The Eighteenth Century

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THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME V

mm

THE EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY by

EMILE .BREHIER

TRANSLATED BY WADE BASKIN

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO AND LONDON

677 ESfp v.

5

216859

Originally published in ig^o as Histoire de la philosophic:

La Philosophic moderne.

II

:

Le Dix-huitieme

siecle.

© ig^o, Presses Universitaires de France

The

present bibliography has been revised

and enlarged

to

include recent publications. These have been supplied by

Wesley Piersol Murphy. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-20912 The University of Chicago Press, Chicago London

&

The

University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada ig6y by The University of Chicago

©

All rights reserved. Published ig6y

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS Newton and Loc\e

i

i

FIRST PERIOD (17OO-40)

11

Deism and Ethics Based on Inner Feelings in

Berkeley

26

Christian Wolff

iv

v

47

Giambattista Vico

Montesquieu

vi

54 61

SECOND PERIOD (174O-75) vii

viii

David ix

x

Condillac

Hume

and

Adam

Vauvenargues

The Theory

of

73

Smith

114

Nature

121

91

13

VI

CONTENTS Voltaire

xi

143

Jean Jacques Rousseau

xii

155

THIRD PERIOD (1775-1800) xiii

xiv

Sentiment and Pre-Romanticism

The

Persistence of Rationalism

xv

Kant

INDEX

199

259

175

192

NEWTON AND LOCKE between the great

systems

theological

of

Male-

branche, Leibniz, or Spinoza and the massive philosophical structures of Schelling, Hegel, or to

be a

moment

Comte, the eighteenth century appears

of relaxation for the synthetic

and constructive

mind. Appraisals have differed: the eighteenth century has been scorned

by historians of philosophy Berkeley,

Hume, and Kant—

who —apart from

have found

its

the

doctrines

disconnected, not very original, pamphletary, and biased;

other point of view, the violent

negative, destructive, critical century. In short, as

which

is

considered to be

The beginning

its

it

as

it

seem

many

like a

different

on the French Revolution,

direct outgrowth.

of the eighteenth century

the rapid decadence

from an-

reaction which marked the be-

ginning of the nineteenth century tended to make

judgments have been passed on

of

thinking to be sketchy,

was characterized by

and collapse of the great systems in which

the intellectual heirs of Descartes

losophy of nature and

had sought

the philosophy of mind.

the eighteenth century were

to

unite the phi-

The

luminaries of

Newton and Locke: Newton, whose

basic teachings, expressed in his natural philosophy or physics, are

only loosely connected with his doctrines of spiritual trines

which he was inclined

to accept

realities

rather than to subject to methodical meditations as

part

and parcel of

his physics;

—doc-

through personal mysticism

and Locke, the author of

if

they were

a philosophy

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

2 of

mind not

directly related to the

of mathematical

and physical

Newton. Locke and, more to establish

between mind

contemporaneous development hands of Boyle or

sciences in the

particularly,

some

of his successors tried

and the material world an affinity like an

affinity is dis-

which Descartes had

tried to estab-

that reflected in the theory of attraction; but such

from

tinct

the methodical unity

between the different parts of philosophy.

lish

It is

phor in which the image of mind corresponds ture as revealed by

Newton,

a simple meta-

to the

model of na-

for the illusion persisted that

possible to achieve in sciences of the

human mind

it

was

success as remark-

able as that achieved in natural sciences.

No

matter

of nature

how

paradoxical

it

may

seem, this radical separation

and mind dominated eighteenth-century thought. The

dualistic direction of

Locke and Newton governed men's thinking

throughout the century, except for the protestations which later

i

we

shall

examine.

Newton's Thought and

The

essential traits of the

Its

Diffusion

change of mind produced by the pro-

digious success and diffusion of Newton's celestial mechanics are

worth noting. At the beginning of the eighteenth century a kind of Cartesian orthodoxy virtually dominated instruction in every

and Rohault's physics was widely

country, years

it

diffused.

had completely disappeared; abandoned

first

Within

thirty

in England,

it

survived in Scotland until 1715. "I believe," wrote Reid (August 24, 1787) of James Gregory, professor at the University of St. "that he

was the

first

who

professor of philosophy

taught

ton's doctrine in a Scottish university; for the Cartesian

the orthodox system at that time Voltaire,

who

and continued

with Maupertuis did

much

to

Andrews,

New-

system was

to be so

till

1715."

propagate the

New-

tonian spirit in France, considered the year 1730 as the date of definitive success. "It

was only

after the year 1730,"

its

he wrote con-

cerning the philosophy of Descartes, "that there was a withdrawal in

France from

this

chimerical

philosophy,

when

experimental

—

3

NEWTON AND LOCKE

geometry and physics began

to receive

more

attention." It

was then

that the Newtonians, notwithstanding Fontenelle's faithfulness to

Cartesianism, gained admission to the

Academy

of Sciences. Later,

Holland wrote that the philosophy of Descartes had few

in 1773,

adherents.

Newton's

mechanics

celestial

metrically opposed to those

is

found

characterized by two traits diain Cartesian physics:

the application of mathematics to natural

cision in

utmost pre-

phenomena,

which allows rigorous calculation of the great cosmic phenomena (motion of the planets, gravity, are given;

tides)

and ample allowance

when

their initial conditions

for inexplicable

phenomena,

since

cannot be deduced mathematically but are

their initial conditions

provided only by experience. In Descartes, on the contrary, there

were certain instances when qualitative descriptions of mechanisms

which did not

which was intended

that characterize

traits

pendent.

The

culus, the only lytical

first

Newton's

it

to be integral.

it

how

shows

But

magnitude

like ana-

at a

—and

this is the

second

does not contain the conditions that

calculus

possible

application to physical reality.

agine conditions which,

if

given

the magnitude varies in intensity

differential its

me-

differential cal-

new mechanics;

expresses the state of a

direction at that instant.

a

The two

mechanics are interde-

celestial

depended on the discovery of

language adequate to the

geometry,

instant; in addition,

and

any prediction appeared alongside

result in

chanical explanation

It is

trait

make

easy for us to im-

they had been realized, would have

ruled out the use of differential calculus and the discovery of the

law of attraction: under actual conditions, in a planet in relation to the sun

bodies in the universe to

it

is is

ciprocal attraction of

if

calculate only the re-

the other disturbing forces

to solar attraction in the chaos of reciprocal

actions (typified by the

applicable.

we need

two masses; but

pends on everything)

the position of

negligible in relation to the attrac-

tion of the sun, with the result that

had been comparable

fact,

such that the attraction of the other

world of Leibniz, in which everything dedifferential

calculus

would have been

in-

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

4

Some

conditions could have been different, however, with-

initial

out affecting the solubility of the mechanical problem; for example, it

makes no

difference whether the tangential force of the

motion

of planets acts in a particular direction or in the opposite direction.

The two lestial

inseparable: the solution of problems of ce-

traits are

mechanics requires data which cannot be explained me-

Newton provided no cosmogony —no

chanically. In other words, scientific

explanation of the origin of the existing arrangement and

As the astronomer Faye noted, "Newton when he came to the constitution, gyratory in origin,

velocity of celestial bodies.

stopped short

be interpreted?

We

But how

1

of the solar system."

cannot

fall

is

this

lacuna in his explanation to

back on chance, for

if

planets were

flung haphazardly into the field of gravitation of the sun, the probability that they is

would assume

infinitely small.

telligent

We

who

being

must have recourse

set the planets in

power

of an in-

motion and who,

to create

immense

distances

to the

isolated solar systems, "placed the fixed stars at

from each other for fear that these globes would by virtue of the force of their gravity."

Newton's mechanics

and an

a geometer terials of his

and

accepted

it

inexplicable

2

way

a continuous

that the result

tried to

it

is

a stable state

the foundation of his natural religion,

phenomena and

to construct

random motion and

is

it

—solutions

subject solely to the

Newtonian like

the

system? That was the question studied by Kant and by

Laplace,

who showed

clearly

how

the motion inaugurated by

ton could not stop where he had intended to stop 2

of

that particles

law of attraction are of necessity shaped into a system solar

many

for mechanically

cosmogonies

How

pre-

While Voltaire

obvious.

narrow the allowance made

problems declared insoluble by Newton. actuated by a

was

and periodic motion. The

instability of this link

and made

Newtonians

on each other

own theology. His God is who knew how to combine the ma-

architect

and

fall

linked to his

system in such a

of equilibrium

cariousness

is

and motions

their actual positions

it.

"On

As quoted by Busco, Les Cosmogonies modernes (Paris, 1924), Leon Bloch, La Philosophic de Xewton (Paris, 1908), p. 502 f.

this

p.

52.

Newpoint

NEWTON AND LOCKE

5

[the arrangement of the planets]

Newton

.

.

.

,"

causes

are

wrote Laplace.

"When we

human mind and

of the progress of the final

cannot help observing

method which he applied

deviated from the

fully elsewhere

I

continuously

we

its

To

explain a phe-

was, for Descartes, to imagine the mechanical structure

from which

it

issued, but such

several possible solutions

an explanation

inasmuch

likely to introduce

is

same

as the

through quite different mechanisms.

chanical structures imagined to account for

be avoided in experimental philosophy.

Non

result can be ob-

Newton

stated that all the "hypotheses" of the Cartesians

—that

phenomena

repeatedly is,

the

me-

—ought

jingo hypotheses

to

means

do not invent any of the causes which may well explain phe-

nomena but which

are only probable.

Newton admits no

except the one that can be "deduced from

When

of

find a type of intel-

ligibility quite different from the Cartesian type.

I

see that the

limits

physics rejected his meta-

physics. Furthermore, even in his physics

that

we

pushed beyond the

Thus many who accepted Newton's

tained

so success-

3

knowledge."

nomenon

far

trace the history

errors,

its

how

phenomena

he enunciated the law of universal gravitation,

cause

themselves."

Newton was

under no illusion that he had arrived at the final cause of the phenomena explained by his law. He was only showing that it is in accordance with the same law that heavy bodies are drawn

toward the center of the earth, that the liquid masses of the

drawn toward

are

ward the

earth

the

moon

in tides, that the

we

is

drawn

to-

and the planets toward the sun. Proof of the law

of universal gravitation rests solely

example,

moon

seas

on experimental measures. For

can demonstrate Newton's thesis by calculating ac-

cording to the laws of Galileo the motion which actuates a heavy

body placed this

motion

at the distance of the is

precisely that of the

of the terrestrial meridian

our calculation, and tion of 3

its

it

is

moon and by determining that moon (the length of the degree

one of the elements that enter into

was because Newton accepted a

false estima-

length that he almost abandoned his theory, which

As quoted by Busco, op.

cit.,

p. 52.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

6

nevertheless

was confirmed by

plished at a later date). It

name

that he gave the

cause of

all

these

that gravitation

a

more

measurement accom-

exact

was by analogy with

terrestrial gravity

phenomena. But he was by no means

is

self,

and

any action from

impossible. Since the principle applies to

Newton was

in space

certain

was the cause of these phenomena, and he went

so far as to posit as unassailable the principle that

a distance

unknown

of gravitation or attraction to the

that

led to declare that

inasmuch

telligent being, space

is

as this

is

God

by

and

God. Consequently

collision

edge of phenomena was insufficient effects of collision

God him-

present at every point

the presence of an active, in-

the sensorium of

tation could be explained only

is

to

gravi-

and contact; but knowl-

permit deduction of the

contact; therefore he posited, at the periphery

of his experimental philosophy

and by way of example, an ether

which matter was suffused and whose properties would explain

in

gravitational

phenomena by impulsion.

But the master's suggestion was not followed. "His desires have not been fulfilled," wrote D'Alembert in 1751 in his Discourse

on the Encyclopedia, "and probably will not be time."

On

the contrary, there

crowning achievement attraction

This

is

who answered

duced occult

long

fulfilled for a

Newton's

to regard

as the discovery of attraction

an irreducible property of matter,

penetrability. bert,

was a tendency

and

to

make

like extension or

clearly the interpretation favored

im-

by D'Alem-

who accused Newton of having intro"What harm would he have done to phi-

those

qualities:

losophy by giving us grounds for believing that matter can have

unsuspected properties and by disabusing us of the ridiculous confidence is

which allows us

to think that

we know them

all?" This

the exact opposite of Cartesianism. Descartes began with a clear

and

distinct idea

of matter

and

to

which gave him

intuitive

knowledge of the essence

which nothing could be added;

it

was by "con-

sulting" this idea that one could determine the properties of matter.

The Newtonians found for

in their master a completely different rule

determining the universal properties of matter: "The qualities

of bodies

which can neither increase nor decrease and which

be-

NEWTON AND LOCKE

7

long to in the all

bodies that can be investigated," says the fourth rule

all

Regulae philosophandi, "ought

Thus experience and induction alone

bodies."

ton's rule

to be treated as qualities of

is

confirmed by the

are decisive.

on substance

reflections

Essay. Locke, too, assumes that substance

is

known

New-

in Locke's to

us only

through an accumulation of properties which experience alone veals to us as being rigidly interlinked. It

even necessary to attribute attraction

is

—which,

re-

then permissible and

Newton

as

proved,

has the same coefficients regardless of the bodies under consideration

—to matter. Thus measurement alone assures

of a quality.

"The

first

means employed by

when

"are not within our reach

us of the identity

nature," said Voltaire,

they are not amenable to compu-

tation."

Thus

attraction,

though

it

defied explanation,

was

to

Newtonians

an incontestable property of matter. Voltaire was expressing a

when he said that number of properties

widely held opinion

physics consists in starting

from a very small

of matter revealed through

the senses

and discovering through reason new

attraction.

"The more

men

prised that

I reflect

on

it,"

must have an

everything

distinct" {Philosophic

Through rated

said, "the

more

I

am

sur-

new principle or property number of them, for in nature

are afraid to recognize a

in matter. It is

he

attributes such as

approach

this

infinite

also, the

de Newton, Part

II).

philosophy of nature was sepa-

from the philosophy of mind. The primitive data by means

which nature was interpreted were the data of experience, but

of

the

mind could not

penetrate

them

or identify their cause. In the

course of the century a long series of difficulties arose from this

empiricism.

