The Dialogues of Plato [1 ed.]

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The Dialogues of

PLATO 7 R

INSl ITED BY

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The Seventh 7

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Letter

HARWARD

William Bextox, Publr

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, CHICAGO- LOS DOS

•

INC.

TOROSTO GENEVA* SYDNEY-TOKYO •

-J- -J-

of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, is reprinted arrangement with Ozfoid University Press

The Dialogues b>

The Seventh by

J.

Epistle

is

reprinted from

The

Platonic Epistles, translated

Harward, by arrangement with Cambridge University Press

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO The Great Books is

published with the editorial advice of the faculties of

The University of Chicago

© 1952 by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

copyricht under international copyright

l nion t

All Rights Reserved under Pan American and Universal Copyright Conventions by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Library of Congress Catalog Card

Inc.

Number: 55-10317

BI< K ,u

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in

NOTE

\i

Plato, Pi \i' ion o( in

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|fj

triston .\nA Perictionc, i

one

"i tlu-

ton

is

s.iul

CodrUS

tO

...

.

I

lis

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^

born

ftmil) u.is, 00 DOth MRAS Ml S

CRATYLl PHAEDRI

TIMAEUS

*8

OKI

I

S

us

'1

EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY

Mil

III

I

S

US

149

SOPHIS1 STA SMAN

»74

PHILEBUS

14a

SYMPOSIUM Ml NO

\S

1

l'AKMl \!!)l

s

[ON

I

1

51a 551

l

LAWS

BOOK BOOK II CRITO 213 BOOK III P11AEDO 220 BOOK IV GORGIAS 252 BOOK V THE REPUBLIC 295 VI BOOK BOOK ^95 BOOK VII BOOK II 310 BOOK VIII BOOK III 3^4 BOOK IX BOOK IV 34^ BOOK X BOOK V 356 BOOK XI BOOK VI 373 BOOK XII BOOK VII THE SEVENTH LETTER, 800 200

I

I

vu

553 1

686 697 7'3

743

77'

784

CHARMIDES, or Temperance ONS

mi DlALOGUI

Ol

Cstrn as, n.

v >

RATI*,

The Polscstt

'.•,

*

•-

who ,

\\ tn bdai evening

nem

I

(hi

Porch

ol thi

K

i

*

I returned From the having been a good while away, thought that should like to go and look at my old haunts. So went into the palaestra ot Taurcas. which is over against the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon. and there Found a number ot' persons, $ ot w horn I knew, hut not all. My \ sit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides; and Chacrephon. who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saving. How did vou escape, Socra-(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.) i

arm)

IS the

which

beauty, or both. Critias, glancing

// 5^/ invited

my

were coming

in.

rr*

11

attention to tome youth

and talking

other, followed bv a crowd.

Socrates, he said,

I

DOisilj

t would enquire into ihe nature uciuust pursue the enquir) into health

I

i

4

and not into w hai

.inc.

extra m

ii

\ ri

tic.

And he who ju physician as

a

wl

v

i

fudge of the whal relati

\

li

IM

icTM C

II

I"

htly will

physician

in

v

t!er and ter

;

••

I

Are not these, mv friend, the n vantages which are to Ik- gained from And are not we looking aod seekin] something more than is to Ik- found ifl That is very likely, he That is very likely, 1 said; and vcr] we have been enquiring to no purp insight?

Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, science oi science, M\d ot the absence

who

will

u.ils.

would seem, excepl the phy sician cm have this knowledge; and therefore noi the wise man; he would have to he a physician as well as a wise man. at all,

ledge

ih.it

cause, in addition to the

.1

rannot.

one

know

ot

this

were supposing

is

wisdom?

at hrst, the

If,

wise

discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well ulty of

;

and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of

'•'•

l

led to inter, because

I

observe that

if

thil

dom. some strange consequences would Let us, it you please, assume the p

follow.

iences, and further ado was originally suggested, thai w is the knowledge ot whal we know and know. Assuming all this, still, upon further

allow, as

consideration,

am

I

doubtful.

nether

I

wisdom, such as this, would do us much For we were wrong. think, in suppov we were saying just now, that such v. ordering the government of house M would be a great benefit. I

How

so: he said.

Why,

I

said,

we were

far too

the great benefits which

ready to admit

mankind would

ob-

from their severally doing the things which they knew, and committing the things ot which they are ignorant to those who were better acquainted with them.

tain

Were we not I

right in

making thatadmission 3

think not. very strange, Socrates'

How Bv

the

vou; and

dog of was thinking I 1

d,

there

as

I

much

agree with iust

now

1)1

12

A LOG LIES

consequences would we were on the wrong track; tor however ready we may be to admit that this is wisdom, [ij$] I certainly cannot make out what good this sort of thing docs to us. What do you mean he said; wish that you could make me understand what you mean.

when

I

follow,

said that strange

and

thai

I

v.as a! raid

OF PLATO happy; but I think that you mean to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, 1 174] such for example future.

one

:

I

dare say that what

1

am

saying

is

nonsense.

and yet it a man has any teeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined. replied;

like that, he said. Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the conI

trol of

and

wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers

set

up

the true prophets in their place as

the revealers of the future.

Now

I

quite agree

mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear this is a point which we have not yet Critias, that

—

been able to determine. Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else. But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just

answer me that small question. knowledge of shoemaking?

Do

you mean

a

God forbid. Or of working

in brass?

Or

in wool, or wood, or anythingof thatsort? No, I do not. Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine

who

according to knowledge is according to knowledge, and yet they are not allowed by you to be lives

happy, for these

of

it

live

as

him you

mean him,

I

I

was saying, knows the some

are speaking or of

but there are others as well.

some one who knows the past and present as well as the future, and is ignoYes,

said,

I

rant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, and if there is. you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men. Certainly he is. Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him

happy? Not all equally, he replied. But which most tends to make him ha ppy the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the

game

of draughts?

Nonsense about the game of draughts.

Or

of computation?

No.

Or

of health

That

And

is

3

nearer the truth, he said.

knowledge which is nearest of all, knowledge of what' The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil. Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this time hiding from I

said,

me

that

is

the

the fact that the

life

according to knowl-

makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge include edge all

is

not that which

the sciences, but one science only, that of

good and

evil.

For,

let

me

ask you, Critias,

you take away this, medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver whether the art of the pilot will not clothes? equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war? Quite so. And yet, my dear Critias, none of these whether,

if

—

things will be well or beneficially done, science of the

Certainly not.

that he

Is

else.'

Yes,

I

I

who,

as the prophet,

if

the

good be wanting.

True. But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of use. And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however

much we assume

that wis-

I

tloii

\i

i

A

\v

i\ she a ill have good undei lui

och< I.

•..

ii

uii> c ol

An.

w

I

wisdom do

1

1

u- %

il«»

only

the effct

the

ranee, 1

hat

is

K

an)

«>t

them

mid

I

i

not

«!«>

theit

othei arts,

the

ol

is

good friend;

not he the produCCI

«•!

(

tor that

we have

just

mv

now

.nt.

true.

can

wisdom

be advantageous,

giving no advantage? Th.u, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.

was not far in fearing that could have no sound was quite right in tie notion about wisdom; awxiating myself; tor that which is admitted to be the best ot" all things would never have seemed to us useless, it had been good tor anything at an enquiry. But now have been utterly defeated, and have tailed to discover what that is to which the imposcr ol names gave this name ot temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could then. Critias. th.u

I

I

I

I

I

be burly granted: tor

we admitted

that there

was a science ot science, although the argument said No, and protested against us: and

We admitted

hid en

h.ipp\

VVht

it.

w hethei you have th!«»

Miir that WJU must

quite

a\\cA

i

\

I.

I

tlir

ol

\c\i>\\c.

hut

lippothales,

said; uli.it

1

realU [H-tlr^t lo\r \oti \\a\c tound'

wh

II

noble ind

.»

wish

I

th.it

would hrvoui me with thr exhibition which you haw been making to thr rest t the company, and then shall be able to ju whether you know wh.it a lovei OUght tO (20$ sbout his love, either to the youth him you

ow

\otir

ii

hoiio

ful lovi

to you,

and ma)

I

;

or to others.

sclt.

you surely do not

\.i\. Socrates, he said;

tach any importance to what he

is

at-

you disown the love ot the person whom he s.ivs th.it you but deny thai make verses or address compositions to him. le is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad. c ) lippothales, I said, it you have ever made any verses or songs m honour ot vour favourite, I Jo not want to hear them; but want to know the purport ot them, that I may he able to judge ot vour mode oi approaching vour lair one. :^pus will Ik able to tell you, he said; tor it, as he avers, the sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of them. I

*o

you mean,

said, that

I

!

I

I

1

1

I

i

es,

indeed, said Ctesippus;

I

know

only too

and very ridiculous the tale is: for though he is a lover, and very devotedly

well;

love, he has

nothing particular

his beloved

which

is

a child

not that ridiculous?

to talk

might not

He can only

al-

in

about to

say.

Now

speak of the

wealth of Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses,

and

games, and at the Isthmus, and at Xemea with four horses and single horses these are the tales which he composes and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who was a connexion of their victory at the Pythian

—

the family, setting forth

how

in virtue of this

was hospitably received by an Lysis; this ancestor was himself be-

relationship he

ancestor of

gotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us,

and we are obliged

When

I

heard

to listen to

this,

I

said:

O

him. ridiculous Hip-

•

hone-

conquered and won

mi. h

u be »lij*

»

you, the more you h thr more iidu ul( i.iiu

this t.urrst

and

best

ol

I

dents.

nil

are I

tilled

)o

more I

with the

;

spirit ot

you not agree with

And

he said. the more

difficult

!*•

ii

hi

'I

when any one

tair.

him,

I

1i

I

.in

.i

f

',iin,

1

we

s.imr as the good, «.

>i 1

.is

1

\

u

ill

hr unjust will

be the

;

i

vi

m

Ik-

1

1

1 .

1 1

I

w ith

tlir

i

en. •rni.

ol

1 1

is

n.

I

True. position ol ouri which, Bui thai too was you w '1! remember, has been already refuted

We

anything

is

to be

done?

men who argue meats: nor the

to be

done? Oi

1

is

there

can only, like the wise

I

in courts,

sum up

tin

neither the beloved, not the lover, like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor

there were tucfa

.i

cannot remember all—

ot

whom we

number it

none

d

ipoke

them

that

ot these ait

I

lair

.it

\

I

pany. I

said,

ho

parting: Menexenui and lous ih.it vnu two boj and
ui

would think nu\ seem to I

If..: I..

.

lie. ir

.1

in.

.mi

I

In-

hacei ol d

m

.1

.1

discoursing 1

union and to oth

bad; and

diai

lover,

thai

ol

true

whi •

virtue, 01

and

theme,

quite

man and worth)

I

li>M

such an one

I

deem to be the true mud harmony than thai ol

lusions.

•

the

will be

the lyre, or an) pleasant instrument ol music;

tion

he has in his own life words and deeds arranged, not or in the Phrygian mode, nor yei

been our

tor truly

a

harmonj

ol

in the

Ionian,

in the

Lydian,

mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such m\ one makes me merry with the sound ot his voice; ami when bul in the true

him

hear

coui

Hut

I

\

[ellenic

am thought to be a lover of disam in drinking in his words.

;er

a

I

man whose

words

actions do not agree with his

m\ annoyance

me; and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then seem to be a hater ot discourse. As to Socrates, have no knowledge ot his words, but of old, as would seem, have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments are natural to [ iSg] him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and is

to

I

I

I

shall be delighted to be interrogated

such as he

having

and

to learn of

Solon, "that

many

is,

I

him:

would

by a

man

not be annoyed at

shall

for

fain

I

too agree with

grow

old, learning

must be allowed to add "ot the good only." Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the things." But

I

—

is younger, or not as yet in repute anything of that sort is of no account with me. And

teacher

therefore, Socrates,

I

give you notice that you

and confute me as much as ever you and also learn of me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and ^.we

may

teach

like,

your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the dirTerence of our ages.

a proof of

tl

I

I

Ami

\\ ill

I

on the pi u ill listen,

cian, attuned to 1 Eairej

I

I

i

lira

d

am delighted beyond measure: compare the man and his words, and note the harmonj and correspondence t them.

ol Ins

'

I

(shall

ing,

no harm which w.is firsi ii

and

other

own

whom

mode

pr
.

ol Ins ii

h.i\r

i

mm

-K, lir said; but triil. i\

until yes

even

lot the \t the Mine tnur he w» klr bed, ind mi down .»t my feet, tnd then hr 1

c-1

1

1

1

him

sun

ill '

Oenoc whithei

turn from

had gone

I

nn runaway

ptu

in

ilavc Satyrus, .»s meant same othei mattei had not come in the- w .iv; on my return, when a had done nipper and were about to retire to rest, ins brotnej said to me: Protagoras is come. w.is going to Mm .u once, and then thought that the night was fai spent But the moment sleep left me aftei mv fatigue, got up and came bithei dsrei t. I. who knew the \eiv COUXageOUJ madness of the man, said: What is the matter? Has Proi>t

have told you,

to

I

I

I

tagoras robbed you oi anything? lie replied, laughing:

Yes, indeed

has,

In-

wisdom which he keeps from

the

:i

I

ii

r

C

wh) ever) one ii 10 and the laws; suppose, I

and

thr s.unr ir.ulinrss

l»r

intn

intereti

in

ii

say, thai tdrrr

pU

I..

teaching one another Bute playing, do you ites, thai the sons ol good flute would be nunc likeh to be than think not. Would not the sons ol bad ones? ihcit sons grow up to be distinguished or un distinguished according to their own natural >

*.

i

>
positcs have some qualities in common; e\en the parts of the Eace which, as we were saying 1

I

I

1

and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar. and one ot them is like another ot them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike. And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small before, arc distinct

degree of likeness? Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view. [$32] Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the

examples which you mentioned instead. you admit the existence of folly? I

1(

1

thai p Km h is dot done sw iftly, and th.u w h nes dowly .

le

I

I

win, h

And

|llst.

replied;

th.it

thai

rence between them, Bui what matti please; and lei us assume, il you you pic-. isc will, th.it justice is holy, and thai holiness is

I

!•

is

rid

1

P.irJon me.

thai

cannot limply

proposition thai justice

holiness

I'

I

And

ilh mc*. I

fool

trmp
u would u m. i\ be permitted to give th behalt, .uul whether \ou would

like justice;

u hethei w

I

Do

.isscnted

And

.1.

is done in the same done by the same; and th.u win, h .111 Opposite in. inner 1>\ the OppOf

which

th.u

m

is

agreed.

I

le

(

tace more,

I

said,

is

there anything

I

ful-

Yrs.

To which There

And

the only opposite

the ugly?

is

the evil

there anyth::

is

There is. To which the only opposite There is no other.

And

is

no other.

is

there

is

;

the acute in sound'

True.

To which the only opposite is tl. There is no other, he s.nd. Inn that. Then

every Opposite has one opposite only

and no more? I

le

assented.

Then now,

I

said, let us recapiti:

missions. First of

all

we admitted

that every-

thing has one opposite and not more than one? We du!

And we

admitted also that what was done

opposite ways was done by Yes.

And

that

which was done

foolishly, as

further admitted, was done in the opposite to that

which was done

in

o;

we way

tern.

do.

And

is

not

is

true,

wisdom

the verv opposite of

folly

That

he

foolishly

said.

And when men

act

And that which was done temperate! done by temperance, and that which was done

rightly

and advanta-

geously they seem to you to be temperate: Yes, he said. And temperance makes them temperate?

I

ed.

And done bv Yes.

that

which

opposite:,

:

is

done

in opposite

ways

is

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

50

And

one thing

is

done by temperance, and

be said;

in opposite

yet unjust

And good

therefore by opposites:

— then

folly

is

is

good sense 1

(i

Clearly.

li

And do you remember

that lolly has already

sense

is

good counsel

doing

in-

ceed

ran ted. they succeed.

said, or

I

1

wisdom?

And you would admit

1

if

they do not suc-

;

been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of

the\ succeed.

the

existence

of

goods 2

assented.

And we

in

just:

the opposite of temperance?

He

;

that be admitted.

Yes.

ways?

Certainly.

And

let

And temperance

Yes.

And

and

are temperate,

quite another thing by follv?

said that everything has only

one

Yes.

And

opposite?

is

the

good

that

which

is

expedient for

man?

Yes.

[333] Then, Protagoras, which of the two we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they assertions shall

Yes, indeed, he said: and there are

things which

may

some

be inexpedient, and

are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in

them good. thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded mv

themselves and in their functions, like the parts

business,

Which

two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord

of a face.

can they be said to agree

if

assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?

He

assented, but with great reluctance. are the same,

and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. as before justice

man

you think that an unjust

can be tem-

perate in his injustice? I

should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to

acknowledge may be found

And

shall

I

this

which nevertheless many

to assert.

argue with them or with you?

I

replied. I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will. Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opin-

ion or not.

My

object

is

to test the validity of

and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial. Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouragthe argument;

ing; at length, he consented to answer.

Now

[334]

then,

I

said,

begin

at the

and answer me. You think

that

beginning

some men

and gently

When you

said: say, Protagoras, that things

inexpedient are good, do you ent for

man

and do you of

many

mean

inexpedi-

only, or inexpedient altogether?

call

the latter good'

Certainly not the

is

Then temperance and wisdom

Do

I

of these

how

or agree: for

everything

call

things

last,

he replied; for

I

know

— meats, drinks, medicines, and

which arc inexpediman, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses: and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians ten thousand other things, ent for

always forbid their patients the use of

oil

in

their food, except in very small quantities, just

enough

to extinguish the disagreeable sensa-

tion of smell in meats

When

and

sauces.

he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember

PR( what he

\s thru,

talking aboul

is

il

I

»

I

\(.
i

had U

you uric going you would have had t.. r.o-.c youi m>\N hav ing ni< li a bad memoi \ will '

;:i>!

.

,

tocul youi answers ihorter,

mr w

il

I

hkr

!

ir

i

you would take partun

tth JTOU.

W'lut do son mean? hr said: bow am to shoiten m\ answi .hall ike thru) too

id mi red

I

I

not.

•a.i'.lv

I

.Hid lo,

Hut the truth

laid.

-hurt rtU'i

ask

insH er u hat appears tO tnr to In- short enough, or what appears to you to he short 1

quest I

you can speak and

said, thai

A

otTi iboui the same things ai such length thai wordi nevei tcrnifd to tail, or with nich brevity thai no one could vise fewer

Beach

them. Phase therefore. [$$$] it \ou talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method. oi

item, I

he replied,

fought, ami tation

it

hail

I

which

many

mv

words followed the method a battle of

adversaries desired, as

you want me to o\o. should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere. saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and sidcred that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: ProtagoI

I

do not w ish to force the conversation upon vou if you had rather not, but when you are ras.

I

me

such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you willing to argue with

in

sav oi yourself, are able to

have discussions

in

shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for

master of wisdom; but I cannot manI I only wish that could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.

you are

when

1

enou] have heard,

have

that

is

|

is |

lid.

!

Shall

!*-!!

a

these long speeches:

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand, and in his left

hand caught hold

of this old cloak

said: We cannot let you go, Socyou leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to

|

should repU

|

same

in

ili.it

ot in\

,

I

hut

won!,!

thq

ply. tad t) and me in the same stadium, you must bid him sl.u ken his speed to mine, fol quickly, and he can run tad in like I

manjM discoursing, you must ask

him

to shorten bis

answers, and keep to the tirst; it not, how can there l>e anv For discussion is one thing, ami oration

is

quite another, in

But you

he did

at

di

mak

mv hum.

sec. Socr.r

d Pro claim to sj>eak in h way, jual as vou claim to s|>eak in \ours. lerc Alcibiades interposed, and Callias, is not a true statement ot the our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech in this he yields the palm to Pi ras: but I should be greatly surprised it he

may

fairly

1

a

—

yielded to any living

man

in the

ing and apprehendir. oras will

confess that he

make is

power of hold-

j.imcnt.

N

a similar admission,

and

inferior

mentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, not, when a qui let him ask and answer

—

is

away from answering, making

asked, slipping

the point, and in-

a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue not that Socrates is likely

stead of

(

—

I

although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory ). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the than Protagoras; that is my view, ami man ought to say what he thinks. When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one Critias. I believe went on to say: C ) Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be get

I

will be

—

bound

for that,

—

of mine.

He

a partisan of Protagoras:

rates, for

if

des,

who

side.

But we should not be partisans either of

and

this led Alcibia-

loves opposition, to take the other

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

52

Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.

[337 J Prodicus added: That, to

me

to be well said, for those

Critias,

who

seems

are pres-

an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president: he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper

ent at such discussions ought to be impartial

length.

hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval: Callias said that he

equality, for both sides should be impartially

heard, and yet an equal

meed should

not be

assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise.

