The End of the Jihad State - the Reign of Hisham Abd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads [1 ed.] 0791418286, 0791418278, 0791418236

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Khalid Yahya Blankinship

The End of the Jihad State The Reign of Hisham I bn Abd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads Khalid Yahya Blankinship

Stretching from Morocco to China, the Umayyad caliphate based its expan­ sion and success on the doctrine of jihad—armed struggle to claim the whole earth for God's rule, a struggle that had brought much material suc­ cess for a century but suddenly ground to a halt followed by the collapse of the ruling Umayyad dynasty in 750 CE. The End of the Jihad State demon­ strates for the first time that the cause of this collapse came not just from internal conflict, as has been claimed, but from a number of external and concurrent factors that exceeded the caliphate's capacity to respond.

"The work argues a plausible theory singlemindedly but quite convincingly with full control of all the sources, which are treated intelligently and with the proper critical circumspection. It thereby contributes greatly to the understanding of important developments in early Muslim history." —Franz Rosenthal, Sterling Professor Emeritus, Yale University

"This is the first major book in English on the reign of any Umayyad caliph. The fall of the Umayyads and the rise of the Abbasids has been a central topic of Islamic history for three generations, but until now no one has put it all together and drawn specific conclusions for the caliphate as a whole, and no one has seen the military defeats of Hisham's reign as avoidable disasters that presaged the dynasty's fall. These are fresh insights and serve to refocus attention in a valuable way. Hisham had been thought a quite competent caliph. After reading Blankinship, people will have to reconsider. When they do, they will also have to reconsider the place of Jihad in the whole Umayyad period." —Richard W. Bulliet, Columbia University Khalid Yahya Blankinship is Assistant Professor of Religion at Temple University. He is the translator of Volumes 11 and 25 of the History of alTabari, also published by SUMY Press.

A volume in the SUMY series in Medieval Middle East History Jere Bacharach, editor

STATE UNIVERSITY OF MEW YORK PRESS ISBN 0-7914-1828-6

90000> m X

9 780791 418284

The End of the Jihad State

SUNY Series in Medieval Middle East History Jere Bacharach, editor

The End of the Jihad State The Reign ofHisham Ibn 'Abd Al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads

Khalid Yahya Blankinship

State University of New York Press

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1994 State University of New York

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, NY 12246

Production by Bemadine Dawes • Marketing by Bernadette LaManna Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Blankinship, Khalid Yahya The end of the jihad state: the reign of Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik and the collapse of the Umayyads / Khalid Yahya Blankinship. p. cm. — (SUNY series in medieval Middle East history) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-7914-1827-8 — ISBN 0-7914-1823-6 (pbk.) 1. Islamic Empire—History — 661-750. I. Title. II. Series. DS38.5.B58 1994 909'.09767101—dc20

10 987654321

93-26126 CIP

Contents Acknowledgments

ix

Explanations, Symbols, and Abbreviations

Introduction

x

1

The Importance of the Umayyad Caliphate and Its Collapse / 1 The Problem of the Reign of Hisham / 4

Is- Jihad and the Caliphate before Hisham 11 The Doctrine of Jihad / Il An Outline of the History of the Jihad State 2-132/623-750 / 19 The Madman State and the First Expansion 2-35/623-56 / 21 The First Civil War and the First Hiatus 35-40/656-61 / 23 The Sufyanid Umayyad State and the Second Expansion 40-63/661-83 / 24 The Second Hiatus and the Second Civil War 63-76/683-92 / 26 The Marwanid Umayyad State and the Third Expansion 73-99/692-718 / 28 The Third Hiatus and 'Umar II99-101/718-20 / 31 The Marwanid Umayyad State and the Fourth Expansion 101-22/720-40 / 34

2s. Administrative Geography and Tribal Identity under Hisham 37 The Administrative Geography of the Caliphate in 105/724 / 37 Tribal Identity in the Administration and the Army / 42

vi

CONTENTS

3s- The Individual Provinces of the Caliphate 47 Syria, the Metropolitan Province / 47 The Jazlran Superprovince / 50 The Iraqi Superprovince: The 'Viceroyalty of the East' / 57 The North African or Western Superprovince / 67 The Southern Zone: The West Arabian Backwater / 73 4s- Administrative Policies and Ideology at the Beginning of Hisham's Reign 77 The Caliph Hisham and the Caliphal Office / 77 The Central Administration of the Caliphate under Hisham / 79 Caliphal Fiscal Policy at the Start of Hisham's Reign / 81 Ideological Centralization / 92

5s- The Challenges of Internal and Foreign Opposition to Hisham's Caliphate 97 The Internal Opposition under Hisham / 97 The External Strategic Situation in 105/724 / 102 The Byzantine Empire / 104 The Caucasian Principalities / 106 The Khazar Khanate / 108 The Turgesh Khanate and Transoxiana / 109 Sijistan / 110 India / 110 The Franks / 112 The Berbers / 113 Other Parts of Africa: Nubia and Abyssinia / 114 6s- The Beginning of the Military Crisis 105-11/724-29 117 The Building Crisis / 117 The Byzantine Front 105-11/724-29 / 117 The Caucasus 105-11/724-29 / 121 Transoxiana 105-11/724-29 / 1255 Sijistan 105-08/724-27 / 129 India 104-08/723-27 / 131 Egypt 105-11/724-29 / 135 North Africa and the West Mediterranean 105-11/724-29/ 136 Spain and the Franks 105-11/724-29 / 140

