The Ethics of the Enactment and Reception of Cruciform Love: A Comparative Lexical, Conceptual, Exegetical, and Theological Study of Colossians ... ... Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe) 316155261X, 9783161552618

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Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament · 2. Reihe Herausgeber / Editor Jörg Frey (Zürich)

Mitherausgeber/Associate Editors Markus Bockmuehl (Oxford) ∙ James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala) Tobias Nicklas (Regensburg) ∙ Janet Spittler (Charlottesville, VA) J. Ross Wagner (Durham, NC)

487

John Frederick

The Ethics of the Enactment and Reception of Cruciform Love A Comparative Lexical, Conceptual, Exegetical, and Theological Study of Colossians 3:1 – 17

Mohr Siebeck

John Frederick, born 1981; MDiv from Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary; PhD in New Testament from the University of St. Andrews; 2011 – 13 adjunct lecturer in New Testament Greek at the University of St. Andrews; 2014 – 17 Assistant Professor of New Testament, Theology and Worship at Grand Canyon University; currently lecturer in New Testament at Trinity College Queensland and Flinders University. orcid.org/OOOO-OOO3-3375-7061

ISBN 978-3-16-155261-8 / eISBN 978-3-16-156357-7 DOI 10.1628 / 978-3-16-156357-7 ISSN 0340-9570 / eISSN 2568-7484 (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 2. Reihe) The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019  Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, Germany.  www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was printed by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany.

For my spiritual fathers in the faith, Rt. Rev. William Murdoch (Bishop Bill), Rev. Roger Nelson, and Matthew Kruse

Acknowledgements I am thrilled to have this monograph published with Mohr Siebeck eight years after having started research on it as a doctoral dissertation at the University of St. Andrews. The outstanding initial editorial feedback I received from HansJosef Klauck was profoundly helpful to me. It reinvigorated me, providing a fresh passion for a project which had sat on the back burner for a few years between a successful viva and its preparation for publication. In particular, Professor Klauck’s comments concerning my use of the Two Ways motif and his editorial critique concerning the topics of Epicureanism and the Greco-Roman sources in my original draft proved to be invaluable in the revision of the manuscript. I am likewise grateful to Jörg Frey for his acceptance of the project into the WUNT II series, and for the work of Henning Ziebritzki at Mohr Siebeck for providing such a quality publishing experience for me during the past year of work on this book. Additionally, I want to acknowledge my sincere thanks to Christoph Heilig who provided initial feedback and encouraged me to submit my manuscript to Mohr Siebeck. During the doctoral years I found the keen insights of my supervisor Grant Macaskill to be perfectly concise and eminently helpful. One of the key, coveted skills of theologians and biblical scholars is the ability to express profound ideas in a small amount of words and space. Most of us are on a steep learning curve when it comes to the development of this skill but Grant is uniquely gifted in this regard. He provided really valuable insights and critique that allowed me to develop as a researcher, exegete, writer, and thinker. He was truly a great Ph.D supervisor in every way. I would also like to thank him for being the first person (among many since) to call into question my propensity for using the comma as a frequent, aesthetic accoutrement, rather than as a legitimate grammatically-correct mark of punctuation. Without him this manuscript would no doubt have had hundreds more commas than it does in the current version. I wish to thank Michael Gorman whose groundbreaking work on cruciformity as the narrative substructure of the Pauline epistles has inspired much of the theological foundations of chapter 7 of this book. More specifically, I was encouraged and honored by his willingness to read the entire manuscript and offer his own substantial commentary on it prior to my Ph.D viva in 2014. During that same period of time in my doctoral years I was likewise greatly

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Acknowledgements

blessed by Scott Hafemann’s warm, humble Christian demeanor and his pastoral spirit. Without his example and hospitality it would have been a lot harder to finish the course on the road to the viva. It is not an overstatement to say that without my wife, Tara, I would not have begun, continued, or completed this project. I learned about the love of God and the profound, familial nature of the church through the study of the New Testament; but it has become experientially – one could say even sacramentally – true for me through the profound moments of life lived with Tara and our children, Liam and Zoe. Thanks to: Carole, John, Joel and Jackie – and to all of my family and extended family. Sincere thanks to my friends, colleagues, and co-workers in ministry Jonathan Sharpe and Andrew Zonoozi for their Christlike humility and cruciform commitment. I experienced Jesus in profound ways in my time of planting a weird, mystic, Anglican church with Jon, Andrew, and a handful of other holytroublemakers in Phoenix. I’ll always have fond memories of the worship, community, Taizé singing, and the experience of encountering the peace, presence, and person of Jesus Christ at Christus Victor Anglican Church. Much of the theology of this book was worked out and lived out within the context of worship with our little congregation of university students, friends, and family. I can honestly say that, thanks to that congregation, most of my clothing and possessions carry the permanent scent of Nag Champa incense, an aroma pleasing to the Lord (and to me). Finally, I’m grateful for all of my colleagues at Trinity College Queensland, and especially to Paul Hedley Jones and Leigh Trevaskis for welcoming my family into a new season of life and learning in Brisbane. It has been so refreshing to be a part of team where I feel valued and supported in my research, teaching, and in the life of faith. Sincere thanks go to all of the above, but of course, any oversights or errors in this manuscript belong to myself alone. I am exceedingly grateful to God and to my friends, family, colleagues and publishers for the privilege to conduct this work and to share it with the church.

Table of Contents Acknowledgments ....................................................................................... VII Abbreviations ............................................................................................. XIII

Chapter 1: Literature Review and Methodology...............................1 A. Thesis Statement ........................................................................................ 1 B. General Introduction .................................................................................3 C. Literature Review ...................................................................................... 5 D. Methodology, Authorship and Furthering the Quest ............................... 27

Part 1 – Comparative Lexical and Conceptual Studies Chapter 2: Aristotle and Colossians .................................................. 37 A. Introduction ............................................................................................. 37 B. Key Themes in Aristotle’s Ethical System in the Nicomachean Ethics ................................................................................ 38 C. Aristotle’s Key Ethical Themes Compared with those of Colossians and Paul ................................................................... 41 D. Is the Author of Colossians Transforming an Aristotelian Virtue Ethic into a New Christian Key? .................................................. 51

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E. Comparative Study of the Virtues and Vices of Col 3:12, 14 with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ............................................................... 54 F. Conclusion – Peripateticism and Colossians ........................................... 58

Chapter 3: The Cynics and Colossians .............................................. 61 A. Introduction to the Cynic Literature ........................................................ 61 B. General Components of Cynic Philosophy and Ethics ............................ 63 C. A Comparison of Ethical Thought in the Cynics and Colossians............. 66 D. Was Paul a Cynic? .................................................................................. 68 E. Comparative Lexical Study of the Cynic Sources and Colossians ........... 69 F. Conclusion – The Cynics and Colossians ................................................ 79

Chapter 4: The Stoics and Colossians ................................................ 81 A. Introduction and General Overview of Stoicism ...................................... 81 B. Was Paul a Stoic? – Comparing the Central Programmatic Elements of Stoic Ethics to Colossians and the Pauline Ethical Tradition .................................................................. 92 C. Comparative Lexical Study of the Stoics and Colossians ........................ 95

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Summary – Comparative Studies of Hellenistic Sources and Colossians .............................. 133 Chapter 6: The Septuagint and Colossians ..................................... 137 A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 137 B. Background Information on the Septuagint ........................................... 138

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C. Comparative Study of the Virtues of Col 3:12 with the Septuagint ........ 141 D. Comparative Study of the Vices of Col 3:5, 8 with the Septuagint ......... 152 E. Conclusion – The Septuagint and Colossians ........................................ 161

Chapter 7: Philo, Ben Sira and Colossians ..................................... 163 A. Philo ...................................................................................................... 163 B. Ben Sira ................................................................................................. 177

Part 2 – The Governing Ethical Pattern of Thought in Colossians Chapter 8: The Ethics of the Enactment and Reception of Cruciform Love ............................................................ 187 A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 187 B. Col 1:9–10 – Walking, Working, and Growing in the Knowledge of God Himself .................................................................... 189 C. Col 1:28 – Everyone Perfect in Christ ................................................... 193 D. Col 2:1–2, 18–19 – United by Means of Love to Grow with the Growth that Comes from God ........................................ 196 E. Col 3:1–17 – The Communal Bond which Leads to Perfection ................................................................................ 207 F. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 219

Chapter 9: Conclusion .......................................................................... 221

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Bibliography ............................................................................................... 225 Index ........................................................................................................... 239

Abbreviations Primary Sources De Finibus

Ench. Diss. DL Lives NE Or./Discourses

Cicero. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. Vol. XVII. Translated by H. Harris Rackham et al. 30 Volumes. LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914). Epictetus, Enchiridion Epictetus, Dissertations/Discourses Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Dio Chrysostom. Discourses. Translated by J. W. Cohoon (Or. 1-31) and H. Lamar Crosby (Or. 32-80). 5 Volumes. LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932–1955).

Select Journals, Monograph Series and Commentaries Journal, monograph, and commentary series abbreviations follow the SBL Handbook of Style. The following list includes some journals not accounted for in the SBL Handbook and a selection of other sources cited in this book, some of which may be less well known in the discipline. AB AGJU ANRW ARSHLL BDAG BJS BJSSPM

Anchor Bible Commentary Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt Acta Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. Brown Judaic Studies Brown Judaic Studies: Studia Philonica Monographs

XIV BRS BSS BZNW COQG CPh CSAP DBZAW EGGNT FPh FRLANT HCS HNT HTKNT JHS JJS JMT JR JSP KTAH LCM LEC MCL MTZ ÖTK PFES Phr RNT RUSCH SCLT SCHNT Sem SHC

Abbreviations

Biblical Resource Series Black Sea Studies Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft Christian Origins and the Question of God Classical Philology Continuum Studies in Ancient Philosophy Durham Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament Forum Philosophicum Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments Hellenistic Culture and Society Handbuch zum Neuen Testament Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament The Journal of Hellenic Studies Journal of Jewish Studies Journal of Moral Theology The Journal of Religion Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha Key Themes in Ancient History Loeb Classical Monographs Library of Early Christianity Martin Classical Lectures Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift Ökumenischer Taschenbuchkommentar zum Neuen Testament Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society Phronesis Regensburger Neues Testament Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought Through the Sixth Century Studia ad corpus hellenisticum Novi Testamenti Semeia Studies in Hellenistic Civilization

Abbreviations

SHR SIPOT SMGP SNTW SUNT SVF

Studies in the History of Religions Studies in Personalities of the Old Testament Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie Studies of the New Testament and Its World Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta

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Chapter 1

Literature Review and Methodology A. Thesis Statement A. Thesis Statement

This book will demonstrate that the use of the ethical catalogue form in Colossians 3 is an example of a common literary form which appears in almost every tradition of the first century Hellenistic world. I will show that the author of Colossians has taken up this literary form as means of communicating and demonstrating the Christian ethical life to a largely Gentile audience (in Colossae) in a way that would be conducive to effective communication, easy comprehension, and successful acquisition and appropriation. Furthermore, I will argue, contrary to Troels Engberg-Pedersen,1 that neither the apostle Paul nor the author of Colossians adopts a Stoic underlying pattern of thought. Neither, as N.T. Wright has recently proposed, does Paul2 appropriate or transform a more Aristotelian virtue ethic in the form of an “ancient pagan theory of virtue” on account of his use of the catalogue form.3 Such claims cannot merely be assumed but instead must be demonstrated by a detailed study of both the correspondences of the words themselves in their various contexts, and the function of those words within the texts, systems, and patterns of thought of each particular author. Based upon the results of my lexical and conceptual studies and the theological conclusions which stem from them, I will demonstrate that Aristotelian, Stoic, and Cynic categories and concepts do not form the basis upon which the author of Colossians was constructing his ethical vision for the church. Instead I will demonstrate that Paul and Colossians is working from an inherited Jewish Two Way ethic which views ethical realities in terms of binary opposites. Any study in the provenance and pattern of ethics in Colossians must seek to identify: (1) the primary source of influence of the ethical language, lexemes,

Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000). N.T. Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon: An Introduction and Commentary (TNTC 12; Leicester: InterVarsity Press, 1988). Wright considers the apostle Paul to be the author of Colossians. Cf. N.T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God. 2 Vols. (COQG 4; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013). 3 N.T. Wright, Virtue Reborn (London: SPCK, 2010), 207, 209. 1 2

2

Chapter 1: Literature Review and Methodology

and content of the epistle, and (2) the nature of the driving, ethical, programmatic pattern of thought which controls the mechanics and logic of the ethical system of Colossians. Concerning the primary sources of influence for the ethical words in Colossians, in regard to the virtues, I will argue that the author chooses ethical terms which describe the character of the Righteous and the character of God in the LXX and Jewish sources, and which can also be derived from the sayings and descriptions of God and Jesus Christ in the New Testament. In regard to the vice terms, I will show that the author derives the bulk of his terms from his inherited Jewish ethical tradition, but feels free to incorporate new terms of vice from his cultural milieu when they are commensurable with his governing Jewish moral vision. These terms are then embedded in a Hellenistic literary catalogue form. Whenever there is true overlap between Paul, Colossians, and the Greco-Roman moralists, these parallel terms show themselves to be incidental, common, all-purpose, ubiquitous ethical words which are widely used in antiquity and across ethical schools of thought. The terms, on the other hand, which show themselves to be entirely absent from Colossians (and from the generally accepted Pauline epistles) prove to be of the greatest importance. For, these Greco-Roman terms which are unattested in Colossians represent those key systematic and programmatic themes, such as εὐδαιµονία and ἀπάθεια, which drive the governing ethical patterns of thought of the ethical schools of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Cynicism. Therefore, the presence of ubiquitous incidental words across Greco-Roman schools and in Colossians essentially tells us nothing more than that the author of Colossians was situated in the same first century context as those Hellenistic writers who use these widely shared and generally agreed upon terms of moral virtue and vice. The absence of the key systematic and programmatic terms, however, in concert with the absence of other crucial Greco-Roman doctrines, concepts, and ideas makes it exceedingly unlikely that the author of Colossians was operating under an Aristotelian, Cynic, or Stoic pattern of thought. Through an exegesis of Colossians, I will demonstrate that the pattern of thought which drives the ethic of the epistle is neither the eudaemonia nor middle way of Aristotle, nor the principles of life in accord with nature or apathy of the Stoics or the Cynics. Rather, the moral vision of Colossians is governed by a pattern of thought that aims at the perfection of the Christian through the enactment and reception of cruciform love in the context of the church. For Colossians, ethics and ethical catalogues are not personal codes that lead to individualistic behaviorism and perfectionism, but rather the blueprint of communal Christlike transformation through cruciform participation in divine love.

B. General Introduction

3

B. General Introduction B. General Introduction

This book constitutes a study of the ethical material in Colossians 3 which is widely considered to represent the form of the ethical catalogue. Additionally, it is a study of the ethical patterns of thought within which catalogues of this sort appear and function in a selection of literary works of antiquity by the authors who are antecedent to and roughly contemporaneous with Colossians. The study of the use of ethical catalogue forms in the New Testament received significant attention in the 20th century, primarily through four major German works by Alfred Seeberg, Anton Vögtle, Siegfried Wibbing, and Ehrhard Kamlah.4 Additionally, a major work was published in English by E.G. Selwyn5 as a part of his commentary on 1 Peter in 1947. Lastly, several short articles throughout the 20th century were published, including a notable and oft-quoted contribution arguing for a Hellenistic provenance by Burton Easton Scott6 and an equally influential article by M. Jack Suggs which argued for a New Testament connection with the Scriptural theme of the Jewish Two Ways.7 More recently, scholars such as Abraham Malherbe, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Michael Thompson, N.T. Wright, Allan Bevere, and James W. Thompson have contributed new research which has both expanded old theories and put forth new theories concerning the nature of the apostle Paul’s interaction with Hellenistic ethics and his Jewish heritage.8 4 Alfred Seeberg, Der Katechismus der Urchristenheit. Leipzig: A. Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Georg Böhme), 1903; Anton Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament: Exegetisch, religions- und formgeschichtlich untersucht (NTA 16; Münster: Aschendorff, 1936); Siegfried Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament: und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der QumranTexte (BZNT 25; Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1959); Ehrhard Kamlah, Die Form der katalogischen Paränese im Neuen Testament (WUNT 7; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1964). 5 E.G. Selwyn, The First Epistle of St. Peter (London: MacMillan, 1947). 6 Burton Easton Scott, “New Testament Ethical Lists,” JBL 51 (1932): 1–12. 7 M. Jack Suggs, “The Christian Two Ways Tradition: Its Antiquity, Form, and Function,” in Studies in New Testament and Early Christian Literature, ed. David Edward Aune (NovTSupp 33; Leiden: Brill, 1972), 60–74. 8 Abraham J. Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition (SBLSBS 12; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977); Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (LEC 4; Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986); Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989); Abraham J. Malherbe, “Greco-Roman Religion and Philosophy and the New Testament,” in The New Testament and Its Modern Interpreters, ed. Eldon Jay Epp and George W. MacRae (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 1–26; Abraham J. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Part 2, Principat, 26.1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992), 267–333; Abraham J. Malherbe, “Stoics,” in The Oxford Companion to the Bible, ed. Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic

4

Chapter 1: Literature Review and Methodology

While the standard classic works and the more recent contributions on the topic provide illuminating facts concerning the NT catalogues in their historical context, there is a definite need for new works which investigate not only the literary form and the lexical content of the NT ethical lists but also the governing ethical patterns of thought in which these catalogues are situated. These new studies need to operate from an updated and more critical methodology which takes into account not only the lexical correspondences and parallels, but also the semantic value of words, phrases, forms, and ideas within their own contexts and within the operative and respective systems of thought of the author of each particular work. The earlier 20th century studies tend to look broadly across massive spans and schools of Hellenistic and Jewish thought in the first century, and across several books and authors of the NT. This approach is useful to an extent, especially in tracing the phenomenon and frequency of word usage and forms across a variety of contemporaneous schools. However, as my methodology section will indicate, this former approach, with its heavy emphasis on comparative lexical study alone, does not sufficiently provide information concerning the operative ethical underlying pattern of thought of any of the authors or texts in question. Therefore, this book is an attempt at both continuity and progress: continuity, in terms of working from a conscious effort to proceed with the level of rigor and detail in comparative lexical study that was indicative of the works of the past centuries; progress, in that by focusing on a more narrow group of texts than past studies, I intend to uncover both the lexical similarities and differences between the terms in the literary works, and also to understand how these words function in their various contexts. My study will focus specifically on the Epistle to the Colossians 3:5, 8, 12–17 and the ethical terms contained therein, in comparison with a selection of antecedent and contemporaneous Aristotelian, Cynic, Stoic, and Jewish works in order to determine: (1) the provenance of the literary form, (2) the source of influence for the ethical content of the catalogues of Col 3:1–17, and (3) the governing ethical pattern of thought which drives the usage of the ethical list in Colossians.

Philosophy (SHC 2; Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990); Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Stoicism in Philippians,” in Paul in His Hellenistic Context, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 256–90; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000); Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul, Virtues, and Vices,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook, ed. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003), 608–33; Michael Thompson, Clothed with Christ: The Example and Teaching of Jesus in Romans 12.1–15.13 (JSNTSup 59; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991); N.T. Wright, Virtue Reborn and N.T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God; Allan R. Bevere, Identity and the Moral Life in Colossians (JSNTSup 226; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003); James W. Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul: The Context and Coherence of Pauline Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012).

C. Literature Review

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The limitation of this study to Aristotelian, Cynic, Stoic, and Jewish works is intentional. The lack of engagement with Epicurean, Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Jewish pseudepigraphal sources should not be taken, however, to suggest a disregard for the importance of these sources as significant literary works of antiquity which would make a valuable contribution to the field of inquiry pursued in this book. Ideally, the works of Plutarch, the fragments of Epicurean writings, and the Jewish Pseudepigrapha, as well as the Latin works of Seneca–at the very least–would have been included. Yet, given that the methodological praxis of this work revolves around a deep (rather than a surface level, merely lexical) engagement with each original source surveyed, the breadth of sources consulted must be limited in advance.9

C. Literature Review C. Literature Review

1. Studies dealing with Ethical Catalogues and Comparative Lexical Studies 1.1. Alfred Seeberg In 1903 Alfred Seeberg published the work Der Katechismus der Urchristenheit, which argued, in part, that the ethical content of the Pauline epistles was derived from a fixed oral teaching called “the ways.” This early Christian paradosis was said to have been constructed from Jewish sources and traditions which were themselves derived from the moral contents of OT passages such as Leviticus 18 and 19. Though Seeberg’s hypothesis for a fixed ethical teaching (“the ways”) as the source of the Pauline paraenetic content seems to have been largely rejected (to the point of being called a “fiction”)10 and has been subsequently abandoned by scholars, it continues to offer some valuable prolegomena for any study of virtue and vice lists in the NT. Seeberg’s view that the NT ethical lists stem in part from a shared Jewish tradition of teaching which was rooted in the Scriptures as received through the early Christian faith communities is a point which has been frequently argued in several recent publications on Pauline ethics, and is becoming a dominant position in the field.11 However, Seeberg’s main argument, which proposes that the apostles (and specifically Paul) were drawing from a consciously-received and specifically 9 For an introduction to religious and philosophical movements contemporaneous with early Christianity beyond the ones considered in the current study see Hans-Josef Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity: A Guide to Graeco-Roman Religions (SNTW; Fortress: Minneapolis, 2003). 10 Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 109: “Die Fiktion eines Proselytenkatechismus erweist sich so auf Grund des vorliegenden Materials als unhaltbar.” 11 See esp. Bevere, Sharing in the Inheritance and Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul. My own research in this thesis will further strengthen this proposal.

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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Methodology

fixed form, is problematic and has not found modern scholarly support. The evidence presented in Seeberg’s work does not make the case for the necessity of, nor the existence of, a hypothetical orally-transmitted fixed form. Furthermore, there is no ground for claiming that in his use of the word διδαχή, “the apostle must have had ethical instruction in mind as the content.”12 The word almost certainly includes ethical content, but the evidence from the context of the passages in which it appears are either too general to limit its meaning to an exclusively ethical teaching (e.g. Rom 6:17; 1 Cor 14:6, 26) or actually seem to work against such an interpretation altogether by suggesting that what is meant is more doctrinal in nature (see Rom 16:17). Likewise, the idea that the Two Ways constitutes a conscious, fixed tradition rather than a shared, scripturally-based understanding of ethics, while clever, is not sustainable or necessary.13 Lastly, although Seeberg is correct to emphasize the certainly plausible notion of a shared ethical ethos amongst the NT authors and the early church in general (indeed, this seems to go without saying), he tends to rely far too heavily on lexical proofs which, upon further investigation, do not actually strengthen his thesis. For example, his claim that, based upon the common occurrence of the words πλεονεξία and πορνεία in Paul’s epistles, “we may assume that the catalogues of sins are based on a pattern, which belonged to the traditional material of the ways,”14 is flawed because in order to make this claim we would expect to encounter this pattern across the entire collection of ethical teachings in the NT. Yet we do not find this level of consistency in the NT. In fact, in the NT, the word πορνεία occurs, outside of the Gospels and the Pauline writings, only in the Book of Revelation. Therefore, instead of serving as support for the moral catechism theory (“the ways”) this lexical data actually works against it. Similarly, in the epistles, we encounter πλεονεξία only in Paul (6x) and 2 Peter (2x). If this word were drawn from a shared fixed oral tradition, should we not also expect it to appear in other major ethical portions from roughly contemporaneous works such as James and 1 Peter? While Seeberg helpfully discerns a pattern in the Kingdom of God sayings in the Pauline epistles, this does not add anything substantial to his moral catechism theory. He rightly points out that in 1 Cor 6:9, 10; 15:50 and Gal 5:21 the word βασιλείαν, when acting as the direct object of the verb κληρονοµέω, is, in every instance, non-articular. For Seeberg, this “proves beyond a doubt”15 that we are dealing with a fixed-formula. However, when we notice that the 12 Seeberg, “Moral Teaching: The Existence and Contents of ‘the ways’” in Understanding Paulʼs Ethics: Twentieth Century Approaches, ed. Brian S. Rosner; trans. Christoph W. Stenschke (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 55–75, 160. 13 Ibid., 162, 163. 14 Ibid., 164. 15 Ibid., 165.

C. Literature Review

7

verbal form of κληρονοµέω in conjunction with the word βασιλείαν occurs literally no-where else outside of Paul, then the entire idea of a shared fixedpattern becomes doubtful. How can we construct a hypothetical source for an apostolic pattern which is attested in only one NT author? 1.2. Burton Easton Scott Burton Easton Scott’s article from 1932 on the ethical lists of the NT is one which is still widely read today. It is one of the few articles that has been written specifically about the ethical catalogues of the NT. He writes: It is now generally recognised that the catalogs of virtues and vices in the New Testament are derived ultimately from the teaching of the Stoa. Lists of this kind are all but absent from the Old Testament and are scantily represented in the Talmud…In Hellenistic Jewish literature, however, such lists are fairly abundant and are elaborately developed by Philo…Early Greek Christianity, therefore, was in contact with the practice of teaching by using ethical lists on two sides, the Hellenistic Jewish and the pure Greek.16

The “generally recognised” fact of Stoic teaching as the ultimate source of the catalogues of virtue and vice is no longer generally recognized. Many of the most recent works, including my own research in this book, disagree quite substantially with Scott’s emphasis on Hellenistic sources (and particularly the Stoics) as the primary influencing agent and source for NT ethics.17 Nevertheless, the position, as we shall soon see, does still find some serious contemporary support, thus necessitating attention and reassessment in present day research on NT ethics, including my own in this book.18 Scott argues that there is no “original list” of NT virtues and vices, nor is there a fixed oral teaching which is informing the NT authors’ choice of ethical terms. He is certainly correct in this assertion. Overall, however, Scott’s methodology places too much emphasis on the catalogue form itself and as a result does not pay enough attention to OT ethics, ethical terms, and moral themes which occur outside of the catalogue form. Thus, Scott fails to see what most recent researchers and commentators now acknowledge to be a common and demonstrable theme, namely, the fact that Paul’s Jewish lineage, traditions, and the LXX/Hebrew Bible itself present several unique ethical terms and concepts that are central to Paul, which are incommensurable with and absent from the Greco-Roman sources and ethical schools most contemporaneous with Paul and the other authors of the NT.

16 17

Scott, “New Testament Ethical Lists,” 1. Cf. Bevere, Sharing in the Inheritance; Thompson, Moral Formation according to

Paul. 18 I am thinking particularly of the extensive work of Engberg-Pedersen on Paul and the Stoics.

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1.3. Anton Vögtle Anton Vögtle’s work on the virtue and vice lists in the New Testament is the first of three major comparative and lexical studies on the content and literary form of ethical catalogues. The fact that practically every recent commentary on a NT text that contains an ethical catalogue cites Vögtle’s work speaks volumes for the quality of his study and the extent of its influence across theological perspectives. Vögtle attempts to investigate the literary form, content, and potential sources for ethical lists across the entire NT and very broadly across the Hellenistic world. The work, therefore, treats an impressive and wide representation of Greco-Roman sources. However, on account of this breadth it lacks depth in the analysis of the context and systems of thought for the works and authors in which the lexemes appear.19 Vögtle does manage to offer one particularly helpful contextual/theological discourse in some depth, namely, his treatment of Pauline ethics. Here his proposals continue to find resonance and support in contemporary discussions, although not always as a result of direct influence of his own theories. In particular, Vögtle’s focus on the centrality of love as the center of Paul’s ethic is a point which continues to be a widely agreed upon majority position in the study of Pauline ethics.20 Vögtle expresses his exegetical and theological impression that, for Paul, love (ἀγάπη) is clearly given a preeminent status of which the other virtues seem to be manifestations. He writes: Der Apostel selbst hat 1 Kor 13 den inneren wesensnotwendigen Zusammenhang zwischen der einen unübertrefflichen Agape und der Vielheit ihrer Erscheinungsformen in einzigartiger Weise grundsätzlich ausgesprochen und illustriert.21

The apostle’s view of ἀγάπη, according to Vögtle is that love functions as the Quellpunkt (“source point”), Inbegriff (“epitome), Wurzel (“root”), Ziel (“aim”), and Ruhepunkt (“resting point”) of his ethical instruction.22 Vögtle’s incorporation of the theme of “union with Christ” as an “intrinsic element of Pauline ethics” is another abiding contribution which finds a central place in current studies on Paul’s ethics.23 Aside from this focus on reigning Pauline concepts, however, Vögtle’s monograph tends to be more focused on a thorough, comparative lexical study. He avoids the “Greek vs. Hebrew influence” fallacy and points out that the volume Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, V. Ibid., 132–33. Cf., for example, Wright, Virtue Reborn and Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul’s Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative Soteriology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009). 21 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 160. He argues that the love commandment is a mechanism that incorporates “eine Vielheit von Tugendbegriffen.” Cf. 158. 22 Ibid., 167. 23 Ibid., 132. 19 20

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and influence of popular moral-philosophical ethical material in the first century would have been massive and wide-reaching. Not only is it difficult, but in many ways pointless (“sinnlos”), thinks Vögtle, to attempt to determine a neat and artificial division between the various streams of influence in Paul.24 Nevertheless, Vögtle arrives at a position which emphasizes the Hellenistic influence on both the content and the catalogue form of Paul’s ethical lists. Dazu kommt, daß das Griechentum nicht nur allgemein der ethischen Terminologie des Christentums vorgearbeitet hat, sondern speziell im Katalogisieren und Systematisieren von Tugenden und Lastern, ethischen Habitualitäten und Qualitäten Einzigartiges geleistet hat; tatsächlich sind die aus griechischer Entwicklung erwachsenen Analogien am meisten unseren ntl Ken verwandt.25

At other points, Vögtle notes that many of the terms do appear in the Jewish sources. Yet, he argues, they never occur in any sort of literary style that is comparable to the catalogue form that commonly occurs in the NT.26 Vögtle’s methodology here exhibits the same problem as that of Scott, that is, it focuses too heavily on the literary form of the ethical catalogue rather than the words contained therein. This impedes and masks the evidence of the OT lexemes which are now agreed to have been informing Paul’s ethics, but which, of course, do not occur in an ethical catalogue, but rather in other forms, such as poetry, prose, or historical narrative. On account of this methodology based on literary form, Vögtle argues that the Covenant Book (Exod 20:21–23:19), the rules of the Mosaic Law, the re-giving of the Law, the “Fluchkatalog” in Deut 27:15–26, the general rules of Lev 19:11–18 “cannot be used as virtue and vice catalogs,” 27 and that the “Spruchliteratur” does not really offer any virtues (with a few exceptions). This line of thinking has generally not been accepted and, indeed, is in the process of being addressed in the most recent literature on the subject.28 It is now understood that the lack of the literary form of the ethical catalogue in the OT does not necessarily mean that the ethical content of the NT could not be derived from the OT’s concepts and words which were originally presented in other literary forms and genres such as proverbs and psalms. In fact, it will be shown that, in the NT, ethical content originally presented in one literary form in the OT can and is re-presented in a newer textual form, namely

24 Ibid., 201: “Es ist bei dem gemeinsamen Bestand eben überhaupt schwierig, wenn nicht im Einzelfall sinnlos, eine griechisch-heidnische und jüdische Traditionslinie des LKs säuberlich scheiden zu wollen.” 25 Ibid., 57. 26 Ibid., 4, 92. 27 Ibid., 93. 28 E.g., Bevere, Sharing in the Inheritance; Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul.

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the catalogue form, in the NT. This is because the catalogue form was a common and contextual style of writing and communication in the first century Greco-Roman world. It is Vögtle’s commitment to approaching his study from the standpoint and priority of the ethical-catalogue form (as opposed to singular words occurring outside of catalogues and their relation to broader theological, metaphorical, and literary themes) that causes him to make methodological and interpretive errors. Although he does not say this overtly, one gets the definite impression from Vögtle’s monograph that he believes the NT writers are taking over the Hellenistic forms and concepts29 and adjusting them according to a distinctly Jewish perspective. 1.4. Siegfried Wibbing While Vögtle’s work emphasizes more heavily the Hellenistic roots of the NT virtue and vice catalogues, Wibbing’s similarly titled monograph spends more time in the Jewish sources such as the Dead Sea Scrolls, and traditions such as the Jewish Two Way ethical scheme. Taken together, the works of Wibbing and Vögtle balance one another by providing a wide-scope of the Jewish and Hellenistic literature in comparison with the ethical portions of the NT. As with Vögtle, Wibbing is involved in a much broader study of sources here, but unlike Vögtle, the level of engagement with the Jewish sources is more substantive and revealing, especially in terms of his treatment of the theme of the Two Ways. Furthermore, Wibbing describes his method as a history-of-traditions approach which analyzes the lexical data via a comparison, not primarily of the form itself, but of the perceived structure-of-thought that constitutes the particular words used and the meaning of the passage as a whole.30 In his willingness to engage in this type of analysis, Wibbing’s approach is especially influential on my own methodology in terms of applying both a lexical (literary form and comparative-lexical) and conceptual (theological concepts and patterns of thought) analysis to the texts. Though he interacts frequently in his monograph with the earlier work of Vögtle, Wibbing is somewhat critical of any thesis which gives primary emphasis to Stoic and popular philosophical teachings as the source of NT ethical content on the basis of lexical parallels. He argues that many of the words are so frequent in the culture that they had become common, everyday terms. The point is well taken. Wibbing’s basic hypothesis is that the content of the NT catalogues are influenced primarily by the concepts and ways of thought of the OT and “Late Judaism,” delivered in contemporary Hellenistic forms (i.e. Haustafeln and 31

29 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 158: “Aus der reichen Nomenklatur des popularphilosophischen TKs nimmt Pl einige stimmungsmäßig verwandte T-begriffe, die eine aus der neu orientierten Sittlichkeit geforderte Tugend bezeichnen konnten, auf.” 30 Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 190. 31 Ibid., 30.

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ethical catalogues) which were ubiquitous in antiquity, occurring in the diatribes and popular philosophy of Hellenism, and the various works of Hellenistic Judaism.32 Wibbing implicitly adopts but does not explicitly state that the literary form of a text does not necessarily tell us how the author is viewing the content contained within nor how the author is using the content within the larger of context of the literary whole. This is a sophisticated distinction. Clearly, against Seeberg and in concert with Vögtle and nearly every recent commentator, Wibbing notes that there is not one common ethical source just as there is not one exact literary form used in each NT catalogue. Yet, after dealing fairly with the Hellenistic sources, it is clear that Wibbing sees the real influence for Paul’s ethic lying primarily in another domain. Wibbing is correct to claim, along with Vögtle, that the OT contains no true, Hellenistic-style virtue and vice lists such as those which appear in the popular philosophers and the NT.33 Indeed, he argues that in the OT we typically encounter moral rules presented with instructions (Exod 20; 22–23; 33; 34:10ff; Lev 18 and 19). In many cases (such as the Decalogue) these rules are stated in the negative and thus perhaps more precisely categorized as “Gebots- und Verbotsaufzählungen.”34 However, when Wibbing briefly notes in passing that the closest literary phenomenon to catalogue forms appear in the Prophets and, above all, in Proverbs (e.g. Prov 6:17–19) and that these ethical discourses have a strong connection to social unrighteousness,35 Wibbing too quickly moves on from an illuminating ethical source on the basis of a methodology which makes the litmus test for potential influential content too dependent on the necessity of its positive use of a shared literary catalogue form. This skimming of the OT content is the one major weakness of Wibbing’s work. However, the real focus of his monograph was not on the OT as a source but on the Jewish Two Way motif in the OT, and more specifically, concerning the use of OT sources in “Later” Judaism as evidenced by the literature in the Pseudepigrapha and the literature of the Dead Sea Scrolls. On these sources Wibbing’s work is masterful and comprehensive. Wibbing keenly discerns the Two Way ethical pattern which appears throughout the OT (Gen 18:19 “the way of God”; Jer 21:8 “the way of life and the way of death”; Ps 1:6 “the way of the righteous/wicked”; Ps 25:10 “the way of the LORD”; Ps 16:11 “the way of life”; Ps 119:33 “way of the commandments of God”; Prov 8:13 “the way of evil” etc.).36 However, his study stops 32 Ibid., 77–79. See Adam H. Becker and Annette Y. Reed, eds., The Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (TSAJ 95; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003) for a discussion about the significance of the phrase “Late Judaism” and the subsequent reason for its abandonment. 33 Ibid., 26. 34 Ibid., 24–25. 35 Ibid., 25. 36 Ibid., 34. All of these references were provided by Wibbing.

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short of providing an analysis of the original contexts of these Two Ways texts. Instead, Wibbing is far more interested in seeking to establish the OT roots of the Two Way ethic and then tracing its use in the Jewish literature that is closest in time to the composition of the NT documents. This general weakness in regard to a broader study of the contexts in which the words appear and the role they play in that context is one of the contributions of the current book. Vögtle’s initial work stressed ἀγάπη as the key concept for NT ethics but erred in emphasizing too greatly a Hellenistic priority for the source of the content of Pauline ethics. Wibbing provides a much-needed corrective to this by suggesting a Jewish priority for the source of Paul’s ethical content based on the traditional Jewish Two Way ethic but, like Vögtle before him, focuses primarily on lexical content without a suitable treatment of the function of the terms in the context of the works and patterns of thought of the authors that he is examining. Both works are indispensable but both are also incomplete. 1.5. Ehrhard Kamlah Kamlah’s work is the most recent of the three major published monographs on the ethical catalogues of the NT, and it is also the most abstract. The thesis is built upon the earlier work of K.G. Kuhn concerning the influence of Iranian cosmology and H. Michaud’s work on the influence of Iranian cosmological myths in the writings of Plutarch. Kamlah undertakes a form-critical investigation of a variety of sources from the OT, NT, Pseudepigrapha, Dead Sea Scrolls, Greco-Roman literature, and the Iranian Bundahishn in order to trace the presence and the development of a perceived shared dualistic cosmology and cosmogony. Ultimately, Kamlah is convinced that the NT shares in an influential cosmological myth which he calls the Zwei Engel (Two Angels) theory. He proposes that the root of the myth is contained initially in the Iranian sources but is mediated to the NT authors, not directly from the Iranian sources themselves, but through the intermediary of Judaism which has itself been influenced by this Iranian dualistic cosmology in its own writings and traditions. 38 Overall, Kamlah is closer to Wibbing in giving the Jewish (mostly Pseudepigraphal, but also some OT) texts priority as the initial source of influence for the NT ethical lists. Yet, he too is not so rigid as to be overly narrow in that he affirms the likelihood of a multiplicity of potential streams through which, for him, the Iranian Cosmology is influencing the scriptural writers.39 Kamlah’s study is thorough, interesting, and potentially illuminating but because of his form-critical approach, and his focus on a mythical form rather 37

Kamlah, Die Form der katalogischen Paränese, 49. Ibid., 176, 215. 39 Ibid., 150. 37 38

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than on the content of the lists,40 his results are of little significance to the particular task of this book. The focus of his monograph is on the history of the Iranian mythological Zwei Engel form as it morphs and appears in the various sources which he sees as either themselves influencing or displaying the same sort of influence that is apparent in the NT ethical documents. I do not wish to take up here the question of what influenced “sources behind the sources,” so to speak (i.e. to what extent Iranian mythology influenced Isaiah etc.), but to determine how the author of Colossians would have synchronically read and interpreted the LXX and later Jewish documents as self-contained complete texts in continuity with earlier and current streams of Jewish thought within the Hellenistic mission and milieu of the first century. I will note, however, that Kamlah’s methodology is questionable and assailable based on the fact that he uses post-Pauline and post-NT traditions (e.g. the Second century writer Mani,42 the heavily-redacted Bundahishn, and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, etc.) in order to establish his form-critical case for the all-pervasiveness of the Zwei Engel theory on Jewish/Christian thought. Kamlah’s vast study seems to discover Iranian mythology behind every text. This inflated level of influence is perhaps best seen when he asserts that the definitive “switch” from a Zwei Engel teaching to an overt Two Way teaching is clearest in the Pseudepigraphal Testament of Asher. This is a highly questionable and problematic text and does not warrant Kamlah’s confidence in it as the fulcrum of an argument for indirect and inherited Iranian influence in the early Christian catalogues and theology. This is especially so because of the abundant attestation of a well-established Two Way tradition which exists within Judaism and the Jewish Scriptures themselves quite apart from external Iranian mythology.43 Kamlah’s findings and analyses on the ethical thought of both Philo and the authors of the Dead Sea Scrolls (e.g. I QS 3) indicate that these, too, essentially adopt the Iranian cosmology and adapt it by putting it under a sovereign monotheistic Jewish God. He argues that Philo, 1QS3, and Paul (though in a variety of different ways) essentially insert the Zwei Engel dualistic framework into 41

40 Ibid., 1, fn.3: “Es geht in dieser Arbeit nicht um eine Studie der Ethik; sie befaßt sich also nicht primär mit den Inhalten der neutestamentlichen Kataloge. Es geht vielmehr um die Erfassung von deren Eigenart, um das, was sie bezwecken, um die Art, in der sie eingeführt, und ausgewertet werden, mit anderen Worten um ihre Form und ihre Funktion.” My emphasis. 41 Ibid., 2. 42 Ibid., 74–103 for an extensive discussion on Mani. 43 Ibid., 173: “Aber im Testamente Assers ist diese Fixierung deutlich eingetreten: Zum ersten Mal sehen wir hier den Übergang der Zwei-Engel-Lehre in das paränetische Schema der zwei Wege.”

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an anthropological, inner-man battle.44 But, having already noted that for him, the primary mediator of this Zwei Engel theory is the Jewish sources as they have been influenced by it, Kamlah is confusing and inconsistent when he speaks of the myth in ways that suggest direct or conscious influence. For example, when he discusses Paul’s contrast of the Spirit and Flesh in Gal 5:17 he claims that this: “ist eine mikrokosmische Anwendung der Zwei-Engel-Lehre.” Thus, while I am not convinced by Kamlah’s larger thesis, and do not incorporate his Two Angel developmental Iranian theory into my own work here, I do, however, agree with the general trajectory of scholarship which focuses more intently on Paul’s inherited Jewish Scriptural heritage. 1.6. M. Jack Suggs In 1972 Suggs proposed that the Two Ways tradition, evident in canonical and post-canonical literature such as the Didache, is based upon a thoroughly Jewish tradition. In addition, his view of the Two Ways tradition as a literary tool which contributed to the construction and defining of community identity is a helpful insight that is not commonly reflected upon in the relevant literature. In particular, Suggs argues that: “1 QS 3:13–4:26 preserves a sectarian tradition which is–both in content and in structure–markedly similar to the Christian Two Ways and provides irrefutable documentation of a Jewish precursor.”45 Suggs contends that the background to the Two Way material found in both 1QS and early Christian documents is derived from Judaism and the OT, and that this tradition has been infused with an eschatological element which, when combined with the inherited tradition, results in the ethically dualist nature of these lists. Although the nature of this dualism (that is, whether or not it refers to an anthropological dualism or to a merely functional, categorical, literary dualism) is not parsed out by Suggs, still, his suggestion offers much to work with and build upon. His formulation of the three-fold eschatological Two Way form in 1QS and the NT, consisting of a sharp dualistic introduction, followed by a double catalogue of virtues and vices, and completed by an eschatological admonition is a keen explication of the Two Way paradigm as it appears in these eschatological texts.46 Also exemplary in this study is Suggs’ concise explication of Kamlah’s Two Angel theory which both explains the basic contour of that earlier argument, and also interacts with it, combining it with his own three-fold paradigm of the Two Ways. The strength of Suggs’ theory, however, is that it in no way relies on Kamlah’s Iranian-influence theory but rather operates and stands on its own merit. Most importantly, Suggs makes a lasting contribution here to the discussion of the reception of the Two Ways paradigm 44 Kamlah wrote about: the dualism of 1QS3 on page 54; Philo on pages 115 and 204; and Paul on pages 44 and 48. 45 Suggs, “The Christian Two Ways Tradition,” 62. 46 Ibid., 64.

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of ethics in Judaism and the NT by demonstrating that the ethical appropriation of the Jewish Two Way scenario is in no way “post-apostolic” but rather is evident in the NT itself and in the antecedent and contemporaneous Jewish literature.47 The reception and appropriation by Paul and the author of Colossians of the Two Ways paradigm and the words often found therein is a foundational concept in the current study, and a central premise of this book. 1.7. James W. Thompson In the forty-year period between Suggs’ article and Thompson’s 2012 monograph, many commentaries and scholarly articles have been published on NT ethics. However, none of them are particularly relevant to an overview of a lexically-based study of Pauline ethics. Wibbing’s, Kamlah’s, and Suggs’ focus on the Jewish sources as the area of primary influence for Pauline and NT ethics has become a dominant position in the discipline in recent years. This is not to say that scholars have completely abandoned theses which propose a heavy influence of Hellenism on Paul’s ethic (as we shall see momentarily), but it is to say that the current field of scholarly inquiry into the question is far from the consensus-like, “generally recognised” Stoic opinion of Scott in 1932.48 Thompson writes: . . .despite the formal connections that scholars have observed, major differences between Pauline ethics and the ethics of the Hellenistic moralists suggest the limitations of Hellenistic morality as a consistent source of Pauline ethics or as the basis for the coherence of Paul’s ethical instructions.49

Noting the lack of central Hellenistic ethical concepts such as eudaemonia and the lack of emphasis on the cardinal virtues in Paul,50 Thompson concludes: “Although the form of virtue and vice lists in Paul resembles aspects of GrecoRoman moral instruction, little in the actual content of Paul’s lists is indebted to the Greco-Roman moralists.” 51 Rather, he argues, a comparative lexical study of the NT ethical lexemes with the LXX, and in particular with the Wisdom literature and the Holiness Code of Leviticus, reveals a clear connection to Jewish ethical streams of thought. Thompson demonstrates that the Pauline vices of πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, φαρµακεία, εἰδωλολατρία, and the Pauline virtues such as µακροθυµία are particularly present in LXX sources.52 The monograph Ibid., 73. Scott, “New Testament Ethical Lists.” 49 Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul, 11. 50 Ibid., 53; cf. 59, 89, 109. 51 Ibid., 109. 52 Ibid., 11, 33, 34, 85, 97, 99, 100, 109, 121–25, 131, 186–88. This perspective, which emphasizes the Jewish influence upon Paul as primary, proceeds from and is also observable in Bevere, Sharing the Inheritance. There Bevere argued that, in his ethics, Paul maintains a “fundamentally Jewish perspective on the moral life” (30; cf. 48–49; 59). He also notes 47 48

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is less successful, however, in demonstrating the degree to which these and other key terms are absent from the contemporaneous Greco-Roman sources. In many cases, the terms which are ubiquitously attested across the Second Temple collection of writings and the LXX, are entirely unattested in the relevant contemporaneous Greco-Roman literature. The present book offers a more thorough treatment of this aspect of the research and strengthens the overall force of this argument. Thompson’s position is rooted in the theory that: In his moral instructions, Paul undoubtedly depended on both Hellenistic and Jewish sources while at the same time omitting those aspects of both traditions that were not consistent with his gospel.53

This middle-way avoids novelty and over-simplicity while rightly reorienting the scholarly pursuit of Paul’s ethical provenance in a primarily, but not exclusively Jewish world of texts and traditions. Even in its brevity and broader style, written for a wide level of readers beyond the academy, Moral Formation according to Paul manages to deliver a convincing thesis which will be affirmed and authenticated by my own research. Where it does fall short, however, is in its indiscriminating use of certain sources, such as the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs as a means of making statements about Judaism.54 This text is now considered by many specialists to be a Christian composition, or at the very least a heavily redacted work. Greater caution and methodological intentionality should be exercised, therefore, to avoid the mistakes made by earlier generations of Pauline researchers in regard to the dating and accuracy of sources purporting to be indicative of Second Temple Judaism. Thompson’s work also suffers from the occasional piece of misinformation, such as the claim that sexual intercourse was “only for the sake of procreation” in many ancient Greco-Roman ethical streams when in reality, such a view is not frequent or indicative of Greco-Roman ethics generally, but rather is usually interpreted as the particularly Jewish nature of πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἰδωλολατρία, σπλάγχνον, οἰκτιρµός, µακροθυµία, and ταπεινοφροσύνη (200, 201, 202–10). Bevere, like Thompson, is not onesided. He notes the mixture of Jewish with more common, incidental Greco-Roman ethical terms like πάθος, ἐπιθυµία, χρηστότης and πραΰτης (209–10). He concludes on page 188: “Thus, it seems that while the form of the ethical lists can be found in Iranian dualism, Stoicism and Hellenistic philosophy, the content (sic) of the lists (as well as the form) reflect most adequately a Jewish framework.” – My own research will confirm and strengthen this point. 53 Ibid., 15. This is observable in my own distinction between both Paul and the author of Colossians’ use of common, incidental terms which were ubiquitous across Jewish and Greco-Roman ethical streams in antiquity, and, on the other hand, the absence in Paul, Colossians, and the NT of key programmatic and systematic terms, which comprise dominant Greco-Roman patterns of thought such as the Aristotelian middle way, eudaemonia, and the Cynic/Stoic concept of apathy. 54 Cf. James R. Davila, The Provenance of the Pseudepigrapha: Jewish, Christian, or Other (JSJSupp 105; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 181.

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somewhat of a Greco-Roman anomaly most often associated specifically with the Stoic Musonius Rufus. 2. The Influence of Hellenistic Philosophy on the Ethics of Colossians and Paul It will now be helpful to consider, in addition to the lexically-based ethical studies of Paul, a basic overview of the field and literature which represents the current state of scholarship that is concerned with the study of the relationship between Paul and Hellenism. I am seeking to articulate here the various perceptions in the scholarship of the nature and the extent of Hellenistic thoughts and ideas on Paul and the authors of the New Testament. 2.1. Troels Engberg-Pedersen Engberg-Pedersen has devoted many rigorously argued volumes to the topic of both Stoicism and the relationship of Stoic ethics to the thought of Paul. His work is less vague than N.T. Wright about his position concerning the relationship between Paul and the Stoics. It must be said at the outset that I am fairly certain that Wright himself would reject a taxonomy in which he is grouped with Engberg-Pedersen given his recent heavy and substantive critique of a good deal of Engberg-Pedersen’s work. 55 Wright can and should be distinguished here from Engberg-Pedersen in the sense that, while Wright argues for an overt transformation of Aristotelian virtue theory, and thus for the Pauline adoption of not merely words and phrases, but pagan virtue method itself, he does so, however, while firmly situating Paul within his Jewish context. The same cannot be said about the work and conclusions of Engberg-Pedersen. Engberg-Pedersen consistently argues for a position in which Paul’s ethics are rooted in and working from “a radicalized version, not only of Aristotelian ethics, but of Stoic ethics, too.”56 Furthermore, he asserts, on the basis of a

55 See Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, Ch. 14. Wright may also object to being grouped in this fashion since he argues on page 1377 that Paul: “has not derived his moral framework from the surrounding philosophies, but he is happy to recognise that at many points the Christian is called to walk the path of genuine humanness that others have sketched before – and perhaps to do so more effectively.” However, his suggestion of an adoption and transformation of Aristotelian virtue ethics does indeed constitute the reception and application of a pagan moral framework, albeit with a different framing story and telos. 56 Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 628. Cf. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “The Relationship with Others: Similarities and Differences Between Paul and Stoicism,” ZNW 96 (2005): 35–60 where he refers to Paul’s “Jewish and Stoic heritage.” It is this manner of speaking so generally of Paul as “Stoic” that I am challenging in this book. Even if Paul or the author of Colossians can be shown to engage with Stoic ideas, or even to absorb and take up ideas associated with Stoicism, this still does not warrant attributing to him the title “Stoic.” This point will, of course, be properly argued in due course. I do, however, agree

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perceived overlap in the Pauline and Stoic patterns of thought and due to the general use of the ethical catalogue form in Paul, that the “ancient virtue system”57 was “presupposed by Paul,”58 and that Paul’s thought should thus be interpreted according to Aristotelian “character ethics.”59 The main problem with this line of thinking is that it mixes and matches various Hellenistic philosophies under the guise of vague phrases like “ancient virtue system,” thus presenting what is essentially a variegated and complex assortment of often incommensurable Hellenistic schools of thought as if they were one unilateral entity. The fact of the matter (as we shall see from my own research) is that Stoic theories (and the plural matters here) of virtue, while not entirely detached from elements contained within Peripatetic and Platonic schools, are essentially incommensurable as systems in their totality. It makes no sense to claim that Paul is taking up Aristotle’s ethical system while simultaneously taking up a Stoic system. These are two distinct ethical systems, which are intricately tied to two distinct holistic world-views which are, in many ways, not interchangeable. Furthermore, in terms of pure lexical content, as Wibbing has noted, the NT does not present an ethic based upon the four cardinal virtues which are common in Hellenistic sources, which one would expect to be included in any inherited iteration of the adopted, albeit “transformed” Hellenistic “ancient virtue system.”60 2.2. N.T. Wright Wright, in his recent work, Virtue Reborn has argued that what Paul is arguing for “is a Christian form of the ancient pagan theory of virtue” which has been transformed and “thoroughly Christianized.”61 Although we should not assume that Wright is limiting this idea of “ancient pagan theories of virtue” to Aristotle’s texts and ideas alone, we can, on the basis of the abundant attention given to Aristotle’s ethical approach in Virtue Reborn and Wright’s own application of it, safely determine that the type of virtue theory that he has in mind with the spirit behind Engberg-Pedersen’s view that if the study of Stoicism is to be “engaged in by New Testament scholars (as it should be), it requires an intensive study of Stoicism in its own right.” 57 Ibid., 613. 58 Ibid., 613. 59 Ibid., 611. 60 Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 85. Cf. Seon Young Kim’s critique of Pedersen in “Paul and the Stoic Theory of Οἰκείωσις: A Response to Troels Engberg-Pedersen,” Novum Testamentum 58 (2016): 71–91, 71: “. . . Engberg-Pedersen’s treatment of Paul is insufficient both in its methodological refinement and in exegesis. Engberg-Pedersen’s comparison is dyadic and imbalanced. Moreover, it fails to grasp the complexities and intricacies of Paul’s view of the Jewish customs, the Law, scriptural traditions, and other culturally conditioned social norms.” 61 Wright, Virtue Reborn, 207, 209.

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is of the sort which is derived from Aristotle, either as a result of direct or indirect influence. In his newest work, Wright further confirms that this Aristotelian style of virtue ethics is indeed what he means by Paul’s reception and transformation of an “ancient pagan theory of virtue” when he states that Paul’s ethics are a “radical revision of Aristotelian virtue-theory.” The type and degree of influence that Wright proposes from the “ancient pagan theory” on Paul, is clearly not based simply on Paul’s purported taking up of mere words or phrases, but rather on the basis of an entire (yet transformed) underlying pattern of thought and Hellenistic ethical theory which revolves around “character development” and “virtue ethics.” Indeed, Wright overtly states that: As I have argued elsewhere, Paul does indeed teach what we may call a virtue ethic. He believes in moral progress, and in the hard work required to make it happen. He has, as it were, taken the classical tradition of ‘virtue’, all the way from Plato and Aristotle to Cicero and beyond, and has reworked it into a Christian key.62

and I hope, conversely, to have alerted New Testament ethicists to the fact that Jesus and his first followers can be understood within the context of ancient pagan theories of the moral life, not in terms either of straightforward borrowing or simplistic ‘topping up,’ but in terms of transformation of the theory itself.63

In chapter 2 of this book I will offer a complete argument against this view which shows the idea of an Aristotelian governing pattern in the thought of the author of Colossians to be unsustainable. 2.3. David deSilva In a similar manner, deSilva has argued that Paul does indeed use some GrecoRoman “topoi, metaphors, figures and forms,”64 and he concludes that Paul’s ethic is “not in any way specifically Christian” but rather represents “the conventional morality of the time,” and is consciously included by Paul to “reinforce Christianity’s commitment to conventional morality.”65 As we shall see, however, the evidence that we have does not allow us to draw these kinds of conclusions. In fact, in light of Paul’s rather negative view of worldly wisdom (1 Cor 1–2) and the author of Colossians’ comment about “philosophy” which is “not according to Christ” (Col 2:8) it is exceedingly unlikely that either Paul or the author of Colossians were concerned with adopting large portions of ethical content in an effort, as deSilva suggests, to make a “commitment” to conventional morality.

Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 1374, 1404. Wright, Virtue Reborn, 209. My emphasis. 64 David A. deSilva, “Paul and the Stoa: A Comparison,” JETS 38 (1995): 549–564, 563. 65 Ibid., 561. 62 63

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Still, deSilva’s suggestion that the influence of Stoicism on Paul “goes well beyond the realm of words” or that there are “several basic ideas shared in common between the two worlds of thought” is on target.66 For even the claim that Paul or the author of Colossians essentially took over some incidental Hellenistic content, ideas, and literary forms is not to say, with Engberg-Pedersen and Wright, that Paul is adopting an entire underlying, programmatic Hellenistic ethical system (however, deSilva is quite close to Wright and EngbergPedersen in terms of the degree of Hellenistic influence which he asserts to be operative for Paul). Despite my assertion of a more complex and overtly Jewish provenance for the ethic of Colossians (in company and fused in some ways with incidental Hellenistic words, thought, and ethics, but not an entire takeover of Hellenistic systems or programmatic concepts and words), I place myself within the stream of thought represented by deSilva on account of his ultimate willingness to assert the wholly different underlying influence of Paul’s reigning pattern of thought. For deSilva, this pattern retains its distinctly Jewish theological roots and is centered on Paul’s encounter with and experience of Jesus Christ rather than Stoic ideals of the wise sage or Aristotelian systems of virtue. His assertion is worth quoting in full: Metzger is correct, however, to qualify the relationship strongly by saying that “the theological presuppositions and the springs of Paul's actions were very different from those of a Stoic philosopher.” It was the encounter with Christ, the experience of the Spirit, all within the framework of a fervent eschatological expectation that shaped Paul's message, and . . . accounts for many of the differences between Paul and the Stoics at each level of parallelism explored. [my emphasis]67

2.4. Abraham J. Malherbe Abraham J. Malherbe has written at length about the tendency to misuse, and sometimes mis-label, “parallels” in comparative lexical and exegetical studies. Malherbe suggests that parallel books such as Betz’s Plutarch’s Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature 68 have a tendency to “paint with a broad brush”69 and that the “enterprise is frequently conceived by some of its representatives and certainly by many in the scholarly community as a hunting for parallels.”70 Furthermore, his call for more attention to be given by scholars to “entire traditions, traced in some detail, with which Christianity might have come in contact,” is, as will be shown in the following section, completely in line with my own concerns, intent, and methodology in this book. In another Ibid., 558–59. Ibid., 564. 68 Hans Dieter Betz, ed. Plutarch’s Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature (SCHNT 3; Leiden: Brill, 1975). 69 Malherbe, “Greco-Roman Religion and Philosophy and the New Testament,” 15. 70 Ibid., 16. 66 67

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article, Malherbe commends a methodological approach which endeavors to read the ancient authors “in their respective contexts” in order that we might not be ignorant of the conceptual differences in their underlying philosophies. When this does not happen, ignorance emerges which then governs the study and results in a naive understanding and comparison of authors who are often very different. Ultimately, this leads to erroneous conclusions based upon the wrong perception that ancient philosophers and authors felt free to mix, match, and choose random philosophical ideas in antiquity, from often opposing philosophical schools, in the manner of a philosophical “grab bag” approach. 71 Malherbe is correct in stating that: The philosophers in fact did not use materials they derived from others in so undiscriminating a manner, and the supposition that they did has led to the obscuration or loss of the nuances and contours of much moral teaching.72

Much like the ethical catalogues which we will be studying, the Haustafeln (one of which occurs in Col 3:18–25) are an example of a literary form which is taken up together with various elements of content, yet set within the context of a unique Christian pattern of thought. A central element to my own methodological approach in this book is the proposition that the sharing of literary forms, and incidental words, phrases, and ideas, does not automatically indicate a sharing or adoption of a complete and programmatic underlying ethical worldview.73

Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 276. Ibid., 276. My emphasis. 73 For example: Abraham J. Malherbe, “Paul’s Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11)” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (NovTSupp 82; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 125–39, 138 discusses how language of “self-sufficiency” used by Paul in Phil 4:11 is also used frequently by the Stoics. However, Malherbe argues that it is Paul’s custom to use “the moral philosophical language of his day” but to situate it “within a larger framework quite foreign to the philosophical tradition he uses.” Thus, the simple sharing of words, phrases, and concepts really tells us nothing about ancient texts or the governing thought patterns of their authors. What is needed is a deep, contextual study of the way in which words, phrases, and concepts function within each author’s general system of thought. An example of this phenomenon with regard to the topos of friendship in antiquity is available in Hans-Josef Klauck’s article “Kirche als Freundesgemeininschaft? Auf Spurensuche im Neuen Testament,” MTZ 42 (1991): 1–14. There we find the Jesus of the Johannine community referring to the faithful with the group term “friends” which, as Klauck points out, is a term also utilized by the Epicureans and Pythagoreans (2). Yet, rightly so, Klauck does not argue that the Johannine community is Epicurean. It is understood, rather, that a shared cultural topos does not thereby constitute an adoption of an entire governing conceptuality, worldview, or social imaginary. Likewise, later in the article, Klauck makes valid comparisons between the shared friendship topos of Rom 5:6–8, 10 and the Epicurean philosopher Philonides without then claiming that, on the basis of this, Paul is an Epicurean. Neither does Klauck lampoon 71 72

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The Topos of the Two Ways The topos of the Two Ways has been a major field of scholarly study in recent decades. In regard to the provenance of the early Christian writings that conform to the Two Ways pattern, the current scholarly consensus points to a (probably oral) Jewish vorlage and to the prior scriptural witness to the Two Ways patterns and tradition in the canon of Israel. The basic contour and content of this Jewish Two Way vorlage can be observed as an underlying foundation for many early Christian documents such as the Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas, and for the pattern as it is occurs in the writings of the New Testament itself. According to Aldridge, the Two Ways tradition “is of manifestly Jewish rather than Christian character, despite its preservation only in Christian sources,”74 and its “relevant phraseology is inherited from Judaism, albeit now infused with new meaning.”75 Likewise, though they argue for a Jewish Christian origin for the Two Ways in the Didache, Larsen and Svigal concede that the Epicurean view when he offers a legitimate difference between it and the Pauline teaching. In his comparison, he notes that the Pauline teaching of Rom 5:10 of Christ dying for us “while we were God’s enemies” is a version of the Hellenistic topos that has been “korrigiert und überboten durch den Mehrwert, den das Christusereignis in sich birgt” (10). He notes that “Er ist nicht nur für Freunde gestorben, sondern sogar für Feinde, für Menschen, die gar nichts Freundliches und Liebenswertes an sich haben” and sums up the point by stating: “Jesus Christus hat mehr getan” (10). Instead of, on the one hand presenting Epicureanism as the foil for the “better” teaching of Paul concerning Jesus, or on the other hand presenting the Pauline teaching as equivalent to the Epicurean teaching, Klauck is able to compare and contrast in a more objective, neutral sense. However, as will be demonstrated, this sort of scholarly skill and precision is often lacking in the praxis of comparative studies between the New Testament and the Greco-Roman world. Paul has been labelled a “Stoic,” and a “Cynic” for simply sharing a topos with these contemporaneous schools of thought. The caution and care of Malherbe and Klauck should provide our benchmark as we go forward in the discipline to avoid simplistic overstatements that cast antiquity and Paul in an inaccurate light. 74 Peter Aldridge “Peter and the ‘Two Ways,’” VC 53 (1999): 233–64, 263, emphasis mine. Cf. Matthew Larsen and Michael Svigal, “The First Century Two Ways Catechesis and Hebrews 6:1–6,” in The Didache: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle in Early Christianity, ed. Jonathan A. Draper and Clayton N. Jefford (SBLECL 14; Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015), 477–495, 481: “The Two Ways finds echoes in early Hellenistic literature (see, e.g., Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.21–34; Hesiod, Op. 287–292), but the early Christian form appears to have taken its cues from Jewish religious themes. The Two Ways pattern can be seen in the Hebrew Scriptures (see, e.g., Deut 30:15; Pss 1:6; 139:24; Prov 2:8–22; and Jer 21:8), at Qumran (see esp. 1QS III, 13–IV, 26), 13 in the Pseudepigrapha (see, e.g., m. ‘Abot 2:9), and the Babylonian Talmud (see, e.g., b. Ber. 28b),” emphasis mine. 75 Ibid., 235. Though earlier in the article, Aldridge refers to the Jewish provenance in less definite terms as a “possibility.” See Ibid., 233: “The Two Ways is a short work of moral instruction, possibly based on an earlier Jewish model but now extant primarily in Greek and Latin (about 700 words in the Greek). The concept of two ways (those of obedience or

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“while the early church used the Two Ways didactic pattern, most scholars agree that it came into existence before the birth of Christianity.”76 Perhaps the quintessential contemporary work that argues for a pre-Christian, Jewish provenance for the Two Ways tradition in the early Christianity is Kurt Niederwimmer’s Hermeneia series commentary on The Didache. There Niederwimmer masterfully argues that: The different versions of the tractate go back to an originally Jewish basic model, which began as a pre-Christian, Jewish tractate on the Two Ways and whose original wording can no longer be restored in detail on the basis of the related material . . . [and] The Christians then received the whole thing from Jewish tradition, altered it, and gave the tradition a new Sitz im Leben.77

Pertinent to the thesis argued here concerning the influence of a Jewish Two Way ethic on the literary form and theological function of the ethical content of Colossians is Philip Carrington’s proposal in 1940 that the New Testament epistles were rooted in a pre-Christian, Jewish catechetical tradition based on the topos of the Two Ways.78 Carrington argues that: The Two Ways . . . are probably old Hebrew material arranged for the Greek synagogue” and “. . . Greek texts, therefore, such as the Two Ways . . . are to be looked on as the catechetical material of the Greek synagogue designed for hearers or catechumens of all kinds, whether children or adult proselytes. It is a Greek recension of Hebrew material, much of which can be traced back to Lev. xix, Ecclus. vii, etc. It would appear likely that it is from the Greek synagogue that it passes into the Christian church; but the process should be

disobedience to God) is found in the Old Testament, New Testament, apocrypha, pseudepigrapha, Qumranic literature, and apostolic fathers,” emphasis mine. Cf. Larsen and Svigal, “The First Century Two Ways Catechesis,” 488–89 who locate the root of the theory of a Jewish provenance for the Two Ways in early Christianity in the lectures of Charles Taylor at the Royal Institute in 1885. There Taylor “demonstrated the thoroughly Jewish character of the Didache with many contemporary and rabbinic parallels” and has on that basis concluded “that the so-called treatise of the Two Ways was a text that must have originated in non-Christian Jewish circles.” For more on the history of scholarship affirming a foundational, pre-Christian, Jewish provenance for the Two Ways in the Didache see Willy Rordorf, “An Aspect of the Judeo-Christian Ethic: The Two Ways” in The Didache in Modern Research, ed. Jonathan A. Draper (AGJU 37; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 148–64, 149: “It was C. Taylor who advanced the hypothesis of a common source which he believed to be Jewish; Harnack was won over to his point of view.” 76 Larsen and Svigal, “The First Century Two Ways Catechesis,” 480, my emphasis. As stated, Larsen and Svigal argue against the thesis that proposes a pre-Christian Jewish provenance for the Two Ways in documents such as the Didache, arguing instead that “it is much easier to assume that the Two Ways treatise was produced by the Jewish Christians” and that the “Two Ways treatise in Did. 1-5 originated in Jewish Christian circles,” 438, 453. 77 Kurt Niederwimmer, The Didache, ed. Harold W. Attridge; trans. Linda M. Maloney (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 36, 63. 78 Philip Carrington, The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the Epistles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940).

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thought of as the development of a living organism rather than the borrowing of a literature . . . 79

While some of the core elements of Carrington’s catechism theory (such as the claims to the Jewish roots of early Christian Two Way discourse) have found common ground and subsequent validation in scholarship, like the earlier work of Seeberg, Carrington’s theory of a formed, identifiable catechismal formula has not found widespread support. Niederwimmer critiques Seeberg’s theory arguing that “it is very doubtful whether there ever was such a generally circulating and more or less fixed catechism schema in Judaism, containing various teachings including the Two Ways doctrine.”80 While that is not a direct argument against Carrington’s more sophisticated work, Niederwimmer does extend his critique of catechism theories beyond Seeberg’s “fixed forms” theory to views which propose that the Two Ways tractate in the Didache should be conceived of as a “proselyte catechism.” He finds such theories to be “dubious” and this critique appears to apply to Carrington’s work. Yet, it is necessary to distinguish between Seeberg’s more ambitious (and far less convincing) theory for fixed ethical forms in early Judaism and Christianity, and Carrington’s more modest thesis. Whether or not the findings of Carrington constitute a “proselyte catechism” is likely impossible to validate or invalidate at this stage in the scholarly quest. However, quite aside from the catechetical theoretical component of Carrington’s work are several other elements that resonate with the current scholarly consensus concerning the Jewish provenance of the Two Ways topos in early Christianity. These should be regarded as immensely valuable and useful to the discipline, whether or not his catechism theory is taken to be a plausible solution. In particular, Carrington strengthens the argument for Jewish influence on early Christian ethical thinking by linking levitical and holiness language and metaphors in key texts of the New Testament to ethical catalogues and discourse.81 In so doing, he moves the conversation concerning a Jewish provenance for early Christian moral discourse and instruction beyond mere forms and words toward the concept of shared use through the oral tradition of Jewish cultic categories that express moral and ethical realities. My own work in this 79 Ibid., 12, 13. Cf. 96: “The imagery of the Two Ways (vii, 13–14) is, of course, a commonplace of nearly all Jewish catechisms (cf. Prov. iv, 18, 19).” 80 Niederwimmer, The Didache, 36. 81 In The Primitive Christian Catechism, 14–15 Carrington argues that the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15, “dispenses with circumcision and other levitical requirements, but demands that a certain standard of levitical purity be maintained by abstention (apechesthai – ‘to keep one’s distance’) from things offered to idols, from fornication, and from blood, three points which may be taken to cover fairly well the contents of Lev. xvii and xviii, the introductory chapters of the Holiness Code.” He proceeds to demonstrate the ubiquity of this holiness theme in the ethical texts of 1 Corinthians, Colossians, Ephesians, Galatians, and 1 Peter, on pages 16–21.