From in a

the philosophical standpoint, Newton's science leaves us

quandary: his mechanics can direct us toward theology or

we are not told explicitly where mind can go beyond the opaque

materialism, and

explanation stops

or whether the

qualities ascribed

to experience.

of his results

There

is

a striking contrast

and the imprecision

was the underlying theme philosophy.

of a

between the precision

of his principles

—a contrast which

major part of eighteenth-century

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

8

Diffusion of Locke's Ideas

ii

"Locke can be said

same way

that

to

have created metaphysics in

Newton had

it

was often used

The word "metaphysics"

powers, and

its

its

limits.

Locke spoke of

infinity, the

used

is

in the eighteenth century, to designate

the subject of Locke's Essay

Essay,

the

created physics," wrote D'Alembert in

his Discourse on the Encyclopedia.

here, as

much

—the

study of

human

understanding,

In discussing the understanding in his

subjects peculiar to metaphysics

—the

idea of

question of liberty, the spirituality of the soul, the exist-

God and the external world—but he dealt with these subjects not so much because of his interest in them as because of his desire to determine how far the human mind can go in such ence of

questions.

"The aim

1737), "is to

of metaphysics," said Father Burner

make such an

exact analysis of the objects of the

(1661-

mind

that all things can be conceived with the greatest possible exact-

ness

By

and

precision."

4

the beginning of the eighteenth century Locke's ideas were

widely diffused on the continent.

The Essay was known

in

French abridgment published by Leclerc (1688), in numerous tions of Coste's translation

of

(1700),

Wynne's English abridgment.

nals:

Nouvelles de

la

It

and

in the

lettres

edi-

French translation

was discussed

Republique des

its

in learned jour-

(August, 1700 and

February, 1705), Memoires de Trevoux (June, 1701), Histoire des

outrages des savants (July, 1701), and Bibliotheque choisie (Vol. VI, 1705).

Long

his Treatise

of

before Voltaire, in 1717, Claude Burner wrote in

on First Truths: "Locke's metaphysics has led a part

Europe away from

was of course referring which are

to Locke's

certain illusions disguised as systems." to the systems of Descartes

system as fiction

is

He

and Malebranche,

to history.

The

Philosophi-

(1734) which Voltaire brought back after his stay in England (1726-29) crowned what was already an established succal Letters

cess. *

Elements de tnetaphysique (ed. Bouillier),

p. 260.

Bibliography

Becker, C. L.

New

The Heavenly

Haven,

City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers.

1932.

La philosophic de Newton. Paris, 1908. M. H. Phases of Thought in England, pp. 225 fT. Oxford, 1949. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. F. Koelin and J. Pettegrove. Princeton and London, 1951. Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy. Vol. 5, Hobbes to Hume. Westminster, Bloch, L.

Carre,

Maryland, 1964. Faguet, E. he XVIIIe

Flamenc, L.

le.

siecle. 1890.

Les Utopies prercvolutionaires

et la philosophic

du XVIIIe

siecle. Paris, 1934.

Gillispie, C.

The Edge

of Objectivity:

An

Essay in the History of Scientific

Ideas. Princeton, i960.

Hazard,

P.

La

crise

de

la conscience

europeenne (1680-1715). 3

vols. Paris,

1935. .

.

The European Mind, 1680-1J15, trans. J. L. May. London, 1953. European Thought in the Eighteenth Century, from Montesquieu

Lessing, trans.

J.

L.

May. London,

to

1954.

Koyre, A. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, pp. 155 ff. Baltimore, 1957. Lalande, A. Les theories de I 'induction et de I 'experimentation, pp. 110-45. Paris, 1929.

McLachlan, H. The Religious Opinions of Milton, Loc\e and Newton. Manchester, 1941.

Mauzi, R. L'idee du bonheur au XVIIIe siecle. Paris, i960. Mornet, L. Les sciences de la nature au XVIIIe siecle. 191 1. Rosenberger. Isaac

Newton und

seine

physi\alischen

Principien.

Leipzig,

1895.

Vernier e, P. Spinoza et la pensee francaise avant la Revolution. Vol.

XVIIIe

siecle. Paris, 1954.

Whittaker, E. T. Aristotle, Newton, Einstein. London, 1942.

2,

Le

FIRST PERIOD 1700-1740

DEISM AND ETHICS BASED ON INNER FEELINGS it

rationalists

was

in

the

absolute

seventeenth-century

that

sought to establish the rules of thought and action:

Cartesian reason sought "true natures" whose immutability

guaranteed by

God

himself; Malebranche

in Leibniz principles of

knowledge are

saw

was

God; and

ideas in

also principles of divine

action. Seventeenth-century rationalism preserved the idea that the

rule of thought, like the rule of action, transcends the individual.

Acceptance of apriorism or innatism resulted from the desire to avoid having these rules depend on chance and accidental discoveries through individual experience.

The

Many

century

rationalism of the eighteenth literary critics attribute

he was the

first

it

to Descartes

The

in individual experience

rules of thought

and

reason, the

different.

on the ground

find order in chaos

and organize

his

own

tribunal, efforts

knowledge and

of the thinkers of the period

and they

man must action. It

were inclined

in this experience a principle of order, a benevolent reality

would support

their efforts or

make them

form of nature or God, manifested

possible

—reality

is

to find

which in the

in the regularity of external

things or in man's innermost tendencies. There trast

that

and action were sought

supreme

required no other guarantee: through his

many

quite

to assert the rights of reason against authority,

but they are mistaken.

true that

is

is

a striking con-

between the excessive finalism of the century of nonbelievers 13

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

14

and the reserve with which the century of signs of ciple

rational prin-

but was rather a kind of divine complicity, with the result

that the

God who was

and became, ture.

believers treated the de-

God. This finalism was not in any sense a

support remained in the background

its

in materialistic systems, simple nature

There was a strong tendency

to

—our

own

na-

view transcendental authority,

whether imposed from without by the church or monarch or from within by innate ideas, as something wholly arbitrary invention justified only by reasons priests

and

politicians,

human,

too

all

—a

human

a stratagem of

was

a set of philosophical prejudices. It

thought that true generality

—a

standard

—could

be found by pro-

ceeding in just the opposite direction: toward nature as

God

vealed to the unprejudiced observer.

it

re-

is

himself, according

Lord Bolingbroke, resembled an English monarch whose

to

were

acts

always in keeping with the conditions that result from the nature of things: he

imposed on of

mind

i

Deism

was limited by the

his infinite

power.

1

are provided by deism

rules

which

Remarkable examples of and

wisdom

his infinite

this state

on inner

ethics based

feelings.

Fenelon described with precision the scope and nature of the deist

so in

movement which was France during the

so important in

first

England and even more

part of the eighteenth century:

great vogue of the freethinkers of our time

is

"The

not to follow the

system of Spinoza. They credit themselves with acknowledging

God

as the creator

according to them,

given

man

whose wisdom

God would

a free will

—that

is,

is

evident in his works; but,

be neither good nor wise the

his final goal, to reverse the order

power

to sin, to turn

and be forever

lost.

if

he had

away from ... By ad-

hering to a system that eliminates any real freedom, they divest themselves of any merit, blame, or Hell; they admire

God

out fearing him, and they live without remorse, swayed

way and then another by 1 2

passions."

2

If,

as

we

one

read these words,

on the Spirit of Patriotism (London, 1752). Lettres sur divers sujets de metaphysique et de religion. Letter 5. Letters

with-

first

DEISM AND ETHICS

15

we

disregard the bishop's hostility toward the

clearly that a

new

new

spirit,

we

see

conception of man, wholly incompatible with

the Christian faith,

had been introduced: God the

architect

who

produced and maintained a marvelous order in the universe had been discovered in nature, and there was no longer a place for the

God the

no longer and

God who bestowed upon Adam God was in nature and

of the Christian drama, the

"power

to sin

and

to reverse the order!'

in history; he

biologists

was

in the

and no longer

wonders analyzed by

in the

human

accompanied

feelings of sin, disgrace, or grace that

he had

left

man

in charge of his

Thus, in his definition of a stressed the

human

new

own

naturalists

conscience, with the his presence;

destiny.

Anglican bishop Gastrell

deist, the

morality that had replaced the dictates of the

conscience:

"The

deist

is

one who, while he accepts a God,

denies Providence or at least restricts

it

to such a degree that

he

excludes any revelation and believes that his obligations are deter-

mined

by public or private

solely

of another life" (Certainty

The

situation could

interest,

and Necessity

have appeared

without consideration

of a Revelation)

the

all

more

defenders of the faith because there was no one

.

serious to the

among them

to

counter the pretensions of reason with pure and simple fideism. All were advocates of a natural religion based on strated

dogmas demon-

by reason; they clashed with their adversaries over the issue

of determining whether, as they believed, natural religion by

itself

leads to revealed religion. Gastrell, for example, posited the thesis that, if a deist is

not at bottom an

impossible in a Christian land for ligion.

Samuel Clarke, who

enemy of natural religion, it is him not to accept revealed re-

typified this spirit,

the rationalists of the seventeenth century to

sake rational truths concerning

one

step further

revelation; he

God and

was not content

expound

for their

like

own

the soul or even to go

and determine whether they would agree with

was always wavering between reason and

faith,

and

in spite of the apparent rigor of his demonstrations, he took pains to erase the lines of demarcation between them.

The

result

was a singular

situation: in

England

especially, deists

and orthodox Christians used the same weapons, or rather

deists

—

l6

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

had only

borrow from

to

theologian, Sherlock,

Gospel

ligion of the

and

nature,

which

is

that

its

who is

was an orthodox

their adversaries. It

said in a

sermon

in 1705 that the re-

and

the true primordial religion of reason

precepts introduce us to the primordial religion

"as old as the Creation."

These words, which are in such one

perfect agreement with Locke's rational Christianity, enunciate

which became

of the ideas

They took

deists.

a favorite

theme of

all

eighteenth-century

delight in contrasting the simplicity

and naturalwhich

ness of the ethics of Jesus with the theological superstructures

many

brought on mankind so case insoluble.

An

earlier

Christianity, based solely

The same theme cated (1739)

conflicts, often

on

The Moral Philosopher

his primitive

reason, with neither tradition nor priest.

The True Gospel by Thomas Chubb, who made appears in

an exposition of fundamental truths such in

bloody but in any

example was Toland, 3 with

(1737-41)

of Jesus Christ Vindi-

the teaching of Jesus

and

as that of Socrates,

by Thomas Morgan,

who

sought the true religion in primitive Christianity. In spite of their rationalism affinity

between English

that their doctrines

whom

deists

we

and

generally find an extraordinary Scripture.

were completely

Although they

rational, these

were scholars or clergymen, seemed unable

insisted

men, many of

to dispense

with

amMatthew Tindal

the revelation provided by Scripture. This accounts for the

biguous character of the ( 1 656-1 733),

men and

for example, the

their thinking.

most celebrated of the

voted to the defense of the rights of the church in

with the

state,

Sherlock's

he published a work which borrowed

statement,

quoted above

Christianity

as

had a

deists,

high position in the national clergy. At the end of a long its

life

de-

relations

its title

Old

from

as the

Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature (1730).

He

and drew ligion

called

this

upon

all

the arguments of Clarke and Wollaston,

conclusion concerning the comparison of natural re-

and the Gospel: The

religion of nature

tion correspond exactly to each other, with

them except 8

the

See Emile Brehier,

manner

in

no

and external

revela-

difference between

which they are communicated.

The Seventeenth Century (Chicago, 1966),

p. 285.

Was

it

DEISM AND ETHICS

17

not obvious that this sole difference should rule out completely

any revelation, together with the consequence?

If

throughout the book,

it

which was

historical tradition

Tindal did not draw

this

conclusion,

was through an obvious

its

implicit

On

inconsistency.

the other hand, one of the great enemies of the Anglican clergy,

Thomas Woolston

(1669-1731), chose to interpret allegorically the

miraculous accounts of the Gospel and to see in them pure truths of reason rather than to

Thus confusion

abandon Scripture

of philosophical

altogether.

knowledge and revelation had

reached the point where the only means of freeing religion was

demonstrate that revealed religion could produce

to

all its benefits

without the motives for acting proposed by reason. Such was the

Warburton (1698-1779), who became Bishop of 1759. In The Divine Legation of Moses, Demonstrated

goal of William

Gloucester in

on the Principles of a Religious Deist (1737-41), he showed that one of the rational truths thought by deists to be essential to the Mosaic religion

and Christianity

—a

truth

namely the immortality of the soul his people.

him

What

on which

—was

conclusion could be

supernatural power and

means indispensable

to

grounded,

is

not taught by Moses to

drawn except

made him

law-makers

ethics

that

God

gave

capable of dispensing with

who employ

only reason?

In his Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution

ham

and Course

in 1750,

conflict.

He

Nature (1736) Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durchose a different course in an attempt to mitigate the of

addressed himself to adversaries

posedly assumed that

God was

and he then undertook

were the same in nature and

this hypothesis

as

those raised against the religion,

affirmed that the providence of If there

were identical

identical presumptions

ligion

ment

on both

against both deism

natural or

God was

difficulties, it

sides,

were disregarded. His method

of determinism or fatalism:

if

and

deists

—who

sup-

the author of the system of nature,

demonstrate that the

to

by

men.

—the

true,

it

if

is

difficulties

raised

just as refractory

revealed,

which

reflected in the lives of

followed that there were the special proofs of re-

illustrated

by his treatment

can be used as a valid argu-

religion,

and the argument can be

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

10

refuted in the

same way

in both instances.

cannot deny the existence of a

finality

This

true because one

is

and consequently of a

will

in nature but can only say to the deist that this will acts through necessity; yet the institution

and punishments, such

of rewards

made

by the author of nature of a system

judgment which causes us

to expect either

according to the circumstances, ous than

finality.

show

to

as that taught

by

religion,

is

not

probable by the supposition of fatalism, since our moral

less

On

rewards or punishments,

a fact of experience no

is

less

obvi-

work was designed

the whole, then, Butler's

the equivalence between the probability of religion

the probability ordinarily associated with other things

course of things always

makes

it

affairs in

establish

the truth of religion."

was insoluble

His aim was

natural

necessary for us to act in our

accordance with proofs similar to those which

temporal

conflict that

"The

:

and

4

Butler's

in the terms in

doctrine transposed a

which

it

had been

an absolute,

not, like Clarke, to establish

stated.

rational,

universally equivalent certainty, but to define motives for believing

by comparing them with motives ordinarily accepted by men.

work appeared, Marie Huber published

Shortly after Butler's

book designed

a

to

provide religion with a principle of certainty

which sound judgment would adopt therefore eliminate of

God

all

at

sight

and which would

traditional opinions contrary to the nature

man. To accomplish her aim the Genevan writer

or

Man;

Letters concerning the Religion Essential to

from what

merely an accession to

is

published in 1738, was printed in

it

(the

as

French

it is

version, also

Amsterdam)—imagined an

man who discovered the First Being through and who was then introduced into society and

—in

distinct

un-

tutored

self-examina-

tion,

persuaded to

accept the Christian religion. In her supposition

same object

spirit that led

was

to

of his thought.

she put 4

it,

Wor\s, ed.

that

She had

to

might

his historical

interfere

imagine a

man

and

E. Gladstone (1896), Vol.

I.

