The German Policy of Revolutionary France: Volume 2 The German Policy of Revolutionary France: A Study in French Diplomacy during the War of the First Coalition, 1792-1797, Volume 2 [Reprint 2013 ed.] 9780674734500, 9780674730267

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The German"Policyof Revolutionary France %

a· V O L U M E II

1

The German Policy of Revolutionary France A Study in French Diplomacy during the War of the First Coalition

1792-1797

Sydney Seymour Biro χ V O L U M E II

1957 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts

© Copyright, 1957 By the President and Fellows of Harvard College

Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press London

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 56-9370 Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

PART IL THE DIRECTORY Berlin and Campo-Formio I.

T H E DIRECTORY T A K E S OVER THE REINS

1. The New Government 2. The First Directors 3. The State of France at the Commencement II.

GENERAL

PRINCIPLES

OF FOREIGN

of the Directory

POLICY

1. The Directory and the Natural Boundaries 2. Factors Conditioning Foreign Policy 3. Delacroix's Plan of Pacification III.

THE

1. 2. 3. 4. IV.

V.

THE

DIRECTORY

EARLY

DIRECTORY

AND

501 506 510

AUSTRIA

514 521 522 527

7795

PRUSSIA

The Line of Neutrality Again in Question France, Prussia, and Hanover The Policy of Prussia under the Leadership of Haugwitz France, Prussia, and the Left Ban\ of the Rhine France, Prussia, and the Leadership of Germany EARLY

OCTOBER

DIRECTORY

26,

POTERATZ

AT

1. Poteratz 2. Degelmann

AND THE LEFT

1795-AuGusT

ι. The Forced Loan 2. The Administrative VI.

AND

The Second Mission of Poteratz to Vienna Carletti Madame Royale The Franco-Austrian Armistice of December

THE

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

EARLY

23,

483 488 498

BANK

OF THE

530 532 533 536 538

RHINE,

1796

Organization of the Left Ban\

539 546

BASEL

and Wic\ham

Approach

Barthélémy

551 556

vi VII.

CONTENTS ENDEAVORS TO COERCE A U S T R I A BY A C T I N G U P O N

HESSE-

CASSEL AND T U R K E Y , AND RAISING THE SPECTER OF POLAND

χ. Rivalz at Cassel 2. Aubert-Dubayet at Constantinople 3. Poland as a Factor in the Directory's German Policy VIII.

POTERATZ WESTERN

IX.

AND THE PLAN

OF A REPUBLIC

IN

559 562 562

SOUTH-

GERMANY

SOUTHWESTERN

568

GERMANY

AFTER

THE WITHDRAWAL

OF

POTERATZ

1. The Directory Deserts the Swabian "Patriots" 2. The Franco-Swabian Armistices, July ιη, 25, and 27, ιηφ 3. Frankjort-on-the-Main X.

THE

EMPEROR

582 586 594

WAVERS

1. The War and the Nobles of Austria 2. Gallo at Basel 3. The Frisching Negotiation XI.

THE

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN

TREATY

596 597 599

OF BERLIN,

AUGUST

5,

1796

ι. The Line of Neutrality Once Again 2. Two Treaties Demanded by France 3. The Treaty Signed XII.

PRINCE THE

HENRY

OF PRUSSIA

AND THE

602 605 615 REORGANIZATION

OF

EMPIRE

1. Plans for the Reorganization of the Empire 2. Prince Henry's Memoir of June 10, ιηφ 3. Parandie/s "Regarding the Barrier of the Republic" XIII.

SUBSISTENCE-PEACE

1. 2. 3. 4· 5· XIV. XV.

IN SOUTHWESTERN

622 625 629

GERMANY

The Franco-Württemberger Treaty of August 7, ιηφ The Franco-Franconian Armistice of August 7, 7796 The Franco-Badenese Treaty of August 22, ιηφ The Franco-Bavarian Armistice of September 7, ιηφ Frankfort and France During and After the French Retreat

PRINCIPLES THE

OF

DIRECTORIAL

SUBSISTENCE-PEACE

WARFARE

AND THE

FRENCH

631 633 639 646 648 650

RETREAT

1. The Franco-Württemberger Secret Convention of October 28, ιηφ 66o 2. The Accession of Saxony to the Neutrality of Northern Germany, November 29, ιηφ 662 XVI.

THE

DELACROIX-MALMESBURY

DECEMBER XVII.

19,

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN 1796

NEGOTIATIONS,

OCTOBER

23-

1796

669 RELATIONS

FROM

AUGUST

TO

DECEMBER 675

vii

CONTENTS XVIII.

T H E DIRECTORY AND AUSTRIA DURING THE LATTER PART OF

1796

ι.

General

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The Zwanziger Mission to Vienna, August—October Charruelle at Vienna, October iy A. Lebon, L'Angleterre et l'émigration française de 1794 à 1801 (Paris, 1882), p. 342. Guyot (Direc., p. 125) cites Lebon, Angl. émig. jr., p. 342, and Briefe Thugut, I, 242, as authority for the assertion that Thugut agreed to the exchange only when he believed he could marry the Princess to an archduke, and so acquire rights to French territory. But this statement finds

no substantiation in these sources. " "Destailles les plus intéressans du voyage . . . de Marie Thérèse Charlotte de France," Hüfier-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 34. n. 2. 98 Mém. sec. Augeard, pp. 352-353. M Lenotre, Dtr. Louis XVI, pp. 286-287. TO "Destailles," Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 34, n. 2. " J a n . 13, 1796, Lenotre, Dtr. Louis XVI, pp· 305-306·

526

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

you will be an angel of peace," the governess had countered. "Under those circumstances I shall make that sacrifice for my country," had been the surprising answer.72 It seems very unnatural that this girl should have been so fervently attached to the state the citizens of which had murdered both her father and her mother, her aunt and — virtually — her brother. Yet she did write to Provence, the Pretender, during her journey to Vienna: "Yes, my uncle, it is I, it is the one whose father, mother, and aunt they killed, who asks on bended knee for forgiveness for them, and peace." 73 The Pretender wished his niece to marry Angoulême, 74 and according to Augeard, had surrounded the girl with persons instructed to lead her to believe she was obeying her parents' will in deciding for Angoulême. Neither Louis X V I nor Marie Antoinette had disposed of their daughter's hand, according to Augeard, and as private secretary of the martyred queen, Augeard certainly was in a position to know. 76 The Princess did not marry Angoulême until June 10, 1799. In fact, she was held virtually a prisoner in Vienna for three and one-half years.76 For a time, therefore, rumors continued to fly, even after Madame Royale's mind was definitely made up, and Charles had withdrawn his offer of marriage.77 According to Delacroix, Provence drew up, signed, and remitted to the Emperor, an edict containing, under the guise of a dowry, the cession full and absolute of Alsace and Lorraine to Madame Royale, his niece. Delacroix related this as a positive fact; he added that the Emperor had received the document and thanked Provence.78 A slightly different version is to be found in the Rédacteur of December 20,1796. There it is declared that the Pretender had offered his niece to Archduke Charles on condition that he (Provence) were recognized as king of France by the Courts of Vienna and London. Bacher to Delacroix, Dec. 28, 1795, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, lxxxvii, n. 3. 73 Quoted in 2nd report of Bayard to Wickham, without date but enclosed in Wickham's letter of April 8, 1796, to Grenville, in Lebon, Angl. émig. fr., p. 352. This attitude must have been largely due to the training of her late father, who, in his testament (a few weeks before his execution) found it in his heart to speak as follows: "I recommend to my son, should he have the misfortune to become king, that he forget all hate and all rancor, and especially everything relating to the unhappiness and suffering that I endured. . . In moments of disorder and excitement, people are often not their own masters" 72

("Testament Ludwigs X V I , " G. Landauer [ed., tr.], Briefe aus der französischen Revolution [tr. mosdy from the French; 2 vols., Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1919], I, 471-472). By the time two decades had passed, however, the Princess' saintly attitude had been replaced by one of hatred and contempt for France and everything French (Lenotre, Dtr. Louis XVI, pp. 326 et seqq). 74 Perhaps in order to save Navarre for the French Crown, as indicated supra, Pt. I, chap. XV, n. 22. ''"Mem. sec., p. 353. 78 Lenotre, Dtr. Louis XVI, p. 332. '"Ibid., pp. 352-353. 78 Sandoz to the King, Dec. 18, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354.

T H E EARLY DIRECTORY AND

AUSTRIA

527

If the Emperor would aid his return and Establishment in France, he would cede him Alsace and Lorraine. 79 But Alsace and Lorraine were not to be torn from the side of France for another three quarters of a century, and it was not to be an operation of love, but of blood and iron — and hate.

4.

T H E F R A N C O - A U S T R I A N ARMISTICE OF DECEMBER

1795

T h e first military operations undertaken by the Directory on the Rhine were a failure because of the treason of Pichegru. T h e Bavaro-Palatine Elector had, toward the end of the Convention, allowed the French to take possession of Mannheim and Düsseldorf; Ehrenbreitstein and Mayence had been under siege by the French already for some time. However, Pichegru failed to advance into Germany, and though Jourdan pushed forward from Düsseldorf to the Main, he was forced to fall back because of Pichegru's inaction. T h e details of Pichegru's strange behavior do not concern us here. Suffice it to say that he had entered into secret negotiation with the Austrians, or with Condé, or both, and had been promised certain advantages if he would use his army to overthrow the Directory and proclaim Provence. Pichegru evidently believed that his plans would be furthered by retreating, perhaps to surfeit the French people with the war by extracting the element of glory, perhaps to be nearer Paris in case of need. A t any rate, after retreating behind the Wissembourg Lines, Pichegru consented (December 31,1795) to an armistice suggested by Clerfayt and already accepted by Jourdan ten days earlier.80 It was an unwise move on Clerfayt's part, for France lay prostrate at his feet. However, his army was exhausted. It was probably this armistice which saved the life of the French Republic, and it is equally probable that this armistice it was which cost Clerfayt his command. 81 T h e French Republican, it will be recalled, was allergic to armistices. They were regarded as signs of weakness unworthy of a free people. Sieyes' declaration to Théremin 8 2 in October 1795 that never would France make ™ N o . 370. 80 For the sake of accuracy, let it be noted that the negotiations with the French were begun by the Austrian general Kray without Clerfayt's concurrence, and even without his k n o w l e d g e . But Clerfayt acquiesced w h e n he learned of the agreement (Hansen, Quellen, III, 7 1 3 ) . 81

Société d'écrivains militaires et Pilon [ e d . ] ) , Guerres de la française et du Premier Empire

civils ( A . Révolution ( 1 2 vols.,

Paris, 1 8 7 6 ) , III, 2 - 1 7 ; L . de Gouvion SaintCyr, Mémoires sur les campagnes des Armées du Rhin et de Rhin-et-Moselle de 7792 jusqu'à la paix de Campo-Formio (4 vols., Paris, 1 8 2 9 ) , II, 3 3 1 - 3 3 2 ; R. P. Dunn-Pattison, " T h e General W a r , " C. Mod. H., VIII, 4 4 2 - 4 4 3 ; H . M. Stephens, Revolutionary Europe (6th ed.; London, 1 9 2 4 ) , p. 172. 82 Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 5 ; chap, x v , § 3-

528

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

an armistice with a state with which she was at war,83 formed part of the creed of the Directorial revolutionists also, as is shown by Delacroix's Plan of Pacification.84 However, the creed ceased to have a basis in logic when, as now, the French troops were too exhausted to fight. Nevertheless, no one dared to take the responsibility for the armistice of December 1795. If we may believe Barras' Mémoires, Pichegru blamed it on Jourdan, and Jourdan on Pichegru.85 Thugut was surprised to hear of the suspension of hostilities, for he had not authorized it; however, he accepted it because it accorded with his policy of withdrawing from the Rhine region unless and until further English subsidies were forthcoming.86 Rumor declared that overtures for peace had accompanied the negotiation of the armistice. This, Thugut flatly denied; likewise, the suggestion that peace would be discussed during its duration.87 "His Majesty [is] irrevocably determined never to detach himself from his allies," the Austrian helmsman affirmed.88 Delacroix declared to Sandoz in February that an Austrian general and three (so-called) merchants had been sent by the Habsburg government, at first to Jourdan's camp, and then to Paris, with confidential letters from Thugut. They had been authorized by their government, Delacroix said, to receive and transmit offers of peace. The agents were told that the French Republic desired and esteemed peace, but that it would not beg for it; and that it would state its conditions only in so far as it was apprized of those of the coalesced powers. From that time forth, said Delacroix, several merchants had announced themselves as charged with secret overtures, but they had turned out to be without any mission whatsoever.89 This statement by Delacroix, made as it was to the Prussian minister, must be taken for what it is worth. It might be true, but it might also be a pure invention, designed to frighten Prussia into alliance with France by suspending the sword of a Theremin to Degelmann, Oct. 18, 1795, A . von Vivenot (ed.), Thugut, Clerfayt, und Wurmser (Vienna, 1869), p. 299. 84Supra, Pt. II, chap, ii, § 3. 85 Mém. Barras, II, 37. 88 Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, lxxxix-xc. 87 Nevertheless, the war-weary Rhineland, which, by virtue of its location, would necessarily bear the brunt of continued Franco-Austrian hostility, chose to hope that peace was really at hand. " A t least it is absolutely certain," wrote the Stadtkölnische Kurier of December 23, 1795, "that the warring powers have reached agreement to the extent that, until the conclusion of a general peace . . . , all hostilities will 88

cease." A n d on December 26, the same paper reported, " T h e negotiation of peace has already been started in complete earnestness" (Hansen, Quellen, III, 7 1 2 , η. ι). T h e French troops in the Rhineland also hoped that the armistice would turn into a general peace. There was great discontent in the army because of the lack of articles of prime necessity, and that, of course, assisted in producing the pacific inclinations ( A . and J. Bricard [eds.], Journal du canonnier Bricard, 1792-1802 [2nd ed.; Paris, 1 8 9 1 ] , ibid., p. 732, η. 3 ) . " T h u g u t to Gherardini, Jan. 14, 1796, H. H . S. Arch., Expeditionen nach Turin 26. " S a n d o z to the King, Feb. 16, 1796, G. S. Arch, R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 131.

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND AUSTRIA

Franco-Austrian accord above Frederick William's head. "Some secret negotiation is certainly going on between Vienna and Paris," runs an unsigned report on France in the Austrian archives; and there is cited as proof the goings and comings of subaltern agents of the respective powers. 90 T h e Directory replaced Pichegru with Moreau as commander in chief of the Rhine and Moselle Army, and on March 25, 1796, announced that "the Directory is determined to resume hostilities as soon as possible, and its intention is not to allow itself to be anticipated by the enemies of France." 9 1 However, it was the Austrians who denounced the armistice on the Rhine (May 21, 1796). T o soften this measure, and to demonstrate Austria's desire for peace, T h u g u t ordered Degelmann to send a note to Barthélémy, French Ambassador to Switzerland, by way of Burgomaster Bourcard, inquiring under what conditions France would agree to treat with the Allies. T h e note did not designate Barthélémy by his title; and neither the Republic nor the Directory was mentioned, but only France. T h e French government was furious. "Point out to Degelmann," Delacroix wrote to Barthélémy on May 26, "that when one desires to treat with a body or an individual, he must commence by recognizing that body and that individual," and he (Delacroix) concluded that the purpose of the Austrians was "to cast upon the Directory the stigma of refusing an overture which they themselves had intentionally rendered inadmissible." 92 Barthélémy, in his reply of June 1 to Degelmann, merely copied and signed Delacroix's note. 93 T h e overture had only strained relations further. MH.

el

H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 18. Dated from Berne, March 25, 1796; forwarded by Gherardini. Debidour, Recueil, II, 27.

82 Guyot, Direc., pp. 175-176. " G a l l o to Thugut, June 15, 1796, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 52.

>S

CHAPTER IV

if

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND PRUSSIA

I.

THE LINE OF NEUTRALITY AGAIN IN QUESTION

O

N May 17, 1795, it will be recalled, a Franco-Prussian treaty had established around northern Germany a line of demarcation and neutrality. T h e French had bound themselves not to cross this line. 1 While no one wanted to cross it, everything went well, and the Prussian corps of observation under Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen made a grand showing strutting about, magnanimously protecting northern Germany from the ravages of war. But in the latter days of the Convention, Clerfayt at last bestirred himself to action, and on order of the Emperor, he paid no attention whatsoever to the Line of Demarcation. 2 O f course, the drawing of such lines by one of the states of the Empire, in concert with the Empire's declared enemy, was absolutely unconstitutional. Respect for the Line could be secured by Prussia only by force of arms, which would have meant war with Austria. This, Frederick William did not want. General Jourdan did not really respect the Line either, but he did not disregard its existence entirely, as did the Austrians. Thus, the Line tended to hamper Jourdan's movements. Moreover, it angered the French to see the Austrians cross and recross the Line as if it did not exist, and the Prussians do nothing at all. O n October 10, 1795, Jourdan informed HohenloheIngelfingen that the Committee of Public Safety had just given him the "positive order" to pay no more attention to the Demarcation Line, but to do, "within it or without it, whatever he believed . . . advantageous to his operations without permitting anything whatsoever to stop h i m . " 3 A s with the Austrians, only force could have kept the French out of the neutralized zone, especially now that Jourdan had been specifically ordered to disregard the Line of Demarcation. 1 2

Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, x, § 1. Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xii, § 2.

' Q u o t e d in Haugwitz to Caillard, Nov. 25, 1795, Arch. N . , A F III 76, d. 315.

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND PRUSSIA

53I

Frederick William was in no position to risk friction with France at this critical time. 4 Greater things were at stake than a principle and a few ravaged states which would not necessarily even be Prussian. T h e Polish-partition question, mentioned above, was coming to a head, and Frederick William had sent Tauenzien to St. Petersburg to conclude. T h e compromise solution signed on October 24 provided that the disputed Palatinates of Cracow and Sandomir, 5 long occupied by Prussia, should go to Austria, but that Austria should cede Prussia a strip of territory necessary for the security of Warsaw. 6 T h e actual exchange of territory, and the ironing out of details, were of course to come later, and might be the source of future trouble. It was safest to have an army at hand, and to make certain that relations with France were of the smoothest. Therefore, on October 24, i.e., on the very day of Tauenzien's "compromise-capitulation," Prussia announced its intention of renouncing the southern portion of the neutrality line. O n November 8, Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen commenced his withdrawal from the Frankfort region, moving eastward to the Prussian possessions in Franconia. Through Hardenberg, Prussian minister of state then at Basel,7 Barthélémy was informed that it was the King's desire to maintain that portion of the Line of Demarcation guarding Westphalia. 8 T h e Republic was not at all disgruntled at the renunciation of the southern portion of the Line. Jourdan attributed to his respect for its existence the defeat he suffered at Clerfayt's hands shortly after the dissolution of the Convention. 9 Quite naturally, the whole question of the advisability of the Line of Demarcation became once more a living issue. O n January 6, Sandoz rendered to Delacroix an official note concerning a line of neutrality which would circumscribe Westphalia and the Electorate of Hanover. Delacroix hesitated to accept it. "Of what use are these unsustainable lines of neutrality?" he demanded. " W h a t guarantees us that [they] will be respected?" 1 0 Four days later Delacroix declared that "if it were a question . . . only of Westphalia, we would soon reach an agreement, and the K i n g of Prussia would dictate the articles; but it is a question of the Electorate of Hanover, the possession of which would serve to repurchase our Leeward Islands." 1 1 In his despatch of January 12, Sandoz declared that the Line of Demarcation had become a subject of debate between Carnot, Aubert-Dubayet (minister of war), Reubell, and Delacroix. T h e first two, influenced by the reports of ' H a r d e n b e r g to the King, Nov. 14, 1795, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 31. E Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, vi, i 3; chap, viii, § i a ; chap, ix, § 3a. " L o d g e in C. Mod. H., VIII, 552. ' A t Basel to arrange for treaties of separate peace between France and German states

(exclusive of Austria). "Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, xxi. ' H a r d e n b e r g to the King, Dec. 5, 1795, ibid., pp. 34-35. " S a n d o z to the King, Jan. 7, 1796, ibid., p. 44. 1 1 Idem, Jan. 12, 1796, ibid., p. 45.

532

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Jourdan, combated and rejected the neutrality proposition as confining the army within too narrow a sphere and paralyzing its operations. T h e last two sustained the proposal on political grounds, saying that it gave France a lien on the amity of Prussia. 12

2.

F R A N C E , P R U S S I A , A N D HANOVER

France was indeed in an anomalous position with respect to Hanover. A possession of the English King, the Electorate should have served as a lever whereby the Republic could exert pressure upon the England its armies could not reach. Hanover should have supplied its pro rata share of the foodstuffs necessary to maintain the French armies in the war which England was subsidizing, and contributions so heavy should have been laid upon the Electorate that the funds would have had to be brought from England. Hanover should have constituted a region where the French armies might maneuver freely. Hanover should have served as a free zone for the propagation of liberty, and its spread over Germany. Instead, Hanover was sacred soil — i.e., sacred vis-à-vis France. For her enemies, no. French émigrés, Dutch émigrés, English soldiers — all seemed to be persona grata there. T h e Directory was indignant, 13 but it was an inherited indignation. T h e Convention, also, had been plagued with the problem. O n July 22, 1795, the Prince of Orange had announced to the K i n g of Prussia that England had agreed to take into her pay the Dutch troops which had refused to serve France's Batavian puppet. T h e Prince had asked the K i n g of Prussia to facilitate the passage of these Hollanders to Osnabrück, where they were scheduled to be mustered into service. 14 Frederick William had replied by pointing out to the Prince of Orange that Osnabrück was within the Line of Demarcation, so, despite his deep concern for the Orange family, he could not permit an armed assemblage of Orangists there without bringing down upon himself and North Germany the wrath of France. 16 O n October 16, 1795, Reinhard, France's unrecognized minister to the Hansa, had written Barthélémy that "tomorrow" all the corps in English pay would leave Hanover, according to the Hanoverian regency. 16 T h e English cavalry did indeed leave, perhaps not on the day scheduled, but before the twenty-ninth. 17 T h e French émigrés were dissipated by November i l . But the Orangist troops remained assembled, and continued to threaten the Batavian Republic. Barthélémy asked Bacher to demand ex"Ibid. 1 8 Caillard to Haugwitz, Nov. 20, 1795, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 5. " Dropmore Papers, III, 91.

" A u g . 3, 1795, ibid., p. 94. " A r c h . A . E., Allemagne 670, f. 40. "Bulletin from Bremen, Oct. 29, 1795, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670, f. 51.

533

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND PRUSSIA

planations of Hanover, and he himself planned to see Hardenberg. 18 Bacher reported a month later that it had been intended to transfer the Orangists, unarmed, to the Isle of Jersey, but that only fifty would embark; the remainder were to be given six months' pay, and disbanded.19 This apparently ended the matter, as the complaints ceased. French attention continued to center on Hanover, however. Delacroix mentioned to Barthélémy that France attacked England through Hanover in the Seven Years' War, and did so quite successfully. He suggested that if France guaranteed Prussia its possessions, or perhaps even some advantages, Prussia might not oppose French use of the method again.20 Carnot complained to Sandoz that the only way France could attack England was to invade Hanover and lay it under contribution, to which Sandoz objected: "What good would that do? Does it pay to revolutionize northern Germany in order to exact some paltry contributions from Hanover, . . . to overturn states which one neither wishes nor is able to conserve, and which will become just so many irreconcilable enemies?" Carnot thereupon dropped the hint that Hanover could be detached entirely from England. 21 In the ensuing year this idea of a new prince for Hanover reappeared again and again. One school of French thought wished to give the Electorate to Prussia outright; 22 another to give it to Prussia, to be exchanged for Mecklenburg with the latter's duke; 23 another to give it to Frederick William's relative, the Prince of Orange; 24 and yet another to give it to a younger son of George III.25 T o all of these plans, the Prussian King turned a deaf ear. Hanover was within the Line of Demarcation, and that was that. 3.

T H E P O L I C Y OF PRUSSIA U N D E R T H E LEADERSHIP OF

HAUGWITZ

"If France succumbs, Prussia is conquered; if Prussia is invaded, France is in danger," ran an article in the Ami des Lois of January 5, 1796.26 Reubell Barthélémy to CPS (sic), Nov. 11, 1795, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670, f. 60. ""Jan. 13, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670, f. 119. 20 Feb. 8, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 152. 21 Sandoz to the King, May 6, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. FrkI, 67. "Idem, Jan. 18, 1796, ibid., p. 46. Also offered on August 2, 1796, by Reubell (Guyot, Direc., p. 227), and again on October 5, 1797, by Talleyrand (G. S. Arch., R XI Trankreich 89, fase. 356). 28 Parandier to Delacroix, July 20, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 315. 24 G. Pallain, Le ministire de Talleyrand sous 18

le Directoire (Paris, 1891), p. 120. Accord: Sandoz to the King, April 7, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 321. 26 No. CXLVIII, under "Diplomacy," by C.H.R.G. "C.H.R.G." was the pen name of Prince Charles of Hesse-Rheinfels-Rothenburg, a German living in Paris. Charles had entered the French army under Louis X V I , but the Court had refused him an independent command because of his incompetence, so he became a rabid Jacobin for revenge. It was his incendiary articles which drove Custine to the block. Arthur Chuquet has devoted a book of 416 pages to the personal, political, and literary life

534

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

declared to Sandoz, three weeks later, that the Directors unanimously envisaged the amity of the King of Prussia as infinitely valuable, and would try to cement it by all possible means. 27 The instructions of Sandoz, dated October 21, 1795, had indeed mentioned the possibility of alliance with France, but only as the result of "unforeseen and improbable events, imperious circumstances." 28 The reference was, of course, to the possible need of French aid against Austria and Russia in the Polish-partition question. But with that question now out of the way, an alliance would benefit only France, and Frederick William was not an altruist. Sandoz thought out "a plausible and judicious manner of eluding the [French] proposals" for an alliance: to refuse to consider them until after the general pacification. But the offers were, in Sandoz' opinion, "a glory to Frederick William." 29 The French knew, of course, that the principal motive for Prussia's friendship no longer existed, and they started to seek evidence of Prussia's current attitude. The results were not reassuring. Clerfayt had violated the Line of Demarcation with impunity, and the Prussians were withdrawing instead of fighting. The protests made to Hardenberg at Basel had resulted only in accelerating that minister's departure.30 Shortly after leaving Basel, Hardenberg had declared that Prussia would deal out justice to the Batavian Republic. 31 Caillard wrote from Berlin that the Prussian King continued to recognize Hartzinck as minister of the States-General of the United Netherlands to Hamburg. 32 Frederick William's sister, daughter, and grandson were members of the House of Orange, 33 so he could hardly be expected to view events in Holland objectively. It was known that the Prussian King detested the French Jacobins almost as much as he did the Court of Vienna; 3 4 also, that a powerful faction at Berlin regarded the excessive power of France as a threat to the very existence of Prussia. 35 It seemed to the Directors that Prussia was playing a waiting game, like the innocent-appearing cat which crouches for hours before a gopher hole, apparently resting, but with eye and mind poised for a kill. They directed Caillard to force Prussia to show her true colors by proffering an alliance, at the same time circulating a rumor that an agreement had been reached with Austria through Spansh mediation. Caillard dared not obey this order. 3 " of this interesting man whom he dubs the Marat of generals {Un prince jacobin: Charles de Hesse ou Le général Marat, Paris, 1906). " S a n d o z to the King, Jan. 27, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk; I, 47· Μ Bailleu, Pr. Frk·, I, 29. 29 Sandoz to the King, Dec. 21, 1795, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 24. 80 Guyot, Direc., p. 129.

81

Ibid. To Delacroix, Dec. 26, 1795, Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 315. Also Dec. 29, 1795, ibid. " H a r d e n b e r g to CPS, April 10, 1795, Arch. N „ AF III 76, d. 314. 81 Sybel, Europe, IV, 239. β Ibid., p. 240. 89 Guyot, Direc., p. 129. 82

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND PRUSSIA

535

England was offering Frederick William everything he could ever hope to acquire, provided he would join the Coalition. 37 For France to importune him too might produce a decision — adverse to France. A s it was, he was weathering the English onslaught without wavering. Frederick William's staunchness was due to a variety of causes. Alliance with England meant also alliance with Austria, and the red heat of Frederick William's hate for the Emperor had turned to white heat when he was forced to yield before Austria and Russia on the Cracow question. H e could not cool down so quickly. Then, the King's health had never recuperated from his Polish expedition, and his sensual pleasures were serving only to aggravate his illness. Sick, annoyed, gloomy, and naturally disinclined to apply himself to his duties, he found it easiest to do nothing. Lastly, Prussia's finances were not in thriving condition, 38 and wars could not be fought without money — except perhaps by the Directory. Haugwitz' ideas accorded well with the inclinations of his royal master. Haugwitz thought Prussia should mind her own business. If others wanted her advice, she should give it, but only then. If they wanted her good offices to further the cause of peace, these also should be willingly granted. 39 If Prussia were slapped in the face in consequence, well — that was not contemplated, but it was apparently all right too, as the following seems to indicate. After Mannheim surrendered to Pichegru in September 1795, all southern Germany was thrown into a panic, and the rulers of Mayence, Württemberg, and Baden sought to avail themselves of the separate-peace provision of the Treaty of April 5. Hardenberg had been staying in Basel solely to give effect to that provision. Baden specifically asked for Prussia's good offices, and Hardenberg spoke to Barthélémy about Baden. 40 T h e expiring Convention and infant Directory, in disregard of common decency, left the overtures unanswered, 41 thus placing in an embarrassing position the Hohenzollern king, who had advertised himself so loudly in the Empire as the patron saint of partial pacifications. T h e plenipotentiaries of the above-mentioned rulers thereupon left Basel, and so did Hardenberg. "My presence was absolutely useless and perhaps harmful," he wrote to Mallet du Pan. 42 H a u g w i t z Sybel, Europe, I V , 240. "Ibid., pp. 238-239. M Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, xiv. " V o l l m a c h t für Reitzenstein, Sept. 30, 1795, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 352; Edelsheim to Karl Friedrich, Oct. 8, 1795, ibid., p. 355; von Jarrach (Harnier?) to Frederick William, Oct. 23, 1795, ibid., p. 358. " H a r d e n b e r g to the King, Nov. 22, 1795, ibid., 361; Der Geheime Rath to Moreau, 87

July 15, 1796, ibid., pp. 399-400. The reason for the French inaction is clear. Swabia was the larder which was to supply the armies marching against Austria, and the French government had not yet thought out a solution of the problem how to have peace without losing the advantages of the rights of war. " D e c . 13, 1795, Mém. corr. Mallet du Pan, II, 194.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

should have raised a great stir, but instead, under his guidance, Frederick William played the saint, and turned the other cheek. That was presently slapped too — for the Directory (as the next chapter will relate) imposed the forced loan on the Prussian left bank in violation of the Treaty of April 5 (Article I V ) , and when Sandoz remonstrated, he was told that France would satisfy Prussia in great things, but could not be bothéred with trifles.43 This would again have been the moment to rattle the saber, but such was not the policy of Haugwitz. He was the dam holding back the flood tending to sweep Prussia into the Coalition, Caillard wrote home from Berlin. 44 Under him, the Prussian army itself was allowed to fall into decay. It was due largely to the influence of this man that France was given that carte blanche upon which Napoleon was one day able to write "Jena," and Davout, "Auerstädt." The only redeeming feature of his craven policy, so disastrous politically, is that it afforded northern Germany eleven years of peace — an eleven years which constituted the most brilliant epoch for German literature.45 4.

F R A N C E , PRUSSIA, AND T H E L E F T B A N K OF T H E R H I N E

But all the Prussian cabinet ministers did not share Haugwitz' principles. A "firm" and "menacing" tone was recommended by Hardenberg as a means especially appropriate to secure the recovery of the Prussian left-bank territories, conquered and retained by the French during the course of the war. 46 Just one week before leaving Basel, Hardenberg suggested to his king that "perhaps the time is not far distant when we shall find it proper to say that such a state of things cannot last indefinitely." 47 And the day after leaving, he wrote to Mallet du Pan that if force would constrain France to a reasonable peace, he favored its use.48 According to an unsigned note in the Austrian archives, there is reason to believe that Hardenberg first thought to render the French more tractable on the subject of conquests in Germany by sending the Saxon count von Beust to Paris to argue the French out of their expansionist tendencies.49 If this is true, Hardenberg's advocacy of firmness and menace indicates a change in his viewpoint as to how France should be treated, and the conclusion is inescapable that Clerfayt's victories,50 though doubtless too extensive to be pleasing to Hardenberg, 51 had a good deal to " S a n d o z to the King, March 1 , 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 157. " Baillcu, Pr. Fr{., I, xxv. 40 As pointed out in H. E. Bourne, The Révolutionary Period in Europe (1763-1815) (New York, 1923), p. 235 (Ranke's observation). " N o v . 26, 1795, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 4 1 1 , n. 2. " Dec. 5, 1795, ibid., p. 36.

" F r o m Zurich, Dec. 1 3 , 1795, Mém. corr. Mallet du Pan, II, 193. " H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin, 18. Dated from Berne, Nov. 2 1 , 1795. 50 M. Dumolin, Précis d'histoire militaire (2 vols, in 1 2 fase., Paris, 1901 [ o 6 ] - i 9 i 2 ) , I, 312-315. 51 Mallet du Pan to Count de Sainte-Aldegonde,

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THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND AUSTRIA

do with the change. Sandoz' instructions (dated October 21) had ordered him to labor for the complete or almost complete restitution of the left bank, to renounce his efforts only at the last extremity — but, if unsuccessful, to yield in return for appropriate indemnities. 52 Hardenberg's menaces might have been more successful, especially after Pichegru's treasonable actions had taken all the glory out of the French campaign of 1795. O n December 28, Sandoz declared to Sieyes that if France absorbed an inch of territory along the Rhine, she would make an enemy of the Empire, and hurl it into the arms of Austria; that the Republic ought to adopt the status quo ante bellum as the basis of its negotiations, and thus assign to Prussia the principal influence in Germany. " W h a t stops France from following this system?" Sieyes replied. "I do not wish to dissemble. It is because she is not sufficiently assured of the attachment of the K i n g of Prussia." " H e [then] enveloped himself in a line of argument," wrote Sandoz, "which neither I nor he understood." 5 3 Delacroix asserted to Sandoz that the extension of France's boundaries to the Rhine was necessary to offset Russia's aggrandizement at the expense of Poland, and presently, perhaps, at the expense of the Porte; it was the task of France, according to Delacroix, to deliver Europe from a yoke ready to strangle it. 54 T h e same line of reasoning appeared in an article in the Moniteur. T h e coalesced courts, said the writer, had armed themselves with new sources of population, strength, and wealth, and were now in a position to execute "yet more baleful designs," unless France, by annexing the left bank, "replaced, in the political system, the void . . . created by the destruction of unfortunate Poland." W h y the rape of Poland is essentially different from the rape of Germany, the present writer fails to understand, but the author of the Moniteur article, while assuring us that the partition of Poland would result only in new wars, ridicules the idea that the mutilation of the Empire would be an "obstacle to peace." 5 5 Perhaps the answer to the riddle is supplied by J. Loew in an article in Der Pariser Zuschauer, a German-language newspaper of Paris. L o e w tells us that "it is not only the interest of France which demands the expansion of France up to this great river; the true interest of Germany 66 likewise demands it. Father Rhine! you are worthy to divide the two giant nations of Europe." 87 Nov. 12, 1795, Mém. corr. Mallet du Pan, II, 191. " Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 29. 68 Sandoz to the King, ibid., p. 41. "Idem, Jan. 12, 1796, G. S. Arch., R X I Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 62. Russia and Austria were contemplating the partition of Turkey (vide W . F. Reddaway, A History of

Europe from 1715

to 1814

[London, 1936],

P· 358). K Eschassériaux aîné, "Suites des intérêts de la République Française et de toutes les puissances de l'Europe," Moniteur, X X V I I , 385. M Italics in original. "Ist es dem Interesse der Frankenrepublik gemaes, ihre Graenzen bis an dem Rheine zu

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

538

Reubell considered that Prussia and Hesse-Cassel had ceded their leftbank territories to France by the Franco-Prussian and Franco-Hesse-Casseler treaties of April 5 and August 28, 1795, respectively, which treaties had deferred the cession of the left-bank lands of these two German states to the peace of the Empire.58 According to Reubell, this reference to a future Franco-Imperial peace was made only to humor the Prussian King, who did not desire to be considered the first to subscribe to the dismemberment of the Empire.59 Despite Reubell's insistence on the Rhine boundary, Sandoz held out to his king the hope that France would renounce the Rhineland. The presidents of both the Five Hundred and Ancients had assured Sandoz that they regarded the Directory's schemes of conquest as "inconsistent and dangerous," and they had promised, when the Councils would be consulted on the question, to try to make the Directory renounce its expansionist aims.60 5.

F R A N C E , PRUSSIA, A N D T H E LEADERSHIP OF

GERMANY

Corollaries to France's desire to retain the left bank were various propositions intended to induce a favorable reaction thereto on the part of Prussia by promoting Frederick William's interests. Indemnification by secularization will be treated later, for at the current date, the proposals on that subject were not yet defined. But already in January of 1796, Delacroix offered the "influence, credit, and money" of France "to procure the transfer of the Imperial crown to the House of Brandenburg." 61 Barthélémy wrote to Paris indicating that he favored the formation of a confederation of the circles, sustained by Prussia.62 The Rédacteur gave currency to an article in a Frankfort paper questioning the right of the Emperor to act hostilely against states of the Empire, and advocating the formation of a confederation of German princes to oppose the ambitious views of the House of Austria.63 Implicit in such a plan was of course the powerful concurrence, probably the leadership, of Prussia. It,is clear that the Directory had no inkling of what the future held for Franco-Prussian relations. erweitern?" Jan. 13, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 197. This article was one of the second-prize essays of the essay contest supra, Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 5. Loew was an inhabitant of Deidesheim, but sent in his contribution from Mannheim, in the German language (Hansen, Quellen, III, 636). T h e Pariser Zuschauer was Reubell's paper, edited by Böhmer, Dorsch, Nimis, and Blau — former Mayence Clubists {vide supra, Pt. I, chap, ii, § | i b , 3 ) . It started publication on January 1, 1796, and Reubell made it a practice to scatter many copies over the Rhineland (Hansen, Quellen, III, 554, η. ι ) .

raThe

states of the Empire had no power to pass absolute title to their o w n territory situated within the limits of the Empire. Reubell's annotation on a report of Bonnier's, Jan. 5, 1797, Arch. N . , A F III 76, from Guyot, Direc., p. 120. " S a n d o z to the K i n g , March 19, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347. a Idem, Jan. 12, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 64. ω Τ ο CPS (sic), N o v . 6, 1795, Arch. Α . E., Allemagne 670, f. 47. « N o . 8 (Dec. 23, 1 7 9 5 ) .

^

CHAPTER V

if

T H E EARLY D I R E C T O R Y A N D T H E L E F T B A N K OF T H E R H I N E , OCTOBER 26, 1 7 9 5 - A U G U S T 23, 1796

I.

THE FORCED LOAN

Λ Ύ the commencement of the Directorial period, the entire left bank Ο / χ of the Rhine, excepting Mayence, was in French hands, and Mayence itself was the subject of a determined investment. However, on October 29, Clerfayt drove the French from their positions before Mayence 1 and followed up this victory by reconquering the region between the Rhine and lower Moselle.2 Then welled up a patriotic movement in the restored territories, and ill fared those who had conspired with the invader. The Prussian King was not on hand personally to receive his share of the public scorn, but he must have suffered keenly from the popularity enjoyed by the Emperor, whom the inhabitants regarded as their savior.3 It is not the reconquered region, however, but the part yet in French hands, with which the following discussion is concerned. The chronic disease of France was financial chaos. The Revolutionary armies had to be fed, clothed, and paid, and the storehouses were empty. The only possible solution was to order the army to live off the country — enemy country if possible, but French country if need be. The Rhine and Moselle Army was authorized to draw its subsistence from the départements 1

The Austrian victory at Mayence was greater than it would seem, thus baldly recorded. The French had been working for almost a year on the contravallation lines surrounding this fortress. There were walls of earth 8 feet thick; trenches 20 feet wide and 10 feet deep; a system of pitfalls to check cavalry charges; hornwork; redoubts; everything French ingenuity could devise (H. F. Lang-

werth von Simmern, Oesterreich und das Reich im Kampfe mit der französischen Revolution von 1790 bis 1797 [2 vols., Berlin, 1880], II, 264). 2 Sorel, Europe, V, 21. 3 J . Hashagen, Das Rheinland und die französische Herrschaft: Beiträge zur Characteristic ihres Gegensatzes (Bonn, 1908), pp. 89-90.

540

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

adjacent to the Saar and Moselle Rivers, and from the département of the Meurthe.4 The Sambre and Meuse Army was ordered to utilize all the means offered by the conquered but not annexed country.5 And it was stipulated that when these means should have been exhausted, the laying in of supplies should take place principally in thé conquered and annexed regions, as distinguished from France itself.6 Of course, the root — or, at least, one main root — of the problem was the practical worthlessness of the assignats — all 40,000,000,000 livres' worth. On December 6, 1795, the Directory, as a first step toward ridding the country of them (it wanted to destroy the plates the succeeding February 19), 7 appealed to the Council of Five Hundred for a law it knew would hardly be popular. It wanted the legislature to impose a forced loan on France — and its annexed territories; this was, it explained, "the last plank of safety . . . in this moment of shipwreck." Four days later, the "loan" — euphemism for "tax," since repayment was impossible — was enacted into law.8 The Law of December 10 provided that the well-to-do citizens of France and of territories she had annexed should be divided into sixteen classes according to wealth, and should "lend" the government — compulsorily — 600,000,000 francs in coin value, to be repaid (!?) in ten yearly instalments. Of course, there was no chance of securing any appreciable amount of coin, so the subscribers were to be allowed to substitute natural produce, or assignats at one per cent of their face value.9 On December 15 the Directory, thinking that the Rhineland might possibly be made to yield 50,000,000 livres,10 instructed its minister of finances to present views upon the extension of the loan to territories occupied by the troops of the Republic but not yet annexed.11 Three days later, the finance minister ordered the forced-loan law extended to the conquered but unannexed territory — with this difference: the left bank had no choice but to subscribe "in minted or unminted gold and silver." Commissaire ordonnateur Blanchard was given the task of introducing the loan into the area occupied by the Sambre and Meuse Army. 1 2 Bella, Director-General of Domains and Contributions in the Conquered Country between the Rhine and Moselle, promulgated the law on the southern left bank on January 15, in the following terms: ' D i r . to Joubert, Jan. 29, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, I, 508. At Rivaud's request, the Directory ordered these requisitions to cease. 6 Dir. to Garrau, Nov. 20, 1795, ibid., p. 93. "Dir. to Joubert, June 6, 1796, ibid., II, 560, n. 4. 'Hansen, Quellen, III, 728-729. 8 Sciout, Direc., I, 464-467. But its yield did not come up to expectations, so a new issue

of paper, the "mandat territorial," was introduced (Hansen, Quellen, III, 729, η. 2). Ibid., p. 729. 10 Ibid. u A r c h . N., A F III 335, d. 1448. 13 Gezwungenes Varlehen vom Jahre IV ("Forced Loan of the Year I V " ) , Hansen, Quellen, III, 729, η. 4. 9

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

54I

The apportionment . . . should be made in the first décade of pluviôse [i.e., January 21-30]. A further delay may entail your arrest and transference to a fort in the interior [of France]. The entire sum must be in the receiver's hands by 30 pluviôse [February 19]. Armed force will be used to constrain those who do not wish to pay. . . You . . . will answer for each other to me for the least delay. . . I warn you that there will be a fine of an additional tenth for each ten days you allow to elapse beyond [the nineteenth of February]. Objections of all sorts will be of no avail. My instructions are such that I am not able to consider them. I know that your country has suffered much from the war, that you have contributed much to the armies, that two years ago you supported heavy revolutionary taxes, and paid a good part of the impositions. But thére is not a commune in the Republic which cannot allege the same motives [for not paying]. Besides, here it is only a question of an advance to be made to the government. Means will be devised to assure repayment.13 This proclamation raised a storm of protest on both the left bank and the right. Cetto, envoy of the D u k e of Zweibrücken, asserted on February 3 that the agents of France in Zweibrücken were virtual leeches, bleeding the people white. H e cited Bella's proclamation itself as proof that the country could bear no more impositions, and pointed out that despite his (Bella's) admission of their poverty, the people were threatened with the loss of their liberty if they did not satisfy his demands. "Is that really the will of [the French] government?" Cetto asked. 14 T o Barthélémy, Cetto wrote (February 5) that the text of the forced-loan law did not stipulate its extension to the unannexed conquered country, for it spoke only of the annexed conquered region. Thus, it was implied by silence that the Rhineland would, after so may exactions, be left unmolested. 15 It has been seen above that the Directory, on December 15, took steps to prevent the left bank from escaping through the gap in the law. O n March 6, Rivaud, Commissioner to the Rhine and Moselle Army, declared to Barthélémy that "positive orders of the government" had subjected to the forced loan "all regions occupied by the French army without distinction." 16 Trêves objected to the imposition of the loan, but the only result of its protest was that the Directory charged the minister of finances to accelerate the process of collection. 17 " A r c h . A. E., Allemagne 670, ff. 147-148. Dated at Saarbrücken, Jan. 15, 1796. " C e t t o to Laquiante, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, fï. 150-151. 16 Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 147. " A r c h . A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 170. There are certain statements in Rivaud's letter which imply special treatment for some German states without indicating which: "I am ignorant whether, in the usage the [French]

government has made of its rights of conquest, it has had particular reasons for drawing a distinction between the Corps Germanique and some of its members other than those with which it is publicly at peace; and you know that it is not within my province in such a case to attribute to it veiws of which I have no knowledge" (ibid.). " Dir. to min. of finances, April 3, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, II, 80, η. 2.

542

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Article I V of the Franco-Prussian T r e a t y of A p r i l 5, 1795, it w i l l be recalled, had provided for the entire cessation of all contributions in coin and in k i n d in Cleves, Meurs, and Gelderland. 1 8 T h e application of the forced loan to the Prussian left bank drew a vigorous protest f r o m Sandoz.

Ac-

cording to him, a forced loan was a w a r exaction, forbidden by the Peace of Basel. Delacroix declared that it was merely public revenue, w h i c h France, as occupant of the territories, had a right to collect. 19 Reubell also dubbed it public revenue, and cited the fifth article of the T r e a t y of A p r i l 5 (permitting French occupation until a definitive arrangement had been m a d e ) and the second secret article (whereby the Prussian K i n g promised to cede his leftbank possessions if the E m p i r e yielded the Rhineland to France) as proofs that, in the absence of contrary stipulation, France was to collect the revenues. "I defy an enlightened reader to find another meaning," challenged Reubell. 2 0 T h i s thesis was incorporated in a despatch w h i c h the Directory sent to Joubert, its Commissioner to the Sambre and Meuse A r m y , on February 1 6 : 2 1 When a country occupied in consequence of the events of a war obtains by means of negotiation the privilege of not being treated as conquered territory, it would be very strange for it to aspire to be better treated than the very country to which it has been provisionally joined. T h e forced loan is a general contribution which weighs upon all of France, and can in no wise be compared to the contributions of war against which the Prussian lands are guaranteed by the Treaty of April 5. As to the exemption from paying their quota of the ten-million [franc] contribution in kind, exemption established in favor of the Prussian territories on the left bank of the Rhine by the Committee of Public Safety's decree of 28 messidor last [July 16, 1795], it is difficult to see how this . . . favor could serve as a title to new favors. Far from exempting the Prussian lands from subsequent taxes and contributions, the favor accorded them . . . singles them out more particularly than any other in the collection of the new imposition, for in all well-administered countries, alleviations should be for the parts of a state which have been the most burdened; augmentations, . . . for those which have suffered the least. . . Doubtless, the Directory intends that these lands should be treated with consideration. . . But there is no inconvenience in accustoming the conquered territories to regard the French as their brothers whose burdens and advantages they ought to share; and the Directory considers it especially important that you should devote yourself to rejecting on all occasions the idea . . . that this region is to go back to Prussia. 22 Despairing that the French government could be induced to excuse the Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, ix, § 2. "Delacroix to Sandoz, Feb. 10, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 134. 20 Sandoz to the King, Feb. 16, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 128. 21 Joubert had ruled in a contrary sense, but 18

inquired of Paris. Meanwhile, he had initiated Caselli, National Agent at Aix-laChapelle, into his own views, and Caselli had instructed the District Administration at Bonn accordingly (Hansen, Quellen, III, 7 3 1 ) . M Arch. N., A F III* 218.

THE EARLV DIRECTORY AND THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

543

Prussian left bank from the loan, Sandoz asked for a respite. Delacroix declared that there was not sufficient time to suspend the application of the law, for the date for complete payment was close at hand, but that "means could be devised to indemnify the people for this advance." 23 Reubell refused to promise even that much. " W e are paupers gathering together our rags," he said.24 O n March i , Sandoz, finding the Directory assembled, protested that one could not exact loans from his creditors; that the proper course to pursue was to deduct the Prussian left bank's quota of the forced loan from the sums already owed to the Prussain left bank by France in consequence of previous "advances." T h e Directory's reply has already been noted : 2 5 It was willing, it said, to satisfy the K i n g of Prussia on all matters of great importance, but could not be bothered with trifles.26 T o the Directory itself, however, the matter did not seem quite so unimportant. O n March 9, it approved of Joubert's zeal in applying to the Prussian territories with energy the measures necessitated by the forced loan; 27 and on April 16, it praised him for his activity in regard to the forced loan in general. 28 Joubert had allocated to the army the first 600,000 francs which should be collected, repayment to be made when possible; 29 and he had promised the Directory important sums. T h e government therefore quite naturally invited him to continue his measures, and to conclude the affair in a manner "as advantageous as possible to the interests of the Republic." 30 T h e 600,000-franc sum mentioned above has a history of a sort. Joubert had ordered that the forced loan should not affect the common people — only "rich owners [and] fat priests." But who were they? They were to be divided into sixteen classes, said the French law, yet no one would betray their names or their relative wealth. A l l that confidential informants would say was that the region was exhausted. Other "helpers" presented financial reports to prove it. T h e most that could be done was to give these conscientious objectors twenty days to draw up a list. However, Joubert wanted some coin immediately. H e therefore forced the largest bankers, merchants and proprietors to "advance" 600,000 francs. 31 That is the 600,000 he allocated to the army. Is it a wonder that such a resourceful person as Joubert was appreciated at Paris? Sandoz to the King, Feb. 22, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 138. 21Idem, Feb. 22, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk·, I, 5 5 56. 25 Pt. II, chap, iv, § 3, supra. 26 Sandoz to the King, March 1, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 157. It did, however, grant Sandoz a considerable reduction in the total amount of the forced loan, which had stood at 12,500,000 livres. 23

The loan was subscribed with considerable difficulty, partly by means of military execution (Hansen, Quellen, III, 748). " Dir. to Joubert, Arch. N., A F III* 202. 28 Idem, Debidour, Recueil, II, 160. 29 Dir. to Petiet (min. of war), April 1, 1796, Arch. N., A F III* 202. 80 Dir. to Joubert, March 9, 1796, Aroh. N., A F III* 202. " H a n s e n , Quellen, III, 730-731.

544

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

The forced loan has been given precedence in this chapter because of the size and peculiar character of that imposition. But it must not be thought that the conventional sort of contributions, or the requisitions, were allowed to become rusty through disuse. On November 3, an immediate contribution of 1,000,000 francs in specie was demanded of the left bank, to be recovered by military force if necessary. No protests were to be considered. But the people had no specie, so numerous temporal and spiritual hostages were seized in Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Coblenz, and either imprisoned or carted off to France.32 Payment was to have been made on November 5 and 6. It stretched out over the following three months. On December 21, War Commissioner Lolliot threatened to lock the gates of Cologne and proceed against 600 "zahlbare" (sic) citizens. He demanded 40,000 livres on the spot. He was offered 24,000, and refused. He got his 40,000.33 Meanwhile, November 9, the Bonn District Administration presented Cologne with a bill for 177,000 livres — a reminder that Pérès' 10,000,000 imposition of June 13, 1795,3i still lay unburied.35 An attempt was made, also, to collect another contribution imposed in the time of the Convention. In brumaire, Year III (October-November 1794), Representative on Mission Bourbotte had levied a contribution of 4,000,000 livres on the city of Coblenz.36 Of this amount, 1,044,155 livres had been paid, but the city had failed to acquit itself of the remainder of the debt, and the Committee of Public Safety had recognized that too much had been demanded originally. It seems that the matter was allowed to drop for a time. However, a letter sent by the Directory to Joubert on January 16, 1796, announced approval of Joubert's determination to exact 600,000 livres in coin, in partial satisfaction of the 2,955,845 livres remaining due. Though the city remonstrated vigorously, Carnot, Reubell, and Barras overrode its objections. Coblenz had not contributed to the needs of the Sambre and Meuse Army in the same proportion, they declared, as the other cities of the conquered country, such as Treves and Düsseldorf. It was left to Joubert's prudence to decide on the mode of obtaining the sum demanded.37 Joubert's prudence told him to seize hostages in the city and transport some to Givet, some to Luxemburg. The harassed city thereupon borrowed 80,000 livres for one year from the Mühlen Bank of Coblenz.38 That was enough for a first payment. Joubert's prudence was paying off. w

lbid., pp. 693-694. "Ibid. 84 Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 3. 85 Hansen, Quellen, III, 709.

M

Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, vii, § 2. Arch. N., A F III* 218; A F III 340, d. 1 5 1 3 . 88 Hansen, Quellen, III, 749. 37

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

545

Another imposition, one which might sound petty after the preceding, but which was the source of much general harassment and indignation, was the table money of French officers. Unable to get a square meal in their native land, these officers were veritable connoisseurs and gluttons in the conquered country, eating and drinking like kings at the expense and before the very eyes of the hollow-cheeked citizenry. General Marceau's breakfasts cost 16 reichstaler 39 each. His wine had to be of 1783 vintage. T o feed him from January 22 to May cost Trêves 28,000 reichstaler. T h e demands also of Generals Lefebvre, Bernadotte, Kléber, Beurnonville, and especially Soult were exorbitant. Soult told Bonn it should be honored to pay for his meals; he and Lefebvre threatened to quarter additional soldiers and destroy a certain avenue because of protests. Soult even had a Bonn city official hauled out of a municipal meeting and into jail. There was table-money trouble in (besides Trêves and Bonn) Coblenz, Aix, Cologne, and Düren, from the end of 1795 until the Directory regulated the amount of table money according to rank on October 23, 1796, and provided that an innkeeper feeding a general could get his money from the civil administration. 40 And, of course, the ever-present requisitions were there to plague the citizen. O n March 4, 1796, Rivaud decreed that the region between the Rhine and Moselle would have to furnish 2,000 wagons to the French army, and acquit itself of certain other requisitions in kind yet unpaid. T h e Directory approved (March 16) . 41 O n April 24, the French government authorized Haussmann, Rivaud's colleague, to requisition 1,500 oxen in the conquered territories to provision Landau. T h e oxen, however, were to be paid for. 42 In the neighborhood of Trêves, according to a contemporary account, French "guards [were] going through every house and taking half the rye, oats, straw, meat and other things; of some articles, everything. . . In our city, all cows must be surrendered. . ." 43 O n June 6, National A g e n t Caselli urged the National Agents to the District Administrations "in the name of our fatherland [to] do your utmost to [make] the communes turn in to the magazines the provisions that the new requisition obliges them to furnish. . . W e have just learned that the divisions which crossed to the right bank are not provided with victuals." 44 But it was not only money and provisions that were requisitioned. A " The reichstaler varied in worth from $.55 to $1.10. Vide table of "German . . . Measures, Weights, Coins," D. Sanders, cont. by I. Schmidt and C. Stoffel, Muret-Sanders eticy\lopädisches englisch-deutsches und deutsch-englisches Wörterbuch (grosse Ausgäbe, rev.; 4 vols., Berlin, 1899), IV, x x x v i -

xxxviii, s.v. "Thaler." " H a n s e n , Quellen, III, 7 1 0 - 7 1 1 . 41 Dir. to Rivaud, Arch. N., A F III* 202. a Arch. N., A F III, 364, d. 1757. 43 Trierer Tagebuch of L. Müller, end of April 1796, Hansen, Quellen, III, 774, n. 3. " H a n s e n , Quellen, III, 799.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

labor force was needed by the army to build roads and entrenchments, and the city administrations were required to furnish a specified number of workers. Of course, these workers would be paid — by the city! That was mere justice, said the military, for the city would thereby be assuring its own defense. H o w did the system work? A t Trêves, for example, each house had to supply one worker, and each guild, fifteen. Of course, one could hire a substitute, but the unending contributions and requisitions had drained off so much wealth that, presently, distinguished citizens, men of God — among them deans of cathedrals, and even women, were sweating side by side with manual laborers in the ditches. 45 T h e foregoing will give some idea of the function of the left bank under the Directory; but that function was quite the same as under the Convention. In fact, a general prospectus of burdens imposed on the Meuse-to-Rhine region from autumn, 1794, to February 3, 1796, passes over the change-ofgovernment date without comment. This prospectus, borne to the Directory by a deputation from the Central Administration at A i x , shows an approximate cash loss to the Moselle-northward region, as a result of the French occupation, of 257,500,000 livres.46 Of course, the Directory was responsible for but a fraction of this. Given time, it would show up better. Sandoz learned quite early that the new government had no desire to make a pretense of solicitude for the Rhineland. In April 1796, he complained to Carnot and Delacroix of the "irregular, cruel, and unjust" treatment of the Prussian left bank by the French; and in order that he should not feel obliged to mince his words, he accused only the agents of the Republic. Carnot replied, " T h e complaints of these provinces are exaggerated; our agents have not made a single move without the approbation of the Directory." 47

2.

T H E ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF T H E LEFT

BANK

W h e n the Directory took over the reins from the Convention, it found the left bank in a state of frightful disorganization, administratively speaking. Civil and military authorities were quarreling over jurisdiction. Civil offices had been duplicated at enormous expense but with no corresponding benefit. Personal spite constituted the mainspring of many an official act. A network of ruinous deputations from Cologne, Coblenz, Aix-la-Chapelle, Bonn and other Rhineland cities was intriguing at Paris. T h e effect of all this on the orderly conduct of affairs may well be imagined, and the supply services "Ibid., p p . 783-784. Treves example f r o m Müller's Tagebuch. " H a n s e n , Quellen, III, 771-772.

" A p r i l 12, 1796, G . S. Arch., R XI reich 89, fase. 347.

¥ran\-

ΤΗ® EARLY DIRECTORY AND THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

547

of the occupying French armies were suffering considerably in consequence. Moreover, as Joubert wrote to Paris, the vices of administration had "rendered odious the French name." 48 Joubert's comment had its consequences. O n February 3, 1796, the Directory abolished the Central Administration at Aix-la-Chapelle, and replaced it with a three-member commission of Rhinelanders of French origin, 49 to be appointed by the Directory on Joubert's nomination. T h e government "expressed the belief" that Joubert would choose only those whose patriotism (with respect to France) was known to him. 50 Roberjot, like Joubert a former Representative on Mission in the Rhineland, objected to the creation of an administrative commission, 81 and his arguments and the desires of the Rhinelanders induced the Directory to abolish (May 17) all organs of government established by the Convention and by the Directory itself. T h e conquered country was then divided into two sections, called "General Directions," separated, roughly speaking, by the Moselle, and designated by the terms "Between the Rhine and the Meuse" and "Between the Rhine and the Moselle," respectively. Over each division was placed a director-general charged with administering the national domain, i.e., all property appropriated by the French government from princes, nobles, ecclesiastics, and anyone sufficiently wealthy to be worth dispossessing. T h e director-general was also to collect all taxes owed to the former established authorities and to turn over these sums, together with the charges imposed by France, to an appointee of the minister of finances.52 O n July 5, the Directory rendered this arrangement applicable to all the conquered territory on the left bank of the Rhine, whether actually in French hands on May 17, or not. By the same decree, Bella and Pruneau were appointed directors-general of the territories between the Rhine and Moselle, and Rhine and Meuse, respectively. 63 T h e creation of the General Directions ended one of the most interesting examples of administrative hurly-burly in the Rhineland — that afforded by the city of Cologne. T h e Committee of Public Safety and the Representatives on Mission had, for political reasons, maintained the old aristocratic Senate and magistracy of Cologne in power. This policy angered Delacroix. C. Schmidt, Les sources de l'histoire des territoires rhénans de 1792 à 1814 (Paris, 1921), pp. 3-8. " A r c h . N . , A F III* 218. " D i r . to Joubert, Feb. 25, 1796, Arch. Ν., A F III* 202. 61 Schmidt, Sources rhénans, p. 9. M Arch. N., A F III 371, d. 1820. Hansen presents this as a reorganization only of the Moselle-northward region. He says that south 48

K

of the Moselle, there already was a General Direction since August 9, 1795, and that the Directory merely continued this southern General Direction (Quellen, III, 784). Technically, the General Direction created on August 9 was really only a bureau subordinate to a Central Commission of five {vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 7 ) . Debidour, Recueil, III, 13.

54

8

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

T h e free and victorious French nation, he declared, never transmitted to its mandatories the power to maintain a people in slavery. Besides, unity of administration and of policy required that Cologne should submit to the laws of France. Delacroix's anger had yet another cause. T h e city's contingent was still serving with the army of the Empire, and Delacroix suspected that Cologne was paying that contingent. 54 It is very likely that Delacroix would have known nothing about the matter if not for Franz Theodor Biergans and his Brutus. Geich and Biergans have been mentioned above. 55 Their sport seems to have been to harass the Senate of Cologne. First it was Geich. H e had — in the last year of the Convention — published a reply to the appeal of " T h e Senate of the Ubii [i.e., of Cologne]" that the Convention honor the city's 2000-year-old institutions 56 — a reply of such tenor that Geich himself realized that Cologne would no longer be for him a healthy place in which to live. 57 That attack was made in February 1795. N o w , at the end of 1795, Geich's place as official critic was taken by Biergans — aided and abetted by others, it is true, most notably by the Augustinian chronicler A n n o Schnorrenberg. 58 But Biergans was the most violent, the most sensational, ergo the most annoying, and the most heard. Biergans divulged that part of Cologne's contingent was helping to garrison Mayence, hence was still in a state of active war with France. 59 T h e city saw itself obliged to admit that Brutus had told the truth. Biergans sniped continually at J. N . Dumont, the Cologne burgomaster, who had gone to Paris to complain, and who remained as a sort of self-constituted ambassador. Brutus told the French: " Y o u abolished nobility, yet here [Cologne] it rules still. Y o u have imposed restraints on the clergy, yet here it still tyrannizes over our consciences, thunders publicly against your great deeds, and defames you as blasphemers. . . Y o u r people are free; here they are more enslaved than before." 6 0 Biergans finally became so violent, coarse, and abusive that Cologne succeeded in procuring his arrest. But soon he was freed, then rearrested, then refreed. 61 However, Biergans' fate is not at issue here. W h a t is important is that his attacks, reinforcing as they did the previous attacks of Geich, rendered the French self-conscious about their having allowed the old regime to subsist in a city they had conquered "for liberty." Delacroix, in consequence, recommended to the Directory the dissolution of the established authorities " D e l a c r o i x to Dir., Jan. 23, 1796, Arch. N . ,

" H a n s e n , Quellen, III, 566.

A F III 59, d. 230. 55 Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 5.

M

M

Hansen, Quellen, chap, vii, η. 1 1 7 .

III, 404. Vide supra, Pt. I,

Ibid., p. 700, n. 1 et passim. ** Ibid., p. 720. °° Ibid., pp. 698-703.

81

Ibid., pp. 722-724.

THE EARLY DIRECTORY AND THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

549

of the city, the creation of a municipalité, and the auditing of the civic accounts.62 If the Ami des Lois may be believed, an attempt of French Commissioners to inspect the accounts of the city had already been made, but the proud descendants of the Ubii had ejected the intruders bodily from the city hall.63 On April 27, the Directory, to "assure better administration and the services of the army," abolished all the old authorities in Cologne, and subjected the city and its environs to the administrative commission established on February 3 at Aix-la-Chapelle. This decree was to enter into force as soon as the parties concerned had been notified.64 On May 27, Joubert informed the Directory that in accordance with its order, he had suppressed the Senate of Cologne and replaced it with a municipal commission of six members and a "National Commissioner." 65 In the meantime (May 17), however, the Directory had abolished all organs of government in the Rhineland, and created the General Directions. It will be realized how much the inhabitants must have suffered at the hands of these ever-changing authorities who, owing to the brevity of their terms in office, had no opportunity to remedy their errors but yielded to successors who made the same errors all over again. One of the regions suffering from maladministration was of course the Prussian left bank. This was a deep wound to Prussia, home of efficient administration. But a deeper wound by far was the ruination of Frederick William's left-bank subjects by unreasonable impositions. It was not only his subjects the King was thinking of. France was destroying his own potentialities for taxation if and when he should recover his lost provinces. Towards the end of the Convention, Frederick William had repeatedly asked the Republic for permission to administer his left-bank states, but he had not dared ask to collect their revenues.68 That demand came, however, under the Directory.67 Barthélémy did not recommend granting Prussia's request, but a similar demand by the Duke of Zweibrücken in the spring of 1796, he viewed in another light. It might be wise politics, he wrote to Paris, to consent in the latter case, for the Duke was the prospective head of the Bavaro-Palatine House.68 However, the French government felt that to allow the Duke of Zweibrücken or anyone else to collect his revenues "prejudiced a question of Delacroix to Dir., Jan. 23, 1796, Arch. Ν., A F III 59, d. 230. " N o . CL (Jan. 7, 1796). " A r c h . Ν., A F III* 218. " A r c h . Ν., A F III 365, d. 1764. Joubert added: "In this city the partisans of the Republic are very rare and litde known" (ibid.). 62

Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 3. " Vide, e.g., Sandoz to the King, Oct. 13, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349, f. 45; idem, Jan. 21, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. "Barthélémy to Delacroix, March 4, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 161.

M

550

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

the greatest importance" (that of the eastern boundary of France), 69 even if he should administer his estates as a simple individual. 70 The Directory reacted in a strange way to Barthélemy's arguments in favor of the Duke. It believed it detected in the Ambassador a certain partiality for his Grace. 71 Barthélémy protested that he had been ordered to humor the small states of Germany. 72 Delacroix's answer is classic: "Without doubt the French Republic will be the protectress of the weak princes of Germany when she has accorded them peace; but could it be concluded therefrom that she ought to let them enjoy the benefits, until then, of those of their goods which she has in her possession? She will be the protectress of the Palatine House, but this she will be in a manner which conforms with her interests — and, to be sure, with those of the Palatine House." 7 3 "Delacroix to Barthélémy, March 1 2 , 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 173. m Idem, April 14, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 672, f. 208. Cetto asked later for the Duke's Alsatian revenues, and was told that all that France could do for him was to draw up a contingent convention granting him indemnity in the Breisgau and elsewhere at the end of the war (Sandoz to the King, Oct. 6,

1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349)· "Delacroix to Barthélémy, April 18, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 193. "Barthélémy to Delacroix, April 25, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 194. 73 Delacroix to Barthélémy, April 29, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 196.

>5 CHAPTER VI Κ

POTERATZ AT BASEL

I.

POTERATZ

A M not surprised at the reception given you," Delacroix wrote to Poteratz on January 26,1796, after the breakup of the latter's conferences with Thugut. " W e were expecting it when you left [Paris]. It was the inevitable consequence of the intoxication caused by the momentary successes [of the Austrians] on the Rhine." Then Delacroix announced that the envoy's instructions would remain unchanged: France would not renounce the left bank; she had 300,000 men on the Rhine all ready to march, and the forced loan was in full swing. 1

/

It will be recalled that Thugut and Poteratz had arranged for the continuation at Basel of their secret negotiations. Poteratz arrived in that city on January 27. H e explained to Degelmann that though the Directors did not favor a formal congress, he had proposed to them preliminary conferences like those held at Hamburg in the year 1643. (These had preceded, and prepared the ground for, the Peace of Westphalia.) T h e object of these conferences would be, according to the French agent, the claims and complaints of the different princes who had suffered losses as a result of the war. When the difficulties had been solved, the envoys could constitute themselves as a peace congress. 2 A week or two later, Poteratz added further details. T h e conferences could take place under the mediation of Denmark and Sweden, the first named of which was satisfactory to France (though the Republic was now positive that the Danish minister, Count von Bernstorff, had a predilection for England) ; the second named, to Austria. Poteratz preferred Hamburg as the seat of the conferences for two reasons: the city was far removed from the theater of the war; and the conferences of 1643 had been 1

Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 21.

' Ibid., p. 22.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

held there. T h e latter fact supplied perhaps the strongest motive, for Poteratz took great delight in drawing a perfect analogy between the Thirty Years' W a r and the W a r of the First Coalition. 3 T h u g u t rejected the idea of a preliminary conference. T h e very example cited by Poteratz — the conferences preceding the Peace of Westphalia — demonstrated the futility of such assemblies, he said. T h e parleys commencing in 1643 had consumed four or five years in fruitless discussion. W h a t Europe needed was a speedy peace, and Austria was resolved to continue military operations until the moment had arrived when a just and reasonable settlement could be made. 4 A few days later, Poteratz abandoned his preliminary-conference project. His government had no taste for half measures, he said.5 Regarding Austria's desire for a congress, Delacroix wrote to Poteratz, the Directory thinks the suggestion "inexpedient, useless, and premature." It was inexpedient because France ought not to take the initiative in seeking peace after her overtures have been refused; this would compromise the dignity of the Republic. Moreover, his (Poteratz') mission had proved the desire of the Republic for a just, stable, and suitable peace. A congress would be useless because his journey had already destroyed Europe's opinion that France had a repugnance to peace. This idle talk was no longer believed, Delacroix declared, except perhaps by some disguised royalists who would have liked to see the Republic retreat humbly within its former limits and suffer without murmuring the colossal increase in the power of the coalesced states. A congress would be premature because Vienna had received much gold from London, was expecting more, and had determined to trust once again to the god of war. If France agreed to a congress, there would result therefrom only a political farce. " T h e peace of Germany would be made either at Berlin or at Vienna. T h e secondary powers would act only through one channel or the other." France desired that the general peace should come about by Prussian mediation of treaties of separate peace. Truly, a congress would have to be held some time, but it ought to be avoided until separatepeace agreements had consecrated the principle of secularization. Then it would be "simple, easy, and rapid" to draw up a general treaty. Without this precaution, the intervention of England and of Russia and the intrigues of the priests would result in interminable delays, and deliver France almost without defense to its cruelest enemies. That a great increase of influence in the Empire would result to Prussia from its mediation, Delacroix admitted, * Degelmann to Thugut, Feb. 9, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 197. * Thugut to Degelmann, Feb. 22, 1796, H. H.

S. Arch., Schweiz 216. 'Degelmann to Thugut, March 7, 1796, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 29.

POTERATZ AT BASEL

553

but characterized it as "worthy recompense for the good sense which led it to be the first to rally to the yet poorly consolidated Republic." 6 T h e same day that Delacroix wrote this despatch, he informed Poteratz that the Directory had declared his mission at Basel to be terminated. Poteratz was ordered to return to Paris. 7 Delacroix's despatch of March i, however, modified this command: "If you believe you can do something to advance the cause of peace, you may construe my antepenultimate letter [i.e., the letter of February 19] relative to your return [in a way to permit you to remain]." 8 This letter of March 1 contained also a very interesting passage concerning a congress. "Find a means of having a Germanic congress without priests, or, just as well, a congress where the lay princes are strong enough to neutralize totally the action of the priests. That would remove a great obstacle to the general pacification. Until this is accomplished, it appears impossible for us to avail ourselves thereof [i.e., of a congress]." 9 O n March 3, Poteratz defined the position of his government with respect to the eastern frontier of France. His despatch to Degelmann of that date declared "that the will of the Republic 1 0 is to have the totality of the waters of the Rhine as its boundary on the side of Germany, and it will have them. . . It needs the consent of no one . . . and will not ask it, . . . but it would have desired to make an agreement with the Emperor [on the subject of indemnities] rather than to shed blood. . . " 1 1 W h y the French desired all the waters of the Rhine, instead of the customary half, is easily explained. They would thus acquire complete control of the commerce on the River, relieving French nationals of tolls, and of the necessity of appearing before the slow-moving German courts. A n d they would gain possession of the almost innumerable islands, some of them quite large, with which the River is dotted, thus facilitating for the French army the hopscotch operation of crossing the Rhine. Poteratz soon realized that the Austrian minister at Basel was empowered only to listen, and not to reply. W e cannot accomplish anything under such circumstances, the French agent wrote to Degelmann, and he requested the latter to ask for power to do something real. 12 In the meantime, Poteratz ' F e b . 19, 1796, Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, ff. 34-35. 7 Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 35. 8 Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 31. 'Delacroix to Poteratz, Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 50. 10 T h e despatch of Sandoz' of a fortnight later drew a distinction between the will of the Republic and that of the Directory. T h e ma-

jorities of the two Councils were strongly in favor of peace, Sandoz declared (to the King, March 19, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Vran\retch 89, fase. 347). " P o t e r a t z to Degelmann, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 28. 13 Idem, March 5, 1796, H . H. S. Arch., Schweiz 197.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

made two attempts of his own to activate the negotiations. H e wrote to Degelmann that he had been about to mount his carriage for Paris when he received from his government two letters 1 3 which rendered it imperative that he and Degelmann should have a confidential, thorough conference. "Tomorrow evening I will come to see you," ran Poteratz' note. Degelmann wrote on the note: " N o t answered." 1 4 Poteratz came anyway. 1 5 Poteratz' other attempt to activate the negotiations took the form of a leter to Thugut announcing his willingness to return to Vienna to settle the points which could not be agreed upon between him and Degelmann — provided that Degelmann would be given power to decide the general bases of an agreement. If the general bases were not first established, declared Poteratz, he was loath to return to Vienna. " Y o u can easily understand that it is neither agreeable nor decent for a man such as I to play the sad role of an obscure agent." 1 6 Poteratz proposed to T h u g u t a four-articled program: (a) to make an immediate separate peace on the bases already enuniciated, which peace would be held secret between Thugut, Poteratz, and the Directory; (b) to prolong the armistice in both Germany and Italy until July i ; (c) to convoke a congress in Hamburg or elsewhere ("I prefer Hamburg") ; (d) to announce suddenly, at the opening of the congress, the separate FrancoAustrian peace, and to declare, without speaking of conditions, the firm resolution of the Emperor and the Directory to guarantee to each other the territories destined to each state by the treaty. T h e n the congress would have nothing to do but to arrange the indemnities and compensations for secular princes who had suffered losses. Poteratz promised that if T h u g u t would accept these propositions, England would be introduced into the definitive treaty in a manner satisfactory to Austria. 17 T h e French agent probably meant that she would be introduced in a minor capacity, as he had already suggested to Degelmann on March 3. 18 Poteratz "urgently advised" T h u g u t to accept this program, and then broached the subject of the Saint-Priest correspondence. A t the time of his first journey to Vienna, the French agent averred, a certain person had formed the project of publishing this correspondence in order to bring about the removal of an enemy of France from the control of Austrian affairs. Poteratz claimed that he himself had warded off the blow by removing the documents in question from the archives and turning them over to the The first, of February 28, rejected the idea of a congress. The second, of March 1, was the one suggesting a congress without priests or with the priests neutralized. "March 7, 1796, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 31. 18

Degelmann to Thugut, Feb. 9, 1796; sent Feb. 11: ibid., pp. 22-23. "Poteratz to Thugut, March 8, 1796, ibid., p. 32. "Ibid. " Ibid., pp. 28-29.

15

POTERÀ ira AT BASEL

555

minister of foreign affairs — after he (Poteratz) had read them. "They compromise you seriously," he gently assured the Baron. 19 Poteratz must not be thought of with too much contempt. That was his spiritual level. T o him blackmail was a perfectly legitimate source of political capital, and all his thoughts tended toward compromising his antagonist. Thus, in February, when he drafted a letter intended for Thugut, and suggested an assembly to be held in Hamburg, he made the following observations to the Directory : " W e must always speak of the second journey I made to Vienna. It has been a mystery to the Courts of London and of St. Petersburg"; and "I have drawn it [the letter] up in a manner to be able some day to compromise the Court of Vienna in the eyes of its allies, . . . and Baron von Thugut in the eyes of the courts paying him, if he is receiving money." 20 Poteratz' letters to Thugut were left unanswered on the pretext that their subject matter could not be confided to writing, 2 1 and Degelmann was ordered to avoid connections with the French agent which might appear as confidential relations.* T h u g u t was of course thinking of possible attempts to estrange England from Austria by stories of secret Franco-Austrian pourparlers. Newspapers were announcing that Poteratz was about to make a new trip to Vienna, 2 2 and, according to William Wickham, who represented England in Switzerland, 23 Poteratz himself was declaring it to everyone. Thugut had ordered Degelmann on January 10 to grant the French agent no passport to return to Vienna; however, the Austrian helmsman feared that Poteratz would come without a passport if he could not come with one.24 A n amusing incident occurred on May 18. Degelmann suddenly came face to face with Poteratz on a bridge in Basel, and tried to pass him by, pretending that he had not seen him. However, Poteratz called out that it was he, Poteratz. Degelmann stopped. T h e French agent inquired whether "Poteratz to Thugut, March 8, 1796, ibid.,

ΡΡ· 32-33· "Proposition of Some Measures Adapted to the Present Circumstances," Feb. 1, 1796, Arch. A. E., Autriche 365, f. 84. " D e g e l m a n n to Thugut, May 11, 1796, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 44, η. ι. 0 Thugut to Degelmann, April 20, 1796, enclosing no. 101 of the Frankfort-on-the-Main Mercure universel, which drew the "information" about Poteratz' impending trip to Vienna from a Paris newspaper (ibid., p. 40). 23 Chargé d'affaires from end of 1794 to summer of 1795; minister from 1795 to 1797. In the last-named year, the Directory de-

20

manded his expulsion by the Swiss on the ground that he served as a fomenter of insurrection instead of as a diplomatic representative. Specifically, Wickham had protested against Switzerland's decision to expel the French émigrés who had taken refuge there. Back in England, Wickham became British undersecretary of state for home affairs (J. F. and L. G . Michaud [eds.], Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne [2nd ed.; 45 vols., Paris, 1854], s.v. "Wickham, William"; Dictionary of National Biography [new ed., rev.; New York, 1908], s.v. "Wickham, William"). M Thugut to Degelmann, May 9, 1796, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, P t II, Vol. I, 44, n. 2.

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T h u g u t had sent in a message for him. Degelmann answered negatively. Poteratz then asked whether Degelmann ever recalled him to Thugut. T h e Austrian replied: "I never fail to." T h e men then parted. 25 Poteratz must have been bitterly chagrined. According to Degelmann, he was burning with the desire to play a grand role in the general pacification, 26 and Thugut would not pay any attention to him. It would be interesting to know if the French agent was aware that, at the very moment when he was talking on the Basel bridge, Degelmann was negotiating with France through the channel of Poteratz' political rival, Barthélémy. 27

2.

DEGELMANN AND W I C K H A M APPROACH

BARTHELEMY

England's prime minister, William Pitt, believed that the change in France from Convention to Directory offered a favorable moment to suggest peace to France, and W i c k h a m was ordered to approach Barthélémy. T h e idea of approaching Poteratz seems never to have occurred to the British. 28 N o t that they were unaware that Poteratz was "negotiating" — or claiming to negotia t e — in the Directory's name, 29 but that he was known to be seeking to wean Austria away from England. 30 So there was good reason to use the 26

Degelmann to Thugut, May 23, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. Poteratz soon after sent a letter to Thugut, for on May 29, Thugut wrote to Count Colloredo: "Your Excellency will find . . . a third [letter] from that odious Poterat[z] intriguer, who, also, has thought himself obliged to recall to us his detestable existence" (Briefe Thugut,

I» 303)· Degelmann to Thugut, March 8, 1796, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 34. " Ibid., p. 44. Poteratz had heard rumors of an overture made by Wickham to Barthélémy (vide infra, text, next section), which overture had prompted the Barthélemy-Degelmann negotiation (Sorel in RH, XXIX, 306). In fact, Poteratz had heard rumors of several negotiations between Paris, Vienna, and London — all of them commenced by France, according to his information. "Are the agents of these negotiations authorized by the Directory?" he queried of Delacroix. "That is what I am ignorant of, and what I ought not presume" (Poteratz to Delacroix, April 27, 1796, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 42). Delacroix replied that Poteratz was deceiving himself. Royalist intrigues there might be, but, for those, the governx

ment was not responsible (May 4, 1796, ibid., η. 2). 28 But it did to the French. The Directory's instructions of April ι , 1796, to Poteratz authorized him to listen, but not reply, to British insinuations (Art. II, Arch. A . E., Autriche Supp. 25, f. 94). Barras, according to his Mémoires, seemed to believe Wickham's overture was unauthorized by Downing Street (II, 136). Wickham to Grenville, March 17, 1796, Dropmore Papers, III, 181. A n agent of Wickham's had even held a conference, on the night of May 9-10, with Bassal, Poteratz' second in command in a presently-to-bedescribed scheme (infra, chap, viii) to revolutionize southwestern Germany (Poteratz to Delacroix, May 25, 1796, Bonnal de Ganges, Repré., IV, 558). *" Wickham did not fear the Poteratz intrigue. "If [Austria] makes war ill," he wrote to Grenville, "she has generally made peace worse, and always the last" (June 15, 1796, Dropmore Papers, III, 213). But Grenville feared that "if the Milanese were thought irrecoverable by force, Herr Thugut would willingly sacrifice the Netherlands to regain it by treaty" (Grenville to Sir Morton Eden

POTERATZ AT BASEL

557

regular diplomatic channel — the French embassy in Switzerland. And Austria, desirous of coordinating its policy with that of its English ally, thereupon opened, through the channel of Burgomaster Bourcard, the abovementioned negotiation with Barthélémy in which the French ambassador was "Monsieur" and the French Republic was "France." 31 However, Poteratz lost nothing by the preference accorded to Barthélémy — for two reasons. The first was, of course, the Emperor's so-obvious attempt not to say anything which might be construed as a recognition of the Republic. The second was Austria's apparent intention to act only in concert with England — a concert based solely upon their common hostility to France. The Directory was willing, Delacroix wrote to Barthélémy, to listen to just and reasonable terms of peace so as to end "a disastrous war which the free French have sustained with energy, but which they did not by any means provoke," but Austria's behavior did not seem to bespeak a desire for peace. The French government apparently wished to be very sure that Barthélémy showed the proper indignation, else it would not have sent in its own masterpiece to guide him in his reply, as already related. Degelmann forwarded "Barthélemy's" reply to Vienna with the remark that "the tone and vein seem to have been dictated by the notorious principle professed by those who are governing France of astonishing by means of extreme arrogance, as well as by the necessity imposed on them by the last conspiracy of continuing the war so as to avoid the dangers which peace — that is, the return of the trooops — would involve." The negotiation naturally ended with the French reply.32 The Anglo-French parley fared no better. Wickham's note of March 8 had similarly sought to escape recognition of the Republic by studiously avoiding use of the words République française, Directoire, and Ambassadeur de la République.3S This of course irked the Directory, so, knowing England's interest in restoring Belgium to the Emperor,34 the Paris govern[Brit. envoy to Vienna], May 24, 1796, ibid., p. 207). The event proved Wickham to have been the shrewder observer. 31 Pt. II, chap, iii, § 4. There was the possibility, of course, that Degelmann would some day be suddenly confronted with an indignant Poteratz who had learned that Degelmann had turned a peace note over to Barthélémy. In such case, ordered Thugut, admit the facts and say that they are a direct consequence of our inseparability from England, which has chosen Barthélémy as its medium (Thugut to Degelmann, May 9, 1796, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 44). "Ibid., pp. 48-49.

88

"The undersigned [W. Wickham] . . . is authorized to convey to monsieur Barthélémy the desire of his court to be made acquainted . . . with the dispositions of France in regard to . . . a general pacification" (British Annual Register, 1796, p. 421). " T h e Emperor, or rather Thugut, was less anxious to obtain Belgium back than was England that he should have it. The minds of the inhabitants had been stirred up by the revolutionary propaganda, and, according to Thugut, a goodly portion of Austria's German troops, and almost all of Belgium's revenue, would have been needed to pacify the province (Eden to Grenville, Nov. 26, 1796,

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

ment replied (through Barthélémy, March 26) by throwing back in Wickham's teeth an article of the Republican constitution — misinterpreted, or rather misstated, to suit the occasion. Article 332 forbade the alienation of French territory by secret articles. It was cited as authority for the proposition that the so-called constitutional frontiers of France, which included Belgium, Liège, and Luxemburg, could not even be discussed,35 though the remainder of the left bank might form the subject of negotiation. "Charged by the Constitution with the execution of the laws," Barthélémy wrote, "it [the Directory] cannot make or listen to any proposition contrary to them. T h e Constitutional Act does not permit it to consent to any alienation of what, according to existing laws, constitutes the territory of the Republic. A s to the territories occupied by the French 36 armies, and which have not been united [with France], these, as well as other political or commercial interests, may become the subject of negotiation." T h e British answer, prescribed by D o w n i n g Street but sent by W i c k h a m (April 22), objected to considering as an internal regulation what concerned all of Europe. 37 Thus ended the Wickham-Degelmann overtures. Their failure cannot be laid exclusively at the door of the Directory. T h e British and Austrian governments had overplayed their parts by their tricky penwork. Next time they would know better. E. Herrmann, Diplomatische Correspondenzen aus der Revolutionszeit, 1791-1797 [Gotha, 1867], p. 540). Besides, it was too open to attack by France. England was not amenable to such arguments. She wanted a strong and friendly prince as her trans-Channel neighbor. To her it was a matter of life and death. (Vide Sandoz to the King, Dec. 20, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 106-107.) 86 "Noli me tangere frontiers," was the way Lord Macartney characterized them to Grenville, September 27, 1795 (Lebon, Angl, êmig. jr., p. 343).

°° Underscored in the original. " H . H. S. Arch., England 183; Schweiz 198. Barthélemy's note of March 26 may be found in the British Annual Register, 1796, section on "Public Papers," pp. 124-125, with only the inconsequential difference that the Register fails to indicate that the word "French" was underscored. Why the underscoring, the present writer knows not. It should be noted that p. 124 of the Register is, by a curious slip, numbered 421, so that the above citation appears to be 421-125.

>a

C H A P T E R VII

tf

E N D E A V O R S T O COERCE A U S T R I A BY A C T I N G UPON H E S S E - C A S S E L A N D T U R K E Y , A N D R A I S I N G T H E SPECTER OF P O L A N D

I.

RIVALZ

1

AT CASSEL

H I L E Poteratz was assuring Degelmann of France's willingness to promote Austrian influence in the Empire in return for the left bank, Rivalz was in Hesse-Cassel trying to stir up the Empire against Austria. T h e instructions remitted to the latter agent on February 24, 1796, afford an excellent example of the Directory's policy toward the small states of Germany. France, declared the instructions, has until now maintained a legation at Cassel only from sheer decency; there was nothing of major importance to be discussed. This situation could, however, be altered by the force of circumstances, and the Casseler legation could become the seat of the most important and most delicate negotiations. Rivalz should try to determine the true sentiments of the Landgrave and of his ministers with a view to ascertaining whether France might make use of these sentiments to accelerate the era of general peace. Rivalz should be very polite, very obliging, to Baron von Waitz, one of the most influential of the Landgrave's ministers, but in the beginning he should not go beyond the stage of compliments. H e might remark how wise was the Court of Cassel when it severed its ties with the Coalition. H e should express the great satisfaction felt by France when the Landgrave's ministers at Ratisbon refused the Diet's demand for "Roman months." 2 W a i t z would himself probably take the next step, and bare his sovereign's aspirations. This would give France the handle she sought. 1

Not Rivali.

2

Military contributions, in men and money. Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, vi, η. 95.

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T H E DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

T h e instructions emphasized that Rivalz should be chary of promises. H e should bind himself by no engagement not expressed or implicit in France's treaty with Hesse-Cassel, or involved in the following plan of general pacification: cession of the left bank to France; indemnification of dispossessed left-bank princes with secularized right-bank ecclesiastical lands; reorganization of the Empire with four new electorates (Hesse, Orange, Württemberg, Mecklenburg, or others) ; French guarantee of the new German constitution; and confederation against the triple alliance of Austria, England, and Russia. Rivalz should bring out "by the simple language of reason" that the concert of Austria, England, and Russia was a "political monstrosity" which menaced the liberty and the independence of the minor states. These tiny morsels of land would soon serve to gorge the appetites of their giant neighbors did not France form a redoubtable counterweight. This thesis, unremittingly enunciated, and supported by the invasion of Poland, should cause the minor princes of the Empire to view favorably the aggrandizement of France. Rivalz could point out that the geographical position of the cities of Cassel and of Frankfort-on-the-Main would enable either of these cities to become a convenient center of negotiation, secret union, or understanding between the Republic and several states of the Empire. Should the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel secretly favor, or, better still, provoke the conclusion of treaties of separate peace with princes with whom he was connected, France would endeavor to obtain for him "enclaves important by their population and their revenue," to secure for him the electoral dignity, and to raise his position to the level of the powers of Germany of the second order. T h e preliminary to all this was for him to free himself entirely from the influence of the Court of London. Rivalz might enter immediately into negotiation regarding the indemnities claimed by Hésse-Cassel for the damage done by the French army during its last invasion of Franconia. H e should treat the affair with the "exalted honesty and generosity toward neighbors proper to a great, free nation." However, the acquittal of the amounts adjudged due should take place only at the general peace, and consist principally of territory. 3 Should Habsburg agents make overtures to Rivalz regarding Austria's projected acquisition of Bavaria, Rivalz should answer that though he had no positive instructions in the matter, he nevertheless believed he could say that France would interpose no obstacle thereto if the cessions that she herself was demanding were accorded, if suitable indemnities were assured * T h e Directory was planning to indemnify the Landgrave at the expense of his neigh-

bors for the losses caused by the army — a very economical policy.

French

CASSEL, T U R K E Y , POLAND, AS KEYS TO AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

5 6I

to the Palatine House, and if a prompt, stable, and general peace with the Empire were likely to result therefrom. Rivalz should answer vaguely any propositions made by the ecclesiastical electors and princes; he should make no species of engagement with them. Propositions relative to the family or brothers of the former king (Louis X V I ) , as well as to the émigrés, should be rejected without discussion. The instructions concluded thus: Finally — to dissipate the anxiety which appears to have been conceived in Germany regarding our republican principles and their propagation — Citizen Rivalz will be sure to declare that although France desired the propagation of her principles when she had no regular government and was in the clutches of a revolutionary maelstrom which did not always allow a selection of means, yet she did so only because that seemed the best guarantee of her independence; now, however, having rendered that independence secure, . . . she would maintain exact neutrality as between peoples and sovereigns.4 The suggestion of an alliance between France and several of the states of the Empire, with its nerve center at Cassel, was a gentle reminder of the importance of the Hessian princes during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was not, however, the first Revolutionary suggestion that Hesse should revive its ancient splendor. Eight days before the Convention dissolved itself, the Committee of Public Safety had ordered Barthélémy to insinuate to Waitz that the time had come for Hesse-Cassel to adopt a more imposing attitude, and to unite with France against a prince whose pride and domination it was in the Landgrave's interest to suppress (viz., the Emperor). Barthélémy was told to harp adroitly on the complaints of Hesse-Cassel against Austria.5 Nor was this the first suggestion, for Barthélémy had asserted, on October 7, 1795, that the moment — England had ceased paying Hesse-Cassel its subsidy, thus angering the Landgrave — was favorable for France to hire the troops of the Landgrave and to establish in Germany, in accord with Prussia, the bases of a confederation aimed at the overthrow of the Austrian colossus.6 These attempts to excite the ambition of the Court of Cassel, and to turn that ambition into channels mutually beneficial to Cassel and France, may be regarded as a blueprint of Revolutionary policy vis-à-vis the small states of Germany except in so far as the compelling necessities of subsistence forced a revision or modification of that policy. Supplement of instructions for Citizen Rivalz, Feb. 24, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, I, 668-671. 5 Oct. 18, 1795, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670,

4

f. 13· ' Barthélémy to CPS, Arch. A . E., 669, ñ. 366-367.

Allemagne

562

T H E DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

2.

AUBERT-DUBAYET AT CONSTANTINOPLE

At approximately the same time that the Directory decreed the foregoing instructions for Rivalz, it sent to Constantinople Aubert-Dubayet on a quite similar mission. Aubert-Dubayet was to try to induce the Turks to harass Austria in the rear, while France was attacking the Habsburgs in Italy and on the Rhine. Victory would be easy, he was to assure Turkey, for the Hungarian barons could be stirred into revolt by visions of independence. After Austria was defeated, the Porte could turn all its efforts against Russia, most unrelenting enemy of the Turks. The Ambassador should make the Turkish alliance "the primary object of his efforts." 7 Interesting in this connection is a conversation of Sandoz with Delacroix. It was, of course, a favorite French argument that the acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine by France was necessary to enable the Republic to hold Russia in check. Sandoz declared: "You believe that these new boundaries would overawe Russia to the extent of putting a stop to its designs on Turkey? You are wrong. . . You may rest assured that the more that Europe exhausts herself by the continuation of the war, the more Russia fortifies itself to carry through its vast designs on Constantinople. . . It is peace which will save Turkey and Europe from a general upheaval, and not your miserable conquests." Sandoz reported that his reflections seemed to have made a great impression on Delacroix.8 3.

POLAND AS A FACTOR IN THE DIRECTORY'S GERMAN POLICY

"France and Turkey ought . . . to unite all their efforts to return to Poland her independence, or to procure to one of their allies the possession of this usurped kingdom," ran an article by Prince Charles of Hesse-Rheinfels, the German Jacobin commentator of the Ami des Lois, soon after the Directory came into power.9 The next year Verninac, French envoy extraordinary to the Ottoman Porte, predecessor of Aubert-Dubayet, endeavored to secure the aid of Turkey in Establishing Poland.10 Parandier,11 whom the Con* "Memoir to Serve as Instructions for Citizen Aubert-Dubayet," Feb. 27, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, I, 699. Aubert-Dubayet did not arrive in Constantinople until October 2, 1796 (Sciout, Direc., Ill, 575). "Sandoz to the King, Feb. 22, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 54· 'No. CXXXV (Dec. 22, 1795). 10 Sciout, Direc., Ill, 574. Verninac had been working to this end during the Convention

also. The CPS had written to him on June 21, 1795, that the interests of the Porte required that the Polish territory in Austrian and Russian hands be torn away, but not that in Prussian hands (Sorel, Europe, IV, 360). "Parandier's official title was that of "observer," but he was practically a spy. He corresponded directly with Delacroix, who utilized the information he sent in to check up the

CASSEL, TURKEY, POLAND, AS KEYS TO AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

563

vention had sent to Poland to study the political potentialities of the Polish situation, and who was still intriguing to this end under the Directory, wrote to Delacroix that the resurrection of the unfortunate kingdom was properly the function of Turkey. 1 2 However, it was to resurrection by Prussia that most eyes turned, though Saxony did come in for occasional consideration also. On March 25, 1796, a memoir received by the French government suggested that, once Frederick William was tranquilly in control of his share of Poland, it was in Prussia's interest that the Czarina should lose her share. 13 The following month, Delacroix told Sandoz that if Frederick William wished to re-create Poland to oppose it to Russia, the King "would have to say only one word; all that would soon be organized." T o which Sandoz replied that it were better to leave the Poles alone, as they only spent on their pleasures the large sums granted them. 14 On September 14, 1796, the French minister of foreign affairs received a copy of a printed work on Poland, in which such a remolding of the Baltic map was suggested as would give Poland Livonia and West Prussia, and the ports of Danzig, Königsberg, Riga, Reval, Elbing, Thorn, and Libau. 1 5 Ten days later arrived a "Notice sur la Pologne," proposing a partially reconstituted Poland under the Prussian King's second son. 16 The "Notice" anticipated the objection that Prussia would become too powerful in consequence, by arguing that the interests of the respective states would overshadow dynastic interests.17 About this time (the document is undated), one Citizen Bonneau proposed to the French government that the crown of a constitutional Poland — that is, of that part of Poland which formed the subject of the Third Partition — should be bestowed upon the Elector of Saxony, on the express condition that Saxony and Poland should be forever united into a single state, and the whole admitted to the German Empire. This, said the author, would be the only means of creating, out of the wreckage which was Poland, a state strong enough to survive. 18 On October 15, Delacroix despatched to Caillard and Parandier copies of work of Caillard (R. Tabournel, "Le Prince Henri de Prusse et le Directoire," REH [Revue des études historiques], 1908, p. 1 2 ) . Sybel describes Parandier as a "red-hot Jacobin . . . who was ready for any intrigue" (Europe, IV, 242). 12 May 18, 1796, Sciout, Direc., II, 20, n. 3. ω H. la Salle, "Memoir on the Reëstablishment of the Political Independence of Poland," Arch. N., A F HI 74, d. 301. " S a n d o z to the King, April 26, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347.

" A r c h . Ν., A F III 74, d. 301. "Later, the King's nephew, Prince Louis Ferdinand, was suggested by the French minister of foreign affairs as a possible candidate for the Polish throne. Vide Report of min. of for. aff. to Dir., Aug. 29, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 74, d. 301. "Sept. 24, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 74, d. 301. 18 Arch. N., A F III 74, d. 301. This plan would have introduced into the German Diet the representative of a friendly non-German state (i.e., friendly with respect to France).

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

a memoir concerning the reëstablishment of Poland. 19 This memoir declared that Prussia had found herself unable to dominate Polish national sentiment, and would gladly give Poland political independence under a Hohenzollern ruler. 20 T h e memoir expressed hope for the support of the Prussian King's uncle, Prince Henry, who did indeed regard the resurrection of Poland as necessary to restore the European balance; and suggested the House of Ferdinand, closely related to Henry, for the throne of the new Poland. 21 Delacroix informed Caillard. that he had submitted a copy of the memoir to the Directory, and asked Caillard and Parandier what were the chances for success of the plan. 22 Parandier replied at great length, riddling the arguments of the memoir with objections. H e said the Prussian K i n g wanted to maintain his hold on Poland; that he rejected everything that Prince Henry favored in order not to appear to be led by his uncle. Therefore, concluded Parandier, Prince Henry's opinion that the partitions were an error was of no particular import. 23 Despite this advice, there arrived in Berlin, on November 10, a most secret agent of the Directory with propositions reeking of the disapproved memoir. T h e mission was so secret that the agent, D'Audibert-Caille, would not divulge even to Caillard, whom he had known well in Amsterdam, the nature of his propositions. D'Audibert's passport described him as a traveler on business.24 H e did indeed have business, and he was traveling, so Delacroix had not lied in wording the passport. T h e Poles of Paris had authorized D'Audibert to negotiate with Prussia regarding Polish affairs. H e was to offer the crown of a constitutional Poland to a Hohenzollern prince if Prussia would aid in the resurrection of the murdered state.25 T h e Directory had added its authorization to that of the Poles, 26 and permitted the agent to draw 12,000 francs from the secret funds. 27 D'Audibert was unsuccessful in seeing Haugwitz, 2 8 but he did get a " Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 55. 20 Vide Caillard to Delacroix, Dec. 9, 1796: "There is not a man of intelligence at Berlin who does not agree today that the last partition of Poland was a disastrous operation for Prussia; and people recall with bitterness the well-known maxim of Frederick the Great that the existence of some kind of a Poland was necessary to its [Prussia's] repose" (Bailleu, Pr.' Fr\., I, 448). Accord: Rivalz to Delacroix, Fdb. 20, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 317. 21 Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, β. 60-62. 22 Delacroix to Caillard, Oct. 15, 1796, Arch.

A. E., Prusse 220, f. 55; Delacroix to Parandier, Oct. 15, 1796, ibid., f. 59. 28 Nov. 3, 1796, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, ff. 102-108. "Caillard to Delacroix, Nov. 15, 1796, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, ff. 126-127. 25 "Note upon Facts Relative to Poland," D'Audibert to Reubell, June 1, 1798, Arch. N „ A F III 76, d. 318. " D e c r e e of Sept. 11, 1796. 27 Guyot, Direc., p. 87. œ Abstracts of despatches from Caillard and D'Audibert, Nov. 15, 19, 1796, Arch. N., A F ΙΠ 76, d. 318.

CASSEL, TURKEY, POLAND, AS KEYS TO AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

565

29

letter to him. However, since the agent had pretended that his mission was without the knowledge of the French government, 30 he was, on Haugwitz' order, escorted back across the border into Saxony without ceremony. 81 The treatment accorded D'Audibert was apparently immoderate, for the Prussian Ministry, to mitigate its "offense," permitted two French citizens to wear the tricolor cockades which they had been ordered to cease wearing. 32 H o w did the Directory react to the expulsion of its agent? It could not show anger because it was supposed to be foreign to the whole affair. Also, if Haugwitz felt so strongly on the subject, the Directors did not want him to know they favored the spurned plan. So they wrote to Caillard, quite obviously for verbatim transmission to the Prussian government: You know that the Republic takes a real interest in Poland, and that it is convinced that Prussia and France have a common interest in [Poland's] reëstablishment. But when the Directory desires to make insinuations on the subject to its Prussian ally, it always makes use of the regular diplomatic channels. The Directory has had no part, direct or indirect, in the overture of D'AudibertCaille. . . You are authorized to disavow it to the Court of Berlin.33 In less than three months, the Directory made use of the regular diplomatic channels, and this time tried to entice the Prussian King with visions of greater commercial prosperity if only he would "give it to be understood that he desired to reëstablish Poland, and intended to surrender his last slice." The Directory assured him that all fugitive Poles would flock to the Prussian standard, and insurrections would break out in Russian and Austrian Poland. The two Emperors would be obliged to relinquish their booty, and Poland would be glad to have a king from the house which had reëstablished it as a state. But while such a result was very acceptable to France, the Republic was determined upon the resurrection of Poland only in so far as that would be agreeable to Prussia also.34 It was not agreeable to Prussia, and the reasons are not far to seek. In the first place, the King did not care to give up any of his share of Poland, 29

Caillard to Delacroix, Nov. 19, 1796, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220 ff. 1 3 1 - 1 3 3 . 80 Parandier to Delacroix, citing Haugwitz' subaltern agent Ephraim, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 135. n Abstracts of despatches from Caillard and D'Audibert, Nov. 15, 19, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 318. "Parandier to Delacroix, Dec. 3, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 3 1 7 . What these two Frenchmen had done to cut themselves off from a privilege granted generally since September is unknown to the present writer.

The Gazette françoise de Berlin, in its no. 109, September 1796, had published the grant of permission to wear the cockade. The wearing was to derogate in no wise from the character of the wearer as "temporary subject" of the Prussian King, and was to affect only his relations with France (Sept. 10, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 64/41). " A r c h . A. E., Prusse 220, f. 288. "Delacroix to Caillard, approved by four of the Directors as instructions for Caillard, April 6, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355.

5 66

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

especially now that the respective shares of the partitioned had just been pacifically agreed upon, and he had secured some rectification in his favor. 35 In the second place, the K i n g must have realized that his best guarantee of remaining in peaceful possession of his part of the booty was for him to maintain close friendship with the other spoliators.3® Lastly, the K i n g cannot have been unaware that the Poles were very discontented with the despotic administrative system he had established in his portion of Poland, and would be very unlikely to desire a Hohenzollern king. 37 There is no evidence, however, that the Prussian government already knew of the following letter, found upon a Pole arrested in Cracow: " A l l our compatriots, . . . as we, feel the necessity of attaching ourselves to the party38 which . . . appears . . . most fitting to return to us our political existence without a \ing of the House of Brandenburg. . . W e have gained much if Sandoz is sincerely attached to our party. T r y hard to keep him there. . ." 39 Prussia's coldness to Polish resurrection, and plain logic, showed the Directory clearly enough that Prussia was averse to its Polish plans; but the planning did not cease. Parandier had once suggested that Prussia might be more inclined to consent if she were offered concrete indemnities (at the expense of Austria or of the ecclesiastical princes) for her share of Poland — that perhaps the practical king did not regard as sufficient inducement the harm he might do to Russia and Austria. 40 T h e Directory's first reaction to the suggestion was to decide that Prussia might keep most of her share of Poland, while Austrian Poland, under the Elector Palatine, would serve as nucleus for the resurrection of the Polish state.41 But the purpose of all schemes regarding Poland 4 2 was to wound Austria (and Russia) mortally, and the Elector Palatine was too much under the influence of Austria to fall in with this plan. So the end of hostilities in 1797 found the Lodge in C. Mod. H., VIII, 552. Vide Abstract of a despatch from Caillard, March 7, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 74, d. 301. "Parandier to Delacroix, Sept. 4, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 317. Vide also Caillard to Delacroix, Oct. n , 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 463. 38 The italicized passages were underscored in the original. " Prince Antoine Radziwill to Stanislas Woyczynsky (the arrested man), Nov. 13, 1796. A copy of this letter was later sent to Sandoz by the Prussian Ministry, with a request for a detailed explanation "upon the faith of your oath." Sandoz' reply announced the receipt of the strange letter, but made no reference therein to the matter in question; neither did his later reports in G. S. Arch.,

85

86

R XI Frankreich 89. The above-quoted letter is in fase. 360. Some communication must have been made by word of mouth. "Parandier to Delacroix, Nov. 12, 1796, Arch. N., AF III 74, d. 301. "Delacroix to Clarke, Nov. 16, 1796, Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, ff. 7-9. 42 Including that of the Polish corps under Dombrowski, formed partly of deserters from the Austrian army and paid by the Italian republicans — because foreigners could no longer serve in the French army (Dir. to Moreau, Dec. 21, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 490-491; idem, Jan. 27, 1797, ibid., pp. 740-741; Rédacteur, no. 489 [April 18, 1797], p. 2, under "Nouvelles étrangères, Basel").

CASSEL, TURKEY, POLAND, AS KEYS TO AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

567

French minister of foreign affairs talking in the same familiar strain about how glad Prussia would be to give up her last share of Poland, and how Frederick William might even be willing to compel Russia and Austria to relinquish their shares. T h e then minister recommended to the Directory that the Polish crown should be bestowed upon a son or nephew of the Prussian ruler — on condition that the new monarch signed the Polish constitution of 1791. But then came the admission on the part of the minister that "the resurrection of Poland depends upon the most intimate concert between Prussia and the Porte, particularly upon the offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia which does not yet exist." 43 W h a t Delacroix wrote to Caillard in April 1797 was essentially true until the definitive treaty with Austria had been actually signed: " T h e only plan to which it [the Directory] adheres immutably is that Prussia unite her troops with those of France to constrain Austria to an advantageous peace." 44 Poland was only a pawn in the game of war, and Frederick William did not want to play. " Report to Dir. by min. of for. aff., Aug. 29, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 74, d. 301.

" April 6, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355.

^

CHAPTER V i l i

X

P O T E R A T Z A N D T H E P L A N OF A REPUBLIC IN S O U T H W E S T E R N GERMANY

O

N February 6,1796, Poteratz sent to Delacroix his "Proposition of Some Measures Adapted to the Present Circumstances." The fourth suggestion arrested the attention of Director Carnot, and Delacroix wrote to Poteratz on February 19 that he was going "to have it transcribed under [his] very eyes . . . to remit it to Carnot." 1 It is important to know what sort of measures appealed to this Director, for Carnot disputed Reubell's monopoly of foreign affairs whenever the opportunity arose. A n analysis of the fourth suggestion follows. The Austrians, by publishing papers which they say belonged to Merlin of Thionville, have spread fear throughout the continent regarding the manner in which we intend henceforth to levy war. "On my side, I have done everything possible to add to their fright." We ought to draw some advantage therefrom. If you desire to imitate Frederick the Great's mode of levying war, you can find immense resources in Swabia — "if your agents do not steal them" — of victuals, forage, clothing, equipment, gold, silver, copper, lead, and remount and draught horses. Remember that the terrible measures you take in Swabia and Bavaria will resound to the depths of Bohemia and Austria, that a city pillaged coldly by order, and methodically, if its inhabitants dare to take up arms; a district, a canton, crushed by an excess of contributions . . . ; some meager villages or hamlets burnt with a great noise if resistance is encountered; hostages borne off on all sides and in very great numbers, and chosen with preference from the class of priests, monks, and nobles . . . ; all these rigorous and frightful measures will most certainly enable you to cause very great upheavals in the states of the Emperor, which upheavals will lead to the conclusion of peace. 1

Arch. A. E., Autriche 365, f. 34. Poteratz' "Proposition" was encountered supra, Pt. II,

chap, vi, § 1 and n. 20.

POTERATZ AND THE PLAN OF A SWABIAN REPUBLIC

569

Moreover, so much the worse for the Germans, for why do their sovereigns levy war upon us! 2 So this is the kind of measures Carnot liked! A n d the Directory, according to Delacroix, was much pleased with the "precision, the force, [and] the dexterity" which characterized Poteratz' correspondence. 3 T h u g u t spoke better perhaps than he knew when he wrote to Degelmann three days later : "It is never permissible to relax one's measures of precaution with any agent of a government which, as the present one of France, . . . does not scruple . . . to employ the darkest and most odious maneuvers." 4 Nothing resulted for several months from this exposition of the advantages to be derived from an invasion of Swabia. O n April 1, the Directory voted additional instructions for Poteratz, and did not mention the Circle. T h e Directory carried one step farther its design to reject Austria a safe distance from the Republic's frontiers — a design which had entered into Poteratz' instructions of November 28 of the preceding year. T h e government's current disposition was that the Lech, Danube, and Regen should mark the westernmost bounds of the Habsburg dominions, and that all Austrian territory west of that line should serve for exchanges or indemnities (Article 1). Poteratz was charged to utilize all means necessary to activate and terminate the negotiations with Württemberg, Zweibrücken, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and other states (Article 3). H e was directed to listen to no proposition not based (a) upon France's acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine and all arms of the River; (b) upon the formation of an offensive and defensive alliance between the Republic and contracting princes, whether they treated as a group, or individually, "for the Republic [was] not able to content itself with simple neutrality, the only result of which would be to deprive it of resources and hamper the movements of its armies"; and (c) upon the principle of compensation by secularization, with a mutual guarantee of the possessions acquired (Article 4). T o decide Württemberg to conclude peace, Poteratz might offer the Duke, besides territorial compensation for his territorial losses, the good offices of France to procure for him the electoral title at the general peace (Article 5). Poteratz might offer HesseDarmstadt and Baden indemnification (for their losses in land) at the expense of the House of Austria in the Breisgau, or by means of secularization, at their discretion. H e could promise that France would protect them from the Emperor if the latter persecuted them for having sought a separate peace (Article 6). T h e D u k e of Zweibrücken should be assured that the Palatine House would obtain ample territorial indemnities, and that the Directory ' F e b . I, 1796, Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 86. "Delacroix to Poteratz, Feb. 19, 1796, Arch.

1

A. E., Autriche 365, f. 35. Feb. 22, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz

216.

570

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

desired to render to that house the preponderance in Germany which it ought to enjoy (Article 7).® Such instructions did not satisfy Poteratz, and he complained to Carnot (April 13) that almost three months had elapsed since he first represented to the French government the pressing need of invading Swabia. Poteratz confessed that the means he had advocated were "not very regular," but explained that when it was a question of gaining an end, "it is a great fault to look too closely." He even admitted that his plan involved the possible us of "frightful" means, and would necessitate that the government defend him should he be prosecuted.® If the government gave him the verbal promise that the "means of rigor and of audacity" which he found necessary to employ to arrive at his ends would never be counted against him, "all obstacles would disappear . . . and the Republic would be saved." 7 Poteratz informed Carnot that all he needed to conquer Swabia was an excellent chief of staff, two clever engineers, "three head Commissioners, capable, and not thieves," and a company of artillerymen.8 The money and provisions needed could be obtained by means of seizures.9 Poteratz' memoirs had the desired effect. The same month (April 1796), he was given a secret mission at Basel, with four classes of duties: to watch the movement of enemy troops on the Upper Rhine; to find out the condition of the Schwarzwald passes; to determine the disposition of the émigrés, and induce some of Condé's troops to desert; and to propagate revolutionary principles and organize a revolutionary party in the adjoining regions of Baden and Anterior Austria. Poteratz was not placed under Barthélemy's control, but allowed to communicate directly with the minister of foreign affairs.10 The agent approved neither the conduct nor the principles of the Ambassador of the Republic in Switzerland, and had insinuated that if he were allowed his own way, he would steer the bark in an entirely different manner, and with far greater success.11 Poteratz went about his revolutionary task with great ingenuity, it is true. He entered into close relations with Jean Bassal, a former priest, fanatical Jacobin, ex-Conventional, and secret agent of France in Basel, who ' Arch. A. E., Autriche Supp. 25, ff. 94-95. • Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, fi. 130-131. 7 "Mémoire sur les dispositions à faire pour pénétrer en Souabe." Remitted to Carnot for Dir., April 4, 1796, Arch. Α . Ε., Autriche 365,11.157-158. 8 April 13, 1796, Arch. Α . E., Autriche 365, f. 131. Guyot, Direc., p. 208, wrongly dates Poteratz' letter as April 3. * "Mémoire sur les dispositions," Arch. A. E., Autriche 365, fi. 157-158.

10

u

Κ . Obser, "Der Marquis von Poterat und die revolutionäre Propaganda am Oberrhein im Jahre 1796," ZGOR (Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins), n. F., VII (1892), 385. It was Poteratz' request that not even the bureaus serving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be initiated into the secret (Poteratz to the Fr. gov't [sic], April 23, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 672, f. 222). Degelmann to Thugut, April 15, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198.

POTERATZ AND THE PLAN OF A SWABIAN REPUBLIC

STI

already had in his pay a staff of emissaries; and with Johann Georg Friedrich List, ex-councillor of the Palatine exchequer, who, so the story runs, had been discharged by his prince because he opposed oppression of the people.12 List was a passionate friend of the Revolution, and saw in the republican form of government a panacea — the only possible one — for Germany's ills also. Of limited mind but an honest visionary, absolutely devoid of base intentions, he corresponded with Swabian and Rhinelander revolutionists, and with the Mayençais exiles.13 Already in March 1796, Poteratz had spoken with List of a Swabian republic. Poteratz had then published a proclamation, probably the work of List, summoning the "noble, generous" German people to shake off the yoke of despotism and fight side by side with their French brethren for freedom. This appeal was to be spread by agents specially charged to prepare the revolution on the right bank. 14 A Badener, Ernst Jägerschmidt, had been commissioned, probably through List, to obtain the necessary confederates. Jägerschmidt was the son of a district physician {Bezir\sarzt), and employed in the Zässlin Iron Works of Niederschöntal. He was a restless, ambitious sort of fellow, and long regarded — not without reason — as a French spy by his fellow countrymen.15 In April Jägerschmidt obtained as auxiliary one Christoph Hoyer, son of a Miihlheimer castellan. Hoyer was at the time unemployed, but had once been a commercial clerk in Strasburg and Basel; also a French spy when General Ferino was on the Upper Rhine. Jägerschmidt confided to Hoyer that the French army was about to invade his land, and that the only way to save it from being plundered and devastated was to introduce the republican form of government.16 Thus, matters were well advanced when the Directory commanded the propagation of revolutionary principles in Baden and the Breisgau in the month of April 1796. On April 23, Poteratz informed the French government that he believed he could promise, without possibility of failure, to produce an insurrection in Baden and the Breisgau the very moment French troops should cross the Rhine. This would cover their operation, and assure its success. Twenty thousand men would rise in revolt in the Margraviate, and ten thousand in the Black Forest. They desired only to be free and to be treated as friends, though their chiefs wished also an asylum in France in case of failure, and indemnification for the property they would be forced to leave behind in such an event.17 " T h i s is the List who — almost certainly— sponsored the essay contest on the Rhinefrontier question, described supra, Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 5. " Obser in ZGOR, n.F., VII, 390-391.

Ibid., p. 391. p. 393. l a Ibid., pp. 393-394. 17 Arch. A. E., Allemagne 672, f. 222. 11

albid.,

572

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

T h e Directory seems to have been unable to make up its mind whether to fall in with Poteratz' schemes. It granted Poteratz authority (April 23) 1 8 to promise the most powerful assistance of the French Republic and of its armies to the inhabitants of Baden, the Breisgau, "and any other region of Germany which desires to obtain its independence"; 1 9 also to promise French citizenship and indemnification in case of failure. 20 But Poteratz was not informed of the decree. It remained a dead letter in the Directory's secretariat. O n May 1, Poteratz again wrote to Delacroix of the ease with which a general insurrection could be provoked on the Upper Rhine, especially since the Margrave of Baden had levied a forced loan. Such an insurrection would be more advantageous to French arms, he declared, than all the Directory's separate-peace treaties, 21 which cost much time, called for partial measures, and were often badly observed. 22 Moreover, according to Poteratz, the prospects were good for the spread of the revolution to the remainder of Swabia and to Bavaria. T h e n the scoundrel drew upon his knowledge of practical psychology for an argument calculated to overcome the government's hesitation. "I know perfectly well," he averred, "that there are many things . . . the Directory must desire, however hazardous they may be, upon which it cannot give written instructions. N o w , let it say to me but a single word, promise not to abandon me in case I fail, and then let me set to work." 23 T h e approach was subtle and effective. It was the kind of "hush-hush" language the Directory understood. T w o days later, the government decided to give effect to its decree of April 23, and wrote to Delacroix: The Executive Directory eagerly welcomes . . . the proposition made to it to second the generous insurrection of the inhabitants of the Margraviate and of the Breisgau. It invites you in consequence to authorize Citzen Poteratz to continue to hold intercourse with the chiefs of this enterprise, to promise them the efficacious assistance of France to make it succeed, and, in case of adversity, indemnities equal to the losses which these chiefs might have incurred. You will likewise order him to concert with General in Chief Moreau, and with General Laborde, employed on the Upper Rhine. The Directory is about to inform him of this disposition, and of its intention to favor by the movement of troops the success of the plan of insurrection of the German patriots, who, when they have become indeErdmannsdörffer {Pol. Coir. Karl Fr., II, 374) has April 17. But vide List to Delacroix, July i l , 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 134, and Degelmann to Thugut, June 15) 1796» H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. " T h e spirit of the Decree of November 19, 1792, riseth from the dead. 80 "Copia einer ausgebreiteten Bevollmächtigungsurkunde des französischen Directorii 18

für den Bürger Poterat," Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., Π, 374-375· 21 This was intended to cast doubt upon the worth of Barthélémy, whom Poteratz was anxious to replace (Obser in ZGOR, n.F., VII, 393). " Poteratz to Delacroix, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 672, f. 252. "Idem, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 672, f. 253.

POTERÀ TZ AND THE PLAN OF A SWABIAN REPUBLIC

573

pendent, will never have cause to fear for their liberty from French arms, and who, until then, have everything to expect therefrom [in the way of assistance] to conquer it. 24 T h e same day the Directory wrote to Moreau, Laborde, and (May 6) its Commissioner, Haussmann, telling them to "second this enterprise with all [their] means," for success was "of the greatest importance in its eyes." 2 5 Delacroix authorized Poteratz to offer, in the name of the Directory, the guarantees stipulated in the Decree of April 23· 2β Poteratz was not given command of an army, however, despite his military experience. It would excite general discontent among the troops, he was told; the civil and diplomatic operations were more than sufficient to occupy him. If the insurrection succeeeded, Austria would be forced to withdraw her troops from the Rhine for the defense of her hereditary states, and then Poteratz would perhaps be approached regarding peace terms. H e should inform the government if, and as soon as, he were approached on this subject. Regarding Poteratz' revolutionary functions, these were to be shared with Bassal, who would be second in command. Delacroix then added a precious bit of information: A revolutionary conflagration was about to develop in the Tyrol, and Citizen Comeyras had been charged to fan it. Poteratz should come to an understanding with him when the time was ripe. 27 T h e revolution would presumably soon spread to Württemberg, "whose inhabitants have not yet lost all their liberty," and to the other states of Swabia. Delacroix was planning on a grand scale. T w o important duties, directed Delacroix, were to occupy Poteratz as soon as the first explosion occurred: H e should form military corps of citizens to second the efforts of the French army; and he should organize a representative assembly, which could facilitate the levying of contributions in victuals, horses, and other necessities. The second point was the more important one, he said. Delacroix then made two observations: the first, that it is necessary to proceed in a revolutionary manner, . . . that you do not have to attach yourself scrupulously to a fixed basis, such as the mathematical calculation of population. . . The second is to apply yourself to bringing about the disappearance of the petty animosities which may exist between the inhabitants of the different principalities, to uniting them, to welding them all into a single political body. This amalgamation should not be difficult because of their common interest in resisting their immediate tyrants and their chief [i.e., the Emperor] . 2 8 24

Arch. A. E., Allemagne 672, f. 255. ^Debidour, Recueil, II, 286-287, 3 1 9 - 3 2 0 . 26 May 4, 1796, Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 169. Poteratz was, at the same time, sent a copy of the Decree, bearing the Great Seal

of the Republic {Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 3 7 5 ) . " M a y 4, 1 7 9 6 , Arch. A . E., Autriche 367, ff. 170-171. " D e l a c r o i x to Poteratz, May 4, 1796, Arch, A . E., Allemagne 672, f. 259.

574

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

The Directory's decree of April 23 was communicated to the chiefs of the insurgents of Baden and the Breisgau on May 14, 1796. If we may believe Poteratz — unfortunately his word is quite unreliable — he forthwith commissioned more than twenty emissaries, investing some of them with regular powers in order to gain the confidence of the property owners who were expected to rise in revolt. Then he issued a proclamation commencing with the words Freiheiti (Liberty!) Gleichheit! (Equality!) Bruderliebe\ (Fraternity!) and running essentially as follows: The French nation has conquered not only its freedom but its enemies. But you, the people, are not its enemies — only the princes, your tyrants, and all their lackeys who, together, suck you out. Excellent, magnanimous German men, you were not created to starve your lives away in slavery. Break your chains. Annihilate your miserable oppressors. Be men. A French army is here. W e are all your brothers, and will fight with and for you. Do not fear us. W e will never violate your freedom and independence; much rather will we help you to gain them.29 The propaganda was not without its converts,30 and there was talk of establishing "Clubs" to propagandize in favor of a general insurrection.31 The estates of Baden and Württemberg stirred.32 The Margrave of Baden, perhaps to restore confidence, asserted that he found no trace of revolutionary agitation,33 but his archives are full of traces.34 (And when the French armies overran Baden the following July, a portion of the population "did everything within its power to effect a revolution.") 35 In general, however, the Badenese refused to listen to the Decree of April 23 36 — which should not occasion surprise, for Karl Friedrich was perhaps the most enlightened of all the German rulers of his day.37 On May 27, Poteratz wrote to Delacroix: All is ready. Success is certain. The ramifications of this conspiracy extend as far as Heilbronn and Heidelberg on the one side, and toward Ulm, Augsburg, and even Nuremberg — where I already have connections — on the other. It will be a general conflagration, the progress of which will be rapid, and the effects terrible if they are freely seconded by the army. . .38 These people are awaiting only the N.d., Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 375. Obser in ZGOR, n.F., VII, 395. 81 Bacher to Delacroix, June 4, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 202. 82 Ν. to Ν . (unidentified), July 23, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 414 and n. 1. " A c c o r d : " N o one here desired our arrival" (Moreau, July 17, 1796, Sybel, Europe, IV, 234)· 81 Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 376, n. 1. 29

80

Reitzenstein to N.N. (unidentified), Aug. 1, 1796, ibid., p. 444. M Obser in ZGOR, n.F., VII, 396. " T h i s was Frederick the Great's opinion, and he was no mean judge (G. P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution [London, 1920], p. 12). 88 "I am far from wishing to insinuate alarming ideas," wrote Degelmann to Thugut the following July, "but I am convinced that the 85

POTERATZ AND THE PLAN OF A SWABIAN REPUBLIC

575

signal. A plan of provisional government has been prepared by Bassal [for publication and circulation among the inhabitants]. . . All these operations have required much money. I have produced it in order to be the better served. I have borrowed here on my own credit. Of course I counted on being reimbursed from the strongboxes of the Margrave and of the monks.39 This statement of his achievements was intended by Poteratz as a protest against a decree of the Directory of May 19, announcing that "Citizen Poterà [«V] 40 will cease to be employed in the mission which has been delegated to him." 41 A few days before — the order arrived in Basel on May 20 — Bassal had been recalled. Poteratz had no intention of leaving his task incomplete, and induced Bassal to remain also. They both appealed to Paris for reconsideration of the orders.42 The Directory "stuck to its guns." On the letter from Poteratz, after the latter's signature, the following can be read, "Citizen Poteratz will give to General Moreau all the information and means of success which are in his power. (Signed) Carnot, Revellière, Reubell." Lower on the page is written, "Copy of this decision sent to Citizen Poteratz on the fifteenth" 43 (i.e., 15 prairial, IV or June 3, 1796). Now, this sounds indeed as though the Directory meant what it said, but hope lives eternal in the human breast, so Poteratz stayed on, waiting for the wind to change. On June 22, Delacroix wrote to Poteratz, in essence: I told you a long time ago that the Directory has terminated your mission. Would you mind coming home ? 4 4 Poteratz did mind; or at any rate, he still did not come. So, on June 29, the Directory, instead of reconsidering, ordered Barthélémy to request the Burgomaster and Senate of Basel to arrest Poteratz, place seals on his papers, and turn them (both the man and the papers) over to an agent of the French police, to plans of the French are exceedingly vast" (July 16, 1796, H . H. S. Arch., Schweiz 199). A n unsigned report concerning Paris, dated from Berne on January 19, 1796, declared that "the project of a universal republic is still the dominant project to such an extent that Sieyes has just had translated at Paris a new treatise of Kant upon this subject. . . Sieyes himself has made an abstract thereof, printed in one of the latest Moniteurs" ( H . H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 18; sent in to Vienna by Gherardini). Arch. Α . Ε., Allemagne 672, f. 284. 40 A not-unprecedented error, which helps to explain how the "z" came to be generally omitted. Here the " t " is also dropped, it not being pronounced either by the less careful speaker. C f . "Portera" in Lebrun to CPS,

June 13, 1793, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, xxxvii, n. 1. " A r c h . N., A F III* 176, f. 39. That Poteratz was recalled thus early has not been hitherto known. Obser in ZGOR, n. F., VII, 401-402 gives the date of his dismissal as June 19. T h e repetition of the order, necessitated by the stubbornness of the agent, was perhaps taken for the original order. " A r c h . A . E., Autriche 365, f. 196. Curious it is that, on May 17, Poteratz wrote to Thugut, "I wish to inform you that I still have my powers" (Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 47-48). " O n letter from Poteratz to Delacroix, May 27, 1796, Arch. A.E., Allemagne 672, f. 284. " A r c h . A . E., Autriche 365, f. 190.

