The Discourse of Business Negotiation [Reprin 2011 ed.] 9783110881516, 9783110140392

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The Discourse of Business Negotiation

W G DE

Studies in Anthropological Linguistics 8

Editors

Florian Coulmas Jacob L. Mey

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

The Discourse of Business Negotiation

edited by

Konrad Ehlich Johannes Wagner

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

1995

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

The discourse of business negotiation / edited by Konrad Ehlich, Johannes Wagner. p. cm. - (Studies in anthropological linguistics : 8) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 3-11-014039-X (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Negotiation in business. I. Ehlich, Konrad, 1942— . II. Wagner, Johannes. III. Series. HD58.6.D57 1995 658.4-dc20 95-4933 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

The discourse of business negotiation / ed. by Konrad Ehlich ; Johannes Wagner. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1995 (Studies in anthropological linguistics ; 8) ISBN 3-11-014039-X NE: Ehlich, Konrad [Hrsg.]; GT

© Copyright 1995 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin. All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Data conversion: Arthur Collignon GmbH, Berlin. - Printing: Gerike GmbH, Berlin. Binding: Dieter Mikolai, Berlin. - Printed in Germany.

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to express their gratitude to Alan Firth for his cooperation in the early phases of the preparation of this book, and to Eija Ventola, Susanne Scheiter, Alan Parker, Guy Kellog, Rineke Brouwer and Brigitta Rödl for editorial assistance. A special thanks to an anonymous referee for invaluable help during the years of editing this volume. The editors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Danish Network on Foreign Language Pedagogy.

Contents

Introduction Konrad Ehlich—Johannes Wagner

1

Part I: Business negotiation as discourse type

7

What makes a discourse a negotiation? Johannes Wagner

9

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism: The problem of form and substance in negotiation analysis David Francis

37

Part II: Discourse structures in business negotiations

65

International sales talk Jochen Rehbein

67

The management of discourse in international seller-buyer negotiations Helen Marriott

103

Telenegotiation and sense-making in the "virtual marketplace" Alan Firth

127

Organisational power in business negotiations Mirjaliisa Charles

151

Part III: Simulating business negotiations

175

Negotiation discourse and interaction in a cross-cultural perspective: The case of Sweden and Spain Lars Fant

177

Dyadic and polyadic sequencing patterns in Spanish and Danish negotiation interaction Annette Grindsted

203

English and Danish communicative behaviour in negotiation simulations. On the use of intratextual and intertextual repetition Flemming G. Andersen

223

viii

Contents

An analysis of language use in negotiations: The role of context and content Joyce Neu—John L. Graham

243

Part IV: Politeness and disagreement in business negotiations 273 The expression of disagreement Judith Stalpers

275

Culturally determined facework priorities in Danish and Spanish business negotiation Anette Villemoes

291

Politeness in French/Dutch negotiations Per van der Wijst—Jan Ulijn

313

References

349

Index

373

Introduction Konrad Ehlich—Johannes Wagner

There is a growing interest in business negotiation, which originates from at least three perspectives: — There are the practitioners, who do negotiations, and who are interested in feedback to better evaluate their professional communication skills; — there are the novices, who do not have sufficient experience with negotiations, and who want support for their training in becoming effective negotiators, and — there are the researchers in the field of discourse analysis, who consider business negotiation an interesting example of verbal interaction from theoretical and practical points of view. Obviously, these three perspectives are interrelated. The researchers cannot do their work without help from the practitioners who are engaged in negotiations and can provide the necessary data for analysis. The practitioners, then, can gain insights into their daily practices through the work of the researchers, and the novices can learn from both the research and the practitioners' experiences. The growing analytic interest in business negotiations originates from various theoretical and methodological backgrounds. The first dimension of interest is a practical one, and literature covering this aspect of a simple training standpoint is extensive. It collects, combines and generalises experiences from various areas. This type of interest aims directly at the practical outcomes: How can I achieve better results in negotiations? But the direct way - which results in a variety of practical suggestions and advice - does not offer many insights into the structural characteristics of business negotiations. It merely scratches the surface. The second dimension is ethnographic and/or ethnological. It offers comparative and contrastive analysis of the role of negotiation in various cultural and economic contexts. Ethnographic and ethnological analyses are mainly concerned with a type of negotiation which differs from present-day Western negotiation culture. Compared to the first dimension, these analyses often are of relatively little direct applicability to interac-

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Konrad Ehlich—Johannes Wagner

tions in today's world of commerce. However, it very often offers interesting perspectives and insights into the structural characteristics of negotiations. A third dimension of interest is psychological. It considers business negotiation as a specific type of interaction to be analysed from the point of view of the involved individual in his/her socio-psychological context. Most of the recent research is done from this perspective, and it is often combined with the fourth dimension of interest: economics. An economic interest in business negotiation might appear to be the most "natural" one, and it obviously comes closest to the interests of practitioners and novices. It does not, however, provide much opportunity to look at business negotiation from a distance, which is necessary if one attempts to conceptualise business negotiation as what it obviously is in the first and last instance, namely a specific type of verbal communication. Few studies have been published thus far which analyse business negotiation as a specific type of discourse. This is the focus of the contributions to this volume. They all pay close attention to the communicational aspects of negotiating business issues. At the heart of this approach are the various verbal activities of negotiatiors in business contexts. The analyses presented in the volume are based on genuine data from business encounters, either - and as much as they are available - from real-life situations or from training contexts, i. e. from simulations such as role plays which involve experienced negotiators. Basing analyses on real data means that the analysts do not simply trust what the negotiators claim to be doing when they negotiate, but that they go a step further and look at what the negotiators really are doing when they negotiate. This type of data inevitably demands audio-taping of negotiations. Business negotiation, however, is certainly one of those fields of verbal interaction to which it is most difficult for a non-participant, an analyst, to gain access. There are all those many little facets of — to put it in a paradoxical way - "professional privacy" which are involved in negotiations and which make the access of data so difficult. The authors of the articles in this volume are most grateful to their "informants" who, in spite of all reservations, kindly accepted to be taped. Of course, it would be of further interest to include non-verbal interaction into the analyses. This would necessitate both the audio- and videotaping of ongoing negotiations. The obstacles for getting such data from real life contexts prove to be much greater and much more difficult to overcome than those which hinder the access to authentic audiotaped

Introduction

3

data. So far, such data are rare. A pioneering example comes from the Eindhoven-Tilburg analysis group (Stalpers, Ulijn—van der Wijst, this volume). The audiotaped data are transposed into a written form, i. e. they are transcribed. Transcribing is a complex process of working with aural data. It involves not only focusing on the content of the verbal interaction, but also on the way in which the content is expressed. A large variety of communicative activities, which the participants are scarcely aware of during their interaction, have proved to be of major importance for the success or failure of the interaction as a whole. Such phenomena are, for example, the management of verbal turns, the organisation of pauses, the fluency of the speakers, the degree of interruptions and self interruptions, etc. These aspects are transcribed with equal precision as is the content of the ongoing discourse. The taped and transcribed data are analysed from various linguistic perspectives and within different theoretical frameworks as, e. g., that of Discourse Analysis and Conversation Analysis (C.A.). These approaches often focus on different aspects of the verbal activities of the participants in a negotiation, taking as their field of analysis, e. g., the structural characteristics of business negotiation as a specific type of discourse, on the one hand, or micro-phenomena such as "feedback", on the other hand. In doing so, all of the approaches involved contribute to a better understanding of business negotiation as a specific type of communication. The volume has four parts. Part I: Business negotiation as discourse type sketches a theoretical framework for business negotiation and discusses its position with regard to related discourse genres. Additionally, it deals with the major methodological issues related to the problem of form and substance in negotiation analysis. Johannes Wagner discusses the analytical distinction between "negotiation" as a discourse type and "negotiating" as an activity. David Francis makes a distinction between negotiation as manoeuvring (negotiating around) and bargaining (negotiating over). Taking this semantic differentiation as his analytic starting point, he gives a critical account of some basic ethnomethodological and C.A. studies. Part II: Discourse structures in business negotiations consists of four papers. They discuss essential elements of the negotiation activities, and they highlight various subtypes. Jochen Rehbein, Helen Marriott, and Alan Firth write about international negotiations. These are intercultural in nature. Business negotia-

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Konrad Ehlich—Johannes Wagner

tion, then, has the character of direct intercultural communication. This is becoming more and more the case in today's business world. Rehbein develops a general scheme of the action pattern of buying and selling and characterises the discourse of negotiation as a decisionmaking process on the part of the buyer which is executed in a step-bystep order. International and intercultural negotiations tend to show a variety of repetitive structures such as communicative circles and nonfunctional explanations. Marriott, analysing the negotiation between an Australian seller and a Japanese buyer, also sketches a step-by-step sequence of the interaction and analyses the topical movement of the interactants. Alan Firth describes the "embedded nature" of business negotiation. He sees embeddedness not as a given fact, but rather as being socially and organisationally accomplished in and through communicative action. The specific subtype of business negotiation which is analysed in his paper is "telenegotiating". Mirjaliisa Charles examines authentic negotiations of native speakers of English. She concentrates on the "power differential" which is characteristic for the positions of buyer and seller. Topic development can be used as an indicator for a description of power and power shift. Part III: Simulating business negotiations consists of four papers; three of them are based on a large scale Scandinavian project on cultural differences in business negotiation. All papers in Part III are based on simulations. Compared to the contributions in the other parts of this volume, they refer to a larger amount of data. The comparison of data is made possible because the settings are much more under the researcher's control than is often the case in real life negotiations. Lars Fant considers major differences in national business negotiation cultures which, as he shows, persist not withstanding the "globalisation" which results in a unified style of doing business along the American model. He shows how differences in management of time, efficiency, straightforwardnes, etc. affect negotiation strategies, the organisation of turn-taking and feedback, reference strategies and other aspects of the discourse of business negotiation. Annette Grindsted, taking negotiation as a specific subtype of conversation, compares the ways in which Spanish and Danish negotiators organise their verbal interactions. The two groups differ in respect of immediacy and with regard to the time consumption which is involved in reaching the goal of the negotiation.

Introduction

5

Flemming G. Andersen analyses the use of intra- and inter-textual repetition in negotiation simulations of English and Danish interactants. Repetitions are often verdicted on the grounds of maxims of efficiency. Nevertheless, they obviously play an important role in communication. Members of the two groups of Danish and English negotiators make use of the communicative resource of repetition in order to fulfill different functions. The Danes use repetition with a topic-closing function; the English use it for a topic-continuing function. In the fourth paper in this section, Joyce Neu and John L. Graham use Kelley's negotiation simulation to show that structure and form of communication play an important role for efficiency in business negotiation. On the basis of statistical evidence, they criticise an isolated "content-analysis" approach for the evaluation of business negotiation. Part IV: Politeness and disagreement in business negotiations takes into consideration specific subparts of business negotiation. Judith Stalpers traces the "expression of disagreement". This certainly is one of the most riskful events in negotiation. "Disagreement acts" serve the main purpose of executing mitigation strategies. However, they are less frequent in business negotiation than in other types of communication. Anette Villemoes (whose analysis is also part of the Scandinavian research projects mentioned in part III) looks for an explanation of why Spanish interaction and Danish interaction are intuitively felt to be very different. These differences are determined by some non-overt factors such as distance, power and ranking of face-threatening acts. Distance proves to be the most important factor: Danes attribute a higher value to distance than do Spaniards, ceteris paribus. Per van der Wijst and Jan Ulijn compare politeness strategies in French and Dutch negotiators based on negotiation training. Whereas there are severe differences with regard to politeness strategy preferences in Danish and Spanish business negotiation, French and Dutch negotiators use similar strategies of politeness. However, there prove to be differences in the closing parts of the negotiations where the French negotiators were more concerned about the relational aspect of the negotiation than the Dutch interactants.

Parti Business negotiation as discourse type

What makes a discourse a negotiation? Johannes Wagner

1. Introduction Only a fraction of the vast literature about negotiations (for an overview cf. Zartman 1994; Firth 1991) investigates interaction. This holds true for studies on business negotiations. Traditionally, research about business negotiation has been oriented towards the output of negotiation, not towards its process. This is not very surprising in the light of the goaloriented research tradition in business studies (Reinsch 1991). Of the numerous studies of communication processes in negotiations, many are concerned with measurement of interactions on the basis of predefined coding systems ( P u t n a m - J o n e s 1982); other studies discuss general aspects of communication theory ( P u t n a m - R o l o f f 1992). More recent research investigates discourse aspects of business negotiations. Three pioneering monographs (Lampi 1986; Firth 1991; Stalpers 1993) and a number of smaller studies indicate a rapidly growing interest in business negotiations (cf. contributions in Grindsted-Wagner 1992; in Firth 1995; the contributions to this volume; furthermore Fant 1989; Grindsted 1989; Stalpers 1987; U l i j n - G o r t e r 1989). Despite the multifaceted interest in "business negotiation", the concept seems somewhat vague. There is no general agreement about what counts as a negotiation and, maybe more essentially, what does not. In the business tradition, negotiation is very often related to sales talk (cf. as an example the numerous studies of Graham), but the border line between sales talk and sales negotiation is not clearly defined. Business professionals themselves refer to very many different kinds of communication as "negotiation". Firth (1991) tries to solve this problem quite radically. He distinguishes between "Negotiation Encounters" and "negotiating activity". '"Negotiation Encounter' is characterised as a single-location encounter, formallyand physically-defined, involving parties with potentially conflicting wants and needs, while 'negotiating activity' is interactionally defined, being contingent on the parties' mutual discourse actions". (Firth 1991: 8).

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Johannes Wagner

Both are not necessarily related, i. e., not all negotiation encounters include negotiating activities, and negotiating activities may occur outside negotiation encounters. The distinction between social setting (i. e., encounter) and interaction creates at least one well defined scientific concept. Firth (1991), arguing in the tradition of Conversational Analysis (C.A.) (Maynard 1984), gives a very precise description of "negotiating activity" (for a discussion cf. section 3). This is the positive outcome of his terminological distinction. The negative outcome is that negotiation encounters are left out of considerations and that possible ties between the study of the social situation and the interaction are cut. Precisely because "negotiation" is such a frequently used concept in ordinary language and in a variety of fields, and because there is such a huge amount of research in this area, it is essential not to give up on a unified concept which covers setting and interaction. In this paper, I will elaborate on the definition of negotiation. In section 2, I will deal with negotiation encounters. In section 3, I will look at several examples of negotiating activity. In section 4 , 1 will discuss how the categories of "negotiation encounter" and "negotiating activity" can be brought together for the description of discourses. The data used in this paper are drawn from authentic business communication and from role plays. The role play data are kindly provided by Lars Fant, Annette Grindsted, and Anette Villemoes. 1 Background information on these data is given in their contributions to this volume. From the Fant-Grindsted—Villemoes corpus I use the transcription of 10 role plays in which Danish business professionals enacted two different situations. In all role plays, Danish is used as the language of communication. The authentic data were collected as part of a Danish project. Here communication in English, German, French and Swedish between Danish companies and their foreign partners were taped and transcribed. All non-English data used in this article are translated in the text. They are given in their original form in the appendix.

2. Negotiation encounters The study of negotiation encounters faces a type/token problem: on the one hand, members of a culture/speech community share tacit knowledge about ways to carry out certain functions or to reach certain goals. On the other hand, only interactions, i. e., tokens, are observable.

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

11

Tacit knowledge is prototypical in nature and must not be confused with the actual encounters. While interactions are the object of scientific study, the description of tacit knowledge is one of its goals. Tacit knowledge has been referred to by different terms "language game" (Wittgenstein 1958), "activity type" (Levinson 1979), "frame" (Tannen 1979), "frames" and "scripts" (Goffman 1974, 1981), or "Handlungsmuster" 'pattern of action' (Rehbein 1977; Ehlich-Rehbein 1986). For all of the theories related to these terms, the description of negotiation presents a challenge because of its enormous interactional complexities. One problem in researching negotiation seems to be that there is no generally accepted way to account for tacit knowledge about negotiation, though most definitions, which refer to a Western concept of negotiation, seem to include the following elements (cf. Wagner 1990; W a g n e r - P e t e r sen 1991; for an example of a non-Western negotiation, see Bilmes 1992): a. A negotiation is the interaction of two (or more) parties, which optimises their mutual goals. Each party wants to realise its own goals in the best possible way. Neither of the two parties is able to reach its goals alone, because the goals are to some extent controlled by the other side. This means that both parties need to cooperate. b. During the negotiation, each party modifies its own goals and coordinates them with the modified goals of the other party. In this sense, a negotiation is a strategic interaction. c. Both parties know that the other party has goals to reach. In this sense, negotiations are exchange relations. Both parties exchange the possibility of realising their own goals. The negotiation defines the conditions for exchange, as shown in Figure 1. If these elements are accepted as the definitional core, different settings for negotiations can be described by the following model. Using goal and control as variables, four different settings for (business) negotiations can be distinguished in Figure 1. The four types of setting in Figure 1 can be illustrated by both authentic and invented examples: Setting 1 Several small Danish agricultural companies join forces regularly to display their products at the annual Berlin trade fair, a major agricultural fair. Every company is able to reach its goals when sharing the costs of being represented at the fair with other companies. Setting 2 A network, consisting of several small independent Danish companies cooperate in marketing their products in Germany. One of these companies is specialised in drawing and developing steel construc-

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Johannes Wagner

Setting

Type of

(1)

A has goal Χ. Β has goal Z. Neither A nor Β has control over both goals.

