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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD
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12.
LUCRETIUS PPirTFTTIS
Intrpduct
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GILBERT (.A LI LEO
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ROBERT VICKLROY
The Dialogues of
PLATO 7 R
INSl ITED BY
\|
HI
\
The Seventh 7
R.lXSL.tri-D
l!\
I.
\1
1
\
low
I
I
1
Letter
HARWARD
William Bextox, Publr
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, CHICAGO- LOS DOS
•
INC.
TOROSTO GENEVA* SYDNEY-TOKYO •
-J- -J-
of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, is reprinted arrangement with Ozfoid University Press
The Dialogues b>
The Seventh by
J.
Epistle
is
reprinted from
The
Platonic Epistles, translated
Harward, by arrangement with Cambridge University Press
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO The Great Books is
published with the editorial advice of the faculties of
The University of Chicago
© 1952 by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
copyricht under international copyright
l nion t
All Rights Reserved under Pan American and Universal Copyright Conventions by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Library of Congress Catalog Card
Inc.
Number: 55-10317
BI< K ,u
\n
in
NOTE
\i
Plato, Pi \i' ion o( in
|
|fj
triston .\nA Perictionc, i
one
"i tlu-
ton
is
s.iul
CodrUS
tO
...
.
I
lis
\v
.»
^
born
ftmil) u.is, 00 DOth MRAS Ml S
CRATYLl PHAEDRI
TIMAEUS
*8
OKI
I
S
us
'1
EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY
Mil
III
I
S
US
149
SOPHIS1 STA SMAN
»74
PHILEBUS
14a
SYMPOSIUM Ml NO
\S
1
l'AKMl \!!)l
s
[ON
I
1
51a 551
l
LAWS
BOOK BOOK II CRITO 213 BOOK III P11AEDO 220 BOOK IV GORGIAS 252 BOOK V THE REPUBLIC 295 VI BOOK BOOK ^95 BOOK VII BOOK II 310 BOOK VIII BOOK III 3^4 BOOK IX BOOK IV 34^ BOOK X BOOK V 356 BOOK XI BOOK VI 373 BOOK XII BOOK VII THE SEVENTH LETTER, 800 200
I
I
vu
553 1
686 697 7'3
743
77'
784
CHARMIDES, or Temperance ONS
mi DlALOGUI
Ol
Cstrn as, n.
v >
RATI*,
The Polscstt
'.•,
*
•-
who ,
\\ tn bdai evening
nem
I
(hi
Porch
ol thi
K
i
*
I returned From the having been a good while away, thought that should like to go and look at my old haunts. So went into the palaestra ot Taurcas. which is over against the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon. and there Found a number ot' persons, $ ot w horn I knew, hut not all. My \ sit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides; and Chacrephon. who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saving. How did vou escape, Socra-(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.) i
arm)
IS the
which
beauty, or both. Critias, glancing
// 5^/ invited
my
were coming
in.
rr*
11
attention to tome youth
and talking
other, followed bv a crowd.
Socrates, he said,
I
DOisilj
t would enquire into ihe nature uciuust pursue the enquir) into health
I
i
4
and not into w hai
.inc.
extra m
ii
\ ri
tic.
And he who ju physician as
a
wl
v
i
fudge of the whal relati
\
li
IM
icTM C
II
I"
htly will
physician
in
v
t!er and ter
;
••
I
Are not these, mv friend, the n vantages which are to Ik- gained from And are not we looking aod seekin] something more than is to Ik- found ifl That is very likely, he That is very likely, 1 said; and vcr] we have been enquiring to no purp insight?
Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, science oi science, M\d ot the absence
who
will
u.ils.
would seem, excepl the phy sician cm have this knowledge; and therefore noi the wise man; he would have to he a physician as well as a wise man. at all,
ledge
ih.it
cause, in addition to the
.1
rannot.
one
know
ot
this
were supposing
is
wisdom?
at hrst, the
If,
wise
discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well ulty of
;
and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of
'•'•
l
led to inter, because
I
observe that
if
thil
dom. some strange consequences would Let us, it you please, assume the p
follow.
iences, and further ado was originally suggested, thai w is the knowledge ot whal we know and know. Assuming all this, still, upon further
allow, as
consideration,
am
I
doubtful.
nether
I
wisdom, such as this, would do us much For we were wrong. think, in suppov we were saying just now, that such v. ordering the government of house M would be a great benefit. I
How
so: he said.
Why,
I
said,
we were
far too
the great benefits which
ready to admit
mankind would
ob-
from their severally doing the things which they knew, and committing the things ot which they are ignorant to those who were better acquainted with them.
tain
Were we not I
right in
making thatadmission 3
think not. very strange, Socrates'
How Bv
the
vou; and
dog of was thinking I 1
d,
there
as
I
much
agree with iust
now
1)1
12
A LOG LIES
consequences would we were on the wrong track; tor however ready we may be to admit that this is wisdom, [ij$] I certainly cannot make out what good this sort of thing docs to us. What do you mean he said; wish that you could make me understand what you mean.
when
I
follow,
said that strange
and
thai
I
v.as a! raid
OF PLATO happy; but I think that you mean to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, 1 174] such for example future.
one
:
I
dare say that what
1
am
saying
is
nonsense.
and yet it a man has any teeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined. replied;
like that, he said. Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the conI
trol of
and
wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers
set
up
the true prophets in their place as
the revealers of the future.
Now
I
quite agree
mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear this is a point which we have not yet Critias, that
—
been able to determine. Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else. But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just
answer me that small question. knowledge of shoemaking?
Do
you mean
a
God forbid. Or of working
in brass?
Or
in wool, or wood, or anythingof thatsort? No, I do not. Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine
who
according to knowledge is according to knowledge, and yet they are not allowed by you to be lives
happy, for these
of
it
live
as
him you
mean him,
I
I
was saying, knows the some
are speaking or of
but there are others as well.
some one who knows the past and present as well as the future, and is ignoYes,
said,
I
rant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, and if there is. you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men. Certainly he is. Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him
happy? Not all equally, he replied. But which most tends to make him ha ppy the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the
game
of draughts?
Nonsense about the game of draughts.
Or
of computation?
No.
Or
of health
That
And
is
3
nearer the truth, he said.
knowledge which is nearest of all, knowledge of what' The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil. Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this time hiding from I
said,
me
that
is
the
the fact that the
life
according to knowl-
makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge include edge all
is
not that which
the sciences, but one science only, that of
good and
evil.
For,
let
me
ask you, Critias,
you take away this, medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver whether the art of the pilot will not clothes? equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war? Quite so. And yet, my dear Critias, none of these whether,
if
—
things will be well or beneficially done, science of the
Certainly not.
that he
Is
else.'
Yes,
I
I
who,
as the prophet,
if
the
good be wanting.
True. But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of use. And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however
much we assume
that wis-
I
tloii
\i
i
A
\v
i\ she a ill have good undei lui
och< I.
•..
ii
uii> c ol
An.
w
I
wisdom do
1
1
u- %
il«»
only
the effct
the
ranee, 1
hat
is
K
an)
«>t
them
mid
I
i
not
«!«>
theit
othei arts,
the
ol
is
good friend;
not he the produCCI
«•!
(
tor that
we have
just
mv
now
.nt.
true.
can
wisdom
be advantageous,
giving no advantage? Th.u, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.
was not far in fearing that could have no sound was quite right in tie notion about wisdom; awxiating myself; tor that which is admitted to be the best ot" all things would never have seemed to us useless, it had been good tor anything at an enquiry. But now have been utterly defeated, and have tailed to discover what that is to which the imposcr ol names gave this name ot temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could then. Critias. th.u
I
I
I
I
I
be burly granted: tor
we admitted
that there
was a science ot science, although the argument said No, and protested against us: and
We admitted
hid en
h.ipp\
VVht
it.
w hethei you have th!«»
Miir that WJU must
quite
a\\cA
i
\
I.
I
tlir
ol
\c\i>\\c.
hut
lippothales,
said; uli.it
1
realU [H-tlr^t lo\r \oti \\a\c tound'
wh
II
noble ind
.»
wish
I
th.it
would hrvoui me with thr exhibition which you haw been making to thr rest t the company, and then shall be able to ju whether you know wh.it a lovei OUght tO (20$ sbout his love, either to the youth him you
ow
\otir
ii
hoiio
ful lovi
to you,
and ma)
I
;
or to others.
sclt.
you surely do not
\.i\. Socrates, he said;
tach any importance to what he
is
at-
you disown the love ot the person whom he s.ivs th.it you but deny thai make verses or address compositions to him. le is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad. c ) lippothales, I said, it you have ever made any verses or songs m honour ot vour favourite, I Jo not want to hear them; but want to know the purport ot them, that I may he able to judge ot vour mode oi approaching vour lair one. :^pus will Ik able to tell you, he said; tor it, as he avers, the sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of them. I
*o
you mean,
said, that
I
!
I
I
1
1
I
i
es,
indeed, said Ctesippus;
I
know
only too
and very ridiculous the tale is: for though he is a lover, and very devotedly
well;
love, he has
nothing particular
his beloved
which
is
a child
not that ridiculous?
to talk
might not
He can only
al-
in
about to
say.
Now
speak of the
wealth of Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses,
and
games, and at the Isthmus, and at Xemea with four horses and single horses these are the tales which he composes and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who was a connexion of their victory at the Pythian
—
the family, setting forth
how
in virtue of this
was hospitably received by an Lysis; this ancestor was himself be-
relationship he
ancestor of
gotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us,
and we are obliged
When
I
heard
to listen to
this,
I
said:
O
him. ridiculous Hip-
•
hone-
conquered and won
mi. h
u be »lij*
»
you, the more you h thr more iidu ul( i.iiu
this t.urrst
and
best
ol
I
dents.
nil
are I
tilled
)o
more I
with the
;
spirit ot
you not agree with
And
he said. the more
difficult
!*•
ii
hi
'I
when any one
tair.
him,
I
1i
I
.in
.i
f
',iin,
1
we
s.imr as the good, «.
>i 1
.is
1
\
u
ill
hr unjust will
be the
;
i
vi
m
Ik-
1
1
1 .
1 1
I
w ith
tlir
i
en. •rni.
ol
1 1
is
n.
I
True. position ol ouri which, Bui thai too was you w '1! remember, has been already refuted
We
anything
is
to be
done?
men who argue meats: nor the
to be
done? Oi
1
is
there
can only, like the wise
I
in courts,
sum up
tin
neither the beloved, not the lover, like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor
there were tucfa
.i
cannot remember all—
ot
whom we
number it
none
d
ipoke
them
that
ot these ait
I
lair
.it
\
I
pany. I
said,
ho
parting: Menexenui and lous ih.it vnu two boj and
ui
would think nu\ seem to I
If..: I..
.
lie. ir
.1
in.
.mi
I
In-
hacei ol d
m
.1
.1
discoursing 1
union and to oth
bad; and
diai
lover,
thai
ol
true
whi •
virtue, 01
and
theme,
quite
man and worth)
I
li>M
such an one
I
deem to be the true mud harmony than thai ol
lusions.
•
the
will be
the lyre, or an) pleasant instrument ol music;
tion
he has in his own life words and deeds arranged, not or in the Phrygian mode, nor yei
been our
tor truly
a
harmonj
ol
in the
Ionian,
in the
Lydian,
mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such m\ one makes me merry with the sound ot his voice; ami when bul in the true
him
hear
coui
Hut
I
\
[ellenic
am thought to be a lover of disam in drinking in his words.
;er
a
I
man whose
words
actions do not agree with his
m\ annoyance
me; and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then seem to be a hater ot discourse. As to Socrates, have no knowledge ot his words, but of old, as would seem, have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments are natural to [ iSg] him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and is
to
I
I
I
shall be delighted to be interrogated
such as he
having
and
to learn of
Solon, "that
many
is,
I
him:
would
by a
man
not be annoyed at
shall
for
fain
I
too agree with
grow
old, learning
must be allowed to add "ot the good only." Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the things." But
I
—
is younger, or not as yet in repute anything of that sort is of no account with me. And
teacher
therefore, Socrates,
I
give you notice that you
and confute me as much as ever you and also learn of me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and ^.we
may
teach
like,
your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the dirTerence of our ages.
a proof of
tl
I
I
Ami
\\ ill
I
on the pi u ill listen,
cian, attuned to 1 Eairej
I
I
i
lira
d
am delighted beyond measure: compare the man and his words, and note the harmonj and correspondence t them.
ol Ins
'
I
(shall
ing,
no harm which w.is firsi ii
and
other
own
whom
mode
pr
.
ol Ins ii
h.i\r
i
mm
-K, lir said; but triil. i\
until yes
even
lot the \t the Mine tnur he w» klr bed, ind mi down .»t my feet, tnd then hr 1
c-1
1
1
1
him
sun
ill '
Oenoc whithei
turn from
had gone
I
nn runaway
ptu
in
ilavc Satyrus, .»s meant same othei mattei had not come in the- w .iv; on my return, when a had done nipper and were about to retire to rest, ins brotnej said to me: Protagoras is come. w.is going to Mm .u once, and then thought that the night was fai spent But the moment sleep left me aftei mv fatigue, got up and came bithei dsrei t. I. who knew the \eiv COUXageOUJ madness of the man, said: What is the matter? Has Proi>t
have told you,
to
I
I
I
tagoras robbed you oi anything? lie replied, laughing:
Yes, indeed
has,
In-
wisdom which he keeps from
the
:i
I
ii
r
C
wh) ever) one ii 10 and the laws; suppose, I
and
thr s.unr ir.ulinrss
l»r
intn
intereti
in
ii
say, thai tdrrr
pU
I..
teaching one another Bute playing, do you ites, thai the sons ol good flute would be nunc likeh to be than think not. Would not the sons ol bad ones? ihcit sons grow up to be distinguished or un distinguished according to their own natural >
*.
i
>
positcs have some qualities in common; e\en the parts of the Eace which, as we were saying 1
I
I
1
and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar. and one ot them is like another ot them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike. And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small before, arc distinct
degree of likeness? Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view. [$32] Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the
examples which you mentioned instead. you admit the existence of folly? I
1(
1
thai p Km h is dot done sw iftly, and th.u w h nes dowly .
le
I
I
win, h
And
|llst.
replied;
th.it
thai
rence between them, Bui what matti please; and lei us assume, il you you pic-. isc will, th.it justice is holy, and thai holiness is
I
!•
is
rid
1
P.irJon me.
thai
cannot limply
proposition thai justice
holiness
I'
I
And
ilh mc*. I
fool
trmp
u would u m. i\ be permitted to give th behalt, .uul whether \ou would
like justice;
u hethei w
I
Do
.isscnted
And
.1.
is done in the same done by the same; and th.u win, h .111 Opposite in. inner 1>\ the OppOf
which
th.u
m
is
agreed.
I
le
(
tace more,
I
said,
is
there anything
I
ful-
Yrs.
To which There
And
the only opposite
the ugly?
is
the evil
there anyth::
is
There is. To which the only opposite There is no other.
And
is
no other.
is
there
is
;
the acute in sound'
True.
To which the only opposite is tl. There is no other, he s.nd. Inn that. Then
every Opposite has one opposite only
and no more? I
le
assented.
Then now,
I
said, let us recapiti:
missions. First of
all
we admitted
that every-
thing has one opposite and not more than one? We du!
And we
admitted also that what was done
opposite ways was done by Yes.
And
that
which was done
foolishly, as
further admitted, was done in the opposite to that
which was done
in
o;
we way
tern.
do.
And
is
not
is
true,
wisdom
the verv opposite of
folly
That
he
foolishly
said.
And when men
act
And that which was done temperate! done by temperance, and that which was done
rightly
and advanta-
geously they seem to you to be temperate: Yes, he said. And temperance makes them temperate?
I
ed.
And done bv Yes.
that
which
opposite:,
:
is
done
in opposite
ways
is
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
50
And
one thing
is
done by temperance, and
be said;
in opposite
yet unjust
And good
therefore by opposites:
— then
folly
is
is
good sense 1
(i
Clearly.
li
And do you remember
that lolly has already
sense
is
good counsel
doing
in-
ceed
ran ted. they succeed.
said, or
I
1
wisdom?
And you would admit
1
if
they do not suc-
;
been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of
the\ succeed.
the
existence
of
goods 2
assented.
And we
in
just:
the opposite of temperance?
He
;
that be admitted.
Yes.
ways?
Certainly.
And
let
And temperance
Yes.
And
and
are temperate,
quite another thing by follv?
said that everything has only
one
Yes.
And
opposite?
is
the
good
that
which
is
expedient for
man?
Yes.
[333] Then, Protagoras, which of the two we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they assertions shall
Yes, indeed, he said: and there are
things which
may
some
be inexpedient, and
are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in
them good. thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded mv
themselves and in their functions, like the parts
business,
Which
two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord
of a face.
can they be said to agree
if
assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?
He
assented, but with great reluctance. are the same,
and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. as before justice
man
you think that an unjust
can be tem-
perate in his injustice? I
should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to
acknowledge may be found
And
shall
I
this
which nevertheless many
to assert.
argue with them or with you?
I
replied. I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will. Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opin-
ion or not.
My
object
is
to test the validity of
and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial. Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouragthe argument;
ing; at length, he consented to answer.
Now
[334]
then,
I
said,
begin
at the
and answer me. You think
that
beginning
some men
and gently
When you
said: say, Protagoras, that things
inexpedient are good, do you ent for
man
and do you of
many
mean
inexpedi-
only, or inexpedient altogether?
call
the latter good'
Certainly not the
is
Then temperance and wisdom
Do
I
of these
how
or agree: for
everything
call
things
last,
he replied; for
I
know
— meats, drinks, medicines, and
which arc inexpediman, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses: and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians ten thousand other things, ent for
always forbid their patients the use of
oil
in
their food, except in very small quantities, just
enough
to extinguish the disagreeable sensa-
tion of smell in meats
When
and
sauces.
he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember
PR( what he
\s thru,
talking aboul
is
il
I
»
I
\(.
i
had U
you uric going you would have had t.. r.o-.c youi m>\N hav ing ni< li a bad memoi \ will '
;:i>!
.
,
tocul youi answers ihorter,
mr w
il
I
hkr
!
ir
i
you would take partun
tth JTOU.
W'lut do son mean? hr said: bow am to shoiten m\ answi .hall ike thru) too
id mi red
I
I
not.
•a.i'.lv
I
.Hid lo,
Hut the truth
laid.
-hurt rtU'i
ask
insH er u hat appears tO tnr to In- short enough, or what appears to you to he short 1
quest I
you can speak and
said, thai
A
otTi iboui the same things ai such length thai wordi nevei tcrnifd to tail, or with nich brevity thai no one could vise fewer
Beach
them. Phase therefore. [$$$] it \ou talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method. oi
item, I
he replied,
fought, ami tation
it
hail
I
which
many
mv
words followed the method a battle of
adversaries desired, as
you want me to o\o. should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere. saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and sidcred that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: ProtagoI
I
do not w ish to force the conversation upon vou if you had rather not, but when you are ras.
I
me
such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you willing to argue with
in
sav oi yourself, are able to
have discussions
in
shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for
master of wisdom; but I cannot manI I only wish that could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.
you are
when
1
enou] have heard,
have
that
is
|
is |
lid.
!
Shall
!*-!!
a
these long speeches:
Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand, and in his left
hand caught hold
of this old cloak
said: We cannot let you go, Socyou leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to
|
should repU
|
same
in
ili.it
ot in\
,
I
hut
won!,!
thq
ply. tad t) and me in the same stadium, you must bid him sl.u ken his speed to mine, fol quickly, and he can run tad in like I
manjM discoursing, you must ask
him
to shorten bis
answers, and keep to the tirst; it not, how can there l>e anv For discussion is one thing, ami oration
is
quite another, in
But you
he did
at
di
mak
mv hum.
sec. Socr.r
d Pro claim to sj>eak in h way, jual as vou claim to s|>eak in \ours. lerc Alcibiades interposed, and Callias, is not a true statement ot the our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech in this he yields the palm to Pi ras: but I should be greatly surprised it he
may
fairly
1
a
—
yielded to any living
man
in the
ing and apprehendir. oras will
confess that he
make is
power of hold-
j.imcnt.
N
a similar admission,
and
inferior
mentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, not, when a qui let him ask and answer
—
is
away from answering, making
asked, slipping
the point, and in-
a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue not that Socrates is likely
stead of
(
—
I
although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory ). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the than Protagoras; that is my view, ami man ought to say what he thinks. When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one Critias. I believe went on to say: C ) Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be get
I
will be
—
bound
for that,
—
of mine.
He
a partisan of Protagoras:
rates, for
if
des,
who
side.
But we should not be partisans either of
and
this led Alcibia-
loves opposition, to take the other
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
52
Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.