576

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

be brought to Paris for examination. The decree of arrest accused Poteratz of conspiracy against the internal and external security of the state.45 Of interest are the grounds for the Directory's suspicions. Poteratz had long been coquetting with the émigrés at Basel. His mind abounded in plans for putting them to work for France, and then securing their readmission to the patrie on the basis of services rendered. Already on February 28, 1796, Delacroix, in reply to a letter from Poteratz on this subject, had declared that the Constitution tied the hands of the Directory regarding the émigrés, for that instrument had banished them forever from French territory. If they rendered signal service to the Republic, all that could be done for them was to compensate them outside of France, "and you have been authorized to promise this." 48 On May 3, 1796, Poteratz informed Delacroix of a plan he had conceived to induce the émigrés to deliver the fort of Kehl to the Republic.47 On June 1 or 19,48 Poteratz, in a "Copy of the Propositions Which Have Been Made to Me by Several Émigrés in the Name of the Major Part of the Army of Condé," declared that Condé's army was ready to join forces with the Republicans, and to second the internal movements of the country it was inhabiting (the region between Alt-Breisach and Mühlheim) against the common enemy, the Austrians.49 According to Bacher, Poteratz had boasted to the émigrés that he was possessed of sufficient power to procure their return to their homes,50 and these proposals to utilize the émigrés probably had as their purpose to induce the Directory to agree to their return in order that the agent could gather in a golden harvest as the price of his services. A Breisgau merchant in the secret employ of the French army, in a report dated June 16, announced that an émigré serving as an officer in Condé's army, who was in close touch with the insurrectional committee established at Basel, had confided to him things which appeared to exceed all human extravagance: that there existed a project of founding in Germany a more democratic republic than that of 1793, having the Black Forest as its center; that the members of the old Mountain were about to emigrate from all parts of France, and establish in Germany a new Gallic colony; and that he had heard some one say to Poteratz that the émigrés of the army of Condé were the instruments which Providence, inscrutable in its decrees, would utilize to cause the peoples of Germany to rise up en masse, Debidour, Recueil, II, 744-745. " Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 44. " Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 247. " P o t e r a t z dates this document as " i " messidor L'an 4 e = ι " Juin 1796," which is not true. 1 messidor = June 19, and June 1 = 13 prairial. " A r c h . A . E., Autriche 365, f. 216. The majority of the poorer nobility in Condé's army 15

were ashamed to return to France with foreign aid. " T h e ministry at Verona," says H . Morse Stephens (A History of the French Revolution [2 vols., N e w York, 1 8 8 6 - 1 8 9 1 ] , II, 502), "was assiduous in its warnings against Austria." Vide also ibid., pp. 34, 503. " B a c h e r to Dir., June 20, 1796, Arch. N . , A F III 382, d. 1955.

POTERATZ AND THE PLAN OF A SWABIAN REPUBLIC

577

exterminate the Austrians, and create and consolidate in Swabia the new Republic "null and invisible." 5 1 On June 20, Bacher wrote to the Directory to beware of its secret agents (Poteratz and Bassal), who, he said, were being deceived by the émigrés and Austrian agents with whom they were dining and fraternizing at Basel. It was émigrés and Austrian agents, Bacher declared, who were leading Poteratz and Bassal to believe in the possibility of a revolution beyond the Rhine, and of an approaching insurrection of 45,000 men in the Breisgau. The plan of the Republic's enemies, said Bacher, was to lay a trap for General Moreau by attracting a part of his army to the region between Breisach and Basel, to enable them to attack him with superior forces near Landau. 52 The Breisgau merchant mentioned above reported that the rich proprietors of Germany were convinced that a revolution in the Swabian Circle could have as its purpose only to deprive them of their lands, and to supply positions as Commissioners to several "bandits"; that rendering the Swabians free would have nothing to do with the operation. "That is the opinion prevalent in Germany." 53 List, also, may have written to Paris denouncing "the liberticide intentions of this wretch" (Poteratz) 54 Degelmann stated categorically that such was the case.55 List was summoned before "the Seven," a Basel court, on July 9, at the time of Poteratz' arrest. He (List) denied any part in the intrigue, and even boasted that he had uncovered Poteratz' "treason." The matter seems then to have been allowed to drop.58 On June 24, General Moreau crossed the Rhine at Kehl, but no revolution broke forth, though the French overthrew the Swabian Circle's troops (mostly Württembergers), and spread over the Ortenau and the central part of the Margaviate.87 The French had no intention of being deceived, and their army acted on all points of the right bank save the one where the revolution was supposed to commence. "This disconcerts all plans," wrote List to the French minister of foreign affairs; "[it] throws the friends of liberty into confusion, and appears destined to rivet the chains on a people who had resolved to make all efforts and sacrifices to recover its natural rights under 51

Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 54. According to the anonymous Mémoires tirés des papiers d'un homme d'Etat sur les causes secrètes qui ont déterminé la politique des cabinets dans les guerres de la Révolution (depuis 1792 jusqu'à 1815) (13 vols., Paris, 1828-1838), V , 144, it was Barthélémy who caused the plan to fail by demonstrating its extravagance. T h e French archives contain a design for the official seal of this new republic. It pictures an old man of the Black For-

est, with the words "Free State of Germany" beneath (Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 38). ra Debidour, Recueil, II, 744, η. 4. " J u n e 16, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 56. " L i s t to Delacroix, July 11, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 134. " T o Thugut, July 20, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. " Obser in ZGOR, n.F., VII, 402. "Ibid., p. 398.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

the protection of a generous and powerful nation. . . Vous jugerés Citoyen Ministre! del'Amparas dans le quel nous nous trouvons!"58 (Original orthography preserved.) There existed at the time several rumors concerning the reasons for Poteratz' arrest. These rumors are highly interesting, if not necessarily truthful. One was that Poteratz had offered to make the Prince of Condé the lifelong president of Baden. Another was that the Prince had declared his readiness to occupy Basel with his troops, and then to invade Swabia in common with Moreau's Republicans; in compensation for these services, Conde was supposed to have asked for a protectorate over the French Republic, but to have agreed to content himself, when this was refused, with the hereditary post of a constitutional king of Swabia. A third story was that Condé had offered to Poteratz to get rid of the Pretender; Louis XVIII could be enticed to Basel, and hurled into the Rhine during a feigned tumult. Then the monarchy would be reëstablished. However, these were mere rumors. According to Wickham, who knew very well what went on in Condé's camp, Condé and the Count de Lille had discussed with Poteratz the possibility of a restoration without the aid of the Coalition, by means of a counterrevolution in France. Apparently, Poteratz, to sgain their confidence, had appeared to enter into their plans. Perhaps the above rumors stemmed from the fact that Poteratz had advised Condé to make a sudden attack on Basel, and had guaranteed that part of the French army would support a counterrevolution.59 Poteratz had been constantly boasting to Delacroix that he had extracted the secrets of the émigrés from them, but it seems that while he was doing the extracting, he had supplied them with important information.60 "The emissary in question is regarded here generally as a double spy," wrote Degelmann to Thugut.61 Another cause of Poteratz' arrest was his indiscretion. He talked too much, and so did his subemissaries. That it was intended to provoke a general insurrection in the Black Forest, Baden, and the Breisgau soon became common knowledge— or, at any rate, common rumor.62 Before the end of May, the conspiracy was definitely betrayed by Christoph Hoyer's brother to Privy Councillor Groos (sic), the high bailiff of Badenweiler. The Karlsruhe government did not, however, take energetic meas68

July 3, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 1 1 4 . Persons desiring to study List's correspondence with Delacroix should come to the archives prepared with a special dictionary — one which contains the words "efarougé" (effarouché), "insuniations" (insinuations), "autaurisé" {autorìse), "coment" (comment), "come" (comme), and the prizewinning "incritable," which seems to be a

hybrid created by crossing écrit and incroyable (Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 1 2 3 124, 134—135). ra Obser in ZGOR, n. F., VII, 399-400. "Ibid. " J u n e 24, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. "Bacher to Delacroix, June 4, 1796, A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 202.

POTERATZ AND THE PLAN OF A SWABIAN REPUBLIC

579

ures, perhaps because of fear. It neither arrested Hoyer, nor instituted an investigation, nor even warned the authorities in the Breisgau. Astonishingly late — June 15 — the Austrian embassy at Basel learned of the revolutionary intrigues of Poteratz. This came about in two ways. Degelmann was informed one day in June that on Wednesday or Thursday of the preceding week, Poteratz had arrived at a very early hour before that gate of Basel which barred entrance to the city from the Margraviate and the Breisgau. The French agent was in a carriage in the company of two soldiers who appear not to have been French. Poteratz descended from the vehicle, which returned in the direction whence it came. Poteratz remained before the gate until some one came and opened it, whereupon he entered the city. Degelmann immediately informed Wurmser's successor,63 General Count de la Tour, of this occurrence, and De la Tour ordered the closest scrutiny for the future.64 His pains bore fruit. He succeeded in surprising Poteratz one fine morning at daybreak, and seizing his papers. There was found the Directory's decree of April 23. Degelmann warned Thugut and the Freiburg government.65 De la Tour warned Karl Friedrich of Baden.68 The second mode in which Degelmann learned of the revolutionary plans is less sensational. Poteratz had declared that Bacher had no talent, which naturally aroused the ire of the really efficient secretary-interpreter. Bacher was well acquainted with one Colonel de Zebro, who had presented him with a German translation of the Decree of April 23. In revenge, Bacher turned over the paper to Degelmann.67 Barthélémy was not grieved when the Directory ordered him, on June 29, to procure the arrest of Poteratz. The agent had been paying newspapers to denounce his (Barthélemy's) method of conducting affairs, and to give the French people to understand that he could do much better.68 In Poteratz' trunks were found letters which attested his hatred for Barthélémy, in which the Directory was treated none too gently, and which proved that the suspicions conceived with respect to the émigrés were not unfounded.69 On August 4, Poteratz was examined at Paris by Cochon, Minister of General Police. The interrogatory was based principally on the following points: (1) the false news given by Poteratz to Generals Moreau and Laborde to induce them to mass forces on the Upper Rhine; (2) Poteratz' statement to Laborde that the enemy had 40,000 troops in the Breisgau, and that he Wurmser had been sent to Italy (Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 374, n. 1). 84 Degelmann to Thugut, June 17, 1796, Η. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. M Obser in ZGOR, ». F., VII, 396. " Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., Π, 374· ω

"Degelmann to Thugut, June 15, 1796, Η. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. 08 Obser in ZGOR, n. F., VII, 393. "Degelmann to Thugut, July 20, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

(Poteratz) had seen some of them; (3) Poteratz' negotiations with List and Jägerschmidt regarding an insurrection and the founding of a new republic in Swabia and the Breisgau — whether he had not proposed to give the presidency of this republic to the Prince of Condé, and the great bulk of offices to the émigrés, and if he had not seen Condé during his sojourn at Basel; lastly, (4) the hope held out by Poteratz to several émigrés that they would be allowed to return to France if they merited it by their services, and the pretense that he, Poteratz, had extensive powers in this respect.70 Cochon found Poteratz' responses "negative" — mere attempts to justify his "apparently reprehensible conduct." "It is easy to convince oneself that he has exceeded the powers transmitted to him by the Executive Directory," said Cochon; but he added that material proof of Poteratz' misdeeds could not be presented in court, for certain of his papers could not be rendered public, "considering that they form part of the secret measures which the government must adopt in the present circumstances." Cochon suggested that Poteratz should be freed on condition that he leave Paris, which was not his habitual abode anyway. 71 The Directory acted on this advice the same day, and Poteratz was instantly liberated.72 He withdrew to his country house in the département of Loiret, and was yet there when the First Coalition fell asunder.73 Toward the end of 1798, Poteratz wrote a letter of justification to Director Merlin (of Douai). He said that he had intended to commence his revolution by exciting revolts in the Arguel and in the Münstertal, then to republicanize Swabia, Franconia, Bavaria, and even the Tyrol, and to have the "patriots" exterminate all Austrians between Strasburg and Ulm under cover of the revolution. He said that, iu conducting such an enterprise, he had been obliged to uncover many criminal conspiracies on the part of agents of the Directory, during which process he had necessarily earned for himself many enemies. It was to the mercy of these same enemies, he affirmed, that the examination of himself and his papers had been confided.74 When the Directory cashiered Poteratz on May 19,1796, it did not intend to renounce the revolutionization of Baden and the Breisgau. The dismissal was due to dissatisfaction with Poteratz, not with his plans. This is well illustrated by a letter of the Directory to General in Chief Moreau, dated May 25: "It [the Directory] has not varied in the least its declared intention of furthering the effects . . . of the revolutionary movements brewing on the "Report of Cochon to Dir., Aug. 6, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 393, d. 2073. An "Inventaire analytique" of Poteratz' papers will be found in Arch. A. E., Autriche 365, ff. 242249. " Arch. Ν., AF III 393, d. 2073.

72

Decree of Aug. 6, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 393, d. 2073. n Guyot, Direc., p. 209. " O c t . 30, 1798, Debidour, Recueil, II, 745, η. ι.

POTERATZ AND THE PLAN OF A SWABIAN REPUBLIC

5

8I

right bank of the Rhine; it attaches great interest thereto; but it is none the less convinced of the necessity of using prudence in this delicate matter." 7 5 However, after the Directory had learned through Bacher how very improbable a right-bank revolution really was, and after the revolution had failed to burst forth when the French crossed to the right bank, the Directory did not scruple to leave the movement without a head by arresting Poteratz and neglecting to appoint a successor. The conclusion of armistices with Württemberg (July 17), Baden (July 25), and the Swabian Circle (July 27) 76 set the seal to the Directory's renunciation of its plan for a South German republic — for the time being, at least — for Article III of each of these armistice agreements pledged the French troops to respect the forms of government, laws, religion, persons, and property of the conquered states. However, the German "patriots" whose revolutionary ardor had been excited to fever pitch could not so suddenly change their course. It may even be that the Directory, which had never revoked the commissions delivered by Poteratz, wished for the movement to continue without its aid. But events brought complications which rendered such a course difficult. 76

Ibid., p. 474.

™ Vide infra, chap, ix, § 2.

X

CHAPTER IX

¡f

SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF POTERATZ

I.

THE DIRECTORY DESERTS THE SWABIAN

PATRIOTS

/ ^ " T ^ V J R I N G their invasion of Swabia, the French had pillaged Kehl and I Jnear-hy Orenburg. This had created a veritable panic on the right bank, and the peasants of the Upper Margraviate had concealed their possessions in the Black Forest and in Switzerland. This state of affairs was naturally very disconcerting to the French, who, invading without stores of their own, had reckoned on living off the country; 1 and General Moreau thought it necessary to reassure the people by a proclamation.2 Bacher, also, realized the necessity of calming the Germans, lest the Rhine and Moselle Army should find in Swabia a desert instead of the expected "granary of abundance." As Commissioner of the government for the exchange of prisoners of war, Bacher published at Basel (on July 4) a circular in parallel columns of German and French, inviting the officials of the conquered country to remain at their posts, and assuring the people of Baden, the Breisgau, and Upper Swabia that their religion, property, and laws would be respected if they showed themselves friendly to France. 3 I approve of the proclamation that you have circulated in Baden to calm the people excited by the apprehension of pillage, wrote Delacroix to Bacher. Try especially to convince them that the French government will never make use of means which are not regular. 4 1

Count Julius Soden, Die Franzosen in Franken im Jahr 1796 (Nuremberg, 1797), p. 200. Both the Sambre and Meuse, and the Rhine and Moselle Armies were "traveling light," so to speak. They had not wanted to travel at all without supplies (Moreau and Jourdan to Dir., May 17, 1796, * * * Isic], Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la campagne de 1796, contenant les opérations de l'armée de Sambre et Meuse sous les ordres

du general en chef Jourdan [Paris, 1818], "Pièces justificatives," no. ii [p. 232]), but the Directory had ordered action on March 29 and April 10 (ibid., nos. i and i, cont. [pp. 217—218, 222 et seqq.Y). 2 Bacher to Delacroix, July 5, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 . 'Arch. Α. E., Allemagne 673, f. 1 1 6 . 'Delacroix to Bacher, July 17, 1796, Arch, Α. E., Allemagne 673, £. 153.

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583

Bacher's proclamation filled List with consternation, for the latter was still laboring to bring about a revolt. It did not take him long to protest. His letter to Delacroix asks pointedly: How is it possible that, on the one hand, M. Bacher has distributed the document herein enclosed [the proclamation of July 4], while on the other, we possess the decree of the Directory . . . which informs us that the [French] army will sustain our insurrection ? I cannot believe that it is by order of the same Directory that this proclamation . . . has been published. . . Your honor, your reputation, [and] that of the Directory are compromised, for the insurrectional powers delegated to Poteratz have been delivered by him to the insurgents more than once in too legal a manner for their authenticity to be disputable.5 The proclamation of July 4 seems to have had rather startling consequences — at least, if the First Secretary-Interpreter can be believed. He reported to Delacroix that more than two thousand inhabitants of Upper Baden came to Basel to seek copies of his circular and national (i.e., French) cockades.6 The circulars and cockades connoted opposite things : the former, the preservation of the old regime; the latter, revolutionization. But what matters such a slight discrepancy when the Rédacteur assures us that, "furnished with these things, they [the two thousand Badenese] have been bringing tranquillity and hope to their country" ? 7 Officials of Badenese communes ordered 12,000 cockades, Bacher declared. These officials came to Basel as a species of deputation to express to Bacher their confidence that there would be no pillage, and promising to attend to the apportionment of requisitions and contributions so that "arbitrariness and waste" should not "speedily ruin the proprietors and deprive the French troops of this infinitely precious resource." 8 Probably this enthusiasm of the Badenese to pay contributions was the result of a secret meeting of Mayençais Clubists and other Germans (e.g., Cotta, List, Hofmann, Dr. Linck) in Fribourg, a French border town near Hüningen. These Germans had once been commissaires évacuateurs in the Electorate of Trêves and in the Palatinate, with results disastrous to those states, and they were insinuating that they were about to reënact their rapacious roles in Swabia.9 Rather a thousand voluntary contributions than submission to such vultures! seems to have been the consensus of Badenese opinion. "July 6, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 . ° Bacher to Delacroix, July 5, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 1 1 9 . 7 No. 2 1 2 (July 14, 1796). There is some confusion here as to whether the pacificatory circular sought by the Badenese were Bacher's,

or one issued by General in Chief Moreau, or both. The matter is of little importance, except perhaps to Bacher. 'Bacher to Delacroix, July 5, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 1 1 9 . 'Bacher to Delacroix, July 5, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 1 1 9 .

5

84

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Noting the temper of the inhabitants, Bacher wrote to Delacroix that if the French generals wished to secure the confidence and attachment of the peoples of Germany, they should be especially careful not to employ Mayençais Clubists; that there were enough bilingual persons in Alsace w h o could serve as collectors of contributions and requisitions — men who knew how to sweeten "these very onerous charges," and "to make the French Republic loved while . . . provisioning the armies and filling the military coffers." 1 0 T h e Directory thereupon wrote to Haussmann to watch with all his accustomed vigilance the agents of Mayençais Jacobinism, who were seeking to establish in the Breisgau the maxims of their sect "in order to disorganize these unfortunate lands and please the English politicians who are paying them."11 Haussmann had already taken steps to quiet the unrest. H e had issued a proclamation in parallel columns of French and German telling the people that their own officials would apportion the contributions; "with so simple a plan, there will be no need for the êvacuateurs, who have so often desolated the conquered country." 1 2 T h e Directory, as a further precaution, ordered General Moreau to transfer to another sector Major General Mengaud, whose "too exalted patriotism" had led him to protect Poteratz' creatures in a manner which alarmed the Germans. T h e government directed that the officer chosen to replace Mengaud should "know how to unite with ultraconciliatory qualities the firmness which is indispensable to the maintenance of discipline, and the most unequivocal disinterestedness." 13 One of the creatures of Poteratz whom Mengaud had protected was Jägerschmidt, who was still carrying boldly on. July 21, 1796, Jägerschmidt published a circular which was a virtual summons to insurrection. It invited all "right-minded" persons to be present the following Friday at a public meeting to be held on the Kaltenherberg, where measures required by the welfare of "our beloved fatherland" would be discussed. 14 However, as mentioned in the last chapter, armistices were signed with Württemberg, Baden, and the Swabian Circle between July 17 and 25, and all three agreements had guaranteed the old constitutions. In fulfillment of this obligation, French agents, before a month was over, were — according to Jägerschmidt — persecuting the "patriots" of Baden, and had cast some into prison. JägerIdem, July 8, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, £. 132. " A u g . 12, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, ΠΙ, 338. 12 "Réponse du citoyen Haussmann etc.," July io, 1796, Arch. Α. E., Allemagne 673, f. 133. The present writer believes Haussmann frowned on the whole revolutionary movement in Swabia. He pretended to List that 10

he knew nothing about it (List to Delacroix, July 3, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 114), thus producing a comical situation. List begged Delacroix to give Haussmann the same powers Poteratz had had (July 11, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, £. 134). " A u g . 12, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 335. "Quoted by Obser in ZGOR, n. F., VII, 413.

SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY AFTER POTERATZ' WITHDRAWAL

585

schmidt regarded this persecution as a sample of what was in store for the "patriots" at the hands of the Margrave when the French should finally have withdrawn from Baden, and he asked the Directory to insert in each future treaty of peace an article guaranteeing the persons and property of those who had worked for the friendly reception of the French. 15 T h e government had already done so with respect to treaties recently made, 16 though not, it seems, with Barthélemy's approval. T h e Ambassador wrote to Delacroix that the French troops would have been received in a friendly manner by the Badenese had Jägerschmidt never been born, and that all that Jägerschmidt had done was to stir up trouble in order to profit personally by the disorder. 17 O f course, Barthélémy was hostile to all disturbers of the existing order. This was a natural consequence of his training. T h e government's current attitude toward the revolutionization of southwestern Germany he heartily approved of, and when a group of Breisgau inhabitants came to him to express their desire for the union of the Breisgau with the Swiss Confederation, or, alternatively, for the independence of the Breisgau under French protection, he could not be prevailed upon to give a word of approbation. They concluded that the French had other and less palatable plans for them, and manifested the greatest revulsion at the thought of being turned over to some other prince of the Empire in indemnification or exchange 1 8 — the very fate which the Directory was reserving for t h e m 1 9 now that its plans for revolutionization had been abandoned. T h e abandonment was definitive, too — for the time being, at least — as is shown by Delacroix's action in October in again thanking Bacher for his "truly patriotic" zeal in calming the inhabitants "excited by Austrian emissaries." Bacher was assured of the government's approbation. 20 A n insurrectional movement cannot, however, be turned on and off like water from a faucet, and the Rédacteur continued to announce revolutionary upheavals, such as the pillaging of chateaux, throughout 1796. T h e Directory attributed the unrest to the instigation of priests,21 but this was hardly logical, for the priests were of the same persuasion as the castellans. T h e future of Swabia was discussed in a memoir remitted to Barthélémy by its author, the burgomaster of one of the free cities of the Circle. T h e Memoir Addressed to the Directory by Jägerschmidt of the Niederschönthal, Baden," Aug. 23, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 273. 18 Vide injra, chap, xiii, §§ 1 , 3 . " O c t . 26, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 273. "Barthélémy to Delacroix, A u g . 15, 1796, 15

Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 247. " S a n d o z to the King, Aug. 17, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 85; idem, Oct. 6, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349. " O c t . 8, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 342. 21 Vide, e.g., no. 342 (Nov. 22, 1796).

5 86

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

memoir was entitled, "Political Reflections Concerning the Question: W h a t W i l l Be the Fate of Swabia at the General Peace?" T h e author foresaw three possible solutions in case the independence of the Circle should be decided upon at the pacification of the Empire: (a) it could be revolutionized and erected into a single, unified republic; (b) it could be divided between princes whom France desired to favor; or (c) it could be given a federal constitution which preserved intact all the great and little states except for a few changes, this constitution to be guaranteed by France, and the new state to be linked with Switzerland, if possible. T h e author rejected the first proposition as contrary to the repeated promises of France; and the second, because the princes favored by gifts of territory might later become enemies of France. T h e third was recommended because the small states would be harmless to France, and because the divergency of interests of the various states of a Swabian confederation would render it certain thát French commerce would never be embarrassed by Swabian competition. 22

2.

T H E FRANCO-SWAB I A N ARMISTICES, J U L Y

I 7 , 2 5 , AND 2 7 ,

1796

It will be recalled 23 that on September 20, 1795, D u k e Friedrich Eugen of Württemberg had solicited France for a separate peace, to be concluded during an armistice of one month's duration. It will be recalled also that this armistice, though actually and legally concluded, had been repudiated by the Committee of Public Safety because it violated the Committee's concept of the proper function of Württemberg in the French scheme of things. This function was simply and briefly characterized by Bacher in some "Reflections" he sent to Merlin of Thionville: " T h e D u k e [Duchy] of Württemberg, and Swabia in general, as well as all the part of Germany situated on the left bank of the Main, should be destined essentially to nourish our armies and to support contributions to maintain them." 2 4 T h e Württemberger armistice had afforded too little in this respect, so the Convention had restored the more profitable state of war. W h e n the Directory came into being a month or so later, it made no move which would indicate displeasure at the Convention's action. But what about Württemberg^ peace overture? It had not been rebuffed outright. Württemberg had been told that preliminary conversations might take place with Rivalz at Cassel, and with Bassal at Basel. 25 T h e negotiations 22

Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, fi. 218-221. Enclosed in Barthélemy's letter of Aug. 17, 1796, to Delacroix. A fragment of this memoir appears in the Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 460-461, but very little of the portion outlined above.

Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xiii, § 2. '"Arch. A. E., Allemagne 669, f. 365. Undated; probably end of September or start of October 1795. œ Guyot, Dtrec., p. 220.

SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY AFTER POTERATZ' WITHDRAWAL

587

did commence, a treaty was drafted,2® and the Duke sought pretexts to withdraw his contingent.27 Rumors of the negotiations reached the French press, and the extremist commentator of the Ami des hois, Prince Charles of Hesse-Rheinfels, ventured his noisy opinion that the alleged treaty was premature, to say the least. The Duke's peace motive was the presence of a French army at his door, said Charles; that was his best claim to consideration, and not a very good one. Charles detailed the physical assets of Württemberg 28 and recommended that the Directory say to the Duke: "Do you [really] want to be the friend and ally of France? In that case you . . . must . . . furnish us amicably [i.e., gratis] the wheat, wood, and wine that you have been exporting to England, Switzerland, etc." 29 Prince Charles was worrying himself needlessly. France was not to lose her larder — not if all the rules of diplomatic nicety had to be violated. Württemberg had not been the only state of Swabia to seek peace with France during the autumn campaign of 1795. Baden was equally anxious to end the awful nightmare, situated as she was directly across the Rhine from Alsace, and squarely athwart the southern highway to Vienna. On September 30, 1795, Karl Friedrich, Margrave of Baden, had granted full powers to negotiate peace to his governor of Rötteln, Baron von Reitzenstein. The full powers stipulated the Margrave's desire for the intervention of the King of Prussia,30 and Reitzenstein was ordered to ask for Prussia's good offices, and to negotiate a treaty of peace upon consultation with Hardenberg. 31 On October 23 — three days before the end of the Convention — a despatch from Basel informed Frederick William that Barthélémy was refusing to accept Prussia's overtures until the Directory should have come into power and given him specific authority to treat.32 But Barthélémy did forward to Paris overtures made by Hardenberg in behalf, not only of Baden, but of Württemberg. 33 When these overtures arrived in the capital, the French armies were still in the flood tide of success. Baden and Württemberg were therefore anxious for prompt action. The Convention made no reply. The MG.

W . Vreede, La Souabe après la Paix de Bale. Recueil de documents diplomatiques et parlementaires concernant les négociations avec la République Française . . . (Utrecht, i 8 7 9 ) , p. xxiii. 27 Edelsheim (Badenese min. of state) to Karl Friedrich, Nov. 10, 1795, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 360. 28 Products: wheat, wine — in fact, everything but salt, which was imported from Bavaria. Revenues: eight to ten million

livres. Population: 600,000. Size: χ66,000 square miles. ( Vide next citation.) 29 No. 120 (Dec. 18, 1795). Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xiii, § 3. 1,1 Instructions for Reitzenstein, Oct. n , 1795, Pol. Corr. Karl jr., II, 356. ""Von Jarrach (or Harnier?) to the King, ibid., p. 358. " H a r d e n b e r g to the King, Nov. 22, 1795, ibid., p. 361; Reitzenstein to Barthélémy, July 12, 1796, ibid., p. 397.

588

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Convention was succeeded by the Directory, and the Directory made no reply. Presently Pichegru decided to commit a little treason, and "Fabius" Clerfayt actually bestirred himself to seize the advantage offered. It was after the consequent French reverses that Hardenberg wrote to his king concerning the overtures which had passed through his hands: "There is no question whatsoever of negotiations; but what should surprise is that the French government does not reply. . ." 34 Hardenberg should not have been surprised. France could not come out with an open admission that she did not want peace with the states of Swabia, yet she felt that she could not afford to forego the rights of war in that region while Austria was yet unconquered. 35 It was unfair to expect her to use up her own resources, she reasoned, in order that Germany might receive her merited chastisement. It was enough that France was giving her blood. She should not be required to hunger too. It may be set down as a principle of Directorial policy: no peace with Swabia before peace with Austria. That the principle was violated later does not vitiate the formula, for it was not the Directory which violated it but General Moreau. H e acted, admittedly, without other authority than "the example afforded by Bonaparte." 36 A n d his combinations were to solve the difficult problem how to secure the advantages of peace and war at the same time. Baden and Württemberg were to have their peace treaties, but a new definition of "peace" had to be composed for the dictionaries. Since the campaign of 1795 had ended in reverses for France, Baden and Württemberg were not unduly perturbed at the shelving of their peace overtures by the Directory. They realized, however, that the campaign of 1796 might return the French to their doors, so they decided not to let the matter of peace quite die. Württemberg kept in contact with the Directory through List, 37 and approved the Franconian Circle's suggestion that the Circles of the Upper and Lower Rhine, of Franconia and of Swabia, all unite to procure for themselves a separate peace with France. 38 In this matter, Baden sided with Constance, which saw the influence of Prussia in the Franconian Circle's suggestion, and rejected it for fear of offending the Emperor. 39 H o w ever, to remove any impression that Baden was not anxious to further the cause of pacification, the Margrave asked the Emperor (January 15, 1796) to intimate to France the Empire's desire for peace.40 " N o v . 22, 1796, ibid., p. 361. As Hardenberg himself remarked on December 5, 1795: "Separate-peace treaties are not desired, as they would render impossible living at free quarters" (to the King, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 36). Guyot, Direc., p. 221.

87 Ibid.

"Aus den Berichten der badischen Gesandtschaft beim schwäbischen Kreise," October 1795, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 358-359. 39 ibid. 10 "Aus dem Tagebuch des Geh. Raths Emanuel Meier," Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 368.

88

SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY AFTER POTERATZ* WITHDRAWAL

589

T h e Emperor did not take the suggestion kindly. 4 1 H e desired to conquer some territory to compensate himself for the loss of Belgium, or perhaps to give to the Bavaro-Palatine House in return for Bavaria. T h e French were not contemplating peace, either. Rumor in Basel, already in March, announced that the French plan for the new campaign was to plunge with great force into Swabia. 42 O n May 21, it seems, the French tried to sweep across the Rhine in the neighborhood of Hüningen 43 — without waiting for the agreed ten days 4 4 to elapse after Archduke Charles's denunciation of the armistice the day before. 45 It was plain from the military activity and from the very location of Württemberg that she, like the rest of Swabia, would soon become a battleground once more, and D u k e Friedrich Eugen wrote to the Emperor expressing the urgent wishes of the Empire for an early peace. 46 This was June 23. T h e next day Moreau's Rhine and Moselle Army, which had been moving south as if to join Bonaparte in Italy, suddenly stormed across the Rhine over a bridge of boats secreted at Strasburg, 47 and captured K e h l without encountering any real resistance.48 "Panicky terror" spread as the French advanced, owing to "the lukewarmness of the public spirit in Germany," and the "furious energy and . . . real talents" of the French. 49 Visions of plundering loomed before Friedrich Eugen's eyes, and he appealed to Archduke Charles to save his people. Charles did not reply; 5 0 his communications were threatened, and he fled the valley of the Rhine. 5 1 T h e estates of the duchy proposed a separate peace with France. Likewise, the privy council. 52 T h e D u k e was not a coward. H e had contemplated, and executed, measures of defense while there was yet a chance, but he could not see how Germany would be benefited by the devastation of Württemberg. 5 3 H e sent Abel, his counsellor of legation, and von Wöllwarth, his minister, to ask Barthélémy for peace. Barthélémy said they would have to go to Paris, for albid.

first

42Ibid. aIbid.,

p. 369. "Mém. Saint-Cyr, II, 332. "Ibid., III, 13. " K . Kliipfel, "Die Friedensunterhandlungen Würtembergs mit der französischen Republik, 1796-1802," HZ, XLVI (1881), 389. " Mémoires du maréchal-général Soult, duc de Dalmatie (pubi, by his son; 3 vols., Paris, 1854), I, 303. It was a night crossing, prepared by two months of effort. The crossing was made at Strasburg for two reasons: a large number of boats could be hidden there; the Upper Rhine is so dotted with islands that rare is the location where one can cross the River without

landing on an island where he would be a target for the enemy (Mém. Saint-Cyr, Ill, 33-38). " T h e Austrians suspected the Württemberger colonel Müller, in command at Kehl, of having been bribed (Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 449, η. ι ) . Archduke Charles said he had the "strongest intimations" that there was treason at Kehl (Wöllwarth to Karl Friedrich, Aug. 8, 1796, ibid., p. 449). "Degelmann to Thugut, July 1, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 199. "Kliipfel in HZ, XLVI, 390-391. S l Mém. Soult, I, 303. M Klüpfel in HZ, XLVI, 390-391. M Ibid., p. 390.

590

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

he still lacked powers. But the French troops were advancing, and other negotiators sent by Friedrich Eugen to seek an armistice of French had not been able to get past the Imperial outposts. Wöllwarth Abel therefore repaired to Moreau's headquarters at Baden-Baden, requested an armistice. 54

two the and and

N o w , it has been mentioned that it was a theory of the French revolutionists, Directorial as well as Conventional, that armistices were unworthy of a free people. 55 Republican warriors fought to the death for victory; they did not stop and parley. T h e right to make an armistice was therefore not regarded as one of the prerogatives of a French general. T h e armistice agreements, explicit or tacit, which eighteenth-century conditions imposed on armies practically every winter, 56 were acts of the central government decreed by the Representatives on Mission to the Armies, under the Convention; and by the Commissioners of the government to the armies, under the Directory. 57 W h e n Jourdan, on December 21, 1795, made with Clerfayt that armistice which rescued his army from a difficult position, stopped the advance of the victorious Austrians, and not improbably saved the Republic from extinction, he was accused of having violated the Constitution^) and severely reproved. 58 In Robespierre's time he would have paid with his head for his temerity. Yet now, seven months later, Moreau proceeded to grant Württemberg^ request for an armistice without regard for the fact that no Commissioner of the government was present. Perhaps the General in Chief was emboldened by Jourdan's experience in bearding the Directory. But the government did not disavow Moreau either, possibly because this time again, the interest of the Republic was so evident. In reality, it was not an armistice at all that he made, in the common acceptation of this term. It was downright plunder, with the victim agreeing to his own spoliation so that he might escape a worse fate. T h e actual negotiations were conducted for Moreau by his chief of staff, General Reynier, who knew how to impose the most crushing terms in the most affable manner. 59 From Moreau's camp, Wöllwarth wrote to the Badenese minister of state, Edelsheim, that the Margrave of Baden had asked Württemberg to watch over Baden's interests too; that Wöllwarth should concert to this end with Reitzenstein. 80 But Baden had not been idle herself. T h e Margrave, to save " W ö l l w a r t h to Edelsheim, July 15, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 400. œ Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, iii, § 4. ME. Daniels, "The Seven Years' War," C. Mod. H., VI (The Eighteenth Century, 1909), 255. " D i r . to Bonaparte, 1796, after occupation

of Milan; Bonnal de Ganges, Repré., IV, 259. 68 Guerres Rév. Emp., Ill, 85. " W ö l l w a r t h to Edelsheim, July 15, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 400-401. °°lbid.

SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY AFTER POTERATZ' WITHDRAWAL

5Ç)I

his principality from spoliation, had been trying desperately to make it appear that he and France were currently in the midst of peace negotiations. He sent General Count de la Tour a letter bulging with paltry excuses why he had to withdraw his troops defending the banks of the Rhine; 6 1 and his plenipotentiary, Reitzenstein, wrote to Barthélémy explaining that everyone was expecting peace to follow the armistice of December 1795, 62 and asking meekly whether the Directory had not yet reached a decision on Baden's ninemonths-old overture; whether the Directory had not yet empowered him (Barthélémy) to treat for peace; whether he (Reitzenstein) should not go to Paris; and whether, in view of Baden's efforts the year before, the Margraviate might not expect to be recognized as neutral territory, or whether for such recognition, an armistice would have to be concluded with Moreau — the procedure Württemberg was following. 63 The last question was answered by the aforementioned letter from Wöllwarth to Edelsheim. Wöllwarth advised Baden to make direct contact with Moreau, though he (Wöllwarth) would speak with Reynier about Baden too.®4 Reitzenstein repaired forthwith to Moreau's camp, as did two deputies of the Swabian Circle, Lasollaye and Mandelsloh, and there the armistices with Baden and Swabia were negotiated.65 Württemberg's armistice was signed on July 17, Baden's on July 25, and Swabia's on July 27. The terms of the three agreements were very similar and can be generalized : The military contingents of the "states" 66 were to be withdrawn from the army of the Empire, and used for internal police (Article I). 6 7 French troops were to have free passage through the three states for the remainder of the war; these troops might be lodged with the inhabitants or in huts in the fields, but gratuitously in either case (Article " J u l y 2, 1796, ibid., p. 384. They would interfere with the General's troops; they were needed at home; their services were not worth much, anyway. 1,2 July 12, 1796, Pol. Cotr. Karl Fr., II, 397. Accord: Delbret-Cassé (soldier A. SMeu) to X, Jan. 22, 1796, H. Bourdeau, Les armées du Rhin au début du Directoire (Paris, 1909), Documents annexes, B: Correspondance privée, p. 364. " July 12, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 3 9 7 398.

" J u l y 15, 1796, ibid., p. 400-401. " S y b e l (Europe, IV, 235) says that Reitzensteinr tried to corrupt Reynier and was obliged to flee, so the armistice was negotiated by "his successor, Edelsheim." Yet one does not find the name of Edelsheim on the instrument, but only that of Reitzen-

stein (vide reference to De Martens, this chapter, n. 69). " O f course, Württemberg, Baden, and the Swabian Circle were not states from the point of view of the political scientist, but the English language does not contain any word which would describe accurately the states of the Empire. " Archduke Charles, angered at the withdrawal of the contingents, disarmed the circle troops yet under his command. This aroused much hate against Austria (Sybel, Europe, IV, 238), for the epidemic of defections in the summer of 1796 had been due to the instinct of self-preservation, not to ill will, as Charles himself admitted with respect to Baden (Wöllwarth to Karl Friedrich, Aug. 8, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 448-449)·

592

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

II). French troops passing through the states were to respect persons and property, laws and religion; the states were to remain under the military and civil governments of their respective German masters (Article III). If circumstances rendered it necessary for the French troops to draw their subsistence from the country, the local magistrates might not refuse the demands made upon them for grain, bread, hay, meat, wood, wagons, and draught horses. These commodities were to be checked off against the provisions and coin owed to France by the terms of the armistices; objects appropriated from individuals were to be paid for by the troops (Article I V ) . Württemberg, Baden, Swabia, and the religious corporations of Swabia were to pay to the French army four million, two million, twelve million, and seven million livres in coin, respectively (Article V — and Article X of the Swabian armistice). Except for Article V I I I of the Württemberger armistice, by which Moreau agreed to welcome the good offices of the D u k e of Württemberg in favor of the states of the Swabian Circle desiring to treat for peace with France, the remainder of the articles dealt with rather prosaic but vital subjects. Württemberg, Baden, and the Circle of Swabia, respectively, were to deliver to the French: 4,200,68 1,000, and 8,400 horses; 0, 500, and 5,000 oxen; 100,000, 50,000, and 150,000 cwt. of hay; 50,000, 12,000, and 100,000 sacks of oats; 100,000, 25,000, and 150,000 cwt. of grain; and 50,000, 25,000, and 100,000 pairs of shoes.89 These terms, crushing as they were, would not have been so unendurable had they been imposed on a fresh country prosperous with years of peace. But this was the fourth year of the Imperial war, and both belligerents had made inroads on Swabia's resources. This, lamented Wöllwarth, made the French demands "a truly unendurable burden. . . But one must submit to the law of the victor, and get along as best he can." 70 Baden complained 68

Not 42,000 as in Guyot, Direc., p. 221. Guyot did indeed make use of the archives for his figures, but he must have consulted an uncertified copy of the Franco-Württemberger Treaty — or perhaps his "42,000" is merely an error of the printer's which proofreading failed to catch. Guyot does not give the figures of the Vrznco-S wabian agreement, merely indicating that they were "double those" of Württemberg^ treaty. That is untrue with respect to the grain, oxen, and hay, but is true with respect to the horses — but here Guyot indicates otherwise. The exact figures, with their monetary equivalents, can be found iri the little book of Armbruster cited in the next

note. *"G. F. de Martens (ed.), Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance . . . de l'Europe, Ser. II (2nd ed. [of Vols. V-VIII by C. de Martens]; 8 vols., Göttingen, 1817-1835), Vol. VI, 265-267, 273-276, 286-289; J· M. Armbruster (ed.), Sünden-Register der Franzosen während ihres Aufenthalts in Schwaben und Vorder-Oestreich, I (n. p., 1797)) 44 _ 47· Despite the incendiary title of Armbruster's book, the documents reproduced leave nothing to be desired for accuracy. " T o Edelsheim, July 15, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., Π, 400.

SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY AFTER POTERATZ' WITHDRAWAL

593

that when the French entered the country, they seized all provisions and then quartered troops on the inhabitants. Edelsheim wondered how they were expected to feed the troops — and themselves. 71 They could not buy food in Alsace; export of French foodstuffs was forbidden. T h e n came the crushing demands for grain, etc., in the Armistice of July 25. It is almost comical — so absurd it is — to read of Reitzenstein's hopes that perhaps France would permit the Badenese to buy wheat and rye in Alsace so they could meet the terms of the Armistice. 72 France did not permit it. A Directorial decree of September 9 ordered a watch kept to prevent the Margrave from buying grain or horses in France. T h e Bas-Rhin had complained of such purchases. 73 T h e terms had been even more stringent. Baden's experience can serve as an example. Reitzenstein insisted to the French that the contributions they had demanded would "ruin the country." T o take so many oxen would "destroy agriculture," and to demand from Baden more oxen than from Württemberg was "unjust." "In all of Baden one could not find 1,000 [horses] of the kind asked." " T h e ordinary harvest did not suffice for the needs of the country," and grain had to be "bought abroad." 7 4 T h e demands of the French were subsequently softened in certain instances, and the minutes of the Badenese Privy Council's session of July 26 may or may not tell us why. " T o General Reynier, who refused absolutely the sums of money offered him: four choice riding horses; . . . to General in Chief Moreau: six of the same"; but "to the Commissioner of the Executive Power Hausmann [sic], who . . . had been offered 20 — 30 — 40,000 fl.75 by Privy Councillor Maler : 25,000 fl." 76 It was, of course, the custom to give presents to the negotiators of the opposing side, but the wording of the Protokoll is unusual, to say the least. T h e terms imposed on the Swabian Circle were the harshest of all, and the diet of the Circle, hoping for amelioration, supplicated the Swiss government for its good offices. T h e Bishop of Constance, as Directing Prince of the Circle, appealed to Barthélémy on August 29, 1796 77 — but in vain. This does not mean that France collected what was written in the agreement. T h e terms were so harsh they could not be executed, even had the fortunes of war permitted the French to remain on the spot. A s it turned out, the French were going to have to do their collecting in absentia. " T o Karl Friedrich, July 18, 1796, ibid., p. 405. 72 Reitzenstein to N . N., Aug. 1, 1796, ibid., p. 444. 7 3 Debidour, Recueil, III, 579.

7 4 "Bemerkungen,"

July 19, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 408-409. "Imperial florins. " " P r o t o k o l l , " Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 419. " A r c h . A . E., Allemagne 670, fi. 258-259.

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

594 3.

FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAIN

Moreau's invasion of Swabia was paralleled by Jourdan's operations farther north. It will be recalled that in the autumn of 1795, Frederick William had renounced the Line of Demarcation around Frankfort and ordered his troops to repair to Ansbach and Baireuth. This had left Frankfort without protection, and inasmuch as the city had never made a separate peace with France nor had even withdrawn its contingent, 78 it was legitimate prey for an invading host. O n July 16, 1796, the city fell to Jourdan's Sambre and Meuse A r m y after a short bombardment. 79 H o w it should be treated the government soon divulged. "Frankfort has always been rich," the Directory wrote to Jourdan. "It has been further enriched by the war. It has never ceased furnishing help to our enemies; it should exert some efforts for us." T h e Directory suggested a contribution of 10,000,000 in coin — more or less, as Jourdan should judge proper. "Very many" hostages, selected from the wealthiest and most proAustrian families, should be taken to assure the payment of the 10,000,000. "Frankfort has . . . immense stocks of hides, cloth, articles of subsistence, and necessities of the army. W e imagine that you could furnish the French troops in this city with everything they lack and will lack later on. Whatever you do not need at the moment, send immediately to the left bank of the Rhine, and we will find it in due course." Disarm the Frankforters completely, "by vigorous action if necessary," and send to France all their powder, cannon, and guns. "Whatever belongs to the enemies of France you should confiscate for the benefit of the Republic." If you want to seize something, and its apparent owner says it belongs to him and not to the Austrians, you should seize it anyway, giving a receipt. T h e apparent owner can then obtain compensation from the Austrians. 80 It is now perhaps clear what the Directory had in mind when it wrote to Jourdan: " W e ought not treat Germany as parts of Europe were treated some centuries ago by barbarian hordes. However, we are not obliged to spare anything when it is a question of our interest in a country which we do not intend to keep, and the formal intention of the Directory is that you should send to the left bank of the Rhine and to our strongholds of war all that is not absolutely necessary to the army you are commanding." 8 1 Joubert levied a contribution of ten million livres and a mountain of Its contingent was garrisoning the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein (Bacher to Merlin-Th., autumn, 1795, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 669, f. 365). " E . Bourdeau, Campagnes modernes (3 vols., 78

Paris, 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 2 1 ) , I, 243. " J u l y 20, 1796, Mém. campagne de 1796, "Pièces justificatives," no. xi (pp. 267-270). 61 Arch. Ν., A F III 91, d. 2054.

SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY AFTER POTERATZ' WITHDRAWAL

595

supplies,82

taking twenty-five hostages to assure the acquittal of the ten millions. T h e hostages were to be returned when half the money had been paid. 83 Frankfort appealed to the K i n g of Prussia to intercede in its behalf in the hope of securing some amelioration of the conditions. T h e city probably reckoned on the influence of Hardenberg, who was engaged in some financial affairs there,84 but the K i n g was profoundly conscious that Frankfort had voluntarily allowed the time to elapse during which it could have made peace with Prussian mediation. H e mentioned the point to his cabinet ministers, but ordered them nevertheless to write to Sandoz to try to have the contribution reduced on the ground that he was interested in the city. 85 Carnot replied to Sandoz' appeal with a flat refusal. Frankfort was too Austrian, he said. 86 O n August 15, the Directory ordered Joubert to accelerate the rate at which the contributions were coming in. 87 Three days before, the government had ordered Jourdan to augment the contribution for each day of delinquency, past and future, and it suggested 100,000 livres per day increase. T h e use of force "to the extreme degree of severity authorized by the rights of war" was commanded to oblige Frankfort to pay. " T h e Directory regrets that you took only twenty-five hostages; . . . [it] believes the number insufficient to dominate this city always ready to take sides against us, and its intention is that the number be much augmented." 88 Thus started with fire and brimstone a relationship which, in a few short months, would breathe an air of sweetness and brotherly love. But that in its place. For the time being, the air was heavy with sulphurous fumes. T h e land of the West Franks and the Franks at the ford did not see eye to eye. King of Prussia to his cabinet mins., July 22, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. ""Min. of for. aff. to min. of war, Sept. 30, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 336. 84 Barthélémy to OPS, Sept. 25, 1795, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 669, ff. 325-326. 85 King of Prussia to his cabinet mins., July 83

22, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. 86 Sandoz to the King, Aug. 12, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. " A u g . 15, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 377, note. 88 Aug. 12, 1796, ibid., pp. 340-341.

>s

CHAPTER X

ai

T H E EMPEROR W A V E R S

I.

THE WAR AND THE NOBLES OF AUSTRIA

/ / Τ a desk in Paris in the early months of 1796 sat a young man, short, Ç d a r k , with a hawklike eye and the greediness of a vulture. He was relatively unknown, though he had distinguished himself at Toulon, and at Paris — as author of the "whiff of grape shot." A n office desk suited him ill, and his mind pushed out beyond the four walls to impossible feats of military legerdemain. Impossible? That is indeed what General in Chief Schérer said when he received, through Carnot, the young man's plan of campaign for his (Schérer's) Army of Italy. Let the author of this crazy plan come and carry it out, declared the experienced but not very active general in disgust. I resign. 1 Schérer's resignation was accepted, and, primarily 2 through Carnot's influence, the young man stepped into Schérer's place. The world little suspected the significance of the appointment. The new general in chief was only "a young Corsican terrorist named Buonaparte" in a report on France dated March 1 1 . 3 The indefinite article soon became definite, far too definite for the comfort of Europe. On March 27, the young general assumed command of his army. Then things began to happen. The French army slipped between the Austrians 1

2

A . Lévy, Napoléon intime (Paris, 1893), p. ι°5·

Welvert, Lend, rêv., p. 34. Barras, in his Mémoires (II, 6 et seqq.), pretends that he put through Bonaparte's appointment to please the latter's fiancee, Josephine de Beauharnais, widow of the General Beauharnais who had been guillotined to "avenge" the loss of Mayence. Guyot (Direc., pp. 156-157) explodes this myth. Barras did not even sign Bonaparte's nomination, which was carried by the votes of

Carnot, Le Tourneur, and Revellière-Lépeaux. It is interesting, however, to note that the report from Berne quoted in the text describes Bonaparte further as "the right arm of Barras," but this is probably because of the relations of Barras and Bonaparte on the 13 Vendémiaire. 'Unsigned report on France, dated at Berne, March i t , 1796, and forwarded to Vienna by Gherardini, H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 18.

597

THE EMPEROR WAVERS

and their Sardinian ally, compelling the latter to make peace. With his rear safe, Bonaparte then turned upon the Emperor's forces.4 A series of reverses followed for Austria — Lodi, Castiglione, Areola, Rivoli, Mantua — drawing in their train a strong desire for peace. The higher nobles of Vienna had long been discontented with the war, anyway, for the charges of war weighed upon them, as owners of land. Thugut owned no land, so the war did not affect him adversely — a fact which the overburdened nobles keenly resented. It seemed to them that Thugut kept the war going because he had nothing to lose.® Toward the end of May, the noble opposition became so strong that the Emperor was obliged to take notice of it, and asked his "conference ministers" for their reflections. These were presented in the form of memoirs, which Prince Rosenberg consolidated into one. His report recommended peace, a radical change of policy, and the cashiering of Thugut. The Emperor turned the document over to Thugut.® 2.

GALLO AT BASEL

At this very time, the Neapolitan Court, to avoid invasion, decided to make peace with France. Gallo, Neapolitan Ambassador to Vienna, was ordered to repair to Basel so that Prince Belmonte Pignatelli, Naples' peace negotiator, could consult with him as the Prince passed through Switzerland on his way to Paris.7 Now, the Queen of Naples did not want to separate her interests from those of Austria. Gallo was therefore directed to try to induce Austria also to treat with France. Thugut at first advised against making any overtures at all, for two reasons. He did not want to separate his interests from those, of England, and he regarded the military situation as too unfavorable to admit of a satisfactory peace. Gallo intimated the possibility of an invasion of Austria through the Tyrol, to which Thugut replied that in such a case, the Emperor would flee his capital, but not sign a separate 'Dumolin, Précis, I, 412 et seqq. It was at this juncture that Bonaparte heard of a rumor to adjoin to his command that General Kellermann whose cannonade "checked" the Prussians at Valmy. Bonaparte wrote to Paris though not to the Directory (May 14, 1796): "I cannot serve willingly with a man who considers himself the foremost general in Europe; besides, I believe that one bad general is better than two good ones. . . " (J. H. Stewart [ed.], A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution [New York, 1 9 5 1 ] , pp. 673-674.)

Vide next note. ® Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, evi et seqq. It is interesting to consider that when Rosenberg died the following November, Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador to Vienna, said that Rosenberg's death was "an irreparable loss to the Prussian legation." Concerning this remark, Thugut wrote to Count Colloredo: " A fine funeral oration for a 'conference minister' of his Majesty 1" (Nov. 1 7 , 1796, Briefe Thugut, 5

7

ι, 3 5 1 . ) Guyot, Direc., p. 178.

59

8

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

peace. If the Emperor did want to sign, he could. H e was the master. But never would he, Thugut. Efforts were even made to deter Naples from concluding the separate agreement she was contemplating. Gallo was urged to remonstrate with his court instead of repairing to Basel to concur with Belmonte, as he had been ordered. 8 But Gallo decided to proceed to Basel, as directed. W h e n T h u g u t saw he was really going, he started to discuss with him ways and means of disentangling Austria from her uncomfortable situation. T h u g u t commissioned the Neapolitan to make all inquiries and take all steps necessary to facilitate the process of pacification, but in such a manner that the French should themselves feel prompted to authorize Gallo to make propositions to Austria. These propositions could then be discussed with England, and serve as a basis for the opening of general negotiations. If Naples had made peace by that time, its king could mediate the general peace. Thugut emphasized that it was only a general peace he would consider.® T h e Emperor personally made the same point to Gallo, but added something more. H e asked Gallo "in the most urgent manner" to procure peace for him either together with his allies or through the mediation of the Neapolitan monarch. This seems to indicate a willingness to sign a separate peace, but the Emperor instructed Gallo that "the first principle of the negotiations must be the indivisibility of the Allied courts." Gallo asked what he should do if the French would not negotiate at Basel. Should he go to Paris? T h e Emperor, both personally and through Thugut, replied with a categorical no. W h e n Gallo arrived in Basel, he was informed that Barthélémy had no powers. If he wanted to negotiate, it would have to be in Paris. From the Emperor's positive stand on this point, Gallo should have known the battle was lost before even it had begun, but he decided to make an attempt. H e therefore sent Baptiste, his secretary, to Vienna (June 3, 1796) with a letter for T h u g u t asking permission to proceed to the French capital. Baptiste was to point out the dangers for Austria inherent in the Archduke's retreat and to state that Gallo had ascertained that France was inclined to make peace with Austria, but needed the enmity of England to fire the enthusiasm of the nation. Thugut's reply was to order Gallo back to Vienna. 1 0 "Let "Authority for this and the succeeding two paragraphs: Gallo to the King, June 2, 1796, quoted in Hüfier, Politik. Mächte, pp. 200-203. "This aspect of Gallo's trip seems to have escaped Guyot's attention. Vide his Direc., p. 177. Guyot was certainly misled by the reports of Lucchesini to Berlin. On August

18, Lucchesini wrote: "Gallo tried, before leaving, to procure a commission from Thugut [to negotiate] with Barthélémy, but all he could get was a meaningless utterance of the Emperor's" (Hüffer, Politik. Mächte, p. 200). 10 Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, cviii; Hüffer, Politi\ Mächte, p. 203.

599

THE EMPEROR WAVERS

Belmonte go alone to Paris, to intrigue as much as he wants, provided that he does not involve us in his foul deeds," wrote Thugut to Count Colloredo. ". . . It is plain that the Neapolitans would be . . . much pleased to . . . [have us] partake of their dishonor." 1 1 3.

T H E FRISCHING NEGOTIATION

The Emperor was no more anxious than Thugut to appear a suppliant for peace in the enemy's capital; still, he did want to see the end of the bloody scourge. When his conference ministers presented him with a more moderate memoir on June 27, one which Count Colloredo could approve, he pondered over it for a fortnight, then adopted its conclusions. Summoning Rosenberg, and complimenting him for his "zeal and insight," he ordered that instructions drawn up in Rosenberg's own hand be sent to Degelmann (July 14, 1796). 1 2 Degelmann made contact with Karl Albert von Frisching, ex-treasurer of the canton of Berne, and a friend of France. Presently there arrived in the French capital a suggestion for Franco-Austrian negotiations with Prussian mediation, but it seems impossible that these overtures should have originated with Degelmann or Frisching. Sufficient time for that had not elapsed. Perhaps the conference ministers had been making insinuations, ignorant as they were that Austria had been specifically excepted from the benefits of Prussia's good offices by the sixth secret article of the Treaty of Basel. Delacroix's response took the shape of a letter to Barthélémy. " I hardly conceive the object of this step," he wrote. " I do not know what advantage she [Austria] hopes to draw therefrom. . . We have no interest in crushing Austria, and probably she would gain more by addressing herself straight to the Directory, sending someone to Paris to appeal to French generosity. . . If you see Degelmann, insinuate this to h i m . " 1 3 When this letter arrived in Basel, the Frisching negotiation had already assumed a greater degree of consistency. Barthélémy had received a note from Frisching, and before replying, had inquired through a certain civil captain of the city of Constance if Frisching's reputation was good. Assured that it was, Barthélémy wrote to Delacroix (July 22, 1796). 14 The French ambassador also repeated to Frisching what Delacroix had instructed him to insinuate to Degelmann. 15 On July 31, Frisching made his first formal communication to Barthélémy. " J u l y 7, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 3 1 5 . 13 Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, cix. " J u l y 16, 1796, ibid., p. 62.

" G u y o t , Direc., p. 226. " J u l y 22, 1796, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 64.

6oo

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

H e declared that he had been charged by an agent of Austria to make indirect peace overtures to France — overtures which honor forbade the Emperor to make directly. T h e note proposed that France should retain possession of Belgium and of the German left bank; restore Lombardy to the Emperor; and allow Austria to possess itself of Bavaria up to the Isar, the Elector Bavaro-Palatine to be indemnified with the Breisgau. T h e Emperor, according to Frisching, feared the effect that knowledge of the proposition regarding Bavaria would have on Prussia and on the Empire; he therefore desired that the Directory should assume the responsibility therefor. Secrecy, moreover, was requested. 16 Barthélémy should communicate the overture straight to the Directory, or to one of its members. " N o one wishes to be known, and I yet less than anyone else. T h e initiative of a peace is such a delicate thing." 1 7 Frisching had signed his notes to Barthélémy, but because he had asked that his name should be withheld, Barthélémy did not reveal the agent's identity when he transmitted to Reubell on August 5, 1796, a copy of Frisching's second letter (the note containing definite peace proposals). The French ambassador insisted, however, on the sincerity of the writer and on the reliability of the channels through which the latter had obtained his propositions. 18 T h e answer of the Directory is very interesting. After secret deliberation, on August 25, it wrote to Barthélémy that France was willing to treat for peace, but could not do so with "a man who hides himself and might be disavowed. Let frank explanations and suitable propositions be made directly and officially, [and] the Executive Directory will prove, by its eagerness to receive them, how desirous it is to arrive at a sound and durable peace." 1 9 Reubell thought to capitalize this offer of Austria's to frighten Prussia into alliance with France, and the above reply was palpably an attempt to gain time. However, the Emperor never came forward with frank explanations. In the course of the summer, military successes on the part of Austria reanimated the party of war at Vienna, and the Frisching negotiation was just dropped. 20 Its existence, however, had much influence upon the Directory's German policy. Austria had been brought to the point where she was seeking peace, with concrete proposals involving a fair give-and-take. Moreover, she had admitted that the left bank of the Rhine could exchange masAll Europe was soon humming, however, with Imperial negotiators supplicating for peace (Mallet du Pan to Count de SainteAldegonde, Nov. 2, 1796, Mém. coir. Mallet du Pan, II, 273). 17 Debidour, Recueil, III, 459-460; Arch. Ν., A F III 398, d. 2124.

u

" G u y o t , Direc., p. 226. " A r c h . A . E., M. et Ό., 654; cited by Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 74. This letter was composed by Reubell, and not by Le Tourneur, as asserted. "Debidour, Recueil, III, 460.

THE EMPEROR WAVERS

601

ters. This was a healthy change from the French point of view, for heretofore the Emperor would not admit that peace could be reëstablished on any other basis than the status quo ante bellum, with an increase of territory for Austria in the neighborhood of Belgium, and some further indemnity such as Alsace. France saw in the change a sign that the Emperor was weakening, and felt reassured on the question of her "natural boundaries." This negotiation, or rather torso of a negotiation, convinced France that her foreign policy had been correct; that the proper road to her goal was to make an entente with Prussia and war upon Austria. If anything, the Frisching negotiation hardened the attitude of France toward the Habsburgs, and, despite the reverses of Jourdan and Moreau, tended to raise the Directory's price for peace.

>4

CHAPTER XI

if

T H E F R A N C O - P R U S S I A N T R E A T Y OF B E R L I N , A U G U S T 5, 1796

I.

THE L I N E OF NEUTRALITY ONCE AGAIN

H E retreat of the French armies to the left bank toward the end of 1795 lent a new aspect to the Line of Demarcation, as far as France was concerned. The Line was no longer hampering French operations on the right bank; there were no operations to be hampered. Thus, when the King of Prussia, in renouncing the southern section of the Line of May 17, expressed the wish to maintain the portion protecting Westphalia, the Directory replied that it would "consent willingly to regard as intact [that] part of the L i n e . " 1 As time passed, however, the French attitude gradually changed. Jourdan attributed his defeat to respect for the Line. Carnot and Aubert-Dubayet, the war minister, influenced by Jourdan's reports, therefore spoke out against any further restriction on military operations.2 Barras and Le Tourneur, both possessed of military experience, joined with Carnot in declaring that France could bind herself to observe a line of demarcation only if Austria pledged herself to do likewise. 3 T o Sandoz' objection that Austria had no reason to attack Westphalia or Hanover, hence her pledge could be taken for granted, Carnot replied that implicit consent was not enough.4 In reality, the request for Austria's engagement was only a means of rejecting the whole line-of-demarcation idea, for it was known that the Emperor would never agree. But Francis could hardly have been more hostile than the French government. The Line of Demarcation was repugnant to France principally for three reasons: Neutrality placed "Road Closed" signs athwart attractive 'Dir. to Barthélémy, Nov. 19, 1795, quoted in Barthélémy to Delacroix, Jan. 25, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 672, f. 60. ' Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, iv, § 1.

"Sandoz to the King, March 7, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 59. 'Idem, March 7, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, β. 169-170.

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIA TREATY OF BERLIN, AUGUST 5 , I 7 9 6

603

routes, preventing free maneuvering. It locked the cupboard door, interfering with the supply services of the army. And, last, but not least by any means, it protected from invasion a possession of the English King. The third reason had the greatest emotional appeal for Frenchmen. Not that France had any profound grievance against George III. Indeed, George was hostile to the Revolution. However, his real crime consisted in his being the head of a state which had captured the colonies of France and of the United Netherlands; which was the financial prop of its allies; and which could not be laid under contribution. Here was a time when "natural boundaries" worked against France's interests. The neutralization asked by Prussia would not be, of course, without redeeming features. The French troops could concentrate along a shorter line. Withdrawal of the contingents of the neutralized states — they had not all been withdrawn, despite the Treaty of Basel — would weaken the Empire's army. The levée en masse of the right-bank states would no longer be possible. Provisions could be obtained for a longer period in a neutralized region than in a conquered region, "for the most fertile countries are quickly exhausted when treated as conquered territory." 5 The neutralization would please Prussia, which was making virtually a sine qua non of the matter, Sandoz' instructions declaring that the "refusal of the French government to subscribe to the neutrality . . . of Hanover, and to the Line of Demarcation . . . [could be envisaged] only as a violation of the Peace of Basel." 6 Haugwitz was very much in favor of a neutrality line, and since it was principally he who was holding back the forces seeking to reclaim Prussia for the Coalition,7 it was good policy to humor Haugwitz. 8 Why was Prussia so determined upon the neutralization idea? Bacher says it was because Hardenberg, a Hanoverian by birth, had, to shield his natal land, convinced the Prussian Court that only neutrality would keep the war away from Prussian Westphalia.9 Another likely reason, certainly equally important, concerns the probability of revolutionary contagion if the French armies came too close. Wrote Hardenberg to Frederick William, "[France] would not make war on your Majesty even if she had the means; but she might carry this scourge up to your very frontiers, [thus exciting] . . . all the revolutionary dangers. . . That is what I fear, Sire." 10 On several occasions Hardenberg told Barthélémy that French troops in Han0

"Summary of the Political, Military, and Commercial Advantages that the Neutralization of Lower Germany would Procure for the French Republic," n.d., Arch. A.

E., Allemagne

671, f. 41.

' J a n . 29, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 45. 7 As mentioned supra, Pt. II, chap, iv, i 3.

•Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, xxv; Caillard to Delacroix, April 2, 1796, ibid., pp. 439-440. ' Bacher to Merlin-Th., vendimiare, IV (September-October 1795), Arch. A. E., 10

Allemagne

669, f. 364.

Nov. 22, 1795, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.·, I, 33-

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

over would mean an insurrection there and in Prussia, and that therefore Prussia would have to resist a French invasion of Hanover by force of arms. 11 The same fear of "revolutionary and democratic principles" appears also in a letter of Finkenstein 12 to Haugwitz. Finkenstein made the additional point that if France occupied Hanover, she would be so close to the heart of the Prussian states that she could speak with excessive authority to Frederick William. 13 The French government really did not know what to do. The same arguments could be used to advocate opposite courses of action. Some reasoned that since Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen and others were urging the King to rejoin the Coalition, it was rash and foolish to agree to restrictions on the free movement of French troops. Others said that concessions to Prussia were necessary just because hostile elements were whispering in Frederick William's ear.14 In February, therefore, we have a period of hesitations and contradictions. Carnot continued hostile to the Line; Reubell and his mouthpiece, Delacroix, while also personally hostile, were officially inclined to yield on the question. On February u , Delacroix informed Sandoz: "The Directory awaits only to be instructed of the line of demarcation which his Prussian Majesty will determine, and it will give him a prompt and satisfactory response. It is a sacrifice, I do not conceal it, which it [the Directory] will make to its political interests." 15 But in his "Plan of Pacification" of February 20, Delacroix condemned the neutrality of northern Germany as preventing France from attacking England through Hanover.1® The "political interests" of which Delacroix spoke were the hope of alliance. In other words, the French minister said France would agree to a line of demarcation in fond anticipation of closer ties with Prussia. A t approximately the same time, Bischoffswerder— in the face of difficulties with Austria and Russia over Polish boundaries, and fearful lest· the war in Germany should recommence before the restoration of the Line of Demarcation— reversed Delacroix's reasoning,17 and spoke to Caillard of closer ties, in order to hasten the reconstitution of the neutrality line. 18 On March 7, Delacroix suggested to Sandoz a "positive way" of inducing the Directory to agree to a new neutrality convention: Prussia should desigFeb. 18, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 154. 12 Finkenstein had charge of the Prussian Foreign Office. " F e b . 22, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Fr{., I, 53-54. " Ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi. 15 Sandoz to the King, ibid., p. 48. 1β Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, ii, § 3.

11

"France was opposed to a neutrality line but consented to agree to one in hope of obtaining the alliance of Prussia. Prussia was opposed to an alliance, but proposed to dangle the hope of one before France's eyes in order to secure the reëstablishment of the neutrality line. 18 Guyot, Dtrec., pp. 212-213.

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN TREATY OF BERLIN, AUGUST 5 , 1 7 9 6

605

nate, in the neutrality treaty, the secularizations destined to indemnify the House of Orange for the loss of the stadholderate; this would assure the Directory that Prussia had no designs on the Batavian Republic. Now, though the King of Prussia was anxious for the indemnification of his Orangist relatives, he did not covet the role of destroyer of the German constitution. Moreover, it was not by any means certain that France would be the victor in the war, and if she were not, there would be neither secularization nor need of it, for the left bank would return to its former owners. When Sandoz intimated to Delacroix that perhaps the French plans would prove impossible of realization, the French foreign minister interrupted with pride: "If the French Republic and the King of Prussia are willing to agree regarding this, I do not know where is the power which could prevent i t . " 1 9 The period of indecision might have stretched out indefinitely had not Carnot changed sides for diplomatic reasons, making a majority in favor of the proposed neutrality.20 On March 22, a decree signed by all five Directors in secret session authorized Delacroix to treat with Sandoz for the reëstablishment of the neutrality line. 21

2.

T W O TREATIES DEMANDED BY FRANCE

On April 4, Delacroix, to the astonishment of Sandoz, presented to him, not a treaty project, but the projects of two treaties, to be accepted or rejected together only. It was Delacroix's own idea that the King's desire for neutrality could be used as a lever to pry out of him what France desired. The first project recognized the neutrality of northern Germany; the second, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, with indemnification for Prussia and the ex-stadholder.22 Sandoz declared to the French foreign minister that he would willingly sign the first project, but could not see sufficient connection between the two to necessitate that they should be accepted at the same time. Delacroix characterized the second treaty, which was to be held secret, as a means of tranquillizing the allies of the Republic (that is, Batavia) regarding the disposition of the K i n g for the remainder of the war. Sandoz offered to send the two projects to Berlin by courier, to which Delacroix agreed. However, when the men parted, Delacroix's attitude was cold, and his displeasure was evident. 23 On April 20, Caillard remitted to Haugwitz two treaty projects of the same purport as those presented by Delacroix to Sandoz. The patent articles Sandoz to the King, March 7, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 58. 20 Idem, April 5, 1796, ibid., p. 62. a A r c h . N., AF I I I * 20. 19

22 28

Bailleu, Pr. Frk.·, I, xxv. Sandoz to the King, April 5, 1796, ibid., pp. 61-62.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

provided that the Convention of May 17 should be executed with the following modifications: Establishment of a new line of neutrality. Withdrawal of their contingents within two months by states behind the neutrality line, the withdrawal to be guaranteed by Prussia by means of armed force, if necessary. Prussia to guarantee that no troops inimical to France should cross the Line of Demarcation, or issue from behind it to combat the French troops (for which purpose the Hohenzollern monarch should unite 10,000 soldiers in Ansbach and Baireuth, and warn Austria that a violation of the neutrality line would be met by armed force; should the Austrians violate the neutrality line nevertheless, it would be considered nonexistent for those states which had not concluded treaties of separate peace with France). The states within the neutrality line to place their troops on a peace footing, and to permit no assemblages of émigrés, whether French or Dutch, upon their territories.24 The secret articles provided that Prussia might mediate peace treaties between France and the states within the neutrality line, the basis of the negotiations to be the cession of the left bank to France, with indemnification by secularization on the right bank for the losses of secular princes; that Prussia should renounce its left-bank territories in France's favor, and consent to accept in lieu thereof, with France's guarantee, the Bishopric of Paderborn and the Duchy of Westphalia excepting the part enclaved in the Bishopric of Münster; that France should endeavor to secure the exchange of these territories and of other Prussian possessions in Westphalia for Mecklenburg, and should unite with the King of Prussia in an effort to procure the electoral dignity for the Duke of Mecklenburg if he facilitated the said exchange; that the Houses of Nassau-Orange and of Hesse-Cassel should also be indemnified by secularization on the right bank, and by the electoral dignity; that Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen should be replaced by a general "who has not rendered himself conspicuous by his devotion to Austria and hatred of France"; that the King of Prussia should oppose with the entirety of his forces any increase of territory in the Empire on the part of the Anglo-Hanoverian ruler — especially should George Ill's acquisition of any of the Hansa cities be prevented; and, lastly, that French troops should be permitted to cross the part of Mark situated on the left bank of the Ruhr River.25 The King expressed surprise that France expected the signature of two treaties, one of which had nothing to do with the line of neutrality, and had never been discussed at all. He was horrified, moreover, that the French had added to the treaty project an article, in manifest contradiction to the Peace 24 G. S. Arch., R XI ®G. S. Arch., R XI

Frankreich Frankreich

89, fase. 347. 89, fase. 347.

The documents have Roër here by error. The latter river is to the west of the Rhine.

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN TREATY OF BERLIN, AUGUST 5, 1796

607

of Basel, providing for the King's cession of his left-bank states (which the Treaty of April 5 had deferred to the general peace of the Empire). 26 Caillard, in a note of April 26 to the Prussian Ministry, explained why France was insisting upon the signature of two treaties. If the French were to conclude an agreement with Prussia embodying merely a neutrality convention, the only state to profit thereby would be England, the king of which would have his most precious possession guaranteed from harm. However, Hanover was the only spot where France was able to strike effectively at Britain, and the Republic had to be compensated for giving up its best opportunities. This was the reason for the two projects — one to supplement the other and render it worth while. 27 Haugwitz observed that it was quite impossible to make a treaty on the basis of mere contingencies, but Caillard responded that it was precisely because of the contingent nature of the projected articles that they ought to remain secret; that if France were actually master of the entire left bank of the Rhine, without any fear of being dispossessed, it could announce its intentions with as much publicity as it did in regard to Belgium. 28 All these arguments were in vain, however. Prussia's views had not altered since the previous January, when Caillard reported: " I can assure you, Citizen Minister, that Herr Haugwitz favored the overture [of secularization], but I confess to you that he would prefer that the King of Prussia win the favor of the princes of Germany through his procuring their reëstablishment on the left bank of the Rhine." 29 T o the Directors, Prussia's resolute refusal to subscribe to the plans of France seemed evidence of ill intentions, and Delacroix, Reubell, and Barras, in turn, submitted Sandoz to severe questioning: Why had Haugwitz left Berlin for Brunswick? What was meant by the assemblage of an army of 80,000 (sic) men under Hohenlohe? Did the K i n g intend to invade Holland and restore the stadholder? Did Frederick William purpose to break the Peace of Basel and declare war on France? Sandoz rejected all such suspicions as preposterous, but his refutations met with the cynical look of one who is firmly convinced he is listening to a liar. 30 Prussia's actions are easily explained. The deputies of the two circles of Lower Saxony and Westphalia had met at Hildesheim under the presidency of Frederick William's envoy, von Dohm, to discuss (among other things) whether an army of neutrality were necessary, and how it should be maintained, if established. A plurality had voted in favor of an army of neu29

Royal rescript of April 16, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347. G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347. "Caillard to Delacroix, April 23, 1796,

27

Bailleu, Pr. F r I , 441. "Idem, Jan. 16, 1796, ibid., p. 433. "Sandoz to the King, May 6, 1796, ibid., p. 66.

6o8

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

trality. 31 But when Prussia sent 22,000 men to protect the Line of Demarcation, a variety of rumors arose as to what they were to do: invade Clèves; attack Holland; take possession of Mecklenburg, giving its duke Hamburg and Lübeck. Since Caillard feared to have the pro-Allied Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen in command, the D u k e of Brunswick had been given leadership of the force. "That is to go from Scylla to Charybdis," wrote Parandier. 32 Reinhard insinuated a few months later that it was contrary to France's interests to have a German army stationed so near to France's conquests and France's (Batavian) ally. 33 Even some Germans regarded the Congress of Hildesheim as a scheme of Prussia's, aiming at her own aggrandizement, and Mecklenburg demanded at the Congress a precise statement that the neutrality army would never be used for another purpose than the protection of North Germany against France and Austria. 34 France, of course, knew of these suspicions through her observer, Citizen Kerner, who was "usefully occupied" at Hildesheim, and who, "in all these circumstances . . . has shown great zeal, and a lively love of liberty and of his adopted country." 3 5 It seemed that Frederick William would absolutely not agree to cede his left-bank states or to specify which of his neighbors he would rob to compensate himself for having been robbed. O n May 9, therefore, Reubell tried the argument which was so very likely to make an impression on a Prussian: "If the K i n g of Prussia wishes to remain a friend of France, we are resolved to accord little or no indemnity to the Emperor, and, as a corollary, to reject all idea of the transfer of Bavaria; if, on the other hand, the K i n g of Prussia wishes to renounce our friendship, we shall be forced to consent to the exchange of Bavaria for Belgium, and to neglect in consequence the interests of his Prussian Majesty." 3 8 This argument certainly had great weight, but Bonaparte's defeat of the Austrians at Lodi the next day, and the sudden possibility of a separate Franco-Austrian peace, were even more powerful arguments. A little gold dust, conveniently sprinkled about, may also have aided some of the Prussian ministers (Bischoffswerder, principally) to glide more easily from the side of Austria to that of France. 37 O n May 21, Prussia notified France that it "Abstract of the Minutes of the Congress of Hildesheim," n.d. (spring, 1796), Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 315. 82 T o Delacroix, April 17, 1796, Arch. N . , A F III 76, d. 315. Brunswick regarded it as a disgrace that Prussia stooped to negotiate . with the Directory (Hammond to Grenville, A u g . 17, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 64/41). 33 T o the Fr. gov't, July 8, 1796, Arch. N . , A F III 76, d. 315. 81

"Minutes of the Congress," Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 315. 88 "Note upon Cit. Kerner by the First Political Division of the Dep't of For. A f f . , " Arch. N . , A F III 625, d. 4432. " Q u o t e d in Guyot, Direc., p. 214. 87 Sybel, Europe, IV, 244. Bischoffswerder was the author of the Austro-Prussian alliance against France in the early days of the Revolution ( K . Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen 81

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN TREATY OF BERLIN, AUGUST 5 , 1 7 9 6

would agree to the double-treaty project.38 "I£ anyone is tempted to honor me for this success," wrote Caillard to Delacroix on May 24, "let him not forget that the cannon of Italy did three fourths of the work." 39 Part of the credit for the Prussian capitulation must also be granted to the seventy-twoyear-old Prince Henry, uncle of the King, who, according to Parandier, grew younger with each of Bonaparte's victories.40 The very day that the King consented to accept the double treaty (i.e., May 2 1 ) , the Austrians denounced the armistice, and Prussia was beside herself with fear that the war would be resumed before the neutrality line had been reëstablished. T o tempt France to honor the remnant of the old line, the King restricted it considerably. This would "leave France, as it desires, the necessary freedom for its army's movements," he wrote to Sandoz. 41 But before the Directory could have received this information and acted upon it, it had ordered General Jourdan to consider the neutrality line as "in a way . . . nonexistent." Jourdan's troops might cross the Prussian territories on the left bank of the Ruhr, and levy contributions in the southern portion of the Duchy of Westphalia. If his operations required him to pass through Hesse-Cassel, he should "not hesitate at all to do so, informing the Landgrave in a friendly and becoming manner of the necessity which causes [him] to act thus." Frankfort should be "treated as a declared enemy, and the Directory hopes you will make it repent for the perfidious conduct of which it was guilty last year with respect to the French Republic, and that you will make it pay dearly for the promptitude with which it decided to offer the freedom of the city to the Prince of Hohenlohe in compensation for his equivocal and perfidious conduct toward us. . ." 4 2 It will be recalled that the campaign of 1795 had allowed Clerfayt to possess himself of a substantial part of the left bank of the Rhine. The French plan of campaign for 1796 had, as its first aim, to lure Clerfayt's successor, bis zur Auflösung des alten Reiches [2 vols., Stuttgart, 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 1 1 ] , II, 14). A few remarks concerning Haugwitz must be made here. It is of course the custom to present gifts to negotiators of the opposing side. Such gifts involve no suspicion of bribery. But a peculiar fact must be noted in Haugwitz' case. The Decree of September 23, 1796, authorizing a gift of Sèvres porcelain worth 24,000 livres to Haugwitz, specified plainly that the gift was for signing the Treaty (Arch. N., A F I I I * 176, ff. 68-69), but Delacroix's letter to Haugwitz of September 26, praying Haugwitz to accept the gift, describes it as being in "appreciation . . . of Haugwitz' zeal in

hastening new conventions between France and princes in Germany" (Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 1 5 ) . Delacroix's apparent reluctance to touch upon a subject which should not have required delicate treatment, causes one to look back and note that the Directory, in rendering the above decree, had ordered that it should "not be printed at all." 88 Bailleu, Pr. Frk·, I, xxvi. 89 Ibid., p. 443. " S y b e l , Europe, IV, 242-243. "Instrucs. for Sandoz, May 23, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk·, I, 68. " D i r . to Jourdan, May 25, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, II, 476-477.

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Archduke Charles, onto the right bank by Jourdan's advance to the right bank himself; and as its second aim, to facilitate Moreau's crossing of the Rhine farther south by a diversion in the north. By virtue of its very boldness, the plan was bound to overawe Prussia, even if it ended in defeat — which it did. But the defeat occurred only on June 15 (at Wetzlar) and 18 (Uckerath), 4 3 and meanwhile the French had won a victory at Altenkirchen (June 4) which caused a change of heart on the part of Prussia. Far better to concert with the victor now, she thought, than to wait until additional successes had swollen his pride and his price. So Frederick William informed Caillard that he had decided to accept the cession of the left bank to France as the basis of the future treaty. 44 Caillard, beside himself with joy, forthwith opened negotiations with the Prussian ministers on the text of the secret articles. Caillard had good cause for joy. T h e moment was at hand when one of the principal powers of Germany would itself strike a blow at the integrity of the Empire — that principle which stretched like a ghostly hand over the conquered left bank to remind the conquering Republicans at every turn that they might have and hold — but that that did not give title. Indeed, France had held Metz and T o u l and Verdun for ninety-six years before the Empire would cede them. Republican France knew how to cut the Gordian knot. Prussia would abandon the integrity concept, the North German states would follow suit, then the smaller South German states, and soon the Emperor would stand virtually alone. Moreover, the principle of indemnification by secularization would hitch Prussia, perforce, to the French chariot, and make of her an ally who would help to crush the hated Austrians. A n d who had brought about this triumph of diplomacy, who had drawn from Prussia what Barthélémy had been unable to extract at Basel ? — W h y he, Caillard! My, to what heights might he not dare aspire after this signal service to his country! T h e government at Paris would surely blush to think that it had considered recalling him the preceding February. 45 A n d then there arrived in Berlin, like a bolt out of a blue sky, a despatch from Sandoz which spoilt all. Carnot had been dissatisfied with the way foreign affairs were being conducted. Whether his dissatisfaction stemmed from Delacroix's actual shortcomings or from his (Carnot's) hatred of the Director behind Delacroix's acts, is immaterial. W h a t is important is that when Carnot became president of the Directory toward the end of May, he decided to short"Bourdeau, Campagnes, I, 234-238. " G u y o t , Direc., p. 215. 45 Sandoz to the King, Feb. 11, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f.

125. On February 22, Sandoz reported that Caillard would be allowed to remain at Berlin (to the King, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 346, f. 138).

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Òli

circuit the regular diplomatic channels and engage Sandoz in direct and personal negotiations. This was very pleasing to Sandoz, who was extremely nervous regarding what might happen when hostilities recommenced, and he could hope for no encouragement from Delacroix. Sandoz demonstrated to Carnot by means of despatches received from his king that Prussia was contemplating nothing against Batavia. He explained that his king was very loath to commit himself regarding the future treaty, and that if the neutrality line were to be reconstituted before the fighting recommenced, there was not time anyway to discuss eventual indemnities. Sandoz asked for immediate restoration of the neutrality line. Now, Carnot had latterly relaxed his hostile attitude toward the line of demarcation asked by Prussia because the French plan of campaign for 1796 contemplated an invasion farther south than the area Prussia wanted to neutralize. He therefore offered, as president of the Directory, to engage the government not to invade Hesse, Westphalia, or Hanover, provided Prussia engaged not to use her demarcation army against Holland; and he agreed to defer the question of the left bank and indemnification therefor to the Franco-Imperial peace negotiations. But the neutrality arrangement would have to be tacit.46 " W e cannot consent in this war to a public convention regarding the line of neutrality," he declared. " W e cannot renounce the advantages of intimidating our enemies by causing them to fear invasion without being indemnified by other well-determined advantages. . . [However], we are able to make with him [i.e., the King of Prussia] the secret engagement not to undertake anything against northern Germany or against Hanover." 4 7 Sandoz saw Reubell, also, either the same day (May 30) or the next, or possibly the next after that. It was on the last-mentioned day (June 1) that Sandoz wrote to his court: "But can one and should one have full confidence in the verbal assurances of two members of the Directory in a matter of the importance of the Line of Demarcation? . . . I believe I can say that one can rely thereon implicidy, and I could not be accused of levity at my age." My reasons are the desire of the Directory for peace, which renders it [the Directory] anxious to remove all obstacles thereto; then the amity of France for Prussia, and hope for her [Prussia's] alliance; lastly, "everything attests that Reubell and Carnot alone compose the Directory," and these two members are neither false nor deceitful. "The verbal and tacit convention will dispense with the secret convention — a powerful consideration . . . which will serve, until the general peace, the interests and the amenities of your "Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, xxvi; H. Hiiffer, Europa im Zeitalter der französischen Revolution (3 vols., Bonn, 1868-1890), I (Oestreich und Preussen gegenüber der französischen Revolution bis zum Abschluss

des Friedens von Campo Formio), 306; Guyot, Diree., pp. 2 1 5 - 2 1 8 . " S a n d o z to the King, June 1 , 1796, Bailleu, Fr. Fr\., I, 72.

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Majesty vis-à-vis Russia and Austria." Sandoz remarked in conclusion, "I have no other difficulty at present than to cloak from the gaze of M . L a Croix my conference with Reubell and Carnot. H e is extremely jealous of his ministry. . ." 48 During the next few days, Sandoz spoke again with Reubell and Carnot (separately), and reported to his king: They repeated to me formally . . . that the French armies would respect the Line of Demarcation, Hanover included, during the period of the war, and that your Majesty could lend them your entire confidence. I have since conferred also with La Croix; he repeated to me the eternal argument that the signature of the neutrality convention had to be followed by that of the secret convention, and that reciprocity in politics was absolutely indispensable. I am perplexed how to let him know that Reubell and Carnot are in accord in postponing the secret convention until the general peace. . . Already embittered by the disfavor the Directory has manifested toward him, [he] would perhaps take it ill.49 Sandoz realized he would eventually have to tell Delacroix of his conversations with Reubell and Carnot, but when he started, Delacroix jumped at him with: "Caillard has given me good news; we will soon be in agreement on the subject of the secret convention." T h e same thing happened on June 9 and June 10, on which dates Delacroix manifested the greatest contentment with the near Franco-Prussian rapprochement. Sandoz was bewildered. H e did not know whether to congratulate or deny. 50 T h e Berlin Court learned on June 10 of the unexpected offers from Paris, and immediately broke off the pourparlers with Caillard. Caillard, in sight of his goal, was furious. 51 But the change of policy at Paris lasted only so long as Delacroix was held to one side. Once he returned to favor — which he presently did — he quickly led the Directors back to his system of a double treaty. 52 It was not long, therefore, before Reubell, in his conversations with Sandoz, turned again to the matter of the secret articles.53 A n d then this Director, probably to divert attention from the fact that he had concurred in Carnot's propositions, accused Carnot of giving out his own personal opinion as the pleasure of the Directory, and emphasized the collective character of the Directorial authority. 54 H e declared to Sandoz that a tacit convention would have been of value only in the absence of an express one, 48Idem,

June i , 1796, G. S. Arch., Frankreich 89, fase. 347. "Idem, June 5, 1796, G. S. Arch., Frankreich 89, fase. 347. 50Idem, June 11, 1796, G. S. Arch., Fran\reich 89, fase. 347. B1 Guyot, Direc., p. 218. 82 Sandoz to the King, June 30, Baiileu, Fr. Frk-, I, 76.

R XI R XI R XI

1796,

"Reubell promised, however, that the line of neutrality would be respected pending negotiation and signature of the secret convention concerning indemnities. Carnot gave a like promise (Sandoz to the King, June 25, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frank· reich 89, fase. 348). 84 Mém. Barras, II, 159.

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but that the arrangements for the secret convention were then too far advanced to be put off until another time.85 Sandoz spoke with Carnot about the change in Reubell's attitude. "I have only my own vote," Carnot replied/6 and thus washed his hands of the matter. Reubell asked Sandoz to urge his court to sign the secret treaty stipulating Prussia's indemnification.57 Sandoz complied. "My general conclusions," he wrote to Berlin on June 25, "are yet as in my previous despatch [June 20] — to supplicate your Majesty with entreaties of the purest zeal not to defer too long your secret and contingent arrangements with the French Republic." 68 Carnot, also, impressed upon Sandoz the necessity for Prussia's concluding her secret arrangements immediately, because — and he presented a motive likely to produce a deep effect — negotiations with Austria were about to take definite form.69 "Yes! there exist here pourparlers on the part of the Emperor, concealed with the most profound secrecy," reported Sandoz a few days later. "I cannot doubt it after what escaped La Croix ['s lips] yesterday morning. . . : 'Every time we have entered into negotiation with Vienna regarding the preliminaries of the peace, we have not neglected to inform [his Prussian Majesty] thereof; we notified him again a few days ago — that is to say, more than four weeks ago,' he added, with extreme embarrassment and confusion." Sandoz pretended that he had not noticed the indiscretion.60 Reference must have been to private insinuations of the Emperor's conference ministers, alluded to above. Slowness of the mails precludes the possibility that Delacroix was referring to Rosenberg's instructions for Degelmann of July 14. And of course Carnot's revelation preceded the fourteenth.61 The summer campaign of the Rhine armies had meanwhile opened, and was in full swing. On June 24, Moreau had crossed the Rhine and captured Kehl and Ofïenburg. On July 5, Rastatt had fallen. On July 9, the battle of Ettlingen had resulted — perhaps without sufficient cause but with a superfluity of effect — in the retreat of Archduke Charles to the Danube. Part of the Sambre and Meuse Army, already camped on the right bank of the Rhine south of Düsseldorf, had pushed south and crossed the Sieg on June 30; the remainder of the Sambre and Meuse Army had passed over the Rhine on the night of July 1-2. On the seventh, the united army under Jourdan had reached the Lahn. Wartensleben had tried to check him but " S a n d o z to the King, June 25, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. "Idem, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. 57 Guyot, Ό tree., p. 218. M G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348.

" S a n d o z to the King, July 1 2 , 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. 80 idem, July 15, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. β1 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, χ, § 3.

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had been beaten at Friedberg in Hesse (July 10), and had had to fall back to avoid being cut off from the Main River. 62 The states of South Germany were hastening to plead for peace with the conqueror. The Imperial cause, in the name of which Prussia had so long refused to yield on the left-bank question, appeared to be irretrievably lost. It seemed vain to Frederick William not to admit the facts and glean what profit he could from the situation.®3 On July n , therefore, he called in his Francophile uncle, Prince Henry, for advice.64 What that advice would be was a foregone conclusion. Frederick William promptly capitulated on the question of the secret treaty. He wrote to Sandoz that it was hardly to be supposed that the French would renounce the left bank under the circumstances, and that necessity thus required that his indemnity should be soon determined.65 The very next day Sandoz wrote to Berlin that the military successes had caused the Rhineboundary system to reassume its full vigor, and that both houses of the French legislature were favorably inclined thereto.66 The indemnities had already formed the subject of frequent conversations. On March 24, Delacroix, appropriating an idea of Parandier's, had declared to Sandoz that the Directory intended to offer Mecklenburg to Prussia, either to keep for itself or to give, together with the title of elector, to the Prince of Orange in indemnification for his losses.67 The King, desiring to play the role of protector and not of spoliator of the Empire, had rejected this suggestion with a scoff (April 8). He had not shown himself averse, however, to receiving the Bishopric of Münster. This, Caillard had opposed out of consideration for the Batavian Republic, which would thus have had a very powerful neighbor on almost its entire eastern frontier. France had then offered Prussia the Duchy of Westphalia, a dependency of the Ecclesiastical Electorate of Cologne, plus the Bishopric of Paderborn. Prussia had insisted on Münster. In the course of June, however, a compromise had been arranged — Prussia would obtain part of Münster, the remainder being reserved for the Batavian Republic. This was in contravention of Sieyes' plan to reject Prussia as far as possible from the frontiers of France. A mental reservation had, however, remedied the defect. Prussia would not be allowed to retain Münster; she would be obliged to cede it to the princes of Mecklenburg in return for their abandonment of Mecklenburg to Prussia.68 The proposed changes of territory, Delacroix assured Sandoz, were calculated to augment the influence of Prussia in the Empire, and to fortify the German Protestant party, of which the Hohenzollern king was the head.69 Sandoz "Bourdeau, Campagnes, I, 238-243. 63 Sybel, Europe, IV, 244. **Sciout, Direc., II, 24. 63 Bailleu, Pr. Fr%., I, 76, n. 1. ββ G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348.

"Sandoz to the King, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 60-61. "Bailleu, Pr. Fr\„ I, xxvi-xxviii. "Sandoz to the King, May 25, 1796, ibid., p. 7 1 .

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interposed that the moment had not yet arrived to speak of secularization; that to broach the subject at that time would cause all the princes of the Empire to rally around the Emperor. Delacroix did not agree. He declared that it would weaken the Catholic party, and he terminated his remarks with the interesting if none too relevant argument that "the military form of the French Republic draws it closer to the military government of Prussia." 70 3.

T H E T R E A T Y SIGNED

On July 16, the treaty was signed in the form of a preliminary by Haugwitz and Caillard. Before its ratification, Prussia, doubtless emboldened by the accord with France and the Emperor's predicament, marched his troops into Nuremberg, five bailiwicks of Bamberg, and several districts in Würzburg and Eichstädt. 71 The most important seizure was of course Nuremberg. Prussia was merely vindicating an old claim, said Frederick William. 72 France tried to conceal her vexation. Reubell accepted the annexation to assure ratification of the July 16 treaty. 73 Delacroix consoled himself with the thought that Austria would be displeased by the act.74 But Carnot was openly hostile and talked with Sandoz about the free wishes of the inhabitants, and the franchises and immunities of the cities.75 Not long after, Nuremberg, certainly to gain Prussia's protection against the exactions of the French army, supplicated Prussia for annexation, but Carnot was not pacified. "The incorporation should have been postponed to the general pacification," he said to Sandoz. 76 When one considers that the French government had only recently received a recommendation that Prussia should not be allowed to expand in Franconia (but should rather be asked to exchange Ansbach and Baireuth for Saxony's Lusatia), and that the jurisdiction of the free cities should be extended as nuclei of future republics,77 it is easy to guess what was in Carnot's mind. Prussia herself would not have been so bold had she known that her entente cordiale with France was built upon shifting sand. Approximately one week before the Prussians marched into the suburbs of Nuremberg, the Directors — all five of them — in answering certain questions on foreign m

Ibid„ p. 72. " E l g i n to Grenville, Aug. io, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 64/41. "Gallus, "Essay upon the Peace with Germany," Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 67. Vide also Sybel, Europe, IV, 245-246. " G u y o t , Diree., pp. 227-228. " S a n d o z to the King, Sept. 1 7 , 1796, Bailleu,

Pr. Fr\., I, 90. ldem, Sept. 4, 1796, ibid., p. 87 and n. 1. Idem, Sept. 17, 1796, ibid., p. 89. m "Analysis of a Dissertation upon a Question Relative to the New Limits of France," Aug. 30, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 265-266. m n

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policy presented by a memoir before them for consideration, decreed, " T o the (Bavaro-)Palatine House: Tuscany, Modena, Ferrara, Mantua, the Romagna, and Bologna; to Austria: Bavaria." 7 8 T h e Preliminaries of July 16 were transformed into the Treaty of Berlin by their ratification on August 5. T h e Treaty consisted of two parts: one patent; the other, secret. T h e patent part was a neutrality convention—a concession to Prussia intended to help counteract the warlike forces seeking to draw her into the Coalition. 79 A Line of Demarcation was drawn, which followed the seacoast from Holstein to the frontier of Holland, then ran along the Dutch frontier to Anholt, turned west to the Yssel to include the Prussian possessions around Zevenaar, then mounted the Rhine up to its junction with the Ruhr, mounted the Ruhr to its source, jumped to the Eder and descended it to its union with the Fulda, and then ascended the Fulda to its source. This was Article I. T h e second article was the same as Article II of the Convention of May 17, except that the states which desired to take advantage of the neutrality arrangement were required "really" to recall their contingents from the Emperor's army within three months from signature, if they had not already done so, and to give no pecuniary aid toward the prosecution of the war against France. Article III concerned the status of that portion of the County of Mark which lay on the left bank of the Ruhr. It was to be neutral because it belonged to neutral Prussia, but troops might cross it; however, they were neither to engage in combat nor to intrench themselves there. T h e fourth article provided that Prussian commissioners should supervise the passage of the French troops through Mark; that stern discipline should be maintained; and that the French should pay for whatever they consumed. By the terms of Article V I , the K i n g of Prussia guaranteed that no troops should cross the Demarcation Line to fight against France or the Batavian Republic. T o this end, an observation corps was to be established, and measures were to be concerted with the other states behind the Demarcation Line. 80 It is to be noted that Prussia did not pledge herself to attack Austria in case the latter state violated the neutrality line, as provided for in the third patent article of the French project. T h e first article of the secret portion of the Treaty provided that if the left bank should be ceded to France by the Empire, Prussia should be partially indemnified for the loss of her left-bank states — and of Zevenaar, which (though on the right bank of the Rhine) 8 1 should also be ceded to France — with part of the Bishopric of Münster and with Recklingshausen, and " J u l y 25, 1796, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 69-71. Authorship of the memoir is unknown. "Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, xxv. 80 De Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI,

56-58. "Zevenaar is located on the right bank of the Rhine, but in a strip of Prussian territory which was jutting into the Batavian Republic.

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619

that the remainder of the King's compensation should be determined by agreement with France; that Prussia should not oppose the Republic when the latter sought to secure the cession of the left bank by treaty, and that the K i n g should accept the principle that dispossessed left-bank secular rulers would be indemnified by means of secularization. T h e Batavian Republic should obtain the remainder of the Bishopric of Münster. By the terms of Article II, Secret, France accepted the mediation of the K i n g of Prussia in favor of those princes of the Empire w h o desired to treat immediately with the Republic on the basis of secularization and the cession of the left bank to France. By Article III, Secret, France and Prussia agreed to work together to procure suitable indemnities for the House of Hesse, and electoral status for Hesse-Cassel — if the left bank should be ceded to France and the principle of secularization adopted. By Article I V , Secret, the K i n g engaged himself "to conserve Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck in their integrity and independence." Article V , Secret, provided that if, at the future pacification, the House of Orange should not be reinstated in Holland, France and Prussia should employ their good offices to secure a satisfactory arrangement between the Batavian Republic and the Prince of Orange. T h e basis of this arrangement should be the renunciation of the stadholderate and of all the lands of the House of Orange in the United Provinces and its colonies. In return, the Dutch Republic should pay the Prince for his lands, and the French Republic should devote all its efforts to secure the to-be-secularized Bishoprics of W ü r z b u r g and Bamberg and the electoral dignity for the House of Orange — the Bishoprics to revert to Brandenberg in default of male heirs in the Orange line. 82 A s was the case with the Treaty of Basel, the Treaty of Berlin satisfied completely neither of the contracting parties. T h e Directory was discontented, in the first place, with the contingent nature of the arrangement and tried to tempt the K i n g to cede his left-bank provinces outright by offering him additional territory. Frederick William was willing to acquire more territory, but not at the expense of being the first to breach the Empire's integrity. 83 His conscience was uneasy already because of his past transgressions. T h e Directory was discontented, in the second place, because the astounding successes of its armies in July and early A u g u s t 8 4 had whetted its taste for territory, and the Treaty stipulated the Rhine frontier. Resolving not to be restricted by its own too-modest program, it demanded of Baden (vide infra) 88 — not without success — the cession of Kehl, fifty-five acres of De Martens, Traites Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 60-61. " G u y o t , Direc., p. 220. " F r a n c e had become the master of the Circles of the Upper Rhine, Franconia, 82

Swabia, and much of Bavaria. Saxony was menaced, and hence even Prussia. Vide the retrospective memoir of Haugwitz, Jan. 30, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 113. " C h a p , xiii, S 3.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

territory below the old bridge of Hüningen, and a towpath on the right bank. O n August 20, Carnot asked Sandoz for a roadway on the right bank, in order that France could erect fortifications 88 there. 87 W i t h such vast plans, it is easy to see that the simple Rhine frontier was almost beneath contempt. In the third place, the Treaty did not give France what she really desired: an active alliance with Prussia so as to be able to constrain Austria to an advantageous peace. Prussia admitted the possibility of alliance with the Republic, but only after the latter should have made peace with Europe. 88 That would be too late for France. A s mentioned above, Reubell thought to utilize the Frisching negotiation to frighten Prussia into alliance with France. 89 H e allowed the Prussians to guess what was going on at Basel, and rumors were soon rife that Prince Colloredo was on his way to Paris to treat for peace. Reubell wanted to shelve the negotiations with Austria until the Prussian alliance was a fact, so sent to Barthélémy, for transmission to Frisching, the note already cited declaring that the Directory could not treat with a person who hid himself and who might be disavowed, but that if frank, direct, and official proposals were made, the Directory would prove its desire for peace. Frank, direct, and official proposals never arrived, however; nor any other, either, for that matter — perhaps because the Baron of the W a r 9 0 suspected Reubell's intentions; perhaps because the military (and financial) situation was turning in Austria's favor. Catherine II of Russia had decided to send 60,000 men to aid against France, and T h u g u t had obtained advance knowledge that Hammond, undersecretary of state in the British Foreign Office, was on his way to Vienna to offer subsidies. 91 Prussia had no intention, however, of allying with France. O n August 3, two days before the Treaty was ratified, Alvensleben, in charge of the Prussian Foreign Office during the temporary absence of Finkenstein, assured Elgin, British envoy extraordinary at Berlin, that "no offensive or defensive alliance is in negotiation between this court and . . . Spain, France, [or] Holland." 92 These assurances were later repeated. Prussia wanted to M

The influence of Carnot's friend Garrau (Cmr A. I) may perhaps be seen in this demand of Carnot's. On July I, 1796, Garrau had written to the Director: "I am far from belonging to the faction of the [natural] limits: I am insistent upon the barrier of the Rhine, and, to guarantee that, I would want to occupy militarily, i.e., have garrisons in, Erebeinsthein [Ehrenbreitstein!], Cassel, Manheim [ w ] , and Kelh [mortally sic]" (Bonnal de Ganges, Repré., IV, 550).

Sandoz protested that such a cession would cast the petty princes of Germany into the arms of Austria, and refused (Sciout, Direc., II, 26). 88 Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, xxix. 88 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, x, § 3. " I . e., Thugut; called thus in parodistic reference to the Prince of the Peace, Godoy (Hiiffer, Europa, I, 216). 81 Guyot, Direc., pp. 227-228. " Elgin to Grenville, Aug. 3, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 64/41. 67

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN TREATY OF BERLIN, AUGUST 5, 1 7 9 6

621

use France's influence to advance her own ends. But she did not intend to fight France's battles for her, even though the enemy was a common enemy. However, though no alliance was agreed upon, Prussia had harnessed her chariot to the French steeds, for she had concurred with the despoiler of the Empire to despoil others of their lands in order to compensate herself, and to make something in addition, if possible. In so doing she had become the accomplice of the nation's enemy: a traitor. The ratification of the double Treaty of August 5, 1796, marks the highest point of Franco-Prussian accord since the Second Silesian War. The French held the secret articles of the Treaty so secret 93 that even Paris rumor supplied not the slightest clue that the prospective despoilers had come to an "understanding." 94 The same cannot be said of the Prussians. Out of fear that the Directory would inform the Czar of the agreement, they decided to do so themselves — for they could then give a rosy interpretation to their motives. The Czar communicated the text to Vienna and London in 1797, and the Times published it on August 27, 1799.95 But the French government had discovered long before then that the secret had not been kept, for in Talleyrand's report to the Directory of September 12, 1797, we find the phrase: "a contingent convention, the insignificance of which was betrayed . . . by compromising the mystery at Petersburg. . ." 96 " Vide Dir. to Jourdan, Dec. 21, 1798, Arch. N., AF III* 19. " O n August ι , it was rumored that Prussia would mediate peace at a congress in Basel (Aulard, Paris, III, 361); on September 7, that Prussia had declared war on the Emperor (ibid., p. 436). On September 21, the police reported much talk about peace

negotiations and of a treaty of alliance with Prussia (ibid., p. 466); and on September 30, talk about a "past treaty of offensive and defensive alliance" between France and Prussia (ibid., p. 487). x Guyot, Direc., p. 219, n. 3. " A r c h . A. E., Prusse 221, f. 381.

'S

CHAPTER

XII

Χ

P R I N C E H E N R Y OF P R U S S I A A N D T H E R E O R G A N I Z A T I O N OF T H E EMPIRE

I.

PLANS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE

M O R did not wait for the ratification of the Preliminaries of July 16 before starting to grind out "reports" as to what was to happen next, A modern writer has said that rumor has a certain value in that it tells what people would like to believe. 1 True, but also what they fear to believe. In this case, there must have been an admixture of feelings, for the rumor's purport was that the hoary Holy Roman Empire was about to be reorganized. W h a t consequences such a step might entail, whose toes might be trod upon in the process, was anybody's guess. O n July 19, Caillard reported to Paris that the Prussian Ministry was contemplating the renunciation of all Prussian territory west of the Weser River. T h o u g h there was no confirmation of this despatch from Prussian sources,2 Delacroix lent it full credence, and several months later was still pondering its possible implications. H e reasoned that it might signify that Prussia meant to appropriate everything between Brandenburg and the Weser, and though it was France that had been urging expansion upon Frederick William, such a thoroughgoing acceptance of her arguments could not but arouse some apprehension even at Paris. 3 Delacroix did not have only Caillard's despatch upon which to base his worries. Noël had reported from Frankfort on July 29 that Prussia was planning to take immediate possession of the Bishoprics of Münster and Paderborn, and of the Duchy of Westphalia. 4 Theremin voiced fears of another stamp. H e raised the question whether Prussia were not planning to possess herself some day of all the W . Westergaard, "A Danish Diplomat at the Court o£ Charles II," Pacific Historical Review, XI (1942), 4. ' Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, xxviii. l

"Delacroix to Caillard, Oct. 20, 1796, Arch, A. E., Prusse 220, f. 74. 1 To Delacroix, Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 315.

PRINCE HENRY AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE

623

region between the Elbe and the borders of Thuringia. There were two objections to that, he said: Prussia would be too powerful; Prussia would be too near. "It is in our interest," declared this former Prussian official, "that [Prussia] should not pass the Weser. . . The region between the Rhine and the Weser should be occupied by princes of the Empire at the disposal of the Republic." 5 While France was endeavoring to fathom the Hohenzollern designs, official Prussia was watching nervously the rampaging French armies. "My fear is that [their] unprecedented success . . . will reawaken the project of remolding the constitution of the Empire and of making a second Peace of Westphalia," Sandoz wrote to Frederick William on August 2.6 And his fears seemed confirmed indeed when, a fortnight later, Carnot told him that "this governmental chaos [the constitution of the Empire] has endured too long," that the territorial changes necessitated by the extension of France's boundaries to the Rhine would require the supersession of the Treaty of Westphalia by a new treaty which should serve in its turn as the basis for the constitution of the Empire.7 Plans for the future of Germany there were without number, some of them similar to Carnot's; others, not. One Citizen Anfrye, a judge, thought the Empire — aside from the left bank, which France should keep — should be partitioned between Prussia and Austria.8 Division between Prussia, Austria, and a league of princes under France's influence was recommended by one Citizen Gorgen. His argument ran as follows: It is important that France prevent the rise in Germany — ever — of a prince powerful enough to direct alone, by himself, the entire machine. It is important that this machine be complicated so that its actions should be slowed down, and that there be division so that there should not be concert.® CElsner, former contributor to Archenholtz' Minerva, in a series of newspaper articles and in a pamphlet published in the summer of 1796, betrayed much the same idea. Obviously with Prussia in mind, he warned that it was not in France's interest to permit the rise of a vast military power in Germany, adding: "It would be in vain for such a power to assure us that it was our natural "Memoir of Theremin, Sept. 1 3 , 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 315. ' Bailleu, Pr. FrkI, 84. The project had already been reawakened a half year before. It will be recalled that on February 9, 1796, Degelmann reported that Poteratz took delight in drawing a perfect analogy between the Thirty Years' War and the War of the First Coalition (vide supra, Pt. II, chap, vi, § 1 ) . T Sandoz to the King, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 85. In his "Plan of Pacification" {supra, Pt.

II, chap, ii, § 3 ) , Delacroix asserts that the War of the First Coalition annulled the Peace of Westphalia, so the field was clear for remolding the Empire on a new basis. 8 "Diplomatic Observations Relative to the General Peace," addressed to Dir., Nov. 27, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 388. "Dated germinal, V (March-April 1797), Arch. A. E., Allemagne 696, f. 85.

624

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

ally; it would cease to be such from the very moment that it could fight us on equal terms." Œlsner thought the Republic should prevent such a rise by organizing the small states of Germany into a league under French auspices.10 Delacroix suggested to Sandoz the erection of a great number of German principalities into independent republics to serve as a barrier between Austria and France; or, alternatively, that Baden and Württemberg be aggrandized to serve this end. 11 An anonymous writer wished to create ten or twelve grand duchies between Prussia, Austria, and France, bound into a loose confederation without an emperor, but with France as their protectress. Elements of disunion should be allowed to subsist, to prevent union of the grand duchies into a too-intimate whole. Along the Rhine, according to the same plan, there should be a second confederation of small states under the auspices of France. 32 Another writer favored the Empire as then constituted because its fundamental law rendered difficult the commencement and progress of a war; he did not regard secularization as fatal to the preservation of this advantage (but Austria's absorption of Bavaria, he did). 1 3 Secularization, and the favoring of Protestant princes in the process, were recommended by a "Project of Pacification and of a New Order of Things in Germany." "It is necessary," said its author, "to excite the religious frenzy of the Protestant people, and the ambition of the princes of this sect. Shrewd men should be sent to these princes, especially to Berlin, to follow this plan with tenacity." 14 Already mentioned have been Barthélemy's suggestion that the circles of the Empire form a confederation under Prussia's patronage, and Delacroix's offer to Prussia of France's aid in placing the Imperial crown upon the Hohenzollern brow. 15 These are but samples of what was a mania for reorganization. Everyone had his plan. But the individual whose plan the Directory was most likely to honor was Theremin, who served as the Directory's consultant in such matters. 16 What did he have to say? That the Republic was interested in the disappearance of all the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany, but did not wish to see secular possessions appropriated without compensation, for then Germany would become, by a series of usurpations, a kingdom under a single head. . . The invasion of the Imperial cities on the seaboard ought not to 10

J. Droz, L'Allemagne et la Révolution française (Paris, 1949), p. 76. On Œlsner, vide supra, Pt. I, chap, i, § 2m. "Sandoz to the King, Sept. 4, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk-, I, 87. M "Analysis of a Dissertation upon a Question Relative to the New Limits of France," Aug. 30, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne

673, fi. 265-266. "Memoir "Upon the Exchange or Dismemberment of Bavaria," n.d., Arch. A. E., Bavière 178, f. 188. " N . d . , Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 322. M Vide supra, Pt. Π, chap, iv, § 5. " S a n d o z to the King, Aug. 2, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk-, I, 84.

PRINCE HENRY AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE

625

be permitted, unless it were advantageous to the Republic that they should pass under the sway of powers strong enough to exclude the English. . . Perhaps it would be in the interest, either of the Republic or of Germany, that the Imperial dignity should be abolished, or that it should cease to be held for life, there being chosen instead at fixed intervals a Director of the Empire.17

2.

PRINCE HENRY'S MEMOIR OF JUNE IO, 1 7 9 6

Theremin was not the only person of Prussian birth who had a mania for the reorganization of the Empire. Prince Henry, uncle of the King of Prussia and brother of Frederick the Great of honored memory, was equally anxious to subvert Europe, to the gain of Prussia and the glory of France. Henry was a bitter enemy of Austria, and a friend and admirer of France. In his château at Rheinsberg he entertained Parandier, and — after the arrival of Caillard in October 1795 — Caillard. Henry ordinarily had very little influence upon affairs, for the young king was extremely fearful lest people should believe that his uncle was leading him. This jealousy on the part of the monarch rendered it extremely difficult for Caillard to maintain the close relations established with Henry upon his (Caillard's) arrival. He therefore visited the Prince less and less often, and the latter, displeased, made Parandier the depositary of his confidences and projects.18 On April 17, 1796, Henry declared to Parandier that the French government ought to have at Berlin "a minister of the first order who, by a firm attitude and vigorous declarations, would put an end to all intrigues, direct public opinion, and regulate the steps of the Prussian government." On another occasion, Henry, at that time in Berlin, tried to induce the King not to go to the waters at Pyrmont accompanied by "his clique of women and émigrés." The same day, Henry said to Prince Radziwill, "I hope Poland will be reëstablished, and that it will be by Prussia." Parandier retailed at length to Delacroix all this essentially unimportant gossip. The latter eventually tired of it, and informed Parandier that his letters were devoid of interest. Parandier, piqued, was silent for well-nigh a month. Then, on June 15, he wrote again, telling about another visit to Rheinsberg. Four days later he sent in a "Project of the Peace Which the French Republic Ought to Impose on Europe," of Prince Henry's composition. This masterpiece arrived at Paris precisely when the line of neutrality was being traced. Since it said not a word on that subject, Delacroix, very busy, gave it hardly more than passing notice. However, after Bonaparte's "Sept.

13, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d.

315· " T h e authority for this and the succeeding

two paragraphs is Tabournel In REH, pp.

11-27.

1908,

626

THF. DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

victories in Italy, the Treaty of August 5, and the death of Catherine II, the problem of the conditions of the approaching Franco-Austrian peace presented itself forcefully to France, and Delacroix's reports to the Directory are replete with Prince Henry's ideas. Through the channel of Delacroix, moreover, many of these ideas entered the Treaties of Leoben and CampoFormio. 1 9 If France desired possession of the left bank, the memoir declared, the Empire had no choice but to cede it. Indemnification for princes who were adversely affected by the transaction could be arranged only in a congress. A congress was necessary, moreover, to enable France to favor her friends by gifts of ecclesiastical territory. T o this congress should be admitted the ambassadors only of France, Prussia, and the Emperor. T h e electors, dukes, and landgraves ruling over large states should be permitted to send deputies. Russia and England should be allowed no delegates at all. T h e K i n g of Prussia should be represented both as king and as elector. T h e congress should be based on Franco-Austrian preliminaries and a Franco-Prussian alliance. T h e preliminaries should oblige Austria to renounce some of her provinces; to accept with resignation the aggrandizement of Prussia; and to agree to total secularization. If Austria accepted without resistance the Republic's terms, she should be promised indemnity for her losses. It was good policy, in any event, not to reduce a great power to despair, for it might prefer to risk a new campaign to signing its own death warrant. Also, Austria would, if adequately indemnified, itself find means to accelerate the peace. T h e need of France for Prussia's alliance to thwart the intrigues of Russia, Austria, and England should determine the amount of indemnity to be accorded for Clèves, Gelderland, and Meurs. T h e alliance of France and Prussia should be negotiated as soon as the Franco-Austrian parleys appeared to be drawing to a close, but its signature should be postponed until after the peace of the Empire. If the alliance was signed, it should at least be kept secret in order that Prussia should not appear biased at the Franco-Imperial negotiations. "Its [Prussia's] complete intimacy with France, if it were known, would alienate from her the princes of the Empire." T h e alliance having been agreed upon, France and Prussia should arrange the latter's indemnity, also in secret. This indemnity should be such as to enable Prussia to employ all her efforts against Russia without having to worry about an attack from Austria. In other words, Prussia should obtain " C f . Syfoel: "If the treaties with Wiirttemberg and Baden [vide next chapter] prepared the Confederation of the Rhine, those

of Leoben and of Campo-Formio are already in large part indicated in this memoir" (Europe, IV, 244).

PRINCE HENRY AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE

the part of Bohemia between the Elbe and the Saxon frontier. This cession would be more important from a strategic point of view than as an increase of territory. However, such an indemnity would be possible only if Austria were crushed as completely as was Sardinia. Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz would also make suitable indemnities for Prussia, but since their owners had given no provocation for dispossessing them, the ruler of the first could be given Hanover, and of the latter, Lüneburg. Both these princes would thus become friends of France and of Prussia. Moreover, to divest George III of Hanover would deprive him of the opportunity of hiring troops from the petty princes of Germany. To replace the three ecclesiastical electorates destroyed by the cession of the left bank to France, three new electorates should be created — out of the Landgraviate of Hesse, aggrandized with the Bishopric of Fulda; out of the Duchy of Württemberg, aggrandized with the Bishopric of Freisingen; and out of the Duchy of Brunswick, aggrandized with the Bishopric of Hildesheim (on condition of a promise by its duke to be forever faithful to France). This arrangement would offer two advantages. Three Catholic electors would be replaced by Protestants; and "the old Germanic colossus would still remain [as a buffer] between France and the Powers of the North." The coadjutor of Mayence, Báron Dalberg, because of his kindliness and enlightenment, should be singled out from the other ecclesiastical princes, and given some secular principality to rule. However, he should be obliged first to renounce his holy orders. The process of secularization offered several advantages to the Republic. The princes favored by grants of land would feel indebted to France; it would be possible to indemnify, to the extent desired, those princes whom the Republic wished to attach to its interests; and the influence of Austria over the Empire, born of her connection with the ecclesiastical electors, would be destroyed. If the ecclesiastical princes of Germany played upon the religious instincts of the people to hinder secularization, France, being master of Italy, could exact from the Pope, as the price of the Republic's protection, a brief forbidding all temporal possessions to ecclesiastics as incompatible with their spiritual jurisdiction.20 Such was the memoir of Prince Henry, which Parandier forwarded to Paris. There were certain ideas of the Prince, however, which reached the French capital through other channels, and have been wrongly declared by historians to form part of this important memoir. Such is the suggestion that, in the conclusion of peace, France should distinguish between Austria and the Empire, and grant only preliminary and provisional conditions to the " J u n e i o , 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 315.

628

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

former, while the peace of the latter should be made by a congress in such city, and with such powers, as pleased the French Republic. This was the system followed by Bonaparte at Leoben. 21 Toward the end of June, Henry, in two conferences with Caillard, suggested the division of all ecclesiastical territory — after the desires of Prussia and Austria had been satisfied — between the four Houses of Saxony, Cassel, Württemberg, and the Palatinate. 22 There is, in the Archives Nationales, an undated extract of a memoir addressed by Henry to the King. T h e memoir may possibly belong to a slightly later period, but the subject matter is connected with no particular epoch. T h e extract reads as follows : They [the French] are depicted [by some persons] as desirous of republicantzing23 everything, as being the enemies of all governments; all governments, therefore, ought to unite against them. Without stopping to refute this assertion in detail, we shall say that the Rhine is a sufficient barrier to the advance of France. It has always been the bulwark of Germany; there its force concentrates; there weakens that of its enemy. The French cannot desire anything beyond it. As to their scheme for a republic, could they not see that Germany as a republic would be more dangerous to them than Germany divided, parcelled out between so many princes; have they not the proofs, so advantageous to them, of the resources of a republic? And would they wish to give these resources to so bellicose a people, who would soon become their enemy? 24 Such sentiments — and the actual services of Henry in promoting the Treaties of Basel and Berlin 2 5 — naturally endeared the Prince to the Directory, and he was consequently laden with gifts by the poverty-stricken Republic. A decree of September 23, 1796, provided that there should be proffered him "a pattern of the arms of the manufactory of Versailles, costing between 1,500 and 2,000 francs." 2 8 Six days later, the present was on its way to Paris, to be sent from there to Prussia. Boutet, Artistic Director of the Luxury Arms Factory, described the gift as follows: " A couple of richly trimmed fighting pistols of chiseled steel, the wood adorned with basreliefs, and the barrels inlaid with gold, the said pistols in a mahogany box trimmed with double-gilded, chiseled bronze." 2 7 Pistols were a rather appropriate gift for one w h o found his chief delight in advocating alliance with France, for such an alliance would be certain to draw Prussia into the Parandier to Delacroix, June 15, 1796, Arch. N., A'F III 76, d. 315. Sybel, Europe, IV, 243, erroneously declares this to be part of the memoir, and other historians have followed him. " Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 317. ** Underscored in the original. 24 Arch. N., A F ΠΙ 76, d. 316. 11

Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, viii, § ia; Pt. II, chap, xi, § 2. M Arch. N., A F III * 176, f. 68. A decree of December 8, 1798, authorized the minister of foreign affairs to pay 3,000 francs for the gift (Arch. N. AF III* 177, f. 220). "Boutet to Delacroix, Sept. 29, 1796, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 28. 25

PRINCE HENRY AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE

629

war against Austria. However, the Directory also lavished books upon Henry — by the dozen copies of each! 2 8 The Directory did not wish to appear niggardly toward a faithful servitor. 3.

PARANDIER'S "REGARDING THE BARRIER OF THE REPUBLIC"

Parandier's sole function was not to receive Henry's ideas and memoirs. He had been commissioned by the Convention to stir up an insurrection in Poland, 29 and was still intriguing to this end under the Directory. He maintained correspondents in Warsaw, Danzig, and many other cities in the north of Europe, and compiled their reports into bulletins which were sent to Paris along with Caillard's despatches.30 Parandier enjoyed the full confidence of Delacroix though he was not of ambassadorial rank. 31 During the fourth year of the Republic (the document to be discussed here is not dated with greater precision), Parandier sent in to Delacroix some of his reflections "Regarding the Barrier of the Republic against Austria in Germany and in Italy": 3 2 The greatest danger of the Anglo-Austrian alliance to France, he said, was that, by putting France between two fires, it compelled her to engage simultaneously in land and sea warfare. The best means of insuring peace for France was to remove Austria from her frontiers, thus annulling the effect of the alliance. Such a measure was all the more urgent since there was no hope for a sincere Franco-Austrian rapprochement. The Habsburgs would never pardon the proscription of the French Bourbons, to whom they were united by marriage. Austria would never forgive France for invading Belgium and the Empire, 33 nor would she ever reconcile herself to France's playing a dominant role in Germany and in Italy. Austria was despotic and France was republican. The Republic was not able to offer the Habsburgs any indemnities for their losses; if they were offered Bavaria, they could retort that they did not need France to obtain that. The conclusion drawn by Parandier was that, when France and Austria treated for peace, the Austrians should be regarded as permanent enemies. A strong buffer state should be set up on the right bank to serve as a bulwark for the Republic against Austria. This buffer could be formed by uniting the ecclesiastical states of Swabia with the Bavaro-Palatine territories. And the 29

Decree of Sept. 28, 1796, Arch. N., AF III * 176, ff. 72-73. These books were Diderot's Jacques le fataliste, La Religieuse, and Le Salon (Arch. Ν., AF III « 176, ff. 72-73). "Sciout, Direc., Π, 20, η. 3. *°Guyot, Direc., p. 85 and n. 1. "Tabournel in REH, 1908, p. 12. " T h i s document is not signed. The present

writer has determined its authorship by comparison of handwritings. The same is true of what Delacroix wrote without signature at the top: "Remove Austria from the frontiers of the Republic, and fortify against it the Palatine House. Deprive it [Austria] of Modena and the Milanese." 83 Belgium was of course part of the Empire, but thus did Parandier write.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

D u k e of W ü r t t e m b e r g could be strengthened at the expense of the C h u r c h . "It would, moreover, be possible for the Republic — everything is possible for it today because of the terror w h i c h its successes have spread a m o n g its enemies — to f o r m a League of the Rhine, proposed already before." 3 4 Parandier, like Sieyes, believed in rejecting Austria to a distance f r o m France's frontiers. M

Arch. A. E., Autriche 365, f. 252. A confederation of the Rhine under the auspices of France was proposed also by an anonymous dissertation upon the future boundaries of France, dated August 30, 1796.

The dissertation asserted that federations have just the proper amount of inertia to serve as barriers, and pointed to the example of Switzerland (Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 265).

"a

CHAPTER XIII

X

S U B S I S T E N C E - P E A C E IN S O U T H WESTERN GERMANY

I.

T H E FRANCO-WÜRTTEMBERGER TREATY OF AUGUST 7 ,

I796

!E signature of the Armistice of July 17 between France and Wurt· JL temberg 1 came none too soon. It was k n o w n in Stuttgart only two hours before the French arrived in the city. A b e l and W ö h l w a r t h were already on their way to Paris to conclude the definitive treaty provided for in the Armistice. 2 Speed seemed the only key to Wiirttemberg's salvation. T h e Paris conferences commenced on July 29. Delacroix's instructions, inspired by Reubell, provided that he should secure the Rhine as a boundary, the secularization of a sufficient number of ecclesiastical states to indemnify left-bank secular princes, and the renunciation of all claims against France for causes anterior to the treaty. T h e D u k e of Württemberg, in 1789, was the reigning sovereign of six small parcels of land on the left bank of the Rhine, the most important of which were Montbéliard, near the bend in the Upper Rhine; and the Upper Alsatian principalities of Horburg, Ostheim, and Reichenweier. These, Delacroix was to demand. H e was also to require that the D u k e support France's efforts to secure the entire left bank of the Rhine when the subject of boundaries should come up in the future negotiations with the Empire. A n d in order that the proposed separate peace with Württemberg should not deprive France's armies of any of their freedom of movement, the D u k e was to authorize the passage of French troops through his duchy. But the quid pro quo offered Friedrich E u g e n reflected the military situation. H e had been defeated, and the secularizations agreed upon for h i m were quite limited in s c o p e — a f e w crumbs in return for a loaf. T o boot, on July 30, Delacroix was ordered to exact a contribution of 300,000 francs per month, and the occupation of a fortress. T h e first demand was for just one fortress; 1

Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, ix, § 2.

" Kliipfel in HZ, XLVI,

391.