If there is a relation between X and Z, there could be talks between A and Β to coordinate their actions.

(2)

A and Β have the same goal Y. Neither A nor Β alone has control over Y.

If both can reach the goal, they may have talks on cooperation.

(3)

A has goal Χ, X is controlled by B.

A has to ask for X or has to convince Β to allow X. The result may be persuasive talk.

(4)

A has goal Χ, Β has goal Ζ. X is controlled by Β, Ζ by A.

A and Β have to negotiate.

interaction

Figure 1. Settings for negotiations

tions, a second in producing these constructions and a third in painting and in other kinds of finishing techniques. The three companies join and combine strength to strive for a share of the foreign market. To fulfil contracts, the companies have to engage in close cooperation. Another example of business cooperation in this type of setting has been described in length in Wagner (1995). Setting 3 Sales talks can be classified as encounters in the third type of setting. Either the seller has the goal of selling something to a buyer, i. e., has to convince the buyer, or the buyer has the goal of buying something which is not for sale. Settings 3 and 4 may be best illustrated by an invented example: Techno is a producer of electric machine parts and produces cooling fans for a range of household hardware products. Whiztech is a producer of small computers. The company needs a cooling device for its new generation of slimline computers. It is essential for Whiztech that its subcontractors deliver standard products of very high quality. Techno approaches Whiztech with a newly invented compact low energy fan. Techno has the goal of selling as many fans as possible to as many producers as possible. One of these could be Whiztech. Consequently, Techno's goal is to sell to Whiztech. If Techno's new fan is an outstanding new product, Whiztech may get an edge on the market by using it. Consequently, Whiztech may be interested in persuading Techno not to sell the fan to Whiztech's competitors. In this case, Techno and Whiztech are operating in a type (4) setting.

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

13

On the other hand, if Techno wants to get into the computer subcontractor market at virtually any price, and if Whiztech knows this and already is served by other subcontractors, Techno and Whiztech would be operating in a type (3) setting. In this case, depending on its economic power, Techno has to convince, beg, or force Whiztech to accept Techno as a subcontractor. The contact between both companies might evolve into a type (2) setting. If Whiztech uses certain quality standards, the company might be interested in implementing the same standards among its subcontractors. If Techno makes use of this opportunity to heighten the quality of its own products, both companies would be operating in a type (2) setting. Some important observations can be made in connection with the model: 1. Settings are not stable. During an interaction, settings may change or be redefined by the participants. A type (4) setting may very well be changed into a type (2) setting and vice versa, as I will show later. Apparently, "experienced negotiators" are able to move the setting into a position which is more favourable for their own cause. This can be done by, for example, introducing new information about oneself or the other party or by introducing new goals, or by combining goals of the different parties. A related authentic case has been analysed by Olesen (1992). He taped the first meeting between a Danish agent and representatives of an Egyptian company. Later the Egyptian company became a major supplier for the Danish agent. All this is far from being clear in the first meeting, where Olesen makes his case for negotiation on the basis of "evidence" in the discourse (1992: 182). The knowledge of the setting and the result of the meeting is a strong argument that the Dane and the Egyptian were engaged in a negotiation, but in the first meeting, the potentials of the setting are not developed yet. Olesen's data show clearly that ethnographical knowledge has to be drawn upon in the study of negotiation encounters. 2. Two companies may be involved in several different settings at the same time as it is shown by the example above. Whiztech and Techno may be at the same time involved in a type (4) setting and a type (2) setting regarding different topics. 3. It is possible that the participants have different interpretations of the setting in which they are operating. While company A may interpret the setting as being of type (3), the other company may interpret it as type (4). A difficulty for the analysis is that the conditions for classifying the interaction (i. e., goal and control) may not always be explicit.

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Johannes Wagner

Particularly the latter observation indicates that it is essential to know if, and how, the interactants themselves define the setting. If the participants verbally refer to their goals and how to implement them, and if different parties' goals are referred to as interrelated, we may call the discourse a negotiation. On the other hand, if an external observer finds all conditions for a negotiation in place without the participants realising this and without referring to it verbally, we may not call the discourse a negotiation. So far, the question, "What makes a discourse a negotiation?", may be answered as follows: a discourse is a negotiation if the conditions for a negotiation (interrelated goals and control) are a topic in the interaction. Negotiations may evolve out of one of the four settings described above. With regard to the model, the fourth kind of setting will be viewed as the core, i. e., the most genuine kind of negotiation. Though, due to the instability of the settings, all four may be referred to as negotiations, which is exactly what business professionals are doing in ordinary language use. Based on the observations of the model, two hypotheses about the discourse in the four settings can be formulated. Hypothesis 1 (HI) If the setting for all participants is clearly framed as a type (4) setting, the participants do not need to define the setting interactionally. But since the implementation of goals controlled by others is a difficult task, I will expect that these topics can be traced in the verbal data. I will discuss relevant data in section 2.1. Hypothesis 2 (H2) If the setting is not well defined for the parties involved, I expect that they will define the situation interactionally and that this can be traced in the verbal data. I especially expect interactants in a type (3) setting to try to redefine the setting if they are in a weak position. Interactants in settings of type (1) or (2) may try to redefine the setting to put themselves into a better position. (Re)definitions of the setting may be accomplished in different ways: the participants may explicitly label the encounter as a negotiation, or they may refer to elements (goal and control) which are central for the definition of a negotiation and agree on them. I will discuss examples in section 2.2. 2.1. Contextually

defined

negotiations

As I have argued above, type (4) is the core setting for negotiations. Since I do not have access to authentic data from a well defined setting of this type, I will use two sets of simulations to illustrate my point.

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

15

The first simulation is called the fishing boat case: Party A (represented by the players Al and A2) wants to sell a fishing vessel to party Β (played by B1 and B2) who are local fishermen. The simulation creates an interaction in a type (4) setting. The simulation is further described in the contribution of Villemoes, this volume. After the central item (the boat) has been discussed at some length, the participants in all six role plays display the type of discourse in which they are engaged. I will give a short example from the data. Β points out the benefits A as a businessman gains by selling the boat to B. As stated above, all data from languages other than English have been translated. The original version and a list of transcription symbols are found in the appendix. (1) (original data in Danish) 1 Β we are the lea I mean we are the leading company that must be the reason why you consulted us to sell that boat so it would be it would be good for you sort of to come in and (A: yes absolutely) sell it here 2 A so it it is a great advantage to have a kind of references later (B: yes) that you have done some business with somebody who is important in the trade 3 Β yeah maybe we could help each other in the future actually I (A: that shouldn't be impossible) see some possibilities that's for sure absolutely for sure I really do In turn 1, Β connects his own goal (to buy the boat and buy it for a good price) with a goal he ascribes to A {getting goodwill in the fishing business). By accepting this in turn 2, A displays that he acknowledges it as a relevant goal. In example (1) and in other sections in the data, interdependencies of goals are explicitly mentioned. A and Β act in accordance with the training program from which these data were taken: they embed the negotiation in a climate of mutual dependency and cooperation. In all fishing boat role plays, the participants make it clear that they negotiate in a type (4) environment: (1) They stress that both parties have certain interests where they can help each other, and that they will benefit from helping each other; (2) the advantage of the deal for the other party is stressed; (3) several deals are explicitly connected. The second role play is called the company case: the role play simulates a conflict within a petrochemical company. The head of the laboratory and the head of the division of production engineering meet to discuss testing and marketing of a new product. There have been disagreements between both divisions for a long time.

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Johannes Wagner

In three out of the four role plays of this type in my data, the interaction starts by mutual assurance that both parties have common interests and that they are deeply dependent on each other. In one instance, the assurance takes the form of a ritual. (Both parties are represented by two players Al and A2, and B1 and B2, respectively). (2) (original data in Danish) 1 B1 if you are prepared so (.) let's try to start with the issues we have to discuss 2 Al we are really minded to obtain a good result 3 B2 sure 4 B1 good 5 B2 we are too 6 Al there should be absolutely no doubt about it 7 B2 no that's absolutely sure 8 Al and we'll do what we can (B2:hm) to obtain a good result 9 B2 that's good 10 Al that's for sure 11 B1 yes 12 B2 count on us 13 Al and we have common interests, haven't we 14 B2 absolutely 15 Al we can't live without you we have to admit that 16 B2 and we can't live without you 17 Al isn't that right Michael (=A2) (B2 chuckles) 18 A2 yes 19 Al no 20 B2 then only good things can come out of this, can't they 21 Al absolutely sure 22 B2 that's what I would say too 23 B1 well but if we are assuring each other how good this can be (B2 chuckles) 24 Al yes 25 B1 then I think we should try to get on with what we have to talk about The role play continues as a discussion of cooperation concerning one particular topic, the final testing of a new product. For a time it seems like an interaction in a type (2) setting, but later, different goals are explicitly related, as example (3) shows.

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

17

(3) (original data in Danish) 1 Al but that means that we should do the Mexican crude (name of test in question) 2 B1 yes 3 Al and then you'll see to it that it gets marketed 4 B1 within three months 5 Al our production 6 B1 we market the product 7 Al yes 8 B1 yes 9 Al and see to it and fight to get production going In turns 1 and 3, Al explicitly links his own goal with Bl's goal, and B1 confirms this in turns 2 and 4. Hereby, both express that they are acting in a type (4) setting. The data from both role plays show that hypothesis HI has been fulfilled. Even though the situation is clearly defined, the participants engage in lengthy verbal exchanges about central elements of the model (goals and interests). In both role plays, both parties express common interests; they stress the advantages of the deal to themselves and to the other party, and they relate goals explicitly to others. As a matter of fact, the participants express their agreement about what they are doing in a ritualistic way (example 2). A possible explanation for this verbal behaviour is the training context from which the data are taken. The role plays are predefined settings. They are part of a training scheme, and it is clearly defined that a negotiation is taking place. Unfortunately, I have no access to authentic data in clearly defined settings where the participants openly refer to the setting. Therefore, I cannot argue that comparable metacommunicative agreements will be displayed in authentic settings. The lack of comparable authentic data may be accidental because, as it is expressed in several contributions to this volume, there is little and unsystematic access to data from business communications. But it could be that authentic business communication is different from negotiations as found in training settings and business guides. In this case, the lack of data would be significant. 2.2. Redefining a discourse as a negotiation It was expected (H2) that participants in settings of type (1), (2), or (3) might redefine the setting as type (4) to strengthen their position. This

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Johannes Wagner

can be done implicitly by making the other party understand that conditions have changed. But fortunately it can be done explicitly in such a way that changes in the setting are made verbally and are accepted verbally by the participants. I will discuss an example from a routine sales talk to illustrate this. The data are drawn from authentic telephone communications between a Danish plant export company (DanGreen) and customers in Denmark, Germany and the UK. The data were collected in 1986. The seller calls the buyers on a regular weekly basis. In example (4) to (7), two participants, a Danish seller from DanGreen and a German customer, are talking about the delivery of potted plants. For all plants, the customer can order boxes, layers (which are normally 4 boxes), or racks containing several layers. The number of layers in a rack depends on the size of the plants. Each talk consists of several sales cycles and a considerable amount of small talk. Some talks start with a seller-initiated cycle (S), others with a customer-initiated cycle. Every cycle starts with one of the participants referring to a certain sort of potted plant. Often the customer (C) initiates the talk by asking for certain plants. His knowledge that a specific flower is for sale originates from previous talks and from his professional knowledge about flowers to be sold at that time of year. (4) (original data in German) 1 C okay two layers of Pollux and two layers orange (.) the orange ones have been quite good Mrs. Wind said 2 S uhu 3 C but don't send me all this deformed stuff 4 S (chuckles) (.) .h well In turn 1, the customer orders a certain amount of a particular plant and comments on the quality in turn 3. The seller writes down the order and the cycle is finished. In seller initiated topics the seller offers plants. The offer can be rejected, as in example (5), or accepted, as in example (6). (5) (original data in German) 1 S what about (.) primroses or (.) Malacoides 2 C no we have our own (6) (original data in German) 1 S what about ferns (.) Cordata (6.0) 2 C nice ones

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

3S c s 6c 7 s 8c 9s 10 c 11 s 4 5

19

yes how much? (.) two marks and eight (.) no certainly not I don't want them and how 'bout the ones in the the nine centimeter pots and how much are they one fifteen uh yes eight boxes (quietly spoken) eight Cordata

Before the customer accepts and orders a certain amount, he normally asks for assurances that the plants are of high quality (turn 2). In turn 6, the customer refuses one kind of fern (because of the price). The seller in turn offers a smaller and cheaper sort (turn 7) and gets an order for eight boxes. The specifications can be expanded by — occasionally quite lengthy - exchanges concerning size, quality, color, and price (for a comparable procedure cf. Firth 1991). After having described the basic structure of the sales talks, I will return to the question how negotiation can be established in the discourse. In the following example, the German customer (R) initiates the topic. He is interested in getting a larger delivery of snowdrops than the Danish supplier (M) is willing to deliver. The talk is recorded in January, which is very early for snowdrops. (7) (original data in German) 1 R what about snowdrops? are we going to get any more? are we getting one rack or what? 2 Μ no we are getting only one layer (.) at the moment 3 R is that rEAlly the best you can offer? didn't you want me as your (.) best customer? 4 Μ yes, yes sure [(chuckles) 5 R yEs] 6 Μ well we'll have to w(h)ait a bit (.) 7 R yes but how can I become your number one customer if you don't supply me? 8 Μ well that is you're right At this point, the topic is left and another cycle about a different plant is opened. R asks for a plant which Μ cannot deliver either. Μ asks if a certain competitor of R (Schmidt) has sold plants of this kind at the market, and R closes the topic with a negative description of this competitor. Following this, he reopens the topic snowdrops'.

20

Johannes Wagner

9 R 10 Μ 11 R

12 Μ 13 R 14 Μ 15 R

16 Μ 17 R

18 Μ 19 R 20 Μ 21 R

okay snowdrops Martin see if you can somewhere somehow do something maybe] some more [but the] Maier AG (competitor) doesn't need any Schmidt (competitor) doesn't need any either (M chuckles) they are not your regular customers Martin (M:.h) you have to realize that an[d to tell yourself okay but they are] regular customers people who buy everything from me (.) who really are [loyal (M: yes)] DanGreen [customers (M: yes)] (.) really but I mean the others could also become regulars if they (.) get good products now or are getting (.) [what you are getting now that's not true] I was at his place yesterday your things were there two racks were sent back (M: uh [where) two] containers (M: where) well in Emsdorff (.) no there were three layers Kalanchoe that's all (.) [m two] containers were there there was [mini (M: m)] Kalanchoe and there was Pollux (M.yeah well) nononono (..) two containers were at his door Danb uh [Green Dan]Blue (DanGreen's competitor) I am sure yes but you see he buys there too (M chuckles) they are no top [customers forget of course they buy there too] it (M: mm) really Martin you should do that [I think (M: m)] it would be fair (M: mm) these bastards

R interrupts Μ by saying that he actually has been at Schmidt's place and has seen several boxes with items to be returned to DanGreen. Therefore, he concludes that Schmidt is by no means a top customer. R goes on by telling a story how he had been treated unfairly by Schmidt concluding that it would not be fair if snowdrops were delivered to Schmidt. 22 R 23 24 25 26

Μ R Μ R

27 Μ 28 R

and therefore I think it is not fair if these bastards get the snOwdrops (M: m (.)) no Martin (.) .h well they [have to have some yes this morning they again had] [some hm] some they must have [xx yes] Martin they had some this morning [I had (M: m)] none how many [did (M: .m)] they get one layer (chuckles) no

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

29 Μ

30 R

31 Μ 32 R

33 Μ 34 R 35 Μ

36 R 37 Μ 38 R

39 Μ 40 41 42 43

R Μ R Μ

21

yEs (.) one layer (.) if he had more then they are from somewhere else (R: yes) but I don't think so [all (R: yes)] the others I [know xx no one on] the central market (.) because of [course (M: m)] those few [which (M: m)] we had went immediately (M: m) and these bastards do have them (M: yes (.) yes (.)) I don't think that's fair but you know as soon as there are more available you will get most of them you know that from (.) [earlier years yEs, but it is eh] now I mean (.) then then then then [give (M: m)] then tell them they will get half a layer or [some (M: m)] boxes (M: yes yes) yEs (.) really Martin in my eyes (.) that would be would be fair (M: yes) you know that I (2.0) that I buy regularly from your company you certainly do (.) fifty percent increase in one month (M: yes) nobody else had that did they (M (chuckles) .h) did anybody achieve that? well I mean compared to eighty-five well but then it wasn't badly cold and then you were (.).h you should compare the figures (.) with those of eighty-four then you can (.) yes but do compare with eighty-four (M: yes (.)) do compare with eighty-four then yeah you could do that we'll [do (R: yes)] that I am curious (M: m) and if it is more in spite of that (M: yes (.)) 'cos I mean last year we didn't buy lEss from you .h (M: no) you have seen it at the end of the year it was a couple of thousand German Marks (M: yes) (2.0) is that clear with the snowdrops (2.0) yes I mean if they aren't there Rüdiger then then (0.5) then they aren't I [can't yes] Martin but it is [it would be fair just give them unfortunately I can't work miracles] just give them four boxes that's enough well yes (0.5) .h next item

