The Governance of Digital Policies: Towards a New Competence in the European Union 3030380726, 9783030380724

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The Governance of Digital Policies Towards a New Competence in the European Union

Mirela Mărcuţ

The Governance of Digital Policies

Mirela M˘arcu¸t

The Governance of Digital Policies Towards a New Competence in the European Union

Mirela M˘arcu¸t University of Oradea Oradea, Romania

ISBN 978-3-030-38072-4 ISBN 978-3-030-38073-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38073-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

The Internet is now truly a part of our daily lives. Whether we talk about social networking or paying our taxes, we engage not only with our peers, but also with other companies, as well as with our local, regional, and national government. At the same time, the notion that the future Internet will almost certainly change our lives forever has also become a part of public discourses across Europe. This discourse has been present in the public debate even earlier, once the Internet started to get traction in the 90s. The challenge for public decision-makers was the same then as it is now: leaders must design policies to harness this unmeasurable potential, as well as help mitigate some of the challenges facing Europe. The difference is that back then leaders aimed to bend the rules to fit the architecture of Europe, while now it is clear that the architecture, the governance must adapt to fit the challenges. Essentially, this is the purpose of this research into the governance of digital policies. It starts with a theoretical and historical discussion of the actors and mechanisms behind policy design for the Internet. Not only that, it aims to provide a few pointers into how the architecture and the actors may need to change so as to improve the delivery of meaningful policies for the European citizens. The research starts with a reconstruction of the main ideas surrounding governance as a means of interaction between actors in the European Union (EU). This research is in congruence with the view of governance

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as a model for building actions towards reaching common objectives, actions which are performed by multiple types of actors at different levels—supranational, national, and sub-national. As the research focuses more on the functioning of the European Union with regard to digital policies, the theoretical assumption is that the EU is a polity with different actors intervening at different levels of the decision-making process. To pursue this assumption further, the research engages two governance theories, namely the framework of experimentalist governance and Multilevel Governance (MLG), so as to identify the learning process behind policy decision-making and implementation on the multiple levels in Europe. The role of MLG is to provide justification for a greater involvement of local and regional authorities within digital policies, showing with certain examples that they are encouraged by the EU to grow their involvement, but they can also feed expertise in the policy-making cycle. On the other hand, the experimentalist framework governance is useful to explain the constant policy revisions necessary for digital policies and to illustrate the fluid relations between the national and European levels. The historical discussion stretches between the advent of the research and technological development policy from the Single European Act to the Digital Single Market, and it is mainly designed to explore the balance between the national and European levels and their role in the fate of information technology policies. Although Member States have their own preferences, it is up to the European level to create a proper legislative framework and a proper mechanism to tackle digital challenges properly. In this sense, this research also deals with the idea of regulation, where the control of MS is more active in the decision-making process, and with coordination, where the EU is able to involve other actors, such as sub-national authorities, businesses, and experts. Also, there is another focus on the Europeanization of digital policies, on the growing European supremacy in policy design and implementation with strategies, such as the Digital Single Market strategy. One sign of the growing Europeanization is the development of regulatory authorities that work at the EU level to oversee the implementation of legislation, as well as the development of a network of independent regulators from each Member State. A large portion of this research is dedicated to the involvement of subnational authorities in decision-making and implementation of policies. Their involvement is a sign of their empowerment as full-fledged actors and their presence is paramount to policy domains, such as R&D or innovation. This is where the European Union provides the biggest boost

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for them. At the same time, this research will also pursue other avenues by which they can grow their influence in digital policies, featuring examples from Darmstadt, Germany’s first digital city and Transylvania Digital Innovation Hub. Finally, the research asks another question regarding the possible advancement towards a digital competence of the Union. This is a tricky question, given that it unveils some of the complicated mechanisms employed by the Union to design digital policies, one of which is active regulation. The other refers to the coordination of actors towards a common set of goals, but coordination does not feature enforcement. The idea of a specific competence would give more power to the Union to decide on regulations, funding, research, etc., which the EU definitely needs, considering the complicated decision-making process. It would not guarantee success automatically. What would guarantee a bigger success would be a clearer governance framework and this is what this research is proposing. This research would not have been possible without the research activity undergone within the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe in Lausanne, which facilitated the access to the Jacques Delors archives that opened the historical perspective of digital policies. Moreover, as this research focuses also on local entities, active discussions with directly involved parties were extremely valuable for this endeavour. I am grateful for the fruitful discussion with interested parties within the Darmstadt Digital City project. Oradea, Romania

Mirela M˘arcu¸t

Contents

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Theoretical Framework Introduction EU Governance in a Nutshell Experimentalist Governance Multilevel Governance (MLG) Conclusion References

1 1 4 14 17 18 19

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Digital Policies: Past and Present Introduction Beginnings of Digital Policies in the EEC/EU National vs. European in the Evolution of Digital Policies Conclusion References

21 21 22 38 59 59

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The Governance of Digital Policies Introduction Trends in the Governance Model of Digital Policies Experimentalist Governance Framework for Digital Policies The Multiple Levels of Actors in Digital Policies A New Model of Governance for Digital Policies Conclusion References

65 66 66 76 87 119 122 122 ix

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Conclusion: Towards a New Competence for the Union?

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Index

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List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Responsibility of actors for eEurope measures (Source Own composition based on Commission of the European Communities [2000] and European Commission [2002]) DIHs in the EU by identified regional scope (Source Own composition based on Smart Specialization Platform [2018b]) Structural funding for digital challenges. Breakdown by MS (Source Own composition based on Smart Specialization Platform [2018c])

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1

Overview of governance mechanisms of eEurope and DAE Challenges and projects of Darmstadt—digital city

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CHAPTER 1

Theoretical Framework

Abstract This chapter aims to create the theoretical framework that serves as the model for the analysis of digital policies in the European Union. Starting with a brief discussion on governance in general and European governance in particular, the chapter focuses on two theories that can provide insights into the interaction between actors, into their preferences, as well as into possible solutions for an improved governance mechanism for digital policies in the European Union. Keywords Digital policies · Governance · European governance

Introduction Cyberspace has been the backdrop of difficult discussions over the recent years both on the global stage and within the European Union (EU). Cyberspace or the digital space is nowadays quite different than it was two decades ago. On the global stage, the main topics concern privacy and security, followed by the phenomenon of fake news, while the European topics are concerned also with the socio-economic aspects related to a unified digital space across the EU. No matter the topic, digital issues trickle down to each and every individual and, conversely, each and every level of authority.

© The Author(s) 2020 M. M˘arcu¸t, The Governance of Digital Policies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38073-1_1

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The pervasiveness of information and communication technologies (ICTs) can act as a double-edged sword for individuals and authorities. Individuals can be empowered or can be a part of the digital divide. Those with digital skills and access to high technology have better chances in today’s digital society, while those that are a part of the digital divide, in either form, risk continued exclusion from society. Similarly, public authorities must answer to individuals’ and businesses’ challenges by pursuing well-thought strategies to push for digitization and the overall transformation of the economy engulfed in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Recently, national and European authorities have pursued public policies meant to mitigate the threats from the digital space, while creating strategies meant to harness the massive potential of ICTs in society and economy. The decision level that is closest to the individual, the subnational level, is also involved on its own in this effort, but in its own manner and more often with no direct coordination with the other two levels. In the context of the pervasiveness of ICTs and the efforts to build a unified digital space by the EU, the interaction between the abovementioned decision-making levels is shifting. Of course, we can no longer discuss a state-centric model, as defined by Hooghe and Marks. The governance model for the EU has shifted when discussing digital policies, as their evolution points to a gradual shift to the European level (M˘arcu¸t 2017). The Digital Single Market is a relevant example for this point, as it is an effort to create a harmonized European framework for digital markets. In this sense, this research aims to assess the extent to which local or sub-national authorities are involved in the digital policy-making. Why the sub-national level? Firstly, they are the closest official entities to the individual and the digital revolution must start at the roots, which are sub-national authorities in this case. Secondly, the involvement of sub-national authorities is a feature of the EU governance model that can create greater value for European integration as a whole. Thirdly, the advancement towards a unified digital space requires policies at all decision-making levels. The theoretical framework of this research, which is to be presented in this chapter, concerns two governance models. The first refers to the architecture of experimentalist governance, explained in multiple papers by Sabel and Zeitlin and which has been adapted for other policies, such as environmental policy or data protection. The second framework delves deeper into the accepted plurality of actors involved in the functioning

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of the EU, as the research aims to empower sub-national actors in digital policies with the help of multilevel governance (MLG). The theoretical source for the MLG framework is the research done by Hooghe and Marks. Why two theoretical outlooks? Both theories regard the EU as a polity and deal with the inner workings of decision-making rather than aiming to provide an overview of the future of European integration. The benefits of the experimentalist framework are that it reflects a “learning by doing” approach to policy-making. This idea is valid for digital policies in the sense that technological innovation has the potential of constantly changing the playing field and, hence, the policies. On the other hand, the benefits of MLG are two-fold. Firstly, they empower the European level, liberating the EU level from the constraint of being merely an agent of Member States (MS). Secondly, they empower local and regional authorities by including them in the governance cycle. Both theories can contribute to better decision-making and implementation as regards digital issues. Experimentalist governance explores mainly the relation between the central and local units—the European level versus the national level. One shortcoming of experimentalist governance may refer to the fact that the European level seems secondary to the decision-making process of national actors, despite its control powers that the authors mention. In this sense, the MLG framework contributes to the theoretical analysis of the paper by putting more emphasis also on the supranational level, which does not merely act as an agent of the national preferences (Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 3). One of the keywords in Hooghe and Marks’ analysis of the supranational level is its ability to act as an “independent” policy-making entity. In this framework, the EU can act more as a facilitator with abilities to control agents’ performance. MLG regards the EU as a full-fledged polity that can act independently. This chapter begins by offering a brief outlook at governance with a focus on the EU with references from the literature, then it moves on to focus more on the two theoretical outlooks that form the core of the research.

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EU Governance in a Nutshell Defining Governance The literature emphasizes the often-vague character of governance. In this sense, a brief discussion about what governance is not can be helpful. Firstly, the concept was derived from government, but it has become an alternative to it because it challenges the traditional authority lines of government. The government means the state and the theory of governance affirms that new policy challenges require a different architecture, one that can go beyond the state, but not necessarily outside the state framework (Kjaer 2010, p. 111). Secondly, it is not a singular theory aiming to explain policy in totality, precisely because of challenging issues (Levi-Faur 2012, p. 33). Bartolini provides two similar antagonisms of governance, one referring to the idea of governmental control and the second one referring to dealings between private actors that have no consequences beyond them. As a result, the literature provides a preliminary definition of governance as a normative system situated between the constraints of governmental bureaucracy and private interactions (Bartolini 2011, p. 7). This preliminary definition leaves room for various discussions on governance and, in this sense, the prime feature of governance is fluidity. Why fluidity? Firstly, governance is tasked with analysing the interactions of actors when aiming to achieve a policy result. This interaction takes the form of negotiation and, hence, governance can be seen as a means of facilitating agreement with the help of negotiation between actors (Ion 2013, p. 78). Levi-Faur argues that the emergence of governance has been signalled by a series of changes in the distribution of authority, resulting in several spheres of authority that can either cooperate or be in competition with each other (Levi-Faur 2012). Bartolini’s explanation of governance as a frame concept describes a fluid system of norm production where there is a lot of variation. The identity of the actors involved in the so-called co-production is not only dichotomous, divided into private and public actors, but rather there is room for innovative decision-making entities resulted from various shifts (Bartolini 2011, p. 8). One such entity could be the EU. In this sense, institutional transformation can be one of the keys to understanding governance, in general, and European governance in particular. The polity has constantly evolved across the decades and it has done so with the creation and/or transformation of institutions at various levels. Transformation involves innovation in decision-making in various directions—top

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to bottom, bottom towards the upper level or side by side (Levi-Faur 2012). Governance is the umbrella term for these institutional transformations within an entity or between entities, transformations which create also new forms of interaction. The resulting mechanisms are more fluid than the traditional government and, supporters argue, are better for decision-making. Hence, the entity suffering most of these transformations is the state, whose traditional mechanisms of decision-making from top to bottom, have been shifted in various ways depending on the policy that is tackled. However, this does not mean that the state is obsolete, given that governance research is not focused on the evolution of the state, rather on the way in which policies are decided and implemented. In fact, according to some researchers referenced by Kjaer, policy-making implies a movement beyond the state rather than a cancellation of the role of the state and moving beyond it (Kjaer 2010, p. 111). The state is still a player in policy-making but, given the fluidity of governance styles, it must share its competences with other players that have a stake in decision-making. This opinion is shared also by Bartolini, who states that the role of the state in governance is no longer fixed, but it still remains a key player in the production of norms (Bartolini 2011, p. 9). What else experiences fluidity in governancing ? The level of interaction is also subject to variety, which can range from a simple consultation to participation in the effective decision-making process (Bartolini 2011, pp. 9–10). The multiplication of actors means that their roles change constantly depending on the type of policy or intervention. In the case of the EU, Wallace argues that there is a distribution of role in policy-making, which is agreed upon and activated with the help of the treaties regulating the relation between the EU and the state and other types of legislations (Wallace et al. 2010). What are the directions of these distributions of authority? Levi-Faur discusses three major directions: upward, downward, and horizontally (Levi-Faur 2012, p. 31). The upward distribution of authority refers to the creation of new spheres at the transnational, intergovernmental or global level. The downward distribution considers granting more authority to the local and regional spheres, while the horizontal dissemination focuses on a new type of actors involved in governance for the sake of transparency, such as private actors or the civil society. This dissemination can take place in different directions for the same entity. In the case of the EU, these shifts have taken place at all levels. Local authorities have

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been empowered within the cohesion policy, while some competences have shifted to the supranational level, in the cases of monetary policy for instance. The fluidity of governance can also be a drawback in some instances. In the case of this research, institutional transformation is ongoing for the EU, either in the form of more integration or in withdrawal to the national level in case of certain policies. Either way, the interaction between various levels can change across time. In this case, the analysis can be performed only a snapshot portraying how actors communicate with each other at a defined point in time on a specific piece of policy. The mechanisms between actors are not established and can be altered as the policy purposes evolve. This is the case of the EU in general, and it can be the case for digital policies in particular, especially considering that this specific policy area has only been prioritized in recent years. Having this drawback in mind, it is still valuable to analyse this snapshot of EU governance as a testament to its evolution and as a means of providing valuable insights into how digital policies, in this case, can benefit from a more fluid interaction between public or private actors. Categorizing Governance In the spirit of the fluidity of this concept, Levi-Faur designates four instances of governance: governance as a structure, governance as a process, governance as a mechanism, and governance as a strategy (Levi-Faur 2012, p. 32). As a structure, governance focuses on the architecture of institutions or actors involved in the policy-making process. More specifically, it looks at how institutions are built to perform and cooperate with others. As a process, governance reflects the dynamics and the interactions between actors in the decision-making process. This facet of governance reflects the idea that institutions or actors transform themselves by enhancing or limiting their jurisdictions in various policy scenarios. This means, as Levi-Faur argues, that there is no set and definitive set of steps and institutions to be involved in decision-making. As a mechanism, governance focuses on the actual steps taken to involve actors and elicit their preferences that result in a policy decision. For instance, the EU has several governance mechanisms at its disposal, the most used of which is the ordinary legislative procedure.

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Finally, governance as a strategy reflects the preferences of actors involved in negotiation and discusses their efforts to impose their preferences. Even if collaboration and negotiation are the main interactions between actors, they are influenced by the preferences of actors involved in the process (Levi-Faur 2012, pp. 32–34). The literature on EU governance is extremely rich considering the uniqueness of this entity and even if the research refers strictly to governance as a theory, the EU is introduced as a case study, example, or illustration of different modes of governance. The reason behind this resides in the idea of institutional transformation, as the European integration process has been the epitome of this concept in the past decades. However, as the literature suggests, the discussion on European governance does not deal directly with institutional transformation, it deals with the interaction between new actors resulted from this transformation in the policy-making process. European Governance The four facets of governance presented above demonstrate the fluid and overreaching aspects surrounding governance, as well as the multitude of changes brought about by shifts from governing to “governancing” (Levi-Faur 2012, p. 33). These facets can be understood better if we appeal to the power of example and the best example to do so is the EU. In order to do so, it is also relevant to present a definition of governance given by the European Commission in the White Paper on European Governance: “Governance means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence” (Commission of the European Communities 2001, p. 8). This definition highlights the principles by which the EU abides in relation to other actors involved in decision-making, either private or public ones. Most importantly, it also features three of the four facets emphasized by Levi-Faur in his later work: rules, processes, and behaviour. Rules relate to the idea of governance as a mechanism, processes to the same idea of governance as a process, while behaviour reflects the idea that actors have certain strategies in the whole process that are aimed at promoting their preferences. The idea of structure is missing from the European definition of governance, but one can argue that it reflects the notion that the EU is a structure that is constantly evolving due to the pace of integration.

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Hence, this latter definition of governance focuses more on the interactions and preferences of actors involved in decision-making than on the structure of institutions. The principles of governance presented in the White Paper do not mention the existence of a hierarchy within the governance of the Union. For instance, the principle of participation states that “the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation” (Commission of the European Communities 2001, p. 10). Indeed, the existence of a hierarchy would go against the idea of governance and it does not exist under a hard form in the EU. The principle of participation reflects the idea that more actors need to be involved in the policy process so that the results fair better. Hence, one of the hallmarks of governance in general and in the EU in particular refers to the interaction of actors in a non-hierarchic manner. This is what Kjaer references when stating that governance has not moved above the state in higher ranks, but has gone beyond it by involving different players at different levels. The types of shifts appearing in governance— upward, downwards, or horizontally—do not create a hierarchic order in the EU, but rather empower actors at various levels to take on certain responsibilities. More specifically, the EU institutions have not become hierarchically superior to the states, but rather they function in a partnership to pursue certain goals. Depending on the goals though, one or another takes centre stage. For instance, the state is still responsible for its fiscal policy, while the European Commission assumes an advisory role. Reversely, the EU institutions are responsible for monetary policy for instance and the European Central Bank regulates the monetary policy of the Eurozone states. This section will tackle the way in which the literature reflects the idea of European governance in terms of the rules, processes, and behaviour. European governance is circumscribed more often within the idea of “new governance”. One source of “new governance” refers to the changes caused by globalization, which require new regulation regimes and innovative means of cooperating to tackle international challenges. Again, the prime example to illustrate this idea is the EU, as the first attempts of collaboration to solve major international issues, such as the elimination of war or the restart of the European economy, meant that new forms of interaction between states had to be created. One of the first entities to do that was the European Economic Community. The

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2001 White Paper on European Governance is an illustration of “new governance”. The principles illustrated in this document reference a fluid decision-making process, which recognizes the legitimacy of multiple levels and actors along with the MS with no visible hierarchy. New governance references the innovative aspects of the European integration project, which has resulted in a hybrid system that is neither a form of federalism or a simply intergovernmentalism. “Old governance” would refer to the top-bottom decision-making process, while “new governance” entails the creation of horizontal networks meant to contribute to the production of norms (Kjaer 2010, pp. 110–111). Other researchers focus on a slightly different term to illustrate innovation in governance, namely by using the ideas of new modes of governance’ (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011, p. 49). This term relates more to the evolution of the EU and the authors suggest that its development has been caused by the attempts to foster European markets and by the increasing number of participants in these markets due to the enlargement of the EU (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011, p. 49). The actual definition given by them points to the idea of fluidity of mechanisms and processes, emphasizing a wide policy-making effort helped by a multitude of new actors, either public or private ones, which interact in various manners outside the traditional governmental mechanisms. They tie this concept strictly to the idea of regulation as a means of creating a new market. In the case of this research, the focus is on creating the Digital Single Market using regulation that can be decided and implemented with various mechanisms ranging from the decision-making process to delegating these responsibilities to a network of regulatory authorities. Hence, although it does not seem, we must make a distinction between new governance and new modes of governance. New governance can refer to the system of governance as a whole. Using Levi-Faur’s categorization of governance, it refers to the overall structure of a system of institutions and actors that find new ways of solving problems and interacting with each other. On the other hand, new modes of governance refer to the other two categories of governance: a mechanism and a process. In their paper, Héritier and Lehmkuhl discuss six such examples, all of which could be included within Levi-Faur’s three categories. The six modes are applied specifically to the EU within a variety of policies, demonstrating once again that governance in this space is highly fluid and it is objective-oriented. New modes of governance, such as dispute resolution, benchmarking, regulatory oversight, and self-regulation, could be

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circumscribed to the idea that governance is a mechanism, considering that they are actual steps taken to involve actors and elicit their preferences. On the other hand, tripartite policy-making and comitology, could be circumscribed to the idea of governance as a process, more exactly describing the dynamics between actors in the policy-making process. Let us take regulatory oversight as an example of a mechanism meant to contribute to the creation of digital policies in the EU. In this field, regulation is key for the success of technological policies, especially when there is a pan-European effort to create a Digital Single Market. In this sense, the EU has two choices, either to create a single EU authority that is superior to national ones or to foster a network of national bodies. Two examples come to mind in this respect, namely BEREC and ENISA. ENISA is an EU-wide centre for network and information security, established in 2004, but which has received strengthened powers due to the NIS directive and due to the Cybersecurity Act, which has been adopted in April 2019 (European Parliament. Legislative Observatory 2019). Hence, it has slowly become an EU institution with the power of oversight across the MS. Its role is to contribute to the creation of an EU cybersecurity umbrella. On the other hand, BEREC has a more consultative role and acts as a forum for national regulatory authorities (BEREC 2015). These mechanisms are a part of the idea of new governance, they are an illustration of the loose connections between actors in the activity of norm production. These two examples are also illustrations of the idea of institutional transformation and of the emerging governance of the Digital Single Market, which is one of the objectives of this research. Héritier and Lehmkuhl also detail some of the root causes for the emergence of such new modes of governance. They are relevant in the sense that they drive the discussion towards the emergence of digital policies and the researchers mention four possible explanations. All four revert back to the idea of fluidity and institutional transformations that are some of the hallmarks of governance, but, at the same time, they focus on actor preferences. The first and probably most obvious root cause is the accepted need for more expertise in areas that are rather technical and require a wide consensus on the part of actors. In this sense, the traditional forms of government might relinquish their authority and open discussions with sources of expertise in order to provide regulation for more complex areas, such as energy or environmental issues (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011, p. 54). The second one refers to the preferences of

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private actors of not wanting to be subjected to regulation. It can be considered a way of bypassing or at least mitigating regulation by submitting to self-regulation (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011, p. 55). The third root cause is inspired by a willingness to subject themselves to regulation by national actors, but also by a reluctance to lose competences in favour of the European institutions. The authors view it as a second-best solution after the ideal way of the community method (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011, p. 56). Finally, the fourth root cause is the necessity to improve the way in which regulation is implemented at the national level. The national specificities are still at work and the engagement of specialized actors in the process can contribute to a successful implementation and adaptation at the national level (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011, p. 57). The question to be asked is which of these root causes can be applied to this emerging digital policy? This question will be explored further, but it is rather obvious that technology requires expertise both to create the technical aspects related to market integration (i.e. standardization and interoperability) and to allow the market to thrive by pushing forward innovation and technological development. At the same time, when talking about national specificities to digital challenges in the EU, the involvement of new modes of governance or new types of actors might seem mandatory. In this sense, we refer mostly to the fragmentation that still exists as regards digital transformation, digital skills, or e-government. The responsibility lies here directly with the Member State, with some assistance from the EU level. However, such new forms of interaction among actors could help improve the performance of MS. Hierarchy, Shadow of Hierarchy or Governance Mix? The above-mentioned root causes of new modes of governance in the EU relate to alternative means of achieving policy results when there is no clear-cut manner of pursuing hard legislation. Is this the case for digital policies in the EU? Recent evidence shows us that there is hard legislation already being implemented. This would mean that there is a sign of hierarchy within the EU as regards digital issues. Some of the most recent pieces of legislation would point to this idea, especially considering the regulations, such as GDPR or the future e-Privacy regulation, as they clearly state a supranational regulatory regime. However, this is only one part of the discussion in digital policies, considering that vast territory that this term covers. In this sense, it is wise to provide a quick theoretical overview of some of the manners in which EU governance can manifest

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itself. This can serve as a foundation for the two frameworks used to argue for a governance model for digital policies and for the involvement of local actors in the process. Although by definition European governance does not entail the superiority of the EU in front of other actors, the literature mentions a series of instances related to the interaction of actors within the EU. One author identifies three types of interactions, namely hierarchy, competition system or market, and network (Börzel 2012, p. 567). This section will focus more on hierarchy and networks, which are more specific to the digital policies. Two key terms are important when discussing the mechanisms and the structure of European governance. One refers to the idea of the shadow of hierarchy and the second is the idea of policy networks. They are also the systems that can point to the empowerment of local authorities in the production or implementation of norms. A hierarchical system entails interactions among public actors, while others might have diverse interactions. At the same time, hierarchy refers to a structure of governance, wherein the main actor delivers decisions, pieces of laws and regulations that are mandatory to some extent, while it is the duty of the other actors to implement them. Hence, the main interaction is controlled and usually, decisions are taken within a topbottom system. On the other hand, a network system or “network governance” is a less institutionalized manner of interaction among actors, emphasizing the willingness of actors to contributing to a proper policy result. It does not have a truly mandatory character and, of course, there is no hierarchy. The literature identifies two types of networks: policy communities and task-based networks (Ion 2013, p. 129). The focus here is on the task at hand, either a large or a narrow one, rather than on the position of the actors in a hierarchical system. Indeed, there is a distribution of roles within networks, but communication is fluid. In EU policy-making, the researchers agree that a network-based system of governance can be the key for successful policies that are adapted to the diverse EU space. Actually, the EU integration process is considered a driver of the development of policy networks in Europe and, vice versa, networks could drive Europeanization (Ion 2013, p. 150). Others refer to network governance as the involvement of private actors in the policy process and assume that it is a very rare occurrence, considering that the major policy results are decided by governmental actors (Börzel 2012, p. 567). However, networks are also the result of cooperation of national regulatory agencies or

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specialized expert groups. Are networks similar to the new modes of governance referenced above? Networks are more result-oriented and require an exchange of expertise, while the new modes of governance focus more on the involvement of actors in different manners so as not to create a hierarchical system. Of course, both modes resent hierarchy and are created by the need to draft more expertise into a policy. The question that seems to find no answer in literature is the following: what type of governance does the EU use? This is a highly debatable issue, as it is highly dependent on the type of policy discussed. Considering the variety of policies, it is highly difficult to craft a single EU governance style. Researchers usually point to a combination of mechanisms and processes. Others discuss the idea that the EU is not creating a “hard” hierarchy among actors, but rather it is putting forward a “shadow of hierarchy” (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011). Does this suggest that there is a hierarchy within the European policy-making process? In this sense, Wallace focuses on the idea of the distribution of multiple roles in the regulation process, with no direct hierarchy among the actors (Wallace et al. 2010, pp. 29–34). This point of view regards actors as working towards achieving a goal, without any superior power among them. Each has its own competence on the matter and they are not really interchangeable. However, the EU has a legislative procedure, namely the ordinary legislative procedure, which creates some version of a hierarchy, with the Commission as the promoter of legislation and the Council and the Parliament as the negotiators. However, there are other actors behind the two institutions providing input, expertise or actually contributing to the implementation of the rules. In this sense, there is indeed a “shadow of hierarchy”, in the sense that the final actors deciding of hard legislation are the ones at the European level. It is not a hard rule written in the treaties, but the same treaties settle the types of competences that can create a shadow of hierarchy among actors. These are the exclusive and shared competences. At the same time, Héritier and Lehmkuhl explain that the shadow of hierarchy could be a threat to some actors, as it means that the EU has the ability to intervene and create hard legislation on certain matters that influence private or public entities. In this sense, they reference the new modes of governance as alternatives to policy-making in the shadow of hierarchy. Finally, there is another argument in the favour of the existence of this shadow and it refers to the ability of the EU level to empower actors to cooperate in different stages in the policy cycle. The architecture

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of the cohesion policy empowers local and regional authorities, the regulatory policies empower certain specialized agencies in various domains, such as ENISA, BEREC or the newly created European Public Prosecutor’s Office. They are created by virtue of hard legislation and their involvement in the policy process is also negotiated between the EU and the national levels. In conclusion, one cannot clearly crystallize an overall type of governance for the EU, as it is highly dependent on fluidity and institutional transformation. There is high variety in sectoral policies, each with its own governance style and range of actors involved. Hence, the EU is characterized by a governance mix, which varies depending on the type of competence and the extent to which the MS are involved (Börzel 2012). Börzel establishes that the shadow of hierarchy is weaker or absent when the Council has the prerogative to decide by unanimity or when the open method of coordination is at play. For the purposes of this research, we assume that the EU functions as a governance mix, balancing competition with coordination among actors and establishing a model or a mode as it evolves. The best example of the idea is the subject of this research, digital policies, a domain that has been developing along with the expansion of technology in the lives of European citizens. How do actors interact within digital policies? What can be done to improve the mix of methods in implementing digital policies? The theoretical framework of this research makes use of two theories to help answer this question and to argue in favour of a more local approach to digital policies, by empowering local and/or regional authorities. They are presented briefly in the following sections and will be expanded and applied in the following chapters.