Contents

7^ The Climax of the Military Crisis

145

A Sudden Turn for the Worse / 145 Sijistan 108-14/726-32 / 146 India 108-13/726-31 / 147 The Caucasus 112-14/730-32 / 149 Transoxiana and Khurasan 111-15/730-33 / 155 The Byzantine Front 112-14/730-32 / 162 The Frankish Front 112-14/730-32 / 163 Egypt and North Africa 112-14/730-32 / 165

8^ The Continuation of the Policy of Expansion 115-22/733-40 167 Lull and Resumption / 167 The Byzantine Front 115-22/733-40 / 168 The Caucasus Front 115-23/733-41 / 170 Transoxiana and Khurasan 115-23/733-41 / 176 Sijistan 115-25/733-43 / 185 India 113-22/731-40 / 186 KharijI and ShiT Revolts in Iraq and the East / 190 Egypt 115-22/733-40 / 192 North Africa 115-22/733-40 / 193 Spain and France 114-22/732-40 / 196

9.- The Collapse of the Expansion Policy 122-25/740-43 199 The Berber Revolt and the End of Expansion / 199 The Byzantine Front 123-25/741-43 / 200 The East, Including Sind 122-25/740-43 / 202 The Great Berber Revolt 122-25/740-43 / 203 Causes of the Revolt / 204 The Beginning of the Revolt 122-23/740-41 / 206 'Abd al-Malik b. Qatan al-Fihri's Coup in Spain 123/741 / 208 The Brief Governorship of Kulthum b. 'Iyad 123-24/741 / 209 The North African Governorship of Hanzala b. Safwan al-Kalbl 124-27/742^15 / 213 The Caliphal Twilight in Spain 124-25/742-43 / 218

Conclusion

223

Final Results of the Destruction and Scattering of the

vii

viii

CONTENTS Syrian Army / 223 The Yamanl-Sponsored Reform Program: Rationale and Result / 225 General Conclusions / 230

Maps

237

Appendix A: Sources for the Reign of Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik 247 Historical-Critical Considerations / 247 Some Aspects of Methodology / 251 The Nature of the Sources / 254 The Limitations of the Material Evidence / 257 The Muslim Literary Sources and Their Geographical Limitations / 258 Christian Literary Sources / 265 Social and Structural Limitations in the Muslim Literary Sources / 267 Modern Scholarship / 270

Appendix B: On the Population of the Umayyad Caliphate 273 Glossary of Arabic Technical Terms

Notes

279

Bibliography

Index

353

369

Map Index

395

275

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all those who contributed to the writing of my dissertation and to its thorough revision for publication as the book you now hold before you. First, I would like to thank the editors and staff at the SUNY Press for their excellent work and their patience when my revision and editing were going more slowly than I would have liked owing to reasons beyond my control. I include in this the readers who recommended the dissertation for publication with criticisms that I hope I have dealt with. I would especially like to thank Professors Jere L. Bacharach, my disserta­ tion supervisor, and Carol G. Thomas, Arther Ferrill, and Farhat J. Ziadeh, members of my committee, for their guidance, insights, and suggestions made on the original dissertation. Furthermore, I want to express my appreciation to Professor Hussain MonSs of Cairo University, without whose training and help at the Master's level this book would scarcely have been possible. In addition, I wish to credit the late Professors Muhammad al-Nowaihi and Muhammad Diya' al-Dln al-Rayyis for their important contributions to my train­ ing. I also extend my thanks to Yasir Sakr for helping me to revise the maps. My thanks also go out to my wife, who patiently bore my engrossment in the preparation and revision of this work and actively encouraged me to hasten its completion. Whatever faults may remain in the work are my own.

Explanations, Symbols, and Abbreviations

The Arabic transliteration used in this book is that generally in use among scholars. However, the final Id' marbuta is not represented by an 'h' or any other symbol, except when it is the first element of a construct (jdafa), in which case it is shown as a't'. Throughout the text, dates are given according to both the Mus­ lim hijri calendar and to the common era, the hijri dates come first, fol­ lowed by both common era dates; thus, 105-25/724-43, not 105/724125/743. In all cases, the two dates are separated by a slash mark (/). Complete references for the sources cited in the notes are found in the bibliography. Citations in the notes give the author's short name as alphabetized in the bibliography and the page number of the reference. In case more than one source by a particular author is cited, a short title is also given to indicate which of the author's works is meant. Volume numbers are given in capitalized Roman numerals; Qur'anic suras are indicated by small Roman numerals. I have used very few abbreviations for references in the notes that cannot be found explained in the bibliography. Probably the most significant of such are EP and El2, which refer respectively to the first and second editions of The Encyclopedia of Islam. Most names on the maps represent those contemporary with the reign of Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik. Some modern names on the maps are printed in italics. This is especially the case in the map of India, map 7. But many of the names common to modern Western usage, such as geographical terms like 'Mediterranean Sea/ or the names of French cities, still occur in ordinary type. On the whole, I have tried in the maps to represent the medieval names actually used by the sovereignty ruling a place. Thus, most names in Anato­ lia (map 4) are transliterated from the Greek, although they may have Arabic equivalents occurring in Arabic texts. Likewise, French names are shown for France, including Narbonne (Ar. Arbuna), Arabic names for Spain. For India, I have given such Arabic names as occur in the texts, supplementing these with transliterated Indian names where the Arabic terms are unknown or unavailable.