[337 J Prodicus added: That, to
me
to be well said, for those
Critias,
who
seems
are pres-
an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president: he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper
ent at such discussions ought to be impartial
length.
hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as
This proposal was received by the company with universal approval: Callias said that he
equality, for both sides should be impartially
heard, and yet an equal
meed should
not be
assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise.
And
I
as well as Critias
would beg
you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of goodwill, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke
many of the company applauded words. Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are Prodicus, and
his
against nature.
grace then,
if
How we,
great
would be the
who know
dis-
the nature of
and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height things,
as such are
of dignity, but should only quarrel with
one
another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, [338] but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into
would not
let
me
ofT,
choose an arbiter. But
and they begged me
to
said that to choose
an
I
umpire of discourse would be unseemK was inferior, then the interior or worse ought not to preside over the better: or if he was equal, neither would that be well: for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him.1 And it you say, "Let us have a better then," to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him: not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Prois not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many the person chosen
—
questions as he likes to ask,
manner answer me; and
let
him
in like
he seems to be not answering the precise question if
very ready at asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. arbiter
—
all
And of
this
you
will
require no special
shall be arbiters.
This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows: I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; [339] ano this I conceive to be the power of ^
knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and 1 have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to
PRO! iron
(lie
poem
01
I
kiu>\\
to you w hole i
the
I
\
Mtu>n be
And
in
a contradiction,
good
No, not
I
as
not agree with the ot a
m
\
M
becomii
lid not
Simonid*
icw. diat
"I lardl)
I
replied.
\
fir*
1
in
1
man
.1
contradiction? he asked.
.1
And
same
word
ol
you
do
s.i\. "I
Pittacua, albeii the
wise man: Hardl) can
a
man
will observe th.»t this
he
is
said
two
s.i\-
poet.
know it. And Ao you 1
.ire
think,
consistent
lie
said, tluit the
:
I
I
little
I
either in his
first
I
had received
I
blow from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So 1 turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. [ $40] I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when bea
leaguered by Achilles, aid him, saying: Brother dear,
let
hut
tor
trom himself.
summons
the Swnois to
us both together stay the force of
not
something
sa\m;*,
diflei
Pitta< us
does not say; oni des s.ns, th.u bardl) can man become go hut hardly can a man he good: and our Jricnd Prodicus would maintain that being, l'r.1
ras,
not the
is
same
with himself.
sistent
becoming;
as
Simomdes
.ind
thc\
1!
not in
is
dare- say that
I
and many others would
Prodicttl
say, S
On the one hand hardly For the gods hope nude virtu But on the other hand u
•
,
become g
.
height,
Then,
to retain virtue, h
I
sit ion. is
Prodicus heard and approved; but P:
Your
ras said:
correction. Sckt.i-
greater error than
which you are
or his second assertion.
Many of the audiencecheered and applauded this. And felt at first giddy and faint, as if
us.
1'itt.u 11s,
imagines, tor repeating thai which be
himself,
turther on in the poem, forgetting,
and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, "Hardly can a man be .!." which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be
the hero.
or. is
then he blatnrs
are not the same, then
said, think so (at the same time Yes, could not help tearing that there might he .something in what he said). And you think otherwise? Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both : First of all. premising as hisown thought, "I lardly can a man become truly good"; and
wrong
•
Quite right, said Prodk
utterance
then a
wish
I
\..i the
I
ingi
.ill
\rm, w hu h is irn sui h
»:
1
1
J
part
on is
•
.is
m wh.it follows he meant t» ar.;ue
il
.1
litth
:
|
.1
diiiu ulty in
bo
"ii
:
liblc tor a tiiiie,.ind onl\ fol
become good, and
t^W. wish Protagoras either to ask or an ;
:
I
iwct .is he is inclined; but would rathei hive done with pocmssndodes, it hedoes not objo t. and come back to the question about which w .is asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end d that The talk about the I
but
I'i.'
would do allies, snd
In(
me
commonplace inter vulgar company have re-
like a
tainment to which a who, because they are not able to verse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound ot their own vo and conversation, by reason d their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring course;
i
tor a great
their
sum
the voiee ot a flute instead ot
own breath, to among them:
course
are real gentlemen
no
he the
medium
but where the
will or
will not 1sunt.11/
\\r
see
the argument
we ma)
th.u
a
rates rlsr.
and men of education, you
the
medium, and which they
anil in
own
pany
voices are
carry on by turns
w uh one another.
to talk
think
like this of ours,
And
and men such
a
com-
as
we
do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they profess to be,
are saying; people
some
who
cite
them
that
!
ashamed by then
when
tii
were superadded, d
that
s.u.l
I
i
answer.
So I
I
haw
s.tid:
I
)o not
imagine, asking qui .inn.; up ,\
1
is
to ask. *
that
to sa)
thai he docs e>
is
evil
which
when near, and lessei will gram thai also.
become greater and smaller, and more and iewer.and differ in degree? For if any one sa\ s: "Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain" To that I should reply: And do they ditier in anything but in pleasure and pain.' There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a
—
weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which skilful
outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more
numb
VI
Ik
at
11
'
consist in
d
not doing or in avoiding the
be the
ta,\
ing prim ipte
:•
Would
Inn:
oi
an ol measuring be tl or would the power oi
the
not
ciple;
not the latter that deceiving art whicfl us Wander Up and down and take the things
one tune ot which in our actions and
at
both
great a\m\ small
:
v.
I
our
in
But the
ait
I
would do away with the and. showing the truth, won 1
h the
soul at last to find rest in the truth,
thus
our
N.i\e
life.
Would
acknowledge
orally
plishes this result
is
Yes, he said, the
and
not
that tin
art
the art ot measureo
an
turement.
1
human
Sup,
depend on the choice oi od on the knowledge ot when a man to
choose the greater or less, either Ives or to each otlu-
there of the relations of pleasure to pain other
than excess and defect, which means that they
lux
.1.
thickness and arc in then
oi
at a
knowledge
a
tk>n
one
is
:
Would
and
when
delect,
and
number, when the question and e\en The world will assent, :
:
not
ot
1
not ki
of measuring,
ot excess
life
and
id whether would be the
distance: what
principle of our li\es
—
in
:i.
the
a
I
is
1
will
they
:
Protagoras himself thought that thev W
Well then,
my mends.
that the salvation ot
ny
I
human
to consist in the right choice
pains,
—
in the
to
them:
lit; 1
res
and
choice of
and the and remoter, must not
er,
this
measurm:
be a con-
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
62 sideration of their excess ity in
and delect and equal-
relation to each other
This
is
;
undeniably true.
to introduce
names, whether he
to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful.
And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art ami sciem They will agree, he said. The nature ot that art or
you said that pleasure olten got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we reiused to allow this, and you rejoined: C) Pro-
what
is
disposed
However,
by whatever name he preiers to call them, 1 will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in
my science will be a
matter of future consideration; but the existence of such a science lurnishes a demonstrate answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, it you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then
tagoras and Socrates,
would beg my tnend Prodicus not his distinction of
is
the
meaning
—
of
sense oi the words. Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the
others.
Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant' The honourable work is also usclul and good? This was admitted. Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the belter.
And
this inferiority of a
man
to himselt
merely ignorance, as the superiority of a
is
man
wisdom.
tell us being overcome by pleasure if not this? what you call such a state: if we had immediately and at the time answered "Ignorance,"
to himself
you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in
ion
and being deceived about important mat-
ters
?
—
and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure; ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare their choice of pleasures
—
that they are the physicians of ignorance; but
you,
who
are under the mistaken impression
that ignorance
of
not the cause, and that the art speaking cannot be taught, nei-
is
which I am go yourselves, nor send your children, to
ther
the Sophists,
who
are the teachers of these
—you take care of your money and give them none; and the that you are the worse public and private both —Let things
result
off
is,
in
life:
us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general:
And now
I
should like to ask you,
[358] Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not? They all thought that what
I
said
was en-
And
To
agree,
I
said, that the pleasant is
the good, and the painful evil.
And
here
I
all
is
assented.
not ignorance the having a false opin-
is
unanimously assented. no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less. this also they
Then,
said,
I
All of us agreed to every
Well,
said, there
I
fear or terror; ticularly
and
like
agree with
me
expectation of
is
word
of this.
a certain thing called
here, Prodicus,
I
should par-
to
know whether you would
in
defining this fear or terror as
evil.
Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror. I said; but let me ask our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be
Never mind, Prodicus,
whether,
if
evil ?
[359] That also was universally admitted. Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us
he said
tirely true.
Then you
They
at first.
I
how
he can be right in what in what he said
do not mean
quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five
\(
I
ttol
i
cm
.
none
Uir
ii
V
thrin
tii
i»t
lliciu
them had
oi
\\
Wai
like »t\) «'ihrt
which heaiterwaidi made ii
the
ili.u
bui
-in
•
w ere
in to
ik
I)
And
the others.
pro
follow ing
iv
i \ And » ill show yoil VI li-it COCK ir.c t«. U llir n.itu: the task, ind w li.u ion ol discourse 1
n
this,
»>i
the •
I
I
i
in
lic-.u
;
and
if I
do
ridiculous manner,
onl) venture to
I
chit to a ver) inartistic *!*»
laugh
i>.»t
impm\
and
me.
ai
foi
I
before you
isc
am
cagei to heaj youi wisdom: and must ihereiorc ask you and youi disciples to refrain son oJ Vxio hua, from laughing. And now, (
let
mc
ol
those
)
to .i^L
idiculous questions which
t
am
I
There
does not. Well, then,
is
said, since
next question. Shall
wc
we
not be
happy
is it
We
not
solemn sage
ma) be
that wealth
required to
is
easily is
wc esteem good? No us
tell
which
this,
answered; for every one a good.
will say
are not health
and beauty goods, and
there be any doubt that
power, and honours goods 3
He
good
birth,
own
in one's
and
land, are
other goods are there
3
I
said.
and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods: For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?
They
are goods, said Cleinias.
Very
well,
I
said;
and where
tind a place for
in the
wisdom
company-
— among the
think whether we have left out any considerable goods. I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. I
Cleinias,
th.it
said,
Upon recollection, I said, indeed am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all. I
to
am
Z4
I
him
I
Bute-players
fortunate ami successful in
I
I
.>
.
assented.
le
are not the
Writing and reading (
scnU
And
one
rtun.itr
the dangers ol
it
tl.
the •
d in war, in V
you W
rather take the risk
general, or with
— in
I
3
With
a
wise one.
you were
it
ill,
whom
would you
have as a companion in a dangerous wise physician, or an ignorant one? :sc
You
man
is
le
lllnc
one.
think,
sank thai
I
more fortunate than
rant one I
in
let:-
ertainly.
Amid
to act
with an
if]
3
assented.
[280] Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for b) wisdom no man would e\cr err, and therefore he must act rightK and SUCO or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer. agree
the goods.
And now,
!
flute?
We
goods or not?
Among
know,
say of temperance, justice, cour-
age: do you not verily
we
ing his SUI
\
And
assented.
And what What do you
.
th.it.
company would you company with a wise
other personal g He agreed.
Can
what was the meat isdom is
more fortunate on None, certainly.
Certainly, he said.
And
a
he simple minded south was
I
Ami
things do
list
may know
child
obsei
assented.
the
.iskcd
1
o not .ill nun desire happiness? Ami yet, perhaps, tins is one put
do you
\\'h\
I
contrived in a
I
general conclusion, that he
who
wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, said, our making tb sion that we should be happy and tormany good things were present with us I
.
3
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
70
He assented. And should we
be happy by reason of the
presence of good things, ; if they profited us
if
they profited us not,
they profited us, he said. they profit us,
if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink, and did not drink,
And would
should we be profited? Certainly not, he said.
Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them.' For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked? Certainly not, he said.
And
if a person had wealth and all the goods which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?
of
No
indeed, Socrates.
as the possession of
if you have the use as well good things, is that suffi-
my opinion. And may a person use them Yes, in
That
is
of a thing
one
an
is
nor an
He
quite true, is
far
said.
And
the
wrong
use
worse than the non-use; for the
and the other is neither a good [281] You admit that?
evil,
evil.
assented.
Now
in the working and use of wood, is not which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter? Nothing else, he said. And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?
spoke is
in the use of the
at first
goods of which
we
—wealth and health and beauty,
not knowledge that which directs us to the
right use of them,
and regulates our
practice
about them?
He thing,
and every use of a which gives a man not
in every possession
knowledge
A A A A A
poor man.
weak man or weak man. noble
man
man?
a strong
or a
mean man?
mean man.
And
a
coward would do
geous and temperate
man
less
than a coura-
;
And an indolent man less than an active man? He assented. And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? All this I
was mutually allowed by said, Cleinias, the
sum
us.
of the mat-
appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are
more
able to minister to the evil principle
which
them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing? That, he replied, is obvious. What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result
are indifferent,
is
that
—that other things
and that wisdom
is
the only
good, and ignorance the only evil? assented.
[282] Let us consider
a further point,
I
said:
Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, life, and the and good fortune in the use the inference of them, is given by knowledge, is that everybody ought by all means to try and
and
a right use, of the things of
right use of them,
assented.
Then
man?
He
agreed.
And
—
rich
rules
that
He
I
ter
either rightly or
rightly. I
me,
he not make fewer mistakes.? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? Certainly, he said. And who would do least a poor man or a
Then,
cient to confer happiness?
wrongly? He must use them
tell
Yes.
Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? True. Well, Cleinias, but
said, O tell me, what do posman, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom.' Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would
And
sessions profit a
or
If
only good-fortune but success? He again assented.
make
—
himself as wise as he can?
II
M
II, l.i
I
;
a lien i.uu tins
tic
iu-i
01
|
man
think-, tint
iMiir. t.u
guardian
i
oi
lie
.
money, from
tli. »n
iiiuir
friend oi
i
i
u hethei iii.tu oi it range d and praya to them thai il>r\ would imparl c
i
to
.'in
you,
is
mm
.ii
i
dishonourable,
.ill
Clcinias; ooi in .m\ one to be blamed foi d an) honourable aervice oi ministration to ani
whether
in. in,
gel
w isdom.
v
1
I lovei
k>
you
01
not,
i
Ins .inn
il
||
led by
us to h.isr
thnn
and play, and [wait
jest
t0
laid.
I
aid, I quite agree, and
m
re
think that you
tti
I
profoun
said:
.•.hi.
said, Cleiniaa,
I
it
wisdom can
only
be
and does not come to man ipontanc ously; for this is i point which h.is still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon bj you and me •it.
But
think, Socrates, thai
I
wisdom can be
taught, he said.
you sa) having saved
hi
lid;
I
and
I
shall
i
words. Well. -t\:
ell,
not
C
7*
linn
all
1
H thcii
(
U then r\:striu
thru nor
"i
oi
(
in.
we
I
i
which
If-iin
i
I
!
1
.
.1
Ami w
in K\
I
nam
just
that proved, 11 you ma) remembi could affirm negative; foi no one could affirm
(hat
>
l
tesippus,
I
e sure. And now suppose
Her.
he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural iks
we do
whefl we name cannot
Her. other,
failure.
natures?
Her. Soc. tor in
I
as things
quite agree with you.
And
naming a part giving names men speak. is
Her. That Soc.
And
not
3
is
is
a sort of action
not
naming
and
also a sort
2
And we saw
that actions were not relabut had a special nature of
own-
Then
I
the
we name with
)o
we
not give intormatior.
|
to their
the threads of the V
of distn
Her.
And
Soc.
the shuttle
which has
with something
And
Then
Soc. well
— and
is
the instrument of the
to be cut has
3
that
which has
will
woven
or
means
use
the
like a teacher
like
.
name
:
well
— and
the well
3
Her. Yes. Soc. And when the weaver uses the whose work will he be using well.3 Her. That of the carpenter.
And
is
every
man
shuttle,
a carpenter, or the
3
Her. Only the Soc.
to be
the weaver will use the shuttle
well
skilled onlv
Her. Yes. Soc.
}
Her. Certainly we do. Then a name is an instrument of teaching and ot distinguishing natures, as the shut-
Soc.
success.
agree.
Soc. But again, that to be cut
I
Soc.
means
argument would lend us to inSoc. fer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other shall
.i
and distinguish things according
teacher
Her. Precisely.
Her.
ask
;
tive to ourselves,
way
I
wca\cr Her. Assuredly.
Her. True. Soc.
that
\*-
|
I
tle is
speaking
has a relation to acts, of action
of speaking
true.
is
if
on n.
question about names: will \ou BOI I Regarding the name as an instrument.
ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument 3 Anv other mode of speaking will result in error and of speaking,
•'•'
.»
kind of action?
a
the
tr
some
Hennogenes, there is Orestes the man of the mountains who appean to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness sin,
)
nature.
Her, That
>
.
N .
And
very likely, Socrates.
his father's
name
is
also according
into
).
antalus; and int
1
ident ot tr.idit
1
I
he nan
father,
Hem
/
meaning, although hard
to he ui
sentence, which some call him and use the one half, and others who use the other halt call him tifl Am r. t! 'her signify the nature ot the tod, and the business :>rrss the name, as we were savin nature. Pot there is none who is more the thor of life to us and to all, ih;m the
cause re.ilU like into
two
.1
1
parts, tor
I
king of
Her, Clearly. .
.u
it
!\ iii
'i
comphshmeni the
being now
.a
.i
and these
word
my
the top oi
bent,
1
1
mg
1
understand, hut ttuda is transparent, ami agrees with the principles which preceded, tor all thingsbeingin aflui ioviw), k.im.i is a io\ (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name oi as yet
i
kojoo, or vice, specially appropriated to ot tuuc&s
icfrai
may
The
it.
Ik turther
trated by the use or heJda (cowardice),
which
to
I
(
presses the greatest soul;
and
and strongest bond
curopta (difficulty)
same nature (from a
not,
an
is
and
go), like anything else which
is
ot the
evil ot the
-n-optvaTHai to
an impediment
motion and movement. Then the word Rojrta appears to mean *a/c) will be the opposite
or this sort
or" it,
signify-
ing in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let
or hindrance, and
or,
more
1
is
therefore called
t«> stagnation he gave the n.une
hindered the
this
dow beaten together
is
rrocn
«»:
sorts.
.iii
and
fiui
into
•
Her. Hut what do yoU Soc.
Thai
is
more obscure;
onl) due to the quantity,
by altering or into
Her. .
He
r.
-\\^l
\et
the b
has been
o.
What do yotl mean This name appears to denote mind. :
\
lo"
me ask vou what is the cause wh\ anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the c.i Her. Certainly. Ami must not this be the mi: Soc. Let
or ol
men. or
Her. Soc.
oi
both
:
\
Is
not
mind
that
which
things by their names, and
caller
not
is
•
mind
the
:
xaAoi Her. That is evident. Soc. And arc not the work* ot intelligence
beautiful
(
I
and mind worthv ol praise, and are not other works worthy of blame? Her, Certainly. Soc. Phvsic does the
work
of a physician,
carpentering docs the works ot
He
r.
.Iptr?/,
Soc.
and
works
correctly, aeiptiri) (ever-rlowing),
Iliad, vi. 265.
enemy
whuh
illus-
have come alter dpSpcio, but was torgotten, ami. as tear, is not the only word which has been passed over. AoA/.i signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain Secrpo?), lor Atar means strength, and theretore SuXia ex-
ought
:ig
•
great hence-
I>r
it.
on!\
should like
meaning ol the two words (virtue) and Muc(a (vice); &peTJj do not
meaning
am
koAAi
Bowing), and this is in accordance with former derivations. For the name gi
,
consider the
to
i
ami oi m was s.i\ ing,
\\\o, pajKo%
pupfwnfr. But, as
;
I
mean
has the
irr right;
li
ionale
sign oi great ac
for fiijKo*
ing oi greatness,
make up
be
too
also.
you
likelj
.
I
word
this
t
will
1-
a
and
carpenter'
\actlv.
And
the principle of beauty does the
of beauty?
Her. Of course.
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
102
And
Soc.
principle
that
we
affirm
to
be
mind'
Soc.
Her. Vcr\ true. Soc.
lie
Then mind
is
rightly called beauty be-
cause she does the works which and speak of as the beautiful:
Her. That
is
we
recognize
their opposites.
[417]
The meaning of avfxfyipov (expedient) I that you may discover for yourself by the
light of the previous examples,
—
for
it is
a
sis-
meaning just the motion (i
and
(eW|«o«) or hinderei m\ d brother
n>i
8I01
is
hat
oi
.1
whn
h rnlrrs into lh
not see th.it we could do anything I
We
could not: tor by bodily imitation only can the body eves express anything. Her. Vers, true. N And when we want to express ourscb cs, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that .
n b.
Then
Sac.
name
a
is
vocal imitation ot that
a
which the vocal imitator names or imitates? Her.
