprehensive, coordinated measure, albeit one focused on the provision of “urgent relief,” as it represented only a portion of the larger Homeless Persons’ Survival Act originally proposed by advocates. The McKinney Act thus represented an effort to address a crisis but was never viewed by homeless advocates or others as a way to end homelessness or prevent its reoccurrence (Foscarinis 2007; General Accounting Office, May 1994). On the positive side, funding did get through despite barriers, and additional funds were authorized, even in opposition to administrative wishes. But there were many disappointments and problems. The administration’s efforts to hang on to government-owned real estate that otherwise might have been used for shelter or housing would have appealed to Orwell’s sensibilities. Its failures in educating homeless children defied understanding. Deadlines that could not be met, different timelines for different programs, and copious bureaucratic requirements,

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including the need for matching funds, ensured that organizations already helping the homeless had a hard time accessing HUD funds. None of this escaped the attention of members of Congress committed to following implementation. Mandated reports on implementation done by the GAO were supplemented with special reports on barriers being experienced in accessing McKinney program funds. The Office of the Inspector General, in a report on implementation prepared for the Interagency Council on the Homeless, found multiple barriers to using McKinney programs: Respondents said that because the funding cycles of the different McKinney programs are disjointed, providers sometimes do not learn that funds are available in time to apply. Many complained that the application process, especially for housing programs, is too complex. Some said that the cost of completing a lengthy, cumbersome application with extensive documentation discourages smaller providers with minimal administrative funds and staff from applying. Others said that the one-year funding cycle leaves too little time, for smaller providers especially, to complete applications, look for matching funds or meet other program requirements. (Kusserow 1990, p. 7)

In addition to different timelines and complex rules, state and local governments, as well as nonprofits seeking and receiving funding from multiple programs managed by different agencies, had to grapple with different definitions of “homeless” and differential treatment of religious organizations. While advocates and service providers were troubled by access issues, a concern raised by agencies and the GAO was the lack of oversight and monitoring, and how long agencies were taking to spend funds. Moreover, statutory language and administrative rules ensured that shelters were designed as relatively long-term institutions providing shortterm relief, in effect institutionalizing a permanent emergency and supporting the growth of a homelessness services industry beyond what started in the early 1980s. What good occurred often required the intervention of advocacy groups and members of Congress acting as “fixers,” calling the agencies to fulfill their obligations and taking them to court when they did not, reporting on implementation, providing testimony at hearings, making changes to legal language when reauthorizing programs, and bringing the GAO in to examine implementation efforts. And more organized fixers were being developed in this period. In 1987 and 1989, two new advocacy organizations formed that would serve as fixers and promoters of an alternative program to end homelessness in the future. The National Alliance to End Homelessness had its origins in a small bipartisan committee formed in 1983 that was initially called the National Citizens Committee for Food and Shelter. Susan Baker, wife of former secretary of state James Baker, was a member of the committee. The group initially engaged in tangible relief efforts.

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Recognizing that much more needed to be done following passage of the McKinney Act, the committee worked to establish the National Alliance, an organization focused on preventing and ending homelessness that welcomed a broad membership including providers of service to homeless people, as well as public and private partners (National Alliance to End Homelessness, 2018). A year later, in 1989, Maria Foscarinis followed her legal and legislative advocacy work on behalf of homeless people and the National Coalition for the Homeless, with the founding of the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (Caton 2017). The center developed a focus on protecting the legal rights of people who were poor and homeless and would become a highly influential force. As we will see in the next chapter, these organizations would join with others to push for needed reforms and other measures to prevent and end homelessness, largely by focusing on housing. Notes 1. The Committee on Government Operations reported that “the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-181) authorized $60 million in annual funding for the creation of a HUD homeless assistance program. However, HUD opposed the program, and Congress instead directed the funds be used to extend the FEMA Program in fiscal year 1985” (Committee on Government Operations 1985). 2. Required representatives included at least the secretaries (or their designees) of agriculture, commerce, defense, education, energy, HHS, HUD, interior, labor, and transportation, as well as the administrators (or their designees) for the ACTION Agency, FEMA, General Services, the Postmaster General (or designee), and the administrator for Veterans Affairs (or his designee). Any other heads (or designees) of federal agencies deemed appropriate by the council could be added. 3. The council could ask HHS to provide staff with experience serving the Federal Task Force on the Homeless. 4. HUD’s Emergency Shelter Grants Program was originally enacted through its appropriation for fiscal year 1987. Proposed rules were initially published in the Federal Register on December 17, 1986 (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Proposed Rule and Program Requirements, 1986) to be used until final rules were published. Passage of the McKinney Act added funds to a program that had not yet published its final rules and would not until October of 1987 (to meet a legal deadline). 5. The formula for the grant changed immediately from a flat minimum of $30,000 for metro cities and urban counties to a minimum of 0.05 percent of funds appropriated in a fiscal year (Emergency Shelter Grants Program, HUD Notice, 1987). The Department of Housing and Urban Development used the CDBG formula to decide which places received funds (General Accounting Office, May 1991). The GAO noted that the CDBG formula was really two formulas, with locations eligible to receive funds using the formula that yielded the most funding (General Accounting Office, May 1991). Population data, people living below the poverty level, and occupied housing units were variables used for one formula. Another used the people living in poverty, the lag in population growth, and stock

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of pre-1940 housing units as its variables. One formula favored old, poor communities in decline and the other favored large poor communities. 6. It is worth noting that while expanding the services that could be covered would hopefully help homeless people, reasonable questions were raised about whether funds for services should be coming from HUD (Culhane 2011). 7. Between fiscal years 1987 and 1991, $277.8 million went to about 400 eligible jurisdictions, with the majority going to metro cities or urban counties. The recipients then disbursed the funds to an “estimated 3,000 to 3,500 providers” with most being experienced and well-established. Abt Associates found that close to half of the funds went to shelter operations, while 36 percent went to building conversion, renovation, or modification and 13 percent went for services. Less than 5 percent was used for prevention services. The federal government’s share of providers’ budgets was approximately 30 percent (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 1995). 8. The Section 8 voucher follows the person who seeks housing, with the funds going to the landlord of an eligible unit. Program expansion would certainly help poor people avoid homelessness in areas with vacant affordable housing. In highcost, low-vacancy areas where landlords could easily attract more affluent people, it was (and remains) hard to find a landlord who accepts Section 8 vouchers. The administration wanted more vouchers. This final rule gave the administration an opportunity to voice its displeasure with Congress, for dramatically increasing the transitional housing program without greatly expanding voucher sums. The decision on Section 8 vouchers did draw concern from commenters on proposed rules, and HUD pointed out that individual public housing authorities could still prioritize homeless individuals in transitional housing for vouchers within their geographic service areas. 9. The issue had already been addressed in the rules for the pilot transitional supported housing program. The pilot program’s guidelines made it clear that “pervasively sectarian” organizations could not be directly funded (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Proposed Rule and Announcement of Fund Availability, 1987). As it issued proposed rules for the new supported housing program, HUD argued for the merits of its former guidelines, and offered the same legal compromise crafted for the Emergency Shelter Grants Program. 10. As stated by HUD in the Federal Register: “While the transitional housing demonstration program originally authorized in the Homeless Housing Act of 1986 imposed no matching requirements, the Transitional Housing Demonstration Program (THDP) Guidelines administratively imposed dollar-for-dollar matching requirements on all applicants” (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Proposed Rule and Announcement of Fund Availability, 1987). As in the case of the Emergency Shelter Grants Program, Congress tried to soften the requirement by permitting the use of in-kind contributions (including donated materials) as matching funds. To comply with the law, HUD had to make provisions for in-kind contributions and did so, but then used its discretionary authority to set the matchingrevenue bar higher. In its proposed rules for the new supported housing program, HUD reported: “While section 425(a) does not require a match for funding of annual operating costs, the proposed rule, like the THDP Guidelines, imposes an administrative requirement for such a match” (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Proposed Rule and Announcement of Fund Availability, 1987). 11. The McKinney Act stated that requests for operating costs could not exceed 75 percent of the proposed annual budget. The act thus required some contribution toward operating costs, but not 50 percent. HUD chose to make a 50 percent match

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on operating costs a rule, despite hearing that this would impose a hardship (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Final Rule, 1988). 12. While the McKinney Act required HUD to allow in-kind contributions, HUD chose to strictly limit them. HUD’s views on in-kind contributions were clearly negative (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Final Rule, 1988). In-kind contributions could include leases on buildings (in addition to donated buildings), but the requirement that the minimum lease term be for ten years was viewed as a barrier to participation (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Final Rule, 1988). Instead of scaling back the time period, HUD expanded the rule to encompass all transitional supported housing funded projects in leased facilities, even those just receiving operating-cost funds. 13. HUD defended its requirement in the Federal Register: “While recipients of transitional housing assistance under the SHDP program are required to provide housing and supportive services for a minimum of 10 years, rather than five years as required under the THDP guidelines, HUD continues to believe that the five year limitation on operating cost funding is appropriate” (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Proposed Rule and Announcement of Fund Availability, 1987). 14. HUD noted: “In setting this date, HUD balanced the need for the expeditious distribution of funds for the homeless against the concern, expressed by entities developing projects for deinstitutionalized homeless individuals and other homeless individuals with mental disabilities, that HUD provides a sufficient period of time to develop applications. HUD believes that the May 17, 1988 date strikes an appropriate balance between these factors” (Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, HUD Notice of Fund Availability, 1988). 15. In late December of 1988, following passage of the 1988 amendments to the McKinney Act, HUD published a notice in the Federal Register notifying the public of important changes to comprehensive plan requirements. This notice included the following: “In addition, this Notice implements section 6001 of the Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert B. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988. This amendment eliminates the requirement that the Secretary of Education distribute funds for the Adult Education for the Homeless Program under Title VII of the McKinney Act on the basis of CHAP data” (Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan, HUD Notice, 1988). 16. FEMA later became part of the Department of Homeland Security. 17. The development of the new national board replicated the methods used for FEMA’s original Emergency Food and Shelter Program. The national board set the formula for fund distribution using population size, numbers of unemployed, the unemployment rate, and numbers of poor residents (General Accounting Office, May 1991). The nation’s oldest community chest organization, the national United Way, served as the fiscal agent for the program. The pattern of private charity input at the national level was also again replicated at the most local level, keeping in place prior processes and structures. The local boards picked the public and nonprofit organizations that would receive money. Some funds were set aside under this program for state administration; they were handled through a separate state committee with similar representation. The funds set aside for state distribution could be used in communities not already served by the program; they could also go to locations already receiving funds. Approval of use of state set-aside funds had to come from the national board (just as in the case of local board spending) (General Accounting Office, May 1991). The funding structure for this program thus made a certain amount available to states and localities, based on a formula, but with national oversight through a national board.

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18. The notice specifically noted the $50 million for 1983–1984, the additional $40 million appropriated in November 1983 for PL 98-151 and PL 98-181, the $70 million appropriated in August 1984 (PL 98-396), the $20 million in August 1985 (PL 99-88), the $70 million in November 1985 (PL 99-160), the $70 million in October 1986 (PL 99-500), and the $45 million in February 1987 (PL 100-6). 19. The notice presented the formula being used to determine areas with greatest needs, limits on the uses of funds (to include increasing the amount that could be used for administrative cost to 5 percent of the funds appropriated and limiting amounts for renovations to the cost of making buildings safe and bringing them up to code), and how funds would be distributed at the local level. 20. The majority of those who received funds reported favorably on the program. The GAO randomly selected 1,137 recipients of Emergency Food and Shelter Program funds from a total available of 7,568, with a resulting sample of 879 “usable responses” (General Accounting Office, May 1989, pp. 15–16). The vast majority of those surveyed (80 percent) were satisfied with FEMA’s rules for participation in the program (guidelines and program requirements). Almost half (46 percent) found the program helpful in getting funds to them to “provide more food/meals, feed more people, and expand their meal programs” (p. 4).

7 Services, Not Justice

There are various perspectives on the post-McKinney iteration of homelessness, with many scholars pointing to its normalization (Hopper 2003). Paul Toro and Melissa Warren argue that financial constraints associated with McKinney created an environment in which “policies formulated to cope with homelessness eventually come to sustain it” (1999, p. 127). The authors explained that state and local governments spent most of their money on emergency services and had nothing left over to develop longterm housing, making homelessness “an enduring social problem” (p. 127). Gary Blasi (1990) discusses the post-McKinney period as a time in which the orientation toward the problem of homelessness shifted from seeking its amelioration to seeking its management. Public policy scholars provide additional insights on the creation of a homelessness industry by using a lot of words that end in -ization: bureaucratization, professionalization, institutionalization, privatization, and criminalization (see, for example, Hopper 2003; Reeves 1999; Wagner with Gilman 2012). This chapter covers the homelessness industry during the George H. W. Bush administration, from 1989 to 1993. As in earlier chapters, we continue the pattern of describing the government’s response to homelessness and the advocacy movement’s push for a much stronger federal response. We see the first year of the Bush administration as a liminal period in which the binary established in the early homeless literature continued, with the two major competing views of homelessness and how to address it in play: (1) homelessness as a structural and social justice issue rooted in lack of affordable housing, poverty, or inadequate income; and (2) homelessness as a problem primarily affecting individuals with mental health and substance abuse issues who need social services. By 1990 major leadership losses

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among those advocates fighting on behalf of homeless people and failure to pass legislation to restore funding for needed housing programs ended this phase; a threshold was crossed in which ideas associated with structural and social justice issues lost more and more ground to an emphasis on individual behavior. This change was not merely rhetorical but also reflected a shift in how the problem was addressed. Advocates fighting for social justice were increasingly overshadowed by service providers. These service providers tended to compete with other organizations for meager resources and were preoccupied with service provision rather than seeking more federal resources, thus diverting attention from the fight for a stronger governmental response or longer-term solutions such as housing. A Thousand Points of Light At the close of the 1980s, the nation continued to pursue a neoliberal course and activists and advocates initiated a new campaign for a much stronger federal response. Side by side there existed both optimism about the potential of a new president, who publicly supported the McKinney Act, and pessimism about the nation’s treatment of its poorest citizens. There was understandable skepticism about the possibility of meaningful change at the federal level. As a candidate for president, George H. W. Bush endorsed support for the McKinney Act. In his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination for president, he invoked images that separated him from the Reagan administration and helped to define his orientation to domestic public policy—if not in practice, then at least in theory. Specifically, he talked about the need to be responsible and compassionate. Bush stated: “Things aren’t perfect in this country. There are people who haven’t tasted the fruits of expansion.” He then cited examples: farmers who could not pay bills, factories that were strained, and “children who play amidst the shattered glass and shattered lives. And there are the homeless.” Later in the speech he stated that he was moved to “want a kinder, gentler nation.” He concluded his speech with “I will keep America moving forward—for a better America, for an endless enduring dream and a thousand points of light.” From that speech onward, the images of a thousand points of light and a kinder, gentler nation became synonymous with George H. W. Bush (Bush 1988). Bush’s appointments of the secretaries of two departments, Health and Human Services (HHS) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), further signaled a departure from Reagan’s agenda. For HHS secretary, Bush chose Louis Sullivan, who served from 1989 to 1993. The only African American appointed to the Bush cabinet, Sullivan focused his attention on racial disparities in access to medical care and gaining access to care for medically underserved urban and rural locations (Cimons 1992). His stated

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priorities were in the areas of support for anti-poverty programs and cost containment (Orlando Sentinel 1989). Bush’s choice for secretary of HUD, Jack Kemp, marked a significant departure from his predecessor, Samuel Pierce, who was perhaps primarily known for his disinterest in the work of HUD, eviscerating public housing, reducing the HUD budget, and scandals. On his watch, appropriations for low-income housing had been cut by nearly half, and accusations of misconduct had resulted in prison terms for some HUD officials and an investigation into Pierce himself (Smith 2000). Jack Kemp, though an ardent supporter of the Reagan Revolution, was described as an engaged and enthusiastic secretary who echoed the new president’s more proactive and kindly orientation. He was credited with revitalizing the Interagency Council on the Homeless and making it a more effective, well-staffed organization, able to get information to those at the local level in General Accounting Office (GAO) congressional testimony (Oversight and Reauthorization of McKinney Act Programs 1990, p. 6). Kemp was comfortable visiting and speaking with disadvantaged people and believed himself to be a champion of the poor (Maxwell 1988). During an August 17, 1989, speech in Atlanta to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Kemp noted that under the new administration HUD would make sure that it would be working “for the poor and needy,” and he explained that it is “hypocritical to have a country divided between the prosperous and the poor.” He pledged during the speech “to make HUD a partner in progress and in home ownership and opportunity” (Kemp quoted in Lyall 2014). This latter comment captured the essence of Kemp and the new administration’s continuation of a neoliberal approach to poverty and inner-city development: the federal government could serve as a limited partner in efforts to increase economic opportunities. Change would come at the local level. Early in his leadership Kemp accepted an invitation from Hayes of the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) to tour some of the inner cities to get a sense of housing conditions and homelessness. James Traub (1989) wrote about Kemp’s visits in a New York Times article titled “Jack Kemp Faces Reality.” The article captured the cautious optimism Kemp engendered among advocates and local policymakers, noting that now they at least had someone talking with them. Advocates welcomed the new secretary’s willingness to listen and his openness to meeting with poor and homeless people. But advocates also voiced concerns that the new administration would not understand that serious federal investments were needed in housing and social welfare programs (Traub 1989). Moreover, it was difficult for advocates to reconcile their optimism with Kemp’s adherence to the ideological underpinnings of the Reagan Revolution, of free markets and tax cuts bringing development and jobs, of rent control as a barrier to affordable

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housing, and other conservative policy positions. Advocates disagreed with the secretary’s proposed solutions to the problems of the poor, which were based on neoliberal notions of privatization, markets, tax breaks for businesses in low-income neighborhoods, and private ownership of public housing (Kemp 1979). Finally, some advocates viewed Kemp’s (and Bush’s) commitments to the poor as very thin. For example, during a panel discussion, Mitch Snyder said that listening to Kemp felt like being in a “meeting of the Save the Whales committee with Capital Ahab chairing it” (Snyder quoted in Lyall 2014). Snyder explained his position by noting that Kemp had not done anything to put money back into the HUD budget or affordable housing following the Reagan cuts. Moreover, Kemp’s first budget as HUD secretary included further cuts to housing. Bush had advocated full funding of McKinney Act programs while running for office, but his April 1989 request for supplemental appropriations did not bear this out, as no additional funds were requested (Hombs 1989). To remedy the situation, Snyder called for action, saying that money needed to be put back into affordable housing and that was likely not going to happen unless the citizenry could “make them [government officials] do it” (Snyder in Lyall 2014). Housing Now! The Next Step in Social Justice The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) had a plan to make Congress respond. In a conversation with his partner Carol Fennelly, Snyder said something to the effect that all great movements have a march on Washington, D.C., and that now was the time for this movement (Fennelly personal communication, June 8, 2016). Aware that permanent housing and the prevention aspects of the Homeless Persons’ Survival Act had not been enacted and that homelessness was much larger than an emergency situation, Snyder began a national organizing campaign. The campaign was designed to build on local leadership to support federal intervention and was inaugurated in January of 1988 during a National Housing Policy Summit called by Snyder and held in Atlanta (Carol Fennelly Papers). The 250–350 participants signed on to a call for action. Advocates pledged that they would organize in support of federal legislation that would end homelessness by creating affordable housing, and by making clear that housing is a human right (Barak 1992). With the goals of the summit guiding the effort, the CCNV worked with the NCH, the National Low Income Housing Coalition, and the National Union of the Homeless. All agreed to create and fund a national campaign for affordable housing. Under the banner of “Housing Now!” the campaign would include a march on Washington, D.C.

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In April of 1988, Snyder reached out to a reluctant Donna Brazile to organize the Housing Now! march. According to Brazile herself, she was tired from working on the Dukakis campaign, burned out from organizing marches, feeling that she needed to get “a real job,” and grieving her mother’s death. In her memoir, Brazile explained how much she wanted to say no, but described how she changed her mind after a “nightmare about my own family’s struggle to keep our house, and how we had been homeless for a spell. I woke up knowing I had to say yes” (Brazile 2004, p. 161). Because most things associated with the CCNV were not traditional, the arrangement with Brazile may have seemed unorthodox. Her office was located in the 2nd and D Streets shelter in Washington, D.C., and her compensation involved the CCNV paying her living expenses, primarily the rent on the apartment she leased. She ate most of her meals in the shelter. Brazile refers to her time getting to know the men and women in the shelter, as well as Snyder and Fennelly, as therapeutic (Brazile 2004).1 In her memoir, Brazile discussed how her job included balancing the two goals of the march. First, the march was to be, in part, by and for homeless people, which was largely accomplished through cooperation with the National Union of the Homeless. The union chose to participate and helped to make the event successful, but disagreed with the approach being taken, preferring and advocating for a more militant approach (Carol Fennelly Papers). Second, the march was designed to broaden the coalition of advocates working for housing. To accomplish this Brazile brought in more mainstream organizations, such as the National Low Income Housing Coalition. She drew on her multiple connections to build a strong force of volunteers (275 people) and 25 paid staff to help coordinate the event (Brazile 2004). At the same time, Snyder was working to build a national coalition to support housing by organizing local communities. He met with “thousands of people in nearly 100 communities across the country.” These communities brought thousands of people to D.C. and lobbied local representatives for a federal response, with some community groups engaged in organizing efforts to help the homeless in their communities (Carol Fennelly Papers). The march took place on October 7, 1989. The police and National Park Service estimated between 40,000 and 70,000 participants, and Housing Now! organizers estimated 150,000 (Gold 1989). Over 200 organizations joined the Housing Now! Coalition, with groups ranging from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), and the National Urban League, to the Elks Grand Lodge (Barak 1992). The event involved two lobbying days before the march, and the inclusion of an “exodus march” in which 300 mostly homeless people walked to D.C. from hubs located in both the northeastern and southern parts of the country. There was a children’s brigade in

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which children, using sixty little red wagons, delivered letters from homeless children across the nation to House Speaker Thomas Foley. The NCH said that the march “marked the beginning of a national housing movement” (quoted in Barak 1992, p. 38). Although restoring HUD monies lost in the Reagan years, or otherwise infusing large capital spending into affordable housing, might seem fanciful, the George H. W. Bush years brought with them a moment of optimism about federal dollars. Specifically, advocates hoped that the money saved from ending the costly and protracted Cold War with the Soviet Union could be transferred into a significant pot of money that Bush called a “peace dividend.” However, not all members of the Bush administration supported the idea of a peace dividend. Those members working with defense contractors were able to redirect Cold War money to other aspects of the military and private industry (Markusen 1997). The summer before the march occurred, one of the earliest supporters of legislative action on homelessness, Representative Mickey Leland, died. In April of 1990, the Mickey Leland Peace Dividend Housing Assistance Act was introduced with sixty-eight cosponsors. While the bill had bipartisan support, only three of its original cosponsors were Republicans. It died in committee. The peace dividend did not emerge. Those seeking an end to homelessness knew that funds for affordable housing were necessary to make a significant difference. Losing the momentum of the march and the potential of a major peace dividend was a loss. At the local level, organizing efforts involved in the push for Housing Now! worked to strengthen local commitments to address homelessness (Carol Fennelly Papers). National advocates also continued to work on the issue and called on others to organize in support of a permanent end to homelessness (Foscarinis 1991). While local efforts were critically important from the start and would continue to be an important locus of work to end homelessness, by 1990 there was significant loss of leadership at the national level, including from the NCH, the National Union of the Homeless, and the CCNV. Robert Hayes left the NCH to return to private practice; David Wagner with Jennifer Gilman (2012) indicated that Hayes had regrets about the Callahan v. Carey consent decree, as it helped to elevate shelters as a solution to homelessness rather than affordable permanent housing. Moreover, in Mother Jones magazine, Hayes referred to another consequence: the rise of the “social-industrial complex” (quoted in Ferguson 1990), or what later came to be called the homelessness industry. Few public remarks offered commentary on Hayes’s leaving, although he had hinted early on at the possibility of a limited tenure, noting both that new blood was necessary for good work and that the pace of the position was not sustainable for a long period of time. Not long after the Housing Now! march, in 1989 Chris Sprowal, a leader of the National Union of the Homeless, admitted to and sought help