In example (7), R opens the cycle (turn 1) by bidding for a larger quantity of snowdrops (a whole rack). Μ promises to deliver a small quantity, a layer. In this situation, R tries to change the setting. He defines a goal for Μ (turn 3) which Μ accepts verbally, but Μ comments at the same time with his chuckling that he is not taking C's argumentation seriously. It is not clear if R aims at defining the setting as a cooperation (type (2),

22

Johannes Wagner

"we both have to cooperate to reach our goals") or as a negotiation (type (4), "if you want to reach your goal, you have to help me to reach my goal"), since he does not succeed in his attempt to change the setting. After reopening the topic in turn 9, R introduces the notion fairness in order to obtain his snowdrops. Fairness is expanded in two ways: Schmidt is described as acting unfairly towards M, the seller, since he returns some of the commodities bought from DanGreen. Μ does not accept the argument, but argues that Schmidt is still a regular customer and needs delivery from Μ — as R does. On top of that, Schmidt is described as acting unfairly with regard to R himself. This is backed by a narration (not quoted here). Since Μ still persists that he has to deliver snowdrops to Schmidt (turn 23), R mentions that Schmidt that very morning had a larger stock at the central market than R himself, implicating that these plants may have been delivered by DanGreen and hereby indirectly accusing Μ of giving Schmidt better service than R himself. In this way, he uses the fairness argument for a third time: Μ is being unfair to him (R). This is immediately countered by Μ (turn 31) who assures R that he will always be treated better than other customers. 2 In turn 32, R suggests that Μ might deliver a smaller amount of snowdrops to Schmidt. This might imply that R expects that the remainder could be delivered to R. Again, this is backed by the fairness argument and the aforementioned argument that R himself is M's top customer. Μ is willing to discuss the argument, but does not at any time promise a larger delivery, except for a vague promise in turn 10. To summarise: R tries to change a sales talk into a type (2) setting or a type (4) setting, respectively, by claiming a goal for M. He backs this with different arguments. R's own goal - a larger delivery of snowdrops - has already been made clear. Following R, seller and customer may reach their goals if the seller does as the customer wants, i. e., delivers as much as possible. The seller, however, does not enter this line of argument; he simply avoids the topic. R goes metacommunicative when claiming M's goal: Didn't you want me as your best customer (turn 3). So far the data are comparable to the role plays. Negotiation (or cooperation, respectively) is established by referring to the conditions of the setting. In the case of R and M, however, it does not work out. Μ does not accept the redefinition. In a wider context, other interpretations can be made for what is going on. R might have the intention to put pressure on M. To do this he tries to change the setting and to strengthen his position. Another possibility would be that R wants his status as a special customer con-

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

23

firmed, which — in the long run — may be useful for him. If this is his goal, he is successful: in the talk, R's status is acknowledged by M. I cannot rule out either of these interpretations, since I have no access to further ethnographical data. But still, hypothesis H2 is fulfilled: a participant in a weak position tries to redefine the setting to strengthen his position. I will illustrate my point further with another example. Here the participant fails to redefine the situation, actually never getting as far as R in his pledge for snowdrops. The data are taken from recordings of telephone calls between a Danish and a British company. The call is part of a longer interaction with the following topic. A machine in the production line of the Danish company has been damaged. Several spare parts are needed to get the machine working again. The British company which had built the machine has informed the Danish company that it might take about four weeks to deliver the necessary spare parts and to get two fitters to Denmark to repair the machine. Until that time, one of the production lines of the Danish company will not be operational and will cost an enormous amount of money. In this situation, the employee of the British company (who is the Dane's regular contact person) suggests that the Dane might call the production director of the British company in order "to put pressure on him". This is done immediately. (8) (original data in English) 1 D I have speak to your Mister John Smith about some spare parts (B: yes). We have a little accident from our XYZ machine [(chuckles) 2 Β Yes] I understand 3 D (chuckles) maybe you have heard about it 4 Β Yes I have. He's been to see me about it 5 D Okay. I will naturally also speak to our production engineer or manager and (1.0) they have sent me back here and will you try to press your company a little bit (chuckles) and that is why I'm calling you. 6 Β Right now (D chuckles) as I understand it you (.) you need some spare parts (D: yes) and then you would like our fitter to come (.) out to help you put those spare parts on and to check the machine (D: yes) over (D: yes). Right now then I'm not sure er the last time I spoke to John on this (D: mm mm) he was having a certain amount of difficulty in acquiring one of the spare parts. 7 D Yes that is correct

24

Johannes Wagner

D is in a comparable situation to R in example (7). They act in a type (3) setting where their goal is controlled by somebody else. The point for my argumentation is not that they both fail to succeed, but that they use different strategies. In turn 5, D tries to refer to high ranking employees in his own company in order to put more social power behind his words. In the same turn, D defines the situation as a type (3) setting, and Β agrees in turn 6 that D is asking Β for a service. D's strategy can be described as referring to higher authorities and their demands. This is different from R's strategy in which he tries to redefine the situation to strengthen his own position. D is not able to redefine the situation into something more favorable for his goals. As a consequence, D is not able to put pressure on B. In conclusion, I have argued that negotiation encounters evolve in certain settings, and that two variables (goal and control) make it possible to distinguish between different settings. The discourse resulting from these settings is not necessarily a negotiation. Only if the participants refer to these variables may we call it a negotiation. As the role play data show, this occurs even in situations which are heavily framed as negotiations. If goal and control are not well defined through the setting, the participants can try to establish a negotiation by (re)defining the two variables. As I have shown, this is done metacommunicatively.

3. Negotiating activity In section 1, I followed Firth (1991) in making a distinction between negotiation encounters and negotiating activities. In this section, I will comment on negotiating activity. Firth, in his study of commodity trading, defines negotiating activity on the basis of a regular "purchasing sequence" consisting of: (1) the buyer's request for price-level information, (2) the seller's provision of the information, and (3) the acceptance of the price by confirming a certain order. From this perspective, he describes negotiating activity as "initiated by one party's display of misalignment with a substantive proposal, offer, request, or suggestion of the opposing party, and terminated when definitive agreement on one or more substantive issues is reached. The demonstrable end goal orientation for the parties involved in negotiating activity is thus mutual alignment" (Firth 1991: 145).

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

25

In the DanGreen data, which are comparable to Firth's, negotiating activities are not always found in instances of misalignment (cf. example 6). In other instances, negotiating activities do not always lead to mutual agreement. This difference to Firth's data certainly has to do with the amount of money and commodities involved. In Firth's data, few commodities in very large quantities change hands, while DanGreen sells many different plants to customers in relatively small quantities. So misalignment between seller and customer is manageable for DanGreen, and the seller's motivation to reach alignment for each and any commodity is not very high. I will look at two examples of negotiating from the DanGreen data. In the first, the buyer aligns to the seller's initial proposal. (9) (original data in German) IS .h so then we had I had two layers red (.) and one layer (.) pink (1.0) 2 C of the Minikalanchoes 3 S no of the mini uh roses well those bigger ones (.) the four sixty five ones [in the ten centimeter pots (0.5) 4 C .h] yes how much (0.5) 5 S two layers (.) red and one layer pink (.) 6 C two red (.) .h and how much 7 S (.) four sixty-five they are really (.) top quality 8 C no that is too expensive Martin 9 S no they will sell well now on Valentine's Day 10 C yes but (chuckles) 11 S you have (.) it's Valentine's Day the fourteenth 12 C are they really] nice bushy ones 13 S sure 14 C short and compact 15 S sure 16 C packed in a bag 17 S (.) .h yeah they are [in a bag 18 C but Mar]tin four sixty-five that is mad 19 S no (.) you will get it without problems in the first uhm okay in three four weeks (.) they maybe (0.5) .h cost you only fOUr marks but (.) they are really well there is a great demand for them Schmidt bought them immediately (.) when he saw them he also said (.) well four sixty five but (1.0) 20 C oh well okay

26

Johannes Wagner

The seller proposes the commodity in turns 1 and 3. The buyer asks routinely for the price in turn 4. Instead of mentioning the price, the seller refers to a quantity. In doing this, he does not give the expected response (second part of an adjacency pair). The buyer may take this as an indication that the price might be high. When the buyer asks for the price a second time, the seller delivers the information and immediately assures him that the goods are of top quality (turn 7). C rejects the price in turn 8. S does not accept the rejection and argues that there will be great demand for flowers on upcoming Valentine's Day. In turns 12, 14, and 16, C enquires about the quality of the product, but again complains about the high price (turn 18). Hereafter, the seller adds two more arguments in favor of the product, i. e., time of the year (earliness) and a competitor's quality judgement. Finally, C aligns by accepting price and quantity. Example (10) illustrates the opposite case: the seller misaligns to the proposal of the customer, then gives a different proposal to which the buyer aligns: (10) (original data in German) 1 C then uh (4.0) Boston (2.0) what do you have any good on[es xxx 2 S last time] I think you had last time those for twelve marks fifty (.) do you mean those (1.0) 3 C well yeah are there really big ones you don't have 4 S no they are too expensive they cost you (.) twenty marks (3.0) 5 C twenty marks (0.5) 6 S yes (.) and they aren't so much thicker than [er 7 C may]be you can do something about the price eighteen marks or something like that 8 S well I would take those for twelve fifty they are uh (0.5) better value for the money (2.0) 9 C yes 10 S yes (.) 11C yes but they hadn't so so so they hadn't grown so beautifully (0.5) they have to be bushy (.) 12 S yes (.) more compact or what 13 C yes 14 S I sure can get them (2.0) 15 C yes and really thick ones give me two boxes (2.0) 16 S you could take a layer that's ten of them 17 C yes then give me ten of them really thick ones (1.0) 18 S mm (3.0)

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

19 C 20 S

27

but (.) really bushy ones not too long then they will break (S:no) on the top (S: m) they have to be bushy (.) (S: m) compact yes

The topic for example (10) is "Boston", a special brand. C is looking for a better quality than that which he received in the previous consignment. Apparently, a larger brand is available, but the seller is not willing to deliver (turn 4). Consequently, he does not react when C asks for a price reduction (turn 7). This is one of the few instances in the DanGreen data where the customer tries to bring down the price. Otherwise, there is no price negotiation in my data. In turn 8, S again suggests that C should buy the smaller species. C aligns but then demands better quality. S assures him of that. The structure of a negotiating activity described by Firth (1991) holds for the DanGreen data. A successful negotiatiating activity consists of four elements: the proposal, the indication of misalignment, the agreement work, and the final agreement. If the negotiation does not succeed, step four will be a final disagreement of some kind. Agreement work can be done in different ways. In Firth's data, it is done by a sequence consisting of offer and counteroffer, that is by "squeezing the water out of the quotations" as Firth (1991: 79) quotes Rangarajan (1985). In the DanGreen data, agreement work is done in a slightly different way. Argumentation plays a much more central role. As shown in example (9), the work is done by backing the proposal, in example (10) by backing a counterproposal. The most comprehensive agreement work in my data is done in example (7). The customer tries to redefine the setting, but does not succeed. The agreement work in example (7) is schematised in Figure 2. The starting point is the proposal (turns 1 and 9) and the misalignment of Μ in turns 2 and 10. R argues his case during the agreement work, but does not verbalise clear proposals, though they are apparent in his argumentation. In Figure 2, these implicit proposals are shown in italics. Since the proposals are not explicit, there is no need for Μ to react to them. He reacts to what is said, not to what is meant. In this way, the discourse is a sequence of arguments and not a sequence of proposals and counterproposals. It has to be borne in mind that both Firth's and DanGreen's data are drawn from a retailer context. In both cases, a commodity is sold to another retailer. In this economic context, commodities are produced as

28

Johannes Wagner because

Deliver snowdrops to me because

I am a good customer and you want me to be your best customer (3,7)

You should deliver deliver to me

You don't have to deliver to Schmidt (11,22)

You should —* That's me deliver to top customers (13)

because

Schmidt is not a good customer (11) because he returns deliveries (15-19)

because

You should deliver less to Schmidt (32,42) * because

Schmidt already has enough snowdrops (24)

—>

Where did he get them from?

and deliver the rest to me!

I am your best customer (32,34)

—*

You should deliver to me

Figure 2. Argumentation in the snowdrop case

a standard mass product. It exists before the interaction starts. As a consequence, there is a price which can be mentioned in a proposal and which can be discussed. There are other ways of doing business. At least in the Danish context, it seems very common that companies outside the retailer market do not sell predefined products, but rather concentrate on developing potential products. A product in the producer market is nowadays very often not fixed, but has to be developed to fit the customer's specifications. This is typically done in "technical meetings". To return to the earlier example, Whiztech and Techno meet and discuss what kind of technical specifications Whiztech needs (regarding, for example, power, size, material). Techno declares that they are able to deliver such a cooling device; alter-

What makes a discourse a negotiation?

29

natively they demand that Whiztech changes certain specifications. So far, the interaction is oriented more towards production and cooperation than towards a price. The price is determined by several factors, where the final agreement on technical specifications plays a central role (for a related case, cf. Wagner 1995). Interactions in technical meetings like these certainly contain some type of negotiating activity which may be quite different from the retailer negotiations shown in this paper. In general, I would assume that different types of economic contacts reveal different types of negotiating activities. Further field work and empirical data are needed to prove this assumption.

4. Negotiating activity in a negotiation discourse After having approached the topic of negotiation from two directions, the question now has to be raised how negotiation (discourse) and negotiating activities are related. Negotiating activity, as it has been defined earlier, is a conversational activity in which speakers may engage when proposals are not accepted. It has to be kept in mind that this is a definition on purely conversationaltechnical grounds. In ordinary conversation, these negotiating activities may or may not lead to a final agreement. In business negotiation, things are different. To do business, the participants have to reach an agreement. Even so, as example (5) shows, not every nonalignment to proposals leads automatically to negotiating activity. Depending on the kind of business, nonalignment may be acceptable on a "local" level, if the overall goal of the business is accomplished. But, in general, the parties involved in business negotiations are oriented towards alignment (cf. section 3). This makes negotiating activities in business different from those in ordinary conversation. The category "institutional mandate" has been introduced to account for an overall orientation which professionals in institutional settings share. In Maynard's data from plea bargaining (Maynard 1984), the participants act towards the solution of juridical cases. In Firth's (1991) data from retail negotiations, the participants do business with each other. By relating the specifics of negotiating activity in business (the orientation towards "mutual alignment" (Firth 1991: 145)) to the institutional mandate, the social setting is again tied to the interaction as a context condition. This makes the distinction between negotiation encounter and negotiating activity spurious.

30

Johannes Wagner

My answer to the question "What makes a discourse a negotiation?" is based on the participants' activities in the interaction in certain settings. A discourse counts as a negotiation if the participants relate themselves to each other's goals and interests and to the problems of implementing their goals. This will most clearly be a relevant activity in a type (4) setting. Negotiating activity may be part of the discourse, but its occurrence is not part of the definition of a negotiation discourse. If the participants in the interaction do not refer to goals and interests, we cannot call the discourse a negotiation. If, for example, one participant is not aware that implementation of his/her goals depends on the other, we cannot say that he or she is negotiating. In this way, the definition of the negotiation discourse is again tied to the participants' own definition. As already mentioned, discourses emerging from type (1) to type (3) settings are in ordinary business language often referred to as negotiations. This makes sense because participants' own definitions of the settings are essential, and participants can (try to) redefine settings of type (1), (2), or (3) into type (4) settings. This means that these settings do have the potential to become negotiations. As a consequence, I will refer to discourses in type (1) to (3) settings as negotiations if at least one participant tries to redefine the setting. In this sense, a sales talk becomes a negotiation if one participant tries to connect the sale with other goals of the interactants.