Experimentalist Governance The normative level of the analysis focuses more on the relations between actors within the EU. In this sense, several conceptualizations of governance are useful for this analysis, namely MLG, network governance, as well as “governance without government”. These concepts focus on the relations between the actors involved in governance process and can be used as a starting point in the analysis of digital policies. The utility of these frameworks of governance stems from objective of the research to formulate a possible model of digital policies governance in the EU. Are the actors involved in networks? Are there hierarchies (either formal or

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not) involved? How exactly do institutions coordinate? These questions have been addressed at the theoretical level in this chapter. This section will delve more into frameworks of research on governance, namely experimentalist governance and MLG. These two theories will help provide the baseline and will help explain the current status of digital policy governance, as well as a possible future, in Chapters 2 and 3. Experimentalist governance is a model of Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, which has been elaborated in recent years in several publications. The assumption of such a framework reflects the above-mentioned idea that EU is a polity, but focuses more on the mechanisms of interaction between actors rather than advancing a theory of integration. In their views, decision-making in the EU is deliberative and informal, taking place within a multilevel system with no hierarchy (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p. 2). Deliberation takes place because of this type of interaction, where there are considerable differences between states. When these differences are translated into policy goals at the central level, they are a result of informal discussions to resolve differences. Indeed, the informal character of this type of governance refers to the discussions, not to the institutions (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p. 4). For the EU, interinstitutional negotiations on certain pieces of legislation are a fine example of this mechanism. Lastly, the multilevel character of experimentalist governance reflects the relation between the EU and the MS, given that both have their own responsibilities and autonomy, but the system only functions properly when the two collaborate (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p. 4). The two authors explain the conditions for experimentalist governance to emerge. One is the lack of certainty regarding the goals to be pursued. The authors argue that the components of the system learn about goals while working to achieve them. This is certainly the case considering the ever-changing ecosystem of digital issues, which are horizontal across policy fields, while also being constantly transformative. Cooperation at the supranational level is necessary to acquire sufficient knowledge in order to be able to tackle digital policy goals. For digital policies, one example is the challenges of online platforms gaining more and more importance in the digital space. This issue has arisen only in recent years, as it was not present in the former Digital Agenda Europe and the EU must now learn the dynamics of such entities. The second condition regards the existence of several actors with various levels of authority that do not interact in a hierarchy but as several decision-making poles (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p. 9). The actual architecture of the EU reflects this idea, as cooperation between the two levels,

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European and national, is a mandatory condition for delivering the Digital Single Market. This is a unified regulatory space, which does not render the national level useless, but whose goal is to bring the digital markets of all MS under one regulatory umbrella for more overall economic and social gains. Due to these characteristics, the components of this system, the EU and the MS, collaborate in several stages to create proper policies (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012, p. 3). According to the two authors, the first step relates to the definition of broad goals, which are decided by central and local units in conjunction with stakeholders. This step is not really deliberative, but it is based on a broad consultation of all interested parties. In the second step, the MS pursue their own decisions to set goals, which can be in the form of strategies or laws. This does not exclude the action of the EU in relation to certain policy goals, especially considering the fact that, in the third step, the lower authorities must report on their progress to the European level. Finally, the final step regards the evaluation of the process in a collaborative environment, which can also be extended to integrate new types of actors. The theoretical outlook of experimentalist governance may render the EU invisible in this cycle, but the central unit is indispensable in all steps considering its verification powers and its commitment to create a transnational policy with the help of the national level. The inner workings of digital policies in the EU can be better understood with the help of the experimentalist governance framework. Firstly, although the EU legislates on the Digital Single Market, it relies heavily on MS to pursue their own customized goals for advancing the digital economy and society at the national level. Secondly, the two levels share powers and they must work to synchronize their efforts so that the goals are transformed into policy results. For instance, each MS has a national strategy for digital issues that feeds into the overall European strategy, either the former Digital Agenda for Europe or the current Digital Single Market strategy. The EU tracks their efforts within the yearly Digital Economy and Society Index in an attempt to provide more impetus to national efforts. The framework will be applied in depth in the following chapters, by exploring the relations between the European and national levels in digital policies and assessing the learning process that this framework implies.

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Multilevel Governance (MLG) The second theoretical framework to be applied within the research reflects yet another recent tendency of the EU, namely to involve more actors within the governance process. This issue has been emphasized in the experimentalist governance theory and takes place within the final stage of the cycle of governance, where more actors should be involved for better policy results. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks are the theoreticians of this framework of MLG, defining it in comparison with statecentric governance (Marks et al. 1996). The alternative to this traditional style is entitled MLG and entails the sharing of authority at multiple decision-making levels, under the assumption that state sovereignty has been diluted within the supranational system. Hence, this theory shares this assumption with experimentalist governance, but it adds another layer, namely the introduction of sub-national actors within the policy process. Experimentalist governance explores mainly the relation between the central and local units—the European level versus the national level. One shortcoming of experimentalist governance may refer to the fact that the European level seems secondary to the decision-making process of national actors, despite its control powers that the authors mention. In this sense, the MLG framework contributes to the theoretical analysis of the paper by putting more emphasis also on the supranational level, which does not merely act as an agent of the national preferences (Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 3). One of the keywords in Hooghe and Marks’ analysis of the supranational level is its ability to act as an independent policy-making entity. Sabel and Zeitlin explain that principal (EU)—agent (MS) relations are not possible within the EU, as actors have to learn on their own about the problem in the very process of problem-solving. In this framework, the EU can act more as a facilitator with abilities to control agents’ performance. MLG regards the EU as a full-fledged polity than can act independently. Moreover, its independence provides the EU with the opportunity of lifting other relevant actors within the policy process. These are subnational entities—either local or regional authorities—who are even closer to the citizen and have an important say in decision-making and implementation. The authors state that the national level is indispensable to the functioning of the EU, but their role is not to assume the entire decisionmaking for themselves. Their new role regards sharing the control with other entities of the activities within their territories (Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 4).

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The path analysed by this research reflects decision-making and implementation within the EU. This last stop is where sub-national authorities are relevant, as European decision must be brought closer to the citizen. Regional or local institutions have become relevant actors in this multilevel mechanism in two manners. First, they implement new norms closes to the individual. Secondly, the European level empowers them with the help of structural funds and other types of support. The aim of this research is to build on this MLG framework to analyse the presence of such sub-national institutions within the digital policy process. We aim to answer questions related to the importance of these entities within the implementation of digital policy objectives and to evaluate whether they must be more involved in the agenda setting or decision-making processes. The MLG framework is useful for the exploration of the role that local/regional authorities play within digital policies, which has not been approached extensively in literature.

Conclusion The focus of this chapter has been the outline of the current discussions on EU governance in order to be able to place digital policies properly in the governance mix. The EU functions as a mix of governance modes that have been created due to the shifts caused by globalization and to the integration process within the continent. The increasingly complicated issues that the EU must face can be tackled better by empowering more actors and creating more fluid forms of policy. In digital policies, the focus is on market integration, namely the proper functioning of the Digital Single Market. Hence, the governance mix favours regulatory aspects, from new types of authorities to new modes of governance, such as comitology or regulatory oversight. However, there are challenges that must be tackled in a more flexible manner, which are currently pursued within a coordination framework in the EU. This chapter has also delved into two theories that will be applied to provide more fluidity to digital policies, namely experimentalist governance and MLG, in order to create a clear framework for the study of actor interactions in digital policies. Special acknowledgement is necessary for the Jean Monnet Foundation in Lausanne for the access to the Jacques Delors archives.

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References Bartolini, S. (2011). New Modes of European Governance: An Introduction. In A. Héritier & M. Rhodes (Eds.), New Modes of Governance in Europe: Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy (pp. 1–18). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. BEREC. (2015). What Is BEREC? https://berec.europa.eu/eng/about_berec/ what_is_berec/. Accessed 18 July 2019. Börzel, T. A. (2012). The European Union—A Unique Governance Mix? In The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Commission of the European Communities. (2001). European Governance: A White Paper. European Parliament. Legislative Observatory. (2019). Procedure File: 2017/0225(COD) | Legislative Observatory | European Parliament. https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do? reference=2017/0225(COD)&l=en. Accessed 8 May 2019. Héritier, A., & Lehmkuhl, D. (2011). Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy: New Modes of Governance in Regulation. In A. Héritier & M. Rhodes (Eds.), New Modes of Governance in Europe: Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy (pp. 48–74). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multilevel Governance and European Integration. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Ion, O. A. (2013). Guvernant, a în Uniunea European˘a. Abord˘ari actuale [Governance in the European Union. Current Approaches]. Ias, i: Polirom. Kjaer, A. M. (2010). Guvernant, a [Governance]. Cluj Napoca: CA Publishing. Levi-Faur, D. (2012). From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”? Oxford: Oxford University Press. M˘arcut, , M. (2017). Crystalizing the EU Digital Policy: An Exploration into the Digital Single Market. Cham: Springer. Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Blank, K. (1996). European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 341–378. Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (Eds.). (2010). Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin J. (2012). Experimentalist Governance. In Oxford Handbook of Governance (24p.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace, H., Pollack, M., & Young, A. R. (2010). Elaborarea politicilor in Uniunea European˘a [Policy-Making in the European Union], 6th edn. Bucharest: Institutul European.

CHAPTER 2

Digital Policies: Past and Present

Abstract This chapter provides a historical outlook on how digital policies and other previous technology-related policies have developed ever since the introduction of the research and technological development (RTD) policy. By pinpointing major milestones in this evolution, the chapter uncovers the relationship between policy objectives and decisionmaking based on different actor preferences. The dynamics between the national and European levels are at the centre of this analysis, with a thorough analysis of official documents that can shed a light on their evolving preferences and mechanisms. Keywords Research and technological development policy · Information society · Open method of coordination

Introduction The theoretical framework of the previous chapter has revealed some of the main pathways to be followed by this research. Its outlook towards the interactions between actors using the two perspectives has created a foundation for further investigation. The purpose of this chapter is to build on the theoretical framework in order to explore the evolution of governance in digital policies. What has

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been the rapport between the European and national levels? Can we discuss sub-national priorities in this aspect? From a governance perspective, what type of interactions are observable? Do they differ on different segments of this horizontal policy? Thus, we discuss about a focus on actors in policy-making. Previous research has focused on the discourses, on policy priorities and drivers of such prioritization and it has revealed that the beginnings of digital policies can be traced back to the Delors era of the European Commission, when research and technological development (RTD) became an official policy of the Union and framework programmes sought to advance research and technology in Europe (M˘arcu¸t 2017). The incentives were the gaps in terms of productivity and technological deployment compared to international competitors. At the same time, the developing pace of integration in Europe has helped prioritize technology over the years, but still there is no official governance framework for such policy initiatives. The actor-based approach is justified due to the fact that the digital technologies and innovation have substantially changed the social and economic environment, while the actors have remained fairly constant and have changed only as a result of subsequent efforts for further European integration. How has their interaction developed along with the progress of EU integration? The actors interact based on the competences attributed to them or on the basis of their legitimacy and expertise, hence their actions are the result of their internal environment coupled with externalities and push factors. Using this actor approach, this chapter will retrieve the historical evolution towards digital policies, starting from the 1980s. It will track the involvement and actor preferences within the governance system. Secondly, this chapter aims to assess the balance between the national level and the European level in the evolution of digital policies.

Beginnings of Digital Policies in the EEC/EU The cornerstone of the integration effort that the continent has gone through after the war was the Common Market, the idea that goods and services would travel freely across borders. Although this process was not without flaws and delays, the efforts of the Delors Commission had successfully made the Common/Internal Market into reality.

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Two key issues are relevant when talking about the evolution towards digital policies. Firstly, they are strongly connected to the Single Market (M˘arcu¸t 2016). Secondly, previous research has established the policy evolution from RTD towards the information society and, eventually, the digital policies. These two policy discussions are necessary in order to establish a foundation for the involvement of actors in the evolution of digital policies. The Connection with the Internal/Single Market The sources for the connection between these policies can originate in the conceptualization of the integration process translated by the political discourse. More specifically, these policies share common sources, but they were also connected in the political agenda ever since the 1980s. The internal market policy was redesigned in the 1980s to respond to major needs of the Community space, namely liberalization and the need for more collective action from the states (M˘arcu¸t 2017, pp. 81–85). The integration effort had been stuck in a fatigue, according to Jacques Delors, who assumed a mission to create a more concrete Europe that could be felt in the daily lives of citizens (Delors 1985a, p. 3). The Common Market had existed even from the Treaty of Rome, but reality contradicted the treaty language and Delors assumed the mission of cataloguing barriers between Member States (MS) and tackling them accordingly. At the same time, he advocated for more collective action and coordination between states. He assumed concrete steps for more concrete Europe in a neofunctionalist effort to create spillover to other policy areas. Liberalization, doubled by a regulatory framework fit for purpose, were the mechanisms created at the European level to encourage economic growth. At the same time, the competitiveness gap with other global powers was also referenced as a source for more integration. These necessities have been evident also in the evolution of the digital policies towards the Digital Single Market (DSM). Jean-Claude Juncker named the DSM a priority of his Commission mandate (Juncker 2014). The preceding Commission introduced the Digital Agenda for Europe in 2010, where it discussed the need for elimination of barriers between digital markets. The priorities of the Barroso II Commission were shaped by the “extraordinary times” experienced by the Europeans in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis, which had to be tackled with various methods (Barroso 2009, pp. 1–3). The idea of strengthening digital markets

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was part of the effort to exit the crisis by creating new models for development (Barroso 2009, pp. 28–29). The political priorities of the Barroso Commission contain references to the need to “open up” the ecommerce market, a reference to the idea of liberalization, as well as the need for regulatory certainty for European networks, as well as for new businesses (Barroso 2009, pp. 21–28). Similarly, the political priorities of the Juncker Commission bear the same references to liberalization and regulation within the connected DSM, but the emphasis is more on constructing the regulatory framework, given that he lists data protection, copyright or consumer rules as the main targets for regulation within the DSM (Juncker 2014, p. 6). The political actors have also created connections between the two policies/constructions across the decades, ever since the efforts of the Delors Commission. The idea to create connections between policies signified a deeper effort for the actors to commit to further integration. From the inception of the Internal Market programme in the 1980s, the strategy of the Commission aimed to streamline the elimination of barriers, while creating connections between the internal market policy and other integration efforts of the European Union. For once, the structural policy that set out to reduce disparities between MS was one of the supporting policies for the internal market. Secondly, as Jacques Delors has repeatedly stated, there are other several policies that help reinforce the internal market. For instance, in the 1991 Programme of the European Commission, Delors argued for more concentrated and coordinated actions between policies, as well as actors. He references the need for concentrated efforts in research and technology, as well as the industry policy, which will “serve to strengthen the large frontier-free market” (Commission of the European Communities 1991, pp. 4–5). This point of view had been established ever since the beginning of the concerted efforts to rebuild the Internal Market, as it is evident from the 1987 Communication on the Delors I Package: “the establishment of a large market without internal frontiers, economic and social cohesion (in other words greater convergence as regards both the methods used and the results obtained), a common policy for scientific and technological development, the strengthening of the European Monetary System, the emergence of a European social dimension and coordinated action relating to the environment. It is easy to show that these policies have to go hand-in-hand if the single economic area is really to be achieved, which is the only outcome compatible with the overriding

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idea of European Union, as formally restated in the preamble to the Act” (Commission of the European Communities 1987, p. 2). Even as early as 1985, Delors stressed the idea of technological cooperation across borders with the proposed European Technology Community to help support technological innovation and translate its benefits to the internal market (Commission of the European Communities 1985, p. 2). The idea of a technology community made use of the Community dimension of governance as a means of bringing together various actors to a common goal. The results of such of an approach would serve to enhance the benefits of the internal market. The intertwining of policies has been clear in the speeches of European leaders even in today’s times, as Jean-Claude Juncker declared that the now digital policy should become a horizontal one to underpin all policies and sectors of the economy and society (European Commission 2015a, p. 2). Similar to the DSM Strategy, the Juncker Commission issued a strategy for the Single Market that was meant to adapt the cornerstone of the Union to the new post-crisis realities, where digital technologies would play an essential role. The measures of the DSM are mentioned across the document as means of responding to these challenges, as well as opening new opportunities in terms of cross-border e-commerce, consumer rights, or the role of online platforms (European Commission 2015b). One example where the two policies meet is cross-border e-commerce and parcel delivery across borders, more specifically it is the point of meeting between the digital space and the real space. In this respect, there are still barriers in the delivery of parcels, but an agreement for a regulation on parcel delivery rules was seen in 2017 as a “step closer to […] helping consumers and companies reap the full benefit of the EU Single Market and cross-border e-commerce within the EU” (European Commission 2017). The regulation created transparency rules so that the consumers were able to compare national and cross-border delivery rates. This is where the connection between the two policies becomes evident, namely in the existence of barriers, which have gradually been overcome in one policy, but still exist in another. Actually, the concerted cross-policy effort has become one of the solutions to these barriers. In this sense, defending the effort to tackle them with a package of regulations targeting geo-blocking, parcel delivery and consumer protection, the Commissioner for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs stated: “discrimination between EU consumers based on the objective to segment markets along national borders has no place in the Single Market.

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With clearer rules, better enforcement and more affordable cross-border parcel delivery, it will be easier for consumers and companies, especially SMEs, to make the most of the EU Single Market and the cross-border e-commerce” (European Commission 2016). As opposed to the first attempts to build connections between the internal markets and its predecessors, the current effort is not evidently towards further integration per se. It is worth mentioning that the Delors’ reforms were inscribed in the Single European Act, which provided a boost to the integration process with revised voting rules, new common policies and coordinated action. The current effort to build a DSM is a direct policy objective to be tackled with existing rules and decisionmaking mechanisms of the Union. It can be seen as an indirect effort for integration towards the digital space, a real spillover, but it has not garnered direct discussions on the next steps of integration. However, the role of the Commission has strengthened with this political priority, as the institution has taken charge on a number of issues that have no direct Union competence. The role of the Commission will be analysed in detail below. Regardless of this role, the connection between the Single Market and the DSM is evident in that the first provides policy support for the latter and it has done so even from before the inception of the DSM, when digital policies would take other forms. Finally, as emphasized by the previous examples, the connections between the internal market policy and the digital/technological policies have touched a number of various targets, from technological development to electronic commerce. This is due to the unprecedented transformations caused by technological innovation across all areas of the economy, which prompted more diverse policy approaches by the political actors in the European Union. Policy Evolution This discussion aims to provide detail to the effort meant to circumscribe the current digital policies. While it is clear that the DSM is emerging as a separate space, there are also some complementary efforts meant to boost its functioning and they become evident when mapping the policy evolution. These efforts involve other types of actors and relations, which will be highlighted across this chapter. The past thirty years have experienced a development of digital policies, from simple supporters of the Internal Market programme to a bona-fide

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horizontal issue, which has an enormous impact on other policies. This evolution has taken place due to the massive technological development in the past 30 years, which has seen the development of the World Wide Web, new business services, social media, artificial intelligence, etc. The mission of policy creators has been to design measures meant to boost development, while at the same time not hindering innovation in the field. For instance, this is one of the messages of the Bangemann report from the 1990s, which studied Europe’s possibilities to advance to the information society. The core messages were to foster an entrepreneurial spirit meant to advance towards the new economy, as well as to create a regulatory framework meant to boost market performance (European Commission 1994a). Over the decades, there have been numerous calls to boost policy-making in these fields, but each has had their own set of challenges. Research and Technological Development Policy As the integration effort advanced, so did the attitude towards technology issues advance in the European Union. The first main moment in this evolution is the establishment of the RTD policy, which became a Community policy as of the Single European Act, the first major reform of the European Communities (Official Journal of the European Communities 1986). This point is relevant because the involvement of actors in the advancement towards digital policies is highly dependent on their preferences regarding European integration. First of all, the RTD policy was used to support the internal market integration effort (M˘arcu¸t 2017, pp. 17–21). Secondly, as with other domains, there were varying levels of technological development across the Community territory (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 200). This policy offered fertile ground for the Commission to boost the integration effort, considering that research is ultimately a collaborative effort whose results could potentially benefit the entire Community. Still, by the 1970s, the research effort had been approached more from an intergovernmental point of view rather than a common European effort (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 201). The Commission response was to find other actors that could be involved in transnational research and began partnering with large tech companies, which by definition are transnational. The idea of collective action appealed both to the Commission and to these companies, which were keen on competing internationally. The result of this collaboration was ESPRIT, launched in 1984, whose mission was to create a framework for technological cooperation, while

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at the same time creating a true European industry (European Commission 1985). This partnership brought together two actors, which suffered from marginalization in their respective domains. First, European companies played a “minor role in cutting edge industries – information, integrated circuits – with the exception of telecoms” (Delors 1985b, p. 105). Secondly, the Commission and the Community in its entirety was choked by protectionist measures of MS, which weakened the performance of the Commission. The private actors brought experience and know-how to the table, while the Commission would bring financial resources, as well as stimulation towards a pooling together of research and experience (Delors 1985b, p. 107). This project allowed the industry to design directly their own research programme fitted to the specificities of European industry. Also, to stimulate transnationalism, the Commission mandated that research would require partners from at least two MS in order to qualify for funding (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 206). Despite the fact that Delors had repeatedly praised this initiative as a success story of collective action, the literature points to the fact that a proposed boost in the programme budget caused conflicts between the Commission and the MS, who could not agree on these financial aspects (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 206). Entrusting the Commission with a substantial budget was seen as a means of empowering this institution to the detriment of the MS and the response of the latter was to promote an alternative approach, based on more intergovernmental practices. The core functioning of EUREKA was similar, but the MS were in charge of implementation as it meant pooling together national R&D budgets. Not surprisingly, the biggest MS came to dominate the EUREKA framework (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 207). While the literature also mentions the disdain of the Commission for EUREKA, Delors’ public remarks that are available from this period do not mention explicit objections to this alternative, but he does mention the advantages of a Community approach with regards to RTD: “a capital of experience, solid expertise and, hopefully, financial engineering”. The latter refers to an effort by the Commission to find new forms of financing for innovation projects (Delors 1986, p. 9). This necessity for financial engineering was most probably motivated by the need for creativity, considering the lacking support of MS for an enlarged budget for ESPRIT. With EUREKA, the big MS pursued their own research objectives, while the rest of the EU research projects were targeted by smaller and poorer MS (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 207).

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So far, the RTD policy had a clear industrial character, both because it involved a connection with major European companies and because synergies between policies were necessary in order to boost the overall integration process thought out by the Delors Commission. Still, the main feature of this step in the policy evolution is the clash between Community action and intergovernmental decisions. With the Single European Act, the RTD policy became an official Community policy, but it still remained in the middle of a tug of war between the MS and the Commission. The decision-making mechanism on the main instrument of the RTD, namely the Framework Programme (FP), was subject to unanimity in budgetary issues, while other projects, such as ESPRIT or other multi-annual activities, were left to another vote within the Council, using qualitative majority voting (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 209). Research, Technological Development, and Innovation Policy Policy evolution is defined as an adaptation of the objectives, measures, and actions of a policy, as a consequence of changing external conditions, such as a changing society. Simply put, policy actors respond to social or economic pressures and changes by providing solutions, which will have, in turn, their own socio-economic impact. The shifts caused by developing technologies are the best examples to illustrate policy evolution. Ideally, the policy actions taken by relevant actors should not only respond to these challenges, but they should anticipate some other changes. When talking about RTD policy and its evolution towards digital policy, it is essential to act swiftly to adapt to changing condition. This did not happen in the European Economic Community (EEC) after the adoption of the Single European Act, considering that even after the adoption of the decision-making mechanism for this policy, the actors had to agree unanimously on financial aspects related to the FP mechanism. The negotiation for the Second Framework Programme is a fitting example of the continuing discords between the two levels, which caused a one-year delay in the implementation of programmes. It is worth mentioning that the discord regarded financial issues rather than specific priorities, which was regarded as unacceptable by Delors (1987). Regardless of the policy and supremacy discords between the two levels, policy evolution went on, hand in hand with the integration process that targeted another level of Europeanness, namely the emergence of a single currency and a closer Union. The competitiveness gap between the EU and the USA or Japan still persisted, while unemployment was on

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the rise. Hence, the second stage of policy evolution as regards technologies had to regard a closer approach to society and economy. Initially, RTD had a pronounced industrial character and it was meant to boost mainly the production of market-led research, which would in turn mean more industrial development across the EEC, but it meant that the benefits would lead indirectly to citizens and other actors. The benefit of this approach was that it promoted the Community dimension and the idea of thinking transnationally rather than nationally, but it left aside other challenges created by new technologies. The shift towards more swift action as regards technology did not transpire in the final text of the Maastricht Treaty, considering that the decision-making system of the treaty required unanimity in the Council of Ministers (representing the states) for the FP budget, while codecision applied for multi-annual research budgets and programme lines (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 212). This mechanism required heavy negotiation to achieve unanimity within the Council, while the Parliament had to be consulted. Yet again, the reality of technological change was defeated by negotiation mechanisms among actors and delays were registered in implementing certain research programmes due to the laborious mechanism. The press, especially the English one, at that time viewed the idea of easing the decision-making mechanism in research issues as being “controversial”, along with other policies, such as the social policy or trans-European networks (Delors 1991). Nevertheless, the RTD policy remained in this grey area of decision-making and other issues were starting to leave their mark on the EU effort regarding technology. The second step of the policy evolution surrounds the idea of innovation. In this sense, starting even from mid-80s, the idea of an innovation policy began to frame itself in EC policy documents, as Jacques Delors talked in his speeches about the diffusion of innovation as a means to translate the benefits of technology to Europeans. Some authors also mention that innovation was seen as a shift from focusing on technology producers to the users, as well as an added focus on diffusing technology (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 219). Nevertheless, technological innovation brought changes to the European space, which had to be tackled by a more targeted approach than simply encouraging RTD backed by the industry. The 1994 White Paper (WP) on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment details the effects of such innovations, which were systemic and not industry or country-specific (Borras 2003, p. 15). The systemic nature of these innovations would also mean that innovative

