The Geopolitics of Pope Francis (Annua Nuntia Lovaniensia) 9789042940659, 9789042940680, 9042940654

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The Geopolitics of Pope Francis

Edited by

Jan De Volder

PEETERS

THE GEOPOLITICS OF POPE FRANCIS

ANNUA NUNTIA LOVANIENSIA

LXXVII

The Geopolitics of Pope Francis

Edited by

Jan De Volder

PEETERS LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT

2019

Cover illustration: Pope Francis addresses the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 󰀂󰀅 September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 © Belga A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publisher © Uitgeverij Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 󰀁󰀅󰀃, B-󰀃󰀀󰀀󰀀 Leuven (Belgium) ISBN 󰀉󰀇󰀈-󰀉󰀀-󰀄󰀂󰀉-󰀄󰀀󰀆󰀅-󰀉 eISBN 󰀉󰀇󰀈-󰀉󰀀-󰀄󰀂󰀉-󰀄󰀀󰀆󰀈-󰀀 D/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀆󰀀󰀂/󰀁󰀀󰀈

Contents Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Jan De Volder Francis’s Ideosyncratic Approach to Vatican Geopolitics: An Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

󰀁

Sandra Arenas Latin America in Francis’s Geopolitical Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . .

󰀂󰀅

Massimo Faggioli The Geopolitics of Pope Francis and the USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

󰀄󰀇

Jan De Volder Pope Francis’s Views on the Rebirth of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

󰀆󰀁

Stefano Picciaredda Pope Francis and Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

󰀈󰀇

Agostino Giovagnoli China and the Geopolitics of Pope Francis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀁󰀀󰀅 Terrence Merrigan Between Doctrine and Discernment: Pope Francis on Interreligious Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀁󰀂󰀇 Marco Impagliazzo Pope Francis and Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

󰀁󰀅󰀁

Brandon Gallaher The Pure Signifier of Power: Remembering, Repeating and Working through the Significance of the Papacy and Pope Francis for Eastern Orthodoxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀁󰀆󰀉 Johan Verstraeten It Is Better to Build Bridges Than to Build Walls: Pope Francis on Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀁󰀉󰀉

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CONTENTS

Jan Wouters and Giuliana Rotola Pope Francis’s Interactions with the United Nations and Other International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀂󰀀󰀉 Index of Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀂󰀃󰀃 Index of Toponyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀂󰀃󰀉 List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 󰀂󰀄󰀃

Acknowledgements This collection of articles is mainly the result of a symposium on the “Geopolitics of Pope Francis,” which was organized on 󰀄-󰀅 December 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of the KU Leuven, with an introductory public lecture by Antonio Spadaro, S.J., “Francis: A Pope for the Era of Globalization.” After my general introduction, which also elaborates some ideas of Spadaro’s Louvain lecture, we first proceed geographically: while Sandra Arenas (Pontifical Catholic University of Chile) discusses Pope Francis’s approach to his native Latin-America, Massimo Faggioli (Villanova University), analyzes the difficult relationship between the United States of America and the Vatican of Pope Francis. Following my analysis of the Pope’s thoughts on Europe (especially the European Union, but not only), Stefano Picciaredda (University of Foggia) discusses Pope Francis’s African politics. Agostino Giovagnoli (Catholic University of Milan) introduces us to the backgrounds and the dynamics of the negotiations between the Holy See and the Popular Republic of China, which led to the historic 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 ‘Provisional Agreement’. In the second part of this volume, we follow a more thematic approach. We have three reflections on the ecumenical and interfaith dialogue within the Geopolitics of Pope Francis. Terrence Merrigan (KU Leuven) reflects on the (lack of) progress of theological thinking on the dialogue with non-Christian faiths. Marco Impagliazzo (Roma III) examines Francis’s way of building relationships with the multi-faceted Muslim world. The volume then offers Brandon Gallaher’s (University of Exeter) contribution about how the relationship with Rome plays into the intra-orthodox relationship between the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Moscow. We then have a reflection, by Johan Verstraeten (KU Leuven), on Pope Francis’s ideas on war and peace in the light of the evolution of Catholic thinking since the Second Vatican Council. An overview of the Holy See’s particular role in the United Nations and other International organizations and an analysis of some particularities of this pontificate, by Jan Wouters and Giuliana Rotola (KU Leuven), conclude our collection. The Symposium and this publication are an initiative of the Cusanus Chair “Religion, Conflict and Peace” at the Faculty of Theology and

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Religious Studies of the KU Leuven. I thank all the authors for their contributions and Fr. Antonio Spadaro, S.J. for his inspiring lecture. My gratitude goes to John Steffen, Anne Hodgkinson, Joseph Grabau, Luca Van Cleempoel and Rita Corstjens for their editing work. Finally, I thank my co-chairholder, Mathijs Lamberigts, and Dean Johan De Tavernier for the Faculty’s support, Yvan Deckers of the Cusanus Foundation, Paul Peeters of the eponymous Publishing House, and colleagues Anthony Dupont and Leo Kenis, editors of the series “Annua Nuntia Lovaniensia,” without whom this publication would not have been possible. Jan De Volder, Leuven, 󰀁󰀅 September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉

Francis’s Idiosyncratic Approach to Vatican Geopolitics An Introduction Jan De Volder “The pope! How many divisions has he got?” Stalin’s presumed selfconceited question is a classic one when the Catholic Church’s impact on international affairs is discussed.󰀁 Ridiculed by many, mythologized by others, the influence of the Church and its Roman center in world politics is a subject worthy of scholarly analysis. Indeed, almost one century after the Lateran Treaty (󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀉), which guaranteed the Vatican’s sovereignty and the international status of the Holy See, the Catholic Church remains a unique subject on the international stage.󰀂 It is not only the oldest and, with 󰀁.󰀃 billion Catholics around the globe, the largest international institution, it is the only established religion with both a worldwide capillary network and a well-defined centralized authority structure. Moreover, its Roman center enjoys the privileges both of national sovereignty (Vatican City) and of recognized supranational status (Holy See). In modern times, the Roman Catholic Church may have lost much of its influence because of the secularization of traditionally Catholic nations, it may be regarded by liberal-secular thinkers and opinion makers as outdated and old-fashioned, and its leadership in its Roman center and its episcopates may face strong internal and external criticisms, yet the pope nevertheless continues to represent a unique moral reference for hundreds of millions of human beings and, therefore, owing to its centuries-old tradition, a beacon of 󰀁

 Moreover, it’s probably a myth, due to Western anti-communist propaganda. Cf. Giorgio Fabre, “Vaticano e URSS dopo la prima guerra mondiale,” in id. and Karen Venturini (eds.), La Chiesa tra restaurazione e modernità (󰀁󰀈󰀁󰀅-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀁󰀇󰀁-󰀂󰀁󰀄. 󰀂  See classic works like Hyginus Eugene Cardinale, The Holy See and the International Order (Toronto: McMillan of Canada, 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀆). For recent updates, see, among others, Timothy A. Barnes, “Sovereignty, Supranationalism, and Soft Power: The Holy See in International Relations,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 󰀁󰀅, no. 󰀄 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀆-󰀂󰀀; Jodok Troy, “The Catholic Church and International Relations,” Oxford Handbooks Online (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆); Mariano Barbato, “A State, a Diplomat, and a Transnational Church: The Multi-layered Actorness of the Holy See,” Perspectives: Review of Central European Affairs 󰀂󰀁, no. 󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀂󰀇-󰀄󰀈.

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stability in a rapidly changing and uncertain world. Moreover, even if the Catholic Church, since the Second Vatican Council, has definitely taken its distance from the Constantinian ideal of a “Christian empire,” it is not renouncing the role of global actor, a “unique international,” using its multilayered legal tools, even in these times of a pope called Francis.󰀃 Insight into Jorge Bergoglio’s approach to world politics and an analysis of its geopolitical influence are all the timelier, since Francis – who has been pope for over six and a half years as this is being written – represents an idiosyncratic and non-conventional voice on the world stage. Such an analysis also shifts from the usual framing of Church analysts in the media who use purely political and journalistic categories such as left vs. right, progressive vs. conservative, liberal vs. traditional, and modern vs. antimodern. Such categories were never very appropriate when analyzing a pope’s vision and approach to world affairs, and especially not in the case of an authentic and hard-to-define character such as Jorge Mario Bergoglio, who is both a conservative and a revolutionary, a kind and easygoing man and yet not easy to decipher, a humble but also authoritative leader. His surprise election in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 and his immediate unconventional choices – from his unprecedented choice of “Francis” as his name, to his simple and down-to-earth language and his decision not to live in the apostolic palace and to free himself of other paraphernalia of a worldly prince, which had come to surround the papacy over the centuries – have concentrated the world’s attention on him, making him a world leader speaking to the hearts and minds of many people, and attracting a great deal of media attention. Especially in the first years, it made him widely popular, even outside the Catholic Church. As the years pass, the difficulty of conceptualizing and introducing Vatican and Church reforms (desired by some, abhorred by others), the continuation of scandals – especially in the sphere of sexual abuse – and the growing opposition within the Church to his papacy, this widespread popularity has gradually faded away. Yet, Pope Francis is still a very singular personality, who points more often at inner conversion than at administrative reform, and he continues with his idiosyncratic approach, compared to his immediate predecessors, even in the (geo-)political realm. This article – which is also an introduction to the volume on the “Geopolitics of Pope Francis” – without claiming to be exhaustive and definitive on a still unfolding story, aims to highlight and summarize some aspects of this particularity. 󰀃

 See Jan Wouters and Giuliana Rotola, “Pope Francis’s Interactions with the United Nations and Other International Organizations,” in this volume, 󰀂󰀀󰀉-󰀂󰀃󰀁.

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I. An “Outspoken” Pope Pope Francis uses a simple, human, and rather frank language, not only when he meets the faithful or when he is in his pastoral role, but also (and even) when he talks about sensitive political and diplomatic issues. This is a novelty in the tradition of the modern papacy, where communication is traditionally built on strictly prepared and revised homilies and speeches; interviews used to be rarely given, and when they were, they were usually strictly organized and controlled, both before and after taking place. Francis has a freer approach with the media than any of his predecessors, giving lengthy interviews to both confidants, such as his fellow Jesuit Father Antonio Spadaro,󰀄 and secular journalists and researchers such as Eugenio Scalfari and Dominique Wolton. Francis indulges in rather free conversations with the press during the inflight press conferences when he travels. This is not just a shift for the papal communication machine, but also a change of style for Bergoglio himself, who as archbishop of Buenos Aires used to shy away from interviews and media exposure. Sometimes this outspokenness comes at a cost. “A person who thinks only about building walls, not bridges, is not a Christian. This is not in the Gospel,” he famously said in early 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 during his flight back to Rome from Mexico, hinting at the then Republican presidential hopeful, Donald Trump, who was to be elected president of the United States some months later.󰀅 Such statements, which could be considered imprudent slips of the tongue and a consequence of his choice to have quite free and frank, unprepared conversations with journalists, have forced his coworkers more than once to later adjust his answers and statements. This does not mean, however, that Francis is a naïve person who does not grasp the workings of today’s media. On the contrary, he understands it all too well. He perfectly understands that powerful gestures – like celebrating the Eucharist on the US-Mexican border, taking refugees stranded in Lesbos along with him on his papal flight, kneeling down at the feet of political leaders to beg them for peace – speak more than a thousand 󰀄

 His 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 interview was published simultaneously in various Jesuit publications across the globe, among them America in the US. https://www.americamagazine.org/ faith/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/󰀀󰀉/󰀃󰀀/big-heart-open-god-interview-pope-francis. 󰀅  Pope Francis on his flight from Mexico back to Rome, February 󰀁󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=v󰀉WqGT󰀄󰀂jy󰀀; http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/february/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀂󰀁󰀇_messico-conferenzastampa.html.

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words. And in his declarations, he has chosen to engage in an open conversation with journalists, deliberately taking the risk, but avoiding generally any “langue de bois.” This does not imply that he does not understand the art of avoiding difficult questions or shrewdly dodging them. But Pope Bergoglio does not shrink from making himself vulnerable because of his outspokenness. Pope Francis considers this to be part of parrhesia, that kind of “bold speech” that often characterizes Jesus’s words or the apostles’ preaching. For Antonio Spadaro, editor in chief of La Civiltà Cattolica and a privileged interpreter of and unofficial spokesman for this pontificate, the pope’s free language, marked by frankness, clarity, and sometimes challenging statements, is a typical point of his prophetic language and visionary outlook, which suggests the possibility of a new global role for Catholicism.󰀆 Pope Francis has indeed been crystal clear on such tricky global and political questions as climate change, migration, armed conflicts, the arms trade, human trafficking, deforestation, corruption, and freedom of religion, always defending the voiceless and the deprived. His predecessors did so as well, especially John Paul II, although their message was usually wrapped in the typical Church style that allows for more nuance and softens the message. No doubt Francis also knows how to be diplomatic, but if the defense of the poor is at stake, he prefers to adopt the clear and un-nuanced approach of the prophet. II. A Pope from the Global South As an Argentinian and former archbishop of Buenos Aires, Pope Francis is the first pope to come from the “Global South.” This is a major turning point in the history of the Catholic Church, whose center of gravity is quickly shifting southwards, and which is becoming less Eurocentric and even ‘Rome-centric’. This is reflected in his choice to install a “Crown Council” to prepare the reform of the Roman Curia, originally composed of eight, later nine, cardinals, representing every single continent.󰀇 It is reflected in his appointments of new cardinals. Europeans 󰀆  Antonio Spadaro, public conference in Leuven, December 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, opening the symposium on the “Geopolitics of Pope Francis.” Unpublished notes of the author. 󰀇  This advisory body, known as the “C󰀉,” was originally composed of: Oscar Andrés Rodriguez Maradiaga, archbishop of Tegucigalpa (Honduras); Giuseppe Bertello, president of the Pontifical Commission for the Vatican City State; Oswald Gracias, archbishop of Bombay (India); Reinhard Marx, archbishop of Munich and Freising

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for the first time in history no longer constitute the majority of the Sacred College, shifting the geopolitical balance of the assembly that will elect the next pope.󰀈 This fact also influences Francis’s geopolitical vision of the world. The papacy’s hitherto privileged bond with the European and American “West” and its democratic capitalism is no longer to be taken for granted, as was still the case with the pontificates of Pope John Paul II (in his struggle with eastern communism, while also fiercely critical of the dehumanizing aspects of capitalist ultraliberalism) and Pope Benedict XVI (with his agenda of defending Christian core values in the Western world). In his publications, addresses, and visits, one can readily see how Pope Francis identifies with the victims of globalization and capitalism, rather than with the beneficiaries. He often speaks of global capitalism and liberalism as “an economy that kills.”󰀉 This is partly inspired by his Argentinian background, for as archbishop of its capital city Buenos Aires, he experienced the financial meltdown of 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀁-󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀂 and its horrific social consequences.󰀁󰀀 Having met several times with international social movements with an anticapitalist agenda, Pope Francis has strongly criticized and condemned “the unfettered pursuit of money,” dubbed, with reference to an ancient expression, “the dung of the devil.”󰀁󰀁 Especially with his encyclical letter (Germany); Seán Patrick O’Malley, archbishop of Boston (US); Francisco Javier Errazuriz Ossa, archbishop of Santiago de Chile (Chile); George Pell, archbishop of Sydney (Australia); Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya, archbishop of Kinshasa (DR Congo). In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, Pietro Parolin, cardinal secretary of state, was added to the group. In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, cardinals Errazuriz Ossa, Monsengwo, and Pell were dismissed, without being replaced. 󰀈  Out of the seventy cardinal-electors (cardinals younger than 󰀈󰀀) that Pope Francis has created up to now, only twenty-five were Europeans (while European cardinals created by John Paul II and Benedict XVI were 󰀅󰀇 percent). Today, for the first time in history, European cardinals would not compose half (ca. 󰀄󰀀 percent) of a conclave that would elect a new pope (situation as of autumn 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). 󰀉  Evangelii Gaudium Apostolic Exhortation, November 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, par. 󰀅󰀃. http:// w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀄_evangelii-gaudium.html. See also Andrea Tornielli and Giacomo Galeazzi, This Economy Kills: Pope Francis on Capitalism and Social Justice (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). 󰀁󰀀  Cf. Samuel Gregg, “Understanding Pope Francis: Argentina, Economic Failure, and the Teologia del Pueblo,” in Pope Francis and the Caring Society, ed. Robert M. Whaples (Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀅󰀁-󰀆󰀈. 󰀁󰀁  “The earth, entire peoples and individual persons are being brutally punished. And behind all this pain, death and destruction there is the stench of what Basil of Caesarea – one of the first theologians of the Church – called ‘the dung of the devil’. An unfettered pursuit of money rules. This is the ‘dung of the devil’. The service of the common good is left behind. Once capital becomes an idol and guides people’s decisions, once greed for

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Laudato Si’, he has called for a revolution in today’s way of living, consuming, and producing, and for the overthrow of the “technocratic paradigm” that underpins it. He advocates a lifestyle – individually and collectively – and an economy that takes into account the urgent social and ecological challenges facing humanity. Though far from being a Communist or a Marxist󰀁󰀂 – as some of his conservative critics charge󰀁󰀃 – Pope Francis is radical in his defense of the poor and the victims of globalization and climate change. Defending the poor and advocating social justice is obviously a longstanding tradition of the Catholic Church and its leaders, but one has to admit that Pope Francis has formulated his critique of today’s global economy and capitalist system in stronger and less nuanced terms than any of his predecessors. III. Change Comes from the “Periphery” Describing himself as having come from the “ends of the earth,” and as archbishop ardently frequenting the poor areas of Buenos Aires, Francis has introduced his love for the “human and existential peripheries” into the center of the Catholic Church in Rome. This predilection obviously mirrors Jesus’s attention for the poor, sick, and marginalized as well as the Church’s “preferential option for the poor.” According to Spadaro, “mercy” is therefore at the center of both Francis’s pastoral and political vision.󰀁󰀄 He describes the features and roots of this “diplomacy of mercy,” as follows: “The power of mercy changes the meaning of historical processes: no thing and no one is ever to be considered as definitely ‘lost’ even when speaking of relations between peoples and nations.” This is precisely the reason which permits us to understand why the pope never stands for rigid interpretations when dealing with money presides over the entire socioeconomic system, it ruins society, it condemns and enslaves men and women, it destroys human fraternity, it sets people against one another and, as we clearly see, it even puts at risk our common home, sister and mother earth.” In Address at the Second World Meeting of Popular Movements, July 󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/july/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀇󰀀󰀉_bolivia-movimenti-popolari.html [accessed June 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀁󰀂  For a Marxist view on Francis, see Michael Löwy, “Pontifex Maximus versus Kapitalismus: Laudato Si’: une encyclique antisystémique,” Actuel Marx 󰀆󰀄, no. 󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀇󰀄-󰀈󰀅. 󰀁󰀃  E.g. conservative US talk-radio host Rush Limbaugh. https://www.theguardian. com/world/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/dec/󰀁󰀅/pope-francis-defends-criticism-of-capitalism-not-marxist. 󰀁󰀄  Spadaro speaks about the ‘geopolitics of mercy’ or ‘diplomacy of mercy’: https:// nanovic.nd.edu/events/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/󰀁󰀀/󰀁󰀀/the-keeley-vatican-lecture-󰀂/ [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. See also “Francesco e la sfida all’apocalisse,” Limes: Rivista italiana di Geopolitica 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀆󰀁-󰀇󰀁.

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situations and international crises. Instead, he offers a multi-polar vision, acting with great freedom of movement, focusing on social peace and the inclusion of the most vulnerable.”󰀁󰀅 This flexibility and feeling for the complexity of human situations and political realities also helps to understand why Pope Francis often says he prefers the “polyhedron” to the perfect geometry of the sphere. Such language illuminates his operating paradigm as one that prefers multifaceted reality to the illusory perfection of pure theory.󰀁󰀆 This model indicates his way of contemplating and acting within the complex reality of the world, and of the Church. In this perspective of “mercy” and “focus on the periphery,” pastoral and political action are inevitably intertwined. Hence his dramatic choice to open the Holy Year of Mercy, in November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, with a hazardous visit to Bangui, the capital city of the Central African Republic, one’s of the globe’s poorest, most marginalized and war-stricken countries. Similarly, his first visit outside Rome was to Lampedusa, while his first visit to an EU country was to the Greek island of Lesbos, both islands on Europe’s border which have become symbols of the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean and the plight of refugees and migrants. His travel destinations often indicate his predilection for “peripheral” countries, even where Catholics comprise a tiny minority, from Georgia (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) and North Macedonia (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉) to Sri Lanka (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅) and Myanmar (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). In his travels, as well as his Vatican meetings, he usually pays special attention to the most marginalized, for instance, to the inhabitants of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro during his first visit as pope to Latin America (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃) and to the Roma during his visit to Romania (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). Not only his travels, but his cardinal appointments as well often show predilection for the periphery. Francis has created cardinals from such unlikely places as Les Cayes (Haiti), Yangon (Myanmar), Tonga (Tonga), Bangui (Central African Republic), Port-Louis (Mauritius), Rabat (Morocco), and other places that never had a cardinal or dreamt of having one. On the other hand, archbishops of major cities with a Catholic tradition and a substantial Catholic population, especially in Italy and the United States, 󰀁󰀅  Antonio Spadaro: “Francis: A Pope for the Era of Globalization,” public lecture at the eve of the Symposium “The Geopolitics of Pope Francis,” Leuven, Belgium, December 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. Notes of the author. 󰀁󰀆  “Here our model is not the sphere, which is no greater than its parts, where every point is equidistant from the centre, and there are no differences between them. Instead, it is the polyhedron, which reflects the convergence of all its parts, each of which preserves its distinctiveness. Pastoral and political activity alike seek to gather in this polyhedron the best of each.” In Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀃󰀆.

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such as Turin and Los Angeles, have been denied the cardinal’s title that they used to have. This is part of Francis’s policy to globalize, and therefore de-westernize, the College of Cardinals, which will have its influence on a future Conclave and further developments in the Catholic Church.󰀁󰀇 Francis’s focus on the periphery is part of his inner conviction that the reality is better understood from the fringes than from the center. “To the extent that we leave the center and move away from it, we discover more things and, when we look at the center from these new things that we have discovered, from new places, from these peripheries, we see that reality is different. It is one thing to look at reality from the center and another is to look at it from the last place you arrived.”󰀁󰀈 He calls this the perspective of Ferdinand Magellan: “Europe seen from Madrid in the sixteenth century was one thing, but when Magellan arrives at the end of the continent of America, he looks at Europe from the new point reached and understands another thing.” Moreover, Francis is convinced that real change comes not from the center but from the fringes, or at least from a center that listens to the peripheries, as he is intending to do. For him this is a principle that applies to both theology and politics. “We are faced with an approach that can be applied equally to geopolitics and theology,” Secretary of State Pietro Parolin stated.󰀁󰀉 In this context, Andrea Riccardi speaks of “evangelical geopolitics” or “geotheology.”󰀂󰀀 IV. Mess with Reality Rather than sticking to the mere proclamation of central moral principles, Pope Francis is ready to “mess with” difficult and dirty realities, according to his guiding principle that “realities are more important than ideas.”󰀂󰀁 The diplomacy of the Holy See has, of course, a long track record of being active, in front of and behind the scenes, in international 󰀁󰀇  Cf. Piero Schiavazzi, “Se il Conclave si tenesse oggi…,” Limes: Rivista italiana di Geopolitica 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀇󰀇. 󰀁󰀈  Interview with “La Carcova News” (March 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), quoted in Antonio Spadaro, Il nuovo mondo di Francesco: Come il Vaticano sta cambiando la politica globale (Venice: Marsilio, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), 󰀄󰀇-󰀄󰀈. 󰀁󰀉  During his lectio magistralis at the Theological College of the Triveneto (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), quoted by Fulvio Scaglione, “The New Vatican Geopolitics,” Eastwest (October 󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈) https://eastwest.eu/en/eastwest-󰀈󰀀/the-new-vatican-geopolitics [accessed May 󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀀  Andrea Riccardi, Periferie: Crisi e novità per la Chiesa (Milan: Jaca Books, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), 󰀁󰀀. 󰀂󰀁  Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀃󰀁-󰀂󰀃󰀃.

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political affairs and concrete situations of war and conflict, from Pope Benedict XV’s peace initiative in 󰀁󰀉󰀁󰀇 to Pope John Paul II’s effort to prevent the US-coalition-led invasion of Iraq in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀃. Pope Francis holds Vatican diplomacy in high esteem, as is illustrated by his selection of Pietro Parolin – a Vatican old-school top diplomat – as Secretary of State and by his decision to overturn his predecessor’s practice of not receiving apostolic nuncios. Francis meets them on a regular basis, and he has even made one of them – Mario Zenari, nuncio in Syria – a cardinal, a very unusual promotion for diplomats on mission. The negotiations in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 between Cuba and the US under the Obama administration, leading to the opening of a US embassy in Havana and President Obama’s historic visit to the island in March 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, were a classic example of successful and patient Vatican diplomacy behind the scenes: both Raul Castro and Obama thanked Francis for the Holy See’s critical role in brokering their rapprochement (eventually undone by the next administration under Donald Trump). The historic “Provisional Agreement” signed on September 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China concerning the procedure of nominating bishops for China’s divided Catholic Church – after years of tentative talks, periods of rapprochement and setbacks – can also be considered a classic example of the Catholic Church’s diplomacy. Thus, Francis unquestionably has given a new dynamic and relevance to Vatican diplomacy, after Benedict XVI’s pontificate marked a crisis in the Catholic Church’s presence in world affairs.󰀂󰀂 But, unlike his predecessors, he has done so, as Morozzo della Rocca rightly points out, by putting himself in the middle of political and diplomatic action. He relies on his collaborators until a certain point; but, when they are hesitant to follow him, he is ready to go it alone, “as a Jesuit used to act alone.”󰀂󰀃 Francis is not afraid to engage personally in difficult affairs and to take risks. He thus embodies that Church which is “bruised, hurting and dirty” because it has set out on the difficult roads of the world, which he prefers to a Church that “is unhealthy from being confined and from clinging to its own security.”󰀂󰀄

󰀂󰀂  Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, “La Santa Sede è ancora un soggetto internazionale?,” in Il cristianesimo al tempo di papa Francesco, ed. Andrea Riccardi (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), 󰀁󰀆󰀈-󰀁󰀈󰀂. 󰀂󰀃  Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, “La diplomazia pontificia soffre il protagonismo del Papa latinoamericano,” Limes: Rivista italiana di geopolitica 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀁󰀁󰀅-󰀁󰀂󰀂, at 󰀁󰀁󰀈. 󰀂󰀄  Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀄󰀉.

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Francis has indeed not shrunk from delicate missions and initiatives. During his May 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 pilgrimage to the Holy Land, he surprisingly invited the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, and the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbaz (Abu Mazen), for a prayer meeting in the Vatican.󰀂󰀅 This event took place in the Vatican gardens on the evening of June 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. Even if the meeting was unable to prevent the outbreak of military confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip that same summer, it was one of the only diplomatic initiatives trying to bring the different sides together in a difficult time of tensions, which demonstrated the ability of the Holy See to remain on speaking terms with both sides and to offer a safe and neutral location for the meeting.󰀂󰀆 In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 Pope Francis decided – in the face of significant security concerns and against some recommendations that he not go – to open the Holy Year of Mercy in Bangui, the capital of war-torn Central African Republic, a place that had hardly seen the visit of a world leader in recent years. His visit of November 󰀂󰀉-󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 included a visit to the Central Mosque of Koudoukou, situated in one of Bangui’s “hottest” quarters, where tensions between Muslims and Christians had been high. The visit went remarkably well and was able to give new impetus to the difficult and complex peace process in the country.󰀂󰀇 Two years later, at the end of November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, Pope Francis set out on another very delicate mission to a peripheral and conflict-ridden area. He visited Myanmar, where the authorities – the military leaders but also former opposition leader and now Minister of Foreign Affairs Aung San Suu Kyi – are being held accountable by human rights organizations for discriminating and actively persecuting the Rohingya people, causing their massive exodus towards neighboring Bangladesh. In a country with few Catholics and an increasingly aggressive Buddhism, Francis was able to avoid a series of diplomatic cliffs. He accepted to meet privately with 󰀂󰀅  According to the pope’s account during the flight back to Rome, this initiative came rather spontaneously: “I thought: ‘Something might be done’, but the concrete gestures, none of these was planned as such. Some things, for example inviting the two Presidents to pray, we had thought of doing there, but there were so many logistical problems, so very many, since they also have to take account of the territory, where it would take place, and that is not easy. So we thought of a meeting… but in the end we came up with this invitation which I hope will turn out well.” http://w󰀂.vatican.va/ content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/may/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀀󰀅󰀂󰀆_terrasanta-conferenza-stampa.html. 󰀂󰀆  “Pope Works on Mideast Peace” in Politico, June 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. https://www.politico. com/story/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/󰀀󰀆/pope-francis-shimon-peres-mahmoud-abbas-󰀁󰀀󰀇󰀅󰀇󰀃. 󰀂󰀇  Mario Giro, “Francesco l’Africano,” Limes: Rivista italiana di geopolitica 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀁󰀄󰀉-󰀁󰀅󰀆; Stefano Picciaredda, “Pope Francis and Africa,” in this volume, 󰀈󰀇-󰀁󰀀󰀄.

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strong-man General Min Aung Hlaing, internationally seen as the evil genius of the military leadership. Francis understands very well that, in order to reach solutions and to improve situations, he needs to speak with all parties, especially those with the keys of power. In Myanmar, he refrained from pronouncing the politically highly sensitive word “Rohingya” – in order not to provoke his hosts and embarrass the country’s Catholic community – but he did so in neighboring Bangladesh, while meeting with a group of refugees.󰀂󰀈 In Myanmar and Bangladesh, Francis showed not only his diplomatic skills but also his determination not to dodge difficult situations and his willingness to be present “on the crossroads of history.”󰀂󰀉 And what can be said about his initiative to invite to a Vatican “retreat” the main leaders of the warring groups in South Sudan, including President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Vice President designates Riek Machar and Rebecca Nyandeng De Mabior? The initiative, labeled both “ecumenical” and “diplomatic,” was itself surprising, since the former allies Kiir and Machar are sworn enemies in spite of a 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 power-sharing deal. It ended with an unprecedented and spectacular gesture. Pope Francis, in an effort to reinforce his plea that the countries’ leaders would “unite hands” and so become “fathers of the nations,” kneeled down and kissed the feet of the leaders, who were as flabbergasted as the world was to watch this unprecedented scene.󰀃󰀀 It is easy to imagine all of the criticism that Pope Francis can expect from Catholics (and others) who fear that he is selling out papal authority by exposing himself to so much danger and by kneeling in front of (even cruel) political leaders, the Roman tradition holding that instead the repentant leaders, Canossa-like, should kneel down before the papal throne. He took indeed a serious risk, because a lack of positive results coming from his gesture might have weakened the Holy See’s prestige and eroded the papacy’s mythical aura. Yet, on many occasions Francis has shown that he is quite immune to this kind of prudential reasoning and that he is ready to take any risk and to commit his full weight, if it  Spadaro, Il nuovo mondo di Francesco, 󰀂󰀇-󰀂󰀈.  Antonio Spadaro, “At the Crossroads of History: Pope Francis’ Conversations with the Jesuit in Myanmar and Bangladesh,” La Civiltà Cattolica, December 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. https://www.laciviltacattolica.com/at-the-crossroads-of-history-pope-francis-conversationswith-the-jesuits-in-myanmar-and-bangladesh/. 󰀃󰀀  “Will a Papal Kiss Truly Reconcile Kiir and Machar?,” Africanews, April 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. https://www.africanews.com/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀄/󰀁󰀁/south-sudan-s-mediators-will-a-papal-kiss-trulyreconcile-kiir-machar// [accessed June 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀈

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might serve the cause of reconciliation and peace. However the situation on the ground in South Sudan may evolve, this striking gesture will remain a part of the history of that country and, indeed, of the papacy. Bergoglio is convinced that mediating for peace is a “craftswork,” which requires “original industriousness” and personal commitment, as he once explained when he was Archbishop of Buenos Aires. Unlike the intermediary, who is making his own profits, the mediator has nothing to win: “The mediator is the one who, to unite the parties, pays with his salary, consumes himself. And the mediator always loses, because the logic of charity is to lose everything so that unity may win, so that love may win....”󰀃󰀁 For Pope Francis, preaching the Gospel of reconciliation and achieving peace is an urgent duty for every Christian and for the Church in today’s violent world, where he sees an ongoing “third World War, which is fought piecemeal.” In this regard, he is clearly in line with the tradition of the Church and especially of the popes of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, who have abhorred warfare and generally tried to do everything in their power to help avoid or stop bloodshed and military confrontation. Often their voices and warnings were ignored by political leaders. Sometimes, however, even if it remains difficult to measure their exact impact, their supplications seem to produce some effect, for instance when Francis, in a letter sent to Russian President Vladimir Putin while at the G-󰀂󰀀 of September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, launched an urgent appeal to bring an end to the war in Syria by dialogue and negotiation, and “to lay aside the futile pursuit of a military solution.”󰀃󰀂 After chemical weapons were used in Syria, allegedly by the government, thus crossing the “red line” that the Obama administration had drawn, Obama surprisingly refrained from military reprisal. An international escalation was avoided. Many reasons will have played a role in that decision, but at least for public opinion the pope’s appeal seemed to have had some effect, recalling Pope John XXIII’s alleged role in preventing the Cuba missile crisis from escalating.󰀃󰀃 󰀃󰀁  Quoted in Andrea Riccardi, La sorpresa di papa Francesco: Crisi e futuro della Chiesa (Milan: Mondadori, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀇󰀇. 󰀃󰀂  “Abandon Futile Military Solution for Syria, Pope Tells G-󰀂󰀀 Leaders,” The Independent, September 󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/abandon-futilemilitary-solution-for-syria-pope-tells-g󰀂󰀀-leaders-as-vatican-urges-dialogue-󰀈󰀈󰀀󰀀󰀄󰀁󰀅.html. 󰀃󰀃  On the role of Pope John XXIII and his communications with Nikita Khrushchev on the Cuba crisis, see Gerald P. Fogarty, “Vatican II and the Cold War,” in Vatican II behind the Iron Curtain, ed. Piotr H. Kosicky (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), 󰀂󰀇-󰀄󰀉.

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Francis is fully in line with this “pacifist” tradition of the Catholic Church, which has existed since the Church lost its worldly power in 󰀁󰀈󰀇󰀀, though officially it has maintained and constantly updated its “just war” tradition. But Francis seems to go further, because he is the first pope who refuses to speak about “just war,” maintaining that one can justify a “defensive war,” but that war is never just. Only peace is just.󰀃󰀄 In order to achieve this, Francis is ready to go very far, even to lower himself, as he literally did in the case of South Sudan. Besides intervening and trying to be an authentic mediator in situations of tension and armed conflict, there is another way in which contemporary popes have tried to be peacemakers: by bridging the divide between different religious worlds, fault lines which in history have produced so much bloodshed and warfare, through genuine ecumenical and interreligious dialogue. V. Advancing on the Road of Christian Unity With regard to inter-Church relations, Pope Francis is of course building on the foundation laid by the Second Vatican Council (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀂󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅) and is following the path paved by his immediate predecessors of ever-closer relationships with other Christian denominations, in order to restore unity.󰀃󰀅 Yet, Pope Francis has given a new impulse to the ecumenical movement by investing in strong personal relationships with the leaders of other Churches rather than by seeking formal agreements on theological and ecclesiological disputes. This is especially the case with Bartholomew, ecumenical patriarch, with whom Francis has developed a warm and close relationship, unprecedented in the relationship between Rome and Constantinople. Bartholomew, not worried about being overshadowed by the Roman pontiff, has accepted the invitation to accompany Francis on several important occasions, for instance, during the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 pilgrimage to the Holy Land, 󰀃󰀄  “Nous avons appris en philosophie politique que, pour se défendre, on peut faire la guerre et la considérer comme juste. Mais peut-on dire une ‘guerre juste’? Ou plutôt une ‘guerre de défense’? Car la seule chose juste, c’est la paix.” In Dominique Wolton, Pape François: Politique et Société (Paris: Éditions de l’Observatoire, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀅󰀇-󰀅󰀈. When the author insists asking if the word ‘Just War’ should not be used any more, the Pope answers: “Je n’aime pas l’utiliser (…). Aucune guerre n’est juste. La seule chose juste, c’est la paix.” 󰀃󰀅  Major documents are Unitatis Redintegratio, Decree on Ecumenism, November 󰀂󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀄; Ut Unum Sint, encyclical letter by Pope John Paul II, May 󰀂󰀅, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀅.

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during the above-mentioned follow-up meeting between the Israeli and Palestinian presidents in the Vatican, and during the politically sensitive trip to the island of Lesbos. Pope Francis also has developed a strong relationship with other Orthodox patriarchs and leaders of Oriental Churches, by visiting them in their countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, and Greece). So too did his predecessors, especially John Paul II, the first pope in history to visit Orthodox nations. Yet, whereas both John Paul II and Benedict XVI dreamed of an historic meeting with the patriarch of Moscow – which was often predicted but never materialized – it was the Argentinian pope who actually achieved it with the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. The unprecedented encounter between the head of the Catholic Church and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, by far the most influential of the Orthodox Churches, took place on February 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 in the unlikely setting of the VIP lounge of Havana’s Jose Marti International Airport.󰀃󰀆 Their “Joint Declaration” emphasized the need of protection for Christian minorities, especially in the Middle East, but mentions many other societal and political issues: secularism, consumerism, migration, the protection of the family.󰀃󰀇 The geopolitical significance of the meeting of these two major Church leaders alone is self-evident. It was significant not only for the difficult situation of Christian minorities in the Middle East, whose survival is in jeopardy because of Islamic extremism; active Russian military involvement was critical to wipe out the embryonic Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). But the meeting was also of utmost importance for the conflict in Ukraine, a Christian country with a very complex and tense ecclesiastic situation, on the border between western Catholicism – seen as aggressive and proselytizing by Moscow – and eastern Orthodoxy, which considers Kiev the cradle of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Joint Declaration calls on the Churches “to work together towards social harmony” and to “refrain from taking part in the (military) confrontation.” Regarding the conflict in Ukraine, it is clear that Pope Francis’s priorities are to end the bloodshed between two peoples he considers as “brothers” and the restauration of peace. He advocates this position, even if it sometimes comes at the cost of hurting the feelings of Greek Catholics in 󰀃󰀆  Adriano Roccucci, “Vaticano e Mosca mai così vicini,” Limes: Rivista italiana di geopolitica 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀂󰀂󰀃-󰀂󰀃󰀄. 󰀃󰀇  Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia, February 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/february/ documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀂󰀁󰀂_dichiarazione-comune-kirill.html#Joint_Declaration.

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Western Ukraine, whose patriotic fervor is not inferior to that of the Russians.󰀃󰀈 Francis has likewise been able to build constructive relations in the Protestant world. With Anglicans he has not insisted on inter-Church differences but has built a warm relationship with the archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby. It was actually Welby who had suggested to the pope that he invite South Sudan’s political leaders for a retreat in the Vatican, and the Anglican leader was present at the event himself, as were leaders of different Christian Churches of South Sudan. With the traditional Protestant Churches, especially the Lutheran Church, Pope Francis has added a new layer on an already constructive relationship. On the occasion of the five-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation, he visited Lund in Sweden and had words of gratitude for the Reformation, which “helped give greater centrality to sacred Scripture in the [Catholic] Church’s life.” In a common statement with Lutheran Bishop Munib Younan, president of the Lutheran World Federation, Francis endorsed the common desire to “receive the Eucharist at one table,” but he has not actually made any concrete move towards inter-Communion.󰀃󰀉 As for the booming Evangelical Churches in the neo-Protestant galaxy, Pope Francis seems to take a more relaxed attitude than his predecessors, who abhorred the increasingly successful proselytism of the “sects,” drawing masses of Catholic faithful. This has to do with Francis’s experience in Argentina, where as a Jesuit provincial superior he had first forbidden all contacts “with charismatics and their ‘samba schools’” – he later apologized for this – but as archbishop of Buenos Aires developed good relationships with some Pentecostal pastors and on some occasions assisted at their services. Though stating that some of the new communities and charismatic preachers contrast “sharply with the ecclesiological principals and experience of the historic churches,” the pope basically holds that “Pentecostals and Catholics should learn from each other.”󰀄󰀀 He understands that the success of the Pentecostal Churches among baptized Catholics is also, in part, a result of an overly clerical approach as well as prevailing pastoral 󰀃󰀈  In his general audience on February 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, the pope spoke about “fratricidal violence” and said that not “victory” but “peace” should be sought. http://w󰀂.vatican. va/content/francesco/en/audiences/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀂󰀀󰀄_udienzagenerale.html. 󰀃󰀉  https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/marking-reformation-francis-calls-lutheransand-catholics-new-common-path. 󰀄󰀀  Address to the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, September 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/september/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀉󰀂󰀈_plenaria-pcpuc.html.

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flaws within the Catholic Church. This has not prevented him, however, from warning against a perverted Gospel that exclusively focuses on material and corporal wellbeing, blessing the rich and cursing the poor.󰀄󰀁 It is more than a superficial impression that Francis is making serious progress on the road of ecumenism. The worsening situation of many threatened Christian minorities, especially in the Middle East and in other Muslim-dominated regions, creates a sense of urgency, helping to overcome centuries-old disputes, divisions, and distrust. This is illustrated by the ecumenical Prayer Meeting for the Middle East, which took place in Bari, Italy, on July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, where many Christian Churches were represented, and by an impressive number of patriarchs. By his brotherly attitude, Pope Francis seems to be seen by more and more non-Catholic Christians as the natural leader of the Christian world. Not insisting on Rome’s jurisdictional primacy and personally at ease in ecumenical “horizontal” settings, Francis seems to be considered less threatening by other Churches and ecclesial communities than the impressive geopolitical giant John Paul II and the dogmatic theologian Benedict XVI. Of course, pockets of virulent anti-papal rhetoric are still present in the Protestant and Orthodox worlds, but for the moment they seem less thriving, at least among the leadership of most Churches and communities, who are increasingly happy with a good relationship with the pope. It still remains to be seen how this inter-ecclesial rapprochement unfolds and whether it can lead to lasting formal or informal ways of unity. But it is safe to say that Francis’s pontificate has produced a thaw in that “ecumenical winter” which he found on his arrival.󰀄󰀂 And since divisions among Christians and their Churches have in the past, and sometimes also in the present, contributed to no small degree to political divisions and sometimes violent conflict, a growing unity of the Christian world cannot but have geopolitical implications. VI. Disarming the Civilizational Clash In relations with non-Christians, Pope Francis walks the path prepared by the Second Vatican Council and its ground-breaking declaration Nostra 󰀄󰀁  See Antonio Spadaro, “The Prosperity Gospel: Dangerous and Different,” La Civiltà Cattolica, July 󰀁󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. https://www.laciviltacattolica.com/the-prosperity-gospeldangerous-and-different/ [accessed June 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀂  See e.g. Ola Tjørhom, “‘Ecumenical Winter’? Challenges in Contemporary Catholic Ecumenism,” The Heythrop Journal 󰀄󰀉 (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈): 󰀈󰀄󰀁-󰀈󰀅󰀉.

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Aetate󰀄󰀃 as well as by the “Spirit of Assisi,” a fruit of the historic meeting of October 󰀂󰀇, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀆 in the City of Saint Francis, one of the most prophetic intuitions of John Paul II’s pontificate. “Assisi” is in fact the Church’s answer to religious extremism and to the theory of the “Clash of Civilizations,” even years before the term was coined. In taking the name of “Francis,” the pope also has adopted this legacy of interfaith dialogue as it was developed within the Catholic Church in the last few decades. Francis profoundly believes that respectful dialogue and genuine encounter with believers from other traditions is the way that ultimately leads to peace.󰀄󰀄 Francis went to Assisi to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the event in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.󰀄󰀅 In fact, Benedict XVI also went there in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁, to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary, though as Cardinal Ratzinger he was among the critics of the event in 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀆 and eventually later authored the “Dominus Iesus” Declaration. This text imposes a brake – considered a necessary brake by some, a dreadful hindrance by others – on further theological developments in interreligious and ecumenical dialogue, seen as a possible relativization of Christ’s role in the redemption of humankind and an undermining of the unicity of the Catholic Church.󰀄󰀆 Less concerned with theological rigor than his predecessor, Francis has also inherited “Dominus Iesus” and does not seem to make any haste in officially overhauling it or looking actively for further theological deepening of interreligious dialogue.󰀄󰀇 What this pontificate seems to add to Rome’s interfaith relationships is the pope’s personality and charisma. Francis brings his experience from Buenos Aires, a globalized multi-religious megacity, where he developed close relations with leaders of other faiths. In particular, Rabbi Abraham Skorka, with whom he published a book, became a very close friend.󰀄󰀈 󰀄󰀃  Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, October 󰀁󰀈, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀄. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/ vat-ii_decl_󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅󰀁󰀀󰀂󰀈_nostra-aetate_en.html. 󰀄󰀄  Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀅󰀀-󰀂󰀅󰀄. 󰀄󰀅  Visit of Pope Francis to Assisi for the World Day of Prayer for Peace: “Thirst for Peace: Faiths and Cultures in Dialogue,” September 󰀂󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/inside/documents/papa-francesco-assisi-giornata-preghiera-pace_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.html. 󰀄󰀆  Declaration on the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, August 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/ documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀󰀀󰀈󰀀󰀆_dominus-iesus_en.html. 󰀄󰀇  See Terrence Merrigan, “Between Doctrine and Discernment: Pope Francis on Interreligious Dialogue,” in this volume, 󰀁󰀂󰀇-󰀁󰀅󰀀. 󰀄󰀈  Translated into English in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃: Jorge Mario Bergoglio and Abraham Skorka, On Heaven and Earth: Pope Francis on Faith, Family and Church in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Random House Large Print, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃).

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Skorka is without doubt the first rabbi in the Vatican’s history who has a natural seat at the pope’s table whenever he finds himself in Rome. Skorka was at Pope Francis’s side during his trip to Israel in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. In the forefront of combating anti-Semitism, Francis has developed a good relationship with the Jewish world. His pontificate has not yet been marked by any major incidents and frictions which from time to time characterize this sensitive relationship between Catholics and Jews.󰀄󰀉 The pope’s decision to open the archives of the pontificate of Pope Pius XII (󰀁󰀉󰀃󰀉-󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀈) for scholarly research by 󰀂󰀀󰀂󰀀 has further buttressed the mutual relationship. It is especially with the Muslim world that Pope Francis has been able to push the boundaries. In a time in which Islam often has a bad image because of the bloodshed in many places in the world caused by extremists who claim to be genuine Muslim believers, Francis has been careful never to link Islam as such to violence. After the shocking murder of the French priest Jacques Hamel in a church in Normandy in the summer of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, Pope Francis refused to speak of “religious violence” or to identify Islam with terrorism.󰀅󰀀 Rather, on such occasions, he tends to diminish the Islamic element, pointing at pockets of fundamentalist presence in every religion, Christianity included, or at the economic reasons behind today’s warfare, or at common criminality: “When baptized people commit a murder, do we have to speak of Catholic violence?” Pope Francis indeed rejects “the narrative that prepares for the apocalypse,” and therefore, according to Spadaro, “he is carrying forward a systematic counter-narrative to the narrative of fear.”󰀅󰀁 Remembering the violent reactions in the Islamic world after Benedict XVI’s 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆 Regensburg lecture, in which the former pope quoted a fourteenth-century Byzantine emperor linking the Islamic faith and “the sword,” Francis seems extremely cautious – according to his critics, exaggeratedly cautious – in not provoking the Islamic world.󰀅󰀂 󰀄󰀉  Though some Jews raised protests when Pope Francis linked “Phariseisms” and “hypocrisy.” Cf. https://www.thelocal.it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀀󰀅󰀁󰀂/pope-francis-warned-off-anti-semiticpharisee-stereotype. 󰀅󰀀  Jan De Volder, Martyr: Vie et mort du père Jacques Hamel (Paris: Cerf, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), 󰀇󰀀-󰀇󰀁. 󰀅󰀁  Antonio Spadaro, “Francis: A Pope for the Era of Globalization,” Public lecture, Leuven, December 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. Notes of the author. 󰀅󰀂  Benedict XVI’s quote of Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos was: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In note 󰀃 of the official text published on the Vatican’s website, Pope Benedict XVI explains he used the quote for his discourse on reason, faith, and violence without endorsing the emperor’s polemic stance. “In the Muslim world, this quotation has unfortunately been taken as

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A long-lasting effect of the Regensburg crisis had been that the Vatican’s official dialogue with the authorities of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo – considered one of the most authoritative seats in the Sunni world – was disrupted and eventually broke down in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁 when Pope Benedict XVI accused Egypt of discriminating against Christians. Pope Francis has been able to overcome this crisis by establishing a strong personal link with Al-Azhar Grand Imam Ahmed El-Tayeb. Stepping stones on this road of rapprochement have been El-Tayeb’s participation in two conferences of Christian-Muslim dialogue organized by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Florence (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅) and Paris (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), his visit to the Vatican in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, Pope Francis’s speech during a peace conference organized by Al-Azhar in Cairo in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, and especially the meeting between Pope Francis and El-Tayeb in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in February 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. Here the two religious leaders signed a common document on “Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together,” without any doubt the most ambitious text of Catholic-Islamic understanding ever produced and signed on this level.󰀅󰀃 Thus, Pope Francis was not only the first pontiff ever to visit the Arabic Peninsula, which has a particular resonance in the Muslim world, he also had the genius to create an interlocutor in the Sunni world, which is notably a universe without clearly established hierarchical structures. However, knowing the complexity of the multifaceted Muslim world, Francis not only has focused on the Arab world but has accepted to engage in dialogue with different expressions of Islam, especially during his travels to countries with a Muslim majority, such as Turkey (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), Albania (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), Bosnia and Herzegovina (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), Azerbaijan (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), Bangladesh (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), and Morocco (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). He has also reached out to Shia Islam, receiving Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani in the Vatican in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, and especially with his short stop in Baku, Azerbaijan (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), a country with a Shi’ite majority. an expression of my personal position, thus arousing understandable indignation. I hope that the reader of my text can see immediately that this sentence does not express my personal view of the Qur’an, for which I have the respect due to the holy book of a great religion. In quoting the text of the Emperor Manuel II, I intended solely to draw out the essential relationship between faith and reason. On this point I am in agreement with Manuel II, but without endorsing his polemic.” http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/benedictxvi/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆󰀀󰀉󰀁󰀂_universityregensburg.html [accessed July 󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀅󰀃  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/outside/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀀󰀂󰀀󰀄_documento-fratellanza-umana.html. The text is extensively analyzed by Marco Impagliazzo in “Pope Francis and Islam,” in this volume, 󰀁󰀅󰀁-󰀁󰀆󰀇.

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Like his predecessors, Francis also has given attention to relations with the great Asiatic religious traditions, especially Buddhism. Visiting, like Paul VI and John Paul II, Sri Lanka in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, he spoke with the Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, and Christian leaders of the multi-religious island and even made an unscheduled visit to a Buddhist temple in the capital, Colombo.󰀅󰀄 During his travels to Myanmar (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), well aware of the rise of radical discourse and behavior in the Buddhist world, he met with the supreme council of Buddhist monks, inviting them to conquer “prejudice and hatred.”󰀅󰀅 Advocating peaceful, respectful interfaith relationships and harmonious co-existence, this pope has continued along the path on which the Catholic Church embarked with the Second Vatican Council, when the Church left behind the “Nulla salus extra ecclesiam” principle and eventually declared that believers are not to reject anything “that is true and holy” in other religious traditions.󰀅󰀆 Obviously, the results of this policy will need to be judged in the long run; but it has to be recognized that, in the short term, the Catholic Church has taken up its leadership role at a time when radical religious discourse has been able to inflame many people’s hearts and when Christian communities are often victims of discrimination and easy targets of violent extremists. In helping to keep local conflicts from becoming the often-predicted global clash of civilizations, the Catholic Church under Pope Francis is doing more than its part. VII. Pontifex Maximus One might argue that Pope Francis, while certainly moving further away from a “Constantinian” conception of the Catholic Church, does embody the epithet “Pontifex Maximus” – the title of the Roman emperors traditionally applied to Roman pontiffs󰀅󰀇 – at least, in its original 󰀅󰀄  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/january/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀁󰀁󰀃_srilanka-filippine-incontro-interreligioso.html [accessed July 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. On his surprise visit to the Mahabodhi Viharya Temple, see https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/francis-makes-impromptu-visit-to-buddhist-temple-in-sri-lanka-󰀇󰀉󰀀󰀂󰀈. 󰀅󰀅  Meeting with the Supreme Sangha Council in the Kaba Aye Centre in Yangon, Myanmar, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/november/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀉_viaggioapostolico-myanmar-monaci-buddisti.html. 󰀅󰀆  Nostra Aetate, par. 󰀂. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅󰀁󰀀󰀂󰀈_nostra-aetate_en.html. 󰀅󰀇  The title was given to Roman emperors since Augustus (󰀂󰀇 BCE – 󰀁󰀄 CE), in reference to the sacred role they played as “bridge builders” between the divine and human

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meaning of “bridge builder.” Indeed, at a time in which the global community is increasingly torn apart by ancient and new nationalisms and geopolitical rivalries, intolerant religious and ethnic discourse, economic inequality and other divisions, which result in the erection of many new walls, Francis considers it the holy duty of the papacy to build bridges between worlds that differ from each other and have clashing world views and interests. This role is far from being a new concept in the Holy See’s international action, but one has to admit that Pope Francis has pushed the boundaries of this longstanding tradition. He has done so, on the one hand, by using and revalorizing the classic diplomatic tools and skills of the Holy See’s established diplomatic tradition, as could be seen by Rome’s intermediary role in defusing international conflicts, such as the one between Cuba and the United States, or in playing a conciliatory role in national conflicts, such as the one in the Central African Republic. It could be observed particularly in the “provisional” agreement reached in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China, on the sensitive issue of the nomination of bishops and the Chinese clergy’s relationship with Rome and the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, which illustrates not only Rome’s patience in mending difficult relationships but also its capacity to compromise when it sees a window of opportunity. On the other hand, on top of this classic approach of papal diplomacy, Pope Francis has added a tier with his personal style and commitment, as seen, for instance, in his hazardous interventions in conflict-torn countries such as Myanmar, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Yet, like any political action, these interventions are not one-dimensional and not free of paradox. Catholic diplomacy is also a complex given, since different bodies within the Vatican administration sometimes have conflicting views, and since Rome sometimes takes a different view and another approach than national episcopates. Faithful to his own convictions, which privilege the periphery over the center and which therefore place more importance on the role of local bishops and bishop conferences than in the past, Francis has agreed in some circumstances not to intervene in order not to hurt local sensitivities, as seems to have happened in declining President Nicolas Maduro’s repeated invitations to mediate in the worlds. Despite widespread acceptance of the title shifting from the emperor to the pope in late Antiquity, it was probably not until the Renaissance that it started to be part of the traditional nomenclature of the bishop of Rome. See Roald Dijkstra and Dorine van Espelo, “Anchoring Pontifical Authority: A Reconsideration of the Papal Employment of the Title Pontifex Maximus,” Journal of Religious History 󰀄󰀁, no. 󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀃󰀁󰀂-󰀃󰀂󰀅.

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political stand-off in Venezuela (after an earlier tentative attempt by the Holy See failed).󰀅󰀈 But in other situations, Pope Francis has not hesitated to follow his own line and to overcome local resistance, even if this comes at the cost of pushing aside the “periphery” by the “center.” Such is the case in the Ukrainian context, where Francis prefers defending the sake of peace and reconciliation with the Russians, rather than endorsing the nationalist stance of the Greek-Catholic bishops; likewise in the case of Colombia, where Pope Francis has endorsed the peace process against the skepticism of part of the Colombian episcopate.󰀅󰀉 Thus, inevitably, papal action comes with a certain degree of paradox: a pope needs to reconcile different interests, such as preserving the unity of the Church and building bridges; or defending threatened Christian minorities and establishing good relationships with non-Catholic actors; or sticking to moral principles and compromising for the sake of peace. Francis’s dialectic mind and pragmatic way of acting seem fit to reconcile the different and contrasting aspects of his ministry. No doubt, serving God, the Gospel, and the Church in today’s world is Pope Francis’s main objective. Since a Roman pontiff is both a religious and a political leader, with followers worldwide, his political and diplomatic actions will always be mixed with and underpinned by spiritual, theological, and ecclesiological considerations. Moreover, in Francis’s pontificate, as we have seen, theological preferences impact his political choices, as was also the case for his predecessors. Papal ‘politics’ are indeed not politics for the mere sake of power and influence, but serve the higher goal of building a more just and peaceful world, in the light of the Gospel message. It is known that some idiosyncratic aspects of Francis’s style and personality have met with fierce criticism within those circles in the Catholic Church that fear that he is selling out the prestige that comes with the papacy. The way that he is introducing reform in the Vatican’s administration and the life of the Church is also criticized by different sides, since he is going much too far for some, while for others it is far too little. However, in the realm of global politics, Francis has definitely been able to remove some long-lasting obstacles and to trace new paths for the future, showing the impact that the Catholic Church and the 󰀅󰀈  Lorenzo di Muro, “Sul Venezuela chavista, Papa e vescovi locali parlano lingue diverse,” Limes: Rivista italiana di geopolitica 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀂󰀅󰀁-󰀂󰀅󰀉. 󰀅󰀉  Gianni La Bella, “In Colombia, Il Papa affronta i vescovi che boicottano la pace,” Limes: Rivista italiana di geopolitica 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀂󰀄󰀃-󰀂󰀅󰀀.

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papacy are still able to have in the second decade of the twenty-first century. It is too early to say where this is all going to lead. This is still an unfolding story, and Francis is clearly trying to set up processes that will bear fruit in the not-so-foreseeable future. But that Pope Francis thus far has been a remarkable world leader and a bridge builder, with authentic words and actions in the difficult and troubled scenarios of today’s world, is a concluding observation that is safe to make.

Latin America in Francis’s Geopolitical Thought Sandra Arenas In 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀃, José Vasconcelos received an honorary doctorate in Santiago, Chile, and said in his speech, “I see the Iberoamerican flag flying, the same flag in Brazil and Mexico, the same in Peru and Argentina, the same in Chile and in Ecuador. I feel myself, in this University of Santiago, full of responsibilities with the present, as if I had spent in here all my previous years.”󰀁 A cornerstone of Francis’s religious and geopolitical thoughts is the following: the destiny of the Latin American people is intimately attached to the destiny of Catholicism as such. The quotation above represents a utopia in the strict sense of the term, namely, an imaginary place where an imagined community or society possesses qualities that are highly desirable or nearly perfect for its members. We – all Christians – believe and should hope that the day will come when everyone will be seated at the same table, with no limits, no flags, all the same, God among us, we ourselves among each other. Is this not a sort of Great Homeland dream? Among Latin American people, the idea of a Great Homeland brought about through greater social, political and economic unity has expanded in the collective consciousness, mostly among leftists. Such appeals for unity have been raised in the recent past by figures like Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez;󰀂 nonetheless, the idea’s origins are found in emotional speeches by Latin American independence heroes such as José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar.󰀃 Nowadays, however, both religious pluralism and laicization󰀄 are emerging as huge challenges to Catholicism. Religious referents remain  Published in Claridad I, no. 󰀁 (May 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀃): 󰀂.  Nicolás Maduro, “El papa Francisco está en sintonía con el legado de Chávez,” El Mundo, January 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, www.elmundo.es/america/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/󰀀󰀁/󰀂󰀂/󰀅󰀂dfb󰀈a󰀀e󰀂󰀇󰀀󰀄e󰀉󰀉󰀄 a󰀈b󰀄󰀅󰀇󰀀.html [accessed November 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈]. 󰀃  As for the social unification of the Continent, see Salvador Rivera, Latin American Unification: A History of Political and Economic Integration Efforts (Jefferson, NC: McFarland Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄). 󰀄  The privileges of the Catholic Church before the State are diminishing. Chronologically, we start our examples from the 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s: Guatemala (󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀅); Nicaragua (󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀇); Colombia (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁); Paraguay (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀂); El Salvador (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀂); Peru (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀃); Bolivia (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄) and Argentina (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄). 󰀁

󰀂

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important for a good number of Latin Americans despite the sociocultural process of progressive marginalization and privatization of religious practices and beliefs.󰀅 It is easy to verify that religious practices have enormously decreased, mostly due to disaffiliation or what has been called privatization of the faith experience. The sense of community and traditional hierarchies are being contested. In addition, plurality is installed within Catholicism itself; the same word “catholic” means “all-embracing” or “according to the whole.” Theologically and spiritually diverse sensitivities end up in quite different methods of evangelical praxis with some peculiar tendencies.󰀆 There is no longer a Catholic monopoly, although generally speaking, Catholicism still continues to be a majority in the statistics.󰀇 In this article, we are going to describe the way by which Latin America reflects itself in Francis’s geopolitical thoughts, through an analysis of the internal inclusive narratives, its influences and global potentialities, as well as its limitations. I. Arguing Exclusivism through a Latin American Utopian Narrative While visiting ten Latin American and Caribbean countries, and delivering speeches to Latin Americans worldwide on different occasions, Francis had always touched upon the very core of a cultural utopia that is largely being contested by the current economic system and its sociopolitical background.󰀈 It is indeed not quite usual that a global figure 󰀅  All the Latin American Episcopal Assemblies, from Medellín to Aparecida, have dealt with secularization. Cf. J. de J. Legorreta, Modernidad, secularización e Iglesia en América Latina: Los obispos latinoamericanos y el cambio cultural (Mexico D. F., Mexico: Universidad Iberoamericana, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃). 󰀆  To explore this issue see Rodolfo De Roux, “L’Église catholique en Amérique latine: Quelques grands défis de l’histoire récente,” in Les relations de Louvain avec l’Amérique latine: Entre évangélisation, théologie de la libération et mouvements étudiants, ed. C. Sappia and P. Servais (Louvain-la-Neuve: Bruylant, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆), 󰀄󰀁-󰀅󰀄. 󰀇  It is still true in most of the countries, although no longer so in others such as Uruguay and Honduras, where only 󰀄󰀂% and 󰀄󰀆% respectively feel themselves Catholics. Paraguay and Mexico, with 󰀈󰀀% and 󰀉󰀀% respectively, are the Latin American countries with the most official Catholic membership today. 󰀈  Francis’s official itineraries included the following Latin American countries and issues: Brazil (July 󰀂󰀂-󰀂󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃): addicts, jail, poor neighborhoods, World Youth Day (July 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈); Ecuador-Bolivia-Paraguay (July 󰀅-󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅): Francis addressed them as the poorest countries in the Continent; he rejected colonization and crimes against indigenous people and claimed to guarantee the so-called 󰀃T (“tierra, techo, trabajo,” meaning: land, house and work); Cuba-US (September 󰀁󰀉-󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅): Francis urged a continued thaw in relations between the

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permanently evokes “romantic” ideas in line with the neutralization of the fragmentations in such a pluralistic context. It is about blurring all kinds of boundaries, to become a suitable place where everybody may have a home. Politically, Latin America and the Caribbean have lacked a celebrated unifying figure for quite some time. Yet Francis appears to be emerging as an unexpected leader; he is well known and has a broad authority, and uses his celebrity to cross all the usual boundaries. He plays the religious figure that he is, within a pluralistic religious context as much as a secular one, and also brings up all the social issues as matters belonging to the religious arena. In the teachings of the current Pope, the social concerns blur the political and ecclesial boundaries as shared issues to be faced jointly. Paradoxically, in Latin America, Catholics and non-Catholics alike see him as an attractive religious institutional leader, approaching issues from a spirit of inclusion that forms part of Latin America’s political culture. By repeatedly invoking the idea of a “Patria Grande,”󰀉 a great Latin American homeland, Francis has been truly moving the “left-wing” dis-institutionalized believers and provoking the “right-wing” institutionalized ones. To be sure, when it comes to left-wing political leaders, just in May 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, for instance, Cuba’s President Raúl Castro, an unwavering communist, went to Rome to see Francis and observed: “If the Pope continues to speak like this, sooner or later I will start praying again and I will return to the Catholic Church and, I’m not saying this jokingly.” Andrés Manuel López Obrador, recently elected President of Mexico, sent Francis one of his best social programs, entitled “Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro” (ni-ni)󰀁󰀀 and had addressed him as “my leader and inspiration, for your true interest for two nations, rejecting neoliberalism as an economic system that excludes by principle; Mexico (February 󰀁󰀂-󰀁󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): corruption, violence, poverty, exclusion, pedophilia and kidnappings; Colombia (September 󰀆-󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): reconciliation and peace in the context of drug traffic and the internal armed conflict that was a huge problem in this country for half a century; Chile-Peru (January 󰀁󰀅-󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): corruption, inclusion, inequality, child sexual abuse accusations against clergy/covering up by bishops, which he later called a “culture of abuses and covering-up”; Panama for the World Youth Day (January 󰀂󰀃-󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). 󰀉  The category “Patria Grande” (Great Homeland) was first used by the Argentinian Manuel Ugarte, in his 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀂 book entitled “La Patria Grande.” He gave speeches in many Hispanic American countries advocating their unification. 󰀁󰀀  “Ni-ni” refers to a governmental strategy for young Mexicans (between 󰀁󰀈 and 󰀂󰀉 years old), who currently do not study or work. Cf. https://www.gob.mx/profedet/articulos/ programa-jovenes-construyendo-el-futuro-oportunidad-educativa-y-laboral-󰀁󰀈󰀄󰀈󰀄󰀃?idiom=es [accessed June 󰀁󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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the poorest and forgotten in this society.”󰀁󰀁 Bolivian president Evo Morales said, “For the first time in my life, I feel like I have a Pope, Pope Francis.” The Socialist former president of Chile, Michelle Bachelet, in her speech welcoming Francis on his visit last January, dared to bring up many issues of public interest such as the immigrants’ situation in the country, childhood rights protection, the “conflict” with the (indigenous) Mapuche people and the reinforcement of democracy: “It is a great privilege having you among us, Pope Francis, a brother in the faith of father Alberto Hurtado and a lover of truth, you are for us a genuine stimulus to continue in the paths for more justice and welfare for all the Chilean citizens.” Nonetheless, at the same time, Paraguay’s conservative President, Horacio Cartes, was similarly effusive, applauding Francis for “his direction that lights the way and also gives us a grand task: to work together, with sacrifice and perseverance, so that we might have a community that is more equal for all.” When the Pope flew out to the Southern Cone, he also met the Peruvians. The current president of Peru, Pablo Kuczynski, read his presence as a way to stimulate the Peruvians towards peace and dialogue within a context of strong social conflicts. Francis replied by reminding everyone of the evil that is weakening Latin American democracies, namely the social virus of corruption that infects everything, with its main victims the poorest and Mother Earth. Francis also exhorted president Iván Duque of Colombia, who had visited him in Rome about half a year before, to opt for peace and unity, after more than half a century of civil war. In the same period he also received the current Chilean president Sebastián Piñera and told him that his country’s new immigration policies were highly questionable (for example, thousands of “democratic responsibility” visas were granted to Venezuelans and only a few to the many Haitians applying). These cases serve as example of the Pope’s attractiveness among so diverse political figures and social milieus. Political corruption, immigration policies, drug traffic, any sort of colonization or exclusion policies: whether social, political, cultural or economic issues, they are tackled daily by the Argentinian Pope before anyone who is willing to hear, being Catholic or not. For Francis, the political borders have affected but not destroyed the common cultural heritage; Latin Americans are encouraged to face current and upcoming challenges together, precisely because – for the Pope – this represents a cultural identity. In that regard, exclusiveness and fragmentation are far from what he envisions. 󰀁󰀁

 Message delivered in Rome by José María del Corral, General Director of “Scholas Occurrentes,” on behalf of the Mexican president, September 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈.

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Let us take a closer look. On November 󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, in celebrating 󰀁󰀆󰀀 years of life of the Pontifical Latin American College in Rome (at Thanksgiving), Francis addressed words to the audience that may help us understand which identity he is referring to: Perhaps the most notable characteristic of your College is its Latin American character. It is one of the few Roman Colleges whose identity does not refer to a nation or a charism, but which seeks – rather to be the meeting place, in Rome, of our Latin American land – the Great Homeland as our heroes liked to dream. In this way the College was dreamed of, and in this way, it is loved by its bishops who give priority to this house, offering you, young priests, the opportunity to create a vision, a reflection and an experience of communion that is expressly “Latin Americanized.”󰀁󰀂

Being Latin Americanized, for Francis, means going beyond any kind of nation or charism, it means becoming a common meeting place, a Great Homeland, a place where diversity is not only respected but above all, encouraged. From this standpoint it is compulsory to create a common vision, as well as concrete socio-political and ecclesial structures, that includes going straight against any sort of colonization that might endanger that inherent cultural identity. It is Francis’s view on the destiny of Latin America which he is trying to communicate – as much as it would be pertinent to do so – from the Petrine See to the Church worldwide, and to the whole world. It is in that regard that Pope Bergoglio represents a critical approach to the centralization of power, which transversally crosses socio-political, economic and ecclesial structures. How could this be otherwise? Opposing imperialism and the centralization of power without also questioning the current ecclesial structures would simply be a populist standpoint; it would be a lie, a point which we will come back to later. For this inclusive non-uniform communion to be accomplished, one must dare to dream. II. Expanding the Boundaries by Re-understanding the Center On the 󰀂󰀀󰀀th anniversary of Argentina’s independence from Spain, Francis called on its citizens to do precisely this, to “dare to dream” by 󰀁󰀂  Audience with the Community of the Pontifical Latin American College, November 󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀁󰀁/ 󰀁󰀅/󰀁󰀈󰀁󰀁󰀁󰀅c.html.

