The Concept of Social Change. A Critique of the Functionalist Theory of Social Change 0710076975


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The concept

of social

change

Monographs in Social Theory Editor: Arthur Brittan, University of York Titles in the Series

Zygmunt Bauman Culture as praxis Keith Dixon Sociological theory Antony D. Smith

The concept of social change

A catalogue of the books in the other series of Social Science books published by Routledge and Ke

volume.

Qbe found at the end of this

Anthony D. Smith

The concept *'J soda] change A critique of the functionalist theory of social change

Routledge SO Kegan Paul London and Boston

_

First published in 1973

by Routledge & Kevan Paul Ltd Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane, London EC4V 5EL and 9 Park Street, Boston, Mass. 02,108, U.S.A.

Printed in Great Britain by

Clarke, Dobie 8; Breridort Ltd

Plymouth

© Arithorty D.

Smith 1973

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form. without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation passages i t criticism

of brief

ISBN o 7100 7607 3 o 7100 7697 Q. Library of Congress Catalog Number 73-79114 T . "

Contents

Preface 1

2

vii

Functio-nalism and social change

1

The attack on functio-nalism (1 ) statics and dy11cL~rnic5

2

The attack on functionalism (2) system and conflict

5

The functionalist rejoinder: two strategies $11 expansi-o11i5.': climate

8

The 'neo-evolutionary'

7

revival

Digerzntiation

3

Reintegration Adaptation

18 23

The stages of evolution

26 26 29 31

The 'logic' of evoIuti.onis1'r1 The functionalist heir The stages of c1:~vilisation

The' probl.e'm of unil.i-neatity Culture and structure The problem of transitions The problem

go 37

42 50

of endogen-ism

-

60

4 Modernism and modernization Three types of umtndernisation Leur'tlillg through experience

61

Social maturity

65 68 71 79 84

-.

$'lDitfereutiat~Lou~intf:gratio11. A superfluous model?

3 Generating and absorbing change Managers of QnoderMsetiou v

63

vi

Contents The critique of Modernism' Accounting for 'novelty

87

94

5 Revolution

96

Disturbance aruzl strain Collective behaviour

101

'Value-ucldecl': revolution Lu France cruel Holland

102

'Ceutrral values' and revolution Types of rebellion

111

97

108

Asynchronous change The homeostatic rrtoclel The problem of psychology Deterrnirulsru in the revolution Conclusion

115

118 122

125 128

6 Equilibrium and change

130

Dynamic equilibrium Cumulation and disintegration' neo-evo1~u,tPower c.IcfTati:un

iP1'o\0si groups *

F Loss of auihuny

Illitt Inahiliijr

Accc1¢.'Iu[UE

v Rc'.'lj1ILlliL'=n 4

Revolution

119

He then spells out 'two clusters of mutually-influencing necessary, or remote, causes of revolution': the pressures of a disequilibrated social system leading to power deflation, and elite inability producing a loss of authority; the Final or sufficient cause being an 'accelerator', 'usually contributed by fortune', and depriving the elite of its weapons. This theory is diagramatically illustrated opposite. Iollnson's attempted theory has the merits of concentrating on a single phenomenon, thus inviting comparison with similar theories,

and of distinguishing fairly clearly the analytical stages involved in the revolutionary process. These very strengths also produce its underlying weakness: the desire to be comprehensive makes for an overdeterrninistic model with all-inclusive categories. Since this is, as

I said, the problem fading all predominantly structural theories of change, including the Marxist, we need to look at Johnson's theory from a broader perspective. Three aspects of the problem can be isolated: the notion of equilibrium, the problem of psychology, and the question of personal choice. I take them in turn. On the whole, Johnson prefers the mechanistic model of society to the organic, perhaps because, in Pareto's words, it 'alone permits

an understanding of the very complicated actions and reactions of

. .

social phenomena . and in this way affords us a precise conception of social and economic equilibrium z" Johnson is interested in the way in which parts of the system (roles, norms, institutions) dovetail functionally, one providing a corrective to disruptive tendencies in anodier. This sell'-correcting process can also be observed in physiology. Bodies have these self-regulating mechanisms. But the key to the idea of a 'honleostatic' equilibrium lies in the existence

and stability of various processes for fulfilling the functional prerequisites of a social system, without recourse to violence. The point is that a homeostatic equilibrium can accommodate growth or differentiation, provided (a) change is gradual, (b) change is synchronised.

Where disequilibrium is likely, it is because an enviroinnental change did not come gradually or failed to synchronise with changes in social values. If for example many hunting and gathering societies, where it is the role of women to collect vegetables, suddenly change over to agriculture, men may not be able to re-evaluate their roles as farmers and the social equilibrium will be destroyed. The value

system must alter to accommodate the changing division of labor. I

120

Revolution

According to Johnson, this is what happened during the ilnmigrations into the United States during the past century. Change was synchronised and gradual. There are two difficulties here. One i5 that the hoineostatic model has little heuristic value. In practice it is a limiting case. Most societies are subje t to chronic tensions, anthropological utopias notwithstanding. They are also experiencing irregular. if 'small-scale', changes all the time. I am not now referring merely to role conflicts and status tensions; nor to the growth of population, density and specialisation. I am concerned with changes in institutional patterns, in the distribution of power between groups, in the patterns of social and cultural activities, in the allocation of goods and services, and in the development of values and conceptions. In all these respects, societies change their patterns at irregular but frequent intervals. As they do so, the different groups which compose a 'society' change their status and privileges. Beyond the most simple, no historical society has ever been free of group ten.sions or alienation. Some group is always deprived under conditions of scarce resources, and so much so that the real question is why revolution has been so rare. It is a question for which neither Marxists nor functionalists, their gaze fixed upon the inevitability of revolution, provide convincing answers. The trouble with the functionalist answer is that its alternative to equilibrium is the unstruc tired anarchy of anomie.

whereas what

we discover repeatedly are patterns of group conflict and multiple tension and 'dysfunction', rather than those of synchronous equilibrium or normative break