632

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

boldness was to come later. In return, Delacroix was to pledge France's aid in securing the electoral cap for the Duke. This offer was intended as a favor not only to Friedrich Eugen, but to France, for the D u k e would owe his increased importance to the Republic and hence find it to his interest to promote the Republic's power. It was thought possible at first to oblige Württemberg to agree to make war upon Austria should Habsburg troops enter upon Wiirttemberg's territory; but the effort was dropped when resistance proved too strong. Wöhlwarth and Abel succeeded also in securing a reduction by one third in the monthly contribution demanded. 3 T h e treaty was signed on August 7. Its second article should be noted carefully. N o t only did it provide for the withdrawal of Württemberg from the Coalition, as had been required of Hesse-Cassel, but it declared that in the future, the D u k e should furnish to no power at war with the Republic any contingent or aid in any form, "even when required of him as a member of the German Empire." This article constituted the first step toward the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire, which actually took place in 1806. Article III was intended to promote the process of extinction. It provided that French troops might pass freely through Württemberg, sojourn there at will, and occupy all military posts necessary to their operations. This provision tore a huge gap in the Imperial defense system; by Imperial law it was the troops of the Empire which had the right, in an Imperial war, to garrison any strong point within the limits of the Empire. By virtue of succeeding articles, French products were granted liberty of transit and storage in Württemberg, and French wagoners most-favored-nation treatment in the payment of tolls (Article V I ) ; and the D u k e renounced Montbéliard and his other left-bank possessions in favor of the French Republic (Article I V ) . T h e first secret article committed France to insist, in the peace negotiations with the Empire, upon the secularization, and cession to Württemberg, of the Abbey of Zweifalten, and of Oberkirchen and Ellwangen. Article III bound the D u k e to support, before the Diet of the Empire, the cession to France of the entire left bank of the Rhine, and of the islands and course of the River; 4 and the principle of indemnification of left-bank secular princes by secularization. Articles I V and V practically repeated Articles II and III of the patent treaty, thus revealing the importance attached to them by the Directory. These were the articles which provided for Württemberg's neutrality in all future wars involving France, and French occupation of Würt" Guyot, Direc., pp. 222-223. 4 It is a custom dating from the hoary past that when a river marks the boundary line between nations, it is the center of the

principal navigable channel which is the boundary. Each nation therefore receives, in general, half the waters and half the islands of the river.

SUBSISTENCE-PEACE IN SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY

633

temberg's strong points. According to Article V I , all persons imprisoned by the D u k e for their political opinions, or prosecuted therefor, should be immediately set free; all legal processes instituted against them and all sequestrations or confiscations of their property should be set aside, or, if the said property had been sold, indemnification should be accorded them. Such persons, moreover, should be allowed free ingress, egress, and sojourn in Württemberg. This was practically a declaration of open season for all interested in hunting down the D u k e and the social and political system which he represented. That he should have been required to tolerate the forces bent upon his own spoliation must assuredly have shaken his faith in France's desire to preserve the strength of his house by secularization or otherwise. By Article VII, it was expressly agreed that all civil disputes between French citizens in Württemberg should be decided by the diplomatic agents of the French Republic. French law was the only enlightened system, and Frenchmen abroad were entitled to its benefits. Article X provided that the contributions stipulated in the Armistice of July 17 should be acquitted in their entirety, and that there should be paid, in addition, a contribution of 200,000 livres per month, commencing with the Year V (September 22, 1796), and continuing until the signature of preliminaries of peace with Austria. 5 These conditions reduced Württemberg to virtual vassalage to France. T h e French could come and go through Württemberg, could agitate against its government, could collect staggering contributions, could exercise the rights of extraterritoriality in civil disputes, could oblige Württemberg to violate its Imperial obligations, , could retain part of Württemberg's territory — and what was Württemberg to receive in return ? Some insignificant bits of territory belonging to its neighbors. Were this an earnest of Republican policy toward the small states of Germany, hope for a durable peace would have been sufficiently slim. Unfortunately, it was but a mild sample of what was to come.

2.

T H E FRANCO-FRANCONIAN ARMISTICE OF AUGUST 7 ,

I796

While Moreau was invading Swabia, Jourdan plunged into Franconia. Shortly before the latter's troops arrived, a man in tatters made the rounds in Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen's little principality, asking questions about livestock, agriculture, the prosperity of the inhabitants, and the like. T h e answers — and there were answers, for the German farmer is not particularly shrewd — were jotted down in a notebook. In leaving, the ragged one ' D e Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 267-272.

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revealed a bulging money-belt.® T h e same thing occurred elsewhere, and in one instance the inquiring reporter was captured — but escaped.7 T h e foregoing account, related by a participant in the drama of Franconia in 1796, is a necessary introduction to what follows. A s the French armies progressed, living off the country, Jourdan published a proclamation. H e had no desire to inflict the wounds of war upon the peaceful inhabitants of Germany, he said. His quarrel was only with their sovereign, whose "callous heart nothing can move," "so, blood must continue to flow." But Germany need never fear that France will inflict on it the outrages that were inflicted upon France when she was the battlefield. "Your property will not be devastated. Y o u will not see your houses go up in flames. Stay with your flocks, take no part in military events, and you can rest assured that you will find protection with all heads of the army. I so command it." T h e n Jourdan descended to details. If an inhabitant attempted to flee with his goods and cattle, he would be arrested, and his property confiscated. If he remained at home, unarmed, he would not be disturbed. N o French soldier would be allowed to plunder or abuse the inhabitants. It was to be war as the gods would play it. 8 T h e deputies of the Franconian Circle were not deceived. T h e y knew the French had not yet sprouted wings, and they sought out Jourdan's chief of staff, Ernouf, to ask for an armistice. It was accorded. 9 T h e keynote of the agreement is sounded in a letter from Ernouf to Gleichen, 10 secret agent of France in Germany. These two men it was w h o negotiated the armistice for France. Wrote Ernouf: " T h e deputies [of Franconia] must give me a statement, before we conclude, of the resources for the army which can be drawn from their country, as well in coin and clothing as in provisions. That is the point in which the General in Chief is most interested." 1 1 T h e armistice was signed on August 7, the same day that Württemberg " T h e Directory had intended to let its troops levy contributions in HohenloheIngelfingen's estates, for Hohenlohe was known to be inimical to France and to favor Prussia's reentry into the Coalition (Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, x x v ) , but the cordiality of Franco-Prussian relations caused the Directory to reverse its intentions on August 15, 1796 (Dir. to Jourdan, Debidour, Recueil, III, 377, note). 'Soden, Vranz'n Franken, pp. 187-188. 8 "Der General en Chef der französischen Sambre- und Maasarmee an die Bewohner des rechten Rheinufers," June 29, 1796, ibid., pp. 34-38. "Gleichen to Delacroix, Aug. 9, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 204.

10 Pseudonym

u

for Philippe Reibelt, or Reibeld, or Reibett, or Reibell — a citizen of the département of Mont-Terrible, commissioned by the Directory on March 3, 1796, to go on a secret mission to the north of Europe. He traversed Switzerland, established himself in Munich, and made excursions to neighboring cities — Ratisbon, Augsburg, Nuremberg (Report to Talleyrand on Cit. Reibett, by the general secretariat of Min. of For. Aff., Arch. N., A F III 625, d. 4432 [The report might have added that Gleichen's French was atrocious; e.g., on n'attend emerges as on n'atand]). A u g . 3, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 182.

SUBSISTENCE-PEACE IN SOUTHWESTERN GERMANY

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concluded its separate peace with France. T h e first article guaranteed respect for persons, property, religion, laws, and customs; and the second authorized every. Franconian to arrest, or cause the arrest of, French soldiers found plundering or committing other excesses. Articles I V and VIII required Franconia to turn over to France 2,000 horses and 8,000,000 livres in coin, or 6,000,000 in coin and 2,000,000 in kind. T h e value of any supplies furnished the army was to be deducted from the 8,000,000, except the quarters of the troops, which should be free (Article I X ) . Franconian territories owned by Prussia and Hesse-Cassel should be exempt from any charges (Article X I I ) . 1 2 T h e Franconians heaved a sigh of relief when this agreement was signed, for though the conditions were rigorous, they were at least definite, and, considering the terms imposed upon the Swabian Circle, even magnanimous. Moreover, Article I had guaranteed them — at least so they thought — against the possibility of revolutionization. H o w vain were their hopes will soon be seen. T h e day after the Armistice was signed, Ernouf appointed Gleichen to supervise the apportionment of the contributions 13 "so that it should be done in accord with French principles," 1 4 which meant so that the poor should not have to pay, while the wealthy, nobles, and ecclesiastics would be taxed ruinously. 16 Gleichen, in announcing his appointment to Delacroix, made the significant statement: "It is true that it is also a question, and even a more important one, of preparations for a new order of things in Franconia, Swabia, the remainder of the Circle of the [Upper] Rhine, and perhaps also in Bavaria — which everyone is loudly demanding." 1 6 A very few days after the signature of the Armistice, the Franconians were agonized to hear that the instrument had been annulled by General in Chief Jourdan. It was apparently in violation of previous orders of the government, for on August 12, the Directory wrote to the General: " W e shall here recall to you our intentions. Your first object should be to impose heavy contributions on Würzburg, Bamberg, and Nuremberg." 1 7 Heavy contributions Jourdan thereupon imposed, not only upon these three cities and their districts, but upon every town and district of the Circle — contributions far beyond the ability of the inhabitants to p a y ; 1 8 yet hostages were taken and sent to France to assure their acquittal. 19 " D e Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 290-292. ω Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 200. "Gleichen to Delacroix, Aug. 9, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, £. 204. "Debidour, Recueil, III, 626. " A r c h . A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 204. " Debidour, Recueil, III, 339.

Sometimes they were also physically impossible of acquittal, as when Nuremberg was asked for six times as many shoes as she had hides out of which they could be made (Soden, Franz'η Franken, p. 182). 19 Ibid., p. 187; Debidour, Recueil, IV, 432, 18

565.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Nuremberg was assessed 2,500,000 livres in coin, 300 horses, 50,000 pairs of shoes, 10,000 pairs of boots, 50,000 shirts, and 50,000 pairs of gaiters. 20 W ü r z b u r g was taxed exactly twice as heavily. Of Bamberg were demanded 4,000,000 livres in coin, 400 horses, 100,000 pairs of shoes, 10,000 pairs of boots, 100,000 shirts, and 50,000 pairs of gaiters. 21 Schweinfurt, a little city then of less than 5,000 inhabitants, and including in its district only a few neighboring towns, was assessed 500,000 livres in coin, 400 cwt. of beef on the hoof, 1,000 cwt. of hay, 90,000 lb. of bread, 10,000 pints of wine, 6,000 lb. of salt, 8,000 pairs of shoes, and wood and straw as needed. 22 T h e unrealistic character of these figures is apparent at a glance. General Clarke, Director of the French government's Historical and Military Topographical Bureau, 23 transmitted to Delacroix on September 1 a list (compiled by Joubert) of the requisitions made by Jourdan in Franconia. This list shows that the General by that date had obtained 6,000,000 francs in coin, 2,000,000 in provisions, and 1,000,000 in horses, and was demanding a further 6,000,000 in coin and 1,275,000 in provisions — in all, 16,275,000, against the 8,000,000 stipulated in the Armistice. 24 Such was the administration of the army, however, that in the midst of all this opulence, the troops often suffered actual deprivation except with respect to what the men themselves seized from the inhabitants, or received in the homes where they were quartered. T h e Administrations, and the Commissioners of the government, however, always had the best of everything in ample quantities, 25 and a " A l s o 300,000 lb. of bread; 5,000 cwt. of hay, and like amounts of oats, straw, and meat; and 25,000 pints of brandy (Soden, Franz'η Franken, pp. 179-180). There are two errors in Soden's account re Nuremberg: the monetary contribution was 2,500,000, not 250,000; that part of Nuremberg which Prussia had seized early in August, in vindication of an old claim, was not exempt from contributions (Dir. to Jourdan, Aug. 12, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 339). In fact, Prussia assured France that her occupation would have no effect upon the contributions remaining unpaid. Carnot had expressed the "embarrassment of the Directory" concerning this point (Sandoz to the King, Sept. 17, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk; I, 90). " A r c h . A . E., Allemagne 673, ff. 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 . Marshal Soult tells a little anecdote about the Bamberger contributions. After the French had collected part of the contribution in coin, the Austrians suddenly recaptured the city, and the people apprized

them that the French quartermaster had much money on hand. A squad of twenty hussars invested the house where the Frenchman was staying. T h e quartermaster filled a basket with coins, emerged, and divided the coins among the hussars. Dazzled by their good fortune, they never thought of determining whether there was yet more. Soon after, the French retook Bamberg, and the quartermaster turned over to the army treasury 400,000 crowns. He had lost only 1,000 (Mém. Soult, I, 3 " . n· 1 ) · " S o d e n , Franz'n Franken, pp. 178-179. 23 Vide infra, chap, xx, n. 8 for a detailed sketch of Clarke's life and career. Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 286. * Pascal-Vallongue (major of engineers) "Coup d'œil sur l'armée de Rhin-et-Moselle, sur les abus qui l'énervent et sur quelques moyens de lui redonner de l'énergie," March—April 1796, Bourdeau, Armées Rhin Direc., Documents annexes, B: Correspondance privée, pp. 374-378. 21

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fierce hatred developed between the men who walked hand in hand with Barras and those who walked hand in hand with Death. 26 It may be noted here for future reference that the letter from Joubert to Delacroix which described the requisitions laid on Nuremberg, Würzburg, and Bamberg contained also the following: "I have charged the Commissioner of Wars sent to Nuremberg to take all the precautions necessary to prevent the removal of the manuscripts, books, pictures, and other precious objects which may yet be in this city, while awaiting the savants and artists, for whom I have asked, to arrive and make a choice." 27 Franconia did not tamely submit to Jourdan's annulment of a legally concluded agreement. Zwanziger and Rhodius, two deputies of the Circle who had signed the Armistice of August 7, remitted to Delacroix a memoir appealing to the justice of the French nation, and protesting against the levying of contributions far beyond the capacity of Franconia to pay. 28 Jourdan's excuse for annulling the agreement — because it had been published by the Franconians before Ernouf had had time to submit it to Paris or to Joubert 29 — was a mere pretext, for no provision for ratification had been embodied in the agreement. Moreover, the payment of the first million was to be effected within ten days after the signature, and the entire sum within forty-five days. Haste was therefore necessary, so the population was immediately informed of the agreement through the press, and invited to furnish the necessary funds. 30 T h e Directory felt itself obliged, for honor's sake, to annul Jourdan's annulment of the Franconian armistice (September 6). 3 1 However, it approved of Jourdan's measures to obtain more money from the Circle, and so annulled in practice its own annulment of the annulment. While decreeing that the Armistice should stand, it provided that the Franconian deputies should be given a duplicate of the Decree of September 6 only after they had remitted to the French government a signed statement that they "never had regarded the arrangement concluded with General Ernouf . . . as anything but provisional." 32 T h e same day (September 6), the Directory ordered Delacroix to treat with the Franconian Circle for the delivery to France of additional contributions in coin and in kind, supplementary to those stipulated in the "provisional" arrangement of August 7· 33 T h e French governSoden, Franz'n Franken, p. 189. Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 . 28 Aug. 31, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 267. s D c Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 292-293. " R h o d i u s and Zwanziger to Delacroix, undated (probably September 1796), Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 243. M

27

Extract from the Register of the Deliberations of the Executive Directory of 20 fructidor, IV (Sept. 6, 1796), Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 289-290. 82 Dir. to Delacroix, Sept. 6, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 291. " D e Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 293. From Art. 4 of a Directorial decree of Sept. 6, 1796. 81

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

ment declared, however, that neither supplementary nor any other kind of contributions were to be paid by the Franconian possessions of states at peace with France (viz., Prussia and Hesse-Cassel) ,34 It should be noted in passing that the Directory, in order to leave the field free for its own supplementary contributions, annulled Jourdan's order for the levying of contributions in Nuremberg, Würzburg, Bamberg, and Schweinfurt, and provided that what had already been collected should be reckoned to the account of the sums due according to the Armistice. 35 T h e supplementary contributions which the Directory had in mind were: 6,000,000 francs, "at least," in coin, besides the 6,000,000 of the Armistice; 20,000 pairs of boots, 100,000 pairs of shoes, and 100,000 shirts, to be reckoned as part of the 2,000,000 francs' worth of supplies stipulated in the Armistice; then another 20,000 pairs of boots, an additional 150,000 pairs of shoes and 150,000 shirts; also, 200,000 pairs of gaiters. 36 O n September 7, 1796, Delacroix was authorized to treat with Rhodius and Zwanziger, w h o were then at Paris, "regarding the contributions imposed upon almost all of the states of this [i.e., the Franconian] circle." 3 7 A preliminary agreement was made two days later, whereby an additional 4,000,000 francs in coin was to be paid to France, plus 20,000 pairs of boots, 150,000 pairs of shoes, 250,000 pairs of gaiters, and 150,000 shirts. In signing this convention, Rhodius and Zwanziger appealed to the "generosity" and "justice" of the French government to deduct 2,000,000 francs from the coin payments. O n September 11, the Directory, by vote of Revellière-Lépeaux, Barras, and Reubell, yielded to this request. 38 T h e definitive convention was concluded on September 14 and signed by Delacroix, with the authorization of the Directory, two days later.39 T h e preamble declared that the agreement was the result of Franconia's desire for neutrality. T h e first article repeated, essentially, the corresponding article of the Armistice of August 7 (respect of persons, property, laws, etc.). T h e fourth article was formed by the contributions convention concluded on September 9, and modified on the eleventh; a reduction from 250,000 to 50,000 in the number of pairs of gaiters demanded is the only change to be noted. Article V provided for the delivery of 2,000 cavalry horses 40 to France. "Except that Prussia's new Nuremberg territory was not to be exempt — a fact already mentioned. The reason which the Directory alleged for this exception was that the territory was in the middle of the conquered region (Dir. to Jourdan, Aug. 12, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 339). The real reason was probably that the Directory was angry with Prussia for seizing the region without previous concert with France.

" A r t s . 3 and 4 of the Decree of Sept. 6, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 289. " D i r . to Delacroix, Sept. 6, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 291. " A r c h . Ν., A F III 401, d. 2159. " S e p t . 9, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 300. 89 Dir. to Delacroix, Sept. 16, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 310. " I n Delacroix's report of February 1, 1797, to the Directory, the Minister erroneously

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The remaining articles except the last also dealt with contributions, which were to be paid by the right-bank portion of the Circle only, and states at peace with France were to pay no part thereof (Articles V I , V I I ) . The contributions collected by Jourdan were to be applied to the account of the sums due under the new arrangement (Article I X ) . Article X I I I specified that everything furnished to the French army, except quarters, was to be deducted from the contributions required. According to the fourteenth and last article, a French diplomatic agent was to be despatched immediately to Franconia to watch over the interests of the Republic. 41 A n attempt was made by one Haussmann, a Nuremberg deputy then in Paris, to have France supervise the levying of these contributions so that "friends of France might be rewarded, enemies punished, and neutrals humored," 4 2 but the suggestion could be nought but fruitless because the French, retreating before Archduke Charles, were no longer in Franconia but in the neighborhood of Wetzlar. 43 A n d Charles, three days before the definitive convention was signed in Paris, had by proclamation forbidden the payment of contributions to the enemy 44 The French thought, nevertheless, to force payment by not releasing the hostages taken until the contributions should have been paid — and this, despite the fact that some of the French administrators had been trapped in Franconia when the French army retreated, and they had been seized as hostages for the release of the German hostages.45 By the end of December, however, the Directory decided that "the considerations which had necessitated the seizure of several hostages in Germany [had] been changed by circumstances," and it ordered the exchange of all non-Austrian German hostages for French hostages in Germany. 48 The order was not obeyed in its entirety. The hostages of one German city (Bruchsal) were retained by the minister of war till their city should have satisfied its engagements — and the Directory approved this failure to carry out its orders.47 If there was a chance of collecting one extra livre, trust the Directory to seize that chance.

3.

THE FRANCO-BADENESE TREATY OF AUGUST 2 2 , 1 7 9 6

" W e are occupying a superb country [Baden]," wrote an agent of the Directory from Basel on July 17, eight days before the Franco-Badenese Armistice of July 25. " . . . I saw the richest crops in the greatest abundance. It would asserted that this agreement granted France much equipment but no horses (Arch. A. E,. Allemagne 696, fi. 50-51). "Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 304-307. "Sept. 13, 1796, Arch. Ν., AF III 59, d. 230. "Dumolin, Précis, I, 364. " D e Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. Π, Vol. VI,

293, note. The prohibition was repeated on October 8 (ibid.). "Dir. to min. of war, Dec. 8, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 432. "Idem, Dec. 31, 1796, ibid., p. 565. "Idem, Jan. 4, 1797, ibid., p. 594.

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be inexhaustible if it were managed prudently. . . I promised [the inhabitants] that they would be neither despoiled nor maltreated. They are delighted to see that we have entered as brothers. They will pay contributions with great pleasure; they will furnish requisitions in grain, forage, and oats. W e will win forever the amity and the attachment of the inhabitants of the region." 48 T h e Armistice of July 25, it will be recalled, had given the Badenese whatever pleasure requisitions might afford. That agreement was, however, only an armistice. The definitive arrangements — that is, the treaty — were to afford them further gratifications of like stamp, to wit, a monthly contribution similar to that exacted from Württemberg by the Treaty of August 7. O n August 8, 1796, Reitzenstein, the Badenese plenipotentiary, arrived in Paris to negotiate peace. Delacroix demanded of him that Baden cede its left-bank territories. A l l of these had been catalogued in Reitzenstein's instructions of October 11, 1795, together with their yield, for the Margrave wished it realized that for years he had not received any income from them owing to the French occupation.49 But as indemnity for territories and moneys, all that Delacroix was authorized to offer was the bailiwick of Ettenheim — the revenues of which were less than a tenth those of the lost Badenese possessions — and perhaps such other territories as Reitzenstein might suggest, and the Directory approve.50 Reitzenstein did not resist with undue vehemence the proposal for the cession of Baden's left-bank possessions, for Sandoz had warned him that there was no use resisting; France would obtain the left bank. The proper course for Baden, said Sandoz, was to take what indemnity she could get, and forget about the whole matter. 51 But when, in exchange for the Margrave's lengthy list of possessions, Delacroix suggested Ettenheim, Reitzenstein was indignant. Then the French minister asked him what he would suggest, and Reitzenstein brought forward such exaggerated claims that Delacroix became indignant. After a time, Delacroix yielded on some points.52 But the real contest took place when Delacroix presented the Directory's next demand — for the fortified city of K e h l 5 3 and the bridgehead of Hüningen. 48Rédacteur,

no. 224 (July 26, 1796).

" 1 7 8 9 - 1 7 9 5 : 627,579 florins in coin and kind; 49,650 florins in outstanding cashadvances (Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 3 5 7 358). 50 Dir.'s instructions, Aug. 15, 1796, ibid., p. 458. n Reitzenstein to Edelsheim, Aug. 12, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 453. ra Delacroix to Dir., n.d., ibid., p. 473. Vide "Entwurf des Friedensvertrags mit den Bemerkungen Reitzensteins," ibid., pp. 463-

472. M

Guyot asserts that Delacroix asked for the bridgeheads of Kehl and Hüningen (Direc., pp. 223-224). This is an error. Article IV of the Directory's instructions demands the "cession of the city and fortress of Kehl, and its territory" (Aug. 15, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 457). On August 12, the Directory had written to Moreau: "One of the most essential operations is to reëstablish Kehl, and to construct a formidable bridgehead at Hiiningen. W e recommend

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Then Reitzenstein was truly stunned. Kehl was on the right bank of the Rhine; so was the Hüningen bridgehead. Such a demand violated the thesis upon which, ostensibly, the Directory's German policy had hitherto been based — that of the "natural boundaries." The cession of Kehl would compromise the Margrave in the eyes of the Empire, Reitzenstein complained, and he made "very strong observations."54 But France was in a commanding position, so Reitzenstein could do nought but try to make the best of a bad situation. If France insisted upon transgressing the oft-proclaimed Rhine frontier, he told Delacroix, it would have to be in the secret articles,55 and the Republic would have to pay Baden's price.56 One might well recall here that Poteratz' instructions of November 28, 1795, in asking for all the waters of the Rhine and a towing path on the right bank, contained the assurance, "The Republic . . . desires no further German territory." 57 The Directory's Rhine demands, it will thus be seen, were progressive; and just as originally no one in France hoped for more than the bounds of Gaul, which meant the middle of the principal navigable channel, and just as later, a towing path on the right bank seemed to be the non plus ultra, so this demand regarding Kehl and the Hüningen bridgehead likewise would presently appear too restrained. Thus did France, by her very success, sow the seeds of her own downfall. The Franco-Badenese treaty was signed on August 22. Therein, the Margrave bound himself never, in the future, to assist a power at war with the French Republic, even though assistance should be required of him as a member of the German Empire (Article II). The significance of a provision such as this has already been pointed out in connection with the similar restriction imposed upon Württemberg. The treaty with Baden granted French troops the privilege of marching freely through the Margraviate, of sojourning there, and of occupying all military posts necessary to their operations (Article III). This provision also is reminiscent of the Franco-Württemberger treaty. Repeated, it assumes greater importance, and calls for some further remarks. Usually, after peace has been concluded between two belligerent states, the soil of the vanquished becomes once more inviolable.58 This could not be the case with Baden because, as mentioned above, Imperial law granted Imperial armies the right of transit and garrison in the various states of the Empire. As long as the Imperial war continued, therefore, a pacified 66 Guyot, Direc., p. 223. that you do not lose sight of this goal for 57 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, iii, § 1. a single instant" (Debidour, Recueä, III, " I . e . , either immediately or upon fulfillment 335)· "Delacroix to Dir., n.d., Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., of a condition whose performance depends solely upon the act of the vanquished. II, 473·

"Ibid.

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German state was potentially hostile territory. Moreover, under such circumstances, it was hardly more than fair that France should have the same rights of transit and garrison as the Empire, especially in the case of German states bordering directly upon France, such as Baden. T w o articles of the Treaty dealt with the Margrave's rights on the left bank of the Rhine. These rights were ceded to the Republic in toto (Articles I V , V ) . Likewise, the Margrave's title to the islands of the Rhine, 59 and to the various arms of that stream, including especially his rights respecting justice, police, and tolls (Article V I ) . 6 0 Either party was to be free to construct dikes for the protection of his territory, provided no damage to the other would accrue. A l l disputes on this subject, or concerning the establishment and conservation of the towpath provided for below, were not to be decided judicially but by negotiation between the two governments (Article V I I ) . This provision gave a pronounced advantage to France, for while in a judicial dispute, right triumphs — or at least, is supposed to triumph — in a negotiation, victory lies with the party having the greatest potential strength. T h e Margrave agreed to leave a space thirty-six feet in width on the right bank, to serve as a towpath for the navigable parts of the River (Article V I I I ) . Where the towpath ran through areas owned by the Margrave or by ecclesiastical corporations or communities, title thereto was to pass unreservedly to France; portions of the towpath owned by lay communities and individuals were to remain with their owners under French sovereignty (Articles X ) . France was to have exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses relative to navigation committed upon the towpath (Article I X ) . T h e Rhine was to be free to inhabitants of both France and Baden (Article XI), 6 1 and no tolls were ever to be levied upon that portion of the stream flowing between the two states (Article X I I ) . A n article regarding liberty of transit and storage in Baden was taken over bodily from the FrancoWiirttemberger Treaty of August 7 (Article X V ) . ' Vide n. 4, this chapter. " A t the epoch of the Franco-Imperial peace, France might become less exacting on this point and permit of mixed tribunals and mixed police, says a marginal note of the French minister of foreign affairs on an abstract of a letter from the Margrave. The letter: June 1, 1797. T h e marginal note: July 28, 1797 (Arch. A . E., Baden 4, ff. 120 et seqq). ' T h i s was apparently in violation of the wishes of Strasburg's business interests. In a memoir, they had asked that "especially" the Badenese should be excluded from merchant navigation other than that in which the raw products of Baden were con-

cerned (Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 230). In another memoir, the Bureau de correspondance de commerce of Strasburg had acknowledged that France's principles of freedom should apply also to Rhine commerce, but it asked that, nevertheless, Strasburg's monopoly of the cartage of goods ascending the Rhine to Switzerland should be preserved, for it brought France a million livres' worth of foreign business per year: T h e goods could be unloaded only on the left bank of the Rhine, in Alsace, by treaties with the Palatinate, Mayence, and Baden (n.d., Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 4 5 9 460).

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In the secret articles, it was provided that at the peace discussions between the Empire and the Republic, the latter should use its good offices to secure for the Margrave of Baden the secularization of the following: the Bishopric of Constance; the Abbey of Reichenau; the bailiwick of Schlingen (dependency of the former Bishopric of Basel); the right-bank portion of the Bishopric of Spires (if Baden received this, she was to demolish the fortifications of Philippsburg, and never permit their reconstruction; or, if preferred, French troops could occupy the fortress); the bailiwick of Ettenheim, formerly dependent on the Bishopric of Strasburg; Seligenstadt, and some small portions of territory formerly dependent on the Bishopric of Mayence, which portions could then be exchanged for the Badenese enclaves; and the lands, revenues, and rights of all ecclesiastical communities within Baden or its acquisitions, the capitals of which were on the right bank of the Rhine. Reciprocally, Baden should turn over to France the lands, revenues, and rights of all ecclesiastical bodies and communities within Baden or its acquisitions, the capitals of which were on the left bank of the Rhine — exceptions to be made where the Grand Chapter and Bishoprics of Basel, Strasburg, and Spires were concerned (Article I). The Republic engaged to employ its good offices to obtain for the Margrave the unlimited privilege of non-appellando (exemption from the jurisdiction of the Imperial tribunals as courts of last resort), the abolition in Baden of the postal system of Count von Thum und Taxis, exemption from all feudal dependence on the Bishops of Basel and Spires, and the transfer to the Margrave of the Bishop of Constance's right to convoke the Estates and direct the affairs of the Swabian Circle (Article II). The Margrave promised to support, at the peace negotiations of the Empire, the French program for the left bank and the islands and course of the Rhine, with its corollary of indemnification by right-bánk secularizations (Article VIII; counterpart of Article III, Secret, of the Franco-Württemberger treaty). And he ceded to France all his rights to the city, fortress, and territory of Kehl; also, fifty-five acres 62 of territory on the right bank of the Rhine below the old bridge of Hüningen, plus a road leading to the latter plot, if such were deemed necessary (Article IV). The Margrave pledged himself to observe neutrality in future wars to which the French Republic should be a party (Article IX). The tenth secret article, like the fifth secret article of the Franco-Württemberger treaty, authorized French troops to march through, or sojourn in Baden "during all future wars stirred up against the Republic by Germany," and to occupy all military posts necessary to their operations. This privilege had already ω

"Fifty arpents" is the wording of the Treaty. That document defines an arpent as 100 perches (i.e., square perches), and

the perche as 22 feet. Fifty arpents is therefore 55.5 acres.

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been granted by the third patent article. Perhaps it was repeated to emphasize that France was in earnest. It could indeed be argued that the secret article limited the patent article to cases where Germany was the aggressor, but it is very unlikely that such was the intention of the Republic. N o nation ever-admits aggression; even Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany conquered Europe in self-defense. Also taken over bodily from the Württemberger treaty was the provision that a French diplomatic agent should have jurisdiction over civil disputes between French citizens in Baden (Article XIII). Article X V I , akin to the Württemberger treaty's tenth secret article, provided for the payment to France of a monthly contribution 63 until peace preliminaries with Austria should have been signed. Curious but logical was the stipulation that all judgments rendered in favor of Badenese individuals against the French for failure to pay for their purchases of horses, catde, and other commodities, should be regarded as void, and the amends already paid should be returned to France (Article X V I also). In the absence of such a provision, the French would have been obliged to exact from the Badenese government the funds necessary to pay the Badenese individuals — for France had no money. Under the circumstances, this was a sensible short cut, even if it does not look good on paper. A provision peculiar to the Badenese treaty bound the Margrave to furnish the Republic within three years 8,000,000 feet of lumber suitable for maritime construction (Article X V I I ) . If Poteratz can be believed — and truthful statements did sometimes escape his lips — this lumber was to be used for building ships to invade England. 64 A n unusual provision obliged the Margrave to restore to his subjects the rights and privileges which they once enjoyed, especially in the interior administration of the country (Article X V I I I ) .®5 T h e Treaty put in a good Twenty thousand francs, according to De Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 285. Guyot, Direc., p. 224, speaks of 100,000 francs per month. " D e g e l m a n n to Thugut, July 16, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweix 199. It seems indeed that Poteratz was not lying. Certainly, great maritime preparations were under way. The Directory's instructions of August 15, 1796, spoke of hemp and sailcloth and 12,000 tree trunks suitable for maritime construction (Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 458). General Tuncq demanded 2,000 fir-tree trunks and 2,000 spruces (Reitzenstein to Delacroix, Aug. 15, 1796, ibid.). The demands for trunks and hemp can be traced to the minister of marine (Report of 83

85

Aug. i l , 1796, ibid., pp. 452-453). This provision has an interesting history. On July 23, N . wrote to N . (names are missing) that the latter should apprize Reubell of a ferment in Baden which could be of great value to France, "procuring access for us at all times." The people were agitating for the restoration of their ancient liberties and the regular convocation of the estates. If Reubell should suggest that a treaty of peace follow the armistice, the estates would have time to send two representatives to Paris, and terms could be imposed on the Margrave which would re-create in Baden a situation not unlike that in France under the Constitution of 1791. Then the Margrave could

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word also for Baden's political prisoners. They were to be released (Article X I ) . This provision was of course taken over from the Württemberger treaty. T o the friends of France its purpose was to promote liberalism. But it is true that it could serve equally well to promote dissension and hence weaken the Badenese state, which — according to the old(?) diplomacy — was a perfectly legitimate goal.6® The treaty draft had provided (in Article X V I ) that the contributions stipulated by the Armistice should be paid off. This, according to the Badenese, was impossible. A memoir of Reitzenstein, dated August 3, asserted that Baden could not support the charges imposed by the Armistice; that the French general in chief must have been misinformed as to the wealth of the country; that Baden had never produced enough grain for its own inhabitants; that epizoöty was raging among the cattle; that few horses were bred there; that the exportation of building lumber and wine — Baden's principal industries — had been ruined by the war, for the German armies had ravaged the forests, and there had been no wine at all for several years; that there were few factories; that German troops had drained off most of the coin; and that Lower Baden, ordinarily very rich, had been transformed by the war into a desert.87 It appears that at least some of these allegations were true, for a Directorial decree of September 9, passed in answer to complaints from the central administration of the Haut-Rhin (Upper Alsace) that Alsace was being denuded of grain and horses, ordered a strict watch to be kept to prevent the Margrave from buying grain or horses in France. 68 If there had not been a dearth of these commodities in Baden, the Margrave would not have been trying to buy them abroad. Relief was not far off, however, for the war was soon to rid the Margraviate of its expensive guests. This is what the Margrave had been waiting for, but not only that. "Madame," he wrote to the Empress of Russia, " . . . I dare to place at your feet the severity of my destiny; I dare to flatter myself that you will deign to sweeten it by your powerful protection at the epoch of the general peace." 89 That was Sandoz' thought also. "One signs here {Paris], and does not discuss," he wrote to Edelsheim. "The negotiation of the general peace will enable . . . the Margrave to recant concerning several points of the said treaty. . . This opinion is not at all an idle fancy, and should have its influence upon [the question o f ] ratification." 70 But Karl never again succumb to the influence of the Emperor, for his legislature would prevent it, France being the defender of its liberties (July 23, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., ll, 414). Erdmannsdörffer thinks Bacher was the author of this letter (ibid., η. ι ) . " D e Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI,

276-285. " A r c h . A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 178-181. "Arch. N., AF III 401, d. 2166. " K a r l Friedrich to Kaiserin Katharina, August 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 456. 70 Aug. 28, 1796, ibid., p. 503.

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Friedrich did not wait so long to recant. H e wanted the modifications before he ratified. 71 T h e year 1796 had flown, and almost all of 1797 too, before his Serene Highness consented to exchange ratifications. A n d he consented then only in the expectation of modifications. 72

4.

T H E FRANCO-BAVARIAN ARMISTICE OF SEPTEMBER 7 ,

1796

In the early days of September, Jourdan, who had boldly penetrated into the heart of Germany, was routed by Archduke Charles and compelled to retreat. 73 Charles had obtained his victory by leaving only 30,000 men with D e la Tour to hold Moreau in check while he led 28,000 soldiers to join Wartensleben's 34,000 encamped behind the Naab. Moreau did not realize immediately the precarious position into which he had been thrust by Jourdan's retreat, and imprudently continued to advance. "Let him go as far as Vienna," the Archduke had told D e la Tour. "It matters little provided that I defeat Jourdan." 7 4 Jourdan was now defeated, but Moreau was still continuing merrily on his way. O n September 3, his left wing, under the command of General Férino, attempted to seize Munich. T h e attempt was vain, but the Elector of Bavaria, who had fled to Saxony, was so frightened thereby that, blind to the potentialities of Moreau's position, he requested a suspension of hostilities. O n September 7, an armistice was signed at Pfaffenhofen by Moreau and the deputies of the Bavarian Estates. 75 This instrument was drafted along the lines of the armistices imposed in July upon Württemberg and Baden. It pledged the Elector to withdraw his contingent from the A r m y of the Empire (Article I). It granted French troops free passage through Bavaria for all time, with the privilege of quartering the soldiers on the inhabitants without compensation (Article I I ) ) . It promised that the French military would respect the political, religious, social, and economic status quo of Bavaria (Article III). It bound Bavaria to honor French demands for grain, bread, hay, oats, meat, carriages, and draught horses — these to be checked off against the provisions and coin which Bavaria was to pay to France (Article I V ) . It pledged the Elector to deliver to the French army (a) 10,000,000 livres in German or French currency, or in bills of exchange, or in ingots (Article V — compare with the 2,000,000 exacted of Baden, and the 4,000,000 exacted of Württemberg); Reitzenstein to Edelsheim, March 19, 1797, ibid., p. 575. " S a n d o z to the King, Oct. 25, 1797, ibid., p. 623; Reitzenstein to Edelsheim, Dec. 22, 1797, 'bid., p. 625. "Sept. 2-4 (Dumolin, Précis, I, 364). The retrograde movement really started August 23 (Guerres Ré v. Emp., IV, 9). Jourdan 71

was then on one bank of the Naab River, near Ratisbon, and but a few miles from union with Moreau's Rhine and Moselle Army. The campaign is described by an eyewitness, Count Julius Soden, Franz'n Franken, pp. 195 et seqq. " Guerres Rév. Emp,, IV, 22. Sciout, Direc., Π, 38-40.

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(b) 3,000 cavalry and draught horses, and 300 choice saddle horses (Articles VI-VIII) ; (c) 200,000 cwt. of grain, 100,000 sacks of oats, and 200,000 bales of hay (Article X ) ; and (d) 100,000 pairs of shoes, 10,000 pairs of boots (Article XI), and 30,000 ells of cloth for officers' uniforms (Article XII). Two articles of the Armistice are of especial interest. One bound Bavaria to pay France the monetary equivalent of the above-mentioned provisions in case a turn in the war resulted in the flight of the French army from Bavaria (Article XIII); the other provided that French artists designated by the government or the general might choose twenty pictures from the galleries of Munich and of Düsseldorf, his Serene Highness engaging himself not to remove any of them (Article X V ) . 7e This armistice was never ratified by the Elector, for Archduke Charles, after driving Jourdan back and defeating him at Altenkirchen (September 20), turned upon Moreau. With his communications threatened, Moreau was forced to desert Bavaria and scamper home. For over a month he fell back through a hostile country, impeded by bad roads, lofty mountains, and dense forests. He recrossed the Rhine on October 25 and 2 6 " It is to be noted that the retreat deprived of its significance not only the Pfaffenhofen Armistice but also the Secret Treaty of August 5 with Prussia. From the military point of view, the results of the German campaign of 1796 were nil for France, except that a large force of Austrian troops, which would otherwise have been sent into Italy, was kept occupied. From the diplomatic point of view, however, the results were significant. Armistices had been signed with Württemberg (July 17), Baden (July 25), the Swabian Circle (July 27), the Franconian Circle (August 7), and Bavaria (September 7); and treaties with Prussia (August 5, owing to the French invasion almost as much as were the other agreements), Württemberg (August 7), and Baden (August 22) ; while Saxony (vide infra) 78 had asked for Prussia's good offices for the conclusion of a separate peace with France. Thus, despite the defeats, a writer in the Rédacteur felt justified in exulting when he compared the diplomatic situation in brumaire, IV, with that in vendémiaire, V (October—November 1795, with that in September-October 1796). At the date of his writing (October 8,1796), he saw "the circles of the Empire abstracted from the influence of Austria, ready to form between it [Austria] and us an imposing barrier,79 withdrawing from it the aid of their contingents, hastening to conclude treaties of separate peace, and paying to us in contributions the indemnities they had promised to the Imperial treasury." 80 " D e Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 294-298. "Stephens, Rev. Eur., p. 178; Bourdeau, Campagnes, I, 262.

" C h a p , xv, § 2. Vide Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II, 358-359. 80 No. 297. 70

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But even the diplomatic picture soon darkened. T h e Bavarian armistice was never ratified; the D u k e of Württemberg dismissed the minister w h o had conducted his negotiations; 8 1 the secret treaty with Prussia had become a dead letter since the retreat of the French; and Saxony (infra) found the French terms too rigorous. T h e invasion had raised up the party of Prussia and of peace in southwestern Germany; the successes of the Archduke hurled southwestern Germany back into the arms of Austria, and Archduke Charles forbade the engagements with France to be kept. But a new star was rising in the South which was to eclipse even the brilliant Charles of Habsburg, and make of the unpaid contributions a dead issue that somehow refused to be buried. 82

5.

F R A N K F O R T A N D FRANCE DURING AND AFTER T H E FRENCH RETREAT

After the retreat of the Sambre and Meuse A r m y across the Rhine following Altenkirchen, an attempt was made to collect also the contributions yet owing from Frankfort; and a Directorial decree of October 16, 1796, authorized Delacroix to negotiate and sign a treaty on the subject with the deputies of the city. 88 A n agreement to this end was reached on October 2g.84 This is not, however, the matter to be treated here, but the startling change in Franco-Frankforter relations following Jourdan's retreat. Instead of revenging themselves upon the fleeing warriors of France, the Frankforters had gone out of their way to shower consideration upon the hapless host.86 A n d on November 12, the two burgomasters of Frankfort, Lauterbach and Schweifer, sent to the Directory a letter which spoke of the common principle of individual liberty upon which the two governments rested, and expressed the gratitude of the Frankforters for France's patronage. 88 Such acts and language toward a defeated adversary touched the Directory's conscience, and it ordered the return of the Frankforter hostages. 87 A few days later, it decreed that if the war resulted again in France's invasion of the Main-River region, Frankfort would be regarded as neutral. A note attached to this decree explained that the concessions were intended as a reward for Frankfort's good conduct. 88 T w o weeks later, the Directory Stephens, Rev. Eur., p. 180. " Vide infra, chap, xxii, § 4b. " A r c h . N , A F I I I · 176, f. 75. "Delacroix to Dir., Feb. 1, 1797, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 696, ff. 50-51. The document has 7 brumaire, IV, by error. It should be V . 81

"Decree of Dec. 2, 1796, printed in L'impartial européen (Brussels), no. 457 (May 2, 1797). Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 313. " A r c h . Ν., AF III 59, d. 231. " N o v . 28, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 376. " A r c h . A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 313.

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authorized Barthélémy to deliver passports to Frankforter merchants whose business necessitated their coming to France. 89 However, where the claims of Frankfort involved the ownership of tangible property on the left bank of the Rhine — such as the Münster salt works on the Nahe, owned by several Frankforter families, and operated in common— the Directory showed itself absolutely unyielding, despite a secret convention with the city providing for the lifting of all sequestrations. 90 Where the left bank was concerned, a special set of principles governed. Concessions ended at the Rhine boundary. m

Debidour, Recueil, IV, 459. "Basse and Oelsner (deputies of Frankfort) to Delacroix, Feb. 10, 1797, Arch. A. E.,

Allemagne 696, £. 58; min. of finances to Delacroix, April 1 1 , 1797, ibid., f. 77.

>a

CHAPTER XIV

X

P R I N C I P L E S OF D I R E C T O R I A L WARFARE

A

T H O R O U G H account of the German policy of the Directory must contain far more than the story of the intercourse of diplomats. T h e principles governing the actions of the French armies when they were marching across German territory, and the reasons behind the principles, also constitute part of the German policy of the Directory, and aid, moreover, to understand the arrangements concluded by the French generals with the various states of Germany during the summer of 1796. " D o not lose sight of the fact," wrote the Directory to General Jourdan on July 5, 1796, "that the great art of war is to live at the expense of the enemy." 1 " Y o u ought to nourish the army with the fruit of its courage," the government had written to General Moreau but a week before. " T h e levying of contributions in coin and in provisions of all sorts . . . [is] too important not to occupy your attention." 2 These maxims are identical with those which guided the Committee of Public Safety. " W e must . . . avoid making war as dupes," declared Carnot in 1794, referring to the invasion of Belgium of that year; " w e ought to live at the expense of the enemy. W e are not invading his country to carry him our riches." 3 T h e army had no riches to carry. It was destitute except for what it could appropriate. In some instances it had no meat. 4 In others, no food stores at all. In one case on record, it actually had to resist the Directory's order to march because, should it have left the homes wherein it was quartered, its very next meal would have been endangered.® It had no shoes. A n 1 Debidour,

Recueil, III, 21. June 30, 1796, Arch. N., AF III 383, d. 1958. " H . Wallon, Les Représentants du peuple en mission (5 vols., Paris, 1889-1890), IV, 240. 2

' D i r . to min. of finances, Dec. 6, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 421. "Moreau and Jourdan to Dir., May 7, 1796, Mem. campagne de 1796, "Pièces justificatives," no. ii (p. 232). Accord: Uém. Saint-Cyr, III, 14.

PRINCIPLES OF DIRECTORIAL WARFARE

65I

archive memoir placed 100,000 pairs of shoes and 16,000 pairs of boots as a sine qua non without which the war could not be resumed (following an armistice).6 It lacked most of the necessities commonly regarded as vital.7 There was a great shortage of hay,8 and of horses to eat it.9 "Confiscate all the horses found. . . You know . . . our resources in this direction," the Directory wrote to Haussmann; 1 0 and to Bonaparte went the plaintive tale that the Rhine and Moselle Army's "cavalry was absolutely nonexistent for lack of horses," 11 and the plea to send to Moreau all captured animals not needed by the Army of Italy. 12 Months sometimes passed without the troops' receiving a sou of pay. 13 Saint-Cyr's men did not have enough money to pay for postage or to have their shirts laundered, while the plight of General Augereau himself was even yet more touching. On January 17, 1796, he wrote to Ritter, Commissioner to the Army of Italy: "I am now completely naked. . . I am no longer able to patch my clothes; the thread will not hold. . . If you do not soon come to my aid, you will expose me to showing everything I own. Adieu, my dear Representative \_sic] . Think of me. . . " 1 4 Of course, such a state of things did not have to be. T o use a contemporary phrase, "the administrative services [were] gangrened." 15 Jourdan told the Council of Five Hundred that for two years the French government had paid a contractor to furnish his army 150,000 rations a day. His army had '"Mémoire au Directoire Exécutif sur les opérations de guerre futures, en cas de reprise d'hostilités," Sept. 16, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 1 4 4 a , d. 680. ' Aubert-Dubayet (min. of war) to Dir., Nov. 18, 1795, Arch. N., A F III 147, d. 692. 8 " I tell you, merely in passing, that since I've been here, our artillery horses . . . have not had one bundle of hay" (General Castelverd to General in Chief Jourdan, Sept. 10, 1796, Mém. campagne de ¡796, "Pièces justificatives," no. xxxiv [p. 339]). "It had been thought that the Decrees of February 3 and 14, 1796 (Arch. N., A F I I I * 2 1 8 ) , providing for the levy of every thirtieth horse in France, and of every horse not used habitually in commerce or agriculture, would remedy this situation; but corruption defeated their proper execution. Vide E. Desbrière and M. Sautai, La Cavalerie sous le Directoire (Paris, 1 9 1 0 ) , pp. 37 et seqq. 10 June 30, 1796, Arch. Ν., A F III 383, d. 1958. 11 May 18, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, II, 418.

" J a n . 27, 1797, ibid., IV, 742. "Report of Lieut. Col. Le Coq, Aug. 25, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 83. During a campaign in enemy country, they could of course pay themselves if the enemy could bear up under the strain. Wrote Desaix to Saint-Cyr: "I find it difficult to believe that so small a country as the one we are occupying is able to pay this sum" (Feb. 28, 1797, Mém. Saint-Cyr, IV, "Pièces justificatives," no. 44 [p. 3 0 3 ] ) . Saint-Cyr thought it could pay — since someone had to. "I'm deserting from the army in a week if means cannot be found to pay the troops," he wrote to Desaix (Feb. 2 1 , 1797, ibid., no. 43 [p. 3 0 1 ] ) . 14 Ibid.·, Count de Sérignan, "La Vie aux armées sous la Révolution et le Premier Empire," RQH (Revue des questions historiques), LXXXIV (1908), 180. 15 Min. of war to Dir., Nov. 18, 1795, Arch. Ν., A F III 147, d. 692. Vide Pascal-Vallongue, "Coup d'œil sur l'armée etc.," Bourdeau, Armées Rhin Direc., Documents annexes, Β: Correspondance privée, pp. 3 7 4 378.

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received only ιο,οοο. 16 T h e remainder, of course, had gone to line the pockets of the contractor and of his friends in the government who had secured his contract for him. But what was the army supposed to do? It was face to face with the enemy and had to fight. So it took the only course open to it, viz., to live off the countries it conquered. A n d the Directory thought that was a very felicitous solution. T h e Directory even planned its campaigns with this in mind. It instructed General Beurnonville that it was "of the greatest interest to penetrate anew into Germany, in order to establish winter quarters there, which will assure the provisioning and the different services of the army at the expense of the enemy." 1 7 A n d to General Jourdan, it (Carnot, really) wrote: "If you have reason to believe that you will find provisions in the neighborhood of the Lahn, hasten there with almost all of your forces." A n d in the same paragraph: "Don't lose an instant before breaking the armistice . . . and thrusting with impetuosity . . . [to] the L a h n . " 1 8 T o which Jourdan and Moreau replied: W e do not have the provisions necessary to begin hostilities. 19 Whereupon Carnot confessed: "It must be admitted that the position of the Lahn is detestable and almost impossible to hold." 2 0 In a certain sense, requisitions for the purpose of subsistence are legitimated by compelling necessity even if the necessity be the result of negligence, incapacity, or corruption. However, it is difficult to justify requisitions of food far in excess of an army's needs, in a country that is suffering from the ravages of war. So much bread and meat was exacted of Franconia in the summer of 1796 that some of it had to be cast out into the road; 2 1 so much food, in general, from Swabia that the Directory charged Haussmann to send the excess to the left bank, to both the strongholds of war and the Sciout, Direc., II, 596-597. Quoted supra, Pt. I, chap, iii, § ι . " N o v . 5, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 208. 18 March 29, 1796, Mem. campagne de 1796, "Pièces justificatives," no. i (pp. 217—218). " M a y 7, 1796, ibid., no. ii (p. 232). The conquered left bank,, which was regarded as the proper source of supply for the Sambre and Meuse, and Rhine and Moselle, Armies when forced back to the west side of the Rhine (Dir. to min. of finances, Dec. 12, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 449; decree of Dir. of Dec. 7, 1796, Arch. N., A F III * 219; Dir. to Garrau, Nov. 20, 1795, Debidour, Recueil, I, 93; Dir. to Hoche, Feb. 13, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 433, d. 2484), had been drained quite dry, and so had France (Unsigned report on France, 16

dated from Berne, March 11, 1796, sent in to Thugut by Gherardini, H. H. S., Arch., Relationen aus Turin, fase. 18). Yet Jourdan had to have some stores, for the first regions his army would cross (Berg and southern Wetterau) were sterile (Dir. to Bonaparte, May 18, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, Π, 418). " T o Jourdan, June 23, 1796, Mim. campagne de 1796, "Pièces justificatives," no. viii (p. 255). Of the Lahn position, Marshal Soult has written: " T h e banks of the Lahn are, generally speaking, precipitous, and offer positions all the more difficult to attack because, to arrive there, one must follow long gorges and carry, by main force, the passages leading to the gorges" (Mem. Soult, I, 248). a Soden, Franz'n Franken, p. 184.

PRINCIPLES OF DIRECTORIAL WARFARE

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départements. And the excess beyond that was to be sold to the Swiss for coin! 22 Swabia had the further affliction that the Rhine and Moselle Army, retreating from Bavaria in autumn, repassed through Swabia, and proved to be even worse when in reverse. Complaints poured in to Barthélémy of the "excesses, disorders, requisitions, and pillaging" of the Rhine and Moselle Army. 23 "I am as sad as you about it," wrote Delacroix to Barthélémy. 24 Delacroix had good reason to be sad. The excesses produced a species of insurrection against the retreating Frenchmen. 25 The Directory seems to have made a sincere effort to correct the ills which had driven the inhabitants to revolt. It knew from experience acquired during the Convention how difficult it was to hold hungry, ill-clad troops in line during a retreat. Often it was tantamount to suicide for an officer to attempt it.28 The Directory therefore carried its problem to the Five Hundred, inviting that body to enact stringent laws against disorders in the army. 27 With respect to officers who incurred enormous bills at German inns and then refused to pay, the government approved the action of its Commissioner, Alexandre, who had struck upon the felicitous idea of retaining part of the salaries of such officers, and paying their bills for them — with their own money. 28 The same measure could not be taken regarding similar offenses of the common soldier, however, because the men were not being paid for months at a time, so there was little opportunity to withhold anything from them. Not that the soldier was without money. "Very few of them have not ten crowns in their pockets," reported the Prussian Le Coq. "It is easy to imagine to what excesses they resort in order to procure it." 2 9 However, the restraining hand of the French government on the common soldier is seen " A u g . 12, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 338. Likewise with the requisitions in coin. A large surplus remained in the paymaster's chest after the needs of the army were satisfied (Dir. to Alexandre, Cmr A. SMeu, Oct. 7, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 407, d. 2230). The Directory proposed to use this surplus to boost the public credit (Dir. to Moreau, July 30, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 220). M Grand-Bailiwick of Rötteln to Barthélémy, Oct. 24, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, ff. 277-278. " N o v . 19, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 671, f. 143. Delacroix said he would try to induce the Directory to recompense the victims (ibid.).

25

Dir. to Bonaparte, Oct. 1 1 , 1796, Corr. inéd. Napo., II, 108. "Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung des k. und k. Kriegsarchivs, Krieg gegen die französische Revolution, 7792-/797 (2 vols., Vienna, 1905), II, 281. " O c t . 25, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 125. 28 Nov. 18, 1796, ibid., pp. 308-309. " A u g . 25, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.·, I, 83. And he adds: "The peasants are starting to defend themselves against the marauders. They kill them and mutilate them without mercy" (ibid.). The Directory urged Jourdan to proclaim severe penalties for attacks on French troops (Decree of June 8, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, II, 575, η. 3 ) .

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in the following news item in the Rédacteur: The son of the Prince of Württemberg tried to buy his freedom from his French captor by offering him half his purse. "All of it is mine already," replied the Frenchman, and appropriated it. But at headquarters he gave it back.30 It was not only minor officers and privates that the government had to combat. General Tuncq, commander of Hüningen, created a commission of four, charged with despatching into the département of the Haut-Rhin everything that it pleased him to requisition on the right bank. 31 Tuncq was especially fond of wines, which he tried to exact from the Margrave of Durlach, despite the latter's armistice with General Moreau. Adjutant General Perrin journeyed from regency to regency, and from abbey to abbey, in Swabia, forcing the exchange of depreciated paper money, and even of his own promissory notes, for coin at par.32 The Directory was indignant at seeing its official conduct thus imitated. Tuncq's unauthorized impositions were voided.33 The government ordered Haussmann to arraign Tuncq and Perrin before a council of war,34 and forbade requisitions to be made thenceforth by anyone except generals in chief or their representatives.35 The abuses continued, however. A letter of Parcus, Director-General of the Revenues of the Conquered Territory on the Right Bank of the Rhine, informed Haussmann on October 25, 1796, that "General Duhem pillages the houses which lodge him, and General Tapponnier fills his wagons with cloths of all colors by way of requisition; and these gentlemen resemble merchants going to a fair rather than generals marching against the enemy." 36 No. 214. Unofficial. Soden speaks of the exaggerated concept of the rights of the victor entertained by the French military. A soldier of the Sambre and Meuse Army is reported to have said to a public officer in a city hall in Franconia, "Do you know, your shirt is mine if I ask for it?" (Franz'n Franken, p. 185.) " D i r . to Haussmann, Aug. 12, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 337-338. Tuncq was connected with Jägerschmidt and other heads of the revolutionary movement in Baden (Edelsheim to Reitzenstein, in cipher, Aug. 26, 1796, Pol. Coir. Karl Fr., II, 80

459, n. 1). ""Dir. to Haussmann, Aug. 7, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 393, d. 2076. " P r i v y Councillor Herzog to Karl Friedrich, Aug. 21, 1796, Pol. Corr. Karl Fr., II,

474-475· " D i r . to Haussmann, Arch. N., A F III 393, d. 2076. "Debidour, Recueil, III, 279-280.

"Ibid., IV, 125, η. 6. The origin of other abuses related by Parcus may perhaps also be traced to the example of the Luxembourg, though can hardly be called part of the German policy of the Directory. "The army arrived there [Freiburg-im-Breisgau] laden with the spoils of the country it had crossed. . . A t Freiburg, a young girl of thirteen was forced to satisfy the brutality of twelve soldiers, and her old father was compelled to witness this frightful spectacle. She died the next day as a result, and the crime has remained unpunished." The French troops also kidnapped children for ransom in coin (ibid.). The really shocking excesses produced a literature of violent hate for France. Armbruster, cited supra (Pt. II, chap, ix, n. 69), attempts to list the misdeeds according to place. In so far as the present writer has been able to verify them by reference to official documents, they are accurate, but of course only a few admit of verification. E.g., regarding Vandamme's

PRINCIPLES OF DIRECTORIAL WARFARE

655

O n August 2i, 1796, Parcus tried to reassure the inhabitants of Anterior Austria and other right-bank territories which had no peace or armistice with France. Y o u see how equitable the French government is, he proclaimed. 37 While it has a right to treat your country as conquered territory, it leaves you your old constitution, religion, and property untouched, and contents itself with the taxes you used to pay to your former princes. 38 O n August 26, Parcus again assured the people of Anterior Austria that their property would be "solemnly" (heilig) protected. 39 H e repeated the assurance yet a fortnight later, calling T u n c q a "monster," publishing a copy of the minister of war's order for Tuncq's arrest,40 and assuring the inhabitants that if T u n c q had any imitators, they too would be arrested. " Y o u shall suffer no future requisitions," his proclamation read; but in the next paragraph he declared — in honeyed words — that the inhabitants would have to satisfy his own "reasonable demands," and thank the French government for the "magnanimity" with which they, a conquered people, were being treated. 41 Sandoz noted the change in France's attitude, accentuated, of course, by the military reverses. "Moderation has . . . succeeded the pride of pretension," he wrote to his court, "and it has been realized that the friendship of the weak is worth more than their forced submission." 42 But if the French government had reformed its army's private morals, the process never did reach its own public morals. A s pointed out many times before, requisitions in time of war have a certain sanction: the necessity of an invading army to live and to eat. True, the army should bring its stores along, yet that is not the responsibility of the man w h o fights and dies. But wherein lies the necessity for pictures? T h e desire for pictures has its origin, not in necessity, but in cupidity. T h e French are an artistic people, and the parvenu bigwigs of the Directory exactions on I, 136 of Armbruster, check with Debidour, Recueil, II, 309; regarding Tuncq on pp. 35, 36, 96, check with Arch. N., A F III 393, d. 2076; regarding the seizure of hostages and their transportation to Charlemont in France, on p. 187, check with Debidour, Recueil, IV, 432, 565. But how verify the hundreds of alleged rapes, murders, robberies — especially where officially unrecognized? " This proclamation appeared in parallel columns of German and French, dated August 21 and 22, respectively: H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. 88 The "tax proclamation" referred to here appeared under Haussmann's name on

August 16, 1796: H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. 86 "Bekanntmachung an die Bewohner der Länder auf dem rechten Rheinufer, denen von dem Fränkischen Gouvernement noch kein Waffenstillstand akkordirt worden ist" (Armbruster, Sünden-Register, I, 33). 40 "Auszug eines Schreibens des Kriegsministers an den Bürger Bacher," Aug. 25, 1796, ibid., p. 36. 41 "Proklamation an die sämmtliche Einwohner der vorder-Oestr. Länder," Sept. 9, 1796, ibid., pp. 34-36. " O c t . 6, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349.

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combined with their artistic sense an insatiable desire for possessions. T o gather together in Paris the treasures of the ages — all without cost — ah! what glory! They believed themselves generous, too, these revolutionary spoilers. T h e Romans made slaves of conquered nations, they said; we leave them their liberty and take their pictures. Some clearer heads protested against thus besmirching the fair name of France, but were overruled. 43 O n July 4, 1796, the Directory suggested to Haussmann that "it would be nice to see the A r m y of the Rhine and Moselle unite with that of Italy in embellishing the soil of the Republic with the most precious things offered by Nature and genius in the countries which its courage renders tributary to its laws." 44 O n July 20, it "invited" Jourdan to send to the minister of the interior the most celebrated works of art in Frankfort-on-the-Main which would "figure strikingly" in the French Museum of Arts or of Natural History. " A m o n g the first, the Directory limits itself to mentioning the picture of the Twelve Apostles by Piazzetta." 4 5 O n August 1, it ordered deposited at Strasburg "the most remarkable things found in the cabinet of natural history and in the library of the University of Freiburg." 4 8 A n d on August 20, it informed the minister of the interior what artistic productions had already been found in Germany by the Rhine and Moselle Commissioner, adding: " Y o u see . . . that the Republic still continues by its conquests to enrich itself with the productions of the arts found in the territory of the defeated enemy." 4 7 O n September 3, the Directory declared to Joubert that "the minister of the interior has been ordered to send into Germany, as promptly as possible, artists capable of making a choice of the productions with which the Republic ought to enrich itself by right of conquest." 48 These documents show that the Directory saw nothing amiss in the methods it utilized to stock its museums. Some fascinating remarks are contained in a letter written by Keil, French Commissioner Charged with Receiving Objects of the Arts and Sciences in the Conquered Territories of Germany, to the minister of the interior: I had wished to choose, in conformity with Article X V of the treaty of armistice concluded with . . . the Elector of the Palatinate and of Bavaria, ten pictures in the gallery of Düsseldorf; but being on the spot, I saw to my great astonish13

D. Quynn, "The Art Confiscations of the Napoleonic Wars," AHR (American Historical Review), L (1944-45), 439 - 44°> quoting Quatremère de Quincy, Lettres au général Miranda, Paris, 1796. " A r c h . N., AF ΙΠ 384, d. 1973. "Mém. campagnes de 1796, "Pièces justifica-

tives," no. xi (p. 268). "Debidour, Recueil, III, 240, η. ι . "Ibid., p. 407, n. 3. "Ibid., p. 528. It will be recalled that Joubert had asked for the artists {vide last chapter, I 2).

PRINCIPLES OF DIRECTORIAL WARFARE

657

ment that they no longer existed. The regency has informed me that all the pictures formerly composing this gallery have been transported by order of the Elector to Munich. He is deceiving himself if he thinks he can thus spirit away the most esteemed pieces, for I have a catalog of them. . . [With respect to the pictures that the Munich galleries should furnish us, we would rather have the Elector give us others from the Mânnheim gallery, for] I have visited these galleries several times before the Revolution; they do not contain twenty pictures worthy of being placed beside the masterpieces of Italy which now adorn the museum at Paris. . . [Besides, the Munich pictures were damaged by transporting them in an effort to place them beyond the reach of the approaching French armies.] 4 9 T h e pictures from Mannheim which Keil proposed should be demanded were (1) two heads by Denner (reputed to be the most natural works of art existing); 5 0 (2) two hundred German medals of the Middle Ages; (3) three hundred modern medals relative to divers European states — "I should observe here that the [French] National Cabinet possesses no German medals of the Middle Ages, nor any modern medals"; (4) Jean Bologne's rhinoceros tusk sculptured in bas-relief; (5) the chalice of Helitrope, which is in one piece and "unique for its grandeur." 5 1 T o which may be added Keil's later suggestion of "Reubens' best work, 'La Trinité.' " 52 T h e Directory charged the minister of the interior to decide what use should be made of Keil's suggestions, 83 and the minister passed the duty on to the "Council for the Conservation of Objects of the Arts and Sciences." This body decided that the following should be chosen from the Düsseldorf gallery : 6 4 Reubens' "Last Judgment," " T h e Progress of Silenus," " T h e Rape of the Sabines," Friar on wood, and Reubens' first wife; David Teniers' " A Flemish Fête" on wood or copper; Berchem's ruins and animals; Vanderwerf's "Ecce H o m o " and "Madeleine"; Girard Dousset's "Pope Nicholas V Visiting the Prisoners"; Piètre Testa's " A Dream"; Carlo Dolci's "La Madeleine"; Rachel Ruich's "Fruits"; Antoine Wandick's 5 5 portraits of a man and a woman, and "Christ Dead Upon the Knees of the Virgin" on wood; Rembrandt's "Descent from the Cross" and "Christ at the T o m b " ; " T h e thirty-two words last quoted (i.e., before the final brackets), referring to the galleries both of Düsseldorf and of Munich, are from Keil to Dir., April 27, 1797, Arch. A . E., Bavière 178, f. 217. " R e the assertion in parenthesis: idem, Arch. A . E., Bavière 178, fï. 217-218. 51 Jan. 30, 1797, Arch. A. E., Bavière 178, ff. 207-208. MTo Dir., April 27, 1797, Arch. A. E., Bavière 178, f. 217.

" M a y 14, 1797, Arch. A. E., Bavière 178, f. 219. "Apparently the contents of that gallery had been brought back, unless what is meant here is what was once in the Düsseldorf gallery. " A t least not "Wandisch," as in the FrancoBavarian treaty project of brumaire, V, i.e., October-November 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 673, f. 361. The writer's sympathy to Van Dyck!

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

and Gérard of Lacresse's "Ulysses on His Return from Ithica," and "Ulysses at the Mast of His Ship." 66 T h e Directory was also interested in old books and manuscripts, so Keil, in his letter of January 30 above, had suggested that twenty incunabula should be exacted instead of some of the pictures. 67 T h e Council of Conservation, however, decided otherwise. T h e Directory asked Joubert to have the library of St. Emerand at Ratisbon searched for an ancient manuscript stolen from the Abbey of St. Denis. "It consists only of psalms and prayers," the Directory declared, "but it goes back, it is said, to the fifth or sixth century." 58 A n d the General was told to take possession of the registers of the Diet as soon as he should arrive at Ratisbon. 59 In its despatch concerning Piazzetta's Apostles, the government ordered Jourdan to send to Paris "the original of the Golden Bull, and the register whereon [were] inscribed the names of the bourgeois of Frankfort." Also, "all what remains at Frankfort of the jewels used in the coronation of the Emperors." But do not permit the embezzlement of what you collect, cautioned the Directory. This is an "important part of the duties of a Republican general." 60 Little wonder that Audouin, like many others, lamented: Liberty is not this hideous robbery Which lays, fore'er, its hands on property. We owe our ills to immorality.®1 W h e n Keil had been appointed "art collector" for Germany on September i l , 1796, the armies of Jourdan and Moreau were plunging deep into the Empire, and it was thought Keil would probably manage to sack even the H o f b u r g at Vienna. Certain it is that his attention was expected to be July 2, 1797, Arch. A . E., Bavière 178, ff. 228-229. Characteristic errors in orthography have been preserved. 07 Arch. A. E., Bavière 178, f. 217. 58 Aug. 15, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III,

M

377· wlbid.

July 20, 1796, Mém. campagnes de 1796, "Pièces justificatives," no. xi (pp. 267-270). 61 P. J. Audouin, "L'épître à Urbin" upon the Revolution, Rédacteur, no. 432 (Feb. 20, 1797). Pierre Jean Audouin was a member of the Five Hundred, and a former Conventional. Actually very far to the left, he claimed to be above party, to be governed only by principle. Founder of the Journal universel in 1790, he early earned the reputation of a very ardent controversialist who never tired in his attacks on enemies of the

60

public weal. In 1795 he suspended publication of his paper with the explanation: "It is better to tell truths at the tribune of the Convention; in a newspaper, one is only [regarded as] seditious." Fearless in the expression of what he held to be the truth, he defended Saint-Just even after Thermidor. T h e blunt epistle quoted in the text therefore could have come as no surprise to those who were tarnishing the fair name of France (Dr. Robinet, A . Robert, J. Le Chaplain, Dictionnaire historique et biographique de la Révolution et de l'Empire, 1789-1815 [2 vols., Paris, 1898], s.v. "Audouin (Pierre-Jean)"; A. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des conventionnels [Paris, 1916], s.v. "Audouin (Jean-Pierre)"; Moniteur, X V I , 458-459 [Note that Kuscinski transposes Audouin's Christian names]). W e have met Audouin supra, Pt. I, chap, ix, η. 6 i ; chap, xi, η. g.

PRINCIPLES OF DIRECTORIAL WARFARE

directed to the virgin territory of the right bank of the Rhine, where artistic victories such as Bonaparte's in Italy could be expected. But the German campaign of 1796 was a disaster, so Keil settled down in the libraries and museums of the left bank, to glean what he could. Keil began on October 12, at Trêves. H e visited the libraries of all the cloisters and took what pleased him. Also, he confiscated the library of the estates, sending it to Maestricht to be auctioned. Whenever he found anything of value that he did not think worthy of Paris, he took it anyway — to be sold for the benefit of the French fiscus. Keil arrived next in Coblenz, but the estates' library there had disappeared. T h e room was empty. But he managed to find many books to his liking in the libraries of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders. Then came Bonn. Keil made his selection from the Cabinet of Natural Curiosities of the former Prince-Elector, and ordered the remainder turned over to the municipalité for auctioning. A n d he did the same with the University Library! T h e Rector pleaded that the library was necessary for instruction, but Keil insisted it was the property of France by virtue of the Decree of May 17, 1796.62 However, no one would bid on it. T h e library was therefore removed to Cologne for sale, along with the Natural Curiosities. T o the same city went also the library of the Trêves estates, for no one at Maestricht had bid upon it. A t Cologne, everything was auctioned off. But what about the treasures of Cologne itself? D i d they escape now? There was little left to escape. A l l that remained in the armory, the ancient suits of armor and the helmets, were carted off to the smelter, to provide weapons for liberty. In 1794 some of the books taken from Cologne had been shipped in cartons to A i x and stored there; these were now despatched to the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, together with several boxfuls of books collected presently from A i x itself. Likewise shipped to Paris was a picture of the high altar which had belonged to the austere and devout Capuchins. 63 Poor Audouin! Such an inappropriate appropriation as the last named might well have caused his outraged soul to wail: O foolish knave, thou wouldst not falter T o steal the Most High from His altar.64 83

This decree provided that the income of corporate bodies, princes, nobles, ecclesiastics, etc., in the conquered territories should form part and parcel of the national income of France (Hansen, Quellen, III, 785, η. 4). It is difficult to see how a university library could come within this classification, even though a university is a corporation, for a library is not income. But where there is a will, there is a way.

It should be noted that General Hoche reopened the University of Bonn on May 1, 1797 — it had apparendy been forced to close for default of books — and authorized all persons between the ages of twenty and forty to attend lectures (Sagnac, Rhin jr., p. 143). 63 Hansen, Quellen, III, 856-859; 882, η. 4· " I t should be noted that Keil was a German {ibid., p. 856, n. 6).

>5 CHAPTER XV

if

THE SUBSISTENCE-PEACE AND THE FRENCH

I.

RETREAT

THE FRANCO-WÜRTTEMBERGER SECRET CONVENTION OF OCTOBER 2 8 ,

1796

A F E W weeks after the Treaty of August 7 between France and Ç ^ S J . Württemberg, the retreat of Moreau rendered it impossible to execute the Franco-Württemberger contributions agreement. Austrian armies were occupying the country, and two proclamations of Archduke Charles (September 1 1 and October 8) had forbidden the payment of contributions to the enemy. 1 Not that Württemberg was anxious to pay, now that the necessity therefor had passed, but France was pressing for payment through a Basel merchant recommended by Barthélémy to the Directory. 2 The merchant asked for the 2,000,000 still owing, and was presented with a counterclaim for damages wrought by French troops since the conclusion of the Armistice of July 17, and for debentures delivered by the French in payment for extraordinary levies of supplies 8 — together totaling 2,000,000 livres. The Duke suggested that France agree that he should indemnify his own subjects with the money he would have paid to France. In so far as the 200,000 francs of monthly tribute specified in the Franco-Württemberger Treaty of August 7 was concerned, the Duke suggested that the French accept in lieu thereof a flat sum of 1,200,000 francs. Delacroix, in reporting this proposal to the Directory, said that such an arrangement appeared satisfactory to him, only he thought that the sum to be paid should be raised to 1,500,000 at the least.4 1

As mentioned supra, Pt. II, chap, xiii, § 4. 'Haussmann to Barthélémy, Oct. 21, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, ff. 275-276; Barthélémy to Haussmann, Oct. 24, 1796, ibid., ff. 276-277; Dir. to Haussmann, Nov. 3> 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 199-200.

Haussmann did the actual employing of the collector. 'Barthélémy to Delacroix, March 22, 1797, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 305. 'Delacroix to Dir., Oct. 10, 1796, Arch, A. E., Wurtemberg 37, ff. 3 1 1 - 3 1 3 .

THE SUBSISTENCE-PEACE AND THE FRENCH RETREAT

66l

The plenipotentiaries of the Duke also insinuated that if, at the general pacification, the political complexion of Swabia were remolded in favor of Württemberg, the Duke could engage to pay into the French treasury a sum proportionate to the value of his new acquisitions. This could be made the subject of a contingent convention.5 Some unsigned "Observations" in the French foreign affairs archives pass judgment upon these insinuations in the following words: Without doubt, the precious object would be to establish in the Circle of Swabia a permanent and armed neutrality by the creation of a national militia. [This,] . . . combined with the neutrality of the Swiss cantons, would form a respectable barrier between the Republic and the House of Austria. This system could come to pass, or acquire permanence, only by sensibly aggrandizing . . . the Lutheran regions, always the best administered, such as the Duchy of Württemberg, the Margraviate of Baden, and others. . ® A new secret contributions convention was signed by France and Württemberg on October 28. The Republic, in consideration of the damage wrought by its armies, renounced a fourth of all the contributions in coin and in kind imposed by the Armistice of July 17 (Article I). The Duke was to pay a million francs in cash as the third and last quarter of the monetary contribution (Article II). The delivery of provisions having become impossible, the contributions in kind yet unpaid were to be acquitted in coin, up to three fourths of their value. If more than three fourths of their value had already been paid, the Republic was to reimburse the Duke to the extent of the excess (Articles III, I V ) . In composition for the 200,000 livres of monthly tribute, his Serene Highness was to pay down 500,000 francs in cash, in consideration of which the tribute requirement should be cancelled (Article V ) . In so far as circumstances permitted, the French Republic was to employ its good offices to secure the cession to Württemberg, at the time of the general pacification, of three abbeys and a village over and above the previously stipulated indemnity (Article V I ) . In case the French troops passed through Württemberg after the entire acquittal of the contributions, they should pay in coin, at the prices current in the Duchy, for everything furnished to them (Article V I I ) . 7 The Directors were satisfied with this convention because they considered as pure gain anything collected when their troops were no longer on the spot to compel payment. Württemberg was satisfied because the agreement removed the possibility of the country's being treated as a delinquent ' Arch. A. E., Wurtemberg 37, ff. 3 1 1 - 3 1 3 . 'Oct. 7, 1796, Arch. Α. Ε., Wurtemberg 37, £. 308.

' A. de Clercq (ed.), Recueil des traités de la France (20 vols, in 21, Paris, 1864-1900), I, 306-307.

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debtor in case the French again invaded the Duchy. Moreover, there was a substantial reduction in the charges. A patriotic German state, however, would not have thought of supplying the enemy with gold, unless it were exacted at the point of the bayonet. T h e Convention of October 28 demonstrates as well as anything else the sad lack of patriotism in Germany which helped to bring about the dissolution of the ancient Empire, and the subjection of all Europe to the rule of an ambitious and unscrupulous, if gifted man. 2.

T H E ACCESSION OF SAXONY TO T H E NEUTRALITY OF N O R T H E R N GERMANY, NOVEMBER 2 9 ,

1796

It will be recalled that when, in October of 1795, the Imperial cause seemed lost, the Saxon Elector — availing himself of an old Imperial law permitting a state of the Empire, when in danger, to call its military forces home — recalled his contingent from the army of the Empire. 8 T h e very same month, however, marked a turn in the fortune of war, 9 and it was not until the summer of 1796 that Saxony was again menaced. But this time no pretenses were necessary. T h e threat was actual and immediate, what with neighboring Franconia already under the French heel. Elector Friedrich August of Saxony had not tried to avail himself of the separate-peace provision of the Treaty of Basel, for he had long regarded himself as the "devoted ally" of the Emperor. 10 But with the French so uncomfortably close, he decided to approach Caillard and Jourdan on the question of peace. Their terms were too severe, however, and he drew back. 1 1 H e did not really want peace, anyway, but merely a guarantee of freedom from French exactions. For this, neutrality would suffice. Friedrich August appealed to Prussia for its good offices to secure neutrality for the Electorate and the entire Upper Saxon Circle, and an armistice during the negotiations. Prussia, pleased, informed Caillard, and sent Lieutenant Colonel L e Coq to Jourdan's camp "to prevent the useless effusion of blood." 1 2 According to the terms of the Franco-Prussian agreements of April 5, May 17, and August 5, states desiring-to take advantage of the neutrality provision had to withdraw their contingents from the army of the Empire within three months. 13 N o w , of course, Electoral Saxony had withdrawn its contingent in October 1795, but the troops had apparently been sent back, for they were fighting with the Imperial army again in 1796.13* Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xii, § 1 . " Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xv, § 7. 10 Sciout, Direc., I, 19. "Guyot, Direc., p. 222. 8

Bailleu, Pr. Frk_·, I, 80-81. Supra, Pt. I, chap, ix, § 2, and chap, x, § 1 ; Pt. II, chap, xi, § 3. "'Sciout, Direc., II, 14.

12

13

THE SUBSISTENCE-PEACE AND THE FRENCH RETREAT

%

On August 3, 1796, Delacroix wrote to General Clarke essentially as follows: Saxony has made peace proposals to Caillard. The Directory demands that first the Saxon contingent be withdrawn; then, an armistice could be accorded.14 But the day before, when Prussia commissioned Le Coq to request an armistice for Saxony, these words had been used in his instructions: "The Elector of Saxony has just requested . . . the good offices of his Majesty to obtain . . . neutrality, . . . and having, in consequence, recalled his contingent . . . " 1 5 Of one thing, therefore, we may be certain. When Saxony requested neutrality, her contingent was withdrawn, so the allimportant condition precedent had been satisfied. Rumor at Berlin seized upon the Elector's overture to assert that Saxony was soliciting France for a separate peace. Though the Prussian Court denied it, the belief persisted "that peace will be made16 with Saxony, probably on the payment of a large sum of money." 17 The rumor soon spread to Paris, and was believed even by those in the highest circles. Delacroix was one of those who gave it credence. Immediately, the lust for contributions surged up in his breast. The terms of the armistice which is to precede the treaty, he wrote to General Clarke on August 3, should be similar to those imposed on Württemberg, but more money should be exacted, if possible, because Saxony is richer; then the same number of horses as Württemberg yielded; 100,000 pairs of shoes; and 10,000 pairs of boots. "We might be able to exact even more if we despatched part of our army into Saxony, but we need all our troops." 18 Sandoz found it difficult to tell Delacroix and the Directors that Saxony wanted only neutrality. They refused to listen to the proposition. "It is easy to understand why," Sandoz wrote to his court. "Each separate peace is to France a receipt for coin." 19 "Haugwitz believes we will not be able to obtain a pecuniary indemnity from Saxony," Caillard reported from Berlin. "He says we are not occupying its territory. Eh, well! must we be at Dresden or Leipzig in order to make peace? 'No,' says Haugwitz, 'you will not enter Saxony in order to exact several millions. Your principal object is to drive back the Austrians. The inaction of Saxony can be advantageous to you, [for] if you want to invade Bohemia, your rear will be safe from attack. Moreover, we will need [the influence of] Saxony for the pacification of the Empire.' " 20 Nothing had been decided when, on September 3, Jourdan began his " A r c h . N . , A F III 59, d. 230. On Clarke's office, vide infra, chap, xx, n. 8. " A u g . 2, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. F r i I , 80-81. Italics are the present writer's. 1 8 Underscored in the original. " E l g i n to Grenville, July 28, 30, 1796, P. R.

O., F. O. 64/41. Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 230. " A u g . 17, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. " C a i l l a r d to Delacroix, A u g . 23, 1796, Arch. N . , A F III 76, d. 315.

18

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

retreat from Würzburg. A s the Sambre and Meuse A r m y fell farther and farther back, the possibility of obtaining a contribution from Saxony became more and more remote. "It seemed very natural to me two months ago," declared Caillard on September 17, "to exact a large contribution from Saxony as the price of peace with France. Today I believe it to be impracticable. It is not I, but circumstances, which have changed. A t that time, the armies of the Republic were almost at the frontiers of Saxony. . . Nothing could have sheltered it from an invasion." Today, if a contribution were demanded, Saxony might reunite with France's enemies rather than compromise her dignity by paying it. 21 T h e Directory found the argument convincing. It renounced the demand for pecuniary contributions, and Delacroix ordered Caillard to "neglect nothing which will induce the latter [i.e., the Saxon Elector] to send plenipotentiaries to Paris." 22 A g a i n it was necessary to inform Delacroix that the Elector did not desire to conclude a separate peace, but only to accede to the neutrality of northern Germany. If peace negotiations succeeded his accession, then Saxony could send plenipotentiaries to Paris. 23 Delacroix was grieved that it was not a question of a real pacification, but consoled himself with the thought that the first results would be the same. 24 O n October 4, a note from Delacroix to Caillard announced to the latter that the Directory had authorized him to receive the pure and simple accession of the Circle of Upper Saxony to the neutrality of northern Germany. But the Directory was still hoping, the foreign minister added, that the K i n g of Prussia would interpose his good offices to transform the Saxon neutrality into a real pacification. 25 A real pacification! W h a t did these words mean to the Directory? A clue may be offered by a "Project for a General Peace" in the archives at Paris. T h e articles concerning Saxony are crossed out, probably because the Saxon Circle had obtained the Directory's permission to withdraw from the war without charge. But what were these articles, notwithstanding? The Elector of Saxony permits the removal from the public and Electoral libraries of: (1) 3,000 volumes of printed works, ancient and modern, and 50 manuscripts, diplomas, or charters; (2) 20 original pictures from the gallery of Dresden, and especially Corrège's "Birth of Christ" and "St. George"; Raphael's "Madonna," "St. Madeleine," "St. Sebastian," a head of Christ, etc.; (3) 100 objects from the "Green Cave" ( C a v e a u vert)·, (4) and (5) 50 objects from each of the two following "Cabinets": of Antiques at Dresden, and of Natural To Delacroix, Bailleu, Pr. Pr\., I, 446. " S e p t . 22, 1796, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, f. 3. "Caillard to Delacroix, Sept. 27, 1796, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, ff. 20-21. 21

"Delacroix to Caillard, Sept. 30, 1796, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, £. 26. 25 Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, ff. 35-36.

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History; (6) 50 engravings from the Electoral château — all at the choice of the French Commissioner. Then, the city works . Leipzig. Leipzig.

of Leipzig shall deliver to the French Republic: (1) 2,000 printed . . and 15 manuscripts, . . . to be taken from the public libraries of (2) 20 engraved stones, to be taken from the Cabinet of the Council of All at the choice of the French Commissioner.26

These terms would indeed have pacified the Saxons! How the Directory could not see that spoliation was unworthy of the great name of France is one of the enigmas of history. It believed it was glorifying the nation by stealing pictures of the Virgin and heads of Christ! Saxony adhered to the neutrality of northern Germany on November 22, and seven days later, Caillard and Haugwitz signed an "Additional Article" to the Treaty of August 5, 1796. This article prolonged the neutrality line so as to include the Upper Saxon Circle.27 The Directory considered the adherence of Saxony to the Neutrality Convention as but a first step toward a North German league, to consist of Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, arid Hesse.28 "Its bases . . . are already definitively decreed," declared an article in the Gazette française. "The King of Prussia is its protector and supreme moderator. Its combined forces, forming an army of 100,000 men, will extend from the banks of the Weser to those of the Main." 29 The selfsame idea is contained in Delacroix's despatch of November 11, 1796, to Caillard,30 and in Caillard's despatch of November 29 to Delacroix.31 Archduke Charles was disconcerted. He had allowed the Saxon troops to fly to the protection of their hearths, and now there was talk of Saxony's allying with the Emperor's hereditary enemy. He demanded that the Elector send his contingent back to the army of the Empire, since the situation which had induced him to withdraw it no longer obtained.32 The Elector refused, and it was not practicable to force him to comply, for his army was strong. Moreover, since Prussia and Hesse-Cassel had also violated the law, there was a possibility that they would support their comx

Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 370. Dated brumaire, V (October-November, 1796). Text in Debidour, Recueil, IV, 543-544. 28 When Caillard spoke to Haugwitz about Frederick William's posing as the defender of Germany against the personal views of the Emperor, Haugwitz replied: "Very well, but don't start by alienating from us thé Elector of Saxony, without whom the league of princes would always be incomplete, this prince being the first in importance among 27

the princes of the second order" (Caillard to Delacroix, Oct. 4, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 3x7). 29 Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 306. Date of article: Feb. 15, 1797; of the journal: March 9. 1797· Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 1 1 8 . 81 Arch. Ν., A F III 76, d. 3 1 7 . 82 Vide Eden to Grenville, Oct. 5, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 7/46.

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rade-in-error. Hesse-Cassel had already been placed, to all intents and purposes, under the ban of the Empire, 33 so had little to lose, and Prussia had told the Diet that, considering its (Prussia's) own well-known relations, it would not be able to take any part in the Diet's troop-raising proceedings. 34 A n d of course all the other states which had concluded separate-peace treaties with France were sympathetic to Saxony. This sympathy had not been decreased by the Emperor's act of citing them before the Ratisbon Diet for violating the Imperial constitution, 85 nor did Francis' direct protests to Württemberg, Baden, and Swabia tend to anything but support of the Wettin Elector. 36 Likewise, the report that Archduke Charles had ordered military execution against princes whose contingents in men or money were in arrears.37 Thus, it was not a case of the Emperor vs. Saxony, but of the Emperor vs. his Empire. W h e n the year 1796 drew to a close, almost all Germany had abandoned its chief. 38 T h e Directorial policy, blundering though it may have been, had contributed to render possible the dazzling exploits of the succeeding year. "Barthélémy to CPS, Oct. 7, 1795, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 669, f. 366. "Bulletin from Ratisbon, Feb. 1, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 672, f. 75. A hundred Roman months had been voted (ibid.). M Rédacteur, no. 372 (Dec. 22, 1796). M "Bulletin" of Nov. 16, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 81, d. 336. 37 Rédacteur, no. 163 (May 26, 1796). M The contingent of the Bavarian Elector was the only one of consequence still with the Imperial army. The Elector had urged Arch-

duke Charles to allow him to withdraw it, as Bavaria had promised at Pfaffenhofen. The Archduke refused absolutely (Eden to Grenville, Oct. 5, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 7/46). Sciout says that after Saxony's defection, all Germany had abandoned its chief (Direc., II, 19), but Delacroix wrote to Caillard on January 26, 1797, that Bavaria, "in this war, has been constandy armed against it [France]" (Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, ff. 318-319).

>ft

CHAPTER XVI

X

T H E D EL A C R O I X - M AL ME S BUR Y NEGOTIATIONS, OCTOBER 23-DECEMBER 19, 1796

T will be recalled that an attempt had been made by England (through

/

Wickham) to come to terms with France in the early spring of 1796. The effort had failed largely because the Directory refused to consider the possibility of returning the Belgian Netherlands to Austria — a return which England was pledged to procure by her treaty with the Emperor. 1 T h e war was very expensive, however, and the invasion of the right bank of the Rhine by Moreau and Jourdan, and of Italy by Bonaparte, during the summer of 1796 had emphasized the possibility of a separate Franco-Austrian peace. In September, Lord Grenville expressed to the Danish minister in England the wish that the Danish minister in Paris should ask the French government for a passport for a person of confidence authorized to discuss means of restoring peace. 2 T h e Paris populace did not know of the overture, but the police reports inform us that the thought of concluding the conflict with England was in many French minds. There seemed, however, overwhelming obstacles in the path of peace. England was too tyrannical and too powerful on the seas. George III wished to treat only jointly with Austria, 3 and the Directory insisted on separate-peace agreements. T h e Franco-Spanish treaty seemed by its terms necessarily to exclude an accord with England. Still, the French ' A s explained supra, Pt. II, chap, vi, η. 34, the Emperor, or rather Thugut, was less anxious to obtain Belgium back than was England that he should have it. 'British Annual Register, 1796, "Public Papers," p. 126. "Reference for this assertation alone: "Minute of Lord Grenville," Sept. 2, 1796, Drop-

more Papers, III, 239. "The interests of Great Britain cannot be so separated from those of the Continent," wrote Grenville. ". . . Such a mode of treating [i.e., joint negotiarion] has always been found to be the only effective mode of restoring peace to Europe when engaged in general or extensive wars" (ibid.).

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people talked among themselves about the possibility of sending a negotiator to England — but they presently rejected the thought as humiliating. 4 A n d now England was offering to send a negotiator to France. T h e Danish minister in Paris, after making the overture to Delacroix, waited three days for an answer which Delacroix had promised would be immediate. Then the Danish minister called on Delacroix. T h e latter's tone was very dry. T h e Directory had not permitted him to reply in writing, he said, but he was authorized to express himself verbally as follows: " T h a t the Executive Directory of the French Republic would not, for the future, receive or answer any confidential overtures or papers transmitted through any intermediate channel from the enemies of the Republic; but that if they would send persons furnished with full powers and official papers, these might, upon the frontiers, demand the passports necessary for proceeding to Paris." 5 A more impudent answer could hardly be imagined. T h e representative of the K i n g of England should, without the certainty of being admitted, make the trip to France and stand as a suppliant before the French frontier. H e was not promised admission even orally. It was promised only that he could come to the frontier and request a passport — which he knew already. Grenville was determined, however, to leave the French no pretext for eluding a discussion, in order that responsibility for continuation of the war should rest on shoulders other than his own. H e therefore swallowed his pride and wrote to Delacroix for the necessary passports 6 — though he did not, be it noted, send his representative to the French frontier until the passports had arrived. Lord Malmesbury, who had once been despatched to Berlin to keep Prussia in the Coalition, was selected as the negotiator, and he left for Paris on October 16. O n the twenty-third, he held his first conference with Delacroix. 7 Malmesbury proposed as a general basis for the negotiations that England and France should barter conquests, England returning the captured French colonies to France, and France returning the Austrian territories occupied by French troops to Austria. 8 T h e Directory objected that such a balancing of the interests of the Allies would necessitate a congress, the ways of which were "always tardy." A n d it declared that this was but a renewal, "under more amicable forms," of Wickham's propositions. T h e Directory would, however, consider proposals for exchange provided that England secured a "Oct. 5, 1796, Aulard, Paris, III, 497. "British Annual Register, 1796, "Public Papers," pp. 126-127. 'Ibid., pp. 127-128. This time the Directory and the Republic were named. T W . Hunt, The History of England, 1760-

1801 (London, 1905), p. 383, in W . Hunt and R. L. Poole (eds.), The Political History of England (12 vols., London, 1905-1921), X. "Oct. 24, 1796, British Annual Register, 1796, "Public Papers," pp. 130-131.

THE DELACROIX-MALMESBURY NEGOTIATIONS, LATE I796

67I

mandate from Thugut, and Austria agreed to be bound by what England and France decided.9 Malmesbury could produce no mandate, and for a good reason. England was negotiating despite Austria, not by agreement with Austria. Thugut thought it was no time to make peace when one's armies were winning victories, and there was at last a chance to secure some indemnity for all the losses of four years of war. Nor did Thugut think he had a right to take any step toward peace without first consulting his Russian ally,10 especially since the consequences of alienating Russia might be greatly to Austria's detriment. Nor was Thugut pleased that Hammond had been sent to Berlin by Pitt the previous August 1 1 without informing Austria, precisely as Malmesbury had been sent to Paris now without notice to the Emperor. 12 Nor did Thugut view without resentment England's failure to send adequate subsidies. Nor did Thugut like Malmesbury personally.13 But the Austrian minister was not averse to England's plan of exchange, of itself — with qualifications! Belgium was acceptable to him if properly aggrandized with Dutch Flanders and Liège. However, without such aggrandizement, the reacquisition of Belgium was to him only the first step of the long-planned Bavaro-Belgian exchange. To this, England was hostile because she wanted a strong friend installed across the Channel. Thugut's argument that Austria could defend Belgium against France more effectively if she did not own Belgium but did own Bavaria,14 fell on deaf ears. 'Extract from the Register of the Directory, Oct. 26, 1796, ibid., pp. 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 . 10 Unless, of course, his ally did not know anything about it, which was not the case here. Toward the end of November, an Austrian courier, arriving at Vienna and learning that the Emperor was at Pressburg, stopped only long enough to change horses, and repaired to Pressburg. This courier was reported to have let slip that he was the bearer of propositions of peace or of armistice. Thugut complained of the courier's reported indiscretion, for, said the Minister, "we are absolutely obliged to communicate any overtures whatsoever to our allies, . . . whereas politics requires that, notwithstanding, we reserve the faculty of speaking to the Allies about them or not, according to the circumstances" (Thugut to Count Colloredo, Nov. 22, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 356). u S e n t to offer Prussia Belgium if Frederick William would join the Coalition and drive the French from the Netherlands; but owing to George Ill's resistance, Hammond was ordered not to be too explicit (Guyot,

Direc., pp. 264-266). "The Austrians have, as yet, had no opportunity of shewing whether they are willing to go the same lengths. Whatever may be their conduct on this occasion, they have shewn themselves a high-minded and magnanimous people" (W. Windham [British secretary of state for war] to Admiral Sir Sidney Smith [then prisoner in France], Nov. 5, 1796, L. Melville [pseud, for L. S. Benjamin] [ed.], The Windham Papers [2 vols., Boston, 1 9 1 3 ] , II, 26-27). Windham evidendy hoped that Austria was sufficiently magnanimous to forgive the sending of Malmesbury without previous concert. 18 Eden to Grenville, Nov. 16, 1796, Herrmann, Dipl. Corr., pp. 539-541; Eden to Lord Auckland (his brother), Nov. 16, 1796, The Bishop of Bath and Wells (ed.), The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord Auc\land (4 vols., London, 1 8 6 1 1862), III, 360-362; idem, Dec. 9, 1796, ibid., p. 368. " E d e n to Grenville, Nov. 16, 1796, Herrmann, Dipl. Corr., pp. 539—540. u

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If Austria would not reinstall herself permanently in Belgium, then Belgium would have to be given to Prussia, Britain's ambassador informed Thugut. T h u g u t forthwith blew up. T w o million inhabitants added to the hereditary enemy! Unthinkable! That was twice the population Austria stood to gain if she obtained Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate. 15 A n d how could the Bavaro-Palatine Elector ever be compensated if Belgium was turned over to Prussia? With Ansbach and Baireuth? They were hopelessly inadequate. With secularized territory? T h e Emperor had agreed with Czarina Catherine not to consent especially to that.1® D i d England plan to strangle the Elector or send him to Botany Bay? the Austrian minister demanded. 17 Thugut was not only angry that England should have made such a proposition, but fearful that it might lead to closer ties between England and Prussia. 18 Faced with a situation fraught with unknown and dangerous potentialities, the Emperor appealed to Russia for help. England was about to desert him, he said. Austria would succumb if Catherine did not come to its aid with a l l 1 9 of her forces. But Czarina Catherine was dead. Had been already for three days when the plea left Vienna (November 20). Her successor was Paul I, weak-minded scion of the famous empress, and friend of her enemies. Austria could therefore count no longer on help from the East. 20 Meanwhile, the negotiations at Paris were at a standstill to give time for England to obtain and present concrete evidence that Austria concurred in Malmesbury's propositions. Thugut's mandate never arrived, of course, because it was never sent. Malmesbury urged that the discussions proceed (November 12) . 21 It seems that the Directory's patience was running out, for it forthwith asked for details of the English plan of exchange. 22 Malmesbury replied that France had not yet agreed to accept the principle of bartering conquests, and that such acceptance was a necessary preliminary to any discussion of what particular items might be bartered. 23 Delacroix replied that his previous correspondence showed that the Directory had accepted the "Idem, Nov. 26, 1796, ibid., pp. 541-543. Contra: Bavaria would mean to Austria an increase in population of 3,000,000, and in revenues, of 30,000,000 livres (Ami des Lois, no. cxxxviii [Dec. 26, 1795]. This copy of the Ami des Lois is wrongly numbered cxxxviii; however, since all copies after no. cxxxii [really cxxii] have the error, it must be preserved for the sake of consistency). Sybel places the population of the Austrian Netherlands at 1,500,000 (Europe, IV, 480). " E d e n to Grenville, Nov. 26, 1796, Herrmann, Dipl. Corr., pp. 541-543. " E d e n to Lord Auckland, Dec. 9, 1796, /.

Corr. Auckland, III, 368. " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, Aug. 24, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 332. " A reference to the long-promised 60,000 Russians. 20 Sciout, Direc., II, 50-51. Paul recalled the Russian armies from foreign soil, announcing that while his mother had always aimed at conquests, his desire was to make his peoples happy (Sybel, Europe, IV, 332). "British Annual Register, 1796, "Public Papers," p. 133. 22 Ibid., p. 134. 28 Nov. 26, 1796, ibid., pp. 135-136.

THE DELACROIX-MALMESBURY NEGOTIATIONS, LATE 1 7 9 6

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principle, and he forthwith confirmed its acceptance.24 Thereupon, Malmesbury demanded of his court what proposals he should make, and submitted the reply to Delacroix on December 17. The British government offered to restore all the French colonies if the Directory returned Belgium and Lombardy to Austria, and — as to the Empire— agreed to "a suitable arrangement conformable to the respective interests and the general safety of Europe." 25 It was evident that the latter terms concealed only lightly a willingness to yield at least part of the Rhineland to the Directory, and indeed, in his next conversation with Delacroix, Malmesbury declared that it was "not impossible" that France should be allowed some aggrandizement on the side of Germany, but not all the left bank — Malmesbury made that clear. However, Delacroix found the demand for the return of Belgium too much, and asked if it was a sine qua non. "Most certainly," replied Malmesbury, unless the French could suggest some other disposition which would take the province out of their hands and prevent them from seizing it again. Delacroix did not ask for elucidation. Belgium was an integral part of the Republic, he said. It was part of France when the Directorial constitution was adopted, hence could cease to be a part of France only by revising the Constitution. Neither the Directory nor the legislature could do that, he declared. A constituent assembly would have to be convoked, with all the attendant confusion. This line of reasoning was of course pure nonsense, and Malmesbury — merely for the sake of argument — undertook to reduce it to absurdity. Let us assume, he said to Delacroix, that Belgium does form an integral part of France. Now, had the war resulted in France's losing a part of what she considered her integral dominions instead of having resulted in an increase of territory, could not the French government, as then constituted, have ceded a portion of France in order to save the remainder ? Delacroix answered that that was stating a case of necessity, which did not now exist. Malmesbury replied that if the power to cede a part of the territory of France existed in a case of necessity, it existed in all cases. Delacroix protested that the French needed Belgium and the left bank in order to restore the European equilibrium destroyed by the Polish partitions and the English conquests on the sea. Malmesbury recalled to Delacroix that the latter had said to him in a previous conference: "We are no longer in the decrepitude of monarchical France, but in all the force of an adolescent republic." Now, said Malmesbury, since France was an object of jealousy and attention under her kings, and is yet stronger, according to Delacroix " N o v . 27, 1796, ibid., p. 136. œ "Confidential Memorial on the principal Ob-

jects of Restitution, Compensation, and reciprocal Arrangement," ibid., pp. 1 3 6 - 1 3 7 .

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himself, since the Revolution, Europe could not tolerate that this invigorated France should extend its boundaries also. To this, Delacroix replied that "In the revolutionary period, all that you are saying, my Lord, was true — nothing equalled our power; but that period no longer exists." And Delacroix explained that the French could no longer be induced to rise up en masse, and sacrifice their lives and fortunes for the public weal. When once peace had been concluded, he added, the French Republic would be the most pacific power in Europe. Malmesbury remarked that the change from youth to decrepitude would thus be rather sudden.26 When Delacroix and Malmesbury separated after this discussion (December 17), it was on such a tone of cordiality and mutual willingness to discuss that Malmesbury was quite shocked to receive, the next day, the following note from Delacroix: "The Executive Directory has listened to the reading of . . . [your] two confidential memorials without signatures. . . It cannot consider any confidential note without a signature. . . Present me, officially, within four and twenty hours, your ultimatum, signed by you." Malmesbury replied that the notes, to which the memorials were attached, were signed; however, he would — and he did — send in signed copies. As to the demand for his ultimatum before the two powers had even had an opportunity to submit their respective claims, such a demand, he declared, shut the door on all negotiation. He was ever ready, he said, to discuss further, but could do no more.27 In reply, the Directory (through Delacroix) declared that it would listen to no proposals contrary to the Republic's laws, constitution, and treaties. Moreover, since Malmesbury always maintained that he was "in want of the opinion of his court, . . . his presence at Paris [was] useless." Delacroix was "charged to give him notice to depart from Paris in eight and forty hours . . . and to quit, as expeditiously as possible, the territory of the Republic." 28 Thus ended the Delacroix-Malmesbury conferences of the autumn of 1796. Wrote Edmund Burke, who had opposed the sending of Malmesbury originally: "This mongrel [England] has been whipped back to the Kennel yelping and with his tail between his Legs. . . However, anything is better than a Jacobin peace. In every other posture of things, there are at least chances." 29 "Malmesbury to Grenville, Dec. 20, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., England 183; British Annual Register, 1796, "Public Papers," pp. 1 3 9 148. "Malmesbury to Delacroix, Dec. 19, 1796,

ibid., pp. 148-149. Dec. 19, ibid., p. 149. 29 To W. Windham, Dec. 25, 1796, Windham Papers, II, 35.

28

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CHAPTER XVII

X

F R A N C O - P R U S S I A N R E L A T I O N S FROM A U G U S T TO D E C E M B E R 1796

/ f S already pointed out, much of the diplomatic effort made by France since the Treaty of April 5, 1795, was devoted to trying to secure the alliance of Prussia against Austria. After the Treaty of August 5, 1796, these efforts were continued, for Austria had not yet been brought to her knees. A great deal of consideration for Prussia's sensibilities was manifested in order to win Prussian good will. "Political considerations have decided the Directory," that body wrote to Joubert on August 8, "to treat the possessions of princes who are relatives of the King of Prussia with all the consideration which the circumstances of war permit. Make sure, Citizen, that the contributions imposed on the principality of Nassau-Orange are so small that the cabinet of Berlin will be grateful to the French government for its moderation." 1 "The greatest mutual politeness" wrote Elgin to Grenville on August 10, "is established between the Prussians and the French. The latter pay the utmost attention to all sauvegardes given by Count Hardenberg. His written applications in favor of particular villages and persons are scrupulously acquiesced in. . . These attentions have produced a very evident effect." 2 In its efforts to secure Prussia's favor, however, the Directory did not entirely obliterate itself. The Prussians had requested the French army to treat Ratisbon, seat of the Diet of the Empire, as neutral. Carnot declared to Sandoz that "the city of Ratisbon, for which the King of Prussia has rel

Debidour, Recueil, III, 300. But contributions there had to be, even after Prussia intervened in favor of Nassau-Orange-Dillenburg, which sought neutrality. Le Coq reported to his king: "General Jourdan declared he could not possibly renounce the contributions in coin, the assessment of which had been . . . approved by the government, and

that new orders were obliging him to insist upon payment at the dates fixed, under pain of military execution and of an increase in the sums demanded. In regard to the requisitions, I found him less exacting" (Aug. 23, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk_., I, 82). 2 P. R. O., F. O. 64/41. The italicized words were underscored in the original.

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quested neutrality, is too Austrian to permit our yielding to his desire. We have believed ourselves obliged to treat it in the same manner that Frederick II did — that is, to put to flight its diet and its deliberations." 3 Two days before this — as already noted 4 — the Directory had ordered Jourdan to take possession of the registers of the Diet as soon as he should have arrived at Ratisbon. 5 Requests for Prussian military cooperation against Austria, veiled with threats to further the Emperor's ambitions if Prussia remained cold to France's advances, were legion. Carnot declared to Sandoz that France, left to her own resources, could either take little from Austria, and give her nothing in return, or take much and compensate her in proportion — with part of Bavaria, for example. However, none of the Directors wanted to increase the size of the Austrian possessions, so if Prussia would mass troops on the Austrian frontier, Austria, forced to sue for peace, could be deprived of much and still granted little.6 The same note was struck again several months later. Delacroix wrote to Caillard that if Prussia persisted in an inactivity profitable neither to herself nor to France, the Republic would be obliged to allow Austria to acquire "compensations vaster than she would have obtained if Prussia had pronounced herself more decidedly." Delacroix had first written — but had considered the expression too strong — "compensations not at all agreeable to Prussia." Caillard was ordered to make these insinuations with reserve.7 It was difficult to convince the revolutionary that there was such a thing as honor in politics. He thought the Prussians downright stupid because they insisted that neutrality meant neutrality, and not warlike demonstrations on the Austrian frontier — and at a time when Austria was weakening. Reubell, Le Tourneur, and Delacroix declared that "never was epoch more favorable for the King of Prussia to appropriate to himself all the influence in Germany. What was to be feared from Russia? She was weak as soon as one raised up against her Turkey, the malcontents of Poland, and Sweden. What was to be feared from Austria? She was too exhausted to resist Prussia. The combined forces of France and the latter [i.e., Prussia] would suffice for everything. . . " 8 Seeing their arguments unavailing, the Directors decided that perhaps the King of Prussia hesitated to make war upon Austria because he feared to be considered by his fellow Germans as the pawn of France. Caillard therefore suggested to Haugwitz to •Aug. 17, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 348. 4 Supra, Pt. II, chap. xiv. °Aug. 15, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, III, 377. "Sandoz to the King, Aug. 17, 1796, Bailleu,

Pr. Fr\., I, 85. 'Nov. i l , 1796, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, ff. 118-119. 8 Sandoz to the King, Sept. 27, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349.

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN RELATIONS, AUGUST—DECEMBER

1796

rally the princes of Germany around you, take them under your protection, and declare to the Court of Vienna that the Empire, fatigued by a war which has no other motive than the personal views of the Emperor, desires absolutely to put an end to the devastations to which it is continually exposed. . . Then you would not appear as the ally of the Republic, but as the natural friend and defender of the repose of Germany; and we also would attain the goal we have in mind [i.e., to force Austria to conclude peace on French terms].9 After the Directory gave its consent to Saxony's adherence to the neutrality of northern Germany, the idea of a simple Franco-Prussian alliance developed into one including Saxony, Hesse,10 Sweden, and the Porte. 11 The function of the last two powers would of course be to hold Russia in check; of the first two, to assist against Austria. However, all these grandiose plans were doomed to end in failure, for, as Haugwitz declared to Elgin in August 1796, Prussia did not intend to take any part in the war, but only to exert its influence at the pacification.12 Hers was an economical policy. Waitz, Minister of State of Hesse-Cassel, seems, however, to have been willing to fall in with France's plans, at least in so far as action against Austria was concerned. Waitz, then in Berlin, agreed with Caillard that the moment was favorable for Prussia, Saxony, and Hesse to unite with France to impose peace on Austria — in fact, especially favorable since the accession of Paul to the Russian throne and the (rumored but untrue) surrender of Mantua. But Waitz wanted to promulgate a principle, in the declaration to be made to Austria: that hereditary right-bank princes would conserve their states in complete integrity. This would mean that Austria could not have Bavaria. Would the Directory approve? 13 Indeed it would, it replied by vote of Le Tourneur, Carnot, and Revellière, "willingly . . . with the exception of some slight changes." Caillard was to be charged to stir the German princes into action.14 But nothing came of this overture, for, almost two months later, Caillard was threatening the Prussian Ministry with letting Austria have Bavaria unless Berlin — preferably in union with Dresden and Cassel — made an energetic demonstration against Austria to force the latter to enter into serious negotiations for peace.18 Prince Charles of Hesse-Rheinfels naturally could not keep from adding his influence to the question of a Hessian alliance. In an article in the Ami des Lois, he worked on the principles of fear and suggestion: "Caillard to Delacroix, Oct. 4, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frit-, I, 447. 10Idem, Nov. 8, 1796, ibid., p. xxix. "Delacroix to Caillard, Oct. 10, 1796, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, f. 48. " E l g i n to Grenville, Aug. 13, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 64/41.

"Caillard to Delacroix, Dec. 20, 1796, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, S. 222-223. " D i r . to Delacroix, Jan. 5, 1797, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 257. 15 Feb. 28, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354.

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If France could be subjugated, it would terminate his [i.e., the King of Prussia's] power. I am going to trace his fate: He, and his dear cousin [the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel] as well, would be put under the ban of the Empire; both would be deposed in consequence of their weaknesses, their sons reinstated perhaps on humiliating conditions; and the House of Austria, which never pardons, would parade them shamefully before the whole Empire, to serve as an example to posterity, and would confine them closely in prison. Let not people say that I am presenting a fairy tale here. Open the annals of the history of Charles V . . . [Prussia and Hesse] should be our allies for their own sakes, for ours, and for the sake of all Europe. . . Will they take up arms [on our side against Austria] ? Yes, certainly, if the Emperor refuses to be indemnified at the expense of the ecclesiastical electors, bishops, and monks, . . . if he listens only to his hates, . . . and if he insists on squandering the blood and treasure of his peoples, and wishes to complete the ruin of the entire Empire. There is no doubt that, in such case, William will imitate the sublime example set by the great Frederick in 1778. . . l e A n attempt was made to capitalize the King's greed. Delacroix suggested to Sandoz that Prussia could aggrandize herself with Polish territory, purchase Swedish Pomerania, obtain Mecklenburg in exchange for Westphalia and Münster, etc., etc. 17 Théremin remitted to Delacroix a memoir advocating that Saxony should be given to Frederick William — " H e would invade it anyway before two years were up" — and that the Saxon Elector should be established in Franconia. 18 Théremin knew what was dearest to a Prussian heart. 19 It should be mentioned again that not everyone in France was blind to the danger of aggrandizing particular states of Germany. L e C o q reported to his king on August 23 that in Jourdan's army there were several persons, including the Commander in Chief himself, w h o were opposed thereto. Jourdan told L e Coq that his opinion had been molded by the consideration that "these soldiers of the contingents at whom we now mock would become so many redoubtable warriors under the flag of a great power." 20 Still the Directory was doing everything humanly possible to make Prussia into a great power. If Frederick William had gathered about him, as suggested, the states of the Empire, it would not have been long before the greedy Hohenzollern House would have created out of the Empire a unified military state. H o w little this would have been to France's interest " N o . 472 (Nov. 27,1796). " S a n d o z to the King, Sept. 17, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk; I, 89. "Sept. 13,1796, Arch. N., A F Ι Π 76, d. 315. " I n 1752, Frederick the Great, believing himself at death's door, drew up a testament indicating for his successors what territories

should be conquered for the greatest good of Prussia. Electoral Saxony came first on the list. This acquisition was necessary to round out the shapeless Hohenzollern dominions, Frederick thought (Daniels in C. Mod. H., VI, 251). 20 Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 82-83.

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was pointed out by an archival "Analysis of a Dissertation" 21 — if the Directory needed assistance in realizing this plain fact. The Gazette française of a litde later period published a letter from Nuremberg which contained some very useful ideas on this question of aggrandizing Prussia. Its author argued that Prussia should not be built up even to equal strength with Austria because, whereas Austria's area and population were greater than Prussia's, Prussia was able to exert greater force at a given point. If France increased the Prussian strength, Prussia might force the Republic to restore to the Empire territory won by French valor.22 The Directory's error was to regard Prussian hegemony in the Empire as French hegemony. France was sowing dragon seeds, and could not hope to reap posies. 21

"Analysis o £ a Dissertation upon a Question Relative to the New Limits of France," Aug. 30, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 265. 23 Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 298. (Eisner, former Minerva contributor, said in a pamphlet appearing in the summer of 1796, "The Germans, divided, . . . view with sufficient indifference the large slice being

detached from their Empire. But, once joined together as a national unit, the memory of what they [formerly] possessed would awaken, along with the ambition to reclaim it. . ." (Considérations d'un voyageur sur les relations futures de la France avec les pays situés sur la rive droite du Rhin, quoted in Droz, Allemagne, p. 76.)

Vi

CHAPTER XVIII

if

THE DIRECTORY AND

AUSTRIA

D U R I N G T H E L A T T E R P A R T OF 1796

I.

GENERAL

H E retreat of Moreau and Jourdan from the heart of Germany at first gripped the French in a vise of terror, and the wildest rumors gained currency: The Austrians were at Cologne. They were besieging Strasburg. Jourdan had been wounded and was dying; his army was in a dangerous mood; he had lost 30,000 men and 200,000,000 francs' worth of equipment and money. Moreau's losses had not, as yet, been fully disclosed. Every young man between eighteen and thirty was to be drafted. There was to be a forced loan of 100,000,000 francs. 1 The government intended to demand three years' taxes in a lump sum.2 Sixty thousand Russians were coming to the Emperor's aid. 3 In a few days, however, the public mind had calmed, and was turning its attention to the efforts of the army to regain its lost advantages, and to the possibility of peace.4 Rumor said the King of Prussia had decided to link his interests with those of France, and was pressing Austria to accept the Directory's peace terms; that peace was therefore just around the corner.5 All news that appeared to delay or obstruct the conclusion of peace was received with ill grace.6 There was general satisfaction with the renewed success of the Sambre and Meuse Army, and the report circulated that a final and mighty effort was to be made to determine Germany and England to subscribe to a general peace. A majority of the Directory was said to be strongly in favor of peace.7 Then panic seemed to seize on the public again, due to alarming stories in the newspapers.8 The Austrians were reported to have captured Kehl, 1

Report of Oct. i, 1796, Aulard, Paris, III, 486-487. 2 Report of Oct. 2, ibid., p. 488. " Report of Oct. 1, ibid., p. 487. 1 Report of Oct. 6, ibid., p. 497.

" Report of Oct. 7, ibid., p. 499. " Report of Nov. 4, ibid., p. 556. 7 Report of Nov. 7, ibid., p. 559. ' Report of Nov. 12, ibid., p. 570.

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and to be bombarding Hüningen. 9 The Rhine and Moselle Army became the object of solicitude.10 The King of Prussia was said to be about to invade Holland and reestablish the stadholder. 11 This is the background against which most of the present chapter must be read.

2.

THE ZWANZIGER MISSION TO VIENNA, AUGUST-OCTOBER 1 7 9 6

On July 21, 1796 — this was yet in happier times, when Jourdan was approaching Würzburg and Moreau was plunging through Swabia — Le Tourneur proposed in the Directory that an envoy extraordinary should be despatched to the Emperor to announce the sincere wish of France for peace. Carnot and Revellière supported this motion, but Reubell and Barras argued that such an overture would seem to have been dictated by fear, and would really prolong the war; that the surest way to bring about the end of hostilities was to take Mantua, drive out the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and defeat Archduke Charles. Then it would be the Emperor who would sue for peace, and the terms imposed would be honorable and worthy of the French Republic. Revellière changed sides, and L e Tourneur's motion was rejected. 12 It was not long, however, before Carnot found means of commencing the negotiation which his friend, L e Tourneur, had proposed. The advance of Jourdan and Moreau into southern Germany had not been a military operation alone. Swarms of secret agents had accompanied, and even preceded the troops, to prepare the way by seeking out friends of liberty and progress — or, in more modern parlance, by purchasing fifth columnists. One of these French agents, traveling under the pseudonym Stephani, made an important "discovery" in Nuremberg. Zwanziger and Rhodius were members of the Council of Regency of the County of Kastel, and represented Kastel at the diet of the Circle of Franconia. Despite their positions of trust, they agreed to act as informers for the French, and to exercise their great influence for the benefit of the Empire's declared enemy. 13 When General Jourdan 1 4 arrived with his Republicans, they it was, it will be recalled, who negotiated the Franco-Franconian Armistice of August 7, 1796, which granted such vast quantities of supplies to the French (yet which proved to be not enough). They had offered to negotiate this agreement in fulfillment of their promise to serve France, and they subsequently procured their own appointment to treat for the peace at Paris. ' Report of Nov. 11, ibid., p. 567. Report of Nov. 12, ibid., p. 569-570. 11 Report of Nov. 14, ibid., p. 573. u Mém. Barras, II, 173.

10

Guyot, Direc., pp. 308-309. " N o t Moreau, as in Guyot, Direc., p. 309. Moreau was invading Swabia and Bavaria. 13

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W h e n Zwanziger and Rhodius arrived in Paris, Carnot and his friend Clarke of the Historical and Military Topographical Bureau were racking their brains how to institute peace negotiations with Austria in such a way that the obstinate Reubell and his blundering protégé Delacroix could not disrupt them. T o them, Zwanziger was an angel in disguise, and they forthwith sent him on a secret mission to Vienna. T o keep the secret secret both from the Directory and from its minister of foreign affairs was not easy. Communication with the envoy was ordered maintained by military courier sent by way of Italy, and Zwanziger's letters were to be addressed to Clarke personally. Thus, no amount of research in the Archives Nationales or Archives des Affaires Etrangères will turn up a scrap of this interesting intrigue. 15 Zwanziger left Paris for Vienna on September 16, but did not arrive until October 5, when the Austrians were in the flood tide of success. T h e agent therefore refrained from submitting to the Austrian government the "Bases" which served as his instructions, thinking the time unfavorable. 16 But it was unfavorable only in a certain sense, for, as people in Paris were saying, the Emperor should have been more inclined to peace now that the French were no longer in the heart of his Empire. 1 7 That was on the assumption, of course, that Zwanziger's terms were reasonably consonant with the new military situation. A glance will determine whether they were or not: France wishes to keep the left bank of the Rhine, and the right-bank bridgeheads of Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel, Kehl, Alt-Breisach, and Hüningen. Austria shall renounce her possessions on the left bank, in Swabia, and in Italy except Tuscany, and accept indemnification in Germany — such indemnification to be at the expense of Bavaria, as implied by a provision for indemnifying the Bavaro-Palatine Elector in Italy. T h e K i n g of Prussia, the ex-stadholder, and the D u k e of Modena (who would be dispossessed) shall be indemnified in Germany for their losses. Eight electorates shall be recognized at the general peace, three of them in favor of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the D u k e of Modena, and the Prince of NassauOrange, respectively; the Electorate of Mayence shall be continued under another name; the former Electorates of Bohemia, Saxony, Brandenburg, and Hanover shall subsist.18 T h e Bases, then, reflected a situation which no longer existed, and new instructions should have been rushed to Zwanziger. Instead, there arrived Guyot, Direc., p. 309, points this out. Zwanziger to Clarke, Oct. 25, 1796, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. 1, 79-80. Clarke's letter arrived on October 11. "Report of the Central Police Bureau, Oct. 3, 15

18

13

1796, Aulard, Paris, III, 491. Fructidor, IV (August-September 1796). Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 75-76.

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Clarke's letter of September 20 — a product of gladder times, though not too glad. Jourdan had already retreated to the Lahn and, according to the admission of Clarke himself, the Rhine and Moselle Army was merely in a condition to resist and defeat its enemies — not victoriously advancing. But Clarke had confidence that the pendulum would presently swing back in France's favor, 19 so, boasting that France was not aggravating the terms, he ordered the Bases to be presented without any modification whatsoever. How incongruous to the victorious Austrians must have seemed Clarke's threats: "Think of what our emissaries, our proclamations, and our armies could do in Bohemia, in Hungary, and perhaps in Vienna. . . If the Emperor does not make peace, the Executive Directory will have Trieste and all the maritime settlements on the Adriatic destroyed"; if the Emperor wants to escape this fate, he must promptly despatch a plenipotentiary to Paris.20 Zwanziger was told that the Emperor was still desirous of peace, but of a just one, such as was not incompatible with his engagements with his allies; and that, while attempts at intimidation might succeed with a small state, it could never overawe a power such as Austria.21 Nevertheless, Zwanziger was authorized by Thugut to remain in Vienna for the time being and continue his correspondence with Paris — so as to leave a road open for peace negotiations in case England deserted the Austrian alliance. However, the secret soon became public property. Sandoz demanded an explanation of Carnot, who declared that the Directory had had only a very limited part in the affair.22 3.

CHARRUELLE AT VIENNA, OCTOBER 1 7 9 6 - J A N U A R Y

1797

The threat to destroy the Austrian maritime settlements on the Adriatic did not come through Zwanziger alone. On September 20, the Directory had written to Bonaparte to make the same threat, adding: "As soon as the fate of Wurmser and of his last division is decided, send [someone] to Vienna to give notice of this, and march upon Trieste, ready to execute a threat rendered legitimate by the rights of war and the pertinacity of a proud dynasty which dares all against the Republic and makes sport of its fairness." 23 The day before this, Carnot had written to Bonaparte, "Threaten u

Sandoz noted this attitude as a general characteristic of the ruling revolutionists. On October 6, Sandoz wrote, "The assurance that they will reobtain superiority and military success towards the end of this campaign maintains and fortifies it [the system of leftbank conquests] in every way; they speak, they plan, and they decide as if they had arranged matters with Destiny" (to the

King, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349. f· 24)· 20 Clarke to Zwanziger, Hüfíer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 76-77. "Zwanziger to Clarke, Oct. 25, 1796, ibid., p. 81. 22 Guyot, Direc., p. 3 1 1 and n. 6. 23 Corr. inéd. Ñapo., II, 42.

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the Emperor that you will destroy his only port if he does not hasten to accept peace; and really do so if he is obstinate." 24 Bonaparte was by no means averse to blustering; moreover, he liked to feign horror for the sufferings caused by the war. H e therefore made his letter to the Emperor a strange combination of noble sentiments and ignoble menaces: "Sire, Europe desires peace. This disastrous war has been lasting too long." T h e n came the threat to fill up the harbor of Trieste, etc., ending with, "I desire that your Majesty should be sensible of the misfortunes which threaten your subjects, and render repose and tranquillity to the world." 2 5 This letter was delivered by the same courier — an officer of Bonaparte's army, named Charruelle — who brought Clarke's letter of September 20 to Zwanziger. 2 6 If not for the arrival of Charruelle, Zwanziger would have been deported; the Emperor had already authorized T h u g u t to invite him to leave within twenty-four hours. 27 However, Clarke's letter to Zwanziger had been opened by the Austrians, and found to be in cipher. From this circumstance, Thugut concluded that Zwanziger was in the employ of the Directory, 28 and not merely sounding the intentions of the French government respecting peace on the invitation of persons in Vienna, as he had asserted; 29 also, that the Zwanziger intrigue and the Charruelle mission were "simultaneous and intimate combinations of the same affair." 30 Clarke's letter was duly delivered to Zwanziger, but he was kept under surveillance, and detained in the hope of drawing from him some of his secrets. T h u g u t was particularly anxious to learn "whether the Prussian government be privy to his mission," for Zwanziger "is of an intriguing and resdess character, and known to be a zealous partisan, of the Court of Berlin in Franconia, where he is employed at the diet of that circle as the agent of several of the lesser princes." 3 1 It is interesting to note that Lucchesini, Prussian Ambassador to Vienna, and the Prussian Ministry, were just as " Ibid., p. 56. 25 Ibid., p. 97. " Thugut to Count Colloredo, Oct. 10, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 342. K Eden to Grenville, Oct. 12, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 7/46. a Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 79. η· ι· " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, Oct. 10, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 343. The despatch for Zwanziger came in several envelopes, each (except the last) inside another, addressed to one Ployer, who, according to Zwanziger, had several times had the opportunity of

learning the Emperor's sentiments at first hand. Zwanziger asserted that he knew Prince von Colloredo-Mannsfeld, the Imperial vice-chancellor; also Counts Kolowrat and Lazansky (ibid., pp. 342-343). And, indeed, Lucchesini reported to Frederick William on October 19 that Zwanziger "conversed frequendy with Prince von Colloredo and Baron von Thugut" (Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 79, n. 1). " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, Oct. 12, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 344. 31 Eden to Grenville, Oct. 12, 1796, P. R. O.,

F. O. 7/46·

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685

anxious regarding Charruelle's purposes as was Thugut. 3 2 Thugut eventually decided that Zwanziger was not employed by the Court of Berlin, and that the message in cipher was from a Parisian friend of the Franconian, urging him to advise Austria to make peace before she had been totally ruined. 33 The Austrian public somehow assumed that Charruelle — or rather "Moustache," for so he had been designated in his passport 34 — had come to offer that Bonaparte would evacuate Italy if Moreau's army were allowed to retreat into France unmolested.35 Thugut doubted very much that his purposes could be so honorable, and even his name caused misgivings. "It ("Moustache") is evidently the fictitious name of some bandit and veritable sans-culotte who has been hurled at us, and who is doubtless a very crafty rogue, suited for spying . . . here and en route in case the other designs . . . fail." These "other designs" only time would divulge. Thugut sent on its way the letter from Bonaparte to the Emperor, and ordered that, for the time being, "Moustache" should be well treated but — in a sense — quarantined.36 How to prevent the public from forging a never-ending chain of wild rumors, based on the continued presence of the flowing moustaches, was a problem not lightly to be considered. It was solved by giving it to be understood that Charruelle was a courier who had been intercepted by an Austrian patrol and sent to Vienna for examination. First he was lodged in a private house; 3 7 then in the artillery barracks, where two officers never left his presence. He was not allowed to go into the open, nor to see anyone except those who were serving him. He was never granted the honor of appearing before Thugut. 38 Otherwise, he was treated with such great attention, and given so many opportunities for pleasure, that he almost succumbed (literally!) from overindulgence. 39 The Austrian government did not allow Charruelle to leave until January 5, 1797, alleging his illness as the reason. However, when we reflect that his release came the day after the news of the rupture of the DelacroixMalmesbury conferences arrived in Vienna, we cannot fail to conclude that the Austrian government was retaining the courier as a means of commencing negotiations with France in case England made a separate peace, as she had done at Utrecht and at Aix-la-Chapelle. 40 It is also true, of course, that 82

Hüffer, Europa, I, 220. ""Eden to Grenville, Oct. 16, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 7/46. " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, Oct. 10, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 342. 85 Nerciat (pseudonym: Certani; French agent in Vienna) to Guiraudet (head of the general secretariat of the French Department of Foreign Affairs), Oct. 19, 1796, Hüffer-

Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 78. Thugut to Count Colloredo, Oct. 10, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 342. " E d e n to Grenville, Oct. 12, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 7/46. 88 Hüffer, Europa, I, 221. 89 Nerciat to Guiraudet, Nov. 5, 24, 1796, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 78. " I t would certainly be difficult to put any M

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several weeks of the courier's virtual imprisonment were due to the desire of Austria to negate, by the lapse of time, the importance of any observations he might have made while on his way to Vienna. 41 The direct results of Charruelle's visit were nil. The Emperor, not deigning to answer a letter filled with menaces, or to enter into correspondence with an enemy general,42 ordered a simple receipt to be given the courier to certify that the despatch had been delivered.43 And Thugut instructed Degelmann to inform Barthélémy that the Emperor could entertain no proposition which had not come through regular diplomatic channels. "An insufferable haughtiness governs everything that this Austrian Ministry does," Carnot raged to Sandoz. 44 The indirect results of Charruelle's mission were, however, important, for the kind treatment accorded to Charruelle prompted the Directory to send a military officer directly to the Emperor to propose peace. Thus originated the mission of Clarke to Vienna, which will constitute the subject of the next chapter but one.