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policy instruments would be required to properly tackle the changes. But what exactly did the innovation policy constitute? And how does it make the connection from the internal market and RTD towards digital policy? While the RTD policy had clear-cut boundaries, the literature on innovation policy portrays a more diluted view on the boundaries of this policy. This discussion can mirror the current debates on the idea of horizontal digital policy, given that there is no clear-cut competence of the EU in either of the two policies. Innovation policy does not refer simply to the creation of new technologies, but it also targets the effects of these technologies in various aspects, such as intellectual property rights, social cohesion, the new economy, etc. (Borras 2003, p. 13). New targets and policy tools were required to tackle the new systemic changes, or, as the 1994 WP called them, the upheavals. In this sense, there can be both large and narrow views on the policy instruments sought by innovation policy. Susanna Borras describes the wide view of innovation policy, as the EU could have a mandate to provide financing or to foster an area of networking among those involved in innovation. The narrow view is adopted by the Commission, according to Borras, in that other targets, such as tackling socio-economic disparities, are left outside the innovation policy borders, while issues like property rights, research or standardization are within its borders (Borras 2003, pp. 17–18). Ultimately, Borras defines five areas of the innovation policy—research and development, property rights, standardization, and risk, and social sustainability of innovation (Borras 2003, p. 20). Still, the author also suggests that innovation is an umbrella policy, comprising different other areas, such as education, networks, or regional issues (Borras 2003, pp. 19–20). These wide-ranging domains are tackled using various instruments, but mainly regulation, deregulation or regulatory control (Borras 2003, p. 20). Information Society Policy An important source for the development of Internet-related policies in the European Union is the Bangemann Report, which regardless of its market-building effort, also emphasized other types of challenges of the newly formed information society. The theoretical framework surrounding the information society is well illustrated by Manuel Castells, who discusses the idea that the new ICT paradigm entails the expansion and complete change of the existing social structures. As a result, Castells states that the very foundations of society, namely time and space, are transformed into the space of flows and

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timeless time (Castells 2011, pp. 500–507). Of course, the theoretical debates on the subject emphasize the fluid character of the information society and the lack of a unitary definition, in line with the debate surrounding between the voluntaristic and deterministic view of information technology (Martin 2005, p. 4). However, the socio-economic component of the information society is obvious and it is exactly the subject of the ICT-related developments by the European Union in the 1990s and early 2000s. The discussion on the information society that took place during the 90s in the EU is one example for the idea that innovation policy strayed away from the restrictions of RTD policy, as well as the limits imposed by the Commission. In general, the connection between innovation and the concept of information society revolves around the idea of societal transformation, brought about by innovations. The idea of an information society stems from the fact that information created by technology becomes one of the main commodities in the economy, which not only creates economic pressures, but also social ones, which might take the form of automation or labour market changes (Borras 2003, p. 118). The first discussions about the information society stem from the Delors Commission and its growing concern about the changes in the make-up of society caused by the development of technology. The growing importance of the information society was impeccably summed up by the WP, as being “a crucial aspect in the survival or decline of Europe” (European Commission 1994b, p. 13). The same document circumscribes some new policy areas within the information society, namely: communication networks within companies; widespread teleworking; widespread access to scientific and leisure databases; development of preventive health care and home medicine for the elderly (European Commission 1994b, p. 13). The model of the information society is decentralization, with the emergence of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as new actors, while the private sector still plays an important role in creating the right conditions for the development of the information society, namely the development of infrastructure and new services. Still, the debate between national and European is still present in this WP, as the Commission states that MS should pursue their own efforts to tackle the information society, in an effort meant not to impose certain ideas on the states (European Commission 1994b, p. 21). In turn, the WP also mentions the views of the MS on the subject, whereas the role

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of the Community would be to focus on market creation and on ensuring competition (European Commission 1994b, p. 107). Overall, the WP focuses on deregulation and market creation, as well as best practice sharing, as main means to foster the creation of the information society and the “common information area”. The policies related to social aspects were only presented succinctly, which was the case also in the Bangemann Report that accompanies the Delors WP. The policy aspects related to the information society began with the Bangemann report and the acknowledgment by the European Council of the importance of such a discussion (Bulletin of the European Communities 1994, pp. 3–5). At the same time, in the view of the Commission, the information society policy was seen as support for the liberalization of telecommunication markets, in a manner that is similar to the relation between cohesion and internal market (Lamoureux 1994, p. 2). This shift in the points of view on ICT-related issues stemmed from the acknowledgement of the fact that they are not mere tools in the industrial revolution, they “overhaul in relation to society and man” (Lacroix 1994, p. 2). Such shifts required more conscious policy choices and, for this reason, the European Council started an intergovernmental coordination mechanism, with representatives from the national ministries in order to oversee “all aspects of the subject (political, financial and regulatory)” (Bulletin of the European Communities 1994, p. 7). The same mechanism was foreseen by the Commission. The report also featured some of the first debates between regulatory policy approaches, either in the form of MS-guided policies or more Community action and, of course, it argued for more EU-level action in order to “enable the market” (European Commission 1994a, p. 17). The key term in this stage is coordination at the EU level, but with more involvement from states. The introduction of social aspects into the policy discussion with regards to the innovation policy and the information society meant a diffusion of the authority from the Community level to the MS, as the latter ones had the main competence in dealing with such aspects. Still, by the time the Lisbon Strategy was discussed and introduced by the European Union, the Internet had become one of the main tools of communication and connection between people, a fact that brought social issues back on the table. The Lisbon Strategy aimed to produce the most developed knowledgebased economy in 10 years’ time and it established more connections

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between the information society and other policies, such as RTD, industrial policy, as well as the European social model or education (Rodrigues 2003, pp. 16–18). The systemic character of information society, as well as the innovation policy, had been recognized by then. This strategy did not produce in itself some version of treaty reform or more integration, but it did establish the open method of coordination (OMC) among states as a “means of spreading best practices and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals” (European Parliament 2000). The role of the Commission would be both as a catalyst of policy discussions and as a space for networking where social partners would be invited to participate with expertise. While the OMC will be approached in a subsequent section of this chapter, it is worth mentioning that the information society policies fell under the auspices of the OMC, a perfect fit considering the commitment of the mechanism to respect national diversities and the systemic character of information society and innovation. The coordination mechanism was a general theme of the early 2000s, in times when the extent of the changes caused by the Internet still had not become clear and when the establishment of new online businesses was met with far too much excitement. The dot-com bubble is just one example of this situation. In terms of policy coordination, the actors involved were meant to make their own set of goals and plans and to communicate at a European level. This idea appears in the eEurope documents, issued in 2002 and 2005, which envisioned a national coordination of policies with sharing of best practices and benchmarking (European Commission 2002, p. 8). The eEurope action plans envisioned the involvement of private actors, first discussed by the Bangemann report and the Delors WP, in light of the fact that the electronic markets and the infrastructure supporting the development of the information society are endeavours pushed forward by private actors. Slowly, the realization was that a multi-stakeholder partnership would be necessary to deliver certain policies, and in this sense, the eEurope action plan envisioned the creation of a steering committee, “chaired by the Commission (composed of Member States and candidate countries representatives, the European Parliament, and, where necessary, representatives of the private sector and of consumer groups)” (European Commission 2002, p. 21). Another document relevant for the evolution towards digital policies is i2010, as it marks the transition towards more assumed leadership at the European level in terms of Internet policies. This empowerment can be

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related to the one of the objectives that the document states, namely the creation of the Single Information Space, a precursor to the DSM (European Commission 2005, p. 4). The document creates the main directions that will be streamlined by the current digital policy approach, with the Commission at the helm and the MS, either in a supportive capability or as agents of the EU objectives. The evolution of the policy regarding the Internet and its connecting technologies was rather demand-pulled, in the sense that it represented a constant response to the changes that had already taken place in society and economy. While the RTD policy focused on building technology, either as market-led or not, the innovation—information society effort meant to open the discussion on the systemic nature of the socioeconomic changes, signalling that a different perspective is necessary for technology issues. Along with the development of the market, due to the market creation efforts of the EU in the 90s, other aspects became relevant, as the economic aspects started prevailing yet again. Of course, the last and current pace of policy evolution regarding ICTs, are digital policies. Digital Policies The upheaval discussed by the Commission ever since the 1980s had finally taken place in the 2000s. The Internet became a part of citizens’ lives, businesses could not function without connectivity, while telecommunications developed into true trans-European networks. Nevertheless, the efforts of the European Union to become the most competitive knowledge-based economy had failed by 2010. Policy efforts required a rethinking of objectives and even a refocusing of the actions. This is the era of digital markets and of the DSM. The economic focus towards ICTs had been clear ever since the Bangemann Report, but the actions envisioned by the team of experts that wrote it focused on the importance of private actors in building the markets, stating that “the private sector will be the driving force”, especially in terms of infrastructure (European Commission 1994a, p. 13). The same report questioned the uniformity of EU endeavours in building the information society, wondering whether they would be “a strategic creation for the whole Union or a more fragmented and much less effective amalgam of individual initiatives by Member States, with repercussions on every policy areas, from the single market to cohesion” (European Commission 1994a, p. 9).

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Despite the multitude of efforts since the Bangemann report, such as eEurope, i2010 or the Digital Agenda for Europe, none of them reached the true strategic character of the DSM, which entails a much wider regulatory framework than the others. This is not to say that there were no regulations passed before 2010, but they did not have a clear and coordinated target, such as the achievement of the DSM. One reason for this takes us back to the theoretical framework of experimentalist governance, according to which actors learn more about the goals to be pursued while they pursue them. The transition towards “digital” policy had taken place while the EU was pursuing other information society tasks with no wider umbrella of goals. What is different for the digital policy compared to the previous stages? The first difference refers to the prefix choice, as “digital” designates the two digits of the binary system that dominates the Internet. Secondly, the dictionary designates “digital” as an attribute of e-commerce (Macmillan Dictionary 2019). Hence, the attribute “digital” points both to the economic aspects related to the Internet, but most importantly, it underlines the widespread character of the Internet. Thus, it provides cause for the cross-reaching nature of digital policies in general. Digital policy refers not only to the economic issues surrounding the Internet, such as electronic commerce, but it also designates the social issues that must be discussed whenever the discussion about the changes brought about by the Internet arises. In the case of the European Union, can we talk about a unified policy or are there many policies? The answer is provided by the existence of a regulatory framework, which the EU can pursue based on the internal market competence and by the complementary action that it can provide in terms of social issues or digitization. In this case, we discuss more about digital policies rather than one unified policy. The transition towards the digital policies started with the Digital Agenda for Europe policy document presented in 2010, as a part of the effort to rethink the growth of the European Union in times of crisis. The political priorities of the 2009 Commission mentioned the digital agenda as a means of connecting people impacted by the digital divide, as well as a means to eliminate barriers with a targeted legislative programme (Barroso 2009, p. 30). Network security was also introduced within this effort. The Digital Agenda for Europe appeared in 2010 and listed seven priorities, in order to approach the digital issues from different directions.

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It had social, as well as economic priorities, doubled by a cultural component. The most important realization of this document was that it presented the state of fact in relation to the EU digital markets, namely that they were highly fragmented, with state borders manifested in the digital space (European Commission 2010). With this focus, it set the stage for the development of the DSM. The core of the next endeavour that has marked the digital policies, namely the DSM Strategy, was focused on the building blocks of this space, the foundation of which is the regulatory framework created by pieces of legislation, such as the NIS directive or GDPR. Although the focus is on the market, the strategy also mentions the social aspects of policy, namely the need to build more infrastructure and to develop digital skills of Europeans. Because of the highly complex issues to be regulated, the governance structure of the DSM should be flexible enough so as not to exceed the limits of the principle of subsidiarity and the policy actions focused on the internal market competence. At the same time, it should be strict enough in order to help ensure the adoption of legislation at the EU level, both within the institutional framework and within the MS. In this sense, this can be quite a challenge, regardless of its obvious technical character. The priorities envisioned by the DSM strategy regard three main directions, namely ensuring access for citizens and businesses, creating the regulatory framework necessary to its proper functioning and focusing on the growth potential of the data economy (European Commission 2015a, pp. 3–4). The governance architecture of the strategy is focused on four pillars: 1. Cooperation between supranational institutions 2. The coordinating role of the Commission 3. Dialogue with stakeholders on policy advice and support for implementation 4. Technical support from advisory groups (European Commission 2015a, pp. 18–19). The support from technical experts and advisory groups is essential, because they can provide expertise, as well as identify future areas meant for regulation stemming from the advancement of technology. What about the involvement of states? The previous policy phases featured many interventions of the states, especially in financial issues. The DSM defies state borders by definition and state intervention should be minimal, as

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it could distort functioning. However, as with any other policy, there are national preferences that can be felt in the design of digital policies. This intertwining will be developed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Still, the European coordination is clear within digital policies, much more than in previous phases of Internet-related policies. The strategic character mentioned by Bangemann has been acknowledged with this coordination between different actors and with the wide-ranging priorities.

National vs. European in the Evolution of Digital Policies The previous section has focused on providing a bird’s eye view of the way in which supranational and national actors have interacted in policy design related to ICTs and, specifically, the Internet. Despite the different phases, the interaction among actors has remained fairly constant overall and it was not solely dictated by actor preferences in relation to the technologies, but rather it was connected to push and pull factors determining the general functioning of the European polity. Such examples include the constant opposition of MS to the extension of the RTD funding that was supposed to be managed by the European Commission or the constant Commission advocacy towards more EU level action rather than fragmented actions by MS. This is the central debate that has marked the evolution and, ultimately, some of the success of digital policies nowadays. Since governance is concerned with the multiplication of actors involved in all policy phases and since their actions define governance approaches, this research must approach the pool of actors involved in digital policymaking and map their interactions. Another justification to the actor-based approach is the fact that the digital technologies and innovation have substantially changed the social and economic environment, while the actors have remained fairly constant and have changed only as a result of subsequent efforts for further European integration. How has their interaction developed along with the progress of EU integration? The actors interact by virtue of the competences attributed to them or by virtue of their legitimacy and expertise, hence their actions are the result of their internal environment coupled with externalities and push factors. When analysing the European governance, the first type of interaction worth discussing is the national—European dichotomy. The theoretical

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framework has established that a single EU governance framework is difficult to establish because of its sui generis character and because of the fluid interactions depending on the type of priority or objective. In this sense, this section will focus on three of the views on governance in digital policies, aiming to answer the following questions: • What are the main dynamics between national and European actors in digital policies? Have they evolved? • What are the national and European preferences with regard to digital policies? How are these preferences elicited? The theoretical assumption is that the European Union represents a governance mix, interactions are fluid, as well as preferences. The section will test the shadow of hierarchy model and it will investigate the three types of interactions mentioned by Tanja Börzel, namely hierarchy, market and network between national and European actors. National–European Dynamics in Digital Policies: The Transformation of Actors This section approaches the presumed idea that there is a hierarchy between national governments and European institutions regarding digital policies and their precursors. Based on the evolution discussed in the previous sections, we can discern two types of hierarchical relations. The first refers to the presence of the national governments, MS, at the top. The second presents a reversed view of hierarchy, with the Commission, namely the supranational level at the top, with the MS acting as enforcers of legislation. The early days of the technology revolution were relatively unknown challenges for the MS, although research was being developed at a national level, with France, Germany, or the United Kingdom having the biggest research budgets (Eurostat 2019). National supremacy was the norm, while European-level attempts at building a wider research programme with national funding were met with distrust and were delayed or had their funding reduced. The response of the European Commission was constant advocacy for Community-wide action and multilateral cooperation, which had, in their view, multiple advantages, such as “creating a community of researchers to exchange knowledge, the optimal allocation

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of resources and the coming together of enterprises in the field” (Delors 1985c, p. 4). The results of this advocacy were mixed, considering that the RTD policy received recognition by the Single European Act, but the funding battle still persisted with national hold-outs and delays that made this Community action difficult. In this sense, we can argue that the hierarchical structure of early technology policies had the MS in the top position, while the Commission was limited to building strategies and action plans. In one example, Jacques Delors scolded the hold-out for the approval of the FP for 1987–1991, using some more undiplomatic words, as “unacceptable” or procrastination from MS: “That is unacceptable. Are such highly important programmes as Esprit, RACE or Brite going to have to be wound up this year for lack of funding? […] is this procrastination, especially where research is concerned, to be interpreted as indicating suspicion of the Community? That would be both unfair and misguided. Far from harbouring any ambition to set up in competition with Member States, we are actuated by the wish to lend support to desirable, essential cooperation between players on the economic scene. Witness our open and vigilant attitude to Eureka” (Commission of the European Communities 1987, p. 8). The vigilant attitude to Eureka refers to the openness of the Commission to a MS-centred research programme encouraged by France, as an intergovernmental response to ESPRIT. The attitude of the Commission reflected by Delors in relation to MS is one of disbelief, especially considering his success in advocating for deeper integration and facilitated decision-making for the internal market that were introduced within the Single European Act. Still, the message of the MS was that they controlled the governance mechanism and the Commission could only act as an agent of their preferences. Hence, an important point in the development of national–European dynamics with regard to digital policies relates to supranational financing. Funding was a push-pull factor between the two decision-making levels ever since the development of the RTD policy. This weapon of negotiation placed the control on technological development to the states rather than to the European level. As the previous section has stated, this constraint determined the European level to redirect the development of research policies to other entities, for instance to private actors in the development of ESPRIT. The attempt of the states to control the European level as regards the development of research, innovation and digital

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policies has consistently been about financing. However, one of the successors for the DSM strategy is the Digital Europe programme, which entails financing much more than anything. The Council and the Parliament have reached a common understanding on the Digital Europe programme, which entails a financial scheme of 9.2 billion Euro for the next multi-annual financial framework. The press has also reported that digitization is also an area where there is more understanding than other policies, such as cohesion (Zalan 2018). Although there seems to be a shift in attitudes, the financial control is still ultimately in the hands of states and the Commission, namely the European level, remains in an inferior position as regards financing for digital policies. In terms of the overall policy approach, in the past the Commission could act on strategies and action plans, but was dependent on Member State commitment and coordinated actions. The strategies put forward by the Commission could only succeed as long as the MS assumed their commitment. Of course, this position was encouraged by the decision-making mechanism in effect at that time, with co-decision and consultation procedures tipping the decision-making balance to the national governments reunited in the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the European Councils that discussed such initiatives featured similar discourse by the MS, with the Corfu Council asking for the formation of an intergovernmental committee to discuss information society issues, while the Commission was tasked to create its own coordination mechanism (Bulletin of the European Communities 1994). If the RTD policy was subsequent to the will of the MS because of its obvious financial component and symbolism, other actions of the information society objectives could also be promoted with other mechanisms. Firstly, the objective of liberalization of telecoms and other technical aspects related to electronic markets required hard legislation to dismantle national monopolies. Although the requirement for a single European regulatory framework in Internet services would have been a necessity in itself, the development of the relationship between the two levels required a refocusing towards other actors, namely liberalization of services. The creation of a European regulatory framework meant, in the eyes of the states, that the EU level would take over certain responsibilities and, eventually, would chip away more from national sovereignty. Secondly, the only solution for the Commission to exit this apparent deadlock was to promote an intermediary mechanism, namely coordination of measures, policies, and strategies to promote the information society

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objectives. These are two aspects that have contributed to the shift in the dynamics between national and European actors and they were promoted by the European level in order to gain more room to manoeuvre in relation to technology and information society policies. The Bangemann report has been often quoted in this chapter and rightfully so, considering its influence on future EU approaches. It was focused more on market building, as it was referenced before, and placed great importance on liberalization. Bangemann ties the achievement of a properly functioning information society to the liberalization of telecommunications, software, and other types of Internet-related services in order to achieve “a positive outcome”. The report specifically urges the governments to “support accelerated liberalization by drawing up clear timetables and deadlines with practical measures to obtain this goal” (European Commission 1994a, p. 20). The wording is also significant, as Bangemann also advocates for greater speed in going forward with some of the commitments assumed within the European Council: “In this context, the 1993 Council Resolution remains a useful point of reference. Even before the specified dates, governments should take best advantage of its built-in flexibility to seize the opportunities offered by a burgeoning competitive market. They should speed up the opening to competition of infrastructures and of those services that are still in the monopoly area, as well as remove political burdens imposed on their national TOs [telecom operators]” (European Commission 1994a, p. 20). Once again, the European level acts as a lever for the national one, urging MS to assume commitments and, most importantly, to deliver on their promises in terms of liberalization. Seemingly, the commitments assumed within the European Council by MS have a relatively vague character and leave room for different approaches at the national level. Still, the conclusions referenced by Bangemann referred to the general situation of the Union, which was going through a crisis (European Council 1993). What was the focus of liberalization and how did it impact national– European dynamics with regards to Internet-related policies? National monopolies in terms of telecommunications were the roadblocks to the development of a truly European information space. The effort for liberalization lasted for 10 years and the Commission used a step-by-step approach, by tackling small parts of the sector with different pieces of legislation (Liikanen 2001, p. 2). At the same time, national monopolies represented the Member State symbolically. The former Commissioner for the Information Society explained in a speech that liberalization was

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an essential part of a wider puzzle meant to develop a truly European telecoms policy. Hence, he stated that liberalization was a part of a triangle of elements supporting it, along with harmonization of the European market and competition issues (Liikanen 2001, p. 2). Liberalization led the way for the empowerment of the EU, making it easier to create common rules at the supranational level. In this sense, the dynamics between national and European actors significantly changed, albeit it was a stepby-step change. A liberalized and a harmonized market requires an objective watchdog that can oversee the respect for the common European level. In this sense, the wave started by liberalization led to the empowerment of independent regulatory authorities for each Member State, the keyword being “independent”. Although they have a national statute, they serve the EU legislation by protecting the telecoms regime from the creation of monopolies or other types of market abuses. They have again altered the dynamic between national and European levels or, in the words of the Commissioner, “the birth of independent regulators has not been without pains in the EU” (Liikanen 2001, p. 3). With the creation of these actors, the hierarchy described above in relation to Internet-related policies shifted towards the European level. The message and the core responsibility of an independent regulator are also related to the competition policy of the Union, which is an exclusive competence of the Union nowadays. Hence, one can argue that the appearance of independent regulators has shifted the national–European dynamics in governance in favour of the European level. The system of independent regulators does not entail only national level institutions, but also supranational regulators that create European oversight in relation to digital-related issues. Nowadays, the European Union has several independent regulators in digital policies, such as BEREC, ENISA or the European Data Protection Supervisor. They have become actors in their own right within digital policy governance and their involvement will be analysed in a later section. Another point of focus in the relations between the European and the national levels is the coordination mechanism that was introduced as of the Lisbon strategy in 2000. The importance of the Lisbon Strategy for the development of digital policies has already been referenced, but it is worth emphasizing that the objective of creating the most competitive economy in the world was based, among others, on the need for “preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better

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policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by completing the internal market” (European Parliament 2000, p. 1). In other words, the build-up towards the major goal desired by the Union was firstly based on the need to develop the information society and the knowledge-based economy, as the main pillars of the EU. Because of the limited governance of the EU in these matters, the states needed to step up their efforts and coordinate to achieve the goal. The components of the OMC for information society and innovation policies included a Commission Action Plan, as well as the benchmarking of national initiatives and indicators meant to assess performance (European Parliament 2000, pp. 2–3). Actually, the Commission had delivered a strategy for the development of eEurope one year before the Lisbon strategy, where it identified “10 areas where action at European level will add value” (Commission of the European Communities 2000, p. 2). MS and the European Parliament requested a revision of the action plan to include more areas of the information society, especially as regards skills, inclusion, and content (Commission of the European Communities 2000, pp. 2–3). Beyond the obvious priorities to develop the information society, the Action Plan is relevant in that it details the methods for the national and European coordination: • “Accelerating the setting up of an appropriate legal environment; • Supporting new infrastructure and services across Europe; • Applying the open method of co-ordination and benchmarking” (Commission of the European Communities 2000, p. 4). Who are the actors involved in these governance modes? What is the balance? The legal environment is the responsibility of the European level, as the Commission is in charge of proposing new legal initiatives. The second method refers indirectly to the need to achieve funding for the development of new infrastructure and service. Hence, the responsibility lies directly with the MS, but the Action plan relies also on “private sector funding”. Finally, the benchmarking process remains under the supervision of the European Council, thus under the responsibility of the MS. The balance seems to incline to the national level in the governance approach of the Action Plan for eEurope. Figure 2.1 paints a different

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Actors featured as responsible for IS policies 16 14

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eEurope 2005

Fig. 2.1 Responsibility of actors for eEurope measures (Source Own composition based on Commission of the European Communities [2000] and European Commission [2002])

picture, as it shows the analysis of the responsibility of the actors for the actions featured in the eEurope strategies for 2002 and 2005. As one can observe, the EU level is responsible for more actions than solely the national level. Also, it is clear that the governance of information society policies has been very fluid, as the engagement of actors constantly changes. As a matter of fact, the joint governance of the Commission, MS, and other actors actually prevails, thus showing that there is no control by one level towards another. Moreover, this figure also shows that the EU level has leadership on certain actions. Looking closely at the types of actions that the European Commission is in charge of, either with or without the MS, we find that the actions revolve around technical issues on standardization or the creation of a regulatory framework. Still, there are also funding actions. When analysing the actions attributed to the MS, we find actions related to the social aspects of the information society, as well as health-related issues. The OMC is considered as a new mode of governance in the literature because it describes a fluid method of acting by entities involved in governance that assumes that the actors are independent and acting willingly, with no direct hierarchy. The fluidity of the OMC is evident in Fig. 2.1,

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as we see the oscillation of actors across the eEurope Action Plan both within the same programme and as an evolution in time. The variety of actors also points to the open character of the mechanism, as it aims to create partnerships with other types of actors (Rodrigues 2003, pp. 27– 28). The governance of the Lisbon strategy would be ensured by this new method, “coupled with a stronger guiding and coordinating role for the European Council to ensure more coherent strategic direction and effective monitoring of progress” (European Parliament 2000, p. 2). Thus, this system has two components, namely the OMC and the guiding role of the European Council, represented by the MS. The implementation system designed for the strategy involves cooperation between the European and the national levels, as it is also obvious from Fig. 2.1. First, it was designed to ensure the autonomy of the MS in pursuing their own national initiatives and this idea is actually stated by the Council document, as follows: “the method […] is designed to help Member States progressively develop their own policies” (European Parliament 2000, p. 7). In this spirit, the document also states that OMC is decentralized, with no direct EU hierarchy. However, if we look at the components, the supremacy of the European level is apparent, with its various facets—either supranational or intergovernmental. The national level is involved both in the overall supervision of implementation and it takes place within the European Council, as well as in the design of national policies “tailored” to the specificities of MS. In each phase of OMC, there is a specific dynamic between the national and European levels. In the guideline setting phase, EU level guidelines are set by the Commission, but also the MS set their own objectives. There is an attempt to balance the responsibilities at both levels. Secondly, indicators and benchmarks set by the European level, but this step also leaves room for national specificities, as they are “tailored” to each state. Benchmarking in the eEurope action plan was foreseen to be supervised by the European Council, not the Commission. The third step of OMC refers to the translation of guidelines into national and regional policies. Here, the European level sets the overall strategy, while the states are in charge of national implementation. What is relevant here is the idea that national and regional differences should be taken into account. Finally, monitoring is done at the EU level to ensure objectivity and also to encourage the sharing of experiences.