Introduction

The Importance of the Umayyad Caliphate and Its Collapse

The early Muslim state or caliphate, first centered in al-Madlna and then in Syria, constituted one of the largest unitary empires that mankind has ever known. Starting from small beginnings in west­ ern Arabia, the Muslim state rapidly grew enormous, uniting a ter­ ritory stretching from Spain to China and from Yaman to the Cauca­ sus under the rule of the Muslim caliph within a single century. As a result of this expansion, the Muslim caliphate surpassed the Roman and Chinese empires in land area, perhaps being exceeded only by that of the Mongols in pre-modern times. Although precise information for its population is lacking, the Muslim state also undoubtedly would rank high on the list of pre-modern states in that regard as well, owing to its sheer size.1 Like all other multinational empires, the Muslim state reached its greatest extent through a series of military campaigns. These are referred to in Muslim literature as "the openings" (al-futiih or alfutuhat). This terminology is directly comparable to the American expression "opening up," as in "the opening up of the West" in ref­ erence to the extension of Euro-American conquest and settlement westward to the Pacific Ocean in the nineteenth century. In this case, as in those of the Romans, the Mongols, the Spanish, and oth­ ers including the Muslim Arabs, expansion became an ideological imperative justified on moral grounds.2 In the case of the Muslim caliphate, this imperative was the establishment of God's rule in the earth, for that was the sole legitimate sovereignty. God's rule was to be established by those kinds of efforts that He had ordained, which included armed struggle in His path. Such armed struggle became known as jihad3 and remained the most salient policy of the caliphate down to the end of Umayyad rule in 132/750. Most signif­ icantly, the jihad called for a mass mobilization of Muslim man­ power that played an important role in the caliphate's success. Indeed, the persistence of the Muslim movement forward on all

2

THE END OF THE JIHAD STATE

fronts, for nearly a century, can only be explained if this basic doc­ trine of early Muslim ideology is taken into account. Many other peoples have shared the desire for wealth and the wish to escape poverty and overpopulation, insufficient explanations which have been offered for the astonishing rapidity and extent of the early Islamic conquests. Such a persistent dedication to armed struggle as exhibited by the early Muslims required an ideological belief to back it, even if worldly expectations also played a role. After all, the Muslim fighters, especially in the earliest period, were not profes­ sional soldiers but, nevertheless, carried out the jihad continuously, despite numerous debacles and defeats. Being partly inspired by a belief is not, of course, unique to the Muslims. For example, the Mongols, from an early stage in their conquests, were also propelled by the belief that they were destined to rule the whole earth.4 However, in the case of Islam, the work of conquest through jihad was first for God, second for the reward of the other world for those who sacrificed their property and their lives in God's path, and only third for worldly rewards for God's warriors who survived.5 Unlike the Mongols, whose empire was founded by a warrior chieftain, the Muslims did not fight to estab­ lish the rule of a particular person or his family, for Islam was taught by a spiritual leader who was, above all, a prophet rather than a warrior. While the Muslims' inspiration for fighting in God's path had spiritual roots, it is clear that the material success of their early con­ quests in this world helped to strengthen their belief in the rightness of their pursuit of jihad. Fighting in God's path succeeded brilliantly against an exhausted Sasanid Persia, a seriously divided East Roman or Byzantine empire, a weak Visigothic Spain, and a Sind alienated from its rulers when the early Arab Islamic strength had not yet spent itself. The great amounts of booty gained, helped finance the continuing struggle to advance on various fronts. As a result, the Islamic state grew accustomed to financing itself through booty to a considerable extent. However, despite the enormous size of the caliphate and the ideology of jihad that supported it, the universal caliphate did not endure for centuries like the Roman and the Chinese empires, but suffered a sudden and unexpected disruption after which it was never reconstituted. This came about before the end of the rule of the Umayyad family in 132/750. Because of this disruption, which began with the civil wars of 122-32/740-50 and culminated in the replacement of the Umayyads with the 'Abbasids, three major results emerged.