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book further verifies and extends these findings, demonstrating, on the one hand, the usage of this Jewish holiness/cultic ethical metaphor in other, noncanonical Jewish sources, and on the other hand, the complete lack of this phenomenon in the Greco-Roman ethical texts most contemporaneous with the New Testament. Beyond this contribution, the contour and main components of Carrington’s argument are useful, even if, taken together, they do not result in a convincing proselyte catechism theory. Unlike Seeberg, Carrington’s analysis does not necessitate the existence of a fixed ethical form within Second Temple Judaism and early Christianity. Rather, he discerns and proposes a general cluster of literary and ethical concepts, a “common pattern,” that is informing the ethical texts of early Christianity.82 This pattern of oral instruction and tradition consists of four main elements discerned in the epistles of the New Testament and the Two Ways texts of the early church, namely, the themes of: putting off evil, submitting oneself to others, watching and praying, and resisting the devil.83 The argument made by Carrington is that this cluster of general ideas is, for the most part, present in the epistles of Paul (and deutero-Paul), James, and Peter in the New Testament, and that these concepts (and others) find parallel usage in Jewish texts and traditions. Carrington does not attempt to conform the attestations of these phrases and concepts too rigidly across the various texts in which he discerns the pattern. As a result of the plasticity of the model and his application of the model, Carrington succeeds in demonstrating that these patterns occur across the New Testament. Therefore, regardless of the 82 Ibid., 54. It is likely, with current scholarship that many of these concepts were rooted in the ethics of Judaism which were “prior to, and independent of, any of our [New Testament] authors.” Yet, the phrase “or contemporaneous with” should be added to this assessment. For it is also possible that some of the ubiquitous concepts that Carrington highlights in the New Testament ethical texts were products of both a prior Jewish tradition and the contemporary first century discourse of the early Church. 83 Ibid., 30. On “putting off evil” see page 32; “submitting oneself” see page 37–38; “watching and praying” see page 39; and “resisting the devil” see pages 40, 44, 53–54. I find all of these to be convincing with one caveat: the topos of Household Codes was ubiquitous in antiquity. Therefore, it must be stated that while the other three categories of concepts are more easily placed within an apocalyptic Jewish/early Christian cultural framework, the concept of a hierarchy of submission in the household was held across the board by Greek, Roman, and Jewish thinkers alike. See for e.g., David Balch, Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in I Peter (SBLMS 26; Chico: Scholars Press, 1981); David Balch, “Neopythagorean Moralists and the New Testament Household Codes” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Part II, Principat, 26.1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992), 389–404; and James E. Crouch, The Origin and Intention of the Colossians Haustafel (FRLANT 109; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972). On “apocalyptic” versus “ethicizing” approaches to the Two Ways in Second Temple Judaism and early Christianity see: John S. Kloppenborg, “The Transformation of Moral Exhortation in Didache 1-5” in The Didache in Context: Essays on its Text, History, and Transmission, ed. Clayton N. Jefford (NovTSupp 77; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 88–109.

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role they play in his larger catechism theory, the implications of and information about the shared oral tradition ought to be retained as a valuable part of the scholarly conversation regarding the provenance of ethical thought in early Christianity. Proceeding from Carrington’s foundational work on the Two Ways in Judaism and early Christianity, the phenomenon of the Two Ways topos in the writings of the New Testament has continued to be of interest to contemporary scholars. Draper, for example, has argued convincingly that behind the ethical discussion of Galatians 5 is a Two Way topos shared by the Didache and Paul.84 He points to a “moderate correlation of virtues and vices” in the Didache and Gal 5, a shared usage of the love command in both texts, and Paul’s usage of the “flesh/spirit” duality as evidence of a link between the Two Ways of the Didache and the epistle to the Galatians.85 Beyond the Pauline tradition, Aldridge has explored early Christian associations of the apostle Peter with the Two Ways in the Didache, calling attention to streams of the church which even attributed the authorship of the Two Ways tractate to Peter himself. This theory, however, has been rejected by contemporary scholars as a pseudepigraphal legend.86 Furthermore, Van De Sant has detected the influence of the Two Ways traditions in the epistle of James.87 Lastly, Larsen and Svigal have

84 Jonathan A. Draper, “The Two Ways and Eschatological Hope: A Contested Terrain in Galatians 5 and the Didache,” Neotestimentica 45 (2011): 221–51, 221. Draper maintains that Paul was aware of the Two Ways catechesis “whether in written or oral form and of its relationship to the Torah . . . whatever the date of the final redaction of the Didache as a whole” and that “. . . it seems likely that the Two Ways topos lies behind Paul’s argument in Gal 5, although the language is not obvious,” 224. 85 Ibid., 228–29. Draper suggests that the Two Ways theme itself is rooted in Deut 28:15 and 30:15–20, and that Paul is calling these to mind in Gal 5: “These Deuteronomic texts seem to be foundational to the use of the Two Ways tradition in Second Temple Judaism, although it gets fused in some texts with cosmological speculation on the Angels of Light and Darkness and the warfare between them found, for instance in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Barnabas.” 86 Peter Aldridge, “Peter and the ‘Two Ways,’” 263. Aldridge sums up the discourse on Peter and the Two Ways, stating: “Clearly, Peter did not write the Two Ways. That work is of manifestly Jewish rather than Christian character, despite its preservation only in Christian sources. Those Christian sources further present the Two Ways anonymously rather than as the work of Peter, despite their composition close to Peter’s lifetime. It appears that earlier Christian memory is of Peter sermonizing a powerful moral treatise, while later tradition may depict him as writing that work.” 87 H. Van De Sant, “James 4, 1–4 in the Light of the Jewish Two Ways Tradition 3, 1– 6,” Bib 88 (2007): 38–63. Though, I question the legitimacy of some of the parallels listed here such as: the shared usage of ἐπιθυµία in the Didache and James, the shared focus on anger in Did 3:2 and James 1:19d–20, and the focus on “meekness” in both texts. As we will see, these sorts of base level lexical parallels and comparisons do not really assist in proving anything because the words and concepts cited are ubiquitous in antiquity. One could just as

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argued satisfactorily that the author of Hebrews was drawing on a shared Two Way tradition in the composition of Hebrews 6:1–6.88 Thus, the scholarship on the Two Ways topos on Judaism and early Christianity of the 20th and 21st centuries strongly favors a pre-Christian Jewish provenance for the Two Way ethic that exists in the New Testament and in the noncanonical documents of early Christianity such as the Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas. Furthermore, Carrington’s groundbreaking, yet concise work postulating a connection between early Christian moral instruction and Jewish ideas of cultic purity will be confirmed and expanded in the current work. In fact, no other concept is more central to the literary form and the governing ethical conceptuality of Colossians 3:1–17.89 Lastly, this brief survey of the Two Ways topos in early Christianity demonstrates that within the scholarly conversations concerning the Two Ways and the New Testament, scholars have detected the topos within several different epistles, including: Galatians, 1 Corinthians, Colossians, Ephesians, James, 1 Peter, and Hebrews. My research confirms the scholarly lean toward the Jewish provenance of the Two Way ethical topos in early Christianity. The earlier research also serves to validate my own original, independent contributions which continue to argue for a Jewish provenance to the ethics of Colossians.

D. Methodology, Authorship, and Furthering the Quest D. Methodology, Authorship, and Furthering the Quest

1. Methodology In terms of methodology the current book is both a comparative lexical study and an exegetical, theological, and conceptual study. easily (and wrongly) say that the use of ἐπιθυµία in James to express a vice is a result of his “incipient Stoicism.” 88 Larsen and Svigal, “The First Century Two Ways Catechesis,” 477, 479–80. They conclude that: “the author of Hebrews shows an awareness of a common early Christian Two Ways catechesis and initiation in Heb 6:1-6, the cognizance of which would have been shared by the original readers of Hebrews who had experienced the catechism initiation. The Hebrews version of the Two Ways catechesis and its initiatory rites were similar to that pattern preserved for us in the Didache,” and that there are “compelling lexical and conceptual parallels between the two documents” which reaffirm “the common view that at least an oral Two Ways didactic pattern similar to that found in the Didache existed when the writer of Hebrews addressed his readers.” 89 It is important to note that I did not read Carrington’s work until the final editing stage of this project, nearly four years after submitting an earlier version of the current book as a PhD dissertation to the University of St. Andrews. Thus, I arrived at my conclusions concerning the cultic ethical metaphors (which in any case go far beyond his original observations) independently of Carrington. It was encouraging to then find that the patterns I observed both validate his earlier germinal comments and strengthen my own observations.

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1.1. Comparative Lexical Study – A Study of the Patterns of Word Usage As a lexical study, in each chapter I seek to compare the relevant antecedent and contemporaneous Hellenistic and Jewish texts with the lexical content of Colossians 3 in order to determine potential links at the level of (1) word usage and, (2) literary form. It is not, however, the primary purpose of this thesis to examine word usage in and of itself. Nor does correspondence or lack thereof prove the influence (or lack thereof) of any particular ethical stream of thought. However, I am presupposing that if patterns of unique and specific words, or groups of words can be found which are particular to one ethical tradition, and not attested in any of the others, this would then enable us make justified claims as to the particular influence of one ethical school over another. Indeed, my investigation has yielded such patterns of attestation and non-attestation. I will address in chapters 2–5 the lack of four key vices found in Colossians, as well as the consistent lack of attestation of most of the virtues of Colossians in the Hellenistic sources surveyed. On the other hand, in chapters 6–7, I will demonstrate the consistent attestation of these same virtues and vices in the LXX, NT, and Jewish sources. This indicates a particular, primarily Jewish provenance for certain ethical terms and concepts in Colossians. 1.2. Exegetical/Theological/Conceptual Study – A Study of the Patterns of Thought The exegetical/theological/conceptual component of this study operates from the desire to examine the history, the theological systems, and the philosophical concepts in which the individual words appear and function in their own contexts, and in the systematic thought of each of the authors as a whole. For, the sole fact that the same incidental (often ubiquitous) word appears in two different documents tells us nothing unless we observe its conceptual function within the context of the totality of the work and within a general understanding of the worldview of the author. Thus, in my approach, I will begin by examining both the lexical attestation and the contextual function (chapters 2–7) of the individual words in various Jewish and Greco-Roman sources. Next, I will seek to observe and articulate potential patterns of thought which have emerged from the data in order to construct theories for the governing, driving thought patterns which inform both the choice of the words and their function within the various ethical systems of thought of each author in comparison with the patterns of word usage and patterns of thought in Colossians 3. Lastly, I will conclude by articulating the theological ethic and governing pattern of thought of Colossians itself in chapter 8.

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2. On the Authorship of Colossians and the Relationship of Colossians to the Epistles Generally Attributed to Paul In a book focusing centrally on a New Testament epistle the authorship of which is disputed, it is necessary to address a few issues regarding the manner in which the authorship of Colossians functions, and the degree to which Pauline authorship (whether affirmed or denied) affects the conclusions and arguments of this book. While a detailed discussion of the authorship of Colossians is not possible here, a few orienting remarks will assist the reader in navigating the claims of this book in regard to authorship issues from a methodological standpoint. My own view is that the most critical reading of Colossians indicates that the evidence presented against Pauline authorship of the epistle is not sufficient to deny that the epistle was, in fact, written by Paul. The view that affirms Pauline authorship of the epistle, which was the majority view in antiquity90 and then became a minority view in the 19th–20th centuries, is experiencing a resurgence in scholarly support in the 21st century, although a consensus on the matter is still far from being reached.91 Though I am persuaded by the argument in favor of Pauline authorship of Colossians, this thesis does not rely 90 See e.g. Irenaeus (Adv Haer 3.14.1); Tertullian (De Praescr Haer 7); Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 1.1) according to Peter T. O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon (WBC 44; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1982), xli. 91 Those who hold to Pauline authorship of Colossians include: the letter itself 1:1; 4:18; C.F.D. Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon (CGTC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 13–14; O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, xli– xliv; F.F. Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians (NICNT 10; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 28–32; N.T. Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon: An Introduction and Commentary (TNTC; Leicester: InterVarsity Press, 1988), 31–34; Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, Colossians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, trans. Astrid B. Beck (AB 34; New York: DoubleDay, 1994), 57; 114–25; Michael J. Gorman, Apostle of the Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul and His Letters (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 550–51; Marianne Meye Thompson, Colossians & Philemon (THNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 4; Douglas J. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 28– 40; Nijay Gupta, Colossians (SHBC 27; Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 2013), 8–10, and according to Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 29 fn 5: Percy, Kümmel, Guthrie, Harris, Aletti, and Johnson who leaves open the possibility that Colossians was written under Pauline supervision. Those who hold that Paul did not write the epistle include: Eduard Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians: A Commentary (London: SPCK, 1982), 18–26; Petr Pokorny, Colossians: A Commentary, trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991), 2–20; Rosemary Canavan, Clothing the Body of Christ at Colossae: A Visual Construction of Identity (WUNT 2. 334; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 24–27, and according to Peter T. O’Brien Colossians, Philemon, xli–xliv: Mayerhoff, Baur, Synge, and according to Douglas J. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 29 fn 5: Bujard, Ernst, Gnilka, Kiley, Schenk, Collins, Wolter, Luz, Lincoln, MacDonald, Outi Leppä, and Wilson.

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on any assumptions regarding Pauline authorship. Nor do the core arguments or conclusions rely upon any correspondences between Colossians and any other epistles attributed to Paul whether typically considered genuine or deutero-Pauline by the guild. However, in order to work within the framework of those who do not hold Pauline authorship of Colossians in the guild, and in order that the present work might be of optimal use in comparing Colossians to the unanimously accepted genuine epistles, I will refer to the author of Colossians as “the author of Colossians” and to the author of the genuinely accepted Pauline epistles as “Paul” or “the apostle Paul.” This is an attempt to clearly distinguish between the two in those instances in which I am speaking of Colossians in particular or, on the other hand, the apostle Paul and the undisputed epistles bearing his name. Correspondences between the Epistle to the Colossians and other NT epistles commonly attributed to Paul will, however, frequently be noted in this book. This is not to propose, necessitate, or require Pauline authorship of Colossians, but to simply point out lexical and conceptual similarities, particularly in regard to ethical praxes and patterns of thought in the documents of early Christianity which are present in the New Testament. To the reader who holds to the Pauline authorship of Colossians, these correspondences could be interpreted as demonstrating further cohesion between Colossians and those writings which are generally regarded by virtually all scholars of Paul to be genuine Pauline epistles. Thus, such parallels could potentially serve to further strengthen the position that Colossians was indeed written by Paul, or that it was, at the very least, closely supervised by him under an amanuensis. For the reader who does not hold to Pauline authorship of Colossians, the similarities between Colossians and the genuine Pauline epistles to which I will frequently refer could be interpreted as demonstrating nothing more than a common conceptual and ethical thread taken up by (in that view) two (or more) different writers of the period, potentially belonging to a hypothetical so-called “Pauline school.”92 Even if one firmly resists the affirmation of Pauline authorship in a favor of its composition by an individual, or group of individuals in a Pauline school, the issue is far from settled. For, there is no agreement or scholarly consensus concerning what–if anything–is meant by the phrase “Pauline school.” Standhartinger helpfully articulates the plurality of views associated with the “Pauline school” theory. She writes:

92 On the history of scholarly thought concerning theories about a Pauline school see: J.D.G. Dunn, “Pauline Legacy and School,” in Dictionary of The Later New Testament & Its Development, ed. Ralph P. Martin and Peter H. Davids (Downers Grover: IVP, 2000), 887–93; Gregory S. MaGee, Portrait of an Apostle: A Case for Paul’s Authorship of Colossians and Ephesians (Eugene: Pickwick, 2013), esp. 7–9; and Angela Standhartinger, “Colossians and the Pauline School,” NTS 50 (2004): 572–93, 572.

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Many scholars designate the Deutero-Pauline writings as products of the School of Paul. But despite this opinio communis, there is no agreement regarding what is meant by that term. Some scholars, like Hans Conzelmann, speak about the ‘School of Paul’ as a phenomenon contemporary with Paul. For Conzelmann, the ‘School of Paul’ was a school of wisdom, of which both Paul and his fellow-workers were a part. After Paul’s death, however, this school continued its work. Other scholars, like Eduard Lohse and Peter Miller, see the ‘School of Paul’ as a purely post-Pauline phenomenon. This school collected and preserved the teachings and traditions of the apostle.93

Thus, it is worth noting that despite the crankiness that often emerges from the swamp of the scholarly Colossian studies when Pauline authorship is even considered as a possibility, the alternative views are far from a consensus. It is, therefore, wise to avoid approaching the study of Colossians in a way that is either dependent upon Pauline authorship, or dependent upon authorship from a person other than Paul who belonged to a hypothetical school attached to his name and teachings. That said, if we were to propose that the epistle was authored by a member of a Pauline school, I agree with Richard Pervo’s view, namely that the concept ought to be held in the broadest possible sense, open to both the possibility of a school contemporaneous with Paul, or one that was operative after his death.94 The central argument of this book is that the author of Colossians is operating from an inherited Two Way ethical paradigm rather than an Aristotelian, Cynic, or Stoic paradigm. This Jewish Two Way paradigm has unique resonances with the LXX and NT categories of the Righteous, and the character of God and Jesus Christ in terms of virtues, and the attributes of the Wicked in Two Way scenarios in terms of the vices. In concert with these biblical influences remains an additional resonance with certain general, incidental GrecoRoman vice terms ubiquitous at the time in Asia Minor (but not the more conceptually-loaded, technical, programmatic Greco-Roman terms). Further it will be argued here that ethical pattern of thought which drives the ethic of Colossians is the governing concept and paradigm of Christlike transformation by cruciform participation in the enactment and reception of divine love. None of these central arguments and points relies on issues of Colossian authorship at all, whether Pauline or other. That is to say, the findings, arguments, and core components and movements of this book stand alone in reference to Colossians 93 Standhartinger, “Colossians and the Pauline School,” 572. I share Standhartinger’s apprehension about whether the phrase “school of Paul” is worth using given the variegated possibilities concerning Pauline school hypotheses, 573. Betz’s theory, holding that in Col 2:5 the phrase “though I am absent in body, yet I am with you in spirit,” is a clue and veiled reference to Paul’s death is unconvincing. For, earlier in Col 2:1, the author speaks in the present tense (Θέλω γὰρ ὑµᾶς εἰδέναι ἡλίκον ἀγῶνα ἔχω ὑπὲρ ὑµῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ) of his struggles on behalf of the Colossian church. 94 Richard I. Pervo, The Making of Paul: Constructions of the Apostle in Early Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 286, fn 36. Cf. Standhartinger, “Colossians and the Pauline School,” 572.

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in its Greco-Roman, Jewish, and early Christian milieu. The conclusions at which I arrive, therefore, are not reliant on correspondences with other Pauline or NT writings. Any resonances, parallels, and similarities with other NT and Pauline sources, while helpful in the reconstruction of ethical patterns of thinking in early Christianity, constitute additional information not necessary for the functioning of the conclusions I make, which, as will be seen in the final chapter, are referring to the ethical content of Colossians alone. If these conclusions are shown to be present throughout the larger Pauline corpus, this only proves to identify a cohesive thread which can be observed throughout the texts of epistles commonly attributed to Paul. 3. Furthering the Quest, Filling the Lacunae, and Synthesizing the Contribution This book will support and further the work of Wibbing, Suggs, Bevere, and Thompson by focusing on the central influence of Jewish texts and traditions on the author of Colossians, and in particular by focusing on the influence of the Two Way scenario and ethical content on Paul and Colossians. In comparing literary style, lexical content, and the governing pattern of thought of Colossians to the relevant Jewish and Greek sources, I will show that several of the words used in Colossians are not only uniquely Jewish, occurring rarely and in most cases never in any antecedent or contemporaneous Hellenistic source surveyed, but also that they occur in great frequency in the context of Jewish and OT Two Way ethical literary scenarios. While the studies of Bevere and Thompson have helpfully identified several particular words which they correctly indicate are central to Judaism, they have not sufficiently emphasized the degree to which these terms are absent from the Hellenistic sources. This latter point strengthens and clarifies the thesis which argues for the centrality of Jewish ethical streams of thought present in Colossians and thus makes a substantial contribution toward a more robust understanding and explanation of the nature and extent of Paul and the author of Colossians’ Jewish ethical roots. Part of the means by which this will be accomplished will be through a more intentionally deliberate choice of Greco-Roman and Jewish sources. While the classic studies of Vögtle, Wibbing, and Kamlah each sought to survey an exceedingly broad amount of works and authors in antiquity, the current book operates from a methodology which selects fewer works but looks more deeply at, not only the words used by the authors, but how those words function in the context of the general world of thought of the author (whether Stoic, or Hellenistic Jewish, or Peripatetic) and in the work in particular. Relatedly, for this very reason, the weight given to the literary form of the ethical catalogue is not a binding or limiting feature in the determination of ethical sources as it was for Vögtle, and to a lesser extent Wibbing. Thus, greater attention to the

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complete context of ethical texts is given which results in a more focused analysis of the use of ethical concepts and language in the Old Testament than was the case in the initial modern works in this field. Second, in line with Malherbe, Metzger, and Thompson, this book will strengthen the position which holds that the author of Colossians, while particularly rooted in Jewish ethical streams, freely incorporates incidental words and elements from his Hellenistic ethical context insofar as they are commensurable with his ethical system as inherited from the OT, which are then revisioned and reinterpreted through the event, person, and sayings of Jesus Christ. This will be accomplished, not simply by comparing word usage in various ancient documents, but by articulating a phenomenon that constitutes a particular form of generic, Hellenistic ethical teaching, found in various popular Stoic writers in the first–second centuries CE which, I argue, proves itself to be the version of Hellenism most influential to the author of Colossians. I refer to this stream as Stoic Popular Moralism, and I propose that it contains a basic moral teaching, ubiquitous in the ancient world across ethical schools, streams, and traditions, but which itself is not contained within, or governed by a Hellenistic ethical system such as Stoicisim, Cynicism, or Peripateticism. In making this argument I will be simultaneously critiquing the views of Burton Easton Scott, which have been followed by Troels Enberg-Pedersen, Gerald Downing, and others who hold to a more centralized position for entire Hellenistic ethical systems in the thought of Paul. I will show that such a view, in light of my own research, and that of recent scholars, is no longer convincing or sustainable. Third, the final chapter of this book will provide a synthesis of the works of Michael Gorman’s theory of cruciformity as a narrative substructure present in the thought of Paul generally, with the older, frequently overlooked works of George T. Montague in order to propose that cruciformity itself is the governing pattern of thought of the ethical portion of Colossians framed and delivered within the literary style of the Two Ways inherited from the Old Testament, rather than such Greco-Roman programmatic and systemic concepts and words as eudaemonia or apathy (words and concepts which, as it so happens, are completely absent from Colossians, the Pauline epistles, and the entire NT). I will demonstrate the mechanics and logic of cruciformity as it functions in this manner through an extended exegesis of the Epistle to the Colossians informed by my lexical studies of the antecedent and contemporaneous sources of Jewish and Greco-Roman ethics.

Part 1 Comparative Lexical and Conceptual Studies

Chapter 2

Aristotle and Colossians A. Introduction A. Introduction

In recent years there has been a resurgence in interest in the topic of virtue ethics and the question of how this theory, which originated with the system of ethics first articulated by Aristotle, may or may not be influencing the writers of the New Testament. Most recently, N.T. Wright has argued that Paul, in his ethical teaching, is operating from a “transformed” Aristotelian virtue ethic concerned with the building of character.1 Therefore, in a study which is investigating the source of the ethical terms and the governing pattern of thought of Colossians, a treatment of Peripatetic ethics is crucial. To this end, I will briefly identify and articulate the key components of Aristotle’s ethical theory as they appear in his most famous work, The Nicomachean Ethics.2 I will then compare these central aspects of Aristotelian ethics with what we find in the Epistle to the Colossians to observe whether the governing pattern of thought in Colossians corresponds with or is contrary to the general Aristotelian ethical system. Lastly, I will compare the terms of the ethical catalogue in Colossians with the lexical content of the NE in order to determine if, at the level of word usage, there are noticeable correspondences and/or notable patterns of non-correspondence. Let us begin by articulating the key themes that constitute the center of Aristotle’s ethical system and pattern of thought.

Wright, Virtue Reborn, 209 and Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 1374, 1404. Hereafter NE. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934). Perseus Digital Library. Accessed 16 June 2017. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0054; Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson; Revised Notes and Appendices by Hugh Tredennick; Introduction and Further Reading by Jonathan Barnes (London: Penguin Books, 2004), and Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. J. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894). Accessed 16 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0053. 1 2

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B. Key Themes in Aristotle’s Ethical System in The Nicomachean Ethics3 B. Key Themes in Aristotle’s Ethical System

The pervading programmatic theme and controlling idea which drives Aristotle’s ethics is undeniably agreed to be eudaemonia, which means happiness, or the complete and fulfilled life. This eudaemonistic life is arrived at through the “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”4 Virtue, and the concept of dispositions of character in an individual which are arrived at precisely through virtuous actions are, for Aristotle, not things an individual is born with, but that which human beings are born with the potential to acquire through their own virtuous activity.5 Aristotle writes: . . .like activities produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting dispositions. . .[and] It is virtuous activity that determines our happiness, and the opposite kind that produce the opposite effect.6

For Aristotle, virtue is achieved and habits or dispositions are acquired in order that the ethical agent might ultimately reach a point from which he is responding to ethical scenarios on the basis of these dispositions which are stabilized and, essentially, a part of his habitual character. The road to the habitual, ethically virtuous dispositions of the soul are precisely through another key programmatic concept for Aristotle, namely, the doctrine of the mean, otherwise known as the middle way. The mean in Aristotle’s ethical system is the place where “moral qualities” are formed, between the choices of either excess or deficiency.7 He describes the mean in NE 1106a: By the mean of the thing I denote a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us, that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for everybody.8

3 While this section is sufficient to give the reader a basic, orienting introduction to Aristotle’s ethics, it is not meant to take the place of a full introduction to Aristotelian ethical thought. Space and the nature of this project do not allow for this kind of an explication. However, many excellent full-scale introductions exist, and I commend them to the reader for further consideration and detail. See, for example, J.O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); David Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Richard Kraut, ed. The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), as well the Introduction in Thomson, The Nicomachean Ethics by Jonathan Barnes. 4 Barnes in Thomson, The Nicomachean Ethics, 16. 5 Cf. Ibid., 31. NE 1103a. 6 Ibid., 23, 32. NE 1103b. 7 Ibid., 34. NE 1104a. 8 Rackham, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a.

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Aristotle elaborates that this is not simply a universal mean determined by the object or activity itself, but that which is determined to be the middle between excess and deficiency relative to that particular person.9 He explains: “So virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and that which a prudent man would use to determine it.”10 It must be stressed that central to this governing ethical pattern of thought is activity itself, most often expressed through the programmatic word ἐνέργεια (or its related verbal form ἐνεργέω). That is, the experience of performing the act of choosing the middle way is the mechanism by which, in Aristotle’s ethical paradigm, one forms the disposition from which they will respond instinctively once the habit is established in the individual. Aristotle describes this core element of his ethical philosophy in this manner: . . .the function of man is the active exercise (ἐνέργεια) of the soul's faculties in conformity with rational principle. . .if this is so, and if we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise (ἐνέργεια) of the soul's faculties and activities in association with rational principle, [15] and say that the function of a good man is to perform these activities (ἐνέργεια) well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with its own proper excellence–from these premises it follows that the Good of man is the active exercise (ἐνέργεια) of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them.11

This focus on contemplation brings us to a few final summary remarks on Aristotle’s ethical system in regard to the concepts of community, friendships, and relationships, and the role they play in contributing to the end goal of each individual’s life in pursuit of virtue, namely eudaemonia. For Aristotle: Happiness, then, is co-extensive with contemplation, and the more people contemplate, the happier they are; not incidentally, but in virtue of their contemplation, because it is itself precious.12

This primary place for the contemplative life as a necessary component to ultimate eudaemonia leads to a position in Book X of the NE which argues that only people involved in vocations which allow for sufficient contemplation will actually achieve the ethical eudaemonistic principle that he has been explicating throughout his book. People involved in trades and other positions of

9 My emphasis. Rackham, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b: “In the same way then an expert in any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean–the mean that is not of the thing but relative to us.” 10 Thomson, The Nicomachean Ethics, 42. NE 1107a. My emphasis. 11 Rackham, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a. Cf. for example 1100a; 1153a; 1177a; cf. 1177a. 12 Thomson, The Nicomachean Ethics, 275. NE 1178b.

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manual labor such as farming and construction would not likely be able to pursue a life of contemplation, and would thus be hindered in any success in the eudaemonistic life. Likewise, as Aquinas has pointed out in his commentary on NE 1100a1–5, children, on account of their inability to perform and comprehend the nature of virtuous deeds, are not able to begin a pursuit of virtue properly during the years of their youth.13 Lastly, in regard to Aristotle’s view of one’s interaction with others toward the pursuit of one’s eudaemonia, there are three categories of friendship which describe the nature of relationships that a human being can experience with the other.14 These can be described as: (1) friendships based on utility, (2) friendships based on pleasure, and (3) perfect friendships of reciprocity.15 A friendship based on utility is one that is based, not on the love of the essence of the person, but upon some quality which they offer to you. If the quality ceases to serve the individual, then the friendship no longer has any real grounds to continue. The second category, a friendship based on pleasure, is similar to a friendship of utility in that it is based on something which the other party provides for you. In the case of this second type, which is common among young people, the friendship is often, but not exclusively, tied to erotic pleasure. The perfect friendship, which for Aristotle is clearly the ideal and highest form, still contains elements of both utility and pleasure but includes the notion of reciprocal goodness from one friend to the other. These highest, perfect types of friendships, argues Aristotle, cannot exist in abundance. They are by nature and necessity few in number.16 The ultimate purpose of friendships for Aristotle is the role they play in assisting in the cultivation of virtue in the individual leading to one’s own eudaemonia through engagement with the other. Aristotle writes: the friendship of the good is good, and increases in goodness because of their association. They seem to become better men by exercising their friendship and improving each other; for the traits that they admire in each other get transferred to themselves.17

In summary, these are several key components of Aristotle’s ethical system. Aristotle’s ethic is a system, a pattern of thought which has a particular logic 13 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.I. Litzinger, O.P. (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 1100a1–5 (176). 14 John T. Fitzgerald, “Friendship in the Greek World Prior to Aristotle” in Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (SBLRBS 34; Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 1997), 13–34, 13 notes that discussions about friendship in antiquity are common pre-Aristotle, but argues that Aristotle is the first to present a systematic view of friendship. 15 Thomson, The Nicomachean Ethics, 204–10. NE Book VIII and IX, but particularly 1156a–b. 16 Ibid., 210. Cf. 250: “So more friends than are enough to fulfill our own lives are superfluous and a hindrance to living in the right way: therefore there is no need for them.” NE 1170b–1171a. 17 Ibid., 253. NE 1172a.

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and mechanics to it, and in which several key terms and concepts, namely, eudaemonia, the middle way, and activity (ἐνέργεια) function programmatically and technically as terms which are central to the working of the ethical system itself. The system is far broader than the generic notion of “character formation.” In fact, the generic idea of virtuous character building was ubiquitous in antiquity, and is obviously present in Paul (e.g. Rom 5:3–5; Phil 2; Gal 5) and in Colossians (Col 3; cf. Eph 4–5). Yet, the idea of character building itself, however, in this generic sense, does not describe the totality of a truly Aristotelian ethic. As we have seen, the NE contains not only the idea of character building, but also a particular ethical system, and several programmatic terms and key ideas which contribute to the articulation of precisely how this disposition of virtue and character is achieved. Aristotle’s ethic, and any ethic following it which is said to be “transforming” it or participating in it must contain, at the very least, the primary programmatic ideas of an end goal (eudaemonia) which is arrived at through a life lived in accord with virtue by means of the activity of the soul in accord with virtue through the active choice of ethical decisions which constitute a middle way between excess and deficiency. This life of active virtue, which exists as a mere potential for virtue at birth, must be cultivated through action (ἐνέργεια), which is reliant entirely on the ethical agents’ own impulse, power, and choices. These choices form dispositions and habits from which the agent is then able to make future choices which lead to the eudaemonistic life. It is a life available, in a normative sense, only to those who can truly devote themselves to contemplation, and a life in which friendship can exist in many forms. Ultimately, the pursuit of virtue for Aristotle is involved in a series of inter-related projects of individual virtue and character formation. Therefore, having explicated Aristotle’s governing ethical pattern of thought, we now turn to compare these central ideas and terms with those found in Colossians. When we ask: How many of these crucial, central, non-negotiable essential Aristotelian programmatic words, elements, and concepts correspond with the ethical system of Colossians? – the answer is strikingly silent and short: none.

C. Aristotle’s Key Ethical Themes Compared with Those of Colossians and Paul C. Aristotle’s Key Ethical Themes Compared

1. The Lack of Aristotle’s Programmatic Doctrine of the Mean in the New Testament Μεσότης, which is the word translated as “the mean” in NE, and which constitutes the primary ethical programmatic paradigm for the concept of virtue in Aristotle does not appear even once in the NT. For Aristotle, the mean is the

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“middling disposition” which he identifies as the virtuous goal that lies between various levels of excess and deficiency.18 Yet, when compared with the ethical presentation in Col 3:1–17 (and everywhere else in the Pauline writings and NT for that matter), not only do we not find ethical material presented using the term and conceptuality of the doctrine of the mean, but, on the contrary, we find an approach that seems to present ethical realities in terms of two polar opposite and distinct ways of life. If this central and primary programmatic element to Aristotelian ethics is missing, not only from Colossians and the writings of Paul, but from the entire textual witness of the New Testament, in what sense, then, can we claim, with any substantial degree of legitimacy, that the ethical conceptual framework of Colossians is derived from a Hellenistic ancient theory of virtue which is itself dependent on this concept? Furthermore, Aristotle views virtue in two tiers, namely, moral and intellectual. Yet, a distinction of this sort does not appear in Colossians or any of the Pauline epistles. For Aristotle, the entire point of virtue is to foster technical excellence19 in being human which is essentially accomplished through doing the right things well in order to experience eudaemonia (roughly “happiness”).20 In Colossians, however, we have a different conceptuality altogether, in that human beings are not exhorted to be good at being human, as a good shoemaker is at making excellent shoes or a good musician is at playing quality music. Rather, for Colossians, the image is of two divergent and opposite modes of being, or ways of life. Colossians operates under an ethic which presents the agent with a choice between Two Ways, not an Aristotelian invitation to take the middle way.21

Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 43. Ibid., 20. 20 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 18. 21 Cf. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 1355–57; 1371 and especially 1404 where Wright acknowledges that in “Paul’s radical revision of Aristotelian virtue-theory . . . the goal is not eudaimonia, but the Messiah himself, and the primary character-strength required in the present if one is stretching forward to that future is again agapē, love.” Cf. Wright, Virtue Reborn, 125; 162; 179. However, the point still remains that in order for Paul to have been revising an inherited Aristotelian virtue-theory, more than the programmatic term and concept of eudaemonia would be at stake. Otherwise, it makes no sense to claim that the system Paul is working from is Aristotelian. The Aristotelian system necessarily consists of an ethic focusing on the middle way between excess and deficiency, a point which does not appear in Paul or the New Testament. Nor does Paul show evidence of having incorporated Aristotle’s understanding of action (ἐνέργεια), the necessity of being able to contemplate in order to achieve the ethical goal, or a host of other key programmatic concepts which are essential to any ethic which is in any way Aristotelian. 18 19

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2. The Lack of Aristotle’s Programmatic Element of Eudaemonia in the New Testament Central to Aristotle’s ethical system is the concept of eudaemonia as the goal of all virtuous living. It occurs a total of 55 times as a noun (e.g., 1095a; 1097b; 1099a, b) and it appears an additional nine times in its verbal form (εὐδαιµονέω; 1095a; 1097b). Most translators struggle with how best to render this key word, indicating that the concept of “happiness” is often misunderstood and misinterpreted in our contemporary societies. By this word Aristotle is essentially referring to a “life worth living,” a “complete life,”22 “a successful life, a completely-fulfilled human,”23 or a perfectly good and balanced life which is the result of “the activity of the soul in accord with virtue.”24 Like µεσότης, the word εὐδαιµονία never appears in any text in the New Testament.25 This now provides us with two major programmatic concepts and terms which are absolutely central and, indeed, indispensable to Aristotle, and yet are entirely absent from the writings of Paul and Colossians. 3. The Incompatibility of Aristotle’s View of Friendship and Community with the Thought of Paul and Colossians Jennifer Whiting describes Aristotle’s three-fold view on friendship which, while certainly exalting perfect friendship (which is the closest in kind to the NT teaching on love of neighbor), still “counts at least some relationships based on pleasure and utility as genuine friendships . . .”26 Schroeder is correct in asserting that Aristotle’s concepts of friendships based on utility and pleasure cannot be considered “truly altruistic.”27 From the perspective of the Pauline epistles and Colossians the inclusion of friendships which are based merely Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 11, 18. Barnes, The Nicomachean Ethics, xxxii. 24 Ibid., 16. 25 Cf. Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul, 59, 109. A similar point is made in Bevere, Sharing in the Inheritance, 212: “There are no classical Greek virtues, such as rationality or moderation, presented as the basis of moral behavior. Rather it is ἀγάπη which is emphasized because it reflects God’s love.” Cf. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 1404. 26 Jennifer Whiting, “The Nicomachean Account of Philia,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 276–304, 281. Cf. Malherbe, “Paul’s Self-Sufficiency,” 135 where he discusses the “less noble” form of friendship in Aristotle, namely utilitarian friendships which he describes as friendships that arise “out of need or for the attainment of certain goals, such as happiness or tranquility.” 27 Cf. Frederic M. Schroeder, “Friendship in Aristotle and Some Peripatetic Philosophers” in Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (SBLRBS 34; Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 1997), 35–57, 37: “Obviously, the two latter kinds of friendship cannot be truly altruistic because they are grounded in qualities other than love for friend himself . . .” 22 23

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on utility or pleasure would not qualify as legitimate examples of friendship.28 Colossians situates Christian relationships within the life of the Christian community that is bound together by love unto perfection (Col 3:14) and which consists in many seemingly un-pleasurable and un-utilitarian characteristics such as the need to be meek, patient, humble, merciful, and to bear with and forgive one another (Col 3:12–14; cf. Gal 6:2). Exhortation toward communal relationships of this sort are totally incompatible with Aristotle’s view of both the nature of friendship and the nature of the eudaemonistic life. Another issue of incompatibility between the NE’s view of friendship and the Colossian vision of loving community is that for Aristotle, the number of true and perfect friendships in one’s life should be necessarily small and cannot or should not be adequately maintained in abundance. He believes that, “more friends than are enough to fulfill our own lives are superfluous and a hindrance to living in the right way” and that “therefore there is no need for them.”29 Aristotle works from an egoistic view of friendship which is ultimately interested in maintaining it as a necessary component to the fulfillment of one’s own eudaemonia. There are, however, disagreements amongst scholars of Aristotle concerning the relationship of friendship and the individual’s eudaemonia. I disagree with Urmson’s attempt30 to rescue Aristotle’s view of friendship from an egoistic view of eudaemonia. Aristotle clearly holds the egoistic view. 31 Yet, Schroeder is helpful in seeking to distinguish between Aristotle’s teleologically-driven concept of egoistic eudaemonistic friendship, and the more raw, negative concept of Aristotelian friendship as that which is based on “pure egoism.”32 While it is certainly necessary to compare and fairly contrast Aristotle’s views with those of the other Greco-Roman and early Christian ethical thinkers, it is wise to avoid casting Aristotle’s view in too negative a light. That is to say, it would be incorrect to portray his view as purely individualistic, in an evil, or morally dubious sense. It is far better to note that Aristotle’s view is altogether different from, for example, the author of Colossians’ perspective rather than to say it is worse or inferior. To regard Aristotle (or the Stoics, 28 Ibid., 37 where Schroeder argues that even perfect friendship in Aristotle is selfish because, in Aristotle’s view, “. . . the self-sufficient man, who has all the good things of life already, will have no need of friends.” 29 Aristotle in Thomson, The Nicomachean Ethics, 210, 250. NE 1170b–1171a. 30 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 116. 31 John T. Fitzgerald considers Aristotelian friendships of pleasure and utility to be “inferior, unstable, and egoistic” compared to “character friendship, which is altruistic and seeks the friend’s good.” See John T. Fitzgerald, “Philippians in Light of Some Ancient Discussions of Friendship” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (NovTSupp 82; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 141–60, 157. 32 Schroeder, “Friendship in Aristotle and Some Peripatetic Philosophers,” 39.

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Cynics, or any ancient stream of philosophical and ethical thought) as a negative foil to Christianity would be to engage in the creation of a simplistic straw man and an inaccurate dualism. While the author of Colossians and the apostle Paul, for example, situate their ethical thinking around individual and communal conformity to Christ within an ecclesial context, Aristotle’s approach to friendship is rooted “in the communal life of the classical polis” which is “the larger network of social obligation [that] frames all of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship.”33 Furthermore, David Konstan is most helpful indeed in his analysis of Aristotelian friendships of utility. Building on the work of Paul Millett, Konstan argues that friendships of utility were not base, self-centered friendships, devoid of affection or authenticity. Rather, utility was often either a factor in the genesis and initiation of the friendship or a confirmation that an existing friendship was indeed a true and legitimate friendship. Konstan, notes that for the Greeks “helpfulness” was considered to be a “confirmation of kindly intentions” and “to be a friend [is] to afford help when it is needed.”34 We must then take great care to avoid a simplistic reading of utilitarian friendships in Aristotle, for, in his writings and in the culture of ancient Greece on the whole, a utilitarian friendship is never purely or solely based on utility. As Konstan masterfully argues, To make the point sharper, we may note that Aristotle never suggests that two people who are useful to one another are automatically and on that basis alone friends. But it does often happen that two people who have a mutually advantageous association become friends. In such a case, the origin of the philia is in utility, but the affection is not reducible to the mutual appreciation of one another’s serviceability. Because this kind of love emerges from advantage, it may be short-lived and will tend to evanesce if there ceases to be a common benefit . . .35

Relatedly, it would be an anachronistic mistake to interpret the ancient GrecoRoman culture of exchange through the interpretive lens of the contemporary custom to delineate between commerce, exchange, and friendship in presentday Western societies. Friendships of utility are situated within a larger culture of economic reciprocity that is incommensurate with modern economies and contemporary ideas of authentic friendship. The ancient culture of exchange was expressed, in part, through the concepts of benefaction and patronage. Konstan, building on Finley makes this distinction clear: In The Ancient Economy (1985 [orig. 1973]), Finley argued that the societies of classical Greece and Rome did not possess an economy in the modern sense of the term. Rather, the Ibid., 36. David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (KTAH; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 57, emphasis mine. 35 Ibid., 72–73. Cf. 80–81 where Konstan notes that for the Greeks, “friendship imposed ethical obligations, which were frequently, and understandably, illustrated in economic terms,” emphasis mine. 33 34

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economy was inextricably embedded in a complex of social relations that included personal bonds. To impose modern categories by separating out economic exchange or other transactions as a distinct domain of social activity obliterates the difference between the ancient world and contemporary capitalism. 36

I mention this because the concept of a society rooted in a culture of reciprocity and exchange through social networks is entirely foreign to the contemporary thinker, and may well seem base or even sinister. Yet, an entirely negative assessment of the ancient Greco-Roman culture of exchange should be considered rash, unbalanced, and misinformed. It would not be in accord with an accurate knowledge of the function of the system in antiquity. First, it is crucial to distinguish between institutional forms of social exchange and the concept of “social exchange.” As Joubert explains, social exchange “refers to the reciprocal relationships that are established and/or maintained between parties involved in an exchange of services and/or gifts.”37 Patronage (Roman) and benefaction (Greek) are not mere synonyms and should be distinguished as distinct but related phenomena in antiquity. Yet, while the two concepts differ in regard to the “contents of the goods exchanged and the nature of the ensuing social relationships,” nevertheless both systems of social exchange involve “an exchange of goods and services that creates a social relationship.”38 Benefaction and patronage are pertinent to any discussion about friendship in antiquity because it has been the case that a major stream within the scholarship has envisioned ancient friendship as an entirely utilitarian relationship of benefaction that is completely devoid of affection. Konstan illustrates this view, highlighting the tendency to conceive of ancient Greek concepts of friendship as incommensurate with contemporary views of friendships rooted in mutual affection:

Ibid., 4. Stephan Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection (WUNT 2. 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 8. 38 Ibid., 66–67. Cf. 68–69 on the relationship between Roman patronage and the Greek culture of exchange: “Contra some researchers’ views that the difference between benefaction and patronage is one of form rather than of substance, it appears that there are in fact substantial differences between these relationships in terms of their nature, structure and content, which merit understanding these as two distinct forms of social exchange. Of course, this does not imply that there were no overlapping functions between these, or that certain forms of social interchange could not have been understood in terms of both benefaction and patronage by various parties . . . but in general, during the first century CE, Roman patronage coexisted alongside other forms of exchange, such as ‘kinship and friendship relations’, and ‘charity and euergetism’. It is only during the late Empire, with Roman ideologies firmly embedded, that one could probably speak of patronage as a universal phenomenon, usurping all the functions of the civic benefactor, but this theme falls outside the scope of our investigation.” 36 37

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. . . it has been denied that the terms that are translated as ‘friend’ or ‘friendship’ in ancient Greek or Latin involve the personal intimacy and affection that are associated with the modern conception. Thus, Malcolm Heath (1987: 73–4) writes that philia (friendship) in classical Greece ‘is not, at root, a subjective bond of affection and emotional warmth, but the entirely objective bond of reciprocal obligation; one’s philos [friend] is the man one is obliged to help, and on whom one can (or ought to be able to) rely for help when oneself is in need.’ Simon Goldhill (1986: 82) remarks in a similar vein: ‘The appellation or categorization philos is used to mark not just affection but overridingly a series of complex obligations, duties and claims.’39

In assessing this line of thought, Konstan concedes that the above stated views are not “radical or eccentric; on the contrary, they represent the dominant and indeed almost universal conception of ancient friendship, especially Greek friendship, in current scholarly literature.”40 Yet, he successfully demonstrates that the word philos and its related forms in the Hellenic period referred to “that which is dear” to oneself and can often be shown to include the concept of affection.41 Thus, while it is the case that friendships of pleasure and utility, and likely even perfect friendships in Aristotle differ substantially from the concept of friendship as held by Jesus, Paul, the New Testament authors, and particularly for our purposes here–the author of Colossians; nevertheless Aristotelian friendships ought not to be considered merely functional and pragmatic, devoid of emotion or affection. While such a charge might be an appropriate 39 Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World, 2. Cf. 24 concerning the dominant scholarly views on the legendary friendship of Patroclus and Achilles in the Illiad: “. . . many modern scholars suppose that in archaic epic, friendship is conceived as a formal and nonemotional bond based on obligation rather than love. Thus Paul Millett (1991: 120–1), summarizing the influential argument of Arthur Adkins (1963), writes: “Homeric ‘friendship’ appears as a system of calculated cooperation, not necessarily accompanied by any feelings of affection.” 40 Ibid., 3. 41 Ibid., 1–31. Cf. 28, where he shows how philos can refer to something that is “dear” but also to one’s body parts. On the basis of this, “some scholars have taken philos as equivalent to a possessive adjective, ‘one’s own,’ and have drawn the further conclusion that this is the primary or original significance of the word.’” However, Konstan (in my view) successfully demolishes the possessive adjective view by engaging with the work of James Hooker: “James Hooker (1987) has criticized the etymological interpretation on which philos always means ‘one’s own’ or ‘an inalienable possession,’ as well as the insistence on the contractual or institutional, as opposed to emotional, nature of philia and Adkins’ view that the term refers to things that belong to one’s own sphere or estate. Hooker (55) lists a series of passages in which ‘the verb is qualified by a word or phrase of such a nature as to make it plain that an affectionate attitude is being described’ . . . and he proposes (64) that the basic sense of philos is ‘dear’: the meaning ‘one’s own’ is a later accretion, deriving from formulaic collocations with the possessive pronoun . . . The co-presence of philos and the possessive more plausibly suggests, indeed, that they were perceived as distinct, and David Robinson has argued on the basis of a meticulous examination of cases and contexts that the adjective philos, whether masculine, feminine, or neuter, is appropriately rendered by ‘beloved’ virtually every time it occurs . . .”

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critique of the Stoic view concerning friendship, it does not adequately deal with the textual witness to affection as a key component to ancient Aristotelian views on friendship. Likewise, it is, in any case, a massive category error to simply equate, or conflate the phenomena of benefaction and exchange with friendship. In some cases (such as in the case of a utilitarian friendship) these categories overlap but this overlap does mean that they are to be totally equated. The concepts are distinct. As Konstan has elsewhere argued, Roman friendship should not be subsumed under the culture of patron and clients: It has sometimes been supposed that the Romans placed a greater emphasis on the practical aspects of amicitia, reducing the relationship to one of quid pro quo reciprocity and all but evacuating it of sentimental or emotional content. While it is true that the Romans, like the Greeks, recognized that favors entailed debts or obligations and paid scrupulous attention to the duties and forms attaching to the exchange of informal courtesies, such regulated interactions did not pertain essentially to the domain of friendship as such.42

Therefore, a truly accurate assessment of friendship in antiquity, and in Aristotle in particular must avoid the polarizing tendency to divorce Greek concepts of friendship from relationships constituted and characterized by affection. Furthermore, a thoroughgoing treatment of utilitarian categories in Aristotle will resist faulty conflations in which utilitarian friendship is considered to be synonymous with the culture of benefaction. Likewise, care must be taken to resist demonizing the culture of benefaction (or friendships of utility) as such. To assess the culture of benefaction in this manner would be to rip it from its ancient context and to complain when it does not sit well in a contemporary, capitalist setting. David Konstan, “Friendship, Frankness, and Flattery” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (NovTSupp 82; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 7–19, 16. To make this point, Konstan draws upon Seneca’s seven-volume treatise on friendship De beneficiis in which Seneca clearly distinguishes friendship (which includes affection) from debts and social obligations, and from the culture of benefaction. He writes: “The seven books of Seneca’s De beneficiis, which meticulously define the protocols of benefactions and gratitude, have virtually nothing to say about amicitia. Cicero and Sallust are conscious of the forms of reciprocity, but again, they do not situate their comments in the context of friendship; thus, for example, Cicero, in his letters of recommendation, speaks of the clients who petition favors from him as acquaintances or familiars, but seems careful to reserve the term amicus for people bound to him by true amity. Such affection was understood to be altruistic and looked to the good of the friend rather than to one’s own advantage. It was earned by the virtuous disposition of the other.” Emphasis mine. Note though that elsewhere in Friendship in the Classical World, 147, Konstan acknowledges that the structures of Roman culture did intrude on affection in amicitia: “The stratification of Roman society threatened at times to render hollow the intimacy and affection associated with friendship as the term was used for relations marked by hierarchical display and dependency, but the strong sense of amicitia remained available as a means of unmasking such appropriations.” 42

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Still, even with these necessary and serious caveats it is worth emphasizing– indeed, insisting–that, at the very least, Aristotle’s concepts of friendships of pleasure and utility are incommensurate with the conception of the others-centered love of Christ that defines the intra and extra-ecclesial dispositions, desires, and relationships (including friendship) of the writings of the New Testament.43 In making this statement, however, my aim is not at all to demonize the Aristotelian view, but rather to draw attention to a significant difference that exists between the Peripatetic and Colossian approaches to the topic of friendship.44 43 Cf. Fitzgerald, “Philippians in Light of Some Ancient Discussions of Friendship,” 141– 60 which argues that the topos of friendship is taken up by the apostle Paul in Philippians in order to correct a faulty view of Epicurean utilitarian friendship held by the congregation. I find this solution to be a possibility. However, I am not at all convinced that in his response “Paul . . . sides with the majority of philosophers in basing friendship on virtue.” This replaces the proposed problem of utilitarian ethics with another basic Greco-Roman concept, namely, the choosing of friends based on their virtue. In the New Testament, and Colossians particularly, such a prerequisite and rubric for the choice of friends is not articulated by the author. Rather, the author insists that the church consists of people who typically would not belong together (“Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free”; Col 3:11), who are potentially at odds with one another (the language of bearing burdens, complaining, and forgiving; v. 13), and who were–apart from Christ–quite characterized by vice (vv. 5–9) not virtue. On the general Greco-Roman theory of virtue as the basis of friendship see Malherbe, “Paul’s Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11),” 136–37: “. . . it is on basis of virtue, understood in the ordinary, general sense, that a friendship is formed. One seeks out the person who is worthy of one’s friendship, Plutarch says, and attaches oneself to him (De am. mult. 94E). The more fully one understands this, the more fully one grasps the truth that one does not develop friendships because of need; indeed, true friendship does not proceed from need but virtue, the virtuous person seeking a friend who is like himself.” For the author of Colossians, it is not virtue, but the others-centered, self-giving cruciform love of God embodied, enacted, and received by believers in the church that constitutes the center and character of all authentic relationships in Christ. 44 For example, Konstan’s description of utilitarian Aristotelian friendships as potentially being “short-lived” and tending toward “evanesce if there ceases to be a common benefit” is out of sync with the view in Col 3:11–17 that ecclesial relationships are rooted in the transcultural, burden-bearing love of Christ. Verse 13 makes it clear that the ecclesial bond of love continues not only when one’s utility might have ceased, but indeed when schism has occurred in the relationship. There is no sense in which a component in the ecclesial relationship would warrant the evanescence of a friendship, making it thus “short-lived.” We should also, however, be just as eager to acknowledge the significant parallels between the Greco-Roman topoi on friendship and those employed by the New Testament. Several pertinent examples of similarities in topoi can be found in Klauck, “Kirche als Freundesgemeininschaft?” such as: the shared title of “friends” for the community used by the Johannine, the Epicurean, and the Pythagorean communities alike, the metaphorical designation of believers as “brothers and sisters” attested in both the Johannine and (to a lesser extent) the Pythagorean writings, and the Lukan emphasis on “common property” which is part and parcel of the Greco-Roman friendship topoi of the period, 2, 3–4, and 6.

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Related to the issue of differing views of friendship in the NE and the NT, I should point out that, entirely contrary to Colossians’ communal ethic in which there is not “Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free but Christ is all and in all,” (Col 3:11; cf. Gal 3:28), Aristotle’s ethic is, according to Bostock, completely class specific and catered solely to the “Athenian gentleman of leisure.”45 He explains: There is no suggestion that one might earn one’s living as a cobbler, or a builder, or a scribe, or a flute-player. These lives are simply not regarded as candidates for being “the good life”, and one who is forced for financial reasons to engage in them is automatically debarred from eudaemonia.46

Broadie’s interpretation, which holds that Aristotle extends the concept of “statesmen” to include a broader representation of people, is far too generous and does not accurately portray what one finds in the NE, which, according to Bostock, is “unashamedly elitist,” and in which Aristotle clearly “recognizes that most people have no chance to aim at the eudaemonia that he describes.”47 4. The God-Empowered Energeō of Paul, Colossians and the New Testament As I have mentioned previously, for Aristotle the activity of the soul in accord with virtue is aimed at achieving the eudaemonistic well-lived, fulfilled human life. A.W. Price points out that the verb ἐνεργέω is used to “signify actualization of a potentiality of disposition, with a contrast between having a potentiality.”48 Interestingly, Paul uses this same verb in its participial form in Gal 5:6 when he describes the qualitative characteristic of faith as one that is “active,” “or actualized” in love. However, contra Engberg-Pedersen, the lexical link proves nothing.49 It certainly does not suggest a correspondence with the programmatic usage of ἐνέργεια in Aristotle’s ethical system. For Aristotle the word ἐνέργεια, as mentioned in the previous section, simply refers to one’s own action and activity in responding virtuously in various ethical situations in life. Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 190. Ibid., 190. 47 Ibid., 239. I am convinced by the thought of Bostock here contra Broadie. 48 A.W. Price, “Acrasia and Self-Control,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 234–54, 245. 49 Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul, Virtues, and Vices,” 611; cf. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 51: “A virtue is a state (hexis) of mind, one that need not always be active but may precisely be activated in the appropriate circumstances in an ‘actualization’ or ‘activity’ (energeia–an idea that points directly forward to Paul’s claim in Gal. 5:6 that the only thing that matters in Christ is faith that ‘is active’ energoumene through love).” – What I object to here is not the idea that faith must be active but the passing manner in which EngbergPedersen jumps from Stoic eudaemonism to Aristotelian eudaemonism. He is working from the false premise that Aristotelian ideas can simply be melded with Stoic ideas which is certainly unwarranted and worthy of rejection, as Malherbe has previously argued in “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 276. 45 46

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However, whenever ἐνέργεια appears in the OT and NT it is nearly always being used to serve a specific theological function which is altogether absent from the Aristotelian system, namely, the concept of the supernatural work and gracious agency of God in individuals as they accomplish the purposes of his will.50 For example, in Eph 1:19; 3:7; Col 1:29; Gal 2:8, the word ἐνέργεια is used to refer to the phenomenon of God’s powerful and supernatural work within Paul as the energizing force by which he accomplishes his own work. Elsewhere,51 the word is used in the same manner, referring to the powerful work of God in the believers. The word is also used to refer to God’s own powerful work in the OT.52 Likewise, in the NT, it refers particularly to God’s powerful and miraculous work in Jesus.53 The term is not used in this way at all in Aristotle’s NE or in the larger peripatetic tradition where it is simply used to refer to the actions of the ethical agent himself. Therefore, while it is interesting to note the appearance of this highly occurring and central Aristotelian term in some of Paul’s letters it must be said that when read in conjunction with the entirety of the results of the NE/Colossians lexical study and the totality of the LXX and NT documents, it is highly unlikely that Paul or the author of Colossians are deriving the term from Aristotle or intentionally seeking to transform it, or incorporate it into their theology in an Aristotelian way. Rather, the usage of the term in Colossians and elsewhere in Paul emphasizes the powerful work of God by which the one who has faith is energized through and for love in order that they might become like the God who is love.

D. Is the Author of Colossians Transforming an Aristotelian Virtue Ethic into a New Christian Key? D. Is the Author of Colossians?

In suggesting that Paul and Jesus are transforming the Aristotelian virtue “theory itself,”54 N.T. Wright has proposed that they are, in fact, consciously or subconsciously, adopting this systematic, programmatic line of thought, and working from it as a governing ethical pattern. The above comparative study of the central elements of Aristotelian ethics, and the ethics of Paul and Colossians have shown that this position is no longer sustainable. 50 Ἐνεργέω appears 7 times in the LXX and 21 times in the NT and its nominal form ἐνέργεια appears 8 times in LXX and 8 times in the NT. 51 Such as in Eph 3:20; 4:16; Col 2:12; 1 Cor 12:6, 11; 2 Cor 4:12; Gal 3:5; Phil 2:13; 1 Thess 2:13; James 5:16. 52 Isa 41:4; 2 Macc 3:29; 3 Macc 4:21; 5:12; 5:28; Wis 7:26. 53 Matt 14:2//Mark 6:14; Eph 1:11, 20. 54 Wright, Virtue Reborn, 209.

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The unfortunate weaknesses of Wright’s proposal is that his entire position rests on an assumption concerning the influence of a pagan virtue theory on Paul, Jesus, the author of Colossians, and the early Christians, while nowhere providing justification for such a claim based upon lexical evidence or a robust investigation of the ethical conceptuality from which Paul was working. Wright assumes a Pauline reception of the idea of virtue theory in a manner that is too general and homogeneous. He speaks of virtue as though the Aristotelian idea that one becomes virtuous by the doing of virtuous deeds which serve to develop a habit–a disposition, from which one acts almost by default in virtuous ways, achieved through the pursuit of life in the middle way of virtue between excess and deficiency–is a sort of, lowest-common denominator “virtue theory” which is essentially present in all of the various streams of Hellenistic ethical thought in this basic form, and built upon in various ways in the manifold ethical traditions of Hellenism. This, as we will see, is simply not the case. Rather, each Hellenistic school promoted particular methods of achieving the virtuous life. Thus, to speak of “ancient pagan theories [in the plural] of the moral life” in one breath, and then to refer to these admittedly distinct theories (i.e. Stoicism, Peripateticism, etc.) in the next breath as a singular “theory” which Paul is then said to have “topped up,” as Wright has done in Virtue Reborn, is ultimately to hoist a hypothesis about the influence of an “ancient virtue theory” on Paul which is not in accord with the variegated approaches to virtue at play during Paul’s lifetime in the first century which were not one, but many.55 While the idea of virtue and character building itself is ubiquitous, Hellenism, like Judaism, is variegated and complex, exhibiting multiple perspectives on how virtue is developed, not all of which are com-

55 Ibid., 209. I suspect that Wright is assuming a general mood of virtue teaching in the air, and that he is making his claim for Paul on this basis. Something similar is claimed by Wayne Meeks, The Moral World of the First Christians (LEC 6; Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), 15: “It was a cliché in Greek moral writing in antiquity found already in Plato and Aristotle, that ethos led to ethos; that is ‘habit’ (practicing the virtues until they became second nature) would eventually build ‘character.’”– This is no doubt true, yet this general idea needs to be distinguished from a fully formed Aristotelian paradigm which contains distinctive programmatic words and elements such as the middle way between excess and deficiency, eudaemonia, etc. I maintain in this book that unless these programmatic elements are demonstrable in the writings of Paul and in the Epistle to the Colossians, then: (1) to use the term “Aristotelian” or “pagan theory of virtue” is inaccurate, imprecise, and misleading; and (2) the imposition of entire systems of virtue into the reconstructed thought of Paul and the author of Colossians are not sustainable unless they can be demonstrated from the texts of Paul and Colossians themselves. While the sources are sufficient to show that Paul and Colossians were interested in what we could roughly term “virtue,” they are not, however, clear concerning the governing conceptuality, or pattern of thought which drives the acquisition, formation, or appropriation of virtue. I propose that they actually argue against the reception or transformation of an Aristotelian-based virtue ethic.

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mensurable with an Aristotelian system of excess and deficiency and the pursuit of the virtuous life through a middling disposition. I am not seeking to argue against the concept of virtue ethics as such, but I am offering a critique of the imposition of this foreign hermeneutical grid onto Colossians and onto the mind of Paul himself. It is important to state that I am most definitely not alone in claiming that neither Paul nor the author of Colossians were governed by an Aristotelian virtue/character ethic. On the contrary, the position I hold is, in fact, a mainstream view, and one which has been and is currently held by many leading biblical scholars throughout the 19th–21st centuries. This line of thought which questions the nature and extent of the influence of Aristotelian virtue/character ethics on the authors of the New Testament and early Christianity goes back, at least, to Wernle in 1897, who saw many of the main vices of the NT as evidence that the frame of the lexical content and moral vision was particularly Jewish, having connections with the Apocalyptic writings, and specifically so when it came to terms such as murder, fornication, magic, and idolatry.56 Later, in his classic 1956 monograph on virtue and vice catalogues, Siegfried Wibbing argued that Paul’s focus was not on character development (“die arete ist nicht unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Charakterbildung verstanden”), but rather on a communal moral brotherhood and family (“brüderlichen Gemeinschaft”).57 Perhaps the most prominent, modern proponent of the view would be leading contemporary biblical scholar Abraham Malherbe, who specialized in the comparison of the New Testament with Greco-Roman philosophy, and who is still widely regarded as the leading contemporary expert on the topic. Malherbe has, on the basis of the results of his lifetime of studies, determined that while philosophical traditions are indeed used by the New Testament authors, they are, however, taken up “without their preoccupation with the use of reason or the nature of character development.”58 Additionally, Malherbe argues that, Unlike ancient moralists, Paul is concerned not with the virtue or happiness of the individual, but with the corporate identity of his communities as the basis for moral formation” 59 and that they [Christians] “therefore seldom spoke of virtue, did not share the Greek notion of character development, and did not define happiness as their goal.60

56 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 3; Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 3 in which he points out, however, that Wernle’s analysis suffered from a lack of proper interaction with the Hellenistic sources thus making the study one-sided, and not representative of the totality of potential influences. 57 Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 119. 58 Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 61. My emphasis. 59 Ibid., 53. 60 Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 15. My emphasis.

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Most recently, James W. Thompson has argued along the same lines in his monograph, Moral Formation according to Paul. 61 Therefore, my thesis against Wright’s idea of a governing “transformed” Aristotelian framework for the moral vision of Paul and Colossians is situated within a strong, representative, and diverse movement and established stream of scholarship.

E. Comparative Study of the Virtues and Vices of Col 3:12, 14 with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics E. Comparative Study

I will now focus on the similarities/differences between the virtues and vices which appear in Col 3:1–12, 14 and those which can be found in Aristotle’s NE. The Greek text of NE to which I will refer is Bywater’s version, which is available and fully searchable online at Perseus Digital Library.62 1. Virtues Beginning with the virtue terms, we find that none of the seven virtues of Colossians 3 makes an appearance in the NE. In the case of four of these terms, namely σπλάγχνον, οἰκτιρµός, χρηστότης, and µακροθυµία, neither the specific terms nor any of their related adjectival or verbal forms are attested. Three of the Colossian terms, while not appearing in their specific Colossian form (namely, ἀγάπη, πραΰτης, and ταπεινοφροσύνη) do however make an appearance in similar and related lexical forms. While the word ἀγάπη is not attested in this form in the NE, the verbal form, ἀγαπάω does appear (20x).63 Naturally, however, it does not have the specialized theological meaning or significance with which it is later infused by the authors of the NT. The verb in NE is used to refer simply to that which one cares for, values, likes, has affections toward etc. Likewise, and perhaps more relevant and illuminating, although we find no attestation of the Colossian word πραΰς, πραΰτης in this form in NE, we do, however, find the related form of the word, πρᾶος, which is used nine times by Aristotle to refer to the virtuous disposition of gentleness. Furthermore, the form πραότης occurs an additional five times carrying the same virtuous meaning. Concerning the use and the general meaning of the word, both Aristotle and the author of Colossians hold it up as a virtuous disposition to be sought. My lexical study of the Jewish sources will, however, reveal an equally high Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul, 11. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. J. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894). Accessed 16 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc= Perseus:text:1999.01.0053. 63 See for example: NE 1095b; 1096a–b; 1118b; 1119a; 1168a–b; 1175a; 1180a. 61 62

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attestation of the word in the the LXX and Jewish sources. In many cases, such as in the present case of this incidental lexical parallel, we need not limit Paul to a simplistic either/or, Hellenistic or Jewish scenario in terms of his ethical influences; it is conceivable and even probable that he is being influenced more generally, in many cases, by his first century moral milieu which consisted of a variety of ethical streams all intersecting and melding at various points. Lastly, my lexical study reveals that the word ταπεινοφροσύνη and its related verbal form, ταπεινόω do not appear in NE. Aristotle does, however, use the adjectival form of the word, ταπεινός, one time in 1124b. The context of the passage, however, clearly indicates that the word is not being used as a virtue, but rather as a descriptive term which is referring to a person who is literally poor, that is, considered economically and culturally lowly in terms of their societal class. Therefore, we can conclude that Aristotle does not use the term in NE, in any of its forms, including this one occurrence of attestation, in the sense of the Christian virtue (i.e. “humility”). It is likely that Aristotle would have considered this Christian type of humility (as well as the Christian virtue of chastity) to be a vice.64 These results essentially mirror what we find in the first century B.C.E. work on Peripatetic Ethics by Arius Didymus, which is to say, a lack of any real and substantive virtue correspondence at the lexical level.65 2. Vices Concerning the twelve Colossian vices that are found in Col 3:5, 8 there are four words which were completely unattested in the NE. Neither πορνεία, nor ἀκαθαρσία (nor ἀκάθαρτος), nor εἴδωλολάτρης (nor εἴδωλον), nor βλασφηµία, (nor βλασφηµός or βλασφηµέω) are attested in the NE. The latter three words (but especially the forms ἀκαθαρσία and εἴδωλον), on the other hand, exhibit consistent and widespread attestation throughout the LXX and NT, to which I shall turn in chapter 6. Πλεονεξία occurs twice in NE and on both occasions it means “greedy” or “taking more than one should.” It also occurs as a noun and a verb nine times (πλεονέκτης, ου, ὁ and πλεονεκτέω) and it is translated in the same manner. This, of course, overlaps with the Colossian usage and is worthy of note. In general, I interpret πλεονεξία as a word which has resonances in both the Hellenistic and Jewish streams of ethical thought which therefore makes it a word of overlapping significance. Still, because of the almost certain centrality of the Ten Commandments, I find it more likely that the word would have had a primarily Jewish provenance for Colossians which was merely further strengthened by Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 50–51. With one exception – Arius Didymus does show attestation for χρηστότης (3x – 2.7.25; 2.7.51) which is not attested in NE. See Arius Didymus, Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics, ed. Arthur J. Pomeroy (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999). 64 65

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its inclusion and commensurability with the Hellenistic morality of the day. Furthermore, the fact that πλεονεξία is equated with εἴδωλολάτρης in Col 3:5 is evidence that weighs in favor of an OT LXX provenance for his apprehension and subsequent usage and incorporation of the term in the ethical discourse in Colossians. The reader might also note that several of the words thus far (πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, βλασφηµία) which have exhibited no attestation in the NE are words that have a connection with cultic themes of purity and holiness which are, of course, greatly attested and of high significance to the OT and NT authors. The absence of these terms in their ethical/metaphorical context, will prove to be a reoccurring absence in the Hellenistic sources while occupying an undoubtedly central place throughout Colossians and the epistles of Paul. This will prove important in chapters 6–7 when I argue for a primarily Septuagintal provenance for the ethical word usage and pattern of thought of Colossians which is supplemented by incidental and ubiquitous Greco-Roman lexemes, but not rooted in, ancient and contemporary non-Jewish Hellenistic ethical words and traditions.66 One vice in particular, on the other hand, exhibits no LXX or NT attestation apart from its use in Colossians. This word is αἰσχρολογία. Since this word makes no appearance in the LXX, it must be concluded that it has been gleaned from the author’s general first century C.E Hellenistic context. Due to its commensurable ethical force, the author has appropriated it to his own speech ethic. The word occurs once in NE and means in that context “obscene language,” which is exactly what the author of Colossians seems to mean by it. Whether or not this says anything about the relation of Colossians to the NE, in conjunction with the rest of my lexical study remains, however, highly doubtful. It is much more likely that the author picked up the word from a later Hellenistic stream, perhaps related to the Stoics or Cynics, and as demonstrated in the works of Epictetus, who also uses the word and is much more contemporary to Colossians, and thus, more probably a key to the provenance of the word for the ethic of Colossians. Furthermore, the fact the word is absent from the extant Jewish writings does not mean, of course, that it couldn’t have been used as a common way of referring to obscene speech in Greek-speaking Jewish communities of the first century C.E. It is not as though Paul or the author of Colossians would have needed to “discover” this word in a Greek book of ethics in order to properly use it in everyday speech. Thus, when I argue that the usage 66 This finding both affirms what Bevere, Sharing in the Inheritance and Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul have argued and demonstrated concerning the particularly central role these terms play in Jewish ethics. My work here serves to demonstrate, not only the presence of these words in Jewish ethical texts, but their absence in specific GrecoRoman works thus strengthening the theory of the Jewish provenance of these particular words.