4.

NERCIAT AT V I E N N A , NOVEMBER I 7 9 6 - J A N U A R Y

1797

While Stephani settled as French agent in Nuremberg, Nerciat, another agent, famous ( ? ) as the author of pornographic literature,45 penetrated as far as Vienna, and escaped deportation because of a connection with the Neapolitan legation. Like most French agents, he constituted himself a plenipotentiary and tried his hand at high politics. On November 8, he wrote to his wife that he was sure he could bring about a Franco-Austrian peace "if our Republic truly desires peace," and that he had spoken with Thugut, who did not appear to be deaf to words of amity.46 On November i l , however, he wrote to Secretary-General Guiraudet that peace would not be so easy to conclude because of Russia.47 A few days later the agent was again hopeful after a conversation with an unnamed "person" initiated other construction on the following entry of Karl von Zinzendorf's: "The French courier Chancelle [sic], who has been here since October 10, 1796, was sent away emptyhanded on January 5, 1797, because (weil) on the day before, it was learned that Lord Malmesbury had left Paris on December 2 1 " (1SelbstbiographienZinzendorj, p. 246). In his "Tagebuch," Zinzendorf says "we sent back . . . Moustache . . . apparendy out of consideration for England" (Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 486). " E d e n to Grenville, Oct. 16, 1796, P. R. O.,

F. O. 7/46. Emperor to Alvinczi, Dec. 17, 1796, Thugut, C, W, pp. 54-55. " E d e n to Grenville, Oct. 16, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 7/46. " Hüffer, Europa, I, 221. " Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 77. n- 2. "Ibid., p. 87, n. 2. "Nerciat to Guiraudet, ibid. (Guiraudet was secretary-general of the Department of Foreign Affairs, not of the Directory [that was Joseph Lagarde].) 42

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in the secrets of the Court of Vienna. Announced Nerciat to Guiraudet on November 24: At last . . . some interesting details. . . I am about to have at my disposal the best of all means to second my views. . . I can confide to you in advance that it will not be wholly impossible to wean the Court of Vienna away from the influence of those of London and of St. Petersburg, and that if certain arrangements which have been faintly sketched to me in an important conversation could be . . . favored by our Republic, sacrifices would be made on this side which would satisfy it [i.e., the Republic] exceedingly. Nerciat reported that he had discussed the following subjects with the above-mentioned "person" : Does not the interest of Austria require that she should treat directly with France, and without England's interference, regarding the peace of the continent? How might Austria send an agent to treat with France without compromising the Emperor's dignity? Could not the Republic make some inconsequential, oblique overture which would afford Austria an opportunity to commence negotiations? Could not the French and Austrian generals agree on certain military positions from which it would be difficult to dislodge each other, then start to negotiate, shake off foreign intervention, and end by coming to an agreement? 48 On December 24, Nerciat wrote to Guiraudet that he had been ordered to quit Vienna. On January 3, he announced that he was leaving the next morning, but would be able to send to . . . (undeciphered) the message he had been charged to convey. The undeciphered name was probably "Thugut," for the Austrian helmsman wrote to Count Colloredo on January 4: " A few hours ago a letter was brought to my address. . . The author of this letter appears to be a kind of Poterat[z], but I do not fully understand how he reached Vienna without a passport. . . I am equally ignorant of the reasons why he became embroiled with the police, who expelled him from here yesterday, as he has informed me." 49 It is interesting to note in passing that, from this passage, Sorel, in his " L a Mission de Poterat[z] à Vienne," has manufactured a reappearance of Poteratz at the Austrian capital in January 1797.®° After his departure from Vienna, Nerciat was arrested in Linz. " T h e police," wrote Thugut to Count Colloredo on January 9, "have made a very disagreeable mistake in regard to Poteratfz] the Second, who has been 48

Idem, ibid., p. 87. "Briefe Thugut, II, 2. 80 "Released [after his arrest in July 1796]," writes Sorel, "Poterat[z] reappeared in Austria in the month of January 1797. . . Thugut had him expelled, and obliged him to sign an engagement not to enter Germany

again. . . What was he going to do at Vienna in the month of January 1797? Was he seeking to renew the thread of his negotiation of 1796? It cannot be affirmed" (RH, XXIX, 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; vide Hüffer-Luck wal d t, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 108).

688

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

arrested at Linz." 5 1 Seized, also, was a packet of letters which Nerciat had written and addressed for transmission to Basel. T h e Austrians simply tore up the envelopes and sent the letters to Thugut. 5 2 A n exceedingly polite person visited Nerciat in jail, and ordered him in the Emperor's name to quit the Habsburg lands, and even the Empire, declaring that it was only because of his good intentions that he was not treated as a spy, considering that he had introduced himself stealthily into Austria. Nerciat was asked to leave L i n z that very evening. 53 H e did.

5.

P E A C E PROPOSITIONS T O AUSTRIA VIA NOVEMBER

NAPLES,

1796

It was a direct result of the unfortunate 1796 campaign in Germany that yet another attempt was made to pave the way for Franco-Austrian peace. During the second week of November 1796, the Directory sought out Prince Belmonte Pignatelli, Neapolitan Ambassador to France, and asked a favor of him. Inasmuch as his queen's son-in-law was Emperor Francis II, would Prince Belmonte request his queen to offer peace to Francis in the Directory's name ? If the Emperor should agree to renounce Belgium and abandon the left bank of the Rhine to France, "very honorable" terms could be arranged. T h e overture bore no fruit, 54 though some of the elements must have been acceptable to the Emperor, for they had been offered by him through Frisching. 6.

A G E R M A N I N T R I G U E FOR

PEACE?

Practically at the same moment that Pignatelli was being approached by the Directory, a peace intrigue seems to have been going on inside Germany. W e know about it through a letter written on November 20 by von Duminique, minister of Prince-Elector Klemens Wenzeslaus of Trêves, to the Trêves chancellor, Eschermann: If the Austrian victories continue, we can expect a prompt and acceptable peace, and I will then initiate you into the secret plans and conferences of certain powers and princes. These involve, in case France should be victorious, not only the loss of the left bank, but also the secularization of certain South German right-bank territory to serve as indemnities for dispossessed princes. Klemens Wenzeslaus is trying to checkmate the plans. Y o u can inform the dean of the cathedral about this, confidentially. It is through singular good luck, and from an unimpeachable Briefe Thugut, II, 2. to Count Colloredo, Jan. i o , 1797, ibid., p. 3. " N e r c i a t to Guiraudet, Jan. 24, 1797, Hiiffer51

5 2 Thugut

Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 116. " S a n d o z to the King, Nov. 14, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk_., I, 104. Vide also Sciout, Direc., II, 113.

T H E DIRECTORY AND AUSTRIA, LATTER PART OF

I796

689

source, that we learned of these "diabolical" plans. " A certain ecclesiastical prince who was not born a prince" (obviously Baron von Erthal, PrinceElector of Mayence) has apprized Berlin that he is predisposed to secularization; and he has been negotiating to this end for his own advantage. On the other hand, the Prince-Electors of Cologne and Trêves, who, because of their high connections (the former with the Habsburgs, the latter with the French ex-royal house), had a right to expect great advantages from secularization, are strongly defending the integrity of the Empire. "Another lucky blow [i.e., victory] at the present juncture will oblige the enemies at Paris to abandon their hopes and our German enemies to drop their plans and ambitions." Duminique had just received news that Bonaparte had been soundly thrashed at Areola,55 and that is why his hopes were so high. But we, who know who won at Areola, must view the intrigues of Mayence in a different light. " H a n s e n , Quellen, III, 853 and η. 3 ; 854.

Xi

CHAPTER XIX

X

THE RHINE A N D T H E R H I N E L A N D , SPRING, 1796-SPRING, 1797

I.

THE DIRECTORY AND THE GERMAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

/ Í N oppressive regime is accepted docilely by people when it is vicÇ ^ / j L t o r i o u s . However, let insuccess appear, and the discontent that military glory might have soothed will soon break forth with unsubdued violence. So it was in France toward the end of September 1796. T h e Sambre and Meuse A r m y had already been driven onto the left bank, though the Rhine and Moselle A r m y was not yet to recross the Rhine for almost a month, when there appeared in the Courrier des armées et du corps législatif a scathing denunciation of the Revolution, in the form of a parallel between the old and new regimes. In 1788 A Bastille A dominant religion Churches rich in silver An abundance of coin 26,000,000 French Army and militia selected by lot People never lacking in things of prime necessity 55 million livres deficit Liberty under the name of slavery Respect for persons and property Protection to virtue and talents The scaffold for crime

In 1796 More than 44,000 bastilles No religion of any kind Churches entirely despoiled Coin exported, buried, vanished 19,000,000 French Conscripts and volunteers marching bound People in distress and misery Over 50 billion deficit Slavery under the name of liberty Contempt for persons and property Protection to thieves and assassins Amnesty for crime, and the scaffold for virtue 1

This was all very true, but though not said either as openly or as cleverly before, it was no revelation. A n unsigned report on the condition of France, ' N o . 347 (Sept. 27, 1796).

RHINE AND RHINELAND, SPRING, I796-SPRING, I 7 9 7

691

forwarded to T h u g u t from Italy in the earlier part of the year, tells the same story from the single point of view of finance: "Taxes, assignats, free [äV; forced?] loans, confiscations, sales, all having become insufficient, how meet the expenses of the war and of the Revolution ? By the operation of the savage . . . : cut down the tree to get its fruits." 2 T h e Directory did not like people to be saying or thinking such things about it, so decided it would attempt to resuscitate the economic life of the nation. T h e industry in which it was particularly interested was the metallurgical, because that produced the tools of war. T h e Directory placed a protective duty on articles of iron and steel, 3 and wrote the minister of war the following letter : Occupied constantly with means of multiplying the resources of the Republic, the Directory has just passed two decrees, Citizen Minister, which present the double advantage of augmenting French industry and of curtailing that of our neighbors. By one it is charging you to send a Commissioner to Solingen [a German city on the Wipper near Düsseldorf, and center of the manufacture of arms, and of implements of iron and steel] to look into the manufacture of side arms, of scythes and sickles, [and] of saws and files and carpenters' tools, which are made there; and to induce the workers to come to establish themselves in France. You realize, Citizen Minister, that to make such an enterprise succeed, it is indispensable to employ an intelligent man therein, accustomed to directing workers of this stamp, to give him all the means of triumphing over obstacles, to address and recommend him to Citizen Joubert, Commissioner of the government to the Sambre and Meuse Army; to inform the General in Chief of the army of this ingenious enterprise, to invite him to support it by force, if necessary; in short, to do anything which tends to its success. The Commissioner you will name could announce to these workers that the French Republic, great in everything it does, assures them special protection; that it will place them in a fine climate, provide for their lodging, have food distributed to them, procure for them steady and useful employment, [and] take care of them in their old age. This Commissioner will not fail to make these inhabitants feel the superiority of the French republican regime over other governments. He could insinuate ingeniously that the Solingen region will perhaps soon cease to offer to the workers living there the resources awaiting those who come to establish themselves in France. . . 4 a

Jan. 19, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 18. " Vide Dir. to Five Hundred, March 22, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, II, 10, η. 4. The Directory also maintained the high duty on the importation of foreign cloths, established in 1791 in the interest of French manufacturers (min. of int. to min. of for. aff., July 1 ,

1797, Arch. A. E., Prusse 221, f. 254). The Law of October 3 1 , 1796, which prohibited the importation of all foreign cloth, was a political measure aimed at England, and not an effort to promote French industry (ibid.). ' T h e Directory had written to Jourdan the day before this decree was rendered that he should destroy "all military factories such as

692

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Counting on your zeal, Citizen Minister, the Directory invites you to employ it for the success of a measure which tends to wrest from our enemies a major branch of their industry, and to establish it irrevocably in France.6 (Signed by Le Tourneur, Carnot, and Reubell.) And a Commissioner was sent to Vienne and to Thiers to prepare lodgings for the workers who should come from Solingen, willingly or unwillingly.® Of course, this was not the proper way to establish an industry in France, but the Directory was composed of revolutionists who were accustomed to short cuts to Utopia. It would be unjust to judge them by our standards. One must realize, also, that this was a great compliment to Solingen. It was the second time since the start of the war that the government of France had sought the services of Solingen's artisans. Indeed the first time was merely an attempt to purchase, but the Committee of Public Safety (it was January 6, 1794) expressed its "great and urgent need" for what Solingen had to sell.7 The Directory, more modern, sought to move Solingen to France. It is instructive to note also the interest of Revolutionary France in the Saar basin — specifically in Nassau-Saarbrücken. Under the old regime, the princes of Nassau-Saarbrücken were on excellent terms with France, and all of them had taken service with their great neighbor to the west. The Revolution brought about no change in the cordiality existing between the two states. The Prince ousted French émigrés and priests. When war was those for the manufacture of arms, etc., in the areas through which the Sambre and Meuse Army passe [ d ] " (Mém. campagne de 1796, "Pièces justificatives," no. xi [p. 2 7 1 ] ) . s July 21, 1796, Arch. Ν., A F III 389, d. 2024. This letter was followed on August 16 by one of similar tenor, mutatis mutandis, dealing with the Imperial city of Constance in southern Germany. Apparently many silk manufacturers of Lyons had fled France during the Terror, settled in Constance, and established their manufactories there. Constance already had a silk industry of its own, which, because of its location, enjoyed much of the trade of Germany. The Directory feared that the French technicians would impart to others their perfection of taste, and so cause a decline in, and perhaps the annihilation of, the luxury industry of Lyons. It (i.e., the Directory) therefore ordered General Moreau to effect the return of the French manufacturers to Lyons by destroying their ability to ply their trade in Constance. Moreau should seize and transport to

France all good machines, and destroy the rest. He should tear down all buildings and machines ancillary to silk manufacturing or to other manufacturing conducted at Lyons. When this had been done, the Directory would consider indemnifying the Constance inhabitants by allowing a diminution in the contributions which Constance should pay as a party to the coalition against France. Signed by Carnot, Reubell, and Barras (Quoted in Dejoint, Pol. écon. Direc., p. 262 [Annexes, no. 3 ] ) . 'July 21, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 389, d. 2024. 7 Corr. gén. Carnot, IV, 850. France was accustomed, before the war, to import "immense quantities" of steel, but not because of a lack of French iron. It was a lack of sufficient smelters that was the cause (Garnier [secret agent] to Francqueville, first clerk of the Bureau of Correspondence, Nov. 20, 1793, P. Caron [ed.], Rapports des agents du ministre de l'intérieur dans les départements (1793-an II) [2 vols., Paris, 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 5 1 ] , I, 461).

RHINE AND RHINELAND, SPRING, I796-SPRING, I 7 9 7

declared, he refused to supply his contingent and Roman months to the Empire, forbade the "exportation" of grain and forage to Germany, and turned over his grain and forage and horses to the French. In return for all this, the French treated Nassau-Saarbrücken very well — until the middle of 1793, when the Prince was deprived of nearly all his possessions.8 During the Franco-Austrian negotiations following Leoben (infra), Delacroix informed Bonaparte and Clarke that an "interesting" part of the lands of this prince — the county of Saarwerden and its dependencies — had been annexed to France, and the revenues of the principality of Saarbrücken sequestrated. The annexation was irrevocable, said Delacroix. The sequestration was irrevocable for the present. Then the foreign minister added: "It [the Directory] considers that it would be advantageous that the principality of Saarbrücken . . . be likewise incorporated [with France]." And Delacroix declared this matter to be of "major importance." 9 With the coal of the Saar, the iron of Lorraine, and the skilled artisans of the Ruhr, the Directory thought to make France a great industrial nation. All that was needed was to oil the channels of commerce, and France would have the prosperity for which her impoverished people yearned. 2.

THE NAVIGATION OF THE RHINE

Rivers were the principal highways of French commerce now that England had swept the seas of French shipping, and roads and canals were practically unusable for lack of maintenance. Of these natural highways the Rhine was of course the most important, both because of its great length and because of its navigability for great distances upstream. Boats could readily ascend the Rhine to Basel, though some loads were disembarked in Alsace and carried overland. 10 The Rhine had not always been navigable as far as Switzerland. Several centuries before this period, the commune of Strasburg, at enormous expense and by dint of indefatigable effort, had rendered the Rhine navigable from Basel to Mayence. 11 This step in the direction of promoting use of the River actually had the opposite effect — at least for many years. 8

"Memoir of Herr Karcher, Agent of the Prince of Nassau-Saarbrücken," remitted to Barthélémy, c. January 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, ff. 128-129.

'July 13, 1797, Corr. inêd. Napo., VII, 152153. It is interesting to note that the coal mines of Nassau-Saarbrücken had been nationalized by Prince Wilhelm Heinrich almost a half century before the French occupation (viz., in 1 7 5 1 ) . Since 1751, coal was

mined in Saarbrücken by state employees, and the income constituted part of the income of the state, on a par with taxes (R.

Capot-Rey, La région

industrielle

sarroìse

[Paris, 1934], p. 272). The French farmed the mines (ibid., p. 273). 10 Hermann (of the Five Hundred) to Reubell, June 8, 1796, Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 230. u "Note on the Navigation of the Rhine," Nov. 29> I794i Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 230.

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Having expended her own time and treasure, Strasburg expected a monopoly, and did indeed enjoy one for a time, both the Emperor and neighboring states having recognized the justice of her claims. But as time passed, the boatmen of powerful neighbors entered into competition with the Strasburgers, and by a series of treaties, the rights of Strasburg were restricted as follows: Strasburg's monopoly was maintained for downstream navigation, but her boats could go no farther than Mayence. Upstream navigation was to be permitted her only during the month of January, and for six weeks at the time of each of the two annual Frankfort fairs — and during these four months, Strasburg was to have no monopoly, but to share the River with Mayence and the Palatinate. 12 This system of dividing up the Rhine into "spheres of influence" spread. Strasburg's boatmen were not allowed to go beyond Mayence because, between Mayence and Cologne, the monopoly belonged to the latter two cities. Boats from Cologne could go only as far as Nijmwegen, for there the Cologne "sphere" ended. A n d at each new "sphere," cargoes had to be shifted to other boats, with all the resultant expense and loss of t i m e 1 3 — and, undoubtedly, ofttimes of cargo. But these were not the only restrictions on freedom of commerce. If a boatman stopped somewhere, he paid a halting-place toll. If he did not stop, he paid a toll for passing. Between Germersheim, or the most southerly point of the Palatinate, and Rotterdam, tolls were collected at (Germersheim,) Philippsburg, Mannheim, Gernsheim, Oppenheim, Mayence, Bingen, Bacharach, Laub, St. Goar, Boppart, Oberlahnstein, Coblenz, Andernach, Leidersdorf, Linz, Bonn, Zoes, Düsseldorf, Kaiserswerth, Ruroth, Orsau, Rees, Emmerich, Lobyt, Schenkenschanz, A n der Fahrt, Arnheim, W y k (and Rotterdam). 1 4 That would be thirty on any night. T h e French revolutionists quite understandably were irked by these really intolerable burdens, which weighed upon the trader much as the old feudal dues weighed upon the tiller of the soil. A s a Strasburger himself confessed, liberty of commerce was one of the rights of man. 1 5 T h e French seized upon every opportunity to promote the free navigation of the Rhine. A provision to this end was included in the Franco-Austrian armistice for the winter of Article X I of the Franco-Badense Treaty of August 22, 1796 provided that the Rhine should be free to both French and Badenese. 17 Looking ahead: General Hoche decreed the free navigation of Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 230. Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 230. 14 Loew in Pariser Zuschauer, Jan. 14, 1796, H . H. S. Arch., Schweiz 197. 15 Wencker, "Mémoire sur la médiation de la Prusse en faveur de la France pour sa pacifi12 u

M 17

cation avec les Etats d'Allemagne," undated (probably April 1796), Arch. Α . E., Allemagne 670, f. 186. Moniteur, XXVII, 257. Supra, Pt. II, chap, xiii, § 3.

RHINE AND RHINELAND, SPRING, 1796-SPRING, I797

695

the Rhine, in so far as it depended upon him, in the spring of 1797.18 After Leoben, when Archduke Charles returned to his Rhine command, Moreau asked him to consent to the free navigation of the Rhine up to Mayence; Charles agreed.19 Article II, Secret, of the definitive peace between France and Austria contained a free-navigation provision for the Franco-Imperial peace.20 Strasburg was apprehensive of the effect upon her of the proposed freedom, and knowing she could not stem the trend by outright opposition, she indulged in a campaign of letters and memoirs. In one of these, the business interests of Strasburg slyly recommended that, if perfect liberty of navigation from Basel to the sea was not stipulated in future treaties with other riverain states, Strasburg's own restrictive privileges could be increased21 To Reubell was pointed out that free navigation would deprive the French Republic of the "immense flow of merchandise and of all the collateral branches of this commerce" — reference being to goods destined for Switzerland, which, as matters then stood, were being landed in Alsace, but which, under free navigation, would (or at least might) be landed in Baden.22 Reubell read the latter note, and sent it to Delacroix. Delacroix read it and sent it to Reubell.23 But neither of them cared to espouse a cause so contrary to French principles. Commerce on the Rhine was indeed not as extensive as it would have been under more ideal conditions, but the following products were brought down the River: wood, wine, tobacco, madder, flax, millet, dried fruit, juniper berries, rags, coarse linen, potash, wade ashes, and ironware. Most important were wood, wine, and tobacco 24 Anquetil of the Institut national suggested, in an archive memoir on "The Commerce of Germany by Means of the Rhine," that the exchange of the products of Rhine commerce be implemented by the establishment of permanent entrepots on both banks of the River — at Hüningen, Strasburg, Mannheim or Heidelberg, Mayence, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Coblenz, and Wesel.25 It is obvious that Rhine commerce played an important part in French calculations to improve the economic well-being of the Republic. It follows that economic motives must be credited with their due share in shaping the Directory's Rhine policy. 18

A. Sorel, Bonaparte et Hoche en 7797 (Paris, 1897), p. 280. Rédacteur, no. 565 (July 3, 1797). 20 Art. II, Secret, Oct. 17, 1797, infra, chap. 16

21

X X X , § I.

"Article which the Municipalité and Business Interests of . . . Strasburg Desire to be Inserted in the Peace Treaty," c. end of 1794,

Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 230. Hermann to Reubell, June 8, 1796, Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 230. 23 Ibid. 24 Loew in Pariser Zuschauer, Jan. 14, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 197. 25 Sept. 9, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 283-284. 28

696

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

3.

THE LEFT B A N K UNDER THE GENERAL DIRECTIONS,

MAY 1796-MARCH 1797 a.

Administration

Gold was the God of the Executive Directory, and the left bank of the Rhine was viewed largely from the standpoint of its productiveness, directly or indirectly, of the divine metal. A n d it was productive. The January 2, 1797 report of the minister of finances, after reviewing the income of the Rhineland up to September 22,1796, declared that if France reconquered the region lost to the Austrians, the income of the Rhine to Moselle region would reach 8,000,000 francs per year. That between the Rhine and Meuse he evaluated at 7,000,00. Total: 15,000,000 per year.26 This was not all profit, however. Administration of the two Directions cost 1,669,825 francs annually. 27 But what ever became of the 13,330,175-livre difference? The troops rarely, if ever, saw any of it. None of it ever reached Paris. Charles Alexandre, Commissioner of the government to, and commissary general of, the Sambre and Meuse Army, had an answer. He said that despite a Directorial order of August 7, 1796, providing that (1) only a general in chief could levy contributions and (2) only a commissary general could levy requisitions, "a multitude of persons attached to the army who h a [ d ] not even proper title or qualifications, every day lev[ied] requisitions of all kinds and on all sorts of objects which h a [ d ] no relation whatsoever to the service of the armies, . . . result[ing in] a multitude of abuses of authority, of vexations, of violence extremely contrary to the interests of the Republic [and] those of the inhabitants. . . " 28 Director-General Pruneau (Meuse to Rhine) agreed. " A s to cheating," he said, "one is able, thanks to a confusion that has been wantonly allowed to enter all parts of the army in the last three years, to conceive of the most improbable things without fear of exceeding the truth." 29 Pruneau gave an example: Heavy charges against a citizen for having an article — which had been requisitioned from him — transported, unloaded, weighed, delivered; even for payment of customs.30 A n d of course the government never saw any of the money illegally collected. Many administrative changes on the left bank had aimed at curing these virtual robberies. It will be recalled that Merlin of Thionville once organized the Moselle-southward region in a manner which he thought would banish "maladministration" forever. 31 But many of the culprits were in the army Debidour, Recueil, IV, 580 and n. 2. Ibid., p. 469. 28 Hansen, Quellen, III, 836, η. η.

w

87

"ibid., p. 837, η. 2. "Ibid., p. 837. 81 Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xiv, § 7.

697

RHINE AND RHINELAND, SPRING, 1796-SPRING, 1 7 9 7

— heroes, undoubtedly, when it came to fighting — and since the army was living off the country, a hard and fast line could not be drawn between civil and military. So change could be superimposed on change without improving conditions one iota. Of course, not all changes had clearly definable motives. When the supervision of the southern Direction was taken from the minister of finances and confided to the war minister on September 29, 1796,32 it was partly the result of the oppression of the southern Rhineland by Director-General Bella, against whose excesses the Coblenz deputy J. F . Schmitz had been sent to Paris to complain; partly the result of Bella's quarrels with the military authorities, who levied requisitions and contributions without asking him; 3 3 and partly a matter of personalities.34 There had been many popular complaints against Bella. One of them was composed by J. B. Hetzrodt, recognized leader of the estates in the Archbishopric of Trêves before the French invasion. His list of grievances, which attacked both the policy and the person of Bella, was sent to the Director-General himself in the name of the former estates of Trêves, and earned imprisonment for two months for Hetzrodt. 35 The syndic P. E. von Lassaulx, who will be remembered for his trip to Custine and his subsequent trials,36 was the author of another complaint, this one on behalf of the clergy. 37 A third was composed by Mayor Rosenbaum of Coblenz. Said Rosenbaum: "Our fields [are] unploughed and ravaged, [our] gardens pillaged, vineyards devastated, forests stripped, fruit trees cut down . . . , stables denuded, buildings destroyed. . . W e are on the verge of the exhaustion of all resources. . . We . . . cannot endure these shameful oppressions, this treatment unprecedented among civilized nations." 38 On December 1, Bella resigned on request, and — he the way — administration was returned to the minister of Director-General was J. B. Holtz, an Alsatian like Bella. his functions on January 23, 1797. 39 How briefly he was to appear in Chapter X X V I I below.

being now out of finances. The new Holtz entered on exercise them will

b. Burdens Imposed, with Particular Reference to the Prussian heft Ban\ It has been noted above 40 that the extension of the forced loan to the left bank drew vehement protests from Prussia, but that the Directory would not yield. The exactions did not end there, for the occupying French army " Arch. N., AF III 405, d. 2209. " Hansen, Quellen, III, 870. Μ Debidour, Recueil, IV, 392. " Hansen, Quellen, III, 846, η. ι. " Vide Pt. I, chap, ii, § ia.

87

Hansen, Quellen, III, 840. Ibid. p. 846, η. ι. "Ibid., p. 870. 40 Pt. II, chap, ν, § 1.

33

698

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

continued to eat, and heavy requisitions were added to the forced loan. Delacroix and Reubell had defended the forced loan as mere public revenue. 41 T h e requisitions could not be so defended, but Jourdan was ordered to apply them to the Prussian left bank "without any distinction or exception whatsoever." 42 A n d on July 25, 1796, the Directory approved Joubert's measures to "establish and assure" the circulation of the worthless Republican money in the Rhineland throughout his jurisdiction. 43 O n October 13, Sandoz protested that the Treaty of Basel's provision for occupation of the Prussian left bank by French troops did not grant the civil administration or the collection of the public revenues to France. It was merely a military arrangement, he said.44 Sandoz renewed his complaints just after the middle of December. 45 Then it seems that Frederick William hearkened for a moment to Hardenberg's advice to play a strong hand, for he (the K i n g ) ordered published in his left-bank states a proclamation directing the inhabitants of Clèves and Gelderland to pay their taxes into his own coffers and not into France's. But instead of coming out boldly and declaring his act to be the result of his own sovereign will, he pretended that it was in consequence of an agreement between Sandoz and the Directory which never existed. Carnot approached Sandoz with astonishment, and we have the unique spectacle of an ambassador belying his king.4® Result: Frederick William had to yield. But Sandoz' efforts did result in some relief to the Prussian left bank. T h e Directory agreed to place the revenues of the provinces upon the same footing as when the French troops entered; however, the King's attribution of these revenues to himself was unanimously rejected by the French government 47 — in order to save the Directory's face, according to Sandoz. 48 Also, the forced loan was continued, 49 and — contrary to the orders of the minister of finances (Ramel) — a requisition of 100,000 Prussian crowns was levied. 50 In other words, Sandoz won little more than a paper victory. It could hardly have been otherwise. T h e two armies of the Rhine, driven back onto the left bank by Archduke Charles in the autumn of 1796, were albid.

Arch. N., A F III* 218. 13 Debidour, Recueil, III, 220. " S a n d o z to the King, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349, f. 45. Vide supra Pt. II, chap, ν, § 2. 45 Bonnier(í), "Report on the Wording of Article V of the Treaty Concluded at Basel on 16 germinal, III [April 5, 1795]," Arch. N . A F III 76, d. 318. (Bonnier was head of the Diplomatic Bureau.) " S a n d o z to the King, Dec. 30, 1796, G. S.

42

Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. "Idem, Jan. 17, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. 48Idem, Jan. 21, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. " This is shown by a letter of the minister of finances to the Directory's Commissioner at Aix-Ia-Chapelle, Jan. 15, 1797, G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. 60 Caillard to Delacroix, Feb. 23, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 317.

RHINE AND RHINELAND, SPRING, 1796-SPRING, 1797

699

destitute. So was France. Money had to be found somewhere. On October 28, a few days after Moreau's return across the Rhine, the Directory decreed that there should be collected a contribution of 3,000,000 livres in the General Direction between the Rhine and Moselle, payable in coin. This should be substituted for the land and direct personal taxes formerly collected for the princes of the country, and which should be forgiven in the Year IV. 5 1 The Directory preferred coin payments to payments in kind, as it wrote to Haussmann; but if enough coin could not be obtained, then requisitions were to be levied on the conquered country — "for the obligation to keep the defenders alive should outweigh all other considerations. Moreover, the political fate of these territories not being yet determined, and the chances of war being always doubtful, it is not proper that the Republic should be exposed by this incertitude to see the enemy consume what it [the Republic] had a right to take for itself." 5 2 A message of like purport was sent to Alexandre, Commissioner to the Sambre and Meuse Army, with the added warning not to carry the impositions so far as to produce insurrection.53 On December 7, the Directory, on the report of the minister of war, decreed that the Sambre and Meuse, and Rhine and Moselle Armies should be provisioned at the expense of the conquered but unannexed left bank and of conquered but annexed Belgium and Luxemburg; that the requisite foodstuffs should be demanded of the authorities and removed by armed force, if necessary. The decree specified that in the conquered but annexed region, the value of the objects furnished should be deducted from the contributions imposed.84 By its silence, the decree implied that this was not to be the case in the unannexed conquered region. 55 The advantage of occupying the left bank is evident. It should be noted here, however — as has been noted before — that the Directory regarded the same treatment proper for France when the left bank could not meet the needs of the army. 56 The left bank was useful during this time of crisis also as a storehouse of means wherewith the Directory could pay for its purchases. When the army needed meat, the penniless Directory merely sold all the bar and sheet iron, tin plate, and other metals in the warehouses and shops of part of the left bank to a meat contractor, to be paid for with meat deliveries.57 But the favorite mode of payment was in the form of permission to cut down trees to a certain value in the forests of the left bank. N o matter that the Directory did not have legal title to the Rhineland, and hence not to the forests any B1

Arch. N., AF III 4 " , d. 2266. Nov. h , 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 254. ""Nov. 17, 1796, ibid. p. 297. " Art. VII. 55 Arch. N., AF III* 219. K

56

Dir. to Rudler, Dec. 16, 1796, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 467. 57 Vide the case of Gobert, Moïse-Isaac, and Co., in Debidour, Recueil, IV, 333.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

more than to the tin plate. This, in fact, rendered the method all the more attractive. 88 T h e Prussian left bank was not exempted from this practice, and Sandoz lodged repeated complaints with the Directory. After many efforts on his part, the Directory at last revoked the decrees authorizing the felling. 59 A s very often happened, however, the officials of the Directory rendered the concession nugatory. They continued to cut down the forests under the pretext of executing prior contracts.60 Sandoz stated no half-truth when he declared that such actions would be considered harsh during a state of war, but that, during the state of peace and amity that was supposed to exist between France and Prussia, they were both inexplicable and unjustifiable. 61 T h e French government acted in an unbelievably strange manner also in regard to the domains of the Prussian left-bank clergy. It actually sequestrated them. 62 Sandoz protested, but could obtain no satisfaction, for the Directory had been enraged by Frederick William's proclamation ordering his left-bank subjects to pay their taxes into the royal coffers. 63 Eventually, however, the Directory granted to the clergy of Clèves and Gelderland provisional repossession of their lands. Reubell declared that this meant absolute possession but that the use of such an expression would have aroused the jealousy of the Belgian clergy. 64 A s far as France's left-bank officials were concerned, however, it meant no possession at all, for these representatives of the sovereign people considered it their function to annul the effect of all concessions made by the central government. A strange procedure it was, to have confiscated the lands of the clergy when the cession of the left bank to France was yet only a hope. However, this was not the only strange procedure. O n December 29, 1796, the son of the Prussian King, Prince Louis, passed away, and Director-General Pruneau forbade the Prussian left bank to hold the usual funeral ceremony. Sandoz thereupon complained to the ministers of foreign affairs and of finances. T h e latter wrote to Pruneau on January 16 that "the laws relative to the external signs of ceremonies and religions have not been promulgated in all the 58

M

Vide the case of Collet, Caillard, and Co., in Arch. N . , A F III 400, d. 2155. Note again, however, that the Directory did not hesitate to follow the same policy with respect to the forests of France when such a course was necessary to procure money or food or fodder. Vide Sciout, Direc., II, 235 and n. 2; also 236. Caillard to Delacroix, Feb. 1 1 , 1797, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, f. 256. A n d Pruneau was reprimanded for his George Washington role (Sandoz to the K i n g , Jan. 17, 1797,

G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354). " C a i l l a r d to Delacroix, Feb. 23, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 317. 6 1 G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349, f. 178. " S a n d o z to the King, Dec. 30, 1796, G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. "Idem, Dec. 30, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. "Idem, Jan. 17, 1797, G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354.

RHINE AND RHINELAND, SPRING, 1796-SPRING, I 7 9 7

7OI

countries occupied by the Republic. . . Everyone is free to celebrate as pleases him the memory of such foreign name as he desires to honor." 65 4.

T H E C A M P A I G N OF I 7 9 6 AND THE RHINE FRONTIER

The retreat of the French armies from Bavaria in the summer of 1796 did not modify the desire of the French for the Rhineland.®6 The Sambre and Meuse Army was back on the left bank of the Rhine, and the Rhine and Moselle was on its way home when Sandoz noticed a great moderation developing in the Directory's principles — but not with respect to the Rhineland.67 Nor did renunciation of the Rhineland seem to enter the thoughts of the Directory's officials 68 or of the newspapers. Bella ordered the Republican New Year's Day (Fête of 1 Vendémiaire) to be celebrated by the army occupying the left bank. T w o young girls of Trêves crowned two wounded French soldiers with garlands, while Bella declaimed: "Come, Citizenesses, aid us to recognize the heroism of our 69 defenders. . . Let virtue, let beauty crown courage." 70 On December 1, Poultier, editor of the Ami des Lois, 65

Ramel to Pruneau, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. Funeral rites were permitted also for the Queen-Dowager (March 1797), and for Frederick William II himself (December 1797). (Hashagen, Rheinland,

p. 102.)

" I t s effect was rather to emphasize the value of the Rhineland as a magazine for the army. Efforts were made, under dire threats, to bring in the arrears of past contributions; and new requisitions of meat, grain, and bread were decreed (Hansen, Quellen, III, 828, 832). Had Archduke Charles succeeded in making a victorious crossing of the Rhine, the Directory might have readjusted its mode of thought. But though Charles tried a crossing at Coblenz, at Mayence, and then at Mannheim, he had no lasting success (ibid., p. 847). " T o the King, Oct. 6, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349, f. 24. 88 The Rhinelanders, however, did everything in their power to start them thinking about it, though actual revolt was not attempted. There was an agitation to arm the left-bank peasants (Hansen, Quellen, III, 847). Cologne was unruly, and a French soldier was murdered there (ibid., p. 827). Rhineland ecclesiastics ordered the peasants not to pay their ground rents to the French, on the ground that the clergy would soon be col-

lecting these charges again (ibid., p. 831). Suggestions that the left bank should also have a Sicilian Vespers poured across the Rhine (ibid., p. 822). The French were worried. Their proclamations combated the idea of arming the peasants (ibid., pp. 847-848); forbade assemblage for political discussion (ibid., p. 825); and threatened tithe-conscious priests with loss of pensions, and transportation to France (ibid., p. 831). Whether the false order of Pope Pius VI to the French Catholics to submit to the French government, "for it was of God" — a fraud that appeared in the Cologne Welt- und Staatsboth of September 19 — was a piece of French propaganda, the present writer knows not. It certainly would have been good French propaganda if it had been believed, for it was largely on religious grounds that annexation of the Rhineland to France was inconceivable to the Rhinelanders (ibid., pp. 828829). "Meaning, probably, that the French troops were defenders of the Rhineland as well as of France. ' TO Minutes of the Fête, drawn up by Bella, and sent in to the Directory on Oct. 14, 1796, Arch. N., A F ΠΙ 407, d. 2239. Rain poured heavily during the celebration. Two girls from an orphanage, garland-

702

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

published a fragment of a poem of his own composition, extolling the French soldiers who, with their "generous" blood, fixed the limits of France at the line prescribed by Nature, and ending, Europe arms in vain against their undertaking. They batde Europe, and Europe, downed, is quaking. 71 Pruneau's decree forbidding a funeral ceremony for a scion of the reigning house of Prussia was practically a denial of Prussia's sovereignty over Clèves, Meurs, and Gelderland. Keil, the Directory's "art collector," declared that during his mission he had noted a sincere longing on the part of most Rhinelanders for union with Republican France, "whose principles they share and whose vigor they admire." 7 2 A decree of the commander of the Sambre and Meuse A r m y forbade anyone on the left bank to carry arms — a decree necessitated probably by the vices of administration and of the army of occupation, against which even French voices had been raised in protest, 73 but a decree, nevertheless, which tightened France's hold on the left bank, not relaxed it. A n d this decree was approved by the Directory on February io. 74 O n February 25, 1797, Sandoz reported that during the preceding week, the Directory's great moderation had spread to the Rhine-boundary question; that Reubell, Carnot, and L e Tourneur had assured him that if the K i n g of Prussia would mediate the peace of Germany and of Europe without delay, France would renounce all acquisition on that side. " T h e K i n g of Prussia, by declaring himself mediator of the peace, gives to the Directory the power to dictate the terms, and Austria will be forced to subscribe thereto." 7 5 Actually the government's great moderation had spread to the left-bank question already a month earlier. O n January 16 — the day before the Directory permitted the Prussian left bank to honor foreign names — the government had signified its willingness to negotiate concerning its Rhine-boundary claims. 76 In fact, this new attitude explains why it permitted the funeral crowned and garbed in white, ascended the bough-bedecked platform, on either side of the burgomaster. Bella appeared then, and spoke (in French). A procession consisting of the town council, high French officials, the Trêves garrison, and the girls then waddled through the rain to the hospital of St. Maximin. There, two wounded soldiers were crowned with laurel and presented with fifty livres apiece, to the accompaniment of a speech of praise and thanks. Then back through the downpour to the leafy platform for a final drenching and a speech, and the new year was safely on its way — except, probably, for the participants. There was no

penicillin in those days (Miiller's Tagebuch, in Hansen, Quellen, III, 830 [The present writer accepts responsibility for this presentation; Müller is innocent!]). 71 Amt des Lois, no. 476. Couplet paraphrased. 72 Keil to Dir., Feb. 5, 1797, in Rédacteur, no. 426 (Feb. 14, 1797). " P o l i c e report of Jan. 20, 1797, Aulard, Paris, III, 702. " D i r . to min. of war, Arch. N., A F III 432, d. 2477. 75 T o the King, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 117. ™ Vide next chapter, § 5. Sandoz, of course, did not suspect it, and reported on January 31 that Reubell, Revellière, Barras, Delacroix,

RHINE AND RHINELAND, SPRING, 1796-SPRING, 1797

703

ceremony. And on January 26, the news of a change of policy was despatched to Berlin. 77 It seems that no one outside the French government yet knew of the change, however. Probably the Directory feared just a little to let the generals know that the product of their valor might be returned to the despised enemy. This consideration for the military must account for the Directory's approval of the disarming of the left-bank populations — while it was contemplating renunciation of the left bank. But the policy of France would soon return to the norm, for already when Sandoz sent in his despatch of February 25, the Directory was weakening. 78 and Truguet (min. of marine) were partisans of the left bank; that Carnot, Le Tourneur, and the other ministers were contra (to the King, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase.

77 78

354)· Vide next chapter, § 6. Vide next chapter, § 7.

*

CHAPTER XX

if

C L A R K E ' S M I S S I O N TO

I.

"VIENNA"

INTRODUCTORY

T

H E gracious reception accorded Charruelle by the Austrian authorities has already been mentioned as one of the factors prompting the Directory to send a military officer to Vienna with propositions of peace. Other factors were not lacking. Moreau had been obliged to recross the Rhine on October 25 and 26, 1 and though Beurnonville had replaced Jöurdan, nothing could yet be expected from that quarter. 2 Superior Austrian forces under Alvinczy and Davidowich were marching to the relief of Wurmser, locked in Mantua. 3 The never-ending Austrian attempts to wrench victory from the French destroyed the Directory's confidence in the permanence of its triumph in Italy, and the idea developed that the Italian successes were but bargaining points in the negotiation to come.4 The Malmesbury parley was in a state of suspended animation while the British negotiator waited for Thugut's mandate which he knew would never arrive; and the Directory may well have reasoned that conversations with Austria, cleverly revealed, would make England fear isolation and thus invigorate the negotiations. Prussia had cooled toward France since Austrian fortunes in Germany became brighter, and there loomed suddenly the possibility of a Russo-Anglo-Prussian accord. Zwanziger had been authorized by Thugut to continue his correspondence with Paris. The financial situation of the Republic was critical.5 The elections were not far off. Such were the factors 1

Bourdeau, Campagnes, I, 262. 'Ibid., p. 256. ' Ibid., p. 295. 4 Sybel, Europe, IV, 353. "The French government was expecting to lay London under contribution as soon as Hoche should have conquered the British Isles, but found itself obliged to resort meanwhile to temporary expedients, such as selling the church silver of Belgium, the crown jewels of France and Holland, the forests of

Belgium, Holland, the Palatinate, etc. Even so, the troops of the Republic were unpaid and half clothed; the hospitals without furnishings, heat, or medicine; the charitable institutions without means of assisting the ill and infirm; the highways sadly in need of repair; the public officials forced to accept bribes as the only alternative to starvation (Sciout, Direc., II, chap, vi [mislabeled iv], §§ 2-3).

CLARKE S MISSION TO

VIENNA

7O5

rendering peace negotiations with Austria good policy and good politics. Barras gives an interesting account of the origin of Clarke's mission. On November 12, Carnot, speaking with solemnity, and as if in the name of the whole Directory, suddenly announced to Delacroix that the Directory was about to send an ambassador to Vienna to propose peace (with an armistice preceding). This proposition, announced as though it were a settled matter, astonished Barras, who inquired whether such a decision had been reached in his absence. Carnot replied that it was his personal opinion, shared, he believed, by his colleagues. Le Tourneur immediately avowed that it was his opinion also, and ought therefore to be adopted, but that the matter was open to debate. Barras declared that to make to the Emperor so humble and sudden an overture at a time when Malmesbury was about ( ? ! ) to receive powers from Austria to treat was highly inexpedient; that it would tend to discourage the French armies and impart to the enemy the impression that France was very weak. Reubell remarked that it would alienate all the German princes who had shown a sincere disposition to ally with the Republic, and that he would never submit to such a course. Revellière considered it dangerous to make such abrupt overtures. It would be more advisable, he said, to address to Archduke Charles a request for a general armistice. Reubell endorsed Revellière's suggestion, and the Directory unanimously adopted it. But Carnot wanted more. He insisted that an envoy should be sent to Vienna, and that the opportunity should not be lost of making overtures, demanded, according to him, by public opinion. Reubell interrupted him, saying that a regicide should not hearken so much to public opinion, for it also demanded the recall of the Bourbons, which would perhaps sound the death knell of Carnot, a regicide. Carnot would not yield,® and his persistence was rewarded with a measure of success, for his motion, as modified by Revellière's amendment, was carried.7 Carnot nominated General Clarke for the mission because his road had been paved by the Zwanziger intrigue. Objections were immediately raised to Clarke's foreign antecedents,8 despite his birth on the very soil of metro8

Nov. 12, 1796, Mem., II, 236-237. ' N o v . 1 3 - 1 4 , 1796, ibid., p. 237. 8 Mém. Barras, II, 237. Henri Jacques Guillaume Clarke was the son of Thomas Clarke of an Irish regiment. His mother was Louise Shée, sister of the Duke of Orléans' private secretary. Clarke accompanied Orléans to London in 1789 as secretary-interpreter, and liked diplomacy to the point of surrendering a military captaincy which the Duke de Chartres had procured for him. However, Clarke later served under Chartres (in 1792) as lieutenant colonel, and proved himself a

good soldier. In fact, his feats earned him the rank of brigadier general during the period when Danton was in power. Disgraced under Robespierre, Clarke was reinstated in 1795, and, owing to Carnot's favor, was attached to the Historical and Military Topographical Bureau of the Committee of Public Safety. This was a species of general staff for all the French armies. Clarke became director of this bureau on November 20, 1795, and a major general little more than a fortnight later. When assigned the mission to Vienna, Clarke was thirty-two years of age,

7o6

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

politan France. 0 Clarke's appointment was carried, however, by Carnot, L e Tourneur, and Revellière — the last named granting his vote on the express condition that Clarke should first confer with Bonaparte. 10 W h e n T h u g u t learned of Clarke's mission, he acquired a "fever thinking of all the intrigues which [would] result therefrom." 1 1 A n d he got "goosepimples" when he considered the effect that the arrival of a French negotiator would have upon "our Jacobins of Vienna." T h u g u t suspected that "these knaves of the Directory" were setting " a new trap for us," 1 2 and he ordered that no Frenchman should be allowed to pass through the Austrian lines without express authorization. If Clarke should actually come and ask for a passport, "we shall see then what we will d o . " 1 3 Eden wrote to his brother, Lord Auckland, that the Austrian armies were "cry[ing] so loud for an armistice," and so much ill-humor prevailed on account of England's refusal of subsidies and her failure to concert her moves with Austria's, that if Clarke asked for a passport, he would get one. 14 There was no more accord among the Directors on the terms of Clarke's instructions than there was on the mission itself. Carnot would have liked to renew the Poteratz blackmail scheme. H e thought Clarke should carry the originals of the Saint-Priest correspondence to Vienna, and lay before the Emperor's own eyes the proof that T h u g u t was a traitor. A first draft of Clarke's instructions did indeed mention the telltale correspondence, but the reference was dropped in succeeding drafts. It is quite probable that this recurrence of projects for underhanded negotiation was due to a letter sent by Poteratz to the Directory, and read before that body on October 5, 1796. " W h a t good Frenchman would not be touched by the difficulties you are in?" the letter commences. " . . . I have among my papers documents able to and a divorcee. His former wife was English-bora. Personally, Clarke was well built and handsome. He had a live expression. His manner was free and easy, and his demeanor, noble. Perhaps this latter was his misfortune, for he acquired a mania for nobility. He steeped himself in genealogies, and announced one day that he had discovered he was related to the Plantagenets. Bonaparte liked to tease him, and on one occasion spoke out in a numerous company: " Y o u have not told me about your rights to the English throne. Y o u must insist on them." Under the Empire, Napoleon made Clarke the Duke de Feltre, so handsome Henri got his tide after all (Dry, Soldats ambas., II, 4 - 9 ; Vincent to Thugut, Jan. 5, 1797, Thugut, C, W, p. 365; Journal Desaix, p. 283, n. 1 ) .

Landrecies, département of the Nord (Six, Die. biog., s.v. "Clarke [Henri-Jacques-Guillaume]"). 10 Guyot, Direc., p. 312. " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, Dec. 6, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 367-368. ^ idem, Dec. 5, 1796, ibid., p. 367. As late as April 5, 1797, these suspicions seemed confirmed when Trevor wrote to Lellis, Austrian secretary of legation at Turin, that, after a conference with Clarke in the home of a third party, he, Trevor, believed that all Clarke's advances were merely a blind — "pour jetter de la poudre aux yeux" (Lellis to Thugut, H . H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19). 9

Thugut to Count Colloredo, Dec. 6, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 368. 14 Dec. 9, 1796, /. Corr. Auckland, III, 368. ls

CLARKE'S MISSION TO " V I E N N A "

707

cause at Vienna a revolution favorable to our interests. . . " A n d there is sketched out a letter to Thugut, which opens with the words, " Y o u were not born a subject of the Emperor, Sir Baron. Y o u owe your elevation to the old France," and ends with a threat to publish the compromising documents unless T h u g u t prepared with him (Poteratz) overtures for a "salutary" peace. 15 O n November 14, the Directory remitted to Clarke a letter of introduction to the Emperor, but five days later superseded it with another. T h e difference between the two letters was in the opening phrases, where a passage concerning the participation of the Emperor's allies in the negotiations was omitted in favor of a reference to the policy of the separate peace. 16 "Already overtures for a separate peace have been made to you," ran the final version (of November 19), "as they were made to several other powers of the [German] Confederation which have concluded their separate-peace agreements. However, your Majesty appears to wish to treat only in concert with those [powers] still at war with the Republic. Y e t a peace negotiated in this manner may entail delays." T h e Directory dwelt in the letter upon the evils of war, and the uselessness of continuing the mutual slaughter; it spoke of the weakening of the Coalition by the separate-peace agreements of several of the German states and by the neutrality of northern Germany; and it proposed a twofold program: a simultaneous general armistice between the Austrians and the French; and the convocation of ministers plenipotentiary to treat of the definitive peace between the two powers and their respective allies, in so far as the latter should accept the invitation to participate in the parleys. T h e letter concluded: . . . Already a negotiation has been commenced between the French government and one of your principal allies, the King of Great Britain; and the overture which the Directory is now making to your Majesty, far from being in conflict with these first overtures, is a manifestation of its ardent desire to accelerate the effect, to bring about as soon as possible the necessary meetings, and especially to suspend from this moment on the course of the calamities of the war between the Republic and your Majesty.17 Clarke was to go to Italy and have Bonaparte procure passports for him from the Austrian generals. Delacroix proposed to allot 25,000 francs for the expenses of the mission, but Carnot, owing perhaps to his friendship for Clarke, but possibly also to the thought that it would be unwise psychologically to let the enemy guess into what straitened circumstances the Re15 16

Arch. N., A F III 406, d. 2225. Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 84, η. ι . "Following the example of the ancient Romans," explains Talleyrand in his Mé-

moires, "the French Republic had adopted the maxim not to include two of its enemies in the same peace" (I, 258). "Debidour, Recueil, IV, 319-321.

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

7O8

public had fallen, proposed 50,000, and secured the adoption of the higher figure.18 Clarke was given the title of Envoy Extraordinary. 19 Why he was not named Minister Plenipotentiary as contemplated in the letter of November 19, we do not know. The change was perhaps made to mollify Reubell, who hated Clarke, and certainly begrudged him any rank whatsoever.

2.

CLARKE'S INSTRUCTIONS

The decree establishing Clarke's mission is inscribed on the secret register of the Directory under the date of November 15. 20 Clarke's instructions contained the following stipulations of especial interest: . . . The conditions of the armistice should be limited to assuring the status quo, . . . and the desire of the Directory is that no cession should take place in Germany or in Italy of positions won by Republican valor. . . You will refuse absolutely all terms leading to the evacuation of the bridgeheads of Dusseldorf and of Kehl, and you will stipulate the evacuation of the bridgeheads of Neuwied and of Hüningen only in case of absolute necessity, and after obtaining from the Austrians [the pledge] that their troops will not issue from Mayence at all, 21 and that [they will] . . . evacuate the bridgehead of Mannheim on the left bank of the Rhine.22 Before Clarke left Paris, he received further instructions from Delacroix. "Without being specially charged to negotiate peace," he was told, "you can prepare it in the conversations you have with influential personages. . . Your journey will be sufficiently useful should it end only in our getting to know the passions which animate them, and the means of turning them [i.e., the passions] to the profit of the Republic and of humanity" 2 3 — in other words, Clarke should determine if Thugut could be bribed. Decree of Nov. 15, 1796, Arch. N., AF III* 20. Guyot, Direc., p. 312. 10 Arch. N., AF III* 20. "Considering that the evacuation of Mayence by the troops of any German state requesting an armistice with France was a stock requirement of the Directory, that being the Directory's only hope of capturing the welldefended fortress (Delacroix to Clarke, Sept. ι , 1796, Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 230), one might be inclined to question the correctness of this provision. However, its unusual terms were intended to prevent the Austrians from making sorties from Mayence into the Palatinate, which was supporting a goodly body of French troops (Baron P. Lahure [pubi.], 18

M

Souvenirs de la vie militaire du lieutenantgénéral baron L.-J. Lahure, 1787-1815 [Paris, 1895], p. i n ) . To the same effect are Carnot to Merlin-Th., Dec. 6, 1794, Corr. gén. Carnot, IV, 732; CPS to Rps AA. RMo, Dec. 20, 1794, F· A. Aulard (ed.), Recueil des actes du comité de salut public avec la correspondance officielle des représentants en mission et le registre du conseil exécutif provisoire (28 vols., Paris, 1889-1951), XVIII, 556; Dir. to Jourdan, June 20, 1796, Mém. campagne de 17Φ, "Pièces justificatives," no. ix (p. 261). M Debidour, Recueil, IV, 288. " N o v . 16, 1796, Arch. Α. E., Autriche 367, f. 7·

CLARKE'S MISSION TO "VIENNA"

Delacroix then discussed, in the form of alternative propositions, what terms could be offered Austria in return for the Belgian and left-bank possessions she would be obliged to cede to France, (a) If her Italian possessions were restored, she could be granted the Archbishopric of Salzburg, the Provostship of Berchtesgaden, the Bishopric but not the city of Passau, and the Upper Palatinate as far as the Naab; the Elector Bavaro-Palatine could be indemnified in the vicinity of the Rhine, (b) If Austria's Italian possessions were not restored, she could obtain the Romagna, the March of Ancona, and the Duchy of Urbin; the Grand D u k e of Tuscany could be given the remainder of the Papal possessions, including Rome and Sienna, with the title of K i n g of Rome; France would obtain the island of Elba, (c) If Austria renounced everything south of the Alps and in Swabia, and undertook to indemnify the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany herself, she could have Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Salzburg, Passau, and other ecclesiastical territories enclaved therein; the Elector Bavaro-Palatine could be indemnified with a goodly portion of the Papal States, and the title of K i n g of the Romans. This project would be very agreeable to France, declared Delacroix, but it might displease Germany. T o secure its adoption, the K i n g of Prussia could be assured ample indemnities. " W i t h him satisfied, all the rest will be silenced." (d) T h e last combination provided that Austria should obtain Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Salzburg, Passau, and other ecclesiastical enclaves; that the Grand D u k e of Tuscany should be transferred to Rome, with the title of K i n g of Rome; that Austrian Poland should be ceded to the Elector Palatine, w h o would then serve as a center for the resurrection of Poland; the K i n g of Prussia would retain the largest part of Prussian Poland. 24 T h e capital point, according to Delacroix, was to persuade the Emperor that the interests of Austria and of England were antithetic; that England could only hinder the progress of the negotiations; and that Austria could obtain more, and that more speedily, from France alone. 28 O n November 18, a supplement of instructions for Clarke declared that though the primary object of his mission was to propose an armistice, he was authorized also to find out if Austria would consent to treat for a separate peace, and what were the most favorable terms which could be obtained. Y o u can mention to the Emperor, Clarke was told, that he could be indemnified for his cessions to France by means of secularizations, and "you will recall [to him] that his indemnity has already been secured in part through the invasion of Poland." 26 " N o v . 16, 1796, Arch. A . E., Autriche 367, ff. 7-9. The instructions of Delacroix to Clarke of November 16, 1796 (26 brumaire, V ) are also in the Corr. inéd. Napo., II, 396401, but with the doubly wrong dates of 4

brumaire, V, and November 14, 1796. 4 brumaire, V , is October 25, 1796. 25 Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, f. 7. " D i r . to Clarke, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 310.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

T h e departure of Clarke for "Vienna" seemed to confirm what Sandoz had long been fearing — that a Franco-Austrian accord was either in the course of realization, or already realized. Circumstantial evidence did indeed afford some justification for the Prussian minister's suspicions. T h e long sojourn of Bonaparte's courier at Vienna, the intervention of the Court of Naples, the proud and brusque replies to Lord Malmesbury had strangely come all at the same time. 27 Sandoz complained to Carnot of the overtures, declaring that they deferred the cessation of hostilities rather than brought it nearer. " T h e need of peace and hatred of England," Sandoz ventured, "cause the Directory to take the most imprudent steps in regard to Vienna." Carnot's reply is classic. T h e overtures were necessary, he said, to prove to the French nation that the Directory was seeking peace. T h e most pitiful and public means fulfilled this function, he declared. 28 Sandoz of course feared especially that France would grant her aid and consent to the Bavaro-Belgian exchange. It will be realized that the renunciation of the Belgian Netherlands by France had not entered into the combinations presented by Delacroix to Clarke. Carnot could therefore truthfully assure Sandoz (November 22) that the exchange was not contemplated, and he gave powerful reasons therefor: Austria would become too strong in comparison with France; the Republic would be deprived of Belgium; an unsatisfactory northern frontier would be the result for France; and the princes of Germany would be subjected to the Austrian yoke, which would be politically prejudicial to France. 29 On his way to the A r m y of Italy, Clarke stopped at Turin to see the Marquis di Gherardini, Austria's minister plenipotentiary stationed there. Clarke came armed with letters of recommendation written by the Baron de Choiseul, formerly French ambassador at Turin (until 1792). These declared Clarke to be a "perfectly honest man," and asserted that since his (Clarke's) principles were known at Paris, the choice of him by the Directory was " a positive indication that this time it [the French government] was truly desirous of peace with the Emperor." 30 Clarke told Gherardini that he was on his way to Vienna to request an armistice of the Emperor. H e explained away the attempts of various Frenchmen to revolutionize Italy as transgressions of their instructions; and the disorders in the conquered countries he blamed on indigenous rascals who were profiting of the circumstances of war to seize authority and tyrannize over their compatriots. H e admitted that the French generals did endeavor to **Sandoz to the King, Nov. 21, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349. "Idem, Nov. 24, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349.

"Idem, Nov. 24, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 349. "Gherardini to Thugut, Dec. 6, 1796, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, P t II, Vol. I, 97.

CLARKE'S MISSION TO " V I E N N A "

711

create a party in the conquered territories for military reasons, but declared that all such activity would cease if his Majesty would agree to make peace. He said that the former overtures made by the Directory might have succeeded if the Emperor had been willing to listen to them; that he (Clarke) would not have been the one chosen to go to Vienna if it had been intended to make a display of "gasconades and rodomontades" — and, if he had been chosen for such a purpose, he would have refused; that he believed his propositions reasonable, and useful to the two parties, who were ruining themselves to the advantage of their rivals. Clarke's conversation proved to Gherardini that the French envoy was hoping that Austria would consent to cede Belgium. Clarke had intimated, however, that France was not particularly interested in Italy, nor in the various little governments which she had set up there. It should be noted that, like a good diplomat, Clarke manifested but little consideration for the cabinet of Berlin, and less for the minister, Lucchesini, a native of Lucca, who represented Prussia at Vienna. 31 According to plan, Bonaparte's chief of staff, Alexandre Berthier, asked the commander of the Austrian army, Alvinczy, for a safe-conduct for a general (and his aide-de-camp, a secretary, and two servants), whom the General in Chief of the Army of Italy desired to send to Vienna to accelerate the conclusion of an armistice between all the French and Austrian forces. 32 Berthier did not mention that Clarke was the bearer of powers from the Directory, because of the belief — here note the influence of Charruelle's visit — that a military mission would be more readily permitted by Alvinczy. 33 Alvinczy replied that his powers were strictly confined to military operations, but that he had already sent the request on to Vienna. The Austrian commander then proposed a tacit armistice until the reply should have arrived. Bonaparte rejected the idea as likely to favor too much the Austrian retreat, 34 'and, through Berthier, asked Alvinczy to forward to the Emperor a letter written by Clarke, dated December 5. This letter announced that Clarke was authorized to negotiate a general and simultaneous armistice between the French and Austrian armies, and to propose measures to accelerate peace between the two powers and their allies; and it asked the Emperor to forward safe-conducts.35 Clarke had become possessed with the fear that the Emperor, hearing of the resolution of the Directory relative 31

Idem, Nov. 26, 1796, ibid., pp. 8 9 - 9 1 . N o v . 29, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 2 3 5 ; Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 95, prints this letter with the date November 28, 1796. " C l a r k e to Pres. of Dir., Dec. 6, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 2 3 5 . 34 Cf. Thugut to Count Colloredo, Dec. 6, 1796: "This resolution [to ask for an armis32

tice] was adopted when Alvinczy was advancing. . . The way things have turned out now, the desire of the French for an armistice has probably diminished" (Briefe Thugut, I, 368). ""Alvinczy to Berthier, Dec. 3, 1796; Berthier to Alvinczy, Dec. 5, 1796; Clarke to Pres. of Dir., Dec. 6, 1796: Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 235.

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to his mission, would refuse to grant the passports requested through Alvinczy, on the ground that it would be useless to treat with a simple agent of General Bonaparte when he could treat with the representative of the Directory. He therefore deemed it necessary to inform the Emperor that he was the envoy in both cases. The question as to whether he should write to Thugut or to the Emperor was setded by Bonaparte's dictum that the assurance of greater despatch and the fear of ministerial opposition rendered it advisable to dispense with subordinates.36

3.

THE EMPEROR'S IDEAS

Clarke's letter did not produce the passports. The Emperor wrote to Alvinczy on December 17 that he could hardly consent to admit this so-called French envoy into [his] estates. . . The journey would have for its principal object only to spy and to intrigue. However, it would not be proper to reject brusquely the advances that the French government was pretending to make to us, . . . [for] the members of the Directory, . . . being very far yet from wishing for . . . a reasonable peace, would desire nothing more . . . than to have pretexts to attribute to my inflexibility and to my disdain the prolongation of the war.37 The Emperor sent Alvinczy a draft of a letter upon which to base his answer to Clarke. This draft declared that Clarke's coming to Vienna would be subject to "divers inconveniences"; that especially was it inadvisable to commence a new peace negotiation at Vienna while the Malmesbury-Delacroix negotiations were going on at Paris. The latter negotiations would be retarded by complication and crossing, the draft declared. However, the Emperor was only too glad to do anything likely to facilitate the making of peace, and so had authorized Gherardini to confer with Clarke in some city of the Venetian state or elsewhere regarding means to facilitate the conclusion of peace. In regard to the proposal of an armistice, Baron von Vincent, one of the adjutants-general of his Majesty, would discuss with Clarke various considerations respecting both his Majesty's engagements with his allies, and military matters.38 Thugut's instructions for Baron von Vincent ordered him to declare to Clarke that the Emperor was anxious to concur in preventing the useless effusion of blood, but was bound by treaty with his allies to make no general armistice without the consent and concurrence of those allies. This did not apply to partial and local truces, like that on the Rhine the previous year. " C l a r k e to Pres. of Dir., Dec. 6, 1796, Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 235. 37 Thugut, C, W, p. 534.

"Enclosed in letter of Emperor to Alvinczy of Dec. 17, 1796, ibid., pp. 538-539.

CLARKE'S MISSION TO " V I E N N A "

713

If Clarke cared to discuss the conditions of an armistice for Italy, Austria would be obliged to demand either (a) that the French should retire behind the Mincio, or that some other distribution of the armies should be made which would leave Austria free to communicate with Mantua; or (b) that the armies should remain in statu quo, but that Austria should be allowed to send into Mantua sufficient provisions to last for the period of the armistice, as it would not be right for the garrison to exhaust its food supply during the armistice, and then have to surrender as soon as the war recommenced because of lack of food. During the armistice, the French should not encroach on any part of the Papal States yet in the Pope's power; the further revolutionization of the Italian states should cease; no hostilities or violence should be undertaken against Venice, Tuscany, Genoa, or any other Italian states. If these conditions were accepted, then an armistice could be concluded for Italy until March 15 or 20. If the French insisted, the document could be ratified by Alvinczy and Bonaparte, the commanding generals, but all further ratification was to be refused as superfluous. 39 O n December 21, Clarke was still waiting for his passports.40 T w o days later, Sandoz reported that it was feared he would be made to wait a long time, or would even be refused. 41 There was interminable speculation as to why they did not arrive, but the reason most often alleged was Thugut's desire to humor the English cabinet. 42 If the mission had been a secret one, Nerciat wrote to Guiraudet on December 19, less difficulties would have been encountered, and he suggested that perhaps it was still advisable to return to "the means of mystery." 4 3 Nine days later, Clarke informed the Directory that the Emperor had been much annoyed by the publicity given to the mission. 44 Thugut wrote to Gherardini that the ostentation with which the mission had been published in France could have had no other purpose than that of sowing jealously and distrust among the Allies. 45 " T h e entire conduct of the French government," said T h u g u t in the postcript of the same letter, "demonstrates only too clearly its intention of calumniating the Allies and of rejecting upon their pretended obstinacy [all responsibility for] the prolongation of a war whose burden the people in France are already very weary of supporting." 46 Thus, the Directory had compromised its cause from the beginning. There was but one situation in which his Imperial Majesty would have 30 J bid.,

pp. 540-545. " C l a r k e to Dir., Dec. 21, 1796, Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 235. "Sandoz to the King, Dec. 23, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. "Idem, Dec. 30, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354.

"Hüfier-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, ΙΟΙ. " Arch. Ν., A F III 59, d. 235. " D e c . 27, 1795, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. ι , 103. 18 H. H. S. Arch., Expeditionen nach Turin 26.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

been willing to treat separately with France, and that was one wherein his allies had not reciprocated his good faith. But politics, according to Thugut, had to provide for all contingencies. 47 T h e Baron therefore stipulated the principles which would have to underlie any possible treaty: the possessions of members of the Empire on the left bank to be returned to them, and no alteration or considerable change to take place without sufficient indemnification of those adversely affected; complete restitution, without exception, of all territories invaded by the French during the war, with indemnity for the Emperor for having had to go to such great expense to wage a war declared by the French; cession of no territory by Austria except upon equitable indemnification, considering richness and population. Austria could not accept the proposition that France would keep Belgium while Austria indemnified herself by occupying Bavaria by force; Austria would like to have Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, but desired the Elector of Bavaria to receive Belgium in return. His Majesty could not accept the principle of compensation by secularization, as one secularization would be followed by another, resulting in the destruction of the ancient order of things in the Empire. If Clarke should suggest that Prussia could be induced to agree to Austria's acquisition of Bavaria in consideration of some advantages, Gherardini should refuse, and give it to be understood that no acquisition could be pleasing to the Emperor if it entailed a new increase in the power of Prussia. If France really desired a reconciliation to his Majesty, it should propose indemnities the acquisition of which depended really upon France, and which a jealous power could not forestall. Gherardini was to present all this as his own reflections, based upon his knowledge of the Emperor's sentiments. 48 T o understand fully the armistice question, a f e w facts must be adduced. O n December 14, Moreau's adjutant, Baudot, appeared at the Austrian outposts and requested to be allowed to see Archduke Charles in order to hand him a letter from Moreau. Baudot was led blindfolded to Kork, whither the Archduke repaired. T h e letter Baudot brought declared that: "Your Royal Highness is certainly not ignorant of the fact that General Clarke has been sent by the French government to Vienna to treat for a cessation of hostilities during the course of the more serious negotiations which have just opened at Paris" (obviously a reference to the Malmesbury-Delacroix conversations). " W r o t e T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, the objects to be gained by Gherardini's conversations with Clarke were: to penetrate the French views without compromising Austria, while waiting to see whither Russia would turn under its new ruler, and h o w the English subsidy question would end;

also, to avoid as much as possible the appearance of unshakably refusing peace by unreasonable stubbornness (Dec. 27, 1796, Briefe Thugut, I, 374). 48 T h u g u t to Gherardini, Dec. 27, 1796, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 1 0 4 105.

CLARKE'S MISSION TO "VIENNA"

Moreau then spoke of the inclemency of the season, and asked Charles what he thought about an armistice. Charles's answer, dated December 14, was a conditional acceptance. On December 15, Moreau asked Charles to name a general to concert with his (Moreau's) appointee regarding the terms of the armistice, and suggesting that the basis should be the status quo, and a tenday notice before resumption of hostilities. The next day the Archduke notified Moreau that there could be no question of arrangements between them concerning winter quarters unless the French evacuated the right-bank fortress of Kehl.49 Charles expected a flat refusal of this suggestion, and, in point of fact, Moreau did not yield, but wrote on December 30 that new instructions of his government had ordered him to ask the Archduke to agree to conferences between generals of the two armies, "to determine in a precise manner what was possible to do for the relief of humanity and the repose of the armies." Charles did not answer this letter.50 The Archduke still hoped to capture Kehl, but asked the Emperor what he should do if he could not, and if Moreau, contrary to all expectation, agreed to evacuate Kehl on condition of an armistice for the outposts. Indeed, on January 7, 1797, Moreau offered to evacuate Kehl, and again asked that an Austrian general with power to negotiate should be sent to him. Charles answered the next day that the Emperor had not authorized him to conclude an armistice, but that if the useless effusion of blood troubled Moreau, he could send two officers to the Austrian lines, fully empowered to arrange and conclude the capitulation of Kehl and the bridgehead of Hüningen — "the only means of accomplishing this object." Moreau (letter of January 8, 1797) promised to appoint Desaix. Actually, on the next day (January 9, 1797), the capitulation of Kehl was concluded. However, Desaix refused to surrender the Hüningen bridgehead.51 The siege of Mantua by the French and of Kehl by the Austrians had been going on simultaneously, and each side was anxious for the armistice to profit itself exclusively. On January 7, the Directory wrote to Clarke that it agreed with Bonaparte that no armistice should be made which would not benefit France's military position on the Rhine 52 — as the price of postponing the capitulation of Mantua. The Emperor, as already signified in Vincent's instructions, was willing to conclude an armistice in regard to Italy, but he wrote to Charles on November 27 to make no armistice on the Rhine.53 "Moreau to Charles, Dec. 13, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Haus Korrespondenz 179. "Charles to Emperor, Dec. 16, 1796, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 97. 61 Ibid., p. 98.

52

Dir, to Clarke, Jan. 7, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., II, 4 1 1 . M Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 92-93.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

4.

CLARKE AT

VICENZA

Clarke arrived on the night of January 2 at Vicenza, whither Vincent had come to meet him. T h e French envoy declared that it was not in his power to negotiate a partial armistice. 54 H e expressed his astonishment at no» having been allowed to go to Vienna, averred that he was charged with proposals proper only for the ear of his Majesty, protested the desire of the Directory for peace, and appeared mortified that he was not recognized as the "Envoy Extraordinary of the French Republic," but only as a "major general." (Since Austria had not recognized the Republic, she did not recognize its appointments.) T h e conversations ended on January 3 — absolutely fruitlessly, of course. 56

5.

T H E DIRECTORY'S I N S T R U C T I O N S OF J A N U A R Y 1 6 - I 7 ,

I797

T h e same day, January 3, Clarke wrote to Alvinczy that he could not see Gherardini without an express order from the Directory; and he queried whether he might not proceed to Vienna, seeing that the Malmesbury negotiations had terminated, and that there was thus no longer danger of complicating those negotiations. 56 However, the Austrians had plenty of other excuses on hand, and on January 17, the Directory empowered Clarke "to enter into negotiation with Gherardini, or any other minister or agent of the Emperor . . . , [and] to agree upon preliminary articles of peace. . . T h e Directory grants him all the necessary powers." 5 7 N e w and detailed instructions were sent to Clarke on January 16. T h e first and most essential point, these instructions declared, was Austria's abandonment of her left-bank possessions (i.e., of Belgium, Luxemburg, Falkenstein, 58 and the Fricktal). 5 9 "These territories [the Belgian NetherVincent to Alvinczy, Jan. 3, 1797, Thugut, C, W, pp. 551-552. " V i n c e n t to Thugut, Jan. 5, 1797, ibid., pp. 560-566. 54

" C l a r k e to Alvinczy, Jan. 3, 1797, ibid., pp. 557-559· " Extracts from registers of Dir.'s deliberations, H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19. 58 A small left-bank county of meager revenue, the sole importance of which was that it was the last heritage of the House of Lorraine on the left bank of the Rhine. Bought by the Duke of Lorraine in 1667, and retained despite the cession of Lorraine to Stanislas Leszczynski, Falkenstein entitled the Lorraine line to a seat and vote in the Reichs-

fürstenrat (Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 142, n. 1 ) . Falkenstein was in the Palatinate (Langwerth von Simmern, Oestr. Reich fr. Rev., II, 428). On March 12, Clarke said the Directory would be satisfied if the Emperor ceded Falkenstein to another prince (Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 142-148). On May 14, the Emperor indicated his willingness to cede the tiny principality to another prince for a price (part of Ferrara), but only if its future owner were first designated — to make sure France did not obtain it (Instructions for Gallo and Merveldt, ibid., pp. 198-199). 58 A tiny state bordering, during the Directory, upon the cantons of Berne, Solothurn, and

CLARKE'S MISSION TO "VIENNA"

717

lands] have been for the last two centuries a source of wars, reborn without end, between France and the House of Austria." The solution was for France to swallow up the bone of contention, for which Poland had already supplied compensation on the sacrificial altar; and besides, the Austrian possessions in northern Italy would be returned. The second condition of peace was that the Emperor, as Archduke of Austria and as head of the Empire, should not oppose France's retention of the Habsburg left-bank territories, and of the districts united to France by treaties, laws, or the Constitution (such as Porentrui, Montbéliard, Stavelot, Malmédy, and the Bishopric of Liège). The promise of nonopposition could constitute a secret article of the treaty. France would continue to occupy, as formerly, until the peace of the Empire had been concluded, all the territories 60 and forts of Germany which she was then occupying, the intention here being either to leave the way open to obtain the left bank from the Empire if the opportunity should afford itself, or merely to preserve for the Republic a good bargaining position. France did not object to Austria's engulfment of Bavaria if the Republic and its allies were indemnified; 6 1 however, no arrangement in regard thereto should enter into the preliminaries. If the Emperor desired to treat conjointly with England, Clarke should demand that the preliminaries be signed first; 6 2 then Austria could mediate a Franco-English peace. The next article is worthy of quotation: "Our occupation of a part of Germany and of Italy has necessarily led there to the propagation of the love of liberty. A very great number of inhabitants of these lands have pronounced themselves for our principles. They have been incited thereto by Basel; and now dependent upon the canton of the Aargau. The Fricktal is located upon the left bank of the Rhine between Zurzach and Basel. The French desired this litde territory to indemnify the Swiss Confederation for France's annexation of Porentrui, which constituted the largest part of the old Bishopric of Basel. Clarke suggested once to Carnot that the Fricktal be given to the Prince of Löwenstein-Wertheim, a German prince with possessions in Alsace who had the distinction of being the only Alsatian prince willing to accept the indemnity France had offered him. A memoir in the Berne archives suggests the union of the Fricktal with an enlarged canton of Basel (Denkschrift über die politischen Verhältnisse der Waat," Staatsarchiv, Berne, G. R. Α., XXXVII, no. 144, published in J. Strickler [ed.], Actensammlung [9 vols., index, Berne, 1886], I, 42; Arch. Α. E., Allemagne 674, f. 7 1 ; Arch. Ν., A F III 59, d. 235;

Guyot, Direc., pp. 634 et seqq.). °° Coir. inéd. Ñapo., II, 416, has here "bridges" instead of "territories." It is an error of capital importance, for such a wording would seem to indicate an intention to evacuate at least some of the left bank upon the conclusion of peace with Austria. 81 Caillard wrote from Berlin on January 26 that it was more advantageous to France that Austria should be aggrandized lengthwise, as by the acquisition of the Archbishopric of Salzburg or the Bishopric of Passau, than by rounding off, as by the acquisition of Bavaria (to Delacroix, Arch. N., AF III 79. d. 324)· 62 On February 6, 1797, Starhemberg wrote to Grenville that he had "anew the certitude that the French wish to make advantageous offers to my court to detach it from England" (Dropmore Papers, III, 297).

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

our example, perhaps even by direct invitation from some agents of the government. This is doubtless not a sufficient motive for compromising the security and interests of the Republic." However, the treaty should contain a provision that no one would suffer in his person or property for any civil, political, military, or commercial act committed during the war. 63 A s appears by the foregoing terms, the Directory was now in the grip of the "great moderation" mentioned in the last chapter, and was willing to renounce for the time being insistence upon the cession of the German left bank except for certain bits of territory necessary to round off the French frontier. W h a t can have been the reason for this sudden readiness to pass over a matter which had hitherto constituted the sine qua non of Revolutionary politicians? T h e answer may be found in the Directory's fear of the nation — that grand French nation which loves glory, indeed, but which also insists upon honor and justice. T h e elections were approaching. Would not the people accuse their government of systematically prolonging the war — and would they not therefore elect royalist deputies in protest? That is what the Directory feared. O n January 16, the government confessed to Clarke the need for concessions: "These propositions are the ultimatum of the Directory. Y o u will perhaps find them too restrained. However, the need for peace is so great in all of France, the cry is so universal, the penury of our means for continuing the war is so absolute that we must restrain ourselves." 84 Barras wrote in the margin of the instructions of January 16 that Clarke should concert all his measures with Bonaparte, and not make any move until Bonaparte had found it to be in conformity with the interests of the Republic and the safety of his army.®5 Clarke was at first very unhappy that he had been bound so closely to Bonaparte. H e wrote to Carnot on February 3 that the despatch had made him ill. 66 On January 17, the Directory decreed supplementary instructions for Clarke. These declared that it did not matter that Gherardini was — as it appeared — quite devoid of powers, for he could at least agree with Clarke on a place where all the ministers plenipotentiary of the two powers and their allies might meet to discuss the general peace. A t the same time, Clarke should sound Gherardini as to his disposition with respect to a separate Franco-Austrian peace. T h e Directory then suggested that Clarke might start a secret negotiation with Thugut, writing to him directly, and declaring that he possessed sufficient powers to conclude arrangements in an hour's time, if Austria desired to treat separately. H e could, moreover, present such Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, ff. 47-55. " Q u o t e d by Sorel, Bon. et Hoche, p. 39. 1,5 Arch. A. E. Autriche 367, f. 56. M

°° Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, 127, η. ι .

Pt. II, Vol. I,

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an advantageous ultimatum that Austria could not refuse it unless she absolutely did not desire peace. He might add that everything could be arranged as a preliminary treaty, which did not need the consent of the French legislature, and which could be a secret between the Directory and the Emperor until it was completed.67 Other supplementary instructions of the same date declared that "public negotiations are not always conducive to the promptest and happiest result. Often, success is more easily attained by expedients concealed from the restless gaze of the public." Clarke was ordered to work upon the fear and avidity of Thugut: to threaten to reveal the compromising documents, to offer to satisfy "his claims upon the public debt of France," and to promise him an additional million francs if, through his good offices, a favorable peace were made.68 On January 23, the Directory sent Clarke a treaty draft 6 9 which duplicated, in its essential points, the instructions of January 16. T w o articles (V and X ) require particular mention. Article V 7 0 provided that the French should continue to occupy the Italian states of the Emperor until . The instructions of January 16 had provided that Bonaparte was to specify the time and mode of evacuation. 71 However, when rumors of the victory of Bonaparte at Rivoli (January 14) reached Paris, certain of the Directors — even before official verification 7 2 — set themselves up as the champions of Italian "independence." Carnot was opposed to propositions which it would be difficult for Austria to accept, and declared he would slap the face of anyone who proposed to break off the negotiations under the pretext of Italian freedom. Reubell immediately took umbrage at Carnot's words, and jumped to his feet ready to seek instant satisfaction. "Explain," he roared, "what you mean by a slap in the face, and to whom your threats are addressed." Carnot replied that he of course meant his words to apply only to those not connected with the Directory. 73 The outcome of the matter was that the Directory wrote to Clarke to insist upon the independence of the Italian states formerly under Austrian domination, to declare that France did not desire for herself any further territory than was already designated in preceding treaties and laws, and that the French Republic would not only consent to Austria's indemnifying herself in Germany on the right bank, but would 67 68

Ibid., pp. 111—112.

Ibid., pp. 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 . " T e x t in Corr. Napo., II, 342-345; and Debidour, Recueil, IV, 7 1 5 - 7 1 6 . 70 Debidour, Recueil, IV, 7 1 5 , has omitted Article V by inadvertence, and numbered Article IV as V. " Corr. inéd. Napo., II, 416.

" T h e official news must have arrived from Italy on January 25 or shortly before, for on the twenty-fifth, the Directory "hastened to inform" the Five Hundred of the victory (Dir. to Five Hundred, Moniteur, XXVIII, 534)· 13 Mém. Barras, II, 290.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

also add its influence to procure compensation for her. However — and here appears the influence of Carnot's threatened slap — if this insistence might lead to a rupture or to retardation of the negotiations, or compromise the safety of the army, Clarke should yield. Bonaparte's opinion was to be asked, and nothing undertaken without his advice and consent.74 Article X of the January 23 treaty project declared that the Republic would not oppose the arrangements the Emperor chose to make with his co-states to indemnify himself for his losses — a covert reference to Bavaria. The instructions of January 16 had ordered Clarke to avoid as much as possible all discussion on this point, and if forced to speak of it, to confine himself to oral communications.78 6.

FRANCE ENDEAVORS TO ENLIST T H E AID OF PRUSSIA AGAINST AUSTRIA

T o lure and frighten Prussia into intimidating Austria to accept the treaty project of January 23, Delacroix sent to Caillard a despatch (dated January 26) which contained both a statement of principles and a program of action : The Directory would insist on keeping only the territories already united with the Republic. It clung to the idea of secularization as the only means of indemnifying those princes who had suffered losses, the respective shares of territory to be agreed upon in a preliminary conference composed, not of belligerents, but of those who would be called upon to prepare the peace. The Austrian share should be determined by a "very pronounced act" on the part of Prussia and other princes of the Empire. The Directory preferred measures which would be agreeable to Prussia and to its other German allies, "but only on condition that they united with it [the Directory] to accelerate [the peace]." The Directory was disposed to allow Austria to have as indemnity Salzburg, Passau, and perhaps the Upper Palatinate; it was absolutely opposed to the projected absorption of all Bavaria by the Habsburgs. "However, if two or three more campaigns are necessary to prevent it, and Prussia remains idle, it will be impossible for the Republic to defend alone and longer a state [Bavaria, of course] which in this war has been constantly armed against it." 78 When this despatch of Delacroix's reached Berlin, Caillard asked Haugwitz "whether, when all handsome behavior . . . had been found to be fruidess . . . , Prussia would use language worthy of a great power toward the Court of Vienna, and prevent the Emperor from further fatiguing the Empire by a war which had become absolutely devoid of object." Haugwitz "Debidour, Recueil, IV, 727. 75 Coir. inêd. Ñapo., II, 415.

"Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, ff. 318-319.

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refused to bind himself as to what Prussia might do in future contingencies.77 A month later, Sandoz divined the existence, between France and Austria, of pourparlers and "of a sort of rapprochement effected or about to be effected." He mentioned the subject to Reubell and Carnot. These Directors were loud in their denials. "Pourparlers with the Court of Vienna[?] No!" they replied; "but military correspondence, yes! It is of a nature to instruct us concerning everything we are interested in knowing." Sandoz remarked to his king that he did not know how much truth there was in what he was told. "French agents know how to render themselves interesting only by lying," he added.78 7.

THE DIRECTORY'S ATTITUDE STIFFENS

Despite Haugwitz' refusal to commit himself as to what Prussia might do in future contingencies, the Directory seems to have expected to see Prussia soon emerge from her neutrality. The moment would indeed have been favorable for Prussia to amputate another limb of the giant crippled by Bonaparte, but Frederick William's moral standards were higher — or perhaps, merely, his courage was lower — than Frederick II's, and he contented himself with villifying his rival. But even without Prussian aid, France was justified in viewing the future with confidence. The victory at Rivoli, the crushing of a royalist conspiracy,79 the fall of Mantua — had followed one another in swift succession. It was only natural that the Directory should have begun to wonder whether it had done right in weakening on the Rhineland question, that it should have made fitful efforts to retrace its steps. On February 12, Delacroix sent Clarke one of Chouchard's maps of Germany with "the new frontier line to be established" traced thereon. This "new frontier" was apparently not the frontier of Clarke's January 16 and 23 instructions, but a very old frontier, for the accompanying letter of Delacroix ran: "I observe to you that it is sent only for your information, and that you should not regard it as necessary to be exacted if its admission might hamper the negotiation."80 However, the Directory did not renounce its renunciation. It dared not. France was too restless, too critical of its government. Murmurs everywhere! The meagerness of resources; the rarity of coin; the slow pace of commerce; the lack of public works; the penury of public servants, government pensioners and holders of government securities; the actual hunger pangs of the indigent; the tardiness of justice; the general dissatisfaction 77

Caillard to Delacroix, Feb. i8, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 453. "March 22, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frank.-

reich 89, fase. 354. ™ Vide infra, chap, xxiii, § 7. 80 Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, f. 77.

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with the necessity for a new campaign; the spread of desertion from the army; the renewed threat of civil war in Brittany and Normandy; the rumors of a plague involving eighteen hundred deaths at France's very door (Kehl) ; the lampoons of journalists ("Your five pigs are too fat") ; and the excesses of "several humorists [ w h o ] went so far as to accuse the Directory of venality" — all these served to arouse public discontent despite a full appreciation of the glory of Bonaparte's victories at Rivoli and Mantua. 81 In fact, the public refused to regard Bonaparte's victories as mere victories; they were steps to peace. T h e police reports make this crystal clear.82 It was hardly time for the Directory to raise obstacles which did not exist before. One must mention that no reliance may be placed upon Guyot's account of the Clarke negotiation at this point. 83 Neither of the two supplements of instructions of February n so much as alludes to the left bank, let alone renounces it, as Guyot says. T h e first supplement talks about the taking of Mantua and of alliance with Sardinia. 84 T h e second, about the Cispadine and Modena; the second also refers to previous instructions for information as to the Directorial will regarding Mantua and the Milanese. 85 But nothing about the Rhineland. A n d the map mentioned above, which indicates a boundary which Delacroix said was "not . . . necessary to be exacted," naturally could not indicate the renunciation of the Rhineland which Guyot "sees." Unfortunately the map is now missing. It is neither with its covering letter nor in A F III 432. But we do not need the map to assert categorically that one does not exact what he is renouncing. If one looks closely, he will see that Guyot has given no citation for the supposed instructions of February i l . T h e reason is that there is none to give. Indeed his remarks concerning the Cispadine and Modena are accurate, but the same cannot be said of what follows them. W e have, then, the Directory struggling about like a fish out of water seeking to reach the Rhine after it has itself leaped therefrom, anxious to be back, but not knowing how to get there without making itself a target for all the baiters of France. Finally it worked out a plan aiming to gain by indirection what it feared to seek directly. T h e strategy was to prompt several German states to ask France to give up the idea of renunciation. O n February 21, Delacroix wrote to Caillard: The limit of the Rhine . . . is . . . less necessary to us than to the Protestant princes of Germany. . . It is uniquely upon this extension of the French RePolice reports of Jan. 23, Feb. 14, τη, 18, 19, 20, 21, 1797, Aulard, Paris, III, 709710, 743, 750, 755-757, 759-760, 7 6 2 763. 82 Police reports of Feb. 12, 18, 1797, ibid., M

ΡΡ· 743. 757· " Direc., p. 331. 84 Arch. A . E., Autriche 367, ff. 71-74. 80 Arch. A . E., Autriche 367, fi. 75-76.

CLARKE S MISSION TO

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723

public that the principle of secularization rests. . . This principle alone is the fertile source wherein the House of Brandenberg will find the basis of its new power, wherein those of Mecklenburg, Hesse, Württemberg . . . [will acquire] the aggrandizement and titles they have so long coveted. This limit not assumed, the ecclesiastical electorates will conserve their integrity, the House of Austria its preponderance. France, Delacroix went on, has no interest in aggrandizing Austria, which has never done anything for her, but if the Republic, abandoned to its own forces, is not able to arrive at a glorious peace by the application of the principles agreed upon between France and Prussia, France will treat directly with Austria, and, after stipulating her own advantages, will "apply the same zeal to perpetuating the divided state of Germany that she would have applied to establishing the modifications agreed upon." 8 6 Guyot declares that by this despatch of February 21, the Directory withdrew its concession regarding the left bank of the Rhine. 87 That this is not true is borne out not only by a careful consideration of the text quoted, but by the despatch of March 8 from Delacroix to Clarke. Therein Delacroix explicitly stated that the Directory was still disposed to depart from its former demand for the Rhine boundary. 88 In another part of the March 8 despatch, Delacroix (on Reubell's order) informed Clarke that any possible ultimatum to Austria should conform to the supplementary instructions of January 25 and February n , 8 9 neither of which mentioned the Rhineland, 90 hence neither of which can be cited to modify the explicit renunciation of the Rhineland. It is indeed strange that any despatch should fail to mention a subject formerly deemed so important that it was a sine qua non, yet the disagreeable topic was religiously avoided by both the Directory and Clarke for prolonged periods. 91 Therefore, it seems that in this instance, also, Guyot's presentation is gravely at fault. After the fall of Mantua (February 2, 1797), the French expected the Emperor to commence overtures for peace.92 They were not therefore too much surprised when Major General Guyeux (of France's A r m y of Italy) wrote to Bonaparte that one Hohenzollern had arrived under a flag of truce, asserted that Clarke had reopened negotiations and that therefore it was useless to continue shedding blood, and asked for an armistice in Alvinczy's " A r c h . A. E., Prusse 220, ff. 382-383. " G u y o t , Dtrec., p. 333. ω Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 133. 88 Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, ff. 93—94. w Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, ff. 64, 71-76. 91 T h e following communications to a n d f r o m Clarke d o not allude to the left b a n k : Supplement of instructions for Clarke, Jan. 25,

i797> Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, f. 64; Clarke's despatches of Jan. 31 to Feb. 11, ibid., ff. 65-70; two supplements of instructions of Feb. 11, ibid., ff. 71-74, 75-76; and Clarke's despatch of Feb. 18, ibid., f. 78. °2 Sandoz to the King, Feb. 20, 1797, G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354.

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

name. Guyeux reported that he had professed ignorance of any armistice proposals, and declared that he could cease hostilities only on orders from Bonaparte.93 Bonaparte thereupon advised Clarke (by letter) that if armistice proposals should be made to him, he might well agree to a suspension of hostilities until June i, for there was a worrisome possibility that a great part of the Austrian army on the Rhine would be transferred to Italy.94 Little likelihood existed, however, that propositions would be made to Clarke. Archduke Charles, transferred to Italy to check Bonaparte, had allowed himself to be led into a peace parley a few days before Hohenzollern's overture,95 and the Emperor ordered him — on March 8, three days after Bonaparte's letter to Clarke — to reject each and every French proposition for an interview or armistice, and to forbid any meetings or undertakings between his subordinates and Republican officers.96 Indeed, Charles might disobey. Thugut complained that Charles did not follow the orders given him.97 But official Austria and Archduke Charles were as far removed from each other as official Prussia and Prince Henry. The official patient had to be in extremis for the two to become one. Prussia had feared that French victories in Italy would lead Austria to make a separate peace.98 Her fears were gratuitous. Adversity only intensified Thugut's will to conquer.99 The Directory's intentions regarding the form of the negotiations it was trying to promote calls for elucidation. Was it a peace congress or a separate peace that Clarke was supposed to be offering Austria? A peace congress the Emperor would probably have accepted; 100 a separate negotiation, no. Bonaparte thought it was both. He wrote to the Directory: "It has appeared to us that we could not commence negotiations for a separate 93

Guyeux to Bonaparte, Feb. 23, 1797, H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19. " C l a r k e to Delacroix, March 5, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 1 3 1 132· " O n February 16, 1797, Charles received a letter. Immediately he mounted his horse and rode away. When he reached the outposts, he dismissed his escort, and engaged in conversation for three hours with a lone figure in civilian clothes. This personage left in Charles's hands a three-point peace program: restitution of Lombardy to the Emperor, indemnities in Italy, and exchanges in Germany. The identity of the Archduke's interlocutor has never been ascertained (Guyot, Direc., pp. 347-348). "March 8, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 152.

" T o Count Colloredo, Feb. 19, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 18. M Elgin to Grenville, Feb. 25, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 64/43. 89 Vide Sandoz to the King, Feb. 20, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. Also Thugut to Gherardini, Jan. 27, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 1 1 9 : "The French need not hope that events will have any effect on his [the Emperor's] principles." Hiiffer gives the source of this letter as H. H. S. Arch., Sardinien 27; it should be Sardinien 26. 100 Though he did write to Archduke Charles: "In no respect is the present moment appropriate for peace" (March 8, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. ι.

134-135)·

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725

peace with Vienna at the same time that we were lending our ears to propositions for the opening of a congress [in accordance with Clarke's instructions of November 14]. . . W e can never bring the Court of Vienna to enter into negotiations with us except by pronouncing ourselves decidedly against the opening of a congress." 1 0 1 Delacroix replied with a letter to Clarke : Proposing a separate peace and agreeing to the formation of a congress have nothing contradictory about them. . . You will appear to lend yourself to his [Gherardini's] propositions for the formation of a congress while . . . you endeavor to start a direct and secret negotiation with Herrn Thugut for a separate peace. These two negotiations can advance abreast, and perhaps the apparent negotiation with Gherardini will be even pleasing to the Court of Vienna as a screen to hide from the eyes of its allies the real negotiation going on between you and Herrn Thugut. 102 T o Sandoz, who had asked Reubell, Carnot, and L e Tourneur if they would accept the intervention of Prussia for a general peace, the reply was made that "they would have preferred a partial peace for an infinity of reasons, but would not refuse a general peace." 1 0 3 T h e Directory, it seems, was not at all certain it could force a separate negotiation on Austria, but Clarke kept his legation together in the hope that he might yet be permitted to go to Vienna to negotiate a separate peace with Thugut. T h e spring campaign of 1797 would not be begun, Clarke 101 102

103

March 6, 1 7 9 7 , Corr. Napo., II, 474. March 8, 1 7 9 7 , H i i f f e r - L u c k w a l d t , Quellen, Pt. II, V o l . I, 133. S a n d o z to the K i n g , March Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 120.

10,

1797,

O n April 9, 1 7 9 7 , T h u g u t wrote to Cobenzl at St. Petersburg that the chargé d'affaires of Prussia at V i e n n a (Lucchesini had gone to Italy) had been instructed to offer the E m p e r o r Prussia's good offices for the conclusion of a general peace o n the basis of the integrity of the Empire. T o T h u g u t , this was merely a piece of Prussian propaganda to counter the rumors whispered here and there throughout the Empire that the K i n g of Prussia had conspired with the foreign enemy to violate the integrity of the Empire and despoil his f e l l o w princes f o r his o w n benefit. (It will be recalled that Prussia had betrayed its o w n secret treaty of A u g u s t 5, 1 7 9 6 to Russia, and that Russia had apprized Austria [vide supra, Pt. II, chap, x i , § 3 ] ; it was this information that was n o w trick-

ling forth, to Frederick William's consternation.) T h u g u t replied to the Prussian chargé d'affaires that the Emperor was "touched by the confidential overture," and saw therein " a new proof of the amity of the K i n g , to w h i c h he will always attach an infinite price." But to C o b e n z l he wrote that " n o t h i n g could be more afflicting to us than to be reduced to admitting the Prussian intervention in our pacification"; and he charged Cobenzl to incite Paul to offer his mediation too, as an antidote (April 9, 1 7 9 7 , A . V i v e n o t [ e d . ] , Thugut und sein politisches System. Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Politik, des österreichischen Kaiserhauses während der Kriege gegen die jranzösische Revolution [2 parts, Vienna, 1 8 7 0 ] , Pt. II, 1 8 - 2 0 , reprinted f r o m the Kaiserliche A k a d e m i e der Wissenschaften [ e d . ] , Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen, XLII, XLIII).

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told the Austrians, before new efforts had been made to obtain a hearing. 104 But he (Clarke) made the point that if the war recommenced anyway, and the French obtained new advantages, his former propositions of peace would become null and void. 105 The war did recommence, and Bonaparte's cannon did sound the death knell of Clarke's propositions, but it was not to be Clarke who would deliver the funeral oration. 8.

CLARKE A T FLORENCE

By a letter of March 8 from the Emperor to Archduke Charles — not the letter of March 8 mentioned above —the Habsburg ruler ordered his brother to refrain from all correspondence with the Archdukes at Milan and at Florence, and with the Tuscan minister, Manfredini. 106 The reason for this order follows. Bonaparte had long been advising Clarke to confer with Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany, but Clarke had rejected the idea as appearing to recognize the mediation of the Grand Duke. 107 Finally, Clarke yielded, at the instance, it seems, of Manfredini, whom Bonaparte and Clarke had been entertaining. 108 About the end of February or the beginning of March — the letter in which Clarke describes his visit is not dated, and the despatch to which it was originally affixed is missing from the Correspondance politique — the Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic repaired to Florence in disguise under the name Robert. Manfredini ushered him into the presence of the Grand Duke, and then left the two men alone. Clarke read to Ferdinand fragments of the letters of Saint-Priest and of Aiguillon (minister of foreign affairs under Louis X V ) , which proved that Thugut had sold the secrets of Austria to France. Regarding terms of peace, Clarke declared to Ferdinand that the House of Austria would be asked to make no other sacrifice than that of the territories it possessed on the left bank of the Rhine; that France would not at all exact that river as a boundary . . . ; that if Austria consented, either to give us the Rhine as a frontier, or to renounce some of its possessions in Italy, the French Republic . . . [would aid in] the acquisition by the House of Austria of a considerable amount of territory in Germany.109 1M Gherardini

to Thugut, March 9, 1797, H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19. 105 Clarke to Delacroix, March 17, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 142, n. 2; Clarke to Carnot, March 19, 1797, ibid. m Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I,

107

134-135· Perret (Clarke's secretary of legation) to

Carnot, Feb. 26, 1797, ibid., p. 129, n. 1. Clarke to Delacroix, Feb. 25, 1797, ibid. 308 Détails sur l'Entrevue Seerette avec le Grand Duc de Toscane, undated; somewhere between Feb. 25 and March 5, Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, f. 86. The italicized phrases were underscored in the original. 108

CLARKE'S MISSION TO "VIENNA"

The Grand Duke promised to report the substance of the interview to the Court of Vienna, and kept his word. He addressed his letter to Archduke Charles, hoping, perhaps, to induce the victor of Altenkirchen to cast the weight of his fame in the scales against Thugut; or fearing, perhaps, that a letter to the Emperor would fall into the hands of the ministers. The results were unforeseen. The Emperor opened the letter addressed to his brother, thinking that it might contain something urgent which, if not known immediately, would result in harm. 110 Then he forbade Charles, as already mentioned, to communicate with the Italian archdukes, and he turned the letter over to Thugut for reply. The answer which Thugut drafted, to be sent to Ferdinand in the Emperor's name, declared that Clarke's behavior in Florence did not manifest a sincere desire for peace, but rather a wish to sow dissension among the Allies. The Grand Duke should please expel Clarke from Florence, as his presence there tended to excite suspicion against Austria. If France really wanted peace, why did not Clarke make his propositions to Gherardini, instead of complicating an already-too-complicated situation by multiplying negotiations which crossed each other? 1 1 1 Archduke Charles was bound by oath to confine himself to military matters, and could under no circumstances meet with any French negotiator, were it Bonaparte or Clarke or anyone else. 112 The Emperor accepted Thugut's draft, and on March 29, Ferdinand, by a very cordial note, informed Clarke of the failure of his plans. 113 The Directory did not entirely approve of Clarke's behavior at Florence. It realized that if Thugut weathered the storm, Clarke could no longer commence with him the secret, separate negotiation which the Directory had suggested.114 Barras, Reubell, and Revellière were indignant that Clarke had not insisted upon the independence of Italy. (These three members had one day, in the absence of Carnot, added to Clarke's despatches that the liberation of Italy was to be regarded as a sine qua non.) 1 1 6 Carnot was left ""Emperor to Charles, March 8, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 135. 111 The multiplication increased, it seems, for on March 9, Gherardini wrote to Thugut: "Marsan saw Clarke at Bonaparte's house in Bologna. Clarke said he still hoped to go to Vienna. . . " (H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19.) And on April 19, Delacroix informed Clarke: "The Directory does not care to follow up the unofficial overtures you have made to St. Marsan" (Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 182). Thugut to Emperor, March 15, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 150-151.

m 114

Ibid. Delacroix to Clarke, March 14, 1797, ibid., p. 1 4 1 . It should not be thought, however, that the Directory objected to Clarke's modus operandi of itself. On March 2 1 , Reubell and Carnot indicated to Sandoz that they expected results from some steps taken, and Sandoz' report tells that one "General Pellegrini has promised to unmask the venal and secret reason why Thugut continues the war"; Thugut was afraid the English would divulge that he was in the pay of Pitt (to the King, March 22, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354). Vide Mém. Barras, II, 346.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

in charge of the negotiations, but it was decided that Clarke should conform to his latest instructions regarding the Italian possessions of the Emperor. Also, an armistice suggestion tendered by Clarke, and approved by Bonap a r t e — result of the overtures made to General Guyeux — was to be rejected with the assurance that the French troops on the Rhine were ready to second powerfully the A r m y of Italy. 116 9.

T H E CLARKE-GHERARDINI

CONFERENCES

"It appears evident," wrote Gherardini to Thugut on March 11, "that Clarke has utilized our request for an armistice as a pretext for renewing the negotiations." 1 1 7 Gherardini was ignorant of Clarke's visit to Florence; to him the negotiations had been severed since the breakup of the parleys with Vincent on January 3. O n March 10, Clarke had come to see Gherardini again. H e (Clarke) requested that their conferences should be secret, lest the moderation of his propositions should cool the zeal of the partisans of France in the conquered countries; and he cited Cologne as an example of attachment to France. Gherardini gave an oral promise to maintain secrecy. Clarke then tried to create bad blood between Austria and England by discoursing on the haughtiness of the English, their failure to pay promptly the loans which had been promised, and other "wrongs" committed against Austria by her allies. 118 Three days later (March 13), Clarke, in accordance with his instructions, wrote a private letter to Thugut, complaining (with reason) of the insufficiency of Gherardini's powers, and again suggesting a separate peace. If the Emperor was favorably disposed to this proposition, he wrote, and would either send him passports to go to Vienna, or indicate to him a negotiator who had sufficient powers, he (Clarke) would divulge very moderate bases for the definitive peace of the continent. These bases could be embodied in a preliminary treaty — which did not require the ratification of the French legislature. 119 But by what means could Clarke despatch this letter to T h u g u t ? T h e Envoy Extraordinary had recourse to a rather puerile stratagem. O n March 12, the previous day, Clarke had declared to Gherardini that the latter's powers were so circumscribed that he (Clarke) desired to read to him a letter which he proposed sending to T h u g u t through the channel of Gherardini himself. T h e letter contained the peace propositions of the Directory : the Emperor to renounce Belgium, Luxemburg, Falkenstein, and ue

117

Delacroix to Clarke, March 14, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 141; Mém. Barras, II, 347. H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19.

'"Gherardini to Thugut, March 11, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 135-138. u e Ibid., pp. 140-141.

CLARKE'S MISSION TO "VIENNA"

729

Italy north of the Po, and to obtain the greater part of Bavaria, Mantua, and Venetian Croatia; the Wittelsbachs to receive no indemnity whatsoever because they were staunch adherents of neither of the two belligerents; Austria to mediate peace between France and England. Gherardini rejected the idea that Austria should indemnify herself at the expense of neutral Venice, and he contradicted Clarke's assertion that Austria had obtained a great increase in power through the Polish partitions; Austria was now relatively weaker, he asserted, for Russia had obtained vastly more of the booty than had the Habsburgs. Gherardini concluded from the conversation that France was really desirous of peace, and that Clarke would like to be the instrument; that a scission in the Directory was impelling one side to endeavor to end the war; and that France would concur with Austria to realize the Emperor's program of restoration of the German left bank, compensation for the cession of the Austrian Netherlands, and nondesertion of his English ally. 120 Gherardini agreed with Clarke that the latter should draw up the above letter in formal fashion, and send it unsealed 1 2 1 to him at the Austrian legation (in T u r i n ) . However, when the letter arrived, it was found to be sealed. Instead of refusing to send it, Gherardini forwarded it nevertheless, warning Clarke of its uselessness in case it contained propositions not in consonance with the terms which Clarke had outlined verbally to him, or with the dignity and integrity of the Emperor. 122 W h e n the letter arrived at Vienna, T h u g u t found therein only Clarke's note of March 13 declaring that if the Emperor would agree to make a separate peace, and send him passports for Vienna, or indicate to him a negotiator with ample powers, he would divulge the Directory's terms. N o t a trace of the letter read by Clarke to Gherardini, which contained the detailed bases of a pacification. 123 Gherardini never discovered that he had been duped. W h e n Thugut's letter of April 2, divulging the trickery of the Envoy Extraordinary, arrived in Turin, Gherardini had been dead already for some three weeks. T h e strain of the Clarke negotiation had aggravated an old illness, and though he was bled three times, he grew steadily worse. Toward the end he was out of his head most of the time. Death came as a great boon on March 24. 124 Gherardini to T h u g u t , M a r c h 14, 1 7 9 7 , ibid., p p . 1 4 2 - 1 4 8 . O r , rather, unfastened but sealed w i t h a " f l y i n g seal," w h i c h adheres only to the upper fold of a letter, leaving it open to inspection.

120

m

Gherardini to Clarke, March 1 5 , 1 7 9 7 , H . H . S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19. 123 T h u g u t to Gherardini, April 2, 1 7 9 7 , H i i f f e r - L u c k w a l d t , Quellen, Pt. II, V o l . I, 155-156. 124Ibid., p. 150, η. ι . w

X

CHAPTER XXI

Χ

T H E D E F E A T OF A U S T R I A

I.

T H E INVASION OF AUSTRIA A N D T H E

A R M I S T I C E OF J U D E N B U R G , A P R I L 7 ,

I797

UVL

E A N W H I L E , the victories of Bonaparte were continuing apace. On March 16, the youthful general forced the passage of the Tagliamento, and Charles retreated eastward behind the Isonzo, sending his heavy artillery northward to Tarvis. Then Charles himself swung northward to Tarvis, but the French got there first — in fact, were just defeating an Austrian contingent there when Charles arrived in time to partake of the defeat. T h e Archduke retreated to Klagenfurt in Carinthia to regroup his army. Bonaparte left Bernadotte at Wipbach and Prewald (near Trieste) to observe, while he moved through Villach on Klagenfurt. On March 28, Charles was defeated and retreated, while Bonaparte made Klagenfurt his new center of operations. 1 At the end of March, Bonaparte, flushed with victory, seemed to be in a commanding position, but actually his situation was almost more precarious than the Archduke's. Charles was at home; the population was friendly and a potential source of reinforcement. Bonaparte was in a hostile country where every face was the face of an enemy and he would have only those troops he brought in with him. T o appease and intimidate the inhabitants so the French should not be unduly molested, Bonaparte made use of propaganda. 2 For reinforcements, he summoned General Bernadotte from Wipbach, and General Joubert from the Tyrol where he (Joubert) had been sent to guard Bonaparte's left wing. Bernadotte arrived with his 10,000 men, but Joubert never received the order to bring his 19,500 because the Tyrol was in full insurrection. T h e entire Army of Italy was only 62,000 strong, and with the loss of Joubert's men, casualties, and the troops left to guard strategic places, ' T h e military operations described in this and the two following paragraphs are from

2

Bourdeau, Campagnes, I, 3 1 2 - 3 1 6 . Vide infra, § 4, this chapter.

T H E DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

73I

Bonaparte probably had no more than 32,000 3 effectives at his disposal. That was not enough to conquer a country the size and strength of Austria, especially with revolt or near-revolt in the Tyrol and Venice menacing his communications. T h e General in Chief appealed nervously to the Directory for information as to whether the two Rhine armies were on their way to join him. N o , he was told; they did not have the supplies, so were still on the left bank. 4 Bonaparte concluded that the Directory feared to place three armies under his control. 5 There was only one road open: to negotiate. Better to negotiate now as a victor than later as a victim, he reasoned. T h e conclusion of peace had become a "military operation." 6 But Charles was forbidden to negotiate. 7 Thus, when an adjutant of Bonaparte's 8 arrived at the Austrian outposts on April 1 and asked to speak with Charles about matters of the greatest importance, the Archduke told him to send his message in writing so he could forward it to Vienna. Thereupon, a trumpeter brought Charles several letters, among which was one from Bonaparte 9 commencing, "Valiant soldiers levy war and desire peace," and ending, "If the overture which I have the honor to make to you is able to save the life of a single man, I shall deem myself more worthy of the civic crown that I shall have merited than of the sad glory which comes from military success." 10 Archduke Charles replied that he was not less anxious than Bonaparte for peace, but had not been authorized to negotiate. 11 A n d he sent Bonaparte's letter to his government. Meanwhile, the French continued their advance, forcing an entrance to the gorges of the Olsa against ferocious resistance,12 and besieging Neumarkt, which fell on April 2. Still retreating, * Razoumouskoi to W o r o n z o w , April 22, 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, 3 1 9 ; C o m mandant C a m o n , La guerre napoléonienne (4 vols, and atlas, Paris, 1 9 0 3 - 1 9 1 0 ) , I, 65. Masséna had an additional 11,000 men, with w h o m he skirted the base of the mountains to keep the Austrians f r o m hurling themselves into the T y r o l and turning the French left w i n g (ibid.). ' T h e i r delay in crossing the Rhine had been due also to another cause: time was needed to permit Bernadotte to conduct reinforcements to the A r m y of Italy (Bourgeois, Manuel, II, 1 5 0 ) . 5 H ü f f e r , Europa, I, 232. e Vide A . Fournier, Napoleon I (2nd ed., rev.; 3 vols., Vienna, 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 5 ) , I, 123. N o t in ist ed. (3 vols., Leipzig, 1886), I, 100, and hence not in Jaeglé's French translation, based o n the ist edition. 7 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, x x , § 8.

8

It was Marmont (Mémoires du maréchal Marmont, duc de Raguse, de 1792 à 1841 [9 vols., Paris, 1 8 5 7 ] , I, 1 6 8 ) .

Charles to Emperor, April ι , 1 7 9 5 , HüfíerL u c k w a l d t , Quellen, Pt. II, V o l . I, 155. 10 Vide the complete text in the Rédacteur, no. 488 (April 17, 1 7 9 7 ) . 9

11

H ü f f e r , Europa, I, 232. One of the Directory's journalistic critics queried w h y the Archduke's answer was never published in the French papers, insinuating that there was an unavowable motive involved (Rédacteur, no. 491 [April 20, 1 7 9 7 ] ) .

" T h e French advance was not so m u c h the "military p r o m e n a d e " that M . Louis A u d i bert indicates ( " L ' i m m o r t e l l e campagne de 1 7 9 6 - 1 7 9 7 en Italie," REN tRevue des Etudes Napoléoniennes], XLV [1939], 1 6 9 ) . T h e r e is, however, the possibility that the entire G e r m a n campaign of Bonaparte, w i t h its unexpected denouement, was

73 2

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Charles pleaded for an armistice pending receipt of Thugut's reply, but Bonaparte — faithful, for the time being, at least, to the Revolutionary tradition of allergy to armistices— replied that one could easily negotiate and fight simultaneously. 13 According to Count Roger de Damas, who was fighting with the Austrians in Condé's contingent, the Austrians' need of an armistice was great. As Damas phrases it, "the declarations of war and signatures of peace of the cabinet of Vienna have, since 1787, never been opportune, but eyewitnesses will except the peace of Leoben because of the indefinable distress existing then." A n d he explains that the Austrian troops were discouraged, and the "heads more disorganized than the regiments"; that the part of the army facing Franconia was in the most deplorable state, and utterly ruined; and that Archduke Charles himself advised peace "and had every reason to do so." 1 4 A l a r m for the safety of Vienna actually accentuated the speed of the Austrian retreat, and the French merely followed, harassing the enemy's rear guard. Through Judenburg and Knittelfeld the cavalcade passed, and by April 7, Bonaparte was in Leoben, within eighty miles of the Austrian capital. 15 T h u g u t was frantic, but not with fear. T h e Archduke had failed for days at a time to report to Vienna on his progress — in reverse; and T h u g u t had had to seek information on the Austrian army's movements from foreign envoys like Eden. 1 6 A s far as the military situation was concerned, T h u g u t — for all his unmoral actions — showed himself in this crisis to be the great man that his countrymen declare him to have been. UnafErighted, he courageously asserted that the resources of the Austrian monarchy were sufficient to save it: Vienna was being placed in a state of defense and orders had been given for a general insurrection in Hungary similar to that in the Tyrol. 1 7 Then, to take care of all eventualities, T h u g u t appealed to Russia in the Emperor's name. 18 But an appeal to Russia could have no real meaning in those days of part of a plot between Bonaparte and Archduke Charles; that peace at the expense of Venice had been agreed upon by Charles and the unknown person with w h o m he conversed on February 16 (vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xx, n. 95), and that the remainder of the campaign was mere ¡play-acting to save appearances. Bloody encounters have often been staged to conceal collusion, and the one at the entrance to the Olsa gorges may have been of this character (vide R. Guyot, " L e Directoire et Bonaparte," REN, I [ 1 9 1 2 ] , 326). 1 3 Hiiffer, Europa, I, 232; Bourdeau, Cam-

pagnes, I, 317. " J . Rambaud (ed.), Mémoires du comte Roger de Damas (2 vols., Paris, 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 4 ) , I, 263-264. Accord: Eden to Grenville, April 29, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. " B o u r d e a u , Campagnes, I, 3 1 7 . 19 Thugut to Count Colloredo, March 23, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 25. " T h u g u t to Gherardini (deceased), April 2, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 156. "Thugut's draft, April η, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 29.

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

733

horseback communication; the enemy was at the door — in fact, quite literally within the living room. The Emperor felt constrained to avail himself of the only possible solution under the circumstances. He sent Chief of Staff Count von Bellegarde and Major General von Merveldt to Bonaparte's camp at Judenburg. 19 There, on April 7, they concluded an armistice for six days — from the night of the seventh to the night of the thirteenth 20 — with the understanding that a separate Franco-Austrian peace would be negotiated during this period. To make an armistice before the signing of the peace was in accord with the instructions given Clarke, but Poteratz' instructions, it will be recalled, had required that peace preliminaries should be signed first. In practice the army had usually disregarded the armistice-only-after-peace policy which the Directory had inherited from the Convention, and the Directory, finding the results good, seems to have abandoned the idea. There was little danger that the Directory would repudiate Bonaparte's armistice, but there was a chance, for he completely lacked authority to make it. Thugut affirmed to Eden that the despatch of Merveldt to Bonaparte's camp had as its principal object to gain time for consolidating means of defense and obtaining pecuniary aid from England; that the Emperor was determined to avoid having to submit to terms of peace dictated by his enemies in the neighborhood of his capital, which terms could not fail to be inconsistent with his honor, his engagements, and his interests.21 And indeed this was the tone also of Thugut's letter of April 17 to Count Colloredo. 22 The appeal to Russia would likewise indicate an intent to keep up the fight. But on the fifteenth, the Baron seemed to resign himself to defeat: " I see very well that one cannot escape one's destiny, and that one must resign oneself to it. . . Everything seems to conspire to . . . plant the tree of liberty throughout Europe." 2 3 Probably Thugut did not himself know what attitude he would assume on the morow. He was waiting for events to shape themselves. That is why he had written to Clarke on April 5 in such a noncommittal manner: that Gherardini's serious illness — news of the tragedy had not yet reached Vienna — had necessitated another channel of communication between the two governments; until it was designated, the " N o t e that Charles was not chosen to do the necessary negotiating. The Austrian government was adhering to the policy that the Directory attempted with Bonaparte when it placed all diplomatic powers in Clarke's hands. But as locks keep out only honest men, so do such safeguards restrict only the disinterested. 20 The dates of this armistice are given as April 7 - 1 4 in Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 235.

This would make the armistice seven days long, except for the fact that it was signed at midnight of April 7-8 (J. H. Rose, "Bonaparte and the Conquest of Italy," C. Mod. H., VIII, 582). It was twice renewed. 21 Eden to Grenville, April 12, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. 21 Briefe Thugut, II, 32. "Ibid., p. 3 1 .

734

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Emperor had charged Counts von Bellegarde and von Merveldt to confer with Bonaparte, who had made some communications to Archduke Charles. Added was a remark that Thugut presumed Clarke would be present at the conferences between Merveldt, Bellegarde, and Bonaparte. 24 Unlike the Austrians, Bonaparte was deadly serious about the negotiations. Moreover, he did not intend that Clarke should have any part therein. It is thus very probable that the General in Chief refrained from sending Thugut's invitation on to Clarke. If he had, Clarke would have received it on April 10 or n at the latest, and would have arrived in Leoben about April 16.25 A s will appear later, he did not arrive. Bonaparte did not intend to be disturbed by the Directory either. 26 His combinations would produce a much more advantageous peace than Clarke's instructions provided for, he wrote to the Directory on April 8.27 T h e Directory actually played into its ambitious general's hands. By a letter of April 6, it had ordered General Clarke to "step aside and do nothing" until the Directory should have sent him new instructions in consonance with Bonaparte's victories. 28 Meanwhile, Bonaparte was busy negotiating, although he had no authority to negotiate, Clarke being the Directory's diplomat. It seems that it was not only the negotiations that Bonaparte appropriated to himself. According to Thiébault, he did the same with a case of Tokay wine which the Austrian government sent to the French lines. 29 T h e wine was probably intended for Clarke, who was expected to negotiate the peace. But Bonaparte intended to negotiate the peace himself, so thought he had better drink the wine too. 2.

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN RELATIONS ON THE OF AUSTRIA'S

EVE

CAPITULATION

T h e efforts of France in the early months of 1797 were all devoted, as usual, to securing the assistance of Prussia against "recalcitrant" Austria — Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 158-159. 26 Guyot, Direc., p. 356. Guyot ventures the " opinion that Bonaparte had deliberately sent Clarke away — "under the pretext of negotiations with Sardinia — and flown to meet the Archduke's troops" (REN, I, 326). " T h e Commissioners to the armies did, however, restrict his freedom of action until their abolition in April 1797, before the Preliminaries were signed. It has thus been pointed out that Bonaparte's emancipation from the Directory's orders was a gradual 21

process. He neither defied the Directory from the start, nor did he execute its orders faithfully from the start (vide the review of J. Godechot's Les commissaires aux armées sous le Directoire. Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre les pouvoirs civils et militaires, 2 vols., Paris, 1937, by G. Lefebvre, "La Révolution et l'Empire," RH, C L X X X V I I [1939], 9 1 - 9 2 ) . 27 Corr. inéd. Napo., II, 552. 28 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 160. 28 F. Calmettes (ed.), Mémoires du général

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

735

and these efforts took many forms. General Hoche, commanding the Sambre and Meuse Army in replacement of Beurnonville (who, on September 9, had replaced Jourdan),30 was ordered to comport himself in a friendly manner toward the neutral states of Germany, and especially toward Prussia, and to observe the Line of Demarcation "with care." 31 Prussian recruiting officers in Switzerland were authorized to send their recruits to Wesel across French territory, though this was contrary to the Constitution of the Year III.32 Hesse-Cassel was asked to urge Haugwitz to accede to the French proposals for an anti-Austrian alliance.33 Reubell declared to Sandoz that Frederick William should, to save Germany from being "exposed to the destructive scourge of war, declare himself the mediator of Germany and protector of the princes of the Empire." 34 Delacroix wrote to Caillard that if Prussian troops joined the French in an attack on Austria, or even merely pretended to do so, "the Executive Directory [would] leave Prussia the mistress of their [i.e., the peace terms'] determination." 35 Caillard, on the Directory's order, pointed out to Prussia that the Directory would admit discussion on the fate of the Rhineland 36 — a concession calculated mightily to please Frederick William — and Carnot assured Sandoz that the restitution of the left bank "had been definitively decided upon provided your Majesty would sustain his mediation [by force of arms]." 3 7 Caillard authorized the Duke of Zweibrücken to inform the Prussian cabinet that the Directory would never abandon Bavaria to the Emperor except in a case of real necessity; 38 and he remitted to Haugwitz an extract of an article from the Ami des Lois which threatened that France would assure Austria the possession of Bavaria, Würzburg, Salzburg, Passau, and Bamberg in return for the left bank and Italy if Prussia did not drop its irresolution. Then Prussia would realize too late the imprudence of its political conduct, and descend to the rank of a second-rate power, very fortunate yet if it succeeded in maintaining itself there, for without France it is nothing, and can do nothing. The Austrians have, in the baron Thiébault (5 vols., Paris, 1893-1895), II, 96. 80 Dir. to Jourdan, Mém. campagne de 1796, "Pièces justificatives," no. xli (p. 350). 81 Dir. to Hoche, Feb. 13, 1797, Arch. Ν . , A F III 433, d. 2484. 82 Dir. to Rudier, Jan. 15, 1797, Debidour, Recueil, IV, 665. 88 Rivalz to Delacroix, March 27, 1797, Arch. Ν . , A F III 76, d. 317. " S a n d o z to the K i n g , Jan. 27, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 112. Haugwitz said he would not undertake 1 a real mediation between France and Austria unless France agreed

to recognize the integrity of the Empire (ibid., p. x x x ) . Caillard reported on April 8 that Haugwitz had told Lord Elgin that he (Haugwitz) intended to intervene in the Franco-Austrian peace negotiations (to Delacroix, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 3 1 7 ) . 85 April 5, 1797, Arch. A . E., Prusse 221, f. 48. 88 Caillard to Pr. Min., Feb. 28, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. " S a n d o z to the King, March 30, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. 88 Caillard to Delacroix, Jan. 17, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 318.

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

736

Seven Years' War, and even since the Revolution, demonstrated that they are not without means and courage; and certainly they will be neither the allies nor the friends of Prussia.38 Delacroix wrote to Caillard on January 5, 1797, that the accession of Paul, who did not seem inclined to support Austria, afforded a favorable opportunity for the formation of an alliance between the smaller states protected by the Line of Demarcation, and Prussia, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Turkey, and France, having for its object to compel Austria to conclude peace.40 A n d , contrariwise, the Directory turned over to Prussia intercepted letters demonstrating the hostility of Paul, who had been angered by the Treaty of August 5, 1796. 4 1 Caillard assured the Prussian Ministry, in a note dated April 16, that Russia and Austria would undoubtedly attack Prussia sooner or later because of its desertion of the Coalition, and that it were best for Prussia to join herself to France for a two months' immediate war in order to avoid one of years, later. Should Prussia fear to be considered inconsistent in levying war upon Austria when it had shortly before offered its good offices to the Emperor for the conservation of the integrity of the Empire, the following arguments could be adopted by the Prussians: " ( 1 ) It is the K i n g of Hungary and of Bohemia, the Archduke of Austria, whom it is necessary to compel to make peace; the Emperor has nothing to do with the matter. (2) T h e K i n g offered his good offices to the presumably frank and honorable Court of Vienna, and is making war on the clearly perfidious Court of Vienna." 42 France, by imagining that the Prussian alliance was necessary to her triumph over Austria, had placed herself in a species of servitude to Prussia, even as the wooer is in bondage to the woman he courts. Bonaparte was to declare on April 2 2 — peace had been signed four days before — that the capitulation of Austria through the unaided efforts of France had rendered the Republic independent of Prussia. 43

3.

VIENNA IN A STATE OF SIEGE

During the armistice between the French and the Austrians, the Viennese were feverishly putting their city in a position to resist the threatened attack. A t first there was much discontent among all classes of the population at the thought of having to withstand a siege, and T h u g u t was threatened G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. The date of the journal is February 21, 1797. " A r c h . A. E., Prusse 220, f. 260. 88

" Bailleu, Pr. Frk.·, X, xxx-xxxi. 42 G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355. 43 Coir. Napo., III, 3.

737

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA 44

with violent death by the alehouse and the street. The Emperor was astounded at the faintheartedness of his subjects.45 Bonaparte, who had spies in the Austrian capital,46 openly boasted to Merveldt and Bellegarde that his lack of heavy artillery would not hinder him from taking Vienna; that he knew too well the sentiments of the Viennese to think that he should be obliged to have recourse to cannon.47 As the preparations for defense progressed, however, the masses took heart. It was not their first experience of this sort. A Viennese free corps had been formed in 1795 when Jourdan approached too close 48 But the high nobility of Vienna continued to intrigue for a peace at any price.49 4.

