The Conception of Man in the Works of John Amos Comenius 9783631678732, 9783653070101, 3631678738

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Jan Čížek

The Conception of Man in the Works of John Amos Comenius

European Studies in T heolog y, Philosophy and Histor y of Relig ions Edited by Bartosz Adamczewski

This book maps the entire development of Comenius’s considerations on man, from his earliest writings to his philosophical masterwork. Although this book primarily offers an analysis and description of the conception of man in Comenius’s work, it may also serve the reader as a more general introduction to his philosophical conception. The author shows that, in spite of the fact that Comenius has received no small amount of academic attention, funded studies or monographs in English language remain in single figures. Thus, a range of Comenius’s remarkable ideas are still unknown to the wider public.

Jan Čížek studied philosophy and history at Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. The author is working as a Researcher and Assistant Professor at the universities in Olomouc and in Ostrava. His main scholarly interest is the history of Renaissance and Early Modern philosophy, the intellectual history and the work of J. A. Comenius.

The Conception of Man in the Works of John Amos Comenius

EUROPEAN STUDIES IN THEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF RELIGIONS Edited by Bartosz Adamczewski

VOL. 15

Jan Čížek

The Conception of Man in the Works of John Amos Comenius

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Čížek, Jan, 1986- author. Title: The conception of man in the works of John Amos Comenius / Jan Čížek. Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Peter Lang, 2016. | Series: European studies in theology, philosophy, and history of religions, ISSN 2192-1857; VOL. 15 Identifiers: LCCN 2016017789 | ISBN 9783631678732 Subjects: LCSH: Comenius, Johann Amos, 1592-1670. | Philosophical anthropology. Classification: LCC B4805.C64 C59 2016 | DDC 128.092–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016017789 This book is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA CR 14-37038G “Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context”.

ISSN 2192-1857 ISBN 978-3-631-67873-2 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-653-07010-1 (E-Book) DOI 10.3726/978-3-653-07010-1 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Frankfurt am Main 2016 All rights reserved. Peter Lang Edition is an Imprint of Peter Lang GmbH. Peter Lang – Frankfurt am Main ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

Contents Foreword.....................................................................................................................9 1. Introduction...................................................................................................11 2. Comenius’s work in view of his conception of man......................15 2.1 Characterisation and periodisation of Comenius’s work......................15 2.2 De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica and other works from the panorthotic period.......................................18 2.3 Works from the pre-pansophic and pansophic periods........................25

3. De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica.....27 3.1 Europae lumina, salvete, and Panegersia.................................................27 3.2 Panaugia......................................................................................................36 3.3 Pansophia....................................................................................................39 3.3.1 Mundus possibilis............................................................................. 39 3.3.2 Mundus idealis.................................................................................. 42 3.3.3 Mundus angelicus............................................................................. 43 3.3.4 Mundus materialis............................................................................ 44 3.3.5 Mundus artificialis............................................................................ 65 3.3.6 Mundus moralis................................................................................ 73 3.3.7 Mundus spiritualis............................................................................ 78 3.3.8 Mundus aeternus.............................................................................. 83 3.4 Pampaedia...................................................................................................87 3.5 Panglottia, Panorthosia, and Pannuthesia...............................................93

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4. Comenius’s conception of man in the Consultatio as a system?......................................................................... 105 4.1 Terminological inconsistencies............................................................. 105 4.2 The ontological primacy of reason, or will? Paunagia versus the rest of the Consultatio.......................................................... 110 4.3 The ontological primacy of free will, or the immortal human mind?................................................................... 116 4.4 The question of human nature.............................................................. 120

5. The conception of man in selected works of the panorthotic period...................................................................... 127 5.1 The transition between the pansophic and panorthotic periods................................................................................ 127 5.1.1 Pansophiae praeludium................................................................. 127 5.1.2 Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio....................................... 129 5.1.3 Pansophiae diatyposis.................................................................... 131 5.2 Texts from the panorthotic period........................................................ 134 5.2.1 Via lucis............................................................................................ 134 5.2.2 Angelus pacis................................................................................... 139 5.2.3 Unum necessarium......................................................................... 141 5.2.4 Janua rerum reserata...................................................................... 146 5.2.5 Clamores Eliae................................................................................. 149

6. The conception of man in the works of the preparatory and pansophic periods.................................................. 159 6.1 Theatrum universitatis rerum................................................................ 159 6.2 Amphitheatrum universitatis rerum.................................................... 162 6.3 Letters to Heavens................................................................................... 163 6.4 The Mournful........................................................................................... 163 6.5 Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart.............................. 165

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6.6 Centrum securitatis and Renuntiatio mundi...................................... 167 6.7 Didactics................................................................................................... 170 6.8 Prima philosophia................................................................................... 173 6.9 Physicae synopsis.................................................................................... 174

7. The conception of man in the works of John Amos Comenius.............................................................................. 179 8. Possible sources of Comenius’s conception................................... 185 9. Comenius’s anthropology in scholarly literature....................... 195 10. Summary....................................................................................................... 201 Abbreviations and reference list.................................................................. 205 Abbreviations................................................................................................... 205 Internet sources................................................................................................ 205 Sources.............................................................................................................. 206 Secondary sources........................................................................................... 209

Index of Names��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 231

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Foreword I began my inquiries into the work of the Czech philosopher, theologian, writer and not least educational reformer Jan Amos Comenius during my undergraduate studies. First of all I attempted to place Comenius’s philosophical and theological views within the context of the thought of the Unity of Czech Brethren church, which was founded in the second half of the 15th century on the basis of the teachings of the religious thinker Petr Chelčický, and in which Comenius was a bishop. In subsequent studies I focused primarily on Comenius’s relationship towards the philosophical work of the Renaissance philosopher Franciscus Patricius or the encyclopaedist from Herborn, Johann Heinrich Alsted. However, for a long time during that period I was also cultivating the idea of compiling a work devoted exclusively to Comenius, which would deal in a complex manner with his conception of man. This became the focus of my entire doctoral studies, which I underwent at the Department of Philosophy of Palacký University in Olomouc from 2010 to 2014. To a certain extent this book is based on my dissertation work, nevertheless it broadens and expands upon its content to a considerable degree. Unlike the dissertation, it maps the entire development of Comenius’s considerations on man, from his earliest writings to his philosophical masterwork. By contrast, the original version was focused precisely and solely on the later form of Comenius’s stances. Although this book is a priori aimed at an analysis and description of the conception of man in Comenius’s work, it may serve the reader also as a more general introduction to his philosophical conception. As I show in the following text, although Comenius has received no small amount of academic attention, funded studies or monographs in English language remain in single figures, and thus a range of Comenius’s remarkable ideas are still unknown to the wider public. For their support in the compilation of this work and for their valuable advice and assistance with procuring frequently obscure and difficult to access literature I would like to thank Tomáš Nejeschleba, Paul Richard Blum, Pavel Floss, Vladimír Urbánek, Ladislav Chvátal, Martin Žemla, Jiří Michalík, Petr Pavlas and Roman Kucsa. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family, above all my dear wife Blanka – for her understanding, helpfulness and support. As a whole, this book is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 14–37038G “Between Renaissance and 9

Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context”. Work on this publication was enabled also thanks to the grant subsidy of the Jan Hus Educational Foundation (allocated for the academic year 2012/2013) and the František Topič Endowment Fund (grant allocated for 2015). Olomouc, spring 2016 J.Č.

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1. Introduction At the XIII International Colloquium of Comenius Studies in Uherský Brod, which dealt with Erasmus, Johannes Valentinus Andreae, and John Amos Comenius, the Czech philosopher and historian Robert Kalivoda said that Comenius’s philosophy of man was largely uncharted territory. He could not have known that his observation would remain valid for two decades to come.1 Today, Czech and foreign scholars can draw on a large number of studies dealing with Comenius’s works. However, the majority of those barely scratch the surface of the philosopher’s conception of man, or else view it from only one perspective (most frequently, a pedagogical one). Surprisingly enough, several publications dealing with Comenius’s anthropology had been planned, but either were not completed or did not make it to the publishing stage. Take for example Kalivoda’s intended second volume of the Hussite Monograph, which was to deal with anthropological questions, or the unpublished monograph J. A. Komenský, myslitel o nápravě člověka [John Amos Comenius: A Thinker Concerned with the Reformation of Man].2 Gertrud Britschgi’s dissertation, which analyses a wide spectrum of sources, is probably the most important contribution to the study of 1 Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení [Comenius’s Conception of Emendation and Reformation Thought]. In: SCetH 35 (XVIII), 1988, p. 37. During the ensuing discussions, Kalivoda expanded on his paper: “What I have presented here is only a brief description of the problem. To resolve it, a lot of work, or maybe a whole book would be necessary. But most of all, there would have to be cooperation. The task cannot be managed by one person, especially not an ageing one. This is an appeal to the younger colleagues who may be interested in taking on this particular anthropological subject which I have attempted to sketch out here.” Quoted from SCetH 35 (XVIII), 1988, p. 61. In light of these words (and for other reasons as well), I kindly ask the reader to take this book as a humble attempt to fill in a piece of the puzzle that is Comenius’s conception of man. 2 See Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení [Comenius’s Conception of Emendation and Reformation Thought]. In: SCetH 35 (XVIII), 1988, p. 36 or Kalivoda, Robert: Význam J. A. Komenského pro rozvoj novodobé filozofie [The Significance of John Amos Comenius for the Development of Modern Philosophy]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, p. 113; Čapková, Dagmar – Červenka, Jaromír – Floss, Pavel – Kalivoda, Robert: J. A. Komenský, myslitel o nápravě člověka [John Amos Comenius: A Thinker Concerned with the Reformation of Man]. Prague 1974 (Pedagogický ústav ČSAV, manuscript). The basic findings, if nothing else, presented in this monograph written by a group of authors are summarised in a study by these authors. See Čapková,

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Comenius’s anthropology in a world language, yet it pays only scant attention to Comenius’s masterpiece, as we shall see.3 In order to assess the extent to which scholarly literature has managed to cover Comenius’s philosophical and theological conception of man, we shall review the current state of research on the subject in a separate sub-chapter (Comenius’s anthropology in scholarly literature), which follows our own exposition of Comenius’s conception of man. Methodologically speaking, a study of Comenius’s anthropological system cannot dispense with an explanation of what this system consists in. As we shall see, this is reflected in the formal structure of the book you hold in your hands. The present volume is concerned with Comenius’s philosophical-theological view of man (we are of the opinion that philosophy and theology are inseparably bound in Comenius’s works). In the words of Stanislav Sousedík, John Amos’s work is characterised by the theologisation of philosophy and the philosophisation of religion. An effort to erase the boundaries between philosophy and theology can be considered the defining feature of Comenius’s work. Comenius, on the one hand, acknowledges philosophy’s right (or duty) to present its own views of theological questions, because he believes that the Scripture contains answers to some of the most pressing philosophical questions; on the other hand, he points out that philosophical problems can best be illuminated against the background of reason and religion working in unison – in other words, through a synthesis between philosophy and theology.4 The aim of the present study is to give a systematic account of Comenius’s philosophical-theological conception of man. As nearly all historians of philosophy and Comenius scholars share the view that Comenius’s work as a whole went through several important stages, we have decided to respect the established periodisation in our study. Furthermore, as our preliminary research had indicated that the only work in which Comenius’s anthropology is set out fully and comprehensively is the author’s masterpiece, De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica, we have decided that the Consultatio should

Dagmar – Červenka, Jaromír – Floss, Pavel – Kalivoda, Robert: The Philosophical Significance of the Work of Comenius. In: AC 8 (XXXII), 1989, p. 5–16. 3 Britschgi, Gertrud: Naturbegriff und Menschenbild bei Comenius. Zur Begründung der Bildungsidee im universalen Rationalismus. Zurich 1964. 4 Sousedík, Stanislav: Einige Züge der Philosophie des J. A. Comenius und deren bisher unberücksichtigen Quellen. In: AC 4/1 (XXVIII/1), 1979, pp. 80–81, 84–85.

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be the first work that we would subject to historical-philosophical analysis.5 As Comenius worked on his magnum opus for several decades along with other thematically related works, we have thought it important to take the other works into consideration as well, especially to the extent that they are relevant to the study of the author’s anthropology, and their creation coincided with the writing of the Consultatio (works that fall into the panorthotic, or emendation period). An analysis of these works will therefore be the next step (for terminological definitions of the periods and the reasons for including particular works in our study, see Chapter 2). After having sketched out Comenius’s late anthropology, which is, as we have said, embodied in the author’s masterpiece, we shall be able to describe how Comenius’s view of man evolved from his earliest writings to his latest works. As for the organisation of the content, we shall first be concerned with the periodisation of Comenius’s oeuvre with regard to the evolution of his conception of man. Next, we shall define the periods we will have identified in terms of content and chronology and provide an overview of the works representative of these periods, together with a justification for why they are relevant to the study of the author’s philosophical-theological conception of man and therefore worthy of our attention. The third chapter gives a systematic exposition of Comenius’s conception of man embodied in De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica, a work which has not yet been thoroughly interpreted from this point of view. This exposition is followed by an analytical and historical essay concerning the basic aspects (and problematic features) of Comenius’s anthropology. This forms the content of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 specifies the differences between the pansophic and panorthotic periods of John Amos’s philosophical career (with examples from specific texts). It also presents an analysis of selected works that are thematically and chronologically related to the Consultatio and relevant to the subject of anthropology. 5 Komenský, Jan Amos (Comenius, Iohannes Amos): De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica. Vol. I and II. Prague 1966. Hereinafter referred to as CC followed by a Roman numeral referring to the volume and Arabic numerals referring to the page and column cited (e.g. CC I, p. 103, col. 126). Although we refer to the Latin edition of Comenius’s principal work throughout this study, a Czech translation is also available. Cf. Komenský, Jan Amos: Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských I–III [General Consultation on an Improvement of All Things Human I–III]. Prague 1992. For easier reference, quotes from the work are given in italics regardless of the typeface used in the cited text.

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The chapter presents a systematic exposition of the philosopher’s conceptions of man, which are analysed and compared to the one embodied in the Consultatio. Chapter 6 focuses on Comenius’s early writings predating the pansophic and panorthotic periods. Although these works do not deal specifically with anthropological questions, they can help us better to understand the germination and evolution of the philosopher’s view of man from the very beginning of his philosophical and theological career. The results of all the previous analyses are summarised, compared and evaluated in Chapter 7, which forms a conclusion to the whole book and generalises the particular findings presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. At the conclusion of the volume, we devote some space to reflections on the current state of research on Comenius’s anthropology and on the sources of his conception of man. Although in footnotes we refer to the sources of inspiration for Comenius’s views (or at least to the literature that specifically deals with these subjects), the most important views and their possible philosophical and theological sources are dealt with in separate chapters. The book closes with a summary, an index of abbreviations, and a reference list.

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2. Comenius’s work in view of his conception of man 2.1 Characterisation and periodisation of Comenius’s work The oeuvre of John Amos Comenius is very extensive, and philosophically, theologically, and pedagogically varied and profound. A few fundamental questions must be answered before any study is undertaken. One of those questions is whether the evolution of Comenius’s thought can be considered continuous or discontinuous. As the existing research on Comenius has shown – and as we intend to demonstrate in the present study – the evolution of John Amos’s thought cannot be seen as linear, uninterrupted, or characterised by absence of abrupt changes. The philosopher’s thought, as embodied in his work, is characterised by maturation and amplification, but also by radical revisions of previously held philosophical, theological, and pedagogical beliefs.6 The examination of the evolution of Comenius’s thought must – if it should be found discontinuous – be followed by a periodisation of his work aimed at identifying the events that marked the transitions between the particular periods. In this case, the answers are much harder to come by. If we accept for a fact that Comenius’s work went through certain stages, we must say how many transitions there were, describe those transitions in terms of both quantity and quality and, lastly, we must define the stages chronologically. Based on our own reading of Comenius’s work and our analysis of and comparison between the author’s individual works, we align ourselves with the periodisation proposed by the Czech philosopher and Comenius scholar Jan Patočka, who divides Comenius’s life into three qualitatively dissimilar periods: prepansophic (also called preparatory or encyclopaedic), pansophic and panorthotic (characterised by Comenius’s reformation efforts).7 6 Granted, a certain (small) number of scholars view the evolution of Comenius’s thought as linear. See e.g. Schröer, Henning: Reich Gottes bei Comenius. In: Schaller, Klaus (Hrsg.): Comenius. Erkennen-Glauben-Handeln. Schriften zur Comeniusforschung. Bd. 16. St. Augustin 1985, p. 88, in which the author argues that Comenius’s work did not go through stages, but that different elements were accentuated in different periods. 7 Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského ve všenápravném období [The Development of Comenius’s Pedagogical Thought in the Panorthotic Period]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie II [Comeniological Studies II]. Prague 1998, pp. 70–107; Patočka, Jan: Přítomný stav bádání o Komenském [The Current State of the Study of Comenius].

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After a careful reading of Comenius’s texts, we can identify with Patočka’s definition of the first, i.e., prepansophic period as being delimited at one end by the beginning of Comenius’s literary activities in the 1610s and at the other by the philosopher’s departure from the Czech lands to exile in 1628, and especially

In: Id.: Komeniologické studie II [Comeniological Studies II]. Prague 1998, p. 19. See also Kopecký, Jaromír – Patočka, Jan – Kyrášek, Jiří: Jan Amos Komenský. Nástin života a díla [John Amos Comenius: An Outline of His Life and Work]. Prague 1957, p. 29–91. When it comes to the periodisation of John Amos’s life and work, a variety of conceptions exist within the domain of Comenius studies. First, we must mention Comenius’s own characterisation of the individual periods of his literary career he himself went through (the Leszno, Swedish, Sárospatak, and Amsterdam periods). On this subject, see Patočka: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského, op. cit., p. 70. Furthermore, cf. the periodisation by Josef Tvrdý which includes a mystical-religious period (before 1640), rationalistic, or humanistic-universalistic period (before 1665) and voluntaristic, or pietistic period (from 1665). See Tvrdý, Josef: Komenský a Descartes [Comenius and Descartes]. In: AJAK XVIII, 1959, pp. 2–3. Furthermore, Pavel Floss suggests that the life of John Amos can be divided into three periods: 1614–1621, during which the philosopher was a spectator in the theatre of the world; 1622–1627, when Comenius was lost in labyrinths; and 1628–1670, when he came to believe firmly in the reformability and humanisability of the whole world. Floss, Pavel: Grundriss der Philosophie des Johann Amos Comenius. In: SCetH 57–58 (XXVII), 1997, pp. 20–21. Drawing on this periodisation is Robert Kalivoda’s two-phase conception, in which the first two periods defined by Floss are collapsed into a period of Comenius’s maturation and the following years of the philosopher’s life are called a period of maturity. Kalivoda, Robert: Význam J. A. Komenského pro rozvoj novodobé filozofie [The Significance of John Amos Comenius for the Development of Modern Philosophy]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, pp. 113–114. An emphasis on external factors informs the periodisation of Comenius’s work presented by Jiřina Popelová in her study Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě [Comenius’s Path to a Great Reformation]. Prague 1958. as well as Dagmar Čapková’s Myslitelsko-vychovatelský odkaz Jana Amose Komenského [The Philosophical and Pedagogical Legacy of John Amos Comenius]. Prague 1987, pp. 43–44 (in which the author posits six periods of Comenius’s career). For more periodisation studies and a more general biographical overview, see e.g. Blekastad, Milada: Comenius. Versuch eines Umrisses von Leben, Werk und Schicksal des Jan Amos Komenský. Oslo – Prague 1969; Kumpera, Jan: Jan Amos Komenský. Poutník na rozhraní věků [John Amos Comenius: A Pilgrim at the Turn of Eras]. Ostrava 1992; Novák, Jan V. – Hendrich, Josef: Jan Amos Komenský. Jeho život a spisy [John Amos Comenius. His Life and Works]. Prague 1932.