Introduction

3

First, the political unity of Islam and the Muslims, which is strongly insisted upon in the Qur'an,6 was immediately and forever sundered after 122/740. Although the 'Abbasids continued the caliphate and maintained the unity of most of the caliphal domain, 'Abbasid rule never extended far west of modern Tunisia,7 so that the lands in the modern countries of Algeria, Morocco, Spain, and Portugal were lost. While most of these lands had been acquired by the caliphate under the Umayyads only forty or so years earlier, their separation nevertheless constituted a huge loss. Furthermore, they were not simply lost to the caliphate but immediately became Muslim states outside of it. This decisively ended the political unity of the Muslims and undermined the legitimacy of the 'Abbasids by denying the universality of their rule, thus contributing to the even­ tual disintegration of their domain. 'Abbasid rule was eventually replaced with an ever-shifting kaleidoscope of separate Muslim polities that prevail to this day. Second, the jihad stopped on all frontiers, also from 122/740, with only a couple of exceptions. Just as the Umayyad collapse spelled the end for Muslim unity in a single state, so it also meant the end of the universal jihad, immediately and forever. Under the Umayyads, the Muslim caliphate had rarely concluded even tempo­ rary truces with non-Muslim polities; under the 'Abbasids, such truces would become frequent, leading in time to exchanges of embassies, and finally a diplomatic mosque in Constantinople.8 Under the Umayyads, the frontiers had frequently been expanded right through the time of the caliph Hisham (105-25/724-43), but the 'Abbasids made only minor local frontier expansions, and oth­ erwise suffered from continuous territorial losses to new, parochial Muslim entities that presaged the political division of the medieval Muslim world. This political division created a doubt about who could authorize and lead jihad, which, as a universal campaign to claim the earth for God's rule, ended with the fall of the Umayyad caliphate. Third, the end of the Umayyad state fundamentally changed the way Muslims looked at the world, thus helping to shape the future course of Islam. Without expansion as a main cause, the Mus­ lims had to turn their attention inward to the internal ordering of their own society. The principle of the equality of the believers of all different origins and stations in life was strengthened.9 Although the establishment of an Islamic government remained an ideal, respect for the actual rulers continued to dwindle, as the 'Abbasids discovered to their chagrin, and the Muslim religious leadership became more and more dissociated from the government in fact, if

4 s- THE END OF THE JIHAD STATE

not in theory. With the failure of the universal war jihad, more emphasis began to be placed on the peaceful spiritual quest,10 even though the concept of religiously sanctioned warfare remained "on the books," to be invoked if needed. By this peaceful transforma­ tion, the doors were opened for the already extant spiritual element of Islam to undergo a continuous elaboration persisting to this day, a development which has greatly enhanced the attractiveness of Islam to non-Muslims and thus facilitated its spread in the world. In view of its spectacular and defining importance, we must carefully consider the causes of the downfall of the Umayyad caliphate. Although these causes have been seen in the internal situ­ ation in the caliphate, in tribal or ethnic conflict, regional rivalry, and schismatic religious movements, the external context of the caliphate must also be, as it has not usually been, taken into account. In particular, it is necessary to scrutinize in greater detail the reign of Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik, who witnessed with frustra­ tion the end of his family's venerated jihad policy in his own life­ time, and to pay special attention to the little-studied external rela­ tions of his reign-

The Problem of the Reign of Hisham Most modern historical opinion considers the reign of Hisham to have been one of the more successful in the Umayyad period.11 This opinion owes mainly to the belief that, as a personally sober, seri­ ous, and apparently hardworking ruler, Hisham delivered his enor­ mous realm undiminished and undamaged to his successor, despite severe pressures on it from many sides. In fact, he even enlarged it on several fronts; for example, the Muslims reached farther than ever before in France, the Caucasus, and India during his rule. Like­ wise, the Muslim tradition about Hisham has pictured him as a con­ scientious and efficient, if severe and tightfisted, administrator.12 And, medieval Muslim historians unite with the moderns in con­ curring that, rather than the rule of Hisham, it was more the brief rule of the prodigal al-Walld b. Yazld (125-26/743-44) that exacer­ bated underlying problems, leading to a series of revolutions and civil wars which ended with the collapse of Umayyad rule alto­ gether. Thus, the modern historian Hugh Kennedy has stated, "It should not be thought that collapse was inevitable or that another Hisham could not have sustained the empire,"13 and, "The Umayyad regime had never been as strong as it had been under Hisham only a decade before the final collapse."14