The

traditional milieu,

with the natural course with respect to

"no authority can be used other than the W.

recognize the

Condillac to his hypothesis of the statue.

remove man from

from the influences

we

whom,

as

intrinsic char-

DEISM AND ETHICS

10.

acteristics of truth

which an unbiased observer

As

itself,

for revelation

amenable

torical data

indubitable truths of

to the

finds in revelation."

must be made between

a distinction

his-

—clear and —and accessory elements tinged

ordinary rules of evidence

common

sense

with obscurity, such as the harsh evangelical advice which was

sometimes given by Jesus and which goes against man's natural inclinations;

many

of

contains

revelation

finally,

impenetrable

which contradict our elementary sense of

mysteries,

justice

—for

ex-

ample, the notion of imputative righteousness, ransom, or substitution,

which

an

attributes the merit or demerit of

act to

someone

man

obviously

other than the performer. Marie Huber's unhistorical

accepted only the unhistorical part of Christianity, for he did not

Deism

intend to be overburdened by the weight of tradition.

one aspect of a general tendency to find all the elements of his

—the

but

is

tendency of the individual

moral and

own

intellectual life in his

experience and reason.

The

conflict

continued for

many

years.

Orthodox Christians

ac-

cused deists of being atheists in disguise, since, according to them,

through a

series

existence of

God

of logical consequences leads to faith;

and

the deists accused the orthodox

Christians of adding arbitrarily to the data of reason.

was speculative only

in appearance.

adversaries to be the

same thing

disciple of Clarke

The

conflict

Deism may have seemed

and a noted enemy of the

thus in his Treatise on the True Religion (1737)

:

la

composed." For princes,

it

God

is

Chambre, a

"Nothing

is

then admits that there tion

is

God

between good and

that religion provides

port for this distinction.

of retribution pro-

evil,

an atheism which recognizes the

and confidently follows whatever reason

Chambre quickly adds

more

which

a comforter. Although he

says that atheism denies the distinction

Thus when

it

"encourages people to do

their duty"; for societies, the notion of a

motes virtue; for individuals,

its

deists, describes

desirable for princes, for societies, or for the individuals of societies are

to

but only because

as atheism,

could not replace the religion which Francois de

French

of the

the affirmation

deists

prescribes,

much

first

and

distinc-

De

la

stronger sup-

spoke of reason and

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

20

freedom of thought,

adversaries countered by emphasizing

their

and the instruments of government. In consequence,

social policy

deism and atheism were linked to every demand for tolerance, to

Deism was linked both

every tendency toward reform.

to empiri-

cism and to individualism; the "inner feeling" was the archenemy

De

and

of orthodox Christians,

he saw La Bruyere put

he wrote that religion

ence to those

who deny

distrusted

even

it,

when

to the service of religion. Criticizing the

it

proof of God's existence which ing,

Chambre

la

"is

La Bruyere based on an

of

no use

since

it,

inner feel-

in proving the divine exist-

one person cannot manifest

his

inner feelings to another and since the inner feelings of one person are

no model

for the inner feelings of another."

Here he

the Savoyard Vicar's criticism of religion. But his refer to a

movement which

was linked

to

paralleled deism

movement during

remark

and which,

empiricism and individualism.

the development of this

We

the

anticipated

shall

first

also

may

like deism,

now

follow

forty years of

the century.

Ethics Based on Inner Feelings

ii

To Hobbes man was

naturally an egotist

and could be induced

only by external coercion to accomplish virtuous useful to society. Significantly, both

and

criticized in

tury, the first

The views

England

at the

acts, that

affirmations

is,

acts

were contested

beginning of the eighteenth cen-

by Shaftesbury and the second by Mandeville.

of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) contrast sharply with those

of his contemporaries. in each animal species that these inclinations

He

believed that natural social inclinations

were directed toward the good of the

species,

were the work of a providence which, through

them, maintained the perfect harmony of the universal order, and that

man

good and

possessed a "moral sense"

which made him aware of

evil.

Francis Hutcheson, professor at the University of Glasgow in 1729,

gave a more systematic turn to Shaftesbury's ideas in several

of his works, particularly in

An

Inquiry into the Original of

Our

21

DEISM AND ETHICS

Ideas of Beauty

and Virtue

He,

(1725).

came under

too,

the influ-

ence of Malebranche. His proofs of the existence of the "moral sense" are worth noting:

which we bring

to bear

from the

issues

it

on

acts, or rather

judgment

disinterested

on the person who has

we would have the same feelings for we would no more admire distant land or century than we love the

accomplished them; otherwise

a fertile field as for a generous friend;

who

a person

lived in a

mountains of Peru; we would have the same inclination toward inanimate beings and rational beings. This moral sense has no

we have

ligious foundation;

the Divinity

lofty ideas of

re-

honor without knowing

and without expecting any reward from him;

further-

more, without our moral sense divine sanctions could make us

Nor

reach decisions only by coercion and not by obligation. related to the social good, for

man who own, and we esteem

we

person

it

whom we

is

it

betrays his

grounded on a quality

truly inherent in the

country in the interest of our

enemy. Finally,

is

despise a

are judging, for

it is

foolish for us to

a generous

assume that

the virtue of another person depends on our approbation of him.

We

should add that the word "sense"

is

appropriate,

and

that

it

does not presuppose any innate idea.

This faith in man's natural benevolence toward

man was

widely

accepted in the eighteenth century. In 1745 Diderot translated (not

without some modification) The Essay on Merit and Virtue, in

which Shaftesbury's indivisibly linked to

happiness sentence

is

the

aim was

to

show

knowledge of God and

inseparable

makes

The second

stated

first

from

virtue.

that virtue

is

almost

that man's temporal

The second

clause

in

his

one almost redundant.

of Hobbes' theses

is

implicitly criticized in a

work

which was immensely popular throughout the eighteenth century:

The Fable in 1705

and

of the Bees, or Private Vices, Public Benefits (published reprinted, with additions, in 1714

and

1723), by Bernard

de Mandeville, a Dutch physician residing in London. that

"Envy

isters of

itself," pride,

and human passions

He

in general are

argues

"Min-

Industry," and that the suppression of vice, which ethics

seeks to destroy,

would put an end

to

industry and

commerce

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

22 (p.

Adam

n). As

Mandeville's ideas,

ism which, ates

from

prime

6

Smith indicated

the heart of his thesis

ascetic severity

thus

necessity;

and

critical

exposition of

an extreme moral

is

as luxury everything that

burgeoning industrial

the

in

sees evidence of vicious passions,

seemingly disinterested his country,

his

rigor-

Cynicism, views as sensuality everything that devi-

like

around him he

in

not a

is

civilization

and he thinks

that

such as the devotion of a Decius to

acts,

can be obtained only through the

legislator's skill in

exciting vanity; vanity, the strongest of the personal passions, surpasses the egotistical pleasures act for others. ville's

What

rigorism, however, but the perfect

egotism and social

of

Common

Clear evidence of the same state of of the Jesuit Claude Burner, of tises

on metaphysics there are

Buffier

was not Mande-

harmony between

natural

had anticipated

their

Sense: Claude Buffier

mind

whom

sections

The work attracted when Reid and the

disowned." century,

when we

sacrifice

utility.

The Philosophy

in

which we must

the eighteenth century retained

little

provided by the work

which Locke would not have attention until the

Scottish

own

is

Voltaire wrote: "In his trea-

philosophers

philosophy of

end of the

showed

common

sense.

that

The

English translation of the Treatise on First Truths (1717), published in 1780, even accused

We

them

explicitly of plagiarizing Buffier.

shall see later that the Scottish school

as well as to Descartes,

and

it

is

was

hostile to

sincere esteem for Locke, the central idea of his system alien to Locke.

This idea

is

Locke

certain that in spite of Burner's is

totally

that first truths are not linked to the

inner sense, as Descartes supposed, and that the affirmation of such a union leads to

an extravagant skepticism which can be overcome

only at the price of inconsistency. For to say that, primitively,

we

are aware of the actual modification of the soul only as this modification

is

revealed to us by the inner sense,

is

to say that

legitimately doubt external things, the events of our past, 6

Theory of Moral Sentiments, VIII,

ii.

we

can

and the

DEISM AND ETHICS

23

men,

existence of other

since

inner sense; and

ject of the

none of

it is

these things could be the ob-

we

illusory to think that

could be-

gin with the modifications and demonstrate rationally the existence

The

of the things.

the idea of

God

God

Cartesian proof of the existence of a typical

is

we we

"begin with what ideas, or feelings,"

example of

through

illusory thinking, for

experience within ourselves cannot, as this proof

—our

if

we

thoughts,

would have us

go

do,

beyond "the perception of our own thoughts." All the insoluble problems that issued from the

methodical doubt

are,

therefore,

which are

"first" just as surely as the

external world or of other

I,

men,

(called "external truths")

inner sense

—the reality

of the

for example. For Buffer's

first

no sense the common notions which Descartes

truths are in Principles,

problems. There are

fallacious

truths relating to existences outside us

initial fallacy of

49) utilized in his reasonings,

greater than the part,"

which

is

(cf.

such as "the whole

is

a simple logical or "internal" truth,

a mere linkage of ideas from which existences could never be de-

duced. First truths posit existences outside us.

The what

faculty

is

meant

in a particular

which perceives these truths is

is

"common

Here

sense."

not innate ideas but "a simple disposition to think

way

at a particular juncture"

—for instance, to affirm,

when we

are in the act of perceiving, that external objects exist.

Common

sense

is

the

same thing

our awareness of nature that

origin of all truths of principle." is

as nature, since "it

we must

nature and

That nature should mislead us

unthinkable, and the sole function of the philosopher

common

who

sense of the obscurity diffused by "those

miliar with objects beyond the senses "scholars it

is

recognize as the source and

who

succession

of

when

a

great

are not fa-

and popular ideas" or by

How

misconstrue the most important truths."

be otherwise,

to rid

is

could

"excessive curiosity, vanity, bias, the brilliant

number

of

consequences

.

.

conceal

.

the

falsity of their principle?"

Buffier

had no

difficulty in refuting the reiterated objections of

the skeptics concerning the reality of the external world.

out that sense data are "adequate guides in daily

life"

He

even

pointed if

they

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

24

enough

are not certain

"to procure for us a science of pure curiosity,"

that whatever seems probable to us generally conforms to truth

the ordinary needs of

are at issue,

life

and

if

that in the opposite case

reflection readily corrects the situation.

Bu flier was union which

and

sense

and we should not

a theologian,

note the close

fail to

he established between the philosophy of

"Out of consideration

religious truths.

of mind," he wrote

end of the foreword,

at the

common

for certain turns

have restricted

"I

myself exclusively to the purely philosophical sphere; but lead to the

most

solid principles of religion."

end of the

cially the

(XIX-XXIV),

it

will

should note espe-

part of his treatise on the certainty of

first

XIV-XVIII) and

the testimony of the senses (Chapters authority

We

of

human

particularly his discussion of Locke's opin-

ion on the second point. Here he reprimands Locke for saying that the

argument of authority reached only probable conclusions

whereas, in certain questions of also censures

him

transmitted

is

credible. It

is

number

—obviously

clear that his

Catholic tradition

—that

is,

false

of intermediaries through

when

aim was

to

sense,

and

is les-

which

witnesses are equally

all

ground the authority

of the

of testimony traceable ultimately to direct

perception of the acts and words of Jesus

mon

equivalent to certainty; he

for saying that the probability of testimony

sened in proportion to the it

fact, it is

—on the

that in his view apologetics

first

truths of

had everything

by relinquishing Cartesian philosophy and returning to

com-

to gain

common

sense. It is in

the second

on Locke, in

book of

his Treatise that Buflier relies

mainly

his analysis of the ideas of essence, infinity, identity,

duration, substance,

and

liberty.

He

joins

Locke

in

condemning

the Cartesians' attempts to resolve the problem of the origin of ideas

and of the

relation of

his hostility to

"The most

mind and body, and he

human

faculties.

substantial fruit of metaphysics," he concludes, "is the

clear recognition of the limits of

many

declares in particular

any physiological explanation of

philosophers, ancient

our mind and the vanity of so

and modern."

Bibliography Bartholmes, C. Histoire critique des doctrines religieuses de la philosophic

moderne. Strasbourg, 1855. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury. London, 195 1. Broad, C. D. Five Types of Ethical Theory. London, 1930. Carrau, L. La philosophic religieuse en Angleterre depuis Loc\e jusqu'a nos Brett, R. L.

jours. 1888.

Espinas, A. "La philosophic en ficosse au XVIIIe siecle: Hutcheson,

Adam

Hume," Revue philosophique, XI, 1881. Flew, A. Hume's Philosophy of Belief. New York, 1961. Smith,

Hutcheson, F. Worlds. 5 vols. Glasgow, 1772. Lanson, G. "La transformation des idees morales rationnelles de 1689 a 1715," .

"Questions diverses sur l'histoire de

Revue

View

l'esprit

morales

1910.

philosophique avant 1750,"

France, 19 12. of Conscience and Obligation,"

d' histoire litteraire

Lefevre, A. "Butler's

de

et la naissance des

Revue du mois, January, la

The

Philosophical

Review, 1900. Leroux, E. and Leroy, A.-L. La philosophic anglaise classique. Paris, 195 1. Leroy, A. La critique et la religion chez David Hume, pp. 1-3. Paris, 1929. Lyon, G. L'idealisme en Angleterre au XVIIIe siecle. Paris, 1888. Mackintosh, J. On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, Chiefly during the

XVII and

the XVIII Centuries. Edinburgh, 1872. Types of Ethical Theory. 1 vols. 3d ed., rev. Oxford, 1901. Montgomery, F. K. La vie et I'oeuvre du P. Buffier. 1930. Raphael, D. D. The Moral Sense. Oxford, 1947. Schlegel, D. B. Shaftesbury and the French Deists. Chapel Hill, N. C, 1956. Scott, W. R. F. Hutcheson, His Life, Teaching, and Position in the History of Philosophy. London, 1900. Seth, J. English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy. London, 1912. Sidgwick, H. Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers. London,

Martineau,

J.

i93iSorley,

W.