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by his shift of focus from encyclopaedic to pansophic efforts, represented mainly by his didactic works (for example, the Czech Didaktika).8 As for the transition between the pansophic period,9 beginning around 1628 (precise dating is of course impossible) and the late panorthotic period,10 we can again agree with Patočka, who says that the transition coincided with Comenius’s stay in London in the years 1641 and 1642.11 According to Patočka, the pansophic period is characterised by a new-found emphasis on the idea of unity and comprehensiveness of knowledge, including, for example, a unified methodology. In this period, Comenius entertained the idea of social reform, nevertheless, his ideas were applied to specific, defined societies (often the Czech one). The philosopher did not yet have in mind a universal, comprehensive reformation (panorthosia).12 According to Patočka, Comenius only developed an interest in 8 Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie. Studie k  filosofii výchovy J. A.  Komenského. Monografie z pozůstalosti [Didactics and Pansophy. Studies of Comenius’s Philosophy of Education. A Legacy Monograph]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie III [Comeniological Studies III]. Prague 2003, p. 30. 9 For a more detailed discussion of the period, see e.g. Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 48–73; Patočka, Jan: Náčrt Komenského díla ve světle nových objevů [An Outline of Comenius’s Work in the Light of New Discoveries]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 103–104; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 246–251, 260–270. 10 Throughout this study we use the less common expression panorthotic (instead of reformatory) to make clearer the relationship of the panorthotic period to the previous pansophic period. For a discussion of the usage of this term in Czech literature on Comenius, see e.g. Brambora, Josef: Od rozhledu po divadle světa k úsilí o jeho nápravu [From a View of the Theatre of the World to Efforts to Reform It]. In: AJAK XXII (1963), pp. 49–58; Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky [On Comenius’s Metaphysics]. In: SCetH 6 (III), 1973, p. 34. 11 On Comenius’s stay in Britain, his preparations for the stay and the outcomes of the stay, see Turnbull, G. H.: Hartlib, Dury and Comenius: Gleanings from Hartlib’s Papers. London 1947, pp. 342–370 or Young, J. T.: Faith, Medical Alchemy and Natural Philosophy. Johann Moriaen, Reformed Intelligencer, and the Hartlib Circle. Aldershot 1998, pp. 127–137. A view similar to Patočka’s has been articulated by Červenka, Jaromír: Die Weltenschichten bei Campanella und Comenius. In: AC 4/1 (XXVIII/1), 1979, pp. 138–139. 12 Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského, op. cit., pp. 72–73. Jiřina Popelová, however, disagrees with Patočka’s argument. In her opinion, Comenius’s previous works (especially those from the 1630s) lack the universalistic aspect typical of this conception; nevertheless, in her opinion we can talk about the idea of universal emendation. To illustrate her point, Popelová looks to certain treatises, especially Haggaeus redivivus. In the detailed philosophical and historical-philosophical analysis we

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universal reformation during his stay in London, when the scope of his reform proposals was broadened to include all people, the entirety of humanity. Patočka holds that the work which marked the transition between the pansophic and panorthotic periods was Via lucis, a treatise in which the philosopher sets forth his conception of the great reformation of all things human, which foreshadows the Consultatio in its overt universalism.13 However, Patočka’s arguments are not the only, nor the most important reason why the present study was conceived the way it was, opening with a philosophical-theological treatment of the Consultatio catholica before moving on to other works from the same period in the subsequent chapters, beginning with a discussion of Via lucis. Our analysis of Comenius’s writings from the second half of the 1630s has shown that his first bona fide panorthotic work is Via lucis, while prior works fall into the previous period as far as content is concerned. To make a clear case for this periodisation (and hence our alignment, albeit not unqualified, with the assertions of Jan Patočka), we have included in Chapter 5 of the present study an analysis of Pansophiae praeludium, Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio, and Pansophiae diatyposis, i.e., works that directly precede the conception of Via lucis in terms of both dating and content, while paying close attention to the aspects that allow us to classify these works as pansophic.14

2.2 De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica and other works from the panorthotic period Although historians of philosophy have frequently remarked that Comenius’s ideas about the reformation of humanity evolved gradually and inconspicuously from as early as the 1620s and 1630s,15 a careful examination of his works and

present in the fifth chapter, we demonstrate that the texts which predate Comenius’s departure to England clearly belong to the older pansophic period, as they lack the attributes of the works from the panorthotic period. Last but not least, it should be noted that Popelová herself admits that Comenius’s conception of universal emendation only acquired its final form after the philosopher’s return to mainland Europe, when it eclipsed the original pansophic conception. See Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 244–251, 312. 13 Patočka, Jan: Náčrt Komenského díla, op. cit., p. 104. 14 For more detailed information on these treatises and the reasons why we have included these works in our analysis, see Chapter 5. 15 See e.g. Floss, Pavel: Poselství J. A. Komenského současné Evropě [Comenius’s Message to Today’s Europe]. Brno 2005, pp. 43–45.

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correspondence reveals that he only arrived at a well-defined and philosophically and theologically grounded panorthotic conception later. The Czech scholars Josef Hendrich and Jiřina Popelová, and Jan Patočka, who in many ways drew on the work of the previous two, share the view that Comenius’s idea of universal emendation was inspired not only by his stay in London, where he acquired a broader and more universal view of social reform, but also by his other practical experience, in particular, his engagement in the talks which took place in the Polish town of Orla at the close of the summer of 1644, and which were aimed at preparing the ground for a much more important meeting – the planned Colloquium charitativum. The ‘friendly conversation’ that was organised in the summer of 1645 in Toruń with the aim of finding common ground between the Reformed, Lutherans and Catholics which Comenius personally attended is thought – together with the anticipation of the Westphalia peace talks – to have urged Comenius to realise the need for a theoretical approach to the reformation of the human things.16 Sometime during 1644, Comenius conceived the idea of writing a treatise on the poor state of the human things and the need for a ‘great reformation’, or panorthosia.17 Despite Comenius’s reticence regarding the nature of the planned Consultation, his writings and especially his private correspondence reveal quite a lot about it.18 Jan Patočka argues that the reform ideas which John Amos conceived

16 Bečková, Marta: K  toruňskému „Colloquium charitativum“ [On “Colloquium charitativum” in Toruń]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, pp. 143–148; Blekastad, Milada: Comenius. Versuch eines Umrisses von Leben, Werk und Schicksal des Jan Amos Komenský, op. cit., pp. 404–407; Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského ve všenápravném období [The Development of Comenius’s Pedagogical Thought in the Panorthotic Period]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie II [Comeniological Studies II]. Prague 1998, p. 74; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 285–306. See also Müller, Hans-Joachim: Von der Notwendigkeit der Praxis. Friedensdenken und irenisches Handeln. Comenius und das Colloquium Charitativum. In: SCetH 79 (XXXVIII), 2008, pp. 397–421; Neval, Daniel: Comenius und die Ökumene – zwischen Wahrheit und Beliebigkeit. In: SCetH 61 (XXIX), 1999, pp. 30–32. 17 Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada [Comenius’s General Consultation]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie II [Comeniological Studies II]. Prague 1998, p. 154; Turnbull, G. H.: Hartlib, Dury and Comenius: Gleanings from Hartlib’s Papers. London 1947, pp. 399–408; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 306–323. 18 On the difficulty of dating the inception of the individual parts of the Consultatio, see Čapková, Dagmar: Úvod – Komenského Obecná porada a její význam [Introduction – Comenius’s General Consultation and Its Significance]. In: Komenský, Jan Amos:

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during his stay in England found their most perfect embodiment thus far in Via lucis. That is true, but only insofar as we discount the fact that Comenius only set out his panorthotic plans in detail in the preface to the treatise, which was written in 1668, that is, many years after he wrote the body text (dated 1641 to 1642), in which panorthotic ideas are expressed as well, but only in a diffuse and crude manner (as we shall see in chapter 5). The very fact that the dedicative preface to Via lucis became an integral part of the treatise makes it justifiably and undoubtedly part of the author’s panorthotic oeuvre.19 As indicated above, Comenius’s correspondence is a considerably more valuable source of information on the dating of the inception of the Consultation. It shows that Comenius only made known his intention to write a seven-volume treatise on the emendation of the human things on 18 November 1644 in a letter to Cyprian Kinner.20 More details about the conception of the planned sevenvolume treatise, one part of which was to be titled Pansophia, were revealed by Comenius the following year in a letter to Louis de Geer (dated 18 April 1645) in which he explicitly mentions Pampaedia as well.21 John Amos’s conception of the work went through several changes in the following years; however, the basic framework of the Consultatio remained unchanged,22 which cannot be said of the individual parts of Comenius’s magnum opus. For example, Comenius originally intended the aforementioned Pampaedia to include textbooks and informatoria penned by himself. In the

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Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských I [General Consultation on an Improvement of All Things Human I]. Prague 1992, pp. 23–25. See Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 154. Jan Amos Komenský to Cyprian Kinner (Elbląg, 18 November 1644). Retrieved from: http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/db34c987-ba 98-4c4b-9a0a-240622459a8c [ 2016-01-31]. See also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 156 or Turnbull, G. H.: Hartlib, Dury and Comenius: Gleanings from Hartlib´s Papers. London 1947, pp. 389–391. John Amos Comenius to Louis de Geer (Elbląg, 18 April 1645). Retrieved from: http:// emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/85bfb4aa-af26-422a-be7f-9825498655de [ 201601-31]. See also Blekastad, Milada: Comenius. Versuch eines Umrisses von Leben, Werk und Schicksal des Jan Amos Komenský, op. cit., pp. 396–397; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě op. cit., p. 312. On the frequent amplifications and revisions of the work, see e.g. the correspondence between Petr Figulus and Louis de Geer. See Petr Figulus to Louis de Geer (Elbląg, 26 June 1646). In: Patera, Adolf (ed.): Jana Amosa Komenského correspondence [The Correspondence of John Amos Comenius]. Prague 1892, pp. 278–279 (Vol. II, pp. 118–119). See also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 160.

process of finalising Pampaedia, he removed these portions and collected them in a separate volume of didactic and pedagogic texts published under the title Opera didactica omnia (ODO).23 The fact that Comenius removed the didactic and pedagogic content (didactica) from the pansophic corpus (pansophica) is one of the reasons why we shall not – with a few substantiable exceptions – deal with his pedagogic works (the most important of which is the ODO); instead, we shall place our focus on Comenius’s treatises on chiefly philosophical and theological subjects.24 It should be noted that the first part of the Consultation to have seen the light of day was the first part of the Consultatio, Panegersia, which was presented to Samuel Hartlib under its then title Magnae consultationis excitatorium. Panegersia and the two prefaces to the Consultatio had demonstrably been written by 1647.25 There is no doubt that Comenius worked on Pansophia in the ensuing years. Panaugia; the first two pansophic worlds and an unspecified portion of Panorthosia had demonstrably been finished by the time of Comenius’s third stay at Leszno (from 1654 to 1656); nevertheless, the main part of Panaugia had definitely been written much earlier – see Chapter 4.26 23 See Comenius, John Amos: Continuatio admonitionis fraternae, par. 125–127, a quote from Hendrich, Josef (trans.): Jana Amose Komenského Vlastní životopis ze spisu „Pokračování v bratrském napomínání Samuela Maresia o mírnění horlivosti láskou“ [The Autobiography of John Amos Comenius from the treatise “The continuation of a brotherly lecture to Samuel Maresius on the moderation of zealousness by love”]. Prague 1924, pp. 122–125. Cf. also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 158, 162. 24 For more detailed information on Opera didactica omnia, see e.g. Čapková, Dagmar: Pansoficko-pedagogická struktura Komenského souboru Opera didactica omnia [The Pansophic-Pedagogical Structure of Comenius’s Opera didactica omnia]. In: SCetH 20 (IX), 1979, pp. 31–43; Patočka, Jan: O pozdních pedagogických spisech Komenského [On Comenius’s Late Pedagogical Treatises]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 117–124. On the reasons for the inclusion in the ODO of the new editions of Pansophiae praeludium and Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio, i.e., works that are pansophic – as opposed to didactic – in nature (although one may not contradict the other), see Patočka, Jan: O vzniku a stavbě díla Opera didactica omnia [On the Genesis and Construction of Opera didactica omnia]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 241. 25 John Amos Comenius to Samuel Hartlib (12 June 1647 to 15 June 1647). Retrieved from: http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/af355dfc-8213-4358-aacc-cb7c4688253b [2016-01-31]. See also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 158. 26 John Amos Comenius to Samuel Hartlib (Leszno, 29 July 1654). Retrieved from: http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/9ec456db-98cd-4db0-9ea2-

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Despite the magnitude of the disaster of 1656, during which Leszno, the then home to Comenius, was burned down, causing the loss of a portion of Comenius’s work, the only materials lost were the fair copies of the Consultation prepared for printing. The majority of the completed portions of the Consultatio, i.e., Panegersia and Panaugia, survived, as evidenced by the fact that Comenius remade them into a new fair copy during his journey to Amsterdam, which he then handed to Laurens de Geer to put them into print. The unfinished portions (the first three levels of Pansophia) were destroyed in the fire.27 Unfazed by the Leszno disaster, Comenius soon completed other parts of the Consultatio: Panorthosia and Pannuthesia.28 As his physical strength dwindled, he became aware that he might not be able to finish the work by himself. With that in mind, he left behind a very detailed plan for the finalisation of the work (either a written one, which has not survived, or one communicated orally) and he implored Daniel, his son from the second marriage, and Christian Vladislav Nigrin, his close friend, to complete it.29 After John Amos’s death, Nigrin took it on himself to finalise the Consultation. Nigrin’s enlisted the help of Comenius’s companion and friend from his last years, Paul Hartmann, in whose house in Oxford Nigrin had seen the yetunedited, complete manuscript of the Consultatio for the first time. That was in 303c0659e4ab [2016-01-31]. See also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 160–161. For more details on Comenius’s work on his magnum opus, see Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 323–339. 27 See Comenius’s testimony in Comenius, John Amos: Continuatio admonitionis fraternae, par. 117, a quote from Hendrich, Josef (trans.): Jana Amose Komenského Vlastní životopis ze spisu „Pokračování v bratrském napomínání Samuela Maresia o mírnění horlivosti láskou“ [The Autobiography of John Amos Comenius from the treatise “The continuation of a brotherly lecture to Samuel Maresius on the moderation of zealousness by love”]. Prague 1924, pp. 116–117 or the letter: John Amos Comenius to Petr Figulus (Silesia, 5 May 1656). Retrieved from: http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/ image/a6bd3c3e-a650-4d6b-8bd8-f28d84c1f77a [2016-01-31]. See also Patočka, Jan: O vzniku a stavbě díla Opera didactica omnia [On the Genesis and Construction of Opera didactica omnia]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 232–233. 28 Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 161. See Comenius’s own testimony in: John Amos Comenius to Johannes Rülz (Szczecin 24 June 1656). Retrieved from: http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/image/007daf39-f98d-4d5e-86d 1-3c4933c7615d [ 2016-01-31]. See also Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 341–343. 29 Čapková, Dagmar: A Manuscript Copy of the First Part of the Greatest Work by John Amos Comenius in the British Museum. In: AJAK XXIV (1970), p. 64.

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1675, five long years after Comenius’s death. The manuscript was being arranged and edited by the two men with the help of Comenius’s son Daniel until at least 1681, when mentions of the fate of the Consultation and the lives of Comenius’s literary executors disappear from all sources.30 The last recorded editorial interference in the corpus was Nigrin’s removal of the appendices from the body text of the Consultatio. These appendices were later collected in separate publications by Nigrin between the years 1680 and 1681. One of these appendices, Janua rerum, was apparently intended by Comenius not as an appendix to Mundus possibilis (as argued by Patočka), but as an integral part of the body text.31 To give a proper treatment of John Amos’s view of man as of the last, panorthotic period, this particular work will also need to be taken into consideration. In addition to Via lucis and Janua rerum reserata, we also need to focus on Comenius’s philosophical diary Clamores Eliae, which in many ways illustrates the basic elements of his late thought. We shall also examine the treatises Angelus pacis and Unum necessarium, which are interesting in terms of both chronological placement and content (they present philosophical reflections on anthropological matters). In contrast, we have decided to leave out Comenius’s texts and collections dealing with subjects related to revelations, due to their ambiguous authenticity.32

30 Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 167–176. 31 See CC I, p. 216, col. 311 or Comenius, John Amos: Janua rerum reserata. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, p. 158 (Ad academias Europae praefatio). Generally, see also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 174. Also see Chapter 4.1. Patočka reasons by analogy that Triertium catholicum was also meant to become a part of the pansophic Mundus artificialis (Comenius finished the treatise himself in August 1670; however, the work was published by K. V. Nigrin only in 1681). Because the treatise is concerned with the trivium of logic, grammar, and pragmatics, in the sense of providing a practical illustration of the application of the principles of pansophy, and as such does not offer any new insights into John Amos’s philosophical-theological view of man, we shall not deal with it in this study. On more information on the relationship of the treatise to the Consultatio see Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 174, note b. 32 The problematic nature of any interpretation of revelations has been pointed out several times. See Bernát, Libor: K eschatologickým prvkom v diele Jána Amosa Komenského a Mikuláša Drabíka [On Eschatological Elements in the Works of John Amos Comenius and Mikuláš Drabík]. In: SCetH 67–68 (XXXII), 2002, p. 76. For a more detailed treatment of the topic of revelations, see e.g. Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 86–107; Válka, Josef: Komenský v evropské kultuře 17. Století [Comenius in the

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We wish to point out that the most attention will be paid to the Consultatio and the works that are closely related to it in terms of content, i.e., works in which the question of man and his quiddity is approached from a philosophicaltheological point of view. Considering the size of Comenius’s oeuvre, only a selection of relevant works will be analysed. Furthermore, as the present study touches on several other subjects related to the Consultatio that are of relevance to the domains of Comenius Studies and history of philosophy (i.e., in addition to anthropology which is the main subject of the study), it should be noted that we cannot claim to be exhaustive on those topics. In such cases, the reader will be referred to relevant secondary sources for a discussion of the subject in question. To conclude this sub-chapter, let us mention that the manuscript of the treatise under study, i.e., the seven-volume Consultatio catholica, was discovered by the Ukrainian-born philosopher and literary scientist Dmytro Chyzhevsky in the archives of the Main Library of the pietistic orphanage in Halle in 1934 in the form of a collection of manuscripts and printed copies of certain portions of the work (Pansophia, Pampaedia, Panglottia, and Pannuthesia). Later, in 1937, the newly discovered folio of Panegersia and finally, the folios of the remaining portions of the Consultatio (probably dating from 1657, and used to reconstruct important passages from the Consultation), were included in this collection.33 Besides the Consultatio, Chyzhevsky’s finds included a dictionary titled Lexicon reale pansophicum,34 which was probably written between the years 1662 Context of the European Culture of the 17th Century]. In: Id.: Husitství na Moravě. Náboženská snášenlivost. Jan Amos Komenský [Hussitism in Moravia. Religious Tolerance. John Amos Comenius]. Brno 2005, p. 348. 33 Chyzhevsky, Dmytro: Dva nové nálezy Komenského [Two New Discoveries of Comenius’s Works]. In: Slovo a slovesnost 4 (III), 1937, pp. 230–232; Chyzhevsky, Dmytro: Foliové vydání vševědného díla Komenského [The Folio Edition of the Pansophic Work of Comenius]. In: AJAK XIV, 1938, pp. 6–11; Chyzhevsky, Dmytro: Hallské rukopisy děl J. A. Komenského [The Halle Manuscripts of the Works of John Amos Comenius]. In: AJAK XV, pp. 85–107; Chyzhevsky, Dmytro: Nová komeniana hallská [New Halle Comeniana]. In: Slovo a slovesnost 4 (VI), 1940, pp. 193–199; Chyzhevsky, Dmytro: Ztracené části Komenského Pansofie nalezeny [The Missing Portions of Comenius’s Pansophia Found]. In: Slovo a slovesnost 2 (I), 1935, pp. 118–119; Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 167–172; Patočka, Jan: Nad komeniologickou prací Dmytra Čyževśkého [On the Comeniological Work of Dmytro Chyzhevsky]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 322–326. 34 Liber librorum ceu Bibliotheca portatilis, hoc est LEXICON REALE PANSOPHICUM Rerum omnium quae sciri possunt ac debent Definitiones veras (omnia quae ad rei

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and 1665 and is thematically related to the Consultation. As it is clear that the dictionary was compiled from a much older material (which cannot be properly dated due to the unfinished nature of the work), we have decided not to analyse it separately, but instead to refer to its content (or its possible relevance to the study of Comenius’s conception of man) only in footnotes.35

2.3 Works from the pre-pansophic and pansophic periods After having analysed John Amos’s comprehensive anthropology, we shall focus on his writings from the pre-pansophic and pansophic periods and attempt to identify the original conceptions and plans which were a basis for Comenius’s late philosophical-theological conception of man. To this end, we shall focus on Comenius’s earliest encyclopaedic work, Theatrum universitatis rerum (on which he probably worked from 1616) as well as his planned, albeit unfinished revision of the same, titled Amphitheatrum universitatis rerum. In addition to the author’s encyclopaedic works, attention will be paid to his consolation, social-critical, and novelistic attempts such as Listové do nebe (Letters to Heavens), the dialogue Truchlivý (The Mournful), the world-famous Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart, and Centrum securitatis. These works illustrate Comenius’s development as a philosopher during the 1610s and 1620s. The treatises he wrote concurrently with those mentioned above and which deal with the same topics will only be taken into account, but will not be covered. Thus, we shall not analyse the treatises Přemyšlování o dokonalosti křesťanské (Reflections on Christian Perfection), Nedobytedlný hrad (Unconquerable Castle) or Pres boží (The Press of God). Also, we shall not discuss the tract Retuňk proti Antikristu a svodum jeho (A Diatribe Against the Antichrist and His Temptations) because of the yet-unresolved question of its authorship and especially because of its theological-polemical nature.36 There is a similar cujusque constitutionem intimam spectant, explicantes) ordine Alphabetico proponens. See CC II, pp. 437–681, cols. 804–1275. 35 For a description of the content and evolution of the work, see: Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 203–205. 36 Retuňk proti Antikristu a svodum jeho, kteříž v zarmoucených těchto časích mnohým k zahynutí nešťastně se rozmáhají, a nejedněch od víry odstupování se děje, těm, kdož by duše své retovati a před zahynutím vystřáhnouti dáti chtěli, podaný od jednoho z milovníků Ježíše Krista [A diatribe against the Antichrist and his temptations which, sadly, are becoming rampant, ruining many lives and causing many to lose their faith, from one of the lovers of Jesus Christ for those who want to save their soul from

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(similar in terms of dating and content) tract titled Haggaeus redivivus, which can be safely ascribed to Comenius and which deals, above all, with subjects related to theology and church reform.37 However, not even this tract includes any passages relevant to the study of Comenius’s anthropology. For this reason, the tract will not be covered in the present study. The Didaktika (Didactics), written in Czech, occupies a special place in Comenius’s oeuvre. It can be regarded as the last work of the pansophic period that ushered in a new stage of Comenius’s philosophical career. It is therefore very important to our analysis. The metaphysical texts from the pansophic period are represented by Prima philosophia, written in 1630. The list of works we will analyse also includes (in addition to the aforementioned Pansophiae praeludium, Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio, and Pansophiae diatyposis) Comenius’s textbook of physics titled Physicae synopsis, which was published for the first time in 1633.

death]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Retuňk proti Antikristu a svodum [A Diatribe against the Antichrist and His Temptations]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 2. Prague 1971, pp. 7–287. On the question of authorship, see ibid. p. 225. 37 Haggaeus redivivus to jest Křesťanských vrchností, kněží Páně a všeho pobožného lidu, z antikristského babylonského zajetí a rozptýlení navrátilých, k živé a vroucí pokáním svatým horlivosti a k horlivému vzdělání a znovu spořádání domu božího (jenž jest církev) horlivé a vroucí jménem božím napomenutí [Haggaeus redivivus of the Christian authorities, priests and all the pious people from the Babylonian captivity caused by the Antichrist and the diaspora of the returnees, to the living zeal through ardent penance and to zealous education and reformation of the House of God (being the Church), a zealous and ardent reminder in the name of God]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Haggaeus redivivus. In: Id.: Opera omnia 2. Prague 1971, pp. 289–397.