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of αἰσχρολογία in Colossians is derived from the author’s Greco-Roman context, I am simply noting that it is a ubiquitous term that doesn’t have uniquely Jewish attestation and importance. Another word that we will find is likely delivered to the author of Colossians through its Hellenistic cultural and ethical popularity is πάθος. The word plays a major role in NE, appearing 74 times where it is not technically considered by Aristotle to be either a virtue or a vice.67 Rather, a person’s virtuousness or viciousness is to be determined, in part, by the way in which the individual reacts to the various “feelings” or “emotions” (πάθος). In Col 3:5, however, πάθος is listed alongside other vices without any negative adjectival modifier. This is actually closer to a Stoic usage of the term than an Aristotelian meanbased usage. Whereas in NE, Aristotle seems to approach the πάθοι as neutral, leaving judgement concerning one’s character to the assessment of their proper (or improper) reactions to “the passions,” Colossians presents passion itself as the vice. Ultimately, then, the view found in Colossians is quite different and I will argue, incommensurable with the Stoic view as well. The Colossian usage evokes neither the neutrality of Aristotle nor the central function and loaded meaning of the term in the Stoics. The last four vices, namely, ἐπιθυµία, κακός, ὀργή, and θυµός, present a unique problem in that they are equally well attested in both the LXX and NE/Hellenistic tradition. Therefore, in the case of these words, the lexical information does not yield any immediately illuminating results. Whatever the case, we must surely allow for the author’s further contextually-driven apprehension and application of new vices which are in accord with those things that he found objectionable in the contemporary pagan cultures of his day. Furthermore, it follows that we should expect a certain degree of overlap between the various ethical streams available to Paul based upon commonly (and possibly universally) held conceptions of that which is ethically wrong. For example, the fact that both the author of Colossians and Aristotle consider κακός (“evil”) behavior to be characteristic of the vicious person really tells us nothing. It is a completely incidental parallel. One should not expect to find overt evil describing anything but the Wicked (in the LXX) or the vicious man (in Aristotle). Vögtle also mentions the fact that some ethical terms are so obviously and ubiquitously negative that, in all likelihood, in any context and from any stream of thought, they would be considered indisputably bad.68 When theorizing in regard to these words then (ἐπιθυµία, κακός, ὀργή, and θυµός), we must approach with caution and humility, seeking both to determine how the words are being used in their various contexts, and then, on the basis of this, seeking to assess the legitimacy or illegitimacy of each parallel. For example: 1095a; 1101a; 1104b; 1128b; 1132a; 1134a; 1168b; 1169a; 1173b; 1178a; 1179b. 68 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 218. 67

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While ἐπιθυµία occurs 77 times in its substantive and verbal forms (ἐπιθυµητής, οῦ, ὁ and ἐπιθυµέω) it is difficult to determine what significance, if any, should be given to this fact.69 As with πάθος (“emotion”), ἐπιθυµία (“desire” or “appetite”) is not seen by Aristotle as a virtue or vice, but as a variable, based upon the reaction to which one is determined to be either virtuous or vicious. The author simply modifies the word with the obviously negative κακία70 thus indicating that, in this circumstance, he is viewing it as a definite vice. This difference in usage demonstrates that, in fact, a different conceptuality is at play in Colossians. Ὀργή appears ten times in NE as well as a total of 25 additional times in its other forms (ὀργίλος, ὀργίζω).71 In context, it most often refers to the emotion of anger, which like πάθος and ἐπιθυµία are not technically vices for Aristotle, but rather emotions which are acted upon in ways that render the person either, virtuous or vicious. On the contrary, once again, Paul presents ὀργή, in the context of Col 3:8, as a simple vice which is to be “put to death.” There is no presentation of the concept in Colossians in terms of a neutral emotion which is dealt with in various appropriate or inappropriate ways. In chapter 3, I will show that the LXX and NT can use the word in this way, but my point here is that in Colossians, the author’s presentation is essentially binary. Aristotle’s use of θυµός (which appears 38x) can refer to the emotion of anger, but also to an emotional “strong feeling” or “spirit” in the person.72 The reaction to θυµός will determine the character of the individual. Here again, in Colossians, there is not this sense of “degrees” or “a mean” in reference to these Aristotelian neutral emotional potentialities. Θυµός in Colossians is something to be put to death in a manner that is much more consonant with an inherited Jewish Two Way scheme than with an Aristotelian mean-based system. This Two Ways paradigm, however, has been reevaluated, re-appropriated, and transformed in light of the author of Colossians’ reception of the gospel.

F. Conclusion – Peripateticism and Colossians F. Conclusion

Through my conceptual comparative study of the Nicomachean Ethics73 and Colossians I have discovered that both of the central programmatic Aristotelian ethical components, namely eudaemonia and the doctrine of the mean were See, for example, 1103b; 1111a–b; 1148a; 1149a–b; 1153a; 1168b. Κακία and its related words appear a total of 147 times in Aristotle. 71 1103b; 1125b; 1130a; 1135b; 1149b. 72 For example: 1095b; 1105a; 1111a, b; 1116b; 1117a; 1126a; 1135b; 1145b; 1147b; 1148b; 1149a, b. 73 Cf. Pomeroy, Arius Didymus. 69 70

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foreign to the thought of the author of Colossians thus causing an unresolvable tension for theories positing a transformation of Aristotelian character ethics. Likewise, I argued that the programmatic Aristotelian conceptions of friendship, community, and activity (ἐνέργεια), and the way in which those concepts contribute to a Peripatetic ethic, were not commensurable with a Colossian ethical pattern of thought. Furthermore, in regard to the lexemes, I encountered a particularly weak degree of lexical correspondence between the virtues of NE and those of Col 3:12, 14. While I did encounter a greater numerical showing of attestation in the NE of some of the vices from Col 3:5, 8, we discovered, however, that in many cases, the words which were being presented by the author of Colossians as actual vices, were viewed, in Aristotle’s system, simply as emotions or desires, which could either result in virtuous or vicious behaviors and dispositions depending upon the response of the ethical agent to these emotional stimuli and scenarios. Therefore, I determined that even these lexical correspondences were complicated, and should be considered insubstantial and incidental as a result of the different spectrums of their semantic domains as evidenced in their contexts in NE. I discovered that some words, such as πάθος and αἰσχρολογία which were likely not derived from strictly Jewish or LXX sources. Lastly, I noted that several of the vice terms (πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία) of Colossians were entirely absent from the NE. Therefore, it is now my task to continue this study by focusing on later ethical discourses and traditions from which these early Hellenistic words and governing patterns of thought could have been apprehended by the author of Colossians in the first century.

Chapter 3

The Cynics and Colossians A. Introduction to the Cynic Literature A. Introduction to the Cynic Literature

1. Sources for Cynicism Our focus will now turn to a comparative lexical study of select Cynic sources during the first century C.E., that is, the period of time around which Colossians was composed. I will leave authors and works of a more properly Stoic nature until the following chapter. Concerning the Cynics, the literature that we do have consists of either pseudepigraphical epistles (known as the Cynic Epistles) which are comprised largely of legendary “sayings” from various ancient Cynic figures and leaders such as Diogenes, Crates, Anacharsis, Heraclitus, and Socrates; or secondary accounts of the life and sayings of Diogenes, provided by later writers such as that of Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers VI; hereafter DL), Dio Chrysostom (Discourses/Orations 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10), and Epictetus (Dissertation/Discourse 3.22).1 I will present the current consensus on dating for each of these works in the body of the chapter as I approach each work. Concerning the content of these texts, suffice it to say for now that, generally speaking, it is apparent and widely held that the Cynic Epistles and DL Lives present a less idealized form of Cynicism than the material in Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus, which tend to diminish any radical and anti-social behavior and to cast the original ancient Cynics in a way that reflects more of a Stoic image. 2. Two Waves of Cynicism Indeed, the fact that there seems to have been at least two waves of Cynicism in the ancient world is something which we need to take into account when choosing sources and forming opinions about possible correspondence in thought patterns between the Cynics and Paul. Branham explains that the first wave of Cynicism was characterized by “a radically individualistic philosophy advocated by charismatic spokesmen” which, by the time in which Colossians 1 Francis Gerald Downing, Cynics and Christian Origin (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 58. Downing cites these documents as among those which are commonly appealed to in studies of the Cynic streams of thought in the first century C.E. I find his list to be helpful and in concert with most other works on the Cynics.

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was written, had “evolved toward a collective philosophical praxis that gradually made Cynicism the preeminent popular philosophy of the Roman empire.”2 Although I can definitely assert with Downing3 that this radical anti-social element was likely much less pronounced from the earlier Cynicism of the first century C.E., there are still indications (as Downing himself acknowledges)4 that there remained significant strands of the Cynic tradition that were utilizing these more ancient individualistic and outrageous traditions in the first century C.E. For example, in the otherwise generally idealized picture of the ancient Cynic Diogenes which is presented by Dio Chrysostom, in his Eighth Discourse, Dio reports that following a public speech, Diogenes squatted “on the ground” and “performed an indecent act” of public defecation to which the crowd “scorned him and called him crazy.”5 Likewise, Epictetus’ highly idealized account of Cynicism in Diss. 3.22.80 asserts that: The present Cynics are dogs that wait at tables and in no respect imitate the Cynics of old, except perchance in breaking wind but in nothing else. [my emphasis]6

That Epictetus is intent on describing the original Cynics here as idealized as opposed to certain Cynics who were his contemporaries, strongly indicates that there were in fact still some in the first century C.E. who either self-identified or were identified by others as Cynics, who were acting in ways that Christians would consider morally base, socially unacceptable, and sinful.7 According to Sayre, the original Cynics from the third Century B.C.E. had “no relation to morality,” but were, on the contrary, in many ways amoral, and furthermore, “made no pretense of sexual morality.”8 R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy (HCS 23; London: University of California Press, 1996), 5. 3 Downing, Cynics and Christian Origin, 58. 4 Ibid., 79. 5 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 8.36. All quotes from Dio Chrysostom are from Dio Chrysostom, trans. J. W. Cohoon [Or. 1-31] and H. Lamar Crosby [Or. 32-80]; 5 Volumes; LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932-1955). 6 Epictetus, Diss. 3.22.80, as quoted by Farrand Sayre, The Greek Cynics (Baltimore: Furst, 1948), 17–18. 7 Cf. Hans-Josef Klauck, Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006), 175 who refers to “hard” and “soft” versions of Cynicism in antiquity: “Within Cynicism itself it is possible to distinguish between a radical ‘hard’ Cynicism and a milder ‘soft’ Cynicism. After a temporary plateau Cynicism experienced a reawakening in the early imperial period.” Cf. the same basic idea in HansJosef Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity, 380: “The Cynicism of the imperial period was not a unified movement. There existed, for example, both a more radical and a milder tendency, a distinction which applied also to the attitude taken to religion and belief in the gods,” emphasis mine. 8 Ibid., 2, 3. 2

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B. General Components of Cynic Philosophy and Ethics B. General Components of Cynic Philosophy and Ethics

It is not difficult to comprehend the claim concerning a lack of “morality” among the Cynics which Sayre voices above on account of the eccentric behavior exhibited in the primary sources for Cynicism from antiquity. We read, for example, in the Epistle of Diogenes 146, 4–15 about the act of indecency and public masturbation by the famous Cynic, Diogenes of Sinope in the midst of a wrestling match: Then my pointer somehow became erect (I’m afraid to mention the other name on account of the general public), and with this the lad left me and went away in embarrassment. But I stood there and rubbed myself.9

Other legendary stories purporting to be historical abound, such as that which appears in Lives Book VI in which Diogenes is described of as walking “upon snow barefoot” and even attempting “to eat meat raw” even though he “could not manage to digest it.”10 Elsewhere, in what is certainly a legendary account, Diogenes is reported to have called Alexander the Great “a bastard.”11 Indeed, he is said to have embodied the Cynic virtues of apathy and the despising of cultural norms to the highest degree. Dio Chrysostom writes that, in public meetings, Diogenes held to the same line of conduct, not changing his ways nor caring whether anyone of his audience commended or criticized him; no, not even if it was some wealthy and prominent person such as a general or ruler who approached and conversed with him, or some very humble and poor individual.12

Indeed, not only could it appear that virtue was far from this founding Cynic’s personality, but also “music, geometry, astronomy, and the like studies” which Diogenes considered “useless and unnecessary.”13 After a life of committing odd and sensational acts, legend has it that Diogenes died either by accident from colic resulting from his dining on a raw octopus, or on purpose, voluntarily “by holding his breath.”14 Interestingly, however, the later traditions, particularly those in Dio Chrysostom really do paint an idealized, hygienic, safe, and admirable picture of the founding Cynic. There he appears not as the octopus-eating, publicly-defecating, name-calling, wrestling match-masturbating

Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles, 147 (Epistle 35.2). Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R.D. Hicks; 2 Volumes; LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972 [1925]). Accessed 17 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01. 0258. (Hereafter DL), 6.34. 11 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 4.18–20. 12 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 9.7. 13 DL, Lives, 6.73. 14 DL, Lives, 6.76. 9

10

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eclectic but as a lauded example of an ideal man of virtue. The truth probably lies somewhere between the octopus and the idealism. The fact of the matter, however, is that even with an acknowledgement of the anti-social elements associated with the Cynic movements of antiquity, it is not accurate to say with Sayre that this constitutes a complete disinterest on the part of the Cynics in morality, the cultivation of virtue, and in the pursuit of eudaemonia. The Cynics were thoroughly engaged in the quest for eudaemonia and virtue even if they often expressed it and pursued it in ways that are quite antisocial and seemingly (and often, actually) vicious. The essential Cynic version of ethics centers on the programmatic idea of the life lived by means of apathy which means literally, an insensitivity to the passions or emotions. This pursuit of eudaemonia through apathy is related to the Stoic ideas put forth by Zeno which also focus on the complete eradication of the passions in order to achieve a sage status. However, the Cynics are unique in that the way in which they envisioned the realization of this path through apathy to eudaemonia to occur was through a life of poverty, begging, and freedom from the binding social conventions of the world. They spoke of this as the “shortcut to happiness (εὐδαιµονίαν).”15 This life of apathy included considering one’s “own possessions to be sufficient for patient endurance” and a willingness to decline both marriage and the producing of children.16 The Cynics did, however, seriously pursue virtue itself, in addition to the practice of this ethical paradigm of non-conformist apathy. For example, in the Epistle to Diogenes we encounter Diogenes as teaching against drunkenness, gluttony, sexual immorality, and effeminate behavior.17 Elsewhere he chides his audience exclaiming: “But nothing is enough for you, for you are lovers of glory, irrational, and ineptly brought up.”18 Another Cynic, Heraclitus, in the epistle which is attributed to him, proclaims and testifies to the success of his own Cynic quest toward eudaemonia through apathy and freedom from societal norms:

Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles, 175 (Epistle 44); cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. 6. Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles, 179 (Epistle 47); cf. 181 (Epistle 50) wherein Diogenes of Sinope indicates that one must rid himself of “all of his passions” (τὸ σύµπαν πάθος). Cf. The Epistle of Heraclitus (203, Epistle 7). Cf. Victor Eugene Emeljanow, The Letters of Diogenes (Stanford University Dissertation, 1968), 61 who notes that in the Epistles of Diogenes 3, 37, and 44, marriage along with “sexual ties and lasting or demanding friendships” were too “subversive” to the Cynic lifestyle.” Furthermore, in the epistles, “Diogenes rejects the idea of marriage since it saps the individual’s ability to be free when he wants freedom,” 70. Cf. 67–68, 217–18. 17 Ibid., 123 (Epistle 28.4–6); cf. 127 (Epistle 29.2) where Diogenes asks sternly “. . .will turn you from softness (τῆς µαλακίας).” 18 Ibid., 125 (Epistle 28.8). 15 16

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I have overcome pleasures, I have overcome money, I have overcome ambition, I overthrew cowardice, I overthrew flattery, fear does not contradict me, drunkenness does not contradict me, grief fears me, anger fears me. It is against these that I struggle.19

In comparison, Heraclitus lambastes a crowd who he claims has used their tongues as “a weapon” and: committed fraud, seduced women, poisoned friends, robbed temples, prostituted, been found breaking oaths, beaten your ritual drums, each one of you being filled with a different evil.20

Therefore, on account of the focus on the pursuit of the moral life, and the critique of the immoral life, it is important to balance out the odd behavior of the Cynics with the actual ethical pursuit which is equally evident through their writings. These moral discourses often come in the form of ethical lists of virtues and vices, but they are also evident in the common Cynic commitment to a life which consisted of the programmatic core values of freedom from possessions and a life supported by begging. After having relinquished all of his possessions, the Cynic Anacharsis writes: “So the evils which were yours long ago have passed over to those who have a hold on you and your possessions.”21 Likewise the famous Cynic named Crates explains that he is experiencing “complete peace” since having been freed “from every evil by Diogenes of Sinope. . .although we possess nothing. . .”22 Diogenes himself proclaims: “Poverty lives here, let no evil enter.”23 It is clear, therefore, that poverty itself, and the relinquishing of personal possessions is, for the Cynic, a means of obtaining freedom, apathy, and eudaemonia. Naturally, this creates a need for income which consists, not in traditional employment, but in public begging. Even here, though, both Crates and Diogenes are quick to develop an ethical protocol which distinguishes shameful and vicious begging from virtuous, Cynic begging. The distinction lies in the motivation of the beggar. If an individual is begging as a result of gluttony, this, argues Crates, is from “wickedness.”24 However, if one begs as a Cynic for subsistence and not for excess, then this form of begging is perfectly acceptable and “not at all disgraceful.”25

Ibid., 193 (Epistle 4.1–6). Ibid., 203 (Epistle 7.4). 21 Ibid., 49 (Epistle 9). 22 Ibid., 59 (Epistle 7). 23 Ibid., 151 (Epistle 36.4); cf. 181 (Epistle 50) the common phrase, here put forth by Diogenes which resonates with 1 Tim 6: “But if he was really nurtured on virtue, he should, right from the start, not have introduced into himself the love of money, which is the cause of all evil.” 24 Ibid., 67 (Epistle 17). 25 Ibid., 103 (Epistle 10). 19 20

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In summary, the phenomenon of Cynicism in antiquity comes in various waves. Though it is customary to refer to the movement as a singular phenomenon called “Cynicism,” it was never at any point a unified school in any sense, and it is more accurately conceived of as a variegated movement with both extreme and moderate forms.26 The original Cynics appear to have been more well-known for their anti-social public shenanigans, while the later descriptions of Diogenes of Sinope meld into a form of Stoic idealism, painting Diogenes as an admirable wise sage without much mention of his eccentric behavior. In reality, throughout the history of Cynicism, and in the first century, it is likely that various degrees and personality types were present which fell within the Cynic school of thought and lifestyle. Whether they were Cynics of the socially obnoxious sort or Cynics of the sage-like idealist sort, several core programmatic factors remained at the center of a Cynic identity, ethic, and way of life. Cynics pursued a “short-cut” to virtue, pursuing eudaemonia through the exercise of a life that focused on apathy, poverty, begging, and moral virtue. I turn now to examine how these core Cynic values and how the Cynic ethical lexical content compares with that the ethical content of Colossians.

C. A Comparison of Ethical Thought in the Cynics and Colossians C. A Comparison of Ethical Thought

1. Eudaemonism in Cynicism as compared with the ethical pattern of thought in Colossians The central, programmatic Cynic element of eudaemonism is incommensurable with the thought world of Colossians and Paul. A.A. Long, an expert on the Cynics, argues that, “their [the Cynics’] project was to make happiness depend essentially on the agent’s moral character and beliefs, and thus to minimize or discount its dependence on external contingencies.”27 This eudaemonistic emphasis is confirmed by Sayre28 and by my own reading of the Cynic material, in which I observed a constant emphasis on eudaemonism in the Cynic Epistles

26 Donald R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. (London: Methuen & Co, 1937), 37: “It would be an exaggeration to speak of any Cynic ‘school’ in the regular sense of organized teaching and a common body of doctrine. But Diogenes must have been a familiar figure to every Athenian of his time: and no doubt many persons listened to his discourses, if only out of curiosity.” 27 Anthony A. Long, “The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (HCS 23; London: University of California Press, 1996), 28–46, 30. 28 Sayre, The Greek Cynics, 7.

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and various other Cynic sources.29 Since, as I pointed out in the previous section on Peripatetic ethics, the programmatic word εὐδαιµονία never occurs in any of the writings of the New Testament, this would make any claim to dependency on a eudaemonistic “ancient pagan virtue theory,” such as that preached by the Cynics, highly unlikely. There are others who hold a similar opinion. Branham, a scholar of Hellenism, for example, argues that the ultimate end of Cynic ethics, namely εὐδαιµονία, is “unambiguously imminent and secular,” and with Augustine, he argues further that the Cynic rejection of shame “flies in the face of the most basic Christian doctrine.”30 2. The Ideal of the Cynic Sage as compared with the Ethics of Colossians and Paul Likewise, the programmatic concept of the individualistic Cynic ideal sage does not seem to correspond to the image of the ethical New Man in Christ presented in Colossians and in the other epistles of Paul. Colossians envisions Christians to be those who honored and sacrificed for one another in marriage (Col 3:18–19), 31 raised children (Col 3:20–21), 32 and honored their parents (Col 3:20). 33 Elsewhere Paul commends those who were concerned for the poor34 and were obedient to the governing forces (Rom 13:1–7).35 The Cynics, on the other hand, were typically described as those who generally looked down upon marriage, family, and raising children, often lacked “sympathy” for the poor (because they considered them to possess the most freedom from societal customs and thus the most freedom to live by nature),36 and who forsook contributing to society, obeying societal laws, and fulfilling obligations to parents. 37 Additionally, while labor was regarded as essentially evil for the Cynic,38 according to the vision for Christian life in Colossians, labor was a 29 Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles– Crates (56, line 19; 70, line 25; 80, line 16); Diogenes (144, line 7; 156, lines 14, 30, 31; 158, lines 5, 10; 174, line 10); Socrates (234, line 19). See also εὐδαιµονία in: DL, Lives, 6.1.11; Dio Chrysostom Or. 4.114, 120; Or. 6. 7, 34; Or. 8.15; Epictetus, Diss. 3.22 (3x). This list was compiled during my reading and searching of the materials. 30 Branham, The Cynics, 19. 31 Cf. Eph 5:22–33; 1 Cor 7:1–17; 1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:6. 32 Cf. Eph 6:1–4; cf. 1 Tim 3:4–5. 33 Cf. Eph 6:1; cf. Rom 1:30; 1 Tim 4:5; 2 Tim 3:2. 34 Rom 15:26; Gal 2:10; 1 Cor 16:1–3. 35 I compiled this list using Accordance Bible Software. 36 Sayre, The Greek Cynics, 7, 16, 22. The list of differences was compiled and paraphrased from the information contained on these pages. It is also something that I agree with on the basis of my own readings and studies of the Cynics as will be made clear in the following section containing the lexical studies. 37 Ibid., 9, 27. 38 Ibid., 12.

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good, godly, and necessary endeavor (Col 3:22–23).39 Relatedly, concerning two of the key programmatic Cynic virtues,40 δίαφορος (indifference) occurs only once in the entire Pauline canon (Rom 12:6). There it is used in an entirely un-Cynic manner while the other Cynic virtue, ἀπείθεια/ἀπειθής (apathy) appears in Paul, not as a virtue, but as a vice.41 3. The View of the Divine in Cynicism, Colossians, and Pauline Thought Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Malherbe, an expert on both Paul and the Cynics, helpfully points out that Paul’s use of “God” in his ethical system is “completely non-Cynic.”42 While there is some debate about the status of God in the speech of the Cynics, especially within the milieu of Cynicism and Cynic popular philosophy during the period of the first Century, Malherbe contends that the way in which the Christian and Jewish ethic was presented would, in any case, be viewed by pagans as “a mark of their superiority.”43 According to Goulet, concerning the early Cynics, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the notion of the gods “are insignificant in Cynicism and that in Diogenes’ philosophy there is no place for religious preoccupations.”44

D. Was Paul a Cynic? D. Was Paul a Cynic?

Gerald Downing has argued that, while Paul is in fact a Christian Jew, nevertheless he shows “some important Cynic traces in his discourse and life-style,” having been “pervasively informed by Cynic models,” and is in certain ways “aligned with Cynicism.”45 He continues by arguing that Cynicism “played an important, albeit not dominant, role in Paul’s life and thought as a Christian. . .”, Cf. Eph 4:28; 1 Thess 4:11–12; 2 Thess 3:11–12. According to Sayre, The Greek Cynics, 9. 41 For ἀπειθής see, for example: Rom 1:30; cf. 2 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:16; 3:3. Cf. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 229. For ἀπείθεια see, for example: Rom 11:30, 32; Eph 2:2; Col 3:6. In the NT the word always means “disobedience” and is never used to express the Stoic virtue of apathetic indifference. 42 Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 59. 43 Ibid., 61. 44 Cazé Goulet, “Religion and the Early Cynics,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (HCS 23; London: University of California Press, 1996), 47–80, 73; cf. 59, 60. 45 Francis Gerald Downing, Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches: Cynics and Christian Origins II (London: Routledge, 1998), 10, 26, 256. Cf. Downing’s bold statement: “It will in fact be argued that Paul became quite rapidly disenchanted with many of the Cynic strands and motifs in his initial Christian thinking . . . by the time he wrote Philippians and Romans the more Stoic tendencies in his thought and attitudes had come to the fore” (53– 54). I find this to be delightfully weird, completely wrong and impossible to “argue.” 39 40

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and that Paul in Galatians employed “Cynic-like language” such that: “It is hard to imagine how Paul could have been seen as anything other than a renegade Cynic Jew.”46 On the contrary, what is, in fact, “hard to imagine,” based on the survey of Cynic sources and sayings presented here, is that anyone would argue for such an overt employment of Cynic ideals by Paul. I concur entirely with N.T. Wright that any overlaps with Cynicism of the sort championed by Downing are “largely superficial.” 47 There is, however, a definite stream of positive reception detectable in the writings of the early church fathers that, despite the wild shenanigans of Diogenes enshrined in the Cynic literature, revere Diogenes as an exemplar of virtue.

E. Comparative Lexical Study of the Cynic Sources and Colossians E. Comparative Lexical Study

1. The Cynic Epistles and Colossians Concerning the background and dating of the collection commonly referred to as the Cynic Epistles, we are best served by a quote from Branham: The authors of the letters are unknown, and their dates of composition may vary considerably (from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D.). The epistles (written in Koine) offer a valuable survey of the topoi and anecdotes that may have informed many a “diatribe,” the terms conventionally used to describe the oral performances of the Cynic street preachers that are so often remarked on by our sources. . .48

Branham sees these epistles as a means of presenting Cynicism as a popular philosophy and ideology in the first century. The epistles do, on the whole, seem to present a type of Cynicism that, as Griffin describes, avoids “presenting extreme positions” and adopts “a somewhat compromising attitude.” 49 However, as will be demonstrated below, the content of the epistles present a much less idealized version of the Cynics than the later Stoicized portraits of ancient Cynicism presented by Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus. One might perhaps be able to make a comparison between Epictetus’ Diogenes and Paul, but one would likely not be able or willing to make the same comparison with 46 Ibid., 32, 72, 266. Cf. John D. Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 421–22. 47 N.T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (COQG 2; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 72. 48 Branham, The Cynics, 15. Cf. Hans-Josef Klauck, Ancient Letters and the New Testament, 176: “Modern scholarship dates the origin of the Cynic Epistles between the first century BCE and the end of the second century CE.” 49 Miriam Griffin, “The Ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (HCS 23; London: University of California Press, 1996), 205–239, 210.

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Diogenes, the shameless publicly masturbating misfit of the Cynic Epistles. Therefore, I agree with Downing that, compared to the other literature which I will survey, the Cynic Epistles present a more “plebeian,” or vulgar picture of the Cynics.50 The important thing to recall is that Epictetus himself, despite his general tendency toward the idealization of the Cynic way in his writings, bears witness to the fact that this sort of vulgar Cynicism existed and was visible in the first century C.E.51 Furthermore, it is generally recognized that what we encounter in the Cynic epistles is the ancient literary form of prosopopoeia, that is, speech-in-character. According to Klauck, prosopopoeia is “the ancient art of literary personification, impersonation, or dramatization, of putting speeches into the mouths of historical characters.”52 The epistles–though clearly pseudepigraphal–would not have been conceived of as forgeries or dubious on account of their status as speech-in-character, or on the basis of the spurious nature of the historicity of the accounts that they report, for both the author and the recipient of prosopopoeia in antiquity were aware of the genre, its purpose, and its limitations.53 Related to the status of the accounts in the Cynic epistles as prosopopoeia, Fischel has identified the source of the anecdotes within a tradition of popular

Downing, Cynics and Christian Origin, 59. Derek Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic Among the Fourth Century Fathers,” VC 47 (1993): 29–49 cites Basil (36), John Chrysostom (37–38), and Gregory of Nazianzus (who refers to Diogenes as as an exemplar of “a person living in voluntary poverty for the sake of others,” 40). Critique, however, is also present in the fathers, including in the writings of John Chrysostom and the fathers of the Antiochine tradition (see 37–44). Krueger summarizes the reception of Diogenes chreiai in the early church fathers thus: “On the basis of the evidence examined here, we can make the general observation that Late Ancient Christians cited Diogenes positively to support their arguments in favor of the life of poverty and selfcontrol, and negatively to argue against surrendering to passion and lust. However, Christian lack of consistency with regard to Diogenes should not be surprising. Christians presented a varied picture of Diogenes because they had received a varied picture. The πρόσωπον of Diogenes was a composite of asceticism and shamelessness. The variety of ways in which Christians employed the chreiai attributed to Diogenes reflected the diversity within the figure of Diogenes which the chreiai preserved.” 52 Klauck, Ancient Letters, 178. 53 Ibid., 181: “Yet in our letters there can be no talk of forgery in the strict sense. The authors do not really intend to pull the wool over the eyes of their audience, nor would the readers have been so easily deceived. The authors and readers share a common knowledge of the traditional anecdotal material out the Cynics and of the rhetorical technique of prosopopoeia, which could be adapted to letters. One can therefore regard the production and reading of the Cynic epistles as a kind of serious game that was played with the full consent of all the players–serious to the extent that it aimed at finding a successful plan life, which kept the game going.” 50 51

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Cynic chria that were circulating prior to and after the composition of the Cynic epistles.54 A Cynic chria was: a terse, realistic anecdote, originally and usually [based] on a Sage-Philosopher, that culminates in meaningful action or a truth in form of a gnome, apophthegm or proverb. The Cynic (or cynicizing) chria distinguishes itself by the odd, extreme, and often even burlesque action (or basic situation or final statement) of the central Sage-Hero that becomes the basis for a demonstration of Cynic ideals and values. The climactic finale is usually witty, approximating a “punch-line.” Double entendre, invective and altercation abound. It was thus an ideal vehicle for the teaching of the non-conformist ideas of the Cynics . . .55

As a collection of chriai and prosopopoeiai, the primary purpose of the Cynic epistles is not to present historical facts but to celebrate and idolize the founding Cynic figures, and to assist in the rhetorical and grammatical education of young men.56 Furthermore, the epistles have the goal of “propagating the ideal of the Cynic life, or gaining more followers, and of keeping the new adherents on the right track.”57 I will now investigate each epistle in the collection individually by comparing them with the virtues and vices which appear in Colossians in order to determine the level of correspondence between the Cynic Epistles and Colossians 3. 1.1. The Epistles of Anacharsis58 This collection represents some of the oldest Cynic literature that is currently available, with scholars dating its contents (with the exception of Epistle 10) to the third century B.C.E.59 Of the seven words that I am considering virtues 54 Henry A. Fischel, “Studies in Cynicism and the Ancient Near East: The Transformation of a Chria,” in Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, ed. Jacob Neusner (SHR 14; Leiden: Brill, 1970), 372–411. 55 Ibid., 373. Cf. Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic Among the Fourth Century Fathers,” 31: “Major credit for the preservation of traditions about Diogenes in Late Antiquity must surely belong to the place of the chreia [χρεία] in the curriculum of the schools of rhetoric. According to a textbook on rhetoric written by Theon of Alexandria in the second half of the first century, the chreia is ‘a concise statement or action which is attributed with aptness [εὐτοχία] to some specified character [πρόσωπον] or to something analogous to a character.’” 56 Ibid., 31: “The eventual goal was to be able to use the chreia to compose an entire speech, or to use a chreia effectively in the course of a speech in order to illustrate a point.” On the difference between a chreia and a maxim: “A chreia differs from a maxim [γνώµη] in that the chreia is attributed, while the maxim is anonymous.” 57 Klauck, Ancient Letters and the New Testament, 179. He continues: “Canvassing for converts is the one goal, while the second, exhortation to perseverance, is perhaps even stronger. To this end the example of Diogenes is repeatedly presented, because the writers not unreasonably assumed that personalized paraenesis is more effective than the mere moral appeal, and that one graphic example says more than many words . . .” 58 Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles, 35–51. 59 Ibid., 6.

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from Colossians 3, none are attested in the Epistles of Anacharsis. The closest and only correspondence to the virtue list of Col 3:12, 14 is the one attestation of the related adjectival form of ταπεινοφροσύνη, which is ταπεινὸς (44, 5). However, in the context of the epistle it is clear that the word is not being used as a virtue, but rather is being used in a negative sense to denote the “low estate” of officials who poorly manage their house. Therefore, no correspondence exists between Colossians and Anacharsis on the lexical level in terms of virtues. The vices too show weak attestation and correspondence. Seven of the eleven vices from Colossians are not attested. Of the vices that do occur, πάθος occurs one time (40, 18) modified by the negative adjective δύσµολον, thus signaling it as a vicious passion. Ἐπιθυµὶα (46, 7) and θυµός (44, 20) each also occur one time only, while κακός occurs a total of three times.60 1.2. The Epistles of Crates61 The contents of the Epistles of Crates are to be dated, according to Malherbe, “at the earliest” in the first or second century C.E.62 I am approaching them, therefore, knowing that some of the material may post-date the composition of the Epistle to the Colossians. Therefore, as with most of the Cynic Epistles, I am not looking for a true “source” from which the author of Colossians would have been working, but a group of texts which would deliver traditions that would likely have been heard from a street Cynic by any person in the first century. Again, of the seven virtue terms in Col 3:12, 14, surprisingly, I find no attestations in the entirety of the Epistles of Crates. A search for the Colossian vices also turns out weak with nine of the eleven vices exhibiting no attestation. Of the vices that are attested, ἐπιθυµὶα occurs once (88, 18) as something which must be dealt with and controlled and κακός occurs six times. The word αἰσχρός occurs three times (66, 19 and 21; 78, 6). Thus far we have encountered very limited vice correspondence and no attestation of the Colossian virtues in the Cynic writings.

60 Αἰσχρός appears once and the related adjectival form of αἰσχρολογία occurs once to indicate that which is shameful. 61 Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles, 53–87. 62 Ibid., 10.

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1.3. The Epistles of Diogenes63 This diverse set of letters is typically thought by scholars to have been composed by a variety of authors.64 While Sayre65 reports that the set of epistles as a whole was written in the first century B.C.E., Malherbe presents the findings of Emeljanow, who prefers to date some of the epistles (1–29) to the first century B.C.E. and others (30–41) to the second century C.E.66 As was the case with the Epistles of Crates, many of the Diogenes epistles are early enough to pre-date Paul and Colossians, and even if some of them do post-date Colossians, they are, nevertheless, still valuable in displaying a picture of Cynicism that is likely indicative of the Cynicism that the author of Colossians would have experienced. Diogenes is clearly the most popular figure of both ancient and first century Cynicism. This is evident by noting both the significant increase in the length of his collection as compared with Anacharsis, Crates, and Heraclitus; and by observing the tendency of later writers, such as Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus, to reinvent and represent Diogenes as the ideal Cynic philosopher.

Ibid., 91–183. Emeljanow, The Letters of Diogenes, 20 thinks that it is “extremely unlikely” that the letters are by the historical Diogenes. Considering the nature of the Cynic epistles as chreia and prosopopoeia, it seems more accurate to disregard any notion that the historical Diogenes composed the letters attributed to his name. With Desmond [William Desmond, Cynics (Ancient Philosophies 3; Durham: Routledge, 2014), 6], it is preferable and more commensurate with the contemporary scholarly understanding of the Cynic epistles to regard ancient Cynicism as “a body of loosely related ideas that, as a whole, remained fairly constant” and which endured “from the early Greek Cynics to the last known representatives under the late Roman Empire.” It is also interesting to consider that “it is difficult to reconstruct the exact views of ‘true’ Cynics such as Diogenes, who, being wanderers, could not write very much and are known mainly at a remove.” 65 Sayre, The Greek Cynics, 65. 66 Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles, 17. He doesn’t offer a date here for the remaining epistles (41–51) in this scenario. Emeljanow, The Letters of Diogenes, 6 proposes a two-fold (or potentially three-fold) history of composition. He hypothesizes: “that there was in existence an early collection (a) perhaps dating from the first century B.C. or even earlier (this is when after all Marcks dates the whole collection), and that a second collection (b) was composed about the second century A.D. It seems likely that the second writer composed the letters with the first in mind but published it separately. The notes to letters 29 and 40, 7 and 34, 8 and 35 show how in some cases the vocabulary and subject matter is identical in 34, 35, 40 . . . which I suppose be part of an earlier collection. In fact, the writer of the former has even paraphrased in prose Homeric lines he found in verse (letters 7 and 34). Finally, a third collection (c) containing letters 41–50 is not impossible.” He does note earlier (4), however, that the theory is “highly conjectural” and for this he takes “full responsibility.” Thus, it is worth exercising due restraint in regard to the dating and composition history of the various epistles of Diogenes. More work needs to be done in order to test Emeljanow’s hypothesis. At the present time detailed studies of this nature do not exist beyond his initial thoughts from 1968. 63 64

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The Cynic Epistles, as has been previously mentioned, are early enough to present the figure of Diogenes as an eclectic and indecent social character. There is no way to be certain if Paul knew of the legends concerning his outrageous social behavior or not, but it is hard to believe that if he knew of these stories, he would have consciously built his ethical message in association with a school that had such a person as its primary, paradigmatic leader. In regard to the attestation of the Colossian virtues in the Epistles of Diogenes, the most popular example and forefather of Cynicism, I find not one attestation. This is the third instance in a row in which I have found zero correspondence between the virtue terms of Colossians and the Cynics. Seven of the eleven vices find no attestation in the Epistles of Diogenes. However, the related forms of two of these non-attested terms do appear, namely πλεονέκτης (1x)67 and αἰσχρός (4x).68 Πάθος appears four times69 and ἐπιθυµὶα appears three times.70 Κακός is widely used in the Epistles of Diogenes (27x), some of which is likely attributable to its longer length. 1.4. The Epistles of Heraclitus71 Malherbe, based upon the fact that Epistles 1 and 2 are incorporated into Diogenes Laertius, dates all but Epistle 3 to the first century C.E.72 In these epistles the degree of attestation of the virtue terms is only slightly higher. Only one of the seven terms actually appears in the form in which it occurs in Colossians, namely, σπλάγχνον (214, 19). However, the term in Heraclitus is referring to literal human bowels, and is in no way used in the metaphorically virtuous sense of Col 3:12. Therefore, technically, there are no “actual” virtue correspondences or parallels. I did, however, encounter three relevant related forms with one occurrence each of χρήστης (206, 25) and πρᾶος (194, 25); and two appearances of related verbal form ἀγαπάω (200, 26; 212, 6). Seven of the eleven Colossian vices are not attested in the Epistles of Heraclitus. Our usual Hellenistic vice πάθος occurs six times73 and ἐπιθυµὶα once (212, 29). Additionally, ὀργή appears once (192, 5) and κακός four times. As has been the case thus far with the Cynic Epistles, αἰσχρός appears by itself (that is, without λογία) three times.74 Therefore, while the virtue correspondence remains weak, I can still trace the popularity of πάθος and αἰσχρός with relative confidence as primary Cynic vices in a roughly first century context. Ibid., 120, line 23. Ibid., 102, line 17; 106, line 15; 142, line 17; 144, line 2; 145, line 14. 69 Ibid., 96, line 5; 118, line 20; 138, line 22; 180, line 24. 70 Ibid., 138, line 2; 176, line 15; 180, line 22. 71 Ibid., 185–215. 72 Ibid., 22. 73 Ibid., 196, line 4; 200, line 7; 202, line 18, 28; 212, line 5; 214, line 20. 74 The verbal form αἰσχύνω appears an additional 2 times (212, line 3 and 10). 67 68

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1.5. The Epistles of Socrates75 The Epistles of Socrates, which, like the other Cynic Epistles are clearly and unanimously regarded as pseudepigraphal, likely date to the first century “or even earlier” according to Malherbe.76 However, they are a part of a larger group of epistles which purport to be by disciples of Socrates, the Socratics. For the purposes of this book, primarily because these other Socratic epistles are dated later (the final author is writing in 400 C.E. but Malherbe thinks many of them are from 200 C.E. or a little later),77 I will restrict my search to the earlier group of writings alone which are known as the Epistles of Socrates. Continuing the pattern encountered thus far, there is no attestation of any of the Colossian virtues in the Epistles of Socrates. The related forms χρήστης occurs twice (218, 24; 234, 28). Also, ταπεινός appears one time (224, 28), but it is not used as virtue. As for Colossian vices, eight of the eleven vices make no appearance in the epistle. We find one attestation each of ὀργή (224, 1) and ἐπιθυµὶα (224, 30), and three occurrences of κακός. As expected, I once again find αἰσχρός making one appearance (220, 12). 1.6. Summary of the Comparative Lexical and Conceptual Study of the Cynic Epistles and Colossians It is warranted and accurate to conclude that, based upon the results of this study, strikingly, there are no significant correspondences between the virtues of Colossians and those of the Cynic Epistles. Quite simply, the case could not be any less compelling for an argument positing Cynic influence on the ethical virtue terms and pattern of thought in Colossians. There is no lexical evidence in the Cynic Epistles to suggest such a position. In regard to the Colossian vices listed in Colossians, I have perceived and documented a continued pattern of the reoccurring attestation of αἰσχρός and πάθος in the Hellenistic sources. These two words show practically no attestation in the LXX (chapter 3) and thus confirm my thesis that these particular words are rooted in a Hellenistic ethical tradition. Lastly, I note the continuation of a curious absence thus far in our Hellenistic sources of virtues and vices which present ethical realities in terms of metaphorical purity (πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία). These sources continue to manifest themselves almost entirely and solely in Jewish sources. Next I will examine the contents of Book IV of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers which present another reliable source for the construction of an image of Cynicism in the first century C.E.

Ibid., 217–44. Ibid., 27. 77 Ibid., 28. 75 76

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2. Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers Book VI and Colossians Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers Book VI contains nine chapters, each delivering a brief history of a major Cynic figure. The work contains the histories of: Antisthenes, Diogenes, Monimus, Onesicritus, Crates, Metrocles, Hipparchia, Menippus, and Menedemus. While it is generally reported that Diogenes Laertius wrote in the third century C.E., it is noted with regard to the contents of Book VI that much of the material of Diogenes dates to the first century, and thus according to A.A. Long, it has “a good chance of being authentic or at least true to the spirit of Diogenes’ discourse.”78 Long concedes, however, that even with its authentic Cynic presentation, Book VI is still likely colored by a later Stoic influence. In my own reading of Book VI, while I agree that it is the case that it contains some Stoic coloring, this coloring is much less obvious than that which appears in the work of Epictetus. Somewhat more probable is the view of Krueger who argues that the information on Diogenes in the Lives of Eminent Philosophers consists of a collection of anecdotes that are unlikely to have historical merit. Indeed, historical accuracy was not a primary concern of either the authors or the readers of ancient chreia such as are found in the Lives of Eminent Philosophers. He writes: In the Lives of the Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius makes use of a number of earlier collections of chreiai specifically concerned with Diogenes of Sinope in compiling his anecdotal ‘life’ of Diogenes.” Studies attempting to assess the authenticity of these and other sayings and deeds attributed of Diogenes are ultimately futile, since the whole point of the school was to manipulate these statements and thus change them. There was little concern that the attributions should be accurate, only that they should be apt.79

Downing thinks that the sources of the document would have been in circulation in the first century C.E. and that it represents the “authentic Cynicism”80 of that period. I find this to be overly optimistic based on what we can know for certain about the documents themselves. Still, Lives of Eminent Philosophers is an incredibly useful text for a lexical study seeking to survey the ethical terms of Cynicism as they may have appeared in the Hellenistic culture of

Long, “The Socratic Tradition,” 30–31. Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic Among the Fourth Century Fathers,” 32. Cf. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, 29: “There is little point in retailing any of the stories from Diogenes Laertius; they belong rather to an anthology of Greek humour than a discussion of philosophy.” Cf. Desmond, Cynics, 5 where he distinguishes between “true” extant fragments of Diogenes and Crates as opposed to the “more ‘literary’ adherents and inheritors” among which he includes Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers, Book VI. 80 Downing, Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches, 61. 78 79

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the first century C.E. Emeljanow considers book six of Lives of Eminent Philosophers to be the “main source for the life of Diogenes” noting, however, that the account “relies mainly on accumulations of anecdotes.”81 In terms of my approach to the nine chapters of Book VI, I have elected to carry out one overarching search rather than nine separate smaller searches. This is based upon the relative brevity of the work as a whole. Strikingly, yet again, I find that when it comes to attestation of the seven Colossian virtues there are absolutely no occurrences of any of the words in the form in which they appear in Colossians. I do find the related adjectival form χρηστὸς once in Book VI, Chapter 2 [75] where it is translated as “Honest” and refers to the nick-name of a particular man. As was the case in the Cynic Epistles, the related adjectival form ταπεινός appears once in Book VI, Chapter 2 [32], however it is not used as a virtue. Therefore, this reliable and central document on Cynicism, much of the content of which dates to the first century C.E, shows no correspondence with the ethical virtue terminology of Colossians. Six of the eleven Colossian vices are unattested including πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, and εἴδωλολατρία. In addition to these six unattested words, one of the attested words θυµός (Book VI, Chapter 5.85), although spelled the same as the term used in Colossians to refer to the vice of “anger,” is here used to refer to the herb “thyme.” Unless the author was seeking to exhort the Colossians to avoid acting like a culinary herb, we can count the unattested words at seven of the eleven. Several of the words have somewhat related forms attested such as πόρνη which appears three times in Book VI, Chapter 5 [85, 86, and 90] and refers to a prostitute, ἀκάθαρτος once in Book VI, Chapter 2 [63] and is describing a literally “dirty” (as in filthy) place and thus not used in the ethical metaphorical sense of the LXX and NT, and the typical Cynic staple vice αἰσχρός which appears three times in Book VI, Chapter 1 [3 and 12] and 2 [62]. The four vices which actually occur are: κακός (16x), βλασφηµία once in Book VI, Chapter 5 [90] where it is used to refer to verbal abuse, but not impious speech against a deity, ἐπιθυµὶα which is used once as a vice in Book VI, Chapter 2 [66], and the other staple Cynic vice πάθος occurring three times in Book II, Chapter 8 [86, 92, and 95]. Thus, the pattern of slender lexical correspondence between Colossians and the Cynic Epistles continues to manifest itself in our study of Diogenes Laertius’

81 Emeljanow, The Letters of Diogenes, 11. He argues that despite the anecdotal nature of the accounts in Diogenes Laertius, nevertheless “it is possible at least to derive certain main events in the life of the Cynic some of which are referred to in the letters.” Some of examples of these events include: Diogenes leaving Sinope “apparently as the result of a treasury scandal in which his father was involved and moves to mainland Greece,” his period of study in Athens with Antisthenes after leaving the oracle at Delphi, the famous story of his period of residence in a tub, and his penchant for “ridiculing the philosophical theoreticians, e.g. Plato.”

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Book VI. Likewise, the expected vices of πάθος and αἰσχρός are present along with an interesting occurrence of βλασφηµία. 3. Dio Chrysostom’s Discourses 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 and Colossians Even the most casual reading of the sections of Dio Chrysostom’s Discourses (4, 6, 8, 9, 10) will yield an obviously idealized and tamed version of Diogenes and the Cynics. Discourse 4, specifically, presents Diogenes as a respectable legendary wise man, especially when compared with the image of him that one receives from the Cynic Epistles. This idealizing tendency is also apparent in Discourse 6 which contains texts that report tales about Diogenes, that describe his manner of living in nature and his minimal Cynic attire without any real emphasis on the original, first wave, Cynic records which highlight his eccentric character and indecent public acts. However, that the account of Dio Chrysostom has not totally broken with the ancient tradition is apparent in Discourse 8 in which, as was previously stated, he describes a famous account of Diogenes’ act of public defecation at the conclusion of a speech. None of the virtues of Col 3:12, 14 are attested in the Discourses of Dio Chrysostom that deal with the Cynics. Related forms do appear, but even these are inconsequential. For example, although ταπεινὸς occurs six times in Discourse 4,82 it is never used as a virtue. Likewise, πρᾶος, appears once in Discourse 6.3, where however, it is used not as a virtue, but rather in a geographical/topographical reference to a “low” portion of land. In the same manner, of the four occurrences of ἀγαπάω,83 none are references to the virtue of “love.” Six of the eleven Colossian vices do not appear in Dio Chrysostom’s Cynic Discourses. However, in two cases the related adjectival forms, namely αἰσχρός (4.68) and εἴδωλον (4.86), each appear once. Along with the Hellenistic Cynic staple vice πάθος (4x; 4.82, 126, 138; 10.6), other vices, including ὀργή, ἐπιθυµὶα and κακός appear two, eleven and fourteen times respectively. Of particular note is the one occurrence of βλασφηµία (4.94), translated “curses.” Continuing the pattern of non-attestation of particularly Jewish words, I note that neither ἀκαθαρσία nor πορνεία is attested, nor is πλεονεξία. 4. Epictetus’ Dissertation 3.22 and Colossians It is widely acknowledged that Epictetus in Dissertation 3.22 presents, like Chrysostom, an idealized and Stoicized version of Diogenes which was probably not in accord with the historical person and is not consonant with other depictions such as that of the Cynic Epistles. Goulet, describes the general approach of such authors as Epictetus and Julian:

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Or. 4.80, 91, 118, 122; 6.58. Or. 4.15; 6.56, 59; and 10.4.

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These authors turn Diogenes into a pious man, with a mission from the gods, and attribute to him a discourse on the divine that certainly did not originate with Diogenes.84

Additionally, although it is clear that the original Cynic emphasis on shamelessness is largely absent, 85 we do encounter (as was mentioned earlier) in 3.22.80, an instance in which Epictetus, through a comparison of certain contemporary false Cynics, through an idealized portrait of the classic Cynic Diogenes, indicates that, in fact, in the first century C.E., there were still streams of Cynicism which were emulating the more crass original social behavior of Diogenes such as that presented in the Cynic Epistles. The fact that Epictetus makes such a comment itself proves the variegated nature of Cynicism which probably included varying degrees of social behavior ranging from that which was consonant with Stoicism to that which was more indicative of Diogenes’ original antics. This reality should make us wary about suggesting any conscious desire on the part of either Paul or the author of Colossians to be grouped with such a potentially morally dubious and often socially and ethically questionable group. In terms of lexical correspondence, this section is perhaps the simplest of all of the Cynic materials to explain; there is none. There is one actual attestation of a Colossian virtue ταπεινοφροσύνη (3.24 [56]) but it is not used as a virtue. Relatedly, ταπεινός occurs a total of five times (3.2, 24). However, as expected, it is used by Epictetus as a vice. The vices themselves are equally unattested, with the only actual correspondence being the seven appearances of κακός (3.22.23, 30, 31, 32, 33) which, as previously noted, is of little value in the current study. Equally unimportant are the three appearances (3.1, 21) of a related adjectival form of the Colossian virtue ἀκαθαρσία, which is ἀκάθαρτος. In each case the word refers, not to a morally vicious or unclean state, but is simply used to a person who is messy or dirty in appearance. I therefore conclude that Epictetus’ Dissertation 3.22, a widely noted source for the study of Cynicism in the first century C.E., yields virtually no attestation of the Colossian virtues or vices and certainly none that would suggest the plausibility of either dependence or correspondence between Colossians and the Cynic tradition in terms of word usage and ethical concepts. However, the more Stoic portions of Epictetus and others remain to be approached in Section 3 of the next chapter in order to trace established Hellenistic correspondence with Colossians of certain terms and to eliminate others due to non-attestation.

F. Conclusion – The Cynics and Colossians F. Conclusion

In this section I have carried out several comparative lexical studies of the relevant Cynic materials which represent the various images and streams of Cynic 84 85

Goulet, “Religion and the Early Cynics,” 80. Ibid., 220.

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thought and teaching from the third century B.C.E. through the first century C.E. The results clearly indicate that, based upon lexical usage, there are virtually no connections between the ethical virtue terms of the Epistle to the Colossians and the various Cynic sources. In regard to the vices, I noticed a continual occurrence of the vices πάθος and αἰσχρός throughout the Cynic literature which I perceive to be a witness to the location of the generally Hellenistic provenance of these terms in the ethical presentation in Col 3:1–17.86 This continues a pattern of attestation which I first discovered in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and which will be further confirmed in my research of the Stoic sources. The other vices, particularly πορνεία, πλεονεξία, εἴδωλολατρία, ἀκαθαρσία, and βλασφηµία, were either completely unattested or highly infrequent and thus unlikely to demonstrate any evidence of dependence or connection between the Cynic and Colossian ethical traditions. Lastly, I began by highlighting the many programmatic, conceptual differences between the Cynic pattern of thought and the Colossian and broader Pauline worldview, including: the lack of a eudaemonistic ethic in Colossians and the epistles of Paul, the lack of the Cynic emphasis on individuality that is typically against societal and familial commitments (which has been shown to be, on the other hand, a matter of central importance for Paul and the author of Colossians), and the stream of indecency and immorality in some major Cynic figures and literature which I found to be generally incompatible with the witness of Christian literature and the Colossian and broader Pauline moral vision. Therefore, I conclude that while it is clear that the usage of ethical terms in Colossians and Paul is consistent with and overlaps with some of the contemporary Hellenistic terms of the time as used by Aristotle and the Cynics (i.e. πάθος and αἰσχρός) in an incidental manner, my results indicate that the majority of the terms are, however, inconsistent with, and indeed, conspicuously absent from, both streams and thus are likely to have their source in another location altogether. I turn now to the Stoics in order to identify other areas of correspondence or disconnect.

86 I would, therefore, disagree with Emeljanow, The Letters of Diogenes, 50 who argues that the pathoi do not “play a large part in the letters” and “may thus be regarded as a later, possibly Roman, development in Cynicism.” Emeljanow here is speaking only about the Letters of Diogenes in the Cynic Epistles. Nevertheless, I must disagree with his analysis in this case. In my analysis of the sources for ancient Cynicism, including the epistles of Diogenes, I have demonstrated that the virtue of apathy shows itself to be a ubiquitous concept which is central to the Cynic ideology.

Chapter 4

The Stoics and Colossians A. Introduction and General Overview of Stoicism A. Introduction and General Overview of Stoicism

In the current section, through surveying the literature of the Stoics, we will encounter what I consider to be the closest Hellenistic parallels to the lexical material found in Colossians. However, once one acknowledges that authentic Stoicism was much more than a bare carrier of a generalized and essentially generic eudaemonistic ethic, but was rather a fully integrated worldview consisting of interweaving and interdependent concepts of theology, ethics, logic, and physics,1 it becomes necessary to ask if it would even be possible or rea-

Anthony A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Oxford Scholarship Online. Accessed 10 August 2011. Online: Cf. Katerina Ierodiaknonou, “The Stoic Division of Philosophy,” Phr 38 (1993): 57–74, 69, 70 argues that, to the ancient Stoics, all of the parts of philosophical discourse were important, but the different orders presented by the various ancient sources are a result of pedagogical concerns. She also notes, on page 71, that sometimes the various philosophical elements of Stoicism were presented simultaneously, in a mixed and interrelated fashion. Cf. Julia Annas, “Ethics in Stoic Philosophy,” Phr 52 (2007): 58–87. On pages 60–61, Annas argues that becoming “a good Stoic requires more, however, than mastering the ethical part. Stoic philosophy consists of all three parts strongly unified into a whole . . .” More than any other article I’ve come across, Annas masterfully demonstrates that the Stoics envisioned all of the categories (i.e., theology, ethics, logic, and physics) as necessarily integrated into proper Stoic teaching. It was not merely a case that to be a “Stoic” one could opt only for the ethical element of Stoic teaching. Rather: “To make progress towards the overall unified view of the sage that we aspire to, we have to learn philosophy by learning ethics, physics and logic, but the aim is clearly an integration of the findings of all three parts in a unified view which the sage can ultimately grasp synoptically. As Diogenes Laertius says, ‘no part is preferred to any other; they are mixed,’” 63, emphasis mine. Further: “The different parts of philosophy, thought of as parts, concern distinguishable areas of study, and can be distinguished as different in that way. However, how can one be prior to another? It is equally true of each of the three parts of Stoic philosophy that if it is removed we no longer have the whole. Nothing in the integrated picture supports the view that one of the parts is dependent on another,” 66. Annas makes the point that Stoic thought was not foundationalist, while also successfully recognizing that the domain of ethics, for example, can be “defined and discussed” in its “own terms,” 67. However: “the ethical part of Stoic philosophy, whether from a dry epitome or from a more rhetorically gripping presentation like Cicero’s, would be effective up to a point in getting 1

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sonable to claim that someone (Paul or the author of Colossians) could be legitimately referred to as Stoic in any meaningful sense without operating in the context of, and in concert with, the entire system of Stoicism. Was Paul consciously extracting one portion of the worldview (ethics) and inserting it into an entirely new worldview complete with massively different, and often seemingly incommensurable views of God, creation, and human nature? Were this the case, would it still make sense to refer to him as Stoic? I will address this question in due course. I turn first, however, to a brief survey of Stoicism itself in order to situate my comparison in the works of the Stoic writers who were most contemporaneous with Paul and Colossians. It is necessary at this point to enumerate and articulate some basic orienting facts concerning Stoicism. This section is not intended to be a full-orbed treatment of Stoic thought as space does not allow for such an exposition. Furthermore, several introductory texts on the basics of Stoicism have been written in recent years which sufficiently fulfill this need. I would commend to the reader those works should they desire a more in-depth orientation to Stoicism.2 My task will be to simply identify and briefly explain some of the elements which are central to Stoic ethical thought.3

you to think, act and be motivated as a Stoic, but would be incomplete in itself to turn you into a Stoic. To use Cooper’s example, you might be convinced that your child’s death is not an evil, but might find this cold comfort, because it did not enable you to live well, or maybe not even to cope, in the world in which this could happen,” 71. 2 See especially F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (Bristol: Bristol Press, 1989); John M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (SCLT 1; Leiden: Brill, 1985); Christoph Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (CSAP 14; London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009). 3 The focus on this chapter will remain focused–as has been the custom thus far–on complete literary works and corpora rather than on collections of fragments. This is in line with the Malherbian methodology governing the approach taken in this book which insists upon a contextualized consideration (and desired mastery) of whole works and corpora, as opposed to cultivating parallomania derived from random acontextual references to fragments of texts. However, in the case of the Stoics, I will make use of Hans Von Arnim, ed. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (4 Vols. Lissiae In Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1903. Repr. 4 vols, Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2016); hereafter SVF. This work is not yet available digitally thus limiting its potential for an exhaustive lexical study. Yet, Volume 4 contains a very useful word and author index. I have used this index to locate and observe lexemes, and I have attempted to discern the significance of the various lexemes in the context of the individual fragments, and considered together as a set of fragments in SVF. Throughout the chapter I will refer to SVF (typically in footnotes) in order to demonstrate lexical patterns across the entire works surveyed and their parallels in this collection of Stoic fragments.

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1. The Ideal Stoic Sage As has been highlighted by Engberg-Pedersen and others, the Stoic ethic falls within a larger stream of eudaemonistic ethics. Beginning with Zeno and throughout the history of the school, this traditional Hellenistic distinctive was a central element for the Stoics.4 However, it is crucial to note where Stoicism differs from the more-Aristotelian approach to eudaemonia. In orthodox Stoic teaching, there was no “doctrine of the mean,”5 but instead virtue was considered an all or nothing affair. That is, for the Stoic, the “Ideal” sage, the virtuous and truly wise man, was entirely virtuous and always acted in accord with virtue, and he could not act otherwise. Virtue was considered an absolute state, a fixed disposition, a possession of a perfect knowledge of the good which was achieved by an instantaneous conversion and not by gradual acquisition. There were, therefore, not “grades of goodness,” but instead a person was considered wholly vicious or wholly virtuous in disposition.6 Jedan describes a traditionalorthodox articulation of the Stoic view: for the Stoics there was no intermediate state between virtue and vice (κακία): a sharp dichotomy separates the wise and the vicious. Whereas the possession of virtue is tantamount to happiness, the possession of vice makes an agent utterly unhappy. The Stoics describe the vicious with insulting terms: they are “stupid,” “foolish,” “impious,” “lawless,” or even “mad.”7

This classic view can be demonstrated in the historical accounts of the earliest Stoics all the way through to the period of the New Testament in the first century and beyond. In Cicero’s account of Chrysippus’ ethic, for example, we read: all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, interference or want. The essential principle not merely of the system of philosophy I am discussing but also of our life and destinies is, that we should believe Moral Worth to be the only good.8

Likewise, For every action that the Wise Man initiates must necessarily be complete forthwith in all its parts; since the thing desirable, as we term it, consists in his activity.9

Sandbach, The Stoics, 29, 48; Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 2; Colish, The Stoic Tradition, 36. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 19. 6 Sandbach, The Stoics, 44. 7 Jedan, Stoic Virtues, 97. 8 Cicero, Tulli. Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, fasc. 43. de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. M. Tullius Cicero, Th. Schiche (Leipzig: Teubner, 1915). Accessed 16 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0036%3Abook%3Dpraef. 9 Ibid., Book III. 9.32; cf. Chapter 10. 4 5

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This theme persists in Musonius Rufus, the Stoic teacher of Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, who holds that once a man reaches wisdom and understanding, the “person who gains this comprehension immediately stops doing wrong.”10 This indicates that the programmatic idea of an instant conversion to wisdom was still operative by the teacher of the most well-known first and second century C.E. Stoic figures. Similarly, Arius Didymus writes earlier in the late first century B.C.E.: they [the virtues] are also inseparable. For he who has one has them all and he who acts in accordance with one acts in accordance with them all.11

Dio Chrysostom, in the late first century C.E. indicates that he believes most men are living in folly and that the “wise and sensible man is 'fortunate and happy' in every case, but that the worthless man is 'unfortunate and unhappy,’” thus indicating an all or nothing Stoic ethic still remains in his teaching and in that era of Stoic thought.12 Yet, the Stoic approach to ethics is not at all one dimensional in this regard since some writers in the Stoic tradition such as Seneca, Panaetius and Posidonius tended to place less weight on the idea of an “instant conversion” and instead emphasized the gradual acquisition of virtue.13 Furthermore, even in the more classic and standard Stoic doctrine expressed by Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and later Epictetus to some extent, despite the seemingly unachievable height at which the disposition of virtue was held, it was still maintained that virtue could be taught and that its pursuit was not a vain exercise.14 For example, Epictetus, though a Stoic, expresses in several different contexts the view that progress is indeed possible for the ethically inclined individual. He writes: Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us. 15

and Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress toward virtue is progress toward each of these things. . .Where then is progress? If any

Musonius Rufus, 42, Lecture 8.8 [Stobaeus 4.7.67] in Musonius Rufus: Lectures and Sayings, ed. and trans. Cynthia King; Preface by William B. Irvine (Lulu: 2010); cf. 51, Lecture 10.5 [Stobaeus 3.19.16]. 11 Pomeroy, Arius Didymus, 19; 5b5. Cf. 23 (5b8): “There is nothing in-between virtue and vice. All men have natural impulses for virtue . . . while they are incomplete they are worthless, but once complete they are worthwhile”; cf. 73 (11g). 12 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 23.12. 13 Colish, The Stoic Tradition, 46, 48. Colish notes that in the case of Panaetius and Posidonius this was due to a rejection of the classic monistic Stoic psychology. 14 Jedan, Stoic Virtues, 101, 102. 15 Epictetus, Diss. 1.2.32. 10

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of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will to exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice–this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not traveled in vain.16

According to the classic view, expressed by Chryssipus, Zeno, Musonius Rufus, Arius Didymus, Dio Chrysostom, and occasionally Epictetus, the sage possesses a perfect monistic virtuous rationality that, in reality, practically no-one possessed.17 In the eyes of a Stoic, a vicious person (i.e. essentially everyone) may respond in a seemingly virtuous way which is identical to the response of the sage. Yet, the difference would be that the reaction of the fool would not be sourced and rooted in a “stable and irrefutable disposition,” and thus would not be technically virtuous.18 However, even if the classical view contains a seeming contradiction between the charge to pursue virtue and the relative rarity of the actual possibility to be considered truly virtuous, i.e., a sage; nevertheless, all Stoics had a category for moral progress, even prior to the acquisition of the status of sage. Oikeōsis is the technical word referring to the process of how moral progress can be made, and it is a concept that is present within the fabric of the ethical doctrines of all of the Stoics–from Chrysippus to Panaetius to Epictetus and beyond–regardless of their particular differing views concerning the gradual or non-gradual nature of the apprehension of virtue in human beings.19 The process of oikeōsis involves the self-preservation and outworking of innate, preconceived natural and ethical knowledge that forms the individual through the instrument of reason.20 Long describes the concept of oikeōsis as Epictetus, Diss. 1.4.3, 18–22; cf. 2.18. Cf. Hans-Josef Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity, 376: “It appears that the Stoic ideal in its pure form exists only in theory: in praxis, only differing degrees of approximation to this ideal are found. The Stoics do not, however, infer from this that they must abandon their ideal and cease to strive towards it. On the contrary, they infer that they must never relax their efforts: their own deficiency is . . . theoretically very optimistic, but in practice rather skeptical and gloomy.” 18 Jedan, Stoic Virtues, 70. 19 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 17 cites Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII 85–89 and Cicero’s De Finibus III 16–21 as two examples of the ancient accounts of the Stoic doctrine of oikeōsis. 20 Matt Jackson-McCabe, “The Stoic Theory of Implanted Preconceptions,” Phr 49 (2004): 323–47, 327. There he demonstrates Chrysippus’ use of the term ἔµφυτοι προλήψεις 16 17

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involving “an internal criterion” that is innate in human beings that functions as “the voice of reason” and “a teleological principle which exists in our nature in order to structure human life in the best possible way.”21 The process of oikeōsis begins in infancy in both humans and animals, and it is experienced as the natural inclination and impulse to love one’s self in order to preserve one’s life, health, and well being.22 As a human being matures into adulthood, the Stoics thought that the original, basic animal “impulse toward self-preservation” graduated to a perspective that “adopted accordance with nature” as a goal not only physically, in regard to the survival of one’s bodily existence, but entirely, in regard to the conforming of the totality of one’s life (including of course, one’s moral and ethical choices) to nature through reason.23 Wagoner shows that, in Seneca, moral progress takes place through having “the right goal (moral improvement) and focusing on the right content (res rather than verba). These, he argues, are “necessary conditions for achieving moral improvement and thus for living well.”24 Moral progress–whatever that might mean to any one particular Stoic–includes the study of Stoic philosophy, but does not proceed in the same manner for every student. Nevertheless, the pursuit of virtue through the process of oikeōsis is inseparably tied to right thinking, and the pursuit of progress through reason. Wagoner helpfully explains the way in which this process works,

(‘preconceived, implanted notions’) “with specific reference to preconceptions of the ethical sphere whose formation is guaranteed by oikeiosis, and which in this sense represent a type of inborn knowledge.” 21 Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 39 quoting Long from a paper entitled “Greek Ethics after MacIntyre.” 22 Ibid., 66, 68, and 70. 23 Ibid., 83. I find convincing Striker’s claim that Cicero, De Finibus III. 21 is attempting to offer “an account of a psychological development that shows how a man can come to adopt accordance with nature” as the goal of his life. 24 Robert Wagoner, “Seneca on Moral Theory and Moral Improvement,” CPh 109 (2014): 241–62, 248. Wagoner accurately argues that in Stoicism a plurality of views exists concerning the way in which an individual progresses from “one’s current condition (being unwise) to being wise (or, at least, becoming wiser),” 248. One Stoic view emphasizes the priority of knowledge to progress. This approach to progress “holds that the correct way to make progress–the only way to make progress–is to improve one’s access to and understanding of the relevant truths. Philosophical argumentation will be indispensable for moral progress,” 255. Wagoner shows that this view can be found in Seneca and Epictetus, but that it doesn’t follow a strict curricular pedagogy that proceeds in the same order in every instance. Rather, for both Epictetus and Seneca, there exists a plurality of potential approaches to the acquisition of correct knowledge. What will be most expedient for one group of students may be quite ineffective for another group. Thus, for Seneca and Epictetus, though knowledge takes priority on the quest for moral progress, it doesn’t exist within a rigid pedagogical paradigm. Instead, the philosopher must discern for his student the best approach which will be most conducive to moral and philosophical progress.