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for a significant and destructive cocaine addiction (McNeill and Hall 2011; Williams 1990). Snyder was noted by a journalist to have called to encourage Sprowal in his rehabilitation (Williams 1990). Sprowal’s admission to his problem with cocaine led to his removal from leadership roles at Dignity Housing (a landmark entity run by homeless people that he co-founded in Philadelphia) and within the union. Leona Smith was selected to replace him as union president (McNeill and Hall 2011). In a later interview, Willie Baptist, another leader within the National Union of the Homeless during its heyday, addressed what led to the fall of the union in the early 1990s. He commented on the devastating impact of crack cocaine on the union, as a form of “chemical warfare” attacking the inner-city poor, and on union leaders like Sprowal. He also spoke of the impact of civil disobedience arrests of leaders whose prior records led to lengthy jail sentences, and cooptation of leaders and members of the union and its chapters to silence them (Baptist and Rehmann 2011). On July 5, 1990, Mitch Snyder was found hanged in his bedroom in the 2nd and D Streets shelter. As is always the case in the deaths of public figures, a great deal of speculation arose regarding the triggering event for his suicide, with journalists pointing to personal as well as political losses and organizational challenges within and outside of the CCNV.2 Wagner with Gilman (2012) quoted a 1990 Chicago Tribune article titled “Man Who Wanted to House a Nation Departed with Empty Feeling,” stating that “both Snyder and his movement fell victim to a foreshortened national attention span. America grew weary of the homeless who would not go away . . . hearts were turned against Snyder and the homeless” (Daley 1990, p. 4). This argument was challenged by Maria Foscarinis, who noted that public polls and surveys from 1988 into the mid-1990s indicated public sympathy for homeless people, as well as strong support for a federal role in funding affordable housing (Foscarinis 1996). Fennelly, who was obviously very close to Snyder, responded to journalists that he was not despondent about political losses or the shifting tide of American sentiment toward the homeless (Carol Fennelly Papers). Whatever the causes, his death was viewed as a significant loss to efforts to arouse moral concern for the nation’s homeless. Incremental Changes to the McKinney Act Although the Leland Housing bill died, and major federal housing investments were not coming soon, significant incremental improvements were made to the McKinney Act in 1990 through amendments passed by Congress and signed into law by Bush. The amendments attended to some of the concerns of advocates and service providers, and they were in keeping with the compassionate conservatism of the administration. As noted by the

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Professionalization

People who knew Mitch well recognized the omnipresence of his anguish. Having had several extended interactions with Mitch prior to his suicide, I saw his despair as related to his own internal torment, as well as the alienation that he felt from the movement that he helped to start. He was shocked that shelter providers, social workers, and the like would be satisfied with both the resources that they were given and the limitations of the McKinney Act, rather than being motivated to fight for more. He said he no longer spoke the same language as service providers, who used medical models rather than a humanistic viewpoint and sought individual solutions to structural problems. —Elizabeth Beck National Coalition for the Homeless (2006), the 1990 amendments were more far reaching, “altering the majority of programs authorized by the original act.” These adjustments were made through the McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments of 1990 (PL 101-645). The 1990 legislation added new programs and adjusted existing programs, including adding preventive efforts. For example, a greater percentage of the shelter funds could be spent on services. Among the new programs was the Shelter Plus Care program, an administrative proposal attributed to HUD secretary Kemp3 that offered a form of supported housing focused on homeless people deemed hard to serve (Foote 1995). This program paired rental assistance with supportive services for those with disabilities, recognizing that pairing a housing subsidy with support would benefit many (an issue raised when HUD stopped linking housing vouchers to exits from transitional housing). Homeless people served by the program could have a variety of disabling conditions, including mental illness, substance abuse issues, and AIDS. The amendments also addressed the growing local opposition to programs for homeless people. Supported housing had to be low-density and was not to be geographically concentrated.4 The 1990 amendments renamed the Community Mental Health Services Program, changing it to the Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness (PATH). PATH targeted homeless people with serious mental illness and substance abuse issues. Responding to the concerns of mental health and homeless advocates, no grant funding could go to agencies that excluded people from services based on the “presence or suspicion” of mental illness and substance abuse. This addition was clearly designed to address long-standing barriers to care suffered by those commonly called

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the “dually diagnosed” today—who frequently encountered a fragmented service sector, where they could get help for one problem but not the other. An additional positive decision expanded those eligible for PATH services to those at “imminent risk” of homelessness, a move toward prevention. Services funded under the PATH program included outreach, screening and diagnosis, habilitation and rehabilitation, community mental health services, substance abuse treatment services, staff training (including shelter workers, mental health clinics, substance abuse programs, and other sites), and case management services. Community demonstration projects also received additional funds through the 1990 amendments. The demonstration grants were available to create projects to provide mental health services for those suffering from chronic mental illness and to create projects to provide substance abuse treatment. Funds under this program could be used for security deposits for housing, and onetime payments of rent could be made available to help people avoid eviction. There were, of course, matching requirements. For every $3 in grant funds, the applicant had to have a match of $1 (but the match could be “hard” or fairly evaluated in-kind contributions of physical plants, equipment, or services) (US House, 101 H. Rpt. 951). Title VI of the amendments included provisions that began to focus on prevention efforts for families and programs to move families from subsidized or public housing to greater independence. This title added family support centers as a demonstration program focused on prevention. The centers were to provide “intensive and comprehensive support services.” Funds could be used for gateway programs targeting low-income families, especially those who were previously homeless or at risk of homelessness and living in subsidized or public housing. Gateway programs were designed to have education agencies working with public housing authorities and others to make on-site education, training, and supportive services available to public housing residents. Funds were made available under the amendments to avoid family disruption and children being placed out-of-home due to homelessness. Titled Preventive Services Regarding Children of Homeless Families and Families at Risk, this program amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to authorize a demonstration program with the goal of helping families find appropriate housing to prevent homelessness and to speed family reunion when and where children had been taken from their parents due to homelessness. The 1990 amendments included funds to add a demonstration outreach program targeting children to the existing Health Care for the Homeless Program. Modeled after a New York mobile health care project that served children and youths,5 the demonstration program was designed (US House, 101 H. Rpt. 951) to offer grants to provide:

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• Comprehensive primary health care to homeless children and children at risk of homelessness, including mobile care. • Referrals for appropriate health, social, and education services to eligible children. • Outreach to identify homeless youth and inform parents or guardians of available services.

The amendments also provided increased funds for the Education of Homeless Children and Youth Program and made clear that state and local education agencies had to ensure access to public education. The original McKinney Act focused efforts on addressing residency requirements as barriers to accessing education. In the years since McKinney’s passage, there was growing awareness that focusing on residency was not enough. To keep children who were homeless in school, the focus had to be broader. Hence, Section 612 of the amendments noted that efforts to address barriers to education were to focus on “laws, regulations and practices or policies acting as barriers to education for homeless children and youth” (US House, 101 H. Rpt. 951). Moreover, the amendments clearly stated that homelessness was not a sufficient basis for separating children from mainstream education; homeless children and youth were to have access to before- and afterschool programs and other available services (US House, 101 H. Rpt. 951). Schools in need were to receive funds from local educational agencies to implement provisions under the law. The 1990 amendments required a feasibility study for distributing funding to projects established under the McKinney Act based on the actual incidence of homeless people in an area, as well as other variables, such as available housing and poverty. Signaling the continued debate surrounding efforts to document the size of the problem of homelessness in the United States, the GAO was also charged with conducting a study of the “methods and procedures” used by the Census Bureau to count the homeless in Section 402 of the amendments (US House, 101 H. Rpt. 951). Journalists reported on disagreements among advocates about whether the Census count of homeless people would be helpful or hurtful (Reynolds 1990; Spolar and Greene 1990). Snyder had been convinced that the Census would produce a gross undercount of homeless people, leading to shrinking funds, inadequate services, and diminished public sympathy. Moreover, he believed that by not being counted, homeless people were stripped of their humanity as they became invisible (Clifford 1990). Legislators had not yet given up on the surplus property program. Representative Collins of the Committee on Government Operations noted that the amendments included requirements for homeless assistance providers to get timely information on unused and underutilized property and priority consideration among applicants. This did not mean that government proper-

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ties would not go to other applicants for “meritorious and compelling” reasons (Statement of Representative Collins 1990; Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1990). On November 9, 1990, Bush signed the amendments into law, stating that “by providing health services, substance abuse services, and counseling in addition to housing assistance, this Act enhances the administration’s ability to address the needs of the homeless in all their complexity” (Bush 1990). While these amendments represented significant positive changes, barriers to serving homeless people through McKinney Act programs did not disappear under the Bush administration. Early in 1991 HUD narrowed its definition of homeless persons eligible for its McKinney Act programs. The new definition focused support on the literally homeless (on the street or in emergency shelter), with the potential to aid those facing imminent loss of housing through eviction and those exiting from an institution (without housing resources) (General Accounting Office, August 1992). This change in definition would affect HUD’s Emergency Shelter Program, its Supportive Housing Program, its SAFAH program, its single-room-occupancy Moderate Rehabilitation Program, and its Shelter Plus Care Program. Organizations and agencies funded under HUD’s McKinney Act programs were faced with potential loss of eligibility for HUD funds and redefining whom they served. Congress asked the GAO to study this issue. The GAO reported that HUD’s rationales included insufficient resources to serve all of those who were homeless, much less those who might be at risk of homelessness, hence the need to prioritize access to those literally homeless; HUD also argued that states and local communities were responsible to provide for those leaving mental health institutions. In its report, the GAO found that the change in definition would likely result in loss of support for three populations that previously received help under these programs: the deinstitutionalized mentally ill, those living doubled-up or in substandard housing, and homeless people in rural areas. The GAO also found that HUD directives to field offices and its published interpretations were vague, leading to misunderstandings and misdirection that could result in denial of services to people who were vulnerable and in need (General Accounting Office, August 1992). While program evaluation data on McKinney efforts were still lagging, some documentation of outcomes was beginning to emerge. One of the programs that would be affected by the new definition, HUD’s Transitional Housing Program for the homeless, was a case in point. The GAO conducted a study of outcomes related to the program and found that approximately 40 percent of program graduates appeared to be housed and with income, though much of the income was through social welfare programs. Those who stayed longer and received more supportive services and those who did

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not suffer from mental illness and/or substance abuse fared best (General Accounting Office, September 1991). The GAO found the results promising but noted that longer-term evaluations of impact were needed and that agencies received insufficient guidance in data collection to document outcomes. The GAO report on the 1990 Census made it clear that the nation was no closer to having a reliable way to establish the size of the homeless population. The report documented critical problems with the 1990 Census count, including problems with operations and local government participation. The report found that the 1990 count was flawed and of “limited value” (General Accounting Office, December 1991). Although the amendments brought new program efforts and an increased emphasis on the health and education of homeless children, they did not address structural issues, nor remedy the systematic cuts that had been made to HUD funding during the Reagan years. The lack of major investments in affordable housing demanded by those involved in the Housing Now! march remained a significant problem for homeless people and those seeking to help them. Two years later, in 1992, President Bush signed into law additional incremental changes through amendments to the McKinney Act (Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, PL 102-550). The changes evidenced increased emphasis on mental health and substance abuse as causes of homelessness. The amendments addressed McKinney housing programs, the Interagency Council on the Homeless, and FEMA’s Emergency Food and Shelter Program. Consistent with an emphasis on illness and deinstitutionalization, a new supportive housing program was added called the Safe Haven Program. This program funded low-density housing (no more than twenty-five people) that would have “low demands” for service involvement for literally homeless people with mental illness. Safe Havens had to provide drop-in services to homeless people not living at the site, as well. The Safe Haven model emerged from a joint HUD and HHS supported report titled Outcasts on Main Street (1992), published by the Interagency Council on the Homeless.6 The 1992 amendments consolidated and made permanent HUD programs providing supported housing. This signaled a growing understanding that homelessness was not going to be a short-lived emergency. Consolidating the supplemental assistance program (SAFAH) with the now permanent supported housing programs under the title Supportive Housing Program addressed administrative and applicant concerns about the number of separate programs and separate applications that were needed to access HUD McKinney Programs (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 1995). The amendments provided additional funds for the more active Interagency Council on Homelessness and expanded the Shelter Plus Care Pro-

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gram. They also created a Rural Homeless Housing Assistance Program that was not implemented because it received no appropriation. The McKinney Act’s two HHS demonstration programs focused on mental health and substance abuse were combined under one title. The new program offered funding in both areas and was titled Access to Community Care and Effective Services and Support (ACCESS). The nature of the new program remained a demonstration program, however, offering funds on a competitive basis. Summary At this point in this history of homeless social policy, the advocacy movement was weakened, and efforts to create additional affordable housing were pushed to the margins. A focus on the personal characteristics of the homeless and their services needs was the more dominant perspective. After fighting about the size of the homeless population for a decade, the nation did not yet have a reliable method for determining its size. The work of the Bush era yielded incremental improvements to the McKinney Act, including support for prevention efforts and mental health concerns. Yet resources remained constrained and efforts were made to further narrow who could be served by federal funds. As noted in Chapter 6, the implementation process takes time. The amendments signed into law by President Bush in 1990 and 1992 were still unfolding as the next administration took office. A number of formal evaluations of McKinney programs originally passed in 1987, as well as those passed and amended in the early 1990s, became available in the middle to late 1990s and informed decisions made by the new administration. While they would offer more sophisticated information on what was working to support homeless people, they would not significantly alter the nation’s policy direction. In a context of continued neoliberal approaches to economic and social problems, and concomitant lack of investment in affordable housing and antipoverty initiatives, homelessness was becoming a seemingly intractable problem, which at best could be managed. Warnings emerged about the potential for homeless people to begin to be viewed as another special interest group and for homelessness to become institutionalized (see Foscarinis 1991, pp. 1234–1235). Efforts to manage the problem were producing a proliferation of services, giving rise to the homelessness social service industry. Within this industry, professionals and volunteers vied for resources for their programs, at the expense of an advocacy movement focused on social justice and eliminating the structural conditions that ensured the existence and continued production of homelessness.

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Notes 1. Brazile described working at “the bottom” as therapeutic (2004, p. 161). She vividly described the population served as disproportionately made up of black men “with broken spirits,” many veterans, and people who looked two to three decades older than their age due to the hardships they experienced (pp. 161–162). 2. Journalists pointed to personal, organizational, and political issues as potential concerns Snyder faced before his death (Clifford 1990; DeParle 1990; Reynolds 1990; Simon 1990; Spolar and Greene 1990), including his broken engagement with Fennelly, opposition within the CCNV, disagreements with other advocates, and recent political controversies and losses. Fennelly responded to the obituaries noting that Snyder was not despondent over shifting political tides or public opinion (Carol Fennelly Papers). 3. When the conference report on the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1990 was discussed in the House of Representatives on October 26, 1990, Chalmers Wylie noted that the Shelter Plus Care Program was “truly an innovative concept proposed by Secretary Kemp” (Statement of Representative Wylie 1990). 4. Low density meant no more than eight, or no more than sixteen, if one-fifth or fewer of those served were disabled. HUD’s secretary could waive the cap on size if the local community could demonstrate a need for a larger project. Projects could not be geographically concentrated (US House, 101 H. Rpt. 951). 5. As the House discussed the 1990 amendments to the McKinney Act, Representative Miller of California noted that the health care program for children was based on a bill he introduced in the House (H.R. 5666, Primary Pediatric Outreach and Care for Disadvantaged Children Act of 1990) that had a companion bill introduced by Senator Chris Dodd. He discussed the great need for the program and its basis in Dr. Irwin Redlener’s model mobile program for children and youth in New York (Statement of Representative Miller 1990). 6. The report was alternatively called the Report of the Federal Task Force on Homelessness and Severe Mental Illness. The Federal Task Force on Homelessness and Severe Mental Illness was convened by the Interagency Council on the Homeless. Safe Havens were designed to address the needs of homeless people living on the street who might resist being engaged in the service delivery system.

8 From Managing to Ending Homelessness

Between the end of the first Bush presidency and the end of the Obama administration, the nation’s approaches to homelessness followed an arc that moved from continued efforts to manage the problem to policies designed to end homelessness among targeted groups, with even a moment in which there was the hope of ending homelessness altogether. The more positive orientation to McKinney housing and services programs from the executive level that was started under the first Bush administration continued. Based on arguments made by researchers and advocates within and outside of Congress, incremental policy changes emanated from the executive level with changes often made administratively or through the appropriations process. Legislation to amend and reauthorize the McKinney Act was not a priority in Congress and finally occurred when the nation faced an extreme economic crisis. Also during this time, programs and practices became increasingly data- and evidence-based with a focus on cost efficiencies. More sophisticated research was used to document risk factors for homelessness. New methods for estimating the prevalence and dynamics of homelessness provided higher-quality data on the affected population, and a new line of research pointed to ways to end homelessness. However, efforts were constrained by insufficient resources allocated to solve the problem. In the absence of a strong national movement seeking structural solutions, and concomitant national failure to make sufficient investments in affordable housing and anti-poverty measures, homelessness became further normalized and institutionalized (Foscarinis 1996). The homelessness services industry became increasingly specialized, and the prison-industrial complex flourished, giving rise to three systems

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for managing the homeless. The first developed within the criminal justice system. The second entrenched the homelessness services industry. The last finally began to focus on permanent housing. Management by Exclusion We call the first system management by exclusion. Here jails became de facto shelters, with the problem of homelessness managed by excluding homeless people from the public eye. In contrast to less visible public support for policy to help homeless people, local politicians as well as business interests and their associations were organized to vocally oppose public homelessness (Foscarinis 1996; Steffen 2012). As people grew weary of the problem, elected officials and local government leaders increasingly began to enforce vagrancy laws and develop quality-of-life ordinances. It became a criminal offense to do such things as sleeping/lying in public, begging, panhandling, and loafing in public places:1 the condition of homelessness became criminalized. Helping to usher the change from public support for homeless people to their criminalization were the rise of compassion fatigue, NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard), and corresponding media attention to these issues. As the decade of the 1990s began, compassionate responses toward homeless people could still be found, as evidenced by polls depicting a sympathetic public willing to spend tax dollars on housing for the homeless (Foscarinis 1996), but this was not reflected in public policy that could support homeless people. At the same time, media accounts began to focus on the phrase “compassion fatigue.” The phrase represented declining public support for homeless people given that after ten years the problem had still not been fixed. David Wagner with Jennifer Gilman (2012) reviewed quotes from news article written between 1990 and 1991 to illustrate changing attitudes. One example is Marcia Mercer’s 1991 article in the Chicago Tribune titled “A Compassion Fatigued Nation Hardens Its Heart to the Homeless.” Images of homeless people used by the media were also changing. In 1989, the Center for Media and Public Affairs released a study indicating that the majority of the stories about homeless people found between 1986 and 1989 in major print news, magazines, and on network news tended to humanize them (Center for Media and Public Affairs 1989). By 1993, things had changed. In their study of language and homelessness between May 1993 and January 1996, Rebecca Lind and James Danowski (1999) found a very different perspective. The authors reviewed 3,134 references to homeless people found in electronic media. Forty-six percent of the references presented what the authors called a stigmatizing image of homeless people. While this was not a majority of the articles, it represented a signif-

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icant shift, in which homeless people were frequently portrayed unsympathetically and even as deviant. While the ideas associated with NIMBY were in effect longer, the term itself emerged in the 1980s when what people did not want in their backyards shifted from environmental hazards such as waste dumps to human services facilities and the people they served. This shift can be viewed as a backlash toward the growth in local shelters for homeless people and residential services for people with HIV and AIDS in response to the emerging epidemic (Takahashi 1997). The advent of NIMBYism brought yet another corresponding change in media coverage toward the homeless. In their review of television coverage on homelessness in the early 1990s, when the nation was experiencing economic recession, Insung Whang and Eungjun Min (1999) found that homeless people were no longer the subject of their own story; rather, they became objects within a middleclass subject. In this narrative middle-class people were seen demonstrating their antagonism toward homeless people in anti-homelessness rallies and protests to voice their support for NIMBY policies. Whang and Min concluded that “homelessness has been translated into a matter of conflict between the middle class and the homeless”; and that homeless people were positioned as a social disease within an otherwise healthy society rather than a social issue involving the extreme poor (p. 101). Whang and Min further argued that shelter providers and advocates for the homeless ended up reinforcing negative views of homeless people in order to overcome NIMBYism. To gain community acceptance, representatives of organizations that wanted to provide services for homeless people had to assure the public that they too would not tolerate problematic behaviors and would enforce tough rules for residents. As stigmatization of homeless people and their perceived threat to others began to gain attention in the news cycle, the focus on controlling homeless people shifted from the neighborhood level to a citywide level. In 1989, Gregg Barak and Robert Bohm wrote an article that illustrated the country on the cusp of criminalization at the municipal level. The authors looked at policies toward homeless people in two cities: Tucson, Arizona, and Aurora, Illinois. They described Tucson as having few services for homeless people, who were seen as “objects of law enforcement and subjects for criminalization” (p. 278). In contrast, in Aurora where services were offered, the condition of homelessness was viewed as a crime against humanity. Strengthening the view of homeless people as nuisances or threats, in the 1990s support grew throughout the country for the so-called broken windows theory and a zero-tolerance orientation toward criminalized behaviors. These two ideas were put forward in a 1982 piece for the Atlantic Monthly titled “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety” by George Kelling and his colleague James Q. Wilson. According

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to the theory, neighborhood disorder, as exemplified by a broken window, sent a message to criminals that the area did not police itself, and therefore the area was ripe for criminal activity. As a metaphor, broken windows was used to illustrate the way in which one broken window left unrepaired led to a building of broken windows, which led to urban decay. Moreover, broken windows were a stand-in for other unsightly images that could range from litter to homeless people. In his first term as mayor of New York City (taking office in 1994), Rudy Giuliani hired Police Commissioner Bill Bratton to implement a broken windows orientation to policing in which any behavior that negatively impacted quality of life such as public drunkenness, loitering, prostitution, and public urination would not be tolerated (Auletta 2015). Even without a modern theory such as broken windows, Dennis Baker (2009) pointed out that arguments very similar to it had supported criminalization policies toward the poor and homeless over the past six centuries, noting that the Vagrancy Act of 1824 was still used in England against homeless people who asked for money by begging or panhandling. Moreover, both then and now, the impulse toward criminalization drew strength whenever homeless people were viewed as ill or having individual pathology. While the removal of homeless people to support quality of life was one interpretive framework that helped to explain the rise in criminalization policies, the criminalization of the homeless must also be viewed through a second lens: local planning and neoliberal policies that supported cities’ revitalization efforts. Randall Amster (2003) discussed the antagonism between “business improvement districts” and homeless people. He pointed out that in many cases the improvements involved promoting entertainment districts as a source of revenue and that the presence of homeless people limited the potential economic impact of the improvement. Charles Steffen provided an example of this antagonism when he pointed out that the director of the city of Atlanta’s downtown development effort referred to homeless people, both in writing and verbally, as “thugs, derelicts, undesirables, delinquents” (2012, p. 175). In both Tempe, Arizona, as described by Amster and Atlanta as discussed by Steffen, the cities used a sleight of hand in which each implemented quality-of-life ordinances (called civility measures in Tempe), while promising to support homeless people. For example, in Atlanta the criminalization ordinances that included public sleeping were coupled with plans for social services centers for homeless people. As in other cities, Atlanta’s imposition of quality-of-life measures took place against a backdrop in which need outweighed available services. For example, as criminalization measures were being implemented in Atlanta, a report by the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP) found

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that need greatly exceeded capacity: there were ten times more people in the city in need of services/shelter than available space would accommodate, including with the development of additional services (National Coalition for the Homeless and National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2006). By the 1990s, the combined effects of media reports of compassion fatigue, NIMBYism, and broken windows theory created a context in which many cities implemented a wide range of criminalization policies that made illegal many common activities of homeless people (National Coalition for the Homeless and National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2006; Wagner with Gilman 2012). As identified in a report by the National Coalition for the Homeless and the National Center on Homelessness and Poverty, these included: • Legislation that made it illegal to sleep, sit, or store personal belongings in public spaces in cities. • Selective enforcement of more neutral laws, such as those regarding loitering or open-container laws. • Sweeps of city areas where homeless persons lived to drive them out of the area, frequently resulting in the destruction of their property, including important personal documents and medication. • Laws that punished people for begging or panhandling (National Coalition for the Homeless and National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2006, p. 9).