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3. De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica 3.1 Europae lumina, salvete, and Panegersia Anthropological matters are already touched upon in the dedicative preface titled Europae lumina, viri docti, pii, eminentes, salvete, which precedes the inception of the body text of the Consultatio itself.38 In the opening paragraphs, Comenius partially explains his understanding under the term human things (res humanae).39

38 For a comparison between the text which we have analysed, which comes from the Halle finds with the manuscript of Europae lumina discovered more recently (1992) in Finspång, Sweden, see: Komenský, Jan Amos – Karlsson, Blanka (ed.): Finspongský rukopis Jana Amose Komenského: dosud neznámý anonymní rukopis Komenského předmluvy Europae lumina a Dedikace třem královstvím nalezený ve švedském Norrköpingu [The Finspång manuscript by John Amos Comenius: The yet unknown anonymous manuscript of Comenius’s preface to Europae lumina and Dedication to Three Kingdoms, discovered in Norrköping, Sweden]. Brno 2000, pp. 14–15, 55–60, 75–77. 39 Comenius’s definition of the human things as well as his awareness that the human things have become corrupt and need to be reformed were inspired above all by his reading of Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon. He found in their writings the belief that the human things can be reformed through the emendation of human knowledge and the human ways of knowing. Campanella inspired Comenius’s belief that all existing scientific disciplines need to be reformed and consolidated to form a unified system of knowledge and Bacon inspired Comenius’s notion that a suitable method would need to be invented before this new unified body of knowledge could be systematised. However, Bacon’s influence on Comenius stops there, as is evident from the fact that Comenius regarded Bacon’s method of induction as non-universal, and hence inadequate. Campanella’s ideas resonated with Comenius on a much deeper level. Comenius set out to unify and systematise the three sources of human knowledge – the human mind, nature, and the Scripture (an idea he borrowed from Campanella) – in the spirit of pan(harmony), a concept he borrowed from Nicholas of Cusa. Eventually, he parted ways with both Campanella and Bacon by rejecting the political and technical details of the reform they proposed and came up with his own conception of universal education. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius. Prague 1970, p. 63; Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., p. 25; Patočka, Jan: Náčrt Komenského díla, op. cit., pp. 99–101. John Amos is thought to have been inspired the most by his reading of Novum Organum, a work which he was probably familiar with as early as around 1630. The new science

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For him, the term covered man’s relationship to things (cum Rebus), to oneself





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proposed by Bacon was intended to serve the purpose of reinstauratio, a restoration of not only the world but also of man and his original (paradisal) privileges as the steward of creation, an idea that very much resonated with Comenius. It follows that Comenius was also attracted to the idea that people should search for a new method that would ultimately lead to the instauration of the image of God in man. See Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky [The Philosophical Foundations of Comenius’s Pedagogy]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 172–173; Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 148, 155–156. It is not without interest that Comenius considered Bacon the author who had initiated the impetus for the great reformation of science. See Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia. Vol. 14, p. 349, par. 10. On Comenius’s relationship to Bacon, see the footnotes later on in this study; Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon [Comenius and Bacon]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie III [Comeniological Studies III]. Prague 2003, pp. 542–583, which contains many references to other sources; or Webster, Charles: The Great Instauration. Science, Medicine and Reform 1626–1660. London 1975, pp. 25–27, 48–53, 108–114, 127–128, 145. It is often assumed that Comenius was familiar with the preface to Campanella’s Prodromus philosophiae instaurandae (Frankfurt 1617), which came from the pen of Tobias Adami. John Amos also probably read the treatises Realis philosophiae epilogisticae partes IV (Frankfurt 1623) and Universalis philosophia seu metaphysicarum rerum iuxta propria dogmata partes III (Paris 1638). There is speculation about his familiarity with Campanella’s Civitas solis. A theory may be put forth that John Amos was attracted to the vision of reformation through knowledge and the notion of a book which would summarise all human knowledge – a book that was available to the denizens of Campanella’s world. See Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie., op. cit., pp. 25, 154–156; Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., pp. 184–185. For a more general discussion of the relationship between the ideas of Campanella and Comenius, see e.g. Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius. Prague 1970, pp. 63, 91, 99; Červenka, Jaromír: Die Weltenschichten bei Campanella und Comenius. In: AC 4/1 (XXVIII/1), 1979, pp. 117–157; Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon, op. cit., pp. 557–570; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 413–416; Urbánek, Vladimír: Politické myšlení Komenského a Campanelly: antimachiavellismus a universální monarchie [The Political Thought of Comenius and Campanella: Anti-Machiavellianism and Universal Monarchy]. In: SCetH 89–90 (XXXXIII), 2013, pp. 84–86. In his cogent essay, Vojtěch Balík points out that the only real authority for Comenius was the Scripture. All other, non-biblical sources were used by him only as substructure to support his arguments. See Balík, Vojtěch: Citáty z raně církevních Otců v díle J. A. Komenského [Quotations of Early Church Fathers in the Work of John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 77–78 (XXXVII), 2007, p. 18. For an exhaustive discussion of the sources of philosophical and theological inspiration behind the Consultatio generally,

(cum Seipsis) and to God (cum Deo); or to put it even more simply, the term covered education (eruditio), politics (politia) and religion (religio).40 see: Červenka, Jaromír: Zur Quellenfrage des IV. Gradus der Comenianischen Pansophia. In: AJAK XXIV (1963), pp. 145–190. 40 CC I, p. 28, col. 4. The basic triadism of Comenius’s thought is already much in evidence here – a testament to the influence of St. Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa. On Comenius’s triadism, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 44, 59 and note 30 on p. 164; Floss, Pavel: Poselství J. A. Komenského současné Evropě [Comenius’s Message to Today’s Europe]. Brno 2005, pp. 12–13, 18–19, 34–37, 41; Nejeschleba, Tomáš: Struktura a triády. Ke zhodnocení významu filozofie J. A. Komenského Pavlem a Karlem Flossovými [Structure and Triads. On the Evaluation of the Significance of the Philosophy of John Amos Comenius by Pavel Floss and Karel Floss]. In: SCetH, 63–64 (XXX), 2000, pp. 36–41; Patočka, Jan: Komenský – Kusánský – Descartes. Nedokončená monografie z pozůstalosti [Comenius – Cusa – Descartes. An unfinished legacy monograph]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie III [Comeniological Studies III]. Prague 2003, pp. 280–300; Schadel, Erwin: Komenskýs Emendationstriadik im reformatiorischen und speziell sozinianischen Umfeld. In: SCetH 35 (XVIII), 1988, pp. 91–111. John Amos acquainted himself with the ideas of St. Augustine during his stay at Přerov from 1614 to 1616. It has been demonstrated that he was familiar with the majority of St. Augustine’s principal philosophical and theological works, e.g. Confessiones, De genesi ad literam, De civitate Dei, De unitate ecclesiae, De vera religione, as well as his epistulae and sermones. See Balík, Vojtěch: Citáty z raně církevních Otců v díle J. A. Komenského, op. cit., p. 29; Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 43. In addition to the influence of St. Augustine’s Trinitarianism, we should mention the influence that this Church Father had on Comenius’s conception of the three basic human principles: nosse/scire – velle – posse (for a discussion of the subject, see below). Although several Comenius scholars have argued that Comenius was influenced by Campanella’s triadic formula of potentia – sapientia – bonitas/amor (these being the three Divine primalities), which we can find in many of Campenella’s works, we think that this formula can in fact be traced back to the works of St. Augustine. On Campanella, see Comenius, John Amos, Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských I [General Consultation on an Improvement of All Things Human I]. Prague 1992, note 8 on p. 307 and note 68 on p. 367; Campanella, Tommaso – Sherry Roush: Selected Philosophical Poems of Tommaso Campanella. Chicago 2011, pp. 56–57 and 74–75. In the case of St. Augustine, we refer to his triadic formula of nosse – posse – esse, which he used, for example, in his Confessiones, Liber decimus tertius, Cap. XI Symbola trinitatis in homine. The hypothesis that Comenius was influenced by St. Augustine is corroborated by similar, although rare, conclusions made by historians of philosophy (e.g. Schadel, Erwin: Komenskýs Emendationstriadik im reformatiorischen und speziell sozinianischen Umfeld. In: SCetH 35 (XVIII), 1988, pp. 102–103) as well by Comenius’s own statements. In Mundus spiritualis, Comenius implies that the triad of posse, nosse,

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Comenius sets out his conception of the three basic human things in the first part of the Consultatio titled Panegersia.41 The human things constitute human velle comes from St. Augustine. See CC I, pp. 710–711, cols. 1229–1231. The situation is further obfuscated by Dagmar Čapková’s assertion that Comenius was influenced by Nicholas of Cusa, whose triad materia – forma – connexio supposedly served as a basis for Comenius’s own triadic formula. Furthermore, Čapková argues that the triadic formula of nosse – velle – posse was based on the triad ratio – oratio – operatio which Comenius had articulated earlier. See Čapková, Dagmar: Ordo – usus – amor: K otázce propojení některých triadických principů pansofické metafyziky a jejich uplatňování v oblasti lidské činnosti [Ordo – Usus – Amor: On the Connection between Some Triadic Principles of Pansophic Metaphysics and Their Application in the Activity of Man]. In: SCetH 62/XXIX, 1999, pp. 99–100. Adding to the confusion is Erwin Schadel’s theory that Comenius was influenced by Hugh of Saint Victor and Bonaventure. See Schadel, Erwin: Komenskýs Emendationstriadik im reformatiorischen und speziell sozinianischen Umfeld, op. cit., note 95 on p. 110. On Comenius’s relationship to St. Augustine, see Balík, Vojtěch: Citáty z raně církevních Otců v díle J. A. Komenského, op. cit., pp. 15–31; Čapková, Dagmar: Ke vztahu Komenského k Augustinovi [On Comenius’s Relationship to St. Augustine]. In: SCetH 77–78 (XXXVII), 2007, pp. 51–56; Floss, Karel: Jan Amos Komenský a trinitární nauka Aurelia Augustina [John Amos Comenius and the Trinitary Teachings of Augustine of Hippo]. In: SCetH 77–78 (XXXVII), 2007, pp. 44–50; Floss, Pavel: Význam studia patristiky pro pochopení kořenů a povahy Komenského díla [The Importance of Patristics for the Understanding of the Sources and the Nature of Comenius’s Work]. In: SCetH 77–78 (XXXVII), 2007, pp. 8–14. Of all the Church Fathers that Comenius mentions, St. Augustine is the most cited with one third of all mentions, followed by Jerome, Tertullian, John Chrysostom, and nearly seventy other names. See Balík, Vojtěch: Citáty z raně církevních Otců v díle J. A. Komenského, op. cit., pp. 27–29. Comenius is believed to have become acquainted with the works of Nicholas of Cusa in his youth, specifically during his stays at Přerov and Fulnek. He was exposed to the ideas of the German cardinal through the anthology Speculum intellectuale felicitatis humanae, edited by the Nuremberg physician Ulrich Pinder (Nuremberg 1510). Comenius’s triadism, the unity of opposites, panharmony, and the general idea of a Christian all-science founded on a synthesis between philosophy and theology were all borrowed from Nicholas of Cusa. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 43–44; Floss, Pavel: Komenský a Kusánus [Comenius and Cusa]. In: SCetH 2 (I), 1971, pp. 11–38; Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 21, 42, 127–136. Patočka suggests that John Amos was exposed to the teachings of Nicholas of Cusa through one of the two following sources: Johann Heinrich Alsted, a theologian with a soft spot for Paracelsian alchemy, or Lutheran mysticism and Weigelian literature. See ibid., p. 136. 41 Comenius’s choice of terminology, especially the Greek titles of the books of the Consultatio which start with the prefix pan-, is often thought to have been inspired

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nature (natura humana). Anything else that man participates in along with other animals is not uniquely human.42 Man not only differs from animals (a brutis differimus) in his essential faculties, but also rises above them (super bruta elevamur) towards the sublimity of God.43 In Panegersia, Comenius says that the quality that sets man apart from animals is his superior soul (animae praeeminentia). In all other aspects, be they the harmoniousness and beauty of body, agility, strength, or resilience, animals can potentially surpass man. Man, however, is human even if his body is ungainly, slow, weak, sick and mortal,44 for his soul contains the living image of the living God (imago viva vivi Dei), which is his essence. The soul has the capacity for understanding things, or reason (ratio), the capacity for choosing among the things it apprehends, or will (voluntas), and the capacity for moving those things, or agency (facultates operativae).45 Human reason thirsts for true understanding of things, the will strives for true and eternal good, and agency strives for dominion over existing things and the creation of new ones.46 Human sublimity (sublimitas humana) thus stems from three sources which are unique to the human spirit (animus humanus): reason, will, and agency. These aspects are infinite (infinitae sunt capacitatis) and constitutive of man’s nature (constituunt hominem). According to Comenius, it is the soul (anima) that man owes his humanness to. The soul and the three infinite components of it are reflections of God’s infinity, consisting in omniscience (omniscientia), omnivolence (omnivolentia), and omnipotence (omnipotentia).47 Out of these three roots (radices), or basic principles of the human soul or spirit (we shall discuss Comenius’s inconsistent use of terminology in Chapter 4),

42 43 44 45 46 47

by Francesco Patrizi. See Čížek, Jan: Filosofie Franceska Patriziho a Jana Amose Komenského ve světle jejich vrcholných děl [The Philosophies of Franciscus Patricius and John Amos Comenius in View of Their Late Works]. In: SCetH 83–84 (XXXX), 2010, pp. 32–33; Erdmann-Pandžić, Elisabeth von: Panaugia: Zur Herkunft des Begriffs bei Patricius und Comenius. In: Gutschmidt, Karl (Hrsg.): Slavistische Studien zum XI. Internationalen Slavistenkongreß in Preßburg/Bratislava. Cologne 1993, p. 124; Fattori, Marta: La filosofia del rinascimento Italiano in J. A. Comenius: Note su Campanella e Patrizi. In: Graciotti, Sante: Italia e Boemia nella cornice del rinascimento Europeo. Florence 1999, pp. 323 and 325; Schiffler, Ljerka: Humanizam bez granica: hrvatska filozofija u europskom obzoru. Zagreb 1992, p. 140. CC I, p. 52, col. 33. CC I, p. 50, col. 28. CC I, p. 50, col. 29. CC I, p. 50, col. 29. CC I, pp. 50–51, cols. 29–30. CC I, p. 51, col. 30 and CC I, pp. 78–79, cols. 85–86.

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the three basic human things grow like boughs or fruits. Our desire for truth gives rise to philosophy (philosophia), our desire for goodness gives rise to religion (religio), and our desire for dominion gives rise to politics (politia).48 In John Amos’s view, these three areas of human activity are essential; everything else is secondary and de facto insignificant.49 Comenius offers several arguments for this conclusion. Man, who was created in the image of God (ad imaginem Dei), is the living image of God’s attributes, in particular, His ability or power (potentia), His wisdom (sapientia), and His goodness (bonitas).50 The reflections of these attributes in man are located in his reason, will, and capabilities.51 In relation to the human things, Comenius says that man needs to account for everything that he comes into contact with, including inferior species (infra se), of which he is the owner and user, and his rule over which is the domain of philosophy; other people around him (circa se) with whom he desires to live in friendship, peace and justice, which is the domain of politics; and finally, God above him (supra se) to whom he is subject and whom he must respect and trust, which is the domain of religion.52 According to Comenius, these three basic human things have existed since the dawn of mankind. When he was created, Adam had to observe the species, name them, and reign over them. According to Comenius, this was the beginning of philosophy. When God made Eve, he said to her and Adam, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth”. This was the beginning of politics. God forbade Adam to eat from the tree of knowledge. This was the beginning of religion (religio) or piety. According to Comenius, there has been no human society in the history of mankind that did not cultivate the three basic human things in one form or another.53 The things which most deserve to be called human and which we shall be concerned with in this consultation are education, religion and politics. These are the things that have always and at all times belonged to man so much so that they cannot be taken away from him without depriving him of what makes him human.54

48 CC I, p. 53, col. 34. 49 CC I, p. 51, col. 30. 50 This triad of Divine principles (sometimes represented as power – wisdom – love) was, as we suggested earlier, inspired by the conception of Tommaso Campanella. See Jan Amos Komenský, Janua rerum reserata 1643. In: SCetH 62 (XXIX), 1999, p. 223, note 31. 51 CC I, p. 51, cols. 30–31. See also CC I, p. 73, cols. 74–75. 52 CC I, pp. 51–52, cols. 31–32. 53 CC I, p. 52, col. 32. 54 CC I, p. 53, col. 34: “Nec igitur ambigat id, quod Rerum humanarum nomine potissimum indigitari dignum sit, considerandumque nobis in tota hac Consultatione maxime veniat,

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We see that the human things and the principles that characterise man’s soul or spirit are so profoundly connected to his nature that any attempts to take them away from him would necessarily dehumanise him. Conversely, the simultaneous presence of these three things in man consummates the image of God in him and perfects (perficio) him.55 Unfortunately, the noblest creature of God (nobilissima Creatura Dei), man, has come to disregard his most valuable part and has stopped asking what his mission in the world is (cur missa est). Many people live without knowing why they were sent into the world or where they will go afterwards.56 Comenius points out that as the end of the world is approaching, it is increasingly important to bring the poor state of the basic human things and the need to reform them to people’s attention.57 As we can see, Panegersia contains indications of Comenius’s eschatological conviction.58 Comenius thought that the human things in his time were in a lamentable state and that people should focus on reforming them. From the moment human society came into existence there have been disagreements between various philosophical, religious, and political factions as to the verity of knowledge, religious zeal, and governance over people by other people. These disagreements came to a head in Comenius’s times.59 Man is the only animal that tolerates discord and mutual animosity, behaving in fact worse than the animals: wolves, bears, tigers, and even snakes can live with other members of their species in harmony. One of the principal messages of the Consultation is that violence is contemptible in any form.60 The human things may be in a bad way, but are not beyond repair.61 Man has not lost his thirst for knowledge, his sense of piety, or his impulse to do good. Philosophy, religion or politics do not have to be rebuilt from scratch – they

55 56 57 58 59 60 61

Eruditionem, Religionem, Politiam esse. Utpote quae Omni homini, semper et ubique, ita conveniunt, ut separari nequeant, nisi ex Homine facere velis non hominem.” CC I, p. 55, col. 38. CC I, p. 60, col. 48. CC I, p. 45, col. 19. See also e.g. CC I, pp. 72–73, cols. 73–74 For more on this topic, see Čížek, Jan: On the eschatology of Consultatio catholica. In: SCetH 91–92 (XLIV), 2014, pp. 19–30. CC I, pp. 52–53, cols. 33–34. CC I, p. 61, col. 50. This belief was certainly shaped by Comenius’s reading of Campanella. See Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon, op. cit., p. 566. Popelová adds that Comenius’s view of corruption is essentially Aristotelian. For more on this, see Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., p. 349.

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merely have to be reformed. Our dulled sense of truth, our weakened desire for good, and our exhausted agency just have to be brought back to the path from which they have deviated.62 The human things will be reformed by eliminating ill will among people (and violence from human relationship to things), as well as by edifying man and his faculties through education (as we shall explain in our discussion of Pampaedia). It is man’s nature to be active, not passive. We are more willing to be proven wrong than to have no opinion at all; we would rather make a bad choice than have nothing to wish for; and we would rather make a mistake than be idle. However, when we are faced with a cause that our reason recognises as true, our will recognises as good, and our agency recognises as attainable, we stand to discover our common notions (notiones communes), common desires (instinctus communes), and the love of harmony (amor harmoniae), or common capabilities.63 These norms (normae) or prescripts (seu directoria) were given to each man by God along with the three basic principles of the soul64 (reason, will, agency) as protections against error and folly.65 When we remove obstacles to human capabilities, people will hopefully strive for the highest goals. When we harmonise our common desires with our common notions in the mind (mens), the human things will hopefully be emended.66 A successful reformation of the human things will, however, not be a matter of human endeavour alone; nor will it be exclusively a matter of God’s will and mercy. Just as God created man and made sure that he would be happy, but soon ordered him to take care of himself, so will it be imperative that man, with God’s blessing and mercy, expend effort to mend his own affairs.67 Comenius explains this necessity in theological terms: from the moment God created the world, He has not had to create anything by Himself; everything in the world has arisen from creation themselves. Man’s ultimate goal is to take care of his salvation (salus). Just as a sick person may pray to God for his recovery, but also has to take medications, so man may pray for his salvation, but also has to expend effort to

62 CC I, p. 70, col. 68. 63 CC I, p. 70, cols. 68–69. 64 In the ensuing paragraphs, the terms anima and mens are again used interchangeably. See CC I, p. 79, col. 86. 65 CC I, p. 79, col. 86. For more on this topic, see CC I, p. 89, col. 107. 66 CC I, pp. 70–71, cols. 69–70. 67 CC I, pp. 74–75, cols. 77–78.