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. . . both Epictetus and Seneca emphasize two related aspects of moral progress: the importance of having the right approach to philosophical study and the need, ultimately, to do it for oneself. Seneca and Epictetus are clear that our goal should not be simply that of knowing that Chrysippus said X or that Zeno said Y. This goal is neither difficult to achieve nor properly connected to the goal of philosophy. One must, instead, read Chrysippus or Zeno with the aim of laying aside one’s faults, as Seneca puts it, or with the aim of not failing to get what one desires, as Epictetus puts it. This shared concern that students of philosophy approach their study with the correct attitude is easily explained by the concern that their students develop certain dispositions before advancing to the study of theory and dialectic, but it also demonstrates Seneca’s and Epictetus’ commitment to the ultimate necessity, for moral improvement, of acquiring knowledge. Acquiring the right dispositions is important for beginning to make progress, but only by coming to understand Stoic philosophy in the right way will their students secure these dispositions.25

Thus, the process of oikeōsis involves a progress of sorts, and what is at issue with the various Stoic thinkers is whether this progress is properly termed “virtue” at any point before the instantaneous conversion to a sage status. That the Stoics believed that progress in knowledge and moral formation can be made, is beyond question. The classical Stoic luminaries such as Chryssipus and Zeno, together with some of the Roman Stoics (like Epictetus) would not view moral progress as “virtue,” while others (like Panaetius, and possibly Seneca) would be more open to labelling that which is attained in the gradual process of moral formation as “virtue.” Either way, it is worth noting with Nussbaum that, for the Stoics, any possibility of growth in knowledge and morality, is rooted in “the fact that they refuse to trace human misery to any natural or inherent evil; instead, it is produced by ignorance, confusion, and weakness of thought.”26 Furthermore, in regard to the comparison of Christianity to Stoicism, the technical nature and difference between an “all or nothing” Stoic theory of virtue and a mean-based Aristotelian eudaemonism is one reason that we must be very specific when attributing to Paul (or any New Testament author) a eudaemonistic or Hellenistic ethic. There was a eudaemonistic strand in essentially all Greek ethical systems, but we must not speak of eudaemonism as one homogenous species but rather as a variegated phenomenon situated in the systematic thought of a variety of schools (i.e. Stoicism, Cynicism, Aristotelianism etc.).27 Furthermore, if we were to attribute to Paul a Stoic eudaemonism 25 Ibid., 259. Wagoner holds that both Seneca and Epictetus inherit a Stoicism that “although it is well worked and developed, does not dictate any precise pedagogy.” I agree with this assessment. 26 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (MCL 2; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 352. 27 In Paul and the Stoics, Engberg-Pedersen assumes a priori that Paul is following the eudaemonistic Hellenistic ethical tradition without any argument or reasoning. He continually asserts this position, although he recognizes that Paul never uses the word eudaemonia and that the term has an individualistic nuance which is likely to be considered foreign to Paul. Such a position must be demonstrated not merely assumed.

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(as Engberg-Pedersen has done), what gives us the right to construct our “model” of Stoic ethics on Chrysippean orthodoxy and not the more “gradualistic” Stoic ethic of Seneca or the “psychologically non-monistic” and “gradualistic” model of Panaetius and Posidonius? 28 How would we determine which of these “versions” of Stoicism was “the one” by which Paul was influenced? The task is too subjective and practically impossible to achieve because it starts from without rather than within, giving priority to Hellenistic texts outside of the Pauline tradition and Colossians rather than giving priority to the inner contour of the arguments and content of the Biblical texts themselves. If such a task is approached, however, it must begin from within the texts of Paul and the New Testament rather than from a perceived, or even reconstructed paradigm of Stoicism. 2. Pathos and the Stoics The Stoics hold the passions to be a central and fundamental problem. On account of their anthropological psychology, they consider everything that is within a person’s control (for Chrysippus, even sweating) to be subject to the rational, monistic, unified, successful, unassailable response of the virtuous agent.29 References to the passions are frequent across all of the Stoic literature, and the common Stoic view holds that the passions are akin to mental and moral diseases which must be entirely eradicated in the virtuous man precisely because they inhibit the proper and perfect functioning of rationality.30 In Cicero’s account of classic Chrysippean Stoicism, he recounts a discourse by the character Cato in which he explains that unlike the Peripatetics, “good health” is not considered a virtue, nor is it necessary to the virtuous life. It is rather an indifferent aspect of life, over which one has no control. Thus, one should cease 28 Cf. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, Ch. 14; particularly 1370–1407. In Paul and the Stoics, Engberg-Pedersen relies primarily and much too heavily on a representation of Chryssipus’ Stoic ethic in Cicero’s Book III De Finibus and ignores other more contemporaneous and illuminating Stoic texts, thus causing serious deficiencies in his proposed model. Consequently, what we end up with is a flawed, incomplete, or at the very least, uncertain paradigm of Stoic ethics which serves as the basis for Engberg-Pedersen’s model of Paul’s “Stoic” pattern of thought. 29 Sandbach, The Stoics, 42, 65. In terms of lexical attestation, the index to Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta testifies to centrality of the term and concept of πάθος in the classic Stoicism of Chryssipus. The attestation list for πάθος ranges longer than most lexemes in the index, comprising the better part of three full pages (see 108–110). 30 Ibid., 59, 61; Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 26; Keimpe Algra, “Stoic Theology” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153–78, 95. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 358: “. . . they [the Stoics] claim (whether successfully or not) that the commitment to rational self-determination, properly understood, actually entails the extirpation of the passions. And in the account of self-reliance that I have just given, one can already see some strong suggestions of the anti-emotion view.”

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to give it power by yielding to it as a necessary component to eudaemonia.31 The same programmatic idea is central to Epictetus, who writes in Enchiridion: And then examine it by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.32

Preceding this is the teaching of Musonius Rufus, perhaps influential to Epictetus, which argues that: A reasonable person neither applauds a place nor rejects it because he holds it responsible for his happiness or unhappiness. He relies on himself for his whole well-being. . .33

Beyond the Stoic core idea of things which are indifferent to virtue is the larger, governing programmatic concept of apathy itself, which is the center of Stoic ethics. Dio Chrysostom teaches that the Stoic man of apathy: should be wholly unaffected by such outbursts, and neither if they applaud him, should he on that account be elated, nor, if he feels he is being insulted, should he be depressed.34

Musonius Rufus likewise teaches that the theme of apathy is tied directly to an ascetic detachment from physical pain and suffering so as to remove the power from these conditions which tend to detract from one’s quest to eudaemonistic wisdom and virtue. He writes: We will train both soul and body when we accustom ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, scarcity of food, hardness of bed, abstaining from pleasures, and enduring pains. 35

The Stoic passions include behaviors that are actually considered virtues in other traditions such as empathy and humility. These characteristics would be

31 Cicero, De Finibus, Book III.7; Arius Didymus in Pomeroy (43 [7a]; 45 [7b]) who refers to some things as “preferred” and others as “indifferent things, some are in accord with nature, others contrary to nature, while others are neither contrary to nor in accord with nature.” 32 Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1. 33 King, Musonius Rufus, 44 (Lecture 9.2 [Stobaeus 3.40.9]). 34 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34.33; cf. Epictetus Diss. 3.24.1–3: “If a man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault: for God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations.” 35 King, Musonius Rufus, 37 (Lecture 6.4 [Stobaeus 3.29.78]). Cf. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 360, 361 who notes that, for the Stoics, anything outside the agent’s free choice and control “such as health, wealth, freedom from pain, the good functioning of the bodily faculties–have no intrinsic worth, nor is their causal relationship to eudaimonia even that of an instrumental necessary condition,” and that “Virtue by itself is self-sufficient, sufficient for eudaemonia.” Cf. Charles Hogg, “Reflections on Epictetus’ Notion of Personhood,” FPh 19 (2014): 97–106, 101: “For Epictetus as for all the Stoics, one subject, one unified agent, underlies all of a human’s acts. I am responsible for what I choose. I am not responsible for what others choose, or for what happens to them outside my choice.”

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considered vicious mental deficiencies to the Stoics because they would represent a foolish acquiescence to the circumstances of external life and fate which are beyond the control of the rationality of the individual agent. However, it would be very easy–on account of the Stoic theory of apathy– to attribute to the school an inhumane disregard or aloof disinterest in humanity. Yet, such a view would not accurately account for the care for fellow human beings that is evident in the writings of the Stoics. For example, in surveying the views of Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, Julia Annas sums up their disposition concerning Stoic approaches to the care of others and to responsible citizenship: “When you become a Stoic, you don’t cease to think and act as a son, brother, town councillor; rather, you now do your best to be a Stoic son, brother, town councillor.”36 Living as a Stoic was not an invitation to an individualistic existence on a quest for personal virtue at the expense and abandonment of the rest of the world. Rather, it was the commitment to virtue itself that necessitated that one would exercise their duties and civic obligations to their families and to society at large.37 Stoicism, then, while committed to the pursuit of the eradication of the passions, did not advocate for an eradication of solidarity and concern for others. Annas asserts, Stoicism holds that we have a natural concern for others; moral development does not erase or minimize this, but rather transforms it, eventually extending it to all rational beings regardless of their actual relations with us. So in the life of a Stoic concern for others will almost certainly play a larger role than in that of a non-Stoic . . .38

36 Julia Annas, “Epictetus on Moral Perspectives,” in The Philosophy of Epictetus, ed. Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew S. Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 140–52, 145. 37 Ibid., 146–47. Cf. 148: “The point is that, given that our aim as Stoics is to achieve the good by becoming virtuous, this is to be found not in running away from our commitments, or by abstracting from our socially embedded roles and relationships. Rather, we seek the good from within those relationships, in a way that is best captured by what can be called aspiring to the Stoic ideal in our everyday life.” Contra Philip F. Esler, “Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case,” NTS 50 (2004): 106–124, 114 who argues that “whatever the status of Stoic beliefs in duties owed to other human beings, these beliefs were not the generating force for . . . their ethics as applied to person-to-person relations . . . Stoic ethics were driven by the need to explain to the wise and worthwhile man how to achieve the good. They were largely self-centered, and benefits to others were by-products of this primary concern. That is to say, notions of universal human community remained as a noble idea with no real function in their ethical practices, so that there is little substance in EngbergPedersen’s claim that they had a communal aspect to their thought comparable with Paul’s.” Nussbaum’s far more balanced view rescues the Stoics from Esler’s overly polemical degradation of Stoic motivation which views the Stoics negatively as an ethical foil to Paul. 38 Ibid., 149. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “The Relationship with Others,” 57 sees both Paul and the Stoics as advocating that individuals should completely forget about themselves and think instead in a completely others-centered manner. While I agree that this is very accurate

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3. The Stoics and Sexuality Likewise, differences abound in terms of the Stoic teachings on sexuality, which range from views which are incredibly liberal to those which are, perhaps, even more conservative than that which appears in the NT. For example, on the more conservative side of Stoicism are the teachings of Musonius Rufus which reserve sexual activity for the purpose of procreation alone within the confines of marriage (Lecture XII). Still, the words πόρνη or πορνεία (“sexual immorality”) practically never occur in any of the Hellenistic works, including in those of the Stoics. On the more liberal side of Stoicism, particularly represented by the earliest records of the Stoic school which we find Zeno, the founder of the school, as well as in the writings of Chrysippus, we find the school promoting an ideal society consisting of communal wives, sexual promiscuity, and homosexual activity. 39 Colish provides a good panoramic view of the variety of views which existed amongst Stoic thinkers: Sexual needs may therefore be met in whatever manner pleases the individual, including prostitution, incest, masturbation, and homosexuality. Adultery is the sexual practice at which the Stoics draw the line. Musonius Rufus is the only member of the school who dissents from its sexual latitudinarianism. . .Cannibalism is admitted by some ancient Stoics as a perfectly reasonable and sanitary way of disposing of the dead. Chrysippus even holds it permissible to urinate in rivers and public fountains, although he can scarcely justify this practice on hygienic grounds.40

4. The Stoics and Theo-Ethics For the Stoic, God is nature, and thus the perfectly virtuous man, who acts in accordance with nature, is essentially viewing and experiencing reality from the divine, and thus perfect, point of view.41 Epictetus strikes a particularly pantheistic (or panentheistic) tone when he argues that human beings consist of “a portion separated from the deity” and that humans have in themselves “a certain portion of him [God].” 42 Likewise, Dio Chrysostom asserts that the concept of God is “innate” in every human being. This theological view is connected, in the Stoics, with a basic understanding of the nature of mankind as completely free and able to attain perfect rationality and virtue without the hinderance of any hint of a sinful nature in the sense in which the early Christians conceived of it. As Musonius Rufus puts it: “. . .there is an inborn capacity 43

indeed with regard to Paul, I see no evidence of this precise degree or pattern of otherscentered behavior in the writings of the Stoics. 39 Sandbach, The Stoics, 25; Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 79. 40 Colish, The Stoic Tradition, 39. My emphases. 41 Jedan, Stoic Virtues, 99. 42 Epictetus, Diss. 2.8.11. 43 Cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. 12.39.

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in the human being’s soul for proper living and . . . the seed of virtue exists in each one of us . . .”44

B. Was Paul a Stoic? – Comparing the Central Programmatic Elements of Stoic Ethics to Colossians and the Pauline Ethical Tradition B. Was Paul a Stoic?

The Epistle to the Colossians and the Pauline sources lack the programmatic and paradigmatic Stoic concepts of: (1) a “fixed disposition” of virtue, (2) a current possession of “all of the virtues” by the wise sage,45 (3) eudaemonism, (4) theological pantheism (and panentheism), (5) an optimistic anthropology which operates from the assumption that the potential for virtue is innate in all humans and can be actualized by one’s own virtuous effort, and (6) the subscription to the notion that the entirety of a Stoic worldview, including the other inseparable components of a Stoic view of logic and physics, must remain interconnected in order for the ethical system to make sense. Therefore, labeling either Paul or the author of Colossians a “Stoic” is a category mistake, an unsustainable proposition.46 I will develop and reinforce the nature of these nonKing, Musonius Rufus, 26–27 (Lecture 2.4 [Stobaeus 2.9.8]). The Stoic instantaneous conversion of the sage to virtue is incommensurable with the obviously gradual nature of Paul’s view of the believers’ conformity into the image of Christ. This is true on the basis of the frequent use of the imperative in Paul and in his own testimony of his own experience of the pursuit of holiness in Christ. See e.g. Gal 5:13–6:2; Phil 2:12– 13; 3:12–21; cf. in the disputed epistles Col 3:1–17; Eph 4:20–6:24. 46 Along the same lines, I question the wisdom of attempting to cast guesses as to the potential level of Paul’s various audiences’ awareness (or lack thereof) of Stoic doctrine. Thorsteinsson, for example, asks if Paul’s hearers who “doubtless were exposed to Stoic principles” would have viewed Rom 12 as radically divergent from Stoicism? [Runar M. Thorsteinsson, “Paul and Roman Stoicism: Romans 12 and Contemporary Stoic Ethics.” JSNT 29 (2006): 139–61, 143]. Yet, we must be careful here, for on what basis can we say that the church at Rome were “doubtless exposed to Stoicism,” as opposed to a more streamlined popular moralism taught by Stoic philosophers and evidenced in the Dissertations of Epictetus and the Orations of Dio Chrysostom? Thorsteinsson assumes in “Paul and Roman Stoicism” that Paul’s audience in Rome would be conversant with Stoic doctrine. Just as it is presumptuous to assume that Paul is conversant (or not) with the inner workings of Stoic doctrine, it is unhelpful to assume more than a basic understanding of Stoicism for his audiences. Though, of course, I will concede that it is not impossible that a large-scale understanding of Stoicism existed in the church. I simply fail to see, though, how such a position could be factually established so as to be acceptable to a scholarly discussion given the current literature that exists in the New Testament and in the writings of early Christianity. Compare Thorsteinsson’s analysis with that of Esler who holds that a comparison of Rom 12 and the Stoics results in a Pauline ethic that constitutes “a radically different moral vision” from the Stoics. See Esler, “Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case,” 106. While I agree with Esler’s analysis over the results of Thorsteinsson, I reject Esler’s position on 44 45

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correspondences and lacks which are problematic for those claiming a primary Stoic provenance for the ethical terms of Colossians and for the author’s governing pattern of thought. Although we encounter many parallels between Colossians and the Stoics in terms of word usage, literary forms, and metaphorical illustrations, ultimately Colossians is working from a more gradual and progressive approach to virtue than the classic Chrysippean Stoic orthodoxy as described by Cicero, and as taken up as the center of Engberg-Pedersen’s model of “Stoicism.”47 This is not to naively claim or unnaturally separate the author of Colossians from the Stoics with regard to certain shared similarities in terms of various virtues and vices. In fact, both speak about the “passions” (πάθος) as a characteristic element of vice or, for Colossians, the “old man.” However, even here, once we get beyond the fact of a parallel in word usage, we must recognize a significant difference in the way in which the term is used in Colossians and that of the place of the passions in orthodox Stoic doctrine. The parallel is merely incidental and not central or programmatic.48 In Colossians, it is one of many vicious elements typically associated with the former life apart from an obedient covenant relationship with God and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, the term only occurs a total of three times in the entire body of literature associated with Paul.49 The general vice of πάθος in Colossians and

page 108 which argues that a comparison between Paul and Greco-Roman sources should intentionally search for differences instead of similarities. A more neutral approach would attempt to identify both similarities and differences without privileging parallels to contrasts, or vice versa. 47 Claims by Engberg-Pedersen (Paul and the Stoics, 39) that Paul is more “concerned about the inner states than the outward acts” and that internal “states were considered by him a necessary precondition of the acts” would indeed indicate correspondences between Paul and the Stoics, if this were actually the case in the Pauline epistles. However, such arguments cannot be sustained in the light of Pauline and Colossian usage of the imperative and ethical catalogues which contain, and cannot be separated from, actions. Engberg-Pedersen’s comments here tell us more about his Cicero-based Stoic model than they do about the teachings of Paul. 48 James L. Jaquette, “Paul, Epictetus, and Others on Indifference to Status,” CBQ 56 (1994): 68–80, 68, cites Hans Dieter Betz as arguing that, on account of Paul’s use of the phrase “it makes no difference to me” in Gal 2:6 that “that Paul subscribes to the Stoic doctrine of ἀδιάφορα in order to relativize the authority of the men of repute at Jerusalem.” Jaquette’s own perspective in this article is balanced, arguing that the usages of the concept of “indifference” in Paul and in Stoicism are mutually illuminating without overstating his case. Betz, on the other hand, presents an example here of the flawed tendency in biblical studies to attribute Stoic theories or influence to Paul in ways that are premature and which lack a sufficient scholarly foundation. To share a common theme of “indifferent” categories does not mean that Paul is subscribing to a “Stoic” doctrine, and neither does it mean that the Stoics are taking up a Pauline teaching transposed into ‘a Stoic key.’ 49 Col 3:5; cf. Rom 1:26; 1 Thess 4:5.

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the more technical and central role of the elimination of πάθος in the unshakable, rational, virtuous, apathetic Stoic man are quite distinct. In Colossians, a detachment from the emotions as mental disturbances is not commended. Rather, on the contrary, the author commends the “bearing” of burdens (Col 3:13)50 as the primary form of the fulfillment of the love command. He exhorts believers toward the active pursuit of a compassionate and humble lifestyle (Col 3:12).51 Furthermore, as I mentioned previously, on the basis of this necessary interconnectedness between the elements of Stoic logic, physics, ethics, and theology in order to comprise the totality of a system which could reasonably and responsibly be referred to and representative of Stoicism, that is, as a comprehensive system and worldview, it is questionable to me as to whether the popular assumption of a Pauline detachment of Stoic eudaemonistic ethics from the other integral elements of Stoic thought and worldview is even possible. As Diogenes Laertius clearly shows, the Stoic approach to ethics was intertwined within a matrix of a complete worldview that included many integrated teachings from a variety of disciplines. No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus.52

Therefore, on the basis of these objections and inconsistencies to theories of the Pauline incorporation of Stoic eudaemonism, I find the general approach and results of Troels Engberg-Pedersen’s project on Paul and the Stoics to be in serious error.53 DeSilva quite correctly points out the similarities and, perhaps even influence, of the literary form of the Stoic diatribe, the virtue and vice catalogue, the shared use of “topoi, metaphors, figures and forms,” and the appearance of a “natural theology in Epistle to the Romans.”54 However, ultimately, none of

Cf. Gal 6:2. Cf. Phil 2:3. 52 Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.1.40. My emphasis. 53 Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 161, 165 imputes to Paul an entirely Stoic anthropology, arguing that Paul understands Christians to have undergone a complete reconstitution of their minds which has resulted in a “completely stable and unalterable set of other-directed attitudes.” This is, of course, the classic Stoic orthodox position concerning the ideal sage, but it is not, however, at all indicative of Paul’s view. If Paul’s position really were one that envisioned a “completely stable” ethical disposition for Christians, we would not find such frequent ethical exhortations, imperatives, and ethical catalogues, written to churches consisting of those who are already Christians, warning them to not fall back into old, vicious patterns of living. This critique applies to the Epistle of Colossians as well. 54 deSilva, “Paul and the Stoa,” 559, 561, 563. 50 51

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these definitively indicate that Paul was working from an essentially Stoic underlying pattern of thought which was then in some way combined with, or the means by which, he articulated his understanding of the Christian faith. Rather, these parallels simply demonstrate that Paul used popular forms of communication (i.e. diatribe, virtue and vice catalogues, popular culturally-relevant metaphors, etc.) in order to convey his message in ways that would make sense to his audience. Is this phenomenon not basically attributable to the commonsense rules of effective communication and contextual presentation? Should we expect Paul to be so aloof, anti-social, obtuse, and peculiar that he would be incapable of communicating his message to a largely Gentile audience in forms that would be understandable and successfully apprehensible to them? DeSilva, unlike Wright and Malherbe, does not think Paul is Christianizing the Hellenistic lists, but actually adopting the form and content of the contemporary Hellenistic moral Stoic status quo wholesale: Not only the form but also the content of these lists corresponds to what one encounters in Stoic (and other non-Christian) authors, suggesting that Paul has incorporated them to reinforce Christianity's commitment to conventional morality. The lists themselves are therefore "not in any way specifically Christian" but represent the conventional morality of the time.55

DeSilva makes a compelling case for a sharing of common forms, topoi, and metaphors, but in order to claim anything beyond a simple, incidental sharing of common communicative patterns, words, and ideas by Paul and the Stoics, a more thorough lexical study is needed. The current study constitutes a step in that direction.

C. Comparative Lexical Study of the Stoics and Colossians C. Comparative Lexical Study of the Stoics and Colossians

1. Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers Book VII We have looked previously at the sixth book on Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers which focused exclusively on the Cynic strand of philosophers. Book VII presents the same type of material yet with a focus on seven different Stoic philosophers namely: Zeno, Ariston, Herillus, Dionysius, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, and Chrysippus. The current section constitutes the results of a lexical study of the entirety of Book VII. While some of Book VII consists of random lists and odd legendary anecdotes such as the death of Ariston by overexposure to his bald head (7.2.164) and the drunken arrogance and death by laughing fit of Chrysippus (7.7.183, 185), a good deal of the longest chapter in the work (chapter 1 on Zeno) provides a wealth of useful Stoic doctrine and virtue and vice catalogues. Here we find detailed descriptions of: the early three-fold Stoic philosophy which consists of physics, ethics, and logic 55

Ibid., 561.

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(7.1.39), the Stoic concept of the divine spirit which indwells man when he seeks to live a virtuous “life in accord with nature” (7.1.88), and an explication of the essential interdependence of the various philosophical elements (physics, ethics, and logic) within the Stoic system (7.1.40). Section I on Zeno also presents other key elements of Stoic thought such as: the character and role of God in and as Nature in the Stoic system (7.1.135, 137), the doctrine of Fate (7.1.149), and the nature, temporary survival, and eventual extinction of the soul in the after-life (7.1.156–57). Diogenes Laertius expounds the classic Zenoian foundational Stoic doctrine of virtue as an allencompassing totality of being which consists completely of virtue apart from the passions (7.1.89, 92–93, 125). A specific and overt contrast is included in which the author highlights the difference between the Stoic doctrine of the possession of all of the virtues in perfect totality and the Aristotelian idea of virtue as a mean (7.1.127, 130). Book VII notes that for Stoics such as Zeno and Herillus there is only either virtue or vice with everything else considered indifferent (7.1.102, 106; 7.3.165). Interestingly, several of the states, circumstances, and experiences which Diogenes Laertius portrays Zeno as classing in the category indifferent, such as: “life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth,”56 are, on the contrary, for Aristotle, not indifferent, but actually crucial to the eudaemonistic life. The reader will recall that in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle was essentially writing to the upper class, and he considered things such as wealth, physical attractiveness, and noble status to be essential for human flourishing and eudaemonia. Once again, we can see how attributing the influence of a generalized and vague “ancient pagan virtue theory” to Paul or the author of Colossians is not methodologically helpful precisely because of the variegated nature of eudaemonism within the Hellenistic traditions themselves. Of course, Book VII contains the basic core Stoic doctrines on the passions which are described on various occasions as “unnatural movement in the soul,” “impulse in excess” (7.1.108) or “irrational mental contraction” (7.1.108–14). ᾽Ἔλεος, which is well-known as a central Pauline virtue and attribute of God and Christ in the LXX and NT, is presented as one of Zeno’s passions, and thus represents a mental deficiency as opposed to its usage in the NT as a virtue and attribute of God. In fact, a word that shares the same root (ἐλεηµοσύνη) is actually used in a section which compares the vicious passion of “mercy” (listed between the co-vices of enviousness and quarrelsomeness) to the bodily maladies of the common cold and an irritable bowel!57

56 57

DL, Lives, 7.1.102. DL, Lives, 7.1.115.

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In terms of the results and interpretation of my comparative lexical study of Colossians and Book VII of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives, in regard to virtue terms of Col 3:12, 14, there are no actual correspondences with the virtue content. Specifically, five of the seven Colossian virtue terms are not attested (σπλάγχνον and οἰκτιρµός, πραΰτης, µακροθυµία, and ἀγάπη). Vögtle is correct in pointing out that instead of love, apathy occupies the central motivic, programmatic ethical pulse of the Stoic writings.58 Furthermore, not only are the two Colossian virtue terms which do appear, namely χρηστότης and ταπεινοφροσύνη, not used as virtues, they are, on the contrary, used as vices.59 Thus, the pattern of a non-correspondence between the Colossian virtues and the Hellenistic sources continues from Aristotle through the Cynics and into the first major source on the Stoics. When it comes to vices, five of the eleven Colossian vices do not appear in Book VII. The classic and expected Hellenistic vices of: ὀργή (4x), θυµός (3x), ἐπιθυµὶα (7x), and πάθος (9x) appear with a good degree of frequency considering the short length of the book. All of these are to be expected, and continue the patterns that we have thus far encountered and articulated. In Book VII, however, the occurrence of ἐπιθυµὶα and πάθος are surprisingly infrequent in light of the central role that they play as core concepts of the Stoic ethical system. Although αἰσχρολογία itself does not appear in Book VII, the related form αἰσχρός occurs five times.60 This further verifies my theory concerning the Hellenistic provenance of the word in Col 3:8, a fact which will be significantly strengthened momentarily when we turn to a study of Epictetus. Furthermore, and importantly, the pattern continues in which I notice a definite lack in metaphorical holiness/purity words in Diogenes Laertius’ Lives. We have been demonstrating that this cluster of Colossian vice terms has not been a common pattern for any of the Hellenistic moral ethicists. Πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, πλεονεξία, and εἴδωλολατρία make no appearance here, while βλασφηµία occurs once but not as a vice. 2. Arius Didymus Much like the content of the Stoic-related works of Diogenes Laertius, the writings of Arius Didymus are thought to present the reader with a vision of early Stoicism as it existed around the time of Chrysippus. In many ways, the information corresponds to the text that is contained in Diogenes Laertius. Renowned Stoic scholar A.A. Long thinks that the Stoic texts which are usually attributed to Arius Didymus are more accurate and complete than anything else deSilva, “Paul and the Stoa,” 219. Cf. Galenus, de Hippocr. et Plat. plac IV 3 (SVF I, 51, 24) in which the related form ταπείνωσις (“humiliation”) is referred to negatively as a πάθη (a “passion”). 60 DL, Lives, 7.1.100, 103; 7.7.187. 58 59

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that is currently available which purports to describe the teachings of early Stoicism.61 The texts of Arius Didymus, who lived during the late first century B.C.E., date to a collection later organized by Stobaeus in the early 5th century C.E. The manuscripts of Stobaeus contain an assortment of ancient philosophical, oratorical, poetic, and political texts which are arranged topically.62 We will encounter this source again in this chapter when we look at the teachings of Musonius Rufus, which are also contained within Stobaeus’ anthology. While caution must be used when approaching these texts due to their secondary reception and transmission by Stobaeus and their singular availability within his collection alone, scholars specializing in these texts do not give any indication that the writings of Arius Didymus or Musonius Rufus show evidence of significant redaction or corruption. In fact, in the case of the Stoic writings of Arius Didymus, it is commonly argued that Stobaeus’ texts essentially present Didymus’ original compilation text which was itself comprised of “a kind of loosely organized and heterogeneous scrapbook in which he sometimes copied more or less verbatim from an earlier source”63 with some updating of texts into his own words and according to his own editorial intentions. A.A. Long, together with von Arnim, thinks that Didymus was likely making use of a compendium book of sorts,64 while Long alone (but not von Arnim) offers that this compendium may have the followed the “substance, if not the order, of a Chrysippean handbook very closely.”65 On the basis of its Greek text (which makes it a more fruitful candidate for a lexical study of the sort which I am conducting as opposed to Cicero’s well respected and oft-approached, yet Latin, text on the same topic) and on the basis of the scholarly opinion concerning its early Stoic content, I find the Stoic writings of Arius Didymus to be a source of prime interest for my purposes here. Whether Arius was himself a Stoic of the persuasion that is described in his writings is perhaps impossible to determine due to the fact that the writings are thought to be intended primarily to deliver the ancient Chrysippean doctrines rather than Arius’ own innovations or beliefs. Kahn has pointed out that at least two experts (Zeller and Pohlenz) consider him to be an “eclectic” Stoic, perhaps open to harmonizing and incorporating Peripatetic ideas, into his own project.66 But again, this matter is out of the scope of my project, which is not 61 Anthony A. Long, “Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics,” in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh (RUSCH 1; London: Transaction Books, 1983), 41–65, 56. 62 Arius Didymus/Pomroy, 1. 63 Charles H. Kahn, “Arius as a Doxographer,” in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh (RUSCH 1; London: Transaction Books, 1983), 3–13, 7–8. 64 Long, “Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics,” 55. 65 Ibid., 56. 66 Kahn, “Arius as a Doxographer,” 7.

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attempting to discern the philosophical trajectory of Arius Didymus himself, but rather to compare his presentation of Chrysippean ethics with that of the ethical content of Colossians. Concerning the general content of Chrysippean teaching within the texts of Didymus, I find the classic, Stoic programmatic polar distinction between the wise sage and the fool to play a central role (Arius Didymus 5b8; 11g). However, the contrast seems to be presented even more clearly, directly, and frequently in Arius Didymus (11k–11L) than in the corresponding sections of Diogenes Laertius. The man who is not a sage (which for the Stoics was practically everyone) is continually described as being unhappy, quarrelsome, annoyed, stupid, ungrateful, not inclined toward virtue, etc. In much the same way that we encountered it in Diogenes Laertius, the Christian virtue of “mercy/pity” is, on account of the Stoic theory of the passions, considered a pathos and thus a vice worthy of complete eradication. Notice the context in which the word “pity” appears in Arius Didymus: Under pain are subsumed distress, envy, jealousy, pity (ἔλεος), grief, worry, sorrow, annoyance, mental pain, and vexation. (10b)67

Clearly then, there is an inherent problem with any claim, whether based on the classic orthodoxy of Chrysippus as stated in Arius Didymus and Diogenes Laertius, or based on the writings of the more contemporaneous Roman Stoics, that would argue an essential take over of the Stoic ethical paradigm by Paul. To do so would ignore the fact that a central characteristic of Paul’s theology and ethic, and indeed God himself, were vicious and needed to be annihilated, or at least neutralized. This would be equivalent to equating God with the Stoic “fool”; something which no true Stoic, in their own theology, would be able or willing to do. Indeed, it seems that Paul would make both a pathetic Stoic and a blasphemous Christian. Many other contradictions appear, but I will name only one more and then examine the results of my lexical study. On the issue of marriage, it is clear, as with all of the streams of the generally individualistic and eudaemonistic focus within Stoicism as a system, that Arius Didymus’ view of marriage is essentially utilitarian. Arius writes: . . . it is fitting for the worthwhile to write down what is able to benefit those who happen upon their writings, as is also to stoop (συγκαταβαίνειν) to marriage and the raising of children, both for his own sake and his country’s sake . . . (11b; my emphasis)

The word which Arius uses here, συγκαταβαίνω, refers to a stooping down from a higher place to a lower place which indicates that Arius’ view of marriage was, in some sense, an act of degradation. The act of marriage and the raising of children, pay off, however, in that they benefit the individual himself 67

Pomeroy, Arius Didymus, 61 [10b]; cf. 10c on 63.

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and the society as a whole.68 As we shall see, with, the exception of one Stoic thinker, namely Musonius Rufus, on the whole, the Stoic system of ethics provides a view of individual eudaemonia as the teleological goal. This results in a utilitarian and instrumental view of friendships and relationships (including marriage) in which they serve as the means to the end of individual eudaemonia. By no means does the Stoic view constitute a heartless and sinister system that is devoid of affection and mutual benefit, for this would be a caricature. However, the point remains that the Stoic view of marriage (along with the entire Stoic system of ethics) is inherently and necessarily self-centered. This makes it incommensurable with the ethical teachings of the New Testament. Turning now to a comparative lexical study between Arius Didymus and the ethical catalogue in Colossians, I find several patterns emerging which will continue to reveal themselves throughout the other sources with which we interact. First, in terms of virtue correspondence, as we will generally find with the Stoics more contemporaneous with Paul and Colossians, the attestation of ethical terms from Colossians in Arius Didymus are very few. In fact, only one of the virtues in Col 3:12, 14, namely χρηστότης appears in Arius’ work on the Stoics.69 It is worth noting in addition, though, that, while the Colossian form of the term πραΰτης does not occur in Arius Didymus, the nearly identical term, πραότης (“gentle”), is used twice (11s). This pattern of low or non-attestation of Colossian virtues will show itself to be a continual pattern with several of the virtue/vice terms ultimately making no appearance whatsoever in any of our sources. Concerning the vices, all of the typical central Stoic terms appear (θυµός 2x, ὀργή 8x, κακός 34x, ἐπιθυµὶα 10x, πάθος 10x)70 but these incidental parallels 68 However, it has been argued that Aristotelian concern for society, the polis, has been minimized in Arius, having been replaced with the broader, more individualistic focus on oikeōsis of the individual. Schroeder, “Friendship in Aristotle and Some Peripatetic Philosophers,” 52–53 links this shift in thinking to “the decline of the classical polis and the rise of the Hellenistic cosmopolis and individualism.” 69 Χρηστότης occurs likewise as virtue meaning “good, useful” in the Stoic fragments of SVF. See e.g., Stobaeus, ecl II 60, 9 (SVF ΙΙΙ 64, 41); cf. SVF III 64, 24 where it appears within a virtue list; Andronicus, περὶ παθῶν (SVF III 67, 8); and Hieronymus, comment in epist. ad Galatas Lib. III cp. 5 v. 22 (SVF III 71, 32–34) where χρηστότης is shown to be equivalent to the Latin words benignitas and bonitas. 70 Cf. the frequent occurrences of πάθος in SVF, including e.g., III 378.92, 11 (Stobaeus ecl. II 88, 6 W) where the passions are spoken of as ruling the soul; III 377.92, 5 (Clems Al. Strom. II, 640 Pott) in which the vice of anger is the result of the passions; and III 426.104, 29 (Cicero Tusc. Disp IV 31) which presents a Latin text speaking about the passions as “omnes morbi et perturbationes.” Cf. further Galens (de H. et Plat. Decr. IV 7 (152), 397) in SVF III 467.118, 30 in which the passions are described as that which become “inflamed.” Likewise, the fragment from Plutarch (de virtute morali cp. 10, 449d) in SVF III. 468.119, 25 categorises “passion” as a sin (ἀµαρτία). Concerning, ἐπιθυµὶα SVF is equally helpful in

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are of little overall help in our quest to determine the underlying pattern of the ethical paradigm of Colossians. The very specific, programmatic Stoic doctrine of the passions has been shown to be incommensurate with Colossians and unPauline. Thus, words like ἐπιθυµὶα and πάθος should not be understood within the Stoic paradigm when used in Colossians and the Pauline literature. The words πορνεία, πλεονεξία, εἴδωλολατρία, βλασφηµία, ἀκαθαρσία and αἰσχρολογία do not occur at all in Arius Didymus. However, quite uniquely, the related adjectival form of ἀκαθαρσία, namely ἀκαθαρτός (5b12), appears in the context of a discussion in which the central assertion is that the wise man alone is holy and thus able to serve in the role of priest. Arius writes: The worthless transgress many of the just customs pertaining to the gods, on account of which they are unholy, impure, unclean, defiled, and barred from festive rites. (5b12)71

It is important to point out that, in this context, it is due to the fact that the worthless (i.e. the non-sage) transgresses customs“pertaining to the gods” that the man is therefore declared unclean. The passage is thus describing the incorrect and vicious mechanics of actual ritual and priestly services, and thus is not using the image of priesthood, holiness, or worship as a metaphorical ethical literary device as it is frequently used in Paul and in Colossians. The Greek words which comprise the Colossian collection and combination of vice terms, then, continue to remain distinctively Pauline (and Jewish). 3. Epictetus Before engaging in an interpretation of the results of my comparative lexical study of Epictetus’ Discourses and Enchiridion with the Epistle to the Colossians, it will be helpful if we consider an overview of some of the major programmatic themes and unique contributions of Epictetus himself. 3.1. General Introduction to Epictetus and His Writings Epictetus is widely acknowledged to have been the most famous and exemplary student of the Stoic teacher, Musonius Rufus.72 Born circa 50 C.E., the teachings of Epictetus are known to us today solely through the lecture notes of his demonstrating the negative view of the “emotions” in Stoic thought from the very beginning of the movement. Ἐπιθυµὶα is described as an ἀλογος ὄρεξις (‘irrational appetite’) in SVF III 391.95, 20 (Andronicus, περὶ παθῶν 1) and III 463.115, 35 (Galenus de H. et Plat. decr. IV 2 [135], 336 M); cf Galenus in III 464.116, 17. In the Latin texts, the fragments included in SVF from Cicero’s Tusc. disp III 11, 24 (SVF III 385.93, 40) talk about passion as an “immoderata appetitio.” 71 Pomeroy, Arius Didymus, 27. 72 William B. Irvine, Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50. Cf. B.F. Harris, “Dio of Prusia: A Survey of Recent Work” from ANRW II.33.5 (1991), 3853–3881, 3873: “Musonius’ most illustrious pupil, Epictetus,

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student Arrian and are contained in the collections known as Dissertations and the Enchiridion.73 These lectures were delivered in Nicopolis of Epirus (Western Greece) after Epictetus’ exile from Rome under Domitian in 93 C.E.74 The lecture notes that we have–primarily in the Dissertations–definitely evidence an underlying, governing Stoic pattern of thought but they do not constitute systematic philosophical lectures. Rather, their focus is “almost exclusively” on ethics. Klauck explains, Epictetus presupposed a knowledge of logic and physics, and this framework also allowed a more detailed treatment of these topics. His own didactic lectures, in which he concentrated almost exclusively on ethics, were the high point. People travelled from distant places to hear him. His pupils, properly so called, remained over a period of years and then took up various professions. Other visitors remained only for a few weeks, or took advantage of a stop on their way to hear the famous teacher or to seek his advice.75

Nussbaum contrasts the quality and nature of the writings of Arrian on Epictetus’ lectures with those of Seneca, whose “style is more literary and elaborate than the popular styles of Musonius and Epictetus.”76 Furthermore, she accurately describes the style of Epictetus’ teachings in the writings we have as being: vigorous, brief, colloquial, direct–suited to a general audience from many different backgrounds, and requiring little literary or philosophical preparation–although some, as well, are concerned with the needs of pupils who have already done advanced philosophical reading.77 was a more profound expositor of Stoicism than his teacher, and it has been commented above that it is in the teaching on free speech under tyranny that Dio shares some common ground with Epictetus.” 73 Hans-Josef Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity, 347: “It is not possible to determine Epictetus’ biographical dates with precision. He was born c. 50 CE in the city of Hierapolis in Asia Minor (cf. Col 4:13), and his death is assigned by some to the year 120, by others to 130 or even later.” Compare with Irvine, Guide to the Good Life, who assigns Epictetus’ birth to the period of time between 40–50 C.E. Cf. Ronald F. Hock, “‘By the Gods, It’s My One Desire to See An Actual Stoic’: Epictetus’ Relations with Students and Visitors in His Personal Network,” Sem 56 (1992): 121–42, 121 who lists Epictetus life span as circa 50–120 C.E. 74 Hock, “By the Gods,” 121. Cf. 135: “. . . as a harbor town on a route connecting the Greek East and Rome, Nicopolis is therefore also a factor in the size of Epictetus’ network, especially with regard to the visitors who figure so prominently in the Discourses. Indeed, Epictetus was something of a tourist attraction in Nicopolis (3.9.14), 25 which could only increase the number of visitors as the years went by, thereby swelling further the size of Epictetus’ network.” Cf. 134, where Hock hypothesizes that “roughly forty persons–students, visitors, and others” constitutes the reach and volume of Epictetus’ school in Nicopolis. 75 Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity, 348. 76 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 331–32. 77 Ibid., 331–32.

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The characteristic style, then, is a colloquial style that focuses on practical, ethical teaching. As Hock argues, it was evidently more important to Epictetus that his students were living out the practical applications of Stoicism, rather than merely cultivating an expert intellectual knowledge of the Stoic writings, sources, and teachings of the sages.78 It should not, however, be therefore assumed that Epictetus required of serious students only a basic knowledge of Stoicism.79 On the contrary, in addition to the practical ethics of the Dissertations, students were required and expected to pursue a rigorous curricular training in the classic texts and precepts of Stoicism. According to Hock, . . . for Epictetus being a Stoic required a rigorous academic training which included reading various textbooks on philosophy (2.16.34; 17.40; 21.10) but in particular the works of Chrysippus and other Stoics (1.4.6; 10.10; 17.13–19; 2.16.34; etc.), listening to Epictetus’ expositions of them (2.6.23; 14.1; 21.11), mastering Stoic logic (1.8.1–4; 17.4–12; 2.25.1), and 78 Hock, “By the Gods,” 136: “. . . far more important for Epictetus is his conviction that being a Stoic means living out the tenets of this philosophy. For most of his students this would simply mean eating like a man, drinking like a man, exercising self-control, marrying, having children, entering politics, putting up with rebuke, enduring an unreasonable brother, father, son, neighbor, or traveler (3.21.5). For others, however, events might call for greater endurance in response to news about the death of a son, the loss of a ship, or condemnation by Caesar (3.8.1–6). In other words, Epictetus’ διάνοια, his way of thinking, the content he imparted to those in his network, is a practical Stoicism whose dogmata, praecepta, and exempla were intended to help others behave like Stoics.” 79 In fact, Cooper argues that the Dissertations are not indicative of a typical lecture of Epictetus, but represent an assortment of “informal admonishments or protreptics, or bits of practical advice, addressed to his pupils and delivered, it would seem, in the afternoons or evenings, after the main work of the day was already completed.” What we have, then, in the Dissertations are “not part of the formal course of instruction in Epictetus’ school” which consisted, rather, of “the systematic reading out loud of classic ‘old’ Stoic texts–particularly those of Chrysippus, but we hear mention several times of Antipater and Archedemus as well, and once of Diogenes of Babylon–together with Epictetus’ oral commentary and interpretation of them.” The lessons “consisted of exegesis of classic texts of Chrysippus and others of the ‘founding generations’” rather than the more basic focus on popular ethical application and praxis in the writings that we have in the Dissertations. Cooper asserts this view on the basis of the “internal evidence . . . as the title of ‘diatribes’ itself suggests” as well as select citations from Diss. 2.14.1ff; 3. 21.6–7; 23.10–11 and 16. If this view is correct it will significantly change the manner in which we interpret the lectures of Epictetus, and our understanding of his impact in Greco-Roman culture. It also situates Epictetus more firmly within the mainline of Stoic thought rooted in the classic texts of the school. The theory makes some sense of the ancient opinion that Epictetus was the student of Musonius Rufus par excellence. It also provides a more striking contrast between the style of Epictetus and the Stoic Popular Moralism of Dio Chrysostom. See John M. Cooper, “The Relevance of Moral Theory to Moral Improvement in Epictetus,” in The Philosophy of Epictetus, ed. Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew S. Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 9–19, 10–11. Cf. Algra, “Epictetus and Stoic Theology,” 54 who likewise does not consider the Dissertations to be examples of Epictetus’ actual lectures, and instead views them as consisting of material that is characterized by “a particular, rather untechnical, brand of ethics.”

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writing various compositions (1.1.21–25; 2.6.23; 17.35). This curriculum required of students much time and effort (1.11.40; 20.13; 2.21.14; 3.15.11), and Epictetus took it seriously, too, rising early to prepare for class (1.10.8) and employing an assistant to help with the readings (1.26.13).80

Epictetus’ lectures were aimed at educating young men (and young men, exclusively)81 in order that they might “examine themselves” as in a physician’s office. They were meant to leave the class “feeling bad rather than feeling good” because Epictetus believed that “any treatment likely to cure is also likely to cause him discomfort.”82 3.2. Prohairesis in Epictetus Perhaps the most central and commonly appealed to programmatic theme in the writings of Epictetus, which have come down to us through the lecture notes of his student Arrian, is the emphasis on a person’s prohairesis, which is the word that refers to the exercise of self-control in an individual’s moral decisions.83 There are for Epictetus, as in all of the Stoic literature, certain things which are beyond the control of the individual, and these things are considered indifferent. Dwelling on them or trying to change these “external” and “morally indifferent” circumstances is seen, then, as a fruitless struggle against fate and a vicious entertainment of the passions.

Hock, “By the Gods,” 136. Ibid., 127–28, on the typical student profile for a young man studying at Epicetus’ school: “These students are mostly young men (νείοι) (1.9.18; 29.34; 30.5; 2.8.15; 17.29; 3.21.8; 23.32; 4.11.25), though not so young as not to have a wife and children (1.18.11; 2.22.4; cf. 1.1.14; 12.20; 2.21.18; 3.17.7), and they usually have traveled some distance to sit with Epictetus (1.4.21; 35.1; 21.8; 23.32; 24.22, 78). In addition, they are, as Brunt puts it, “surely drawn from the better classes” (22), as is clear from their aristocratic experiences and expectations. They have been raised by nurses and paedagogi (2.16.39; 3–19.4–5; 24.53) and served by various other slaves (1.1.14; 13.3; 18.19; 2.21.11; 3.19.5; 26.21–22). They have also received a thorough education, including rhetorical training (1.1.2; 2.2.7; 23.36– 47; 3.23.6–14, 25; 4.6.12). When they reach Nicopolis they lead a leisurely life: reading books and writing their own compositions (1.4.22; 17.11–19; 2.1.33–34; 17.34–36; 21.10– 14); frequenting gymnasia, baths, and symposia (2.16.29; 2.21.14; 1.19.8–10); and going perhaps to a gladiatorial show (3.16.14) or even traveling to Olympia (1.6.23; 4.4.24). And they expect, after leaving school, to return to family and friends (3.21.8), to manage their properties (4.10.19), to engage in the affairs of their city (2.10.10; 3.24.36), and perhaps to go to Rome and seek out the emperor as a patron of still higher offices and honors (1.25.26; 2.6.20; 4.10.18–21).” 82 Irvine, Guide to the Good Life, 52. Cf. J.N. Sevenster, “Education or Conversion: Epictetus and the Gospels,” Novum Testamentum 8 (1966): 247–62, 248–49: “Epictetus did not educate children, he wanted to guide young people, educate them and, especially, induce them to adopt a certain attitude to life,” emphasis mine. 83 Sandbach, The Stoics, 165; Colish, The Stoic Tradition, 20, 47–48. 80 81

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3.3. Empathy as a Vice in Epictetus This way of thinking, in line with what we have just encountered from Zeno in Diogenes Laertius’ Book VII and Arius Didymus’ Epitome, is necessarily characterized by an aversion to empathy, compassion, and mercy which, as it turns out, is utterly at odds with the putting on of deep empathetic compassion in Colossians (Col 3:12–14) and the centrality of the compassionate, self-giving character of Jesus Christ throughout the New Testament, and indeed, of God throughout the entirety of the biblical canon. Epictetus articulates this belief clearly in Diss. 3. 24: for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault: for God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations.84

This constitutes a significant stumbling block for the one who would purport that Paul or Colossians roots the core of ethical discourse in an essentially Stoic pattern of thought. A.A. Long expounds the idea in Epictetus: Epictetus would not be a Stoic if he thought that the proper way to help a distraught person is to “feel” that person's pain. The task of a Stoic comforter is not to become upset oneself but to try to assuage the afflicted person. . .Epictetus does recommend “showing” sympathy in words and even “sharing in another's groans,” provided that one does not “groan within oneself” (Ench. 16)85

Not only does the New Testament and Paul specifically exhort believers to “bear one another’s burdens” (Gal 6:2) as the central means of faithful and loving obedience, but the entire Christian religion and worldview revolves around the cross of Christ which is itself the ultimate act of divine empathy and compassion, or, from the Stoic perspective, the ultimate demonstration of the result of actively engaging in the vice of empathy. The interpretation of this others-centered, life-giving suffering and emotional involvement would depend on whether you asked Paul, the author of Colossians, or Epictetus. One thing is certain for Paul, the apostles, and the early church, namely, that on the cross, God in Jesus not only “shared in our groans” but was pierced for our transgressions (Isa 53:5) and it was by his wounds that we are healed. Still, despite these differences, A. Bonhöffer is correct to point out that the Stoics and Epictetus did not advocate for a complete disinterest in helping other people. Rather, they taught that the motivation to care for and help others should

84 Compare Epictetus’ teaching to the teaching of Jesus in the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:30–37) and to Paul’s admonitions to believers to count others better than oneself, to have the servant mind of Christ, and to bear one another’s burdens (e.g. Phil 2:1– 11; Gal 6:2); a view which is shared by the author of Colossians (Col 3:12–15). 85 A.A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 253.

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not be in response to the pathos of mercy/pity.86 Within the context of Stoicism, this is simply following the systemic theory of the passions to its logical conclusion. This “safeguarding” of one’s own eudaemonia by means of the utility of friendship and non-passionate involvement, is similar to that which we encountered earlier in Aristotle, and promotes a view of friendship in which the relationship is the result of the “synthesis of the egotistic and altruistic motives” unlike the agapē principle of Paul, Colossians, and Jesus.87 3.4. Anthropology in Epictetus Although Epictetus continued in the Chryssipean idealistic view of the wise sage which was essentially unattainable, his anthropology is notably optimistic and eudaemonistic,88 stressing through very practical teaching89 that, despite the high bar reserved for the status of sage, human beings were designed and capable of pursuing and potentially attaining virtue. This progress itself was not technically virtue, and in line with orthodox Stoicism, the person pursuing it was still technically considered wholly vicious, but nevertheless, as has been previously demonstrated in the introduction to this chapter, Epictetus took progress to be a real possibility.90 3.5. God in Epictetus Likewise, while both Colossians and the works of Epictetus exhibit an integration of ethics with theology, the views of Paul and Epictetus concerning the nature of the divine are vastly different and entirely incommensurable. Epictetus’ view of God, though often uniquely expressed in a way that sounds more Adolf Friedrich Bonhöffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus: An English Translation, trans. William O. Stephens (Revisioning Philosophy 2; New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2000 [German Original 1894]), 147. 87 Ibid., 17, 20. Cf. Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World, 113 where he articulates the general view of Stoics on friendship noting that: “The Stoics had small interest in friendship as opposed to human attachments generally (Epictetus, Disc. 4.5.10 notes that mankind is ‘a mutually affectionate [philallelon] animal’; cf. the role of oikeiosis or ‘affinity’). On a strict account, sages and no one else are capable of being friends (Diog. Laert. 7.124; cf. Cic. De amicitia 5.18), and they, secure in their autarky and impassiveness (apatheia), are imperil in their affections: ‘the sage acts from moral virtue, not because of strong feeling for another’ (Lesses 1993: 71). Seneca (Ep. 6) affirms that the wise man, as a craftsman in the art making friends, can always replace a deceased friend with a new one.” 88 Long, Epictetus; Epictetus. The Enchiridion, trans. Elizabeth Carter. The Internet Classics Archive. Accessed 17 August 2011. Online: http://classics.mit.edu//Epictetus/epicench.html, 29. Cf. Epictetus, Discourses Books III–IV and The Encheiridion, ed. Jeffrey Henderson; trans. W.A. Oldfather (LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000 [1928]). 89 Long, Epictetus, 15, 46; Epictetus, Diss. 3. 21. 90 Epictetus, Diss. 1.4; see also Long, Epictetus 80, 83. 86

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like the monotheism of Judaism and Christianity,91 is ultimately in line with the classic orthodox Stoic pantheistic view of God as nature.92 Human-beings, inasmuch as they live in accord with nature, in some sense participate in the divine.93 This Stoic idea of God as nature is in fact quite different from the Colossian concept of God as a Creator who is separate from his creation.94 91 Keimpe Algra, “Epictetus and Stoic Theology” in The Philosophy of Epictetus, ed. Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew S. Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 32–55 explores the personalized theological language used in Epictetus in comparison with the classic Stoics. He notes that Epictetus has a “rather strikingly theistic conception of god, that is: a conception of god as a person, who sees us, who speaks to us, who helps us, and to whom prayers can be meaningfully addressed,” 33. Algra provides a helpful survey of the scholarly literature on the topic, noting that A. Bonhöffer holds that in using personal language to describe God, Epictetus did not depart from mainstream Stoicism and that the theistic traces in his lectures are owed to “concessions to popular religion,” 33. Cf. Algra’s presentation of Long’s perspective, which interprets personal theistic language to be “a matter of personal commitment or attitude rather than . . . a substantial shift away from orthodoxy,” 33. Contra this view, Algra lists: Langrange, Jagu, Souilhe, Germain, and Radice as examples of scholars who perceive Epictetus to be an innovator, and significantly revising the classic Stoic pantheistic position, 33. Algra’s own view is that “scholars have too often presupposed too much of a rift between Epictetus and early Stoicism” in regard to theological formulations and that “Epictetus’ theology does not significantly outstep the limits of Stoic orthodoxy,” 36, 55. He argues that the classic Stoics were pantheists, but that this pantheism came in two styles. The first equated God with the world like Zeno and Chrysippus did (DL, Lives VII.148), while the other talked about god being “the active principle or formative pneuma, which is at work in the cosmos (Aetius I.7.33 = SVF II.1027), 36–37. Furthermore, Algra proposes that, for the Stoics, rationality, god, and the cosmos were essentially synonymous phenomena, and thus personalized language about the divine, and the concepts of the indwelling of the divine in humanity, or human beings as “fragments” of god were really references to the human experience of participating in the pantheistic deity who is perfect reason and nature. In this understanding, “god’s help” is “really something we should obtain ourselves, by becoming rational,” and the fatherhood of God is functioning as a personalized reference to “the idea of god being the provident cosmic cause of things being as they are,” 38, 40, and 44. 92 Contra A. Bonhöffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, 120: “So Epictetus’ theology is, considering our modern concepts, a scarcely intelligible mixture of theism, pantheism, and polytheism . . .” I think it is more appropriate to see Epictetus as using a variety of forms, both singular and plural, both personal and abstract, to speak of the one pantheistic divine reality in line with Chrysippean orthodoxy. 93 Long, Epictetus, 26, 226; Contra Algra, “Stoic Theology,” 36 who argues that: “early Stoicism was not as exclusively pantheistic as it is often supposed to be, whereas on the other hand the kind of personalistic theism that we may attribute to Epictetus does not appear to have been all that radical or unheard of after all.” Cf. J.N. Sevenster, “Education or Conversion,” 250, cf. 256 on the concept of human beings as “fragments of God” in Diss. 1.114.6 and Diss. 2.8.10–14. 94 Algra, “Epictetus and Stoic Theology,” 47–52, notes that prayer in Epictetus operates in a philosophical system in which there is no room for such a thing as grace as a free act of god, nor for any other specific divine intervention in the lives of individuals” and that in

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Furthermore, even if we granted this immense and problematic gap in theological correspondence, and even if we were then willing to allow the Stoic ethic to be detached from Stoic theological presuppositions and subsequently “taken up” by Paul or the author of Colossians (a separation which, as we have seen in Zeno, is not proper Stoic protocol) then we would still have to explain the often stunningly contrary differences in ethical praxis that result from the teachings in Epictetus’ various writings. For example, Epictetus teaches that death itself is not bad, but rather the fear of death is the problem. This is clearly contrary to Paul’s view of death itself as evil and his theology of Christ’s victory over it (1 Cor 15:20–58).95 Elsewhere, Epictetus encourages apathy toward an adulterous wife.96 3.6. The Nature of the Correspondence between the Writings of Epictetus, Colossians, and Paul Arguing in a manner that is entirely consonant with my thesis and methodology, Ierodiakonou helpfully examines the definite overlap in the many terms which are used by Paul and Epictetus and determines that while there has been a long and large amount of scholarly attention paid to these similarities by scholars (e.g., “angel,” “martyr,” “deacon,” “apostle”): Nevertheless, such striking similarities in the vocabulary have been convincingly explained by the fact that both Epictetus and the authors of the Scriptural texts use the common conversational language of the day, which reflects a common way of thinking about things in this period.97

Epictetus’ theological perspective “our happiness, our virtue, our rational attitude is up to us,” 52. The theological presuppositions, therefore, of Christianity and Epictetus operate within completely different and incommensurable paradigms. For, as Algra argues: there is a crucial difference between the ways in which the relation between man and god was conceived by Christian theism on the one hand and by what one might call Epictetan quasitheism on the other,” 51. 95 Epictetus, Ench. 5. 96 Epictetus, Diss. 1.18.11. Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity, 360, 361 argues that Epictetus’ views on death are “more radical than the earlier Stoa” in that he abandons the concept of a “temporally limited continuing life of the soul and localises its dissolution, which other Stoics see as taking place at a later point, at the moment of death . . .” Further, for Epictetus this dissolution is described in 3.24.94 as “a kind of cosmic recycling” in which “the material components of the human person” are reduced to their “most elementary structure - the body to water and earth, the soul to fire and air . . . [and are] utilised as components for something new. This is all that Epictetus can promise in terms of a continued existence after death.” In Epictetus’ view, there is no longer a personal existence that continues after death. 97 Katerina Ierodiakonou, “The Philosopher as God’s Messenger” in The Philosophy of Epictetus, ed. Andrew S. Mason and Theodore Scaltsas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 56–70, 65.

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Again, the comparison based on the interweaving of religion and ethics must be seen within the totality of Epictetus’ system in comparison to the totality of the ethical system in Colossians, and in the other epistles of Paul which then reveals their non-correspondence and unique trajectories and foundations. If it were the case that we were continually finding that Colossians and the Stoic writings overlap in a high degree of lexical correspondence and a high degree of programmatic thought patterns (i.e. apathy) then we might be inclined to attribute to the author a Stoic eudaemonistic pattern of thought in Colossians. However, on the contrary, we continue to encounter gaping holes in the supposed Hellenistic eudaemonism of Colossians, with respect to both word usage and underlying ethical and religious paradigms. Therefore, we must continue to ask, specifically with regard to Colossians, and especially in light of the surprising results that we are continually encountering: Might not the primary underlying paradigm and ethical pattern of thought in Colossians be rooted elsewhere? While I must defer engaging the question just yet, let us turn now to the lexical study of Epictetus in order to identify some helpful observations which will serve to strengthen the case that I have been arguing thus far. 3.7. Comparative Lexical Study of Epictetus’ Discourses, Enchiridion, and Colossians I find no significant instances of correspondence between Epictetus’ writings and those of Paul or Colossians. While χρηστότης, µακροθυµία98, and οἰκτιρµός are, once again, completely unattested, the word σπλάγχνον occurs five times. Each of the references, however, are simply to the internal parts of an animal. Likewise, ταπεινοφροσύνη occurs once, but follows the orthodox Stoic pattern of interpreting “humility” as a vice. The verbal form of ἀγάπη, ἀγαπάω, occurs one time, but as has been the pattern, it carries the much less ethically-weighty meaning of “welcome affectionately.” The closest that we get to a real correspondence is one usage of πρᾶος, a word which is related to πραΰτης in Colossians.99 It carries a virtuous meaning, but taken within the general lack of Pauline virtues attested in Epictetus, it fails to offer much potential for building a case for establishing a dependence in Colossians on a Stoic ethic on the basis of lexical and conceptual overlap. The vices, however, prove to exhibit more potentially fruitful overlap. This is particularly so with Epictetus’ use of the word αἰσχρολογία, which occurs twice (Diss. 4.3.2; Ench. 33.16). The related adjectival form αἰσχρός occurs an additional thirty-seven times and establishes a closer parallel for a first-century Stoic usage of the term. I have no doubt that the author’s apprehension of the Μακροθυµία is likewise not attested in the index of SVF. Cf. SVF III 632.161, 20 where the Chrysippean fragment from Stobaeus (ecl. II 115, 10 W) likewise uses the form πρᾶος as a virtue; cf. the fragment from Plutarch, de virtute morali cp. 2 p. 441a (SVF III 255.60, 6–7). 98 99

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term was from a general word pool in the first century which was formed via the influence of a Hellenistic and probably Stoic ethic as demonstrated earlier in Aristotle and in writings more contemporaneous with Colossians and the works of Epictetus. The central Stoic key words appear as expected including: πάθος (11x), ἐπιθυµὶα (16x), κακός (235x), ὀργή (5x) and θυµός (1x). This is in line with the pattern that we have been observing thus far, and confirms Wibbing’s earlier assertion that πάθος and ἐπιθυµὶα were common stock in the catalogues of the diatribe.100 However, their inclusion, when taken in conjunction with a consideration of their “technical” usage in the Stoic approach to the passions, proves to be far more complex and central than Paul’s more basic usage of the terms as simple vices. While several of the words associated with the vice terms in Colossians still exhibit no attestation (πορνεία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία), the word ἀκαθαρσία does appear in the metaphorical sense of ethical uncleanliness. There is also one instance here of a Colossian vice, namely, πλεονεξία being used in the positive (but not technically virtuous) sense of “having an advantage” (Diss. 2.10.9). Lastly, in reading through the Discourses and Enchiridion we encountered several illuminating virtue and vice catalogues. In terms of what the results tell us concerning any parallels or notable details between the works of Epictetus and Colossians, I have nothing of substance to report. Additionally, a general overview of the results surveyed from the largest ethical catalogues present in Epictetus’ work indicate that roughly 70% (thirty-eight) of fifty-five words are not attested in Colossians or in the “genuine” Pauline epistles.101 I have observed, however, that amongst the Pastoral epistles, which are generally classed as deutero-Pauline, a far greater degree of lexical overlap exists.102 4. Dio Chrysostom 4.1. General Introduction to Dio Chrysostom and His Writings Dio Chrysostom was a Stoic/Cynic moral popular-philosopher and politician in the region of Bithynia who lived from approximately 45–115 C.E., thus placing him slightly later103 than the apostle Paul but close enough to accurately present a view of the Hellenistic climate of popular ethics and politics Cf. Ibid., 98. In one of these cases ταπεινός is attested but used as a vice instead of a virtue. 102 My use of the word “deutero-Pauline” here is meant to indicate neither my acceptance nor my rejection of Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles. I use it simply to distinguish between those works of Paul which the majority of scholars agree are authored by Paul, and those for which Pauline authorship is contested. Space does not at all allow here for a sufficient engagement and discussion of the matter. 103 Mussies presents Dio as “a contemporary of the N.T. authors,” which may or may not be completely helpful depending on when one dates the various writings. Most of the genuine Pauline Epistles, for example, typically date too early for Dio to be considered a “true” 100 101

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which is likely indicative of that which would have been experienced by the authors of the New Testament.104 Although Dio, on account of his status as a Roman citizen and his social standing within the wealthy class, probably does not reflect the life situation of the majority of people who lived in the first century, nevertheless, C.P. Jones points out that in “a world measured by wealth and education,” people like Dio, Plutarch, and Epictetus, represented a class which was “influential far beyond its numbers.”105 Dio’s thought comes down to us in the form of eighty Discourses (or Orations), several of which are thought to be inauthentic (e.g. Or. 37; 63; 64), and which represent either short notes taken by listeners, or more likely, the personal speaking notes of Dio himself.106 The Discourses consist of a variety of styles which stem from three different periods of Dio’s life, namely, a period of relative success and influence in Rome (pre-exile), a period of exile as a wandering philosopher, and finally a period of post-exilic return to Prusa as an important philosophical and political teacher and leader. Several views exist concerning the nature of Dio’s underlying philosophical framework and contemporary of Paul for he would have been only 10–15 years old at the time of their composition. G. Mussies, Dio Chrysostom and the New Testament (SCHNT 2; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), VIII-IX. 104 Dates are approximate as suggested by Simon Swain, ed. Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. Compare with J.L. Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” JHS 98 (1978): 79–100, 82 who tentatively notes that “perhaps” the year of Dio’s birth is 40 C.E. Cf. Lau likewise lists 40 C.E. as Dio’s date of birth, while Blomqvist offers the decade of 40–50 C.E. as the possible range of dates for his birth. See Te-Li Lau, Politics of Peace: Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian Four Books (NovTSupp 133; Boston: Brill, 2009), 157; and Karin Blomqvist, Myth and Moral Message in Dio Chrysostom. A Study in Dio’s Moral Thought, with a particular focus on his attitudes towards women (Lund: Sweden, 1989), 11. 105 C.P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (LCM 12; London: Harvard University Press, 1978), 130. Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” 80 writes concerning the topic of Dio’s Roman citizenship: “His maternal grandfather had been friends with a Roman emperor (xlvi 3-4, xliv 5, xli 6), perhaps Claudius, and both he and his daughter, Dio’s mother, were granted Roman citizenship (xli 6). Dio does not record his father as having Roman citizenship and in context this strongly suggests that he did not have it. If so, Dio’s own Roman citizenship was not inherited but earned: precisely when is an intriguing question possibly of some relevance to the problem of Dio’s early relations with philosophers in Rome.” Cf. Blomqvist, Myth and Moral Message, 11 on Dio’s family, including the fact that Dio was married with children: “He was the son of wealthy and prominent parents, and both his mother and maternal grandfather were Roman citizens. This may have been the case for his father too, although it is not mentioned explicitly. We know that Dio had brothers and at least one sister . . . He married and had children.” 106 Bekker-Nielsen argues that the fragments and the discourses which come to us as bare introductions suggest that the Discourses often represent the foundational basis for Dio’s more extemporaneous speeches. I find this to be a convincing proposal. Tønnes BekkerNielsen, Urban Life and Local Politics in Roman Bithynia: The Small World of Dion Chrysostomos (BSS 7; Langelandsgade: Aarhus University Press, 2008), 38.

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whether it follows a discernible trajectory from a Sophistic to a Cynic to a more deeply Stoic and mature philosophical position.107 Many of these conversion paradigms, however, are problematic because of the highly politico-rhetorical nature of the Discourses.108 The traditional view concerning Dio’s conversion is typically associated with A.D. Nock and with H. von Arnim, who reformulated the conversion hypothesis into a tripartite structure. Moles summarizes the traditional view as recognizing Dio’s career to consist of: a sophistic period ending with his exile under Domitian, a Cynic period during his exile, and a period after his recall from exile when he achieved a successful synthesis between philosophy and rhetoric without actually engaging in separate sophistic activity.109

This view, however, can no longer be considered a consensus view, with the shift of scholarly opinion on the matter having moved toward hypotheses that are characterized by less of a neat division of definite periods from which Dio was thought to have “converted.” Blomqvist points out that Dio himself makes no claim “to have taken up philosophy and rejected rhetorics at a particular moment in his life.”110 Similarly, Harris feels that Desideri was correct in critiquing “Arnim’s theory of a distinct conversion from sophist to philosopher,” thus demonstrating the shift away from Arnim’s clearly delineated theory.111 While Lau thinks that a conversion from sophism to wandering Cynic to Stoic philosopher is possible, nevertheless he argues that “Dio is a politician engaged in the rough and tumble of local politics” who uses “his rhetorical skills” in order to project “a political and public persona” which is aimed at his goal of advancing peace and civic.112 All of these scholarly contributions adequately highlight the possibilities and probabilities in regard to the conversion (or not) of Dio Chrysostom. However, of the aforementioned scholars, only Lau presents the role of Dio’s public oratorical and literary public personae as a key component and catalyst to the conversion theme in his Orations. The first major study of personane in Dio 107 See Anthony R. R. Sheppard, “Dio Chrysostom: the Bithynian Years,” L’antiquité classique. Tome 53 (1984): 157–73 for an overview of Dio’s foray into a public building project that was politically side-lined upon his return from exile. 108 For an introduction into the topic of Conversion in Dio see: Edmund Berry, “Dio Chrysostom the Moral Philosopher,” Greece & Rome 30 (1983): 70–80; Mole, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom”; and Aldo Brancacci, “Dio, Socrates, and Cynicism” in Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy (ed. Simon Swain; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 240–60. 109 Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” 81. Cf. Harris, “Dio of Prusia,” 3860: “Von Arnim concluded that Dio emerged from what was clearly a sophistic period, through his exile which was marked by strong Cynic traits, into the mature philosopher and Bithynian politician of his later years.” 110 Cf. Blomqvist, Myth and Moral Message, 231. 111 Harris, “Dio of Prusia,” 3860, 3862. 112 Lau, Politics of Peace, 199.