Introduction

5

Others have sought longer-term causes for the Umayyads' fall in the social conditions of the times rather than in the personal qual­ ities of the caliph. But, it is worthwhile to note that modem western, as well as medieval Muslim historical opinion has been sufficiently impressed by the apparent zenith of Islamic expansion under Hisham to look for these deeper reasons almost entirely in the inter­ nal problems of the Islamic state: tribal, regional, and sectarian. Outwardly, this appears reasonable enough, for after all, the Syrian Arabs of the metropolis did start the civil wars of the Third Fitna (126-34/744-52) by killing al-Walld II. Then, while the Syrians fought among themselves to establish power, the 'Abbasids relied on provincial Khurasanis who had responded to their call for the government of a righteous imam. Most modern historical analyses expand on these bits of infor­ mation. Thus, Wellhausen found the dissatisfaction of the growing class of non-Arab Muslims with their second-class status, especially in Khurasan, to have been the prime cause of the Umayyads' down­ fall, along with the tribal strife among the Arabs themselves.15 Shaban has emphasized the assimilation of the Arab tribes in Khurasan to local interests as providing a model for solving the problem of equitable integration for all Muslims in the state, a process which led the newly integrated revolutionaries to oppose the Umayyads' Arab tribal state, leading to its downfall.16 Crone considers the main cause of the Umayyads' fall to be the appearance of a class of gener­ als who no longer needed the dynasty's tribally based regime.17 Curiously, all three of these share a social explanation for the entirely military events of the civil wars of the Third Fitna. However, a close examination of the evidence suggests quite another view that also takes into account the structure of the rela­ tions of the Umayyad caliphate, but also looks at those relations outside its borders as well as within. The various internal problems which beset the Umayyads, including tribal strife, regionalism, and revolutionary movements with a religious coloring, were mostly long standing. Though severe, these previously had been and still might have been compassed, deflected and overcome, even in Hisham's reign, given enough time, concentration of effort, and political wisdom. But what made that impossible was an unprece­ dented series of military disasters inflicted on the caliphate by out­ side powers during this reign. It was mainly this combination of spectacular military defeats that started the Umayyad rule hurtling toward its sudden downfall, rather than any new or worsening set of internal problems. Even the sage Hisham was incapable of doing much to remedy the situation and gradually lost control over the

6

THE END OF THE JIHAD STATE

course of events, though it was left to his successors to feel the full force of the deluge. If reponsibility is to be assessed with the benefit of hindsight for this outcome, it may best be assigned to the unbending Umayyad adherence to their traditional policy of expansion through war against the non-Muslims, a policy that was entirely continued by Hisham,18 though now with disastrous results. The expansion pol­ icy was a fundamental pillar of the state ideology, informed as it was by the belief in jihad, the military struggle against the non-Mus­ lims until they either embraced Islam or agreed to pay tribute on their persons in exchange for protection (jizya), a belief derived orig­ inally from the Qur'an itself19 and pursued ever since, almost with­ out a break, by the successive caliphal governments. By the time of Hisham, the Muslim state not only faced a grow­ ing reluctance to fight on the part of some of its own troops, who pre­ ferred to settle down to enjoy the many fruits of victory.20 But also, it faced, more ominously, a wall of strong peoples on all sides, against whom the caliphate unavailingly hurled its troops in the renewed campaigns to advance the frontiers that followed the death of TJmar II. They faced not only a reinvigorated Byzantium shorn of most of its non-Greek provinces, but also relatively unurbanized, poor, and unorganized peoples at the fringes of civilization, the Central Asian Turks, the Khazars, the Berbers (these had never been completely islamized), and the Franks. Besides these, they also faced an impor­ tant front against several civilized kingdoms in India. Fighting against all these opponents turned out to be materially unrewarding. Each of these except the Franks had been partially subdued by the earlier blows of the first Muslims they had encoun­ tered. Each seemed to have learned from adversity in the interim and now dealt the Islamic state one or more severe defeats during Hisham's reign. The Turks and the Khazars even forced the Mus­ lims onto the defensive. It would appear, in fact, that the reaction of each of these peoples to the Muslim onslaught reached its peak at the same time, overburdening the capacity of the Muslim state to respond. Of course, it is true that the military debacles of Hisham's reign did not precipitate the downfall of the Islamic state itself. The caliphate's central areas remained safe and unravaged. In fact, the caliphate actually succeeded in overcoming its external opponents to some extent, renewing the offensive even before the end of Hisham's reign against the Turks, Khazars, and Berbers and keep­ ing up warfare against the Byzantines and the Indians. This persis­ tence is what has given a false impression of the effects of these

Introduction

7

campaigns on the state. Since the caliphate did not disappear but instead continued to triumph for a while over certain of its foes into 'Abbasid times, it is assumed that the wars of Hisham were merely further stages in the hard but steady process of Muslim military success. Since the results of Hisham's debacles were not immedi­ ately fatal to the Muslim state, their possibly dominant role in the dynasty's downfall has not been considered. But actually, though Hisham's hard-fought wars did not directly bring about the Umayyads' downfall, they nonetheless immediately created three fatal difficulties. First, the expense of carrying on continuous warfare and replac­ ing lost military units brought huge new burdens to a state treasury that had to some extent depended on a steady flow of booty from campaigns, a flow which had by then been greatly curtailed because new conquests had stopped. The state's dependence on booty was compounded by the lack of a sufficient administrative infrastruc­ ture that would enable it to tax its subjects efficiently. As a result of this situation, the increased military burdens contributed to an unexampled financial crisis which compelled the state to impose severe methods of financial retrenchment, including various forms of stricter accounting and taxation as well as cost-cutting measures and restrictions on spending. Naturally, these fiscal measures cre­ ated a good deal of discontent, provoking violent resistance in many areas within the caliphate. Furthermore, the stricter financial measures were often ineffective, or at least insufficient, so that the financial crisis persisted. Second, the continuous harsh campaigning and accompanying military disasters had, to a considerable extent, weakened the enthusiasm of the troops for fighting. This was especially the case when the fighting was not only unrewarding in material terms, but also militarily useless or, worse, disastrous, as was usually the case with campaigning under Hisham. Just as success had strengthened the spirit of jihad earlier, failure now weakened the will to perform it. This unprecedented weakening of the will to carry out the princi­ ples of the state ideology first showed itself on those fronts where the fighting had been the hardest, particularly Khurasan, where it is best documented. But, it was present on other fronts as well. Natu­ rally, as the men began to feel bitter over their hard lot, they increas­ ingly made invidious comparisons about how their situation was worse than that of troops on other fronts who received the same pay but had it easier. Under Hisham, the reluctance of such troops to go out on campaigns at all forced the caliph to introduce Syrian troops to defend the various provinces. This made the local troops even