By 1994, during President Clinton’s first term in office, and at the beginning of Mayor Giuliani’s first term in New York City, it was estimated that forty-two cities had criminalization laws (Foscarinis 1996). In addition to outlawing common activities of homeless people, a new trend emerged in which things that were done for homeless people were also criminalized. For example, additional local laws worked to limit charitable activities conducted by faith groups, making it illegal to serve food to homeless people in public areas, depending on the area, with or without a permit. As Maria Foscarinis (1996) pointed out, no matter how the laws were described or implemented, they all had the same goal: the removal of homeless people from targeted areas. As criminalization efforts unfolded outside of the homelessness services industry, within it, and throughout the Clinton administration, programs and practices became increasingly specialized and focused on those people with behavioral and mental health disorders. This focus became increasingly more entrenched in the corresponding social service programs, and notions of self-advocacy as found within the National Union of the Homeless gave way to medical and social service experts (Lyon-Callo 2000).

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Management of Behavior in the Clinton Administration The focus on homeless people with behavioral and mental health disorders carried with it assumptions that individual behaviors and pathologies of homeless people caused their lack of housing. Solutions then involved implementing a medical model, in which professionals identified and diagnosed the problematic behaviors and developed treatment plans to address them (Lyon-Callo 2004).2 In this model, moving from homelessness to independence involved following one’s treatment plan, which served as a blueprint for sobriety or addressing illness. With sufficient progress, the homeless person could become housing-ready. The catch was that when the person was “ready,” affordable housing was frequently not available (see Padgett, Henwood, and Tsemberis 2016). With this administration’s focus on a medical model, attention to the structural issues driving the homelessness industry migrated further into the background. The focus on individual behavior was consistent with Clinton’s support of some neoliberal ideas.3 In order to contextualize his policies toward homelessness, we begin with a brief overview of Clinton and relevant aspects of his administration. The New Democrat William Jefferson Clinton

In the early 1990s, the Democratic Party turned to the center in response to a variety of political losses including Dukakis’s landslide loss to George H. W. Bush and the view that the party’s traditional ideas, such as concern for the poor, had fallen out of favor within the electorate. In response, a conservative faction of the Democratic Party sought to rebrand the party as “new democrats” who would embrace a strong shift to the center and in some places neoliberal ideas. These individuals organized themselves into the Democratic Leadership Committee, which Governor William Jefferson Clinton from Arkansas helped to shape. In 1992 Clinton was elected president. As a new Democrat, among his campaign promises were health care reform, a tougher stance on crime, and a vow “to end welfare as we know it.” The latter reflected Clinton’s lack of support for redistribution polices (Day and Schiele 2013). In his inaugural address, Clinton called for an emphasis on opportunity as well as individual responsibility (Clinton 1993). Unable to achieve health care reform and concerned with reelection, Clinton needed to keep his promise to end welfare as we know it. To do so he worked closely with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its secretary, Donna E. Shalala, who was an experienced administrator and scholar, with prior federal experience at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and a belief in cost containment. In 1997 Shalala helped to secure passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-

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tunity Act in opposition to key HHS administrative staff who were concerned about it increasing poverty and placing undue burdens on families and children (DeParle 2004). The bill’s passage, a crowning and controversial achievement of Clinton’s first term, replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (known as “welfare” to many) with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. Where AFDC was a needs-based entitlement program that represented a small fraction of the national budget, TANF was a time-limited contract between caseworker and client (Day and Schiele 2013; DeParle 2004). Ultimately TANF and other changes to the safety net frequently worked against homeless people. Clinton also took a neoliberal approach to aspects of public housing and the mission of HUD. This was most evident in what was called the “President’s Empowerment Agenda,” which worked to “reform” public housing by enacting a program entitled HOPE VI. The HOPE VI program addressed dilapidation, concentrated poverty, and crime, by razing existing public housing developments and replacing them with mixed-income areas. Once these had been converted, only about a third of the original poor residents were able to return. Those not given the option to return were to receive housing vouchers. However, not all original residents received vouchers, and in other cases, due to a dearth of eligible, affordable private-sector rental units, not all former vouchered residents could find housing that would accept them. Not only did HOPE VI decrease the public housing stock, but it also added to homelessness. As the Urban Institute noted, in some cases original residents had to double up with friends or families or live in homeless shelters (Thomas Kingsley, Johnson, and Pettit 2003; Popkin et al. 2004). The empowerment agenda was led by HUD secretary Henry Cisneros, a former mayor of San Antonio, Texas, with graduate education in urban and regional planning and public administration (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009c). Leading HUD’s efforts in addressing homelessness and overseeing McKinney Act programs was Assistant Secretary Andrew Cuomo. Cuomo had experience founding a large transitional housing program for homeless people in New York (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, January 20, 2009b). In 1997 Cuomo became Clinton’s HUD secretary and held that office through the remaining years of the Clinton presidency. As assistant secretary, Cuomo’s first major achievement was to lead the development of Clinton’s policy on homelessness, resulting in the 1994 federal report titled Priority Home! The Federal Plan to Break the Cycle of Homelessness. The report was informed by data collected from multiple community forums and surveys of more than 12,000 organizations. The data spoke to ongoing issues with homelessness services including fragmentation, insufficient coordination and lack of comprehensiveness in planning, and a continued focus on emergency services (Karnas 2000).

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Clinton-Era Policy on Homelessness

Washington Post journalist Guy Gugliotta (1994) covered the press conference, announcing Priority Home and noting that it was held in Franklin Park, a location frequented by homeless people. Representing the administration, Cisneros announced an appropriation of $900 million in new HUD money, with total spending on homelessness across federal agencies of $2.15 billion for fiscal year 1995. The effort was hailed by the administration as the first federal initiative to acknowledge the depth and extent of national homelessness and the first “comprehensive strategy” to address homelessness focused on needed supports (Gugliotta 1994). The report stated that the administration would focus its work on two major groups of homeless people, those in “crisis poverty” where homelessness was a “transient or episodic disruption in lives that are routinely marked by hardship,” and those with “chronic disabilities” in which homelessness was treated as a “chronic” condition (Gugliotta 1994). Continuum of Care. On April 24, 1994, Cuomo informed Congress of HUD’s desired legislative priorities. He reported that HUD wanted to reorganize its McKinney Act programs through homeless assistance grants that would help communities design Continuum of Care systems to meet the needs of local homeless individuals and families (H.R. 3838; Housing and Community Development Act of 1994, pt. 2, p. 19). The Continuum of Care concept was at the core of the Priority Home plan. The Continuum of Care was both a planning tool and a strategy for service delivery. As a planning tool, the Continuum of Care required communities to submit a single application for McKinney monies that showed interagency cooperation and planning. As a service delivery strategy, the Continuum of Care was designed to move homeless people into housing by applying a medical model to a four-step continuum, sometimes referred to as a “staircase model” (Culhane 2011). At the first step, homeless people engaged in “lowdemand programs.” During this time, individual-level treatment plans were devised. Treatment plans could include meeting with mental health professionals, maintaining a period of sobriety, or otherwise engaging in some type of case management. Once individuals had shown the ability to comply with their plans, they were transitioned to what amounted to a congregate (group) living option that could include transitional housing (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, January 20, 2009). An emphasis on HUD-financed transitional supportive housing could be viewed positively, as a recognition of needed supported housing for a segment of the homeless population. Given the cost of supportive services, it could also be viewed as a diversion of needed HUD housing funds to pay for services that should have been covered by mainstream programs (e.g.,

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Culhane 2011; National Alliance to End Homelessness 2001). Once stabilized in congregate living, homeless people would theoretically be moved to permanent, independent living upon becoming “housing-ready” (Culhane 2011; Tsemberis and Eisenberg 2000). Although the Continuum of Care also included sensible notions, numerous barriers to homeless people’s successful participation were embedded in the model. One barrier was the lack of individual choice to take medicines. Refusing to take medicines cannot be automatically viewed as willfulness, as medication can have difficult side effects. Moreover, some drugs have been shown to be ineffective for a portion of the population. A second barrier to participating in the Continuum of Care was the expectation that people would be able to maintain sobriety while living in environments riddled with readily available alcohol and drugs. When homeless people were asked about their experiences with the Continuum of Care, Sam Tsemberis and Ronda Eisenberg (2000) reported that some saw access to services as complicated and at times counterproductive. For example, people talked about being constrained by rules that required them to show up in person to fill out paperwork that they could have done on their own. In one community, clients talked about having to wait, sometimes for hours, to see a case manager. Obviously, such activities interfered with their ability to get or maintain employment (p. 63). However, the largest problem with the Continuum of Care was the often significant gap between the need for housing and its availability (Burt et al. 2002). In a report on the Continuum of Care prepared for the Urban Institute, Martha Burt and colleagues wrote, “Providers and administrators stressed that finding affordable housing was their greatest challenge and one of the biggest obstacles for clients trying to secure permanent housing” (Burt et al. 2002, p. 49). Finally, the delivery of services to fit the Continuum of Care was not welcome by all localities, as some cities had to totally reorganize their service planning and delivery to meet its focus and requirements. The Continuum of Care also included a data management component that required all cities that received federal money to create or use an existing central data management system. It was hoped that information systems could provide data to guide policy, as researcher Dennis Culhane and his colleagues had demonstrated the potential for administrative data systems to provide unduplicated counts of homeless persons as well as longitudinal, dynamic analyses of homelessness (Culhane et al. 1994). Additionally, local information systems could allow caseworkers across an area to track clients’ progress. Caseworkers could see and share clients’ diagnoses and treatment plans, as well as what services clients had applied for and received. Centralized management systems were touted for their ability to stop clients from falling through service delivery cracks. But there was a downside, as such systems also held potential for surveillance and

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exclusion. For example, labeling individuals as noncompliant could bias future service providers in other programs. Moreover, caseworkers and others expressed concern that information-sharing violated clients’ confidentiality rights (Burt et al. 2002). There were also questions about the validity and utility of service data within data management systems, because caseworkers may not consistently input data due to workload issues, work priorities, or service provision through outside parties (McKinney-Vento Reauthorization and Consolidation of HUD’s Homeless Programs 2007, pp. 65–66). Central to the success of the Continuum of Care was coordination with mainstream social welfare programs or services not targeted to homeless people, such as subsidized housing, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), TANF, job training, health care, mental health care, substance abuse treatment, and veterans’ programs. In effect, the Continuum of Care assumed that after homeless people connected with mainstream services, they would have the benefits and resources necessary to transition to independent housing. However, reliance on these programs for support was at odds with administrative and legislative actions that limited access to these programs. For example, although the Continuum of Care included a focus on homeless people struggling with addiction, legislative changes in 1994 and 1996 first systematically limited and then ended eligibility for SSI and Disability Insurance programs for those disabled because of alcoholism or drug addiction. Between March of 1996 and December of 1998, over 120,000 lost eligibility for SSI; most were males with no other source of income (Waid and Barber 2001). But perhaps of greatest concern was TANF. Rather than receiving a monthly check, TANF recipients were to be moved into work while receiving transitional supports such as child care subsidies and continued access to Medicaid (for a period of time, determined by the state). However, the success of TANF was not measured by individuals entering the work force; rather, it was based on decreasing the total number on the welfare rolls. The rolls could be reduced by decreasing new program enrollees. To this end, TANF offices often engaged in a practice called diversion, which as journalist Jason DeParle (2004) noted was used at times to keep eligible families from receiving checks. Because families applying for TANF checks did not have a right to them, the diversion of funds ensured that only a limited number of families would be able to access cash aid. In fact, researchers documented that of 7,068,069 families who were eligible to receive TANF in 2014, only 1,643,160 did (Clark, Esch, and Delvac 2016; Ridzi and London 2006). The Urban Institute prepared an evaluation of the Continuum of Care, based on in-depth review of twenty-five programs/cities (Burt et al. 2002). The evaluation examined both the coordination and service delivery sides of the program. With respect to coordination, the report made clear that communities organized themselves in different ways, and it concluded that

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the role of the coordinating bodies ranged from very active to doing only what was needed for funding (Burt et al. 2002). As to services, the report addressed the insufficiency of permanent housing options for clients and stated that the Continuum of Care created what the report called a “renewal burden.” This occurred when a city’s entire budget went to existing programs, so there were zero funds for housing. The report then noted that homelessness could be reduced only through more attention to prevention and affordable housing. Instead of suggesting that the federal government dramatically expand funding for affordable housing and prevention efforts, the report stated that growth in these areas required “significant involvement from mainstream agencies and strong support from the wider community” (Burt et al. 2002, p. 148). The use of the word “involvement” rather than “improved access” or “funding” in the report was telling.

Other Clinton-era policies affecting homelessness. Congress passed cuts to McKinney-Vento funding and there were some negative program changes and losses. In 1994, the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act (PL 103-421, 108 Stat. 4346) removed closing military bases from the surplus property provisions of McKinney. After passage, those seeking military property to benefit homeless people had to work with local redevelopment authorities, pitting their projects against local development interests. Although not directly tied to homeless policy, Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act into law in September of 1994 (PL 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Alexander 2012), a policy likely to be detrimental to the extremely poor and homeless. While incarceration rates had already increased by 400 percent between 1970 and 1994, they doubled again between passage of the act and 2009 (Alexander 2012). Foscarinis’s work documented the parallel rise of criminalization of the homeless in the 1990s. Reincarceration and use of homeless shelters were found to be related. In a study of shelter use and reincarceration among those exiting New York prisons to New York City between 1995 and 1998, findings supported a cross-institutionalization risk relationship, with shelter use increasing the risks of post-prison shelter use and reincarceration within two years of prison exit (Metraux and Culhane 2004). According to the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH), in fiscal year 1996, McKinney Act funding was cut by 27 percent, and a number of programs lost all funding, including the Adult Education for the Homeless Program, the Homeless Veterans Reintegration Project, the Emergency Community Services Homeless Grant Program, and the Family Support Centers (National Coalition for the Homeless 2006). In 1998, the adult education and job training programs under the McKinney Act were repealed with passage of legislation that consolidated programs through the Workforce Investment Act

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(National Coalition for the Homeless 2006; Workforce Investment Act of 1988 [PL 105-220]). As noted earlier, Congress did not reauthorize the Interagency Council; thus it did not receive any “direct” funding from 1994 through 2000. The Clinton administration created a working group within the White House Domestic Policy Council to continue the council’s work, and HUD provided the staff (US Interagency Council on Homelessness n.d.; General Accounting Office, May 1994). The working group was chaired by a representative from HUD and cochaired by representatives from HHS and the Veterans Administration (VA), signaling an understanding that these three agencies needed to work closely together to tackle homelessness. Indeed, the VA became more engaged in efforts to address homelessness in the 1990s; in 1992 a joint HUD-VA initiative was launched that provided housing choice vouchers for veterans, paired with supportive services provided by the VA. Clinton appointed Jesse Brown as the first African American to serve as secretary of the VA. Brown, a wounded Vietnam-era Marine veteran, had years of service in the Disabled American Veterans organization. He was credited with increased attention to and funding for homeless veterans (Scherer 1995). Clinton’s second VA secretary, Togo West, followed suit. Another positive change occurred when the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 was passed (PL 103-382). It amended the education titles under the McKinney Act. For children, it focused on the rights of preschoolers to “appropriate” public education access. Under the new law, parents’ voices would be important in the selection of their children’s educational placements. The law also made education funding more flexible (National Coalition for the Homeless 2006). Also, in 1996, a more stable funding mechanism was developed for the Health Care for the Homeless Program, as it was legislatively combined with the national Consolidated Health Center Program under Health and Human Services; it began receiving a portion of the health center’s appropriation (National Health Care for the Homeless Council 2011). One of the great ironies of this period is that while this administration increased funding for homelessness assistance, expanding transitional supportive housing and providing some permanent housing for the disabled, homelessness was not decreasing. The General Accounting Office (GAO) noted in 1994, early in Clinton’s first term, that while the McKinney Act programs were not funded at congressionally authorized levels under prior administrations, full funding “would probably be able to provide benefit for only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands estimated to be homeless already and would help few of those who are at imminent risk of becoming so” (General Accounting Office, May 1994, p. 17). Although Cisneros fought for money to address homelessness and called it his largest priority as HUD secretary, he was not able to reduce it. Rather, targeted homelessness services and programs became increasingly entrenched, albeit with

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more of an emphasis on supportive transitional housing (General Accounting Office, May 1994). An Urban Institute study conducted for the Interagency Council on Homelessness in 1996 described the country’s very large food security and homeless service system including approximately 40,000 programs in 21,000 sites (Burt et al. 1999). Following the departure of Cisneros as HUD secretary, Cuomo received the largest budget increases in a decade for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009b). While this represented movement in the right direction, the added funds, including those for additional housing vouchers, were insufficient to get the agency back to spending levels prior to the severe cuts during the Reagan-Bush period (Dreier 2005). Cisneros and Cuomo were credited with saving HUD from being abolished, and with making significant improvements and investments (Dreier 2005). But the Clinton administration’s orientation toward homelessness did little to prevent or end homelessness as a phenomenon. By the spring of 1999, a GAO official testified before the Committee on Government Reform that “federal agencies seem to have made little progress in addressing the root causes of homelessness, and federal programs seldom focus on preventing homelessness” (General Accounting Office, March 1999, p. 1). The testimony included concerns about duplication of effort and the efficacy of some programs. An important legacy of this period, however, was the documentation of widespread homelessness, confirming what advocates had reported early in the 1980s (Culhane et al. 1994). This period also included the emergence of research findings on a narrowly targeted path forward addressing chronic homelessness (Kuhn and Culhane 1998). Critiques by Academics and Advocates

As Clinton came into office, important critiques of the shelter system were emerging. The system was costly, with national average annual costs per occupied shelter bed in 1988 of $10,000 (including shelter and shelter services) and there were questions about the purpose and efficacy of shelters (Culhane 1992). Shelters were described as potential stand-ins for overcrowded city jails or social service agencies working in the areas of mental health, substance abuse, housing, and child welfare, in essence potential “dumping grounds” for people unable to access public services, in part due to cutbacks and overcrowded agencies. Moreover, it was not clear how shelters functioned as a path out of homelessness; as Culhane put it, there were questions about whether shelters had a role in “ending, promoting or reproducing residential instability” (1993, p. 58). In a sobering finding, Culhane (1992) noted that the number of new people in the shelter system was growing even as others were moved into permanent housing. Using data from Philadelphia, he demonstrated that more

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people moved into shelters as others moved out. Shelter stays in Philadelphia were relatively short (an annual average of sixty days), providing evidence of residential instability within a diverse poor population, approximately a third of whom might be repeat shelter residents (Culhane 1993). Between a strong and steady stream of people losing housing and incentives to be in shelters, how then might homelessness be eradicated? In his testimony before Congress in 1994, Culhane stated: “At the broadest level, homelessness prevention requires increasing the residential security of poor households through more comprehensive income maintenance protections and through the expansion of affordable housing opportunities” (H.R. 3838; Housing and Community Development Act of 1994, pt. 2, p. 84). In his 1992 article, he acknowledged the limited political will to undertake such efforts. Culhane’s views were supported by advocates who recommended other changes in homelessness policy, beyond better planning through a Continuum of Care model. Testifying before Congress in 1994, Foscarinis supported potential consolidation of HUD’s McKinney programs, but argued that increases in funding needed to be more focused on permanent solutions. Foscarinis also recommended a variety of prevention policies (including, among others, preventing evictions and offering tax credits to offset housing cost burdens). She highlighted criteria that should be used to judge homeless program proposals, which would add greater levels of accountability and transparency to the process as well as the banning of receipt of federal funds for locations that enforced laws or practices that discriminated against homeless people (H.R. 3838; Housing and Community Development Act of 1994, pt. 2, p. 94). Other advocates also supported a much greater emphasis on prevention and permanent housing, including increased funding for affordable housing subsidies and affordable housing development, as well as improved access to mainstream programs and increased benefit levels. A statement submitted for the NCH called for expanding safety net programs and recommended a “national housing entitlement” (H.R. 3838; Housing and Community Development Act of 1994, pt. 2, p. 720). The NCH also proposed shifting funding for construction or renovation of transitional housing to permanent housing paired with services based on need. Managing Homelessness by Ending Chronic Homelessness As the Clinton era drew to a close, systematic research supported a significant change in the nation’s approach to homelessness. The data showed (1) an identifiable, finite, and aging segment of the homeless population composed of people who were chronically homeless who had one or multiple

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disabilities; (2) that chronically homeless people did not fare well in traditional efforts to manage behavior; and (3) that the care of this homeless population—be it in shelters, emergency rooms, or jails—was very expensive (Culhane and Kuhn 1998; Culhane, Metraux, and Hadley 2002; Kuhn and Culhane 1998). A new service model emerged focused on single, disabled adults who were chronically homeless. In this model homeless people were first moved into permanent housing, and then linked with services that would allow them to sustain their housing. By the end of the George W. Bush administration, the model was extended to homeless veterans and families who met specific criteria. Because this new approach emphasized cost savings, it could be seen as keeping with neoliberalism (Willse 2010); however, it achieved what many advocates had called for all along: permanent housing, albeit for targeted groups. We first describe the data and service model that led to this innovation in service provision, and then explore its beginning with the Bush administration. Data Suggest Change Is Needed