And

I

as well as Critias

would beg

you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of goodwill, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke

many of the company applauded words. Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are Prodicus, and

his

against nature.

grace then,

if

How we,

great

would be the

who know

dis-

the nature of

and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height things,

as such are

of dignity, but should only quarrel with

one

another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, [338] but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into

would not

let

me

ofT,

choose an arbiter. But

and they begged me

to

said that to choose

an

I

umpire of discourse would be unseemK was inferior, then the interior or worse ought not to preside over the better: or if he was equal, neither would that be well: for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him.1 And it you say, "Let us have a better then," to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him: not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Prois not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many the person chosen

—

questions as he likes to ask,

manner answer me; and

let

him

in like

he seems to be not answering the precise question if

very ready at asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. arbiter

—

all

And of

this

you

will

require no special

shall be arbiters.

This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows: I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; [339] ano this I conceive to be the power of ^

knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and 1 have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to

PRO! iron

(lie

poem

01

I

kiu>\\

to you w hole i

the

I

\
Mtu>n be

And

in

a contradiction,

good

No, not

I

as

not agree with the ot a

m

\

M

becomii

lid not

Simonid*

icw. diat

"I lardl)

I

replied.

\

fir*

1

in

1

man

.1

contradiction? he asked.

.1

And

same

word

ol

you

do

s.i\. "I

Pittacua, albeii the

wise man: Hardl) can

a

man

will observe th.»t this

he

is

said

two

s.i\-

poet.

know it. And Ao you 1

.ire

think,

consistent

lie

said, tluit the

:

I

I

little

I

either in his

first

I

had received

I

blow from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So 1 turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. [ $40] I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when bea

leaguered by Achilles, aid him, saying: Brother dear,

let

hut

tor

trom himself.

summons

the Swnois to

us both together stay the force of

not

something

sa\m;*,

diflei

Pitta< us

does not say; oni des s.ns, th.u bardl) can man become go hut hardly can a man he good: and our Jricnd Prodicus would maintain that being, l'r.1

ras,

not the

is

same

with himself.

sistent

becoming;

as

Simomdes

.ind

thc\

1!

not in

is

dare- say that

I

and many others would

Prodicttl

say, S

On the one hand hardly For the gods hope nude virtu But on the other hand u

•

,

become g

.

height,

Then,

to retain virtue, h

I

sit ion. is

Prodicus heard and approved; but P:

Your

ras said:

correction. Sckt.i-

greater error than

which you are

or his second assertion.

Many of the audiencecheered and applauded this. And felt at first giddy and faint, as if

us.

1'itt.u 11s,

imagines, tor repeating thai which be

himself,

turther on in the poem, forgetting,

and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, "Hardly can a man be .!." which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be

the hero.

or. is

then he blatnrs

are not the same, then

said, think so (at the same time Yes, could not help tearing that there might he .something in what he said). And you think otherwise? Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both : First of all. premising as hisown thought, "I lardly can a man become truly good"; and

wrong

•

Quite right, said Prodk

utterance

then a

wish

I

\..i the

I

ingi

.ill

\rm, w hu h is irn sui h

»:

1

1

J

part

on is

•

.is

m wh.it follows he meant t» ar.;ue

il

.1

litth

:

|

.1

diiiu ulty in

bo

"ii

:

liblc tor a tiiiie,.ind onl\ fol

become good, and

t^W. wish Protagoras either to ask or an ;

:

I

iwct .is he is inclined; but would rathei hive done with pocmssndodes, it hedoes not objo t. and come back to the question about which w .is asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end d that The talk about the I

but

I'i.'

would do allies, snd

In(

me

commonplace inter vulgar company have re-

like a

tainment to which a who, because they are not able to verse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound ot their own vo and conversation, by reason d their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring course;

i

tor a great

their

sum

the voiee ot a flute instead ot

own breath, to among them:

course

are real gentlemen

no

he the

medium

but where the

will or

will not 1sunt.11/

\\r

see

the argument

we ma)

th.u

a

rates rlsr.

and men of education, you

the

medium, and which they

anil in

own

pany

voices are

carry on by turns

w uh one another.

to talk

think

like this of ours,

And

and men such

a

com-

as

we

do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they profess to be,

are saying; people

some

who

cite

them

that

!

ashamed by then

when

tii

were superadded, d

that

s.u.l

I

i

answer.

So I

I

haw

s.tid:

I

)o not

imagine, asking qui .inn.; up ,\

1

is

to ask. *

that

to sa)

thai he docs e>

is

evil

which

when near, and lessei will gram thai also.

become greater and smaller, and more and iewer.and differ in degree? For if any one sa\ s: "Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain" To that I should reply: And do they ditier in anything but in pleasure and pain.' There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a

—

weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which skilful

outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more

numb

VI

Ik

at

11

'

consist in

d

not doing or in avoiding the

be the

ta,\

ing prim ipte

:•

Would

Inn:

oi

an ol measuring be tl or would the power oi

the

not

ciple;

not the latter that deceiving art whicfl us Wander Up and down and take the things

one tune ot which in our actions and

at

both

great a\m\ small

:

v.

I

our

in

But the

ait

I

would do away with the and. showing the truth, won 1

h the

soul at last to find rest in the truth,

thus

our

N.i\e

life.

Would

acknowledge

orally

plishes this result

is

Yes, he said, the

and

not

that tin

art

the art ot measureo

an

turement.

1

human

Sup,

depend on the choice oi od on the knowledge ot when a man to

choose the greater or less, either Ives or to each otlu-

there of the relations of pleasure to pain other

than excess and defect, which means that they

lux

.1.

thickness and arc in then

oi

at a

knowledge

a

tk>n

one

is

:

Would

and

when

delect,

and

number, when the question and e\en The world will assent, :

:

not

ot

1

not ki

of measuring,

ot excess

life

and

id whether would be the

distance: what

principle of our li\es

—

in

:i.

the

a

I

is

1

will

they

:

Protagoras himself thought that thev W

Well then,

my mends.

that the salvation ot

ny

I

human

to consist in the right choice

pains,

—

in the

to

them:

lit; 1

res

and

choice of

and the and remoter, must not

er,

this

measurm:

be a con-

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

62 sideration of their excess ity in

and delect and equal-

relation to each other

This

is

;

undeniably true.

to introduce

names, whether he

to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful.

And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art ami sciem They will agree, he said. The nature ot that art or

you said that pleasure olten got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we reiused to allow this, and you rejoined: C) Pro-

what

is

disposed

However,

by whatever name he preiers to call them, 1 will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in

my science will be a

matter of future consideration; but the existence of such a science lurnishes a demonstrate answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, it you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then

tagoras and Socrates,

would beg my tnend Prodicus not his distinction of

is

the

meaning

—

of

sense oi the words. Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the

others.

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant' The honourable work is also usclul and good? This was admitted. Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the belter.

And

this inferiority of a

man

to himselt

merely ignorance, as the superiority of a

is

man

wisdom.

tell us being overcome by pleasure if not this? what you call such a state: if we had immediately and at the time answered "Ignorance,"

to himself

you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in

ion

and being deceived about important mat-

ters

?

—

and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure; ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare their choice of pleasures

—

that they are the physicians of ignorance; but

you,

who

are under the mistaken impression

that ignorance

of

not the cause, and that the art speaking cannot be taught, nei-

is

which I am go yourselves, nor send your children, to

ther

the Sophists,

who

are the teachers of these

—you take care of your money and give them none; and the that you are the worse public and private both —Let things

result

off

is,

in

life:

us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general:

And now

I

should like to ask you,

[358] Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not? They all thought that what

I

said

was en-

And

To

agree,

I

said, that the pleasant is

the good, and the painful evil.

And

here

I

all

is

assented.

not ignorance the having a false opin-

is

unanimously assented. no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less. this also they

Then,

said,

I

All of us agreed to every

Well,

said, there

I

fear or terror; ticularly

and

like

agree with

me

expectation of

is

word

of this.

a certain thing called

here, Prodicus,

I

should par-

to

know whether you would

in

defining this fear or terror as

evil.

Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror. I said; but let me ask our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be

Never mind, Prodicus,

whether,

if

evil ?

[359] That also was universally admitted. Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us

he said

tirely true.

Then you

They

at first.

I

how

he can be right in what in what he said

do not mean

quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five

\(

I

ttol

i

cm

.

none

Uir

ii

V

thrin

tii

i»t

lliciu

them had

oi

\\

Wai

like »t\) «'ihrt

which heaiterwaidi made ii

the

ili.u

bui

-in

•

w ere

in to

ik

I)

And

the others.

pro

follow ing

iv


i \ And » ill show yoil VI li-it COCK ir.c t«. U llir n.itu: the task, ind w li.u ion ol discourse 1

n

this,

»>i

the •

I

I

i

in

lic-.u

;

and

if I

do

ridiculous manner,

onl) venture to

I

chit to a ver) inartistic *!*»

laugh

i>.»t

impm\

and

me.

ai

foi

I

before you

isc

am

cagei to heaj youi wisdom: and must ihereiorc ask you and youi disciples to refrain son oJ Vxio hua, from laughing. And now, (

let

mc

ol

those

)

to .i^L

idiculous questions which

t

am

I

There

does not. Well, then,

is

said, since

next question. Shall

wc

we

not be

happy

is it

We

not

solemn sage

ma) be

that wealth

required to

is

easily is

wc esteem good? No us

tell

which

this,

answered; for every one a good.

will say

are not health

and beauty goods, and

there be any doubt that

power, and honours goods 3

He

good

birth,

own

in one's

and

land, are

other goods are there

3

I

said.

and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods: For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

They

are goods, said Cleinias.

Very

well,

I

said;

and where

tind a place for

in the

wisdom

company-

— among the

think whether we have left out any considerable goods. I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. I

Cleinias,

th.it

said,

Upon recollection, I said, indeed am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all. I

to

am

Z4

I

him

I

Bute-players

fortunate ami successful in

I

I

.>

.

assented.

le

are not the

Writing and reading (

scnU

And

one

rtun.itr

the dangers ol

it

tl.

the •

d in war, in V

you W

rather take the risk

general, or with

— in

I

3

With

a

wise one.

you were

it

ill,

whom

would you

have as a companion in a dangerous wise physician, or an ignorant one? :sc

You

man

is

le

lllnc

one.

think,

sank thai

I

more fortunate than

rant one I

in

let:-

ertainly.

Amid

to act

with an

if]

3

assented.

[280] Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for b) wisdom no man would e\cr err, and therefore he must act rightK and SUCO or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer. agree

the goods.

And now,

!

flute?

We

goods or not?

Among

know,

say of temperance, justice, cour-

age: do you not verily

we

ing his SUI

\

And

assented.

And what What do you

.

th.it.

company would you company with a wise

other personal g He agreed.

Can

what was the meat isdom is

more fortunate on None, certainly.

Certainly, he said.

And

a

he simple minded south was

I

Ami

things do

list

may know

child

obsei

assented.

the

.iskcd

1
o not .ill nun desire happiness? Ami yet, perhaps, tins is one put

do you

\\'h\

I

contrived in a

I

general conclusion, that he

who

wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, said, our making tb sion that we should be happy and tormany good things were present with us I

.

3

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

70

He assented. And should we

be happy by reason of the

presence of good things, ; if they profited us

if

they profited us not,

they profited us, he said. they profit us,

if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink, and did not drink,

And would

should we be profited? Certainly not, he said.

Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them.' For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked? Certainly not, he said.

And

if a person had wealth and all the goods which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?

of

No

indeed, Socrates.

as the possession of

if you have the use as well good things, is that suffi-

my opinion. And may a person use them Yes, in

That

is

of a thing

one

an

is

nor an

He

quite true, is

far

said.

And

the

wrong

use

worse than the non-use; for the

and the other is neither a good [281] You admit that?

evil,

evil.

assented.

Now

in the working and use of wood, is not which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter? Nothing else, he said. And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

spoke is

in the use of the

at first

goods of which

we

—wealth and health and beauty,

not knowledge that which directs us to the

right use of them,

and regulates our

practice

about them?

He thing,

and every use of a which gives a man not

in every possession

knowledge

A A A A A

poor man.

weak man or weak man. noble

man

man?

a strong

or a

mean man?

mean man.

And

a

coward would do

geous and temperate

man

less

than a coura-

;

And an indolent man less than an active man? He assented. And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? All this I

was mutually allowed by said, Cleinias, the

sum

us.

of the mat-

appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are

more

able to minister to the evil principle

which

them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing? That, he replied, is obvious. What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result

are indifferent,

is

that

—that other things

and that wisdom

is

the only

good, and ignorance the only evil? assented.

[282] Let us consider

a further point,

I

said:

Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, life, and the and good fortune in the use the inference of them, is given by knowledge, is that everybody ought by all means to try and

and

a right use, of the things of

right use of them,

assented.

Then

man?

He

agreed.

And

—

rich

rules

that

He

I

ter

either rightly or

rightly. I

me,

he not make fewer mistakes.? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? Certainly, he said. And who would do least a poor man or a

Then,

cient to confer happiness?

wrongly? He must use them

tell

Yes.

Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? True. Well, Cleinias, but

said, O tell me, what do posman, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom.' Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would

And

sessions profit a

or

If

only good-fortune but success? He again assented.

make

—

himself as wise as he can?

II

M

II, l.i

I

;

a lien i.uu tins

tic

iu-i

01

|

man

think-, tint

iMiir. t.u

guardian

i

oi

lie

.

money, from

tli. »n

iiiuir

friend oi

i

i

u hethei iii.tu oi it range d and praya to them thai il>r\ would imparl c

i

to

.'in

you,

is

mm

.ii

i

dishonourable,

.ill

Clcinias; ooi in .m\ one to be blamed foi d an) honourable aervice oi ministration to ani

whether

in. in,

gel

w isdom.

v

1

I lovei

k>

you

01

not,

i

Ins .inn

il

||

led by

us to h.isr

thnn

and play, and [wait

jest

t0

laid.

I

aid, I quite agree, and

m

re

think that you

tti

I

profoun

said:

.•.hi.

said, Cleiniaa,

I

it

wisdom can

only

be

and does not come to man ipontanc ously; for this is i point which h.is still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon bj you and me •it.

But

think, Socrates, thai

I

wisdom can be

taught, he said.

you sa) having saved

hi

lid;

I

and

I

shall

i

words. Well. -t\:

ell,

not

C

7*

linn

all

1

H thcii

(

U then r\:striu

thru nor

"i

oi

(

in.

we

I

i

which

If-iin

i

I

!

1

.

.1

Ami w

in K\

I

nam

just

that proved, 11 you ma) remembi could affirm negative; foi no one could affirm

(hat

>

l

tesippus,

I


e sure. And now suppose

Her.

he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural iks

we do

whefl we name cannot

Her. other,

failure.

natures?

Her. Soc. tor in

I

as things

quite agree with you.

And

naming a part giving names men speak. is

Her. That Soc.

And

not

3

is

is

a sort of action

not

naming

and

also a sort

2

And we saw

that actions were not relabut had a special nature of

own-

Then

I

the

we name with

)o

we

not give intormatior.

|

to their

the threads of the V

of distn

Her.

And

Soc.

the shuttle

which has

with something

And

Then

Soc. well

— and

is

the instrument of the

to be cut has

3

that

which has

will

woven

or

means

use

the

like a teacher

like

.

name

:

well

— and

the well

3

Her. Yes. Soc. And when the weaver uses the whose work will he be using well.3 Her. That of the carpenter.

And

is

every

man

shuttle,

a carpenter, or the

3

Her. Only the Soc.

to be

the weaver will use the shuttle

well

skilled onlv

Her. Yes. Soc.

}

Her. Certainly we do. Then a name is an instrument of teaching and ot distinguishing natures, as the shut-

Soc.

success.

agree.

Soc. But again, that to be cut

I

Soc.

means

argument would lend us to inSoc. fer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other shall

.i

and distinguish things according

teacher

Her. Precisely.

Her.

ask

;

tive to ourselves,

way

I

wca\cr Her. Assuredly.

Her. True. Soc.

that

\*-

|

I

tle is

speaking

has a relation to acts, of action

of speaking

true.

is

if

on n.

question about names: will \ou BOI I Regarding the name as an instrument.

ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument 3 Anv other mode of speaking will result in error and of speaking,

•'•'

.»

kind of action?

a

the

tr

some

Hennogenes, there is Orestes the man of the mountains who appean to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness sin,

)

nature.

Her, That

>

.

N .

And

very likely, Socrates.

his father's

name

is

also according

into

).

antalus; and int

1

ident ot tr.idit

1

I

he nan

father,

Hem

/

meaning, although hard

to he ui

sentence, which some call him and use the one half, and others who use the other halt call him tifl Am r. t! 'her signify the nature ot the tod, and the business :>rrss the name, as we were savin nature. Pot there is none who is more the thor of life to us and to all, ih;m the

cause re.ilU like into

two

.1

1

parts, tor

I

king of

Her, Clearly. .

.u

it


!\ iii

'i

comphshmeni the

being now

.a

.i

and these

word

my

the top oi

bent,

1

1

mg

1

understand, hut ttuda is transparent, ami agrees with the principles which preceded, tor all thingsbeingin aflui ioviw), k.im.i is a io\ (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name oi as yet

i

kojoo, or vice, specially appropriated to ot tuuc&s

icfrai

may

The

it.

Ik turther

trated by the use or heJda (cowardice),

which

to

I

(

presses the greatest soul;

and

and strongest bond

curopta (difficulty)

same nature (from a

not,

an

is

and

go), like anything else which

is

ot the

evil ot the

-n-optvaTHai to

an impediment

motion and movement. Then the word Rojrta appears to mean *a/c) will be the opposite

or this sort

or" it,

signify-

ing in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let

or hindrance, and

or,

more

1

is

therefore called

t«> stagnation he gave the n.une

hindered the

this

dow beaten together

is

rrocn

«»:

sorts.

.iii

and

fiui

into

•

Her. Hut what do yoU Soc.

Thai

is

more obscure;

onl) due to the quantity,

by altering or into

Her. .

He

r.

-\\^l

\et

the b

has been

o.

What do yotl mean This name appears to denote mind. :

\

lo"

me ask vou what is the cause wh\ anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the c.i Her. Certainly. Ami must not this be the mi: Soc. Let

or ol

men. or

Her. Soc.

oi

both

:

\

Is

not

mind

that

which

things by their names, and

caller

not

is

•

mind

the

:

xaAoi Her. That is evident. Soc. And arc not the work* ot intelligence

beautiful

(

I

and mind worthv ol praise, and are not other works worthy of blame? Her, Certainly. Soc. Phvsic does the

work

of a physician,

carpentering docs the works ot

He

r.

.Iptr?/,

Soc.

and

works

correctly, aeiptiri) (ever-rlowing),

Iliad, vi. 265.

enemy

whuh

illus-

have come alter dpSpcio, but was torgotten, ami. as tear, is not the only word which has been passed over. AoA/.i signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain Secrpo?), lor Atar means strength, and theretore SuXia ex-

ought

:ig

•

great hence-

I>r

it.

on!\

should like

meaning ol the two words (virtue) and Muc(a (vice); &peTJj do not

meaning

am

koAAi

Bowing), and this is in accordance with former derivations. For the name gi

,

consider the

to

i

ami oi m was s.i\ ing,

\\\o, pajKo%

pupfwnfr. But, as

;

I

mean

has the

irr right;

li

ionale

sign oi great ac

for fiijKo*

ing oi greatness,

make up

be

too

also.

you

likelj

.

I

word

this

t

will

1-

a

and

carpenter'

\actlv.

And

the principle of beauty does the

of beauty?

Her. Of course.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

102

And

Soc.

principle

that

we

affirm

to

be

mind'

Soc.

Her. Vcr\ true. Soc.

lie

Then mind

is

rightly called beauty be-

cause she does the works which and speak of as the beautiful:

Her. That

is

we

recognize

their opposites.

[417]

The meaning of avfxfyipov (expedient) I that you may discover for yourself by the

light of the previous examples,

—

for

it is

a

sis-

meaning just the motion (i

and

(eW|«o«) or hinderei m\ d brother

n>i

8I01

is

hat

oi

.1

whn

h rnlrrs into lh
not see th.it we could do anything I

We

could not: tor by bodily imitation only can the body eves express anything. Her. Vers, true. N And when we want to express ourscb cs, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that .

n b.

Then

Sac.

name

a

is

vocal imitation ot that

a

which the vocal imitator names or imitates? Her.