I
think
Soc. \a\\ that
I;
in (
we have
Why
Her.
so.
my
I
am
disposed to think
not reached the truth as yet.
stre.im
not?
it we have we shall he obliged admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they
to
them
is
a
I
have been right
in
what
I
opinion, no. But wish that you me, Socrates, what sort of an imitaI
n.m
-
to re
asking;
h.is
.in.:
grasped thr n.iturc
and s\Hab!cs
:n
such
.1
ot
uunnrr
Her. Very good. Bui are these the oni\ prnn.irv names, or are there otl
Her. There must be others. should expect. But how shall wc further analyse them, ami wl the imitator begin? Imitation 01 the rtaenrc ism syllables and letters; ought WC not. tl,: I
hrst to separate the letters, just as those
who
.ire
beginning rhythm first distinguish the of elementary, and then oi compound sounds, and when they have done so. but not ; they proceed to the consideration ot rh\thms I
He
r.
Yes.
Must WC
not begin in the
sam
separating the vowels, and then the
consonants ami mutes, into
«.'
which are neither vowels, nor
mutes; and distinguishing into classes the An when we have pervowels themselves yet
i
should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation or. what music imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour: Her. Certainly.
But the
the semivowels,
:
:
Soc. In the
Sbc.
'
tl
the
to the received distinctions 01 the learned: also
my
name
think
as to imitate the CSSCnCC or not.
letters; first
was saying?
tion
tu
in letters
Soc.
tell
in
about which fOM wc whether the ii.ni nr
imitate.
Her. In
),
I
to
;
Soc. Because
would
True, then
is
1
friend,
Her. Quite true. Soc. Then could
tin',
condition
a
Soc. So
I
nam
or
n. liner,
.
which we want to express. Her. It must he so, think.
hi
\\
.
horse, or any other
gestures
and the
1
animal,
.
W
/•/-'•
should mut. itc the natun the thine; the elevation ol our hands to hea> en n
first place,
art of
I
naming appears
fected the classification of things, their
sec
whether, as
we
sh.>
in the case of
which the and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know letters,
be
all
1
not to be
names, and
Cf.
there are any classes to
referred;
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
106
how
to apply
them
what they resemble
to
—
ters to the expression of objects, either single letters
when
Gods waiting
plexity have their
whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour,and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too. we shall apply letrequired, or several letters; and so
we shall form syllables, as they are called, [425] and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even
must
in the air; an*
get out of our difficulty in like fashion, b
saying that "the
Gods gave
the
names, ant
first
therefore they arc right." This will be the bes contrivance, or perhaps that other notion ma'
•
be even better still, of deriving them from souk barbarous people, for the barbarians are oldei than we arc; / 426] or we may say that antiq uity has cast a veil o\cr
them, which
is
the same
sort of excuse as the last; for all these are noi
reasons but only ingenious excuses for hawn^. no reasons concerning the truth of words, yet
any
ignorance of
sort of
first
names involves an ignorance
or primitive
secondary
of
I
words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a \erv lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true ;
was carried away meaning to say that this wis the way in which not we but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject; and we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are rightly giv-
names are though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have. Her. Fear not; I will do my best.
so shall
we make
speech by the art of the
or the rhetorician, or by that
I
am
literally
some other
namer Not
art.
speaking of ourselves, but
—
(
en or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work,
and
in the
wrong
certain that
Her.
I
them
in this
way?
for
I
am
should not.
Much less am Shall we leave
men
say,
we must do
likely to
as well as
we
can.
What
do you think 2 Her. I very much approve. Soc. That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any per-
—
first
and
Soc. In the
me the
notions of original
ridiculous,
first
place, the letter p appears to
to be the general (/ci'i^ais).
meaning
among same
of this
the ancients, is
And
letters.
77 was not in use only employed e; and
letter
who
nor, which
as Uvat.
correctly given as
ern
instrument expressing all I have not yet explained latter word, which is just
But
(going); for the
iccris
the root
be able. them, then? or shall we Soc. seek to discover, if we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as I
My
truly wild
motion
direction.
Her. That, Socrates, I can quite believe. Soc. Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse
tier. Certainly, Socrates.
Soc.
is
the old Teens-
Assuming
in
a foreign form, the
word
ku'7/o-k will be corresponding mod-
this foreign root
*
change of the 77 and the insertion of the v,we have nvnym*, which should have been wueunjim or cicris-; and arda^ is the negative of iemi (or cutis-), and has been improved into o-ruais. Now the letter p. as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an
and allowing
for the
excellent instrument for the expression of tion:
and he frequently uses the
mo-
letter for this
example, in the actual words he represents motion by p\ also in the words rpofios (trembling), Tpa\v>; (rugged); and again, in words such as Kportiv purpose;
for
ptw and
porj
(strike),
Opaveiv
(crush),
ipcLKeiv
(bruise),
BpvTTTtLv (break), KeppaTi^ecv (crumble), pvp.-
(Sdv (whirl); of
all
these sorts of
movements
he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he
RATYLI
(
*>
I
l>\
.in
letter
he-
I
menti whk
,l
hr uses the
.ill
lettei
subtle rlr
ir
i
through
pass
h
uhv
is
.
hr
i
you
tl
imitati
.!••
i
snothci ol
m
;
uhilr
th
i
h the pronun*
In.
iation is a< ompanicd xpenditui breath; these are used in the imitation ol iu< h
the
notions
Uotkr.l out. .Hid
t
.
i
I
•
when
to
Ik-
ihivei in
i
\
shaken
.
|hO( k
|
introduced In the givei
i\s
what ii have thought thai the ind pressure oi the tongue in the uttei .'i and r wai expressive »>t binding .m.l rest in a place: he hirtnei observed the liquid movement oi a, in the pronunciation t which the tongue slips, and in this In- found the ea pression oi smoothness, .is m ,\
He teems
(windy),
s.
glutinous
clammy
yAiKis-. yAota»8(s-.
1
he
he observed
i
have a notion of inwardness; hence he duced the sound in iv&ov and t\r.*
What
How
rates?
I
be
bed the wall come
Phaedr.
lx-
was staving with Fpicrates, the house of Morvehus; that house
at
x
I
rca
OUfltl
117
\.
liki
guide
dunk
in llir
1
kj
trol lui
•
you
thai
in
ii
In iend; .*««! hope uw when \ou hr.r I
yOU will ruihr
th.it
whuh
le.ison, e,
tint
IS,
I
.mi
.i
and the men who dwell
lowt
ol
ki
M
•
in thectt) are
m\
and not the trees qi tin- country, do indeed l>clir\c tli.it \oii found spell with which to draw me out «>t the into the country, like hungr) cov< l>< whom a bough or a bunch ol trim is \\.i\ol. oni) hold up before me in like mann book, and n»hi ma) lead mo .ill round r\ti ami mrr the Wide World. Ami DOW h.i\m rived, intend to he down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read Inst. Begin.
from; but
not
ill
I
il
hers,
Though
;
1
.i
friendship
It
publu
i
.i
I
i
You know how
isten,
m. liters
with me; and how, ai conceit may arranged for the advantage ol both ol us. Ami maintain that ought not •! in ni| suit, because am not your lover: tor lovers repent of the kindnesses which the) have shown when their passion CCasCS, hut to the non-lovers who are tree ami not under any compulsion, no tune ot repentance ever comes; tor they confer their benefits according to tinst.unl
I
W
this affair
I
I
I
i
measure of their ability, most conducive to their
way which is own interest. Then
in the
how
by reason of their love they have neglected their own concerns and rendered service to others: ami when to these benefits conferred they add on the troubles which they have endured, they think that they have long ago made to the beloved a very ample return. But the non-lover has no such i.
!o\ers consider
tormenting recollections; he has never neglected his atlairs or quarrelled with his relations; he has no troubles to add up or excuse to invent; and being well rid of all these evils, why should he not freely do what will gratify the beloved
:
— that, fer
if
men,
true,
i|
and ot
il!
n
he
his heart;
his laboUl has riot is
mon
u.mh been
m.istrr.
good, and Again.
not
the
ol
lost
:
but
tl
SI
opinio
Mis is following the eupation ), and whenever the. 1
his
exchange tm o p ordt about some affair ot love i
temptation; but when nc asks the reason w h\ bo .nisr .
IIO
pi
ople
know
one th.it
talking to another is natural, whether ship or mere pleasure be the moti
Once more,
it
\ou
te.ir
friendship, consider that
m
the
tk klcr M
anv other
a mutual calamity; but now, given up what is
quarrel might be
when you have tore,
m
oser, and there you will be you will have more reason in
to you,
1
t
of the lover, for his vexations
.ire
mam.
.\w\ he
always fancying that every one is against him. Wherefore also he debars his be loved from society; he will not have vou intimate with the wealthy, lest they should exceed him in wealth, or with men of education, lest they should be his superiors m understanding; is
|
t pains; and me ostentatiously toexuli trom w
.-I
i |K*.in
.!
Imw
well he
to
>..tilil
the
%.i\
1
1
\i
dim
i
in
il
same thing
in i^«>
ui tin
U
ll.lt
s. I
v
:
.is
cspo
the
merii oi oi \\ liuh the iubje
uld
t
you
si
I
I
I
along w
\«'u.
itli
\n
ckni sages, men and women, w ho have ami written ol these things, would mm- up in judgment against me, it out oi complaisance I
to \OU.
,1
Who arc they, and where did you anything better than thii .mi sure thai must have heard; bui .it this moment Ao not remember From whom; perhaps from Sappho the lair, or An.u rcon the I
!
I
or, possibly, ,
is
beech
Why,
:
M
s.i\
I
t
nil,
good
.is
bom
a prose- writer.
because
and
that
I
Whj
perceive thai
I
COuld
do
my
make .mother
as that ol Lysias,
and
Now am certain that this is not my own. who am well aware
kill
wanting airs.''
trom
know
grand:
is
who was my
— but
better oration, equal in
length and entirely new, on the same subject; I. like the nine Archons. will promise to
and set
up :,
a
golden image
at
Delphi, not only
but ot you, and as large as
or"
lite.
You are a dear golden ass it you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that can make a speech trom
I
I
his art and
1
re let
indeed,
there
how
know
I
matters Band; and
fc»
won!
the
Then don't say
that
will; and Phaedr. Yes, but be an oath. "I say. or rati I
god
u:
is
it.
m\
be witness
will
swear, that unless you rep discourse here in the t.ueot this \erv plane-tree, plane-tree
I
will
I
never
tell
you another; ne\cr
his
tricks
arguments are to be excluded. something which is to the point. Who, tor example, [236] could speak on this thesis ot yours without praising the discretion of the non-lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover.- These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in (for what else is there to be said? ) and must be allowed and excused; the only merit is in the arrangement of them, for there can be none in the invention; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality. Phaedr. I admit that there is reason in what all
to
ot authors will say
I
which
ot
word ot another''' Soc Villain! am conquered; ot discourse has no more dr. Then why arc you
Soc.
The worst
Phaedruj
succ-t
DM
tore per]
compete With extern; h He is a master in am an untaught man.
mind
earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise
make another and
nn
would he
that be a mystery not to be divulged even at
my to
s;
am
I
Phaedr, You sec never
where you heard the discourse or from whom; let
and
alone,
not uni
stir
ot the
:
i'.ut. it
informant.
That
we
this place
boson,
younger than \u: Where do not compel me to use
I
I
dr.
K.itl
I
stupidity
1
invention
that
I
my
compel
'"1
all
nothing, and therefore can only inter that have been rilled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the waters ot another, though have actually forgotten in
or
different.
>\n
I
ot
and you up
I
let
you have
the poor lover
tl
still
al
:
Soc. I am not going to play trick you have taken the oath, tor cannot allow myI
self to
be starved.
Phaedr. Proceed.
[2^ J
Soc. Shall
Phaedr. Soc.
I
I
tell
vou what
I
will
do :
What?
will veil
my
face
the discourse as fast as
I
and gallop
can, for
if
I
tl
see
you
I
ashamed and not know what to say. Phaedr. Only go on and you may do anything else which you please. shall feel
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
120
Come,
Soc. are
called,
O
ye Muses, melodious, as ye
whether you have received
this
name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians are a musical race, help,
O
me in desires me
the tale
help
which
my
good triend here
to rehearse, in order that his iriend
whom
he always deemed wise may seem to him to he wiser than ever. Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very
and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had perfair
suaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument that he ought to accept the non-lover rather than the lover; his
—
words were as follows: "All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will all come to nought. But people imagine that they know about the nature of
when they having come
things,
don't
know about them, and,
not to an understanding at first because they think that they know, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves. Now you and I must not be guilty of this fundamental error which we
condemn
in others; but as our question is whether the lover or non-lover is to be pre-
ferred, let us first of all agree in defining the
nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage. "Every one sees that love is a desire, and we
know
also that non-lovers desire the beautiful
and good.
Now
in
what way
is
the lover to be
distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one
is
is
pleasure, that
power
of misrule
is
called excess.
Now
excess has
bers,
and many forms, and any of these forms very marked gives a name, neither hon-
when
possessed by
many names, and many mem-
ourable nor creditable, to the bearer of the name. The desire of eating, for example, which
is
it is
desire of drink,
called gluttony,
called a glutton; the tyrannical
which
inclines the possessor of
name which
the desire to drink, has a
too obvious, and there can be as
only
is
doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called; of that
now
my
I
which happens
—
little
will be the
it
dominant.
to be
name And
think that sou will perceive the drift of
word
discourse; but as every spoken
manner
is
in a
had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her own kindred that supreme desire, I say, which by leading conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced, from this very force, receiving a name, is plainer than the unspoken,
1
—
called love
(
tppoj^xei '«k epojc
description
and certainly not the terror of his enemies; which nobody can deny. And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of his lover in the the next point to
him. But w
':
ot
is
'
time? Must he not nel the extn mitj when he
the anxiety ot his friends and also ot his lover,
matter of his property; this
in
then:.
himself,
and
v
intolerable
when
the
m
and, besides being inl over the world in all their indcluacy and someness when he is drunk.
And not only while his love is he mischievous and unpleasant, but when his love !
he becomes a {xrrtidious enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths ami and promises, [241 1 and yet could hard vail upon him to tolerate the tedium companv even trom motives ot irr hour of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master; instead of love and infatu. lom and temperance arc his 1
bosom
it
the beloved has not discov-
ered the change which has taken place in when he asks for a return and recalls to his
and doings; he bespeaking to the same person, and the other, not having the courage to recollection former sayings lieves himself to be
confess the truth, and not fil
die oaths and promises
know ing how which he made
to ful-
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
122
under the dominion of folly, and having now grown wise and temperate, docs not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. And so he runs away and is constrained to be a dethe oyster-shell
faulter;
1
has fallen with the
— he changes pursuit into
other side uppermost
while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation not knowing that he ought never Irom the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his esflight,
tate,
hurtful to his bodily health,
and
still
more
hurttul to the cultivation of his mind, than
which there neither is nor ever will be anything more honoured in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed
upon you:
As wolves love lambs
so lovers love their loves.
you so, I am speaking in verse, and had better make an end; enough. Phaedr. I thought that you were only halfway and were going to make a similar speech But
I
told
therefore
I
about
all
lover.
Why do you not proceed?
Soc.
the advantages of accepting the non-
Does not your
I
add the praises of the non-lover, what become of me? Do you not perceive that I
to
will
already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non-lover has all the advantages in which the lover is accused of being deficient. And now I will say no more; there has been enough of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate, [242] I will cross the river and make the best of my way home, lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you. Phaedr. Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the midday sun
am
standing still, as people say, in the meridian. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said, and then return in the cool. Soc. Your love of discourse, Phaedrus, is superhuman, simply marvellous, and I do not believe that there is any one of your contempo1
game
which two
parties fled
or pursued according as an oyster-shell
which was
In allusion to a
thrown into the uppermost.
air fell
in
number
of speeches. I would except Simmias Theban, but all the rest arc tar behind \ou. And now I do verily believe that you ha\c been
the
the cause of another.
Phaedr. That
is
good news. But what do you
mean? Soc.
I
mean
to say that as
the stream the usual sign
was about to cross was given to me, I
which always iorbids, but never bids, do anything which I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a \crv good one, but I have enough religion tor mv own use, as you might say of a bad writer his writing is good enough for him; and am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how prophetic is the human soul! At the time I had a sort ot misgiving, and, like Ib\cus.'*l was troubled; I feared that I might be buying honour from men at the price of sinning against that sign
me
to
—
I
Now
the gods."
What
Phaedr. Soc.
That was
I
recognize
my
error.
error? a dreadful speech
brought with you, and you made
which you utter one
me
as bad.
simplicity observe that
have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover? And if I
am
rancs who has either made or in one wav or another has compelled others to make an equal
with the dark or light side
How
Phaedr. Soc.
It
was
so?
foolish,
I
say,
—
to a certain ex-
impious; can anything be more dreadful? Phaedr. Nothing, if the speech was really such as you describe. Soc. Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphro-
tent,
dite,
and
a
god
3
Phaedr. So men say. Soc. But that was not acknowledged by Lysias in his speech, nor by you in that other speech which you by a charm drew from my lips. For if love be, as he surely is, a divinity, he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both the speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was refreshing; [243] having no truth or honesty in them, nevertheless they pretended to be something, hoping to succeed in deceiving the manikins of earth and gain celebrity among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised, not by Homer, for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind, but by Stesichorus, who was a philosopher and knew the reason why; and therefore, when he lost his eyes, for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely Helen, he at
»
r
1
\
1
i
i
once purged himself \nd the intation, vt hi< h began thus
m
and when
lie
had completed
his
poem, which
ii
called "the recanution," iminediatel) hi
No*
returned to him.
culirt Stesichorus 01
make m\
i
before
veiled
U>M and
intation
Ik-
in thai
I
M>ur.
i
re> ilin
foi
on ould be more agreeable to
1
.1
own. when we
of
tell
the-
1
—
aare say not, Socrates.
Soc. Therefore, because 1 blush
and
Love himself,
I
of
my
cars
also because
.it
I
the thought
am
afraid
or'
wash the brine out with water from the spring; and desire to
s.irnc name, 1! they madness to be I must have thought that there madness which was a noble t! words, parrot)} and p and the letter r is only a modern
insertion.
and
and therefore
tion,
Know
then, fair youth, that the former
was the word of Phaedrus, [244] the son of Vain Man. who dwells in the city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this which I
is
is
it
An
faculty
1
the
other signs-
.
rational in\ese
-this, tor as
which supplies from
art
mind
1
1
trik
)
two
confirmed by the
I
ot birds or ot
ly
Soc.
this
:i
termed
discourse
And
which was given by them to the of futurity, whether
Phaedr. Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same theme. Soc. You will be true to your nature in that, believe you.
and
both by the
rather than the non-lover.
I
;
with madness
to
Phaedr. Speak, and fear not. Soc. But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and who ought to listen now; lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a non-lover before he knows what he is doing 3 Phaedr. He is close at hand, and always at your service.
•
In-
b
\\
when go move up ih< 1
1
*
«-
to
\
banquet
the vault
c*l
heaven
1
.«n«l 1
ifim the)
il,
will
jealous) hai no place in th
foi
tul choir. Bui
i»i
man) ^
:
the top
he chariots ol
it •
• 1
h-\
but
others labour,
the-
re
foi ilir
tpidly
I
\
i
|
tangible essence, visible onl) to mind, the pilot ot the soul. The divine intelligence, being nur-
tured upon
d
which
receiving the food proper to
it.
is
capable
rejoices at
and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution ot the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge lute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knov absolute in existence absolute: and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home; and there the charioteer putting up his ho: the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar reality,
to drink.
[24S] Such is the life of the gods; but ot other souls, that which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world,
and
is
carried round in the
revolution, troubled indeed bv the steeds,
with I
:
difficulty
other only
and
beholding true being; while an-
rises
and
falls,
and
sees,
and
ag.iin
by reason of the unruhness ot the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing tails to see
after the
ll. is
n. nu-
seen truth in the second degree shall be
mind and pure knowledge, and
the intelligence ol every soul
beholding
some musical and loving
upper world and they
not being strong
enough they
all
follow, but
are carried round
below the surface, plunging, treading on one
'uel; the
which
ot
is
the third class
s
:
or economist, or trader: the fourth shall
lover ot gymnastic
shall lead the lite ot a
prophet or
the sixth the character 01
.1
pod
him or
s-
:
imitative artist will be assigned; to the
the
lite
I
I
st vcutli
of an artisan or husfaandmai
eighth that ot
a sophist or
—
ninth that of a tyrant; probation, in which he
improves, and he
who
demaj
al!
the
I
who doc docs unr:
de-
teriorates his lot.
years must elapse before the one can return to t! whence she came. [249] tor she camber wings in less; onl\ the soul ot a guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy.