R.

A

History of English Philosophy. Cambridge, 1920. Reprinted

1937.

25

BERKELEY GEORGE BERKELEY (1685-1753), DOITl of English Stock

He

College, Dublin, in

Ireland, entered Trinity

at Dysert, in

ordained, and lectured on Greek, Hebrew, and theology. losophers have been

an

earlier age.

more precocious

trine, of

Few

New

Human

in 1710, contains all the features of his doc-

which a part had been expounded a year

Essay Towards a

Theory

of Vision.

monplace Boo\, written between 1702 and in its formative stages, and and Philonous, published in

his

of the

1710,

shows

his doctrine

Three Dialogues between Hylas

1713, presents

revive moral

philosophical errors

and

religious feelings

ing his sojourn in Collins,

it

in a

new

form, in-

(1713).

travels in France, possibly in Sicily,

and

London he made

The

where he evidenced an

well as in archeology.

It

was

rectifi-

which he was combating, to refute freethinkers.

a direct attack

to

Dur-

on Arthur

one of the most eminent of the freethinkers, in

The Guardian

An

earlier in

His notebook, the Com-

tended for a very wide public. Berkeley attempted, through cation

phi-

or formulated a doctrine at

His Treatise concerning the Principles of

Knowledge, published

in

1700.

took his degree of Master of Arts, became a fellow in 1707, was

his articles

following years were given over to Spain,

and

interest in

in

especially in Italy

France (in Lyons,

turning to England) that he wrote

and

geology and geography as

De motu

as

he was

(1720), in

re-

which he

attacked Newton's physics. In 1726, after he had served for two years as

Dean

of Derry, he inherited a part of the fortune of Esther

26

s

BERKELEY

27

Vanhomrigh. His

first

thought was to use his inheritance to propa-

gate Christian civilization and thought in the American possessions

and he made public

of England, in

On

Bermuda.

his intention to

the strength of a promise of

from the government of Robert Walpole, he

project.

he

1731,

in

became intimately acquainted with the Neo-Platonic

first

who had

a profound influence

works; he wrote Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher

his last

which continued the polemic against freethinking

(1732), in

out in 1728 and took

sent to

philosophers Plotinus and Proclus,

on

an important subsidy

set

Rhode Island, where he waited in vain; the money him and he became less enthusiastic about the During his sojourn in Rhode Island, which lasted until

up residence

was not

found a college

initiated

The Guardian; and he met Jonathan Edwards, who propagated

his ideas in

and the

America. After his return to England in 1732, Alciphron

caused

him

ticians,

which inspired

to

(The Theory

An

his defense

of Vision

The Analyst

(1734).

.

doctrinal additions. cese populated

.

.

New

and

and explanation of the theory

Vindicated and Explained, 1733) and

During

edition of his Dialogues

him

Essay Towards a

Theory of Vision become involved in a polemic with the mathema-

third edition of

the

same year he published a new

Principles,

He was named

which contained important

Bishop of Cloyne, an Irish dio-

mainly by Catholics. The plight of Ireland caused

up economic questions (The Querist, 1735-37; Letter on the Project of a National Ban\, 1737) and moral questions (A to take

Discourse

.

.

.

Occasioned by the Enormous License and Irreligion

of the Times, 1738).

On

several occasions (notably in 1745, during

the Scottish revolt in favor of the Stuarts), he affirmed his desire to reach

an understanding with Catholics: (The Bishop of Cloyne

Letter to the

Word

to the

Roman

Catholics of the Diocese of Cloyne, 1745;

Wise, 1749;

Maxims concerning

The him with an

Patriotism, 1750).

outbreak of an epidemic in Ireland, in 1740, provided occasion to experiment with tar water, a

A

remedy which he had

dis-

covered in Rhode Island and in which he thought he saw the universal panacea. This

sophical work, Siris:

A

was the point

of departure of his last philo-

Chain of Philosophical Reflections and In-

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

28

quiries concerning the

Virtues of Tar-Water

Subjects Connected Together in

which

(1744),

marvelous

his guest for the reasons for the efficacy of the

remedy brought him

1

and Divers Other

and Arising One from Another

to Platonic metaphysics.

Philosophical Ideas in

The Commonplace Boo\

The Commonplace Boo\ number

contains a

of short notes in-

tended mainly for the preparation of the work which Berkeley was contemplating

—his

Principles.

These notes

refer not only to the

—the

book

only parts of the

the applications of the doctrine in geometry

and physics ("My end

projected Introduction

work is

to

appear

and

to the first

—but also to a second book, which was to deal with

not to deliver metaphysics altogether in a general scholastic way,"

he wrote, "but in some measure to accommodate them ences and

and

show how they may be

to a third,

(as in the trine;

which was

we

Dialogues)

De motu

to deal

useful in optics, geometry, etc."),

with

which he is all

in the Principles

for the third. Berkeley never actually carried out

set

the

Thus

find only the elementary part of the doc-

the project of his youth, however,

used,

ethics.

substitutes in certain respects for the second book,

and Alciphron in

to the sci-

down

more

and The Commonplace Boo\,

many

his fleeting reflections,

interesting because

it

of

them never

reveals the breadth

and

The last note sums up his aim in these words: "The whole directed to practice and morality as appears first, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; secondly, from cutting off the useless labor of sciences, and so forth." scope of his project.

Still,

we

—

find nothing here that resembles the heavy

war machine

used by Clarke and his like to advance the good cause. Berkeley lived in a happy,

tense

and harsh,

buoyant atmosphere, and recalls that of

his

Malebranche.

manner, though

Nor do we

less

find any-

thing that resembles the Cartesian attitude, wholly antinatural, of peaceful meditation beyond the level of the senses.

It is

in the mathematicians to despise sense," for without

it

"ridiculous

"the

mind

can have no knowledge, no ideas. All meditations or contempla-

.

BERKELEY

20.

tions

.

.

.

which might be prior

The famous

out by the senses are patent absurdities (328)." tesian Cogito

is

from with-

to the ideas received

tautological (731) or,

if it

means

that

our

own

To

Berkeley the pretended spirituality of mathematics

an

existence

illusion:

tions

by

The

"The

Car-

knowledge of

prior to that of things, contrary to truth (537)

is

mathematicians

folly of

their senses.

stable realities

merely

is

in judging of sensa-

[is]

Reason was given us for nobler uses" (370). which geometers pretend to identify are shown

by Berekley to be changeable, undergoing countless modifications

and blending together fixed

in the flow of consciousness. If

measurement ascribed

to

by

it

longer than time in pleasure" (7)

?

physicists,

why

God Time is

mind. But the same

true of space: a line, to the eye,

is

a thousand years, rather than a

to

and

a sensation,

that changes with our position,

ought

and

it

is

solely in the is

prove highly embarrassing to mathematicians in defining

to be the judge, "then all lines seen

which they

equal,

a thing

according to Berkeley,

this,

such simple notions as the equality of two triangles, for is

has the

whether, to God,

thousand years a day."

"a day does not seem to

it

"time in pain

If a succession of ideas is at-

may wonder

tributed to the Eternal Being, one

is

under the same angle are

will not acknowledge."

judge, however, for

we

sight

if

cannot touch or

Touch cannot be

the

without

feel these lines

length and these surfaces without depth imagined by the mathematicians.

To

the objection that "pure intellect

and

replies that "lines

must be judge," he

mind"

triangles are not operations of the

(521).

Berkeley's spirituality then for it

whom

mathematics

is

not that of a Plato or a Descartes

a step toward the intelligible.

man who

be otherwise in a

is

Locke had postulated] between (528)

?

lectic

Locke

There

since

for

is

no

exists.

intellectual

and material world"

from one

This

is

to the other,

why

Berkeley

no

dia-

criticizes

a distinction between ideas of sensation and

ideas of reflection. Is there "any real difference ideas of reflection

could

the distinction [which

:

necessity to pass

no opposition

making

How

is

wrote "Vain

and others of sensation"

—for

between certain

example, between

— THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

30

"perception and white, black, sweet"? Just

from white" (575)

tion of white differ

?

how

The

"does the percep-

between

distinction

"an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of

imagining material substances" distinct from

we

Unless

suppose that perception

the idea perceived"

—that

the thing perceived tion

that

"an idea of

it is

different

reflection,"

from

whereas

—why posit the distinc-

between the two worlds?

The mind self

is,

"an idea of sensation"

is

spiritual things (599).

"somewhat

is

then does not have to win

or isolating

sidered in

its

nothing

for

itself,

concrete reality

—as

much

victory by detaching

is,

it-

other than mind, con-

a person

"Nothing properly but persons, that All other things are not so

its

exists

who

wills

and

acts.

conscious things, do exist.

existences as

manners of the

exist-

ence of persons" (24). Berkeley's

main

task

opaque, impenetrable Locke's Essay began limits of

was

then

realities

—seen

to

show

that

the

obstacles

by philosophers were specious.

with prudent reservations concerning the

our faculties and our definitive ignorance of the intimate

essence of things. Berkeley's Principles begin with the assurance

and

that these limits faculties:

"We

have

this first

ignorance relate only to the misuse of our raised a dust,

and then complain we can-

not see" (Principles, Section 3).

The

11

Is

it

New

Theory of Vision

not possible for us simply by opening our eyes to apprehend,

through

sight, external objects

tain dimensions,

and material things which have

which are separated by determinate

which constitute a world

totally alien to the

is

in thinking that

we

see

placements or positional relations; point, regardless of

its

point of the retina;

and

mind? Berkeley

an-

New

Theory of Vision. Our distances, dimensions, and dis-

swers our preliminary objection in his

mistake

we do

not see distances, since a

distance, can always be projected

we do

cer-

distances,

on the same

not see dimensions, since the relative

dimensions of objects can be estimated only through knowledge

BERKELEY

31

of their remoteness

—knowledge

which we

we do

lack; finally,

not

see displacements, since they depend soley on changes in relations

involving distance.

His theory then eradicates the

distinction, traditional since Aris-

between particular sensibles

totle,

common

sensibles such as

—colors,

sounds, and so on

magnitude and extension. There are only

common

particular sensibles, according to Berkeley; the old sibles

—those studied by the geometer—are

the object of geometry

Why,

then,

is

do we think we

light

and

The

man

reason

ff.).

when

see external objects

color

we

that

is

is

learn

that infinitely small changes in the gradation of

colors correspond to changes in distance;

imagine ourselves without "a

sen-

really peculiar to touch;

tangible extension (Section 139

just as internal as pleasure or grief?

from experience

—and

this experience or prior to

born blind, being made

to see.

.

.

The

.

if it,

we try to we are like

objects intromitted

by sight would seem to him (as in truth they are) no other than a

new

set of

thoughts or sensations, each whereof

the perceptions of pain or pleasure"

as

is

as near to

(Section 41).

We

him have

learned from repeated experiences that a particular adaptive sensation of the eye corresponds to a particular distance, that is

distinct in proportion as

visual

scheme are

like signs in

an object

near to us; these differences in the

it is

which we read the properties which

touch will cause us to perceive directly.

Thus we can

dismiss sight, for

it

does not enable us to become

acquainted with a reality inaccessible to the mind. But Berkeley led to a

much more

visual aspects

is

important conclusion: between these signs or

and the things

signified there

is

obviously no

more

resemblance or necessary connection than between a word in our

language and just as

we

spell

its

meaning; we must learn

words:

that rock only in the

to spell this

language

"I see, therefore, in strict philosophical truth,

same sense

that

I

may

be said to hear

it,

when

word roc\ is pronounced" (Alciphron, Fourth Dialogue, Section 11). Nothing would cause us to foresee a priori the link between a change of clarity and a change of distance. All languages are instituted by minds, and a universal language such as the one

the

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

32

under discussion here could have been instituted only by a universal

mind, by an arbitrary decree of Providence which rules over

Consequently the study of vision, far from turning us toward

us.

material things, leads us

mind which governs

first to

all

our

things. It

own mind, is

then to the supreme

possible,

still

however, that

touch might provide us with direct knowledge of material objects.

Does

it ?

Immaterialism in "The Principles"

in

and "The Dialogues* The

by

visual language instituted

helps us

if

harms us

if

we simply consider it we mistake signs for

animates them. That

God

can help us or harm

as a sign of tangible qualities; realities

and forget the mind

true of any language.

is

A New

Vision, the source of important psychological works, to Berkeley only because

it

us. It

calls attention to

is

one of the

it

that

Theory of important illusions of

language, even in knowledge which seems most immediate. In the Principles he

shows

at the outset that

language

the source of the

is

condemned in visual perLocke and Malebranche, he was preoccupied question of language, which is interposed like

very errors that he has discovered and ception.

Coming

from the

after

outset by this

a veil between us

and our

ideas

:

"Locke's great oversight," he writes,

"seems to be that he did not begin with his Third Book [or] least that first

he had not some thought of

it

at first. Certainly the

Many

tion (his hypothesis

is

two

{Common-

books don't agree with what he says in the third"

place Boo\, 710).

at

times in his notebook he engages in specula-

man blind from birth) man who, "put into the world would know without words"

similar to that of the

concerning the thought of a solitary alone with admirable abilities

.

.

.

(555)It is

in such a state, prelinguistic in a sense, that the Introduction

to Principles^ seeks to place us: X

A

first

"Whatever

draft of his Introduction, written before the

Frazer's edition

(I,

407).

ideas

I

consider, I shall

end of 1708,

is

published in

.

BERKELEY

33

endeavor

my

of

them bare and naked

to take

thoughts, so far as

am

I

my

into

view; keeping out

names which long and

able, those

constant use has so strictly united with them" (21). Later he writes:

own

thinking,

and endeavor

thoughts in reading that

What,

I

had

in writing

and

source of belief in abstract ideas,

—an

mind It

was

in

which he

which

error

The

aberrations.

Locke

To Locke

an independent

all scientific

is

the

show

reality

and moral

this filiation.

abstract ideas

an abstract idea was properly a

fabrication of the understanding, peculiar to

unknown

he substituted for the real but

of

this belief is the source of the

belief in

found the doctrine of

that Berkeley

train

language

Briefly,

?

