Plato: The Dialogues, First Period. (Volume 2): 002 0691098131, 9780691098135

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PLATO: THE DIALOGUES (FIRST PERIOD)

the Eidos, "for its own sake," if only from afar, then it is obvious that the good cannot depend on evil. Otherwise, the good would no longer exist when evil is overcome. The absolute nature of the good, therefore, cancels the need for evil as an efficient cause for the good. 10/ /Thus, if we now leam that the great definition of "love" ( cpíi\ov) that moved upward to the vision of the "first love" seems to be nothing but mere chatter ( OOi\os), because both the final cause and the efficient cause have been thrown out, this is in­ tended to make us see the absolute nature of "the beloved and the good." Vlhat looks like a refutation is a clarification. The difference between the mixed states characteristic of ordinary human life, for which the original statement is valid, and the realm of absolute essences for which it is not lid could not be sh9wn more effectively than in this dialectic. l /The ceaseless dialectic comes to a rest once more in the last definitive statement of the dialogue. Efficient and final cause are given 1?-e���f�\!]gs; �(ormer as desire ( rn16vµía), the latter as thc Mffg� th�n ( oiKeiov) ; for desire derives from a need ( Mieés), and there is a relationship between a person in need and the object ofhis need such that they are complementary or reciprocally congenial. We must note, in particular, that this concept of the congenial has both a personal and an objective side in the kind of interpenetration that seemed to us elsewhere11 to be the special characteristic of the nature of the Platonic Eros. First, there is the personal side. Love is based upon a kinship6t" � � the "soul," and he who loves truly must, because of this kinship, find his love retumed. This, we may note, throws a new light on the problem discussed in the first conversation with Menexenos. It is also worth noting how differently the participants react to these conclusions. When the notion of congeniality is applied to the love between human beings, Menexenos assents, whereas Lysis remains silent. This shows the difference in their experiences. But when Socrates goes on to talk about the true love and the reciprocity of true love, both boys are reluctant to give their assent, whereas Hippothales blushes in delight. The reader knowing Hippothales, however, will look around and recognize, not far off, who is "the true and not only the counterfeit lover." 12

VI. LYSIS

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Next, there is the objective side ofthis concept ofthe congenial. Earlier we learned that the goal of love was the good and the beautiful. Now we find, instead, that we must necessarily love that which is congenial by nature. Thus, the question arises whether the good is not the "congenial," and the reciprocal re­ lationship between the soul and the Agathon is felt: the soul in need of the good, but at the sarne time congenial and akin to it. That this interpretation is not too farfetched becomes clear when we look at the end of the dialogue where the last thesis, that love intends the "congenial," is dialectically dissected and refuted in a manner characteristic of the Lysis -as a whole. The "congenial" is first identified with the like or the similar ( óµoiov), and we are back at the first "refutation" ofthe third conversa­ tion: that like is friend of the like. Next, the congenial is inter­ preted as a relative term. For good people it means the good is congenial, whereas for bad people, the bad is congenial. This brings us back to the other thesis, also refuted previously, ac­ cording to which the bad can be friend to the bad. There remains only the third possibility of equating the "congenial" with "the good." 13 From this it follows that only the good can be friend to the good. But this, too, we "refuted" -or, rather, "we thought we had refuted. "14 Thus, all these theses are refuted; yet all of them also have a degree ofvalidity. The first, to be sure, is inherently ambiguous and is recognized as such when converted into the second. If we move upward to the third thesis, however, we are shown once more the kinship and mutual interdependence of Socrates and Lysis, of the soul and the good./ The place this dialogue occupies in the bo.dy of Plato's works is eyaluated differen�_according to.....t.wQJDajor tendencies On the one hand, interpreter� have seen its intimate ronnection ��!!h other dialogues on the theme of love, and the �ysis is said to be eilber a worth;)( dia]ectiGal.co.unterpart ta tbe o.thet.LQL§imply a satelfüe to the Sympqsium not deserving any special considera­ tion.1� On the other li�n