I

think

Soc. \a\\ that

I;

in (

we have

Why

Her.

so.

my

I

am

disposed to think

not reached the truth as yet.

stre.im

not?

it we have we shall he obliged admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they

to

them

is

a

I

have been right

in

what

I

opinion, no. But wish that you me, Socrates, what sort of an imitaI

n.m

-

to re

asking;

h.is

.in.:

grasped thr n.iturc

and s\Hab!cs

:n

such

.1

ot

uunnrr

Her. Very good. Bui are these the oni\ prnn.irv names, or are there otl

Her. There must be others. should expect. But how shall wc further analyse them, ami wl the imitator begin? Imitation 01 the rtaenrc ism syllables and letters; ought WC not. tl,: I

hrst to separate the letters, just as those

who

.ire

beginning rhythm first distinguish the of elementary, and then oi compound sounds, and when they have done so. but not ; they proceed to the consideration ot rh\thms I

He

r.

Yes.

Must WC

not begin in the

sam

separating the vowels, and then the

consonants ami mutes, into

«.'

which are neither vowels, nor

mutes; and distinguishing into classes the An when we have pervowels themselves yet

i

should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation or. what music imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour: Her. Certainly.

But the

the semivowels,

:

:

Soc. In the

Sbc.

'

tl

the

to the received distinctions 01 the learned: also

my

name

think

as to imitate the CSSCnCC or not.

letters; first

was saying?

tion

tu

in letters

Soc.

tell

in

about which fOM wc whether the ii.ni nr

imitate.

Her. In

),

I

to

;

Soc. Because

would

True, then

is

1

friend,

Her. Quite true. Soc. Then could

tin',

condition

a

Soc. So

I

nam

or

n. liner,

.

which we want to express. Her. It must he so, think.

hi

\\

.

horse, or any other

gestures

and the

1

animal,

.

W

/•/-'•

should mut. itc the natun the thine; the elevation ol our hands to hea> en n

first place,

art of

I

naming appears

fected the classification of things, their

sec

whether, as

we

sh.>

in the case of

which the and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know letters,

be

all

1

not to be

names, and

Cf.

there are any classes to

referred;

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

106

how

to apply

them

what they resemble

to

—

ters to the expression of objects, either single letters

when

Gods waiting

plexity have their

whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour,and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too. we shall apply letrequired, or several letters; and so

we shall form syllables, as they are called, [425] and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even

must

in the air; an*

get out of our difficulty in like fashion, b

saying that "the

Gods gave

the

names, ant

first

therefore they arc right." This will be the bes contrivance, or perhaps that other notion ma'

•

be even better still, of deriving them from souk barbarous people, for the barbarians are oldei than we arc; / 426] or we may say that antiq uity has cast a veil o\cr

them, which

is

the same

sort of excuse as the last; for all these are noi

reasons but only ingenious excuses for hawn^. no reasons concerning the truth of words, yet

any

ignorance of

sort of

first

names involves an ignorance

or primitive

secondary

of

I

words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a \erv lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true ;

was carried away meaning to say that this wis the way in which not we but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject; and we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are rightly giv-

names are though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have. Her. Fear not; I will do my best.

so shall

we make

speech by the art of the

or the rhetorician, or by that

I

am

literally

some other

namer Not

art.

speaking of ourselves, but

—

(

en or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work,

and

in the

wrong

certain that

Her.

I

them

in this

way?

for

I

am

should not.

Much less am Shall we leave

men

say,

we must do

likely to

as well as

we

can.

What

do you think 2 Her. I very much approve. Soc. That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any per-

—

first

and

Soc. In the

me the

notions of original

ridiculous,

first

place, the letter p appears to

to be the general (/ci'i^ais).

meaning

among same

of this

the ancients, is

And

letters.

77 was not in use only employed e; and

letter

who

nor, which

as Uvat.

correctly given as

ern

instrument expressing all I have not yet explained latter word, which is just

But

(going); for the

iccris

the root

be able. them, then? or shall we Soc. seek to discover, if we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as I

My

truly wild

motion

direction.

Her. That, Socrates, I can quite believe. Soc. Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse

tier. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc.

is

the old Teens-

Assuming

in

a foreign form, the

word

ku'7/o-k will be corresponding mod-

this foreign root

*

change of the 77 and the insertion of the v,we have nvnym*, which should have been wueunjim or cicris-; and arda^ is the negative of iemi (or cutis-), and has been improved into o-ruais. Now the letter p. as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an

and allowing

for the

excellent instrument for the expression of tion:

and he frequently uses the

mo-

letter for this

example, in the actual words he represents motion by p\ also in the words rpofios (trembling), Tpa\v>; (rugged); and again, in words such as Kportiv purpose;

for

ptw and

porj

(strike),

Opaveiv

(crush),

ipcLKeiv

(bruise),

BpvTTTtLv (break), KeppaTi^ecv (crumble), pvp.-

(Sdv (whirl); of

all

these sorts of

movements

he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he

RATYLI

(

*>

I

l>\

.in

letter

he-

I

menti whk

,l

hr uses the

.ill

lettei

subtle rlr

ir

i

through

pass

h

uhv

is

.

hr

i

you

tl

imitati

.!••

i

snothci ol

m

;

uhilr

th

i

h the pronun*

In.

iation is a< ompanicd xpenditui breath; these are used in the imitation ol iu< h

the

notions

Uotkr.l out. .Hid

t

.

i

I

•

when

to

Ik-

ihivei in

i

\

shaken

.

|hO( k

|

introduced In the givei

i\s

what ii have thought thai the ind pressure oi the tongue in the uttei .'i and r wai expressive »>t binding .m.l rest in a place: he hirtnei observed the liquid movement oi a, in the pronunciation t which the tongue slips, and in this In- found the ea pression oi smoothness, .is m ,\

He teems

(windy),

s.

glutinous

clammy

yAiKis-. yAota»8(s-.

1

he

he observed

i

have a notion of inwardness; hence he duced the sound in iv&ov and t\r.*

What

How

rates?

I

be

bed the wall come

Phaedr.

lx-

was staving with Fpicrates, the house of Morvehus; that house

at

x

I

rca


OUfltl

117

\.

liki

guide

dunk

in llir

1

kj

trol lui

•

you

thai

in

ii

In iend; .*««! hope uw when \ou hr.r I

yOU will ruihr

th.it

whuh

le.ison, e,

tint

IS,

I

.mi

.i

and the men who dwell

lowt

ol

ki

M

•

in thectt) are

m\

and not the trees qi tin- country, do indeed l>clir\c tli.it \oii found spell with which to draw me out «>t the into the country, like hungr) cov< l>< whom a bough or a bunch ol trim is \\.i\ol. oni) hold up before me in like mann book, and n»hi ma) lead mo .ill round r\ti ami mrr the Wide World. Ami DOW h.i\m rived, intend to he down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read Inst. Begin.

from; but

not

ill

I

il

hers,

Though

;

1

.i

friendship

It

publu

i

.i

I

i

You know how

isten,

m. liters

with me; and how, ai conceit may arranged for the advantage ol both ol us. Ami maintain that ought not •! in ni| suit, because am not your lover: tor lovers repent of the kindnesses which the) have shown when their passion CCasCS, hut to the non-lovers who are tree ami not under any compulsion, no tune ot repentance ever comes; tor they confer their benefits according to tinst.unl

I

W

this affair

I

I

I

i

measure of their ability, most conducive to their

way which is own interest. Then

in the

how

by reason of their love they have neglected their own concerns and rendered service to others: ami when to these benefits conferred they add on the troubles which they have endured, they think that they have long ago made to the beloved a very ample return. But the non-lover has no such i.

!o\ers consider

tormenting recollections; he has never neglected his atlairs or quarrelled with his relations; he has no troubles to add up or excuse to invent; and being well rid of all these evils, why should he not freely do what will gratify the beloved

:

— that, fer

if

men,

true,

i|

and ot

il!

n

he

his heart;

his laboUl has riot is

mon

u.mh been

m.istrr.

good, and Again.

not

the

ol

lost

:

but

tl

SI

opinio

Mis is following the eupation ), and whenever the. 1

his

exchange tm o p ordt about some affair ot love i

temptation; but when nc asks the reason w h\ bo .nisr .

IIO

pi

ople

know

one th.it

talking to another is natural, whether ship or mere pleasure be the moti

Once more,

it

\ou

te.ir

friendship, consider that

m

the

tk klcr M

anv other

a mutual calamity; but now, given up what is

quarrel might be

when you have tore,

m

oser, and there you will be you will have more reason in

to you,

1

t

of the lover, for his vexations

.ire

mam.

.\w\ he

always fancying that every one is against him. Wherefore also he debars his be loved from society; he will not have vou intimate with the wealthy, lest they should exceed him in wealth, or with men of education, lest they should be his superiors m understanding; is

|t pains; and me ostentatiously toexuli trom w

.-I

i |K*.in

.!

Imw

well he

to

>..tilil

the

%.i\

1

1

\i

dim

i

in

il

same thing

in i^«>

ui tin

U

ll.lt

s. I

v

:

.is

cspo

the

merii oi oi \\ liuh the iubje
uld

t

you

si

I

I

I

along w

\«'u.

itli

\n

ckni sages, men and women, w ho have ami written ol these things, would mm- up in judgment against me, it out oi complaisance I

to \OU.

,1

Who arc they, and where did you anything better than thii .mi sure thai must have heard; bui .it this moment Ao not remember From whom; perhaps from Sappho the lair, or An.u rcon the I

!

I

or, possibly, ,

is

beech

Why,

:

M

s.i\

I

t

nil,

good

.is

bom

a prose- writer.

because

and

that

I

Whj

perceive thai

I

COuld

do

my

make .mother

as that ol Lysias,

and

Now am certain that this is not my own. who am well aware

kill

wanting airs.''

trom

know

grand:

is

who was my

— but

better oration, equal in

length and entirely new, on the same subject; I. like the nine Archons. will promise to

and set

up :,

a

golden image

at

Delphi, not only

but ot you, and as large as

or"

lite.

You are a dear golden ass it you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that can make a speech trom

I

I

his art and

1

re let

indeed,

there

how

know

I

matters Band; and

fc»

won!

the

Then don't say

that

will; and Phaedr. Yes, but be an oath. "I say. or rati I

god

u:

is

it.

m\

be witness

will

swear, that unless you rep discourse here in the t.ueot this \erv plane-tree, plane-tree

I

will

I

never

tell

you another; ne\cr

his

tricks

arguments are to be excluded. something which is to the point. Who, tor example, [236] could speak on this thesis ot yours without praising the discretion of the non-lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover.- These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in (for what else is there to be said? ) and must be allowed and excused; the only merit is in the arrangement of them, for there can be none in the invention; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality. Phaedr. I admit that there is reason in what all

to

ot authors will say

I

which

ot

word ot another''' Soc Villain! am conquered; ot discourse has no more dr. Then why arc you

Soc.

The worst

Phaedruj

succ-t

DM

tore per]

compete With extern; h He is a master in am an untaught man.

mind

earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise

make another and

nn

would he

that be a mystery not to be divulged even at

my to

s;

am

I

Phaedr, You sec never

where you heard the discourse or from whom; let

and

alone,

not uni

stir

ot the

:

i'.ut. it

informant.

That

we

this place

boson,

younger than \u: Where do not compel me to use

I

I

dr.

K.itl

I

stupidity

1

invention

that

I

my

compel

'"1

all

nothing, and therefore can only inter that have been rilled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the waters ot another, though have actually forgotten in

or

different.

>\n

I

ot

and you up

I

let

you have

the poor lover

tl

still

al

:

Soc. I am not going to play trick you have taken the oath, tor cannot allow myI

self to

be starved.

Phaedr. Proceed.

[2^ J

Soc. Shall

Phaedr. Soc.

I

I

tell

vou what

I

will

do :

What?

will veil

my

face

the discourse as fast as

I

and gallop

can, for

if

I

tl

see

you

I

ashamed and not know what to say. Phaedr. Only go on and you may do anything else which you please. shall feel

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

120

Come,

Soc. are

called,

O

ye Muses, melodious, as ye

whether you have received

this

name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians are a musical race, help,

O

me in desires me

the tale

help

which

my

good triend here

to rehearse, in order that his iriend

whom

he always deemed wise may seem to him to he wiser than ever. Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very

and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had perfair

suaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument that he ought to accept the non-lover rather than the lover; his

—

words were as follows: "All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will all come to nought. But people imagine that they know about the nature of

when they having come

things,

don't

know about them, and,

not to an understanding at first because they think that they know, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves. Now you and I must not be guilty of this fundamental error which we

condemn

in others; but as our question is whether the lover or non-lover is to be pre-

ferred, let us first of all agree in defining the

nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage. "Every one sees that love is a desire, and we

know

also that non-lovers desire the beautiful

and good.

Now

in

what way

is

the lover to be

distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one

is

is

pleasure, that

power

of misrule

is

called excess.

Now

excess has

bers,

and many forms, and any of these forms very marked gives a name, neither hon-

when

possessed by

many names, and many mem-

ourable nor creditable, to the bearer of the name. The desire of eating, for example, which

is

it is

desire of drink,

called gluttony,

called a glutton; the tyrannical

which

inclines the possessor of

name which

the desire to drink, has a

too obvious, and there can be as

only

is

doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called; of that

now

my

I

which happens

—

little

will be the

it

dominant.

to be

name And

think that sou will perceive the drift of

word

discourse; but as every spoken

manner

is

in a

had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her own kindred that supreme desire, I say, which by leading conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced, from this very force, receiving a name, is plainer than the unspoken,

1

—

called love

(

tppoj^xei '«k epojc

description

and certainly not the terror of his enemies; which nobody can deny. And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of his lover in the the next point to

him. But w

':

ot

is

'

time? Must he not nel the extn mitj when he

the anxiety ot his friends and also ot his lover,

matter of his property; this

in

then:.

himself,

and

v

intolerable

when

the

m

and, besides being inl over the world in all their indcluacy and someness when he is drunk.

And not only while his love is he mischievous and unpleasant, but when his love !

he becomes a {xrrtidious enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths ami and promises, [241 1 and yet could hard vail upon him to tolerate the tedium companv even trom motives ot irr hour of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master; instead of love and infatu. lom and temperance arc his 1

bosom

it

the beloved has not discov-

ered the change which has taken place in when he asks for a return and recalls to his

and doings; he bespeaking to the same person, and the other, not having the courage to recollection former sayings lieves himself to be

confess the truth, and not fil

die oaths and promises

know ing how which he made

to ful-

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

122

under the dominion of folly, and having now grown wise and temperate, docs not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. And so he runs away and is constrained to be a dethe oyster-shell

faulter;

1

has fallen with the

— he changes pursuit into

other side uppermost

while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation not knowing that he ought never Irom the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his esflight,

tate,

hurtful to his bodily health,

and

still

more

hurttul to the cultivation of his mind, than

which there neither is nor ever will be anything more honoured in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed

upon you:

As wolves love lambs

so lovers love their loves.

you so, I am speaking in verse, and had better make an end; enough. Phaedr. I thought that you were only halfway and were going to make a similar speech But

I

told

therefore

I

about

all

lover.

Why do you not proceed?

Soc.

the advantages of accepting the non-

Does not your

I

add the praises of the non-lover, what become of me? Do you not perceive that I

to

will

already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non-lover has all the advantages in which the lover is accused of being deficient. And now I will say no more; there has been enough of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate, [242] I will cross the river and make the best of my way home, lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you. Phaedr. Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the midday sun

am

standing still, as people say, in the meridian. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said, and then return in the cool. Soc. Your love of discourse, Phaedrus, is superhuman, simply marvellous, and I do not believe that there is any one of your contempo1

game

which two

parties fled

or pursued according as an oyster-shell

which was

In allusion to a

thrown into the uppermost.

air fell

in

number

of speeches. I would except Simmias Theban, but all the rest arc tar behind \ou. And now I do verily believe that you ha\c been

the

the cause of another.

Phaedr. That

is

good news. But what do you

mean? Soc.

I

mean

to say that as

the stream the usual sign

was about to cross was given to me, I

which always iorbids, but never bids, do anything which I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a \crv good one, but I have enough religion tor mv own use, as you might say of a bad writer his writing is good enough for him; and am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how prophetic is the human soul! At the time I had a sort ot misgiving, and, like Ib\cus.'*l was troubled; I feared that I might be buying honour from men at the price of sinning against that sign

me

to

—

I

Now

the gods."

What

Phaedr. Soc.

That was

I

recognize

my

error.

error? a dreadful speech

brought with you, and you made

which you utter one

me

as bad.

simplicity observe that

have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover? And if I

am

rancs who has either made or in one wav or another has compelled others to make an equal

with the dark or light side

How

Phaedr. Soc.

It

was

so?

foolish,

I

say,

—

to a certain ex-

impious; can anything be more dreadful? Phaedr. Nothing, if the speech was really such as you describe. Soc. Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphro-

tent,

dite,

and

a

god

3

Phaedr. So men say. Soc. But that was not acknowledged by Lysias in his speech, nor by you in that other speech which you by a charm drew from my lips. For if love be, as he surely is, a divinity, he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both the speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was refreshing; [243] having no truth or honesty in them, nevertheless they pretended to be something, hoping to succeed in deceiving the manikins of earth and gain celebrity among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised, not by Homer, for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind, but by Stesichorus, who was a philosopher and knew the reason why; and therefore, when he lost his eyes, for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely Helen, he at

»

r

1

\

1

i

i

once purged himself \nd the intation, vt hi< h began thus

m

and when

lie

had completed

his

poem, which

ii

called "the recanution," iminediatel) hi

No*

returned to him.

culirt Stesichorus 01

make m\

i

before

veiled

U>M and

intation

Ik-

in thai

I

M>ur.

i

re> ilin

foi

on ould be more agreeable to

1

.1

own. when we

of

tell

the-

1

—

aare say not, Socrates.

Soc. Therefore, because 1 blush

and

Love himself,

I

of

my

cars

also because

.it

I

the thought

am

afraid

or'

wash the brine out with water from the spring; and desire to

s.irnc name, 1! they madness to be I must have thought that there madness which was a noble t! words, parrot)} and p and the letter r is only a modern

insertion.

and

and therefore

tion,

Know

then, fair youth, that the former

was the word of Phaedrus, [244] the son of Vain Man. who dwells in the city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this which I

is

is

it

An

faculty

1

the

other signs-

.

rational in\ese

-this, tor as

which supplies from

art

mind

1

1

trik

)

two

confirmed by the

I

ot birds or ot

ly

Soc.

this

:i

termed

discourse

And

which was given by them to the of futurity, whether

Phaedr. Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same theme. Soc. You will be true to your nature in that, believe you.

and

both by the

rather than the non-lover.

I

;

with madness

to

Phaedr. Speak, and fear not. Soc. But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and who ought to listen now; lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a non-lover before he knows what he is doing 3 Phaedr. He is close at hand, and always at your service.

•

In-

b
\\

when go move up ih< 1

1

*

«-

to

\

banquet

the vault

c*l

heaven

1

.«n«l 1

ifim the)

il,

will

jealous) hai no place in th

foi

tul choir. Bui

i»i

man) ^

:

the top

he chariots ol

it •

• 1

h-\

but

others labour,

the-

re

foi ilir

tpidly

I

\

i
|

tangible essence, visible onl) to mind, the pilot ot the soul. The divine intelligence, being nur-

tured upon

d

which

receiving the food proper to

it.

is

capable

rejoices at

and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution ot the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge lute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knov absolute in existence absolute: and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home; and there the charioteer putting up his ho: the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar reality,

to drink.

[24S] Such is the life of the gods; but ot other souls, that which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world,

and

is

carried round in the

revolution, troubled indeed bv the steeds,

with I

:

difficulty

other only

and

beholding true being; while an-

rises

and

falls,

and

sees,

and

ag.iin

by reason of the unruhness ot the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing tails to see

after the

ll. is

n. nu-

seen truth in the second degree shall be

mind and pure knowledge, and

the intelligence ol every soul

beholding

some musical and loving

upper world and they

not being strong

enough they

all

follow, but

are carried round

below the surface, plunging, treading on one

'uel; the

which

ot

is

the third class

s

:

or economist, or trader: the fourth shall

lover ot gymnastic

shall lead the lite ot a

prophet or

the sixth the character 01

.1

pod

him or

s-

:

imitative artist will be assigned; to the

the

lite

I

I

st vcutli

of an artisan or husfaandmai

eighth that ot

a sophist or

—

ninth that of a tyrant; probation, in which he

improves, and he

who

demaj

al!

the

I

who doc docs unr:

de-

teriorates his lot.

years must elapse before the one can return to t! whence she came. [249] tor she camber wings in less; onl\ the soul ot a guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy.