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The significance of the objective proposed by the Lisbon Strategy required a clear commitment from the MS, but the implementation mechanism left sufficient autonomy for the states to act on their own. Although the literature states that OMC has been a solution for the times when states again were not keen on giving the EU more political powers, the power given to the EU still existed, as it could develop an overall strategy for the entire territory. The EU controlled the overall approach, having the power to initiate the discussion and draw the broad strokes. Still, the ability of the EU to supervise and correct is limited to periodic monitoring and “mutual learning process”. The autonomy of the national actors, combined with the power of the Commission to design the policies, point to the experimentalist governance framework detailed in the theoretical chapter, whereby the relation between the local and central units is characterized by the same principles: autonomy of the local unit, policies devised by the central level, and reporting and monitoring at the central level. What happens to another phase of the experimentalist governance framework? Do revisions take place as a part of the learning process? Revisions do take place and the eEurope example also showcases this final step in the experimentalist governance framework of information society policies. The next strategy, born out of the eEurope 2002 document, was entitled eEurope 2005: An Information Society for All, and characterized the initial strategy as a “successful format”, but aimed to pursue additional measures based on the successes achieved by the initial strategy (Commission of the European Communities 2000, p. 8). The organization of the new action plan was similar to the initial one, with policy measures, sharing best practices, benchmarking, and overall coordination of national policies (European Commission 2002, p. 9). There is a clear growth of the responsibility of the Commission compared to the eEurope 2002 strategy, while joint actions by the national and European level seem to have dropped. Generally, the responsibility of the Commission revolves around the development of frameworks, the supervision and monitoring of implementation, as well as on the creation of legislative proceedings. Figure 2.1 also features a comparison between the two action plans and it emphasizes the coordination mechanism initially designed by the Lisbon Strategy. It also shows an increase in the responsibility of the Commission. The principle of subsidiarity states that “the Union is justified in exercising its powers when Member States are unable to achieve the

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objectives of a proposed action satisfactorily and added value can be provided if the action is carried out at Union level” (Panizza 2019, p. 2). The coordination mechanism is a suitable application of this principle, considering that the information society or technologies are not bounded by national borders. At the same time, the coordination mechanism can limit the intervention of the EU level in more poignant issues related to the information society, such as social or health-related issues, which are also featured within the referenced strategies. The balance between the European and national levels is also influenced by other specific actors, such as entities in the private sector, social partners, or even regional actors, which engage, according to this strategy in workshops, summits or support networks (Commission of the European Communities 2000, pp. 18–19). This involvement resembles the first days of the RTD policy, when the Commission appealed to the industry to develop the first EUwide research programmes. In this sense, the balance inclines towards the European level, as it has the power to foster the involvement of different actors in order to create a critical mass. This critical mass has the potential to elevate the involvement of the EU level, considering the cross-sectional and transboundary character of these types of policies. There is still a question that needs to be asked: did the OMC of the Lisbon strategy contribute to the elevation of the European level in policymaking? The answer can be split between the following manifestations of the EU level, namely if we talk about the direct EU level or intergovernmental EU level. First, the OMC was placed under the supervision of the European Council, which represents the national level on the European stage. However, the analysis of the involvement of actors reveals that most of the actions are taken either by the Commission or by the Commission in tandem with the MS. The task of the Council was to monitor, but it did not control the process, which is the task of the Commission. Hence, as the literature states, the mechanism goes beyond intergovernmental cooperation and it can be considered as a tool meant for integration (Rodrigues 2003, p. 28). The growing importance of the EU level can also be monitored using the influence that the Commission has had on national information society policies, a fact which is catalogued as being successful by the eEurope implementation report: “the different types of impact can be found in combinations in various Member States and indicate that eEurope as a public intervention has been successful in influencing the Member States within the policy field of Information Society in many different ways. The evaluation has also shown that the impact

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of eEurope goes two-ways – where eEurope, defined as the consolidated European policy, is sometimes directly influenced by Member States utilising its delivery mechanisms” (Commission of the European Communities 2009, p. 9). The ability of the Commission to use coordination to influence national policies points to the elevation of its policy leadership. The literature also references the Europeanization of policies, which is the final stop in the analysis of national and European dynamics in the digital policies. The coordination is credited to appease the MS’ preferences while boosting the involvement of the European level in policy-making. Has this endeavour proven to be successful for the elevation of policy-making? The OMC, benchmarking, and sharing of good practices do not appear in the same form as part of the implementation process of the next big strategy of the Union, namely the Digital Agenda for Europe. Table 2.1 shows a comparative overview of the implementation mechanisms for the Lisbon strategy and, implicitly, the information society strategy and for the Digital Agenda for Europe. The organization of the new implementation mechanism has suffered some changes compared to the mechanism of eEurope, which was centred around the support for national specificities and the autonomy of the states to pursue national policies in accordance to their needs. The foundation of the new mechanism is based on policy coordination at the EU level, because of the manner in which technologies have developed and changed the landscape completely in the past decades. Hence, the first priority is to create coordination within the Commission. The elevation of the European level is evident also from the growing importance of the European Parliament, which is directly involved in the legislative process and has equal footing with the Council after the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament directly represents the citizens as well and it has become a forum for debate and development of digital policies in recent years. At the same time, the role of MS has not diminished, as they are involved in a high-level analysis group. Still, the coordination set by the eEurope strategy is missing. Another significant difference is set by the growing role of stakeholders, which could be involved within action platforms, as well as within the Digital Assembly debate that would take place every year. The only point that is still present in the new mechanism is the reporting phase, split into the publication of a scoreboard and a progress report destined for the European Council. The benchmarking

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Table 2.1 Overview of governance mechanisms of eEurope and DAE Governance of eEurope 2002

Digital agenda for Europe—implementation and governance mechanism

“Accelerating the setting up of an appropriate legal environment”. This legal framework is the attribute of the joint EU level

“Set up an internal coordination mechanism”—with the Commissioners’ Group to ensure effective policy coordination across the different policy areas Cooperate closely with Member States, the European Parliament and all interested Stakeholders: Establishing a ‘High Level Group’ to work with Member States Engaging in regular dialogue with representatives of the national parliaments Setting up action-oriented platforms on the seven action areas with a wide range of stakeholders Chart progress on the Digital Agenda by the annual publication in May of a scoreboard Organise a wide stakeholder debate on the progress as tracked in the digital scoreboards in the form of an annual Digital Assembly in June, bringing together Member States, EU institutions, citizen’s representatives and industry to assess progress and emerging challenges “The Commission will report on the results of these activities in an Annual Progress Report to the European Council”

“Supporting new infrastructure and services across Europe”, mainly with the involvement of the private sector, Member States, as well as with EU funding

“Applying the open method of co-ordination and benchmarking”, based on a strategy designed by the Commission, with autonomy of the states to implement national policies, and oversight by the European Council

Source Own composition based on Commission of the European Communities (2000) and European Commission (2010)

component is missing from the governance layout, but there are European targets that need to be achieved at the European level. A possible reason for the absence of benchmarking is that the DAE no longer focuses on national specificities and normal coordination according to them, but rather the European level is taking over with coordination at the level of the Commission, which means that it takes place solely at the level of overall policies.

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From the point of view of experimentalist governance, this governance mechanism lacks the same respect for the autonomy of national levels or “local units” as they are called. Despite this fact, they can pursue their own digital policies, considering the principle of subsidiarity and the fact that most of the competences involved within the design of digital policies are shared between the two levels. Otherwise, the “learning by doing” process still takes place within the Digital Agenda for Europe, due to the complexity of the policy tasks at hand. In the DAE, the relation between the EU and the national levels is governed by the same principles as within experimentalist governance, namely EU coordination, local autonomy for policy implementation, as well as reporting and correcting the path, which is also done at the EU level. National Presence Within the DSM The final stop in the analysis of the national and European involvement within digital policies regards the DSM strategy and the upcoming Digital Europe programme, which is still under legislative procedure as of June 2019. By definition, the DSM strategy represents the peak of European supremacy as regards digital policies. This idea can be proven even by appealing to a semantic discussion and to the original construction that is at the core of the European Union, namely the Single Market. The connection between the two entities has been discussed above and also in other publications, with the conclusion that the DSM has slowly developed and will digress from the Single Market (M˘arcu¸t 2017). Still, the message of the DSM is the same as the Single Market, namely that content, information, data in general must travel freely, but also citizens are European citizens with the same rights even in the digital space. On the other hand, the semantic discussion refers to the idea that there is one market covering the entire European territory, a fact that has symbolic implications for the EU. Hence, the development of the DSM means more involvement from the EU level because of the measures meant to achieve positive integration with the harmonization of regulation. The governance of the DSM strategy closely resembles the DAE mechanism. The European level will strengthen the cooperation among the institutions, for decision-making and implementation of EU regulation. The shadow of hierarchy is not even a shadow in this system, as it is clear

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that the European level is in charge of pursuing the objective of achieving the DSM. However, one should not diminish the importance of the national level, considering its direct involvement in the legislation process especially within the Council of the European Union. The supremacy of the Commission as regards digital policies is expressed by the ability to propose legislation aimed at achieving a common regulatory field for the DSM. According to the previous analysis, this supremacy has evolved slowly, as it was marked by the influence of MS and their desire to maintain bits of supremacy. Likewise, the existence of such an entity already points to the development of a true European policy, but this achievement depends on the interaction and the preferences of actors within the policy cycle, especially in the design and decision-making phase, as well as in implementation. In case of digital policies since the prioritization of the DSM, the dynamics of actors resemble the experimentalist governance framework, wherein the central unit proposes the regulatory framework, while the local ones respond to the proposals of the central unit, in this case, the Commission. This is what has also happened within the DSM. How has the national level responded in the decision-making process regarding the regulatory framework? Has it retracted, marked by the acknowledgement that the European dimension is much more important? To answer these questions, an analysis of the decision-making process behind the major pieces of legislation of the DSM is necessary. As of March 2019, the Commission has stated that the European institutions have agreed upon 28 out of the 30 legislative proposals regarding the DSM, which is a considerable progress regarding the harmonization and uniformization of the legal framework regarding digital policies (European Commission 2019). This result has required four years of intense negotiations, deliberations, and discussions among the delegations and the EU institutions themselves. In order to perform this analysis and answer the above-mentioned questions, a short overview of the documents of the Council of the EU regarding pieces of legislation mentioned by the Roadmap of 2019 was required. These include preparatory texts, general approaches, compromise agreements, as well as voting results available in the Council register. They reveal some interesting insights into the involvement of MS in shaping legislation. Although the analysis has revealed that the vast majority of the proposals passed by a unanimous vote within the Council of the European Union, the MS were still there to shape the outcome of the legislation

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passed. For instance, the Telecommunications Code, the regulation for the empowerment of BEREC, the European regulatory body for telecommunications, the regulation on the free flow of non-personal data, as well as some VAT regulations for e-commerce, all passed by unanimous vote in the Council. Still, what they also have in common is the fact that the unanimous vote was a result of several rounds of compromises within the Council, as well as interinstitutional negotiations with the Commission and the European Parliament. The case of the BEREC regulation is interesting for this research, as the result of the legislative process meant the empowerment of a new actor within the governance of digital policies, namely a regulatory authority for the entire EU. The agreement for the establishment of a legal personality for the office was on the table, as well as the possibility to strengthen its mission. The regulation passed rather quickly, but only after interinstitutional negotiations to create a compromise among the three (Buzek 2018). At the same time, the analysis of the preparatory documents for a compromise also reveals a desire of MS to tame the development of such an actor. For instance, the Commission initially wanted to merge two institutions, namely BEREC and the BEREC Office, which is an agency that provides administrative support for the former. The MS did not agree with the stipulation and it was finally eliminated from the regulation (Council of the European Union 2017a, p. 3). At the same time, the same compromise proposal formulated by the Council takes away the possibility for BEREC to make binding decisions, which would have contributed greatly to the empowerment of the European regulatory agency (Council of the European Union 2017a, p. 3). The Commission had proposed these two stipulations, but the Council eliminated them. Thus, the national level still controlled the pace of the regulation and the establishment of a new actor despite the possibility for further compromise. BEREC is not the only entity that proved to be contentious during negotiations. The audiovisual media directive, which has been a part of the DSM regulating efforts, contained provisions that would “formalize the European group of national regulators for audiovisual media services (ERGA), which is currently functioning as a Commission expert group” (Council of the European Union 2016, p. 12). The justification was related to the fact that its responsibilities might overlap with another committee in charge of assisting the Commission in implementing the directive. However, this issue has come up more often than not with

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other agencies or bodies. States have also taken issue with ENISA in the negotiations for the Cybersecurity Act. The mandate and the objectives of ENISA as an empowered European agency have been intensely discussed in the negotiations (Council of the European Union 2018a). In the final wording of the regulation, the mandate of the agency is to be performed in such a way so as not to interfere with the MS: “when carrying out its tasks, the Agency shall act independently while avoiding duplication with Member States activities and considering already existing Member States expertise” (Council of the European Union 2019a, p. 13). The power of national authorities to keep these agencies in check stands in their proposed governance structure and their overall organization. MS have also influenced these sensitive points in the case of BEREC and the High Computing Joint Undertaking, an entity created by the High Computing regulation and meant to handle the high computing infrastructure of the Union for data processing. Issues pertaining to national sensitivity have appeared in these cases apart from their proposed mandate and objectives. Voting rights and financing have been contentious issues. In the case of the Join High Computing Undertaking, the structure did not include all the MS at the end of the legislative process (European Commission 2018). Still, the decision-making process was stalled also because of voting rights within the undertaking: “the question on the way in which the voting rights would be distributed in proportion to the financial and in-kind contributions by Participating States is causing concern for certain delegations. Some delegations consider that the voting rights should not be linked with the financial and in-kind contributions” (Council of the European Union 2018b, p. 3). The involvement of the national level in such undertakings and other types of EU-wide agencies is a sign of the continuous desire of the states to be a part of the decision-making, even though their influence within the body is diluted. Nevertheless, compromise is the keyword regarding the decisionmaking in digital policies. Virtually all pieces of legislations examined were subjected to several compromises in order to accommodate the preferences of certain MS. This means that the Commission proposal can be significantly altered. Additionally, most of the proposals from the DSM legislative process underwent trilogue procedures in order to find common ground also among the three institutions. The biggest number of trilogue meetings was held for the adoption of the Cybersecurity Act, a total of five informal meetings.

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The culture of compromise and interinstitutional dialogue could be a double-edged sword. The trilogue discussions are not public, yet they help foster a common position to help push the legislative process further. However, this culture of compromise points to a second result of this analysis, namely that the vast majority of regulations or directives required two years or more to be implemented. In the fast pace of technological development, the time necessary to discuss, negotiate and finalize a legislative proposal is significant. This time is spent on discussions among states, in order to equalize national preferences into a significant compromise at the Council level, but the agreement of the Parliament is also necessary. The laborious process still usually ends in the first reading phase, without running the risk of going to conciliation. These interactions can help point to an initial answer to the question whether the national level has retracted in favour of a more comprehensive EU-wide framework. The culture of compromise means that states are willing to let go of some of the interests in one regard, which in turn means that the policies can push further towards more Europeanization. However, there are other examples in the performed analysis that still emphasize the preference of MS to keep this Europeanization in check or to ease certain obligations that they might have. More specifically, they regard attempts similar to the intervention in the BEREC regulation. Apart from the issues related to differing legislations at the national level, the MS assumed certain reservations and made sure the latter were either introduced in the legislation or published as separate statements following the adoption of an act. In the case of the roaming regulation, four states (Cyprus, Spain, Greece, and Croatia) voted against it and also issued a common statement expressing their regret that “the final text does not effectively prevent the occurrence of unrecoverable losses for the providers of regulated roaming services, especially when these providers exhibit significant imbalances between incoming and outgoing roaming volumes” (Council of the European Union 2017c, p. 2). In this case, they are all massive tourist attractions and relied on earnings from roaming charges. If some states expressed their national preferences, in other cases, others stated that the legislation did not go far enough. Such is the case of the regulation on ending unjustified geo-blocking, which Luxembourg catalogued as not going far enough: “which does not provide for legal certainty and which confirms, rather than removes, existing barriers” (Council of the European Union 2018c, p. 2).

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Other objections of states could be catalogued as issues related to overregulation of certain aspects, which the MS have traditionally opposed. The audiovisual media directive is yet another example of the effort of states to stop the over-regulation of the Commission, as it introduced provisions related to the regulation of video-sharing platforms within the scope. The reaction of the states was mixed. The context of the proposal to extend the regulation of video-sharing platforms was related to the spread of hate speech online, to which states could impose certain measures, which were considered “too prescriptive”. At the same time, the prerogative of the states to adopt stricter measures was rejected by the Commission unless they complied with a number of other directives. In this sense, the European level meant to provide the punitive framework from which the states could choose, but they rejected this approach. At the same time, the final statement by the states opposing this directive contained the opposition towards over-regulation as follows: “rather than overregulating video sharing platforms, a strong emphasis should be placed on promoting critical media literacy and media education in the Member States” (Council of the European Union 2016, p. 5). This point of view reflects the preference for state action in the form of soft methods rather than the top-bottom hard regulation approach. The regulation on consumer protection cooperation, part of the ecommerce package, meant to improve the framework of cooperation among national authorities as regards online traders, scams, or other types of illegal online activities. The MS obtained the prerogative to abstain from joining some coordinated EU actions against illegal activities online (Council of the European Union 2017b, p. 4). Similarly, the compromise also eliminates certain obligations that the MS might have had under the regulation, such as: “the obligations to exchange of other information relevant for the detection of infringements and consumer policy information, as well as the exchange of enforcement plans” (Council of the European Union 2017c, p. 5). One piece of legislation featured yet another attempt of relieving the national level of obligations, namely the regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, which also contains enforcement mechanisms. In this sense, some states even signed a statement highlighting the need to change some of the wording of the enforcement mechanism so as to relieve the obligation of MS “to provide for public enforcement by supervisory bodies or any other ex officio enforcement”, under the justification that this might constitute too much regulation (Council of the European Union 2018d, p. 2).

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Another example refers to the objections that MS might have with regards to the scope of the legislation, the form, as well as its measures. The cross-border parcel delivery legislation proved to be contentious in this sense, as “a number of delegations question the scope of operators to be covered in various parts of the draft Regulation (USPs, SMEs, other operators) and its impact on fair competition. Furthermore, the vast majority of delegations expressed concern on the proportionality of some of the proposed regulatory activities, the administrative burden to be imposed and the lack of justification for measures relating to specific segments of the market” (Council of the European Union 2017a, p. 3). The issue of proportionality as an objection to several digital policy measures is present in other negotiations as well, but also in the form of a discussion regarding the adequate legal instrument necessary. In two examples, the decision-making process featured a discussion surrounding the legal instrument chosen by the Commission to regulate the issue. The state delegation expressed their desire for a directive regarding the proposal to regulate the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organizations (the SatCab regulation), considering that the directive is a more relaxed legal instrument giving them the opportunity to adapt it to the national legislation (Council of the European Union 2018d, p. 4). The second one is the Single Digital Gateway, where states also questioned the subsidiarity issues as well as the legal instrument proposed (Council of the European Union 2017d, p. 2). This points to the fact that the choice of the legal instrument is not entirely the prerogative of the Commission and alterations can take place if the states desire more control over legislation. One of the most controversial pieces of legislation proved to be the copyright directive, which also caused numerous reactions from the civil society and from stakeholders. Finally, five countries (Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Italy, and Finland) opposed the final text with a statement of harsh words: “We believe that the Directive in its current form is a step back for the Digital Single Market rather than a step forward. Most notably we regret that the Directive does not strike the right balance between the protection of rights holders and the interests of EU citizens and companies. It therefore risks to hinder innovation rather than promote it and to have a negative impact on the competitiveness of the European Digital Single Market” (Council of the European Union 2019b, p. 2). Estonia, arguably a digital leader within the European Union, issued a separate statement with less harsh words, but with the

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same message, stating that the final directive does not strike a balance among all interests involved. These objections are quite interesting when coming from the MS because they can point to a lack of compromise agreement. Although the desire for a more balanced framework does not have direct national implications, it does have implications for citizens’ lives, which eventually would be in a position to vote the leadership of countries that supported such an agreement. Finally, we are left to answer the questions regarding the involvement of the MS in decision-making and whether they have retracted to leave room for a true European dimension of digital policies. States are still in the position to oppose certain pieces of legislation or proposals of the Commission, but the organization of the decision-making mechanism, either in its formal or informal character, makes it difficult for reasonable roadblocks caused by national preferences to exist. Still, the national level has the ability to shape legislation within these mechanisms, where compromise is the main interaction and they could use precisely this way of working to introduce their own preferences within the legislation or, more likely, to reduce the European supremacy on legislation. This has been the case for the legislation surrounding the creation of new regulatory bodies or agencies, such as BEREC, ENISA or European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA). At the same time, this regulatory push of the Commission can point to a true Europeanization of digital policies. Fourteen out of a total of twenty-eight of the submitted measures are regulations, meaning that there is one unifying framework applicable to the entire EU territory, fit for the development of the DSM. At the same time, even the decisionmaking structure can point to the development of a European dimension, considering that only one of the three institutions involved in formal or informal negotiations or trilogues represents the national level directly, but that which is more significant in the ordinary legislative procedure. On the other hand, several other committees deep within the decisionmaking process are a reflection of the national level with representatives from all MS.

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Conclusion This chapter has analysed the evolution of digital policies based on the evolution of actors in decision-making. The main aim was to test whether there has been an uplifting of policies from the intergovernmental decision-making to the European dimension. We have found that the European level has slowly moved towards supremacy, while the national level has continued efforts to curtail the European dimension. This evolution has gone hand in hand with the evolution of European integration, manifested especially in decision-making processes and legislative procedures. Digital policies have evolved also because of the acknowledgement that they must have a European dimension in order for the EU and for the states to remain competitive. The pendulation between European and national level has caused the development of other actors that are significant in the entire governance cycle, such as regulatory authorities or stakeholder groups, whose input is necessary for such a technical field.

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Council of the European Union. (2018c). Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Addressing Unjustified Geo-Blocking and Other Forms of Discrimination Based on Customers’ Nationality, Place of Residence or Place of Establishment Within the Internal Market and Amending Regulations (EC) No. 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC (First Reading)—Adoption of the Legislative Act—Statements. Council of the European Union. (2018d). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Promoting Fairness and Transparency for Business Users of Online Intermediation Services—Statement by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and the United Kingdom. Council of the European Union. (2019a). Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA and on Information and Communication Technology Cybersecurity Certification and Repealing Regulation (EU) No. 526.2013. Council of the European Union. (2019b). Draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (First Reading)—Adoption of the Legislative Act—Statements. Delors, J. (1985a). Les orientations de la Commission des Communautés européennes. Delors, J. (1985b). Projet (dactyl.) de discours avec corrections manuscrites a/s Grand marché, nouvelle donne technologique y compris communications, “le difficile pari de la communication” en l’absence d’opinion publiqué européenne, domaine audiovisue. Delors, J. (1985c). Verse l’Europe de la technologie. Intervention de M. le President Delors au Conseil Affaires Generale. Delors, J. (1986). Discours du President Delors devant L’Association National de la Recherche Technique. Delors, J. (1987). Address Given by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament (18 February 1987), 13. Delors, J. (1991). Conference de Press. Suite au Conclave des Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres. Conclave à la veille du conseil européen de Maastricht (La Haye). European Commission. (1985). ESPRIT: Building on Success. Press Release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-85-409_en.htm. Accessed 8 June 2019. European Commission. (1994a). Growth, Competitiveness and Employment White Paper Follow-Up. Europe and the Global Information Society. Recommendations of the High-Level Group on the Information Society to the Corfu European Council (Bangemann Group).

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European Commission. (1994b). Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Commission. (2002). eEurope 2005—An Information Society for All. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 52002DC0263&from=EN. Accessed 18 Feb 2019. European Commission. (2005). i2010—A European Information Society for Growth and Employment. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=COM:2005:0229:FIN:EN:PDF. Accessed 18 Feb 2019. European Commission. (2010). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and to the Committee of the Regions. Digital Agenda for Europe. European Commission. (2015a). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and to the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/? uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN. Accessed 2 Jan 2018. European Commission. (2015b). Communication from the Commission to the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Upgrading the Single Market: More Opportunities for People and Business. European Commission. (2016). Commission Proposes New E-commerce Rules to Help Consumers and Companies Reap Full Benefit of Single Market. Press Release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1887_en.htm. Accessed 1 June 2019. European Commission. (2017). EU Agrees to Make Parcel Delivery More Affordable. Press Release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5203_en. htm. Accessed 1 June 2019. European Commission. (2018). The European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking—EuroHPC. Digital Single Market—European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eurohpc-jointundertaking. Accessed 8 July 2019. European Commission. (2019). Roadmap for the Completion of the Digital Single Market. European Council. (1993). European Council in Brussels. Presidency Conclusions. European Parliament. (2000). Lisbon European Council 23–24.03.2000: Conclusions of the Presidency. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en. htm#d. Accessed 8 June 2019. Eurostat. (2019). Intramural R&D Expenditure (GERD) by Sectors of Performance. Units: millions of Euro—1985–1990. http://appsso. eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053382_ QID_-51B1CBB2_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;

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SECTPERF,L,Z,0;UNIT,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection= DS-053382INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053382UNIT,MIO_EUR; DS-053382SECTPERF,TOTAL;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2& rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=SECTPERF_1_2_1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC= ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true& footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_ recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23. Accessed 15 June 2019. Juncker, J. C. (2014). A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Lacroix, J. (1994). ‘Saisir toutes les opportunités de la société de l’information’: note de synthèse par Justine Lacroix des questions de société soulevées par la diffusion des NTI (24/11/1994). Lamoureux, F. (1994). Note pour le President. Objet: Societe de l’information. Liberalisation des telecommunications. Liikanen, E. (2001). The European Union Telecommunications Policy. Macmillan Dictionary. (2019). Digital (Adjective) Definition and Synonyms. https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/digital. Accessed 13 June 2019. M˘arcu¸t, M. (2016). The Socioeconomic Evolution of the European Union: Exploring the Electronic Frontier. Cham: Springer. M˘arcu¸t, M. (2017). Crystalizing the EU Digital Policy: An Exploration into the Digital Single Market. Cham: Springer. Martin, B. (2005). Information Society Revisited: From Vision to Reality. Journal of Information Science, 31, 4–12. Official Journal of the European Communities. (1986). Single European Act. Panizza, R. (2019). The Principle of Subsidiarity. Peterson, J., & Bomberg, E. (1999). Decision-Making in the European Union. London: Macmillan Press. Rodrigues, M. J. (2003). European Policies for a Knowledge Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Zalan, E. (2018). The Big European Budget Battle—Who Is Fighting for What? EUobserver. https://euobserver.com/economic/142761. Accessed 21 June 2019.

CHAPTER 3

The Governance of Digital Policies

Abstract Based on the conclusions of the previous part, the final chapter addresses the challenges and opportunities of the current governance model of digital policies in the EU. Opportunities include the growing involvement of the European level directly using the framework of the Digital Single Market, while the challenges relate to the complicated decision-making system, combined with often-times inflexible preferences that limit the scope of these policies. The analysis then moves to the application of experimentalist governance in digital matters to explain the innovation taking place and to propose certain additional solutions for experimentation. One in particular relates to the involvement of other actors, more specifically local and regional authorities in the decisionmaking process. Using MLG, the research proposes a deeper look into the contribution that this sub-national level can provide to digital policy governance. Keywords Digital Single Market · Digital policies · Local and regional authorities

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Introduction The investigation into digital policies has focused on the actors and the mechanisms they use to put forward and implement policies in the European Union. So far, the analysis has been based on the assumption that the Union functions under the shadow of hierarchy and the previous chapter has brought evidence to this fact. The evolution of digital policies has emphasized a shift from the intergovernmental to the European dimension to technology-related policies. Although there is no official policy-making hierarchy, the Commission has taken over as the main actor designing policies related to digital, with various processes meant not to disturb the balance between the national and European preferences. A second assumption stemming from the theoretical chapter is that the actors at various levels are not under competition in terms of digital policies, rather the design of policies is meant to be interdependent and so that the actors can complete one another. The evolution of digital policies has also shown that the mechanisms have also shifted, in tandem with the appearance of new types of actors, such as regulatory authorities or private actors. They stem from the evolving decision-making mechanisms and technologies. In this sense, the playing field has expanded to include more participants, but what happens when the rules constantly change due to technological evolution? The purpose of this chapter is to propose certain solutions to existing governance challenges in the European Union, such as persistent differences among MS in terms of the components of the Digital Economy and Society Index or the everlasting competitiveness gap between the EU and other countries, such as the USA or China. These solutions take the form of an investigation into the possible experimental and multilevel characters of digital policies.