F R A N C E A N D T H E I N T E R N A L E N E M I E S OF T H E HABSBURG

MONARCHY

Throughout the double campaign of 1796-97, the French had reckoned upon the assistance of the internal enemies of the Habsburg monarchy. As early as May 26, 1796, the Directory had directed Joubert to cast over to the Austrian outposts brief circular letters accusing the Habsburg government of desiring to steep the earth in blood. " [The Emperor] refuses peace," the letters should say. " K n o w how to conquer it by shaking off an odious yoke and uniting with the children of liberty. The dazzling victories of the Republican army in Italy should lead you to reflect that those who are fighting you will continue to defeat you if you do not wish to aid them to overthrow your tyrants." 60 The same day Karl Ludwig von Erlach, member of the Grand Council of Berne, wrote to Degelmann the following brief note: " I hasten to give you information of the greatest importance. It is that the French have found a way to propagandize in Hungary. I am unable to say where or how, but the fact is certain. I hold it from a man initiated in this mystery of iniquity and perfidy. . . " 6 1 It would be interesting to know from what source Erlach received his information, for it was not until August 20, 1796 (three " C é s a r (Pr. counsellor of legation at Vienna) to his court, April 2, 1797, Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 2 3 1 . "Emperor to Charles, April 2, 1797, HüfíerLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 1 5 7 . " S a n d o z to the King, April 23, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 3 5 5 . According to an anonymous letter dated from Genoa, January 24, 1797, Bonaparte also had informers in the Austrian army itself. They cost him much money, but were reliable (H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 200). Ac-

cord: Mem. Thiébault, II, 5 1 . " E d e n to Grenville, April 10, 1797, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 1 6 1 162. "Langwerth von Simmern, Oestr. Reich fr. Rev., II, 3 1 4 . " E d e n to Grenville, April 12, 1797, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 1 6 7 - 1 6 8 . 50 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 51

45. n· 3· H . H. S. Arch., Schweiz

198.

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

738

months later), that the Directory wrote to Joubert, Commissioner to the Sambre and Meuse A r m y : It is high time, citizen, that we benefited by the discontent which is manifesting itself among the inhabitants of Bohemia and Hungary against the oppressive regime of the House of Austria. . . The Directory thinks that you should now circulate in Bohemia and in Hungary a proclamation in the languages which are familiar there, inviting these people to profit of the opportunities offered them to reassert the ancient rights which have been successively filched from them by the Court of Vienna; and you will give them to understand what powerful support to . . . their insurrection the victorious arms of the Republic could accord. 52 But the Sambre and Meuse A r m y was soon in retreat, and the R h i n e and Moselle was obliged to follow suit. O n September 18, the Directory confided its plans to General Beurnonville. H e was instructed to "publish proclamations w h i c h will reëstablish the confidence of the peaceable inhabitants, especially that of the Bohemians, w h o m w e must endeavor to w i n . " A w e e k later, Beurnonville w a s told to circulate a proclamation in the German, Bohemian, and Moravian languages the m o m e n t his army entered Franconia. "It is especially the Bohemians w e must r e a c h . " 5 3 T h e same day a similar but more elaborate order w e n t out to Bonaparte : It is not sufficient for us to prevent them [the German people] from becoming our enemies. W e must make them such [i.e., make them enemies] with respect to their old governments, and sow the seeds of insurrection even in the countries where our arms have not yet penetrated. This observation is particularly applicable to Hungary, where strongly pronounced political interests among the higher and lower nobility and the different classes of the people render the yoke of Austria more ponderous. Circulate there, in the vulgar languages, proclamations whose energy reawakens the pride of the Hungarians and their old hatred for their oppressors. T h e fame of your successes and of French integrity will give them confidence in your promises, and perhaps inspire them with the desire to reconquer their independence. T h e Court of Vienna will at least be alarmed thereby, and the resources . . . it draws from this kingdom will diminish in proportion to its fears. . . B4 In December, Bonaparte assured the Directory that d u r i n g the next campaign, he w o u l d carry the w a r of insurrection into H u n g a r y . 8 5 T h e day after the A r m y of Italy drove the A r c h d u k e ' s forces f r o m K l a g e n f u r t , Zinzendorf recorded Bonaparte's expectation of an insurrection in H u n 62

Arch. N . , A F III 397, d. 2 1 1 1 . A t this point, it is interesting to recall Clarke's threat of September 20, 1796: " T h i n k of what our emissaries, our proclamations, . . . could do in Bohemia, in Hungary.

. . ." "Sept. 640. "Sept. 55 Dec.

(Supra, Pt. II, chap, xviii, § 2.) 18, 25, 1796, Debidour, Recueil,

III,

25, 1796, Corr. inéd. Ñapo., II, 49. 6, 1796, ibid., p. 299.

739

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

gary. 56 A n d indeed there were rumblings as the French bit deeper into the Habsburg dominions. 57 T h e Emperor wanted to flee with his family to Prague, but it soon appeared that the sentiments of the mass of the Hungarians were strongly in his favor, and T h u g u t urged him rather to go to Hungary and organize a vast insurrection of Magyars against the French. 58 Instead, the Emperor sent Merveldt and Bellegarde to Bonaparte's camp to indicate his willingness to yield. A l l Poteratz' activities in the Breisgau in 1796, including the rumored "clubs" 5 9 and the verified labyrinth of intrigue, should be borne in mind in any discussion such as this of the internal enemies of the Habsburg dominions. Also, the order to Poteratz to concur with Citizen Comeyras, who had been charged to fan a revolutionary blaze in the Tyrol. 60 T h e Tyrol was of great importance to Bonaparte. It was the gateway — or at least, one gateway — to Vienna. A s Bonaparte's victories in Italy piled up — Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, Ceva, Mondovi — and the conqueror pushed into Milan, the danger to the Tyrol became evident to all but the stouthearted schemer in charge of Austria's foreign affairs. "Great God," he wrote to Count Colloredo, in commenting on a letter from the Tyrol saying it was necessary to arm the peasants, "do we have only old women everywhere . . . ? It is inexcusable to show so much partiality in spreading the most sinister news." This was written the very day Bonaparte entered Milan (May 15, 1796). 61 A t the end of May, the military high command of Austria ordered Wurmser to detach 25,000 men from his army on the Rhine and lead them through the Tyrol to the defense of Italy. 62 Thugut was still unperturbed, at least so far as has been recorded, and on June 5 he wrote to Count Colloredo the classic lines, "Let us be, in the name of God, well convinced that there is no situation in the world which has not its expedients." 63 But the precaution was taken of concerting measures of defense with the Tyrolese, who, alarmed at the proximity of the enemy, were creating an organization intended to last until the end of the war with France. 64 T h e precaution soon justified itself. O n June 14, Bonaparte circulated the following proclamation in the Tyrol: " "Aus dem Tagebuch Zinzendorfs," March 2 9> 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 487. " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, April 2, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 26 (both letters). A newspaper article of later date envisaged a confederation composed of independent Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland (Rédacteur, no. 566 [July 4, 1 7 9 7 ] ) . " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, April 6, 1797,

Briefe Thugut, II, 28. " Bacher to Delacroix, June 4, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 202. °° Supra, Pt. II, chap. viii. 61Briefe Thugut, I, 297. 6 2 Hiiffer, Europa, I, 208. " Briefe Thugut, I, 305. M General Derrécagaix, Nos campagnes au Tyrol, 1797-1799-1805-1809 (Paris, 1910), pp. 16-17. s

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

I am going to cross through your country, brave Tyrolese, to force the Court of Vienna to a peace as necessary to Europe as it is to its own subjects; it is your own cause that I am going to defend. For a long tipie you have been vexed and fatigued by the horrors of a war undertaken, not in the interest of the German people, but for the passions of a single family. The French army loves and respects all peoples, especially the simple and virtuous inhabitants of mountains. Your religion, your customs [N.B.: Bonaparte did not bind himself here to respect the constitution and laws of the Tyrol] will be respected everywhere. Our troops will maintain severe discipline, and nothing will be taken in the country without its being paid for in coin. You will receive us with hospitality, and we will treat you with fraternity and amity. But if there be some among you who are so little cognizant of their true interests as to take up arms and treat us as enemies, we will be as terrible as lightning; we will burn the houses and devastate the lands of the villages which take part in a war which is foreign to them. Do not allow the agents of Austria to lead you into error; guarantee your fatherland, already vexed by five years of war, from the misfortunes afflicting it. . , 65 T h e virtuous Tyrolese did not like their new brothers, and refused to disband, though they did become frightened and appeal to Francis II for aid. ee Thereupon issued forth another proclamation from the chancery of the future Emperor of the French: We are passing through your country [the Tyrol, of course] only to oblige the Court of Vienna to accede to the prayers of desolated Europe and to hear the cries of its peoples. We have not come here to aggrandize ourselves. Nature has traced our bounds at the Rhine and the Alps. . . Tyrolese! whatever your past conduct has been, return to your hearths. Desert the flags so often beaten. A list of the penalties for disobedience followed. T h e communes which did not withdraw the troops they were maintaining would be set on fire, and the inhabitants sent as hostages to France. W h e n a commune had withdrawn its troops, but certain individuals of the commune had continued to make part of any Tyrolese company, the houses of those persons would be forthwith set afire, and their relatives to the third degree arrested. Tyrolese belonging to bodies of irregular troops, caught arms in hand, would be directly shot.®7 Still no effect. General Joubert, commanding in the Tyrol under BonaM M

Corr. Ñapo., I, 489-490. Derrécagaix, Campagnes Tyrol, p. 17. And the Estates of the Tyrol urged the Emperor to make peace (August 1796, Selbitbio-

graphien Zinzendorf, p. 243). "Rédacteur, no. 278 (Sept. 18, 1796). The proclamation is dated August 30, 1796.

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

74I

parte, decided to try his hand at pacifying the people. "The French," ran his magnum opus, "entered the Tyrol intending to lighten the burdens of the people, and to demonstrate the difference between how they act, and Austrian tyranny." 68 But there was no purpose in being friendly if the Tyrolese reciprocated with warlike measures. Therefore, the fathers of all young men who enrolled in Tyrolese companies would be arrested and their property would be confiscated. If the inhabitants mingled with Austrian troops, they would be regarded as assassins. The French army would be as "terrible as a thunderbolt" for them. "I have proved that I love the ways of gentleness; I will likewise prove that I know how to deal severely with the ill-intentioned." 69 The Tyrolese were fervendy loyal to the Habsburgs, and refused to be terrorized, especially because, since the French arrival, there had "strangely" sprung up in their midst advocates of independence and of confederation with Switzerland.70 Odd it is, indeed, that an "Abstract of a Memoir Sent in by an Emigré upon the Infallible Means of Metamorphosing the Politics of Europe" in the Archives Nationales, dated February 3, 1797, suggested not only the attachment of the Tyrol to the Grisons, but the incorporation of both in a large republic which would include even Styria, and have its capital at Trieste. 71 It was only when the ferment in the Tyrol began to assume the proportions of war that Bonaparte, fearing for his communications, ordered General Joubert to assure the Tyrolese by a proclamation that their laws would be respected. But still no mention was made of their constitution; 72 and the establishment of a governing commission must have caused many Tyrolese to fear that they were to be severed from their prince.73 A rising of the whole Tyrolese population followed. 74 The great consideration which Bonaparte pretended for the Tyrolese, and his orders to humor churchmen and savants, to speak well of the Emperor but ill of his ministers, and to seize only Imperial funds, the while examples were made of those who conducted themselves hostilely toward the French — all these were of " B u t there was no Austrian tyranny in the Tyrol. An idyllic relationship existed between this province and the House of Habsburg (Derrécagaix, Campagnes Tyrol, p. 26). After the reëstablishment of peace, the Emperor overwhelmed the Tyrolese patriots with money, medals, tax exemptions, etc. (Ibid., p. 59.) "Ibid., pp. 25-26. 70 Abstract of a letter from Augsburg, dated April 5, 1797. Rédacteur, no. 493 (April 22, 1797). " A F III 76, d. 317. " G e n e r a l Joubert complained to the Austrian

commander that the peasants were not playing the game according to Hoyle, and in his letter he pretended that die French had guaranteed the Tyrolese constitution: " W e offer them the maintenance of their laws, of their government, and of their religion if they are willing to live at peace with us" (Gen. Joubert to Gedrigoni, Feb. 14, 1797, quoted in Derrécagaix, Campagnes Tyrol, p. 27). " M a r c h 15, 1797, Corr. Ñapo., II, 505-507. ™ Thugut to Count Colloredo, March 30, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 25.

742

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO 75

no avail. It was the loyalty of the Tyrol to its Emperor which prevented Joubert from joining Bonaparte in Klagenfurt, and it was Bonaparte's lack of Joubert's 19,500 men which rendered so very necessary the overtures which terminated the war. On April 1, 1797, Bonaparte despatched to Bernadotte an order for the organization of the government of Carniola. This order has never been found, but a note which the General in Chief sent to Bernadotte under the same cover has fortunately not suffered a like fate: "You will choose the ten members, and you will install the government without delay. You will oblige it to take an oath of obedience to the French Republic." 76 T o the Carinthians, Bonaparte declared (April 1, also) that the French army is not coming into your country to conquer it, nor to effect any change in your religion, your habits, [or] your customs. It is the friend of all nations, and particularly of the brave people of Germany. The Executive Directory has spared nothing to end the calamities which desolate the continent. It decided to make the first overture and send General Clarke to Vienna as plenipotentiary, to commence negotiations for peace. However, the Court of Vienna has refused to listen to him. It has even declared at Vicenza, through . . . Vincent, that it did not recognize the French Republic. General Clarke asked for a passport so he could speak personally with the Emperor, but the ministers at Vienna feared . . . that the moderation of his propositions would decide the Emperor to make peace. These ministers, corrupted by the gold of England, are betraying Germany and their prince. . . Inhabitants of Carinthia, I know you detest as much as do we both the English (those perfidious islanders, the horror of all Europe),77 who alone are profiting by the present war, and your minister, who has sold out to them. If we are at war for the last six years, it is contrary to the wishes of the brave Hungarians, of the enlightened citizens of Vienna, and of the simple and good inhabitants of Carinthia. Well, despite England and the ministers, let us be friends! . . . You will not mix in a war to which you have not consented. [Note the subversive doctrine: no martial declaration without representation.] You will furnish us the victuals we need. On my side, I will protect your religion, your customs, and your property. [Again no mention of the constitution of the country, though the civil and criminal laws were guaranteed later.] . . . Carinthia will be governed by a commission composed of ten members, which will bear the name of "the Central Government," and which will have all the civil, political, and administrative authority.78 75

Bonaparte to Gen. Joubert, Jan. 26 and March 15, 1797, Corr. Napo., I, 355; II, 505-507. m Ibid., II, 581. The italics are the present

writer's own. " T h i s phrase occurred in another part of the same proclamation. 78 Corr. Napo., II, 575.

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

743

This truly sounds as though the detachment of Carinthia from the monarchy were contemplated, or else why was not the word "provisional" prefixed to the name "Central Government"? Desaix reports in his Journal that Bonaparte was expecting to acquire great influence in (Austrian) Friuli by returning to the vicars the rights usurped by the canons, thus securing the attachment of the vicars.79 Bonaparte's plan was apparently to harp on old wrongs, promise or grant assistance to the aggrieved party, and then utilize the resultant discord to promote French influence. No Austrian province was entirely neglected in the scheme to defeat Austria from within. A "Memoir on Poland" in the Archives Nationales recommended the promotion of insurrections by Polish patriots: "In the war to the death that France has undertaken against despots, insurrections are of value to France by rendering conquest easier and cheaper. Besides, as soon as the Polish revolution has been effected, 100,000 free men can fall on . . . Austria from the rear." 80 It has been mentioned that Polish soldiers were urged to desert from the Austrian army and join Dombrowski's free corps in Lombardy, 81 it being realized that the existence of a separate Polish army composed of "Austrian rebels" would certainly cause much concern to the Emperor.82 And the constant efforts to stir up Prussia to resurrect Poland were ideally suited to keep the Poles in Austrian (and Russian) Poland in a ferment, and so tie down some of the Emperor's troops. All in all, the Directory deserves recognition for the versatility of the means which it employed to render the mighty Austrian monarchy helpless. 5.

THE INTERNAL ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE (EXCLUSIVE OF AUSTRIAN POSSESSIONS)

A companion effort to the excitation of revolution within the Habsburg dominions was the promotion of revolution in the territories of Austria's ally, the Empire. The latter process had been going on for a long time. Occasionally the influence of France therein is obscure, but usually some seemingly insignificant detail betrays the identity of its promoter. The story of the attempt to create a republic in Baden has been told in connection with the Breisgau.83 Poteratz' plans also included the Palatinate, which one Linck had been commissioned to stir into revolt 84 as part of a ™ Journal Desaix, p. 281. 80 Undated; approx. start of 1797, Arch. N., AF III 74, d. 301. 81 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, vii, η. 42. 82 Vide Bonaparte to Dir., June 1, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., IV, 7-8.

83 84

Supra, Pt. II, chap. viii. List to Delacroix, July 1 1 , 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 134. This is the Linck mentioned supra, Pt. II, chap, ix, § ι.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

chain of insurrections which would presently unite all southwestern Germany into a new republic. Perhaps owing to Poteratz' efforts, perhaps to those of another secret agent, Citizen Gleichen,85 Augsburg was almost ripe for insurrection — at least, according to Gleichen. Wrote he to Paris: "More than three quarters of the populace are supporters of our cause, . . . but . . . the Germans have not yet the necessary energy and courage." 86 The Rédacteurs of 1796 tell of repeated insurrections in Franconia and Swabia.87 D. T . Bayard, royal Prussian official in Ansbach, reported that the Franconian Circle's deputation was planning to remold the Circle into a republic under French protection, with the former sovereigns and estates forming a representative sovereign senate. This plan, he said, had been sketched in conjunction with Gleichen.88 On November 20, 1796, the Ami des Lois told of an insurrection in the valley of the Kinzig — the river that joins the Rhine just below Kehl. One John Bender was asserted to be at its head. "He wears a uniform of three colors." 89 Early in January 1797, ran a despatch of Sandoz to his king, an emissary representing a faction in Baden and Württemberg presented to the Directory a memoir signed by 1,500 persons, asking if the French government would support an insurrection aiming at independence. Sandoz was told that the petitioners were given a negative response; but the whole story might be a Directorial fabrication.90 In March, in Prussia, a conspiracy against the state, attributed to the influence of the philosophers, was followed by several arrests.91 A week later there was a tumult at Frankfort-on-the-Main, caused by the workers.92 A week later still, a revolutionary conspiracy was uncovered at Danzig. Several young men, and workers and soldiers, had been meeting for some time at a wigmaker's. The commander of Danzig was informed, and he surrounded the house, arrested the occupants, and carried off all the evidence, to wit: pistols, sabers, swords, about 1,000 cartridges, and (on an eighteen-year-old Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xiii, n. 10. "Abstract of Despatch no. 35 of Citizen — , secret agent in Augsburg," May 27, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 672, f. 287. T h e name of the agent is crossed out, but judging from the loops of the " G " and "1," and the facts of the case, it is certainly Gleichen. " N o . 342 et passim. 88 "Einige Bemerkungen über den dermaligen Zustand . . . ," Oct. 12, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Fr^., I, 100. 88 No. 465. 80 Sandoz to the King, Jan. 7, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Frk_., I, 108. 85

86

81

Reinhard to Delacroix, March 31, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 317. It might be thought that a revolution in Prussia could not be the doing of France, since the two states were near-allies. But the plans of many Frenchmen included Prussia as an enemy or near-enemy. Thus, the "Memoir on Poland" quoted in the last section contains the phrase, "in the war to the death which France has undertaken against despots . . . " ; also the remark that "100,000 free men can fall on Prussia and Austria from the rear" (c. start of 1797, Arch. N., A F III 74, d. 301).

"Rédacteur,

no. 478 (April 7, 1 7 9 7 ) .

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

745

son of the wigmaker) an appeal to the people, a song to the tune of the Marseillaise, a sketch of a constitution, and models of oaths. One of the documents indicated that the project of a revolution had existed since 1793, and was to be executed in June 1797.93 Another revolution, long brewing, was stifled by the arrest in Berlin in September 1797 of 312 soldiers and a score of officers. It seems that an oldiron merchant of Liège, long established in the Prussian capital, had formed a sort of Club, the members of which plotted to assassinate the K i n g and the commander of the fortress, take possession of the arsenal, arrest the royal princes, and organize a commune. T h e people were discontented over the farming of the tobacco tax, and this circumstance was reckoned on by the conspirators to render a general insurrection possible.94 Besides active revolutionists functioning more or less in concert with the French Republic, the Empire contained many informers who had sold or granted their services to France. Some of these were high-type intellectuals who regarded the French Revolution as a divinely ordained movement; others were mercenary scoundrels. Gleichen employed many informers on his trip to south central Germany in 1796 — a trip the officially designated purpose of which was "to increase the number of our friends in Germany and the scope of our political information, and to procure new correspondents." 95 Gleichen had proposed to add to his functions the establishment of a universal political journal written by a few German savants of his own choice, the journal to appear at Hamburg under Gleichen's name "without anyone's being able to discover the secret hand of the French government." 96 T o this Delacroix replied that though the establishment of such a journal would doubtless promote the cause of human understanding and hasten the time of a revolution in Germany, that did not form part of Gleichen's instructions. 97 Of what matters within Germany did the French government wish to be informed? T h e correspondence agreement made with "Jean Dresky," an American named Dillman who lived with a statesman in Augsburg, answers this question. Dresky agreed to write to Paris once a week on the following topics: revenues and expenses of the state; private fortune of the regent; wealth of the nobility and clergy; general news of the country; the political situation; condition of the inhabitants, and the causes which augment or diminish their number, with a comparison of former numbers and the reason for the change; military resources in men and provisions; the state Despatch April 26, "Parandier Arch. Ν . , 85 Delacroix M

of Consul Rosenstiel, from Elbing, 1797, Arch. N . , A F III 76, d. 3 1 7 . to Delacroix, Sept. 23, 1797, A F III 76, d. 3 1 7 . to Gleichen, May 17, 1796, Arch.

A . E., Allemagne 672, ff. 270-271. " G l e i c h e n to Delacroix, April 12, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 672, ff. 198-199. " D e l a c r o i x to Gleichen, May 17, 1796, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 672, f. 270.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

of animal and vegetable husbandry; public opinion; the spirit of the cabinet and court; envoys, if any; movements of troops; influential persons, and why and where influential; cabinet changes, with their causes; the rise or fall of noted men; the goings and comings of noted persons; persons absent in France or returning from France, with the motives for their trips. This list, in the order indicated, was followed in Dresky's case with the following statement: "I accept the twenty-four francs for each closely written sheet, declaring, however, that it is not gold or silver which can direct me or accelerate my steps, but a card of protection . . . from the government on whose side I have ranged myself." 98 Dresky was to present the statistical side of events and conditions." Gleichen obtained a statesman-scholar for politics, commerce, and literature. "He cannot be paid with money, so I must ask you for a letter of thanks for him. He will receive a salary." Another correspondent engaged by Gleichen was a rich banker who had taken the name of Felice. "He does not care to be paid. He must be sent an obliging letter." 100 Six weeks later, Gleichen procured the services of a savant, Dr. Erhard (pseudonym: Charatophile Nomocrates), and a wealthy merchant (pseudonym: David Martin), and wrote that he would soon secure the concurrence of a certain geographer and a particular savant-statesman-philosopher.101 6.

PROBST

The information-supplying functions of German traitors were complemented by the activities of French-born agents — usually Alsatians, whose familiarity with the German tongue enabled them to pass unnoticed in the Reich. The function of these agents was to arouse discontent and perhaps revolt throughout the Empire. Several such agents were arrested by the Austrians at various times, but the arrest most sensational in its consequences was that of Valentin Probst,102 friend and former secretary of Reubell. Probst had been seized in Nuremberg toward the end of the Convention — in consequence of his own indiscretions; 103 and the story of what followed sheds interesting light on the resourcefulness of Revolutionary diplomacy. First, Barthélémy asked Burgomaster Bourcard of Basel to remit a note to Degelmann on the subject of Probst. This step was taken on the recommendation of Delacroix and of several French legislators, according to "Dated May 3 1 , 1796, by Dresky, Arch. Α. E., Allemagne 672, ff. 294-295. "Gleichen to Delacroix, June ι , 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, £. 6. 100 Idem, July 14, 1796, Arch. A . E., Alle-

magne 673, f. 142. Idem, Arch. Α. E., Allemagne 673, f. 142. 102 Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, vi, § 5 103 Guyot, Direc., p. 85. 101

747

THE DEFEAT OF AUSTRIA

Barthélémy. 104 A couple of months passed with no answer from Vienna. 1 0 5 T h e Directory thereupon ordered the seizure in Freiburg-im-Breisgau, and detention at Pfalzburg at his own expense, of Herrn Greifïenegg, Sr., administrator of Anterior Austria. Greiffenegg's arrest was intended to "offset" the detention of French agents by Austria — to use Delacroix's expression. 106 T h e Austrians had no idea why the elderly man had been seized. Bacher elucidated. France had merely acquired a hostage to assure the release of her agents, particularly of Probst. 107 T h e plan failed, at least for the time being. T h e Austrians refused to include Probst in their list of prisoners to be exchanged, arguing that Probst was a revolutionary seeking to provoke anarchy in a country at war with France, and could in no wise be assimilated to Greifïenegg, a simple hostage. 108 Bacher thereupon suggested to the family and friends of Greifïenegg that they plead with Archduke Charles for the freeing of Probst as the only means whereby Greifïenegg could be restored to freedom. Charles agreed to ask the Emperor to release Probst, and Francis II consented — despite Thugut, who had vowed, it is said, that Probst should never again see the light of day. 109 O n April 10, 1797, the Directory authorized Bacher to exchange Greifïenegg for Probst. 110 T h e exchange took place on April 20, 1797, two days after the signing of the Leoben Preliminaries (infra) . l u T h e war being over, Probst was regarded no longer as such a menace. But Austria was soon to learn that peace did not necessarily mean the end of French intrigues within Germany. June I, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. Not 4 months, as in Bacher to the Aust. Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, Nov. 8, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 198. The Directory had ordered the presently-to-be-described arrest of Greifïenegg after two and one-half months (Delacroix to Bacher, Aug. 11, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 205). l0°Idem, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 205. 104

105

Bacher to the Aust. Commission, Nov. 8, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 199. 108 Imperial and Royal Military Commission to Bacher, March 8, 1797, H. H. S. Arch., Schweiz 200. 109 Bacher to Delacroix, April 5, 1797, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 696, f. 72. 310 Arch. Ν., AF III* 177, f. 16. 111 Bacher to Delacroix, April 5, 1797, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 696, f. 72; Guyot, Direc., pp. 85 and 632, n. 3. 107

X

CHAPTER

XXII

ϋί

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN APRIL 18, 1797

I.

THUGUT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO T H E AUSTRIAN

PLENIPOTENTIARIES

' O N A P A R T E offered Austria two alternatives in the negotiations at J L / L e o b e n . Either (a) Austria should cede Belgium to France, and consent that the Rhine form the Franco-German frontier (Mayence to be immediately surrendered) ; France should restore Milan and Mantua to the Habsburgs (the existence of the Cispadine Republic, including Modena, to be maintained); and France should procure for Austria the continental territories of Venice as far as the Tagliamento, including Istria and Dalmatia; or (b) France should renounce the acquisition of the German left bank, contenting herself with the Austrian Netherlands and Liège, plus the other frontier rectifications involved in the term "constitutional boundaries"; France should form Lombardy and Milan into a Republic; Austria should obtain the Venetian possessions up to the Adige, or up to the Mincio, and perhaps also the territory between the Mincio and the Adda, with Bergamo, Brescia, Dalmatia, and Istria. 1 Merveldt, commissioned to negotiate the treaty, forwarded these combinations to Thugut on April 13. Merveldt was not the sole Austrian peace negotiator. Thugut had adjoined Gallo to him because he (Merveldt) was not a diplomat. But when Gallo arrived (April 15), Bonaparte refused to accept him. He was an Italian, and Bonaparte thought that this fact might interfere with his plan to partition northern Italy in conjunction with Austria. Merveldt thereupon requested of Thugut a substitute for Gallo, and the Austrian minister designated Vincent, whom Thugut had once appointed to discuss an armistice with Clarke. 2 However, when Merveldt asked Bonaparte for an abstract of 1

Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 169.

2

Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xx, § 3.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL 1 8 , V]Q(]

749

his diplomatic powers, Bonaparte decided he could accept Gallo after all. T o the Directory, Bonaparte pretended that he capitulated because, if the war was resumed as a result of the failure of a foreigner, public discontent in Austria and Hungary would be great, and he (Bonaparte) would be able to exploit the passions aroused. 3 Thugut's instructions for the Austrian plenipotentiaries were decreed on April 15. T h e Austrian helmsman desired a preliminary treaty because of the time necessary to discuss each and every point of a definitive peace, and because a preliminary did not require legislative ratification in France. 4 Belgium could be ceded to France, he said. T h e integrity of the German Empire should be stipulated, but that need not prevent an arrangement satisfactory to France regarding certain bits of territory. France should stipulate Austria's indemnity for Belgium. If Bonaparte offered Venetian territory, he should be reminded that France could not cede that to Austria before Venice had ceded it to France. 5 T h e plenipotentiaries should express the Emperior's astonishment that he was not offered the Legations, ceded to the Republic by the Pope, for there a formal cession by treaty existed.6 It should also be insinuated to Bonaparte that the Three Legations (Ferrara, Bologna, and Romagna) could be used to indemnify Venice if Austria were compensated with Venetian territory for the loss of Belgium. T h e Emperor could not consent to the republicanization of Modena, for that state belonged to his uncle, w h o had bought dearly his peace with France by the Treaty of May 12, 1796; and besides, it would interfere with the Emperor's communications with Tuscany. A l l other Austrian possessions should be restored, though the Milanese could be excepted for a consideration. After the preliminaries were signed, France should evacuate without delay the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Austrian Friuli. There should be a truce of three months to prepare the definitive peace with the Emperor and with the Empire. T h e Emperor's honor required that Austria's allies should be invited to send plenipotentiaries to these negotiations, but Austria was willing to agree that the congress would effect no change in the terms of the Franco-Austrian preliminary or definitive peace. There was no objection to H ü f f e r - L u c k w a l d t , Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 170-171, 175 a n d n . 1; Sciout, Direc., 333> n · 1 ; Guyot, Direc., p . 358, n . 2. * T h e Directory maintained that it could dispense w i t h the ratification of the legislature in the case of a preliminary treaty, f o r if such ratification w e r e necessary and given, the preliminary treaty w o u l d become a definitive treaty (Delacroix to Clarke, Feb. 12, 1797, Arch. A. E., Autriche 367. f. 7 7 ) · a

5

It was lust for Venetian territory, and not the proximity of the French, which produced the Treaty of Leoben, according to von Sybel, w h o emphasizes that Bonaparte's position was in m a n y ways m o r e precarious than the E m p e r o r ' s (Europe, IV, 481, 483-484). " I t h a d been suggested m a n y times in Paris that R o m e could be given to a G e r m a n prince as indemnity. Vide Sciout, Direc., I, 666, n . 2; II, 112.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

recognition of the Republic if the French would agree to observe the etiquette and rank of the old regime.7 2.

T H E PRELIMINARIES SIGNED, APRIL l 8 , 1 7 9 7

Bonaparte and the Austrian plenipotentiaries soon agreed on three alternative treaty projects, which were carried to Vienna by Gallo. Project I provided for the cession to France of all territories included within the term "constitutional frontiers"; 8 the postponement of the question of the German left bank until the peace of the Empire; 9 the union of the efforts of France and Austria to procure for the Emperor all the Venetian territory between the Mincio, the Po, and the states of Austria; the cession to the Duke of Modena of that portion of the territory of Brescia between the Oglio and the Mincio; the formation of two republics in northern Italy: the first composed of Bergamo, the Venetian territory between the Oglio and the Milanese, and the Milanese itself, and the second composed of Modena, Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna; and maintenance of the independence of the city of Venice, and of the archipelago. Projects II and III also provided for the recognition of the constitutional frontiers by Austria, and the postponement of the question of the left bank until the peace of the Empire. The second project need not arrest our attention further. The third provided, in addition, for renunciation by the Emperor of all his rights to the Milanese and Lombardy; compensation of the Emperor for the Milanese and Modena, which compensation should be the object of a separate negotiation; evacuation of Germany by the Army of Italy; and possession by the Emperor of his indemnity within three months. 10 Merveldt recommended the third project to Thugut, though it did not correspond with his instructions. It did, however, afford Austria an opportunity to enjoy an armistice for three months, during which period she could reorganize her army. 11 Thugut read the projects and wrote to the Emperor, through Count Colloredo, essentially as follows: I suspect du' Hüfier-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 171-173. 8 A very vague expression, and one destined to be fruitful of much difficulty. As already mentioned, it was supposed to signify the boundary which circumscribed old France plus Belgium, Liège, Luxemburg, Savoy, and Nice (vide Delacroix to Caillard, Jan. 26, 1797, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 318), but part of the Rhineland had been annexed before some sections of Belgium, yet did not commonly come within the purview of this elusive term (vide supra, Pt. I, chaps.

ii, n. 112; xiv, § 6). " I t is obvious that Bonaparte was not particularly concerned whether he secured the Rhine frontier. He wrote to the Directory on April 16: "Never, since history retraces military operations for us, has a river succeeded in constituting a real obstacle. If Moreau wants to cross the Rhine, he crosses it" (Corr. Ñapo., II, 641). Quoted supra, Pt. I, chap. xvi. 10 Corr. Ñapo., II, 639-640. "April 15, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 174-175.

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plicity, perhaps even bad faith and trickery. Bonaparte lacks full powers. Still, he must have something or he could not have concluded three armistices. 12 According, to my humble opinion, none of these three projects is acceptable. If Bonaparte will agree to an armistice of three months, and withdraw his army, we may be able to negotiate a general peace — at any rate, we can reorganize our army. 13 Thugut expected the war to be resumed momentarily, and urged the Emperor to send Archduke Charles — who was then in Vienna — back to his army. 14 But before Thugut could spoil Bonaparte's plans, the preliminaries were signed (April 18). T h e sudden signature of the Preliminaries will always remain somewhat of an enigma. 18 In the first place, Bonaparte had confessed that he lacked the power to treat, and had declared (April 14) that he had sent for General Clarke, w h o was in possession of the requisite authority. 18 Then, shortly before Clarke arrived, Bonaparte suddenly signed the treaty. It may be that he desired not to have to share with Clarke the glory of pacificator — at any rate, that is what contemporaries accused him of. 17 It may be that he feared that Clarke would bring new and extravagant demands from the Directory. That is what he frightened the Austrians with. 1 8 It may be that jealousy of Hoche's success — by April 13, news of Hoche's victory around Mayence The last one was scheduled to end on April 20, and if peace were not signed by that time, lack of the means of subsistence would compel Bonaparte to march forward "unless in the meantime there should appear great probability of peace being concluded" (Eden to Grenville, April 17, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49). The thirteen days between the seventh and twentieth could have been utilized to reach Vienna, and there were loud complaints in the French army. Masséna, in particular, threatened to denounce Bonaparte at Paris as another Dumouriez (Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 237).

parte of having been bribed by the Austrians (Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 126). Napoleon said later ("Œuvres de Sainte-Hélène") that such an attempt had indeed been made, that he had been offered a German principality of a quarter-million souls for himself and his family "in order to shield him from republican ingratitude," but that he had only smiled and replied that he desired no greatness, no riches, which were not given him by the French people. "And with this support, be assured, Monsieur, that my ambition will be satisfied" (Corr. Napo., XXIX, 299-300).

" A p r i l 17, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 32-33. " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, April 17, 1797, ibid., p. 33. " G u y o t , Direc., pp. 361-362, explains it this way: On the morning of April 16, Merveldt arrived at Leoben with the Emperor's consent to the àmpie exchange of Belgium and the Milanese for Venetian territory, which Bonaparte had suggested on April 13. The Emperor had urged immediate signature of the treaty upon this basis, lest Bonaparte should change his mind.

" E d e n to Grenville, April 17, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. " S a n d o z to the King, May 7, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Frk,·, I, 126. Clarke, also, had a lively desire to play a role in European politics, which was quite natural for a person possessing "a great fund of vanity" (Emanuel von Khevenhiiller, in the report of March 20, 1797, of the Austrian embassy at Turin, H. H. S. Arch., Relationen aus Turin 19). 16 Merveldt to Thugut, April 19, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. Π, Vol. I, 181.

12

Sandoz wrote to his king on May 7, 1797, that some people were accusing Bona-

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

had reached L e o b e n 1 9 — was responsible for Bonaparte's unseemly precipitation. 20 Bonaparte had not even waited for the signature of the Preliminaries to try to check the successes of his rival. Already on April 15, before the principal bases of the peace had been determined, Adjutant General Ledere (Bonaparte's brother-in-law), who had been sent as courier to Paris with a despatch announcing the renewal of the armistice, was ordered to stop en route at the headquarters of General Moreau, to induce him to suspend operations. 21 Note that this courier was not sent to Hoche at all, That would have been too blatant, and the same — perhaps better — results could be obtained without it. If Moreau had held back his troops as requested, and Hoche had continued to advance — as he might well have been expected to do — his flank would have been exposed. 22 Such a scheme was not beyond the little Corsican. O r are we charitably to assume that Moreau was himself to induce Hoche to stop? W e have no evidence of this. T h e plot — if plot it was — failed. T h e Directory had instructed Moreau and Hoche not to suspend operations, "so as to assure their [armies'] subsistence, and to collect contributions." 23 T h e two generals had therefore continued their advance until a second courier brought news of the PrelimiBourgeois, Manuel, IX, 151. " M r á . Barras, II, 386-388. 21 Guyot, Direc., p. 361, emphasizes that this attempt was to be made only with respect to Moreau; Bonaparte's April 16 despatch to the Directory, pointing to the opposite conclusion (Corr. inéd. Ñapo., II, 554), might have been written in a conscious effort to mislead. Neither of the two Rhine generals had yet really started fighting on April 15. Hoche began on the 16th (with right-bank maneuvers culminating in the crossing of the Rhine by the remainder of his army at Neuwied on the 18th); Moreau, not till the night of April 19-20 (Guerres Rev. Emp., I V , 366, 380). On the 15 th, in fact, Moreau was in Paris to plead for supplies, returning only on the 17th (ibid., p. 365). Thus, if it had been proper to ask either of the generals to stop, that one should have been Hoche, who was at least about to start.

to Paris, and was unwilling to do anything at all. . . I saw by your letters that you had no other hope than in the advance of Hoche alone. I thought the campaign was lost . . . and I concluded peace" (Corr. Napo., Ill, 1 2 ) . T o which the annoying question must again be raised: If Bonaparte thought Hoche was advancing and Moreau was not, why was not the request to cease advancing sent to Hoche? When Moreau crossed the Rhine — at Diersheim (Guerres Rév. Emp., IV, 367) below Kehl — he took the enemy completely by surprise. Only one Imperial regiment was present to dispute the crossing. Moreau destroyed or captured it, and his troops spread unopposed over the right bank. A n y Austrians encountered were surprised in their cantonments, and either fled or surrendered. It was an auspicious start for a new campaign (R. Bittard des Portes, Histoire de l'armée de Condê pendant la Révolution française (1791-1801), d'après les archives de l'état, les mémoires d'émigration et des documents inédits [Paris, 1896], p. 320).

19

22

N o one seems to have realized this possibility. That Bonaparte was cloaking some unavowable thoughts follows inevitably from his letter of April 30 to the Directory: "If Moreau had been willing to march, w e would have had the most brilliant campaign, . . . but instead of that, he returned

23

Information in despatch of April 22, 1797, of Dir. to Bonaparte, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 188.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL l8, 1797 naries — to both of them.

24

753

Hoche and Moreau then found themselves

obliged to cut short a brilliant offensive for the sake of a mediocre peace. Hoche, especially, was burning to emulate Bonaparte, of whose success he was naturally jealous. 25 " M y army is 86,000 strong," he had written to the Directory just before hearing that peace had been concluded. " I can transport 70,000 of them to the Danube this very moment, and compel the enemy to make a more advantageous peace. . . " 2 e A n d shortly before that: " L e t the campaign open, and nothing will be able to prevent us from reaching Vienna."

27

Other reasons for Bonaparte's hasty signature have been alleged, such as the precariousness of his position from the military point of view. T h e T y r o l was in full revolt; the Venetian Terraferma was in an ugly mood; 30,000 Austrians had been assembled in the Archbishopric of Salzburg; his o w n army w a s small and in the center of a hostile kingdom; his food supply was running low. 2 8 Probably, however, what worried him most was not shortage of food, nor lack of siege artillery, nor revolts of the peasants in his rear, but the rise of another star, also young and full of ambition, but for whose timely death 24

29

the Napoleonic E m p i r e might never have been.

Moreau received the news of peace on April 22, and Hoche on the twenty-third. Ledere was still in Moreau's camp — at Bischofsheim — when the second courier arrived. Hoche was near the hamlet of Arsenheim, with his headquarters at Friedberg (Moniteur, XXVIII, 674, 677; Guerres Rév. Emp., IV, 391). 25 Sorel, Bon. et Hoche, p. 332. 26 J. Michelet, Œuvres complètes (40 vols., Paris, n.d.), XXXIX (Pt. II: Les soldats de la Révolution), 402. "Ibid., p. 401. The troops of the Rhine army must have been as disgrunded as their generals, for there already existed ill feeling between them and the men of the Army of Italy. The latter are said to have regarded themselves as a citizen army par excellence, and to have dubbed the Rhine army "the Army of Gentlemen." When a regiment of the Rhine army was sent, after Leoben, to reinforce the Army of Italy, this nickname, tossed at them in ridicule, is said to have resulted in a pitched battle. Officers from both sides, sent to separate the combatants, are declared to have joined in the affray, with more than a hundred casualties resulting (Mém. Thiébault, II, 102-103). 28 Eden to Grenville, April 17, 1797, P. R. O.,

F. O. 7/49. Vide RF, 1938, pp. 1-20, 2 1 29, for an interesting verbal altercation between Guglielmo Ferrerò ("Bonaparte et l'Italie") and Pierre Muret ("Encore quelques remarques sur 1' 'Aventure' de M. Guglielmo Ferrerò") as to whether the Leoben terms were the product of Bonaparte's fear of the "mysterious disorders which his army and his victories had provoked in Italy," or of a personalized foreign policy on the part of the future emperor. Ferrerò holds to the first thesis; Muret to the second. 29 Hoche died in unspeakable agony on September 19, 1797. (For details, vide Bonnal de Ganges, Repré., IV, 377.) He had acquired a continual cough as the result of a chill (Sorel, Bon. et Hoche, p. 331), but rumor said he had been poisoned — and truly, at the autopsy, large black stains were found in his stomach and intestines. Bonnal de Ganges, by the process of elimination and direct arguments, seeks to pin the "crime" on Barras (Repré., IV, 378379). Some people suspected English agents because, while Malmesbury was negotiating at Paris the previous year, a laborer of Rennes, Brittany, tried to assassinate Hoche, and declared he had been hired to do so by England (Guyot, Direc., p. 291).

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The day after the signature of the Treaty, Merveldt forwarded to Thugut a list of the reasons which had determined Gallo and him to sign so suddenly. They make interesting reading: The improbability of the success of Austrian arms in western Germany; the disagreeable influence upon the negotiations of any French victories on the Rhine; the "great condescension" of Bonaparte, who offered very liberal terms to induce the Austrians to sign before Clarke's arrival so that he should have the honor alone; the advantage of being rid of the unwelcome visitors who had penetrated to the heart of the Emperor's dominions; the opportunity to improve the Austrian army; and the fear of new and onerous demands on the part of the Paris government. 30 The Treaty reëstablished peace and prewar ceremonial, including order of rank (Articles I, II). That meant, of course, that the Emperor, as titular head of the Christian world, should enjoy his accustomed precedence over the Directory. Each power pledged itself to promote the internal tranquillity of the other (Article III) ; France should not attempt to revolutionize Austria, and Austria should not endeavor to restore Monarchy to France. Both powers should send plenipotentiaries to Berne, where, in a congress attended by the allies of France and of Austria, a definitive peace should be concluded within three months (Article IV). France and the Empire should, also, conclude a definitive peace in a congress, the composition of which was not specified in the Treaty; the basis of the peace should be the integrity of the Empire; meanwhile, an armistice should obtain between France and the Empire (Article V). 3 1 Regarding territorial stipulations: The Emperor should renounce all his rights to Belgium, and recognize the "constitutional limits" of France, while the Republic should pledge itself to furnish an equitable indemnity to the Emperor at the time of the definitive peace (Article VI). As far as the patent articles were concerned, it was only the former Austrian Netherlands which should be abstracted from the Emperor's hereditary states (Article VII), but the first secret article added the Milanese, with the stipulation that Austria should receive in compensation the Terraferma of Venice east of the Oglio, and Dalmatia and Istria. France bound herself in the Treaty to evacuate all the Austrian provinces occupied by the Army of Italy (Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Friuli, and the Tyrol) immedi° April 19, 1 7 9 7 , Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 1 8 1 . 1 The inconvenience of this armistice provision to France was often manifested, e.g., when the Directory wished to force defaulting German debtors to pay the contributions they had agreed to acquit in 1796 ( v i d e infra, this chapter, § 4b). Moreover, during the discussion which caused

Barras to write in his memoirs (May 1 , 1 7 9 7 ) , "the German princes will be notified that if they do not withdraw the troops and contingents they have furnished England, the Republican army will consider them as enemies" ( M é m . Barras, II, 3 8 9 ) , the question necessarily arose: H o w act against them without violating Article V of the Preliminaries?

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ately following the Emperor's ratification of the Preliminaries (Article V I I I ) . All the secret articles concerned Italy. 32 It will be noted that these articles contain no mention of recognition of the Republic. It was an intentional omission, wrought by Bonaparte himself. Thugut had long been willing to grant recognition, 33 and the Austrian plenipotentiaries had proposed, in accordance with their instructions of April 15, that the first article should provide for it, but Bonaparte — if we may believe the "Œuvres de Sainte-Hélène" — had foreseen that "in reality, this recognition would have been harmful, for, if some day the French people wished to create a monarchy, the Emperor could have said that he had recognized the Republic." 3 4 He therefore declared that the Republic did not want to be recognized, that it was in Europe what the sun was on the horizon; so much the worse for him who did not wish to see it and profit by it. 35 The question of ceremonial should also be mentioned. The Austrians' offer to recognize the Republic had been coupled with the proviso that the Republic should observe the same etiquette toward Austria as had Bourbon France. Bonaparte had answered that matters of etiquette made little difference to the Republic, and so the Leoben terms provided for the observance of the old customs. However, when the Imperial plenipotentiaries wanted to place the Emperor always before the Republic — the Holy Roman Emperors had never yielded the "alternative" to kings of France — Bonaparte refused. 36 Evidently he was not so unconcerned with ceremonial as he pretended. 82

De Martens, Traités Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 386-389. Μ Thugut to Gherardini, Dec. 27, 1796, H. H. S. Arch., Expeditionen nach Turin 26. P. S. to the letter in Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 102-108. M Corr. Ñapo., XXIX, 298. "Bonaparte to Dir., April 16, 1797, ibid., II, 638. The "Œuvres de Sainte-Hélène" gives a slighdy different version of this famous statement: "Cross that out! The Republic is like the sun, which shines by its own unaided efforts. The blind alone do not see it" (ibid., XXIX, 298). The Directory did not, of course, suspect Bonaparte's motive in rejecting recognition of the Republic. It thought the rejection did honor to the proud young republic, and printed Bonaparte's high-sounding phrases in the Rédacteur, whence they reached the Moniteur (XXVIII, 676). But it must not be thought that the idea of nonrecognition

was original with Bonaparte. Under Danton's regime, the CPS had ordered certain civil commissioners to stipulate for the recognition of the Republic (Sorel, Europe, III, 420), but under Robespierre's rule, their instructions had been altered to read: "They will not listen to those who speak of the recognition of the French Republic. The Republic exists; elle existe de droit par la nature, et de fait par la volonté et par les moyens" (F. A. Aulard, "La diplomatie du premier Comité de salut public," RF, XVIII [1890], 156). The Committee, on January 8, 1795, had declared — with respect to its projected treaty with Prussia — that "the recognition of the Republic should not enter into the articles of the treaty of peace, since it [the Republic] exists in fact" (supra, Pt. I, chap, viii, § ic and n. 33). "Bonaparte to Dir., April 16, 1797, Corr. Ñapo., II, 638.

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T h e fifth patent article of the Preliminaries should be carefully noted. By specifying that the definitive peace should be made on the basis of the integrity of the German Empire, instead of leaving the question open, as had been done in the treaties with Prussia and Hesse-Cassel, Bonaparte annulled at one fell swoop the treaties concluded by the Republic with Frederick William and other German princes — all based upon the hypothesis that France would retain the left bank. Still, Bonaparte knew these treaties existed, for copies had been sent to Clarke. 37 It is of course true that the Directory had thought for a time or renouncing the Rhineland in the interest of peace. Even as late as April 18, the date when the Treaty was signed, Carnot declared to Sandoz that Bonaparte's instructions ordered him to insist on keeping Belgium, Luxemburg, Maestricht, and Liège, but "to return the left bank of the Rhine to the Empire." 38 T h e Directory had since, however, become intoxicated with the successes of Hoche and Moreau, and on April 22, Delacroix sent to Clarke, at his request, 39 instructions "more in keeping with the latest events [on the Rhine]." 40 These instructions, though decreed after the Preliminaries were signed, are of value as an indication of the Directory's desires when it received the Treaty. " T h e primary basis of the treaty, and the one that the Directory is most anxious to see adopted, [should be] the union with the territory of the Republic of whatever belongs to the House of Austria and to the German Empire upon the left bank of the Rhine." Clarke might agree to the demolition of the fortifications of May enee if the Emperor objected to France's acquisition of the fortress intact. 41 T h e Austrians should evacuate, and permit the French to occupy, until the peace of the Empire, the fortresses of Philippsburg, Mannheim, Mayence, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein. T h e Emperor should consent to Baden's cession of Kehl and of the area occupied by the Hüningen bridgehead, and not oppose the measures France saw fit to take to collect the arrears of the Swabian and Franconian contributions. France's need for peace was so great that the Directory would consent to the evacuation of the Milanese and of Mantua, and even permit the fortifications of the latter to be conserved intact. Clarke should use this concession as a means of procuring Mayence for France in its fortified state. T h e ReGuyot, Direc., p. 363. " Sandoz to the King, April 18, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 354. 89 "Although the Directory presumes that the preliminaries will have been signed before you receive this despatch, it charges me to answer your request for supplementary instructions" (Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 185). In other words: No harm in sending you instructions now. It's prob87

ably all over. " D i r . to Bonaparte, April 22, 1797, ibid., p. 188. "Sorel, Europe, V, 162-163 is, in this connection, apt to be misunderstood. Sorel declares that "the Emperor [was to be asked] to consent to the cession of the entire left bank of the Rhine, and, concerning Mayence, to at least the dismantlement."

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public would not object to the Emperor's further indemnification on the right bank, provided that he used his authority to procure compensation within Germany for the displaced princes of the left bank. Clarke should ward off the Emperor's possible offer to mediate peace between France and England. The despatch ends: "The Directory is giving you no categorical demands to put through. It charges you and Bonaparte to treat as advantageously as possible upon the foregoing bases." These instructions were approved by Carnot, Le Tourneur, Revellière, and Barras.42 They are almost an exact counterpart of the Bases given to Zwanziger.43 The Directory, then, was still — or rather again — a devotee of the natural-boundaries creed. The Treaty of Leoben, however, was the negation of this program, for while failing to reach the Rhine, it transgressed the Alps. Guyot tells us that the Treaty "consecrated the definitive abandonment of the policy of the Committee of Public Safety, represented and defended by Reubell. . . It marked the first steps beyond the program of the natural frontiers — maximum program formulated by Reubell. . ." 4 4 To this, one need only ask, What about the Batavian Republic? The Committee had itself transgressed the natural frontiers, and Reubell himself had negotiated the Treaty of The Hague with the new puppet.45 The natural-boundary program, if one looks below the surface, was not a maximum program but a minimum program. As soon as an opportunity to transgress Nature's ramparts presented itself, the natural-boundary advocates themselves could not resist the temptation to leap over them. The virtual annexation of the United Netherlands 46 is not the only example. On November 13, 1795, the Directory — then only eleven days old — informed its Commissioner to the Rhine and Moselle Army that it "still persists in its resolution to keep Mannheim," and ordered the generals "to spare nothing to keep" Düsseldorf also.47 The next day the government wrote to the general in chief of the same army repeating its instructions as to the necessity for keeping Mannheim.48 Of defeated Baden the following year were demanded Kehl, " A p r i l 22, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 185-188. 48 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xviii, § 2. 44 Direc., pp. 367-368. Guyot, it seems, has taken much too seriously such statements of Reubell's as: "Our system is invariable in so far that whatever successes we may have, we will confine ourselves always within the Rhine boundary, and even within our former frontiers" (Sandoz to the King, June 1, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.·, I, 73). The italicization of "maximum" is Guyot's handiwork. 45 Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, x, § 2 and n. 24.

" T h e Franco-Batavian Treaty provided for a French army of occupation paid by the Dutch, and for Dutch acceptance of the assignats. It also required that the Dutch declare war on England (R. R. Palmer, "Much in Little: The Dutch Revolution of 1 7 9 5 - , " /• Mod. H., XXVI [1954], 23). It could hardly be maintained that the Batavian Republic was a sovereign state. It was merely an appendage of France, and not a very happy one (Lefebvre, Rév. jr., p. 504). " A r c h . N., A F III 3 1 5 , d. 1246. 48 Arch. N., A F III 3 1 5 , d. 1 2 5 1 .

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the the the the

Hüningen bridgehead, and a towpath on the right bank. In August of same year (1796), when the French were in the flood tide of success, Directory proposed to incorporate the right-bank city of Alt-Breisach in Republic by changing the course of the Rhine. T h e Rhine had once flowed to the east of the city, and might have returned to its old bed were the Austrians not so assiduous in building dikes. T h e Directory ordered engineers appointed to study the feasibility of diverting the River into its old bed. 49 Hauteville, military geographer and engineer, made his report on September 24, when the tide of French success was ebbing fast. H e found the project practicable, and — by what means the present writer knows not — determined that the old bed was really the one traced by Nature, hence constituted the veritable boundary of the Republic. Besides, he reported, Alt-Breisach was of commercial importance, and could be used as an entrepot for all goods coming from the Empire, Italy, and other countries. Also, it would save twenty-five leagues of travel. 60 It can thus be seen that Bonaparte's transgression of the Alps did not constitute the great change of policy that Guyot seems to think. It was unique only in that here one preferred to leap the Alps instead of to move the Rhine. 3.

T H E RECEPTION OF T H E PRELIMINARIES

T h e Preliminaries arrived in Paris on April 29, but the entire French nation had already received the glad tidings through another channel. A s stated above, Ledere was in Moreau's camp when another courier from Bonaparte arrived with the news of peace. Moreau had just composed a letter to the Directory in which he proudly roported the crossing of the Rhine, the capture of Kehl, the complete rout of the enemy, and the seizure of thousands of prisoners including a general and several staff officers, with considerable booty. Small wonder that the announcement of peace received from him but a reluctant postscript of one sentence. 51 Yet this meager sentence was soon the eager property of all France, for as Ledere proceeded toward Paris bearing Moreau's letter among his papers, he broadcast the news of peace. Bonaparte did not send the Preliminaries to Paris until the day after they were signed, and the trip to the capital took ten days. 52 H a d the Corsican " A u g . 10, Debidour, Recueil, III, 312, η. 3. 50 "Memoir upon the Advantages Which Would Result to the French Republic from the Establishment of a Bridgehead on the Right Bank of the Rhine at Alt-Breisach by Changing the Course of the Rhine in Whole or in Part from the West to the East of the

City, thus Causing the City to Fall within the Territory of the Republic," Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 330. " D a t e d 3 floréal, V, or April 22, 1797, Moniteur, XXVIII, 674-675. K Guyot, Direc., p. 365.

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been interested in haste, his messenger could have covered the three hundred leagues between Leoben and Paris in six days.53 But haste had apparently not been enjoined upon his courier. Perhaps Bonaparte was a little afraid for the Directory to learn his terms. Perhaps also he wished Time to dull the luster of Hoche's successes before his own not-too-brilliant terms should become known. To the Directory, he expressed regret at the hasty signing of the Preliminaries, but he carefully worded his regrets so that they should cast reproach upon Hoche and Moreau instead of upon himself: "Since I learned of the passage of the Rhine by Hoche and Moreau, I much regret that it did not take place a fortnight earlier." And to his staff, Bonaparte said, "What a difference there would have been in the Preliminaries if . . . it [the passage of the Rhine] had taken place!" 64 Yet he knew that the Rhine armies might be on the march, for on March 14, 1797, Delacroix had written to Clarke (1) not to make an armistice; (2) that the Rhine armies were ready to second powerfully the Army of Italy.65 And by April 13, as mentioned, news of Hoche's victory around Mayence had reached Leoben. Certainly it was because Bonaparte feared that the Rhine armies were on the march that the Treaty of Leoben was signed. The fact that the French masses knew as soon as did the Directory — and some even before — that peace had been made, was of great consequence. The Directory's approval or disapproval was bound to be influenced by public opinion. Had the Luxembourg received the news first, and privately, it is possible that the Preliminaries would never have been ratified. On the Austrian side, too, there was discontent. Thugut refused to approve the Treaty, and resigned. The Emperor accepted his resignation, but asked him to remain in office until a successor could take over.56 Thugut then apparently tried to induce the Emperor not to ratify the Treaty, though he (Thugut) had told Eden that, under the circumstances, he could not offer such advice.57 Still, the Emperor wrote to Thugut on April 23, in his own hand: "I have thoroughly weighed the arguments . . . you have laid before me." And he gave Thugut the "express and positive command" to send the ratification and Treaty back to the plenipotentiaries.58 Thugut of course obeyed, but he was sure — or rather, he hoped — that it was a meaningless gesture, that Clarke would repudiate the General in 58

Carnot, Réponse à Bailleul, p. 73. " Mém. Barras, II, 421-422. M Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 141. 16 Eden to Grenville, April 22, 1797, Hiiffer, Politik Mächte, Beilage V (pp. 240-241). Thugut expected Louis Cobenzl, Ambassa-

dor to Russia, to be his successor (ibid.). " H ü f í e r , Europa, I, 490. 58 Briefe Thugut, II, 33-34. On August g, Thugut declared to Eden that his personal wish was for a renewal of the war (Eden to Grenville, Aug. 10, 1797, P. R. O., F. O.

7/50)·

760

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Chief and refuse to sign. 89 True it is that Clarke would have refused to sign had he arrived before it was too late. He, and he alone, was the Directory's diplomat. 60 Bonaparte had exceeded his instructions in negotiating at all. " T h e Executive Directory has reserved to itself exclusively the power which the Constitution gives it to negotiate peace," 6 1 Bonaparte had been informed on April 25 of the previous year. N o w , one year later, the General in Chief of the A r m y of Italy had signed a peace which violated not only his own instructions, but Clarke's also. Clarke was furious, "sputtering fire and flame at Bonaparte's precipitation." 62 But the Envoy Extraordinary need not have been so indignant. O n April 15, 1797, after a terrific battle in the Directory, he had escaped recall only by Revellière's opinion that it was impolitic to cashier him then and there. Carnot and L e Tourneur had already yielded to the pressure of Barras and Reubell for his dismissal. O n Revellière's compromise suggestion, Clarke was merely left without instructions; the Directory's will was signified to Bonaparte alone. 63 O n April 19, Delacroix wrote to Clarke, informing him in gentle terms of what had occurred: T h e Directory, said Delacroix, thinks that if circumstances have forced Austria to negotiate, such negotiations will go on not at Turin, but at the headquarters of the French army; therefore the Directory has declared its will to Bonaparte directly. This renders new instructions for you unnecessary. 64 T h e peace had already been signed, however. O n April 18, neither Bonaparte nor Clarke knew that the Directory was — not changing horses in midstream, but — straddling horses in midstream. That is indeed what it was doing, for Clarke remained its sole diplomat officially, while the diplomatic instructions went to Bonaparte. T h e extent of Clarke's chagrin and surprise at Bonaparte's signing so unauthorized a treaty can perhaps best be conceived by comparison with the reaction of an Allied diplomat. Count Razoumouskoi, Russian ambassador to Vienna, wrote to his countryman Woronzow, who represented Russia at the Court of St. James's: "Providence has watched over us; that is the only conclusion I can reach, and I abandon myself to It for the future." A n d again: " Y o u will have difficulty conceiving of the conduct of the French general. H e pursues the Austrians, shattered, disorganized, frustrated, from " Guyot, Direc., p. 364. "Bonaparte pretended to Miot de Melito, France's new ambassador to Turin, that Clarke had been joined to him (Bonaparte) only as a matter of form, that Clarke had no influence and never received any despatches (General de Fleischmann [ed.], Mémoires du comte Miot de Melito [2nd ed.; 3 vols., Paris, 1873-1874], I, 152).

Debidour, Recueil, II, 229. Count Razoumouskoi to Count Woronzow, April 22, 1797, dated at Vienna. Enclosed in letter of Woronzow to Grenville, May 5, 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, 319. Mém. Barras, II, 381. 64 Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 182. 81

M

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL 1 8 , 1 7 9 7

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the Piave up to ten relays 65 from Vienna, where reigned a panic of terror which would have delivered up to him, without obstacle, a city without defense, empty of troops, the nobility in flight, the inhabitants confused, discontented, in a trance. He begins an overture for peace, agrees to armistices, gives time for reinforcements to arrive and for public opinion to become composed, and finally precipitates preliminaries whose first and most essential fruit is the evacuation of the provinces." 66 Bonaparte himself — according to his secretary, Bourrienne — wrote to the Emperor several months later, in a letter that was never sent: "The Preliminaries . . . assure . . . your Majesty . . . of a peace so glorious and so advantageous that it is impossible to tell by this treaty which of our two powers the fortunes of war have favored." 6 7 Clarke did not disavow Bonaparte. Instead, he sought for arguments to induce the Directory to accept the Treaty: "The ideas of the Executive Directory . . . and those of the Emperor differed widely," he wrote to Paris. "It was thus necessary to cut the Gordian knot. A new Alexander has done this, with the intention of serving the Republic well. Already the Emperor has announced his ratification [in a letter from Thugut to Gallo, April 20 ], and doubtless the Directory, after weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the bases . . . , will itself not hesitate to ratify a transaction the elements of which are mobile." 68 In other words, though the Treaty might be unsatisfactory as it stood, the Directory should accept it in the hope that — in the negotiations for the definitive peace — it could be rendered acceptable. Bonaparte sounded a similar note in a despatch of the same date to the Directory. "If you sincerely wish peace, then the Preliminaries, which will be susceptible at that epoch [the general pacification] of all the modifications wished, will promptly lead to a durable peace . . . which will procure for us the limit of the Rhine, or almost." 69 A week later, he extolled yet other advantages of the Treaty: "It rids us of the influence of Prussia, and puts us in a position to hold the balance of power in Europe." And he declared K

A relay was usually about 5 miles (J. E. Mansion [ed.], Heath's Standard French and English Dictionary [2 vols., New York, 1934]» I. i·"· "poste"). M Razoumouskoi to Woronzow, April 22, 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, 319. Gallo called Leoben "the finest and most miraculous of peaces" (Nabonne, lnéd. Reubell, p. 49). " Mémoires de M. de Bourrienne, Ministre d'Etat, sur Napoléon, le Directoire, le Consulat, l'Empire et la Restauration (10 vols.,

Brussels, 1829-1830), I, 1 8 1 . " C l a r k e to Delacroix, April 22, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 184. Delacroix replied to this effect: "The position Bonaparte was in when he signed the Preliminaries is keenly appreciated; it is evident that he did all he could under the circumstances. But the circumstances have changed. Put them to profit by bettering the conditions in the definitive peace" (May 6, 1797, Corr. inéd. Ñapo., IV, 22-23). 69 Corr. Ñapo., Ill, 3.

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

that Gallo already had received powers for the definitive peace 7 0 — which is doubtful, to put it mildly. 71 It was indeed necessary to resort to wheedling — and perhaps to lying — for Reubell and Barras were furious with Bonaparte, and Carnot was highly displeased. Barras and Reubell had been planning to trade Bonaparte's conquests in northern Italy for the definitive abandonment by Emperor and Empire of the left bank of the Rhine. 72 Carnot was not particularly anxious to see France acquire the left bank, but he believed that Bonaparte should not have agreed to immediate evacuation of the German territories his army had conquered, for these could have been exchanged for the French colonies at the general peace.73 And all the Directors were hostile to the idea of a congress — apostles that they were of the policy of separate treaties separately concluded. The general discontent soon gave way to general discord, and, as usual, the fury of Barras fastened itself upon the Organizer of Victory, and he roundly accused Carnot of having been responsible for the "infamous treaty of Leoben." Reubell, shrewder, quickly made a sign to Barras not to attribute to Carnot all the honor of having brought peace.74 Should the Directors reject the Treaty? T o do so would have been a stupid and rash act — stupid, because the peace, coming as it did before the entry to power of the new legislature, had justified the Directory's system and "torn the arms from the hands of the opposition"; 75 rash, because all France was yearning for peace, and discontented elements had been trained by the Revolution to revolt when things did not go as they wished. As soon as the news of the signing of the Preliminaries arrived in Paris, and before the terms were known, ballet performers danced with olive branches in their hands; actors wove references to the Preliminaries into their lines and drew thunderous applause and repeated curtain calls.76 Allusions to the peace formed part of every greeting on the street. 77 Peace was the sole topic of conversation in the cafés — peace, and a speech of Dumolard's (in the Council of Five Hundred) on the subject of peace.78 The merchant class was overjoyed at the opportunity for increased trade. The holders of government securities envisioned the payment of the arrears due them. 79 Even those whose prosperity depended on war greeted the '"Bonaparte to Dir., April 30, 1797, ibid., p. 13. 71 The Emperor granted such powers only on July 3 1 , 1797. Vide infra, chap, xxiv, § 2 and n. 3 1 . 72 Sciout, Direc., II, 59. "After such success, . . . a shameful peace," wrote Barras in his memoirs, and he accused Bonaparte of regarding himself as the center of the world (Mém., II, 386).

78

Sciout, Direc., II, 350, n. 2. Cf. Dupre, Carnot, p. 227. 74 Carnot, Réponse à Bailleul, p. 90. 75 May 10, 1797, Inéd. Mallet du Pan, II, 275· 76 Aulard, Paris, IV, 81. '"Ibid., p. 82. 78 Ibid., p. 80. ™Ibidn p. 90.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL l 8 , I 7 9 7

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80

Preliminaries with joy. No, the Directory dared not ignore such a seeming unanimity of opinion. It should be noted that these pacific dispositions preceded all knowledge of the terms of the Preliminaries. Truly, people presumed the Rhine boundary had been obtained. 81 That was natural after such a succession of victories, both in Italy and in Germany. But even after the terms became known, the approval was at first almost "universal 82 — except among those patrons of the cafés who were known for their exaggerative tendencies." These people hankered after the Rhineland, or at least, the lower Rhineland. 83 As the days passed, however, even moderates began to wonder why the Treaty had not stipulated for the Rhine boundary. France's victories had certainly earned that much. But for a time they consoled themselves that at least there was now one less enemy. 84 By the fourth of May, however, public opinion had so far changed that questions were raised as to the military advisability of the new eastern frontier, 85 and there was a general disposition to regard the Preliminaries as tentative — subject to revision in the negotiations for the definitive peace.88 Some newspapers presented the Rhineland as included within the term "constitutional frontiers" because of France's annexation of part of the left bank in I793·87 The renunciation of the Rhineland in the Leoben terms prompted an interesting speech on the part of Jean Debry of the Five Hundred. Instead of assimilating France to ancient Rome as the revolutionists delighted in doing, 88 Debry made a comparison and found Rome wanting: The Romans were a conquering nation, and France has fought only for its liberty, only for peace. The Romans insulted vanquished kings and peoples; the government of France is the friend of peoples and of governments at peace with the Republic. The position is therefore not the same. Consequently, if those *>lbid., p. 87. 81 Ibid., pp. 83, 87. 82 Therefore, the Directory, in its public utterances, was careful not to talk against the terms. It even pretended that Bonaparte's terms were its own. Said the President of the Directory: "The intrepid general of the Army of Italy, instructed as to the intentions of the Executive Directory, offered peace and signed the Preliminaries" (May g, 1797, Moniteur, XXVIII, 689). 88 Aulard, Paris, IV. 91. "Ibid., p. 93. 85 Ibid., p. 95. 89 Ibid., pp. 95-96. m Heigd, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 242. 88 "War I War on this modern Carthage [England]" (Garrau to Carnot, July 1,

1796, Bonnal de Ganges, Repré., IV, 552); "We are friends of the Brutuses and Scipios . . . whom we have taken as our models" (Bonaparte to Army of Italy, 1796-1797, ibid., p. 258); "Alexandra Bonaparti duci Gallorum invictissimo etc." (inscription reproduced from the Moniteur, ibid., p. 270); similarity of the French Republic to the Roman does not signify that a general could become Caesar of the modern Rome, i.e., of France, for the French system embodies safeguards (nonofficial article by Dir., Aug. ι, 1796, ibid., pp. 452-456). Prince Charles of Hesse-Rheinfels compared Moreau, the cautions (Hansen, Quellen, III, 877), to Fabius the Delayer, and Bonaparte to Scipio Africanus (Chuquet, Charles de Hesse, p. 275).

764

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

ancient solemnities were to be renewed amongst us, I would demand that, instead of that slave placed on the chariot of the victor, . . . a mother in mourning should represent humanity there — humanity which has cause to weep over the most dazzling victories.89 It would be of interest to consider the opinions of Moreau, Hoche, and Delacroix as to the wisdom of the various provisions of the Treaty. O n June 2, 1797, Moreau wrote to Dumas of the Council of Ancients that he found no fault with the relinquishment of the Rhine frontier. T h e Meuse boundary was, he said, very good, and had the advantage that several of the fortresses necessary to such a line were already in existence. But Bonaparte should not have evacuated the Austrian provinces without first securing for France the right to occupy, until the Franco-Imperial peace, at least two of the four right-bank-of-the-Rhine fortresses.90 N o w , he said, what guarantees France that the Empire would consent to make peace? Further, Austria should have been ousted from the Breisgau, 91 and "that is a great mistake." Also, Austria had been given too long a coastline. Of that, the Porte could justly complain. Besides, the opportunities for increased trade for Hungary and the eastern Habsburg provinces would render Austria much more powerful than when she owned just Belgium and Lombardy. But on the whole, the Treaty was advantageous to France. That it was advantageous to the Emperor also was not wholly a detriment, for if it were not, England could soon induce Austria to break it. Barthélémy (chosen Director May 26) would also tell Dumas that the Treaty was more advantageous for the Emperor than for France, but France needed peace so badly that Bonaparte deserved the nation's gratitude. It should be realized also that Bonaparte's military position was critical. His left w i n g was not well enough established to permit the remainder of his army to proceed, and he had not enough cavalry to emerge from the mountains. "But he would have come out honorably, for he has great talents." 92 General Hoche wrote to the Directory on May 20, 1797, that he would have preferred had Bonaparte exacted the Rhine frontier. Acquisition of the April 30, 1797, Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 269. °° Immediately after receiving news of the Preliminaries from Bonaparte, Moreau wrote him that he hoped the terms provided for the occupation of some of the Rhine fortresses so as to guarantee the payment of the Swabian and Bavarian contributions. "Without these funds we shall run the risk of dying of hunger while awaiting the end of the negotiations, which will doubtless be lengthy," added Moreau (April 23, 88

1797, Corr. inid. Napo., Ill, 69-70). Austria's relinquishment of the Breisgau was desired, as mentioned many times, to remove France and Austria from contiguity. Also, to indemnify princes who had suffered losses by France's expansion eastward. Vide Parandier's "Concerning the Treaty with Austria and the Empire," c. Year IV (September 1795 — September 1796), Arch. A . E., Autriche 365, f. 254. "RF, LXIX, 370-376, under "Documents." 81

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL 1 8 , 1 7 9 7

765

Rhineland was, to his mind, necessary to indemnify the Republic for the ills of the war, and to balance the Polish partitions. However, if it were unattainable, profit could be drawn from a boundary line running roughly from Worms to Trêves to the Roër, then along the Meuse and Rhine. "This frontier [would] enable us to effect an advantageous invasion or a glorious defense." In other words, Hoche did not regard the Rhine as indispensable from a military standpoint 93 any more than did Moreau. Delacroix did not have a great deal of respect for the Preliminaries. He thought that they multiplied causes of friction between Austria and France, and though he did not raise objections to the renunciation of the Rhineland, he mentioned a possibility that a physiocrat such as he should not have noticed: that there was danger that Austria would develop commerce with the Levant. 94 A good deal of the confusion in the public mind after Leoben was due to the enigmatic behavior of the Directory. At first the government did not confirm the peace officially.95 Then, after official confirmation, it acted so strangely that some people doubted the reality of the Treaty. 96 Others believed the Directory intended to reject some of the articles,97 but feared to confess it. That certainly would have been a hazardous undertaking, for it would have antagonized the successful general at a time when the revolutionists on the Directory were contemplating a coup d'état against the moderates in the Councils.98 (The moderates had been overwhelmingly successful in the elections held on 20 germinal, V [April 9, 1797], only eleven of the 216 outgoing Conventionais being reëlected.) 99 The day after the conclusion of the Preliminaries, Bonaparte insinuated that if his treaty were rejected by the Directory, he would return to Paris and embark on a civil career. 100 The implications could not have been lost on those who had seen the effects of his "whiff of grape-shot" on 13 Vendémiaire. And the Directory could not easily forget the disguised threat implicit in his sending in the simple news of the start of peace negotiations, not by a common soldier or inferior officer, but by Adjutant General the ex-Marquis Dessolle, 101 son-in-law of the General Dampierre who died a hero's death at the head of M

Abstract of Hoche's memoir, included in Dir.'s despatch of May 3 1 to Bonaparte, Coir. ìnid. Ñapo., IV, 35-40. M "Project of a Report of Delacroix to Dir. on the Leoben Preliminaries," undated, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 191. 95 Aulard, Paris, IV, 82. 86 ibid., p. 86. "ibid., p. 87. M Sciout, Direc., II, 347-348.

"ibid., p. 3 1 7 . 100 Guyot, Direc., p. 491. 101 Corr. Ñapo., XXIX, 300. Charles Durozoir, in his sketch, "Dessolle (le marquis JeanJoseph-Paul-Augustin)," in Biog. univ. (Michaud), says Dessolle brought the Preliminaries to the Directory. There is a flaw here, however. Durozoir quotes Moreau as writing the Directory that Dessolle arrived immediately after he, Moreau, had crossed the Rhine. But Moreau wrote to the Direc-

766

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

his troops in '93.102 This was psychological warfare at its best. It must be confessed that the Directory was not a free agent. O n May 1, the matter of acceptance or rejection was put to the ballot by the Directors, and the Preliminaries were ratified by four votes to one, the dissentient voice being that of Reubell's. 103 H e believed that France's victories gave her a title to the Rhine frontier; 1 0 4 that the Preliminaries were vague, as indeed they were; and that the abandonment of part of Italy to Austria would be the fruitful source of new Franco-Austrian conflict, 105 contrary as it was to the (not unwise) plan of separating the possessions of the two states geographically as far as possible. Moreover, at the time of the capitulation of Mayence to the Prussians in July 1793, Reubell — at least, so declares Barras in his Mémoires — had agreed with Merlin of Thionville that neither would shave off his moustache until Mayence were reunited with France. Reubell is said to have declared during the debate on the ratification that if he should sign any treaty which did not provide for the restoration of Mayence, he would consider himself guilty of perjury; that, however, his heart approved of a peace which his honor forbade him to accept. 106 It will not be uninteresting to summarize the motives which induced four of the Directors to vote for ratification. They demonstrate very clearly the total absence of a settled system in the foreign policy of the Directory. Carnot approved of the Treaty because the country needed peace; because the moderates — the rising party — earnestly desired the end of the war; and because the Leoben terms seemed to him sufficiently advantageous. T h e arguments for a natural defensive boundary left him unmoved. H e regarded the frontiers of Louis X I V ' s France — the "frontier of iron" — as equivalent

102

tory from Bischofsheim — which is two days of swift campaigning away from Diersheim — that a courier had at that instant brought him news of the Preliminaries (Moniteur, XXVIII, 675). Bonaparte made a point of sending in to Paris the great "names" of his army, in order, it would appear, to increase his own importance and intimidate possible opponents (vide Mém. Marmont, I, 170). At intervals throughout the campaign of 1796-1797, a general arrived from the Army of Italy with captured enemy flags. On April 15, the simple news of the renewal of the pre-Leoben armistice was, as mentioned above (this chapter, § 2), carried by the brother-in-law of the great general himself. And after the fighting was over, and peace had been signed, General Masséna, the "Cherished Child of

Victory," arrived either with the Preliminaries (Corr. Napo., XXIX, 300) or with the Emperor's ratification of the Preliminaries (Moniteur, XXVIII, 688-689). And a few months later yet, Bonaparte sent in General Augereau under circumstances described infra, chap, xxiii, § 7. 103 Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 235. Many books erroneously declare that the vote was three to two. The writer has seen the original instrument. 104 Sandoz to the King, May 7, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Frk_., I, 125. Reported Sandoz, "My arguments disquieted without convincing him. The great successes of the armies have dazzled him" (to the King, May 1, 1797, ibid., pp. 124-125). 105 Guyot, Direc., p. 370. 106 Mém. Barras, II, 388.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL l 8 , 1 7 9 7 in defensive value to the R h i n e . W h e n

he p r o v o k e d

767 the annexation

B e l g i u m , it w a s f o r strategic purposes — to outflank E n g l a n d . 1 0 7

of

Moreover,

he reasoned, if F r a n c e absolutely desired to a n n e x the left b a n k , she could do so w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of the Preliminaries, since — as the

French

n e w s p a p e r s h a d pointed out — part of the R h i n e l a n d could c o m e

within

the definition of "constitutional f r o n t i e r s . " 1 0 8 O t h e r factors also p r o m p t e d C a r n o t ' s acceptance. C a r n o t , already a p p r o a c h i n g coup

d'état,

as early as J a n u a r y

1 7 9 7 , sensed a n

a n d sought to attach B o n a p a r t e to himself. It w a s

C a r n o t , it w i l l be recalled, w h o h a d been m a i n l y responsible f o r Bonaparte's a p p o i n t m e n t as general in chief of the A r m y of Italy, a n d the t w o m e n h a d m a i n t a i n e d f r i e n d l y relations ever since. 1 0 9 T h e n , too, as the old O r g a n i z e r of V i c t o r y , C a r n o t h a d learned to respect military success, a n d ergo

the

successful g e n e r a l ; so it w a s not u n n a t u r a l that he should h a v e r e g a r d e d w i t h s o m e degree of deference this excursion into h i g h politics on the part of B o n a p a r t e . A n d of course L e T o u r n e u r agreed w i t h C a r n o t . H o w could he h a v e done o t h e r w i s e ? 107

108

Mémoires sur Carnot par son fils (new ed.; 2 vols., Paris, 1893), II, 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 . Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 242, for this sentence alone. Sandoz protested to Carnot on May 29 that neither the Emperor nor the French legislature understood the term "constitutional frontiers" in this expansive sense, whereupon Carnot laughed without replying (ibid.). Sandoz' report of July 8 tells of a similar occurrence. Sandoz had pointed out to Carnot the inconsistency of his (Carnot's) statement that the frontiers of the Republic were still a matter of discussion and incertitude, and of the Emperor's announcement to the Diet that the integrity of the Empire was assured. Carnot replied with the assertion that the "constitutional frontiers" included the left bank. Sandoz refuted his statement, whereupon Carnot merely smiled (to the King, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355). We get a glimpse of what lay behind that smile when we consider Carnot's message of January 18, 1797 to Clarke: "I think it is unnecessary to stipulate anything in the treaty about the Rhine boundary. Our military position, in itself, [will give] us sufficient influence upon the congress without our needing to throw Germany into consternation by speaking, in advance, . . . of the extension of our frontiers" (Mêm. sur Carnot, II, 142). According to

1M

Carnot's philosophy, the Treaty said, not what was written, but what the military position of France could impose. Dupre, Carnot, pp. 221-226; Welvert, Lend, réf., p. 34. The revolutionists of Paris accused Carnot of having repeatedly tried to secure the recall of Bonaparte. According to them, when Clarke was originally sent to Lombardy, it had been to replace Bonaparte in the command of the Army of Italy (Aulard, Paris, IV, 87). Yet Carnot was the first to suggest ratification, i.e., Carnot and Le Tourneur (Guyot, Direc., p. 366). It is interesting to note in passing that rumor said Reubell wished to replace Bonaparte by Hoche in Italy, but could not muster a majority in the Directory. Reubell was irked by Bonaparte's "despotic" behavior (ibid., p. 246). Bonaparte regarded Clarke as a spy sent to check up his behavior and principles (Mem. Miot, I, 152), but he had proceeded to win the "spy" for himself. Clarke reported to the Directory that Bonaparte was "attached to the Republic, and without other ambition than that of conserving the glory he has won. . . The Constitution is his only guide" (Dec. 7, 1796, Dry, Soldats ambas., II, 34-35). Barras complained that Clarke, the Directory's agent, had placed himself at Bonaparte's service (ibid., p. 20).

768

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Revellière had remained faithful to the Brissotin system of dependent republics. Bonaparte also was a Brissotin. It was a foregone conclusion that they should agree on that part of the Preliminaries which established the Cisalpine Republic. Revellière could not have been very pleased, however, with the arrangements which contemplated the delivery of the territory of Venice over to Austria. 1 1 0 This Director had long dreamed of a united or federative Italy reaching from top to toe of the Italian boot. However, a series of revolutions which Revellière believed to be spontaneous had broken out in the Venetian territories, and he may well have comforted himself that Austrian occupation would be only temporary at most. 1 1 1 A s regards the renunciation of the left bank, Revellière was not deeply concerned, for, as already mentioned, he believed in "freeing," not in annexing. T h e Leoben terms were therefore not particularly objectionable to the "altruist" on the Directory. Barras, the fourth Director to vote for ratification, was moved by pressing personal considerations. Bonaparte had intercepted three letters of Alvise Querini, Venetian minister to Paris, with whom Barras had covenanted to protect Venice against Bonaparte for 600,000 francs — plus commission for an intermediary. T h e intermediary was Barras' hunting companion, the unscrupulous Dalmatian, Wiscowich. 1 1 2 There had been talk earlier of much larger sums — up to 7,000,000 francs — and Querini had inquired of his government whether it wished to consider such a proposition. T h e 7,000,000, or part thereof, was to be paid to certain contractors supplying the A r m y of Italy who were friends of Barras — which suggests that these funds were intended for Barras. 113 But before the Venetian government had replied, there came the more restricted offer of 600,000 francs, from Wiscowich. This schemer told a story that two Directors wanted to save Venice, and two to destroy her, but that the fifth was as yet undecided. However, 600,000 francs would decide him — provided there was an almost immediate answer. Vide Moniteur, XXV, 380. C f . Talleyrand to Dir., A u g . 14 (not 2nd), 1797, Pallain, Min. Talleyrand, p. 99: " [ W i t h ] the Emperor established in Italy close to the revolutionary volcano, . . . you will be able, when you so desire, to efface with a stroke of the pen several provinces from the list of his possessions." (Talleyrand succeeded Delacroix on July 16 [vide next chapter, § 5 ] ) . m Actually, Querini turned over 700,000 f r a n c s — 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 for commission, and for bribes to smalltime crooks (G. B. McClellan, Venice and Bonaparte [Princeton, 1 9 3 1 ] , p. 204). Sorel tells a different story 110 m

about how the 600,000 became 700,000. He says that it had stood at 600,000, but that Querini demanded that the notes should not be discounted until there had been at least partial performance. Barras is supposed, thereupon, to have flown into a rage at seeing his honor thus questioned, but — a s Sorel phrases it — consented to have his honor impugned for an additional 100,000 francs (Bon. et Hoche, p. 135)· " ' E . Bonnal (de Ganges), Chute d'une république: Venise (Paris, 1885), pp. 2 1 7 218.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL l 8 ,

1797

769

Querini did not know what to do. The stakes were too high: his country's liberty versus a sum of money. He decided to sign without waiting for authority, but exacted that Wiscowich should first bring him the original of a government order to Bonaparte to do six things which he (Querini) specified. 114 Wiscowich brought him an almost meaningless document, 115 but the actions and talk of the schemer had such an urgency about them that Querini, cowed, signed nevertheless. Subsequent events showed that Bonaparte had not been checked at all, and Querini demanded his notes back. Wiscowich said he did not have them; they had already been turned over to the fifth Director. 116 All this Bonaparte knew from Querini's correspondence. If Barras had dared to vote for rejection of the Preliminaries, Bonaparte would certainly have informed the world of his (Barras') motives by publishing the compromising despatches. Guyot avers that he so intended, 117 but the document Guyot cites in substantiation does not necessarily bear him out. 1 1 8 He may, however, be right. Interesting it is to note that Barras, even though his vote had aided in sealing the fate of Venice, tried to collect on the notes. Querini repudiated them. 119 Barras had not reckoned on this, and was furious. Bonaparte was furious, too — at the attempt to bribe the Directory to interfere with his plans. Querini was arrested on his way home, and imprisoned in the chateau of Milan. On February 1 1 , 1798, he was interrogated in so diplomatic a manner that it proved possible to elude the question: Which Director was it who had been bribed ? 1 2 0 At the end of March he was sent to P a r i s 1 2 1 — perhaps to give him an opportunity to escape. At any rate, that is what he promptly did, on March 30, 1798. 122 How were the Preliminaries received in Germany and in the Rhineland ? The Viennese newspapers carried the following item on April 23: "The German Empire retains its full integrity. There is general jubilation and but one voice: 'Long live our best Emperor Francis.' Without the stipulation of the integrity of the Empire there would have been no signing of the Preliminaries on the Imperial side." The Hamburger and Frankforter 114

Ibid., pp. 220-222. Reproduced by McClellan, Venice Bon., pp. 204-205. 11 'Ibid., p. 205. According to Revellière's Mémotres, Barras admitted he knew Wiscowich, but said that Wiscowich had extorted the money from Querini on his own account and for his own benefit (II, 242). " ' G u y o t , Direc., pp. 369, 481. Vide also p. 472, n. i. 118 It is Corr. Ñapo., XXIX, 3 1 9 that he cites (Direc., p. 369). The only relevant pasm

sage there says merely that "despatches, intercepted at Milan, placed Napoleon in a position to counteract this plot; he had in his hands the record of the sums distributed at Paris. He used his authority to annul everything." 1M McClellan, Venice Bon., p. 205. 120 Mém. Larevellière, II, 244. The interrogatory is reproduced in Bonnal, Venise, pp. 383-387 (in Italian). m McClellan, Venice Bon., p. 206. Sciout, Direc., II, 392 says he escaped from Milan. ""Ibid.

770

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

journals soon had reproduced the highly palatable news, and already before the end of April, Chancellor Albini of Mayence and Prince-Elector Max Franz of Cologne were reveling in the news that the integrity of the Empire had been assured. Baron von Duminique, minister of the Trêves Elector, regretted that the war did not end on a note of victory and glory for Austria, but he recommended making peace on the best terms possible "should the war continue to be waged as it has been [up to now] on the Lower Rhine." 1 2 3 A t first the Rhineland populace had to content itself with general rumors about the peace terms, but by April 25, the words "integrity of the Empire" appeared in private letters. Probably many people guessed the terms from the behavior of the French, especially from the behavior of Durbach, the Rhineland's French tax collector, whose pitilessness in the pursuit of loot 1 2 4 bespoke an early withdrawal of the invader. T h e Rhineland papers brought news about the Treaty only on May 10. 4.

F R A N C E A N D T H E T R E A T M E N T OF

CONQUERED

G E R M A N TERRITORY BEFORE A N D A F T E R

a. The Levy of Contributions on Austrian

LEOBEN

Provinces

As indicated many times, one of the principal functions of a French general was to collect contributions, both for the support of his army and for the maintenance of the government at Paris. Jourdan in Frankfort and Franconia, Moreau in Swabia and Bavaria, Bonaparte in Italy and . . . A t this point the analogy ends. In all the cases mentioned except that of Bonaparte in Austria, the general principle obtained. In Austria, General Bonaparte clashed with the general principle, and Bonaparte won. The Directory did not expect this conflict. It knew that Bonaparte had behaved in Italy like a man after its own heart. Untold millions of livres in coin and kind had taken the road to Paris or served to outfit the Army of Italy. T h e Directory had earlier manifested its intention of milking the Austrian monarchy in like manner. When Jourdan was forging ahead in the summer of 1796, the Directory ordered him to levy contributions in Bohemia. 125 Of course, Jourdan never reached Bohemia, so this order must, at its inception, be classed with other forlorn hopes. Not so with the government's order to Bonaparte to levy "all the contributions you can" in the Tyrol. 1 2 6 Bonaparte reached the Tyrol — occupied it. Did he levy contributions ? Not one kreuzer, except as a punishment for malfeasance. 127 His For this and the following paragraph: Hansen, Quellen, III, 954-955. 131 Vide infra, chap, xxvii, § ib. 125 July 31, 1796, Mem. campagne de 1796, 1211

128 127

"Pièces justificatives," no. 18 (p. 300). Sept. 26, 1796, Corr. inéd. Napo., II, 50. Bonaparte to Gen. Joubert: "Instructions Concerning the Conduct to be Observed

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL l 8 ,

1797

77I

instructions to General Joubert specifically forbade "the levying of any contribution or the seizure of any money chest." Only "requisitions for subsistence, according to the legal forms," were allowable.128 On March 15, this order was modified to provide that the money chests and magazines belonging to the Emperor might be seized, but only those. Neither the monts-de-piété nor the treasure chests of the cities were to be appropriated.129 Six days later, Bonaparte forbade anyone but the commissary general to demand anything from the conquered territory under any pretext whatsoever.130 As the French army advanced, the command not to levy contributions was extended to other Austrian provinces.131 Exaggerated requisitions were ordered reduced.132 The taxes normally paid to the Emperor were used to pay for supplies exacted, and to indemnify those who had suffered loss because of the French army's passage.133 So perfect was the deportment of the usually uncontrolled French troops that they were able, without appearing ridiculous, to reproach the Austrians for their lack of discipline.134 "I have not levied a single contribution in Germany," wrote Bonaparte to the Directory. " . . . I shall act similarly during the evacuation. . . The time will come when we shall reap an advantage from this sage conduct. It will germinate in all of Hungary, and will be more fatal to the throne of Vienna than . . . victories." 135 The General failed to say what he admitted a little later: that his "sage conduct" was due partly to a fear of stirring up the Austrian people against his army. 136 He likewise did not mention that he was making a bid for Austria's friendship as a step to the realization of his personal ambitions. One thing is certain. Bonaparte's in the T y r o l , " Art. VIII, Corr. Ναρο., II, 507. Accord: Mém. Barras, II, 152. It was not intended, of course, that the contributions should take the form of indiscriminate looting by the French troops when they entered a village and found the whole population off to war. Yet that is what occurred (Derrécagaix, Campagnes Tyrol, p. 29 et passim). But it should not occasion surprise. Bonaparte had practically encouraged looting in Italy. Vide De Sérignan in R Q H , L X X X I V , 179, 181. 128 Jan. 26, 1797, Corr. Ναρο., I, 355. 128 Bonaparte to Joubert: "Instructions Concerning the Conduct etc.," Art. VII, ibid., 180

1X1

m

π , 505-507. Order of Bonaparte, March 21, 1797, ibid., p. 528. Bonaparte to Bernadotte, April 1, 1797, ibid., p. 581. Bonaparte to Hulin, April 14, 1797, ibid.,

p. 634. Bonaparte to the People of Carinthia, Rédacteur, no. 487 (April 16, 1797). 134 " A u s dem Tagebuch Zinzendorfs," April 13, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 489. i a c April 19, 1797, Corr. inéd. Ναρο., II, 565. But vide T h u g u t to Gallo, June 10, 1797, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 209. According to Thugut, the conduct of the French in occupied Austria was not so exemplary as a reading of Bonaparte's despatches and proclamations would indicate. T h u g u t charged that the French exhausted and devastated divers cantons by all species of exactions and excesses after they were supposed to have left according to the Leoben terms. 1 M T o Dir., April 30, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., III, 6.

138

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

772

renunciation of Austrian contributions was not a part of the G e r m a n policy of the Directory. b. Contributions

in non-Austrian

Germany "

7

After

Leoben

There is no especial interest in the question of contributions levied on non-Austrian Germany just before Leoben. It is the armistice between France and the Empire, incorporated into that treaty, which renders the question of contributions one of special significance. T h e Treaty did not mention the subject. T h e occupying French forces continued to levy requisitions and contributions on the conquered territory of the right bank despite the armistice — unreasonable charges, far in excess of the maintenance needs of the occupying French military, according to the complaints of Gallo and Merveldt. 1 3 8 It will be recalled that heavy contributions had been levied in 1796 on Baden, Württemberg, the Swabian Circle, Frankfort, and the Franconian Circle despite their armistices with France, but the present circumstances were far different. Baden, Württemberg, and the others had consented, in their armistices, to pay contributions. T h e Empire had consented to nothing. W e r e such exactions legal? T h e Austrian plenipotentiaries protested that they were not. Bonaparte and Clarke, upholding the affirmative, argued as follows: The effect of an armistice is not to end entirely the state of war, but only to stop its military activity. . . [With respect to] conquered territories, . . . [an armistice] guarantees their possession provisionally to the conqueror, who recognizes . . . no other rules than those prescribed by humanity and the rights of war. . . In consenting to an armistice in favor of the German Empire, . . . [we] did not expect that this act of deference . . . could possibly be interpreted in a sense so disastrous to the French Republic. 139 A r c h d u k e Charles took up the battle of words — he w h o had failed in the battle of arms. "It does not appear to be in conformity with the principles It is a question here of right-bank territories occupied by the French. 138 Gallo and Merveldt to the French plenipos., June 2 i , 1797, Corr. inéd. Ñapo., VII, 137-138. 180 Bonaparte and Clarke to the Austrian plenipos., June 28, 1797, H . Hiiffer (ed.), "Ungedruckte Briefe Napoleons aus den Jahren 1796 und 1797," Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, X L I X , Pt. I ( 1 8 7 2 ) , 282-283. T h e Gazette française, no. 1951 (May 10, 1 7 9 7 ) , stated the French position quite succinctly: "Since France, in treating for separate peaces with the Duke of 187

Württemberg and the Margrave of Baden, as well as with the Circles of Swa'bia and Franconia, exacted large indemnities in money, supplies, munitions, objects of equipment and of clothing, and even territorial cessions, how could the other princes and circles of Germany hope to come out of their difficulties without payingf Since the earliest k n o w n times, it has always been the weak w h o have paid to the stronger, and without being the Oracle of Delphi, one can be sure that this philosophy will remain perpetually in vogue" (Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670, f. 3 1 7 ) .

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL l 8 , I 7 9 7

773

of integrity of a great nation to oppress and exhaust provinces of which it is in momentary possession until the conclusion of peace . . . ," he wrote to Hoche. Hoche's adjutant replied that "it [was] in perfect conformity with military principles that an army should live at the expense of conquered country." 1 4 0 The King of Prussia tried to protect his friends in the Empire, but Carnot declared to Sandoz that the King's "protections" could not be honored by the Directory, for the intention of the Republic was not to spend one sou for the maintenance of its armies, thus rendering contributions and exactions inevitable. 141 The Directory refused, also, to revoke or mitigate a heavy contribution imposed on Werden, which was not behind the neutrality line, but the sovereignty of which was claimed by the Hohenzollern king. 1 4 2 It would be an error to discern, behind the Directory's attitude, only an economic motivation. If France renounced the levy of contributions, there would be no way, now that the shooting was over, to exert pressure for the swift conclusion of peace — on France's terms. But with the French troops sapping the lifeblood of the conquered country, the enemy would be glad to agree to a relatively onerous peace just to be rid of them. In other words, the armistice may have ended the shooting war, but not the war of attrition, which had become a political bludgeon of stupendous significance. The armistice in favor of the Empire in the Leoben Preliminaries posed another problem which might well have stumbled the professors of international law — that of the unpaid contributions levied in 1796 on Swabia, Franconia, and Bavaria. These contributions have a curious history, and 110

Charles's letter and its reply: May 12, 1797, De Martens, Traites Eur., Ser. II, Vol. VI, 381. Hoche had another argument: This was neither a new contribution, nor a contribution levied during an armistice, but an equivalent of the far heavier contributions levied by Jourdan the year before, and in arrears (Hansen, Quellen, III, 957). The Frankjurter Journal said that "General Hoche founds his behavior on the theory that while peace has been concluded with Austria, only an armistice has been concluded with the Empire, and the real peace . . . will not be concluded . . . until the Congress [is held]. . . Meanwhile, his troops must eat; and his empty coffers render these measures necessary for him" (ibid., p. 970, n. 2). To the Directory Hoche wrote on May 1 that, until the middle of June, "the army will be fed and paid by the region it is oc-

141

142

cupying on the right bank of the Rhine. It will issue from there entirely reestablished, mounted and equipped. I would wish to be able to have it rest 20 or 25 days on the left bank, in the Electoral possessions— which seem to me to be destined for return. There we will consume the magazines that I have just had established" (ibid., p. 992, n. 1 ) . But on May 30, Hoche asked the minister of war if he should continue to levy contributions. He complained that the German papers were saying: Bonaparte and Moreau are not levying contributions; Hoche must be doing it on his own account — without orders. That "does not make me a very good reputation" (ibid., p. 970). Sandoz to the King, May 30, 1797 (Carnot's statement was of May 28), G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355. Report of Delacroix to Dir., May 23, 1797, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 696, f. 125.

774

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

emphasize once again the economic factor in the Directory's martial activities. Before the news of the Preliminaries reached Paris, the Directory informed Bonaparte that Hoche and Moreau had been instructed to proceed with their invasion of the Empire despite the armistice between the A r m y of Italy and Charles. T h e Directory's reason? N o t to attain favorable military positions to assure that the Emperor would accept France's terms; not to frighten the Austrian public into compelling their government to make peace; but, as mentioned above, "to assure their [the Rhine armies'] subsistence and to collect contributions." 143 There is good evidence that the unpaid levies imposed in 1796 were in the Directory's mind when this order was despatched to the generals of its Rhine armies, for Delacroix wrote to Clarke the same day that the treaty with the Emperor should provide that his Imperial Majesty would not oppose France's measures for collecting the arrears of the Swabian and Franconian contributions. 144 T h e following month, Moreau informed Barthélémy that the Directory had charged him (Moreau) to demand, through the D u k e of Württemberg, payment of the Swabian contributions. " W e would be very embarrassed during the congress if these sums were not forthcoming," explained Moreau. 145 In June, Delacroix suggested to General Clarke that France could perhaps assign the Bavarian contributions due under the Pfaffenhofen agreement to Austria, in return for the relinquishment of personally owned Habsburg property in Belgium. 1 4 8 A l l these thoughts and overtures occupied time, and meanwhile the Rhine and Moselle A r m y was in desperate straits for lack of funds. Presently its gunners revolted, and if certain funds had not chanced to arrive from Paris, the movement might have assumed serious proportions. Moreau charged General Desaix to repair to Italy and plead with Bonaparte and Clarke to secure Austria's intervention for the collection of the sums due from Germany. Since Bonaparte had stopped Moreau's offensive, he should have complied willingly. But Bonaparte hesitated to help Moreau. H e was angry with him for his failure to support the A r m y of Italy in 1796, and in 1797 before Leoben, 1 4 7 and jealous of him for his victories. Finally, on July 27, Bonaparte wrote to Clarke that they (he and Clarke) would have to threaten the German delinquents with military occupation, for which purpose extraordinary couriers would be needed. 148 Bonaparte composed a sample note for delivery to the debtors, and sent it in to Clarke for his Supra, § 2, this chapter. Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 185-188. 145 Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670, f. 316. 146 June i l , 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 143

144

132-133. Journal Desaix, pp. xliii-xliv, xlviii. 148 Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 180-181. July 28, according to Corr. Napo., Ill, 267. 147

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL l 8 ,

1797

775

149

comments. Clarke asked Merveldt for passports for Munich and Stuttgart, 150 but Merveldt requested that Clarke await Gallo's return from Vienna, for the matter was not so simple, the Emperor having annulled the armistices because they had been made without the Empire's consent.151 While waiting, Bonaparte and Clarke wrote two notes, identical in form, mutatis mutandis, to the Bavaro-Palatine Elector and the Duke of Württemberg (for the Swabian Circle), respectively, asking them to pay, and reminding them that their engagements had been contracted according to the laws of w a r ; 1 5 2 should they fail to honor their promises, Swabia and Bavaria would revert to the state of war which obtained before the armistices were made. 153 In the logic of these notes, there existed two flaws. First, the agreement with Bavaria never had been a valid contract; it lacked the ratification of the Elector. Second — disregarding the first point for the sake of argument— the repudiation of the contributions engagements might indeed have ended the armistices with Bavaria and Swabia, but Bonaparte himself had written into the Preliminaries another armistice between France and the Empire. The Austrian plenipotentiaries pointed this out to Bonaparte, who replied: The Republic granted an armistice to the Empire out of deference to the Emperor, hence France has a right to expect that Austria will help France to secure payment.154 Desaix was charged to deliver the above notes personally to the Elector and the Duke, and to pay the sums collected into the coffers of the Republic and especially of the Rhine and Moselle Army. 155 Armed with a safe-conduct granted by Gallo and Degelmann on September 19, Desaix started out confidently for Germany. His reception soon aroused his apprehension. An Austrian officer was assigned to accompany him everywhere, and he was told he could not see Elector Karl Theodor except in the presence of the Austrian minister, von Seilern. He (Desaix) was even denied permission to hand Bonaparte's letter to the Elector; it had to go through an Austrian. The results may be imagined, but in order not to offend by a flat refusal, Karl Theodor replied that his answer would be sent either to Bonaparte or to the Directory. Desaix threatened invasion, but to no avail. Four days later he left — empty-handed — for Stuttgart. But the Duke of Württemberg ""July 29, 1797, Corr. Napo., Ill, 279. 150 Though Württemberg itself had reached an agreement with France, as part of the Swabian Circle it was delinquent (vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xv, § 1). 151 Clarke to Bonaparte, Aug. 4, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 2 1 1 . 152 Notice this argument. It was probably intended to answer Gallo's assertion that the agreements were illegal because not con-

sented to by the Empire. Said the French: They are legal under the code of war, which recognizes the validity of force. 15,1 Sept. 17, 1797, Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, ff. 498-499. 154 Bonaparte to the Austrian plenipos., Sept. 2 3> 1797) Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, f. 513· 155 Bonaparte and Clarke to Desaix, Sept. 17, 1797, Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, f. 500.

776

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

was conveniently not in his capital when the collector arrived. N o r were the Estates of the Swabian Circle in session.156 From Aschaffenburg, Desaix informed Bonaparte of his insuccess.157 His journey had not been without result, however. It had shown the Germans that they could not plead duress if ever they signed an engagement with the French Republic. This increased the dread of France in German minds and resulted in several overtures being made to Desaix by members of the Estates of Bavaria, frightened at the fate destined for their country should the French invade again. 158 c. The Evacuation of Austria After

Leoben

According to Article VIII of the Preliminaries, the French troops were to evacuate the Austrian provinces immediately after the Emperor's ratification of the Treaty. 159 Bonaparte indicated that the process would require eight or ten days. 160 The evacuation started satisfactorily enough, and continued at a fast pace until May i, then slowed to a mere trickle. W h e n the French were still in Trieste on May 12, and Bernadotte was named commander of Friuli, Merveldt took the road to Milan to see Bonaparte. But at the gates of Milan, the Austrian negotiator met Bonaparte's courier bearing a letter for him (Merveldt), promising the evacuation of Gorizia and Klagenfurt on May 23, and Trieste on the twenty-fourth. 161 T h e evacuation was completed on the latter date, as promised. 162 W h y was the evacuation delayed? one might be permitted to ask. Was Bonaparte contemplating the revolutionization of the Habsburg provinces despite Article III of the Leoben Preliminaries? If analogies are of any significance, the French-inspired uprisings in Venice's east Adriatic possessions 1 6 3 may possibly be regarded as a clue. These also were territories destined for the Emperor. Even after the evacuation of Austria, France maintained her interest in the disruptive tendencies within the Habsburg monarchy. The Republic set herself up as protectress of Austrian revolutionists.164 T h e Directory ordered Clarke to make known to the Imperial plenipotentiaries the great ^ Journal Desaix, pp. xliii-liv. 167 Oct. 24, 1797, "Briefe Napo.," Arch, öster. Gesch., XLIX, Pt. I, 287-288. Journal Desaix, p. Ivi. ""Eden wrote to Grenville that Gallo had been ordered not to exchange ratifications until Bonaparte had actually evacuated the German possessions of Austria (May 20, 1797. P· R· O., F. O. 7/49). 160 Thugut to Gallo, June 10, 1797, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 209.

Merveldt to Thugut, ibid., p. 201, n. 2. Thugut td Gallo, June 10, 1797, ibid., p. 209. 168 Vide infra, chap, xxviii, §§ ic, d. 191 The instructions of Bonaparte and Clarke had recommended that the definitive treaty include a provision that Austria should not prosecute those of her inhabitants who had aided the French (May 6, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., IV, 21). m

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN, APRIL 1 8 ,

1797

777

value which the Directory placed on the deliverance of Kolloutay, a Pole imprisoned at Olmiitz. 165 And Bonaparte intervened in favor of Colombo, another revolutionist. This "new insolence" prompted Thugut to write: "What do you expect from people who loudly proclaim that they want to protect all our Jacobins, all those amongst us who desire to disturb the tranquillity of the state?" 1 6 6 In August, France's new foreign minister, Talleyrand, held out the hope that the bestowal of revolution-ridden Italian territory upon the Emperor would result in the spread of the Revolution to the German provinces of Austria. 167 Considering Bonaparte's appointment of Bernadotte as commander of Friuli, and the subsequent acts both of Bonaparte and of the Paris government which indicate favor toward a revolution in Austria, Bonaparte's failure to evacuate the Austrian provinces immediately after Leoben inevitably gives rise to suspicions that he acted thus for fear he might yet want to revolutionize them. According to Thugut, this would not have been a chimeric venture. His (nominally, the Emperor's) appeal to Paul for aid contained the words : "Public opinion, today so easy to lead astray . . . " 1 6 8 And, earlier, Thugut had said, "our Viennese Jacobins are sedulous in spreading bad news to serve as a counterweight to the pleasure the public could derive from [Austrian victories]." 1 6 9 The elements for an Austrian revolution were apparently present. It may well be that Bonaparte hesitated to forego the advantages which such a revolution would afford. 165

July i g , 1797, ibid., VII, T o Count Colloredo, July Thugut, II, 44. 167 To Dir., Aug. 14, 1797 2), same report as quoted ter, n. m , and more fully 1M

165. 30, 1797,

Briefe

188

(misdated Aug. supra, this chapinfra, chap, xxiv,

169

§ 3-

Francis II (Thugut's draft) to Paul, April 7, 1797) Briefe Thugut, II, 29. To Count Colloredo, Feb. 9, 1797, ibid., p. 15.

X

CHAPTER XXIII

Χ

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN A N D THE RISING CRISIS IN FRANCE

I.

THE QUESTION OF A CONGRESS

/ Í R T I C L E I V of the Treaty of Leoben had provided that the definiC _ / j L tive peace between France and Austria should be concluded in a congress to be held at Berne, to which the allies of both powers should be invited. T h i s peace was to be signed within three months — within three months of what, had not been specified — but before a fortnight was over, T h u g u t began to fear that the French would try to aggravate the Leoben conditions. Gallo and Merveldt therefore requested Bonaparte to commence discussion of the definitive peace forthwith in some Italian town. 1 Bonaparte agreed, but had already written to the Directory — basing his position upon Gallo's interpretation of a vague passage in T h u g u t ' s instructions of A p r i l 15 2 — that the Leoben terms could be considered merely as a first draft, and that the Rhine boundary could probably be obtained. 3 T h u s , T h u g u t ' s plan to sign the definitive peace before the French terms had increased in severity was doomed to failure from its inception. T h e Directory had at first resigned itself to the idea of a congress at Berne, although Bonaparte had run counter to the usual policy of his government w h e n he agreed to such a meeting. O n M a y 3, the Directory ordered Delacroix to invite Prussia, Hesse-Cassel, Württemberg, Baden, and the Batavian, Ligurian, and Lombard Republics to send plenipotentiaries. 4 A f e w days later, Reubell, Carnot, and L a Tourneur declared to Sandoz that 1 2

Sciout, Direc., II, 349. Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 183. Bonaparte had violated the article of the Preliminaries which concerned the disposition of Venice and the Legations, so Thugut deviated from the Preliminaries as a basis for his instructions to Gallo — but only for the purpose of securing compensa-

tory indemnity in Italy. Thugut did not intend to abandon the Leoben terms in all matters, as Gallo seemed to think (vide Sciout, Direc., II, 411). 8 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xxii, § 3. 4 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 192-193.

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

779

the Austrian government had not wanted a congress at all, but that the French had insisted upon one so that they could augment the preponderance of Prussia by means of secularization, and favor their other German friends. 5 This was of course a pure invention, as will soon appear, but the fact remains that the Directory had ratified a treaty providing for the signature of Austria's definitive peace in a congress. T h e Directory did not intend that the congress should drag along at snail's pace, as congresses are wont to do. " T h e menacing position of the army you are commanding," it wrote to Moreau on May 2, "will contribute not a little to accelerate the conclusion. . . While the negotiations last, it is essential that the ardor of the troops should not cool because of inactivity; it is not sufficient to have vanquished; one must also show the desire to vanquish." 6 T o have Berne as the site of the proposed congress was as little to the liking of the Directory as the congress itself. There were too many émigrés in Switzerland. Clarke suggested Stuttgart; ''Delacroix, Hüningen; 8 Carnot and Le Tourneur, Paris. 9 In reality, however, the government was merely casting about for a pretext to dispense with the congress altogether. This pretext was found in the above-mentioned statement of the Austrian plenipotentiaries that the Emperor desired to commence the discussion of his definitive peace forthwith in some Italian town. O n May 6, the Directory sent Bonaparte and Clarke full powers and instructions to negotiate, conclude and sign a separate, definitive peace. 10 " T h e Directory accepts with pleasure," it wrote, "the proposition made by his Imperial Majesty to open the negotiations . . . in some city of Italy without summoning the allies." 1 1 Delacroix went still farther and declared that "it is much to be wished that a congress for the peace with the Empire could likewise be avoided, or that at least the powers foreign thereto should be excluded." 1 2 T h e Emperor had no intention, however, of renouncing the congress of Berne, for "although this congress will be a mere formality as to what concerns the interests of Austria and France — which will be decided upon in advance . . . , it is indispensable in order to shield Austria from all reproach of having abandoned her allies." 1 3 T h e Imperial plenipotentiaries, it must be said, had never actually renounced the Berne congress, and it is May 7, 1797, G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355. 6 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 192. ' C l a r k e to Delacroix, April 22, 1797, ibid., p. 185. 'Delacroix to Bonaparte, May 1, 1797, Arch. A . E., Autriche 367, f. 165. "Sandoz to the King, May 7, 17, 1797, G . S. 5

Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355. Arch. Ν . , A F III 447, d. 2627. Signed by all five Directors. u Coir. inéd. Ñapo., IV, 15 et seqq. " D e l a c r o i x to Bonaparte and Clarke, May 19, 1797, ibid., p. 30. 18 Instructions of Gallo and Merveldt, May 14, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 199.

10

780

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

almost certain that Bonaparte's reports to Paris that they had done so were for the purpose of coaxing the ratification of the Leoben terms out of the Directory. 14 W h a t had really happened, according to the Austrian plenipotentiaries, was this: It was foreseen that the congress for Austria's definitive peace would be the scene of many lengthy discussions, so the plenipotentiaries of the two states, desirous of preventing the least delay in realizing the advantages of the Preliminaries, agreed to utilize the meeting which was to be held in some Italian town for the exchange of ratifications of the Preliminaries to treat separately the most urgent matters . . . and smooth out the others, which would then be definitively decreed at the congress. Never was it intended that this separate negotiation . . . should annul the holding of the congress.15

2.

T H E CONVENTION OF MONTEBELLO ( M A Y 2 4 , AND T H E QUESTION OF T H E LEFT

I797)

BANK

T h e exchange of ratifications of the Leoben Treaty took place on May 24 at Montebello, thirty-two miles south of Milan, where Bonaparte had set up his quarters in a magnificent palace and surrounded himself with a court of fawning flatterers.16 Established like a king — complete with palace and courtiers — Bonaparte proceeded to enact his role in real life. First it was Machiavelli's Prince w h o strode upon the stage, and — so the Austrians swore — tried to substitute another treaty for the Leoben Preliminaries. T h e Austrians noticed the substitution and raised a great clamor, whereupon the future Emperor, without a word, produced a correct copy. 17 Deception having failed, in a trice the actor changed his lines. N o w he was the blunt and candid monarch who knew well what he wanted and, by his sovereign will, would command it into existence. H e had pretended to the Directory that Gallo had renounced the Congress of Berne. N o w he would bring that to pass by refusing to exchange the ratifications unless G a l l o 1 8 would sign what " G u y o t , Direc., p p . 486-487. " T o Bonaparte a n d Clarke, June 28, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 144. 16 Miot de Melito w a s surprised to find Bonaparte in the midst of a brilliant "court" rather than at the headquarters of a n a r m y . Strict etiquette governed his court. T h e General n o longer dined w i t h his aidesde-camp a n d officers; to eat w i t h h i m h a d become a signal and coveted h o n o r , and was a public function w h e r e strangers could come to catch a glimpse of the great conqueror. Bonaparte's whole family was there, f r o m Uncle Fesch d o w n t h r o u g h Mother Laetitia,

Brothers Joseph a n d Louis, to Sister Pauline. His salons were attended by a glamorous array of generals, administrators, large contractors, a n d high nobility (Mém. Miot, I, 150-152). " W . M. Sloane, The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte (rev. ed.; 4 vols., N e w York, 1912), I, 438. " M e r v e l d t was absent. H e had been given the task of supervising the evacuation of the Austrian provinces by the French ( L a n g werth von S i m m e r n , Oestr. Reich fr. Rev., II, 425).

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

781

has come to be known in history as the "Convention of Montebello." 1 9 Gallo signed. In its first article, the agreement provided that the negotiation of the separate, definitive, Franco-Austrian treaty should commence the following day at Montebello, that it should be concluded and ratified by both contracting parties before the commencement of the negotiations for the peace of the Empire, and that it should be held secret and not submitted to the French legislature until the moment agreed upon by both powers. 20 Other provisions of the Montebello Convention sought to apply to the future Franco-Imperial peace the same principle of a separate negotiation which Bonaparte thought to impose regarding Austria: the negotiations for the definitive peace between France and the Empire should commence on July ι, 1797, at Rastatt 2 1 (Article II) ; no foreign power should be admitted to the latter negotiations, but the Emperor, by one of the articles of the definitive treaty, should offer his mediation for a peace between France and the Emperor's allies, said mediation to be accepted by the Republic in the same article (Article III) ; and if, within a fortnight, the Imperial plenipotentiaries should prefer that the allies of France and Austria participate in the Congress at Rastatt, each power should charge itself to invite its allies.22 Probably Bonaparte did not insist upon the separate-negotiation principle here because, separate negotiation or not, the K i n g of England would be represented as Prince of the Empire (Hanover). Judging by the "Œuvres de Sainte-Hélène," one would think that, at Montebello, Gallo renounced the Berne congress, and consented to a separate negotiation with Austria and to the opening of the Imperial negotiations only in July — all out of gratitude that Bonaparte had not contested the diplomatic primacy enjoyed by the head of the Empire since Charlemagne's time. 23 By representing Gallo's act as voluntary, Bonaparte thus sought to hide the illegality of his having exacted it. But it had been exacted to no avail. T h e Emperor refused to ratify the Convention of Montebello. T o him, a congress for his definitive peace was a sine qua non?* T h u g u t rejected at the same time a treaty project which had been submitted by Bonaparte to Gallo. This project disregarded the existence of the Preliminaries, and asked for the left bank of the Rhine; for Mantua and Brescia; and for the Adige as the boundary of the new Lombard republic. T h e Emperor was offered as indemnity Venice and the Dogado in Italy, and Salzburg and Passau in Germany. N o change was to be made on the right Guyot, Direc., p. 489. Corr. inêd. Napo., IV, 61; Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 204. 81 Delacroix had suggested Frankfort-on-the Main in his April 22 instructions to Clarke (Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. 19

20

I, 187). Corr. inéd. Napo., Corr. Napo., XXIX, 24 Thugut to Gallo, Luckwaldt, Quellen, 22

118

IV, 61. 367. June 5, 1797, HüfferPt. II, Vol. I, 206-207.

782

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

bank of the Rhine except that Prussia was to obtain a bare equivalent for Clèves, and if she demanded more, she was to be left her Cleves. 25 T h e Emperor's rejection was founded on the fact that the project failed to restore the left bank to the Empire, and Mantua to the Emperor, and did not give Austria sufficient indemnity for abandoning the Preliminaries. Moreover, the Emperor did not desire to strike a blow at the constitution of the Empire, which the acceptance of Salzburg and Passau would have done. 26 That Gallo had consented to listen to such terms — incidentally contrary to his instructions, or at least to his written instructions — does not seem to have astonished Bonaparte. T h e General had faith in the Neapolitan's stories of his great influence with the Emperor, the Empress, and Thugut. It is also true, however, that though the Imperial plenipotentiary had not shown himself irreconcilably opposed to France's acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine, 27 he had not been as conciliatory on the question as Bonaparte's demands and despatches led the Directory to believe. T h e deception was deliberate. If the government could be induced to believe that the left bank would easily be obtained by its general's efforts, it would grant him carte blanche regarding Italy — and that was where his interest really lay. 28 T h e Directory would have liked to obtain the entire left bank, but it was willing to content itself with a part in case of need. O n May 19, Delacroix suggested some possible frontiers to Bonaparte and Clarke. One was the strict Rhine boundary, but another left the three ecclesiastical electorates and most of the other left-bank ecclesiastical states to the Empire. 29 Then, twelve days later, the Directory addressed to Bonaparte an abstract of a memoir submitted by Hoche, concerning the eastern limits of France in case the Rhine were not obtained. T h e suggested frontier, already mentioned, 30 ran from Worms to Trêves, then jumped to the Roër, and followed this river, the Meuse, and the Rhine to the North Sea. In its winding course, it managed to include several of the important cities of the left bank. It gave France the plains of the Palatinate, the defiles of the Vosges, and the valleys of the Lautern and Moselle, thus assuring the Republic of a strong offensive and defensive position. According to this plan, the Saar and Blise Rivers were to belong to France for their entire courses. Hoche emphasized that both these streams Langwerth von Simmern, Oestr. Reich jr. Rev., II, 429. 28 Sciout, Direc., II, 413. T h e Emperor preferred not to be compensated in Germany. On May 6, the Directors indicated that they too preferred that he not be, but for a reason litde to be expected from those constantly pleading for Prussia's alliance: the K i n g of Prussia would want to receive an

25

amount of German territory equal to what the Emperor got (Instructions for Bonaparte and Clarke, May 6, 1797, Corr. inéd., Napo., IV, 1 7 ) . " Clarke to Delacroix, June 3, 1797, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 204. 28 Guyot, Direc., pp. 490-491. 28 Corr. inéd. Napo., IV, 32-33. 80 Supra, Pt. II, chap, xxii, § 3.

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

783

were navigable, and that their banks boasted of great forests and thriving manufactories. The Meuse and Moselle, he said, were susceptible of union by utilizing the Roër and Dyle(?) Rivers, permitting an increase in markets and enabling France to dispense with having to ask its neighbors for transit privileges.31 Wrote the Directory, "The plan of these frontiers appeared judicious to us, . . . and worthy of consideration by the plenipotentiaries of the Republic." 32 This was substantially the frontier agreed upon in the definitive treaty.

3.

THE NEW MODERATE MAJORITY IN THE COUNCILS

33

The willingness of the Directory to agree to such a great reduction in the size of its projected portion requires explanation — an explanation to be found in the internal political situation in France. It will be recalled that, according to the Constitution, one third of the legislature was to be renewed annually.34 On May 20, 1797, the newly elected "second third" — the original new third had been selected in October 1795 as complement to the two thirds holding over from the Convention — took their seats in the two Councils. Almost all of them weary of corruption and violence and war, they formed, with the conservatives already in office, a preponderant majority in favor of moderation and retrenchment at home, and peace abroad. T o secure peace, they were willing even to renounce the conquests which had embittered Europe against the Republic. Theirs was the party of the anciennes limites.35 The unbalanced idealists and unassorted knaves, in the Directory and without, had long viewed with consternation the growing triumph of the conservative element of the population. They had contemplated the imposition of restrictions upon the franchise. They had discussed the immediate retirement of one of the Directors so that the expiring legislature, with its two thirds of former Conventionais, could choose his successor.36 And after the elections of April 9, 1797 had turned out against them, they had toyed with a plan to prevent the new legislators from taking their seats. Had Barras and Reubell been sure thus early of the support of the armies, and especially of the victorious leader of the Army of Italy, the coup d'état of Fructidor would probably be known to history as the coup d'état of Floréal. As it was, the radicals on the Directory had to bide their time, and when the lot fell on Le Tourneur to retire 37 — assuming that it did "fall" on him, and Corr. inéd. Napo., IV, 35-40. The memoir is dated May 20, 1797. "Ibid., p. 35. The Directory's letter is dated May 31, 1797. 33 The general authority for this section is Sciout, Direc., II, chap x, § 1; chap, xi, § 2, 31

and pp. 564-565. Art. 53 (Duguit and Monnier, Const, et lois, p. 87). 80 Sorel, Europe, V , 170. M Dupre, Carnot, p. 235. 37 As per Art. 137 of the Constitution (Duguit 34

784

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

was not "pushed" by Barras, as was suspected 38 — they had to swallow their revolutionary pride and accept into their midst the mild-mannered career diplomat Barthélémy. T h e ex-Ambassador to Switzerland was completely out of touch with French politics, owing to his inherent gentleness and his long residence abroad. Sandoz reported that he (Barthélémy) was entirely opposed to the annexation of the left bank. " H e maintains that to wish to aggrandize the Republic in this manner solely to counterbalance the power of Russia is an intolerable political absurdity; it would do nothing but obstruct the peace and render it precarious, and [France would] lose all influence in Germany." 3 9 In his inaugural address, the new Director spoke of his ardent desire for a general pacification, knowing full well that he spoke for a majority in the Councils as well. But the Constitution of the Year III had allocated the control of foreign affairs to the Directory, which meant, in practice, to the standing majority of the Directors: Reubell, Barras, and Revellière-Lépeaux — especially Reubell. W i t h manifest contempt, the Directory determined to disregard the wishes of the Councils, and make known its most far-reaching decisions only after they had been carried into execution. N o matter that sometimes these decisions involved virtual acts of war, the declaration of which the Constitution reserved to the Councils. T h e ruling Directors seemed to regard themselves as the old Committee of Public Safety, and the Councils as the rubber-stamp Convention. Let the lawyers grumble, they reasoned. W e control the army and police! But the lawyers did more than grumble. Realizing that the key to effective supervision of the turbulent executive arm of the government lay in the control of the purse, their first step was to investigate the finances. They found an Augean stable of shameless corruption, and determined to clean it out. Bailleul, apologist of the Directory, unable to deny the maze of corrupt transactions, tried to shift the blame to the legislature. T h e Directory needed money to force the enemy to conclude an honorable peace, he said, and the legislators had consistently refused to provide the necessary funds. Gibert des Molieres of the Five Hundred countered with a little true story : Fifteen to eighteen months before, the Directory had asked the Finance Committee for 100,000,000 francs in mandats. Gibert and his colleague had refused, for the Constitution provided that appropriations should be made to the ministers, not to the Directory. One of the Directors had then appeared personally before the Finance Committee, and confided, " Y o u do not know and Monnier, Const, et lois, p. 95). " M a d e l i n , Fr. Rev., p. 524.

" " T o the King, June 10, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 130.

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

785

that with the 100,000,000 . . . we would buy silks, with silks we would buy coin, and with coin we would have peace." Anxious to do nothing which might retard the making of peace, Gibert and his colleague induced the Council to place the sum requested at the disposal of the Directory. But it soon became evident that the Director had lied, that this was merely another Directorial scheme for raising money without having to account to the legislature for its application. A n d doubtless it was an exceptionally clever scheme, for it would have placed in a very unfavorable light anyone who had rejected the plea — a plea for peace. But when peace was not forthcoming, Gibert protested to the Directory. That body replied that peace was impossible, for it would mean a return of the troops 40 and France was too exhausted to support them. Make peace, Gibert and his colleague responded, and we will find means to feed the troops till they are disbanded. However, the Directory was not seeking peace, but only a pretext to continue a system in which the finances of the state could be plundered at will. T h e game of "Milkman, Milk the C o w " was played in France as follows : W h e n flour was selling at 11 livres per hundredweight, one of the Directory's ministers bought for the armed forces 60,000 cwt. at 21 livres each. T h e minister turned over 1,260,000 livres in bills of exchange as payment, but received back 420,000 livres in coin in return for a reduction of the amount of flour required to 40,000 cwt. N o w , for 40,000 cwt., the selling company should have received only 440,000 livres, but actually it received 840,000. Gain to the company (besides legitimate profit): 400,000 livres; gain to the minister: 420,000 livres; gain to Mephistopheles: one minister. W i t h such subterfuges and embezzlements creating huge voids in the financial structure of the state, there was no money to pay the army. Of course, while the war continued, the troops were quartered in enemy country, and it was the policy of the Republic that they should receive their food and pay from requisitions and contributions levied there. But in the Rhineland, the expenses of administration were so exorbitant that they exceeded what was drawn from the region. 41 T o increase the contribution only increased the amount wasted or embezzled, and benefited the troops not at all. Money, therefore, had to be sent from France to pay the ill-fed, illclothed troops. But this money often failed to arrive because, as mentioned, all the embezzlers were not in the Rhineland. Here was a rare opportunity for the Directory to make political capital, so it informed the troops that they were not receiving their wages because the Council of Five Hundred had allocated all available funds to the payment of legislators' salaries. This naturally turned the army against the Councils, as contemplated. 40

This episode has already been mentioned supra, Pt. II, chap, ii, § 2.