Ten thousand
soul ot each
mm
•
1
in the third of the
recurring jKncxls
ol
sand years; he is distinguished from the nary good man who gains wings in three t: sand years:— and thev who choose this lite _ three times in succession have wing them, and go away at the end of three t! sand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and 1
after the
judgment they
go,
some
the houses ot correction which
of
them
to
the
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
126
and are punished; others to some place heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The
amazement; but they
earth,
in
in
this rapture
soul of a
man may
pass into the
life
of a beast,
or from the beast return again into the
man.
But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And there-
—
—
mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in fore the
recollection to those things in
which God
abides,
beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired. Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have
and
in
shown
what
are ignorant of
means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of
them: they are seen through
a glass dimly;
and
there are few who, going to the images, behold
them the realities, and these only with diffiThere was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in in
culty.
brightness,
— we philosophers following
gods; and then
in the
company with other
train of Zeus, others in
we beheld
the beatific vision
mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining inpure light, pureourselves and not vet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the bod\, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away. But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest
and were
initiated into a
aperture of sense. For sight
is the most piercing though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the
of our bodily senses;
privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she
most palpable
is
also the
is
not newly initiated or
to sight.
who
Now
he
who
has become cor-
rupted, does not easily rise out of this world
this of all inspirations to be the noblest
to the sight of true beauty in the other; he looks
and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who
only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, he is given over to pleasure, and like a brutish beast he rushes on to enjoy and beget; [251] he consorts with
loves the beautiful
is
called a lover because he
For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her
partakes of
it.
passing into the form of man. But
all
souls
do
not easily recall the things of the other world;
may have seen them or they may have been
[250] they time only,
for a short
unfortunate and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the in their earthly lot,
memory
of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt
wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of is
many glories in
amazed when he
like face or form,
sees
the other world,
any one having a god-
which
is
the expression of
a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god; then while he gazes on him
divine beauty; and at
first
I'll \l lion,
an.
DIM
S
tlir
I
in unusual beat and the receives the effluence ol beaut) thro the eyes, the wing moistens and h< Vnd
ity,
warms, the parti out ol which tlir .uul \s lm h had been hith< .uul bad prevented tlir w ing from
..111:
es into i
i
us
\\c
a
,
;
.
ma)
I*-
•.•
m.l
i
wlu.
Il
ti
Forth, are melted, .uul .is nourithi ims uym\ him, the lowei end ol the w
iwell .uul grow from the i"«»t up and the growth extendi undei ilir uholr soul foi once the whole \\.»s \s in hiring tins process the w lu.lt- soul ii all in a state ol ebullition .uul effervescence, which ma) be compared to the irritation .uul uneasi is
to
wards;
may
1
iuss in
tlu-
mum m
bubbles up, .uul hai is
a feeling ol
uneasiness .uul
but
beloved meets •
blc
|
K-r eye
warm motion
.uul
ot
she
which flow emotion
towards her, therefore called
is refreshed .uul warmed by them, and then she ceases trom her pain with joy. But when she is parted trom her beloved and her
tails,
then the orifices of the pass. me wing shoots dry up ami
out ot which the
.
and intercept the germ ot' the wing; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations ot' an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection ot beaut \ is again delighted. And from both ot' them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness ot her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And
wherever she thinks that she
will behold the
beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs.
And when
she has seen him, and bathed herself in the waters of beauty, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more
pangs and pains; and
this
is
the sweetest of
all
SlU h
.is
I
\>ct
lov
l.i
ill
i
i\
ihr
,
in.
d upon. I
s
h.r
htrdly,
!
ffld
them
Mir.
I
men ind
one another, lie u ill rc.isoiiN oi his arrangement, and show whj one soul is persuaded bj particuUu form ol inrni, and anothei not \ ou lit\ c hit upon vei j good w a) s thai in the true and only \ nibjtt ^.m be ki forth 01 treated b) n rules ol .ut. whether in speak writing. Hut the writers oi the present day, ai who* (eel you have sat, craftily conceal the nature ol the iouI which they know quite well, Nor, until tlu\ adopt our method ol reading and writing, gas we admit th.it they write by rules ol an /'•• Wh.u is our method : Soc, cannot give you the exact details; but I should hkc to tell you generally, .is Ear as is in m\ power, how man ought to proceed accord ing to rules ol art i
!
:
thru km-! •
to
IN
in.
;
I
.1
.
tins
m
;
..
.
•
.
lux)
i
t
it
.i
||
then
u Would \ .uid k have heard from Lysiai thing whi< h in Phacdr. It tr\ t
but
the
.11
r
moment
Cf.
I
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
138
Phaedr. Certainly, he does. believe that he has a clever and inI genious case of this sort: He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should argue thus: "How could a weak man " like me have assaulted a strong man like him: The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in I not right, Phaedrus? the system. Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. Bless me, what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not? Phaedr. What shall we say to him? Soc. Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates Soc.
—
5
Am
the various characters of his hearers and to divide all things into classes
hend them under
and
is
able
to compre-
single ideas, he will never be
a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of
human power. And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in
wiser
him
men
lies;
[274]
for there
than ourselves, that a
is
a saying of
man
of sense
should not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here.
Phaedr. I think, Socrates, that this is admiif only practicable. Soc But c\cn to tail in an honourable object is honourable. Phaedr. True.
rable,
Enough appears
Soc.
of a true
and
to
false art of
have been said by us speaking.
Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. But there is something \et to be said of proprietv and impropriety of writing. Phaedr. Yes. Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to
God?
Phaedr. No, indeed. Do you.' Soc. I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know; although if we had found the truth ourselves, do vou think that we should care much about the opinions of men? Phaedr. Your question needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard. Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which
is
called the Ibis
is
sacred
him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but to
his great discovery
was the use
of letters.
Now
days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would in those
take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts.
to
But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the
memory and
for the wit.
Thamus
re-
O
most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge plied:
of the utility or inutility of his to the users of
stance,
you
who
them. [275]
own And
inventions in this in-
are the father of letters,
from a
own
children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will paternal love of your
create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, be-
1
l'i
w
the)
-
:ll
ate
not
I
\
will trust to the external written chai
remember of themselves
not
you have dis overed
ii
k
hut
not
in lid not
which
mci
t
on!)
but
truth,
the
Mlriit
the)
they
ling;
having
the
will
s!n>w
be
thi
k
comp
tiresome
wisdom without
oJ
tl>r
x
ites,
Egypt, or
\ihi
.in
^
easily invent
any other country. s is tradition in the temple ot Ion. th.it o.iks lust gave prophetU utter inces. The menoi old, unlike in their simpli< ity .'.
i
1
I
oi
.1
young philosophy, deemed th.it the) heard the truth even from "oak or rock," wasenough lor them; where. is \ou seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, hut who the speaker is and trom what country the tale it
it
.l!'.
husb
.1
t.ikr the
w
;
1
them
plant
"hiring the
!
'•
i
t.'
Iw~
I
.
aid
.
•:
:
S
I
fu
I
w ill be hearen »>i many ind w ill have leai ned noth to he omnis< ieni and w ill generally uth;
rc.ilit\
DKI
rem in
to
ciplrs ti
I
memoi
iIh-ii
them sake
-
amusement and pastime
ot
m
is
in
he WOUld
le.ot
at
e.irnest
he iOWl in
I
lit'
uses husbandry, and months the seeds whkh he
I
in
if
ut
hersell
«hr
fcrphdl
m any one whodoes sen ice to .mother un-
oi
But
w ho
the
is
er
this
h
is .is
ti
ommoi
1
m\
contribution as could m
good
I'.uis.mi.is
1
in
I
,
1
.1;
wha h have been wise to speak; and AriatooV turn ot Aristophanes anced way
in
I
1
1
the
••
had eaten too miM h, or fron he bad the hiccough,and wasoblij turns with r\ xim.u husthe 1
;
reclining on the COUch
bdow
him.
I
he said, you ought enl. COUgh, or to s(K-.ik in mv turn until
:
.
us,
':.
I
oil.
the one capable of
do lx»th. said Eiyiimai your turn, and do J and while am speaking let you to hold your breath, and 1! after JTOU done so tor some time the hicCOUgh is no better, then gargle with a little water; and it it still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and it you sue; the most violent hiccough is surwill do as you prescribe,
virtue, the other seeking to acquire
get on.
each ot them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he t.in to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good;
communicating wisdom and them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one then, and then only, may the beloved yield with hon-
—
our to the lover. Nor when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the impression that he is rich, [185] and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done
show that he would give himself up to any one's "uses base" for the sake of money; but this is not honourable. And on the his best to
will
I
I
s[K-.ik in
.
I
1 1
I
Eryximachui spoke as follows: Seeing that Pausamas made a fair Ixrginmng. [l86j and but a lame ending, must endeavour I I
think that he has rightl\ tinguished two kinds of love. Hut my art further informs me that the double love is merely an affection of the soul of mar: his deficiency.
I
-
the
tair.
or towards anything, but
in the bodies of all
of the earth, is
and
the conclusion
from
how
my own
I
animals and
may
which
art of
say in I
seem
in
all
to
found
to be
productions that
have gathered
medicine, whence
great and wonderful
deity of love,
is
I
learn
and universal is the whose empire extends over all
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
156
human. And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art. There are in the human body these two kinds of love, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, they have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of things, divine as well as
the healthy
is
one, and the desire of the diseased
another; and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honourable, is
—
and bad men dishonourable: so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best he
who
able to separate fair love
making love grow up among them; and thus
these other cases, music implants,
and unison
to
music, too,
is
concerned with the principles of
application to harmonv and rhythm. Again, in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life. either in the composition of songs or in the cor rect performance of airs or metres composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and love
in
their
—
of preserving their love;
gar Polyhymnia,
and again, of the
vul-
who must
friendship and accord in these elements, was
be used with circumspection that the pleasure be enjoyed, but may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. Whence I infer that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, [18S] for they are both present. The course of the seasons is also full of both
the creator of our art, as our friends the poets
these principles;
physician
is
is
from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the conand make them loving friends, is a Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, bitter and sweet, moist and dry, and the like. And my stitution
skilful practitioner.
ancestor, Asclepius,
here
tell us,
and
knowing how
believe
I
to
implant
them; and not only
medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymand husbandry are under his dominion. [ i8y] Any one who pays the least attention to the subject will also perceive that in music nastic
same reconciliation of opposites;and this must have been the meaning Heracleitus, although his words are not ac-
there I
is
the
suppose that
of
The One is united by harmony of the bow and the
curate; for he says that
disunion, like the lyre.
Now
harmony
there
is
is
an absurdity in saying that
discord or
is
composed
of elements
But what he probably meant was, that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony clearly not. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be; you cannot harmonize
which are
still
in a state of discord.
—
that is
which
disagrees. In like
compounded
and long, once and now in accord; which accordance, the former instance, medicine, so in all
differing as in
manner rhythm
of elements short
and when,
as
I
was saying, the
elements of hot and cold, moist and dry. attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men. animals, and plants health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the sea-
sons of the year
more
all
is
sacrifices
termed astronomy. Furtherand the whole province of
which is the art of communion between gods and men these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination divination,
—
M tlu-
i%
peacemakei
M
i
ItWr
«
t
li
IN
godi uml men,
•!
•
knowledge ol th< h exist len< ics w
l>\
i
•..
i
human
in
lo
t!
force oi
ind the lo ted w nli
love
ially,
u Km
ind which
ii
l»
i
company with
perfected in
tern
W lull' men, h.is ihe greatest power, and in the source out happiness and harmony, and m us h icndj with the gods w ho are above un. and u :ih one another. dare vi\ thai w hu h might be said in niNlu
pel iik e .ind
e,
i
I
I
i
and he u ith set en t
round
.»
. but this w.in not intentional,
you, Aristophanes, ike
some
ma) now lupplj the amis lmr ol commendation;
othei
perceive that you
I
rid oi the
.in-
d,
I
I
.1
1
I
1
1
I
You I
are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughwill
unsay
my
words; DUl do you please
Hot to watch me. as
I
tear that in the speech
I am about to make, instead ol others laughing with mc, which is to the manner horn or" our muse and would he all the better, shall only he laughed at by them. Ho you expect to shoot your holt and es Aristophanes? Well, perhaps it you are very careful and bear in mind that you will Ik- called to account, I may be induced to let you off. Aristophanes professed to open another \ein o! discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, unlike that either ot Pausanias or Eryximachus. Mankind, he said, judging by their neglect of him. have never, as think, at ail understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and oilered solemn sacrifices in his honour; but this is not done, and most certainly ought to be done:
which
1
I
is the best friend of men, and the healer of the ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race. will try to describe his power to you. and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am
since of
all
the gods he
the helper
I
teaching you. In the the nature of
first
place, let
man and what
now
I
d Aj istophanes, w ho Followed, the hiccough is gone; not, however, until plied tin wonder whethei ihr \\ and harmony ol tlu- body has love ol such noises and ticklings, tor no sooner applied the sru ing than was cured. ryximachus said: Beware, friend Aristoph« gfa you are going to speak, you .ire making fun oi me; and shall have to watch and see whether cannot have a laugh at your expense, when you might speak m pe ing.
i
mm
mc
treat of
has happened to
do.
i
and hr
. turning foUf
Icet.
right in
and over
v.
when
v.
hr
ith
were thrre. and 1>
SI
dances, hr
is
(
.ur
:
i
lord
kindness evci and nevci gives unkind good, the wondei oi the the amazement o( the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and pro to those who baVC the Inner part in him; es
in.iniiri
kliru the
!
||
should spc.ik Well ilitrritlon u
Ii. ili;'
V,
ness; the friend oi the
hun
.
parent of delicacy, luxury, desire,
Fondness,
[ardful ol the good, regard
softness,
utc to
comrade, helper; glor) ol gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose
whk h
footsteps
let
ever)
man
follow, sweetl) singing
honour and joining in thai sweet strain with which love (."harms the souls ol gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, hah playful, yet having a certain measure oi serious: in his
my
which, according to the god.
ability.
I
dedicate to
t\ t
an
imagu
gathered
l>c
a:, '
that
"he is all this." and ':' Milking hun ap|>car the
who knou hun upon those who know h:m
ot all to those
not un|H)se
I
noble and solemn In hearsed. But as
mn
pn
ot
misund
I
when
the praise
I
nature ot
-
said that
'
;
.'
I
had clone speaking, was a general eheer; the young man was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, ami of the g And Socrates, looking at Kryximachus, said: Tell me. son ot Acumen us, was there not reason in my tears.- and was not a true prophet when said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that should be in a strait. The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon, replied Kryximachus, appears to me to be true; but not the other part that you
Phaedrus, whether you would have the truth about love, spoken in am and in any order which may happen to into my mind at the time. Will that Ix
will be in a strait.
able to you?
\:
Stodemus
saicl
that there
1
I
:
I
—
Why. my
dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak attcr he has heard such a rich and varied discoui am especially struck with the lx*auty of the concluding words who could listen to them I
—
wuhout amazement
2
When
I
reflected
on the
immeasurable inferiority of my own powers. I Was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape. For was reminded of Gorgias, and at the cm} of his speech fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master I
I
my
would take
I
must beg t»» be absolved from ise which made in ig Euripides would say was a promise of the and not ot the mind do not praise ill strain: tor deed, cannot. But it you like t hr.tr di turn,
When Agathon
I:
vou should reall) should ap[>car to prai
the evil: in every word, work, wish, Eear
ol
sa> tour, pilot,
or
I
)
lips
:
:
I
;
I
about love,
am
I
manner, though
I
ready
tie the easiest way, and
...
to the wise
shall take
w
in
bai
is
"I ben
b
t:
L
i»i
"What "
;
tal
th
t
foolish
beaut] in every form
is
to
one
ii
and the samel Ami when he perceives tins be will abate Ins violent love oi the one, which he will despise and deem a sm.ill thing, and will
me
a lover oi
next stage the
lu-
all
beautiful forms; in the
will consider thai the beauty
mind
oi the
is more honourable than the beauty outward form. So that it a virtuous soul
have but
a little
comeliness, he will be content
and tend him, ami
and brim: to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty oi institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty oi them all one family, ami that personal beauty is a trifle; and alter laws and institutions he will go on to love
will search out
i
to the sciences, that he
may
see their beauty,
being not like a servant in love with the beauty oi one youth or man or institution, himselt a slave
mean ami narrow-minded,
hut drawing
towards dnd contemplating the beauty, he will create
many
tair
is
and noble
revealed to
him
which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention: of a single science,
"He who
has been instructed thus far in the who has learned to see the
things ot love, and
due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, [21 1 J Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils) a nature which in the tirst place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or beautiful in
—
waxing and waning; secondly, not
fair in
dtmtmii
I
•
out
tint tin
niiliK in r
thai beauty,
(..
the
oi is
11.
true .t
II
fai
from the
1
1
u
beauties «»t earth and moui vikc oi that otha beaui only,
thr
and from out
two
in
t.ur
prai bees,
forms, and fi and from fair pi notions, until from t.ur notion'. the notion oi absolute beauty, and what the essence oi beauty is. Ins. ius." nid the stra th.it hie above all others which man should fail
ill
I
one
point of view and foul in another, or at one
live,
the
contemplatioo «>t beauty absoluti beauty which ii you once beheld, nu wi in
see
not to DC after the incisure ot gold.
garments, ami
.
and youths, w b enCC now entrain es -I \u and D a one would be content to live seeing them and conversing with them without drink, it that were possible look .it them and to Ik- with them. But wh.it if man had eyes to see the true beauty the diwnc mean, pure .\m\ clear and U1 beauty, fair boys
I
—
I
not clogged with the [Pollutions of
vast
thoughts and notions in boundless love oi a dom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision
but lasting, whii
ami
all
the colours ami
— thither
\
.unties ol
:
human
life
looking, ami holding converse with
the true beauty simple
member how
in that
and divine ;
communion
/
21 2 j
only,
I
Ixrl.
ing beauty with the eve oi the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not imagi but realities! for he has hold not ot an image but oi a reality ). and ortfa and nour ing true virtue to become the friend and be immortal, it mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble lil Such. PhaedlUS and I speak not on!\ were the a you, but to all of you I
—
—
am
persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment ot this end hutima; anil
man
I
nature will not
:id
a helper better
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
168
And therefore, also, man ought to honour him as
than love.
I
say that e
myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit I
of love according to the measure of
my
ability
now and ever. The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please. When Socrates had done speaking, the com-
pany applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders. "If they are friends of ours,'* he said, 1
them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over." A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting "Where is Aga"invite
thon? Lead me to Agathon," and at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his attendants, he found his way to them. "Hail, friends," he said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and violets, his head flowing with ribands. "Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your
Or
crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I am here to-day, carrying on my head these ribands, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I revels?
know /
shall
I
very well that
I
am
speaking the truth,
may laugh. But first tell shall we have the understand-
21 3] although you
me;
if I
come
ing of which or not?"
I
in
spoke?
2
The company were
Will you drink with
me
vociferous in begging
would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him; and as he was being led, intending to crown Agathon, he took the ribands from his own head and held them in front of his eyes; he was thus prevented from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, 3
Cf. 205.
Supra, 212: "Will you have a very drunken
man?"
etc.
couch.
By all means: but ner in our revels?
who makes said
the third part-
Alcibiades, turning
round and Socrates.
here
and
starting up as he caught By Heracles, he said, what
sight of is
this
'
Socrates always lying in wait lor me. always, as his way is, coming out at all is
sorts of unsuspected places: and now, what have you to say for yourself, and wh\ ;ire you lying here, where perceive that you have con1
trived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest
of the
company?
Socrates turned to
Agathon and
said:
I
must
ask you to protect me, Agathon; for the passion of this man has grown quite a serious matter to me. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not onlv abuses me but can hardly keep his hands me, and at this moment he may do me some
harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.
There can never be reconciliation between you and me, said Alcibiades; but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And 1 must you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but alw; Whereupon, taking some of the ribands, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.
—
Then he sober,
that he
1
and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him. Take of! his sandals, said Agathon, and let him make a third on the same
my
friends, to be
a thing «ot to be
endured: you
said:
which
is
—
You
seem,
must drink lor that was the agreement under which I was admitted and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large goblet, Agathon, or rather, he said,
—
addressing the attendant, bring
me
that
wine-cooler. The wine-cooler his eye
was
quarts
—
serve,
my
a vessel
he filled bade the attendant fill this
which had caught holding more than two and emptied, [214] and it again for Socrates. Ob-
friends, said Alcibiades, that this in-
genious trick of mine will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk. Socrates
1
M
I
the
J|
I
I
N
m
*
Mlll.U
the attendant
ulti.lt
W
litis N.U.I
hive neith
^>£y^*ys>g>^g>^>£>^£>^^>^*>^£.
[jo] Meno. Can you
tell
me, Socrates, whether
acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other virtue
way?
O
Meno, there was a time when famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend AristipSocrates.
the Thessalians were
pus.
And
this
is
Gorgias' doing; for
when he
came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians,
fell
in love
am
as
poor as the
rest
virtue
you
is.'