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deserve it. Man cannot do anything without God (nihil posse sine Deo) and God does not want anything without man (nihil velle sine homine).68 Panergesia contains clear indications of the weight John Amos gave to human will and agency – themes which would be fully developed in the subsequent parts of the Consultatio, in particular, Pansophia and Panorthosia. Nevertheless, Comenius already states in the first book of the Consultatio that God gave man such dignity (dignitas) that all inferior creatures are subject (subjiceret) to him, while he himself is subject to no one but himself (sui esset juris) and is guided only by his decisions (proprio regeretur arbitrio). Man can be the governor and arbiter of all creation (rector et arbiter omnium) because he was endowed with the will (velle), power (posse) and knowledge (scire) to govern himself – in other words, God imprinted on him the image of His essential powers.69 The ‘innate principle’70 of velle corresponds to the image of the love of freedom (amor libertatis) represented in the human soul by the free will.71 The innate principle of scire corresponds to reason (ratio) combined with conscience (conscientia). The innate principle of posse corresponds to agency, which draws from countless examples of other beings and their actions.72 As mankind defied these God-given principles and rules, the three basic human things that rooted in reason, will and agency have been thrown into disarray, disharmony, and unrest. In Panegersia, Comenius even goes so far as to call freedom of the human will a manifestation of Divinity in man. He writes that this essential Divine power was imprinted on man, whom God made in His own image. The Creator admonishes, stimulates, and cultivates man’s reason, will, and agency, but He never forces His will upon him. For if he forced man’s volition, he would destroy the freedom of his will that He once gave him (arbitrii libertatem semel datam 68 CC I, pp. 75, cols. 78–79. This turn of phrase was inspired by St. Augustine, as pointed out by Neval, Daniel: Comenius und die Ökumene – zwischen Wahrheit und Beliebigkeit. In: SCetH 61 (XXIX), 1999, p. 33 (the reference is specifically to Sermo 169, 11; Migne PL 38, pp. 922–923). 69 The triadic formula of scire – velle – posse, which is the leitmotif of Comenius’s Consultatio and a metaphysical basis for other triads, has been extensively discussed in literature. On the conception that we identify with, see Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky [On Comenius’s Metaphysics]. In: SCetH 6 (III), 1973, pp. 55–56. 70 The term ‘innate principles’ is used to refer to aspects of the aforementioned image of the essential Divine powers in man, based on which reason, will, and agency are constituted, as we shall see later. 71 CC I, p. 58, cols. 44–45. 72 CC I, p. 58, col. 45; CC I, p. 70, cols. 84–85.

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destruere) and turn him into a non-man (ex homine facere non hominem).73 In Panegersia, Comenius makes two statements regarding the highest part of man, that which makes him human. This nobility is first attributed to the human soul (or spirit or mind) and later to one of its components, free will. As this subject comes up in other parts of the Consultatio as well, we shall provide a comprehensive treatment of it in the fourth chapter.

3.2 Panaugia Anthropological ideas are also found, albeit to a lesser extent, in the second book of the Consultatio titled Panaugia.74 The human soul (here referred to with the more general term ‘the inner being of man’) is represented again as a unity of three parts, but these now include reason (intellectus), will (voluntas), and emotions (affectus).75 Comenius’s idea of man’s innate faculties clearly underwent a change from Panergesia to Panaugia in terms of both content (the substitution of emotions for agency in one instance and conscience, conscientia,76 in another) and in terms of the terminology used (the author uses the term intellectus synonymously with ratio). This inconsistency does not differ materially from the aforementioned synonymous use of the terms anima, animus, and mens77 to refer to the highest part of man that reflects the infinite image of God. The inconsistency, as we shall attempt to prove later, does not in any way detract from the coherence of Comenius’s anthropological system. A much more important discrepancy as far as the philosophical-theological conceptions of Panegersia and Panaugia are concerned is related to Comenius’s inconsistent attribution of the highest excellency to different parts of man’s inner being. In Panegersia, centrality is attributed to freedom of the will; in Panaugia, it is attributed to reason, as evidenced particularly by Comenius’s conviction that 73 CC I, p. 79, col. 87. 74 On the meaning of the term panaugia in Comenius’s philosophical system and the circumstances under which it was included in it, see Čížek, Jan: Filosofie Franceska Patriziho a Jana Amose Komenského ve světle jejich vrcholných děl [The Philosophies of Franciscus Patricius and John Amos Comenius in View of Their Late Works]. In: SCetH 83–84 (XXXX), 2010, pp. 21−45; Čížek, Jan: Johann Heinrich Alsted: A Mediator between Francesco Patrizi and J. A. Comenius? In: AC 26 (L), 2012, pp. 69–88; Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 76, 145 and 192. 75 CC I, p. 103, col. 126. 76 See CC I, p. 103, col. 126. 77 In Panaugia, the terms ‘spirit’ (animus) and ‘mind’ (mens) are entirely conflated. See CC I, p. 111, col. 142.

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reason must be purified and emended before anything else.78 This observation also comports with Comenius’s conception of the three sources of knowledge, or three books, or God’s lanterns (Lucernae Dei): the world (mundus), which we perceive through our senses; the human mind (mens nostra), which contains in itself the light of reason (lumen rationis); and finally, the word of God (Verbum Dei), which speaks to our faith.79 Comenius even goes so far as to say that this inner light is that which sets man apart from animals, for animals can perceive but cannot understand.80 Thus, man is proclaimed a rational creature (creatura rationalis) capable of counting, measuring, and weighing (numerare, mensurare, ponderare).81 Comenius concedes that ‘the mind’s light’ (lux mentium) cannot be reduced to the faculty of reason, endowed with common notions (i.e., notions common to all people, the definition of which does not differ from that found in Panegersia).82 Just as physical light contains the glow that makes things visible, but also warmth and motion, so the human soul (anima nostra) contains the light of reason (lumen inteligentiae), but also the enthusiasm of the will (ardor voluntatis) and zest for action that stems from agency (facultates operativae). This inseparable triad of faculties is the lantern of God (lucerna Dei) in man. It should be noted, though, that for Comenius, the will and agency are ancillary aspects, whereas the light of reason, which is located in the mind, is superior to all the other endowments of

78 CC I, p. 103, col. 126. 79 CC I, p. 107, col. 135; CC I, p. 108, col. 137. Comenius’s conception of three sources of knowledge is thought to have been inspired by Tommaso Campanella. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 63–65; Fattori, Marta: La filosofia del rinascimento Italiano in J. A. Comenius: Note su Campanella e Patrizi. In: Graciotti, Sante: Italia e Boemia nella cornice del rinascimento Europeo. Florence 1999, pp. 307–308, 311–312. In one of his unpublished (that is, unpublished during his life) essays, Jan Patočka argues that although Comenius cites Campanella as the inspiration for the idea of the three lanterns, the original proponent of this conception was Nicholas of Cusa. On this subject, see Patočka, Jan: Komenský – Kusánský – Descartes, op. cit., pp. 301–310. Uwe Voigt even speculates that Comenius was influenced by St. Augustine’s triadic formula of extra nos – intra nos – supra nos. See Voigt, Uwe: Illegitime Säkularisierung oder berechtihe Selbstverweltlichung? Die Bedeutung der ‚Via lucis‘ für die Geschichtsauffassung des Comenius. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, p. 55. 80 CC I, p. 111, col. 143. 81 CC I, pp. 111–112, cols. 143–144. 82 See CC I, p. 113, col. 147.

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the spirit.83 It should also be noted that the centrality of reason for Comenius is deducible from his identification of reason with the mind as such: For the mind is indeed a mirror that reflects the image of all things in all places. It is also the facility that analyses the relationships between images apprehensible by reason and is itself called REASON.84

Although we shall not be concerned with the three sources of human knowledge, or the three ways or eyes through which man sees things and gains enlightenment (the senses, reason, and faith), we would like to draw the reader’s attention to Comenius’s pronounced anthropological optimism. He believes that every man (unless he deviates from the natural order – abberatio naturae) was endowed with the senses, reason, and faith (albeit with varying degrees of perfection).85 Just for completeness’ sake, it should be mentioned that the senses are focused on the world and the things contained in it (and thus correspond to philosophy); reason is focused on one’s interaction with others (and thus corresponds to politics); and faith is focused on piety (and thus corresponds to religion).86 Man’s preparation for eternal life is called the essential and ultimate human goal in both Panegersia and Panaugia, a goal which implies the obligation to explore the things found in the world, to name them and subdue them. Man apprehends things and makes new ones. He creates himself (fabricatur ipse) in the process of creating new things.87 Panaugia contains the seeds of the idea that man’s nature is free and open-ended, an idea which would be fully developed in Pansophia and which presupposes total freedom of the will and centrality of the will to man’s inner being.

83 CC I, p. 112, cols. 144–145. Jaromír Červenka takes a slightly different view of the question. See Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky [On Comenius’s Metaphysics]. In: SCetH 6 (III), 1973, p. 44. 84 CC I, pp. 123–124, cols. 167–168: “Nam quia Mens revera Rerum speculum est, imaginem omnium quae usquam sunt excipiens. Vis illa quae imaginum illarum rationes inter se confert, eoque ipsa RATIO dicitur.” 85 The triadic formula of sensus – ratio – fides was no doubt inspired by Campanella’s reinterpretation of Nicholas of Cusa’s earlier triadic principle of sensus – ratio – intellectus. See Patočka, Jan: Komenský – Kusánský – Descartes, op. cit., p. 301. For a more detailed discussion of Comenius’s conception of the senses, reason and faith, see ibid., pp. 301–310. This idea had reached Comenius indirectly through a preface by Tobias Adami, which influenced his reading of Campanella. See Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon, op. cit., p. 563. 86 CC I, p. 124, col. 169. 87 CC I, pp. 147–148, cols. 214–216.

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In Panaugia, Comenius discusses the question of man’s ultimate purpose in life, drawing on an eschatological discourse. Citing Daniel’s prophecy of seventy weeks, he shows that man has come a long way in his knowledge of himself and the world, from the initial exclusive use of self-observation, to the development of language, to the establishment of schools, to the invention of writing systems and the printing press, to navigation, to countless optical devices, and so on until man reaches the end of time (finis seculorum), after which he will be directly transported to the heavenly academy (Academia coelesti). Comenius believed that all the strongholds of darkness that remained had been found out and that with the help of the Consultation, people would be able to vanquish the darkness for good, which would open up the road to eternal beatitude and salvation.88

3.3 Pansophia 3.3.1 Mundus possibilis In Pansophia, the question of man and the efforts to put man on a theoretical footing are placed into focus.89 Comenius’s growing interest in anthropology is 88 CC I, pp. 149–150, cols. 219–221. 89 The idea of writing a pansophic work, which was initially a far cry from Comenius’s later panorthotic efforts, is believed to have matured in the philosopher’s mind during 1628 based on various impulses. See Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., p. 193 or Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon, op. cit., pp. 557–570. The inspirations behind Comenius’s pansophy have been extensively discussed by historians of philosophy. Pavel Floss maintains that Comenius’s conception was primarily influenced by Ramon Llull and Petrus Ramus. See Floss, Pavel: Poselství J. A. Komenského současné Evropě, op. cit., p. 44. Jaromír Červenka and Robert Kalivoda opine that Comenius’s adoption of the term pansophia was inspired by the Rosicrucians. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Grundlagen der pansophischen Idee des Johann Amos Comenius. In: AC 1 (XXV), 1969, pp. 77–78; Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 46–47; Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení, op. cit., pp. 42–46 (Kalivoda points out that John Amos only declared his affinity with Rosicrucianism in his Clamores Eliae). Ján Kvačala demonstrates that the word pansophia was already used by Philo of Alexandria and Jakob Böhme and that Comenius borrowed the term from the Lutheran theologian Peter Lauremberg. See Kvačala, Ján: K histórii slova pansophos, pansophia [On the History of the Words “Pansophos”, “Pansophia”]. In: AJAK V, 1922, pp. 38–39. Although Comenius mentions Laurenberg (and Alsted, who was his teacher) in certain passages of Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio which deal with the subject of pansophy, he adds later that the term is his own coinage. See Comenius, John Amos: Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15 II, pp. 66–67, par. 10–15. In Pansophiae praeludium, Comenius

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already apparent in the first preface to what is the most voluminous part of the Consultation. In it, Comenius repeatedly uses the term ‘human nature’ (humana natura), albeit in a general, unspecific way, without adding much detail.90 More relevant philosophical material can be found in the second preface, which contains indications of what would become Comenius’s main focus (and consequently a basis for the pansophy as a whole), viz., the human mind, representing the image of God’s mind.91 The mind is an internal source of light (fons lucis internus) and its components are common to all people without exception.92 The components of the human mind constitute the ‘possible world’ (Mundus possibilis), which Comenius describes as “a complete and organised system of ideas, which encompasses everything that a sane mind can imagine, can sanely ask for and can safely carry out.”93 The possible world is located in the minds (intra mentem) of all beings created in the image of God, i.e., angels and people.94 The most fundamental principle of man’s nature is intellection. Comenius says that it is as natural for the mind to think as it is for the eye to see and for the ear to hear. The other fundamental principle (altera fundamentalis veritas) is the desire for good things; the last but not least fundamental principle (tertia fundamentalis veritas) is the ability to carry out the possible.95 The possible world, or the light of the human mind, belongs to everybody. Just as there is no one on whom the Sun does not shine, so there is no one who is not enlightened by the internal light of his mind.96 To know the nature of man, we need not study a large number of people. All people are in fact the same – if we know one person, we know them mentions, among other authors, Campanella, Bacon and Johannes Valentinus Andreae. See Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae praeludium. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15 II, p. 44, par. 97. Lastly, Jan Patočka repeatedly argues that Comenius’s pansophic conception was inspired mainly by Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon. See e.g. Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon, op. cit., pp. 542–583. On the evolution of Comenius’s pansophic conception, see Červenka, Jaromír: Einige Bemerkungen zur Comenius’s Metaphysik. In: AC 3 (XXVII), 1972, pp. 117–119. 90 CC I, p. 163; CC I, p. 170, col. 251; CC I, p. 173, col. 254. 91 CC I, pp. 188–189, col. 268–269. 92 Ibid. 93 CC I, p. 199, col. 278: “Cogitationum systema plenum, beneque ordinatum; quiquid scilicet a mente sana distincte concipi, salubriter appeti, certoque effici potest.” For a more detailed discussion of the mind’s contents, see e.g. Červenka, Jaromír: Mundus possibilis, op. cit., pp. 5–24. 94 CC I, p. 200, cols. 279–280. 95 CC I, p. 201, cols. 281–282. 96 CC I, p. 218, cols. 315–316.

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all. A definition of man, therefore, should not be sought outside or beyond oneself. It should be enough to focus on one’s mind, which is identical to the minds of all other people.97 Just like man, the entire visible world is the image of God. If a person (microcosm) knows himself, he also knows other people, the whole material world (macrocosm), and God, who is the archetype of the human mind.98 Similarly as in Panergesia, the ‘possible world’ (and consequently the human mind) is represented as a triad: reason (intellectus) – will (voluntas) – capabilities (facultates, potentiae, or vires). God gave reason to man so that he would be able to discriminate between things; will so that he would desire the good things he would recognise as such by the faculty of reason, and so that he would be able to protect himself from evil; and finally, capacities so that he would be able to carry out what his will would desire.99 At the basis of this triad lie the three principles of all actions (omnium actionum): understanding (scire) – will (velle) – power (posse).100 It is man’s duty to strive for perfection. Man should be guided by his reason to look for the truth, by his will to desire good things, and by his agency to carry out only such wishes that are true and good.101 Comenius reiterates that the components of the human mind are not incidental and instead represent the image of God’s mind.102 CC I, pp. 200–201, cols. 280–282. CC I, pp. 200–201, cols. 280–282. Comenius probably borrowed the idea that man is a microcosm of the world from Nicholas of Cusa. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 160–162, 194–202; Patočka, Jan: Komenský – Kusánský – Descartes, op. cit., pp. 219–224, 301–310. If we take a closer look at Comenius’s ideas, we shall see that the microcosm-macrocosm analogy is applicable not only to man but also to other creatures. According to Červenka, Comenius might have been influenced by Jean d’Espagnet, according to whom even plants constituted microcosms. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 230. There are speculations that this schema was inspired by Paracelsus, Böhme, Sennert, or Fludd. See Comenius, John Amos: Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských [General Consultation on an Improvement of All Things Human]. Volume I. Prague 1992, p. 307, note 7. We think that the concept may also have reached Comenius through his Herborn-based teacher Johann Heinrich Alsted who introduced it in his early writings. See e.g. Alsted, Johann Heinrich: Physica harmonica, quatuor libellis methodice proponens. Herborn 1616, pp. 265–268. On earlier forms of this schema, see Chvátal, Ladislav: Der Mensch als Mikrokosmos in den Werken Gregors von Nyssa. In: Byzantino – Slavica. Revue internationale des études byzentines. LXII 2004, pp. 48–55. 99 CC I, p. 201, cols. 281–282. 100 CC I, p. 201, cols. 281–282. 101 CC I, p. 214, cols. 307–308. 102 CC I, p. 215, cols. 309–310.

97 98

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By pondering the contents of the mind (reason, will, and capabilities) and the principles that they are based on (understanding, will, and power), we can discover the mind’s origin, i.e., the Infinite Mind. Thus, we can encounter the first and the last essence (ens primum et ultimum), which is eternal and has no beginning or end: the eternal mind which is the archetype of the human mind.103 God’s mind is turned inwards and outwards at the same time, creating the possible world, which is located in the human mind, and the other worlds.104

3.3.2 Mundus idealis Before he sets out to describe these worlds, Comenius focuses on the ‘archetypal world’ (Mundus idealis seu archetypus) and the eternal mind (mens aeterna).105 He posits and then substantiates the existence of an infinite good, which is the origin of the human mind. Although he mostly repeats the argument presented in the previous pansophic level, some passages are certainly relevant to the study of his anthropology and therefore worthy of our attention. John Amos points out again that the human mind is rooted in God’s mind. However, he adds that man’s thirst for knowledge, his actions and his desires are unlimited and cannot ever be satisfied. This suggests that man’s nature is Divine (divinitas).106 Comenius says that by creating man, God sought to express Himself – a statement which indicates that the author was convinced of the inherent dignity of man.107 Another passage of Comenius’s description of the ‘archetypal world’ that deserves our attention is the one in which he ponders the fundamental parts

103 CC I, pp. 215–216, cols. 310–312. 104 CC I, p. 216, col. 311. Jan Patočka points out that Comenius’s discovery of the image of the eternal being in the light of the human mind is highly reminiscent of the conceptions put forward by his contemporaries René Descartes and particularly Tommaso Campanella. Patočka goes on to say that Comenius most probably drew on Campanella’s treatises Atheismus triumphatus, seu Contra Antichristianismum, etc. (Paris 1636) and Universalis philosophiae seu metaphysicarum rerum, iuxta propria dogmata, partes tres (Paris 1638). See Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 175–176. For a discussion of Mundus possibilis generally see Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., pp. 205–212. 105 On the historical background of the term Mundus archetypus, which typically appears in the hermetic tradition, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 159. 106 CC I, p. 235, cols. 338–339. 107 CC I, p. 235, col. 339.

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of man. He says that if a man was deprived of his soul (anima), he would die. If man was deprived of his spirit or mind (spiritus seu mens), he would become a brute (brutus animal). If man was deprived of his body (corpus), he would cease to exist completely.108 It follows that man’s most basic and essential aspect that elevates him above the animals is the mind (this conviction is repeated in other parts of the Consultatio).109 In another passage in the same part, Comenius argues that man, being the primary creature (creatura primaria), was endowed with an infinite capacity for deliberation and the use of things as a form of compensation for his imperfection.110 By having a mind, man partakes of infinity. In the second pansophic level, Comenius revisits the topic of the innate principles of the human mind, incorporating those into his metaphysical system. The more a person (or thing) partakes of knowledge, desire, and agency, the more he partakes of Being, and vice versa.111 Man was endowed with not just any kind of desire, but a desire that is directed to a specific goal – the highest good (summi Boni desiderium), which leads man towards God. Man was also endowed with innate notions and the ability to count, measure, and weigh, which enable him to transform the existing things and produce (producere) new ones. In addition to the aforementioned capabilities, man also has a perfect command of speech.112 If an individual makes good use of his God-given capabilities, he becomes a small world (a microcosm) and a small God (parvus Deus), a ruler over inferior creatures.113

3.3.3 Mundus angelicus Not man, but an angel is the most perfect image of God.114 The angel is in Mundus angelicus described as the first creature (creatura prima), utterly spiritual and rational (tota spiritualis et rationalis) and endowed with clairvoyance, unlimited 108 CC I, p. 244, cols. 356–357. 109 This conception as well as the ambiguous and often problematic usage of the term spiritus will be dealt with later. 110 CC I, p. 255, col. 378. 111 CC I, p. 252, col. 373. 112 CC I, pp. 259–260, cols. 387–389. 113 CC I, p. 259, col. 387. 114 For a more detailed discussion of Mundus angelicus, see e.g. Koudelka, Martin: Andělský svět Jana Amose Komenského a učení Dionysia Areopagity [Comenius’s Angelic World and the Teachings of Dionysius the Areopagite]. In: SCetH 77–78 (XXXVII), 2007, pp. 84–90.