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bringing together both the memories of the elderly and the courage of youth.󰀁󰀃 Argentinians, he said, have to follow the path of their Latin American ancestors, the ones that had dreamt of a totally different sociopolitical endeavor where both the cultures and subcultures impose their best qualities on a standardizing social order.󰀁󰀄 Just one year before that, Francis had also addressed a beautiful letter to the Argentinians on the occasion of the 󰀁󰀀󰀀th anniversary of the Faculty of Theology of the Catholic University of Argentina.󰀁󰀅 Interestingly enough, here too the Pope spoke in terms of expanding the frontiers, this time, the theological ones. For him practicing theology means “living in a frontier” where the Gospel meets the people’s needs in a meaningful and understandable manner. What is needed is a theo-politics that confronts the “desk’s/ museum’s theologians” with theologians who are based among the marginalized, living and thinking from within the peripheral environments, who do not have any intention of domesticating Revelation. Such a theo-politics brings together both the crudity of reality, with all its conflicts and miseries, and the best of his local theological tradition. Two questions arise: How can such a reality be described? and where does that tradition come from? When the reality of Latin America and the Caribbean is analyzed at an intra-national level, clearly marginality becomes a common ground. The continent may be described as a great marginal corpus, where the marginal condition reflects itself in citizens being deprived not only of basic resources and goods, but also of real participation in decisionmaking spheres, where their destinies are being determined. It is a radical marginalization that – in political language – does not refer to “proletarianism” but rather to a cultural systemic destruction of the lower strata. This marginalization inevitably leads to structural domination and oppression. Within this context, throughout the last decades the social movements had become an essential component of critical reflection and a spearhead to penetrate a society of privileges. The socio-political and 󰀁󰀃  Letter to the Argentinian Episcopal Conference, July 󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. https://w󰀂.vatican. va/content/francesco/en/letters/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀇󰀀󰀈_indipendenza-argentina.html. 󰀁󰀄  Cf. John Charles Chasteen, Americanos: Latin America’s Struggle for Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈), 󰀁󰀆󰀀-󰀁󰀆󰀁. 󰀁󰀅  Letter of Francis to the Grand Chancellor of the Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, for the 󰀁󰀀󰀀th Anniversary of the Founding of the Faculty of Theology, March 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀃󰀀󰀃_lettera-universita-cattolica-argentina.html.

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popular movements have also shown their pertinence to Francis in rebuilding a broken society, in his own homeland. To be sure, to trace back the tradition he belongs to, Bergoglio was educated and became a priest precisely while huge socio-political and also ecclesial transformations were occurring both continentally and globally. He undeniably belongs to the generation under the influence of a post-conciliar Latin American Church that was confronting very tough socio-political circumstances, where a turning point for global Catholicism occurred. Much has been said in this regard.󰀁󰀆 From that background, the Jesuit Pope has gone through an examination of the profound roots of the cultural transformations and problems and left behind the “class struggle” analysis. The revolutionary ideologies in the form of nationalism had been at work although roughly contested by mechanisms of mediation between the authorities and the communitarian bases. Such a mediation had rationalized the conflict between the common good and the private interests as an alternative way of surpassing the continental marginalization. Politically, the developed/underdeveloped societies theories settled the discourses and policies. Ecclesiastically, the Church had questioned itself about its identity as well as the relevance of its doctrines and disciplines. In calling for scrutinizing the signs of the times and interpreting them in the light of the Gospel, the Church had beautifully bound divine revelation with historical events. That platform was taken and developed much further by the Latin American and Caribbean Church throughout the decades immediately following the Council. The natural place where these political and ecclesial developments had decanted was the diagnosis of a structural sociopolitical situation of injustices that challenged the Church’s theology and praxis about marginalization. The conviction was that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, came from the margins to liberate human beings from being excluded and that the excluded themselves, from these same margins, play the lead in the liberation process. Such a view involved the conviction that the power that might eventually change the state of order can only come from below. The “margins/frontiers/from below” narrative is not extraneous to the ecclesial 󰀁󰀆  As it is in Th. Rourke, The Roots of Pope Francis’s Social and Political Thought: From Argentina to the Vatican (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). Another more nationalistic biographical approach is found in Armando Puente, Yo, Argentino: Las raíces argentinas del papa Francisco (Buenos Aires: Distal, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). Puente goes into the Bergoglio’s Peronist thought in depth, as well as his bounds with the Theology of the People of Gera, Scannone and Tello.

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Latin-American accounts, nor is it a novelty within ordinary post-conciliar continental Catholicism. While acknowledging this, one must realize that Bergoglio’s standpoint is a quite “standard” one among postconciliar Latino priests. The novelty, however, is that this way of understanding social, political and ecclesial changes has arrived at the See of Peter from an evidence based narrative. As a global religious figure, Francis begins with a globalized vision within a globalized world. Laudato Si’ is a clear example of such a view, where Francis links the earth and ecological issues with God and his creational plan of salvation. The preferential option/obligation for the poorest, from such a view, becomes a theological category, not a political-sociological one;󰀁󰀇 although the connection between these two spheres seems to be undeniable. From this “margins/frontiers/from below” narrative, Francis is also mapping the interconnectedness of the socio-political developments and the ecclesial orders. This papacy is taking into the global ecclesio-political arena what a regional church has been developing doctrinal-theologically and in praxis for decades. It comes from the foundations of the Medellín Assembly of 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀈 and goes far beyond liberation theology and the so-called theology of the people. Indeed, Francis develops an ecclesiology of the peripheries that he intends to make the worldwide ecclesiological paradigm by updating the best from Medellín (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀈) to Aparecida (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇); in our opinion, he is not exporting Medellín or Aparecida to the entire Church. It is not his intention to impose a Latin American ecclesiological model or pattern but rather to impel the local churches to assume the mission by inculturating themselves (EG 󰀂󰀇, 󰀃󰀀, 󰀁󰀁󰀇). The theological density of the socio-political issues and the social movements is regarded as the underlying factor of inculturation, which can be described as the acknowledgment and discernment of historical events as signs of the times and the positive understanding of culture(s) and history. Does it not belong to the depositum fidei itself, which was updated globally by Vatican II? Nevertheless, it does not seem quite obvious that a Pope assumes the marginalization and the human margins as a Leitmotiv of his Pontificate, which when applied to the entire apparatus ecclesiasticus should end up in gradually fading internal as well as external boundaries. And here we come to the point where Francis’s academic and ecclesiastical biography is at work. First of all, his undeniable optimism  Cf. Jorge Castro, La visión estratégica del papa Francisco (Buenos Aires: Distal, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). 󰀁󰀇

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regarding a discerned, planned and projected future.󰀁󰀈 When he calls upon a Church to go towards and become a margin, in the sense of moving away from the center to meet the marginalized, a well-known Latin American tradition of social Catholicism arises, too. It has been sustained under an open theology of the Church that enabled these communities to engage with the ongoing socio-political processes.󰀁󰀉 The foundations of this ecclesiology that blurs boundaries, an ecclesiology of the peripheries, come from Francis’s own understanding of the Latin American tradition since Medellín where a process of ecclesial renovation was initiated because of Vatican II. Medellín pointed out the institutional and structural dimensions of the poverty and injustices, inequality, oppression and institutional violence, as well as the need for a renewal of the structures that brought along a theological-pastoral dynamism in view of the socio-transformative dimension of the faith.󰀂󰀀 Within that tradition, Francis has great awareness of the socio-structural dimension of poverty and marginalization and articulates it by paying particular attention to the existential dimension of the human suffering. There was a positive development compared to the conciliar teaching on the matter. The Council made a start with decentralizing the Church and sending it into the world. Such a perspective produced a Copernican turning point, namely that the spiritual powers would no longer also exercise the temporal ones. Now it is the world which establishes the norms and points towards the religious goals. Nonetheless, the Council 󰀁󰀈  We are reminded here of an interview with Jorge María Bergoglio as Archbishop of Buenos Aires: “Optimism is a psychological attitude towards life. Hope goes beyond. It is the anchor that one throws to the future and that allows [us] to pull the rope to reach what [we] craves. It is to strive in the right direction.” Cf. Sergio Rubin and Francesca Ambrogetti, El Jesuita: Conversaciones con el cardenal Jorge Bergoglio, S.J. (Barcelona: Vergara, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀), 󰀁󰀆󰀅 [translation mine]. 󰀁󰀉  The renovation of the ecclesial structures since the 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀s, be it the land reform headed by ecclesial figures such as the ones in Chile, Brazil or Peru, for instance, promote constructive actions for the popular movements. In parallel, many organizations of priests were appealing for a renovation of the priesthood in the light of the socio-political demands until the early 󰀈󰀀s, but significant associations of religious orders like the CLAR also emerged. The laity committed themselves to social development issues organizing themselves to also live their faith in a politically engaged way. 󰀂󰀀  To some extent this is in line with what the Argentinian Bishops pointed out at the conciliar aula: The Church must pay particular attention to the methodology that connects the natural and supernatural orders and accordingly become poor. The social engagement belongs to the evangelical mission of the Church. Cf. Luis Liberti, La participación de los Obispos de Argentina en los esquemas del Concilio Vaticano II. Vol. II: Constituciones Conciliares (Buenos Aires: Editorial Guadalupe, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀄󰀉󰀃-󰀄󰀉󰀄.

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had not accurately historicized that world, a world where the majority of human beings suffer from injustice and marginalization. Medellín knew the insufficiency of talking about openness to the world without determining with clarity and precision what world they were referring to, what it looked like and where it was to be found. It was the tremendous value of Medellín that it overcame the conciliar limitations on that matter by critically reflecting and describing the reality of the world and by examining what constituted the world using conciliar criteria. In concretizing and historicizing redemption in terms of the liberation of concrete and local social injustices, political oppression and economic marginalization, Medellín took a huge step forward by substituting a concrete and meaningful language for an abstract one. The Council had indeed produced and developed an open theology in dialogue with the modern world, situating the world and all its density of temporal realities at the center. At receiving and locally updating that teaching, Medellín established a theology and a teaching committed to the concrete liberation processes, by naming them. Such a process gained much strength and vitality with Francis. His own understanding of this tradition reveals his perception of the theological density and spiritual character of the socio-political issues as much as his concerns for the role that the Church is playing in society. Within this context, the Jesuit Pope considers the Council to be a rereading of the Gospel from the perspective of contemporary culture. Such a rereading was – in his understanding – locally received in Medellín and needs to be developed further globally.󰀂󰀁 In urging the whole Church to become “a poor church for the poor” or “an outgoing church towards the world’s peripheries”, the Pope is situating himself at a coordinate equidistant from both the Council and Medellín (as global and local magisterium, respectively) and future Catholicism as well. Such a point of departure – the Council and Medellín – shapes the Pontiff’s ecclesial agenda towards a discernment of the historical problems and contemporary challenges from the viewpoint of the one who habits and exists within the margins, as theological places. It also denotes a particular way of doing theology and developing magisterial teaching: most attention needs to go to the surface problems of the socio-existential margins, and 󰀂󰀁  Cf. Letter of Francis to the Grand Chancellor of the Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, for the 󰀁󰀀󰀀th Anniversary of the Founding of the Faculty of Theology, March 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀃󰀀󰀃_lettera-universita-cattolica-argentina.html [accessed January 󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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to the care of the common house, the culture of solidarity as well as the crucial role of the socio-popular movements that are strongly guiding the political agenda within the Latin American countries. Francis keeps an eye on them: the ecological, student and women’s movements that are in the process of reshaping a different socio-political and ecclesial order. Francis’s political narratives indeed in a way defy ideological categories and are a way of doing international relations in reconceptualizing the global order. Such a reconceptualization begins by placing the diverse peripheries in the center; margins that are not confined to just one geographical region or to a predetermined social category. The peripheries become the place from which reality is observed. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the destruction of glaciers in Latin America and the subjugation of native cultures all provided Bergoglio with some particular lenses to look at refugees, climate change and immigrants from all over the world with a sort of peripheral foresight, meaning to assign the unique value that each human corner has. All those corners – in their uniqueness – configure the pattern through which Francis draws out his living/announcing/denouncing/theologizing/forging doctrine. The margins are challenging the institutional belonging. There is no search for a new Christendom whatsoever. The Latin American dream today includes even more plurality than two hundred years ago, not only because of the ongoing cultural changes and the extended religious pluralism but mostly because of the engagement in blurring boundaries from the standpoint of the margins. Within this diverse context, Francis’s principal goal is to make the poorest the main focus of the Church. It is precisely this orientation that has allowed him to intervene in large-scale debates on such matters as the consequences of the current capitalist economy, mass migration and political migration policies, as well as the undeniable ecological issue of climate change. By valuing the immense plurality, Francis’s call points to decentralizing the standpoint of the evangelical discernment by pushing forward diversity from the perspective of the poorest. In the words of the third Latin American Episcopal Assembly held in Puebla, Mexico in 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉, the Church must have a preferential option for the poor in whatever moral or personal/existential situation they were found (cf. DP 󰀂󰀇). Francis’s margins relate to each other and with the poorest, as described in Puebla and thereafter. Poverty is to be understood as a human and socioeconomic phenomenon, massive among us and not only related to deprivation but also to the humiliations, frustrations and marginalization of the whole societal spectrum. This Pontiff’s magisterium has renewed

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Puebla’s option (to favor the poor) by also giving a concrete face to the poor (cf. DP 󰀂󰀈) and to the marginalized. This in turn obliges the Church to be attentive and sensitive to the current demands, mostly from the marginal situations of children, youth and women. Within such a view, the values of popular culture will emerge; both the Church and society might learn from the marginalized (the majority of the population of the South) about their own way of building harmonious relationships, as beautifully stated by Francis before the natives of the Andes and Amazon regions last year: “[…] Allow me to state that if, for some, you are viewed as an obstacle or a hindrance, the fact is your lives cry out against a style of life that is oblivious to its own real cost. You are a living memory of the mission that God has entrusted to us all: the protection of our common home.”󰀂󰀂 Why should the entire Church move into such an ecclesiological paradigm? Again, the corn stone of Francis’s geopolitical ideas is that the destiny of the Latin American people and the destiny of Catholicism as such are intimately interrelated. Francis acknowledges the strong potential that the above-mentioned tradition has for a global Catholicism when it aims to be relevant in society. His “outgoing church” statement might rightly be considered a more developed conciliar ecclesiology which positions the center at the outside of oneself by touching the very core as follows: “the Church is as a sacrament, as a ‘sign and instrument of salvation’,” a community that mediates and should bring both vertical and horizontal communion by critically examining the way we relate to each other, to creation and to God. Francis’s utterance refers precisely to this moving towards suffering humanity so as to become “sign and mediation” of the mercy and justice of God: “outgoing towards the peripheries.” Such a displacement is indeed the core of the ecclesial reform developed by Medellín, faithfully and creatively taken over and understood by the Jesuit Pope. As has been said, Francis combines “the political genius of a charismatic leader and the prophetic mysticism of a saint of the desert.”󰀂󰀃 These are the gifts that during this pontificate are at work in receiving the tradition. 󰀂󰀂  It was on January 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 in Peru. See http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/january/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀁󰀁󰀉_peru-puertomaldonadopopoliamazzonia.html [accessed January 󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀃  Austen Ivereigh, El gran reformador: Francisco, retrato de un papa radical (Madrid: Ediciones B, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), 󰀄󰀇󰀅.

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Undeniably, the entire Church has to move towards the peripheries; the extension of the whole, where the borders manifest the potential of life. In their post-conciliar social role, the ecclesial communities on the continent are witnessing the potential emerging from areas where no one expects anything to emerge. The Argentinian Pope knows this from experience. While Archbishop of Buenos Aires, Bergoglio showed that he had particular criteria, an interpretative way to look at the unity and reform of the province, which had gone far from an ideology and placed the poorest in the center. It seems that he was well aware of the fact that the elite was wrong in clericalizing the reform. For him “not the clergy, not the bishops, not Rome itself was in a possession of a truth, something that could have been distributed from above, but rather that the Holy Spirit revealed itself through a dialogue between the faithful and the universal Church.”󰀂󰀄 For developing such a perspective, the theological/geopolitical analysis of the reality from below is compulsory, in order to have both a missionary instrument and global integration. In other words, the Church will not accomplish its mission of mediating communion without a profound understanding of what has been confined to the borders, and without an accurate knowledge of the lands, of the territories, of the boundaries. For this model to be achieved, Bergoglio provides an account in his Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, a sort of foreign-affairs manual. In it, the ecclesiological paradigm mirrors the Church with reality, and a Church that interferes with reality would be willing and prepared to take the field with realism and inclusiveness, because “unity shall always prevail over conflict” (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀆-󰀂󰀃󰀀) not by standardizing but rather by taking the best of each particular place. ‘Messing’ with reality means seeking a collective good, because Francis is convinced that “the whole is greater than the part” (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀁), it is wider than the triumph of any particular frontage. This Pope’s geopolitics, therefore, does not separate vision from caution; instead he tries to connect the two in his approach to reality. Tracing those insights back, it is easy to arrive at a more recent ecclesiopolitical approach, the one provided by CELAM 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 in Aparecida,󰀂󰀅 where then-Cardinal Bergoglio played a crucial role: “Everywhere is mission  Ivereigh, El gran reformador, 󰀁󰀆󰀃.  Galli rightly points out that Aparecida and the Pope reflect one another. Cf. Carlos Maria Galli, La alegría del Evangelio en América Latina: De la Conferencia de Medellín a la canonización de Pablo VI (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀈-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈) (Buenos Aires: Ágape, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), 󰀉󰀃. It is rather simple to trace back the current magisterium to the 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 CELAM Assembly, nonetheless, we do believe that Aparecida is reflected in the Pope and that the Pope’s actions far exceed what was pointed out there. 󰀂󰀄 󰀂󰀅

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territory, and everything in the Church must be mission-driven” (DA 󰀄󰀃󰀁). The activity of the whole Church should be directed toward missionary discipleship, decentralizing itself, abandoning the sacristy for the streets and the cozy ecclesial ghettos for the field hospitals. It was called “The Great Continental Mission,” renewing the biblical-theological category of discipleship for Church-society relations. That is the Latin American dream, that is – in Francis’s view – the Latin American destiny as well as the destiny of worldwide Catholicism. III. Nightmares within the Dream: Francis’s Ecclesiology of the Peripheries Contested from Within Nevertheless, within that dream there are nightmares too. The decade since Aparecida has been politically difficult in the CELAM countries. Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador have all had to deal with political crises. Engaging in missionary work becomes more difficult when various regimes are very diligently filling the “field hospital” with sick/dead/destroyed and marginalized bodies. The Church’s credibility regarding its preference for poor communities, as places of social cohesion and mediating communion, as secure environments to build up an inclusive community is being contested by diverse fronts, and not only external ones. One of the most critical global and extended issues is, indeed, the gender agenda as a whole. In the public square, female believers’ fights strongly confront the religious institutional orders by pressing to harmonize their traditions with “common sense.” Female ecclesial marginalization has been raised as evidence, while increasingly, gender inequalities are being rejected by civil society. Women must no longer be excluded from any arena; doing so is seen as an injustice that generates imbalance and leaves dead bodies. In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, nearly three thousand women were murdered in Latin America and The Caribbean alone.󰀂󰀆 Statistics like these had recently forced eighteen Latin American countries to modify their laws to finally codify and punish the femicides.󰀂󰀇 Just before the World Youth Days in Panama Francis brought up the subject of femicide 󰀂󰀆  See the indicators on the CEPAL Observatorio de Igualdad de Género de América Latina y el Caribe webpage https://oig.cepal.org/es/indicadores/feminicidio [accessed January 󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀇  Costa Rica (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇), Guatemala (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈), Chile and El Salvador (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀), Argentina, Mexico and Nicaragua (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂), Bolivia, Honduras, Panama and Peru (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), Ecuador,

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on the Continent, calling it a plague.󰀂󰀈 By acknowledging and ethically judging this reality, Francis is taking a position himself and is willing to engage the episcopate too. The power asymmetries in human relationships have created the space for women to be abused, even killed, in many ways. The Pope knows the situation can no longer be prolonged without lamenting even more losses. Such a diagnosis should be followed by a revision of the asymmetrical internal power relations, but it is not so clear thus far whether the Pope intends to reformulate internal policies. Before the Pontifical Commission for Latin America, at the beginning of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, Francis continued to approach the women’s situation as a “women’s theme,” as something external that apparently is not related with ecclesial structures as such. He referred to the need of facing the pastoral attention to women by bearing in mind the female quality of the identity of the Church itself. As it was expressed as a hermeneutical criterion to deal with the situation of women in the Church, it seems to us not only insufficient but clearly inappropriate, and also quite distant from Francis’s own statement on the female face of the hope of Latin America. The theoretical recognition of women’s social and ecclesial strength, as well as their capabilities to reshape realities according to their needs, is dissonant with the ecclesial structures that have neither been revised nor changed in accordance with those narratives. It is true that ecclesial as well as public opinion had some raised expectations on receiving the news of the Pope appointing women to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, or his approval of a commission ad hoc to study the possibilities of rehabilitation of the women’s deaconate, in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. Nevertheless, here too Francis has not gone much further, demonstrating his distance from contemporary social women’s movements. Latin American Catholicism has certainly influenced such a lack of developments. To be sure, with regard to Latin American post-conciliar Catholicism, gender inclusion is as important as it is irrelevant. Such a paradox is easily verifiable. When the Latin American and Caribbean Episcopal Assemblies, from Medellín (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀈) to Aparecida (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇) had faced the role of women in society and the Church, they progressively and strongly affirmed the need to promote and defend women’s equality Dominican Republic and Venezuela (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), Brazil and Colombia (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), Paraguay (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) and Uruguay (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀂󰀈  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀀󰀁󰀂󰀆_omelia-cattedrale-panama.html [accessed January 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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over that of men in the public arena, in the same way as Vatican II did (GS 󰀉, 󰀂󰀉). Yet the conciliar magisterium was extremely deficient in facing the nature and mission of women in ecclesial life, almost without nuances. This lack of doctrinal development followed the same pattern in the local magisterium. Women are still an “issue”; they are seen within the framework of the family institution (GS 󰀅󰀂) and in their maternal and educator mission (SD 󰀁󰀀󰀈; DA 󰀄󰀅󰀁-󰀄󰀅󰀈), as well as in allowing (even the possibility of) the non-ordained ministries to be exercised in their communities (DP 󰀈󰀄󰀅). It has not been critically problematized or reflected theological-doctrinally, in order to allow the priesthood to refer to the intra-ecclesial fundamental equality between men and women. Neither have they established the theoretical platform to substantially change institutional mechanisms from exclusive to inclusive ones. What has not been provided by the magisterium must be led by a theology that emerges from the praxis, from spirituality. It is clear to us that the Argentinian Pope is seeing women’s “issues” from the continental traditional stance with all its limitations. Women’s margins – in practice – have not entered as a clear sign of the current times yet. The changes within the Roman Catholic Church have always been if not outdated, at least slow. Within the last half century, the population has doubled in Latin America alone. On the other hand, the number of priests has not followed this demographic explosion. This has created a huge problem, and the Church’s clericalism as an institution prevents it from finding a solution.󰀂󰀉 Not all ordained priests are being replaced.󰀃󰀀 In the same line of argument, as for Francis, the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 Synod for the Amazon region seems to be the evidence of the local (Latin American) magisterium’s failure. The unifying/no-frontiers dream falls down when faced with the issue of re-conceiving the ordained ministries in the light 󰀂󰀉  For this to be understood see J. Orlandis, “Consideraciones sobre la evolución estadística de la Iglesia en el último cuarto del siglo XX,” Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia 󰀁󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀃): 󰀁󰀈󰀆. For one good example, see the online article by Rafael Marcoccia, “Brasil: Muchas comunidades y pocos sacerdotes,” Tierras de América: Noticias y análisis desde América Latina, 󰀂/󰀀󰀈/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 [online http://www.tierrasdeamerica.com/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/󰀀󰀈/󰀀󰀂/ brasil-muchas-comunidades-y-pocos-sacerdotes-el-papa-auspicia-soluciones-valientes-yconcretas-una-empieza-tomar-forma-los-ministros-ordenados-locales/]. 󰀃󰀀  According to the Central Statistical Office of the Holy See, in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂, there were – as an average – 󰀆 seminarians out of 󰀁󰀀󰀀 faithful in Latin America and The Caribbean. Cf. Vittorio Formenti and Enrico Nenna, “Il seme che continua a germogliare,” L’Osservatore Romano, 󰀁󰀀/󰀀󰀅/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 [print version].

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of the demands of the whole Andes and Amazon region (plus many urban regions in some countries, such as Chile) for a non-celibate voluntary priesthood able to take up the mission. These geographically remote lands have for decades been searching for viable ways to confront their marginal social and ecclesial contexts. The same Francis acknowledged his own and the world’s ignorance about these lands and their potential for the whole native and urban world. On January 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, on the occasion of the Apostolic Visit to Chile and Peru, Francis addressed the indigenous Peruvians by recognizing that “Each culture and each worldview that receives the Gospel enriches the Church by showing a new aspect of Christ’s face. The Church […] does not want to be aloof from your way of life and organization.”󰀃󰀁 According to the committed ecclesiastical figures, the Catholic Church could learn a lot from the way these native communities from the most extended region on the continent organize themselves. A native sociology is being developed among the so-called high and low lands (literally differing in altitude by up to five kilometers) which do not operate as autonomous or even antagonistic cultural areas but rather as independent fields whose knowledge might be reciprocally illuminating.󰀃󰀂 Within such a framework, authority and power are not synonymous with coercion; on the contrary, leadership is always understood as a rotating role in connection to communities’ needs and challenges. Leadership is being shared too, because the geographical location of the communities makes them difficult to access. Since everything is related, as in normal life, the natives’ religious leaders are naturally seen as sociopolitical leaders too and they are being affected by the obligation of celibate ministerial priesthood. More will be heard of their views on the matter when the Synod takes place. One might presume that Francis is going to deal with socially committed ecclesial communities that will strongly contest his stance of maintaining the obligatory celibacy for the ministerial priesthood without any further consideration.󰀃󰀃

󰀃󰀁  See http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/january/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀁󰀁󰀉_peru-puertomaldonado-popoliamazzonia.html [accessed January 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀂  A recent work on the matter: Diego Villar and Isabelle Combès, eds., Las tierras bajas de Bolivia: Miradas históricas y antropológicas, Colección Ciencias Sociales de El País 󰀂󰀉 (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: El País, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂). 󰀃󰀃  As he has endorsed it on January 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 https://www.catholicnews.com/services/ englishnews/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/affirming-celibacy-pope-explains-narrow-possibility-for-marriedpriests.cfm.

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It is not going to be an easy issue to resolve, since Francis is entirely aware of the particular cultural and spiritual fertility of these places. He himself approaches their representatives by acknowledging that It is a diverse face, one of infinite variety and enormous biological, cultural and spiritual richness. Those of us who do not live in these lands need your wisdom and knowledge to enable us to enter into, without destroying, the treasures that this region holds. And to hear an echo of the words that the Lord spoke to Moses: “Remove the sandals from your feet, for the place on which you are standing is holy ground” (Ex 󰀃:󰀅). Allow me to say once again: “Praise to you, Lord, for your marvelous handiwork in your Amazonian peoples and for all the biodiversity that these lands embrace!󰀃󰀄

What would “needing” their wisdom and knowledge mean, then, when it comes to the theological-doctrinal developments of the ministries in the Church? The entire address had beautifully connected almost all of Francis’s entire political and ecclesial agenda. Here too the Pope expressed his will to promote cultural respect, which enables true dialogue within diversity. He acknowledges the need to institutionalize social and ecclesial policies that promote inclusion. We hear the Pope saying: We have to break with the historical paradigm that views Amazonia as an inexhaustible source of supplies for other countries without concern for its inhabitants. I consider it essential to begin creating institutional expressions of respect, recognition and dialogue with the native peoples, acknowledging and recovering their native cultures, languages, traditions, rights and spirituality. […] Recognition and dialogue will be the best way to transform relationships whose history is marked by exclusion and discrimination.󰀃󰀅

Even if the ecclesial co-responsibility for social justice and the care of the common house that Francis is calling us to have is fairly consistent with the recent G󰀂󰀀 agenda (December 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈) held in Francis’s own “land” – Argentina – his own geopolitics runs the risk of losing strength precisely because of bad management at the level of ecclesial politics. Indeed, the Latin American Church’s missionary energy has dramatically diminished in countries like Chile, where child (as well as adult male and female) sexual abuse cases, plus their covering up by bishops, are being so disastrously coped with in both Chile and Rome. The calamitous 󰀃󰀄  Puerto Maldonado, Peru, January 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/ en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/january/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀁󰀁󰀉_peru-puertomaldonadopopoliamazzonia.html [accessed January 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀅  Ibid.

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crisis, from which it will take at least two generations to recover, takes the communities and membership into investigations, compensation, restoration and hopefully also reconciliation. The crisis alludes to something within the Church that broke itself. The Church must analyze it and decide how it is going to be repaired in the short term. The G󰀂󰀀 Francis meeting address, welcoming the so-called Group of Twenty leaders in Buenos Aires just last December 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, Argentinian President Mauricio Macri stated “Sustainable development is the north star of all our economic, social and environmental goals.” Pedro Sánchez, Spanish Prime Minister, added that “we have tried to push for a global governance that is fairer, more prosperous and more inclusive.” A fairer, prosperous and inclusive global governance is dear to Francis’s political agenda, too. However, as long as the Church that he leads continues to be plagued by badly managed scandals there will be little space for trust, unless this Pontiff prefers “to err in trying rather than staying pure by observing” and dares to keep facing the internal affairs as deeply as he embraces the external ones. Little has been done in this regard. Francis very timidly began to echo some of the current achievements in secular society and politics by, for instance, intending to leave behind the classic Eurocentric Catholicism and thus slightly increasing the responsibilities of the local episcopal conferences.󰀃󰀆 He is increasingly taking Latin American voices into the “super-structures,”󰀃󰀇 although with less drastic measures when it comes to women’s involvement and transparent public procedures.

󰀃󰀆  Although in the exceptional case of Chile and because of the huge failure of the local episcopal conference as a whole, a sort of Romano-centrism came back to solve a local crisis through an ‘intervention’. Now, the real possibility exists that, for instance, the next Archbishop of Santiago may be a foreigner, appointed directly by Rome. Also Francis’s appointments to the red hat have somewhat changed the geopolitical equilibrium of the assembly that will elect the next global Catholic authority. To be sure, the representation of Latin American and the Caribbean grew to more or less 󰀆%. Nevertheless, although the continent has provided the Catholic Church with its largest membership population, its representation has always been underdeveloped. 󰀃󰀇  Francis has also achieved worldwide recognition for some great Latin American leaders, among them Óscar Romero who represents the fight for social justice, equality and the Church’s option for the poor, Enrique Angelelli, Hêlder Cámara, Rutilio Grande and Esteban Gumucio. No women have been mentioned so far. The Church has a pastoral vocation that all those ecclesial leaders witnessed. By publicly recognizing them, Francis places himself on their paths, modernizing gestures and styles, codes and visions accordingly.

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IV. Concluding Remarks The continental episcopal conference for Latin America (CELAM) – stretching from Mexico to Argentina and including the Caribbean – was established by Pius XII and held its first plenary meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀅. In parallel, many different initiatives have been created in Latin America since the 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀀s along the lines of the “sueño bolivariano,” such as the ODECA (Organization of the Central-American States), the Andes Nations Community, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Latin American parliament and the Pacific Alliance. The core idea is to build up the unity of Latin America within the framework of a multipolar world, a vision that had managed to limit the imperial globalization of the Anglo-Saxon world. By analyzing Francis’s challenging of exclusion through his receptiveness to local Latin American and Caribbean utopian narratives, we have touched the core of the current pontificate’s message, namely the absolute conviction that the socio-political and ecclesial order must be turned into a more inclusive one by taking the marginalized as leading figures of any kind of transformation. The boundaries blur themselves while moving the center to the heart of the margins and it is from there that everything at the social level can be re-understood. Such an approach – from the borders themselves – to reality and facing its problematic corners is clearly present in Francis’s theology of the Church although not well reflected in its ecclesial policies and reforms so far. This is turning out to be quite problematic for the credibility of his message, which has in general been received positively by quite a number of Catholics and non-Catholics alike. As a Latin American pope, Bergoglio has taken developments in the socio-cultural sphere, as issues intimately related to this religious tradition, into the Catholic arena. By doing so, he is bringing to global Catholicism a Continental way of understanding and living Christianity, traditionally represented by the local magisterium since the late 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀s as well as the peculiar and well-known contextual theology developed throughout the last six decades. Yet, this Pontiff, in our view, is not trying to “Latin Americanize” the Catholic world. He knows that we have already had enough of the longterm Europe-centered Catholicism, and that turning the tables would simply be a non-“Catholic” move. He is rather trying to equalize the asymmetrical relationships between the north and the south within both the socio-political and ecclesial institutional organizations. While not

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losing strength in his geopolitics because of bad management at the level of ecclesial politics, he will eventually succeed in bringing the best of his local tradition to global Catholicism.

The Geopolitics of Pope Francis and the USA Massimo Faggioli I. Introduction The relationship between Francis and the USA has been difficult since the beginning of the pontificate, at both the political and the ecclesiastical levels. The peak in this difficult relationship was reached on the political level during the presidential campaign until the election of Donald Trump in November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 – a little over one year after Pope Francis’s visit to the USA in September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. On the ecclesiastical level, the tensest moment of the relationship coincided with the unprecedented crisis of the summer of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 with the allegations made through the press by former nuncio to the USA (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò, against Francis. Archbishop Viganò concluded his testimony with a request for Pope Francis’s resignation. In those tumultuous weeks of August and September a noninsignificant minority of the US episcopate and the Catholic conservative intelligentsia carefully avoided signaling their communion with Rome and actually took a public position about Francis’s papacy that can be described as evasive if not flirting with schism.󰀁 As shocking as this was, this unprecedented fracture between Francis and part of the US bishops reflected a pre-existing positioning on their part of the US, and it was not surprising as it followed the ideological trajectory of important sectors of political and religious conservatism within US Catholicism. There are indeed different factors in the tensions between Francis and the USA, such as the transition, within US Catholic intellectual circles during the last decade, from the 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s-󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀀s generation of Catholic neoconservatives to a younger generation of Catholic journalists and intellectuals that are closer to anti-Vatican II traditionalism than to neo-conservatism;󰀂 there is a visible chasm between Francis and these circles on a range of issues, especially moral-theological issues and on the Catholic social doctrine. 󰀁  For an accurately researched chronicle of those weeks in the summer of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, see Andrea Tornielli and Gianni Valente, Il giorno del giudizio (Milan: Piemme, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈). 󰀂  See Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Origins of a Movement (New York: Simon and Schuster, 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉; second edition 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃).

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In the background there is also an important gap between Francis and the US episcopate in terms of political philosophies and theologies. All these elements contribute to the peculiar geopolitical issue at the heart of the difficult relationship between Francis and the USA. Pope Francis has placed his pontificate and the Roman papacy in a new position with respect to both the global political scene and the universality of the Catholic Church in the global world. The new inculturation of the papacy goes well beyond the logistical and most visible aspects such as Francis’s choice to live in a hotel for the clergy in the Vatican (Santa Marta) and not in the papal apartment. It is also a geopolitical repositioning of the papacy and the Vatican in a shifting world order. The relationship between Francis, the USA, and the Americas, from both the geopolitical and the geo-religious point of view, is one of the keys to interpreting Francis’s mind.󰀃 A geopolitical analysis of Pope Bergoglio is essential for relativizing the usual framing of this pontificate within the narrow scope of “right vs. left” or “conservative-traditionalist vs. liberalprogressive categories.” The geopolitical analysis is especially important in order to understand the relationship between US Catholicism and Francis’s pontificate, and it needs to be framed in a complex history of relations between and the Vatican, the USA, and US Catholicism. II. Pre-Existing Geopolitical Tensions between Catholicism and the USA The geopolitics of Pope Francis contain some clear challenges for the geopolitical sense of self of American Christianity, which is linked to a set of ideas about the role of the USA in global history. However, it is not an entirely new history. The geopolitics of the Vatican has been at odds with the geopolitical role of the USA for a long time, the USA and the Catholic Church being two “parallel empires” with moral and political claims that are in some sense competitive and alternative:󰀄 the most important center – historically and politically – of Christianity in Rome vis-à-vis the most 󰀃  See Massimo Borghesi, Jorge Mario Bergoglio: Una biografia intellettuale (Milan: Jaca Book, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). English translation: The Mind of Pope Francis (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈). 󰀄  See Massimo Franco, Imperi paralleli: Vaticano e Stati Uniti: oltre due secoli di alleanza e conflitto (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). English translation: Parallel Empires: The Vatican and the United States. Two Centuries of Alliance and Conflict (New York: Doubleday, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉).

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religious of Western countries since the migration of religious dissenters from Europe in the early 󰀁󰀇th century. There are different actors and intentions between Catholicism and the USA. The geopolitics of the Catholic Church in late modernity/the contemporary global world is made of different components: among the most important are the geopolitics of Vatican diplomacy and the Secretariat of State, of the Roman Curia (especially Propaganda Fide), of the religious orders (the missionary orders, the Jesuits), of Catholic intellectual networks, and of Catholic media. The geopolitics of the USA includes the worldview of military power, economic power, and soft power – the media, but also American religion.󰀅 America is a country with a religious idea of itself: the missionary outreach of Evangelical Christians has also always been a national mission, in continuous competition with the missionary outreach of Catholics. This competition was the mirror of a larger set of tensions: the missionary outreach of the United States of America as a religious and moral idea has always competed with the universalism of Roman Catholicism. To understand the North American situation, it is important to remember that the Catholic Church converted itself to a new sense of internationalism in the 󰀂󰀀th century.󰀆 On the other hand, the American nation has converted itself from internationalism to a new perception of itself, less confident of its role in the world, also in its theological thinking, during these last two decades. This tension between the two “parallel empires” had subsided during the Cold War but had already been evident during the 󰀁󰀉th century and the aftermath of World War I. It has become evident again after the end of the Cold War and has taken a further step with the beginning of a new century that was “inaugurated” by the terrorist attacks of September 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀁. III. Pre-Existing Geopolitical Tensions between Global Catholicism: The Vatican and US Catholicism On top of the pre-existing tensions between the Catholic Church and the USA, even before the election of Francis in March 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, there was a 󰀅  About this see Massimo Faggioli, “Un problema americano per il papa dalla fine del mondo?,” Limes: Rivista italiana di geopolitica 󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄): 󰀁󰀆󰀉-󰀁󰀇󰀆, and id., “Francesco e Trump, convergenze parallele,” Limes 󰀇 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀁󰀉󰀁-󰀁󰀉󰀇. 󰀆  See Jacopo Cellini, Universalism and Liberation: Italian Catholic Culture and the Idea of International Community 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃-󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀈, KADOC Studies in Religion, Culture and Society 󰀂󰀀 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇).

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particular set of geopolitical tensions between the Catholic Church and American Catholicism. The problem is indeed not only between Francis and America in general, but also between Francis and some particularities of American Catholicism. The tension between the geopolitical vision of Francis and that of America is the result of a distance that is not only politicalideological, but especially historical-geographical. It is a tension that sees American Catholics as part of this scenario. Francis called his global perspective the “Magellan’s gaze,” which invites us to look at the center from the periphery: this constitutes a challenge for all the geopolitical worldviews of Americans, including American Catholics.󰀇 In the first place, the worldview of American Catholics has always been conditioned by the debate in the United States between races/ethnicities and between cultural, social, and economic identities within the country. This means that there are a number of different worldviews within American Catholicism, depending on the different ethnic and social components (in a Church that in the USA is as diverse as few others on the globe) and of ideological worldviews. The worldview of white Catholics has a special relationship with Europe (specifically Irish, Italian, German, Polish, and French) from which this component derives: a privileged relationship but at the same time one that conflicts with the old continent perceived as the prey of secularization and now lost to the Catholic faith. Historically, the geopolitics of Catholicism and of the USA has been influenced by the transition of American Catholicism from the religion of poor immigrants from Europe to the religion embodying the cultural mainstream in the USA – and the polarization around it in the last few years. This evolution of American Catholicism was substantiated not only by a socio-economic change, but also by an Americanization of US Catholicism in different ways. Lately US Catholics became American in a new way, becoming part of the discourse, typical of neo-conservative white Catholicism, on the need to make American Catholicism “evangelical” – in some ways, evangelical in a sense that is more political than doctrinal: that is, politically conservative as the “white evangelicals.”󰀈 󰀇  See Antonio Spadaro, “Lo sguardo di Magellano: L’Europa, papa Francesco e il premio Carlo Magno,” La Civiltà Cattolica 󰀃󰀉󰀈󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): 󰀄󰀆󰀉-󰀄󰀇󰀉. For a deeper look at the geopolitics of Francis’s pontificate, see Antonio Spadaro, Il nuovo mondo di Francesco: Come il Vaticano sta cambiando la politica globale (Venice: Marsilio, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈). 󰀈  See George Weigel, Evangelical Catholicism: Deep Reform in the 󰀂󰀁st-Century Church (New York: Basic Books, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄).

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This evangelicalism, including white Catholic evangelicalism, does not exactly share the cosmopolitan and universal vision of the world typical of Roman Catholicism, but sees the world as a village and as a suburbia – with America at the center – and expresses a different vision of citizenship in the world, of identity and geographical position with respect to the universal Catholic vision, especially with regard to other religions and Islam. Evangelical Christianity does not express an idea of citizenship in the world either theologically or geopolitically, and is often prey to the heresy of the “prosperity gospel” – a particular kind of religious culture to which some US Catholics are not immune.󰀉 This evangelicalization of American Christianity and Catholicism represents and embodies the tendency towards shifting boundaries between different Christian identities and confessions, if not the deconfessionalization of Christianity. But it also shows the ethnicization and tribalism of American Catholicism. The debate on race and religion in America is one of the factors of the political resilience of white evangelicalism, despite its evident theological and intellectual crisis – or “the scandal of the evangelical mind,” as the most important American Evangelical intellectual, Mark Noll, called it in a book published in 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄.󰀁󰀀 The question is whether, in what form, and with what kind of variations US Catholicism will follow the path of white evangelical Protestantism in terms of deepening of its conservative political allegiances (in a divide from the non-white component of that Church), paired with a mounting intellectual crisis, especially in terms of its theological tradition. Another pre-existing tension between the Vatican and US Catholicism was around the self-understanding of the Church in the modern world – the ecclesiology of the relationship between the Church and the world and in particular the reception of the pastoral constitution of Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes. The history of the reception of Vatican II in the USA witnessed a first phase of ebullient embrace of the ecclesiology of the council, followed from the beginning of the mid-󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s by a more skeptical view, if not a rejection, of the ecclesiology of dialogue. It was one of the theological effects and contributions to the so-called 󰀉  See Antonio Spadaro and Marcelo Figueroa, “Fondamentalismo evangelicale e integralismo cattolico: Un sorprendente ecumenismo,” La Civiltà Cattolica 󰀄󰀀󰀁󰀀, no. 󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀁󰀀󰀅-󰀁󰀁󰀀; iid., “Teologia della prosperità: Il pericolo di un ‘vangelo diverso’,” La Civiltà Cattolica 󰀄󰀀󰀃󰀄, no. 󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀁󰀁󰀅-󰀁󰀁󰀈. 󰀁󰀀  See Mark A. Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄).

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“culture wars.”󰀁󰀁 The place of “the secular” in Gaudium et Spes is one of the problems for its reception in this ecclesial and ecclesiological context, where the relations between religion and politics in the United States are substantially different from the relations between religion and politics in the culture of those who drafted the pastoral constitution of Vatican II. Particularly different between the context of Gaudium et Spes and American Catholic ecclesiology is that “the role of the state is at center of the focus” of chapter IV (par. 󰀇󰀃-󰀇󰀆) of the constitution. In other words, there is clearly a Transatlantic “God gap” between America and Europe.󰀁󰀂 But there is also a transatlantic “City of God gap” between the USA and the political cultures of Vatican II. Finally, the geopolitical tensions between the Vatican/Catholicism and the USA have centered for quite some time around the issue of the changes within US Catholicism thanks to the immigration of Catholics, especially from Latin American countries. Besides the political and social issue, the ecclesial issue concerns the future of Latinos in the US Catholic Church, where they constitute a growing component of the Church, especially among young Catholics, but in a situation of under-representation in the ecclesiastical circles, among the clergy, academic theologians, and especially in the network of Catholic philanthropy and lobbies in the Catholic media.󰀁󰀃 IV. The Trump-Francis Effect on the Geopolitics of the Church The election of Pope Francis inserted itself in this pre-existing set of geopolitical tensions between the Vatican and the USA/the US Catholic Church. The present time sees a number of other factors that have created a new level of geopolitical tensions during the pontificate of Francis. Between the vision of Pope Francis and the USA today there are numerous elements of tension and opposition that represent a novelty in the history of relations between the Holy See and the White House, at least since the Second World War.󰀁󰀄 󰀁󰀁  See Massimo Faggioli, Catholicism and Citizenship: Political Cultures of the Church in the Twenty-First Century (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀁󰀂  See Thomas Albert Howard, God and the Atlantic: America, Europe, and the Religious Divide (New York: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁). 󰀁󰀃  See Timothy Matovina, Latino Catholicism: Transformation in America’s Largest Church (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄). 󰀁󰀄  About US foreign policy and religion, see Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂).

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First, it must be noted that the Francis effect is magnified by the fact that he became pope during the second term of the Obama presidency (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). There are some similarities between the symbolism of the election of the first African-American president and the first Latin American pope that are suggestive of the geopolitical shift taking place in the 󰀂󰀁th century within Catholicism and symbolized by the election of Francis to the Roman pontificate. The relationship between the pontificate and the USA remained at the theological and cultural-political level during the presidency of Barack Obama and never reached the level of a political clash. Pope Francis’s visit to the USA took place in September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, just a few months after the beginning of the unofficial campaign for the primaries of the presidential elections of November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, but still during the Obama presidency. Francis’s mediation to resolve the tensions between the USA and Cuba, going back to the Castro revolution, was publicly appreciated and acknowledged by the Obama administration in December 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄; Francis’s speech to the US Congress on September 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 was the highest point in the rapprochement between the Argentinien pope and the United States of America. At the same time, during the Obama administration Francis maintained a certain independence in the Vatican from the White House and did not signal an alignment: for Francis’s visit of September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, the decision to arrive in Washington, D.C. from Cuba and the mass celebrated at the USMexico border contained a hard-to-miss political symbolism. The situation changed considerably during the presidential campaign of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, and after the election of Donald Trump – and even earlier, in February 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, when the pope was flying from Mexico and was asked during the in-flight press conference about Donald Trump’s promise to build a wall between the USA and Mexico. Less than six months after the visit to the USA, already during the primaries for the selection of the Republican presidential candidate, the relationship between Francis and the USA started to show both more tension and elements of clarity. The election of Donald Trump to the presidency in November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 helped clarify a misunderstanding that is often part of the narrative about Francis on the other side of the Atlantic, namely that Pope Francis would be a “pan-American pope,” an expression of the whole American continent from Alaska to la Tierra del Fuego, and for this reason he would have better relations with US Catholicism than his predecessors did.󰀁󰀅 Even  This is the thesis, for example, of Manlio Graziano, In Rome We Trust: L’ascesa dei cattolici nella vita politica degli Stati Uniti (Bologna: Il Mulino, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆); English 󰀁󰀅

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without entering into the question of the complex relations between different cultural and national identities within Latin and South America and the specificities of Argentina within Latin America, it is evident that both Trump and Pope Francis’s leadership speak of a continent touched by tensions, which makes it more difficult, also from a religious and Catholic point of view, to speak about pan-Americanism. The election of Trump also helped clarify a key element of the position of American Catholicism in the global world. The present time has to be seen as part of the transition of American Catholicism from the religion of immigrants from Europe to a religion that is increasingly made of immigrants from Latin America facing a political majority – the Republican party – that has taken up, accepted, or considered irrelevant the white supremacist views of its president, who was elected by a majority of white Catholics.󰀁󰀆 There are a few particular factors that have amplified the impact of the geopolitics of Francis on the role of the United States in global Catholicism and in the global world. The first factor that has surfaced in the last decade is the resurgence of the ethnic-racial issue within the political debate on social and economic justice: if the Trump presidency signals the desire to put an end to policies aimed at tackling the gap between whites and other ethnic-racial identities (African-Americans in particular), the rejection of identity rhetoric in Pope Francis is a problem both for a certain type of “white Christians” in American Christianity and for the discourse on identity and progressive “identity politics” in the United States. Jorge Mario Bergoglio-Francis is not perceived, by the WASP culture, as a white of European origin in the same way that Anglo-European white Christians are white. As the history of first the exclusion and then inclusion of Irish Catholics and Italian Catholics in the “whiteness” of US white Christians shows, Catholicism has always presented North America with a particular set of challenges against its perceived and fluctuating racial and ethnic identities.󰀁󰀇 This time, this challenge comes directly from the pope and at a particularly critical time translation: In Rome We Trust: The Rise of Catholics in American Political Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀁󰀆  According to the analysis of the Pew Forum, 󰀆󰀀% of white Catholics voted for Donald Trump compared to 󰀃󰀇% of white Catholics who voted for Hillary Clinton http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/󰀁󰀁/󰀀󰀉/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆-analysis/ft_󰀁󰀆-󰀁󰀁-󰀀󰀉_relig_exitpoll_religrace/. 󰀁󰀇  See especially Robert P. Jones, The End of White Christian America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇).

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for the USA geopolitically, in a crisis of identity about its role as a global power facing new protagonists both politically and religiously. The second factor is the recent debate on the sustainability of the very idea of the United States in the American culture of the so-called “postChristianity.” Francis’s pontificate has coincided with a further stage in the so-called “culture wars” between conservative Catholicism and the liberal mainstream, but also with a genuine concern of many Catholics seeing the rise of the “nones” and the secularization of the USA. This concern with the prospect of a “post-Christian USA” has been translated into a debate on the “options” of American Christians, the most successful of which is “The Benedict Option” by Rod Dreher (blogger and journalist, convert to Catholicism, who left the Catholic communion and became Eastern Orthodox in the aftermath of the sexual-abuse crisis in the early 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀s).󰀁󰀈 This withdrawal option (but not this one alone) is based on the rejection of an ecclesiology of the dialogue between the Church and the world, and is a new version of the fortress mentality.󰀁󰀉 One of the sources of tension is that the very American idea of “civil religion” as a blend of faith and patriotism is directly at odds with Roman Catholicism and in particular with pope Francis’s ecclesiology.󰀂󰀀 From the beginning of his pontificate Francis proposed a far wider agenda than that of “culture wars” on theology and teaching on sexuality; on the other hand, his Vatican II ecclesiology rejects any form of medieval political Augustinianism, which presupposes a superior and a legitimizing role of the Church with respect to secular politics and the secular state. The rejection of “the Benedict Option” by intellectual Catholic circles in the Rome of Francis is a revealing element in the relationship between US Catholicism and this pontificate.󰀂󰀁 This debate, 󰀁󰀈  See Rod Dreher, The Benedict Option: A Strategy for Christians in a Post-Christian Nation (New York: Sentinel, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇); Massimo Faggioli, “The ‘Benedict Option’ and the Debate on ‘Post-Christian America’,” Cristianesimo nella Storia 󰀃󰀈, no. 󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀁󰀇󰀅-󰀁󰀈󰀆. 󰀁󰀉  See Anthony Esolen, Out of the Ashes: Rebuilding American Culture (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇); Charles Chaput, Strangers in a Strange Land: Living the Catholic Faith in a Post-Christian World (New York: Holt, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀂󰀀  For the beginning of the debate on the concept of “civil religion,” see Robert R. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Dædalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 󰀉󰀆, no. 󰀁 (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀇): 󰀁-󰀂󰀁. 󰀂󰀁  Rod Dreher’s best-selling book The Benedict Option was embraced by important US bishops (for example, Charles Chaput and Robert Barron). A few months later, in September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, the book was negatively reviewed during the Italian tour of the author in the pages of the official newspaper of the Holy See, L’Osservatore Romano, by the large-circulation Catholic newspaper owned by the Italian bishops, L’Avvenire, and, earlier in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, by the Jesuit-run and Vatican-vetted journal La Civiltà Cattolica.

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which gives voice to the fear of Christianity (including Catholicism) of becoming a minority and of paying the price of its minority status in terms of persecution and/or loss of religious freedom, is also a reaction to the Obama presidency and to the changes in American society during the previous decade, especially the federal legalization of same-sex marriage. In this context, the ecclesiology of the global Church under Francis, who reads the clash on biopolitics in the Western hemisphere as only part of a world troubled by serious social, economic, and environmental imbalances, is perceived by American conservatism (Catholic and non-Catholic, Christian and non-Christian) as substantially inadequate to understanding and facing the challenges posed by the culture of secularist progressivism and theological liberalism to Christianity and its anthropology. A third element of tension between the worldview of Francis and that of the USA and of some American Catholics is the theological and social ideas/stereotypes about the epochal crisis of migrants and refugees. On the issue of migrants and refugees there is little difference, and actually a visible convergence, between the positions of the US bishops and Francis: the notable exception concerns the implications of the kind of support given implicitly by some US Catholic bishops to Donald Trump in the presidential election of November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. But there are deep and subtle cultural differences between the apparent convergence of Francis’s and the US bishops’ statements on immigrants and refugees. For Francis as a priest and a Jesuit, the Church and the world are in a process of global “resettlement.” If the American imagination is that of a world for settlers and of a nation settled by Christians, for Francis it is a world for re-settlers, for the displaced: in his moral imagination, the language of “dialogue” is more important than “identity.” The acceptance of migrants and refugees for Francis also means the acceptance of some other kinds of “migrations” (cultural, theological, and moral) in the Church and in the public square, with important consequences on the framing of other theological and “public” issues, such as the meaning of “religious liberty” in a multi-cultural and multi-religious world. This difference in the geopolitical and cultural framing of the issue of migrants and refugees between Francis and the US bishops is part of a larger gap, and in some instances also a disconnect, between US Catholic conservatism and papal teachings, and in particular those of Francis: on society and capitalist economics; health care; the death penalty and criminal justice; on nuclear weapons and the interpretation of the doctrine on “just war”; the care for creation and the environment.

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A fourth element of pre-existing tension that erupts and emerges under Francis has to do with a radical difference between the North American and the Latin American religious worlds in their relationship with the urban and megacity with respect to the suburban and rural world. Francis speaks of the world as a global city, in which God and faith live in a complex and multifaceted, multicultural, and multi-religious environment, traversed by secular and composite identities.󰀂󰀂 The social and religious imagination of Francis is essentially urban, cosmopolitan, and pluralist. If in the American imagination the city assumes the character of a history and a place of alienation between faith and life, Pope Francis sees the urbanization of religious life as a challenge and an opportunity for the Church. This is one of the factors in the crisis of the ethos of citizenship in Catholic culture, at risk of falling into the image of the Church as a village or a monastery to be defended from pluralism and the secular. Finally, the pope from Argentina, who decided to arrive in Washington, D.C. via Cuba during his visit to the USA in September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, represents the reference to the demographic and cultural center of the world and of global Catholicism – and the role of the United States in it. It is not just about the end of the control of Anglo-European whites in the Catholic Church. It is also about the United States now grappling with the geopolitical shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific axis: the Vatican must be credited with an understanding of the global world that the American establishment seems to ignore or deny. On the other hand, the Vatican of Francis also seems to have withdrawn some of the credit Rome gave to the USA in terms of representation of Catholicism beyond its geographical boundaries. The fact that the archdiocese of Los Angeles (more than 󰀁󰀁 million Catholics) does not have a cardinal elector as does, for example, the diocese of Santiago de Cabo Verde (󰀃󰀈󰀉,󰀀󰀀󰀀 Catholics) speaks volumes about the way the role of US Catholicism is being redefined by Pope Francis above and beyond the redefinitions of the geopolitical role of the USA and of the US Catholic Church in the world of today. There is a profound sense of unsettlement of US Catholicism and of the USA in general with Pope Francis, not only theologically but also 󰀂󰀂  See Carlos Maria Galli, Dio vive in città: Verso una nuova pastorale urbana (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄); Andrea Riccardi, Periferie: Crisi e novità per la Chiesa (Milan: Jaca Book, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). English translation: To the Margins: Pope Francis and the Mission of the Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈).

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geopolitically, so that under Francis the transatlantic relationship seemed to go back to the tensions typical of the early 󰀂󰀀th century. The Vatican mediation, thanks to Pope Francis, between the USA and Cuba in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, and the provisional agreement between the Vatican and the People’s Republic of China announced in September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 reminded the centers of American power of the resilience of papal “soft power” even in a secularized world. In the USA of today, Roman Catholicism still proposes itself as a form of internationalism that no longer finds an important interlocutor in the American presidency and even less so in the American political and intellectual elites. On the other hand, the support offered by some Catholics (including some bishops) to the Trump presidency is one way to move away from the internationalism of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine from the first half of the 󰀂󰀀th century up to Vatican II, and to the post-conciliar magisterium.󰀂󰀃 V. The US-Francis Geopolitical Tensions and the Disruption of Global Catholicism Bergoglio’s election to the papacy takes on the significance of a course correction which has been imprinted on the Catholic Church, even from the viewpoint of the geopolitics of Catholicism. Here it is evident that Francis’s geopolitical challenge to US Catholicism and to the US bishops’ worldview must be seen in the context of other geopolitical shifts. Both Francis and Donald Trump helped make the Atlantic wider: the USA and Europe are now more distant from each other than under any pontificate between Pius XII and Benedict XVI, and far more distant than any time during the last forty years, since John Paul II. This should say something to Catholics, but also to all those who are interested in understanding the world of today. From the point of view of the cultural and institutional history of Catholicism, the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church in the USA and Europe, Italy, and the Vatican has always been revelatory of the profound movements within this immigrant religion (especially from Europe, Latin America, and Asia).󰀂󰀄 󰀂󰀃  It suffices a quick look at the articles published on Catholic social teaching and pope Francis in magazines popular in American Catholic conservative circles like First Things or Crisis. 󰀂󰀄  See Peter R. D’Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀄).

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This is not just a geopolitical disruption but also a possible geo-religious disruption within Catholicism – what I would call a “Catholic Pangea” in movement: the image of the “Catholic Pangea” describes the redefinition of distances and trajectories in the relations between the different geographical components of the Catholic orbis in their cultural, political, theological, and spiritual components: with respect to this, the pontificate of Francis places himself at the service and listens to the global Church. The global pontificate of Francis is characterized not only by the effort to decentralize the Roman Catholic Church, but also by the decentralization of other “centers” of gravity in the Church: this implies a redefinition and a relativization of the role of North American and US Catholicism in the global Church. However, Francis’s same attempt to redefine the idea of the “center” of Catholicism has a great impact on a Church, like the one in the USA, which thinks of itself as the center of the world – consciously or unconsciously, both in its conservative component (with its agenda of reaction against theological liberalism, against the pluralization of the religious world, against secularization) and in the progressive component (with its agenda of universalization of same-sex marriage, of a feminist theology of women’s empowerment, of the theologization of identity politics). In other words, the fracture that has become more evident within US Catholicism during Francis’s pontificate is not just a North American problem in its relationship with Rome: it is the most visible fracture among the many fractures or fault lines in the globalization of Catholicism.󰀂󰀅 It is the shift from 󰀂󰀀th-century Catholic internationalism (based on supra-national Catholic networks of politicians, union leaders, students and religious orders) to the current globalization of Catholicism (when the above-mentioned networks are much weaker) that reflects a higher internal complexification of Catholicism. This presents US Catholicism with a particular challenge given the shifting geopolitics of the pontificate from the European-North Atlantic axis toward the global south and Asia. This is also a departure from a US-centered religious world. This element is particularly important because the fracture between the USA and US Catholicism and Francis’s pontificate is not the cause, but the consequence of this pontificate as 󰀂󰀅  See also Massimo Faggioli, “La crisi della globalizzazione cattolica: Chiesa e politica dal Vaticano II a Francesco,” Il Mulino 󰀅󰀇, no. 󰀅 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀈󰀄󰀆-󰀈󰀅󰀄; id., The Liminal Papacy of Pope Francis: Moving toward Global Catholicity (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 󰀂󰀀󰀂󰀀).

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an interruption in the Americanization of Catholicism. The “NorthAmericanization of Catholicism” was part of the neo-conservative project beginning in the 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s-󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀀s and especially in the early 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀s: US Catholicism as a model for the future of Roman Catholicism globally.󰀂󰀆 The first Latin American pope is redefining this trajectory theologically and geopolitically. Theologically, we have the crisis of the theological and political paradigm formed during the preceding forty years (starting under John Paul II) and geopolitically the crisis of the American century which assumed a given role for Roman Catholicism. It is no wonder that the tensions between the first Latin American pope and the neo-Americanist heralds of US Catholicism are on full display.

󰀂󰀆  See R. R. Reno (editor of the hardline conservative magazine First Things), “The Populist Wave Hits the Catholic Church: How Pope Francis Triggered a Rebellion,” Foreign Affairs, November 󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀁󰀁-󰀁󰀃/populist-wave-hits-catholic-church.

Pope Francis’s Views on the Rebirth of Europe Jan De Volder The pontificate of Pope Francis, from 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 until today, coincides with a serious crisis in many European countries and the European Union as a whole: a widely but unequally spread social crisis as a fall-out of the 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈 economic and financial crisis; a humanitarian crisis as a result of the influx of refugees and migrants and Europe’s wavering response; a cultural and identity crisis as a consequence of the continuing secularization and globalization processes; a geopolitical crisis, as a result of the sense of decline of Europe’s role in the global world and the overall deterioration of its relations with important partners such as Russia, Turkey, and the United States; and a crack in the idea of “an ever closer Union” due to the rise of nationalist and other centrifugal forces, of which the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 Brexit vote is the provisional culmination point. This article focuses on some aspects of the relationship between Pope Francis and this complex, multifaceted and uncertain Europe: its peoples, its nations’ governments, its Union, its Churches, etc. In particular, it will analyze the political vision on the Old Continent – which goes together with the pastoral vision – of the first pope coming from the Global South, and will try to assess the eventual impact of this papacy on the continent. I. Bergoglio, a Non-European Pope When Jorge Mario Bergoglio appeared on the Central Loggia of St. Peter’s Basilica on March 󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, he was the first non-European cardinal to be elected pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church since ancient times. This is a major shift for the Catholic Church, since the papacy was Italian for centuries, until the election of John Paul II (󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀈) and Benedict XVI (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅). However, these Polish and German popes were still Europeans. With his choice of Benedict as his papal name, Ratzinger was explicitly referring to Europe’s patron saint, as in an ultimate attempt to save Europe for Christianity and the Catholic Church.󰀁 󰀁

 In his first general audience after his election, on April 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅, Benedict XVI explained his name choice, by the spiritual bond with Benedict XV (󰀁󰀉󰀁󰀄-󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀂), a pope

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Bergoglio, archbishop of Buenos Aires, was aware of the historic fact of being the first pope to come from the Global South, when he said that first evening: “It seems that my brother Cardinals have gone to the ends of the earth to get [a new Bishop of Rome] ... but here we are....”󰀂 His unprecedented name choice still contained a European reference, since Saint Francis is also the patron saint of Italy, but in his initial explanation the pope did not refer to that aspect, but rather to the fact that the saint is universally known for loving the poor, peace, and creation.󰀃 Some of Bergoglio’s biographers have hinted at the idea that he did not particularly like Europe. He did not have a lot of international experience. When, in the mid-󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s (then almost fifty years old), he was sent to Germany to work on a doctorate, homesickness consumed him. He has told the story that he loved to go watch the planes departing from the Frankfurt airport on their way to Argentina, where his heart was.󰀄 Later, as a bishop, archbishop, and cardinal, he of course was often invited to Rome and had other international duties, but he did not seem to cherish the experience and would return to Argentina as soon as possible. Besides his native Spanish, Jorge Bergoglio speaks Italian fluently, though not flawlessly, and admits to having forgotten much of the French, English, and German that he had earlier studied. Unlike his predecessors, he does not claim to be a polyglot.󰀅 who preached European reconciliation during the First World War, and by “the great ‘Patriarch of Western monasticism’, St Benedict of Norcia.” Cf. https://w󰀂.vatican.va/ content/benedict-xvi/en/audiences/󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅󰀀󰀄󰀂󰀇.html [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. Earlier that month, receiving the Saint Benedict Award in Subiaco, Italy, on April 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅, few days before the death of Pope John Paul II and his own election, cardinal Joseph Ratzinger delivered a critical reflection on Europe’s cultural crisis, connecting it to Saint Benedict. He concluded: “We need men like Benedict of Norcia, who at a time of dissipation and decadence, plunged into the most profound solitude, succeeding, after all the purifications he had to suffer, to ascend again to the light, to return and to found Montecassino, the city on the mountain that, with so many ruins, gathered together the forces from which a new world was formed.” Cf. https://zenit.org/articles/ cardinal-ratzinger-on-europe-s-crisis-of-culture-part-󰀄/ [accessed June 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/march/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀀󰀃󰀁󰀃_benedizione-urbi-et-orbi.html [accessed June 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃  “That is how the name came into my heart: Francis of Assisi. For me, he is the man of poverty, the man of peace, the man who loves and protects creation.” From his first meeting with the media, March 󰀁󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃. Cf. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/march/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀀󰀃󰀁󰀆_rappresentanti-media.html. 󰀄  Paul Vallely, Pope Francis: Untying the Knots (London, New Delhi, New York, and Sydney: Bloomsbury, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀅󰀉. Austin Ivereigh, The Great Reformer: Francis and the Making of a Radical Pope (New York: Picador, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), 󰀁󰀉󰀈-󰀁󰀉󰀉. 󰀅  Francesca Ambrogetti and Sergio Rubin, El Jesuita: Conversaciones con Jorge Bergoglio, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀; translated in English, Pope Francis: Conversations with Jorge Bergoglio (New York: Putnam, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀁󰀅󰀅-󰀁󰀅󰀆. However, during his travels he delivers speeches in English, French, and Portuguese.