And am
with his
of the world;
say further that
I
I
the "quale"?
How,
if I
knew
much
alike.
body who had. Men. There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the
man
—he should know how to ad-
state,
and
in the administration of
to benefit his friends
himself.
174
have.
for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found any-
and he must
can I know nothing at all of
my
Men. Very true. Soc. Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is;
minister the
how
this report of
I
suspect that you and he think
know
the "quid" of anything
back
Men. And did you not think that he knew? Soc. I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for
virtue of a
confess with
to carry
dear boy, but you have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment. Men. Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?
may
it
I
I
Thessaly? Soc. Not only that,
shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not
and
I
to
Soc. Yes,
wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot my dear Meno. [yi] Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: "Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not." And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty,
tell if he was fair, or the opposite and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could? Men. No, Indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what
Meno, could
of fair; rich
is
A
and harm
his enemies;
also be careful not to suffer
woman's
virtue,
if
harm
you wish
to
"
|
Ml kn.'W iboul tut)
mi)
ilt.it,
tO "I.!.
in
ilio be caul)
hn
I
hoUSC,
.ni.l
den ribed ».r,|.
175 the
\\ I,., I
indoors, and obej bei husbaj
in
condition
;
triu. lie. Ik. in!
oi
Of
t>i
numbei
definitions oi them;
t»'i
and
each
actions
tin-
01
ol
VII
t
irtucs
\
young
life,
(ft
.u;rs ol
and no
less,
virtue
is
ol us in
l.u
k
relatn .ill
\
hi
virti
thai
imc mi) be said i>i Iov« fortunate am, Menol Win S you fai one virtue, you present mr with 1 iwarm oi them, which are in N*>tn keeping. Suppose that v.m \ on the figure ol the iwarm, and ask oi you, What ii the nature »»t the b and you answer that there arc man) kinds oi bees, and repl) Bui ^l*' bees diftei .is bees, be cause there are many and different kinds ol them; or arc they not rather to be distinguished In some other quality, .is for example beauty, low would you answer me? size, or ahape? Men. should answer that bees do not differ From one another, as bees. tad it went on to s.iv: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike; would you Ik* able tO answer .
I
1
••
thu
without
Met
I
1
trm and
Men,
!
i»ist
U.ih men and women good men and women, '
to
1
rrt.ii'
i
Ik-
1
•
S.ill.
ue.
1
I
I
—
one
Men. They
I
should.
And
Men.
so of the virtues,
understand? I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish. Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to
Men.
size,
would you say the same of health, and strength? Or is the nature of
health always the same, whether in
man
or
Men. They would Then now that
should say that health
is
the same,
man and woman. Soc. And is not this true of size and strength If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reaboth in
:
son of the same form and of the same strer subsisting in her which there is in the man.
the- sameness of all virtue and remcmlxr what and Gorgiai say that wrtuc is. Men. Will you ha\c one definition of them
has been proven,
mean
to say that strength, as strength,
man
ference
Men.
or
woman,
2
That
Soc.
the same.
Is
is
know
them
all,
tue
the |>owcr
is
clude
and
I
And
virtue?
all
And
in a slave,
who governed
whether
there any dif-
Cf. Tfuractctus, 146.
1260*-
dclini'
not what to sav. but that
Is
same
virtue the
Meno? Can Ix:
in a
child
the child govern his
any longer a
and would he s\..
Men. think not. Socrates. No, indeed; there v« I
will not virtue, as virtue, be 13.
seeking.
ha\e one
Setc.
Yet once more, fair friend: according is "the power of governing"; but
in that.
to you, virtue
Men. i.
am
to
father, or the slave his master;
think not.
Cf. Aristotle, Politics,
I
ning mankind. does this definition ol \irtuc in-
do vou not add I
what
you want
I:
I
:
[j$] Soc. a
is
tr\
all
.
of
not.
Soc.
Soc. I
temperate and
1:
woman? Men.
Ik-
Yes.
hen all men are good in the and by participation in the same virtui 11. Stub is the And they surely would not bjVC good in the same way, Unless their virtue had been the same?
Do you
and
un-
I
however many .\n
(
the time w h< n
l
to
be
Icd^c by putt in
imisi
ul
this .is
.«t
man, which only need
»
nto U»
lit
him, both
Kts in
:
h.i
he
foi
v
.ilu
t
i\
.
.ilu.iss citJ
•
>b\ h'lislv.
\nJ
thai
the truth ol
ii
thingi .ilw.iss
.ill
is imn Wherefore be ol good cheer, and u\ to fed m hal you do not know, or rather what you do not remembei like what you feel, aomehow, thai
existed in the loul, then the s.ml
I
arc- s.a
I
is
m»t
\ml
Meno, like what am laying. have said ol which am not altogether confident Bui thai we shall be better I,
things
1
1
I
ami braver and Less helpless u we think thai we ought to enquire, than we should have hern it
',.
indulged in the idle fancy thai thei no knowing and no use m seeking to know what we di> not know; that is a theme upon which am ready to right, in word and deed, to the utmost oi my power. There again, Socrates, your words
membt
or rather,
alone
n.
me
.ire.iureeJth.it a
man
I
gether into the nature
ot virtue
2
Men. By all means. Socrates. Ami \ct would much rather return to my original question. Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we I
should regard
it
as a thing to DC taught, or as
a gift ot nature, or as
other
way
Soc.
to
men
in
some
:
Had
ot myself,
coming
I
the
Meno,
command I
ot
you
{
should
enquire about that which lie does not know, shall you And make An effort to enquire to-
as well as
would not have enquired
whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained "what it is." But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself, such being your notion of freedom, must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of i thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question "Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way." to be argued upon hypothesis? [Sj] As the geometriiamwhen he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle, I
it
taught; and
lx-
Men.
Then, aswe
irtue
\
is
knowli
Yrtainly.
(
this question:
excel lent.
Soc.
it
;
Then now we have
I
.
d
'i
llol I).
!.
.
i
l'\
m
(who
recently
h.is
4
made himaeu
Polycrates), but h\ his
,i\
w\
.1
Anthcmion, who
i
;
m ho
I
in
insolent,
not p
ei
.
well condition
.1
'
•
in
\
,
htm
to
arc the t
\
whom
inn
«-i
.
Ins h
edu< ition, as the Athenian pci ban to think. tor the) choose
from
i
and indua
ikill
01
ifns son oi
.
own
\ou
.ire
hkels
ri
to learn !
the
fill i
in
der
I
thus:
matter
tin-
we
It
to be a
them;
In
i |
Or
v
we wanted htm to we not send him to
il
Uer, should .
tl.
What, A
Certainly.
.
tor
rupting influent
to the physicians? I
w
ot milir, 'lie
good physi< ian, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him
ranted Meoo
|>c,
whether w ho they
\:i\tus. to help me and youi answering our question, Who arc
tc.ulu
thr
.irr
men
arc. Plc.isc-.
Mctn>
thrsr
th.it
be a '^n^\ cob
do you me. in
the cobl
who
to
DOt only
corrupt those
/
An J
Soc.
so forth:
in
s.i\
who
these arc
tli.it
do them
••
n
metm. fOU aware t}. ami other politicians have doubts wheti. tue can Ik- taught or not. but ti. Qjfl the
And
.ire t
.ire
same thi: Men. Where does he SO) In these elegiac va
poet sa\s the very
.
make with \ou
Do
hU
I
to thi
1 will lose
t'.
I
thr imteUig
..
you observe
that virtue
I
v
.1!!
tins
:
when
But
ii
place, the) havi
and, in
th>-
>•n
r
indeed, Scm
listen to
ill
will
Hi.it
tlir
unjust, and hateful n> the gods.
is
i
w
I
nut no qui< k ol apprehension ai the jud
tor tQ art
snd
\n\
inakr thr
am
that
appro> ing
in
ilu\ do,
h w
'I
m
and
would you ihou
low
and
.III
Ins fathei
ist 1
him, dies ihmumK
nil
i
ates; ai
least
il
they
me.
^
.it
i.
r
s
Bui they will be sure to listen it they find thai jrou are good speaker. There was notion thai came into my mind while you w
th.it
ting;
said to myself: "Well,
1
Euthyphro does prove
me
to
thai
and whai til
it
1
:
may
be hateful to the gods,
still
piety
and im
piety are not adequately defined In these dis tiiutions. tor that
which
is
hateful to the gods
h.is been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, do not .isk you to prove this; I will suppose, it you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such will amend the definition so an action. Bui tar .is to say that what all the gods hair is impious, and what they love pious or holy; ami I
I
what some
of
them
love
and others hate
is
and impiety? 3
Soc.
I
am conwhy not.
no reason But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider. Euth. Yes. I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which cerned. Euthyphro, there
they
is
Ought we
enquire into the truth of this. Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others
to
What do you
2
Euth.
We
say
;
We
should enquire; and
shall
in a little while.
wish holy
I
believe that
know better, my good friend. The point which I should hrst
understand is whether the pious or beloved by the gods because it is holy.
to is
DOf
is
is
vrr-n
not
tint)- led
..
now
I
|-
;
k- intelligible; and statr tu.ii
,
in
s
tl.
bi
tb
think, Euthyphro, thai
ting will
m\ meaning
thai
:>.
action or passion implies pre
t
or pa ssion.
dcst
is
must all
instructed
..
fair
that to
which the
given : As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not? Euth. True.
men
in re
ligion.
And spe.ik the truth. Socrates. me then, oh tell mc — what I
Soc. Tell
not attention always designed
good or benent of is
should. in, there
As there
would be
your meaning, Euthyphro? Euth. Yes.
attention
all
ing of a ship.
is
Soc. In like
And
i
the art of attending to hors
art of attending to the
Soc.
is
to the ship-builder
Euth. True. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to Euth. Yes. Soc. As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? Euth. Very true.
for the
inc
view would you
.
Yes,
Nor
which
ser\ ice, ba> ing in
every one qualified to attend to but only the huntsman.:
Soc.
I
to the:;
;
is
h
still
I
(
manship
hk
nisi
work which
the gods
is
thai
do by the help
ministrations? •;. Many and which they do. [14] Soc. W'\
fair,
Socrates, arc the
nd, and I
But the chief of them
Would you chief
1
not sa\ thai
is
rar
is
the
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
198
Euth. Certainly. Soc.
Many and
Euth. That
fair, too,
works of the
are the
husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his work is the production of food from the
chief
earth
?
Euth. Exactly. Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one 5 Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very
tiresome. Let
me simply say that how to please the
piety or holi-
gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety ness
is
learning
and states, just as which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction. Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you is
the salvation of families
the impious,
—
by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and
what
piety?
is
Do
sort of science of
Euth. Yes, Soc.
And
and prayer
I
you mean
that they are a
praying and sacrificing?
do.
is giving to the gods, asking of the gods?
sacrificing is
Euth. Yes, Socrates. Soc.
Upon
of asking
Euth.
this view, then, piety
is
a science
and giving?
my
capitally, Socrates.
friend; the reason
is
that
I
am
and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them? a votary of your science,
Euth. Yes, I do. Soc. Is not the right of
way
of asking to ask
the right
of giving
is
to give
them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want. Euth. Very true, Socrates. Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one to
another ?
have no particular liking for anywish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; [15] for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an allair of business in which wc have very greatly the advantage of them. Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts 3 Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods? Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, I
thing but the truth.
I
.
as
I
was
just
now
what pleases them.' pleasing to the gods, but
saying,
Soc. Piety, then,
is
not beneficial or dear to them
Euth.
I
?
should say that nothing could be
dearer.
Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods' Euth. Certainly. Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument,
comes round to the same not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten? Euth. I quite remember. Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the
as
you
same
will perceive,
Were we
what
as
is
dear to them
—do you
see?
Euth. True.
Sor.Then
either if
we were wrong in our formwe were right then, we are
wrong now. Soc.
way
may
One of the two must be true. Then we must begin again and
Euth.
Euth. Certainly.
And
an expression which you
is
like.
er assertion; or,
them what we want? Soc.
if
point.
You understand me
Soc. Yes,
you Soc. But
use.
What
ask.
That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident is
piety?
.
i
,
would ncvei
i>u
.
«-ti
U
i
i
I
i
run
mi. h
«•'
in the sighi |
im
Mm IN
.
therefore, ih
iliul
J Jo
i
n
1!
n.>l
hurry,
md
I
"i
\
must go now
I
.mi
i
in
I'll
i
APOLOGY -^%N*>%.^>
[iyj
How
fected by
vou,
O
that they almost so persuasively
made me
forget
who
I
not l>e good; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly. And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go on
was
did they speak; and yet they
have hardly uttered
many
Never mind the manner, which may or may
Athenians, have hecn afbut I know
my accusers, I cannot tell; word
a
of truth. But of the
was one which quite amazed me; I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and falsehoods told by them, there
—
For of old I have had many who have accused me falsely to you during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who Ix to the later ones.
accusers,
not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force my eloquence. To say this, when they were
of
certain to be detected as soon as
and proved myself
I
opened
my
anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the lips
to be
when you were
—
moment;
my
for
cause: at
am confident in the justice my time of life I ought not to I
appearing before you,
O men of Athens,
me
it
of
me.
a favour:
And
—
If I
I
—
defend myself in
my
children,
minds with
and took possession
their falsehoods, telling of
one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause.
The
cusers
whom
disseminators of this tale are the acI dread; for their hearers are apt
fancy that such enquirers do not believe in And they are many, and their charges against me areof ancient date, to
the existence of the gods.
and they were made by them in the days when you were more impressible than you are now in childhood, or it may have been in youth and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my
of
be
in the
let no one exmust beg of you to grant
character of a juvenile orator pect
of your
accusers; unless in the chance case of a
accus-
tomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using
poet. All
Comic
who from
suaded you
—
envy and malice have persome of them having first con-
—
men
in the agora, at the tables of the
vinced themselves
anywhere else, I surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court quite a stranger to the language
with; for I cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to
and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, [ 18] whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country: Am I making an unfair request of you?
assume widi me, as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long
money-changers, would ask you not to be
or
of law,
I
am
of the place;
—
most
200
all
this class of
are
difficult to deal
.
and mu
hi
ihc- -..iinr
pound
i
i
11
in I*
i
u
I
i
f
11
l«.
ihr
(.:•
i
«h. ilr.
ii.
pro
il
true
I
lul ike glad if probe the argument furthet feat that when dren, you are haunted with
01
the soul leaves the body, the wind ma) really blow bet away and icattei her; especiall) ii man ihould happen to die in great itorm and m>t w hen the iky ii aim.
the)
c
I
anythi
lia
.1
them alwayt w
of
Ii
.i>
i
Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must irgue us cut t>i out (ears and yet, strictly speaking, they .ire not our tens, but there is a child within us to whom death is son oi hobgoblin: him too we must persuade .1
when
not to be afraid
In- is
alone
in the
dark.
Soc rates said: -ft the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the I
fear. /
Ami where shall we find a good charmer when you are gone?
jSj
of our fears, Socrates, 1
he replied,
[ellas,
is
a
rous races not a tew: seek tor
I
should
it
you
please, let us return to
argument
at
which we
or
!
!> j
Ii
r
1
or quite the reverse? M.i\ the) not rather bt ICribed as almost alwayi changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with
one another
The
:
Cebes; the) are always
latter, replied
a state- ot
And
/?>t Ins lusts, the- iouI, mean, accustomed to hate and feai i bodily
1)(
probable. An«!
bod)
ilir
I
I
ihe bod) ind
!>\
led to believe thai the truth onl)
form, which
.t
diftv uli
them
pi.
here
Some
is
not, be said.
arc happiei than others;
and the hap
themselves and in the pis whu h they go arc these m bo have pra< tised thr civil and social virtues which are < ailed ten both
pseat
anoe and
in
and are acquired by habit and and mind/ they the happ
justice,
attention without philosophy
Why
.ire
Bei auac they
may
be
a into
1
some gentle .i\\A social kind whuh is Like thnr own, such .is bees or w.isps or ants, or b.u k again into the form oi man, and ]ust and mod
men may be supposed to spring lrotn them. Very likely. \o one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the
erate
knowledge only. And Simmias and febei, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshy lusts, and hold out against them ami renot befuse to give themselves up to them, Clods, but the lover of this
is
the reason,
(
—
cause they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, likcthelovers ol money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or
disgrace of evil deeds.
No,
Socrates, that
would not become them,
said Cebes.
No
indeed, he replied; and therefore they
own souls, and do moulding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and who have any
care of their
not merely live
fT.:
lust.
By unchaste loo^s, loose gestures, and foul taIJ{, Bf.t most by lewd and lavish act of sin, Lets in defilement to the inward parts, The soul grows clotted by contagion, Imbodies, and imbrutcs, till she quite lose,
The
.
and propensii 1
ti we-.
this corporeal
finally in
.ill
depart pure and unalloyed?
continual association and constant care body have wrought into bei nature.
Ven Ami
there
to
by the corporeal, which 'hr
pan
il
Ami
Impossible, be replied. Slu-
will
ih iiM h natui
doyousu]
attained on)) b) philosophy;
I
which to and can be
mtcHritti.il principle,
tin-
the bodily eye
t
eyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, [ioj] and our souls will truly exist in another world' am convinced. Socrates, said Ccbcs, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simiinas. or any one else, has any lurther objection to make, he had better speak out. and do not know to what not keep silence, since other season he can deter the discussion, h there is anything which he wants to say or to
ot the
"But although the odd the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place ot the odd?" Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; tor this has not been acknowledged, but it this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of lire and heat and any other thing. Very true. And the same may be said of the immortal: the immortal is also imperishable, then the it soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; Yet
will not
if
True.
imperishable,
attacking the
and unmeltcd— tor it could ne\cr have pcrnor could it have remained and admitted the heat
soul,
Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die. but the immortal
must not three he imperishable?
mow, must
Most
sa\ that this
course.
•
must not the
also impensh.i
Yes. he said.
ishable,
OF PLATO
true;
will
not mistaken, as well as
ney thither.
For
after death, as they say, the genius of
I'll \l tndi\ idu.il. to uln'iii hr
,
Kim
leads
if
I
ertatn plat
>
iiri
has been given
i
Ki
\ou
you mean mall that youj art producci tlir
mom
you
>»>
mrii and nut
l)|
II.
What
I
A
rned
ideccivin] Willi
1
the
Now
I
same way;
want
—
is
to
know
about rhetoric
rhetoric the only art
in
which
brings persuasion, or do other arts have the
same
effect
3 I
mean
say
to
teaches anything persuade
— Does
men
who
he
of that
which
he teaches or not 3 Gor. He persuades, Socrates, there can be no mistake about that. Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now ipeaking: do not arithmetic
—
—
and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of
number
3
Gor. Certainly. Soc.
And
therefore persuade us of
them
3
Gor. Yes. Soc.
Then
artificer of
arithmetic as well as rhetoric
persuasion
Gor. Clearlv.
3 .
is
an
OF PLATO
DIALOGl
256 Soc.
And
any one asks us what sort of per-
if
—
and about what, wc shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantit\ ot odd and r\cn; 1 454 J and wc shall he able to show that all the other arts ot which wc were just now speaking arc art nicer so! persuasion, and of what suasion,
Then
.
rhetoric
not the only artificer of
is
Gor. True. then,
that
works by persuasion, but
m
same, as
the
case- ot
mscn which persuasion
what?
—
is
is
not only
rhetoric
that other arts
do the
the painter, a question
a very lair
way
Of what and about
one:
rhetoric the artificer,
not that a lair
is
of putting the
5
".
think
I
you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer? answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the Gor. art ot persuasion in courts ot law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about Soc.
'I
"hen,
if
I
And
that,
I was suswould not have
Gorgias, was what
pecting to be your notion; yet
I
\ou wonder if by-and-by am found repeating seemingly plain question; tor I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and I
:.
that
we may
not get the habit of anticipating
and suspecting the meaning of one another's words; I would have you develop your own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.
Gor. Soc.
I
think that you arequite right, Socrates. let me raise another question;
Then
is such a thing as "ha\ ing learned" Gor. Yes. Soc. And there is also "having believed"? Gor* Yes. Soc. And is the "having learned" the same as "having believed," and are learning and belief
there
the
same things?
Gor. In the same. Soc.
my
Then
would appear, is the persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them? rhetoric, as
artificer of a
Gor. True. Soc.
And
the rhetorician does not instruct the
just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters
time 3 Gor. Certainly not.
in a short
Come, then, and let us see what we realmean about rhetoric; for do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly Soc.
ly
I
meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a proposition
ascertain in
what do you
your judgment is right, as you may this way: If a person were to say
—
to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well
— you would reply,
taken, that there
is.
Gor. Yes. Soc. Well, but
is
Gor. No.
say,
Gorgias?
Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a
judgment, Socrates, they are not
well as a true?
and not
taken, then the military will advise the rhetoricians: er of rhetoricians,
I
if I
there a false
am
not mis-
knowledge
as
me assure as well as
from you.