In 1994, Culhane and colleagues reported that approximately 1 percent of the population in Philadelphia and New York experienced homelessness over the course of a year, with that rate multiplying over periods of three and five years. Culhane testified in the Senate that data systems had developed in multiple locations, with a range of estimates supporting the work he and colleagues did in Philadelphia and New York. These findings indicated that the advocates pushing for federal attention to the problem had been closer to the truth about the size of the problem (1–2 million people) than the HUD counts. Culhane and his colleagues found that those experiencing relatively short-term homelessness were a much larger, less disabled population than those experiencing chronic homelessness. He noted that this called for different approaches to homelessness to meet very different needs, a recommendation that he testified was consistent with the Continuum of Care proposal (Reauthorization of the FEMA Emergency Food and Shelter National Board Program 1994, pp. 8–10). In addition to recognition that the problem of homelessness was widespread and dynamic, as the Clinton administration left office the assumption that all homeless people needed services and a “staircase” path to “housing readiness” was also being questioned. Newer studies found this approach was costly and rooted in false assumptions, particularly for families with children (Bogard et al. 1999; Gerstel et al. 1996). Citing a HUD report, Culhane noted that by the end of the 1990s, the nation’s housing agency was disproportionately spending its McKinney program funds for service programs, with transitional housing accounting for much of this (Culhane 2011). Moreover, there was growing awareness

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that with McKinney Act programs and policies, homelessness remained as it had been or increased rather than decreased. Something needed to change. A seminal article published in 1998 by Randall Kuhn and Culhane brought significant attention to chronically homeless people; as the findings of this research gained a broader audience and as additional findings emerged, administrative policy began to be steered by data. The authors identified typologies of homeless people using cluster analysis: (1) the transitionally homeless, who used shelters for short periods as a stopgap until they found other more permanent housing; (2) the episodically homeless, who tended to cycle in and out of treatment, jail, hospitals, and shelters; and (3) the chronically homeless. According to Kuhn and Culhane, although only about 10 percent of the shelter users were chronically homeless, these individuals were older, more likely to be African American, had greater service needs (mental health and substance abuse), and consumed a disproportionate amount of shelter resources. In fact, they used half of the shelter days in Philadelphia and New York City, the two cities on which the researchers’ work was based. The authors explained that for this population “the shelter system is not acting in its ‘emergency’ capacity, but is serving as a long-term housing arrangement” (Kuhn and Culhane 1998, p. 229). They argued that the chronically homeless, who were using far more resources, should be the target group for “alternative long-term housing options.” In this strategy housing was the priority. Housing First

While Culhane and his colleagues were writing about the cost-effectiveness of targeting and prioritizing housing for the chronically homeless, a bold approach to homelessness began taking shape. The Pathways Housing First program started to provide chronically homeless individuals with housing first and then with services (Padgett, Henwood, and Tsemberis 2016). Sam Tsemberis founded the Pathways program in 1992 using a harm reduction approach. Because he also believed that housing was a human right, he wanted a strategy that allowed people to move directly from the street to permanent housing (Pathways Housing First 2017). Starting as a small program, Pathways Housing First grew into a national service and housing strategy. Pilot studies were conducted, yielding strong results, particularly in the area of housing stability. It was found that, once in housing, people became stabilized and able to stay in that housing, in contrast to losing their housing for inappropriate behavior. However, the data were largely anecdotal, and therefore their impact on policy was limited. But in 1996, Tsemberis, with longtime researcher on homelessness Mary Beth Shinn, responded to the federal government’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) solicitation for pro-

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posals related to substance abuse, mental health services, and homelessness. Tsemberis and Shinn received an award to support a randomized controlled trial in six sites. In the trial, half of the population of homeless people (94 percent of whom met the criteria for chronic homelessness) received the usual intervention, and half participated in Housing First (Padgett, Henwood, and Tsemberis 2016). This and subsequent research supported the conclusion that the Housing First model offered “robust improvements in housing” as well as days homeless (with cost savings that could be based on the severity of illness and disability of those served) (Rosenheck 2010). The promotion of housing as the solution to homelessness also received support from McKinney Act program evaluations and innovative trials. HUD’s single-room-occupancy Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program appeared to be working well as early as 1990 (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 1990). Synthesizing findings on transitional housing, Susan Barrow and Rita Zimmer (1999) found that the successful implementation of transitional housing depended on available subsidized permanent housing (at exit) and supportive services. In the most telling work of the 1990s, cities were beginning to demonstrate that they could reduce homelessness by focusing on the chronically homeless using the Housing First model (US Senate 2007). The Housing First model was favored by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. An increased emphasis on permanent housing was also supported within Congress; HUD’s appropriations act for fiscal year 2000 required a set-aside of 30 percent of the agency’s homeless assistance funding for permanent housing (Culhane 2011). As the Housing First model for those with disabilities was adopted as a policy direction for addressing chronic homelessness, prioritization of permanent housing also emerged in a related intervention called “rapid rehousing” that offered shorter-term rent, utility or other assistance to get people into housing “without preconditions” (National Alliance to End Homelessness 2014). A New Bush Administration: Evangelism and Compassionate Conservatism Against the backdrop of this homelessness research and more than a decade of McKinney Act funding, George W. Bush took office in 2001. Like his father, he embraced the idea of private charity and voluntarism. He called himself a “compassionate conservative,” even though this was not popular with conservatives (Kristof 2016). Bush believed in self-help but was willing to spend federal dollars to move people out of poverty. As a born-again Christian, he used his first executive order to establish the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in the White House,

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signaling his intention to expand upon existing options for getting money to faith-based programs and services (Bush 2001). Apart from Bush’s adoption of a more “compassionate” approach, his second administration was genuinely conservative. Bush campaigned on a promise of tax cuts and signed them into law on June 7, 2001 (Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, PL 107-16). The combined effects of significant tax cuts, coupled with very costly military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, reversed the government’s fiscal status, from surplus to deficit. Conversations regarding social spending were increasingly set within a presupposed “zero-sum” (Thurow 1980) funding environment, in which any funds needed in one area had to be offset by cuts in another (Kamarck 2013). It became clear in 2008 that the country was in a severe economic downturn, necessitating policies of economic relief. Despite this, a remarkable facet of the second Bush presidency was reports of declining rates of homelessness, particularly among the chronically homeless and veterans, even as the nation struggled with mortgage foreclosures and one of the worst recessions in decades. Policy direction on homelessness in the second Bush presidency often took the form of administrative proposals put forward by agency-level leaders but significantly shaped by research findings and input from advocacy organizations, particularly the National Alliance to End Homelessness (see Burt et al. 2004). Congressional efforts to consider bills to amend and reauthorize the McKinney-Vento programs, particularly to streamline HUD’s housing programs, were limited, with little passed prior to 2009.4 Mel Martinez was appointed as Bush’s first secretary of HUD, serving until 2003. His background as a young Cuban émigré, supported by a Catholic charity and a foster family, was compatible with the president’s interests in faith-based initiatives (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009d). Martinez shared with a journalist that a personal experience influenced his commitment to addressing homelessness. On his way to work on a cold winter morning in Washington, D.C., his limousine passed homeless people who were trying to stay warm; he reported thinking that “someone ought to do something to help,” and he quickly realized that this someone was himself (Greve 2008). While Martinez served at HUD only until 2003, he played a significant role in changing the direction of US homelessness policy. He was followed by his second in command at HUD, Deputy Secretary Alphonso Jackson, who served as secretary of HUD from late January of 2004 through late March of 2008. Jackson had experience managing the Dallas Housing Authority in Texas and corporate experience prior to his position at HUD (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009a). Jackson continued the policy direction on homelessness begun under Martinez and headed the agency through a period of significant decreases in chronic homelessness. When

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asked about the irony of a Republican president embracing the issue of homelessness, Philip Mangano, the head of the Interagency Council on Homelessness, responded by reminding people that President Lincoln was also a Republican (McGray 2004). Advocates Working with the Administration to End Chronic Homelessness

HUD’s new emphasis and the president’s focus on ending chronic homelessness were publicly endorsed by the National Alliance to End Homelessness in its ten-year plan to end homelessness issued in 2000 (Burt et al. 2004). As noted earlier, the National Alliance grew out of a committee led by Susan Baker, the wife of James Baker (who had served as Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff and President George H. W. Bush’s secretary of state); she was also an occasional supporter of the Community for Creative NonViolence (CCNV) (Fennelly personal communication, June 8, 2017). Journalists documented that in her leadership role in the alliance, Susan Baker knew Culhane’s work on chronic homelessness and the Housing First model and was positioned to share her knowledge with Martinez (McGray 2004; Stein 2003). Baker also knew Mangano, a self-described homelessness abolitionist, from his work as director of the Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance. Mangano’s history, as described in an article about him published in The Atlantic, was not unlike that of other advocates, in that he was reported to have had a spiritual awakening that led him to leave his career in the music industry to be in “companionship with the poor,” becoming a full-time volunteer at St. Anthony’s Shrine in Boston (McGray 2004). Journalists reported that Mangano knew the work of Culhane and was familiar with the Housing First model; Baker was reported to have convinced Martinez of the efficacy of tackling chronic homelessness through a Housing First model and advocated hiring Mangano to direct and revitalize the US Interagency Council on Homelessness (McGray 2004; Stein 2003). Mangano accepted the position, with Mary Ellen Hombs (one of the founding and longest-serving members of the CCNV) coming in as deputy director. In July 2001, Martinez said: “It is time to commit the multitudes of talents and resources that bless this nation to the task of finding . . . homes— permanent homes for the chronically homeless” (Martinez 2001). Martinez also announced ending chronic homelessness as a HUD goal when he delivered a keynote address at the National Alliance’s 2001 annual conference (Burt et al. 2004). Martinez was supported by Bush, who in his 2003 budget proposal included ending chronic homelessness in the next decade as a high priority of his administration (Staff New York Times 2002). Moreover, because the Housing First approach required support from mainstream

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resources, the collaboration of federal agencies within a strengthened Interagency Council was important. In addition to new leadership and a new direction, the Interagency Council was reenergized by congressional support through appropriations. Two agency heads were added to the council administratively, the president’s new White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and the USA Freedom Corps. A sum of $500,000 was appropriated, and in subsequent appropriations the budget was reinforced with a significant infusion of money. Once in his role as director, Mangano was said to have turned the Interagency Council into a “bully pulpit to press the nation’s governors, mayors, and county commissioners to adopt 10-year plans to end homelessness using a Housing First approach” (Greve 2008). Mangano had research to back his enthusiasm for the new approach. Findings documented the expenses associated with serving the chronically homeless in the existing homelessness services system. Dennis Culhane, Stephen Metraux, and Trevor Hadley (2002) found that annually, one homeless person used about $40,000 of public resources, with the chronically homeless again using a larger share of the resources. In 2004, the first randomized controlled study showing the efficacy of the Housing First model was published in the American Journal of Public Health. The results were clear—the model was working. Of the 225 participants, those individuals enrolled in the Housing First model were more likely to obtain housing and remain in it than were the control groups. Subsequent research supported the same conclusion.5 Additionally, the research found that significant cost savings were associated with stabilizing housing (Padgett, Henwood, and Tsemberis 2016), although savings were likely due to the severity of illness of the target population and relative to the costs of other institutional care (Rosenheck 2010). New research was designed to study further implementation of the Housing First approach at the local level. In 2004, at HUD’s request, a group of researchers led by well-established homelessness researcher Martha Burt submitted a proposal titled Studies for Reducing Chronic Homelessness. The researchers studied seven communities working to end chronic homelessness; their goal was to identify best practices and implementation issues as Housing First was rolled out across the country. By that time, 127 cities and states had followed the lead of Mangano and the early adopters of Housing First by developing their own plans to end chronic homelessness in concert with HUD and the Interagency Council. Unlike the Interagency Council of the late 1980s, the latest iteration of the council actively engaged in outreach and information dissemination, focusing attention on the newest federal priority: chronic homelessness. “Policy academies for states” were organized and focused on sharing information on how to end chronic homelessness. In 2002 an additional $10 mil-

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lion was appropriated for a two-year demonstration program focused on chronically homeless people addicted to alcohol, carried out under the oversight of the Council (US Interagency Council on Homelessness n.d.). In 2007, more communities were able to implement their strategies with help from the federal government, as money was allocated to the Collaborative Initiative to Help End Chronic Homelessness through HUD, the Health Resources and Services Administration, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, and the VA. Money was awarded to eleven communities to implement initiatives that combined permanent housing and supportive services. In their analysis of the work of the Collaborative Initiative to Help End Homelessness, Marilyn Kresky-Wolff and colleagues (2010) asserted that a paradigm shift had occurred in services to the homeless in which shelter was replaced with permanent supportive housing (for additional results on the project, see Mares and Rosenheck 2009). In 2002 there were two community plans to end homelessness; by 2009 there were 350 (Taylor, Perlman, and Satterfield n.d.). Ending Chronic Homelessness for Veterans and Others

The VA continued to be critically important in efforts to address homelessness, and HUD-VA collaborative program efforts expanded during this period. Three VA secretaries served under George W. Bush: Anthony Prinicipi, Jim Nicholson, and James Peake. All three had relevant experience as decorated Vietnam veterans and were military academy graduates; the first two had legal backgrounds and the third had a multidecade career as a military surgeon. All three were charged with making needed reforms at the VA, with Peake specifically brought in to focus on reforming the VA medical system. US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq further strained an already troubled VA medical system, inundating it with new veterans suffering from significant injuries and illness. At the close of 2001, Congress passed and the president signed additional special legislation focused on ending chronic homeless among veterans titled the Homeless Veterans Comprehensive Assistance Act (PL 10795). Section 3 of the law established the nation’s goal as ending chronic homelessness among veterans within a decade of enactment. Congress acknowledged that this effort would require cooperation across federal agencies, as well as state and local governments and public and private stakeholders. Section 4 of the law demonstrated a shift in Congress’s perspectives about ways to address the problem of homelessness and focused on prevention efforts. This section also made clear that rather than abrogating responsibilities (as was the case in the Reagan years), “federal agencies, particularly the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Labor, should cooperate more

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fully to address the problem of homelessness among veterans” (PL 107-95). Increased collaboration across federal agencies to tackle homelessness, particularly across HUD, HHS, and the VA, became the expected norm. In keeping with the name of the act, a variety of supports were authorized to prevent and end chronic homelessness among veterans, including access to housing and health care, as well as continued efforts under the Department of Labor for training and reintegration into the work force. The HUD–Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing Program (VASH), launched as a pilot in 1992, became a significant program in 2008 when $75 million was made available to pay for 10,000 HUD housing choice vouchers targeting chronically homeless veterans. The program was funded at the same level in 2009. Under this program, veterans eligible for VA health care (a means-tested program) were referred by their VA medical center to their local public housing authority for housing choice vouchers and the VA provided case management services (Crone 2017). Other Initiatives That Affected Homeless People

The No Child Left Behind Act, a Bush-supported education reform, became law in 2001. It amended the education provisions under the McKinneyVento Act. In fact, Subtitle B, “Education for Homeless Children and Youth,” highlighted the importance of making sure that all children had equal access to a free and appropriate education, including access to preschool education. Subsequent amendments strengthened emphases on removing all barriers to education and getting grant funds to the local level. In addition to the use of research to drive policy and program development, a new system for documenting national homelessness emerged. Early in 2007, HUD published the first Annual Homelessness Assessment Report to Congress. Based on a multiyear research effort begun in 2002, for which the principal investigators were Dennis Culhane (University of Pennsylvania) and Jill Khadduri (Abt Associates), the report concluded that the total pointin-time estimate for those homeless who were sheltered and unsheltered “on an average day” in January 2005—when the data were generated—was 754,147 (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and Development, 2007). The report’s authors stated: “In comparing these results with those of previous studies, there is no evidence that the size of the homeless population has changed dramatically over the past ten years” (p. iii). The figures were offered as a benchmark for measuring future progress. The second annual report yielded a single-day point-intime estimate for January of 2006 of 759,101 homeless people, a 2.3 percent increase from 2005 among those sheltered, but a 3.9 percent decrease among those literally homeless, the unsheltered. The report made it clear that the point-in-time counts overrepresented the chronically homeless and did not

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capture all homeless people (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2008). There were real issues with the counts. The NLCHP issued a report on methodological problems with HUD’s annual point-in-time estimates, particularly the inconsistent methods used across geographic areas each January to field volunteers to count literally homeless people living outside; the counting of existing homeless service system beds was also criticized for focusing on supply rather than demand (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2017). Requiring recipients of federal homeless assistance funds to provide data, however, helped to make it possible to regularly assess the scale of what had been funded. Using those numbers, knowing they represented an undercount, provided a starting point. The reports showed that even in the context of a dramatically weakened economy, by the end of the second Bush administration there was an almost 50 percent decrease in the number of chronically homeless people captured in the pointin-time estimate, which represented more than 50,000 people who obtained and largely kept permanent housing (Greve 2008; Frum 2013). At the same time, there was a nearly 40 percent decrease in the number of homeless veterans. The fifth annual report noted an increase of 60,000 permanent supported housing beds, which occurred between 2006 and 2009, a significant jump in supply (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and Development, 2010). Critiques: Consensus and Controversy

There was significant support for changes to HUD’s McKinney Act programs among advocates, academics, service organizations, and government officials. There were repeated legislative efforts, beginning as early as 2000, to align these programs with new policy directions based on research and evaluation of existing programs. There was significant agreement that more funding was needed for prevention, to stop homelessness from occurring. These stakeholders also supported consolidating HUD’s McKinneyVento housing programs and offering localities increased flexibility in the use of McKinney-Vento funds. There was also broad support for permanent solutions and permanent housing.6 Support for the government’s emphasis on the chronically homeless was mixed. Representing the Interagency Council in a 2006 hearing, Mangano appeared to be anticipating criticism regarding the emphasis on chronic homelessness when he testified that the national partnership to end chronic homelessness represented “a priority, not an exclusivity. We have not forgotten homeless families” (McKinney-Vento Reauthorization and Consolidation of HUD’s Homeless Programs 2007, p. 8). Written statements by researchers Ellen Bassuk and Martha Burt raised questions about whether families’ needs were, in fact, being addressed.

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Researcher Bassuk called for more equitable treatment of families: “Unfortunately, this single-minded focus has resulted in the diminished allocation of resources for homeless children and families” (McKinneyVento Reauthorization and Consolidation of HUD’s Homeless Programs 2007, p. 52). She reminded Congress of the deleterious effects of homelessness on families, noting they composed about 40 percent of those homeless. Bassuk also argued for a broader definition of homelessness that better addressed the vulnerabilities of families, an argument also made by homeless services representatives. Known for her research at the Urban Institute, Burt concurred that families with a disabled member should be included in the proposed definition of “chronically homeless” in her written statement. Burt commented that “it is clear that some proportion of families are just as unlikely as chronically homeless single adults to achieve stable housing without the substantial supports available through permanent supportive housing” (McKinney-Vento Reauthorization and Consolidation of HUD’s Homeless Programs 2007, p. 58). A written statement from Gloria Guard, president of the People’s Emergency Center, submitted on behalf of her organization and sixteen other homeless serving agencies from Philadelphia, decried a sense of imbalance in the proposed legislation in favor of serving the chronically homeless. She spoke to the losses in funding that family-serving agencies in Philadelphia had already experienced under administrative shifts in direction. She illustrated the classic zero-sum budgetary dilemma: “Surely, it is in everyone’s best interests to avoid passing a law that seeks to end homelessness among one population by worsening homelessness among another” (McKinney-Vento Reauthorization and Consolidation of HUD’s Homeless Programs 2007, p. 71). At the same hearing, researcher Culhane expressed concern that broadening HUD’s definition of homelessness would increase demand on a finite sum of money and noted that the literature on family homelessness did not support classifying families as “chronically homeless.” He favored prevention and rapid rehousing for homeless families, using mainstream programs. A HUD representative also argued in favor of maintaining HUD’s narrower definition. While proposed legislation was not passed in 2006 or 2007, Congress authorized significant investment in rapid rehousing in legislation passed early in 2009. In the context of the economic crisis, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The act provided $1.5 billion for the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program (HPRP); the funds were to provide help to approximately 1.4 million people over three years, providing prevention services and rapid rehousing (National Alliance to End Homelessness 2014). The demonstration was based on local successful initiatives that used short-term financial help to

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move people out of homelessness quickly. HUD funded twenty-three community rapid-rehousing pilots (National Alliance to End Homelessness 2014). The new emphasis on housing as central to solving the problem of homelessness begun during the second Bush administration seemed sure to continue through the inauguration of Barack Obama, as Obama asked Mangano to stay long enough to help him move the work of the Interagency Council forward and help him expand the federal commitment to addressing homelessness. Efforts to address the problem would continue to face serious limitations on financial support, however, in a context of protracted military engagements abroad and the nation’s financial crisis. Significant work remained on moving away from a homelessness services industry and toward a country without homelessness. For 2009, HUD reported that the nation had 214,425 year-round emergency shelter beds, 207,589 transitional housing beds, and 219,381 permanent housing beds in its homeless assistance system (US Census Bureau 2012, p. 369). A Moral Turn: Ending All Homelessness

Solving homelessness resonated with Obama’s campaign message of hope and his signature slogan “Yes We Can.” Making a moral commitment to end homelessness was also consonant with Mangano’s abolitionist stance on homelessness and his argument that witnessing successes in ending chronic homelessness would “remoralize” leaders, making them eager to do more (McKinney-Vento Reauthorization and Consolidation of HUD’s Homeless Programs 2007, p. 12). The new administration’s approach was captured in Opening Doors, its new federal plan on homelessness: “It is simply unacceptable for individuals, children, families, and our nation’s veterans to be faced with homelessness in this country” (US Interagency Council on Homelessness 2017). Thus, homelessness in all its forms was unacceptable and had to be ended. To do so, resources were needed. Early in the Obama administration, the Interagency Council released specific outcomes and timetables to (1) end chronic homelessness; (2) prevent and end veteran homelessness in five years; (3) prevent and end homelessness among families and children in ten years; and (4) develop a plan to end all homelessness (US Interagency Council on Homelessness n.d). Toward achieving these goals, the council would work closely with executive-level allies across multiple agencies. The secretaries of HUD, HHS, and the VA are highlighted here. Obama appointed Shaun Donovan, an architect and housing policy professional with years of experience developing and funding affordable housing inside and outside of government, as his first secretary of HUD (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2014). He was followed in 2014 by Julian Castro, an attorney and former mayor of San

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Antonio. Castro brought experience implementing programs at the city level that reflected the new president’s priorities. Reflecting on his time at HUD, Castro highlighted the administration’s accomplishments in reducing veteran homelessness as a major accomplishment and noted that if he had more time at HUD he would want to continue to build on those successes and end homelessness among veterans, the chronically homeless, and families (Kimura, January 17, 2017). Kathleen Sebelius served as secretary of HHS from 2009 through 2014 and was elected chair of the Interagency Council on Homelessness in 2012. She had executive experience as a governor of Kansas and had served as insurance commissioner in Kansas. Sebelius resigned following a troubled rollout of the Affordable Care Act, at which point Sylvia Burwell replaced her as HHS secretary. The VA was critically important to fulfilling one of the goals articulated in Obama’s plan: ending veteran homelessness; Eric Shinseki and Robert McDonald were appointed to serve as secretaries of the VA during Obama’s two terms in office. While the goal of ending all homelessness was ambitious, new programs and reductions in chronic homelessness during the Bush years supported the possibility. The next step was legislation to prevent increased homelessness in a severe economic downturn and amid a housing finance crisis. Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing In May of 2009, Congress passed and the president signed the Preventing Mortgage Foreclosures and Enhancing Mortgage Credit Act (PL 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632). The first division of the legislation was given the short title Helping Families Save Their Homes Act and was a response to the housing crisis associated with the 2008 “great recession” and the subsequent rise in evictions. The second division of the act made significant changes to the McKinney-Vento Act through the Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act, by enshrining in law prior administrative initiatives and settling some long-term disputes over the causes of homelessness, how best to define it, and how best to end it. The language in the act’s preamble offered a logical conclusion to the years of advocacy and research in the 1980s and 1990s. Congress finally acknowledged that the advocates had been right by attributing US homelessness to the lack of affordable housing and the inadequate scale of housing assistance programs affecting all types of communities (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty n.d.). In keeping with HUD administrative proposals floated in earlier years and two bills with HEARTH titles proposed earlier in 2007 and 2008 (National Alliance to End Homelessness