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free will and unlimited agency and capabilities. Comenius calls the angel a small God, too.115 The angelic mind is not trapped in a physical body like the human mind is and has a greater degree of perfection. The angelic reason is nimbler and can penetrate deeper than the human reason, which is limited by man’s corporeality.116 As a result, angels have much greater knowledge than any humans have.117 The better and more profound understanding a creature has, the greater is its power and the less limited its will. Angels have therefore a greater freedom of the will. The more solid and hard a body a creature has, the more difficult is it for it to move or do anything. Substantiae spirituales have greater agency than corporeal substances (corporeis).118 Although the angelic mind is close to perfection, the reason, will, and capabilities of angels are not sovereign or independent. According to Comenius, angels depend on God, whom they cannot defy by their reason, will, or actions.119 However, the dignity of the angelic reason, will, and capabilities serves to show by contrast how limited the human mind is and what it would be capable of if it were not trapped in a physical body.120

3.3.4 Mundus materialis The physical (visible and material) world was created to make possible the existence of corporeal beings.121 First, God created passive matter (materia), which 115 CC I, p. 277, cols. 409–410. 116 This idea is thought to originate from Dionysius the Areopagite. See Koudelka, Martin: Andělský svět Jana Amose Komenského a učení Dionysia Areopagity, op. cit., p. 88. 117 CC I, pp. 278–279, cols. 412–414. 118 CC I, p. 280, cols. 415–417. 119 CC I, pp. 282–283, cols. 419–422. 120 CC I, p. 278, pp. 411–412. 121 Comenius says of the position of the material world relative to the angelic world that the Mundus materialis represents an ontologically lower level, being the visible embodiment of all the worlds that are above it. The material world is situated below the angelic world, like a smaller sphere embedded in the centre of a larger sphere. See CC I, pp. 378–379, cols. 596–599. Speaking of the size and relative proportions of the two worlds, Comenius points out that the material world and its highly dignified inhabitants, meaning people, were created in order to remedy the fall of one third of Heaven’s angels. We can infer that one third of the angelic world was burdened with corporeality and it was to this extent that the world was made visible. See CC I, p. 380, cols. 600–601. For a more detailed discussion of Comenius’s natural-philosophical views of the material world, which we shall not deal with here, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die

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He subsequently animated by the spirit of life (spiritus vitae).122 These two principles were joined by another principle representing pure activity – light or fire (lux seu ignis).123 As soon as the light began to warm the matter, the matter became thinner and divisible, and hence more susceptible to the spirit which transformed it into the three states of matter – gas, liquid, and solid (spirabili, fluida et consistente).124 Thus were created the three basic bodies: the sky (coelum) formed of air, the sea (mare) formed of water, and the earth (terra) formed of solid matter.125 In his Mosaic account of Genesis, Comenius makes the point that the created world does not share its Creator’s eternity.126

Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 88–104. See ibid. for a comparison of Mundus materialis with other natural-philosophical texts written by Comenius, e.g. Physicae synopsis and Addenda. On the sources of Comenius natural philosophy, see ibid., esp. pp. 102–104 and Červenka, Jaromír: Zur Quellenfrage des IV. Gradus der Comenianischen Pansophia. In: AJAK XXII (1963), pp. 154–190. 122 CC I, p. 297, col. 436. For a more detailed discussion of Comenius’s natural-philosophical views of matter, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 176–180; on spirit, see ibid. pp. 181–185. On questions around the problematic usage of the term spiritus in Comenius’s works, see Giglioni, Guido: Spiritus plasticus between Pneumology and Embryology, op. cit., pp. 84–85. 123 CC I, p. 298, col. 437. On the subject of light, see our discussion of Panaugia and Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 186–192. Precursors of Comenius’s conception of the genesis of the world can be found in the works of Robert Fludd, Tomasso Campanella and Nicholas of Cusa. Patočka holds that Comenius’s conception of a passive matter, formative light and unitive spirit corresponds nearly exactly to the triadic models of Nicholas of Cusa. See Patočka, Jan: Komenský – Kusánský – Descartes, op. cit., pp. 316–317, 323. See also Floss, Pavel: Die Entwicklung der philosophischen Terminologie Komenskýs und einige Aspekte der Geschichte des substanziellen und systemässigen Denkens. In: AC 7 (XXXI), 1987, pp. 8–9. 124 CC I, p. 298, cols. 437–438. 125 Ibid. 126 CC I, p. 299–300, cols. 440–441. Comenius’s Mosaic-coloured physics (or philosophy) was influenced greatly by his Herborn-based teacher, Johann Heinrich Alsted. Comenius might also have been inspired by the works of Philipp Melanchthon and the ideas of Rosicrusianism. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 32, 41, 52. On Comenius’s conception of the genesis of the world, see ibid. pp. 172–176. On Mosaic philosophy in general and Comenius’s place within this tradition, see Blair, Ann: Mosaic physics and the search for a pious natural philosophy in the Late Renaissance. In: Isis 91(1), 2000, pp. 32–58; Floss, Pavel: Grundriss der Philosophie des Johann Amos Comenius. In: SCetH 57–58 (XXVII),

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The living God did not want created matter to remain lifeless and unformed. Thus, He imbued it with living force. To impose order on the unity, He created light that gave rise to the visible world.127 In Comenius’s view, the creation and the subsequent existence of things was made possible by God-given nature (natura), which is shared by all material creatures as well as the Mundus materialis itself.128 According to the Czech historian Jaromír Červenka, Comenius uses the term natura in three different ways. First, he uses it to refer to the visible world in its original form, untouched by man; second, he uses it to refer to human nature; and third, he uses it to refer to the aforesaid force that acts upon the material world.129 Thus, the three fundamental principles of the world were established.130 Comenius repeatedly points out that the creatio ex nihilo (‘creation out of nothing’) was completed precisely at that moment. All the subsequent works of creation were in fact based on the refinement of and interaction between these basic principles.131 Interactions between matter, spirit, and light gave rise to the abodes of each of these principles in the world: sulphur, salt, and mercury (sulphur, sal, mercurius). These elements are not understood merely in chemical terms, but 1997, pp. 11–12; Sousedík, Stanislav: Einige Züge der Philosophie des J. A. Comenius und deren bisher unberücksichtigen Quellen. In: AC 4/1 (XXVIII/1), 1979, pp. 85–107. 127 CC I, p. 300, col. 442. 128 CC I, p. 301, col. 444. 129 Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 19. Červenka also comments that Comenius’s conception of nature is not particularly original. The dichotomy between the natura naturans and natura naturata can be found in the works of many philosophers before him (Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, and Meister Eckhart, to name just a few). Červenka adds that Comenius was most probably exposed to this idea through the works of Johann Heinrich Alsted. See ibid., pp. 193–195. Alsted’s works indeed contain such notions. See e.g. Alsted, Johann Heinrich: Physica harmonica, quatuor libellis methodice proponens. Herborn 1616, pp. 224–230 or Alsted, Johann Heinrich: Encyclopaedia Septem tomis distincta, op. cit., pp. 676–677. Pavel Floss points out that Comenius might have borrowed the idea from Paracelsus, Weigel, Franck or Andreae. See Floss, Pavel: Grundriss der Philosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 9–10, 12–13. 130 Comenius’s triadic model of elemental bodies was probably inspired by the naturalphilosophical theories of Franciscus Patricius. See Čížek, Jan: Filosofie Franceska Patriziho a Jana Amose Komenského, op. cit., pp. 33–34; Dadić, Žarko: Franjo Petriš i njegova prirodnofilozofska i prirodnoznanstvena misao [Franciscus Patricius and His Natural Philosophical and Natural Scientific Thought]. Zagreb 2000, pp. 131–133. 131 CC I, p. 300, cols. 441–442. On this subject, see also Floss, Pavel: Comenius – Kosmogonie und Kosmologie. In: Colloquia Comeniana I, 1968, pp. 95–97.

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in terms of the three philosophical principles of alchemy.132 The unity of matter, spirit, and light gave rise to fluidity and thereby to water. The primal fluid (primum fluidum) is associated with mercury. The dry, warm, and durable (incorruptibilis) salt is the perfect embodiment of matter. Sulphur is a solid element with an admixture of fire, with which it shares most of its characteristics. In the visible world, each of these elements forms an abode for one of the original principles: fire (sulphur), spirit (mercury), and matter (salt).133 According to Comenius, the three philosophical principles were central to the creation of the world and all physical bodies. The actions of the spirit during the genesis of the world presupposed the existence of fire. Fire, however, could not have existed without its sustenance (pabulum), viz., flammable sulphur. All matter might not have been created flammable, otherwise the world would not have survived. Two thirds of the matter that makes up the world was created inflammable: solid and dense salt and thin and volatile mercury.134 During the creation and multiplication of the substances of the world, these elements – to the extent to which they are represented in them – lent them their characteristics. Sulphur lends flammability, elasticity, and readiness to enter into compounds; salt lends solidity, compactness, and durability; and mercury lends fluidity, viscosity, and resistance to fire.135 Matter, spirit, and light (and their corresponding abodes) are represented in the human body in the form of moisture (humor), the spirit incarnate (spiritus innatus), and innate warmth (calor nativus).136 In Comenian physics, motion (motus), being the active principle instrumental in the creation of all physical substances, must accompany the three alchemical principles.137 Motion not only brings about the existence of things, but also ensures their preservation.138 132 CC I, p. 306, col. 454. The Paracelsian influence is unmistakeable. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 90, 153. Červenka (ibid. p. 197) suggests that Comenius may have been exposed to these ideas through the works of Johann Heinrich Alsted. See Alsted, Johann Heinrich: Physica harmonica, op. cit., pp. 231–232 or Alsted, Johann Heinrich: Encyclopaedia Septem tomis distincta, op. cit., pp. 674–675. 133 CC I, p. 307, cols. 455–456. 134 CC I, p. 307, cols. 455–456. 135 CC I, p. 308, cols. 457–458. 136 CC I, p. 307, cols. 455–456. 137 CC I, p. 309, cols. 459. 138 On Comenius’s views of motion, which were probably derived from the theories of Francis Bacon, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 199–207.

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Comenius already touches on the question of man and his characteristics in the introductory passages of the Material world, in which he deals with the origins of the world. He says that man resembles an angel in that his mind and the mind’s faculties (reason, will, and agency) are very mature, which makes man the most perfect material creature. In other respects, however, man and the angel could not be more different.139 People were not created at the same time, nor were they endowed with eternal life. God intended mankind to propagate through gradual procreation. For this reason, man’s most natural environment, the material world, had to be created mutable and susceptible to the forces of development and damage. God’s intentions for mankind differ significantly from the fixed quiddity of angels.140 Let us now revisit Comenius’s natural philosophy. John Amos uses the term ‘motion’ in an Aristotelian, broader sense to mean not only locomotion, but any kind of change, including birth and death.141 No new matter or form is created as new things come into being, because matter is eternal (aeterna) and forms are immutable (immutabiles). A new entity arises from a combination of existing matter with existing forms.142 Every creature of the material world is subject to decline (corruptio). This is because all things are mostly made of matter, which was created out of nothing and is still nothing in itself.143 Motion gives rise to seven classes of substances, which are rooted in the three fundamental principles of the material world.144 The primal matter, incapable of motion, the primal spirit, endowed with motion, and the primal fire, capable of conferring motion, gave rise to elements (elementa), which are capable of forming bonds by virtue of their capacity for forward motion; vapours (vapores), capable of both forward and backward motion, which form compounds; atmospheric phenomena (meteora), which are capable of inward and outward motion; and minerals (mineralia).145 The fifth class of material substances includes plants

139 140 141 142 143 144 145

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CC I, p. 284, cols. 423–424. CC I, p. 312, cols. 465–466. CC I, p. 311, cols. 463–464. CC I, p. 313, cols. 467–468. CC I, pp. 316–317, cols. 473–476. CC I, p. 317, col. 476. Surprisingly enough, Comenius says nothing of minerals and their capacity for motion – a blank space is left here. This omission is all the more striking considering that in the previous chapters of Mundus materialis, he says that stones can sustain themselves and perish: See CC I, p. 315, col. 472. Červenka believes that the passages dealing with minerals were inspired by the works of Campanella, d’Espagnet, Kircher

(plantae), which are capable of moving upwards, downwards, sideways, inwards and outwards (the outward motion represents growth); the sixth class includes animals (animalia), the first species capable of locomotion (τοποκίνητον). At the top of the hierarchy stands man (homo), a substance that is not only fully mobile (omnimode mobile) but also acting freely (primum liberum agens, αὐτεξούσιον).146 According to Comenius, the ontological dignity of the substances of the material world derives from their mobility. Man is superior to other creatures of the visible world, including the animals, by virtue of his unlimited and multimodal mobility. Comenius’s assertions concerning the dignity of the human mind in the pansophic Mundus idealis are followed by what is already the second attempt to describe what constitutes man. We shall see later if these attempts complement or contradict each other. In Comenius’s conception of nature, the elements represent the primal and elementary constituents of the material world. Strictly speaking, they are not perfect substances; rather, they are only semi-perfect (substantiae semicompletae). They exist independently, but their only purpose is to generate new substances; they must enter into combinations. The bodies that arise from these combinations can be called perfect substances (substantiae completae).147 Citing d’Espagnet, Comenius posits three elements: earth (terra), air (aer), and water (aqua).148 He offers several arguments why fire should not be included as the fourth element. Fire does not exist separately from earth, water, and air; rather, it is included in them. Furthermore, fire is not capable of existing independently like the other elements are. If we separate fire from the matter it devours, it immediately goes out and ceases to exist. Unlike true elements, fire is neither heavy nor light, but changes its weight depending on what matter it attaches to, etc.149 The interplay between the principles and the eventual dominance of one of them determines which element will be produced. Earth is characterised by the dominance of matter which makes it dense and immobile; water is characterised

146 147 148 149

and Drebbel. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 225–226. On the historical-philosophical background of Comenius’s conception of vapours, see Rattansi, P. M.: The Comenian natural philosophy in England. In: SCetH 1 (I), 1971, p. 19. CC I, p. 317, col. 476. CC I, p. 318, cols. 477–478. CC I, p. 318, col. 477. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 214. For a discussion of the elements generally, see ibid. pp. 213–217. CC I, pp. 318–319, cols. 477–480.

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by the dominance of spirit which causes its liveliness and fluidity; and air is characterised by the dominance of fire to which it owes its permanent motion and diffusiveness.150 Lastly, the elements are mutually convertible.151 In our discussion of perfect substances, we shall limit ourselves to the two highest classes, i.e., animals and man.152 We shall first be concerned with animals, which seems a reasonable choice, not least because Comenius considered man part of the animal kingdom, even if his features elevated him above it. In the sixth chapter of Mundus materialis, John Amos elaborates on his rough definition of the animal. He describes the animal as a substance endowed with life, senses (sensus) and unlimited mobility (motus liberus). While life also characterises other, inferior substances, the senses and unlimited mobility seem to define the animal with a greater degree of specificity: “The animal is a substance endowed with unlimited mobility and the senses”.153 If other classes of material creatures are sensate and mobile, they would also be called animals. Comenius must decide which of the two characteristics of animals is the more fundamental. He analyses the differences between animals and concludes that they are best defined by their unlimited mobility, not their sentience. The same feature that sets one animal apart from others, sets an animal apart from a non-animal (nonanimal). Every animal without exception is endowed with the senses, but there is no animal capable of all kinds of movement, e.g. slithering, crawling, swimming, running or flying.154 Comenius argues that sentience is in fact subordinated to movement. Animals were endowed with the senses so that they would be able to orient themselves in space when moving.155 Comenius says: “The distinction lies in that which is unique to a thing in comparison with another”. Compared to plants, animals are characterised by unlimited mobility, not sentience, because the latter characterises plants as well. Comenius says, without any further detail, that the sentience of plants is evidenced by the fact that they choose their food.156 The main difference between animals and plants must be in that the former can move from one place to another (libera sui huc illuc agitatio), an ability 150 CC I, p. 320, col. 481. 151 CC I, p. 320, col. 482. 152 On the other substances, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 217–229. 153 CC I, p. 338, col. 518: “Animal est substantia mobilis, sensu praedita, ut vermis, piscis, avis, bestia.” 154 CC I, p. 338, col. 518. 155 CC I, p. 338, col. 518. 156 Ibid.: “Differentia sumenda est ab eo, quod res prae alio sola habet”.

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which Comenius calls αὐτοκινησία.157 The reason why animals were configured for movement is threefold: to be able to forage and secure food; to carry out the actions they were destined (destinantur) to do; and to preserve their living force (vigor vitae).158 In general, every animal is defined by seven faculties: foraging (facultas nutritiva), living (facultas vitalis), sentience (facultas sensitiva), locomotion (facultas locomotiva), self-expression (facultas enuntiativa), self-defense (facultas defensiva) and procreation (facultas generativa).159 The concept of unlimited mobility which defines animals is strikingly similar to the concept of multimodal mobility (omnimode mobile), which Comenius cites in his introduction to Mundus materialis as the defining feature of man, the highest creature in his hierarchy of existence. Thus, mobility cannot be that which truly sets man apart from other material creatures and elevates him above the nature God created. As indicated earlier, motion sets animals apart from other, inferior substances of the material world. But motion also sets one animal species from others. Based on movement, we distinguish animals that dilate (animal dilativum), such as clams; animals that crawl (reptile), such as worms; animals that run (gressile), such as mice and dogs; animals that swim (natatile), such as fish; animals that fly (volatile), such as birds; and animals that perambulate, such as bipedal man (bipes homo).160 The placement of man at the top of the hierarchy shows that Comenius considered man part of both the material world and the animal kingdom. Comenius offers other criteria for the classification of animals such as the extent to which their bodies are involved in movement or the element in which they naturally live (distinguishing terrestrial, aquatic, and aerial species).161 Comenius puts the amazing diversity of life forms endowed with movement down to God’s design to fill all the elements with inhabitants and adds that this diversity was intended to serve man. Animals which follow their instincts set an

157 CC I, p. 338, col. 518. This belief was inspired by Campanella’s Philosophia realis epilogistica. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 230. 158 CC I, p. 346, cols. 533–534; CC I, pp. 347–348, cols. 536–537. 159 CC I, p. 339, col. 520: Again, the Campanellian inspiration is unmistakable. Surprisingly enough, Comenius reduced the original Campanellian eight faculties to seven, so that the number would be expressive of numerological symbolism. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 231. 160 CC I, p. 351, col. 543. 161 CC I, p. 351, cols. 543–544.

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example of good conduct to man (both morally and by teaching him mechanical and intellectual aptitude).162 Animals can also help man preserve himself, as they can be eaten for food, and they are both diverting and a pleasure to look at (for example, song birds).163 In the sixth chapter of the Material world, Comenius deals with animal and human procreation (generatio), drawing on the microcosm-macrocosm schema. The birth of an individual is analogical to the creation of the world. The establishment of the three fundamental principles of the material world (matter, spirit, and light) by God is re-enacted in the birth of a new animal. The coming together of the father and mother’s seeds gives rise to the matter of the embryo, which develops until it attains its final form in what could be called a manifestation of the spirit. The healthy development and maturation of the foetus is ensured by the presence of warmth.164 Procreation occurs through the seeds of both sexes, which contain a spirit separated from the body of the procreating individual (spiritus a corpore generantis avulsus). Offspring of both sexes is produced by the action of the male and female seeds. If only the seed of one of the procreating parties is active, only individuals of that sex will be born.165 The woman, however, can conceive (concipere) and give birth (generare) even without the presence of the male seed, but in that case, she delivers an unformed body (carnem informem) which does not have the appearance of a human being and which is called a monster (mola). Comenius believed that such cases did happen.166 By his excursus into the theory of animal procreation, in which he deals primarily with man and human procreation, Comenius prepares the ground for his subsequent discussion of man, the apex of the Mundus materialis. The creation of the material world would have remained incomplete, if God had not created (producere) a perfect image (imago perfecta) of Himself, which is itself a representation of His infinity (characteribus infinitatis suae signatam). By the same token, we would not be able to call the material world a universe (τò πᾶν) if it was not inhabited by man.167 Comenius already gives another, this time less roundabout definition of man in the opening passages of the seventh chapter:

162 Ibid. 163 CC I, p. 352, col. 545–546. 164 CC I, pp. 350–351, cols. 542–543. 165 CC I, p. 350, col. 541. 166 CC I, p. 350, cols. 541–542. 167 CC I, p. 353, col. 547.

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What is MAN? An animal endowed with agency, destined for lordship over God’s creation and for eternal communion with his eternal Creator.168

This is the first bona fide definition of man in the Consultatio. Comenius says that man was created (creatus) as the pinnacle of creation, and his role is that of the steward (gubernator) of the material world, a deputy king (Pro-Rex), or even a second God (Vice-Deus).169 While freedom of the human will and man’s lordship over the material world were implied earlier in Mundus materialis, the third important quality (i.e., eternity), which Comenius attributes to man, makes its first appearance here in the seventh chapter. Man is not merely destined for eternal communion with the Creator, but he also partakes of God’s eternity (aeternitatis consors).170 Comenius elaborates on this idea in a discussion of the metaphysical constitution of man. Being rooted in the material world, man, like other animals, has a body (corpus) and a sensate soul (anima sensitiva), in other words, ‘animality’ (animalitas). But he also has rationality (rationalitas),171 the highest part of which is a limitless, free will (liberum arbitrium). The third basic human feature is immortality (immortalitas).172 Man is the most excellent (excellentissimus) of all living beings, for his animality anchors him in the world of corporeal beings, but his other features elevate him above it and destine him to reign over it. It is through this third feature that he partakes of the eternity of his Creator. For God wanted to “create a being that was as similar to Him as possible, a being that represented His eternity in the realm of the finite”.173 Like Nicholas of Cusa, Comenius considers man the finite manifestation of the infinity of God. Inhered in this small world (mundus parvus)174 is the nature of all other created substances, not only of the primal principles (matter, spirit, fire), but also of all the lower classes of the substances of the material world. The human body

168 Ibid.: “Quid ergo est HOMO? Animal liberae actionis, creaturarum dominio, Creatoris vero aeterno consortio destinatum.” 169 CC I, p. 353, col. 547. 170 CC I, p. 353, col. 547. 171 It should be noted that the features of rationality in this conception correspond to the components of the human mind, or mens, as described, e.g., in Panergesia. This can be considered another example of the terminological inconsistencies that abound in Comenius’s works. 172 CC I, p. 353, col. 548. 173 CC I, p. 353, col. 548: “Producere creaturam sibi summe similem, hoc est infinitudinem suam finitis modis repraesentantem.” 174 CC I, p. 353, col. 547.