Appendix The non-English transcripts Transcript symbols indicates a very short gap in the speech indicates turn overlap [] indicates emphasis give (0.5) indicates pause in tenth of seconds transcribers comments (abc) indicates omitted text ((·)) .h indicates an inbreath wo(h)rd indicates laughter XX inaudible segments (•)

(1)

Β

A Β

vi er jo ret vil jeg sige retningsgiver det er vel ogsa derfor du ligesom har henvendt dig oh dig til osaeh for at fä fä solgt den bad der säe det vil jo det vil jo vasre en god ting for dig ligesom at komme ind og ja men altsä helt besternt at fä solgt den her

What makes a discourse a negotiation? A Β A Β A Β

31

saeeh det 0h det er da en stor fordel at man ligesom ka0h ka har nogle referencer senere jah til at man har lavet nogle handler med med nogle af dem som har betydning for branchen helt besternt detoh jamen det kan da vaere vi kan hjaelpe hinanden henad vejen altsä jegoh det er da ikke helt umuligt ser da muligheder i det det er da helt sikkert det g0r jeg helt sikkert

B1 hvis I er indstillet pä det säeh fors0ger vi og og komme i i gang med de ting vi skal snakke om Al vi er helt klart indstillet pä at vi skal opnä et godt resultat B2 helt sikkert B1 godt B2 det er vi ogsa Al det0h det skal der i hvert fald ikke herske nogen tvivl om B2 nul det er helt sikert Al og 0h vi vil g0re hvad vi kan B2 hm Al for og opnä et godt resultat B2 det er godt Al det er helt sikkert B1 ja B2 den er vi med pä Al og vi har jo faelles interesser ikke sandt B2 helt klart Al det 0h vi kan ikke leve uden jer i hvert fald det indrommer vi blankt B2 og vi kan ikke leve uden jer Al ikke Michael (A2) B2 (griner) A2 ja Al nej B2 sä kan der kun komme noget godt ud af det ikke Al helt sikkert B2 Ja det vil jeg da ogsä sige B1 ja ja men hvis i ellers i gang med sädan at forsikre hinanden om hvor godt det her det kan blive ikke säe B2 (griner) Al ja Β1 synes jeg vi skal prave ogoh og sä nä frem til hvad det er vi skal snakke om Al men 0h det det vil altsä sige at 0h vi skal lave den mexikanske crude B1 ja Al

og sä vil d u o h 0h 0h S0rge f o r at fä marketsf0rt

32

Johannes Wagner B1 Al B1 Al B1 Al

inden tre mäneder vores Produktion far vioh markedsf0rt produktet ja ja og og serge for og kaemper for at fä Produktionen igang

C S C S

okay zwei lagen Pollux und zwei lagen orange (.) die orange wärn ganz gut gewesen sagte frau Wind aha aber schickt da nich son krüppelzeug da her (schmunzelt) (.) .h gut

(5)

S C

was is mit eh (.) primeln oder (.) Malacoides nnö wir ham selbs hier

(6)

S C S C S C S C S C S

was is mit farne (.) Coradata (6.0) schöne ja kosten (.) zwei mark un acht nee die auf kein fall die will i ni ham un dieehm neunertÖpfe un was komm die einfümsehn mm ja acht kisten (leise) acht Cordata

(7)

R

Μ R

was is jetz mit Schneeglöckchen kriegn wa da mehr kriegn wa da ein container oder wie najn wir kriegn nur eine eine läge (.) im moment is das wirklich das beste du wollst doch dass ich dein (.) künde nummer eins werde ja ja genau [(schmunzelt) jA]

Μ

.h aber da müssn wir noch wa(h)rten (.)

R

ja aber wie wie soll ich künde nummer eins werdn wenn du mich nich versorchst ja das is da has du recht ((-))

(4)

Μ R

Μ R

Μ R

also Schneeglöckchen kuck ma Martin ob de da nich da kannste doch

irgendwo was [machn vielleich] η paar mehr [aber der] Maier brauch keine die Schmidt A G brauchn auch (M schmunzelt) keinee de sind ja nich deine stAmmkunden Martin (M: .h) da musste aber auch jetz ma sehn .h un[d sagen okeh

What makes a discourse a negotiation? Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ

R

Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R

33

das sind das sind wOhl] stammkundn aber leute die bei mir hundert prosent einkaufen (.) die [treue ja] DanGreen [kundn ja] sind (.) ja Ehrlich ja die annern ich meine die annern könn ja auch hundertprozentige werdn wenn die (.) wenn die jetz eh eh gute ware bekommen oder das bekommen was (.) [was du auch bekomms is doch gar nich wahr] ich bin gestern im betrieb gewesen da standa doch (.) standn doch s deine sachn wieda zwEI cointainer die zurückgingn mh wo [denn zwei] container (.) wo Ja in Emsdorf (.) neä da stand da standen drei lagen Kalanchoe das is alles (.) [m zwei] container standen da da standen [mini m] Kalanchoe und da stand Pollux nja ja nenenenenee (..) zwei container stand auch an der tür Danb eh [Green Dan]blue wahrscheinlich nich ja aber da siehste schon das a (Μ schmunzelt) da auch kauft ne das sind also keine hundertprozentigen [kundn klopp dir türlich kaufn die da] die mal ab (.) mm Martin das solltstu wiklich machn [ich fänd m] das fand das (.) fair m diese armleuchter ((··•)) und deshalb fand ich das nich fair wenn d wenn die armleuchter da (.) die die schnEEglöckchen kriegn m (.) ne Martin (.) .h ja s die [mUssn η paar ja die hatten heute morgen auch wieder] [welche hm] η paar müssn die habn [xx ja] Martin die hatten heute morgen auch wieder welche ich [hatte m] keine wieviel [ham

34

Johannes Wagner Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ

m] die denn gekriegt eine l(h)age L ne dOch (.) eine läge (.) wenn a mehr hatte dannäh sin die anderswo her ja aber ich (..) glaub es nich [die

R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ

ja] annern die kenn ich [alle xx keiner auf]m grossmarkt mehr (.) wei de weil die na[türich m] die paar dinger .h [die m] wa hattn sin weggewesn mm un die armleuchter ham die (..) ja (.) ja (.) ich find das nich nich fair aber du weiss ja sobald mehr da sin dann kriegst du ja die hauptmenge da weiss du ja von (.) [von den annern jahrn jA aber is eh] is doch jetz ich mein dann dann dann dann [gib m] den sach ebm se kriegn ne halb läge oder η [paar m] kisten ja ja JA (.) we wirklich Martin das fand ich (.) fand ich fair ja (.) du weisst ja dass ich eure (2.0) betändig bin bei euch (.) das bis tu ja (.) fümfzig prozent zuwaks in eim monat ja (.) das hatt a wohl keiner ode(h)r (schmunzelt) .h hat das jemand anners naja ich meine im vergleich zuu (.) fümundachzich nich da war das ja auch nich schlimm kalt und da wars du ja dann (.) .h man muss einklich dieeh die zahlen mit (.) vierunachzich vergleichn dann kann man (.) ja aber vergleich doch mit vierunachzich (.) ja (.) vergleich doch mit vierunachzich (.) jaa kann man auch machen m[ach tja] en wir

R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ

R Μ R Μ R Μ

What makes a discourse a negotiation? R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ R Μ (9) S

35

das das intressiert mich m un wenn das trotzdem mehr is ja (.) denn ich mein wir ham vorichs jähr ne ja nich schlEchter gekauft bei dir .h nöh du has ja gesehn am ende des jahres handelte sich das um paar tausen mark ne ja (2.0) is das klar das de mit den mit den Schneeglöckchen (2.0) ja m ich meine wenn die nich da sin Rüdiger dann dann (0.5) sind ebm nich da ich kann [ja ja] Martin aber is ja is [ja is doch fair gib den doch zaubern kann ich eh leider nich] gib den doch vier kistn dann is doch gut jaja (0.5) .h gut weiter .h so da hatten wir da hatt ich zwei lagn rote (.) und eine läge (.) pink (1.0)

C S C S C S C S C S C S C S C S C S

C

von den Minikalanchoes ne von den mini eh rosen also eh die etwas grösseren (.) die vier fümunsechziger [im zehnertopf (0.5) .h] ja wieviel (0.5) zwei lagen (.) rot und eine läge pink (.) zweimal rot (.) .h un wie teuer (.) vierfümunsechzich die sin also wirklichch (.) astrein ne das is zu teuer Martin ne die werdn gehn jetz zu Valentins (.) ja aber (lacht) du has ja w (.) am vierzehnten is VAlentintag sind das richtich] schöne buschige dinger sicher kurz un kompakt sicher in ner tüte .h (.) doch die sin [inna tü aber Marjtin vierfümunsechzig das is Wahnsinn (0.5) ne (.) da k kricht ja spielen für die ersten ah okei enenen drei vier (.) wochen nich da kosten die vielleicht (0.5) .h nur vIEr mark aber (.) eh die sin echt aso die sind wohl sehr gefragt der Schmidt hat die auch sofort gekauft (.) wo er die gesehn hat er er sagt auch (.) mensch vierfünfunsechzig aber (1.0) .h na gut okei

36

Johannes Wagner

(10) C S C S C S C S C S C S C S C S C S C S: C S: C: S: C: S

dann eh (4.0) Boston (2.0) was habta da irgendwie was vernünftig[es xxx du hattess] beim letschen mal glaub ich zzwölf mark fümfziger (.) meinstu die (1.0) nja gibts ganz grosse gibs nich nein die sind zu teuer die kosten (.) zwanzig mark (3.0) zwanzig mark (0.5) ja (.) un so viel dicker sin die auch nich als die [eeh da] kannste ja vielleich noch bisschen was im preis machen achzehn mark oder was weiss ich m also ich würd die zwölffümziger nehm die sin echt eh (0.5) besser für das geld (2.0) ja ja (.) ja die warn aber so so so η warn nich schön gewasch nöh gwachsen (0.5) das muss so buschig sein (.) nja (.) etwas kompakter oder wie ja das kann ich wohl kriegen (2.0) ja un ganz dicke denn mach doch ma nee ne ne zwei kisten (2.0) kann man auch ne läge nehm das sin zehn stück nich ja dann mach die zehn stück ganz dicke (1.0) mm (3.0) aber auch (.) vernünftig buschig nich so lange dann brechen die nein nämich ohm ab m die mussn buschig (.) m kompakt sein jouh

Notes 1. The data have been taped in training seminars organised by AKTI A/S (Copenhagen). 2. As a matter of fact, Μ calls Schmidt immediately after his call. He tells Schmidt that he is not able to deliver any snowdrops at all to him before next week.

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism: The problem of form and substance in negotiation analysis David

Francis

1. Introduction This paper seeks to address the question: How are negotiation and decision-making related? However, it does not address this question in the way that such questions typically are formulated in sociology. The standard way of posing this - and many other - questions is as a generalisation: "What is the relationship between negotiation and decisionmaking?" Notice the work that the is doing here. It is commonplace to treat such questions as necessarily generalised; the only kind of answer deemed adequate involves some kind of general model. Such a model abstracts from the particulars of this or that case of negotiation or decision-making to present a generalised picture of some common pattern or structure. The model then stands proxy for the cases; cases only count as worthwhile sociological phenomena by virtue of their relationship to the model - as confirmations of it, exceptions to it, reasons for modifying it and so on. They are of no interest as phenomena in themselves. This analysis-by-generalisation tendency in "mainstream" sociology is well documented (Button 1991). Arguably, it is constitutive of mainstream analytic practice. It is my belief that some ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts - whose work stands over against mainstream sociology in many important ways - are in danger of succumbing to this tendency in their work on negotiation and decision-making. I hope to show in this paper that such a "rush to generalisation" is both unnecessary and unwarranted. The paper is in two sections. In the first half, I present a critique of conversation analysis (hereafter C.A.) based studies of negotiation and decision-making, focusing on the work of Maynard. In the second, I consider some conversational materials (see transcript appendix) in the light of the methodological arguments in the first part.

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2. Negotiation and decision-making: idealisations and interactional actualities It is a commonplace of social scientific knowledge that the activities of negotiation and decision-making are closely related. However, the value of this insight is vitiated by the practice of analysis-by-generalisation. This practice has two main features. The first is definitional stipulation. It is assumed that before any useful substantive work can begin, a definition must be stipulated of the phenomenon one seeks to investigate and explain. The second is generalised or decontextualised description. When it comes to describing the phenomena which fall under one's definition, such a description is cast in the form of typicalities or probabilities. The effects of these practices are manifest in the generalised and idealised conceptions of negotiation and decision-making, and the relationship between them, which abound in the social sciences (Putnam—Poole 1987). Most often models are presented which define one activity as an aspect or component of the other. But there is little agreement about which is subordinate to which. Thus, some theories define negotiation as one mode of decision-making ( J a n i s - M a n n 1977), while others conceive decision-making as one phase of the negotiation process (Gulliver 1979). Given that each theory abstracts from the world in its own way, according to its own rules of relevance, it is little wonder that the business of comparing and contrasting them is deeply and irresolvably problematic. Despite the relentless piling up of studies, the goal of cumulative knowledge recedes rather than grows. Little wonder also that, however the relationship is stipulated, there remains a stubborn gap between the idealisations of the theorist and the interactional actualities of the activities to which the theory intendedly refers (Eglin 1982; Francis 1982). In their search for formal types, common patterns or underlying structures, theorists attempt to span this gap in various ways; by far the most common is the use of selected empirical case materials to illustrate some purported general property or feature. It is noteworthy that analysts rarely address the crucial methodological question of how such illustrative descriptions come to be deemed adequate with reference to the events they intendedly describe. Ethnomethodology and C.A. contrast with the analytic practices referred to above in their commitment to the grounding of sociological description in the detail of naturally occurring, real world interaction. In relation to negotiation and decision-making, this commitment involves the rejection of generalised models and theoretical stipulations in favour

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism

39

of close study of the interactional practices in and through which negotiation and decision-making are performed in real world settings. It also means that analytic attention is paid to the ways in which persons "contextualise" their actions, fitting them to the perceived social setting within which they are being undertaken and in so doing accomplishing the features of that setting. The ethnomethodological approach to decision-making emphasises the occasioned character of decisions and the practical reasoning which informs and defines them. In direct contrast with the rationalistic tradition, in which idealised and decontextualised versions of "rational decision-making" stand proxy for the actual processes by which decisions are reached, ethnomethodology seeks to describe the rationality-in-use of actual persons in specific practical circumstances. The centrality of the study of practical rationality to the ethnomethodological enterprise has been elegantly summarised by Boden (1990): Ethnomethodology is, quite simply, the study of rational action, or, to hone the point, the actual occasions of rationality-in-action. It has much to offer (...) apparently larger approaches in its ability to uncover the local logic of the world as it happens. (...) That logic is, in turn, nested within and reflexively tied to past events and future outcomes, but it is irredeemably and unavoidably local in that any and all larger 'goals', or 'rules' or even 'laws' must be tailored to particular conditions, particular actors, specific times, definite places. (...) This is not to say that the world is up for grabs at each succeeding moment but rather that it must, most elaborately, be brought off as a reasonable affair in the present, in the light of the past and with the horizon of the future.

Boden makes two important points. First, that ethnomethodology stands over against the entire cognitivist perspective in its concern with rationality as a displayed feature of action. Practical rationality is not to be found inside people's heads, still less in models of what is happening inside people's heads. Rather, it has social existence in and as courses of practical action and interaction. Secondly, that practical rationality is ubiquitous in social life. Wherever persons engage in practical action, they do so knowingly, in the sense that they orient to their circumstances in whatever ways are to them required by the character of those circumstances. Unlike the conventional sociological researcher, then, the ethnomethodological researcher is not required to "seek out" his/her phenomenon, nor devise strategies for isolating it from the analytic detritus of its location. It is precisely the-phenomenon-in-its-location that is of interest. Whether all this amounts to a distinctive contribution to the concerns of main-

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David Francis

stream sociology, as Boden seems to imply, or a thoroughgoing rejection of those concerns, as others (myself included) would argue, what is beyond doubt is that there is a fundamental difference in approach. The concerns of C.A. have always been more narrowly focused than those of ethnomethodology. Its central object of enquiry is a specific kind of practical activity, ordinary conversation. In its investigations of the accomplished orderliness of ordinary conversation, C.A. has shown how certain aspects of this orderliness are relatively independent of others. Specifically, the sequential and turn-taking dimensions of conversational order are accomplished by participants through interactional forms which are relatively independent of the referential content of the talk. In simplistic terms, the lesson of C.A. is that in ordinary conversation what people talk about has only a weak connection with how, interactionally, they talk about it. Over the past fifteen or so years there has been a concerted attempt to apply the methodology of C.A. to the investigation of other kinds of practical activities. Ordinary conversation is not the only social activity performed in and through talk. Many of these other activities are more obviously "significant" as activities than ordinary conversation appears to be. One suspects that Boden's concern to show how ethnomethodology can "contribute" to the conventional concerns of sociology provides at least a partial clue to the motivations which inspire such work. Be that as it may, studies of a wide variety of institutional settings have shown how the organisation of talk in these settings involves the utilisation of interactional forms which are either identical with or systematically related to those of ordinary conversation. Specifically, these studies have demonstrated ways in which the institutionalised distribution of speaking rights in a given setting are realised and managed in and through modified "conversational" structures of turn-taking and sequencing. This strategy has also been utilised in the study of negotiation. Here, though, there is something of a problem. Within conversation analysis, the concept negotiation has long been used to identify certain technical, sequential properties of talk (Jefferson —Schenkein 1977). The manner of its use is strictly technical, in that the phenomena so described, though they are features of participants activities, are not available at the level of ordinary, everyday (participants) concerns. Referring to certain stretches of talk as "negotiation sequences" is an analytical device for pointing to some ways in which sequential matters are interactionally resolved by conversational participants. (I will return to this usage at the end of the paper). By contrast, a recent body of work has developed