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Yet this does not mean that, prior to becoming bishop of Rome, Jorge Bergoglio had no links with Europe at all. On his father’s side, he hails from a family of Italian migrants, with their background in Piedmont, while his mother was Argentinian. The domestic culture in which he grew up was Italo-Argentinian, from the cuisine to the music.󰀆 He was very much at home in Buenos Aires, a complex international city, a capital of the Global South, populated by migrants and children of migrants, and probably the most “European” capital of Latin America.󰀇 Bergoglio considers himself fully a product of this miscegenation, his blended identity being typical for Argentina.󰀈 His education also was very mixed. His cultural references are first of all Argentinian and Latin American. He likes authors such as the celebrated writer Jorge Luis Borges and the Uruguayan intellectual Alberto Methol Ferré. Moreover, his theology is profoundly influenced by influential Argentinian theologians such as Lucio Gera and Juan Carlos Scannone, and by the overall developments of Latin American theology: not only by the controversy surrounding liberation theologies, but also by the “theology of the people,” as formulated in Aparecida.󰀉 At the same time, he was formed by the Company of Jesus, a European-founded missionary congregation; and, as a student, he was profoundly influenced by the ideas of European Jesuits of the French-speaking region, such as Henri de Lubac, Gaston Fessard, and Michel de Certeau. German theologians and thinkers, such as Romano Guardini, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Erich Przywara also attracted and influenced him. This 󰀆  Cappelletti con ragù and risotto piemontese were the masterpieces of his mother’s cooking, and to Ambrogetti and Rubin, Bergoglio explained that the family used to listen to Italian operas on the radio on Saturday afternoons. Ambrogetti and Rubin, Pope Francis, 󰀃󰀀-󰀃󰀁. 󰀇  Andrea Riccardi, La sorpresa di Papa Francesco: Crisi e futuro della Chiesa (Milan: Mondadori, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀁󰀃󰀀-󰀁󰀃󰀁, 󰀁󰀅󰀅-󰀁󰀅󰀇, and passim; Gianni Valente, Francesco: Un papa dalla fine del mondo (Bologna: Emi, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃). 󰀈  As he declares in his conversations with French intellectual Dominique Wolton: “L’identité argentine est métissée. La majorité du peuple argentin est issue du métissage. Parce que les vagues d’immigration se sont mélangées, mélangées et mélangées.” “L’Argentine est comme ça. Le sang des Argentins est criollo pour ceux qui sont originaires d’ici, mais aujourd’hui c’est un sang mélangé, arabe, italien, français, polonais, espagnol, juif, russe, ukrainien… tout cela à la fois.” Pape François, Politique et société: Rencontres avec Dominique Wolton (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana; Paris: Éditions de l’Observatoire/Humensis, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀂󰀄󰀄, 󰀂󰀄󰀆. 󰀉  “The Conference of Aparecida,” Brazil, in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 was the Fifth Episcopal Conference of Latin American and Caribbean bishop’s conferences (CELAM). Cardinal Bergoglio had a major role in drafting the final document. https://www.celam.org/aparecida/Ingles.pdf [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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bipolarity of his education, deeply Latin American while in the same time to a certain extent very European, together with other forms of bipolaridad, has shaped Bergoglio’s antithetical thinking.󰀁󰀀 The election of the first Latin American pope was a turning point for the Roman Catholic Church, after two thousand years of history and five hundred years after Europe’s conquest and evangelization of the American continent. It is a clear sign, as illustrated by Philip Jenkins and others, that the center of gravity of the Christian world has dramatically shifted southwards.󰀁󰀁 II. A Less Eurocentric World and Church The choice of a non-European cardinal as Bishop of Rome can be considered a reflection of the decrease of the weight of Europe, which is a fact in the multipolar world of the twenty-first century. The European Union may still be a strong economic bloc – weakened, however, by Brexit – but politically, militarily, diplomatically, and especially demographically, the Old Continent has become more and more outweighed by the superpowers of the United States and China, as well as by rising powers in Africa, Latin America, and especially Asia. This is also true in the Catholic world, as secularization has been particularly rampant in Europe, though recently mitigated by globalization with its influx of Catholic migrants. According to the latest figures, of the world’s 󰀁.󰀃 billion Catholics, roughly half (󰀆󰀃󰀁,󰀀󰀀󰀀,󰀀󰀀󰀀 or 󰀄󰀈.󰀆%) live on the American continent (north and south combined). Europe is the only continent where Catholics are declining in absolute numbers (minus 󰀂󰀄󰀀,󰀀󰀀󰀀 between 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 and 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), notwithstanding the growth of the overall population.󰀁󰀂 This shifting reality is also reflected in Pope Francis’s choices of new cardinals. He seems determined to reflect the globalization of the Catholic Church in the College of Cardinals as well. From the start of his

 On this Massimo Borghesi, Jorge Mario Bergoglio: Una biografia intellettuale (Milan: Jaca Book, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀂󰀉-󰀄󰀅, 󰀇󰀉-󰀁󰀁󰀆, and passim. 󰀁󰀁  Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀂; 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇). 󰀁󰀂  https://zenit.org/articles/vatican-catholic-church-statistics-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. Based on the latest available statistics of Church’s Book of Statistics, updated to December 󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 [accessed June 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀁󰀀

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pontificate, Francis has surrounded himself with a Council of Cardinals – dubbed the C󰀉 – from all five continents.󰀁󰀃 During the six years of his pontificate, Pope Francis has held six consistories, one every year since 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, creating seventy-five new cardinals, of whom 󰀇󰀀 are younger than eighty, with the right to vote for the next pope; out of these 󰀇󰀀, 󰀂󰀅 of them, only a third, were European bishops. This is a shift.󰀁󰀄 True, the globalization of the College of Cardinals started long before this pontificate; but, in the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 Conclave, European cardinals still had a slight majority (󰀆󰀀 cardinals out of 󰀁󰀁󰀅 electors, or 󰀅󰀂%). The Italians formed the largest group with 󰀁󰀈 electors, the United States the second largest with 󰀁󰀁 electors. Today, European cardinals make up 󰀅󰀂 of the 󰀁󰀂󰀄 electors, which is 󰀄󰀁.󰀉%; thus, the change is significant and more than symbolic.󰀁󰀅 The time in which Europeans had a dominant position within the College of Cardinals belongs to the past. It is not the only change Pope Francis has introduced. The most radical shift was the creation of cardinals in countries that had never had one, even where Catholics are a tiny minority, such as Burma, the Central African Republic, and Sweden, as well as the non-automatic creation of archbishops in cities that were used to receiving the red hat: this has especially affected some major cities in Italy (Turin, Venice, Milan) and in the USA (Baltimore, Philadelphia, Detroit, St. Louis, Los Angeles). But it has not affected European countries like Belgium, where Msgr. Joseph De Kesel, a year after his nomination as archbishop of Mechelen-Brussels, received the red hat.󰀁󰀆

󰀁󰀃

 Originally composed of the cardinals Oscar Andrés Rodriguez Maradiaga (Honduras); Giuseppe Bertello (Italy, Vatican City State); Oswald Gracias (India); Reinhard Marx (Germany); Seán Patrick O’Malley (United States of America); Francisco Javier Errazuriz Ossa (Chile); George Pell (Australia) and Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya (DR Congo). 󰀁󰀄  Including the consistory of 󰀅 October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. Of the cardinals created by both John Paul II and Benedict XVI, 󰀅󰀇 percent were Europeans. 󰀁󰀅  https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evoluzione_del_collegio_cardinalizio_durante_il_ pontificato_di_Francesco. 󰀁󰀆  De Kesel was nominated Archbishop of Mechelen-Brussels on November 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 and took possession of the see on December 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. On October 󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, Pope Francis announced his creation to cardinal in the Consistory that took place on November 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. It could be assumed though, that, because Catholic influence had decreased so rapidly over the last half century, the elevation to the cardinalate of the Archbishop of Mechelen-Brussels can no longer be taken for granted in the foreseeable future (as was already the case for Archbishop André-Joseph Léonard, Archbishop of Mechelen-Brussels from 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀 to 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅).

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The growing diversity in the College of Cardinals, and the ending of European and especially Italian dominance, is a gradual, but well intended process in this pontificate.󰀁󰀇 III. Entering Europe from the “Back Door” Before moving to an analysis and assessment of Pope Francis’s ideas on Europe and his message for the continent, it is worth analyzing another fact of his pontificate: the idiomatic design of the apostolic travels. European destinations have not been disregarded by Francis: of his 󰀃󰀂 international travels (outside of Italy), nearly half of them (󰀁󰀄) were to European destinations.󰀁󰀈 However, unlike his predecessor, he is not visiting the major capitals. In his eight-year-long pontificate (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), Benedict XVI visited such major European capitals as Paris, London, Berlin, and Madrid, but also Zagreb, Prague, Vienna, and Warsaw. During the first six years of his pontificate, Francis visited none of these cities. Rather, in approaching Europe, with the notable exception of his visit to the European institutions in Strasbourg (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), Francis has privileged destinations on the periphery, just outside the borders of the European Union, such as Albania (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), Bosnia (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), Armenia (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), Georgia and Azerbaijan (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), and North Macedonia (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉).󰀁󰀉 Even within the EU, he prefers not to go to the central countries, but to the peripheral ones, such as the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈) as well as both Bulgaria and Romania (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). Furthermore, he prefers to travel to symbolic places, rather than to places where political power and intellectuals reside. For example, to mark the beginning of the remembrance of 󰀅󰀀󰀀 years since the Reformation, the pope did not go to Luther’s Germany, but rather to Sweden; and then, not to

󰀁󰀇  Italians with 󰀂󰀂 cardinal-electors and Americans with 󰀉 cardinal-electors are still by far the largest national groups in the Sacred College. Compare with the 󰀆 cardinals younger than 󰀈󰀀 from Spain, or the 󰀄 cardinals from Brazil (situation of October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). 󰀁󰀈  Between his election in March 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 and June 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. 󰀁󰀉  Pope Francis clearly sees this as “a sign,” for others to interpret. In his conversations with the pope, Dominique Wolton, understands his attention for poorer and often forgotten countries at the periphery as a sign of predilection “for the ‘cartoneros’ of globalization,” and he is not contradicted by the pope, who confirms it is a “signal,” without further explanation. In Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀃󰀀󰀅.

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Stockholm, but to Lund (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆).󰀂󰀀 In Portugal, he visited Fatima, but not Lisbon; in Poland, he visited Auschwitz and Krakow, not Warsaw. This travel plan not only is part of his unique and many-sided personality, as if he wanted to enter Europe “from the back door,” but also clearly expresses his love for that “human and urban periphery” that he often speaks about. Pope Francis is convinced that the world is better understood when seen from the more forgotten or poorer parts, from the outskirts, rather than from the center. Antonio Spadaro calls this the perspective of Ferdinand Magellan and Matteo Ricci, those sixteenthcentury travelers who went to the extremes of the earth, to the west and to the east.󰀂󰀁 In his conversations with the French intellectual Dominique Wolton, the pope explains how Europe, just as in Magellan’s sixteenth century, is better understood from the periphery than from centers like Paris, Madrid, or Lisbon.󰀂󰀂 Dodging the centers is more than a tactic or a method; it is an inner conviction and an evangelical imperative. Pope Francis considers the center “closed off,” “far from the people,” too “intellectual,” and too “elitist,” which represents the dangers of Gnosticism, defined as “an elite that is not going to the people.” Like the apostles, who did not stay in Jerusalem “to build a Church of intellectuals” but went to the whole world, Francis, more pastor than theologian, is intent on announcing the Gospel and building (and rebuilding) the Church first of all in the periphery, where the common people are.󰀂󰀃 󰀂󰀀  His travels to EU countries often served other goals: the one to France in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 was to meet the European Institutions in Strasbourg; the aim of the one to Greece in April 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 was to visit the refugees in Lesbos. The one to Poland in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 took place in the context of the World Youth Day in Krakow, the one to Ireland (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈) in the context of the World Family Day. 󰀂󰀁  “Quando parlo di periferia, parlo di confini. Normalmente noi ci muoviamo in spazi che in un modo o nell’altro controlliamo. Questo è il centro. Nella misura in cui usciamo dal centro e ci allontaniamo da esso, scopriamo più cose e, quando guardiamo al centro da queste nuove cose che abbiamo scoperto, da nuovi posti, da queste periferie, vediamo che la realtà è diversa. Una cosa è osservare la realtà dal centro e un’altra è guardarla dall’ultimo posto dove tu sei arrivato. Un esempio: l’Europa vista da Madrid nel XVI secolo era una cosa, però quando Magellano arriva alla fine del continente americano, guarda all’Europa dal nuovo punto raggiunto e capisce un’altra cosa.” Cited in Spadaro, Il nuovo mondo di Francesco, 󰀄󰀈. 󰀂󰀂  “L’Europe s’est mieux représentée elle-même lorsque Magellan a atteint le Sud. Soudain, elle ne s’est plus représentée seulement depuis Paris, Madrid ou Lisbonne, qui étaient au centre de l’Europe.” Cf. Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀅󰀄. 󰀂󰀃  “La phrase que j’aime citer, c’est: ‘La réalité se comprend mieux depuis les périphéries que depuis le centre’. Tout d’abord parce que le centre est fermé, alors qu’en périphérie tu es avec les autres. Ensuite, aller aux périphéries, c’est le commandement évangélique. Les apôtres sont allés de Jérusalem au monde entier. Ils ne sont pas restés

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This “geopolitical strategy” – if we can use this term – of approaching Europe from its peripheries was also part and parcel of the two visits that Pope Francis paid to places symbolic of the humanitarian crisis on the Mediterranean: to the Italian island of Lampedusa (in July 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, his first visit outside Rome) and to the Greek island of Lesbos (in April 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, his first visit to an EU country). In Lampedusa, after having thrown a garland in the sea to commemorate the victims, Francis sharply criticized the “globalization of indifference,” which takes away the capacity to have compassion for those refugees.󰀂󰀄 Repeatedly and with great insistence, Pope Francis has urged European and world leaders to welcome and protect those fleeing war and starvation, to develop other policies, to avoid allowing the Mediterranean “to become a cemetery.” His visit to the island of Lesbos was even more dramatic: not only because he insisted once more on the need to build bridges rather than walls (while explaining he understood a certain fear of the influx of migrants), but especially because, at the end of his visit, in a surprise move, he took three refugee families home with him, offering hospitality by the Catholic Church in Rome. Thus, he concretely practiced “relocation”: this practice of “relocating” refugees stranded in southern European countries like Greece and Italy is recommended by the European Commission, but most EU member states are very wary of implementing it. The pope put it into reality, albeit on a small scale, showing that any individual and any institution can do more than they are already doing.󰀂󰀅 Moreover, all twelve refugees who returned with him were Muslims (while the original intention was to return with a mixed group of Christian and Muslim families, this proved to be impossible because of administrative issues). This fact was strongly criticized by some, even if later more refugees from Lesbos were “relocated” by the Vatican, this time including Christians. But the pope’s choice was clear: he invited Europeans and là-bas à bâtir une Église d’intellectuels. Au point que la première hérésie que dénonce l’apôtre Jean, c’est le gnosticisme, l’élite qui ne va pas vers le peuple.” Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀅󰀄-󰀅󰀅. 󰀂󰀄  “Has any one of us wept because of this situation and others like it? Has any one of us grieved for the death of these brothers and sisters? (…) We are a society which has forgotten how to weep, how to experience compassion – ‘suffering with’ others: the globalization of indifference has taken from us the ability to weep!” http://w󰀂.vatican. va/content/francesco/en/homilies/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀀󰀇󰀀󰀈_omelialampedusa.html [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀅  Cf. Jan De Volder, “Tussen profetie, angst en hoop: Europese katholieke bisschoppen en (moslim)migratie,” Collationes: Tijdschrift voor Theologie en Pastoraal 󰀄󰀆, no. 󰀄 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): 󰀄󰀀󰀁-󰀄󰀂󰀄.

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Christians not to make a distinction between Muslims and Christians when it comes to welcoming vulnerable refugees. “It is not a privilege. All twelve are children of God. The privilege is to be children of God.”󰀂󰀆 Thus, from Europe’s Mediterranean periphery symbolized by Lampedusa and Lesbos, Pope Francis sent a clear message to European capitals and the European Union. For him, the response to the refugee crisis will be decisive for the future of Europe and the conservation of its “soul.” IV. Reflecting on Europe’s Crises Pope Francis has spoken to Europe not only with symbolic and dramatic gestures. Coming from the New World, he also has offered a personal and original reflection on the past, the present, and the future of the Old Continent. During the first year of his pontificate, Pope Francis was silent on Europe, to the point that it was argued that this was a topic that the Argentinian and “global” pope was willing to avoid.󰀂󰀇 That changed, and until now he has delivered five major addresses on Europe:󰀂󰀈 (󰀁) in Strasbourg in the European Parliament and (󰀂) the Council of Europe (November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄);󰀂󰀉 (󰀃) when receiving the Charlemagne Prize (May 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆);󰀃󰀀 (󰀄) to the heads of State and Governments of the European Union on the occasion of the 󰀆󰀀th anniversary of the Rome Treaty (March 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇);󰀃󰀁 and (󰀅) during the conference 󰀂󰀆  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/april/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀄󰀁󰀆_lesvos-volo-ritorno.html [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀇  During a visit to the Basilica of Santa Maria in Trastevere in Rome, on June 󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, he said, “A friend of mine asked me a question, some time ago: why don’t I talk about Europe? I tricked him, I said: ‘Did you hear when I spoke about Asia?’, and he realized it was a trick question! Today I’m speaking about Europe. Europe is tired. We have to help her rejuvenate, to find her roots. It’s true: Europe has disowned her roots. It’s true. But we have to help her find them again.” http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/june/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀀󰀆󰀁󰀅_comunita-sant-egidio. html [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀈  Published in French: Pape François, Repenser l’Europe: La personne et la communauté (Paris: Salvator, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈). 󰀂󰀉  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/november/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀅_strasburgo-parlamento-europeo.html and http://w󰀂.vatican.va/ content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/november/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀅_ strasburgo-consiglio-europa.html. 󰀃󰀀  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/may/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀅󰀀󰀆_premio-carlo-magno.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀁  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/march/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀃󰀂󰀄_capi-unione-europea.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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of the Commission of EU Bishops Conferences (COMECE) “(Re-)thinking Europe” (October 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇).󰀃󰀂 More reflections on Europe are to be found in his conversations with Wolton and in various speeches, both in the Vatican and during his travels. In those reflections, one can readily see what Pope Francis loves about Europe: he praises the greatness of its centuries-long history and universal thought, its creativity and genius, its capacity for integration of foreign influxes and of a diversity of peoples and cultures, its being the cradle of democracy and humanism, all aspects to which, in his eyes, Christianity has greatly contributed. Francis also has words of appreciation for the European Union, especially for the spirit of such founding fathers as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Alcide De Gasperi, who were able to reinvent Europe after the two World Wars, as a project of peace and reconciliation, of friendly collaboration between peoples and nations, of freedom and democracy. For those visionary politicians, Christianity was the foundation of their common understanding.󰀃󰀃 The idea of European collaboration is very dear to Pope Francis, as can be seen both by his visit to Strasbourg, which he did not regard as a visit to France but to the European institutions (European Parliament and Council of Europe), and by his choice to accept the Charlemagne Prize, while generally being wary of accepting distinctions.󰀃󰀄 It is close to his vision that “the whole is greater than the part, but it is also greater than the sum of the parts.”󰀃󰀅 For him, this is a “principal of geopolitics.”󰀃󰀆

󰀃󰀂  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/october/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀁󰀀󰀂󰀈_conferenza-comece.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀃  “…their impassioned pursuit of the common good, their certainty of sharing in a work greater than themselves, and the breadth of the ideals that inspired them. Their common denominator was the spirit of service, joined to passion for politics and the consciousness that ‘at the origin of European civilization there is Christianity’, without which the Western values of dignity, freedom and justice would prove largely incomprehensible.” In: http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/march/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀃󰀂󰀄_capi-unione-europea.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀄  “Je ne voulais pas recevoir ce prix. Parce que je n’ai jamais accepté les distinctions, cela ne me plaît pas. (…) Je l’ai accepté pour le bien de l’Europe. Parce que je crois qu’en ce moment l’Europe est en crise.” Cf. Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀁󰀂󰀁. 󰀃󰀅  “The whole is greater than the part, but it is also greater than the sum of its parts. There is no need, then, to be overly obsessed with limited and particular questions. We constantly have to broaden our horizons and see the greater good which will benefit us all.” In Evangelii Gaudium, Apostolic Exhortation, November 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, par. 󰀂󰀃󰀅. http:// w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀄_evangelii-gaudium.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀆  Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀄󰀆.

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Yet, on all these occasions, Pope Francis also held up a quite critical mirror to Europe. It is clear to him that Europe is a continent and a project in crisis. He distinguishes different types of crises: demographic, socioeconomic, spiritual, political, institutional, etc. In what follows, we offer a quick overview of the different crises and an attempt at classification. 󰀁. Sterility of a Closed and Declining Europe Europe’s major crisis, in the eyes of the pope, is linked to a lack of vitality: before the European Parliament, he famously used the image of Europe as a “nonna,” a “grandma,” noting “a general impression of weariness and aging,” of a Europe which is “no longer fertile and vibrant.”󰀃󰀇 Like his predecessors, the pope does not hide his concern about the low birth rates in many European countries, a phenomenon that is affecting particularly southern and often Catholic European countries, with Malta, Spain, and Italy having the lowest rates.󰀃󰀈 Francis on various occasions questions this “demographic winter.” Another side of the crisis is Europe’s growing closing itself off to migrants. In Francis’s eyes, the two are closely linked, since integrating migrants – as his native Argentina has successfully done – could be a way forward for Europe. He does not understand Europeans’ refusal both of having more children and of immigration: “If the Europeans want to stay among themselves, let them make children!,” as quoted by Wolton.󰀃󰀉 In more private conversations, Pope Francis is said to use even stronger words, stating that Europe is committing “suicide.”󰀄󰀀 This perception may be influenced by the situation of Italy, and some other southern and eastern European countries, which indeed face a decrease of their population, while thanks to migration, the overall projections for the 󰀃󰀇  Address to the European Parliament, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. He came back to this comparison – which was criticized by some – in his address at the conferral of the Charlemagne Prize, May 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. 󰀃󰀈  In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, the average fertility rate in the EU-󰀂󰀈 was 󰀁.󰀅󰀉 live births per woman, whereas 󰀂.󰀁 live births per woman is considered the replacement level in developed countries. Among the EU Member States, France reported the highest total fertility rate in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, with 󰀁.󰀉󰀀 births per woman, followed by Sweden, with 󰀁.󰀇󰀈 births per woman and Ireland, with 󰀁.󰀇󰀇. By contrast, the lowest total fertility rates in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇 were recorded in Malta (󰀁.󰀂󰀆 live births per woman), Spain (󰀁.󰀃󰀁), Italy and Cyprus (both 󰀁.󰀃󰀂), Greece (󰀁.󰀃󰀅), Portugal (󰀁.󰀃󰀈). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics#live_births_per_woman_in_the_EU_in_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇 [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀉  “Si les Européens veulent rester entre eux, qu’ils fassent des enfants.” Cf. Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀃󰀂. 󰀄󰀀  Information of the author.

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European Union in the twenty-first century are still of population growth, though with the share of the elderly (over 󰀈󰀀) increasing.󰀄󰀁 Beyond the statistics and the projections, it is undeniably true that Europe’s influence in the world is shrinking and that it is increasingly considered, by other states with a younger population, as the elderly’s continent. Addressing the Council of Europe, the pope expressed this perception in a series of pungent rhetorical questions addressed to the continent: “Where is your vigor? Where is that idealism which inspired and ennobled your history? Where is your spirit of curiosity and enterprise? Where is your thirst for truth, a thirst which hitherto you have passionately shared with the world?”󰀄󰀂 󰀂. Crisis of Values The preceding quote already demonstrates that, for Francis, the lack of vitality is linked not only to a lack of young people but also to a crisis of values. He criticizes the lifestyle of many Europeans, dominated by individualism and consumerism. In the Parliament, while praising Europe’s commitment to human rights and human dignity, even beyond its own borders, he mocked the increasingly “individualistic” interpretation of the conception of a human person and human rights; he remarked that “loneliness” had become one of the most common European diseases; he overtly criticized the indifference and the “rather selfish lifestyles,” the “throwaway culture” and the “uncontrolled consumerism’; and the fact that political debate was increasingly dominated by “technical and economic questions,” “to the detriment of genuine concern for human beings.”󰀄󰀃 Here the Argentinian pope echoed earlier criticisms leveled by his predecessors. Like Pope John Paul II, who had criticized the “culture of death,” Francis castigated the culture that discards what is not useful: 󰀄󰀁  Eurostat projections over the next six decades predict the EU-󰀂󰀈’s population to peak around 󰀂󰀀󰀄󰀅, reaching 󰀅󰀂󰀉 million persons, an increase of 󰀁󰀈.󰀈 million (or 󰀃.󰀇 %) compared with the situation as of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. The size of the EU-󰀂󰀈’s population is then projected to progressively fall with a population of 󰀅󰀁󰀉 million persons by the start of 󰀂󰀀󰀈󰀀. The share of the very old – aged 󰀈󰀀 years and over – in the total EU-󰀂󰀈 population is projected to increase from 󰀅.󰀄 % in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 to 󰀁󰀂.󰀇 % by 󰀂󰀀󰀈󰀀. In absolute figures, their number is projected to more than double, rising from 󰀂󰀇.󰀃 million very old persons in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 to 󰀆󰀆.󰀁 million by 󰀂󰀀󰀈󰀀. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index. php/People_in_the_EU_-_population_projections [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀂  Address to the Council of Europe, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. 󰀄󰀃  Address to the European Parliament, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄.

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“the sick,” the “terminally ill,” the elderly “who are abandoned and uncared for,” and the children “who are killed in the womb.” The ecological crisis, the subject of his encyclical letter Laudato Si’, is also seen as part of this value crisis, as human beings tend to treat nature as masters, not as stewards: “We are often guided by the pride of dominating, possessing, manipulating, exploiting; we do not ‘preserve’ the earth, we do not respect it, we do not consider it as a freely-given gift to look after.”󰀄󰀄 On other occasions, Francis criticizes Europe’s arms industry and export of weapons, which contribute in his eyes to the fueling of armed conflicts across the globe, and which are part of this moral crisis.󰀄󰀅 󰀃. Socio-economic Crisis and the Human Dignity The pope also sees a socio-economic crisis in Europe, with rising numbers of youth unemployment and poorly paid labor. According to the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, dignity of labor is a key aspect of human dignity. In a world dominated by liberalism and the dogmas of the free market, the pope pleads for the intervention of the State in order to insure this dignity of labor.󰀄󰀆 In his analysis, the problem is the “liquidity” of today’s economy, which has lost its link with the concrete material world. He pleads for a return from the virtual to the real world, which would create a more “social market economy.”󰀄󰀇 According to the pope, Europe has given in to the idolatry of money.

󰀄󰀄

 Address to the European Parliament, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄.  Speaking on June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 to the representatives of the Riunione delle Opere di Aiuto alle Chiese Orientali (Roaco), Francis said: “Gridano le persone in fuga ammassate sulle navi, in cerca di speranza, non sapendo quali porti potranno accoglierli, nell’Europa che però apre i porti alle imbarcazioni che devono caricare sofisticati e costosi armamenti, capaci di produrre devastazioni che non risparmiano nemmeno i bambini.” https://www.lastampa. it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀆/󰀁󰀀/vaticaninsider/il-papa-leuropa-apre-i-porti-alle-armi-e-non-alla-gente-ammassata-sulle-navi-HjLgne󰀁lovfC󰀂󰀁U󰀇JBiprL/pagina.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀆  “L’économie libérale de marché est une folie. On a besoin que l’État régule un petit peu. (…) J’ai demandé à l’Europe d’abandonner la liquidité de l’économie pour retourner à quelque chose de concret, c’est-à-dire à l’économie sociale de marché. J’ai gardé le marché, mais ‘sociale’ de marché.” Cf. Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀁󰀀󰀁. 󰀄󰀇  “L’économie de l’Europe n’est pas une économie productive de la terre, une économie concrète. Ella a perdu sa ‘concrétude’. C’est une économie liquide. La finance. C’est pour ça que les jeunes n’ont pas de travail. (…) C’est le virtuel contre le réel.” Ibid., 󰀁󰀃󰀀-󰀁󰀃󰀁. 󰀄󰀅

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For Francis, this crisis is linked to a too-technical and numeric approach by the political systems, which loses the idea of the centrality of “the human person,” which is reduced to an abstract item: “Statistics, however useful and important, are about arguments; they are soulless.”󰀄󰀈 Of course, one must also refer here to the many times Pope Francis criticizes the way the poor are treated by society, and especially how migrants are rejected. As this is a common thread in his preaching and teaching, we will not discuss it further here.󰀄󰀉 󰀄. Institutional Political Crisis of Europe’s Unity The unity of the European Union is coming increasingly under pressure, with rising populism and nationalism in different member states. The decision of the UK in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 to leave the EU has been the culminating point of this tendency of disaggregation of the Union. The Vatican has not often spoken of Brexit, but Pope Francis considers the lack of European unity a problem and a challenge.󰀅󰀀 He insists that unity does not entail uniformity. In an image that is dear to him, and that he has repeated on various occasions, he states that, while the “sphere” might be regarded as a perfect geometric shape, with every point on the surface having the same distance to the center, this is not an ideal political reality. “Homogenization is never fertile; it always leads to infertility.”󰀅󰀁 He prefers the “polyhedron,” in which the particularity of the components is better preserved in a harmonic unity. Regarding Brexit, Pope Francis believes that the error of “Brussels” has been to impose uniformity.󰀅󰀂 He criticizes what he sees as a growing split between European citizens and European institutions, “which are 󰀄󰀈  “Sadly, we see how frequently issues get reduced to discussions about numbers. There are no citizens, only votes. There are no migrants, only quotas. There are no workers, only economic markers. There are no poor, only thresholds of poverty. The concrete reality of the human person is thus reduced to an abstract… .” Address to the COMECE, October 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀄󰀉  See for instance his yearly messages for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees (celebrated on the second Sunday after Epiphany since 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀄, before Francis shifted it in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 to the last Sunday of September); see also his messages for the World Day of the Poor, established by Francis in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇 on the 󰀃󰀃th Sunday of ordinary time, in November. 󰀅󰀀  On Brexit: “que va faire l’Europe? Elle doit justement être créative. Chercher à souligner, mettre en valeur les différences entre les pays et, à partir de ces différences, s’unir de nouveau.” Cf. Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀂󰀅󰀂. 󰀅󰀁  Ibid., 󰀁󰀂󰀁. 󰀅󰀂  “L’erreur a été de croire que l’unité se ferait par l’uniformisation, par un Bruxelles disant ‘il faut faire ceci et pas cela’.” Ibid., 󰀂󰀅󰀂.

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often perceived as distant and inattentive to the different sensibilities in the Union.”󰀅󰀃 󰀅. Spiritual Crisis These different crises also have a link with the spiritual crisis of a Europe that is less Christian than it used to be. Unlike his predecessors, Pope Francis has been prudent in drawing attention to this crisis, as he is fully convinced that the “Constantine period” – with the close link between the Church and European peoples and political entities – has come to an end. Francis does not see “secularization” as the main problem. In any event, he has shied away from the battle over the “nonnegotiable values,” which was dear to his predecessor. He does oppose, however, the “secularist prejudice,” which is not capable of recognizing the positive role of religion in society, confining it to the private realm.󰀅󰀄 The pope warns Europeans not to lose the “transcendent” dimension of things. The loss of openness to transcendence is part of Europe’s closedness, and its consequences could be substantial over time: “A Europe which is no longer open to the transcendent dimension of life is a Europe which risks slowly losing its own soul and that ‘humanistic spirit’ which it still loves and defends.”󰀅󰀅 V. Papal Proposals for Europe This non-exhaustive array of Europe’s crises can suggest that Francis nurtures a very negative judgment on the state of the continent. Yet, it has to be underlined that, for the Jesuit pope, the notion of “crisis” is not per se negative and is more than just a painful moment to be endured. He reminds us: “The word ‘crisis’ has its origin in the Greek verb kríno, which means to discern, to weigh, to assess. Ours is a time of discernment, one that invites us to determine what is essential and to build on it. It is a time of challenge and opportunity.”󰀅󰀆

󰀅󰀃  Address for the Celebration of the 󰀆󰀀th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, March 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀅󰀄  Address to COMECE, October 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀅󰀅  Address to the European Parliament, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. 󰀅󰀆  Address on the Occasion of the 󰀆󰀀th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, March 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇.

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How, then, can discernment lead to the restoration of confidence and hope, and how can the ideal of a harmonious and peaceful Europe be pursued? In what follows we focus on some of Francis’s proposals and intuitions for overcoming Europe’s crises, for reconnecting with the best of its own tradition and finding the paths for the future. 󰀁. Reconnecting with Europe’s Roots and Transcendence The key concept seems to be that of “openness.” First of all, Francis insists on the need for Europe to reconnect with its roots and with transcendence, in order to find the way of hope, creativity, and fertility for the future. Europe needs to overcome what he calls its “memory deficit,” which he sees as the cultural legacy of the 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀀s, when a healthy idea of tradition between older and younger generations was betrayed.󰀅󰀇 Speaking to the European institutions in Strasbourg, the pope used two effective images: in the Parliament, he referred to Raphael’s famous fresco in the Vatican, the so-called “School of Athens,” with Plato, on the one hand, pointing his finger upward toward the heavens, and with Aristotle, on the other hand, holding his hand out before him, indicating the concrete, worldly reality. According to Francis, this is a very apt image of Europe, “made up of the constant interplay between heaven and earth, where the sky suggests that openness to the transcendent – to God – which has always distinguished the peoples of Europe, while the earth represents Europe’s practical and concrete ability to confront situations and problems.”󰀅󰀈 In the Council of Europe, Pope Francis used another image: that of a poplar tree, “its branches reaching up to the sky, buffeted by the wind, while its trunk remains firmly planted on deep roots sinking into the earth.”󰀅󰀉 This connection, between reaching for the heights and being rooted, is vital for Europe’s future: “In order to progress towards the future, we need the past, we need profound roots.”󰀆󰀀 This calls for a renewed interplay between religions, culture, society, and politics. 󰀅󰀇

 Address to COMECE, October 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇.  Address to the European Parliament, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. 󰀅󰀉  The image was taken from Italian poet Clemente Rebora’s “Il Pioppo,” in Canti dell’Infermità (Milan: Vanni Scheiwiller, 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀇), 󰀃󰀂. 󰀆󰀀  “Throughout its history, Europe has always reached for the heights, aiming at new and ambitious goals, driven by an insatiable thirst for knowledge, development, progress, peace and unity. But the advance of thought, culture and scientific discovery is entirely due to the solidity of the trunk and the depth of the roots which nourish it. Once those roots are lost, the trunk slowly withers from within and the branches – once flourishing 󰀅󰀈

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These roots for the pope are of course partly Christian, which is an undeniable fact and source of Europe’s history and identity. And, according to him, it would have been healthier to recognize that fact in the project of a European Constitution.󰀆󰀁 Without Christianity, “the Western values of dignity, freedom and justice would prove largely incomprehensible,” he states.󰀆󰀂 Yet Francis does not claim any exclusivity for these roots. Like his predecessors, and probably even more so than them, he is at ease with today’s secular and multireligious dimension of Europe, as long as the tradition and lofty role of Christianity in building and upholding Europe’s key values, not only in its history but also in present society, is recognized and respected. “In our multicultural world, these values will continue to have their rightful place, provided they maintain a vital connection to their deepest roots. The fruitfulness of that connection will make it possible to build authentically ‘lay’ societies, free of ideological conflicts, with equal room for the native and the immigrant, for believers and nonbelievers.” 󰀂. Openness to and Dialogue with the “Other” This openness to its own spiritual and cultural roots and to transcendence creates, according to Francis, the conditions for another openness, equally necessary: the openness to the “other,” openness to the outside world. This openness has a place within the European Union – which he sees as a multipolar and complex reality – and also outside the EU, with the nations and peoples both close by and further away. But it implies especially a fundamental attitude of openness to the one who is “different,” especially the migrant. and erect – bow to the earth and fall. This is perhaps among the most baffling paradoxes for a narrowly scientific mentality: in order to progress towards the future we need the past, we need profound roots. We also need the courage not to flee from the present and its challenges. We need memory, courage, a sound and humane utopian vision.” Address to the Council of Europe, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/ en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/november/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀅_strasburgo-consiglioeuropa.html. 󰀆󰀁  “Je crois que l’Europe a des racines chrétiennes, mais ce ne sont pas les seules. Elle en a d’autres qu’il ne faut pas nier. Pourtant, je crois que l’erreur a été de ne pas vouloir dire ‘les racines chrétiennes’ dans le document de l’Union européenne sur la première Constitution, et cela a été commis aussi par les gouvernements. Ça a été une erreur de ne pas voir la réalité. Cela ne veut pas dire que l’Europe doit être entièrement chrétienne. Mais c’est un héritage, un héritage culturel, que l’on a reçu.” Cf. Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀂󰀆󰀅. 󰀆󰀂  Address for the 󰀆󰀀th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. Cf. n. 󰀃󰀃.

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Cultural, religious, and political diversity – both within the EU and more broadly on the European continent – is part and parcel of the European identity. Therefore, Europe is called to recognize this multipolarity, and needs to refrain from every uniformization policy. The strengthening of its unity, in the view of the pope, calls for an effort of creativity to build a harmonious European society, which, rather than erasing diversity, is respectful of its cultural differences. Here is an expression of the pope’s allergy to the geometric perfection of the sphere, and his predilection for the “polyhedron,” which builds unity by integrating complexity and difference, and “in which the harmonic unity of the whole preserves the particularity of each of the parts,” as he said in Strasbourg.󰀆󰀃 In that same speech he insisted on another requirement of a transversal conversation: the necessary dialogue between different generations and cultures. This requires “the ability to break out of the structures which ‘contain’ our identity and to encounter others, for the sake of making that identity more solid and fruitful in the fraternal exchange of transversality.”󰀆󰀄 For the pope, overcoming Europe’s temptation to close in on itself also implies a fruitful dialogue with the peoples outside the borders of the European Union. When visiting countries just outside its borders, especially in the Balkans (he visited Bosnia, Albania, and North Macedonia), he heard the aspirations of the people to one day be part of the European Union, an ambition that he seems to endorse. He considers the dialogue that accompanies this complex political process also healthy for the EU itself, since it is “better to build bridges than walls.” Such an attitude of reaching out to neighbors must not be limited to the European continent but must extend to other neighbors on the Asian and African continents. On tricky geopolitical issues, such as the position of Ukraine as a bridge country linking East and West and the possible relations between the EU and Turkey, Francis has not been outspoken, though he has been careful not to hurt sensibilities of Moscow and Constantinople. 󰀃. Welcoming the Refugee and the Migrant Of course, however, the litmus test for Europe’s openness to the “other” has been the capacity of the European peoples and nations to 󰀆󰀃

 Address to the Council of Europe, November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄.  Ibid.

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welcome refugees and migrants. Time and again Pope Francis has asked Europe (its governments, institutions, peoples, Churches, and communities) to be welcoming to those who flee wars, violence, hunger, injustice, and abject poverty, as well as to those who just want a better life for themselves and their children.󰀆󰀅 Indeed, these six years of his pontificate coincide with what is called the “migration crisis” of Europe: a constant influx of refugees and other migrants, fleeing wars in Middle Eastern countries such as Syria and Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia; fleeing injustice and oppression, such as the Eritreans; and fleeing abject poverty and difficult living conditions (most African nations). The combination of push and pull factors and the fact that asylum seekers need to set foot on European soil in order to apply for protection have increased the pressure on the borders of the EU, creating a humanitarian crisis especially in the Balkan and Mediterranean border regions, unprecedented since the Second World War. This crisis was not limited to the borders of the EU but was repeated within the EU, especially among Schengen and non-Schengen countries (e.g. the refugee camp in Calais), as well as between Schengen countries trying to keep migrants out (the borders between Italy and France and between Italy and Austria). The responses of European countries to this phenomenon have been varied, hesitant, and shifting in the direction of greater restrictions, with the European Commission unable to realize a common approach and “burden-sharing.”󰀆󰀆 All countries draw the legal distinction between “refugees” – eligible for international protection according to criteria of the Geneva Convention – and “economic migrants,” who eventually are rejected. Some EU member states have had a more welcoming policy (especially Germany and Sweden), while others have been more restrictive or totally opposed (especially central-eastern European countries known as the Visegrad Group: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia); and some have tried to adopt different policies depending on the cultural background of the asylum seekers and migrants (favoring Christians while 󰀆󰀅  A rich anthology of his words on migrants, covering the first two years of his pontificate (from March 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 through June 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), is to be found in Pape François, Où est ton frère? Paroles sur les migrants et les réfugiés (Paris: Bayard, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). 󰀆󰀆  For one analysis and view point, see: Lucas Schramm, “Solidarity – from the Heart or by Force? The Failed German Leadership in the EU’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis” (January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀁. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=󰀃󰀃󰀁󰀂󰀇󰀀󰀆 or http://dx.doi. org/󰀁󰀀.󰀂󰀁󰀃󰀉/ssrn.󰀃󰀃󰀁󰀂󰀇󰀀󰀆 [accessed May 󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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rejecting Muslims). After the summer of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, which saw the influx of approximately one million people after Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to temporarily suspend the “Dublin rules” and give them the opportunity to lodge their asylum request in Germany, the policy of all EU countries, including Germany, has been shifting dramatically towards greater stringency: the EU deal with Turkey in March 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, the end of the search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean since 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, and the closure since 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 of Italian ports to boats filled with migrants have been the dramatic turning points in this evolution. Pope Francis has consistently appealed for more solidarity with migrants, refusing to make too many distinctions between (political) refugees and (economic) migrants, refusing also to make distinctions between Christians and Muslims. The need to protect the vulnerable is critical to him. Yet, there is more behind this than Jesus’s evangelical imperative to welcome the stranger: “I was a stranger and you invited me in.” Francis is also convinced that European countries have the capacity and the duty to integrate these newcomers. He explains how this is a part of the strength of Europe’s identity and history: “her history has been greatly determined by encounters with other peoples and cultures”; “hers is, and always has been, a dynamic and multicultural identity.”󰀆󰀇 Therefore, as he often repeats on various occasions, migrants are to be considered “more a resource than a burden.”󰀆󰀈 Francis has not refrained from using strong language against those who want to build walls to keep the poor migrant out: those policies cannot win in the long term, since they will be “destroyed” on the day of the Lord and “the arrogance of the few will be replaced by the solidarity of the many.”󰀆󰀉 Pope Francis has been accused, by friends and foes alike, of being an advocate of an “open border” policy. Yet, this is not a fair judgment. 󰀆󰀇  Address on the occasion of the 󰀆󰀀th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, March 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀆󰀈  Address to COMECE, October 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀆󰀉  “We can build any number of walls and close our doors in the vain effort to feel secure in our wealth, at the expense of those left outside. It will not be that way for ever. The ‘day of the Lord’, as described by the prophets (cf. Am 󰀅:󰀁󰀈; Is 󰀂–󰀅; Jl 󰀁–󰀃), will destroy the barriers created between nations and replace the arrogance of the few with the solidarity of many. The marginalization painfully experienced by millions of persons cannot go on for long. Their cry is growing louder and embraces the entire earth. In the words of Father Primo Mazzolari: ‘the poor are a constant protest against our injustices; the poor are a powder keg. If it is set on fire, the world will explode’.” Message for the Third World Day of the Poor, June 󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ messages/poveri/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀀󰀆󰀁󰀃_messaggio-iii-giornatamondialepoveri-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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While being the voice of the poor and migrants in the public debate, he also makes clear that he understands people’s fears and underlines the duty of government authorities to address the migration issue “with prudence,” the “virtue proper to governance.” He explicitly asks authorities to take into account the capacity of a society to fully integrate the newcomers, “on the social, economic and political level.” He recognizes the right (and the duty) of government bodies to regulate migration but invites them to do so with magnanimity and without giving in to the temptation of fear and hatred. Finally, he also states that it is the responsibility of migrants “to learn, respect and assimilate the culture and traditions of the nations that welcome them.”󰀇󰀀 󰀄. Solidarity and the Dignity of Man in the Heart of the European Project For Francis, reconnecting the European project with the spirit of the founding fathers of the EU means putting the concepts of “solidarity” and “human dignity” back in the heart of the European project. “The first element of European vitality must be solidarity,” he said on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty, referring to J. Beck, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister at the time. “That spirit remains as necessary as ever today, in the face of centrifugal impulses and the temptation to reduce the founding ideals of the Union to productive, economic and financial needs.” In order for the EU to be not a merely liberal, capitalistic, and mercantile project, the political structure needs to pay more attention to the social aspects of its policies. Pope Francis insists many times on social equality and inclusion. For him “a just distribution of the fruits of the earth” and “dignified and well paying jobs” is not “philanthropy” but “a moral obligation.”󰀇󰀁 As is well known, Francis is deeply concerned about the levels of underemployment of the young generation, and not only in Europe.󰀇󰀂 He considers it an effect of “soulless globalization, more

󰀇󰀀

 Address to COMECE, October 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇.  “The just distribution of the fruits of the earth and human labour is not mere philanthropy. It is a moral obligation. If we want to rethink our society, we need to create dignified and well-paying jobs, especially for our young people.” Conferral of the Charlemagne Peace Prize, May 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. 󰀇󰀂  In the EU-󰀂󰀈, the unemployment rates of the population younger than 󰀂󰀅, had risen sharply due to the 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈 crisis, to reach a peak in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, since then they have fallen. In southern European countries though, such as Spain, Italy and Greece they remain higher than elsewhere https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index. 󰀇󰀁

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attentive to profits than people,” which has created “pockets of poverty, unemployment, exploitation and social unease.”󰀇󰀃 According to him, the creation of dignified and well-paid jobs should be a priority for governments: “Governments have the duty to create the economic conditions that promote a healthy entrepreneurship and appropriate levels of employment.”󰀇󰀄 In his view, social policies and job creation will have healthy effects on many other aspects of the European crisis, such as peace in the poor peripheries of the cities.󰀇󰀅 It will also create better conditions for young people who want to marry and raise children, boosting the declining birth rates.󰀇󰀆 󰀅. Generating a New Humanism The above-mentioned papal reflections, proposals, and intuitions concerning Europe are driven neither by nostalgia for the past nor by fear of the future: they show Francis’s unshaken confidence that in the foreseeable future Europe can still play a significant role, on the condition that it is creative and ambitious enough, in shaping what he calls “a new humanism.” With his address on the occasion of the conferral of the prestigious Charlemagne Prize, Pope Francis delivered his most original and ambitious thoughts for this “rebirth” of Europe. According to the pope, the very idea of Europe needs an “update.” For him, Europe is still capable of giving birth to a new humanism, if it uses three critical capacities: to integrate, to dialogue, and to generate. Based on the thoughts of the Polish-German Jesuit Erich Przywara regarding “Idee Europa,”󰀇󰀇 he develops the idea that the greatness of Europe lies in its ability to integrate the most varied cultures in new syntheses, as is seen in the uniqueness and the different layers to be found in European cities. This capacity, which, in the end, is a means to conceptualize and to realize complexity, is the real answer to forms of reductionism, attempts at uniformity, exclusion and even “ideological colonization.” This php?title=File:Youth_unemployment_figures,_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈_(%󰀂󰀅)_T󰀁.png [accessed June 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀇󰀃  Address to COMECE, October 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀇󰀄  Ibid. 󰀇󰀅  “There is no peace without employment and the prospect of earning a dignified wage. There is no peace in the peripheries of our cities, with their rampant drug abuse and violence,” on the occasion of the 󰀆󰀀th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, March 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀇󰀆  Conferral of Charlemagne Prize, May 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. 󰀇󰀇  Erich Przywara (󰀁󰀈󰀈󰀉-󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀂) was an influent theologian in postwar Germany, as editor and editor-in-chief of the German Jesuit magazine Stimmen der Zeit.

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capacity of integration has also to do with solidarity and the commitment to openness, especially to newcomers in Europe. For the pope, “it is not enough to settle individuals geographically: the challenge is that of a profound cultural integration.” For Francis, Europe is still capable of achieving this, as it has in the past. Integration goes together with the capacity to have a fruitful conversation with peoples and groups which do not belong to one’s natural circle of contacts. This is especially an educational challenge, according to the pope, who pleads for arming “our children with the weapons of dialogue, that we teach them to fight the good fight of encounter and negotiation.” Finally, all these elements will help Europe to rediscover the capacity to generate, overcoming that infertility that the pope pinpointed several times. The dream for Europe with which Pope Francis concluded his speech is probably the best summation of his ambitious views on Europe: I dream of a new European humanism, one that involves “a constant work of humanization” and calls for “memory, courage, [and] a sound and humane utopian vision.” I dream of a Europe that is young, still capable of being a mother: a mother who has life because she respects life and offers hope for life. I dream of a Europe that cares for children, that offers fraternal help to the poor and those newcomers seeking acceptance because they have lost everything and need shelter. I dream of a Europe that is attentive to and concerned for the infirm and the elderly, lest they be simply set aside as useless. I dream of a Europe where being a migrant is not a crime but a summons to greater commitment on behalf of the dignity of every human being. I dream of a Europe where young people breathe the pure air of honesty, where they love the beauty of a culture and a simple life undefiled by the insatiable needs of consumerism, where getting married and having children is a responsibility and a great joy, not a problem due to the lack of stable employment. I dream of a Europe of families, with truly effective policies concentrated on faces rather than numbers, on birth rates more than rates of consumption. I dream of a Europe that promotes and protects the rights of everyone, without neglecting its duties towards all. I dream of a Europe of which it will not be said that its commitment to human rights was its last utopia.󰀇󰀈

VI. A Prophet Crying in the European Wilderness? The words that Pope Francis has spoken concerning Europe – and particularly his dreams for Europe – are concepts with a rare spiritual 󰀇󰀈

 Conferral of Charlemagne Prize, May 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.

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depth in a context usually dominated by political, economic, and technical language, especially in the world of the EU headquarters. Interpreting the voice of the peoples in the peripheries, the marginalized elderly, the unemployed youth, the urban poor, the migrants and refugees knocking on Europe’s door and drowning in the Mediterranean, he has spoken to Europe’s heart – just as he speaks to the globalized world – as a prophet. Yet, as a conclusion, it can be asked whether, after nearly seven years of this pontificate, Pope Francis is being listened to. Has he had any impact, or is he an unheard prophet? On the political level, one can recall how few critical voices there were prior to his coming to the European Parliament in the autumn of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, when his straightforward speech was welcomed with a standing ovation. He was still exceptionally popular, and probably, as an unconventional pope, even more among non-believers and hesitant Christians than among devout Catholics. On the political level, while European nations’ political leaders and EU leaders have listened politely to Pope Francis, one cannot say that they have been following him, especially not regarding his main point: the welcoming and integration of refugees and migrants. The notable exceptions have been the Italian Prime Ministers Letta and Gentiloni, who organized the search-and-rescue operation “Mare Nostrum,” and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose Willkommenskultur was partly inspired by Pope Francis. Some European governments (those of Italy, France, and Belgium) have worked with the ecumenical project of the “Humanitarian corridors,” which opened a safe and legal pathway for vulnerable refugees from Syria and elsewhere.󰀇󰀉 But populist leaders have taken over, and in recent years Europe’s policies have become more restrictive regarding the welcoming of refugees and migrants: a take-back agreement with Turkey, barbed-wire borders, push-backs at sea, a ban on NGOs rescuing refugee boats at sea, etc.… “fortress Europe” has materialized. On the ecclesiastic front too, Pope Francis has not had overall success. Though the European bishops have generally been on his side – much more so than the US bishops – and have defended his policies (for instance, writing documents on the need to welcome refugees and migrants and responding to the pope’s surprise appeal during the Angelus of September 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 that “every parish, every religious community, every shrine 󰀇󰀉  See, e.g., Michael Collyer, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito, Humanitarian Corridors: “Safe and Legal Pathways to Europe,” Policy Briefing, University of Sussex, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/󰀇󰀂󰀄󰀂󰀄/ [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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house a family”),󰀈󰀀 there have been other voices. Especially in Eastern European countries, Catholic bishops have been rather cautious in following Francis’s invitation to welcome refugees. Most bishops have been silent, but in the Visegrad countries, some criticisms were raised. Even authoritative figures, such as Cardinal Dominik Duka, archbishop of Prague, have openly suggested that Pope Francis, with his Latin American sensibilities, does not understand European concerns.󰀈󰀁 The main point of discussion is the degree to which Europe, once a Christian continent but more and more multicultural and secular, is able to integrate Muslim migrants, dubbed by some as a fifth column ready to take over.󰀈󰀂 At a time when a good number of European Catholics are tempted by an “identitarian” approach to Catholic and European identity, Pope Francis is working and pleading for an “outgoing Church,” which should not close in on its own identity or fight “cultural wars” but rather should serve humanity, and especially the poor. “Closedness is not Christian. Faithfulness is Christian. If I close myself in, I defend myself, it’s not Christian. Defending values by closedness is not the Christian way. Values are defended by themselves, if they are proclaimed as they are, as Jesus has given them to us.”󰀈󰀃 This battle for the soul and future of the continent and for the proper mission of the Church is far from over. Yet, Pope Francis knows that he is in it for the long run. He is not pointing at easy and immediate success; rather he is planting seeds for the future, “generating processes,” as he likes to say, which will produce their fruits in the future. Antonio Spadaro has rightly pointed out how the three verbs “integrating, dialoguing, generating” indicate that, for Pope Francis, Europe is to be considered a process, rather than a thing. “Time is superior to space,” Francis wrote in Evangelii Gaudium,󰀈󰀄 and this idea seems also to be his guideline for his considerations about Europe. “Far from protecting spaces, Europe becomes a mother who 󰀈󰀀

 The official text of the Angelus on the Vatican website does not mention the introduction, where the appeal was made. See, e.g., https://www.ncronline.org/news/ vatican/francis-calls-every-parish-across-europe-house-refugee-families [accessed May 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀈󰀁  “The sensitivity of Pope Francis on social issues is different from ours in Europe. (…) He also comes from Latin America where the gap between rich and poor is much bigger,” cardinal Duka was quoted saying in an interview with Lidove noviny on May 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/󰀅󰀅󰀃󰀂/cardinal-claims-pope-can-t-understandrefugee-crisis-because-he-is-not-from-europe [accessed June 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀈󰀂  De Volder, “Tussen profetie, angst en hoop,” 󰀄󰀀󰀁-󰀄󰀂󰀄. 󰀈󰀃  Cf. Pape François, Politique et société, 󰀁󰀀󰀃. 󰀈󰀄  EG 󰀂󰀂󰀂-󰀂󰀂󰀅.

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generates processes. If Europe considers itself as a ‘space’” – writes Spadaro – “then sooner or later will come – and it has already come – the moment of fear, the fear that space will be invaded. The space must be defended first. If, on the other hand, Europe is to be preserved as a process in progress, then we can understand how it puts energies into motion, ascertaining the challenges of history.”󰀈󰀅

 Translation from Spadaro, Il nuovo mondo di Francesco, 󰀅󰀉-󰀆󰀀.

󰀈󰀅

Pope Francis and Africa Stefano Picciaredda For me Africa was a surprise. I thought: God surprises us; but Africa surprises us too! So many different things... the crowds, the crowds... They felt they had a visitor. They have such a great sense of hospitality.󰀁

On November 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, pope Francis uttered the above words to express the surprising experience of his first meeting with the African continent. He was engaged in a conversation with journalists on the papal flight back from Bangui to Rome, at the end of his journey in Kenya, Uganda and Central African Republic, where he had opened the extraordinary jubilee of mercy. Like Karol Wojtyla, Bergoglio did not know Africa directly, because he had never visited it. Wojtyla had so well filled the gap, with 󰀁󰀄 trips in 󰀄󰀂 countries, that he was described as “John Paul the African”󰀂 and “Defensor Africae.”󰀃 His constant interest in the events of the continent had “forced” public opinion and political debate to deal with Africa, during a period marked by so-called Afro-pessimism and by the tendency of the European and Western countries to assume a certain indifference towards the continent, whose macroeconomic destinies were willingly entrusted to the care of the International Monetary Fund and its structural adjustment formulas.󰀄

󰀁  In-flight Press Conference of Pope Francis from the Central African Republic to Rome, papal flight, November 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, at the end of the apostolic journey to Kenya, Uganda and the Central African Republic (November 󰀂󰀅-󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). www.vatican.va. 󰀂  The definition is of the Senegalese cardinal Hyacinthe Thiandoum. 󰀃  Andrea Riccardi, Giovanni Paolo II: La biografia (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁), 󰀃󰀈󰀄-󰀃󰀈󰀆. 󰀄  Finn Tarp, Stabilization and Structural Adjustment: Macroeconomic Frameworks for Analysing the Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa (London and New York: Routledge, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄); J. Barry Riddell, “Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in SubSaharan Africa,” The Journal of Modern Africa Studies 󰀃󰀀, no. 󰀁 (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀉): 󰀅󰀃-󰀆󰀈.

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I. A Continent to Be Better Understood At the end of the first five years of his pontificate, is it possible to identify an “African policy” of Pope Francis, or at least a project reflecting one? And on what visions would it be based? It should be noted that, because of the rapid transformations that have hit the world in the era of globalization, the social, economic and political reality of sub-Saharan Africa today is quite different from that in 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀈-󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅, the years of Wojtyla’s pontificate. This makes it necessary to make an effort to better understand the current situation. It is even more urgent because of the fact that, in the public opinion of some European countries such as Italy, Africa now represents a homogeneous space, devoid of historical depth, diversity and nuances, characterized almost univocally by the presence of tens of millions of young people, perhaps a hundred million, ready to leave to realize the “invasion” of Europe, thus bringing to completion the design of “substitution” conceived by the leaders of economic and financial globalization such as George Soros. At least this is the thesis conveyed by one Italian newspaper with national distribution, among others.󰀅 Economists instead tell of a privatized and flourishing Africa, in which the air is one of “Afro-optimism.” There is a new class of rich Africans: approximately 󰀂󰀀󰀀-󰀃󰀀󰀀 million out of over 󰀁.󰀂 billion people, who are benefitting from the economic mechanisms of ultra-liberalism. An Africa that has become the kingdom of “private”: private schools and clinics are arising in the place of public schools and health centres. States have weakened.󰀆 The disengagement of the European countries and of the United States after the failure of the Restore Hope mission of 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀃 in Somalia left the field opened to China, which within twenty years, starting from 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀆, a century after the European colonization, has achieved the new reality of “Chinafrica.”󰀇 The change is cultural and anthropological. While it remains the poorest continent on the planet, the culture of globalization and individual well-being is now also spreading in Africa. 󰀅

 See ie www.ilgiornale.it, “l’anarca” blog.  Cf. Oliver Campbell White and Anita Bhatia, Privatization in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀈); Horman Chitonge, Economic Growth and Development in Africa: Understanding Trends and Prospects (London: Routledge, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). 󰀇  Stefano Gardelli, L’Africa cinese: Gli interessi asiatici nel Continente Nero (Milan: Università Bocconi, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉); Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa (London: Nation Books, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀). 󰀆

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It is a continent of young people – and that is why it frightens us. Young people are “young people of the market,” individualists, enterprising. Nationalism is less widespread than in the past, as is the passion for panAfricanism. In their place, we have globalization, as a “revolution of the ego.” Among these urbanized and proletarianized young people, a culture of competition and materialism has replaced the traditional and supportive culture. The impulse to seek individual interest at all costs and the incitement to “succeed” are so strong that they erode the religious discourse. The Catholic Church is being challenged by the new Neo-Christian “Churches of Prosperity,” which adapt their preaching to the spirit of the age. II. Does Francis Have an “African Policy”? Perhaps it is too early to give a definite answer to the question about the existence of an “African policy” of Pope Francis. Of course, he has identified three priorities, on which I intend to concentrate my attention. Because it is a different topic, I will not refer to the intra-ecclesial and more strictly pastoral challenges that the African Churches present, but to the main social and geopolitical issues. The first priority concerns the need to work to restore or consolidate peace in countries and regions affected by violence and conflict. The pope has made it clear that several “pieces” of a new world war, of which he himself has illustrated the characteristics, are in place in sub-Saharan Africa. In January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, during the traditional address to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See, he said: Nor can the international community overlook the suffering of many parts of the African continent, especially in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Nigeria and the Central African Republic, where the right to life is threatened by the indiscriminate exploitation of resources, terrorism, the proliferation of armed groups and protracted conflicts. It is not enough to be appalled at such violence. Rather, everyone, in his or her own situation, should work actively to eliminate the causes of misery and build bridges of fraternity, the fundamental premise for authentic human development.󰀈 󰀈  Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greetings, Regia Hall, Monday 󰀈 January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/january/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀁󰀀󰀈_corpo-diplomatico.html.

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Here Francis has explicitly mentioned five countries where the international community must not limit itself to expressing indignation and to exhorting warring parties to reconcile; it has to “work actively.” The interesting and partially innovative fact is that the pope has intended to give the example of this way of “working actively.” This was not an exhortation addressed to others, but rather the explanation of a program that he himself tried to put into practice in different contexts. I will try to describe the traits of this action that we know about, those made public, starting with South Sudan. In this young African country, created at the end of the long dispute between the north and the south of the former English colony, after a dispute ended in independence, the peaceful cohabitation broke because of the struggle between the two once-allied strong men, the president Salva Kiir and the vice president Riek Machar.󰀉 The division between factions immediately modelled itself along the lines of ethnic affiliation, adding the fuel of ethnic hatred to the economic and political motivations that are behind the dispute. There is a high risk of a new Rwanda, of a genocide among groups of the same country, which furthermore has a large Christian majority. The conflict exacerbates a situation of extreme poverty and famine, in a country with one of the lowest average life expectancies on the planet. It is because of this, perhaps, that the South Sudanese dossier arrived on Bergoglio’s desk, attracting and focusing his concerns and actions. I will try to follow his modus operandi. Among his first acts is the invitation to the Vatican addressed to the bishop of Juba, Paulino Lukudu Loro. At the meeting, on October 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, the prelate was not alone, but accompanied by the Episcopalian archbishop and by the moderator of the Presbyterian Church. The discussion was based on the modalities of a work of reconciliation, that could mitigate the hatred between groups.󰀁󰀀 It is a solid fact: Pope Francis commits not only Catholics but different Christian denominations as well to the work of pacification. In this way, divisions are overcome not through a theological dialogue but through jointly working for peace. If there were doubts about Pope Francis’s intentions, they disappeared shortly after, on February 󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. During a visit to the Anglican Church of Rome, the pontiff announced 󰀉  Cf. Hilde F. Johnson, South Sudan: The Untold Story. From Independence to Civil War (London: I. B. Tauris, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆); Nicholas Coghlan, Collapse of a Country: A Diplomat’s Memoir of South Sudan (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀁󰀀  Cf. “Pope Francis invites Christian Leaders of South Sudan to Discuss the Crisis,” in www.fides.org, October 󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.

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his intention to make a trip to South Sudan as soon as possible, not alone but together with the Anglican primate Welby. The news is announced in the pope’s response to an African seminarian: The bishops, the Anglican, the Presbyterian and the Catholic came together to tell me: “Please come to South Sudan, only one day, but do not come alone, come with Justin Welby,” the Archbishop of Canterbury. This creativity has come from them, from this young Church. And we’re thinking if we can do it, if the situation is not too bad down there... But we have to do it because they, the three, they want peace together, and they work together for peace.󰀁󰀁

It seems from these words that the initiative came from the bishops themselves. It also seems that the pope has studied a formula similar to the one experimented with on the island of Lesbos, a symbolic place of the tragedy of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea: an all-day trip, from morning to evening, together with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. Although the journey has so far not fulfilled its mission, the ecumenical dialogue has given life to a permanent body, the South Sudan Council of Churches, which includes many Christian denominations, in addition to the two represented in the meeting with the pope. The Council succeeded in entering into discussions and negotiations between the parties, until it took part in the Khartoum negotiation, which led to an unexpected agreement, signed on September 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 in Addis Ababa. Subject to criticism, for the choice of multiplying government tasks and distributing them to the different parties, to satisfy the most varied needs and “appetites,” the agreement is showing a capacity to hold.󰀁󰀂 The observers highlighted the contribution made by the Council of Churches, which offered solutions as well as a compensation fund at the moment of the negotiating deadlock. It is not correct to ascribe the success of the talks to it, but what is interesting to underline is the passage of Christian leaders from an exhortative position of moral encouragement, to direct involvement in negotiations. Here are two firm points of Pope Bergoglio’s conception of commitment for pacification: working actively, 󰀁󰀁  Cf. Andrea Tornielli, “Il Papa: Andremo in Sud Sudan con il primate anglicano,” Vatican Insider, www.lastampa.it, February 󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. In November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇 Pope Francis wrote a preface – a fact quite unusual – to a book of an Italian missionary: Daniele Moschetti, Sud Sudan: Il lungo e sofferto cammino verso pace, giustizia e dignità (Viareggio: Dissensi, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀁󰀂  Cf. “Soudan du Sud: le nouvel accord de paix accueilli avec prudence,” Jeune Afrique, September 󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. Pope Francis has asked many times for people to pray for peace in South Sudan and in RDC, and he presided over a dedicated evening prayer in St. Peter’s basilica on February 󰀂󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈.

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“getting our hands dirty” in contact and dialogue with the warring parties, and doing so in a unitary, ecumenical manner, acting independently of theological divisions and disagreements. Confronted with the uncertainties of the peace process in South Sudan, Francis once again took the initiative in April 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, hosting an unprecedented spiritual retreat for prayer and reflection at the Vatican, at the invitation of the Anglican primate Welby, for the country’s political and religious leaders. Participation was at the highest level: the president and his three deputies came to Rome, embodying all the warring factions. At the end, the pope made a surprising and extreme gesture, bowing down to kiss the leaders’ feet, as an ultimate appeal to renounce arms. The picture of the pope prostrated at the feet of Salva Kiir quickly went around the world, causing controversy and amazement. The recipients of the gesture were profoundly affected. Leaving the prepared text, and speaking to them from his heart, Francis had asked “as a brother” to remain in peace, adding: “I beg with my heart: let’s go ahead, there will be so many problems, but don’t panic. Go ahead, solve problems. You have started a process, may it end well! There will be fights between you, but may they remain within the office. Hands together in front of the people! Thus, from simple citizens become fathers of the nation. Allow me to ask you this with my heart, with my most profound feelings […] Peace is possible, I will never tire of repeating it!”󰀁󰀃 According to Bergoglio, the search for synergies in the work of pacification must not be limited to Christians but must involve the Muslim world. Many examples bear witness to this conviction. On June 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, Pope Francis recommended to the Bishops of Sierra Leone, Gambia and Liberia during their ad limina apostolorum visit, “to always enter into dialogue with moderate Muslims.”󰀁󰀄 The same bishops announced that “a document on cooperation and interreligious dialogue that can contribute to peace and brotherhood among Christians and Muslims in the world is being prepared.” What this meant was understood, as we shall see, in February 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. There is in Bergoglio, of course, a concern for fundamentalism, radicalism and its most violent and intolerant expressions, which have 󰀁󰀃  Salvatore Cernuzio, “Papa Francesco bacia i piedi ai leader del Sud Sudan: Basta guerre,” Vatican Insider, www.lastampa.it, April 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. Comments on the gesture of the pope in www.fides.org, “I Sud Sudanesi colpiti dal gesto che papa Francesco ha fatto a loro nome,” April 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. 󰀁󰀄  Cf. Festus Tarawalie, “The Bishops of Sierra Leone and Liberia Invite Pope Francis to Visit Their Two Countries,” Vatican News, June 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, www.vaticannews.va.

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marked the depth of the history of the third millennium. This concern, however, does not turn into Islamophobia. The pope is aware that fundamentalism is a “disease” that afflicts every religious belief: Fundamentalism is a sickness which exists in all religions. We Catholics have some people – not just a few, but a lot – who believe they possess absolute truth and go around slandering and defaming everyone else; they do a lot of harm. I say this because it’s my Church, but it is all of us! And we have to fight against it. Religious fundamentalism is not religious. Why? Because God is missing. It is idolatrous, just as money is idolatrous.󰀁󰀅

If the Sudanese case provides us with an example of ecumenical commitment, the Central African one shows the fruits of building collaborative relationships between Catholics and Muslims. The Central African Republic represents a case of a neglected country, quantité négligeable on the international scenarios, prey for those aspiring to exploit its natural resources and the scene of an economic war incited by hatreds related to ethnic and religious differences.󰀁󰀆 At the extreme periphery of the world, Bergoglio wanted to place it, at least for one day, at the centre of the attention of the Catholic world, making it the “spiritual capital of the world.” In Bangui, the pope opened the first “holy door” of the Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy. It was November 󰀂󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. In the Central African capital, although advised against the gesture for security reasons, Francis literally asked to go to the border line that separates Christian neighborhoods from Muslim ones, a line that, during the clashes and in the hottest moments of the conflict that has ravaged the country, had become a front line. After passing the famous “km. 󰀅,” Bergoglio met the local Islamic community and its imam, and before entering the mosque he told everyone that “between Christians and Muslims we are brothers,” thanking the two communities for protecting each other during the conflict. Later in the mosque, he stated: In these dramatic times, Christian and Muslim leaders have sought to rise to the challenges of the moment. They have played an important role in re-establishing harmony and fraternity among all. I would like express my gratitude and appreciation for this. We can also call to mind the many acts of solidarity which Christians and Muslims have shown with regard to their fellow citizens of other religious

󰀁󰀅

 In-flight conference (cf. n. 󰀁).  Cf. Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard, Making Sense of the Central African Republic (London: Zen Books, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). 󰀁󰀆

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confessions, by welcoming them and defending them during this latest crisis in your country, as well as in other parts of the world.󰀁󰀇

The reference is to the mutual protection that, during the clashes, churches and mosques had offered to each other’s believers, a choice that had stifled the attempt to turn the conflict into a religious war. For the imam, the pope’s visit represented “a historical fact that changed the history of our country.” The pope’s visit, the media hyper-exposure and the gestures of reconciliation led in fact to a truce and to a suspension of violence, and promoted calm in the presidential elections held in the following month of December, an important step in the stabilization of the country’s institutional framework. The pope’s visit was returned in an original modality: after being appointed cardinal, the archbishop of Bangui, Dieudonné Nzapalainga (born in 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀇, the youngest member of the College of Cardinals and the first Central African cardinal in history), went to Rome for the consistory of November 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, together with the Imam Kobine Layama and the Protestant pastor Philippe Sing-Na. The latter were able to meet and confer with Bergoglio before undertaking a joint visit to the Roman mosque of Monte Antenne. The three religious leaders created the “Inter-religious Platform of Central Africa,” with the aim of providing education for peace to the young population, starting precisely from the example of dialogue and collaboration between confessions and religions that Bergoglio explicitly “blessed.”󰀁󰀈 This experience has undoubtedly played a role in the elaboration of the historic “document on human fraternity for world peace and living together,” signed by Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of the University of Al-Azhar, Ahmed El-Tayeb in Abu Dhabi on February 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. The declaration, announced to African bishops on their ad limina visit, as mentioned, set out “from a profound consideration of our contemporary reality.” The multiplication of armed conflicts is one of the central themes addressed by the document: History shows that religious extremism, national extremism and also intolerance have produced in the world, be it in the East or West, what might be referred to as signs of a “third world war being fought piecemeal.” In several parts of the world and in many tragic circumstances these signs have begun to be painfully apparent, as in those situations where the 󰀁󰀇  Apostolic Journey to Kenya, Uganda and the Central African Republic (November 󰀂󰀅-󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), meeting with the Muslim community. Address by Pope Francis, Central mosque of Koudoukou, Bangui (Central African Republic), Monday, November 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. 󰀁󰀈  Cf. the interview of V. Corrado with Msgr. Nzapalainga, November 󰀁󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, published by the Italian news agency “Sir,” in www.agensir.it.