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is made up of the elements and a certain quantity of vapours; the bones and flesh structurally resemble minerals; the faculty of growth and nutritive faculty are analogical to the faculties of plants; and unlimited mobility and sentience are shared with animals.175 Of the three essential components attributed to man, animality lies lowest. Without it, man would be akin to angels, with whom he shares an immortal mind (spiritum mentalem et immortalem). The other two parts of man, rationality and immortality, however, elevate him above animality.176 It follows that the aspect that sets man apart from other living corporeal beings is his free will (which, as we have seen, forms the basis of his rationality, elsewhere understood in more traditional terms as the mens) and his immortality. Comenius does not offer much detail on the proposed system – quite the contrary. He writes in another passage in the same chapter that the advantages man has over other species include reason (ratio), the faculty of speech (oratio), and freely acting (libera operatio), which is founded on his unlimited free will (in arbitrii libertate absoluta).177 The whole ensuing discourse indicates that Comenius considered free will constitutive of human nature. Free will is defined in opposition to reason and is attributed a higher, virtually sovereign status: But man’s will would not permit to be overridden by the senses or reason. It acts freely and chooses or rejects things in defiance of the senses at one time and reason at another.178

Comenius calls the omnipotent free will the principal and fundamental aspect that sets man apart from animals: The main difference between man and animals is that the former is αὐτεξουσιóτηs, meaning that he possesses free will to do anything, and therefore is the governor of everything, including himself.179

Animals, representing the second class of material substances, were endowed with mobility, but this mobility is not completely unlimited. Because they do not have free will, their movement is not based on premeditation; rather, they are always limited by their natural instincts (instinctus naturalis).180 The God-created CC I, p. 354, cols. 549–550. CC I, p. 353–354, cols. 548–550. CC I, p. 354, cols. 549–550. CC I, p. 354, col. 550: “At hominis voluntas nec sensu, nec ratione ligari permittit, res libere, jam contra sensus, jam contra rationem eligens et reprobans.” 179 CC I, p. 354, col. 550: “Deinde, hominis ab animali differentia principalis nobis est, quod sit αὐτεξουσιóτηs hoc est liberum agendi quicquid libet arbitrium, atque ita in omnia, etiam seipsum, dominium.” 180 CC I, pp. 354–355, cols. 550–552. 175 176 177 178

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world would not be perfect, if it was not filled with all kinds of substances: biological and non-biological, free and unfree. God, in His wisdom, destined man to subdue the beings that are limited by their nature (natura) and to interact with those that were endowed with free will. Man, who was given free will (liberum arbitrium), is the only worthy object (obiectum) of the infinite wisdom of God. For the one who deals with active and mobile objects is more excellent than the one who only deals with passive and motionless objects.181 God wanted to create a perfect image of Himself. The perfect image of an infinite Being must also be infinite, albeit not in existence (infinita essentia belongs to God only). The infinity of man consists in his indeterminateness, unboundedness, and open-endedness: God had to create a being that had no limits and actualised himself endlessly and eternally; a correlate of His eternal wisdom.182

Man is an indeterminate being that creates himself endlessly and eternally. To this end, he was endowed with a free and limitless will which enables him to determine his own destiny. The freedom of the human will is such that it cannot be curtailed by other people, angels, the devil, or God Himself.183 In Comenius’s view, man was made excellent because God did not want to reveal Himself all at once. In fact, He reveals Himself only gradually. If it were otherwise, man, with his limited intellect, would not be able to grasp God’s excellency. To put it in other words, God’s excellency is not manifested through God Himself, i.e., through the existence of an infinite being, because a finite being would not be able to grasp it. Rather, it is made manifest through finite man.184 At the end of the passage in question, Comenius says that free will is central to human nature (centrum naturae nostrae).185 Does that mean that man’s nature is defined by his free will? If yes, human nature would be characterised by indeterminateness and open-endedness, in other words, by the absence of any kind of nature. This paradox will be dealt with in the fourth chapter. 181 CC I, pp. 355–356, cols. 552–553; see also CC I, p. 364, cols. 569–570. 182 CC I, p. 356, col. 553: “Ergo producenda fuit creatura indeterminata, in infinito infinite seipsam agens, ut esset adaequatum quodam modo infinitae Sapientiae obiectum.” 183 CC I, p. 356, cols. 553–554; CC I, p. 403, col. 646. 184 CC I, p. 356, cols. 553–554. Just for completeness’ sake, it should be noted that in another attempt to substantiate his view of man as a being defined by free will, Comenius argues that an individual’s free will has its origins in his early childhood. Crying and anger are manifestations of the young child’s desire for freedom and an act of protest against oppression. See CC I, p. 355, cols. 551–552. 185 CC I, p. 356, col. 553.

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We can also consider man’s internal constitution. For Comenius, in layman’s terms, man was composed of a body (which is visible and mortal) and a soul (which is invisible and immortal). However, it would be more correct to say that man consists of the triad of body (corpus), soul (anima), and spirit (spiritus).186 The body is of elemental nature, the soul originates from the spirit of the world (spiritus mundi) (note that the animal soul does as well), and the mind (mens) is given to man in the act of God’s exhale.187 It should be noted that the terms spiritus and mens are sometimes used to refer to different concepts, but sometimes are used as synonyms.188 In either case, the spirit or mind is described as the highest and the most excellent part of man. In support of his tripartite conception of man, Comenius marshals several theological arguments (calling on the Scripture, e.g., 1 Thess. 5:23) and offers his own rational deductions. In line with his triadism, he argues that any two extremes must be connected by a third, mediating component. The crude, perishable body and the sensate, immortal soul can be harmonised only by an action of the spirit that participates in both extremes.189 Because of its features, the primal and ontologically lowest part of man, the body, is paradoxically evidence of man’s superiority over other corporeal beings, which predestines him to reign over the whole material world. Man was not given a strong or large body, which must mean that he, the image of God, surpasses all other material creatures by the force of His reason (vi rationis).190 In another seeming paradox, man, by virtue of his corporeality, is more excellent than angels, who occupy a higher rank in the hierarchy of substances.191 Man participates in the material world by his body and in ontologically higher worlds by his 186 St. Augustine’s anthropology is definitely echoed here. See, e.g., Aurelius Augustinus: De fide et symbolo. Migne PL 40, 193, par. 23. On the term spiritus, see Giglioni, Guido: Spiritus plasticus between Pneumology and Embryology, op. cit., p. 85. 187 CC I, p. 356, col. 554. The scholars who have dealt with the question of how Comenius’s conception of spiritus mundi fits in with his broader philosophical system have pointed out various influences, encompassing virtually the entire preceding philosophical tradition (from Plato to Nicholas of Cusa to Tommaso Campanella to Franciscus Patricius). See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 182, 238. 188 The situation is made even more confusing by Comenius’s admission to using the terms anima and spiritus interchangeably. See CC I, p. 356, col. 554. 189 CC I, p. 357, cols. 555–556. 190 Ibid. 191 Martin Koudelka opines that Comenius was influenced by Dionysius the Areopagite, because like him, he considered angels superior to man. This theory must be rejected

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spirit or mind.192 He participates in both the world of animals and the world of God. He is therefore destined to act as a mediator between the lower and higher strata of the universe. The human body is also evidence of man’s uniqueness and limitless freedom. Unlike other animals, man was not given any permanent vesture (vestis) such as fur or plumage, or any permanent means of protection (arma) such as spines or horns. These devices are a burden to those that have them, because they prevent them from engaging in a wide range of activities. In contract, man, who was created bare-skinned and defenceless (nudus et inermis), can do anything he desires.193 The human hand, which has nearly limitless capabilities, far outstrips the natural devices of other animals. Finally, the uniqueness of man is underscored by the fact that he is the only material creature that has an erect posture (statura erecta). This is evidence of his Divine origin.194 However, the matter that makes up the human brain is greatly similar to the matter that makes up the brains of animals, which are inferior to man. It is clear that there must be something else apart from the body (however unique it is) that sets man apart from the rest of the material world.195 The body, which is the lowest part of man, is the abode (habitaculum) of the soul, which forms a part of the spirit of the world (spiritus mundi) confined to the human body and responsible for man’s actions. The human soul has a similar constitution to the animal soul, except that man has more and purer (copiosior ac purior) talents: more acute attention (attentio acrior), stronger imagination (imaginatio fortior), better memory (memoria tenacior), and stronger emotions (affectus vehementiores).196 The greater content capacity, and hence dignity of the human soul (Comenius again uses the terms anima and spiritus interchangeably) is indicated by the absolute and relative (to body size) dimensions of the human brain.197 We already touched upon the subject of animal (and human) procreation in our analysis of Comenius’s view of animals, as presented in the sixth chapter of Mundus materialis. Comenius revisits this subject in the seventh chapter. The

192 193 194 195 196 197

on the grounds that we have raised here. See Koudelka, Martin: Andělský svět Jana Amose Komenského a učení Dionysia, op. cit., p. 89. CC I, p. 357, cols. 555–556. CC I, p. 357, col. 556; CC I, p. 386, col. 612. CC I, p. 357, col. 556. CC I, p. 357–358, cols. 556–557. CC I, p. 358, col. 558. CC I, p. 358, cols. 557–558.

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question of the human soul is closely related to the ways in which the soul is born into the world. Comenius presents a ‘traducianistic’ theory of the birth of the soul, drawing on Scripture.198 The whole of mankind (tota humana gens) was created the moment God created its root (stirps), Adam. It was in Adam that mankind was made in the image of God; it was in Adam that it was tempted; and it was in Adam that it committed original sin. However, people are born of others through seed.199 Comenius’s understanding of the conception and birth of a new human being comports with his idea of man’s unlimited freedom and indeterminateness. After creating the first man, God handed over (cessavit) the work of creation to the created beings (He, nevertheless, continues to intervene in the material world by preserving it).200 The ontologically most excellent part of man is the human spirit or mind. The terminological inconsistencies in the passages that deal with the spirit or mind have to do with the fact that Comenius uses the terms spiritus and mens as complete equivalents (as is evident from the title of the chapter, De Spiritu seu Mente).201 The mind, which is the image of God reflected in man, is composed of three parts (ex trino infinito): infinite reason, infinite will, and infinite power (potestas).202 It is the mind or spirit which makes man similar to God: just as God

198 Mal. 2:15. In his treatment of Comenius’s fairly complex conception of the human soul, Pavel Floss points out that Comenius, who had probably been influenced by Tertullian, espoused the traducianistic view of the birth of the soul or introduced a new kind of traducianism, called proto-evolutionary traducianism. See Floss, Pavel: Antické myšlenkové paradigma a J. A. Komenský [The Ancient Thought Paradigm and John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 41 (XX), 1990, p. 103 and Floss, Pavel: Poznámky ke Komenského názorům o původu duše [Remarks on Comenius’s Views of the Origin of the Soul]. In: Id.: Meditace na rozhraní epoch [Meditations at the Turn of Eras]. Brno 2012, pp. 66–70. 199 CC I, p. 359, cols. 559–560. 200 Ibid. 201 CC I, p. 360, col. 561. 202 CC I, p. 360, cols. 561–562; CC I, p. 361, col. 563; CC I, p. 362, cols. 565–566. That the human mind is infinite is evident from its infinite and incessant activity. The mind is permanently active; it does not rest when we sleep, as is clear from the fact that we have dreams. As far as the sources of Comenius’s tripartite model of the human mind are concerned, the author himself explicitly refers to Scripture, particularly Deut. 6:5. John Amos was also apparently influenced by St. Augustine and Campanella. See Červenka, Jaromír: Zur Quellenfrage des IV. Gradus der Comenianischen Pansophia. In: AJAK XXII (1963), p. 173.

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created (fecit) everything out of Himself (a seipso), through Himself (per ipsum), and for Himself (propter ipsum), so man learns (discit) from himself, through himself, and for himself. The tripartite constitution of the human mind, which consists of reason, will, and power, reflects the three essential attributes of God: His power, His wisdom, and His love, or the eternal posse, scire, velle. Man’s constitution as a unity of body, soul, and spirit reflects the triune nature (tri-unitas) of God. It comes as no surprise that Comenius repeatedly calls man the visible God (Deus visibilis), ruler over the material world, and steward of the universe (rector et gubernator Universi).203 Man’s body was made of earth, or dark matter (tenebricosa materia), his soul originated from the spirit of the world, and his spirit came immediately from God, who thereby made him a participant in immortality.204 Comenius’s own definition of the spirit or mind is as follows: “The spirit or mind (commonly referred to as ‘rational soul’) is the strength to follow the thing that good is.”205 The mind is characterised as being composed of three infinite parts: reason, will, and power. The mind has three basic faculties: to understand everything that exists (cognoscendi omnia quae sunt), which is based on reason (ratio, intellectus); to desire everything that is good, which is based on the will (voluntas); and to do everything that serves these two purposes, which is based on power or agency (facultas motiva). Comenius divides reason into imagination (imaginatio),206 judgement (judicium), and memory (memoria). The will consists of desires (desideria), emotions (affectus) and conscience (conscientia). Agency (operatio) is characterised by the force of motion (vis movendi), the ability to use instruments and appendages (instrumenta, membra) and dexterity (dexteritas).207 The mind as such is characterised by innate, common notions (notities communae) that represent the outlines of the universe and harmony between all things.208 The most important of these notions209 are the God-given ability to count (numerare), which includes

CC I, pp. 360–363, cols. 561–568. CC I, p. 360, col. 561. Ibid: “Spiritus seu mens (vulgo anima rationalis) est intellecta bona persequendi vis.” In another passage, Comenius replaces this feature with talent (ingenium). See CC I, p. 364, col. 570. 207 CC I, pp. 360–361, cols. 561–564. 208 CC I, p. 366, cols. 573–574. 209 Also included among the essential and basic components of the human mind in other passages is (self-)reflection (actiones reflexae), a capacity found only in God, angels and man. A creature endowed with a mind and its corresponding perfection is able to 203 204 205 206

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the ability to discriminate between things; the ability to measure (mensurare) and organise things; and the ability to weigh (ponderare) things, which includes the ability to compare things.210 There are no other creatures apart from man that are able to count, measure, and weigh.211 Although at one point Comenius called the free, limitless, and unconquerable will the principal and fundamental feature of man’s nature which made him absolutely indeterminate, and hence nearly equal to God, he now says that what sets man apart from other material substances is his reason. If we analyse Comenius’s statements about reason, the will and the interaction between them, the primacy, indeed, belongs to reason. But reason has only chronological priority, as it is the first tool of the mind that people use. However, the will, which is the second tool of the mind that people use, has ontological priority and is more excellent than reason: Everything that has been weighed in the brain passes into the palace of the heart, which houses Queen Will that independently decides for or against it.212

Comenius does not leave any room for doubt: the seventh chapter of Mundus materialis includes several passages that stress, with varying intensity, the priority of the will over reason. Comenius says that reason does not command the will; rather, it is the torch that sheds light on all things. Based on what reason finds out, the will decides if it should follow it or not. The light of reason is a mere advisor and servant to the will. Comenius bases his argument on the Scripture, which makes it explicit that man was made in the image of God not to think or

understand not only himself but also his own way of understanding and is, therefore, capable of transcending his own will and agency. See CC I, p. 362, cols. 565–566. 210 CC I, p. 368, col. 577. Inspiration by the Scripture, particularly the part which says that God created all things in number, weight, and measure, is unmistakeable here. See Wisd. 11:20. See also CC I, pp. 361–362, cols. 563–566 and CC I, p. 528, col. 883, where Comenius elaborates on his Mosaic philosophy. According to John Amos, the ability to count, measure and weigh is at the basis of all human knowledge, science and art, in other words, of the entire wisdom of mankind – a statement which Comenius proceeds to illustrate with a particularly cogent example. Jaromír Červenka argues that Comenius developed this idea after reading the works of Nicholas of Cusa, in particular, the treatise De docta ignorantia. Cf. Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 45, 163–164. 211 CC I, p. 368–369, cols. 578–579. 212 CC I, p. 363, col. 568: “Quicquid sic in cerebro trutinatum est, transmittitur ad cordis palatium, ubi regina voluntas residet, quae pro arbitrio eligit aut reprobat.”

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understand, but to reign – to subdue everything with his free will.213 Reason was added later as a necessary constituent.214 All this leads to the logical conclusion that the highest part of man cannot be reason, but the will, which is the aspect that elevates him above other creatures and puts him almost on par with God.215 The will, endowed with the capacity to make choices, is God’s throne (tribunal divinum) in man and the middle as well as central (centralis) perfection of the human mind.216 The will is above not only reason, but also agency, or power.217 The capacity to make choices is an integral component of the will; without it, the will would not be what it is; it would be a non-will (noluntas). In support of his claim about the inseparability of the will and freedom, Comenius repeats his argument that the human will can be subdued by neither another human being, nor by an angel, nor by the Devil, nor by God Himself. Although He could do it, God would never interfere with man’s autonomy which He has given him, for that would reduce him to a non-man (ex homine faciat non-hominem). The centrality of freedom to human nature is such that if man was deprived of his freedom, he would suffer degradation into a non-man.218 Note that this freedom and inviolability applies only to the highest part of man – his mind or spirit. The body, which is material in nature and exists in the realm of the elements, can be assaulted and destroyed by anything or anybody (e.g., savage animals, falling rocks, etc.).219

213 214 215 216 217 218 219

Gen. 1:26. CC I, p. 355, cols. 551–552. CC I, p. 356, cols. 553–554. CC I, p. 369, col. 579. CC I, p. 369, cols. 579–580. CC I, p. 369, col. 580. CC I, p. 369, cols. 579–580. The body and the seven essential internal organs are susceptible to diseases: the heart is susceptible to plague, the brain to stroke, the lungs to pneumonia, the kidneys to stones, the spleen to hepatitis, and the gall bladder to fever. Just for completeness’s sake, let us mention that man’s external body is also composed of seven parts, namely skin, flesh, bones, marrow, nerves, veins, and arteries. Furthermore, Comenius distinguishes seven kinds of flesh (caro) and seven parts of the body (head, thorax, abdomen, two upper and two lower extremities). See CC I, p. 390, cols. 620–621. It is of some interest that the number seven is not only characteristic of the human anatomy, but also the chronological division of man’s life. See CC I, p. 390, cols. 620–621; CC I, p. 529, cols. 884–885. Comenius also draws a parallel between the seven ages of man and the seven visible planets. The planets in turn correspond to man’s internal organs. This conception was inspired by the ideas of Daniel Sennert, to which Comenius was exposed through Alsted’s encyclopedias.

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The will is the most excellent part of the human mind, and therefore the most essential human feature, as evidenced by the infiniteness of the possibilities of the will reflected in the indeterminateness of human existence from the moment of birth. The will itself is neither good nor bad; it takes on the moral qualities of the goals it chooses. Reason plays an important role. The will leans towards that which reason recognises and appraises as good and turns away from that which reason appraises as evil. Mistakes and evil tendencies are attributable primarily to reason and poor judgement.220 The freedom of the human will is threefold and includes freedom from external influences (ab externo agente), freedom from things, or objects of the will (a rebus obiectis), and freedom from oneself (a seipsa intus).221 Comenius’s beliefs concerning the superiority and supremacy of free will are reflected in his ethical system, in which the liberum arbitrium plays an important role: if man behaves like an animal, he will become one.222 The capacity to make choices alone is clearly that which shapes an individual’s self-creation, helping to make him become who he decides to be. Man is faced with endless possibilities, not all of which are good. His freedom permits him to sin. Comenius says that man was not created so that he would not be able to sin (qui non possit peccare), but to be able to choose not to sin (qui posset non peccare).223 The third infinite part of the human spirit or mind is power or agentive capacity (facultas exsequutiva). This capacity gives man his omnipotence (omnipotentia). Human reason assesses whether the impulses it obtains through the senses are good or bad. Based on the judgement of reason, the will decides between virtuousness and evil and its decision is carried out by the agentive capacity. It is only when all the three fundamental principles of the human mind cooperate that the human being can achieve his highest goal, which is beatitude or the highest good (beatitudo seu summum bonum). The latter, as we shall see, consists in salvation and participation in eternal beatitude.224 The principal tool available to man’s agentive capacity is the hand, called the instrument of all instruments (instrumentum instrumentorum), as it enables man to do virtually anything he wants. Comenius’s assertions concerning the hand and its practically limitless See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 243. 220 CC I, p. 370, col. 581–582. 221 Ibid. 222 CC I, p. 358, col. 557. 223 CC I, p. 371, col. 583. 224 CC I, p. 372, cols. 585–586.

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possibilities are clear indications of his profound metaphysical optimism.225 The length and exceptional flexibility of this instrument, the fact that it terminates in individual fingers and the fact that man has two hands are all evidence that God intended man to have an unlimited agentive capacity.226 In addition to the three, infinite parts of the human spirit or mind, Comenius mentions other features which are also characteristic of man but not as central to his nature as those we have touched upon above. These non-essential features include feelings227 and the faculty of speech (facultas communicativa), which is used by man to express his states of mind.228 The philosophical and theological material included in the seventh chapter of the Material world indicates that for Comenius, man surpassed the other beings that were created at the same time and were destined to exist in the material world by not only his immortal mind, which he received immediately from God and which was based on the three infinite principles of reason, will, and agency, but apparently, and most importantly, by his free, unlimited and unconquerable will, which is the one feature that truly defines him. An attempt to resolve this problem will be presented in the fourth chapter. At the end of the seventh chapter of the Material world, in which Comenius discusses man’s accidents and the Mundus materialis as a whole, the reader will find other anthropologically relevant observations. As mentioned several times, John Amos understood man as a microcosm of the world, a miniature God, and the perfect image of God.229 The idea is further expanded upon here. Man is a microcosm because everything that belongs to the world also belongs to him and is meant to serve him. The stars in the firmament serve as his lanterns, and the species below him serve to satisfy his basic needs (e.g., sheep give him wool and milk, bees give him honey, etc.). Everything that occurs in the material world is meant to satisfy man’s needs and benefit him (rain, dew, snow, sulphur, salt). Citing the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Comenius even goes as far as to say that angels, too, were created to act as servants to man (ministratorii

225 On this subject, see also CC I, p. 390, cols. 620–621. 226 CC I, p. 373, cols. 587–588. For example, the lines on a person’s palm indicate the health of his or her internal organs as well as his or her temperament. A bent palm can be used as a mensa pythagorica for counting operations or as a sundial, etc. 227 See CC I, pp. 371–372, cols. 584–586. Feelings are common to other life forms as well, particularly animals. See CC I, p. 361, cols. 563–564. 228 CC I, p. 375, cols. 590–591. 229 CC I, p. 376, col. 592.