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2018), the new act consolidated and replaced housing programs under McKinney-Vento. It also established a national goal of getting homeless people back into housing within thirty days. Consistent with the new emphases on homelessness prevention and ending homelessness, HEARTH broadened the definition of homelessness by including people exiting institutional care, individuals at imminent risk of homelessness, those experiencing housing instability (moving place to place) due to disabilities or for other reasons, and victims of domestic and sexual violence. As HUD issued proposed and final rules under the new law, developing a definition for “chronic homelessness” that reflected the statute, offered sufficient clarity, and avoided the unintended consequence of making people remain homeless for longer periods to get help, it garnered significant attention from many stakeholders (Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing: Defining “Chronically Homeless” 2015). In terms of program changes, HUD’s Emergency Shelter Grants Program became the Emergency Solutions Program, funding prevention and rapid-rehousing efforts as well as shelter and outreach services. In a significant win for those advocating for families, rapid-rehousing activities included an emphasis on serving homeless families. More money was authorized for the new programs with the expectation that 40 percent would be spent on prevention and rapid-rehousing efforts. There was a continued emphasis on providing permanent housing for the chronically homeless, but now families would be included as among the chronically homeless. The Shelter Plus Care, Supportive Housing, and single-room-occupancy Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Programs were consolidated into a single grant program called the Continuum of Care. Applicants could continue to request funding for activities previously funded under the separate programs, but funds could now be used for more preventive measures. The Safe Haven Program, which offered low-density, low-demand supportive housing for those suffering from mental illness, was eliminated under HEARTH, though already established and successful programs could continue to be funded; the arguments supporting the Safe Haven Program also supported the new overall emphasis on rapid rehousing and permanent supported housing using a Housing First harm reduction model. The Rural Housing Program (never funded) was replaced by the Rural Housing Stability Assistance Program, which offered rural communities a simplified application process. A 50 percent set-aside was established for places with populations of 1,000 or less, and priority for funding was given to communities of 5,000 or less and those with little access to federal funds (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Special Needs Assistance Programs, 2013). In keeping with increased recognition that housing subsidies were essential to ending homelessness and that some housing for disabled formerly homeless people would require sustained help with operating costs, HEARTH

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included support for permanent housing through project-based subsidies, renewal of leases, and continued coverage of operating costs. Under HEARTH, the Interagency Council on Homelessness was expanded to include additional representation and charged with developing a plan to end homelessness within ten years. The act also required the Interagency Council to meet at least quarterly each year and to develop partnerships at all levels of government and with the private sector to reduce and ultimately end homelessness. Additionally, HEARTH provided significant financial support for well-designed experimental research that compared different approaches to reducing family homelessness. Consistent with prior efforts to engage states and localities in taking greater responsibility for social issues, states were encouraged to develop state-level interagency councils on homelessness and plans to end homelessness. Applicants for funding became “collaborative applicants” and could, with approval, become “unified funding agency” entities that not only disseminated funds through subgrants but also ensured accounting and auditing practices (National Alliance to End Homelessness 2008). Other legislation passed after HEARTH offered potential increased access to needed mainstream care and services for homeless people. Advocates and researchers hoped that the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 would help to offset health-related costs for single poor adults in permanent supported housing for adult chronically homeless persons (Culhane and Byrne 2010). SAMSHA grant initiatives began funding services to address the behavioral health needs of homeless people with an emphasis on integrating services with permanent housing. Both developments represented a needed shift toward financing services with HHS rather than using HUD dollars. The overall direction of federal homelessness policy was now set: prevention of homelessness, rapid rehousing of those who became homeless, and permanent supported housing for the most disabled would serve as the general categories of homelessness assistance. Near the end of the Obama administration, an important amendment to the McKinney-Vento Act was signed into law in 2015. The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) of 2015 went into effect in 2016 and placed increased responsibilities on state and local educational agencies to ensure that homeless students did not experience having their education destabilized and to ensure they were appropriately linked to needed services. The NLCHP issued a report on the new law and its implications for schools and students. The NLCHP report, based on a survey of schools, found that funding levels were insufficient, even with the increased appropriations, and that many local schools were not receiving subgrants under the youth education program included in the McKinney Act. The NLCHP found that close to thirty years after passage of the McKinney Act, many schools struggled to be in

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compliance with the act. The NLCHP noted that the size of the homeless student population had increased significantly over the years, reaching 1.36 million, and was unlikely to decline soon (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty n.d.). Research and Directions for the Future

Homelessness was studied throughout the Obama administration. There were increasingly sophisticated study designs using experimental and quasi-experimental controls. Researchers also made use of available centralized data systems. Evidence yielded further support for the Housing First model as a path to moving people out of homelessness quickly. Studies also emerged demonstrating the importance of macro-level policy to preventing and ending homelessness. The Housing First approach was supported for use with veterans in a naturalistic study funded by the VA. Results from a 2010 HUD-VASH demonstration indicated that the Housing First model offered better housing outcomes: reducing the length of time between homelessness and housing placement, decreasing emergency-room use, and increasing housing retention (Montgomery et al. 2013). Similarly, the final report on the Veterans Homeless Prevention Demonstration Program supported earlier work on prevention and rapid rehousing (Cunningham et al. 2015). The three-year pilot program focused on early intervention and prevention of homelessness among veterans. Housing stability was increased, with 85 percent stably housed; there was some increased employment participation (and increased income), and there was increased access to veterans’ benefits (Cunningham et al. 2015). The 2014 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report counted 49,933 homeless veterans, a 33 percent drop between 2009 and 2014 (a decrease of 24,117) (Henry et al. 2014). The importance of housing policy and subsidies was also apparent in experimental studies conducted with homeless families. In October 2016 the final report from the Family Options Study was published. This landmark study compared four intervention options: long-term housing subsidy, project-based transitional housing, community-based rapid rehousing, and “usual care.” This study addressed numerous issues raised by prior efforts by using field-experiment controls, for example assigning families to different interventions and tracking their outcomes for three years.7 The study compared 2,200 families with more than 5,000 children in twelve communities who had been homeless in shelters for at least seven days. They were interviewed at baseline, three months after assignment, and again twenty months after assignment. At twenty months, the preliminary findings indicated that the long-term housing subsidy was a powerful model. The final report concluded with stronger findings that, after thirty-seven months, the

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long-term housing subsidy was the most powerful and beneficial model. The authors saw benefits in multiple areas, including increased housing stability; reduced psychological distress among adults; decreased intimatepartner violence, school instability, and behavior problems among children; as well as reduced food-insecurity. Responding to the findings in a letter at the beginning of the final report, a HUD official noted that the cost of a housing voucher was “a modest investment to achieve substantially better outcomes for parents and children” (Gubits et al. 2016). The importance of the housing subsidies in the Family Options study made logical sense based on findings related to community determinants of homelessness. A 2012 study of community structural factors (including housing market, demographic, safety net program, and economic variables) in relationship to contemporary homelessness estimates concluded that “homelessness has its root in housing market dynamics, and particularly in the difficulty in obtaining affordable housing” (Byrne et al. 2012, p. 621). The authors also concluded that “macro-level policy interventions are ultimately necessary to prevent and end homelessness” (p. 623). A study of the demographics of homelessness pointed to labor and housing market factors as potential explanations for an identifiable age cohort present in contemporary homelessness. Single, adult baby-boomers born in the latter years of the boom appeared to have been particularly vulnerable to homelessness; researchers pointed to several potential explanations for the cohort phenomenon, including labor and housing market issues associated with the recessionary 1970s and 1980s; the crack cocaine epidemic and associated criminal justice involvement; and contracting social welfare benefit programs (Culhane et al. 2013). The 1970s and 1980s were, of course, a period of rapid deindustrialization in the nation. They were also a time in which many affordable single-roomoccupancy housing units were destroyed in urban areas. Viewed as a whole, findings from studies as well as the experiences of those trying to help homeless people seemed to converge on major categories of need insufficiently addressed by policy: housing and employment or stable income, with services as needed. Summary The three management systems focused on exclusion, behavior, and chronic homelessness developed from the early 1990s to the present continue to operate. Criminalization of homeless people continued throughout this period into the present. Not only were homeless people unnecessarily burdened by fines and legal problems, but they were also targets for hate crimes (National Coalition for the Homeless 2016). A large homeless serv-

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ices industry remained in place, though with less emphasis on emergency shelter and more on transitional and permanent housing programs. By the end of this period, evidence clearly supported the superiority of broadening and deepening prevention efforts for those with emergency needs and getting those who became homeless back into permanent housing as quickly as possible. Nearing the present, the nation faced a dilemma. A homelessness services industry had been built and continued to be needed, alongside an increasingly privatized prison system that required filled beds. Economic and social policies continued to support the production of new homelessness, particularly in high-cost housing areas; they both sustained demand for emergency shelter and limited investment in affordable housing and needed subsidies that would offer a means to end homelessness. With significant community resources still needed for emergency relief amid shortages of affordable housing and insufficient housing subsidies, homelessness would remain a problem. While data documented important and significant decreases in point-in-time estimates of national homelessness between 2007 and 2016, there were still a very conservatively estimated 549,928 homeless people in the United States on a single night, with 32 percent “unsheltered” (Henry et al. 2016). Although recent research had supported a focus on a “finite population” of chronically homeless adults who were not being replaced (Culhane and Byrne 2010), by 2017 concerns began being raised about a new, younger cohort of millennials entering adult homelessness (Couch 2014). Journalists and researchers documented the disproportionate growth of homelessness in specific cities (e.g., New York) and parts of the United States (Henry et al. 2016; Holland and Karlamangla 2015), raising questions about how resources like housing vouchers are equitably distributed to ensure that places with the highest concentrations of homeless people receive help commensurate with their need (Khadduri 2010) without neglecting homeless and poor people elsewhere in the country. The difficulties inherent in major changes to the homeless services system also raised questions for the future. In Los Angeles, an increase in literal street homelessness was attributed, in part, to local funding cuts and bed losses in transitional housing as the city shifted more resources to permanent housing, an illustration of zero-sum choices and changes in policy in which a positive development like permanent housing can only come at the expense of existing homeless services. A local homeless housing provider expressed concern that greater focus on the chronically homeless single adults would lead to longer-term homelessness among families she could no longer serve (Smith 2016). By the end of the Obama years, more was known about how to get homeless people into housing, but the front door to homelessness had not been closed. Systemic structural changes were still needed, along with a shift in values that would support them.

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Notes 1. It is a violation of the Eighth Amendment and the equal protection clause to target a segment of the population. There are several examples in which homeless people stated that their right to equal protection had been violated. Depending on the jurisdictions, homeless plaintiffs both won and lost these claims. Additionally, successful legal challenges have claimed that anti-panhandling laws violate free speech. For a review of constitutionality, see Foscarinis 1996. 2. More recently, Robert Rosenheck (2010) has argued that a true medical model would involve treatment, followed by a period of recovery, then reintegration into employment and private-sector housing, and that the models frequently employed in homelessness services offer more of a “social rehabilitation” approach, with underlying assumptions that illness is long-term and that rapid return to economic self-sufficiency is unlikely. 3. Clinton supported free trade and globalization, smaller government, a reduced safety net, and individual responsibility. 4. During a 2006 hearing on a Senate bill (S. 1801, Community Partnership to End Homelessness Act) to reauthorize and consolidate McKinney-Vento programs, Senator Wayne Allard noted that there were prior efforts to pass consolidation bills in 2000 and 2002 and that HUD supported doing this to streamline its programs (McKinney-Vento Reauthorization and Consolidation of HUD’s Homeless Programs, 2007, p. 2). In a prepared statement submitted for a hearing in 2007, Maria Foscarinis summarized efforts to amend and reauthorize McKinney-Vento programs, noting that after failed passage of legislation in 1994, changes made to programs emerged from targeted spending priorities in appropriations bills and through notices of fund availability issued by HUD. She testified that some changes were positive (Continuum of Care) and that others “created controversy,” such as the “heavy focus” on those who were chronically homeless (Reauthorization of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, Part I 2008, pp. 69–70). 5. Multiple studies showed the efficacy of Housing First. In a book synthesizing the studies and supporting the model, Deborah Padgett, Benjamin Henwood, and Sam Tsemberis wrote that the findings from the experiment were so remarkable that “if similar results were found in a pharmaceutical trial, investigators could be ethically obliged to stop the experiment and provide everyone with the experimental [intervention]” (2016, p. 56). Eighty-four percent of Housing First participants remained housed after three years, while 60 percent of the non–Housing First participants stayed in their homes. On average, $10,000–14,000 was spent on supportive housing in the Housing First model. This dollar amount stands in contrast to the cost of $18,000–22,000 for a cot in a shelter. The findings from these studies, particularly as related to housing retention, held across other studies (see, for example, Tsemberis, Gulcur, and Nakae 2004). 6. Multiple administrations attempted to block-grant HUD’s McKinney programs. There was considerable concern that this would lead to decreased funding and could lead to local government misuse of the funds for other purposes. 7. In August of 2015, the executive summary for a rapid-rehousing prevention study noted that while prevention of housing loss was a positive finding, data did not support a conclusion that efforts resulted in long-term housing stability. Data and monitoring efforts were not as rigorous as desired and would not support the analysis of impact. The authors also noted that centralized intake without centralized power to allocate assistance would not yield desired results.

9 The Continuing Quest for Justice

Few would question that homelessness has become a normalized feature of the social fabric of the United States. Although the RapidRehousing and Housing First models offers a more positive policy direction, the number of homeless people in the United States remains unacceptably high and the response inadequate.1 In a sample of thirty-two cities in twenty-four states studied by the US Conference of Mayors, the data point to serious unmet needs including lack of shelter space (Lowe, Batko, and Layton 2016). The nation also has a set of particularly hard-hit coastal states2 (Henry et al. 2016). In the introduction to this book, we identified five factors as essential to understanding the rise of the homelessness industry: (1) adoption of historical views of the poor in which only the worthy poor merit help, whereas the poor not deemed worthy are blamed for their status; (2) adoption of neoliberal economic and social policies that disadvantage the poor and working class; (3) compromises in public policy that responded to homelessness primarily as an emergency situation and a social service problem rather than a predictable outcome of neoliberal economic and social policies; (4) focus in public policy on homelessness as a psychiatric problem rather than a housing problem; (5) creation of a large social service sector, referred to as the homelessness services industry. In this chapter we recap the five factors and show how they worked to create the homelessness industry. We combine the first factors, historical conceptions of poverty and its causes, and the adoption of neoliberalism as they are intertwined. We additionally combine the last two, as they are also interrelated. Then we explore two alternative ways forward: one that moves us away from a neoliberal agenda by targeting key areas for change

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(housing, health care, income, and public supports), and one that supports the basic needs of people, building on a human rights framework.

Factors Instrumental to the Homelessness Industry Historical Antecedents and Neoliberalism

Here we take a look back to fifteenth-century England in order to trace patterns between then and now. In the fifteenth century landowners realized that wool carried more efficiencies and a larger profit margin than farming, and that land that could be used for grazing sheep was lost to small farms and patches set aside for communal farming (Trattner 1999). Thus began the Enclosure Movement, in which landowners and royalty acquired, confiscated, and sometimes bought communal land to monopolize large parcels. This practice was strengthened in the 1600s and reached into the 1900s as Parliament passed a series of laws known collectively as the Enclosure Acts. The acts allowed government to take tracts of land, much as is done under eminent domain today, under the guise of serving a public good. As early as the 1500s the effects of the Enclosure Movement included food scarcities, widespread famine, and homelessness (Rotberg and Rabb 1985; Trattner 1999). Parliament also passed a series of laws to control vagrancy and the behaviors of the “vagrants” through criminalization. For example, statutes implemented as early as 1531 called for the severe punishment of people who were assumed to be able-bodied and found begging. Punishment included public beatings of naked individuals (Trattner 1999). Although some of the strategies to address issues of poverty were repressive, a common belief was expressed in the English Poor Laws that the worthy poor deserved some level of help and that the community had a responsibility to provide it. In an acknowledgment that unemployment and poverty were linked, the English Poor Laws used the workhouse to provide subsistence, albeit limited and miserable, for “wandering persons and common laborers, able in body.” Nonworthy poor and vagrants were subject to jail, banishment, and in some cases death (Mencher 1967). Samuel Mencher explained that among the public “the impression was gaining ground that the causes of poverty were with the poor themselves. By the end of the century the view was widely held that it was not lack of employment but the laziness of workers and their profligate habits that led to poverty” (1967, p. 11). With the elites overwhelmingly focused on individual accumulation of wealth, the efficacy of competition, and an unregulated and extraneous labor force, the domestic policies of the time already carried some of the hallmarks of classical economic policy, on which neoliberalism is based.

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The orientation to the poor during this historical period carried over to the United States through creation of the colonies and had bearing on the creation of modern homelessness and its industry. We can substitute the decision to move from more labor-intensive and small farming to larger agribusiness and a less labor-intensive product (sheep), with deindustrialization, and more recently automation. During each of these social and economic transitions, political and industrial leaders scoffed at government interference. Legislation to curtail land grabs gained no traction in Parliament in the 1500s. Although limited efforts were made to address deindustrialization in the 1980s through job retraining and assistance (e.g., the Trade Readjustment Act), these efforts paled in comparison to the nation’s lack of response to the harm done through deindustrialization. Rather, support built up for globalization and off-shoring of industrial production (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Harrison and Bluestone 1990). We can further suggest that the English Poor Laws, with their emphasis on identifying the worthy poor, compare in many ways to contemporary society’s attention to specific vulnerable populations among the homeless. We can also see how even after so much time has elapsed, personal behavior, rather than changes to wages, employment, and housing, and loss of public support—whether in the form of communal lands or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—is viewed as causal to poverty and homelessness. Both instances demonstrate the dehumanization of poor people, whether the naked vagrant who is publicly beaten, or the “welfare queen” who becomes the shamed public symbol for all those seeking aid. History also shows that classical economic liberalism and neoliberalism thrive on great disparity between the rich and poor, that they in effect require poverty, and yet there continues to be little ability to see how increases in poverty relate to social and economic policy. Behavior, rather than loss of land, was argued to cause the growth of poverty in historical England. Today behavior, not loss of income or housing, is viewed as a critical component in homelessness. To ensure the prioritization of markets and individual liberty over societal well-being, neoliberalism was supported by tropes that were used to strengthen its agenda. Some of these suggested that other perspectives and the people who held them were dangerous to society, such as the slippery slope to communism. Others involved images that encouraged dis-identification with poor people. Not only was the “welfare queen” lazy, but she also thrived on taking what was not hers. As noted by former Reagan campaign aide Lee Atwater, the decision was explicitly made to exploit both of these tropes in his campaign for president. This included painting critics as unpatriotic and airing television advertisements with racist messages, aimed toward galvanizing support of whites while distracting them from their own loss of income (Perlstein 2012). Starting as early as the fifteenth century,

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the decoupling of poverty and context (to include the direction and health of the economy) has reinforced the historical narrative that poverty is the result of individual behavior. Multiple explanations account for neoliberalism’s recent ascendancy. Clearly the marketing of the Mont Pelerin Society’s ideas through US think tanks was significant. For example, one cannot view as casual the Manhattan Institute’s financial support for Charles Murray to write on welfare reform and its subsequent marketing of his 1984 book Losing Ground, which argued that public welfare programs caused poverty (Murray 1994). Undoubtedly money in politics fuels the neoliberal goals of many US businesses, including low wages, limited trade union power, and deregulation, while tax cuts support the wealthy who own and operate the enterprises. Moreover, the status quo, which values profit over people, is kept afloat when images of frightening African American men, “bad Hombres,” and “radicalized Muslims” are used to deflect attention from income inequality and changes in the production of goods and services. Daniel Stedman Jones (2012) reminded us that neoliberalism has also been a bipartisan endeavor and pointed to President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, who talked about a third way in which free markets and social goals could live side by side. But any hope of a kinder, gentler neoliberalism seems to have been suspended by President Donald Trump. He campaigned as a populist concerned about deindustrialization, globalization, and the difficulties faced by the working class (Covert 2017). Now in office, however, he and his cabinet seem poised to complete the neoliberal agenda of the late 1970s and 1980s with the help of Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, who is committed to cuts in welfare programs along with Medicaid and Medicare (Stein 2017). Together Trump and Ryan have the potential to bring the Reagan Revolution to full fruition through the evisceration of those parts of the safety net that Reagan did not completely eliminate. For all presidents, their budget is a wish list that represents the administration’s values and orientation to how government funding should be prioritized. The budget put forward by Trump calls for major cuts to programs within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and other safety net programs (other than Medicare). For HUD, the budget proposes cutting approximately $6 billion, over 10 percent of the HUD budget over the budget of 2017. Because much of what HUD spends goes to subsidize affordable housing for the nation’s poor, the proposed budget is viewed as likely to cut people from these programs and increase homelessness. Among the cuts proposed are the elimination of the Interagency Council on Homelessness and the entire Community Development Block Grant program (Covert 2017; Gee, June 7, 2017; Reiss 2017). Like Reagan, Trump appointed a secretary of HUD with no prior work experience with federal housing programs. Secretary Ben Carson enjoyed a

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career as a neurosurgeon before entering politics and pursuing presidential candidacy himself. While his background as a doctor might have been a good fit for a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) appointment, it provides him with no work experience relevant to the nation’s housing policies or homelessness. When attempting to defend the president’s proposed budget, Secretary Carson seemed unaware that the budget would eliminate the Interagency Council on Homelessness, which he praised as effective in his testimony (Gee, June 7, 2017). Perhaps as further sign of the president’s indifference to expertise in government service, the new head of the Federal Housing Office that serves New York and New Jersey, Lynne Patton, is a wedding planner who organized events for the Trump family and the Carson campaign (Alcindor and Goodman 2017). Although she may have skills in other areas, she does not have expertise in housing and homelessness. Devaluing the roles of administrative leaders, requiring no background or expertise for the management of complex programs, and proposing draconian cuts to needed programs could reasonably be interpreted as a general lack of concern for the poor. Coupled with extensive efforts across the government to roll back regulations, the neoliberal prize seems at hand: the end of the state’s role in countering the worse effects of capitalism in the market. Not surprisingly, advocates and others are noticing and predicting significant increases in homelessness (for example Covert 2017). However, for now there might be a bit of reprieve. While Trump’s proposed budget raised concerns, the spending bill signed into law in March of 2018 bore little resemblance to that proposal. Perhaps due to the president’s lack of experience negotiating with Congress, or the chaos caused by government shutdowns and their potential consequences, or congressional leaders acting as fixers, some HUD programs received increases rather than cuts. What will actually be funded is still in question as the president and some legislators consider the possibility of rescission of funding. US policy on homelessness is also unclear. Secretary Carson has endorsed continuing the Housing First approach established under the prior two administrations (Carson 2018), though Trump has called for an approach more in keeping with management by exclusion through creation of more psychiatric hospitals. While Trump’s call for a return to some form of institutionalization for those who might be ill and dangerous came in the wake of a school shooting, it was immediately linked to discussions of homelessness and a potential return to warehousing people with mental illness (Carey 2018). Compromise in Public Policy

The most important thing to remember about the McKinney Act is that it was a small portion of a larger proposal that included permanent housing

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and prevention, and that given the hostility of the Reagan administration toward homeless people, it was believed to be the best that could be done at the time by those pursuing its passage. In that context, passage of the act was a major win for homeless people and advocates. Efforts to achieve prevention measures and permanent solutions significantly slowed in the 1990s, but through the work of a handful of advocates, academics, and committed bureaucrats the focus of the McKinney Act was moved from emergency shelter to more permanent solutions for homeless people. The 2016 HUD point-in-time estimate of homelessness (Henry et al. 2017) offered evidence that a real shift was occurring. For the first time, the report found that there were more permanent housing yearround beds serving formerly homeless people (53 percent) than beds in emergency, transitional, or Safe Haven housing. Although progress was made, the emergency services response remains in use and is needed because of the significant numbers of currently homeless people. Within the 2017 point-in-time count, a full 65 percent of those reported as currently homeless were in emergency shelters or transitional housing; 35 percent were completely without shelter. This represented a 9 percent increase in unsheltered homeless people (Henry et al. 2016). Although much more is being done now to provide permanent and transitional housing, particularly when compared to the early years of the McKinney Act, significant unmet needs remain a challenge. Moreover, without a significant infusion of money for permanent, affordable housing the efforts are only able to lift a limited portion of those affected out of homelessness, while managing the problem among many others. Current efforts are not able to end homelessness. Psychiatry and the Homeless Services Industry Mental health and medicalization. The focus in public policy on homelessness as a psychiatric problem rather than a housing problem is reflected in the treatment of homeless people as patients. We noted in Chapter 4 that Louisa Stark, an anthropologist and chair of the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) board, warned that the disproportionate amount of attention going to mental health and substance abuse issues among homeless people overshadowed the structural conditions that caused homelessness and the need to support economic equality (Holden 1986). The prescient nature of her words is reflected in a 1991 HUD report on President’s George W. Bush’s National Urban Policy: “A large number of homeless, probably a majority, suffer from mental illness, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other disorders and illnesses. . . . If the Nation is determined to eliminate long-term poverty from society, comprehensive treatment must be a priority” (p. 68).