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precise number of victims, widows and orphans is unknown. We see, in addition, other regions preparing to become theatres of new conflicts, with outbreaks of tension and a build-up of arms and ammunition, and all this in a global context overshadowed by uncertainty, disillusionment, fear of the future, and controlled by narrow-minded economic interests.󰀁󰀉

The novelty is that, faced with these “pieces” of global war, Catholics and Sunni Muslims now present a common position and response, which expresses a clear and radical condemnation of war and violence: Moreover, we resolutely declare that religions must never incite war, hateful attitudes, hostility and extremism, nor must they incite violence or the shedding of blood. These tragic realities are the consequence of a deviation from religious teachings. They result from a political manipulation of religions and from interpretations made by religious groups who, in the course of history, have taken advantage of the power of religious sentiment in the hearts of men and women in order to make them act in a way that has nothing to do with the truth of religion. This is done for the purpose of achieving objectives that are political, economic, worldly and short-sighted. We thus call upon all concerned to stop using religions to incite hatred, violence, extremism and blind fanaticism, and to refrain from using the name of God to justify acts of murder, exile, terrorism and oppression. We ask this on the basis of our common belief in God who did not create men and women to be killed or to fight one another, nor to be tortured or humiliated in their lives and circumstances. God, the Almighty, has no need to be defended by anyone and does not want His name to be used to terrorize people.󰀂󰀀

Beyond the concrete repercussions that this document may produce, which will be measured over time, the historical value of many statements is evident. Themes and motives of the so-called “spirit of Assisi” resonate, that is the process of approach (without confusion) between religious worlds started by John Paul II in Assisi in 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀆. The document represents in a certain sense the fulfilment of an option for peace understood as a direct and personal commitment of the top of the Catholic Church, which has had its most important test in African situations. III. The Relationship between Peace and Democracy The democratic nature of a society and of an institutional system depends on a complex multiplicity of factors. Regular, free, transparent 󰀁󰀉

 The complete text of the Document is in www.vatican.va.  Ibid.

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and peaceful elections and the respect for the results of a race in a multiparty context is only one of these factors. However, for public opinion and the international community it is the one that, more than others, connotes the level of democracy reached by a nation. The relationship between African powers and democratic electoral dynamics, with their stringent rules, has never been simple in independent countries of subSaharan Africa. This is of course not due to a congenital allergy, but to the economic and social difficulties inherited from the colonial past, as well as to the sometimes-heavy constraints of external forces, which are not interested in establishing stable democratic systems. The processes of democratization, mainly started in the 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀀s, experienced accelerations, delays and tragic returns to the past. In this context the Catholic Church – and the Christian churches in general – did not remain neutral spectators, especially in some historical phases. In the 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀀s, in particular, they have at the same time represented a pressure factor in favor of democratization and an active subject in the transitions for the overcoming of authoritarian regimes. John Paul II had long supported the direct involvement of the bishops in resolving institutional crises or in peace mediations between warring parties. The political role of bishops in African societies peaked after 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀉. It is an involvement that has different modalities than on the other continents. In Benin, Gabon, Togo, Congo and Zaire, local bishops presided over national conferences for transition to democracy. In Malawi the bishops originated an opposition movement against Kamuzu Banda. In Madagascar, the Christian Churches together gave life to the “Comité des forces vives” that led to the collapse of Ratsiraka. In Mozambique, Msgr. Jaime Gonçalves was one of the mediators of a long and effective peace negotiation.󰀂󰀁 These examples bring out the close relationship between the affirmation of democracy and peace, and the conviction within the Catholic hierarchies that the former is a necessary condition for the realization of the latter. It is also known that Catholic social thought includes the principle that “there is no peace without justice,” and justice is a rare commodity in societies governed by illiberal, dictatorial regimes or otherwise refractory to the logic of alternation. It is also known that this 󰀂󰀁  The story of Benin has been told by Susanna Cannelli in Cattolici d’Africa: La nascita della democrazia in Benin (Milan: Guerini e Associati, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁). Cf. also Godé Iwele, Mgr Monsengwo: Acteur et témoin de l’histoire (Louvain-la-Neuve: Duculot, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀅); Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Mozambico, una pace per l’Africa (Milan: Mondadori, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀂).

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awareness has matured in the Catholic Church only in very recent years, when the terms “freedom” and “pluralism” have ceased to constitute an anathema. Not a few African bishops still look favourably on rulers who do not excel in respecting human and political rights but who grant to the Christian communities a benevolent and favorable treatment. Pope Francis is undoubtedly convinced of the need for the episcopates to regain the role they played at the end of the 󰀂󰀀th century, and he shares the importance of expanding the democratic method to all countries, countering, among other things, the widespread pathology that drives some African presidents to intervene by continuously changing the fundamental laws to prolong or multiply their mandates well beyond the envisaged deadlines. This orientation is witnessed by the attitude taken towards the largest laboratory for the transition to democracy on the continent, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to where Bergoglio was supposed to have gone in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, a trip which has always been postponed due to the continuous delays of the presidential elections scheduled for December 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.󰀂󰀂 Located in the very heart of the continent and with its highest number of Catholics, symbol of an Africa rich in resources and potential but reduced to misery by the deadly combination of exploitation, authoritarianism, war, foreign interference and the inability of the local ruling classes, Congo Kinshasa has been the theatre of the bloodiest war since World War II, with more than four million victims, overwhelmingly civilians. Since the 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀s, the Catholic Church has become accustomed to embodying the role of opponent and to being the advocate of democracy, first in the historical opposition of Card. Malula to the dictatorship of Mobutu, then with the presidency of Bishop Monsengwo Pasinya of the National Convention. When, in the autumn of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, it became clear that the end of the year’s election deadline would not be met and that the presidency of Joseph Kabila, begun in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀁, would be prolonged, the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Cenco) became the protagonist, by opening a negotiating table between government and oppositions to avert the beginning of a civil war. The proximity with which Bergoglio followed the negotiation and the support provided by him appear extremely significant.

󰀂󰀂  Cf. David Van Reybrouck, Congo: The Epic History of a People (New York: ECCO, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄); Isidore Ndaywel e Nziem, L’invention du Congo contemporain: Traditions, mémoires, modernités, 󰀂 vols. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆).

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Pope Francis followed the progress of the negotiations in real time. At the end of December 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, the president of Cenco flew to Rome during a pause from work to report to the Pope, who wanted to have news de visu. The negotiation led to the signature, on December 󰀃󰀁, of the “Saint Sylvester agreements.”󰀂󰀃 The twenty-four months between the signing of this document and the actual elections, held on December 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, saw the mobilization of the Catholic base, with various events, to demand compliance with the agreements. The price paid was high. The five intellectuals of the “Comité Laic de coordination,” including the historian Isidore Ndaywel e Nziem, promoters of initiatives in favor of an amnesty for political prisoners and freedom of expression during the electoral campaign, had to live underground. The authorities reacted harshly, forbidding any kind of demonstration and intervening to dissolve the gatherings in the parish premises, with multiple casualties. This led the bishops to take a decisive stance, denouncing violence and the prevaricating attitude of the government, as can be seen from these passages of their November 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 message, Des élections crédibles pour une véritable alternance démocratique, from which some relevant passages are quoted below: L’Accord de la Saint-Sylvestre avait arrêté les mesures de décrispation du climat politique sur lesquelles nous sommes souvent revenus. Vous le constatez: jusqu’à présent, certains opposants politiques sont toujours soit en prison soit en exil.󰀂󰀄 La liberté de manifestation n’est pas encore un acquis pour tous. La récente répression violente de la manifestation des étudiants de l’Université de Kinshasa qui a causé trois morts en est une illustration. Faut-il souligner aussi que l’accès aux médias publics n’est pas équitable. Nous observons aussi que, contrairement aux dispositions légales, les Agents de la territoriale et les administratifs, des ministres aux chefs des villages, sont contraints de battre campagne pour une seule tendance politique; et les moyens de l’État sont réquisitionnés, et mis à la disposition d’une seule plateforme politique. Ce qui consacre l’inégalité des chances, inadmissible dans une compétition démocratique (cf. Loi électorale, art. 󰀃󰀆).

The message ends with a series of recommendations, addressed to the Congolese people, to the government, to the parties, to the electoral 󰀂󰀃  Trésor Kibangula, “RD Congo: L’accord politique global et inclusif enfin adopté et signé à Kinshasa,” Jeune Afrique, December 󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. 󰀂󰀄  The complete text of the document can be found on the official website of the Episcopal Conference, www.cenco.cd.

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commission, to the candidates and to the international community. Also remarkable was the role of monitoring organized and deployed by Cenco once the elections were finally called and the seats were opened. An “army” of 󰀄󰀀,󰀀󰀀󰀀 observers monitored the counting operations, extracting a quantity of information on the basis of which the Cenco spokesman publicly asked the electoral commission to proclaim the results “relevant and compliant with the reality of the vote.” The delayed publication of the results on the night of January 󰀁󰀀, differing from the forecasts, provoked heated polemics, but no clashes or violence, and for the first time sanctioned a political alternation, with the presidential election of Felix Tshisekedi. The action of Congolese bishops in the long and turbulent transition phase – and the parallel one of the historical Protestant Churches – was immediately perceived and proposed as a “model of intervention for the continent,” obviously to be adapted to different situations.󰀂󰀅 In the year 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, elections will be held in many countries, including Senegal and Nigeria. We will probably witness a renewed action by the bishops, with the undoubted support of the pope, in favor of alternation and democratic values. IV. Social Justice The last priority, but not in order of importance, among those identified by Bergoglio on the African continent, concerns the great field of social justice and the fight against widespread poverty. To understand Pope Francis’s conceptions, it is important to remember that he had analyzed the economic processes triggered by neoliberalism – with all their social consequences – in depth before the election to the papal throne. Bergoglio has observed these processes at work in Latin America, where the struggle between the public good and the privatization of the economy (against the backdrop of the dispute between conservatives, liberals and populists) has a longer history. He is convinced that the dynamics of his continent are similar on a global level, and that observations, complaints and formulas are therefore also valid for Africa. 󰀂󰀅  Fides Press Agency, organ of the Pontifical Mission Societies, on January 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉: “Controversie elettorali in Africa: L’episcopato congolese, un modello per il continente.” In www.fides.org. The article also emphasizes the unity shown by the Congolese bishops, unlike other episcopal conferences often divided internally on political issues.

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Bergoglio invites us to grasp the effects of “turbo-liberalism” policies starting from the suburbs, where the “magic” deceiver of the market has not acted, and where the “scraps” have been rejected. Before all else, let us begin by acknowledging that change is needed. Here I would clarify, lest there be any misunderstanding, that I am speaking about problems common to all Latin Americans and, more generally, to humanity as a whole. They are global problems which today no one state can resolve on its own.󰀂󰀆

This is how the Pope spoke in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, at the second world gathering of popular movements, on July 󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. He added: you have mentioned the many forms of exclusion and injustice which you experience in the workplace, in neighborhoods and throughout the land. They are many and diverse, just as many and diverse are the ways in which you confront them. Yet there is an invisible thread joining every one of the forms of exclusion. These are not isolated issues. Can we recognize that invisible thread which links them? I wonder whether we can see that those destructive realities are part of a system which has become global. Do we realize that that system has imposed the mentality of profit at any price, with no concern for social exclusion or the destruction of nature?

Pope Francis is firmly convinced: the great injustices and situations of misery have a world dimension, and they are unacceptable for any reason in an evangelical logic. While criticizing the macroeconomic data that report a growth trend, he noted: Do we truly realize that something is wrong in a world where there are so many farmworkers without land, so many families without a home, so many laborers without rights, so many persons whose dignity is not respected?󰀂󰀇

The pope took the battle of the “three Ts”: Tierra, Techo, Trabajo (land, home, work). As it follows from the famous document of Aparecida, of which the Argentine cardinal was one of the great inspirers, Bergoglio went beyond the concepts of liberation theology. Its purpose was to put poor people back in the centre, but in the evangelical logic, not according to an ideological vision. There was special attention for new poverties and vulnerabilities related to large urban concentrations: the old people, the 󰀂󰀆  Apostolic journey of Pope Francis to Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay (July 󰀅-󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). Participation at the second world meeting of popular movements. Address of the Holy Father, Expo feria Exhibition centre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Bolivia), July 󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. 󰀂󰀇  Ibid.

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street children, the new poor, immigrants. The poor people are “not only exploited but considered superfluous, like waste.” I cannot and I will not summarize the social conceptions of the present pope. I only want to point out how, in Africa, the choice was similar: as soon as he arrived in Kenya he went to one of the poorest districts of the capital Nairobi, Kangemi, pronouncing a speech denouncing the dreadful injustice of urban exclusion. These are wounds inflicted by minorities who cling to power and wealth, who selfishly squander while a growing majority is forced to flee to abandoned, filthy and run-down peripheries. This becomes even worse when we see the unjust distribution of land (if not in this neighbourhood, certainly in others) which leads in many cases to entire families having to pay excessive and unfair rents for utterly unfit housing. I am also aware of the serious problem posed by faceless “private developers” who hoard areas of land and even attempt to appropriate the playgrounds of your children’s schools. This is what happens when we forget that “God gave the earth to the whole human race for the sustenance of all its members, without excluding or favouring anyone” (Centesimus Annus, 󰀃󰀁). One very serious problem in this regard is the lack of access to infrastructures and basic services. By this I mean toilets, sewers, drains, refuse collection, electricity, roads, as well as schools, hospitals, recreational and sport centres, studios and workshops for artists and craftsmen. I refer in particular to access to drinking water. “Access to safe drinkable water is a basic and universal human right, since it is essential to human survival and, as such, is a condition for the exercise of other human rights. Our world has a grave social debt towards the poor who lack access to drinking water, because they are denied the right to a life consistent with their inalienable dignity” (Laudato Si’, 󰀃󰀀). To deny a family water, under any bureaucratic pretext whatsoever, is a great injustice, especially when one profits from this need.󰀂󰀈

V. Conclusion These are just a few examples of a personal style of commitment and involvement in some situations into which Francis has plunged, taking up the dossiers and encouraging the work of Christians involved in the dialogue and in the search for peace. If it is not a precise program, it is surely a fundamental choice to address Africa’s suffering, and also a 󰀂󰀈  Apostolic journey of Pope Francis to Kenya, Uganda and the Central African Republic (November 󰀂󰀅-󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), visit to Kangemi slum. Address of Pope Francis in Nairobi (Kenya), November 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅.

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strong denunciation of corruption and tribalism. Precisely in Africa, however, is where his overtures appear little understood and shared: it was the African episcopate that expressed greater perplexities by, and sometimes opposed them in the debate that animated the first and, even more, the second synod on the family.󰀂󰀉 The South African cardinal Napier, although not among the four cardinals extending the dubia concerning Amoris Laetitia, has critically intervened on several occasions. More generally, I think we can say that the reception of the pontificate is proceeding slowly in Africa, partly due to the lesser attention of the local media towards the figure of the pope, partly due to the scarce dissemination of documents (such as the exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, a true manifesto of the pontificate, circulated only in restricted environments), and partly due to self-sufficiency and self-referentiality of ecclesial leaders. The African Churches, on the other hand, although young, are now fully integrated into the universal Church, and not as second fiddle: to date there are fourteen cardinal electors and six non-electors, a cardinal member of the Council of Nine for the reform of the Roman Curia, two prefects and two congregation secretaries in the Roman dicasteries, in addition to the presence in the nunciatures and among the general superiors at the head of ancient congregations. Together they compose a living and authoritative subject of the Church, in a manner that was unthinkable fifty years ago. The painting remains in chiaroscuro. While every year the publication of general statistics on the condition of the Catholic Church allows it to talk about the African miracle, with a constant growth of all indicators, strident with the exponential descent registered in other contexts, it should be noted that the numbers do not say it all. 󰀂󰀉  In preparation for the second synod of October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, African bishops invited to the session wrote a common document in which they expressed their intention to oppose any change in the status quo regarding family issues. Eleven of them, including Card. Sarah and six other cardinals, published a contribution entitled L’Afrique, nouvelle patrie du Christ: Contribution de pasteurs africains au synode consacré à la famille (Abidjan: Paulines, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). It expresses concern about possible yielding to gender ideology, judged a demonic creature of the new millennium along with the violence of Daesh. The preparatory documents of the synod did not sufficiently take the reality of the African family into account, according to the writers of the letter, and it would instead be an ideological colonialism campaign aimed at destroying the family in Africa by introducing some of the deteriorating aspects of Western freedom. Among the various articles and comments on this, cf. the one appearing on October 󰀁󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 on the Le Monde website by Cécile Chambraud, “Synode sur la famille: Les Africains pour le statu quo” (www.lemonde.fr, section Religions).

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The statistics are likely to mislead, especially those that absolutize the number of baptized people. South of the Sahara there is a very strong mobility of believers from one Church to another. The worshipper, perhaps initiated and raised to faith in the Catholic milieu, is confronted with a hypertrophic Christian offer, coming not only from the traditional, Evangelical and Reformed Churches, but above all from the “Awakening Churches” or “neo-Protestants,” according to a much-discussed definition, mostly belonging to the Pentecostal galaxy, with fanciful names, and a national, local or even neighborhood dimension, large or small, but always led by a pastor, who can be a man or a woman.󰀃󰀀 These groups, often self-proclaimed “Churches,” deprived of a doctrine and sacraments, indifferent to the Christian calendar and the cadences of the liturgical year, self-organized and self-referential, promise wellbeing to those who attend them, are in competition with each other and ruthlessly court the faithful. They look for them through presentation campaigns, and they have a strong capacity for hospitality and entertainment, but are only concerned with money. At the centre of the prayer and adoration sessions there is always the valued moment of contribution, when those who can show the most generous offers receive the most effective blessing and have the opportunity to exhibit their success in public, considered a divine gift according to the “theology of prosperity” which operates a sort of overthrow of the main evangelical values.󰀃󰀁 The profession of the shepherd is therefore one of sure success. Paraphrasing the well-known motto that favors providing technical and professional skills to donating food – not giving fish but teaching to fish, pêcher in French – in the capital of the Democratic Republic of the 󰀃󰀀

 Cf. Jean-Pierre Bastian, “Il protestantesimo durante la crisi della modernità,” in Le religioni e il mondo moderno. Vol. 󰀁: Cristianesimo, ed. Giovanni Filoramo (Turin: Einaudi 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈), 󰀅󰀈󰀅-󰀆󰀀󰀁; Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀄). 󰀃󰀁  The bibliography on the Churches of Awakening and the theology of prosperity is becoming vast. I list here some titles from which I have drawn information: Silvia Cristofori, “Note sul movimento pentecostale in Africa,” Cristianesimo nella storia 󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃): 󰀈󰀂󰀃-󰀈󰀇󰀈; André Corten and André Mary, Imaginaires politiques et pentecôtismes: Afrique/Amérique latine (Paris: Karthala, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀); Élisabeth Dorier-Appril and Robert Ziavoula, “La diffusion de la culture évangélique en Afrique centrale: Théologie, éthique et réseaux,” Hérodote 󰀁󰀁󰀉 (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅): 󰀁󰀂󰀉-󰀁󰀅󰀆; Ludovic Lado, “Les enjeux du pentecôtisme africain,” Études 󰀄󰀀󰀉 (July 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈): 󰀆󰀁-󰀇󰀁; André Mary, “Le pentecôtisme brésilien en Terre africaine: L’universel abstrait du Royaume de Dieu,” Cahiers d’Études africaines 󰀄󰀂, no. 󰀁󰀆󰀇 (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀂): 󰀄󰀆󰀃-󰀄󰀇󰀈; Cédric Mayrargue, Les dynamiques paradoxales du pentecôtisme en Afrique subsaharienne (Paris: Ifri, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈); Jean-Paul Willaime, “Le pentecôtisme: Contours et paradoxes d’un protestantisme émotionnel,” Archives de sciences sociales des religions 󰀅 (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀉): 󰀅-󰀂󰀈.

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Congo, it is used to repeat “si quelqu’un a faim, mieux vaut apprendre lui à prêcher (preaching).”󰀃󰀂 What has been said poses a question about the identity of Christian Africa in the coming decades. The projections show that in 󰀂󰀀󰀅󰀀 Christians will be above all in the South of the world and Africa will be the continent that will host the largest number of them. What face will these communities present, and how much will Francis’s drive for involvement in favor of peace, justice and the fight against poverty affect reality?

 Cf. Trésor Kibangula, “RDC: Pasteur, un job en or,” Jeune Afrique, April 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄.

󰀃󰀂

China and the Geopolitics of Pope Francis Agostino Giovagnoli I. The Provisional Agreement of September 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Fear is not a good counselor. […] Man tends to communicate, a civilisation tends to communicate. It is evident that when communication happens in an aggressive tone to defend oneself, then wars result. But I would not be fearful. It is a great challenge to keep the balance of peace. […] The Western world, the Eastern world and China all have the capacity to maintain the balance of peace and the strength to do so. We must find a way, always through dialogue; there is no other way. (He opens his arms as if extending an embrace.) Encounter is achieved through dialogue. The true balance of peace is realized through dialogue. Dialogue does not mean that we end up with a compromise, half the cake for you and the other half for me. This is what happened in Yalta and we saw the results. No, dialogue means: look, we have got to this point, I may or may not agree, but let us walk together; this is what it means to build.󰀁

These words, from an interview conducted in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, encapsulate China’s place in Pope Francis’s geopolitical vision. Though (deliberately) simple, they point to an original, organic perspective that aims to combat the fear that many in the West feel towards China, to favor the latter’s full re-integration within the international community, to avoid in every way a new Cold War, and to encourage all peoples to see the world as a shared good whose problems we should all face together. Francis has pursued these aims from the very beginning of his papacy, more and more explicitly as the years have gone by. As far as the People’s Republic of China is concerned, Francis sent his good wishes to Xi Jinping not long after the latter’s election as the country’s president. A year later, Francis revealed that the Holy See and the People’s Republic had been engaging in talks, and expressed his belief that these would prove fruitful.󰀂 A few months later, he sent a message to the People’s Republic 󰀁  “Pope Francis urges world not to fear China’s rise.” Interview by F. Sisci, Asia Times, February 󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. 󰀂  “Benedetto XVI non è una statua. Partecipa alla vita della Chiesa.” Interview by F. De Bortoli, March 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄.

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as he flew over the country’s airspace on his way to South Korea. Many more greetings and messages followed, and in many of these the pope expressed his desire to visit this great country. Francis’s open-armed stance towards the People’s Republic finally resulted in a concrete achievement on September 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈: an Agreement signed by Monsignor Antoine Camilleri, Undersecretary for the Holy See’s Relations with States, and Wang Chao, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Though the Agreement’s contents have not been disclosed, and despite its restricted purview and provisional nature (it will cease to be valid in two or three years), its historical significance remains clear.󰀃 Indeed, it concerns a crucial question: the future appointment of Catholic bishops in the People’s Republic, and the pope’s involvement in these appointments. It is also worth noting that this is a bilateral agreement between parties that are both very different and very distant from each other: on one side, the Holy See, an international subject unlike any other, representing the Catholic Church; on the other side, the People’s Republic of China, led by a Communist government that exercises tight control over religious organizations. The Agreement has also come after several centuries’ worth of complex relations, followed by seven decades characterized by the absence of official relations, intense hostility, and great suffering on the part of Chinese Catholics. Finally, it is striking that the Agreement was signed at the same time as the reemergence of economic and political tensions between the People’s Republic and the West generally, and between it and the United States specifically. The significance of the Agreement should be particularly clear when framed within the context of the long and tormented history of the relationship between China and the Christian Churches. Indeed, throughout history, there were four attempts to establish Christianity in China: each of these attempts practically started from scratch, and each ultimately suffered some form of termination or interruption. The first attempt was made by Syriac monastics in the seventh century, the second by the Order of Saint Francis in the Middle Ages, the third by Jesuits in the Modern Era, and the fourth by missionary congregations in the 󰀃  “The only thing that cannot be said about last September’s Provisional Agreement on the appointment of bishops is that it is not a historical moment for the Chinese Church.” In Fernando Filoni, “A proposito della Chiesa cattolica in Cina,” L’Osservatore Romano, February 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉.

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nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, from the fourteenth century onwards, Western Christianity ceased to develop contacts via land with the Chinese world, while missionary activity was burdened by a profound intercultural conflict that obstructed the evangelizing mission of Matteo Ricci and his brethren in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which resulted in the long and emblematic controversy over rites that concluded as late as 󰀁󰀉󰀃󰀉. It is also worth noting that, when it was relaunched in the nineteenth century, missionary activity in China was strongly informed by European colonialism, and the Catholic Church only began to distance itself from the latter in 󰀁󰀉󰀁󰀉, with the publication of Benedict XV’s Maximum illud. Up until the early twentieth century, then, the history of the relationship between Western Christianity and Chinese society, already rife with geopolitical relevance, had been characterized by multiple divisions, and multiple kinds of division. Remarkably, however, in spite of this history and these divisions, the thread of a truly Chinese Catholicism never entirely disappeared. Of course, the Communist Revolution of 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀉 ushered in an era of great challenges for the Church. All foreign missionaries were expelled, and Chinese bishops, priests, and other religious individuals were imprisoned, persecuted, and/or forbidden from practicing their beliefs. The Communist government forced Chinese Catholics to break off all relations with the Holy See and other centers of Catholicism outside of China itself, and, like other religious groups, Catholics were also forced to join government-approved associations. Within this context, the illicit appointment of Catholic bishops (that is, their selection without the pope’s involvement) began in 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀈. The situation further deteriorated with the Cultural Revolution, when followers of all religions were forbidden from practicing their beliefs. The history of the Catholic Church in China after 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀉 presents parallels with the history of the Catholic Church in other Communist countries, such as the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Here, too, we find governments that were not only ideologically opposed to religion generally, but also hostile towards the Catholic Church specifically. The discourse regarding the relationship between Catholicism and Communism tends to focus on the tension between religion and politics, and the fundamental issue of the existence (or lack thereof) of areas of overlap between Catholic groups and institutions, on one side, and Communist governments, parties, and movements, on the other. However, the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Chinese government eventually took on distinctive characteristics: the latter’s

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approach to the former became very different (and arguably graver) from the way other Communist governments approached the Catholic Church. Specifically, the Chinese government established a policy of neatly separating Chinese Catholics (as well as other religious groups) from any foreign influence. This policy rests on the principles of self-government, self-funding, and self-propaganda, and it has resulted in strict control of the Church on the part of political authorities. It has also made it more difficult for Catholics and other religious groups to practice their beliefs. Leaving aside Communist ideology and the influence of the USSR, this policy was above all informed by the People’s Republic’s own long-standing heritage, as well as the history of its relations with the West in the Modern and Contemporary Eras. The most obvious expression of China’s distinctive approach to the Catholic Church is the illicit appointment of large numbers of bishops, which has no parallel in the religion’s recent history. Illicit appointments resulted in a profound division within the Chinese Catholic Church, one that is often improperly referred to as a schism between an “underground” Church loyal to Rome and a “patriotic” Church loyal to the Chinese state. In the course of the seven decades that followed 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀉, some have argued that Communist atheism is incompatible with the Catholic faith, both in order to deny “patriotic” Catholics the authenticity of their faith, and “underground” Catholics the authenticity of their identity as Chinese citizens. Many have cast doubt on the validity of the illicit appointment of “patriotic” bishops and therefore also the validity of the sacraments these bishops have since administered and the actions they have since performed, while others have expressed doubts about “underground” bishops that were also appointed without the pope’s involvement, on the basis of the extraordinary faculties they were allowed. And so on. Of course, the division between “patriotic” and “underground” Catholics, although an internal one within the Church, has drawn so much scrutiny because it has paralleled the greater geopolitical division between East and West, however they may be defined. Tensions internal to the Catholic Church have certainly informed these wider geopolitical tensions, but, above all, the latter have informed the former. This reciprocal influence has transformed an apparently minor, marginal issue, concerning a relatively small number of Christians, into a crucial (if arguably symbolic) question within the context of international relations. It should be clear, then, why Pope Francis’s initiative with regards to China, with its aim to definitively heal the division between “patriotic” and “underground” Catholics, has seemed so significant and has elicited so many discussions even outside the Catholic Church.

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II. A Religious Division, or a Historical One? The relationship between Rome and Beijing began to change between the end of the Cultural Revolution and the start of the period of reforms and the “opening up” policy inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s. In other words, it was around that time that Rome and Beijing began the tortuous journey that led to the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Agreement. In 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀, the People’s Republic made its earliest attempts to establish contacts with the Holy See and seek agreement over unresolved problems.󰀄 Indeed, in the years that followed, Beijing often took the initiative in re-establishing contacts. The Agreement of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 was itself the culmination of a diplomatic back-and-forth kick-started by the People’s Republic, who drew encouragement from Francis’s election. This demonstrates an autonomous interest on the part of the People’s Republic to normalize relations with the Holy See, contrary to what the “specialized”󰀅 Catholic presses often claim. It is not a simple matter to decipher the People’s Republic’s motivations, and indeed they have probably changed over time, but they have been strong enough to inspire a desire for dialogue that the country has overall consistently honored, though the intensity of the dialogue has varied at different times. It is therefore impossible to consider the geopolitical maneuvers of Francis and the Holy See without also taking into consideration the actions of the People’s Republic. It was the People’s Republic that first sought out the Vatican, not vice versa. Indeed, this partly explains Francis’s approach to the matter: in contrast with the fear, doubt, and inertia that have gripped many Western countries in reaction to the People’s Republic’s increasing geopolitical importance, from the very beginning Francis has seen the country’s overtures as an opportunity to be quickly seized. Of course, the very fact that the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Agreement was also signed by one of its representatives demonstrates that the Holy See, too, has cultivated an earnest interest in finding common ground with the People’s Republic, going as far back as 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀. However, before Francis, the prevailing attitude on the Catholic side was more conflicted and less straightforward than that on the Chinese side. This was largely because it was unclear what approach the Holy See should take with regards to the 󰀄  Agostino Giovagnoli, “Santa Sede e Cina,” in L’accordo tra Santa Sede e Cina, ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Elena Giunipero (Vatican City: Urbaniana University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉), 󰀃󰀇ff. 󰀅  Elena Giunipero, “‘Sinizzazione’ e politica religiosa nella Cina di Xi Jinping’,” in L’accordo tra Santa Sede e Cina, ed. Giovagnoli and Giunipero, 󰀈󰀉ff.

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historical division between Rome and Beijing, and the more recent one within Chinese Catholicism itself. Indeed, for many decades, these matters were made even more complicated and difficult by the close interlocking of religious, political, ideological, military, and other issues. In particular, the division within Chinese Catholicism tied into a number of crucial issues, above all the relationship between Chinese Catholics and the pope: after all, a Church without a pope cannot properly define itself as Catholic. Some have even described the Chinese Catholic Church as being on the verge of experiencing, or having already experienced, a schism. Several authoritative figures within the Church have not hesitated to label “patriotic” Chinese Catholics as schismatics. Some have even expressed hope that an official schism be declared, for the sake of a total division between Catholicism and the world of Chinese Communism. However, these voices have met opposition from the Chinese Catholic community itself, which has demonstrated great perseverance and has never acquiesced to a radical separation from communion with the universal Church. Moreover, throughout the last seven decades, neither the pope nor the Holy See have ever officially declared the emergence of a schism in the People’s Republic, or that Chinese Catholics should not be considered true Catholics. Of course, there have been several cases of illicit bishops operating outside of communion with Rome, and some of these bishops have been officially excommunicated. However, canonical sanctions such as these do not equal the declaration of a schism. Due to the persistence of deep ties between the Chinese Catholic community and the wider Catholic world, in the face of hostile pressures from all sides, it has always been clear that the divisions present within Chinese Catholicism derive not from theological or ecclesiastic disputes, but from historical and political ones, though the latter have certainly informed the life of the Church. It is because of this crucial distinction that we may see the undoubtedly deep and painful division within the Chinese Catholic community as something that may be healed soon. For decades, it was not clear where the division might lead, and whether the thin thread of perseverance would one day break. Within the Catholic Church, the debate around illicit episcopal appointments has been particularly fraught. If the ultimate motivation behind these appointments, made without the apostolic mandate, has been exclusively informed by historical or political factors, it should be possible to recognize them as legitimate, given certain conditions. Monsignor Agostino Casaroli publicly said as much in Hong Kong in 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀁. Afterwards, in the

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mid-󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s, under the direction of the Holy Office (then led by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger), the Holy See discreetly carried out a thorough analysis of the way in which these appointments had been celebrated, especially aimed at detecting substantial violations of liturgical and sacramental norms. Eventually, the Holy See concluded that, though illicit due to the absence of the apostolic mandate, the appointment of “patriotic” bishops should be otherwise considered valid. Indeed, beginning in the 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s, many “patriotic” bishops sent requests of acknowledgment to Rome, and many of these requests have been honored, based on the assumption that many of these bishops had had no choice but to acquiesce to illicit appointment, that their intentions had not been contrary to the Holy See’s will, and that they had not sent their requests as a way of expressing regret and asking for forgiveness. Indeed, the very fact that these requests were sent undermines the many debates (which nevertheless persisted as late as 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈) regarding whether or not the pope’s exclusion from the appointment of “patriotic” bishops constituted the violation of “non-negotiable principles” and was therefore incompatible with both the laws and the very “doctrine” of the Catholic Church. Though certainly relevant to theological and ecclesiastical questions, these issues are also relevant to geopolitics. After all, in different ways, they have much to do with the far-reaching divisions that emerged after 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀉 both between the Holy See and the People’s Republic and within the Chinese Catholic Church. On the Catholic side, many have often argued that this division was religious in nature and should therefore be regarded as definitive: in other words, that it was a schism. However, one may just as easily argue that this division derived from anthropological issues of identity rooted in a contrast between the West and China that transcends political, economic, or military tensions. Within the context of the Cold War, to talk of schism was no different than to raise an impenetrable wall between the People’s Republic and the West, and force the Catholic Church into definitively declaring its loyalty to the latter. Nevertheless, proponents of the schism argument have never managed to prevail, as demonstrated by the acknowledgment of the validity of the illicit appointments. Indeed, the schism argument contrasts with fundamental constitutive elements of the Catholic Church, such as its universality, its supra-national identity, its distinctive unity around the bishop of Rome, its constant missionary tension, and so on; moreover, it contrasts with the Chinese Catholic community’s refusal to cut ties with Rome and the Catholic world in general. However, the schism argument has undeniably been strong enough to pose a long-standing obstacle to

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reconciliation, even after changes in Chinese politics in the early 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s finally made the latter possible. Only with Francis has the Catholic attitude towards China freed itself from this inconvenient burden. III. Francis and China Francis has not revolutionized the Vatican’s approach to China.󰀆 Instead, he has emphasized and used a number of pre-existing elements in order to bring about the natural conclusion of a process that failed to reach this conclusion for four decades. Firstly, Pope Francis positioned himself within a thread of contemporary Catholicism that developed throughout much of the twentieth century, and which had its most relevant manifestation in the Second Vatican Council. After centuries of being closely associated with Europe and the West, the epicenter of Catholicism gradually shifted to outside the Old World, leading to the redefinition of its relationship with the different regions, cultures, and peoples of our planet. Francis’s attitude towards China has been informed by the Church’s profound transformations regarding the following: ecclesiology, liturgy, canon law, and other similar fields; the role of bishops and particular Churches; the relationship between the Church and the rest of the world; the relationship between faith and politics; the Church’s dialogue with both non-believers and other religious groups; evangelization and the related matter of the Church’s relationship with different cultures, as well as inculturation and interculturalism; and so on. This list summarizes a broad range of issues, but they are all tied to the repositioning of the Catholic Church in the contemporary world from the perspective of evangelization. In other words, they are all indirectly relevant to geopolitics. And, due to the importance of the People’s Republic, reconfiguring the relationship with this country has been one of the most arduous and important challenges the Church has faced in this time of transformation. These transformations informed all papacies from John XXIII onwards. In Francis’s case, the influence of the Second Vatican Council was apparent from the very beginning, with his programmatic document Evangelii Gaudium. Francis’s papacy stands out for its missionary attitude, its perspective as a Church that looks outwards, its care of the  Elena Giunipero, “Il laboratorio cinese,” in Il cristianesimo al tempo di papa Francesco, ed. Andrea Riccardi (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), 󰀇󰀈ff. 󰀆

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poor, its reduced emphasis on institutions, and so on. Evangelization has informed Francis’s approach to Asia, as well; indeed, with regard to the People’s Republic specifically, Francis has often claimed that Matteo Ricci and the Jesuit mission of the eighteenth century constitute his chief sources of inspiration. It is therefore not a coincidence that the Agreement of September 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, signed by the Holy See, has “a pastoral objective, that is, the objective to help local Churches acquire greater freedom, autonomy and organisation, so that they may dedicate themselves to the mission of spreading the Gospel and contributing to the holistic development of the individual and society as a whole.”󰀇 Francis has also been favored by a number of things that have particularly caught the attention of the People’s Republic. Of course, Francis is the first non-European to serve as pope in several centuries, and the fact that he comes from “the world’s edge” casts a distinctive light on his papacy. Specifically, the People’s Republic sees him as the first pope to be completely divorced from European colonialism. Though of Italian heritage, Francis was born and lived in Argentina, a country that was colonized by Europeans and that, like other Latin American nations, gained its independence by fighting its colonizers. Many Chinese appreciate this, given the long “humiliation” their country suffered at the hands of European colonialists, from which they believe the country began to redeem itself only after 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀉 (as President Xi Jinping himself has argued). After his election to the papacy, Francis indirectly confirmed this initial impression, demonstrating a great closeness to the peoples of the Global South that is devoid of any kind of colonialist logic. Francis’s closeness to the Global South certainly does not coincide with hostility towards Europe, a continent that he has often expressed his interest in and care for. But the People’s Republic appreciates Francis’s care for Europe as well: after all, from its point of view, the “European Pole” plays an important role in a geopolitical context where the United States constitute the People’s Republic’s chief adversary. Indeed, the Chinese perception of the United States as a threat has also informed the People’s Republic’s favorable reception of Francis, whom they also see as a true outsider to the rationale of the Cold War. Specifically, from the beginning, the People’s Republic saw Francis’s Latin American origins as a likely indication that he would not be particularly favorable to North American interests. His behavior since his 󰀇

 September 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. “Card. Parolin: il Papa affida ai cattolici cinesi l’impegno per la riconciliazione.” Vatican Information Service.

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election has confirmed this initial evaluation: the People’s Republic have noted the way Francis has kept his distance from North American politics generally, and from those of the Trump administration specifically. During the Cold War, Chinese authorities repeatedly accused the Holy See of adhering too closely to North American politics, and even after 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀉 they continued to believe the Vatican’s actions to be heavily influenced by United States interests. An important change took place in the 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀀s, when Vatican authorities openly manifested their availability to help resolve the Taiwan question and transferred the Apostolic Nuntiature to Beijing, thus explicitly abiding by the People’s Republic’s “OneChina policy.” However, Taiwan subsequently attempted to disrupt relations between the Holy See and the People’s Republic, not without a certain measure of success. Only after Francis’s election were the disruptive effects of Taiwanese diplomacy greatly reduced, allowing relations between Rome and Beijing to develop in a much more linear fashion, culminating in the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Agreement. The open hostility of much of the media in English-speaking countries and the United States government has also demonstrated the full independence of Francis and his collaborators from North American influence. However, if one looks closely, Francis’s Latin American origins do not explain everything. Even though the arguments outlined in the preceding paragraph make sense, it would be reductive to attribute Francis’s distance from Western interests entirely or even partly to his place of birth. In other words, Francis’s attitude towards China should not be read as the expression of a Third-Worldist policy. Though he is certainly an outsider to European colonialism and the Cold War, Francis’s main motivation has been to preserve the autonomy and unity of the Catholic Church in view of the declaration of the Gospel to the world, which is every pope’s task, as well as the Holy See’s. This is not to deny the influence of Francis’s origins, biography, and personal inclinations on his style, choices, and actions. Above all, however, these derive from robust ecclesiastic motivations. From the very beginning, Francis has determinedly pursued the full autonomy of the Holy See and the Catholic Church within international geopolitics, as a necessary precondition for the Church’s evangelizing action and its promotion of peace. Indeed, his actions have not only appeared to be impervious to international pressures, but they have also appeared to be impervious to the pressures of specific organizations and individuals, including lobbies, big business, and even ecclesiastic groups. Francis’s battles against corruption, particularly the “spiritual” corruption that has resulted in the emergence of

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secular attitudes within the Church, as well as his firmness in the struggle against pedophilia in the Catholic clergy, have confirmed his credibility. All of these things have strengthened his approach to the delicate Chinese question, allowing him to overcome several obstacles that were set up for him. In order to understand Francis’s approach to China, it is also illuminating to compare it to Vatican Ostpolitik, that is, the diplomatic tradition the Catholic Church developed in relation to the Communist nations of Eastern Europe and the USSR during the Cold War, most prominently manifested in the work of Agostino Casaroli.󰀈 The Holy See has long considered the People’s Republic a particularly complex case with regards to Eastern politics. Indeed, though Vatican Ostpolitik managed to overcome many challenges and achieve a number of successes in Eastern Europe, its use with regards to the People’s Republic is seen as an overall “failure.” As Andrea Riccardi notes, this “failure” cannot be traced to a specific episode or question: rather, it derives from the Ostpolitik’s overall balance of the application of such a policy in the relationship with Beijing.󰀉 From an Ostpolitik perspective, the People’s Republic was lumped together with all other Communist countries, meaning that the Holy See’s main responsibility was seen as preserving the Chinese “Church of Silence” from persecution by government authorities. However, contemporary China has always been much more complex than that. Francis (and, to an even greater extent, his Secretary of State, Cardinal Parolin) has often been accused of allowing his approach to China to be informed by the Casaroli model of Ostpolitik, seen as too compliant with Communist governments. However, Andrea Riccardi has rightly observed that Francis’s approach brings something new to the table. This is due to the profound transformations the world has experienced following the end of the Cold War and the redefinition of the relationships between the great continental blocs, as well as that between the different “civilizations.” Specifically, Riccardi notes the absence of ideology in Francis’s attitude towards the People’s Republic. In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, Francis stated: “I would very much like to go to China. I love the Chinese people, I wish them well, and I hope for a possibility of good relations. We do 󰀈  Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Tra Est e Ovest: Agostino Casaroli diplomatico vaticano (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄). 󰀉  Andrea Riccardi, “Oltre l’Ostpolitik: In dialogo con un popolo, una civiltà e un protagonista dei rapporti internazionali,” in L’accordo tra Santa Sede e Cina, ed. Giovagnoli and Giunipero, 󰀂󰀇ff.

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have contacts, we talk, we are moving forward, but for me, having as a friend a country like China, which has a great culture and such opportunity to do good, would be a joy.”󰀁󰀀 Francis, then, views the People’s Republic as “a friend”: not as an adversary with whom to negotiate, but as an entity with which to establish mutual understanding. Moreover, in the Holy See’s multi-polar vision, the People’s Republic is an extremely relevant element as concerns the Church’s promotion of global peace. Vatican diplomacy is well aware of the role the People’s Republic has carved out for itself not only in Asia, but in all global markets, including in Europe and Africa. The Holy See must establish a relationship with the People’s Republic that is founded on pragmatism and positivity and encompasses broad scenarios; in other words, it should not limit its dialogue with this country to the question of the Chinese Catholic Church. Not that Francis’s Vatican is willing to sacrifice Chinese Catholics on the altar of international or national interests (contrary to what some of the pope’s critics claim): rather, Francis wishes to consider each question with a clear understanding of its framework. Francis does not merely see the People’s Republic as an economic and political superpower, he sees it as a great civilization as well.󰀁󰀁 In his view, then, the People’s Republic does not merely deserve the respect owed to any legitimate government, as affirmed by Benedict XVI in his 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 Letter: instead, the People’s Republic deserves the capital-R “Respect” owed to any great culture.󰀁󰀂 IV. The Patriotic Association Francis’s approach has enabled the Holy See to finally complete the journey towards an agreement, something it had never managed before. However, Francis faced extremely strong resistance. Taiwan, in particular, fearing its own growing international isolation, has openly attempted to obstruct the dialogue between the Holy See and the People’s Republic. Indeed, not many nations still entertain diplomatic relations with the 󰀁󰀀

 September 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. “In-flight Press Conference of His Holiness Pope Francis from the United States of America to Rome.” Available at http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/september/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀉󰀂󰀇_usa-conferenzastampa.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀁󰀁  “Pope Francis urges world not to fear China’s rise.” https://insidethevatican.com/ news/reaches-russia-francis-also-reaches-china. 󰀁󰀂  Ibid.

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Republic of China, and it is likely that, were the Holy See to terminate relations with this state, the latter would be left in complete diplomatic isolation. A section of Hong Kong society, concerned about Beijing’s increasing control over the former British colony, has also offered strenuous resistance to Sino-Vatican talks. These two “islands,” so to speak, have strongly resisted the development of relations between the Holy See and the People’s Republic, mostly by attempting to influence authoritative figures within the Holy See, Vatican diplomats, prominent individuals in the Catholic world, missionary agencies, and the Catholic media. The two “islands” found allies in those factions within the Catholic Church that have spent the last several years pushing for a brand of Catholicism that is founded on identity politics, confined to a uniform minority, and characterized by political conservatism.󰀁󰀃 Indeed, these factions have often found their own allies in prominent and powerful political, military, and financial groups that are based in the West, and whose interests clash with Chinese ones. These forces lie behind the hostility of both the (mostly English-speaking) media and United States diplomacy. Some have also attributed doubts and hostility to “illicit” bishops and certain groups within the Chinese Catholic community, but the latter also includes its fair share of groups that are favorable to the Agreement.󰀁󰀄 Most likely, “illicit” Chinese Catholics have been simply instrumentalized by more powerful opponents of the Agreement; of these, of course, Cardinal Zen Ze Kiun has been the most vociferous. Although these opponents are motivated by concrete reasons and interests that have little do with theological and ecclesiastic questions, they have chosen to fight their battle against Sino-Vatican relations on theological and ecclesiastical grounds. Unsurprisingly, however, despite the strenuousness and loudness of the opposition to Francis’s approach to the People’s Republic, its arguments have been, on the whole, rather weak. Indeed, these arguments derive not so much from inherent motivations, but from a range of different interests that happen to converge on a geopolitical vision that is the opposite of Francis’s: that it is in the West’s interests to break off its ties with China and work towards the latter’s international isolation. We saw this with regards to the two main issues that the resistance has rallied around: that of the Chinese 󰀁󰀃  Andrea Riccardi, “La Chiesa tra centri e periferie,” in Il cristianesimo al tempo di papa Francesco, ed. Riccardi, 󰀈-󰀉. 󰀁󰀄  Gianni Valente, “Cina, dopo l’accordo vescovi e fedeli pregano per il Papa,” Vatican Insider, www.lastampa.it, September 󰀂󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈.

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Catholic Patriotic Association, and that of the absence of religious freedom in the People’s Republic. Both of these issues have been bandied about with insistent reference to the words of Benedict XVI, who, in this as in other areas, has been comprehensively weaponized by Francis’s opponents. Without a doubt, the Holy See’s approach to these same questions has been informed by Francis’s innovative geopolitical approach, but it is worth noting that Francis has acted in substantial continuity with his predecessor, who denies alleged divisions within the current papal magisterium. In recent years, the debate around the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association has focused on the Association’s statute, which fosters the “independence” of the Chinese Catholic Church. This term has been subject to several different interpretations over the years, but it clearly concerns an extremely delicate matter: the relationship between the Chinese Catholic Church and both the Holy See and the pope. Some groups have certainly pushed to extend the independence of the Chinese Catholic Church, even in ecclesiastic matters, particularly around the time of the founding of the People’s Republic. Over time, however, “independence” has acquired a softer interpretation, as well as a broad range of practical translations across the whole of China. Nevertheless, some still argue that the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association’s claims of independence constitute a formidable religious obstacle to the development of relations between the Holy See and the People’s Republic. For a long time, the prevailing opinion was that the Holy See should not concern itself with the Patriotic Association, as it is a civil institution, not an ecclesiastic one. However, in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇, Benedict XVI stated that the “independence” fostered by the PA’s statute went against Catholic doctrine, according to which the Church should be one, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic.󰀁󰀅 However, it is worth noting that Benedict XVI also openly contemplated the possibility that Chinese bishops be allowed to decide how they may receive acknowledgement on the part of secular institutions, and expressed his hope that all clergy and faithful in their dioceses acquiesce to their decision in this regard. Nevertheless, from 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 onwards, many began to argue that “illicit” bishops should not be allowed to adhere to the Patriotic Association. Indeed, in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀, the 󰀁󰀅  Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China, no. 󰀇. May 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇. Available at http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/letters/󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ let_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇󰀀󰀅󰀂󰀇_china.html [accessed June 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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Vatican Commission for the Catholic Church in China took a stance against “participation in assemblies that contradict communion with the pope,” alluding to the Eighth Assembly of Chinese Catholic Representatives promoted by the Patriotic Association alongside other organizations.󰀁󰀆 In these matters, even during Francis’s papacy, different figures within the Holy See have taken on different attitudes. However, none of Francis’s predecessors ever condemned bishops or clergy who are also members of the Patriotic Association, and neither has Francis himself. Before the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Agreement, neither Francis nor his collaborators publicly voiced their thoughts on these matters, in order to avoid contradicting widespread interpretations of Benedict XVI’s position. From the beginning of the latest round of Sino-Vatican talks, in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, the two sides have agreed to postpone a discussion on the Patriotic Association, opting instead to work on an Agreement regarding episcopal appointments. The hope was that the vexata quaestio of the “independence” of the Chinese Catholic Church would be solved by a sufficiently significant change in the situation that Benedict XVI’s 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 pronouncement would no longer be relevant. This is exactly how things went: the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Agreement led to a reduction in the importance of the Patriotic Association (much to the latter’s displeasure), as well as the introduction of innovations with regards to the way bishops are appointed, which deprive the statute’s use of the word “independence” of any concrete meaning. This prevented the matter from becoming an explosive, unsolvable problem that could encourage religious interpretations of the division between “underground” and “patriotic” Catholics, with the aforementioned associated geopolitical implications. Francis and his collaborators (who share his motivations) chose to follow this strategy because matters relating to the Patriotic Association, however relevant, are relatively limited in scope, and are not as important as other matters. Indeed, they mostly have to do with the Chinese government’s recognition of the “underground” Church, which, as an aim, should be seen as complementary to the main one of re-establishing the unity and “Catholic-ness” of the Chinese Church. Benedict XVI’s 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 Letter already pointed to the reconciliation of “underground” and “patriotic” Catholics, and therefore the healing of the division that has 󰀁󰀆  “Comunicato della sala stampa della Santa Sede: Riunione della commissione sulla Chiesa cattolica in Cina” (no. 󰀂), May 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀. Available at http://travels.vatican.va/ content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀/󰀀󰀃/󰀂󰀅/󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀅/󰀀󰀀󰀄󰀁󰀅.html [accessed May 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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formed over the last seven decades, as one of the main objectives the Holy See should pursue. It is in this light that we should interpret Francis’s actions, particularly his open manifestation of his own personal investment when, on the occasion of the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Synod on Young People, he greeted two bishops from “continental China.” As noted by a Vatican official, the fact that the pope was visibly moved by the occasion was worth more than ten official Holy See announcements, and demonstrated how closely the pope had followed the talks that led to the Agreement a few days prior, and of which the appearance of these two bishops constituted a clear result. The Agreement has played a fundamental role in the redefinition of the relationship between the Holy See and the Chinese Catholic Church, as well as in the attempt to restore the latter’s unity: neither of these objectives could have been achieved without an agreement with Chinese authorities. Benedict XVI himself was well aware of this, as demonstrated, again, by his 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 Letter, in which he explicitly recommended the creation of an agreement with the People’s Republic. However, the papacy of Francis’s predecessor lacked the geopolitical vision and will to act that would have been necessary to deal with the implications of an agreement with the Chinese government. Most notably, in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉, though Monsignor Parolin’s attempts at creating such an agreement came close to success, they were thwarted by Parolin’s reassignment to Venezuela. The plan Benedict XVI outlined was therefore left incomplete, and indeed it is likely that these events have something to do with the abrupt conclusion of his papacy. Even before the end of Benedict XVI’s papacy, Chinese authorities made a new attempt to resume talks, based on the conviction that the Holy See had not raised objections that could not be overcome, and that it was worth pursuing their proposed accord. In other words, the People’s Republic believed that talks had been disrupted because of external forces, not because of the specifically religious matters that most concerned the Holy See. In other words, despite some groups’ claims to the contrary, the talks had not stopped for religious reasons. V. Religious Freedom The same parties who claim that the Patriotic Association constitutes an obstacle to the establishment of relations between the Holy See and the People’s Republic also often insist that the issue of religious freedom

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does as well. Partly taking inspiration from arguments that cast doubt on both the validity of relations between the Holy See and a Communist government, and the trustworthiness of “illicit” bishops (even those recognized by Rome), these parties believe that the absence of full religious freedom in the People’s Republic constitutes a challenge that cannot be overcome. Without full religious freedom, they argue, any agreement would be useless and misguided. It would be useless because it would not result in any substantial change in the everyday lives of Chinese Catholics, and it would be misguided because it would legitimate a government that prevents people from freely practicing their beliefs. In a way, these arguments contain an element of truth. However, given how things are in the People’s Republic in the present day, to cast the issue of full religious freedom as a fundamental preliminary condition for talks between the Holy See and the People’s Republic would mean forgoing the possibility of an agreement or even simply of a dialogue (which is the true aim of those who make such arguments). Indeed, these arguments would lead to the extreme view that the absence of religious freedom makes it impossible for the Chinese Catholic Church to even exist. According to this view, the Chinese Catholic Church should instead be seen as consisting of a faction of Catholics whose true “Catholic-ness” may be doubted because they abide by the government’s rulings, and a “Church of Silence” (a term that even John Paul II found problematic) whose inability to express itself would rival that of Catholic Churches in Eastern European Communist states before 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀉. In other words, proponents of this view would argue that there is nothing to lose in demanding full religious freedom, as there is currently no such thing as a Chinese Catholic Church, because the latter could exist only after full religious freedom is achieved – something which would presumably take some time. For his part, Francis has never denied the problem of religious freedom in China: he even referred to it in the Message he sent out on the occasion of the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 Agreement, where he wrote that China lacks the “ideal social and political conditions” that would allow the Church to operate to its fullest potential.󰀁󰀇 However, his approach to this issue has been informed by his knowledge, respect, empathy, and affection for the 󰀁󰀇  Pope Francis, Message to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church, par. 󰀂, September 󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. Available at http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/ pont-messages/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀉󰀂󰀆_messaggio-cattolici-cinesi. html [accessed June 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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Chinese Catholic community: he has acknowledged not only its existence but also its ties with Rome, however limited these might be. In other words, Francis acknowledges the validity of their “Catholic-ness,” regardless of the limits imposed on it by circumstances, and regardless of the difference in the forms it takes compared to canon law models. Francis therefore understands “Catholic-ness” differently from the factions who oppose the Holy See’s talks with the People’s Republic on the grounds of religious freedom: these factions place doctrine and identity above all else, as well as the possibility of religious leaders and their followers to publicly express their beliefs. Instead, Francis and his collaborators understand “Catholic-ness” as above all about liturgy and the sacraments; indeed, it is based on the sacraments that, in the 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀s, the Holy Office recognized the validity of “illicit” episcopal appointments. This interpretation of “Catholic-ness” also allows for the acknowledgement of the existence of that very human network of contacts, exchanges and familiar ties that informs the everyday experience of Catholics. From this point of view, the absence of religious freedom in China appears to be mostly relevant with regards to its impact on the degree of “Catholicness” the Chinese government allows the Chinese Catholic community, which should motivate the Holy See not to reject a dialogue with the People’s Republic but to actively seek it, so as to make the Chinese Catholic community even “more” Catholic, that is, even closer to Rome. (This is not to deny the suffering that many Catholics in China have experienced due to the lack of religious freedom: unlike what some may claim, the Holy See has not left the “underground” Church behind.) As Cardinal John Tong Hon wrote in February 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, when he was bishop of Hong Kong,󰀁󰀈 if Beijing had been open to an agreement with the Holy See on the matter of episcopal appointments (an agreement which of course was signed in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), it still would not be open to allowing “entire freedom” to the Church, however it would concede the “essential freedom” necessary to be a Catholic Church in the full meaning of the term. The Agreement of September 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 does not mean that the Holy See will no longer attempt to attain full religious freedom in the People’s Republic, both for Catholics and for other religious communities. However, the Agreement does mean that the Holy See has chosen to make concrete decisions based on the essential issue of “Catholic-ness”: Francis 󰀁󰀈

 John Tong, “The Future of the Sino-Vatican Dialogue from an Ecclesiological Point of View,” Hong Kong Sunday Examiner, February 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇.

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and his collaborators have always been aware that the Agreement would not immediately lead to all the hoped-for results, but they have always been sure that it would trigger processes of historical significance that would eventually resolve even the most complex matters. It would also be wrong to see the Holy See’s dialogue with the People’s Republic as an attempt to ensure preferential treatment for Catholics, with no interest for other religious communities. Choosing the issue of episcopal appointments as a starting point does not demonstrate a “selfish” interest in a matter that is of exclusive interest to Catholics and that has nothing to do with the larger issues that affect the majority of other religious communities; in other words, it is not meant to detract from inter-religious solidarity. Though it may appear to be of secondary importance, the issue of the Chinese Catholic Church’s full “Catholicness” is relevant to other religious communities as well, and indeed to Chinese society as a whole. The gradual resolution of the problems that have historically divided the Chinese Catholic community will strengthen the latter and facilitate its mission of evangelization, thus contributing to a dynamic that favors pluralism and the extension of spaces that allow for religious freedom, which will benefit everyone, not just Catholics. In the case of the People’s Republic, the Holy See has also taken into consideration the historical-juridical complexity of the matter of religious freedom. History shows that the granting of religious freedom, including the creation of norms to preserve it and initiatives to promote it, both on the national and on the international level, has often been tied to the policies and concrete interests of Western states. For centuries, “Christian nations” made it their prerogative to protect the Church in countries they colonized. European states claimed it as their right and duty to protect Christians, be they Westerners or locals, from dangers both real and presumed, in regions outside of Europe, as part of a strategy to extend and justify their rule over local populations. In the case of China, it was France who took on the responsibility to “protect” Catholics,󰀁󰀉 even though the Holy See did not request this, at least from the papacy of Leo XIII onwards; indeed, Benedict XV and his successors made their disapproval explicit.󰀂󰀀 Following the end of Spanish, Portuguese, and French patronage, the dearth of religious freedom in non󰀁󰀉  Louis Wei Tsing Sing, La politique missionaire de la France en Chine 󰀁󰀈󰀄󰀂-󰀁󰀈󰀅󰀆 (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀁). 󰀂󰀀  Agostino Giovagnoli, ed., Roma e Pechino: La svolta extraeuropea di Benedetto XV (Rome: Studium, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀉). See also Olivier Sibre, Le Saint Siège et l’Extrême-Orient (Chine, Corée, Japon) de Léon XIII à Pie XII (󰀁󰀈󰀈󰀀-󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀂) (Rome: École française de Rome, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂).

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Western countries was used not only by states but also by lobbies as a justification for limiting freedom of commerce or imposing sanctions and prohibitions, both economic and political, against governments who were seen as responsible for it.󰀂󰀁 The principle of “religious freedom” motivated the Chinese policy of “open ports,” which, though not the same as colonial occupation, was still functional to Western interests. And so on. Claiming that full religious freedom is a fundamental preliminary principle can be a way of both imposing limitations on Chinese national sovereignty and obstructing geopolitical processes that would be unfavorable to Western states. By not doing so, the Holy See has avoided mixing issues of faith with political matters that have nothing to do with and would indeed get in the way of the Church’s specific religious goals generally, and its evangelizing mission specifically. The Second Vatican Council clearly stated that the “Church, by reason of her role and competence, is not identified in any way with the political community nor bound to any political system.”󰀂󰀂 Benedict XVI made reference to this principle specifically in relation to China in his 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 Letter, drawing from it the conclusion that “therefore, the Catholic Church which is in China does not have a mission to change the structure or administration of the State; rather, her mission is to proclaim Christ to men and women, as the Saviour of the world.”󰀂󰀃 The Letter goes on to emphasize that “the solution to existing problems cannot be pursued via an ongoing conflict with the legitimate civil authorities.” Obviously, this does not imply that “compliance with those authorities is not acceptable when they interfere unduly in matters regarding the faith and discipline of the Church.”󰀂󰀄 However, it does not allow for the limitation of national sovereignty, which is what would happen if the Holy See demanded that the People’s Republic establish full religious freedom. An intransigent approach on these matters would have had particularly wide-reaching geopolitical implications. This because opponents of the Agreement advocate for the full religious freedom of all ethnic minorities and religious communities in the People’s Republic. There are fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minorities in the country, and several religious groups, including Buddhists, Daoists, Christians of different denominations, 󰀂󰀁  Anna Su, Exporting Freedom: Religious Liberty and American Power (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). 󰀂󰀂  Gaudium et Spes, par. 󰀇󰀆. 󰀂󰀃  Benedict XVI. May 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇. Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China, no. 󰀄. 󰀂󰀄  Ibid.

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Muslims, new religious sects, and so on. However, as far as ethnic minorities are concerned, such as the Uighur of Xinjiang or the Tibetans of Tibet, and other groups elsewhere, issues of religious freedom are of secondary importance to issues of autonomy or independence, which are often relevant to specific border regions and therefore have significant international implications. These issues have nothing to do with Catholic concerns, since Catholicism in the People’s Republic is not tied to a specific ethnicity: there are Catholics both among the Han majority and among the various minorities. As for the other religious communities, they are all very different from one another: take, for example, the many Neo-Protestant sects, which are widespread throughout the country, and which have been accused by government authorities of relying on the United States’ financial and political support. These problems are also foreign to the concerns of Chinese Catholics. Overall, then, the Catholic case presents a number of elements that make it quite distinctive from the case of other religious groups in the People’s Republic, including with regards to geopolitics: above all, the problem of how a foreign authority (i.e. the pope) can be involved in the appointment of local religious leaders (i.e. bishops) without interfering with local political and economic matters. As already noted, under Pope Francis, the Holy See has only asked the Beijing government to grant the Chinese Catholic Church the “essential freedom” that would allow it its full “Catholic-ness.” Rome is obliged to make this request, but it should not be seen as a direct or indirect expression of hostility towards the People’s Republic: indeed, the universality of the Catholic Church has everything to do with its autonomy from all other political, economic, and financial subjects acting on an international level. At the same time, by refusing to tie Catholic claims to the claims of other religious groups, and, above all, to those of ethnic minorities, the Holy See prevents an inappropriate extension of the religious aspect of its interests that would turn it into an anti-governmental, anti-Chinese “flag” for a range of very different groups to rally around. If it had tied itself to these groups, the Holy See would have been dragged into a geopolitical strategy that is hostile to the interests of the People’s Republic. The Holy See has therefore prevented other forces from using Catholicism as a weapon to exacerbate current geopolitical divisions, and it has created a possibility for China to be welcomed within an international community that is simultaneously more open and more cohesive.

Between Doctrine and Discernment Pope Francis on Interreligious Dialogue Terrence Merrigan Pope Francis continues to surprise, in what he says, what he does, and what he advocates. It is far too early to know how history will assess him, but one thing is certain, namely, that any adequate judgment will have to be carefully nuanced. As one of his biographers noted, Francis is “a pope of paradox – a man who is a radical but not a liberal, an enabler with an authoritarian streak, a self-confident man in constant need of forgiveness, and a churchman who combines religious humility and political wiles.”󰀁 The paradox that is Pope Francis extends to his theology, and this is perhaps nowhere more evident than in his ‘theology of interreligious dialogue’, that branch of Catholic thought which endeavors to account for the claim that Jesus Christ is the unique and universal savior of humankind, while simultaneously endeavoring to account for, engage with, and do justice to the world’s other religious traditions, some of which predate, and have even shaped, Christianity. In what follows, we shall endeavor to delineate the main features of the pope’s approach to interreligious dialogue, against the background of the contention and even crisis which has characterized, and perhaps even paralyzed, the recent history of this discipline. I. The Nature of the Theology of Interreligious Dialogue The history of the theology of interreligious dialogue is long and complex, and cannot be rehearsed here. For our purposes, it will suffice to highlight the most significant developments of the recent past, a period characterized by considerable controversy regarding the nature and goals of interreligious dialogue and, perhaps more significantly, a period in which the Magisterium, particularly the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, has intervened directly in theological discussions,  Paul Vallely, Pope Francis: Untying the Knots (London: Bloomsbury, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀁󰀉󰀀.

󰀁

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fostering what can only be described as a crisis in the theology of religions. Let us begin by examining the background to this crisis. In 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁, the ‘Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue’, and the ‘Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples’ collaborated to produce a document entitled, Dialogue and Proclamation: Reflection and Orientations on Interreligious Dialogue and the Proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. As its title indicates, this document sought to address the complex relationship between two ostensibly incompatible projects, namely, (i) the dominical charge to preach the Gospel with a view to the conversion of the religious ‘other’; and (ii) the post-conciliar enthusiasm for meaningful dialogue with that same ‘other’. The document contained a number of surprising, and somewhat progressive, elements, something which might explain its conspicuous absence from later official ecclesiastical discourse. Three aspects of the document’s considerations on interreligious dialogue are particularly significant in light of later controversies surrounding the theology of dialogue. These are: (i) the basis for interreligious dialogue; (ii) the nature of interreligious dialogue; and (iii) the implications of interreligious dialogue. Let us briefly examine each of these elements separately. 󰀁. The Basis for Interreligious Dialogue According to Dialogue and Proclamation, the foundation for all interreligious dialogue is the conviction that all men and women are united in a “mystery of unity” (par. 󰀂󰀉). This unity is manifest on three levels, namely, (i) the “common origin” and “destiny” of all human beings; (ii) he unity of the economy of salvation; and (iii) “the active presence of the Spirit of Christ in the religious life of the members of the other religious traditions” (par. 󰀂󰀈). The first claim, namely, that all men and women share a common origin and destiny is, at first glance, not especially controversial. In fact, however, it ‘betrays’ (so to speak) a very particular(ist) vision of humanity. The document specifies that our common destiny is nothing other than “the fullness of life in God” (par. 󰀂󰀈). This claim presupposes a theistic faith tradition. Only a personal God can promise or provide personal happiness. The second claim (concerning the unity of the economy of salvation) is even more tradition-specific than the first. It locates the center of gravity of God’s salvific activity squarely in the history of Jesus of Nazareth. The “one plan of salvation for humankind” has “its center in Jesus

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Christ, who in his incarnation ‘has united himself in a certain manner to every person’” (par. 󰀂󰀈). According to this line of thought, the thought of orthodox Christianity from its inception, the ultimate basis for the unity of salvation history is its rootedness in God Himself. The history of salvation has its origins in God and culminates in God’s radically personal presence in history in Jesus of Nazareth. In other words, from a Christian perspective, salvation history is ultimately God’s own history with humankind. The doctrine of the incarnation is the key to Christian self-understanding. It defines Christianity as a distinctive religious tradition. Whether other saving figures function in a similar fashion within other traditions is not at issue here (though it does not seem that they do). What is important is that the identity of Christianity and the history of Jesus of Nazareth are inextricably intertwined. Taking the doctrine of incarnation seriously means entering into the heart of (Catholic) Christianity. Once one has made that journey, is one able to turn again to the non-Christian world in a spirit of openness and receptivity?󰀂 The third claim developed by Dialogue and Proclamation makes clear that such a return is possible. It does this by allowing space for the activity of Christ and his Spirit outside the confines of the visible Church and the Christian tradition. The traces of this activity are manifest in the so-called bona spiritualia et moralia, i.e., “the spiritual and moral good found among non-Christians, as well as in their social and cultural values” (par. 󰀁󰀇).󰀃 Already in 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀇, the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences included among these “a sense of the sacred, a commitment to the pursuit of fullness, a thirst for self-realization, a taste for prayer and 󰀂  Terrence Merrigan, “Towards an Incarnational Hermeneutics of Interreligious Dialogue,” in The Past, Present, and Future of Theologies of Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Terrence Merrigan and John Friday (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀁󰀇-󰀂󰀇. The argument developed in this article, regarding the sacramental dimension of other religions, resonates with the remarks of Pope Francis in Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀅󰀄 to the effect that: “Non-Christians, by God’s gracious initiative, when they are faithful to their own consciences, can live ‘justified by the grace of God’, and thus be ‘associated to the paschal mystery of Jesus Christ’. But due to the sacramental dimension of sanctifying grace, God’s working in them tends to produce signs and rites, sacred expressions which in turn bring others to a communitarian experience of journeying towards God. While these lack the meaning and efficacy of the sacraments instituted by Christ, they can be channels which the Holy Spirit raises up in order to liberate non-Christians from atheistic immanentism or from purely individual religious experiences.” 󰀃  The term appears, among other places, in Nostra Aetate, par. 󰀂. In the volume entitled Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 󰀂 vols. (London: Sheed & Ward and Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀀), 󰀂: 󰀉󰀆󰀉, the editor, Norman Tanner, translates “bona spiritualia et moralia” as “spiritual and moral good things.” For stylistic reasons, I prefer to use my own formulation here.