8

THE END OF THE JIHAD STATE

more hostile to the central government, because it introduced inter­ lopers who threatened to make the locals superfluous and to take over their locally privileged positions. But, while some of the provincial troops thus became furious about the Syrian domination, the dominant group, the YamanI Syri­ ans, themselves bore the greater losses in the military catastrophes of Hisham's reign, especially those that occurred later. By upsetting the two-party tribal balance in the empire between the Yaman and the Mudar in favor of the latter, the Yaman's losses created the third fatal weakness in the Umayyad state, the collapse of the dynasty's main support, that of the Syrian army units identified with the Yaman tribal grouping. In particular, the severe losses suffered by the YamanI Syrians in North Africa from 122/740 undermined the Yaman's claim to be the basis of Umayyad power, a claim which they had maintained since their victory over the Mudari Qays grouping at Marj Rahit in 64/684. Their losses also appear to have created a military vacuum in Syria at the end of Hisham's reign. Though the Syrian army contin­ ued to exist, its remaining forces were now almost entirely dis­ persed, especially in North Africa. This situation greatly enhanced the position of the geographically unified Jaziran army adjacent to Syria on the Byzantine front. This force was now probably more dominated than ever before by Jaziran Mudari units. This Mudari dominance of al-Jazira stemmed from the loss of many Syrian Yamanls in Adharbayjan with al-Jarrah al-Hakami in the disaster of 112/730, as well as to the subsequent withdrawal of the Syrian Yamanls of Hirns from the Byzantine front, along with some Mudarls of Qinnasrln, for service in North Africa. Furthermore, their disastrous losses may have given the surviving Syrians less stomach for further fighting. These Syrian military reverses, as well as the regime's fiscalism, strengthened the resolution of the Syrian Yaman tribes to further elaborate their own political program, first clearly adumbrated in the caliphates of Sulayman and 'Umar II. These tribes pushed furi­ ously for its adoption, even by violent means, partly out of belief in reform for its own sake, and partly in a desperate effort to save themselves from the weakness of their position by broadening their power base. From this resolve issued the killing of Hisham's successor alWalld II, who had stuck unrepentantly to the outmoded traditional policy of the Umayyad house but had nevertheless managed to alienate even its members. Once the Umayyads' legitimacy once destroyed by the Yaman's military coup against al-Walid II, it was

Introduction

9

left to the only two significant surviving army groups in the empire, the Jazlran and the Khurasan!, to fight it out to see whose prefer­ ences would dominate. The KhurasanTs' victory established the 'Abbasid regime. The isolated Syrian Yamani remnants in Spain and North Africa were thereby left out in the cold, while Spain, Morocco and Algeria were forever sundered from the caliphate as a result of the 'Abbasids' victory elsewhere. To summarize, at the outset of Hisham's reign, it could not have been expected that the Umayyad state would unravel so quickly. By the end of the reign, the deterioration was nakedly exposed for all to see. Therefore, as far as the Umayyads are concerned, it was in the reign of Hisham that their fate was decisively sealed rather than before or after it. The Muslim power with its united state survived, but the dynasty did not, except as an exile state in Spain with an entirely different elite. This outcome stemmed, above all, from an unprecedented series of military defeats inflicted on the caliphate mostly by non-Muslim outside powers during Hisham's reign. These defeats overburdened the Islamic state's military capacity, which led, in turn, to a serious financial crisis, a weakening of the will to fight in the provincial armies, and huge losses in the Yamanldominated Syrian army, until then the main prop of the state. This situation exacerbated pre-existing tribal and provincial rivalries which had only just been controlled, causing them to break out again with a renewed virulence that swept away the Umayyad dynasty itself.

-1 Jihad and the Caliphate before Hisham

The Doctrine of Jihad

More than any polity that had existed before it, the early Muslim caliphate was an ideological state, that is, a state directed toward a single, unified ideological goal. In general, the caliphate's ideology was the religion of Islam or the submission to God's will, as revealed in the Qur'an to the Prophet Muhammad. Whether or not the Qur'an contains clear prescriptions for an Islamic state, it is cer­ tain that the Prophet himself did in fact establish a charismatic polity based both on the enlightenment of God given to him by rev­ elation, and on his own personal leadership. The sole official pur­ pose of this polity was to teach and transmit the ideology of Islam.1 After the Prophet's death, the caliphal state carried on this purpose, finding clear ideological expression for it in the doctrine of jihad, the struggle to establish God's rule in the earth through a continuous military effort against the non-Muslims until they either embraced Islam or agreed to pay tribute (jizya) on their persons in exchange for protection.2 The idea of jihad was derived from the Qur'an itself and had been applied by the Prophet Muhammad perhaps as early as Ramadan 1/March 623.3 From that time forward, for more than a century and almost to the end of the Umayyad caliphate, despite a few interruptions, the policy of jihad was applied unswervingly. Indeed, the policy of jihad constituted one of the main ideological underpinnings for the institution of the caliphate from the begin­ ning; since the struggle to expand Islam's realm had been continu­ ous from the time of the Prophet, there was an obvious need for a central political and military leadership to control and coordinate that effort. The emphasis put on jihad from the earliest times is one of the best attested facts of early Muslim history and therefore has been less challenged by doubts that have been raised by certain scholars about the value of the Muslim historical corpus, than have other 11