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Chrysostom predates Lau’s 2009 work by over thirty years. In 1978, Mole, in his article “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” demonstrated the adoption of at least three distinct personae by Dio which lent toward his selfpresentation in the Orations as a “wanderer-philosopher.” These personae included those of Odysseus, Diogenes, and Socrates.113 Moles’ analysis is quite thorough. The contours and details of the arguments contained within the article cannot be rehearsed in detail here, but the main point will suffice, namely, that Dio adopted the personae of Odysseus, Diogenes, and Socrates in order to cause his hearers to think of him with the same characteristics, and within the same honored philosophical stream as these revered heroes of Greek culture and philosophy. Thus, Moles argues: Dio’s operation of personae therefore is remarkably detailed and sustained. The explicit comparisons between himself and his eminent forerunners are used to suggest that he is in the great tradition and to some extent can be mentioned in the same breath as the great Greeks of the past. The implicit or suppressed comparisons help to invest Dio with something of the aura of these men while at the same time avoiding the admission that he himself is not a great original.114

And furthermore: The accounts of Diogenes’ and Zeno’s conversions to philosophy were almost certainly modeled upon Socrates’ and Dio puts himself in the great tradition by representing his own visit to the Delphic oracle and its repercussions in highly Socratic terms. This process necessarily involved a certain falsification of the facts but Dio was not the man to worry about that.115

In addition to establishing a link to revered Greek luminaries of the past, Moles hypothesizes that another underlying reason for Dio’s use of the personae is the need to explain the troubles of his early career, and to “blot out his murky past” which led to the period of exile. Insodoing, Dio was able to spin the story of his exile into a positive light wherein he became a respected wandering philosopher in the line of Odysseus, Diogenes, and Socrates, thus turning misfortune into opportunity.116 The link to Socrates is also parsed out by Klauck who detects and demonstrates a definite link between Dio and the Socrates tradition in Or. 12. He writes: This reading of the speech is confirmed by its introduction, the so-called prolalia in 12.1–15 (or 12.1–16), an entertaining piece ‘on a deceptively light note.’ We hear of a drab owl and a magnificent peacock, of swans and nightingales. Dio is the owl, and he compares himself unfavorably with sophistic peacocks, poetic swans, and lyric nightingales. Yet, the birds flock to the owl, and the crowds to Dio. This strongly evokes the scenery of Athens at the

113 Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” 96–97 (on the Odysseus persona), 97–98 (on the Diogenes persona), and 98–99 (on the Socrates persona). 114 Ibid., 98. 115 Ibid., 99. 116 Ibid., 100.

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times of Socrates and his battles with the sophists.’” It comes as no surprise that Socrates is mentioned by name in the prolalia in 12.14 (as is Pheidias in 12.6).117

Though not arguing a full-orbed theory of personae, Blomqvist too recognizes the tendency in Dio’s writings toward a style of self-presentation that is aimed at creating a public image centered around a highly curated and intentional set of ideals.118 For example, Dio describes himself as a poor man, without wealth. He refers to his poor health. In his contacts with the cities of Asia Minor, Dio depicts himself as an admonisher of mankind; he is like a father who admonishes his children and prays for them. It is apparent that Dio takes pride in his own fame.119

That is, it is difficult to discern when Dio is arguing rhetorically and simply in an effort to win over and woo the crowd and when, on the other hand, he is arguing from a position that is actually representative of his own fully-formed worldview. Based on the findings of Moles, Blomqvist, Harris, Lau, and Klauck I am convinced that Dio does indeed employ the personae of the classical Greek philosophical heroes to align himself with their prestigious reputations, and possibly that he does so with a view toward providing a pleasant, favorable–and even honorable–explanation for the episodes of his life in the pre-exile and exile period.120

117 Hans-Josef Klauck, “Nature, Art, and Thought: Dio Chrysostom and the Theologia Tripertita,” JR 87 (2007): 333–54, 350. Klauck discusses (on the same page) how Dio likewise practices speech-in-person thus transforming the sculpting of the famous statue of Zeus by Pheidias from Homer’s lighting bolt-throwing god into the image of the Stoic god. Therefore, the pattern of adopting personae is evident, not only in Dio’s own self-presentation, but in his presentation of classical Greek stories represented and revised to conform to Stoic theological and philosophical ideals. 118 Blomqvist, Myth and Moral Message, 227. 119 Ibid., 227. 120 Here I disagree with Lau, Politics of Peace, 202 who argues that debate may exist as to “whether this persona is a facade or an accurate depiction of the real Dio.” The scholarly research on the topic evidences an overwhelmingly positive case that Dio is embodying the personae of others. Thus, it seems beyond debate that the self-presented depiction of Dio cannot in any way be considered “accurate” as a historical witness to the person of Dio himself. Where room for interpretation exists, however, is in answering the question of intention. Did Dio purposefully strategize to present himself in the light of the great Greek figures of the past, or is this phenomenon the result of a subconscious self-understanding of his life as wandering philosopher? Though Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” 100 presents a stunning scholarly case for the hypothesis concerning the adoption of personae by Dio, he goes too far in asserting positively that Dio’s conversion “is a fraud.”

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From my own reading of the Discourses, I am inclined to argue that, based upon the fact that Dio is said to have received his early training in Stoic philosophy from Musonius Rufus, 121 a Sophistic-Cynic-Stoic development in thought is, in fact, unlikely and that, the differences in emphasis which we experience in Dio’s thought stem from a mixture of his own maturity as a person, his own life circumstances during the time of the speech’s composition, and the context in which the particular speech is being delivered. It seems, for example, that the Discourses which appear to be more akin to Cynic philosophy are based largely upon Dio’s present or past experience as a wandering philosopher in exile (e.g. Or. 7, 8, 9, 10) while some of the essentially political speeches stem from his political involvement upon returning from exile (e.g. Or. 38, 40, 43, 44, 45).122 However, wherever one falls in terms of theoretical constructs concerning Dio’s conversion, it is clear that Dio’s Discourses represent a type of Stoicism that is, on the surface, essentially practical as opposed to theoretical. This practical Stoicism is similar to Epictetus, which probably stems from their shared training by Musonius Rufus (whom we will look at next), a Stoic teacher whose writings clearly present praxis (and not theory) as the priority for the eudaemonistic ethical life. Dio’s frequent concern is to promote ethical behavior and concord in the Greek cities of the Roman Empire in order to contribute to eudaemonistic-living and in order to decrease the likelihood of external Roman involvement due

121 On the influence of Musonius Rufus on Dio see Lau, Politics of Peace, 158: “Dio eclectically combines Stoic with Cynic and Stoic motifs. He frequently uses Diogenes as a model and his discourses on kingship carry many Cynic features. He leads the lifestyle of a Cynic, but he is certainly also influenced by Musonius Rufus.” Cf. Blomqvist, Myth and Moral Message, 11: “Early in his youth, during the sixties, Dio went to Rome, where he mingled in the highest social circles. It is not improbable that, already at that time, he made the acquaintance of his future friend and teacher, Musonius Rufus. At any rate, it is certain that he was influenced by the lively political and philosophical discussions going on at Rome at that time, i.e. the latter part of the sixties and the seventies.” Cf. Brunt, who links Dio’s admiration for farmers as opposed to the comforts of “soft” living with the same idea in Dio’s teacher, Musonius. See P. Brunt, “Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and of the Stoics,” in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 19: 9–34, 13. Harris, “Dio of Prusia,” 3873, though noting that Dio studied under Musonius, nevertheless argues that Epictetus was the more model student of Musonius’s Stoicism: “Musonius’ most illustrious pupil, Epictetus, was a more profound expositor of Stoicism than his teacher, and it has been commented above that it is in the teaching on free speech under tyranny that Dio shares some common ground with Epictetus.” 122 Cf. Klauck, “Nature, Art, and Thought,” 341. Klauck argues that Dio is a “philosopher in his own right” and that his orations demonstrate that he is “Stoic by orientation, with occasional sympathies for a Cynic style of life, which were further provoked by his experience of being exiled under Domitian.”

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to political unrest in local governments.123 Wibbing is keen and correct to point out the functional difference between the morality espoused by “wandering” popular philosophical preachers such as Dio and the community-centeredness of the ethic of Colossians.124 Dio formed no new community of his own, but rather sought to contribute to the “concord” of his own homeland and to the communities of those to whom he spoke. Paul and the author of Colossians’ missions were not primarily aimed at the concord of the political commonwealth, but on the formation of Christ-centered communities in accord with the Gospel. 4.2. Stoic Morality presented in the Style of Popular Philosophy and General Morality One of the reasons for conducting a study on the Discourses of Dio (besides his shared geographical location and his rough contemporaneity with the NT authors) is that, even more than Epictetus, Dio presents practical ethics that stem from Stoic doctrines presented separately from an exposition of their underlying programmatic, technical, theoretical, and logic-based foundations.125 As we observed, Epictetus does indeed focus to a large extent on that which is practical, but even in Epictetus the writings are notes from lectures which were directed to young male philosophical students. With Dio, the practical-philosophical ethic appears, with some cosmological and theological interaction, but

123 Lau, Politics of Peace, 191 noting Dio’s desire for concord in order to avoid “the ire and attention of the Roman authorities.” Earlier Lau explains the function and goal of concord in Dio Chrysostom’s approach: “Not only does concord minimize the probability of Roman interference, it also increases the likelihood that Greek cities may one day gain actual independence and have some measure of freedom so that they can manage their own affairs with dignity. In calling for concord with the Roman authorities, Dio again pursues the via media between passive submissiveness on the one hand and irresponsible attacks on the other,” 96. 124 Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 220. 125 Cf. Blomqvist, Myth and Moral Message, 1 correctly asserts that “Dio’s writings are to a great extent didactic and protreptic: normally, there is a moral message in them.” Cf. Harris, “Dio of Prusia,” 3876 who notes that Dio was “less the cosmologist and theologian in his own right than the populariser” who adapted and presented “Stoic, Cynic, and Platonic ideas according to the audience being addressed.” In attributing the motivation for Dio’s presentation style and content in part to the audience in question, Harris’ point resonates with Blomqvist (Myth and Moral Message, esp. 2–5) who makes the case that even in his presentation of moral content we must seek to distinguish between the moral views actually held by Dio and those presented by him to his various audiences and contexts. Lau (Politics of Peace, 188, 191–94) makes a similar point by demonstrating how, in some contexts, Dio appears to be a champion of the poor, and in others he postures himself as a supporter of the aristocrats (e.g., Or. 53) or even a friend of Rome (e.g., Or. 41) largely depending upon the audience to whom he is speaking at the time.

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in an essentially accessible form directed to listeners in the general public and political settings. It is this type of general Hellenistic virtue/vice discourse, I propose, from which both Paul and the author of Colossians would be easily able to experience and incorporate Hellenistic ethical ideals into their own, particularly Jewish/Christian ethic. Since the Discourses are not philosophical lectures but rather political speeches calling for personal and social ethical living, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to discern the extent to which Dio himself was an “orthodox” Stoic; that is, whether he like Epictetus was rooted in the traditional Stoic doctrines stemming from Chrysippus, or whether he held to the more progressive doctrines of Panaetius. It is clear, nevertheless, that the core pattern of thought is “generically” Stoic and continually emphasizes life in accord with nature as the means to virtue along with a focus on the problem of the passions (e.g. Or. 34.33). 4.3. The Passions in Dio Chrysostom Concerning the virtues and the concept of life in accord with nature (e.g. Or. 80.5), Dio is instantaneously recognizable as influenced by Stoicism, but concerning the passions, though he constantly denounces them, the expected Stoic emphasis on their eradication is less apparent and overt. It would therefore be possible, and perhaps likely, that one of his hearers who was ignorant of the complexity and totality of Stoic doctrine, would receive Dio’s teaching as simple descriptions of the virtuous and the vicious life, without necessarily knowing that in the Stoic system, this ethical pursuit, was typically tied to an entire worldview that consisted of an integrated system of ethics, logic, cosmology, and theology. 4.4. Stoic Popular Moralism and its Influence on Paul and Colossians If the author of Colossians was incidentally influenced by Hellenistic ethics (and I believe he clearly was), I want to argue that it is on the basis of this type of a non-technical, non-theoretical, non-systematic, non-programmatic popular ethic which, though itself perhaps rooted in and stemming from a complete Stoic worldview, was delivered apart from an exposition of a totality of the system, and thus appears as a purely ethical and practical exposition of virtue and vice.126 While it is highly unlikely that Paul or the author of Colossians sat 126 Similarly, Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 1384: “We can nevertheless be reasonably confident that a popular-level Stoicism was widespread in the worlds which Paul visited and to which he wrote.” Cf. Emeljanow, The Letters of Diogenes, 59 concerning the focus on popular moralism and ethics in the Cynics rather than the propagation of entire philosophical systems: “The Cynic made sure he was in contact with all walks of life–this formed part of his training programme –and this linked the Cynics generally . . . with popular

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in on Stoic lectures, or were operating from a Stoic/Cynic worldview, or were building their ethics consciously on an Aristotelian eudaemonistic pattern of thought, it is very likely that they would have heard public speakers articulating, in a general way, the Greek life of virtue and vice, in the style of Dio Chrysostom. In other words, I am proposing that Paul and the author of Colossians, in the first century, would have most likely received moralist popular philosophy which just happened to be delivered by a Stoic, but not Stoicism itself, complete with its full complex of integrated programmatic ideas. On account of the variegated philosophical positions present in Dio, Brancacci argues that “one must admit that Dio can in no way be considered a systematic philosopher. . .or one who fully belonged to any philosophical school,” but at the same time he thinks that older term “eclectic” is “generic and unsatisfactory.”127 Edmund, however, is comfortable with the term “eclectic” and thinks Dio is more satisfactorily described as a “moralist” rather than as a Stoic. He describes the approach of both Dio and Plutarch: Both are eclectic and adhere to no single philosophical line; both adopt reasonableness and common sense as their guides. Their aim is to give useful, practical advice to men and communities on how to survive in the present world and to maintain moral principles. They are first and foremost moralists.128

Based upon my own observations thus far, I think it is helpful to ascribe the word “moralist” to Dio. He is, then, best described as a Popular Moralist rooted in Stoic doctrine, or a Stoic Popular Moralist. I prefer to retain the word Stoic in reference to Dio (contra Edmund) because I think that, based upon his training under Musonius Rufus and the content of his Discourses (despite the lack of technical explication), I can discern a definitely Stoic pattern of thought.129 As my lexical study will show, the closest parallels to Paul and Colossians come from a non-technical, non-systematic, non-programmatic Hellenistic teaching which is presented as a more generic, eclectic, and practical ethic.130 ethics rather than philosophic systems,” emphasis mine. Cf. Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘In Season and Out of Season’: 2 Timothy 4:2,” JBL 103 (1984): 235–43, 239 who distinguishes between the approach of the Cynics who were “indiscriminate in their use of freedom of speech and scattered advice by the handful to all within hearing distance” and the professional philosophical elite of the upper class, such as Seneca who “would speak only to those who were in a condition to receive a benefit and would not threaten to drag the philosopher down to their level.” The popular moralism that was so prevalent during the time of the composition of the New Testament was much closer to the popular moralism of the Cynics and Stoics than that of aristocratic teachers like Seneca. 127 Aldo Brancacci, “Dio, Socrates, and Cynicism,” 259. 128 Berry, “Dio Chrysostom the Moral Philosopher,” 70. 129 Ibid., 71. Berry thinks Dio is much more eclectic: that is, he is “roughly Stoic but often really an amalgam of Stoicism, Cynicism, and Epicureanism.” 130 Lau, Politics of Peace, 159–60 notes some illuminating potential similarities between the apostle Paul and Dio Chrysostom including the fact that they were both “situated in the

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This strengthens my position which argues that Paul and the author of Colossians were occasionally influenced incidentally by Hellenistic ethical words and concepts but were not operating from a programmatic Aristotelian, Cynic, or Stoic governing pattern of thought. What matters for Paul is not Dio’s Stoic worldview, complete with a presumably pantheistic view of God, deterministic view of fate, intricate system of logic and physics, and a cosmology of conflagration,131 but rather Chrysostom’s simple, moralistic teaching which was presented for everyday citizens. This (or something like it in regard to its nonsystematic, moralistic style), I propose, is what Paul and the author of Colossians would have likely heard and used freely in that most of the terms encountered were already in accord with or explicative of their own previously held and underlying understandings of ethics. The underlying Stoic influence on the popular moralistic presentation can be clearly observed in Dio’s Discourses. In Discourse 1.42 (cf. Or. 36.30), we encounter an ethical discourse rooted in a clearly Stoic cosmology, which describes reality occurring in “infinite cycles without cessation,” and “guided by good fortune and a like power divine (cf. Or. 32.9; 36.31, 36; 68.7), and by foreknowledge and a governing purpose most righteous and perfect” in which we share. This divine benevolence in which we partake as humans is further described in Discourse 12.27–30 as something innate in human-beings and is “a common and general endowment of rational beings” (Or. 12:39). While Dio does seem to speak to general audiences and cities as if the pursuit of virtue was possible and graspable, the Stoic emphasis on the vice of the many is represented as well, such as in Discourse 14.3, where he refers to the “majority of men” who live in folly. On the whole, however, the traditional Stoic emphasis on the wise sage as the ideal and basically unobtainable goal is not a central concept of discussion in Dio. This is perhaps due to the general same milieu and both function as intermediaries between different interest groups” and that both address cities under Roman rule by offering “strategies to cope with life in the Roman Empire.” Other similarities cited by Lau, however, such as the fact that both possibly had “conversions” and that both were “moral philosophers” are too general and too hypothetical to be of much use in the scholarly comparison of Paul, the Pauline school, and/or the author of Colossians to Dio Chrysostom. What would it even mean for Paul to be, for example, a “moral philosopher?” 131 Incidentally, further Dio’s Stoicism and as I will demonstrate, a belief in the Stoic doctrine of the conflagration is definitely evident in his writings. See Lau, Politics of Peace, 204: “Although Dio holds to the Stoic theory of an eternal sequence of cosmic cycles in which the cosmos perishes in a conflagration and then regenerates back into existence, better than before (Or. 36.42–60), he does not specifically locate his general vision of human concord within this metanarrative.” Cf. Harris, “Dio of Prusia,” 3876: “There is no doubt that in Or. 36 (‘Borystheniticus’) Dio comes closest to a full Stoic cosmology, as the study of his ideas and vocabulary shows.” Yet: “It needs to be remembered, of course, that Dio was less the cosmologist and theologian in his own right than the populariser; he needed to adapt Stoic, Cynic, and Platonic ideas according to the audience being addressed.”

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moralistic nature of the speeches. If Dio had emphasized a strict orthodox Stoic Chrysippean monistic anthropology in an overt manner in his speeches it is unlikely that they would have been very effective in their intended goal, namely a large-scale turn to virtuous individual living and intra/inter-city political relationships which were marked by concord. The rare ideal sage, would be so few and far between as to make Dio’s political purposes unobtainable on a practical level. Dio’s explicitly stated and overly optimistic desire to purify entire cities “by reason” (Or. 48.17; cf. 41.9) and the self-deprecating description of his own limited knowledge (which is not more than “average”; Or. 42.2) highlight probable inconsistencies in his own thinking and departures from the orthodox Stoic necessity of absolute knowledge for virtue and the relatively small number of people who achieve it. Yet, despite the fact that texts like Discourse 14.3 on human moral depravity are rare in Dio in contrast to this more positive approach to popular ethics on a larger scale, texts which reveal a more classic Stoic anthropology are occasionally encountered. Dio describes the truly eudaemonistic life of the Wise Man in Discourse 32.16 for these maladies one remedy and cure has been provided by the gods, to wit, education and reason, and the man who throughout life employs that remedy with consistency comes at last to a healthy, happy end; but those who encounter it rarely and only after long intervals.132

If Dio’s anthropological commitment to the classic Stoic anthropology is questionable, his articulation of Stoic indifference is much more consistent with broader Stoic thought. The expected Stoic commitment to apathy is entirely clear in Or. 34.33 where the virtuous man is to be “wholly unaffected” from various emotional situations and in Or. 16.6 the virtuous man is compared with a solider who is to be “invulnerable” and “not easily wounded.” Therefore, inasmuch as Dio articulates a clearly Stoic underlying pattern of thought as is evidenced by such things as his cosmology, theology, and a theory of the passions we can responsibly refer to him as, in some sense, Stoic. On the other hand, as has been emphasized, inasmuch as Dio presents this Stoic ethic largely apart from a full exposition of Stoic doctrine and the Stoic worldview, but as a more practically-focused ethic, we can safely call him a Moralist. Before moving on to examine the results of our comparative lexical study of Dio Chrysostom and Colossians, we must briefly examine any notable similarities or differences that exist on a more general level between the ethical teachings of Dio, Paul, and Colossians.

132

Or. 32.16. Emphasis mine.

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4.5. Specific Similarities between Dio’s Stoic Moralism and the Ethic of Colossians and Paul a. Sexuality and Effeminacy There are two areas of overlap and two areas of distinction with regard to Dio’s views and the views of Colossians and Paul. First, Dio clearly and constantly articulates a position that is against sexual immorality, the blurring of gender roles, and other acts which he perceives as perversions of sexuality and thus not in accord with nature. This is particularly detectible, as Hawley points out, in Dio’s opposition to effeminate males, but extends also to sexually immoral behavior amongst women.133 Overt references to sexually inappropriate and vicious behavior abound throughout the collection of the Discourses (e.g. Or. 4.102; 7.133–34; 150–52; 14.4; 20.17; 33.36; 36.17; 47.24; 62.5–7; 66.1; 6.18– 20; 72.7). 134 This attention to sexual ethics, although often using different words, is consonant with the NT emphasis on sexual purity. I should note, however, that not all of the references in Dio which speak against male softness and effeminacy are opposing this characteristic on sexual grounds alone. Rather, the general idea seems to be that effeminacy causes men to live in manner that is not in accord with their own maleness, and thus in way that is consequently not in accord with nature, virtue, and the eudaemonistic life. For Dio, effeminacy weakens a man and renders him unable to stand up to the physical, emotional, and situational problems and passions which assail him and ultimately keep him from virtue. This is demonstrated in texts like Discourse 77.41, where Dio is against such things as ointments and baths for men because they create “softness” and contribute to vice. (cf. Or. 60.8). It does seem though, despite this secondary facet of male weakness as a barrier to virtue and contrary to Hawley’s opinion,135 Dio is more than opposed to, but in fact, disgusted by effeminacy in males and possibly to homosexual behavior as well. This opposition to effeminacy overlaps, and actually goes well beyond the mention of effeminacy and/or homosexual behavior in the NT (Rom 1:27–29; 1 Cor. 6:9; 1 Tim. 1:10). In the section which follows my work with Dio Chrysostom, we will discover that Dio’s teacher, Musonius Rufus, is likely the source of this emphasis on sexual purity as the fragments of his teachings indicate that he taught a somewhat revolutionary view which called for a restriction of sexual activity to the purpose of procreation alone. 133 Richard Hawley, “Marriage, Gender, and the Family in Dio,” in Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, ed. Simon Swain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 125–39, 129, 133. 134 Ibid., 133, 135–36. These references are helpfully gathered and listed with descriptions of their contexts, all of which concern sexual ethics and issues of gender. 135 Ibid., 137. He thinks that neither Dio and Plutarch condemn “male-male love as disgusting, but their reticence seems to me to be one of reluctant tolerance in a cultural climate where such activity was viewed more and more as out of date and eccentric.”

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b. Covetousness as a Central Vice In addition to conservative views on sexual ethics, a secondary area of similarity between Dio and Colossians lies in the vice of covetousness. Dio considers this to be the central vice, which is unprecedented thus far in any of the materials which we have reviewed from the various Hellenistic writers. An entire discourse (Or. 17) is devoted to the matter. 4.6. Specific Differences between Stoic Popular Moralism and the Ethic of Colossians and Paul There are many notable differences between the ethics of Dio Chrysostom, Paul, and Colossians. The two most important areas of difference are: (1) the presentation of ethical content within an honor/shame framework (Dio Chrysostom) compared within an ethical presentation framed by cruciform compassion (Paul and Colossians) and; (2) the conception of friendship as operating within a utilitarian paradigm (Dio Chrysostom) compared with the conception of friendship as operating according to the principle of others-centered ἀγάπη (Paul and Colossians). a. The Culture of Benefaction and Honor vs. The Culture of Cruciform Compassion Chrysostom’s view of the care of the poor in society was not driven by the virtues of humility, compassion, and love as it was for the author of Colossians (e.g. Col 3:12–14). In Dio’s world and system, caring for the poor was linked to a larger socio-political phenomenon of honor and benefactions.136 Essentially, the political system of the time in Asia Minor revolved around “the munificence and benefactions of the elite” who “serve to legitimize an elite monopoly of political leadership.”137 Most often in this system, the motivations of the benefactors were stemming from a mixture of their own desires to gain political power and to be the recipients of honor in a society that was actually, in a sense, somewhat legitimately reliant on the human desire for recognition and praise. This is not to attempt to judge the inner motivations of benefactors because without them, in this system, cities would not function. It is, however, to point out the difference in emphasis in societal contribution and care of the poor in Dio and in Paul and Colossians. b. Friendships of Utility vs. Friendships of Others-Centered Ἀγάπη The second general and explicit difference between the thought of Dio and Paul concerns their particular views on the nature of friendship. We have previously 136 137

Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom, 28. Bekker-Nielsen, Urban Life, 69; cf. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom, 85.

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encountered in Hellenistic ethics, a threefold taxonomy of friendships, namely friendships of utility, pleasure, and true/perfect friendships. In Discourse 3.104 Dio notes that many friends are more “useful” even than a multiplicity of body parts, and in Discourse 3.107 he argues that “he who is rich in friends is able, although but one man, to do a multiplicity of things at the same time.” 138 Whereas, in Colossians, friendship and fellowship often involve “bearing with one another” (Col 3:13),139 the Hellenistic concept of the friendship of utility contains the idea, foreign to the NT, of the necessity of friendship as a means of personal eudaemonia through utility. Now that I have sufficiently discussed many of the central concepts, underlying assumptions, and similarities/differences of Dio’s Discourses as they relate to Colossian and Pauline thought, let us turn to the results of my lexical study in order to interpret correspondences at the level of word usage. 4.7. Comparative Lexical Study of Dio Chrysostom’s Discourses and Colossians Dio Chrysostom, the Popular Moralist Stoic, is the closest in connection to Colossians in word usage. In terms of positive lexical correspondence, the texts of Dio continue and increase the popularity of πρᾶος which appeared once in Epictetus as a virtue, but occurs 47 times in the Discourses and is used as an attribute of the ideal king (e.g. 1.5, 20, 40), as a virtue of men in word and deed,140 and as characteristic of Zeus (12.74, 77). It is clearly a major virtue for Dio in a way that it was certainly not for Diogenes Laertius and only minimally so for Epictetus. We will find that this word also has strong attestation in the OT and NT, thus making it ripe for Pauline usage from every angle. Another newer addition to the Hellenistic ethical word pool at this point in history and specifically in Dio Chrysostom is χρηστός which is used by Dio 22 times as a virtuous quality. It is used to refer to the goodness: of a speech (2.28; 32.5), of a king (1.11; 3.25), and of a man (31.25, 93; 68.5) as well as to refer to good things (23.11; 65.3, 8) and to refer to that which is useful (40.34; 79.6). The related Colossian form, χρηστότης, occurs once in Dio in an odd passage

138 Lau, Politics of Peace, 182 presents a picture of Dio’s approach to friendship that, while not fully utilitarian, does have a strong sense of aspects of utility and the “usefulness” of friends: “Dio remarks that friends are necessary to control the weapons of war; friends are allies, function as extensions of the king’s own body; and friends must be selected from all corners of the empire. With the development of a network of friends who have political leverage in the various local governments throughout the vast reaches of the empire, the ideal king is then able to exercise full control. The friends of the ideal king can therefore function as imperial agents or personal envoys in establishing the beneficent rule of the king.” 139 Cf. Gal 6:2. 140 Or. 2.26; 7.24, 33, 138; 18.2; 27.4; 30.41; 32.27; 34.47; 38.35; 40.37; 41.1, 10; 45.15.

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(7.141) in which it is used to describe the “simplicity” of men who call adulterers their friends and thus not as a virtue. The reader will recall that the word χρηστότης was also used as a vice in Diogenes Laertius, Lives (Book VII) and that neither it, nor its related forms were present in Nicomachean Ethics, the Cynic Epistles or Epictetus’ Discourses. As was the case with all of the Hellenistic sources thus far, neither σπλάγχνον, nor οἰκτιρµός, nor any combination of the two occurs at all in any of Dio’s Discourses. Likewise, just as the virtue of µακροθυµία does not appear in either Aristotle, the Cynic literature, Diogenes Laertius, Arius Didymus, or Epictetus, neither does it appear in Dio Chrysostom. The Colossian virtue and attribute of Christ, ταπεινοφροσύνη, is not attested and the 27 occurrences of ταπεινός in the Discourses are used to express the vice of baseness, lowliness, negative public humiliation, and degradation.141 A unique usage occurs here in which Dio uses the Colossian virtue as a vice to describe cheap and ignoble housing (47.15) and a structure not “fit for a dog” (40.9). Likewise, ἀγάπη, while not attested in its nominal form, does appear frequently (79x) in its participial and verbal forms in the Discourses, but, as expected, it is not used in the technical sense of the NT authors.142 In terms of the occurrence of the vices in Dio Chrysostom, we see many of our established patterns being repeated and strengthened here. Not surprisingly, considering Dio’s Stoic and Cynic sentiments, the words ἐπιθυµὶα and πάθος occur quite frequently (42x and 39x respectively) as central characteristics of the vicious man and κακός appears (158x) with its related form κακία (an additional 31x). The pattern that I have been tracing concerning the Hellenistic lack of emphasis on words which Colossians uses to express vice is generally continued with πορνεία showing no attestation and ἀκαθαρσία occurring in Dio, as it did in Epictetus, only once. This almost complete absence from our Hellenistic sources with a representation of only two attestations in total shows the massive difference in emphasis and popularity of the concept of purity and holiness expressed through the use of the term ἀκαθαρσία specifically for the biblical writers. The term appears 62 times in the LXX and 10 times in the NT, nine of which are in the Pauline epistles, and six of which occur in the context of ethical catalogues, including the catalogue in Col 3:5. 143 The fact that πορνεία (which occurs 49x in the LXX and 25x in the NT) and ἀκαθαρσία often appear together in Pauline ethical lists and in the ethical list of Colossians, and that, as we continue to encounter, they never (or in the case of ἀκαθαρσία, rarely) appear in Stoic and Cynic lists continues to strengthen my insistence that the terms are likely derived by Paul and the author of Colossians from the 141 E.g. Or. 1.81; 2.75; 4.80, 91, 118, 122; 6.58; 9.20; 11.33; 36.60; 44.12; 50.9; 65.5; 66.12. 142 Cf. ἀγαπάω SVF III 630. 161, 13 (Stobaeus ecl. II 108, 5 W). 143 Cf. Rom 1:24; 2 Cor 12:21; Gal 5:19; Eph 4:19; 5:3.

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LXX, their inherited Jewish ethical tradition, and the thought of the early church rather than one of the various streams of non-Jewish Hellenistic eudaemonism. Additionally, we continue to encounter complete non-attestation of the term εἴδωλολατρία. The related form εἴδωλον (9x) is not used as a vice concerned with idolatrous worship that is offensive to God (as it is in the LXX and NT) but is instead used in reference to: statues (4.86), people wearing cosmetics (7.17), and in a morally neutral description of nature (12.79). The author of Colossians is clearly being influenced from elsewhere in terms of the vice of idolatry. We do however encounter among Dio’s vices, as we experienced with the virtues πρᾶος and χρηστός, a notable increase in the frequency in the usage of the word πλεονεξία. The word occurs 20 times in the Discourses, and unlike in Aristotle, the Cynic Epistles, Diogenes Laertius, and Epictetus, it is a vice which Dio considers especially serious and dangerous. As has been previously mentioned, in the midst of a speech which is entirely devoted to challenging the vice of πλεονεξία, he names it as the “cause of the greatest evils” (17.6) and “the greatest evil” to both man and his neighbor (17.7). It is difficult to determine precisely why this increase in interest in πλεονεξία occurs at this point in the tradition but I think it is likely attributable to the frequent political and social settings of Dio’s speeches in which greed would not only be a vicious behavior but would essentially cause the city to virtually malfunction and to financially sink due to the hoarding of funds by potential benefactors. In Dio’s climate, the entire society, including building projects and public welfare was dependent upon the generosity of liturgies, financial gifts, and wealth of the ruling class. Were this to be withheld, it would constitute a total financial meltdown. In any case, a surface level reading of Dio’s Discourse 17 on the vice of covetousness shows a general disdain for the act itself regardless of any underlying and extended societal implications which might stem from it. In this way it is similar to the teachings of Jesus in Mark 7:22 and Luke 12:15 and the context of Ps 119:36 (118:36). Therefore, in regard to this particular term, it is important to note its increased frequency here which may demonstrate a general disdain present at the time of Paul in both the Hellenistic, LXX, and Jesus traditions. Lastly, the vices ὀργή (18x) and αἰσχρός (50x) both occur and carry their usual negative meanings. The vice, αἰσχρολογία, however is not attested. θυµός (5x) appears but often carries the more neutral nuance of “spirit” which can be either a vice or a virtue depending on the context. In sum: on account of the increased frequency of πρᾶος, χρηστός, and πλεονεξία, I have argued that Dio Chrysostom as a Popular Stoic Moralist is closest to Paul and the author of Colossians in word usage compared to the other Hellenistic sources that we have studied thus far. However, due to the fact that his career likely overlapped with the end of Paul’s career, it is unlikely

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that any direct influence occurred. The pattern of non- (or extremely minimal) attestation of the Jewish vice words used in Colossians continued and was further confirmed by my study of Dio Chrysostom. 5. Musonius Rufus 5.1. General Introduction to Musonius Rufus and His Writings Both Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus were said to have been taught by Musonius Rufus who lived c.30–100 C.E. thus making him a definite contemporary of the authors of the New Testament.144 However, despite the apparent relevance of Musonius for Stoic and NT studies, Cynthia King notes that his work has been practically ignored for much of the 20th century.145 While Van der Horst’s helpful 1974 article in Novum Testamentum provides many useful lexical and literary parallels, the case still remains that in NT studies, works which interact with Musonius continue to be few in number. Relatedly, Van der Horst’s article, while definitely illuminating, amounts to a short introduction to Musonius Rufus followed by a collection of rough parallels with a variety of NT texts. Works of this sort tend to be excellent places to begin but too broad and random to provide any comprehensive and compelling results by way of the comparisons which they identify and highlight between the various passages. For example, in his article, Van der Horst lists the occurrence of φθόνος in a vice list in Rom 1:29 and M.R. 7 as a “parallel” which, while interesting, really tells us nothing apart from the simple fact that the authors used the same word.146 I suspect that the lack of interaction with Musonius Rufus may have something to do with the nature and provenance of the Lectures and Sayings which are attributed to him. The entirety of the 21 Lectures of Musonius come down to us from the 5th century C.E. anthology of Stobaeus and are thought to be the product of the lecture notes of Musonius’ student Lucias.147 They therefore do not represent the writings of Musonius himself and it is generally held that, in 144 P.W. Van Der Horst, “Musonius Rufus and the New Testament: A Contribution to the Corpus Hellenisticum,” Novum Testamentum 16 (1974): 306–15, 306; cf. the Preface of King, Musonius Rufus, 9–12. 145 King, Musonius Rufus, 12. 146 Van Der Horst, “Musonius Rufus and the New Testament,” 310. See also 313 where he points out the similarity of the use of ἐπιθυµίαν κακήν in Col 3:5 and ἐπιθυµίας κακάς in M.R 7. Both of these words are far too frequent in first century to really make their presence convey to us anything of significance or definitiveness. 147 King, Musonius Rufus, 14–15. King also notes that the Sayings of Musonius 23–53, along with the 21 Lectures are also contained in the Anthology of Stobaeus. We will here, however, be looking solely at the lectures. I find the sayings too short to contribute anything to the type of study that I am here carrying out. Cf. Amand Jagu, Musonius Rufus Entretiens et Fragments: Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire (SMGP 5; New York: Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim, 1979), 9. I am also making use of C.E. Lutz, Musonius Rufus "The Roman Socrates" (YCS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947).

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fact, Musonius did not write anything to leave behind. While I approach these documents with tempered optimism, mostly because of their late date, opinions vary as to the veracity and faithfulness of the texts as a witness to the original teachings of Musonius. For example, Jagu thinks that, “celles de Lucias manifestent un arrangement qui défigure son modèle et ne laissent aucunement transparaître le ton primitif,” which is in contrast to the more faithful renditions of Epictetus’ lectures taken down by his student Arrian.148 He does not however provide an argument that would serve to back up this statement which would seem to render it to be more of an opinion. According to King: Stobaeus never seems to give the whole of a lecture (this is confirmed for Lecture 15 to which there is independent witness from the papyrus which survived by chance), and he breaks up several lectures to fit into several categories which he wishes to illustrate. . .149

Still, there is no good reason to be overly cautious, and the Lectures do indeed capture the essence of a more distinguishably practical and distinctly less-technical Stoicism which continues and evolves in the later writings of Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus. However, on the basis of the later date, I wouldn’t be comfortable forming any major theses on the parallels contained within the Lectures. I take them to provide an additional, but a less weighty, support for the theories and patterns which I have been identifying and articulating thus far by sources which are generally held to be much less assailable on the basis of dating and authorship. 5.2. Conceptual Study of Musonius Rufus’ Writings a. Practical Εthics Musonius Rufus, though definitely basing his teachings on the tenets of orthodox Stoicism, provides the likely beginning of a trend within the first century Stoics which present a form of philosophy that focused more on practical ethics and less on technical discourse, logic, physics, and theology. This is not to say that these elements are absent from his writings; they are not. However, they occur within the broader context of arguments for popular morality and practical ethics, and not in the context of a Stoic doctrinal exposition. Irvine describes Musonius succinctly as being “long on practical advice and short on theory.”150 In both Lecture 3 (Stobaeus 2.31.126) and 5 (Stobaeus 2.15.46), Musonius uses a medical metaphor to express the priority of importance of action over theory. His point is not that theory is not important but rather, as we find in

Jagu, Musonius Rufus, 10. King, Musonius Rufus, 19. 150 Ibid., 11. 148 149

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Epictetus, that it is not the end, but a means to the end, namely virtue.151 Therefore, Musonius’ view constitutes, not a change in doctrine but in emphasis. This likely contributes to his more overtly optimistic presentation of human nature and the acquisition of virtue, which, while being in line with the Socratic foundations of orthodox Stoicism, strikes the reader as lacking the original emphasis on the practically unattainable ideal of the wise sage. When he writes, “. . .there is an inborn capacity in the human being’s soul for proper living and . . . the seed of virtue exists in each one of us. . .,”152 the reader can discern the early stages of practical Stoic-based ethics that will begin to become prominent in Dio Chrysostom and, to a lesser extent, Epictetus. This strengthens my previous proposal concerning the general trajectory of a first-second century Stoic ethic which became somewhat detached from the complex totality of the programmatic Stoic worldview and system (including physics, logic, theology, cosmology etc.) and emphasized instead, essentially practical ethics almost apart from, or at least with less overt instruction in, the originally integrated doctrines concerning human action, anthropology, and explications of monistic psychology. If this was the case, then my insistence on the Colossian use of Stoic terms only, apart from underlying ethical systems and patterns of thought, becomes even more convincing because, as I argued in the case of Dio Chrysostom, it provides the means within Hellenism itself, of a stream of philosophy which, though based upon Stoic doctrines, was essentially received by its hearers, apart from the programmatic complexities of true orthodox Stoicism, resulting in a kind of first century practical morality for the non-specialist. Nevertheless, it is rather simple to detect the Stoic doctrinal roots of Musonius’ practical popular ethical presentation even though they themselves are rarely the central topic of discussion. In Lecture 17 (Stobaeus 4.50c.94) the classic Zenoian Stoic formula which places the essence of virtue within the pursuit of life in accord with nature is overtly stated.153 b. Apathy as Necessary for the Virtuous Life The Stoic central doctrine of apathy and the control of the passions forms a great deal of Lecture 1 (Stobaeus 2.31.125) and Lecture 19 (3.1.209), the latter of which presents Musonius as advocating a shoeless lifestyle as a means of building up the ability to withstand the external elements with virtue. This, ascetic focus, is also evident in Lecture 6 (Stobaeus 3.29.78), in which Musonius writes:

151 King, Musonius Rufus, 36. “Si la théorie est première dans l'ordre chronologique; la pratique l'est dans l'ordre hiérarchique.” 152 Ibid., 26–27, Lecture 2 (Stobaeus 2.9.8). 153 Jagu, Musonius Rufus, 79–80.

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We will train both soul and body when we accustom ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, scarcity of food, hardness of bed, abstaining from pleasures, and enduring pains.154

One can sense the roots of the sort of teaching which becomes even more central to Epictetus, that is, the teaching that focuses on the ability to remain unaffected by external emotional and physical elements and, indeed, any potential feeling or situation which is out of our control. Elsewhere, in Lecture 9 (Stobaeus 3.40.9) Musonius teaches that the virtuous life depends on one’s ability to rely “on himself for his whole well-being,”155 thus highlighting the significance of the unassailability and complete apathy of the virtuous man in Stoic thought. It is helpful here to remember the absolute centrality of fate to the system of Stoicism even despite the absence of any discourse on the matter in the explications of Musonius. We can assume that his teachings were partly relying on that classic programmatic Stoic doctrine. c. The Divine in Musonius Rufus In terms of theological discourse, I find less of an emphasis in Musonius than in both the classic Stoics and the Dissertations of Epictetus. However, more than enough references to the divine exist to reasonably discern the Stoic roots of Musonius’ view of the divine being as “nature” in which the philosopher participates.156 d. The Instantaneous Conversion of the Stoic Sage Although, as I have mentioned, the “new school” of Stoics (Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and especially Dio Chrysostom) generally write in such a way as to minimize views in which the acquisition of virtue is highly idealized, I can still detect traces of the orthodox Stoic doctrine of the instantaneous conversion of the sage. Musonius writes: A beast is not able to comprehend that many of the wrongs done to people are done out of ignorance and a lack of understanding. A person who gains this comprehension immediately stops doing wrong.157

e. Popular Teachings of Musonius Rufus and their Similarities and Differences to Ethical Thought in Colossians In addition to these obviously classic underlying Stoic patterns of thought, we find many notable overtly stated novel elements in Musonius which appear to be, if not entirely new, at least emphasized in a way that is extremely unique. King, Musonius Rufus, 37, Lecture 6.4 (Stobaeus 3.29.78). Ibid., 44, Lecture 9.2 (Stobaeus 3.40.9). 156 Lecture 9 (Stobaeus 3.40.9); Lecture 15 Part A (Stobaeus 4.24a.15). 157 King, Musonius Rufus, 50, Lecture 10.5 (Stobaeus 3.19.16). My emphasis. 154 155

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Many of these have definite resonance with Colossians, the writings of Paul, and the sayings of Jesus in the Gospels. These themes include: the high view of women and the insistence on their participation in philosophy (Lecture 3, Stobaeus 2.31.126), the limiting of sexual relationships to a man and woman in marriage (Lecture 12 , Stobaeus 3.6.23), the limiting of sexual intercourse for the purpose of procreation (Lecture 13, Stobaeus Part A 4.22c.90),158 the disapproval of homosexual behavior159 (Lecture 12, Stobaeus 3.6.23), the emphasis on ethical behavior as both individual and communal (Lecture 14, Stobaeus 4.22a.20), the high view of children,160 and the use of the language of the “image of god” to describe the ethical pursuit of the philosopher (Lecture 17, Stobaeus 4.50c.94).161 It is, perhaps, important to point out that when Musonius refers to people being in the “image of god” and sharing in the divine, he means something entirely different than Paul in the undisputed epistles and in Colossians (Col 1:15; 3:10).162 For Musonius, this conviction is rooted in the Stoic belief in a pantheistic god who is nature while for the author of Colossians it is a reference rooted in the OT (Gen 1:27) and is based upon the definite distinction between Creation and Creator. Likewise, Musonius is worlds away from Paul and Colossians in holding the common Stoic view that death is not evil (Lecture 6, Stobaeus 3.29.78//Lecture 8, Stobaeus 4.7.67). Nevertheless, we should acknowledge and not attempt to downplay the shared usage of topoi and terms between Paul, Colossians, and Musonius. In

158 Ibid., 57, Lecture 13.2 (Stobaeus 4.22c.20): “In marriage there must be, above all, companionship and care of husband and wife for each other, both in sickness and in health and on every occasion.” Cf. Col 3:17–21//Eph 5:22–33. See also Lecture 14.2 (Stobaeus 4.22a.20), 59: “Marriage obviously is in accordance with nature, if anything is. Why else did the creator of humankind first cut our species into two and then make for it two sets of genitals, one female, one male? Why else did he implant in each a strong desire for companionship and union with each other and mix into both a strong longing for the other, the male for the female and the female for the male?” Cf. Gen 1:26–28; 2:21–25, esp. v. 24. 159 Ibid., 55, Lecture 12.2 (Stobaeus 3.6.23). On sexuality and marriage: “Among other sexual relationships, the most illegitimate involve adultery, and the relationships in which males relate to males are no more tolerable than adulterous ones because this outrage is contrary to nature.” 160 Ibid., 63, Lecture 15 Part A5 (Stobaeus 4.24a.15). Note the similarity to Matt 6:25–34 concerning not worrying about financial and physical means of survival. Musonius writes: “How do these little birds–the swallows and nightingales and larks and blackbirds–which have far fewer resources than you raise their own nestlings? . . .” 161 Ibid., 69, Lecture 17.2 (Stobaeus 4.50c.94). “Indeed, the human being, alone of all the creatures on earth, is the image of the divine and has the same virtues as the divine . . . inasmuch as he is a copy of a god, must be considered like a god when he acts in accordance with nature.” 162 Cf. Rom 8:29; 1 Cor 11:7; 15:49; 2 Cor 3:18; 2 Cor 4:4.

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many significant ways, their thoughts and speech really do overlap. It is, ironically, the firm acknowledgement of true parallels within the context of the larger framework of their own distinctive “theologies” and “world-views” that yields the most illuminating results. For, this actually serves to demonstrate yet again that similar terms, topics, and literary forms could be used by contemporaneous writers while holding essentially different, and often contrary, systematic foundational world-views without the wholesale adoption of the others’ underlying pattern of thought. 5.3. Comparative Lexical Study of Musonius Rufus and Colossians For my lexical study of Musonius Rufus’ Lectures, I used Lutz’s text, which simply collects the Greek text of the Musonius material from the larger volume of Stobaeus and presents it as a neatly organized and digitally-searchable collection.163 Surprisingly, none of the virtues in Colossian appear in Musonius Rufus except χρηστότης which occurs one time (14.35). The related form χρηστός occurs 11 times referring to the “good man” as opposed to the “wicked man” (13B.17) and as the virtue “good” in an ethical catalogue (16.85). Therefore, the pattern of attestation of the Hellenistic/Stoic ethical author most contemporaneous with Paul and Colossians shows almost no lexical overlap with him here. Furthermore, we have yet to see the virtues οἰκτιρµός or µακροθυµία appear at all in any of our Hellenistic sources. This combined with the fact that the Pauline and NT virtues of ταπεινοφροσύνη/ταπεινὸς have only occurred (and do not occur at all here) as a vice, gives us an increasingly strong indication that the primary ethical root of Colossians must be based somewhere else besides the Hellenistic world. The Colossian vices πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία, words that I have continually associated with the Pauline Jewish vice motif, do not occur at all in Musonius Rufus. In fact, metaphorical usages of the cultic metaphor in reference to ethics are entirely absent. Likewise, αἰσχρολογία and θυµός do not occur in Musonius. The expected Stoic central themes, as usual, appear, but with a great deal less frequency. Πάθος occurs only 2x (3.30; 9.46) and ἐπιθυµὶα 11x (e.g. 8.43; 18A.29; 7.3; 12.42; 21.27). Of course, κακός (38x) is widely used, and κακία (6x) and ὀργή (1x) both make appearances but this provides little illumination.164 Lastly, πλεονεξία occurs (6x) contributing to my previous theory that that vice had become popular ethical stock term. With Musonius, then, we receive another helpful addition to the articulation of the patterns that have been observed thus far, namely: a lack of correspondence with the Colossian virtues, a steady attestation of the Stoic central vices

Lutz, Musonius Rufus. I have noted that Vögtle has made this same point in his work. So too Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 30. 163 164

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(πάθος and ἐπιθυµὶα), and a notable increase in the use of the virtue χρηστότης and the vice πλεονεξία in the Roman Stoic literature.

Chapter 5

Conclusion and Summary – Comparative Studies of Hellenistic Sources and Colossians I have carried out and analyzed several systematic lexical and conceptual studies of Aristotle, the Cynics, and the Stoics in: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, The Cynic Epistles, Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Arius Didymus’ Epitomes of Peripatetic and Stoic Ethics, Epictetus’ Enchirideon and Discourses, the Discourses/Orations of Dio Chrysostom, and the lecture notes of Musonius Rufus. I have perceived and noted several reoccurring patterns concerning the correspondence between the various Hellenistic texts and the ethical terms and pattern of thought of Paul in the Epistle to the Colossians. First, in terms of the conceptual comparative studies I found significant points of incommensurability between Colossians, and the Peripatetics, the Cynics, and the Stoics. Unlike the Peripatetics, I argued that the Colossian ethic is neither programmatically eudaemonistic nor mean-based thus making theories which are based upon the premise of a transformation of Aristotelian character ethics unlikely and imprecise. Likewise, I argued that the programmatic Cynic and Stoic views of: the ideal sage, nature as the pantheistic divinity, the centrality of apathy and the eradication of the Passions, and (in the case of the Cynics) well-known anti-social patterns of behavior, were areas of disconnect between the ethical world of Paul and Colossians, on the one hand, and the Cynics and Stoics on the other. On the basis of these inconsistencies, and many others, I consistently questioned the likelihood of either Aristotelian, Cynic, or Stoic systems of thought as the governing pattern from which Colossians was working. Second, in terms of my comparative lexical studies, the research revealed a definite overall lack of correspondence and attestation of Colossian virtues in general. Neither the virtue terms οἰκτιρµός and µακροθυµία, nor any of their various adjectival and verbal forms, were attested at all in any of our selected Hellenistic sources. Relatedly, σπλάγχνον, though attested in several texts, was never used to refer to “deep compassion” as it is in the NT, but to the literal bowels of an animal or human. Likewise, ταπεινοφροσύνη/ταπεινὸς, was used most of the time to signify the vice of “baseness” and never the virtue of “humility.” Aristotelian, Cynic, and Stoic uses of ἀγάπη were essentially restricted to the verbal form, and were neither a central concept of virtue nor were they comparable to the highly specialized usage in the NT and in the writings of

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Paul. However, positively, I did notice a steady attestation amongst the various Hellenistic sources for the Colossian virtue of πραΰς, πραΰτης, although typically appearing in a number of variant spellings. The virtue of “gentleness,” therefore, seems to be a point of common agreement. Likewise, χρηστότης, although appearing more frequently in the adjectival form χρηστός, evidenced attestation in both Paul and various Hellenistic writers, but especially increased attestation in the writings of Dio Chrysostom. An example of an even stronger parallel is the Colossian attestation of the term αἰσχρολογία. Although attested only in Aristotle and Epictetus, I determined the word was definitely representative of an instance of the almost certain acquisition and incorporation of a Hellenistic term by the author of Colossians for use in his own ethical context. The term does not occur in the LXX, and occurs in the New Testament only in Colossians. Secondly, in terms of the vices, I noticed a steady pattern of words occurring frequently across the entirety of the selected texts. I noted that the terms: ὀργή, θυµός, πάθος, ἐπιθυµὶα, and κακός belonged to this ubiquitous group. In the cases of four of these words, namely, ὀργή, θυµός, ἐπιθυµὶα, and κακός, I argued that this frequency of attestation occurs, not only in the Hellenistic sources, but, as we shall soon encounter in the study of the LXX, throughout all of the literary sources treated in this book.1 Therefore, on account of the incidental nature of these parallels, the functional potency of the lexical significance of these particular words is greatly diminished. Context, I noted, must be taken into consideration when attempting to analyze parallels which involve these terms. Yet, even with the context taken into consideration, I argued that the ubiquity and the unanimous agreement as to the obviously ethically negative nature of these terms across ethical schools and cultures makes them unable to successfully function as the fulcrum for an argument of dependency or influence in either direction on their own. Thus, they will serve a position of secondary importance and a “supporting role” in the thesis of this book. I did, however, note that the term πάθος was almost surely gleaned from the author’s Hellenistic environment due to its relative infrequency in the LXX compared with its high and wide frequency in the writings of all of the Hellenistic ethical schools. Nevertheless, it was clear that when viewed within the context of the broader teachings of the Stoics and Aristotle, the usage in Colossians is less technical and programmatic. Aristotle viewed πάθος as either virtuous or vicious dependent on one’s reaction in terms of an ethical mean, and the Stoics viewed πάθος in a technical, systematic way. They stressed the complete eradication of the mental disturbances of the πάθοι. In Colossians, the term was not programmatic 1 The ubiquitously, and obviously negative nature of these vices within Stoic philosophy and ethics can be observed in their voluminous attestation as catalogued in the index (volume 4) of SVF. Ὀργή can be found in SVF IV, 104–105. Θυµός appears in SVF IV, 73. Κακός is listed on pages 76–78 of SVF IV.

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at all, and was instead used as a simple vice. It involved neither the concept of Aristotle’s mean nor the intricacies of Stoic anthropology and psychology. Furthermore, I pointed out that mercy, a πάθος and vice for the Stoics, was considered a virtue by Colossians and the Pauline Epistles. Although I argued, on the basis of its inclusion in the Ten Commandments, that πλεονεξία likely has LXX roots, I noted that, especially in Dio Chrysostom, the term was used to indicate a central vice. This indicates, that at least for Dio, the term also had strong Hellenistic usage roughly around the time in which Colossians was being composed. I also noted that on the basis of this increase in usage between the virtue χρηστός and the vice πλεονεξία in the Discourses, Dio Chrysostom, more than all of the other texts which I studied, exhibited the closest lexical parallels to Colossians. I suggested that this, combined with the general tendency in the later Stoics, namely, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Dio Chrysostom, to emphasize practical morality and ethics over technical doctrine and logic, itself serves to strengthen my thesis that both Paul and the author of Colossians could adopt words, phrases, and ideas without their underlying programmatic patterns of thought. For, if the ethical material was beginning to be delivered in a manner that emphasized practical ethics over systematic doctrine, I argued, the incidental taking up of words, phrases, and ideas apart from the underlying programmatic doctrinal system, would have been even more simple and likely based on the trajectories and presentations of the Stoics themselves. Thus, I proposed that the Stoic Popular Moralism of philosophers such as Dio Chrysostom, delivered to public crowds as general moral discourses of virtue and vice apart from systematic Stoic doctrinal exposition, was the most likely source of interaction and acquisition of Hellenistic ethical terms and ideas which the author incorporated into his inherited Jewish ethic whenever they were commensurable. Lastly, I noticed a continual non-attestation of vices that I saw as being related to a frequent, likely Jewish, Pauline motif. These words, namely, πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία were absolutely central in Colossians with parallels throughout the undisputed epistles, yet were very uncommon or entirely absent in the writings of Aristotle, the Cynics, and the Stoics. It is significant to point out that–in addition to the works surveyed in their entirety– the lexical index of the standard collection of fragments on the Stoics, namely Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta lists no attestations of σπλάγχνον, οἰκτιρµός, πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, or βλασφηµία. 2 This lack of attestation strongly indicates that a cluster of particularly Jewish terms exists which expresses ethical and moral concepts through metaphorical Jewish cultic lan-

2 See Hans von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Vol 4. Quo Indices Continentur Conscript Maximilianus Adler (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2016) [Repr. Lissiae In Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1903].

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guage and concepts. With these patterns in mind, we now move on to investigate the LXX in a similar manner in order to discover if the gaps that remain from my Hellenistic study can be filled by these others streams of sources and influence.

Chapter 6

The Septuagint and Colossians A. Introduction A. Introduction

In the previous chapter I concluded that, although both Paul and the author of Colossians were indeed incidentally influenced by certain terms and ideas from the Hellenistic ethical sphere, my comparative lexical and conceptual results were divergent enough to warrant and necessitate the search for a more comprehensive source for the content and function of the ethical terms, and underlying ethical pattern of thought of Colossians 3. In this chapter, I will show, through the results of my lexical and conceptual comparative study of the LXX and Colossians 3, that the patterns of conspicuous lexical absence of Colossian ethical terms in the Hellenistic sources, can be explained by their patterns of lexical presence in the LXX texts and in the texts of the NT. The information will be presented in two distinct sections. First, I will observe and comment upon the usage and contexts of the virtue terms of Col 3:12, 14 in the LXX. In the second section I will deal with the vice terms of Col 3:5, 8 in same manner. Three core motifs will arise from the reading of the attested correspondences, namely (1) the ethical terms of Colossians 3 frequently appear in the context of LXX passages which present ethical reality through a moral binary motif of the Righteous and the Wicked in a Two Way pattern of thought, (2) the virtue terms of Colossians are used often in the LXX and NT to describe the character of the Righteous, the character of God, and the sayings and character of Jesus; and (3) the Colossian vice terms show frequent parallel attestation to those terms which describe the Wicked in the LXX and NT. These three ethical concepts, I propose, and will further demonstrate and develop in chapters 7 and 8, are feeding into the governing ethical pattern of thought and the choice of particular ethical terms of Colossians 3.

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B. Background Information on the Septuagint1 B. Background Information on the Septuagint

While those reading this book are likely familiar with the basic background information of the Septuagint (hereafter LXX), it is worth noting a few central points about the translation process and style, dating, and vorlage of the LXX in order that the lexical and conceptual study of the ethical concepts contained within it might be assessed with a working knowledge of the cultural, historical, and literary context. In regard to the dating of the translation, it is widely acknowledged that the legends concerning the initial translation found in the Letter of Aristeas, Philo, and Josephus refer specifically and solely to the translation of the Pentateuch which occurred sometime in the mid-third century B.C.E.2 The other books were translated by different translators at a variety of unknown times with a likely terminus of the mid-end of the second century B.C.E. at the latest.3 1 References to the greek text of the Septuagint in this book are to the Rahlfs edition. Alfred Rahlfs, ed. Septuaginta LXX, Editio altera by Robert Hanhart (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006). Porter offers a concise explanation of the history of the Rahlfs translation compared with the Göttingen project in Stanley E. Porter, “Septuagint/Greek Old Testament” in Dictionary of New Testament Background, ed. Craig A. Evans, Stanley E. Porter, and Ginny Evans (Downers Grove: IVP, 2000), 1099–1106, 1104: “. . . Rahlfs’s edition of the Greek OT . . . relied on the three major codices: Vaticanus, Sinaiticus and Alexandrinus. This means of arriving at the text in many ways resembles the principles used by Nestle in the creation of his Greek NT edition. Rahlfs prepared this edition in part as a stopgap measure while the Gottingen Septuagint Project got underway (see Jellicoe, 9–21). First edited by Rahlfs, who published an edition of the Psalter in 1931, and then by Kappler, Hahnhart and now Aejmelus, this current project is undertaking to edit eclectic texts for every book of the Septuagint . . .” 2 Mogens Müller, First Bible of the Church: A Plea for the Septuagint (JSOT 206; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 47–61 on Aristeas, and 61–66 on the LXX translation legend in Philo and Josephus. 3 J. Trebolle Barrera, Jewish Bible and the Christian Bible: An Introduction to the History of the Bible (Boston: Brill, 1998. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 14 July 2017). Cf. Müller, First Bible of the Church, 39. Müller notes that original translation consisted only of the Pentateuch, and that “The translation of the other groups, Prophets and Writings, were completed at various times following more or less distinct initiatives. The quality of the various translations fluctuates.” Cf. Porter, “Septuagint/Greek Old Testament,” 1101 where Porter argues for the third century B.C.E. translation of the Pentateuch: “The current position is that probably there is some basis in fact for what Aristeas relates–that the Law, or Pentateuch, was translated into Greek in Egypt beginning in the third century B.C. . . . Current Septuagint scholarship tends to treat positively the basic elements of the Aristeas tradition . . . It thus accepts that the Pentateuch was translated first, in the third century B.C., followed by the Prophets and the Writings, most of which were translated by the second century (see Tov 1992, 136–37).” Cf. Emmanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research (3rd Edition; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2015), 16: “The name ‘Septuaginta’, which now refers to all Jewish-Greek biblical books, at first applied only to the Torah. When the collection of Greek biblical books grew, however, it came to denote the whole corpus.”

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Concerning the translation style and quality, Tov categorizes the various translations that comprise the LXX as “a collection of individual translation units rather than a homogeneous translation.”4 Thus, Septuagint scholars agree that the LXX consists of a varied set of translations ranging from functionally equivalent “free” translations to those exhibiting a more literal, formal equivalence.5 Additionally, the LXX exhibits many instances of Hebraizing in syntax, vocabulary, and Hebrew idioms.6 This variegation in translators and styles should be kept in mind as we continue in a lexical and conceptual study of the LXX. Given that the LXX is undoubtedly a work of a community of translators, redactors, and authors working over an extended period of time in the context of Palestine, Alexandria, and elsewhere in the Diaspora, a survey of its content consists of an analysis of cultural patterns, theologies, terms, and concepts that were present in the Judaism of the third and second centuries B.C.E. Therefore, patterns detected across the various books of the LXX represent, not the views of a single individual or translator (or even, team of translators) but evidence of similarly held ethical, theological, and cultural concepts present in a ubiquitous way across the Judaism of the time. In regard to the approach taken in this book, the result is that a survey of the LXX and a comparison of its ethical themes to those found in the New Testament provides a much broader and useful historical, literary and cultural resource than if the LXX were the product of a single interpretive community within Second Temple Judaism.

Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint, 15–16. Ibid., 28: “The majority of the books of the LXX fall somewhere between the characterizations “free” and “literal”; that is, they are either relatively free or relatively literal”; cf. Porter, “Septuagint/Greek Old Testament,” 1103; Trebolle Barrera, Jewish Bible and the Christian Bible, 304: “On the whole the translation is of high quality, more literal in some books, freer in others.” Trebolle Barrera gives examples of this phenomenon noting that while the text of the Pentateuch “basically conforms to the MT,” the translation of Isaiah “is very free” and is “barely of use for textual criticism of the Hebrew of this book.” Furthermore, the text of Jeremiah “is one eighth shorter than the MT” whereas the “Greek Psalter translates the masoretic Hebrew with greater and lesser success,” 319. 6 Henry S. Gehman, “The Hebraic Character of Septuagint Greek,” VT 1 (1951): 81–90. See esp. 87: “. . . the LXX is full of Hebrew idioms which also involve a matter of syntax. It may appear, however, that these are due simply to a literalistic rendering from Hebrew into Greek, and no doubt many of them have such an origin. On the other hand, if the LXX made sense to Hellenistic Jews, the translation was understood because its idiom corresponded to a familiar Denkart. At any rate, if the Greek spoken by Alexandrian Jews was saturated with Semitic expressions, their translation did not help them in making the transition to a pure Greek . . . The Hebraic character of LXX Greek, however, is not limited to syntax including a Semitic use of conjunctions, prepositions, and pronouns; the vocabulary also was bound to be influenced by the Hebrew original. Certain Greek words had to be adapted to Old Testament usage, and in this way they received a meaning not found in classical or ordinary Hellenistic Greek.” 4 5

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The Hebrew Vorlage of the LXX is generally considered to have been an earlier version of the Hebrew text that, on the whole, is very close to the MT.7 Where the LXX disagrees with MT it lines up instead, in many cases, with versions of the Hebrew in texts such as the Samaritan Pentateuch and Qumran. However, it is not easy to determine the extent to which these parallels between the LXX and the Hebrew of these other texts is a result of what Tov refers to as “common exegesis” and “contextual exegesis”; or on the other hand, represents a legitimate parallel to a shared Hebrew Vorlage that pre-dates the MT.8 In regard to its status in antiquity, the LXX was considered to be equal in authority and inspiration as the Hebrew original.9 Müller demonstrates not only the commonly known fact that the LXX was the Old Testament text of the early church, but also that early church fathers such as Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria held it to be an inspired text and translation.10 Jellicoe helpfully sums

7 Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint, 217: “Probably the sole generalization which can be made with regard to all the books of the LXX is that they reflect more significant deviations from MT than all other versions together. Furthermore, apart from a few scrolls from Qumran . . . the LXX is the only source that contains a relatively large number of variants that bear on the literary criticism of the Bible. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that the LXX translation was made from valuable scrolls, which often preceded the ones that became the basis of the MT family.” Cf. 223: “My intuition tells me that more often than not the LXX reflects an earlier stage than MT both in the literary shape of the biblical books and in small details.” Concerning the Greek text variants possible impact on the MT, Revell argues that “any variant reflected in the Greek translation, whether affecting consonants or only the understanding of them expressed in vowels, could have become involved, before 100 AD, with the standard reading tradition from which the MT developed.” E.J. Revell, “LXX and MT: Aspects of Relationship,” in De Septuaginta: Studies in Honour of John William Wevers on his sixty-fifth birthday, ed. Albert Pietersma and Claude Cox (Ontario: Benben Publications, 1984), 41–52, 48. 8 Emmanuel Tov, “The Nature of the Hebrew Text Underlying the LXX: A Survey of the Problems,” JSOT (1978): 53–68, 60. Though Müller, First Bible of the Church, 36 seems more optimistic that over a thousand of the roughly six thousand differences in the Samaritan Pentateuch from the MT line up with the LXX and with textual fragments from Qumran, and that these point to an earlier Hebrew text than the MT of which the Samaritan Pentateuch, Qumran, and the LXX were aware. 9 Müller, First Bible of the Church, 24. 10 Ibid., 75. On the LXX in the early church in the apostolic era: “For the New Testament authors, the original text, that is, the text they drew on, was primarily the Septuagint,” 144. Cf. Trebolle Barrera, Jewish Bible and the Christian Bible, 302: “The Christian communities accepted this pluralism of books and texts in the Greek version.” Cf. Porter, “Septuagint/Greek Old Testament,” 1104: “The Septuagint constituted the set of sacred writings for early Christians and many if not most Jews, even many in Palestine, in the first century” and “. . . Longenecker (60–66) has noted not only that the great majority of OT quotations of Jesus are apparently from the Septuagint but that in several instances the point that Jesus makes in the Gospel account is based on the Septuagint reading (e.g., Mk 7:6–7 and Mt 15:8–9, citing Is 29:13),” 1105.

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up the nature of the prominence and priority given to the LXX in early Christianity: The LXX will fall into perspective only when it is recognized that for the Greek-speaking Jew of the pre-Christian era and over a century beyond, and for the Christian Church from the time of its birth, this Jewish-Greek Bible, with its text gradually assimilating ‘corruptions’, held its place as the inspired Scriptures. Adoption by the Christians led eventually to abandonment by the Jews, and among the former it held its place universally until its supersession in the West by the Latin Vulgate; in Greek-speaking Christendom it has continued to the present day as the official Old Testament.11

The LXX, then, represents not merely a secondary, peripheral translation of the Hebrew original with a corresponding second-order status. Rather, it constitutes the accepted, authoritative, inspired Old Testament of Greek-speaking Judaism, the New Testament authors, and the early church. Therefore, a survey of the LXX is vital to our study of ethical words, phrases–and most importantly–concepts as they appear in the Bible of early Christianity.

C. Comparative Study of the Virtues of Col 3:12 with the Septuagint C. Comparative Study of the Virtues of Col 3:12 with the Septuagint

A study of the LXX is crucial to an investigation of potential ethical influences on the author of Colossians. If the author is Paul, he undoubtedly would have been well-versed in the content of the Hebrew Bible from his early studies of the written Torah in Tarsus and his subsequent studies of the oral Torah under Gamaliel.12 Furthermore, if, as Porter has proposed, Paul was traveling with “a series of scrolls” which comprised a testimony book or collection of Greek manuscripts of the OT, and if these scrolls contained, as Porter suggests, either the complete Psalter in Greek or major portions of it, then it is altogether reasonable to conclude that perhaps these Greek OT sources may have provided some level of influence.13 Further, the fact that the text of Col 3:16 explicitly 11 Sidney Jellicoe, The Septuagint and Modern Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 353. Cf. 354: “While it is true that the LXX is a translation and from its very nature has an antecedent textual history, these matters are of less moment for textual criticism than the fact that, when the books of the New Testament came into general circulation, both LXX and New Testament as the accepted Scriptures of the Christian Church were transmitted side by side. The Old Testament, like the New, was tacitly accepted as a Greek work, and accordingly it must be approached as such for the purposes of textual criticism and tradition-history,” emphasis mine. 12 Stanley E. Porter, “Paul and His Bible: His Education and Access to the Scriptures of Israel,” in As It Is Written: Studying Paulʼs Use of Scripture, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Stanley (SBLSymS 50; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008), 97–124, 103. 13 Ibid., 120, 122–23.