Trends in the Governance Model of Digital Policies In their analyses of policy-making in the EU, Helen Wallace et al. conclude that policy-making is in constant evolution and they identify some tendencies that contribute to these changes (Wallace et al. 2010,

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pp. 405–406). Out of all the tendencies, two are relevant for this discussion on policy-making related to technology. The first has already been a part of this investigation into digital policies and states that there is a plurality of policy-making methods created by unofficial interpretations of the treaty. The second relates to this plurality, which is caused by constant experimentation of the traditional policy-making methods that, again, occurs in two instances: • The use of multiple traditional policy-making mechanisms in one policy area • The innovation of these mechanisms and experimentation into new ones (Wallace et al. 2010, pp. 405–407). What does that mean for digital policies? How do these tendencies manifest in digital policies? The vast area of digital policies has developed into different facets of mechanisms, depending on the balance between national and European interests. As mentioned before, the areas pertaining to digital skills require a softer approach from the EU, as the states must take charge of social and education issues. Hence, the mechanisms used by the EU level to expand digital skills around Europe are not regulatory, but they are means of supporting national efforts. Examples include the digital training opportunities or the Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs, an industry-led effort guided by the European Commission aiming to promote the development of digital skills across the EU. On the other hand, the main mechanism used in digital policies has become the regulation, given that the Commission has taken charge on the creation of the Digital Single Market. In other areas of digital policies, the EU has engaged in policy coordination among members, the prime example being the implementation of the Lisbon strategy that had an important component in the creation of the information society. At the same time, we must also mention the research and technological development policy that has roots in the 1980s and that functions slightly differently than the regulatory mechanism for the DSM. Not only does it function differently, but it has a different legal justification in the Treaty of Lisbon. At this point, it is obvious that the cycle of governance of the digital policies seems difficult to crystallize into a clear-cut model, considering the various facets. Previous research has also focused on these aspects and

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it also inferred the presence of multiple facets of digital policies, based on the involvement of European actors (M˘arcu¸t 2017). The conclusion of the previous research was that actors should pursue more unitary action on policies, based on a bigger commitment of the Union towards digital. However, this commitment is dependent on the willingness of Member States to transfer more of these issues to the European level. This situation was illustrated in the previous chapter, which explores the balance between the national and European levels. This balance and the constant technological evolution can force the European institutions to become more creative in justifying and creating proper policies for the digital age. The justification for the European action towards the Digital Single Market was that fragmentation of digital markets impaired the economic performance of the Union, while the scope of the most recent digital programme, Digital Europe, consists of areas where “no single Member State acting alone can guarantee success, and where public spending is likely to make the highest impact” (Digital Single Market—European Commission 2019c). This leitmotif of working together has been present throughout the history of technology policies ever since the 1980s, when the creation of the R&D policy was justified by the need to pull resources together to become more competitive. The Digital Europe programme is another sign of the tendency to centralize digital policies at the European level, along with the Digital Single Market strategy, and they are a hallmark of the changing tendencies of digital policies in the European Union. Despite the various facets enumerated above, there are some basic mechanisms and actors that mark the governance of digital policies. First, let us consider the actors, who are engulfed in governance mechanisms fit for the digital age. The primary actor in digital policies has become the European Commission, considering that most of the digital initiatives of the past years have been top-bottom ones. More simply put, the Commission has taken over a coordinating role, due to the prioritization of digital issues in the past 10–15 years. For instance, the 2014–2019 Commission has had two seats dedicated to digital issues, namely the Digital Single Market, a portfolio for one of the VicePresidents, and one for the Digital Economy and Society. Similarly, the previous chapter has also emphasized the elevation of the role of the Commission in digital policies, ever since the Lisbon strategy and the Digital Agenda for Europe. The elevated role of the Commission will

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be also evident when analysing the mechanisms involved in digital policy, namely coordination and regulation. The democratization processes of the European Union have brought another actor to the frontlines of decision-making, a fact that is evident also when analysing digital policies. The regulation activity in which the Commission has engaged involved the ordinary legislative procedure, where the Parliament has leaned into its more significant role and has contributed to the digital debate in issues, such as the copyright directive that has been at the forefront of legislative debates in 2019. The Parliament altered the original content of the directive proposed by the Commission and transformed itself into the main player in the copyright directive, with two major stances within the hemicycle, one favouring the growing accountability of online platforms for the content posted online (the stance that actually became a part of the directive) and the other opposing content filters and other measures that would presumably stifle the freedom of the Internet. The negotiation of the directive lasted for more than three years, while Mariya Gabriel, the Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, labelled the discussions as “complicated” and “difficult” in one parliamentary debate (2018b). The Parliament has become an important player in digital policy-making not so much because of the aims of these policies, but rather to develop their voice as a worthy institution in policy-making. They also influenced other pieces of legislation, such as roaming (M˘arcu¸t 2017). Other than the Commission, the biggest influence on the process of digital policies has been brought by other public and private actors involved due to the development of a variety of policy areas. Some became subjects of policies, such as telecoms companies or online platforms, while others were the agents of policies, such as the network of regulatory companies, or private IT companies. These actors showcase the variety of intervention areas and the multiple mechanisms necessary to ensure proper intervention, which is in terms of the subsidiarity principle. The policies that involve these types of actors are likewise various, stemming from regulatory policies that should be overseen by regulatory authorities to self-regulation or coordination among several entities. In the case of digital policies of the European Union, many of the new actors have become involved due to the growing presence of the Commission in the centre of policy-making. In the case of the agents of policies, some IT companies have had the opportunity of becoming a part of the research and technological policy ever since the 1980s with the inception

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of ESPRIT. More recently, the Commission’s initiative for the digitization of the European industry has included IT companies, SMEs or other types of private entities in new collaboration ventures meant to boost the innovative capacities of the continent. These include Digital Innovation Hubs (DIHs), defined as “digital innovation hubs are ecosystems that consist of SMEs, large industries, startups, researchers, accelerators, and investors. They aim to create the best conditions for long-term business success for all involved” (Digital Single Market—European Commission 2019a). Due to the fact that the Commission cannot intervene in a more pronounced manner in digitization due to the subsidiarity principle, its only course of action is to pull together resources and other actors and to promote cooperation, at the regional, national, as well as European level. These three layers of digital innovation are discussed in the document entitled Digitising European Industry. Reaping the Full Benefits of a Digital Single Market , which highlights the need for all levels to be involved in digitization, despite the fact that the business sector is primarily in charge of this aspect: “whilst it is for business to take the lead in adapting to market realities, an urgent EU-level effort to help coordinate national and regional initiatives to digitize industry is important. Today supply chains span Europe and digitization raises challenges such as standardization, regulatory measures and volume of investment that can be only addressed at European level” (European Commission 2016a, p. 2). In this sense, DIHs are meant to attract the innovative energies and push them to the European level, considering that the Commission has created also a Pan-European Network of Digital Innovation Hubs (Digital Single Market 2016). In a sense, it has created also new actors, while creating new channels of delivering and disseminating digital policies. On the other hand, other actors have come to the limelight along with the growing involvement of technology in the daily lives of Europeans. They have become subjects of policies. The growing influence of online platforms and social media has led the Commission to target them with several policy measures, stemming from soft law, in the form of communications, to hard legislation, such as the copyright directive. In the case of online platforms, the Commission has issued a set of guidelines to be followed in the policy-making efforts that will target them. These guidelines are a single unifying framework for the entire European space, the need to enforce existing rules, the need to pursue a problem-driven approach to regulating the online platforms, a level-playing field for all players, and

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measures for self-regulation, as well as co-regulation in the market (European Commission 2016b, pp. 4–5). Again, the Commission proposes a variety of actions, aiming to strike a balance between top-bottom and bottom-up approaches. As the Communication states, online platforms are also subject to hard legislation, such as the General Data Protection Regulation or the Network and Information Security Directive. The question to be asked is whether the interactions among these actors and the mechanisms used are something different from the traditional open method of coordination pioneered by the European Union in 2000? The first answer is yes, they are different, especially considering the main policy-making mechanism used, namely regulation. The thesis of this research is that the Union has experimented with digital policies and must do so with coming policies, so a short overview of the latest mechanisms is necessary. Firstly, we need to reiterate the two tendencies related to digital policies identified courtesy of Wallace et al., namely the combination between various traditional policy-making mechanisms and the experimentation towards new ones. Regulation is a rather new tendency, although there have been previous pieces of legislation directed towards electronic communications, such as the previous privacy directive or the directive on electronic communications. However, these were adopted in a period at the beginning of the technological boom determined by the Internet before the true development of digital markets and the honest acknowledgement of the need to act in a more concerted effort. For instance, the privacy directive was adopted in 1995, well before the explosion of personal data available online. What makes regulation a rather new mechanism is that it takes place under the umbrella of a specific Commission priority and it is a part of a concerted effort with multiple interdependent actions. At the same time, the majority of the legislative instruments used in the strategy are regulations rather than directives, which means that the rules apply directly to the MS and the framework is more uniform, considering that states need not implement their own legislative version at the national level (M˘arcu¸t 2017, p. 186). The regulation mechanism involves several other modes of governance, such as comitology, which is the basis for the creation of proper legislative procedures. The Commission makes use of committees and networks or experts to help make sense of technical issues. The Communications Committee has issued opinions on the telecoms sector. However, such a committee consists of members from each MS, once again pointing to the involvement of national authorities in the

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functioning of the EU level. On the other hand, this involvement could be interpreted as the collection of expertise from every MS. The involvement of regulatory authorities is yet another example of a mode of governance and the EU has developed such a network in various domains, such as data protection, cybersecurity or telecommunications. These modes of governance have only been developed in recent years in digital policies, which is yet again a sign of the evolution of policy mechanisms. The second most important mechanism is coordination both of policies and of actors, which again could be considered not to be a very innovative mechanism. Coordination involves looser connections among actors, but it does involve more assumed targets and connections, as well as reporting on those common targets. One example of coordination among actors in digital policies is the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition, an entity supported by the Commission, where public and private actors participate willingly with an aim of training citizens in digital skills. They have several objectives and assumed targets, such as “to train one million young unemployed people in or vacant digital jobs through internships/traineeships, apprenticeships and short-term training programmes” (European Commission 2018a). Cooperation has recently been strengthened and improved, along with the creation of a governing board at European level, as well as with the adoption of an action plan, which includes strict and loose targets, such as to “help expand EU Code Week to reach 50% of all schools and beyond by 2020” or “support the work to ensure funding for digital skills in the next EU budget” (Digital Single Market—European Commission 2018a). However, the mechanism remains open in terms of actor participation, with different possibilities for involvement, from pledging members to national coalitions supported by the government. This mechanism is a layered one, with various actors at different levels interacting according to their background and possibilities. For instance, Member States can create their own national coalitions, bringing together national players in digital skills, from NGOs to companies and public institutions (Digital Jobs and Skills Coalition 2019). These national coalitions feed into the European coalition, with events, pledges, and expertise. Another example of coordination is the digitization initiative, supported yet again by the European Commission. In the Communication on digitization issued in 2016, the Commission underlined that national action in digitization would be detrimental to the European economy,

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given that it “bears the risk of leading to further fragmentation of the single market and to efforts below the critical mass needed to attract private investments” (European Commission 2016a, p. 4). The European coordination is significant because it offers a proper and large enough medium “to ensure impact”. Yet again, the coordination at European level is rather loose, considering the purpose of framework proposed in the digitization initiative, as follows: • facilitate the coordination of EU and national initiatives on digitisation • mobilise stakeholders, and resources across the value chain • exchange best practices: – Twice a year, a high-level Roundtable of representatives of Member States’ initiatives, industry leaders, and social partners ensuring a continuous EU-wide dialogue, with preparatory activities developed, when needed, in specific Working Groups addressing both sector-specific and cross-sector issues. – A yearly European stakeholder forum for wider consultation and outreach involving stakeholders from the full digital value chains (European Commission 2016a, p. 6). This level of coordination refers to the creation of a critical mass and a pool of resources to help main actors develop their own digitizing initiatives at the regional and local level. The main construction for coordination among actors is the DIH, a digital competence centre, combined with “actions to facilitate access to finance and with outreach and brokerage actions” (European Commission 2016a, p. 8). In this version of coordination and cooperation, the European level plays a more important role as a possible financer of innovation with various structural policy mechanisms. The main actors still remain the private entities engaged in innovation, with support from the regional or national authorities, as private–public partnerships are considered possible “main vehicles for implementing EU-wide digital industrial strategies, ensure closer links between R&D&I and standardisation efforts and foster the use of all available financial instruments” (European Commission 2016a, p. 8). In this case, the Commission has proposed to boost the existing initiatives by offering them a European platform in a bottom-top initiative, while the coalition for digital jobs was a reverse construction. However,

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there is layering also in the digitization approach, considering that strategies capitalize on existing regional and national initiatives created as a result of smart specialization (European Commission 2016a, p. 6). A question still remains: has this version of coordination evolved since the open method of coordination of the early digital policies in the Lisbon strategy? There are differences between OMC and current coordination in digital policies. They both start from the same premise, namely that the EU must act on the virtue of the subsidiarity and attribution principles. Given that the EU does not have specific extended competences on a variety of issues, such as social and industrial policies, then the EU institutions, more specifically the Commission, must act as a catalyst and as a supporter of states’ efforts. A short review of the components of OMC is necessary: • Creating guidelines for the Union, along with timetables for the goals • Establishing qualitative and quantitative indicators, as well as benchmarks and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice • translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures • periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning processes. The coordination of the Lisbon strategy was highly intergovernmental, with careful European supervision and with goals set first at the top level for implementation by the other layers. While the current coordination of the two examples still emphasizes the importance of top initiatives, the Commission has started to learn from the experience of bottom levels and has started to translate these lessons to the top level. The experience of digital competence centres is relevant, as they were elevated to the status of DIHs with Commission support. The variety of actors is another difference, as the level of loose cooperation allows different types of involvement, from pledging in the case of the digital skills coalition to public and private partnerships in digitization. Also, the idea of tailor-made policies is absent from the current version of coordination, although it is almost

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silently acknowledged. The emphasis is on fragmentation and existing differences among MS, which are not the result of different national traditions, but the result of incomplete involvement of the European level, which is meant to provide more impact. Coordination also takes place nowadays in order to acquiesce to a European standard, for instance in data protection or cybersecurity. This takes place due to the overseeing capacities of national regulatory authorities, which form their own network and work together with the European ones. In this case, we no longer talk about national traditions with regards to protection of personal data, for instance, because now there is a European standard in the form of the General Data Protection Regulation. The final question to be answered by this section relates to the possible innovative or experimental character of the mechanisms employed in digital policies. Firstly, there are various traditional mechanisms employed under one policy umbrella, which is extremely vast and cross-sectoral. The combination of regulation and coordination is not innovative per se, considering that it is used in other policy areas, for instance in the internal market policy as negative and positive integration. However, the experimentation comes from the continued combination of several mechanisms, beyond regulation and coordination, which is caused by the combination of policy competences at Union level, namely internal market, telecommunications, social, and industrial policies. A second marker of the experimentation in digital policies refers to the constant evolution of actor involvement in mechanisms. Experimentation was clear when the Commission began the first research and technological development programmes together with industry players, despite the roadblocks put by the intergovernmental decisions for funding. Experimentation is also evident in the various possibilities for actor involvement in training for digital skills, such as the above-mentioned pledging, and in the growing role of other actors in general. These are just two instances in which one can observe that the evolution of digital policies has not taken place on a carefully thought out path, but rather with various experiments and innovations meant to free this policy from the traditional battle between the European and national levels. Despite the fact that the European and national institutions are still the main characters, there is room for experimentation and democratization of the mechanisms and roles of the actors. This is to be explored in the coming sections.

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Experimentalist Governance Framework for Digital Policies The Governance Cycle of Digital Policies The previous section emphasized that, in the absence of a defined competence and in the face of the constant development of technology not matched by an evolution of the decision-making in the European Union, the main EU actors are more creative in coming up with different policy solutions. The combination of mechanisms, as well as experimentation, have led to the current outlook of digital policies, characterized by the presence of regulation and the growing coordination in vast areas that are not completely covered by a definite competence of the EU. This section aims to provide a framework for experimentation, by using the idea of experimentalist governance proposed by Sabel and Zeitlin in order to expose possible future improvements to the governance of digital policies. The recent tendencies in digital governance have emphasized the combination of traditional methods and the extending pool of actors involved in decision-making. Is there room for learning and for new actors? This question will be explored in detail in the coming sections. To reiterate, the accelerated pace of technological development requires active actors and flexible decision-making and implementation. This is a challenge for a system as the European Union, where negotiation and consensus are some of the main policy-making mechanisms, especially considering the growing number of actors and interested groups. More specifically, the pivoting between the European and national levels, corroborated with the growing power of private actors, dismisses the traditional view of hierarchical governance wherein the European level decides and the national level implements. Although the European Union has expanded its policy-making to digital policies, there is still no specific competence with regard to this horizontal policy and the national attitudes and outlooks with regards to digital technologies are very different in decision-making, implementation, and progress. In such a complicated policy environment, the policy goals are hard to define. For instance, the regulation eliminating roaming charges for the EU citizens took more than 4 years to be decided and implemented (European Parliament 2018b). Building a Digital Single Market for the entire Union requires complex problem-solving that must take into account country specificities, as well as EU-wide regulation.

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What does experimentalist governance have to do with the governance of the digital policies and the DSM in particular? The theory is directly applied to the EU and assumes that the interaction among decisionmakers is informal and deliberative, which means that actors engage in several dialogues and consultations in order to reach a consensus. This is due to the many types of actors involved, although the theory revolves more around the balance between the European and national levels. The discussion in the previous chapter surrounding the latest pieces of legislation on digital policies has revealed this exact idea, namely that decision-making in digital policies requires several consultations and negotiations in order to reach a proper consensus on issues, such as copyright, roaming or cybersecurity. For instance, in case of the anti-geo-blocking regulation, there were several instances of compromise and trilogues meant to alleviate concerns of MS with situations, such as those related to price discrimination, so much so that the Presidency of the Council iterated the overall frustration in a diplomatic language: “the Presidency invites Member States to be as flexible as possible on its compromise detailed above with a view to progress significantly in the negotiations with the European Parliament on this file. The Presidency stresses that nothing can be considered as finally agreed until everything has been agreed” (Council of the European Union 2018, p. 7). The authors also emphasize the lack of hierarchy in decision-making, as is the case in the European Union in general and in digital policies. Once again, a connection with the evolution of digital policy is required, considering that it has shown several instances in which the intergovernmental approach has prevailed only to be replaced by a resurgence of European supremacy. Essentially, the European and the national levels dominate decision-making, but the system functions only if the interaction is non-conflictual and non-hierarchical (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). Sabel and Zeitlin define experimentalist governance as a periodic process involving goals and revisions of those goals considering the current outlook and alternative approaches in policies. (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012, p. 3). They use the qualifier “recursive”, referring to the method whereby a policy result can be used as the premise for the next policy process in a virtuous cycle. Applying this idea to the digital policies, the Digital Single Market strategy can be seen as one such example of a recursive process. The Commission describes the actions within this multi-annual strategy as “interdependent actions that can take place only at the EU level” (European Commission 2015a, p. 3).

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The roaming regulation and the cross-border portability of online content are two key pieces of legislation enabling the free movement of citizens, their data and their Internet habits across borders. Although the portability of online content does not work only for mobile devices, its success is guaranteed especially when Europeans are able to use their mobile data packages beyond borders, especially as this type of connection has grown more powerful. These two are examples of this recursive process. First, the elimination of retail roaming charges eases the communication beyond borders. Secondly, Europeans can access their content easily across borders with their national mobile data package. Moreover, major legislative initiatives related to the Digital Single Market function more often than not in packages. The Connected Continent package that led to the elimination of retail roaming charges is one such example. The Communication regarding these legislative proposals specifically stated that this package is an “intermediary step towards that ultimate goal of a fully integrated single market” and that it can act as a “tipping point to allow the market to evolve towards as a pan-European single market” (European Commission 2013, p. 5). The adoption of this legislative package has allowed for other pieces of legislation to be put forward, which are listed within the new Digital Single Market Strategy put forward by the Commission in 2015. More recently, the digitization initiative of the Commission was regarded as complementary to the overall DSM strategy, as the document talks about different separate, but targeted initiatives meant to advance digital policies from several angles: “the DSM strategy builds on these initiatives and provides a coherent framework for taking the digitisation of Europe’s economy forward” (European Commission 2017a, p. 2). The next key terms of experimentalist governance focus on goal setting and revision, which are based on constant learning from alternative approaches. They are revised across time with the updates given to major strategies, as the Digital Agenda for Europe and the Digital Single Market strategy. Along with the development of digital technologies, the public policies envisioned by the European Commission have experienced changes in priorities. In the beginning, the EEC/EU’s approach was focused more on research and technological development, as detailed in the previous chapter. Along with the spread of technology in society and economy, the EU has started focusing on building the information society, by emphasizing the need for digital skills and on early attempts of digitization. Nowadays, more than 30 years after the prioritization of

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technology in the EEC’s public policies, the current focus is on digital markets as the solution for EU’s economic growth. Similarly, in digital policies, the European Commission is the author of both binding and non-binding proposals, but they are revised within the legislative process by the Council and the European Parliament. The ordinary legislative procedure allows the Council and the European Parliament to shape the legislation based on the commitment for the democratization of the EU and they do so by voting specific positions on the proposals. Their positions are usually reconciled within interinstitutional dialogue in an attempt to obtain legislative consensus and advance the regulation process. All three institutions form their own analyses and opinions on a subject, like the elimination of retail roaming charges or data protection. In the cases of the roaming regulation and the overall Connected Continent package, the Commission proposed the elimination of intra-EU call surcharges. However, the European Parliament eliminated this proposal from the regulation and, finally, the package was adopted with a narrower scope (European Parliament 2018a). We can argue that there are conditions to provide a clearer analytical picture for digital policies by using the experimentalist governance framework. Based on the experimentalist paradigm, the next question is whether the constant revision stems from learning and analysis of alternative approaches or it comes from the shift between the European and national levels. The European Commission can provide an answer from two instances, namely the specific governance of the DSM strategy and the Better Regulation principles. For the Digital Single Market strategy, the Commission has laid out the strategy in detail, emphasizing that it “will engage in an on-going dialogue with stakeholders to inform on policy-making and to ensure effective implementation of the strategy”. The Commission emphasizes the need for constant learning and consultation as follows: “given the cross-cutting nature of the Digital Single Market Strategy, its implementation will require the support of dedicated advisory and support groups. The Commission encourages the European Council to provide the necessary impetus and review progress regularly. The Commission will also seek to improve the quality of the data and analysis needed to underpin the Digital Single Market by pooling the relevant knowledge and making it easily accessible to the public” (European Commission 2015a, pp. 17–18). Hence, advisory groups and relevant knowledge on the subject are a requirement, given the “cross-cutting”

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nature of such a policy. Technical and expert analysis must underpin the process and only by learning can the institutions deliver targeted policies. This idea is illustrated also within the Better Regulation guidelines of the Commission, which emphasize the need for preparatory documents for legislative proposals in order to deliver the best legislative piece available for the scope and competence of the EU by also maintaining the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (European Commission 2017a, pp. 4–5). More specifically, the Better Regulation principles for digital policies specifically emphasize the need for a broad consultation “with a wide range of stakeholders, including from the technical internet community” in case of policy proposals where the Internet technology “plays a central role” (European Commission 2017b, p. 196). Consultation with experts requires learning and adapting the legislation and that is precisely to what these guidelines contribute. The Commission and the other institutions learn from experts and stakeholders organized in different manners, as they bring their experience to the table. For instance, in the Communication on digitizing the European industry, stakeholders are quoted discussing the need for space to test digital innovations before actually investing in them and this becomes the basis for the discussion on DIHs (European Commission 2016a, p. 8). At the same time, the Commission also learns from the evaluation of legislation, but this will be detailed in another part of this section. What about the revision of goals? Are goals revised due to national preferences or due to learning? This question has several layers involving the type of institution and instrument to which we refer. For instance, major strategies of the Union, which are designed by the Commission, such as the DSM strategy of the Digital Agenda for Europe, are presented to the European Council. These policy documents reveal the rough draft, the wider goals to which all legal initiatives would converge and it is the prerogative of the European Council to issue an opinion or to actually propose the wider goals of the Union. For instance, the European Council in June 2015 discussed, among others, the DSM, as “as a vehicle for inclusive growth in all regions within the EU”, but also directed attention to several priority areas within the strategy, namely several key pieces of legislation that needed to be adopted swiftly, as well additional action on anti-geo-blocking, the free movement of content and data or standardization (European Council 2015, pp. 7–8). The same dynamic was evident even in case of the discussion on the information society, as the Corfu Council of 1994 directed several broad ideas for the

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information society: “the European Council, having noted the findings of the Bangemann group, considers that the importance and complexity of the issues raised by the new information society justify the setting up of a permanent co-ordination instrument to ensure that the various parties involved - public and private - are working along the same lines” (Bulletin of the European Communities 1994, p. 5). In these cases, the Council evaluates the results of the discussions created by the Commission and indicates several prioritization paths, but it does not revise the entire goal. At the same time, in the previous chapter, the presentation on the exertion of national preferences has shown that the goals are not the subject of negotiation among delegations to the Council, but rather the actions meant to achieve them. For instance, the debate on personal data protection featured several separate opinions by countries with objections to the decided framework on the grounds that it falls short of their own national traditions. Sabel and Zeitlin’s cycle of experimentalist governance can provide more clarity to the digital policy process, as an academic view rather than an official view of the governance of digital policies that the European Commission envisions. The researchers see it as an iterative cycle, where each end of the cycle brings together new lessons for future policy initiatives, much like the traditional public policy cycle from research. However, the steps differ from the traditional cycle precisely due to the presence of several actors, the extension of the pool of actors and the need for experimentation that can be inherent to the European Union. Firstly, central and local units collaborate with civil stakeholders in order to establish broad goals and metrics to track them (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). In this exemplification, the central level represents the EU, while the MS are the local units, assuming that the two are the main decisionmaking levels in the European architecture. Undoubtedly, the DSM is the current broad goal that is being pursued in digital policies. The DSM strategy defines it as follows: “a Digital Single Market is one in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured and where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence” (European Commission 2015a, p. 3). However, the DSM is not the only goal of digital policies, albeit it is the most visible. As a result, most other initiatives converge to it, such as the New Skills Agenda for Europe or the Digitization initiative. In the cycle of digital

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policies, the DSM is at the centre considering that it crystallizes many of the existing policy challenges in a familiar manner, easy to grasp by both policy-makers and by citizens. An alternative goal would be digital transformation of Europe, but it does not have the same real grasp as the Digital Single Market. Hence, the governance of digital policies and this discussion will not refer only to the DSM, but also to other complementary initiatives, which aim to provide the DSM more support. In order to pursue this goal, the decision-makers put forward initiatives in conformity to the principles of the Union, as well as its designated competences. The various facets of digital policies influence the manner in which the goal is pursued. Moreover, each goal and subsequent initiatives are based on a series of assessments and consultations. For instance, the Commission Staff Working Document on the Digital Single Market highlights the context, the benefits, as well as the perspectives of parties involved in digital markets in a policy document that serves as a basis for the strategy (European Commission 2015b). The initiatives take different forms, from broad guidelines or coordination procedures to R&D funding or actual legislation, but they are precisely defined to feed into the broad goal, such as achieving the DSM or working towards digital transformation. As mentioned, each goal requires a series of metrics. In digital policies, the EU tracks the digital progress of the EU, as well as the Member States, in the yearly Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI). There is no benchmarking or a series of targets in general, compared to previous metrics, for instance in the Digital Agenda for Europe. DESI is not a direct result of DSM policies, rather an illustrator of the current state of policy pursued both at the European and at the national levels, considering that a state by state analysis of the digital progress in a given year accompanies the yearly DESI statistics. Even from this first phase of the cycle, national authorities are regarded as major players in policy governance. In this case, MS are responsible also for their own national efforts for digital transformation in general and they are encouraged to pursue national versions of policies. At the same time, the EU level can be inspired by previous national initiatives. In the former case, the MS have been encouraged to create their own national coalitions for digital skills and jobs or their own national digital agendas. In the latter one, several regional or national digitization initiatives have served as an inspiration for the Union’s own approach, namely those from the Netherlands or Germany. Either way, local efforts