Principles were intended to

criticized.

same

the

them" (25)

the source of

is

words the occasion

attain

to

then, are the dangers of language

fundamental philosophical error or of

my

he would make

"I entreat [the reader] that

of his

human

reason,

which

essence of things in order

be able to give a meaning to the words of language and, conse-

to

quently, to be able to reason

and

tute for the substantial form,

we

to

communicate

owes

it

his ideas; a substi-

existence to the fact that

its

disregard everything peculiar to individual objects which re-

semble each other in certain qualities and preserve only that which is

common The

and

is

to all of

them.

abstract idea, as defined here,

neither possible nor useful.

is

an invention of philosophers

It is

not possible, because

it

is

obviously contradictory for us to have the idea of a motion which

belongs neither to one body nor to another, which

nor slow, neither straight nor curvilinear; traries

must belong

not useful: strations,

much importance

which are

at least

to the abstract idea, yet is

it

is

neither fast

one of the con-

excludes both.

It is

attached to the geometer's demon-

said to apply to triangles in general

a particular triangle, but the question

is

to

and not

determine whether

it

to is

not possible for us to speak of triangles in general, without recourse to the abstract idea of the triangle

triangle

which

is

entirely possible for us to

represent

all

—that

is,

without imagining a

neither isosceles, nor scalene, nor equilateral.

other triangles,

draw if

a particular triangle

which

It is

will

(as Berkeley explains in the second

34

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY we pay no

edition)

attention to "the particular qualities of the

angles, or relations of the sides" (16). It follows that

we do

not

need an abstract idea for demonstration but only a particular idea

which

will be the sign of other particular ideas

great importance in Berkeley's system.

an

To

nominal essence but

abstract, real, or

think

—a

not to apprehend

is

to pass

positive idea of

from one idea

to

another, thanks to the function of sign assumed by the idea.

The more

source of this error, according to Berkeley, exactly, in the

man who had

manner

in

is

which language

been "put into the world alone

in language or,

is .

.

interpreted. .

A

would know

without words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas"

assumed

{Commonplace Boo\,

that language would be meaningless

signify an abstract idea. This

is

if

555). It

is

wrongly

each word did not

untrue for two reasons

:

first,

a

word

such as "triangle" signifies not an idea but the unlimited multiplicity of

all

lines;

figures

which

are plane surfaces

bounded by

three straight

next (a profound observation which later proved to be very

useful in the psychology of thought), in ordinary conversation

words evoke no idea

at all

which always stand

for particular quantities

but are employed like

need not keep in mind in order language

is

most

letters in algebra,

—quantities

to reason clearly.

that

we

Furthermore,

often intended to suggest, not ideas but, as in discourses,

emotions or attitudes. These observations tend to loosen the bond

between language and ideas: a sign thing but

which

The

is

retains a certain determination

abstract idea

of language.

is

not a label attached to a

rather the instigation of a complex train of thought

is

a

and

But Berkeley's prime target

istence of a thing

a certain suppleness.

monster of logic wrongly linked

to the use

—the doctrine of the ex—had source in faith

independent of the mind

its

in abstract ideas. In his notebook Berkeley observed that

inasmuch

modern philosophers had set down exact principles, it was surprising that they had gone so far astray in drawing their consequences. The modern philosophers to whom he refers are Descartes, as

Malebranche, and Locke; their principles are the theory of knowledge which reduces external things to ideas— that is, to modalities

BERKELEY

35

mind; and the

of

false

consequences are their corpuscular physics.

Berkeley saw (this stands out in

all his critical

between the theory which reduces

and

ceived to modalities of mind,

qualities

Locke by the

in

—such

and secondary

qualities

conflict

affirms the ex-

from mind. This

conflict

distribution of qualities into primary

and

as extension

which

physics,

istence of matter as a substance distinct

was expressed

remarks) a

external things that are per-

all

solidity

—which

pertain to things,

—odor, heat—which are modalities of mind.

Berkeley does not dwell on principles which, after Locke's analysis,

of

seemed almost obvious

what Locke

so forth

calls

him. All external objects are composed

—or of what Berkeley

acknowledge ideas of if

to

called "ideas of sensation"

simply "ideas."

we noted

(who, as

reflection distinct

It is

from

is

that

it

ceived by doctrine;

them it is

that only

exist

{esse est percipere et percipi)

To Locke (and

{esse

all

modern

it is

without

is

is

as self-

ideas per-

not a

new

however, which ruin the

distinctions,

Descartes) ideas are representative; they

intuitively evident that only

idea; moreover, these

no

thinkers (1-7).

are copies or images of an external reality. This thesis since

it is

just as impossible

minds which perceive and

the principle recognized by

Immediately they make doctrine.

it is

man. This truth

as the abstract idea of a triangle or a :

refused to

earlier,

ceases to exist as soon as

merely one more abstract idea, and

evident as an axiom

and

ideas of sensation)

longer perceived. Being without being perceived percipi)

solidity,

obvious, however, that an idea exists only

mind and

perceived by a

—odor, color,

is

absurd,

an idea can resemble another

models that they speak of

either

have been

perceived by us and are then ideas, or they are not ideas and can-

not be discussed. Locke agreed to this {Essay,

II,

8,

15)

in his

handling of secondary qualities; odor, sound, color certainly do not exist except in their perceived being.

mary as

qualities

it is

matter.

—figure,

defined by

The

modern corpuscular

distinction

is

this is

—which

is,

we immediately

not true of the priconstitute the

physics and

inadmissible, for

figure in motion, by itself (that sensible quality),

But

motion, solidity

if

we

which

try to

body

exist in

imagine a

divested of color or any other

see the impossibility of

our do-

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

36

ing so: extension and motion in themselves are then abstract ideas

which the mind imagines

can contrive. Furthermore, reasons

it

valid against the reality of secondary qualities outside

mind

are

equally valid against primary qualities. According to the example of the ancient Skeptics, sweetness cannot be a primary quality of

wine since wine seems

bitter to us

neither magnitude nor solidity

is

when we

are sick;

if

that

is

true,

a property of a body, since magni-

tude changes according to the distance and structure of our eyes,

and hardness or

softness

depends on the force

In his Dialogues Berkeley nevertheless

between diverse

basis for the distinction

called their emotive

we

exert

qualities

tone. Heat, cold, smells,

on the body.

a psychological

indicates

—something

and

later

tastes affect us

with the vivacity of a strong feeling of pleasure or pain, in contrast to the rather insipid ideas of extension

of placing pleasure

and

grief outside

and motion. The absurdity

mind was

responsible for the

attribution of a separate existence to primary qualities alone, but

such a reason

not

is

sufficient, for a sensation is

sensation in proportion as

more

it is

not more or

less

a

or less stamped by affectivity.

Finally, since these qualities are not in the perceiving

mind, a sub-

which they can be assigned must be imagined: matter, which

ject to

serves as their substratum. After Locke's criticism of the idea of

substance, his

it

was not hard

"something

I

know

is

singular. Descartes

sential

form

it

the emptiness of

its

philosophy

—mechanistic

physics

virtue of the distinction

there

es-

inti-

—

was linked

to philosophy only

between a confused idea and a

as its object a true,

was an even more

—was

he had found mechanistic physics to be

inadmissible. In Descartes physics

which had

ideas the

Then Berkeley made his apfirst way the way of

pearance and declared that by following the

—uncompromisingly,

to

Cartesian form as well

had assumed under Boyle and Newton, one

aspect of this

mately linked to the theory of ideas. truth

said.

had managed

modern philosophy only by making

immediate objects of knowledge; but in as in the

show

not what" of which nothing can be

Berkeley's situation here lay the foundation of

for Berkeley to

immutable nature;

clear-cut distinction

in

by

clear idea

Malebranche

between a sensation, a

.

BERKELEY

37

simple modality of mind, and an idea which has

From

God.

object in

its

Berkeley's point of view, however, this distinction completely

him

disappears, for according to

and have no true

abstract ideas

it

from

issues

and number

clear ideas of extension, motion,

a vicious circle.

(clear ideas

The

which are

do not provide the foun-

existence)

dation for mathematics and mechanistic physics; instead, the latter seek to justify themselves by arbitrarily conferring a special value

on these

ideas.

Berkeley's doctrine, with

was bound

ciple, It is

interesting to follow

seems

its

him

in the fiery struggle in

modern mathematics,

acquisitions of

surest

at times to possess a singularly

original conception of science.

Berkeley has raised in the

little

name

trouble, of course, in refuting the objections

of

common

sense.

Told

that

and the chimeras

distinguish between reality

impossible to

it is

of our imagination

being consists only in being perceived, he counters that the

tinction

me

easy: there are in

is

ideas

and

is this

the

mass

common

only bodies dictated by

way

we

of ideas that

sense (which

corporeal substance postulated

may

be objected that

common

close

my

—

eyes whereas

This objection these ideas

my mind

that the landscape before

is

may

easily

my

knows nothing

we

of

regular

are

ordinarily

call

soon as they cease to

as

me

is

not annihilated

vision of the landscape

is

when

annihilated.

answered, however, for the permanence of

be allowed

if

their being

is

related not only to

mind

but also to other minds and to the universal

There remained mathematical and mechanistic then reigned supreme.

nature; the

sense holds that things are

permanent whereas ideas are annihilated be perceived

one an-

that

call a

by philosophers)

combinations of such ideas, which are what things. It

my

distinct; finally, they

are produced according to fixed rules, in such a ticipates the other. It

dis-

which are independent of

will; they are particularly strong, vivid,

I

which he

and condemn the

at times to typify the reactionary

new and

if

apparently simple and obvious prin-

to upset the equilibrium of the science of his time.

Two

basic notions

(25-28)

physics,

which

were incompatible with

his doctrine: the notion of infinitude in mathematics,

and

in conse-

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

38

quence the whole of infinitesimal calculus; the notion of cause or

and

force in physics,

in consequence the

whole of Newtonian dy-

namics.

Berkeley holds that mathematics has a sensible object.

and magnitude, apart from false ideas.

To

for there

a tangible

is

is

sensible things, are only abstract

the senses, however, space

and

visible

and

is

not infinitely divisible,

minimum

beneath which nothing

perceived and, consequently, beneath which nothing

he

Number

Boldly,

exists.

question even the oldest discoveries of the Greek mathe-

calls in

maticians: irrationals are inadmissible, for any magnitude

posed of a

finite

number

minima; we cannot,

of visible

speak of a polygon tending toward a

circle or of

com-

is

therefore,

having an idea of

a space larger than any given space, for since that of

which one

has the idea must be something given, the thing cannot be larger

than

The same argument

itself.

Analyst, but

it

Berkeley's criticism of to

De

motu,

is

Newtonian mechanics, from

linked up with the same principle.

Malebranche attributed any reason the fact that of matter

efficient causality to

when he examined

efficient

parallel to that of

causality.

the Principles recall that

God, giving

as his

which he had

nothing resembling

Here Berkeley's thinking runs

Malebranche: the ideas or perceived beings into

which the external world ternal, active essences

we do

it

The

est percipi.

We

the clear idea

—the idea of extension—he found in

a force or an

since

appears in various forms in

always goes back to the principle: esse

is

resolved are passive; the so-called in-

which we

not perceive them;

attribute to things are pure fictions,

we

observe that ideas follow and

replace each other in accordance with general rules revealed to us

by experience; we do not see that one idea

On to

the other hand, experience

minds;

we know

be the cause of an idea; a moving cause certain succession of ideas occur in a

move

is

the cause of another. causality pertains

ourselves as free agents. Furthermore,

be noted that, for Berkeley, to be a cause

to

is

shows us that true

to say that

is

is

mind;

it

should

by the same token

a cause

to

which makes a

to say that

we

are free

our minds are capable of producing in us a

succession of ideas corresponding to the motion of our arms. Al-

39

BERKELEY and

ternatively, there are ideas

which occur

series of ideas

in us

without our willing their occurrence, and which therefore must be

and from

attributed to the influence of other minds;

sense derives

its

this,

common

belief in the existence of other persons. Certain

motions which are seen, certain words which are heard, are sure

According

signs of the existence of these other minds.

to Berkeley,

only prejudice prevents us from generalizing the procedure and

knowing God

mind as surely as we know which we produce and the ideas

or the universal active

other minds, for outside the ideas

produced in us by that constitute

what we

series so regular that

lar idea

minds analogous

finite

nature

call

—ideas

to ours are all the ideas

which form groups and

through experience, the perception of a particu-

becomes for us the sure sign of another particular

natural science

is

grammar

simply a kind of

of nature

idea,

and

which teaches

us the constant relations of signs to the things they signify.

But then the ideas produced in us to

an omnipotent mind, nature's

with a constant will and laws of nature. Nature distinct cause of

God;

to us as distinctly, if

creator,

infallible rules, is

to interpret

a science of laws

are relegated to metaphysics.

The

legalistic

conception

is

not language

is

itself

it,

as

God

speaks

our fellow men.

division of tasks anticipates, in a

intimately

which was probably the only reason for matters most

accordance

and not of causes, which

sense, the positivist conception of science; but

Berkeley's

acts in

pagan philosophers assumed, a

not, as

we know how is

which

attributed

which are nothing but the

the language through which

it is

Consequently physics

way must be

in this

its

but what

it

we

should note that

linked to finalism, introduction.

What

communicates

to us.

Rigorous exactitude in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules hardly concerns Berkeley,

such as to recreate and exalt the order, extent,

and

variety

who

mind with

of natural

proposes "nobler views,

a prospect of the beauty,

things" which these rules

evidence in their creator (109). These uniform rules bear the imprint of otent,

wisdom but not

and providential

of necessity, for their cause will.

is

a free,

omnip-

— 40

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

—"natural philosophy"—boasted of finding in

Mechanistic physics nature

itself

the

moving

active,

phenomena. Boyle's

of

causes

mechanistic physics indentified the cause of light and sound with the insensible mechanical structures of matter; the Newtonians saw in attraction an essential property of matter

According separated

to Berkeley, in

modern

and a source of motion.

physics positive results

from the prejudices which

added

are

to

must be

them. Thus the

mechanist apprehends a constant relation between certain mechanical

of

phenomena and sound, and he motion

to the idea of

cause of sound idea,

which

is

law linking certain ideas

one idea can be the cause of another

to say that

is

finds a

sound; but to say that he has found the

absurd. Berkeley's admiration for

he limits himself

stinted so long as

Newton

un-

is

to the discovery of analogies be-

tween apparently isolated phenomena, such

as gravity

and

tides,

each of which becomes a particular example of a general law of nature, according to his investigations; but to assert that attraction is

and possessed by

universal

dicts experience,

a cause of

namics mental

and

motion

does experience

when we

nisus,

show

The

familiar terms of dy-

—designate,

by themselves,

us about heavy objects?

earth with an accelerated motion.

force? Gravity, to the physicist,

when

What

is

That we become

does this teach us about a

not a cause but a motion that

to all of the other so-called forces that

and the same

of course, these mathematical beings

—had

was an absolute

sition of a

an absolute

space,

applies

must always be reduced

mathematical hypotheses (De motu, 1-41).

there

tired

released, they fall to the

occurs in accordance with a determinate law,

tension, motion, time

What

to bodies only metaphorically.

support them and that,

To Newton,

and

attraction a property of matter

conatus, vis

which are applied

acts

matter transcends or even contra-

all

make

manifestly absurd.

is

sollicitatio ,

to

an absolute

reality.

place,

—number,

According

to

to

ex-

him,

which was the po-

body in absolute

the passage

space, an absolute motion, which was from one absolute place to another absolute place.