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mentions the singing of psalms as a means by which the word of Christ is to dwell richly in the members of the church, and as a means of the teaching and admonishing of one another, gives us good reason to take a look at the Book of Psalms specifically as a potential source for the preceding virtues (Col 3:12– 14). While we cannot be certain as to whether the Psalms of the OT Psalter are what the author is exclusively referring to here, it is reasonable to assume that even if we should not limit ψαλµός to the OT Book of Psalms, nevertheless, the Psalms would most certainly be included in use of the term in the Pauline Epistles generally and in Colossians in particular. My studies in the Psalter of the LXX confirm that all but one term of the virtue list of Col 3:12 is attested in the Book of Psalms as either a virtue that God honors or desires, or one that he himself is said to possess as an attribute.14 I will now examine the attestation and function of each virtue and vice term in Colossians 3:5, 8, 12–14 in the writings of the LXX, and then, based upon the results of this research, proceed to construct my threefold theory concerning the parameters of a Colossian theory of ethical word-usage and the author’s governing ethical pattern of thought. 1. Σπλάγχνον and Οἰκτιρµός “deep compassion” Though we do not find these two words in this particular combination in the LXX, we do find both in several different places. Σπλάγχνον occurs in the context of a Jewish Two Way dualism between the Righteous and the Wicked in Proverbs 12:10. It reads: “Whoever is righteous (δίκαιος) has regard for the life of his beast, but the mercy (σπλάγχνα) of the wicked (ἀσεβῶν) is cruel.”15 The term is used elsewhere, in Phil 1:8 as an attribute of Christ and in exhortations to believers as a virtue.16 In addition, the verbal form σπλαγχνίζοµαι, which in the Scriptural sources is found in the LXX only in 2 Macc 6:8 is attested 12 times in the NT, where it is used with Jesus as the subject17 or by Jesus in the context of a parable. 18 The case for a Jewish/Christian provenance for σπλάγχνον is strengthened when we note that in Col 3:12 the modifying word, οἰκτιρµός, is itself certainly derived from a Jewish ethical stream as demonstrated in the LXX. Οἰκτιρµός is well-attested throughout the LXX and it exhibits especially high frequency of usage within the Psalms. The word occurs as an attribute of God in its substantive form οἰκτιρµός19 and in its adjectival

Σπλάγχνον appears in the LXX as a virtue, but not in the Psalms. ESV. Hereafter, all translations will be my own unless otherwise noted. 16 Cf. 2 Cor 6:12; 7:15; Phil 2:1; Philemon 7, 12, 20. 17 Matt 8:2; 14:14; 15:32; 20:34; Mark 1:41; 6:34//Matt 9:36; Luke 7:13. 18 Matt 18:27; Luke 10:33; 15:20. 19 Pss 25:6 (24:6); 40:11 (39:12); 51:13 (50:15); 69:16 (68:17); 77:9 (76:10); 79:8 (78:8); 103:4 (102:4); 119:77 (118:77); 106:46 (105:46); 145:9 (144:9). 14 15

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form οἰκτίρµων in the Psalms.20 It is attested in its verbal form οἰκτίρω with God as the subject.21 With the witness of this amount of Psalmic attestation alone it is reasonable to conclude that this first virtue phrase has its initial roots in the LXX and is related to and descriptive of the character of God. Thus, here I would agree with Vögtle that this first virtue, σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρµοῦ is derived from an OT Jewish background and often associated with the mercy of God.22 That the term is used widely in an oft repeated formula concerning the character of the God of Israel (“the LORD, a God merciful [gk. οίκτίρµων] and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness”23) further solidifies both the likelihood of an instant mental access to it as a virtue throughout the history of Israel and an awareness of the term’s divine association. Therefore, I agree here with Larsson, who has already sufficiently and successfully argued that the virtue lists are connected with elements of the character of God and Christ.24 There is, however, an additional conceptual nuance which the context of the attestations of the lexical evidence reveals, namely, a connection to the categories of the Righteous and the Wicked in the OT literature. In Ps 37:21 (36:21) we read: “The wicked (ὁ ἁµαρτωλός) borrows but does not pay back, but the righteous (ὁ δέ δίκαιος) is generous (οἱκτίρει) and gives.” As mentioned in the introduction, I am not simply seeking to point out corresponding attestations of lexemes but rather I am attempting to discover how the words are being used in their particular contexts. I have already noted the first paradigmatic motif, namely, the link between Colossian virtue terms and the words used to describe the character of God and Christ in the OT (and NT). The second motif which I propose is also framing the choice of ethical terms in Colossians is this OT paradigm of the Two Ways as expressed through the actions of the characters of the Righteous and the Wicked. Broyle,25 Clifford,26 and Craigie27 argue that Ps 37:21 is a Proverbial/Wisdom Psalm (of the sort that we find in other OT texts such as Prov 2:12, 20; 4:11, 14, 18; 15:9–10, 19) which accents the traditional Jewish Two Way ethic, Pss 86:15 (85:15); 78:38 (77:38); 111:4 (110:4); 112:4, 10 (111:4, 10); 103:8 (102:8); 145:8 (144:8). 21 Pss 102:13 (101:14); 103:13 (102:13); 123:2 (122:2) 22 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 155. Cf. Bevere, Sharing in the Inheritance, 30; cf. 48–49; 59; 200, 201, 202–10 and Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul, 11, 33, 34, 85, 97, 99, 100, 109, 121–25, 131, 186–88. 23 Exod 34:6; Neh 9:17; Pss 86:15 (85:15); 103:8 (102:8); 112:4 (111:4); 145:8 (144:8); Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2. 24 Edvin Larsson, Christus als Vorbild: Eine Untersuchung zu den paulinischen Tauf- und Eikontexten (Uppsala: Enjar Munksgaard Kopenhagen, 1962), esp. 68, 102, 130–31, 148, 220, 222–23. 25 Craig C. Broyles, Psalms (NIBC 11; Peabody: Hendrickson 1999), 179. 26 Richard J. Clifford, Psalms 1-72 (AOTC; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 187. 27 Peter C. Craigie, Psalms 1-50 (WBC 19; Waco: Word Books, 1983), 296. 20

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expressed in terms of the way of the Righteous and the way of the Wicked. In this Psalm, the terms are highly connected to legal and social righteousness as opposed to abstract moral categories. Schaefer helpfully and rightly describes righteousness here as “life consonant with the land of promise where one dwells, which presupposes conduct in accord with the covenant terms”28 which is epitomized by the “relationship with God.”29 As was the case with Ps 37:21, Prov 12:10 (which, as I discussed previously, also contains the first word in the Colossian list, σπλάγχνον) is in the context of a classic Jewish Two Way teaching. The Righteous (δίκαιος) are said to “have compassion” (οἰκτίρει) over against the so-called “mercy” of the Wicked. The literal translation of the LXX is “but the mercy of the Wicked is unmerciful (gk. ἀνελεήµων).” Proverbs 12 in its entirety works from the Jewish Two Way ethical perspective. in the ways of righteousness (is) life (ζωή), but the ways of evil grudge-bearing (µνησικάκων) result in death (εἰς θάνατον).30

Similarly, Prov 21:26 (LXX) uses the term (again in its verbal form) in the context of a Two Way ethical duality. The Wicked desires evil desires all day long, but the Righteous is continually merciful and has compassion (οἰκτίρει) without sparing.

In the context of this Proverb, the Two Way scheme is once again overt, and literally mentioned in the case of the Wicked in 21:8 as “crooked ways” (σκολιάς ὁδούς), and in reference to the Righteous as in 21:16, 21 as “the way of righteousness” (ὁδοῦ δικαιοσύνης). Lastly, before we move on to the next virtue, I must mention the interesting attestation of the word οἱκτίρµος in the prophetic text Zech 12:10, which, although not cited in the Pauline epistles, is cited and interpreted as a Messianic prophecy referring to Jesus by other NT authors (cf. John 19:37; Rev 1:7). In this text God pours out a Spirit of compassion and grace on the inhabitants of Jerusalem. In summary, with respect to the first terms appearing together in Colossians as the phrase σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρµοῦ (“a heart of compassion”), the evidence allows us to formulate a two-fold result. The term is linked both with the person and character of God, and the term functions as a positive attribute that is commonly found in Two Way ethical dualities which describe the character of the Righteous. Konrad Schaefer, O.S.B., Psalms (BOSHNP; Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 92; Cf. Craigie, Psalms 1-50, 330. 29 Schaefer, Psalms, 94. 30 One function of the preposition εἰς is to indicate result. See Daniel Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 369. 28

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2. Χρηστότης “kindness” The result of an exhaustive search of the LXX yields major attestation for χρηστότης. We find that the word is used in the Psalms in the substantive form (χρηστότης) as an attribute of God31 and as a general virtue which the Psalmist desires to be taught to him by God.32 It also appears in its adjectival form in the Psalms functioning, again, as an attribute of God.33 Let us now examine some individual occurrences of the term in order to thoroughly observe how it is used in the original context of the LXX passages. I find the use of the adjectival form of the word (χρηστός) in Ps 112:5 (111:5) to be highly illuminating. Kind/loving/benevolent (χρηστός) is the man who practices compassion (οἱ οἰκτίρων) and lending, he conducts his matters with justice (ἐν κρίσει).

The previous verse 112:4 (111:4), the following verse 6, and verses 9–10 shed further light on the manner in which the word is used in this context and its association with the Righteous category of people. Light springs up in the darkness for the upright (τοίς εὐθέσιν), they are merciful, compassionate (οἰκτίρµων), and righteous (δίκαιος). . . .because, he will not be moved in the age, with the result that (εἰς) the Righteous (δίκαιος) shall be an everlasting memorial.” He has distributed freely, he has given to the poor. His righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) endures for the age of the age. His horn will be exalted in glory. The Wicked (ἁµαρτωλός) will see it and become angry, he will gnash his teeth and dissolve into liquid. The desires of the Wicked will perish.

We should note that Paul directly quotes Ps 112:9 in 2 Cor 9:9 during his appeal to the Corinthians for generosity in the Macedonian collection. If the same “Paul” also wrote Colossians, this would confirm that he could – indeed, has – drawn from the ethical material in Psalm 112 in order to teach ethics in a Christian context elsewhere. At the very least, this usage of Ps 112:9 in 2 Cor 9:9 shows a precedent in early Christianity for the use of the Psalm in an ethical context. Adding further weight to this theory is the fact that these two terms which are used in Psa 112 to describe the righteous person (112:4) have been used in the previous Psalm (Ps 111), to describe the very character of God (i.e. Ps 111:4b of the Lord; ἐληµων and οἰκτιρµων).34 31 Pss 25:7 (24:7); 31:19 (30:20); 68:10 (67:11); 85:12 (84:13); 104:28 (103:28); 119:65 (118:65); 119:68 (118:68); 145:7 (144:7). 32 Ps 119:66 (118:66). 33 Pss 25:8 (24:8); 34:8 (33:9); 52:9 (51:11); 69:16 (68:17); 86:5 (85:5); 100:5 (99:5); 106:1 (105:1); 107:1 (106:1); 109:21 (108:21); 119:39, 68 (118:39, 68); 136:1 (135:1); 145:9 (144:9). The term is also used in Rom 2:4; 11:22; Eph 2:7 to describe Jesus, and in 1 Cor 13:14; 2 Cor 6:6; Gal 5:22; Col 3:12 as a virtue commended to believers. 34 Schaefer, Psalms, 277. It was on account of Schaefer that I became aware of this connection.

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Moving on to the Proverbial literature, continuing the contextual pattern which I have previously articulated, we find the Colossian virtue χρηστός used in connection with the category of the Righteous in the context of the Jewish Two Ways ethical motif.35 For, if they were proceeding on good paths (τρίβους ἀγαθάς), then they found smooth paths of righteousness (τρίβους δικαιοσύνης λείους; Prov 2:20) The good/kind/upright (χρηστοὶ) will be inhabitants of the land. . . (Prov 2:21a) . . .ways of the Ungodly/Wicked (ὁδοὶ ἀσεβῶν) will be destroyed from the land, and the lawbreakers (παράνοµοι) will be ejected from it (Prov 2:22).

The link between the way of righteousness and our virtue χρηστός is clearly discernible in the text as is the obvious fate of the Wicked and their connection with lawless behavior (cf. 2:17, 22). Clifford notes that while the theme of the “land” may be making a reference to the historical land of Canaan, in this context it probably refers more generally and metaphorically to “living in peace and dying prematurely,” which is a common metaphorical use of the “land” theme in many of the Proverbs.36 Therefore, here too, we find χρηστότης, used in reference to both the character of God, and the character of the Righteous in a Two Way scenario. 3. Ταπεινοφροσύνη “humility” We do not find the form ταπεινοφροσύνη itself used in the Psalms as an attribute of God. However, we do find strong attestation in the Psalms for the other frequently occurring forms of the word, such as ταπεινός or ταπεινόω, within the context of descriptions of the Righteous in the LXX. This occurs most often in the Psalms and Wisdom literature but it also has strong attestation in the Prophetic literature.37 Therefore, I am on solid lexical ground in maintaining the dual motif of the basis of the Colossian virtues in both the character of God and/or Christ, and the character of the Righteous.38 Let us investigate some select occurrences of the word in a variety of its forms in the LXX. 35 Proverbs 2 (LXX): τρίβος (“path”) occurs 4 times, ὁδός (“way”) occurs 7 times, ἂξονας (“pathways”) occurs 2 times, and the word τροικιαὶ (“paths”) occurs 1 time in order to carry on the Two Way metaphor. 36 Richard J. Clifford, Proverbs: A Commentary (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), 49. 37 Pss 18:27 (17:28); 35:13; 147:6 (146:6); 138:6 (137:6); Prov 3:34; 11:2; 29:23; Sir 2:17; 3:18; 7:17; Isa 11:4; 51:17 (50:19); 66:2; Ezra 8:21; Zeph 3:12. Cf. Phil 2:8 and 2 Cor 10:1 for a NT example in which humility is presented as a virtue that both defined the character of Christ and which was to be emulated by his followers as the model of obedient love. 38 Cf. Larsson, Christus als Vorbild, 214–16. Likewise, F.F. Bruce highlights the fact that in the OT, God makes his dwelling with the humble. See The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 154.

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In Ps 18:27 (17:28) we have, perhaps, the most obvious instance of an occurrence of ταπεινός in which it is absolutely clear that “humility” is a virtue which God desires and rewards. For you will save a humble people (λαὸν ταπεινόν); but arrogant eyes you will humble.

In addition to being a generally straightforward affirmation of God’s approval of humility as the necessary disposition for one who desires salvation, it is important to point to the language of the Ways which make some appearances in Psalm 18. We learn that the Psalmist “kept the ways of the LORD” (τὰς ὁδούς κυρίου; Ps 18:21), that “the way (ἡ ὁδός) of God is blameless/without defect (ἄµωµος; Ps 18:30),” and that, in fact, God himself made his way (τὴν ὁδόν) blameless (ἄµωµον; Ps 18:32). Ταπεινός also occurs in another Two Way ethical scenario in Prov 3:34 where it it appears directly in the context of a Righteous/Wicked duality. Curses of God (are) on houses of the Wicked (ἀσεβῶν), but the houses of the Righteous (δικαίων) are blessed (Prov. 3:33). The LORD is opposed to the proud, but to the humble (ταπεινοῖς) he gives grace (Prov 3:34)

Not only do we have here a definite connection between the categories of the Righteous/Wicked and the humble/proud respectively, but we once again find it in the midst of a Proverb which is rich in actual usages of the word ὁδός (Prov 3:6, 17, 23, 26, 31) as it describes reality through the literary-metaphorical construct of the Two Ways. Further, the appearance of the word ταπεινῶν in Prov 11:2, yet again sets the virtue of humility within the Two Ways tradition (ὁδός; vv. 5, 20) and in the immediate context of a Righteous and Wicked duality. The Proverb presents the Righteous as those who exercise mercy and justice in their communal relationships. Whybray, commenting on the Hebrew text notes that, these verses form a group which is concerned with the relationship of the individual to the community as a whole rather than simply individuals and their dealings with other individuals.39

This is quite significant because if Paul and Colossians are rooted in the thoughts and concepts of the LXX and the Two Way tradition, then this would mean that they would be aware of the social and communal elements of the ethical character of the Righteous. Based on the fact that all of the genuine Pauline ethical content, as well as the ethical content of Colossians, is directed toward the church as a people, and is never presented as an individualistic 39 R.N. Whybray, Proverbs (NCBC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 179. This is significant, because in the final chapter of this book I will argue that the ethical conceptuality and driving pattern of thought in Colossians is communally-centered and focused on the relational enactment and reception of Christ-like love.

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personal ethical system, we can say that at the very least, the Pauline and Colossian approach is consistent with this communal focus of OT ethics.40 A similar usage of the word in a Proverb is found in 29:23, which displays the same overt Two Way motif and casts humility as a virtue. The Proverb reads: Pride will humiliate a man, but the LORD will firmly fix the humble (τοὺς ταπεινόφρονας) in glory.41

A few verses later in verse 27, the author states that the unjust man is an abomination to the Righteous and that the one who keeps his way (ὁδός) straight is an abomination to the lawless. Clifford sees this as not primarily conveying “abhorrence one type has for the other” but about “the ‘either-or’ quality of the moral life.” He notes that ethical dualism of this sort is also found in Qumran and the NT (e.g. John 12:36; 2 Cor 6:14).42 This point illustrates a conceptual connection between the OT and NT in both the literary style of ethical dualism and the governing pattern of thought of the Two Ways tradition.43 It is clear from my presentation that ταπεινός was indeed used in this virtuous sense in the LXX.44 On the basis of the heavy attestation of “humility” in the various wisdom sources, I disagree with Vögtle’s earlier assessment which indicated that Jewish Spruchliteratur does not offer virtues.45 4. Πραΰτης “gentleness/meekness” Though this word appears often in its substantival and adjectival form in the Psalms it is not used to describe an attribute of God. Where it does appear in the Psalms,46 the Wisdom literature,47 and the Torah and Prophets48 it is used as a virtue that God commends and rewards. In the NT it is used to describe the character of Christ49 and as a virtue in the context of an apostolic ethical exhortation.50 Therefore, the dual connection of our Col 3:12 virtue terms to 40 I will fully articulate this ethical pattern of thought from an exegesis of Colossians in chapter 8 in concern and based upon the proposals of this chapter. 41 This is the related but slightly different form ταπεινόφρων which carries the same essential meaning: “humility.” 42 Clifford, Proverbs: A Commentary, 256. 43 Ibid., 214. 44 Ibid., 214. 45 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 93. 46 Pss 25:9 (24:9); 34:2 (33:3); 37:11 (36:11); 45:4 (44:5); 76:9 (75:10); 147:6 (146:6); 149:4. 47 Sir 3:17; 4:8; 10:14, 28; 36:23; 45:4. 48 Num 12:3; Zeph 3:12; Zech 9:9. 49 Matt 11:29; 21:5; 2 Cor 10:1. 50 Col 3:12; Cf. Matt 5:5; 1 Cor 4:21; Gal 5:23; 6:1; Eph 4:2; 2 Tim 2:25; Titus 3:2; James 1:21; 3:13; 1 Pet 3:4.

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both the character of God and/or Christ, and the character of the Righteous in the LXX Two Way tradition is further confirmed by the results of my study of πραΰτης.51 Ps 147:6 (146:6) is a clear example of the sense of the term and its use as a virtue in the LXX in the context of a Two Way scenario. The LORD lifts up the meek (πραεῖς), but he humiliates the wicked/sinners (ἁµαρτωλοὺς) down to the ground.

In terms of the connection of πραΰτης to the Two Ways motif, we encounter a high degree of overlap between the occurrence of the terms in Ps 25 and 37. Meekness/gentleness appears in Pss 25:9 (24:9) and 37:11 (36:11), both of which contain a motivic usage of the Two Way theme. He will guide the meek (πραεῖς) in justice, he will teach the meek (πραεῖς) his ways (ὁδοὺς αὐτοῦ). But the meek (οἱ δὲ πραεῖς) shall inherit the earth, and they will delight in an abundance of peace.

The context of the appearance of πραεῖς in Ps 25 is again within the theme of the Ways. This theme is ubiquitous in the Psalm, occurring in verse 4 (“make known to me your ways ‘ὁδοὺς’ and teach me your paths ‘τρίβους’”), verse 8 (the LORD instructs sinners in the Way ‘ἐν ὁδῷ’), verse 10 (“all the ways of the LORD ‘πᾶσαι αἱ ὁδοὶ κυρίου’ are steadfast love and faithfulness), and in verse 12 (in which the LORD instructs the man who fears him in the Way ‘ἐν ὁδῷ’). 5. Μακροθυµία “patience” As with each of the other virtues in Colossians, µακροθυµία is found throughout the LXX where it is used to describe both the character of the righteous person and the character of God. This is in contrast to its complete non-attestation in the Hellenistic sources which I surveyed in chapters 2–5. The adjectival form µακρόθυµος appears in several Psalms as an attribute of God.52 In agreement with the findings of Larsson,53 we encounter the word and its related forms presented as virtues in the Proverbial literature of the LXX.54

51 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 152. He too posits a probable Jewish provenance for the term. 52 Pss 7:12 (7:11); 86:15 (85:15); 103:8 (102:8); 145:8 (144:8). This form and its related forms appear elsewhere as an attribute of God in the Scripture: Exod 34:6; Num 14:18; Neh 9:17; Wis 15:1; Sir 5:4; 18:11; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Nah 1:3; Jer 15:15; 2 Macc 6:14; Luke 18:7; Rom 2:4; 9:22; 1 Pet 3:20; 2 Pet 3:9. It appears as an attribute of Christ in 1 Tim 1:16; 2 Pet 3:15. 53 Larsson, Christus als Vorbild, 217–20. 54 Prov 14:29; 15:18; 16:32; 17:27; 19:11; 25:15; Sir 2:4.

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Patient/slow to anger (µακρόθυµος) man is great in understanding, but the fool is strongly discouraged (Prov 14:29)

Again, this appears in the context of a Proverb that views reality in terms of Two Ways (Prov 14:2, 8, 12, 14). A similar use of the word appears in Prov 15:18, which is also firmly rooted in the Two Way wisdom tradition (ὁδός; 15:9, 19, 24, 28). The most interesting use of the Ways here is verse 24 in which the author describes the “ways of life” (ὁδοί ζωῆς) which save a person by turning them from Hades. In this case (as in the OT in general) the “life” of this Way is not an otherworldly or eternal life, but rather a statement about the quality of life that is indicative of the Righteous Way.55 Furthermore, because Colossians attributes the same virtue to Christ, I agree with Bruce that, “. . .Patience. . .like compassion and kindness. . .is a quality of God which should be reproduced in those who bear his image.” Two particular attestations in Sirach are also of note. Sir 5:11 is quoted by James (1:19) in the NT and shares a concern with sins of speech that is emphasized in Col 3. 56

Be quick in your hearing, and in patience (ἐν µακροθυµίᾳ) speak an answer.

The second attestation of note is Sir 1:23 which not only mentions the patient man (µακρόθυµος) but is in close proximity with another Colossian wisdom keyword, namely the language of the “treasuries of wisdom” (ἐν θησαθροῖς σοφίας). The reader will recall that in Colossians this word is used in the context of an exposition which described all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge in Christ. 6. Ἀγάπη “love” The word ἀγάπη, which was rarely attested in the Hellenistic sources, is, on the other hand, widely attested in its various forms in the LXX. It occurs in the form of a noun 116 times in the NT,57 yet only 19 times in the LXX.58 The verbal form ἀγαπάω, however, is highly attested in both the LXX and the NT, occurring 271 times in the latter and 143 times in the former. In the LXX, 55 R. Murphy and E. Huwiler, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs (NIBC 12; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1999), 76. They take this position in describing how Prov 15:24, 16:32 and 17:27 represent examples of this duality. 56 Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 154. 57 A brief selection from the results of my own word study on ἀγάπη in the NT–Love of believers (Heb 6:10; 10:24; 1 Pet 4:8; 5:14; 2 Pet 1:7; Jude 2); The love of God in believers (1 John 2:5, 15; 3:1, 16; 3:17; 4:7; 1 John 4:12, 17, 18); God is love (1 John 4:8); Godʼs love (1 John 4:10, 16; Jude 21); Love for God in keeping his commandments (1 John 5:3; 2 John 6); In the Gospels (Matt 24:12; Luke 11:42; John 5:42; 13:35; 15:9, 10, 13; 17:26). 58 A brief selection from the results of my own word study on ἀγάπη in the LXX– Love as a human disposition and emotion (2 Sam 13:15; Eccl 9:1, 6; Song 2:4, 5, 7; 3:5, 10; 5:8; 7:6; 8:4, 6, 7; Jer 2:2); Love for God (Wis 3:9); Love of Wisdom (Wis 6:17, 18).

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ἀγαπάω, is used to describe the steadfast love of the LORD,59 in exhortations from the LORD which command love toward neighbor,60 in passages which describe the existence of, or exhort an individual toward, the love of God.61 It is also used in negative contexts in order to describe what one must not love or that which is not worthy of ultimate love62 as opposed to those things which are in fact worthy of love.63 Love is presented as a commendable virtue and characteristic of the Righteous and an attribute of the character of God. 7. Summary – Comparative Lexical Study of the Virtues of Col 3:12 with the Septuagint Thus far I have surveyed the LXX usage of the virtues of Col 3:12 and in every case, I have clearly discerned and subsequently articulated a two-fold pattern which emerged from the results of the study. This lexical pattern suggests that the ethical terms in Col 3:12 are closely connected and perhaps directly rooted in the OT description of the character of the Righteous, and in the OT (and NT) description of the character of God and/or Christ. I have demonstrated a strong connection between the overall choice of ethical terms in Colossians and their context within the tradition of the Jewish Two Ways motif.

All of the following LXX data continues to be the result of my own studies: Exod 20:6; Deut 4:37; 5:10; 7:8; 7:9, 13; 10:15, 18; 23:5; 1 Kings 10:9; 2 Chr 2:11; Neh 1:5; for righteous deeds (Pss 11:7; 33:5; 37:28; 45:7); “the gates of Zion” (Ps 87:2); the LORD reproves whom he loves (Prov 3:12); toward he who pursues righteousness (Prov 15:9); the LORD loves wisdom (Wis 8:3; Hos 11:1; Isa 43:4); “For I the LORD love justice” (Isa 61:8; Jer 31:3; Dan 9:4). 60 Lev 19:18, 34; Amos 5:15; Mic 6:8. 61 Deut 6:5; 10:12, 19; 11:1, 13, 22; 13:3; 19:9; 30:6, 16, 20; Josh 22:5; 23:11; 1 Kings 3:3; Tob 14:7; Pss 5:11; 18:1; the habitation of your house (Ps 26:8); “and those who love his name shall dwell in it” (Pss 69:36; 70:4; 97:10; 116:1); of his commandments (Pss 119:47, 48, 127, 159); of his Law (Pss 119:97, 113, 163, 165); the Lordʼs testimonies (Pss 119:119, 167); his name (Ps 119:132; Prov 8:21; Sir 2:15, 16); “Love your Maker” (Sir 7:30; 34:16). 62 E.g. “the one who loves violence” (1 Kings 11:2; Ps 11:5); “you love evil more than good” (Ps 52:3); “you love all words that devour” (Ps 52:4); “he loved to curse” (Ps 109:17); “all who hate me love death” (Prov 8:36); “love not sleep” (Prov 20:13); “Whoever loves pleasure will be a poor man. . .” (Prov 21:17); “whoever loves danger will perish by it” (Sir 3:26); “love no false oath” (Zech 8:17); “Everyone loves a bribe” (Isa 1:23; 57:8); Idols (Jer 8:2; 14:10; Ezek 16:37). 63 E.g., “he who loves purity of heart. . .” (Prov 22:11); “Love righteousness” (Wis 1:1); those who love “wisdom” (Wis 6:12); “if you love to listen you will gain knowledge” (Sir 6:33); “love truth and peace” (Zech 8:19). 59

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D. Comparative Study of the Vices of Col 3:5, 8 with the Septuagint D. Comparative Study of the Vices of Col 3:5, 8 with the Septuagint

As I carry out my comparative lexical and conceptual study of the Colossian vices and the LXX, we will discover another continual two-fold pattern emerging which will connect the ethical terms which are used as vices in Col 3:5, 8 which corresponds to both: the OT Two Way paradigm (and specifically with the category of the character of the Wicked), and the ethical vice terms of the sayings of Jesus in the NT. Furthermore, all of the vices which were typically absent from the Hellenistic sources (πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία) will be shown to be frequently attested in the texts of the LXX and/or NT. 1. Πορνεία “sexual immorality” Πορνεία, in the LXX, is used to refer to both literal references and exhortations concerning the avoidance of sexual immorality, and as a metaphor to convey unfaithfulness to God through the vice of idolatry. In addition to its occurrence here in Col 3:5, it is used quite frequently in the other Pauline epistles in the context of ethical discourses.64 Most notably, it occurs in Gal 5:19 as one of the works of the flesh as opposed to the fruit of the Spirit, a literary and conceptual construction which Vögtle sees as potentially corresponding with the Two Way ethical scheme.65 Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that the context in which LXX uses the words that appear in the vice lists of Col 3:5, 8 are frequently descriptions of the Wicked and almost always in context of a Two Way ethical duality. However, despite its attestation in some LXX texts, and its function in Paul’s epistles and Colossians within the context of an ethical binary paradigm and pattern of thought, the word is primarily derived from the sayings of Jesus in Matt 5:19; 5:32; 19:9; Mark 7:21 as it was taken up and applied in traditions such as the Holiness Code by the early church (cf. Acts 15:20, 29). I hold that the LXX attestations are still valuable indirect antecedents to the sphere of thought in Colossians. In Sir 41:17, the author exhorts the listener saying “Be ashamed of sexual immorality (πορνείας),” in the context of a teaching in which he describes the ungodly (ἄνδρες ἀςεβεῖς) as those who have forsaken the Law of God (νόµον θεοῦ; Sir 41:8), who are therefore cursed to destruction (ἀπο κατάρας εἰς απώλειαν; 42:10), with the result that their evil names will be blotted out (ἐξαλειφθήσεται; 41:11). While the point of the passage in its original context is to exhort the hearer to have regard for their good name which will “live on” (Sir 41:12–13), the concern of the author of Colossians is no longer with the 64 65

Cf. 1 Cor 5:1; 6:13, 8; 7:2; 2 Cor 12:21; 1 Thess 4:3; Eph 5:3. Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 194.

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name of the individual, but with the name of the Lord Jesus as the means and end of all words and deeds (Col 3:17). Elsewhere in Sirach we find πορνεία used in the description of a woman who has broken the Law of the Most High (ἐν νόµω ὑψίστου ἠπειθησεν) by committing adultery through sexual immorality (ἐν πορνεία ἐµοιχεύθη). If we examine the other writings of NT and of Paul specifically, we find potentially illuminating clues which can help us to propose a provenance for term which influenced the author of Colossians. As mentioned above, Acts 15:20, 29 and 21:25 place the word πορνεία in the context of a discussion which is exhorting new believers to abstain from idolatry. This connection of the two concepts of idolatry and sexual immorality, as we shall see momentarily, are common in the LXX which, as previously mentioned, often uses the word πορνεία to refer metaphorically to the act of idol worship. In regard to the OT witness of the use of πορνεία as a metaphor for idolatry we have many examples. Some of the most clear and compelling ones come from the Book of Wisdom. Wis 14:12 describes what Gregg calls “spiritual fornication” which entails “forsaking Yahweh for another deity.”66 In Wis 14 we learn that “equally hateful to God are the ungodly man and his ungodliness (ὁ ἀσεβῶν καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια αὐτοῦ; v. 9)” and that “the idea of making idols was the beginning of fornication (᾽Αρχὴ πορνείας; v.12), and the invention of them was the corruption of life” (RSVA). 2. Ἀκαθαρσία “impurity/uncleanness” Ἀκαθαρσία and its derivative forms are well attested throughout the LXX. They always refer to a negative quality which separates one from God. This word is common in the Psalms67 and also occurs in some key places in the Proverbial literature as a term which describes the Wicked. One such occurrence is Prov 24:9. The fool dies because of sins, and impurity (ἀκαθαρσία) causes defilement to a menacing man.

The Proverb on the whole paints a picture of the Wicked as consisting of people who are “evildoers” (κακοποιοῖς), “wicked/sinners” (ἁµαρτωλούς), “evil” (πονηρῶν) and “ungodly” (ἀσεβῶν). They are said to have “no future.” Elsewhere in the LXX, the language of “impurity” is used in relation to the concept

66

J.A.F. Gregg, The Wisdom of Solomon (London: Cambridge University Press, 1922),

136. 67 Pss 86:15 (85:15); 78:38 (77:38); 103:8 (102:8); 111:4 (110:4); 112:4 (111:4, 10); 145:8 (144:8).

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of holiness in the context of passages dealing with cultic law.68 Another reference to the “impure” is in Prov 3:32 which is in close proximity to verse 34, a passage which, as previously mentioned, emphasizes the Colossian virtue of humility (ταπεινοῖς). For an impure person (ἀκάθαρτος) is wholly lawless before the LORD, and he does not sit in council among the Righteous.

The vice terms serve to “concretize” the wicked group which is, as Vögtle has stated, the basic function of the Pauline vice catalogues.69 We see this antithesis between two morally opposite groups again in Prov 21:15. It is a joy of the Righteous to do justice, but holiness is impurity (ἀκάθαρτος) in the sight of the evil doer (κακούργοις).

The passage casts the evildoers as those who are so opposed to righteousness that they actually consider the state of impurity to be holy. In the very next verse these evildoers are described, with the use of the Two Way form, as those who have wandered astray from the way of righteousness (ὁδοῦ δικαιοσύνης). Later, in verse 21 they are contrasted with those who actually do travel “the way of righteousness and mercy” (ὁδοῦ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐλεηµοσύνης). These people, says the author, will find “life and glory” (ζωὴν καὶ δόξαν). Both of these terms are also central to the way of life proposed in Colossians, which is focused on Christ and promises life and glory in him (Col 3:3–4).70 These connections indicate an awareness by the author of the OT connection between right behavior and the themes of life and glory/honor. These concepts would have been elements of the fundamental Proverbial curriculum to the former Pharisee. Elsewhere in the LXX, Proverbial literature continues to use impurity to describe the Wicked. Sir 40:15 describes the children of the Wicked/Ungodly (ἀσεβῶν) as “impure roots” (ῥίξαι ἀκάθαρτοι) and in Wis 2:16, the Wicked person himself is portrayed as describing how his own ways (τῶν ὁδῶν ἡµῶν) are viewed by the Righteous as “impure” (ἀκαθαρσιῶν). Furthermore, the author of Wisdom describes these impure Wicked people as led astray and blinded by evil (ἡ κακία; 2:21) and unaware of the mysteries of God (µυστήρια θεοῦ; 2:22). He continues by saying that God created man for “incorruption” (ἀφθαρσίᾳ) and that he “made him in the image (εἰκόνα) of his own eternity” (2:23).”

Lev 5:3; 7:20, 21; 15:3, 24, 25, 30, 31; 18:19; 20:21, 20:25; 22:3, 4; Num 19:13; Judg 13:7; Lev 16:16, 19; 1 Esd 1:49; 8:83, 87; Ezra 9:11. 69 Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge, 12. 70 Col 3:4: “When Christ who is your life (ἡ ζωὴ ὑµῶν) appears, then you will also appear with him in glory (ἐν δόξῃ).” 68

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3. Πάθος “passion” The vice of passion as it is presented in Colossians is almost certainly rooted in the influence of a Hellenistic ethical stream. In chapters 2–5, I demonstrated the ubiquitousness of the word in a wide variety of Hellenistic sources across a long span of time. I have no reason to think that its appearance in 4 Maccabees has had any particular substantial influence on the author of Colossians. As was argued in chapter 2, I maintain that a significant difference exists in the technical and programmatic function of the word within Stoic ethics and that of the more simple, non-programmatic vicious quality of the Pauline usage of the term. Furthermore, I have noted in detail that in several cases Stoic passions and vices such as “mercy” are, on the contrary, Pauline and Colossian virtues and attributes of God and Christ. Therefore, I suspect an adoption of the term in Colossians which functions incidentally as a simple vice and thus which is operating separately from an underlying Stoic pattern of thought with which the Pauline and Colossian ethic is generally incommensurable. 4. Ἐπιθυµὶα and Κακός “evil desire” Though in Col 3:5 κακός (“bad/evil”) is used in its adjectival form to modify ἐπιθυµὶα (“desires”), in Col 3:8 it is used as a substantival adjective, and thus as a vice in and of itself. For this reason, I will approach the two words separately in order to avoid repetition. We should note that the combination of the two does not occur in the LXX. What we will find is that, in most cases, ἐπιθυµὶα is more or less neutral but that it is the context and category of people with which it is associated that gives it its negative (or positive) meaning. Of course, the use of the term is obvious here in light of the vicious modifying adjective. Ἐπιθυµὶα is frequently attested in the LXX as a negative type of desire, appearing mostly in the Psalms71 and in the Wisdom literature.72 Outside of the Psalms and Proverbial writings, it occurs in a passage of great interest to any work on biblical ethics, namely, the Ten Commandments (Exod 20:17//Deut 5:21). In terms of the Psalmic usage we have the Wicked (ὁ ἁµαρτωλὸς) in Ps 112:9 “praising himself” on the basis of “the desires of his soul (ταῖς ἐπιθυµίας τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ),” thus connecting the category of the Wicked with the desires that necessarily correspond to his way of life. It is the fact that this person is Wicked which makes the desires of his soul wrong, rather than something inherent to desire (ἐπιθυµὶα) in itself. In this sense, it is similar to the teaching of Jesus in the Gospels where he says that it is “out of the heart” from which the wrong actions and vices spring (Matt 15:19//Mark 7:21). The Righteous are described as being generous and portrayed as individuals who care for their 71 72

Pss 10:3 (9:24); 106:14 (105:14); 112:10 (111:10); 140:8 (139:9). Prov 6:25; 12:12; 21:25; 24:1; Sir 1:22; 5:2; 18:30; 23:5; Wis 4:12.

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neighbor. The sense is that the Wicked, on the other hand, neglect both love for God and love for neighbor. Thus, the desires of the Wicked are in accord with the general scope of their worldview while the actions of the Righteous are characterized by “loving reverence,” through which they become “more and more like God,” because “Love for God flourishes in genuine love in human relations.”73 In the Psalms, the word ἐπιθυµὶα is sometimes used in a definitely negative context in which the people of God are described as “desiring with desire” (ἐπεθύµησαν ἐπιθυµίαν) in the desert. This is cast as vicious behavior because it doubts the sovereignty of God (Ps 106:14). However, the fact that desire itself is not necessarily a bad quality, is abundantly clear in Ps 119:9–10 where the Psalmist reveals that the decrees of the LORD are: “More to be desired (ἐπιθυµητὰ) than gold and an exceedingly precious stone.” This positive usage of ἐπιθυµέω occurs again in Ps 119:20 in another reference to the deep desire of the Psalmist for the decrees and rules of the LORD.74 As in the majority of the other Col 3:5, 8 vices, ἐπιθυµία occurs frequently in the Wisdom literature as a characteristic of the Wicked in a Two Way scenario. Prov 12:12 contrasts the Wicked (ἀσεβῶν) whose desires (ἐπιθυµίαι) are evil, with the root of the Righteous/Godly (ῥίζαι τῶν εὐσεβῶν) which is in a fortress.75 Prov 21:25–26 portrays the desire of the sluggard as something that kills him in contrast to the Righteous who “has mercy and is compassionate without sparing” which, yet again, presents reality in terms of the Two Ways of life. Likewise, Prov 24:1 presents a warning to the hearer which separates humankind into two groups.76 Turning now specifically to κακὀς (Col 3:5 as an adjective modifying ἐπιθυµὶα) and κακία (Col 3:8 as a substantival adjective) “evil,” we find that, not surprisingly κακός and its related forms are abundantly attested in the Psalms, Wisdom literature, and throughout the rest of the LXX. It is used frequently in Two Way passages where it serves as a vice that describes the Wicked.77As was mentioned several times in chapter 2, since the attestation of this word is ubiquitous across the scope of all of the ethical streams in question, and since it always unanimously means “evil” or “bad”, I will provide only a few select examples from the 614 possible passages within which the word appears in the LXX. Schaefer, Psalms, 280. This positive desiring is also evident in such texts as Sir 1:26 where the desire is for wisdom and the words of God. 75 Cf. The use of ῥιζόω in Col 2:7 to exhort believers, who “have been rooted” in Christ, to continue to walk in the faith, and Eph 3:17 where believers are “rooted and grounded in love.” 76 Prov 24:1 “Son, do not be zealous toward evil men nor desire to be with them.” Whybray, Proverbs, 343 explains that to “be with them” carries the idea of desiring to join them in their activities. 77 E.g., Rom 13:10. 73 74

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In Ps 21:11 (20:12) the enemies of the LORD are said to lay out κακά against the people of God and in Ps 34:17–18 the LORD sees, hears, and delivers the Righteous (οἱ δίκαιοι) but he cuts off from the earth the one who does evil (34:16). The Psalm teaches that “the face of the LORD is against those who do evil (ποιοῦντας κακὰ; 34:16) and that a person should keep their tongue from evil (τὴν γλῶσσάν σου ἀπὸ κακοῦ) and turn away (ἐκκλινον) from it. In the Prophetic literature of the LXX we have Micah pronouncing woe upon the people “who work evil while in their beds” (ἐργαζόµενοι κακὰ ἐν ταῖς κοίταις αὐτῶν) because of the havoc they were wreaking on small landowners through their socially unjust behavior. Isa 13:11 has the LORD punishing the world for its evil (κακὰ) and wickedness. Jer 9:3 has the Wicked, who are later described as those who have broken God’s Law (9:13), proceeding “from evil into evil” (ἐκ κακῶν εἰς κακὰ). In the Wisdom literature, Prov 2:12 is set within the Two Way ethical duality and teaches that understanding keeps people from the “way of evil” (ὁδοῦ κακῆς) which also makes an appearance in Prov 4:27; Sir 7:1 and 12:3 directly connect evil-doing to social and communal injustice through the lack of almsgiving, while Sir 33:14 provides, perhaps, the most literal passage in terms of the complete opposition of good to evil. Good is the opposite of evil, and life is the opposite of death, thus the Wicked are the opposite of the Godly.

Here, “good” is connected with “life” which is connected with the Two Ways category of the Godly (εὐσεβοῦς) while “evil” is connected with “death” which is the lot of the Wicked (ἁµαρτολός). 5. Πλεονεξία “greed” Πλεονεξία and its related forms appear a total of only 11 times in the LXX and only 19 times in the NT. In the OT, it occurs in Ps 119:36 (118:36) where the Psalmist exhorts the reader to incline their heart to the testimonies of God instead of toward selfish gain (πλεονεξίαν). But even more interesting is its appearance in the ethical teachings of Jesus from the Gospels (Mark 7:22; Luke 12:15) in which greed is said to come from within a person and something against which the faithful should be on guard. The use of the term in Colossians could stem from the oral teachings of Jesus which were in circulation amongst Christians during the apostolic period.78 Although, as mentioned in chapter 2, the popularity of the term amongst the moral philosophers, roughly contemporaneous with Paul and Colossians, suggests that the vice was popularly and 78 Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 156. Bruce takes the position that in many places “Paul’s ethic is directly dependent on the teaching of Jesus, according to whom the whole OT ethic hung on the twin commandments of love to God and love to one’s neighbor.”

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widely opposed across a variety of streams making it ubiquitous as a vice at the time in which Colossians was composed. 6. Εἴδωλολατρία “idolatry” Idolatry in Col 3:5 may function as a term which further describes the immediately preceding word πλεονεξία, or it could function as a summary term for the vices of the entire verse. Although the form εἴδωλολάτρης never appears in the LXX, the related form εἴδωλον is attested in a variety of different genres and most importantly in the Ten Commandments (Exod 20:4//Deut 5:8). This is something of which the author of Colossians would undoubtably have been aware. I should mention that, if we include εἴδωλολατρία as an official vice of Col 3:5 then this makes the number of vices six rather than five. Kamlah’s thesis, which posits an Iranian influence based on the five-fold list depends on the number five in order to work. If, as I am suggesting should be done, one were to include “idolatry” as a vice, the entire five-fold sequence and subsequent Two Angel theory must be called into question. I see no reason why to not take it as a vice, even if it is acting as a summary term. Therefore, the fivefold sequence is not nearly as strong as Kamlah claims. Furthermore, although the second vice list (Col 3:8) does indeed seem to contain only five definite vices, even this list is summed up in the exhortation: “Do not lie to one another” (Col 3:9) which serves as a prohibition against the vice of lying, although it presents the vice in its verbal form.79 Likewise, the virtue list of Col 3:12 seems to contain five virtues at first glance, but since the virtue of love in verse 16 is clearly considered a virtue (actually, the virtue) the count here as well should be six as opposed to five. Thus, I must conclude against Kamlah that if the author of Colossians were (even roughly) committed to a five-fold form (which it seems is not the case), it would essentially tell us nothing about the content but merely reveal his commitment to a common literary style of the time.80 7. Ὀργή “anger” In many cases in the LXX the group of words which are based upon this root are describing the unrighteous anger of the Wicked group.81 However, there are instances in which the word itself represents a justifiable anger. For example, the exhortation of Ps 4:4 (4:5) is “Be angry, but do not sin.” This Psalm is later 79 This is not to say, however, that Iranian sources had no indirect and prior influence on the catalogue form which the author of Colossians subsequently received and applied. 80 O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 178. O’Brien explains the position of Lohse in that the apostle likely chose the form: “Without being conscious of the history-of-religions connections (much less the myth of the two cosmic ‘men’ with their five members, as Käsemann argued) . . .” 81 Such is the case in: Pss 37:8 (36:8); 35:20 (34:20); 55:3 (54:4); 112:10 (111:10); 138:7; Prov 16:32; 22:24; 29:8, 22; Wis 10:3; Sir 27:30; 28:3.

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quoted in Eph 4:26, thus indicating that the tradition and concept of justifiable, non-sinful anger was known and advocated in the Pauline school. Of course, it is this same type of justified and righteous anger which is attributed to the LORD in the LXX82 and in the NT83 in response to sin. Despite this variety, the word in the context of Col 3:8 is most definitely treated as unjustified anger and thus as a vice associated with the old way of life. The usage of the word in Ps 37:8 (36:8) brings us into familiar territory. Here we have the previously examined vice of κακός in verse 27, the verbal form of the virtue οἰκτρίµος in verse 21, the vice ὀργή (v. 8) and another, yet to be studied vice θυµός (v. 8). In the context of the Psalm, it is clear that all of the vices are attributed to the Wicked, evildoer, and transgressor (all referring to the same group) who will ultimately be destroyed (v. 38). This is contrasted with the salvation of the Righteous (σωτηρία τῶν δικαίων) which is said to be from the LORD. As noted above, there are many other instances in the Psalms in which the word is used as a descriptive term for the Wicked. Likewise in the Wisdom literature we find high attestation of the vice within the Two Way paradigm. In the Book of Proverbs, we find examples in which the Wise and those who walk on the “good way” are described as being in control of their anger. A patient man is better than a mighty man and he who seizes control of his anger is better than he who overtakes a city (Prov 16:32)

Earlier in the same Proverb we discover that the “lawless man” who entices his neighbor walks in “way that is not good” (ὁδοὺς οὐκ ἀγαθάς; Prov 16:29) while the man whose “gray hair is a crown of boasting” (indicating a long life due to wise living) is said to find it in the “ways of righteousness (ἐν δὲ ὁδοῖς δικαιοσύνης; v. 31). Once again, we have a vice that is clearly attested within the context of the Jewish Two Way ethic.84 Other times the Wisdom literature directly connects the vice with the negative group. Such is the case in both Prov 22:24 and Sir 27:30. Do not be friends with a wrathful man, and do not associate with a quick-tempered (ὀργίλῳ) man. Anger and wrath (ὀργή), these things also are abominations and the sinful/Wicked man will controlled by them.

Of particular interest is Sir 27:30 because, in addition to clearly associating wrath with the Wicked, it is found in the same chapter as a clothing metaphor 82 Exod 4:14; 15:7; 32:10–11; Num 11:1; 16:22, 46; Deut 9:12; 29:28; Josh 7:26; Pss 6:1 (6:2); 110:5 (109:5); Job 20:28; Mic 5:15; Isa 5:25; Jer 7:20; Sir 5:6; Zeph 1:18. 83 Matt 3:7; Luke 21:23; John 3:36; Rom 1:18; 2:5, 8; 5:9; 1 Thess 5:9; Mark 3:5; Eph 2:3; 5:6; Col 3:6; Rev 14:10. 84 Another example of the Wise being described by the lack of “wrath/anger” is Prov 29:8 – “Menacing men set a city aflame, but wise men turn away wrath.”

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which uses the verb ἐνδύω. The verse states that if one pursues justice/righteousness (τὸ δίκαιον) they will attain it and “wear it as a robe of glory” (καὶ ἐνδύσῃ αὐτὸ ὡς ποδήρη δόξης). In Col 3:10, 12, the same verbal form is utilized to develop a metaphor of clothing oneself with the virtues. 8. Θυµός “rage/anger” Θυµός is used in the LXX in much the same way as ὀργὴ. In fact, they often appear together as a pair and seem to be somewhat interchangeable. While θυµός is used quite frequently in both the OT and NT in reference to the wrath of God85 it, like ὀργὴ, is also used as a negative characteristic of the Wicked. Most of these usages occur in the Wisdom literature and in the context of the Two Way scheme. For example, Prov 22 warns against friendships with a man of rage (ἀνδρὶ θυµώδει; v. 24) and teaches that people of this sort stir up quarrels (v. 22). In Prov 29:11 the angry fool is contrasted to the controlled wise man and in Prov 15:18 the man of rage (ἀνὴρ θυµώδης) is contrasted with the patient man (µακρόθυµος), which, as has previously been mentioned, is a virtue in Col 3:12.86 In most cases, the angry man in the LXX is seen as one who stirs up communal unrest which shares a high degree of overlap with the communal context of the ecclesio-centric ethic in Colossians. 9. Βλασφηµία “blasphemy/slander” Βλασφηµία and its related forms occur infrequently in the LXX and when they do occur it is almost exclusively in the Apocrypha. In the NT the word is used by Jesus as both a vice in terms of a sin against the Holy Spirit (Matt 12:31; Luke 12:10) and as one of the vices that comes from within man (Matt 15:19//Mark 7:22). As I argued earlier, concerning the vice πλεονεξία (which Jesus also lists as a vice in Mark 7:22), it is likely that the use of the term βλασφηµία in Colossians comes from an oral tradition which was circulating amongst Christians in the early church. It is possible that, whether or not the author of Colossians knew the sayings of Jesus concerning blasphemy, he could be making a more general reference to a common vice of the day, namely “slander” in order to refer more generally to negatively-charged speech that is directed against other individuals or people. This seems to be the use of the verbal form βλασφηµέω in passages such as Acts 13:45; 18:6; Rom 3:8, and 1 Cor 10:30. It is also quite possible that the author had both the nuances of blasphemy against God and his Word and the slandering of neighbors in mind. LXX–Exod 4:14; 15:8; 22:24; 32:10; Num 11:1; 12:9; 22:22; 32:13; Deut 4:21; 7:4; 29:28 (29:27); Judg 2:20; 2 Kings 22:17; Pss 6:1 (6:2); 106:40 (105:40); Sir 5:6; Mic 5:15 (5:14); Nah 1:2; Isa 9:19; Jer 7:20; Ezek 5:13. GNT–Rev 15:1; 16:1; 19:15. 86 Cf. Wis 10:3; Sir 1:22; 8:16; 10:18; 28:8; 30:24; Eccl 7:9. 85

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In either case, it is clear and obvious that it is indicative of the old way of life and thus it acts functionally as one of the updated vices of the Two Way scheme. One other passage of note from the LXX is Sir 3:16 which reads: Whoever forsakes his father is like a blasphemer (βλάσφηµος), and whoever angers his mother is cursed by the Lord. (RSVA)

The verse appears in the context of a wisdom teaching concerning the honoring of one’s parents. Since this verse is commenting on behavior which directly transgresses one of the Ten Commandments (Exod 20:12) it would present an obvious link between blasphemy and a way of life which is not lived in accord with God. 10. Αἰσχρολογία “filthy language” The word has the sense of “obscene language” which is defamatory to others. It does not appear in the LXX, and occurs only in Colossians in the NT as a hapax legomena. We do, however, encounter a few other appearances of the related form αἰσχρος in the NT and Pauline epistles.87 There are some attestations of the word in the works of Aristotle and Epictetus and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in Colossians αἰσχρολογία was integrated from the popular moral ethical streams of the contemporaneous Hellenistic culture.

E. Conclusion – The Septuagint and Colossians E. Conclusion – The Septuagint and Colossians

My comparative studies of the virtues and vices of Col 3:5, 8, 12, 14 have yielded results which point to a strong lexical correspondence between Colossians and the LXX and other NT texts. I observed a frequent attestation of the ethical terms of Colossians 3 in LXX passages which present ethical reality through the paradigmatic moral binary motif of the Righteous and the Wicked in a Two Way pattern of thought, and the concept of the character of God. I also noted several connections indicated a strong likelihood for the provenance of at least three of the Colossian terms in the ethical sayings of Jesus. In my study of the virtues, I discovered that all of the terms had strong connections to the two-fold pattern of both the character of God, and the character of the Righteous in the LXX and NT. This is compared to the absence of the majority of the Colossian virtue terms in the Hellenistic sources as I observed in chapters 2–5. Therefore, I can now say, regarding the Colossian virtues, that there is a definite correspondence between the terms used to describe the character of the Righteous in the OT, and the character of God and Christ in the Old and New Testaments and the virtue terms in Colossians. The ethical content of these categories inform the virtue terms which were used in Col 3:12, 87

1 Cor 11:6; Eph 5:4 (αἰσχρότης); Eph 5:12 (αἰσρχος).

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14 to describe the character of the New Man and provide us with a unique lexical clue which links the author’s ethical terms to a particular, antecedent, and traditional Jewish stream of thought in contrast to the terms’ non-attestations in contemporaneous Hellenistic ethical streams. In the case of the Colossian vices, five of the eleven terms in Col 3:5, 8 (namely, ἀκαθαρσία, ἐπιθυµὶα, κακός, ὀργή, θυµός) were frequently found in connection with LXX texts which presented reality in terms of the Two Way category of the Wicked. In addition to this connection to the LXX Two Way tradition, I determined that the author of Colossians must have felt free (especially in the case of πάθος and αἰσχρολογία) to update or supplement his inherited Two Way tradition incidentally with new vices which were popular amongst the philosophers of the Hellenistic culture of his time and commensurable with his own received and transformed ethical tradition. The term εἴδωλολατρία, while having a definite OT precedent as a key element of the Ten Commandments, was equally, or primarily, accessible to the author from the orally transmitted traditions of the sayings of Jesus himself. This was also the case, I argued, concerning the words πορνεία, πλεονεξία, and βλασφηµία, on account of their attestation in the NT ethical sayings of Jesus, and their relative absence and sparseness respectively in the texts of both the LXX and the Hellenistic sources of chapters 2–5. Our next task will be to trace these words, themes, and concepts through two sources of Jewish background in Philo and Ben Sira in chapter 7 in order to determine if these patterns are attested elsewhere and in a similar fashion in other Jewish texts.

Chapter 7

Philo, Ben Sira and Colossians A. Philo A. Philo

1. General Introduction to Philo and His Writings Philo’s works provide us with a Hellenistic-Jewish corpus with which to compare the lexical and philosophical writings of Colossians. As a loyal, but thoroughly Hellenized Jew writing from the equally thoroughly Hellenized Alexandria in the early first century C.E. (Philo was born circa 15 B.C.E. and died circa 50 C.E.), we have in Philo a prime, indeed, the prime example of what happens when Jewish religion and identity become overtly governed and in many ways entirely reinterpreted through Hellenistic philosophies and ethical conceptualities. 1.1. Philo as Exemplar of a Truly Hellenized Jew Philo resided in Alexandria amongst a community and in continuity with a segment of Judaism which, while retaining a high degree of “Jewish loyalty”1 in their traditions, customs, and sacred texts (albeit in their Greek translation), had, to a large extent, fused their Judaism with Hellenistic philosophy and culture, thus creating a new, contextualized, Jewish social experience and hermeneutic. For Philo and his fellow Alexandrians this connection to their Jewish roots was based on much more than empty tradition and sentimentality. Indeed, in a city such as Alexandria in which the Jews occupied a lower social status than resident Greeks, fidelity to ancestral customs and religion was a catalyst and source for social identity formation and even for survival.2 However, this commitment to deliberate cultural distinction also came with a high cost as is evidenced by the content of Philo’s own writings, which describe a massive pogrom against the Jews during 38 C.E. in Alexandria in which Jews were stoned, killed (Flacc. 64–66), made to eat swine’s flesh (Flacc. 96), and in some cases even burned en masse (Flacc. 68). Despite these severe persecutions, Philo and the Jewish community at Alexandria continued in the faith of their 1 Samuel Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 15. 2 Alan Mendelson, Philo’s Jewish Identity (BJS 161; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 22, 24.

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fathers. Yet, they did so in a way that newly utilized the best of Hellenistic philosophy in which they were undoubtedly culturally immersed. Furthermore, not only did they continue to live as Jews in Alexandria but they actually considered it their homeland. From their “patria,” Alexandria, they expressed a love and desire for the message of salvation to benefit all of mankind through the God of Israel. This is demonstrated by Philo’s offer of prayers “for the whole universal race of mankind. . .” (Spec. 1:148; cf. 2:167), and their acceptance of proselytes.3 Therefore, Philo was in no way a separatist, and, on the contrary, he should be considered a universal particularist, believing that the world would be blessed through worship of the God of Israel alone, and exclusively through the wisdom of the Law. Schenk explains Philo’s position well which is that, “the particular laws of the Torah were universal truths that were applicable to people of every race.”4 This desire to universalize the teachings of Judaism for a broader Hellenistic audience, and to reinterpret Scriptural teachings and traditions through the medium and infusion of Hellenistic philosophy is evident throughout Philo’s entire literary corpus. For example, while Philo holds to an extremely high view of Scripture (QG. 3:1), his interpretation of Scripture essentially subordinates (but doesn’t ignore) the literal meaning of the text beneath the higher, intellectual, allegorical, hermeneutical quest for ethical and philosophical truths (Conf. 190). As Winston has stated, “Philo seeks assiduously to retain the terminology and idiom of his biblical text” but transposes “its teaching into a philosophical key.”5 This is achieved by turning narratives into “accounts of universal personality traits, and divine commandments into norms of virtue that are rational, rather than being divine demands and prohibitions.”6 The extent to which Philo was consciously reading Hellenistic philosophy into the texts, or subconsciously viewing himself as extracting these philosophical points from the texts is a matter of ongoing debate. Runia7 3 Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time (NovTSupp 86; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 249. Borgen notes that this particular universalism is also evident in Josephus (Ag. Ap. 2:261). Contra Erwin R. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), 130, 131, 133. 4 Kenneth Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 50. 5 David Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Hellenistiches Judentum in römischer Zeit: Philon und Josephus. Part 2, Principat, 21.1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), 138. 6 Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 25. 7 David T. Runia, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist?: A Difficult Question Revisited,” The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, ed. David T. Runia (Volume 5; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 129; cf. George E. Sterling, “Platonizing Moses: Philo and Middle Platonism,” The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, ed. David T. Runia (Volume 5; Atlanta: Scholars Press 1993), 103, 111.

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argues that Philo views his allegorical interpretation as an “explication” of the actual content of the text, and not as a foreign “imposition” thus suggesting that Philo thought that these ideas were inherent in the texts themselves, while Winston8 views Philo as consciously and purposely “infusing the biblical text” with Platonism. Whichever view is most correct concerning Philo’s interpretive disposition, what is indisputable is that the result of Philo’s allegorical exegesis is undeniably Hellenistic, and specifically, and to a large extent Middle Platonic and Stoic. He frequently idealizes biblical figures into the apathetic model of the allwise and virtuous Stoic sage. Thus, Moses is described as one who has “bound the reins” of temperance and fortitude (Mos. 1:25), and who as unique lawgiver, king, priest, and prophet displays “eminent wisdom and virtue” (Mos. 2:3, 10). Likewise, the Patriarchs are described as living “irreproachably and admirably” (Abr. 4) and Noah is described as perfect and one who possesses all of the virtues (Abr. 34). Lastly, the figure of the High Priest is idealized to the point of being described as bordering between Deity and humanity (Spec. 1:115–16). As a general hermeneutical principle, Philo sees the Patriarchs as “incarnations of the Unwritten Law of Nature,”9 which exist as moral examples for the Jews and the world to follow toward the path of virtue. However, it was not only biblical figures that captivated Philo’s apologetic and Hellenizing influence, but also Jewish customs and traditions which were recast through the hermeneutic of Hellenistic philosophy. The synagogue, for example, is described by Philo as a kind of Jewish philosophical school in which ethical progress is made through contemplation and learning on the Sabbath. He refers to synagogues as the “schools of wisdom, and courage, and temperance, and justice, and piety, and holiness, and every virtue. . .” (Mos. 2:216) in which the Jews cultivated their “National Philosophy” (Legat. 155), and where the Jewish populace would learn how to “improve in virtue,” in order that they might be made better “both in their moral character and in their conduct through life” (Mos. 2:215). The synagogue, then, was both a key element of Jewish social identity, and, according to Philo, a specifically Jewish location for the appropriation of a Jewish brand of Hellenistic philosophy. In his writings, an apologetic tone is often discernible, and Philo goes to great lengths to explain seemingly arbitrary elements of the Jewish faith and tradition in order that they might be more appealing to Hellenistic Jews, and likely to potential Gentile converts. In Spec. 4:108–109 Philo explains that the Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” 143; cf. R. Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics, Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Hellenistiches Judentum in römischer Zeit: Philon und Josephus. Part 2, Principat, 21.1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), 437. 9 Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 87. 8

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prohibitions relating to animal hooves are derived from an allegorical meaning in which the hooves represent approaches to virtue and vice. Elsewhere, he seeks to explain circumcision in terms of its manifold significances including: its benefit to physical health and cleanliness (Spec. 1:4–5), its metaphorical symbolism as a bodily object of generation which represents the heart as the generative organ of thoughts (Spec. 1:6), its benefit to successful procreation due to the more efficient flow of seminal fluid from the circumcised organ (Spec. 1:7), and the metaphorical representation of the cutting away of the passions (Spec. 1:9). Relatedly, Philo is also eager to explain the apparently embarrassing instances of divine anthropomorphisms which occur through the Scriptures. This is a reoccurring phenomenon throughout his literary corpus. In Decal. 32–36 Philo explains to the reader that the manner in which God is speaking is not through a mouth, or a “windpipe” as a man, but (oddly) through “an invisible sound” which was “created in the air” and which was a “rational soul. . .which fashioned the air and stretched it out and changed it into a kind of flaming fire” which resulted in God’s voice creating a sound like “a breath passing through a trumpet” for the benefit of those at a distance. For Philo it was important that his Greek and Hellenistic Jewish readers knew that, by no means was God speaking through a human wind-pipe (for that would be ridiculous!) but rather, when God spoke, he was speaking by means of the much more convincing air-stretching, fire-breath which passed through a metaphorical trumpet. On other occasions, his reasoning is less fantastical but simply notes that God doesn’t really: “live” in the Garden, “breathe” like a man (Leg. 1:43–44), or take oaths (Sacr. 93). This desire to rationally and reasonably explain the Scriptures even spills over to a discernible discomfort with supernatural and mythological texts. For example, when describing the miraculous scene from Exod 17:1–7 in which Moses strikes a rock which gives water, Philo conjectures that it might be due a spring previously concealed beneath it, as well as a possible miraculous infusion of water channels. In these cases, it is easy to detect Philo’s desire to recast the Jewish Scriptures in terms that would be acceptable to his Alexandrian readers. This liberalizing spirit and desire to Hellenize the Jewish message is also visible in Philo’s “flexible” approach to the purpose, nature, and protocol for Jewish rituals (such as Passover) which he held to be important to retain but was not dogmatic about in terms of distinctive rubrics, and which seemed to hold their primary level of importance for him in terms of their inner intent as the outworking of piety.10

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Mendelson, Philo’s Jewish Identity, 64.