" H o c h e to Intermed. Commis., March 1797, Hansen, Quellen, III, 909.

16,

786

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

A l a w passed by the Councils on July 26, 1797, curbed the p o w e r of the Directory in financial matters. A n d in an endeavor to undo the effects of the Directory's anti-Council propaganda a m o n g the armies, this same law provided that the subsistence and wages of the troops were to constitute a first lien upon the treasury. T h e L a w of July 26 filled the revolutionists w i t h consternation, but their cup of bitterness was not yet filled. O n A u g u s t 14, the laws sequestering the property of relatives of émigrés were abrogated. O n the twenty-fourth, the same fate was meted out to the laws proscribing the n o n j u r i n g clergy. It was generally expected that the next step w o u l d be the adaptation to M o n a r c h y of the Constitution of the Y e a r III. In sooth, some very real royalist conspiracies were hatching, and they involved not only General Pichegru, President of the C o u n c i l of F i v e H u n d r e d , but — in all probability — General M o r e a u as well. 4 2 T h e sands of revolution were fast r u n n i n g out, and w h a t w a s more, the foreign enemy was eying events with altogether too m u c h interest.

4.

MALMESBURY

AT LILLE —

AND THE

CONGRESS!

T h e E n g l i s h did not really blame the Austrians for entering into a separate negotiation w i t h France. T h e possibility of such a negotiation had been seriously considered in Grenville's instructions of A p r i l 11 to E d e n , and the surrender of some of England's conquests on the sea was therein contemplated to render easier the lot of George's defeated ally. 4 3 O n the eighteenth, the very day the Preliminaries were signed, Grenville w e n t even farther and offered to surrender all England's conquests save the Cape and Ceylon. 4 4 2

Concerning his retreat to the left bank after the defeat at Altenkirchen (campaign of 1796), Moreau remained later: "Without that little handful of émigrés, the Austrian army would have been upon m e " (Bittard des Portes, Hist, armée Condé, Introduction, p. vi). This may not indicate intelligence between Moreau and Condé, but it does cause at least one eyebrow to be raised. The other will no doubt undergo considerable agitation when it becomes known that Mathieu Dumas of the Council of Ancients wrote to Moreau on August 4, 1797: "General Pichegru, with whom we are perfectly in accord, has charged me to render you a thousand compliments" ( V . Pierre, 18 Fructidor [Paris, 1893], p. 38). Four months before (April 2 1 ) , Moreau had captured the luggage of the Austrian general Klinglin, and found therein letters which — though in code and with fictitious names — revealed the clandestine relations between

Pichegru and Condé. Moreau had not hastened to inform Paris. In fact, it was only on September 27, three weeks after the Fructidorian coup d'état, that he sent in the damning evidence ( H . von Zeissberg, Pichegru und Condé in den Jahren 17g5 und 17Φ [Vienna, 1898], pp. 1—2). On September 2 — two days before the coup d'etat — T h u g u t reported that Moreau was a moderate, and suggested an attempt to negotiate with him, and perhaps to secure his concurrence in case the war were resumed (Thugut to Count Colloredo, Briefe Thugut, II, 5 2 - 5 4 ) . 48 P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. " T o Eden and Hammond, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. Hammond had been sent to Vienna as special negotiator with power to conclude peace with France either in a congress, or separately — but simultaneously with Austria. He did not reach Vienna until April 30 (Guyot, Direc., pp. 3 7 5 - 3 7 6 ) .

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

787

Then came news that the Treaty was signed, and Eden eagerly awaited information as to how Britain's unfortunate ally had fared; but Thugut declared that he could not transmit the terms without an express order from the Emperor, as a provision for profound secrecy had been embodied in the Treaty. 45 However, Thugut added, "the whole transaction bore such earmarks of ignorance and inconsiderateness, and was altogether so confused and in many parts so unintelligible, and must meet with so many difficulties in being consolidated into a regular treaty that he was inclined to suppose that it might never arrive at that point of maturity — That he had sent for M. Gallo to explain what he [Gallo] had done. . ." 46 Grenville deduced from Thugut's reticence that conditions unfavorable to England had been agreed upon, or that perhaps, even, a Franco-Austrian alliance had been concluded; 47 and he decided that to safeguard the interests of England, it was necessary to commence immediately a separate negotiation with France. 48 At first it was intended that only a preliminary treaty should be signed, to be changed into a definitive treaty at the general congress which was expected to follow the war. 49 However, the hostile manner in which Thugut finally communicated the terms ^ T h u g u t permitted Eden to make a summary of the secret articles, but not to copy them, 50 and did not express his desire that the Anglo-Austrian concert should continue 5 1 — coupled with Starhemberg's insistence to Grenville that Thugut was playing a role, that he was only pretending to be angry with Gallo but really found the Preliminaries quite acceptable,62 induced Grenville to drop the requirement of a congress entirely. 53 Eden to Grenville, April 22, 1797, Hiiffer, Politik. Mächte, Beilage V (p. 2 4 1 ) . Why the profound secrecy, Thugut was a bit pressed to explain to Eden. At first he said that Bonaparte wished to keep the articles secret "since their disclosure would bring on numerous representations from many princes of the Empire who had promises of being compensated for . . . losses, or . . . subserviency to . . . France" (idem, April 22, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49). But he had to abandon this story when Eden pointed out that all the German states knew that the Leoben Treaty guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Empire because of a circular letter to that effect sent around by the Emperor (idem, May 3, ibid.). "Idem, April 22, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. " Louis Starhemberg to Thugut, May 16, 1797, H . H. S. Arch., England 183. 18 Grenville to Starhemberg, June 2, 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, 327. "A little con-

45

fidence on the part of your government would perhaps have authorized us to await the invitation to a Congress. Perhaps it was preferred at Vienna to force us to do what we have done. Perhaps one does not care at all about it" (idem, ibid.). "Grenville to Eden, June 2, 1797, P. R. O., F. O., 7/49· 60 June 5, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. 51 Grenville to Eden, July 23, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/50. 52 Starhemberg to Grenville, June 3, 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, 328: "Do not believe that Thugut is a stranger to all what is happening. Count upon the word of your friend, this minister finds the peace honorable. Gallo has been only an ignorant and intriguing instrument. . . That infamous Archduke made the peace. Thugut is not at bottom angry, but he pretends so to be. . ." "Grenville to Eden, June 30, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/50.

788

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

When, on June 17, the Imperial plenipotentiaries (Merveldt had been sent back to Italy to stiffen and watch the too-accommodating Gallo) 64 insisted to Bonaparte on a congress to which Austria's allies should be called, the French general replied that England was already negotiating for herself separately at Lille. 65 It was not true at that date, but the preliminary steps had already been taken, and on July 3 the British negotiator, Lord Malmesbury, landed once more in France. 66 T h e French negotiators — L e Tourneur (until recently, Director), Pléville le Pelley (the admiral, presently minister of marine), and Maret (the ex-prisoner of Austria) 57 — were already at Lille, 68 but the conferences did not begin until July 6.59 It was agreed that the peace should be a definitive one, and should include the allies of both powers. 60 For France, this meant Spain and the Batavian Republic. England, no longer sure of Austria's position, claimed as her ally only Portugal. L e Tourneur commenced by stipulating that no proposals should contradict the Constitution, laws, and treaties of France. 61 These were the selfsame shoals upon which had been wrecked the first Malmesbury conference, but Malmesbury courageously accepted the French stipulation except as concerned secret articles — "and to this point they all nodded consent." 62 T h e British negotiator pointed out right from the start that Britain had conquered much territory and expected to keep some of it to balance the acquisitions of the other great powers in Europe. 63 H e suggested that since the peace was to include the allies of each power, the possessions of each and its allies should be lumped together as a unit, and adjustments made on that basis.64 O n request, Malmesbury presented a project of treaty. H e readily crossed out exchanges at the expense of France, but maintained those at the " A n d Louis Cobenzl, Thugut's "presumptive successor," had been summoned from St. Petersburg, for he was a capable negotiator — which Gallo had proved he was not (Langwerth von Simmern, Oestr. Reich jr. Rev., II, 430). Regarding Merveldt's reappearance in the negotiations, Bonaparte complained to the Emperor on July 23, "Everything went well until Count von Merveldt came to Montebello" (Corr. Napo., Ill, 270). After the definitive peace with Austria was finally signed, Bonaparte ordered an expensive piece of jewelry made for Gallo, to show his appreciation of the Neapolitan's conciliatory attitude. But Gallo never received his jewel (worth about 100,000 francs), for it was sold to Genoa in April 1798, to help pay the cost of the Egyptian expedition (Bonaparte to Belleville, April

2, 1798, Dry, Soldats ambas., II, 102, η. 3)· Judging by a letter from Bonaparte to Talleyrand, the jewel seems to have been in the form of olive branches set with diamonds (Aug. 16, 1797, Corr. Napo., Ill, 315)· Eden to Grenville, June 27, 1797, P. R. O., F. O., 7/50. Bonaparte added with distinctly less accuracy that Austria's other ally, Russia, was also negotiating a separate peace — at Copenhagen (idem, ibid.). M Diar. Corr. Malmesbury, III, 376. E7 Ibid., p. 37758 Ibid., pp. 375-376. 58 Ibid., pp. 380-381. "Ibid., p. 373. β Ibid., p. 382. "Ibid., pp. 382-383. 85

Ibid. MIbid.,

p. 384.

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

789

expense of Spain and of the United Netherlands. 65 H e heard no protests from the French plenipotentiaries, yet respect for France's treaties should have included respect for the Franco-Spanish treaty of alliance in whose patent articles a mutual guarantee of territorial integrity was contained. 66 T h e guarantee of the Batavian Republic's possessions was in the secret articles of the Franco-Batavian treaty, 67 hence Malmesbury had not bound himself with respect to them. W h e n the Directory learned of Malmesbury's proposals, it decreed that a sine qua non of the negotiation was the return of all conquests. 68 This decree marks the real death of the Lille conferences (July 15, 1797), though they lived on — like a zombie, without intelligent purpose — for two months more. 69 Nabonne details what went on during these two months. Maret, through a Lille postal inspector, Pein; and Talleyrand, through Pierre Lagarde, future "policeman" of Bonaparte, struck up a lucrative trade with Malmesbury: France's diplomatic secrets for cash on the barrel. From the documents purchased, Malmesbury concluded that those in charge of French policy would sell out their allies, or desert them gratis, for the sake of peace for France. Only Reubell was unyielding. H e regarded the friendship of Holland as part of his plan for the left bank. But Malmesbury was given to understand that Carnot and Barthélémy would take care of .Reubell, with the help of General Pichegru. A l l Malmesbury had to do was wait. A n d he was still waiting on 18 fructidor. Then, however, the expected coup was effected in reverse, and it soon proved to be the coup de grâce of the conferences. 70 T h e importance of the Lille Conference to the German policy of France lies in its effect upon the simultaneous Franco-Austrian negotiations. While the Lille conferences continued, there was an unknown quantity in the equation — a variable. Each French or Austrian proposition had to be 66Ibid.,

pp. 384-385. Guyot, Direc., p. 416. 67 Diar. Corr. Malmesbury, III, 402. 68 Ibid., pp. 405-406. "Prophetic were the words of the Earl of Carlisle: "If war is necessary for the Directory, and they see an end to their power without it, we shall make no peace with them, but with those armies hereafter, into whose hands they must consign themselves" (to W . Huskisson [Member of Parliament], Aug. 19, 1797, L. Melville [pseud, for L. S. Benjamin] [ed.], The Huskisson Papers [London, 1931], p. 29). In his Mémoires, Talleyrand declares that the British overture was not sincere, and that Malmesbury had to simulate a negotiation 88

to escape embarrassment (I, 256). '"Nabonne, Inéd. Reubell, pp. 56-61. It seems that an American, Thomas Melville (uncle of our famous novelist Herman Melville), also had a hand in the highfinance aspects of the Malmesbury conferenee. For undisclosed French principals, he offered to sell England favorable terms — for ¿450,000, or about 11,000,000 francs, Pitt was disposed to pay. England needed peace so desperately, and the money could be routed from India around Parliament. Probably it was the coup d'état which wrote finis also to this aspect of the "negotiations" (vide R. R. Palmer, "Herman Melville et la Revolution Française," in AHRF, X X V I [1954], 254).

790

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

weighed from two points of view: ( i ) if the Lille parleys should succeed, and (2) if they should not. Obviously, the French position was weakened while there was yet a possibility that England would join Austria again if the French tried to drive too hard a bargain. And, conversely, the Austrian position was strengthened by each seeming impasse in the Lille negotiations. Then there was the apparently perennial question of a congress for Austria's definitive peace. This was proving to be one of the great hurdles of the Franco-Austrian negotiations. 71 T o what extent was it influenced by the Lille conferences? Clarke expected the Lille negotiation to banish the Emperor's demand for a congress, 72 and it seems reasonable that it should have — or that it should at least have lessened his insistence. But it did not. T h e Emperor would have a congress whether his allies would or no. His honor was at stake. A n d then he may have thought that if the French knew a congress was coming, where England and especially Russia would be represented, even though the congress were not to touch the already-decided Franco-Austrian arrangements, there would be less likelihood that the French would try to impose onerous conditions. They would realize that Russia might whisper, "Those terms are too hard on you, my friend. Let's tear them up and write another treaty with the sword." They would realize that England might forgive and forget Austria's lapse, and prove once more that the Anglo-Saxons had a heart of gold. England had shown herself willing to treat Austria with consideration even after Leoben, realizing that concerted action was then more necessary than ever "to prevent the revolutionary principles from becoming the public law of Europe." 7 3 But England did not intend to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Austria. "If the Court of Vienna suffers from this separation of interest and conduct, it has only itself to thank for it," wrote Grenville to Malmesbury; and he added shrewdly, with reference to Austria's insistence on a congress: "Some good may perhaps result to our Negotiation from any rub which that Negotiation experiences." 7 4 T h e war of words over a congress placed the Directory in an uncomfortable position. It disliked the idea of a congress to the point where it might even have been willing to resume the fighting on that account alone; but it feared the French people. Bonaparte had been ordered, already a fortnight before Malmesbury's arrival, to inform the Austrians that the Directory "intends" to treat separately, that it "will not suffer itself to be made sport of," and that if the war should be resumed, a manifesto would expose Austria's "perfidy." It was on this very point, it will be recalled, that Poteratz' negotiations with Thugut had broken down in January 1796 (vide supra Pt. II, chap, ill, § i ) . " C l a r k e to Talleyrand, July 20, 1797, Pallain, 71

Min. Talleyrand, p. 73. Grenville to Woronzow, May 5, 1797, Dropmore Papers III, 320. " J u l y 13, 1797, Diar. Corr. Malmesbury, III, 395· 73

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

79I

Bonaparte should prepare to fight, but should not violate the Armistice until ordered to do so, for "the Directory attaches the greatest interest to the nonrecommencement of hostilities, considering the effect . . . [it would have] on the interior of France." 7 5 According to Barras' memoirs, Bonaparte was not to commit a hostile act even if the Emperor broke off the negotiations. 76 O n June 19, the Austrian plenipotentiaries renewed their demand for a congress, or, rather, for two congresses. They said the Emperor would not yield the point. 77 Bonaparte and Clarke asked them if they wanted to recommence the war now that France had evacuated five Austrian provinces. T h e French plenipotentiaries pointed out that the despoiling of a third state (Venice) was not a fitting subject for a public congress attended by inter•ested powers. T h e point was raised, also, that if Austria called in her allies, she would not be concluding the separate peace to which she had agreed. A n d then Bonaparte and Clarke played what they must have regarded as a very clever hand. First, they demanded in virtue of what power it was that Gallo and Mer veldt wrote the note of June 19 insisting on two congresses,78 inasmuch as the Austrian plenipotentiaries had always maintained that they possessed no new powers, but only those they had when they signed the Leoben Treaty. Merveldt's stand was that the Emperor, determined upon the execution of the Preliminaries, saw no reason to grant his plenipotentiaries other powers than those which sufficed at Leoben. 79 Bonaparte and Clarke drafted a note to Gallo and Merveldt demanding that the latter obtain new and additional powers, but this note was never sent.80 Instead, a stronger approach was decided on. Bonaparte and Clarke wrote to Gallo and Merveldt that since Austria insisted upon adhering to the letter of the Leoben Preliminaries, they (Bonaparte and Clarke) would insist in their turn that the definitive treaty should be signed within the three months' period stipulated by Article I V of that instrument. This three months would end, according to them, on July 18, and if nothing had been signed by that date, Austria would lose her rights ;r 'June

14, 1797, Arch. A. E., M. et D., Autriche 8, f. 182. Thugut wrote to Louis Cobenzl on June 12 that a dedaration that the Emperor is resolved to fulfill the Leoben terms religiously and expects the same of France "would perhaps be the surest way to baffle the artifices of the French plenipotentiaries and to embarrass the Directory, which, in the face of the very pronounced desire of the majority of the inhabitants of France for the acceleration of peace, would probably find it repugnant to expose itself to general disapprobation . . . by an act

of bad faith as evident as the refusal to execute clear engagements made in due form and recently ratified" (Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 218). 78 Mem. Barras, II, 436-437. 77 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 220. 78 June 20, 1797, Corr. inéd. Ñapo., IV, 62. 78 Clarke to Delacroix, June 23, 1797, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 224. 80 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 221, η. ι .

792

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

to the promised aggrandizement in the Terraferma of Venice. 81 A few days later, the French plenipotentiaries added an inducement to the threat: If Gallo and Merveldt desisted from their demands for a congress for Austria's definitive peace, the French would "grant Austria immediate possession of all the territories destined for her by the separate article, which acquisitions, if delayed, might, . . . [Bonaparte] said, be resisted by other powers." 8 2 In view of the fact that Prussia had offered, toward the end of 1796, to guarantee Venice's integrity against France and Austria, 83 the French offer was not meaningless, though the instructions of Gallo and Merveldt had required possession immediately after the exchange of ratifications of the Preliminaries. 84 T h e Austrian reply was twofold. Gallo and Merveldt announced that if France renounced her Loeben pledge, so would the Emperor. 85 A n d they riddled the logic and accuracy of the French position. They pointed out that nowhere in the Preliminaries did it say that the definitive Franco-Austrian peace was to be concluded, at the latest, three months from the signature of the Preliminaries. T h a t treaty said only (Article I V ) that France and Austria would send plenipotentiaries to Berne, to conclude a definitive treaty within three months. Thus, the three months would start when the delegates assembled at Berne. W e r e the French interpretation correct, since the congress would logically assemble only after the exchange of ratifications of the Preliminaries, and one month was allowed for this in the Treaty, the three months of Article I V would automatically become two. A n d since both powers were entitled to call their allies, and it required time to send couriers to St. Petersburg, London, and Madrid; and more time yet for these capitals to draw up instructions for their delegates; and still more time for those delegates to journey to Berne, it followed that the three months would be consumed before the congress opened. 86 But it is the glory of some persons that "even though beaten, they can argue still." Bonaparte was one of these, and he was backed up in his stand by Paris. 87 It seemed to be an impasse. June 21, 1797, ibid., pp. 221-223. the minutes of the meeting of July 18, w e shall find Clarke still urging Gallo and Merveldt to ask for new powers (Corr. inêd. Napo., VII, 1 5 6 - 1 5 7 ) . 82 Eden to Grenville, June 27, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/50. Art. VI of the Preliminaries guaranteed possession of the promised indemnity only at the definitive peace (vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xxii, § 2). 83 Sciout, Direc., II, 146. It is amusing to consider that as late as April 10, 1797, Austria 81

offered her alliance to Venice (Sybel, Europe, IV, 481). Less than a week later, she was planning with a coconspirator to dismember her near-ally. 84 May 14, 1797, Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 199. 85 T o the French plenipos., June 28, 1797, Corr. inêd. Napo., VII, 146-147. 86Idem, July 18, 1797, ibid., pp. 158-159. " T a l l e y r a n d to Bonaparte, A u g . 5, 1797, ibid., pp. 2 1 1 - 2 1 5 .

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

793

Bonaparte finally decided that the only way to press matters to a conclusion was to send Clarke to Vienna to denounce Thugut as a traitor — not only because of his past relations with France, but because of his present (suspected) relations with England. 8 8 Gallo appears to have favored the plan. 89 Thugut, of course, would not let Clarke come to the Austrian capital. Merveldt had suggested already in June that Bonaparte and Clarke should be invited to negotiate in Vienna, but the Austrian helmsman had rejected the idea with force, objecting especially to the rumors and popular unrest that would result. 90 Gallo did obtain Thugut's consent, however, to transfer the seat of the conferences to Udine, some twenty-five miles north of Aquileia, so that communication with Vienna should not involve such long delays. 91 Merveldt and Gallo thereupon repaired to Udine, where they were soon joined by Clarke. Bonaparte, however, did not arrive. H e utilized the needs of his Cisalpine creation as a pretext to remain in Lombardy. 9 2 H e did not want the Austrians to procrastinate, but, in the last analysis, he was no more anxious for a prompt settlement than were they. T h e General in Chief bared his thoughts to the Directory's new ambassador to Turin (Miot de Melito) : It is not at all my intention to put an end to Austria so promptly. Peace is not in my interest.93 You see what I am, what I am able to do now in Italy. If peace were made, I should no longer be at the head of the army that I have attached to myself. I should have to renounce this power, this high position which I have attained, and go to woo the lawyers in the Luxembourg. I should want to leave Italy only to play in France a role much the same as I am playing here, and the time for that has not yet come. The pear is not ripe. . . There is no accord at Paris. A party favoring the Bourbons is raising its head. . , 94 T h e Emperor, also, was trying to draw matters out without concluding anything, and it was because of this same "party favoring the Bourbons." If it should triumph, the negotiations would take an entirely different turn. Bonaparte understood, but he abstained from strong measures for fear of being disavowed by the nervous Directory. 88

Guyot, Direc., p. 503. Clarke's "Compte rendu," Arch. A. E., M. et D., Autriche 8, £. 275. Vide infra, chap, xxviii, n. 2, re Clarke's "Compte rendu." " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, June 26, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 40. " T h u g u t to Merveldt, July 7, 1797, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 250. ea Sciout, Direc., II, 472-473. 88

83

Accord: Mém. Bourrienne, I, 179: "Bonaparte was, at this time, anything but disposed to peace, which he still hoped to sign at Vienna after a German campaign seconded by the Armies of the Rhine (and Moselle?), and of the Sambre and Meuse." M Mém. Miot, I, 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 . Though ostensibly quoted by Miot, the wording is probably not Bonaparte's at all, but Miot's own.

794

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

5·

T H E M O D E R A T E S LOSE T H E

FIRST

ROUND95

T h e internal crisis in France was, during the month of July, marching with great strides toward its denouement. A n d advancing to meet it was a diabolically clever plot hatched by the scum which the Revolution had thrust to the surface of the seething cauldron. Usually scum rises only to be cast off; in France it rose to form the head, or heads — for this monster was what is known as a Triumvirate. A n d its body was composed of an ignoble noble, a lawless lawyer, and an unsavory savant. T h e Triumvirs did not wait for the opposition to crystallize before taking countermeasures, but they had to step warily, for the revolutionary expedients they contemplated would certainly embolden the anarchistic element which would, of necessity, be their ally in any coup d'état. T h e ground was prepared by the Circle of Salm, a club originally formed by the abbé Sieyes to combat the moderate Club of Clichy. T h e leading lights of Salm were a group of philosophers of the vintage of 1789: Mme. de Staël, daughter of Necker and wife of the Swedish ambassador; her current lover, the brilliant Benjamin Constant; and her lame 9 6 ex-lover and debtor, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, former Bishop of Autun. 9 7 T h e parent club encouraged the formation of similar bodies throughout France, and soon the country was seething with denunciation of the Councils and of their attitude toward the Austrians, royalists, and priests — as though all were one. 98 T h e next step was to put "safe men" in all key positions. Bénézech, the minister of the interior; Cochon, the minister of police; and Petiet, the minister of war, were on too friendly terms with the Councils, and their removal was a measure of prime necessity. But this removal had to be General authority for this section : Sciout, Direc., II, 573-584; Sorel, Bon. et Hoche, pp. 286-287, 291-292. 96 Lord Holland (ed.), Foreign Reminiscences by Richard Henry, Lord Holland ( N e w York, 1 8 5 1 ) , p. 33. " I t has been the custom to "poke f u n " at Talleyrand's holy orders because he was so unscrupulous. But his family may have forced him into holy orders on account of his lameness {ibid.). Originally destined for the army, Talleyrand, when a child of four, had been allowed to fall from a commode by a woman in whose care he had been placed. He dislocated his foot, and she did not divulge the accident for months. A t least, this is how Talleyrand explains his affliction (Mem., I, 7; vide also Mem. 9j

Barère, IV, 365, and last paragraph of no. 163, Bibliographical Essay, infra). M Sandoz reported on June 22, 1797, as follows: "In the proportion that the Council of Five Hundred devotes itself to withdrawing from the Executive Directory the nomination to administrative offices, the superintendence of the national treasury, [and] the surveillance of the departmental ministers [by exacting their responsibility], . . . so does the Executive Directory have recourse to all the means in its power to fortify its existence . . . : the revival of clubs and popular associations, and . . . [the fomenting], under color of consolidation of the Republic, of the factions which augment and stir up discord" (to the King, Bailleu, Pr. Fr%„ I, 132).

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

795

brought about in a way which would attract the minimum of attention. It was the Councils themselves which enabled the Triumvirs to effect this aim. Barras was for sale. Everyone knew Barras was for sale. The moderates conceived the brilliant idea that it might be possible to bribe Barras to commit a worthy act. They wished him to propose, in the course of a meeting of the Directory, that a certain four ministers obnoxious to the Councils should be dismissed. These ministers were Ramel, of finance; Merlin," of justice; Truguet, of the marine; and Delacroix, of foreign affairs. Delacroix, especially, was objectionable to the legislators.100 It was not only his incapacity: he had forgotten (!) to give copies of France's secret treaties to the delegation negotiating with England at Lille. 101 It was not only his mistaken judgment: by crushing the weak states of Europe and imposing on them humiliating terms of peace, he had created for the Republic so many irreconcilable enemies.102 But Delacroix lacked the tact necessary to a successful minister of foreign affairs. He was too arrogant toward the powers of Europe, and the peace-yearning moderates suspected he was trying to prolong the war. However, the moderates had not paid "cash on the barrel" — the only language Barras understood — hence his promise to cooperate "on my faith as a republican gentleman" was not to be trusted. Unsuspicious, the moderates told Carnot he would be sustained by the ex-noble if he (Carnot) suggested in the Directory the dismissal of the four ministers. On July 16, Carnot duly made the proposal, mentioning the wishes of the legislature as his reason. Irked, Reubell pointed out that the selection and dismissal of ministers was constitutionally the affair only of the Directory, 103 but declared his willingness to put to a vote the continuance in office of all the ministers. Revellière seconded the motion, and to the consternation of Carnot and Barthélémy, Barras concurred with the fire-eaters. The ministers favorable to the moderates were dismissed by three votes to two, and the objectionable ones were retained — all except Truguet of the " T h i s was Merlin of Douai. 100 Rumors of Delacroix's impending replacement were of course rife. One of these was to the effect that "a wretch named Poter a t [ z ] " was to be substituted for him. "His nomination is a matter of finance. He has promised 200,000 francs to Mme. Reubell [Delacroix's friend, be it remembered] and to Barras' mistress" (May 3, 1797, Mém. corr. Mallet du Pan, II, 273-274). 1 0 1 Guyot, Direc., p. 414. 102 Sandoz to the King, Sept. 30, 1796, BaiJleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 90. Of course he was usually but Reubell's instrument. l o s This was true. The Constitution did not provide that the ministers should be pleas-

ing to the Councils, but as Carnot mentioned at the time, one had to agree, even without recognizing the right of the Councils to be pleased, that good government required harmony between the legislature and the ministers (Sorel, Bon. et Hoche, p. 152). The importance of this matter to the German policy of the Directory is patent, Baldly, it was a question whether the radical Directory or the moderate Five Hundred should control the minister of foreign affairs. It is noteworthy, also, that the events of this day increased the personal hatred between Barras and Carnot, "the deceiver and the deceived" (Sybel, Europe, V , 78).

796

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

marine and Delacroix of foreign affairs. These two were sacrificed, mostly for the sake of appearances : to befuddle the moderates, and conceal the true nature and significance of the changes.104 Delacroix was succeeded by Talleyrand,105 a "man to whom one could safely accord anything except his confidence." 106 The highly colored account in Barras' Mémoires,107 according to which Mme. de Staël procured the appointment of Talleyrand by • importuning Barras until he yielded merely to be rid of her, is apocryphal. Talleyrand's appointment, as indicated above, was part of a general housedirtying operation. (It could hardly be called housecleaning.) 108 Mme. de Staël's influence entered into the whole operation through her coleadership in the Circle of Salm. With one exception, all the new ministers were members of the Circle.109 General Hoche was named minister of war. N o matter that the General was one year below the required age of thirty. He was hostile to the moderates. That was enough. Truly the reasons for his hostility did not coincide entirely with those of the Triumvirs. Though Hoche, as they, saw in the 104

Barthélémy says in his memoirs that he felt an urge to join his resignation to those of the cashiered ministers, and would have done so had it not required greater courage to remain than to resign (Mém. Barthélémy, p. 226).

105

According to a passport Talleyrand received at Hamburg when returning from America in 1796, the new minister was "5 feet 5 inches in height, had fair hair and eyebrows, blue eyes, high forehead, medium nose, ordinary mouth, full face, and round chin" (quoted in G. Lacour-Gayet, Talleyrand, 1754-1838 [4 vols., Paris, 19301934], IV, 50). Talleyrand had come to America from England, whither he had been sent on a diplomatic mission early in 1792 (vide supra, Pt. I, chap, iv, § 21). The British had eventually expelled him, but Talleyrand could not return to France because he had meanwhile been declared an émigré. Also, he hoped to recoup his fortune here in America.

Madame de Montesson, from F. Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787-1804 (Paris, 1877), p. 405. 1 0 7 II, 443-465· ""Reubell, who helped put Talleyrand in office, himself said: "If you want integrity and talent, beware of considering Talley-

rand. He is a starched nullity and a knave incarnate" (quoted in Guyot, Direc., pp. 393-394). Barras, another of Talleyrand's patrons, wrote in his Mémoires of Talleyrand's "perpetual duplicity and unparalleled servility. . . He has . . . no heart" (III, 134). Sandoz reported early in 1798 that: "The Minister of Foreign Affairs loves money and publicly proclaims that, once out of office, he does not want to have to seek alms of the Republic" (to the King, Jan. 21, 1798, Bailleu, Pr. I, 168). Talleyrand's avowal of venality seems less shocking when one considers that while the ex-Bishop was in America, the Convention, regarding him as an émigré, ordered the sale of all his property. Between March 31 and July 15, 1795, his sofas, beds, saddles, linen, clothes, etc. were sold for the benefit of the Republic. They brought 149,461 livres (LacourGayet, Talleyrand, IV, 45). 109 P. de Lacretdle, Madame de Staël et les hommes (Mayenne, 1939), p. 118. When Talleyrand appropriated Delacroix's portfolio, he was taking only what remained. The ex-Bishop had already appropriated Delacroix's wife (Count de Saint-Aulaire, Talleyrand [tr. from the French by G. F. Lees and F. J. Stephens; New York, 1937], p. 99).

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

797

moderates the champions of Monarchy and of return to the prewar boundaries of France, with the Triumvirs, as we have seen, "economic" motives loomed large in addition. And there were the considerations of power. The Triumvirs reveled in their authority, and looked askance at the efforts of the Councils to confine the Directory within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. Revellière asserts that Hoche was appointed at his (Revellière's) suggestion, to show army men that Carnot had no influence in the government, and that the power of promotion — perhaps their promotion — was in the hands of the Triumvirs. 110 It was not intended that Hoche should remain minister. Perhaps it was expected only that his ministry would last long enough to enable the next step to be taken against the moderates.

6.

GENERAL

HOCHE111

On July ι, 1797, General Hoche had detached ten thousand troops from the Sambre and Meuse Army and directed them to march to Alençon, then on to Brest, ostensibly to make part of an expedition to Ireland. Their itinerary would of necessity have led them to approach closer to the seat of the legislative bodies (viz., Paris) than the Constitution permitted, and the soldiers themselves knew they were really marching on Paris. On July 17, the day following that on which the ministers were changed, the Councils learned of the proximity of the soldiers, and protested excitedly to the Directory. Carnot, then President of the Directory, denied all knowledge of their presence, despite the fact that Hoche showed a paper signed by Carnot himself, purporting to be an order for the march. 112 The disgraced but stillfunctioning minister of war, Petiet, also pleaded absolute ignorance, as did Reubell and Revellière. Barras, in his Mémoires, admits that the descent 310 m

Mémoires, II, 120. General authority for this section: Pierre, 18 Fruc., pp. ix-x, 1 - 3 4 ; Sciout, Direc., π, 584-595· Hoche's mother died when he was four and one-half years old. His father, who worked in the royal stables, boarded him with a stranger. Later, young Hoche himself worked in the stables, but — night and day — immersed himsdlf in Voltaire and Rousseau. Hoche, the father, by now retired on a pension, failed to pay toward his son's support, and part of the pension money had to be withheld by the government. The records say the father was a "very bad subject." The son eventually tired of horses, and when sixteen years of age,

112

enrolled in the gardes-françaises, where he advanced rapidly (A. Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de Hoche," FH, II [1909], 2 1 7 218; " U n document sur l'enfance de Hoche," RF, LXXI [ 1 9 1 8 ] , 458). Hoche possessed the ability to make himself loved and feared at the same time (E. Welvert, "Celui qui découvrit Hoche," FH, XI [1914], 542), which, in the vocation of arms, is a distinct advantage. This, coupled with a burning ambition probably born of the neglect he suffered as a child, and with the ability to apply himself, explains his meteoric rise. It was a simple order for the expedition to Ireland. Vide Carnot, Réponse à Bailleul, p. 149.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

upon Paris was plotted by Hoche and himself, but insists that he had the full authorization of Reubell and Revellière-Lépeaux.113 The Directors took fright at the firm attitude displayed by the Councils, and ordered the troops to retreat behind the constitutional perimeter. Then Hoche was haled before the Directory, severely scolded, and threatened with prosecution. Carnot, as President of the Directory, conducted the interrogatory, yet during the entire proceeding, Hoche did not take his eyes from Barras' face. But the ex-noble dared not meet his glance, and pretended to be reading a paper. Hoche did not betray Barras' complicity, but left the Luxembourg filled with disgust for his accomplices, and determined to execute the projected coup with them or without them. He did, however, resign the ministry of war — but only because he had learned that the Five Hundred was about to take action. Hoche retired to his army on July 24, and two days later the Directory ordered him to lead 9,000 men to the west coast for the Irish expedition. Hoche set out with 15,000 men for Paris. Schérer, the new minister of war, had not been initiated into the conspiracy, and when he found 15,000 men on the march when but 8,000 (sic) had been mentioned in the rolls, he ordered them to withdraw. Hoche ceased his advance, but did not order a retreat, informing the minister of war that the troops were tired and needed to rest. The same evening (July 30) came a new order from the Directory to advance to the west. Hoche refused to go. The next day, the order was repeated except for any troops with the General in excess of 9,000. But Hoche's mind was preoccupied with two other events. On July 30, he had been accused in the Five Hundred of embezzling 736,600 livres of army funds to defray the cost of the coup d'état,114 On the thirty-first he was publicly declared responsible for the illegal march of the troops on Paris. Compromised in the eyes of the public, Hoche was now no longer so valuable to the conspirators on the Directory, especially as there had just arrived from Italy General Augereau — Bonaparte's choice for the coup de main, an unintelligent, twice-compromised soldier who could be trusted to wince at nothing the Directors might order. Bonaparte did not care to soil his own hands with the defense of such a government; Augereau's hands were already soiled. So, we are told, reasoned the future emperor as he sent his lieutenant to Paris. 115 Hoche rejoined his army on the Rhine, full of rancor against the legislature for unmasking him; against the majority Directors for discarding h i m ; 1 1 6 and against Bonaparte for stealing his opportunity to balance the " * Ι Ι „ 484. 114 Vide his letter of justification, written from Wetzlar, and published in Bonnal de Ganges, Repré., I V , 423-425.

116

Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 245. In his Mémoires, Barras denies any strained relations between himself and Hoche (II, 496-498).

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

799

13 Vendémiaire with a little coup of his own. Much rubbish — the word is not too strong — has been written about Hoche's love of Bonaparte, his total lack of jealousy, 117 his purely unselfish motives in aiding the Directorial Triumvirate. Michelet goes so far as to deny that Hoche contemplated a coup d'état when his troops crossed the constitutional perimeter. For Michelet, the General was merely on his way to the coast with no thought in his unsullied mind but to surprise England by a sudden descent on Ireland. 118 These stories are apocryphal, even when they contain a modicum of truth. They stem from the fact that Hoche passed away not long thereafter, leaving the world to speculate upon what "might have been." Perhaps Bonaparte could not have murdered the Republic. 119 Perhaps France would have been spared the Napoleonic blood bath. And a web of fancy is woven about the youthful general who merely had the good fortune to depart this life before he had irretrievably compromised himself. He had certainly made a good start. 7.

GENERAL

BONAPARTE

What was the interest of Bonaparte in the projected coup d'état} When did the Corsican decide to link hands with the rogues in the Directory? What was the importance of Bonaparte's decision from the point of view of the German policy of the Directory? When Bonaparte snuffed the life from the ancient Republic of Venice, he pretended to the Directory that the Venetians had brought on their own ruin by perfidious behavior toward the French. The Councils at first believed the story, but soon learned through Mallet du Pan that Bonaparte was the real culprit. 121 Carefully omitting all mention of the too-powerful general, the moderates in the Five Hundred condemned the Directory for making 117

118 119

Vide, e.g., Michelet, Œuv. compi., X X X I X , 403-404. Reputedly, Hoche had been the paramour of Josephine in 1794 (Nabonne, Inèd. Reubell, p. 166, η. 2 ) . If this be true, human nature would certainly have implanted some jealousy of Bonaparte in Hoche's breast. And jealousy in love is a virus which knows no confinement. Michelet, Œuv. compi., X X X I X , 404-405. Vide Mém. Larevellière, II, 179. Revellicre thinks Hoche would have forcibly and successfully resisted Bonaparte's usurpation of French sovereignty, but he does not venture to suggest what would have happened next. Hoche dreamed of a Republic of Europe pacified by France, as Rome had pacified the ancient world (Sorel, Bon. et Hoche, p. 3 3 3 ) .

120

General authority for this section: Sciout, Direc., II, 286-287, 563-569» 601-611; Pierre, 18 Fruc., p. 3 2 ; Sorel, Bon. et Hoche, p. 289, n. 2. 1 Bonaparte had four times offered Venice the alliance of France, and been four times rebuffed. This angered him. If Venice would not be a friend, then she was an enemy. There was no middle ground. And Bonaparte laid his plans accordingly (McClellan, Venice Bon., chap. xi). Austria had long been "preparing" Venice for dismemberment in accordance with the Austro-Russian Treaty of January 3, 1 7 9 5 (A. Sorel, " L a neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne en 1 7 9 5 , " RH, X V I I [ 1 8 8 1 ] , 299).

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

war, peace, and "alliance" with Venice without the concurrence of the legislature, as prescribed by the Constitution. T h e Triumvirs immediately detected a chance to embroil the Councils with Bonaparte, whose services they thought they might need for their coup d'etat. Accordingly, they defended his conduct most enthusiastically. T h e attack on Bonaparte, his justification by the Triumvirate and its minions, and Bonaparte's subsequent verbal barrage against the Councils because of their criticism of his treatment of Venice, have created the impression that the Corsican general joined the conspiracy of the Triumvirs for revenge. Nothing could be further from the truth. Plain common sense had long before told Bonaparte that if he allowed the moderates to reform the politics, finances, and administration of France, the country would not need a savior — the role he intended to play. Moreover, if the moderates triumphed, they would make their own brand of peace with Austria and Italy and the other belligerents. Then where would he be, the successful general in a successful state at peace with the world? No, he needed stormy waters to prove that he was a worthy captain, the only captain who could bring the foundering ship of state safely into port. Another factor inducing — yea, compelling — Bonaparte to side with the Directory was his conviction that if the Councils won, the monarchy would be restored. Many royalists had returned, secured the erasure of their names from the list of émigrés, and ended up in the Five Hundred or Ancients. Royalist journalists were openly attacking the government. T h e arrest of the royalist conspirators Brottier, L a Villeheurnois, Poly, and Duverne de Presle in January had led only to sentences of imprisonment for ten years or less, where the Directory had hoped for death, 122 and this emboldened other royalists. General Pichegru, justly suspected of conspiring with Condé while he (Pichegru) was commanding on the Rhine, 1 2 3 nevertheless enjoyed the confidence of the Five Hundred, of which he held the presidency. A n d then came (May 21) Bonaparte's seizure of the royalist agent Count de Launai d'Antraigues, 124 with his portfolio of secrets, including the record of Pichegru's negotiations with Conde. 1 2 5 It seemed to Bonaparte that the Republican structure was shot through 122

122 124

128

The documents are in Buchez and Roux, Hist, parlem., X X X V I I , 186 et seqq. Zeissbcrg, Pichegru und Condé, passim. He signed "d'Entraigues" when captured by Bonaparte's army (Mém. Bourriennc, I, 164). Bourrienne transcribed part of this record, and it is printed in his Mémoires, I, 1 6 5 176. Vide also Pingaud, Antraigues, pp. 136, 139, 145 et seqq. D'Antraigues was

seized (by Bernadotte) with three portfolios, but his wife, the celebrated actress and singer Mme. Saint-Huberty, to whom he had been secretly married since December 29, 1790 (M. Pellet, "La Saint-Huberty et le Comte d'Antraigues," Variétés révolutionnaires [Paris, 1885], p. 202), managed to destroy two by fire and water. T h e third was opened by Bonaparte instead of being sent directly to Paris.

ABANDONMENT OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN

801

with royalist termites. 126 He saw that if the Republic was destroyed, and the Bourbons were restored, he could never attain the top rung of the ladder he was climbing so eagerly. There was only one thing to do: join the malefactors until the time was ripe to crush them. 127 His mind once made up, he excited his soldiers to compose seditious addresses threatening the "royalists" and "émigré/' and "fanatical priests" of the Councils, 128 and sent the addresses in to the Directory, together with his own grandiloquent menaces, 129 by the agency of General Augereau. The other French armies, including Hoche's, also fulminated against the Councils. Only Moreau's army maintained its silence and its dignity — so Moreau was summoned to Paris. The conspirators feared to have him at the head of his troops when the news of the coup d'état should reach him. Moreau's Rhine and Moselle Army was thereupon united with the Sambre and Meuse under Hoche. It so happens that Moreau did not receive the letter summoning him to Paris until four days after the coup d'état™ The military dispositions made in preparation for the coup d'état do not concern us particularly. Suffice it to say that Augereau was appointed head of the army of Paris, and Chérin, Hoche's chief of staff, was placed in command of the Councils' own military guard. Troops from all points of the compass converged upon Paris, stopping just outside the constitutional perimeter. As the appointed day approached, Reubell and Revellière-Lépeaux suffered attacks of extreme nervousness stemming from their fear that Barras was conspiring with Augereau to make the coup d'état at their expense, and for Barras' personal benefit. 131 There was danger, also, that the Councils would hear of the plot and anticipate the coup with one of their own. In fact, on the night of 1 5 - 1 6 fructidor (September 1 - 2 ) , plans to this effect were laid, but dropped when everything seemed quiet. 132 Reubell's nervousness seems

121

m

D'Antraigues was interrogated by Bonaparte, and later allowed (?) to escape (Pingaud, Antraigues, pp. 145, 147, 149152, 1 6 9 - 1 7 2 ) . "Royalism, no longer hopeful of making a counterrevolution by arms, proposed to make it by treason" (Thibaudeau, Mém. Conv. Direc., II, 1 5 1 ) . According to Miot de .Melito, his pattern of thought was somewhat as follows: "I am willing to weaken the republican party some day, but I wish that the weakening be to my profit and not to that of the old dynasty. Meanwhile, it is necessary to march along with the republican party" (Mém., I, 156). -

128

Excerpts from almost a dozen of these addresses can be found in Buchez and Roux, Hist, parlent., X X X V I , 326-329. w Ibid., pp. 319-320. ""Moreau to Dir., Sept. 10, 1797, quoted in Mém. Saint-Cyr, IV, "Pièces justificatives," no. 65 (p. 325). m Barras was indeed conspiring — but with the Bourbons. Or, more correctly, his negotiations with the Bourbons had just fallen through (Sciout, Direc., II, 583, n. 1 . Vide also Mém. Larevellière, II, 79). 182 A. Meynier, "La journée de 18 fructidor An V (4 septembre 1797)," RF, L X X X (1927), 23, 26.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

to have remained much in evidence. In fact, this fire-eater, with his reputation for vigorous action in time of trouble,133 was even inclined to flight.134 The girlish fears of these blood-and-iron purgers would be amusing if the plot were not quite so heinous. As it is, one must not permit even a trace of a smile to temper his anticipative horror as attention is again focused upon the negotiations with Austria. 133

On March 19, 1797, Sandoz had written to his king: "In the moments of the successive conspiracies which have taken place here, the members of the Directory were often stunned and disconcerted; Reubell,

alone courageous and firm, took measures of vigor, and drew along the vote of his colleagues" (Bailleu, Pr. Frk_., I, 122). mMém.

Larevellïère,

III, 1 6 - 1 7 .

II, 127; Mém.

Barras,

>i

CHAPTER XXIV

X

PERRET'S MISSION TO VIENNA (JULY-AUGUST 1797), AND BAPTISTE'S MISSION TO PARIS (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1797)

I.

T H E Q U E S T I O N OF A N

ULTIMATUM

T

H U G U T wrote to Gallo on July 7 and 10 that if the French continued to refuse a congress for Austria's definitive peace, the parleys would have to be suspended. 1 T o outthreaten the threatener, Clarke proposed to Bonaparte that they should send un ultimatum to Austria. This, the Envoy Extraordinary wished to do without consulting the Directory, for he reasoned that it would be difficult in a moment of internal crisis to induce the Directors to act in a way which might possibly result in war. 2 Bonaparte, also with an eye on the internal crisis, replied that he did not believe that either of them could dare to precipitate a war under the circumstances, 3 and he forwarded to Clarke a copy of a letter he had sent to the Directory that very day. This letter asked the government to announce to the Austrians that if the treaty of peace was not signed by the end of August, the Preliminaries would automatically become null and void, and the war would recommence. Bonaparte declared that no campaign could be fought during the course of 1797 if the war was resumed any later than September i. 4 Enclosed with Bonaparte's letter to the Directory was a virtual ultimatum which the General in Chief had himself intended to send to the Emperor, but which he had decided to hold when he heard of the tumult at Paris. This letter informed Austria that hope for peace had "almost vanished," and that the Republic wanted, "within a month, to be at peace or 1

2

Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 247-250. Retrospective letter oí July 25, 1 7 9 7 , Corr.

inéd. Napo., VII, 179. "July 23) 1797) ibid., p. 1 7 5 . ' J u l y 23, 1 7 9 7 , Corr. Napo., Ill, 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 .

804

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

at war." But Bonaparte pointed out to his Majesty that no Austrian victory, however brilliant, could procure for the Habsburgs a more advantageous peace than that of Leoben. He gave the Emperor credit for sincerely wishing peace, but suggested that "ill-intentioned and ill-instructed persons" in the Austrian army might be pinning their hopes on "a change in the interior of France." And then came the insinuation — immediately repudiated by Bonaparte — that the Emperor had never intended to honor the Preliminaries, even when he signed them, but had deceived the French in order to get them away from his front door.® At this date, Bonaparte was still willing and able to renew the war should he have to — that is, provided he received the necessary reinforcements. According to Bourrienne, the victorious Army of Italy consisted at the end of July of a mere 35,900 men. The General in Chief wanted 60,000, and 10,000 horse, if the war were to be resumed. And he so informed the Directory.® The Directory received Bonaparte's note and enclosure on August 1. It decided that Bonaparte should continue to negotiate, but that he should meanwhile prepare for war, and it charged Talleyrand to draw up a despatch in this sense. Talleyrand recommended (August 3) that Bonaparte's suggestion of an ultimatum should be accepted,7 but the Directory thought otherwise, for it feared to provoke the moderates while the illegal march of Hoche's troops was still so fresh in their minds, and the preparations for the coup d'état were as yet incomplete. It should be borne in mind, also, that Reubell and Revellière were afraid to take a strong stand because of the equivocal attitude of Barras. The bourgeois had no faith in this dissolute ex-noble,8 whose duplicity had no peer unless it were their own. The letter which was finally sent to Bonaparte (August 5) is a fine example of Directorial docility: The Directory wished that "at no price should the renewal of hostilities come from it," and " all the wrongs should be on the side of the Emperor, absolutely all." Bonaparte should try to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion by all the means compatible with the honor of the Republic, but should prepare against a surprise attack. He should insist on a separate negotiation in Italy, and declare that "if it is true, on the one hand, that the Republic promised by Article IV of the Preliminaries to negotiate in a congress at Berne, it is equally true that if this congress did not take place, the fault lies with the Emperor alone, for he showed great eagerness to treat for his peace in Italy, and the Directory only yielded obligingly to this eagerness." The despatch ended with a 'Mém. Bourrienne, I, 1 8 1 - 1 8 2 ; Corr. Napo., III, 270-271. * Mêm.Bourrienne, I, 180.

'Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 282. "Guyot, Direc., pp. 5 1 5 - 5 1 6 .

PERRET AT VIENNA AND BAPTISTE AT PARIS, SUMMER 1 7 9 7

805

statement that the Directors were very pleased that no ultimatum had been sent to the Emperor, for if it had precipitated a rupture, the Directory would have been reproved.9 2.

PERRET'S MISSION TO VIENNA

"I wish you would ask Merveldt for a passport for your secretary [Perret], and send him to Vienna," Bonaparte wrote to Clarke on July 23. "He could be charged with a letter for M. Gallo [Gallo had returned to Vienna on July 20 or 21 to try to induce the Court "to terminate matters more speedily"] ; 1 0 he could see Thugut; and he could return with positive information about the situation of things in Austria. Recommend to him to take note of all things of military interest which he sees while en route. I will send my aide-de-camp Marmont to Vienna by way of the Tyrol. The object of his mission will be the true condition of the Austrian troops, and public opinion concerning the military situation." 11 This letter indicates clearly the original object of Perret's projected journey. The visits to Gallo and Thugut were to be merely a blind; the veritable purpose was one of observation. This appears more clearly yet when one considers Bonaparte's letter of July 29 to Clarke: "I imagine that you have a cipher code for communication with Perret. Do not forget to tell him to collect all possible information regarding the military situation of the Emperor at the present moment, the value of his levies in Hungary and elsewhere, the fortifications that he might have erected at Gratz and Klagenfurt, the bridgeheads of the Drave and Save, and the route from Klagenfurt to Bruck." 1 2 Clarke replied on August 2 that he had informed Perret in cipher of Bonaparte's desires.13 Perret set out on July 26 1 4 as a courier bearing a message for Gallo, for it was only to a courier that Merveldt would grant a passport.15 This message for Gallo reproduced the most bellicose passages of Bonaparte's letter of July 23 to the Directory, invited Gallo to supplant Thugut in directing the foreign policy of Austria,16 and suggested a direct negotiation between Thugut or the Emperor, and Perret.17 Perret brought also an issue of the Moniteur which contained some very harsh words concerning Thugut: "More accommodating than a harlot, more agile than a marionette, he goes down on his knees — not before the wisest, but before the most powerful. The English force him to expel the French, and he obeys; the French ' Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 2 1 1 - 2 1 5 . Clarke to Bonaparte, July 20, 2 1 , ibid., pp. 168, 170. 11 Corr. Napo., Ill, 260. 12 Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 235. " Corr. inéd. Napo., ΥΠ, 204. 10

1797,

14 ibid., p. 203. " C l a r k e to Bonaparte, July 25, 1797, ibid., pp. 1 7 8 - 1 7 9 . 1β Guyot, Direc., p. 5 1 2 . " C l a r k e to Gallo, July 26, 1796, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 270-271.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

demand that he expel the English, and he obeys. This conduct has earned him the title of Baron Acrobat." 18 Certainly this was not the way to earn Thugut's concurrence, and it would have been rather rash to reckon on his not hearing of the article if it were shown to anyone whomsoever in Vienna. Perret insisted on speaking with Thugut, and the Austrian minister yielded to preserve appearances. "I shall see him a moment in his [Gallo's] presence," he wrote to Count Colloredo.19 As things turned out, however, Gallo was not present during the colloquy, and the conversation lasted for hours, during which all the outstanding difficulties of the Udine parleys were touched upon. But Thugut refrained from committing himself as to any of them, always referring to wh^it the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty would do or say.20 And Perret could not appeal to the Emperor because Francis II was not in Vienna at the time.21 Clarke had written to Gallo that negotiation with Thugut or the Emperor would rid the parleys of "a host of obstacles incident to the limited latitude accorded you and Count von Merveldt," 22 but Thugut liked these obstacles, for they gave him a legitimate reason to dillydally while awaiting the triumph of the moderates in France. The strangest rumors were current in Vienna — rumors which painted an idyllic picture for Austria: The Directors, importuned by the Councils, were supposed to have sent Commissioners to Italy to inquire into Bonaparte's highhanded conduct; and Carnot and Barthélémy, with the Councils' assistance, were said to have seized the executive power.23 (A little later, even, the arrest of Reubell was reported 24 — a sort of Fructidorian coup d'état in reverse, in thermidor.) It was important for Thugut to learn the true state of affairs in France, and as long as he had to give an audience to Perret, he seems to have chosen Perret as his informant. 26 As stated, Thugut permitted the Frenchman to remain for several hours instead of cutting him short, as he had intended; and we know from Clarke's letter to Bonaparte that Thugut said practically nothing during that time. Thugut would have had to be very stupid to miss this opportunity, and that, he was certainly not; he questioned even real couriers.26 Briefe Thugut, II, 477. "July 30, 1797, ibid., p. 44. "Clarke to Bonaparte, Aug. 4, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 235. 21 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 281, η. ι. 22 July 26, 1797, ibid., pp. 270-271. " "Aus dem Tagebuch Zinzendorfs" in Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 492. "Thugut to Count Colloredo, Aug. 5, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 45. Disillusionment fol18

lowed shortly {idem, Aug. 7, 1797, ibid.). This conclusion follows from the facts, not from the document cited in its support by Guyot, Direc., p. 512. On July 30, 1797, Perret had not yet seen Thugut and still it is in Thugut's letter of that date that the embarrassment of Bonaparte, mentioned by Guyot, is spoken of (vide Briefe Thugut, II, 44)· M Thugut to Count Colloredo, Aug. 20, 1797, ibid., p. 47. 25

PERRET AT VIENNA AND BAPTISTE AT PARIS, SUMMER 1 7 9 7

807

T h e task of leading on the youthful Perret could not have been very difficult. A few compliments, a few unimportant confidences not necessarily true, and then — T h u g u t could rest back and listen. N o t that Perret was stupid or untrained; 27 rather, that T h u g u t was a sly old fox w h o knew all the tricks from a lifetime of diplomatic jugglery. T h e indirect results of Perret's mission were important. W i t h a clearer picture of conditions in Paris, and confirmation that Bonaparte was "embarrassed" in his relations with the central government, 28 T h u g u t decided to accept an earlier suggestion of Gallo's: that an attempt should be made to divide the Paris government from its fiery Corsican negotiator by sending someone directly to the French capital with propositions of peace.29 T h e Emperor approved, and to break the deadlock over the question of a congress, his Majesty decided to yield the point. H e insisted, however, that he had never before renounced the congress, as the French maintained he had done by implication when he asked to treat directly in Italy. T h e Italian meetings were only to iron out difficulties to be treated afterward at Berne, he said. But — and it was an important "but" — his present renunciation was conditional upon an accord being reached by separate negotiation before September i . If it was not so reached, there would have to be a congress after all. T o this congress only Austria's Russian ally would be invited, because England was already negotiating on her own account. T h e Emperor was sure, however, that France and he could agree. But to provide for all contingencies, he was naming his delegates to the congress immediately. This information was to be contained in a note from T h u g u t to the French minister of foreign affairs, 30 borne by Gallo's secretary, Baptiste. 31 Thus originated Baptiste's mission to Paris, of which more presently. O n August ι, Clarke wrote to Perret: " D o not leave Vienna before you have obtained the guarantee of Lombardy from his Imperial Majesty. Procure the left bank of the Rhine for u s 3 2 by means of advantages granted to him Destined since childhood for a diplomatic career, he had been educated very carefully, and, according to Clarke, had fulfilled his function of secretary of legation with assiduity, talent, and discretion. He had a good knowledge of the affairs of Europe, especially of Germany, and knew perfecdy German, Italian, and Latin. He was 28 when sent to Vienna (Clarke's Compte rendu, Arch. A . E., M. et D., Autriche 8, f. 299). a T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, July 30, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 44. ® Guyot, Direc., p. 512. 80 T o Thugut, this meant Delacroix. He did not know that Talleyrand had succeeded 27

Delacroix on July 16. " J u l y 3 1 , 1797, Arch. A . E., M. et D„ Autriche 8, f. 185; Thugut to Talleyrand, July 3 1 , 1797, Pallain, Min. Talleyrand, pp. 83-86; Gallo to Clarke, July 31, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 197-199. 32 Bonaparte pretended to Gallo and Merveldt that the K i n g of Prussia, and other princes of the Empire w h o had made contingent cessions of left-bank territory to the Republic, were urging France to insist on the Rhine boundary, and to fulfill its promise to them of indemnification by secularization (Eden to Grenville, July 5, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/50).

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

[i.e., to the Emperor]. Remember that we must have part of Germany during the congress of the Empire, 33 and do not forget especially that everything relative to the Empire should be comprised in the separate peace. Insist strongly on this last point." 34 W h e n these instructions arrived, Perret had already left Vienna for Udine, bearing a letter from Gallo to Clarke 3 5 blaming the fruitlessness of the Udine negotiations upon the French refusal to execute Article I V of the Preliminaries, and expressing displeasure at Bonaparte's despatch of July 23 to the Directory. 36 Thus ended a mission whose elements are so simple that it has never been properly presented. Those few historians who are not uncognizant of its existence 87 allow the diplomatic veil to conceal the veritable purpose. G u y o t 3 8 has fallen into this error. From his account, the reader would believe that Perret's function was really to carry a despatch to Gallo. T h e writer ventures to suggest that Clarke's note of August 1, the source of the misconceptions of past historians, was written for the purpose of deceiving the Austrians should they intercept it — else why was it not put into cipher? Moreover, the succeeding day, Clarke wrote to Bonaparte, " A s you appear to desire information regarding Klagenfurt and Gratz especially, I have decided to send Citizen Romeuf 39 to Vienna, too. I have given him a letter of recommendation addressed to Herrn Thugut." 40 T h e evidence is conclusive that Perret was viewed, by those who sent him to Vienna, as an observer (euphemism for spy) and not as a negotiator. Hiiffer realized this over three quarters of a century ago. However, his four-line account of the mission 4 1 is marred by the presentation as fact of a hypothesis for which there is no basis in the documents, viz., that Perret was somehow to pave the way for Clarke to go to Vienna. 88

A reference to the Directory's instructions of May 6 to Bonaparte and Clarke: "The true means of arriving at an advantageous peace with the Empire would be to obtain from his Imperial Majesty that the two armies of Sambre and Meuse ["and Rhine and Moselle" was obviously omitted here by error] should be allowed to occupy the territory of the Empire up to the Lech and the Rednitz, and all the strongholds on the Rhine, or at least the principal ones. By this means, our troops would live at the enemy's expense, and we would be in a position to secure the payment of the contributions imposed last year on Swabia, Franconia, and Bavaria" (Coir. inéd. Ñapo., IV, 16—17).

84

Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 281. Cf. Hamier (Pr. secretary of legation

at Base!) to the King, June 8, 1795: France refuses to discuss the question of Belgium with the Empire, though Belgium is part of the Empire; Belgium's fate must be left to the treaties of separate peace with Austria and England (Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 7 ) . 35 Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 281, η. ι . ™July 31, 1797, Corr. tnéd. Ñapo., VII, 1 9 7 199. 87 Sorel, e.g., in his Europe, Vol. V , makes no mention of Perret. 88 Direc., p. 512. 88 The two brothers Louis and Alexandre Romeuf had been aides-de-camp of the Marquis de Lafayette. 40 Corr. inéd. Ñapo., VII, 204. 41 Europa, I, 346.

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809

BAPTISTE AT PARIS

"Reubel[l] steers the political bark unhampered," wrote Gallo to Thugut in the summer of 1796. "If Europe's dealings were with Barthélémy, and with him alone, it would long be at peace; but he is hampered and envied at every turn." 42 When the first Directors took office in November 1795, they voted to divide up the work among themselves. Carnot took charge of military matters; Barras, of the police; Le Tourneur, of affairs connected with the sea; Revellière, of education and industry; and Reubell, of finance, justice, and foreign affairs.43 Carnot, it has been mentioned, aspired to control foreign affairs also, but Reubell maintained unquestioned hegemony over this branch of the government until May of 1797, when Barthélémy was elected Director to replace Le Tourneur, on whom the lot to retire had fallen. Barthélémy was a diplomat, but a très ancien régime diplomat, and he had probably escaped the guillotine only because, residing abroad, he had not been at hand to be guillotined. True, he had served the Republic well, but that hardly endeared him to Reubell, the Foreign Policy Oracle of the Directory. The control of France's relations with the crowned heads of Europe must not be allowed to slip into his aristocratic hands. The interest of Reubell and of France — to Reubell, one and the same thing — was categorical on that point. But the public expected Barthélémy, the Pacificator of Basel, to take over this branch of the government. Reubell was distressed. "The politics of the new Director is cowardly and weak," he declared to a member of the Five Hundred, ". . . but if public opinion categorically demands that I abandon diplomacy to his care, I shall not interpose objections; only I must assure myself that it is thoroughly in his favor." 44 Apparently public opinion demanded it, for Reubell — before Barthélemy's entry into the sacred circle — arranged that thenceforth all business would be transacted in common. No certain Director was to be assigned a particular branch of government, as before.45 Reubell might not be the recognized master of foreign affairs any longer, but at least he did not have to be a rubber stamp for Barthélemy's dubious policies. And actually he could still work his will through his continued control over the Diplomatic Bureau, which influenced opinion with its newspaper-and-memoir analyses, and had his friends as its head.46 The mission of Baptiste to Paris was predicated upon the ability and " J u n e 15, 1796, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 52. 48 Sciout, Direc., I, 449. "Sandoz to the King, June 3, 1797, Bailleu,

Pr. Fr\., I, 129. "Idem, June 16, 1797, ibid., p. 132. a Mém. Barthélémy, p. 182; Guyot, Direc., pp. 71, 74. Bonnier headed the Bureau.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

power of Barthélémy to assume the direction of France's foreign affairs. Thugut knew Barthélémy to be amicably disposed toward Austria. Barthélémy had even spoken yearningly of "dear Vienna" the year before.47 Baptiste therefore arrived with a note not only for the French minister of foreign affairs but for Director Barthélémy. However, Thugut was afraid to write directly to Barthélémy for fear of compromising him, so the latter note was channeled through Gallo.48 The Emperor is a true friend of peace, the note ran. And it asked that France reciprocate the Emperor's willingness to conclude definitively at Udine with her own readiness to accord the Habsburgs all that had been promised them in the Preliminaries of Leoben.49 The appeal to Barthélémy was in vain. It was not a question of willingness. By advice to Baptiste, by suggestions to Bonaparte, Barthélémy proved that he was willing enough. It was a question of power, and of this the Pacificator of Basel had none. This came as a distinct surprise to Thugut, especially since the news from Paris had latterly been so good — or bad, depending on the point of view. The Mercure de Ratisbonne of August 7, digesting several French papers, had reported continued, lively criticism of the Directory and of Bonaparte by the moderate party.50 But Baptiste, almost right from the start, sent disquieting news to Vienna. "What I see more clearly [now]," wrote Thugut to Count Colloredo, "is that Barthélémy is either a poor simpleton or is worth no more than the rest." 5 1 Talleyrand was authorized to confer with Baptiste, and their first conference took place on August 13. The French foreign minister showed himself remarkably conciliatory. Baptiste had indicated on a map what territories Austria was seeking.52 Talleyrand replied that if Austria renounced Mantua, retroceded part of the Brescian, and indemnified the Duke of Modena with the Breisgau — concessions which Baptiste had been authorized to make — he (Talleyrand) was almost sure he could obtain the consent of the Directory to a peace in which Austria would acquire the Three Legations and Venice. 63 Not a word about the Rhine boundary! Baptiste was elated, but Barthélémy warned him that Talleyrand had probably made proposals unacceptable to the Directory, hence it would be purposeless to send them in to Vienna until the Directory had approved them.54 In partial defense of Talleyrand, let it be said that recent instructions of the Directory to Bonaparte and Clarke had also failed to mention the left Gallo to Thugut, June 15, 1796, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 52. " G u y o t , Direc., p. 513. " G a l l o to Barthélémy, Aug. 1, 1797, Arch. A. E., M. et D., Autriche 8, f. 189. " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, Aug. 7, 1797, 47

Briefe Thugut, II, 46. Idem, Aug. 20, 1797, ibid., pp. 47-48. 52 Guyot, Direc., p. 517. "Baptiste to Thugut, Aug. 15, 1797, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 297. " I d e m , ibid.

51

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81I

bank — but these instructions certainly had not contemplated Austria's acquisition of Venice. 65 On August 14, Talleyrand presented to the Directory his report on Thugut's letter and, doubtless (though this is not too clear from the wording of the report), on his conferences with Baptiste. This report declared that the French government was placed by the concessions of the Emperor "in a more advantageous position than it had occupied after the Preliminaries of Leoben. You are rid of the articles of the Preliminaries which vexed you the most, that is to say, those concerning the convocation of a congress at Berne and the intervention of the allies." 58 Talleyrand declared that it was quite improbable that the House of Austria had the slightest intention of breaking olí the negotiations, since Bonaparte had penetrated too easily into the Austrian dominions, the Emperor's subjects were too disposed to revolt, and the Army of Italy was too accustomed to vanquish for the Habsburg ruler not to fear that the revolutionization or loss of his provinces would result from the resumption of hostilities. Talleyrand divulged that the Emperor expected to be paid in territory for renouncing the Congress of Berne, and he counselled acceptance in principle. However, he suggested that the supplementary indemnity accorded him should be in Germany — to wit, the Archbishopric of Salzburg and the Bishopric of Passau — and not in Italy, as the Emperor desired. Talleyrand saw a danger to the new republics of Italy in any great increase of Austrian strength in the peninsula. His thoughts were fixed rather on weakening the already-existing Habsburg hold on Italy — if not on Germany — as evidenced by the following quotation from his report (rendered above in part). The Emperor, established in Italy close to the revolutionary volcano, and possessing German provinces near this hearth of insurrection, will constantly need your protection in peacetime, and if the present spirit continues to spread, as the 56

Arch. A. E., M. et Ό., Autriche 8, f. 183: Here are the propositions which the Directory wishes you to present as its ultimatum "if you are able to sustain them": — In Italy: The Emperor to keep Trieste, and obtain Istria and Dalmatia; to renounce Mantua, Venice and Terraferma and Venetian Friuli; to evacuate Ragusa. The Republic wishes to keep nothing of continental Italy. It is none of the Emperor's affair what arrangement France makes with the Cisalpine regarding Italian islands. In Germany: The Emperor to indemnify himself with Salzburg and Passau; to indemnify the Duke of Modena in the Breisgau; to evacuate Ingolstadt, Mannheim, Ehrenbreitstein, Ulm,

Königstein, and Mayence. If Bonaparte cannot sustain these propositions, he shall get what he can out of the negotiations. "He has carte blanche." If hostilities must be recommenced, the House of Austria should be expelled forever from Italy, and the first step should be from Tuscany. 56 A draft of Talleyrand's report, dated the day before (i.e., August 1 3 ) , and which may or may not have reached the Directory, mentioned other objections to the Leoben Treaty: Venice would, sooner or later, fall to Austria; the Emperor had obtained a very strong frontier; and Austria would become a maritime power (Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 296).

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

nature of things seems to indicate, you will be able, when you so desire, to efface with a stroke of the pen several provinces from the list of his possessions.67 In essence, Talleyrand was recommending the execution of the Treaty of Leoben, as modified by the Austrian concessions. Carnot was willing, for the sake of peace, to content himself with the Leoben terms even without the concessions. The Organizer of Victory wrote to Bonaparte a few days later: Make peace; you lack only this species of glory. . . Were you obliged to make it on the bases only of the Preliminary Treaty of Leoben, do so; it would be superb nevertheless. It would be superb also for the Emperor, in very sooth, but pray, what's the difference? Could the peace be durable if it were onerous for him? Will not the Emperor become our natural and inevitable ally, owing to his geographic position, from the moment that the apple of discord . . . , the [Belgian] Netherlands, is removed? Moreover, does not his aggrandizement rouse jealousy in his neighbors Russia, Turkey, and . . . Prussia? Do not his new possessions excite difficulties which will prevent him for long from occupying himself with us?

58

Barthélémy also was willing to accept Talleyrand's proposal — or any proposal which would bring peace. H e sent a "person of confidence" to Bonaparte, advising him "that whatever he might do to conclude peace would be very agreeable to the nation." 69 But Reubell saw no reason why victorious France should forego its prize — the rich Rhenish lands; and Barras and Revellière sided with him. It should be mentioned also that the majority Directors had learned of certain secret conversations between Baptiste and the minority Directors, Carnot and Barthélémy. 60 (It was in consequence of these conversations that Carnot later sent the letter, and Barthélémy the person of confidence, mentioned above.) The Triumvirs immediately sensed a royalist plot in the making, 6 1 and wanted none of Baptiste and his propositions. It is quite Aug. 14 (not 2nd), 1797, Pallain, Mitt. Talleyrand, pp. 94—99. 58 Aug. 17, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., IV, 113. According to Barras' Mémoires, Carnot wanted the Directory to send Austria the Preliminaries of Leoben as an ultimatum (II, 507). 59 Baptiste to Thugut, Aug. 15, 1797, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 299. 60 T h e revelation gave rise to a frightful quarrel in the Directory, during which Barras made the remarks already quoted {supra, Pt. II, chap, i, § 2) that Carnot had sold out the Republic, and that there was not a louse on his body but had the right to spit 57

61

in his face. It is by no means certain that the royalists would have entered into a conspiracy with Baptiste. We know that the Prince of Condé did not desire a change then. He wrote to Vienna, to Louis XVIII's chargé d'affaires, that he did not think the pear was "yet ripe enough," though "the government will fall without any doubt." Condé preferred to wait until such time as the Councils would have at their disposal greater relative force. The Directory was still the stronger, he said. Perhaps the following year (to A. L. H. de la Fare, Aug. 18, 1797, Count de la Boutetière [ed.], L'armée de Condé d'après

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probable that Baptiste would have brazenly plotted with the royalists on a grand scale had he had a chance. He was not discreet; he had shown Barthélémy a memoir of Thugut's which he proposed to circulate among certain members of the Five Hundred. Barthélémy persuaded him that it would be too dangerous, and inserted extracts in the newspapers for him instead.62 The Directory, led by Reubell, rejected Talleyrand's suggestions, and, angered by the machinations of the Emperor's envoy, invited Bonaparte to make peace or war according as he should deem it advantageous to France and its allies. When Talleyrand and Baptiste met again, Talleyrand said the Directory wished to hold to the Preliminaries in so far as intervening events should permit, but that the French plenipotentiaries at Udine had full power to treat on the basis of discarding the Preliminaries, and it was to be desired that the Austrian plenipotentiaries should have full powers also. Such vague proposals were repugnant to Baptiste, so Talleyrand became more explicit. The Austrian plenipotentiaries should know, he said, what sacrifices the Emperor would be willing to make to obtain the Three Legations. 83 This was probably a reference to the left bank of the Rhine. Baptiste remained in Paris for a few weeks. He was therefore still there on August 19, to see what results his mission had wrought. Because he had dared to try to enter into relations with the "internal enemy" in France, the Directory sent new instructions to Bonaparte and Clarke increasing the severity of its demands. This aggravation was accomplished under the cloak of pacific words. The Directory "continues to desire peace, and this sustained desire causes it to wish that, whatever be the issue of the negotiations, all the wrongs be on the part of the Emperor." 64 But how different were the realities! 4.

THE DIRECTORY'S INSTRUCTIONS OF AUGUST 1 9 ,

1797

The Directory, ran the instructions of August 19, has determined that you should hasten to recommence negotiating [Bonaparte had not yet gone to Udine] on the general65 basis of the Preliminaries of Leoben, une correspondance inédite de son chef, 1792-1801 [Paris, 1881], p. 56). Guyot, Direc., p. 518. "Baptiste to Thugut, Aug. 15, 1797, HiifferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 298299. It is interesting to note that, in June, Merveldt had been authorized to discuss the possible cession of the left bank with 62

Bonaparte and Clarke in the hope thus of obtaining the city of Venice and the Legations (Merveldt to Tfaugut, June 23, 1797, ibid., p. 227). " Talleyrand to Bonaparte and Clarke, Pallain, Min. Talleyrand, p. m . 05 Underscored in the original,

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

but it desires that you should deviate therefrom as much as you can in regard to stipulations obviously unfavorable to us. And since these Preliminaries are no longer intact, . . . there is ground for hoping that it will not be impossible for you, according to the circumstances wherein you find yourself, to draw even advantage therefrom. T h e most important of the principles which should guide Bonaparte and Clarke was to divert the Emperor's attention from Italy, and indemnify him in Germany. ββ T h a t would reduce his maritime power, and place him in contact with his old rival, the King of Prussia. If the Emperor received Italian territories as compensation, these territories would revolt and join France or its republican creature in Italy in case war should ever break out again between France and Austria. Far more advantageous to the E m peror would it be for him to obtain German territories, where the people were accustomed to the domination of Austria, and loved it. 67 Also, it was desirable to reject Austria as far as possible from the frontiers of France. If the Emperor could be induced to renounce his claim to the Terraferma of Venice, and content himself with Istria and Dalmatia (already occupied by the Austrians, who could be dislodged only with difficulty), 88 he might have the ecclesiastical states of Salzburg and Passau. If he should consent to renounce all indemnity in Italy, and even Istria and Dalmatia, he could have, in addition, Berchtesgaden, the Upper Palatinate to the Naab, Trent, and Brixen. T h e evacuation of the Italian territories and fortresses promised to the Emperor by the Preliminaries should be postponed as long as possible. T h e instructions of May 6, ordering that this evacuation should be subordinated to the Emperor's evacuation of the territory west of the Lech and the Rednitz, and of the strongholds of Mannheim, Mayence, and Ehrenbreitstein, were repeated. As a general principle, "the troops of the Republic should

not evacuate Italy or any part of the countries they are occupying until after the continental peace has been made." 69 As K i n g of Bohemia and Hungary, the Emperor should cede all his remaining possessions on the left bank of the Rhine: the Counties of Falkenstein and of the Fricktal, and the lands and rights of the Habsburgs M

Note that this is just the opposite of the instructions of May 6. There the Directory said "it sees a danger in this increase in the power of the Emperor in Germany," and preferred to give him his entire indemnity in Italy (Corr. inéd. Napo., IV, 1 7 ) . " A Directorial faux pas here I The Directory's theme was always that no German liked Austria; that, eagerly awaiting the

first opportunity to break with Austria, was every German — except perhaps the Emperor. And then — such a statement! 68 Vide infra, chap, xxviii, § id. . The italicized phrase was underscored in the original. It will be recalled that Thugut wanted possession immediately following the exchange of ratifications of the Preliminaries {vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xxiii, § 4).

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815

above Basel. The French plenipotentiaries should exact, in accordance with earlier instructions given to Clarke, the islands of the Rhine dependent on the Breisgau, and the right-bank city of Alt-Breisäch. 70 Under separate cover, Talleyrand wrote to Bonaparte on the same day: "These are only views from which you should draw as much advantage as possible. They are not intended as impediments. . . The Directory leaves you a free field for the peace." 7 1 On August 23, Talleyrand elucidated and developed the suggestion that the Emperor should evacuate Mannheim, Mayence, and Ehrenbreitstein. T o Bonaparte he wrote: It is quite possible that the Emperor, while taking a tender interest in the integrity of the Empire, and refusing all indemnity which might violate this integrity, should remain, despite all these fine protestations, the master of Bavaria after the signature of the peace. As it is very important that he should not seek his indemnity without us, and that he should not be able to dispense with the one we are willing to offer him in Germany, he must be incapacitated from retaining by force at the end of the war any territories of the Empire whatsoever. To this end I propose to you, as an essential article of the definitive peace, that immediately following the signature of the treaty, and within a certain period, the Emperor should evacuate the cities and fortresses belonging either to electors or to princes or states of the Empire, such as, in particular, Ingolstadt, Ulm, Mannheim, Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, or such other places as he has occupied. If the Emperor were master of the forts, he would be master also of the peace.72 It was a hard peace which the majority Directors had in mind for the Emperor — but they had to ask their own embryo emperor to impose it, and whether he would or no depended not upon them but upon him and his idea of the interests of his nascent dynasty. Baptiste was greatly distressed at the turn the negotiations were taking, and sent alarming letters in to Thugut. The war will shortly be resumed, he wrote, unless the left bank is abandoned to France and all the ecclesiastical lands of Germany are secularized. Thugut tried to keep a cool head. "Baptiste should not expect that he will be told the last word right at the start," he wrote to Count Colloredo, but he "asked God and man" if, under the circumstances, at least the September pay of the troops should not be made available. 73 On September 2, Thugut was still trying to calm himself. ™Pallain, Min. Talleyrand, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 9 . Aug. 19, 1797, Corr. inéd. Ñapo., VII, 232. 72 Talleyrand to Bonaparte, Arch. A. E., Autriche 367, f. 442. " A u g . 25, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 50. Exactly one month earlier, Thugut had been so sure of peace that he resisted the 71

"useless" creation of the post of commissary general to Austria's Army of Italy (to Count Colloredo, July 25, 1797, ibid., p. 44). But the Emperor had not been so sanguine. "I can only recommend to you more and more attention to the complete reëstablishment of the army, for the issue

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

" T h e news from Udine has not arrived," he wrote; "I don't know why, but I regard it rather as a favorable indication, for I confess that, despite Gallo, and what Baptiste writes us to please his principal and to frighten us, I still believe that the French on their side are embarrassed not merely to a moderate extent." 74 O n September 3, Baptiste spoke with Barthélémy for the last time. It was the day before the Fructidorian coup d'état, and the Pacificator of Basel was planning far into the future. Barthélémy explained to Baptiste that a peace on any terms would ultimately be favorable to Austria, for it would mean the return of the French troops. T h e return would mean for France disordered finances, strife between the Directory and the two Councils, and eventually civil war. Civil war would mean abandonment of the Cisalpine. A n d an abandoned Cisalpine would most certainly call in Austria to maintain order. Ergo, Baptiste should speak at Vienna in favor of peace. 75 Poor Barthélémy, the next day there were no moderates to wage civil war. 76 A n d poor Baptiste, there was no opportunity for intrigue in the new de-moderated France. T h e disillusioned peace envoy left for Vienna on September 12. Barthélémy also traveled abroad but under different circumstances. 77 If the Jacobins were again to be in peaceful possession of the French state, wrote T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, they might try to democratize all of Europe; and he tried to discern some ray of light in the gloomy situation. H e found it in the hope that the Jacobins, engaged in hypothetical mortal combat with the moderates, might become more anxious for peace abroad "in order to get rid of us." 7 8 Alas for Thugut! the moderates were crushed beyond the possibility of fighting back. T h e future belonged to the conspirators.

71

of the negotiations cannot be foreseen," his Majesty wrote to Charles on August 4 (Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 282). T o Count Colloredo, Briefe Thugut, II, 53.

Baptiste to Thugut, Hiiffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 325. ™ Vide infra, chap, xxvii, § 2. 77 Vide ibid. 78 Sept. 15, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 56. 75

Vi

CHAPTER

XXV

if

T H E DIRECTORY AND THE H A N S E A T I C CITIES

T

H E importance of the Hanseatic cities to France had been realized already during the reign of Louis X I , and a species of alliance, based upon reciprocal advantage, had been established. This connection was so beneficial that, in the Treaty of 1716, as mentioned above, 1 one of the secret articles provided that "in case of war between the Empire and France, these cities shall be reputed to be neutral." When France declared war upon the Emperor in 1792, the Hanseatic cities sent a declaration of neutrality to the Legislative Assembly. The Assembly eagerly received this opportunity of maintaining amicable relations with three commercial cities which were also "to some extent free," and it decreed that French warships and corsairs should respect and even protect the ships of Hamburg and Bremen. 2 In 1793, the Empire declared war upon France, and the Hanseatic cities were drawn into the conflict. They continued, however, to trade with France, to the great advantage of the latter. The annual balance of trade in favor of the Republic was 48,000,000 livres.3 This does not mean that the Hansa lost by trading with France. The gain was mutual, especially in the case of Hamburg, in which city all the commerce of France concentrated because of the war. 4 So much for the framework of this chapter. France resented this virtual monopoly of Hamburg. "It should be arranged," declares an unsigned and undated "Observations upon a Proposed Treaty of Commerce between France and Prussia" in the French archives, "that the commodities from our colonies could be carried directly 1

Pt. I, chap. v. Vide Rédacteur, no. 109 (April 2, 1796). "Memoir by Lagau (French consul to the Hansa to CPS, Sept. 4, 1795, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 669, £. 292. 2

4

CPS to Barthélémy, July 29, 1795, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 669, f. 217. This letter does not appear in Kaulek's collection of Barthélemy's papers.

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

from our ports to Prussia without having to pass through the hands of the Dutch or the Hamburgers, who absorb a part of the gains." 5 "The French government is no longer disposed to lavish our gold in ruinous contracts," ran the Ami des Lois of April 2, 1796, complaining that "the Hamburgers continued to bring us grain, but . . . in order to carry off our gold by selling . . . at excessive prices." 6 However, France was at Hamburg's mercy, for there were not sufficient diamonds at the Directory's disposal to guarantee payment to every creditor, and most international traders, such as the Prussian Treskow, required security. Hamburger merchants, to keep the favor of France, showed themselves very lenient on this score, and accepted bills of exchange which no one even in France — the land of worthless money — would have accepted, and valeurs representing contributions due from German states. But a still more convenient mode of acquittal was the payment of Hamburger merchants with bills of exchange coming from the contribution France had levied on Hamburg itself (vide infra). Without these transactions, the Directory informed the Five Hundred, the services of war and marine would have been exposed to want. 7 The Directory's tone was apologetic. It knew the public feeling toward Hamburg. The French also resented the fact that Hamburg was the continental entrepot of British goods, and that thus France, when buying commodities from Hamburg, was often stimulating the economic life of the national enemy. A law of October 31, 1796 declared it the duty of the French government to promote the industry of the Republic by shutting out the products of the enemy.8 This law prohibited all cloth importation without any distinction or qualification whatsoever, hoping thus to render it certain that English cotton would not creep into the French market through neutral channels.9 On November 21, 1796, the Directory forbade the entry into the Republic of all goods which were not accompanied by a certificate of a French consul or minister that they had not originated in England. This "Probably latter part of 1795, Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 315. This attitude toward foreigners engaged in the carrying trade appeared also in another quarter. Strasburg wished Baden's Rhine carrying trade limited to what Baden itself produced; likewise with the Rhine commerce of the other riverains except Mayence and the Palatinate, which had treaties with France on the subject since 1751. It was recognized by Strasburg, of course, that the principle of free navigation of the Rhine might interpose difficulties ("Article Which the Munici-

pality and Business Interests of . . . Strasburg Desire Inserted in the Peace Treaty . . . ," n.d., Arch. N., AF III 59, d. 230). e N o . 109, under "Nouvelles étrangères." 7 Dir. to Five Hundred, Aug. 22, 1797, Rédacteur, no. 619 (Aug. 26, 1797); Elgin to Grenville, Sept. 12, 1796, P. R. O., F. O. 64/41. 8 R. B. Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleon (London, 1924), p. 199. ' Min. of int. to Delacroix, July 1, 1797, Arch. A. E., Prusse 221, f. 253.

THE DIRECTORY AND THE HANSEATIC CITIES

819

decree caused consternation in Hamburg, for one of the city's chief industries was the refining and sale of British sugar.10 France's third complaint against Hamburg was due to the city's preëminence in the field of banking. There England bought gold and silver whenever it was cheaper than in London, 11 and, conversely, sold it when it was dearer.12 There England raised loans to carry on the war against France.18 There England bought louis d'or to provision the French royalists.14 The result was that there concentrated France's hatred for England. A fourth reason why the Directory was not kindly disposed toward Hamburg was that the city refused to accept a French minister. It was shortly before the end of the Convention that the Württemberger-born Reinhard arrived in Hamburg to represent the interests of France in the Hansa cities. Hamburg had refused to recognize Lehoc, Reinhard's predecessor, in 1793,15 and other French agents since,16 therefore Reinhard informed the Hamburger syndic Dormann that he (Reinhard) would not hand in his credentials until Hamburg had rendered itself worthy of the amicable sentiments contained therein.17 Beware of delaying too long, warned Barthélémy; the position of the Hansa towns is very difficult because of the dominance of near-by great powers.18 But Reinhard could not hand in his credentials. The Hamburger Senate refused to accept them. The refusal may have been due in part to the intrigues of one Citizen Benaven,19 who pretended to be charged with surveying the commercial operations of France, and who gave himself out as the "verificator general" of all accounts of provisions supplied to France.20 Delacroix ordered Reinhard to withdraw from Hamburg, but Reinhard did not obey, and the Directory instructed Delacroix to repeat his order.21 In March, there appeared in a Hamburger paper an anonymous article running: "All your city, all Europe even, knows that for five months there has been at Hamburg a French minister to the Hanseatic cities; he treats "Reinhard to Delacroix, Nov. 18, Dec. 19, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 231. 11 Idem, March 31, April 14, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 317; Rédacteur, no. 491 (April 20, 1797), under "Politique étrangère." 12 "Copies of all Communications between the Directors of the Bank [of England] and Pitt," no. 15 (Interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Feb. 5, 1796), H. H. S. Arch., England 183. Sent in to Thugut by Starhemberg, April 28, 1797. "Caillard to Delacroix, Sept. 6, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 315. Vide also Rédacteur, no. 491. 14 W . Windham to Grenville, April 14, 1796,

Dropmore Papers, III, 192-193. The idea of coining louis d'or in England met resistance, so there was nothing to do but buy them abroad (ibid.). ω Vide supra, Pt. I, chap. v. 18 Rédacteur, no. 109 (April 2, 1796). "Reinhard to Barthélémy, Oct. 16, 1795, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670, ff. 38-39. "Barthélémy to Reinhard, Nov. 2, 1795, Arch. A . E., Allemagne 670, f. 40. 16 Debidour spells this name "Bessavens" (Recueil, I, 725, n. 2). 20 Report to Dir. on Cit. Benaven, April 4, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 231. 3 F e b . 14, 1796, Arch. N., A F I I I * 20.

820

T H E DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

with your Senate; everyone receives him with the consideration due his character. Why have you not dared to receive him?" 22 But the Hamburger Senate did not dare. It feared the English; and besides, George III, as Elector of Hanover, exercised some jurisdiction within the city as owner of the cathedral and of some revenues. This placed him in a position of influence.23 The French were extremely angry at the refusal to recognize Reinhard, and Sandoz reported "indignation . . . beyond description" at Paris. The deputy of Hamburg tried to gain an audience to explain to the French government Hamburg's reasons for not recognizing Reinhard's character; no one wanted to hear him, though eventually he was admitted. Reubell at first was very ill disposed but softened a little when Sandoz, taking up the cause of Prussia's tiny neighbor, explained that had the city acted otherwise, its harbor would have been blockaded by the English and its commerce annihilated. But the most telling argument of Sandoz' was his mention that Hamburg served as France's clearing house.24 A fifth source of Franco-Hamburger hostility was the so-called "archive quarrel." The roots of this curious squabble lie in the late Conventional period. The Senate of Hamburg had refused to recognize Abbema, minister plenipotentiary of the puppet Batavian Republic. Reinhard insisted upon Abbema's prompt recognition, and after four months, the Senate of Hamburg yielded.25 But this was only the start of the trouble. Hartzinck, ex-minister of the defunct Netherlands States-General, refused to turn his archives over to Abbema, and the Senate of Hamburg declined to intervene, arguing that the archives included documents relative to princes of the Lower Saxon Circle who still recognized Hartzinck.26 France wanted Prussia to induce the Hamburg Senate to intervene,27 but Frederick William himself continued to recognize Hartzinck, and seems to have intervened verbally on the other side.28 For Frederick William to ask the Senate to oblige Hartzinck to yield would be tantamount to Prussian recognition of the Batavian Republic, Haugwitz told Caillard.29 This affair combined with the nonrecognition of Reinhard to heat the French to the combustion point. The presence of thousands of French émigrés in Hamburg was a sixth Rédacteur, no. 109 (April 2, 1796), under "Nouvelles étrangères," dated Hamburg, March 17. 23 Lagau to Barthélémy, dated at Hamburg, April 29, 1795, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 669, f. 189. 24 Sandoz to the King, April 12, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347. 25 Reinhard to Barthélémy, Oct. 16, 1795, 22

Arch. A. E., Allemagne 670, f. 39. Caillard to Delacroix, Dec. 26, 1795, Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 315. "Idem, Dec. 29, 1795, Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 315. 28 Idem, Dec. 26, 1795, Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 315. 29 Idem, March 6, 1796, Arch. N., AF III 76, d. 315. 26

THE DIRECTORY AND THE HANSEATIC CITIES

821

ground of friction between the Republic and Hamburg. Some of these émigrés were active in plotting against the Republic, and Reinhard believed that Hamburg should be obliged to expel them 3 0 — though to this, Hamburg could not afford to agree while England controlled the seas.31 The press of Hamburg was accused of being under the Pretender's control.32 Emigrés were constantly slipping back into France on passports granted by Hamburg and the other Hansa cities.33 Monopoly, overcharge, aid to the national enemy (English and Frenchémigré), refusal to honor accredited representatives, and freedom from contributions because of the Line of Demarcation — these were the grievances against Hamburg nurtured by France. Some of these grievances Hamburg made an earnest effort to banish — that of the émigré question, for instance. The Directory had ordered all generals and Commissioners to the armies to send in the names of all Frenchmen appearing on the visitors' registers of occupied German cities since 1789.34 Hamburg was not an occupied city, but it thought it was wisest to grant the French what they could gain by occupation, so supplied them with a list of all Frenchmen passing through or residing in Hamburg since 1789, with the dates of their passage or residence.35 This was of course a plain violation of the neutrality Hamburg was supposed to observe according to the Treaties of May 17, 1795, and August 5, 1796, but it was not the only violation the city indulged in to placate the Republic. Hamburg permitted the organization of a vast spy system, with ramifications extending the length and breadth of Germany, and aided French agents to gather information.36 But the question of the recognition of Reinhard was not so simple of solution, and on April 12, 1796, the enraged Directory, in secret session, ordered an embargo on all Hamburger vessels. All five Directors signed the decree.37 "If we had not been restrained by consideration for the line of neutrality," declared Delacroix, "we should have set our troops marching to lay this city under contribution." 38 Carnot also complained that the line of neutrality prevented France from "wreaking vengeance on those who provoke us audaciously. How can we punish, for example, the city of Hamburg for the affront it has just given us before the eyes of all Europe? Those people are too rich, and it is indispensable that they buy their neutrality Reinhard to Delacroix, April 21, 1797, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 231. 31 Sciout, Direc., Ill, 668. 82 Rédacteur, no. 495 (April 24, 1797), under "Nonofficial." "Reinhard to Delacroix, Nov. 25, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 231. 84 "Circular of Dir. to Generals and Cmrs," Oct. 12, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 407, d. 30

2239. Sciout, Direc., Ill, 671-672. Reinhard asked for similar lists from Bremen and Lübeck {ibid.). 38 ibid., p. 668. " D e b i d o u r , Recueil, II, 140. " Sandoz to (he King, April 12, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347. 35

822

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

dearly." 3 9 Just two weeks later, Sandoz reported to Frederick William that "the great rage against Hamburg [was] subsiding. . . W h a t will save it from a contribution is that the other powers could impose similar levies." 40 O n June 24, 1796, France and Hamburg signed a secret treaty for the Establishment of commercial relations, and Sandoz was proved a poor prophet. A f t e r granting Hamburg the "generous pardon" of France, the agreement stipulated that France should not insist on the recognition of its envoy until the general peace, in order to quiet the city's fears of its neighbors. T h e French envoy was to treat with Hamburg from adjoining Altona, the public records of the Hamburg Senate to contain no trace of the conversations. But — and here appears Sandoz' miscalculation — the government or merchants of Hamburg were to accept 5,000,000 florins' worth of the greatly depreciated Batavian bonds, in payment whereof, Hamburg was to turn over to France 2,000,000 livres tournois in good bills of exchange, and grant receipts (as though in return for payment) for 8,000,000 livres owed by the Republic and never paid. 41 T h e embargo was of course to be lifted, but further trouble for Hamburg's trade soon loomed in the effort of France to strike at England. T h e above-mentioned L a w of November 21, 1796, forbidding the entry into France of goods of English origin, was followed by advices that the French intended to seize as prizes of war Hamburger vessels carrying English goods. 42 A n d indeed some vessels were seized, for after Leoben, certain Hamburg merchants were obliged to buy their ships back from France at extravagant prices. 43 By the Treaty of June 24, France had succeeded in laying Hamburg under contribution without violating the neutrality line. By the seizure of Hamburger ships laden with English goods, another attack on the city was made without breaching that line. But rumor declared that the line would be physically breached; specifically, that France intended to seize the forts at the mouth of the Elbe in order to cut Hamburg off from England. Delacroix gave the lie to this story,44 but Haugwitz lent it credence. In a memoir of January 30, 1797, intended for the Russian government, Haugwitz wrote that France had a plan to render itself master of the shores of the North Sea as far as the mouth of the Elbe. 45 T h e rumor cropped up again "Idem, May 6, 1796, Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 67. 40 Idem, May 20, 1796, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347. 41 Debidour, Recueil, III, 494-496. 42 Elgin to Grenville, Feb. 25, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 64/43. 48 Sciout, Direc., I V , 144.

" D e l a c r o i x to Caillard, Dec. 7, 1796, Arch. A . E., Prusse 220, f. 174. Reinhard recommended strongly that the Elbe be closed to the English, for only so would "Carthage" be "destroyed" (to Delacroix, April 21, 1797, Arch. N . , A F III 59, d. 2 3 1 ) . " B a i l l e u , Pr. Frk.., I, 113.

THE DIRECTORY AND THE HANSEATIC CITIES

823

a few months later, and this time, as reported by Eden, it concerned a plan to invade Hamburg, Bremen, and Hanover. 46 It was not only France that Hamburg might have cause to fear. It was reported at Copenhagen that the English were going to take possession anew 4 7 of the forts at the mouth of the Elbe to forestall the anticipated French seizure.48 The Kings of Prussia and Denmark met at Pyrmont, the watering place, and both Reinhard and Parandier reported that Hamburg's fate was in question there. Parandier said the two kings contemplated giving Hamburg and Lübeck to the Duke of Mecklenburg, in order that Prussia might acquire the Duke's patrimony. 49 Reinhard declared that, according to what he had heard, Hamburg was destined for Prussia, Lübeck for Denmark, Bremen for Hanover, and Frankfort-on-the-Oder for Hesse-Cassel.50 In view of Talleyrand's repeated offer of Hamburg to Prussia, 51 and of the fate of Venice, a few phrases of the above despatch of Reinhard's should be noted: With the power that the French Republic wields in Germany, such a partition could take place only with its consent. Now, would it not be absurd to say that [the] Republic wishes to traffic in peoples, that it wishes to subject to kings republics which were the asylums of equality during the centuries of oppression and barbarism . . . ? Besides, the free states of the Empire are so many counterweights opposed to the despotic states, our natural enemies.52 Parandier, also, declared that France would certainly prevent the sacrifice of Hamburg and Lübeck. 53 It is indeed true that by the Treaty of August 5, 1796, France bound Prussia "to conserve Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck in their integrity and independence." 54 Of course the barb in this provision was intended to wound England primarily, as is shown by a project of treaty in the Prussian archives; 55 but the terms used in the Treaty of August 5 were sufficiently general to apply to all comers. Hamburg's only real assurance that it would not become a pawn in the game of diplomacy was that France had not yet made up her mind to whom she wished to give the city, or whether she should keep it for herself. " T o Grenville, June 24, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/50. As to Hanover, the rumor was reported also by Sandoz (to the King, May 30, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355). Cf. supra, Pt. I, chap, ν and n. 21. " Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, xii, § 2. "Delacroix to Caillard, Dec. 7, 1796, Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 174. " T o Delacroix, July 20, 1796, Aroh. N., A F Ill 76, d. 3 1 5 .

m

Idem, Aug. 6, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 230. Vide Sandoz to the King, Nov. 30, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 356. 52 Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 230. "Despatch of July 20, 1796, Arch. N., A F Ill 76, d. 3 1 5 . "Secret Art. IV. Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xi, I 3. 55 Art. VII. Dated April 1, 1796. G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 347. 51

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

In December 1796, the Senate of Lübeck, commissioned by the Directory of the Hanseatic League, requested Reinhard to forward to the French government a memoir on the interests of the Hansa. 66 This document was not in the form of articles to be incorporated in a treaty because the Hansa did not want to give the impression of trafficking with the enemy. For the same reason, Hamburg proposed to Bremen and Lübeck that similar propositions should be made to the Emperor. Reinhard wrote to the latter two cities, recommending the abandonment of the proposed appeal to the head of the Empire. T o Delacroix, Reinhard expressed the hope that a word from him (Delacroix) would "give to this timorous city [Hamburg] the courage to confide its fate exclusively to the benevolence and integrity of the French Republic." 67 W h a t did Reinhard mean by this last statement? This Württemberger Frenchman had plans which he probably could not himself have defined, but as far as can be determined from his remarks, they were very vast. H e viewed the tiny Hanseatic "republics" as one of the possible "foundation stones of a new constitutional edifice" for Germany, and recommended to his government that they should be linked with the other free cities of the Empire. "By this means a chain of republics would be formed the length of Germany." 5 8 " T h e constitutions of the three Hansa cities are the most democratic in Europe excepting the French constitution," Reinhard declared at another time. " T h e association of these three cities may form a nucleus for a larger union of free German states." 59 T h e Directory ordered Reinhard to endeavor to induce the Hansa cities to act in common despite their political and commercial rivalry — the first step toward the union suggested by Reinhard. 60 MThis

contained three main general thoughts: political independence, both as separate, independent states and as a league; liberty of commerce; and neutrality in future wars of the Empire even if the cities should furnish their contingents in men and money. There were provisions also concerning exemption of Lübeck and Bremen from appeal to the tribunals of the Empire in matters of comm e r c e — a privilege already enjoyed by Hamburg; concerning discharge of Hanover's rights in Bremen; and concerning abolition of the Oldenburg tolls, which, falling principally on French wines, weighed on France as much as on Bremen (Reinhard to Delacroix, Dec. 26, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 231). The previous July 21, one Herr Schlötter, agent of Bremen, had sent Delacroix some

propositions to be included in the eventual peace arrangements. The propositions concerned all the Hansa cities. One article asked for the establishment of the principle that a friendly flag rendered a cargo friendly, except as to contraband. Another article suggested that Hamburg should not be disquieted for having sold goods to.the enemy ("Note sur la ville de Brème et sur celles de Lübeck et Hamburg," Arch. Α. E., Allemagne 670, f. 242). Reinhard to Delacroix, Dec. 26, 1796, Arch. N „ A F III 59, d. 231. 38 Reinhard to Talleyrand, Aug. 25, 1797, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, ff. 234-235. 59 Reinhard to Delacroix, Dec. 26, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 231. 60 Aug. 25, 1796, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 673, f. 231. 07

THE DIRECTORY AND THE HANSEATIC CITIES

825

The next step toward such a union would be to detach the Hansa cities from the Empire. Under the Convention, first Lehoc, then Reinhard, had been sent to Hamburg as minister to the Hanseatic League, though the war was still going on. Both had been rejected because of the state of war. 61 Presently appeared the anomaly of two German cities, Bremen and Lübeck, confiding to the nation's enemy the task of wheedling concessions in their favor out of the Emperor and other German princes.62 Reinhard's plans may have been vast, but the lack of national feeling of the average German of this period was vaster still, and under such circumstances, it may not have been so chimeric an undertaking to try to detach the Hansa from the Empire. 81

82

Barthélémy to CPS, July 13, Aug. 7, 1795, Arch. A. E., Allemagne 669, ff. 187, 219. Memoir of Senate of Lübeck, in Reinhard's

despatch of Dec. 26, 1796, Arch. N., A F III 59, d. 2 3 1 .

^

CHAPTER XXVI

if

FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE 18 FRUCTIDOR

I.

FRANCE AND PRUSSIA

R U S S I A ' S reluctance to help the Republic by a show of armed force when Austria was in a position to strike back was understood at Paris, and Frederick William was not blamed. But the King's refusal to aid in the middle of April, when Austria was crippled, aroused France's resentment 1 because such a refusal, it seemed to her, could be motivated by nought but stark unwillingness. Out of mere habit, however, the Directors continued to deluge Sandoz with tales of Austria's boundless enmity. Carnot declared that Merveldt and Bellegarde, in their conferences with Bonaparte, had exhaled imprecations and reproaches against Prussia, and had even asserted that Prussia's neutrality was more deleterious (because perfidious) to the Emperor than the outspoken enmity of France. 2 Similar stories reached Sandoz through other channels. 3 Sandoz did not necessarily believe the tales he forwarded to Berlin; in fact, he added as commentary to one of his reports that "everything which passes through the mouth or pen of the French is so falsified that I do not know what to think." 4 H e was more concerned in finding out whether the Secret Convention of August 5 had been violated by the Preliminaries with Austria. At first the French insisted that it had not been, but they declined to make known the terms of the Leoben Treaty. It was not until the early days of May that a f e w crumbs of information were forthcoming. Even then, the French presentation was so fraught with untruths that Prussia learned little of what had actually happened at Leoben. Sandoz was told that it was France which had arranged for Austria's indemnification in Italy in order 1 2

Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, xxxi. Sandoz to the King, April 29, 1797, ibid., p. 124.

* Idem., June 3, 1797, ibid., η. 2. Idem, April 29, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Fran\reich, 89, fase. 355.

l

FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE 1 8 FRUCTIDOR

that the Emperor should not obtain Bavaria — an acquisition which France knew Prussia did not favor. Sandoz was advised that the Emperor had wanted a separate negotiation but that France had insisted on a congress at Berne so she could favor her German friends (and the Orange House) by means of secularization. Bonaparte was represented as having insisted that provision for establishing the Prince of Orange be included in the peace, and the Imperial plenipotentiaries were supposed to have drowned all such suggestions in a rain of imprecations directed at Prussia.5 In the midst of all the lies, however, could be recognized the clear admission that Frederick William's Orangist brother-in-law had, despite all France's promises, been left without compensation: a prince without a principality. Delacroix knew how troubled Sandoz would be, so he prepared a line of argument to placate the wrath of the Prussian envoy, to give him hope that the Prince of Orange would yet obtain his indemnity — and perhaps to obtain Prussian aid in increasing the severity of the Leoben terms in the definitive Franco-Austrian peace. An establishment for the House of Orange, Delacroix said, depended upon secularization. Secularization depended upon France's acquisition of the Rhineland. Thus, Prussia's interest, as well as France's, demanded that France secure the Rhine boundary. And Sandoz was assured that the Preliminaries could be corrected to allow for this change.6 Carnot and Reubell had another solution — one that bade fair to involve Prussia in war with England, thus supplying the Republic with an ally against her one remaining active enemy. The two Directors broached the subject cautiously, at first merely declaring to Sandoz that the easiest course at Leoben would have been to assign Hanover to the Prince of Orange — if only the King of Prussia had withdrawn from his neutrality and allowed France to occupy the Electorate. Sandoz remarked how strange it was even to think that the King would consider, at the end of a long war, violating the principles which had guided him through the conflict7 — principles strengthened, though he did not say it, by the virtual certainty of English subsidies in case of need.8 That was all that was said about Hanover at this date. The seed had been planted and left to sprout. Meanwhile, the Prussian disposition continued as bitter as before. Official circles at Berlin were not surprised that our general took the Preliminaries by storm, Caillard wrote to Paris, but they thought our secret convention should nevertheless have been conformed with, at least in so far as possible; 5

Hiiffer, Europa, I, 3 6 3 - 3 6 4 . " S a n d o z to the King, May 7, 1 7 9 7 , Bailleu, Pr. I, 1 2 5 . ''Idem, May 7, 1 7 9 7 , G . S. Arch., R X I

8

Frankreich 89, fase. 3 5 5 . George III to Grenville, Jan. Dropmore Papers, 111, 293.

11,

1797,

828

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

especially did they think the establishment of the House of Orange should not have been entirely forgotten. Haugwitz, in an endeavor to stir France into action regarding compensation for the King's Orange relatives, offered to recognize the Batavian Republic directly that it appeared certain the Orangist indemnity would be soon forthcoming. 9 But that indemnity had to come from somewhere, and unless Prussia "accepted" Hanover, the only source was through secularization — not possible without the Emperor's concurrence, and very unlikely to be concurred in, especially if it should benefit Prussia. Frederick William knew this, and sulked. Caillard thought to improve relations by a mark of confidence and esteem. He apprized the Prussian Ministry, on May 15, of the terms of the Preliminaries — but only of the patent articles,10 the substance of which the ministers could have read for themselves in the Moniteur.11 A s far as the secret articles were concerned, Delacroix did not think it the proper time to divulge them. 12 It may be that he feared Prussia would interpose hurdles to the contemplated rape of Venice. Frederick William, it will be recalled, had once offered Venice a guarantee of her territorial integrity. 13 But just as Thugut's secrecy regarding the Leoben terms caused the English to suspect that a FrancoAustrian alliance had been concluded, 14 so Delacroix's secrecy aroused the same suspicions in Sandoz. 15 Sandoz' suspicions were aggravated by a rumor circulating in Paris that a Franco-Austrian alliance was on the point of being concluded. Some members of the Councils and employees of the bureaus spoke in Sandoz' presence of the utility, for the repose of Europe, of a Franco-Austrian alliance. There really was, at Paris, what Sandoz called an "Austrian party," composed of persons of moderate temperament who held that France needed an ally in Germany, and that since Prussia had shown herself unwilling to assume that role, the choice should fall upon Austria. Sandoz was much perturbed. Carnot, himself a member of the "Austrian party," tried to appease him, and declared that a Franco-Austrian alliance, even if concluded, would be of little consequence, for the interests of France and Austria were antithetic, Austria being the enemy of the friends of France (that is, of Prussia and Turkey). 1 6 Another rumor circulating in Paris at this time declared that the French were about to invade Hanover. T h e French newspapers applauded. Sandoz, convinced that no rumor was entirely baseless, approached Reubell and T o Delacroix, May 13, 1797, Arch. A . E., Prusse 221, f. 132. 10 G . S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355. 1 1 X X V I I I , 681 (May 1, 1797). " D e l a c r o i x to Caillard, May 18, 1797, Arch. A. E., Prusse 221, f. 147. 8

13 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xxiii, § 4. " Ibid. 16 Hüffer, Europa, I, 365-366. " S a n d o z to the King, May 30, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355.

FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE 1 8 FRUCTIDOR

829

Carnot. The first answers he received were not reassuring. *'Why does not the King of Prussia take possession of this electorate?" the Directors asked. "Why does he want the King of England, our bitter enemy, to conserve this territory and this dignity" — then, harking back to their suggestion of three weeks before, the Directors added — "and why does he refuse to make of it an honorable and convenient indemnity for the Prince of Orange?" But at the end of the interview, Carnot and Reubell assured Sandoz that the Directory would respect the neutrality line.17 The Directory was really in a difficult position. It was not satisfied with Bonaparte's treaty, and wanted to aggravate the terms. To do so, it thought it needed the assistance of Prussia. It therefore desired to please Frederick William by finding a principality for his sister and brother-in-law to rule. But Bonaparte's treaty, by failing to require the Emperor's acceptance of the principle of secularization, had rendered it difficult to find anything. Hanover might indeed have constituted a suitable principality, but this choice would have involved Frederick William in war, and if he had wanted to fight, his relatives need not have fled the Netherlands originally. The above reasoning must certainly have coursed through the Directory's mind, with the corollary: if a principality cannot be found for the Prince of Orange, Frederick William may try to restore the Netherlands to him. The result was Caillard's note of June 9, demanding Prussia's immediate recognition of the Batavian Republic. Of course, Prussia herself had really brought to a head the fears that produced this note. Her offer to recognize the Batavian Republic as soon as the Orangist indemnity was assured, when read backwards spelled no indemnity, no recognition — ever. However, through fear of angering the powerful young Republic, the Prussians now promised immediate but provisional de facto recognition: Secretary of Legation Bielefeld would be sent to The Hague "for the present"; de jure recognition would follow when the Prince of Orange's indemnity was assured.18 The Prussians were wrong to blame the Directory for not having stipulated an indemnity for the ex-stadholder in the Leoben Treaty. The Directory had had little to do with the Preliminaries; they were the work of Bonaparte. The French government tried, however, to make some amends. Delacroix had written to Caillard already on May 30: "You are specially authorized to repeat to the Prussian government . . . that the signature of the Preliminaries will not in any way prevent the execution of our secret convention, at least in so far as circumstances and the essential interests of the Republic will permit; especially the idea of establishing the House of Orange will not be forgotten." Caillard was told to add that an establishment for the House of 17

G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355.

18

Hiiffer, Europa, I, 366.

830

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Orange was included in the instructions of the French plenipotentiaries then negotiating the Franco-Austrian definitive peace. 19 This message, presented by Caillard on June 9, incensed Frederick William. France had obligated herself on August 5, 1796, to do all in her power to procure a proper establishment for the Prince of Orange. N o w she was trying to evade that ironclad engagement by modifying it with "in so far as circumstances and the essential interests of the Republic will permit." Likewise objectionable did the King find the expression that "the idea of establishing the House of Orange will not be forgotten." That appeared to him a relegation of the problem to some indefinite future period. Sandoz was ordered to demand the exact fulfillment of the August 5 Treaty. Moreover, he was to try to determine precisely what efforts France had made at Leoben to secure the Emperor's consent to the indemnification of the House of Orange in Germany — for the King had heard from reliable sources that the subject had not even been broached at Leoben. 20 Of course it had not, and quite properly so. The Leoben Treaty was between France and Austria. If, because the Austrian ruler was Emperor, the Empire was considered also, that was no reason for introducing the affairs of a state having no connection with the Empire. As far as Germany was concerned, secularization seemed quite unnecessary. The only ruler deprived of territory by the Preliminaries was Francis II, and his indemnity was to be at the expense of Italy. Bonaparte had not exacted the Rhineland, so there were no left-bank princes to indemnify. The situation was changing, however. Some of the Directors hankered after at least part of the Rhineland, and the dispossessed princes would have to be compensated somewhere. This "somewhere" would necessarily be in Germany at the expense of the Church. Here France's interest matched the interest of Prussia, which needed secularization for the Orange indemnity. The advantages of secularization, from France's point of view, were manifold : the triumph of philosophy over "fanaticism" and "superstition" (Revolutionary terms signifying "the Catholic Church") ; decrease in the influence of the Habsburgs, the cadet members of which family ruled over many sees; and the strengthening of the German Protestant party — the ancient ally of Henry IV, Louis XIII, and Louis X I V — which would be deliberately favored in the process.21 The Emperor naturally refused to agree to secularization, for, aside from 18

May 28, 1797, Arch. A. E., Prusse 2 2 1 , £. 21. 20 Hiiffer, Europa, I, 366-367. 21 When Barthélémy was negotiating the Treaty of Basel with Prussia, Harnier wrote to his king, June 8, 1795, that the French

negotiators were disposed to grant an increase of territory at the expense of the ecclesiastical states even to those princes who would lose nothing by France's retention of the left bank (Bailleu, Pr. Frk.., I, 7).

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83I

the fact that it would work to his disadvantage, he had sworn, as head of the Empire, to defend the Imperial constitution. France therefore thought to induce Prussia — which had itself been promised a great increase of territory at the expense of the German Church — to frighten Austria into accepting the principle as the basis of the future peace. Caillard was ordered to inform the Prussian government that, as the arrangements for the peace seemed to be taking form, it was highly desirable that Prussia should declare publicly and firmly its adherence to the principle of secularization. Caillard was instructed to add that the Emperor had signified that he was only too willing to gain by the process, but felt that his Imperial character precluded him from broaching such a subject; and that Prussia should therefore assume the initiative. Finkenstein answered for the King, for Haugwitz was at Pyrmont with Frederick William. 22 Finkenstein wrote to Sandoz that neither did Prussia desire to appear like a vulture hovering over the expiring Empire; that it was France's place to make the proposition.23 Caillard returned to the charge on June 27, and quoted to Haugwitz parts of a despatch from Delacroix: It is time to lead Prussia to break . . . a silence which deprived us last year of the peace for which we are working today. If the system of secularization . . . is frankly adopted and sustained by it, the influence of its determination will draw along Austria . . . , which is still held back only by the fear of compromising its Imperial character. Then Caillard went through the list of important German states — Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony — adducing reasons why they would favor secularization, and arguing that Prussia would therefore be running no danger if she posed as the proponent of the project. Caillard pleaded with Haugwitz for some bit of written evidence that could be laid before Austria, so Austria could see for herself where Prussia stood. Work with us, he concluded, or else . . . He left the threat unfinished. 24 The King replied that if the Emperor had accepted the principle of indemnification by secularization, but was hanging back for fear of compromising his Imperial character, Prussia would gladly make, with France and Austria, a joint declaration.25 This message, intended by Prussia as the written evidence France had asked for, was sent to Sandoz for delivery. It was duly delivered, and Sandoz was full of confidence for a happy outcome 22

The King was very ill (Hüffer, Europa, I, 369). Reinhard had written already the previous spring that the King had forbidden people to talk about his death, believing thus to postpone the event to a distance (to Delacroix, floréal, V [April-May 1797],

Arch. N., A F III 76, d. 3 1 7 ) . June 26, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Fr\., I, 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 . 24 G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase, 355. a Declaration of Pr. King to Fr. gov't, July 3, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., IV, 83-87. 28

832

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

when he met Barthélémy. Barthélemy's uncle, the celebrated author of Anacharsis, had been on friendly terms with Sandoz, so the Director-nephew of the great man bared his secrets to Sandoz: Never, he confided, had he, a Director, heard anything about the Emperor's acceptance of the principle of secularization. Moreover, he did not expect to. As far as he could recall, the subject had not even been spoken of in the Directory.26 The attempt to secure a declaration from Prussia was given up for a few weeks, in which interval Talleyrand succeeded Delacroix. On August 16, the new minister of foreign affairs wrote to Caillard that "it is not a cold and indifferent mediation which we believe we have a right to expect from Prussia, but an active and complete association." Prussia should aid France to secure the adoption of the principle of secularization, "the only means whereby our interests and its own can be simultaneously satisfied." 27 And the French government pulled out of its files the Prussian note concerning a joint declaration, and put it to work. Clarke, alone at Udine with the Austrian negotiators during the latter half of August, approached the Austrians one day with news. The Directory had written him, he said, that, in consequence of a note received from the Court of Berlin, he was being charged to make overtures to Austria in the name of the King of Prussia. The Austrian negotiators sloughed off the matter as having no possible connection with the negotiations for peace, but tried to fathom Clarke's mind for clues as to what lay behind. Clarke hesitated to talk, said the propositions would be made in the conferences when Bonaparte arrived. However, "he did not hide that it was a plan concerning Germany which was in question." And he insisted that the proposals were advantageous to the Emperor. "It is easy to divine," wrote Cobenzl to Dietrichstein [who was taking Cobenzl's place at St. Petersburg], "the nature of the propositions we can expect. They indicate the most intimate intelligence between Prussia and the French Republic, and probably a determination . . . to carry matters to extremes if we insist . . . on . . . the integrity of the Empire. . . The French present the King of Prussia as an ally already. We must be able to say the same of Russia. . ." Dietrichstein should urge Paul to take a single firm step which would put a halt to the "pernicious conspiracies" of Prussia and "thereby" bring France back to what had been solemnly agreed upon at Leoben.28 M

Hiiffcr, Europa, I, 367, 3 7 0 - 3 7 1 . " A r c h . A . E., Prusse 2 2 1 , f. 329. This despatch seems to have been the result of a letter from Clarke to the French minister of foreign affairs, urging that Prussia be induced to make a positive declaration in

favor of secularization (Talleyrand to Clarke, Aug. 1 , 1797, Pallain, Min. Talleyrand, p. 9 1 ) . 28 Aug. 30, 1 7 9 7 , Thugut . . . System, Pt. II, 45-46.

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833

Closely related to the subject of secularization was that of Bavaria's fate. They were — now that the Bavaro-Zfe/gï'a« exchange was no longer possible — but different aspects of the same problem: indemnification for territorial losses occasioned by French expansion. Prussia was perfectly happy to be indemnified with German territory, but she looked with horror upon any increase in the Emperor's German holdings. Shortly after the Preliminaries were signed, Sandoz asked Reubell, Carnot, and Le Tourneur if Bavaria could be considered safe from Austrian covetousness. The three Directors assured him unanimously that Bavaria would never be accorded as indemnity to the Emperor. The most that might be offered the Emperor was the Archbishopric of Salzburg, and if need be, the Bishopric of Passau, to induce him to consent to the principle of secularization; "but nothing further." 2 9 Carnot's brother 30 gave similar assurances a month later. 31 Barthélémy shook Sandoz' confidence a little by asserting that though the Directory was much opposed to the acquisition of Bavaria by Austria, he, Barthélémy, "would not care to guarantee that it has not been made again the subject of some proposition; anything may be expected from those charged to negotiate a peace so important." 3 2 Sandoz' despatch of August 24 declared that all Bonaparte's letters had represented the exchange of Bavaria as of small import, and that since Talleyrand's entry into the Ministry, an article dealing with the exchange of Bavaria had been framed. These considerations caused Sandoz to distrust the repeated assurances of Reubell that Bavaria would be conserved to the Palatine House. 33 It was only on August 29, when Reubell and Talleyrand apprized him of the instructions to Bonaparte of the twenty-fourth regarding evacuation of the forts of the Empire by Austria, 34 that Sandoz felt better.35 Frederick William did not wish to help France reduce the power of Austria, but he was not backward in demanding the benefits of France's unaided efforts. If France had not thought she needed Prussia's aid to compensate the left-bank princes, it is quite possible that the strained relations obtaining after Leoben would have become a permanent institution. Certainly before the question of secularization arose, the prohibition on the importation of cloth (Law of October 31, 1796) had been applied to Prussia too though the L a w of February 7, 1797, had clearly manifested the inten29

Sandoz to the King, May 7, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355. 80 Claude Marie Carnot de Feulins habitually assisted his Director-brother, hence was well informed (idem, June 4, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355). 31 Idem, June 4, 1797, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 355.

32

Idem, June 28, 1797, Bailleu, Pr. Frk-, I,

135· Idem, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 356. 34 Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xxix, § 4. 35 Sandoz to the King, G. S. Arch., R XI Frankreich 89, fase. 356. M

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

«34 36

tion that the treaty relations between France and Prussia should not be violated. But when Frederick William's favor was again sought, it was recognized that the prohibition could not apply to Prussia. 37 2.

FRANCE AND AUSTRIA

Thugut apparently did not expect that the Baptiste-Talleyrand conferences at Paris would supersede the Udine conversations. Before Baptiste left for Paris, Degelmann had been attached to the Udine mission. "It is well that Baptiste goes on ahead," wrote Thugut, mentioning the paucity, which Baptiste's presence at Paris could remedy, of correct information concerning events in France and their effect upon Bonaparte's position. 38 Baptiste, Gallo, Degelmann, and Merveldt were to push Austria's demands as far as possible, but not to risk the resumption of hostilities. For that, Austria was not ready, since she had discounted its possibility for so long that now she could not retrace her steps.39 Still, as Thugut recognized, one "could not at all be sure" that Bonaparte would not render it necessary to fight.40 It was hard to tell what the French would do. "Even should they decide to be reasonable, they would still begin by making difficulties, by bullying." 4 1 When it should have appeared that Bonaparte had "truly said his last word," when, in other words, war might follow if the French propositions were not accepted, then Thugut would send to Udine the Emperor's ace negotiator, Cobenzl, to conclude the parleys.42 Cobenzl had already arrived from St. Petersburg, where he had long been ambassador, on August 8,43 and Thugut was coaching him since on the part he was to play at Udine. 44 The departure of Gallo and Degelmann for Udine was three times 4 5 announced, but they never seemed quite to "make the grade." Even after Thugut had written: "Our Udine negotiators have finally left," 4 6 Gallo informed Clarke that the arrival of Romeuf seemed to require that he 36

Art. VI of the Treaty of Basel provided for the reëstablishment of prewar commercial relations pending the negotiation of a new treaty of commerce. 87 Min. of int. to min. of for. aft., July i , 1797, Arch. A. E., Prusse 221, ff. 253-254. The complaints of Prussia are noted in min. of finances to min. of for. aff., June 30, 1797, ibid., ft. 246-247. 28 To Count Colloredo, Aug. 5, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 45. '"Thugut to Count Coiloredo, Sept. 17, 1797, ibid., p. 57; also Aug. 23, ibid., p. 49; Sept. 7, ibid., p. 55. 40 Idem, Sept. 7, 1797, ibid., p. 55.

41

Idem, ibid. Idem, ibid. ; also Sept. 17, 1797, ibid., p. 57. Langwerth von Simmern suggests that it might have been reasoned that since Cobenzl was to inherit Thugut's office, he (Cobenzl) should make the peace (Oestr. Reich fr. Rev., II, 430). " T h u g u t to Count Colloredo, Aug. 8, 1797, Briefe Thugut, II, 46. "Idem, Sept. 7, 1797, ibid., p. 55; Sept. 17, 1797, ibid., p. 57. " T h e first announcement was made on August 5, 1797, for "next Monday" (idem, ibid., p. 45). "Idem, Aug. 1 3 , 1797, ibid., p. 47. 12

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835

remain in Vienna a few days longer.47 It was obvious that the plenipotentiaries were procrastinating while awaiting news from Baptiste. They did finally arrive in Italy, however, and that, within the month of August. 48 On hearing the startling news, Bonaparte repaired to Venetia, and installed himself at Passariano (near Udine), in the "extremely rich" country house of ex-Doge Manini. Its enormous hall, "the size of an ordinary house," decorated with paintings; its "singular" garden of four elevations covered with large statues representing mythological characters; its fine, large court entered through a peristyle; its two great piazzas, 49 were to have their influence upon the negotiations, as had the splendors of Montebello. Here, established like Ashurbanipal, Bonaparte was to meet with the representatives of the defeated enemy. Nothing could have been better calculated to increase his pretensions. But every second day, like a gracious monarch visiting the hovels of the poor, he would repair to Udine, where, in relatively plebian circumstances, were lodged the plenipotentiaries of the ancient House of Habsburg. Between the two towns the conversations were to alternate — betwen the piazza of the Doge's palace and the Casa Prospero Antonini. 50 The conferences began on August 31. The Austrian plenipotentiaries declared that the Emperor reserved the right to convoke a congress at Berne if the Udine negotiations did not succeed, to which end he had named plenipotentiaries who were to proceed to Berne immediately upon hearing of the Udine failure. The French delegates objected strenuously, seeing in this statement a derogation from the full powers formerly granted to the Austrian delegates. They declared that the assembly of plenipotentiaries at Udine was really the Congress of Berne meeting in a different place, and that their instructions required them to reject any clause tending to change the character of the Udine negotiations. After a long discussion and a vain attempt to agree, it was decided that the conferences should proceed nevertheless. 51 There is a rather amusing incident connected with the protocol of the second meeting. First, a few remarks by way of introduction. It will be recalled that Article II of the Preliminaries of Leoben had provided for the observation of prewar ceremonial. When the Directory ratified that treaty, it had assumed the precedence,62 though all Europe except Russia recognized the right of the "successor of Charlemagne" to come first. Gallo had therefore " C l a r k e to Bonaparte, Aug. 15, 1797, Corr. tnéd. Napo., VII, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 . " G a l l o arrived at Udine on August 1 7 ; Degelmann, August 19. Merveldt was there already when Gallo arrived (Sybel, Europe, V, n o ) . " Journal Dcsaix, pp. 207-208.

50

Ibid., p. 2 1 3 . "Proctocol of second meeting," Sept. 1 , 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 237. " T h a t was not the Directory's only breach. It had sent its ratification on paper instead of on parchment. 61

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THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

refused to exchange ratifications until Bonaparte agreed to accept simultaneously a protest setting forth the Emperor's prerogative in such matters, and averring that the act of the French government was not to be considered as derogatory thereto. 53 T h e Directory maintained that it had not violated the rules of the old ceremonial since it had not ratified a treaty but only the preparatory bases of a treaty, and since it was not dealing with the Emperor but only with the K i n g of Bohemia and Hungary. 5 4 There is something to be said in favor of the Directory's thesis, though the Emperor found that the French were engaging in "childish and roguish tricks." 5 5 T h e incident which occurred in regard to the protocol of the second Udine-Passariano conference is similar. Bonaparte had hitherto been conforming regularly to the above-mentioned custom which entitled the Imperial plenipotentiaries to have their names highest on the page. O n September 2, however, the future emperor was indisposed, and signed higher than Gallo, Merveldt, and Degelmann. T h e Imperial plenipotentiaries drew his attention to what he had done, but he, in true dyspeptic fashion, retorted that he would sign his name where he found room; moreover, he was not negotiating with the representatives of the Emperor, but only with those of the K i n g of Bohemia and Hungary. T h e meal having eventually digested, the customary order was resumed on succeeding days. 56 T h e third meeting of the Udine-Passariano conferences was also stormy. T h e French plenipotentiaries declared that the Republic had sacrified all the advantages of its victory to the consideration of a prompt separate peace with the Emperor, so that it could turn all its forces against its other enemies, "to hasten in like manner the moment of a prompt and separate peace with them." However, five months had elapsed since Leoben. T h e plenipotentiaries of the Republic therefore declared — without the authorization of the Directory, be it noted 5 7 — that if the definitive peace were not concluded by October 1, they would no longer be able to negotiate on the basis of the Preliminaries, but only on that of "the respective positions of the two powers." Bonaparte explained to the Directory the line of thought which led to this declaration: " T h e Emperor and the [Austrian] people want peace; T h u g u t does not want peace, but he dares not wish for war. . . Show him war like the head of Medusa, and we will bring Herrn T h u g u t to his senses." 58 T h e Imperial plenipotentiaries protested against placing a time limit on the validity of the Preliminaries. 59 Eden to Grenville, June 5, 1797, P. R. O., F. O. 7/49. " B o n a p a r t e and Clarke to Imperial plenipos., June 21, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 140. 50 Emperor to Charles, June 9, 1797, HüfferLuckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 208. 56 "Briefe Napo.," Arch, öster. Gesch., X L I X , 58

Pt. I, 285. ™ Hüffer-Luckwaldt, Quellen, Pt. II, Vol. I, 328. 58 Sept. 3, 1797, quoted in Hüffer, Europa, I, 352. """Protocol of third meeting," Sept. 3, 1797, Corr. inéd. Napo., VII, 239-240.