And
here
let
have your interest in view own. For likely enough some one
you that
my
mak-
cannot do better than learn
the nature of your art
And
as a true.'"
we
—one
courts of law or other assemblies about things
and unjust.
the just
Just so.
gives belief. Soc.
so.
well 3
then assume two sorts of perwhich is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge 3 Gor. By all means. Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge? [455] Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only
question.(
Gor.
suasion,
jxrrsuasion?
Seeing,
And yet those who have learned as who ha\c believed are persuaded
Soc.
as those
Soc. Shall
and about what. d'jr. Vary true.
sort,
Sot
Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief ditfer. Gor. Very true.
I
young men present might desire become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. "What is the use of coming to or other of the to
GORG1 "
Not:
tlirv
I
will
what
.ul
will \..n tan h in i" ich iie
t
l»r-
i
I
and
trs,
will
1
nature
sjfcpss lir.iril,
thr Athenians
lh.it
(
.n
:
thr
to. in
iri|
,
it \
tlir
have
the din ks and thr walls
and the plan
oi thr
«i|
drlrn, r Mot
III
\rrtrd thru iiiMnu
harbcan
accordance with the counsels, partly i>i Themista Irs. and partly ol Peru les, and n«>t .u tinon ol the builders. Sum h is thr tradition, Got shout Themistot les; and myaeli heard the ipeo h ot Pericles when he advised vis about the (raddle devised
|
lion
rhcti
«>t
think,
1
oi
w .i\ oi leading ui on, endeiVOUl t.» ir\r.»l to \
!:kr youi
ij"
hit
•
friends.
\"U .in\uri tlinu
ill
I
ti.
t-nl
alio which Socrates has juit mentioned
low W
r and not so strong as others ol not, being wiser, be also bettei than we are, and
m
u>i
in tins
mattej
mean
w
n
be will
obbli
who understand
but also
aliani
\
and the
u«>t
able
men
the adminii
not on!
e I
t«»
bum from
••
soul.
In reason ot his authority, bui he will noi ex
pend or uuikr use
own
oi
person, or
it
then on he will be pun
large] share ol
.1
ished- his ihare will
lie
noes,
ex*. tt-J
thai
»>t
than th.u ot others, and w e.ikest ot all. he being the best ot less
the smallest share ot right,
Cal.
all,
my friend? You talk about
it
tome, and he In- the
all
will h.i\ e
Callicles:---am
I
not
am
1
not speak-
Answer " Yes"
or
is
Soc.
And ought
Cal.
not the better to have a larger
Not
of meats
and drinks.
but with ah* rq vim with nevei saj in e about t! things, lor at onr time \ou wrrr defining the 1
I
.
-
tnd the superior to be the stronger, then
and now von bring t new notion: the snprrior .111. the DCD now dec lared by you to be the agaifl as the Wiser, a
1
wish, my good Eriend, th.u you me, once tor all. whom you atlirm to l>c the lx-t ter ami superior, and in wh.it they are ln-ttrr' Cal. have already told vmi that meanthosrwho are wise and courageous in the adminis Lration ot a state they ought to l>c the rulers ot their states, and justice consists in their hai I
ing
more than
their subjects.
or will they not have
I
Then
the skilfullest
and
best in
making
my
walk about
in
and have the greatest number them? Cal. Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are
the largest shoes,
Cal.
not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds,
own
if
this
is
and have land
How
as
much
seed as possible for
2
you go on, always talking
in the
same way, Socrates! [491] Soc. Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. Cal. Yes, by the Gods, you are literally alwavs talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argu-
What do you mean? mean that every man
I
is
but perhaps you think that there for
him
to rule himself;
rule others
Cal.
he
is
his is
own
ruler;
no necessity
only required to
:
What do you mean
by his "ruling over
himself".?
A
simple thing enough; just what is said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own Soc.
commonly
Cal.
What
innocence! you
— the temperate?
whv
will
you not
tell
me
in
what a
mean
those fools
—
any one may know that to meaning. Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything' On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence [492] to minister to them and to Soc. Certainly:
be
my
And
this
natural justice and nobility.
To
satisfy all his longings.
ment. Soc. But
more than themselves,
?
pleasures and passions.
you talking 2 Soc. Or,
Eriend
Soc.
shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should
Cal.
th.it
1
Soc. But whether rulers or subjects will they
understand: then, perhaps, of coats the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them? Cal. Fudge about coats! Soc.
trom
I
me
:
Soc.
1
—
"No."
Cal. Yes.
share
111 \
I
Soc. Well, hut l\o you admit that the wiser the better.'
:it
u hu h you bring against
I
meats and drinks and
physicians and other nonsense; ing of them,
his
politicians
1
tratioi
and
he will have a largei share rod Junks, because he ii better, U.wc the distribution ol .ill ol then
the me. us
of
i-.«-
In ihf
told \-»i
not
l>\
Either, then,
S
ol
be
i!ir.,,l\ 1
ol toi
:l.unlv.
his
'
us,
»>i
some-
dui supri
275 !.
•.u.:.;r
d
who
..
I
llld Still
the truth?
the-
ill
iii
of
And what
Foxton, say
does our friend Socrates, he assent to this, or
—does
not? Soc. cles.
He
does not assent; neither will Callisees himself trulv. You will ad-
when he
DIALOG UE S OF PLATO
278 run.
I
suppose, that good and evil fortune are
opposed
And
if
in the
sentence which you have just
word
"thirstv" implies pain
man
cannot have them both, or be
Cal. Yes.
ophthalmia
called
/-/«/'/ Cal.
To
and sound
Soc.
Soc.
the
Soc.
And when
Sue.
same eyes
he has got rid or his ophthalot his eyes too?
them both
Cal. Certainly not.
That would
surely be marvellous
and
?
Cal. Very.
Soc.
gets rid ot
them
in
is
Soc.
And
turns?
)r
(
When
you are thirsty?
in
pain?
—
he
may have
strength and weak-
same way, bv his? swiftness
Cal.
It is.
You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time? Cal. Yes did. / 49j] Soc. But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?
J
and slowness?
Cal. Clearly.
Cal. Certainly.
Soc.
And
does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and Soc.
pleasure in drinking?
Soc.
Cal. Yes.
Soc.
is
Soc. Do you see the inference: that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when vou sav that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not afreet at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the bod> which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this
affected by them, and
Cal. Yes.
ness in the
?
true ?
suppose that he
I
want
Cal. Yes.
the final result, that he gets rid ot
absurd
There
And
Sot
together? Soc.
expressive of
Cal. Yes.
same time?
mia, has he got rid of the health Is
is
ot the satisfaction of the
Cal. Certainly.
Cal. Certainly not.
Soc.
the word "drinking"
and
?
Cal. Yes.
be sure.
at
And
pleasure,
:
Soc. Hut he surely cannot have the
well
admit that
pleasant?
And
disease, they exclude
—
is
is
uttered, the
and
without them both, at the same time? Cal. What do you mean? SOi Take the case ot any bodily alieciion: a nun may have the complaint in his eyes
which
are thirsty,
one
they arc opposed to each other,
then, like health
another: a
And you would
when vou
Cal. Yes.
Cal. Yes.
Soc.
Very good.
Soc.
to drink,
each other?
to
misery, in a similar alternation?
'
Then
pleasure
fortune, or pain the
therefore the
good
is
is
not the same as good
same
as evil fortune,
and
not the same as the pleas-
ant?
Cal. Certainly he has.
Cal.
I
wish
I
knew,
Socrates,
what your quib-
then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil do we agree? Please
bling means.
not to answer without consideration.
Cal. Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in
Soc.
If
—
Cal.
—
I
entirely agree.
Go back now to our former admissions. you say that to hunger, I mean the mere ot hunger, was pleasant or painful?
Soc. 1
)id
stale
said painful, but that to eat when you hungry is pleasant. know; but still the actual hunger is Soc.
Cal.
I
are
1
painful:
am
I
not right?
And
You know,
Callicles,
your admonition of me. Soc.
from
Does not
a
man
cease
from
his thirst
and
drinking at the same time? Cal. I do not understand what you are saying. Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes; we should like to hear the argument his pleasure in
—
Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but thirst, too,
but you affect not
know.
out.
Cal. Yes.
Soc,
Soc. to
painful?
I
must complain of
Need adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are
is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. Gor. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his
painful?
own
is
Cal. Yes, very. I
Cal.
1
agree,
and therefore you need not ad-
duce any more instances. 1
Cf. Republic,
iv. 4 ^6.
the habitual trifling of Socrates; he
fashion.
you shall ask these peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. Cal. Well, then, Socrates,
little
—
Vs,
were
i
:
S
pleasure
.\
man
i
ease
"i
pleasure
i
roni
drinking
lm
(
at
1
v l
tin-
;d «lc-
is
the s.ime 1
tpproai h
ir.iscN
from pain and pleasure
^t
i,
adhere to what you mid? do; but what
1
win, my mend,
is
the infereo
the inierencc
thai
I
I
I
with them.' Cal. Yes. 3
the courageous and the wise are the good
would you not
say so?
Cal. Certainly.
did you never see a foolish child
re-
:
joicing.
man
too?
Cal. Yes, certainly: but
what
a foolish
Nothing
[498] Soc.
is
your drift 5 if you will
particular,
I
And
have.
man
re-
sorrowing
Which They
rejoice
are
and sorrow most
— the
3
much upon
1
battel pleased
.«t
thr
il.ii'
I
ben arc thr foolish and the w the brave all pleased and pained, .is vou Wt re laying, m nr.irlv cd and evil? 1. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]
bad
in a nearlv
[
do not know what you mean.
Cal.
I
Soc.
Why, do you
really
not
remember saying
that
good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils remember. Cal. Yea, Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods 3 present to those who rejoice if they do rejoice the
—
Soc.
be sure.
those
who
rejoice are
And
those
who
good when
are in pain have evil or
sorrow present with them
I
think, in
Soc. evil
3
see a
coward
And would you
still
say that the evil are
by reason of the presence of
Cal.
Soc.
in battle?
Then
goods are present with them.3
Cal. Yes. a par,
Enough: And did you ever
To
;
Cal. Yes.
that respect.
Cal.
\nd arc they not enemy'i departure
Soc.
did you ever see a sensible
wise or the foolish
Soc.
ihrv ripi.ilK
Cal. Certainly.
Cal. Yes.
Cal.
r
I
only answer.
Soc.
thr brs
3
have.
I
And
joicing or
.11
should imagine that more- p. uned.
Soc.
And do vou call the tools and cowards good men For you were saying |ust now that
Cal. Yes,
ire
Cal. Yes.
Soc.
Soc.
I
I
.
Col, ii
good is not the tame as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation ot pleasure anil pain at the same moment: hut not ot good ami evil, tor they are different, low then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as e\ il ? Ami would have vou look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, think, have been considered bv vou when you identified them: Are not the uood good because they have g
I
.
I
their will
?
[510/ Cal. ( iranted, Socrates, it you will only have clone. Soc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice.'
Cal. Certainly.
like
than this greatestof
lous
u tint thei
the doing injustice
Soc.
And what
art will protect us
from
suffer-
ing injustice.it not wholly, yet as far as possible
3
to know whether you agree with me; tor think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power. I
want
I
Cal.
serve
Well
how
said, Socrates;
ready
I
am
and please to obyou when you
to praise
talk sense.
Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who like to like, as ancient is most like to him sages say: Would you not agree to thiv
—
:
Cal.
I
should.
Soc. But
when
the tvrant
is
rude and unedu-
DIALOGUES OF PLATO cated, he is
one
to fear .nn
ma\ be expected
and
his superior in wrtue,
who
will never be able
any one
oi
.
greatly his interior, lor the tyrant will
despise him,
and
will nc\ cr seriously
regard
him
:r:end.
Cal. '1'hat again .
:
Cul.
No. indeed.
Soc.
And
Then
be nibjed anil subscr\ ient to him; he is the will have power in the state, and no
man who one
which saves men in courts ot law, and which you advise me to cultivate Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too. Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions.:
true.
is
the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will he one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to S..
yet, In
o
1 1 * .» t
-»ll
ol i^
U
en profcuion i>
..ihct
«»•
he would hi you despise linn •
-.
I
.in.l
and ineeringly call him in engine maker, you will not allow your daughters to marr)
.lit.
.unl
on
youi ion to Ins
Mi.it iv
00,01
N»>nt
what
prin< iple,
\m.I
J.i
1
1
1
•.
1
was
amc
thai
you u
Bui
it
tlu-
ill
*'|
s.i\,
bettei
consists only in
.i
.un better*
and
what
I
Please, then,
I
bettei born."
viv,
whatever may In- his character, then youi cen oi the engine maker, and oi the phj su ian, and ot the other .ins oi salvation, is ridi< ulous. o im Friend want you to sec ih.it tin* nofatc and the good may possibly be something differ ent from saving and being saved: -May not he who is truly a man ceaSC to care about living a certain time?' he knows, as women sav. that no man can escape late, and therefore he is not fond ot lite; he leaves all that with Cod, arul I
I
—
considers in what way he can best spend his pointed term whether by assimilating him-
—
self to
the constitution under
which he
1
.u you at this moment have to consider J how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, you mean to be in their •>-/
it
good graces, and to have power whereas want you to think and I
this
is
in the state;
see
is
whether
—
would dearest on the
tor the interest ot either of us
not have us risk that which
I
acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian
down the own perany man will
enchantresses, who, as they say, bring
moon from heaven
at the risk of their
you suppose that becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he dition.
But
if
show you the
art of
1
who would
deserve to be the true natural
friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pynlampes* darling who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only.
He, then, who
will
them, will make you
as
make vou most
you
I
in the
ail;
w
iih a
\
things,
iii>
In. In
.
i
icv.
ire,
like
desire, a statesman
and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet
indulge but tun
Very
I
si\t
r
«~
us
Ins
whu
ix
h
had pleasure
ii
a \ul.
|iist
other oi our
CaL Be
i
OfM lusioris
And
-
-.will
h
-
hai
the other had in
icw
\
|
improvement ot that which was ministered whether body or soul' Quite true. And must wr not have the tame vm\ view in the treatment ot our cit\ and cit
to,
C.iii.
SOC.
Must we not
m
and make them
try
5/7/ For we have already dis< that there is no use hi imparting to them am other good, unless the mind of those who arcto have the good, whether money, or otficc, or possible
1
/
any other Shall
we
1
power, be gentle am:
sort ot
say that
:
if you like. you .\\u\ I, Callicles, were intending to set about some public business, anil were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as walls, docks or temples ot the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, hrst. as to whether we know or do not
Cal. Yes, certainly,
Soc. Well, then,
know
it
who
the art of building, and
— would
taught us-
not that be necessary, Callicles
1
CaL True. Soc. In the second place,
consider whether
we had
we
should have to
ever constructed any-
private house, either of our
own
or for our
and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and it upon consideration We found that we had had good and eminent masters. And had been successful in constructing friends,
many
fine buildings, not only with their assist-
ance, but without them, by our 1
Cf.
Symposium.
216.
own unaided
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
288
—
in thatcase prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction ol pub-
Have we
lic works. But it we had no master to show. and only a number of worthless buildings or ROOC at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?
if you will not answer must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that thev were good citizens.
skill
Cal. Certainly.
And
docs not the same hold in all other you and were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent Soc.
cases.; It
I
pnuiisc as state -physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about
that such
lme
I
quiries about you.
And
if
we
arrived at the con-
Cal.
1
skill of either
leaven, Callicles,
that
we
or any
up
as to set
what an absurdity
human
to think being should be so silly
do the same, without having
practised in private, whether successfully
or not, and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar
when you is
are learning the potter's art;
which
thing?
a foolish
[515] Cal. True. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer.' Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer? Soc.
Cal.
You
Soc.
Nay,
are contentious. Socrates. I
ask you, not from a love of con-
want
know
tention, but because
I
what way you think
that affairs should be ad-
ministered
among us
to
in
— whether, whenyoucome
to the administration of
er
really
them, you have any oth-
aim but the improvement
of the citizens?
they were good, then clear! the citizens better in-
it
Cal. Yes.
And, therefore, when
Pericles first
began
speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? to
CaL Very likely. Soc. for
if
Nay, my friend, "likely" is not the word; he was a good citizen, the inference is
certain.
CaL And what difference does that make.' None; only I should like further to know
and advise others
as state-physicians
like ourselves to first
of us, then, by
do.
them must have made
Soc.
no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better medical
I
I
stead of worse?
clusion that for the
surely said so; for
Soc. But of
many times over man? Nay, we
the duty of a public
is
for yourself
to
me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or should make the same enfreeman 3 And
not already admitted
Soc.
whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and money. Cal. You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising
set
who
Soc. But
bruise their ears.
what
I
am
going to
not mere hearsay, but well
tell
known
you now is both to you
at first, Pericles was glorious and unimpeached by any verdict of the [516] Athenians this was during the time when they were not so good yet afterwards, when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefac-
and me: that his character
—
—
tor.
Cal. Well, but badness?
how
does that prove Pericles'
Soc. Why, surely you would say that he was bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you
a
say Cal.
I
Soc.
And
do
the fa
will
vou also do
1
or saving
me
ves.
the favour ot
»R(;i \s u hrthri
.
in.ili is .ui
M.lMlU
I I
mil
them
M
llC
\
.1
hepherdoi men?
.
thnii
and Vnd
S
iiu
hou will not answer. Cal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer ; Soc. I suppose that can; just now, at am '
I
rate, the
speeches which
enough because you I
adjure you by the god
sir,
do
me whether
tell
I
am making
are long
answer me. Hut friendship, my good
refuse to ot
there does not appear to
you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then blaming him tor being bad: Cal. Yes, it appears so to me. [520] Soc. Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner
;
Cal. Yes. but
why
talk ot
men who
are
good
talk of
men
for nothing?
Soc.
who
I
would rather
say,
why
and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of tiie city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city: do you think that there is any difference between one and theother? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised: whereas the truth is, that sophprotess to be rulers,
—
much
superior to rhetoric as legisla-
istry
is
as
tion
is
to the practice of law, or
medicine.
The
orators
and
gymnastic to
sophists, as
inclined to think, are the only class
who
I
am can-
not complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact? Cal. Certainly it is. Soc. If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them. Where-
G IAS .1% it it,
man has been benefited
ft
in
an) othei
example, hr Kai been taught
fat
trainer, hr mi]
pay,
it
htm
you
"i
nil
ti.unri let! thr ni.itln in hitn, .uid
he-
t
run
to I
no ftgroement with htm that he fthould receive money fti won is hr had given him h o( njktiI do men act unjustly, l>ui b)
\n ill
nevet be brou
hkrlv
in.iilr
t
i
.Ml.
hen
I
it
dl< tin c, a uu.l the r.u iii.ui will remain i.m and to on; and ilir dead man, who in life had fancy to have \:i.| it hr l\.i\r tlow in,; h.ui Aon in. wrai marked with the whip end had the printi he- vim: wounds in him when hr oi see thr s.imr in llir dr. id w.is \ r. yOU might unl ii his hull's urn broken oi misshap remain
ill
he
i
Ik
•
mm
tin:
.ill
ihrni, ai
.
.»
i
t
.il
in
found A»i hrlau andai
when
he w.is ah\c.
llir
s.unr ap|x
from
oi
the soul ire laid
to
who is lil
t
.hit ihr\ have
th
e few there .ire w ho .itt.un to this. Sm h gl SSS there m.i\ .irise ge*>d
ot
all
I
.1
1
true
men, however, there ai Athens and
be again,
h.i\e been, in
and
other states,
will
who
have fulfilled their trust righteousl] and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, ;
Ansteides, the son eral, great
As
men
e)t
Lysimai.hus. But,
are also bad,
my
in
gen-
friend.
was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he the bad kind, knows nothing
I
gets a soul ot
about him, neither ents are; he a villain;
who
knows only
and seeing
he
is,
nor
who
I
that he has got hold ot
this,
he stamps him I him awa\ toTarta
able or incurable, and sends
whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or. again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Calliclcs, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled him self with the doingsof othcrmen in his lifetime;
rus,
him Rhadamanthus sends
to the Islands of the
Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on. as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him: Blessed.
Holding a sceptre thr d
Now :
Cf.
I,
Calliclcs,
Rep
of gold
am
persuaded of the truth of
15.