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commitment, a desire for renunciation, a struggle for justice, an urge to basic human goodness, an involvement in service, a total surrender of the self to God, and an attachment to the transcendent in their symbols, rituals and life itself ....”󰀄 In line with the experience of Christians in Asia, the Federation called for “a stance of receptive pluralism,” i.e., “an attitude of openness to and acceptance of the working of the Spirit beyond the boundaries of the Church.”󰀅 In this view of things, the Asian context as such, and the Asian social and religious context, in particular, is looked upon as a theological resource, a locus theologicus, where the divine presence needs to be discerned. Interreligious dialogue, in the spirit of ‘receptive pluralism’, becomes the means to this end. This dialogue is above all a matter of sharing, of exchange, with partners who represent impressive systems of religious thought and practice. It means taking their claims and their self-understanding seriously. According to Dialogue and Proclamation, the recognition of the bona moralia et spiritualia “impels the Church to enter into ‘dialogue and collaboration’” (par. 󰀁󰀇).󰀆 The conviction that God is intent on the salvation of all men and women is the basis for both the theory and the practice of interreligious dialogue. Dialogue and Proclamation therefore insists that, The foundation of the Church’s commitment to dialogue is not merely anthropological but primarily theological. God, in an age-long dialogue, has offered and continues to offer salvation to humankind. In faithfulness to the divine initiative, the Church too must enter into a dialogue of salvation with all men and women (par. 󰀃󰀈).

Once again, we encounter an explicitly theistic perspective. From a Christian point of view, the fundamental motivation to enter into dialogue is not the desire to build a more tolerant society (one need not be a Christian to do this). Nor is it, in the first place, a desire to come to a deeper knowledge of the ‘other’ (this, too, is not something reserved for Christians). 󰀄  Quoted in Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀇), 󰀂󰀂󰀀. The text is taken from a document of the Theological Advisory Commission of the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC), entitled “Theses on Interreligious Dialogue,” FABC Paper 󰀄󰀈, Hong Kong, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀇, 󰀇. The ‘Theological Advisory Commission’ is now known as the ‘Office for Theological Concerns’. 󰀅  See For All the Peoples of Asia: Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences. Documents from 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀-󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁, ed. Gaudencio Rosales and C. G. Arévalo (New York: Orbis and Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀂), 󰀃󰀀󰀀. 󰀆  The reference to ‘dialogue and collaboration’ is taken from Nostra Aetate, par. 󰀂. The reader is also referred to Gaudium et Spes, par. 󰀉󰀂-󰀉󰀃.

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The specifically Christian motivation to engage in dialogue has its roots in a faith conviction, namely, that God desires, and acts to effect, the salvation of all.󰀇 This motivation also shapes the Christian understanding of the nature of dialogue. That is the subject of the following section. 󰀂. The Nature of Interreligious Dialogue Dialogue and Proclamation describes interreligious dialogue as “all positive and constructive interreligious relations with individuals and communities of other faiths which are directed at mutual understanding and enrichment” (par. 󰀉). The implications of this ‘definition’ are explored throughout the text. From the perspective of our reflections, the word, “enrichment,” is particularly significant. Three dimensions of this notion are clearly implied in the subsequent discussion. In the first place, there is the element of reciprocity. Both parties to a dialogue can acquire new insights. In the second place, it is clear that dialogue can lead to the extension of one’s knowledge of one’s dialogue partner. Thirdly, and – from our point of view – most importantly, dialogue can contribute to a more profound insight into one’s own tradition. According to article 󰀅󰀀 of Dialogue and Proclamation, the contact with non-Christians can lead Christians to discover “new dimensions” of their faith. Hence, one author has observed that the encounter with other traditions can serve as the occasion for “an even deeper penetration, understanding and application of the truth of God’s triune self-revelation entrusted to the church.”󰀈 (A case has been made for the view that this was the position of Pope John Paul II, especially in Redemptoris Missio [󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁]).󰀉 Viewed in this light, interreligious dialogue provides an opportunity for the deepening of one’s knowledge of one’s own tradition. Interreligious dialogue can take a variety of forms. Dialogue and Proclamation highlights four possibilities (par. 󰀄󰀂-󰀄󰀃): (i)

“the dialogue of life,” which consists in the attempts of people to live together “in an open and neighbourly spirit,” and to share their daily concerns;

 See par. 󰀄󰀁 of Dialogue and Proclamation: “Given this aim, [namely], a deeper conversion of all towards God, interreligious dialogue possesses its own validity.” 󰀈  Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀), 󰀁󰀁󰀄. 󰀉  For a detailed defense of this reading, see ibid., 󰀁󰀀󰀁-󰀁󰀀󰀉. For a more critical reading of Redemptoris Missio, see Aloysius Pieris, Fire and Water: Basic Issues in Asian Buddhism and Christianity (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀆), 󰀆󰀇, 󰀇󰀆, 󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀅󰀅. 󰀇

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(ii) “the dialogue of action, in which Christians and others collaborate for the integral development and liberation of people”; (iii) “the dialogue of theological exchange, where specialists seek to deepen their understanding of their respective religious heritages, and to appreciate each other’s spiritual values”; (iv) “the dialogue of religious experience, where persons, rooted in their own religious traditions, share their spiritual riches, for instance with regard to prayer and contemplation, faith and ways of searching for God or the Absolute.” Dialogue and Proclamation insists that these four forms of dialogue are “interconnected,” and that “no order of priority” has been established among them (par. 󰀄󰀂-󰀄󰀃). However, the document also points out that “a correct theological evaluation” of other traditions, “at least in general terms, is a necessary presupposition for interreligious dialogue.” One cannot, therefore, simply plunge into interreligious dialogue without some preparation, and certainly not at the level of theological exchange. 󰀃. The Practice of Interreligious Dialogue Interreligious dialogue is clearly a complex and demanding process. It concerns every dimension of our daily lives, from the most mundane contacts with our non-Christian neighbors up to and including participation in their religious practices. It also affects every fiber of our being, by impacting on the way we think, pray and act.󰀁󰀀 To engage in dialogue is inevitably to risk oneself. For that very reason, it ought not to be undertaken lightly. Dialogue and Proclamation can serve as a useful guide to the practice of dialogue, to its promise but also to its pitfalls. Five points in particular are of particular significance: (i) Dialogue implies a willingness to allow oneself to be “questioned” by one’s dialogue partner (par. 󰀃󰀂); (ii) Dialogue can lead to the realization that “the way Christians sometimes understand their religion and practice may be in need of purification” (par. 󰀃󰀂; see also 󰀄󰀉, 󰀅󰀀, 󰀁󰀁󰀅);

󰀁󰀀  See par. 󰀄󰀀 of Dialogue and Proclamation: “Interreligious dialogue does not merely aim at mutual understanding and friendly relations. It reaches a much deeper level, that of the spirit, where exchange and sharing consist in a mutual witness to one’s beliefs and a common exploration of one’s respective religious convictions.”

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(iii) Dialogue requires “the will to engage together in commitment to the truth and the readiness to allow oneself to be transformed by the encounter” (par. 󰀄󰀇); (iv) Dialogue can lead to greater insight into one’s own tradition (par. 󰀄󰀉), i.e., as we have seen, to the discovery of “new dimensions” of one’s own faith (par. 󰀅󰀀); (v) Dialogue can lead those participating in it to abandon their “previous spiritual or religious situation in order to direct [themselves] towards another.” As the document puts it, “sincere dialogue implies, on the one hand, mutual acceptance of differences, or even of contradictions, and on the other, respect for the free decision of persons taken according to the dictates of their conscience” (par. 󰀄󰀁). As was indicated above, Dialogue and Proclamation has largely been neglected, certainly by the Church’s authorities and the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, in particular. The source of this official discomfort with the text is mainly related to one passage in particular, in article par. 󰀂󰀉, entitled, “The unity of salvation.” Therein we read that, Concretely, it will be in the sincere practice of what is good in their own religious traditions and by following the dictates of their conscience that the members of other religions respond positively to God’s invitation and receive salvation in Jesus Christ, even while they do not recognize or acknowledge him as their saviour (cf. Ad Gentes, 󰀃,󰀉,󰀁󰀁).

Commenting on this text, Jacques Dupuis, a Belgian Jesuit theologian to whom we shall return below, observed that: This is … a weighty statement, not found before in official documents of the central teaching authority, and whose theological import must not be underestimated. It means, in effect, that the members of other religions are not saved by Christ in spite of, or beside, their own tradition, but in it and in some mysterious way, ‘known to God’, through it. If further elaborated theologically, this statement would be seen to imply some hidden presence – no matter how imperfect – of the mystery of Jesus Christ in these religious traditions in which salvation reaches their adherents.󰀁󰀁

Dupuis would later be taken to task for these and related claims, and his theological biography might well be read as the story of the contemporary crisis of the theology of dialogue, the crisis which forms the 󰀁󰀁  See Jacques Dupuis, “A Theological Commentary: Dialogue and Proclamation,’’ in Redemption and Dialogue: Reading ‘Redemptoris Missio’ and ‘Dialogue and Proclamation’, ed. W. R. Burrows (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀃), 󰀁󰀃󰀇.

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backdrop against which Pope Francis’s sometimes paradoxical actions and pronouncements have to be situated. II. The Crisis of Theologies of Interreligious Dialogue If there were such a thing as a stock market in theological themes, the theology of interreligious dialogue would be regarded a very risky investment. Since the late 󰀉󰀀s, it has been undergoing something of a crisis and anyone who invests in it runs the risk of losing quite a lot of ecclesiastical capital, including, (i) their reputation for orthodoxy; (ii) their claim to be either familiar with, or loyal to, tradition; and (iii) perhaps even the privilege of teaching. The crisis is evident in the variety of names the discipline has accumulated. What was once the ‘theology of non-Christian religions’ has been reborn as, among other things, (i) ‘theology of religions’, (ii) ‘theology of dialogue’, (iii) ‘theology of interreligious dialogue’, and (iv) ‘interfaith dialogue’. It is well known that rebranding anything, whether it be a product in a supermarket, or a theological discipline, means that, for whatever reason, one is seeking to leave the past behind and forge at least a new image, if not a new product. The most significant moment in the crisis affecting the Catholic ‘theology of interreligious dialogue’ was undoubtedly the controversy surrounding the publication, in 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀇, of a book by Jacques Dupuis, entitled Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism. Dupuis’s work can best be understood as an exploration of the frontiers of traditional Catholic theology of dialogue.󰀁󰀂 In the course of that exploration, he, like all explorers, ventured into uncharted territory. In response, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith made it clear that at least some of this uncharted territory was to be classified as a theological no-man’s land. That no-man’s land included two claims in particular, namely, (i) the notion that nonChristian religions might play some kind of mediatory role in the salvation of their members; and (ii) the proposal that religious pluralism might be regarded not simply as a fact of history, but as a necessary and inevitable 󰀁󰀂  For an extensive reflection on the significance of Dupuis’s work, see Terrence Merrigan, “Exploring the Frontiers: Jacques Dupuis and the Movement ‘Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism’,” Louvain Studies 󰀂󰀃 (󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀈): 󰀃󰀃󰀈-󰀃󰀅󰀉; “Jacques Dupuis and the Redefinition of Inclusivism,” in In Many and Diverse Ways: In Honor of Jacques Dupuis, ed. Daniel Kendall and Gerald O’Collins (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀃), 󰀆󰀀-󰀇󰀁. See also Gerald O’Collins, On the Left Bank of the Tiber (Leominster, UK: Gracewing, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀂󰀁󰀃-󰀂󰀅󰀂.

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consequence of our human situation, “religious pluralism, not only de facto but also de jure (or in principle).”󰀁󰀃 Among other sources, Dupuis appealed to Dialogue and Proclamation to buttress his argument. In 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀁, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith subjected Dupuis’s book to an investigation. During the course of this investigation, Dupuis was prohibited from lecturing or making public statements. The upshot of the investigation was a so-called Notification, a document designed “to set out precise points of doctrine, to censure errors or ambiguities, and to indicate the degree of assent that is required of the faithful.” The Notification confirmed the existence of the confusion surrounding the very nature of the theology of dialogue by pointing out, in its first paragraph, that Dupuis’s work was “not simply a theology of religions, but a theology of religious pluralism.” This Notification made use of “the [theological] principles expressed in Dominus Iesus” (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀) in its evaluation of Dupuis’s book (principles which, it would appear, were enunciated largely in response to Dupuis’s work).󰀁󰀄 These principles highlighted (i) the unicity, and sole mediatory role, of Christ; (ii) the delimitation of the salvific action of the Holy Spirit to that of the Word; (iii) the role of the Church as the exclusive sign, and instrument, of salvation for all people, and (iv) the deficiency of other religions “regarding fundamental truths about God, [hu]man[ity] and the world.”󰀁󰀅  Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 󰀃󰀈󰀆.  These 󰀈 principles are as follows: (󰀁) Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, is “the sole and universal mediator of salvation for all humanity”; (󰀂) No separation may be made between Jesus and the Word of God; (󰀃) “The historical revelation of Jesus Christ offers everything necessary for man’s salvation and has no need of completion by other religions”; (󰀄) The “seeds of truth and goodness that exist in other religions” participate in “truths contained in the revelation of or in Jesus Christ” and are derived from him as their only source-mediation; (󰀅) The salvific action of the Holy Spirit does not extend “beyond the one universal salvific activity of the Incarnate Word”; (󰀆) The Church is sign and instrument of salvation for all people, such that the different religions of the world cannot be regarded as ways of salvation complementary to the Church; (󰀇) “[T]he followers of other religions are oriented to the Church and are all called to become part of her”; (󰀈) The notion that the non-Christian religions might be regarded as ‘ways of salvation’ “has no foundation in Catholic theology. While the Holy Spirit may accomplish salvation in nonChristians through the “elements of truth and goodness” present in the various religions, it must be borne in mind that these religions “contain omissions, insufficiencies and errors regarding fundamental truths about God, [hu]man[ity] and the world.” In the same way, their “sacred texts” cannot be regarded “as complementary to the Old Testament, which is the immediate preparation for the Christ event.” 󰀁󰀅  For a discussion of the contents and significance of Dominus Iesus, see Terrence Merrigan, “Religious Pluralism and Dominus Iesus,” Sacred Heart University Review 󰀂󰀀 (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀): 󰀆󰀃-󰀇󰀉. 󰀁󰀃

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It is against the backdrop of this clear delineation of ‘orthodoxy’ – born out of the Dupuis crisis – that any theological reflection on Pope Francis’s pronouncements on interreligious dialogue have to be set, or, perhaps more accurately, these are the parameters within which Pope Francis would be expected to articulate his vision. We shall return to this theme below. In the period since the Dupuis crisis, and perhaps, to some degree, as a response to it, other avenues towards engagement with non-Christian religions are being explored. One of the more significant of these is so-called ‘comparative theology’, and while Pope Francis has no immediate association with this movement, there are some striking similarities between his reflections and the themes addressed by comparatists. We shall return to the matter of the similarities – and differences – between the thought of Pope Francis and the work of comparatists below. For the moment, it is necessary to provide a brief reflection on comparative theology. III. An Alternative to Theologies of Interreligious Dialogue: The Emergence of Comparative Theology It is at least something of a coincidence that one of the most prominent exponents of ‘comparative theology’ shares Pope Francis’s Jesuit heritage. Francis X. Clooney can rightly be described as one of the pioneers of this approach to interreligious encounter. According to Clooney, comparative theology is rooted in the willingness to engage with the tradition of the religious other in a receptive and open fashion, in “the theological confidence that we can respect diversity and tradition, that we can study traditions in their particularity and receive truth in this way, in order to know God better.”󰀁󰀆 Comparative theology is, then, “a theological and necessarily spiritual practice,” an act of ‘faith seeking understanding’, “by which we see the other in light of our own [spiritual practice], and our own [spiritual practice] in light of the other.”󰀁󰀇 It is a process of “back-and-forth learning,” which goes beyond mere comparison, and engenders respect for both diversity and tradition. It is not primarily concerned with which religion is the true one. It is instead “about learning across religious borders, in a way that discloses the truth of my faith, in the light of [the faith of the religious other].”󰀁󰀈 Indeed, “the core of comparative theology” 󰀁󰀆  Francis Clooney, Comparative Theology: Deep Learning across Religious Borders (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀), 󰀈-󰀉. 󰀁󰀇  Ibid., 󰀁󰀀-󰀁󰀁. 󰀁󰀈  Ibid., 󰀁󰀅-󰀁󰀆.

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is the conviction that by studying religions “in their particularity,” the comparatist can come “to know God better.”󰀁󰀉 In practice, comparative theology is largely ‘textual’ in nature, which is to say that it takes its lead from the writings that are dear to, and have shaped the thought and practice of, the world’s religions. Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness among comparative theologians of the need to extend their mandate to include greater attention to the historical and political contexts within which religious texts have emerged. According to Clooney, comparative theology is not the rival of traditional theologies of religions. It is instead a complement to them, and, it would seem, at least in some respects, an improvement on them. So, for example, Clooney points out that theologies of religions often consider other religions “merely in general terms,” or by means of “shorthand characterizations,” while comparative theology “necessarily includes actually learning another religious tradition in significant detail.”󰀂󰀀 In what might be seen as an irenic gesture towards more traditional approaches, Clooney acknowledges that the theology of religions, for its part, “can make explicit the groundwork for comparative study, uncovering and clarifying the framework within which comparative study takes place,” and although such explication is not essential for comparative theology as such, “it can help correct biases that may distort or impede comparative work.”󰀂󰀁 IV. Between Tradition and Encounter: Pope Francis on Interreligious Dialogue There is clearly a tension, and a tension that remains largely unresolved, between the approaches to the religious other developed within the institutional framework of the Church, i.e., by the Church’s official organs, such as the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and the approaches being developed among individual theologians, and comparative theologians in particular. The thought of the former is rooted in an age-old  Clooney, Comparative Theology, 󰀉-󰀁󰀀.  Ibid., 󰀁󰀄. 󰀂󰀁  Ibid. For a critical assessment of the tendency among comparative theologians to minimalize the role of, and need for, theology of religions, see Kristin Beise Kiblinger, “Relating Theology of Religions and Comparative Theology,” in The New Comparative Theology: Interreligious Insights from the Next Generation, ed. Francis X. Clooney (London: T&T Clark, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀), 󰀂󰀁-󰀄󰀂. 󰀁󰀉

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tradition of doctrine and practice, and was moulded by centuries of missionary activity, and the complex and sometimes tragic history that accompanied this activity. The thought of the latter, while not without precedents (St. Francis of Assisi [󰀁󰀁󰀈󰀁/󰀂-󰀁󰀂󰀂󰀆], Ramon Llull [󰀁󰀂󰀃󰀂-󰀁󰀃󰀁󰀆]), is rooted in a much briefer history of cosmopolitanism and globalism, cultural and social pluralism, and interreligious encounter. It seems fair to say that this tension, or perhaps even paradox, is evident in the words and actions of Pope Francis, particularly in some of his off-the-cuff remarks which, his critics say, do not always exhibit a great concern for theological precision. For those who regard him as too ‘liberal’ (a term which has as many definitions as there are conservatives), this is unsettling and even grounds for condemnation. However, such remarks are also, for those prepared to listen attentively and make allowances for the context, often very revealing. In what follows, we shall seek to discern the main contours of Pope Francis’s somewhat ambivalent understanding of the nature and function of interreligious dialogue, by drawing upon his public statements and reflecting upon particular events in his papacy. 󰀁. Dialogue and Identity It is clear that, for Pope Francis, genuine interreligious dialogue must be grounded in a strong sense of one’s own Christian identity. Addressing the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, Pope Francis declared that: Dialogue does not mean renouncing one’s own identity in approaching others, … nor does it mean accepting compromises on faith and Christian morality. On the contrary, ‘true openness involves remaining steadfast in one’s deepest convictions, clear and joyful in one’s own identity’ ….󰀂󰀂

Similarly, in a meeting with Asian bishops in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, Francis inquired rhetorically: … [I]n undertaking the path of dialogue with individuals and cultures, what should be our point of departure and our fundamental point of reference, which guides us to our destination?󰀂󰀃 󰀂󰀂  Address of Pope Francis to Participants in the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue (November 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/ francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/november/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀈_pc-dialogointerreligioso.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀃  Pope Francis, Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Republic of Korea on the Occasion of the 󰀆th Asian Youth Day Meeting with the Bishops of Asia (August 󰀁󰀇,

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Replying to his own question, he declared: Surely it is our own identity, our identity as Christians. We cannot engage in real dialogue unless we are conscious of our identity. We can’t dialogue, we can’t start dialoguing from nothing, from zero, from a foggy sense of who we are.󰀂󰀄

Without a “grounding in Christ,” he declared, “dialogue can be reduced to a form of negotiation or an agreement to disagree. An agreement to disagree … so as not to make waves … This sort of superficiality does us great harm.”󰀂󰀅 A month later, in August 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, addressing a meeting with the leaders of other religions and other Christian denominations, in Albania, the pope reiterated this view: I also wish to mention something which is always an illusion: relativism, ‘everything is relative’. In this regard, we must keep in mind a clear principle: we cannot enter into dialogue if we do not approach it from the perspective of our own identity. Without identity, there can be no dialogue. It would be an illusory dialogue, a dialogue without substance: it would serve no purpose. All of us have our own religious identity to which we are faithful. But the Lord knows how to guide history. May each one of us begin with our own identity, not pretending to have another, because it serves no end and does not help; it is relativism. What unites us is the path of life, is starting from our own identity for the good of our brothers and sisters. To do good! And so, we walk together as brothers and sisters. Every one of us offers the witness of our identity to others and engages in dialogue with others. Then dialogue can move onto theological questions. But even more important and beautiful is to walk together without betraying our own identity, without disguising it, without hypocrisy. This is what I like to think.󰀂󰀆

󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/august/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀀󰀈󰀁󰀇_corea-vescovi-asia.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀄  Ibid. 󰀂󰀅  Ibid. 󰀂󰀆  Pope Francis, Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Tirana (Albania): Meeting with the Leaders of Other Religions and Other Christian Denominations – Address of Pope Francis Catholic University of ‘Our Lady of Good Counsel’ (Tirana) (September 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/september/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀀󰀉󰀂󰀁_albania-leaders-altre-religioni.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. See also the pope’s remarks during a visit to Sarajevo in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅: “It is always worth remembering, however, that for dialogue to be authentic and effective, it presupposes a solid identity: without an established identity, dialogue is of no use or even harmful. I say this with the young in mind, but it applies to everyone.” Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) – Ecumenical and Interreligious Meeting – Address of the Holy Father – Franciscan International Study Centre (June 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). See

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Speaking at an international peace conference in Cairo in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, he reiterated that it is a “duty to respect one’s own identity and that of others, because true dialogue cannot be built on ambiguity or a willingness to sacrifice some good for the sake of pleasing others.”󰀂󰀇 Indeed, the pope insists that, mutual respect is the condition and, at the same time, the aim of interreligious dialogue: respecting each other’s right to life, to physical integrity, to fundamental freedoms, namely, freedom of conscience, of thought, of expression and of religion …. Such respect can bring seeds of good that in their turn may bud into friendship and cooperation in many fields, especially in service to the poor, to the least, to the elderly, through welcoming migrants, and attention to those who are excluded.󰀂󰀈

It would seem, then, that, for Francis, dialogue must, first and foremost, be rooted in a clear, and theologically grounded, sense of one’s identity.󰀂󰀉 Nevertheless, on other occasions, the pope has sent a somewhat different message. Indeed, even in those instances cited directly above, there is an unmistakable ambiguity in the pope’s ruminations. So, for example, in his Albanian address, the pope appears to equate the starting point of dialogue with ‘doing good’ for our brothers and sisters, and walking together with them. Only then does/can dialogue move on to ‘theological questions’. Here, at least, it would seem that the truest, or at least initial, witness to one’s identity is praxis and that doctrine, so to speak, brings up the rear. This is the subject of the following reflection. 󰀂. Dialogue and Human Existence On many occasions, the pope has indicated that dialogue may, in fact, have its deepest roots in the ‘ups and downs’ of human existence. These constitute, so to speak, the stuff out of which the dialogue of life, the http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/june/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀆󰀀󰀆_sarajevo-incontro-ecumenico.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀇  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/april/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀄󰀂󰀈_egitto-conferenza-pace.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀈  Interreligious General Audience on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Conciliar Declaration ‘Nostra Aetate’, Saint Peter’s Square, 󰀂󰀈 October, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, https://migrants-refugees.va/mr_article/pope-francis-interreligious-generalaudience-occasion-󰀅󰀀th-anniversary-promulgation-conciliar-declaration-nostra-aetate/ [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀉  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Tirana (Albania) (cf. n. 󰀂󰀆).

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dialogue of action, and the dialogue of religious experience are made. It has been argued that Francis’s appreciation of the theological significance of everyday experience, and the popular religiosity which is so bound up with it, was been shaped by, among other things, the piety he witnessed in his family life, his encounters with the poor, and his familiarity with liberation theology.󰀃󰀀 It is, in any case, clear that he attaches great value to encounters at the grassroots level. During an in-flight press conference from Istanbul to Rome in November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, he expressed his enthusiasm for an interreligious dialogue founded on the concrete experiences of people: This is a beautiful thing: men and women who meet other men and women and share experiences. We are not just talking about theology but religious experience. And this would be a beautiful step forward, beautiful.󰀃󰀁

During a visit to Sarajevo, in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, he noted that it was “not by chance that the birth of the Council for Interreligious Dialogue and other valuable initiatives in the area of interreligious and ecumenical work [had come] about at the end of the war, in response to the need for reconciliation and rebuilding a society torn apart by conflict…” Drawing upon Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀅󰀀,󰀃󰀂 and referencing a document drafted by the Indian Bishops Conference in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃,󰀃󰀃 he declared that, Interreligious dialogue, before being a discussion of the main themes of faith, is a “conversation about human existence.” … This conversation 󰀃󰀀  Juan Carlos Scannone, “Pope Francis and the Theology of the People,” Theological Studies 󰀇󰀇, no. 󰀁 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): 󰀁󰀁󰀈-󰀁󰀃󰀅. 󰀃󰀁  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Turkey (󰀂󰀈-󰀃󰀀 November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄) – In-Flight Press Conference of His Holiness Pope Francis from Istanbul to Rome – Papal Flight (November 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), http://m.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/november/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀁󰀁󰀃󰀀_turchia-conferenza-stampa.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀂  The text of Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀅󰀀, reads as follows: “An attitude of openness in truth and in love must characterize the dialogue with the followers of non-Christian religions, in spite of various obstacles and difficulties, especially forms of fundamentalism on both sides. Interreligious dialogue is a necessary condition for peace in the world, and so it is a duty for Christians as well as other religious communities. This dialogue is in first place a conversation about human existence or simply, as the bishops of India have put it, a matter of ‘being open to them, sharing their joys and sorrows’. In this way we learn to accept others and their different ways of living, thinking and speaking. We can then join one another in taking up the duty of serving justice and peace, which should become a basic principle of all our exchanges. A dialogue which seeks social peace and justice is in itself, beyond all merely practical considerations, an ethical commitment which brings about a new social situation.” 󰀃󰀃  Indian Bishops’ Conference, Final Declaration of the XXX Assembly: The Role of the Church for a Better India (March 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀈.󰀉.

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shares the experiences of daily life in all its concreteness, with its joys and sufferings, its struggles and hopes; it takes on shared responsibilities; it plans a better future for all. We learn to live together, respecting each other’s differences freely; we know and accept one another’s identity. Through dialogue a spirit of fraternity is recognized and developed, which unites and favours the promotion of moral values, justice, freedom and peace. Dialogue is a school of humanity and a builder of unity, which helps to build a society founded on tolerance and mutual respect.󰀃󰀄

With regard to the conduct of interreligious dialogue, Pope Francis accords women both high praise and a distinctive role. Speaking, in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, to the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, in a session dedicated to ‘The Role of Women in Education toward Universal Fraternity’, the pope, in a subsection of the text entitled ‘Dialoguing’, declared that women can make a unique contribution to both the dialogue of life, and the dialogue of religious experience: It is obvious that education for universal fraternity, which also means to say learning to build bonds of friendship and respect, is important in the field of interreligious dialogue. Women are engaged, often more than men, at the level of the ‘dialogue of life’ in the interreligious sphere, and thus contribute to a better understanding of the challenges typical of a multicultural reality. But women are also able to fully integrate in exchanges at the level of religious experience, as well as in those at the theological level. Many women are well prepared to take on encounters of interreligious dialogue at the highest levels and not only on the Catholic side. This means that women’s contribution must not be limited to ‘feminine’ topics or to encounters only among women. Dialogue is a journey that men and women must undertake together. Today more than ever, it is necessary that women be present. Women, possessing particular traits, can offer an important contribution to dialogue with their capacity to listen, to welcome and to open themselves generously to others.󰀃󰀅

At times, Pope Francis’s apparent preference for one-on-one encounter above theological discussion finds expression in what are clearly intended as jocular remarks, though they may also betray some personal 󰀃󰀄  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (cf. n. 󰀂󰀆). 󰀃󰀅  Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to Participants in the Plenary Session of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue – Consistory Hall – 󰀉 June 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. See http:// w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/june/documents/papa-francesco_ 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀆󰀀󰀉_pontconsiglio-dialogo-interreligioso.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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ambiguity about the best way to proceed. So, for example, during the 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 in-flight press conference in which he expressed his enthusiasm for dialogue founded on experience, he also lamented theological dithering: I believe we are moving forward in our relations with the Orthodox; they have the sacraments and apostolic succession ... we are moving forward. What are we waiting for? For theologians to reach an agreement? That day will never come, I assure you, I’m sceptical. Theologians work well but remember what Athenagoras said to Paul VI: ‘Let’s put the theologians on an island to discuss among themselves and we’ll just get on with things!’ I thought that this might not have been true, but Bartholomew told me: ‘No, it’s true, he said that’. We mustn’t wait. Unity is a journey we have to take, but we need to do it together. This is spiritual ecumenism: praying together, working together. There are so many works of charity, so much work. ... Teaching together .... Moving forward together. This is spiritual ecumenism ….󰀃󰀆

󰀃. Dialogue and Proclamation Notwithstanding his insistence that dialogue is rooted – and blooms – in interpersonal encounters, particularly those which issue in collaborative endeavors for the good of one’s fellow humans, Pope Francis (not surprisingly) has, on other occasions, prioritized the importance of proclamation. So, for example, less than five months prior to his address in Sarajevo where he declared that, “Interreligious dialogue, before being a discussion of the main themes of faith, is a ‘conversation about human existence’,” he had sounded a rather different note at an interreligious and ecumenical gathering in Colombo, Sri Lanka. There, he declared that, in order for interreligious “dialogue and encounter to be effective, it must be grounded in a full and forthright presentation of our respective convictions.” He continued by saying that, Certainly, such dialogue will accentuate how varied our beliefs, traditions and practices are. But if we are honest in presenting our convictions, we will be able to see more clearly what we hold in common. New avenues will be opened for mutual esteem, cooperation and indeed friendship.󰀃󰀇 󰀃󰀆  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Turkey (󰀂󰀈-󰀃󰀀 November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄) (cf. n. 󰀃󰀁). 󰀃󰀇  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Sri Lanka and the Philippines (󰀁󰀂-󰀁󰀉 January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅) – Interreligious and Ecumenical Gathering – Address of His Holiness Pope Francis – Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, Colombo (January 󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), http://m.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/january/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀁󰀁󰀃_srilanka-filippine-incontro-interreligioso.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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While he went on to say that it was his “hope that interreligious and ecumenical cooperation will demonstrate that men and women do not have to forsake their identity, whether ethnic or religious, in order to live in harmony with their brothers and sisters,” he had clearly promoted another agenda. The ambiguity of the pope’s views on the complex relationship between dialogue and proclamation was evident yet again on June 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 when he addressed a conference at the Pontifical Theological Faculty of Southern Italy (a Jesuit institution). There, he called for students of theology “to be educated in dialogue with Judaism and Islam, to understand the common roots and the differences of our religious identities” and, “in this way, to contribute more effectively to the building of a society that appreciates diversity and fosters respect, brotherhood and peaceful coexistence.” Here, too, however, the tensile – if not dialectical – relationship between dialogue and proclamation is evident. So, for example, the pope also declared that, When the Proemio of Veritatis gaudium mentions the deepening of kerygma and dialogue as criteria for renewing [theological] studies, we mean that they are at the service of the journey of a Church that increasingly places evangelization at the center. Not apologetics, not manuals – as we have heard – evangelizing. At the center there is evangelization [emphasis ours], which does not mean proselytism. In the dialogue with cultures and religions, the Church announces the Good News of Jesus and the practice of evangelical love which He preached as a synthesis of all the teaching of the Law, of the visions of the Prophets and of the will of the Father.󰀃󰀈

V. A Critical Reflection on Pope Francis’s Approach to Interreligious Dialogue 󰀁. The Attention to Identity One of the most striking aspects of Pope Francis’s approach to dialogue is his insistence that it must be premised on the forthright acknowledgement of ‘difference’, that is to say, the recognition of the distinctive identities and interests of the parties involved.󰀃󰀉 In this regard, it is interesting 󰀃󰀈  https://zenit.org/articles/popes-full-remarks-at-theology-after-veritatis-gaudiumencounter-in-naples-italy/. 󰀃󰀉  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Sri Lanka and the Philippines – (󰀁󰀂󰀁󰀉 January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), see above n. 󰀃󰀇.

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to recall that Jacques Dupuis was reprimanded by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith for failing to take sufficient account of what were described as the “omissions, insufficiencies and errors regarding fundamental truths about God, [hu]man[ity] and the world,” which characterized the non-Christian religions. Presumably, Pope Francis had other (more positive) particularities in mind when he declared that it is a “duty to respect one’s own identity and that of others.” Indeed, in one of his most controversial ‘pronouncements’ on the status of the religious other, the pope, during an apostolic journey to the United Arab Emirates, in February 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, endorsed, together with the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Ahmed El-Tayeb, a text entitled, A Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together.󰀄󰀀 This document contained a clause that was remarkably reminiscent of the claim which had led Jacques Dupuis to be investigated – and silenced – by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀇. The clause read as follows: “The pluralism and the diversity of religions, colour, sex, race and language are willed by God in His wisdom, through which He created human beings.”󰀄󰀁 Commentators were divided on the significance of this statement, with some regarding it as an expression of the pope’s radical de iure pluralistic theology of religions (à la Dupuis), while others saw it as no more than an acknowledgement of the de facto pluralistic, religious context, the religious reality of which had been accounted for by Vatican II, and Nostra Aetate, in particular. Pope Francis made this clear on his return flight from Abu Dhabi when he told reporters that, “I want to restate this clearly: From the Catholic point of view, the document does not deviate one millimeter from Vatican II.”󰀄󰀂

󰀄󰀀  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/outside/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀀󰀂󰀀󰀄_documento-fratellanza-umana.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀁  Ibid. 󰀄󰀂  https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀂/󰀀󰀇/does-god-want-religiousdiversity-abu-dhabi-text-raises-questions [accessed June 󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. See Nostra Aetate, par. 󰀂: “…. [O]ther religions found everywhere try to counter the restlessness of the human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing ‘ways’, comprising teachings, rules of life, and sacred rites. The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. She regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men. Indeed, she proclaims, and ever must proclaim Christ ‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (John 󰀁󰀄:󰀆), in whom men [and women] may find the fullness of religious life, in whom God has reconciled all things to Himself.”

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Pope Francis has insisted that “a clear sense of one’s own identity and a capacity for empathy are … the point of departure for all dialogue.”󰀄󰀃 In his public pronouncements and his public performance, he himself would seem to be a paradigmatic instantiation of this balancing act, but history teaches that, when the balance is upset, the quest for internal doctrinal purity often trumps the fellow feeling that had long prevailed. Some commentators have questioned whether Francis’s understanding of identity resonates with many in our society, both religious and nonreligious, who regard identity as a construct, and a malleable one at that. The pope insists that ‘relativism’ is an ‘illusion’ and that “we cannot enter into dialogue if we do not approach it from the perspective of our own identity,”󰀄󰀄 but phenomena such as “multiple religious belonging, hybrid identities, and the move from ‘fate’ to ‘choice’ in religious matters”󰀄󰀅 would seem to gainsay his presumption that religious identity is necessarily stable and clearly delineated. 󰀂. The Link between Dialogue and Proclamation One commentator has noted that the discussion of dialogue developed in Amoris Laetitia “could be applied to interreligious relations, as well as [to] the family”; that, “[i]ndeed, many of the themes recur in what [Pope Francis] says about interreligious dialogue.” These include (i) “taking time to listen until you are sure you have heard everything the other person says, and (ii) thereby acknowledge their truth and deepest concerns, (iii) that diversity is a good thing, and (iv) that ‘we need to free ourselves from feeling that we all have to be alike’.”󰀄󰀆 This is a revealing remark, and highlights the strengths, but perhaps also a particular weakness, of Pope Francis’s approach to interreligious encounter. The strengths include the pope’s manifest good will, his 󰀄󰀃

 http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/august/documents/papafrancesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀀󰀈󰀁󰀇_corea-vescovi-asia.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. The occasion was the meeting with the bishops of Asia, on 󰀁󰀇 August 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. Helene Egnell, “Is Pope Francis an Anonymous Feminist?,” in Pope Francis and Interreligious Dialogue: Religious Thinkers Engage with Recent Papal Initiatives, ed. Harold Kasimov and Alan Race (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), 󰀁󰀂󰀁, reads this text as a claim (by Pope Francis) that “Christian identity is not primarily about doctrine, but about the living faith in Christ.” This claim neglects the doctrinal content that articulates and grounds faith in Christ. 󰀄󰀄  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Tirana (Albania) (cf. n. 󰀂󰀆). 󰀄󰀅  Egnell, “Is Pope Francis an Anonymous Feminist?,” 󰀁󰀂󰀁. 󰀄󰀆  Ibid., 󰀁󰀂󰀄. See Amoris Laetitia, par. 󰀁󰀃󰀇-󰀁󰀃󰀉.

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sincere respect for the religious other, and his rootedness in the reality of every day. The weakness may be a fatherly reluctance to trouble the other members of the family with some pressing issues. I began this reflection on Pope Francis and his approach to interreligious dialogue by recalling Jacques Dupuis’s appeal to Dialogue and Proclamation as one of the major planks in his proposal to grant non-Christian religions some mediatory role in the salvation of their adherents. The document has been largely forgotten, but the theological issues which emerged out of the Dupuis case have never been comprehensively addressed, and the result has been an impoverishment of the theology of dialogue. Up until now, Pope Francis has not taken any significant steps with regard to the theological conundrums that plague this discipline, particularly the demand by some non-Christians to untie the knot between dialogue and proclamation. There is a real tension here, a tension which haunts those non-Christians who are admirers of Pope Francis, but who inquire whether proclamation is not a politer word for proselytization.󰀄󰀇 VI. Concluding Remarks: Pope Francis between Doctrine and Discernment It is obvious that Pope Francis, like all his predecessors, is bound by the tradition he has inherited. It is also the case that, by the very force of his personality, he has enlivened – perhaps even reanimated – meaningful interreligious encounter. He has done so by a remarkable array of gestures, including, among other things, praying in the Blue Mosque in Istanbul (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), and becoming the first pontiff ever to celebrate the Eucharist on the Arabian peninsula (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). It is fast becoming something of a cliché to point to Francis’s Jesuit formation, and the notion of ‘discernment’, in particular, as an explanation of his sometimes surprising words and deeds. Nevertheless, it may go some way to explaining the paradoxical and tensile character of the pope’s reflections on the nature and objectives of interreligious dialogue. 󰀄󰀇  See, in this regard, Ataullah Siddiqui, “Pope Francis, Islam, and Dialogue,” in Pope Francis and Interreligious Dialogue: Religious Thinkers Engage with Recent Papal Initiatives, 󰀁󰀇󰀃; Anantanand Rambachan, “Do We Have a Religious Need for Each Other? Pope Francis and Interreligious Dialogue,” ibid., 󰀂󰀀󰀆-󰀂󰀀󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀉-󰀂󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀄-󰀂󰀁󰀅.

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In his Apostolic Exhortation, Gaudete et exsultate (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈),󰀄󰀈 Francis reflected at length on the content of this notion. He describes it as a way of coming to know “if something comes from the Holy Spirit or if it stems from the spirit of the world or the spirit of the devil” (par. 󰀁󰀆󰀆). While discernment may well be “exercised in small and apparently irrelevant things” (par. 󰀁󰀆󰀉), it is applicable to all domains of our existence. Francis observes that, An essential condition for progress in discernment is a growing understanding of God’s patience and his timetable, which are never our own. … Discernment is not about discovering what more we can get out of this life, but about recognizing how we can better accomplish the mission entrusted to us at our baptism. This entails a readiness to make sacrifices, even to sacrificing everything …. Once we enter into this dynamic, we will not let our consciences be numbed and we will open ourselves generously to discernment (par. 󰀁󰀇󰀄).

In short, Discernment … is not a solipsistic self-analysis or a form of egotistical introspection, but an authentic process of leaving ourselves behind in order to approach the mystery of God, who helps us to carry out the mission to which he has called us, for the good of our brothers and sisters (par. 󰀁󰀇󰀅).

In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, during an interreligious meeting in Azerbaijan, Francis declared that religions are tasked with helping “to discern [our emphasis] the good and put it into practice through deeds, prayer and diligent cultivation of the inner life.” They are, therefore, “called to build a culture of encounter and peace, based on patience, understanding, and humble, tangible steps. This is the way a humane society is best served.”󰀄󰀉 During his address to the Pontifical Theological Faculty of Southern Italy, in June 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, he returned to the notion of ‘discernment’ no less than fourteen times. Most notably, he declared that, In the dialogue with cultures and religions, the Church announces the Good News of Jesus and the practice of evangelical love which He 󰀄󰀈  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papafrancesco_esortazione-ap_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀃󰀁󰀉_gaudete-et-exsultate.html [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀉  https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/october/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀁󰀀󰀀󰀂_azerbaijan-incontro-interreligioso-baku.html; Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Georgia and Azerbaijan – (󰀃󰀀 September – 󰀂 October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) – Interreligious Meeting with the Sheikh and with the Representatives of the Different Religious Communities of the Country – Address of the Holy Father – “Heydar Aliyev” Mosque – Baku (October 󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) [accessed June 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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preached as a synthesis of all the teaching of the Law, of the visions of the Prophets and of the will of the Father. Dialogue is above all a method of discernment and proclamation of the Word of love which is addressed to each person and which in the heart of each person wants to take up residence. Only in listening to this Word and in the experience of the love that it communicates can the actuality of the kerygma be discerned. Dialogue, understood in this way, is a form of acceptance.󰀅󰀀

Might it not be said that Pope Francis has sought to promote a culture of interreligious ‘acceptance’, through a committed engagement with the religious ‘other’, an engagement which does not limit itself to manifest doctrinal differences, but seeks to discern where, and how, and on which basis, the foundations of peaceful coexistence and reciprocal enrichment might be built? There can be no doubt that, in undertaking this mission, he has put flesh on the bones of the mandate contained in Nostra Aetate, par. 󰀂, namely, that the Church’s “sons and daughters” should … through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions, carried out with prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith and life, … recognize, preserve and promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the socio-cultural values found among these men and women.󰀅󰀁

In journeying to engage with non-Christian religious leaders, to visit their temples and mosques, and to pray in their holy places, the pope might be said to be endeavoring, in the fashion of some comparative theologians, to forge a more grounded – and perhaps even experiential – basis for interreligious encounter. Not surprisingly, he is less inclined than comparatists to relativize the place of doctrinal tradition in such encounters, though he does chide theologians not to take themselves too seriously – or at least not to adopt a reactionary stance – when the attempt to build better interreligious relations is the issue at stake. The heart of the theology of interreligious dialogue which Pope Francis seeks to foster is neither the preservation of doctrinal orthodoxy (something which he regards as self-evident) nor the promotion of syncretism (something which he has never countenanced). It is, instead, the creation of a climate – and a culture – of reciprocal tolerance and respect, 󰀅󰀀  Emphasis ours. See https://zenit.org/articles/popes-full-remarks-at-theology-afterveritatis-gaudium-encounter-in-naples-italy/ [accessed June 󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀅󰀁  http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/ vat-ii_decl_󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅󰀁󰀀󰀂󰀈_nostra-aetate_en.html.

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which can only be sustained by ongoing dialogue between committed believers who cherish their respective doctrinal traditions while committing themselves to a process of ongoing communal and personal discernment.

Pope Francis and Islam Marco Impagliazzo I. The Time of Flowers Asked by a journalist about the fruits of his 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 visit to Morocco “for peace in the world, for the coexistence and for intercultural dialogue,” Pope Francis answered “Right now, I would say that there are flowers; the fruits will come later.” He then expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the two journeys, to the United Arab Emirates in February, and the one that had just ended, for having “been able to talk” of something that is of deep concern to him, “peace, unity, fraternity,” being met with “liberty, fraternity, welcoming and respect.” And this, he continued, is a beautiful “flower,” a beautiful flower of coexistence that promises to bear fruit. We must not give up! It is true that there will still be difficulties, many difficulties, because unfortunately, there are intransigent groups. Once again, I would like to state this: in every religion there is always a “fundamentalist” group that does not want to go forward, that lives on bitter memories, on past conflicts, preferring war and sowing fear. We have seen that it is more beautiful to sow hope, to sow hope and walk hand in hand, always forward. We have seen that in the dialogue […] bridges are needed and it pains us to see people who prefer to build walls. Because those who build walls will end up as prisoners of the walls they have built.󰀁

These recent journeys, particularly the first, with the signing of the joint Document on fraternity, in the framework of an interreligious congress held in a Muslim country, identify a point of arrival, a destination in the path of dialogue and construction of relationships that the Argentinian Pope has implemented with the Islamic world. There were indeed few doubts that the pontiff “from the end of the world” would have firmly engaged in such dialogue, having chosen the name of a saint, St. Francis of Assisi, who inaugurated a different approach, dialogic and 󰀁  In-flight Press Conference of Pope Francis on the return flight from Rabat to Rome, Papal Flight, March 󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, at the end of the Apostolic Journey to Morocco (March 󰀃󰀀-󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/march/ documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀀󰀃󰀃󰀁_marocco-voloritorno.html.

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peaceful, to the main enemy of his time, while Christianity and Islam were clashing violently, and even left precise instructions to his brothers to continue on the same path. It is possible to trace some of the causes of Bergoglio’s sensitivity with regard to Islam back to the years when he was the bishop of the Argentinian capital. Indeed, in Buenos Aires he cultivated a spiritual friendship with believers of other faiths, particularly with Jews and Muslims. He asked a rabbi and an imam to accompany him during his journey to the Holy Land in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. Faithfulness to the Second Vatican Council is certainly one of the motives that drove Bishop Bergoglio to cooperate with the representatives of other faiths on social and moral themes. Since his election as Bishop of Rome, the theme of relations with Islam has become of paramount importance, because of its connection to the momentous phenomenon of migrations, and in turn migration’s more visible and exploited images, of the “landings” on the shores of Europe and shipwrecks of makeshift boats, and because of the terrible suicide terrorist attacks that have afflicted a number of European countries, particularly France and Belgium. The wide-ranging debate within European societies and public opinions has drawn powerful, potentially lacerating, echoes within the Church, as well as within the varied Muslim world. II. A Yielding Form of Irenicism? In January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, a retired Italian Archbishop, the former secretary of Cardinal Palazzini, stated, “In ten years’ time we will all be Muslims because of our foolishness. Our moral and religious decadence benefits Islam.” The grounds for this historic change presumably would be the presence in Italy of an excessive number of migrants, which “prejudice the characteristics of Italians by birth.”󰀂 In the same year, in France, Laurent Dandrieu published a book provocatively titled Église et immigration, le grand malaise: Le pape et le suicide de la civilisation européenne,󰀃 questioning the Church and Pope Francis concerning the “invasion” of migrants, which appears to be “progressively replacing the population” of Europe with illegitimate and foreign elements. This argument – of “replacement” 󰀂  The statements of Msgr. Carlo Liberati, Archbishop emeritus of Pompei, are reported by Simon Holmes in Mailonline, January 󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. 󰀃  Laurent Dandrieu, Église et immigration, le grand malaise: Le pape et le suicide de la civilisation européenne (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇).

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– is very dear to the “sovereigntist” circles of resurgent nationalism, which even perceive it as fostering a hidden design concocted by the unseen protagonists of “turbo-capitalistic” and neo-liberalistic financial processes. The Church, on the other hand, would be responsible for wasting the “European opportunity,” by permitting the arrival of “forces that threaten to destroy its true identity” and by requiring its faithful to consent “to the Islamization of Europe.” The reflection on immigration in the end is exhausted by and limited to the question of the presence of Islam – actually Muslim communities, in view of their plurality and diversity – in France. Their presence, according to certain Catholics, is leading to a profound identity crisis within the Church, which appears to be unfaithful to its traditional doctrine on the right of nations. The French Bishops’ Conference, indeed, publicly calls the Catholics to offer welcome and support to migrants. Caught in between are a large number of faithful who feel lost and troubled, or uneasy at the very least, with regard to recent social developments. The fundamental issue is how to remain faithful to a Church that would ask them to choose “between faith and patriotism.” There are others however, who identify in the stances of rejection and closure towards migrants a risk of degrading one’s faith to the level of identity-based statements, with non-authentic and essentially political goals. This is seemingly the case of the Catholic intellectual Erwan Le Morhedec, a conservative himself, who opposes identity-focused perspectives and wittily stated “I see the Pope as the proclaimer of the Gospel, not the defender of Christianity.”󰀄 On a number of occasions, Pope Francis has made remarks that do not respond directly to the accusations and conceptions mentioned above, but clearly represent his position and show how he perceives the situation completely differently from being an invasion with purposes of “replacement.” These remarks are accompanied by concrete gestures and choices, such as his decision to make his first apostolic journey in Italy to the island of Lampedusa, a symbolic and memorial place of the journeys of migrants across the Mediterranean Sea and of the many deaths connected to them. Or his gestures during the celebrations of the Holy Week, with the ritual of the “Washing of Feet” and “Way of the Cross” where the presence of Muslim migrants is constant, both physically and in the reflections that are proposed. Among the many speeches, some of his statements during his visit to the Greek island of Lesbos are  Erwan Le Morhedec, Identitaire: Le mauvais génie du christianisme (Paris: Cerf, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀄

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particularly relevant. This island, facing the Turkish coast, is another symbolic place of modern migrant flows and a port of entry – often closed – to the European dream for many men and women coming from Asia, who end up being “imprisoned” on the island for long stretches of time. Pope Francis went to Lesbos together with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew. The two share many positions, such as concern for the environment and for climate change: though they remain separate, for Bergoglio the Churches must be united in the defense of the weak, in order to make the Christian witness stronger and more effective. In Lesbos he expressed himself in these terms: The worries expressed by institutions and people, both in Greece and in other European countries, are understandable and legitimate. We must never forget, however, that migrants, rather than simply being a statistic, are first of all persons who have faces, names and individual stories. Europe is the homeland of human rights, and whoever sets foot on European soil ought to sense this, and thus become more aware of the duty to respect and defend those rights. Unfortunately, some, including many infants, could not even make it to these shores: they died at sea, victims of unsafe and inhumane means of transport, prey to unscrupulous thugs.󰀅

III. The “Islamization” of the East While in secular France and nearby Italy the debate is lively, but the majority of the bishops basically share the Pope’s position, in the Churches and societies of Eastern Europe the situation presents relevant differences. The repeated public stances of priests and laypersons seem rather in contradiction with the Pope’s position on the theme of migrants. In brief, many bishops fear the Islamization of their countries, and therefore the disappearance of ancient Christian societies. Among the foremost examples are those of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. The link between social and religious issues is evident, and the political institutions choose to represent the concerns connected to the latter. The walls and barriers built along the borders of Hungary and elsewhere in order to try and stop the “East passage” were also justified as a way to “defend Christianity,” as claimed by the heads of the government of 󰀅  Visit of Pope Francis to Lesbos (Greece). Meeting with the people of Lesbos and with the Catholic community, Presidium of the Coast Guard, Saturday, April 󰀁󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. In http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/april/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀄󰀁󰀆_lesvos-cittadinanza.html.

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Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and other countries. These claims were echoed by certain bishops, such as the Bishop of Szeged.󰀆 The Hungarian Church was timid, and basically endorsed the radical opposition to immigration adopted by the government and shared by those who recalled the Hungarian call to stand as a bulwark against Islam and its expansion in Europe, an incredibly farfetched historical leap that puts together the Ottoman advance of the 󰀁󰀅th and 󰀁󰀆th centuries with today’s facts. It is necessary to mention, of course, that in Balkan and Eastern Europe belonging to a religion is, in many cases, the principal cement of national identities. In Poland the bishops publicly called for welcoming refugees, but underscored the need to proceed with great caution, as expressed by a bishop with a role of responsibility within the Bishops’ Conference, Mgr. Kupny, who believes refugees of Christian faith should be favored because they are presumably more capable of integrating and living in the country compared to Muslims.󰀇 This fear of an improbable Islamization, widespread in Eastern Europe, is made clearer by examining their demographic trends: its cause also lies in the rapid ageing and decrease of the population. In an interview given to Lidove Noviny in May 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, the Cardinal Archbishop of Prague, Mgr. Duka, insisted on prudence in welcoming people from “a culture and a civilization completely different from our own.” He then went on to underline the need to accept “firstly Christians, since they are the most persecuted group, whose lives are threatened,” adding, with regard to Pope Francis, that “his sensitivity on social themes is different from ours in Europe (…) He comes from South America, where the gap between the rich and the poor is much wider.”󰀈 IV. Furthering Processes, Being Able to Make Distinctions, Combating Fear The dreaded scenario of Islamic expansion, on such as scale as to jeopardize the survival of Christianity as a majority religion in Eastern 󰀆

 In statements reported by the Washington Post (later denied), he would have affirmed that the Pope does not understand Hungary and that refugees are actually economic migrants. 󰀇  Recent surveys show that 󰀅󰀆% of Poles want access to the country to be restricted to immigrants from Ukraine, Armenia, and Belorussia. 󰀈  https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/󰀅󰀅󰀃󰀂/cardinal-claims-pope-can-t-understandrefugee-crisis-because-he-is-not-from-europe.

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Europe, with the migrants as bridgehead in spite of the variety of countries and situations they come from and their status as asylum seekers, finds no home or room in the words of Pope Francis. On the contrary, in his Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium he wrote that We Christians should embrace with affection and respect Muslim immigrants to our countries in the same way that we hope and ask to be received and respected in countries of Islamic tradition. I ask and I humbly entreat those countries to grant Christians freedom to worship and to practice their faith, in light of the freedom which followers of Islam enjoy in Western countries!󰀉

These words employ the theme of reciprocity, but reverse it compared to those who interpret it in negative terms allowing Western societies to deny those rights that are rejected in other contexts. In Francis’s opinion the comparison between the range of civil rights and spaces of religious freedom granted in the countries of ancient Christian tradition and in those of Muslim tradition should not be used to decrease their level, but rather to increase it. European societies would therefore constitute an example and a precedent enabling Christians to lay claims to the same freedom for other Christians around the world. Pope Bergoglio envisions the lack of synchronism and equal recognition between different societies as an element of history that needs to be overcome, not through anathemas or by displaying feelings of superiority, but rather by triggering processes that will necessarily take time, just as they developed over time in the Western world. This is what he expressed in several responses to the journalists on those occasions for forthright conversation that are the press conferences during his airplane trips. While reflecting upon religious freedom and freedom of worship in Morocco in the previously quoted conversation with the journalists, Bergoglio invited them to “think of us Christians, three hundred years ago, whether there was this freedom that we have today.”󰀁󰀀 He noted that “freedom always develops, grows,” just like faith. He then gave the example of how “today we have removed the death penalty from the Catechism of the Catholic Church, three hundred years after burning heretics alive.” The reason is that “the Church has grown in moral awareness and respect for the person.” Then he added: Freedom of worship is also growing, and we must continue to grow. There are Catholics who do not accept what Vatican II said about  Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀅󰀂.  This and the following quotes are from In-flight Press Conference from Rabat to Rome (cf. n. 󰀅󰀂). 󰀉

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freedom of worship, freedom of conscience. There are Catholics who do not accept this. We too have this problem. Yet the awareness of our Muslim brothers and sisters is also growing and some countries do not understand as well or grow as well as others. In Morocco, there is this growth.

These words reveal his trust in a process of growth that can be stimulated, accompanied, and will always be the object of resistance and opposition from those who mean to defend areas of religious monopoly. Pope Francis conceives his interventions as contributions to this process, which cannot necessarily proceed at the same pace in countries and situations that are extremely diverse. In this regard, his inclination to distinguish the manifold realities that characterize the Muslim world stands out, as well as his rejection of simplifications that portray the Islamic umma as a single indistinct mass, likening more than 󰀁.󰀈 billion believers to one block – often seen as hostile. In his conversations, Pope Francis does not avoid the sensitive issue of conversions. “Some countries still do not provide for it – he said – I do not know if it is forbidden, but in practice, it is. Other countries like Morocco do not create problems, they are more open, more respectful and seek a certain way to proceed with discretion. Other countries with whose representatives I have spoken say: We do not have a problem, but we prefer that baptisms be performed outside the country and that they return as Christians. These are ways of progressing in freedom of conscience and freedom of worship.” Rather than dwelling on the faults of the other, Bergoglio prefers to fix the target on the limits of civilizations and countries defined as Christian. He stressed this when he stated: something else troubles me: the regression of us Christians, when we take away freedom of conscience; think of those Christian doctors and health care institutions that do not have the right of conscientious objection regarding, for example, euthanasia. Why? The Church has gone forward and you Christian countries are going backwards? Think about this because it is true. Today, we Christians face the danger that some governments will take away our freedom of conscience, which is the first step [towards taking away] freedom of worship. The answer is not easy, but let us not just accuse Muslims, let us also accuse ourselves for these countries where this is happening, and this should make us feel ashamed.

The official position of the Holy See on issues concerning interreligious dialogue and relations with Islam, clarified by Pope Francis in a number of remarks, was shaped through reflection on the condition of refugees, but also through consideration of the Muslim communities

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that have been present for ages in Western countries. The summons, generally speaking, is to avoid simplification, to think about these realities without fear, and not to consider them all as belonging to the same constellation of religious fundamentalism: Faced with disconcerting episodes of violent fundamentalism, our respect for true followers of Islam should lead us to avoid hateful generalisations, for authentic Islam and the proper reading of the Koran are opposed to every form of violence.󰀁󰀁

To the guests of a Roman refugee/asylum seekers’ shelter, the “Astalli Centre,” which he visited during the first months of his pontificate, in September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, shortly after his journey to Lampedusa, Francis said: Each one of you, dear friends, has a life story that speaks to us of the tragedies of war, of conflicts that are all too often linked to international politics. Yet, above all, every one of you bears a wealth of humanity and a religious sense, treasures to welcome rather than to fear. Many of you are Muslim or members of another religion. You come from various countries, from different situations. We mustn’t be afraid of differences! Brotherhood enables us to discover that they are riches, gifts for everyone! Let us live in brotherhood!󰀁󰀂

His statements solidify a conviction, indeed in opposition to those stances recalled in the previous paragraph: differences and religious pluralism within societies are not a threat, but rather a value, an opportunity, a chance, a richness. V. The Response of Christianity and Islam to Conflicts For the Pope, dialogue with non-Christian faiths, particularly with Islam, is neither “facile syncretism” nor “a diplomatic openness which says ‘yes’ to everything in order to avoid problems.”󰀁󰀃 Neither is it an end in itself. There is a precise purpose: it is the tool “to give rise to love where there is hatred, and forgiveness where there is offence, of never growing weary of imploring and tracing the ways of peace.”󰀁󰀄 The work for  Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀅󰀃.  Visit to the “Astalli Centre,” the Jesuit Refugee Service in Rome. Address of Holy Father Francis, Tuesday, 󰀁󰀀 September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/september/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀀󰀉󰀁󰀀_centro-astalli.html. 󰀁󰀃  Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, par. 󰀂󰀅󰀁. 󰀁󰀄  Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Georgia and Azerbaijan (󰀃󰀀 September – 󰀂 October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). Interreligious Meeting with the Sheikh and with the Representatives of 󰀁󰀁

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reconciliation and the commitment to decrease the number of “pieces” that make up that particular third world war Bergoglio denounced at the beginning of his pontificate are therefore the framework and the drive that should always be borne in mind in approaching Islam. This idea was tested by the case of the Central African Republic, devastated by a violent conflict with some religious implications. Other parts of this volume hint at it: the Pope chose to go there in order to open the first holy door of the Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy. In spite of the physical risk it implied, he firmly wanted the journey to take place, with a very significant moment during the visit to the Muslim quarter, which had just come through months of siege. Exposing himself to immediate danger like this on such a delicate frontier helped to kickstart the dialogue between the two communities and the peace process. Francis commented upon his decision in these terms: There, where God’s name has been misused to perpetrate injustice, I wanted to reaffirm, together with the Muslim community of the Central African Republic, that “those who claim to believe in God must also be men and women of peace” and consequently of mercy, for one may never kill in the name of God. Only a distorted ideological form of religion can think that justice is done in the name of the Almighty by deliberately slaughtering defenceless persons, as in the brutal terrorist attacks which occurred in recent months in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.󰀁󰀅

The fact that terrorist or violent groups constantly exploit God’s name in this third millennium and do not hesitate to attack innocent people and target places of worship and prayer is of deep concern to the Argentinian Pope. The appeals, summons, and calls to identify shared means to isolate and condemn violence in God’s name, especially with the Muslims, are continuous. More generally, peace is at the heart of Francis’s concerns. He is convinced that religions have a paramount responsibility and opportunity to bring about peace. During his journey to Azerbaijan, he stated: [Peace is] founded on mutual respect, encounter, and sharing, on the will to go beyond prejudices and past wrongs, on the rejection of the different religious communities of the Country. Address of the Holy Father. “Heydar Aliyev” Mosque – Baku, Sunday, October 󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/ en/travels/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/outside/documents/papa-francesco-georgia-azerbaijan-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.html. 󰀁󰀅  Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See for the Traditional Exchange of New Year’s Greetings, Regia Hall, Monday, 󰀁󰀁 January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/january/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀁󰀁󰀁_corpo-diplomatico.html.

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double standards and self-interests; a lasting peace, animated by the courage to overcome barriers, to eradicate poverty and injustice, to denounce and put an end to the proliferation of weapons and immoral profiteering on the backs of others. The blood of far too many people cries out to God from the earth, our common home (cf. Gen 󰀄:󰀁󰀀). Today, we are challenged to give a response that can no longer be put off: to build together a future of peace; now is not the time for violent or abrupt solutions, but rather an urgent moment to engage in patient processes of reconciliation.󰀁󰀆

The many scenarios of conflict, where terrorism plays a relevant role, drove Francis to participate in the yearly meeting of prayer for peace with the leaders of the great world religions in the “spirit of Assisi” organized by the Community of Sant’Egidio for the thirtieth anniversary of the first summoning, in 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀆, by John Paul II. On that occasion, the first Jesuit to become the Bishop of Rome insisted again on the need for religions to fight an extended battle against terrorism, weaving together the spiritual fabric of societies. His stance was more extensively expounded on later during his speech to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See in January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇: [Terrorism is] homicidal madness which misuses God’s name in order to disseminate death, in a play for domination and power. Hence I appeal to all religious authorities to join in reaffirming unequivocally that one can never kill in God’s name. Fundamentalist terrorism is the fruit of a profound spiritual poverty, and often is linked to significant social poverty. It can only be fully defeated with the joint contribution of religious and political leaders. The former are charged with transmitting those religious values which do not separate fear of God from love of neighbour. In this regard, I voice my firm conviction that every expression of religion is called to promote peace. I saw this clearly in the World Day of Prayer for Peace held in Assisi last September, during which the representatives of the different religions gathered to “give voice together to all those who suffer, to all those who have no voice and are not heard.”󰀁󰀇

Today, perhaps more than in the past, we understand how Assisi is the precious fruit of an entire season of interreligious dialogue. That dialogue, which began in the dark years of the Second World War and developed in the horror of war and the Shoah, brought believers closer, made them 󰀁󰀆

 Interreligious Meeting with the Sheikh in Baku (cf. n. 󰀁󰀄).  Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greetings, Regia Hall, Monday, 󰀉 January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/january/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀁󰀀󰀉_corpo-diplomatico.html. 󰀁󰀇

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meet and talk with each other in unprecedented ways and gave new drive to the common search for peace. After the Second Vatican Council, the 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀀s and 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀s witnessed a fruitful phase of ecumenical and interreligious relations, though in later years there were moments of tiredness and misunderstanding. Assisi was, therefore, the place where many paths of dialogue converged. It also stood as a point of arrival with regard to the Conciliar Declaration Nostra Aetate, as an example of creative reception of the Declaration. In an atmosphere of fraternity and prayer, different from that of theological controversies, the world prayer for peace effectively gave new drive to the commitment to dialogue and opened up a renewed season of solidarity among different peoples and cultures. Assisi was therefore the spring of a new and creative perspective in the field of dialogue among religions. This perspective continued over the years with similar meetings that took place mostly at a European level.󰀁󰀈 The dynamic has not been the object of sufficient study, but it has grown over the years in a string of meetings similar to the one in Assisi, organized yearly by the Community of Sant’Egidio, which tasked itself with collecting the legacy of 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀆, believing in its potential for peace building. Alberto Melloni wrote about it in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇;󰀁󰀉 the most pregnant remarks remain those of Piero Rossano, while Andrea Pacini and the Agnelli Foundation dedicated two volumes to interreligious dialogue in the spirit of Assisi, in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉 and 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁. More recently, Riccardo Burigana󰀂󰀀 and Paolo Fucili󰀂󰀁 have published texts on this topic in Italy. Melloni noted how this initiative of Assisi represents “a turning point in the attitude of contemporary Catholicism toward religions” and at the same time a turning point in how other non-Christian religions look at Christianity.󰀂󰀂 󰀁󰀈  An example in this respect are the International Meetings for Peace organized by the Community of Sant’Egidio, which take place in major Italian or European cities, and to which the popes have regularly sent a message, cf. Jean-Dominique Durand, Lo Spirito di Assisi: Discorsi e messaggi di Giovanni Paolo II alla Comunità di Sant’Egidio. Un contributo alla storia della pace (Milan: Leonardo International, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀄). 󰀁󰀉  Alberto Melloni, “Da Nostra Aetate ad Assisi 󰀈󰀆: Cornici e fatti di una recezione creativa del Concilio Vaticano II,” Convivium Assisiense 󰀉 (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇): 󰀆󰀃-󰀈󰀉. The author notes the opportunity of a historical reflection on the day of prayer in Assisi, which he believes is necessary and sensitive at the same time, due to the theological implications it entails. 󰀂󰀀  Riccardo Burigana, La pace di Assisi: 󰀂󰀇 ottobre 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀆: Il dialogo tra le religioni trent’anni dopo (Milan: Terra Santa, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). 󰀂󰀁  Paolo Fucili, Pace in nome di Dio: Lo spirito di Assisi tra storia e profezia (󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀆-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) (Todi: Tau editrice, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). 󰀂󰀂  Alberto Melloni, Le cinque perle di Giovanni Paolo II: I gesti di Wojtyła che hanno cambiato la storia (Milan: Mondadori, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁), 󰀅󰀁.

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VI. The Turning Point of Abu Dhabi These remarks, brought together by a consistent vision concerning the mystery of religious pluralism, read by Francis through the lens of the Conciliar Declaration Nostra Aetate and the spirit of the Council, which generated something more than an update with regard to interreligious dialogue, built an atmosphere of cooperation in tune with a number of Islamic circles around the world. This atmosphere enabled the development and signing of a historical and absolutely unprecedented joint document “on human fraternity. For world peace and living together,” signed by the Pope and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University of Cairo, Ahmed El-Tayeb, on February 󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.󰀂󰀃 I will synthesize the content of this document by illustrating some parts and then examine the conditions that made its signature possible and the scenarios it opens up. The Document is quite articulate, comprising forty-four paragraphs that can be divided – though there is no such indication in the text – into four parts, a foreword (three paragraphs), a section of “headings” (eleven paragraphs), a collection of shared statements and principles (twenty-five paragraphs), and a conclusion. The foreword explains that the gestation of the text took place through a series of “fraternal and open discussions” between the two leaders and – obviously – their delegates, and that the document is the fruit of “honest and serious thought” in order to become “a guide for future generations to advance a culture of mutual respect.” The Document therefore means to provide a sort of grammar to guide everyone, especially the youth, to encounter the other. It calls for cooperation and working together on specific themes and towards precise goals, with the assumption that “Faith leads a believer to see in the other a brother or sister to be supported and loved” and that fraternity among all human beings is a “great divine grace” not limited to one’s fellow believers. The range of themes it examines is extremely wide. It could not be otherwise, given the assumption announced in the foreword, which directly connects the transcendental fact of faith in God to a concrete and effective commitment in favor of one’s neighbor: “Believers are called to express this human fraternity by safeguarding creation and the 󰀂󰀃  Cf. “A Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together,” signed in Abu Dhabi, February 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉. In www.vatican.va. All the following quotes are from this document.