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837

Thus ended, on September 3, 1797 — 1 7 fructidor, V, the third conference of the Udine-Passariano series. Despite the French ultimatum, this would hardly be a proper place to terminate a chapter were not events of major significance to occur in Paris before the next meeting on the morrow. Of course, the slowness of communication would prevent the news thereof from arriving in Udine for several days, so that the effect of the events would not be immediately felt. However, time is unrelenting; 18 fructidor comes on 18 fructidor and on no other day; so we must be grateful we do not have to end this chapter in the middle of a sentence. And we can well utilize the change of scene to see how the Rhineland has been faring.

CHAPTER XXVII

if

THE LEFT BANK ON THE EVE OF THE 18 FRUCTIDOR

I. FRANCE AND THE RHINELAND

a. The Old-Regime Officials Restored T will be recalled that on January 23, 1797, J. B. Holtz entered upon his new duties as Director-General of the conquered territory between the Moselle and Rhine. 1 Holtz, and Commissioner Poissant of the Sambre and Meuse Army's province, mentioned to the Directory that the left bank was being wretchedly administered, and that the maintenance of the French soldiery was suffering thereby. They suggested that the administration be returned to the Germans. 2

/

On January 24, the Directory appointed Lazare Hoche to the command of the Sambre and Meuse Army, and — the common knowledge that efficiency was not an attribute of the General Directions 3 having been so recently reinforced by the remarks of Holtz and Poissant — the Directory raised the question whether Hoche should not be entrusted with the civil administration also.4 T h e new general was himself of the opinion that the General Directions had been "sent for the misfortune of the army and the inhabitants." 6 It was the administrators, he wrote to the Directory, who were responsible for the "famine." Undoubtedly they were good men, honest, pure; but they were uninformed, almost useless, and costly, and everyone, French and German alike, would get along better without them. H e said that, if the old German authorities were recalled, his commissary general, or the latter's agent, could make the demands for money and provisions directly of them, under the ever-watchful eye of the general in chief.® 1

Vide supra, Pt. II, chap, xix, § 3a. Hansen, Quellen, III, 878, η. 5. 8 Ibid. 1 Ibid., p. 876. 2

5

To Petiet, min. of war, Feb. 28, 1797, ibid. "Feb. 2, 1797» Hansen, Quellen, III, 878879.

THE LEFT BANK ON THE EVE OF THE 1 8 FRUCTIDOR

839

T o judge by Hoche's words, his administration of the Rhineland — if it were confided to him — would be a model one, and France too would gain. It formerly puzzled him, he said, why France received so little money from the war. "Oh, I am enlightened now! What treasures, what mines of Potosí, would ever be able to defray the scandalous expenses of some of our military men, the superb retinues of our army contractors, the brilliant houses of our Commissioners of all classes, of our employees of all grades? Clerks give dinners and possess carriages. Is there occasion for surprise? The public fortune has passed into their hands. And in the midst of this brilliant tumult, the defenders of the country go barefoot, lack articles of prime necessity in the hospitals, die for want of bouillon or herb tea." 7 On February 15, the Directory informed Rudler, its Commissioner to the Rhine and Moselle Army, that it had itself been thinking of reëstablishing the former local authorities, to wipe out with one stroke all the vices which had developed.8 On February 24, the Directory revoked all previous laws regarding the administration of the conquered left bank, and charged Hoche with the administration.9 The Directory did not at first make clear that he was to have charge of the civil government south of the Moselle also — i.e., of Moreau's territory — but Hoche prodded it, 10 and soon came the authority to administer both sides of the Moselle. 11 Moreau resisted. Hoche tried to conciliate him, but in vain. Moreau announced that Hoche's dispositions would not be honored in his (Moreau's) territory; and he did not yield. 12 As a result, Hoche's civil administration never did acquire much reality south of the Moselle, 13 and every word, every regulation, of Hoche's must be read with the thought in mind: Does it concern territory south of the Moselle? If so, probably it were best to forget it. On February 26, Duramel, the French minister of finances, briefed Hoche on certain aspects of his new (administrative) task. The Prussian left bank and the remainder of the left bank were, Duramel said, to be treated differently. "The former system of taxation will be maintained in what formed part of the states of the King of Prussia; nothing therein will be changed or added thereto, save what remains due of the forced loan. T o the clergy will be returned the possession of its property, [the fruits] of which it will enjoy in place of the pensions granted it [by l a w ] . " 1 4 T o these points, Duramel added instructions concerning the maintenance of religious liberty; the administration of Hohenzollern property according to the old system, ''Ibid., p. 898, η. 1. Reference is to Potosí, Bolivia. 8 Arch. N., A F III 433, d. 2488. 'Hansen, Quellen, III, 888. 10 March 4, ibid., p. 898. Sagnac thinks Desaix commanded south of the Moselle (Rhin

fr., p. 140). "March 9, Hansen, Quellen, III, 898, η. 2. 12 March 23, ibid. "Ibid., p. 943. 14 Vide η. 22, this chapter.

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but with France's collecting the proceeds; and the felling of timber, which was to cease. T h e n Duramel emphasized that all the above dispensations were for the benefit of Prussian territories alone. T h e remainder of the left bank was to be subject to "the amount and mode of contributions" that Hoche might see fit to impose. " Y o u doubtless . . . will prefer specie." Duramel suggested that the contribution-decrees be phrased to require, in the alternative, . . . units of coin, or . . . units of certain specified provisions; and that the provisions be reckoned at nine tenths of their coin value so people should prefer to pay in coin. Hoche should report monthly, straight to the Directory, on amounts levied and methods used. T h e center of accounts should be the paymaster general; he should be informed what sums were being asked of the country, and he should be in charge of all the receipts. "It is necessary . . . that you place me in a position to communicate with . . . those in charge of collection." 1 5 O n March 4, Hoche acknowledged receipt of the above. "Until now," he told the Directory, "the collections . . . have hardly defrayed the costs of administration. I guarantee you that those of the administration that I am going to organize will not reach 15,000 francs, all expenses included, that we will be able to get part of our pay out of it, and, finally, that the inhabitant will not be so pitilessly pillaged." 1 6 Four days later, Hoche informed the Prussian left bank of the new regulations. T h e old administration and its agents had been suspended, he said, and any further request by them for money or provisions should be disregarded. T h e ecclesiastics would soon have their sequestrated property back, and the leveling of the forests would immediately cease. 17 O n March 12, a series of provisional regulations was posted in the Prussian territory. Article I created an Intermediary Commission of five, to sit at Bonn, 18 its presiding officer to be ex-Colonel Shée, uncle of General Clarke. 1 9 T h e Commission, it was provided, should commence its functions on March 21,1797. O n that date, also, according to Article II, the former customs, laws, and taxes of the left bank should be restored; the old magistrates, chambers of justice, and chambers of finance should resume their functions; the clergy should remain in entire possession of its property. "Until further order, however, the authority of the Republic is the only one which is to be recognized in the conquered territory." Article III provided for the appointment, by the Intermediary Commission, of Commissioners to supervise the execution of the orders of the Commission and of the General in Chief. Article V I proHansen, Quellen, III, 889-891. c i t ó / . , p. 898. 17 Arch. A. E., Prusse 220, f. 422. " T h e Intermediary Commission, also known as the "General Administration of the 15

Conquered Territories," governed the conquered right bank as well as the left. It constituted itself on March 30 (Hansen, Quellen, III, 910, η. 4). 1 9 Biog. univ. (Michaud), s.v. "Shée ('Henri)."

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FRUCTIDOR

84X

vided that the old taxes, as well as what remained due of the forced loan, should be paid in their entirety to the paymaster general of the army. Article VII declared that if the vicissitudes of war, or some other cause, necessitated the levying of provisions or cattle, these should be paid for at a predetermined rate.20 In reporting to Paris on his dispositions, Hoche said, "Perhaps you will reproach me a little for my precipitation. . . I will not justify . . . my laconism. Aside from the fact that it is my way of writing, I thought that, to overlong writing representing no action, should succeed that of deeds done by few words. Phrases are no longer in season in this country; the people want deeds. . ." 2 1 And he gave them deeds. The same day that he promulgated the above regulations for the Prussian territory (March 12), he followed them with regulations for the entire occupied territory — left bank of the Rhine and right: The Intermediary Commission (above mentioned) should appoint bilingual Commissioners to execute its orders locally, apportion and collect taxes, watch over the national domain created by emigration or the rights of war, and receive protests. All requisitions and arbitrary impositions should cease to exist and prewar taxes should be reinstated, which latter — increased by one third as a war levy — should be paid to French agents. The members of spiritual communities (monks, nuns) should have the full administration of their own property; one third' of its income should be devoted to their own support, the remainder paid to the French tax collector.22 Taxes should be equally assessed, with no allowance to specially privileged persons or classes.23 The same day on which the Prussian and the general regulations above were promulgated, Cologne addressed a note to Hoche asking for an interview. The city had heard that an administrative shake-up was contemplated, and it saw a chance to put in a word for its old constitution. Hoche told the city to write.24 It did. As might have been surmised,28 Cologne wrote: May we please have our old Senate back? and please, oh, please! do not place us under the jurisdiction of our ancient enemy, Bonn. 26 The heads of the " A r c h . A. E., Prusse 220, f. 436. 21 To Duramel, March 15, 1797, Hansen, Quellen, III, 903. 22 The Directory, on May 17, 1796, had decreed that all income of whatever nature collected for the benefit of bishops, chapters, curates, abbeys, and monasteries (princes, nobles, corporations, emigres also) in the conquered but not annexed territory should constitute part of the national revenue of France. To keep the ecclesiastics alive, an annual stipend of ι,οοο francs was ac-

corded them (May 17 and June 21, 1796). But the stipends were paid only in part, and for only a few months (Hansen, Quellen, III, 785 and n. 4; 801, n. 3). This was why, according to Hoche, he returned the ecclesiastical property to the ecclesiastics (to Duramel, March 15, 1797, ibid., p. 904). 23 Hansen, Quellen, III, 901-902. Mlbid., p. 907, n. 1. 25 Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, vii, η. 128. 28 March 15, 1797, Hansen, Quellen, III, 907.

842

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Cologne guilds, and ex-Burgomaster J. N . Dumont, also appealed for the old Senate. T h e guilds wrote: If we do not receive our old constitution back, and France renounces the Rhineland to promote peace, jealous neighbors might find a pretext to infringe our liberty, and you would not want that. Hoche's reply was to send the city the first copy of his March 12 decree, and to order the Colonais to restore their old institutions by March 21. T h e city was effusive in its gratitude, 27 but it must be remembered that Hoche came from Paris with the intent to recall the old governments. 28 Moreover, the system he was introducing divided the left bank into districts, one of which had its seat at Bonn (it being the reëstablished Archbishopric of Cologne), and the city of Cologne was attached to that very district. But Cologne was made subject only to the French Commissioner who was also the Commissioner for Bonn, 29 and he established himself in the city of Cologne itself. 30 T h e six districts were given the designations Kreuznach, Zweibrücken, Trêves, Cologne, Jülich, and Geldern. 31 It should be noted that the above-mentioned gratitude in Cologne was not felt by all. There was a local group which had read eagerly the attacks of J. B. Geich, and viewed the return of the. old aristocratic government with distaste. But in the Rhineland as a whole, the sentiment of gratitude was well-nigh universal. 32 Moreover, there now was hope where but a month before there had been only grim despair. Hoche seemed to be superior morally to those bearers of French authority whom the Rhineland had so far encountered (except Gillet, certainly), 33 and to have, in addition, a well-developed political sense. W h e n Hoche had proposed to the Directory, on February 2, that the old authorities be reinstated, he had made these shrewd observations, so self-evident yet so refreshing in their novelty : [French] Commissioners, whose customs, tastes, and usages difïer from those of the inhabitants on the banks of the Rhine, disgust the latter with the French Revolution and with republican government by their . . . exaggeration and false political or administrative principles. . . [Would not the reinstatement of the old officials] attract to the Republic hearts alienated by the bluntness and faults It seems that Bonn really did persecute Cologne when Bonn was the seat of the Bonn District Administration. Vide, e.g., the unequal tax apportionment in Hansen, Quellen, III, 709. Vide also ibid., η. 4· "Ibid., pp. 9°7; 9°8 and η. ι . 28 Hashagen says, "When the General in Chief yielded, the city sent him an enthusiastic letter of thanks" (Rheinland, p. 32). The city's enthusiasm was due rather to Hoche's direction that it attend itself to the reëstab-

lishment of its old government (Hansen, Quellen, III, 908, η. ι ) . Later, of course, it had reason for further jubilation — when it escaped the clutches of Bonn (ibid., pp. 941, n. 1; 943). " H o c h e to Intermed. Commis., March 16, ibid., p. 911 and n. 2. 80 Hansen, Quellen, III, 943. al Ibid., p. 911, η. 2. 82 Hoche to Duramel, March 20, ibid., p. 915. 88 Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, vii, η. 105.

THE LEFT BANK ON THE EVE OF THE 18 FRUCTIDOR

843

of the French administrators? . . . Experience proves that each [ecclesiastical] chapter administered by its monks nourishes ten thousand men, and today it can hardly supply six or eight hundred. . . Experience should have corrected our mania for wanting to municipalize34 Europe. . . One does not become a republican in a day, and those who buy liberty so dearly rarely love it. . .3B With such a man at the helm, the omens were indeed less unfavorable for a Rhineland reconciled to absorption by France. Hoche wrote to the Intermediary Commission on March 16: "Without attempting to make of this country a separate republic or new, annexed départements, we should foster the spirit of liberty by all the means in our power. . . [That spirit] is commencing to germinate here. . . The cities of Cologne and Aix-laChapelle, whose constitutions are truly democratic, are strongly animated therewith. Order the publication, from time to time, of good writings. . . Our present constitution is doubtless the best choice." 36 Hoche proceeded to shade the seedling from harm by ingratiating himself with the very element of the population that was most likely to trample it under foot — the Church, or, rather, the parish priests and the ecclesiastical communities. Regarding the parish priests, Hoche wrote to Duramel: "It is not [a] bad [idea] to maintain [them] in a state of decency commensurate with the functions they are exercising," and he granted each curate a stipend of iooo livres, to constitute a first charge on the income derived from the property of his presbytery.37 It was noted above that Hoche granted monks and nuns the administration of their property and one third of its fruits. He justified this to Duramel as follows: "I have not been able entirely to exclude the ecclesiastics from the administration of their property. They would die of hunger, their pensions not being paid. There is, moreover, another motive. No inhabitant dares to rent the property of monks; the fear of being damned is still very strong in this century of philosophy, and soon we would have been deprived of our principal resource. Besides, is it not [inherent] in French generosity to come to the aid of the unfortunate whom the war has entirely despoiled?" 88 Certainly the real purpose of Hoche was the one he did not mention: to lessen the resistance of the ecclesiastics to the Revolution, to France, and to himself.39 But Hoche soon set about undoing the good will he had so painstakingly nurtured. Perhaps, even, good will was at this time 40 of only secondary To substitute town councils (municipalités) for princes or aristocratic senates. 86 Hansen, Quellen, III, 878-879. M Ibid., p. 914. " M a r c h 20, 1797, ibid., p. 915. 88 March 15, ibid., p. 904. 88 The Intermediary Commission also recog84

nized the "very great influence" of the clergy upon the disposition of the population (to Duramel, June 12, ibid., p. 1002). " W h e n it later became important to him, he knew how to make a sudden about-face (vide Hansen, Quellen, III, i o n ) .

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

importance. Certain things had to be accomplished, as is shown by Hoche's further instructions to the Intermediary Commission. Hoche named ten locations where provisions should be accumulated. These provisions would necessarily (!) be the product of requisition. Hoche hoped the Commission could sell several million livres' worth of timber from the princes' forests "to indemnify the Republic for the expenses of such a long war, . . . the avidity of several of our army contractors, [and] the ignorance and bad faith of certain of our administrators." The old-regime taxes, said Hoche, should be added up and apportioned equally among all the citizens, plus a third to be drawn from the property of monks, priests, and émigré nobles — and the sum total should be collected by a company under contract, designated by him. The émigrés should not be allowed to return and demand possession of their property. The recalled old-regime officials should not be permitted to communicate with their princes.41 It was to be expected that there would be attempts at intercommunication between the reinstated officials and their sovereigns, and Hoche, concerned, thought to prevent it in the following way: He recommended to the Intermediary Commission the immediate creation of "regencies" from among the combined grand bailiffs of the states comprising each of the six districts into which he had divided the Rhineland.42 These regencies would then take the place of the sovereigns. It will be recalled that on November 19, 1792, the Emperor had forbidden service with France; and it was therefore problematical whether the old authorities would not regard themselves as obliged to refuse Hoche's summons to resume their old functions, despite a penalty of imprisonment decreed by Hoche for refusal to serve.43 Baron von Hompesch, governor of the Duchies of Jülich and Berg for the Bavaro-Palatine Elector, Karl Theodor, seeing in Hoche's order a step in the direction of relaxation of France's grip on the Rhineland and a means of ameliorating the lot of the people, issued a circular decree. It was all right to serve, he said; in fact, he, also, ordered it. The magistrates of the Jülich capital of Düren dutifully replied to the Electoral communication, expressing their undying loyalty to Karl Theodor. 44 Both circular and letter fell into the hands of the French. Hoche was furious. He had not intended for the legal owners to be giving orders in territory that he ruled as conqueror. He sent the two communications in to the Intermediary Commission with directions to have the magistrates of Düren arrested, and to order the cutting, as punishment, of " H o c h e to Intermed. Commis., March 16, 1797, ibid., pp. 912-913. "Ibid., p. 912. " Vide supra, Pt. I, chap, ii, § 3; Sagnac,

Rhin fr., p. 136. " C i r c u l a r and reply in Hansen, Quellen, 905 and η. 2.

III,

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845

1,200,000 livres' worth of timber in the right-bank Duchy of Berg. If a million in coin were offered in composition, said Hoche, it should not be refused.45 The magistrates were duly arrested, and an investigation conducted. Eventually, the officials were reinstated — after a French Commissioner attested that they had only been following the old forms, which they had thought they would be allowed to do.46 The episode, however, left a bad impression in the minds of the Rhinelanders. b. The Régie Durbach This bad impression was considerably accentuated when, a couple of weeks after the Düren arrests, a contribution of 3,000,000 livres in specie, half to be paid within fifteen days (from April 14) , 47 descended out of the blue. And the collection was to be in the hands of Hoche's brother-in-law, Durbach,48 at two sous per livre.49 Hoche, of course the source of this "surprise," received for his approval, on April 16, a copy of the Commission's decree announcing the contribution. Reverting for a moment to his role as benefactor, the General ordered the fifteen days extended to one month, and the specie requirement changed to half specie, half produce.50 But the levying of any contribution at all did not form part of his decree of March 12, which was, so to speak, the fundamental law of the new government. Therein Hoche had stipulated: "5) All requisitions and involuntary taxes are and shall remain repealed; the old taxes shall be reintroduced and be collected by the agents of the Republic." 5 1 Immediately, the complaints started. The Bonn regency insisted to the Intermediary Commission that the region was exhausted. The Commission replied sympathetically that such was doubtless the case, "but the needs of our armies are tremendous, they are urgent,62 . . . [and] it is upon their 45

March 27, Hansen, Quellen, III, 927-928. "Ibid., p. 930. " Ibid., p. 947. Exempted were to be the Prussian states and sequestrated ecclesiastical and other property {ibid., p. 948). " H o c h e had married Durbach's sister in 1794. On March 18, 1797, Hoche had appointed Durbach — heretofore a munitions purveyor — to the position of administrator of the national domains and collector of impositions and contributions {ibid., p. 912, n. 2). Durbach has appeared above, Pt. II, chap, xxii, § 3. " T e n per cent! (Hansen, Quellen, III, 9 1 2 913.) Hoche admitted this was "a little high" (to Duramel, March 20, ibid., p. 916). •"Hansen, Quellen, III, 948, η. 4.

51

Ibid., p. 902. On April 9, Hoche wrote to Minister of War Petiet that he hoped to obtain 24,000,000 livres per year net from the Rhineland. To the Intermediary Commission, shortly thereafter, he set his goal at 16,000,000 (ibid., p. 947, n. 2). Thus, the 3,000,000 of which the Rhineland complained so loudly was merely an appetizer. 52 Hoche's army was not actually in need of money. Bonaparte had sent up from Italy two million livres for the use of the two left-bank armies. Hoche wrote to the Directory on April 18 that, having just heard of Bonaparte's armistice, he thought the agreement might perhaps be applicable to his own army, and he wanted to provide for its subsistence in such a contingency (ibid., p. 947, n. 2).

846

9

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

victorious advance that peace and consequently your own welfare depends, There is no sacrifice whatsoever to which the love of the public weal can set limits." 53 Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle protested, both against the size of their respective assessments, and the prospective paralysis of their functions by Durbach's encroachment on their "sovereignty" in the field of indirect taxation.54 It will be recalled that Bonaparte made a six-day armistice with the Austrians on April 7, with the understanding that peace would be negotiated during the six days; that on the 13th, the armistice was renewed; and that preliminaries of peace were signed on the 18th. On the previous day, April 17, Hoche heard about the Army of Italy's armistice, and undoubtedly about the peace negotiations also, from two sources: a courier from Paris, and the Austrian general Kray. 55 Hoche became deeply concerned lest peace should be concluded before the contribution had been collected. Durbach worried too.56 Doubly so. The agreement between the two men bound Durbach to advance a million.57 After only seventeen days from the date of the General's order to the Commission to announce the contribution — perhaps fifteen days after the announcement itself — Hoche was complaining to the Intermediary Commission that he had seen no money yet.58 But Durbach's agents were feverishly at work. 59 Not only did they comport themselves in a most arbitrary manner, but they made use of extreme measures to force the payment of arrears of other contributions — sums to which they were not entitled. And instead of checking the too-busy beavers, Hoche added all ecclesiastical property to the Régie Durbach so that his brother-in-law could get 10 per cent on that too.80 Most important, Durbach devastated the Rhineland forests without conscience.91 Naturally, complaints were legion, and the Intermediary Commission felt itself obliged to draw up instructions for Durbach's guidance. It sent these to Hoche for approval.62 Hoche approved them, but added these quaint observations (May 2) : . . . A much more important point [is] that of collecting the impositions laid. . . You have made so little progress in this matter that, peace being about to be signed, sufficient time does not remain for us to gather in all of the imposip. 956. p. 958. M Ibid., p. 950 and n. 3. "Ibid., pp. 959-960. "Ibid., p. 912, n. 2. Durbach never advanced anything (ibid., p. 940, n. 3). 58 To the Intermed. Commis., May 1, 1797, ibid., p. 960. " Hansen, Quellen, III, 959. ""Ibid., p. 940. Since Hoche took away from the clergy the third of their income which

he had left to them for their support, they should have received the 1000 francs' stipend decreed by the Directory in 1796. But they were left to starve. When Hoche heard of this shocking situation, he was angry (ostensibly) and said he would have the stipend paid as soon as possible — which he promptly didn't (ibid., p. 1004, n. 3).

aIbid.,

51Ibid.,

Ibid., p. 940. °2Ibid., pp. 960-961. 01

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847

tion unless you . . . take the most rigorous measures to reach the goal. I have realized, indeed, that the hope of . . . a very early peace [might cause people] . . . to temporize, . . . but to obviate this inconvenience, I have already put a squadron of hussars at the dispositon of Citizen Durbach, and I am going to put a second. . . e3 On May 13, Hoche urged the Intermediary Commission to take harsh measures against the regencies should they try to delay the payment of the contribution in the hope of escaping payment altogether. " I will take measures to force acquittal of the portion due when the army retires from the conquered territory because of the conclusion of peace. You can warn them of that," wrote Hoche.®4 At this point one must pause to consider the peculiar tax problems of Cologne and Aix. The difficulties of Cologne over its contributions were always great. The city's normal economic life was based principally on the forwarding of freight, but now commerce was almost dead so there was little to be forwarded. N o freight meant no need of ships, so the expensive shipbuilding slips lay idle. The city of Cologne had more banks and more mercantile establishments than, and as much industry as, the entire Cologne Electorate; 65 yet they were largely banks without assets, stores without stocks, industries without raw materials or solvent customers. However, in the apportionment of contributions, these physical appurtenances of an almost extinct economic life misled the assessor,ββ and the impoverished city always was faced with the necessity of appealing, and appealing again, against mountainous impositions. In 1795, as the result of an investigation by Representative on Mission Meynard, 67 it was recognized that the city's fair share of a tax was one eighth to one twelfth of the Electorate's. But in Hoche's contribution of 3,000,000 livres on the entire left bank, Cologne had been assessed 277,777 livres 88 or approximately one eleventh of the burden of the whole German left bank. The city regarded a one-thirtieth share of the left bank's burden as fair, and was ready to pay 100,000 livres. Cologne asked the French Commissioner, Champein, to explain its position to the Intermediary Commission, and Champein obligingly consented; but the " T o President Shée personally, ibid., p. 961. " H a n s e n , Quellen, III, 990, η. 2. 15

M d . , p. 959· "Ibid., p. 982, η. ι . 67 Ibid., pp. 688, 709. 68 This was a preliminary figure, given to Cologne by Champein (ibid., pp. 956-957). Between May 9 and 16, the representatives of four of the districts (not Jülich, and not Zweibrücken because of Moreau's resistance) met to apportion the 3,000,000. Cologne's

277,777 w a s there raised to 317,707. Aixla-Chapelle had been assessed at 145,833, but that was cut to 105,902. However, before the meeting broke up, the deputies heard that Hoche had raised the 3,000,000 to 8,000,000. The Intermediary Commission had not published the new figure yet, however, hoping perhaps that Hoche would relent (ibid., pp. 981-982). Or maybe it lacked the courage.

848

THE DIRECTORY — BERLIN AND CAMPO-FORMIO

Commission was adamant.09 Then Burgomaster J. N . Dumont. the syndic Dolleschall, and Champein went together to the Intermediary Commission. There Dumont, to use his own later words, delivered "such a beautiful and appropriate speech that Cicero himself, had he been there, would have doffed his hat thereto."70 Besides explaining the facts of the case, Dumont asserted that Hoche was to the Rhineland what Bonaparîe was to Italy, and Bonaparte had exempted the little republic of San Marino from his contributions. Cologne's freedom was more ancient than San Marino's, and Cologne had certainly been more useful to France. The pretty speech was in vain. Cologne would have to pay, Shée said.71 Before Shée's decision was rendered, Cologne, anticipating refusal, wrote to Hoche. No argument was omitted, and a copy of the old "Senate of the Ubii or of the Free City of Cologne to the National Convention" letter 72 was sent along for good measure. ". . . What can, indeed, a little handful of livres, scraped together and steeped in the tears of the unfortunate, mean to the great, victorious Republic . . . ?" was the question posed Hoche. He turned the letter over to the Intermediary Commission for comment. It replied cautiously: "We do not doubt that the city of Cologne is extremely burdened, . . . but all the communes are in the same situation." And it added that if Cologne's load were lightened, it should not be at the expense of other taxpayers.73 (During this time, the receiver-general, Lemoine, was threatening the city with execution, and the Senate tried to pacify him by divulging the appeal to Hoche.74 But the populace rioted, and their rallying cry was: "Pay nothing!" There were few troops in the city, so no one was hurt. The Cologne papers did not mention the incident, which seems to have lasted from May 16 to 18.) 75 A deputation, also, was sent (May i8) to Hoche, to Friedberg.7® On May 9, Aix had protested to the Intermediary Commission about the confiscation of its right of indirect taxation. The theoretical basis of the Commission's decree of April 19, giving the Régie Durbach the right to collect all indirect taxes, was that such taxes had been personal possessions ""Ibid., p. 958 and n. 3. 70Ibid., p. 979, n. 5.

mills had been washed into the middle of the Rhine and were there being battered to pieces. The money in banks had been exchanged for assignats. More than half the population was destitute (Hansen, Quellen, III, 3 6 6 - 3 7 7 ) .

""•Ibid., pp. 979-980. " M e n t i o n e d supra, Pt. I, chap, vii, η. 1 1 7 ; Pt. II, chap, ν, § 2. This letter, dated January 26, 1795, pointed out that it was Rhine commerce on which Cologne had flourished, and war had halted that commerce. Moreover, the tolls that Cologne had customarily collected from passing ships had been suspended. T h e city's firewood was all gone — even the trees on its avenues. T h e

'"Ibid., p. 983 and η. 4. Ibid., p. 983.

74 75

Cologne

report

to

Frankfort

newspapers,

ibid., p. 984. ™ Hansen, Quellen,

III, 983, η. 3-

THE LEFT BANK ON THE EVE OF THE 1 8 FRUCTIDOR

849

of the left-bank sovereign princes, to whose rights and privileges the Republic had succeeded. Leaving aside all attempts either to justify or controvert this assumption, application of the principle to Aix-la-Chapelle — and Cologne, which was in the same position — created an impossible situation. T h e city officials were paid, municipal services were maintained, the poor were fed, from these taxes. They were not part of the princely "domains" which the Republic had everywhere seized for its own benefit, but a possession of the generality of the citizens, voted by them or by their representatives for certain specific public purposes. There was little sense in reinstalling the old administrations, and then abstracting the means whereby they might maintain themselves. In Cologne, even, the indirect taxes had already been hypothecated to creditors — for debts contracted, 77 probably, because of the presence of the French. However, the Intermediary Commission, to use its own words, took the position that the indirect taxes were the property "of the sovereign senates — a fund between its [ w ] hands to treat its [λ 503> 885 ni2\ its indirect taxes and the Régie Durbach, 846, 848-849; new elections ordered in, 895; annexationist rather than separatist, 900; Central Administration of, see Central Administration of Aix-la-Chapelle Albini, Baron of, min. of Mayence Elector, his "victory or death," 179s, 360; maneuvers in behalf of peace, 4 1 3 - 4 1 4 ; reaction to the Leoben Treaty, 770 Alexandre, Cmr, 653, 696, 699

Alien-agent spy system, suggested by Deforgues, 195, 278-279; idea of, not new, 195; organized by Bacher, 196; its functions, 196; supplemented by propagandist-spy system, 279 Alopeus, Russian min. plenipo. to Berlin, 927 nio7 Alps, The, mts., 757, 758, 958 Alsace, 491, 506; how France acquired, 2 1 22; voluntary return to Empire pondered in 1790, 40; political and cultural allegiance, 41 »4/; in marriage plans for Madame Royale, 527-528 Alt-Breisach, claimed by Louis X I V , 22; plan to divert Rhine to east of, 758 Altenkirchen, 610, 647, 786 »42 "Alternative," the, 755, 930 Alvensleben, von, Prussian cab. min., 229, 313, 377; assures Elgin no French alliance contemplated, 620 Alvinczy, Austrian gen., 704, 7 1 1 η ¡ 4 , 7 1 3 , 723 Ami des Lois, 533, 549, 677, 701, 818, 914 Andernach, 867 Andlau, von, (ostensible) French peace envoy, 456 Anfrye, Judge, French pol. mem. writer, 623 Angoulême, D u k e of, son of Artois, 449 »22, 526 Anquetil, French scholar, pol. mem. writer, 695 Ansbach, 32, 246, 340 nij, 351 »46, 352, 399 and nçi, 531 Anschel, Dr., Bonn separatist, 900 Antebrogius, Belgic envoy, 10 Antraigues, d', French royalist agent, 800 Antwerp, Congress of, why called, 149; orders repudiation of no-conquests manifesto, 150, 176 Archenholtz, von, Minerva ed., 64, 65, 623 Areola, 597, 689

I0Ó2 Aremberg (or Arenberg), Prince August von, Belgian diplomat, gen., 224 Argenson, d', for. min. of Louis X V , 480; not an expansionist, 23 Ariovistus, Swabian mercenary, invades Gaul on invitation, 1 2 ; settles Germans on left bank, 1 2 ; defeated by Caesar, 1 3 ; escapes across Rhine, 1 3 ; importance of his defeat, 1 3 ; western character of his army, 1 3 - 1 4 Armand, m. Conv., 438 Armbruster, contemp. German chronicler, 654 ηs6 Armistice agreements with France: Imperial, Dec. 3 1 , 1795, necessitated by Pichegru's inaction, 527; unauthorized by France or Austria, 528; rumors of peace accompanying, 528; Delacroix's tales of Austrian peace feelers following the, 528-529; Jourdan is reproved for making, 590; Württemberger, July 17, 1796, 5 9 1 - 5 9 2 ; Badenese, July 25, 1796, 5 9 1 - 5 9 2 ; Swabian, July 27, 1796, 591-592; Franconian, Aug. 7, 1796, 634-639; Bavarian, Sept. 7, 1796, 646-647; Austrian, April 7, 1797, 733; Imperial, April 18, 1797, in Art. V of Leoben Treaty, 754; and the South German contributions, 773, 775; French allergy to, agreements, 3 1 7 , 322, 326, 327—328, 333, 5 1 3 ; Rps conclude Württemberger armistice despite, 404; CPS annuls same, 404-405; Prussia suggests Franco-Imperial armistice but encounters, 410—411; Theremin suggests Franco-Austrian armistice but then interposes, 455; Austrian victories cure, and CPS suggests armistice, 455; Delacroix's Plan manifests, 5 1 3 ; Jourdan and Pichegru conclude armistice end of 1795 despite, 527; principles underlying, 590; Bonaparte displays, early April, 1797, 731-732·, Bonaparte disregards, at Judenburg, 733 Armoire de fer, 460 Army, French, described, 72—73; exemplary conduct of, in Rhineland, 1794, 303; actual privation in, on Rhine mid-/795, 4 2 1 - 4 2 2 ; Meynard and the, revolt in Aix, 422; alleged fear of the return home of, 5 1 0 ; expected to support itself, 650, 652; still destitute under Dir., 650-651; paid intermittently or not at all, 6 5 1 ; requisitions in excess of its needs in Swa'bia, Franconia, 652-653; foreign legions in, 71 n/94, 190, 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 , 201, 202 n i s i Art confiscations, see Cultural rape Artois, Count of, youngest brother of Louis X V I , 43, 63 ηι$ι Arverni, Celtic tribe, 1 2 Assembly of Notables, 39

INDEX Assignats, 42, 196, 203 71157, 2 8 1 - 2 8 7 , 295, 3 0 1 , 3 0 7 - 3 1 0 , 366, 369, 432, 436, 498-499. 5 1 0 «y/, 540; discussed, 2 8 1 ; Cambon's plans for appreciating the, 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 ; effect of Dumouriez' policies on the, 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 ; acceptance of, made obligatory, 282-283; value on the frontier, 283-284; ordered circulated in Belgium and Rhineland, 285-286; coin versus, in paying contributions, 286; forage to be paid for only in, 405 m 2 ; Prussian left bank refuses, after Basel, 418; Dumont chides French for wanting Rhineland to redeem their, 435; Merlin-D. extols advantage to, of annexing Belgium, 438; Dir. plans to rid France of, 540; forced loan and mandats territoriaux succeed, 540 false, millions of, in circulation, 284; Frankfort-on-the-Main accused of making, 102, 284 »77; Bréteuil's proposal for mauufacturing, 284 n/7; Kusel not burned because of, 284 n/7; used as excuse to demand coin in contributions, 290 Assigny, d', French diplomat, 60 Aubert-Dubayet, French gen., war min., ambas., charged by Dir. to stir up Turks against Austria, 562 Aubry, m. Conv., CPS, Mil. Topographic Bureau in 1795, Five Hundred, nonexpansionist, 387, 881; resists Rhine crossing, 179s, 387; questions mil. feasibility of Rhine frontier, 436; proscribed, 881 Audibert, Louis (historian), 731 ni2 Audibert-Caille, d', of French Dept. of For. Aff., diplomat, authorized to discuss Polish resurrection with Prussia, 564; Prussia expels, and Dir. disavows, 565 Audouin, m. Conv., Five Hundred, 355 n6i; 382 »9; quoted, 658; biograph, 658 n6i Aufklärung, 33 and n8, 34, 895 Augeard, former private sec. Marie-Ant., unofficial link between Bacher and Thugut, end 1794, 262; his acquaintance with Thugut in the 1780's, 460; kept away from Vienna, 1794, 5 1 9 ; divulges Thugut's treason to Archduke Charles, 1796, 520; gainsays that Madame Royale's parents had disposed of her hand, 526 Augereau, French gen., 766 η 102, 933, 955 n8; a "model of covetousness," 139; in tatters, 6 5 1 ; Bonaparte sends, to Paris for Fructidorian coup, 798; bearer of anti-Councils propaganda, 800; heads army of Paris, 801; succeeds Hoche in command of Army of Germany, 902 »96; entrusted with Rhineland admin., 902; ordered to permit only annexationist movements, 902; allows Cisrhenish movement to continue for weeks, 903-904; his aide expelled from Italy, 9 1 0 9 1 1 ; his incapacity as justification for Campo-Formio, 933 Augsburg, 574; see Probst; Graf

INDEX Aulard (historian), emended, 89, 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 , 173 n / 7 7 , 9°4 "¡071 suggests that "presidency" of G e r m a n y could have alternated, 477 Austria, u l t i m a t u m to, of Jan. 2 1 , 1792, 52; of Jan. 24, 1792, 54; alliance of, with Prussia, 54; final u l t i m a t u m to, 6 1 ; contemplates d i s m e m b e r m e n t of France, 62, 477; see Francis II, E m p e r o r ; Delacroix's Plan and the House of, 5 1 2 ; Delacroix fears commercial rivalry of, after Leoben, 9 1 3 ; summary of French means of abasing, 9 5 3 954; econ. considerations involved in France's desire to abase, 960—961 "Austrian C o m m i t t e e , " the, 66 Austrian Netherlands, French election-proced u r e in, 439 ni47; annexed by Conv., 440; see W i c k h a m ; H a m m o n d ; Malmesbury; its population, 672; Bonaparte demands, at Leoben, 748, 756; T h u g u t willing to yield, 749; renounced by Austria in Leoben Treaty, 754; renunciation repeated at Campo-Formio, 937 Austro-Prussian Alliance of February 7, 1792, its terms, 54; emboldens émigrés and Rhineland princes, 58 Austro-Russian Convention of January 3, 1795, influence of, o n French policies of Prussia a n d Austria, 3 1 2 ; Frederick William accepts, 353 " 5 2 "Avenger of H u m a n i t y , " 276 m38 Avis au peuple français, 148, 168 Β., Marquise de, pseudo émigrée, 297 ni 04 Babelon (historian), his view of left b a n k , 1 7 «62; of Clovis a n d Charlemagne, 1 7 n62, 18 n6y Bacher, French first sec.-interpreter at Basel, 370; biographical, 194, 358 «S2; organizes alien-staffed secret service, 196; rebuffs H a b s b u r g peace feelers, 2 1 3 ; visited by Schmerz, 266—267; his "Reflections Concerning . . . Peace . . . with . . . Prussia," 3 3 3 ; takes p a r t in Marandet-Harnier conversation, 3 7 6 - 3 7 7 ; insinuates to W a i t z that Prussian good offices unnecessary, 382; peace feeler seen behind moderation of, in M a d a m e Royale negotiation, 452; makes actual exchange of Madame, 524; returns Madame's dowry to Paris, 5 2 4 - 5 2 5 ; warns against Poteratz a n d Bassal, 576—577; g u a r antees Swabians their religion, property, laws, 582; deputation of Badenese seeks circular of, 583; w a r n s against employing Mayence Clubists in Swabia, 584; his "Reflections" on the function of Swabia, 586 Bacourt, de, French m i n . to Baden, custodian of Talleyrand's memoirs, 1 0 2 4 - 1 0 2 5 Baden, G e r m a n state, I m p . peace feelers via, 1 7 1 ; see Karl Friedrich; asks f o r Prussian good offices to escape "enemy country" treatm e n t , 407; seeks to negotiate peace with

1063 Prussian good offices, 407-408, 587; her overture left unanswered, 535, 5 8 7 - 5 8 8 ; Poteratz is authorized to revolutionize, 572; hears of Poteratz' plot but does nothing, 5 7 8 - 5 7 9 ; rejects plan of separate peace for four circles, 588; asks E m p e r o r to intimate desire for peace, 589; signs armistice w i t h Moreau, 5 9 1 - 5 9 2 ; cannot fulfill armistice conditions, 592—593; secures some amelioration, 593; in peace negotiations, France asks right-bank concessions of, 619-620, 6 4 0 641; terms of its peace with France, 6 4 1 645; harshness prompts, to delay ratification, 645—646 Baden, Switzerland, 266 Bailleul, m . Five H u n d r e d , 784, 1 0 1 5 Baireuth, 32, 246, 3 5 1 »46, 352, 399 and ngr, 531 Bamberg, Dir. orders heavy contributions in, 635; French rescue, collections, 636 » 2 / Bannerrat, council of heads of Cologne guilds, Baptiste, Gallo's sec., 598; origin of his mission to Paris, 807—808; bears messages to T a l leyrand and Barthélémy, 810; confers w i t h Talleyrand, 810; angers Triumvirs, 8 1 2 ; results of his mission, 813—815 Barère, m . Conv., CPS, 457; enemy of peace d u r i n g First CPS, 172; his function on Great CPS, 178; a n d the negotiations-quashing Decree of Sept. 24, 179s, 193-194; speech of Jan. 22, 1794, 210, 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 ; speech of Feb. 1, 1794, 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 ; prognosticates execution of Robespierre, report, 224; a n d V a u g h n ' s plan, 228 »299, 243 njgj·, exults in Trèves's capture, 288 Barras, m . Conv., ( R p , ) Dir., 637, 796; a n d Vendémiaire, 463; his predilection for dependent republics, 476; chosen Director, 487; o n impasse between Dir. a n d legislature, 488; his biograph, 493-494; h o w regarded abroad, 494; his Rhine policy based on opposition to Carnot, 505, 506; his ". . . the generals? Would they raise g r e e n s ? " 5 1 0 ; and Bonaparte's appointment, 596 n2\ suspected in death of Hoche, 753 «29; frustrates cashiering of hostile m i n isters, 7 9 5 - 7 9 6 ; plots coup with Hoche, 7 9 7 - 7 9 8 ; negotiates with Louis XVIII, 801 niji; after Fructidor, denounces Carnot's lenient peace terms, 884; sends Bonaparte stern demands, 884; tells Sandoz Austria about to attack Prussia, 894; restored Bourbons h u s h u p their negotiation with, 1023 Barth, recruiter of secret agents f o r Louis X V , 459 / Barthélémy, French ambas, to Swiss Cantons, later m . Dir., 194, 796 ni04; biograph, 194 nioy, his p a r t in alien-staffed secret service, 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 ; Schmerz leaves letters for, a n d disappears, 266-267; CPS authorizes, to treat with Prussia, 3 1 6 ; his instructions,

INDEX

1064 3 1 7 - 3 1 9 ; his moderation responsible for success of Basel negotiations, 3 2 5 - 3 2 6 , 330; see Hardenberg; Basel; C P S asks, for pseudo proposal re Rhineland, 370; Hardenberg tries to sound, on Carletti, 372; arranges for Marandet to provoke proposal asked by C P S , 376; against a g g r a n d i z i n g either Prussia or Austria, 3 7 9 - 3 8 0 ; interprets official French policy, 383; foregoes alimentary sacrifices by Hesse-Cassel, 384; appraised as negotiator, 385; forbidden in Empire without Austrian passport, 410 »45; reshapes C P S ' s for. policy, 465; as Director, favors peace of concessions, 506; approached by D e g e l m a n n , 529, 5 5 7 ; by W i c k h a m , 5 5 6 - 5 5 8 ; depreciates influence of Jägerschmidt, 585; discourages Breisgau revolutionists, 585; alleges lack of power to handle Prussia's interventions near end C o n v . , 587; alleges lack of powers yet in summer, 17φι 589-590; succeeds L e Tourneur as Director (installed June 6, 1 7 9 7 ) , 7 8 3 - 7 8 4 ; confers secretly with Baptiste and urges Bonaparte to m a k e peace, 812; his m e m oirs say, did not try for Prussian alliance, 1022 Basel, Imp. peace feelers arrive f r o m , 1793, 171 Basel, Franco - Hesse-Casseler Treaty of, 3 8 1 385 Basel, Franco-Prussian Treaty of, Prussia's motives for, 3 1 2 - 3 1 3 ; Paris or Basel as site of negotiations for, 3 1 7 , 3 2 5 ; negotiation of, 3 2 2 - 3 4 8 ; see Hardenberg; provisions of, 3 4 8 - 3 5 2 ; pol. importance of alimentary opportunities afforded by, 363 n / 0 7 ; Art. X I o f , interpreted as not intended to extend neutral area, 407; forced loan applied to Prussian left bank in violation of A r t . I V o f , 5 4 2 - 5 4 3 ; armistice of three months, Hardenberg's Basel draft calls for an, 3 4 7 ; C P S rejects, 3 4 7 ; Treaty includes, 3 5 1 ; C P S determines to "interpret," 354; Barthélémy justifies, 364; appraised: by the C P S , 354; by the Conv., 3 5 4 - 3 5 5 ; by the French man-inthe-street, 3 5 5 - 3 5 7 ; by Frederick William, 3 5 7 - 3 5 8 ; by the G e r m a n press, 358-360; by the Rhineland, 360; by George III, 362; by Mallet du Pan, 355, 3 6 2 - 3 6 3 ; rumors f o l l o w i n g : Franco-Imp. negotiations about to start, or just consummated, 423; C P S opposes annexation of northern Rhineland, 423; Electors to shower subjects with food and money, 423 Basel, Franco-Spanish Treaty of, provides f o r Spanish mediation, 406; Hardenberg asks for same rights for Prussia as Spain g o t in, 406 Eassal, R p , later secret agent in Basel, 556 nig, 570, 5 7 5 , 586; his requisitions in the

Jura, 206; conference w i t h W i c k h a m , 556 «29; Poteratz associates himself with, 570; appointed Poteratz' second in c o m m a n d , 573; recalled, 5 7 5 ; Bacher warns Dir. against, 5 7 7 Bassé, personal friend of Hoche, Cologne engages, to urge Hoche to relieve its tax burden, 854 Batavia(n Republic), 605, 6 1 1 , 614, 619, 7 5 7 , 828, 829; its treaty with France infringes its sovereignty, 7 5 7 «46 Baudot, Moreau's adjutant, 7 1 4 Bavaria, its Pfaffenhofen armistice, 6 4 6 - 6 4 7 ; Moreau flees, 647; Elector of, fails to ratify armistice, 647; its population, 672 n / 5 ; assignment of its contributions to Austria suggested, 7 7 4 ; Austrian absorption of, Merlin-Th.'s opinion on, 368; Hardenberg fears FrancoAustrian accord on, 370; discussed by Hardenberg and Merlin-Th., 3 7 2 - 3 7 4 ; W i t telsbachs warned of, 374; unforeseen consequences of warning, 3 7 4 - 3 7 5 ; renewal of League of Princes suggested to prevent, 403; Delacroix's Plan would concede, 5 1 2 ; also Poteratz' instructions, 5 1 5 - 5 1 6 ; also Dir., by vote of July 25, 1796, 6 1 6 ; France threatens Prussia to approve, 676, Clarke's instructions contain conditional approval o f , 7 1 7 ; Prussia worries after Leoben that France has agreed to, 833; until the Inn conceded by Campo-Formio terms, 938; exchange of Belgium for, plan of, explained, 59 ni jo; Prussian resistance to, dropped in 1792, 74; unlikely after D u mouriez' conquest of Belgium, 88; influence on, of Prussia's occupation of Palatinate, 89-90; Wittelsbachs aid Franco-Prussian rapprochement to guarantee against, 164; simple return of Belgium unacceptable to Austria except as step toward, 6 7 1 ; Sandoz fears that, will result f r o m Clarke's mission, 710 Bayard, Prussian official in Ansbach, 744 Beauharnais, French gen., 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 , 596 «2 Beaurepaire, French commandant of V e r d u n , 75

Beaury, Rhinelander republican, 873; instrumental in union of Bonn and C o b l e n z republicans, 872 and M84 Belgae, ancient Celtic-speaking people, cross into Gaul, 10; tribes accompanying, 10; their use of the w o r d " G e r m a n , " 10 Belgium, 857; see Austrian Netherlands Bella, French adms. in Rhineland, appointed Director-Gen. of Domains and Contributions of southern Rhineland, 4 4 1 ; oppresses southern Rhineland, 697; his Republican N e w Year's Day celebration, 7 0 1 ; his resignation and successor, 697, 850 Bellegarde, von, Austrian chief of staff, see Merveldt, von

IO65

INDEX Belmonte Pignatelli, Prince of, Neapolitan negotiator, later ambas, to France, 597, 599; Dir.'s peace overture via, 688 Bender, Austrian commandant of Luxemburg, see Kroch; is directed to silence Kroch, 445 Bender, Kinzig Valley revolutionist, 744 Bendorf, 351, 352 Bénézech, French interior min., and Carletti's request re Madame Royale, 521; and the exchange of Madame, 523-524; too friendly with the Councils, 794; cashiered, 795 Berdot, sec. to Intermed. Com., 858 Berg, Bischofiswerder covets, 38; heavy French contributions in, adjudged "moderate," 393; tree felling ordered in, 844845; shares in Hoche's 8,000,000-livre imposition, 851 «90 Bergamo, 748, 750, 887 Bergzabern, revolts, and appeals for French annexation, 1 1 3 ; propaganda pattern in, 162; annexation of, 130, 503; responsibility of, for Decree of Nov. 19, 7792, 1 1 3 - 1 1 4 Berlin, Treaty of, its origin in Prussia's desire for neutrality, 605; Delacroix links indemnities to neutrality, 605-606; French draft of the, analyzed, 606; Frederick William objects to "ceding" Prussian left bank, 606607; Caillard's arguments for a double treaty, 607; see Haugwitz; Hildesheim; elements inducing Prussian acceptance of double-treaty principle, 608-609; French victory on June 4, 1796, prompts Prussia to consider cession of its left-bank states, 610; promises of Carnot and Reubell interrupt indemnities discussion, 6 1 1 - 6 1 2 ; their promises disavowed by Dir., 612; they urge signature of indemnities convention, 6 1 2 613; Carnot and Delacroix threaten negotiations with Austria, 613; French victories of July, 1796, prompt agreement to indemnities convention, 613-614; preliminary treaty signed July 16, 615; ratified August 5, 616; terms of neutrality convention of, 616; of secret-indemnities convention of, 616, 619; Dir. dissatisfied with, 619-620; Prussia betrays secret terms of, to the Czar, 621 Bernadotte, French gen., 730, 742, 776, 800 n/25, 892, 924 n8g, 932 Bernhard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, his Alsatian venture, 21—22; accepts money from France, 22; is succeeded by France in Alsace, 22 Bernstorff, A . P. von, Danish min. of state, identified, 319; offers to help secure Rhineland for France, 319; denounces Habsburg hegemony in Empire, 320; his Danishmediation hopes dashed, 3 2 1 ; his hopes revived, 412; and quashed, 413 Berthier, Bonaparte's chief of staff, 7 1 1 , 887, 939»

941

Beurnonville, French war min., later gen., 125 1117s, 510, 652, 940 ni6; his attitude

re surrender of Mayence, 1793, 132; delivered to Austrians by Dumouriez, 147; his exchange authorized, 4 5 0 - 4 5 1 ; supplants Jourdan, Sept. 1796, 704, 735; is supplanted by Hoche, Jan. 1797, 790, 838; ordered to propagandize Bohemia, 738 Beust, von, projected envoy, 536 Bielefeld, Prussian sec. of legation, 829 Biergans, Rhinelander republican, 305; his biograph, 426 »6/; his newspapers, 426 n6i; prefers a Rhineland republic to annexation, 426-427; attacks Cologne senate and burgomaster, 548 Billaud-Varenne, m. Jacobins, Conv., 53; insists war leads to tyranny, 47; distorts Vaughn's plan, 228 «299 Bischofiswerder, Prussian gen., and private counsellor of King, reactionary confidant of his king, 36; Sybel's appraisal of, 36 >1/9; his policy, 38-39; see Berg; contemplates dismemberment of France, 38-39; an Illuminé who allegedly employed occultism to influence King, 246 >1413; a peace-at-anyprice advocate in 1795, 342 «24; not averse to future alliance with France, 342 «24; embraces double-treaty project, perhaps for money, 608 Black Forest, 582; revolt in, promised by Poteratz, 5 7 1 ; rumored plan for ultrademocratic Gallic colony in, 576—577; seal of new republic of, 577 »5/ Blankenheim District Administration, 443 11164 Blau, prof, at Mayence, identified, 108; joins Mayence Club, 108; captured fleeing Mayence, 131 Blaux, Rp, 362 Blumendorf, sometime sec. to Austrian embassy at Paris, 461, 517 Blumenthal, Prussian finance min., 313 Bocche di Cattaro, occupied by Austria during Udine parleys, 887, 889; Bonaparte protests occupation of, 887, 889 Bohemia, Clarke threatens to revolutionize, 683; Dir. orders contributions in, 770 Böhm, von, Prussian counsellor of legation at Paris, 499 Böhme, Prussian Rhineland negotiator, see Imstenradt, von Böhmer, former prof, at Worms, sec.-interpreter to Custine, 103; his biograph, 107; forms "triumvirate" with Custine and Dorsch, 109; conceives Mayence Club, 104, 121; blamed for Club's failure, 1 2 1 ; tries to flee Mayence, is imprisoned, exchanged, 429 »76 Boissy d'Anglas, m. Conv., CPS, Five Hundred, 923; his natural-boundary demand found too modest, 263; fraternizes with Carletti, 3 7 1 ; noncommittal on Carletti (to Gervinus), 376; urges Rhine limit in name of CPS, early 1795, 436 71140; his

ιο66 memoir of Aug. 1795 favoring renunciation of Rhineland, 437; and the Théremin negotiation, 453-455; associates himself with Poteratz, 456-457, 881 «244; vacillatory on left-bank issue, 464; deported after Fructidor, 881 Bologna, 727 mil, 749, 750, 887 Bonaparte, Joseph, brother of Napoleon, 910 mo Bonaparte, Napoleon, French gen., negotiator, 884 »5; quoted on Thugut, 88 »27^; favors general peace after Basel, 357; author of "whiff of grape-shot," 463; adopts Brissot's dependent-republic idea, 476; quoted on Le Tourneur, 490; on Reubell, 491, 493 ηφ\ his appointment to Army of Italy, 596 «2; early Italian victories, 597; Tarvis and Klagenfurt, 730; his position appraised, 73°—73 1 ! Klagenfurt letter to Emperor, 731; grants armistice, and negotiates in Clarke's absence, 733-734; arrogates to himself wine sent Clarke, 734; voices natural-boundary concept, 740; his proclamations to Austrian provinces, 740—742; summons Clarke to Leoben, and signs before Clarke arrives, 751; on whether he was bribed by Austria, 751 my, and Hoche, 752-753, 759, 798-799; levies no charges on conquered Austria, 770-771; see Leoben, Preliminaries of; Miot quoted on desire of, to prolong negotiations with Austria, 793; wants to send Clarke to Vienna to denounce Thugut, 793; Councils attack, and Dir. defends, his conduct in Venice, 799-800; why he joined conspirators of Fructidor, 800-801; excites his army to threaten Councils, 801; sends Augereau to Paris to effect coup d'état for Triumvirate, 798-801; see Udine-Passariano Conferences; Dir.'s Sept. 15 ultimatum endangers his plan to content Austria, 909; threatens to resign and appeal to people, 911; Dir. surrenders to, 912; irked by Dir.'s order for revolutionization and Schérer's plans, 923924; tells Cobenzl Prussia will actively join France, 925 «97; considerations rendering him less amenable on Oct. 17, 7797, 932; more amenable, 933-934; signs Treaty of Campo-Formio with Austria, 934; appointed gen. in chief of Army of England, but ordered to Rastatt, 943; calls CampoFormio mere truce, 948; assimilated to Hannibal, 950; his life and career twice endangered by Thermidorians, 955 n8 Bonn, Trêves Elector flees to, 98; Jourdan occupies, 1794, 284; its cultural treasures removed, 300; its feud with Cologne, 301 ni28, 841 ni6; seat of Intermed. Com., 840; execution-soldiers quartered on, regency members, 854; ceremonial proclamation of Cisrhenish Republic in, 900-901 Bonnal de Ganges (historian), 753 »29

INDEX Bonneau, French pol. mem. writer, 563 Bonnier, head of Dir.'s Diplomatic Bureau, 430 »7S, 809 and Ω46 Boos, French army officer, 133, 134 Bottot, Barras's sec., allegedly tries to discount Querini notes, 911 ni¡\ his purposes in Italy, 920-921; his "Compte rendu," 921; his story of shattered porcelain, 931; his reply to Bonaparte's complaints against Dir., 934 ntj6 "Bouches du Mein," 116 Bouchotte, French war min., 204 Bouget, m. Central Admin, at Aix, later m. Bonn regency, calls meeting re deputation to Paris, 851; a republican, but fears annexation unpopular, 851; plan of Vossen and, for Rhineland republic, 851-852; Vossen and his "note confidentielle," 852; Hoche asks after, and Vossen, 857; deputation to Paris postponed on Hoche's arrival, 859 Bourbotte, Rp, his stratagem of requisitions before contributions, 286 n8j; views Trêves as "milch cow," 288-289; his immoderate levies, 289-291; his handling of Trêves "evacuation," 292; executed after Prairial, 441 m;8 Bourcard, burgomaster of Basel, 452, 525, 529, 557, 575, 746, 977 Bourdon, m. Conv., thinks Rhine-boundary demand too moderate, 263 Bourrienne, Bonaparte's sec., 761; on teaservice scene, 932; on attempts at bribing Bonaparte and himself, 943 T135 Brabant, 188, 232, 503 m j Bread, 176, 177, 215, 249, 259, 260, 261, 436, 499, 592, 652 Breisgau, as indemnity for dispossessed German princes, 550 «70, 764 ngi\ Poteratz commissioned to revolutionize, 572; Austria willing to indemnify Duke of Modena with, summer, 1797, 810, 811 »55; CampoFormio and the, 937 Bremen, Brunswick troops occupy, to prevent trade with France, 400; Prussia refuses to interfere in, 400; Prussia yields to French pressure re, 401 Brescia, 748, 750, 781, 887 Bréteuil, émigré-, 284 π/7 Briche, m. Legis. Assem., 201 11147 Briez, Rp, see Du Bois du Bais & Briez; blames Rhineland famine on army agents, 296 Brinton (historian), 139 »262 Brissot, m. Legis. Assem., Conv., Rhineboundary advocate, 25, 51; urges attack on Rhine princes, 45-46, 49; defies Europe, 51; dependent-republic advocate, 51 ; substitutes Austria as culprit, 53-54; compared with Forster and Görres, 65; his adherents produce an Austrian war, 54, 62 Broglie, de (historian), emended, 173 n/77

INDEX Brottier, abbé-, royalist conspirator, 800 Bruck, near Leoben, 805 Brunswick, D u k e of, Prussian gen.: offer to, to head French armies, 56, 57, 160; rejects offer, 57; appointed Allied commander, 68; his manifesto, its origin, 68-69; ' t s content, 69; who drafted it, 69; its reception by Louis X V I , 69-70; its Declaration additionnelle, 70 ni86; its political repercussions, 70—71; his conferences with the French, 85-86; see Valmy Brutus der Freie, 426 nói Brutus oder der Tyrannenfeind, 426 nói Burckhardt, see Bourcard Burgundians, German tribe, in Gaul, 15 Butter, 215, 216, 260, 261 Caesar, Roman gen., writer, defeats Ariovistus, 13; installs Germans on left bank, 13 Caillard, French diplomat, Dumouriez sends, to Reichstag, 60; credentials rejected, 90; tarries at Ratisbon, 90; min. to Prussia, 179$, 403; instructions, Sept. 1795, 403, 438; fears showdown on Prussian alliance, 534-535; see Berlin, Treaty of; reports Prussia contemplates withdrawal behind Weser, 622; angles for Prussian alliance with hints re Bavaria, 894 Calendar, Revolutionary, effect on foreign opinion, 217 Calonne, finance min. to Louis X V I , "prime min. of emigration," 43 Calvert, British col., courier, 342 Cambacérès, m. Conv., CPS, Five Hundred, 306, 338, 487; justifies the separate peace, 382 ng Cambon, m. Conv., his expense-free war plan, 114, 281-282; and the Law of 7 fructidor, II, 257 Campaign of 1796, French, initial strategy of, 609-610; failure to coordinate movements, 646; diplomatic results of, 647-648; wild rumors in France following, 680-681 Campo-Formio, Treaty of, Dir. dubs Rhine "indispensable" after signature of, 934 n/.}6; substance of, 937-939; Monge and Berthier carry, to Paris, 939, 941; Bonaparte defends, 941; ratification of, by Dir., 941-942; of patent portion of, by Councils, 943; rumor that Austria bought, 943 njj·, reception of (patent), by French people, 944-945; Talleyrand's appraisal of, 945946; Talleyrand and Dir. excuse, to Prussia, 946-947; before news of, Sandoz urges Prussian intervention to "save Germany" from France, 947; both signatories regard, as a truce, 947-948; reaction of Rhineland to (patent), 948 »79; of Viennese public, 949 Candles, 216, 259, 261 Carinthia, 742, 743, 749, 754

1067 Carletti, Tuscan ambas, to Paris, 436 m57; his social ostentation, 371; his "Bavaria for the Rhineland" proposition, 371; whether, held Thugut's mandate, 373-376; tries to see Madame Royale during later Conv., 450; repeats attempt under Dir. and is expelled, 521; basis of harsh treatment of, explored, 522 Carlisle, Earl of, 789 n6g Carniola, 742, 749, 754 Carnot, Lazare, m. Conv., CPS, Dir., on Diplomatic Committee favoring natural bounds, Feb. 1793, n o - i l l , 504; escapes betrayal by Dumouriez, 147 m2; manages mil. affairs on Great CPS, 178; objects to a universal republic, 202 ni$y, mollifies his terror instructions re Belgium, 204-205; his " w e must end it," 215; renounces Rhine and part of Belgium, 235, 504-505; desires Rhineland republic, is belief, 242; and the "La Christine," 253-254; sends proRobespierre cannoneers to distant posts, 256 n6; his greediness upon capture of Trêves, 289; claims title to Rhineland by conquest, 263 ηφ, 306, 504; reports Meuse line worth "three years," 440, 505; chosen Director, 487; biography, 488-490; feud with majority Directors, 489; quoted on Revellière, 495; intends to direct for. aff. in Dir., 497; early views as Director, on Rhineland annexation, 503, 504—505; fear of armies, 510; admiration for Poteratz' propositions, 568; his influence in appointment of Bonaparte, 596; hostile to a neutrality line, but yields, 604, 605, 611; see Zwanziger; confers secretly with Baptiste, and writes Bonaparte, 812; on return of left bank after Leoben, 861; analyzes basis of for. policy of Triumvirate, 959 m 3 Carnot de Feulins, brother of Lazare, 487 b / j ; advises Sandoz re left bank, 861 Carra, m. Jacobins, 46, 48, 57 ni 16, 232 "Carthage" (England), 763 n88, 822 Casa Prospero Antonini, 835 Caselli, French National Agent to Central Admin, at Aix, 301, 504 m i , 545; his circular letter, 424 Cassel, fortress of, 756 Castiglione, 597 Catherine II, Czarina of Russia, advises Louis to make war, 65 «57; her position in War of First Coalition, 92 B209; French plot to poison, 184 «56; her Second Polish Partition treaty, 88; Treaty of Jan. 3, 1795 with Emperor, 265-266; promises 60,000 men to fight France, 620; Baden seeks aid of, to undo treaty with France, 645; Thugut appeals to, when England threatens to defect, 672; dead, 672; her son, Paul, reverses her for. policy, 672 «20; her gift to Cobenzl hypothetically shattered by Bonaparte, 931 Celts, ancient tribes of Celtic speech, preceded

ιο68 by whom in Gaul, 9 mi\ extent of their dominion in Europe, 9, 1 1 ; invade Gaul, 9; distinguished from Germans, 19 n6g Central Administration of Aix-la-Chapelle, established for northern left bank, 295, 300-301; announces end of requisitions by military, 296; division into districts under, kindles old Bonn-Cologne feud, 301 M28; southern left bank added to, 302; and subtracted from, 441; its Jan. 13, 1795 message to the people, 308-309 Central administration of the District of Aix-la-Chapelle, 300 ni2i, 307 Central Commission (for southern Rhineland), established, 441; Bella appointed Director-Gen. of Domains and Contributions, 441 Ceremonial, see Etiquette, diplomatic Cetto, Zweibrücken envoy, 541, 550 »70 Ceva, 739 Chabannes, Mme. de, of Mayence, 68 Chambonas, de, for. min. of Louis XVI, 68 Champ de Mars, 50, 504 Champein, Intermed. Com.'s Cmr for Bonn regency, 858; his seat at Cologne, 942; seeks fairer tax-apportionment for Cologne from Intermed. Com., 847; approaches Hoche directly, and angers Com., 849; is moved to Bonn, and Rethel succeeds as to Cologne, 874; Geich seeks to free Rheinbach from, and Bonn regency, 896 Charlemagne, Emperor, origin of his line, 18-19; its Germanic character, 19; division of his Empire among his grandsons, 6; his statue, and columns of his tomb, removed to Paris, 299; his "spirit" advises Germany against Revolution, and cites America as example, 870 niyi Charleroi, 233 »J25, 237, 239, 340 Charles V , Emperor, besieges Metz, 21; assigns Burgundian inheritance to Spain, 21 Charles VII, King of France, see Philip the Good; claims to be heir of Lothair, 20; his claim as origin of "lust for the Rhine" charge, 20 Charles, Archduke, brother of Francis II, his epilepsy and the Tourcoing defeat, 236237; and Madame Royale, 523, 525-526; given a Rhine command, 520 nj6; succeeds Clerfayt, 519 609-610; denounces armistice, May 1796, 589, 609; flees Rhine valley, 589; joins Wartensleben to defeat Jourdan, 646; chagrin at Saxony's defection, mid-J79Ó, 667; discusses peace with civilian on Italian front, and is forbidden to negotiate, 724; Thugut urges return of, to his army just before Leoben Treaty, 7 5 1 ; protests Hoche's right-bank exactions after Leoben, 772-773; Leoben Treaty ascribed to machinations of, 787 »52; Emperor urges, to ready army, Aug.

INDEX 1797, 815 ηγ_j; and the tea-service fantasy, 930-932 Charles the Bald, West Frankish king, 6, 25-26 Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, 20 Charruelle, French officer, courier, brings letters of Clarke and Bonaparte to Vienna, 684; doubts as to his purposes, 684-685; fêted, but given no reply, 685-686; his kind reception prompts Clarke mission to "Vienna," 686 Chaumette, French atheist, 220, 222 Chauvelin, French envoy to Florence, 172-173 Chérin, French gen., later Hoche's chief of staff, orders Dumouriez fired upon, 149 «26; commands Councils' guard on eve of Fructidor, 881 Chérin, French lieut. col., receives ideas of Coburg and Mack on peace, 169 Choiseul, de, French ambas, to Turin until 1792, recommends Clarke to Gherardini, 710 Chouchard, mapper, 721 "C.H.R.G.," see Hesse-Rheinfels-Rothenburg, Charles, Prince of Chuquet (historian), 100, 134; quoted, 118 Cicero, Roman orator, 479, 848 Cimbri, German tribe, 11, 18 «65 Cispadine Republic, 748 "Cisrhenish Germans," ancestry of, 10 Cisrhenish Republic, Bouget and a, 851-852; Hoche suggests a, to Dir., 856; Dir. authorizes a, April 13, 1797, 856, 899; Intermed. Com. authorizes agitation for a, 867868; Moreau unsympathetic toward a, 868, 871—872; Hoche urges Shée to work for a, 871; freedom of press decreed to aid movement for, 872-873; Hoche permits separatists a national guard, 873; agitation for a, starts Sept. 7 in Cologne, 895; Rheinbach serves as entering wedge for creation of, 895-896; Görres and Gerhards' proclamation, 897; Hoche orders Com. to abolish tithes in separatist communes, 897; Hoche informs Dir. it can have a, 898; Com. abolishes feudal burdens in (non-Prussian) left-bank separatist communes, 898; Fructidorized Dir. deauthorizes a, Sept. 16, 899; ceremonial proclamation of the, 900901; Cologne contemplated as capital of, 901, 903; proponents of a, not informed annexation is out, 903; late Oct., Augereau divulges, was stillborn, 903-904; undercurrent of independence continues, 904; character of the movement for a, 904; Bonaparate asks Austria on Oct. 9 to recognize, 929; French people curious re disposition of, by Campo-Formio, 945 "Civil commissioners," dipi, functions of, 173-174; ordered to stipulate for recognition of Republic, 755 7135

INDEX Clarke, French major gen., head of Hist, and Mil. Topographical Bureau, later diplomat, 663, 682, 767 mog, 884 «5; his biograph, 705 n8; see Zwanziger; origin of his mission to "Vienna," 705-706; ordered to confer with Bonaparte, 706; Thugut's reaction to news of, mission, 706; his instructions and Saint-Priest, 706; given letter for Emperor, 707; conditions for, mission, 708-709; Choiseul recommends, 710; converses with Gherardini, 7 1 0 - 7 1 1 ; seeks safe-conduct, 711—712; Emperor shunts, onto Gherardini and Vincent, 712; his success compromised by too much publicity, 7 1 3 ; conference with Vincent breaks up, 7 1 6 ; Dir.'s instructions of Jan. 16, '797> 716—718, 720; ordered to intimidate or bribe Thugut, 719; France would renounce Austrian Italy by Dir.'s Jan. 23 treaty draft, 719-720; ordered to seek independence for Austrian Italy, 719720; Jan. 23 draft and Bavaria, 720; Prussian aid sought to impose treaty draft, 720-721; and Chouchard's map, 721; threatens harsher terms, 726; apprizes Tuscan ruler of Thugut's treason and France's terms, 726; reaction of Emperor and Dir. to his démarche, 727; revisits Gherardini, 728; his peace proposals for Thugut, 7 2 8 729; tricks Gherardini, 729; Thugut invites, to Leoben talks, 733-734; is left without instructions, 760; his nonarrival and Bonaparte, 734, 7 5 1 ; accepts Leoben treaty, 7 6 1 ; Dir. sends, opposing instructions 7 5 6 - 7 5 7 ; defends Bonaparte's treaty to Dir., 7 6 1 ; repairs to Udine, 793; proposes ultimatum, 803; sends Perret and Romeuf to Vienna, 805-806, 808; see Udine-Passariano Conferences; is cashiered after Fructidor, 883; Bonaparte holds, in Italy, 883-884; is ordered to submit report, 883 »2 Clerfayt, Austrian gen., later field marshal, 74, 112, 363, 502, 536, 588; succeeds SaxeTeschen, 386; inaction induces armistice rumor, 387; causes of his inaction, 388; his army divided, 388; unsuccessful after Mannheim treason, 394; ordered to disregard neutrality line, 399; victories of, influence Poteratz' reception end 1795, 518; succeeded by Archduke Charles, 609-610 Cleves, home of Cloots, 198, 199; occupied by Jourdan, 1794, 284; its fate in question at Montebello, 782 Cloots, Prussian exile in Paris, his biograph, 198-200; advocates Rhine boundary for France, 24, 199; granted French citizenship, 1 9 1 ; urges Girondists to make war, 63, 64; and the German legion, 70; joins Mountain, 156; his Universal Republic, 200; his donation to fight tyrants, 201; his prodigality with France's resources, 203

1069 íí/57; expelled from Jacobin Club, 204; his Appel au genre humain, 204 n/6/; his antireligiousness, 199 ni33, 218; executed with other Hébertists, 2 1 8 - 2 2 1 ; his ideas survive in Sieyes, 221 Clovis, Frankish king, defeats Syagrius, 16; other conquests of, in Gaul, 16; appointed consul, 16; Gallo-Romans granted equality by, 17; becomes a Christian, 18 Club, the, of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1 4 1 ; of Mayence, see Böhmer; founded by Custine, 105; and the Moniteur of Nov. 4, /792, 105; leading lights of, 105-108; nationality of its members, 108; activities of, 108-109; n ° t at first committed to annexation, n i ; Forster commits, to annexation, 111 ; discredited, 121, 127; dissolved, 127; elsewhere in the Rhineland, 105, 141, 162, 304-305; in France, reaction against, after Thermidor, 304 ni$7 Cobenzl, Louis, Austrian ambas, to Russia, negotiator, 237, 791 »75; summoned to bolster Gallo, 788 »54; his characteristics, 916; see Udine-Passariano Conferences; calls Campo-Formio mere truce, 948 Cobenzl, Philipp, Austrian vice-chancellor, replies to Minister Dumouriez' ultimatum, 61; quoted, 93 Coblenz, emigré center, 37, 43; Brissot urges attack upon, 49; expects to be destroyed, 99; deputation from, to Custine, 99; Custine blamed for not taking, 136 11248·, Zweibriicken's treasures sent to, 162; occupied by Jourdan, 1794, 284; Bourbotte's 4,000,000-livre imposition on, 291; and the "stockinged feet" episode, 291; its cultural treasures removed to Paris, 300; tree of liberty planted in, 304, 898 «66; attaching of, to Aix admin, multiplies tax burden, 441 n / j S ; vainly seeks relief, 441 ni58, 544; new tree of liberty planted in, 898; officials of, complain to French, 898 Coburg, Duke of, Austrian gen., Imp. field marshal, mode of his appointment, 386 nj; Jourdan compared with, 73; plots with Dumouriez, 146; his no-conquests manifesto, 148; ordered repudiated, 150; his excuses, 150; continues to seek French agreement, 168-169; his Adresse aux Français, 168; his informal letters to French, 168-169; oudines peace bases to Col. Chérin, 169, 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 ; forbidden to negotiate, 170; seeks Emperor's will re keeping Belgium, 239; condemns Belgian evacuation, but query, 241; retires, 237 n j ; 4 Cochon, French min. of general police, 5 7 9 580, 794, 795 Coffee-and-Sugar Memoir, see Dumouriez Colloredo-Mannsfeld, Prince von, Imp. vicechancellor, 684 7129

1070 Colloredo-Waldsee, Count von, cab.- and conference-min., Lord High Chamberlain from 1796, 228, 750; joins in provoking Frisching negotiation over Thugut's head, 599 Collot d'Herbois, m. CPS, 186 «66 Cologne, 843; occupied by Jourdan, 1794, 284; its economic moribundity, 295; loses cultural treasures to Paris, 299-300; feud with Bonn, 301 71128; France owes, three million livres, 305 n¡6s; milder emigration decree introduced in, 416; Bonn, end 1795, levies against, in Pérès' name, 544; Biergans reveals, warring on France, 548; Dir. abolishes Senate of, 549; pleads not to be under jurisdiction of Bonn, 841; Hoche restores old constitution of, 842; name of one of six districts under Intermed. Com., 842; its indirect taxation given to Régie Durbach, 846, 848-849; tax rebellion in, 848; sends letter and deputation to Hoche, 848; Hoche espouses cause of Protestants °f> 853-854; Hoche rebukes deputation from, for intolerance, 853-854; deputation seeks out Hoche's friends, 854; see Bassé; tries to put off tax collector, 854; writes to Dir. but retains letter, 854; its agreement with Hoche, 860-861; complains of license of press, 873 ni86; Schickung of, refuses Rethel a Senate seat, 874-875; Schickung confined in Bonn for obstructing guild elections, 877; Senate of, appeals to Hoche against Com.'s order re accounts, 878; Senate of, suspects purposes of proposed guild assemblages, 878 and «2/9; guild heads resist Com.'s order, 878; guild elections disappoint separatists, 878; its Senate dissolved, 894; its contribution paid, and officials freed, 895; movement for a dependent republic started in, 895; republic proclaimed in, 898-899; contemplated as Cisrhenish capital, 901 Cologne, Elector of, not an absolutist, 32, 37; his attitude toward the Revolution, 36; his explanation of Austria's 1794 retreat, 2 4 1 ; begrudges "one foot of soil" to France, 1 79S> 3 6 ° ; his reaction to Leoben terms, 770 Cologne Welt- und Staatsboth, 424 »50, 701 n68 Colombo, Austrian revolutionist, 777 Comeyras, French min. resident in Coire, Switzerland, 573 "Commissioner of the government," tide of, succeeds "Representative on Mission," 484 n2 Committee of Public Safety, the First: origin, composition, and powers of, 153—154; place of Danton and Barère in, 154; offers royal family's safety for Italian alliances, 167; dissolved, 178; the Great: origin, 1 7 6 - 1 7 8 ; composition, 178; organizes France as a mil. machine,

INDEX 1 7 8 - 1 7 9 ; attains ubiquity through "Representatives on Mission," 1 7 9 - 1 8 0 ; its early victories, and their importance, 180; reverses Danton's peace policy, 1 8 0 - 1 8 1 ; recalls Desportes, 164, 180; orders rigorous treatment of conquests, 1 9 2 - 1 9 3 ; limits with whom it will negotiate, 193; endorses alien-agent idea, 195; rejects annexation of Belgium "for the present," 233; the Thermidorian: its "constitution," 257; fears for loyalty of troops, 258; and for their submissiveness, 262; wants peace, but a glorious one, 262-263; factors inclining Thugut to make peace with, 264-266; Treaty of January 3, 1795 a hurdle to Franco-Austrian peace, 265-266; suspects loyalty of Merlin-Th., 275; secretly welcomes Möllendorff's peace overture, 277; lightens burdens of Rhineland, 296; decrees end of contributions in northern Rhineland, 297; outlines its German policy, 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 ; see Barthélémy; its left-bank and anti-Coalition demands on Prussia, 3 3 1 ; wants to fight while negotiating, 3 3 1 ; Prussia's attitude pacifies, 3 3 3 ; its treaty project of March 10, 7795, 3 3 3 - 3 3 4 ; suggests alliance to Prussia, 334, 974; declares its March 10 project an ultimatum, 3 3 5 336; its dipi, authority delineated, 3 3 7 - 3 3 8 ; asks for proposal to abandon most of Rhineland, 370; rejects Danish-mediation proposals, 4 1 3 ; instructs Barthélémy and Caillard re Rhine demand, 437-438; proposes exchange of Madame Royale to Conv., 4 5 0 - 4 5 1 ; hopes exchange will lead to peace parleys, 452; commissions Théremin to approach Austria, 454; authorizes Hilscher to offer armistice to Austria, 455; sends Poteratz to Vienna, 459; unwisdom and inconsistency of CPS's policy, 467—468 Commune of Paris, its courage in face of invasion, 77; and Brunswick's halt at Valmy, 78; battles Girondists, 154—155; reaction to Sémonville's and Maret's instructions, 183-184 Compulsory Liberty Decree, see Decree of Dec. 15 and 1 7 , 1792 Condé, Prince of, Bourbon émigré gen., heads émigrés at Worms, 43; see Pichegru; Poteratz to promote desertions in army of, 570; Poteratz' traffic with émigrés of, 5 7 6 578; saves Moreau after Altenkirchen, 1796, 786 «42; in Aug. 1797, thinks France unready for coup by moderates, 812 n6i Condorcet, de, French philosopher, scholar, m. Legis. Assem., Conv., 1042; biograph, 5 »7; proposes war on kings, peace to peoples, 5 1 ; speech justifying the war, 62 »/4S; alleged founder of secret society, 95; says organization, not pacifism, is key to peace, 479 040 Congress, peace, France asks for, in Proly's

INDEX overture, 167; Habsburgs suggest, 2 1 3 ; Thugut insists on, to Poteratz, 5 1 8 ; Poteratz offers Thugut preliminary conferences in lieu of, 5 5 1 - 5 5 2 ; Dir. fears, would hamper secularization, 5 5 2 - 5 5 3 ; Delacroix favors exclusion of ecclesiastics from, 553; Poteratz suggests, to follow separate Franco-Austrian peace, 554; separate peace and, proposed simultaneously to Austria, 724-725; Dir. hostile to provision for, in Leoben Treaty, 762, 790; three-months provision of Leoben's Art. IV used as lever against Austria's demand for, 7 9 1 - 7 9 2 ; Emperor renounces conditionally a, for Austria's definitive peace, 807; Campo-Formio excludes outsiders from, for Imp. peace, 937 Conquests, French renunciation of, 24 T143, 94 Constance, rejects separate-peace plan for southwestern circles, 588; Bishop of, complains of Swabian armistice, 593; powers of, in Swabian Circle coveted by Baden, 643; Dir. seeks to transplant silk industry of, to Lyons, 692 «5 Constant de Rebecque, Benjamin, Lausanneborn French publicist, 794 Constantinople, Austria in Istria and Dalmatia a threat to, 914 Constitution, of 1 7 9 1 : no ministerial responsibility, 45 «60; renunciation of conquests, 94; Girondist draft of a, (pubi. Feb. 16, 1 7 9 3 ) : conducive to international tensions, 155-156; of 1793: no peace with an occupying power, 1 7 4 ; of the Year III, 462; provisions of, 484485; Sieyes' contributions to the, 486 "Constitutional frontiers," 886 ni$\ defined by Delacroix, 503, 750 n8; enter into Bonaparte's alternatives at Leoben, 748; in three treaty projects, 750; Austria recognizes, of France at Leoben, 754; Carnot stretches, to include left bank, 767 Contraband, 3 3 2 ; see Hamburg; Jordis the banker Contributions on German right bank, power to levy, limited to gens, in chief by Dir., 696; Austria and Prussia protest Hoche's, after Leoben, 772-773; Bonaparte and Moreau levy no, 773 n/40; double motivation for, after Leoben, 773; Swabian, Francoman, and Bavarian: Emperor's consent to French collection of arrears of, sought, 756; French efforts to secure acquittal of, 774-776; legal problem involved, 775; occupation of Empire desired to enable collection of, 808 n j j Convention, French National, annexes eightyeight Rhineland communities, 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 ; recalls Girondists, 259; argument in, over Hamburg, 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 ; annexes Belgium,

IO71 Liège, and Luxemburg, 440-441; votes exchange of Madame Royale, 450-451 Corbeau, French army officer, 1 3 3 Corrancier, coed, of Journal de Paris, 428, 429 Cotta, former Stuttgart prof., Strasburg publicist, 583; identified, 109; his Wie gut es jetzt das Vol\ am Rhein . . . , 109; Conv. sends, to Mayence, 109 Coup d'état, of 9 thermidor, see Thermidor; of 18 fructidor, see Fructidor Courrier des armées, 690 Couthon, m. CPS, 2 2 1 , 255 Cracow, 265, 353 Crefeld, treatment of abbey in, by Custine's army, 1 1 4 nny, occupied by Jourdan, 1794, 284; all emigrants from, return home, 416 Crema, 887 Crimes des empereurs, 20i η/52 Croatia, 889 Cromm, see Vossen Cultural rape of Germany, left bank: ordered of Custine by Lebrun, 1 1 4 « 7 / 7 ; decreed by Great CPS, 208-209; factual and legislative background of, 299; details of, 299-300; by Keil under Dir., 658-659; right bank, under Dir.: of Nuremberg, 637; of Frankfort-on-the-Main, 656; of Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 656; of Mannheim, 657; of Düsseldorf, 657-658 Custine, Adam de, French gen., his early career, 159; offers peace to Austro-Prussians, 87; negotiates secretly with Prussia, 159; invades Empire in peace time, 93; explanations for his unopposed advance, 94-98; promises to respect persons and property in Mayence, 1 0 1 ; his contributions on Rhineland and Frankfort, 102; offers Frankfort alliance or neutrality, 102—103; forms Mayence "triumvirate" with Böhmer and Dorsch, 109; founds "Clubs" in Mayence, Worms, Spires, 105; creates city councils and "General Admin." in Rhineland, 1 1 5 ; convokes electors, 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 ; attacked by Hofmann, 1 2 2 ; his activities during siege of Mayence, 1 3 5 ; conduct of, as basis for his subsequent execution, 136 η248; "C.H.R.G." and, 533 »26; his politico-military plan accepted, 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 ; his principles suspected, 160; writes Brunswick and Wurmser re peace, 170; Wurmser's aide approaches, without authority, 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 ; his failure to act, 1 7 7 ; his plan revoked, 177; in Paris, is executed, 136, 177 mo\ as a gen., imprisons war min.'s agents, 465 Custine, François de, son of Adam, his mission to Brunswick, 56-57; in Berlin, 57 Cuxhaven, 399, 400 Dalberg, von, coadjutor of Mayence, 278, 627 Dalmatia, at Leoben, 748; destined for Austria by Leoben terms, 754; Dir. willingly ac-

1072 cords, to Austria, 811 »55; Dir. craves Austria's abandonment of, 814; Austrians occupy, to forestall revolutionization, 889 Damas, Roger de, French émigré officer, Artois' aide-de-camp in Sept. 7792, 78, 732 Dampierre, French gen., and the Compulsory Liberty Decree in Aix, 140-141; quarrels with Aix over provisional admins., 140-141; establishes Aix Club, 141; orders national convention elected, 141; succeeds Dumouriez, 166; offers exchange of hostages for truce renewal, 166; proposes exchange of royal family, 166-167; Coburg fails to report proposal of, to Vienna, 166 η128; overtures of, produce flood of Coburg letters, 168; killed by cannon ball in battle, May 8, '793> I 7 ° ni59< 765-766 Danton, French justice min., m. Conv., attacks, then supports Brissot's war policy, 48, 49; advocates "natural boundaries," 119 M39; helps to provoke Decree of Jan. 31, 7795, 142; not above suspicion in treason of Dumouriez, 154 «60; heads First CPS, 154; directs for. aff. with Barère, 154; secures passage of conciliatory Decree of April 13, 1793, 114 n u ; , 156-157, 168; his for. policy contrasted with Girondist, 154—156, 158; backs Italian overtures re royal family, 167-168; a blot on France's honor for seeking peace, 175; declines seat on Great CPS, 178; his letter to Queen in Conciergerie, 183 «46; his interview with Robin, 209; comparison of for. policies of Robespierre and, 222; trial and execution, 222; as justice min. in 1792, controls for. policy, 464; rules First CPS by personal influence, 465 Danube River, 753 Danzig, fate under Hertzberg plan, 38; revolutionary conspiracy in, quashed, April 1797, 744-745 D'Audibert, see Audibert-Caille, d' Dautzenberg, Johann, brother of ed. of Aachener Zuschauer, sec. of Aix Club, 141; a Freemason, 143; his flight, 143 Daverhoult, m. Legis. Assem., 46 Davidowich, Austrian gen., 704 Debry, m. Conv., Five Hundred, proposes corps of tyrannicides, 184 «56; compares abnegative France with conquering Rome, 763-764 De-Christianization movement, effect of, on for. opinion, 217; Robespierre's attitude toward, 218-219 Decree, French, of, Nov. 19, 1792 (aid to all revolutionists), origin of, 1 1 3 - 1 1 4 ; terms of, 114; its reception by the Mayence Club, 114; in Aix, 140; repudiated by Conv., 114 M 1 5 , 156157; its spirit repudiated by Dir., 561; then embraced, April 17φ, 572; Dec. 15 and 17, 1792 (compulsory liberty), text of, 1 1 7 ; purpose, 118; Cmrs sent

INDEX to Mayence to implement, 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 ; Aix resists, 140—142; in Zweibrücken, 162; Jan. 31, 1793 (time limit on liberty), 142; April 8, 1793 (public debts to be paid only in assignats), 282-283; angers army, 283; unenforceable, 283-284; April l i , 1793 (private debts payable in assignats; no premium for payment in coin), 283; Aug. 16, 1793 (ships of states with deliberative voice at Ratisbon are enemy ships), 252; Sept. 15 and 18, 1793 (no philosophy, but the rights of war), 192-193, 204, 208; Dec. 8, 1793 (freedom of religion), 218 «2 48; July 18, 1794 (limits contributions to triple the usual taxes), 441 η 138; June 30, 1795 (authorizes exchange of Madame Royale), 450, 521; May 17, 1796 (income of corporate bodies in conquered territory belongs to France), 659 n62, 841 »22; Aug. 7, 1796 (limits who may levy contributions and requisitions), 654, 696 Deforgues, French for. min., doubts Prussia seeks secularization, 163; reports on chances for peace with Prussia, 164; lacks all policy under early Great CPS, 192; his alien-agent plan, 195, 278-279; his "fable" that Imp. cities have no Diet vote, 254 Degelmann, Austrian min. to Switzerland, 363, 410 «45; Theremin's conversations with, 453-455; ordered to sever talks with Theremin, 455; new proposals to, from Theremin through Hilscher, 455; rebuffs von Andlau's overture, 456; Thugut and Poteratz agree upon, as intermediary, Jan. 1796, 518; is cautioned against Poteratz, 519; and Madame Royale's trousseau, 524—525; approaches Barthélémy through Bourcard, on Thugut's order, 529, 557; violent reaction of Dir. to his attempt not to recognize the Republic, 529, 557-558; says French plans "exceedingly vast," 574 η38; on Poteratz as "double spy," 578; learns about revolutionary intrigues of Poteratz, 579 Dego, 739 Dekadenschrift, 426 n6¡ Delacroix, Charles, French for. min., 165; as for. min. of Dir., enjoys some latitude, 492; his biograph, 497-498; father of famous painter Eugene, 498; thinks France annexed Aix-Ia-Chapelle in 1793, 503; his "Plan of Pacification," 510-513; a natural-boundary advocate on Oct. 1, 1795, 511 n$y, recommends expulsion of Carletti, 521; views Hanover as a tool to effect return of France's islands, 531; his idea of a double treaty with Prussia, 605; Sandoz hides from, that he has been bypassed, 612; suggests buffer between France and Austria, 624; see Malmesbury;

INDEX shortcomings of, as for. min., 795; Poteratz to supplant, rumor, 795 moo·, replaced by Talleyrand, 796; sees danger to Levantine commerce in Leoben Treaty, 913 Delaunay, French pol. writer, his plan for two European confederations, 478 njg Denmark, mediation of, requested by Diet, 269; and by Emperor, 4 1 2 - 4 1 3 ; see Bernstorff; Poteratz suggests mediation of, and Sweden, 551 Derché, French official, essayist, 430 ηγ8 Deroy, Palatine gen., 391 Desaix, French gen., 743; his journey to South Germany as collector, 7 7 5 - 7 7 6 ; Bonaparte recommends, to head Army of Germany, 933 n i 2 g Descamps, French National Agent in Rhineland, 301 Descorches de Sainte-Croix, French gen., agent, chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, importance of his Turkish intrigues, 265 n68 Desertion, army, following Jemappes, 112 Desmoulins, demagog, publicist, m. Jacobins, Conv., 53, 202 n i 5 5 Desportes, French diplomat, on attitude of Zweibrücken, 162; and Esebeck's plan, 163; his unused safe-conduct, 163, 164; his report on the Esebeck negotiation, 163; confers with Frederick William's chamberlain, 163-164; sent to Mannheim to follow up negotiations, 164; recalled by Great CPS, 164; Prussia's attitude toward propositions of, 165 Dessault, French surgeon, 447 Dessolle, French adjutant gen., 765 Destez, C m r of Intermed. Com., 898 Deverine, Augereau's aide-de-camp, asks 600,000 francs, allegedly for Augereau, 911 Diet of the Empire, feudal-enclave princes appeal to, 42; its disunity, 42; works for peace during 1792, 91; votes for war with France, 91; declares war, 92; Emperor ratifies declaration, 92; asks Danish and Swedish mediation, 1794, 269; votes quintuple contingents, 270; its Reichsfriedensgutachten of Dec. 22, 1794, 264, 271, 408 its Conclusimi of July 3, 1795, 408—409; Emperor ratifies Conclusion of, with stipulations, 410; omits Prussia from membership on peace deputation, 413; Dir. orders seizure of registers of, 658; Emperor cites defecting states before, 668 Dietrichstein, von, Austrian col. of engineers, and observer, 327, 367 nija, 395, 413-414 Dietrichstein, von, Austrian diplomat, substitutes for Louis Cobenzl at St. Petersburg, 832, 925 «97 Dillman, see Dresky, Jean, pseud. Dillon, French gen., confers with Gen. Kalkreuth, 83-84 Dion Cassius Cocceianus, Bithynian historian of Rome, 1 0 - 1 1

IO73 Diplomatic Committee, 42; condemns De Lessart, 55; on Rhine boundary, early 1793, no Directors, their official attire, 493; views of first, re annexing Rhineland, 502-506 Directory, constitutes itself, 483; twilight period between Conv. and, 484; miscarriage of Sieyes' plans for a Girondist, 486-488; state of France at start of, 498-500; its circular to agents abroad, 507; motives of early, in approaching Austria, 514; sends Poteratz back to Vienna, 5 1 5 - 5 1 7 ; grants Poteratz all moneys "needed," and secrecy, 516; authorizes D'Audibert-Caille to negotiate on Poland with Prussia, 564; disavows D ' A u dibert-Caille but duplicates his overture through Caillard, 565-566; its only immutable plan an armed Prussian alliance against Austria, 567; commissions Poteratz to revolutionize Germany, 572; orders Poteratz' arrest, 5 7 5 - 5 7 6 ; wants revolutionary movement in South Germany to continue, 580581; guarantees existing governments in South German armistices, 581; its impudent reply to Grenville's overture, 1796, 670; agrees to Malmesbury's "barter of conquests" if Thugut's mandate secured, 670-671, 673; balks at relinquishing Belgium, 674; expels Malmesbury, end 1796, 674; internal crisis of summer, 1797, precludes ultimatum to Austria, 803-805; its division of functions dropped in May, 1797, to circumvent Barthélémy, 809; orders maximum deviation from unfavorable Leoben terms, 814; reverses itself on where Austria shall be indemnified, 814; seeks Austrian renunciation of Istria and Dalmatia, 814; wishes all French evacuations postponed until general peace, 814; ratifies Hoche-Imstenradt Convention, 902; its belated fear of Austrian maritime expansion, 9 1 2 - 9 1 4 ; attentive to Turkish ambas., but balks at reciprocity in trade, 9 1 4 - 9 1 5 ; see Udine-Passariano Conferences; Campo-Formio, Treaty of; projects new exploits for army and Bonaparte to prevent their return, 942-943 Divitiäcus, Aedui chieftain, 12 " D o you know the pretty story . . . ? " 84-85 Dobruska brothers, see Frey brothers Dohm, von, Prussian min. resident at Cologne, 236 η348; peace overtures to, by Mettra and Mandrillon, 86-87; reports on Montgaillard negotiation, 229; his correspondent, on Austria's retreat from Belgium, 241; Cologne Elector on same, 241-242; fears retreating Austrians will seize territory, 246; at Congress of Hildesheim, 607; on discipline of French troops in 1794, 303; induces Hanoverians to renounce anti-French intentions. 401 Dolleschall, Cologne syndic, seeks tax relief from Bonn, 848; on deputation to "Fried-

INDEX

1074 berg," 853; follows Hoche to Friedberg, 854; disputes with Rethel over Senate seat, 874-876 Dombrowski's Polish corps, 566 «42, 743 "Don Quixote," 383, 871 Dona, French agent, 174 Dorsch, prof, at Mayence, later Strasburg, an Illuminé, 97; his biograph, 108; Conv. sends, to Mayence, 109; joins Club, 59, 107; "triumvirate" of, Custine, Böhmer, formed, 109; heads local admin, of Mayence, 109; heads "General Admin.," 115; escapes from Mayence, 131; becomes French citizen, 196 nii4\ Barthélemy's opinion of, 196; president Central Admin, of Aix, 301; his Dec. 20, 1794 speech at Aix, 308; employed in the French Dept. of For. Aff., 309 ni88; essayist, 430 ny8] his reply to Rebmann c. Oct. 10, 7797, 905-907 Doucet, French diplomat, 91 Drave River, 805 Dresky, Jean, pseud, for Dillman, French informer, 745-746 Drouet, postmaster, Rp, 450 T128, 451 T135 Droz (historian), 130 »2/7, 852 ngs, §72 11185> 9 ° 4 nmio,

113

Dubois, Rp, 302-303, 422; relieves Prussian left bank of all contributions and some requisitions, 417; is overruled by CPS, 4 1 7 418; modifies Pérès' 22,000,000-livre contribution, 419; see Roberjot Dubois-Crancé, m. Jacobins, Constituante, Conv., 45, 46 Du Bois du Bais & Briez, Rps, their correspondence with Coburg, 168-169; its importance to Decree of April 13, 1793, 168; are recalled but remain, 169 Dubuisson, Brussels playwright, agent of Lebrun, his mission to Dumouriez, 146 nii\ and to Esebeck at Metz, 163; his execution, 219, 221 Duhem, French gen., 654 Dumas, m. Conv., Ancients, 53, 764, 786 »42, 913 Duminique, von, min. of Trêves Elector, 9697, 688-689, 770 Dumolard, m. Conv., Five Hundred, 152, 762 Dumont, André, m. Conv., 263 Dumont, Daniel, pres. of Mayence merchants, drafts constitution for Mayence, 103-104; banished, 122 η ι $ ; Dumont, J. N., burgomaster of Cologne, 860; "leave us the rest," 300; carries CologneBonn feud to Paris, 301 niz8\ remains in Paris as chronic protester, 427 «67; says Rhineland has not evidenced desire for annexation, 427-428; his entry in essay contest, 435, 438; object of Biergans' sniping, 548; appeals to Hoche to reestablish Senate, 842; appeals to Intermed. Com. against disproportionate contributions, 848; likens

Cologne and Hoche to San Marino and Bonaparte, 848 Dumourier, see Dumouriez Dumouriez, French for. min. and gen., 457; advocate of natural boundaries, 25; later, advocate of left-bank buffer states, 25; becomes for. min., 57; regarded abroad as Jacobin, 58; his policy of isolating Austria, 58, 59; sends new ultimatum to Austria, 61; procures a declaration of war, 61-62; succeeded by Chambonas, 68; Kellermann and, at Valmy, 78-79; courts Prussians, 79-81; his Coffee-and-Sugar Memoir, 80-81; receives another Brunswick manifesto, 81; announces resumption of hostilities, 81; Marat prognosticates his emigration, 152 n44; his victory at Jemappes, 112; does not strip Belgium, 282; grudgingly sanctions movement to annex Aix, 140 «27/; his pol. plans, 146; effect thereon of his defeat at Neerwinden, 146; evacuates Belgium, 146; is investigated by Cmrs of Lebrun's, 146 nn; turns commission of five from Conv. over to Austrians, 146; legal status of the five captives, 147 n>4, 451 nji·, concerts invasion of France with Coburg, 148; his artillery departs, 149; his desertion, 149; see Antwerp, Congress of; severs relations with Coburg, 150; Starhemberg's description of, 150-151; seeks an Austrian command, 151; Dumolard proposes to stab, 152; becomes a homeless wanderer, 151; in England, 1 5 1 ; Danton accused of past conspiracy with, 221; his Coup d'ceil opposes annexation of Rhineland, 307 Duquesnoy, m. Conv., 202 ni Duramel, French finance min., sends Hoche special rules for Prussian left bank, 839-840; his suggestions for remainder of left bank, 840; orders all receipts held by army paymaster gen., 840; protests Hoche's disobedience to orders, 871 m y y Durbach, French tax-farmer in Rhineland, 770, 859 m 2 5 ; brother-in-law of Hoche, 845; Régie Durbach, its establishment, 844, 845; effect of proximity of peace with Austria on, 846; its illegalities and ruthlessness, 846; Hoche adds all ecclesiastical property to, 846; Hoche places hussars at disposal of, 847; Intermed. Com. adds all indirect taxes to, 848-849; assigns, and attempts to assign, Aix's and Cologne's indirect taxes to tax farmers, 849; abolished, 859 Düren, 844 Durlach, Margrave of, 654 Düsseldorf, 423, 691; surrenders to French without a shot, 389; infant Dir. covets, 757 Du Val-de-Grâce, Baron, see Cloots Duverne de Presle (or Praîle), royalist conspirator, 800

INDEX Edelsheim, Badenese min. of state, 494 «40, 590. 593 Eden, Sir Morton, British envoy extraord. to Berlin, 1791-; ambas., 1793, and envoy extraord., 1794-, to Vienna: 245, 706, 732; Thugut insinuates to, desire for subsidies after Campo-Formio, 948 Egalité, Philippe, see Orleans, Duke of Ehrenbreitstein, fortress of Coblenz, 394, 756, 811 «55, 814, 939; Mayence Clubists imprisoned in, 137 Eichelskamp, 389, 395, 423 Eickemeyer, Mayençais engineer, 100, 907 M19 Eisenhower, Dwight D., American gen., pres., 2 Elgin, British envoy extraord. to Berlin, 620, 884 B5 Elizabeth, archduchess, 525 Emigrés, French, 49 »79; problem of the, 4253; at Coblenz, 37, 43; at Worms and Mayence, 43; on right bank, 43 »47; in Hanover, 7795, 532-533; Poteratz' intrigues with, 576-577; of Condé's save Moreau from rout, 7796, 786 «42; accept asylum in Russia, 927 n/07 Emigrés, Rhineland, classes of, 287; how they fit into France's financial system, 287; anarchy in rules governing, 287; regulations of Roberjot and Dubois for northern, 298; return of many, 416; see Prussian left bank Empire, see Diet of the Empire; plans for reorganization of, 623-625; Prince Henry on reorganization of, 626-628; French treaties with Würtemberg and Baden presage extinction of, 632-633, 641-642; Thugut stipulates for integrity of, at Leoben, 749; France refuses to discuss Belgium with, 808 »34 England, Talleyrand in, to seek alliance, 209; Badenese lumber exacted for ships to invade, 644; offers subsidy to Prussia on Jan. 11, J 797> 342 «22; see George III; Pitt; Grenville; Hammond; Malmesbury Erfurt, 137 Erhard, Dr., see Nomocrates, Charatophile, pseud. Erlach, von, m. Berne Grand Council, 737-738 Ernouf, Jourdan's chief of staff, 634, 635; and Gleichen negotiate Franconian armistice, 634 Erthal, von, see Mayence, Archbishop-Elector of Eschermann, von, chancellor of Trêves Elector, 688 Esebeck, von, Zweibrücken min. imprisoned by France, offers services, 162-163; talks with Dubuisson and Desportes, 163; transferred to Paris prison, 164; released, 165 Essay contest, 424-435; announced in Journal de Paris, 428; Hofmann's indignation with subject of, 428-429; Moniteur suspects émigrés are behind, 429; Böhmer allays

IO75 Moniteur's suspicions re, 429-430; data on entrants and winners of, 430; donor of prizes in, 428 »70, 430; contestants' arguments, 430-434; consonance with Roberjot's report, 434; Dumont's antiannexational essay in, 434-435 Esséid Ali, Turkish ambas, to France, 914-915 Estienne, Intermed. Com.'s Substitute-Cmr for Aix-la-Chapelle, his appointment, 874; and the delayed Aix elections, 895 Etiquette, diplomatic, 750, 754, 755, 781 Ettenheim, 640 Ettlingen, 613 Evacuation, Agency of, establishment and function of, 244, 291; south of the Moselle: under Bourbotte, 292-293; economically disastrous, 292, 302; Merlin-Th. abolishes, 293, 302; north of the Moselle: milder, 294 Exportation of necessities prohibited, 253 Fabre d'Eglantine, m. Conv., role in India Company scandal, 201-203; invents "conspiracy of foreigners," 201; sequel to his hoax, 202; Danton accused of conspiracy with, 221; executed, 222 Falkenstein, Rhinelander notary, 361 Falkenstein, in the Palatinate, 716 Famine, and counterfeit assignats are France's two toughest enemies, 284 n/7; is the only enemy in northern Rhineland, 295; assurances regarding impending, 296 Felice, pseud., French informer, 746 Féraud, Rp, 293, 362 nio$ Férino, French gen., 571, 646 Ferrara, 749, 750 Ferrerò (historian), 753 «28 Fersen, de, col. of Royal-Swedish regiment in service of Louis XVI, 44 »57 Festival of Gratitude, 504 Festival of Liberty, 915 Fête of August 10 (1797), propaganda plans for, in Moreau's territory misfire, 871-872 Feudal Committee, 40 Feudal-enclave problem, 39-42; list of princes involved, 39 n^y, princes' attitude traced to Prussia, 42 «45 Feudalism abolished in France, 39-40 Finance, revolutionary, in Rhineland, 286-288 Fingerling, Frankfort-on-the-Main banker, 39? Finkenstein, von, Prussian cab. min. in charge of For. Office, 229, 313, 377, 458 ny¡, 604, 620, 831 First Coalition, its members, 92; French countermeasures to, 92; Empire joins, 92, 143 Flammermont (historian), 1021 Flemings, the Germanic people of Belgium, 10 Fleurus, 236 η348, 237-239 Fleury (historian), 520 Florence, Imp. peace feelers from, 171; First CPS sends Chauvelin to, 109, 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 ; Sémonville ordered to stop over in, 173;

1076 Sémonville's oral instructions re the Queen, and the, gov't, 173 Foreigners, France's attitude toward, before 178 g, 1 9 0 - 1 9 1 ; Revolutionists naturalize foreign notables, 191; lowly, harbored and employed, 191—192; Soulavie recommends expulsion of, 190; Robespierre echoes Soulavie on, 196; Fabre invents conspiracy of, 201; Jacobin C l u b purged of, 204; antagonism to, a product of six months' growth, 202 ni¡¡\ several, executed, 220, 221; see Cloots Forster, former prof., librarian at Mayence, not originator of natural-boundary theory, 25 n8i\ but an advocate thereof, 25; exults over Revolution, 33 «7, 36; dubbed a "German Girondist," 65; a Freemason, 97; joins Mayence Club, 106; his biograph, 105-106; his "natural boundary" speech, 111 ; contradictory stand three weeks earlier, 112; deputy head of Custine's "General Admin.," 1 1 5 ; summarizes trial-election "results," 116; ousted from gov't and Club, 122; vice-pres. of Rheno-German National Convention, 128; sent to Paris with decree seeking annexation, 129; his address to Paris Conv., 129; stranded in Paris, 130; chosen "civil commissioner," 174 B/S2; disillusionment with the Revolution, 130 «2/7; his death, 130 »2/7; Droz's reflections on, 130 »217 Fouché, Rp, 207 France, recognized as "Protector" of Lorraine, 23; declares war on Austria, 62; Allies contemplate dismemberment of, 62, 74, 477; its condition under early Thermidorians, 2 5 9 261; report on, by Greiffenegg's agent, 263; see Convention, French National; Committee of Public Safety; Directory Francis I, Emperor, his 1746 diploma re Hamburg, 248 Francis II, Emperor, succeeds Leopold as king, 58; and as emperor, July 14, 1792, 58; forbids service to France, 125—126; loses early bellicosity after Valmy and Jemappes, 165; refuses to manufacture false assignats, 284 n/7; approaches France through his motherin-law and Count of Sickingen, 165; recovers bellicosity after Neerwinden, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ; authorizes Thugut's treachery toward Dumouriez, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ; orders Coburg not to negotiate, 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 ; does not close door on exchange of royal family, 170; not responsible for harshness of Sémonville's and Maret's confinement, 182 n ^ j ; orders 1794 retreat from Belgium halted, 240; his reaction to Diet's 1794 peace plea, 269-270; frowns upon Wilhelmsbader Conferences, 270; his suggestion of a German levée en masse defeated, 2 7 1 ; instructs Clerfayt to disregard neutrality line, 399; orders Wurmser to guard against desertion of Württemberger or Swabian contingent, 405; irked at

INDEX conditions for exchange of Madame Royale, 451 ; asks Gallo to procure peace for Austria, 598; protests to Württemberg, Baden, Swabia, about their defection, 668 François de Neufchâteau, poet, m. Legis. Assem., Cmr, interior min., m. Dir., replaces Carnot on Dir. after Fructidor, 882; votes to deauthorize a Rhineland republic, 899 Franconian Circle, suggests separate peace by circles of southwest Germany, 588; its resources recorded before Jourdan's arrival, 633-634; Jourdan promises respect for persons and property in, 634; signs harsh armistice with French, 634-635; armistice demands on, secured by hostages, 635; Jourdan annuls armistice with, and doubles levy, 635-636; Jourdan's excuse for annulment, 637; Dir. annuls Jourdan's annulment in form, but annuls own annulment in practice, 637; heavy "supplementary" contributions on, 637—638; contributions convention signed with, 638—639; Archduke Charles forbids, to pay contributions, 639; French try to force payment through hostages of, 639 Frankfort-on-the-Main, 410; Custine's promises to, 102; his exactions from, 102; inhabitants of, admit Prussians and murder French, 103; French incensed at "treason" of, 103; provisions regarding, in Neutrality Convention, 367; alleged conduct of Prussians toward Austrian wounded outside, 389 n_j_j; French threaten to storm, 398; Prussian withdrawal leaves, unprotected, 398-399, 594; Jourdan captures, 594; Dir. orders heavy levies on, 594-595; Sandoz' intercession for, rejected, 595; Dir. orders, treated as enemy, 609; agreement on contributions with, 648; Jourdan's defeated army treated kindly by, 648; Dir. reverses attitude toward, 648-649; concessions to, stop at Rhine boundary, 649; Golden Bull ordered seized in, 658; tumult in, spring,

'797, 744 Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 822 Franklin, Benjamin, American statesman, 496 Franks, Ripuarian, cross Rhine, 15; pressed by Alemanni, 15; win Trêves, 15; united with Salían Franks, 16 Franks, Salian, enter Gaul, 14—15! advance to Somme, 15; see Clovis Franzosen am Rheinstrome, 71 Frécine, Rp, 300, 307—308 Frederick II, the Great, K i n g of Prussia, his maxim on necessity of a Poland, 564 «20; his opinion of Karl Friedrich, 574 and nj7; covets Saxony for his House, 678 nig Frederick William II, K i n g of Prussia, reported to crave secularization, 163; suggested secularizations communicated to, 163; sends chamberlain to expedite Desportes negotiation, 163-164; not unfavorable to Desportes'

INDEX propositions, 165; French plots to assassis nate, 184; his mistresses, 196 nu6; his Polish expedition, mid-/794, 244; needs troops from West, but has honor-trouble, 246-247; a Rosicrucian since 1781, 246 141S > peace with France urged upon, 267-268; authorizes overtures for Prussian mediation of Franco-Imp. peace, 269; his solicitude for Mannheim and Mayence, 274; rejects, at Basel, French demand for Cleves and Meurs, 329-330; his ministers "interpret" his rejection, 331—332; his attitude toward Basel negotiations, 339-341; and subsidy question, 340-342; yields in Cracow-Sandomir controversy, 353—354; strong position of, in Empire after Treaty of Basel, 264, 271, 408409; promises French concessions against France's wishes, 410-411; drops effort to be "Gegen\aiser," 4 1 1 ; fears revolutionary taint on Prussian left bank, 412 ηS4; French proposals to aggrandize, 538; resents Frankfort's failure to avail itself of his good offices for peace, 595 Freemasonic lodges, German reading circles and, 33 n8; and Custine's 1792 invasion, 95; members of: Custine, 95; Forster and Dr. Wedekind, 97; Dr. de Vivignis and Johann Dautzenberg, 143; Dr. jur. Vossen, 143, 304 Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 22, 654 n j 6 Fréron, Cmr, Rp, 494 Frey brothers, Austrian expatriates, 154 «62 Fribourg (historian), 50 Fribourg (French town near Hüningen), 583 Fricktal, 716 Friedensstifter, 278 Friedrich August, Elector of Saxony, 662, 663 Friedrich Eugen, Duke of Württemberg, see Württemberg Friedrich Josias, see Coburg, Duke of Frisching, Karl Albert von, ex-treasurer of Canton of Berne, see Colloredo, Count; presents peace propositions to Barthélémy for Austria, 599-600; his overture rejected obliquely, 604; importance of the, negotiation, 600-601 Friuli, Austrian, 743, 749, 754, 776; Venetian, 811 «J5 Fructidor, Sept. 4, 7797, 783, 789, 816; Augereau and Chérin given key commands before, 801; fears of Directorial conspirators of, 801-802; the mechanics of, 879-880; Carnot flees, 880; Barthélémy deported, 881882; proscription of moderate legislators and journalists, 881; replacement of Carnot and Barthélémy, 882; news of, has no immediate effect at Udine, 887; reverses policy of Dir., but not of Bonaparte and France, 956 Fürstenbund, 35, 276 " G , " of the Lafitte overture, 174 Galatai, see Keltoi

IO77 Galbaud, see Kalkreuth Gall, prof, at Bonn, sec.-interpreter of Intermed. Com., obtains Shée's concurrence for Rhineland separatists, 867-868; his part in ceremonial proclamation of Cisrhenish Republic, 900, 901 Gallo, Neapolitan ambas, to Vienna, 805; quoted on France's "need" of one enemy, 509; ordered to consult with Belmonte, 597; receives commisison from Thugut and Francis II, 598; seeks Thugut's permission to proceed to Paris, and is recalled, 598-599; adjoined to Merveldt at Leoben, 748; Bonaparte rejects, accepts, 748—749; his stories of great credit at Vienna, 782; Bonaparte's jewel for, 788 η r e t u r n s to Vienna to activate negotiations, 805; see Udine-Passariano Conferences Garrau, Cmr, Carnot's friend, advocates French garrisons in right-bank forts, 620 n86 Gaul, pre-Celtic inhabitants of, 9 n n ; invaded by Celts, 9; by Cimbri and Teutones, 1 1 ; rent by civil war, 12; Ariovistus invades, 12; German tribes setde in, 12; Caesar expels Ariovistus from, 13; installs three German tribes in, 13; Ubii setded in, 14; German colonies established in, 1 3 - 1 5 , 17 «64; peaceful infiltration of, by Salian Franks, Burgundians, and Ripuarian Franks, 1 4 - 1 5 ; analysis of its German element, 17 »64; to what extent Germanized by Frankish conquest, 1 7 - 1 8 ; Carnot and the bounds of, 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 ; no reference to bounds of, by Robespierre, 232; bounds of, in essay contest, 434 Gaulle, de, French war hero, statesman, and the Rhine frontier, 2, 26 Gavre, Prince von, Emperor's envoy, 523, 524 Gedrigoni, Austrian commander, 741 «72 Geich, Rhinelander republican, dubbed a "German Girondist," 65; chosen for Paris normal-school course, 305 n/67; his biograph, 426 n6j; his newspapers, 426 n 6 j ; prefers Rhineland republic over annexation, 427; frowns upon restoration of Cologne senate, 842; administrator of Ahrweiler, 895; selfappointed Cmr of Executive Authorities to Rheinbach, 896; obliged to drop his title, 896-897 Geisberg, the, 180 Geldern, 842 General Administration of the Conquered Territories, 840 ni8 "General Administration" of the Rhineland, established by Custine, 115; trial election in, 116; proffered formulary in, rejected, 116;· Forster on the election "results" in, 116 General Directions, establishment, 547 General Direction of National Domains, at Treves: supplants Agency of Evacuation, 302; subordinated to Central Admin, of Aix, 302

1078 Gensonné, m. Legis. Assem., Conv., 64 George III, King o£ England, 362; reasons for French hostility to, 603; and the Hansa, in Delacroix's double-treaty project, 606 Gerhards, prof, at Coblenz, early leader of annexationists of Coblenz, 864; speaks at 1797 planting of tree of liberty in Coblenz, 898 "German," origin of the word, 9 ni¡\ see Belgae; usage of, among ancient writers, IO-II German Protestants, see Protestants, German German unity, budding plans for, in 178g, 35 Germanic element of Paris, its influence on Girondist policy, 63; reasons for affinity of Girondists with, 64; outstanding members of, 64-65 Germans, ancient, distinguished from Celts, 1 9 n6g; fusion of, with Gallo-Romans, 1 8 Germany, "Keltike," 1 1 ; early location of, 1 1 ; birth of modern, 6 ng; economic and political condition of, in 178g, 3 1 - 3 3 ; its thinking semimodern in 178g, 33—34; desire for peace sweeps, early 17g3, 2 1 3 Gerolt, Bouget's brother-in-law and accomplice, 857 Géroni, de, (ostensible) French peace envoy, 87 . Gervai, see Géroni, de Gervinus, Prussian sec. of legation, later chargé d'affaires at Paris, Hardenberg sends, to Paris, 374; his instructions, 3 7 5 ; speaks with CPS members, 3 7 5 - 3 7 6 ; his conclusions re Carletti and left bank, 376; avers early Dir. seeks peace even without Rhineland, 507 Gherardini, di, Austrian min. plenipo. to Turin, Clarke visits, 7 1 0 - 7 n ; authorized to confer with Clarke, 7 1 2 ; instructions for, 7 1 4 ; is revisited by Clarke, 728; Clarke's proposals for transmission through, 7 2 8 729; is duped, 729; death, 729 Gibert des Molieres, m. Five Hundred, quoted on Dir.'s fear of returning armies, 5 1 0 , 881 «243·, and Dir.'s 100,000,000-franc hoax, 7 8 4 - 7 8 5 Gillet, Rp, 422, 443, 842; cuts 25,000,000 Rhineland contribution to 8,000,000, 297; threatens to create émigrés out of all absentees, 297-298; forbids plundering, 3 0 3 304; recommends drastic reduction in Pérès' imposition, 4 1 9 ; investigates double assessment of Coblenz, 441 ηΐζ8 Gironde, Girondist Party, identified, 45; induces war with Austria, 5 3 - 6 2 ; Dumouriez' treason ascribed to, 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 ; fall of, 154— 1 5 5 ; survivors recalled, 259, 484, 495; Constitution of Year III its handiwork, 484; controls Ancients but not Dir., 486, 488 Girtanner, Dr., Swiss physician, publicist, of Göttingen, quoted on Brunswick's manifesto, 7 0 - 7 1

INDEX Gleichen, pseud, for Reibeld, French secret agent, assists Ernouf in making FrancoFranconian armistice, 634; named to supervise Franconian contributions, 635; and Bayard, 744; his 1796 search for informers in Germany, 745, 746 Gobel, constitutional bishop of Paris, 2 1 8 Π255, 220, 2 2 1 Goddess of Reason, 2 1 7 Goertz, Prussian min. to Diet, 42, 366 ni2 Goethe, von, German poet, min., quoted, 3 5 , 83; encourages a nationalist literature, 3 5 ; on Valmy's importance, 79; on the Clubists' escape from Mayence, 1 3 7 Golden Bull, the, 1356, 269 n86, 658 Goltz, von der, Prussian ambas, to Louis X V I , 36; negotiates with France, 3 1 4 ; instructions, 3 1 4 ; indignation at invasion of Holland, 3 2 7 ; illness and death, 3 2 7 Gomez, Clerfayt's chief of staff, 388 «26 Gordian knot, 2 7 1 , 447, 488, 610, 761 Gorgen, French mem. writer, 623 Gorizia, 776 Görres, Coblenz republican, 872; dubbed "German Girondist," 65; in Mayence, 17g2, 99— 100, 865; leader of Coblenz annexationists, 865; effect of his Mayence experience, 865; his philosophy of liberty and morality, 865; his satire on Leoben Treaty, 865; sends Dir. his "Universal Peace, an Ideal," 866; on deputation to Hoche, 873; composes annexationist proclamation, 904 11113; P r e " tends to Stein he planned to re-create Lotharingia, 904 m i 3 "Gothic Diplomacy," 949 Gottschalk (historian), 471 »5, 485 «4 Goujon, Rp, 288-289, 292 Graf, German partisan of Probst, sells mislabeled food and chemicals to France, 3 3 2 Grange-Batelière, Hotel, 164 Grapes, unripe, see Valmy; " D o you know the pretty story . . . ? " Gratz, 805, 808 Grégoire, C m r of PEC, 1 1 8 - 1 2 1 , 1 2 6 Greiffenegg, Sr., Pres. of Admin, of Anterior Austria, hostage for Probst, 747; appeal to Archduke Charles, 747; exchange of Probst and, effected, 747; warns of trouble just before Fructidor, 879 Grenville, Lord, British for. min., 340, 3 4 1 , 353) 362, 449 » 2 2 , 884 ny, fears separate Franco-Austrian peace, 17Φ, 669; overture through Danish min., 669-670; sends Malmesbury to Paris, 7796, 670; see Malmesbury; why, sent Malmesbury back to France, 787 Groos, Badenese privy councillor, 578 Grouvelle, French min. to Copenhagen, 192, 319 Grünstadt, home of the three Counts of Leiningen, 1 2 4 ; tree of liberty planted in, 7797, 872

INDEX Guadet, m . Legis. Assem., Conv., 64 Guérin (historian), emended, 194 n / 0 5 , 3 2 1 »55 "Guillotine oí Business," 295 Guiraudet, sec.-gen. French Dept. of For. Aff. 686-687 Giilich, Nikolaus, at the W h i p p i n g Post, 899, 900 Guyeux, French m a j o r gen., 723—724, 728 Guyot (historian), 596 »2, 734 «25; emended, 502 ng, 525 »66, 570 n8, 592 n68, 598 ng, 640 »53, 722, 7 2 3 , 757 and 1144, 758, 768, 806 »25, 807, 886, 924 Gymnich, von, governor of Mayence fortress, 100-101 Haller, receiver-gen. of French A r m y of Italy: Bottot, Querini, and, 9 1 1 ni ; H a m b u r g , cooperates with French revolutionists, 248; its diploma of 1746, 248; secures diploma renewal, b u t w h e a t is m a d e contraband, 248-249; sells contraband to France, 2 4 8 - 2 5 0 ; ordered to expel French min., 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 ; expulsion p r o m p t s French privateering against, 2 5 1 - 2 5 2 ; French invasion of, contemplated, 2 5 1 ; prize-court judgments against, suspended, 2 5 2 ; Prussia orders all trade of, with France stopped, 252; French privateering against, resumed, 2 5 2 ; and Decree of A u g . 16, I 7 g s , 2 5 2 ; the "La Christine" of, 2 5 3 ; fiction of nonvoting I m p . cities saves, f r o m enemy status, 2 5 3 254; tries to sell France Austrian provisions, 17g5, 365 ni o7; English occupy Cuxhaven to halt trade of, w i t h France, 399; by Treaty of Aug. 5, 1796, Prussia to defend independence of, 6 1 9 ; its annual balance of trade, 817; grievances of France against: monopoly, 8 1 7 - 8 1 8 ; overcharge, 8 1 8 ; entrepot of British goods, 8 1 8 ; exchange center for E n g land, 8 1 9 ; refusal to honor accredited French representatives, 8 1 9 - 8 2 0 ; archive quarrel, 820; hospitality to émigrés, 8 2 0 - 8 2 1 ; freed o m f r o m contributions because of neutrality line, 8 2 1 ; u n d e r contribution by Treaty of June 24, 7796, 822; French seize vessels of, carrying British goods, 822; r u m o r that France will seize Elbe forts, 822; s u m m a r y of reasons for French commercial interest in, 962-963 H a m m o n d , British For. Office undersec., special envoy: to offer subsidy to Austria, 620; his Berlin mission, and Belgium, 6 7 1 - 6 7 2 ; his Vienna mission, April, 7797, 786 1144 Handschuhsheim, importance of this engagement, 3 9 5 ; enigmatic nature of Austrian victory at, 3 9 5 - 3 9 6 Hanover, 3 1 6 , 346, 407; Prussia's Basel offer to occupy, as neutrality measure, 344, 3 4 7 ; Barthélémy fails to exact occupation of, 3 5 4 ; engagement on, given after Treaty signed,

IO79 364; Convention of May 1 7 , 1795, repeats engagement o n , 367; France threatens, over occupation of Cuxhaven a n d Bremen, 3 9 9 400; Regency of, seeks neutrality, 4 0 1 ; disadvantages to France of neutrality f o r , 5 3 2 ; problem of Orangist troops in, 5 3 2 - 5 3 3 ; French consider n e w prince for, 5 3 3 ; feared that French in, would cause insurrection in Prussia, 603-604; r u m o r e d after Leoben that France w o u l d invade, 828-829 Hansen, avers Carnot sought autonomous Rhineland republic in I7g4, 242, 306; emended, 942 « 2 5 H a r d e n b e r g , von, Prussian cab. min., diplomat, 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 , 239; urges status quo ante bellum peace on Frederick William, 268; von der Goltz's successor, 336, 3 3 9 ; his sentiments and his delay in reaching Basel, 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 ; d e m a n d s neutralization of N o r t h Germany, 342; his a r g u m e n t s against ceding Cleves, etc., 3 4 2 - 3 4 3 ; his instructions permit conditional cession, 344; Barthélémy suggests to, a separate neutrality convention, 344; offers to sign if treaty includes a neutrality provision, 345; CPS rejects, then accepts, neutrality proposals of, 346; his March 3 1 treaty project, 347, 975-976; Barthélémy and, compromise, and sign treaty, 348; believes France may renounce left-bank dreams, 360; says Prussia m a d e peace at w r o n g time, 3 6 3 ; engages Prussia to occupy H a n o v e r if latter resists neutralization, 364; tries to sound Barthélémy on Carletti's "overture," 3 7 2 ; his conversation on Bavaria with Merlin-Th., 3 7 2 - 3 7 4 ; sends Gervinus to Paris, 3 7 4 ; asks Zweibrücken to w a r n Karl T h e o d o r , 374; see Prussian good offices; complains of treatment of Prussian left b a n k , 416—417; disillusioned on goodoffices issue, leaves Basel, 5 3 5 ; advocates "get t o u g h " policy toward France, 5 3 6 - 5 3 7 ; after Treaty of A u g . 5, his intercession heeded by French, 675; stiffens hand of Frederick William in left-bank-revenues question, 698 H a r d t , bailiwick of, 895 Harnier, Prussian sec. of legation at Basel, sent to Paris, 3 1 4 ; his conversation with CPS, 3 1 5 - 3 1 6 ; substitutes for von der Goltz, 3 2 7 ; accommodating attitude toward France, 329; held aside by H a r d e n b e r g , 3 4 1 ; his "Dutch uncle" talk to H a r d e n b e r g , 3 4 5 ; Marandet maneuvers, into provoking a quasi-status quo ante bellum suggestion f r o m his court, 376-377 Hartzinck, D u t c h m i n . to H a m b u r g , 534, 820 H a r u d i , G e r m a n tribe, 1 2 Hashagen (historian), 9 0 1 ; e m e n d e d , 842 »2Ä H a u g w i t z , von, Prussian cab. m i n . in charge of for. aff., 86, 3 1 3 , 4 2 1 , 7 2 1 , 883 ny, his pacifism and its consequences, 5 3 5 - 5 3 6 ;