Ten thousand

soul ot each

mm

•

1

in the third of the

recurring jKncxls

ol

sand years; he is distinguished from the nary good man who gains wings in three t: sand years:— and thev who choose this lite _ three times in succession have wing them, and go away at the end of three t! sand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and 1

after the

judgment they

go,

some

the houses ot correction which

of

them

to

the

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

126

and are punished; others to some place heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The

amazement; but they

earth,

in

in

this rapture

soul of a

man may

pass into the

life

of a beast,

or from the beast return again into the

man.

But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And there-

—

—

mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in fore the

recollection to those things in

which God

abides,

beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired. Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have

and

in

shown

what

are ignorant of

means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of

them: they are seen through

a glass dimly;

and

there are few who, going to the images, behold

them the realities, and these only with diffiThere was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in in

culty.

brightness,

— we philosophers following

gods; and then

in the

company with other

train of Zeus, others in

we beheld

the beatific vision

mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining inpure light, pureourselves and not vet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the bod\, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away. But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest

and were

initiated into a

aperture of sense. For sight

is the most piercing though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the

of our bodily senses;

privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she

most palpable

is

also the

is

not newly initiated or

to sight.

who

Now

he

who

has become cor-

rupted, does not easily rise out of this world

this of all inspirations to be the noblest

to the sight of true beauty in the other; he looks

and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who

only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, he is given over to pleasure, and like a brutish beast he rushes on to enjoy and beget; [251] he consorts with

loves the beautiful

is

called a lover because he

For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her

partakes of

it.

passing into the form of man. But

all

souls

do

not easily recall the things of the other world;

may have seen them or they may have been

[250] they time only,

for a short

unfortunate and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the in their earthly lot,

memory

of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt

wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of is

many glories in

amazed when he

like face or form,

sees

the other world,

any one having a god-

which

is

the expression of

a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god; then while he gazes on him

divine beauty; and at

first

I'll \l lion,

an.

DIM

S

tlir

I

in unusual beat and the receives the effluence ol beaut) thro the eyes, the wing moistens and h< Vnd

ity,

warms, the parti out ol which tlir .uul \s lm h had been hith< .uul bad prevented tlir w ing from

..111:

es into i

i

us

\\c

a

,

;

.

ma)

I*-

•.•

m.l

i

wlu.

Il

ti

Forth, are melted, .uul .is nourithi ims uym\ him, the lowei end ol the w

iwell .uul grow from the i"«»t up and the growth extendi undei ilir uholr soul foi once the whole \\.»s \s in hiring tins process the w lu.lt- soul ii all in a state ol ebullition .uul effervescence, which ma) be compared to the irritation .uul uneasi is

to

wards;

may

1

iuss in

tlu-

mum m

bubbles up, .uul hai is

a feeling ol

uneasiness .uul

but

beloved meets •

blc

|

K-r eye

warm motion

.uul

ot

she

which flow emotion

towards her, therefore called

is refreshed .uul warmed by them, and then she ceases trom her pain with joy. But when she is parted trom her beloved and her

tails,

then the orifices of the pass. me wing shoots dry up ami

out ot which the

.

and intercept the germ ot' the wing; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations ot' an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection ot beaut \ is again delighted. And from both ot' them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness ot her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And

wherever she thinks that she

will behold the

beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs.

And when

she has seen him, and bathed herself in the waters of beauty, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more

pangs and pains; and

this

is

the sweetest of

all

SlU h

.is

I

\>ct

lov
l.i

ill

i

i\

ihr

,

in.

d upon. I

s

h.r

htrdly,

!

ffld

them

Mir.

I

men ind

one another, lie u ill rc.isoiiN oi his arrangement, and show whj one soul is persuaded bj particuUu form ol inrni, and anothei not \ ou lit\ c hit upon vei j good w a) s thai in the true and only \ nibjtt ^.m be ki forth 01 treated b) n rules ol .ut. whether in speak writing. Hut the writers oi the present day, ai who* (eel you have sat, craftily conceal the nature ol the iouI which they know quite well, Nor, until tlu\ adopt our method ol reading and writing, gas we admit th.it they write by rules ol an /'•• Wh.u is our method : Soc, cannot give you the exact details; but I should hkc to tell you generally, .is Ear as is in m\ power, how man ought to proceed accord ing to rules ol art i

!

:

thru km-! •

to

IN

in.

;

I

.1

.

tins

m

;

..

.

•

.

lux)

i

t

it

.i

||

then

u Would \ .uid k have heard from Lysiai thing whi< h in Phacdr. It tr\ t

but

the

.11

r

moment

Cf.

I

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

138

Phaedr. Certainly, he does. believe that he has a clever and inI genious case of this sort: He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should argue thus: "How could a weak man " like me have assaulted a strong man like him: The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in I not right, Phaedrus? the system. Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. Bless me, what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not? Phaedr. What shall we say to him? Soc. Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates Soc.

—

5

Am

the various characters of his hearers and to divide all things into classes

hend them under

and

is

able

to compre-

single ideas, he will never be

a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of

human power. And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in

wiser

him

men

lies;

[274]

for there

than ourselves, that a

is

a saying of

man

of sense

should not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here.

Phaedr. I think, Socrates, that this is admiif only practicable. Soc But c\cn to tail in an honourable object is honourable. Phaedr. True.

rable,

Enough appears

Soc.

of a true

and

to

false art of

have been said by us speaking.

Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. But there is something \et to be said of proprietv and impropriety of writing. Phaedr. Yes. Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to

God?

Phaedr. No, indeed. Do you.' Soc. I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know; although if we had found the truth ourselves, do vou think that we should care much about the opinions of men? Phaedr. Your question needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard. Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which

is

called the Ibis

is

sacred

him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but to

his great discovery

was the use

of letters.

Now

days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would in those

take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts.

to

But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the

memory and

for the wit.

Thamus

re-

O

most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge plied:

of the utility or inutility of his to the users of

stance,

you

who

them. [275]

own And

inventions in this in-

are the father of letters,

from a

own

children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will paternal love of your

create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, be-

1

l'i

w

the)

-

:ll

ate

not

I

\

will trust to the external written chai

remember of themselves

not

you have dis overed

ii

k

hut

not

in lid not

which

mci

t

on!)

but

truth,

the

Mlriit

the)

they

ling;

having

the

will

s!n>w

be

thi

k

comp

tiresome

wisdom without

oJ

tl>r

x

ites,

Egypt, or

\ihi

.in

^

easily invent

any other country. s is tradition in the temple ot Ion. th.it o.iks lust gave prophetU utter inces. The menoi old, unlike in their simpli< ity .'.

i

1

I

oi

.1

young philosophy, deemed th.it the) heard the truth even from "oak or rock," wasenough lor them; where. is \ou seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, hut who the speaker is and trom what country the tale it

it

.l!'.

husb

.1

t.ikr the

w

;

1

them

plant

"hiring the

!

'•

i

t.'

Iw~

I

.

aid

.

•:

:

S

I

fu

I

w ill be hearen »>i many ind w ill have leai ned noth to he omnis< ieni and w ill generally uth;

rc.ilit\

DKI

rem in

to

ciplrs ti

I

memoi

iIh-ii

them sake

-

amusement and pastime

ot

m

is

in

he WOUld

le.ot

at

e.irnest

he iOWl in

I

lit'

uses husbandry, and months the seeds whkh he

I

in

if


ut

hersell

«hr

fcrphdl


m any one whodoes sen ice to .mother un-

oi

But

w ho

the

is

er

this

h

is .is

ti

ommoi

1

m\

contribution as could m

good

I'.uis.mi.is

1

in

I

,

1

.1;

wha h have been wise to speak; and AriatooV turn ot Aristophanes anced way

in

I

1

1

the

••

had eaten too miM h, or fron he bad the hiccough,and wasoblij turns with r\ xim.u husthe 1

;

reclining on the COUch

bdow

him.

I

he said, you ought enl. COUgh, or to s(K-.ik in mv turn until

:

.

us,

':.

I

oil.

the one capable of

do lx»th. said Eiyiimai your turn, and do J and while am speaking let you to hold your breath, and 1! after JTOU done so tor some time the hicCOUgh is no better, then gargle with a little water; and it it still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and it you sue; the most violent hiccough is surwill do as you prescribe,

virtue, the other seeking to acquire

get on.

each ot them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he t.in to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good;

communicating wisdom and them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one then, and then only, may the beloved yield with hon-

—

our to the lover. Nor when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the impression that he is rich, [185] and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done

show that he would give himself up to any one's "uses base" for the sake of money; but this is not honourable. And on the his best to

will

I

I

s[K-.ik in

.

I

1 1

I

Eryximachui spoke as follows: Seeing that Pausamas made a fair Ixrginmng. [l86j and but a lame ending, must endeavour I I

think that he has rightl\ tinguished two kinds of love. Hut my art further informs me that the double love is merely an affection of the soul of mar: his deficiency.

I

-

the

tair.

or towards anything, but

in the bodies of all

of the earth, is

and

the conclusion

from

how

my own

I

animals and

may

which

art of

say in I

seem

in

all

to

found

to be

productions that

have gathered

medicine, whence

great and wonderful

deity of love,

is

I

learn

and universal is the whose empire extends over all

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

156

human. And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art. There are in the human body these two kinds of love, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, they have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of things, divine as well as

the healthy

is

one, and the desire of the diseased

another; and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honourable, is

—

and bad men dishonourable: so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best he

who

able to separate fair love

making love grow up among them; and thus

these other cases, music implants,

and unison

to

music, too,

is

concerned with the principles of

application to harmonv and rhythm. Again, in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life. either in the composition of songs or in the cor rect performance of airs or metres composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and love

in

their

—

of preserving their love;

gar Polyhymnia,

and again, of the

vul-

who must

friendship and accord in these elements, was

be used with circumspection that the pleasure be enjoyed, but may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. Whence I infer that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, [18S] for they are both present. The course of the seasons is also full of both

the creator of our art, as our friends the poets

these principles;

physician

is

is

from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the conand make them loving friends, is a Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, bitter and sweet, moist and dry, and the like. And my stitution

skilful practitioner.

ancestor, Asclepius,

here

tell us,

and

knowing how

believe

I

to

implant

them; and not only

medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymand husbandry are under his dominion. [ i8y] Any one who pays the least attention to the subject will also perceive that in music nastic

same reconciliation of opposites;and this must have been the meaning Heracleitus, although his words are not ac-

there I

is

the

suppose that

of

The One is united by harmony of the bow and the

curate; for he says that

disunion, like the lyre.

Now

harmony

there

is

is

an absurdity in saying that

discord or

is

composed

of elements

But what he probably meant was, that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony clearly not. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be; you cannot harmonize

which are

still

in a state of discord.

—

that is

which

disagrees. In like

compounded

and long, once and now in accord; which accordance, the former instance, medicine, so in all

differing as in

manner rhythm

of elements short

and when,

as

I

was saying, the

elements of hot and cold, moist and dry. attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men. animals, and plants health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the sea-

sons of the year

more

all

is

sacrifices

termed astronomy. Furtherand the whole province of

which is the art of communion between gods and men these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination divination,

—

M tlu-

i%

peacemakei

M

i

ItWr

«

t

li

IN

godi uml men,

•!

•

knowledge ol th< h exist len< ics w

l>\

i

•..

i

human

in

lo

t!

force oi

ind the lo ted w nli

love

ially,

u Km

ind which

ii

l»

i

company with

perfected in

tern

W lull' men, h.is ihe greatest power, and in the source out happiness and harmony, and m us h icndj with the gods w ho are above un. and u :ih one another. dare vi\ thai w hu h might be said in niNlu

pel iik e .ind

e,

i

I

I

i

and he u ith set en t

round

.»

. but this w.in not intentional,

you, Aristophanes, ike

some

ma) now lupplj the amis lmr ol commendation;

othei

perceive that you

I

rid oi the

.in-

d,

I

I

.1

1

I

1

1

I

You I

are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughwill

unsay

my

words; DUl do you please

Hot to watch me. as

I

tear that in the speech

I am about to make, instead ol others laughing with mc, which is to the manner horn or" our muse and would he all the better, shall only he laughed at by them. Ho you expect to shoot your holt and es Aristophanes? Well, perhaps it you are very careful and bear in mind that you will Ik- called to account, I may be induced to let you off. Aristophanes professed to open another \ein o! discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, unlike that either ot Pausanias or Eryximachus. Mankind, he said, judging by their neglect of him. have never, as think, at ail understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and oilered solemn sacrifices in his honour; but this is not done, and most certainly ought to be done:

which

1

I

is the best friend of men, and the healer of the ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race. will try to describe his power to you. and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am

since of

all

the gods he

the helper

I

teaching you. In the the nature of

first

place, let

man and what

now

I

d Aj istophanes, w ho Followed, the hiccough is gone; not, however, until plied tin wonder whethei ihr \\ and harmony ol tlu- body has love ol such noises and ticklings, tor no sooner applied the sru ing than was cured. ryximachus said: Beware, friend Aristoph« gfa you are going to speak, you .ire making fun oi me; and shall have to watch and see whether cannot have a laugh at your expense, when you might speak m pe ing.

i

mm

mc

treat of

has happened to

do.

i

and hr

. turning foUf

Icet.

right in

and over

v.

when

v.

hr

ith

were thrre. and 1>
SI

dances, hr

is

(

.ur

:

i

lord

kindness evci and nevci gives unkind good, the wondei oi the the amazement o( the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and pro to those who baVC the Inner part in him; es

in.iniiri

kliru the

!

||

should spc.ik Well ilitrritlon u

Ii. ili;'

V,

ness; the friend oi the

hun

.

parent of delicacy, luxury, desire,

Fondness,

[ardful ol the good, regard

softness,

utc to

comrade, helper; glor) ol gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose

whk h

footsteps

let

ever)

man

follow, sweetl) singing

honour and joining in thai sweet strain with which love (."harms the souls ol gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, hah playful, yet having a certain measure oi serious: in his

my

which, according to the god.

ability.

I

dedicate to

t\ t

an

imagu

gathered

l>c

a:, '

that

"he is all this." and ':' Milking hun ap|>car the

who knou hun upon those who know h:m

ot all to those

not un|H)se

I

noble and solemn In hearsed. But as

mn

pn

ot

misund

I

when

the praise

I

nature ot

-

said that

'

;

.'

I

had clone speaking, was a general eheer; the young man was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, ami of the g And Socrates, looking at Kryximachus, said: Tell me. son ot Acumen us, was there not reason in my tears.- and was not a true prophet when said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that should be in a strait. The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon, replied Kryximachus, appears to me to be true; but not the other part that you

Phaedrus, whether you would have the truth about love, spoken in am and in any order which may happen to into my mind at the time. Will that Ix

will be in a strait.

able to you?

\:

Stodemus

saicl

that there

1

I

:

I

—

Why. my

dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak attcr he has heard such a rich and varied discoui am especially struck with the lx*auty of the concluding words who could listen to them I

—

wuhout amazement

2

When

I

reflected

on the

immeasurable inferiority of my own powers. I Was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape. For was reminded of Gorgias, and at the cm} of his speech fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master I

I

my

would take

I

must beg t»» be absolved from ise which made in ig Euripides would say was a promise of the and not ot the mind do not praise ill strain: tor deed, cannot. But it you like t hr.tr di turn,

When Agathon

I:

vou should reall) should ap[>car to prai

the evil: in every word, work, wish, Eear

ol

sa> tour, pilot,

or

I

)

lips

:

:

I

;

I

about love,

am

I

manner, though

I

ready

tie the easiest way, and

...

to the wise

shall take

w

in

bai

is

"I ben

b
t:

L

i»i

"What "

;

tal

th
t

foolish

beaut] in every form

is

to

one

ii

and the samel Ami when he perceives tins be will abate Ins violent love oi the one, which he will despise and deem a sm.ill thing, and will

me

a lover oi

next stage the

lu-

all

beautiful forms; in the

will consider thai the beauty

mind

oi the

is more honourable than the beauty outward form. So that it a virtuous soul

have but

a little

comeliness, he will be content

and tend him, ami

and brim: to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty oi institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty oi them all one family, ami that personal beauty is a trifle; and alter laws and institutions he will go on to love

will search out

i

to the sciences, that he

may

see their beauty,

being not like a servant in love with the beauty oi one youth or man or institution, himselt a slave

mean ami narrow-minded,

hut drawing

towards dnd contemplating the beauty, he will create

many

tair

is

and noble

revealed to

him

which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention: of a single science,

"He who

has been instructed thus far in the who has learned to see the

things ot love, and

due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, [21 1 J Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils) a nature which in the tirst place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or beautiful in

—

waxing and waning; secondly, not

fair in

dtmtmii

I

•

out

tint tin

niiliK in r

thai beauty,

(..

the

oi is

11.

true .t

II

fai

from the

1

1

u

beauties «»t earth and moui vikc oi that otha beaui only,

thr

and from out

two

in

t.ur

prai bees,

forms, and fi and from fair pi notions, until from t.ur notion'. the notion oi absolute beauty, and what the essence oi beauty is. Ins. ius." nid the stra th.it hie above all others which man should fail

ill

I

one

point of view and foul in another, or at one

live,

the

contemplatioo «>t beauty absoluti beauty which ii you once beheld, nu wi in

see

not to DC after the incisure ot gold.

garments, ami

.

and youths, w b enCC now entrain es -I \u and D a one would be content to live seeing them and conversing with them without drink, it that were possible look .it them and to Ik- with them. But wh.it if man had eyes to see the true beauty the diwnc mean, pure .\m\ clear and U1 beauty, fair boys

I

—

I

not clogged with the [Pollutions of

vast

thoughts and notions in boundless love oi a dom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision

but lasting, whii

ami

all

the colours ami

— thither

\

.unties ol

:

human

life

looking, ami holding converse with

the true beauty simple

member how

in that

and divine ;

communion

/

21 2 j

only,

I

Ixrl.

ing beauty with the eve oi the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not imagi but realities! for he has hold not ot an image but oi a reality ). and ortfa and nour ing true virtue to become the friend and be immortal, it mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble lil Such. PhaedlUS and I speak not on!\ were the a you, but to all of you I

—

—

am

persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment ot this end hutima; anil

man

I

nature will not

:id

a helper better

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

168

And therefore, also, man ought to honour him as

than love.

I

say that e

myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit I

of love according to the measure of

my

ability

now and ever. The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please. When Socrates had done speaking, the com-

pany applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders. "If they are friends of ours,'* he said, 1

them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over." A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting "Where is Aga"invite

thon? Lead me to Agathon," and at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his attendants, he found his way to them. "Hail, friends," he said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and violets, his head flowing with ribands. "Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your

Or

crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I am here to-day, carrying on my head these ribands, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I revels?

know /

shall

I

very well that

I

am

speaking the truth,

may laugh. But first tell shall we have the understand-

21 3] although you

me;

if I

come

ing of which or not?"

I

in

spoke?

2

The company were

Will you drink with

me

vociferous in begging

would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him; and as he was being led, intending to crown Agathon, he took the ribands from his own head and held them in front of his eyes; he was thus prevented from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, 3

Cf. 205.

Supra, 212: "Will you have a very drunken

man?"

etc.

couch.

By all means: but ner in our revels?

who makes said

the third part-

Alcibiades, turning

round and Socrates.

here

and

starting up as he caught By Heracles, he said, what

sight of is

this

'

Socrates always lying in wait lor me. always, as his way is, coming out at all is

sorts of unsuspected places: and now, what have you to say for yourself, and wh\ ;ire you lying here, where perceive that you have con1

trived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest

of the

company?

Socrates turned to

Agathon and

said:

I

must

ask you to protect me, Agathon; for the passion of this man has grown quite a serious matter to me. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not onlv abuses me but can hardly keep his hands me, and at this moment he may do me some

harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.

There can never be reconciliation between you and me, said Alcibiades; but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And 1 must you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but alw; Whereupon, taking some of the ribands, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.

—

Then he sober,

that he

1

and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him. Take of! his sandals, said Agathon, and let him make a third on the same

my

friends, to be

a thing «ot to be

endured: you

said:

which

is

—

You

seem,

must drink lor that was the agreement under which I was admitted and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large goblet, Agathon, or rather, he said,

—

addressing the attendant, bring

me

that

wine-cooler. The wine-cooler his eye

was

quarts

—

serve,

my

a vessel

he filled bade the attendant fill this

which had caught holding more than two and emptied, [214] and it again for Socrates. Ob-

friends, said Alcibiades, that this in-

genious trick of mine will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk. Socrates

1

M

I

the

J|

I

I

N

m

*

Mlll.U

the attendant

ulti.lt

W

litis N.U.I

hive neith
^>£y^*ys>g>^g>^>£>^£>^^>^*>^£.

[jo] Meno. Can you

tell

me, Socrates, whether

acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other virtue

way?

O

Meno, there was a time when famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend AristipSocrates.

the Thessalians were

pus.

And

this

is

Gorgias' doing; for

when he

came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians,

fell

in love

am

as

poor as the

rest

virtue

you

is.'