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The final sentence of this section of the report could have been amended to include comprehensive treatment by professionals. We see medicalization and professionalization as mutually reinforcing ideas that promise two things. First, as Vincent Lyon-Callo argues, lack of housing is viewed as a “symptom of personal pathologies that must be cured by experts” (2004, p. 165). Second, the discourse on homelessness remains in the realm of services, rather than structural changes. Hence the efforts to address homelessness are moved from the advocacy arena to the territory of professionals. In his ethnography of a shelter in Boston, Lyon-Callo provides insight into the effects of medicalization. Lyon-Callo began working in the shelter in the early 1980s, which allowed him as participant observer to witness his shelter’s, as well as most other shelters’, turn toward a medical model in real time. He explained that when he first started working there in the 1980s, the only real skills one needed were concern and empathy for people who were hurting, knowledge about social services, and the ability to manage hectic times. However, now as homeless people enter the shelter, they are routinely sorted into many categories of individual disorders, necessitating specialized “experts” or “professionals.” In making a diagnosis, staff use formal models as found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, supplemented by diagnostic catchphrases such as a “poor work ethic” or “denial” about a variety of problems, from substance abuse to mental illness to “a lack of life skills” (Lyon-Callo 2004). Craig Willse (2010) argues that the homeless person, once diagnosed, is rendered as a subject who cannot assume self-responsibility and therefore must be managed. As Lyon-Callo states, this disease model then leads to a process in which the homeless person’s sense of agency is eroded, and unlike the people involved with the Homeless Union, he or she becomes depoliticized. Lyon-Callo explains the power of medicalization as follows: “Once guests and staff learn that the cause of homelessness lies within their selves, their efforts ‘naturally’ focus on diagnosing the deviance, not on structural inequality” (2004, p. 56). Of significance is the way in which medicalization also works to shift staff’s focus from structural inequality and the desire to address it. Lyon-Callo describes staff as having a desire to do more to solve homelessness but being overwhelmed by the need to focus their energies on helping those individuals they could. At the same time, program evaluations that measure diagnosis and treatment further focus staff efforts on individual pathologies (Lyon-Callo 2004). Arline Mathieu (1993) writes about the overlay of medicalization and criminalization. In her work, she discusses how medicalization was used in New York City by Mayor Ed Koch and his administration to justify the removal of homeless people. Specifically, she notes that in the winter of 1985, homeless people were removed from public places and taken to hospitals when the weather fell below freezing. The removal happened under

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the guise of keeping mentally ill people from freezing to death. However, the administration’s logic was different than its practice, as people were forcibly removed from indoor places such as Grand Central Station. Of significance to Mathieu is the way in which the process of protecting mentally ill individuals morphed into Mayor Koch’s policy of “sweeping” homeless people from public places. As noted, this policy gained greater traction under New York City’s next mayor, Rudy Giuliani, which brings us to the management of exclusion. Exclusion and the homelessness industry. Few would place jail in the cat-

egory of a social service; however, it is used as an alternative to services when society becomes convinced that people are merely vagrants, or a problem, and they are dehumanized. When these views of people are combined with a dearth of services, and the number of unhoused people grows, society requires mechanisms for social control. As in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the default mechanism now is jail. The linkage between jail and inadequate supply of services for homeless people is clear and demonstrable. The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP) (circa 2016) has charted the relationship between criminalization policies and services, demonstrating that criminalization policies occurred against a backdrop of severe need. In another study showing the use of criminalization policies, Kevin Fitzpatrick and Brad Myrstol (2011) found that while the number of individuals placed in jails has increased, there has been a decrease in individuals detained because of a criminal offense. Instead people are serving time in jails for misdemeanors that include offenses based on survival rather than intent to harm someone. Often these people are in jail because larger society views them as “rabble.” John Irwin (1985) defined rabble as individuals who were detached from traditional aspects of community life and society; rabble were those people whose behavior was disreputable or deviated from norms. Most important, Irwin wrote that rather than being a place of incarceration for criminals, the primary purpose of jail was to contain and manage rabble. Loïc Wacquant (2010) has another view on the growth of the prisons in the context of shrinking public aid. He argues that a “diligent carceral system is . . . a constituent component of the neoliberal state” and that the system thrives by “punishing the poor” (pp. 197–198). It is important to remember that the impact of incarceration transcends its physicality. Criminalization policies create a unique and significant trap for homeless people. Failure to pay court fees and fines often results in additional costs and longer periods of incarceration. In the recent past there was a movement, including support from the Obama administration, to grant poor people relief from sanction for nonpayment; this is no longer the

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case under the Trump administration (Bains 2017). Cities, however, are taking their own initiatives. For example, the city of Atlanta is part of a recent trend to eliminate the cash bail system. Additional burdens accrue when someone is rearrested, which is a great possibility for homeless people in a context of criminalization. Having a past arrest record will likely yield tougher sentences that become greater obstacles for housing. Once convicted, even for a misdemeanor, many people are prevented from obtaining public benefits (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, circa 2016; Saelinger 2006).3 Through private prisons, private probation services, and a $2 billion commercial bail industry, neoliberalism is intruding on the criminal justice system. There is a rich literature related to the deleterious effects of each of these industries on people. Private probation companies are overseeing people released from jail on a misdemeanor, and they carry a higher cost than traditional probation and keep people engaged with the criminal justice system for a longer length of time, as they are monitored until they have paid back their bail (Human Rights Watch 2014; SilverGreenberg and Dewan 2018). Nowhere is criminalization more potent than in its impact on African Americans; as Michelle Alexander (2012) made clear, mass incarceration is a new form of Jim Crow laws. Alexander described the ways in which many African Americans are caught up in a legal system in which they are unfairly targeted and sentenced. This disproportionality holds for qualityof-life ordinances, as people of color are charged with violating them more than are Caucasians. While it is true that studies support more absolute numbers of arrests of homeless people who are white than homeless African Americans for these measures (see Fitzpatrick and Myrstol 2011), the raw number of arrests does not reflect the percentage within the larger population. The tautology between homelessness and incarceration, and incarceration and homelessness, is clear. And it is also clear that this self-reinforcing cycle disproportionately harms African Americans, who are more likely to be homeless and more likely to be incarcerated. While jail continues to function as temporary shelter, rapid rehousing and permanent supported housing have shown their abilities to stop that cycle for some homeless people. Research on approaches to housing and helping homeless people affirm the benefits of providing resources to move people from homelessness into housing quickly (Padgett, Henwood, and Tsemberis 2016; Rosenheck 2010). A revitalized US Interagency Council on Homelessness created an environment that supported prevention and expansion of rapid rehousing and permanent supported housing for the chronically homeless as important tools in

Rapid rehousing and the movement away from the homelessness industry.

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addressing homelessness. As discussed earlier, rapid rehousing is designed to help individuals and families leave homelessness and return to permanent housing, using strategies uniquely tailored to the household, with short-term financial assistance and mainstream programs helping those without chronic disabilities; a Housing First model or permanent supported housing is targeted to those who are chronically homeless (US Interagency Council on Homelessness 2015). Both approaches share as their focus achieving permanent housing as soon as possible. While offering homeless people a significant improvement over life on the street or in shelters, the implementation of these programs across the country does raise questions, particularly about who receives them. There are also many lingering questions associated with selling these programs on the basis of their cost-effectiveness. There are at least two ways to think about those not served by these initiatives. The first considers how the approaches are adopted at the local level and the presence of community resources. There are communities in which the local coordinating body is not actively pursuing these strategies for everyone. There are also places in which even where individuals are eligible and open to the idea of being rapidly rehoused with or without supportive services, no affordable rental units can be procured. “For every 100 extremely low-income renter households in the country, there are only 29 affordable and available rental units” (Cunningham, Gillespie, and Anderson 2015, p. 10). The second way to approach those left out is by population, and here the largest issue has been with homeless families and young adults. An Urban Institute report showed that of federally funded beds for households with children in 2014, 34 percent were in emergency shelters, 26 percent in transitional housing, 32 percent in permanent supportive housing, and only 8 percent in rapid rehousing (Cunningham, Gillespie, and Anderson 2015). There are unique barriers to rapid rehousing for families, and at the top of the list is the cost of housing. Securing and paying for a small apartment for an individual and meeting the needs of a family are not the same. By not providing rapid-rehousing resources to families, a local homeless services coordinating body can stretch its dollars to procure more housing for single people. There are additional financial incentives for communities to prioritize moving chronically homeless single people who often require very expensive hospital stays into permanent housing (Rosenheck 2010). Families face multiple barriers to sustaining housing on their own, including the low amount of money associated with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits and lack of a living wage. In the rapidrehousing model, formerly homeless people take over the cost of their home either by becoming connected with mainstream benefit programs or through employment. Benefits work well for veterans and chronically homeless single people, because they are eligible for relatively generous mainstream benefit programs. By contrast, poor families often only have TANF benefits

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(unless someone in the family has a disability), and the small monthly allowance that TANF recipients receive makes it virtually impossible to manage rent. While TANF amounts vary from state to state, South Carolina, on the low end, presently provides families with $282 per month, and Wyoming, on the high end, provides $657. And this money is subject to the lifetime limit of two to five years per family, depending on the state (Schott, Pavetti, and Floyd 2015). By comparison, Supplemental Security Income provides a maximum federal benefit amount of $750 per eligible individual and $1,125 for an eligible couple (Social Security Administration 2018). Others who are rapidly rehoused take over the cost of housing through employment. But for many families, work does not equal adequate housing. In a review of programs serving homeless families, Ellen Bassuk and colleagues (2014) found that 15 to 61 percent of participants worked full or part time after receiving services, and that those who did work often experienced inconsistent employment and low wages, factors that again placed the families in the position of being precariously housed. Another issue raised with the rapid-rehousing and permanent supported housing strategies falls under the role of societal values. Victoria Stanhope and Kerry Dunn wonder what happened to the broader discussion about “the moral implications of a capitalist society having people live long term on the street” (2011, p. 280) in the move to Housing First. Philip Mangano, the head of the Interagency Council on Homelessness, sold Housing First as cost-effective and was able to build bipartisan support. In so doing he appeared to support the neoliberal assumptions about market needs as being instrumental in determining social services (Stanhope and Dunn 2011; Willse 2015). At the same time, the processes that ensured continued homelessness—neoliberal cuts to the safety net, and market policies that did not allow individuals and families to secure affordable housing either because of low wages, high costs, or both—remained unquestioned. Moving Toward the Future The five factors identified here present a way of understanding the homelessness industry and its continuation over time. They do not address preventing its occurrence in the present and future. To end homelessness, we need more than effective programs to address those who end up on the street. We need an approach to society and social welfare that reverses the neoliberal agenda adopted in the late 1970s and pressed forward by the Mont Pelerin Society and laissez-faire enthusiasts. In this section, we explore strategies for addressing homelessness. The first is based on undoing the damage of the Reagan and subsequent administrations and then working to address some of the structural issues that cause homelessness.

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Key Areas for Structural Change

We need to address underlying structural issues using a philosophical lens that recognizes that people have worth and that the public sector can and does play positive roles in society. Addressing the following three areas could be of vital importance to ending homelessness: affordable housing; employment and wages; and health and mental health. These areas have been identified in a report written by a partnership between the US Conference of Mayors and National Alliance to End Homelessness.4 Each year the conference produces its annual status report on hunger and homelessness, and in 2016 the mayors teamed up with the National Alliance. While the demographics of homelessness have changed over time and the size of the population has changed, the reported causes of hunger and homelessness have remained quite consistent. With respect to the issue of hunger, in study cities a majority of respondents (88 percent) listed low wages as one of three “main causes of hunger” in their area, followed by the high costs of housing (59 percent), unemployment (41 percent), and health or medical care costs (23 percent). Later in the document, when discussing homelessness, the conference report states: “When city officials were asked to identify what was most needed to reduce homelessness in their cities, the overwhelming response was more mainstream housing assistance and/or affordable housing. City officials also listed the need for more permanent supportive housing, better employment and employment training opportunities, and better coordination with mental health and substance abuse services” (The United States Conference of Mayors and the National Alliance to End Homelessness 2016). Coupling the voices of mayors with the work of the National Alliance and academics, we see a broad consensus that these key areas need to be addressed. Housing. There is little question that to Princeton University professor Mathew Desmond, the Pulitzer Prize–winning author of Evicted, the country is in a housing crisis. Desmond’s new project, the Eviction Lab, explored nearly 80 million eviction records in the United States going back to 2000. Desmond concluded that over a year, 2.3 million people were evicted, which equaled 6,300 people every day or four evictions a minute. Causes according to Desmond included the cost of housing in relationship to wages and the loss of public housing in United States (Eviction Lab 2018; Shorrock and Kelley, April 12, 2018). While the free market can be counted upon to produce high-end housing in low-vacancy cities in the United States, it has not and will not produce enough affordable housing for all of the low-income individuals and families in need (National Low Income Housing Coalition 2017). The United States stopped adding to the public housing stock in the early 1970s in favor of market-based subsidies (like Section 8 certificates and vouchers), and

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razed many small and large complexes. The maintenance and improvement of what remained of the public housing stock has been insufficiently funded and maintained for decades, ensuring the continued loss of units. While existing subsidies and low-income housing tax credits have supported developers and tenants, the United States has not sufficiently funded the subsidies needed to help the poorest renters in the country access housing, and a significant gap exists between the need for affordable housing and its availability (National Low Income Housing Coalition 2017). Rachel Bratt, Michael Stone, and Chester Hartman (2006) and other progressive housing policy writers have been making the case for needed investments in the area of affordable housing. It is time to follow their advice and make much more significant investments in affordable housing, to include public housing. Given the large gulf between the cost of housing and low wages, housing vouchers can help families, but the available housing subsidies meet a fraction of the demand and do not offer an entitlement based on qualifying need. In 2009, Peter Katel found that only 23 percent of individuals who were eligible for housing vouchers were able to receive them. Peter Dreier (2005) discussed the disconnect between the nation’s significant housing crisis and the insignificant attention paid to housing issues by the media, politicians, and others. He argued that given the large population struggling to afford housing (including working-poor households), within and outside of cities, and the very limited coverage of existing HUD vouchers, the United States should consider a universal housing voucher that would be an entitlement for poor households. Further, developing a means to target more housing subsidy funds to areas with the greatest needs may help in efforts to end homelessness (Khadduri 2010). Ta-Nehisi Coates’s work (2014) on the ways in which African Americans have been systematically excluded from the housing market and thereby left behind in wealth accumulation supports a strong case for reparations in the area of housing. Charles Ogletree Jr., a Harvard Law School professor, is chair of the Reparations Movement Coordinating Committee. Ogletree’s argument is that reparations are best when they are based on broad-ranging initiatives to include housing and health care initiatives. He explains that then they “might overcome individual remedy difficulties and assist in combating racial inequality” (2003, p. 289).

Employment and wages. Bassuk and colleagues (2014) and Deborah Padgett, Benjamin Henwood, and Sam Tsemberis (2016) make clear that a living wage or living-wage jobs are critical components to ending homelessness. The federal minimum wage was last raised in 2009 to $7.25 per hour. According to Drew Desilver, in 2015 there were 2.6 million hourly workers at or below the minimum wage and approximately 20.6 million American hourly workers with earnings “near-minimum-wage” (over their state

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minimum but less than $10.10 per hour). On the more positive side, twentynine states plus the District of Columbia have set higher wage standards. These range from $7.65 in Missouri to $11.50 in D.C., while several cities including Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago are in the process of implementing more generous minimum wages (Seattle, $15.00; San Francisco, $15.00; Chicago, $13.00) (Desilver, January 4, 2017). National and international organizations like the Fight for $15 are experiencing major wins as they work with communities to implement a living wage (Fight for $15 n.d.) In Reckoning with Homelessness, Kim Hopper (2003) speaks to the need to build coalitions with labor. Indeed, as much as housing is critical to ending homelessness, for many a living wage is just as important (and might have prevented homelessness). This conclusion holds especially true for African Americans, who are disproportionately harmed by the present economy. We support this call for a broad coalition aligned with labor to end homelessness. Dreier (2005) also calls for a broad alliance to get housing on the policy agenda. He argues for one that would bring together the nation’s poorest and its middle class that would engage organized labor and also be attractive to business, civic, and religious leaders, as well as those concerned with sprawl and environmental impact. He also calls for a policy agenda that addresses the problems of the many rather than the narrowly targeted few covered by existing programs. This is essentially a call for a major reform movement to address growing economic disparities, a development we support. Such a coalition must work to roll back or redress neoliberal policies. Like the Occupy Wall Street movement, the coalition must call attention to income disparity both as an economic issue affecting the lives of many and also as a moral issue. Additionally, the coalition must question the austerity politics of the social welfare system as workers and others fall through cracks that are likely to widen with automation. Given the growth of automation there may be a need to redefine work and how it is remunerated. US society has functioned on a simple formula for well-being: humans survive with the support of family and the marketplace (employment). Only when these fail does government come in with temporary, transitional relief. But how will this formula work in a society in which traditionally defined work becomes a scarcer option and family units grow smaller and smaller? The development of technology has greatly outpaced our ability to consider the ethical implications of its use. In recent decades, low-skilled manufacturing jobs as well as some skilled jobs have been lost through automation in industry. Between December of 2016 and March of 2017, the New York Times, USA Today, and Fox News all carried news pieces on automation as a major threat to job sectors in the United States (Bomey 2017; Miller 2016; O’Reilly 2017). As a society, we need to develop policies to ensure that people have ways to support themselves economically, and to do so in ways that promote dignity and a sense of worth.

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Moving forward also requires recognition that at present, part-time jobs, outsourcing, and automation offer people few benefits, particularly in the area of health care. Stemming the homelessness industry necessitates rethinking our health and mental health care systems. Health and Mental Health Care

In the United States, health care gets delivered in a mixed market that, although largely private, is financed by a great deal of public money. This highly fragmented system presents challenges to coordinated care, the type of care needed by many homeless people. One of the great ironies of this system is that while public funds are paying for much of the medical care received, government has very little ability to contain costs (including the costs of drugs). Numerous writers have noted the large share of system costs going to insurance companies that do not provide care directly but rather control access to care (see, for example, Woolhandler et al. 2003). Essentially, there are a lot of “middlemen” and profiteers in the US health care system. Most people get their health insurance from employment (or the employment of a family member). As private medical insurance costs have skyrocketed, employers, lacking the ability to contain these costs directly, have increasingly sought to pass more and more of the cost of health insurance to their employees. This includes the prices of policies, increasing premiums and deductibles, and higher pharmaceutical costs (Woolhandler et al. 2003). Developing a health care system that provides coverage for all, that removes the burdens of the costs for that system from employers and lessens them for individuals, could make hiring people with preexisting conditions more feasible for employers, creating better access to income and exposing fewer workers to the risk of poverty and homelessness. Numerous writers have pointed to deinstitutionalization as a major contributor to the creation of homelessness. But as Carol Caton (2017) notes, this invites an argument in favor of reinstitutionalization. She argues persuasively that returning to large state mental health institutions is not the answer. Although she notes that those with serious mental illness do constitute a high-risk group for homelessness who merit special prevention and amelioration efforts, Caton argues for a comprehensive and compassionate system focused on community reintegration of those with mental illness, thorough discharge planning, and targeting and triage of needed resources over time to maintain community stability. We argue that the United States can best end the fragmentation of services that hinders those with mental illness from maintaining access to needed care and support through a more universal health system with equitable treatment of mental health issues (comparable to coverage of other health issues).

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A Human Rights Framework

There are some advocates and others seeking to employ a human rights framework to end homelessness in the United States. These organizations and groups use international and national treaties and standards to argue that homelessness is a violation of human rights. To make their point these groups point to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, which states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” The UDHR included many of the economic rights proposed in 1939 by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his economic bill of rights, which was designed to make tangible the ideas associated with life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Included were housing, medical care, social security, and education. While aspects of Roosevelt’s bill of rights were ultimately reflected in labor laws and protections offered through the Social Security Act of 1935, others were not realized. The Housing Act of 1949, passed in the context of a widespread housing crisis, did establish “as a national objective the achievement as soon as feasible of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family” (PL 81-171). This aspiration is invoked by those trying to end homelessness. Longtime housing scholar and advocate Chester Hartman explains that “establishing a right to housing in the United States does not appear to be immediately feasible” (2006, p. 177).5 However, he adds that it is still important to work toward this solution. A right to housing has been established in other countries. While the United States has not established a national right to shelter for all, it has long-standing experience with a constitutional obligation to house its military members and their immediate families (Hartman and Drayer 1990) that could provide lessons for a broader national commitment. An article by Thomas Byrne and Dennis Culhane (2011) on the right to housing in France and Britain also offers lessons to support a reduction in homelessness. Beyond securing a legal right to housing, the literature includes other ways to use a human rights approach to address the problem of homelessness. One involves using the tools of the United Nations (UN) to support policy changes, and another is for localities to develop their own bills of rights for homeless people. Additionally, UN language and related policies can be used to win legal battles against criminalization. Using United Nations Tools

To engage in human rights work people must understand the United Nations and the tools that it provides, particularly as related to homelessness.