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
294 these things,
and
1
consider
how
1
shall present
my soul whole and undented before the judge in that da\. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims,
and
I
desire only to
to live as well as
die as well as
power,
And,
1
in
I
exhort
to the
men
I
utmost
oi
my
do the same. your exhortation ot me, I
other
return lor
know the truth, when die, to
can, and,
And,
can. all
I
exhort you also to take part
in
to
the great combat,
which is the COmhat ot life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach ol me. and s.iy, that you will not he
when
able to help yourself
the
clay ot trial
and
judgment, of which was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the indge, / $2j ] the son ot Aegina, and. when he has got \ou in his grip and is earn mg you ofl. >ou will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts ot this world, and \ery likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort ot insult. Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wite's tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, it by searching we could find out anything better or truer: hut now you see that you And Polus and (Jorgias, who are the three wisest of the ( .reeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to sutler Injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to I
be followed above
things, as well in public
all
that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished: also that he should avoid all flatas in private life;
and
tery ot himself as well as ot others, ot the lew
many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all hisactions should be done always, with a view to justice. or of the
Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in lite and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind: let him strike \ou, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm m the practise of virtue, it you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together,
we
will apply ourselves to politics,
it
seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid arc wel Let us, then, take the argument as our that
guide, which has revealed to us that the best
way
of
tue in
life is to life
in this exhort all to
practise justice
and death. This way
which you
men
trust
let
vir-
us go; and
to follow, not in the
and
to follow you; for that
ing worth.
and every
in
which you exhort
way,
Callicles,
is
me
noth-
THE REPUBLIC mi
Pi RSONI 0]
Pdl
t
s«
\Kv
•••.
in
C
|]
Thi
u 001
)i
I
i
i-n
U.US]
s
SOGftATBS,
!
J.
I
HI
UYMACHI
in the
"
Wl
'
CUUI
L
.-phiilu\
thi
ill
^#- ^
BOOK I
\vi.\r
down
a
nameita
•-
-^
/r Id me tell \«'u, thai a hen man thinks himjdi to be
below and
-
il
1
f.hiitr correct
m
oi
would
nr
\.i\
:
reus wealth >iu-. he v.nJ.
\u mi
I*
thr truth M. our M
:
\
•
ealth.
iiur. but in. iv
What do
question r
and
in
thai
.i\
uc, be vnil.
thai
11.. I
.
hould
I
a
1
1
i
ii
\\c
I
nir
nli
mm
tn them and -ill men \n.l hence th< \n\ bid company, foi the] in talk about
hat
im a
.1
hni
1,.
1
iend n hen in
ii
.i
r
.11
la is
mon
I
thai
\\
ihr s.ikr dI usr llld profit
i
\...j
this
t..
ion
poemi
ii
thru children, besides that natural
tor
at a
l
I
r\rn
i
resemblin
t>w n,
thcii
.in.!
love
till
ion oi
t
REPUBLK
I
luvc inherited thru
I
2
Certainly not.
When a debt
Simonides said that the repayment of justice, he did not mean to include
was
that case
3
Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend
ought always
to
do good
to a friend
and never
evil.
You mean gold which
two ment of ine him
the
that the return of a deposit of
is
to the injury of the receiver,
parties are friends, a
debt
—that
is
is
if
not the repay-
what you would imag-
to say?
Yes.
And owe
to
are enemies also to receive
them
;
what we
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
298
To
be sure, he laid, thej arc eo receive
what
wc QWC them, ami an enemy, as take it, outs to an enemy thai which is due or proper to him that if to say, evil. Simomdcs. then, after the manner of poets, I
And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. :
—
would seem
meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a dcht. That must have Inrcn his meaning, he said. By heaven! I replied; and il wc asked him what due or proper thing is given DV medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to US? lie would surely reply that medicine gr.es drugs and meat and drink to human bodies. And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what/ that
which
justice gives,
and
to
whom.' It. Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is
to
which gives good
the art
to friends
and
I
think
and
best able to
is
enemies
in
do good
what
harm
;
Then
man
in
what
in playing the
In a
money
result
the just
harp the harp-player
is
certainly
man?
partnership.
Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale ol a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not ; Certainly.
Then what
But when is
pilot
is
to buy a ship, the would be better?
ship-
that joint use of silver or gold
which the just man is to be preferred? When you want a deposit to be kept safely.
You mean when money
a voyage, amid the perils
sort of actions or
is
the just
with a view
man most
enemy and good
chus, there
able to
do
in
a
man
is
well,
That is
is
not wanted, but
lie
mak-
is
to say, justice
is
useful
when money
useless?
That
to his friend?
war against the one and
is
the inference.
And when you want
to
keep
a
pruning-hook
then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser? safe,
my
dear Polemar-
no need of a phvsician?
NC.
Clearly.
And
he
who
is
not on a voyage has no need
of a pilot?
And when you want
to keep a shield or a them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musi-
lyre,
No.
Then
time of peace justice will be of no
in
use?
and not
to use
cian?
am
very Ear from thinking so.
Certainly.
And
[333] You. think that justice may be of use peace as well as in war:
useful
Yes.
they are useful?
Like
husbandry
for
the
acquisition
of
corn?
so of all the other things
when
That
Then
Yes.
Or
is
than the harp-player, as
a better partner than the just
in
ing alliances with the other.
shoes
sort of partnership
a better partner
Precisely.
what
to his
of
Quite the reverse.
allowed to
In going to
1
game
skilful player.
the builder
pilot.
in
or the skilful pla\cr a
better partner at a
And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than
to his friends
time of sickness?
of the sea?
in
The
wright or the True.
so.
The physician. Or when they are on
And
and
And when you want
evil to his
The
man
the just
is
usetul
draughts ?
evil
meaning then?
his
is
And who
to
But
more
enemies.
That
partnerships?
its.
filing to lood. is
mean
by contracts you
aly.
have spoken darkly of the na-
to
ture of justice; tor he really
And what
And
like
justice
is
when
the inference.
justice
is
not good for much. But let Is not he who
us consider this further point;
shoemaking for the acquisition of is what you mean?
— that
Yes.
is
—
they are useless, and useless
can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a
blow?
f
:
i
1
1
k
1
i
r
t
r.
,K
i
i
I
who
\ii.l \\c
from
.in.,
is
most
.«
d
skilful in prevent
I
hai in to
uir
I
\iul l«rst
human
«.i
it
\\r
is
thr
vu.u.I ol
l»rst
steal
ii»
who n em
,
but,
ilir
i»i
it
that win, h wi
i.ini|i
.i
march upon
.1
ili.it
them; and hr lus
hr ought to benefit
able
rutin
in
ihr meat
and Ik
:t.lllllv.
who
tun hr
1
is
Ih.it,
good
Thai
is
Then
after
he
.i
thief.
m.m
implied .ill
And
tins
is
iking oi at
Autolycua,
t>i
the-
who
her oi Odysseus,
l>
ft
;
/
;
hr
th.it
m»t good, only an
Ik- and is same ma) be s.ml. Von would argue thai thr good friends and the bad our enca
to
r
yy5/ and
i.
.ire
our
Vet,
Ami
so,
you and
agreed that justice
is
an
harm
oi
enemies*'
in
and Simonides
art oi tlu-tt; to
however "tor the good
tised
the
tomes:
I
W prat
and Eor was what you
oi friends
— that
were saying? No, certainly not that, though do not now know what I Jul say; but still stand hy the latter words. Well, there is another question: By Eriends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming Surely, he said, a man may he expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. Vc\ but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to I
I
be
and conversely That is true. Then to them the good
will be
enemies and
And good
in that case they will be right in
to the evil
and
evil to the
doing
good?
But the good are
just
and would not do an
injustice?
Then according
to
your argument
it
is
just
who do no wrong?
Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral. Then I suppose that we ought to do good the just and harm to the unjust? like that better.
at
just
are evil? Yes, thai appears to
Hut ought the
me
to
the truth.
Ik-
just to injure
any one
at all
3
Undoubtedly he ought to injure thosewho arc both wicked and his enemies.
When
horses
.ire
injured, arc they
improved
or deteriorated?
The
latter.
Deteriorated, that ities
is
to say, in the
good qual-
of horses, not of dogs?
Yes. of horses.
dogs arc deteriorated
of dogs,
man
in the
good qual-
and not of horses?
Of course. And will not men who is
are injured be deteri-
the proper virtue of
:
And that human virtue is justice? To be sure. Then men who are injured are of made
True.
I
is
Certainly.
Clearly.
to injure those
it
orated in that which
True.
did
todogood to our ir lends and harm to our enemies, we should lurther It is just to do good to our triends when they good and harm to our enemies when they
ities
the evil will be their friends?
instead oi laying sirn;
that
first,
And
2
so,
And
That is the result. But can the musician by unmusical
to
necessity
unjust? his art
make men
:
Certainly not.
Or the horseman by horsemen?
his art
make them bad
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
MO
folly, Socrates,
Impossible.
by justice make men unor speaking generally, can the good by
And just,
can the
just
make them bad? Assuredly not. more than heat can produce cold
virtue
Am
:
Or drought moisture (
?
cannot.
It
Hearty not.
Nor can
harm any one?
the just
is
the good?
rtainly.
Then is
else is
man, but of the opposite,
the un)USt?
1
think that what you say
I
quite true.
is
Sen rates.
Then
a
it
man
says that justice consists in
the repayment of debts,
debt which a sa\ this
man owes
and
not wise; for
is
Ixrcn clearly
good is the and evil enemies to
that
to his friends,
which he owes
the debt
to his
it is
not true,
—
if,
as has
shown, the injuring of another
can be in no case just. agree with you, said Polemarchus. Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus. or any other I
man or am quite
wise I
seer.'
ready to do battle
at
your
side,
he
we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious are
do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.
to
said.
[336] Shall
I
tell
you whose
I
believe the
saying to be?
'Whose? I
do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy. was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him. I should have been struck dumb: but when saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was theretore able to reply to him. Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were "knocking under to one another," and so losing our chance of finding it. And why. when I
any one
to injure a friend or
not the act ol a just
who
has taken possession of you all?
sillybilhes,
I
the good
Impossible.
And
And why,
believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xer-
Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm to xes or Ismenias the
your enemies." Most true, he Yes,
I
tice also
said;
[iff] How characteristic of Socrates! he rewith a bitter laugh that's your ironical have I not already told style! Did I not foresee you, that whatever he w as asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answerplied,
—
—
r
ing?
You
said.
but
if
this
definition of jus-
breaks down, what other can be of-
fered
Se\cral times in the course of the discussion
Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who ft anted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and had done speaking and there was a pause, I
he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panicroared out to the whole company:
are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I reand well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering plied,
twice
six,
or three times four, or six times two.
or four times three, "for this sort of nonsense
—
do for me" then obviously, if that your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? is that your meaning?" How would you answer him? will not
is
—
stricken at the sight of him.
He
so,
What
—
1
I
1
slikl
.iil
it
RKPUHLK
I
'
I
Ik
W
h\ ihoilld lln\
ii
iin-\
|h
i
s(
.u
m w
iii.l
l>.
replied;
I
hi> is
he thinks,
\\
you and
mj w hat bid him nK apj
dun
1
now
(
c
rt.unly.
AnJ
the different
forms oi governmem make
laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and tl laws, which arc made hv them tor their own in
which the\ deliver to •hem and him who tra; they punish as a breaker ot the law and uniust. Anil that is what I mean when say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest ot the government; a\v\ as the government must Ik* supposed to are the justice
terests.
their subjects,
.
I
I
power, I 339] the only reasonable conclusion is. that everywhere there is one principle of jus
which
tice,
Now
I
is
the interest ot the stronger.
understand you,
I
said;
you are right or not will try let me remark, that in defining I
and whether
to discover.
But
vou have yourself used the word "interest" which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words "ot the stronger" arc added. A small addition, you must allow, he said. Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying
the truth.
is
justice
is
Now we
interest of
some
to say "of the stronger"; I
am
justice
arc both agreed that sort,
but you go on
about
this addition
not so sure, and must therefore consider
further.
Proceed.
DIALOGUES OF PLATO
302
and
will;
I is
first tell
)ust lor subjects to
me )o you admit that 1 obey their rulers
it
1
Hut arc the rulers ol states absolutely ble, or arc they sometimes liable to cir be sure,
lie
replied, they are liable to err.
be his interest to do;
they
make them
rightly, they
to their interest;
them agreeably
when
make
;
Ws laws which they
the
obeyed by their subjects
make must
— and that
is
be
what you
call justice?
toubtless.
Then
justice,
according to your argument,
not only obedience to the interest of the ;
stronger but the re\ersc
What
\ou arc saying? he asked. am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. Hut let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about is
that
1
own
their
interest in
also that to
what they command, and
obey them
is
Has not
justice?
that
been admitted? Yes.
Then you must
also
have acknowledged
jus-
not to be for the interest of the stronger,
tice
when
the
rulers
things to be done jury.
For
it,
as
you
to
command their own in-
is
the obedience
unintentionally
which are say, justice
which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, () wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is tor the injury of the stronger? Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if / jjo you are allowed to be his witness. Hut there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself ac-
knowledges mand what
that rulers is
may sometimes com-
not for their
own
Never mind,
interest,
and
them is justice. Thrasymachus said
—
lor
is
is
I
now
says that
replied,
if
he
us accept his statement. Tell
physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact
is
that neither the
grammarian
nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill tails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopt the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, [341] and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest;
his
and the subject
commands; and
and now
is
required to execute
therefore, as
repeat, justice
is
I
said at
first
the interest of the
stronger. I
pear to you to argue like an informer
really ap:
Certainly, he replied.
And do you
both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command ting
weaker who
let
about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the
just.
Yes, Qeitophon, but he also said that justice the interest ol the stronger, and, while admit-
the
Polemar-
Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do
Polemarchus that subjects to do what wascommanded by their
i't s.
his words, rejoined
me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? Certainly not. he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken. You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken they arc.
that for subjects to obey
rulers
this was what the weaker had was affirmed by him to be jus-
chus.
they are
mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit
is
—
this
Those were not
When
Ami
and
tice.
True.
1
whence follows that asmuch as the interest
interest;
est of the stronger
Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?
thai
own
the injury quite
But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interwhat the stronger thought to
infalli-
:
To
is
of the stronger.
do.
I
not for his justice
arc his subjects to
do what
is
tions with
suppose that I ask these quesany design of injuring you in the
argument ; "suppose" is not the word but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.
Nay, he
I
know
it;
replied,
1
I
Imt
i.'
do
\
sjH-.ik
.11
.
KM
Ik-
.
m
rulei
tn
Oi tlir
t
ind
And do you
madman !
i»l
pl.»\ .it
oi
m
\\
I
ilh..
die Uriel
Mii-.cs.
.ill
Iir
the informal
youi hands
sou
it
Why, he
imagine,
,
in;
Bui jrou nevei
said, th.it
I
I
,nn mi. h
.i
rhrasymaehus?
and cheat
either b\
1
I
other. the\
h.i
!er
.
.
I
.
minute
.i
th.it
1
ids in your
you made the attempt
ihr
then Mih|f mi. if pine .ind l.niltlrss while rem. lining true d uninip w Kile 1)
a lion
ihavc
said,
thnn.
\n.|
s.ii.l
ot
ai to tt\
as well
might
fault
«••
require anothei iup|
•
l
lv ible, ne\er
ill
h
i
ti.iv
l>\
ue Mid detoniiils.
\
WJU
i;i\rn to
In-rii
non
bill
admitted
l>n ir. n'.r.l
.itt
i
lid
\n.!
ihutr
the
.ill
\\r \\
ipi
the unjust
i|iiali(ies
tributed by in before to the
iust.
which w
t
u
lh
c
sible;
1
1
lerc feeling perplexed
have
that
we
— My
began
to think o\er said,
no
are in a perplexity; for
Wt
image which we had
be-
what had preceded
wonder
1
lost sight of the
friend,
I
fore us.
What do you mean: that mean to ..;.
I
he sa:d. there
do
exist
natures
gifted with those opposite qualities.
And where do you find them? Many animals, replied, furnish examples I
them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and of
know.
1
Then
there
is
Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end How do justiceand injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length. Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us. Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even Certainly not.
the reverse to strangers. Yes,
safely affirm. is
nothing impossible or out of
Come
who
tion of our heroes.
Would
not he
By
who
is
fitted to
be a guardian,
long.
and let us pass a leisure hour in and our story shall be the educa-
story-telling,
has a similar combination of qualities?
somewhat
then,
the order of nature in our finding a guardian
Certainly not.
if
means.
all
And what
shall be their
education?
Can we
besides the spirited nature, need to have the
find a better than the traditional sort?
qualities of a philosopher?
this has
do not apprehend your meaning. The trait of which I am speaking, jj6] /
and music
1
may
replied,
remarkable
What Why,
be also seen in the dog, and
I is
trait?
whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious? The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your remark.
And
a dog,
surely this instinct of the
— your dog
Why? Why,
is
dog
is
very
a true philosopher.
because he distinguishes the face of a
—and
divisions, gymnastic for the body,
for the soul.
True.
we
begin education with music, and gymnastic afterwards? By all means. And when you speak of music, do you inShall
go on
in the animal.
charming
two
to
clude literature or not? I
do.
And
literature
may
be either true or false?
Yes.
[377] And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false? I do not understand your meaning, he said. You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly des-
main fictitious; and them when they are not
titute of truth, are in the
and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an
of an age to learn gymnastics.
animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?
Very true. That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.
friend
these stories are told
Most assuredly.
Quite right, he
And
You know
not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy? is
said.
also that the
most important part
beginning
is
the
of any work, especially in
I
I
l\\r in
.isr
,
..I
time
ilu-
.it
ind ir.idtU
in,
the
tin
v
.i
1.
is
1
in
curcleul) allow children
w
tales
persons, .m>l
casual
ulr.is foi
liu
to
the most
ll
m.i\
b
\ similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination
which ma\
arise in his
And
instead ol
and do the
shame
like.
or self-control, he will
mind
having any be always whin-
what ought argument has just proved to psooi we must abide until it is
1
not to be, as the
tell
sailors.
Most
true, he said.
then, the ruler catches
It,
Any
State
Most
believe.
Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men. must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed. / ]8()J Still less of the gods, as you say, he Then we
shall not sufTer such an expression used about the gods as that of Homer
when he
-
certainly, he said,
if
our idea of the
In the next place our youth
must be temper-
ate
ever carried out.
is
3
Certainly.
and
self-control in sensual pleasures
of
Then we shall approve such language Diomede in Homer, Friend
,
sit still
and obey my word,
as that
1
and the verses which follow,
The Greeks marched breathing proucss? awe of their leaders?
how
describes
2
True.
replied.
to be
he be priest or ph\
Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders
lolcnt reaction. I
r
3 ,
he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of
ought not 10 be. Wither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a tit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a So
whethc
of the craftsmen,
ship or State.
\
anybody beside
himself lying in the State,
us; ami bv that disproved by a better. It
not to
the captain what is happening about and the rest ot the crew, and howthings arc going with himself or his fellow
not to
sieian or earpcntei
Yes. he said, that is most true. Vs. replied; but that surely is
gymnasium
the ship
to say
ing And lamenting on (light occasions.
1
patient or the pupil of a
speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor
.... in silent Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about
(
your views,
)n
On my me;
we must
n,
we were
views,
truth should be highly valued; saying, a
lie is
if,
useless to the gods,
cians; private individuals
men, then the use
have no business with
them. Clearly not, he said.
any one
have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private
deemed 1
2
man a
at all is to
to lie to them in return more heinous fault than
Ibid, xvi. 433. Ibid, i. 599.
is
heavy with wine,
who
hast the eyes of a
dog and
the heart of a stag,"
as
and
of such medicines should be restricted to physi-
if
of this line,
if
useful only as a medicine to
Then
shall.
What
not admit them.
you like to father them on we must not admit them is certain.
that
and other sentiments of the same kind.
We
mansion*
the
to be
for the
and of the words which follow? [390] Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken ?
They are ill spoken. They may very possibly
afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance.
And
men
—you
Odyssey,
xvii.
383
Iliad
412.
there ?
Yes. 3 *
5 8 7
harm to would agree with me
therefore they are likely to do
our young
,
iv.
Odyssey, Ibid,
iv.
Ibid,
i.
iii.
431.
225.
8.
ff.
nil r ihr
thai
s.i\
nothing
in nil
opinion
u
iteti
RKPUBLIl ••!
men
M
\. lullri luii:
mon
ii
than
hm
w
that
liirnl
hr
li».
I
t
•
hr
sentiments w hn h
is
tit
man
01
i
ondiM
to heai
iu
\ ha mankind two ifti uiswei ing to thi m Mil) iiiiliin tl\ to the v>ul .in.l IhkU ion
Ki< al,
hi
I
ami thr ochei the
ipirited
he-
t
cur
rUtion;
haVC
set
t
said, the vriHin
meaning
the
ol
unwill;
the
learn.
r about their hunting and coursing, gymnastic and equestrian contests? Foi these .ill follow the general principle, and has ing found ih.it, we shall have no difficulty in
Why, said, do you not see that men .ue unwillingly deprived ol good, and willing evil? Is not to have lost the truth .m evil, and to possess the truth .i u would
discovering tlK-m. dare say mat there will he no difficulty. Very uooil, said; then what is the next
conceive thin. |M>sc idected, and he who fails in ; the trial is to be rejected. That will be the wa\ !s,
And
and which they give lurthcr proof of the same
rhcrc should also be toils and pains
conflicts prescribed will be
made
to
lor
them,
in
light,
even be made probable, if it did. your words seem to hesitate on your I low lips'
You will not wonder, I replied, when you have heard.
he replied.