Berkeley's criticism of these notions

must be read with

particular

— 41

BERKELEY He

attention.

does not oppose absolute motion by relative motion

in the Cartesian sense

—that

the continual change of location of

is,

one body in relation to another body which for this

is

supposedly fixed

is

mov-

a purely cinematic notion which does not involve a

ing force. His criticism of Newton, which could also be applied to Descartes,

that

is

Newton thought

it

possible,

thanks to the frame

of reference provided by absolute space, to define motion without

introducing a

moving

he opposes

Newton

to

moved body

force.

The

notion of relative motion which

does of course include the relation of the

to another referential body, but

also requires, for

it

completeness, the thought of the

moving

which

relative chiefly in the sense that

is

stands in

applied to

some

Motion

it.

is

relation to this force

force (spiritual in nature)

and does not

exist

by

consequently the idea of absolute motion must be rejected, for

an abstract

idea, a physical notion,

{Principles

1

Taken by

10-17).

numbers, quantities, and the

no

which

who

is

—"in

own

their

explained in different ways. Mathematics then

The independent associated with

it

we

This consideration gave

surest

means

He had

.

.

bear

the notion of

same thing can be only the abstract

is

and the mechanistic physics of leading

men

to atheism.

"minute philosopher"

rise to the

nored the magnitude of divine works and in Alciphron.

.

express things.

existence of matter

were the

nature

They depend on

defining, with the result that the

language through which

it is

completeness

themselves, mathematical beings

like

relation at all" to sensible things.

the one

asserts its

it

itself;

whom

who

ig-

Berkeley attacked

the general opinion of the orthodox Christians

of his time concerning deism

and he accepted the dilemma of

choosing between Christianity and atheism. But the reason given is

quite personal,

always

my

and

opinion

.

his thinking .

.

is

singularly profound: "It

that nothing could be

of destroying Christianity by crying

sillier

up natural

was

than to think

religion.

Whoever

thinks highly of the one can never, with a consistency, think meanly of the other;

it

revealed, never

being very evident that natural religion, without

was and never can be received anywhere but

brains of a few idle speculative

men"

in the

(V, 29) Natural religion then .

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

42

cannot serve as an introduction to revealed religion, although

common

illusion persists, for

and

rarely. "Precepts

suited to popular

oracles

by

itself it

this

would be understood only

from heaven

are incomparably better

improvement and the good of

natural or rational religion, as such, ever

society then the

we do

reasonings of philosophers; and, accordingly,

not find that

became the popular na-

any country" (V, 9). This is the very essence of immaterialism: the abstract and the mediate have reality only tional religion of

through the concrete and the immediate, mathematical notions only through sensation, reason only through revelation.

The Platonism

iv

A

universal

mind

of Siris

minds through

that expresses itself to other

a

constant and orderly language, a physics that teaches the signs of this is

language, and a metaphysics that teaches their meaning

image of the universe provided by the Principles and Dia-

the

logues. Siris.

—such

Nothing

In this

in these

work

works prepares us

for the speculations of

we

find a universe which,

of Berkeley's old age

like that of the Stoics,

is

an animate being whose motions are

sympathetically interrelated and ruled by a subtle vital fluid

which

suffuses every part of

cause which does not act by

Being, which

is

at

itself

but

it.

is

The

fire is

in the

a kind of

fire,

an instrumental

power of a Supreme

once the force that produces

telligence that regulates

all

all things,

the in-

them, and the goodness that makes them

perfect.

This image of the Universe was borrowed by Berkeley from the

mass of Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean writings

had already appeared during the Renaissance:

first

in

which

Plato

it

and

commentary by Marsilio Ficino), then Proclus' Platonic Theology, Iamblichus' Mysteries, the Hermetic Writings, and some other works. All these works, which he meditated upon Plotinus (with the

during his sojourn in Rhode Island, seemed

to

him, according to

an opinion prevalent among historians of the period,

to reveal a

very ancient tradition rooted in the earliest ages of the world

BERKELEY

43

Here we again

(Sections 298-301).

mysterious knowledge was transmitted alongside the trine

—an

tury

and which played an important

At

body of

find the idea that a

doc-

official

which was widespread during the seventeenth cen-

idea

role at the

end of eighteenth.

body of Platonic doctrines was not very

that time, however, this

popular: the seventeenth century had not shared the sixteenth cen-

with Platonism, which was misunderstood, and

tury's infatuation

Voltaire's jibes simply accentuate this

imagination of the Platonists.

pathetic toward the Platonists,

seemed

to

him

to

God

nature and

scorn for the extravagant

Cud worth, though distrusted

completely symdoctrines,

their

be pantheistic and atheistic

:

which

they seemed to merge

into one whole, or to place at the

summit

of the

universe the One, devoid of intelligence and consciousness. Leibniz

was

certainly influenced by them, but he objected violently to their

thesis of

What

an animate world or a world

Berkeley attempted was nothing short of a complete reno-

vation. In his thinking Platonism

from

soul.

and attachment

sensible things

which should serve For philosophy

was above

philosophy of his day.

"not only the minds of

and

professors

its

students, but also the opinions of all the better sort,

and the

practice

whole people, remotely and consequentially indeed, though

of the

not

detachment

to the purely intellectual things

to counterbalance the

affects

else

all

inconsiderably

.

.

.

and have not fatalism

and

Sadducism

gained ground during the general passion for the corpuscularian

and mechanistic philosophy, which has prevailed tury

?

Certainly had the philosophy of Socrates

vailed in this age

among

wise to receive the dictates of the interest take so general

in opposition to

and

fast

pre-

should not have seen

Cudworth, he upholds the Christian character of

God and

Hermetic books, which affirm

intelligence;

and Pythagoras

think themselves too

hold on the minds of men." Thus,

this divine tradition: the unity of

for the

who Gospel, we

these people

for almost a cen-

and the Supreme Principle

it,

nature

is

not pantheism,

acknowledge a

—the One—

is

directive

devoid of

telligence only in the sense in which, in the Trinity, the Father

prior to the

Word

he engenders.

inis

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

44

Does does

this

Platonism continue the immaterialism of Berkeley or

not rather contradict

it

it?

We

should note at the outset that

this universal force or soul, this subtle fire, is quite different

forces such as universal gravitation:

it

not a property which

is

distributed equally throughout matter but a it is

life

which

is

is

diffused;

not a cause of blind mechanical actions but an instrument of

Providence, and Berkeley

discovered

first

the universal panacea given by nature to

it

agent; finally, cept that

it

at

work

man; by

not truly a cause or a source of activity, and

in tar water,

then,

itself,

it

is

God is the sole universal mode of existence ex-

does not seem to have any

which Berkeley gave

The new element it is

from

in Siris

is

to nature, that of being perceived.

Mind, but

the metaphysical theory of

superimposed, without contradiction, over the theory expounded

in the Principles. In the

showed since the

that

we do

word

edition of the Principles, Berkeley

not have an idea of

Mind and

its

operations,

"idea" designates a passive thing; he remained silent

concerning the

whole system

first

mode

is

knowledge

of

that

we have

of

it,

though

his

designed solely for this knowledge; in the second

we have a "notion" of it. This thesis is From Plato he learned the distinction between

edition he said that

de-

veloped in

the

senses

and

Siris.

intellectual

knowledge, which properly

is

not knowledge

of sensible things derived through intelligence but rather knowl-

edge of spiritual

realities

—knowledge

of this world which, accord-

ing to him, would have been inaccessible to

human

stupidity with-

out a divine revelation.

v

The

Immateriality of Arthur Collier

In 1713 Arthur Collier published his Clavis universalis. His conclusions, derived

mainly from meditation on the works of Male-

branche and Norris, are the same as Berkeley's.

more

of a dialectician

He

however,

and theologian than Berkeley. For example,

he proves that the very notion of an external world dictory because both

is,

its

thesis

and

its

antithesis

is

self-contra-

have been proven:

philosophers have demonstrated that the external world

is

finite

and

BERKELEY

45 that

it is

matter

infinite; that

motion

are simple bodies; that

is is

infinitely divisible

and

that there

both necessary and inconceivable.

dogma

of

the negation of the existence of the external world

is

Furthermore, he uses immaterialism against the Catholic

which assumes the

transubstantiation,

To him

one of the most

domain

fruitful principles

of knowledge.

But in

his

reality of matter.

ever discovered, even in the

mind and

in Berkeley's

of view were fused: a criticism of scientific

upon

two points

knowledge predicated

immediate experience, which does not reveal

a return to

to

us anything similar to the pretended powers of "experimental phi-

losophy"; a certain spirituality and a profound sense of the omni-

The two aspects are inseparable in warmth dissolves and mollifies

presence of mind. as Berkeley's, for

its

a

mind such

rigid

mecha-

nisms. Furthermore, their union, under various guises, became one of the essential traits of the century: in Rousseau, for example, the

return to immediate impressions was linked to the criticism of entific

mechanism and

separated, for

if

mind

to finalism. is

—there

fused to entertain

eliminated

sci-

Yet the two aspects can be

—an

idea

which Berkeley

re-

remains a representation of a universe

which has neither substance

to support

phenomena nor

a cause to

produce them, and in which, as in the universe of the Skeptics of antiquity, regular succession

the results of this separation.

is

the sole reality. Later

we

shall note

Bibliography Texts Berkeley, George.

Wor\s: Including many of his writings hitherto unpuband annotations, life and letters and account of his

lished, with prefaces

philosophy, ed. A. C. Fraser. 4 vols. 2d ed. Oxford, 1901. The Worlds of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and .

T. E. Jessop. 9 vols. London, 1948-57. Philosophical Commentaries, ed. A. A. Luce. Editio Diplomatica. .

Edinburgh, 1944.

—

The

.

Principles of

Human

Knowledge,

ed. T. E. Jessop. 1945.

Studies Broad, C. D. Berkeley's

Argument about

Material Substance. London, 1942.

Cassirer, E. Berkeley's System. Giessen, 1914.

Fraser, A. C. Berkeley.

and London,

M. Berkeley, quatre etudes sur

Gueroult, 1956.

Laky,

J.

(In the series "Philosophers' Classics.")

A

J.

Edinburgh

1881. la perception

et sur

Dieu. Paris,

Study of George Berkeley's Philosophy in the Light of the

Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Washington, 1950. Luce, A. A. Berkeley and Malebranche: A Study in the Origins of Berkeley's Thought. New York, 1934. .

.

Berkeley's Immaterialism. London, 1945. Dialectic of Immaterialism. Verry, 1964.

Maheu, R. "Le catalogue de de

la

Revue

bibliotheque des Berkeley,"

d'histoire

la philosophic, III, 1929.

D. "George Berkeley's

Ritchie, A.

'Siris'."

British

Academy

Lecture. London,

1955.

George Berkeley and the Proofs for the Existence of God. London, 1957. Warnock, G. J. Berkeley. London, 1953. Wild, J. George Berkeley: A Study of his Life and Philosophy. 2d ed. New Sillem, E. A.

York,

Wisdom,

1 J.

96 1.

O. The Unconscious Origins of Berkeley's Philosophy. London,

1953.

Publications of Berkley's

Commemorating

the Bicentenary

Death

Edinburgh, 1953. Hermathena. Dublin, 1953. Revue international de philosophic Paris, 1953. Revue philosophique de la France et de I'etranger. Paris, 1953. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

46

CHRISTIAN WOLFF christian wolff (1679-1754) was one of the few

renowned philosophers of

his

time to teach philosophy regularly in

the universities. His books are handbooks lectures.

Named

professor at Halle in 1706, he

Frederick William

and Lange,

and

I,

in 1723.

collections of his

was discharged by

at the request of his Pietist colleagues,

He

Francke

taught at Marburg, then was recalled to his

professorship at Halle in 1740, following the accession of Frederick

the Great.

On

the surface, the doctrine of Leibniz' disciple

and

popularizer seems to be an exception to the obvious vacillation that

we have

witnessed in

all

quarters at the beginning of the eighteenth

century: in a series of treatises which he wrote,

first

in

German

(Vernunftige Gedan\en von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele, auch alien Dingen iiberhaupt, 1719; V. G. von der Menschen Tun und Lassen, 1720; V. G. von

dem

gesellschaftlichen

Leben der Menschen,

1722), then in Latin {Philosophia rationalis sive logica, 1728; Phi-

losophia prima sive ontologia, 1729;

Cosmologia

generalis,

1731;

Psychologia empirica, 1732; Psychologia rationalis, 1734; Theologia naturalis, 1736-37; Jus naturae,

1740-48; Jus gentium, 1750; Phi-

losophia moralis, 1750-53; Oeconomica, 1750), he provided

German

philosophy with a language, a program, and methods which were to

endure for a long time.

But

this contribution is

infused with the spirit of his era.

The

cause of his dismissal in 1723 was the uneasiness provoked by his

intemperate determinism and his oration 47

"On

the Practical Phi-

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

48

losophy of the Chinese," in which he placed Confucius, along with Christ, in the ranks of the prophets. Chinese thought

the ascendant since their Confucius,

had been

introduction by the Jesuit missionaries

its

Sinarum philosophus,

in

—in

for instance. Here, they said,

they had found a moral philosophy "infinitely sublime, simple,

and drawn from the pure fountains of natural reason."

sensible,

Their statement was promptly appropriated for their

who

by the philosophers

pendent of any

belief in

God. Wolff (who, on that of Leibniz)

finding rules of action which

did not

exist.

His basic

would

this point,

and

is

we

are.