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entire universe and supporting all persons, especially the poorest and those most in need.” Echoing the incipit of the Conciliar Constitution Gaudium et Spes, the signatories then state that during the preparatory discussions “we shared the joys, sorrows and problems of our contemporary world.” The foreword is followed by a part I defined as “headings.” The signatories state that they do not speak only in their name or in the name of the institutions and communities they represent, but rather on behalf of a vast variety of persons, women and men, belonging to the categories included in the eleven paragraphs that make up this section. Each paragraph is introduced by the words “in the name of”: in the name of innocent human life that God has forbidden to kill; of the poor, the destitute and those most in need; of orphans, widows, refugees and those exiled; of peoples who have lost their security, peace, and the possibility of living together; of prisoners of war and those tortured; of all people of good will. The Document also speaks on behalf and in the name of high principles: of fraternity that unites all human beings “and renders them equal”; of freedom; of justice and mercy. It is “in the name of God and of everything stated thus far” that Al-Azhar al-Sharif and the Muslims of the East and West, together with the Catholic Church and the Catholics of the East and West, declare the adoption of a culture of dialogue as the path; mutual cooperation as the code of conduct; reciprocal understanding as the method and standard.

This is followed by a circumstantiated and varied series of denunciations of the pathologies afflicting our contemporary world. Among the causes of the “crisis of the modern world,” the first is “a desensitized human conscience, a distancing from religious values and a prevailing individualism accompanied by materialistic philosophies that deify the human person and introduce worldly and material values in place of supreme and transcendental principles.” The moral deterioration and weakening of responsibility contribute to “a general feeling of frustration, isolation and desperation leading many to fall either into a vortex of atheistic, agnostic or religious extremism, or into blind and fanatic extremism.” The consequences that are listed are tragic phenomena, such as war, widespread poverty: religious extremism, national extremism and also intolerance have produced in the world, be it in the East or West, what might be referred to as signs of a “third world war being fought piecemeal.” Major political crises, situations of injustice and lack of equitable

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distribution of natural resources – which only a rich minority benefit from, to the detriment of the majority of the peoples of the earth – have generated, and continue to generate, vast numbers of poor, infirm and deceased persons. This leads to catastrophic crises that various countries have fallen victim to despite their natural resources and the resourcefulness of young people which characterize these nations. In the face of such crises that result in the deaths of millions of children – wasted away from poverty and hunger – there is an unacceptable silence on the international level.

Then comes one of the key paragraphs of the Document, which sanctions the parting of Christianity and Islam from terrorism and from all forms of violence carried out in God’s name or in any way justified or tolerated by religious representatives. The concept is present in several statements, including the two that follow: Moreover, we resolutely declare that religions must never incite war, hateful attitudes, hostility and extremism, nor must they incite violence or the shedding of blood. These tragic realities are the consequence of a deviation from religious teachings. They result from a political manipulation of religions and from interpretations made by religious groups who, in the course of history, have taken advantage of the power of religious sentiment in the hearts of men and women in order to make them act in a way that has nothing to do with the truth of religion. This is done for the purpose of achieving objectives that are political, economic, worldly and short-sighted. Terrorism is deplorable and threatens the security of people, be they in the East or the West, the North or the South, and disseminates panic, terror and pessimism, but this is not due to religion, even when terrorists instrumentalize it. It is due, rather, to an accumulation of incorrect interpretations of religious texts and to policies linked to hunger, poverty, injustice, oppression and pride. This is why it is so necessary to stop supporting terrorist movements fuelled by financing, the provision of weapons and strategy, and by attempts to justify these movements even using the media. All these must be regarded as international crimes that threaten security and world peace. Such terrorism must be condemned in all its forms and expressions.

These are followed by an appeal for the end of all violence: We thus call upon all concerned to stop using religions to incite hatred, violence, extremism and blind fanaticism, and to refrain from using the name of God to justify acts of murder, exile, terrorism and oppression. We ask this on the basis of our common belief in God who did not create men and women to be killed or to fight one another, nor to be tortured or humiliated in their lives and circumstances. God, the Almighty, has no need to be defended by anyone and does not want His name to be used to terrorize people.

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The acknowledgement of the right to religious freedom by one of the most authoritative and listened to figures in the Islamic world and by the Primate of the Catholic Church is even more relevant. And it is followed immediately by a reading of the phenomenon of pluralism: the variety of cultures, faiths, and sensitivities that fill the world is not a chaos that needs to be reduced to unity by means of propaganda and proselytism, or to be homogenized to create safe societies. On the contrary, complexity is a value, “willed by God in his wisdom,” and the will to impose one religion, one culture, one “cultural way of life” are condemned: Freedom is a right of every person: each individual enjoys the freedom of belief, thought, expression and action. The pluralism and the diversity of religions, colour, sex, race and language are willed by God in His wisdom, through which He created human beings. This divine wisdom is the source from which the right to freedom of belief and the freedom to be different derives. Therefore, the fact that people are forced to adhere to a certain religion or culture must be rejected, as too the imposition of a cultural way of life that others do not accept.

After a paragraph devoted to the protection of places of worship (all of them: churches, mosques, temples), of the sacred places of all religions, so often the target of terrorist attacks, there is another truly surprising declaration, of historical consequence, regarding women’s rights: It is an essential requirement to recognize the right of women to education and employment, and to recognize their freedom to exercise their own political rights. Moreover, efforts must be made to free women from historical and social conditioning that runs contrary to the principles of their faith and dignity. It is also necessary to protect women from sexual exploitation and from being treated as merchandise or objects of pleasure or financial gain. Accordingly, an end must be brought to all those inhuman and vulgar practices that denigrate the dignity of women. Efforts must be made to modify those laws that prevent women from fully enjoying their rights.

With regard to the ways to prevent the Document from being limited to paper, from becoming a dead letter or being forgotten, the signatories demand and commit themselves to its dissemination in clearly identified areas: Al-Azhar and the Catholic Church ask that this Document become the object of research and reflection in all schools, universities and institutes of formation, thus helping to educate new generations to bring goodness and peace to others, and to be defenders everywhere of the rights of the oppressed and of the least of our brothers and sisters.

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It may not be possible to foresee the outcome and the development of the Document in the future, but its signing marks a turning point in the relations between the Catholic Church and Sunni Islam, and even more than that. Indeed, it plots a precise course for the continuation of these relations, and though it is not explicitly mentioned, it speaks directly to the trauma of September 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀁 and the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, that age-making event that seemingly characterized the beginning of the third millennium as marked by the clash of civilizations. Since then the Western world has demanded a radical and unambiguous declaration from the Islamic world concerning terrorism and violence, which now solemnly comes, in the framework of an event – the interreligious meeting in Abu Dhabi – held in a country in the Persian Gulf, at a short distance from the spiritual heart of Islam, the Black Stone of Mecca. In order to understand how this result was attained, it is necessary to focus on the relations between the two signatories. Together with the work of the delegations and organizers, an important role was played by the increasing personal contacts between the Grand Iman of Al-Azhar University of Cairo, Ahmed El-Tayeb, the highest Sunni authority, and Pope Francis. Their first meeting was in the Vatican on May 󰀂󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, ten years after the “Regensburg incident” of 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆, whose protagonist was Benedict XVI. “The encounter is the message,” said Francis at the end of their conversation, during which he had given the Imam, among other things, a copy of his Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si’. “The meeting in the Vatican between the two leaders was a spiritual conversation in friendship,” wrote Andrea Riccardi.󰀂󰀄 In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀 El-Tayeb had been appointed to the office of Grand Imam, the highest reference point for the Sunnis since the abolition of the Caliphate in 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀄 by Ataturk. He inherited a situation of tensions and controversies with the Vatican that had originated with the incident. However, facing the lacerating crisis within the Islamic world, with the harsh clash between Sunnis and Shiites and, within the former, between the various currents with different degrees of radicalism, he perceived the urgent need to reinforce a religious platform, critical toward the violence and fundamentalism of the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis, but nonetheless founded on tradition and the consensus of the Islamic community. His meeting with the Pope of Rome initially did not produce huge 󰀂󰀄

 Andrea Riccardi, “Il papa e l’imam Tayyib, un passo avanti nel dialogo spirituale,” Corriere della Sera, May 󰀂󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.

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ripples, but it did establish an atmosphere of friendliness, a ground for future encounters. In the time of terrorism and violence with religious motivations, the two shared a sense of urgency to develop true bonds and a sense of responsibility between religious worlds. This dialogue gave rise to criticism and controversies within the Catholic world, as well as in the Muslim. It is, however, fully part of a long process, which intensified in the twentieth century and was given reception and new drive by the Second Vatican Council. It is not by chance that one of the Council Fathers and a firm weaver of this dialogue from within the complex situation of a minority Church, Cardinal LéonÉtienne Duval, Archbishop of Algiers, told the Synod of the Bishops of 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀄: “We are men who meet, who mutually share their hopes, their aspirations, the graces they received from God, on a path that goes in the direction God is leading them to.”󰀂󰀅

󰀂󰀅  Remarks of Cardinal Duval at the Synod of the Bishops in 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀄, in Marco Impagliazzo, Duval d’Algeria: Una Chiesa tra Europa e mondo arabo, 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀆-󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀈 (Milan: Studium, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄), 󰀁󰀉󰀃.

The Pure Signifier of Power Remembering, Repeating and Working through the Significance of the Papacy and Pope Francis for Eastern Orthodoxy Brandon Gallaher For the signifier is a unit in its very uniqueness, being by nature symbol only of an absence. Which is why we cannot say of the purloined letter that, like other objects, it must be or not be in a particular place but that unlike them it will be and not be where it is, wherever it goes.󰀁 The greater the resistance, the more thoroughly remembering will be replaced by acting out (repetition).󰀂

I. Orthodox Ecclesial Repetition Compulsion and the Papacy One of the most mystifying elements of Eastern Orthodoxy for Catholics is the split attitude of many Orthodox (especially clerical officialdom) to the papacy and the pope. At one moment Orthodox primates are meeting with the pope in Jerusalem or Cuba, embracing him as a brother and acting like he and the Catholic Church are the closest of brethren while at the next, the same church of these same figures will utter some sort of antipapal slur, usually directed at another Orthodox Church or leader accusing them of being crypto-Catholic. What on earth is going on? Catholics would be forgiven for thinking the Orthodox were a bit mad in this often strange, 󰀁

 Jacques Lacan, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” [󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀆], trans. Jeffrey Mehlman in John P. Muller and William J. Richardson, The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, and Psychoanalytic Reading (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀈), 󰀂󰀉-󰀅󰀄, at 󰀃󰀉. 󰀂  Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through” [󰀁󰀉󰀁󰀄], in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings, trans. John Reddick (London: Penguin Books, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀃), 󰀃󰀁-󰀄󰀂, at 󰀃󰀇.

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self-destructive and repetitive ecclesial behavior, and they would not be entirely wrong. What is going on here, though, is indeed neurotic or compulsive behavior. However, it is something far more complex than mere prejudice or a perceived Eastern muddled-headedness. I want to argue that for many of the primatial Orthodox institutions such as the Phanar of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul and Danilov Monastery of the Moscow Patriarchate in Moscow (and here you will forgive me if I use generalization to bring across my basic point), the pope of the moment is almost always irrelevant. What matters for the Orthodox is that he is a representative or, better, an instantiation of the papacy as a concept or symbol quite apart from any actual facts of the matter. And so the actual individual, or even to a degree the office itself, the content or signified of the signifier of “papacy,” is not what is important in Orthodox relations to Catholicism but the raw signifier of “papacy” itself. For the Orthodox, the signifier of the papacy is a pure or moving signifier whose significance is determined not necessarily by the pope of the moment but by what the papacy at any given moment makes their own Orthodox primatial office signify to themselves unconsciously or their negative relations with other Orthodox rivals, leading (more often than not) to a constant cycle of ever-more bitter and sterile clashes between different hierarchs about power. In other words, the power of the “papacy” for Orthodoxy is a result of its constantly shifting function in the system of Orthodoxy itself. It is a movable pivot, with an ever-changing content, around which a shifting set of Orthodox relations revolve in a seemingly eternal return of the same with bishop attacking bishop and the laity suffering as a result. The signifier of the Papacy – adapting Jacques Lacan’s reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s “Purloined Letter” to interpret Sigmund Freud’s theory of “repetition compulsion” (Wiederholungszwang) – is always hiding in plain sight in Orthodox relations as it means everything and nothing for the Orthodox. When this or that Orthodox primate meets or reacts to Pope Francis they are always already meeting themselves or some possible vision of their own office, positive or negative whether they can see it or not. I will argue later that this is through a form of “projective identification” (Melanie Klein). Now it might be asked, why would this neurotic ecclesial behavior continue in a ceaseless loop?󰀃 In order to attempt to answer this question, 󰀃  I am grateful in the following paragraphs to the recent work of Adam A. J. DeVille who applies Freud’s ideas to the present crisis in the Catholic Church: “The Paralyzed Church,” found at https://www.catholicworldreport.com/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀆/󰀂󰀁/the-paralyzedchurch/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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I want to set out on a slightly experimental path drawing on resources from not only mainstream theological disciplines but psychoanalysis by making a tentative analogy between the psychoanalytic patient/analysand and the Church. This will hopefully serve as a heuristic aid by putting new concepts to work in examining this whole rather confusing area through beginning the process of understanding church behavior in terms of social psychology by tentatively extrapolating from an individual psychology to social (sc. ecclesial) analysis. In the last decades, there has been increasing interest in Catholic󰀄 and Orthodox󰀅 theological circles in putting theology into dialogue with psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. In recent years, in Greece and the UK, this has resulted in a series of conferences and workshops studying the intersections of Orthodoxy and psychotherapy (and especially, more particularly, psychoanalysis), most certainly in the area of pastoral theology, but, also more interestingly, in more traditional areas like dogmatics and spirituality. I want to build in this paper on this recent wave of research in pursuit of understanding difficult and often controversial church historical impasses using the resources of modern psychological disciplines.󰀆 In psychoanalysis, it is understood that what cannot be remembered, the unconscious repressed element, a trauma that has been undergone, will be acted out by the patient in certain repeated compulsive patterns of thought and action which derive their power from what cannot be accessed in any other way. The actions derived from the repressed 󰀄  Marcus Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma (London: SCM Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇); Tina Beattie, Theology after Postmodernity: Divining the Void – A Lacanian Reading of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃); Creston David, Marcus Pound, and Clayton Crockett, eds., Theology after Lacan: The Passion for the Real (Cambridge: James Clarke and co., 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅); and Carlos Domínguez-Morano, Belief after Freud: Religious Faith through the Crucible of Psychoanalysis, trans. Francisco Javier Montero and Verónica Polo Torok (London and New York: Routledge, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈). 󰀅  See Met. Hierotheos Vlachos, Orthodox Psychotherapy: The Science of the Fathers, trans. Esther Williams (Levadia, Greece: Birth of the Theotokos Monastery, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄); John T. Chirban, ed., Personhood: Orthodox Christianity and the Connection between Body, Mind, and Soul (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀆); Petru Cazacu, Orthodoxy and Psychoanalysis: Dirge or Polychronion to the Centuries-Old Tradition (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃); Vasileios Thermos, Thirst for Love: Encounters of Orthodox Theology and Psychological Science (Montreal: Alexander Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀); and id., Psychology in the Service of the Church: Theology and Psychology in Cooperation, ed. Bp. Maxim Vasiljević and the St. Herman Brotherhood (Alhambra, CA: St. Sebastian Orthodox Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). 󰀆  E.g. “Workshop: Psychoanalysis and Orthodox Theology,” “󰀃rd International Conference: National Hellenic Research Foundation: Science and Orthodoxy around the World,” November 󰀂󰀉 – December 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, found at https://project-sow.org/󰀃rd_Workshop [accessed July 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈].

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element in the psyche are an attempt to remember what cannot be accessed in the psyche. As Freud put it, “the patient does not remember anything at all of what he has forgotten and repressed, but rather acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory, but as an action; he repeats it, without of course being aware of the fact that he is repeating it.”󰀇 The analyst, then, helps the analysand or patient in the forum of treatment, using the method of transference, to gradually remember the events of the past and break the cycle of repeating the same neurotic compulsive thoughts and acts and move forward in his or her life. Quoting Freud once again: “The patient is unable to remember all that is repressed within him, especially perhaps its most essential elements, and thus fails to be convinced that the interpretation presented to him is the correct one. Instead he is driven to repeat the repressed matter as an experience in the present, instead of remembering it as something belonging to the past, which is what the physician would much rather see happen.”󰀈 But let us try to apply this psychotherapeutic wisdom ecclesially, tentatively comparing the patient to the Church.󰀉 For the Orthodox as a trans-national communion of Eastern Christian Churches, the memory which they cannot consciously face, what has long been repressed, is arguably the traumatic experience of the break from the West and the role of the papacy in that schism. For centuries they have rehearsed “pseudo-memories,”󰀁󰀀 reductionist stories of complex historical events, of the alleged abuses of the papacy from the excommunication of Patriarch Photius of Constantinople (called, “New Rome”) (󰀈󰀁󰀀-󰀈󰀉󰀁) by Pope Nicholas I of Rome (ca. 󰀈󰀀󰀀-󰀈󰀆󰀇) in 󰀈󰀆󰀃 (falsely bound up in remembrance with the filioque) and the Sack of Constantinople in 󰀁󰀂󰀀󰀄 in the Fourth Crusade (called by Pope Innocent III [󰀁󰀁󰀆󰀁-󰀁󰀂󰀁󰀆]) to the failed 󰀇

 Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through,” 󰀃󰀆.  Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” [󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀀], in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings, 󰀄󰀃-󰀁󰀀󰀂, at 󰀅󰀆. 󰀉  See DeVille “The Paralyzed Church.” Compare id., Everything Hidden Shall Be Revealed: Ridding the Church of Abuses of Sex and Power (Brooklyn, NY: Angelico Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉), 󰀂󰀁-󰀅󰀀 and see 󰀁󰀃󰀀-󰀁󰀃󰀃 (for discussion of theology and psychoanalysis). 󰀁󰀀  I am adapting this notion from DeVille who speaks of the Catholic Church’s “pseudo-memory” which has been used to justify a cult of the papacy and Vatican centralization since the 󰀁󰀉th century: “the last 󰀁󰀅󰀀 years the Church has essayed a particularly hazardous model of maximal centralization, which as we now realize is not only profoundly unhelpful, but also without serious historical or theological justification, or ecumenical appeal. It has done so largely as a reaction to an unconscious traumatic pseudo-memory of the French revolution and Napoleonic ravages in response to which, it was claimed by many nineteenth-century Catholics, a ‘sovereign’ pontiff was needed who would be untouchable by secular powers.” 󰀈

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reunion Council of Ferrara-Florence (󰀁󰀄󰀃󰀈-󰀁󰀄󰀄󰀅) when (it is claimed) the Orthodox were forced to submit to sundry “papist” heresies by ratifying a Papal Bull of Union in 󰀁󰀄󰀃󰀉 at Florence negotiated by Emperor John VIII Palaiologos (󰀁󰀃󰀉󰀂-󰀁󰀄󰀄󰀈) with Pope Eugene IV (󰀁󰀃󰀈󰀃-󰀁󰀄󰀄󰀇) in order to secure protection from the Ottomans at Florence leading to, it is said, as divine judgement, the Fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 󰀁󰀄󰀅󰀃 of which the Byzantine Statesman Loukas Notaras (󰀁󰀄󰀀󰀂-󰀁󰀄󰀅󰀃) was alleged to have said, “I would rather see a Turkish turban in the midst of the City (sc. Constantinople) than the Latin mitre.”󰀁󰀁 All of these pseudomemories of the perfidious Latins and their diabolical popes reflect, I want to suggest, inter-generational traumas from which the Orthodox have never healed preventing them from accessing the true reality of these events and their present relationship with Rome and the West. But instead of confronting these difficult and ultimately very messy truths, which would require acknowledging their own prejudices, culpability and the failure of their ancestors, the repressed reality comes out in the form of obsessive repetitive behaviors fixated on the papacy, which this study will briefly chronicle as case studies in the form of episcopal interactions. The psycho-drama of the Orthodox with Rome or, more precisely, the idea of Rome is being played out at a key moment in the history of Eastern Orthodoxy. The Orthodox world is presently undergoing an epochal transformation from a pre-modern Eastern Church to a modern Church in the West. This transformation involves a clash of visions between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Many in the Moscow Patriarchate see the West as corrupt and having fallen away from the truths of its own original Christian identity. This corruption, some in the Moscow Patriarchate contend, can be seen in Western attacks on traditional Christianity and morality through its 󰀁󰀁  For a selection of different (scholarly and popular) Orthodox perspectives on the papacy see the following: John Meyendorff, ed., The Primacy of Peter: Essays in Ecclesiology and the Early Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀂 [󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃]); Philip Sherrard, Church, Papacy, and Schism: A Theological Enquiry, 󰀃rd ed. (Limni: Denis Harvey, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉 [󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀈]); Aristeides Papadakis with John Meyendorff, The Christian East and the Rise of the Papacy: The Church AD 󰀁󰀀󰀇󰀁-󰀁󰀄󰀅󰀃 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀀); Alexey Young, The Rush to Embrace (Richfield Springs, NY: Nikodemos Orthodox Pub. Soc., 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀆); Michael Whelton, Popes and Patriarchs: An Orthodox Perspective on Roman Catholic Claims (Chesterton, IN: Conciliar Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆 [󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀈]); Two Paths: Papal Monarchy – Collegial: Rome’s Claims of Papal Supremacy in the Light of Orthodox Christian Teaching (Salisbury, MA: Regina Orthodox Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀁); and George Demacopoulos, The Invention of Peter: Apostolic Discourse and Papal Authority in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃).

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pervasive secularist and liberal humanist agenda promoting feminism, gender theory and homosexuality. Only Russia and its Church, as the protector of the traditional Christian identity of the East, can, it is alleged, lead a confused West back to its sense with its teaching of “Russkii mir” (Russian world).󰀁󰀂 The Ecumenical Patriarchate, by contrast, while considering itself to be the continuous protector and sacred chalice of Orthodox Christian tradition, sees itself in a critical but openly creative relationship with the West. It responds not in reaction but proactive engagement, meeting the modern secular West and affirming it where it can but departing from it where it is at odds with the traditional Christian proclamation. But it knows that it must respond creatively to changes the West has inaugurated, synthesizing an alternate Orthodox modernity on issues ranging from climate change and modern slavery to inter-religious dialogue and sexual diversity. In this clash of visions, which plays out as a clash of asserted primacies in and over Orthodoxy, the Old Rome with Pope Francis is a sort of perpetual silent participant – both as dialogue partner and as an Orthodox symbol of the ideal and the temptation of absolute primatial authority – in many of the struggles of the New (“Second”) Rome and the Third Rome. Patriarchs Bartholomew and Kirill look to Francis, as pope or primate, as a world figure and cultural shaper giving authority to the contrasting initiatives of their Churches and their self-perceived status. Three cases of the silent role the papacy plays in intra-Orthodox disputes are 󰀁) the controversy concerning the Catholic-Orthodox international dialogue document on primacy, the Ravenna Statement of 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇; 󰀂) the Holy and Great Council of Crete of June 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆; and 󰀃) the split of Moscow from Constantinople over Ukraine in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. 󰀁. Ravenna Statement We will first look at the Constantinople and Moscow split over the October 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 Ravenna Statement󰀁󰀃 on Primacy from the Joint International 󰀁󰀂  See Brandon Gallaher, “A Tale of Two Speeches: Secularism and Primacy in Contemporary Roman Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy,” in Primacy in the Church: The Office of Primate and the Authority of the Councils. Vol. 󰀂: Contemporary and Context Perspectives, ed. John Chryssavgis (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), 󰀈󰀀󰀇-󰀈󰀃󰀇. 󰀁󰀃  “Ecclesiological and Canonical Consequences of the Sacramental Nature of the Church: Ecclesial Communion, Conciliarity and Authority,” Ravenna, 󰀁󰀃 October 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 [Ravenna Statement], found at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/ chrstuni/ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇󰀁󰀀󰀁󰀃_documento-ravenna_en.html

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Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church.󰀁󰀄 This text affirmed three levels of ecclesial communion: local (as in a local metropolitan who is in communion with his bishops), regional (as in autocephalous or local Churches) and universal (as in primates like Rome and Constantinople). The Ravenna Statement, therefore, cautiously affirmed that primacy at a universal level was accepted by both East and West.󰀁󰀅 In the era of the undivided Church, this involved a canonical taxis in which Rome occupied the first place as protos amongst the patriarchs, “presiding in love” (in Ignatius of Antioch’s famous phrase [Ep. Romans, prologue]).󰀁󰀆 Likewise, it was agreed that this primacy was not merely one of honor but involved a detailed and active engagement of Rome with the other Churches, though Rome did not convene Ecumenical Councils and did not personally preside over them (though it was involved in their decision making).󰀁󰀇 Moreover, Ravenna also agreed that in both the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches primacy and synodality (which implies conciliarity) go together as the synod needs a president/primate and the president/primate needs a synod.󰀁󰀈 Thus there was agreement on the fact of primacy but not on the manner of its exercise or, for that matter, its scriptural and theological foundations.󰀁󰀉 The Ravenna Statement left the question of the role of the bishop of Rome in the communion of all the Churches to be studied in greater depth by future commissions.󰀂󰀀 The Moscow Patriarchate was not represented at the Ravenna meeting because of a dispute over the presence of representatives of the [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. For discussion see Kallistos Ware, “The Orthodox Church and the Primacy of the Pope: Are We Any Closer to a Solution?,” in Album Accademico 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈-󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉 Pontificio Istituto Orientale (Rome: n.p., 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉), 󰀄󰀃-󰀅󰀉. 󰀁󰀄  For different theological Orthodox responses to the possibility of Papal Primacy see Olivier Clément, You Are Peter: An Orthodox Theologian’s Reflection on the Exercise of Papal Primacy (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀃) and the curious unpublished little book (over 󰀂󰀅,󰀀󰀀󰀀 words) by the late Fr. Thomas Hopko, The Sun in the West: A Response to Pope John Paul’s Apostolic Letter The Light of the East (Orientale Lumen) (Manuscript Copy 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇). Also see the Ukrainian Catholic theologian and scholar Adam A. J. DeVille’s important volume: Orthodoxy and the Roman Papacy: Ut Unum Sint and the Prospects of East-West Unity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁). 󰀁󰀅  Ravenna Statement, §󰀄󰀃. 󰀁󰀆  Ibid., §󰀄󰀁. 󰀁󰀇  Ibid., §󰀄󰀂. 󰀁󰀈  Ibid., §§󰀄󰀁-󰀄󰀃. 󰀁󰀉  Ibid., §󰀄󰀃 and see Ware, “The Orthodox Church and the Primacy of the Pope,” 󰀅󰀃-󰀅󰀄. 󰀂󰀀  Ravenna Statement, §󰀄󰀅.

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Orthodox Churches of Estonia. This was in regard to whether they were autocephalous or autonomous and which See (Moscow or Constantinople) had the right to recognize their status and whether to recognize it in the first place (this is an oft repeated story, most recently in the rift over Ukraine between Constantinople and Moscow in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈). Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀆), then archbishop of Vienna, on orders from then Metropolitan (future Patriarch) Kirill (Gundaev) of Smolensk and Kaliningrad (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀆) (as head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department of External Church Relations), withdrew from the dialogue in protest at the presence of the Churches of Finland and of Estonia in their own right. Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀃󰀁) (Ecumenical Patriarchate), as the then Orthodox Chairman of the Joint Commission, proposed a solution that the protest of Moscow would be registered and representatives from Estonia would be willing to withdraw for the moment, but this was not accepted by Moscow. The Moscow Patriarchate, therefore, was not party and did not accept the Ravenna Statement. Subsequently, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church promulgated an official position paper on primacy in December 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃.󰀂󰀁 This position paper was based on the doctoral work at the Amsterdam Free University on the same subject (under Fr. Cyril [Hovorun] and Prof. Andrew Louth) by the lay theologian, Andrey Shishkov. Shishkov, who is the secretary of the Synodal Biblical and Theological Commission, was tasked by Alfeyev with drafting this document.󰀂󰀂 It has been explicated at length by Alfeyev on various occasions󰀂󰀃 and been responded to sharply by the then Metropolitan Elpidophoros (Lambriniadis)

󰀂󰀁

 “Pozitsiia Moskovskogo Patriarkhata po voprosu o Pervenstve vo Vselenskoi Tserkve,” adopted at a meeting of the Synod of December 󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, found at https:// mospat.ru/ru/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/󰀁󰀂/󰀂󰀆/news󰀉󰀆󰀃󰀄󰀄/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉] and “Position of the Moscow Patriarchate on the Problem of Primacy in the Universal Church,” December 󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 [Moscow Statement], found at https://mospat.ru/en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃/󰀁󰀂/󰀂󰀆/news󰀉󰀆󰀃󰀄󰀄/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀂󰀂  See Andrey Shishkov, “Einige Besonderheiten der Position der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche im panorthodoxen vorkonziliaren Prozess,” Una Sancta 󰀇󰀀, no. 󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅): 󰀁󰀁󰀉-󰀁󰀂󰀉 and “Church Autocephaly as Sovereignty: A Schmittian Approach,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 󰀆󰀀, no. 󰀃 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): 󰀃󰀆󰀉-󰀃󰀉󰀅. 󰀂󰀃  See Hilarion Alfeyev, “Presentation by Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, Chairman of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission, Rector of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius Postgraduate Institute,” March 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, found at https://mospat.ru/ en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/󰀀󰀃/󰀂󰀅/news󰀁󰀀󰀀󰀀󰀀󰀁/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉] and “Primacy and Synodality from an Orthodox Perspective,” November 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary, found at https://mospat.ru/en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/󰀁󰀁/󰀀󰀉/news󰀁󰀁󰀁󰀀󰀉󰀁/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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of Bursa (now Archbishop of America), a senior member of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.󰀂󰀄 In the International Orthodox-Catholic dialogue a breakthrough then happened subsequently in the Chieti Statement of September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.󰀂󰀅 At Chieti, for the first time, a common document of both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches agreed on the three levels of communion (local, regional and universal). On the universal level both Churches agreed that 󰀁) Rome exercised a primacy of honor in the ancient Church followed by Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem; and 󰀂) although in the West from the fourth century onwards the primacy of the see of Rome was understood with reference to Peter’s role as chief of the apostles, this was not so in the East, which had a different understanding of the prerogatives of Rome and did not see Rome as exercising direct canonical authority over the East but as being a court of last appeal for ecclesiastical disputes. Why this is such a breakthrough is that the Catholic Church has finally agreed (though this would need to be officially ratified by the pope) that the subsequent evolution in the second millennium of the papal office is something in no way necessitated by the teaching of the whole Church in the first millennium. This leaves open the possibility that the Roman Catholic teachings promulgated by the popes after the schism, including universal jurisdiction of the pope and infallibility, will not be the basis of any agreement for communion between the two Churches. In other words, there is now the (admittedly remote) possibility that much of the magisterium of the Catholic Church can be localized to its communion and not necessarily have to be accepted by the Orthodox in order to enter into communion with Rome. However the participation of the Russian Church in the Roman Catholic-Orthodox International Dialogue has been suspended since the Ukrainian Crisis of late 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 given its creation of a schism with Constantinople by breaking communion and refusing to participate in any meetings where Constantinople takes the Chair as the First See of Orthodoxy. 󰀂󰀄  Elpidophoros Lambriniadis, “First without Equals – A Response to the Text on Primacy of the Moscow Patriarchate,” January 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, found at http://www.omhksea. org/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/󰀀󰀁/first-without-equals-a-response-to-the-text-on-primacy-of-the-moscow-patriarchate/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉] (this text draws on the ideas of Zizioulas and has significant overlap with the work of the Greek-American theologian Fr. John Panteleimon Manoussakis who is said to have ghost written it). 󰀂󰀅  “Synodality and Primacy during the First Millennium: Towards a Common Understanding in Service to the Unity of the Church,” Chieti, 󰀂󰀁 September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 [Chieti Statement], found at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀉󰀂󰀁_sinodality-primacy_en.html [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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The Russian anti-Ravenna text on primacy of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 rejects any form of universal primacy other than one of honor (itself expressed in the order of the diptychs) but it is argued that this role (which the Ecumenical Patriarchate fulfils) is not invested by the canons on which the diptychs are based “with any powers on the church-wide scale”󰀂󰀆 but at best involves “Orthodox witness in the modern world” such as addressing the external world for the Orthodox, however, only if he is empowered to do so by the Local Autocephalous Churches.󰀂󰀇 To hold any other position falls into what the polemical literature calls “papism” (this is a favorite slur of Moscow).󰀂󰀈 The Russian text argues that each Autocephalous Local Church is supreme in power when it meets in council in the form of its primate and his Synod.󰀂󰀉 The text, more generally, is notable for its language of “power” (or in Schmittean language: sovereignty) when speaking of the ministry of the bishop as if the episcopal office was a sort of sacralized Russian governership. Indeed, the Moscow Statement of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃 is highly eccentric in the history of Orthodox theology in that it owes more to thinking about the power of nation states than it does to the notion of local Churches living in an ordered communion with a primate and a certain ecclesial taxis of order. It might be described, for the lack of a better term, as “autocephalite.” Some contemporary Russian theologians now even argue that the Orthodox Church is to be seen as a “republic of autocephalous churches” which are all co-equal with none having primacy over the others and with the power of exception (sovereignty in Carl Schmitt’s sense) lying with the local Church (and exercised within its canonical borders) not a Universal Primate (or even, it seems, a Universal Synod or Council given the Russian intransigence on the Council of Crete). Every primate, therefore, in this sort of “autocephalite” ecclesial thinking, is a little pope within the traditional canonical borders of his Church, albeit somewhat hemmed in by his own Synod. The accusations by Moscow that Constantinople is acting “papist” in exercising its primacy can be seen as a form of projection born out of jealousy which results in the creation of a crypto-papal ecclesiology by Moscow itself. This new Russian ecclesiology, focused as it is on Church sovereignty, is arguably not Orthodox at all but a thinly veiled sacralization of a Russian geo-political notion of state power,  Moscow Statement, §󰀁.󰀃.  Ibid., §󰀅. 󰀂󰀈  Ibid., §󰀁.󰀃. 󰀂󰀉  Ibid., §󰀁.󰀂. 󰀂󰀆 󰀂󰀇

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which argues that non-interference and state sovereignty are inviolable principles of international law, at least in reference to territories outside the former Soviet Union󰀃󰀀 (replace as needed with the “traditional” canonical borders of the Moscow Patriarchate which roughly still map on to the borders of the pre-󰀁󰀉󰀁󰀇 Russian Empire). What the Russian statement, therefore, is really aiming at is not the Roman Catholic claims to universal primacy or the actually existing popes and their concrete exercise of their authority but the Ecumenical Patriarchate who, with the Great Schism, is traditionally agreed to be next in order in the diptychs and is exercising the prerogatives of universal primacy. Thus, in downgrading universal primacy in the Church and making it virtually “toothless,” the Moscow Patriarchate aims to tie the hands of the Ecumenical Patriarch in his exercise of his ministry. In addition, the Russian text aims to give the Moscow Patriarchate’s Synod headed by the Patriarch of Moscow absolute quasi-papal power and, in particular, with the centralization of all power in the Patriarch’s office after 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉, the Patriarch of Moscow himself, Patriarch Kirill (Gundaev) (Patriarch since 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉). Thus, when Moscow talks about papal primacy, it is not talking about the actual papacy or the current holder of the office, Pope Francis, but its own power vis-a-vis Constantinople. It is projecting itself in an autocratic phantasy as Third Rome onto the person and offices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as Second Rome and the Pope of Rome as First Rome. Rome is merely a means to an end of Moscow’s own unconscious desire of repeatedly self-defining itself through power by negating its rival, Constantinople, in an endless cycle of territorial intra-Orthodox sparring by bishops where the Orthodox ceaselessly wound themselves. Moscow’s own internal sense of itself as universal authority (its own internal object) becomes split off and then is projected onto its rival of Constantinople and attributed to it as an external object which is said to be guilty of “papism.” It is unclear why Moscow as an institution is doing this but it may be that it wishes to thereby acquire Constantinople’s alleged power since the allegations of Constantinople being autocratic are simultaneous with Moscow’s attempt to gain more power for itself and its simultaneous disempowerment by the Russian state. The phantasy I am describing ecclesially is called “projective identification” or “projection” in psychoanalysis and was developed by the school of the Austrian-British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein (󰀁󰀈󰀈󰀂-󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀀). 󰀃󰀀

 See Ruth Deyermond, “The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty-first Century Russian Foreign Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 󰀆󰀈, no. 󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): 󰀉󰀅󰀇-󰀉󰀈󰀄.

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󰀂. Holy and Great Council of Crete of June 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 The second singular event that brings out all of these elements of Rome and the Papacy being a ghost in the machine of intra-Orthodox relations is the Holy and Great Council of Crete󰀃󰀁 held in Kolymbari (near Chania) on the Greek island of Crete from June 󰀁󰀉-󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆.󰀃󰀂 This Council was a Pan-Orthodox initiative for over a century and in active planning for 󰀅󰀅 years. It was envisioned by many of its early architects as the Orthodox response to Vatican II. The planning of the Council was driven in its early phase by the great Catholic-Orthodox pioneering ecumenist Patriarch Athenagoras (Spyrou) I (󰀁󰀈󰀈󰀆-󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀂) (Patriarch: 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀈-󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀂). In January 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀉, Pope (now Saint) John XXIII (󰀁󰀈󰀈󰀁-󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃) had announced that the Roman Catholic Church would hold an Ecumenical Council, the twenty-first Ecumenical Council in the Catholic reckoning (Vatican II: 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀂-󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅). This was to be an event allowing the winds of the Spirit to blow through the Church’s windows which were opened to the world. It was to be an event of renewal and ressourcement: a return to the Church’s roots. In 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀁, with the 󰀃󰀁  See Damaskinos Papandreou, ed., Towards the Great Council: Introductory Reports of the Interorthodox Commission in Preparation for the Next Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church (London: SPCK, 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀂); Stanley S. Harakas, Something Is Stirring in World Orthodoxy: An Introduction to the Forthcoming Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church (Minneapolis, MN: Light and Life Pub. Co., 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀈); Patrick Viscuso, A Quest for Reform of the Orthodox Church: The 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀃 Pan-Orthodox Congress, an Analysis and Translation of Its Acts and Decisions (Berkeley, CA: InterOrthodox Press, Patriarch Athenagoros Orthodox Institute, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆); George E. Matsoukas, ed., Orthodox Christianity at the Crossroad: A Great Council of the Church – When and Why (New York and Bloomington, IN: iUniverse Inc., 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉); Theodoros A. Meimaris, The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church & The Ecumenical Movement (Thessaloniki: Ant. Stamoulis Publications, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃); V. Ionită, Towards the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church: The Decisions of the Pan-Orthodox Meetings since 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀃 until 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉, trans. R. Rus, Studia Oecumenica Friburgensia 󰀆󰀂 (Basel: Reinhardt, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄); Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov v Rossii i za rubezhom 󰀁 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) (special issue on Council); Archimandrite Vasileios, Apropos of the Great Council of the Orthodox Church, trans. Elizabeth Theokritoff, Mt Athos Series 󰀂󰀆 (Montreal: Alexander Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆); John Chryssavgis, Toward the Holy and Great Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion, Faith Matters Series 󰀁 (New York: Dept. of Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical and Interfaith Relations, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆); Nathanael Symeonides, ed., Toward the Holy and Great Council: Decisions and Texts, Faith Matters Series 󰀂 (New York: Dept. of Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical and Interfaith Relations, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆); and Nathanael Symeonides, ed., Toward the Holy and Great Council: Theological Commentaries, Faith Matters Series 󰀃 (New York: Dept. of Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical and Interfaith Relations, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆). 󰀃󰀂  For further discussion see Brandon Gallaher, “The Orthodox Moment: The Holy and Great Council in Crete and Orthodoxy’s Encounter with the West: On Learning to Love the Church,” Sobornost 󰀃󰀉, no. 󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀂󰀆-󰀇󰀁.

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echo of the call for Vatican II, the goal of the Holy and Great Council was announced at the first of a series of Pan-Orthodox conferences held in Rhodes, Greece. In 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃, there was discussion on sending observers to Vatican II at the second Rhodes conference. It is not an accident, then, that in January 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀄, in the midst of Vatican II, the famous embrace after 󰀉󰀀󰀀 years between pope and patriarch took place on the Mount of Olives between Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras.󰀃󰀃 This meeting on the Mount of Olives is frequently commemorated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Often the embrace is seen in the light of either the Feast and icon of St. Peter and St. Paul or the Feast of St. Andrew, brother of St. Peter and legendary founder of Constantinople (as it was on this latter feast on November 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 with the visit of Cardinal Kurt Koch, President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, who was attending the Divine Liturgy at the Phanar).󰀃󰀄 Often on these feasts there are dramatic gestures emphasizing the communion between the two ancient Sees as “brother” patriarchs or “sister churches.” On the Feast of St. Peter and St. Paul on June 󰀂󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, Archbishop Job (Getcha) of Telmessos, the dynamic young Orthodox Chairman of the Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches, was representing the Ecumenical Patriarch at the Vatican when Pope Francis gave to the Ecumenical Patriarch a remarkable gift.󰀃󰀅 Since Pope (now Saint) Paul VI (󰀁󰀈󰀉󰀇-󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀈) there had been a reliquary of nine bone fragments said to be those of St. Peter kept in the private chapel of the papal apartments. These fragments were discovered during the excavations of the necropolis under St. Peter’s Basilica that began in the 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀀s. Pope Francis gifted the relics to Constantinople to much consternation from conservative Catholics (who claimed it was a sign that judgement had been passed on Rome)󰀃󰀆 󰀃󰀃  See John Chryssavgis, ed., Dialogue of Love: Breaking the Silence of Centuries (New York: Fordham University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄) and see for background: Yves Congar, After Nine Hundred Years: The Background of the Schism between the Eastern and Western Churches, trans. Paul Mailleux (New York: Fordham University Press, 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀉 [󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀄]). 󰀃󰀄  See “Thronal Feast at the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” found at https://www.ecupatria. org/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀁󰀂/󰀀󰀅/thronal-feast-at-the-ecumenical-patriarchate-󰀂/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀅  See Cindy Wooden, “Pope Francis Gives Relics of St Peter to Orthodox,” July 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://catholicherald.co.uk/news/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀇/󰀀󰀃/pope-francis-gives-relics-ofst-peter-to-orthodox/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉] and commentary at George Demacopoulos, “Pope Francis’s Relic Diplomacy,” found at https://publicorthodoxy.org/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀇/󰀁󰀀/ pope-franciss-relic-diplomacy/ [accessed July 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀆  Diana Montagna, “Pope Francis Gives Away Relics of St Peter to Orthodox Patriarch,” July 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/pope-francis-gives-awayrelics-of-st-peter [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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and to the great delight of the Orthodox,󰀃󰀇 as Pope Francis explained to Archbishop Job that he no longer used his private chapel and was in prayer inspired to give these to his “brother” Patriarch Bartholomew. Constantinople hailed the gift as a giant step towards concrete unity and a bold move from Rome to its “brother.” The emphasis is, then, on the fact that Constantinople is to Rome a brother patriarch, an ancient apostolic see, and the two Churches are twin sister Churches.󰀃󰀈 This setting up (mostly) by Constantinople of the two Churches side by side elevates Constantinople both in the eyes of its fellow Orthodox local Churches (like Moscow) that ceaselessly snipe at its status as “first among equals” but it also raises it in the estimation of the Turks who refuse to acknowledge the Ecumenical Patriarch’s universal status and simply see him as the spiritual leader of around 󰀃󰀀󰀀󰀀 Greeks in Turkey. The image of the Papacy as a sibling See (even as an elder brother or, sometimes, parent), for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, arguably forms a sort of “ego ideal” (Freud) by which the Ecumenical Patriarchate strives towards a future unitary sense of its self (ego) and its ideal despite the very real split between its identity as a persecuted and marginalized group in Turkey and world Orthodoxy and its knowledge of itself as the inheritor of the first-called See of St. Andrew and the “Great Church of Christ.” The Ecumenical Patriarchate as an institution is not the Catholic Church with its vast resources, wealth and power. But it feels that it must somehow stand up and act as a church with a similar status and maturity to its ideal so it takes on the mantle of equality with Rome. The early planning meetings for the Holy and Great Council of Crete were ambitious and reflected the desire of the court of the Phanar – of which the future Patriarch Bartholomew (Arhondonis) I (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀀; Patriarch from 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁) was a young member (indeed he studied at Rome’s Gregorian University’s Pontifical Oriental Institute from 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀁-󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃) – to modernize the Orthodox Church and respond to all its long-festering issues, similarly to Vatican II. However, from the time of the fall of communism in 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁 onwards and with the resurgence of Moscow and those Churches in its orbit, it became increasingly clear that the ambitions of the 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀀s and 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀s for the Orthodox Council were not to be. All but the least controversial issues were taken off the agenda by the time Crete rolled around in 󰀃󰀇  “For the First Time, a Pope Donates a Relic of St. Peter outside Rome,” July 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://www.archons.org/-/pope-relics-st-peter [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀃󰀈  See Will T. Cohen, The Concept of “Sister Churches” in Catholic-Orthodox Relations since Vatican II, Studia Oecumenica Friburgensia 󰀆󰀇 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆).

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󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆. This was to not be a modernizing council like Vatican II headed by a world- and epoch-defining Ecumenical (= Universal, All-embracing) Patriarch equal to any pope, if not his Eastern doppelgänger. Through the machinations of Moscow, which along with 󰀃 other Churches in its sphere boycotted it at the last moment, it ended up being an event that was most noteworthy because it actually took place. In the months leading up to the Council, Moscow and its proxies frequently used anti-papal rhetoric in their attacks on Constantinople and in ultimately (at the last moment) refusing to attend the Council. They claimed that Constantinople was setting itself up above all the other Churches as a new “Eastern Papacy.” They likewise asserted that each autocephalous Church had absolute independence and total power and rights over its own affairs, somewhat like … the standard Orthodox caricature of the Pope of Rome. At every point in the planning and possible outcomes of Crete, Moscow’s intention was to block the Ecumenical Patriarch’s zealous desire to appear to be a contemporary Francis. A recent example can be seen in Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’s April 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 meeting with Pope Francis on Lesbos, Greece to highlight the migrant crisis – though most of the international media ignored the Patriarch in favor of the Pope. What has become clear subsequently from reports coming out of Russia is that if it had attended Crete, Moscow intended to spend the time of the Council contesting Constantinople’s primacy (the fact that it claims Constantinople acts like an “Eastern Pope”) and if it did not go, then it intended to have the “meeting in Crete” seen as a parochial Church meeting called by a Patriarch who (as Moscow often reminds the world) has only 󰀃󰀀󰀀󰀀 parishioners in Istanbul. Thus we see that Constantinople and Moscow are – in a vicious unconscious circle of repetition – using the Roman papacy for the purposes of either elevating their status in a quasi-papal manner by association (what we have referred to as the mechanism of “ego ideal”) or attacking the rival as attempting to be a false Eastern Pope over other Orthodox primates while simultaneously asserting a power in their own Church that is absolute and very much resembles the very papal authority they often attack (which we have argued is a form of “projective identification”). 󰀃. Moscow Patriarchate Ukraine Schism The third example of how the ghost of Roman papacy haunts the Orthodox house is the case of clashes between Constantinople and Moscow in

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Ukraine during 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉.󰀃󰀉 During 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, after many years of deliberation, Constantinople decided to exercise its primatial rights as first among equals, by establishing an independent Church in Ukraine, which it has long regarded as its traditional canonical territory. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁, there had been three main Orthodox ecclesiastical bodies in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, a super-autonomous church under the Church of Russia, led up until now by Metropolitan Onufriy (Berezovsky) (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀄); the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kievan Patriarchate under “Patriarch” Philaret (Denysenko) (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀉) until December 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈; and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church led by Metropolitan Makariy (Maletych) (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀄) until December 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈. The first group was, until recently, regarded almost universally as the only canonical Orthodox Church body in Ukraine and the other two were regarded (especially loudly by the first) as uncanonical and schismatic, and their leaders were deposed by the first group on largely trumped-up charges. However, this effectively left millions of Ukrainians stewing in an uncanonical soup outside of sacramental communion with the rest of the Orthodox Church. The Moscow Patriarchate refused to solve the schism in any other way than by the two other Churches entering into complete submission to itself and its Russian head. For the schismatic Ukrainian (strongly nationalist) Churches, this was impossible, especially after the seizure of Crimea by Russia in February-March 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 and the beginning of the proxy war between Russia and Ukraine in Donbass in Eastern Ukraine which started in April 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. After thirty years of Ukrainian Church lobbying of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, following nearly a century of failed attempts to found an independent Ukrainian Church,󰀄󰀀 as well as pleas from the Ukrainian parliament and president, in October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its head Patriarch Bartholomew made the decision to assert its ancient role as Mother Church of Ukraine and establish a unified Church 󰀃󰀉

 See Peter Anderson “The Ukraine-Russia Crisis Tests the Authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch,” Letter #󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉: Ukraine, Thursday, January 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://insidethevatican.com/news/newsflash/letter-󰀄-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉-ukraine/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; Alya Ahandra, “Old Wine in New Bottles: How Bad Habits Derailed Ukrainian Church Unification – Interview with Cyril Hovorun,” found at https://risu.org.ua/en/ index/monitoring/society_digest/󰀇󰀄󰀁󰀁󰀇/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; and “Ecumenical Patriarchate Responds to Moscow’s Attacks, Challenge to Primacy,” found at https://www. tovima.gr/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀂/󰀂󰀅/international/ecumenical-patriarchate-responds-to-moscowsattacks-challenge-to-primacy/?fbclid=IwAR󰀃ufwPaV󰀈cxYeZnYErdzBzrX󰀁ivPmg󰀆jXm󰀇Ff NHgMZ󰀅ptWYhAS-dZseBHg [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀀  Nicholas E. Denysenko, The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈).

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in Ukraine. It did this from a combination of genuine pastoral solicitude (seeing the suffering of millions) and the collapse of all hope in being able to work with its rival the Moscow Patriarchate for solutions to a host of problems facing Orthodoxy today. The first steps in this process involved Constantinople nominating exarchs or representative legate bishops to represent the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine; abolishing a 󰀁󰀆󰀈󰀆 tomos that was issued to the then Moscow Metropolis by the Ecumenical Patriarchate allowing it to nominate and consecrate the Metropolitan or ruling bishop of Kiev who rules over Ukraine (it was asserted that its terms were not kept by Moscow); and taking in the two schismatic Churches under its omophor and declaring them canonical along with all their hierarchs and clergy (this has proved a stumbling block subsequently for other local Orthodox Churches in the recognition of the new Church in Ukraine: its schismatic origins). An all-Ukrainian Church Sobor of all three Churches was then held on December 󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 at which a new primate – Epifaniy I (Dumenko) of Kiev and All Ukraine, a protégé of the deposed Kievan Patriarch Philaret (Denysenko) – was elected to great controversy. On January 󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, the new united Church (“Orthodox Church of Ukraine”) was given a tomos of autocephaly at the Phanar in Istanbul by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. As of the summer of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, no local Orthodox Church has recognized the new Ukrainian Church, although no Church has gone as far as Moscow in reviling Constantinople. Needless to say, all this high Church politicking has been rather messy indeed. But what does this have to do with Rome and the papacy? Upon hearing that Constantinople had acted thus in establishing a new Ukrainian Church on its “traditional” (since the 󰀁󰀇th century) canonical territory, the Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate broke communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, forbidding its clerics from concelebration with Constantinople and its laity on pain of ecclesiastical punishment from receiving sacraments from Ecumenical Patriarchate Churches. Furthermore, all laity from the Ecumenical Patriarchate are forbidden from communicating in any of “Moscow’s” sacraments. Needless to say, especially in diaspora parishes where laity regularly go back and forth between Churches of different jurisdictions, this fiat from above has proved pastorally disastrous and requires Moscow priests to interrogate parishioners at the Chalice as to whether they “belong” to the Ecumenical Patriarchate or not and assumes certain baptisms and chrismations are Moscow sacraments while others are Ecumenical Patriarchate sacraments. Its ecclesiological and sacramental basis finds its foundation not in classic

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Orthodox teaching but in a Soviet notion of the Church as an Empire with communicants being its citizens. The claim is that Constantinople is teaching a new (but old!) heresy of being a papacy standing above other Churches: One’s appropriation of powers to reverse court judgements and other decisions of other Local Orthodox Churches is only one of the manifestations of a new false teaching proclaimed today by the Church of Constantinople and ascribing to the Patriarch of Constantinople the right of “the first without equals” (primus sine paribus) with a universal jurisdiction.󰀄󰀁

Constantinople is acting, the allegation is hurled by Moscow, as an Eastern Pope, that is, it is schismatic in making its decision to create a unified Church in Ukraine just like (it is claimed) Rome did 󰀁󰀀󰀀󰀀 years ago in asserting itself over the other patriarchates. Indeed, this manufacturing of heresies of which it is alleged Constantinople is guilty in order to justify Moscow’s schism based on a territorial dispute has become something of an industry on websites bankrolled by the Russian state and its associated oligarchs.󰀄󰀂 Here is Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) of Volokolamsk, the present head of the Department of External Church Relations, on the matter: Nearly a thousand years ago, the ungrounded claims of one of the Primates to the sole right to power in the Church already led to a large-scale schism. Now this dangerous path has been taken by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. And already now we have to ascertain with bitterness the existence of a division that does not allow speaking of the 󰀃󰀀󰀀-million-strong community of the Orthodox Christians as one whole. The Patriarchate of Constantinople, having recognized schismatics and entered into communion with them has itself departed into schism.󰀄󰀃

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Metropolitan Hilarion claimed, with his move to create a new Church in Ukraine on Russian canonical 󰀄󰀁  “Statement by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the Encroachment of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on the Canonical Territory of the Russian Church,” found at https://mospat.ru/en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀁󰀀/󰀁󰀅/news󰀁󰀆󰀅󰀂󰀆󰀃 [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉] (the “first without equals” phrase is from a speech of Archbishop Elpidophoros Lambriniadis, see n. 󰀂󰀄). 󰀄󰀂  Caucasian hermit hieromonk Constantine, “Do We Really Agree to ‘St. Bartholomew’s Night’?,” found at https://spzh.news/en/zashhita-very/󰀆󰀃󰀁󰀂󰀄-neuzheli-mysoglashajemsya-na-varfolomejevskuju-nochy [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀃  “Metropolitan Hilarion: Constantinople Is No Longer the Leader of the World Orthodoxy,” found at https://mospat.ru/en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀁󰀀/󰀂󰀂/news󰀁󰀆󰀅󰀆󰀂󰀃/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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territory, breaking of the canons and retreating into heresy, has forfeited his role as first among equals among Orthodox hierarchs, leaving Orthodoxy with no universal primate whatsoever. This is because “at least half” of Orthodox Christians – which it is alleged exist in the Moscow Patriarchate – no longer recognize his authority. The great numbers of Moscow, therefore, trump any tired declaration of tradition by Constantinople, effectively downgrading Constantinople’s quasi-papal status in order to tacitly elevate Moscow itself: The Patriarch of Constantinople has lost his self-declared primacy in universal Orthodoxy, we can no longer recognize him as the first in the family of Orthodox Churches, and he can no longer speak in the name of all Orthodoxy, as he did previously. Patriarch Bartholomew can no longer declare himself “the leader of the 󰀃󰀀󰀀 million Orthodox on the planet,” since at least half of the Orthodox do not recognize him.󰀄󰀄

These anti-papal slurs by Moscow of Constantinople, its projection of the memory of the “bad papacy” onto Constantinople all the while propping up its own quasi-papal status, are deeply ironic, as we shall see later, as Met. Hilarion Alfeyev of Moscow had visited Rome and Pope Francis in the spring of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 to seek the Vatican’s support on Ukraine, that is, Moscow sought the help of the Roman papacy in its battle against the so-called “Eastern pope.” Moreover, as the Russian state works in close cooperation with its Church, it is thought that President Vladimir Putin on a July 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 visit to Pope Francis was lobbying him on the church situation in Ukraine as Francis has already recognized the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine.󰀄󰀅 Thus, we see that the actual pope and papacy is often beside the point of the pope that exists in the mind of institutional Orthodoxy in the ceaseless attack and counterattack concerning the neurotic unconscious construct of the papacy. II. Constantinople-Rome But how does Constantinople view Francis and why? Constantinople’s views on Francis and Bartholomew could not be more similar, as 󰀄󰀄  “Mitropolit Ilarion: Konstantinopol’skii Patriarkh utratil svoe pervenstvo vo Vselenskom Pravoslavii,” found at https://mospat.ru/ru/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀁/󰀂󰀆/news󰀁󰀆󰀉󰀅󰀂󰀁/ [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀅  Courtney Grogan, “Putin Visits Pope Francis on July 󰀄th,” July 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/putin-visits-pope-francis-on-july-󰀄th-󰀄󰀂󰀁󰀁󰀅 [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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can be seen in their close cooperation in the area of the environmental crisis and more recently, on peace in the Middle East and modern slavery. This alliance, however, is not just because the Ecumenical Patriarch sees its own positions in Pope Francis, but because Constantinople sees itself as the ancient brother and equal to Rome, although this status is not acknowledged by Turkey. It therefore heavily emphasizes all these common initiatives because they emphasize and elevate its status worldwide and in the face of world Orthodoxy. Rome forms part of Constantinople’s ego ideal (Freud). This elevation and close cooperation with Rome are seen very strongly in Laudato Si’.󰀄󰀆 For most observers of Pope Francis’s May 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 encyclical on the environment, Laudato Si’, one of the more surprising aspects is the central role the Eastern Orthodox Church played in its composition. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the “Green Patriarch,” is acknowledged at the beginning of the encyclical after the pope’s predecessors as a pioneer in environmental issues and a central inspiration (§§󰀇-󰀉). Moreover, at the press conference for the Encyclical on June 󰀁󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 a statement was read by the renowned Orthodox theologian Metropolitan John (Zizioulas), and the then outgoing and long-time leader of the Patriarch’s dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church.󰀄󰀇 Indeed, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, although not involved in the actual drafting, was involved as a consultant providing the Vatican with extensive and sustained communication of information and ideas on spiritual ecology. The major figure here was the eminent Orthodox theologian Archdeacon John Chryssavgis (b. 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀈) (a close confidant of Zizioulas and former doctoral student of the well-known Orthodox theologian Metropolitan Kallistos [Ware] of Diokleia [b. 󰀁󰀉󰀃󰀄]), who has published extensively on environmental issues. Chryssavgis has edited the many speeches and writings of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew on this theme and related social issues in a series of publications (including one cited in the Encyclical) from Fordham University Press through Fordham’s leading Orthodox Christian Studies Center.󰀄󰀈 It is not an 󰀄󰀆  Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home, found at http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_ 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀅󰀂󰀄_enciclica-laudato-si.html [accessed July 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀇  “Press Conference – Interventions,” found at http://www.justpax.va/content/ giustiziaepace/en/speciale-laudato-si/conferenza-stampa.html [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀄󰀈  See Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew [Archontonis], In the World, Yet Not of the World: Social and Global Initiatives of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, ed. John Chryssavgis (New York: Fordham University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀) and On Earth as in Heaven:

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accident that one of the leading Jesuit universities in America is at the forefront of themes close to Pope Francis’s heart: ecumenism, Orthodoxy and the environment. A common ecological vision pervades all the writings and declarations of Patriarch Bartholomew as well as in the writings of Zizioulas and Chryssavgis. Many common themes from this vision reappear in Laudato Si’ albeit couched in Latin Christian and Catholic terms, especially an awareness of the sinfulness of our actions towards creation: “environmental sin,” a crime against the natural world in polluting it and wounding it by our treating it as a mere resource to be plundered, degrading its integrity by changing the climate. Thus, the sorts of issues with which Pope Francis cooperates with Bartholomew are dear to his liberal Catholic heart. Ironically, these are less at the foreground of Orthodox concerns over time. Pope Francis is noticeably less enthusiastic about traditional Orthodoxy, as we know from an aside at one of his audiences in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 where he mentioned his desire to have a fixed date of Easter and that he had raised this with Moscow and Constantinople. He then briefly dismissed Mt Athos (by alluding to Orthodox monasteries), viewed by many Orthodox as a sort of symbol of traditional Orthodox spirituality, and the Old Calendar it upholds.󰀄󰀉 In other words, Francis’s priorities in encounter with the Orthodox (e.g. modern slavery) seem little different from those on which he would cooperate with Lutherans. Unlike Pope Benedict XVI, drenched as he was in the Fathers, and Pope John Paul II, a Slav inspired by Orthodox theology, Pope Francis seems to view the Orthodox through liberal Catholic spectacles. III. Moscow-Rome The relationship of Rome and Pope Francis with Moscow is more ambivalent than that with Constantinople. Up until the Cuba Meeting of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill on February 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, there had been continuous pressure on Patriarch Kirill from the Kremlin to meet with Pope Francis in order that the West might look more favorably on Ecological Vision and Initiatives of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, ed. John Chryssavgis (New York: Fordham University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂). 󰀄󰀉  Ester Palma, “La Chiesa potrebbe stabilire una data fissa per la Pasqua,” June 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, found at https://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/󰀁󰀅_giugno_󰀁󰀂/chiesa-potrebbestabilire-data-fissa-la-pasqua-e󰀆d󰀂󰀂d󰀀c-󰀁󰀁󰀁a-󰀁󰀁e󰀅-b󰀀󰀉a-󰀉f󰀉a󰀀󰀅󰀈e󰀆󰀀󰀅󰀇.shtml?refresh_ce-cp [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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Russia and relent somewhat on its sanctions, as well as support Russian intervention in Syria (encouraging “peace” and protecting Christians in the Middle East). Moscow (both the Patriarch and Putin himself, as we see with Putin’s visits to Mt Athos in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅 and 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) wishes to appear as the true Orthodox world leader. This is the story behind the Cuba Meeting and other meetings where Moscow sought Rome’s support on Ukraine in the spring of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 through Alfeyev. In around 󰀁󰀅󰀁󰀅, the Monk Filofei of Pskov (d. ca. 󰀁󰀅󰀄󰀂) wrote Grand Duke Vasily III of Moscow (󰀁󰀄󰀇󰀉-󰀁󰀅󰀃󰀃) calling him to the high office of Emperor (Tsar) of the Third and Final Rome. The first two Romes, Filofei argued, had fallen due to a combination of corruption and heresy (Constantinople having capitulated to Rome at Florence), but from now until the Second Coming all Christian kingdoms “have merged into one”: “Two Romes have fallen. The third stands [firm]. And there will not be a fourth. No one will replace your Christian tsardom.”󰀅󰀀 Moscow wishes to be seen, following Filofei, as the Third and Final Rome. The February 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 meeting between Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow in a Havana airport meeting room and their Joint Declaration (largely drafted by the Russians)󰀅󰀁 must be seen as an attempt by Moscow to elevate its own status as Third Rome over the Second New Rome of Constantinople and using old (Catholic) Rome as a means to an end. This seems a strange place to begin an analysis of the Joint Declaration. However, the meeting cannot be properly understood without an awareness of the theory of “Third Rome” that forms a part of the “Russian world” (= Russkii Mir) ideology mentioned at the beginning of our study and promoted for the last decade or more by Church and state in Russia.󰀅󰀂 Indeed, the Joint Declaration itself reads quite easily as a sort of 󰀅󰀀  “Filofei’s Concept of the ‘Third Rome’,” in Medieval Russia: A Source Book, 󰀈󰀅󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀀, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀁), 󰀂󰀅󰀉-󰀂󰀆󰀁. 󰀅󰀁  “Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia,” found at http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/february/documents/ papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆󰀀󰀂󰀁󰀂_dichiarazione-comune-kirill.html [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀅󰀂  See Nicholas Denysenko, “Fractured Orthodoxy in Ukraine and Politics: The Impact of Patriarch Kyrill’s ‘Russian World’,” Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 󰀅󰀄, nos. 󰀁-󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃): 󰀃󰀃-󰀆󰀈; Sergei Chapnin, “A Church of Empire: Why the Russian Church Chose to Bless Empire,” First Things, November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, found at https://www. firstthings.com/article/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/󰀁󰀁/a-church-of-empire [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; and Moritz Pieper, “Russkiy Mir: The Geopolitics of Russian Compatriots Abroad,” Geopolitics, 󰀁-󰀂󰀄, see summary of criticism on “Russian world” at 󰀄, published online May 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, found at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/󰀁󰀀.󰀁󰀀󰀈󰀀/󰀁󰀄󰀆󰀅󰀀󰀀󰀄󰀅.󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈.󰀁󰀄󰀆󰀅󰀀󰀄󰀇?needAccess= true [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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tacit summary of all the major points of the Russian world ideology from the uniqueness of Russia as a Christian civilization and its miraculous rebirth to the necessity of saving “the Christian soul of Europe.” The “Russian world” ideology is a form of civilizational nationalism with a markedly Messianic character that includes a full-scale critique of human rights as well as active collaboration with the far right.󰀅󰀃 It was developed by Patriarch Kirill and President Putin in numerous speeches and Church-state initiatives since shortly before Kirill’s election as Patriarch in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉. It sees “Russia” as a common civilization with a unified language, religion and culture whose borders go far beyond the Russian Federation. “Russia” includes not only the Russian Federation, but Ukraine and Belarus, and sometimes even Moldova and Kazakhstan. Kirill thus described himself in his Havana press remarks as the Patriarch of “All Russia” which he said meant “historical [read ‘greater’] Russia.” Since the Moscow Patriarchate and its leader Patriarch Kirill is the canonical Church of historical Russia and is the bearer of its eternal Orthodox values, Kirill, rather than Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople (Second Rome), is said to more properly be the leader of all  See Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄); Kara Fox and Valentina Di Donato, “In Italy’s City of Love, Global Far-right Groups Join Forces under a ‘Pro-family’ Umbrella,” CNN, March 󰀃󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://edition.cnn.com/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀃/󰀃󰀁/europe/verona-world-congress-of-families-intl/index.html [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; ead., “The European Culture Wars,” ZOiS Spotlight, April 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/ zois-spotlight/the-european-culture-wars/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; Mark Silk, “The Other Russian Collusion Story,” Religion News Service, March 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://religionnews.com/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀃/󰀂󰀅/the-other-russian-collusion-story/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; Paul Glader, “Are American Evangelicals Using Russia to Fight Their Culture War?,” Religion Unplugged, March 󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, found at https://religionunplugged.com/news/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀃/󰀂󰀈/ are-american-evangelicals-using-russia-to-fight-their-culture-war [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir (Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈); Christopher Stroop, “Between Trump and Putin: The Right-Wing International, a Crisis of Democracy, and the Future of the European Union,” Political Research Associates, May 󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, found at http://www.politicalresearch. org/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/󰀀󰀅/󰀁󰀁/between-trump-and-putin-the-right-wing-international-a-crisis-of-democracy-and-the-future-of-the-european-union/#sthash.yabTSawE.cvjvDDWy.dpbs [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; Christopher Stroop, “Pence Meets with One of Putin’s Top Clerics: Strange Bedfellows at BEGEA’s World Summit in Defense of Persecuted Christians,” Religion Dispatches, May 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, found at http://religiondispatches.org/pencemeets-with-one-of-putins-top-clerics-strange-bedfellows-at-bgaes-world-summit-indefense-of-persecuted-christians/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; and Casey Michel, “The Rise of the ‘Traditionalist International’: How the American Right Learned to Love Moscow in the Era of Trump,” Right Wing Watch, March 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, found at http://www.rightwingwatch.org/report/the-rise-of-the-traditionalist-international-how-the-american-rightlearned-to-love-moscow-in-the-era-of-trump/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀅󰀃

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Orthodox peoples. Thus not Bartholomew but, he, Kirill, should be the negotiator of union with the First Rome, reaching out together to the lost West. Here dialogue with Rome is simply the vehicle for Moscow’s projection of itself as the true Orthodox New Third Rome and its triumph over the decayed Second Rome that has time and again given in to the various heresies of the West. We see at work here, as I argued earlier, a form of splitting or projective identification with Moscow projecting onto Constantinople as an external object its own negative internal object of “bad papacy” while through its close relations with Francis as an external object bolstering its own sense of itself as the Orthodox “good papacy.” The “Russian world” is seen as a unique, holistic and providential Christian civilization that has undergone an “unprecedented renewal of Christian faith” after decades of official atheism, with thousands of Churches being built, hundreds of monasteries and theological institutions set up and countless charitable initiatives and social developments at work (see Joint Declaration, §󰀁󰀄). Its Eastern Orthodox values, knowledge and experience of the “first millennium of Christianity” (§󰀄) give the Russian world a singular – and, it is suggested, divinely ordained – position of undistorted Christian witness in the contemporary world dominated by the radical secularization of Western Europe. As Russia is the last remaining Orthodox Christian civilization, it has a God-given Messianic role to fight terrorism (see §󰀁󰀁), protect Christian victims of violence in the Middle East and North Africa (see §§󰀈-󰀁󰀁) and to create peace, bring justice and do everything one can to avoid a “new world war” (see §󰀁󰀁). Here one is reminded of the character of Ivan Shatov, a former atheist who has turned from the delusions of his leftist politics to a fervent belief in Russia and Orthodoxy, in Dostoyevsky’s Demons (󰀁󰀈󰀇󰀁-󰀂): “I believe in Russia. I believe in the Greek Orthodox Church. I – I believe in the body of Christ – I believe that the second coming will take place in Russia.”󰀅󰀄 Yet a lasting peace cannot be found in secularism but the “common values” (see §󰀁󰀁) of Orthodox Christianity. Sadly, Europe has lost touch with its Christian “roots,” its “soul,” “shaped by two thousand years of Christian tradition” (§󰀁󰀆) and so it must be saved. This has led the West to marginalize religion by putting “restrictions” on “religious freedom […] the right to witness to one’s convictions and to live in conformity  Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Devils, trans. David Magarshack (New York: Penguin, 󰀁󰀉󰀁), 󰀂󰀅󰀉. 󰀅󰀄

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with them” (§󰀁󰀅). Above all, the family, which is the “natural centre of human life and society” (§󰀁󰀉), is being attacked by a crisis wrought by secularization leading to the “banishment from public conscience” of the “distinct vocation of man and woman in marriage” (§󰀂󰀀) through gay unions being considered on par with heterosexual marriage. The loss of the natural heterosexual family quickly ushers in contraception (§󰀁󰀉), abortion (§󰀂󰀁), euthanasia and the “manipulation of human life” (§󰀂󰀁) (= IVF, IUI, ICSI, surrogacy, etc.). The Russian world is said to be bonded together by a common language (Russian), a common faith with common values (Russian Orthodoxy), a common canonical Church (the Moscow Patriarchate) with a common Patriarch (Patriarch Kirill of Moscow) that works in “symphony” with a common leader or “czar” (Putin – called such by his inner circle). Thus, in this ethnophyletist ideology, the division of Russia from Ukraine is quite unnatural (hence the present spiritual and political crisis of the Russian Federation and the Moscow Patriarchate given its clash with Ukraine). Indeed, the Russian world is often symbolized by the medieval “Rus’” of St. Vladimir of Kiev (󰀁󰀀th century). The break between the two nations, the Joint Declaration claims, is not due to any external Russian aggression but fratricidal “hostility in Ukraine” (§󰀂󰀆: nothing is said about the annexation of Crimea in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 or the proxy war in Donbass in Eastern Ukraine). This hostility includes not respecting the fact that Ukraine is the rightful canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate (§󰀂󰀇), the existence of “ecclesial communities” of Greek Catholics from the old, now-rejected method of “uniatism” (§󰀂󰀅) and the forbidding of their political involvement as at the Maidan (§󰀂󰀆). This last section famously was wounding to Ukrainian Greek Catholics who felt completely unsupported by Pope Francis and the Vatican, once again sacrificed on the altar of the Vatican’s Ostpolitik.󰀅󰀅 Thus the “we” of the Declaration could quite easily just refer solely to the Russian and not the Catholic Church. It is as if Moscow had absorbed the identity of Rome and spoke for it as an Eastern Papacy. There are, it is true, elements in the Declaration which cannot be found in the reigning Church-state ideology of Russia and which are hallmarks of Pope Francis’s concerns and, ironically, the sorts of issues about which he engages with Constantinople (e.g. concern for the poor [§󰀁󰀇]). The 󰀅󰀅  “Collection of Statements Re Meeting of Francis and Kirill,” found at https:// www.sheptytskyinstitute.ca/collection-of-statements-re-meeting-of-francis-and-kirill/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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question then becomes, why would the Vatican and Pope Francis sign a document that, while it in no way contradicts its official teaching, seems to reflect one Church more than the other? Indeed, the Vatican under Pope Francis has tended to quite consciously move away from a “culture wars” fixation and (rather unsuccessfully given the controversies surrounding Amoris Laetitia [󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆] and the debates in early 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 revolving around homosexuality, an alleged “Lavender Mafia” and the Vatican). One possibility is that Pope Francis was “played” by Patriarch Kirill and his assistant Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev). In this narrative, the Vatican was so desperate for a real achievement in dialogue after years of being turned away by Moscow or simply being told the relationship was merely “strategic” that it ended up signing a statement that was more for the benefit of Moscow than for itself. The Havana Meeting between Francis and Kirill was the culmination of a whole series of high-level conferences, meetings and collaborations between the Russian and Roman Catholic Churches on the challenge of secularism started during the pontificate of Benedict XVI, with notable ones held in Vienna (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆), Moscow (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇)󰀅󰀆 and, in the spring of 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀, the “Days of Russian Culture and Spirituality in the Vatican” (reflecting Gundaev’s then fairly new Russkii Mir initiative).󰀅󰀇 Most recently, Francis loaned the relics of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker (enshrined in Bari) for a trip to Russia where millions of the faithful venerated them. In turn, beginning in November 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 at the Vatican there was an exhibition of famous Russian works of art from the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow, from icons to abstract paintings, which Francis visited officially. This was a response to the loan from the Vatican of Catholic masterpieces of religious art to the Tretyakov Gallery in late 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆-early 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇.󰀅󰀈 Based on this friendly bilateral dialogue that began roughly after 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅 and Benedict XVI’s election, not unsurprisingly as it wished to score points, the Moscow Patriarchate even claimed (without any supporting 󰀅󰀆  “Final Document of the International Scientific Conference on Christianity, Culture and Moral Values,” found at http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=documents& div=󰀁󰀁󰀁 [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. I am grateful to Prof. John Haldane (St. Andrews) for providing me information about some of these initial meetings. 󰀅󰀇  With a symposium between the Churches entitled “Orthodox and Catholics in Europe Today: The Christian Roots and Common Cultural Patrimony of East and West.” See “No Future for Europe without Return to Christian Roots, Says Cardinal Kasper,” found at http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/no-future-for-europe-without-return-to-christian-roots-says-cardinal-kasper/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀅󰀈  “Pope of Rome Visits Exhibition of Russian Art Masterpieces in Vatican,” found at http://www.patriarchia.ru/en/db/text/󰀅󰀃󰀁󰀅󰀂󰀁󰀅.html [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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evidence) that Ratzinger supported its critical stance on Pussy Riot.󰀅󰀉 This came after Met. Hilarion gave a speech in Rome to the Roman Catholic Synod of Bishops in October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂 at their invitation. Here he repeated his call over the years for an alliance of the Russian Church and the Roman Catholic Church against the Christianophobia of “militant secularism and atheism”󰀆󰀀 (this rhetoric has notably softened towards Catholics since Francis became pope). Yet in all these meetings with Rome there is a concern from Moscow that they will be branded as heretics by consorting with a body (the Catholic Church) that many in Russia still see as “heretical.” Indeed, after Cuba, Kirill was widely reviled in Russia as consorting with the enemy. More recently, in May 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, leading up to the move of Constantinople to establish a Church in Ukraine and the break in communion between Moscow and Constantinople, Met. Hilarion Alfeyev went to meet with Pope Francis during their recent cultural exchange. He clearly wished to get Rome’s support – or at least promise of non-intervention – in its Ukrainian clash with Constantinople and its desire for Rome and Francis to muzzle its Greek Catholic Church, which has been loudly but cautiously supportive of a new unified Orthodox Church in Ukraine under Constantinople and which Met. Hilarion routinely attacks even before Latin Catholic audiences. The pope said at his meeting with Met. Hilarion that he would not intervene in Moscow Patriarchate affairs: I want to confirm most of all in front of you dear brother and before you all that the Catholic Church will never allow an attitude of division to be born on its own. We will never allow it. I do not want it. In Moscow, in Russia, there is only one Patriarchate, yours. We will not have another.