And am

with his

of the world;

say further that

I

I

the "quale"?

How,

if I

knew

much

alike.

body who had. Men. There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the

man

—he should know how to ad-

state,

and

in the administration of

to benefit his friends

himself.

174

have.

for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found any-

and he must

can I know nothing at all of

my

Men. Very true. Soc. Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is;

minister the

how

this report of

I

suspect that you and he think

know

the "quid" of anything

back

Men. And did you not think that he knew? Soc. I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for

virtue of a

confess with

to carry

dear boy, but you have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment. Men. Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?

may

it

I

I

Thessaly? Soc. Not only that,

shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not

and

I

to

Soc. Yes,

wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot my dear Meno. [yi] Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: "Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not." And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty,

tell if he was fair, or the opposite and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could? Men. No, Indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what

Meno, could

of fair; rich

is

A

and harm

his enemies;

also be careful not to suffer

woman's

virtue,

if

harm

you wish

to

"

|

Ml kn.'W iboul tut)

mi)

ilt.it,

tO "I.!.

in

ilio be caul)

hn

I

hoUSC,

.ni.l

den ribed ».r,|.

175 the

\\ I,., I

indoors, and obej bei husbaj

in

condition

;

triu. lie. Ik. in!

oi

Of

t>i

numbei

definitions oi them;

t»'i

and

each

actions

tin-

01

ol

VII

t

irtucs

\

young

life,

(ft

.u;rs ol

and no

less,

virtue

is

ol us in

l.u

k

relatn .ill

\

hi

virti

thai

imc mi) be said i>i Iov« fortunate am, Menol Win S you fai one virtue, you present mr with 1 iwarm oi them, which are in N*>tn keeping. Suppose that v.m \ on the figure ol the iwarm, and ask oi you, What ii the nature »»t the b and you answer that there arc man) kinds oi bees, and repl) Bui ^l*' bees diftei .is bees, be cause there are many and different kinds ol them; or arc they not rather to be distinguished In some other quality, .is for example beauty, low would you answer me? size, or ahape? Men. should answer that bees do not differ From one another, as bees. tad it went on to s.iv: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike; would you Ik* able tO answer .

I

1

••

thu

without

Met

I

1

trm and

Men,

!

i»ist

U.ih men and women good men and women, '

to

1

rrt.ii'

i

Ik-

1

•

S.ill.

ue.

1

I

I

—

one

Men. They

I

should.

And

Men.

so of the virtues,

understand? I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish. Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to

Men.

size,

would you say the same of health, and strength? Or is the nature of

health always the same, whether in

man

or

Men. They would Then now that

should say that health

is

the same,

man and woman. Soc. And is not this true of size and strength If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reaboth in

:

son of the same form and of the same strer subsisting in her which there is in the man.

the- sameness of all virtue and remcmlxr what and Gorgiai say that wrtuc is. Men. Will you ha\c one definition of them

has been proven,

mean

to say that strength, as strength,

man

ference

Men.

or

woman,

2

That

Soc.

the same.

Is

is

know

them

all,

tue

the |>owcr

is

clude

and

I

And

virtue?

all

And

in a slave,

who governed

whether

there any dif-

Cf. Tfuractctus, 146.

1260*-

dclini'

not what to sav. but that

Is

same

virtue the

Meno? Can Ix:

in a

child

the child govern his

any longer a

and would he s\..

Men. think not. Socrates. No, indeed; there v« I

will not virtue, as virtue, be 13.

seeking.

ha\e one

Setc.

Yet once more, fair friend: according is "the power of governing"; but

in that.

to you, virtue

Men. i.

am

to

father, or the slave his master;

think not.

Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

I

ning mankind. does this definition ol \irtuc in-

do vou not add I

what

you want

I:

I

:

[j$] Soc. a

is

tr\

all

.

of

not.

Soc.

Soc. I

temperate and

1:

woman? Men.

Ik-

Yes.

hen all men are good in the and by participation in the same virtui 11. Stub is the And they surely would not bjVC good in the same way, Unless their virtue had been the same?

Do you

and

un-

I

however many .\n

(

the time w h< n

l

to

be

Icd^c by putt in

imisi

ul

this .is

.«t

man, which only need

»

nto U»

lit

him, both

Kts in

:

h.i

he

foi

v

.ilu

t

i\

.

.ilu.iss citJ

•

>b\ h'lislv.

\nJ

thai

the truth ol

ii

thingi .ilw.iss

.ill

is imn Wherefore be ol good cheer, and u\ to fed m hal you do not know, or rather what you do not remembei like what you feel, aomehow, thai

existed in the loul, then the s.ml

I

arc- s.a

I

is

m»t

\ml

Meno, like what am laying. have said ol which am not altogether confident Bui thai we shall be better I,

things

1

1

I

ami braver and Less helpless u we think thai we ought to enquire, than we should have hern it

',.

indulged in the idle fancy thai thei no knowing and no use m seeking to know what we di> not know; that is a theme upon which am ready to right, in word and deed, to the utmost oi my power. There again, Socrates, your words

membt

or rather,

alone

n.

me

.ire.iureeJth.it a

man

I

gether into the nature

ot virtue

2

Men. By all means. Socrates. Ami \ct would much rather return to my original question. Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we I

should regard

it

as a thing to DC taught, or as

a gift ot nature, or as

other

way

Soc.

to

men

in

some

:

Had

ot myself,

coming

I

the

Meno,

command I

ot

you

{

should

enquire about that which lie does not know, shall you And make An effort to enquire to-

as well as

would not have enquired

whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained "what it is." But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself, such being your notion of freedom, must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of i thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question "Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way." to be argued upon hypothesis? [Sj] As the geometriiamwhen he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle, I

it

taught; and

lx-

Men.

Then, aswe

irtue

\

is

knowli

Yrtainly.

(

this question:

excel lent.

Soc.

it

;

Then now we have

I

.

d
'i

llol I).

!.

.

i

l'\

m

(who

recently

h.is

4

made himaeu

Polycrates), but h\ his

,i\

w\

.1

Anthcmion, who

i

;

m ho

I

in

insolent,

not p

ei

.

well condition

.1

'

•

in

\

,

htm

to

arc the t

\

whom

inn

«-i

.

Ins h

edu< ition, as the Athenian pci ban to think. tor the) choose

from

i

and indua

ikill

01

ifns son oi

.

own

\ou

.ire

hkels

ri

to learn !

the

fill i

in

der

I

thus:

matter

tin-

we

It

to be a

them;

In

i |

Or

v

we wanted htm to we not send him to

il

Uer, should .

tl.

What, A

Certainly.

.

tor

rupting influent

to the physicians? I

w

ot milir, 'lie

good physi< ian, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him

ranted Meoo

|>c,

whether w ho they

\:i\tus. to help me and youi answering our question, Who arc

tc.ulu

thr

.irr

men

arc. Plc.isc-.

Mctn>

thrsr

th.it

be a '^n^\ cob

do you me. in

the cobl

who

to

DOt only

corrupt those

/

An J

Soc.

so forth:

in

s.i\

who

these arc

tli.it

do them

••

n
metm. fOU aware t}. ami other politicians have doubts wheti. tue can Ik- taught or not. but ti. Qjfl the

And

.ire t

.ire

same thi: Men. Where does he SO) In these elegiac va

poet sa\s the very

.

make with \ou

Do

hU

I

to thi

1 will lose

t'.

I

thr imteUig

..

you observe

that virtue

I

v

.1!!

tins

:

when

But

ii

place, the) havi

and, in

th>-

>•n
r

indeed, Scm

listen to

ill

will

Hi.it

tlir

unjust, and hateful n> the gods.

is

i

w

I

nut no qui< k ol apprehension ai the jud

tor tQ art

snd

\n\

inakr thr

am

that

appro> ing

in

ilu\ do,

h w

'I

m

and

would you ihou

low

and

.III

Ins fathei

ist 1

him, dies ihmumK

nil

i

ates; ai

least

il

they

me.

^

.it

i.

r

s

Bui they will be sure to listen it they find thai jrou are good speaker. There was notion thai came into my mind while you w

th.it

ting;

said to myself: "Well,

1

Euthyphro does prove

me

to

thai

and whai til

it

1

:

may

be hateful to the gods,

still

piety

and im

piety are not adequately defined In these dis tiiutions. tor that

which

is

hateful to the gods

h.is been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, do not .isk you to prove this; I will suppose, it you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such will amend the definition so an action. Bui tar .is to say that what all the gods hair is impious, and what they love pious or holy; ami I

I

what some

of

them

love

and others hate

is

and impiety? 3

Soc.

I

am conwhy not.

no reason But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider. Euth. Yes. I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which cerned. Euthyphro, there

they

is

Ought we

enquire into the truth of this. Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others

to

What do you

2

Euth.

We

say

;

We

should enquire; and

shall

in a little while.

wish holy

I

believe that

know better, my good friend. The point which I should hrst

understand is whether the pious or beloved by the gods because it is holy.

to is

DOf

is

is

vrr-n

not

tint)- led

..

now

I

|-

;

k- intelligible; and statr tu.ii

,

in

s

tl.

bi

tb

think, Euthyphro, thai

ting will

m\ meaning

thai

:>.

action or passion implies pre

t

or pa ssion.

dcst

is

must all

instructed

..

fair

that to

which the

given : As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not? Euth. True.

men

in re

ligion.

And spe.ik the truth. Socrates. me then, oh tell mc — what I

Soc. Tell

not attention always designed

good or benent of is

should. in, there

As there

would be

your meaning, Euthyphro? Euth. Yes.

attention

all

ing of a ship.

is

Soc. In like

And

i

the art of attending to hors

art of attending to the

Soc.

is

to the ship-builder

Euth. True. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to Euth. Yes. Soc. As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? Euth. Very true.

for the

inc

view would you

.

Yes,

Nor

which

ser\ ice, ba> ing in

every one qualified to attend to but only the huntsman.:

Soc.

I

to the:;

;

is

h

still

I

(

manship

hk

nisi

work which

the gods

is

thai

do by the help

ministrations? •;. Many and which they do. [14] Soc. W'\

fair,

Socrates, arc the

nd, and I

But the chief of them

Would you chief

1

not sa\ thai

is

rar

is

the

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

198

Euth. Certainly. Soc.

Many and

Euth. That

fair, too,

works of the

are the

husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his work is the production of food from the

chief

earth

?

Euth. Exactly. Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one 5 Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very

tiresome. Let

me simply say that how to please the

piety or holi-

gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety ness

is

learning

and states, just as which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction. Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you is

the salvation of families

the impious,

—

by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and

what

piety?

is

Do

sort of science of

Euth. Yes, Soc.

And

and prayer

I

you mean

that they are a

praying and sacrificing?

do.

is giving to the gods, asking of the gods?

sacrificing is

Euth. Yes, Socrates. Soc.

Upon

of asking

Euth.

this view, then, piety

is

a science

and giving?

my

capitally, Socrates.

friend; the reason

is

that

I

am

and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them? a votary of your science,

Euth. Yes, I do. Soc. Is not the right of

way

of asking to ask

the right

of giving

is

to give

them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want. Euth. Very true, Socrates. Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one to

another ?

have no particular liking for anywish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; [15] for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an allair of business in which wc have very greatly the advantage of them. Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts 3 Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods? Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, I

thing but the truth.

I

.

as

I

was

just

now

what pleases them.' pleasing to the gods, but

saying,

Soc. Piety, then,

is

not beneficial or dear to them

Euth.

I

?

should say that nothing could be

dearer.

Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods' Euth. Certainly. Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument,

comes round to the same not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten? Euth. I quite remember. Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the

as

you

same

will perceive,

Were we

what

as

is

dear to them

—do you

see?

Euth. True.

Sor.Then

either if

we were wrong in our formwe were right then, we are

wrong now. Soc.

way

may

One of the two must be true. Then we must begin again and

Euth.

Euth. Certainly.

And

an expression which you

is

like.

er assertion; or,

them what we want? Soc.

if

point.

You understand me

Soc. Yes,

you Soc. But

use.

What

ask.

That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident is

piety?

.

i

,

would ncvei

i>u

.

«-ti

U

i

i

I

i

run

mi. h

«•'

in the sighi |

im

Mm IN

.

therefore, ih

iliul

J Jo

i

n

1!

n.>l

hurry,

md

I

"i

\

must go now

I

.mi

i

in

I'll

i

APOLOGY -^%N*>%.^>

[iyj

How

fected by

vou,

O

that they almost so persuasively

made me

forget

who

I

not l>e good; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly. And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go on

was

did they speak; and yet they

have hardly uttered

many

Never mind the manner, which may or may

Athenians, have hecn afbut I know

my accusers, I cannot tell; word

a

of truth. But of the

was one which quite amazed me; I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and falsehoods told by them, there

—

For of old I have had many who have accused me falsely to you during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who Ix to the later ones.

accusers,

not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force my eloquence. To say this, when they were

of

certain to be detected as soon as

and proved myself

I

opened

my

anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the lips

to be

when you were

—

moment;

my

for

cause: at

am confident in the justice my time of life I ought not to I

appearing before you,

O men of Athens,

me

it

of

me.

a favour:

And

—

If I

I

—

defend myself in

my

children,

minds with

and took possession

their falsehoods, telling of

one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause.

The

cusers

whom

disseminators of this tale are the acI dread; for their hearers are apt

fancy that such enquirers do not believe in And they are many, and their charges against me areof ancient date, to

the existence of the gods.

and they were made by them in the days when you were more impressible than you are now in childhood, or it may have been in youth and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my

of

be

in the

let no one exmust beg of you to grant

character of a juvenile orator pect

of your

accusers; unless in the chance case of a

accus-

tomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using

poet. All

Comic

who from

suaded you

—

envy and malice have persome of them having first con-

—

men

in the agora, at the tables of the

vinced themselves

anywhere else, I surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court quite a stranger to the language

with; for I cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to

and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, [ 18] whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country: Am I making an unfair request of you?

assume widi me, as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long

money-changers, would ask you not to be

or

of law,

I

am

of the place;

—

most

200

all

this class of

are

difficult to deal

.

and mu


hi


ihc- -..iinr

pound

i

i

11

in I*

i

u

I

i

f

11

l«.

ihr

(.:•

i

«h. ilr.

ii.

pro

il

true

I

lul ike glad if probe the argument furthet feat that when dren, you are haunted with

01

the soul leaves the body, the wind ma) really blow bet away and icattei her; especiall) ii man ihould happen to die in great itorm and m>t w hen the iky ii aim.

the)

c

I

anythi

lia

.1

them alwayt w

of

Ii

.i>

i

Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must irgue us cut t>i out (ears and yet, strictly speaking, they .ire not our tens, but there is a child within us to whom death is son oi hobgoblin: him too we must persuade .1

when

not to be afraid

In- is

alone

in the

dark.

Soc rates said: -ft the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the I

fear. /

Ami where shall we find a good charmer when you are gone?

jSj

of our fears, Socrates, 1

he replied,

[ellas,

is

a

rous races not a tew: seek tor

I

should

it

you

please, let us return to

argument

at

which we

or

!

!> j

Ii

r

1

or quite the reverse? M.i\ the) not rather bt ICribed as almost alwayi changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with

one another

The

:

Cebes; the) are always

latter, replied

a state- ot

And

/?>t Ins lusts, the- iouI, mean, accustomed to hate and feai i bodily

1)(

probable. An«!

bod)

ilir

I

I

ihe bod) ind

!>\

led to believe thai the truth onl)

form, which

.t

diftv uli

them

pi.

here

Some

is

not, be said.

arc happiei than others;

and the hap

themselves and in the pis whu h they go arc these m bo have pra< tised thr civil and social virtues which are < ailed ten both

pseat

anoe and

in

and are acquired by habit and and mind/ they the happ

justice,

attention without philosophy

Why

.ire

Bei auac they

may

be

a into

1

some gentle .i\\A social kind whuh is Like thnr own, such .is bees or w.isps or ants, or b.u k again into the form oi man, and ]ust and mod

men may be supposed to spring lrotn them. Very likely. \o one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the

erate

knowledge only. And Simmias and febei, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshy lusts, and hold out against them ami renot befuse to give themselves up to them, Clods, but the lover of this

is

the reason,

(

—

cause they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, likcthelovers ol money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or

disgrace of evil deeds.

No,

Socrates, that

would not become them,

said Cebes.

No

indeed, he replied; and therefore they

own souls, and do moulding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and who have any

care of their

not merely live

fT.:

lust.

By unchaste loo^s, loose gestures, and foul taIJ{, Bf.t most by lewd and lavish act of sin, Lets in defilement to the inward parts, The soul grows clotted by contagion, Imbodies, and imbrutcs, till she quite lose,

The

.

and propensii 1

ti we-.

this corporeal

finally in

.ill

depart pure and unalloyed?

continual association and constant care body have wrought into bei nature.

Ven Ami

there

to

by the corporeal, which 'hr

pan

il

Ami

Impossible, be replied. Slu-

will

ih iiM h natui

doyousu]

attained on)) b) philosophy;

I

which to and can be

mtcHritti.il principle,

tin-

the bodily eye

t
eyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, [ioj] and our souls will truly exist in another world' am convinced. Socrates, said Ccbcs, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simiinas. or any one else, has any lurther objection to make, he had better speak out. and do not know to what not keep silence, since other season he can deter the discussion, h there is anything which he wants to say or to

ot the

"But although the odd the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place ot the odd?" Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; tor this has not been acknowledged, but it this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of lire and heat and any other thing. Very true. And the same may be said of the immortal: the immortal is also imperishable, then the it soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; Yet

will not

if

True.

imperishable,

attacking the

and unmeltcd— tor it could ne\cr have pcrnor could it have remained and admitted the heat

soul,

Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die. but the immortal

must not three he imperishable?

mow, must

Most

sa\ that this

course.

•

must not the

also impensh.i

Yes. he said.

ishable,

OF PLATO

true;

will

not mistaken, as well as

ney thither.

For

after death, as they say, the genius of

I'll \l tndi\ idu.il. to uln'iii hr

,

Kim

leads

if

I

ertatn plat

>

iiri

has been given

i

Ki

\ou

you mean mall that youj art producci tlir

mom

you

>»>

mrii and nut

l)|

II.

What

I

A

rned

ideccivin] Willi

1

the

Now

I

same way;

want

—

is

to

know

about rhetoric

rhetoric the only art

in

which

brings persuasion, or do other arts have the

same

effect

3 I

mean

say

to

teaches anything persuade

— Does

men

who

he

of that

which

he teaches or not 3 Gor. He persuades, Socrates, there can be no mistake about that. Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now ipeaking: do not arithmetic

—

—

and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of

number

3

Gor. Certainly. Soc.

And

therefore persuade us of

them

3

Gor. Yes. Soc.

Then

artificer of

arithmetic as well as rhetoric

persuasion

Gor. Clearlv.

3 .

is

an

OF PLATO

DIALOGl

256 Soc.

And

any one asks us what sort of per-

if

—

and about what, wc shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantit\ ot odd and r\cn; 1 454 J and wc shall he able to show that all the other arts ot which wc were just now speaking arc art nicer so! persuasion, and of what suasion,

Then

.

rhetoric

not the only artificer of

is

Gor. True. then,

that

works by persuasion, but

m

same, as

the

case- ot

mscn which persuasion

what?

—

is

is

not only

rhetoric

that other arts

do the

the painter, a question

a very lair

way

Of what and about

one:

rhetoric the artificer,

not that a lair

is

of putting the

5

".

think

I

you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer? answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the Gor. art ot persuasion in courts ot law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about Soc.

'I

"hen,

if

I

And

that,

I was suswould not have

Gorgias, was what

pecting to be your notion; yet

I

\ou wonder if by-and-by am found repeating seemingly plain question; tor I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and I

:.

that

we may

not get the habit of anticipating

and suspecting the meaning of one another's words; I would have you develop your own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.

Gor. Soc.

I

think that you arequite right, Socrates. let me raise another question;

Then

is such a thing as "ha\ ing learned" Gor. Yes. Soc. And there is also "having believed"? Gor* Yes. Soc. And is the "having learned" the same as "having believed," and are learning and belief

there

the

same things?

Gor. In the same. Soc.

my

Then

would appear, is the persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them? rhetoric, as

artificer of a

Gor. True. Soc.

And

the rhetorician does not instruct the

just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters

time 3 Gor. Certainly not.

in a short

Come, then, and let us see what we realmean about rhetoric; for do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly Soc.

ly

I

meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a proposition

ascertain in

what do you

your judgment is right, as you may this way: If a person were to say

—

to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well

— you would reply,

taken, that there

is.

Gor. Yes. Soc. Well, but

is

Gor. No.

say,

Gorgias?

Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a

judgment, Socrates, they are not

well as a true?

and not

taken, then the military will advise the rhetoricians: er of rhetoricians,

I

if I

there a false

am

not mis-

knowledge

as

me assure as well as

from you.

And

here

let

have your interest in view own. For likely enough some one

you that

my

mak-

cannot do better than learn

the nature of your art

And

as a true.'"

we

—one

courts of law or other assemblies about things

and unjust.

the just

Just so.

gives belief. Soc.

so.

well 3

then assume two sorts of perwhich is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge 3 Gor. By all means. Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge? [455] Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only

question.(

Gor.

suasion,

jxrrsuasion?

Seeing,

And yet those who have learned as who ha\c believed are persuaded

Soc.

as those

Soc. Shall

and about what. d'jr. Vary true.

sort,

Sot

Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief ditfer. Gor. Very true.

I

young men present might desire become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. "What is the use of coming to or other of the to

GORG1 "

Not:

tlirv

I

will

what

.ul

will \..n tan h in i" ich iie

t

l»r-

i

I

and

trs,

will

1

nature

sjfcpss lir.iril,

thr Athenians

lh.it

(

.n

:

thr

to. in

iri|

,

it \

tlir

have

the din ks and thr walls

and the plan

oi thr

«i|

drlrn, r Mot

III

\rrtrd thru iiiMnu

harbcan

accordance with the counsels, partly i>i Themista Irs. and partly ol Peru les, and n«>t .u tinon ol the builders. Sum h is thr tradition, Got shout Themistot les; and myaeli heard the ipeo h ot Pericles when he advised vis about the (raddle devised

|

lion

rhcti

«>t

think,

1

oi

w .i\ oi leading ui on, endeiVOUl t.» ir\r.»l to \

!:kr youi

ij"

hit

•

friends.

\"U .in\uri tlinu

ill

I

ti.

t-nl

alio which Socrates has juit mentioned

low W


r and not so strong as others ol not, being wiser, be also bettei than we are, and

m

u>i

in tins

mattej

mean

w

n

be will

obbli

who understand

but also

aliani

\

and the

u«>t

able

men

the adminii

not on!

e I

t«»

bum from

••

soul.

In reason ot his authority, bui he will noi ex

pend or uuikr use

own

oi

person, or

it

then on he will be pun

large] share ol

.1

ished- his ihare will

lie

noes,

ex*. tt-J

thai

»>t

than th.u ot others, and w e.ikest ot all. he being the best ot less

the smallest share ot right,

Cal.

all,

my friend? You talk about

it

tome, and he In- the

all

will h.i\ e

Callicles:---am

I

not

am

1

not speak-

Answer " Yes"

or

is

Soc.

And ought

Cal.

not the better to have a larger

Not

of meats

and drinks.

but with ah* rq vim with nevei saj in e about t! things, lor at onr time \ou wrrr defining the 1

I

.

-

tnd the superior to be the stronger, then

and now von bring t new notion: the snprrior .111. the DCD now dec lared by you to be the agaifl as the Wiser, a

1

wish, my good Eriend, th.u you me, once tor all. whom you atlirm to l>c the lx-t ter ami superior, and in wh.it they are ln-ttrr' Cal. have already told vmi that meanthosrwho are wise and courageous in the adminis Lration ot a state they ought to l>c the rulers ot their states, and justice consists in their hai I

ing

more than

their subjects.

or will they not have

I

Then

the skilfullest

and

best in

making

my

walk about

in

and have the greatest number them? Cal. Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are

the largest shoes,

Cal.

not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds,

own

if

this

is

and have land

How

as

much

seed as possible for

2

you go on, always talking

in the

same way, Socrates! [491] Soc. Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. Cal. Yes, by the Gods, you are literally alwavs talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argu-

What do you mean? mean that every man

I

is

but perhaps you think that there for

him

to rule himself;

rule others

Cal.

he

is

his is

own

ruler;

no necessity

only required to

:

What do you mean

by his "ruling over

himself".?

A

simple thing enough; just what is said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own Soc.

commonly

Cal.

What

innocence! you

— the temperate?

whv

will

you not

tell

me

in

what a

mean

those fools

—

any one may know that to meaning. Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything' On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence [492] to minister to them and to Soc. Certainly:

be

my

And

this

natural justice and nobility.

To

satisfy all his longings.

ment. Soc. But

more than themselves,

?

pleasures and passions.

you talking 2 Soc. Or,

Eriend

Soc.

shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should

Cal.

th.it

1

Soc. But whether rulers or subjects will they

understand: then, perhaps, of coats the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them? Cal. Fudge about coats! Soc.

trom

I

me

:

Soc.

1

—

"No."

Cal. Yes.

share

111 \

I

Soc. Well, hut l\o you admit that the wiser the better.'

:it

u hu h you bring against

I

meats and drinks and

physicians and other nonsense; ing of them,

his

politicians

1

tratioi

and

he will have a largei share rod Junks, because he ii better, U.wc the distribution ol .ill ol then

the me. us

of

i-.«-

In ihf

told \-»i

not

l>\

Either, then,

S

ol

be

i!ir.,,l\ 1

ol toi

:l.unlv.

his

'

us,

»>i

some-

dui supri

275 !.

•.u.:.;r

d


who

..

I

llld Still

the truth?

the-

ill

iii

of

And what

Foxton, say

does our friend Socrates, he assent to this, or

—does

not? Soc. cles.

He

does not assent; neither will Callisees himself trulv. You will ad-

when he

DIALOG UE S OF PLATO

278 run.

I

suppose, that good and evil fortune are

opposed

And

if

in the

sentence which you have just

word

"thirstv" implies pain

man

cannot have them both, or be

Cal. Yes.

ophthalmia

called

/-/«/'/ Cal.

To

and sound

Soc.

Soc.

the

Soc.

And when

Sue.

same eyes

he has got rid or his ophthalot his eyes too?

them both

Cal. Certainly not.

That would

surely be marvellous

and

?

Cal. Very.

Soc.

gets rid ot

them

in

is

Soc.

And

turns?

)r

(

When

you are thirsty?

in

pain?

—

he

may have

strength and weak-

same way, bv his? swiftness

Cal.

It is.

You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time? Cal. Yes did. / 49j] Soc. But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?

J

and slowness?

Cal. Clearly.

Cal. Certainly.

Soc.

And

does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and Soc.

pleasure in drinking?

Soc.

Cal. Yes.

Soc.

is

Soc. Do you see the inference: that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when vou sav that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not afreet at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the bod> which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this

affected by them, and

Cal. Yes.

ness in the

?

true ?

suppose that he

I

want

Cal. Yes.

the final result, that he gets rid ot

absurd

There

And

Sot

together? Soc.

expressive of

Cal. Yes.

same time?

mia, has he got rid of the health Is

is

ot the satisfaction of the

Cal. Certainly.

Cal. Certainly not.

Soc.

the word "drinking"

and

?

Cal. Yes.

be sure.

at

And

pleasure,

:

Soc. Hut he surely cannot have the

well

admit that

pleasant?

And

disease, they exclude

—

is

is

uttered, the

and

without them both, at the same time? Cal. What do you mean? SOi Take the case ot any bodily alieciion: a nun may have the complaint in his eyes

which

are thirsty,

one

they arc opposed to each other,

then, like health

another: a

And you would

when vou

Cal. Yes.

Cal. Yes.

Soc.

Very good.

Soc.

to drink,

each other?

to

misery, in a similar alternation?

'

Then

pleasure

fortune, or pain the

therefore the

good

is

is

not the same as good

same

as evil fortune,

and

not the same as the pleas-

ant?

Cal. Certainly he has.

Cal.

I

wish

I

knew,

Socrates,

what your quib-

then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil do we agree? Please

bling means.

not to answer without consideration.

Cal. Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in

Soc.

If

—

Cal.

—

I

entirely agree.

Go back now to our former admissions. you say that to hunger, I mean the mere ot hunger, was pleasant or painful?

Soc. 1

)id

stale

said painful, but that to eat when you hungry is pleasant. know; but still the actual hunger is Soc.

Cal.

I

are

1

painful:

am

I

not right?

And

You know,

Callicles,

your admonition of me. Soc.

from

Does not

a

man

cease

from

his thirst

and

drinking at the same time? Cal. I do not understand what you are saying. Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes; we should like to hear the argument his pleasure in

—

Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but thirst, too,

but you affect not

know.

out.

Cal. Yes.

Soc,

Soc. to

painful?

I

must complain of

Need adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are

is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. Gor. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his

painful?

own

is

Cal. Yes, very. I

Cal.

1

agree,

and therefore you need not ad-

duce any more instances. 1

Cf. Republic,

iv. 4 ^6.

the habitual trifling of Socrates; he

fashion.

you shall ask these peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. Cal. Well, then, Socrates,

little

—

Vs,

were

i

:

S

pleasure

.\

man

i

ease

"i

pleasure

i

roni

drinking

lm

(

at

1

v l

tin-

;d «lc-

is

the s.ime 1

tpproai h

ir.iscN

from pain and pleasure

^t

i,

adhere to what you mid? do; but what

1

win, my mend,

is

the infereo

the inierencc

thai

I

I

I

with them.' Cal. Yes. 3

the courageous and the wise are the good

would you not

say so?

Cal. Certainly.

did you never see a foolish child

re-

:

joicing.

man

too?

Cal. Yes, certainly: but

what

a foolish

Nothing

[498] Soc.

is

your drift 5 if you will

particular,

I

And

have.

man

re-

sorrowing

Which They

rejoice

are

and sorrow most

— the

3

much upon

1

battel pleased

.«t

thr

il.ii'

I

ben arc thr foolish and the w the brave all pleased and pained, .is vou Wt re laying, m nr.irlv cd and evil? 1. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

bad

in a nearlv

[

do not know what you mean.

Cal.

I

Soc.

Why, do you

really

not

remember saying

that

good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils remember. Cal. Yea, Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods 3 present to those who rejoice if they do rejoice the

—

Soc.

be sure.

those

who

rejoice are

And

those

who

good when

are in pain have evil or

sorrow present with them

I

think, in

Soc. evil

3

see a

coward

And would you

still

say that the evil are

by reason of the presence of

Cal.

Soc.

in battle?

Then

goods are present with them.3

Cal. Yes. a par,

Enough: And did you ever

To

;

Cal. Yes.

that respect.

Cal.

\nd arc they not enemy'i departure

Soc.

did you ever see a sensible

wise or the foolish

Soc.

ihrv ripi.ilK

Cal. Certainly.

Cal. Yes.

Cal.

r

I

only answer.

Soc.

thr brs

3

have.

I

And

joicing or

.11

should imagine that more- p. uned.

Soc.

And do vou call the tools and cowards good men For you were saying |ust now that

Cal. Yes,

ire

Cal. Yes.

Soc.

Soc.

I

I

.

Col, ii

good is not the tame as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation ot pleasure anil pain at the same moment: hut not ot good ami evil, tor they are different, low then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as e\ il ? Ami would have vou look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, think, have been considered bv vou when you identified them: Are not the uood good because they have g

I

.

I

their will

?

[510/ Cal. ( iranted, Socrates, it you will only have clone. Soc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice.'

Cal. Certainly.

like

than this greatestof

lous

u tint thei

the doing injustice

Soc.

And what

art will protect us

from

suffer-

ing injustice.it not wholly, yet as far as possible

3

to know whether you agree with me; tor think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power. I

want

I

Cal.

serve

Well

how

said, Socrates;

ready

I

am

and please to obyou when you

to praise

talk sense.

Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who like to like, as ancient is most like to him sages say: Would you not agree to thiv

—

:

Cal.

I

should.

Soc. But

when

the tvrant

is

rude and unedu-

DIALOGUES OF PLATO cated, he is

one

to fear .nn

ma\ be expected

and

his superior in wrtue,

who

will never be able

any one

oi

.

greatly his interior, lor the tyrant will

despise him,

and

will nc\ cr seriously

regard

him

:r:end.

Cal. '1'hat again .

:

Cul.

No. indeed.

Soc.

And

Then

be nibjed anil subscr\ ient to him; he is the will have power in the state, and no

man who one

which saves men in courts ot law, and which you advise me to cultivate Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too. Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions.:

true.

is

the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will he one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to S..

yet, In

o

1 1 * .» t

-»ll

ol i^

U

en profcuion i>

..ihct

«»•

he would hi you despise linn •

-.

I

.in.l

and ineeringly call him in engine maker, you will not allow your daughters to marr)

.lit.

.unl

on

youi ion to Ins

Mi.it iv

00,01

N»>nt

what

prin< iple,

\m.I

J.i

1

1

1

•.

1

was

amc

thai

you u

Bui

it

tlu-

ill

*'|

s.i\,

bettei

consists only in

.i

.un better*

and

what

I

Please, then,

I

bettei born."

viv,

whatever may In- his character, then youi cen oi the engine maker, and oi the phj su ian, and ot the other .ins oi salvation, is ridi< ulous. o im Friend want you to sec ih.it tin* nofatc and the good may possibly be something differ ent from saving and being saved: -May not he who is truly a man ceaSC to care about living a certain time?' he knows, as women sav. that no man can escape late, and therefore he is not fond ot lite; he leaves all that with Cod, arul I

I

—

considers in what way he can best spend his pointed term whether by assimilating him-

—

self to

the constitution under

which he

1

.u you at this moment have to consider J how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, you mean to be in their •>-/

it

good graces, and to have power whereas want you to think and I

this

is

in the state;

see

is

whether

—

would dearest on the

tor the interest ot either of us

not have us risk that which

I

acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian

down the own perany man will

enchantresses, who, as they say, bring

moon from heaven

at the risk of their

you suppose that becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he dition.

But

if

show you the

art of

1

who would

deserve to be the true natural

friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pynlampes* darling who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only.

He, then, who

will

them, will make you

as

make vou most

you

I

in the

ail;

w

iih a

\

things,

iii>

In. In

.

i

icv.

ire,

like

desire, a statesman

and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet

indulge but tun

Very

I

si\t

r
«~

us

Ins

whu

ix

h

had pleasure

ii

a \ul.

|iist

other oi our

CaL Be

i

OfM lusioris

And

-

-.will

h

-

hai

the other had in

icw

\

|

improvement ot that which was ministered whether body or soul' Quite true. And must wr not have the tame vm\ view in the treatment ot our cit\ and cit

to,

C.iii.

SOC.

Must we not

m

and make them

try

5/7/ For we have already dis< that there is no use hi imparting to them am other good, unless the mind of those who arcto have the good, whether money, or otficc, or possible

1

/

any other Shall

we

1

power, be gentle am:

sort ot

say that

:

if you like. you .\\u\ I, Callicles, were intending to set about some public business, anil were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as walls, docks or temples ot the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, hrst. as to whether we know or do not

Cal. Yes, certainly,

Soc. Well, then,

know

it

who

the art of building, and

— would

taught us-

not that be necessary, Callicles

1

CaL True. Soc. In the second place,

consider whether

we had

we

should have to

ever constructed any-

private house, either of our

own

or for our

and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and it upon consideration We found that we had had good and eminent masters. And had been successful in constructing friends,

many

fine buildings, not only with their assist-

ance, but without them, by our 1

Cf.

Symposium.

216.

own unaided

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

288

—

in thatcase prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction ol pub-

Have we

lic works. But it we had no master to show. and only a number of worthless buildings or ROOC at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

if you will not answer must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that thev were good citizens.

skill

Cal. Certainly.

And

docs not the same hold in all other you and were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent Soc.

cases.; It

I

pnuiisc as state -physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about

that such

lme

I

quiries about you.

And

if

we

arrived at the con-

Cal.

1

skill of either

leaven, Callicles,

that

we

or any

up

as to set

what an absurdity

human

to think being should be so silly

do the same, without having

practised in private, whether successfully

or not, and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar

when you is

are learning the potter's art;

which

thing?

a foolish

[515] Cal. True. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer.' Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer? Soc.

Cal.

You

Soc.

Nay,

are contentious. Socrates. I

ask you, not from a love of con-

want

know

tention, but because

I

what way you think

that affairs should be ad-

ministered

among us

to

in

— whether, whenyoucome

to the administration of

er

really

them, you have any oth-

aim but the improvement

of the citizens?

they were good, then clear! the citizens better in-

it

Cal. Yes.

And, therefore, when

Pericles first

began

speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? to

CaL Very likely. Soc. for

if

Nay, my friend, "likely" is not the word; he was a good citizen, the inference is

certain.

CaL And what difference does that make.' None; only I should like further to know

and advise others

as state-physicians

like ourselves to first

of us, then, by

do.

them must have made

Soc.

no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better medical

I

I

stead of worse?

clusion that for the

surely said so; for

Soc. But of

many times over man? Nay, we

the duty of a public

is

for yourself

to

me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or should make the same enfreeman 3 And

not already admitted

Soc.

whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and money. Cal. You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising

set

who

Soc. But

bruise their ears.

what

I

am

going to

not mere hearsay, but well

tell

known

you now is both to you

at first, Pericles was glorious and unimpeached by any verdict of the [516] Athenians this was during the time when they were not so good yet afterwards, when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefac-

and me: that his character

—

—

tor.

Cal. Well, but badness?

how

does that prove Pericles'

Soc. Why, surely you would say that he was bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you

a

say Cal.

I

Soc.

And

do

the fa

will

vou also do

1

or saving

me

ves.

the favour ot

»R(;i \s u hrthri

.

in.ili is .ui

M.lMlU

I I

mil

them

M

llC

\

.1

hepherdoi men?

.

thnii

and Vnd

S

iiu

hou will not answer. Cal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer ; Soc. I suppose that can; just now, at am '

I

rate, the

speeches which

enough because you I

adjure you by the god

sir,

do

me whether

tell

I

am making

are long

answer me. Hut friendship, my good

refuse to ot

there does not appear to

you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then blaming him tor being bad: Cal. Yes, it appears so to me. [520] Soc. Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner

;

Cal. Yes. but

why

talk ot

men who

are

good

talk of

men

for nothing?

Soc.

who

I

would rather

say,

why

and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of tiie city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city: do you think that there is any difference between one and theother? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised: whereas the truth is, that sophprotess to be rulers,

—

much

superior to rhetoric as legisla-

istry

is

as

tion

is

to the practice of law, or

medicine.

The

orators

and

gymnastic to

sophists, as

inclined to think, are the only class

who

I

am can-

not complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact? Cal. Certainly it is. Soc. If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them. Where-

G IAS .1% it it,

man has been benefited

ft

in

an) othei

example, hr Kai been taught

fat

trainer, hr mi]

pay,

it

htm

you

"i

nil

ti.unri let! thr ni.itln in hitn, .uid

he-

t

run

to I

no ftgroement with htm that he fthould receive money fti won is hr had given him h o( njktiI do men act unjustly, l>ui b)

\n ill

nevet be brou

hkrlv

in.iilr

t

i

.Ml.

hen

I

it

dl< tin c, a uu.l the r.u iii.ui will remain i.m and to on; and ilir dead man, who in life had fancy to have \:i.| it hr l\.i\r tlow in,; h.ui Aon in. wrai marked with the whip end had the printi he- vim: wounds in him when hr oi see thr s.imr in llir dr. id w.is \ r. yOU might unl ii his hull's urn broken oi misshap remain

ill

he

i

Ik

•

mm

tin:

.ill

ihrni, ai

.

.»

i

t

.il

in

found A»i hrlau andai

when

he w.is ah\c.

llir

s.unr ap|x

from

oi

the soul ire laid

to

who is lil

t

.hit ihr\ have

th
e few there .ire w ho .itt.un to this. Sm h gl SSS there m.i\ .irise ge*>d

ot

all

I

.1

1

true

men, however, there ai Athens and

be again,

h.i\e been, in

and

other states,

will

who

have fulfilled their trust righteousl] and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, ;

Ansteides, the son eral, great

As

men

e)t

Lysimai.hus. But,

are also bad,

my

in

gen-

friend.

was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he the bad kind, knows nothing

I

gets a soul ot

about him, neither ents are; he a villain;

who

knows only

and seeing

he

is,

nor

who

I

that he has got hold ot

this,

he stamps him I him awa\ toTarta

able or incurable, and sends

whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or. again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Calliclcs, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled him self with the doingsof othcrmen in his lifetime;

rus,

him Rhadamanthus sends

to the Islands of the

Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on. as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him: Blessed.

Holding a sceptre thr d

Now :

Cf.