Some Helpful Articles and Treaties

In addition to Article 25 of the UNDHR, issues related to adequate housing are directly addressed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Article 11 of the covenant covers the right to adequate housing, which is defined as housing that includes peace, security, and dignity. The United States has signed but not ratified its support of this covenant; ratification comes from US congressional approval (Foscarinis 2000; Libal and Harding 2015). Housing advocates have also focused on additional UN conventions. Signed and ratified by the United States, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is used to argue against criminalization policies, noting the way in which these policies institute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Also signed by the United States is the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Given the historical and persistent nature of racism in housing policies in the United States—including the ways in which the loss of housing subsidies and public housing complexes have disproportionately affected African Americans—this convention can hold meaning. For example, it supports the creation of a right to housing and to redress criminalization because of the disproportionate number of people of color in the United States who are in jail and homeless (United Nations Economic and Social Council n.d.; Reichert 2007). Other advocates have pointed to the potential of focusing on child and family homelessness through the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Although the United States helped to write the convention and signed it, Congress has not ratified the document. This convention is seen as potentially powerful, as it has received a great deal of international support, and at present the United States stands alone among the close to 200 member countries that has not ratified it. The support for the convention in the United States is such that when abolishing the death penalty for children, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy referred to it (Donald Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center v. Christopher Simmons). The convention has language with direct bearing on homelessness, as it states that every child has a right to an adequate standard of living, and it recognizes that children have the right to grow up in a manner that ensures healthy development. Moreover, Article 18 has meaning for family homelessness, as it indicates that “States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children” (United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1989).

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Other methods that employ a human rights approach include training people to be human rights monitors who can address the United Nations. An example is the Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign, which grew out of the work of the Kensington Welfare Rights Union in Philadelphia. The Kensington Welfare Rights Union began in 1991, founded by homeless and formerly homeless people to help others and to advocate for rights; its leadership included Willie Baptist, an active member of the earlier National Union of the Homeless. In 1998 the Kensington Welfare Rights Union organized a month-long bus tour to document poverty in the United States, ending in New York City, where members shared their documentation with a tribunal within the UN (Bricker-Jenkins, Young, and Honkala 2007). In 2002 a second bus tour documented human rights abuses, this time taking its findings to the international headquarters of the United Nations, where representatives from 148 governments heard about poverty and homelessness in the United States. In 2006 the campaign and the Kensington Welfare Rights Union organized a national truth commission in Cleveland, at which testimony was presented to UN commissioners about the variety of human rights violations associated with homelessness and inadequate housing (Bricker-Jenkins, Young, and Honkala 2007). The NLCHP has also actively supported a human rights orientation to homelessness. Often working with partners, the NLCHP has submitted official reports on US housing and homelessness to specific United Nations committees. It has also called attention to the issue during official visits from UN special rapporteurs and other human rights monitors (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2014). The NLCHP has worked to establish a human rights framework within the US Interagency Council on Homelessness by partnering on the development of strategic plans to end homelessness and stop its criminalization. The NLCHP has also partnered with organizations to include language that supports housing as a right. For example, the American Bar Association Commission on Homelessness and Poverty has incorporated human rights language. This is important because of the bar association commission’s role in educating lawyers about employing the law to support people in need. Resolutions in support of human rights have also been approved by local advocacy groups and by the Los Angeles Continuum of Care body (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2014). The NLCHP produces tools and reports in support of human rights advocacy that are available through its website. Another human rights strategy outside of the United Nations involves developing a homeless bill of rights at the state and local level. By 2017, several states had enacted homeless bills of rights that tended to focus on negative rights—that is, rights protecting people from torture or infringement upon civil rights (such as free speech). Many of these rights fell within the realm of anticriminalization policies. Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Illinois, and

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Connecticut each have laws that protect people from discrimination based on housing status (e.g., in jobs and health care), and that ensure freedom to move in public spaces (Bauman, Rankin, and Boden 2014). Other places, including the state of California, are working to enact positive rights—that is, the right to something. In this case that something could be decent housing specifically, or shelter, or even health care for homeless people. As Stanhope and Dunn (2011) argue, it is also imperative, if we are to end homelessness, that we look at the larger moral issues associated with the entrenched nature of homelessness and the values that underlie the US response to it, both historically and since the ascendancy of neoliberalism. A focus on human rights provides a secular moral and legal path forward. A Moral Turn Stanhope and Dunn (2011) also warn that fundamental problems linger when we approach homelessness from a cost-benefit analysis or self-interest, rather than as a moral issue. It is ironic that religion plays such a large role in American society, yet limited use is made of social gospel values to argue for an end to homelessness. With all the talk among political leaders and others about the importance of Judeo-Christian values, and all of the biblical passages quoted by political leaders, one seldom hears any reference to the abundant and fundamental messages in the Old and New Testaments about the need to establish societies in which we care for the poor, the old, the widows and orphans, strangers, and those jailed. The Moral Mondays phenomenon launched by Reverend Barber in North Carolina provides a recent exception to this pattern of oversight, as do Nuns on the Bus and the longtime work of Sojourners and a handful of other organizations. The release of the Boston Declaration: A Prophetic Appeal to Christians of the United States, in November of 2017 is another important exception. The declaration brought together many theologians concerned about racism, social injustice, and the misuse of Christianity here. The Huffington Post reported that it was signed by over 300 theologians (Thistlewaite 2017). These developments are important but seem dwarfed by voices encouraging disdain for poor people and hatred and distrust of immigrants and others. As Gar Alperovitz (2013) warns, when values such as equality and care for others erode, the systems that sustain these values also erode. Longtime housing advocate and scholar Florence Roisman (2000) advises that rather than shying away from the issue of race, as we have seen in other discussions about homelessness, we should build on the work of Martin Luther King Jr. and the Poor People’s Campaign by connecting poverty and racism and saying that both are unacceptable. Clearly a reorientation is needed. Perhaps that orientation might come through shock.

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Naomi Klein makes clear in her book The Shock Doctrine (2007) that the neoliberal agenda has been pushed forward repeatedly following a country’s or locality’s experience with shock. Sadly, the United States has experienced numerous climate-related shocks and may be on the brink of more, due to automation disrupting its work force, a constitutional crisis, further disintegration of the meaning of government, or perhaps most frightening, war. It is vitally important that when shock does occur, people who are concerned about poverty and homelessness are poised to pick up the pieces in a way that supports humanity and collective responsibility. While Hartman (2006) concedes that the adoption of a human rights perspective is not imminent, the aftermath of shock could make this possible. If not a human rights framework, the next big shocks may bring us at least significant changes in housing, employment, and health care policy, and a revised vision of public benefits that is not fabricated on racist suppositions. Perhaps the brilliance of the Mont Pelerin Society was that it rooted its work in values, which left room for a variety of strategies and tactics and places for disagreement. What we have seen in US society is a move away from attention to the common good, away from a collectivist notion that equality makes everyone stronger. To end homelessness, we must return to the values that honor our shared responsibilities to each other, that recognize that our humanity is intertwined with the humanity of all, and that Americans as a nation should be judged by the way in which we treat the weakest among us. Notes 1. The most recent national point-in-time estimate of those homeless in the United States, HUD’s 2017 Annual Homeless Assessment Report, reported to Congress that there were 553,742 homeless people on a single night and that approximately 35 percent of those were unsheltered (Henry et al. 2017). Culhane, one of the principal investigators for the count project, has acknowledged that the methods employed for the unsheltered count capture only about 60 percent of those unsheltered (McPhate 2017). This significant distortion and other problems with HUD’s point-in-time counts are discussed in a special report by the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (2017). 2. According to the 2016 report from the US Conference of Mayors, each of the thirty-two cities studied reported more need than capacity. Some areas were particularly hard-hit. Over half of those counted as homeless on a single night in the 2016 report were in five coastal states in the nation (ordered from highest count to lowest): California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Washington. 3. In 1991, HUD passed a law stating that tenants engaged in criminal activity threatening the health, safety, and rights of other tenants or staff shall be evicted from public housing. In 1996 language was added stipulating that any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises would result in eviction even if a guest in one’s home had drugs and the resident did not know about them, or even if the resident

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tried to stop the activity. Non-drug-using family members could also be evicted. As President Clinton stated, evictions were encouraged for drug activity despite the circumstances (Alexander 2012; HUD v. Rucker 2000). 4. Each year since the early 1980s the US Conference of Mayors has produced an Annual Report on Hunger and Homelessness; 2016 was the first year the report was written in tandem with another organization. 5. Human rights frameworks have not been widely embraced by individuals and groups working for social justice in the United States, but there are some positive developments in this regard. For example, in the profession of social work (in which “social justice” is a core professional value), a group of US social workers, taking their lead from the International Federation of Social Workers, brought human rights frameworks and language to social work education’s core competencies. Today all social work students are required to have an understanding of human rights. Moreover, exposure to human rights frameworks allows students to look beyond ways in which they can secure help for individual clients, to participate in a world in which individuals have access to basic rights such as housing and health care.

Acronyms

ACCESS

ADAMHA AFDC AFL-CIO

CCNV CDBG CHAP DOD ESSA FEMA FHA GA GAO HEARTH

HHS HPRP HUD NAHRO

NCH NIH NIMBY NIMH

Access to Community Care and Effective Services and Support Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration Aid to Families with Dependent Children American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Community for Creative Non-Violence community development block grant Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan Department of Defense Every Student Succeeds Act Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Housing Administration General Assistance General Accounting Office (through July 7, 2004) Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Department of Health and Human Services Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program Department of Housing and Urban Development National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials National Coalition for the Homeless National Institutes of Health Not in My Back Yard National Institute of Mental Health

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Acronyms

NLCHP PATCO PATH RMA SAFAH SAMHSA SMSA SSI TANF TEFAP UDHR UN USDA VA VASH

National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness Ranally Metropolitan Area Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area Supplemental Security Income Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Nations US Department of Agriculture Veterans Administration Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing Program

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Whang, I., and Min, E. (1999). Discourse analysis of television news on public antagonism against the homeless. In E. Min (ed.). Reading the homeless: The media’s image of homeless culture. Westport: Greenwood. White, L. E. (1990). Representing the real deal. University of Miami Law Review 45, 271–313. Wilenski, L. (1986, November 10). BC grad student starts homeless union. The Heights. http://newspapers.bc.edu/cgi-bin/bostonsh?a=dandd=bcheights19861110.2.31. Wilensky, H. L., and Lebeaux, C. N. (1965). Industrial society and social welfare: The impact of industrialization on the supply and organization of social welfare services in the United States. New York: Free Press. Williams, V. (1990, October 23). Recovering dignity activist Chris Sprowal’s recent victory for the homeless was a personal triumph, too; He’s trying to regain the esteem that cocaine abuse wasted. Philadelphia Inquirer. Willse, C. (2010). Neo-liberal biopolitics and the invention of chronic homelessness. Economy and Society 39(2), 155–184. ———. (2015). The value of homelessness: Managing surplus life in the United States. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Wolff, M. K., Larson, M. J., O’Brien, R. W., and McGraw, S. A. (2010). Supportive housing approaches in the Collaborative Initiative to Help End Chronic Homelessness (CICH). Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 37(2), 213–225. Woolhandler, S., Himmelstein, D. U., Angell, M. and Young, Q. D. (2003). Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance. Journal of the American Medical Association 290(6), 798–805. Wright, J. D. (1988). The worthy and unworthy homeless. Society 25(5), 64–69. Yarmolinsky, A. (1966). Ideas into programs. The Public Interest (2), 70–99. Zipple, A. M. (1986, April). NIMH-funded research on the mentally ill who are homeless: Introduction. Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal 9(4), 29–30.

Index

Abramovitz, Mimi, 91–92 Academics, 77–95 Administrative Procedures Act, 144 Adult Education for the Homeless Program, 159 Adversaries, clash of, 54–62 Advocates, for ending chronic homelessness, 215–217 Advocates campaign, 117–129 AFDC. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children Affordable Care Act, 222, 224 Affordable housing, 240–241 AFL-CIO. See American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations African Americans, 245; benefits, lack of, 23, 25; Black Codes and, 19; criminalization and, 237; as homeless, 19, 22, 73, 77, 88, 92; housing market exclusion from, 241; incarceration of, 237; McKinney Act and, 5; migration of, 19; in National Union of the Homeless, 51, 53; Social Security exclusion from, 22; as unworthy poor, 92–95; in Washington, D.C., 44; as welfare queens, 34, 92, 95; in welfare rights movement, 24 Aid to Dependent Children, 23 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 23–25, 94, 114,

203, 231; budget cuts for, 38; general assistance and, 39. See also Aid to Dependent Children AIDS, 48, 130, 132, 190, 199 Air traffic controllers strike, 37 Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, 69 Alexander, Michelle, 237 Alinsky, Saul, 55, 127–128 Alperovitz, Gar, 247 American Bar Association Commission on Homelessness and Poverty, 246 American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 187 American Journal of Psychiatry, 79 American Journal of Public Health, 216 American Psychiatric Association, 79– 80, 82–85 American Psychological Association, 85 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), 220 Amster, Randall, 200 Andrus, Cecil, 46 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (2007), 218 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (2014), 225 Appelbaum, Richard, 99–100 Armey, Dick, 70 Artificial relief industry, 3

275

276

Index

The Atlantic, 215 Atwater, Lee, 231 Augustus F. Hawkins–Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments Act (1988), 159 Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, 14 Bachrach, Leona, 81–82, 85 Bag ladies, 10 Baker, Dennis, 200 Baker, James, 58, 178, 215 Baker, Susan, 58, 178, 215 Baptist, Willie, 52–53, 189, 246 Barak, Gregg, 199 Barber, William, 247 Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act (1994), 207 Bassuk, Ellen, 79, 86–87, 219–220 Bauer, Carol, 90 Baumohl, Jim, 46 Baxter, Ellen, 49, 51, 73, 84 Becton, Julius, Jr., 140 Bell, Terrence, 139 Bennett, William, 139 Berrigan, Daniel, 41–43 Berrigan, Philip, 41–43 Berry, Marion, 75 Black Codes, 19, 27n11 Blasi, Gary, 183 Block, John, 57 Bloomer, Eddie, 57 Bobo, Benjamin, 96, 99 “Body Count: How the Reagan Administration Hides the Homeless,” 100–101 Bogard, Cynthia, 4, 30, 125 Bohm, Robert, 199 Bonker, Don, 90 Boondas, Jennifer, 90 Boston, 21 Boston Declaration: A Prophetic Appeal to Christians of the United States, 247 Bowen, Otis, 138–139 The Bowery, 9 Bratton, Bill, 200 Brazile, Donna, 187, 196n1 Bremner, Robert, 25 Broadway Housing Communities, 51

“Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety” (Kelling and Wilson), 199–200 Brown, Jesse, 208 Brown, Les, 74–75 Bruce, Barry, 112 Bureau of Indian Affairs, 79 Burnside Community Council, 51 Burt, Martha, 219–220 Burwell, Sylvia, 222 Bush, George H. W.: administration of, 140, 183; amendments signed by, 193–195; compassionate conservatism of, 189; election of, 202; peace dividend and, 188; poor commitment to, 186; presidency end of, 197; as presidential candidate, 184 Bush, George W., 8; administration of, 211; as born-again Christian, 213; cabinet appointments by, 214, 217; deficit created by, 214; homelessness and, 12, 215, 219, 221–222; Housing First model and, 213; National Urban Policy of, 234; No Child Left Behind and, 218 Byrd, Robert, 125 Byrne, Thomas, 244 Carey, Hugh, 48 Carpenter, Jesse, 89 Carson, Ben, 13, 232–233 Carter, Jimmy, 33, 35, 55 Casanova, Renaldo, 52 Cash bail system, 237 Castro, Julian, 221–222 Catholic Worker Movement, 40–41 Cato Institute, 32 Caton, Carol, 243 Catonsville Nine, 42–43 CCNV. See Community for Creative Non-Violence CDBG. See Community development block grant Center for Teaching Peace, 42 CHAPs. See Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plans Charity Organization Society, 20–21, 27n12 Chicago, 21 Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, 74, 101

Index

Chicago School of Economics, 31 The Chicago Study, 101–102 Chicago Tribune, 198 Children, homelessness and, 86; as castaways, 88; hearing on, 87 Chomsky, Noam, 35 Chronic homelessness, 210–213; advocates for ending, 215–217 Cisneros, Henry, 203–204, 209 Civil rights, 22–25 Civil Rights Act (1964), 127 Civil War, 19 Claims-making, 4 Clinton, Bill, 8, 201, 211, 228n3, 232; homelessness policy of, 204–209; as New Democrat, 202–203 Clothier, Lynn, 166 Cloward, Richard, 108, 127 Coalition for the Homeless in New York, 48–49 Coates, Ta-Nehisi, 19, 95, 241 Cocaine addiction, 188–189 Coelho, Tony, 124–125 Cold War, 188 Collaborative Initiative to Help End Chronic Homelessness, 217 Collins, Cardiss, 143, 149–150 Colonies, 17, 26n8 Columbus House, 112 Committee for Dignity and Fairness, 51–52 Community development block grant (CDBG), 109; for Emergency Shelter Grants Program, 150; for homeless, 112–113, 118 Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), 4, 29, 103, 112, 186; antiwar activism of, 41; Federal Interagency Task Force on Food and Shelter and, 69; homelessness move to, 44–47; leadership of, 40–44; Reagan administration and, 54–62; surplus property use of, 174–175 Community mental health centers, 66–68 Community Mental Health Demonstration Projects for Homeless: Individuals Who Are Chronically Mentally Ill, 164–165 Community Mental Health Services for the Homeless Block Grant, 162 Community services block grant, 114 Compassion fatigue, 198

277

“A Compassion Fatigued Nation Hardens Its Heart to the Homeless” (Mercer), 198 Compassionate conservative, 189, 213 Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plans (CHAPs), 145–146, 159 Compromise in public policy, 233–234 Conflict: escalation of, 58–62; organizing of, 55–56 Confronting Homelessness: Poverty, Politics, and the Failure of Social Policy (Wagner and Gilman), 3 Consensus and controversy, 219–221, 228n6 Continuum of Care, 210–211, 223; barriers to, 205; evaluation of, 206– 207; as planning tool, 204; as service delivery strategy, 204; as staircase model, 204; Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and, 206 Conyers, John, 128 Cranston, Alan, 167 “Creating a Science of Homelessness During the Reagan Era” (Jones, M.), 85 Cress, Daniel, 52–53 Criminal justice system, 73 Critiques by academics, 209–210 Culhane, Dennis, 53, 113, 210–211, 215, 218, 244 Cuomo, Andrew, 203–204, 209–210 Cuomo, Mario, 75

Day, Dorothy, 40 Day, Phyllis, 22 Deindustrialization, 1 Deinstitutionalization, 2, 66–67, 73, 107 Delfico, Joseph, 111 Democratic Leadership Committee, 202 Demographics of homelessness, 226 Department of Agriculture (USDA), 57; Interagency Task Force and, 115; surplus food from, 117 Department of Defense (DOD): downsizing of, 110–111; Interagency Task Force and, 115; shelter program of, 111–112 Department of Education, 11, 137; elimination of, 139; McKinney Act implementation of, 158–161 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 11–12, 58, 69, 79,

278

Index

104n5, 137, 184–185, 202; homeless policies by, 113–115; McKinney Act implementation of, 161–166 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 12–13, 38–39, 69, 71, 90, 96, 109–110, 184–185, 214; abandoned buildings of, 53; homeless policies by, 112–113; Interagency Task Force and, 115; McKinney Act implementation of, 143–158; McKinney Act support by, 137–138 Department of Labor, 137, 140, 169–170 Department of the Interior, 46 Desmond, Matthew, 240 Deuteronomy, 15, 26n5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 235 Dignity House, 189 Direct action, 127–128 Directions for the future, 225–226 DOD. See Department of Defense Dole, Bob, 124–125 Domenici, Pete, 76, 121, 133n3, 151, 162 Domiciliary Care for Homeless Veterans Program, 167–168 Donovan, Shaun, 221 Doolin, Joseph, 90 Dreier, Peter, 241 Dukakis, Michael, 202 Dumpster diving, 56 Dunn, Kerry, 239, 247 Education of Homeless Children and Youth Program, 192 Eisenberg, Ronda, 205 Elizabethan Poor Laws (1601), 16–17, 23, 26n7, 27n13, 33, 230–231 Emergency Aid to Families Program, 69–70 Emergency Community Services Homeless Grant Program, 162–163 Emergency Food and Shelter Program, 140, 171–174 Emergency Jobs Appropriation Act (1983), 109 Emergency relief for homelessness, 9 Emergency Shelter Grants Program, 121, 145, 171, 179n4–179n5, 223; in action, 149–150; funding for, 150; matching funds for, 147; as

permanent, 147–148; purpose of, 146–147; religious organizations and, 148–149 Emergency Solutions Program, 223 Empowerment agenda, 203 Enclosure laws, 16 Enclosure Movement, 230 Enterprise zones, 70, 104n3 ESSA. See Every Student Succeeds Act (2015) Euclid Street house, 44–45 Evangelism and compassionate conservatism, 213–222 Every Student Succeeds Act (2015) (ESSA), 224 Evicted (Desmond), 240 Exclusion and homelessness industry, 236–237

Factors instrumental to the homelessness industry, 230–239 Fair Housing Act (1968), 23 Falsification, 30 Families, homelessness and, 85–87 Family Options Study, 225–226, 228n7 Farmer’s Home Administration, 115 Fast for food, 56–57 Federal City College, 58, 61, 69, 74 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 12, 108, 110, 113, 137, 140, 181n16–181n17, 182n18–182n20; McKinney Act implementation of, 170–174; national board of, 109 Federal Emergency Management Food and Shelter Program, 131 Federal government, 22–25 Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 23 Federal housing budget, 90 Federal Interagency Task Force on Food and Shelter, 69, 113, 114–115 Federal policies, 108–117 Federal Register, 144–147, 156–157, 171, 174–176 Federal Task Force on the Homeless, 141–142 FEMA. See Federal Emergency Management Agency Fennelly, Carol, 6, 44–45, 55, 57, 124– 125, 186 Feudalism, 15

Index

FHA. See Federal Housing Administration Fischer, Pamela, 105n6 Fixers, 136, 143, 178 Fleming, Mary, 162–163 Florida, 17 Foley, Thomas, 124, 188 Food Assistance for the Homeless, 132 Food Stamps, 24, 132; budget cuts to, 38, 55; Continuum of Care and, 206; for homeless, 117–118; permanent address for, 121; USDA program for, 135 Foscarinis, Maria, 6, 13, 50, 116–117, 120– 125, 128, 142, 150, 161, 179, 201, 210 Foucault, Michel, 95 Freedom of Information Act, 96, 99–100, 104 French, 17 Friedman, Milton, 31–33, 35–36 From the Depths: Discovery of Poverty in the United States (Bremner), 25

GA. See General Assistance GAO. See General Accounting Office Gelberg, Lillian, 110, 113–114 General Accounting Office (GAO), 6, 105n11, 109–111, 193–194 General Assistance (GA), 39–40, 63n5 General Services Administration, 137, 140, 174–175 Gentrification, 2 George Washington University Estelle and Melvin Gelman Special Collections Library, 6 G.I. Bill (1944), 23 Gilder, George, 33 Gilens, Martin, 25 Gilman, Jennifer, 189, 198 Giuliani, Rudy, 200–201, 236 Globalization, 1 Golden, Stephanie, 91–92 Golden, Terrence, 140–151 Gomer syndrome, 166 Gonzales, Henry, 71–72, 74 Goode, Wilson, 90, 102–103 Gore, Albert, Sr., 76, 121–122 The Grate American Sleep Out, 128, 130 Great Britain, 17–18 Great Depression: direct action and, 127; home ownership after, 23;