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism

41

which, while similarly technical in its aims, seeks to establish the constituent, generic features of negotiation as a form of discourse (Maynard 1984; Firth 1990; Hester 1990). The goal of this work is to describe the interactional orderliness of negotiating activities, wheresoever and whensoever they occur. Central to these studies is the proposition that negotiation involves the systematic utilisation of a conversational structure termed the bargaining sequence (Maynard 1984). In its base form this is a type of adjacency pair (Schegloff—Sacks 1973) consisting of: First Pair Part (Speaker 1) Proposal or Position Report followed by Second Pair Part (Speaker 2) Alignment!Non-alignment Maynard emphasises that this base structure frequently is elaborated and extended in various ways. Thus, insertion sequences, involving such things as requests for information, "withholds" and questions, can lead to extensive sequential elaborations of the structure. Hester (1990) has noted that proposals and position reports may themselves come in a variety of forms — as suggestions, requests, inquiries, "musings" and so on. He also points out that alignment and non-alignment are not interactionally equivalent responses. Their production displays a preference structure (Pomerantz 1984), which favours positive responses over negative ones. The centrality of the bargaining sequence to the study of negotiation has been argued most forcefully by Firth: The pervasiveness of the proposal —response sequence in negotiations has led some researchers (e.g., Rubin —Brown 1975) to propose viewing negotiations as complex elaborations on the basic dyadic sequence. Such a proposal would seem to deserve closer attention than it has received hitherto, and would involve delineating the ramifications of 'complex elaborations'. This line of research will require that attention be paid to the identification of possible action sequences that may be associated with a negotiating event. What must be borne in mind, of course, is that action sequences — where they can be seen to exist — are not simply 'part of' negotiations, but are indeed constituent of negotiating activity. To engage in proposalresponse sequences (and elaborations thereon) is to negotiate, and is recognisable as such by the participants and observers. (Firth 1990:29)

This is the approach taken by a number of writers w h o have sought to utilise the methodology of C.A. to investigate negotiation and decisionmaking in organisational settings. The analytic task facing such writers is to show how the formal, sequential dynamics of the bargaining se-

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David Francis

quence mesh with the setting-specific orientations in and through which participants constitute the "content" of their activities. This is not an easy trick to pull off, as can be shown by examining more closely the work of Maynard. In his study of plea bargaining, Maynard draws upon C.A. to construct a discourse system for pre-trial negotiations. The elementary structure of this system is the bargaining sequence. Through the use of this structure, lawyers and others engaged in plea bargaining interactions build decision-making patterns. This relationship between the conversational structure of the bargaining sequence and the organisational structure of the decision pattern is described by Maynard in the following way: We have seen that in general participants employ a basic unit termed a 'bargaining sequence'. Each such sequence consists of two turns: one in which a party makes a position visible by means of a report of a preference or by means of a proposal, and a second in which the other party replies by exhibiting alignment or non-alignment with the presented position. A decision is reached for a case when each of the parties aligns with the same position, whether that be for dismissal, guilty plea, trial or continuance. This achievement is not as simple as it seems. It can be realised through three different paths or patterns. Each pattern involves (A) the presentation of an attempt or attempts to resolve how the case should be handled. Every attempt can be considered an "opportunity" for prosecution and defence to arrive at a mutually acceptable disposition. When any opportunity is not taken, the system allows (B) the option of delaying determination of a disposition by continuing the case or setting it for trial. Both (A) and (B) are accomplished through one or more bargaining sequences being systematically employed within single episodes of negotiation on a particular case. The three kinds of opportunities for determining a disposition embody logical possibilities, given the two parties and the "sides" they represent: (1) one party exhibits a position and the other aligns with it; (2) both parties exhibit positions and one relinquishes an initial stance to align with the other; and (3) the parties compromise. (Maynard 1984: 171/2)

Maynard argues that the three decision patterns are systematically related. Once a position is taken by one or other party - some disposition proposal made by the defence or the prosecution — pattern (1) is the most efficacious for the production of an outcome. The failure of pattern (1) provides the basis for pattern (2). If pattern (2) fails, then pattern (3) is made possible. The systematic relations between these patterns, and various sub-types, constitutes the discourse system for plea bargaining decisions. Maynard's discourse system seems to bridge the gap between two analytic dimensions: the level of conversational order, in which utterances are

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism

43

tied sequentially as conversational actions, and the level of institutional order, in which actions are connected as "moves" in an organisational decision process. It thus holds out the prospect of a systematic and general answer to the question "how are decisions reached?". If a discourse system model can map the processes of plea bargaining decision-making onto generic conversational structures, then presumably similar kinds of models could be constructed for decision-making in other institutional settings. The goal of a cumulative, general theory of decision-making may not be a chimera after all. Perhaps the mistake was simply that decision theorists were looking in the wrong place for such a theory — at what was (supposedly) happening in people's heads rather than in their talk. But does the concept of a discourse system stand up? The crucial question is this: What would it take to show that participants are following such a system? If the analyst is to avoid the kind of generalised, typificatory description of interaction which characterises mainstream theories of negotiation and decision-making, then the mapping of setting specific "decision actions" onto conversational actions has to be a strong one. One has to show closely and in detail how the conversational and institutional levels are connected in a systematic fashion at an utterance-byutterance level. Without such a demonstration, talk of discourse systems is nothing more than a gloss for the analyst's ad hoc interpretive work. It is this kind of close and detailed demonstration which is absent in Maynard's discussion. In its place is an analysis which has just such an ad hoc character. It is not simply that Maynard employs his data in a selective, illustrative way. A bigger difficulty concerns what it is that the data is being used to illustrate. Take, for example, the problem of where a particular "decision discourse" begins. Maynard's model suggests that the first move in this discourse is when one of the parties exhibits a position on a preferred outcome to the case. How does the analyst identify such a first move? What counts as exhibiting a position? Clearly such an action can take a variety of forms, some more explicit than others. Therefore, it is not simply a matter of looking for a specific type of conversational action such as a proposal. Also, a position may be exhibited over a number of utterances - it may "emerge" from a speaker's remarks rather than be clearly stated. It might only be stated unequivocally in response to a formulation preferred by another participant. More problematically (or interestingly) still, participants may disagree over whether a "position" has been exhibited. This may itself become an issue in their discussions.

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My point is not to argue that an analyst cannot identify first moves in a decision process. It is simply to assert that the analysis by which this is done is not systematic but ad hoc and commonsensical. The analyst has no more resources for making such judgements than the participants themselves. Indeed, he is dependant upon the judgemental work of the participants in the first instance. However, the fact that participants make such judgements does not indicate that they are following a discourse system; at best it might indicate how they are using notions like position, counter-position and compromise as commonsense resources of practical reasoning. In this regard, it is not sufficient to show that the interactions through which decisions are arrived at in a setting are highly routinised. Maynard demonstrates convincingly that plea bargaining discussions do have a routinised character and are subject to powerful institutional constraints: For each case, defense and prosecution must decide on some disposition (which may be anything from a dismissal to a jail sentence), must agree a trial date, or must continue the case for reconsideration at a later time. These are the only options for a given case at that settlement conference, which is to say that "no action" on a case is precluded. The instrumental task faced by the lawyers in each case, then, is to assign or obtain one of these outcomes. (Maynard 1984: 171)

Plea bargaining is the stuff of daily work in this setting. The parties can be presumed to know that, however a current case is disposed, there is another one - indeed many - waiting around the corner. Given the massive institutional realities in terms of which any current case can be depicted as "just another one to be dealt with", lawyers have available to them as a socially sanctioned fact that however they agree to dispose of a case, dispose of it they must. As Maynard points out, at the end of the day disagreement is "not an option". Given the routinised character of plea bargaining, it is easy to see the superficial attractiveness of a systemic, game-like analysis. As described above, it resembles in many ways the kind of decision-making situation depicted in the classic models of the rationalistic tradition. First, the participants can be taken to represent clearly defined "interests" in relation to the matters to be decided. Secondly, the range of possible outcomes is predefined and can be presumed to be known in common. Therefore, thirdly, the decision problem is essentially one of choice between these allowed outcomes. The game goes round and round until the players make the moves which co-ordinate their arrival at a mutual endgame.

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism

45

However, what gives such a description plausibility is not that plea bargaining is governed by a discourse system which determines the "logical possibilities" available to participants. What Maynard calls the logical possibilities of the discourse system are glosses on the ways in which participants treat their practical circumstances as an enforceable arena of action. Participants are required - that is to say they require it of themselves and each other - to respect the institutional realities of the court setting and treat these as providing the proper, unavoidable, real world grounds of their talk. Furthermore, this real world orientation is shared as a commonsense resource by Maynard himself. Thus, despite his emphasis on the bargaining sequence as defining the phenomenon of plea bargaining, it is not this sequential structure but rather his commonsense understanding of the setting which Maynard utilises in constituting his data. His data is made up of transcripts of 52 cases in a municipal court. Locating plea bargaining in these transcripts is not accomplished, by Maynard any more than it is by the participants, by looking for the conversational components of the bargaining sequence. Rather, it is the other way round: the setting as an enforceable schema of practical understanding enables both participants and analyst to define behavioral items and stretches of talk as recognisably constituting setting-appropriate activities. Once this point is acknowledged it is clear that the analytical task is not, as it was described above, a matter of bridging the gulf between the conversational and institutional "levels" of plea bargaining talk. This way of thinking is fundamentally mistaken. There are not two separable dimensions to that talk; consequently, there is no task of bridge-building or reconciliation to be done. Plea bargaining talk is not ordinary conversation with an institutional topping larded on. As is so often the case in sociology, the blandishments of an architectural metaphor are enticing. But they should be resisted. There is no "institutional level" resting upon a conversational or discourse "substratum" (c.f. B o d e n - Z i m m e r m a n 1991). Suspending the local, settinged character of plea bargaining talk does not reveal a generic conversational base - it simply renders the talk contextually and interactionally meaningless. The notion that conversation analysis can provide the analytic foundation for a general theory of negotiation and decision-making is one which needs to be treated with extreme caution. For one thing, negotiation may not be conducted through talk, but through textually mediated communication of various kinds, as Firth himself has pointed out (Firth 1991). Where interaction is not conducted through talk, but through, for exam-

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pie, letter, memo, or fax, the requirements imposed by the communicative mode may be (almost certainly will be) substantially of a different order than those inherent in "talk-in-interaction" (to use Schegloff's (1991) phrase). But even if we assume that a C.A. approach to negotiation is restricted, in the first instance, to situations involving talk-in-interaction, the notion that the sequential organisation of talk provides the analytic key to open the interactional organisation of negotiation to formal analysis and description raises many, as yet unanswered, methodological questions. I will further consider some of these questions in the conclusion.

3. Negotiating an advertiser's problem: a substantive analysis So much for the methodological strictures. The second half of the paper will attempt to illustrate an alternative strategy for investigating negotiation and decision-making in organisational talk. It will do this by examining a particular stretch of talk containing activities for which negotiation and decision-making would appear to be commonsensically plausible glosses. The talk to be examined comprises part of a meeting in an advertising agency. The meeting's business consists in a collection of issues and problems relating to one of the agency's principal clients. The personnel involved are those agency staff most closely concerned with the management of this account. The meeting is in many respects a "normal" organisational event - account meetings like this one are held irregularly but fairly frequently as part of the normal work of the agency. They are not routinised in the daily or weekly schedule, but are held as and when necessary. Typically, meetings are held on the major client accounts every two or three weeks, but timing and frequency depends very much on the judgement of the relevant agency personnel that there are matters of sufficient importance and/or urgency to warrant a meeting. The personnel principally involved in this meeting are Steve, who is a creative director, and Ken, who is an account executive. The account they are concerned with is Webster. This is one of the agency's most important and profitable accounts. Webster is an internationally known manufacturer of outdoor, "countryside" clothing. Its most important product line, the basis of its reputation, is waxed cotton, waterproof coats and jackets. Webster is one of the agency's original clients; the Webster account has been with the agency for some ten years. They handle all Webster's advertising, most of its publicity and, in addition, advise on marketing policy.

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47

At this point, I refer the reader to the transcript appendix. The section of the meeting contained in the transcript involves discussion of one of the items of business, which the participants refer to as "The Country Competition". Some brief background explanation is necessary here. The Country Competition is an idea for a publicity event involving Webster. The idea for this event has arisen out of one of the agency's big successes. Over the previous twelve months (prior to the date of the meeting) the agency had organised and administered a competition called "The Webster 'Know The Countryside' Competition". This was a sort of countryside general knowledge quiz, open to everyone who purchased a Webster garment within a given period. Each customer was given at point of sale a glossy leaflet containing fifty questions about the countryside and country sports. The first prize was a Land Rover Station Wagon. The response to this competition, both in terms of number of entries and media interest, was, in Ken's words, "bigger than we dreamed possible". The idea under discussion, discussed on several occasions prior to this meeting, is to follow this up with a different kind of competition, one which will attract television coverage in some form. After working with this material for some time, I was struck by two things. The first was the proliferation of utterances corresponding to those described by Maynard and others as bargaining sequences. Throughout the transcript I could find repeated examples of proposals, position reports, alignments, and (especially) non-alignments. I could also find pre-openers and pre-closers, as well as assertions, counter-assertions, agreement tokens and disagreement tokens and accounts of various kinds. In these ways, I had no difficulty in treating the talk from a purely sequential standpoint as a linked series of so-called bargaining/disagreement sequences. The second thing, however, was the deep connections between the sequential and topic dimensions of the talk. While it was possible to focus on the sequential forms in relative isolation from the content, this way of describing the data seemed remarkably uninformative in relation to the concerns of the participants - the nature of their problems and how they handle these. It is clear to even a casual reading of the transcript that Steve and Ken disagree about what "The Country Competition" could be. Their disagreement emerges and ramifies over the course of the talk. While the ways in which this disagreement develops utterance-by-utterance is amenable to formal sequential description, there is more happening here than just "disagreement". The fact of disagreement cannot be divorced from what those disagreements are about and what occasions

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them. Steve and Ken are discussing a problem about which, at some point, some decisions will have to be made. The discussion is part of a meeting in which the problem of the country competition is but one item of business. There are other matters for discussion of an equally, if not more pressing nature. It is in this context that proposals, position reports and other sequentially implicative actions are produced and responded to. The issue, then, is not how to solve the "riddle" of the relationship between the talk as organisationally contexted problem talk and the sequential organisation of actions. Rather, it is to show how sequential structures are practically utilised by participants in bringing off their organisational activities in and as the talk. Relationships between utterances as sequential action types are a resource in and through which decision problems are defined and addressed; not " a n y " decision problems, nor "decision problems" in general, but this decision problem which these participants have here on this occasion. C o n t r a Maynard and others, it is not sequential relationships themselves that constitute negotiation or decision-making, rather such relationships make these activities possible in their local specificity. The analytic task, then, is to show how participants produce this specificity as an ongoing interactional accomplishment. It is not possible to explore this question in any more than a preliminary way, but to indicate something of its payoff I will briefly examine three extracts f r o m the transcript. (1) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

S Κ

s κ s κ

Erm (0.5) ((quietly)) Here's the cou- country competition We::ll (.) that's half a day discussion (0.5) If not a day (4.5) ((Mark enters and puts some photographs in front of Steve)) ((To Mark, quietly)) Which/ (2.0) Last time I talked t' them about it if you remember I was sayin' that it might not be a competition it might turn out just to be a regular T.V. programme Mm (.) Yeah (2.5) There's go- there's got t' be room for that (0.5)

The utterance I wish to focus on here is Ken's remark in lines 16—18. This remark is occasioned by Steve's announcement of the country competition as the next item of business (line 11). Steve's announcement is actually a re-announcement (see transcript appendix, line 1). It is pro-

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duced as such, perhaps, in the quietness with which he speaks, compared to his loud initial announcement some moments before. Next business announcements in meetings are produced as sequentially implicative objects. They are intended to occasion discussion of the item announced. In this case, business was interrupted by Steve's secretary, Carmel. When the interruption is over, Steve attempts to re-introduce the topic. Introduction of agenda items in meetings often involves two things — the identification of the item itself and some indication of the "point" of the item as a topic for this meeting. This localising work may be done in a variety of ways, for example by bringing participants up to date with the "current state" of a problem and/or indicating what needs to be decided in relation to it. Such introductions define and occasion the discussions that are required. In this respect, one could say that Steve "limits" his re-announcement to a minimal form, simply identifying the topic by the name it has acquired within the agency, by contrast with his initial announcement which included a "why now" account: (2) 1 2 3

S S

RIGHT, H E R E ' S T H E C O U N T R Y C O M P E T I T I O N (0.5) ((Carmel looks in at door)) Now [at this point (goin' ahead)

Ken responds to Steve's re-announcement in his two subsequent utterances (lines 12 and 16), by producing two (what we might call) discussion contexting remarks. His first utterance characterises the topic as a "this meeting" item of business - it requires more time than can be given to it now. Then he produces a second response of a reporting or "bringing up to date" kind. Within that format, his second utterance also contains a proposal report: Ken has discussed the country competition with Webster (them) and suggested that it may turn out not to be a competition but instead a regular Τ. V. programme. The two utterances are not simply alternative "seconds" to the same "first", however. The second remark can be seen as an account for the claim made in the first. In claiming that the topic requires half a day discussion (0.5) if not a day, Ken characterises the difficulty or complexity of the topic. He then produces materials to account for this difficulty, materials which might be seen as raising "fundamental" questions specifically, what kind of media event the proposed event might turn out to be. This claim has the implication that "nothing is decided"; that discussion should begin "with a clean slate". In this sense, then, it might be seen implicitly to challenge a shared understanding - made explicitly in