He continued The Catholic Church, the Catholic Churches, should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, not even in 󰀅󰀉  “Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk Meets with Pope Benedict XVI,” found at http://www.mospat.ru/en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂/󰀁󰀀/󰀁󰀇/news󰀇󰀃󰀁󰀇󰀅/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; “Pope Backs Orthodox Church against Pussy Riot Desecration,” found at https://www.lastampa.it/ vatican-insider/en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂/󰀁󰀀/󰀁󰀇/news/pope-backs-orthodox-Church-against-pussy-riotdesecration-󰀁.󰀃󰀆󰀃󰀆󰀉󰀉󰀆󰀄 [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]; and Michael Day, “Russian Church Was Right to Condemn Pussy Riot, says Pope,” found at http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/europe/russian-Church-was-right-to-condemn-pussy-riot-says-pope-󰀈󰀂󰀁󰀅󰀇󰀆󰀅. html [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀆󰀀  “Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk Addresses the Synod of Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church [on October 󰀁󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂],” 󰀁󰀇.󰀁󰀀.󰀁󰀂, found at http://www.mospat. ru/en/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂/󰀁󰀀/󰀁󰀇/news󰀇󰀃󰀁󰀅󰀇/ [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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political matters. This is my position and the position of the Holy See today. Those who meddle do not obey the Holy See.󰀆󰀁

Kirill’s meeting with Francis in Cuba in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, then, and indeed all of Moscow’s subsequent meetings and joint initiatives with Rome and Francis, actually comes from a sense of needing (and we have argued this can be seen as a form of projection) to elevate his own position in the Orthodox world as the true supreme universal primate/pope of Orthodoxy as well as a fear (which proved prescient) of losing his canonical hold over Ukraine. He has long been fearful that he would lose his Church in Ukraine, and Gundaev took the risk that the relationship with Francis would help prevent this catastrophe through instrumentalizing the relationship with the pope who is widely respected in the corridors of power throughout the world. The Declaration in Havana, therefore, can be seen as a calculated risk by the Moscow Patriarchate. Gundaev staked all the imperial visions of his primacy as Third Rome on a window to the West through the First Rome, which also might assist Russia with mitigating the international sanctions against it and the Moscow Patriarchate’s role to elevate itself above all others in the Orthodox Church. It seems likely that Francis and the Vatican, knowing that Kirill wished for their aid and was fearful of his future and the future of Russia, therefore gave him such a wide leeway in order to more easily justify this relationship back at home where some call the pope a “Catholic heretic.” Moscow can still continue to make bold symbolic claims of uniqueness, from being Third Rome to Russia being “God’s new people, enlightened by His Holy Spirit” (Russian Primary Chronicle, 󰀁󰀂th century), but these will be just so many words. The Vatican is not naïve, at least to a degree. Despite Francis’s broad liberal gestures (“Who am I to judge?” despite his many conservative statements on homosexuality in the priesthood), the two Churches share a common moral vision, a fear of increasing secularization, a heart for the suffering of Christians in the Middle East and a real acknowledgement (often hidden due to zealots) by Moscow of the Roman Catholic Church as the Christian body closest to Orthodoxy. Furthermore, forces in the Vatican and the conservative wing of the Roman Catholic Church see the Orthodox as a privileged ecumenical interlocutor not only because it is one of the “two lungs” through which the Church can breathe properly (using John 󰀆󰀁  James Roberts, “Francis Rules out ‘Interference’ in the Affairs of the Orthodox,” https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/󰀉󰀁󰀇󰀀/francis-rules-out-interference-in-the-affairs-ofthe-orthodox [accessed July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉].

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Paul II’s favorite image from the Russian poet and playwright and Catholic convert, Vyacheslav Ivanov [󰀁󰀈󰀆󰀆-󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀅]) but also because it is seen as having avoided the worst assaults of modernization in liturgy and Christian ethics. The hope is that at the end of the day, Moscow, as the largest Orthodox Church, is now bound to an ecumenical process that it cannot withdraw from without real pain. The true short-term prize, on the way to reunion, will be a pontifical visit to Russia, which the Russian press constantly insists is in the offing. IV. Conclusion: Towards a Healing of Memory We have argued that for the Orthodox, the relationship between Orthodoxy and the Papacy is a moving or pure signifier functioning independently from the facts of history or often even actual relationships with concrete popes such as Pope Francis. The figure of Rome and its world-defining papacy haunts intra-Orthodox relations and individuation both positively, in that Rome and dynamic figures like Pope Francis are seen as an ego ideal for Orthodox primates wishing to make their mark on history and assert themselves over other primates, and negatively, as the nadir of authoritarianism which is to be utterly avoided, which we have described using the theory of projective identification. What is clear here is that Rome and the various historical popes matter less than the function they play symbolically in signification in unconscious repetition of intra-Orthodox polemic and identity formation. Orthodoxy on a primatial level (and even in a different way at the level of the bishop in his individual diocese) is neurotic in its unconscious and self-destructive repetition compulsion seen in its endless cycle of selfdefinition by negation of the “papal” Other. It cannot face up to, cannot remember with peace and equanimity, its past so its long time twisted and repressed memories of its break with the West and the Papacy come out in compulsive ecclesial behaviors including various primates elevating themselves as little popes or attacking others as false Eastern popes. Let me suggest that should Roman Catholic thinkers reconsider Catholic Ostpolitik as regards Orthodoxy, there needs to be a frank acknowledgement by the Vatican that when the Orthodox meet with them or with individual popes like Francis, there is always another papal ghost in the room who mediates any and every Orthodox encounter with the West. Part of solid ecumenical outreach and reflection on its basis is acknowledging that our ecclesial counterparts have often radically

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different narratives and signification chains than our own. Moreover, as has been said repeatedly, there needs to be a mutual healing of memory. Only through acknowledging these truths can true encounter begin to take place. This can open up the possibility in Orthodoxy that a neurotic ecclesial cycle might eventually be broken through an encounter with both itself and the real papacy past and present.

It Is Better to Build Bridges Than to Build Walls Pope Francis on Peace and War Johan Verstraeten Pope Francis’s approach to peace and war is not based on abstract ethical reasoning, nor on a top-down application of rigid principles. Being averse to “mere generalities that challenge no one” (EG 󰀁󰀈󰀂), he exhorts the people of God to “enter[ing] fully into the fabric of society, sharing the life of all” (EG 󰀂󰀆󰀉).󰀁 His thinking is practical and starts from the presupposition that faith is transformative: “an authentic faith – which is never comfortable or completely personal – always implies a deep desire to change the world….” (EG 󰀁󰀈󰀃). Peacebuilding is one of the concrete expressions of this transformative approach, and like any other of its expressions, it requires discernment. Francis has clearly articulated its meaning in his address to the Community of La Civiltà Cattolica: This is the time of discernment in the Church and in the World. Discernment is always realized in the presence of the Lord, looking at the signs, listening to things that happen, the feelings of the people who know the humble way of the daily stubbornness, and especially the poor. But we need to penetrate ambiguity, we need to enter in there, as the Lord Jesus did assuming our flesh.󰀂

From Francis’s perspective, discerning with an open mind what ought to be done in order to let God’s future emerge in concrete circumstances is much more important than proclaiming general truths and inflexible principles. 󰀁  In what follows I refer to the apostolic exhortation Evangelii Gaudium: The Joy of the Gospel (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃) as EG and to Laudato Si’. Encyclical Letter on Care for our Common Home (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅) as LS, each time followed by the paragraph number. 󰀂  Pope Francis, “Discourse to the Community of La Civiltà Cattolica,” La Civiltà Cattolica (February 󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), available at https://www.laciviltacattolica.it/articulo/discourse-of-the-holy-father-francis-to-the-community-of-la-civilta-cattolica. Another interesting address about discernment is To Have Courage and Prophetic Audacity? Dialogue of Pope Francis with the Jesuits Gathered in the 󰀃󰀆th General Congregation (October 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), https://jesuits.org/Assets/Publications/File/GC󰀃󰀆-Dialogue_of_Pope_Francis_ english.pdf.

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Pope Francis’s transformational approach presupposes, moreover, a “real and sincere closeness” with people, especially poor people and migrants. This entails, according to Cardinal Kasper, a real “paradigm shift in method.”󰀃 With regards to peacebuilding it means that it does not start from a neutral or outsider perspective, but from a genuine concern for people, letting oneself be touched by the victims of conflicts and the encounter with those whose action can have an impact on conflict transformation. The aim of Francis’s peace praxeology is, moreover, the fearless realization of the magis, the greater good in the perspective of God. As Father Antonio Spadaro said during the conference, Francis does not want to re-write history, but to move it forward. He is convinced that it is precisely in the real world with all its ambiguities, that something new and better can always emerge. I. “The Spirit of God Has Filled the Universe with Possibilities” (LS 󰀈󰀀): Reality, Time and Conflict Francis’s firm conviction that peace is possible is grounded in his dynamic and mystic interpretation of reality. In his thinking reality is not mere facticity or something static, nor a matter of realpolitik. It is a complex process of change, in which God moves the world forward towards new possibilities. Francis’s articulation of this is crystal clear in Evangelii Gaudium, more precisely, in the paragraphs on the principle that “time has priority over space.” This principle obliges everyone who in involved in action for peace to abandon the fixed “spaces of power and self-assertion” in which people, groups and states are imprisoned (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀃). It obliges individuals and groups to leave their comfort zones, and to tear down the mental walls that narrow their understanding of events (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀂). Such mental walls include sticking to fixed images of the “enemy,” being paralyzed by fear, the refusal of cultural differences, distrusting migrants, etc. Francis believes that “we are always more effective when we generate processes rather than holding on positions of power” (LS 󰀁󰀇󰀈). The consequence is that peace cannot be a sort of static tranquillitas ordinis, nor an anxious protection of the status quo. Peace is dynamic and requires a courageous engagement in a process of  Walter Cardinal Kasper, “Open House: How Pope Francis Sees the Church,” Commonweal 󰀁󰀄󰀂, no. 󰀇 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅): 󰀅. 󰀃

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change, in which one makes “links in a constantly expanding chain” (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀃). Francis articulates this more concretely with reference to the possibility of transforming conflicts. His device “unity prevails over conflict” (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀆-󰀂󰀃󰀀) does not mean that conflicts should be avoided. Neither does he want people to “remain trapped” in conflict.󰀄 On the contrary, conflict must be taken seriously, it must “be faced,” “resolved,” and above all “transformed” into “a link in the chain of a new process” (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀇). That means that it is necessary to go “beyond the surface of the conflict” and to see those who participate in it “in their deepest dignity” (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀈). The recognition of the humanity of the other, even of the person who is perceived as an “enemy,” is a conditio sine qua non for peace. The purpose of the transformation of conflict is not uniformity, because that would be an imposition upon people without recognition of their diversity. The purpose is to achieve a “life-giving unity,” which is a unity that does not destroy particularity and individuality, and which can also be described as “reconciled diversity” (EG 󰀂󰀃󰀀). In order to clarify what this means, Pope Francis refers to the metaphor of the polyhedron, which is the image of a situation “in which all parts converge, while each of them preserves its distinctiveness” (EG 󰀂󰀃󰀆). The realization of this complex unity is, as Scannone explains, the result of a dialectics of the polar opposites, which moves conflict towards a “higher plane and preserves what is valid and useful on both sides” (EG 󰀂󰀂󰀈). Francis’s dialectics of the polar opposites is influenced by Guardini’s “Der Gegensatz: Versuche zur einer Philosophie des Lebendig-Konkreten” and according to Scannone it is also comparable with Enrique Dussel’s anadialectics and Aquinas’ analogy (affirmation, negation, eminence).󰀅 II. A Spiritual Underpinning Pope Francis’s belief in the very possibility of peace as a life-giving complex unity is grounded in a profound spiritual intuition, more precisely in a strong confidence in God’s active presence and redemptive power: “In the heart of this world, the Lord of life, who loves us so much, 󰀄  Juan Carlos Scannone, “Violence socio-politique, communauté chrétienne et libération,” Transversalités 󰀁󰀄󰀇 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀇󰀇. 󰀅  Ibid., 󰀇󰀈.

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is always present. He does not abandon us, he does not leave us alone, for he has united himself definitively to our earth, and his love constantly impels us to find new ways forward” (LS 󰀂󰀄󰀅). God does not act as a sort of other-worldly deus ex machina, but, as Erik Borgman explains, via his presence in the world “working via a mysterious interconnection.” He acts via an interconnection in which all the components “protect, nourish, complete, restore, make more dynamic, and open new possibilities,” doing so “in their diversity and multicolored character.”󰀆 The power of God is the capability to integrate. In Laudato Si’ Pope Francis articulates this as follows: “Everything is related, and we human beings are united as brothers and sisters on a wonderful pilgrimage, woven together by the love God has for each of his creatures and which also unites us in fond affection with brother sun, sister moon, brother river and mother earth” (LS 󰀉󰀂). Indeed, as the Catechism states “God operates in his creation via the interdependence of all creatures…. Creatures exist only in dependence on each other, to complete each other, in the service of each other.”󰀇 It is through God’s presence and action in the emergent reality, that a breakthrough of the good and thus of peace is possible,󰀈 because God is as Basil the Great wrote, “goodness without measure” (LS 󰀇󰀇). In Laudato Si’ this mystic-theological idea of God, who weaves together all that exists through his love, is not only the condition for the possibility of an effective peacebuilding, but it also constitutes an obligation to interpret reality in a holistic perspective and consequently the obligation to overcome fragmentation and disconnection: “the subdivision of knowledge risks to become irrelevant when it loses its sense of the whole, when it does not pay attention to the ‘relationships between things’, when it disregards the wider horizon” (LS 󰀁󰀁󰀀). For peacebuilding and peace research this means that “peace, justice and the preservation of creation” are to be interpreted as “three absolutely interrelated themes which cannot be separated and treated individually without once again falling into reductionism” (LS 󰀉󰀂). This sort of integrated thinking is, according to Francis, not possible without inner peace: “inner peace is closely related to care for ecology and for the common good.” It is “reflected in a balanced lifestyle together with a capacity for wonder which takes us to a deeper understanding of life.” In 󰀆  Erik Borgman, “Deelnemen aan het goede: De contemplatieve politiek van de encycliek Laudato Si’,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 󰀅󰀆 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): 󰀂󰀀󰀉 [Participating in the Good: The Contemplative Politics of the Encyclical Laudato Si’]. 󰀇  Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄), par. 󰀃󰀄󰀀. Quoted in LS 󰀈󰀆. 󰀈  Borgman, “Deelnemen aan het goede,” 󰀂󰀁󰀀.

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other words: peace requires that one contemplates “the Creator who lives among us and surrounds us, whose presence must not be contrived but found, uncovered” (LS 󰀂󰀂󰀅 / EG 󰀇󰀁). III. Peace, the Migrants and the Necessity of a Contemplative Gaze Francis’s peace ethic is also underpinned by a spirituality of opening the human heart to the suffering of others. In Laudato Si’ he invites his readers to integrate “the suffering of crucified people into our own suffering.” It is from this profound spiritual attitude that a sense of solidarity and commitment to act emerges: “Our goal is not to amass information or to satisfy curiosity, but rather to become painfully aware to dare to turn what is happening to the world into our personal suffering and thus to discover what each of us can do about it” (LS 󰀁󰀉). Without such a fundamental openness to the suffering of others and what happens in the world, our culture becomes dominated by a general “globalization of indifference” which is a real threat to peace, because of its “disinterest and lack of engagement, which only helps to prolong situations of injustice and grave social imbalance,” and which causes conflicts, violence and insecurity.󰀉 The alternative is, as he wrote in his message for the World Day of Peace 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, globalizing fraternity. Fraternity and solidarity are a foundation and pathway of peace and a prerequisite for fighting poverty.󰀁󰀀 Pope Francis’s emphasis on the negative consequences of indifference, is particularly strong in his commitment to migrants and refugees. In his homily at Lampedusa he explains that indifference is caused by our materialism and patterns of consumerism: The culture of comfort, which makes us think of ourselves, makes us insensitive to the cries of other people, makes us live in soap bubbles which, however lovely, are insubstantial; they offer a fleeting and empty illusion which results in indifference to others; indeed, it even leads to the globalization of indifference.󰀁󰀁 󰀉  Message of His Holiness Pope Francis for the Celebration of the 󰀄󰀉th World Day of Peace: “Overcome Indifference and Win Peace”, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/ en/messages/peace/documents [accessed November 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈]. 󰀁󰀀  See also Francis’s Message for World Peace Day 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄. 󰀁󰀁  Pope Francis, Homily, Arena sports camp, Salina Quarter, Lampedusa July 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃, as quoted in Jorge E. Castillo Guerra, “A Church without Boundaries: A New Ecclesial Identity Emerging from a Mission of Welcome: Reflections on the Social Magisterium of Pope Francis as Related to Migration,” Journal of Catholic Social Thought 󰀁󰀄, no. 󰀁 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀅󰀁.

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The point is that this indifference not only dehumanizes migrants and refugees, but makes us all “anonymous persons,” “unnamed,” “leaders without names and without faces.”󰀁󰀂 Pope Francis’s Message for the Celebration of the 󰀅󰀁st World Day of Peace (January 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈) is explicitly devoted to the migrants as “men and women in search of peace.”󰀁󰀃 In this text he exhorts Christians to encounter migrants with a “contemplative gaze.” This gaze enables them to see that all “belong to one family, migrants as well as the local populations that welcome them,” that all have “the same right to enjoy the goods of the earth,” and that all have the same universal destination. In Francis’s perspective migrants are not a threat to peace, but a source of “enrichment for the life of the nations that receive them.” In the same peace message he proposes four actions for the creation of a culture of encounter (cultura de encuentro)󰀁󰀄 with migrants and refugees: welcoming, protecting, promoting them, for example by “ensuring access to all levels of education for children and young people,” and integrating them with the guarantee of full participation in the life of the society that welcomes them. He even proposes two “Global Compacts” for regular migration, and for refugees. IV. Dialogue with Enemies Another aspect of Francis’s peace theology is a detail with huge consequences: if peace is a process in which new possibilities emerge, we must enter into dialogue with all who can contribute to it: not only other Christians, or members of other religions, or scientists (EG 󰀂󰀃󰀈-󰀂󰀅󰀈), but also “people who can be considered dubious on account of their errors” (EG 󰀂󰀃󰀆). With these words Francis implicitly reconfirms the distinctions made by Pope John XXIII, in Pacem in Terris, more precisely the distinction between persons “who retain in every case” their “dignity as a person,” and “the [condemnable] philosophies to which they sometimes adhere,”󰀁󰀅 as well as the distinction between “false philosophical teachings” and 󰀁󰀂  For another interpretation of Francis’s address in Lampedusa see: Anna Rowlands, “After Lesvos and Lampedusa: The European ‘Crisis’ and Its Challenge to Catholic Social Thought,” Journal of Catholic Social Thought 󰀁󰀄, no. 󰀁 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀆󰀃-󰀈󰀅. 󰀁󰀃  Message of His Holiness Pope Francis for the Celebration of the 󰀅󰀁st World Day of Peace, January 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/peace/documents [accessed November 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈]. 󰀁󰀄  Juan Carlos Scannone, “Pope Francis and the Theology of the People,” Theological Studies 󰀇󰀇, no. 󰀁 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆): 󰀁󰀁󰀈-󰀁󰀃󰀅. 󰀁󰀅  John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, 󰀁󰀅󰀈.

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“movements which can play a role in the peace process, even if these movements owe their origin and inspiration to these false tenets.” These important distinctions allowed Pope John to welcome people whom many of his contemporaries considered enemies of the Church, such as the family members of Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Union, who were warmly received in the Vatican. That friendly encounter created one of the conditions for the solution of the Cuba crisis.󰀁󰀆 In the same way Pope Francis invites peace builders to include in the process all those who can be of use and whose thinking and acting “contains elements that are positive and deserving of approval.”󰀁󰀇 Both for Pope John and Pope Francis, a hand extended to so-called enemies is more fruitful than a condemnation. To say it with his own words: it is more important to concentrate on what we have in common than on what divides us. Have the courage to say: it is “easier to build bridges than to build walls.”󰀁󰀈 V. Other Components of Francis’s Peace Vision: Non-violence, Accompanying the Poor on Their Way to Liberation and Building Bridges A clear example of his unambiguous option for nonviolence can be found in his Message for the Celebration of the Fiftieth World Day of Peace (January 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), in which he states that “to be true followers of Jesus today (…) includes embracing his teaching about non-violence.” Like Thomas Merton and Pope Benedict XVI he emphasizes that nonviolence is not merely tactical behaviour but rooted in a person’s way of being, the attitude of one who is so convinced of God’s love and power that he or she is not afraid to tackle evil with the weapons of love and truth. Love of one’s enemy constitutes the nucleus of the Christian revolution.󰀁󰀉  For an analysis of the peace ethic in Pacem in Terris see Johan Verstraeten, “Pacem in Terris as Turning Point: How the Catholic Church Has Attempted to Overcome War by Its Ethics and Practice of Peace,” in Peace through Law: Reflections on Pacem in Terris from Philosophy, Law, Theology, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and Mary Ellen O’Connell, Studies on Peace Ethics (London: Bloomsbury and Baden-Baden: Nomos, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), 󰀁󰀁-󰀂󰀉. 󰀁󰀇  Pacem in Terris, 󰀁󰀅󰀉. 󰀁󰀈  Message of the Holy Father Francis for the Opening of the Annual Meeting for Peace, “Bridges for Peace” (Bologna, 󰀁󰀄-󰀁󰀆 October 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bolletino/pubblico/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀁󰀀/󰀁󰀄/󰀁󰀈󰀁󰀀󰀁󰀄d.html [accessed January 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉]. 󰀁󰀉  Message of His Holiness Pope Francis for the Celebration of the 󰀅󰀀th World Day of Peace, January 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/peace/documents [accessed November 󰀂󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈]. 󰀁󰀆

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According to Francis, peace also implies integral human development in the perspective of the preferential option for the poor. This is not only a matter of “caring or thinking for the poor,” but acknowledging the poor’s active participation in decisions that concern their lives (EG 󰀄󰀉). They are neither objects of decisions taken by experts, nor “passive objects for the more powerful donor’s greater spiritual good.”󰀂󰀀 They are subjects of their own destiny and actors from whom we have much to learn. In his address to the popular movements at Santa Cruz (Bolivia, July 󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅) Francis’s standpoint is unambiguous: You the most humble, the exploited, the poor and excluded… the future of the world is to a large extent into your hands, in your capacity to organise yourself, and to promote creative alternatives. Don’t underestimate yourself, you are the sowers of change.󰀂󰀁

Francis is convinced that change comes from the periphery. Accompanying the poor on their path toward liberation requires not only a direct encounter with poor people, but also structural analysis (EG 󰀁󰀈󰀈). An important result of such an analysis is the recognition that “inequality is the source of social ills” (EG 󰀂󰀀󰀃) and hence an obstacle to peace. Interesting is also Francis’s proposal for the year 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 to build “Bridges of Peace.” In particular, religions are invited “to create connections that lead to real encounters, bonds that unite,” and “paths that help to overcome conflicts and harshness.” Bridges of peace are “memories of communion” that heal the wounds of history and lead to the construction of “the fabric of peaceful coexistence in the future.”󰀂󰀂 VI. War and Deterrence Against the backdrop of Francis’s interpretation of peace “which is much more than the absence of war” (LS 󰀂󰀂󰀅), we can understand his critical attitude vis-à-vis war and deterrence, which he rejects as an unsuitable means for solving conflict or stopping unjust aggression.

󰀂󰀀  Susan R. Holman, Beholden: Religion, Global Health and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), 󰀆. 󰀂󰀁  Translated from Le Monde, Friday, July 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅. 󰀂󰀂  Message of the Holy Father Francis for the Opening of the Annual Meeting for Peace, “Bridges for Peace” (cf. n. 󰀁󰀈).

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Francis’s most striking idea in this regard is that the Third World War is not simply a future threat. It is already ravaging the world. In his 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇 World Day of Peace message he interprets the many wars in the world as “a horrifying world war fought piecemeal.” This war includes not only armed conflicts but also terrorism, organized crime, unprecedented acts of violence, abuses suffered by migrants and victims of human trafficking, and the devastation of the environment. In this horrifying world war, violence “is not the cure of our broken world.” It leads to “the death of many people if not all.”󰀂󰀃 This broad definition of the Third World War does not make Francis blind to specific issues, such as disarmament. One of his major concerns is nuclear deterrence and proliferation, a ticking bomb he condemns in more radical terms than his predecessors. Mathias Nebel and Gregory M. Reichberg have articulated the evolution of Papal thinking on nuclear deterrence in a Caritas in Veritate Foundation working paper on Nuclear Deterrence: An Ethical Perspective.󰀂󰀄 This working paper describes how the magisterium of the Catholic Church has gradually changed its judgment on nuclear deterrence from “a practical but non-permanent fixture that would allow time for the responsible parties to engage in disarmament,” and from a recognition that this sort of peace remains a dangerous and fragile path, to a clear statement that deterrence no longer functions as an instrument that allows for disarmament.󰀂󰀅 The consequence is that both threatening with nuclear weapons and the possession of these weapons can no longer be acceptable. Symptomatic of the new policy of the Vatican during the pontificate of Pope Francis is the title of a document issued by the Holy See on the occasion of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄): “Nuclear Weapons: Time for Abolition.” In this text the Holy See clearly states that “the very possession of nuclear weapons, even for purposes of deterrence, is morally problematic.” According to Nebel and Reichberg, this judgment is summed up later in even stronger terms: “Now is the time to affirm not only the immorality of the use of nuclear weapons, but the immorality of their possession, thereby clearing the road to nuclear abolition.”󰀂󰀆 In Pope Francis’s personal message to the Vienna 󰀂󰀃  Kenneth R. Overberg, “Papal Wisdom for the Long Term,” The Way 󰀅󰀇, no. 󰀄 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈): 󰀁󰀁󰀂. 󰀂󰀄  Mathias Nebel and Gregory M. Reichberg, Nuclear Deterrence: An Ethical Perspective (Chambésy: Caritas in Veritate Foundation, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). 󰀂󰀅  Ibid., 󰀆. 󰀂󰀆  Ibid., 󰀁󰀀.

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conference, one of the arguments against nuclear weapons is that they cause unnecessary suffering. The condemnation that is valid for other sorts of weapons, such as chemical or bacteriological weapons, which are condemned by international law, is now also valid for nuclear weapons. In short, according to Francis, nuclear deterrence “cannot be the basis for an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.”󰀂󰀇 It is important to note in this context that this did not remain a matter of words. During Francis’s pontificate the Holy See was the first to ratify the Nuclear Ban Treaty, to which the Vatican diplomats substantially contributed. During a conference on the occasion of the nuclear weapons ban treaty (Vatican City, November 󰀁󰀀-󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), Francis declared unambiguously that “If we also take into account the risk of an accidental detonation as a result of error of any kind, the threat of their use, as well as their very possession, is to be firmly condemned.”󰀂󰀈 Francis is convinced that the possession of and deterrence with nuclear weapons create a “false sense of security,” and that “doomsday predictions can no longer be met with irony or disdain” (LS 󰀁󰀆󰀁). Conclusion Pope Francis’s concept of peace is neither utopian nor unrealistic, but an expression of a deep and complex realism, based on a mystic understanding of reality as process in which God is present and creates new possibilities. This mystic realism allows him a forward-looking imagination which John Paul Lederach translates in secular terms as the capacity to “imagine responses and initiatives that, while rooted in the challenges of the real world, are by their nature capable of rising above destructive patterns and giving birth to that which does not yet exist.”󰀂󰀉 In the context of Pope Francis’s peace praxeology this implies fully entering into the fabric of society (including its conflicts), transforming conflicts, creating new processes, responding to suffering, welcoming migrants, destroying mental walls, abolishing nuclear weapons, and above all, building bridges towards all who can contribute to a greater good. As bridge builder, Francis is a pontifex maximus in the fullest sense of the word. 󰀂󰀇  Pope Francis, Message to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, December 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, ibid., 󰀈󰀃-󰀈󰀄. 󰀂󰀈  Quoted from the text distributed during the conference. 󰀂󰀉  John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀅), 󰀁󰀈󰀂.

Pope Francis’s Interactions with the United Nations and Other International Organizations Jan Wouters and Giuliana Rotola I. Introduction Through its efficient diplomatic corps, the Holy See has worked closely with the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations for many years.󰀁 Every year it publishes an impressive report about its interventions in international organizations.󰀂 Indeed, Pope Francis seems also to take a strong personal interest in international organizations. In addition, he appears to have given a boost to the Vatican’s diplomatic network, as documented in a recent documentary on the Pope’s diplomats, where the journalist and vaticanist Sandro Magister observed that “[a]vec le pape François, les diplomates du Vatican ont été replacés tout en haut de l’organigramme de l’Église.”󰀃 There is even talk about a “renaissance” of Vatican diplomacy. For instance, in his encyclical Laudato Si’, Pope Francis raised great expectations vis-à-vis the UN. Moreover, in the past few years, the Pope has delivered many important interventions and messages at international organizations and fora: from the UN General Assembly in New York on September 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀄 and the 󰀄󰀀th General Conference of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome on July 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇,󰀅 to the World Economic Forum in January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈.󰀆 󰀁  See already Père Jean Lucien-Brun, “Le Saint-Siège et les institutions internationals,” Annuaire Français de Droit International 󰀁󰀀 (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀄): 󰀅󰀃󰀆-󰀅󰀄󰀂. 󰀂  See for 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉, for instance, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/ org-intern/documents/rc_segstat_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀀󰀀󰀇󰀀󰀆_org-internaz-󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉_fr.html. 󰀃  https://www.religion.info/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀀󰀁/󰀁󰀅/saint-siege-et-affaires-internationales/. 󰀄  Pope Francis, Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization. Address of the Holy Father, United Nations Headquarters, New York, Friday, 󰀂󰀅 September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅/september/ documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅󰀀󰀉󰀂󰀅_onu-visita.html. 󰀅  Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Participants in the 󰀄󰀀th General Conference of FAO, Vatican City (July 󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/ pont-messages/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀇󰀀󰀃_messaggio-fao.html. 󰀆  Pope Francis’s Message to Davos 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, in World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, VaticanCity(January󰀁󰀂,󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈),https://www.weforum.org/agenda/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀀󰀁/the-pope-s-announcementto-wef󰀁󰀈/.

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The present contribution inquires whether Pope Francis is breaking new ground in his interactions with the UN and other international organizations or whether these interactions should instead be seen in a perspective of continuous engagement of the Holy See with such organizations. After some considerations on the role of Vatican City State and the Holy See in international relations, we will examine its relationship to the UN and to regional organizations. We will then ask ourselves to what extent Pope Francis is breaking new ground. II. Vatican City State and the Holy See in International Relations The Vatican City State was founded following the signing of the Lateran Pacts between the Holy See and Italy in 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀉, which put an end to the “questione romana.”󰀇 The Pacts consist of two parts: a treaty and a concordat. The first defines the mutual relations on the level of international law, while the second governs the relations between the Italian State and the Catholic Church. The Lateran Treaty recognized the Holy See’s exclusive and absolute power and sovereign jurisdiction over Vatican City, creating the latter as a sovereign State, distinct from the Holy See. Vatican City State is governed as an absolute monarchy and the Head of State is the Pope, who holds full legislative, executive and judicial powers󰀈 and is at the same time the head of the Roman Catholic Church and Vatican City State’s head of state.󰀉 The most important subject of international law, however, is the Holy See. At present, the Holy See has full diplomatic relations with 󰀁󰀈󰀃 States, the European Union (EU) and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta; it is represented by 󰀁󰀇󰀆 nuncios, ten delegates and two representatives with special status.󰀁󰀀 The Holy See has international sovereignty  Cardinal Pietro Gasparri and Benito Mussolini, Inter Sanctam Sedem et Italiae Regnum Conventiones: Trattato fra la Santa Sede e l’Italia, Convenzione Finanziaria and Concordato tra la Santa Sede e l’Italia, Lateran Palace, Rome (February 󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀉). Approved by the Italian Parliament on June 󰀇, 󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀉, http://www.vatican.va/roman_ curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-st_󰀁󰀉󰀂󰀉󰀀󰀂󰀁󰀁_patti-lateranensi_it.html. 󰀈  Vatican City State, State Departments, http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/vaticanstate/en/stato-e-governo/organi-dello-stato.html. 󰀉  Alan Chong and Jodok Troy, “A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal Secular Organization: The Holy See and the United Nations,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 󰀁󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁): 󰀃󰀃󰀅-󰀃󰀅󰀄. 󰀁󰀀  Nota informativa sui rapporti diplomatici della Santa Sede (January 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), http:// press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀀󰀁/󰀀󰀈/󰀀󰀀󰀁󰀄/󰀀󰀀󰀀󰀃󰀄.html. 󰀇

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both as the supreme organ of the Church and as sovereign organ of Vatican City State.󰀁󰀁 The task of representing Vatican City State and managing its relations with foreign States is the prerogative of the Pope, who does so through the Secretariat of State. The Holy See and Vatican City State are members of a number of international organizations, take part in international conferences, and are parties to a variety of international agreements. For instance, the Vatican City State is a member of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), whereas the Holy See is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).󰀁󰀂 In addition, the Holy See is a Permanent Observer in the UN General Assembly, the FAO, the UNESCO and the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). It participated in various UN World conferences, such as the 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄 Cairo Population Conference and the 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀅 Beijing Conference on Women. Moreover, the Holy See or Vatican City State is a party to over a hundred legally binding international agreements. Among the more well-known examples are the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on Drugs, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Outer Space Treaty, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law (guaranteeing protection to the wounded, the sick and civilians in wartime as well as prisoners of war), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the International Convention for the protection of cultural heritage in case of armed conflicts, the UNESCO Convention regarding the protection of the world’s cultural and natural heritage and the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations.󰀁󰀃 The Holy See also participated in various multilateral treaty negotiations, such as, for instance, the 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀈 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 󰀁󰀁  Armando Notaro, “Santa Sede, soggetto di diritto internazionale,” De Iustitia: Rivista di Informazione Giuridica (February 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), http://www.deiustitia.it/cms/cms_ files/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀂󰀀󰀈󰀀󰀄󰀀󰀁󰀀󰀆_fbbu.pdf. 󰀁󰀂  See Vatican City State, Participation in International Organizations, http://www. vaticanstate.va/it/stato-governo/rapporti-internazionali/partecipazioni-ad-organizzazioniinternazionali.html. 󰀁󰀃  Vatican City State, Adherence to International Conventions, http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/vaticanstate/en/stato-e-governo/rapporti-internazionali/adesione-a-convenzioni-internazionali.html.

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The Holy See has a dense network of diplomatic bilateral and multilateral relations which, especially in recent decades, have become increasingly broad and intense. Its mission is peculiar and unlike any other international actor, since it does not have any particular commercial, military or political aims to defend or pursue. It has been identified as a “soft power” diplomacy, which only depends on the ability to persuade and not on military, economic or political strength. What distinguishes it is the core issue of its mission, namely the central role of the human person and the pivotal value of its dignity. Not without reason, The Economist described the Holy See in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇 as “the biggest non-governmental organization in the world.”󰀁󰀄 III. Relations with the

UN

The presence of the Holy See in international organizations began in 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀉 with its accreditation as a permanent observer at the FAO. In 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀁 the Holy See became a member of the Advisory Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀂 the Holy See became a permanent observer at the UNESCO and in 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀇 it became one of the founding members of the IAEA.󰀁󰀅 Neither the Holy See nor Vatican City State is a Member of the UN. However, the Holy See became a “Permanent Observer State” in the UN General Assembly on April 󰀆, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀄.󰀁󰀆 This observer status has further evolved in the course of time. On July 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀄, the General Assembly confirmed the Holy See’s status as a Permanent Observer State with Resolution 󰀅󰀈/󰀃󰀁󰀄.󰀁󰀇 In essence, in its observer capacity, the Holy See can attend all sessions of the General Assembly (where it is sitting, together with Palestine, at the back of the room behind the Member States, and not in the fringes with the observers). The same has applied to the regional commissions of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) since 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀇.󰀁󰀈 Currently, the Holy See has the right to participate in the 󰀁󰀄  “God’s Ambassadors,” The Economist (July 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇), https://www.economist.com/ international/󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇/󰀀󰀇/󰀁󰀉/gods-ambassadors. 󰀁󰀅  Notaro, “Santa Sede, soggetto di diritto internazionale.” 󰀁󰀆  See first recital of UNGA Res. 󰀅󰀈/󰀃󰀁󰀄 of July 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀄, “Participation of the Holy See in the Work of the United Nations.” 󰀁󰀇  UNGA Res. 󰀅󰀈/󰀃󰀁󰀄, “Participation of the Holy See in the Work of the United Nations.” 󰀁󰀈  ECOSOC Decision 󰀂󰀄󰀄 (LXIII): “Invitation to the Holy See to attend sessions of the regional commissions,” July 󰀂󰀂, 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀇.

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general debate of the General Assembly and to intervene in the discussion of any issue inscribed in the agenda of that assembly. It has the right to participate in all meetings open to all Member States, the right to make points of order and to exercise the right of reply, the right to circulate proposals and position papers as official documents, and the right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions. It has permanent observer missions to the UN both in New York and in Geneva. It also participates in the subsidiary bodies of the UNGA, such as the Human Rights Council, and the commissions of ECOSOC, including inter alia the Commission on the Status of Women. The relations between the Holy See and the UN have intensified in the years since the Second Vatican Council (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀂-󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅) and the visit of Pope Paul VI to the UN General Assembly in 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅. The papacy of Pope John XXIII had generated a breakthrough, as he sought to obtain a greater international recognition of the role of the Church through a different approach to the modern world, in particular by emphasizing the importance of religious freedom. Until then, conveying the Catholic message had been hampered inter alia because of the Holy See’s lack of dialogue with other religious confessions, which became ever more difficult to reconcile with the needs of an increasingly pluralist world.󰀁󰀉 The encyclical Pacem in Terris, published on April 󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃, represented the will of the Catholic Church to become a reference point for universal peace.󰀂󰀀 The subsequent pontifical diplomatic action launched under Pope Paul VI led to the so-called Vatican Ostpolitik, of which the greatest architect was Cardinal Agostino Casaroli. Pope John XXIII, although considering the political theories of Marxism wrong, had underlined the importance of dialogue with the countries of the communist bloc, in particular the Soviet Union, and the same diplomatic line was continued by Paul VI. He aimed at ensuring greater protection and religious freedom for the Catholics living in communist countries. In particular, the Act with Protocol attached between the Holy See and Hungary of September 󰀁󰀅, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀄, followed by the agreement with Yugoslavia in 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀆, were considered as major diplomatic successes. The Holy See also succeeded for the first time in taking part in the international discussion on 󰀁󰀉  Romina De Carli, “Il Concilio Vaticano II nel contesto internazionale della Guerra Fredda,” Diacronie: Studi di Storia Contemporanea 󰀂󰀆, no. 󰀂 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), http://journals. openedition.org/diacronie/󰀄󰀀󰀅󰀆. 󰀂󰀀  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/it/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_ enc_󰀁󰀁󰀀󰀄󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃_pacem.html.

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the subject of freedom of thought and religious freedom, becoming a patron not only of the specific problems of the Christian community, but also of those common to all humanity, placing a particular attention to the inviolable rights of the human person.󰀂󰀁 The project proposed by John XXIII in Pacem in Terris revolved around the need to create a climate of mutual trust between States and focused on the need to identify the Catholic Church as the only internationally recognized spiritual authority capable of dealing with the common universal good, because it is impartial and extraneous to any political particularism.󰀂󰀂 It is interesting to consider Article 󰀂󰀄 of the Lateran Treaty in this respect: In regard to the sovereignty appertaining to it also in international matters, the Holy See declares that it desires to take, and shall take, no part in any temporal rivalries between other States, nor in any international congresses called to settle such matters, save and except in the event of such parties making a mutual appeal to the pacific mission of the Holy See, the latter reserving in any event the right of exercising its moral and spiritual power. Consequently, Vatican City will always and in every case be considered neutral and inviolable territory.󰀂󰀃

This provision establishes three fundamental principles. First is the extraneousness of the Holy See to temporal rivalries: it intends to remain extraneous to political or military disputes and to the international instances connected to them. In this sense, it explains why the Holy See enjoys the status of observer and is not a full member of the UN, UNESCO, and the Council of Europe.󰀂󰀄 A series of questions that are of primary interest to state diplomats, such as political alliances, military structures and commercial and tourist promotion, are therefore considered only marginally by pontifical diplomacy and only to the extent that they have moral implications.󰀂󰀅 Second, Article 󰀂󰀄 expressly provides for the possibility for  Michele Forte, L’attività internazionale della Santa Sede, doctoral thesis Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), 󰀁󰀇󰀄-󰀁󰀇󰀅, http://www.salvisjuribus.it/wp-content/ uploads/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/󰀁󰀂/Forte-Michele-tesi-di-dottorato.pdf. 󰀂󰀂  De Carli, “Il Concilio Vaticano II nel contesto internazionale della Guerra Fredda.” 󰀂󰀃  http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/dam/vaticanstate/documenti/leggi-e-decreti/ Normative-Penali-e-Amministrative/LateranTreaty.pdf. 󰀂󰀄  Giovanni Barberini, “Riflessioni sull’origine e sul significato dell’art. 󰀂󰀄 del trattato lateranense,” Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 󰀃󰀈 (December 󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), https://www. statoechiese.it/images/uploads/articoli_pdf/barberini_riflessioni.x.pdf?pdf=riflessi oni-sullorigine-e-sul-significato-dellart.-󰀂󰀄-del-trattato-laterane. 󰀂󰀅  Notaro, “Santa Sede, soggetto di diritto internazionale.” 󰀂󰀁

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the Holy See to intervene between contending parties that are in agreement for it to carry out its peace mission. Third, the neutrality and inviolability of the Vatican territory are confirmed. IV. Relations with Regional Organizations At a regional level, the Holy See has had observer status at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg since 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀 and became a permanent observer to the Organization of American States (OAS) in 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀈. In 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀄, the Holy See sent a permanent representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Previously, it had participated in the Conference for Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe since 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀃 and was one of the protagonists in the conference which led to the Helsinki Final Act in 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀅.󰀂󰀆 The Helsinki Final Act emphasized human rights, including the freedom of conscience and religion, principles of which John Paul II would remind the CSCE heads of State in 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀.󰀂󰀇 In 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀀 the Holy See became permanent observer to the Arab League and the African Union. The Holy See has always shown a special interest in the European integration project. In 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀁 the Council of European Episcopal Conferences (CCEE) was created, a body that brings together representatives of forty-five countries in the European Continent, based in Brussels and composed of a delegate for each national Episcopal conference. The CCEE is made up of thirty-nine members, of which thirty-three are Bishops’ Conferences, the Archbishops of Luxembourg, the Principality of Monaco, the Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus, the Bishops of Chişinău (Moldova) of the Mukachevo Eparchy, and the Apostolic Administration of Estonia.󰀂󰀈 In 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀, the European bishops formed the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE). COMECE is made up of bishops delegated by the 󰀂󰀇 Catholic Bishops’ Conferences of the EU and has a permanent secretariat in Brussels. After the four-year existence of a Catholic Pastoral Information Service (SIPECA, 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀆-󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀), COMECE was established on March 󰀃, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀 in the wake of the  Forte, L’attività internazionale della Santa Sede, 󰀁󰀇󰀅.  See The Holy See, Message of John Paul II on the Value and Content of Freedom of Conscience and of Religion, Friday, November 󰀁󰀄, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀, https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/ john-paul-ii/en/speeches/󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀/november/documents/hf_jp_ii_spe_󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀀󰀁󰀁󰀁󰀄_atto-helsinki.pdf. 󰀂󰀈  https://www.ccee.eu/ccee/. 󰀂󰀆 󰀂󰀇

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first direct elections of the European Parliament in 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉. Among the objectives of COMECE is “to maintain a regular dialogue with the EU institutions (European Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament) through annual summit meetings of religious leaders, dialogue seminars, various conferences and by taking part in consultations launched by the European Commission.”󰀂󰀉 The Holy See has entertained diplomatic relations with the EEC since the 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀀s. Since 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀆 it has held an Apostolic Nunciature to the European Communities, which became the Apostolic Nunciature to the EU in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉. The diplomatic representation of the EU to the Holy See took much longer: the accreditation of the representative of the European Commission in the diplomatic corps of the Holy See happened in June 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆,󰀃󰀀 after a visit by European Commission President Barroso to the Pope.󰀃󰀁 Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉 the diplomatic representation has been handled by the EU Delegation to the Holy See, Order of Malta, UN Organizations in Rome and to the Republic of San Marino. The Treaty of Lisbon also provides for “an open, transparent and regular dialogue” with the Churches (Article 󰀁󰀇 TFEU).󰀃󰀂 V. On Substance: Differences between Pope Francis and Previous Popes? 󰀁. The Holy See and the UN’s Foundations In 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅, Pope Paul VI took part in the UN General Assembly for the first time in the history of the Catholic Church. He identified the UN’s goals of peace and cooperation as the same ones of the long and arduous path that the Catholic Church had travelled over the centuries with the objective of evangelization, and appealed to the representatives of UN Member States to build world peace on the moral conscience of man: The edifice you are building does not rest on purely material and terrestrial foundations, for in that case it would be a house built on 󰀂󰀉

 See http://www.comece.org/site/en/whoweare.  Federico Castiglioni, “Ue: Quel filo invisibile tra Santa Sede e Istituzioni Europee,” Affari internazionali (July 󰀁󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), https://www.affarinternazionali.it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀀󰀇/ ue-filo-santa-sede/. 󰀃󰀁  https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-rome/󰀂󰀃󰀅󰀅/holy-see-and-eu_en. 󰀃󰀂  See in this respect Jan Wouters, “The Place of Religion and Churches in the European Union,” in Secularisation & Europe, ed. Jan Van Reeth, Bernard Pottier, Henryk Slawínski, and Filip De Rycke (’s Hertogenbosch: Betsaida, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀃󰀇󰀅-󰀃󰀉󰀄. 󰀃󰀀

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sand. It rests most of all upon consciences. Yes, the time has come for “conversion,” for personal transformation, for interior renewal. We have to get used to a new way of thinking about man, a new way of thinking about man’s community life, and, last of all, a new way of thinking about the pathways of history and the destinies of the world.󰀃󰀃

When Pope Francis spoke to the UN General Assembly on September 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅, he was the fourth Pope to make an address, after Paul VI (󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅), John Paul II (󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉 and 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀅), and Benedict XVI (󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈). On this occasion, he made an appeal to the world’s political leaders to guarantee to everyone the minimum spiritual and material means needed to live in dignity, namely lodging, labor, land and their spiritual freedom, which includes religious freedom, the right to education and all other civil rights. He affirmed that: […] the simplest and best measure and indicator of the implementation of the new Agenda for development will be effective, practical and immediate access, on the part of all, to essential material and spiritual goods: housing, dignified and properly remunerated employment, adequate food and drinking water; religious freedom and, more generally, spiritual freedom and education. These pillars of integral human development have a common foundation, which is the right to life and, more generally, what we could call the right to existence of human nature itself.󰀃󰀄

Furthermore, Pope Francis pleaded for reform of the UN in order to reach greater equity among Member States, affirming that reform and adaptation to the times are always necessary, progressing towards the goal of granting all countries, without exception, participation and a real and equitable influence on decisions: The need for greater equity is especially true in the case of those bodies with effective executive capability, such as the Security Council, the Financial Agencies and the groups or mechanisms specifically created to deal with economic crises. This will help limit every kind of abuse or usury, especially where developing countries are concerned. The International Financial Agencies should care for the sustainable development of countries and should ensure that they are not subjected to oppressive lending systems which, far from promoting progress, subject

󰀃󰀃  Address of the Holy Father Paul VI to the United Nations Organization, Monday, 󰀄 October 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅/documents/hf_pvi_spe_󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅󰀁󰀀󰀀󰀄_united-nations.html. 󰀃󰀄  Pope Francis, Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, 󰀂󰀅 September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 (cf. n. 󰀄).

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people to mechanisms which generate greater poverty, exclusion and dependence.󰀃󰀅

Nevertheless, the pivotal issue of Francis’s General Assembly address remained climate change, one of the pillars of his pontificate. He underlined that there is a “right of the environment,” because human beings are part of it, and any damage to the environment, therefore, also damages humanity. Pope Francis insisted on the topic, asserting that the abuse and destruction of the environment are associated with an unstoppable process of exclusion, which constitutes a complete denial of human fraternity and a grave offence against human rights. He thereby underlined how […] the ecological crisis, together with the destruction of a large part of biodiversity, can endanger the very existence of the human species. The disastrous consequences of irresponsible misgovernment of the world economy, guided solely by the ambition of gain and power, must constitute an appeal to a severe reflection on man.󰀃󰀆

󰀂. The Holy See and the Protection of Human Rights The Holy See continuously appeals to the international community for a greater commitment in the application of the UN Charter and its principles. It is constantly making interventions in the UN addressing different human rights, in particular, those related to poverty and hunger in the world. The right to access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, the right to adequate housing, the right to education, and the right to food are only a few examples.󰀃󰀇 However, the Holy See’s conception of human rights has changed through the successions of different popes. With the exception of Pope Pius XI’s mention of human rights in his 󰀁󰀉󰀃󰀇 encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge,󰀃󰀈 the first papal reference to human rights can be found in the 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀂 Christmas Message of Pope Pius XII, a turning point in the history of the Catholic Church. On that occasion,  Pope Francis, Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly.  Ibid. 󰀃󰀇  António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres, “Conclusion: A Beacon of Inspiration for the Family of Nations,” in Silvano M. Tomasi, The Vatican in the Family of Nations: Diplomatic Actions of the Holy See at the UN and Other International Organizations in Geneva (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), 󰀈󰀂󰀉, 󰀈󰀃󰀂. 󰀃󰀈  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_ enc_󰀁󰀄󰀀󰀃󰀁󰀉󰀃󰀇_mit-brennender-sorge.html. 󰀃󰀅

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through a radio message, the Pope announced the Church’s commitment to the fundamental rights of the person, pointed to the question of human dignity and pleaded for the defense of the family, work, a fair wage, and higher education for the children of the working class. He affirmed: Who would have the Star of Peace shine out and stand over society should [...] uphold respect for and the practical realization of the following fundamental personal rights: the right to maintain and develop one’s corporal, intellectual and moral life and especially the right to religious formation and education; the right to worship God in private and public and to carry on religious works of charity; the right to marry and to achieve the aim of married life; the right to conjugal and domestic society; the right to work, as the indispensable means towards the maintenance of family life; the right to free choice of state of life, and hence, too, of the priesthood or religious life; the right to the use of material goods; in keeping with his duties and social limitations.󰀃󰀉

In his 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃 encyclical Pacem in Terris Pope John XXIII affirmed that “[e]very basic human right draws its authoritative force from the natural law, which confers it and attaches to it its respective duty,”󰀄󰀀 thereby accepting the secular notion of human rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and successfully adapting religious language into secular human rights language.󰀄󰀁 Pope John Paul II also repeatedly put an emphasis on the concepts of human dignity, religious freedom, peace, and economic opportunities. Even during his first visit to the UN in 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉, taking up the words of John XXIII, he stated: We must diligently examine which principal tensions in connection with the inalienable rights of man can weaken the construction of this peace which we all desire ardently and which is the essential goal of the efforts of the United Nations Organization.󰀄󰀂

At the fiftieth UN General Assembly, John Paul II showed concern because he believed that some still denied the universality of human 󰀃󰀉  Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀂, Rome (December 󰀂󰀄, 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀂), https:// www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/p󰀁󰀂ch󰀄󰀂.htm. 󰀄󰀀  http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_ enc_󰀁󰀁󰀀󰀄󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃_pacem.html (April 󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀃), para. 󰀃󰀀. 󰀄󰀁  Jodok Troy, “The Papal Human Rights Discourse: The Difference Pope Francis Makes,” Human Rights Quarterly 󰀄󰀁, no. 󰀁 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉): 󰀆󰀆-󰀉󰀀, at 󰀇󰀄, https://muse.jhu.edu/ article/󰀇󰀁󰀆󰀃󰀆󰀁. 󰀄󰀂  Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the 󰀃󰀄th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York (October 󰀂, 󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉), https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/ speeches/󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_󰀁󰀉󰀇󰀉󰀁󰀀󰀀󰀂_general-assembly-onu.html.

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rights.󰀄󰀃 He therefore repeatedly expressed the firm position of the Church in the affirmation and defense of human dignity, highlighting how the human person is impoverished by the denial or limitation of human rights, such as the right to religious freedom, as he affirmed in his 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀇 encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis.󰀄󰀄 Pope Benedict XVI’s address to the UN General Assembly in 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈 also focused on human rights, presenting a conservative notion of the concept, according to which the rights recognized and expounded in the Declaration apply to everyone by virtue of the common origin of the person, who remains the high-point of God’s creative design for the world and for history. They are based on the natural law inscribed on human hearts and present in different cultures and civilizations. Removing human rights from this context would mean restricting their range and yielding to a relativistic conception, according to which the meaning and interpretation of rights could vary and their universality would be denied in the name of different cultural, political, social and even religious outlooks.󰀄󰀅

On human rights, Pope Francis approaches the subject matter in a somewhat different way than his predecessors. On the one hand, he is a staunch defender of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For instance, in his address of January 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 to the members of the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See he observed: I would like to devote our meeting today to this important document, seventy years after its adoption on 󰀁󰀀 December 󰀁󰀉󰀄󰀈 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. For the Holy See, to speak of human rights means above all to restate the centrality of the human person, willed and created by God in his image and likeness. The Lord Jesus himself […] makes us understand that every human being, independent of his or her physical, spiritual or social condition, is worthy of respect and consideration. From a Christian perspective, there is a significant relation between the Gospel message and the recognition  Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the 󰀅󰀀th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York (October 󰀅, 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀅), https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/ speeches/󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀅/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_󰀀󰀅󰀁󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀅_address-to-uno.html. 󰀄󰀄  Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: To the Bishops, Priests Religious Families, Sons and Daughters of the Church and All People of Good Will for the Twentieth Anniversary of Populorum Progressio, Rome (December 󰀃󰀀, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀇), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/ john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_󰀃󰀀󰀁󰀂󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀇_sollicitudo-rei-socialis. html. 󰀄󰀅  Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization. Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI, New York, Friday, 󰀁󰀈 April 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈, http:// w󰀂.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ spe_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈󰀀󰀄󰀁󰀈_un-visit.html. 󰀄󰀃

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of human rights in the spirit of those who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Those rights are premised on the nature objectively shared by the human race. They were proclaimed in order to remove the barriers that divide the human family and to favor what the Church’s social doctrine calls integral human development, since it entails fostering “the development of each man and of the whole man… and humanity as a whole.” A reductive vision of the human person, on the other hand, opens the way to the growth of injustice, social inequality and corruption.󰀄󰀆

Still, in the same address, the Pope noted that over the years, particularly in the wake of the social upheaval of the 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀀s, the interpretation of some rights has progressively changed, with the inclusion of a number of “new rights” that not infrequently conflict with one another. This has not always helped the promotion of friendly relations between nations, since debatable notions of human rights have been advanced that are at odds with the culture of many countries; the latter feel that they are not respected in their social and cultural traditions, and instead neglected with regard to the real needs they have to face. Somewhat paradoxically, there is a risk that, in the very name of human rights, we will see the rise of modern forms of ideological colonization by the stronger and the wealthier, to the detriment of the poorer and the most vulnerable.󰀄󰀇

Pope Francis seems to adopt a more collective approach than his predecessors, emphasizing the preservation of collective goods (and rights), such as the environment, rather than putting stress on individual human rights. In his first apostolic exhortation, Evangelii Gaudium, he observed: Sadly, even human rights can be used as a justification for an inordinate defense of individual rights or the rights of the richer peoples. With due respect for the autonomy and culture of every nation, we must never forget that the planet belongs to all mankind and is meant for all mankind; the mere fact that some people are born in places with fewer resources or less development does not justify the fact that they are living with less dignity. [...] To speak properly of our own rights, we need to broaden our perspective and to hear the plea of other peoples and other regions than those of our own country.󰀄󰀈 󰀄󰀆  Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greetings, Regia Hall, Monday 󰀈 January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/january/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀀󰀁󰀀󰀈_corpo-diplomatico.html. 󰀄󰀇  Ibid. 󰀄󰀈  Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium, Rome (November 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃), http://w󰀂.vatican. va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazioneap_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀄_evangelii-gaudium.html.

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It is interesting to note that, in the view of Pope Francis, the answer to the problems of the contemporary world is no longer the defense of individual rights. He believes that it is necessary to have a global vision and to provide collective solutions to collective problems, such as the environmental one. 󰀃. The Geopolitics of Pope Francis The reform of the Church under the pontificate of Pope Francis also extends to foreign policy and is affirmed in the strengthening of dialogue with other religions. This includes the revaluation of the least developed countries, the poor, the unemployed, the migrants, for whom Bergoglio has stood at the UN. When compared to previous popes, the difference is already evident from an analysis of Bergoglio’s biography as he turns out to be a “subversive against established disorder.”󰀄󰀉 One example is his activism against the military dictatorship of Videla in Argentina, during which he created an information network thanks to which the kidnapping of certain politicians could be prevented and their escape abroad could be organized.󰀅󰀀 In the first six years of his pontificate, Pope Francis has had a profound effect on international relations. In this respect one may think of countries that previously had a rather antagonistic relationship with the Holy See, such as China and Russia, the mediation between the United States and Cuba, the Pope’s public opposition to President Trump’s policies, his greater openness to Islam, and the historic meeting with the patriarch of Moscow Kirill.󰀅󰀁 In his new year’s address to the members of the diplomatic corps of January 󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, Pope Francis summarized some of the most significant activities of the Holy See in the international arena since the beginning of his pontificate. He spoke about the future objectives of his policy, referring among others to the situations in Korea, Venezuela, Palestine,

󰀄󰀉

 Pierluigi Mele, “Papa Bergoglio, un sovversivo contro il ‘disordine stabilito’. Intervista a Nello Scavo” (November 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), http://confini.blog.rainews.it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/󰀁󰀁/󰀁󰀉/ papa-bergoglio-un-sovversivo-contro-il-disordine-stabilito-intervista-a-nello-scavo/. 󰀅󰀀  Ibid. 󰀅󰀁  Iacopo Scaramuzzi, “La geopolitica dei ponti di Papa Francesco” (February 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆), http://www.pagina󰀉󰀉.it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆/󰀀󰀂/󰀁󰀉/la-geopolitica-dei-ponti-di-papa-francescotrump-messico/.

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and Ukraine.󰀅󰀂 He pointed out that the universal mission of the Church is the pursuit of peace, not to be understood as a mere corollary of a balance of power between States, but one that is only consolidated when nations can discuss matters on equal terms. He addressed the challenges for the planet, referring in particular to climate change and the migration crisis, as well as the opportunities that the Holy See, with all other international actors, will have to seize. Furthermore, he described his international diplomatic mission by continuously emphasizing three fundamental pillars: a commitment to peace, a commitment to human dignity, and a commitment to fight poverty.󰀅󰀃 A first core issue in the pontificate of Pope Francis is the capacity of the Church in assisting countries for the achievement of peace. The Holy See is working on this issue by fostering a new mentality in the discussions on disarmament and in the actions of international institutions.󰀅󰀄 In his November 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇 address to the international symposium “Prospects for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons and for Integral Disarmament,” the first disarmament conference organized by the Holy See at the Vatican, Pope Francis observed that international relations cannot be held captive to military force, mutual intimidation, and the parading of stockpiles of arms. Weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, create nothing but a false sense of security. They cannot constitute the basis for peaceful coexistence between members of the human family, which must rather be inspired by an ethics of solidarity.󰀅󰀅

Francis pointed out that the price of modernizing and developing weaponry represents a considerable expense for nations, so much so that the development of programs related to the real priorities of humanity, such as the fight against poverty, the promotion of peace, the implementation of education, ecological projects, and the development of human rights are overshadowed.󰀅󰀆 He underlined the significance of the adoption by the United Nations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear  Address of His Holiness Pope Francis, Monday 󰀈 January 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈 (cf. n. 󰀄󰀆).  Andrea Gagliarducci, “Analysis: What Guides Vatican Diplomacy?” (Catholic News Agency, January 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/ analysis-what-guides-vatican-diplomacy-󰀃󰀇󰀃󰀇󰀂. 󰀅󰀄  Ibid. 󰀅󰀅  Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to Participants in the International Symposium “Prospects for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons and for Integral Disarmament,” Vatican City (November 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/ november/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀁󰀁󰀁󰀀_convegno-disarmointegrale.html. 󰀅󰀆  Ibid. 󰀅󰀂 󰀅󰀃

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Weapons (TPNW) on July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇, which includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon activities.󰀅󰀇 However, he pointed out that it is still necessary to continue working on solidarity processes that make it possible to bridge inequalities between peoples and promote humanity and its development. A second core issue of Pope Francis’s pontificate, part of his commitment to human dignity, is the refugee crisis and the “age of migration.” To be fair, the attention of the Holy See for this subject matter has been consistent. The first time it participated with full rights in the activities of the UN was during the conference convened to create a “Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Draft Protocol Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons” in 󰀁󰀉󰀅󰀁. This conference finally produced the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which, as indicated above, was signed and ratified by the Holy See.󰀅󰀈 More recently, the Holy See participated in all the meeting preceding the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted in September 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, and presented 󰀂󰀀 points of action for welcoming, protecting, promoting and integrating migrants and refugees.󰀅󰀉 The Mission of the Church, as stressed time and again by Pope Francis, must be that of paying attention to the weakest, from young people to women, to those without a decent job. But the most consistent reference is certainly to migrants, who for Pope Francis include all those who had to leave their country due to poverty, climate migrants (forced to emigrate as a result of natural disasters), and victims of all kinds of violence and persecution. Thirdly, there is the commitment to fight poverty. As he considers hunger in the world one of the greatest obstacles to achieving global peace, Pope Francis indicated this as one of the priorities in the Holy See’s mission. He visited both the FAO headquarters in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄 and the World Food Programme (WFP) Headquarters in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆, demanding social solidarity among all peoples.