12 s- THE END OF THE JIHAD STATE

aspects of the received tradition. This is because the existence of the jihad is abundantly evidenced from many sources, including con­ temporary ones, both Muslim and Christian. Therefore, the early jihad is evidenced not by the elaboration of its theoretical doctrine in 'Abbasid and later legal texts so much as in the historical record. In fact, the earliest reference to the Prophet Muhammad in a non-Muslim source, the Doctrina lacobi nuper baptizati of c. 13/634, already mentions the military aspect of his teaching.4 The jihad is also emphasized by the Armenian pseudo-Sebeos, who wrote shortly after 40/661.5 Of course, the jihad also enjoys prominent display in the Arabic Muslim sources. Although the Muslim wars of conquest in the caliphal period are not always referred to in the sources using the term jihad,6 they are, nevertheless, plentifully documented. Above all, the doctrine of the jihad is clearly spelt out in the Qur'an. Muslims are required to go out to fight in God's path against unbelievers7 or, to make monetary contributions to the war effort.8 Such contributions are a loan to God that God will repay manyfold.9 Only those who either fight or spend in God's path are the truly sin­ cere.10 Those holding back are threatened with both divine and worldly punishments and denounced as hypocrites.” From this, we can conclude that we have here an example of mass mobilization with universal conscription.12 Fighting in God's path is portrayed as a commercial exchange by which the believers purchase paradise by sacrificing themselves.13 Great rewards in the afterlife are specified for those killed. It is beleived that they will go straight to paradise without any further reckoning of their doings in their worldly life.14 Others who fight are also promised rewards in the hereafter, while shares of the booty are laid out for them if they prove victorious.15 Of this booty, the troops should get four-fifths of the total.16 The purposes of the jihad are also laid down clearly in the Qur'an. At first, jihad is ordained to be waged defensively, so that the worship of God may be pursued freely in the earth.17 Then, it is also enjoined in retaliation against those who fight against the Mus­ lims18 or have driven the believers out of home and family.19 But, it eventually takes on a more general definition. Muslims should fight those opposing them until all religion is devoted to God alone.20 Indeed, God sent Muhammad so that the religion of truth would tri­ umph over all [other] religion.21 Opponents are usually character­ ized as oppressors both in the Qur'an and in the historical tradition, which often refers to an opposing monarch as a tyrant (taghiya).22 Therefore, wars against them are wars of liberation. When those opposing cease their opposition, their desire for peace must be accepted.23 However, this concession eventually is

Jihad and the Caliphate before Hisham

13

only made in consideration of a payment (.jizya), which symbolizes their submission.24 Presumably, this payment then belongs to the reward of the Muslim fighters, who should receive four-fifths of it.25 Jizya should only be taken from peoples of the book, Jews, Chris­ tians, Sabeans, and perhaps Zoroastrians,26 while idolaters may be slain wherever they are found and must be fought unless they accept Islam.27 On the other hand, non-Muslims are not to be forced to embrace Islam.28 Muslims are not to fight against one another.29 The Qur'an even advises the Muslims on military tactics. Espe­ cially, they are not to flinch or become weak when the fighting gets rough, but to endure patiently.30 They should fight in a solid battle formation (saff).3'1 This verse suggests the use of military tactics quite different from those of the stereotypical raiding traditions of nomadic Arab tribes. The causes for the near defeat at the Battle of Uhud in 3/625 are analyzed in some detail.32 But the emphasis is most strongly on ideological commitment to fighting in God's path, a doctrine highlighted by the repeated promises of otherworldly rewards.33 The second main source of Islamic religious and legal practice, the hadith traditions attributed to the Prophet, supports what the Qur'an says on the jihad. Even though the authenticity of their attri­ bution to the Prophet has been challenged by some Western schol­ ars, it is hardly disputable that the hadith corpus is relevant to the reign of Hisham, at which time much of it must have been in circu­ lation, and at least beginning to be recorded in writing, if indeed that process was not already considerably advanced. Certainly, as the hadith represents what the Islamic community chose to remem­ ber about the Prophet's words and deeds, it also must reflect, on the whole, the norms of that community, at least by the end of Umayyad rule. Also, the tone of the hadith concerned with jihad cer­ tainly fits what is known of the jihad of the Umayyad period better than it does that of the 'Abbasids. According to the hadith, waging jihad in God's path is specifi­ cally defined as a duty which every able-bodied Muslim [male] must either perform or try to perform. In particular, a Muslim must respond to the call to arms if called upon.34 The Prophet is said to have drawn up a list of all male Muslims for military purposes,35 suggesting universal conscription, or at least the possibility of it. However, spending to support the jihad effort is equated with actual participation.36 Certain other nonmilitary types of jihad are also acknowledged by the hadith. Thus, performing the pilgrimage to Makka is equated with performing the war jihad.37 The women's jihad is the pilgrimage,38 though women may also go out to the jihad