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homini).230 Comenius’s quite unique view of the material world as a source of material and spiritual sustenance for man is proof of the philosopher’s profound metaphysical optimism and a strong sense of teleological certainty.231 In Comenius’s Neo-Platonic conception of the universe, man is a unique bridge between the lower, visible worlds (in particular, the material world) and the higher, invisible worlds. He participates in the possible world by his nature, his accidents and his flaws. As we explained earlier, the angelic world granted man his infinite and immortal mind, which is, however, confined to the prison of his body (carcer corporum), which is firmly bound to the material world.232 Man is a small God (mikrotheos), not least because the image that God imprinted upon him represents his innermost substance (ipsissima hominis substantia), his quiddity (quidditas), and his nature (natura).233 Man is elevated high above the material world of which he is a part by virtue of his infinity, which was given to him by God and which makes him equal to Him.234 Man’s infinity is located in his mind and lies in the three infinite qualities of reason, will, and agency.235 Man is infinite by virtue of his reason, because reason can penetrate everything, including infinity itself; it can contemplate that which preceded creation and that which will follow the end of the world. The human will is also infinite. Man can desire (or not) an unlimited number of things. The will even allows him to reject an apparent good, to act against his own best interests, or to defy (reluctari) God. Man’s efforts are also infinite.236 The tripartite human mind forms the core of the perfect image of God in man.237 230 CC I, p. 376, cols. 592–593; CC I, p. 403, col. 646. Man also surpasses angels in dignity because he is a small God and a microcosm of the material world. While the former characteristic also applies to angels, the latter applies only to man, the most complex creature of all. See CC I, p. 263, cols. 394–395. 231 Also see e.g. CC I, p. 381, col. 602; CC I, pp. 384, 387, 391, cols. 608–609, 614–615, 622–623. 232 CC I, p. 376, col. 593. 233 Ibid. 234 It should be noted, though, that the lower classes of material creatures also have a certain degree of infinity, just as the Mundus materialis itself. This infinity is, however, of a much lower order and perfection. As an example, Comenius mentions the nearly limitless diversity of plants and their appendages. See CC I, p. 381, col. 602. 235 CC I, p. 376, col. 593. 236 CC I, pp. 376–377, cols. 593–595. 237 CC I, p. 377, cols. 594–595. Man’s comprehension is, however, limited and imperfect compared to God’s. People and angels know the past and the present only; what they know of the future is mere conjecture. God, in contrast, views everything as present.

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Man’s sovereign, indeterminateness and infinite freedom, however, entail moral obligations. Man is everything because he can become anything (aptus est fieri ad omnia), the noblest creature or the basest creature of all. If he concerns himself only with material things and allows himself to be governed by them, he slowly coarsens and then turns to nothing (ad nihilum relabitur). But if he focuses on heavenly things, he rises above other corporeal beings and becomes similar to God.238 As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the Mundus materialis is not permanent or infinite (it contains only traces of these qualities). That being said, there is nothing in the material world that would indicate its imminent demise. The basic elements of the material world, matter, spirit, and light, are not perishable (unless God decides to destroy them); therefore the world is not perishable either. Nevertheless, the visible, material world was not meant to last eternally.239 The Mundus materialis will, strictly speaking, not be annihilated (annihilatio), but transformed into another world.240 It was not God’s intention to carry out this transformation by Himself. He invited man, whom He created in His image, to cooperate in this project.241

3.3.5 Mundus artificialis Being the perfect image of God, man reflects all of God’s thoughts, desires and actions – he even tries to produce (producere) new, unseen or unheard of things. Following the example of God, people adapt all material creatures for various purposes and create copious new substances and thus participate in God’s creation. The results of these numerous activities constitute the Mundus artificialis,

238 239 240 241

Man knows only a part of the present, whereas God knows everything that ever was, is, or will be. God’s way of knowing is based on pure forms; man’s comprehension is dulled and substantially limited by his corporeality. See CC I, p. 399, col. 639. Man’s agentive capacity is also incomparable to God’s: God creates (facere) out of nothing, whereas man can create only out of God-made matter; God’s creation is instantaneous, whereas man’s creation is gradual, etc. See CC I, p. 400, cols. 640–641. Interestingly, Comenius says nothing of the limitations of the human will. It follows that man’s free will, which is one of the three components of his immortal mind, has priority over the other two. CC I, p. 377, cols. 594–595. CC I, p. 412, cols. 664–665. CC I, pp. 412–413, cols. 665–666. CC I, p. 263, cols. 394–395.

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or the world of human artifice.242 The perfection and omnipresence of man’s adaptations, creations, and inventions have warranted the introduction of a new world.243 It should be noted, though, that even this brand new world, which arises out the activity of man, does not go beyond the boundaries of the God-created universe; rather, it pushes them further.244 The Mundus artificialis cannot be the only newly created world, for it is itself rooted in the material world, which it transforms and perfects. Because man participates in higher worlds too, he is also engaged with matters of the spirit. The creations of the human mind (which comes from the angelic world) give rise to another world – Mundus moralis. Man is inseparably bound to God. His communion with God as part of religion gives rise to yet another world, which is called Mundus spiritualis. The excellency of man, which derives from the fact that he is a co-creator of the universe, was clearly established by Comenius in his masterpiece.245 Man is not only the most perfect image of God in the visible world, but also His aide in the creation and preservation of all things and the universe as such.246 The ability to contemplate all the created things, to discriminate between the creatures, name them, imitate them, and adapt them over and over again for one’s purposes is a uniquely human privilege.247 There is nothing in the whole visible world that is not subject to the activity of man. Thanks to their use of fire,248 people are able to process a wide range of metals. Using metals, they are able to exploit wood, stone, and other living beings. Man is able to swim with the fish (natat cum piscibus), walk the earth with animals (parambulat terras cum feris), and fly across the sea using wind power (volat quoque alis ventorum super mare).249 Man’s limitless possibilities also make him the ruler of the sky 242 CC I, p. 421, col. 673. For a discussion of this pansophic level generally, see Hoffmann, Franz: Über die ideologische und problemgeschichtliche Bedeutung der Anschaungen vom homo faber im Konsultationswerk J. A. Komenskýs. In: SCetH 34 (XVII), 1987, pp. 5–11. 243 See CC I, p. 426, col. 678. 244 CC I, p. 422, col. 674. 245 Ibid. 246 CC I, p. 425, col. 676. 247 Comenius supports this assertion by citing Gen. 1:26–29; Deut. 4:19; Pss. 115:16. 248 The use of fire is a uniquely human skill and another aspect that sets man apart from other, inferior animals. See CC I, p. 425, cols. 676–677. 249 See CC I, p. 425, cols. 676–677. Comenius, unfortunately, does not offer any proof for his claim that man can fly, nor does he give any relevant examples. He may be referring to Friedrich Hermann Fleyder’s treatise De arte volandi, cujus ope quivis homo

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and the stars above, on which he imposes astronomical laws (leges ponit). The highest human gift is magic (magia), which enables man to perform wonders of nature (naturae miracula). To put it simply, there is nothing in the whole material world that man would not be able to use, imitate, or that he would shy away from transforming.250 In our discussion of the Material world we made the point that man’s possibilities, however substantial, are of a different order compared to God’s omnipotence. For example, man cannot create brand new substances. His works of creation are limited to transformations of the existing God-created matter of the world.251 Man has to rely on the forms he can find in the material world and imitate them, because he was not endowed with the capacity for creating new forms.252 Man’s principal task as steward of the material world and co-creator of new worlds is to reign over all creation in three different ways: by using it (usus), by governing it (directio), and by imitating it (imitatio).253 The performance of these three duties gives rise to the world of human artifice. Use is understood by Comenius as the use of absolutely everything, including other people. The principle of imitation tells man to regard nature and all its constituents as a model for his conduct.254 According to Comenius, scattered all around nature are ideas (ideae) of activities that man can do. Why else would God have created so many minerals, plants, and animals than to show man examples that he can imitate, asks Comenius and answers himself thus: The entirety of nature sets an example to man – from the nesting birds that teach him the art of construction, to sparrows that teach him pottery, to spiders that show him how to spin, to fish that teach him how to swim. All human inventions are merely imitations of nature.255 All material creatures were meant to be governed and subdued by man; if he cannot subdue them totally, he may adapt them for his purposes.256 These three

sine periculo facilius quam ullum volucre quocumque lubet semetipsum promovere potest. Tubingae 1628. See CC I, p. 445, col. 717. 250 CC I, p. 425, cols. 676–677. 251 Ibid. 252 CC I, p. 426, cols. 678–679. 253 CC I, pp. 426–427, cols. 678–681. 254 CC I, p. 427, col. 680. 255 CC I, pp. 428–429, cols. 682–685. 256 CC I, p. 427, cols. 678–679.

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essential activities (use, governance, and imitation), that are carried out by man within the natural realm, constitute what Comenius calls ‘art’ (ars).257 Whatever limitations there are to man’s activities (e.g. the need to rely on God-made matter and existing natural forms), his creative potential and freedom are immense and very noble. Man can transform nature and the creatures that inhabit it, but what is even more important, he can perfect them. For example, the Sun, which Comenius calls God’s great lantern, shines only by day. To make up for the lack of sunlight at night, man created smaller lanterns such as torches, candles, and so on, modelled on the Sun. Comenius says: “Art begins where the activity of nature ends”.258 The progeny of new inventions forged by human hands was an indication for Comenius that the world of human artifice was nowhere near complete. On the other hand, God created the material world in only six days.259 So when Jaromír Červenka says that Comenius understood natura as an inorganic or even reducant force imposed upon the Mundus materialis, he is right only about the inorganicity. The concept of natura is greatly similar to Comenius’s understanding of spirutus as an active, creative principle. This discrepancy is, nevertheless, compensated for by the centrality of natura to the conception of ars as a kind of second nature. In this sense, natura can by no means be regarded as redundant.260 257 CC I, p. 427, col. 678; CC I, p. 429, cols. 684–685. John Amos’s conception of the relationship between natura and ars was probably inspired by Tommaso Campanella’s treatise Realis philosophiae epistologicae partes IV (Frankurt 1623). See Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., pp. 184–185; Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 53, 157. The study makes explicit reference to: Campanella, Tommaso: Philosophiae realis epistologicae partes quattuor, Pars 2, De moralibus. Frankfurt 1623, Chap. 1, par. 5, p. 255. Also see e.g. Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 19–20. Stanislav Sousedík goes as far as to say that this dichotomy comes from Artistotle (Physica 2, 194a 21–199a 22) and that it was reinterpreted by Thomas Aquinas. The idea is believed to have reached Comenius through the treatises of the Conimbricenses or the compendia by Alsted. See Sousedík, Stanislav: K filosofickým základům Komenského výchovné soustavy [On the Philosophical Foundations of Comenius’s System of Education]. In: Id.: O co šlo? Články a studie z let 1965–2011 [What was it about? Papers and Studies from 1965–2011]. Prague 2012, pp. 100–107. 258 CC I, pp. 429–430, cols. 684–687: “Ubi natura desinit, ars incipit”. Also see ibid.: “Ars perficit naturam, non perverit.” 259 CC I, p. 430, cols. 686–687. 260 See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 195–196. The question that Červenka raised: “Es bleibt eine offene Frage, warum Comenius überhaupt, trotz allen erwähnten logischen Hemmnissen, den Begriff der

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Comenius’s original conception of the relationship between artifice and Godcreated nature is a testament to the relevance and philosophical urgency of his ideas about human artifice. Nature, represented by the material world, precedes the activity of man and is independent of it. Man’s art, in contrast, has no methods of its own. To attain some measure of usefulness and permanence, it must follow nature and respect its laws.261 The quality of man’s actions and creations depends on how well he takes care of himself and his perfection. Every creature was endowed with three aspects of infinity: the intellection (scire), will (velle), and power (posse) to do what preserves itself.262 The most perfect embodiment of these three innate principles is man, who was made in the perfect image of God. Man naturally wants to know and understand everything that he perceives through his senses. He desires everything that his reason appraises as good or useful and he wants to carry that out. For the first time in the Consultatio, Comenius defines the ultimate meaning of these innate principles, and therefore the ultimate and fundamental purpose of human existence, which is nothing other than being close to the infinite God, who is an embodiment of all good. For Comenius, the infinity of the three basic innate principles and the fact that they cannot be satisfied in the conditions of this world are evidence that man can find his purpose only in God.263 In Comenius’s Neo-Platonic conception of the universe, man is an intermediary between the lower (material) and higher (immaterial) worlds, and as such occupies the middle and intermediate position in the hierarchy of existence. His significant participation in the ontologically most excellent worlds (the Mundus angelicus and Mundus possibilis) makes it incumbent on him to pay adequate attention to his highest and most dignified part.264 Comenius repeatedly exhorts mankind to moral chastity and repeats what he says in the Material world, viz., that agency enables man to perfect the noblest parts of his nature and become similar to God. If he concerns himself primarily with his body and material values, he loses sight of his purpose in life and brings doom and annihilation upon

261 262 263 264

Natur als eine selbständige Kategorie in sien naturphilosophisches System eingereiht hat, wenn er ganz gut mit seinem Begriff des Geistes ausreichen konnte,” is thus answered. CC I, pp. 430–431, cols. 687–688. CC I, p. 487, col. 800. CC I, pp. 446–447, cols. 719–720. CC I, pp. 446–447, cols. 719–721.

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himself (see the conclusion to the sub-chapter Mundus materialis).265 Comenius’s view of man as a being that creates himself is retained: Man is everything and nothing all at once. When he is born, he is nothing in himself. However, he is everything in God’s intention, having been made in His image, and perfectible through good education.266

Comenius’s conception of man as we saw it in Mundus artificialis is enriched by another aspect, heretofore not mentioned, namely education or self-education, which is understood as the tool of man’s ultimate humanisation and a way to regulate his self-creation. The purpose of education is to teach (erudire) man how to behave like man (docere itaque hominem agere hominem) and to impart the knowledge necessary for him to use his three basic innate faculties (understanding, will, and power) well.267 Human fallibility can be explained accordingly. As man’s faculties are flawless, his tendency to err cannot be attributed to anything other than his incorrect use or ignorance of those faculties.268 Man must understand himself so that he can use his God-given faculties properly. He should first study that which is the least complex, the most accessible to the senses, and therefore the most comprehensible – the human body. Somatotechnia, a discipline concerned with the use and control of one’s body, teaches man to keep in mind at all times that the body is a mere secondary and less dignified abode for the human soul and spirit. With this in mind, we must take care of our body. If we destroy our body, our soul and our spirit will be forced to abandon it. Therefore we should respect our bodies. We should respect and care for our bodies only as much as is necessary. Citing Seneca, Comenius argues that if we care too much for our bodies, we do not have enough time to pursue the greater goals in life.269 The basic arts (artes) related to the human body 265 Citing Johann Valentin Andreae’s treatise Civis christianus sive Peregrini quondam errantis restitutio (Argentorati 1618), Comenius suggests that what is true of the mind can also be said of the constitution and configuration of the human body. The foundation of the body is located in its lowest section, the intestines are located right above it, and the middle section houses the vital (vitales) appendages. The abodes of God (Domini habitacula) are located in the uppermost section. See CC I, p. 447, col. 721. 266 CC I, p. 447, col. 721: “Homo est omnia et nihil. Nihil ex se, dum nascitur. Omnia ex intentione Dei, ad cujus imaginem formatus, et institutione bona, qua eo formandus est.” 267 CC I, p. 447, col. 721. 268 CC I, p. 448, col. 722. 269 CC I, p. 488, col. 723. For the assertion by Seneca, see his Letter 23.

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include the so-called artes vitae such as hygiene, nutrition (nutriendum), covering the body (tegendum), helping the body (ministeriis iuvandum), and exercising the body (exercendum).270 A much greater amount of care and attention should be paid to the mind (mens) and arts should be developed around caring for it (artes mentis). It is not without interest that Comenius turns from his tripartite conception of the human being in favour of the dyad of body and mind.271 The three basic subjects that the mind concerns itself with are truth (verum), goodness (bonum), and possibility or necessity (possibile ac debitum).272 It is even more surprising, though, that Comenius deviates from the triad of the basic principles of the mind which he introduced in Mundus materialis. The first two faculties (facultates), reason and will, are retained, but the third one is replaced by the spirit (animus).273 The ensuing description of the three faculties of the mind, however, makes it clear that the perfection of the spirit is absolutely identical to that of agency, as it was described in the previous pansophic level.274 Comenius’s modification to this cardinal triad may be explained as a terminological inconsistency or even conceptual discrepancy. It may also indicate that the two parts with the greatest relevance to the quiddity of the human mind are reason and the will (with the latter having priority over the former, as we showed in our previous exposition).275 Lastly, the three faculties of the mind can be defined (in a qualitative as opposed to quantitative sense) as the norms, including innate common notions (communes notiones), common instincts (communes instinctus), and common stimuli (communes impetus), which enable man to think, want, and act, respectively.276 There are three ways in which the human mind 270 CC I, p. 449, col. 724. We shall not discuss these in more detail. For a comprehensive description, see CC I, pp. 449–456, cols. 724–739. 271 CC I, p. 456, col. 739. 272 Ibid. 273 Ibid. 274 See CC I, pp. 456–457, cols. 739–740. 275 On Mundus artificialis, see CC I, p. 493, col. 812. 276 CC I, p. 457, cols. 740–741. According to Patočka, this conception was inspired by the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa. Drawing on his idea of harmony, Comenius postulated that if reason is composed of parts, the will and agency must be also. See Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., p. 200. The idea of innate common notions, which was quite widespread, may have reached Comenius through the works of Melanchton, Alsted, or Herbert of Cherbury. See Čapková, Dagmar: Úvod: Komenského obecná porada a její význam, op. cit., p. 21; Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky, op. cit., p. 40; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana

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should be used. Through demonstration (demonstratio), man controls reason; through persuasion (suasio), man controls the will; and through encouragement (exhortatio), man controls the spirit.277 The discipline concerned with the control of one’s mind is called methetics (the art of learning) and the discipline concerned with the control of the minds of others is called didactics.278 In Mundus artificialis, a certain degree of priority is again given to reason. This priority is, however, only chronological. Reason bears the torch that sheds light on things and enables man to discriminate between those that his will should desire and those that it should reject. The human reason must be ameliorated so that man can make the right choices.279 He must also take care of his will. Although the human will is free, it can be tied down (ligatur) by persuasion or bad habit.280 Man must also try to perfect the third faculty of his mind – agency or spirit (animus).281 All the three faculties of the human mind are themselves infinite, so in principle, man should be able to understand, want and act properly. However, his infinite and correct potentialities can become tainted by falsity, evil, and perniciousness. Man can only attain happiness when he frees himself from his fallibility, which is where self-education comes in.282 Comenius was immensely optimistic about the potential of education to edify the human race. A weak mind is rarely the result of nature – even innate deficiencies can be overcome by training. The most common cause of people’s inadequate understanding, perverted will and weak agency is their own negligence of their innate faculties. For Comenius, education was the key to realising our humanity.283 He was convinced that every individual, by nature, can be educated (sooner or later), so no one should be denied the opportunity to learn.284

277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284

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Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 421–424. Through these philosophers, Comenius may have been exposed to the ideas of the Stoics, which were rediscovered for the Western philosophical tradition by Cicero. CC I, p. 457, cols. 740–741. Ibid. Furthermore, Comenius writes of dialectics (CC I, pp. 473–477, cols. 772–781), diacritics (CC I, pp. 477–483, cols. 781–792), and so on. CC I, pp. 462–463, cols. 751–753. CC I, p. 463, col. 752. CC I, p. 463, cols. 752–753. CC I, p. 483, cols. 792–793. CC I, p. 486, cols. 798–799. CC I, p. 487, cols. 800–801.

Just for completeness’ sake, it should be mentioned that in Mundus artificialis, Comenius attributes to man other (heretofore not mentioned) uniquely human faculties such as faith (fides),285 the faculty of speech,286 and the ability to establish and maintain social relations (man as animal sociabile). Because an individual cannot manage everything by himself and because he was not meant to live alone, he needs society so that he can lead a fulfilled life.287 Let us conclude our treatment of the world of human artifice by saying that all art (ars) is based on the three fundamental innate human principles of scire, velle, posse and their mutual configurations. In practical activities, the order is scire – posse – velle; when one tries to formulate a theory, the order is posse – velle – scire, etc. Comenius’s answer to the implicit question “Where do these principles come from and are they mutually dependent?” shows that for him, the free will, stemming from the velle, had the highest nobility; action and understanding come before the will.288 All human arts and all inventions forged by human hands exist only because God preserves them. God will allow the world of artifice to grow until it reaches its high point (ad summum, quosque hic veniri potest), that is, until all the secrets hidden in the three Divine books – the world, the human mind, and the Scripture – have been completely revealed. The world of human artifice will then be transmogrified into the eternal world (as we shall see later).289

3.3.6 Mundus moralis By his unlimited agency, man transforms and perfects not only the material world, the transformation of which gives rise to the world of human artifice. By virtue of his participation in higher, nobler worlds, he is also engaged with matters of the spirit. The human soul, which is rooted in the angelic world,290 does more than perfect the existing world: it brings forth new ideas that constitute a brand new world called Mundus moralis.291 The moral world is based on man’s dominion over all things (rerum dominus). Comenius treated the art (ars) of caring for oneself and one’s body and mind 285 CC I, p. 486, col. 799. 286 CC I, p. 509, cols. 844–845. 287 Ibid. 288 CC I, pp. 533–534, cols. 892–893. 289 CC I, p. 540, col. 907. 290 Another terminological inconsistency. In the preceding paragraphs, Comenius writes of the mind (mens). 291 CC I, pp. 545–546 (the column number is unclear).