󰀅󰀇  United Nations General Assembly, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, A/CONF.󰀂󰀂󰀉/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/󰀈, New York (July 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇), https://undocs.org/A/CONF.󰀂󰀂󰀉/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇/󰀈. 󰀅󰀈  Tomasi, The Vatican in the Family of Nations, 󰀆󰀈󰀇. 󰀅󰀉  Message of His Holiness Pope Francis for the 󰀁󰀀󰀄th World Day of Migrants and Refugees 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, January 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/migration/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀈󰀁󰀅_world-migrants-day-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈.html. Fabio Baggio, “The Church’s Commitment towards the Global Compacts” (October 󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), http:// www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/documents/rc-seg-st-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈󰀁󰀀󰀁󰀉_ meeting-diplomatici-baggio_en.html.

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It is in this context, and in the light of the new ecological revolution, that Pope Francis is making very strong personal advances in politics and has grown into a truly global leader. His 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 encyclical Laudato Si’ has been heralded as “the most innovative among the many proposals put forward by world leaders in recent years.”󰀆󰀀 It represents a harsh analysis of the damage done by man to our common home, due to the application of development models based on the economy and technology. Pope Francis makes many references to politics, which he accuses of having promoted teachings that aim only at the profit and advancement of technology, without taking into account the devastation they leave behind and without having the foresight that goes beyond electoral promises.󰀆󰀁 The encyclical makes references to pollution, climate change, the issue of water, the loss of biodiversity with the consequences of the deterioration of the quality of human life, and social degradation. The element of novelty of this message lies in the fact that it is addressed not only to the Catholic community but to all inhabitants of the Earth. It is clear that Pope Francis wants to be the bearer of a universal message that transcends faith and one particular religious community. In the Pope’s words, we must all feel united by the same concern since no one can remain indifferent to the ecological drama that we are facing in this era. Other Popes before have addressed their message to humanity as a whole, and not only to the Catholic community. In the encyclical Pacem in Terris, Pope John XXIII made an appeal to “all men of good will,” an expression which has been reiterated in all later encyclicals of general interest, such as Pope Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio.󰀆󰀂 A linguistic change can be seen in the encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, as Pope John Paul II made a reference to “all people of good will,”󰀆󰀃 which was repeated by Pope Benedict XVI in the encyclical Caritas in Veritate.󰀆󰀄 But Laudato Si’ makes a remarkable change, as Pope Francis addresses “every person living on this planet,” turning to the conscience of every individual and 󰀆󰀀  Andrea Tilche and Antonello Nociti, “Laudato Si’: The Beauty of Pope Francis’ Vision,” Sapiens: Surveys and Perspectives Integrating Environment & Society 󰀈, no. 󰀁 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅), https://journals.openedition.org/sapiens/󰀁󰀇󰀀󰀄. 󰀆󰀁  Carlo Petrini, Laudato Si’: Enciclica sulla cura della casa comune. Guida alla lettura (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅). 󰀆󰀂  Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio (March 󰀂󰀆, 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀇), https://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_󰀂󰀆󰀀󰀃󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀇_populorum.html. 󰀆󰀃  Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (cf. n. 󰀄󰀄). 󰀆󰀄  Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate (June 󰀂󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀉󰀀󰀆󰀂󰀉_caritas-in-veritate.html.

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calling for the mobilization of all. The Pope’s message is clear and concrete as never before. Although John Paul II and Benedict XVI, who are regularly referred to in the text, had dealt with these issues before, the political force of Francis is totally new, as is his capacity for universal engagement. This new narrative finds its reason in the urgency of the ecological challenge, a contemporary concern that is affecting humanity as a whole. To all the matters described above, Pope Francis advocates a multilateral approach. This multilateralism certainly characterizes his pontificate: the desire to create common policies for problems and phenomena that are now globalized and can no longer be effectively addressed by individual States.󰀆󰀅 󰀄. Pope Francis and the People’s Republic of China In 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈, the Holy See signed a historic (provisional) agreement with China on the appointment of bishops, also due to the election of Cardinal Pietro Parolin as secretary of the Vatican State and to the long and constant dialogue between the Vatican and the People’s Republic of China. With this agreement the Pope re-established his supremacy in the area of Episcopal consecrations, establishing that the process of appointing bishops, although starting from the Patriotic Association of Chinese Catholics (APCC), will end with a papal decision. This important change serves to restore the full communion and unity of the Catholic Church in China with Rome. The objective of Pope Francis, which arises in this case in continuity with the papacy of Benedict XVI, is the reconciliation of the Chinese Catholic communities.󰀆󰀆 󰀅. Interreligious Dialogue: The Catholic Church and Islam Pope Francis’s diplomatic actions strongly focus on the value of interreligious dialogue, based on mutual respect and recognition of the other as a subject that enjoys equal rights. As part of the relationship between the two major global religions, he is trying to mend the rift that had 󰀆󰀅  Pietro Mattonai, “Vaticano: La ‘geopolitica dello spirito’ di Francesco,” Affari internazionali (January 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉), https://www.affarinternazionali.it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀁/vaticanomanifesto-geopolitica-spirito/. 󰀆󰀆  Pietro Mattonai, “Vaticano/Cina: Francesco rimette al centro le periferie,” Affari internazionali (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), https://www.affarinternazionali.it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈/󰀀󰀉/vaticano-cina-accordo/.

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arisen under Benedict XVI’s pontificate with the Grand Imam of AlAzhar, Ahmed El-Tayeb. The latter had condemned Ratzinger for having requested more protection against religious minorities, shortly after the attack on the Copts of Alexandria in 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁. At the Global conference on Human Fraternity held in Abu Dhabi on February 󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉, Pope Francis and Grand Imam Ahmed El-Tayeb signed a Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together.󰀆󰀇 The objective of Pope Francis’s policies in this respect is to build a Church attentive to the needs of the global peripheries and able to act as a diplomatic force in the international geopolitical landscape. The Abu Dhabi conference gave birth to a historic agreement aimed at peace among the peoples of the world. The agreement is important above all in light of the fact that some of today’s most contested geopolitical theatres are in Africa and the Middle East, particularly in countries with a Muslim majority, and in light of the persistent threat of Islamist terrorism. It was also the first time that a leader of the Catholic Church visited the Arab Peninsula. It is clear that Pope Francis devotes particular attention to Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and other places where Catholicism is still strong and evolving.󰀆󰀈 󰀆. Pope Francis and the EU The relationship of the Holy See and the EU has been defined as a hybrid relationship since, on the one hand, it can be traced to the international diplomacy of the Pope and the Holy See. Yet, on the other hand, it is part of the engagement of EU institutions with prominent non-governmental bodies. As discussed above, COMECE maintains a regular dialogue with the EU institutions. The themes that are being discussed include those on which Pope Francis dwells particularly, including migration management, the role of young people, interreligious dialogue, freedom of thought and belief, ecology, and sustainability.󰀆󰀉 󰀆󰀇  See https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉-󰀀󰀂/pope-francis-uae-declaration-with-al-azhar-grand-imam.html; http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/outside/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉󰀀󰀂󰀀󰀄_documento-fratellanza-umana. html. 󰀆󰀈  Emmanuela Banfo, “Cristianesimo/Islam: Il dialogo continua tra luci e ombre,” Affari internazionali (February 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉), https://www.affarinternazionali.it/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉/󰀀󰀂/ cristianesimo-islam-luci-e-ombre/. 󰀆󰀉  “The Catholic Church in the European Union: Our Topics,” http://www.comece. eu/site/en/ourtopics.

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The first visit of a pope to the European Parliament took place on October 󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀈 with Pope John Paul II, who strongly emphasized the role of Christian roots in the formation of the cultural identity of the European peoples. In his speech the Pope supported the creation of the single market that would come into force in 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀃, as it would accelerate the process of European integration and guarantee more equitable rights without endangering the cultural identities of individual peoples. He also invited the Community to turn its gaze to the global South, so that European cooperation would be brought about without in a non-domineering way, but with the intention of helping the poorest countries to take charge of their own destiny.󰀇󰀀 During the next pontificate, however, Pope Benedict XVI could not visit the European institutions because of the hostility shown by many European parliamentarians towards the Church. Ratzinger had harshly criticized Europe for the abandonment of its values in the speech which he gave at a convention organized by COMECE on March 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome.󰀇󰀁 Also, with reference to the process of European integration, the only reminder that he had made on several occasions was attributable exclusively to the Christian heritage. In 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆, for example, he stressed that only by appreciating its own Christian roots would Europe be able to offer a safe orientation to the choices of its citizens and to face future challenges.󰀇󰀂 On November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄, however, Pope Francis was invited to Strasbourg to officially address members of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. On that occasion, he spoke about the environment, migrants, and the family. The Pope paid particular attention to the subject of work, emphasizing the need to restore its dignity, managing to combine flexibility and stability at the same time: “promoting the dignity of the person means recognizing that he or she possesses inalienable rights which no one may take away arbitrarily, much 󰀇󰀀  Pope John Paul II, Discorso durante la visita al Parlamento europeo (October 󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀈), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀈/october/documents/ hf_jp-ii_spe_󰀁󰀉󰀈󰀈󰀁󰀀󰀁󰀁_european-parliament.html. 󰀇󰀁  Pierre de Charentenay, “I Papi e l’Europa: Da Pio X a Francesco,” Cristiani e cittadini (May 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈), https://www.aggiornamentisociali.it/articoli/i-papi-e-l-europa-da-pioxi-a-francesco/. For Pope Benedict’s address, see http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/benedictxvi/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇/march/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀇󰀀󰀃󰀂󰀄_comece.html. 󰀇󰀂  Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of the European People’s Party on the Occasion of the Study Days on Europe (March 󰀃󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆), http://w󰀂.vatican.va/content/ benedict-xvi/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆/march/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀆󰀀󰀃󰀃󰀀_eu-parliamentarians.html.

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less for the sake of economic interests.”󰀇󰀃 In his address, Pope Francis made strong references to the Christian roots of Europe, a central theme also during the pontificate of Pope John Paul II, affirming that the ability to grasp its richness and potential could represent the solution to the extremism that is rampant in today’s world. He stressed that the enhancement of Christian culture would not necessarily call into question the secular nature of States or the independence of the institutions of the Union, but would only be a cultural enrichment for the European population. Francis also harshly criticized the European institutions that are felt to be distant from the citizens and perceived as advocates of norms not close to the sensibility of the European people. He furthermore emphasized the need for Europe to no longer revolve around the economy, but to focus more on the sacredness of the human person, thus keeping the power of democracy alive and preventing multinational and non-universal interests from further weakening institutions, turning them into systems of financial services for unknown powers. The Pope pointed to individualism as the greatest problem of contemporary Europe. With reference to this, he focused on those excluded from society, particularly the elderly, disillusioned and migrant youths. With reference to the issues related to the defense of human rights and the dignity of the person, Francis highlighted some of the most sensitive ethical issues, returning to the topic of the excluded and the lives that are rejected due to the absolutization of science. He referred to “children killed before being born,” again showing a firm position of the Church against abortion. “This,” he affirmed, “is the great mistake made when technology is allowed to take over; the result is a confusion between ends and means. It is the inevitable consequence of a throwaway culture and an uncontrolled consumerism. Upholding the dignity of the person means instead acknowledging the value of human life, which is freely given us and hence cannot be an object of trade or commerce.”󰀇󰀄 Again, migration and refugees received particular attention in the Pope’s address: Europe will be able to confront the problems associated with immigration [...] only if it is capable of adopting fair, courageous and realistic policies which can assist the countries of origin in their own 󰀇󰀃  Address of Pope Francis to the European Parliament (November 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄), https:// w󰀂.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄/november/documents/papa-francesco_󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀄󰀁󰀁󰀂󰀅_strasburgo-parlamento-europeo.html. 󰀇󰀄  Ibid.

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social and political development and in their efforts to resolve internal conflicts rather than adopting policies motivated by self-interest, which increase and feed such conflicts.󰀇󰀅

From the above, it transpires that Pope Francis continues the policies of his predecessors by emphasizing the contribution of Christian heritage to the formation and growth of the European continent and its shared values,󰀇󰀆 while at the same time, firmly putting his personal stamp on his interactions with the European institutions, in particular on human dignity and migration issues. VI. Concluding Remarks The strength of Pope Francis, compared to the previous pontificates, lies in his ability to argue with his opponents, not to attenuate his own language, and to refuse to fall behind in a fast-changing world. Francis is trying to create a new balance in Catholic communities around the globe, to strengthen the Church’s relationship with a world that is increasingly pluralistic and globalized, and is demonstrating a strong commitment to humanitarian and ecological issues. One may point in this respect to a difference between his Urbi et Orbi speeches and those of his predecessor: when it comes to religious questions, such as attacks on religious freedom, Pope Benedict XVI expressed himself clearly as the head of the Catholic Church, whereas Francis rather tends to take the role of defending humanity, with a stronger accent on socio-economic problems.󰀇󰀇 On the environment and climate change, it is clear that Pope Francis has chosen a much more vocal path than his predecessors. His very strong and repeated messages, in particular the full elaboration in the encyclical Laudato Si’, launched on May 󰀂󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 in order to have a maximum impact on the UN’s deliberation of Agenda 󰀂󰀀󰀃󰀀 and the Paris Conference leading to the Paris Agreement later that year, testify to this. The key distinction in the direction of Pope Francis lies in the attempt to shift the interest of the international community from individual  Address of Pope Francis to the European Parliament.  De Charentenay, “I Papi e l’Europa.” 󰀇󰀇  This difference is also evident in the linguistic features of the speeches of the two popes: see Petr Kratochvíl and Jana Hovorková, “Papal Geopolitics: The World according to Urbi et Orbi,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 󰀁󰀅, no. 󰀄 (󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇): 󰀇󰀉-󰀉󰀂. 󰀇󰀅

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rights to collective and universal ones in order to provide structural and global solutions to the particular problems of a globalized world. Still, there is “continuity in the change.” As Pope Francis himself stated towards the end of his address to the UN General Assembly on September 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅: I would hope that my words will be taken above all as a continuation of the final words of the address of Pope Paul VI; although spoken almost exactly fifty years ago, they remain ever timely. ‘The hour has come when a pause, a moment of recollection, reflection, even of prayer, is absolutely needed so that we may think back over our common origin, our history, our common destiny. The appeal to the moral conscience of man has never been as necessary as it is today… For the danger comes neither from progress nor from science; if these are used well, they can help to solve a great number of the serious problems besetting mankind’ (Address to the United Nations Organization, 󰀄 October 󰀁󰀉󰀆󰀅). Among other things, human genius, well applied, will surely help to meet the grave challenges of ecological deterioration and of exclusion.

Index of Persons Abbas, Mahmud: 󰀁󰀀 Abu, Mazen: see Abbas, Mahmud Adenauer, Konrad: 󰀇󰀀 Ahandra, Alya: 󰀁󰀈󰀄 Alfeyev, Hilarion, Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀁󰀈󰀆-󰀁󰀈󰀇, 󰀁󰀉󰀀, 󰀁󰀉󰀄-󰀁󰀉󰀅 Ambrogetti, Francesca: 󰀃󰀃, 󰀆󰀂-󰀆󰀃 Anderson, Peter: 󰀁󰀈󰀄 Angelelli, Enrique: 󰀄󰀃 Aquinas, Thomas: 󰀂󰀀󰀁 Archontonis/Arhondonis: see Bartholomew, Patriarch Arenas, Sandra: VII, 󰀂󰀅 Arévalo, Catalino G.: 󰀁󰀃󰀀 Aristotle: 󰀇󰀆 Ataturk: 󰀁󰀆󰀆 Athenagoras (Spyrou), Patriarch: 󰀁󰀄󰀃, 󰀁󰀈󰀀-󰀁󰀈󰀁 Augustine: 󰀅󰀅 Augustus, Caesar: 󰀂󰀀 Aung Hlaing, Min: 󰀁󰀁 Bachelet, Michelle: 󰀂󰀈 Balthasar, Hans Urs, von: 󰀆󰀃 Banda, Kamuzu: 󰀉󰀆 Banfo, Emmanuela: 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Barbato, Mariano: 󰀁 Barberini, Giovanni: 󰀂󰀁󰀄 Barnes, Timothy: 󰀁 Barron, Robert: 󰀅󰀅 Barroso, José: 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Bartholomew, Patriarch: 󰀁󰀃, 󰀉󰀁, 󰀁󰀄󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀄, 󰀁󰀇󰀄, 󰀁󰀈󰀂-󰀁󰀈󰀃, 󰀁󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀈󰀆-󰀁󰀈󰀉, 󰀁󰀉󰀁-󰀁󰀉󰀂 Basil of Caesarea: 󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀂 Bastian, Jean-Pierre: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Beattie, Tina: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Beck, Joseph: 󰀈󰀁 Bellah, Robert R.: 󰀅󰀅

Benedict of Nursia: 󰀅󰀅, 󰀆󰀂 Benedict XV (Della Chiesa), Pope: 󰀉, 󰀆󰀁, 󰀁󰀀󰀇, 󰀁󰀂󰀃 Benedict XVI (Ratzinger), Pope: 󰀅, 󰀉, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀁󰀆-󰀁󰀉, 󰀅󰀈, 󰀆󰀁, 󰀆󰀅-󰀆󰀆, 󰀁󰀀󰀅, 󰀁󰀁󰀆, 󰀁󰀁󰀈󰀁󰀂󰀀, 󰀁󰀂󰀄, 󰀁󰀆󰀆, 󰀁󰀈󰀉, 󰀁󰀉󰀄-󰀁󰀉󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀅, 󰀂󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀂󰀀, 󰀂󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀃󰀀 Berezovsky (Onufriy), Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀈󰀄 Bertello, Giuseppe: 󰀄, 󰀆󰀅 Beuret, Michel: 󰀈󰀈 Bhatia, Anita: 󰀈󰀈 Bolívar, Simón: 󰀂󰀅 Borges, Jorge Luis: 󰀆󰀃 Borghesi, Massimo: 󰀄󰀈, 󰀆󰀄 Borgman, Erik: 󰀂󰀀󰀂 Burigana, Riccardo: 󰀁󰀆󰀁 Burrows, William R.: 󰀁󰀃󰀃 Cámara, Hêlder: 󰀄󰀃 Camilleri, Antoine: 󰀁󰀀󰀆 Campbell White, Oliver: 󰀈󰀈 Cannelli, Susanna: 󰀉󰀆 Carayannis, Tatiana: 󰀉󰀃 Cardinale, Hyginus Eugene: 󰀁 Cartes, Horacio: 󰀂󰀈 Casaroli, Agostino, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀁󰀀, 󰀁󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀁󰀃 Casey, Michel: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Castiglioni, Federico: 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Castillo Guerra, Jorge E.: 󰀂󰀀󰀃 Castro, Fidel: 󰀂󰀅, 󰀅󰀃 Castro, Jorge: 󰀃󰀂 Castro, Raul: 󰀉, 󰀂󰀇 Cazacu, Petru: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Cellini, Iacopo: 󰀄󰀉 Cernuzio, Salvatore: 󰀉󰀂 Chambraud, Cécile: 󰀁󰀀󰀂 Chao,Wang: 󰀁󰀀󰀆

* The names ‘Pope Francis’, ‘Bergoglio’ and Biblical names are not included.

234

INDEX OF PERSONS

Chapnin, Sergei: 󰀁󰀉󰀀 Chaput, Charles: 󰀅󰀅 Chasteen, John Charles: 󰀃󰀀 Chávez, Hugo: 󰀂󰀅 Chirban, John T.: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Chitonge, Horman: 󰀈󰀈 Chong, Alan: 󰀂󰀁󰀀 Chryssavgis, John: 󰀁󰀇󰀄, 󰀁󰀈󰀀-󰀁󰀈󰀁, 󰀁󰀈󰀈-󰀁󰀈󰀉 Clarke, James: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Clément, Olivier: 󰀁󰀇󰀅 Clooney, Francis X.: 󰀁󰀃󰀆-󰀁󰀃󰀇 Coghlan, Nicholas: 󰀉󰀀 Cohen, Will T.: 󰀁󰀈󰀂 Collyer, Michael: 󰀈󰀄 Combès, Isabelle: 󰀄󰀁 Congar, Yves: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Corrado, V.: 󰀉󰀄 Corten, André: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Creston, David: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Cristofori, Silvia: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Crockett, Clayton: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 D’Agostino, Peter R.: 󰀅󰀈 Damaskinos, Papandreou: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Dandrieu, Laurent: 󰀁󰀅󰀂 Day, Michael: 󰀁󰀉󰀅 D’Costa, Gavin: 󰀁󰀃󰀁 De Bortoli, F.: 󰀁󰀀󰀅 De Carli, Romina: 󰀂󰀁󰀃-󰀂󰀁󰀄 De Certeau, Michel: 󰀆󰀃 De Charentenay, Pierre: 󰀂󰀂󰀈, 󰀂󰀃󰀀 De Gasperi, Alcide: 󰀇󰀀 De Kesel, Joseph, Cardinal: 󰀆󰀅 Del Corral, José Maria: 󰀂󰀈 De Lubac, Henri: 󰀆󰀃 Demacopoulos, George: 󰀁󰀇󰀃, 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Denysenko, Nicholas E. (Philaret), Patriarch: 󰀁󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀉󰀀 De Roux, Rodolfo: 󰀂󰀆 De Rycke, Filip: 󰀂󰀁󰀆 De San Martin, José: 󰀂󰀅 De Tavernier, Johan: VIII DeVille, Adam A.J.: 󰀁󰀇󰀀, 󰀁󰀇󰀂, 󰀁󰀇󰀅 De Volder, Jan: 󰀁, 󰀁󰀈, 󰀆󰀁, 󰀆󰀈, 󰀈󰀄 Deyermond, Ruth: 󰀁󰀇󰀉 Di Donato, Valentina: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Dijkstra, Roald: 󰀂󰀁

Di Muro, Lorenzo: 󰀂󰀂 Dmytryshyn, Basil: 󰀁󰀉󰀀 Domínguez-Morano, Carlos: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Dorier-Appril, Élisabeth: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor: 󰀁󰀉󰀂 Dreher, Rod: 󰀅󰀅 Duka, Dominic, Cardinal: 󰀈󰀅, 󰀁󰀅󰀅 Dumenko (Epiphany I), Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀈󰀅 Dupuis, Jacques: 󰀁󰀃󰀀, 󰀁󰀃󰀃-󰀁󰀃󰀆, 󰀁󰀄󰀅, 󰀁󰀄󰀇 Duque, Iván: 󰀂󰀈 Durand, Jean-Dominique: 󰀁󰀆󰀁 Dussel, Enrique: 󰀂󰀀󰀁 Duval, Léon-Etienne, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀆󰀇 Egnell, Helene: 󰀁󰀄󰀆 Elpidophoros (Lambriniadis), Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀇󰀇, 󰀁󰀈󰀆 El-Tayeb, Ahmed: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀉󰀄, 󰀁󰀄󰀅, 󰀁󰀆󰀂, 󰀁󰀆󰀆, 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Epiphany I: see Dumenko, Metropolitan Errazuriz Ossa, Francisco Javier, Cardinal: 󰀅, 󰀆󰀅 Esolen, Anthony: 󰀅󰀅 Eugene IV, Pope: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Fabre, Giorgio: 󰀁 Faggioli, Massimo: VII, 󰀄󰀇, 󰀄󰀉, 󰀅󰀂, 󰀅󰀅, 󰀅󰀉 Fessard, Gaston: 󰀆󰀃 Figueroa, Marcelo: 󰀅󰀁 Filofei of Pskov: 󰀁󰀉󰀀 Filoni, Fernando: 󰀁󰀀󰀆 Filoramo, Giovanni: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Fogarty, Gerald P.: 󰀁󰀂 Formenti, Vittorio: 󰀄󰀀 Forte, Michele: 󰀂󰀁󰀄-󰀂󰀁󰀅 Fox, Kara: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Francis of Assisi: 󰀆󰀂, 󰀁󰀀󰀆, 󰀁󰀃󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀁 Franco, Massimo: 󰀄󰀈 Freud, Sigmund: 󰀁󰀆󰀉-󰀁󰀇󰀀, 󰀁󰀇󰀂, 󰀁󰀈󰀂, 󰀁󰀈󰀈 Friday, John: 󰀁󰀂󰀉 Fucili, Paolo: 󰀁󰀆󰀁 Gagliarducci, Andrea: 󰀂󰀂󰀃 Galeazzi, Giacomo: 󰀅

INDEX OF PERSONS

Gallaher, Brandon: VII, 󰀁󰀆󰀉, 󰀁󰀇󰀄, 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Galli, Carlos Maria: 󰀃󰀇, 󰀅󰀇 Gardelli, Stefano: 󰀈󰀈 Gasparri, Pietro: 󰀂󰀁󰀀 Gaudencio, Rosales: 󰀁󰀃󰀀 Gentiloni, Paolo: 󰀈󰀄 Gera, Lucio: 󰀃󰀁, 󰀆󰀃 Getcha, Ihor Vladimir (Archbishop Job): 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Giovagnoli, Agostino: VII, 󰀁󰀀󰀅, 󰀁󰀀󰀉, 󰀁󰀁󰀅, 󰀁󰀂󰀃 Giro, Mario: 󰀁󰀀 Giunipero, Elena: 󰀁󰀀󰀉, 󰀁󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀁󰀅 Glader, Paul: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Gonçalves, Jaime: 󰀉󰀆 Gracias, Oswald: 󰀄, 󰀆󰀅 Grande, Rutilio: 󰀄󰀃 Graziano, Manlio: 󰀅󰀃 Gregg, Samuel: 󰀅 Grogan, Courtney: 󰀁󰀈󰀇 Guardini, Romano: 󰀆󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀁 Gumucio, Esteban: 󰀄󰀃 Gundaev (Kirill), Patriarch: 󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀁󰀇󰀉, 󰀁󰀉󰀄-󰀁󰀉󰀆 Guterres, Antonio Manuel de Oliveira: 󰀂󰀁󰀈 Haldane, John: 󰀁󰀉󰀄 Hamel, Jacques: 󰀁󰀈 Harakas, Stanley S.: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Harvey, Denis: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Holman, Susan R.: 󰀂󰀀󰀆 Holmes, Simon: 󰀁󰀅󰀂 Hopko, Thomas: 󰀁󰀇󰀅 Hovorkova, Jana: 󰀂󰀃󰀀 Hovorun, Cyril: 󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀁󰀈󰀄 Howard, Thomas Albert: 󰀅󰀂 Hurtado, Alberto: 󰀂󰀈 Impagliazzo, Marco: VII, 󰀁󰀉, 󰀁󰀅󰀁, 󰀁󰀆󰀇 Innocent III, Pope: 󰀁󰀇󰀂 Ionită, Viorel: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Ivereigh, Austen: 󰀃󰀆-󰀃󰀇, 󰀆󰀂 Iwele, Godé: 󰀉󰀆 Jenkins, Philip: 󰀆󰀄, 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Job: see Getcha, Ihor Vladimir

235

John VIII Palaiologos, Emperor: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 John XXIII (Roncalli), Pope: 󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀈󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀄-󰀂󰀀󰀅, 󰀂󰀁󰀃-󰀂󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀁󰀉, 󰀂󰀂󰀅 John Paul II (Wojtyla), Pope: 󰀄-󰀅, 󰀉, 󰀁󰀃-󰀁󰀄, 󰀁󰀆-󰀁󰀇, 󰀂󰀀, 󰀅󰀈, 󰀆󰀀-󰀆󰀂, 󰀆󰀅, 󰀇󰀂, 󰀈󰀇, 󰀉󰀅-󰀉󰀆, 󰀁󰀂󰀁, 󰀁󰀃󰀁, 󰀁󰀆󰀀-󰀁󰀆󰀁, 󰀁󰀈󰀉, 󰀁󰀉󰀆-󰀁󰀉󰀇, 󰀂󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀁󰀇, 󰀂󰀁󰀉-󰀂󰀂󰀀, 󰀂󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀂󰀈-󰀂󰀃󰀀 John (Zizioulas), Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀇󰀆󰀁󰀇󰀇, 󰀁󰀈󰀈 Johnson, Hilde F.: 󰀉󰀀 Jones, Robert P.: 󰀅󰀄 Kabila, Joseph: 󰀉󰀇 Kasimov, Harold: 󰀁󰀄󰀆 Kasper, Walter, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀉󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀀 Kendall, Daniel: 󰀁󰀃󰀄 Khrushchev, Nikita: 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀅 Kibangula, Trésor: 󰀉󰀈, 󰀁󰀀󰀄 Kiblinger, Kristin Beise: 󰀁󰀃󰀇 Kiir Mayardit, Salva: 󰀁󰀁, 󰀉󰀀, 󰀉󰀂 Kirill: see Gundaev, Patriarch Klein, Melanie: 󰀁󰀇󰀀, 󰀁󰀇󰀉 Koch, Kurt, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Kosicky, Piotr H.: 󰀁󰀂 Kratochvíl, Petr: 󰀂󰀃󰀀 Kuczynski, Pablo: 󰀂󰀈 Kupny, Jozef: 󰀁󰀅󰀅 La Bella, Gianni: 󰀂󰀂 Lacan, Jacques: 󰀁󰀆󰀉-󰀁󰀇󰀀 Lado, Ludovic: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Lambriniadis: see Elpidophoros, Metropolitan Layama, Kobine: 󰀉󰀄 Lederach, John Paul: 󰀂󰀀󰀈 Legorreta, José: 󰀂󰀆 Le Morhedec, Erwan: 󰀁󰀅󰀃 Leo XIII, Pope: 󰀁󰀂󰀃 Léonard, André-Joseph: 󰀆󰀅 Letta, Enrico: 󰀈󰀄 Liberati, Carlo: 󰀁󰀅󰀂 Liberti, Luis: 󰀃󰀃 Limbaugh, Rush: 󰀆 Llull, Ramon: 󰀁󰀃󰀈 Löwy, Michael: 󰀆 Lombard, Louisa: 󰀉󰀃 Lopez Obrador, Andres Manuel: 󰀂󰀇

236

INDEX OF PERSONS

Louth, Andrew: 󰀁󰀇󰀆 Lucien-Brun, Jean: 󰀂󰀀󰀉 Lukudu Loro, Paulino: 󰀉󰀀 Luther, Martin: 󰀆󰀆 Machar, Riek: 󰀁󰀁, 󰀉󰀀 Macri, Mauricio: 󰀄󰀃 Maduro, Nicolas: 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀅 Magarshack, David: 󰀁󰀉󰀂 Magellan, Ferdinand: 󰀈, 󰀅󰀀, 󰀆󰀇 Magister, Sandro: 󰀂󰀀󰀉 Mailleux, Paul: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Makariy (Maletych), Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀈󰀄 Maletych: see Makariy, Metropolitan Malula, Joseph, Cardinal: 󰀉󰀇 Mancinelli, Maria: 󰀈󰀄 Manoussakis, John Panteleimon: 󰀁󰀇󰀇 Manuel II Palaiologos, Emperor: 󰀁󰀈 Marcoccia, Rafael: 󰀄󰀀 Marx, Reinhard, Cardinal: 󰀄, 󰀆󰀅 Mary, André: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Matovina, Timothy: 󰀅󰀂 Matsoukas, George E.: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Mattonai, Pietro: 󰀂󰀂󰀆 Mayrargue, Cédric: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Mazzolari, Primo: 󰀈󰀀 Mehlman, Jeffrey: 󰀁󰀆󰀉 Meimaris, Theodoros A.: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Mele, Pierluigi: 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Melloni, Alberto: 󰀁󰀆󰀁 Merkel, Angela: 󰀈󰀀, 󰀈󰀄 Merrigan, Terrence: VII, 󰀁󰀇, 󰀁󰀂󰀇, 󰀁󰀂󰀉, 󰀁󰀃󰀄, 󰀁󰀃󰀅 Merton, Thomas: 󰀂󰀀󰀅 Methol Ferré, Alberto: 󰀆󰀃 Meyendorff, John: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Michel, Serge: 󰀈󰀈 Mobutu, Joseph: 󰀉󰀇 Monsengwo Pasinya, Laurent, Cardinal: 󰀅, 󰀆󰀅, 󰀉󰀇 Montagna, Diana: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Montero, Francisco Javier: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Morales, Evo: 󰀂󰀈 Morozzo della Rocca, Roberto: 󰀉, 󰀉󰀆, 󰀁󰀁󰀅 Moschetti, Daniele: 󰀉󰀁 Muller, John P.: 󰀁󰀆󰀉 Mussolini, Benito: 󰀂󰀁󰀀

Napier, Wilfrid, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀀󰀂 Ndaywel e Nziem, Isidore: 󰀉󰀇-󰀉󰀈 Nebel, Mathias: 󰀂󰀀󰀇 Nenna, Enrico: 󰀄󰀀 Nicholas I, Pope: 󰀁󰀇󰀂 Nicholas of Myra (The Wonderworker): 󰀁󰀉󰀄 Nociti, Antonello: 󰀂󰀂󰀅 Noll, Mark A.: 󰀅󰀁 Notaras, Loukas: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Notaro, Armando: 󰀂󰀁󰀁-󰀂󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀁󰀄 Nyandeng de Mabior, Rebecca: 󰀁󰀁 Nzapalainga, Dieudonné, Cardinal: 󰀉󰀄 Obama, Barack: 󰀉, 󰀁󰀂, 󰀅󰀃, 󰀅󰀆 O’Collins, Gerald: 󰀁󰀃󰀄 O’Malley, Seán Patrick, Cardinal: 󰀅, 󰀆󰀅 Onufriy: see Berezovsky, Metropolitan Orlandis Rovira, José: 󰀄󰀀 Overberg, Kenneth R.: 󰀂󰀀󰀇 Pacelli, Eugenio: see Pius XII, Pope Pacini, Andrea: 󰀁󰀆󰀁 Palazzini, Pietro, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀅󰀂 Palma, Ester: 󰀁󰀈󰀉 Papadakis, Aristeides: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Papandreou, Damaskinos: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Parolin, Pietro, Cardinal: 󰀅, 󰀈-󰀉, 󰀁󰀁󰀃, 󰀁󰀁󰀅, 󰀁󰀂󰀀, 󰀂󰀂󰀆 Paul VI (Montini), Pope: 󰀂󰀀, 󰀁󰀄󰀃, 󰀁󰀈󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀁󰀆-󰀂󰀁󰀇, 󰀂󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀃󰀁 Pell, George, Cardinal: 󰀅, 󰀆󰀅 Peres, Shimon: 󰀁󰀀 Petito, Fabio: 󰀈󰀄 Petrini, Carlo: 󰀂󰀂󰀅 Philaret: see Denysenko, Nicholas E., Patriarch Photius, Patriarch: 󰀁󰀇󰀂 Picciaredda, Stefano: VII, 󰀁󰀀, 󰀈󰀇 Pieper, Moritz: 󰀁󰀉󰀀 Pieris, Aloysius: 󰀁󰀃󰀁 Piñera, Sebastián: 󰀂󰀈 Pius XI (Ratti), Pope: 󰀂󰀁󰀈 Pius XII (Pacelli), Pope: 󰀁󰀈, 󰀄󰀄, 󰀅󰀈, 󰀂󰀁󰀈-󰀂󰀁󰀉 Plato: 󰀇󰀆

INDEX OF PERSONS

Poe, Edgar Allan: 󰀁󰀇󰀀 Polo Torok, Verónica: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Pottier, Bernard: 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Pound, Marcus: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Preston, Andrew: 󰀅󰀂 Przywara, Erich: 󰀆󰀃, 󰀈󰀂 Puente, Armando: 󰀃󰀁 Putin, Vladimir: 󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀈󰀇, 󰀁󰀉󰀀-󰀁󰀉󰀃 Race, Allan: 󰀁󰀄󰀆 Rambachan, Anantanand: 󰀁󰀄󰀇 Raphael: 󰀇󰀆 Ratsiraka, Didier: 󰀉󰀆 Ratzinger, Joseph, Cardinal (see also: Benedict XVI): 󰀁󰀇, 󰀆󰀂, 󰀁󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀅 Rebora, Clemente: 󰀇󰀆 Reddick, John: 󰀁󰀆󰀉 Reichberg, Gregory M.: 󰀂󰀀󰀇 Reno, Russell Ronald :󰀆󰀀 Riccardi, Andrea: 󰀈-󰀉, 󰀁󰀂, 󰀅󰀇, 󰀆󰀃, 󰀈󰀇, 󰀁󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀁󰀅, 󰀁󰀁󰀇, 󰀁󰀆󰀆 Ricci, Matteo: 󰀆󰀇, 󰀁󰀀󰀇, 󰀁󰀁󰀃 Richardson, William: 󰀁󰀆󰀉 Riddell, J. Barry: 󰀈󰀇 Rivera, Salvador: 󰀂󰀅 Roberts, James: 󰀁󰀉󰀆 Roccucci, Adriano: 󰀁󰀄 Rodriguez Maradiaga, Oscar Andrés, Cardinal: 󰀄, 󰀆󰀅 Romero, Oscar Arnulfo: 󰀄󰀃 Rossano, Pietro: 󰀁󰀆󰀁 Rotola, Giuliana: VII, 󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀉 Rouhani, Hassan: 󰀁󰀉 Rourke, Thomas R.: 󰀃󰀁 Rowlands, Anna: 󰀂󰀀󰀄 Rubin, Sergio: 󰀃󰀃, 󰀆󰀂-󰀆󰀃 Sanchez, Pedro: 󰀄󰀃 Sappia, Caroline: 󰀂󰀆 Sarah, Robert, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀀󰀂 Scaglione, Fulvio: 󰀈 Scalfari, Eugenio: 󰀃 Scannone, Juan Carlos: 󰀃󰀁, 󰀆󰀃, 󰀁󰀄󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀁, 󰀂󰀀󰀄 Scaramuzzi, Iacopo: 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Scavo, Nello: 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Schiavazzi, Piero: 󰀈

237

Schmitt, Carl: 󰀁󰀇󰀈 Schramm, Lucas: 󰀇󰀉 Schuman, Robert: 󰀇󰀀, 󰀇󰀉 Servais, Paul: 󰀂󰀆 Sherrard, Philip: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Shishkov, Andrey: 󰀁󰀇󰀆 Sibre, Olivier: 󰀁󰀂󰀃 Siddiqui, Ataullah: 󰀁󰀄󰀇 Silk, Mark: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Sing-Na, Philippe: 󰀉󰀄 Sisci, Francesco: 󰀁󰀀󰀅 Skorka, Abraham: 󰀁󰀇-󰀁󰀈 Slawinski, Henryk: 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Soros, George: 󰀈󰀈 Spadaro, Antonio: VII, VIII, 󰀃-󰀅, 󰀇-󰀈, 󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀆, 󰀁󰀈, 󰀅󰀀-󰀅󰀁, 󰀆󰀇, 󰀈󰀅-󰀈󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀀 Spyrou: see Athenagoras, Patriarch Stalin, Joseph: 󰀁 Steinfels, Peter: 󰀄󰀇 Stoeckl, Kristina: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Stroop, Christopher: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Su, Anna: 󰀁󰀂󰀄 Suu Kyi, Aung San: 󰀁󰀀 Symeonides, Nathanael: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Tanner, Norman: 󰀁󰀂󰀉 Tarawalie, Festus: 󰀉󰀂 Tarp, Finn: 󰀈󰀇 Tello, Rafael: 󰀃󰀁 Theokritoff, Elizabeth: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Thermos, Vasileios: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Thiandoum, Hyacinthe, Cardinal: 󰀈󰀇 Tilche, Andrea: 󰀂󰀂󰀅 Tjørhom, Ola: 󰀁󰀆 Tomasi, Silvano M.: 󰀂󰀁󰀈, 󰀂󰀂󰀄 Tong Hon, John, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀂󰀂 Tornielli, Andrea: 󰀅, 󰀄󰀇, 󰀉󰀁 Troy, Jodok: 󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀁󰀉 Trump, Donald: 󰀃, 󰀉, 󰀄󰀇, 󰀅󰀂-󰀅󰀄, 󰀅󰀆, 󰀅󰀈, 󰀁󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Tshisekedi, Felix: 󰀉󰀉 Ugarte, Manuel: 󰀂󰀇 Valente, Gianni: 󰀄󰀇, 󰀆󰀃, 󰀁󰀁󰀇 Vallely, Paul: 󰀆󰀂, 󰀁󰀂󰀇 Van Espelo, Dorine: 󰀂󰀁

238

INDEX OF PERSONS

Van Reeth, Jan: 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Van Reybrouck, David: 󰀉󰀇 Vasconcelos, José: 󰀂󰀅 Vasileios, Archimandrite: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Vasiljevic, Maxim: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Vasily III of Moscow: 󰀁󰀉󰀀 Venturini, Karen: 󰀁 Verstraeten, Johan: VII, 󰀁󰀉󰀉, 󰀂󰀀󰀅 Videla, Jorge Rafael: 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Viganò, Carlo Maria: 󰀄󰀇 Villar, Diego: 󰀄󰀁 Viscuso, Patrick: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Vlachos, Hierotheos, Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Vladimir of Kiev: 󰀁󰀉󰀃 Vyacheslav, Ivanov: 󰀁󰀉󰀇

Whapples, Robert M.: 󰀅 Whelton, Michael: 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Willaime, Jean-Paul: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Williams, Esther: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 Wojtyla, Karol: 󰀈󰀇, 󰀈󰀈 (see also John Paul II, Pope) Wolton, Dominique: 󰀃, 󰀁󰀃, 󰀆󰀃, 󰀆󰀆-󰀆󰀇, 󰀇󰀀-󰀇󰀁 Wooden, Cindy: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Wouters, Jan: VII, 󰀂, 󰀂󰀀󰀉, 󰀂󰀁󰀆

Wang, Chao: 󰀁󰀀󰀆 Ware, Kallistos, Metropolitan: 󰀁󰀇󰀅, 󰀁󰀈󰀈 Wei, Louis Tsing-Sing: 󰀁󰀂󰀃 Weigel, George: 󰀅󰀀 Welby, Justin: 󰀁󰀅, 󰀉󰀁-󰀉󰀂

Zenari, Mario: 󰀉 Zen Ze Kiun, Joseph, Cardinal: 󰀁󰀁󰀇 Ziavoula, Robert: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 Zizioulas, John: see John, Metropolitan

Xi Jinping: 󰀁󰀀󰀅, 󰀁󰀁󰀃 Younan, Munib: 󰀁󰀅 Young, Alexey: 󰀁󰀇󰀃

Index of Toponymes Abu Dhabi: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀉󰀄, 󰀁󰀄󰀅, 󰀁󰀆󰀂, 󰀁󰀆󰀆, 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Addis Ababa: 󰀉󰀁 Afghanistan: 󰀇󰀉 Africa: VII, 󰀆󰀄, 󰀈󰀇-󰀁󰀀󰀄, 󰀁󰀁󰀆, 󰀁󰀅󰀉, 󰀁󰀉󰀂, 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Al Azhar: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀉󰀄, 󰀁󰀄󰀅, 󰀁󰀆󰀂-󰀁󰀆󰀃, 󰀁󰀆󰀅-󰀁󰀆󰀆, 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Albania: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀆󰀆, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀁󰀃󰀉-󰀁󰀄󰀀, 󰀁󰀄󰀆 Alexandria: 󰀁󰀇󰀇, 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Algiers: 󰀁󰀆󰀇 Amazon: 󰀃󰀆, 󰀄󰀀-󰀄󰀂 America (see also Latin America, North America, South America, United States of America): 󰀅, 󰀈, 󰀄󰀈-󰀅󰀆, 󰀅󰀈, 󰀆󰀄, 󰀁󰀇󰀇, 󰀁󰀈󰀉 Amsterdam: 󰀁󰀇󰀆 Andes: 󰀃󰀆, 󰀄󰀁, 󰀄󰀄 Antioch: 󰀁󰀇󰀇 Aparecida: 󰀂󰀆, 󰀃󰀂, 󰀃󰀇-󰀃󰀉, 󰀆󰀃, 󰀁󰀀󰀀 Argentina: 󰀄-󰀅, 󰀁󰀄-󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀇-󰀃󰀀, 󰀃󰀃-󰀃󰀄, 󰀃󰀇-󰀃󰀈, 󰀄󰀂-󰀄󰀄, 󰀅󰀄, 󰀅󰀇, 󰀆󰀂-󰀆󰀃, 󰀆󰀉, 󰀇󰀁, 󰀁󰀁󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀂, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Armenia: 󰀁󰀄, 󰀆󰀆, 󰀁󰀅󰀅 Asia: 󰀅󰀈-󰀅󰀉, 󰀆󰀄, 󰀆󰀉, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀁󰀁󰀃, 󰀁󰀁󰀆, 󰀁󰀂󰀉󰀁󰀃󰀀, 󰀁󰀃󰀈, 󰀁󰀄󰀆, 󰀁󰀅󰀄, 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Assisi: 󰀁󰀇, 󰀆󰀂, 󰀉󰀅, 󰀁󰀃󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀁, 󰀁󰀆󰀀-󰀁󰀆󰀁 Athens: 󰀇󰀆 Athos: 󰀁󰀈󰀉 Auschwitz: 󰀆󰀇 Australia: 󰀅, 󰀆󰀅 Austria: 󰀇󰀉 Azerbaijan: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀆󰀆, 󰀁󰀄󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀈 Baku: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀁󰀄󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀉-󰀁󰀆󰀀 Baltimore, MD: 󰀆󰀅 Bangladesh: 󰀁󰀀-󰀁󰀁, 󰀁󰀉 Bangui: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀀, 󰀈󰀇, 󰀉󰀃-󰀉󰀄 Bari: 󰀁󰀆, 󰀁󰀉󰀄 Beijing: 󰀁󰀀󰀉-󰀁󰀁󰀀, 󰀁󰀁󰀄-󰀁󰀁󰀅, 󰀁󰀁󰀇, 󰀁󰀂󰀂, 󰀁󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀁󰀁 Belarus: 󰀁󰀉󰀁

Belgium: 󰀆󰀅, 󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀃󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀂 Benin: 󰀉󰀆 Berlin: 󰀆󰀆 Bolivia: 󰀆, 󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀈, 󰀃󰀈, 󰀁󰀀󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀆 Bombay: 󰀄 Bosnia and Herzegovina: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀆󰀆, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀁󰀃󰀉, 󰀁󰀄󰀂 Boston, MA: 󰀅 Brazil: 󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀆, 󰀃󰀃, 󰀃󰀉, 󰀆󰀃, 󰀆󰀆 Brussels: 󰀆󰀅, 󰀇󰀄, 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Buenos Aires: 󰀃-󰀆, 󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀅, 󰀁󰀇, 󰀃󰀃, 󰀃󰀇, 󰀄󰀃, 󰀆󰀂-󰀆󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀂 Bulgaria: 󰀁󰀄, 󰀆󰀆 Burma (see also Myanmar): 󰀆󰀅 Bursa: 󰀁󰀇󰀇 Cabo Verde: 󰀅󰀇 Cairo: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀁󰀄󰀀, 󰀁󰀆󰀂, 󰀁󰀆󰀆, 󰀂󰀁󰀁 Calais: 󰀇󰀉 Canossa: 󰀁󰀁 Canterbury: 󰀁󰀅, 󰀉󰀁 Caribbia: 󰀂󰀆-󰀂󰀇, 󰀃󰀀-󰀃󰀁, 󰀃󰀈-󰀄󰀀, 󰀄󰀃-󰀄󰀄, 󰀆󰀃 Central African Republic: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀁, 󰀆󰀅, 󰀈󰀇, 󰀈󰀉, 󰀉󰀃-󰀉󰀄, 󰀁󰀀󰀁, 󰀁󰀅󰀉 Chania: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Chieti: 󰀁󰀇󰀇 Chile: VII, 󰀅, 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀇-󰀂󰀈, 󰀃󰀃, 󰀃󰀈, 󰀄󰀁-󰀄󰀃, 󰀆󰀅 China: VII, 󰀉, 󰀂󰀁, 󰀅󰀈, 󰀆󰀄, 󰀈󰀈, 󰀁󰀀󰀅-󰀁󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀂󰀆 Chisinau: 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Colombia: 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀇-󰀂󰀈, 󰀃󰀈-󰀃󰀉 Colombo: 󰀂󰀀, 󰀁󰀄󰀃 Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC or RDC): 󰀅, 󰀆󰀅, 󰀈󰀉, 󰀉󰀆-󰀉󰀉, 󰀁󰀀󰀄 Constantinople: 󰀁󰀃, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀄, 󰀁󰀇󰀂-󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀁󰀇󰀇, 󰀁󰀇󰀈-󰀁󰀉󰀃, 󰀁󰀉󰀅 Costa Rica: 󰀃󰀈

* ‘Rome’, ‘Vatican’, ‘Holy See’, and localities of Publishing Houses are not included.

240

INDEX OF TOPONYMS

Crete: 󰀁󰀇󰀄, 󰀁󰀇󰀈-󰀁󰀈󰀃 Crimea: 󰀁󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀉󰀃 Cuba: 󰀉, 󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀆-󰀂󰀇, 󰀅󰀃, 󰀅󰀇-󰀅󰀈, 󰀁󰀆󰀉, 󰀁󰀈󰀉, 󰀁󰀉󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀅, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Cyprus: 󰀇󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Czech Republic: 󰀇󰀉, 󰀁󰀅󰀄 Detroit, MI: 󰀆󰀅 Dominican Republic: 󰀃󰀉 Donbass: 󰀁󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀉󰀃 Dublin: 󰀈󰀀 Ecuador: 󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀆, 󰀃󰀈, 󰀁󰀀󰀀 El Salvador: 󰀂󰀅, 󰀃󰀈 Eritrea: 󰀇󰀉 Estonia: 󰀆󰀆, 󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Europe: VII, 󰀅, 󰀇-󰀈, 󰀄󰀄, 󰀄󰀈, 󰀅󰀀, 󰀅󰀂, 󰀅󰀄, 󰀅󰀈-󰀅󰀉, 󰀆󰀁-󰀈󰀆, 󰀈󰀈, 󰀁󰀀󰀇, 󰀁󰀁󰀂-󰀁󰀁󰀆, 󰀁󰀂󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀂-󰀁󰀅󰀆, 󰀁󰀅󰀉, 󰀁󰀆󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀁-󰀁󰀉󰀂, 󰀂󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀁󰀄󰀂󰀁󰀆, 󰀂󰀂󰀈-󰀂󰀃󰀀 Exeter: VII Fatima: 󰀆󰀇 Finland: 󰀁󰀇󰀆 Florence: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀁󰀇󰀃 Foggia: VII France: 󰀆󰀇, 󰀇󰀀-󰀇󰀁, 󰀇󰀉, 󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀂󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀂-󰀁󰀅󰀄 Frankfurt: 󰀆󰀂 Freising: 󰀄 Gabon: 󰀉󰀆 Gambia: 󰀉󰀂 Gaza: 󰀁󰀀 Geneva: 󰀇󰀉, 󰀂󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀃 Georgia: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀆󰀆, 󰀁󰀄󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀈-󰀁󰀅󰀉 Germany: 󰀅, 󰀅󰀀, 󰀆󰀁-󰀆󰀃, 󰀆󰀅-󰀆󰀆, 󰀇󰀉-󰀈󰀀, 󰀈󰀂, 󰀈󰀄 Greece: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀂, 󰀆󰀇-󰀆󰀈, 󰀇󰀁, 󰀇󰀅, 󰀈󰀁, 󰀁󰀅󰀃󰀁󰀅󰀄, 󰀁󰀇󰀁, 󰀁󰀈󰀀-󰀁󰀈󰀁, 󰀁󰀈󰀃, 󰀁󰀉󰀂-󰀁󰀉󰀅 Guatemala: 󰀂󰀅, 󰀃󰀈 Haiti: 󰀇 Havana: 󰀉, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀁󰀉󰀀-󰀁󰀉󰀁, 󰀁󰀉󰀄, 󰀁󰀉󰀆 Helsinki: 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Honduras: 󰀄, 󰀂󰀆, 󰀃󰀈, 󰀆󰀅 Hong Kong: 󰀁󰀁󰀀, 󰀁󰀁󰀇, 󰀁󰀂󰀂 Hungary: 󰀇󰀉, 󰀁󰀅󰀄-󰀁󰀅󰀅, 󰀂󰀁󰀃

India: 󰀄, 󰀆󰀅, 󰀁󰀄󰀁 Iraq: 󰀉, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀇󰀉 Ireland: 󰀅󰀀, 󰀆󰀇, 󰀇󰀁 Israel: 󰀁󰀀, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀁󰀈 Istanbul: 󰀁󰀄󰀁, 󰀁󰀄󰀇, 󰀁󰀇󰀀, 󰀁󰀈󰀃, 󰀁󰀈󰀅 Italy: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀆, 󰀅󰀀, 󰀅󰀄-󰀅󰀅, 󰀅󰀈, 󰀆󰀁-󰀆󰀆, 󰀆󰀈, 󰀇󰀁, 󰀇󰀆, 󰀇󰀉-󰀈󰀁, 󰀈󰀄, 󰀈󰀈, 󰀉󰀁, 󰀁󰀄󰀄, 󰀁󰀄󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀂󰀁󰀅󰀄, 󰀁󰀆󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀀 Jerusalem: 󰀆󰀇, 󰀁󰀆󰀉, 󰀁󰀇󰀇 Juba: 󰀉󰀀 Kaliningrad: 󰀁󰀇󰀆 Kangemi: 󰀁󰀀󰀁 Kazakhstan: 󰀁󰀉󰀁 Kenya: 󰀈󰀇, 󰀉󰀄, 󰀁󰀀󰀁 Khartoum: 󰀉󰀁 Kiev: 󰀁󰀄, 󰀁󰀈󰀄-󰀁󰀈󰀅, 󰀁󰀉󰀃 Kinshasa: 󰀅, 󰀉󰀇-󰀉󰀈 Kolymbari: 󰀁󰀈󰀀 Korea: 󰀁󰀀󰀆, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Koudoukou: 󰀁󰀀, 󰀉󰀄 Krakow: 󰀆󰀇 Lampedusa: 󰀇, 󰀆󰀈-󰀆󰀉, 󰀁󰀅󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀈, 󰀂󰀀󰀃-󰀂󰀀󰀄 Latin America: VII, 󰀇, 󰀂󰀅-󰀄󰀅, 󰀅󰀃-󰀅󰀄, 󰀅󰀇-󰀆󰀄, 󰀈󰀅, 󰀉󰀉, 󰀁󰀀󰀀, 󰀁󰀁󰀃-󰀁󰀁󰀄, 󰀂󰀂󰀇 Latvia: 󰀆󰀆 Lesbos/Lesvos: 󰀃, 󰀇, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀆󰀇-󰀆󰀉, 󰀉󰀁, 󰀁󰀅󰀃󰀁󰀅󰀄, 󰀁󰀈󰀃, 󰀂󰀀󰀄 Les Cayes: 󰀇 Liberia: 󰀉󰀂 Lisbon: 󰀆󰀇, 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Lithuania: 󰀆󰀆 Los Angeles: 󰀈, 󰀅󰀇, 󰀆󰀅 Louvain: VII Lund: 󰀁󰀅, 󰀆󰀇 Luxembourg: 󰀈󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Macedonia: see North Macedonia Madagascar: 󰀉󰀆 Madrid: 󰀈, 󰀆󰀆-󰀆󰀇 Malawi: 󰀉󰀆 Malta: 󰀇󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀀, 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Mauritius: 󰀇 Mecca: 󰀁󰀆󰀆 Mechelen: 󰀆󰀅

INDEX OF TOPONYMS

Medellín: 󰀂󰀆, 󰀃󰀂-󰀃󰀄, 󰀃󰀆, 󰀃󰀉 Mexico: 󰀃, 󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀇, 󰀃󰀅, 󰀃󰀈, 󰀄󰀄, 󰀅󰀃 Milan: VII, 󰀆󰀅 Moldova: 󰀁󰀉󰀁, 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Monaco: 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Montecassino: 󰀆󰀂 Morocco: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀉, 󰀁󰀅󰀁, 󰀁󰀅󰀆-󰀁󰀅󰀇 Moscow: VIII, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀁󰀇󰀀-󰀁󰀉󰀇, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Mount of Olives: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Mozambique: 󰀉󰀆 Mukachevo: 󰀂󰀁󰀅 Munich: 󰀄 Myanmar: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀀-󰀁󰀁, 󰀂󰀀-󰀂󰀁 Nairobi: 󰀁󰀀󰀁 New York: 󰀁󰀆󰀆, 󰀂󰀀󰀉, 󰀂󰀁󰀃, 󰀂󰀁󰀉-󰀂󰀂󰀀, 󰀂󰀂󰀄 Nicaragua: 󰀂󰀅, 󰀃󰀈 Nigeria: 󰀈󰀉, 󰀉󰀉 Normandy: 󰀁󰀈 North America: 󰀄󰀉, 󰀅󰀄, 󰀅󰀇,󰀅󰀉, 󰀁󰀁󰀃-󰀁󰀁󰀄 North Macedonia: 󰀇, 󰀆󰀆, 󰀇󰀈 Palestine: 󰀂󰀁󰀂, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Panama: 󰀂󰀇, 󰀃󰀈 Paraguay: 󰀂󰀅-󰀂󰀆, 󰀂󰀈, 󰀃󰀉, 󰀁󰀀󰀀 Paris: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀆󰀆-󰀆󰀇, 󰀂󰀃󰀀 Pergamon: 󰀁󰀇󰀆 Peru: 󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀇-󰀂󰀈, 󰀃󰀃, 󰀃󰀆, 󰀃󰀈, 󰀄󰀁-󰀄󰀂 Phanar: 󰀁󰀇󰀀, 󰀁󰀈󰀁-󰀁󰀈󰀂, 󰀁󰀈󰀅 Philadelphia, PA: 󰀆󰀅 Piedmont: 󰀆󰀃 Poland: 󰀅󰀀, 󰀆󰀁, 󰀆󰀆-󰀆󰀇, 󰀇󰀉, 󰀁󰀅󰀄-󰀁󰀅󰀅 Port-Louis: 󰀇 Portugal: 󰀆󰀇, 󰀇󰀁, 󰀁󰀂󰀃 Prague: 󰀆󰀆, 󰀈󰀅, 󰀁󰀅󰀅 Puebla: 󰀃󰀅-󰀃󰀆 Puerta Maldonado: 󰀄󰀂 Rabat: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀅󰀁, 󰀁󰀅󰀆 Ravenna: 󰀁󰀇󰀄-󰀁󰀇󰀈 Regensburg: 󰀁󰀈-󰀁󰀉, 󰀁󰀆󰀆 Rhodes: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Rio de Janeiro: 󰀇, 󰀄󰀄 Romania: 󰀇, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀆󰀆 Russia: 󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀄-󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀂, 󰀆󰀁, 󰀁󰀇󰀄, 󰀁󰀇󰀆-󰀁󰀇󰀉, 󰀁󰀈󰀃-󰀁󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀈󰀆-󰀁󰀈󰀇, 󰀁󰀈󰀉-󰀁󰀉󰀇, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Rwanda: 󰀉󰀀

241

Sahara: 󰀁󰀀󰀃 San Marino: 󰀂󰀁󰀆 Santa Cruz: 󰀆, 󰀁󰀀󰀀, 󰀂󰀀󰀆 Santiago de Cabo Verde: 󰀅󰀇 Santiago de Chile: 󰀅, 󰀂󰀅, 󰀄󰀃 Sarajevo: 󰀁󰀃󰀉-󰀁󰀄󰀃 Senegal: 󰀈󰀇, 󰀉󰀉 Sierra Leone: 󰀉󰀂 Slovakia: 󰀇󰀉, 󰀁󰀅󰀅 Smolensk: 󰀁󰀇󰀆 Somalia: 󰀇󰀉, 󰀈󰀈-󰀈󰀉 South America: 󰀅󰀄, 󰀁󰀅󰀅 South Sudan: 󰀁󰀁-󰀁󰀃, 󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀁, 󰀈󰀉-󰀉󰀂 Spain: 󰀂󰀉, 󰀄󰀃, 󰀆󰀆, 󰀇󰀁, 󰀈󰀁, 󰀁󰀂󰀃 Sri Lanka: 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀, 󰀁󰀄󰀃-󰀁󰀄󰀄 St. Louis, MO: 󰀆󰀅 Stockholm: 󰀆󰀇 Strasbourg: 󰀆󰀆-󰀆󰀇, 󰀆󰀉-󰀇󰀀, 󰀇󰀆, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀂󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀂󰀈 Subiaco: 󰀆󰀂 Sudan: 󰀇󰀉, 󰀉󰀃 Sweden: 󰀁󰀅, 󰀆󰀅-󰀆󰀆, 󰀇󰀁, 󰀇󰀉 Syria: 󰀉, 󰀁󰀂, 󰀁󰀄, 󰀇󰀉, 󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀀󰀆, 󰀁󰀉󰀀 Szeged: 󰀁󰀅󰀅 Taiwan: 󰀁󰀁󰀄, 󰀁󰀁󰀆 Tegucigalpa: 󰀄 Telmessos: 󰀁󰀈󰀁 Tibet: 󰀁󰀂󰀅 Tirana: 󰀁󰀃󰀉-󰀁󰀄󰀀, 󰀁󰀄󰀆 Togo: 󰀉󰀆 Tonga: 󰀇 Triveneto: 󰀈 Turin: 󰀈, 󰀆󰀅 Turkey: 󰀁󰀉, 󰀆󰀁, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀈󰀀, 󰀈󰀄, 󰀁󰀄󰀁, 󰀁󰀄󰀃, 󰀁󰀅󰀄, 󰀁󰀇󰀃, 󰀁󰀈󰀂, 󰀁󰀈󰀈 Uganda: 󰀈󰀇, 󰀉󰀄, 󰀁󰀀󰀁 Ukraine: 󰀁󰀄-󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀂, 󰀇󰀈, 󰀁󰀅󰀅, 󰀁󰀇󰀄-󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀁󰀈󰀃-󰀁󰀈󰀇, 󰀁󰀉󰀀-󰀁󰀉󰀃, 󰀁󰀉󰀅-󰀁󰀉󰀆, 󰀂󰀂󰀃 United Arab Emirates (UAE): 󰀁󰀉, 󰀁󰀄󰀅, 󰀁󰀅󰀁, 󰀁󰀆󰀂 United Kingdom: 󰀁󰀇󰀁 United States of America (USA): VII, 󰀂, 󰀆-󰀉, 󰀂󰀁, 󰀂󰀆, 󰀄󰀇-󰀆󰀁, 󰀆󰀄-󰀆󰀅, 󰀈󰀄, 󰀈󰀈, 󰀁󰀀󰀆, 󰀁󰀁󰀃-󰀁󰀁󰀇, 󰀁󰀂󰀅, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Uruguay: 󰀂󰀆, 󰀃󰀉, 󰀆󰀃

242

INDEX OF TOPONYMS

USSR: 󰀁󰀀󰀇-󰀁󰀀󰀈, 󰀁󰀁󰀅, 󰀂󰀀󰀅

Xinjiang: 󰀁󰀂󰀅

Venezuela: 󰀂󰀂, 󰀂󰀈, 󰀃󰀈-󰀃󰀉, 󰀁󰀂󰀀, 󰀂󰀂󰀂 Venice: 󰀆󰀅 Vienna: 󰀆󰀆, 󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀁󰀉󰀄, 󰀂󰀀󰀇, 󰀂󰀁󰀁 Villanova, PA: VII Volokolamsk: 󰀁󰀇󰀆, 󰀁󰀈󰀆, 󰀁󰀉󰀅

Yalta: 󰀁󰀀󰀅 Yangon: 󰀇, 󰀂󰀀 Yugoslavia: 󰀂󰀁󰀃

Warsaw: 󰀆󰀆-󰀆󰀇 Washington, D.C.: 󰀅󰀃, 󰀅󰀇, 󰀁󰀆󰀆

Zagreb: 󰀆󰀆 Zaire (see also Congo, Democratic Republic): 󰀉󰀆

List of Contributors Sandra Arenas is assistant professor in the Faculty of Theology of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. She has a PhD in Systematic Theology from the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of the KU Leuven (Belgium). Areas of interest include the history and theology of the Second Vatican Council, especially in ecclesiology and ecumenical theology. She has published a number of books and articles on the Chilean and Latin American contributions to the Second Vatican Council. Jan De Volder is an historian with a PhD in Social and Religious History. His area of interest is the geopolitics of churches and religions. Currently he occupies the Cusanus Chair ‘Religion, Conflict and Peace’ of the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of the KU Leuven (Belgium). Recent publications include Martyr: Vie et Mort du Père Jacques Hamel (󰀁󰀉󰀃󰀀-󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) (Paris: Le Cerf, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) and Cardinal Mercier in the First World War: Belgium, Germany and the Catholic Church (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀈). Massimo Faggioli is full professor in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at Villanova University (Philadelphia, USA). He worked in the John XXIII Foundation for Religious Studies in Bologna between 󰀁󰀉󰀉󰀆 and 󰀂󰀀󰀀󰀈. He was co-chair of Vatican II Studies for the American Academy of Religion between 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀂 and 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇. Recent publications include The Rising Laity: Ecclesial Movements since Vatican II (New York: Paulist Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) and Catholicism and Citizenship: Political Cultures of the Church in the Twenty-First Century (Collegeville MN: Liturgical Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). Brandon Gallaher is senior lecturer of Systematic and Comparative Theology at the University of Exeter. He holds a D.Phil. in Systematic Theology from the University of Oxford. His publications include Freedom and Necessity in Modern Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆) and [with Paul Ladouceur] The Patristic Witness of Georges Florovsky: Essential Theological Writings (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). He is currently working on a research project on the contemporary theological and pastoral challenges to Orthodoxy from modernity including sexual and religious diversity and religious authority. He is a deacon of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and served in June 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀆 in Crete at the Eastern Orthodox Holy and Great Council as a Theological Subject Expert in the Ecumenical Patriarchate Press Office. Agostino Giovagnoli is full professor of Contemporary History at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milan, Italy). From 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀁 to 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀅 he was

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

president of the Italian Society for the Study of Contemporary History. He has published several books on the Catholic Church and China, including, as co-editor with Elisa Giunipero, L’Accordo tra S. Sede e Cina: I cattolici cinesi tra passato e future [The Agreement between the Holy See and China: Chinese Catholics between Past and Future] (Rome: Urbaniana University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉). Marco Impagliazzo is full professor of Contemporary History at the University of Roma III, Italy. He has a PhD in Social and Religious History. His field of scholarly expertise is the Catholic Church in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, more generally, religion in Europe and the relations between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in the Mediterranean area in contemporary times. He has studied and published on the massacre of Armenians and Christians during the First World War. His most recent studies have focussed on the contemporary history of Rome, from religious and civil perspectives, and on the pontificate of John Paul II. Terrence Merrigan is professor of the Theology of Interreligious Dialogue in the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the KU Leuven (Belgium) and the coordinator of an interdisciplinary research project dedicated to the theme of The Crisis of Religion and the Problem of Catholic Self-definition. He is the editor of The Past, Present, and Future of Theologies of Interreligious Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀇). Stefano Picciaredda teaches Contemporary History and History of Contemporary Europe at the University of Foggia (Italy). His field of scholarly expertise is social and religious history, and he has investigated the political, social and cultural aspects of the Christian presence in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. Among his publications: Le Chiese indipendenti africane. Una storia religiosa e politica del Novecento (Rome: Carocci Editore, 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀃). Giuliana Rotola holds a master’s degree in Comparative, European and Transnational Law from the University of Trento (Italy). She was a research intern in the European Centre for Space Law and conducted independent research in the Institut du Droit de l’Espace et des Télécommunications for her dissertation on militarization, weaponization and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. From February to July 󰀂󰀀󰀁󰀉 she was a research intern at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies at the KU Leuven (Belgium). Johan Verstraeten is full professor of Theological Ethics in the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the KU Leuven (Belgium). His areas of specialization are Catholic social thought, peace ethics, business ethics, and leadership and spirituality. He is founder of Ethical Perspectives and a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Catholic Social Thought.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

245

Jan Wouters is full professor of International Law and International Organizations at the KU Leuven (Belgium), where he also holds the Jean Monnet Chair ad personam and serves as the director of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and the Institute for International Law, and as president of the Council for International Policy. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia University (New York) and visiting professor at Sciences Po, LUISS, and the College of Europe. He has published widely on international and EU law, global governance, and international organizations.

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N.V. PEETERS S.A., WAROTSTRAAT

• GEDRUKT

OP DUURZAAM PAPIER

50, B-3020 HERENT

- ISO 9706