Wolff's intransigence on this question

attains

through

clear

the epitome

any authority

naturalistic ethic, devoid of

is

rooted in his over-all

philosophy. According to him, the aim of philosophy

man

God

if

"Do whatever makes you and your

rule,

except the rational knowledge of what

which

took a

was concerned with

retain their value even

neighbor more perfect, and abstain from the opposite," of an individualistic

purposes

affirmed the existence of a morality inde-

from

position quite different

own

1

is

happiness,

knowledge. Everything then

is

subordinate to the widest possible diffusion of philosophy and to

maximum

the

lectual

much

the intel-

clarity of a Descartes as orderliness

and con-

of clarity, by

and inward

sistency. Wolff,

which he means not

whom Kant

called

so

an "excellent analyst," was be-

value to

and a teacher has a tendency to attach more the formal precision with which a conclusion is deduced

from

premises than to the premises themselves; but in this

fore all else a teacher,

one

its

risks

abusing an excellent precept and confusing the principle

of logical precision with the very principle of being.

happened all

to

Wolff when he defined philosophy

possible things,

him

to

the possible

of philosophical is,

showing why and how they are is

the noncontradictory,

knowledge

is

That

what

is

as "the science of

possible."

and the

For

sole principle

the principle of contradiction

—that

the principle of precision in reasoning. Significantly, he discards

(or he reduces to the principle of contradiction) 1

way

Cf P. Martino, .

p. 311.

U Orient dans la litterature franeaise au

XVIV

the Leibnizian Steele (Paris,

1906),

CHRISTIAN WOLFF

49

mind

principle of sufficient reason which, in the

of the master,

was

the principle of truths of fact or existences.

The

was a whole

result

for

any possible subject:

who managed on

it is

is

the study of propositions valid

a useless science, according to Descartes,

the basis of a certain intellectual intuition to apply

—for

a predicate to a being

example, extension to matter;

indispensable science, according to Wolff, that "discoveries in mathematics

physics

—can

ranging from ontology

series of analyses,

law and economics. Ontology

to

who

and physics

be deduced through certain

it

is

an

thinks he can affirm

—even

experimental

from ontological

artifices

presuppositions."

Ontology, in it

does not simply deduce the predicates of being;

fact,

demonstrates them. According to Wolff,

we know demonstra-

tively that only

wholly determined things

tended, that

an aggregate composed of simple substances which

it is

contain their

own

matter

exist, that

principle of change. Cosmology,

is

ex-

which follows

ontology, begins with the definition of the world as the totality of finite

beings and their relations to each other, and demonstrates that

the world

is

composed of extended, mobile

These bodies are

bodies.

composed of simple elements which have neither magnitude nor

and which

mobility, their

powers or

are distinct although they differ only through

qualities; the active

endowed provoke

powers with which they are

external changes in them; they are truly the atoms

of nature, occupy a distinct place,

and

are capable of acting

on each

other through physical influx. Rational psychology assumes that the soul

is

a force capable of representing the world to

deduces that

it

representations tion; this

possesses

—and

penchant

knowledge

—that

is,

is

new

governed by pleasure, which

and by

grief,

and

confused or distinct

the desire or penchant for a

of a perfection, true or imagined,

itself

is

which

is

representa-

knowledge

knowledge

of an imperfection, true or imagined; these ideas of perfection or

imperfection, evil,

when

of beautiful

clearly identified,

and

ideas of

good and

ugly. Natural theology completes theoretical

philosophy: the existence of sibility of

become

God

is

necessary as a basis for the pos-

other beings which do not contain their

own

justification;

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

50

this is the

proof a contingentia mundi, generally accepted during

from the nature of God whose

the period; finally,

is to be known and honored men—Wolff believes that he has

by rational creatures

creating

by

is,

everything in the universe

made

is

for

aim

sole

in

—that

the right to conclude that

man, and he

typifies the in-

temperate finalism then prevalent.

More than anything (that

is,

else

Wolff seeks "to demonstrate the

reality

the noncontradictory nature) of the concepts" he uses,

in a long critique

which has become

and

a classic (Theologia naturalis,

Sections 617-716), he accuses Spinoza of having failed to do this.

One ing

feature in particular

is

one that has

is

worth noting:

limits in other finite beings

its

the same; but according to Wolf?,

ing

is

finite

a completely determinate

being

is

to Spinoza, a finite be-

and

is

in essence

we assume that an existing bebeing, then we must say that a if

one that cannot increase beyond certain limits which

are determined by

own

its

nature and result from inner determi-

nations.

Here we

see the antithesis

and Wolff's, and the

tem causes him to recognize

He

between Spinoza's geometric approach

distinctive character of the latter. Wolff's sys-

to set beings apart

from one another and

accepts neither Leibniz' pre-established

that the

harmony nor

the notion

powers in these atoms of nature are representations; thus

the unity of the universe can

unity of

to refuse

any whole except one formed by individual beings.

God who

whole of Wolff's his sole ethical

no longer be anything but the external

rules over

it.

An

analogous motive governs the

practical philosophy.

maxim

is

We

have already seen that

the perfecting of ourselves as individuals.

This also accounts for a significant contrast in his

on the one hand

a liberal individualism

which

political views:

sees the sovereignty

of the people as the unique basis of government;

and on the other

a state which, to maintain unity, rigidly controls even the

minute

details of life,

who compels

most

an enlightened and providential sovereign

his subjects to

work and

save,

measures against deism and atheism. Wolff's

and who

state

is

also takes

an enlightened

despotism modeled on the Chinese system, which was also favored

CHRISTIAN WOLFF

51

by Voltaire

new

—and

Prussian

which was not too remote from the

ideal of the

state.

Wolff's philosophy was immensely successful. the universities but spread through

mundane

It

not only invaded

circles.

Diderot praised

Wolff's philosophy in the Encyclopedia. Books such as those of his disciple

Bilnnger, a professor at

Tubingen (Dilucidationes

anima humana, mundo

losophicae de Deo,

et generalibus

phi-

rerum

1725), were widely read and often cited, even in France. At the same time, the idealism of Berkeley and Arthur affectionibus,

Collier

was beginning

to attract attention;

was disturbed over the resemblance

that

consequently Bilnnger

might be detected between

and the philosophy of Leibniz, who

his philosophy

also

seemed

to

reduce everything to minds (monads) and their representations; but he noted that the simple entities to which Leibniz reduced

all

from minds, that they did not possess moving powers, and that Leibniz' corpus phoenomenon (Sections 1 15-18) is really an aggregate of monads and not a perception. Thus his refutation of idealism, which was things were quite different representations but only

to

among German

be the rule

philosophers until the Critique of

Pure Reason, eliminated the element which accounted

for the pro-

found continuity and unity of the Leibnizian universe.

There was

too

still

much

Leibnizianism

among

the Wolffians,

however. They were admired for the order, the analysis, the precise delineation of concepts,

which were the passion of the

admirers wished to have the elements of

was

subject to criticism, even in

and

is

why

their apriorism

Germany. Andreas

at Halle, indicates in his

(1709, second edition, 1722) that

drawn from

this analysis

experience and not decreed a priori. That fessor at Leipzig

era; but their

De

Riidiger, pro-

sensu veri et

he does not believe that

falsi

possibility

can be shown other than through the testimony of the senses, that

we do

not at

first

possess the essence of things,

and

that truth

is

but the agreement of our concepts with sensible perceptions; mathematics borrows

its

own

notions from sensible intuition, for any

proof (here Rlidiger's words indicate the method used by Condillac in

The Language

of Calculi)

is

reduced

to

computation.

The mathe-

52

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

matical method, therefore, contributes no support to philosophy apart from the external arrangement of materials. These criticisms

show

clearly the points

analysis

somewhat through

on which Wolff's

exemplified by

analysis differed

Newton: whereas Wolff

still

from the

subscribes,

reluctantly, to the belief that essences can be identified

analysis, in

Newton's

analysis,

which

consists in reducing

seemingly different facts to one basic fact discovered through experience, the

mind

intervenes only between

—the facts to be reduced and the irreducible

two

fact.

experiential terms

Bibliography Texts Wolff, Christian. Philosophia rationalis, sive logica methodo scientifica pertractata et

ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata. Frankfurt and Leipzig,

1728. .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Philosophia prima sive Ontologia. Frankfurt, 1729. Cosmologia generalis. Frankfurt, 1731.

Psychologia empirica. Frankfurt, 1732. Psychologia rationalis. Frankfurt, 1734.

Theologia naturalis. 2 vols. Frankfurt, 1736-37. Philosophia practica universalis. 2 vols. Frankfurt, 1738-39.

Gesammelte \leinere Schrijten. 6 vols. Halle, 1736-40. lus naturae methodo scientifica pertraetata. 8 vols. Frankfurt and

Leipzig, 1740-48. .

lus gentium. Halle, 1750.

.

Oeconomica. Halle, 1750.

.

Philosophia moralis sive Ethica. 5 vols. Halle, 1750-53.

Studies Arnsberger,

Bergmann,

W. J.

Wolffs Verhaltniss zu Leibniz. Heidelberg, 1897. "Wolffs Lehren vom Complementum possibilitatis," Archiv fur

systematische Philosophic,

Campo, M.

II,

1896.

razionalismo precritico. 2 vols. Milan, 1939. Ludovici, K. G. Kurzer Entwurj einer vollstdndigen Historie der wolffschen Cristiano Wolff e

il

Philosophie. Leipzig, 1736. .

Ausfiirhrlicher

Entwurj einer vollstdndigen Historie der wolffschen

Philosophie. Leipzig, 1737-38. -.

Sammlung und Auszuge

der sammtlichen Streitschriften wegen der

wolffschen Philosophie. Leipzig, 1783. Pichler, H. Uber Wolffs Ontologie. Leipzig, 1910. Utitz, E. Ch. Wolff. Halle, 1929.

"Christian Wolff und die deutsche Aiifklarung," Das Deutsche in der deutschen Philosophie, ed. T. Haering, pp. 227-46. Stuttgart, 1941. Zeller, E. "Ueber Wolffs Vertreibung aus Halle," Preussische fahrbucher, X,

Wundt, M.

1862.

53

GIAMBATTISTA VICO numbed minds with

"philosophers have

method by claiming, with

and

their clear

Descartes'

distinct perception, to re-

discover without expense or fatigue everything found in libraries. .

.

.

Descartes has acquired a great following, thanks to this weak-

human

ness of our

nature,

shortest possible time

which seeks

and with the

to

know

everything in the 1

least possible effort."

This was

which Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) directed in 1726 against the Cartesianism of his young Neapolitan compatriots, who the criticism

had made

it

a short cut to philosophizing. In Vico's view, clear ideas

undoubtedly have a sphere of application, but a very limited one; they are appropriate to mathematics and to the most abstract notions of physics

and held

—those fabricated by the minds; he began with them

fast to

them. Elsewhere, however,

are universally "the vice of

A

clear idea

ample,

I

human

clarity

it

the grandeur of

distinctness

reason rather than

its

is

infinite,

human

and

my

suffering;

nature."

trated by the intuition of historians

the religious, moral,

and

political life of

itself

man, alia

is

examined

commune

obscure, disorderly,

As quoted by Maugain, Etude de revolution

54

is

pene-

and poets and which explains

una scienza nuova d'intorno

razioni (1725). In his book, 1

my

testimony of

this infinitude gives

All this obscure, profound, infinite side of nature, which

Principi di

virtue."

"For ex-

a finite idea, but not all ideas are finite:

is

cannot apprehend, the form and limit of

perception of

and

intellectuelle

de

in Vico's

natura delle

and long mis-

I'italie,

p. 196, note.

a

GIAMBATTISTA VICO

55

understood, Vico tried to determine the general the development of

philosophers of progress (Herder, Michelet, and even likely to create a false impression of the doctrine of a

before

all else

Vico was

an

Comte)

is

man who was

idealist.

of

first

all

There

a Christian.

of history: that of St. Augustine it

to

showered upon him by the

nations. Praise

all

common

traits

and

a Christian conception

is

that of Bossuet.

but, for this very reason, deliberately excluded

Vico accepted

it

from

his in-

he wished to determine the natural laws of history,

vestigations, for

independently of any miraculous intervention (thus depriving himself,

moreover, of

the documentation that might have been pro-

all

vided by the Bible).

He

Secondly Vico was a Platonist.

sought the eternal order of

Laws on which depend

the universe, "the ideal History of eternal the Destinies of

and

their end."

nations, their birth, their progress, their decay,

all

What

lates the infinite

he had in mind was not a law which formu-

progress of

mankind

or Comte, but an ideal law separately history

the

and

which each nation

in

for the duration of

from the fabulous time

whole, as in Condorcet

as a

own

its

life.

participates

For example,

Roman

of the kings until the destruction of

Empire by the Barbarians,

one complete cycle of

constitutes

which the successive phases can and must be rediscovered in the

Time

history of every other nation.

and rewinding

itself

each nation: this Aristotle,

and the

then moves in cycles, winding

{corsi e ricorsi),

and

history begins

the familiar vision of time

is

anew with

common

to Plato,

Stoics.

This fundamental idea shaped Vico's method of investigation

method which, of the

in spite of his

most modern

many

mistakes,

investigations. For, as

must be reconciled with philosophy.

It

is

he observed, philology

must be demonstrated by

comparison of documents from different nations Greece, or

Rome,

for

example

identical for each of them.

The

method must be emphasized.

among men

—

—

the true predecessor

that the

—from

Egypt,

law of development

is

significance of this comparative

Rationalists

except the unity of reason

acknowledged no unity

common

to all; everything

— THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

$6

but reason, everything relating to imagination or passions, could only separate

men from

each other; furthermore, in their thinking

they transported reason to the

dawn

mankind

of

—because,

"in-

capable of formulating an idea of things that are remote and

unknown, they and

picture

them according

know,"

to the things they

also because of "the pride of scholars

who would

like every-

thing that makes up their science to be as ancient as they are." the

dawn

From

of antiquity, the Greeks attributed their laws to the rea-

son of wise legislators. According to Vico the whole theory of the social contract,

then prevalent,

testifies to

the

same mistake.