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the title by which Steve has announced the item - that the basic character, at least, of the event is fixed and agreed. The construction of Ken's utterance seems built to accommodate the availability of this hearing. Notice that Ken's report is done in the form of a reminder. This is not a first report of his conversation with Webster, but a second. What this reminder format accomplishes interactionally, arguably, is to defuse some of the disruptive potential of Ken's remark. Inviting someone to remember something one has done is a way of reminding them of something over and above the action itself — about how they know. In an organisational setting, reminding another that he knows about an action one has taken can be a way of showing that organisational proprieties have been observed. An organisation's division of labour involves not simply a division of functions and tasks, but also a responsibility on those within it to keep relevant others informed about how those functions have been discharged. Such communication within the organisation is crucial if action is to be seen not simply as having been done but also as done in the "right" organisational way. As the account executive for the Webster account, Ken's function is to liaise between the agency and the client. Making suggestions about possible courses of action, to obtain the client's response in order to communicate this to his colleagues, is a legitimate aspect of his role. Thus, Ken's invitation to remember presupposes not simply that Steve has a piece of knowledge he might have forgotten, but also implies that Ken has not acted improperly — that the suggestion that the event might not be a competition has a proper organisational status — despite the fact that it in some respects undermines discussions that have previously taken place. In these ways Ken's remark displays - and utilises - an orientation to the organisation as a moral order. But it does so not in a generalised way but a specific and particular one. The remark has the effect of characterising the decision problem as an open horizon. Everything is up for grabs; about the only thing that is definite is that the agency should try to come up with "something" that will interest television companies and get Webster substantial publicity. The way in which this definition of the problem is achieved "negotiates" the particularities of the situation in an interactionally economical and effective manner. What emerges from this stretch of talk, then, is a definition of the decision problem Ken and Steve face. Put in abstract terms, they have to decide (a) what kind of event is feasible and will achieve the desired goal, and (b) what is necessary to bring about such an event. But neither of these things can be decided in the abstract. Only by solving the problem

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in particular ways will they discover that it is soluble. It is only the particulars of their discussion that will define what the problem amounts to concretely. (3) 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

S

[I- I think really if (.) if (.) if it is- we're gonna do it as aas a y' know (.) a competi::tion (.) as such, if that's th'- th'6asis of it (0.5) like ploughing (.) or (.) 'n y' know

(1.0) Κ Well (.) [I think whichever way it went s [Then youκ I(.)t' tell the truth I see it almost as (1.0) ( j u s t ) s κ s κ

a

regular (.) y' know like Jack Hargreaves [did it [Yeah, but — but you can't control [that [Out of Town = = T h a - that's completely different, that's er = But you can control it

Following a side conversation between Steve and Mark, Steve's technical assistant, on an unrelated matter, talk about the Country Competition continues with an extended stretch of talk concerned with a possible front-person for the event. Then (lines 6 3 - 6 5 ) Steve returns to the issue of what kind of event it could be. His utterance is in the form of a position report, but what precisely the position is that it reports is far from clear. Syntactically, the utterance is built in an "if ... then" format. But the "then" part is aborted in line 68. This is not simply because Steve is interrupted by Ken. Steve's utterance in lines 63 — 65 contains a number of pauses, including the final one which prompts Ken to speak. These are not placed at clearly syntactically marked turn transition points (Sacks-Schegloff-Jefferson 1974), however. Characterising Ken's utterance (line 67) as an interruption is made problematic by these pauses. Repeated hesitation pauses can mark uncertainty. They can indicate a speakers unwillingness to commit himself; alternatively they might be taken as musing, thinking aloud about matters that are themselves uncertain. Ken responds to Steve's position report with one of his own (line 67). It is noticeable that there is a degree of syntactic matching here. The projected two part structure of Steve's utterance ( i f . . . then) is matched by the projected structure of Ken's (whichever ... then). What do these syntactic structures accomplish interactionally? Within a position report

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framework ( / think), they have the effect of doing problem analysis or thinking about possibilities. What the possibilities are is firmed up in Ken's next utterance (lines 69 — 70). He aborts his whichever... structure and produces a further position statement, one that is an interesting combination of definitiveness (t' tell the truth) and indefiniteness (I see it almost (1.0) as (just)). In sequential action terms, then, we have here three successive position reports with no second pair part in sight. This chaining of position statements is explicable if the analysis is broadened from the purely sequential to the task defining content of the talk. These remarks need to be viewed in terms of their interactional character as problem work. Steve is returning to the problem of the nature of the event, which Ken has earlier defined as open and undecided. The succession of positional statements — each taking a conditional form via a syntactic "if/whichever ... then" format - enables the problem to be returned to in a way that invokes possibilities without making a commitment to them. However, once possibilities are out in the open, committing oneself can be hard to avoid. Over the next four utterances (lines 7 1 - 7 5 ) , commitment emerges and with it disagreement between Ken and Steve. The disagreement sequence which begins with Steve's objection to Ken's suggestion of a regular television show (like Jack Hargreaves did it) and Ken's rejection of Steve's objection (But you can control it) ramifies over the next 68 lines of the transcript, before some kind of agreement is produced in lines 139-142. Although there is no space here for detailed examination of this lengthy and complex disagreement, a couple of points should be made about it, albeit at a rough and superficial level. The disagreement centres around two alternative paradigms for the event. On the one hand is Ken's regular programme. The exemplars he produces for this (for example Out of Town) suggest that he has in mind a television series with a countryside theme, hosted by a "personality". (The he discussed earlier in lines 33 — 62 is a famous soccer manager and country sports enthusiast). On the other hand is Steve's notion of a kind of national contest of country skills or sports, which a television company might cover in the way that other sponsored sporting contests are covered. These alternative paradigms and the commitment of the two participants to them do not explain the disagreement. Rather, they are emergent products of the talk in and through which that disagreement is realised. The talk consists in the local production of differences and similarities, "known facts" and "speculations", relevant comparisons and less rele-

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vant ones. These matters are realised in the talk through the sequential production of proposals, claims, position statements, counter-claims, rejections and qualified agreements. That there are real differences between one possibility and another is interactionally "discovered" over the course of the talk, as are the implications of these possibilities for the basic aim of obtaining television publicity for Webster. The second important point is that the disagreement is contexted in the framework of a shared organisational task. Steve and Ken are not just disagreeing - they are disagreeing about matters which they have a common interest in resolving. That interest can be treated as compelling. It is possible for persons like them, colleagues in an organisation working together on a problem, to "bury their differences" for the sake of getting the job done. Thus, in the course of the extended stretch of disagreement there are several points at which reference is made to the sharedness of the problem and the collaborativeness of the task. In the context of the disagreement, these remarks are agreement implicative. The utterances involved do not necessarily achieve agreement, but they "offer" it interactionally by invoking a shared interest in "moving on". Examples are Ken's remarks at lines 109 (We need to think about it then don't we) and 141 (Somewhere in there there's an idea we've got to get out (.) now, I think). The final extract I examine is the stretch of talk that begins with this latter remark.

(4)

141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157

Κ

Κ S

S S Κ S Κ S Κ

Somewhere in there there's an idea we've got to get out (.) now, I think (1.5) [( ) [(Not only that) (.) its competitive planning is what's gonna get (.) people to watch it (2.0) An' there's (0.5) there's quite a bit of ground to cover (1.5) Country superstar's (that makes it ) we weren't in it (1.5) Massive amount of organisation I know (.) I know that's (.) somebody else'll [have to [Absolutely massive amount of organisation (.) [but the [That's for ( )= = That's the way to go, (then fine) (.) okay

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There are a couple of things to notice about Ken's utterance at line 141. The first is its pre-closing character. It is produced as a summarising remark. Somewhere in there can be heard as a reference to the entire discussion. Everything that has gone before, some five minutes of talk, is encompassed by this utterance. The second is his use of a "realist" frame of reference. By employing this frame, Ken is able to catch up all the preceding talk, including the disagreement between himself and Steve as a search for an "object". Furthermore, the search is a joint one. Whatever the idea is which is hiding in the foliage, he and Steve must extract it together. Unfortunately for Ken, Steve does not seem ready to accept the closing down of substantive discussion. The continuer not only that perhaps ties back to his previous remark at line 136. The utterance it prefaces continues the argument by "adding another point" to his case for a competitive event. Ken's attempt to move to a closing is ignored. At this moment, then, there is potential for the argument to continue, if Ken were to produce disagreement with Steve on this point. Alternatively, should he produce agreement, either substantively or in the form of an agreement token, the talk might continue on substantive matters, possibly resulting in further disagreements. Ken avoids both courses of action, by the simple expedient of ignoring Steve's remark. He utilises the same sequential tactic that Steve has just employed, producing a continuer that ties back to his own previous utterance and adding to that a "further point" — there's quite a bit of ground to cover. This reiterates the preclosing offer, tieing as it does all the way back to Ken's initial characterisation of the scope of the problem at the beginning of the discussion {that's half a day discussion, if not a day). Once again, then, we have a stretch of talk in which the sequential requirements of adjacency pairing are flouted in an interesting way. Pairing is suspended as the two participants engage in parallel courses of talk. This stretch of non-paired talk extends for two more utterances before Steve finally acknowledges Ken's Massive amount of organisation by producing an agreement — I know (.) I know that's (.) someone else'll have to. This is the kind of expanded projected action sequence that Jefferson and Schenkein (1977) drew attention to with their concept of sequential negotiations. Here we see negotiation in their technical, sequential sense occurring in the context of a substantive disagreement between two parties who espouse differing points of view on a problem of shared concern. This brings me back to the issue of the relationship between sequentiality and substance, and the two different senses of negotiation which these involve.

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4. Conclusion It is time to pull the two halves of the chapter together. The observations I have made on the transcript are relatively broad and informal. No attempt has been made to produce a finely-honed analysis of the extracts cited. However, the points which have been made are sufficient for the purpose, which is to raise some questions about the character and direction of negotiation analysis. The central issue concerns the use of the concept of negotiation itself. Negotiation is a term which has two different senses. Broadly speaking, there is the manoeuvring sense and the bargaining sense; the difference between "negotiating around" and "negotiating over". Both of these senses have informed the use of the concept of negotiation in ethnomethodological and conversation analytical studies. Therefore, it is important to recognise that quite different kinds of interactional phenomena may be involved in analytic descriptions of negotiation. Thus, when Jefferson -Schenkein (1977) speak of sequential negotiations, the phenomenon they address is primarily negotiation in the former, manoeuvring sense. In their data, conversational participants manoeuvre around the problem of responding to a "pitch" from someone selling magazine subscriptions, resulting in the production of an expanded projected action sequence. The analytic payoff of the concept of negotiation in this case is to highlight the ways in which participants utilise the sequential ties between conversational actions to interactionally "pass around" a problem in a multi-party situation. This phenomenon has little in common with those which Maynard and others have drawn attention to through their use of the concept of the bargaining sequence. It is vital to keep in mind the differences between different senses in which the concept of negotiation can be applied, if one is to avoid overemphasis on the sequential dimension. The central argument of this paper is that the use which has been made of the concept of the bargaining sequence has involved just such an over-emphasis. It is most clearly visible in the comments of Firth which were quoted earlier, especially in his claim that What must be borne in mind, of course, is that action sequences - where they can be seen to exist - are not simply 'part of' negotiations, but are indeed constituent of negotiating activity. To engage in proposal-response sequences (and elaborations thereon) is to negotiate, and is recognisable as such by the participants and observers. (Firth 1990: 29)

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This claim is wrong in several respects. First, to describe some activity as negotiation in the bargaining sense presupposes that the parties involved can be seen in some relevant sense to have differing standpoints on the matter under discussion. If the actions of the parties consist in nothing more than a proposal and an alignment, no difference in standpoint is expressed; therefore, no negotiation has taken place. Quite simply, for an activity to be described as bargaining, persons have to actually engage in some bargaining, not simply agree to another's proposals! Secondly, for disagreement or non-alignment with a proposal to be describable as bargaining, there must be some sense in which the participants stand to gain or lose relative to some set of possible outcomes. This means that a proposal cannot be about just anything. It must relate to some common concerns, responsibilities or tasks. Only by virtue of such common concerns is an action recognisable as a proposal in the first place. But for a response to a proposal to involve bargaining, that response must make available some sense of differing interests vis-ä-vis these concerns. Persons can only bargain if there is something to bargain about. A third point follows from this. Analysts have been misled by their desire for formal descriptions to treat negotiation as essentially a sequential phenomenon. But it cannot be so treated. If negotiation involves the expression of differing standpoints and the interplay of interests and interactional "moves", then clearly it will have a sequential dimension. But it cannot be reduced to this dimension, nor is there any reason to suppose that the sequential dimension is analytically primordial. For what is it to give expression to an interest? What, in a given setting or on a particular occasion, counts as displaying a standpoint on an issue, problem or task? What counts, of course, is what persons treat as counting — or, rather, what a setting makes it possible for them to treat as counting. Negotiation in the bargaining sense is a "settinged" activity, not incidentally but fundamentally. The study of bargaining negotiation, then, is the study of occasioned, practical reasoning. There is, I believe, a rush to formality evident in some recent work. One consequence is the tendency to reduce the interactional to the purely sequential, and to confound institutional matters with conversational ones. This tendency manifests itself in the notion that one can locate the activity of negotiation by identifying specific, formal types of utterances — ones which comprise the bargaining sequence. This is mistaken. It amounts to an attempt to "behaviouralise" negotiation in order to make it amenable to formal, generalised description.

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It was for this reason that no attempt was made in the second half of the paper to develop a systematic formal description of the data extracts as action sequences. Analysing the sequential properties of a stretch of talk is not an end in itself — not, at least, if one's aim is to explicate the activities, such as negotiation and decision-making, that persons may be engaged in, in that talk. What would such a description have revealed about Steve and Ken and their problem? Would it have shown that what they are doing is "really", definitively, negotiating? By locating the components of the bargaining sequence in their talk in a systematic fashion, would one be doing anything more than demonstrating that certain utterances and certain relationships between utterances can be characterised in a particular way? I stated earlier that my aim was not to "prove" that Steve and Ken are negotiating. What is interesting about this data is precisely that the question "are they negotiating?" cannot be given a simple answer. In some respects they are, in other respects not. Are they "decision-making" then? Again, it depends on what we intend to capture about their activities by describing them in these terms. Ken and Steve do express different points of view about the country competition. But they do so, for the most part, tentatively and provisionally rather than dogmatically. The talk is about possibilities as much if not more than it is about preferences. It is not clear whether they have differing interests rather than simply different ideas. The reason why this is not clear is that they do not formulate their differences clearly in such a manner. One might say, perhaps, that they are careful not to so formulate them. Therefore, the talk involves negotiation in both senses - there is as much manoeuvring here as bargaining. What they are doing, it seems, is discovering a disagreement in relation to a shared organisational task and at the same time managing the unfolding contingencies of that disagreement. The overarching organisational fact which frames Steve and Ken's talk is that they are colleagues, working together on a problem. It is not "Steve's problem" nor "Ken's problem" but, in an organisational sense, the agency's problem. However, for the purposes of handling this problem, Steve and Ken are the agency, since they are the team responsible for the Webster account. Finally, back to methodological matters. At the heart of my reservations about the direction being taken in recent work on negotiation as discourse is a worry about the basic aims of such analysis. I began by pointing out how the desirability of "general theory" comprises a pervasive and taken-for-granted assumption in mainstream discussions of ne-

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gotiation and decision-making. Much of the sterility of negotiation analysis in contemporary social science is, I believe, directly traceable to the consequences of this assumption. One of the significant contributions of ethnomethodology is to re-orient inquiry towards the particular and specific, closely focusing attention on what these persons are doing in this setting or occasion. The goal of such analysis - towards which the observations above are merely an illustrative starting point — is first and foremost one of specification not generalisation. Thus, with reference to the data I have presented, what needs to be specified is (for example) the ways in which the members of this organisational team produce disagreement within the team rather than team threatening disagreement. (On the achievement of team identity in negotiation talk, see Francis 1986). The interactional problem which Steve and Ken successfully "negotiate" here is to manage the disagreement in such a way that it does not undermine their collaborative involvement in their joint organisational task. The sequential structures of conversation are artfully utilised to this end. For example, in the final extract examined above, Ken succeeds in closing down the discussion by formulating the problem in shared project terms, despite the disagreement which has gone before. As the empirical section of this chapter hopefully has indicated, I believe that C.A. has something important to contribute to the analysis of actual instances of negotiation and decision-making. But it is vital to be clear about the nature of this contribution. C.A. encourages, or better still, demands, that one look closely at the detail of talk and at the ways in which participants shape their talk to fit its immediate sequential circumstances. It also imposes a methodological constraint on the analyst to ground description in the evident understandings displayed by participants, rather than subordinating description to theoretically defined categories. The point of reference, as both ethnomethodology and C.A. have long argued, has to be the understandings that participants make available to one another. But valuable as these methodological considerations are, one must guard against the assumption that the approach and methods of C.A. can be incorporated wholesale into the study of negotiation and decisionmaking; after all, one must not forget that this approach was developed to facilitate the study of talk as talk. While negotiation and decisionmaking may be conducted in and through talk, and actions thus be shaped by the sequential dimension of utterance-by-utterance organisation that all talk possesses, they are not simply "forms of talk". Taking

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a narrowly sequential perspective upon one's data may make sense for certain purposes; in relation to some kinds of phenomena, it is a strategy with enormous analytic payoff — as the history of C.A. demonstrates. But horses for courses. The formal power of conversation analysis can all too easily lead one to overestimate its substantive scope. If the price to be paid for marshalling that power is the "behaviouralisation" o f negotiation, resulting in an over-emphasis on the general at the expense of the particular and specific, the cost may be too high.