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1.2. Philo as a Philosophically-Eclectic Hellenistic Jew In addition to exhibiting Hellenizing tendencies in his hermeneutical methods and results in a general manner, Philo also makes overt use of the philosophies of Platonism, Stoicism, Aristotelianism, and Neo-pythagoreanism. As I have mentioned previously, scholars disagree as to whether Philo’s writing involved the conscious insertion of Greek philosophy into the biblical text, or, rather, subconscious eisegesis in which the interpretive results are perceived as the true exegetical fruit of allegorical exegesis. Sandmel states that: By resorting to the use of allegory, he is enabled to read Platonic and Stoic ideas into Scripture. But Philo would never have admitted to reading Plato into Scripture; he would have insisted that the Platonism and Stoicism came out of Scripture.11

Barraclough believes that what we experience in Philo’s texts is actually consistent with a larger scale, philosophical fusion that was in the midst of unfolding in Alexandria. He writes: By the first century A.D. there had been a fusion of thought from the major philosophies of which we find ample evidence in Philo’s own writings. Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean, Pythagorean and other streams of ideas clashed or intermingled in this city. . .12

Cohen articulates his assessment of Philo’s ethical influence in a slightly different way, agreeing with Winston and citing his description of Philo’s ethical philosophy as: “a highly Stoicized form of Platonism, streaked with Neo-Pythagorean concerns.”13 Similarly, Sterling perceives in Philo traces of “Platonic, Stoic, and Neo-pythagorean traditions,” 14 while Long characterizes Philo’s project as being influenced largely by “an amalgam of Platonism and Stoicism.” 15 Lastly, Goodenough is correct in assessing the philosophical mixed bag in Philo, by arguing that the philosophical systems which we find in Philo do not provide us with “a coherent account” of his philosophy and thus his philosophical system must be “pieced together from disjointed and passing allusions which frequently contradict one another.”16 However, Goodenough’s Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 28. Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics,” 438. 13 Naomi Cohen, “The Jewish Dimension of Philo’s Judaism: An Elucidation of de Spec. Leg. IV 132–150,” JJS 38 (1987): 165–186, 165. 14 George E. Sterling, “The Queen of the Virtues: Piety in Philo of Alexandria,” The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, ed. David T. Runia and Gregory E. Sterling (Volume 18; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature 2006), 118. 15 Anthony A. Long, “Allegory in Philo and Etymology in Stoicism: A Plea for Drawing Distinctions,” in The Studia Philonica Annual: Wisdom and Logos - Studies in Jewish Thought in Honor of David Winston, ed. David T. Runia and G.E. Sterling (Volume 9; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 198. 16 Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 134. 11 12

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assertion that, on the basis of Philo’s eclecticism, he is therefore not a systematic thinker, does not follow from the premise of eclecticism. For, the mere fact that Philo is eclectic does not prove that his thought does not follow a logical pattern, but rather demonstrates that Philo’s pattern is precisely his own, and thus an amalgamated and variegated but somehow discernible and syncretistic pattern. A four-fold influence of Greek philosophical streams is present in Philo. The two major schools which occupy the primary governing force for Philo are Platonism and Stoicism,17 with Platonism being the most frequent and consistently occurring philosophical school.18 In fact, the eclecticism of Middle Platonism itself, which contained elements of Stoic and Pythagorean philosophy, may account for some of these varying streams in Philo, rather than an eclecticism which is derived from Philo himself. Secondarily, an influence of Aristotelian and Neo-pythagorean philosophies which Philo takes up randomly, sometimes, as Goodenough has pointed out, contradict other ethical systems which he articulates elsewhere, or even in the context of the same discourse. Philo’s indebtedness to Hellenistic philosophy has been well demonstrated, and is in fact so broadly accepted and recognized that I will not belabor the point here. I will, however, briefly offer a few examples of Hellenistic philosophy that I discerned from my own reading of the Philonic corpus. In terms of his use of Stoic philosophy, we find passages such as Leg. 3:130, 144 in which Philo is clearly influenced by the Stoic doctrine of a complete eradication of the passions. Relatedly, the Stoic idealization of the rural life is evident in Decal. 2, among endless other passages which reveal a Stoic flavor of philosophical influence.19 However, despite Philo’s common use of Stoic philosophy, he, like Paul, shows himself to be out of step with the Stoics in at least one element, namely, the attribution of the quality of ἔλεος (“mercy, pity”) to God which Winston points out with reference to Philo in The Ancestral Philosophy, would be considered by the Stoics to be a “λύπη or distress,” that is,

So too Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 28, 89. Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics,” 441; Roberto Radice, “Observations on the Theory of the Ideas as the Thoughts of God in Philo of Alexandria,” in The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism: Heirs of the Septuagint: Philo, Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity, ed. David T. Runia (Volume 3; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1991), 133; Kenneth Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 89; David T. Runia, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist?: A Difficult Question Revisited,” in The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, ed. David T. Runia (Volume 5; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 125; David Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism, ed. Gregory E. Sterling (BJSSPM 4; Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2001), 198. 19 Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy, 162, points us to several others, including: Abr. 201–204; Fug. 166–67; Somn. 1.160; Ebr. 8; Congr. 36; Det. 46; Mut. 1. For Moses: Leg. 3.128–34, 140–47; QG 4.177; QE 1.15; Migr. 67. 17 18

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“one of the four primary passions,” and thus a vicious trait.20 Likewise, in addition to Philo’s deviation from pure Stoic doctrine, we find ample evidence which is not emphasized sufficiently in the secondary literature on Philo of a definite Aristotelian strand of influence. As Winston has pointed out, this Aristotelian strand necessarily contradicts passages which argue from a Stoic view of the passions because the Peripatetic philosophical position, unlike the Stoics, “did not involve complete elimination of irrational emotions, but only their moderation and control.”21 In Philo, evidence of Aristotelianism is frequent and obvious. Philo utilizes many of the key terms associated with Aristotle’s ethical system, such as the doctrine of the mean and eudaemonia (Virt. 204). Philo overtly speaks of an ethic of the middle way (τὸ δὲ µέσον) and grieving in a moderate degree (µετριοπαθεῖν) in Abr. 257.22 Elsewhere he speaks of “keeping a middle path (µέσην ἀτραπὸν) between the two courses,” and “mingling the excesses which are found at each extremity with moderation (τῇ µέσῃ), which lies between the two, so as to produce an irreproachable harmony and consistency of life” (Spec. 4:102). He uses the illustration of the “middle road” in Spec. 4:168 and Post. 102, and exhorts his readers to travel “along the middle (τῇ µέσῃ) of it [the royal road]; for any deviation in either direction is blameable, as that on the one side has a tendency to excess and that on the other side to deficiency (Deo 162).”23 In addition to these obvious examples of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, we find in Philo the use of the Aristotelian term ἐνέργεια and, unlike the word’s appearance in Gal 5:16, it occurs here within the context of an overt Aristotelian philosophical teaching.24 Similarly, we find Philo in Leg. 2:37 using two Aristotelian key ethical terms, namely ἕξις (“habit”) and ἐνέργεια (“energy”), in a passage which clearly utilises an Aristotelian underlying ethical conceptuality. Lastly, of all the Hellenistic philosophical influences on Philo, the least frequent, but still significant, is Neo-pythagoreanism. This can be observed in passages such as Opif. 48 and Spec. 2:200 in which Philo makes arguments based heavily on numerical philosophy, a central element of Neopythagoreanism.25 Thus, I have argued that within the texts of Philo himself a clear and indisputable picture of a Jewish contemporary of the author of Colossians who is significantly, centrally, and directly influenced by Hellenistic ethical streams, and who shows himself in this respect to be entirely unlike the author of Colossians, whose governing ethical patterns are far less easily discerned, and Winston, The Ancestral Philosophy, 189. Ibid., 403. 22 All of the following examples are the result of my own original research. 23 My emphasis. 24 Leg. 1:56. 25 This presence of Neopythagorean ideas in Philo is also recognized by Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics,” 443; although the examples above are the result of my own research. 20 21

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whose lexical terms and ethical concepts are, as I have shown, more often than not contrary to or absent from those systems (Stoic, Peripatetic, and Cynic) which he has often been claimed to have been employing in his ethical texts. When we compare this with the ethical conceptuality which we find in Colossians, it becomes clear that, whatever the influence of Hellenism on the author of Colossians, it is undoubtedly of a less direct and governing sort. One can easily make the case that both the author of Colossians and Paul were not Stoics, or Platonists, but this is essentially impossible to do with Philo given the absolute centrality of Hellenistic philosophy to his entire worldview and scriptural hermeneutic. However, this is not to say that Philo and the author of Colossians, despite their vast differences in direct engagement and influence in Hellenistic ethics, have nothing in common. In fact, although they sometimes use different terminology, and distinct underlying patterns of thought, there are several themes and motifs which emerge conceptually and lexically which are functioning in a similar manner for both thinkers. Before concluding with my comparative lexical study, I will engage in an excursus on one of these similarities, namely the common usage of the clothing metaphor to express ethical realities in Colossians and Philo. 2. Excursus – The Use of Clothing Metaphors to Express Ethical Realities In Col 3:10 we find the verb ἐνδύω used to construct the metaphor of being clothed in the virtues wherein the believers are described as having put on “the new man which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of the one who created him” (ἐνδυσάµενοι τὸν νέον τὸν ἀνακαινούµενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ᾽εἰκόν τοῦ κτίσταντος αὐτόν).26 This is followed, in Col 3:12, by the imperatival exhortation to “Put on” (Ἐνδύσασθε) the Colossian virtues.27 Relatedly, a similar usage of ἐνδύω can be observed in the LXX, in the context of ethical clothing metaphors in which the characters are symbolically “putting on” a variety of abstract character traits and realities such as: “salvation” (2 Chr 6:41; Isa 61:10), “righteousness” (Ps 132:9, 16; Job 29:14; Wis 5:18; Sir 27:8), “strength” and “dignity” (Prov 31:25; Job 39:19; Isa 52:1; Sir 17:3), and “wisdom” (Sir 6:31). Ἐνδύω is also used to refer to a metaphorical 26 For an excellent scholarly treatment of the topic of the clothing metaphor in Colossians see Canavan, Clothing the Body of Christ at Colossae. 27 Cf. Eph 4:24 where the believers are exhorted to “put on the new man” (καὶ ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον). Cf. Rom 13:12, where believers are exhorted to put on “the armor of light” (cf. Eph 6:11, 14, where it is the “armor of God” and its constituent parts; cf. 1 Thess 5:8), and Rom 13:14 (cf. Gal 3:27), which speaks of the believers “putting on” of “the Lord Jesus Christ.” Similarly, in 1 Cor 15:53–54, ἐνδύω is used to explicate the concept of the resurrection body in terms of a formally perishable body “putting on” that which is imperishable and immortal.

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clothing in vices such as: “shame/dishonor” (1 Macc 1:28; Pss 35:26; 109:29; 132:18; Job 8:22), “cursing” (Ps 109:18), and “despair” (Ezek 7:27). Finally, the LXX exhibits occasions of the metaphor being used with reference to the clothing of the Lord, as a means of articulating divine character traits such as his: “majesty and strength” (Ps 93:1; cf. Isa 51:9), “honor and majesty” (Ps 104:1), and his “righteousness” (Isa 59:17). We also find this biblical motif and use of ἐνδύω in Philo. In Fug. 110, Philo describes the mind (διάνοια) of the wise man as clothed with the virtues, and the living God as clothed with “the word as with a garment.” This idea of being clothed with the virtues in Fug. 110 is essentially equivalent to the usage of the metaphor in Col 3:12, thus connecting the author of Colossians with both a popular, metaphorical literary clothing motif in the LXX, and with another contemporary Jewish writer who makes use of precisely the same concept. Perhaps it is most important to point out that this clothing metaphor, which makes use of the verb ἐνδύω, occurs only one time in our surveyed Hellenistic sources. The metaphorical use of ἐνδύω does not occur at all in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, or in any of the writings of Epicetus, Dio Chrysostom, or Musonius Rufus.28 The one seemingly metaphorical usage of ἐνδύω in any of our surveyed Hellenistic texts occurs in Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 4.3. There “dignity” is spoken of as metaphorical clothing. Every other time that the word occurs (e.g., Lives, 2.5, 8; 8.2; Epictetus Diss. 1.16; 4.1) it is clearly in a reference to the literal wearing of clothes. Therefore, the ἐνδύω clothing metaphor itself becomes yet another link which situates the ethical thinking in Colossians within the reception of ethical streams and traditions which were popular, and are lexically well-documented in Judaism, the LXX, and a contemporaneous Jewish ethical thinker, namely, Philo. This phenomenon is also true when it comes to the verb περιβάλλω (“to put on, clothe”), which covers the same semantic domain as ἐνδύω, and which, although not used in Colossians, is used in the NT in Rev 3:5 to refer to the white garments of “the one who conquers” whose name will never be blotted from the Book of Life, and again in 19:8 to refer to the metaphorical clothing of the church as a Bride in the “fine linen, pure and white” which represent the “righteous deeds of the saints.” Likewise, the LXX exhibits a high attestation of περιβάλλω in metaphorical clothing metaphors such as those in which the wicked person is clothed in: “scorn and disgrace” (Ps 71:13), “violence” (Ps 73:6), “cursing” (Ps 109:18–19), or “shame” (Ps 109:29; cf. Mic 7:10). The verb is found, several times, within the same verse, and in conjunction with ἐνδύω such as in Isa 59:17 in which God is described as being metaphorically “wrapped/clothed” in “fury.”29 This word is also used in the context of ethical clothing metaphors in Philo in Agr. 61 where Neither does it occur in the writings of Plato. It is also combined with ἐνδύω in Ps 108:18–19, 29 (quoted above) in an ethical clothing metaphor. 28 29

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the virtuous person is “endowed/clothed with prudence,” and in Mos. 2:6 in which a person is spoken of as being “clothed with happiness and honor.” However, it is crucial to point out that, as I discovered was the case with ἐνδύω, a detailed lexical/conceptual comparative search reveals that περιβάλλω is not used in this metaphorical/ethical sense in any of our selected Hellenistic sources including, in addition, the entire corpus of Plato. The metaphor then, whether governed by περιβάλλω or ἐνδύω can be strongly tied to a specifically Hellenistic Jewish ethical stream over against non-Jewish Hellenistic ethical streams. 3. Lexical Study of the Virtue and Vice Terms of Colossians and the Works of Philo 3.1. Virtue terms Regarding the virtues, I find quite a few instances of lexical attestation in Philo that we did not find in the Hellenistic sources. While both σπλάγχνον and οἰκτιρµός are both unattested in Philo, the related verbal form οἰκτίρω occurs 3 times and in each case, God is the subject, thus establishing the connection which we find in Colossians and the LXX of “compassion” as an attribute of God’s character. In Migr. 122, God is spoken of as having pity on his creatures on the basis of the remainder of a small amount of virtue within them, and it is used in conjunction with the verb ἐλεέω (“to have pity, mercy”) which while being a vicious Stoic passion, is an element of God’s character for Philo, Paul, and Colossians. Likewise, in Fug. 95 and Virt. 91, it indicates the activity of God’s merciful power. Χρηστότης, which occurs 9 times, is considered an attribute of God30 as well as a general and commended virtue of human beings.31 The related adjectival form χρηστός is used to describe the idealized ethical sage Moses (Leg. 3:215), the Law (Spec. 2:82), and as an attribute of God (Det. 46, 146; Mut. 253; Abr. 203). While ταπεινοφροσύνη never occurs, its related adjectival form ταπεινός can be used as both a virtue and a vice in Post. 47, 79. In Her. 29 (cf. ταπεινόω in Post. 48; Fug. 207) the person who is ταπεινός (“humble”) is portrayed as one who exhibits a virtuous posture of surrender to God instead of trust in self, while on other occasions it carries the very common negative Hellenistic meaning of baseness or lowness.32 It can also refer to people who are of financially and socially humble circumstance without any moral weight either way. 33

Leg. 3:73; Migr. 122; Praem. 166. Sacr. 27; Mos. 1:249; Spec. 2:141; Virt. 84; Legat. 73. 32 Deus 167; Leg. 3:18, 84, 134; Ebr. 128; Spec. 3:1; Det. 13, 16; cf. ταπεινόω in Post. 46, 74; Fug. 1; Ios. 150; Spec. 4:88. 33 Post. 109; Agr. 61; Ios. 144; Mos. 1:31; 2:241; Decal. 61; Spec. 2:106; Prov. 32:1. 30 31

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Likewise, the related noun ταπεινότης is used to express that which is essentially “lesser” in terms of a contrast between the lowliness of earthly things as compared with heavenly things (Leg. 3:214; cf. Post. 136), or to express the “insignificance and nothingness of the creature” as compared with the “excessive perfection and pre-eminent excellence in all good things of the uncreated God (Congr. 107; cf. ταπεινόω in Sacr. 62).” The form πραΰτης is not found in Philo, but the related adverbial form πραως occurs 9 times, referring to a mildness, gentleness which is the outworking of a due regard for law and the basis of a hope in God’s favor (Opif. 81), and as an attribute of God (Det. 146; Migr. 101). Μακροθυµία finds no attestation in Philo, but this is perhaps due to the fact that to convey the concept of blessedness or happiness he preferred the more common Hellenistic term εὐδαιµονία which occurs 81 times in the Philonic corpus but never in the NT. This could, perhaps, be an example of where the extent of Philo’s indebtedness to Hellenistic ethics overshadows a more biblicallyrooted term which covers an overlapping semantic domain. While the biblical writers opt for the term with scriptural precedence (µακροθυµία), Philo opts for the term which was far more common in Hellenistic ethical streams (εὐδαιµονία). The key Colossian virtue ἀγάπη appears twice in Philo and is used in reference to the definition of piety as the love of God (Deo 69). The verbal form, ἀγαπάω can mean simply to “love”, as in to “like a great deal” or “prefer”, such as: loving one wife but hating another (Leg. 2:48; Sacr. 19; Sobr. 21-23; Her. 49), loving/delighting in peace (Congr. 41), loving disorder (Congr. 109), loving virtue (Her. 44), and loving solitude (Abr. 22; cf. Abr. 87). It can also express “love” as “contentment” with something, such as: loving/contenting oneself with the Scripture which nourishes the soul (Leg. 3:176), being content to be the slave of a wise man (Leg. 3:193), being content with one’s wife (Cher. 72), and being content with the middle path in between excess and deficiency (Mut. 227). However, Philo’s use begins to approach the expansion of this term, and its connection with the character of God by his use of ἀγαπάω to describe God’s love for Israel (Migr. 60) and to express the idea that God chastises the one whom he loves (Congr. 177). Similarly, we read about Abraham’s love for Isaac (Somn. 1:195) and the general “law of benevolence,” which “enjoins every man to love and cherish a stranger in the same degree with himself” (Virt. 103-104). While it is impossible for a non-Christian writer to use ἀγάπη in the full Christian sense since its definition is governed by the love of God for the world through Jesus Christ his Son, it is notable that Philo transcends the Hellenistic use of the word group which essentially uses it to express a “strong liking or preference” for something or someone, and aligns himself with the septuagintal use of the term as a virtue which is indicative of the character of the Righteous and the character of God.

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It is essential to note at this point that, in every case (except for µακροθυµία) the Colossian virtues, which we discovered had a high degree of correspondence with the character of the Righteous and the character of God in the LXX, and which, on the other hand, exhibited a high degree of lexical absence in the Hellenistic sources, are all used to express both human virtue (i.e. righteous character) and divine character (i.e. the character of God) by Philo. In fact, the only other small exception to this definite correspondence is the fact that the Colossian virtue ταπεινοφροσύνη (which does not occur in Philo), when it occurs in its related form ταπεινός in Philo, only refers to human characters, and not to the character of God. Therefore, my study of the virtues in Philo confirms and further highlights a group of words which are largely absent in the Hellenistic ethical sources, but central to two Hellenistic Jewish writers on the basis of their prior centrality and attestation in the Jewish traditions and the LXX. 3.2. Vice terms As we turn to my lexical study of Philo’s use of vice terms which appear in Colossians, I note again the fact that the terms ὀργή, θυµός, ἐπιθυµὶα, and κακός are ubiquitous across the entire ethical spectrum of Greco-Roman philosophy. For example, the stock Greek words for evil κακία and κακός occur 280 times and 471 times respectively in Philo. As expected ὀργή occurs frequently (70x) in Philo both as a justified element of God’s character when he is portrayed as being angry at sinful behavior, not in a vicious way, but in accordance with reference to his role as lawgiver,34 and in the justified anger of righteous men.35 As I have observed in chapter 3, there is a concept of righteous anger that is not vicious in the biblical texts as well. The word is also used in Philo to refer to the passion of unjustified, vicious anger in human beings.36 Likewise, the term θυµός is used to describe angry feelings which, however, are not technically considered vicious because they are properly governed by reason,37 and as a reference to God’s righteous anger;38 a usage which we also

Opif. 156; Somn. 1:89, 235–36; 2:179; Mos. 1:6; Gig. 17; Deus 52, 60, 71. Fug. 90; cf. Somn. 2:7 “just indignation”; Ios. 154; Mos. 1:302; 2:279; Spec. 3:126; 4:14, 77, 182. 36 Leg. 2:8; 3:147; Sacr. 96; Deus 68; Agr. 17; Ebr. 223 (with θυµὸς); Conf. 48; Migr. 208, 210; Fug. 23; Somn. 2:165; Ios. 15, 21; Mos. 1:89; 2:196; Spec. 2:9, 16; 3:104, 193; 4:103, 220; Virt. 1, 150; Praem. 77 (the virtuous man here noted as one who does not indulge in anger); Prob. 45; Flacc. 182; Legat. 121, 241, 244, 254, 261, 304 (used of the Emperor Gaius), 366; cf. ὀργίζω Leg. 3:114, 123, 131; Ebr. 210; Somn. 2:137; Prob. 144; Legat. 304; Her. 64. 37 Leg. 3:123–24, 127–28, 136–37; 4:10, 92–93. 38 Gig. 17; Deus 52, 60, 70–72 (“metaphorical” anger); Somn. 1:235; cf. θυµόω; Deus 51, 70, 72. 34 35

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encountered in the LXX. In other contexts, θυµός is clearly describing an unjustified, vicious anger39 which must be eradicated (e.g. Leg. 3:129–32, 140, 147). ᾽Επιθυµὶα, which is a term that is frequently found in both LXX and nonJewish Hellenistic ethical texts, is particularly common in Philo, appearing 218 times and referring primarily to appetites which need to be tamed and cured, or irrational desires which essentially control the man who is not temperate, virtuous, or wise.40 There is a particular tie to the LXX tradition in Philo, which is not surprisingly absent from other non-Jewish Hellenistic writers, in which the verbal form ἐπιθυµέω refers to coveting, which is a central vice for all Jewish writers because of its prohibition in the Law and specifically in the Decalogue (e.g., Exod 20:17; Deut 5:21). On several occasions, Philo uses it in a context in which it is clear that he is referencing these OT texts.41 Αἰσχρολογία does not appear in Philo. 42 Likewise, although we do have some scriptural use of the term πάθος, on the basis of Philo’s obvious connection to Stoic philosophy, and on account of the clearly Stoic usage in the context of Philo’s texts, it is all but certain that his usage of the term both derives from, and accords with, the Stoic view of the passions. Πάθος, which occurs a stunning 536 times in the corpus almost always refers to vicious impulses which are opposed to reason and which must therefore be eradicated.43 The term πλεονεξία, which showed itself to be a favorite of Dio Chrysostom but which also has scriptural precedent, occurs 50 times in Philo where it is used in a similar sense to both Dio and the Scriptures as a vice which involves desiring more than one needs and/or the property of others.44 Philo, like Dio, considers it a sort of “king” of the passions, referring to it as the “most treacherous of the passions (Mos 2:186), and proclaiming “that treacherous passion” to be the “cause of all evils” (Virt. 100; cf. Contempl. 70). Therefore, thus far in my discussion of the vice terms of Colossians we have in Philo essentially remained within the patterns which I have previously noted from the LXX and in the non-Jewish Hellenistic sources. However, with regard 39 Leg. 1:73; 3:114, 116, 118, 124; Agr. 17, 73, 78, 112; Ebr. 222–23; Conf. 21; Migr. 66–68, 208, 210; Fug. 23; Somn. 2:165, 191; Ios. 10, 21, 173, 222; Mos. 1:292; Spec. 1:145– 46; 3:92, 193; Virt. 13; Praem. 59; Legat. 166. 40 Leg. 1:69, 73, 86; 2:18, 72; 3:115–16; 3:118, 148, 154, 156, 250; Cher. 33, 50, 71, 92; Det. 16, 25. 41 E.g., Leg. 3:211; Sacr. 24; Somn. 2:266; Praem. 71; Ios. 144, 216; Decal. 142; Spec. 4:78. 42 The related form αἰσχρός appears 81 times, where it predictably refers to base and shameful people and things. 43 E.g., Opif. 80–81; 103; Leg. 1:73, 106; 2:4, 6, 8–9, 11–12, 16, 28, 52, 54. 44 Leg. 3:166; Agr. 83; Her. 105; Mut. 103; Somn. 2:66; Abr. 126, 216; Ios. 30, 216; Decal. 135, 155, 171; Spec. 1:173, 204, 270; 2:43, 77, 93; 3:158; 4:5, 20, 129, 149, 158, 213, 215, 218; Praem. 15, 85, 91, 121; Prob. 78–79, 159; Contempl. 2.

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to the terms πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία, which were almost entirely absent from the Hellenistic sources, but present to a great degree in the LXX and NT, we find a notable confirmation and strengthening of this pattern of Jewish attestation through the presence of all of the terms in some form in Philo. Πορνεία occurs twice in the Philonic corpus where it refers to actual sexually immoral acts (Mos. 1:300) and in an ethical metaphor which compares vice to sexual immorality (Spec. 1:282). The related verb πορνεύω occurs 3 times and in each text it is utilized in an ethical metaphor of prostitution (Fug. 153; Spec. 1:281; cf. Prov 2:18). The substantive form πόρνη is likewise used both for the metaphorical prostitution theme45 and in actual references to a sexually immoral person.46 The substantive ἀκαθαρσία occurs 6 times and is used in reference to impure things in a metaphorical sense, such as those things which are associated with vice and passion. This is the same as the metaphorical and ethical use of the clean/unclean theme which we find in the NT. The related form ἀκάθαρτος is even more frequent, occurring 36 times in Philo, most often referring to the vices and passions as metaphorically “unclean.”47 While the form εἰδωλολατρία is not attested in Philo, the related form εἴδωλον occurs 23 times, sometimes referring to the images in the incorporeal world of intellect which we imitate (Opif. 18; Leg. 246; Abr. 163; Plant. 21), and other times referring to statues (Congr. 65; Spec. 1:25), and the negative idols and images on the mind which are associated with vice.48 Therefore, on the basis of Philo’s strong Platonic underlying philosophical conceptuality, the term can occur as a positive lexeme, but often carries the OT association with vice. This is evident in the LXX and NT but as I observed in chapters 2–5, not very frequent at all in the Hellenistic sources which we surveyed. The term βλασφηµία occurs 11 times in the Philonic corpus and can refer to either slanderous speech against other human beings49 or slanderous and impious speech against both foreign gods (Mos. 2:205) and the God of Israel.50 45 Conf. 144; Migr. 69; 224; Congr. 124; Fug. 114, 149; Mut. 205; Somn. 1:88; Decal. 8; Spec. 1:332, 344; 3:51. 46 Mos. 1:302; Spec. 1:102, 104, 280, 326; cf. πόρνος; Leg. 3:8. 47 E.g., Leg. 3:147; Det. 103; Deus 8; Conf. 167; Spec. 3:208–209; applying the uncleanness of animals to the impurity of polytheism – Migr. 69; describing people who are lovers of self rather than lovers of God, as impure, and not able to come into the purity of God – Fug. 81. 48 A negative stamp of vice on the mind – Fug. 14; False images acquired in dreams – Somn. 2:162; “Images of pleasure” – Praem. 19; “. . .all the base images which they have stamped upon their polluted souls” – Praem. 116. 49 Migr. 117; Ios. 74; Decal. 86; Flacc. 33, 35, 142; cf. βλασφηµός – Ios. 247; Legat. 141; cf. βλασφηµέω – Conf. 154; Migr. 115; Somn. 2:131; Spec. 1:53; 4:197; Legat. 169. 50 Cf. βλασφηµέω – Fug. 84; Mos. 2:206; Decal. 63.

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Interestingly, βλασφηµία, when it is used in the context of impiety to the God of Israel, can come in the form of either speech which is directly slanderous to God,51 or a debased use of the one’s speech in light of the fact that the mouth which utters slanderous words against others is the same “mouth by which the most sacred name is also mentioned” (Decal. 93). Therefore, I find that in particular, the vices πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία, which we discovered were entirely absent from the Hellenistic sources, are further tied to their Jewish origin in the LXX as indicated in chapter 6 by their positive attestation in the Philonic texts and in the text of Colossians. As I have observed, the patterns thus far of the other non-ubiquitous vices, namely, πάθος, πλεονεξία, and αἰσχρολογία have been further confirmed by their presence (or, in the case of αἰσχρολογία, its absence) the Philonic corpus.

B. Ben Sira B. Ben Sira

1. General Introduction to Ben Sira and His Writings The Wisdom of Ben Sira is a work which was originally composed by Ben Sira around “the first third of the second century B.C.E. (between 200 and 167),”52 and was likely translated into Greek by the author’s grandson around 11753 or 11654 B.C.E. It is the mainstream view, and almost unanimously agreed upon, that Ben Sira was writing from Jerusalem.55 For this reason, Ben Sira is a valuable source of an undeniably pre-Christian work of Jewish wisdom and ethics with which to compare Colossians in a lexical and conceptual study. The location of the author in Jerusalem is also ideal because it provides us with a second, pre-Christian Jewish perspective on ethics, but one which is clearly far less overtly Hellenized than the Alexandrian Judaism of Philo. It is quite clear for a number of reasons that Ben Sira is writing his wisdom literature to and for Jews, not the least of which is the fact that the original is universally agreed upon to have been composed in Hebrew. Though opinions vary, it is possible that Ben Sira was, in addition to being a scribe, also a

51 Decal. 93 – “blasphemy. For it is an impiety for any disgraceful words to be uttered by that mouth by which the most sacred name is also mentioned.” 52 James C. Vanderkam, Enoch: A Man for All Generations (SIPOT; South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 104. 53 John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 23. 54 VanderKam, Enoch, 104. 55 Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 12; VanderKam, Enoch, 104; deSilva, ““Paul and the Stoa,” 436, 454.

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priest.56 But whether one accepts this interpretation or not it is clear that Ben Sira was obviously supportive of the Jerusalem priesthood. The very fact that Ben Sira was writing on the topic of priesthood demonstrates the aim of his discourse toward a particularly Jewish audience. There seems to be at least some agreement amongst Ben Sira scholars that the author is aiming to provide young Jewish men with a means of appropriating their own particular Jewish faith and culture in the midst of the strong force of Hellenism which could potentially threaten the sociological and cultural fiber of Judaism.57 John Collins, citing J.T. Sanders refers to Ben Sira’s general approach as an “ethic of caution” which operates against and is opposed to Hellenism, such as that which is represented by “the brash entrepreneurial ethos of the Tobiads.” However, Collins keenly notes that “this did not mean that he [Ben Sira] was opposed to Hellenistic culture, or even Hellenistic commerce, if it could be combined with the traditional, reverential fear of the Lord,”58 noting that such elements as Ben Sira’s instructions concerning behavioral protocol at Hellenistic banquets show that he was “no zealous opponent of Hellenistic culture as such.”59 It has been widely perceived that the main objective of the entirety of the Wisdom of Ben Sira is to present a particularly Jewish approach to wisdom and ethics, in which wisdom is “the exclusive gift of God to Israel.”60 Wisdom in Ben Sira is itself essentially identified with the Mosaic Torah.61 It is quite clear, therefore, that on the basis of the original language of Hebrew, and the covenantal and nomistic fusion of Mosaic Torah and Wisdom that the Wisdom of Ben Sira is aimed at a Jewish audience. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which Hellenistic ideas themselves have been incorporated by the author. Some scholars, such as DiLella, find Ben Sira to be interacting with Hellenistic “thoughts and expressions as long as these could be reconciled with

56 Cf. Saul M. Olyan, “Ben Sira’s Relationship to the Priesthood,” HTR 80 (1987): 261– 86, 263; Eckhard J. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul: A Tradition Historical Enquiry into the Relation of Law, Wisdom, and Ethics (WUNT 2.16; Tübingen: MohrSiebeck, 1985), 8; Benjamin G. Wright III, Praise Israel for Wisdom and Instruction: Essays on Ben Sira and Wisdom, the Letter of Aristeas and the Septuagint (JSJSupp 131; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 103. 57 Alexander A. DiLella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, trans. Patrick W. Skehan (AB 39; New York: Doubleday, 1987), 16: “To bolster the faith and confidence of his fellow Jews, to convince Jews and even well-disposed Gentiles that true wisdom is to be found primarily in Jerusalem and not Athens, more in the inspired books of Israel than in the clever writings of Hellenistic humanism. . .”; cf. Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 29, 31. 58 Ibid., 31. 59 Ibid., 33. 60 Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period (Vol. 1 and 2; London: SCM Press, 1974), 139. 61 Ibid., 139; cf. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, 63.

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the Judaism of his day.”62 An example of this would be the perceived usage of the Greek writer Theognis, whose works on friendship, J.T. Sanders believes, are consciously and overtly taken up by Ben Sira with the intent of positively accenting his inherited Jewish teachings on friendship. 63 However, Sanders helpfully points out a methodological protocol similar to my own approach to describing incidental parallels with Hellenism in Colossians. He argues that in many instances “we must speak of Ben Sira’s unconscious use of Hellenic material, of material that has entered into the mainstream of Hellenistic thinking and speech, that is part of the “Hellenistic diffusion.”64 In other words, Sanders considers Ben Sira’s Hellenistic interaction (with the exception of the aforementioned overt usage of Theognis’ writings) to be best described by the phenomena of “echoes” of Hellenic thought as opposed to true parallels, which is a concept he attributes to Martin Hengel. Quoting Hengel, Sanders notes that in these instances “we can hardly talk here of a real influence; but rather, one should assume the transmigration of sayings from gnomic Greek thought. . .by word of mouth.”65 With the question of Ben Sira’s adoption of Hellenistic patterns of thought (or general lack thereof), the same methodology could theoretically and potentially be employed to verify or rule out Hellenistic influence that goes deeper than the mere incidental, non-programmatic, use of words, phrases, and ideas. In fact, Sharon Lead Mattila’s JBL article “Ben Sira and the Stoics: A Reexamination of the Evidence” provides a rigorous conceptual critique of Marböck and Hengel’s claim that Ben Sira has taken up Stoic philosophical ideas in order to relate the Torah to the Stoic idea of “universal Law” as a means of "universal reason" or the “λόγος.”66 Mattila has argued convincingly for a rejection of such a view on the basis of: (1) massive differences between Ben Sira’s essentially Deuteronomic teleology and ideas of providence, and the Stoics’ “more rationally coherent and far more systematic” approach,67 (2) the “the monistic structure of the Stoic universe” which she argues is at odds and is incommensurable with the traditional retributive principle as observed in Ben Sira,68 and (3) the particularly Jewish nature of the Law

62 DiLella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 16; cf. Jack T. Sanders, Ben Sira and Demotic Wisdom (SBLMS 28; Chicago: Scholars Press, 1983), 59. 63 Ibid., 30. 64 Ibid., 45. 65 Ibid., 55 quoting Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 149–50. 66 Sharon Lea Mattila, “Ben Sira and the Stoics: A Reexamination of the Evidence,” JBL 119 (2000): 473–501, 476. Cf. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 159–60; cf. Otto Kaiser, “Die Furcht und die Liebe Gottes. Ein Versuch, die Ethik Ben Siras mit der des Apostels Paulus zu vergleichen,” in Ben Sira’s God: Proceedings of the International Ben Sira Conference, ed. Renate Egger-Wenzel (DBZAW 321; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), 39–75, 41. 67 Ibid., 475. 68 Ibid., 480.

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as the Mosaic Torah which works against Stoic understandings of natural/universal law and confines wisdom to a particular people and a particular Law, namely, the people of Israel and the Law of Moses.69 Similarly, Schnabel has strongly and systematically argued against the view of overt and underlying influence of Stoic philosophy in Ben Sira, noting that: (1) The Stoic ‘law’ belongs to the realm of Stoic physics and ethics, (2) the monistic and pantheistic aspect of the Stoic cosmic law contradicts everything which Ben Sira would stand for, (3) Ben Sira’s grandson never translates ‫ תורה מצוה‬with λόγος νοῦς which Stoic physics uses predominately for the postulated cosmic law, (4) Ben Sira clearly conceives of the Torah as written (!) law which contradicts the Stoics’ concept of the cosmic law as the living totality of the world.70

Likewise, Collins has pointed out that while it is “not impossible that the Jewish wisdom books have been influenced, if only indirectly, by Greek philosophy,” in the case of Ben Sira, the center of his teaching “is still traditional Near Eastern wisdom material,” and that: “Much of it can be read as an elaboration of the teaching of Proverbs.”71 Furthermore, he notes that while “Sirach had some acquaintance with Greek literature and philosophy,” it still remains the case that “he never refers to a Greek book, or indeed to any nonbiblical book, by name.”72 James Aitken has pointed out that much of Ben Sira’s language is “biblical or can be seen as a natural outcome of reading the Bible, and yet at the same time is similar to Greek philosophical notions.”73 Thus, while noting the inevitable peripheral, incidental influence of Hellenism on Ben Sira where it was consonant or complementary to his inherited Jewish wisdom tradition, and noting one element of the internally discernible aims of his authorial intent which endeavored to provide a Jewish wisdom tradition that was comparable with the attractive in-breaking Hellenistic philosophies of the day, it is nevertheless abundantly clear that we have in Ben Sira a thoroughly Jewish, and covenantally-centered approach to wisdom in which wisdom is equated with, and/or derived from, obedience to God through the Mosaic Law. Compared with Philo, this is a much less overtly Hellenized Jewish work. Whereas Philo’s project was clearly identified as a fusion of Hellenistic philosophy and Jewish tradition and culture, there is no doubt that in his commitment to Judaism, Ben Sira is more conservative. This is especially so in his linking of wisdom with the Law, not in the Philonic sense of the Torah

Ibid., 488. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, 85. 71 Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 39. 72 Ibid., 39. 73 James K. Aitken, “Divine Will and Providence,” in Ben Sira’s God: Proceedings of the International Ben Sira Conference Durham; ed. Renate Egger-Wenzel (DBZAW 321; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), 282–301, 284. 69 70

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as a form of the universal natural law, but as the particularly Jewish, unique, source of wisdom. Although in Colossians, Wisdom and Law are not conflated in such a manner, we do see the concepts of Wisdom and Law funneled into the person of Jesus Christ and the church, his body, which is united to him by faith.74 Having already encountered the correspondence between wisdom terminology and the ethical terms in Colossians in the LXX, I will now show how these same terms continue to show strong attestation in the Wisdom of Ben Sira. 2. Lexical and Conceptual Study of Ben Sira and Colossians My comparative lexical and conceptual study of Ben Sira and Col 3:5, 8, 12– 14 has yielded results which further confirm my thesis that the choice of virtue terms in Colossians are, in large part, drawn from a continuous Jewish tradition which described the character of the Righteous person, the character of God in the Old Testament, and the person and sayings of Jesus Christ in the New Testament. The vice terms of Colossians, especially those which are not attested in the Hellenistic sources that we surveyed, are present in Ben Sira and they are used by to describe a person who is covenantally disobedient to God and thus an unwise sinner. To begin, it is significant that σπλάγχνον occurs in Ben Sira even though in both of its two appearances (Sir 30:7; 33:5) it is not used to describe the virtuous man. In Colossians it appears in a construction with οἰκτιρµός (Col 3:12; σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρµοῦ) which means literally “the bowels of compassions” and indicates deep empathetic compassion as one of the virtues which is “put on” by believers. In Ben Sira, it is used to describe the “feelings” of a man who spoils his son (30:7), and elsewhere to describe the “thoughts” of a fool (33:5). One might at first glance take this to indicate an association with vice, however, in the context the term is neutral. That is to say, there is nothing essentially negative associated with the “feelings” except that in the context in which they appear, they happen to be the “feelings” of a fool rather than those of a wise man. The feelings in and of themselves however are ethically neutral. In my survey of the Hellenistic sources we never found σπλάγχνον used in this metaphorical sense to indicate “feelings,” but instead only encountered it referring to the literal bowels or intestines of a person or animal. Therefore, its presence in Ben Sira further ties Colossians to a Jewish stream and semitic idiom which can be shown to utilize the word in reference to a metaphorical concept of inner

In Col 2:3 wisdom is presented as “in” Christ. Cf. The theme of Wisdom and Christ in the genuine Pauline epistles–Christ as the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24, 30), Christ as the telos, or the one who has fulfilled the Law (Rom 10:4), and the church as consisting of the those who through love fulfill the Law (Rom 13:8, 10; Gal 5:14) specifically by bearing one another’s burdens which he calls the Law of Christ (Gal 6:2). 74

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thoughts and feelings. Οἰκτιρµός, while occurring only one time (Sir 5:6) attributes to God “mercy” and thus further connects our Colossian virtues with terms in the Jewish tradition which were typically used with reference to the character of God. Furthermore, the related lexemes, οἰκτίρω and οἰκτίρµων, occur one time each, in Sir 36:13 and 2:11 respectively. In both cases they attribute “pity” or “compassion” to God. The Colossian virtue ταπεινοφροσύνη is not attested in Ben Sira, however a variety of other related lexemes are attested. In line with its common meaning in the texts of the Hellenistic philosophers, the ταπείν- (“humble, low, poor”) word group appears in Ben Sira at times in reference to those who are financially poor,75 or those who exhibit a “dejected mind” (ταπείνος; Sir 25:23), and to refer to the experience of being “brought low” or humiliated (ταπεινόω; 6:12; 13:8; 33:12). However, in complete contrast to the Hellenistic sources, but in concert with the recognition of humility as a virtue in the Jewish/Christian ethical streams, the word ταπείνος is also used by Ben Sira as a virtue attributed to the wise and virtuous man (Sir 3:20; 10:15; 11:1). Likewise, the verbal form ταπεινόω is used four times (Sir 2:17; 3:18; 7:17; 18:21) to describe those who are humble as those fear the Lord and thus find favor with him. Considering that “fearing the Lord” in Ben Sira is essentially equivalent with being “wise” through obedience to God through the Torah, this tells us that Ben Sira reckoned “humility” a virtue that was associated with the godly, wise, obedient man. The presence of another ethical lexeme which was not indicative of Hellenistic virtue terminology, and indeed, was most often considered a vice, serves to connect the author of Colossians to a Jewish Two Way stream which spans from the writings of the Old Testament, is attested in intertestamental Jewish writings, and finds its way directly into the ethical writings of the earliest writers of the early church and the New Testament. Πραΰτης occurs five times and in each case describes the virtuous man.76 The related form πραΰς is attested once in Sir 10:14 where it describes the “lowly/humble/meek” whom the Lord seats on thrones in the place of “the rulers,” thus indicating that meekness is a virtue which is associated with God’s favor and the character of the Righteous. Μακροθυµία, a term that is almost entirely absent from our Hellenistic sources, occurs once in Sir 5:11 where it is describing the virtuous conduct of “patience” in the act of listening and responding to communication. The related form µακρόθυµος occurs twice, once describing the character of the Righteous and wise man (Sir 1:23), and once describing the character of God (Sir 5:4). Likewise, the verbal form µακροθυµέω occurs four times and is used to describe

Ταπείνος Sir 12:5; 13:21, 22; 29:8; 35:17; ταπεινότης 13:20; ταπείνωσις 11:12; 20:11; ταπεινόω 40:3. 76 Sir 3:17; 4:8; 10:28; 36:23; and of Moses in 45:4. 75

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the character of God in Sir 18:11 and the character of the Righteous in Sir 2:4 and 29:8. Neither χρηστότης nor ἀγάπη occur in the text of Ben Sira, but the verbal form ἀγαπάω appears several times referring to our love for God77 which results in obedience to him and his ways, and which yields wisdom. Thus, although not attested in the nominal form, the αγαπ- (“love”) word group is associated with God-directed, wisdom through obedience unto virtue.78 Therefore, in sum, all but one of our Colossian virtues (χρηστότης) appears in Ben Sira. Additionally, the words that do occur include several terms (σπλάγχνον, οἰκτιρµός, ταπείνος, and µακροθυµία) which rarely occur in our selected Hellenistic sources. Likewise, with the Colossian vices, we experience a high degree of attestation, particularly with the lexemes which were largely not attested in the Hellenistic sources. Πορνεία occurs 3 times and is used in reference to sexual immorality through adultery (Sir 23:23; 26:9), and in the context of an exhortation, in which Ben Sira charges his readers to be “ashamed of sexual immorality” (41:17). Its related form πόρνος occurs twice in 23:17, referring to a sexually immoral man. It appears in the context of a discussion concerning the breaking of a marriage vow. Πόρνη occurs 2 times in 9:6 and 19:2 in reference to sexually immoral women and likely to “harlots” in particular. Next, ἀκαθαρσία, while not attested in this form, appears in the related form ἀκάθαρτος a total of 3 times. Furthermore, when it is used by Ben Sira it fits within the pattern of Jewish and Christian usage in which the term, which originally referred strictly to literal cultic impurity, is used metaphorically to utilize the concept of uncleanness in order to convey the notion of sinful or vicious behavior that is characteristic of the person who is outside of an obedient relationship of covenant faithfulness to God. In Sir 34:4, ἀκάθαρτος refers to an “unclean thing” in the context of a diatribe against dreams, and in 40:15 it is used to describe the children of the ungodly as “unclean roots.” Likewise, a reference to the “unclean tongue,” which characterizes the vicious person in 51:5, is not referring to a mouth characterized by poor dental hygiene but here too the word clearly conveys a metaphorical/ethical idea in which ἀκάθαρτος indicates a propensity to work from a vicious disposition of speech. While εἴδωλολατρία is not attested, the related form εἴδωλον occurs one time in a context in which Ben Sira is delivering a polemic against idols.79 Similarly, Sir 1:10; 2:15, 16; 7:30; 34:16; 47:8, 22. Ἀγαπάω also is used in Ben Sira to refer to: the love of danger by which men perish (3:26); God’s love for us (4:10, 14); one who loves to listen and gains knowledge (6:33); love for a son demonstrated by disciplining him (30:1); to describe how one who loves money will not be justified (31:5); and to describe Moses (45:1) and Samuel (46:13) as beloved of God. 79 Sir 30:19: “Of what use to an idol is an offering of fruit? For it can neither eat nor smell. So is he who is afflicted by the Lord.” 77 78

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while βλασφηµία is not attested in Ben Sira, the related form βλάσφηµος occurs one time in Sir 3:16 where he teaches that “Whoever forsakes his father is like a blasphemer, and whoever angers his mother is cursed by the Lord.” Therefore, all of the terms which exhibit a pattern of almost complete absence from our Hellenistic sources are attested in the Wisdom of Ben Sira albeit in a minimal quantitative degree. The ubiquitous vice term κακός occurs 26 times and the related form κακία an additional 6 times. Πλεονεξία is not attested but the related form πλεονέκτης occurs once (Sir 14:9) to describe a greedy person. Some ethical terms occur in Ben Sira in ways which can be referring to either virtue or vice. For example, ἐπιθυµὶα occurs 9 times total and can refer to “desire” in both a positive80 and a negative/vicious81 sense. This is in accord with the overall neutrality of “desire” in the LXX and NT, and specifically for our interests, in Colossians. Likewise, ὀργή (occurring 21x) and θυµός (occurring 19x) can speak of both the just wrath of God,82 and as an unjustified vice of human beings.83 Αἰσχρολογία is not attested in Ben Sira, but the terms αἰσχύνη (which occurs 11x) and its verbal form αἰσχύνω (which occurs 10x) are used to express the concept of shame. Lastly, in regard to the Colossian vices, it is notable that πάθος never occurs in Ben Sira. If, as has been suggested by Hengel and others, Ben Sira was in some way influenced by Stoic ethical thought, one would certainly expect to encounter this central, programmatic Stoic ethical lexeme within his writings. It’s absence, along with the absence of the key Stoic term ἀπάθεια suggests that, in fact, any Stoic influence on Ben Sira must be peripheral and thus not a major component of his underlying philosophical pattern of ethical thought.

80 E.g., Sir 3:29: “an attentive ear is the wise man’s desire”; 6:37: “where the desire for wisdom is granted through meditation on the statutes and commandments of the Lord”; 14:14 “desired good.” 81 E.g., Sir 5:2 the “desires” of one’s heart that should not be followed; 18:30, 31 “base desires”; 20:4; 23:5. 82 Ὀργή – Sir 5:6, 7; 7:16; 16:11; 23:16; 36:7, 9; 39:23; 44:17; 45:19; 47:20; 48:10; cf. θυµός – Sir 5:6; 18:24; 36:7; 45:19; 48:10. 83 Ὀργή – 10:18; 27:30; 28:3, 10; 45:18; cf. θυµός – Sir 1:22; 10:18; 25:15; 26:28; 28:10; 30:24; 31:30; 45:18.

Part 2 The Governing Ethical Pattern of Thought in Colossians

Chapter 8

The Ethics of the Enactment and Reception of Cruciform Love A. Introduction A. Introduction

A great deal of space and effort in this book has been devoted to demonstrating that the ethics of Colossians is not working from a strictly Aristotelian, Stoic, or Cynic pattern of thought on the basis of the findings of my comparative lexical and conceptual studies. We turn now to an exegetical treatment of Colossians in order to identify key elements in the ethical pattern of thought and to consider how they relate to the Hellenistic and Jewish texts’ patterns of thought analyzed in the past seven chapters. This chapter will show that the governing ethical pattern of thought in Colossians is rooted in the idea of the ultimate perfection of believers which is a result of their communal1 access to the wisdom and will of God through their participation in the community of the people of God in Christ, namely the church. It is through the enactment and reception of divine, cruciform love2 (which is itself the very communal bond which leads to the perfection and maturity of the individuals and the community), that the believer is thereby renewed in the ‘knowledge-of-who-God-is-in-Jesus Christ.’ Crucifomity, as it has been articulated by Michael Gorman, Richard Hays, and many others, refers to the centrality of the sacrificial love of God defined by the death of Christ

Cf. Concerning the communal life “as the locus of moral transformation” see Meeks, The Moral World of the First Christians, 86; cf. 53; Cf. Frank J. Matera, New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 250: “One of the most overlooked aspects of the New Testament’s ethical teaching is its communal dimension”; cf. 251, 252: “The ethical legacy of Jesus and Paul, then, stresses the importance of living the moral life within a community of like-minded believers. There can be no solitary believer who lives the moral and ethical life isolated from or independent of the community of faith. The moral life is lived by, and in, the church.” Cf. Patrick D. Miller, “The Good Neighborhood: Identity and Community through the Commandments,” in Character and Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown; (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 55–72, 59. 2 Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul’s Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 130–31: “faith operating effectively through love,” “faith working practically through love,” or even “faith expressing itself through love.” 1

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on the cross as a ubiquitous, governing narrative sub-structure for Paul.3 Gorman defines cruciform love as, “the narrative pattern of faith expressing itself in self-giving, others-regarding love of the crucified Messiah Jesus.”4 Thus, in adopting the term “cruciform” as an adjectival modifier to love, I am applying a frequently used term and concept in the study of the primary Pauline literature and applying it to similar patterns which have been detected within the Epistle to the Colossians.

3 Cf. Gorman, Cruciformity, 73: “Christ’s death for us both demonstrates and defines divine love.” Cf. Ibid., 176. Cf. Michael J. Gorman, “Paul and the Cruciform Way of God in Christ,” JMT 2 (2013): 64–83, 69: “the rejection of selfish exploitation of status in favor of giving action”; “the rights-renouncing, others-regarding, cruciform humility and love that are needed for existence in the Christian community,” cf. Gorman, Cruciformity, 66: “The term ‘cruciformity,’ from ‘cruciform’ (cross-shaped) and ‘conformity,’ may be defined as conformity to Jesus the crucified Messiah,” and 67: “It is participating in and embodying the cross”; cf. 48–49: “Cruciformity is an ongoing pattern of living in Christ and of dying with him that produces a Christ-like (cruciform) person. Cruciform existence is what being Christ’s servant, indwelling him and being indwelt by him, living with and for and ‘according to’ him, is all about, for both individuals and communities.” Cf. The same basic idea in Richard B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1– 4:11 (BRS 56; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), xxix: “those who are in Christ are shaped by the pattern of his self-giving death. He is the prototype of redeemed humanity.” Cf. Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., Agape in the New Testament – Volume Two: Agape in the Epistles of St. Paul, the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of St. James, St. Peter, and St. Jude, trans. Sister Marie Aquinas McNamara, O.P. and Sister Mary Honoria Richter, O.P. (London: B. Herder Book Co, 1965), 94 on what is essentially cruciformity, though he doesn’t use the word: “In his exhortation to virtue, Paul presents the Savior’s death for love as the immediate model of Christian life. The Gospel paradox holds true: because to live is to love, to live is to die.” Cf. George Lyons, “Church and Holiness in Ephesians,” in Holiness and Ecclesiology in the New Testament, ed. Kent E. Bower and Andy Johnson (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007): 238–56, 255. Cf. J. Ross Wagner, “Working out Salvation: Holiness and Community in Philippians,” in Holiness and Ecclesiology in the New Testament, ed. Kent E. Bower and Andy Johnson (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007): 257–74, 257 on the church as a community of holiness that embodies “the pattern of Christ’s self-giving love.” Cf. David G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 72 on Christian ethical decision-making as “a relational, other-regarding ethic with an essentially christological shape”; cf. 182; 221. Cf. Thompson, Clothed with Christ, 84: “Corporately and individually, Christians are to move toward the goal of ultimate conformity to Christ”; cf. 208, 214, 239: “Spirit-enabled following of Jesus’ spirit and attitude as exemplified and characterized on the cross . . .” Cf. Matera, New Testament Ethics, 107: “Jesus expresses his love for his disciples in the foot washing and thereby provides an example of the kind of love that his disciples must imitate. . .This love is Jesus’ saving death for his disciples, which finds its fullest expression upon the cross” (Emphasis mine); cf. 107, 160, 170, 174, 179: “For Paul, Christians are to imitate the self-emptying of Christ. To this extent, the Pauline notion of imitating Christ is rooted in Christ’s redemptive act rather than in specific moral or ethical examples taken from Jesus’ earthly life.” 4 Gorman, Cruciformity, 176.

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We will turn now to an exegetical study of the ethical theology in Colossians. In approaching this task, I will treat each relevant verse in the order in which it appears, drawing principles which will be built upon and clarified by the author himself and by my own exegetical analysis of his writings as this chapter progresses.

B. Col 1:9–10 – Walking, Working, and Growing in the Knowledge of God Himself B. Col 1:9–10 – Walking, Working, and Growing

The scriptural summation below constitutes a core element of the conceptuality which drives the moral vision of Colossians. My translation of the verse is as follows: 9And

so, we have not ceased praying for you, from the day we first heard about you, asking that you may be filled with the knowledge of his will by means of all spiritual wisdom and (spiritual) understanding10 in order to walk in a manner worthy of the Lord, in all scrupulous attentiveness, with the result that you bear fruit by means of every good work, and with the result that you grow because of [causal dative]/by means of [instrumental dative]/by [dative of agency] the knowledge of God.5

In the above translation the reader will notice several italicized phrases. These constitute the general trajectory of the author of Colossians’ governing ethical conceptuality as expressed through the grammatical constructions in the Greek text of Col 1:9–10. The author’s pattern of thought can be articulated in the following statement: the spiritually-imparted gift of the knowledge of God’s will leads to the living out of that will in attentive walking which results in two realities, namely: (1) the bearing of fruit by means of doing good works, which is an epexegetical unpacking of what it means to walk attentively in a manner worthy of the Lord, and (2) growth which occurs because of 6 the knowledge of God. The knowledge of God’s will leads to the walking which results in the works which act as a witness to the character of God himself. In this passage, the knowledge of God is not a primarily meant to express knowledge of doctrine, theology, or even a general knowledge of the existence of God. Rather, knowledge of God is a reference to God’s character; it is a knowledge of “whoGod-is-in-himself.” This knowledge comes about through living in accord with the divine will which is itself commensurate with the character of God. In Col 3:10, believers are described as participating in a renewal of knowledge according to the image of the Creator, namely Christ. Taken together with 1:9– 5 The translations in this chapter are original. They first appear in my book on a theology of worship. See John Frederick, Worship in the Way of the Cross: Leading Worship for the Sake of Others (Downers Grove: IVP, 2017). 6 Or, “by means of” or “by.”

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10 it becomes evident that, for the author of Colossians, a “renewal in knowledge” occurs for those in Christ in which believers are transformed and renovated in the interiority of their being and character into the image of Christ. This Christomorphic transformation (Col 3:10) is inherently communal, and it involves our active ethical and ecclesial engagement with one another in accord with the will of God.7 Grammatically, this reading of Col. 1:9–10 is easy to demonstrate. First, the prayer is made that the church might be filled with the knowledge of God’s will thus establishing that this will is the basis upon which the remainder of the prayers are built.8 Furthermore, it is important to point out that this knowledge of God’s will is “filled” in the believer by or with spiritual wisdom and understanding. Whether this is an instrumental usage of the preposition ἐν indicating the means by which the knowledge of the divine will is appropriated, or an indication of the manner with which the “knowledge of the will” is encountered is not entirely crucial. Either usage links the concepts of God’s “will” and “wisdom/understanding” together. It is clear in Colossians that wisdom is in Christ. Thus, the take-away in the larger context of the theme of “wisdom in Christ” in the epistle is that the knowledge of God’s will is appropriated to those who are in Christ by means of, or in the manner of spiritual wisdom and understanding. Since we know that, for Colossians, this wisdom is available only in Christ, this is functionally equivalent to saying that access to the filling of God’s will by the Spirit is experienced exclusively in the church through fellowship with those who are “in Christ.” This knowledge of the divine will, and its accompanying or antecedent spiritual wisdom and understanding is meant to accomplish a purpose. This much we can see without question from the author’s usage of the infinitive περιπατῆσαι without the article, which grammatically indicates the beginning of a purpose clause. Therefore, the purpose of the knowledge of God’s will is in order that we might walk in a manner worthy of the Lord. The purpose of the knowledge of God’s will is for acquiring the ability to walk in accordance with the intentions and desires of God’s will. If the purpose of the access to God’s will is the accordant walking, then we must ask: Does the author overtly reveal the result or purpose of walking in 7 Cf. George Montague T.S.M., Growth in Christ: A Study in Saint Paul’s Theology of Progress (Fribourg: St. Paul’s Press, 1961), 108 on communal growth and unity. 8 Πληρωθῆτε, a clear usage of the divine passive. So O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 20; Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 93; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 57; Margaret Y. MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians (Sacra Pagina 17; Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2000), 47; Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 174; Jerry L. Sumney, Colossians: A Commentary (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 45; Marianne Meye Thompson, Colossians and Philemon (THNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 24; Joachim Gnilka, Der Kolosserbrief (HTKNT 10.1 Freiburg: Herder, 1991 [1980]), 40.

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accord with God’s will? Indeed, he does in the form of two parallel adverbial participial phrases, both of which modify the purpose infinitive περιπατῆσαι. In the first participial phrase, the author desires that we be filled with the knowledge of God, so as to walk in a manner worthy of the Lord, “with the result that we bear fruit by means of every good work.” The adverbial participle καρποφοροῦντες here indicates result. The participle is almost certainly not a participle of attendant circumstance, as these are typically in the aorist, not the present tense. It is possible that the participle is indicating purpose,9 rather than result, in which case it would be translated “to walk in a manner worthy of the Lord . . . for the purpose of bearing fruit by means of every good work.” It is also important to acknowledge that the bearing fruit occurs by means of every good work. The preposition ἐν is functioning instrumentally, providing an explication of appropriate means by which we walk in the Lord. Αὐξανόµενοι is likewise an adverbial participle of result (or reference),10 indicating the telos of the walking in good works as an activity that results in the growth by means of 11 the knowledge of God. Indeed, the dative τῇ ἐπιγνώσει could also be taken The majority of commentators do not comment on or commit to a particular function of the participles in v. 10. However, the closest to my position is Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 22 who takes them to express means “by bearing fruit etc.” Another possibility of course is Manner: O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 23; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 48–49. Contra Murray J. Harris, Colossians and Philemon (EGGNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 32 who interprets all four participles here as attendant circumstance. As Wallace, Beyond the Basics, 640–45 notes, attendant circumstance participles are usually in the aorist tense. None of these are aorist participles. 10 So Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Colossians. No Pages. Accessed 16 June 2017. Online: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SSColossians.htm#12 (#21): “And after one has borne fruit, an increase in knowledge follows, and increasing in the knowledge of God; for as a result of eagerly accomplishing the commands of God, a person is disposed for knowledge (my emphasis). Contra O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 23. Interestingly, Barth/Blanke, Colossians,179 see a hendiadys here in which “in every good work and in the knowledge of God” modify both the “bearing fruit” (καρποφοροῦντες) and the “growing” (αὐξανόµενοι) indicating that the fruit bearing and growth occur by means of every good work and by means of the knowledge of God. This interpretation is certainly possible and in its favor it rightly interprets the dative τῇ ἐπιγνώσει as referring to the means of the growth; cf. Eduard Lohse, Colossians and Philemon: A Commentary on the Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon (Hermeneia 65; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 29 who sees growth occurring through the knowledge of God, not in the knowledge of God: “The bearing of fruit and increasing which are effected by the knowledge of God. . .” (my emphasis). Unique here is Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 97 who sees the ἐν governing both datives (that is, both παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ and τῇ ἐπιγνώσει). If this were the case, it would lend credibility to Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 22 who sees the initial prepositional phrase indicating means as a result of an instrumental ἐν. All of this supports my own view in which the dative τῇ ἐπιγνώσει indicates the instrument or means of the growth. 11 Cf. Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 29; Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 42; James D.G. Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC 12; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 72; Petr Pokorny, Colossians: A 9

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to indicate cause12 (“growing because of the knowledge of God). Both interpretations support the basic assertion that the growing is a result of the walking in good works according to God’s will. If τῇ ἐπιγνώσει is functioning causally, it would be grammatically indicating the cause of the growth, namely, the acquisition of the “knowledge-of-who-God-is-in-himself,” which comes through the enactment of the ways of his will. Acting in accordance with God’s will reveals something about who God is, and in this active living out of our faith through love we become like the God who is love. The above exegetical conclusions verify and expand upon the earlier theological and the exegetical view of Montague. He writes: . . .one grows in the knowledge of God by [indicating means] living in communion with his will, so that in Col. 1:9f. Paul asks that his readers first be filled with a knowledge of God’s will, so that through worthy living out of it, they may grow in the knowledge of God himself. Paul is in the tradition of the O.T. in which knowledge means intimate communion with the person or thing known, a commitment of one’s whole being and not merely an act of the mind.13

and The contribution of this passage is that the Christian life progresses toward a greater and more exact knowledge not only of God’s will (as was seen in 1:9) but of the mystery of God itself, summed up and revealed in Christ.14

This connection to the “knowledge-of-God-himself,” and the fact that this knowledge is revealed ultimately by and in Christ, while not explicit in this particular passage, is abundantly manifested in the epistle as a whole. It is stated plainly in several verses such as: Col 1:28 in which the teaching and proclamation about Christ leads to “perfection,” or 2:2 in which “all the riches of full assurance of understanding and the knowledge of God’s mystery” is equated by an appositional grammatical structure with Christ himself, or 2:3 in which it is stated that “in Christ” are hidden “all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” and in 3:10 where our renewal “in knowledge according to the

Commentary, trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991), 48; Sumney, Colossians, 43. 12 O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 23 - dative of reference contra T.K. Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897), 203. Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 32 argues that it is a dative of respect or local/sphere, but notes that it could also be (with Lohse) an instrumental dative. 13 Montague, Growth in Christ, 199; cf. 80: “Though the ἐπίγνωσις of God’s will is of a more elementary nature, it is nevertheless a gift of God; nurturing a life of worthy conduct, it bears fruit in an ἐπίγνωσις of God himself – clearly here a contemplative knowledge, to which the experiential living in communion with God’s will has disposed.” 14 Ibid., 85.

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image of its creator” is an overt reference to Christ.15 It is clear, then, that the motif of knowledge in Colossians is specifically referring to relational and experiential knowledge of Jesus Christ himself. Christ is the image of the invisible God (Col 1:15) and in him dwells all the fullness of deity bodily (Col 2:9). Therefore, it is most appropriate to consider the theme of knowledge of God in Colossians to be technical term that refers to knowledge of Christ as God.16 In this context, my argument thus far, that the author has specifically chosen virtues in Col 3:12–14 that are characteristics of God and Christ, makes all the more sense. For, if the governing conceptual programmatic pattern of thought of Colossians is that through the will of God, the church would walk in good works according to that will, bearing fruit and growing because of the knowledge-of-God-himself that arises from enacting the very attributes of his character, then it makes perfect sense for the author to articulate some of these characteristics (3:12–14) as a sort of blueprint for communal Christ-like transformation.

C. Col 1:28 – Everyone Perfect in Christ C. Col 1:28 – Everyone Perfect in Christ

Having established that the governing ethical conceptuality of Colossians consists of an access to the wisdom and will of God which leads to walking worthily according to that will, bearing fruit in the works of God, which testify to the knowledge of God himself, we turn now toward the telos of this trajectory, namely perfection (Col 1:28; cf. 4:12). In Col 1:28 the author “warns and teaches” the church with a goal of presenting “every person perfect in Christ.” This perfection (according to Col 3:14) is a result of the enactment and reception of cruciform love to one another as the church, and through the church to the world. Perfection is accomplished in and by means of Christ (ἐν Χριστῷ; Col 1:28).17 This perfecting love functions in Col 3:14 as the perfecting bond that unites the church into one New Humanity. Thus, the goal of Colossians can be thought of as state of perfection 15 Cf. Col 1:16 “For by him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities–all things were created through him and for him.” My emphasis. 16 Cf. Eph 4:20 “But that is not the way you learned Christ.” What is proposed to have been “learned” is Christ himself. 17 Sumney, Colossians, 109: “In Christ designates the sphere in which God perceives believers at judgment. It is also the sphere in which they conduct their lives now.” Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 236 indicates and notes with Lightfoot that it might refer to the baptized as opposed to catechumens. Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 267–68 argue that ἐν Χριστῷ refers to trust in Christ from which we can remain or depart. Contra Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 112 who argues that ἐν Χριστῷ means that one is a “Christian.”

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that is cultivated in the sphere of and by means of Christ. However, to argue that perfection in Colossians is a result of Christ the point must be made that the sphere and means of Christ’s perfecting work takes place in the sphere of and by means of the church.18 For the author of Colossians, the two concepts of Christ and his church are inseparable. We are perfected in love through the perfect self-giving love of Jesus Christ as we reciprocally encounter him and embody him in and as the church.19 Ἐν Χριστῷ refers to both the sphere of perfection (namely, the church) and the instrument by which this perfection is achieved, namely by means of Jesus Christ. These two senses of the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ are typically separated into opposing exegetical camps. Yet, they need not be considered mutually exclusive propositions. Both interpretations can be affirmed as true in the context of Colossians regardless of one’s reading of the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ. However, the locative sense (whether metaphorical or actual spacial/locational) carries the primary semantic force for ἐν Χριστῷ in Colossians. This becomes especially evident when we take into consideration Col 3:11. There we find that, after 18 Cf. Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 10: “The formula ‘in Christ’ (ἐν Χριστῷ), in Col as in the other Pauline letters, expresses that those who are ‘in Christ’ are shaped by the Christ-event, or live in the dominion of the exalted Lord. . .” and that the brothers in Christ “are the Christian brothers who, as members of the body of Christ, are drawn together into a community” (my emphasis); cf. Pokorny, Colossians, 104; cf. MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 32; 83; cf. Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 73: “Here ἐν Χριστῷ means either. . .in union with Christ. . .or. . .as a mature member of Christ’s body. . .the individual and corporate senses respectively. . .” (my emphasis). On ἐν Χριστῷ see Gorman, Cruciformity, 36: “The language is not so much mystical as it is spatial: to live within a ‘sphere’ of influence. The precise meaning of the phrase varies from context to context, but to be ‘in Christ’ principally means to be under the influence of Christ’s power, especially the power to be conformed to him and his cross, by participation in the life of a community that acknowledges his lordship,” emphasis mine; cf. 37. Sang-Won (Aaron) Son, Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology: A Study of Selected Terms, Idioms, and Concepts in the Light of Paul’s Usage and Background (Analecta Biblica 148; Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2001), 25 lists Käsemann, Flew, and Best as proponents of the view I am suggesting for ἐν Χριστῷ as referring to the church. Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (London: SCM Press, 1984), 75: “notice that this life is fundamentally a social life. We are ‘in Christ’ insofar as we are part of a community pledged to be faithful to this life as the initiator of the kingdom of peace.” 19 I wholeheartedly agree with Gorman here that this love is aimed at those “both inside and outside of the church,” Gorman, Cruciformity, 385. Cf. Spicq, Agape in the New Testament, 18, 57: “Christians owe fraternal charity first of all to one another, but their love must also be given to every human being without exception. Whenever St. Paul discusses charity, he gives it universal extension”; cf. Paul L. Lehrmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (London: SCM Press, 1963), 52. Cf. Thompson, Clothed with Christ, 139: “the apostle is not excluding love for those outside the faith in Rom. 13.8–10 (cf. Rom. 12.14–21; 1 Thess. 3.12; 5.15; Phil. 4.5; Gal. 6.10), only emphasizing the importance of love among his readers.”

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having announced that the Christians have put on the New Humanity, it is not claimed to be carried out “in which,” as if to indicate an abstract and individualistic appropriation of salvation to separated believers, but rather ὅπου, “where [my emphasis] there is not Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free but Christ is all, and in all.” The perfection of believers takes place through a people20 who are renewed in knowledge according to the image of Christ by putting on of the New Humanity21 which is in accord with Christ. In relation to this theme of corporate, communal cruciform transformation, it is significant that Col. 3:11 says that Christ will be all and “in all.” The means by which Christ is “in all” is through through the activity of faith which is love as it manifests itself in acts of reciprocal ecclesial cruciformity by those who are “in Christ,” that is, the individuals who are members of his body, the church. In this New Man, those in Christ are renewed in knowledge, not by some passive filling but by the God-enabled will, wisdom, and works which are rooted in the exercise of communal love which defines the character of God himself and is defined by the self-giving love of Christ himself, a theme which has been shown to constitute the center of the Paul’s narrative spirituality of the cross.22 We become like the God who is love by participating in his love so that through the enactment and reception of Christlike love, the church is cruciformed into the image of Christ’s suffering love with the result that he might be all and in all (Col 3:11). 20 Cf. H. Wheeler Robinson, Corporate Personality in Ancient Israel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 153 on a similar point in Ephesians: “The Apostle’s aim is to present every man perfect in Christ Jesus (Col 1:28) and thus the perfection of individuals is supposed. But Paul here does not say the goal is πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον nor ἄνδρας τελείους; the singular ἄνδρα τέλειον contrasts sharply with the οἱ πάντες, so as to underline that all are to attain to one perfect Man, who is none other than εἷς καινὸς ἄνθρωπος, ‘the new man’ of 2:15 and 4:24, namely: Christ, τέλειος being used here to stress the term where καινὸς stressed the newness. It is a question here not of an individual perfection but of ‘corporate’ perfection in unity.” My emphasis. Cf. Robert Banks, Paul’s Idea of Community: The Early House Churches in their Historical Setting (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1980), 71 in which maturity (telos) is usually “in contexts where the corporate maturity of the community is in view.” My emphasis. 21 Ernest Best, One Body in Christ: A Study in The Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the Apostle Paul (London: SPCK, 1955), 149. His discussion of the New Man concept in Ephesians is a helpful parallel here in that the metaphor in 4:13 of that epistle is to be a given “a corporate interpretation.” I don’t deny that individual transformation is included, but hold that this is inseparable from a corporate inclusion in Christ. 22 Gorman, Cruciformity, 350, 385. “To be ‘in Christ’ is to live within a community that is shaped by his story, not merely to have a personal relationship with Christ. This corporate character of being in Christ corresponds to the inherently relational character of cruciformity” and “a cruciform existence is inevitably relational. One cannot experience the Christ-like union of faith and love without offering oneself to others, both inside and outside of the church.” Also, Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, xxxiii; 22 on this underlying narrative substructure of the cross in Galatians and Romans.

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D. Col 2:1–2, 18–19 – United by Means of Love to Grow with the Growth that Comes from God D. Col 2:1–2, 18–19 – United by Means of Love to Grow

As the epistle progresses, this programmatic theme of the communal Christlike transformation into the “knowledge-of-God-himself” unto perfection through the communal participation in the enactment and reception of cruciform love is restated and continually developed. In 2:1–2, the author states that he wants the Colossians, “those at Laodicea,” and for all who have not seen him face to face, to know about his great struggles on their behalf. One must ask: What is the purpose of this desire that others would know of the author’s suffering? Is it a desire to convey his commitment to them? Perhaps. However, it is clear, in the context of the broader Pauline commitment to the living out of a narrative spirituality of the cross,23 that Paul’s desire for the Christians to know of his suffering is rooted in his imitation of the cruciform love of Christ which serves as a model for the uniting, communal love that the author also refers to in the very next verse (2:2). The author’s “suffering on behalf of the other,” the church, is exactly the kind of Christlike love that will bind the church together, unite them, and cause them to grow into the “knowledge-of-who-God-is-inChrist,” the one in whose love they are participating through enactment and reception, just as the author is doing on their behalf. This no mere second-order theological hypothesis. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated through an analysis of the grammar. First, it is clear that the purpose of the church’s knowledge of the author’s suffering on their behalf is for the encouragement of their hearts, as the ἵνα παρακληθῶσιν is an instance of the common grammatical form in which ἵνα + subjunctive indicates purpose. Secondly, and also related to the grammatical syntax of the verse, the adverbial participle συµβιβασθέντες is modifying the main verb in the clause παρακληθῶσιν, and thus, by definition, it is telling us something about the “encouragement.” We encounter here an adverbial participle expressing purpose or result. The author’s cruciform suffering on behalf of the Colossians thus results in their encouragement because of its Christlike, perfecting power. This causes the church to be inspired by suffering love, rather than becoming de23 I use the phrase “narrative spirituality of the cross,” borrowing the term, and meaning by it precisely what Michael Gorman does (Cruciformity, 65), where he argues that Paul is a “narrative theologian whose Christological narrative carries within it a corresponding narrative spirituality, that is, an account of how participants in the reality of Christ crucified and resurrected (the paschal mystery to put it in contemporary Roman Catholic terms) ought to live, including concrete practices that derive from the narrative itself”; cf. 67: “the events that are repeated are constituted by the narrative of Christ’s self-giving faith and love that were quintessentially expressed in his (incarnation and) death on the cross. Cruciformity is, therefore, a narrative spirituality, a spirituality that tells a story, the story of Christ crucified.”