The primary aim of Scienza nuova is to refute just such views. Drawing support from philosophy, Vico tries to demonstrate (Montaigne had made a similar observation) that there is an identity among men which is not based on reason, "a common sense, that is,

an unreflective judgment which

whole

class,

is

generally borne

a whole tribe, a whole nation, or by

that "uniform ideas spring

all

and

felt

by a

mankind." The

up simultaneously among whole

result

is

tribes

unacquainted with each other." Consequently there can be

uniform laws in the formation of nations, without reason

A

origin.

certain intuition

istence of the ideal tive study of civil

(Platonic)

law realized by each nation, but only the induc-

and

political facts

can reveal to us what these laws

The

as their

even assures us of the ex-

—like Bacon's study of nature

are.

materials used by Vico in the inductive study of the distant

past were the popular mythological traditions in scribed,

in-

though in a distorted form, the most remote history of

most ancient poems such

peoples, the

primitive laws illusion

which are

as those of

Homer,

the most

such as those of the Twelve Tables. Whatever

may have entertained concerning the original character we should not fail to note the spirit in which he chose

Vico

of his data,

them and

the superiority of his thought in contrast to similar specu-

lations of the Renaissance. In fact,

he discarded

all

the documents

which, during the sixteenth century, were supposed to reveal a fabulously ancient science verses

—Chaldean oracles, Orphic poems, golden

by Pythagoras; he recognized these

as forgeries

from a

later

GIAMBATTISTA VICO

57 era.

Armed

obscure,

with the idea that the origins of mankind are "paltry,

and crude," he

rejected everything that

lated in enigmas; nor did he

which discovered

in myths,

of rational science. In short

when one

greatness rests,

course

might lend support

view that there existed from the beginning a science formu-

to the

have any use for the allegorical method

by a convenient interpretation, the whole

—and

on

it is

incomparable

this that his

was marking out a new

considers that he

—he studied the documents of the past only to determine what

they could reveal of the history, religious beliefs, legal practices,

customs, and language of those the basis for his induction

who

transmitted them.

was narrow

—even

Of

course

narrower than might

have been expected under prevailing circumstances

— since

he

dis-

regarded biblical documents and the data that was beginning to flow in on savage tribes and the inhabitants of the Far East, but his

method was

consistently perfect. It consisted in defining

kind and his progress inductively instead of searching for a

manstatic,

immediate definition or a hypothetical construction.

The or

contrast between his results

Locke

is

According

no to

less striking

Hobbes and Locke,

solution to a rational rational

and a

problem

civilization

view of things

is

These indicate

the formation of society

was the

—a solution sought and discovered by

men; everything was due

objects that there

and those achieved by Hobbes

than the contrast between their methods.

to

human wisdom. To

this

Vico

would be no wise men or philosophers if a state did not already exist, and that a wholly different

provided by the concrete wealth of our documents.

that, after the flood,

men began

to

roam through

the vast forest of the world; only religious terror, the fruit of the

imagination, could begin to subdue these barbarous, ferocious giants; fear of Jupiter's thunder forced those caves.

Such was the genesis of the

who

first

with them, the religious practices and

—

of each individual instance, in

the institution of

which Vico

encumbered by

rites,

sees,

from

its

each designed to

experienced

it

to hide in

permanent dwellings and,

rites

prescribing the conduct

monogamous

marriage, for

beginning, a legal institution instill

reverence. Also

order was the genesis of families: each evolved in

its

own

on

this

shelter,

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

58

isolated

The

from the others and bound only by the

was a theocracy, or

result

To

rule by gods.

added a variable group of vagabonds who remained without law or religion.

forest,

existed rights

the law.

and

was formed by family

the city

cities;

Each

plebians,

Then

and

among whom there group who lived outside

chieftains,

composed

originally aristocratic,

who were

at first treated as beasts

only to the necessities of

for a long time in

life;

in the primitive

families gathered together in

and the plebian

laws,

was

city

of religion.

ties

each family was

of patricians

and had a right

Rome,

patricians

withheld from the plebians even the legal consecration of their 2

marriages. Finally a third age came, the age of reason, in which the rule of

law was applied universally

Roman

realized in the

to relations

among men— a

state

Empire, which crumbled with the Barbarian

invasions.

The scheme

of succession

men;

heros, the age of

(which taire,

is

clear: the

is

age of the gods, the age of

theocracy, aristocracy,

Mabley, and

many

who was

a lawyer by profession

never ceased to concern himself with

Roman

acterizes each of the ages according to

its

makes everything the property temper the law of

on reason. But derives

—as Volremarked —guaran-

other apologists later

tees equality of rights). Vico,

religion to

human government

sometimes a monarchy in which the monarch

from a

must be added

it

jurisprudence, char-

law: religious law, which

of the gods, heroic law,

force,

which

and human law, which

is

original state of mind.

out entering into the details of the contrast between poetic

(wisdom which comprises economics,

politics,

and even

uses

based

that each of these states of

and

perfectly distinct

and

law

With-

wisdom science,

and which the poems of Homer exemplify) and philosophical wis-

dom, should note

that

what

sets

them apart

is

velopment of imagination and reason. Vico's his attempt to define

is

an era in which

chiefly the inverse de-

essential characteristic

all social relations

were

based on beliefs originating almost solely in man's imagination, and 2

Histoire de I'ancien

gouvernement de

la

France (1727), by Henri Boulainvilliers,

contains an analogous thesis concerning the French nation, originally composed of the victorious Frankish nobles, governed by their

reduced to servitude.

own

laws, with native inhabitants

— 59 to

GIAMBATTISTA VICO

demonstrate that without

this providential

law humanity would

not have been able even to subsist; for only the violence of fear

provoked by a strong imagination can curb the violence of

Thus he

rehabilitated imagination,

jected to sarcasm.

Of

appetite.

which Malebranche had sub-

great importance to

mankind

is

the fact that

reason appeared belatedly rather than prematurely, for young

who

are initiated too quickly to the sciences of pure reason

physics

and algebra

—become

capable of great works.

refined

The same

is

men

—meta-

and distinguished, but true,

in-

according to Vico, of

nations which have passed over a halting-place without stopping the Greeks, for example, barity to refinement,

Greeks reappeared.

who

passed without transition from bar-

and the French,

in

whom

the Atticism of the

Bibliography Texts

Op ere,

Vico, Giambattista.

ed.

G. Ferrari. 6

Milan, 1835-37. 8 vols.

vols.

Naples, 1858-69.

Opere, ed. F. Nicolini. 8 vols. Bari, 1914-41. La Scienza Nuova seconda, giusta la edizione del 1744, con le varianti del 1730 e di due redazioni intermedie inedite, ed. F. Nicolini. 2 vols. 3d .

.

ed. Bari, 1942. .

New

The

Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. T. G. Bergin and

Fisch from third (1744) edition. London, 1949. Giambattista Vico: Autobiography, trans. .

New York and

Bergin.

London,

M. H.

M. H. Fisch and T. G.

1944.

Bibliographies Bibliografia vichiana, ed. E. Nicolini. 2 vols. Naples, 1947.

Studies Adams, H. Berlin,

I.

P. The Life and Writings of Giambattista The Philosophical Ideas of Giambattista

Eighteenth-Century

Italy.

Vol.

4,

Instituto

Vico.

London, 1935. and Ideas

Vico: Art

italiano

di

in

Rome,

cultura.

i960.

Berry, T.

The

Historical

Caponigri, A. R.

London, Chaix-Ruy,

J.

Theory of G. B. Vico. Washington, 1949. Idea: The Theory of History in Giambattista Vico.

Time and

1953.

Vie de

J.

B. Vico. Paris, 1945.

La formation de Cochery, M. Les grandes .

la pensee

philosophique de

J.

B. Vico. Paris, 1945.

lignes de la philosophic historique et juridique de

Vico. Paris, 1923.

La filosofia di G. B. Vico. Bari, 191 1. (Compare with Jankelevitch, S. "La philosophic de Vico d'apres B. Croce," Revue de synthese historique,

Croce, B.

XXIII.) Gentile, G. Studi Vichiani. Messine, 19 14.

secondo centenaria della Scienza nuova. Rome, 1925.

.

Per

.

Giambattista Vico. Florence, 1936.

il

Vaughan, C. E. Studies 5.

in the History of Political Philosophy. Vol.

Manchester, 1925. 2d ed. 1939.

60

1,

chap.

•JviV MONTESQUIEU i

The Nature

of

Laws

Charles de Secondat, Baron de

la

Brede

et

de Montesquieu, born

near Bordeaux in 1689, became counselor (1714) and deputy presi-

dent (1716) of the parlement of Bordeaux; in 1726 he sold his

and

in 1728 he set out

on

his travels

He

Holland, and England.

through

Spirit of

Laws

in 1748.

He died in

the Encyclopedia.

Although The

Spirit of

Switzerland,

Italy,

published his Considerations on the

Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the

The

office,

He

prepared the

Romans

in 1734 an *4 6 > i7 8 » l8l >

Leibniz,

i35> 176

Idealism and

n.,

127-36, 176

Hubert, Rene, 161

115,

135, 198-

184, 201-2,

205-9

Le Monnier, 123 Leo X, 149 Leon, Xavier, 179 n. Le Roy, Georges, 80 n.

182

Jacobi, 180, 184-85, 251, 253

Lessing, 177, 180-81, 185, 194

Jakob, L. H., 250

Linnaeus, 125-26, 136, 137 n.

James, 121

Locke, 1-2, 7-8,

Jehovah, 236 Jesuits, 48, 121, 140, 142,

179

16, 22, 24,

29-30, 32-

36, 57, 67-68, 76, 78, 80, 84-85, 89, 94-97, 101, 109, 121, 126-27, 134,

262

INDEX

140, 142-44, 164, 177, 180, 183, 186

Lossius, 205

Louis XIV,

Newtonianism and Newtonians,

1-8,

38, 40, 93, 115, 123, 129

Nicolai, 179

65, 148

Nietzsche, 117

Louville, 146

Luxembourg, Due

Norris, 44 Novalis, 179

de, 155

Mabley, 58 Maimon, Salomon, 251-53, 25311. Maine de Biran, 88

Oedipus, 107 Olivet, Fabre

d',

179

Maistre, Joseph de, 177, 178 n., 180

Malebranche,

1,

13, 21, 28, 32, 34,

8,

Palissot, 122

36, 38, 44, 59, 62, 74, 80, 92, 95-98,

Pallas, 139

147, 158, 166, 205, 234

Pascal, 61, 108, 115-16, 147-48, 147 n.,

184

Malesherbes, 122, 175 Mandeville, Bernard de, 20-22, 117

Persistence of rationalism, 192-97

Marmontel,

Peter the Great, 150

Mar tin ism, Martino,

114, 122

Philo, 104-6

180

P.,

Philosophes, 127, 129, 155, 161, 177-

48 n.

Masson, 176 n. Maugain, 54 n.

Physiocrats, 109

Maupertuis, 135-36, 142, 176

Plato, 29, 42, 44, 95,

Mendelssohn, 185, 205, 250

244-45 Platonism and Platonists, 43-44, 5556, 212

78, 192

Mesmer, 178 Mettrie,

see

La

Mettrie,

Julien

Of-

128,

Plotinus, 27, 42, 157-58

fray de

Michelet, 55

Ploucquet, 205

Mirabeau, Marquis de, 114, 118, 193

Plutarch, 114

Abbe

de, 122

Moliere, 116

Prades,

Molyneux, 83-84 Montaigne, 61, 148 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de, 61-68, 150,

Pre-romanticism, 175-88 Priestly, 193, 196

Proclus, 27, 42, 178

Protestantism

and

Protestants,

151,

241

166, 193

Pyrrhonism, 184 Pythagoras, 43, 56

Morgan, Thomas, 16 Moses, 17 Moultou, 167 Musset-Pathey, 162 n.

Nedelkovich, 140

Quesnay, 192-93 Racine, 116

n.

Needham, 146

Ramsay, 121

Nero, 107

Newton,

157, 238,

Rationalism, 192-97 1-8,

26,

36,

40-41, 52, 80,

%9> 93> 123, 135, 140, 142-47, 146 n.,

180, 183, 201-2, 210, 228, 245

Newton and Locke,

1-8

Ray, Jean, 176 Reid,

187

Thomas, n.,

188 n.

Reimarus, 181

2,

22,

92,

186-88,

263

INDEX

Reinhold, 250-51

Spinoza,

Renaissance, 126, 138 Restif de la Bretonne, 178

Richelieu, 65

Robinet,

103,

185,

Spinozism and Spinozists,

103,

133,

184,

B.,

J.

14, 50, 74, 79,

1,

205

253

Stanyan, 121

138

Rohault, 2

Stoics, 42, 55, 158,

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 45, 75, 91, in, 123, 126, 132, 135, 155-70; life and works, 155-56; Savoyard

Swedenborg, Emanuel, 203

239

Tetens, 205

Vicar's Profession of Faith, 167-70,

Thiry, Paul Henri, 127

Social Contract, 162-67; 175, 176 n.,

Tindal, Matthew, 16-17

204, 234-37

Tittle,

Riidiger, Andreas, 51

Sadducism, 43 St. Augustine, 55, 147-48 Saint-Martin, Marquis Louis Claude

250 Toland, 16, 127, 131, 181 Turgot, 194

Vanhomrigh, 27 Vaucanson, 128 Vauvenargues, Luc de Clapiers, Marquis de,

de, 179

Savoyard Vicar, 20, 167-70, 176

of mind,

Schelling,

114; 132

1,

253

E.,

14-19; doctrine of types 1

14-19;

life

and works,

Viatte, Auguste, 177 n.

Schlegel, 179

Schmid, C.

1

Vico, Giambattista, 54-59, 68, 92

250

Scholz, H., 184 n.

Villermoz, 178

Schopenhauer, 236

Volney, 196 Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet),

Schultz, Albert, 199

Schulze, 253 Seneca, 114

4,

2,

7-8, 22, 51, 58, 75, 84, 114, 119,

122, 142-52, 157, 159, 177, 181; life

Sentiment and pre-romanticism, 175-

and works, 143-45; man anc^ n ^ s " tory, 147-51; theory of nature, 145-

88 Shaftesbury, 20-21, 121, 126

47; tolerance, 151-52, 194

Sherlock, 16 Sinclair, General, 91

Sirven, 143

109-10, 192-94

Warens, Mme de, 155 Weishaupt, 250

107 n.

Wolff, Christian, 47-52, 184, 199, 201-

Skeptics, 36, 93

Adam, 22, Smith, N. Kemp, Smith,

Walpole, Robert, 27 Warburton, William, 17

Socinianism, 179 Socrates, 16, 43, 158

6,

209, 223-24

Wollaston, 16

Sophists, 61

Woolston, Thomas, 17

Spencer, 199

Wynne,

8