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are complementary to the EU-wide effort and they translate into national policies. States require their own strategy for digital competitiveness that should feed into the overall digital strategy of the Union. At this stage, the experimentalist governance framework signals that there is a need for more specific metrics and targets both for central and local units, especially considering the connection between the two types of efforts. Consultation of stakeholders is placed well within the conception of policy instruments as a key aspect of EU-wide regulation, which is emphasized every step of the way within the Better Regulation guidelines for the Digital Society and Economy. For instance, the identification of possible digital policies “may not be possible immediately”, thus requiring “indepth analysis with stakeholders – given that different approaches have different implications for them” (European Commission 2017b, p. 195). The level of technical difficulty regarding certain policies renders the involvement of specialized stakeholders practically mandatory. Moreover, the specificity of the Internet requires adaptation of policy objectives, as, for instance, this document also details the challenges of fast technological change, as well as the open nature of the Internet, which can affect any policy objective followed or eliminate the possibility for certain binding instruments, paving the way for self-regulation (European Commission 2017b, p. 198). The second step of the iterative cycle revolves around the level of autonomy that local units have in the pursuit of their own methods to achieve the goals agreed at the first stage. In digital policies, national autonomy to legislate is higher, considering that these horizontal policies contain both shared competences and support competences of the EU and the room for action at national level is wider than in the case of other policies. For that matter, each MS pursues its own digital agenda and this initiative is tracked even in the DESI report for each country. Another point of the autonomy of MS refers to the directives and regulations implemented at the local unit level. For instance, GDPR works as a general mandatory framework, but each Member State is free to regulate more according to their previous legislation and tradition. Certain aspects of GDPR, such as the reconciliation of freedom of expression with the protection of data or processing in cases of employment, are expressed generally in the EU document with the specific provision that “each Member State shall notify to the Commission the provisions of its law which it has adopted [..] and, without delay, any subsequent amendment law or amendment affecting them” (EUR-Lex 2016, p. 84). This

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mechanism was put in place in order to appease the objections of Member States, as Austria, the Czech Republic, UK, and Slovenia had their own objections when the legislation was voted in the Council concerning the fact that it falls short of the level of national protection of the legislation. This is where the balance of competences between the EU and member states is mostly present because of the fact that this is an emerging field of policy. However, this freedom of local units to choose their own paths does not really stem from political views, but rather from an adaptation of the policies to the national “information society” or digital market. The influence of the EU in the area does not go only into mandatory legal frameworks in the DSM, but it also creates a “mirror” for MS with the DESI. It is not a European benchmark, but rather a comparison between the local units. Moreover, if we move more locally, local public administrations are in charge of their own digital policies, such as cities in Germany, which are competing for the title of Digital City (e.g. Darmstadt). Such examples will be approached in a later section. As a result, this step can be divided into two facets, namely the one surrounding hard regulation and the ones involving soft instruments. Indeed, states have autonomy in pursuing their own paths to achieve the objectives of the copyright directive, but they must do so by acquiescing to the principles of the directive and are under the supervision of the Commission when designing their national legislation and can undergo infringement procedures if they do not implement the directives into national law. At the same time, there is a growing number of regulations in digital policies, a fact that relinquishes the states’ autonomies, but they do exert their own preferences in the decision-making process of the Union, as it has been emphasized in the previous chapter. In this step, the most important initiatives are those that require the coordination of national policies, in issues, such as digital skills, industry policy, or cybersecurity. In the evolution of digital policies, coordination has taken place in various instances, but the underlying issue has remained the same, namely that national specificities should be preserved. Coordination makes the interaction between the national and European actors easier, but it does run the risk of reducing the performance at the EU level. The OMC has been criticized precisely for this aspect. Yet again, this framework exposes the need for greater control from the EU level. The third phase of experimentalist governance goes hand in hand with the second one, considering that the main players are national authorities in this case. In a quid pro quo, local units must report on their progress

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towards the agreed upon goals. In case of digital policies, this progress takes place in two phases. The first is in relation to the European regulation field where MS are required to implement directives into national law or adapt the general framework of regulation to the national environment. Not only that, but they must also report on the law and usually have deadlines for implementation (e.g. GDPR). Secondly, the MS report on the progress towards the digital economy and society within the yearly DESI to showcase not only the European efforts to build a true DSM, but also the national efforts. This may be an effort to create a balance between the European and national decision-making and to have a control over the coordination of policies. The final step regards the periodical revision of the goals, the problems, possibilities arisen with measures, such as extending the pool of actors involved in governance (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012, p. 4). Why revising goals? An evaluation process is a must for the proper functioning of the governance mechanisms. At the European level, the mid-term evaluation of legislation and strategies is a means of correcting the course and taking stock of the performance. For instance, the interim evaluation of the Digital Single Market Strategy acknowledges the areas where more effort is required, such as providing more investment for digital infrastructure. Most importantly, the evaluation acknowledges the “changing digital landscape” as a reason to adopt the strategy to new realities (European Commission 2017c, p. 3). A particularity of such policies refers to the digital environment constantly responding and adapting to new technologies or new business models stemming from them. The growing number of actors involved in the governance process is required not only due to the complex nature of digital policies, but also due to the necessity to reach the citizen directly. Hence, it can be a sign of more integration at a superior level. The tendency to involve more European actors, especially agencies, is clear. Empowering EU agencies with more regulatory powers is a subtle move of moving governance and oversight at the supranational level. Clear cases are ENISA, the EU cybersecurity regulatory agency, and BEREC—the European Bureau of Electronic Communications, whose powers were strengthened at the European level with new frameworks for the Digital Single Market, the Cybersecurity or Connected Continent packages. Their aims are not to control the national authorities, rather to work as a support for the implementation of proper policies at the national level.

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What can experimentalist governance offer digital policies? The idea that the EU is experimenting in pursuing new policies is clear, considering that the decision framework of the EU was set in 2009, when the challenges were different. This framework creates the image of two levels of authority, the state and the EU, which are not in direct competition and are willing to learn from each other for the sake of the policy goal. Is this image accurate for digital policies? The persistence of national preferences might show that there can be some kind of competition for supremacy, based on the tradition of previous technology policies. At the same time, the growing prioritization of digital at EU level and the increasing number of EU frameworks meant to harmonize the digital environment show that the path is changing. The framework has been centred on benchmarking and the autonomy of actors, which do exist within digital policies, but their presence is blurred. For instance, DESI reports on the progress of MS, but it does not offer benchmarks. Also, autonomy mostly refers to national authorities that must preserve their traditions and specificities and they have the possibility to do so within the mechanism of coordination. Still, there is a growing autonomy of the EU level, both at the goal setting and in the implementation levels. A second lesson from experimentalist governance can be that the EU level should require a higher level of autonomy for the higher purpose of achieving the necessary goal of digitizing Europe. In this sense, one can leverage the autonomy of Member States by providing new mechanisms to tackle their specific challenges at home. For some, the challenge is the infrastructure, while for the others the challenge is boosting digital skills or promoting high-tech research. The specificity of actors should be emphasized more in the goal-setting stage. Finally, if the MS are encouraged to tackle their specific issues nationally, they may be willing to give up more on the wider EU regulation framework. Coordination also means that more actors can get involved, as the process extends and the mechanism becomes more open. As such, experimentalist governance does emphasize the need to extend the circle of actors involved. Another possibility to widen the circle of actors in case of digital policies can stem from multilevel governance (MLG), namely the slow inclusion of local/regional actors within the circle of governance. Along with the movement of decisions closer to impact citizens directly, the EU has stepped up efforts to empower local and regional actors. One such

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example is the WIFI4EU programme, where the EU gives out vouchers for the local administration to build up their Internet infrastructure. Also, structural funds are available in MS to encourage the development of technology at a regional level, considering that Europe 2020 aims for more investment in R&D, but also in digital priorities, such as Internet infrastructure or digitization (European Commission 2015b). In its interim evaluation of the DSM strategy, the EU refers to structural funds as necessary instruments for building the infrastructure necessary for the complete Digital Single Market. The next section will focus precisely on the issue of expanding the number of actors using the MLG framework. So far, the research has focused on the evolution of existing mechanisms and actors and on the snapshot of governance based on European-national dynamics. In some cases, the involvement of new actors was dictated by the evolution of technology and here we can refer to companies, industry leaders or institutions. At the same time, there is a category of authorities that could potentially contribute to digital transformation if given the chance to be more actively involved. These are local/regional authorities (LRAs).

The Multiple Levels of Actors in Digital Policies The need for the canvas for digital policies stems from the observation that the European Union has accelerated the pace of legislation on topics related to technology in economy and society. Ever since 2010, the year of the financial crisis, as well as the Europe 2020 strategy, technological issues have been at the forefront of legislation, culminating with bigticket items, such as the elimination of roaming charges, GDPR, removal of geo-blocking, or the copyright directive. Piece by piece, they get closer and closer to the citizen, as the use of information and communication technology has grown in virtually all areas of society and economy. The democratization of digital policies has developed in tandem with the growing use of ICT. Democratization refers here to the growing number of actors involved in governance, not in competition, but rather in cooperation. This democratization has been illustrated in the previous chapter and it mainly referred to the widening circle of actors involved. Experimentalist governance also underlines this idea, as one marker of the need to innovate when faced with a rather rigid governance framework and a growing policy field. The proposal of this section, aimed at reinforcing

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the goal of this research to provide several insights for an improved governance of digital policies, is that LRAs should be more involved in digital policies, both as an advantage for European integration and as a means of advancing digital transformation. The theoretical chapter discussed multilevel governance MLG as a power-sharing framework involving several layers that are not necessarily in competition or in a hierarchical system. There are two advantages of MLG that must be emphasized at this point. The first one is the acknowledgement of the EU level as an independent polity, while the second refers to the extension of actors involved to the sub-national level. Regarding the first advantage, we could argue that the digital policy sector has undergone the process of Europeanization, even though there still is not an official competence in this area. In a top-down approach of Europeanization, the supranational level works on EU-wide priorities, like the Digital Single Market, contributing to a shift in the national arena and uplifting certain domains, like digital skills or digital market regulation. The EU has extended its reach towards this policy domain, but it has not replaced the national level in regulations on digital policies. As mentioned above, the Union can decide on roaming, data protection, the elimination of geo-blocking and these regulations are mandatory for all MS. In data protection, for instance, the national level can issue regulation above the EU framework. At the same time, in digital policies, the EU works together with MS using directives to be applied to the national specificities, such as in the case of cybersecurity or copyright. Despite no direct competence of digital policies, the EU has indirectly become some form of a principal. In such a capacity, the Union is able to provide an arena for new types of actors, opening the governance process as much as possible. From interest groups to other types of authorities, the field of digital policies requires as much actor input as possible considering the complicated digital environment and all the technical challenges that a unified digital space requires. This process is still under development, hence we can expect more interaction between European and national actors, as well as potentially some sub-national authorities. One proof of this assertion is the WiFi4EU programme initiated by the European Commission, aiming to help sub-national authorities with a local or regional approach develop their Internet access by offering vouchers to build Internet infrastructure.

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This is the second benefit that MLG brings to the analysis, as it encourages the elevation of sub-national entities to be involved in the digital policies. Another proof of the communication between the EU and subnational authorities with respect to digital policies stems from the cohesion policy objectives, which encourage the development of technology usage, research and development at the regional level. For instance, Romanian structural funds prioritize research and development, as well as discouraging the digital divide in society with the help of regional projects (InfoRegio 2018). This idea feeds the need to bring the benefits of the DSM as closer to the citizen as possible. In this sense, the definition of MLG provided by Gary Marks et al. is relevant. They define MLG as a means of achieving policy results by engaging multiple actors from various territorial levels in interaction based on continuous negotiation. They see these actors in a nested system (Marks et al. 1996). The key terms in this definition concern the idea of nested public entities whose relationships are characterized as a “continuous negotiation”. In this definition, Europeanization cannot simply function as a top-down initiative, but more as an integrated approach where sub-national authorities should be able to feed into the process as well. Negotiation is a two-way street. They should not be simple spectators taking into account the negotiation between the national and European levels. This idea stems from the study of policy networks, wherein interaction may be frequent or occasional (Kjaer 2010, p. 112). For instance, the Committee of Regions feeds opinions on digital policy legislation, in accordance with its consultation powers stipulated in EU treaties. This is a benefit of the accelerated process of legislation in digital policies from the recent years, as binding norms for the EU digital space benefit from input from the organism representing regions at the EU level. However, local or regional projects of digitization occur in many MS in the forms of smart city or digital city agendas, irrespective of the overall digital agenda for the entire supranational entity. Such examples include Darmstadt (Germany)—digital city, Alba Iulia (Romania)— smart city or other local initiatives to bring forward digitization in city life. They take place independently of the DSM agenda, but they most certainly feed policy results to the overall objectives with projects for digital skills or digitized public services.

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State-Centric Governance The theoreticians of MLG defined it in contrast to state-centric governance and it can be useful to follow the governance of digital policies with this contrast in order to help identify more benefits for the involvement of LRAs. Is there evidence that digital policies are conducted using state-centric governance? State-centric governance does not mean that policies return to the national spectrum, but rather that states decide on their own to approach policies in an intergovernmental manner. Moravcsik argues that the states use coordination as an instrument that increases the control on policy results, considering that they get the chance to achieve policy objectives that cannot be done on their own (Moravcsik 1993, p. 507). States already use policy coordination for digital issues, such as industrial and social ones and, according to this view, MS are able to pursue their own national policies, while working towards some common goals. One example of state-centric governance is states have their own national strategies or digital agendas to pursue national, as well as European goals. The power of the states is that the evaluation of countries’ performances does not translate in infringements or other hard sanctions, as it is the case in other policies. Secondly, the evolution of digital policies has shown that MS have held the control of policies to the detriment of the EU level in issues, such as R&D funding. On the other hand, there are some instances when policy coordination also suits MS, as they acknowledge that they can no longer compete on the international stage. For this, they appeal to the EU to create horizontal frameworks, in issues, such as privacy of personal data, the confrontation with online platforms, artificial intelligence, etc. If we interpret the future digital policy actions in this key, then the willingness to create EUwide funding for the Digital Europe programme become self-explanatory. Digital Europe focuses on five main targets, high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and trust, advanced digital skills, the use and digital technologies across the economy and society, which are key areas that require a wider framework. In a document detailing the future of digital policy, the Council of the European Union highlighted some of the major lines of development and, although the Commission is the main target for action on the long term in this issue, it must pursue actions taking into consideration “Member State priorities” among others (Council of the European Union 2019, p. 4). The DSM and other large

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European action plans are merely tools meant to advance national priorities and issues that require coordination at the superior level, but they are still prisoners to national preferences. What other evidences are there in favour of the existence of statecentric governance in digital policies? Firstly, major political guidelines are first introduced by the European Council, an intergovernmental institution. The new strategic agenda of the Union includes digital transition as a key issue for the development of a European economic model for the future (European Council 2019). Secondly, although the decision-making process has become more democratic with the introduction of the Parliament as a fully fledged actor, the Council is the final decision-maker and this is evident in the ordinary legislative procedure. However, the culture of compromise and consensus has prevailed in the sense that the Commission, Parliament, and Council regularly engage in interinstitutional negotiations. This has happened with virtually all pieces of legislation within the DSM strategy. The mere separation between the regulation and coordination aspects in this policy points to the idea that there still is a state-centric view, as the Union cannot decide for the states in some domains and replaces national supremacy with policy coordination. Supporters of this intergovernmental approach would argue that the EU cannot take over every aspect of digital policies with this current institutional architecture due to the transversal character of the policy and due to the fact that states know more about their performances and needs than the EU level does. In this view, the EU level is only an agent of national preferences, which the previous chapter has shown to be true in the evolution towards digital policies. Given that they are the main actors in treaty negotiations, MS have the power to shape policy-making for the Union. In this view, then states maintain their sovereignty, but they appoint an agent to pursue issues that require a wider framework. The best example refers to the last-minute changes to the research and technological development policy in the Treaty of Maastricht, which made a hybrid out of it, as qualitymajority voting was opposed by the UK for RTD, while unanimity was necessary for Council negotiation, but co-decision was used for policymaking in the field (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 212). This example emphasizes how MS have the ability to impose certain views on the European area in treaties, as well as policy items. Do states really control digital policy-making? They can control and influence the decision-making process, due to the architecture of the

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Union. However, the great weakness of a state-centric view is that states have already acknowledged that they cannot pursue digital transformation on their own without a guided contribution from the Union. This weakness stems from an international analysis, an acknowledgement that they can achieve greater economic gains if they collaborate and create a uniform framework to be able to face international competitors. This issue has been at the forefront of advances in digital policies ever since the era of Jacques Delors (M˘arcu¸t 2017). Moreover, the Commission has the mission to oversee and implement the major goals and priorities, which states can oppose in the decision-making process. In this case, states do not decide only by unanimity, allowing the other institutions the freedom to pursue further legislation despite the opposition of some states. In digital policies, this has been the case for copyright, roaming, or the audiovisual media services directive. Multilevel Governance in Digital Policies—LRAs in Digital Policies In the state-centric governance portrayed by Marks et al., governments control the involvement of local or regional actors that want to be involved in European policies (Marks et al. 1996). This issue warrants a more in-depth analysis. The involvement of sub-national authorities is the key to understanding the level of MLG in digital policies. Although the other conditions meant to support the idea of state-centric governance in digital policies were checked, the issue of LRAs warrants more investigation. An example mentioned above explained the idea that the EU aims to bring digital policies to the local level with programmes, such as WIFI4EU. However, a brief overview of the involvement of LRAs across the digital policies is necessary before delving into a MLG framework. The theoreticians of MLG define it in comparison to state-centric governance and discuss about a series of conditions that ought to prove that the MLG model is valid. The first two refer to the involvement of supranational institutions and MS in decision-making, while the third one refers to the growing presence of sub-national entities in the European arena, which is aimed at putting pressure on national authorities (Marks et al. 1996, p. 356). The most important evidence to support this involvement is the establishment of the Committee of the Regions (CoR), which represents the interests of sub-national authorities across the EU.

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The analysis of the involvement of LRAs must begin from the types of manifestations of the digital policies, namely regulation, policy coordination, and the other mixed initiatives, especially regarding R&D. Considering that regulation generally refers to the creation of a pan-European regulatory framework, like the Digital Single Market, the involvement of LRAs might be considered unnecessary. In the actual DSM strategy, they are mentioned several times, but there is nothing specific to their involvement (M˘arcu¸t 2019, p. 4). Nevertheless, the CoR, which is their voice at the European level, issues opinions regarding each legislation and political priority of the Commission by virtue of the Treaty of Maastricht. The opinions are not legally binding and even the CoR has stated that the digital space poses several challenges, which the LRAs are not well-equipped to handle, considering their limited jurisdictions and coverage (M˘arcu¸t 2019, p. 9). Faced with the idea of a European dimension of digital policies, local authorities should develop a parallel ecosystem in concordance to their jurisdiction. However, the CoR has identified a few areas in which LRAs should become more significant presences, namely: • Modern e-government services • Modern internet infrastructure to create a bridge between the rural and urban areas • Digital literacy for all citizens • A friendlier environment for digital development (Committee of the Regions 2015, p. 3). The issues identified by the CoR pertain both to the regulation and coordination issues in digital policies. The involvement of LRAs in these areas would not create parallel structures, but rather a great deal of support for this European dimension, especially considering digital literacy and relevant internet infrastructure. The final area stated by the CoR in its Opinion on the DSM points to the next area of involvement of LRAs, both in terms of policy coordination and in mixed initiatives. In the case of the DSM, they could be considered bystanders, but they are also active actors both in developing these parallel instruments and in cooperating at the EU level in other frameworks (M˘arcu¸t 2019). The DSM is the territory of the national authorities, when looking at the DSM strategy, as well as the Digital Europe programme, given the prioritization of big-ticket items, such as high-performance computing.

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The cooperation is less nuanced in a newer publication of the CoR where they tie the future of the “digital revolution” to the need “to support cities and communities in their digital transformation through the multitude of local and regional initiatives to promote the benefits of the Digital Single Market, such as the Connecting Europe Facility initiative WiFi4EU” (European Committee of the Regions 2019, p. 18). According to this view, LRAs require tools and mechanisms directly from the European level to help contribute to the digital revolution. Several areas should be prioritized, namely: • Developing proven digital solutions to larger scales using regional, national and European funds and programmes • Encouraging communication and knowledge transfer “by jointly establishing a repository of validated digital solutions, both for citizens and organisations” • “Monitoring and demonstrating benefits of digital solutions and innovation in a consistent and comparable way across the EU through a set of meaningful indicators (DESI–Local) that can measure the progress made in achieving the Digital Single Market rollout at local/regional level with the involvement of local and regional authorities” • “Developing a series of local dialogues on new digital solutions for local/regional digital services combined with a ‘roadshow’ of digital solutions to take place throughout the EU, in close collaboration with members of the European Committee of the Regions and working closely with the Digital Innovation Hubs” • Creating the necessary conditions for citizens to be prepared for the digital transformation with skills and infrastructure (European Committee of the Regions 2019, p. 18). Apart from the priorities mentioned both in the opinion and in the aforementioned document, the idea of “a digital Europe for all”, as it is described, presents some relevant governance mechanisms, and they all have in common the direct communication between the sub-national and the European levels. However, this connection remains strictly in the fields related to information sharing, knowledge transfer, and funding. The idea of dialogue among LRAs is also present, which signifies the will to bypass national constraints and priorities, thus pointing to an interim

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answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section. States control the involvement of LRAs in issues pertaining to the idea of a panEuropean regulatory framework, where the LRAs are passive actors and must apply the framework decided at the EU level. However, in case of coordination, the roles are slightly different. LRAs can escape the control of states, considering that the latter need the former to attract funding and boost the economic outlook of the MS. Smart specialization illustrates this idea, defined as “an innovative approach that aims to boost growth and jobs in Europe, by enabling each region to identify and develop its own competitive advantages” (Smart Specialization Platform 2019a, p. 1). The guiding principle of smart specialization is that of a bottom-up strategy with no directives imposed by the higher levels, hence by the state. The Communication on boosting innovation in Europe’s regions summarizes this challenge as follows: “we need to anticipate and manage the modernisation of existing economic and societal structures, bearing in mind that today, more than ever, local issues have gone global and global issues have become local” (European Commission 2017d, p. 2). Hence, not only do states need regions to access specific funding, but also the EU needs them in order to be able to tackle the global challenges and EU priorities. The region is a microcosm of the EU, where all policies converge to produce tangible results and they must be included in the governance of policies. Currently, the EU is pursuing this involvement by promoting smart specialization directly from the supranational level, by providing funding, but also by offering a platform for interregional cooperation. The abovementioned communication not only aims to uplift regions for their own development, but also to translate these benefits to the EU level by boosting cooperation among regions and EU policies and by focusing on less developed regions. These are some of the challenges identified by the policy document (European Commission 2017d, p. 2). The multilevel character of these initiatives is not only felt in the interaction of actors, but also in terms of policies. This is why the Communication also discusses about the need to ensure complementarity between EU policies and instruments and presents several instruments from different policy fields that can contribute to the implementation of the smart specialization strategies. For instance, there is complementarity between smart specialization and cohesion policy, which uses the redistribution method discussed by Wallace et al. to implement policies. In this sense, tools, such as the European

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Regional Development Fund or the European Social Fund are instrumental, as they are the main source of funding. The research and technological development policies provide funding with other tools, such as Horizon2020 or Twinning, while other mechanisms, such as the DIH or the Smart Specialization Platform, provide the framework for cooperation and information exchange directly at the European level. The multitude of instruments accessible to the smart specialization strategy is due to the variety of actors involved that have the possibility to access different funds from various sources. This entanglement thus illustrates the importance of actor variety on different levels in governance. The region knows its priorities and opportunities best, which “brings together local authorities, academia, business spheres and the civil society, working for the implementation of long-term growth strategies supported by EU funds” (Smart Specialization Platform 2019a, p. 1). The actors involved are diverse, as well as the priorities pertaining to these strategies, but both are directly tied to the region. Their interaction is based on coordination and cooperation, considering the diverse EU policies that are converging at the regional level, such as research, industry, social policy, etc. To foster this cooperation, the Commission has set up the Smart Specialization Platform, which “advises Member States and regional authorities on how to design and implement their smart specialization strategies. It facilitates mutual learning, data gathering, analysis, and networking opportunities for around 170 EU regions and 18 EU national governments” (European Commission 2017a, p. 4). It is a venue for information exchange, once again proving that the EU level fosters cooperation among actors of various types. The approach of the Union is not to differentiate actors by type, but rather to foster cooperation based on subjects related to smart specialization, in industrial modernization, energy and agri-food, in a series of thematic smart specialization platforms meant to help with information exchange directly on priorities (European Commission 2017d, p. 6). For instance, the industrial modernization platform “aims to support EU regions committed to generate a pipeline of industrial investment projects following a bottom-up approach - implemented through interregional cooperation, cluster participation and industry involvement” (Smart Specialization Platform 2018a). This discussion runs the risk of confusing policies at this point and, hence, it is necessary to extract some of the digital priorities that can come

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across in smart specialization strategies. First, the Communication detailing smart specialization offers some clues for the need to include digital policies within smart specialization. The main issue pertains to digital skills, given that every region requires a prepared and flexible workforce that is able to withstand the challenges of digital transformation. In this sense, the European instrument of cooperation entitled the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition is mentioned as a platform that may help boost skills at a regional level, precisely because this coalition also encourages the participation of regional authorities, as well as business partners or NGOs. Secondly, the Communication discusses the need to have a public administration and a business environment that are ready “to foster innovation and increasing dynamism in product and services markets and improving conditions for the creation and growth of start-ups” (European Commission 2017d, p. 5). If we translate these prerequisites into facets of digital policies, we see that e-governance and e-business are paramount to the development of smart specialization strategies. However, these instances also require the participation of national authorities, which are enablers of such policies. Of course, due to local autonomy in some cases, local authorities are free to pursue their own local policies meant to develop e-governance and e-business. The entanglement between national and local authorities may become a challenge, considering some preferences for centralization, which make take the form of “unbalanced participation of representatives from various sectors including research, industry, higher education, public administration and civil society undermined broader reform efforts” (European Commission 2017d, p. 5). In this instance, the Communication specifically addresses the need to improve MLG, to involve more types of actors. Finally, one cannot discuss about smart specialization without referencing the challenge of digitizing the industry, along with virtually every other aspect of society. The Commission initiative on supporting the digitization of Europe has already been referenced in this research, as a part of the EU outlook. It featured a similar scheme of cooperation and information sharing by actors on the European stage so as to make the transition less difficult, as it is mentioned in the beginning: “a framework for coordination between national and EU-level initiatives in this area and relevant policy actions including investments in digital innovations and infrastructure, accelerating the development of ICT standards, exploring regulatory conditions and adaptation of the workforce, including up-skilling” (European Commission 2016a, p. 2). The strategy also mentions regional