Transcript

Appendix

M N C Webster 16/1/85 Conference room, approx. 28 mins. into meeting. Κ S C Μ D

= = = = =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Ken - Webster Account Executive Steve — Creative Director Carmel — Secretary Mark - Technical Assistant Dave — Researcher S S C Κ D S

s s κ s κ s κ s

RIGHT, HERE'S T H E COUNTRY COMPETITION (0.5) ((Carmel looks in at door)) Now [at this point (goin' ahead) [Tea (1.0) Coffee G O O D IDEA Yes (.) Please Tea please, thank you (1.0) ((To Carmel)) Yeah (1.5) ((Carmel goes out)) Erm (0.5) ((quietly)) Here's the cou- country competition We::ll (.) that's half a day discussion (0.5) If not a day (4.5) ((Mark enters and puts some photographs in front of Steve)) ((To Mark, quietly)) Which/ (2.0) Last time I talked t' them about it if you remember I was sayin' that it might not be a competition it might turn out just to be a regular T.V. programme Mm (.) Yeah (2.5) There's go- there's got t' be room for that (0.5) [((S speaks very quietly with Mark — untranscribable))

60 23 24 25 26 27

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Κ

28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

[If we- if we we'd got (.) I mean well (.) if (.) what I mean as a T.V. series (0.5) if we come up with the r/ght formula, r/ght people (3.5) Granada I mean e:rm I.T.V. 'd grab that (.) or B.B.C. [(2.0)

S Κ

Κ S Κ S

S Κ

S Κ

Κ

S Κ Κ S

[((Again speaks quietly with Mark — untranscribable)) (Don't we) perhaps need to kick it around here a bit (.) I mean don't need to go far with it, kick it around a bit (.) 'n maybe (1.5) have a few ideas (.) to pitch to 'im (0.5) But 'ee knows the people Mmhm:m (1.5) An' I think 'ee would (0.5) welcome the chance to redress the balance in a way= =Well why do- why don't we start backwa- backwards in a way (.) why don't we fix a date to get 'im up (1.0) 'n warn 'im when 'ee's comin' = =Is 'ee the right person (9.5) ((Carmel enters with a tray of tea and coffee and puts it on the table)) (Ri::ght) I think 'ee's (1.0) I've got tfew doubts about 'im but (1.0) what 'ee's got goin' for 'im is that 'ee is well known (.) Okay 'ee's 'ad a bit of (stick) but 'ee wants (.) I think desperate to redress the balance on that ((During the preceding utterance Mark has picked up the photographs and left the room)) (1.5) An' 'ee knows the score (.) an 'ee's already bin through the mill, so therefore 'ee's probably got a hell of a lot of input (0.5) for us Yeah ((quietly)) (1.0) 'an 'ee wants to do it (1.5) [('ee could be) right [I- I think really if (.) if (.) if it is- we're gonna do it as aas a y' know (.) a competi::tion (.) as such, if that's th'- th'basis of it (0.5) like ploughing (.) or (.) 'n y' know (1.0)

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

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Well (.) [I think whichever way it went [Then youI(.)t' tell the truth I see it almost as (1.0) (just) a regular (.) y' know like Jack Hargreaves [did it [Yeah, but - but you can't control [that [Out of Town= = Tha- that's completely different, that's e r = = But you can control it (1.5) Y' know, this week we're visitin' Fred Foster (0.5) who's the last er (.) thatcher on the (circuit) (.) or [(0.5) I don't know [ But what we = = This is how he thatches, y' know (1.0) 'n when Fred [dies [No (.) no that's erthat's er- I mean that's er (1.0) [the art will er[that's( ) this more than (.) ( ) y' know (.) that surely is a t- television production (2.0) Y' know, long term planning for them to work out (.) I can't see (1.0) if- if y'- if you've got television coverage (.) associated with (.) this y' know (0.5) COUNTRY SUPERSTAR whatever it might be (.) then they will (.) then you can- it's- it's big enough to attract the right kind of involvement (0.5) But to do it as a regular f- feature. [I don't know( ) [( )manage to get Webster across in it (.) y' know it's blatant [( ) [I- I'm sure (0.5) well I don't know how Webster could come into it but I'm sure that the T.V. companies, both of them (0.5) would (.) would (.) would -er (1.0) bite yer hand off if y-(.) if yer got it right I'm sure that's right for the competition (for the) country star (.) maybe yer could move onto that [(afterward) = [Okay =

(

) but I would (.) I think the country superstar is the best (.) best bet (0.5) the best one to look for (for now) (4.0)

62 109 110

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111

112

113 114 115 116

117

(2.0)

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119 120 121 122

123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151

We need to think about it then, [don't we [I mean otherwise yer just thinking of a country programme (.) I mean that (looks like) many of them

Κ

Are there? Oh there are yeah y' know= = H o w many (.) I can't [think of any [Yeah, y' got things like W I L D L I F E O N O N E I suppose (.) but wh- (.) but this needs some sort of (.) [y' know [(not like that) (2.0)

S

It is 'n it- it is 'n it isn't (.) W- y- well it is if it just falls into the same sort of category of just a (.) programme (.) how- how d' we cover it (.) how do we sponsor it (2.0)

Κ S

S Κ

S

Κ Κ

Κ S

S S

I don't know, but it (.) y' know its got to be thought about= = whereas if its er (.) WEBSTER (.) if its got a title (.) I mean y' can't- y' can't do a television programme called th' (.) er (.) er Webster (0.5) Countryman (1.0) er At Work (.) or whatever it might be (.) they wouldn't do it (2.5) Y' might get away with some [very [Pinch the Marlboro (heading) (.) Welcome To Webster Country (0.5) I don't know (.) I mean y' don't know (.) what's acceptable (.) b u t = = But (.) but if it's- if it's the (0.5) STELLA ARTOIS (.) whatever it might be (.) COMPETITION (.) that's a different (0.5) [its not the same [It is (.) it is different (2.5) Somewhere in there there's an idea we've got to get out (.) now, I think (1.5) [( ) [(Not only that) (.) its competitive planning is what's gonna get (.) people to watch it (2.0) An' there's (0.5) there's quite a bit of ground to cover (1.5) Country superstar's (that makes it ) we weren't in it (1.5)

Negotiation, decision-making and formalism 152 153 154 155 156 157

Κ S Κ S Κ

Massive amount of organisation I know (.) I know that's (.) somebody else'll [have to [Absolutely massive amount of organisation (.) [but the [That's for ( )= = That's the way to go, (then fine) (.) okay

63

Part II Discourse structures in business negotiations

International sales talk 1

Jochen Rehbein

1. Lingua franca:2 Language of trade and commerce — language of communication Ever since human societies have engaged in trade beyond their borders, languages have served purposes of communication or have been developed especially for this task. Hittites and Egyptians, for example, traded in the second millennium BC in the Akkadian-Babylonian language; for centuries most business dealings along the Silk Route were conducted in Arabic. Up to the Reconquista, the Arabs, Jews and Christians in Spain were able to communicate as traders despite their linguistic differences, and the same was true of the Turks and Byzantines in Asia Minor. Trade and commerce were just- not possible without language: either the buyer's or the seller's language or some kind of lingua franca, such as the koine, which was used for centuries throughout the Mediterranean region in Hellenistic-Roman time up to the 6th century A. D. It was later replaced in the West by Latin (cf. Polome 1988) or the true "lingua franca", a mixture of the languages spoken by Genoese and Venetian traders and other languages then prevalent in the Eastern Mediterranean (Levant) (cf. Samarin 1962; Whinnom 1977). While the Hansa was in operation, the language of trade was Low German, from Antwerp to Bergen, from Tallinn to Novgorod (cf. Meier-Möhn 1989a, 1989b; Sanders 1983; Ureland 1987).3 Lingua franca emerged to suit the common purposes of interaction among people in a variety of "societal structures", e.g., empires, states, countries, peoples, tribes, or groups (cf. Redder-Rehbein 1987), so they might be able to produce something jointly or to buy and sell goods (cf. Rehbein 1987). Just as the societies engaged in trade and commerce were of varying complexity, so too were the communicative structures from which different languages of communication (linguae francae) originated; common for all of these languages, however, was the need for multilingualism and how to cope with its problems. Barely 300 years have passed since certain, soon to be standardised languages began to be spoken (hand in hand with the emergence of the

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national states) as national languages in larger, contiguous areas (cf. Le Page 1964). Within the boundaries of the nation-state, there were, naturally, and indeed still are, other languages with varying status. They were spoken by migrants, autochthonous minorities, and/or other minorities who had migrated and settled in bygone ages when both the borders and laws were different, as well as by permanent residents and long-term immigrants. However, the present article is not the place to characterise or list reasons for multilingualism. Every national state does in fact have its multilingual inhabitants, so that even in the nation-state with one national language, multilingual communication occurs daily, necessitating the use of a lingua franca. Much time has passed since trade, commerce, and production were bounded by national borders. Various constraints (not only customs tariffs, but also border checks, technical and manufacturing standards, taxes) have led to the creation of a domestic market within the nationstate in which a uniform language of exchange had to be used. As these various barriers now are coming down, one can expect to see the growth of a single market, at least for the countries in the European Union, where people can engage in trade and commerce without regard to national borders. As briefly mentioned at the outset, internationalism has always been a feature of trade and commerce, but it is a new departure to include several nation-states within one single market: this is the political stamp on what had already existed de facto for some time, the transnational business. Transnational business is not only a matter of different languages. Different habits, customs, and cultural elements do not make buying and selling any easier either. On the communicative level, this situation has yet to be mastered, and the question has to be raised which lingua franca is to be the linguistic medium appropriate to the demands of transnational buying and selling. 4

2. Communication in buying and selling follows patterns The present paper investigates some of the critical areas in the setting of buying and selling in post-1993 Europe where difficulties in mutual comprehension may arise. To do this, we will take a closer look at the basic structures of communication in buying and selling (section 3). As an illustration, an interaction between a Dutch seller of medical equipment and a French-speaking (Walloon) buyer (henceforth referred to as

International sales talk

69

"French") will be used. Section 4 will analyse certain intercultural aspects of the example, and section 5 will define negotiations in relation to the concepts developed in section 3. A closer analysis of the example will be given in section 6. The concluding section 7 will discuss the role of international languages of trade and commerce in international business. In general, buying and selling is characterised by a buyer obtaining something that a seller possesses, i. e., the seller delivers a commodity in return for a certain amount of money from the buyer (price). The seller is interested in obtaining the highest price possible, the buyer in paying as little as possible. The two agents, buyer and seller, thus enter into a process of mutual communication, but they have conflicting interests, and their actions have conflicting aims. Since buying/selling is what makes any exchange possible, this process must be seen as cooperative: both actors are equally interested in the existence of basic structures which make buying and selling possible. Based upon this common purpose, a pattern emerges in which buyer and seller, despite their conflicting aims, cooperate to a certain extent. 5 Buying and selling is not only the exchange of commodities for money. Firstly, there must exist an abstract system of values against which the relationship between object and money can be set (see Ehlich—Rehbein 1972); secondly, the actual exchange is preceded by an offer, a selection process, a bid, etc. Exchange (the system of values and the communicative processes merged into buying and selling) brings about characteristic repetitive positions, each with their specific purposes. Strictly speaking, the social form of selling and buying is a pattern whose form has been institutionalised by historical and society-specific elements. The general structure of business communication is performed in a broad range of historical, society-specific, and cross-cultural varieties. This will be outlined in the following. Shopping at a retail store 6 is a simple matter compared with the complicated transactions of international business. The "simple" thing about the retail transaction is that the phase of exchanging goods against money goes through fewer stages in the system because the actors have more or less the same initial knowledge. In contrast, buying and selling in today's Europe often involves highly specialised products about which not only the seller, but also the buyer needs to have special knowledge. Here the division of labour implies, as Marx said it would, a differentiation in production, in goods, and in a large spread of various institutions dedicated to trade and commerce, all of this in turn resulting in the agents possessing different stocks of knowledge.

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Patterns of buying and selling have been institutionalised from ancient times. To accommodate agents from varying social structures, who are very likely to use different variations of the basic patterns, that common language of communication (cf. section 1) must be found. Since the aims of the discourse are conflicting, agents who can use the mother tongue of the other as the language of communication are the ones who will be best equipped to further their own interests within the pattern. With respect to the actual conditions found in Europe today, especially the German medium-sized and small businesses and company representatives are unable to use the language of the buyer as the language of communication; as a result, a considerable need for multilingual communication arises. In the discourse that takes place between offer and purchase, processes of reflection and thought, strategies and tactics play an important part. The progression of any particular sales talk between buyer and seller involves a lot of moving back and forth in a characteristic fashion, and seldom does either buyer or seller arrive directly at the desired goal. This moving back and forth is the characteristic feature of the negotiating form of discourse (cf. Crott-Kutscher-Lamm 1977; Stalpers—Ulijn 1984; Stalpers 1993). In section 5, we will demonstrate that negotiations are typical progressions within the pattern of buying and selling.

3. The institutionalised pattern of buying/selling In this section, we will give an analysis of the general communicative structures of buying and selling which, under certain circumstances, underlie local, national and international communication, be it in a store or between companies. In our analysis, we will draw on the theory of Functional Pragmatics which has been developed in a number of publications. 7 Functional Pragmatics is based on speech act theory (linguistic pragmatics) and takes on a functional view of communication. Compared to Conversational Analysis, it takes not only interactions, but also mental and perceptible actions into consideration. Compared to Discourse Analysis, it operates on a higher level of schemata ("patterns"), which are analysed as nonlinear structures, i. e., as potentials of actions and interactions, represented in diagrammatic form. By means of these diagrams, Functional Pragmatics draws conclusions about underlying mental decisions from perceptible (inter)actions. This constitutes the usefulness and applicability

Internationa] sales talk

71

of this type of diagram, indeed of the pattern as a whole. It must be stressed that the pattern structure has its own typical features, but each individual sales talk can be analysed against the background of this basic structure. Figure 1 shows the abstract, graphic representation of the communication structure of buying and selling.8 The diagram is divided into two halves, each reflecting the respective actions of buyers or sellers. The pattern is divided into six phases as indicated by the dotted lines. The actions are subdivided according to type into mental actions,9 based on options open to the agents, and interactions, i. e., actions which can be seen and/or heard by the interlocutor. Mental actions occur, e.g., when the client is considering whether to define his wishes to the salesperson more exactly or not, or when he decides to purchase or not to purchase. The next section explains the pattern shown in Figure 1. The numbers refer to the positions in the pattern; the actions are in italics. 3.1. Entering

the

pattern

The seller enters the pattern by making an offer (path from position 1 via the sales wish, 2, to position 9) to a buyer whom he assumes to be interested in making a purchase (see below). He does this by presenting a collection, a sample, a catalogue, a range, etc., in other words a selection of what he can offer (in the retail trade this is usually a display), accompanying position 10. Offers which involve the presentation of a collection start a perceptual process in the buyer (position 11), namely that of inspecting the offer. The perceptual process can remain without consequences (path via 11, 12, out of the pattern to 16). The offer is preceded by greetings, which may be very important for establishing the social contact but which do not belong to the pattern of buying and selling itself. They are left out here. A different action complex, advertising (position 3), precedes the pattern of buying and selling. Advertising must be tailored to a specific culture (cf. Beneke-Nothnagel 1988; Holz-Mänttari 1985), but is in fact becoming increasingly transcultural, as can be seen from many advertisements for cars, jeans, and perfume, or from commercials on television. They reflect what the advertising agencies assume about the wants of the consumer (cf. Flader 1975) and provide rather minimal pre-purchase information for the consumer. We have mentioned advertising in order to mark its place in the system prior to the start of the pattern, and to

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Figure I. Selling — buying

International sales talk

73

point out that direct advertising is not a necessary prerequisite for beginning the sales talk. In the following, we will leave out advertising, as it has been relatively well studied by linguists and semioticians. The initiative for the second possible point of entry (0) into the pattern comes f r o m the buyer. This action, which derives f r o m a want that has been aroused, is what we term showing willingness to purchase (position 8). The buyer might, for example, visit a company's agents, or ask them to visit him. This will only happen if the buyer has prior information about the products, so that his needs and wants have been aroused (position 7). To put it in a different way: by showing that he is interested in purchasing, the buyer indicates the existence of a (mental) want (position 7) for a product. The willingness to purchase does n o t require any explicit demonstration. The appearance of the buyer in the shop or at the market at a point of sale/purchase is taken as evidence of a customer's willingness to buy. The entry of the buyer (via position 7 to 12) and/or the offer and its presentation (9, 10) lead on to a further development, in which the buyer performs a decisive mental operation. At this juncture, he consults his knowledge on the ratio between the expected/asked price and the satisfaction of his want by the purchase of the commodity (i. e., he goes to position 12, in order to perform procedure 14 to position 13). The buyer will refer to this ratio time and again in all subsequent stages and phases of the conversation. It will work as a mental scale of values which is continually consulted (position 13). The consultation procedures (e.g., 14; 17'; 29; 42; 53) are knowledge procedures, operating on a conflict of " m a x i m s " : 1 0 «Acquire commodity χ by giving up sum of money >'» v. «Retain sum of money y by doing without commodity χ» If the buyer at this stage (position 12/15) already has come to the conclusion that the wants/price ratio is too unfavourable, he will exit the pattern of action right at the beginning (path out of the pattern to 16). Further argumentation by the salesman will then in all likelihood be wasted time. When a buyer "browses" 1 1 in a book shop, record shop, etc., this process belongs, systematically, to inspecting the offer (position 11). When browsing, the buyer looks through the collection being presented; his wants have already been aroused (position 7), and he is in the process of specifying his wants (position 20). By the very act of entering the shop (4), the customer has indicated a want (7); he can then enter into more serious reflection (17/18), which will either lead to a decision to purchase (56/57) or a decision not to purchase (exit 16).