I,

Calliclcs,

Rep

of gold

am

persuaded of the truth of

15.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

294 these things,

and

1

consider

how

1

shall present

my soul whole and undented before the judge in that da\. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims,

and

I

desire only to

to live as well as

die as well as

power,

And,

1

in

I

exhort

to the

men

I

utmost

oi

my

do the same. your exhortation ot me, I

other

return lor

know the truth, when die, to

can, and,

And,

can. all

I

exhort you also to take part

in

to

the great combat,

which is the COmhat ot life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach ol me. and s.iy, that you will not he

when

able to help yourself

the

clay ot trial

and

judgment, of which was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the indge, / $2j ] the son ot Aegina, and. when he has got \ou in his grip and is earn mg you ofl. >ou will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts ot this world, and \ery likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort ot insult. Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wite's tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, it by searching we could find out anything better or truer: hut now you see that you And Polus and (Jorgias, who are the three wisest of the ( .reeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to sutler Injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to I

be followed above

things, as well in public

all

that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished: also that he should avoid all flatas in private life;

and

tery ot himself as well as ot others, ot the lew

many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all hisactions should be done always, with a view to justice. or of the

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in lite and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind: let him strike \ou, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm m the practise of virtue, it you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together,

we

will apply ourselves to politics,

it

seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid arc wel Let us, then, take the argument as our that

guide, which has revealed to us that the best

way

of

tue in

life is to life

in this exhort all to

practise justice

and death. This way

which you

men

trust

let

vir-

us go; and

to follow, not in the

and

to follow you; for that

ing worth.

and every

in

which you exhort

way,

Callicles,

is

me

noth-

THE REPUBLIC mi

Pi RSONI 0]

Pdl

t

s«

\Kv

•••.

in

C

|]

Thi

u 001

)i

I

i

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U.US]

s

SOGftATBS,

!

J.

I

HI

UYMACHI

in the

"

Wl

'

CUUI

L

.-phiilu\

thi

ill

^#- ^

BOOK I

\vi.\r

down

a

nameita

•-

-^

/r Id me tell \«'u, thai a hen man thinks himjdi to be

below and

-

il

1

f.hiitr correct

m

oi

would

nr

\.i\

:

reus wealth >iu-. he v.nJ.

\u mi

I*

thr truth M. our M

:

\

•

ealth.

iiur. but in. iv

What do

question r

and

in

thai

.i\

uc, be vnil.

thai

11.. I

.

hould

I

a

1

1

i

ii

\\c

I

nir

nli

mm

tn them and -ill men \n.l hence th< \n\ bid company, foi the] in talk about

hat

im a

.1

hni

1,.

1

iend n hen in

ii

.i

r

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la is

mon

I

thai

\\

ihr s.ikr dI usr llld profit

i

\...j

this

t..

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poemi

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thru children, besides that natural

tor

at a

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resemblin

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love

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REPUBLK

I

luvc inherited thru

I

2

Certainly not.

When a debt

Simonides said that the repayment of justice, he did not mean to include

was

that case

3

Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend

ought always

to

do good

to a friend

and never

evil.

You mean gold which

two ment of ine him

the

that the return of a deposit of

is

to the injury of the receiver,

parties are friends, a

debt

—that

is

is

if

not the repay-

what you would imag-

to say?

Yes.

And owe

to

are enemies also to receive

them

;

what we

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

298

To

be sure, he laid, thej arc eo receive

what

wc QWC them, ami an enemy, as take it, outs to an enemy thai which is due or proper to him that if to say, evil. Simomdcs. then, after the manner of poets, I

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. :

—

would seem

meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a dcht. That must have Inrcn his meaning, he said. By heaven! I replied; and il wc asked him what due or proper thing is given DV medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to US? lie would surely reply that medicine gr.es drugs and meat and drink to human bodies. And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what/ that

which

justice gives,

and

to

whom.' It. Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is

to

which gives good

the art

to friends

and

I

think

and

best able to

is

enemies

in

do good

what

harm

;

Then

man

in

what

in playing the

In a

money

result

the just

harp the harp-player

is

certainly

man?

partnership.

Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale ol a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not ; Certainly.

Then what

But when is

pilot

is

to buy a ship, the would be better?

ship-

that joint use of silver or gold

which the just man is to be preferred? When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

You mean when money

a voyage, amid the perils

sort of actions or

is

the just

with a view

man most

enemy and good

chus, there

able to

do

in

a

man

is

well,

That is

is

not wanted, but

lie

mak-

is

to say, justice

is

useful

when money

useless?

That

to his friend?

war against the one and

is

the inference.

And when you want

to

keep

a

pruning-hook

then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser? safe,

my

dear Polemar-

no need of a phvsician?

NC.

Clearly.

And

he

who

is

not on a voyage has no need

of a pilot?

And when you want

to keep a shield or a them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musi-

lyre,

No.

Then

time of peace justice will be of no

in

use?

and not

to use

cian?

am

very Ear from thinking so.

Certainly.

And

[333] You. think that justice may be of use peace as well as in war:

useful

Yes.

they are useful?

Like

husbandry

for

the

acquisition

of

corn?

so of all the other things

when

That

Then

Yes.

Or

is

than the harp-player, as

a better partner than the just

in

ing alliances with the other.

shoes

sort of partnership

a better partner

Precisely.

what

to his

of

Quite the reverse.

allowed to

In going to

1

game

skilful player.

the builder

pilot.

in

or the skilful pla\cr a

better partner at a

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than

to his friends

time of sickness?

of the sea?

in

The

wright or the True.

so.

The physician. Or when they are on

And

and

And when you want

evil to his

The

man

the just

is

usetul

draughts ?

evil

meaning then?

his

is

And who

to

But

more

enemies.

That

partnerships?

its.

filing to lood. is

mean

by contracts you

aly.

have spoken darkly of the na-

to

ture of justice; tor he really

And what

And

like

justice

is

when

the inference.

justice

is

not good for much. But let Is not he who

us consider this further point;

shoemaking for the acquisition of is what you mean?

— that

Yes.

is

—

they are useless, and useless

can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a

blow?

f

:

i

1

1

k

1

i

r

t

r.

,K

i

i

I

who

\ii.l \\c

from

.in.,

is

most

.«

d

skilful in prevent

I

hai in to

uir

I

\iul l«rst

human

«.i

it

\\r

is

thr

vu.u.I ol

l»rst

steal

ii»

who n em

,

but,

ilir

i»i

it

that win, h wi

i.ini|i

.i

march upon

.1

ili.it

them; and hr lus

hr ought to benefit

able

rutin

in

ihr meat

and Ik

:t.lllllv.

who

tun hr

1

is

Ih.it,

good

Thai

is

Then

after

he

.i

thief.

m.m

implied .ill

And

tins

is

iking oi at

Autolycua,

t>i

the-

who

her oi Odysseus,

l>


ft

;

/

;

hr

th.it

m»t good, only an

Ik- and is same ma) be s.ml. Von would argue thai thr good friends and the bad our enca

to

r

yy5/ and

i.

.ire

our

Vet,

Ami

so,

you and

agreed that justice

is

an

harm

oi

enemies*'

in

and Simonides

art oi tlu-tt; to

however "tor the good

tised

the

tomes:

I

W prat

and Eor was what you

oi friends

— that

were saying? No, certainly not that, though do not now know what I Jul say; but still stand hy the latter words. Well, there is another question: By Eriends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming Surely, he said, a man may he expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. Vc\ but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to I

I

be

and conversely That is true. Then to them the good

will be

enemies and

And good

in that case they will be right in

to the evil

and

evil to the

doing

good?

But the good are

just

and would not do an

injustice?

Then according

to

your argument

it

is

just

who do no wrong?

Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral. Then I suppose that we ought to do good the just and harm to the unjust? like that better.

at

just

are evil? Yes, thai appears to

Hut ought the

me

to

the truth.

Ik-

just to injure

any one

at all

3

Undoubtedly he ought to injure thosewho arc both wicked and his enemies.

When

horses

.ire

injured, arc they

improved

or deteriorated?

The

latter.

Deteriorated, that ities

is

to say, in the

good qual-

of horses, not of dogs?

Yes. of horses.

dogs arc deteriorated

of dogs,

man

in the

good qual-

and not of horses?

Of course. And will not men who is

are injured be deteri-

the proper virtue of

:

And that human virtue is justice? To be sure. Then men who are injured are of made

True.

I

is

Certainly.

Clearly.

to injure those

it

orated in that which

True.

did

todogood to our ir lends and harm to our enemies, we should lurther It is just to do good to our triends when they good and harm to our enemies when they

ities

the evil will be their friends?

instead oi laying sirn;

that

first,

And

2

so,

And

That is the result. But can the musician by unmusical

to

necessity

unjust? his art

make men

:

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by horsemen?

his art

make them bad

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

MO

folly, Socrates,

Impossible.

by justice make men unor speaking generally, can the good by

And just,

can the

just

make them bad? Assuredly not. more than heat can produce cold

virtue

Am

:

Or drought moisture (

?

cannot.

It

Hearty not.

Nor can

harm any one?

the just

is

the good?

rtainly.

Then is

else is

man, but of the opposite,

the un)USt?

1

think that what you say

I

quite true.

is

Sen rates.

Then

a

it

man

says that justice consists in

the repayment of debts,

debt which a sa\ this

man owes

and

not wise; for

is

Ixrcn clearly

good is the and evil enemies to

that

to his friends,

which he owes

the debt

to his

it is

not true,

—

if,

as has

shown, the injuring of another

can be in no case just. agree with you, said Polemarchus. Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus. or any other I

man or am quite

wise I

seer.'

ready to do battle

at

your

side,

he

we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious are

do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

to

said.

[336] Shall

I

tell

you whose

I

believe the

saying to be?

'Whose? I

do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy. was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him. I should have been struck dumb: but when saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was theretore able to reply to him. Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were "knocking under to one another," and so losing our chance of finding it. And why. when I

any one

to injure a friend or

not the act ol a just

who

has taken possession of you all?

sillybilhes,

I

the good

Impossible.

And

And why,

believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xer-

Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm to xes or Ismenias the

your enemies." Most true, he Yes,

I

tice also

said;

[iff] How characteristic of Socrates! he rewith a bitter laugh that's your ironical have I not already told style! Did I not foresee you, that whatever he w as asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answerplied,

—

—

r

ing?

You

said.

but

if

this

definition of jus-

breaks down, what other can be of-

fered

Se\cral times in the course of the discussion

Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who ft anted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and had done speaking and there was a pause, I

he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panicroared out to the whole company:

are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I reand well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering plied,

twice

six,

or three times four, or six times two.

or four times three, "for this sort of nonsense

—

do for me" then obviously, if that your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? is that your meaning?" How would you answer him? will not

is

—

stricken at the sight of him.

He

so,

What

—

1

I

1

slikl

.iil

it

RKPUHLK

I

'

I

Ik

W

h\ ihoilld lln\

ii

iin-\

|h

i

s(

.u

m w

iii.l

l>.

replied;

I

hi> is

he thinks,

\\

you and

mj w hat bid him nK apj

dun

1

now

(

c

rt.unly.

AnJ

the different

forms oi governmem make

laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and tl laws, which arc made hv them tor their own in

which the\ deliver to •hem and him who tra; they punish as a breaker ot the law and uniust. Anil that is what I mean when say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest ot the government; a\v\ as the government must Ik* supposed to are the justice

terests.

their subjects,

.

I

I

power, I 339] the only reasonable conclusion is. that everywhere there is one principle of jus

which

tice,

Now

I

is

the interest ot the stronger.

understand you,

I

said;

you are right or not will try let me remark, that in defining I

and whether

to discover.

But

vou have yourself used the word "interest" which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words "ot the stronger" arc added. A small addition, you must allow, he said. Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying

the truth.

is

justice

is

Now we

interest of

some

to say "of the stronger"; I

am

justice

arc both agreed that sort,

but you go on

about

this addition

not so sure, and must therefore consider

further.

Proceed.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

302

and

will;

I is

first tell

)ust lor subjects to

me )o you admit that 1 obey their rulers

it

1

Hut arc the rulers ol states absolutely ble, or arc they sometimes liable to cir be sure,

lie

replied, they are liable to err.

be his interest to do;

they

make them

rightly, they

to their interest;

them agreeably

when

make

;

Ws laws which they

the

obeyed by their subjects

make must

— and that

is

be

what you

call justice?

toubtless.

Then

justice,

according to your argument,

not only obedience to the interest of the ;

stronger but the re\ersc

What

\ou arc saying? he asked. am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. Hut let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about is

that

1

own

their

interest in

also that to

what they command, and

obey them

is

Has not

justice?

that

been admitted? Yes.

Then you must

also

have acknowledged

jus-

not to be for the interest of the stronger,

tice

when

the

rulers

things to be done jury.

For

it,

as

you

to

command their own in-

is

the obedience

unintentionally

which are say, justice

which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, () wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is tor the injury of the stronger? Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if / jjo you are allowed to be his witness. Hut there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself ac-

knowledges mand what

that rulers is

may sometimes com-

not for their

own

Never mind,

interest,

and

them is justice. Thrasymachus said

—

lor

is

is

I

now

says that

replied,

if

he

us accept his statement. Tell

physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact

is

that neither the

grammarian

nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill tails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopt the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, [341] and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest;

his

and the subject

commands; and

and now

is

required to execute

therefore, as

repeat, justice

is

I

said at

first

the interest of the

stronger. I

pear to you to argue like an informer

really ap:

Certainly, he replied.

And do you

both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command ting

weaker who

let

about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the

just.

Yes, Qeitophon, but he also said that justice the interest ol the stronger, and, while admit-

the

Polemar-

Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do

Polemarchus that subjects to do what wascommanded by their

i't s.

his words, rejoined

me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? Certainly not. he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken. You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken they arc.

that for subjects to obey

rulers

this was what the weaker had was affirmed by him to be jus-

chus.

they are

mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit

is

—

this

Those were not

When

Ami

and

tice.

True.

1

whence follows that asmuch as the interest

interest;

est of the stronger

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

thai

own

the injury quite

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interwhat the stronger thought to

infalli-

:

To

is

of the stronger.

do.

I

not for his justice

arc his subjects to

do what

is

tions with

suppose that I ask these quesany design of injuring you in the

argument ; "suppose" is not the word but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

Nay, he

I

know

it;

replied,

1

I

Imt

i.'

do

\

sjH-.ik

.11

.

KM

Ik-

.

m

rulei

tn

Oi tlir

t

ind

And do you

madman !

i»l

pl.»\ .it

oi

m

\\

I

ilh..

die Uriel

Mii-.cs.

.ill

Iir

the informal

youi hands

sou

it

Why, he

imagine,

,

in;

Bui jrou nevei

said, th.it

I

I

,nn mi. h

.i

rhrasymaehus?

and cheat

either b\

1

I

other. the\

h.i

!er

.

.

I

.

minute

.i

th.it

1

ids in your

you made the attempt

ihr

then Mih|f mi. if pine .ind l.niltlrss while rem. lining true d uninip w Kile 1)

a lion

ihavc

said,

thnn.

\n.|

s.ii.l

ot

ai to tt\

as well

might

fault

«••

require anothei iup|

•

l

lv ible, ne\er

ill

h
i

ti.iv

l>\

ue Mid detoniiils.

\

WJU

i;i\rn to

In-rii

non

bill

admitted

l>n ir. n'.r.l

.itt

i

lid

\n.!

ihutr

the

.ill

\\r \\

ipi
the unjust

i|iiali(ies

tributed by in before to the

iust.

which w


t

u

lh
c

sible;

1

1

lerc feeling perplexed

have

that

we

— My

began

to think o\er said,

no

are in a perplexity; for

Wt

image which we had

be-

what had preceded

wonder

1

lost sight of the

friend,

I

fore us.

What do you mean: that mean to ..;.

I

he sa:d. there

do

exist

natures

gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them? Many animals, replied, furnish examples I

them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and of

know.

1

Then

there

is

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end How do justiceand injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length. Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us. Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even Certainly not.

the reverse to strangers. Yes,

safely affirm. is

nothing impossible or out of

Come

who

tion of our heroes.

Would

not he

By

who

is

fitted to

be a guardian,

long.

and let us pass a leisure hour in and our story shall be the educa-

story-telling,

has a similar combination of qualities?

somewhat

then,

the order of nature in our finding a guardian

Certainly not.

if

means.

all

And what

shall be their

education?

Can we

besides the spirited nature, need to have the

find a better than the traditional sort?

qualities of a philosopher?

this has

do not apprehend your meaning. The trait of which I am speaking, jj6] /

and music

1

may

replied,

remarkable

What Why,

be also seen in the dog, and

I is

trait?

whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious? The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your remark.

And

a dog,

surely this instinct of the

— your dog

Why? Why,

is

dog

is

very

a true philosopher.

because he distinguishes the face of a

—and

divisions, gymnastic for the body,

for the soul.

True.

we

begin education with music, and gymnastic afterwards? By all means. And when you speak of music, do you inShall

go on

in the animal.

charming

two

to

clude literature or not? I

do.

And

literature

may

be either true or false?

Yes.

[377] And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false? I do not understand your meaning, he said. You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly des-

main fictitious; and them when they are not

titute of truth, are in the

and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an

of an age to learn gymnastics.

animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Very true. That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

friend

these stories are told

Most assuredly.

Quite right, he

And

You know

not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy? is

said.

also that the

most important part

beginning

is

the

of any work, especially in

I

I

l\\r in

.isr

,

..I

time

ilu-

.it

ind ir.idtU

in,

the

tin

v

.i

1.

is

1

in

curcleul) allow children

w

tales

persons, .m>l

casual

ulr.is foi

liu

to

the most

ll

m.i\

b
\ similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination

which ma\

arise in his

And

instead ol

and do the

shame

like.

or self-control, he will

mind

having any be always whin-

what ought argument has just proved to psooi we must abide until it is

1

not to be, as the

tell

sailors.

Most

true, he said.

then, the ruler catches

It,

Any

State

Most

believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men. must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed. / ]8()J Still less of the gods, as you say, he Then we

shall not sufTer such an expression used about the gods as that of Homer

when he

-

certainly, he said,

if

our idea of the

In the next place our youth

must be temper-

ate

ever carried out.

is

3

Certainly.

and

self-control in sensual pleasures

of

Then we shall approve such language Diomede in Homer, Friend

,

sit still

and obey my word,

as that

1

and the verses which follow,

The Greeks marched breathing proucss? awe of their leaders?

how

describes

2

True.

replied.

to be

he be priest or ph\

Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders

lolcnt reaction. I

r

3 ,

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of

ought not 10 be. Wither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a tit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a So

whethc

of the craftsmen,

ship or State.

\

anybody beside

himself lying in the State,

us; ami bv that disproved by a better. It

not to

the captain what is happening about and the rest ot the crew, and howthings arc going with himself or his fellow

not to

sieian or earpcntei

Yes. he said, that is most true. Vs. replied; but that surely is

gymnasium

the ship

to say

ing And lamenting on (light occasions.

1

patient or the pupil of a

speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor

.... in silent Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about

(

your views,

)n

On my me;

we must

n,

we were

views,

truth should be highly valued; saying, a

lie is

if,

useless to the gods,

cians; private individuals

men, then the use

have no business with

them. Clearly not, he said.

any one

have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private

deemed 1

2

man a

at all is to

to lie to them in return more heinous fault than

Ibid, xvi. 433. Ibid, i. 599.

is

heavy with wine,

who

hast the eyes of a

dog and

the heart of a stag,"

as

and

of such medicines should be restricted to physi-

if

of this line,

if

useful only as a medicine to

Then

shall.

What

not admit them.

you like to father them on we must not admit them is certain.

that

and other sentiments of the same kind.

We

mansion*

the

to be

for the

and of the words which follow? [390] Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken ?

They are ill spoken. They may very possibly

afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance.

And

men

—you

Odyssey,

xvii.

383

Iliad

412.

there ?

Yes. 3 *

5 8 7

harm to would agree with me

therefore they are likely to do

our young

,

iv.

Odyssey, Ibid,

iv.

Ibid,

i.

iii.

431.

225.

8.

ff.

nil r ihr

thai

s.i\

nothing

in nil

opinion

u

iteti

RKPUBLIl ••!

men

M

\. lullri luii:

mon

ii

than

hm

w

that

liirnl

hr

li».

I

t

•

hr

sentiments w hn h

is

tit

man

01

i

ondiM

to heai

iu
\ ha mankind two ifti uiswei ing to thi m Mil) iiiiliin tl\ to the v>ul .in.l IhkU ion

Ki< al,

hi

I

ami thr ochei the

ipirited

he-

t

cur

rUtion;

haVC

set

t

said, the vriHin

meaning

the

ol

unwill;

the

learn.

r about their hunting and coursing, gymnastic and equestrian contests? Foi these .ill follow the general principle, and has ing found ih.it, we shall have no difficulty in

Why, said, do you not see that men .ue unwillingly deprived ol good, and willing evil? Is not to have lost the truth .m evil, and to possess the truth .i u would

discovering tlK-m. dare say mat there will he no difficulty. Very uooil, said; then what is the next

conceive thin. |M>sc idected, and he who fails in ; the trial is to be rejected. That will be the wa\ !s,

And

and which they give lurthcr proof of the same

rhcrc should also be toils and pains

conflicts prescribed will be

made

to

lor

them,

in

light,

even be made probable, if it did. your words seem to hesitate on your I low lips'

You will not wonder, I replied, when you have heard.

he replied.