279

homelessness and, 2, 9; Hoover’s approach to, 69; progressive movement and, 14 Great recession (2008): homelessness rates of, 214; housing crisis of, 222 Great Society, 14, 24 Guard, Gloria, 220 Gugliotta, Guy, 204 Guinan, Ed, 40–43

Hagen, Jan, 91 Hall, Crystal, 51–52 Hall, Tony, 56 Hartman, Chester, 244 Harvest of Shame, 60 Hatch, Orrin, 169 Hayek, Friedrich, 30–32, 36 Hayes, Robert, 47, 49–50, 72, 74, 185, 188; class action lawsuit of, 48; homelessness federal response to, 117 Head Start: cuts to, 38; enactment of, 24 Health care for the homeless, 115–116 Health Care for the Homeless Act (1987), 115–116 Health Care for the Homeless Demonstration Project, 116, 191–192 Health Care for the Homeless hearing (1986), 115–116 Health Care for the Homeless Program, 164–165, 196n5 HEARTH. See Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act Heckler, Margaret, 58, 69, 138 Heinz, John, 110 Helpful articles and treaties, 245 Heritage Foundation, 32 HHS. See Department of Health and Human Services Hill Staffers for the Hungry and Homeless, 124 Hispanics, 73, 88 Historical antecedents and neoliberalism, 230–233 Hobos, 9 Hoch, Charles, 21 Holden, Constance, 85 Hombs, Mary Ellen, 6, 41, 44, 55, 71–72, 96, 104n4, 175, 215 Homeless adult education, 158–159, 181n15, 208

280

Index

Homeless and Emergency Shelters (Bobo), 96 Homeless bill of rights, 246 Homeless children education, 159–161 Homeless Chronically Mentally Ill Veterans Program, 167–168 Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act (1986), 121 Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act (HEARTH), 222–224 Homeless Housing Act (1986), 121 Homeless in Chicago (Rossi), 101 The Homeless Mentally Ill (Lamb), 80 Homeless Older Americans hearing, 75, 90 The Homeless Persons’ Survival Act (1986), 121, 124–133, 177; incremental changes of, 118, 122; legislative strategy for, 120–123; long-term solutions by, 119–120; omnibus approach of, 117, 122; preventive measures of, 118–119; urgent relief by, 118 Homeless shelters, 21, 45, 58–62 Homeless Veterans Assistance Act, 167 Homeless Veterans Comprehensive Assistance Act (2001), 217 Homeless Veterans Reintegration Project, 167, 169 Homelessness: as adjective, 1; advocates for, 9, 26n1; binary perspectives on, 66–77; criminalization of, 199–201, 226; deaths of, 107, 133n1; disease and, 166; ending of, 5; as enduring social problem, 183; eviction avoidance of, 118; as historical drama, 4; individual perspective on, 66–71, 78; as moral issue, 247; of normal families, 93; normalization of, 2, 5, 12, 183; as noun, 1; numbers on, 96–103; as personal choice, 68; root causes of, 2, 208; as social justice issue, 2–3; structural perspectives on, 71–78; whitewashing of, 94–95; women in, 9 “Homelessness: Experts Differ on Root Causes” (Holden), 85 Homelessness in America: A Forced March to Nowhere (Hombs and Snyder), 45, 55

Homelessness in America hearing, 50, 71–72 Homelessness in America II hearing, 74 Homelessness Prevention and Rapid ReHousing Program (HPRP), 220–221 “The Homelessness Problem” (Bassuk), 79 Homelessness service model, 211 Hoover, Herbert, 69 HOPE VI, 203 Hopper, Kim, 3, 7–8, 12, 21, 49, 51, 72– 73, 84, 92, 99, 242 House Select Committee on Aging, 75 House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development, 75 Housing and Urban Recovery Act (1983), 112–113 Housing First, 12–13, 212–213, 215–216, 223, 225, 228n5, 229, 233, 238–239, 248n1 Housing for the Elderly and Homeless hearing, 75–76 Housing Now, 186–189 Housing vouchers, 241 Housing-ready, 202, 205 How to Lobby Congress: A Guide for the Citizen Lobbyist (deKieffer), 123 HPRP. See Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program HUD. See Department of Housing and Urban Development HUD Report on Homelessness (1984), 96, 104, 105n9, 105n11; criticism of, 98–99; hearings on, 99–101; strategies of, 97–98 HUD Report on Homelessness II (1986), 100 HUD–Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing Program (VASH), 218 Hull House, 27n13 Hurricane Katrina, 36 Hyde, Pamela, 84 Implementation, 144 Improving America’s Schools Act (1994), 208 Incarceration, 248n3; of African Americans, 237; impact of, 236–237; rabble and, 236; rates of, 207 Income disparity, 242 Indentured servitude, 18–19

Index

Independent Agencies Appropriation Act (1986), 151 Indigenous people, 17 Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance: Activist Ethnography in the Homeless Shelter Industry (LyonCallo), 3 Institutionalization, 3 Interagency Council on the Homeless, 129–131, 137, 179n2–179n3, 208, 215–216, 221–222, 237; inaction of, 142–143; purpose of, 141–142; revival of, 185 Irwin, John, 236

“Jack Kemp Faces Reality” (Traub), 185 Jackson, Alphonso, 214 Jail: African Americans in, 92, 245; conditions of, 21; cost of, 211; dispossessed housing of, 62; homelessness and, 97, 101, 212; lengthy sentences and, 189; mentally ill and, 81; nonworthy poor and, 230; pre-release program and, 121; private probation and, 237; as shelters, 8, 198, 209, 228n1; as social service, 236; violence of wasted lives and, 41. See also Incarceration Jim Crow laws, 237 Job Training for the Homeless Demonstration Program, 169 Job Training Partnership Act, 169 Jobs Stimulus Bill (1983), 171 Johnson, Lyndon, 24 Johnson, Roberta, 19 Jones, Charles, 5, 65–66 Jones, Daniel Stedman, 222 Jones, Marian, 85 Jones, Robert, 170 Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation, 105n8 Journal of the American Medical Association, 80, 105n7 Judeo-Christian values, 14, 18 Kansas City, Missouri, 56 Katel, Peter, 241 Katz, Michael, 16, 40 Kelling, George, 199–200 Kemp, Jack, 185–186, 190 Kennedy, Edward, 125, 169

281

Kennedy, Ethel, 125 Kennedy, John F., 24 Kensington Welfare Rights Union, 246 Key areas for structural change: employment and wages, 241–243; health and mental health care, 243; housing, 240–241; human rights framework, 244; using United Nations tools, 244–247 Khadduri, Jill, 218 Kildee, Dale, 87–88 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 247 Klein, Naomi, 36, 248 Koch, Ed, 235–236 Kozol, Jonathan, 68, 93

Lafayette Park, 46, 55, 59, 89 Laing, R. D., 26n2 Laissez-faire capitalism, 15–16 Lam, Julie, 78 Lamb, Richard, 80 Lantos, Tom, 143, 149 Leadership team, 137–141 Leard, Robert, 57 Leland, Mickey, 115, 120–122, 133n2, 188 Levittown, 23 Lincoln, Abraham, 215 Lipsky, Michael, 3 Lobbying, 123 The Logic of Scientific Inquiry (Popper), 31 Losing Ground (Murray), 33, 232 Louisiana, 17 Lowry, Mike, 76 Luna, Cajetan, 88 Luna, Victoria, 176–177 Luther Place Shelter, 10 Lyon-Callo, Vincent, 3–4, 235

“Man Who Wanted to House a Nation Departed with Empty Feeling” (Wagner and Gilman), 189 Management by exclusion, 198–201 Managing behavior in Clinton administration, 202–210, 228n2 Mangano, Philip, 215–216, 221 Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 32, 34 Market economies, 15 Martinez, Mel, 214

282

Index

Mathieu, Arline, 235–236 Matthew, Gospel of, 15, 26n6 Maurin, Peter, 40 Mayor’s Committee on the Homeless in Chicago, 102 Mazmanian, Daniel, 136 McConnell, Mitch, 13 McKinney, Stewart, 76, 102–103, 130 McKinney Act (1987), 2–3, 5–8, 29–30, 50, 65, 76, 86, 203, 234; block grants for, 162–166; data on, 193; eligibility for, 193; fight for, 107–133; findings of, 130; focus of, 78; funding of, 186; implementation of, 12, 133, 135–182; incremental changes to, 189–195; passage of, 11; positive orientation to, 197; purposes of, 130–131; support for, 219; surplus property of, 174–177, 192; titles of, 131–132. See also McKinney-Vento Act (2000); Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (1987); Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act (1987) McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments (1990), 190, 196n3 McKinney-Vento Act (2000), 11, 13, 207, 219, 224 McLaughlin, Ann, 140 McNeill, Emily, 51–52 Medicaid, 24, 114 Medicalization, 25, 26n2, 84–85, 235 Medicare, 24, 114 Meese, Edwin, 68 Mencher, Samuel, 26n7, 230 Mental health and medicalization, 234–236 The Mental Health Needs of Homeless Persons (Bassuk), 86 Mental Health Systems Act, 67 Mental illness, homelessness and, 84; block grant for, 151; discharge plan for, 119, 121; dual diagnosis of, 81, 83; homelessness risk factor for, 79; hospitalization for, 82; housing loss of, 80; service delivery for, 85 Mercer, Marcia, 198 Mickey Leland Peace Dividend Housing Assistance Act (1990), 188 Middlesex Interfaith Partners with the Homeless, 176 Military operations, 214, 217 Miller, James, 68

Min, Eungjun, 199 Minnesota, 53 Mises, Ludwig von, 30–31, 36 Mitzvah, 15 Monetarism, 35 Money-base economy, 16 Monongahela Valley, Pennsylvania, 7 Mont Pelerin Society, 32–33, 36, 232, 239, 248 Moore, Cassandra, 143 Moral Mondays, 247 Morality, 247–249 Moss, Harold, 45 Mother Jones, 188 Mothers, homelessness and, 87 Mothers’ pensions, 22 Moving toward the future, 239–247 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 76, 121 Murray, Charles, 33, 63n1, 232

NAHRO. See The National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials Nasdor, Robert, 176 National Alliance to End Homelessness, 6, 178–179, 215, 240 The National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), 143 National Center on Family Homelessness, 86 National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH), 4, 6, 29, 47–52, 54, 72, 74, 85, 112, 117, 120, 142, 179, 185 National Governors Association, 74–75, 87 National Governors’ Report, 97 National housing entitlement, 210 National Housing Law Project, 91 National Housing Policy Summit, 186 National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), 69, 77, 85, 162 National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 164 National Institute on Drug Abuse, 164 National Institutes of Health (NIH), 139 National Labor Relations Act (1935), 127 National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP), 6, 13, 179, 200–201, 238, 246

Index

National Low Income Housing Coalition, 187 National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, 88 National Pageant of Peace and Christmas, 126 National Review, 32 National Runaway Youth Act (1974), 87 National Union of the Homeless, 29, 51– 54, 63n3, 76–77, 176–177, 187 National Urban Policy, 234 National Visitor Center, 46–47, 63n2 Native Americans, 17 NCH. See National Coalition for the Homeless Negative income tax, 33, 35 Neoliberalism, 1, 29, 230–233; in action, 35–36; bipartisanship of, 232; budget cuts of, 38; as champions of the poor, 32; criminal justice system and, 237; economic values of, 62; on government austerity programs, 33; income redistribution and, 33; origins of, 30; poverty approach to, 107; pursuit of, 184; Reagan administration and, 30–39; reversal of, 239; states and, 39–40 Networks, relationships and, 56–58 New Deal, 23, 30, 39 New Federalism, 68–71, 98, 108, 139, 161 New Mexico, 121 New York City, 4, 18, 20–21, 51 New York Coalition for the Homeless, 93 New York Times, 6, 39, 48, 57, 66, 93, 98, 120, 140, 185, 242 NIH. See National Institutes of Health NIMBY. See Not in my backyard NIMH. See National Institute of Mental Health Nixon, Richard, 35 NLCHP. See National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty No Child Left Behind Act (2001), 218 “No Good Applied Research Goes Unpunished” (Rossi), 101 Not in my backyard (NIMBY), 198–199 Nuns on the Bus, 247 Oakar, Mary Rose, 56, 72, 76, 90 Oakland, California, 53

283

Obama, Barack: administration of, 8, 12, 197; homelessness and, 221–222, 225, 227; Housing First and, 213; McKinney-Vento Act and, 224; nonpayment sanction for, 236 Occupy Wall Street, 242 Office of Management and Budget, 56, 68, 143 Ogletree, Charles, Jr., 241 Older adults, homelessness and, 90–91 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (1981), 38, 55, 72 O’Neill, Tip, 57 The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper), 31 Opening Doors, 221 Outcasts on Main Street, 194, 196n6

PATCO. See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization PATH. See Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness Pathways Housing First program, 212–213 Patton, Lynne, 233 Peace dividend, 188 Pennsylvania, 6–7, 39–40 People’s Emergency Center, 220 Peroff, Kathleen, 99–100 Pew Charitable Trust, 116, 165 Philadelphia, 40, 51–54, 90, 102–103 Phoenix, 99–100, 104n2, 110 Pierce, Samuel, 12, 68, 96–101, 113, 138, 142, 150 Piven, Frances, 108, 127 Plague, 15 Poor: alms to, 15; criminalization of, 15– 16, 25, 34–35; in England, 16–17; laws, 16–18; protection of, 14–15; as public burden, 17, 27n9; as rational actors, 32–33; as responsibility of state, 16; unworthy, 16–17, 25, 90– 95, 115, 157–158, 230; view of, 32– 35; worthy, 16–19, 78–94, 107–108, 145, 150–156, 231 Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign, 246–247 Poorhouse, 18 Popper, Karl, 30–31 Poverty: as crime against the community, 18; historical perspectives on, 13–19; as moral

284

Index

failing, 17–20; as normal, 14–15; as social responsibility, 14–15; as structural problem, 17–20, 22 Preventing Mortgage Foreclosures and Enhancing Mortgage Credit Act (2009), 222 Preventive Services Regarding Children of Homeless Families and Families at Risk, 191 Priority Home! The Federal Plan to Break the Cycle of Homelessness, 203–204 Prison-industrial complex, 197–198 Private Lives/Public Spaces: Homeless Adults on the Streets of New York (Baxter and Hopper), 73 Private prisons, 236 Pro bono lawyers, 47–51 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), 37 Profit over People (Chomsky), 35 Progressive reformers, 22, 25, 27n13 Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness (PATH), 190–191 Protestantism, 18, 20 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal, 84 Psychiatry and the homeless services industry, 234–236 Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal, 88 Public housing, 38–39 Puritanism, 18 Queens, New York, 75–76

Rabble, 236 Rachel and Her Children (Kozol), 93 Rader, Victoria, 42–44, 57, 63n6 Ranally Metropolitan Area (RMA), 97, 99–100, 105n10 Rapid rehousing, 237–239 Reagan, Ronald: anti-labor stance of, 37, 140; on assistance to poor, 34; on deinstitutionalization, 66–67; on homelessness, 66, 136–137; on hunger, 57; as lame duck, 138; landslide victory of, 35–36; reelection of, 60; on regulations, 37; Revolution of, 29–30, 38, 70, 185, 232; war on drugs by, 92; on welfare, 33–34, 139 Reagan administration, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 30–39, 234; on affordable

housing, 90; on assistance to poor, 34; Community for Creative NonViolence and, 54–62; disability payments reduction of, 68 Reaganomics, 4, 30, 36–39 Recessions, 19 Reckoning with Homelessness (Hopper), 3, 242 Reconstruction, 19 Redlining, 23 Reeves, Jimmie, 66, 103 Regulating the Poor (Piven and Cloward), 108 Rehmann, Jan, 52 Reid, James Earl, 126 Reinstitutionalization, 80–81 Religious organizations, 69, 109–110, 135–136, 147–149, 153, 180n9 Rent control, 70 Reparations Movement Coordinating Committee, 241 Republican Ripon Society, 33 Richmond, Mary, 20 Right to housing, 244, 248n5 Riis, Jacob, 21 RMA. See Ranally Metropolitan Area Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 116, 165 Robertson, Marjorie, 88–89 Roisman, Florence, 247 Romano, Lyn, 45 Roosevelt, Franklin, 139, 244 Ross, Jo Anne, 69–70 Rossi, Peter, 91–92, 101–102 Rules for Radicals (Alinsky), 127 Rural Housing Stability Assistance Program, 223 Ryan, Paul, 13, 232 Sabatier, Paul, 136 SAFAH. See Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless Safe Haven Program, 194, 223, 234 Samaritan: The Mitch Snyder Story, 126 SAMHSA. See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Schumer, Chuck, 72 Schweiker, Richard, 138 Science, 85 Scientific American, 79 Scientific charity, 20, 27n12

Index

Seasons Such as These: How Homelessness Took Shape in America (Bogard), 4, 125 Sebelius, Kathleen, 222 Section 8 housing, 90, 113, 145, 152– 153, 240; Moderate Rehabilitation Program of, 157–158, 213; Veterans Administration funding of, 168–169 Segregated housing, 19 Senate Special Committee on Aging, 75 Settlement houses, 20, 22, 27n13 Shalala, Donna E., 202 Sheen, Martin, 125–126, 128 Shelter at 2nd and D Streets, 58, 61–62, 103, 114, 123, 125, 174, 187. See also Federal City College Shelter Plus Care, 190, 196n4 Shelters, 209 Shinn, Marybeth, 78, 85 The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Klein), 36, 248 Shut Out: Denial of Education to Homeless Children (Foscarinis), 161 Single-Room-Occupancy Housing, 157– 158 Skid Row, 9 Slavery, 17–19 Smith, Adam, 30 Smith, Leona, 189 Snow, David, 52–53, 85 Snyder, Mitch, 6, 42–44, 46–47, 51, 55, 59–60, 71, 73–74, 96, 103, 112, 122– 126, 128, 130, 186–187, 189, 196n2 Social Diagnosis (Richmond), 20 Social scientist-activists, 47–51 Social Security Act (1935), 22–24, 39, 127, 244 Social Security benefits: loss of, 80; permanent address for, 118, 121; while institutionalized, 118–119 Social Service Review, 91 Social services, 1 Social welfare, 13–19 Soup kitchens, 41–42, 61, 68, 117 Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 185 Spalin, Ann, 46–47 Spanish, 17 Speenhamland system, 18, 27n10 Sprowal, Chris, 51–52, 188–189 SSI. See Supplemental Security Income

285

Stagflation, 35 Stanhope, Victoria, 239, 247 Stark, Louisa, 85, 99–100, 110, 234 Stark, Pete, 56, 104n2 Steffen, Charles, 200 Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (1987), 130–132 Stimpson, James, 138 Stockman, David, 56 Stoner, Madeleine, 91, 105n6 Stoops, Michael, 51, 126, 128 Street people, 10 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 212–213 Sullivan, Louis, 184–185 Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless (SAFAH), 145; problems of, 156; purpose of, 155–156 Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 61 Supportive Housing Demonstration Program, 180n8–180n11, 181n12– 181n13; housing and community resources for, 152–153; problems of, 153–155; purpose of, 150–152 Surplus food, 56, 63n4 Switzerland, 32

Talbott, John, 80 Talisman, Mark, 110 TANF. See Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Task Force on Food and Shelter for the Homeless, 112 Tax Equality and Fiscal Responsibility Act (1982), 37 TEFAP. See Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), 203, 238–239 Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), 117, 135 Thanksgiving dinner, 126 Thatcher, Margaret, 37 Third World America, 126, 133n4 Thompson, Edward Palmer, 16 Thornburgh, Richard, 39 Thousand points of light, 184–186 Torah, 15, 26n4 Toro, Paul, 183 Tramping workers, 21

286

Index

Tramps, 9 Transitional Housing Demonstration Program, 121, 151, 193 Trattner, Walter, 27n13 Traub, James, 185 Trickledown economics, 37, 62–63 Trump, Donald, 12–13, 232–233, 236–237 Tsemberis, Sam, 205 Turnage, Thomas, 140, 167 Typologies of homeless, 212

UDHR. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN. See United Nations Union busting, 35, 37 United Nations (UN), 244–246 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 244 Unworthy poor, 16–17, 25, 90–95, 115, 157–158, 230 Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act (1987), 123–33 US Conference of Mayors, 74–75, 90, 240, 249n4 US health care: from employer, 243; mental health issues of, 243; mixed market of, 243 USA Freedom Corps, 216 USDA. See Department of Agriculture VA. See Veterans Administration Vagrancy Act (1824), 200 Vagrants, 230 VASH. See HUD–Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing Program Vento, Bruce, 72 Veterans: African American, 23; benefits for, 121; death, frozen to, 89; G.I. Bill and, 23; homelessness of, 11, 13, 78, 88–90, 130, 217–219; Job Training Act for, 132, 167; mortgage loans and, 23; new service model for, 211; pensions for, 115 Veterans Administration (VA), 23, 79, 89, 117–118, 140, 208, 217–218; McKinney Act implementation of, 167–169 Veterans Job Training Act (1987), 132, 167 Vieth, Harvey, 114 Vietnam War, 41, 110–111 Village Voice, 100–101

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), 207 Voice from the Streets, 125 Volcker, Paul, 35 Volunteers in Service to America, 117

Wacquant, Loïc, 236 Wagner, David, 3, 189, 198 Walters, Harry, 140 War on Poverty, 14, 24 Warren, Melissa, 183 Washington, DC: homeless shelter in, 46–47; march on, 186–187 Washington Post, 6, 46–47, 57, 98, 204 Waxman, Henry, 115 Wayfarers lodge, 21 Weak, protection of, 14 Wealth and Poverty (Gilder), 33 Weiss, Ted, 111, 115 Weitzman, Beth, 78 Welfare queens, 34–35, 39, 68, 92, 95, 231 West, Togo, 208 Westat, 97, 100 White, Lucie, 93–94, 103 White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, 216 Willse, Craig, 95, 235 Wilson, James Q., 199–200 Winter Offensive, 52 Women: black clubs of, 22; Brazile and, 187; homelessness and, 9, 61, 73; maltreatment of, 52; mental health and, 7; National Union of the Homeless and, 53, 77; Reagan administration and, 68; shelters for, 48, 125; undervaluation of, 87; as unworthy poor, 18, 91–92; violence and, 42; worthy white, 23 Workhouse, 18 World War II, 23 “The Worthy and Unworthy Homeless” (Wright, J.), 89–90 Worthy poor, 16–19, 78–94, 107–108, 145, 150–156, 231 Wright, James, 78, 89, 102, 125–126, 166 Wright, Paul, 111 Yarmolinsky, Adam, 77 Youmans, Roberta, 91

Zacchaeus Soup Kitchen, 41–42

About the Book

Homelessness once was considered an aberration. Today it is a normalized feature of US society. It is also, argue Elizabeth Beck and Pamela Twiss, an industry: the embrace of neoliberal policies and piecemeal efforts to address the problem have ensured a steady production of homeless people, as well as a plethora of disjointed social services that often pathologize individuals instead of housing them. Tracing the transformation of homelessness from being a social-justice issue to one with solutions based on medical models and zero-sum-games analyses, Beck and Twiss explore how government policies and practices have served to shape our limited response to the problem. Equally important, they consider how a more just, human-rights-based approach might be effected. Elizabeth Beck is professor in the School of Social Work at Georgia State University. Pamela C. Twiss is professor of social work at the California

University of Pennsylvania.

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