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3.2. The main phases of buying and selling Phase 2 is not opened by the seller, but by the buyers entering into an (inner) process of consideration of his want and the asked price (17 with procedure 17'). This entry can be identified by the buyer's specification of his wants to the seller, his precise description, or the like (position 20). The position can be elaborated on by the buyer: he may compare with other products, he may make specific criticisms of the collection shown, and he may emphasise those applications and uses which are of importance to him. 12 Often the buyer expresses (contradictory) preferences, thus clearly revealing the conflict of maxims. When wants are specified, it is very important for the seller to listen to the buyer; in other words, his understanding of the buyer's linguistic act must be very precise. Indeed, precise comprehension is a prerequisite for the next stage, which consists in responding to the (potential) buyer's wants. Thus, the seller, as listener, has to perform an essentially linguistic task. 13 The salesman will hardly be able to respond to the specification of wants by simply repeating his offer (this would be an unacceptable regression from 21 to 9). On the contrary, he will now consult and compare (procedure 22) his own knowledge of the range, specific new product developments, his own price expectation, his own cost/benefit ratio (seller's knowledge 23) in order to present the buyer with a specific, modified offer (position 25). In doing so, the seller may discourage exaggerated consumer wishes, stir interest in future product developments, etc. When the modified offer is commented on 1 4 (27), the buyer is informed about the quality of the commodity, perhaps about newer products on the market, etc., and special attention will be paid to his preferences. 15 The salesman may elaborate the explanation by displaying a fund of factual knowledge, by making critical evaluations, comparisons, etc. The more specialised the article in question, the less sufficient it is merely to point at or to present the commodity nonverbally. On the contrary, the salesman will often need specific technical linguistic skills (cf. Reuter 1989). He must at the same time take into account the knowledge he and the buyer have in common (e.g., if they both work in the same trade) and be able to convey his knowledge of new product developments in comprehensible terms. The buyer's previous experience with products of the same kind can also be referred to. In order to explain the offer, therefore, technical language skills16 of relevance to the buyer's needs are important to the salesman.

International sales talk

Two points should be noted about

75

explaining:17

1. In monolingual sales settings, the explanation contains translations at least from the technical language (technical knowledge) into the language of the buyer. In an intercultural communication, the seller must perform a double translation, from the technical language and from his own native language, into the language of the buyer or into a language of communication (see section 6, below). 2. Explaining the offer is sometimes (e.g., in sales training sessions or role playing) misleadingly termed "advising" the customer. Advising presupposes, however, a basic cooperative structure in which the transfer of a plan from the adviser to the advisee can take place. However, this is not the case when speaker and listener have contradictory aims which will block any attempt to transfer a plan. Advising may therefore only take place with the cooperation of the participants, and not against the opposition of one of them (for example, advising in consumer advisory centres or in consultation by investment advisers). In the salesman's own estimate, his explanation of the product (offer), as coloured by his own interests, is advising; advising is understood as having the extended meaning of informing. - It would also not be right to describe the action which has to be performed at this point in the pattern (position 27) as 'persuading', for the buyer does indeed require specific information (accessible only via the salesman's knowledge, which is biased by interest). Directly subsequent to the specific offer, the buyer can, in a further mental procedure, start checking the wants/price ratio (procedure 29), which, if the result is positive, leads to the agreement in general and thus on to the next stage (via 32 to 33). The procedure of checking (29) can have a negative result, causing the buyer to retreat (via 31 and 18 to 17 and 20) and specify his wants anew. Naturally, this is not what the seller desires, but he too must further modify his offer (25 and 27). There is thus a certain recursivity inherent in the structure of the discourse, since the buyer in turn can re-specify his wants, and so on (20, 21, 25; 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 18, 17, etc.). This recursivity is what we term negotiating. The game can go on until the buyer breaks off because he regards further negotiations as pointless (exit 30). 3.3. The bid If the buyer has agreed to the offer in general (even though he still may have some reservations), he can make a bid (an offer to purchase, from

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33 to 34). With this, a new stage in the discourse has obviously been reached (phase 3), where some things are still unsettled, but from where the buyer cannot retreat to an earlier phase without having to justify himself in some way. The seller must, however, consult the cost Ibenefit ratio (position 23, using procedure 36) and either decide if it is satisfactory, or - which would be disappointing — modify his own offer (back via 37 and 22 to 25). In the latter case, there is the risk of the conversation lapsing into recursivity, just as the buyer had more or less made up his mind. This would be a reopening (emanating from the seller) of negotiations. But the seller cannot "undercut himself'. Therefore, he too sometimes finds himself faced with a conflict of maxims. 18 If things go well, phase 3 is closed with the seller accepting the bid (39); in the next phase, phase 4, the results are summarised (40), usually by the seller, and put into final, binding form. Summaries of this nature are linguistically complicated, since they can make the buyer start reconsidering the matter (procedure 42), which can lead to more questions (potentially a retreat via 41 to 17) and make it necessary to run through the whole procedure again. 3.4. Negotiating

the specific

terms

The pattern of buying and selling has not yet reached its conclusion. The buyer is likely to enumerate a number of specific terms (46) such as conditions of payment, delivery dates, special wishes regarding customised items, and so forth. This fifth phase is often regarded as a coda. It is, in fact, very sensitive. For even here, much remains that has not been settled. Moreover, as we shall see in example (1), this phase is handled differently from culture to culture. The specific terms requested by the buyer may create difficulties for the salesman, since management often has made no special provisions, and the seller will have to "take it on his own head". On the other hand, he cannot interrupt negotiations altogether, now that the most difficult phase already seems to have been mastered. Therefore, further modifications and adjustments to suit the buyer's specific wishes are made. At this point, the buyer can either once again modify his specific terms, in other words enter another round of discourse (44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 45, 44). Alternatively, he may reconsider matters and then announce the result as a specified need (retreat via 54 to 17). The buyer can

International sales talk

77

also fall back to the start of the main phase and thus revise his decisions. All in all, this too is another process of negotiation, within the scope offered by the pattern. If the seller is unable or unwilling to agree to the specific terms of the trade, he will, for his part, either postpone the conclusion of an agreement or modify the offer (retreat to 22 via 49) by returning to a position "farther up" in the pattern. Let us examine an example 1 9 which illustrates the extreme sensitivity of this phase of buying and selling, especially in intercultural negotiations. In this example, DS, the representative of a Dutch company which manufactures specialised products for medical laboratories and hospitals, is talking to a French customer (FB) about the acquisition of a new, expensive piece of equipment. He hopes to persuade the customer to place an order. (1) (FB: French buyer; DS: Dutch seller). 1 FB et nous et nous on paye dans les conditions de paiement si vous voulez on met on paye eh la somme divisee par six avec un sixieme, tous les mois, pendant six mois [and we and we, we pay - according to the conditions of payment if you want we will put we will pay um the sum divided by six with 1/6, every month, for six months] 2 DS Done vous allez eh payer dans six mois alors? [so you will pay in six months then] 3 FB Eh disons dans six mois on aura le dernier eh la derniere tranche quoi [um let us say, in six months, you will have the last um the last installment OK] The Dutchman is trying to pin down special phases of the communication process, i. e., to "stipulate specific terms" of payment (through utterance 2); he is attempting to complete position 50. The French buyer, however, is still considering (17/18) in an effort to keep all his options open, from the initial phase up to the phase immediately prior to the purchase decision. U p to this point, the French buyer (mentally) remains in a phase of deliberation and is unwilling, by explicitly agreeing in general (position 33), to relinquish his option of withdrawing from the deal. It transpires that in international settings, as shown in our illustration, the way the different phases of communication are handled is obviously dependent upon cultural elements. Particularly for the seller, barely perceptible differences may prove crucial. 20

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3.5. Purchase

decision,

contract

and the

hyperpragmeme

Once the specific terms have been discussed in phase 5, the buyer arrives at his purchase decision (56/57), and the seller is informed of the purchase decision (58). The purchase decision is both a choice made by the buyer and an obligation for him to buy. Large scale commercial deals will often take the form of a contract (59). Normally, the agreement is put in writing (in many rural areas, a handshake is sufficient to "seal" the bargain). It is the written contract which distinguishes the institutionalised national and international business communication from oral interactions, e.g., in retail stores. Concluding a contract in a foreign language requires highly developed foreign language skills, in particular as regards the legal terminology. 21 At the same time, the language employed for the specific purpose of commercial contracts must satisfy certain requirements. The individual terms of a contract are often included in negotiations, which means that the buyer does theoretically have the option of changing his mind right up to the time he signs (potential path to 52/54 or 52/ 55). Not until he has signed the contract has he placed the order and has thus come under the obligation to pay; similarly, the seller then is under the obligation to make delivery, etc. If everything goes smoothly, delivery is made (61) after the goods have passed through the stocks (60); payment (63) is made upon receipt (62) of the goods. In Ehlich-Rehbein (1972, 1974), a zone, termed hyperpragmeme, has been defined consisting of a fixed sequence of actions with no possible escape routes for the agents. As is shown there, such a zone forms part of the economic institution of buying and selling. In business communication, the hyperpragmeme is initiated by the buyer's decision to buy (purchase decision). 22 In Figure 1, the hyperpragmeme is enclosed by a bold-faced line. The buyer enters the hyperpragmeme with the result of his purchase decision (57). Inside the hyperpragmeme, he comes under the obligation (usually in the form of a contract, at least on the interactive plane) to make payment. There is no exit without some form of compensation; indeed, neither of the agents can emerge until payment has been made. Finally, it is the type of commodity and the method of payment which determine the actions within the hyperpragmeme. In a retail store, where a range of individual consumer goods is presented in the displays (9/10), the purchase decision is followed by face-to-face interaction; there is no written contract, and normally the buyer pays for the goods as soon as he receives them. Alternatively, written promises to pay may be used.

International sales talk

Nowadays, buying and selling develop both nationally and tionally on the basis of competitive circulation. This means buyer, if he leaves the pattern at one of the possible exit points, ends the pattern, but in addition may take up a competing offer ised in the diagram by arrows leading to a competitor).

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internathat the not only (symbol-

4. Decision-making discourse 4.1. The buyer's decision Let us now take a closer look at the buyer's decision-making process as shown in the pattern represented in Figure 2. The process which culminates in the buyer's purchase decision (56/57) begins with his need or want being aroused (in position 7) and reaches its conclusion in the contract (position 59) or in the verbal expression (information) of the purchase decision (position 58). In each successive phase of the discourse, the buyer's decision becomes firmer; indeed, each phase is characterised by the fact that at least one position taken by the buyer indicates a further increment (or regression) in the decision-making process. In Figure 2, progression corresponds to an intensifying process, illustrated by the incremental axis placed vertically above the mental actions of the buyer. The characteristic feature of the buying and selling pattern is the dynamics of the buyer's decision-making process, which places it in the category of deciding discourse (for a detailed analysis of this type of discourse see Grießhaber 1987; Rehbein 1986, Rehbein-Mazeland 1991). 23 Admittedly, the buyer still has three, or even four positions (12/14, 19/28, 43/41, 51/52) at which he can change his mind without adverse consequences; he will, however, find it increasingly difficult to withdraw his bid the further the conversation has progressed towards the purchase decision.

4.2. Decision-making process and role-playing Grießhaber's (1987) study of job interviews (the position offered was that of a retail sales clerk) revealed that the personnel manager's final decision is made at a very early point in the actual interview (by contrast with the buyer's final decision in our examples). In attempts to simulate interviews in role-playing (e.g., in training sessions), 24 Grießhaber found that it was not really possible to simulate the decision-making process. 2 5 Since in the training/simulation situation the mental positions of the pattern were

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shut out of the system, Grießhaber referred to what happens in roleplaying as a "quoting activity" in contrast to what takes place in real communicative processes. In the same fashion, we would submit that sales training sessions quote communicative realities, i. e., the essential, mental positions are shut out, reducing the whole selling-buying communication to a superficial sequence of interactions. 4.3. Intercultural

differences

in the decision-making

process

Let us take another look at example (1), an international sales talk between a Dutch agent and a French buyer, in which the Dutch agent is pursuing the tactic of partially settling the separate phases of the conversation from the speaker's point of view in order to pin the French buyer down at a phase in the sequence of actions that only the seller has actually reached. In contrast, the French buyer is making efforts to keep all his options, including that of withdrawing, open up to the last minute. To him, it is very important not to finally commit himself before the contract is concluded, so he cannot be held responsible to a purchase decision. Instead, he checks his knowledge (wants/price ratio in position 13) and wavers back and forth between different phases (2, 3 and 4). Since this happens parallel to the Dutchman's tactic of partially settling, the whole negotiation is getting an asynchronic appearance. The differences between the two cultures and the lack of intercultural knowledge may well endanger the conclusion of a contract. Such asynchronicity of interactions is often based on the culturally different handling of patterns of actions. In terms of the pattern, example (1) evinces the asynchronicity of the positions occupied by the Dutch seller and the French buyer. Thus, the two poles of the intercultural negotiating process are the Dutchman's position, stipulating specific terms (at position 50), and the Frenchman's progress (repeated retreats to position 17/18, considering); the consequence is, in this case, that the duration of the discourse is vastly protracted.

5. Negotiation — an auxiliary device As we have seen in section 3.2. above, the buying and selling pattern can enter into a recursive phase. By the term "negotiating", we refer to this recursivity within the pattern. It is to be characterised as an auxiliary device because it functions by means of the pattern.

International sales talk phases

seller

competitor

mental

mental

showing will to purchase

% 10

offering presenting collection

actions

arising want

inspecting the offer wants/

specifying wants

consider™

beni-modifying the offer

ralio /

commenting, the offer

bidding

agreeing in general

within

accepting buyer

ratio

81

Γ

summarising

within know!

specific terms seller's stipulating condit. know! I edge result of purchase decision

date/conditions etc. of delivery

stocks delivery

s

mental checking procedure communicative stages borderline of hyperpragmeme borderline of the pattern stop, exit point path blocked

Figure 2. Decision making process

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Using the graphic representation of the pattern (see Figure 3), we can m a k e o u r definition m o r e precise: negotiating can be observed in those parts of the p a t t e r n where the seller h a s n o t modified the offer satisfactorily (25) in response to the specified wants of the buyer (in 20), m a k i n g him start reconsidering ( f r o m 28 back to 18 via 31), t h u s triggering a respecification of his wants ( f r o m 17 to 20). We will call this the first negotiation circle: Negotiation

circle I: 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 18, 17, etc.

This recursive c o m m u n i c a t i o n initiated by the buyer can be repeated m a n y times over a n d even crop u p again in later phases of the discourse, especially if the buyer leaves position 41 or 52 a n d r e t u r n s via 18 to the considering phase. Viewed f r o m an action-theoretical s t a n d p o i n t , the recursivity of the pattern implies t h a t certain sequential positions have n o t been completely w o r k e d t h r o u g h by either of the agents. These p a t t e r n s have not yet acquired the character of a fixed sequence; t h a t will have to c o m e later. Procedures of this kind occur when the t w o agents have differing interests a n d conflicting aims in the discourse, as seen in the p a t t e r n under discussion. A n o t h e r circle of negotiation, Negotiation circle II, is formed by the seller if, instead of accepting the buyer's bid (38, 39), he takes a step back in the p a t t e r n via 37 to 22 and modifies his offer (25). Yet a n o t h e r circle, this time set u p by the buyer, has already been discussed in the section on negotiating a n d settling the specific terms (46-50): Negotiation

circle III·. 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 45, 44, etc.

D u r i n g business negotiations, a recursivity of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is created when buyer a n d seller, acting according to their conflicting aims, either have differing ideas on the definition of a particular position in the p a t t e r n of buying a n d selling, or are unwilling to fix the pattern at all, at the same time realising that they will have to settle u p o n a cooperative sequence in order to continue the pattern. In discussing a n u m b e r of linguistic a n d sociopsychological app r o a c h e s f r o m a p r a g m a t i c point of view, Wagner—Petersen (1991) outline " n e g o t i a t i n g " as a " p a t t e r n of action". We accept this definition, b u t p r o p o s e a f u r t h e r step in the analysis. Negotiating is, according to my analysis, to be conceived of as a " p a t t e r n within p a t t e r n s " , in short, as an auxiliary device, basically applied to different positions in different patterns.26

International sales talk phases mental

I

seller

actions

sales wish

'

buyer

interactions

interactions

competitor j

mental

actions

advertising > showing will to purchase

ι 1

: mental checking procedure — : communicative stages mmmmammm •. borderline of hyperpragmeme : borderline of the pattern ^ : stop, exit point •