I

—

—

act n
m- .in admixtui 10m or itlver in them ire rai* d u> honour, and •Mir guardians or luxili u u lr M man ol brass m Iron guards the State, it will Ik- destroyed Sucn ii the tale; imposition must in>t

ii

1

1

1

1

«

i

ol

ink

i

.

pitiful

Ik-

i

.

I

1

1

i

.t

I

i

am Mm,

I

and

to be, in. in

civilize

*

I »

* t

1

1

rtain

i

have thr

will

Ik-,

more

h

and humanise them

in

thru relations

;

tion

.i

is

there in) poatibilit) ol

believe in

N

the preseni

may

sens

ol

made

Ik-

to believe

the difficulty, tor the

roch itv


i the two i»ir\, what is the titiili: SUv« we neither have noi ire permitted i \e conveyed to our gnardiai our at) be accounted neither large nor hut one and self sufficing.

new

1

order which v.c impose upon them. the other, said

of

1.

1

which we were

—

mean the 1 speaking before is lighter still rading the offspring oi the guardi.

hen interior. And oi elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring oi the lower

when ally,

naturally su|>erior.

'I

"he intention

the case of the citizens gener-

that,

in

each

individual

should be put to the

which nature intended him, one to one work, and then e\ery man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many. he said; that

I,

is

not so difficult.

we

regulations which

are prescribing,

danger

quite believe

to the

So

him

whole

Damon

—he

and me. and

State,

tells

says that

when

of music change, the fundamental laws

modes

change with them. Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and \our own. Then. I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music? Yes, he said: the lawlessness of which you

of the State always aid

speak too easily

r

The

of the poet; for any musical inno\a-

full of

is

hf to be prohibited.

>e\crc

And

may be praising, not new kind of song; and this

afraid that he

not to be praised, or conceived to be the

meaning tion

l>e

songs, but a

1

and

steals in.

replied, in the

at first sight

Why, yes, he

form of amusement:

appears harmless.

it

and there is no harm: ucre by little this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man it

not that

said,

little

od Adeimantus, are not. as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of a thing, however, which the one great thing I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for

and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights.

our purpose.

and nurture; If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all is well as other matters which omit;

That is my belief, he replied. Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, [425] they can never grow up into well-conducted and vir-

such, for example, as marriage, [424] the possession of women and the procreation of chil-

tuous citizens. Very true, he

—

What may Education,

that be I

;

he asked.

said,

I

dren, which will that friends

all

have

follow the general principle

all

things in

common,

as the

proverb says.

That

will be the best

way

of settling them.

once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good !

-aid. the State, if

constitutions,

and these good constitutions

ing root in a good education improve

tak-

more and

more, and this improvement aifects the breed

man

in

as in other animals.

Very possibly, he

Then above

to

all,

directed

sum

the point to which,

the attention of our rulers should be that music and gymnastic be pre-

—

made. They must do

them intact. And mankind most regard

tain

utmost to mainwhen any one says that their

The newest song which 1 1

/..

that true.'

And when

I

said.

said.

made a good beginning and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, they have

in play,

in a

manner how unlike the lawless play of the accompany them in all their actions

others! will

and be

a principle of

growth

to them,

and

if

there be any fallen places in the State will raise

them up again.

Wry

true,

he

said.

Thus educated, any

they will invent for themwhich their predecessors

lesser rules

have altogether neglected. is

served in their original form, and no innovation

Is

selves

said.

up: This

pri\ate as well as public.

the singers

hate?

What do you mean? mean such things

I

young

as

these:

—when

are to be silent before their elders:

the

how

show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with they are to

me

:

«

THE REPUBLH

I

v

ind idlu

\

wisdom

think, sm.ill But there iv bout inch mitten I

.ur .ins

trm Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to Ik- doing the "-

business ot

a

cobbler, or a cobblcrot

.1

carpenter;

and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever Ik- the change; do you think that any great harm

would result Not much.

to the State

:

But when the cobbler or any other man nature designed to be a lifted

up by wealth

of his

whom

ha\ ing his heart

trailer,

or strength or the

number

followers, or any like advantage,

at-

tempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either other; or

law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and

which

is

a just

is

implements or the duties of the

to take the

ot necessity.

which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the If

that

Which

Then on

it.

man

a

th.it

.uiv

neither Like wh.il

.im right Of not:

I,

if]

ttainly.

Well then,

ia

tr.

the rulers

tx.t

those to

ordium.

1

»hr

wh.it w.is I

1

rice

in

in

petition

glow impatieni

diih

j

who

we missed Ikt. What do \ »n mean mean to lay thai in realit) t.-t i long time talking ol justice, and have nan we have I

-

I*

ch

•.

noth

whai the) have in tliru wa} with in pre looked

the distance; and therefore,

i

when one man

and warrior agree with

and

this

all

me

in one, in

is

then

trader, legislator, I

think you will

saying that this interchange

meddling of one with another

is

the

ruin of the State.

Most

true.

Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be

DlALOGU

350 :stly

termed evil-doing:

And the greatest degree of e\ -doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice? il

Mainly.

This then

is

injustice;

and

oil

the other

hand

the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, ami will make the city just.

when

ree

We

on

if,

trial,

said, be overpositive as yet;

1

conception of justice be

this

individual as well as in the Stale, there will be no longer any room tor doubt; if it Ik* not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old in

the

we began,

investigation, 9 Inch

under the impression

you remem-

as

that,

if

we could

previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example ap-

we conknowing

peared to be the State, and accordingly

structed as good a one as we could, well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be

now applied to the we shall be satisfied the individual,

in

individual ;

or,

we

if

—

if

they agree,

there be a difference

will

And have another

Stale

come back

trial

to the

of the theory.

1 435] The friction of the two when rubbed together mav possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is

then revealed we will fix in our souls. That will be in regular course; let us do as

you

proceeded to ask:

When two things,

a great-

by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the

and

less, are called

same.'

Like, he replied.

The

just

man

then,

if

we

regard the idea of

justice only, will be like the just State?

He will. And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain

same

other affections and

qualities

of these

classes?

True, he

And

An

3

easy question! Nay. rather, Socrates, the

proverb holds that hard Very true. said; and

is

the good.

do not think method which we are employing is at 1

I

that the all

ade-

quate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one.

we may

arrive at a solution not below the previous enquiry. May we not be satisfied with that 3 he said under the circumstances. I am quite content. I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satis-

level of the

—

fied.

Then he

pursuing the speculation,

faint not in

said.

Must we not acknowledge,

I

said, that

in

each of us there are the same principles and

which there arc in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State 3 how else can they come there 3 Takethe quality would be ridiculous of passion or spirit it to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who habits

—

—

are supposed to possess

it,

e. g.

the Thracians,

Scvthians, and in general the northern nations;

and the same may be edge, which

is

said of the love of

knowl-

the special characteristic of our

part of the world, [436] or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attrib-

uted to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. Exactly so, he said.

There

is

no

difficulty in

understanding

this.

None whatever.

say.

I

er

—

soul has these three principles or not

Still

with you.

will not.

verified

ber,

more then. O my friend, we ha\e upon an easy question whether the

ice

alighted

Pre.

but

OF PLATO

said.

we mav assume same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner so ol the individual;

that he has the

3

Certainly, he said.

But the question is not quite so easy when proceed to ask whether these principles are

we

three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action to determine that is the difficulty. Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty. Then let us now try and determine whether

—

they are the same or different.

How

can we? he asked.

The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways: and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different. I

replied as follows:

Good. For example,

I

said,

can the same thing be

1

I

id

motion

III

llir

al

s

line

11

REP

l

Uinr

h

II

I

V

I

1

the

111

same |

llll|Hiss;',>

Still,

trims,

ol

:

ultrj.l\ let

said,

I

us have

mi we should hcrcattci

list

tall

thai

thai

i

I

.1

1

w wants anything

moment

tut

ti>

Ii

i

mode

ol

i|

should object, and should rathei s.i\ thai p.m i»t lum is in motion while anothei

\

(

and

true.

\

Ami mppoac ther,

and

to

tlu-

draw

objectoj to refine

tur-

si ill

the nice distinction that not

I

I

I

the circumferenoc goes round.

desire

it.

while

revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or

forwards or backwards, then view can they be at rest.

left,

point oi

That

is

the correct

mode

ot

in

no

describing them,

he replied.

Then Bone

us to believe that the same riling the same time, [4^ / in the same part or in

relation to the

upon

same thing, can

act or be acted

in contrarv

ways. Certainly not, according to

examine

desire; should

thi

rtainly.

Admitting

this to

Ik-

us suppose a p.trtu

let

irur of desire generally,

ul.ir

|

out Oi these we will srln hunger M\^\ \\. as they arc termed, which arc the most obvit

oi

them

Let us

The

;

(Ac

that

1

lass,

object oi one

is

he said.

mod, and

ol

the

drink? Yes.

And

here comes the point: is not thirst the which the soul has oi drink, and \

t)Ul

length the d

.it

R

I

r

In-

UD

l.lll

of

him;

«

m>ii.

w

ill

iplr-v

i

h

in>

!.

W

il

is

oh

.•

ova

r.l

,:

bctioni

in

thai ingei

is,

though

.in

»t

man) oth Inn a in. ins

«\

.1

which

I

is

desires violently

like the struggle ot

out

i.

n

the

.ilso

auxili

1

different

any one else?

Certainly not. Sup|x>sc that a

man

spirit

simOSl

•

easil)

p.

young

in

-

s.M.n

.is

them

|

hildren

equally

to another, the nobler he

he to fed indignant

n

at

is

the less able

roy suffering, such

.1^

I

True, he said.

when he thinks that he is the sufferer wrong, then he boils and chates, rod is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he sutlers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be But

or the

quelled until he either slays or

is

in. iv

loiner,

is,

ot

uth

ti

enough*

:

w

h.it

is

further

«

you

once more appeal to the words of h h.i\e been .ilre.idv quoted by us,

whu

(mate

his breast,

for in this verSC

and thus rrbukrd

his

'.

rea-

The

illustration is perfect, he replied; and our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds. I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider. in

:

I

power which

loiner h.is clearly SU|

about the Ixrt' worse to be dillerent lrom the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it. Very true, he said. And so. alter much tossing, we have r land, and are fairly agreed that the s.unc printhe

ciples

re.isns

which exist in the Si and that they are three

in

in

individualj

the

numl>cr.

Exactly,

Must we not then infer that the individual is in the same way, and in Virtue ol the same quality which makes the State wisc\ wise

:

slain; or until

he hears the voice of the shepherd, that son, bidding his dog bark no more.

l.itr-

-i

hunger, or col J, or any other pain which the these Injured person may inflict upon him ems to be just, and, as say, his anger reEuses to he excited by them.

What point You remember

we

the

of

Iirrr.r.

brute animals, which

in ;

Full

i

ind you

//(•

done

th.it

l!

.is

on, .ind most ol thrui

I

th inks he haf

i

to It difl

Bui 'hit

sninr ot

si«!

which has already from

passion,

it

I**

t be put into the

Are

form

r.ik

mI'Ic

begin

>,

• I

oi

this

ion w

in.:

the

',

.it

on*

State



r I

replied,

.ill

oi

CI

\

ni.ittrr

the

laid.

conceive, fond ol fine cones and

l

ours and forms and

who


l the nine il ,-i mi. \nd iu.i\ not thr iu.m\ w hu h .irr doubles be dotibles, that in. ol one thing.

1

1 1

•

tmbi

1

knowledge, the

..•

nn iiiU

M ho listened

t

il

halves

.in.l

«'t

Ami

and

they .ur termed, will net Ik- denoted by these .nn more than by hc much esteemed by those of the opte faction; not that the greatest and most lasting uiiury

but by her of

whom

'

done

to her

by her opponents,

professing followers, the same

you suppose the accuser to

the greater

and the agre

is

own

number

best are

sav. that

them are arrant rogues, useless; in which opinion I of

Yes.

Ami

the reason

why

the

good are

useless has

now been explained' True.

Then

shall

we proceed

ruption ol the majority

is

to

show

that the cor-

also unavoidable,

and

not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other: that this

By

is

means.

all

And

us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. [490] Truth, as you will rememlet

whom

ber,

was

and

in all things; tailing in this,

postor,

his leader,

and had no part or

he tollowed always he was an imlot in

true philoso-

phy. Yes, that was said. Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of

him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we

not a right to say in his defence,

that the true lover of

—

knowledge

is

always

striv-

ing after being that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is

;

S.n to him, that, in

to

rs.

Precisely so, he said.

irec

their plot tor getting the ship out ol the cap-

.ot

thc\

and

with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed 00 their \o\age in such a manner as might be expelled ol them. Him

make

mankind are of a different stamp; ma\ be justK compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and Starernors 01

—

an appearance only, but will go on the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail. Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him. And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

I

I

I

H MM

I

K

I

I'l

I

i;

I

\

i

I

of thingi

will.

\nJ w hen ii nth lUtDCd M] evil

in

the

>

the

«'l

u

aptain,

I

1

1

ffeci

i

hand which

tic

I

tiii.lt

-a

i

nid

.

Inii

ihould like

I

i

p the

Impossible. ct and health ol mind will beoi the com pany, and temperance ^ill follov uc, he replied*

I

;ri

is

will n longi

their

n set in array

i

.ui\

kmmhi

\\Ii\

he philosopher'i virtu

I

wordj and look

.it

t.uts, the

who

personi

tome oi them manifi uscU-ss. and the greatei numbei utterly de prated; we were then led to enquire into the unds oi these- accusations, and hate nom ai .uc thus described are

the point

asking

rived

.»t

joritj

bad, which question

i>t

oi

us bach to the examination

why

arc the

ma

necessity brought

and definition

oi

Exactly.

Ami we

have next

do

consider thecorruptions

whv

the philosophic nature,

so

—

many

.ire

sorewescapc spoiling lam speakmg oi those who were said to be useless but not wicked and, [jgi J when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philoso led and

—

manner

phv, what

of

men

are they

who

aspire

which is above them and of which thev arc unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation or which we speak. alter a protession

What

are these corruptions? he said.

will see it I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfecI

tion all the qualities

philosopher, seen

is

which we required in a which is seldom

a rare plant

among men.

causes?

In the hrst place there are their their courage, temperance,

and the

own

virtues,

rest of

them,

every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys

and is

distracts

from philosophy the soul which

the possessor of them.

That

Then

is

very singular, he replied.

there are

all

the ordinary goods of

life

—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections the State — you understand the in

III

»u

iti

to

I

>

1

i

.

\Ci\ true,

There

ii

reason

more injury than 11. 1st (

is

in

when under

natures,

the-

supposing thai thr

finest

alien condition

be ause

the con*

Adeimantus,

that the

inferior,

greater.

eriamly.

we

ni.i\

not say,

most gifted minds, when the) are ill edu< ated, bo ome pre eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit ot pure evil spring out ot a fulness o! nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, when as weak, naturi scarcclv capable o! any very great good or very ;

great evil

There think that you are right. [492] And our philosopher follows the same I

analogy

— he

er nurture,

into

all

is

like a plant

must

which, having prop-

grow and mature sown and planted in an

necessarily

virtue, but,

if

soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often sa\, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists. or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the

alien

who say these things the greatest of all And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts? When is this accomplished? he said. When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a public

Rare indeed. And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!

What

":. i;lt\

Whv, s.ii.l, u r know thai .1" w hethci -a animal, when the) fail Do meet with propci nutriment od

oi

nrm

rxjpular

he he carried awa\ bv the

I

not have the notion*

which he is speaking, but calls honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them

or passions ot

man's heart, as i: *p Within him any private training enable him to stand

oi

this

i

and ewl which the public in general have— he will do as thc\ do, and as thc\ arc, SUCO will he

>t that the iust and noble are the necessary, having never himself, seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the diifercnce between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator? Indeed he would. And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the temjKrs and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in paint;

rates; necessity will

And cessity,

\et.

said, there

I

which has not

is

l>ccn

a

compel him. still

greater ne-

mentioned.

What iv The gentle ;

EofCC oi attainder or confiscation or death, which, as yOU are aware, these new Sophist! and educators, who arc the public, apply

words are powerless. and in right good earnest. what opinion oi any other Sophist, or

when

their

>;

Now come

can be expected to o\er-

;>ri\ate person,

.

m

such an unequal contest? he replied. Milred, said, even to make the attempt oi tolly, there neither is, nor has

c.

1

been, nor

is

of character

what

duce whatever they

in

is

more than human, as the proverb would not have \uu I

ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved bv the power ol ( Jod, [493] as we may trul\ I

quite assent, he replied. let me crave your assent also to a fur-

Then

ther observation.

What Why,

whom deem

are vou going to say? that all those

the

many

call

mercenary individuals,

Sophists and

whom

to be their adversaries, do, in fact,

they teach

nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to Say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is

might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse. and what is the meaning ot his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or intunated; ami vou may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this.hecallshisknowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion ot what he means by the principles their

when he is not obliged, the so-called Diomedc will oblige him to pro-

which has had no other training

not included: lor

if

his judges

necessity of

—

sa\s.

man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them

a

ever likely to be, any different type

virtue but that which :s supplied by public opinion 1 speak, my friend, of human virtue

only;

ing or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from whom I have been describing? For when

him

wisdom.

I

—

praise.

are utterly ludicrous

firmation of their

And

yet the reasons

which they give

own

in con-

notions about the hon-

ourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

No, nor

You

am

I

likely to hear.

recognise the truth of

Then

what

I

have been

me

ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather saying?

let

than of the many beautiful, [494] or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind? Certainly not.

Then

the world cannot possibly be a philos-

opher? Impossible.

And fall

therefore philosophers must inevitably under the censure of the world?

They must.

And

of individuals

who consort with

the

and seek to please them? That is evident. Then, do you see any way in which the

mob

philos-

opher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence these were admitted bv us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

—

Yes.

Will not such an one from his early child-

hood be

in all things first

among

all,

especially

I

irnts

his hod-'

like

.ire

R

II

I

it

I

I

I

us mental

ours

I

1

as he gets ol.lv

mn

theii

foi

i

\


r

persons

th.it

Ver

hut also

be iffirn

1

have.

would be

!*-

.

d
ipend the greatei pari oi their time- with one .mother in the hea\enlv .itc

i

on them .lie just; there Can be no doubt th.it every one oi them will take office as ttero necessity, .mil not alter the fashion t our pics .i

than night

my

i,

And i

i

I.

the true dai " hi
c

i

11

I

tion will gain most.

Yes, that will be the best way.

how,

if

And

I

think,

you have very well described ever, such a constitution might come in-

Socrates,

that

to being.

Enough then

and of the no difficulty

of the perfect State,

man who

bears

in seeing

how we

its

image

— there

shall describe

is

him.

There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

ing also at politics and ruling lor the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty;

BOOK

VIII

and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then

[543] And so. (ilaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all edu-

they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public

cation

memorials and

and the bravest warriors are

sacrifices

and honour them,

the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but not, as in any case blessed and divine.

You

are a sculptor, Socrates,

statues of

our governors

if if

and have made

faultless in beauty.

and the pursuits of war and peace are common, and the best philosophers

also to be

to be their kings? That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed

DIALOG UES OF PLATO themselves, will take their soldier* and place thnn in houses such as \vc were describing,

common

and contain nothing and al>out their propremember what we agrccd remember that no one was to have any oi the ordinary possession! of mankind; they were to l>c warrior athletes ami guardians, rewhich

are

to all,

private, or individual;

;

1

ceiving from the other citizens, in lieu .

whole

nt, only their maintenance,

i

and they

themselves and

care ol

t.tkc

to

ot

the

democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and tamous. which ditlers from them all, and is the tourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do your of any other constitution which can be said to have a dis-

There arc lordships and prinarc bought and sold, and some other intermediate tonus ot go\crnmcnt. But these arc nondescripts and may be found tinct character.

ami now that aided,

which we digressed,

let

that

this division of

us find the point at

we may

return into

path.

'.I

you imyou had finished the d( icription of the State: you said that such a ami that the mar. was good State v.

There

no

is

1

lellencsand

Yes. he replied,

laid;

1

among

Squall)

Slate.

True,

which

cipalities

difficulty in returning;

now,

plied, then as

that

:

who answered

it, although, / $jj] as now morcexcellent things to relate

to

U hail

and man. And you said further, was the true iorm. then the others 'lie lalse lorms, vou said, as remember, that there were tour principal Ones, and that their defects, a