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actors, from companies to authorities, as major players in the pursuit of this policy. Still, the emphasis is on the EU-level coordination of policymakers, which must support the business-led digitization process. The business environment is essential to digital transformation in the view of the EU and, likewise, regional authorities are encouraged to partner with them to identify priorities for that region. This is valid both for smart specialization and for the digitization strategy, with the EU as the platform for communication. In this sense, we must reference the importance of DIHs, as tools for cooperation for industry partners, researchers, and authorities. The technical competences of DIHs range from electronic materials to the Internet of Things, high-performance computing or cybersecurity and they engage in various organizational forms, from public organizations, PPPs to networks and private entities (Smart Specialization Platform 2018b). How many DIHs are regional? What funding do the regional ones get? They all start from the regional level with regional partners, but they can grow their geographical scope due to the agglomeration of partners and services that they provide and considering that their activities do not have only a regional scope, but a global one. An analysis of the data provided by the European Commission using the Smart Specialization Platform presents some interesting results. Figure 3.1 illustrates the fully functional DIHs that have identified themselves as having a regional scope. Out of a total of 278 fully operational DIHs across the EU, 77 have a declared regional scope, either in the sense of the priorities they focus on or on the type of actors involved in the hub. This figure may be underwhelming to the argumentation of the need to pursue such policies at the regional level, but there is another side to this argument It refers to the idea that global issues have become local and local ones have become global, referenced by the Commission. Almost 200 DIHs across the EU have a declared national, European, international or global scale, aiming to provide their own contributions to more complex issues. Also, they all have started with regional partners. Moreover, the declared global or national scope of some DIHs does not mean that the solutions cannot apply directly to the regional. There cannot be smart specialization and innovation at the regional level without the presence of LRAs, which are the closest to the citizen and have the potential to make grassroots improvements. The EU has harnessed this idea by involving authorities in coordination mechanisms meant to bolster innovation and digital policies from the sub-national

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DIHs in the EU by regional scope 25 20 20 15 15

10 7

7

5

3 0

3

2 0

0

1

4

3 0

1

2

2 0

0

0

0

1

2

3 1

0

0

0

0 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK No. of DIHs

Fig. 3.1 DIHs in the EU by identified regional scope (Source Own composition based on Smart Specialization Platform [2018b])

level, but information exchange and specialization are not enough to ensure the success. Funding is key to this discussion and several other referenced policy documents of the Commission have illustrated the need for synergies between innovation or digital policies and cohesion or other types of funding. The Smart Specialization Platform also monitors planned investments in areas related to digital policies by all types of policy funding and shows that a number of 209 regions across the EU are eligible for digital funding within ESIF funding for the 2014–2020 programming period, amounting to a total of 21,402 million Euro (Smart Specialization Platform 2018c). For convenience purposes, the data is broken down by MS and it is available in Fig. 3.2. Poland is the main beneficiary of ICT funding, followed by Italy and Spain. According to the Smart Specialization Platform tracking the funding, 1054 million of Euros out of the total amount for Poland is dedicated to modernization of e-government and building high-speed Internet infrastructure across the country. This is understandable, considering that it lags behind the other MS in the DESI in terms of fixed fast and ultrafast connectivity (European Commission 2019a, p. 4). For this reason, Poland has an entire operational programme for Digital Poland, which is “is designed to consolidate the

4,044 3,376

2,480

57

46

34

8

Finland:

Malta:

Austria:

Netherlands:

6

1.5

Denmark:

68

Luxembourg:

75

Cyprus:

Ireland:

Latvia:

Slovenia:

Estonia:

Sweden:

Bulgaria:

454 371 351 277 223 175 122 102

Lithuania:

CroaƟa:

595 578

United Kingdom:

Portugal:

Romania:

Greece:

Slovakia:

France:

Czech Republic:

Hungary:

Italy:

753

Belgium:

1,069 1,022

Germany:

1,3161,292 1,284 1,222

Poland:

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Spain:

100

ESIF ICT Funding (millions of Euro)

Fig. 3.2 Structural funding for digital challenges. Breakdown by MS (Source Own composition based on Smart Specialization Platform [2018c])

digital foundations of the country’s development, through broad access to high-speed internet, effective and user-friendly public e-services, and growing digital literacy in Polish society as a whole” (European Commission 2019a, p. 3). In the cases of Italy and Spain, the highest proportion of the funding is designated for ICT innovation. Spain focuses on e-government, e-inclusion and digital literacy, as well as ICT services (e-business) and connectivity, while Italy on building fast and ultrafast Internet, smart energy and connectivity. Of course, this type of funding is mostly available through the ERDF and, hence, it should be pursued by the regional actors as well. Moreover, some of the priorities identified directly involve regions, such as smart energy or the idea of promoting connectivity. Hence, funding is another matter by which the EU can provide a boost for regional authorities, although this type of funding also passes through the national level considering the administration of funds. Returning to the initial question of this section, can we argue that states control the involvement of LRAs in digital policies? Based on the vast opportunities for coordination and interregional cooperation offered by the European Union, one cannot safely state that the involvement of LRAs is limited or that MS control their presence. The EU has stepped up its efforts to target them directly also using the WIFI4EU programme, whose mechanism bypasses the national authorities completely (European

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Commission 2019b). The mechanisms, such as smart specialization and DIHs, make it easier for LRAs to connect to European and global issues and directly contribute to major priorities in digital policies. The grassroots connection to the business environment and citizens can only fuel this assumption. The only instance where national control is still pervasive is cohesion policy funding, where national authorities may exert such a control in terms of decisions, evaluation, and implementation of projects. Having established that LRAs do have a presence in the European arena, we must assess their involvement in all the four phases of policymaking crystallized by Marks, Hooghe and Blank. The first phase of policy-making is policy initiation and agenda setting. The involvement of LRAs in this European cycle takes place at the level of the CoR. The CoR is the representative of LRAs in this phase and it presents opinions on hard and soft legislation. It can also draw up position papers, and organize consultations on digital topics. In the second phase, decision-making, there is no direct involvement of LRAs, given that decision-making is split between the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council. The LRAs have a significant role in the third phase, as they are heavily involved in implementing EU funded projects for regional development in digital issues, in DIHs and they play a key role in smart specialization. Finally, LRAs are not directly involved in adjudication, given that the Court of Justice of the European Union is the main actor settling disputes. The idea is that LRAs tend to be more directly involved in the policy initiation and implementation phases, while missing from decisionmaking or adjudication. The diversity of MS polities may obscure their actual presence in the latter functions, but one thing is clear. Regardless of their direct or indirect presence in the phases of the policy cycle, their main focus is to become more relevant partners in various forms, either as critical voices (in the agenda setting phase) or as enablers (in the implementation phase). Either way, there are not to be left out and they certainly are no bystanders. Even so, certain policy documents of the Commission discuss the idea that the public sector should become more innovation-friendly and should embrace the use of ICTs at every stage. Only by doing this, the public sector will develop as an enabler. Even if they are involved indirectly in decision-making at the European level, LRAs still have the ability to design their own local/regional policies in concordance with national and European strategies. This is an instance when European policies can be funnelled to the local or regional level. For instance, the regional development agencies of regions in Romania

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are public bodies, which act independently and devise a regional development strategy. Although the strategy was subjected to an ex-ante evaluation by the Ministry of Regional Development in Romania, it does take into account priorities of the European Union, such as the Europe 2020 strategy, and guiding principles, such as sustainable development, protection of the environment or accessibility (Agent, ia de Dezvoltare Nord-Vest 2015, pp. 8–13). In this example, the region has prioritized digital issues, especially Internet connectivity and research and technological development. In their own manner, they are able to set the agenda directly at the regional or local level, using European tools to achieve the objectives. To generalize, what is motivating the action of LRAs in digital policies? Are they agents or principals? Is it a top-down approach or vice versa? LRAs—Agents or Principals? The previous section has analysed the involvement of LRAs in the MLG of digital policies and it has found that they primarily act as enablers of such policies. As sub-national entities, they do have a degree of autonomy and influence, but they can be dependent on the MS to a lesser or greater extent, depending on the political organization of the MS. What is the interpretation of principal–agent theory in this situation? Firstly, there can be a clash between the principal–agent (PA) theory and MLG with respect to the idea of control. Several papers have seen the principal–agent theory as an alternative to MLG, considering the faults of the latter. Some faults that are often quoted are that MLG does not have any predictive qualities or that it is heavily dependent on the territory (Mendrinou and Tzifakis 2015, pp. 60–61; Stephenson 2013, p. 818). The dependency on territory can be eliminated if we think about actors in terms of the level at which they operate and do not constrain ourselves to the idea of territory. This is especially valid in digital policies, where the idea of territory has shifted and the increasing reach of the digital space requires intervention from every decision-making level. The idea that MLG is a simple explanatory tool is suitable for the analysis of digital policies, considering that the variety of tools and actors involved require an easy model to help make sense of it. MLG does not entail hierarchies and, hence, it does not necessarily entail the control of one actor from one level by another at a higher level. In MLG, control does exist, but it is not based on the idea of lack of trust among the actors involved in policy-making. The two theories are not exact opposites and their combination may be useful in two instances. Primarily, MLG has helped assess the role and place of LRAs in digital

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policies. However, principal–agent theory allows for a proper discussion into their current and prospective level of involvement. A brief overview of this theoretical framework is necessary before delving into the actual analysis. Secondly, the theory focuses on the relations between two entities, namely the principal and the agent. Their relation is defined by a formal or informal contractual agreement by which the principal delegates certain responsibilities to the agent with the expectation that the latter will pursue actions that fulfil the needs of the former. In the case of the European Union, the states are the principals that grant powers and authority to the European body with the expectation that it will follow the objectives and needs of the states. From the outside, this perspective mirrors the state-centric governance model defined by Marks et al. in comparison to MLG. Likewise, states have granted authority to the EU and they have the power to steer the body to their desired political outcomes. The state-centric model discusses the reasons behind the steering of the EU by the states, considering that the EU will be better equipped to pursue some policies or even the idea that they can create a scapegoat for some unpopular measures in their state. These reasons also appear in the PA model. Overall, the principal finds it beneficial for it to pursue this course of action (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017, p. 4). Other reasons include the need to improve policy-making in more technical areas by engaging specialists or the need to resolve a lack of stability in policy-making (Kassim and Menon 2003, pp. 123–124). The focus points of the principal–agent model are the idea of control and the mechanisms used to control the agent. Why is there a need to control the agent? Irrespective of the fact that the sole purpose of the agent is to achieve the outcomes desired by the principal, the agent can begin expressing their own needs and desired outcomes and can also be better informed than the principal (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017, pp. 4– 5). The advent of digital policies is a good example, considering that states have not granted the EU directly the competence to pursue these issues, but the EU has pursued this path having better information about the need to develop a Digital Single Market for all 28 agents. On the other hand, the agent requires sufficient freedom so as to pursue the objectives granted to it by the principal. Hence, there is a delicate balance in terms of interaction between the two and the available information. The EU has justified the development of a regulatory framework for the DSM with socio-economic benefits for all MS. Moreover, the idea of control can be

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materialized in the EU studies with its legitimacy to act in the virtue of the guiding principles of the Union, namely attribution, proportionality and subsidiarity. What is the role of LRAs in this PA model? From the surface, the PA model for the EU analyses the actions of only two parties, namely the MS and the EU. There are many more actors in the EU system than this duality and they too have the means to influence and control the policymaking. Interest groups, such as business associations, have the power to influence policy-making just as much. In digital policies, interested parties and stakeholders are consulted in an essential path towards proper policy-making, considering the technical aspects involved that exceed the competences of the EU-MS duality. The LRAs can function as a double role. They can be agents of the two higher levels nationally or be considered as fully fledged principals. The main idea of this analysis has been that LRAs are not totally dependent and that they can appeal directly to the supranational level when needed. But this architecture has not appeared solely because of the conscious decision of LRAs to pursue this path. The EU has opened channels of communication with them from the beginning of the cohesion policy in the 1980s (Marks et al. 1996). Hence, they have not delegated their responsibilities directly to the EU, as the agent– principal theory postulates. The MS have done so for them, thus making them principals indirectly. The literature describes this system as a chain of delegation (Dür and Elsig 2011; Kersschot et al. 2013). According to this theory, one entity could act both as an agent and as a principal, at a given time and on a given subject. This can be the case for actors in digital policies, but it cannot be generalized for all regions or local authorities, considering the varying autonomous powers that they have in relation to the state. Kersschot, De Bièvre, and Kerremans use the example of Belgian regions to argue for the involvement of sub-national authorities in the EU external economy policy, but Belgian regions have this power as a part of the federal system. Likewise, they formulate two possibilities for the involvement of regions in the chain of delegation. They can be either principals or endorsers and this depends both on their national powers, as well as on the policy concerned (Kersschot et al. 2013, p. 12). If they are a principal, they delegate the state, which delegates the Union, to design policies for them. This delegation is more informal than formal, considering that the citizens are the ultimate principal for both levels and they directly delegate

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both. In the case of digital policies, this delegation ultimately results in funding provided by the Union for digital transformation, boosting Internet connectivity and promoting the development of regions with the help of smart specialization. This is the ideal case when the decision-making process runs smoothly every party has the best information available to do so. However, the authors argue that they do not designate their authority to states or the EU directly (Kersschot et al. 2013, p. 12). They argue that regions are atypical and unintentional principals because they do not choose to designate the authority, given that they have been swept up in the policy-making process by the EU. If they choose to designate their authority, they become a part of the decision-making process. In general, the situation seems rather reversed, given that the EU has chosen to uplift them from the statute of agents with cohesion policy mechanisms. Likewise, the EU has officialized the CoR as a consultative forum. In this instance, they do not have formal control powers over the EU, which is an important aspect for them (Kersschot et al. 2013, p. 12). However, they do have a voice in Brussels. This idea is valid even for digital policies, considering that the EU has introduced a harmonized regulatory framework meant to uplift these policies to the European arena with the Digital Single Market. The only manner in which they could control the DSM process is by using the CoR prerogative of issuing opinions, but this is not control per se, but rather advocacy in good faith. In other aspects of digital policies, they may be better equipped to act as principals, considering that they design smart specialization strategies and come up with their own strategies for digitization, thus being able to provide energy for a critical mass of digital transformation. The ultimate goal of regions as atypical principals is to attempt to develop a mechanism for control. In this sense, the CoR opinion on the DSM has repeatedly argued for more involvement of LRAs in the DSM, as follows: “in connection with the resulting need for adaptation of governance structures, responsibility and the leading role should be assigned to local and regional authorities, as the public sector’s main ‘interface’ with businesses and the general public” (Committee of the Regions 2015, p. 1). The CoR argues for a formalized involvement in the governance, based on the idea that they are in direct contact with the ultimate principal, namely the citizens. The same authors discuss the idea that regions can be endorsers, a term originally coined by Milner (1997). They consider that endorsing refers to the fact that regional authorities are not directly in the chain

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of delegation, but they are more similar to interest groups who aim to have access to information from the ultimate agent, namely the European Commission (Kersschot et al. 2013, p. 17). Another question is relevant here. If the EU has developed its direct interaction with the LRAs, are the latter agents of the EU? The question is difficult to answer, considering that we cannot totally exclude the MS from the discussion. In digital policies, MS contribute to policy-making in the regulatory, as well as in the coordinating phases. LRAs are involved in implementing the DSM legislation, but have no direct rights to influence it. At the same time, an agent possesses a certain degree of autonomy in pursuing several paths that would achieve the principal’s needs. LRAs are autonomous to a certain degree depending on the political system. In digital policies, they can pursue their own regional strategies for smart specialization and engage directly with the EU for funding and information exchange. In this sense, the coordination mechanism and the information exchange could be interpreted as a means of developing information asymmetry between the LRAs and the MS. However, the smart specialization strategies usually must go through the filter of the national authorities and be in concordance to other national strategies. Even in its Communication on the subject, the Commission does not totally exclude national authorities from the mix: “these strategies are a powerful tool that helps translating horizontal policies and instruments at the EU and national level to the regional and local level creating links within broader innovation ecosystems and encouraging social innovation” (European Commission 2017d, p. 3). The national actor is never missing from this equation. This is why LRAs cannot be direct agents of the EU. They can be endorsers or enablers of the policies. Endorsing means acquiring information and using it to leverage other political actors (Kersschot et al. 2013, p. 11). Traditionally, it refers to open support for some entity or some course of action, support that is materialized in various actions. These actions can be directly or indirectly targeting the supporting entity and its courses of action. Then, LRAs have two possibilities. They can either choose one path put forward by the EU to implement such policies locally and regionally. Or, they can choose to become indirect endorsers of digital policies of the Union, with their own set of local policies meant for digital transformation in general. In some manner, virtually all LRAs are direct endorsers, because they have to implement the legislation and also have access to significant funding from the EU to pursue digital projects. Indirect endorsing can refer to local

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smart or digital city strategies that directly target some of the issues in the EU, but they are focused on the local environment. This next section will detail the two aspects of endorsing digital policies. The following cases aim to provide a frame of reference to the possible involvement of LRAs in digital policies at the EU level. They are explanatory and aim to present both a form of experimentation in digital policies from the top to the bottom and vice versa. Indirect Endorsement of Digital Policies: Darmstadt—Digital City Faced with growing digitization and development of EU policies, LRAs can become involved in the digital policies either with structures created by the EU or by pursuing their own strategies. In this sense, the multilevel process can gain an actor that is closest to the citizen. Two different cases have been chosen to illustrate this idea, one is a local authority and the second is a DIH, a structure proposed by the EU that activates in a regional setting. This is the basic research approach for the following sections. The analysis of the following case study is based on an interview performed with key people within a digital transformation project of a local entity, aiming to verify whether LRAs can function as direct or indirect endorsers of digital policies. The interview contains open-ended questions, covering topics related to the specific governance mechanisms and tools meant to implement the digitalization projects, the relation of the local level with the national and European levels in the decision-making and implementation of the projects. The interview took place in October 2018 and the topics are to be presented in this section. A municipality of over 160,000 inhabitants in Germany, Darmstadt has won a national competition to become Germany’s first Digital City in 2017. The competition was organized by Bitkom, “Germany’s digital association” (Bitkom 2018). This is a private association of companies that offer “software, telecommunications and internet services, produce hardware and consumer electronics, operate in the digital media sector or are in other ways affiliated with the digital economy” (Bitkom 2018). Hence, private entities have engaged in an effort to support the digital transformation of cities across Germany, while at the same time advocating for “a strong European digital policy and a fully integrated digital

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single market” (Bitkom 2018). A brief presentation of the project is necessary before discussing its structure and ties to the national and European levels. The idea of a digital city describes a local administration that is deploying digital technologies to virtually every aspect of city life, not only for the sake of using ICTs, but to radically transform city life. Darmstadt is pursuing this avenue by building on the heritage as a city of science and culture and by promoting sustainability and civic participation in the project (Digitalstadt Darmstadt 2018a). The vision of a digital city is more holistic and is first and foremost oriented towards the citizens. Why did Darmstadt win the competition? One of the main reasons was “its balanced inclusion of the various topics and facets of a digital city” (Kai Beckmann 2017). This refers to the idea that a digital city must not focus on only one priority, usually, that being the business sector, rather it must offer the possibility for the daily lives of citizens to transform vastly. Such examples of transformations include smart traffic management, smart parking, sustainable transport, intelligent bins, and city lighting, as well as a complete digitization of the relation between the inhabitant and the administration. In some manner, the idea behind a digital city is different than the idea of smart specialization, considering that the latter aims to focus on a limited set of priorities on which to focus attention and investment. Moreover, smart specialization is concerned directly with innovation, while the digital city project aims to build practical advantages for the citizens and the business environment. However, the starting ground for these two ideas is the same, namely the cooperation of actors from various domains meant to improve the socio-economic outlook of a city or a region. In this sense, the approach of the Darmstadt—digital city project has centred on five core values: civic participation, sustainability, value for citizens, security, and outlook towards the future (Digitalstadt Darmstadt 2018a). All these values underline the major directions of the project, which are mobility and environment, digital services and society, and business and technology. Notwithstanding the tradition of a university city focused on technological development, several challenges have been identified that must be mitigated with a series of projects aimed to build a truly digital city. They are displayed in Table 3.1. So far, 28 projects have been started in the city and citizen participation and feedback is a significant component for the strategy. Citizens can consult the projects. They can

Trade and Tourism

Use of Internet

Logistical challenges in the city due to the development of ecommerce The need for innovative solutions Poor touristic performance of the city

Population growth The need to develop digital skills of citizens The need to attract specialists digital democracy The need for healthcare providers to communicate better between themselves and with patients

Society

Healthcare

Decentralization of energy production Increasing costs of energy infrastructure

Adult education with traditional means Lacking fast connectivity in schools Susceptibility to cyberattacks Threats of data thefts Encryption issues in relation to public authorities Large quantity of data available that is not completely open yet

Challenges

Energy

Data

Digital Public Services

Integration of Digital Technology Integration of Digital Technology Use of Internet

Education

Human Capital Integration of Digital Technology

Cybersecurity

Major topics of the project

Challenges and projects of Darmstadt—digital city

DESI topics

Table 3.1

(continued)

Digital Health Platform to ensure a smooth flow of data between healthcare institutions of all kinds Check-in online to the hospital Darmstadt app for tourists Digital shop window for online shops

“Digital for All”, a project meant to develop the accessibility to digital resources

No projects started yet

The creation of a data platform for the city to develop IoT solutions for the city

Model schools for the digital city House of Digital Media Education No projects started yet

Examples of projects

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IT Infrastructure Security and Civil Protection Culture

Connectivity

Administration

Environment

The need for a common understanding of the importance and potential of digital technologies in industrial production and possible implementation measures Further development of Internet connectivity Deployment of 5G Creative, digital solutions to tackle threats, such as traffic accidents, fires or criminal attacks The need to adapt cultural experiences to the digital city Traffic has been increasing A conflict between the idea of a car-friendly city and new mobility systems Poor air quality because of the traffic Recycling and reducing greenhouse gas emissions Transparency and traceability of information about the services and responsibilities of the administration for citizens The need to improve the interaction between the citizen and the administration

Challenges

GovBot Digital Citizen Communication Digital administration of administrative services

Smart Waste Smart Zoo

A platform that links digitization with science and art, as well as app development Free WIFI in buses and trams Smart parking

Reconnaissance using drones and bodycams for professionals

Smart lighting for the city

No projects started yet

Examples of projects

Source Own composition based on Digitalstadt Darmstadt (2018a), Darmstadt Digitalstadt (2018)

Use of Internet Integration of Digital Technology Integration of Digital Technology Digital Public Services

Mobility

Industry 4.0

Integration of Digital Technology

Connectivity

Major topics of the project

(continued)

DESI topics

Table 3.1

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comment and give feedback on the citizen platform created specifically for them. The challenges and projects envisioned are indeed various and comprehensive, respectively. What is important to recognize is that even a city with a rich culture in technology and research reports issues with the digital skills of its citizens and Internet connectivity. Moreover, other challenges have been also featured in other evaluations of the digital economy and society in the European Union, specifically issues related to e-government, e-commerce, Internet of Things, data protection, etc. Table 3.1 also illustrates the connections between the priorities and the DESI. The majority of the priorities concern the idea of digital technology integration, which is obvious considering the vast transformation envisioned by the project. In some sense, the picture created by this project reflects the European outlook and this project could be replicated to other local or regional administrations that are looking towards digitization more and more. Comparing to the structure of the Digital Economy and Society Index of the Union, we find several matches between priorities. However, considering the cross-sectoral reach of digital policies, it is safe to say that all the priorities of Darmstadt are mirrored in either their regulation or the coordination phases. Some of the sponsors, members in Bitkom, have emphasized this idea precisely: “winning the digital city competition of Germany’s digital economy association Bitkom, the Hessian city is pursuing an ambitious goal: establishing a digital model city with a lighthouse character for Europe” (Mühlner 2019). The connection to the European vision of a digital economy and society is clear. However, the drive has not come from the European Union itself. This is a bottom-up initiative driven by the collaboration between LRAs and private companies that have a vested interest in promoting digital transformation at the local level. The initiative belongs to private actors, namely Bitkom and its members themselves, in collaboration with the German Association of Towns and Municipalities, considering that they support the project directly by contributing their own technologies. For instance, Deutsche Telekom has developed a test-site for 5G in Darmstadt, as well as installed a digital measuring network for air pollutants, which it has developed in collaboration with research institutes in Germany (Mühlner 2019). An analysis performed by the association has shown that 90% of local administrations recognize the benefits of digitalization, but the same percentage

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have admitted that they have yet to design a strategy for this transformation (Strehmann 2019). Proper technological transfer and cooperation between two actors have been the drivers of this type of initiative and the involvement of the private sector is paramount to the successful transformation of a local administration. Given the highly technical character of this challenge, private actors can become partners for the transformation of cities and regions, especially considering the mere fact that they undertake activities at this level, they require labour force and depend on local authorities to help create a stable investment climate. If we analyse this endeavour from the point of view of governance mechanisms, we can first discover an initiative of a networked governance structure, namely Bitkom, which is able to feed expertise to local, national, and European levels, given their vested interest on the subject. They act not under the coordination of public actors, but as their supporters in an innovative fashion. Bitkom held a competition for the German cities, thus attempting to develop a critical mass in other LRAs as well. The local diversity is preserved, given that the private actors have not imposed their vision from the outside. At the same time, the implementation is dependent on reporting to the constituents and to the interested private actors, as well as on the participation of citizens, whose feedback is relevant for this phase. Goals can be revised and, at the same time, there are no hierarchies in the actors involved in the implementation of the project. They act at a sub-national level, but have the desire to internationalize this model of cooperation. If this succeeds, it can be an example of a development MLG mechanism for digital policies. Is there an experimental character to this endeavour? Firstly, the broad goals from the experimentalist model are translated in this example in the competition to name Germany’s first digital city and the participants have designed their own version of the project. Secondly, the winner, Darmstadt, has pursued this idea starting from the city’s experience with science and technological innovation, creating certain projects meant to achieve the vision of a digital city in collaboration with private entities. The third step in experimentalism describes the reporting phase, where the local unit reports to the central one on what has been achieved. In this case, this reporting has transformed into an active collaboration with the stakeholders and private actors. The final phase, the evaluation, and re-design are translated into citizen participation and the constant feedback that the project receives. The final steps are continuous in the project and do not exactly occur in a phase system. Even the main strokes of this project

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point towards the idea of experimentalism in public policies, considering the multi-stakeholder approach, the lack of hierarchy and the involvement, etc. The project features multiple actors, both in the competition and in the implementation phases. So far, three major actors have been identified in the governance of the project, namely the private IT companies together with Bitkom, the local administration, and the citizens. Still, the governance structure has more to offer. The decisions are taken place in a deliberative manner with no hierarchical structure. One could argue that it resembles the idea of a deliberative and direct polyarchic structure presented by Sabel and Zeitlin in their research on experimentalist governance. The governance structure of the Digital City project presents some innovative features by itself and its presentation is relevant in order to assess the cooperation between actors and the implementation. The coordinator of the project is a Digitalstadt Darmstadt GmbH, a corporation set up specifically for this purpose oversees the pillars and the projects. The corporation involves both public and private actors and stakeholders in the decision-making system (Bitkom 2019, p. 53). Hence, the main action points of the strategy have their own coordinator, which advances projects for the city, in consultation with the public corporation. Klaus-Michael Ahrend, one of the key people in the project described the decision-making process in an interview for this research. The key topics of the interview held with the project manager for digital transformation were the actors involved in the conceptualization and implementation of the project, the expertise involved in the project, the relation with the national and European levels, the cooperation with other local authorities, as well as about certain best practices that could be shared with other authorities across Europe. Within the public corporation, there is also a steering committee that provides the major guidelines. The committee consists of professionals in the field, as well as the local and regional administration of Darmstadt. More specifically, the Mayor and the Minister President for the region, the project manager of the Digital City (the interviewee for this section), as well as a representative from the development department in the city administration and the Chief Digital Officer (CDO) are members of the steering committee (Klaus-Michael Ahrend 2018). Nevertheless, the interviewee has stated that the mayor makes the final decision regarding the issue, which is not a very common fact in Germany. The CDO position has been a novel idea for a local administration, as he has been