I
—
—
act n
m- .in admixtui 10m or itlver in them ire rai* d u> honour, and •Mir guardians or luxili u u lr M man ol brass m Iron guards the State, it will Ik- destroyed Sucn ii the tale; imposition must in>t
ii
1
1
1
1
«
i
ol
ink
i
.
pitiful
Ik-
i
.
I
1
1
i
.t
I
i
am Mm,
I
and
to be, in. in
civilize
*
I »
* t
1
1
rtain
i
have thr
will
Ik-,
more
h
and humanise them
in
thru relations
;
tion
.i
is
there in) poatibilit) ol
believe in
N
the preseni
may
sens
ol
made
Ik-
to believe
the difficulty, tor the
roch itv
i the two i»ir\, what is the titiili: SUv« we neither have noi ire permitted i \e conveyed to our gnardiai our at) be accounted neither large nor hut one and self sufficing.
new
1
order which v.c impose upon them. the other, said
of
1.
1
which we were
—
mean the 1 speaking before is lighter still rading the offspring oi the guardi.
hen interior. And oi elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring oi the lower
when ally,
naturally su|>erior.
'I
"he intention
the case of the citizens gener-
that,
in
each
individual
should be put to the
which nature intended him, one to one work, and then e\ery man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many. he said; that
I,
is
not so difficult.
we
regulations which
are prescribing,
danger
quite believe
to the
So
him
whole
Damon
—he
and me. and
State,
tells
says that
when
of music change, the fundamental laws
modes
change with them. Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and \our own. Then. I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music? Yes, he said: the lawlessness of which you
of the State always aid
speak too easily
r
The
of the poet; for any musical inno\a-
full of
is
hf to be prohibited.
>e\crc
And
may be praising, not new kind of song; and this
afraid that he
not to be praised, or conceived to be the
meaning tion
l>e
songs, but a
1
and
steals in.
replied, in the
at first sight
Why, yes, he
form of amusement:
appears harmless.
it
and there is no harm: ucre by little this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man it
not that
said,
little
od Adeimantus, are not. as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of a thing, however, which the one great thing I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for
and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights.
our purpose.
and nurture; If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all is well as other matters which omit;
That is my belief, he replied. Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, [425] they can never grow up into well-conducted and vir-
such, for example, as marriage, [424] the possession of women and the procreation of chil-
tuous citizens. Very true, he
—
What may Education,
that be I
;
he asked.
said,
I
dren, which will that friends
all
have
follow the general principle
all
things in
common,
as the
proverb says.
That
will be the best
way
of settling them.
once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good !
-aid. the State, if
constitutions,
and these good constitutions
ing root in a good education improve
tak-
more and
more, and this improvement aifects the breed
man
in
as in other animals.
Very possibly, he
Then above
to
all,
directed
sum
the point to which,
the attention of our rulers should be that music and gymnastic be pre-
—
made. They must do
them intact. And mankind most regard
tain
utmost to mainwhen any one says that their
The newest song which 1 1
/..
that true.'
And when
I
said.
said.
made a good beginning and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, they have
in play,
in a
manner how unlike the lawless play of the accompany them in all their actions
others! will
and be
a principle of
growth
to them,
and
if
there be any fallen places in the State will raise
them up again.
Wry
true,
he
said.
Thus educated, any
they will invent for themwhich their predecessors
lesser rules
have altogether neglected. is
served in their original form, and no innovation
Is
selves
said.
up: This
pri\ate as well as public.
the singers
hate?
What do you mean? mean such things
I
young
as
these:
—when
are to be silent before their elders:
the
how
show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with they are to
me
:
«
THE REPUBLH
I
v
ind idlu
\
wisdom
think, sm.ill But there iv bout inch mitten I
.ur .ins
trm Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to Ik- doing the "-
business ot
a
cobbler, or a cobblcrot
.1
carpenter;
and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever Ik- the change; do you think that any great harm
would result Not much.
to the State
:
But when the cobbler or any other man nature designed to be a lifted
up by wealth
of his
whom
ha\ ing his heart
trailer,
or strength or the
number
followers, or any like advantage,
at-
tempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either other; or
law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and
which
is
a just
is
implements or the duties of the
to take the
ot necessity.
which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the If
that
Which
Then on
it.
man
a
th.it
.uiv
neither Like wh.il
.im right Of not:
I,
if]
ttainly.
Well then,
ia
tr.
the rulers
tx.t
those to
ordium.
1
»hr
wh.it w.is I
1
rice
in
in
petition
glow impatieni
diih
j
who
we missed Ikt. What do \ »n mean mean to lay thai in realit) t.-t i long time talking ol justice, and have nan we have I
-
I*
ch
•.
noth
whai the) have in tliru wa} with in pre looked
the distance; and therefore,
i
when one man
and warrior agree with
and
this
all
me
in one, in
is
then
trader, legislator, I
think you will
saying that this interchange
meddling of one with another
is
the
ruin of the State.
Most
true.
Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be
DlALOGU
350 :stly
termed evil-doing:
And the greatest degree of e\ -doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice? il
Mainly.
This then
is
injustice;
and
oil
the other
hand
the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, ami will make the city just.
when
ree
We
on
if,
trial,
said, be overpositive as yet;
1
conception of justice be
this
individual as well as in the Stale, there will be no longer any room tor doubt; if it Ik* not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old in
the
we began,
investigation, 9 Inch
under the impression
you remem-
as
that,
if
we could
previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example ap-
we conknowing
peared to be the State, and accordingly
structed as good a one as we could, well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be
now applied to the we shall be satisfied the individual,
in
individual ;
or,
we
if
—
if
they agree,
there be a difference
will
And have another
Stale
come back
trial
to the
of the theory.
1 435] The friction of the two when rubbed together mav possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is
then revealed we will fix in our souls. That will be in regular course; let us do as
you
proceeded to ask:
When two things,
a great-
by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the
and
less, are called
same.'
Like, he replied.
The
just
man
then,
if
we
regard the idea of
justice only, will be like the just State?
He will. And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain
same
other affections and
qualities
of these
classes?
True, he
And
An
3
easy question! Nay. rather, Socrates, the
proverb holds that hard Very true. said; and
is
the good.
do not think method which we are employing is at 1
I
that the all
ade-
quate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one.
we may
arrive at a solution not below the previous enquiry. May we not be satisfied with that 3 he said under the circumstances. I am quite content. I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satis-
level of the
—
fied.
Then he
pursuing the speculation,
faint not in
said.
Must we not acknowledge,
I
said, that
in
each of us there are the same principles and
which there arc in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State 3 how else can they come there 3 Takethe quality would be ridiculous of passion or spirit it to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who habits
—
—
are supposed to possess
it,
e. g.
the Thracians,
Scvthians, and in general the northern nations;
and the same may be edge, which
is
said of the love of
knowl-
the special characteristic of our
part of the world, [436] or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attrib-
uted to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. Exactly so, he said.
There
is
no
difficulty in
understanding
this.
None whatever.
say.
I
er
—
soul has these three principles or not
Still
with you.
will not.
verified
ber,
more then. O my friend, we ha\e upon an easy question whether the
ice
alighted
Pre.
but
OF PLATO
said.
we mav assume same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner so ol the individual;
that he has the
3
Certainly, he said.
But the question is not quite so easy when proceed to ask whether these principles are
we
three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action to determine that is the difficulty. Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty. Then let us now try and determine whether
—
they are the same or different.
How
can we? he asked.
The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways: and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different. I
replied as follows:
Good. For example,
I
said,
can the same thing be
1
I
id
motion
III
llir
al
s
line
11
REP
l
Uinr
h
II
I
V
I
1
the
111
same |
llll|Hiss;',>
Still,
trims,
ol
:
ultrj.l\ let
said,
I
us have
mi we should hcrcattci
list
tall
thai
thai
i
I
.1
1
w wants anything
moment
tut
ti>
Ii
i
mode
ol
i|
should object, and should rathei s.i\ thai p.m i»t lum is in motion while anothei
\
(
and
true.
\
Ami mppoac ther,
and
to
tlu-
draw
objectoj to refine
tur-
si ill
the nice distinction that not
I
I
I
the circumferenoc goes round.
desire
it.
while
revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or
forwards or backwards, then view can they be at rest.
left,
point oi
That
is
the correct
mode
ot
in
no
describing them,
he replied.
Then Bone
us to believe that the same riling the same time, [4^ / in the same part or in
relation to the
upon
same thing, can
act or be acted
in contrarv
ways. Certainly not, according to
examine
desire; should
thi
rtainly.
Admitting
this to
Ik-
us suppose a p.trtu
let
irur of desire generally,
ul.ir
|
out Oi these we will srln hunger M\^\ \\. as they arc termed, which arc the most obvit
oi
them
Let us
The
;
(Ac
that
1
lass,
object oi one
is
he said.
mod, and
ol
the
drink? Yes.
And
here comes the point: is not thirst the which the soul has oi drink, and \
t)Ul
length the d
.it
R
I
r
In-
UD
l.lll
of
him;
«
m>ii.
w
ill
iplr-v
i
h
in>
!.
W
il
is
oh
.•
ova
r.l
,:
bctioni
in
thai ingei
is,
though
.in
»t
man) oth Inn a in. ins
«\
.1
which
I
is
desires violently
like the struggle ot
out
i.
n
the
.ilso
auxili
1
different
any one else?
Certainly not. Sup|x>sc that a
man
spirit
simOSl
•
easil)
p.
young
in
-
s.M.n
.is
them
|
hildren
equally
to another, the nobler he
he to fed indignant
n
at
is
the less able
roy suffering, such
.1^
I
True, he said.
when he thinks that he is the sufferer wrong, then he boils and chates, rod is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he sutlers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be But
or the
quelled until he either slays or
is
in. iv
loiner,
is,
ot
uth
ti
enough*
:
w
h.it
is
further
«
you
once more appeal to the words of h h.i\e been .ilre.idv quoted by us,
whu
(mate
his breast,
for in this verSC
and thus rrbukrd
his
'.
rea-
The
illustration is perfect, he replied; and our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds. I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider. in
:
I
power which
loiner h.is clearly SU|
about the Ixrt' worse to be dillerent lrom the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it. Very true, he said. And so. alter much tossing, we have r land, and are fairly agreed that the s.unc printhe
ciples
re.isns
which exist in the Si and that they are three
in
in
individualj
the
numl>cr.
Exactly,
Must we not then infer that the individual is in the same way, and in Virtue ol the same quality which makes the State wisc\ wise
:
slain; or until
he hears the voice of the shepherd, that son, bidding his dog bark no more.
l.itr-
-i
hunger, or col J, or any other pain which the these Injured person may inflict upon him ems to be just, and, as say, his anger reEuses to he excited by them.
What point You remember
we
the
of
Iirrr.r.
brute animals, which
in ;
Full
i
ind you
//(•
done
th.it
l!
.is
on, .ind most ol thrui
I
th inks he haf
i
to It difl
Bui 'hit
sninr ot
si«!
which has already from
passion,
it
I**
t be put into the
Are
form
r.ik
mI'Ic
begin
>,
• I
oi
this
ion w
in.:
the
',
.it
on*
State
r I
replied,
.ill
oi
CI
\
ni.ittrr
the
laid.
conceive, fond ol fine cones and
l
ours and forms and
who
l the nine il ,-i mi. \nd iu.i\ not thr iu.m\ w hu h .irr doubles be dotibles, that in. ol one thing.
1
1 1
•
tmbi
1
knowledge, the
..•
nn iiiU
M ho listened
t
il
halves
.in.l
«'t
Ami
and
they .ur termed, will net Ik- denoted by these .nn more than by hc much esteemed by those of the opte faction; not that the greatest and most lasting uiiury
but by her of
whom
'
done
to her
by her opponents,
professing followers, the same
you suppose the accuser to
the greater
and the agre
is
own
number
best are
sav. that
them are arrant rogues, useless; in which opinion I of
Yes.
Ami
the reason
why
the
good are
useless has
now been explained' True.
Then
shall
we proceed
ruption ol the majority
is
to
show
that the cor-
also unavoidable,
and
not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other: that this
By
is
means.
all
And
us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. [490] Truth, as you will rememlet
whom
ber,
was
and
in all things; tailing in this,
postor,
his leader,
and had no part or
he tollowed always he was an imlot in
true philoso-
phy. Yes, that was said. Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of
him?
Certainly, he said.
And have we
not a right to say in his defence,
that the true lover of
—
knowledge
is
always
striv-
ing after being that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is
;
S.n to him, that, in
to
rs.
Precisely so, he said.
irec
their plot tor getting the ship out ol the cap-
.ot
thc\
and
with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed 00 their \o\age in such a manner as might be expelled ol them. Him
make
mankind are of a different stamp; ma\ be justK compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and Starernors 01
—
an appearance only, but will go on the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail. Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him. And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?
I
I
I
H MM
I
K
I
I'l
I
i;
I
\
i
I
of thingi
will.
\nJ w hen ii nth lUtDCd M] evil
in
the
>
the
«'l
u
aptain,
I
1
1
ffeci
i
hand which
tic
I
tiii.lt
-a
i
nid
.
Inii
ihould like
I
i
p the
Impossible. ct and health ol mind will beoi the com pany, and temperance ^ill follov uc, he replied*
I
;ri
is
will n longi
their
n set in array
i
.ui\
kmmhi
\\Ii\
he philosopher'i virtu
I
wordj and look
.it
t.uts, the
who
personi
tome oi them manifi uscU-ss. and the greatei numbei utterly de prated; we were then led to enquire into the unds oi these- accusations, and hate nom ai .uc thus described are
the point
asking
rived
.»t
joritj
bad, which question
i>t
oi
us bach to the examination
why
arc the
ma
necessity brought
and definition
oi
Exactly.
Ami we
have next
do
consider thecorruptions
whv
the philosophic nature,
so
—
many
.ire
sorewescapc spoiling lam speakmg oi those who were said to be useless but not wicked and, [jgi J when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philoso led and
—
manner
phv, what
of
men
are they
who
aspire
which is above them and of which thev arc unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation or which we speak. alter a protession
What
are these corruptions? he said.
will see it I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfecI
tion all the qualities
philosopher, seen
is
which we required in a which is seldom
a rare plant
among men.
causes?
In the hrst place there are their their courage, temperance,
and the
own
virtues,
rest of
them,
every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys
and is
distracts
from philosophy the soul which
the possessor of them.
That
Then
is
very singular, he replied.
there are
all
the ordinary goods of
life
—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections the State — you understand the in
III
»u
iti
to
I
>
1
i
.
\Ci\ true,
There
ii
reason
more injury than 11. 1st (
is
in
when under
natures,
the-
supposing thai thr
finest
alien condition
be ause
the con*
Adeimantus,
that the
inferior,
greater.
eriamly.
we
ni.i\
not say,
most gifted minds, when the) are ill edu< ated, bo ome pre eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit ot pure evil spring out ot a fulness o! nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, when as weak, naturi scarcclv capable o! any very great good or very ;
great evil
There think that you are right. [492] And our philosopher follows the same I
analogy
— he
er nurture,
into
all
is
like a plant
must
which, having prop-
grow and mature sown and planted in an
necessarily
virtue, but,
if
soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often sa\, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists. or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the
alien
who say these things the greatest of all And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts? When is this accomplished? he said. When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a public
Rare indeed. And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!
What
":. i;lt\
Whv, s.ii.l, u r know thai .1" w hethci -a animal, when the) fail Do meet with propci nutriment od
oi
nrm
rxjpular
he he carried awa\ bv the
I
not have the notion*
which he is speaking, but calls honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them
or passions ot
man's heart, as i: *p Within him any private training enable him to stand
oi
this
i
and ewl which the public in general have— he will do as thc\ do, and as thc\ arc, SUCO will he
>t that the iust and noble are the necessary, having never himself, seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the diifercnce between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator? Indeed he would. And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the temjKrs and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in paint;
rates; necessity will
And cessity,
\et.
said, there
I
which has not
is
l>ccn
a
compel him. still
greater ne-
mentioned.
What iv The gentle ;
EofCC oi attainder or confiscation or death, which, as yOU are aware, these new Sophist! and educators, who arc the public, apply
words are powerless. and in right good earnest. what opinion oi any other Sophist, or
when
their
>;
Now come
can be expected to o\er-
;>ri\ate person,
.
m
such an unequal contest? he replied. Milred, said, even to make the attempt oi tolly, there neither is, nor has
c.
1
been, nor
is
of character
what
duce whatever they
in
is
more than human, as the proverb would not have \uu I
ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved bv the power ol ( Jod, [493] as we may trul\ I
quite assent, he replied. let me crave your assent also to a fur-
Then
ther observation.
What Why,
whom deem
are vou going to say? that all those
the
many
call
mercenary individuals,
Sophists and
whom
to be their adversaries, do, in fact,
they teach
nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to Say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is
might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse. and what is the meaning ot his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or intunated; ami vou may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this.hecallshisknowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion ot what he means by the principles their
when he is not obliged, the so-called Diomedc will oblige him to pro-
which has had no other training
not included: lor
if
his judges
necessity of
—
sa\s.
man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them
a
ever likely to be, any different type
virtue but that which :s supplied by public opinion 1 speak, my friend, of human virtue
only;
ing or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from whom I have been describing? For when
him
wisdom.
I
—
praise.
are utterly ludicrous
firmation of their
And
yet the reasons
which they give
own
in con-
notions about the hon-
ourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?
No, nor
You
am
I
likely to hear.
recognise the truth of
Then
what
I
have been
me
ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather saying?
let
than of the many beautiful, [494] or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind? Certainly not.
Then
the world cannot possibly be a philos-
opher? Impossible.
And fall
therefore philosophers must inevitably under the censure of the world?
They must.
And
of individuals
who consort with
the
and seek to please them? That is evident. Then, do you see any way in which the
mob
philos-
opher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence these were admitted bv us to be the true philosopher's gifts.
—
Yes.
Will not such an one from his early child-
hood be
in all things first
among
all,
especially
I
irnts
his hod-'
like
.ire
R
II
I
it
I
I
I
us mental
ours
I
1
as he gets ol.lv
mn
theii
foi
i
\
r
persons
th.it
Ver
hut also
be iffirn
1
have.
would be
!*-
.
d
ipend the greatei pari oi their time- with one .mother in the hea\enlv .itc
i
on them .lie just; there Can be no doubt th.it every one oi them will take office as ttero necessity, .mil not alter the fashion t our pics .i
than night
my
i,
And i
i
I.
the true dai " hi
c
i
11
I
tion will gain most.
Yes, that will be the best way.
how,
if
And
I
think,
you have very well described ever, such a constitution might come in-
Socrates,
that
to being.
Enough then
and of the no difficulty
of the perfect State,
man who
bears
in seeing
how we
its
image
— there
shall describe
is
him.
There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.
ing also at politics and ruling lor the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty;
BOOK
VIII
and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then
[543] And so. (ilaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all edu-
they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public
cation
memorials and
and the bravest warriors are
sacrifices
and honour them,
the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but not, as in any case blessed and divine.
You
are a sculptor, Socrates,
statues of
our governors
if if
and have made
faultless in beauty.
and the pursuits of war and peace are common, and the best philosophers
also to be
to be their kings? That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.
Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed
DIALOG UES OF PLATO themselves, will take their soldier* and place thnn in houses such as \vc were describing,
common
and contain nothing and al>out their propremember what we agrccd remember that no one was to have any oi the ordinary possession! of mankind; they were to l>c warrior athletes ami guardians, rewhich
are
to all,
private, or individual;
;
1
ceiving from the other citizens, in lieu .
whole
nt, only their maintenance,
i
and they
themselves and
care ol
t.tkc
to
ot
the
democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and tamous. which ditlers from them all, and is the tourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do your of any other constitution which can be said to have a dis-
There arc lordships and prinarc bought and sold, and some other intermediate tonus ot go\crnmcnt. But these arc nondescripts and may be found tinct character.
ami now that aided,
which we digressed,
let
that
this division of
us find the point at
we may
return into
path.
'.I
you imyou had finished the d( icription of the State: you said that such a ami that the mar. was good State v.
There
no
is
1
lellencsand
Yes. he replied,
laid;
1
among
Squall)
Slate.
True,
which
cipalities
difficulty in returning;
now,
plied, then as
that
:
who answered
it, although, / $jj] as now morcexcellent things to relate
to
U hail
and man. And you said further, was the true iorm. then the others 'lie lalse lorms, vou said, as remember, that there were tour principal Ones, and that their defects, a