14 s- THE END OF THE JIHAD STATE with the men in noncombatant roles with equal spiritual reward implied, but without shares in the spoil.39 Building a mosque to transmit the knowledge and religion of Islam is called the best kind of jihad.40 Finally, in a tradition which spiritualizes and dematerial­ izes the concept, the true fighter in God's path (.mujahid) is described as he who struggles against himself by himself.41 A noncanonical tradition even calls this the greater jihad in comparison to the mili­ tary one, which is lesser.42 However, the overwhelming majority of hadiths refer to the military struggle when they use the term jihad. Other hadiths state that the reward of going forth to fight in God's path is either paradise if one is killed or dies, spiritual reward for the effort and hardship involved, or spoil that is won from the enemy.43 But the greatest reward is paradise for martyrs, that is, those killed while struggling in God's path, about which there are many hadiths.44 These include the famous hadith that paradise is in the shadow of swords.45 Dying as a martyr completely wipes out one's sins.46 Other hadiths, however, suggest that the moral state of the martyr at death also determines his degree in paradise.47 Both a warrior in jihad who dies later in bed or a person who migrates for the sake of God and dies peacefully can also be considered mar­ tyrs.48 Boring military duties such as garrison and guard duty also bring great spiritual rewards even if they involve no fighting.49 A Muslim who dies from plague,50 abdominal disease, drowning, or a collapsing building, also dies a martyr.51 Other versions add to this list those who are burnt alive, fall off a mountain, or are eaten by carnivorous beasts, and women who die as virgins, when pregnant, or in childbirth.52 Jihad is the third most important duty of a Muslim after regular worship and filial piety,53 or the second after regular worship.54 Elsewhere, however, it is considered the very best work.55 Holding back and cowardice are reproved.56 Jihad is to be waged only to exalt God's word; other motives either detract from an effort or dis­ qualify it from being real jihad.57 As for unbelievers, they must be combatted until they accept God's unity, the cardinal tenet of Islam.58 Such people do not neces­ sarily have to be Muslims, however, but can keep their religions if they are people of the book. Other traditions suggest, though, that the struggle must be kept up until they also perform salah (Islamic worship) and pay zakdh (a tax paid only by Muslims).59 Polytheists should not be left in Arabia.60 In other versions, Christians and Jews also should not be left there.61 Opponents should be invited to embrace Islam before the Muslims launch any assault.62 Another version adds that they should be given the choice between Islam,

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15

payment of the jizya, or fighting.63 Treaties or agreements must be scrupulously observed.64 Moral limits are to be observed in warfare, including avoidance of killing noncombatants such as the elderly, women, and children and of destroying fruit trees, livestock, and buildings.65 These limitations are further elaborated in the Islamic law.66 Extensive rules are also established in the hadith for dividing the spoil, with one-fifth going to the government, as outlined in the Qur'an.67 As in the Qur'an, tactical advice is also given in the hadith. The Muslims should fight in close ranks. They should be patient and persistent.68 They must avoid trying to grab the spoils prema­ turely,69 which was a serious temptation for medieval armies. Troops should make sure they have adequate provisions.70 They must also, at all times, obey their commanding officer, unless he orders something in contravention to the divine law.71 Thus, the individual free-for-all of bedouin raiding was out; disciplined, com­ mitted order was in. In general, the impression of the jihad that one gets from the Qur'an and hadith is of a highly motivated mass ideology directed toward a single goal. Indeed, the ideology of Islam anticipated modem ideologies in its mass appeal and means of creating enthu­ siasm. This enthusiasm was probably contagious and did not strictly rely either on promises of paradise or expectations of worldly gain, though both of these were present to help ignite the movement at the first, and both continued to play a role. Nothing that had gone before had ever resembled the Muslim mobilization methods, especially as far as the Arabs were concerned. No wonder the non-Muslim empires of the time were outclassed and tended to be easily dominated and defeated for over a century. Not only the teachings embodied in the Qur'an and hadith, but even the structure of the communal worship required of Muslims five times a day reflected the military commitment and helped to maintain the enthusiasm for the jihad. Except perhaps for details, the structure of this worship must be early and therefore reinforces our evidence from the Qur'an about the paramount importance of the jihad in earliest Islam. Muslim males assemble in the mosques; females stay at home. The men line up for worship in rows, as if in a battle formation. Being in the first row is considered more meritori­ ous than the back rows, as in battle.72 The word used for row in worship is saff; exactly this word is used in the Qur'an for a battle rank or formation.73 During worship services, absolute obedience to the leader (imam) is required, as well as the imitation of all his actions in unison. Just as the pews in a church are sometimes said to

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