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tasked with advising “the city on how to use the possibilities of digitization for the benefit of citizens and businesses” (Darmstadt Digitalstadt 2017). The position is a consultative one and has been granted to an academic, an expert in cybersecurity and data protection. Overall, the overseeing mechanism does not feature private actors, pointing to the idea that local autonomy is respected in the implementation of the project. The involvement of the private companies within Bitkom has been described as pro bono, but they also have the chance to test and implement their solutions within this model for a digital city (Digitalstadt Darmstadt 2018b). The system could be described as a private–public partnership, as the private party supplies expertise, while the public sector provides guidance and is in charge of implementation with the help of experts and academia. At the same time, the involvement of the research and IT sectors has been paramount to the development of the project, according to Ahrend (Klaus-Michael Ahrend 2018). However, the transition to a new type of city also means the development of new economic models and, for this reason, the project required also expertise from people with a strong economic background involved in the local economy, which deal with new economic models. The digital transformation of a city requires multidisciplinary expertise and the main suppliers of expertise in the projects are the practitioners in IT, economy and business administration. However, the academic sector seems rather to be on the sidelines, as Ahrend has stated that they give scientific input to the project, being partners in the generation of new ideas (Klaus-Michael Ahrend 2018). We can deduce a direct and deliberative structure of governance from the statements of the interviewee. A steering committee with actors from various structures is in charge of providing oversight. Moreover, the development of the project involved actors from various domains, who challenged the traditional views of a smart city and provided impetus for the creation of a model city. Similarly, each of the 14 action points of the project have a coordinator with its own expertise in the technical field that they oversee. The coordinator advances projects to the public corporation in charge of the implementation. Here as well, the cycle of cooperation between coordinators, the public entity, the steering committee, and the mayor, seeks to be as inclusive as possible and there is a constant feed of expertise between the technical experts and the decision-makers. However, there is a difference in the implementation phase in the way in which decisions are taken. The interviewee has stated that the final

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decisions belong to the mayor himself, after the consultation of the committee and the CDO. We can deduce a polyarchic structure with information and expertise feeding from the bottom to the top, whose task is to challenge the status-quo and create a city model. There is no evident hierarchy, given that each interested party involved has the task to provide their own expertise and guidance for the best decisions. The presence of multiple stakeholders and the input of citizens involved in the process is able to offer various experiences to the project in a field where experts still recognize uncertainty. Another point that requires further analysis and that has been discussed with the interviewee regards the relationships with the national and European levels. The relations with the upper decision-making levels are considered loose, compared to the involvement of the private sector, whose support is considered paramount (Klaus-Michael Ahrend 2018). Moreover, the European level does not have any type of involvement in any matter in the digitization of the city. The interviewee discussed also the relations with the national level and other regional cooperation, which he has described again as loose connections with no close linkages. Organizations representing the city and regional administrations are familiar with the project, considering also that the German Association of Towns and Municipalities has consulted on the project. Given that the aim of the project is also to become a model for future cities, the interviewee has also insisted on the idea to share the strategy and best practices at a national level. In this sense, the Association of Towns and Municipalities has supported these initiatives, while the federal authorities are said to be familiar with the project (Klaus-Michael Ahrend 2018). The discussion reveals a bottom-top quality of the endeavour to model a digital city out of Darmstadt. While a private association has set only the broad goals, the local administration has harnessed the expertise of local interested parties to create a plan tailored to the local environment, but which also can serve as a model for others in terms of some universal challenges for a city and in terms of collaboration with other parties. In this sense, the interviewee has revealed a series of best practices for similar bottom-up initiatives: • creation of an organization that involves multiple interested parties and political backing for the project is crucial in this phase; • acquiring support from public and private actors that could secure financing for the project;

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• ensuring the cooperation with external actors that could provide guidance and knowledge to the project, even in a joint venture capacity. The externalization of such a project is not recommended; • securing the involvement of the public in the development of the strategy and project (Klaus-Michael Ahrend 2018). Hence, a multi-stakeholder structure, combined with fundraising capacities and expertise from within the local administration are some of the principles for the digital transformation of the city. The in-house approach is considered paramount to the success of the project, as it guarantees further commitment to implementation. Although the interviewee discussed the need for the European level to get involved more in such initiatives, the idea of European financing is missing from these best practices, although it could be circumscribed under the idea of public support from the project. The example of Darmstadt illustrates the indirect endorsement of digital policies in the European Union because it follows some of the principles the EU is using for policy design at the EU level, namely a multi-stakeholder approach, the idea of embracing the diversity of MS and adapting it to their national spectrum within the cooperation facet of digital policies. Moreover, Darmstadt aims to implement certain policies that are priorities at the EU level, namely digital literacy, or digitization of local administration. The local administration has control over the implementation, while the EU must rely on the other decision-making levels. This initiative might seem rather isolated, considering the remarks that there are loose linkages with other cities and the promotion of the project is an initiative of Darmstadt and not of other interested cities. Nevertheless, these local strategies can be upscaled to the national or international levels and are useful for the digital transformation of the continent. Cluj Digital Innovation Hub The previous example illustrates a manner by which the local authorities can contribute indirectly to digital policy objectives in the European Union. The project illustrated an example of collaboration between the private and the public sectors, with measures and projects aiming to become models of digital transformation for other European cities. This indirect effort does not match European policy objectives perfectly, but has the ability to become an example not only in terms of measures, but

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also in terms of actor involvement in decision-making and implementation. The theoretical discussion also talked about a direct involvement into digital policies of the European Union, where LRAs are encouraged to participate in various governance structures within the grand effort of coordination in digital policies. The DIHs have been referenced before in this research, but they require a proper discussion and exemplification into how they relate to the other actors and how they contribute directly to European policy objectives. Transylvania DIH has been chosen for this analysis. It is one of the almost 300 DIHs currently operating in the European Union, defined by the EU “as ecosystems that consist of SMEs, large industries, startups, researchers, accelerators, and investors. They aim to create the best conditions for long-term business success for all involved” (Digital Single Market—European Commission 2019a). According to the definition, they do not necessarily include LRAs within their architecture. Their role is to boost bottom-up digital innovation, according to the EU’s digitization strategy, but they require a proper framework to do so, as well as the support of regions and cities. In this sense, the EU’s smart specialization approach exemplifies this idea with examples of regions that have prioritized ICT whose innovation levels are higher (European Commission 2016a, p. 8). The strengthening of the innovation capacity of a region can be pursued with structural funds available for regions that have placed ICT as a priority (European Commission 2016a, p. 8). Although the presence of LRAs is indirect, the involvement of the EU at the regional level is direct, with the creation of DIHs and the fact that they offer a framework for funding for them. As a matter of fact, the Commission has had a proposed action “to mobilise regions with no Digital Innovation Hub to join and invest” within the digitization strategy (European Commission 2016a, p. 8). Then, the European involvement is direct, manifested in the form of financial and technical support. The example of the Transylvania DIH is significant because it has been developed within a region that has prioritized ICT and a city that has become an ICT pole for the region (Agent, ia de Dezvoltare Nord-Vest 2018, p. 34). At the same time, the region’s smart specialization strategy characterizes the innovation climate of the region as incoherent in terms of actor cooperation (Agent, ia de Dezvoltare Nord-Vest 2018, p. ii). Its SWOT analysis states that the innovation climate is disconnected from loose cooperation among actors (Agent, ia de Dezvoltare Nord-Vest 2018,

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p. 47). The presence of a DIH in a region can boost the interaction among actors and the Transylvania DIH can integrate well within the ecosystem. The architecture of the DIH has built upon the presence of an IT cluster (Transilvania IT cluster) in Cluj-Napoca, a Romanian city with tradition in ICT development. The main stakeholders are other clusters, as well as the regional and local authorities: “Municipality of Cluj-Napoca, Babes, -Bolyai University, Technical University of Cluj-Napoca, Regional Development Agency North – West” (Transilvania IT Cluster 2017). Its declared mission is to “to identify collaborative projects for digitalisation” and the objective is “to stimulate technologically innovative capabilities in order to support them delivering [sic!] the products/services in the European Digital Single Market” (Smart Specialization Platform 2019b). The main focus is regional, with an emphasis on digitization of activities in a sub-national framework. The entanglement of actors, as well as the priorities involved target one of the challenges of Romania in general, which is reflected in the DESI results that rank the country among the last in the European Union (European Commission 2019c). A short analysis of the activities of the DIH reveals that its main concern revolves around digital transformation in the form of developing Internet infrastructures, digitization strategies for local authorities, networking for SMEs and other stakeholders or knowledge transfers (Smart Specialization Platform 2019b). One example of the contribution of the DIH to the digital transformation of LRAs is the contribution to the smart city strategy of Cluj-Napoca that contains domains, such as: “eGovernance, Open Mobility, eHealth, Sharing Economy, eEducation, interaction with other cities, citizens’ safety, renewable energy, consumer education to reuse, hazard report, risk management” (Smart Specialization Platform 2019b). The domains chosen for the strategy resemble some of the priorities of the Darmstadt digital city. In a similar manner to that project, the private sector, as well as technical expertise, have played an important role in the development of the strategy, while the LRA was involved directly in implementation. Similarly, the involvement of the DIH with the local authorities does not stop here, as it has contributed to the strengthening of the connections between the private sector and the local authorities in Cluj-Napoca (Smart Specialization Platform 2019b). Moreover, it has contributed to the smart specialization strategy of the North-West Region.

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In terms of the relations of the DIH with the local and European levels, the examples showcase the close connection between the DIH and its components with them. In this case, the DIH is able to contribute directly to the implementation of digital policies at the local level not only with expertise to authorities, but also with its presence as an aggregator of private actors, whose experience is shared at the European level by means of the Pan-European Network of DIHs. Considering that Transilvania DIH exists within an already established regional cluster, the discussion about its governance structure is redundant. The governance is based on private membership within the cluster. The relation with the public sector is based on a horizontal partnership on mutually interesting domains. The presence of DIH within the European level is encouraged within the Smart Specialisation Platform, as well as the Digital Jobs and Skills Coalition. The original cluster has developed projects with structural funds, in terms of labour specialization, support for the eIDAS implementation in Romania or boosting the presence of the city of Cluj within the innovation environment at the European level (Aries Transilvania 2015). Hence, the contribution of clusters and DIH to digital policies can materialize mainly with structural funding, but they also are able to offer expertise both to local actors and to the private sector in terms of digital transformation. The self-identified regional character of the DIH refers to the fact that it aims to tackle regional challenges, such as building digital skills or promoting knowledge transfers, for the sake of regional development. Compared to the digital city project analysed in the previous section, this DIH may as well not be a model, but it can be a recipient of expertise within the pan-European framework for knowledge sharing that the EU has created.

A New Model of Governance for Digital Policies The final section of this chapter is meant to be a more theoretical exercise into how digital policies can evolve towards a new model of governance. First of all, why do digital policies require a new model? The European Union has worked better when it has had a clear goal to accomplish and this is valid for the Single Market, for the Economic and Monetary Union, and for the Digital Single Market. The implementation of the DSM strategy is at the end and, with the advent of another College of Commissioners, whose mission is not clear yet, the future of digital policies has no

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clear goal for the near future. There are some clues to what it would look like and this is apparent from a Council document, as such “a horizontal and forward-looking consistent digital policy, which is evidence-based, promotes security by design and enables new technologies and business models without imposing unnecessary burdens and cost nor obstacles to innovation” (Council of the European Union 2019, p. 4). The characteristics of the future digital policy are rather broad (forward-looking, evidence-based, etc.), but it does not have a clear goal in mind. Another clue to the future digital policy is the Digital Europe Programme, the first pan-European framework for financing towards digital transformation. However, as it has already been emphasized, the funding is used primarily for “strategic digital capacities” of the Union (Digital Single Market—European Commission 2019b). The development of this funding phase of digital policies has started even earlier, with major priorities of cohesion policies targeting digital challenges of regions and MS in general. After that, programmes, such as WIFI4EU, have contributed to the advancement of this funding phase. Essentially, this is an attempt at public investments directly guided by the European Union, in areas where “no single Member State alone can ensure the level required for digital success” (European Commission 2018b, p. 3). The European Union is counting on the need for strengthened collaboration for MS for the sake of achieving economic advantages and a certain level of strategic autonomy to the Union. At the same time, such a programme requires the involvement of multiple actors, other than public authorities either nationally or locally. For instance, the implementation of the facet of Digital Europe regarding digital literacy is planned to be implemented through European Digital Hubs, which would exist in each MS (European Commission 2018b, p. 12). Funding for other areas is also planned to be under direct management. The involvement of MS may be reduced under this proposal. This new model of governance bypasses the idea of MS supremacy in regulation, as well as the respect to national diversity within the open method of cooperation. Drawing conclusions from this research, we can design a series of broad strokes that would characterize this new type of digital policy described by the Commission in the proposal. The centre of this new policy design could move to the Commission, although it will still rely on the classical decision-making process to adopt legislation. Evidence to this fact stands the crystallization of the Digital Single Market as a fully fledged concept in the European arena, as well as

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the new Digital Europe project that is based on direct or indirect funding from the EU to top players in the field. Considering its technical, as well as strategic value, the digital priorities of the European Union will surely be in the top priorities of the Union, but the key is the collaboration with the MS for the constant advancement of regulation in the field. Current regulation on the Digital Single Market should be revised in accordance with the new development in the field of digital technologies and, hence, there is a need for a renewed commitment of MS towards this area. The idea of a Digital Europe programme points to the fact that the Commission is to control certain areas to a stronger extent, while MS are still responsible for their own national investments towards their own national challenges, such as digital transformation of the industry, development of e-commerce, e-government, etc. DESI is an evaluator of the performances of MS, but, as the experimentalist governance framework discusses, direct and deliberative discussions and sharing of best practices could be one of the keys to advanced progress. Policy coordination towards European goals is still the norm, but the coordination with access to more funding is a stronger incentive for MS. Nevertheless, the mere existence of funding can remain at the disposal of MS, as per the decision-making process. Another marker of a new digital policy refers to the presence of multiple actors within the new governance process, from the growing presence of regulatory authorities to the growing involvement of LRAs. The presence of regulatory authorities has been slowly building with increasing competences, from the EU Cybersecurity Agency to the European Data Protection Supervisor. However, their presence is still dependent on a developing legislative framework that would strengthen their responsibilities. On the other hand, the growing involvement of LRAs does not really require a hard-legislative framework, it only requires a strengthened commitment towards cooperation and further acknowledgement of the potential of local authorities to devise digital policies and work towards the achievement of European goals. This chapter includes examples of types of the possible involvement of LRAs within the chain of the delegation of the European Union. Finally, the governance of digital policies is highly dependent on the idea of changing goals and metrics, considering the future challenges ahead in relation to digital transformations. This is why the Commission relies on experts and comitology for technical knowledge, but regardless of the amount of information acquired, the goals of digital policies

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will certainly change, meaning that its architecture must be flexible and focused on the development of the EU level.

Conclusion This chapter has covered a multitude of topics surrounding the governance of digital policies. Using two theoretical frameworks, namely MLG and experimentalist governance, the research has uncovered a series of features of digital policies, as well as manners to improve policy-making. Considering the sui generis character of the Union, policy-making is witnessing a phase of experimentation, combined with the development of European supremacy and the empowerment of more diverse actors, such as LRAs. They can contribute directly or indirectly to the policy cycle but, as the case studies have shown, their contributions are valuable considering that they are the closest to the citizen. Special acknowledgement is due to the Project Manager of the Darmstadt Digital City for the information provided for this chapter.

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Conclusion: Towards a New Competence for the Union?

The subtitle of this research places an interesting question regarding the creation of another competence of the Union regarding digital policies. Previous research in this field has already revealed this idea, but it can seem rather difficult to pursue this avenue simply because of the transversal character of digital in virtually every policy area of the Union. Considering that the EU is already acting in this field, one might consider that the EU already has certain competences to tackle these issues. And it does, it promotes regulations and a general harmonized framework for the Digital Single Market, while it pursues the coordination of efforts for other issues. The paths to action of the Union are complicated and the aim of this publication has been to attempt to uncomplicate them, as well to pursue other avenues by which policies could have an improved effect. Such an endeavour has required exploration into the governance of digital policies, especially regarding the main actors involved and their interactions in the decision-making and implementation phases. First, the research uncovered the major points of interaction between the national and European levels ever since the first instances in the evolution towards digital policies. The assumption had been that the Member States had controlled the decision-making and implementation of policies related to information and communication technologies. The tracking of the evolution towards digital policies has indeed seen the control of Member States, especially as a reluctancy to deliver more funding for research © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. M˘arcu¸t, The Governance of Digital Policies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38073-1

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or reluctancy towards regulation that does not necessarily fit their preferences. Such examples include the delays in the negotiation for Framework Programmes in the 80s and 90s or, more recently, prolonged negotiations for big-ticket items, such as copyright, data protection or roaming. The European level, represented by the Commission, had been limited in its ability to push for more investments and regulations in this domain. The Open Method of Coordination designed to fit the preferences and diversity of MS was not a successful strategy for the entrance in the new millenium. Embracing the lack of a clear regulatory framework as a possible economic loss for the economies of MS was one of the keys towards the elevation of the Commission as a forefront actor in digital policies. Even so, the research has shown that MS are still eager to express their preferences within the updated decision-making system currently functioning in the EU and, more often than not, informal negotiations between the big actors are necessary to push through deadlock. Another important point in the development of digital policies has been the uplifting of regulatory authorities, both nationally and at a European level. Although in some cases their powers are still restricted, they have been elevated by the Commission as significant players in digital policies. Their development is a sign of the Europeanization of digital policies. Secondly, the governance of digital policies takes place in some major instances, depending on the pursued objective. The regulation phase has taken over in the recent years, once the Digital Single Market has become a priority for the Commission. At the same time, the cross-sectoral character of these policies still means that some issues are still controlled by the MS and, thus, require several innovative mechanisms. In this case, the Commission actively pursues the idea coordination of actors and policies. It also appeals to other actors, from regulatory agencies to experts and stakeholders to feed their technical expertise required for issues, such as disinformation, digital literacy, digital transformation or development of next-level infrastructure (5G). While it cannot really regulate in this avenue, the Commission provides a space for sharing best practices and receiving feedback from interested parties. At the same time, this multiplication of actors could also dilute the control of MS. In this sense, the research has applied some theoretical frameworks to help make sense of digital policies. The experimentalist governance framework has helped with the understanding of the relations between the European and national levels, while multilevel governance was applied

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to explore the idea that sub-national authorities are present to some extent in this governance and that their presence should be enhanced. The idea of experimentation in digital policies comes from the continuous development of ICT, meaning that goals constantly change, because the electronic frontier is constantly moving. Experimentation also means that states can still pursue their policies autonomously, but they are subjected to European control and evaluation, which is actually the case in the coordination phase of digital policies. At the same time, experimentalism states that a wider circle of actors involved in policy-making could extend the reach and success of digital policies. This is where MLG has entered the framework, whose core idea is that sub-national authorities are empowered by the European level directly, thus skipping the national decision-making process. LRAs have been present in European policies mainly in cohesion and as recipients of structural funds for regional development. However, they have grown in importance with the idea of smart specialization and digitization of the European industry. The involvement of LRAs has been analysed in direct relation to the EU by virtue also of the principal–agent theory. This exploration reveals that LRAs could be involved in digital policies, as either direct or indirect endorsers of policies. This idea originates in the rather peculiar relation between them and the EU within the chain of delegation. The research exemplifies these two instances with two local initiatives. One is the project for the digital transformation of Darmstadt and it can serve as a bottom-top example for replication, while the other, Transylvania DIH, reveals a top-bottom initiative in digital policies. The two theoretical frameworks applied in this research do not necessarily point to the idea that a greater control by the EU level due to a renewed competence in digital policies would be the best fit for the current state of affairs. More regulation does not always produce the best results and top to bottom solutions may miss some local aspects. A relaxation of MS preferences and the widening circle of actors derive as solutions from the experimentalist governance framework, while MLG discusses the involvement of sub-national authorities that can bring the benefits of digital policies directly to the citizen. The agenda of the European Union after the Digital Single Market strategy has yet to come and, so far, the Union has presented the Digital Europe programme, the first pan-EU spending programme for digital policies. However, the funding

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has been designed for big-ticket items, such as high-performance computing or artificial intelligence, missing the lower and probably as important issues.

Index

A agent, 3, 17, 40, 91, 102–104, 106, 131

B Bangemann report, 27, 33, 34, 36, 42 Barroso Commission, 24 benchmarking, 9, 34, 44, 47, 49, 50, 82, 86 BEREC, 10, 14, 43, 53–55, 58, 85

C cohesion policy, 6, 14, 89, 95, 101, 104, 105 comitology, 10, 18, 71, 121 Committee of the Regions. See CoR coordination, vi, vii, 2, 14, 18, 23, 33, 34, 38, 41, 43–45, 47, 49–51, 67, 69, 71–76, 82, 84–86, 90, 91, 93, 95–98, 100, 106, 111, 112, 117, 121, 129–131 copyright, 24, 57, 69, 70, 77, 84, 87, 88, 92, 130

CoR, 93, 94, 101, 105 Council, 13, 14, 29, 30, 33, 41, 42, 44, 46, 48–50, 52, 53, 55–57, 77, 79, 80, 84, 90, 91, 101, 120 cyberspace, 1

D Darmstadt, vii, 84, 89, 107–109, 111–113, 115, 116, 118, 131 decision-making, vi, vii, 2–7, 9, 15, 17, 18, 26, 29, 30, 40, 41, 51, 52, 54, 57–59, 66, 69, 76, 77, 81, 84, 85, 91, 92, 101, 102, 105, 107, 113, 115–117, 120, 121, 129–131 decision-making process, vi, vii, 3, 5, 6, 9, 17, 52, 54, 57, 84, 91, 105, 113, 120, 121, 131 Delors Commission, 22, 24, 29, 32 Delors, Jacques, vii, 22–24, 26, 29, 30, 32–34, 40, 92 Digital Agenda for Europe, 16, 23, 36, 49–51, 68, 78, 80, 82

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. M˘arcu¸t, The Governance of Digital Policies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38073-1

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134

INDEX

digital city, vii, 89, 107–112, 114, 115, 118, 119 digital competence, vii, 73, 74 Digital Economy and Society Index, 16, 66, 84, 99, 111, 118 Digital Europe, 41, 51, 68, 90, 93, 120, 121, 131 Digital Innovation Hubs, 70, 74, 80, 94, 98, 117 digital policies, v–vii, 2, 3, 6, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 21–23, 26, 27, 34–36, 38–40, 43, 49, 51–54, 58, 59, 66–72, 74–93, 97, 99, 100, 102–107, 111, 112, 116, 117, 119–122, 129–131 Digital Single Market, vi, 2, 9, 10, 16, 18, 23, 25, 26, 35–37, 41, 51, 52, 57, 58, 67, 68, 70, 76–79, 81, 82, 85, 87, 88, 93, 94, 103, 105, 118–120, 129–131 Digital Single Market strategy, vi, 16, 41, 51, 68, 77–79, 131 digital skills, 2, 11, 37, 67, 72, 74, 75, 78, 82, 84, 86, 88–90, 97, 109, 111, 119 digital space. See cyberspace digital transformation, 11, 82, 87, 88, 92, 94, 97, 98, 105–107, 111, 113, 114, 116, 118–121, 130, 131 digitization, 2, 36, 41, 70, 72, 74, 78, 82, 87, 89, 97, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 114–118, 131 E e-commerce, 24, 25, 36, 53, 56 eEurope, 34, 36, 44–50 ENISA, 10, 14, 43, 54, 58, 85 ESPRIT, 27, 29, 40, 70 EU governance. See European governance EU institutions, 8, 50, 52, 74

EU level. See European level EUREKA, 28 European Commission, 7, 8, 22, 24, 38, 39, 45, 50, 52, 54, 67, 68, 72, 78, 79, 81, 88, 98, 106 European Council. See Council European Economic Community (EEC), 22, 29, 30, 78 European governance, 4, 7, 8, 12 European level, vi, 2, 3, 7, 13, 16–18, 22, 23, 34, 40, 42–44, 46–51, 56, 59, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 85, 93, 94, 96, 101, 115, 116, 119, 130, 131 European Union, v, vi, 1–11, 14–18, 24–27, 31–33, 35, 36, 39, 43, 51–53, 55–57, 66, 68, 69, 71, 76, 77, 81, 87, 90, 100–103, 111, 116–121, 131 experimentalist governance, vi, 2, 3, 15–18, 36, 47, 51, 52, 76–79, 81, 83, 84, 86, 87, 113, 121, 122, 130, 131 F Framework Programme, 29 G GDPR, 11, 37, 83, 85, 87 geo-blocking, 25, 55, 77, 80, 87, 88 governance, v, vii, 2–15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 37–40, 43–47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 59, 66–68, 71, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 85–88, 90–92, 94–96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 112–114, 117, 119–122, 129, 130 Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs, 67 H hierarchy, 11

INDEX

I i2010, 34, 36 implementation, vi, 3, 8, 11–13, 17, 18, 28, 29, 37, 46–52, 67, 74, 76, 79, 85, 86, 95, 96, 101, 107, 110, 112–114, 116–120, 129 industry policy, 24, 84 information and communication technologies (ICTs), 2 information society, 23, 27, 31–36, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47–49, 67, 78, 80, 84 innovation policy, 29–34 internal market policy, 23, 24, 26, 75 Internal Market programme, 24, 26

J Juncker Commission, 24, 25

L liberalization, 23, 24, 33, 41–43 Lisbon Strategy, 33, 43, 47 local/regional authorities. See LRAs LRAs, 3, 18, 87, 88, 90, 92–94, 98, 100–102, 104–107, 112, 117, 118, 121, 131

M Maastricht Treaty, 30 Member States (MS), vi, 3, 9–11, 14–17, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32–35, 37–42, 44–50, 52–58, 66, 68, 71–75, 77, 81–92, 95, 96, 99–104, 106, 116, 120, 121, 129–131 multilevel governance (MLG), vi, 3, 14, 17, 18, 86, 88–90, 92, 97, 102, 103, 122, 131

135

N national level, 3, 6, 11, 16, 17, 22, 39, 42–44, 46, 48, 52–56, 58, 59, 71, 76, 82, 83, 85, 88, 100, 106, 115 networks, 9, 12, 14, 24, 30–32, 35, 48, 71, 98 new governance, 8, 9 new modes of governance, 9, 13, 18 O old governance, 9 OMC, 34, 44–48, 74, 84 online platforms, 15, 25, 69, 70, 90 P Parliament, 13, 30, 34, 41, 46, 49, 50, 53, 55, 69, 77, 79, 91, 101 policy-making, vi, 2, 3, 5–7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 22, 38, 48, 49, 66, 67, 69–71, 76, 79, 91, 101–106, 122, 131 policy networks, 12, 89 polity, vi, 3, 4, 15, 17, 38, 88 principal, 17, 88, 102–106, 131 private actors, 4–6, 11, 12, 28, 34, 35, 40, 66, 69, 72, 76, 111–115, 119 private sector, 32, 34, 35, 44, 48, 50, 112, 115, 118, 119 R regulation, vi, vii, 8–11, 13, 24, 25, 31, 37, 51, 53–57, 67, 69, 71, 75–79, 83–86, 88, 91, 93, 111, 120, 121, 130, 131 regulatory authorities, vi, 9, 10, 43, 59, 69, 72, 75, 121, 130 Research and technological development policy. See RTD policy

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INDEX

roaming, 55, 69, 76–79, 87, 88, 92, 130 RTD policy, 27, 29–32, 35 S self-regulation, 11, 83 shadow of hierarchy, 11–14, 39, 51, 66 Single European Act, vi, 26, 27, 29, 40 smart specialization, 74, 95–98, 101, 105, 106, 108, 117, 118, 131 structural funds, 18, 87, 89, 117, 119, 131 sub-national authorities, vi, 2, 18, 88, 89, 92, 104, 131

sub-national level, 2, 99, 112 subsidiarity, 37, 47, 51, 57, 69, 70, 74, 80, 104 supranational level. See European level

T Transylvania Digital Innovation Hub, vii, 117 trilogue, 54, 55

W White Paper on European Governance, 7, 9 WIFI4EU, 87, 92, 100, 120