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pressed by futile suffering. Furthermore, it empowers them to emulate the loving lead of the author, which leads to ecclesial unity that comes about through their very imitation and engagement in the act of reciprocal cruciform love. Encouragement on the basis of cruciform love leads to its enactment and reception in the church, and this loving community leads to ecclesial, perfecting unity.24 Together, this unity and love lead to the “knowledge-of-who-God-isin-Christ.” Unless the church is a communal communion of cruciform love, the unity that perfects through love is impossible to attain. Without unity and without love the transformational knowledge of the loving and unified God is incomplete and powerless to cruciform the church.25 In this reading, once again, the prepositional phrase ἐν ἀγάπῃ is best translated, not by the vague rendering “in love,” but as “by means of love” in order to bring out the specifically instrumental sense of preposition in this context.26 Unity and the communal element is the primary sense of συµβιβασθέντες in Col 2:2, particularly because the form is used again in 2:19 where it clearly 24 After formulating this exegetical conclusion, I came across a very similar line of thought in Aquinas, which strengthens my claim here. Aquinas, Commentary on Colossians: “Then when he says, having been instructed in love, he mentions their instruction in wisdom. There are two versions of this passage. First, the one we have here. Secondly, the one found in the Gloss: ‘that the hearts of those instructed in love might be consoled . . .’ so that they might know ‘the mystery of God, the Father, and of Jesus Christ.’” – Notice that the consolation and instruction in love, for Aquinas, results in (“so that”) both the consolation and the knowledge of God in Christ through love. 25 Cf. Thompson, Clothed with Christ, 131: “the law of Christ is fulfilled by bearing one another’s burdens, a concrete act of love for the neighbor . . . love is worked out in the life of the church.” Cf. Matera, New Testament Ethics, 133, 134, 198; cf. Richard A. Burridge, Imitating Jesus: An Inclusive Approach to New Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 104–105 on love and community. Likewise, Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 246 on solidarity in community. So too Andy Johnson, “The Sanctification of the Imagination in 1 Thessalonians,” in Holiness and Ecclesiology in the New Testament, ed. Kent E. Bower and Andy Johnson (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007): 275–92, 275, on moral formation in 1 Thessalonians. Cf. Robinson, Corporate Personality, 45 on corporate representation and the way in which Hebrew culture was “more conscious of being one of the group.” Cf. 51 on the communal focus of the covenant: “Observe that the covenant is with the nation, not with the individual Israelites except as members or representatives of the nation.” Cf. 58 on the use of the body metaphor for the corporate nature of the church by Paul: “This is the most explicit utterance of the Bible concerning the relation of the group and the individual. It implies a new kind of individual, but one who, like the true Israelite of old, could never be divorced from his social relationship.” Cf. Wayne Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries (London: Yale University Press, 1993), 5: the New Testament ethical texts are addressed “not to individuals but to communities.” 26 Instrumental/Means: Ralph P. Martin, Colossians and Philemon (NCBC; London: Oliphants, 1974), 75; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 81; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 130; Pokorny, Colossians, 106. Instrumental and/or local: Sumney, Colossians, 115 and Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 166 - means and sphere; cf. Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 80–81.

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refers to the unity of the church. However, the verb can also mean “to advise” or “to teach.”27 If this aspect of the semantic domain were active in 2:2, the verse would still make perfect sense, and fit within my proposed exegetical result. In that case, the meaning of 2:1–2 would be that the author wants the churches to know of his struggles on their behalf in order that their hearts might be encouraged, because of or as a result of their being taught by means of love (the author’s love in this case). Both are true and plausible; however, I am arguing that on the basis of the usage in 2:19, the meaning here in 2:2 is referring to the unity which is a result of the author’s example and encouragement by means of the love which it evokes in the Christians themselves. Thirdly, the phrases καὶ εἰς πᾶν πλοῦτος τῆς πληροφορίας τῆς συνέσεως and εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ µυστηρίου τοῦ θεοῦ, Χριστοῦ, refer to the same telic goal.28 That is to say, the goal of the encouragement and the unity through love is that the believers in the community might reach “all the riches of the fullness of understanding,” namely “the knowledge of the mystery of God, namely Christ.” This is simply a roundabout way of stating the governing conceptuality which I articulated in concert with Montague in this chapter, which is that the enactment of works (i.e. love in action) in accordance with the wisdom and will of God leads to the knowledge of God, here referred to as the mystery of God, which is then further epexegeted through an appositional structure in which the mystery of God is equated with Christ. Again, the connection between love, knowledge, and Christ reveals in advance for us what the author is truly trying to communicate in 3:10–14 with the “New Humanity” clothing metaphor. The knowledge in which we are renewed is the “knowledge-of-who-God-is-in27 Cf. BDAG 4, 956. Instructed in love: According to O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 92f: Dibelius-Greeven, Montague, and the Vulgate “instructi in caritate.”; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Colossians, 77. United/knit together: O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 93; Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 166; Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 90; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 94; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 81; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 75; John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians, translated and edited from the original Latin, and collated with the French version by John Pringle (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1851), 325; Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon, 86; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 130; Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 277–78; Sumney, Colossians, 115; Hans Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser (HNT 12; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 73; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 48; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 80 goes with uniting, but notes the possibility of teaching; cf. MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 85. 28 So also O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 94; Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 168, specifically mentioning purpose or result usage of εἰς, and noting in fn 82: Harris, Barth/Blanke, Aletti, and Gnilka as holding the same view. Noting that these phrases are essentially parallel, appositional statements are: Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 279; Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 239; Calvin, Commentaries, 325.

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Christ,” which, through the communal enactment and reception of love, in all of its various forms, acts as a bond which leads to perfection. The key to this entire passage is that the unity happens by means of love. It is this unity which is the prerequisite to the knowledge of the mystery of God, which is Christ, the very knowledge of Christ in and through whom we are renewed. Relatedly, the author’s critique of the so-called “Colossian error” centers on the fact that this philosophy is an individualistic and contra-communal philosophy that removes one from the necessarily corporate experience of cruciform participation in love which occurs in Christ. This “in Christ” element in Colossians, as I have shown, clearly refers to the sphere of the life of love in the church by means of which the Christian is renewed. Therefore, a departure from this sphere of being is antithetical to the author’s entire programmatic governing pattern of thought which always situates the individual in the context of the community in Christ. While much has been written on the “Colossian error,” the actual problem with the philosophy as a cause of community disengagement and thus spiritual decay due to communal isolation rather than communal participation leading to growth is rarely shown to be directly related to the positive content of the author’s governing narrative spirituality in Colossians which is inseparably and necessarily communal. This can be demonstrated most clearly from two passages in the epistle, namely Col 2:6–8 and Col 2:18–19. First, in Col 2:6–8, we find that the author is exhorting the Christians in the following manner: 6Therefore,

just as you received Christ Jesus as Lord, walk in the sphere (ἐν αὐτῷ) of him, that is, in the way of life which corresponds to the reality of his Lordship. 7Walk in this sphere and this way because you have been rooted in him, with the result/purpose that you are being built up in him, with the result that you are confirmed, established beyond a doubt, in the faith just as you were taught, abounding in thanksgiving. 8Watch out! Lest someone carries you off as a prize of war, through philosophy and empty deceit, according to the traditions of men, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ.29

The grammar of 2:6–8 likewise demonstrates the underlying communal center to the author’s thought about life in Christ in Colossians. Beginning in verse 6, we notice the exhortations delivered by means of the indicative verb παρελάβετε and the imperative περιπατεῖτε, both of which are second person plural forms thus indicating that the exhortations are directed to a group, namely the church. Next, we again encounter the ethical use of περιπατέω (“to walk”) which the reader will recall was used in 1:10 in which the walking was based on the access to the will of God, and which, through the good works it produced, led to a knowledge of God himself. The process was later summed up by an overt statement of the telos by the author, namely presenting every 29 My Translation – Here I am seeking to bring out the general sense of the Greek text, and the grammatical force of the syntax, and not to render a literal translation.

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man perfect in/by means of Christ (ἐν Χριστῷ, 1:28). Here we find similarly that the walking takes place “in/by means of him” (namely, Christ; ἐν αὐτῷ) thus indicating both the sphere and the means by which the Christians (the implied plural subject of the verbs) are to “walk” in a manner according (“just as”; Ὡς) to the Christ whom they have received by faith. Illuminating here is Montague’s comparison of the imperative to walk ἐν αὐτῷ in Col 2:6 with the command to walk “in love” (ἐν ἀγάπῃ) in Eph 5:2.30 These are two ways of expressing the same truth. The statements exegete each other. The result is that the reader understands the dialectic truth that to walk in Christ is a process which is itself defined by love (which in the context of both Colossians and Ephesians is an indisputably communal affair), and to love is defined by being in Christ, because, as is well known, the self-giving love of Christ on the cross is the center of the author of Colossians’ own narrative spirituality. Love defines what it means to be in Christ, and Christ defines what it means to love, and this, simply put, is a concise way to think of the programmatic governing ethical and conceptual pattern of thought of Colossians, namely, communal Christlike transformation through cruciform participation in love, by means of enactment and reception, in Christ, through the church. The Christians are to walk in the sphere of, and by means of Christ, on account of having been rooted in him. The perfect passive participle here, ἐρριζωµένοι, is either an adverbial participle of cause indicating the reason why the walking is possible (namely, the prior rooting in Jesus), or an adverbial participle of means/instrument.31 Here again, Montague’s exegesis is helpful. 30 Montague, Growth in Christ, 40–41. Ἐν αὐτῷ as sphere related to lordship (my view): O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 106; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 78; Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 179. In support of the “Local sense” of ἐν αὐτῷ are: Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 302–303; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 89; Sumney, Colossians, 128: “Christ . . . constitutes the sphere in which believers live their lives. Christ defines their identity and their way of life.” Variations on this view include: Pokorny, Colossians, 111: “the new mode of life in the sphere in which he [Christ] rules . . .”; Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser, 75: Christ as the “motivhaft,” [“motivation”] for this walking; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 50 noting the various forces of the phrase: “at the root of the phrase there seems to be sense of intimate and existential relationship with Christ . . . And ἐν seems to indicate an integration of personal (and social) identity with Christ . . . The crucial feature of this phrase, however, is, as already indicated, that it enabled Paul to realign the identity of the people of God away from questions of ethnic descent and national custom to integration with this Jesus . . .” 31 If ἐρριζωµένοι is indicating means here, then the sense would be that the Christians are to walk by means of having previously (perfect tense indicates time antecedent to the time of the main verb) been rooted. If it indicates cause, they can walk because they have been rooted, hence the nuances of these two grammatical possibilities overlap in their shared antecedent and grounding force here. Contra Montague (Growth in Christ, 100) who sees them as adverbial participles of manner which explain “how Christ dwells in the heart. . .”; cf. MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 88–89. Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an

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He points out that Paul “is the only N.T. writer to use the verb ῥιζόω,” and makes the comparison again with Ephesians, noting that in Colossians “Christians must be rooted in Christ (Col 2:7)” while in Ephesians they must be rooted “in love (Eph 3:17).”32 Therefore, here too, Ephesians (not surprisingly given their close connection in content) is a helpful illuminating comparative text on the basis of a slight difference of wording in a similar pattern. The swapping out of “Christ” for “love” as that which the believer is rooted in, indicates that “love” and “Christ” are viewed as functionally equivalent. To be rooted in love, was to be rooted in Christ who himself defines love, and to be rooted in love (at least the kind of love that Paul and the NT writers meant by ἀγάπη) meant that one was necessarily rooted in Christ. ᾽Εποικοδοµούµενοι, the next participle in the sequence, is also an adverbial participle of result or purpose.33 The idea, in accordance with the governing ethical pattern of thought articulated earlier in the chapter, is that the walking itself results in, or is for the purpose of, being built up or growing. In 1:9–10 the knowledge of God’s will led to walking which is in accord with that will which then led to the works which resulted in growth in the “knowledge-of God-himself.” Then, similarly, in 2:1–2 the unity (συµβιβάζω) which occurs by means of love leads to the knowledge of God’s mystery, namely Christ himself. Here, in 2:7, we encounter a similar communal pattern of active walking which leads to growth which is related to theme of maturity, perfection, and completion (the end result of “growth”) which happens in Christ (1:28). In addition to the rootedness (ἐρριζωµένοι) and growth (ἐποικοδοµούµενοι) in Christ, which both grounds, and is a result of, walking in Christ respectively, the author asserts that the entire process results in the confirmation of the faith of the Christians. Translating the participle βεβαιούµενοι as “established” (as does the ESV) does not sufficiently convey the force and function of the word in this context. The idea, according to BDAG, is the confirmation of something previously known, in the manner of putting it “beyond doubt.”34 Therefore, if one were to translate it as “established” it would be better to render the participle and phrase “established beyond a doubt in the faith just as you were taught.” I stress this point because within the larger context of verses 2:6–8, the idea is that walking in Christ not only leads to growth, but that this rooting and growth results in a situation in which the faith of the church in Jesus is verified, authenticated, and strengthened through the communal encounter with Christ by means of the enactment and reception of cruciform love in the die Epheser, 75 is an example of a commentator who opts for the “begründende Funktion” (causal function). 32 Montague, Growth in Christ, 40. 33 Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 124 sees this ἐποικοδοµούµενοι as imperatival participle, whereas he takes ἐρριζωµένοι to be an adverbial participle. Contra Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 89 who takes them to be attendant circumstance. 34 BDAG, βεβαίοω entry, 172.

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community as a means of participating in the transformative love which renews the believers together in knowledge according to the image of the Christ who is love. The enactment and reception of cruciform love in the church not only transforms personalities and behaviors, it also creates new corresponding epistemological potentialities and perspectives. If the rooting and growth are not communally happening (again note the plural) then the faith will not be sufficiently formed and authenticated by an encounter with the Christ who is love through the other. This is precisely the problem with the “philosophy” in that it tends towards individual experience which removes one from the headship of Christ and the experience of love in the church thus removing one’s roots, hindering one’s growth, and damaging the authenticity and strength of one’s faith.35 The theme continues in 2:19, in which those who are under Christ the head and included in his body are united, using συµβιβάζω, the same verbal root as in 2:1–2 wherein the unity came through love. Here, in 2:19, the unity and support as a part of the one body under Christ leads to a communal growth “with the growth that comes from God” (αὔξει τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ θεοῦ). It is absolutely imperative to point out that this growth in 2:19 evokes the image of the “entire body” which in Greek is expressed through the singular phrase πᾶν τὸ σῶµα, referring to a corporate participation in the community which is grammatically spoken of and rendered in the Greek as one singular entity growing, not a multitude of loosely connected individual spiritual renovation projects. 35 I take “faith” here to be both the content-tradition which has been handed down about the gospel of Jesus Christ, that is, “the faith,” but also as a reference to the individual reception, understanding, and trust in that gospel. The two need not be separated as if one could be said to abstractly hold “the faith” without having a measure of subjective commitment (or non-commitment), response, and conviction (or disbelief) in the content of “the faith.” Therefore, in sum, I hold “the faith” here to be the gospel tradition about Jesus Christ in which they were instructed, and the existential belief and response to that “faith”; cf. Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 142; cf. Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 124; cf. Thompson, Colossians and Ephesians, 51 who notes it could be the faith or one’s subjective faith, and “In the end, there will not be much difference in meaning. . .”; cf. Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon, 90 who views faith as Christian conviction or trust in Christ. Commentators who take “faith” to be the content of the Christian Gospel include: O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 108; Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon, 90; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 99; Lohse Colossians and Philemon, 94; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 78: “Faith is more likely to mean their adherence to the apostolic gospel than personal trust . . .”; Calvin, Commentaries, 328; Ben Witherington III, The Letters to Philemon, the Colossians, and the Ephesians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on the Captivity Epistles (ESSCNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 154; Pokorny, Colossians, 112: “tradition of Pauline theology”; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 89; Sumney, Colossians, 128; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 90; Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 245 dative of reference, probably the content of faith, against, he says, Lightfoot and Meyer.

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In speaking of the church in this manner, the author is further revealing his high ecclesiology in which the unity of the church is inseparable from the individual’s sanctification.36 This point is further established by the author’s usage of two singular participles, ἐπιχορηγούµενον καὶ συµβιβαζόµενον (“supported and united”), which refer to the one body which is described as “growing.” By referring to the plural “joints and ligaments” (διὰ τῶν ἁφῶν καὶ συνδέσµων) as those components which support and unite the one body, the author is integrating a plurality of individual participants into the church as a single (and grammatically, singular) body. His point in regard to the transformation of believers is that one’s personal spiritual growth, sanctification, and perfection comes through one’s integration into the body, the church.37 Therefore, there is no question that, in Colossians, the author pursues both individual and corporate growth. The text reveals that individual cruciform participation in Christ leads to corporate and individual cruciform transformation according to Christ through love, which is itself defined by Christ. There is no dichotomy between the church as a corporate entity and the church as a fellowship of individuals. In Colossians, the point is rather that the perfection of the individual cannot exist without the support and perfection of the other through the inclusion, support, and perfection of their unity as one body in Christ.38 36 Cf. O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 147: “the suggestion in the immediate context is that each part of the body will function properly only as it is under the control of the head. If it acts independently the consequences can be serious”; cf. Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 123. Arguing contra Dibelius who thinks “body” here refers to cosmic body that the false teachers hold to which is the body of the principalities and powers. Bruce thinks it means the church; cf. Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 122 who holds that Christ’s body is the church, and the church is the “domain of his present lordship”; cf. MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 115; Sumney, Colossians, 158; Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser, 89. Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 350–51 note that the body is the church, but then further emphasize that: “in reference to the church, the emphasis on the whole body in this context is significant. Because being preoccupied with their own piety and being puffed up in addition. . .indicate a separatist attitude on the part of the ‘adversaries,’ it is countered with the argument that the Messiah is concerned with the whole church and thus with its unity”; cf. Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 92; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 124; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 186; Pokorny, Colossians, 151; Sumney, Colossians, 157; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 68; Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 271; Aquinas, Commentary on Colossians, 129 though expanding the emphasis on ecclesial unity by referring to charity and the sacraments as “ligaments.” 37 Cf. Lehrmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, 53 on “koinonia” ethics as an ethic of “interrelatedness.” Cf. 55 and 68: koinonia in the church as a “fellowship-creating relationship in which the ‘one’ confronts the ‘other’ in the maturing humanity of man.” Cf. Banks, Paul’s Idea of Community, 70; cf. Gorman, Cruciformity, 161. 38 Cf. Growth in Christ, 159. Montague here quotes Wescott who is articulating the views of Aquinas: “From Christ our head comes not only the increasing compactness of the members of the Church through faith, nor merely the connection or binding through the mutual

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This is why the author is so adamantly opposed to the individualistic philosophy of mystical heavenly ascent and angel worship in Colossae, because it removes one from the sphere, support, and unity of the church. Notice how this trajectory is developed in 2:18–19 with the singular agitator and his individualist actions potentially causing disqualification. This disqualification and “puffing up” with conceit, the author says, is a result of his “not holding fast to the Head,” which of course is Christ. The verse can be translated and paraphrased in this way to bring out its particular theological and grammatical foci: 18Let

no-one (sg.) disqualify you (pl.), in his so-called “humility” and in his worship of angels, which he as an individual (sg. form) has seen upon entering into the heavenly realm, being puffed up with conceit (sg.) to no purpose, result or avail by the mind of his flesh, 19and not holding fast to the Head from whom the whole body, through its joints and ligaments is supported and united, and grows with the growth that comes from God.

Again, this paraphrasing helps to bring out the exegetical and theological conclusion for which I am arguing, and it is thoroughly rooted in the grammar of the text. The primary point of importance here is that the singular individual is emphasized as the problem. And, as has been stated, the ultimate issue is that by removing himself from the Head and the body, he denies himself the necessary context and ability to be supported and united, and to grow. It is clear that his actions are commensurate with and indicative of what the author will exhort Christians to flee from in 3:1–14, namely, “the things of the earth” (τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, 3:2, 5) and “the old humanity” (παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον, 3:9). Therefore, such a person truly would be disqualified because they would cease to have access to the communal cruciform participation in Christ through love which leads to communal and individual Christlike transformation through love into the image of the God who is love, namely Jesus Christ. This literary and ethical device corresponds with the position argued in this book, namely, that the author of Colossians derived many Jewish ethical terms from a Two Way scenario inherited from LXX. Furthermore, it serves to demonstrate the author’s own re-appropriation of the Two Way OT binary ethical paradigm of the Righteous and the Wicked into new metaphorical and literary categories which serve the same function, such as the Old and New Man, and the things of heaven and the things of the earth.

help of charity, but certainly from him comes the members’ actual operation or movement to action, according to the measure and ability of each member. . .for not only by faith is the mystical body compacted, nor merely by charity’s connecting assistance does the body grow; but likewise by the effectual composing activity springing from each member, according to the measure of grace given him, and the actual motion to operation which God effects in us.” My emphasis. Cf. Best, One Body in Christ, 128; cf. 138 on Col 2:19. This growth in perfection is not primarily a reference to numerical growth but rather to growth in the likeness and image of Christ in and as the church.

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We must keep in mind as well that, for the author, it is not simply the social setting which is forfeited by a removal from the communal people of God in Christ through communion with one another and the life of God through the church. Rather, it really is a loss of the God-enabled ability to encounter and enact God’s will, to receive and reciprocate cruciform love through good works which bear fruit, and even to have abiding faith. For, in Col 1:4–6 we learn that the initial faith, hope, and love of the Colossians is a result of the gospel coming to them. This gospel, the author says, is bearing fruit and growing; activities which are beyond the control of the individual and reliant upon the power and grace of God which, the author reminds us in verse 6, is integral to the message and the nature of “the truth.” Furthermore, in 1:8 we explicitly discover that the love that the Christians have is ἐν πνεύµατι, that is, by means of the Spirit.39 Bearing in mind that the filling of the Christian with the knowledge of God’s will in 1:9 comes in the manner of, or by means of “all spiritual wisdom and understanding” (ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ καὶ συνέσει πνευµατικῇ), 40 the oft noted lack of the Spirit in Colossians shows itself to be overstated. The Spirit

39 Commentators who take ἐν πνεύµατι to refer to the Holy Spirit and to indicate means/agency include: Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 92; Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 44; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 56; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 23; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 65–66 or sphere, “in/by the Spirit”; Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 165–67 sphere, source and agency; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 40; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 21; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 23. Commentators who take ἐν πνεύµατι to indicate source include: Pokorny, Colossians, 44; Sumney, Colossians, 42; Pierre Bonnard and Charles Masson, L'Épître de Saint Paul aux Philippiens. L'Épître de Saint Paul aux Colossiens (Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1950), 92 “vrai fruit de l’Esprit”; Gnilka, Der Kolosserbrief, 38 “Sie hat ihren Ursprung im Geist Gottes.” Commentators who take ἐν πνεύµατι to indicate sphere include: Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon, 52; Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 201. So also Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser, 49 indicating that this is indeed the Holy Spirit. Contra Calvin, Commentaries, 303 that this is a “spiritual love” as opposed to a worldly love; cf. Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 38. 40 Commentators who take ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ καὶ συνέσει πνευµατικῇ to refer to the Holy Spirit and take the ἐν to express agency/means include: Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 94 source and agency; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 27; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 51; Masson, L'Épître de Saint Paul, 94; Calvin, Commentaries, 304; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 24; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 30–31; Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 202; Pokorny, Colossians, 47; Robert McL. Wilson, Colossians and Philemon (ICC; New York: T&T Clark International, 2005), 102; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 47. Commentators who take it to indicate source include: Sumney, Colossians, 46; Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser, 50. Contra Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 38: “the point presumably is only that a spiritual love is to be distinguished from one that is purely worldly.”

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is altogether central in these passages, and in the process of communal Christlike transformation by cruciform participation. For, it is the Spirit who enables the Christians to love which we later find is the key programmatic activity and the governing virtue that transforms the church and the individuals.41 Likewise, the author himself is reliant in his struggling on behalf of the church on all of God’s energy (perhaps an indirect allusion to the Spirit?) which powerfully works within him (1:29). This God has taken the initiative, and provides the enablement for progress, growth, and sustenance. This God empowers the author, and is also said himself to have “qualified” the Christians to share in the “inheritance of the saints in light,” (1:12) and to have “delivered” the Christians from the “dominion of darkness,” (1:13) and “transferred” them into “the kingdom of the Son of his Love,” (1:13) and “reconciled in his body of flesh by his death” (1:22) the believers when they were “once alienated and hostile in mind” (1:21). Further, they “have been [past tense, passive voice] filled in him,” (2:10) and they were “circumcised” (2:11) [past tense, passive voice], and they have been [aorist passive participle] “buried with him in baptism,” and they were raised” (2:12) [aorist passive indicative], and they have been made “alive together with Christ,” by God (2:13), forgiven of all their “trespasses,” (2:13) and relieved of “the record of debt” which stood against them (2:14). The initiative of God in the salvation of the Christian, the supremacy and sovereign headship of Christ as the Head of the Body from which all the Christians grow through love, and the centrality of the Spirit who himself enables the love which transforms the community into the image of the Son of God’s love, Jesus Christ, are all central themes. Removing oneself from the body in pursuit of puffed up mystical voyages to the heavenly realms has the effect, not of freeing oneself from the Powers (whatever they may be), but of crushing oneself under the weight of their tyranny and oppression. The false humility of the Colossian philosophers yields only harsh treatment to the body and the subsequent “spiritual” (or perhaps better, fleshly) experiences. However, true humility can take place only under the headship and submission to the Lord in the context of others-centered love in the church and toward the world. While false humility breaks one down in isolation from the other, true humility bows oneself down for the sake of the other, and in so doing, participates through love in a communal bond that leads to perfection.

Cf. Banks, Paul’s Idea of Community, 70; cf. Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 56; cf. Lehrmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, 62: “the church is a koinonia – a fellowship relationship in which each individual functions properly himself in relation to the whole, and the whole functions properly in so far as each individual is related to it . . .” Emphasis mine. 41

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Everything that I have argued thus far finds its culmination in chapter 3 of Colossians. I have demonstrated that the lexical content is fundamentally rooted in the Jewish Two Ways tradition which was inherited by the author of Colossians. Furthermore, the virtues were additionally shown to be characteristics of God, and particularly of “who-God-is-in-Jesus Christ,” through his sayings, teachings, and those things which were written about him in the New Testament. Relatedly, I have shown in the current chapter that the governing ethical pattern of thought is itself christocentric, that is, it reveals itself to be informed by the Spirit-enabled love of God which is enacted and received in the church and toward the world. This love, for the author, is always defined by a “narrative spirituality of the cross,” which Gorman and others have labeled, “cruciform.” It will now be shown that this programmatic Christlike, otherscentered, love is itself the means and mode, the governing ethical paradigm, of the author’s understanding of how morality and ethics function. It will be shown that this love grammatically (not just conceptually) governs even the other virtues, and that this love is, for the author of Colossians, the communal bond which leads to his ultimate goal, namely perfection. This perfection is the result of a life lived in community and the culmination of the renewal in knowledge into the image of the God who is love through love. Let us provide a paraphrase translation of 3:9–11 on the basis of the Greek text: 9Do

not lie to one another [2nd person plural], because you [pl.] have taken off the τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον [sg.], that is, the old humanity, the old way of being human, the old way of life, the old man, and its practices 10 and you have put on the ‘new, being-renewed-inknowledge-according-to-the-image-of-its-creator’ humanity [sg.], way of life, way of being human. 11Here there is not Greek or Jew, circumcision or uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free, but Christ is all and in all.

In 3:9 the first noteworthy element is the imperatival prohibition against lying which is made on the basis of the fact that the believers in the community have put off the old humanity. As indicated in the translation notes, the imperatival prohibition µὴ ψεύδεσθε is addressed to the group which is clear by the use of the 2nd person plural form. It is also the case that the following participle which begins the clothing metaphor, namely, ἀπεκδυσάµενοι, is plural, with the implied subject being the same as the implied addressees of the prohibition. Therefore, the prohibition against lying and the grounding adverbial participle of cause both refer to a group of people who are told not “to lie to one another”

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because42 they have “taken off the old humanity.” Importantly, that which was removed with its practices, namely τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον, [literally the “old man/person”] is singular. For this reason, a translation such as that of the ESV, which sees this as an individual’s “old self” is unlikely and misleading. Such a translation gives the impression that a group of individuals have taken off their old individual existences and now are going to put on their new individual existences as Christians.43 This is not at all what the author is saying in Colossians. If it were, he would more likely have made the direct object παλαιοι ἄνθρωποι, thus indicating that each of the believers’ individual “selves” were being removed. Though this is indirectly true, the main point of the verse is that the group of Christians removed a common old way of life in accord with the old “man,” which, in the context of a broader understanding and knowledge of similar NT metaphors, almost certainly refers to life under the man (ἄνθρωπός) Adam in the vein of Romans 5 as a reference to life under sin in corporate solidarity with their representative, Adam.44 Thus, “the old man” is a reference to the entire former manner of life in the way of disobedience and sin. Earlier in Col 3:2, 5, the author describes the Adamic way of life as living in accord with “the things which are on the earth” (τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς). There (in v. 5) we are told that these earthly, Adamic patterns and behaviors must be put to death because they result only in the wrath of God (3:6). It is clear, then, that these behaviors correspond to the former lives (“walking”) of the Christians

Some commentators take both participles ἀπεκδυσάµενοι and ἐνδυσάµενοι to be imperatival including: J.B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon (CCL; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1959), 214–15 and Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 141. Others take the participles as typical adverbial participles of various types – causal: MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 137; Sumney, Colossians, 199; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 74; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 150–51; O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 189; Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 265; Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 146; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 137; Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 181. Also interpreting them as adverbial participles but without much comment on the specific force are: Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 283 noting that this is also the position of Meyer, Alford, Aletti, Gnilka, and Ellicott – according to Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 186. 43 Cf. Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 138: “‘Self’ in NIV is misleadingly individualistic, since the idea, here as in Romans 6:6, is much more than merely individual . . .” My view, which expresses both the corporate and individual nature of the metaphor is also well expressed by O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 189; Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 265, 268–70, “corporate nature of the new self”; Sumney, Colossians, 200; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 107; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 13; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 75; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 141–42. 44 Cf. Sang-Won, Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology, 58. 42

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under the “old man,” namely Adam (3:7).45 Thus, an interpretation of Col 3:9 that views the ethical catalogue as a reference to a former corporate manner of life makes the best sense of grammatical structure of the section of Colossians in which the exhortations address a plural group but are subsequently funneled into a singular concept, the old and new man.46 It should also be noted that this “old humanity” or “old man” corresponds to a former lordship which was governed by a former power.47 Likewise, it is worth noting again that in this ethical scenario, we find the author both using words associated with the OT Two Way tradition and re-appropriating the Two Way paradigm itself around a new literary ethical dualism. Thus, the author’s connection to the OT scriptures is not only influencing his ethical writings in Colossians at the level of word usage; but it is also, in fact, influencing the very driving, programmatic paradigm and pattern of thought within which he conceives of and delivers ethical teaching to the Colossians in light of Jesus Christ. As the clothing metaphor continues in 3:10 we discover that the adverbial participle ἐνδυσάµενοι which is used to indicate that which has been “put on” is, like ἀπεκδυσάµενοι in verse 9, plural, and thus referring to a communal experience of reclothing. 48 The object of this participle, τὸν νέον τὸν Cf. Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon, 119– 20: “These phrases do not merely mean ‘one’s old, bad character’ and ‘the new, Christian character’ respectively, as an individual’s condition: they carry deeper, wider, and more corporate associations, inasmuch as they are part of the presentation of the Gospel in terms of the two ‘Adams,’ the two creations. . .Thus the terms ‘the old humanity,’ ‘the new humanity’ derive their force not simply from some individual change of character, but from a corporate recreation of humanity; and what enables the individual to become transformed from selfishness to a growing effectiveness as a useful member of a group is precisely his ‘death’ in regard to one type of humanity–the great, collectively unredeemed Man–and his ‘resurrection’ into another: we are back, once more, at the language of baptismal initiation and incorporation. . .”. Cf. Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 197. So also Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 220–21; cf. Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 410–12: the old self is “Adam as representative of the old order, the sin of degenerate humanity, and the new self is Christ as representative of the new, redeemed order of humanity”; cf. Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 78; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 151. Likewise, Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 138 who interprets the New Man as a new sphere “where a different rule of life obtains . . . [which is] patterned on the Messiah who is himself the true Man.” 46 This is nicely summed up by Wagner, “Working out Salvation,” 265: “The disciplined rejection of these old ‘patterns of thought’ and life stands as the necessary corollary to embodying the new pattern that is now their own by virtue of their union with Christ.” My emphasis. Notice the use of the word “pattern” which draws attention to the activities that correspond and in some sense define these two divergent paths of living. 47 Cf. Robert C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1967), 15, 17, 18, 19, 50, 82. 48 Cf. Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 51 who makes the same point about the plural participles in 2:7. 45

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ἀνακαινούµενον, also like verse 9, is singular. Once again, exegetical and theological interpretations which envision τὸν νέον τὸν ἀνακαινούµενον as a “new self” are not dealing properly with the underlying ecclesial context and narrative substructure, nor are they dealing carefully with the grammar. 49 It is clearly a plural group, the members of which have both taken off and put on a singular representative entity and its corresponding practices, namely, the old way of being human, and the new way of being human respectively.50 Within my argument for a communal access to the will of God, which leads to worthy walking in accordance with that will, which then leads to the bearing of fruit and the growing in knowledge of God himself as he is witnessed, encountered, and revealed through the walking which is in accord with his will, as the governing ethical programmatic conceptuality of Colossians, this verse falls right into place. Here in 3:10 the grammar once again points in the direction of a necessarily corporate involvement through the metaphor of a reclothing in the New Man, which is therefore, the corporate Christ, the church, and the way of life shared by the church in Christ, and not some individual appropriation of a constantly evolving sanctification project which only peripherally relies on the church. This is a corporate New Humanity,51 a corporate way of being, a communally clothed people in Christ who are becoming like Christ through an encounter with Christ, and the enactment of Christ’s love toward, and the reception of Christ’s love from the other.52

49 Robinson, Corporate Personality in Ancient Israel, 153 quoting J.A.T. Robinson: “This is not a better self which each person puts on individually. It is always a corporate entity, the one new man, the Totus Christus”; cf. Sang-Won, Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology, 27 who attributes the corporate representative view to Moule, Ellis, and Ridderbos. 50 So also Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ, 22: “through baptism the believer has come to share in Christ. Through baptism he has been included in Christ. He has entered Christ as the corporate person of the new aeon”; cf. 23 baptism into an “inclusive person”; cf. 39, 48; 25: “Col. 3:9-10 makes clear that the ‘old man’ and his counterpart, the ‘new man,’ are corporate concepts . . . Thus putting on the new man binds the believers into a unity which overcomes the divisions of the world (Col. 3:10-11). Gal. 3:28 associates this same motif with putting on Christ, who is understood as a corporate person” (emphasis mine), cf. 50. Cf. Lehrmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, 66. 51 Cf. E. Schweizer, “Traditional Ethical Patterns in the Pauline and Post-Pauline letters and their development (lists of vices and house tables),” in Text and Interpretation: Studies in the New Testament presented to Matthew Black, ed. Ernest Best and R. Mcl. Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 195–209, 213, 218. 52 Thompson, Clothed with Christ, 150 on the parallel verse in Rom 13:14 and how putting on Christ involves putting on “the person who embodies and enables” the various virtues. I find this to be the exact same Christ-like clothing image as we find in Colossians, with precisely the same function as well.

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When we realize that the “being-renewed-humanity” is experiencing this renewal in, through, and toward knowledge,53 it becomes clear that the governing conceptuality articulated earlier from 1:9–10, 28 and 2:6–8, 18–19 in which the knowledge of God’s will ultimately leads to knowledge of God himself through a united communal experience of love, is in mind here too. That the renewal κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν is referring to Christ himself54 here is likely since Christ is already referred to as the εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου in 1:15.55 Furthermore, as mentioned in passing previously, the ὅπου in 3:11 certifies that the communal interpretation of the New Humanity in 3:10 is a reference 53 The εἰς could be expressing purpose “renewed for the purpose of knowledge” or result, “renewed with the result of knowledge” or respect/reference “renewed with respect or reference to knowledge.” I think the force which is most consistent and most consonant with the governing ethical trajectory of the epistle in which walking leads to and precedes knowledge (the sense of BDAG 9) is the use of εἰς to express instrumentality. However, it is also true that the result is knowledge and so, once again, these distinctions somewhat overlap and are not always mutually exclusive. 54 Stephen E. Fowl, The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul: An Analysis of the Function of the Hymnic Material in the Pauline Corpus (JSNTSup 36; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 104; cf. Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 39; Thompson, Clothed with Christ, 84, 85. Commentators who view Christ as the “image” (the view I hold): O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 191; Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon, 120; Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 270; Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 148; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 142; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 107–108; Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 198; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 222–23; Sumney, Colossians, 202; Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser, 103–104; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 78; Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 153; Aquinas, Commentary on Colossians, 155; Ernst Lohmeyer, Die Briefe an die Philiper an die Kolosser und an Philemon (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 226. Contra Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 284–85 who sees an allusion to Genesis and does not think it refers to Christ here. 55 Cf. 2 Cor 4:4 in which Christ is referred to as “the image of God” who has “shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.” See also the following texts in which “knowledge,” and “Jesus” are linked to a transformation from one degree of glory into another precisely through the “image.” Cf. 2 Cor 3:18. “And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another. For this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit.” Cf. 2 Cor 4:4–6 “In their case the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God. For what we proclaim is not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord, with ourselves as your servants for Jesus’ sake. For God, who said, “Let light shine out of darkness,” has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. Cf. on 2 Cor 4:4 Fowl, The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul, 104– 105 who clearly links these themes of “image.”

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to the abstract idea of the New Man as a communal entity. Ὅπου can refer either to the instantiation and tangible manifestation of this reality through the local church in an actual place (i.e. the particular church in Colossae), or it can be speaking more broadly of the church as an abstract metaphorical reality. In either case the reality of the church, whether general or specific, universal or local, remains the point in either interpretative emphasis.56 BDAG, however, seems to go against this interpretation. It lists Col 3:11 and the ὅπου clause as a “marker of more immediate circumstance or expressing a premise”57 in which the truth and reality of a statement is contingent upon the preceding statement and reality, which, in this case would be that the Christians have put on the New Humanity. If this is the correct sense of the adverb ὅπου in the context of Col 3:11, it doesn’t take anything away from my communal transformative reading of the author’s governing ethical pattern, it simply serves to highlight the particular nature of this community. BDAG’s reading of ὅπου serves to express the trans-cultural, trans-national nature of this new way of being human. However, since as I have argued and demonstrated, the New Man of 3:10 is a singular corporate entity which is “put on” by plural subjects, it is more likely, on the basis of the context in which ὅπου appears, that it is speaking of the sphere and location of the New Humanity, namely the church. At the same time–given the nature of the transcultural, distinctive traits listed–it serves to make a statement about the nature of the community itself as defined by Christ and his love rather than cultural or national distinctives. That this communal transformation by cruciform participation is indeed envisioned as necessarily and particularly communal, and, likewise, that this transformation occurs by the enactment and reception of the cruciform love of Jesus leading to the perfection of the church and the individual believers who make up the church is evident in Col 3:12–14. My translation, following the established paraphrase style and protocol, is as follows: 12Therefore,

put on (pl.), as elect ones of God, holy and beloved, deep compassion, kindness (sg.), humility (sg.), meekness (sg.), and patience (sg.).13 Put these on in the manner of/by bearing with (pl.) one another, in the manner of/by forgiving (pl.) each other. If one of you 56 In agreement with Lehrmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, 72 concerning his view of the church as both local and universal. 57 BDAG 2, Ὅπου, p. 717. Cf. Martin Dibelius and Heinrich Greeven, An die Kolosser, Epheser, an Philemon (HNT 12; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1953), 42 hold the figurative view where it refers to a previously mentioned circumstance or reality; cf. Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 414–15. Cf. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 270 who sees “where” as referring to the corporate nature of the new self; cf. Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 139 who argues that Ὄπου “indicates a place, presumably the family of Christ’s people” and Pokorny, Colossians, 169: the Ὄπου refers to “the new nature . . . The new person is a social entity (3:9); it refers to the communion with Jesus Christ (1:13) in which the contradictions of the old world are cancelled . . .”; cf. Sumney, Colossians, 203.

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has a complaint against another one of you as also the Lord has forgiven you (pl.), in this manner also you (pl.) forgive them. 14And, governing all of these things, that is, all of these behaviors and this burden-bearing, cruciform-forgiving manner of life, is love, which is the communal bond (sg.) which leads to perfection.

In Col 3:10–14 we find the culmination and outworking of the author’s underlying governing ethical conceptuality, namely, that through participation in Christ by means of the enactment and reception of cruciform love through the community which comprises his body, the New Humanity, the individual Christians and the corporate church become transformed by a renewal of knowledge through love into the image of the God who is love. Verses 12–14 in particular make it quite clear that the programmatic moral vision of Colossians is a necessarily communal endeavor which leads to perfection precisely through the bond that love creates and sustains. I have already demonstrated that the virtue list in verse 12 is derived from an intertexture of OT and NT traditions and texts which describe the Righteous in Two Ways scenarios, the character of God, and the character of Jesus.58 Now, in this exegetical and theological treatment of the chapter I can articulate further how this intertexture was itself governed by and situated within a larger coherent and conceptual framework of moral transformation into the image of the God of love in Christ. First, the οὖν serves to infer from the fact that “Christ is all and in all” in this communal, non-discriminating community, that this means the Christians should therefore put on the virtues which follow. As my translation indicates, the imperative “put on” (Ἐνδύσασθε) is a 2nd person plural form and thus indicates that the community as a whole is addressed in their plurality. Aside from the first virtue, namely, σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρµοῦ (“deep compassion”) of which σπλάγχνα (literally, “bowels”) is plural, all of the other virtues are in their singular forms. Even with the plural σπλάγχνα, however, this is likely a “singular” set of metaphorical bowels, as odd as that sounds, because the word σπλάγχνον never occurs in the singular in the NT or the LXX. That is to say, in every single occurrence of the term in the LXX, for example, σπλάγχνον is

58 The point concerning the virtue terms of 3:12 as descriptors of God and Christ is frequently made in the commentaries – O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 197 where he also notes that this position is held by Larsson and Jervell. Cf. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 274, 276; Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 152; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 142; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 147; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 111–12; Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 206; Witherington, The Letters to Philemon, the Colossians, and the Ephesians, 179; Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 418; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 140; Sumney, Colossians, 212; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 80.

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in the plural when it refers to the bowels (a plural entity) of one person.59 The term never appears in the singular form with reference to the bowels of an individual, and therefore it can be interpreted here in Colossians to be a plural entity (namely, metaphorical bowels) which belong to a singular individual.60 The reason I stress the singular nature is that, as has been shown above, the entire idea of being clothed in the New Humanity is that this is a corporate clothing under a corporate representative who also determines the style of life and governing way of cruciform love by which transformation into his image occurs. Lending further support to the idea that the ethic of Colossians is necessarily corporate is the fact that an epexegetical set of participles follows the virtue list which essentially demonstrates that the governing ethos and way of this New Humanity is through the incarnation, enactment, and reception of cruciform love. This is clearly discernible in that both of the participles are expressing either manner or means,61 and thus further describing exactly how, in what manner, and by what means this communal ethos and activity in the New Humanity is carried out. Both participles are plural and are followed by pronouns that express a cruciform reciprocity. The Christians in the New Humanity, i.e. Christ, i.e. the church, put on, that is, carry out these virtues, by “bearing with one another” and “forgiving each other.” These epexegetical explications of the life of Christian communal relationality expressed in verse 12 through the virtue list are further epexegeted and unpacked by a reference to their analogy and basis in the forgiving disposition and activity of Jesus Christ. This is the obvious sense of 3:13b καθὼς καὶ ὁ κύριος ἐχαρίσατο ὑµῖν, οὕτως καὶ ὑµεῖς (literally “just as also the Lord forgave you, in this manner also you”). The οὕτως καὶ which is an adverbial particle expressing manner grammatically confirms and demands this interpretation. Notice that here too, the “you” is ὑµεῖς, that is

59 See for example 2 Macc 9:5; 4 Macc 5:3; 10:8; 11:19; 14:13; 15:23, 29; Wis 10:5; Sir 30:7; 33:5; Prov 12:10; 26:22. It occurs twice in the plural in reference to the bowels of many people, in Bar 2:17 and Jer 51:13. 60 The term appears in the singular only once in Pseudepigrapha where it refers to the compassion of God (T. Zebul. 8:2) and the compassion of the Lord (T. Naph. 4:5). 61 Cf. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 274 the participles “show how these virtues are fleshed out.” And the Lord’s forgiveness of us is “grounding all of this.” Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 142: “practical application of the virtues”; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 147–48: “refers to the Lord’s action which gives the believers basis and direction for their conduct.” Cf. Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 112; Calvin, Commentaries, 350–51, noting the example of Christ; Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 207; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 230 themes in 3:12 are “extended, highlighting still more that quality of mutual relationships which any church (or community) needs to nurture if it is to thrive”; Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 422–23; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 140; Sumney, Colossians, 217; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 83–84.

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addressing a plural group. In any case, even if the grammar was not so obviously community-centric, necessitating in itself a communal interpretation for the author’s governing ethical pattern of thought, the nature of forgiveness and burden-bearing itself requires this communal component and make no sense in an individualistic framework and interpretation of the clothing metaphor. This is a communal ethos of cruciformity. We have here another instance of the author’s narrative spirituality of the cross, emphasizing an underlying intertexture comprised of the self-giving love of Christ as a core component to the life of the people in Christ, namely the church. All of this, the carrying out of the virtues, the burden-bearing and forgiving of one another, is governed by love, the author says, and this love creates a bond. More specifically, love itself is the stuff from which bond is made, and it is through this bond that perfection comes to the individual and to the church. Exegetically, it is rarely pointed out what exact force the preposition ἐπὶ carries in the phrase ἐπὶ πᾶσιν δὲ τούτοις τὴν ἀγάπην (literally “governing/controlling all of these things, love”). In the context of the larger metaphor of clothing, many take it to refer to love as the belt62 which is worn over all of the other virtues, thus binding the virtues together. While this is a possibility, I want to argue that what we have here is not necessarily a “love belt” pictured as somehow binding the other virtues together (I am not even sure what that would signify, or why it would be important for the author to stress that the other virtues ought to be bound together). Rather, and in accordance with BDAG 9, a portion of the semantic domain almost entirely ignored or unknown to interpreters, ἐπὶ is expressing a mark of power or control over the object. This is why I have translated the phrase not “above of all of these things,” which would show the preeminence of love (which, however, is also true for the apostle Paul and Colossians), or “over all of these things,” as with the belt interpretation, but instead “controlling (or governing) all of these things is love” thus bringing out the sense of BDAG 9 in accordance with the function of love in Colossians on the whole.63 This sense is also perceived by Spicq. He makes the claim on the basis of both the grammar and the preeminence of the attestation and lexical focus given to the word ἀγάπη itself in the NT as the virtue

Contra Canavan, Clothing the Body of Christ, 46. Ἐπὶ as “above all” in terms of preeminence: Calvin, Commentaries, 351; Lohmeyer, Die Briefe, 228: “Zusammenfassung und Überbietung der vorher genannten Tugenden”; Barth/Blanke, Colossians, 423; “in addition to”: Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 281; “over” as a part of the clothing metaphor: Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon, 123; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 141; Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 84; Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 287; Gnilka, Der Kolosserbrief, 197. 62 63

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which “controls all moral life,” and acts as the “supreme king over all the others [meaning the other virtues and commands].”64 In this sense, the other virtues are governed by, empowered by, enabled by, the controlling programmatic conceptuality of cruciform love. They are explications of love in various relational circumstances and communal modes of discourse, interaction, and service. They are the various modalities of love in communal activity. They are instantiations of cruciform love in the context of the church and in service to the world. Or, as I have called the virtues previously in relation to love, they are the epexegetical blueprint of love in communal participatory cruciformity.65 In short, they are love unpacked and applied. In this sense, they are 64 Spicq, Agape in the New Testament, 8, 65. Although his claim that the preposition is indicating “that what is to be added is both related to and superior to what preceded” is not a clear or complete enough explanation of the grammatical force of the preposition. He does note the governing and controlling force of the preposition on page 67, where he refers to perfection as “governed by charity” without which the other virtues are “imperfect illusions” yet here too he lacks a grammatical explanation to undergird this correct assertion. Cf. Matera, New Testament Ethics, 152 on the role of love in 1 Cor 13; cf. Thompson, Colossians and Philemon, 84: “love does not add anything to these other virtues; it is rather the distillation, the essence, the epitome of them all”; cf. Harris, Colossians and Philemon, 163: the article “suggests that concrete expressions of love.” 65 Spicq argues in a similar manner in Agape in the New Testament, 43, where he states that the other fruit of the Spirit in Galatians are “different aspects of love of neighbor” and “modes or manifestations” of love. I agree with Spicq that on the basis of 1 Cor 13:3, in which the verbal forms of two Colossian virtues (µακροθυµεῖ and χρηστεύεται) are equated with love, we therefore have a grammatical and conceptual precedent for other virtues within the Pauline school, in this case two exact virtues from Colossians (and Galatians), as epexegetical or explications (my wording) of love; cf. 90. Cf. Montague, Growth in Christ, 67 noting that St. Thomas Aquinas argued that “joy and peace are effects of charity” (Gal 5:22). My emphasis. Cf. Matera, New Testament Ethics, 220: “In the present circumstances of the Ephesians, three virtues are needed (humility, gentleness, patience), all of which are modes of bearing with one another in love.”; cf. Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 24 showing that what I am proposing goes back at least as far as Augustine: “In his On the Morals of the Catholic Church, he [Augustine] suggested that the fourfold division of the virtues familiar to pagan philosophers could rightly be understood only as forms of love whose object is God. Thus ‘temperance is love keeping itself entire and uncorrupt for God; fortitude is love bearing everything readily for the sake of God; justice is love serving God only and therefore ruling well all else, as subject to man; prudence is love making a right distinction between what helps it towards God and what might hinder it.’” (emphasis mine); Cf. Likewise this appears to be the position of Aquinas according to Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 49: “For Aquinas the Decalogue is nothing less than the precepts of charity [ST II-II, 122, 1–6]. A person cannot fulfill the precepts unless all things are referred to God. Therefore, to honor one’s father and mother must be done from charity, ‘not in virtue of the precept, Honor thy father and mother, but in virtue of the precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart’ (ST III, 100, 4, ad, 2). So Paul says, above all these put on love, which is greater than all the virtues mentioned above, as we find stated in 1 Corinthians (13:13). Above all these, that is, more than all the others, because love is the end of all the virtues: ‘The end of

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not perceived by the author to represent the totality of the possible explications of love, but rather, representative models. We find, at the height of the discourse on communal transformation by cruciform participation, that this love which governs as an ethos and controls and enables all of the other virtues as a power creates a bond which leads to perfection. I have already made the connection earlier between the knowledge of the will of God, which leads to walking worthily in good works which then lead to a “knowledge-of-who-God-is-in-himself.” Furthermore, I have shown that this knowledge is, in both Col 1:28 and 3:10, that in and by which the individual Christian and church are renewed into the image of Christ.66 Finally, we discovered that this renewal is governed by a communal participation in the corporate reality of the New Humanity, which is the corporate body of Christ through which Christians are enabled and governed through love. Lastly here, once again, the author summarizes his programmatic moral vision by indicating that this bond of love leads to perfection. On this final phrase which is appositional to love, namely ὅ ἐστιν σύνδεσµος τῆς τελειότητος (“which is the bond that leads to perfection”), there are a variety of interpretations.67 The interpretation which I am proposing for the phrase, that love is a communal bond which results in perfection, was one that I arrived at independently, but which I later discovered was central in the works of Spicq and Montague. Spicq writes: the commandment is love’ (1 Tim 1:5). Or we could say, above all these we should have love, because it is above all the rest: ‘I will show you a still more excellent way’ (1 Cor 12:31). Love is above all the rest because without it the others are of no value. This love is the seamless tunic mentioned by John (19:23). The reason we need this love is because it binds everything together in perfect harmony. According to the Gloss, all the virtues perfect man, but love unites them to each other and makes them permanent; and this is why it is said to bind. Or, it is said to bind because it binds of its very nature, for love unites the beloved to the lover: ‘I led them with cords of compassion, with the bands of love’ (Hos 11:4). He says, perfect, because a thing is perfect when it holds firmly to its ultimate end; and love does this.” 66 Cf. Matera, New Testament Ethics, 220 on the both/and of corporate and individual aspects of Christian ethics. 67 My view “the bond which leads to perfection” is held by: Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 149: “It indicates result or purpose. Thus, love is understood as the bond that leads to perfection. It binds together the members of the community who live in the unity of the ‘body of Christ’. . .and thus produces ‘perfection’ in the community of the one body.”; cf. Lohmeyer, Die Briefe, 228; Sumney, Colossians, 219; MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, 141; Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser, 106. Cf. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 281–82, who sees love as that which perfectly binds the virtues, rather than the people together. Cf. The genitive of perfection in O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 203. O’Brien finds further support for the genitive of perfection in: DePlessis, Percy, Schmauch, Lohse, Dibelius-Greeven, and Fridrichsen. Cf. The genitive of result (or purpose), both of which work with my exegesis of the passages, is advocated for by Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 233; cf. Pokorny, Colossians, 172.

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The word “perfection” in the ‘“bond of perfection” refers to “the bond that leads to perfection” and not to a “perfect bond” (cf. Isa 58:6; Acts 8:23). The thought is similar to Romans 13:10 and Galatians 5:14 where agape is said to fulfill and summarize all other precepts.68

In terms of the grammatical force of the genitive in this construction, I see three possibilities which overlap in their syntactical function and significance to some extent. The three possibilities are: (1) genitive of destination,69 (2) genitive of purpose70 (destined for, or toward); or (3) genitive of product, that is, the genitive is that which is produced by something or someone else ("i.e. the God who produces hope" in Rom 15:3 or “the God who produces peace” in Rom 15:33).71 The most precise interpretation, and the one which Spicq also holds (though he does not offer a grammatical rationale for his choice in his work) is the genitive of purpose. The bond is “destined for,” “toward,” “for the purpose of,” “unto” perfection. It is also, of course, possible that we have here a genitive of quality, namely, a “perfect bond.” However, though it is technically possible, in the larger context of the epistle the genitive of quality shows itself to be a far less plausible option than the genitive of purpose.72 Given the

68 Spicq, Agape in the New Testament, 66. However, on page 65 (oddly) it seems that Spicq is referring to the perfection of the other virtues, thus interpreting the “bond” to be that which binds not the church together, but the other virtues. Here I would disagree with his conclusions. 69 Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 100, genitive category 11. 70 Like Rom 8:36 “sheep destined for slaughter,” or Gal 2:7 “the gospel for the uncircumcision.” 71 Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 106–107, genitive category 15. 72 Note also the use of σύνδεσµος in Eph 4:3 where we have the unity of the Spirit by means of love referred to as “the bond which leads to peace” τῷ συνδέσµῳ τῆς εἰρήνης. Here too the “bond” is related to the unity of the church as is obvious from Eph 4:4–6 which talks about the “one body,” “one Spirit,” “one Lord, one faith, one baptism,” and “one God and Father of all.” Even if the genitive τῆς εἰρήνης were referring to the “quality” of the bond, namely, that it is peaceful (which is doubtful), it still situates the “bond” (σύνδεσµος) language and concept within an ecclesial and corporate setting which is exactly my point here. Commentators who see the bond as binding the virtues together: Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 281–82; Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 156; Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon, 143 leans in this direction but mentions the other is possible too; Calvin, Commentaries, 351–52; Martin, Colossians and Philemon, 113; Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, 288; Aquinas, Commentary on Colossians, 162–63; Gnilka, Der Kolosserbrief, 197: “Die Liebe als σύνδεσµος verbindet alle anderen menschlichen Tugenden und führt sie zur Vollkommenheit.” Commentators who see the bond binding the community together: Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 149; Hübner, An Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser, 106; Lohmeyer, Die Briefe, 228; Dunn, The Epistle to The Colossians and to Philemon, 232; O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 204. Commentators who present both options as present: Witherington, The Letters to Philemon, the Colossians, and the Ephesians, 180 does not land on one but cites Lincoln who lists love as both the binder of the virtues

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emphasis on “perfection in Christ” in 1:29, and the considering the usage of σύνδεσµος in 2:19 as a clear reference to a bond which holds together the entire body (πᾶν τὸ σῶµα, i.e. the church), a corporate precedent for the term is well established in the epistle that narrows the exegetical possibilities to favor the genitive of purpose.

F. Conclusion F. Conclusion

The governing ethical conceptuality and programmatic pattern of thought in Colossians is communal Christlike transformation by cruciform participation in the enactment and reception of divine love. Love is the communal bond, the entire focus and fulcrum of the epistle, the lack of which is the ultimate problem with the “philosophy.” This communal bond is the opposite of the selfish, ascetic, individualistic mystic “philosopher,” who is carried off as a pirated and stolen prize by the other “philosophers.” We know through the entire epistle that unity and growth, and the body that is, the church, is the central and necessary component to experiencing growth in the Messiah, unto perfection in the Messiah, authenticating the believers’ faith, and enabling the growth in knowledge which comes from God through love by the Spirit. This is the bond of perfection namely, communal participation through the enactment and reception of cruciform love, which is itself defined by the forgiveness and love experienced through Christ, and enacted unto the other.73 In and through this grace-reciprocity of cruciform communal love we see Christ in the other and are transformed through love into the image of the God who is love, Jesus Christ.

and the community; cf. Pokorny, Colossians, 172; Sumney, Colossians, 218; Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians, 208. 73 On what I have termed the enactment and reception of cruciform love cf. Gorman, Cruciformity, 385: “The call to cruciformity is, therefore, a call that no one can fulfill in isolation. It requires others to remind us, inspire us, encourage us, work with us, and count the cost with us. Cruciformity requires that people be able to give to and receive from one another. Finally, cruciformity requires a community in which the story of Christ crucified can be learned, nurtured, contemplated, and performed”; cf. Gorman, “Paul and the Cruciform Way of God in Christ,” 70 on the communal nature and location of cruciform transformation: “This indwelling Messiah creates and shapes a community that manifests his presence in concrete practices of Messiah-like love.”

Chapter 9

Conclusion In conclusion, I have demonstrated that Paul in Colossians uses virtue terms which were often found in texts that described: (1) the character of God or Christ and/or, (2) the character of the Righteous. Further, these terms were likewise found in the context of Jewish literary dualities which presented ethical living in the literary and conceptual form of the Two Ways in the LXX. The vices, I have argued, typically corresponded to: (1) the Wicked in the LXX, (2) the vices of the sayings of Jesus in the NT, and (3) the common Hellenistic stock of incidental moral terms of the day which were commensurate with the author’s inherited Jewish ethic. This primary Jewish provenance was demonstrated through parallels with the LXX and NT, and in particular, through the presence of several uniquely Jewish terms (πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, εἴδωλολατρία, and βλασφηµία) in the LXX and NT in Paul’s ethical catalogues. These parallels were contrasted with their striking absence in the Hellenistic literature surveyed. In regard to Colossians’ governing ethical programmatic pattern of thought I demonstrated that the lack of key Aristotelian, Stoic, and Cynic programmatic systems and concepts from the thought of both Paul of the genuine epistles and the author Colossians argues against the adoption or transformation of any of these schools of thought as his primary, driving, programmatic, ethical conceptuality. Rather, through an exegesis of Colossians, I demonstrated a unique, programmatic, governing pattern of thought for the ethic of Colossians which centered on Christlike transformation through the enactment and reception of cruciform love. This ethical pattern of thought in Colossians was shown to be dependent upon the wisdom of God and the will of God which is available to believers through the enablement of the Spirit1 in the church (i.e. in Christ). We discovered that knowledge of God’s will precedes, enables, and requires a worthy walking in good works which is referred to as “bearing fruit.” Further, we discovered that this “walking according to God’s will” results in and causes a growth in the “knowledge-of-who-God-is-in-himself,” that is, Col 1:9 ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ καὶ συνέσει πνευµατικῇ. See also Montague, Growth in Christ, 199: “In the prayer of Col 1:9–11, the Holy Spirit does not appear explicitly, but the wisdom and understanding implored is πνευµατικῇ. It supposes the gift of the Spirit; and it makes possible life worthy of the Lord and leads to fecundity and growth in the knowledge of God” and Gorman, “Paul and the Cruciform Way of God in Christ,” 67. 1

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in his own character and person in accord with his revealed will as experienced through the activity of the faithful with one another. I argued that the virtues in Col 3:12–14 are an explicative but not exhaustive blueprint or unpacking of the “clothing in the New Humanity” metaphor which occurs in 3:10. The ultimate aim of this renewal into the image of Christ is perfection which is accomplished through the virtue of love which was shown to be grammatically governing all of the other virtues, thus rendering the others to be situational applications of cruciform love in various communal interactive and relational spheres and modes. This enactment and reception of love, the author reveals, is itself the bond which leads to perfection, which is also explicitly cited as the aim of the author’s proclamation and teaching in Col 1:28 and the telos of his ethical teaching. It is the experience of this kind of love which serves to strengthen and authenticate the believers’ faith through an encounter with the personal object of their faith, Jesus Christ, through one another, by means of the activity of that faith, that is, the active, energizing component which makes true faith alive, namely love, which is itself indicative of the very character of the God in whom that faith is placed.2 I argued that it is through the reception of divine love from the other, and the enactment of divine love toward the other, that one encounters and embodies the very character of Christ in whom they are renewed.3 It is through the communal participation in the activity of faith which is love that the church becomes–individually and corporately–like the God who is love. The ethical conceptuality of Colossians is Christlike transformation through the enactment and reception of cruciform love in the context of Christ’s body, the church. Moving forward in the discipline of Pauline and deutero-Pauline ethics and exegesis, much remains to be done by way of comparative and lexical study in order to further verify and explicate the findings and proposals of this book. Studies of a comparable methodology can and should be conducted which focus on other Greek ethical schools with extant writings which are antecedent or roughly contemporaneous with Paul such as Platonism, Epicureanism, and Neopythagoreanism. Particularly stimulating for further discussion (and further scholarly study) are themes of friendship, community, and character formation in Epicureanism 2 So too Spicq, Agape in the New Testament, 160 concerning love as that which energizes the church unto transformation and growth: “one could define the. . .Church by the charity of her members. . .this charity is that which comes from the head, Christ. It is a divine and dynamic love, and we can be sure that in writing these last words ἐν ἀγάπῃ, St. Paul wished to give the secret of this mysterious growth and this marvelous construction: the vital power, the secret energy of this Body, is charity.” 3 Cf. Lehrmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, 68 on the nature of the church as the body of Christ and a “fellowship-creating relationship in which the ‘one’ confronts the ‘other’ in the maturing humanity of man”; cf. 53.

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and the Pauline and deutero-Pauline epistles. In Klauck’s excellent overview of the basics of Epicureanism he notes that “It is easy to grasp why the Jewish and Christian traditions found little that was positive in Epicureanism, especially since they took over without deeper reflection the distorted image of the anti-Epicurean polemic.”4 He points to 1 Cor 15:32 in which Paul cites the Epicurean slogan “Let us eat and drink, since tomorrow we die” as an example of an early Christian polemic against Epicureanism. Yet, despite the existence of early Jewish and Christian polemical writings against Epicureanism, Klauck helpfully highlights areas of study in Epicureanism that are yielding serious exegetical and historical fruit such as “the structural analogies between Epicurean and early Christian pastoral care” which, he notes, is only in the earliest stages of study.5 Furthermore, it strikes me that the egalitarian ethos of Epicureanism, which was accessible to all–including women and slaves–regardless of the level of one’s prior training, is a point of major contact between Paul, the author of Colossians, and the Epicurean way of life, despite the apostle’s potential aversion to Epicureanism as he understood it.6 Having completed my comparative study of Cynic, Stoic, and Aristotelian streams of thought and Colossians, I am increasingly becoming convinced that “the Epicurean willingness to accept friends without a screening process” is the likely the closest parallel to early Christian community in antiquity. That no “character or nobility test had to be passed before individuals could join the community of friends” and the fact that the formation of character “became an intramural affair among the Epicureans” is far closer to sociological praxis of Paul and the author of Colossians in their invitation of all peoples into the body of Christ.7 Further book length treatments of these themes will no doubt continue to prove massively significant to the study of the New Testament in its Greco-Roman context. Additionally, a fresh set of studies comparing Paul with Plutarch would also be of interest, even though his works post-date Paul, and were not themselves influencing the apostle in any direct way. Furthermore, new studies should be conducted that go beyond the sources written in Greek. In that regard, it is time for a new comparative study (or studies) of Seneca and Paul. Key to the usefulness of all of these studies will be the adoption of a rigorous methodology, such as that used here and set forth by Malherbe, which looks beyond simple

Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity, see esp. 386–400. Ibid., 400. 6 Ibid., 390. Cf. Clarence E. Glad, “Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (NovTSupp 82; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 21–59, 55 where Epicurean community is described as having an “open-ended nature” which “because its obligations were not primarily to the polis, could admit both slaves and women.” 7 Glad, “Frank Speech,” 55. 4 5

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word parallels but seeks to see how these words and words (in the case of studies comparing texts in Latin with Paul’s Greek sources) which belong to an equivalent or similar semantic domain function in the context of the systems of thought of the thinkers who use them. Future studies must go beyond parallel books and actually become acquainted with the primary source writings, and the systems and theories contained therein, in order to compare thinkers at the level of both thought patterns and word usage. In so doing, the study and discipline of Greco-Roman thought and ethics in comparison with the writers of the New Testament will uncover new and exciting levels of clarity and understanding in regard to the Hellenistic world, not only as a background to the New Testament, but as a part of the world in which it was created and resided, and the world it in which it was formed and influenced.

Bibliography Primary Sources Aland, Barbara and Kurt Aland, eds. Novum Testamentum Graece (New Testament in Greek) 27th Edition (Nestle-Aland), prepared by the Institute for New Testament Textual Research in Münster. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1898 and 1993. Aquinas, St. Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by C.I. Litzinger O.P. Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993. –. Commentary on Colossians. No Pages. Accessed 16 June 2017. Online: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SSColossians.htm#12. Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea. Edited by J. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894. Accessed 16 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0053. –. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934. Perseus Digital Library. Accessed 16 June 2017. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0054. –. The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by J.A.K. Thomson. Revised Notes and Appendices by Hugh Tredennick. Introduction and Further Reading by Jonathan Barnes. London: Penguin Books, 2004. Arius Didymus. Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics. Edited by Arthur J. Pomeroy. Atlanta: SBL, 1999. Charlesworth, James H. The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Garden City: Doubleday, 1983. –. The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha: Vol. 2. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985. Cicero, M. Tulli. Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, fasc. 43. de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. M. Tullius Cicero. Th. Schiche. Leipzig: Teubner, 1915. No Pages. Accessed 16 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/ text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0036%3Abook%3Dpraef. Cicero. Translated by H. Harris Rackham et al. 30 Volumes. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914. DiLella, Alexander A. The Wisdom of Ben Sira. Translated by Patrick W. Skehan. New York: Doubleday, 1987. Dio Chrysostom. Translated by J. W. Cohoon (Or. 1-31) and H. Lamar Crosby (Or. 32-80). 5 Volumes. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932–1955. Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Translated by R.D. Hicks. 2 Volumes. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972 [1925]. No Pages. Accessed 17 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc= Perseus:text:1999.01.0258. Epictetus. The Works of Epictetus: His Discourses, in Four Books, the Enchiridion, and Fragments. Translated by Thomas Wentworth Higginson. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1890. No Pages. Accessed 17 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online:

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http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0237% 3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D0%3Achapter%3D0. –. The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Enchiridion and Fragments. Translated by George Long. London: George Bell and Sons, 1890. Perseus Digital Library. No Pages. Accessed 17 June 2017. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999. 01.0236. –. Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae. Edited by Heinrich Schenkl. Leipzig: Teubner, 1916. Perseus Digital Library. No Pages. Accessed 17 June 2017. Perseus Digital Library. Online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext% 3A1999.01.0235%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D0%3Achapter%3D0. –. The Enchiridion. Translated by Elizabeth Carter. The Internet Classics Archive. No Pages. Accessed 17 August 2011. Online: http://classics.mit.edu//Epictetus/epicench.html, 29. –. Discourses Books III–IV and The Encheiridion. LCL. Edited by Jeffrey Henderson. Translated by W.A. Oldfather. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000 [1928]. Musonius Rufus. Musonius Rufus: Lectures and Sayings. Edited and translated by Cynthia King with a Preface by William B. Irvine. Lulu: 2010. Philo. Philonis Judaei Opera Omnia. Vol. 1-6. Textus editus ad fidem optimarum editionum. Lipsiae: Sumptibus E.B. Schwickerti, 1828–1829. –. Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt. Vols. 1–7. Edited by Leopoldus Cohn and Paulus Wendland. Berolini: Typis et impensis Georgii Reimeri/ de Gruyter, MDCCCLXXXXVI – MCMXXX, reprinted in 1962). –. The Works of Philo. Translated by C.D. Yonge. Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995 [1854–1855]. Rahlfs, Alfred, ed. Septuaginta (LXX). Editio altera by Robert Hanhart. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006. Von Arnim, Hans, ed. 2016. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. 4 Vols. Lissiae In Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1903. Repr. 4 vols. Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2016. The Holy Bible. English Standard Version. Wheaton: Crossway, 2001, 2006. The Holy Bible. Revised Standard Version Containing the Old and New Testaments, with the Apocrypha/deuterocanonical Books. New York: Collins, 1973.

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