ιο8ο strongly in favor of a neutrality line, 603; prefers integrity of Empire to aggrandizement through secularization, 607; urges France to grant Saxony neutrality without fee, 663; refuses to commit himself on future course, 720-721; averse to mediation between France and Austria except on integrity basis, 735 n j 4 ; credits report that France would seize Elbe forts, 822; prods France for Orangist indemnity after Leoben, 828 Hausser (historian), 94 04 Haussmann, Nuremberg deputy, 639 Haussmann, Rp, Cmr, 545, 573, 652, 699; Cmr to Mayence, 118, 122; blames Rhineland famine on army agents, 296; coörganizer of northern left bank, 300; ordered to quiet Swabia's fears of "evacuation," 584; seeming hostility to revolutionization of Swabia, 584 m 2 ; receives 25,000 florins for signing Franco-Badenese armistice, 593 Hauteville, French mil. geographer and engineer, 758 Hébertists, Robespierre finds the atheistic, an obstacle to his for. policy, 218; arrest of the, and others, 219-220; their execution, 221 Heigel (historian), 230 Henry II, K i n g of France, 21 Henry I V , K i n g of France, 830 Henry I, the Fowler, German king, 6 »9 Henry, Prince, of Prussia, uncle of Frederick William II, 57, 160, 314, 564; has no influence with Frederick William, 564; his advice sought re Delacroix's double-treaty project, 614; his memoir of June 10, 7796, 626-627; other ideas of, 627-628; Dir. sends him pistols and books, 628—629 Hentz, Rp, 292 Hérault de Séchelles, m. Conv., CPS, 53-54, 457; Proly's overture seemingly authorized by, 167; suggests Italian overtures, 167; directs for. aff. on Great CPS, 178; shuns negotiation as Dantonism, 180 η34; embraces alien-agent idea, 195; and Cloots's donation to fight tyrants, 201 «747; executed, 221-222 Hérault the younger, relative of preceding, in Lafitte overture, 174, 181 Hermann (or Arminius), Cherusci (German) leader, 14 Hertzberg, von, Prussian historian, cab. min., 267 nyy, his "plan," 38; bribes Forster, 106; his peace proposal rebuffed by Frederick William, 267 Hertzog, French treasury agent in Rhineland, 421, 441 ni;8 Hesse-Cassel, 5 1 1 ; first German state, after Prussia, to make peace, 381; CPS's treaty project for, 381-382; withdraws her contingent without notice, 388, 394 »67; her treaty with France contains no alimentary

INDEX stipulations, 384; treaty meets with accident, 385 B2o; Dir. authorizes loan from, 508; instructions of Rivalz, French agent in, 5 5 9 - 5 6 1 ; Dir. authorizes Jourdan to violate territory of, 609; Treaty of A u g . 5, 1796, contemplates electoral status for, 619; Franconian possessions of, not levied upon in 1796 campaign, 638, 639; virtually under ban of Empire for her defection, 667—668; member of France's projected alliance against Austria, 677-678; her aid sought for Franco-Prussian alliance, 735 Hesse-Darmstadt, 381 Hesse-Homburg, Landgrave of, presents Custine's peace proposals to Prussia, 87; makes pacific declaration to France, 1795, 381 Hesse-Rheinfels-Rothenburg, Charles, Prince of, French staff officer, editorialist of Ami des Lois: his biograph, 533 »26; quoted, 510, 562, 677-678 Hetzrodt, m. Trêves estates before the war, later of Central Admin, at Aix, 441 ni58, 697 Heyne, German philologist, 106 Hildesheim, Congress of, votes for North German neutrality army, 607-608; regarded as Prussian scheme for aggrandizement, 608 Hilscher, exiled Leipzig prof., 455 Hist, and Mil. Topographical Bureau, 387, 705 t>8 Hoche, French gen., 206, 704 «5, 752 «22, 767 n i o g ; reopens U. of Bonn, 659 «62; succeeds Beurnonville, Jan. 24, 1797, 735, 838; Leoben Treaty quashes his 1797 campaign, 7 5 2 - 7 5 4 ; his suggested frontier, 765; is approached by Irish rebel leader after Leoben, 867 n/59; influence of early life, 797 nm; his troops march on Paris, 797; named min. of war — unconstitutionally, 796-797; Councils force withdrawal of his troops, 797—798; is castigated, but does not betray Barras, 798; resigns ministry, 798; ordered to lead troops to west coast, 798; second attempted march on Paris, 798; is accused of embezzlement and violating constitutional perimeter, 798, 870-871; Dir. discards him for Augereau, 798; embittered, he returns to his army at Wetzlar, 798, 871; his reputed love of Bonaparte — and of Josephine! 799 and 11117·, his chief of staff, Chérin, serves Fructidorians, 801; and Rhineland admin.: attacks administrators of Rhineland, 838-839; entrusted with civil admin., 839; Moreau resists his admin, south of Moselle, 839; tells Dir. how economical and painless his admin, will be, 840; reorganizes gov't, 840-842; his seeming superiority, 842-843; tries to ingratiate himself with ecclesiastics, 843; sacrifices Rhineland's good will by his: requisitions and fellings, 844; harsh treat-

INDEX ment of Düren, 844-845; three-million contribution, later raised to eight, 845 and n;i, 851; Régie Durbach, 845; ordering "the most rigorous measures" to collect the impositions he had himself forbidden, 846— 847; rude treatment of Cologne's delegation to "Friedberg," 853—854; and his return from his army to left bank: possible reasons for unexpected arrival of, in Bonn, 854-855; writes Dir. about Bouget's Rhineland-republic plan, 855; establishes propaganda fund of doubtful legality, 855-856; Dir.'s desires re left bank plumbed the previous April, 856; told to work for dependent republic, 856; make-up of Directorial majority giving this order to, 856; Shée's advice to Bonn regency to work for annexation, 856-857; learns from Shée about planned appeal to Paris, 857; orders minutes of Bonn regency produced, 857; asks for Bouget and Vossen, and attacks F. J. Schmitz, 857-858; queries about the "note confidentielle," 858; illegally orders all moneys turned over to Intermed. Com., 859; forbids Com. to take orders from anyone but himself, 871 « ' 7 7 ; tries to gain friendship of Rhineland by: blaming his brother-in-law for all abuses, 859; abolishing Régie Durbach, 859; returning to Aix and Cologne their indirect taxes; 859; entrusting national domain to regencies and cities, 859; returning ecclesiastical property to Church, 860; protecting local customs and religious practices, 860; repressing impositions by army personnel, 860; granting Cologne — and later Aix — tax relief, 861, 874 B/96; see Imstenradt; and the Cisrhenish movement: writes Shée to "make our republic for us," 871; effects merger of Bonn and Coblenz movements into one for dependent republic, 872; congratulates Com. on Rheinbach coup, 897; orders abolition of tithes in communes raising Cisrhenish standard, 897; purposes to make all appointments in new state, 897; his fears about abolishing tithes, 897; informs Dir. it can have a cis-Rhenish republic for the asking, 898; Fructidorized Dir. deauthorizes Rhineland republic, and orders, to work for annexation, 899; dies without knowing of new orders, 899; circumstances of his death, 753 »29, 799, 899 «73; his dream of a French "Republic of Europe," 799 n i i g , 949 Hofmann, prof, at Mayence, joins the Mayence Club, 106, 107; his biograph, 107; obtains control of Mayence admin, and Club, 122; his conflicts with Custine, 122; pres. of Rheno-German National Conv., 128; pres. of new "General Admin.," 132; difficulty with France over property of non-

1081 swearers, 132; leaves Mayence with French, 425 »55, 143; pres. of Paris Club of Mayence Patriots, 425; reproaches Merlin-Th. for advocating renunciation of Mayence, 425-426; his open letter to the Journal de Paris, 429; his pamphlet "Concerning the New Boundaries," 429; hopes to "evacuate" Swabia, 583; after Leoben, urges giving effect to March 1793 annexation of RhenoGerman Republic, 866; deputation to Reubell introduced by, 866; his circular letter to southern Rhineland urges petitioning for annexation, 863, 866; promises police protection to distributors of Metternich's Aufruf, 870 Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince of, Prussian gen.: sends passport to Desportes, 163; helps Austrians win at Kaiserslautern, 272; heads Prussian "treaty force," 331; prevails upon Clerfayt to respect neutrality line, 389; is told France will respect line only where contingents withdrawn, 397; France threatens to storm Frankfort if not evacuated by, 397-398; Polish question causes withdrawal of, 398-399; replaced by Brunswick as neutrality-army head, 608; Prussia's friendship prompts France to forego contributions from, 634 «6 Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, Prince of, Austrian gen., 85 Hohenzollern, Alvinczy's envoy, 723 Hohenzollern, Principality of, 406 Holland, 317-318, 327, 336; problem of the Prussian ships captured in its ports, 399400; see Batavia (η Republic) Holtz, Director-Gen. of southern Rhineland, when installed, 697, 838; Poissant and, recommend return of Rhineland admin, to Germans, 838; allegedly, only member of Intermed. Com. whose hands are clean, 850; becomes Director-Gen. of southern Rhineland for Moreau, 868 n i 6 j Hompesch, Palatine governor of Jülich and Berg, surrenders Düsseldorf without a shot, 389-390; orders Jülich's former officials to serve France, 844 Hondschoten, 180 Honorius, Roman Emperor, 15 Horburg, 491, 631, 632 Horses, 318, 366, 382, 393, 431, 436, 592593, 636, 638, 645, 647, 651, 663 Hostages, German, seized by France: for Frankfort's 1792 contribution, 103; from a Crefeld abbey, 114 niiy, for Dumouriez' betrayal of Beurnonville and four deputies, 147—148; for delivery of supplies, 296; for acquittal of forced loan, 544 ; for Bourbotte's old levy on Coblenz, 544; for a 1796 contribution on Frankfort, 594—595; number of, from Frankfort ordered "much augmented," 595; for contributions levied on

io82 Franconia, 635; for the release of Probst and other French agents, 747 Houchard, French gen., 135 "How Can Austria Withdraw from the War?" 264 Hoyer, associate of Poteratz and List in Swabia, biograph, 5 7 1 ; his brother betrays Poteratz' conspiracy, 578-579 Hüffer (historian), 3 1 3 «6, 808; Carletti proved by, to have acted sans Austrian authority, 375 Hügel, Coblenz chancellor, 99 Hungary, copper from, reaches France via Switzerland, 332 » 1 1 4 ; revolutionization of, threatened by Clarke, 683 ; Rp Joubert ordered to promote, 738; likewise, Bonaparte, 738, 922; rumblings issue from, as Bonaparte advances, 739! ordered to rise up against approaching French, 732; Bonaparte expects his conduct to fortify anti-Habsburgs of, 7 7 1 ; Perret to report on troops mustered in, 805; enemies of Austria in, approach Dir., 922 Hunger, 355; a counterrevolutionary force, 177; see Famine Hüningen, 370, 589, 758 Hunsrück, 205, 873 Iccius, Belgic envoy, 10 Illuminati, creation and dispersion of, 34; their responsibility for the Revolution, 34 «9, 96-98; Dorsch, M. Metternich, Macké were, 97; also Simon, 1 1 8 n/_j6; List, 428 »70; and allegedly, Haugwitz, 246 n 4 i j Imperial Censorship Edict of December 3, 1791, 94 ns Imperial letters overt of November 19, 1792, punishment outlined in, for serving France, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 ; effect of, on Mayence voting, 126; French counterproclamation to, 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 ; and Hoche's recall of old officials of Rhineland, 844 Imstenradt, von, Prussian major, negotiator for Cleves, etc.: Böhme and, negotiate convention with Hoche, 862; convention ratified by Frederick William, 862; Hoche omits to send convention to Dir., 862; Sandoz protests violation öf convention, 862; convention finally reaches Paris and is ratified, 902 Imstenrande, Imstenrads, see Imstenradt India Company scandal, 201, 222 Ingolstadt, 811 »55, 939 Intelligenzblatt (Geich's), 426 n63 Intermediary Commission, created by Hoche to administer conquered territory, 840; its pres. refuses relief from contributions, 845, 848; is prodded by Hoche to accelerate collections, 846-847; theory underlying its confiscation of right of indirect taxation, 849; recommends flat charge for Cologne

INDEX and Aix, 849; decrees freedom of press, 872-873; Gen. Hardy and freedom of press in Coblenz, 873; advises Rethel on seat in Cologne Senate, 874; threatens Senate with force, 875-876; Cologne bourgeoisie's complaints lead, to imprison Schickung, 876— 877; orders selection of committee of Cologne guild members to investigate city's accounts, 877; abolishes Cologne Senate, 894; orders new elections in Aix, 895; replaces old-regime officials in Rheinbach with former municipalité, 896; approves revolutionization of Rheinbach, 895, 896; voids M. Metternich's pretensions, 896-897; abolishes feudal burdens in Cisrhenish areas, 898; ignorant that separate republic has been deauthorized, continues to promote one, 899-900; abolishes Bonn magistracy, 900; takes part in ceremonial proclamation of Cisrhenish Republic, 900-901; writes Duramel encouragement could produce a cis-Rhenish republic, 901; Dir. abolishes, and reinstates feudal dues, 902; Dir. leaves Augereau task of apprizing, and Rhineland of its will, 903; Augereau decides not to abolish, 903; contemplates moving to anticipated Cisrhenish capital, Cologne, 903; reconstitutes magistracy of Coblenz, 903; Augereau informs, that dependent republic is out, 903-904 Ionian Islands, France occupies Venice's, 889 »29; Udine treaty-project grants, to Cisalpine, 928; Cobenzl refuses Bonaparte's demand for, for France, 929; Cobenzl yields on, 929; Campo-Formio recognizes French acquisition of, 937 Isnard, m. Legis. Assem., Conv., 47, 53, 154 Istria, in Leoben negotiations, 748; destined for Austria, 754; Dir. willingly accords, to Austria, 811 «55; Dir. seeks Austrian abandonment of, 814; Austria occupies, prematurely, 889 Jacobi, Prussian ambas, to London, 314 >1/2 Jägerschmidt, associate of Poteratz and List in Swabia, 5 7 1 ; tries to revolutionize Baden despite French change of policy, 584-585; Gen. Tuncq connected with, 654 η31 Jeanneret, French agent, 229 Jemappes, 1 1 2 , 1 5 1 , 152 Jordis, Austrian gen., 278 Jordis, Frankforter banker, 278 Joseph II, Emperor, 32, 36-37, 40, 232 nj24 Joubert, French gen., guards Tyrol for Bonaparte in 1797 campaign, 730; summoned vainly to Klagenfurt, 732, 742; his proclamation to Tyrol, 740-741; second proclamation guarantees Tyrolese laws, 741 Joubert, Rp, Cmr, 422, 675, 691; coauthor of 25,000,000-livre contribution north of Moselle, 295; coörganizer of northern left bank, 300; Gillet cuts the 25,000,000 of,

INDEX to 8,000,000, 297; his forced-loan activity, 5 4 3 ; exacts coin from Coblenz in Bourbotte's name, 544; takes precautions re Nuremberg's cultural treasures, 637; his measures to circulate French paper money in Rhineland approved, 698; ordered to propagandize Austrian army, Bohemia, Hungary, 7 3 7 - 7 3 8 Jourdan, French gen., 502; compared with Coburg, 7 3 ; on embezzlement by army contractors, 1 4 5 , 6 5 1 - 6 5 2 ; CPS instructs, to •avoid territory beyond Line of Demarcation, 3 9 6 - 3 9 7 ; informs Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen French will attack contingentsupplying "neutralized" states, 3 9 7 ; his reverses, Oct. 1795, 462; his victory and defeat in 1796, 610, 646; quoted on danger of uniting Germany, 678 ¡ourna! de Paris, 4 2 8 - 4 2 9 Judenburg, Franco-Austrian armistice and peace-agreement signed at, 7 3 3 Julian, Roman Emperor, 1 5 Jülich, Bischoffswerder covets, 3 8 ; fictitious address of a, peasant, 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 ; one of the six districts under Intermed. Com., 842; portion of Duchy of, to be returned to Empire by Campo-Formio terms, 938 Kaiserslautern, Austro-Prussian victory at, Sept. 1794, 2 7 2 ; tree of liberty planted in, '797, 872 "Kalgstein" (blunder for Kalkreuth), 220 Kalkreuth, Prussian gen., confers with Galbaud, Labarolière, and Dillon, 8 3 - 8 4 ; confers with Reubell, Merlin-Th., Simon, on surrender of Mayence, 1 3 4 ; Schmitz's pseudo message to, 274 Kaltenherberg, 584 Kant, German philosopher, 478, 866; quoted, 3 6 ni6; his expectations from the Revolution, 478 Karl Friedrich, Margrave of Baden, his Wilhelmsbader Conferences, 2 7 0 - 2 7 1 ; most enlightened German ruler of his day, 5 7 4 ; withdraws troops from Rhine, 5 9 1 ; pretends his dormant negotiation with France is active, 5 9 1 ; his armistice, 5 9 1 - 5 9 2 ; his catastrophic peace prompts appeal to Catherine II, 645 Karl Theodor, Elector of Bavaro-Palatinate, 844; object of M. Metternichs attack, 3 1 0 3 1 1 ; his girl bride, 3 1 1 n / 9 5 ; threatens separate peace if Mannheim treated harshly, 4 1 4 ; and Pfaffenhofen Armistice contributions, 7 7 5 - 7 7 6 Kaunitz, Prince von, Austrian chancellor, threatens France with an armed coalition, 5 1 - 5 3 ; warns against attack on German territory, 5 3 ; rejects French ultimatum, 54-55 . Kehl, claimed by Louis X I V , 22; Moreau easily captures, June 1796, 589, 6 1 3 ; pil-

1083 laged, 5 8 2 ; cession of, demanded of Baden, 619, 640-641, 7 5 7 ; "ceded," 643; Moreau surrenders, as price of armistice, Jan. 1797, 7 1 5 ; April 1 7 9 7 Moreau crosses Rhine just below, 7 5 2 « 2 2 ; Emperor's consent to "cession" of, demanded, 7 5 6 Keil, Dir.'s "art collector," is expected to sack right bank, 6 5 8 - 6 5 9 ; must content himself with gleaning on left bank, 659; avers most Rhinelanders desire annexation, 702; Rethel substitutes for him during 1796 campaign, 874 Kellermann, French gen., 1 1 2 ; his success at Valmy, 7 7 - 7 9 ; arranges capitulation of Verdun, 84; conference with Brunswick and others, 85; with Reuss and Lucchesini — Valence participating, 86; induces panic in Coblenz, 99; rumored adjoined to Bonaparte, 597 i>4 Keltoi, 9 Kerner, sec. to Reinhard as min., 64, 608 Kiesling, Jean Tobias, see Probst Kiesling, Justus Christian, German partisan of Probst, 279 Kiesling, Karl Gottlieb, German partisan of Probst, 2 7 9 - 2 8 0 Kilmaine, French gen., 887 Klagenfurt, 170, 805, 808; Bonaparte defeats Archduke Charles at, 730; its evacuation delayed after Leoben, 7 7 6 Klein, Geschichte von Mainz, explains Mayence's "treason," 1 2 8 n2oi Kleist, von, Prussian major, 1 3 4 Klemens Wenzeslaus, see Trêves, Elector of Kley, adms. of Rheinbach, later m. Bonn regency, 895-896 Klinglin, Austrian gen., his captured papers implicate Pichegru with Condé, 786 «42, 868 Kolb, French adms. (forests), 441 Kolloutay, Austro-Polish revolutionist, 7 7 7 Königstein, fortress of Mayence, 8 1 1 « 5 5 , 939; Mayence Clubists imprisoned in, 1 3 7 Kork, 7 1 4 Korsakov, Russian observer with Austrian army, 2 3 7 Kosciusko, Polish patriot, 263 >1345, 320 Kospoth, Austrian gen. in Mannheim, 390 Kray, Austrian gen., 5 2 7 n8o, 846 Kreisausschreibende Fürsten, 250 nig, 643 Kreisdirektoren, 250 nig, 593, 643 Kreuznach, one of the six districts under Intermed. Com., 842 Kroch, Marshal Bender's adjutant, confers with Merlin-Th. on Bavaria, 4 4 4 - 4 4 5 ; E m peror rejects proposals to, 446 Kusel, 284 n i 7 Labarolière, see Kalkreuth Labarre brothers, 147 Labor, requisitioning of, in Rhineland, 546 Laborde, French gen., 5 7 2

1084 La Fare, Cardinal de, chargé d'affaires of Louis XVIII at Vienna, 525 Lafayette, de, French gen., émigré, 48, 50, 460; his plans, 56, 66; plot of, and Luckner to spirit away Louis X V I alleged, 66 «765; deserts after suspension of King, 66; tortured by Prussia and Austria, 67; his release, 67 niyi, 939-940 Lafitte, French secret agent, First CPS commissions, to contact Coburg's staff, 174; see " G " ; Great CPS terminates, mission, 174 Lagarde, Joseph, sec.-gen. of Dir., 686 »47, 1014 Lagarde, Pierre, "contact-man" of Talleyrand, 789 Lahn River, 394, 652 Lahure, Belgian gen., 933 n i j i , 1026 Lamarque, Rp, 206 Lamotze, French National Agent to Central Admin, of Aix, 301 Landrieux, head of French secret service in northern Italy, revolutionizes Bergamo and Brescia, 887; avers Haller was asked to discount Querini notes, 911 ni¡, 921 Langeron, Count of, French émigré officer, 237-238 Langwerth von Simmern (historian), 460 nj8 Laquiante, French sec. of legation, 438 Lasollaye, deputy of Swabian Circle, 591 Lassaulx, von, Coblenz syndic, leads deputation to Mayence, 99; Görres accompanies, 99-100; convicted of treason, 100; complains about Bella, 697 La Tour, Count de, Austrian gen., 579, 591, 646 Lauterbach, Frankfort burgomaster, 648 Lavallette, Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, in Paris as Bonaparte's observer, 884 »6; his encounter with Deverine, 9 1 1 ; his wife insane after saving his life, 1023 La Vendée, 180 La Villeheurnois (or Lavilleurnois), royalist conspirator, 800 Law, French, of March 1, 1793 (abolishes all past treaties with enemy states), 511 B54; 7 fructidor, II or Aug. 24, 1794 ("constitution" of Thermidorian France), 257— 258, 273-274, 337; Dec. 8, 1794 (recalls Girondists), 259, 495; Oct. 25, 1795 (excludes relatives of émigrés from public office until the general peace), 463, 509; Dec. 10, 1795 (forced loan), its terms and scope, 540; scope widened — illegally — to include occupied Germany, 540-541; protests of Zweibrücken envoy Cetto against extension of, 541; and Prussian left bank, 542-543; Oct. 31, 1796 (excludes enemy goods

INDEX from France; bans all importations of cloth), 818; July 26, 1797 (curbs Dir.'s financial powers; army wages made first lien on treasury), 786 League of Princes, see Fürstenbund·, 560, 667, 677 League of the Rhine, of 1658, 22; a modern, suggested by Parandier, 630 Le Bon, physician to Cardinal of Guise, originator of "natural boundaries" concept, 21 Lebrun, French for. min., biographical, 152 »45; not interested in general peace, 87; offers Austrian Silesia to Prussia, 158; seeks alliance with Prussia, 158-159; sends Dubuisson, then Desportes, to Metz, 163; favors annexation of Rhineland, 110; sends Proly, Dubuisson, Pereira, to survey Dumouriez, 146 nil; opens Paris to all agents of Emperor, 165; orders Custine to sound enemy on peace, 169-170; shuns Frey brothers, 155 »62; reverses stand on negotiations, 171-172; continues functions though under arrest as Girondist, 155, 157; his instructions to French agents abroad, 157; invents the "civil commissioner," 173; executed, 155 Ledere, French adjutant gen., Bonaparte's brother-in-law, as courier, tries to stop Moreau's 1797 campaign, 752; broadcasts news of peace on way to Paris, 758 Le Coq, Prussian lieut. col., 653, 662, 675 n i , 678 Lefebvre, French gen., does not inform Intermed. Com. that Dir. had ordered Cisrhenish movement dropped, 899; promises that Cisrhenish agitators would get no more aid, 903; avers that separatists were in Hoche's pay, 903; his view of Hoche and of Hoche's death, 903 Lefebvre (historian), 389 Left bank, Merlin-Th.'s report of May 12, 1795 on keeping, 369; a technical term, 504; Delacroix's Plan requires acquisition of, 5 1 1 ; Bonaparte asks for, at Montebello, and Emperor refuses, 781-782; Dir. willing to accept Hoche's compromise frontier, mid-/797, 782-783; Cobenzl offers to concede entire, to France on Oct. 7, 7797, 928929 Legations, the, see Three Legations Lehoc, French min. to Hansa and to Lower Saxon Circle, arrives in Hamburg May 1, 1792, 250, 825; effect of Louis XVI's execution on relations with, 250; Empire demands his expulsion, 250-251; great consideration shown, by Hamburgers, 251; French reprisals to expulsion of, 251-252; succeeded by Reinhard, 819 Lehrbach, von, Austrian ambas, to Munich, special envoy to various courts, confidential

INDEX

1085

counsellor, 388 « 2 5 ; at Berlin, 245; his mission to states of southwest Germany after Basel, 408 « j 2 Leiningen, Counts of, refuse to swear allegiance to France, or emigrate, 124; imprisoned in Landau and Paris, 124, 1 4 7 148, 164 nii6 Leiningen-Guntersblum, Count of, deposed, 33 "5 Leiningen-Westerburg, C o u n t of, 147 Lellis, Austrian sec. of legation at T u r i n , 706 ni2 Lemoine, Durbach's receiver-gen., threatens Cologne with execution, 848; refuses post of Substitute-Cmr for A i x , 874 «792 Leoben, negotiations at, Bonaparte's alternatives, 748; T h u g u t ' s instructions, 7 4 9 - 7 5 0 ; agreement reached on three alternative projects, 750; T h u g u t disapproves all three, 7 5 1 ; Emperor authorizes exchange of Belg i u m and Milanese for Venetian territory, 751 niy, the treaty signed, 7 5 1 ; suggestions that Bonaparte w a s bribed at, 751 ni¡, 943 " 3 5 Leoben, Preliminaries of, explanations of hasty signing of, 7 5 1 - 7 5 4 ; terms of, 7 5 4 - 7 5 6 ; instructions to Clarke of April 22, 1 7 9 7 , differ sharply f r o m , 756—757; Bonaparte justifies his hasty signature of, 759, 7 6 1 762; reaction to, on part o f : Dir., 759, 762; T h u g u t , 758; Emperor, 7 5 9 ; Clarke, 760, 7 6 1 ; Razoumouskoi, 7 6 0 - 7 6 1 ; French public, 7 6 2 - 7 6 3 ; Debry, 7 6 3 - 7 6 4 ; Moreau, 764; Hoche, 7 6 4 - 7 6 5 ; Delacroix, 7 6 5 ; Germany and Rhineland, 769-770;

secret terms of the, 828; rumors of FrancoAustrian alliance f o l l o w , 828; Hoche and Durbach's haste to collect contributions before, should be signed, 846-847; return of left bank unlikely despite, say Reubell and Barras, 861 Leopold II, Emperor, 32; his attitude toward feudal-enclave problem, 42; directs Trêves to expel all armed Frenchmen, 5 1 ; death, 55 Lesage, m. C o n v . , 439, 440, 476 Lessart, de, French for. min., favors peace and Austria, 45; demands dispersal of émigrés in Trêves, 46; asks good offices of Emperor, 46; proposes analogous request, 55; indicted, 55 Lessing, G e r m a n poet, quoted, 35 Leszczynski, Stanislas, D u k e of Lorraine, Lorraine joined to France on death of, 23 Le Tourneur, m. C o n v . , C P S , Dir., 488, 501; elected to Dir., 487; his biograph, 490; his Rhine-policy system based on accord with Carnot, 490, 502-503, 505, 506; lot to retire falls on, 7 8 3 - 7 8 4 ; negotiates with Malmesbury at Lille, 788 Levantine trade, a hope for the future, 9 1 4 ; offsets loss of France's colonies, 9 1 4 ; behind Dir.'s reluctance to grant Istria and Dalmatia to Austria, 9 1 5 Levée en masse of A u g u s t 23, 1793, origin, 186; decreed, 1 7 8 - 1 7 9 ; reconciled w i t h new personal freedom, 178 n / 6 ; Germans doubt its value, 179 ni8\ aimed at all tyrants at w a r w i t h France, 186 Liechtenstein, Prince von, 939 Liège, 188, 232, 438 ni46, 439, 440, 748, 756, 857

ratification of, by Emperor, 7 6 1 ; by Dir., 766; Reubell's objections to, 766; motives of ratifying Directors, 7 6 6 - 7 6 9 ; Dir. assumes precedence in, but agrees to conform in future, 835-836; their provision for a congress at Berne for Austria's definitive peace, 754, 778; Dir. reconciles itself to, 7 7 8 ; Dir.'s repugnance to, 7 7 9 ; Bonaparte avers Austria's renunciation of, 778, 780; Austria insists upon, 7 7 9 780; Bonaparte refuses to exchange ratifications until Gallo renounces, 7 8 0 - 7 8 1 ; E m peror repudiates Gallo's renunciation of, 78:;

Ligniville, French major gen., 160 Lille, Conference of, 5 1 1 B54; Grenville's motive for, 7 8 7 ; British requirement of a congress dropped, 7 8 7 ; Malmesbury agrees to respect France's official acts — secret treaties excepted, 788; Delacroix neglects to supply French secret treaties, 7 9 5 ; question of return of Spanish and Dutch possessions, 7 8 8 - 7 8 9 ; snagged on Dir.'s demand for return of all conquests, 789; financial skulduggery accompanying the, 789; Reubell the apparent stumbling block to success of, 789; Fructidor spells doom of, 789; influence of, on the Franco-Austrian negotiations, 7 8 9 - 7 9 0 , 924-925 L i m o n , de, émigré, 69

their three-months stipulation in Art. I V , 754, 7 7 8 ; attempt to use it to force renunciation of a congress by Austria, 7 9 1 792; Austria reduces the French position on, to absurdity, 792; Talleyrand's report on, notes that Austria w o u l d become a maritime power, and w o u l d eventually acquire Venice, 811 »56; see Delacroix; truth about, held from Sand o z , 826-827; see Orange, House of; effect on Prussia of France's silence concerning

Linck, D r . , of Heidelberg, French secret agent, 583, 743 Lindt, Saxon-contingent commander, 394 Line of Demarcation, see Neutrality, line of List, businessman, French agent, in Basel: a Palatine Illuminé, 428 «70; sponsor of essay contest, 428 ηγο, 430; biograph, 5 7 1 ; his association with Poteratz, 5 7 1 ; disclaims any part in Poteratz' "treason," 5 7 7 ; pro-

ιο86 tests subsequent failure of French to concert with Swabian revolutionists, 5 7 7 - 5 7 8 ; protests Bacher's guarantee of Swabian status quo, 583; hopes to "evacuate" Swabia, 583; acts as intermediary between Dir. and Württemberg, 1796, 588 Lloyd, Henry, military writer, 476 Lloyd George, British premier, 1 Lodi, 597, 608 Loew, essay contestant from Deidesheim (n.w. of Spires), 537 Lolliot, French War Cmr, 544 Lombardy, 748, 750 Longwy, siege and capture of, by Allies, 1792, 7 4 - 7 5 ; abortive execution of a magistrate of, 75; surrenders to France, 84 Lorraine, France becomes "Protector" of, 23; incorporated into France, 84; figures in marriage plans for Madame Royale, 5 2 6 527 . Lot (historian), 11 Lotharingia, birth of, 6; partitioned, 870, 6; whether partition of 870 violated cultural lines, 6 - 1 9 ; northern, definitively reattached to Germany, 925, 6 ng Louis XI, K i n g of France, 20 Louis XIII, K i n g of France, 830 Louis X I V , K i n g of France, 22, 42, 830 Louis X V , K i n g of France, 459-460 Louis X V I , K i n g of France, 43—44, 451 i>35, 460; sends ultimatum to Trêves, 48; declares war on Austria, 62; his reaction to Brunswick's manifesto, 69-70; his saintly testament, 526 « 7 j ; execution, 450 «27 Louis XVII, " K i n g of France," quotation concerning his treatment in Temple, 4 4 7 448; post-mortem report on, 448; incidental manner of reporting his death, 448; w h y T h u g u t refused to recognize death of, 448 m/6; on whether child w h o died in Temple was changeling, 448 ni6 Louis XVIII, K i n g of France, see Provence, Count of Louis the German, East Frankish king, 6, 26 Löwenstein-Wertheim, Prince of, 716 «59 Lucchesini, di, Prussian diplomat, later ambas, to Austria, 684; takes part in 1792 negotiations with France, 85-87; procures peace mission, 268; appraised by Thugut and Malmesbury, 268 n8i; hostile to war with France, 313; first to suspect Carletti of negotiating in Austria's name, 372; himself belies theory of a Carletti negotiation, 522; his error regarding Gallo's mission to Basel, 598 ng; reports on Zwanziger's contacts in Vienna, 684 »29 Luckner, French gen., 56, 73, 1 9 0 - 1 9 1 ; see Lafayette Ludolph, von, Austrian min. to Denmark, ordered to sound von Bernstorff on mediation for Empire, 412 Ludwig the Child, K i n g of Germany, 6 ng

INDEX Lux, Rheno-German deputy, 129, 130; his Apologie de Charlotte Corday brings his execution, 130 »217 Luxburg, von, chamberlain of Frederick William II, confers with Desportes, mid-1793, 163-164; invites Desportes to Mannheim, 163-164; sounds Barthélémy, late 1794, 276 Luxembourg, Directorial palace, 483, 494, 793, 798, 861, 879, 880-881 Luxemburg, 289; claimed by Louis X I V , 22; the strength of its fortress, 440 »150; annexed by Conv., 440; Merlin-Th. offers Bavaria to Austria during evacuation of, 444-445; Clarke's instructions require Austria to abandon, 7 1 6 ; see Austrian Netherlands Macartney, British confidential envoy to Louis XVIII at Verona, 449 »22, 558 n j 5 Machenaud, m. Jacobins, 46, 53 Mack von Leiberich,' Coburg's aide, later chief of staff, 146, 148 »2/, 149, 169, 237, 241 nj82, 520 η 36 Macké, mayor of Mayence, 114, 116; an Illumine, 97 Madame Elisabeth, sister of Louis X V I , 147, 148, 167, 449 «22, 450 «27 Madame Royale, daughter of Louis X V I , 940 ni6; exchange of, (and of entire royal family) proposed by Dampierre, 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 ; rumor that Robespierre would marry, and become king, 246; Spain's demand for surrender of, 446; promise that France would surrender, at general peace authorized and canceled, 446; importance of death of Louis XVII for freedom of, 449; question of future of, 449—450; Louis XVIII's desire to be the first to see, 449; Carletti tries to see, 450; her exchange for Sémonville, Maret, Drouet, and "Dumouriez' prisoners" voted, 450; Pichegru, then Bacher, entrusted with exchange of, 451; problems of her exchange, 4 5 1 - 4 5 2 ; her lot ameliorated, 452-453; exchanged under early Dir., 5 2 3 524; problem of her French trousseau, 524-525; her saintly attitude toward France, 525-526; problem of her marriage, 525-527; her virtual imprisonment in Austria, 526 Madelin (historian), emended, 886 n i ¡ Maestricht, 146, 299, 659, 756 Magdeburg, 893 Maisonneuve, French diplomat, 60 Maler, Badenese privy councillor, 593 Mallet du Pan, Genevese journalist, on Austrian retreat of 1794 from Belgium, 242; on France's "thirst" for peace, 314; impresses unwisdom of a separate peace on Hardenberg, 339; on Basel talks as "a comedy," 340; on Basel Treaty as a strengthener of the Conv., 355, 362-363;

INDEX on importance of Two-Thirds Law to Europe, 486; his erroneous conception of Directorial alignment, 490 «26; on characteristics necessary to French gov't for possible peace, 501 ny, on expansionism of first Directors, 501; dubs Carnot a chameleon, 505; on why the revolutionists want the war to continue, 509 Malmesbury, British diplomat, special envoy to Prussia, later to France, 89 11282, 340, 342, 499 »60, 704, 705, 712, 714, 753 «29; proposes to Delacroix a barter of conquests, 7796, 670; Thugut's reaction to his overture, 671-672; his terms respecting Belgium and Rhineland, 673; Delacroix explains to, why France must have Belgium, 673—674; Dir. demands ultimatum of, 674; is expelled from Paris and France, 674; returns July 1797 for Lille conferences, 788; see Lille, Conference of Malta, 913 Malta, Order of, 226 Mandat territorial, creation of the, 540 n8 Mandelsloh, deputy of Swabian Circle, 591 Mandrillon, (ostensible) French peace envoy, 86-87 Manfredini, Tuscan min., a friend of the Revolution, 173; Sémonville to contact, 173; his love of peace, and Carletti's "mission" in Austria's behalf, 371-372; detested by Thugut, 371 Mangourit, French diplomat, 508 Manini, ex-Doge of Venice, 835 Mannheim, 756, 757, 811 n$$, 814; "PlunderWinter" blamed on conduct of, 206; French threaten to burn, 274, 322-323; bridgehead of, surrendered to French, end 1794, 285, 353 «49; Clerfayt's orders re, if it "pretended neutrality," 389-390; opens gates to French, 391; Vivenot sees Prussia in surrender of, 391, 392; French hopes upon capture of, 392; Wurmser bombards and recaptures, 414 Manstein, aide-de-camp of Frederick William, negotiates with Dumouriez, 80, 81-82; arranges capitulation of Verdun, 84 Mantua, 597, 704, 713, 722, 723, 748, 756, 781-782, 811 »55 Marandet, French sec. of legation at Basel, maneuvers Harnier into provoking desired suggestion from his court, 376-377; insinuates to Waitz Prussian good offices unnecessary, 382 Marat, Dr., French radical leader, 177, 185 n6i Marcomanni, German tribe, 12 Maret, French diplomat, his mission to Naples, 172-173; seized with Sémonville, q. v.; negodates with Malmesbury at Lille, 788 Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, 36, 4 4 45; regards French bellicosity as absurd, 49; betrays Lafayette's military orders, 66

1087 niÓ4; Dumouriez takes hostages for her safety, 147; her exchange in question, τ 66167, 181; her release in question, 167-168, 173; transferred to Conciergerie and arraigned, 181-183; reasons for transfer considered, 181-184; execution, 450 «27 Marie Caroline, Queen of Naples, indicates Francis II's desire for peace, 165 Marie Thérèse Charlotte, see Madame Royale Mariète, French trooper, later col., 304 Marmont, Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, 731 n8, 805, 933 » ' 3 ' Marsan, see Saint-Marsan Martin, David, pseud., French informer, 746 Marval, Prussian min. at Neuchâtel, and the Treaty of Basel, 278 Mary of Burgundy, spouse of Emperor Maximilian I, 20 Masséna, French gen., 731 n¡, 751 ni2, 766 β/02, 955 π8 Mathiez (historian), 95; ascribes Dumouriez' peace efforts to Danton, 79 »229; suspects Danton in Prussian pay after Valmy, 87; discovers Masonic-propaganda document, 95; troubled with Boos's negotiation, 134; believes Danton inspired Dampierre's proposals for royal exchange, 167; emended, 181 »45; his view of Thermidor, 225 Maugeot, agent of Conv., 456 Maurepas, favored min. of Louis XVI, 497 Max Franz, see Cologne, Elector of Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, his bargain with France concerning Alsace, 22 Maximilian of Habsburg, later Maximilian I, Emperor, 20 "Maximum," the, 260-261, 286, 294, 296, 301 Mayence, 811 »55, 814, 890; émigrés in, 43; its mil. importance, 98; Capitulation of, 101, 123; contributions in, 102; first speech of Custine in, 103-104; founding of Club of, 105; Dumont drafts constitution for, 104; lower clergy of, memorialize Custine, 115; unpopularity of the Revolution in, n o ; Johann von Müller declines to head, 115; Custine reorganizes, 115; Compulsory Liberty Decree and, 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 ; Merlin-Th., Reubell, Haussmann sent to, 118; Hofmann ousts "triumvirate" in, 122; Simon and Grégoire sent to, 118; elections ordered in, 119; Convention in, ordered to meet March I0 > ' 7 9 J , 119; oath required of electors of, 119-120; Simon and Grégoire try to win, over, 121-122; but fear to count votes, 121 ; exodus from, 122; refusal to take oath in, and environs, 123-124; measures to obtain oaths in, and environs 124-125; effect of Imp. order not to serve France, 125-127; results of election in, 127; Convention, see Rheno-German National Convention; Paris Conv. annexes, 130, 503; escape of some "patriots" from, 131; meas-

ιο88 ures of rigor against nonswearers in, 1 3 1 ; creation of new "General Admin." in, 1 3 2 ; and of a Committee of Surveillance, 1 3 2 ; Custine's mil. and alimentary dispositions in, 1 3 2 ; views of Cmrs toward defense of, 1 3 2 ; also, of Paris gov't, 132—133; and of Mayence garrison, 1 3 3 ; plots to promote surrender of, 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 ; conference at Prussian outposts, 1 3 5 ; camaraderie between French and Prussian troops before, 1 3 5 ; whether condition of, justified its surrender, 1 3 5 ; capitulation of, 1 3 6 - 1 3 8 ; punishment of all connected with surrender of, 1 3 6 1 3 7 ; fate of Clubists of, 1 3 7 - 1 3 9 ; Möllendorff asks France to abandon siege of, 3 2 3 ; question of neutralizing, 3 2 3 , 3 2 4 - 3 2 5 ; difficulty of capturing, 3 2 2 - 3 2 4 ; CPS authorizes quitting siege of, end 1794, 324; siege of, continued, 324; France must have, CPS avers in early 7795, 3 1 7 ; blockade of, lifted by Clerfayt, 462, 539; French contravallation lines before, described, 539 m ; French fear sorties from, 708; Bonaparte demands surrender of, at Leoben, 748; Dir. wishes to acquire, with fortifications intact, 756; Campo-Formio terms re evacuation of, by Austria, 939; French evacuation of Austria's Italian acquisitions dependent upon, 939; its importance to France as a commercial link with Germany, 965 »24 Mayence, Archbishop-Elector of, liberal toward freethinkers and Protestants, 3 2 ; his attitude toward the Revolution, 3 7 ; forbids armed congregations, 49 »79; approaches Diet re overtures to France, Oct. 1794, 269, 3 2 0 3 2 1 ; unwilling to yield left bank as price of peace, 17g5, 360; said to favor secularization if to his own advantage, 689 Mazarin, min. of Louis X I V , 22 Mazzini, Italian revolutionist, 479 »4/ Meat, 2 1 5 , 260, 2 6 1 , 4 3 1 , 436, 650, 652 Méchain, French capt. of gendarmerie, 524 Mecklenburg, 5 1 1 - 5 1 2 ; Delacroix proposes Prussian Westphalia be exchanged for, 606; Dir. intends, for Prussia or stadholder, Delacroix states, 6 1 4 Mediation, foreign, in French eyes, 3 1 5 , 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 , 326, 407, 5 1 6 Melville, Thomas, uncle of novelist Herman Melville, 789 «70 "Mémoire sur un plan de surveillance," 243 Mémoires tirés des papiers etc., their presentation of Robespierre's peace aims, 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 Mengaud, French gen., protects Poteratz' creatures, 584 Mercy-Argenteau, de, Austrian ambas, to Louis X V I , and negotiator: assigned to Coburg as Francis II's negotiator, 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 ; his part in Montgaillard negotiation, 224, 225, 230; does not mention Montgaillard to Starhemberg, 229—230 Merlin of Douai, Judge, m. Constituante, Conv.,

INDEX CPS, justice min., m. Dir., 502, 795; quoted, 1 9 2 ; his speech on for. policy, Dec. 4, 1794, 262, 2 7 7 ; introduces Conv. discussion on bounds of Republic, 438-440; does not ask for annexation of Rhineland, 439; chosen Director in replacement of Barthélémy after Fructidor, 882; votes to deauthorize a Rhineland republic, 899 Merlin of Thionville, m. Legis. Assem., Rp, m. Five Hundred, 568; Cmr to Mayence, 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 3 ; confers with Kalkreuth on surrender of Mayence, 1 3 4 ; suspected of selling Mayence to Prussians, 1 3 6 «24S; proposes to join Debry's tyrannicides, 276 ni j S ; defends "Plunder-Winter," 206; his for.policy formula of Jan. 8, 1794, 207-208; suggests burning Mannheim if Mayence not yielded, 274; sends Schmitz to spy on right bank, 274; reaction of Möllendorff and CPS to his "overture," 275; abolishes Agency of Evacuation in Trêves region, 293; forces repair of roads by corvée, 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 ; and the Palatine Hojkammerrat, 353 «49; opinion on Austrian absorption of Bavaria, 368; recommends territorial sacrifices and peace, May 1 2 , 1795, 369; returns to former expansionism, 369 n 2 ¡ \ converses with Hardenberg re Bavaria, 3 7 2 - 3 7 4 ; proclamation to Rhineland, 4 2 4 - 4 2 5 ; Hofmann reproaches, re his renunciation of Mayence, 4 2 5 - 4 2 6 ; offers peace and Bavaria to Austria through Kroch, 444-445; reception of overture, 4 4 5 446; influences CPS through Merlin-D., 465; and plan for a federal republic in s. w. Germany, 477 Mersen, Partition of, 6, 5 1 1 η ¡ 4 Merveldt, von, Austrian major gen., negotiator, 734; Bellegarde and, negotiate Judenburg agreement, 7 3 3 ; Bellegarde and, indicate Emperor's submission, 739; commissioned to negotiate peace, 748; Gallo is adjoined to, 748; reasons of Gallo and, for hasty signing at Leoben, 7 5 4 ; supervises French evacuation of Austria, 780 ni8\ reattached to Gallo, 788; Camot's tale of, and Bellegarde's hostility to Prussia, 826 Meslier, Jean, "unfrocker," 2 1 8 » 2 5 5 Metternich, Franz Georg, Count von, min. plenipo. of Austria in Belgium, condemns Coburg's no-conquests pledge, 1 5 0 ; father of later Prince Metternich, 1 5 0 njo; "G" and the chancellery of, 1 7 4 ; his alleged revelation re 1794 Austrian retreat, 241 Metternich, Mat(t)hias, prof, at Mayence, an Illuminé, 97; joins Mayence Club, 108; identified, 1 0 8 ; his propaganda among the farmers, 1 1 5 ; forced to flee, 1 1 6 ; argues in Mayence Convention for union with France, 1 2 8 ; vice-president of new "General Admin.," 1 3 2 ; his fictitious address of a peasant to his prince in Brutus, 3 1 0 , 3 1 1 ; quoted re Rhinelanders' hatred for France, 850 »92;

INDEX his Cisrhenish propaganda to influence Udine talks, 864, 867; his Aufruf, 868-870; his Aufruf answered, 870; see Weckbecker; his Aufruf finds favor with Hoche, 871 Metternich-Winneburg, Count, later Prince, von, son of Franz Georg, τ 66 ni 28 Mettra, (ostensible) French peace envoy, 8687 Metz, 610; France occupies, 1552, 21; defense of, by Francis of Guise, 21; cession to France of, 1648, 22 Meuse River, appearance of agreement on, line after Fleurus, 238; Carnot respects, as good defensive frontier, 440, 505; the, boundary and Hoche, 765, 782-783; Dir. approves, line, 783 Meyer, Strasburger propagandist, identified, 109; shatters Imp. coat of arms, 109-110; Conv. sends, to Mayence, 109 Meyerink, adjutant to Möllendorff, carries Möllendorff's mediation proposals to Frederick William, 268; authorized to treat with France, 275; conversation with Bacher, 2 7 5 276; makes written overture to CPS, 276; CPS grants, permission to come to Paris, 277 Meynard, Rp, 423, 442; and rebellion at Aix, 422; secures money from Aix clergy for Rhine crossing, 423; determines what is a fair tax-share for Cologne in ¿795, 847 Michaud, French gen., 273 "Middle Kingdom," see Lotharingia; Duke of Burgundy aspires to re-create, 20; chances for re-creation of, in seventeenth century, 21; Görres pretends a hidden plan to recreate, 904 M 1 3 Milan, 739, 748, 769, 776 Milanese, the, 749, 750, 756; yielded by Austria at Leoben, 754; and at Campo-Formio, 937 "Milkman, Milk the Cow," 785 Millesimo, 739 Mincio River, 748, 750 Minerva, the, 64-65, 623 Miot de Melito, French ambas, to Turin, his quotation on Bonaparte's ambitions, 793 Mirabeau, French statesman, 42, 96 ni4, 460 Miranda, French gen., 146; his treatise opposing Rhine limit, 306, 426; second publication opposing Rhine limit, 426 Modena, 748, 749, 750, 810 and »55, 913, 937 Möllendorff, Prussian commander in chief, early hopes from, 244-245; disinclination to fight, 245; seeks to free troops for use in Poland, 245; seems to have known about Montgaillard negotiation, 246 «412; commences negotiation with France, 247, 266; sends Meyerink to King with mediation suggestion, 268; is authorized to make preliminary overtures, 269; asks Elector of Mayence to induce Diet to approach France, 269; sends Schmerz to Basel to betray Allied

1089 plans, 272-273; ordered onto right bank, and to send treaty force to Poland, 273; tries to turn Schmitz "overture" into a real negotiation, 275; gives Meyerink full powers to treat, 275; his propositions respecting Wesel and a line of neutrality, 329; promises to sever contacts with Coalition, 331 Mondovi, 739 Monet, mayor of Strasburg, proposes interchange of populations, 26 n86 Monge, French geometer, "art collector," 909 "5, 939» 9 4 1 Moniteur, 537, 754 »_J5 Monomotapa, 203 Montbéliard, 91, 377, 631, 632 Montebello, Convention of, its separate-peace stipulations, 781; Gallo obliged to sign, 780-781; Emperor rejects, 781; effect of Emperor's rejection on negotiations with Empire, 916 Montenotte, 739 Montesquieu, de, French philosopher, jurist, popularizes natural-boundary theory, 24; his influence on Germany, 34 Montgaillard, "Count" de, French adventurer, negotiator, Sybel's account of, 223; Sorel's account of, 223-224; Zeissberg's account of, 224—225; criticism of above accounts of, 226-227; evidence of a, negotiation sifted, 228; Mémoires secrets of, 225, 226, 228; Souvenirs of, 228, 229; rumor that Austria's evacuation of Belgium was concerted with, 235; figures in exchange of Madame Royale, 524 «59 Montmorin, French for. min., 41, 42 Moreau, French gen., 750 ng, 752 »22; Poteratz to concert with, 572-573; crosses Rhine, but Poteratz' revolution is wanting, 569, 570; his pacificatory proclamation, 582; ordered to transfer Gen. Mengaud, 584; his imprudent advance and masterful retreat, 646, 647; Condé's émigrés save, from rout, 786 «42; asks armistice of Charles, Dec. ' 7 Φ , 715; Charles poses condition that, evacuate Hüningen bridgehead and Kehl, 715; surrenders Kehl, 715; instructions of Charles preclude armistice with, 715; Dir. and Bonaparte want no armistice in Italy unbeneficial to Rhine, 715; refuses to yield to Hoche civil admin, south of Moselle, 839; captures Klinglin's papers implicating Pichegru with Condé, 786 »42, 868; Prelims. of Leoben cut short his spring, 1797 campaign, 752-753; his opinion of the Prelims., 764; his army in straitened circumstances, 774; asks Bonaparte's aid in collecting 1796 contributions, 774; Holtz becomes Director-Gen. for, 868 n/6_j; Desaix's venture as collector for, 775-776; fails to attack Councils, 801, 868; refuses mil. support to republican agitators, 868; removed from his command before Fructidor,

1090 801, 868, 874; his army united with Hoche's, 801, 868 Moreaux, French gen., 284 Moselle and Rhine armies consolidated, 302 nij6 "Moustache," see Charruelle Mowat, R. B., 969 m Mühlen Bank, of Coblenz, 544 Millens, Coblenz contractor, 393 Müller, Rhinelander agitator, 896 Müller, Württemberger col. commanding at Kehl, 589 7148 Müller, Johann von, contemp. Swiss historian in Mayence's employ, a Kleinstaat advocate, 33 »7; favors French Revolution, 36; offered Mayence admin., 115 Müller, L., Trierer Tagebuch, 292, 298 Municipalization of Rhineland communities, 115, 162, 305; 1794 ban on, 285, 303 Münster, Bishopric of, Prussia not opposed to receiving, 614; Church of Aix, 299; salt works on the Nahe, 649 Muret (historian), 753 1128 Mylius, von, Imp. commandant of Frankfort, protests revolutionization of Rhineland, and French part therein, 903 " N . , " on a ferment in Baden, 644 n6; Nabonne (historian), 789 Naillac, French diplomat, 60 Naples, Imp. peace feelers from, 171; Maret sent to, re Queen, 167, 172—173 Narbonne, French war min., 47; his for. policy, 56; dismissed, 55 Nassau-Orange, 396 ny8, 5 1 1 , 675 Nassau-Orange-Di]lenburg, 675 m Nassau-Saarbrücken, Prince of, good relations between France and, 692-693; France annexes or sequesters his Saar Basin holdings, 693; coal mines of Saarbrücken stateowned, 693 «9; Dir. regards annexation of Saarbrücken of "major importance," 693; see Saarbrücken Natural-boundary theory, origin, 21; defined, 1; the old monarchy and, 23-24, 27 n8j\ Condorcet and, 5; Rousseau and Montesquieu and, 24; applies to a spiritual line, says Fichte, 5 n8; not originated by Forster, 25 n8i; impressed upon French largely by German expatriates, 24, 25 Navarre, 449 «22, 526 1174 Neerwinden, 145, 146, 149 "Nemesis of Trêves," see Bourbotte Nemetes, German tribe, 12, 13 Nerciat, French secret agent in Germany, intrigues at Vienna for peace, 686-687; expelled, 687; writes Thugut, who dubs him "Poteratz II," 687; blames fanfare for difficulties of Clarke mission, 713 Nervii, tribe of Gaul, 14

INDEX Neumarkt, 731 Neutrality, see Neutrality, line of; Delacroix's Plan rejects entire, system, 512; Dir. instructs Poteratz to reject, and require alliance, 569; revolutionary principles one source of Prussia's desire for, 603-604; see Saxony, Electorate of; summary of advantages of North German, to French, 961—962 Neutrality Convention of May 17, 1795 (Franco-Prussian), origin of, in Prussian poverty, 365; advantages of, to France, 365; provisions of, 367; violation by both sides, 396400, 530; Prussia restricts its application, 531; advisability of neutrality scheme questioned, 531-532; see Neutrality, line of Neutrality, line of, first suggestion of a, 329; adopted at Basel, 344; Barthélémy wants a separate convention on, 344; Prussia insists that, be incorporated in the peace, 344-345, 346; forms part of Treaty of Basel, 3 5 1 352; and Hanover, 344, 346, 354, 364, 5 3 1 533; Prussia seeks revision of, 365; Neutrality Convention of May 17, 1795, see under separate heading·, CPS informs Jourdan how to treat, 396-397; CPS reverses itself on, 397; endangers subsistence of French army, 397; Prussia, Frankfort, and the, 397—398; strained relations between French and Prussians along, 398; Emperor instructs Clerfayt to disregard, 399; English violate, at Cuxhaven, 399; Brunswick violates, at Bremen, 400-401; Prussian reply to French charges of violation of, 400; violated by both French and Austrians, 399; Hanover asks to join neutrality system, 401; Prussia renounces southern part of, 531; French agreement to a, hinges on Austrian concurrence, 602; Hardenberg flees French protests over Austrian violation of, 534; French objections to, concept, 602-603; advantages to France of, 603; why Prussia was so insistent upon, 603-604; Haugwitz strongly favors a, 603; Dir. agrees to new, in hope of Prussian alliance, 604-605; Bischoffswerder dangles hope of alliance to hasten reconstitution of, 604; Reubell's double attitude toward a, 604; Prussia restricts, to induce French to respect it, 609; Dir. orders disregard of, 609; Carnot, as pres. of Dir., promises respect for, and to defer left-bank question, 610-612; Reubell promises respect for, 6 1 1 - 6 1 2 ; Dir. insists on double convention re, and indemnities, 612; of Treaty of Aug. 5, 7796, 616; extended to include Saxony, 667; its observation ordered by Dir., early 7797, 735. Neuwied, Prince of, 97 "Neuwieder, The," see Trenck von Tonder Neveu, Rp, 298, 302 nij8 "No more philosophy" decree, see Decree, French, of Sept. 15 and 18, 1793 Noailles, French ambas, to Vienna, 53

INDEX Noël, French diplomat, is sent to Venice, 172— 173; voices fears about Prussia, 622 Nomocrates, Charatophile, pseud, for Erhard, Dr., French informer, 746 Normal school at Paris, and the Rhineland, 305-306 Novato, see Sémonville Nuremberg, 332, 574, 681, 746; see Probst; Prussia occupies, 615; Dir. orders heavy contributions on, 635, 638 η34', Prussia sanctions contributions, 636 »20; its cultural treasures "impounded," 637; letter written from, re aggrandizing Prussia, 679 Oberndorff, Palatine min., meets with Zweibrücken, Recum, and French officer, 390 Oberthür, Prof., Rhinelander emigré, 295, 307 Ochs, burgomaster of Basel, 267 CElsner, German expatriate, 63-65, 623-624, 679 «22 Offenburg, 582, 613 Oglio River, 750, 754 Olsa gorges, 731 Oppenheim, 133, 134, 390 "Oracle of Delphi," 772 til39 Orange, House of, Hohenzollern interest in, refused mention in Basel Treaty, 348, 357; problem of its troops in Hanover, 532-533; relatives of Frederick William belonging to, 534; Delacroix urges designation of secularizations for, 604-605 ; provisions concerning, in Treaty of A u g . 5, 619; its indemnification not in Leoben Treaty, 827; French efforts to substitute Hanover for secularizations promised, 827-828; French vagueness re, indemnities incenses Prussian King, 829830; provisions concerning, in Campo-Formio Treaty, 938 "Orator of the Human Race," see Cloots "Organizer of Victory," see Carnot, Lazare Orléans, Duke of, cousin of Louis X V I , 221, 452 Ostermann, Russian for. min., on Emperor's intent in Palatinates controversy, 265 n68 Ott, Mayençais sec. of legation at Berlin, 414 Oyré, d', French commandant of Mayence, his meeting with Boos, 133-134; fails to have Clubists covered by Capitulation of Mayence, 137-138 Paine, Thomas, m. Conv., 191 Palatinate of the Rhine, 782, 890; Louis X I V ravages trans-Rhenish, 1689, 42; neutrality guaranteed by France, 7792, 161; nationals abducted and returned by French, 1 6 1 ; occupied by Moreaux, 1794, 284; Wurmser levies requisitions in, but France treats, as neutral, 391-392 Palmer (historian), says French Revolution a world movement, 97 n 2 j Pape, Westphalian ex-monk, identified, 109; translates Constitution of 1791 into German,

IO91 109; Conv. sends, to Mayence, 109; his "Open Letter to Friedrich Wilhelm Hohenzollern," 109; captured fleeing from Mayence, 1 3 1 ; punished personally by Baron von Stein, 137 Parandier, French secret agent at Berlin, identified, 562 nil; intrigues to reestablish Poland, 563, 629; suggests bribing Prussia to resurrect Poland, 566; depositary of Prince Henry's ideas, 625; sends Prince Henry's memoir to Paris, 625; his "Regarding the Barrier," 629-630 Parcus, French director-gen. of right-bank revenues, itemizes French excesses, 654; assures respect for property, 655 Paris, Conference of, 1919, 1, 2 Pariser Zuschauer, 537 «57 Passau, Bishopric of, 781, 811 and «55, 814 Patocki, Rheno-German deputy, 129, 130 Patriotism, lacking among German thinkers, 3 4 - 3 5 ! peculiar concept of "Fatherland" in Germany, 35 n i $ Paul, C z a r of Russia, son of Catherine II, 747; reverses his mother's for. policy, 672 η20; angered by Treaty of A u g . 5, 1796, 736; Thugut urges on, positive stand in favor of Austria, 832 Pauw, Cornelius de, celebrated uncle of Cloots, 218 Peace: feelers, see Andlau, von; Armistice (of Dec. 31, 1 7 9 5 ) ; Augeard; Bacher; Baden; Basel; Brunswick, Duke of; "civil commissioners"; Coburg, Duke of; Custine, Adam de; Degelmann; Desportes; Florence; Géroni, de; Hérault de Séchelles; Hérault the younger; Jordis, Frankforter banker; Kellermann; Lafitte; Lebrun; Lucchesini, di; Mandrillon; Marval; Merlin-Th.; Mettra; Meyerink; Möllendorff; Montgaillard ; Naples; Pellenc; Poteratz; Proly; Prussia; Rayneval, de (brother of Gérard); Rayneval, Gérard de; Robespierre (Nov. 17, 1793 speech); Robin; Saxon legation at Paris; Schmerz; Schmitz; Sickingen, Count of; Théremin; Vaughn; Venice; Wurmser; general, attitude toward, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 463, 470, 509-510; to be reached through separate-peace agreements, 552; enters into Clarke's instructions of Jan. 17, 1797, 718; reaction to Sandoz' suggestion of Prussian intervention for a, 725 and nioj; indefinite postponement of, seen: in personal antagonisms, 507; in need for for. coin and for. territory for economic ends, 508, 963-966; in internal pol. factors, 508510 . Pein, Lille postal inspector, 789 Pellegrini, Gen., 727 ni 14 Pellenc, ex-sec. of Mirabeau, later in Austrian employ, 262 Pereira, Bayonne tobacconist, agent of Lebrun,

1092 his mission to Dumouriez, 146 nil·, his execution, 220-221 Pérès, Rp, his contribution of 22,000,000 livres: decreed, 418; protests against, 4 1 8 - 4 1 9 ; reduced by CPS, 419; CPS approves also Dubois' modification of, 419; Cologne dunned under Dir. for, 544 Pernety, Dom, Avignon Illuminé, 34 ng Perpetuation of the war, see Peace, indefinite postponement of, seen Perret, Clarke's sec., biograph, 807 «27; sent to Vienna for Bonaparte, 805; character of his mission, 805-806, 808; T h u g u t elicits information from, 806—807; results of his mission, 807 Perrin, French adjutant gen., 654 Perroud (historian), emended, 173 n/77 Peter's Church of Cologne, 299 Petiet, French war min., 794, 795, 797 Pétion, m. Constituante, 36 Peyssonnel, de, ex-consul gen. at Smyrna, scholar, writer, 1042; advocates Rhine boundary for France, 24 Pfaffenhofen, see Bavaria Pharos für Aeonen, 426 Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, seeks to re-create Lothair's "Middle Kingdom," 20; Charles VII of France opposes, 20 Philippsburg, 643, 756, 939; claimed by Louis X I V , 22 Physicians, Rhinelander republican, see A n sehet, Dr.; Vivignis, de, Dr.; Wedekind, Dr. Pichegru, French gen., later m. Five Hundred, 225. 3 2 7 . 361, 370, 4 2 4 442» 487 " ¡ h 502, 588; treasonable link with Condé and inaction in 179s, 387, 527; Saint-Cyr sees only blunders in, 389 nji; exchange of Madame Royale first entrusted to, 451; Bacher succeeds, in exchange negotiation, 524 Π59; his plot to proclaim Provence, 527; expected to effect coup d'état for moderates, 789; is himself proscribed, 880, 881 Pillnitz, Declaration of, 44, 45 Pitt, British prime min., his fall held key to peace, 211—212; his distress at Robespierre's fall, 228; sees merit in neutrality for Hanover, 401; disposed to buy peace through Thomas Melville, 1797, 789 «70 Pius V I , Pope, 701 n68 Pléville le Pelley, French adm., min. of marine, negotiator, 788 Ployer, Habsburg-Zwanziger link, 684 »29 "Plunder-Winter," 205-207, 303 Po River, 750 Poissant, C m r , see Holtz Poland, larger slice of, demanded by Prussia, 17g2, 88; Second Partition of, 1793, 88; rage of Austria, 88; international situation at time of Second Partition of, 89—90; revolution in, 17g4, 244; see Subsidy treaty, Anglo-Dutch-Prussian, of The Hague; Prussia invades, but cannot capture Warsaw, 244;

INDEX Prussian troops in West needed in, 246; CPS will not permit immolation of, 318; Prussia yields palatinates of, to Austria, 353, 531; Delacroix's Plan calls for eventual resurrection of, 513; likewise, Poteratz' instructions, with qualifications, 516; Rhine boundary alleged offset to Russian gains in, 537; reconstitution of, proposed under scion of Hohenzollern House, 563-564; partial reconstitution of, under Saxony proposed, 563 Poles, not anxious for a Hohenzollern king, 566; kept in ferment by French resurrection efforts, 743 Political-murder threats, see Frederick William II; Catherine II; Saxe-Teschen; Debry; Merlin-Th. Poly, royalist conspirator, 800 Pont, de, French diplomat, 60 Porentrui (or Porrentruy, or Pruntrut), 717 Portiez of the Oise, Rp, coauthor of 25,000,ooo-livre contribution north of Moselle, 295; his report rejecting independent-Rhineland idea, 427, 438; Gillet cuts his 25,000,000, 297; his Dec. 20, 1794 speech, 308 Poteratz, "Marquis" de, French adventurer, 790 » 7 / ; his biograph, 456-457; Obser's quotation on, 457; his association with Boissy d'Anglas, 456-457; his for.-policy memoirs, 457-459; CPS commissions, to negotiate with Thugut, 459; relation of Thugut's past to mission of, 459-460; offers Bavaria to Austria, and money to Thugut, 461; tricked into leaving Vienna, 462; Dir. sends, back to Vienna, 5 1 5 - 5 1 6 ; conference with Thugut fails, 5 1 8 - 5 1 9 ; alleged part in exchange of Madame Royale, 524 «59; instructions unchanged in defeat, 5 5 1 ; conferences with Degelmann at Basel, 5 5 1 - 5 5 4 , 555-556; recalled, then authorized to remain at Basel, 553; writes directly to T h u gut, 5 5 4 - 5 5 5 ; his "Proposition of Some Measures," 555 »20, 568-569; Dir.'s instructions to, of April ι , 17Φ, 569-570; charged with secret mission at Basel, 570; jealousy of Barthélémy, 570, 579; associates himself with Bassal and List, 5 7 0 - 5 7 1 ; authorized to promise aid to any region of Germany craving independence, 572-573; army on Upper Rhine ordered to assist, 572; commissions emissaries and emits propaganda, 574; recalled twice, then ordered arrested, 5 7 5 - 5 7 6 ; grounds for his arrest, 576-578; examination by the police, 579— 580; not exonerated, but freed, 580; his later letter of justification, 580; suggests new attempt to blackmail Thugut, 706-707; rumor that, would supplant Delacroix through bribery, 795 moo·, offers to revolutionize Germany, 922-923; archive study of his name, 969-973 Potosí, Bolivia, 839

INDEX Poultier, ed. of Ami des Lois, 701-702, 1014 Pradt, abbé de, French émigré diplomat and publicist, identified, 98 112 ¡a\ his Petit Catéchisme quoted, 98 « 2 j a ; his De la Belgique quotes Montgaillard-Trauttmansdorfl conversation, 224—225 Prairial, insurrection of May 20, 1795, 441 B/5S, 484, 489 »20 Pretender, the, see Provence, Count of "Priest, an Irish," his explanation of the retreat from Valmy, 77-78 Prieur, Rp, 113 Prize courts, see Hamburg Probst, French secret agent, 332; functions, 279; arrest by Austria, 746; France "acquires" a hostage for his release, 747; hostage exchanged for, 747 Proly, Brussels-born financier, agent of Lebrun, his mission to Dumouriez, 146 nii\ commissioned to approach Austria, 167; his execution, 220, 221 Propaganda, revolutionary, Strasburg a clearinghouse for, 71, 94, 95; its importance to Brissot and Dumouriez, 71 «194; of Freemasonic origin, 95; and the "Congregation de propaganda," 94 »5; and Girtanner's "The Propaganda," 95-96; and R. R. Palmer's "the Propaganda," 96 ni;\ see Illuminati; also Poteratz; in the Tyrol, 573, 739; in the Austrian army, 737 »46; in Hungary and Bohemia, 737-739; in the Palatinate, 743; in Augsburg, 744; in Franconia and Swabia, 744; in the Kinzig valley, 744; in Danzig and Berlin, 744-745; in the Rhineland, by Hoche's order, 843 Protestant(s), German, Henry II of France and the, 21; Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar a, 22; and Treaty of Basel, 352 048, 830 «2/; and Treaty of Aug. 5, 1796, 614; Delacroix urges, to promote France's Rhine aspirations, 722-723; Talleyrand wants Treaty of Aug. 5 expanded to benefit, 893 Provence, Count of, French Pretender, later Louis XVIII, 43, 44, 525, 526, 576 «49, 821; why Thugut was averse to recognizing, 448 ni6; his eagerness to be first to see Madame Royale, 449 »22; wants Madame Royale to marry Angoulême, 526; Pichegru's plot to proclaim, 527 Prudhomme, Paris publicist, 201 ni¡2, 310 Pruneau, Director-Gen. north of Moselle, 702; quoted on army cheating, 696; forbids funeral ceremony for son of Prussian King, 700, 701 and n6¡ Prussia, under Hertzberg and Bischoffswerder, 38; her alliance with Austria, 54; joins Austria in notes to France, 55, 61; army of, heads towad Rhine, 68; France declares war upon, 68; see Valmy, cannonade of; negotiations with, following Valmy, 85-87; First CPS and, 158-165; rebuffs French feelers, 210; before Basel, sells cloth to

France, 332; after Basel, her provisioning of France changes pol. picture, 363 «J07; also, alimentary picture for Austrian army, 388 «25; her renewal of League of Princes suggested to save Bavaria from Austria, 403; Delacroix's Plan would elevate, to Imp. status, 512; mediation of, in favor of Austria suggested, 599; her Franconian possessions — except Nuremberg — spared contributions in 1796, 638 and nj4, 639; possessions of her relatives ordered coddled, 675; request by, to treat Ratisbon as neutral, refused, 675-676; will not fight, but only influence peace, 677; Austria wants no gain if, gains too, 714; French efforts to woo, in early 1797, 735-736; offers Austria mediation for general peace on basis of integrity, 725 moj, 735 n¡4\ at Montebello, Bonaparte contemplates limiting, to an equivalent for Cleves, 782; offers to guarantee Venice's integrity, 1796, 792; her relations with France strained after Leoben, 833; French embargo upon importation of foreign cloth applied to Prussia until aid for secularization sought, 833—834; alliance of, craved after Fructidor, 891-894; is asked for mil. demonstration on Austrian frontier, 893; Caillard to ask, for Wesel, 893; alliance of, not to be endangered for Wesel, 894; refuses to ally, 894; Campo-Formio Treaty guarantees that, will get no "new acquisition," 938; French efforts to secure alliance of, summarized, 952; as a sea power, not viewed as a threat to France, 912 m i , 961; Barthélémy later avers he never actively sought alliance of, 1018; alliance with, solicited by France, 1 5 8 159. 334. 345. 353. 402-403, 534, 620, 676678, 720, 7347736, 827, 892, 893-894 considers alliance with France, 353, 534 Prussian good offices, 315, 317, 328-329, 397; Art. XI of 'Basel Treaty provides for, 351; Franco-Hesse-Casseler treaty project omits mention of, 382; French resist, then yield, on question of, 382, 384; Caillard's instructions re, 406; not welcomed in practice, says Hardenberg, 406-407; versus mediation, 407; Baden asks for, to escape "enemy country" treatment, 407; CPS protests invoking of, for other than separate-peace purposes, 407; of no avail for treating with Empire or Emperor, 408; offered to lesser states for status quo ante bellum peace, 410; not favored by France, 411; offering of, renounced, 411 Prussian left bank, civil admin, of, and CPS's March 10, 1795 treaty project, 343; Barthélemy's warning re project unheeded, 343; Frederick William demands the, 419-420; Barthélémy recommends humoring Prussia re, as an

1094 alimentary expedient, 420; CPS refuses Prussia the, 420; émigrés, Prussian protests re creation of, 416; CPS orders remedial measures on, but Rps resist, 417; requisitions and contributions on, Dubois decrees relief against, 417; CPS orders reinstatement of, and acceptance of assignats, 418; in Pérès' levy, CPS waives, 418; immediate and subsequent reaction of, to Basel Treaty, 361, 420-421; royal assurances to, of no intention to cede, 421; and the forced loan, 536, 697-698; requisitions and French paper money continue on, 698; Frederick William orders, to pay its taxes to him, 698; financial exactions continue on, 698; felling of forests of, 699-700; clerical sequestrations on, 700; funeral ceremony for King's son on, 700-701, 702-703; Duramel sends Hoche special regulations for, 839840; exempted from Hoche's three- and eight-million-livre contributions, 851 »90; provisions concerning, in Campo-Formio Treaty, 938 "Psychological Crusade," text of propaganda messages in, 307-309; Conv. and CPS disregard annexation suggestions stemming from, 309; explanation of motives underlying, 310 Pyrenees, Treaty of the, recognizes France as "Protector" of Lorraine, 23 Pyrmont, 831, 862; reputed Prusso-Danish territorial arrangement made at, 823 Quadi, German tribe, 12 Querini, Venetian min. to Paris, gives notes for Barras' vote to save Venice, 768-769; repudiates notes, 769; Böttot allegedly asks Haller to discount notes of, 911 ni$, 921; see Deverine Raclawice, 236 ηS45 Radziwill, Prince, Polish patriot, his letter seeming to compromise Sandoz, 566 n j 9 ; Prince Henry to, quoted, 625 Ragusa, republic of, Dir. seeks Austrian evacuation of, 811 nss, 914; Dir.'s ultimatum contemplates independence of, 921 Ramel, French finance min., 698, 795 Ranke (historian), 78-79 Rastatt, 613; Montebello Convention calls for, as seat of Franco-Imp. Congress, 781 ; Treaty of Campo-Formio, likewise, 937; Bonaparte ordered to, 943 Ratification, question of legislative, of Directorial secret treaties, 485 η 3· of Directorial prelim, treaties, 749 and ra4 Ratisbon, Diet at, see Diet of the Empire; "Ratisbon plan," 366 Rayneval, de, brother of Gerard, and (ostensible) peace envoy, 456 Rayneval, Gérard de, author, scholar, first

INDEX clerk dept. for. alí. 1774-1792, councillor of state 1783, arranges for a Franco-Austrian meeting, 313 Razoumouskoi, Russian ambas, to Vienna, on Leoben terms, 760-761 Reading circles, their importance, 33 n8; see Freemasonic lodges Réal, famous journalist, "Historiographer of the Republic," 463 Rebmann, French-domiciled German pol. writer, his arguments for a dependent republic as against annexation, 905; Dorsch's reply to, 906-907 Recognition of the Republic, 80, 171, 316, 749-750. 755 Recum, Palatine merchant, his intercourse with France, 390 Rédacteur, 538, 755 η 3 5 Regencies under Intermediary Commission, purpose, 844; names of, 842 Régnier, French royalist agent of Britain, 490, 498 Reibeld {or Reibell, or Reibelt), French secret agent, see Gleichen, pseud. Reibold, Palatine envoy to France, 133 Reichenweier, 491, 631, 632 Reichsbeschluss of April 14, 1734, 394 Reichsfriedensgutachten of December 22, 1794, 264, 271, 408 1133 Reichsfürstenrat, 716 η¡8 Reinhard, Wiirttemberger-born French min. to Hansa and to Lower Saxon Circle, 64, 509, 532, 608, 823; succeeds Lehoc, 819; Hamburg refuses to recognize, 819-820, 825; recalled but does not return, 819; Dir. lays embargo on Hamburger ships in retaliation for treatment of, 821; his plans for Hansa, 824 Reitzenstein, von, Badenese aulic councillor, appointed to treat for peace with France, 408; on Hardenberg's lost hope for integrity of Empire, 412 η¡3·, negotiates armistice with Moreau, 591-592; protests rigor of its terms, 593, 645; negotiates peace at Paris, 640-645 Rennes, 753 »29 Requisition, power to, limited by Dir. to gens, in chief and their representatives, 654; and commissaries gen., 696; usurped daily by army hangers-on, 696; regulations concerning, in conquered Austria, 770-771 Responsibility, ministerial, in Constitution of Year III, 484; Councils seek dismissal of obnoxious ministers, 795; Reubell interposes constitutional provision on, 795; importance to German policy of Dir. of question of, 795 «103 Rethel, Intermed. Com.'s Substitute-Cmr for Cologne, identification and appointment, 874; his demand for a seat in Cologne Senate, 874-876; sympathizes with Cologne for inability to meet Hoche's contributions-

INDEX compromise, 876; Cologne bourgeoisie restive since his arrival, 876; recommends abolition of Cologne Senate, 876; part played by Sommer and Wasserfall in this recommendation, 877; unpaid contributions lead, to imprison Senators, 877 Reubell, m. Constituante, Conv., Dir., 133, 505-506; advocates Rhine frontier, 25; stifles Alsatian appeal for feudal privileges, 40; urges Girondists to make war, 63; Cmr to Mayence, 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 , I 2 2 > I 2 4 ! ar>d Boos, 134; confers with Kalkreuth on surrender of Mayence, 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 ; basis of Rhine-frontier system of, 378, 505-506; fears returning troops unless the peace supplies means to compensate them, 510 n$i\ chosen Director, 487; his biograph, 490-493; orthography of his name, 490 «27; as Director, his jealous control of for. aff., 492; aids Mayençais exiles, 506 njo; sees equilibrium as object of peace, 513; regards Prussian and HesseCasseler left bank as ceded, 538; uses Frisching negotiation to frighten Prussia, 600; nervous before Fructidor, 801-802; advises southern-Rhineland deputation to circulate petitions for annexation, 866; his rumored guarantee for 60,000 signatures, 868 ni68 Reuss, Prince of, Austrian ambas, to Berlin, 79, 80, 85, 86, 946 n68 "Rêve d'un homme de bien, Le," 478 Revellière, m. Constituante, Conv., Dir., 501; asks French aid for all popular revolts, 113; his responsibility for Decree of Nov. 19, 1792, 113—114; acquires dependent-republic idea from Brissot via Sieyes, 476; chosen Director, 487; orthography, 494 »42; his biograph, 494-496; patronizes Theophilanthropy, 496; his preferences in for. policy, 496, 502; his Rhine policy on Dir. based on opposition to Carnot, 505, 506 Revolution, attitude toward the, on the part of: noted Germans, 36; Prussia, 36; Rhineland princes, 3 6 - 3 7 ; German peasantry, 37 Revolutionization, Sorel-Sybel argument over, 280 ni$y, Dir. disavows desire for, 561; Gleichen divulges plans for, 635; attempts at, during 1796 and 1797 campaigns, 7 3 7 739; of Berlin averted, 745; French interest in Austria's disruptive elements after Leoben, 776-777; of Italy and Habsburg dominions ordered if war resumed, 9 2 1 923; Poteratz offers to effect, of all Germany, 922-923; benevolent attitude toward possible right-bank republics ordered, 923; Bonaparte hostile to, 923; all attempts at, of Austria prohibited by Campo-Formio Treaty, 937 Révolutions de Paris, 201 ni52 Reynier, Moreau's chief of staff, 590; negotiates armistice with Württemberg, 590 Rheinbach, town in Electoral Cologne, its liberal background, 895; complaints in, re

IO95 restoration of old-regime officials, 895896; Bonn regency supports old officials of, 896; Intermed. Com. restores municipalité and begins separatist propaganda in, 896; plants tree of liberty, 896; Intermed. Com. hails its revolution, 895, 896 Rheinsberg, Château of, 625 "Rheno-German Free State," 132 Rheno-German National Convention, its membership, 128; decree of secession, 128; argument in, over joining France, 128—129; decree asking France to annex, 129; sends deputation to Paris, 129; its request for annexation granted in part, 129-130 Rhine, The, for the King, treatise by Jean le Bon, 2 1 ; Poteratz demands all waters of, 553; restrictions on, commerce, 694; Revolutionists promote freedom of, 694-695; Strasburg's apprehension re free navigation of, 695; articles of, commerce, 695; plan to divert, to east of Alt-Breisach, 757; article on free navigation of, in Campo-Formio Treaty, 938 Rhine and Moselle armies consolidated, 302 m 36 Rhine boundary, claimed by France, 1444, 20; French interest in, subsides with death of Charles the Bold, 2 1 ; recurs among populace after 1552, 2 1 ; see Le Bon; France demands, in J gig, 1; and ig45, 2; De Gaulle renounces, 2; not regarded by De Gaulle as the acme, 2, 26; essential to "lasting security," to Dumouriez, 25; "indispensable," to Merlin-Th., early i7gs, 119; demanded by Conv., Jan. 3 1 , 1793, 119; favored by Carnot and the two Merlins, winter 779495, 263 »46, 306; but some opposition to, is expressed, 367; Conv. refuses to claim, March, 179s, 339; existence of secret articles on, in Basel Treaty intimated to Conv., 355; Merlin-Th.'s abnegative suggestions re, May 12, i7g$, 369; mm. of Conv. and CPS favoring, Oct. i7gs, 436; Conv. vote of Oct. ι , 1795, favors, unofficially, 439, 440-441, 503; and tow path beyond, demanded by Poteratz, 5 1 5 ; intended as offset to Russia's expansion, 537; victories of July 1796 in Germany kindle, desire in Councils, 614; territory beyond, demanded of Prussia and Baden, 616, 619-620, 640; defeats of summer 1796 at first have no effect on Dir.'s, system, 701—702; for over a month after mid-Jan. 1797 the, is no sine qua non, 702-703; and Chouchard's map, 7 2 1 ; internal situation of France and, demand, 7 2 1 - 7 2 2 ; Dir. not insistent on, when Leoben Treaty signed, 756; French victories on Rhine restore demand for, 756; Reubell avers, is France's maximum, 757 n44; Cobenzl willing to concede France the, on Oct. 7, 1797, 927; Treaty of Campo-Formio grants France, from Alsace to around An-

1096 dernach, 938; summary of economic considerations involved in, system, 964—966 Rhine problem, origin of, 6, 9 Rhineland, German, invaded by Custine in 7792, 93; propagandized by Jacobins of Alsace, 94; occupied by Jourdan and Moreaux in 1794, 284-285; contributions: 3,000,000 by Bourbotte on Trêves and Luxemburg, and 4,000,000 on Coblenz, 289-291; 25,000,000 by Portiez of the Oise and Joubert north of Moselle, 295; latter cut to 8,000,000 by Gillet, 297; 22,000,000 by Pérès north of Moselle, 418; latter cut to 10,000,000 by CPS, 419; rule of thumb for apportionment of, 423 »42; late 1796 efforts to collect arrears of past, 701 «66; Durbach's 1797 efforts to collect same, 846; separate republic in, favored by, Dumouriez, 25; Forster on Oct. 25, 1792, 112; Carnot, allegedly, 242; Biergans and Geich, 426—427; Rebmann, 904-905; but not Merlin-D. on Sept. 30, 1795, 439; population of, 432 »95; see Prussian left bank; prospectus of burdens on northern, 546; Malmesbury, in 1796, offers to let France keep some of, 673; its income and expenses, 696; heavy impositions on, after 1796 campaign, 698—699; Dir. pays army contractors with metals and forests of, 699700; nervous and unruly after French defeats of 1796, 701 n68; right to carry arms taken from northern, 702; restitution of, promised for Prussia's armed mediation, 735; Bonaparte's alternatives at Leoben, and the, 748; Leoben Treaty contemplates return of, to Empire, 754; Hoche given civil admin, of, 839; Duramel's orders re contributions in, 840; paymaster gen. to be in charge of all receipts from, 840; Hoche restores old-regime officials and taxes, and outlaws requisitions, in, 840-841; Hoche creates Intermed. Com. to administer, 840; Hoche orders spirit of liberty fostered in, 842, 843; names of the six districts into which Hoche divided the, 842; trees of liberty planted in, 108, 113, 139, 140, 162, 304, 896, 903 Rhinelanders, abyss between, and their princes illustrated, 37 »25; by whom ruled in 1789, 93 ni; Coburg's appeal to, for mil. aid, 285; their reaction to Basel Treaty, 361, 420-421; number of republican, 867 11161 Rhodius, deputy of Franconian Circle, see Zwanziger Richelieu, Cardinal de, min. of Louis XIII, and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, 22; regards Paris too near frontier, 23 Richer Serisy, French publicist, quoted on Reubell, 492 on Revellière, 495-496; his arrest after Fructidor, 1015 m 2 Ritter, Cmr, 651

INDEX Ritzebüttel, fort on Elbe estuary, 399-401 Rivalz, French min. resident in Cassel, 194, 196, 586; Sickingen approaches, 165; in Hesse-Cassel to stir up Empire against Austria, 542; his instructions, 559-561 Rivaud, Cmr, 541, 545 Rivoli, 597, 722 Roberjot, m. Conv., Rp, 442-443; blames army agents for Rhineland famine, 296; his inspection tour of Rhineland, 297; and Dubois make order out of émigré regulations north of Moselle, 298, 416; effects return of many émigrés, 416; resists CPS order on Prussian-left-bank émigrés, 417; his report, thermidor III, 417, 434; his comparison of Rhine and Meuse frontiers, 440 m j i ; his report on left bank quoted, 964 ti2j Robespierre, m. Constituante, Jacobins, Conv., CPS, childhood, 243 »J94; early bellicosity re Austria, 47, 187; see Billaud-Varenne; becomes a pacifist, 48; favors war after internal victory, 50; speech of Dec. 18, 1791, 50; of Jan. 2 and 11, 1792, 52-53; hampered by Germanic propagandists, 63; links Girondists to Dumouriez' treason, 153; unwitting cause of Decree of April 13, 1793, 156» 157. 168; is elected to Great CPS, 178; does not favor Prussia, 186-187; his philosophy, 187—189; coached by Soulavie, 190; speech of Nov. 17, 1793 on aliens, conversion by force, peace, 196—197; conversion by force and his Dec. 5 speech, 197; Sorel's view of, 197; regarded as a moderate by contemporaries, 197-198; fear of assassination, 198; his father and grandfather Freemasons, 201 n/54; induces Jacobins to expel "foreigners," 202-204; favors Belgians over Rhinelanders, 205; joins Danton in peace venture, late 1793, 209; embraces Barère's views, 210; his speech of Dec. 5, 1793, on religion, 217-218; his speech of Feb. 5, 1794, on pol. morality, 219; comparison of for. policies of Danton and, 222; mentions need for peace in May 7, 1794 speech, 223; Montgaillard mission for, in Belgium, 223-230; his peace aims, 230235, 242-243; and idea of a dependent Rhineland Republic, 242; rumor of marriage with Madame Royale, 246; rules Great CPS by personal influence, 465 Robin, British secret agent, his negotiation with Danton, 209-210 Rochambeau, de, French gen., 56, 73 Rocroy, 174, 181 Roederer, m. Constituante, coed. Journal de Paris, 428-429 Roer (or Roër, or Rur) River (west of Rhine), 307, 765, 783 Roland, French interior min., his recommendations for Frankfort's future, 103 Romagna, the, 749, 750 "Roman months," 270

INDEX "Rome," 9, 26, 763 Romeuf, Louis, former aide-de-camp of Lafayette, sent to Vienna to observe en route, 808; his arrival delays Gallo's departure, 834-835; negotiates release of Lafayette, 940 Roques, see Montgaillard, " C o u n t " de Rosenbaum, mayor of Coblenz, quoted on conditions under Bella, 697 Rosenberg-Orsini, von, Austrian Lord High Chamberlain and conference min., denies negotiations with Montgaillard, 226-227, 228; recommends peace and cashiering of Thugut, 597; draws up Degelmann's instructions for Frisching negotiation, 599; Lucchesini on, at his death, 597 n6 Rougemaître, French "evacuator," 303 «142 Rousseau, French philosopher, quoted on natural boundaries, 24; his influence on Germany, 33 »7, 34 Roux, m. Conv., 355, 382 »9 Royalist conspiracies involving, Pichegru, 387, 527, 786, 800; Poteratz, 5 7 6 - 5 7 7 ; Moreau, 786 «42; Brottier, La Villeheurnois, Poly, and Duverne de Presle, 800; Antraigues, 800; Barras, 801 niji Rubens, Flemish painter, 299 Rudler, Cmr, 839; commissioned to reorganize Rhineland, 907; allegedly composes annexationist petitions, 907 nug Riihl, m. Conv., asks French protection for "patriots" of Bergzabern and Mayence, 1 1 3 ; defends "Plunder-Winter," 206; on Hamburg as a "neutral," 253; proposes France's boundaries be "defined," 339 Russia, 92; see Catherine II; Paul; Triple A l liance; Poland; T h u g u t appeals to, just before Judenburg, 732 Saar Basin, 782; see Nassau-Saarbrücken, Prince of Saarbrücken, 160; claimed by Louis X I V , 22; value of assignats in, 283; Marandet indicates desire for, 377; Prussia acquiesces in its abandonment to France, 377 Saarlouis, 160 Saarwerden, 693 Sagnac (historian), emended, 93-94, 859 m 2 5 , 864, 1036 Saint-Albin, Rousselin de, French official and writer of biography, music, drama, 463 «90, 1019 Saint-André, m. Conv., 253 Saint-Antoine, Faubourg, 77, »2/S, 361 Saint-Cyr, de, French gen., poverty of his army, 651 Saint-Denis, destruction of the royal tombs at, 185 Sainte-Croix, French ambas, to Coblenz, 58 Sainte-Menehould, 79, 451 η Saint-Huberty, La (Countess d'Antraigues), 800 n i 2 S

IO97 Saint-Just, m. CPS, invites Alsatians to abandon German customs, 37 «4/; his requisitions in Strasburg, 1793-94, 206; undermines Carnot in armies, 255, 256; threatens Carnot with guillotine, 256; executed, 256 St. Mark's, 888 Saint-Marsan, Sardinian gen. and envoy to Bonaparte, 727 nm Saint-Priest, de, ambas, of Louis X V I to Turkey, 460, 517, 520, 554, 706, 726 Salabert, abbe, Zweibrückener chargé d'affaires, 374, 390 Salic Law, 449 ni8 Salm, Circle of, its foundation and purpose, 794; propagandizes against moderates, 794; contributes to ministerial changes of July 16, 1797y 794-796 Salzburg, Archbishopric of, 753, 781, 811 and «55, 814, 833; destined for Austria by Campo-Formio, 938, 945 Sandomir (or Sandomierz), 265, 353 Sandoz-Rollin, von, Prussian ambas, to France, 884 «5, 9 1 7 ; quoted on Delacroix, 497; bombards Carnot re Rhineland, 505 »26; quoted on war as source of French prosperity, 508; on aid to Poles, 563; his loyalty questioned because of captured Polish letter, 566; his advice, "One signs here, and does not discuss," 645; his fears when Clarke departs for "Vienna," 710; divines existence of Franco-Austrian pourparlers, 7 2 1 ; quoted on French veracity, 826; his fears re Bavaria after Leoben assuaged, 833; on Councils' opinion of Campo-Formio, 943— 944; fears France's "revolutionary frenzies," yet dreads French demobilization, 947; says Dir. has no for. policy, 951 San Marino, J. N . Dumont assimilates Cologne to, 848; Hoche rejects assimilation to, and substitutes Venice, 853 Sardinia, 597, 941 nig Save River, 805 Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, von, see Coburg, Duke of Saxe-Teschen, Duke of, Imp. field marshal, 1792 project to place price on his head, 184 «56; becomes Imp. field marshal, 1794, 184 n$6, 386; princely connections, 386 n i ; replaced by Clerfayt, 1793, 386 Saxon legation at Paris, kept open despite the war, 91; Imp. peace feeler through, 171 Saxony, Electorate of, calls its contingent home, 179s, 394, 662; menaced by Jourdan in summer, 1796, 662; finds peace with France too expensive, 662; withdraws contingent again, 663, 667; seeks Prussian good offices for neutrality, 662; rumor that, is suing for peace, 663; terms of armistice France contemplates for, 663; Jourdan's retreat blasts French hopes to tap wealth of, 664; Dir. authorizes neutralization of, without charge, 664; archive project of peace

1098 for, 664, 667; Treaty of A u g . 5 modified to neutralize, 667; envisioned as member of a North German league, 667; the Habsburgs and defection of, 667-668; envisioned as member of anti-Austrian, antiRussian league, 677; annexation of, by Prussia suggested by Théremin, 678; Frederick the Great coveted, for Hohenzollerns, 678 nig Sayn-Altenkirchen, 351, 352 Schema Sessionis, 413 Schérer, French gen., later war min., 921; ridicules Bonaparte's campaign plans for Italy, 596; succeeded by Bonaparte, 596; as min., is source of concern to Bonaparte, 910 Schickung, "Little Council" of Cologne Senate, 874, 875, 877 Schiller, German poet, influence of his Die Räuber, 34; quoted, 35 Schlabrendorff, von, German expatriate, 64 Schlik (or Schlick), Austrian ambas, to Mayence and to Franconian Circle, question re orthography, 54 m o s ; contemplated as recipient of Theremin's proposals, 453 Schlötter, agent of Bremen, 824 η¡6 Schmerz, Kreuznach wine merchant, Möllendorff sends, to Barthélémy, 266-267; confides Mollendörff's propositions to Bacher, 267; betrays Allied plans, 272-273; French refuse to promise, not to attack withdrawing Prussians, 273; and threat to burn Mannheim, 274 Schmitz, of Kreuznach, spy for Merlin-Th., 274; spies and pretends negotiation with Kalkreuth, 274-275 Schmitz, F. J., Coblenz deputy of the estates, sent to Paris to complain of Bella, 697, 850; originates idea of appealing to Paris against Hoche's regime, 850; converts Aix and Cologne re appeal to Paris, 850; investigates Régie Durbach in Bonn, 850; Hoche rails against, to Bonn-regency deputies, 858; is expelled from Bonn, 858 ni22 Schmitz, J. J., m. of Bonn regency, 857 Schneider, Eulogius, prof, at Bonn, 852 Schönfeld, von, see Frey brothers S c h w a r z e n b a c h , monastery, 426 nói Schweifer, burgomaster of Frankfort-on-theMain, 648 Schweinfurt, 636 Schwetzingen, 931 Sciout (historian), 668 nj8, 946 «65 Secret societies, see Propaganda, revolutionary; Illuminati; Freemasonic lodges Secret treaties, ratification of: question of, under CPS, 338; under Dir., 485 n j Secularization, 318; report that Prussia craves, 163; suggestions for, communicated to Prussia, 163; CPS suggests, for indemnifying Prussia, 316; Delacroix's Plan contemplates, 5 1 1 ; Delacroix wants principle of,

INDEX accepted before a congress meets, 552; is only way to indemnify Orange House, 827; Leoben Treaty renders, unnecessary for Germany, 830; advantages of, to France, 830; France wants Prussia to sponsor, 831; Prussia offers to make joint statement on, 831; Barthélémy divulges that Emperor had never accepted principle of, 832; Clarke hints at Udine about Berlin plan involving, 832; Campo-Formio terms require but fail to mention, 946 Seilern, von, Austrian min. to Elector Palatine, 775 Séjour en France, Un, 363 Self-determination, after World War I, 1 ; proclaimed by Custine, 104 »59, 113 m i 2 ; in Carnot's speech, early 1793, 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 Semet, adms. of Ahrweiler, later of Rheinbach, 895 Sémonville, French diplomat, 940 ni6; early role as agent in Germany, 181 «4/, 195; appointed ambas, to Turkey, given Florence commission, 173; seized by Austria, 181; Thugut sifts papers of, 183; offer to destroy Saint-Priest's correspondence if Thugut returns papers of, 517; his portmanteau surrendered to Bacher, end 7795, 518 Separate peace, system of, described by Hardenberg, 406; would starve France, says CPS, 405; copied from ancient Romans, 707 ni6\ Montebello and Campo-Formio apply, principle to congress for Imp. peace, 781, 937 Sequani, Celtic tribe, 12 Shée, French ex-col., uncle of Clarke, pres. of Intermed. Com., 840; refuses tax relief to Cologne, 848; his, "Sell yourself or be sold," 857; assures separatists of cooperation, 867-868; Hoche urges, to form Rhineland republic, 871; at ceremonial proclamation of Cisrhenish Republic, 901; confirms abolition of feudal dues, 901 Sibuet, proprietor of Ami des Lois, 1014; his arguments against granting Istria and Dalmatia to Austria, 914 Sickingen, Count of, Imp. min. extraord. attached to army of Empire, makes overtures to Rivalz, 165 Sieyes, abbé, m. Conv., CPS, Five Hundred, orthography, 95 ni4\ alleged cofounder of secret society, 95-96; and Gérard de Rayneval, 313; not hostile to Austrian absorption of Bavaria, per se, 312-313; his "plan" for reorganizing Europe, 378-379; and the Théremin negotiation, 453-455; suggests a Hohenzollern king for resurrected Poland, 469; carrier of Brissot's dependent-republic germ, 476; his grand design for a tripartite division of Germany, 476—477; his part in Constitution of Year III, 486; refuses Directorship and for. aff. portfolio, 487; his pun on Reubell, 493; ascribes French ex-

INDEX pansionism to Prussia's wavering loyalty, 537; founder of "Circle of Salm," 794; heads opposition to Campo-Formio ratification, 943 Silk, flight of French, manufacturers to Constance, 692 ny, Dir.'s scheme to effect return of, workers, 692 » 5 Simeon, pres. Central Admin, at Aix, 304305. 309 Simon, Cmr of PEC, Cmr to Mayence, 1 1 8 122, 1 2 3 - 1 2 7 ; conference with Kalkreuth on surrender of Mayence, 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 Simon, jailer of Louis XVII, 447 Simond, m. Conv., 252-253 Smith, Sir William Sidney, British adm., French prisoner, 671 ni2 Soap, 216, 253 Society of Jesus, effect of its suppression upon spread of Aufklärung to Rhineland, 33 nH\ its reëstablishment favored, 97 Soden, Count, contemp. German chronicler, 636 »20, 654 BjO Solingen, 691-692 Sommer, German asst. of Rethel, advocate of a dependent republic, 877; his influence seen in Rethel's desire to abolish Cologne Senate, 877 Sommerring, Dr., prof, at Mayence, says guillotined head still conscious, 107-108 Sorel (historian), 174, 366 ni2, 768 nii2, 886; emended, 197, 3 1 5 >127, 388 «25, 457 »65. 687, 756 7141, 808 n j 7 ; quoted on constant factors in for. policy, 26—27; on battle of Fleurus, 237; his version of Montgaillard negotiation, 223—224, 226; confuses incident with essence, 243; quarrel with Sybel over revolutionization in Germany, 279 n/5_j; identifies CPS of Year III with natural-boundary claim, 436; says employment of Poteratz marks diplomatic transition, 459 »75; his differing versions of Thugut's treason, 519 Soucy, Mme. de, 525; charged to accompany Madame Royale to Vienna, 523 Soulavie, abbé, French min. resident at Geneva and in Valais, his ambition, 190; coaches Robespierre in diplomacy, 190; his philosophy of for. policy, 190-192; uncovers Saint-Priest's correspondence, 460 Spalato, 889 Spencer, Lord, British envoy extraord. to Berlin, 340, 341-342» 353 . Spires, invasion of, in peace time, 93; contributions on, 102; resistance to French oath in, 124; election results in, 127; sends no deputy to Mayence Convention, 130; not annexed by France, 130; congress at, for general peace considered, 1 3 5 Stadholder, see Orange, House of Staël-Holstein, de, Swedish ambas, to France, warns France of effect abroad of its irreligion, 2 1 7 ; charged with mediation for

IO99 Diet, 320; makes contact with von Bernstorff and Barthélémy, 321 Staël-Holstein, Mme. de, wife of preceding, identified, 47; and France's for. aff. portfolio, 1792, 47 nj4, 55; coleader of Circle of Salm, 794, 796 Starhemberg, Austrian min. to The Hague, later ambas, to England, 717 «62; condemns Coburg's no-conquests pledge, 150; his description of Dumouriez, 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 ; ascribes Leoben Treaty to Archduke Charles, 787 n¡2 Steel, protective duty placed on, 691; Dir. seeks to induce Solingen, workers to migrate to France, 691-692; Dir. orders destruction of, factories producing arms in conquered territory, 691 «4; prewar France a large, importer, 692 «7 Stein, Austrian gen., 524 «59 Stein, von, Prussian chargé d'affaires at Mayence, his part in Brunswick's manifesto, 68-69; on Custine's capture of Mayence, 1 0 1 ; deputed to castigate Pape, 137 Stephani, pseud., French secret agent, 681, 686 Strabo, 5, 9 ni5 Strasburg, claimed by Louis XIV, 22; deplores abrogation of feudal laws, 40; propaganda center for Rhineland, 7 1 , 94, 162; value of assignats in, 283; Moreau crosses Rhine at, 1796, 589; grudges grant to Baden of freedom of Rhine, 642 nói; reason for its past special privileges on Rhine, 693; jealous of carrying trade of other riverains, 818 »5 Struensee, Prussian finance min., 3 1 3 Stuttgart, 279, 775 Styria, 749, 754 Subsidy treaty, Anglo-Austrian, 409 Subsidy treaty, Anglo-Dutch-Prussian, of The Hague, its origin, 244 »400; Frederick William immediately regrets, 320; defeat of Austrians in 1794 ascribed to Pmssian breach of, 236; cause of breach of, rests in Polish revolution, 244; to expire Dec. 1, 1794, 267; denounced Oct. 17, 1794, 273, 320 »52 Subsidy treaty, Anglo-Hesse-Casseler, 383384 Suet, 216 Sully, chief min. of Henry IV, his plan for a new Europe, 949 and n87 "Summons to . . . ," 71 Swabia, necessities from, reach Alsace via Switzerland, 332 M17·, Poteratz and a republic in, 568—581; armistices for, guarantee old constitutions, 584; Dir. wants no peace with, before peace with Austria, 588; Moreau grants "peace" to two states of, despite Dir., 588; signs armistice with Moreau, 591-592; Circle of, receives extrarigorous treatment, 593; French exact more food from, than they can use, 652-

ΙΙΟΟ 653; revolts in, against excesses of Moreau's retreating army, 653 Sweden, Diet requests mediation of, 269; Poteratz suggests mediation of Denmark and, 5 5 1 ; as m. of anti-Austrian, antiRussian league contemplated by France, late 1796, 677 Sweitzer, French agent in Switzerland, warns France of effect abroad of its irréligion, 217 Swiss mediation, suggested by Habsburgs to Bacher, 213 Syagrius, gov. of Roman Gaul, 16 Sybel, von (historian), emended, 173 n/77, 182 t¡4j, 183, 231, 269, 591 »65, 628 r>27; his version of Montgaillard negotiation, 223, 226; his quarrel with Sorel over revolutionization in Germany, 279 n i ^ y , not quite satisfied Carletti held no mandate, 375; says lust, not fear, produced Leoben, 749 "5 Syrach, brochure, 359 Table money, 545 Tacitus, on origin of certain tribes of Gaul, 14 Tagliamento River, 730, 748 Tainturier, Judge, French army capt., identified, 430; winner of a first prize in essay contest, 430 Talleyrand-Périgord, ex-Bishop of Autun, m. Constituante, envoy to London, exile, for. min., 48; see England; connected with Robin overture, 209; as for. min. of Dir., works tricks to impose his views, 492; succeeds Delacroix, 768 nui, 796; a leading member Circle of Salm, 794, 796; low opinion of, held by Reubell and Barras, 796 nio8\ his lameness, 794 »97, 1021; personal description of, 796 n/05; his recommendations to Dir. after seeing Baptiste, 8 1 1 - 8 1 2 ; his recommendations acceptable to Carnot and Barthélémy, 812; unacceptable to Reubell, who covets Rhineland, 812; after Fructidor, tells Bonaparte to exact Rhine and drive Austria out of Italy, 884; tries to lure Prussia into alliance by proffering Hanover, 894; his "saber-bedecked" presentation of Esséid Ali, 914; likens Campo-Formio to impermanent mil. capitulations of Musselmen, 948; his memoirs guarded by De Bacourt, 1020 Tallien, Rp, m. CPS, Five Hundred, 272, 494 Tallow, 216 Tapponnier, French gen., 654 Tarvis, 730 Tauenzien, von, Prussian diplomat, his part in Coburg's no-conquests manifesto, 148; yields Cracow and Sandomir to Austria, 531 Tauzenberg, Rhinelander republican, destroys old A i x memorial and plants tree of liberty, 140 Tell, William, Swiss patriot, 186 n66 Temporary Commission of the Arts, 299

INDEX Ternant, de, French envoy to German princes, 41 Teutones, German tribe, 11 Theremin, Prussian-born French agent, diplomat, his biograph, 430; winner of a first prize in essay contest, 430; his propositions to Degelmann, 453; canonizes Sieyes and Boissy, 454; his overtures official, 454; sends Hilscher to Degelmann with CPS armisticeoffer, 455; his memoir on Prussian expansion, 622—623; and on Imp. reorganization, 624-625; suggests Prussia's acquisition of Saxony, 678 Thermidor, July 27, 1794, its cause, according to Mathiez, 255; personal antagonisms and fears as its cause, 255-256; Carnot's part in, 256, 490 »25; Conv. recovers its power with, 256-257 Thibaudeau, m. Conv., Five Hundred, 522 Thirty Years' War, 21, 22 Thouvenot, French gen., émigré, 229 Three Bishoprics, see Metz; Toul; Verdun Three Committees, 257 Three Legations, 749; Talleyrand holds out hope for, to Baptiste, 810; queried what sacrifices Austria would make for, 813 Thugut, Baron of, Austrian director-gen. of for. aff., min. mid-1794: his appointment, 88; Bonaparte's appraisal of, 88 «275; orders Coburg to betray Dumouriez and seize French territory, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ; sifts Sémonville's papers, 183; denies Emperor intended to evacuate Belgium, 240-241; suspects Prussia of betraying Allied plans, 272 «J14; desires peace with France, early 7795, 312 n j i regards Republic as too ephemeral to make treaties with, 363; Carletti deal not authorized by, 3 7 1 ; his treason, 459-460; acquaintance with Poteratz in the 1780's, 460; his treason uncovered, 1792, 460; CPS sends Poteratz to, 459; rids himself of Poteratz by a ruse, 461—462; rebuffs Poteratz on the latter's return to Vienna, 518; hypothesis concerning Thugut's treason, 520; commissions Gallo to facilitate peace at Basel, 598; honors his word only if its breach would be known, 671 nio; his reaction to Malmesbury's propositions re Belgium, 672; appeals for Russian aid, 672; his distress at Clarke's mission, 706; spars for time before and after Judenburg agreement, 733-734; urges Emperor to flee to Hungary, 739; resigns in protest against Leoben Treaty, but remains, 759; Emperor overrides, and ratifies Treaty, 759; deviates from Prelims., and why, 778 «2; Gallo assumes, intends to abandon Prelims., 778 n2; desires to prolong negotiations until French moderates win, 793; keeps his head despite Baptiste's alarm, 8 1 5 - 8 1 6 ; loses confidence when extent of Fructidorian coup d'état revealed, 890; advises ratification of

INDEX Campo-Formio, but doubts permanence, 948-949 Tils, German bailiff of Hardt, cashiered by Intermed. Com., 896; arrested by order of Geich, 896 Times, London, 621 Toul, 610; France occupies, 1552, 21; cession to France of, 1648, 22 Tourcoing, 236 Tourzel, Mme. de, former governess of Louis XVI's children, 453, 523 Trauttmansdorff-Weinsberg, von und zu, Austria's Belgian chancellor, his conference with Montgaillard, 223, 224-225; quoted on Montgaillard and Barère, 225 Treaties of the French Crown: Merlin-D., 1790, avers French people not bound by, 4 1 ; Conv. abolishes all, made with nowenemy states, March 1 , 1793, 5 1 1 «54 Treaty of, Verdun, 843, 6; Mersen, 870, 6; Xanten, 1614, 199 ni34; Münster, 1648, 22, 39; Westphalia (Treaties of), 1648, 22, 39, 63 B/52, 3 1 8 ; Pyrenees, 7659, 23; Nijmwegen, 1678, 22, and 1716, 253, 8 1 7 ; Passarowitz, 1718, 38; Versailles, 1756, 52, 81, 402; Sistova, 1791, 39; Feb. 7, /792, 54, 58; Jan. 23, 1793, 88, 265; The Hague, April 19, 1794, 244; Jan. 3, 1795, 265; Basel, April 5, 1795, see under Basel, Franco-Prussian Treaty of; The Hague, May 16, 179$, 757 and «46; May 20, 1795, 409 «40; Basel, July 23, 1795, see under Basel, Franco-Spanish Treaty of; Basel, Aug. 28, 1795, see under Basel, FrancoHesse-Casseler Treaty of; Sept. 28, 1795, 409 Π40·, June 24, 1796, 822; Berlin, Aug. 5, 1796, see under Berlin, Treaty of; Paris, Aug. 7, 1796, 632-633; Paris, Aug. 22, 1796, 641-645; Leoben, April 18, 1797, see under Leoben, Preliminaries of, also under Montebello, Convention of; CampoFormio, Oct. 1 7 , 1797, see under CampoFormio, Treaty of, also under Montebello,· Convention of, and Udine-Passariano Conferences Treilhard, m. Conv., CPS, negotiator, 430 »75, 450 Trenck von Tonder, Neuwieder newspaper publisher, 1008 n8 Treskow, Prussian trader, 818 Treveri, tribe of Gaul, 1 2 , 1 3 , 14 Trêves, 765, 782; northern "alter ego" of Rome, 1 5 ; falls to Ripuarian Franks, 1 5 16; occupied by Jourdan, Aug. 1794, 284; its cultural treasures transferred to Paris, 300; one of the six districts under the Intermed. Com., 842; Cisrhenish Republic not proclaimed in, 900 Trêves, Elector of, his Bourbon connections, 37 «22; urges crushing Revolution, 37; harbors émigrés, 43, 45, 48-49; yields to French and Imp. pressure, 5 1 ; adopts Imp.

IIOI rules of conduct, 52; lists French agents in Germany, 195; invalidates French auctions, 287-288; reportedly resists Erthal re secularization, 688-689 Trevor, English min. to Turin, quoted on Carnot, 489 »20; on Barras, 494; believes Clarke's mission merely a blind, 706 ni2 Triboci, German tribe, 12, 13 Trieste, 8 1 1 »55; threats by Clarke through Zwanziger to destroy, 683; also, by Carnot and Dir., through Bonaparte and Charruelle, 683-684; Bonaparte delays evacuation of, after Leoben, 776; is looted by French, 9 1 3 Triple Alliance of Austria, Russia, England, Sept. 28, 1795, an extension of AngloAustrian alliance of May 20, 179;, 409 «40; its auxiliaries, 5 1 4 Truguet, French marine min., 795—796; directs Hoche to bring to Paris all the money he can, 870 »776 Tuncq, French gen., commander of Hüningen, requisitions tree trunks of Baden, 644 «64; connected with Jägerschmidt, 654 »_;/; his exactions on right bank, 654; is ordered arraigned, 654, 655 Turgot, finance min. of Louis XVI, 497 Turkey, France envisions, as m. of antiAustrian, anti-Russian league, 677; its ambas, fêted by Dir., 9 1 4 - 9 1 5 Tuscany, 372, 749 Two Thirds, Law of the, 505; nauseates French people, 436; produces riot of 1 3 vendémiaire, III, 462-463, 485; its effect undone by "second third," 783 Tyrol, 749; Dir. charges Comeyras to fan revolt in, 573; revolt against Bonaparte threatens in, 7 3 1 ; proclamations of Gens. Bonaparte and Joubert in, 740-741; separatists appear in, 7 4 1 ; evacuation of, and Leoben Treaty, 754-755; no contributions in, by Bonaparte, 770-771 Ubii, German tribe, harass Swabians, 1 3 ; in Rhineland, 1 4 ; Cologne Senate assimilates itself to Senate of, 300 niiyy 301 η 128, 548, 8 4 8 Uckerath, 610 Udine-Passariano Conferences, conferences transferred from Montebello to Udine, 793; arrival of Merveldt, Gallo, Degelmann, 834-835; Bonaparte's pomp at Passariano, 835; Bonaparte and Clarke protest naming of Berne delegates, 835; Bonaparte assumes precedence, 836; Bonaparte and Clarke set an Oct. ι limit, 836; Bonaparte expands meaning of "constitutional frontiers," 885; Austrians counter with demand for much of Italy, 885; Bonaparte offers Venice and the Adige for expanded "constitutional frontiers," 885-886; expansion of "constitutional frontiers" traceable to Delacroix,

1102 886; Austrians protest revolutionization of Venice, 887, 888; Bonaparte protests Austria's occupation of Bocche di Cattaro, 887, 889 »29; Merveldt bears to Vienna a Roer— Nahe-frontier proposition, 890; Dir., Sept. 15, claims Rhineland and islands, concedes Istria and Dalmatia, 908; Dir. unearths blackmail scheme, 909; Bonaparte wants to satisfy Austria, but Dir. is bellicose, 909910; Dir. capitulates to Bonaparte, 910-912; Dir's. belated fear of Austrian maritime expansion, 9 1 2 - 9 1 4 ; Fructidor brings Cobenzl to Udine, 890-891, 908; arguments over Oct. 1 limit, troops in Empire, Imp. congress, 916-918; Prussian gain is Cobenzl's deterrent to left-bank change, 918; Cobenzl wants Venice and Legations, so asks more, 919; question of surrender of Mayence, 919; Austrians reduce demands to Venice and Legations, 919; Bonaparte confers with someone from Paris, with controversial results, 920, 923-925; Bottot's arrival and purposes, 920-921; Dir.'s Sept. 29 ultimatum specifies islands wanted, 921; Bonaparte's attitude hardens on Oct. 3 — the day Bottot arrives, 924; relationship of Lille rupture to Udine negotiations, 924— 925; Bonaparte restricts Austria to the Adige and Venice, alleging Polish partitions, 925; "constitutional frontiers" demand of Sept. 6 is thrice increased, 926, 927; Oct. 7, Cobenzl offers not to resist France's acquisition of entire left bank in return for Mincio frontier and Legations, 927; Bonaparte refuses, 927; Oct. 7 treaty project is sent to Vienna, 928-929; before Vienna can reply, war almost results over fresh demands re left bank and islands, 929-930; Bonaparte makes vain new demands, and presents "declaration" in drunken rage, 930; the "alternative," 930; Austrians discontinue conferences, though Bonaparte yields on "alternative" and withdraws "declaration," 930; Bonaparte's teaservice tale, 930-932; Emperor's approval of Oct. 7 project arrives, 932; Bonaparte pretends reluctance to sign treaty, 932-933; Austrians rush to Passariano to sign, 9 3 3 934; treaty is dated fictitiously from Campo-Formio, 934; receipt the following day of contrary instructions, 934 Ulm, 574, 580, 811 «55, 939 Upper Palatinate, 814 Valence, French gen., his peace proposal to Brunswick, 86; see Kellermann Valmy, cannonade of, its military insignificance, 77, 78-79; condition of Prussian army following, 82-83; explanations of Prussian retreat following, 78, 79-84 Vangiones, German tribe, 12, 13

INDEX Varennes, flight to, its effect upon the emigration, 43; details of the, 451 n j j Varus, Roman gen., 9, 14 Vauban, de, mil. engineer of Louis X I V , believes left bank "suits France," 23 Vaughn, m. House of Commons, flees England because of peace effort, 228 »299; suggests to Robespierre re-creation of Lotharingia, 228 R299 Vendémiaire, Oct. 5, 1795, 765; product of Law of the T w o Thirds, 462-463, 485 Venedey, J. (historian), deëmphasizes role of Illuminati in Custine's Rhineland conquest, 97; condemns Gymnich, 1 0 1 ; avers France promoted Cisrhenish movement to influence Udine parleys, 863-864 Venedey, Michael, Rhinelander republican, his biograph, 97 «2/; his bureau of correspondence, 867 Venice, First CPS sends Noël to, 167, 172; Catherine promises Austria some of, 265 «65; revolt against Bonaparte brewing in, April, 7797, 7 3 1 ; possibility seen of early Franco-Austrian peace at expense of, 731 η 12-, in Leoben negotiations, 748-750; Talleyrand holds out hope for Legations and, to Baptiste, 810; Bonaparte declares war on, 888; Bonaparte forces oligarchy of Venice to abdicate, 888; Bonaparte's treaty with defunct oligarchy of, permits French occupation, 888; Terraferma, 753; east of Oglio promised to Austria at Leoben, 754; east of Adige, at Montebello, 781; Bonaparte's threats and inducements re, to silence congress demand, 791-792; Dir. seeks Austria's renunciation of, 814; Berthier and Landrieux plot revolutionization of, 887 Venloo, 363 B/07, 938 Verbrüderungsfeier, 901 Verdun, 610; Treaty of, 843, 6; France occupies, 1552, 2 1 ; cession, to France of, 1648, 2 2 - 2 3 ; siege and capture of, by Allies, /792, 75; the Virgins of, 75-76; surrendered to France, 84 Vergennes, for. min. of Louis XVI, 480; not averse to expansion, but pacifist in action, 23-24; ends Thugut's "information service," 460 Vergniaud, m. Legis. Assem., Conv., 53 Verninac, French envoy extraord. to Turkey, seeks Turkish aid to resurrect Poland, 562 Verona, 449 «22, 576 »49, 887-888 Vicenza, 716 Vienna, threats to revolutionize, 683; attitude of, toward siege by Bonaparte, 7 3 6 - 7 3 7 ; rumors in, re conditions in France in summer, 7797, 806 Villars, French diplomat, 60 Vincent, von, Austrian adj. gen., negotiator, 715—716; charged to discuss armistice with Clarke, 712; his instructions re Austria's

INDEX conditions for an armistice, 7 1 2 - 7 1 3 ; designated to replace Gallo at Leoben, 748 Virgins of Verdun, 75-76 Vivenot, von (historian), 271-272, 278, 332, 940 ηι6·, avers Prussia promoted Düsseldorf and Mannheim treasons, 391; denies Pichegru's treason responsible for Austria's Handschuhsheim victory, 396 Vivignis, Dr. de, pres. of Aix Club, 141; a Freemason, 143; his flight, 143 Voltaire, French philosopher, his influence on Germany, 34 Vossen, Dr. jur., m. Central Admin, at Aix, later of Bonn regency: Aix Mason aiding French retreat, 1793, 143, 304, 850 n8g\ Aix deputes Cromm and, to negotiate with French, 1794, 304; see Bouget Waitz von Eschen, von, Hesse-Casseler min. of state, negotiates treaty with France, 381— 385; question of his gift for signing, 385 »20; Rivalz to be very obliging to, 559; willing to join Prussia and Saxony to force peace on Austria, 677 Waldeck, Prince of, Austrian quartermaster gen. (chief of staff) of Army of Flanders, 237; orders retreat after victory at Fleurus, 237-238; halts retreat at Meuse, 238; inquires if Emperor wants to abandon Belgium, 239; his conduct rationalized, 241; tries to explain his retreat, 240; cashiered, 240 11377 Walloons, people of s. Belgium and n. France, 10 Walter (historian), 50 War of the First Coalition, international situation on eve of, 38; Bischoffswerder arranges Austro-Prussian concert, 38-39; feudal-enclave problem as source of, 39-42; émigré problem as source of, 43-53; Louis XVI's declaration of war first hostile act of, 61-62; propaganda phase of, begun, 7 1 ; first results of, disastrous to French, 74; Valmy the turning point in, 79; Empire joins, 92, 143; enigmatic position of Russia in, 92 »299; see Peace, indefinite postponement of, seen War of the League of Augsburg, 42 Warsaw, 236 η345 Wartensleben, von, Austrian gen., and the Palatine "negotiators," 353 «49; defeated by Jourdan at Friedberg, 613-614; Archduke Charles and, rout Jourdan, 646 Wasserfall, German asst. of Rethel, advocate of a dependent republic, 877; his influence seen in RethePs desire to abolish Cologne Senate, 877 Wattignies, 180 Weckbecker, former privy councillor of Electoral Trêves, his Gegenaufruf, 870 >1/7/; Geich forbids circulation of the Gegenaufruf in Rheinbach, 896

1103 Wedekind, Dr., prof, at Mayence, a Freemason, 97; and Custine's occupation of Mayence, 101 η43; joins the Mayence Club, 106; his biograph, 107; argues for deposing old sovereigns, 128; escapes from Mayence, 131 Werden, 774 Werder, Prussian finance min., 313 Wesel, CPS refuses to promise not to attack, 328; conditional agreement on, reached, 329; and revoked, 331; Prussia offers trade via, 332; CPS again promises not to attack, 334; festive poem for, Theatre after Basel, 359 n8j; Prussian recruits allowed to cross France to, 735; Dir. seeks to annex, 893894 Westergaard (historian), quoted, 662 and m Westermann, agent of PEC, 79 Westphalia, Peace of, its effect upon FrancoImp. balance of power, 22; dominates Poteratz' thinking in his negotiations with Austria, 551-552; after Aug. 5 Treaty, Carnot talks of superseding, 623 Wetzlar, 610, 871, 873 Whipping-post monuments, at Aix-la-Chapelle, 140; at Cologne, 899 "Who cares if the German lions tear . . . ? " 368 «20; see also «25 " W h o dares speak of peace?" see Barère (Jan. 22, 1794 speech) Wickham, British chargé d'affaires, later min. to Switzerland, 555, 670; approaches Barthélémy, but avoids seeming to recognize Republic, 556, 557-558; his overture snags technically on French refusal to negotiate re Belgium, 558, 669 Wilhelmsbader Conferences, 270—271 Williams, English pastor, inventor of Theophilanthropy, 496 Wilson, Woodrow, American prof., pres., 1 Wimmer, German army contractor, 388 «25 Wimpffen, Franz von, French gen., brother of Georges Félix, abducts assassins of Palatine "patriots," 161; returns them, 161 Wimpffen, Georges Félix de, French gen., brother of Franz, 73 nzoi Winckelmann, von, Cologne's envoy to Diet, 97 Winckelmann, von, mayor of Worms, 133 Windeck, sec. of Bonn regency, 857, 858 Winter of 1794-9259 Wipper (or Wupper) River, 351, 691 Wiscowich, Barras' hunting companion, 768 Wissembourg (or Weissenburg), 1043; value of assignats in, 283 Wissembourg Lines, 210 M87, 500 Wöllwarth, von, Württemberger min., Barthélémy disclaims authority to treat for peace with Abel and, 589-590; Abel and, conclude armistice with Reynier, for Moreau, 590 Worms, 765, 782; invasion of, in peace time,

1104 93; contributions levied on, 102; resistance to French oath in, 124; election results in, 127; annexed by France, 130 Woronzow, Russian ambas, to London, 760 Woyczynsky, Polish patriot, 566 njg Wurmser, Austrian gen., field marshal Dec. 1795: driven from Alsace, 89; Frederick William's pleasure at defeat of, 89 n2#2; his aide tells Custine of Emperor's desire for peace, 169; forbidden to negotiate, 1 7 1 ; invades Alsace, 176; a born Alsatian, asks Alsatians to join him, 180 njo; given command of part of Clerfayt's army, 388; Thugut orders, to requisition supplies in Palatinate, 390—391; warned against desertion of Württembergers or Swabians, 405; bombards Mannheim, 414; inaugurates period of victory for Austria, Oct. 1795, 413, 502; besieged in Mantua, 704 Württemberg, 5 1 1 - 5 1 2 ; its one month's armistice, 404; its armistice annulled, 404-405; its separate-peace negotiation meets with stony silence, 405, 587-588; new policy toward, and other small German states, 405406; Dir. anticipates revolutionization of, 573; endorses plan of separate peace for four southwestern circles, 588; urges peace on Emperor, 589; see Abel; its Armistice of July 17, 1796, with France, 590, 591-592; Abel and Wöllwarth negotiate Treaty of Aug. 7, 631-633; harshness of the terms, 633; dunned after French retreat, 660; its secret convention of Oct. 28, 1796 with France, 660-662 Württemberg, "Prince" of, 654 Würzburg, 635-636, 664 York, Duke of, his defeat at Tourcoing, 236; his views on Austria's flight from Belgium, 239-240 Ysabeau, of Paris Commune, 183-184 Ysenburg, Prince of, 406 Yssel (Old and N e w ) River, 351 Zante, 913, 921

INDEX Zara, 889 Zastrow, von, Frederick William's aide-decamp, 134 Zebro, Col. de, 579 Zeissberg, von (historian), his version of Montgaillard negotiation, 224, 226, 227, 228 Zengg, 889 Zevenaar, 616 Zinzendorf, Karl von, Austrian privy councillor, interior min., manager audit office, 685 «40, 738 Zwanziger, deputy of Franconian Circle, asks Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen to protect Franconia, and negotiates for its neutrality, 399 ngi; Rhodius and, negotiate contributions convention with France, 638; background of mission of, to Vienna, 681; Rhodius and, secretly in French service, 681; Rhodius and, at Paris to negotiate peace for Franconia, 681; is sent secredy to Vienna by Carnot and Clarke, 682; ordered to present Bases conceived in victory, 682-683; o r " dered to threaten revolutionization, and destruction of Trieste, 683; his terms rejected, but he is permitted to remain, 683; suspected of connection with Prussia, 684; influence of Malmesbury's presence at Paris on treatment of, and Charruelle, 683, 685; see Charruelle; Carnot makes light to Sandoz of, affair, 683; Clarke's instructions of April 22, 1797 parallel Bases of, 757 Zweibrücken: city of, claimed by Louis X I V , 22; Duchy of, treated as neutral in 7792, 161; see Bergzabern; occupied by France, and "Compulsory Liberty Decree" promulgated in, 162; Minister Esebeck of, imprisoned, 162; Marandet indicates desire for part of, 377; one of six districts under Intermed. Com., 842 Zweibrücken, Duke of, 32, 735; tolerates democratic newspaper, 161; escapes, 162; offers services to France, 163; his meeting with a French officer, Recum, and Oberndorfer, 390; asks permission to collect his Rhineland revenues, 549-550