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in the previous pansophic level. That art was related to man’s being in nature. However, man, who governs all things and nature as well as himself (rerum et sui dominus) is a different and much more dignified creature. Man as “a creature that governs himself and that does not bow before anybody else’s will” is the subject of Mundus moralis. Man is not governed by art (ars), but by moral prudence (prudentia moralis), which is the art of all arts (ars artium). It should be noted that while Comenius’s conception of the dichotomy between natura and ars is Campenellian in origin, the third (and most excellent) aspect, prudentia, is his own original philosophical contribution.292 While the majority of arts related to the manipulation of things which are rooted in the material world and which find their expression in the world of human artifice have been brought almost to perfection, the art of dealing with people, i.e., beings endowed with free will and autonomy, has a long way to go before reaching perfection.293 The significantly more noble focus of prudence is definitely a contributing factor. The arts used in the world of human artifice only serve to achieve honours (honores) or pleasure (oblectatio), whereas prudentia is oriented towards more permanent and dignified goals, namely “peaceful and joyous life under the protection of God’s mercy”.294 In Mundus moralis, Comenius emphasises the excellency and autonomy of man, which stems from his self-governance founded on the laws of clear reason (intellectus clarus), free will (voluntas libera), and spontaneous powers (vires spontaneae). He cites Ecclus. 15:14 in support of his argument that man was given freedom so that he would not be governed by anybody but himself. If a man cannot or will not govern himself, he may allow himself to be governed by somebody else (voluntarily, not through coercion or violence).295 In keeping with his anthropological optimism, Comenius repeats what he says in the Material world, viz., that man has so much autonomous control and independence that he cannot be governed involuntarily by any other being, no matter how intelligent.296

292 CC I, p. 545 (the column number is unclear): “Creatura suo arbitrio seipsam agens, alterius voluntati non subiacens”. For more on the term, see Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., p. 157; Válka, Josef: Komenského sociální a politické myšlení v Konzultaci [Comenius’s Social and Political Thought in the Consultatio]. In: SCetH 57–58 (XXVII), 1997, pp. 41–46. 293 CC I, pp. 545–546 (the column number is unclear). 294 CC I, p. 546 (the column number is unclear): “Vitae tranquillitatem et gaudia sub favore Dei.” 295 CC I, p. 549, cols. 915–916. 296 Ibid.

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The moral world stems from the identity or equality of human nature (naturae humanae identitas seu aequalitas), which leads man to live humanly (humaniter) as opposed to insensitively or brutishly. To achieve that, people must be guided by reason and wisdom (rationaliter et sapienter).297 Here, Comenius offers a much more specific definition of human nature compared to the one he formulated in the introductory passages of Pansophia. His conception of nature (and human nature in particular) is very complex, thus we have reserved a section in Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion. The principal perfections of prudence include self-knowledge (αὐτoγνωσία), moral autonomy (αὐτoνομία), and self-governance (αὐτoκρατεία), which together constitute autarchy (αὐταρκήα).298 Prudentia as such is understood as “the art of taking care of one’s peace and the peace of others through the proper use of relevant means”.299 The ultimate goal of prudence is to ensure that there is peace in the human things (res humanae) and that every individual can be happy without undue worries and cares. This goal should be achieved through knowledge, the acknowledgement of one’s limitations, and the proper treatment of oneself and others.300 Prudence rests on three mainstays: the use of oneself (usus sui ipsius), the imitation of others (imitatio alterius), and rule over others (regimen aliorum). The use of oneself is aimed at protecting one’s nobility while relying on one’s own means such as agency, emotions, the faculty of speech, and most important of all, one’s free will. Imitation refers to the imitation of the perfect arrangement that existed in the beginning of creation, including especially a return to the original moral values. Rule over others refers to the control of one’s capabilities and faculties and the control of others as part of the pursuit of one’s well-considered goals. Man, being the image of God, must treat himself and his fellow men in the same way as God treats him; in other words, he must treat them as he would treat God’s image in himself. The idea of the image of God (idea imaginis divinae) is the paragon of prudence in man.301 In Comenius’s system, the prudentia moralis related to the use of oneself is called ethics (ethica). All beings are to some extent capable of governing themselves, but this feature is most patently present in man. No other being is endowed 297 Ibid. 298 Ibid. 299 CC I, p. 550, col. 918: “[…] ars tranquillitati suae et aliorum providendi, per media certa, mediisque utendi modos debitos.” 300 Ibid. 301 CC I, p. 551, col. 919 and CC I, p. 552, col. 922.

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with sovereignty of the will and movement, and on no other being (not even angels)302 is the salvation or annihilation of the world as contingent as it is on man. Rule over oneself is de facto rule over the whole world.303 Comenius’s Neo-Platonic conception of the structure of the universe carries over to the realm of ethics. Comenius repeats his conviction that man, being the creature of God destined to reign temporarily over all creation and to be in eternal communion with God,304 participates in both the lower strata of the universe (i.e., corporeality and animality) and the higher strata, including the highest. Being the image of God, he also partakes of Divinity (divinae formae particeps). Comenius infers from the passage in the Bible which says that God blew the breath of life into man’s nostrils that man was created immortal.305 In another instance of terminological inconsistency, he describes man as a being composed of three parts, which he now refers to differently, although the terms clearly correspond to the original triad of body, soul, and spirit or mind. Thus, we now have animality (animalitas), which relates man to animals; rationality (rationalitas), which man has in common with angels; and spirituality (spiritualitas), which makes man similar to God.306 Considering that in the Material world Comenius defines man as a being uniquely endowed with freedom of the will, it is quite surprising that he now assigns greater importance to the immortal human spirit (or mind): […] immortality gives us hope for the future and our togetherness with God. Therefore, the real and most obvious distinction between us and animals is that we can rise to God if we respect His will and we can partake of His beatitude. This is denied to other creatures.307

Man, being the most complex creature of all, is also the most dignified: by virtue of his third component, which participates in Divinity, he is elevated even above angels. It is divine nature (divina natura) to understand everything that is knowable, to be able to do everything that is possible, to want everything that is good, and to be eternally happy as a result of obtaining this good. The original three 302 303 304 305

See also CC I, pp. 558–559, cols. 934–935. CC I, p. 555, col. 928. CC I, p. 556, col. 929. CC I, p. 556, col. 929. This line of argument and its anthropological groundings are totally Mosaic. See Gen. 1. 306 CC I, p. 556, col. 929. 307 CC I, p. 556, col. 930: “[…] Immortalitae denique ad spem futuri seculi, et ipsum usque Dei consortium ascendere. Et proinde, hanc inter nos et bruta veram esse maximeque notabilem differentiam, quod nos numinis cultu ad Deum usque ipsum ascendere, deque illius beatitudine participare possumus: id quod aliis creaturis negatum est.”

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infinite principles of the human mind, the scire, velle, and posse, thus become a tetrad: scire, velle, posse, possideare in aeternum.308 Subordinated to these four principles are innate, God-given notions, capabilities, and instincts.309 In Mundus moralis, Comenius for the first time raises objections to some aspects of man’s self-creation and self-actualisation. The philosopher has already indicated that man can preserve his immortality and hope for eternal life with God or he can degrade his dignity and bring annihilation upon himself – all by his choosing. Comenius now also focuses on the ramifications of an individual’s attitude to his own freedom and dignity during his life on this earth. If the individual concerns himself exclusively with the things that he shares with other animals (existence, nutrition, movement, etc.), he turns into a human animal (homo animalis), or brute (bestialis). If he takes care of his wisdom as well, he becomes a political man (vir politicus), one that shall govern the world. If he focuses on his Divine aspects, he becomes a true man, i.e., the man of God (vir divinus) who can rightly be called the image of God. Man is free to destroy his own dignity and forfeit his humanity, but if he cultivates his Divine features, he can become Godlike and achieve omniscience (omniscientia), omnipotence (omnipotentia), and complete beatitude (omnibeatitas).310 In Comenius’s terms, moral prudence in the governance of oneself and others is called symbiotics (symbiotica) or the art of human interaction (ars conversandi), which is rooted in man’s God-given sociability and tendency to form groups (family, friends, etc.) on the basis of love (amor).311 Prudentia moralis in the governance of other people who are already members of a group (a household or family, domus seu familia) is traditionally called economics (oeconomica);312 if it is a group of young people, moral prudence is called schooling (scholastica).313 Moral prudence in the governance of a polity (respublica) is called politics (politica),314 or monarchy (monarchia)315 in case the polity is a kingdom. In Comenius’s view, the purpose of monarchy is to maintain peace among nations (continere populos in pace), for peace is the best thing known to man.316 Judging 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316

CC I, pp. 556–557, cols. 930–931. CC I, p. 557, col. 931. CC I, p. 558, col. 933–934. CC I, p. 570, col. 957. CC I, p. 577, col. 972. CC I, p. 584, col. 985. CC I, p. 585, col. 988. CC I, p. 588, col. 993. CC I, p. 590, col. 997.

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by his statements in Mundus moralis, Comenius was not totally opposed to war. For him, war was permissible for three reasons. First, he believed that force could be countered by force; second, war is a natural mechanism that purifies the body of the state, as fever purifies the body of man; third, war was permitted by God Himself. Comenius eventually moderated his attitude and conceded that peace was better than any conflict, whether it led to a victory or not. Wars should not be waged without there being a real reason, because they are brutal (bellunium) and inhuman. Conflicts in families, communities and kingdoms should also be avoided. Wars between states are permissible only if there are no other ways to resolve the disagreements.317 The peaceful existence and coexistence of individuals and societies rests on voluntariness. Having been endowed with free will, man can be subdued only by reason (ratio), never by force (vis).318 Forced rule is nothing but tyranny (tyrannis) and tyranny breeds violence and destroys individuals and communities.319

3.3.7 Mundus spiritualis The highest and the ontologically most excellent part of the human being, viz., the spirit or mind, was made in the perfect image of the eternal mind of God. The highest form of man’s wisdom is his communion (consortio) with the Father of Spirits (Pater spirituum) in the spiritual world.320 The spiritual world is founded on the dependence of an image (man) on its archetype (God) (dependentia hominis a Deo) and consequently the similarity between human nature and God’s nature.321 The image of God in man is the quality that urges him to search for his archetype (archetypus) and the highest good (summum bonum).322 The human spirit, seeking knowledge of its origin and a way to perfect itself, finds its essential expression in religion, which is the fundamental principle of the spiritual world, which translates into spiritual prudence (spiritualis prudentia).323 317 CC I, p. 590, cols. 997–998. On this passage in more detail, see Válka, Josef: Komenského sociální a politické myšlení v Konzultaci [Comenius’s Social and Political Thought in the Consultatio]. In: SCetH 57–58 (XXVII), 1997, pp. 47–48. 318 CC I, p. 588, col. 978. 319 Ibid. 320 CC I, p. 605, col. 1018. On this passage in more detail, see Kučera, Zdeněk: Komenský teolog, op. cit., pp. 46–51. 321 CC I, p. 605, cols. 1018–1019. 322 CC I, p. 606, col. 1020. 323 CC I, p. 611, col. 1031. This concept is thought to have been inspired by Campanella. See Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 194.

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Religion, or spiritual prudence, leads man to God. Through faith (fides), man assimilates his reason to God’s reason; through love (dilectio), he assimilates his will to God’s will; and through hope (spes), he assimilates his capabilities to God’s powers. All this he does of his own accord. He serves God by serving all other creatures and people.324 The relationship between man and God is based on the permanent co-operation between the human will and God’s grace (perpetuus arbitrii humani cum gratia divina concursus).325 This cooperation may seem to put limits on man’s autonomy and freedom of the will, but it is not so. Comenius says that God does not impose his omnipotence (omnipotentia) on mankind; rather, He leaves all decisions to man. If God forced anything upon man, He would turn man’s will into a non-will (non voluntas) and man into a non-man (non-homo326). This would be an act of violence against His creation. If man respects God’s will, he does so voluntarily and such voluntary obedience will be rewarded, whereas disobedience (a human choice, too) will be punished.327 The co-operation (concursus) between the human will and Divine grace strengthens the partnership between God and man, which is a topic we dealt with in our discussion of Mundus materialis. Man realises that he cannot do anything without God and His mercy, but he also understands that he cannot leave everything to God and neglect his own duties.328 Man’s relationship with God rests on three pillars: use (usus), imitation (imitatio), and governance (directio). Man is compelled to use God, because God is the highest good; he is compelled to imitate God, because God is the paragon of virtue; and he is compelled to govern (dirigere) God, i.e., to sway God so that He will want only good for man and give it to him.329 The greatest wisdom lies in rising to the highest that is in us and in participation in God’s wisdom, power, and goodness through use, imitation and governance.330

CC I, pp. 611–612, cols. 1031–1032. CC I, p. 612, col. 1032. CC I, p. 708, col. 1225. CC I, p. 612, col. 1033. This idea is repeated almost verbatim later in the Spiritual world. See CC I, p. 629, cols. 1066–1067. 328 CC I, pp. 612–613, cols. 1033–1034. 329 CC I, pp. 615–616, cols. 1039–1040. Comenius cites the following biblical passages in support of his assertion concerning man’s governance of God: Gen. 18:17, Gen. 32:26, Exod. 32:10, Pss. 18:26–18:28, Pss. 145:19. 330 CC I, p. 616, col. 1040. 324 325 326 327

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Man is also free to choose the opposite of what we have described. The Scripture contains many stories in which man, who is not a mere metaphorical image of God, but His true image, defies God out of his own free will and turns away from him. Comenius classifies such acts as abuse (abusus) of the free will, which means that the will must have primacy over other faculties.331 God permitted the fall of man out of His infinite wisdom. He had made man in His image and given him infinite reason and free will, so obviously He did not want to deprive him of these faculties and thus turn him into a monster.332 As a consequence of the fall, man’s body became damaged (corruptum) and mortal, his soul (anima) was damaged, his reason was filled with darkness (tenebrae) and his will with sinful desires.333 In Comenius’s view, the will of post-fall man is the principal cause of his sinful conduct, which means that his freedom must have been unaffected by the fall. Comenius’s exposition departs from the previous chapters of the Consultatio (e.g. Mundus materialis) in that it describes man as a bipartite being. Other statements confirm this alteration. Comenius says that the fall did not cause the destruction of any part of man; rather, all parts were damaged. As we said earlier, the body became mortal; the part that is now mentioned in the second place (the spirit, animus) sustained damage to all its three components: reason and agency were enfeebled, the will came out free, but liable to error (ethically speaking) and to sin (theologically speaking).334 The fall caused damage to God’s image in man and the God-given principles of the human spirit (the scire, velle, and posse).335 Surprisingly, in other passages of the same chapter, Comenius calls the bipartite division of the human being a Pagan idea, one which takes into consideration only man’s animality. Christians, on the other hand, are obliged to defend the idea that man is composed of a body (corpus), a soul (anima), and a spirit (spiritus).336 Let us now get back to the question of original sin. The partnership between God and man, which we have discussed in connection with creation, is evidenced, among other things, by the fact that man has never been able to atone for his fall. God sent a person who participated in both the Divine and the human (a Deus – Homo).337 In addition to the oft-mentioned intermediary position of 331 332 333 334 335 336 337

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CC I, pp. 622–623, cols. 1053–1054; CC I, p. 647, col. 1102. CC I, p. 623, col. 1054. CC I, p. 626, cols. 1060–1061. CC I, p. 628, col. 1064. CC I, p. 637, col. 1083. CC I, p. 678, col. 1164. CC I, p. 632, cols. 1072–1073.

man, who is represented as a gold chain (catena aurea) that connects God whom he serves and creation which he governs, we should also mention the mediating role of Christ as a link between God and man and participant in both worlds.338 With His Divine, infinite, and unerring understanding, will, and power, Christ is central to the emendation of human nature of which He partakes and which was damaged, clouded over, and enfeebled by the fall.339 Jesus Christ emended man and the three basic principles of human nature through His teachings that speak to man’s knowledge, agency (representing the human power), and will.340 By transforming man and reforming his spirit along with its three basic components, Christ paved the way for the restoration of piety, which is the basic principle of the spiritual world.341 The indispensability of man’s cooperation with God in the continuation and completion of the work of creation as well as the regeneration of man damaged by the fall is beyond question.342 The regeneration (regeneratio) of man is analogical to the act of his birth (generatio). Man receives the gift of life from his procreator (genitor), but how long he will live depends largely on his actions. Regeneration cannot be accomplished by man himself, but only by God’s restorative power (Dei virtute nos restituente). Once regenerated, man must make good on his conversion by doing virtuous deeds of his own volition. After regeneration, man retains his unlimited free will.343 Man cannot be without God (sine Deo non posse) and God does not want to be without man (sine homine nolle).344 In other words, God’s mercy and freedom of the human will, the active and the passive principles, need to be harmonised, otherwise man cannot achieve his salvation.345 338 CC I, p. 633, col. 1074; CC I, p. 624, col. 1056 and CC I, p. 642, col. 1093, in which Comenius cites contradictions in certain relevant biblical statements as proof of the dual nature of Christ. 339 CC I, p. 633, cols. 1074–1075; CC I, p. 637, col. 1083. 340 CC I, pp. 643–644, cols. 1095–1096. 341 CC I, p. 653, col. 1115; CC I, p. 658, col. 1124; CC I, p. 660, col. 1128. 342 Comenius’s belief in the reformability of the image of God in man is thought to have been inspired by Bacon. See Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon, op. cit., pp. 555–556. 343 CC I, p. 660, cols. 1128–1129; CC I, p. 661, col. 1131. 344 CC I, p. 661, col. 1130. An identical formulation can be found in the ensuing discussion. See CC I, p. 707, col. 1223. 345 Ibid., col. 1131. On more arguments for man’s responsibility to cooperate with God, see CC I, p. 707, col. 1223. Comenius mainly draws on the Scripture. See e.g. Gen. 6:3; Rom. 8:8; 2 Kings 3:5; Eph. 2:1–5; Eph. 4:24; John 15:5, etc. The Augustinian inspiration is unmistakeable. See esp. Augustine of Hippo, Sermo 169, chap. XI (Migne PL 38,923).

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In Mundus spiritualis, Comenius refuses to back down from his radically optimistic anthropological position, or to moderate his views concerning the autonomy and freedom of the human will.346 The conclusions he arrives at from his starting points are all the more surprising, at least on the surface. The regeneration of man presupposes the surrender by him of his free will – the greatest obligation that he has towards himself. In a seeming paradox, he does so out of his own free will; he submits deliberately, voluntarily, and unconditionally to the will of God. By his own choosing, man surrenders his innermost (intimum) possession, his own form (forma ejus creaturae) and assimilates and surrenders it to God’s will.347 In Mundus spiritualis, Comenius attributes yet another feature to man, one that is much more sublime and glorious than those we have seen. Not only is man’s will infinite in the sense that it enables him to defy all material and immaterial beings including God Himself, it is also open to being surrendered to God without any external pressure to do so. Comenius puts it expressis verbis: There is nothing in the Scripture that says we do not have free will – our free will was unaffected by original sin. However, the Bible forbids using it and teaches self-sacrifice. This is proof that our free will was not taken away. Our three basic features, reason, will, and power, may be the highest parts of human nature, but are also substantially corrupt. We must eschew them inasmuch as they are corrupt and submit to the judgement, will, and power of God.348

According to Comenius, man’s noblest feature is his free will, because it is the most Godlike. The best that man can do for God is to surrender his will to God’s will.349 Self-denial (abnegatio sui) and submission (submissio) are the only ways to salvation.350 Man’s complete regeneration (regenerationis plenitudo) takes place in stages. Man needs to understand himself first (cognitio sui) and then he must try to return to God by changing his thinking, accepting faith in Christ, serving Christ and rejoicing in Him and in the salvation He offers, struggling incessantly to win His favour, submitting to God, and surrendering (resignatio) his will to God’s will 346 On this, see e.g. CC I, p. 692, col. 1192. 347 CC I, p. 662, col. 1132. 348 CC I, p. 680, col. 1169: “Arbitrium liberum nobis esse, etiam post corruptionem, nusquam Scriptura negat, sed vetat eo uti, resignareque suadet atque eo ipso nobis non deesse docet. Tria enim illa, ratiocinandi, volendi, efficiendique facultas humanam naturam pariter absolvunt, pariter corrupta sunt. Pariterque jam non illis fidere, sed divinae rationationi, voluntati, potentiae submittere iubemur.” 349 Ibid. See also CC I, p. 708, col. 1225 and CC I, p. 715, col. 1238. 350 CC I, p. 681, col. 1171.

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so that he may be redeemed.351 The surest way to achieve salvation is through religion (religio), which, as we have said several times, constitutes the basic principle of the spiritual world, which is based on true service to God (cultus Dei verus).352 Just for completeness’s sake, let us mention that the four internal, basic defining features of man were retained in the Spiritual world. The tetrad includes reason, will, agency, and immortality. Man is immortal not because of his nature, but because of God’s mercy.353

3.3.8 Mundus aeternus All the worlds that we have discussed so far can be understood as a succession of progressively less perfect images of the Mundus idealis. The angelic world is the most perfect world that was made in the act of creation (creatura). Due to the solidity of matter, the imprint of the ideal world upon the material world is less perfect. The Mundus artificialis is even less perfect. Because people care less about ethics than they do about creativity, the Mundus moralis is an even less faithful image of the ideal world. People treat God worse than they treat other people. The Mundus spiritualis is therefore characterised by an even lesser degree of perfection. God, however, cannot permit such degradation to continue. He must erase all imperfection by bringing everything to Himself (reducet omnia in se), into a state of eternal beatitude (beatum aeternitatis status) which Comenius calls mundus aeternus.354 Comenius explains his conception of the Mundus aeternus in traditional NeoPlatonic terms and offers other philosophical and theological arguments for its reality. All the worlds known to man are utterly chaotic, so there must be a world with perfect arrangement and order. From a metaphysical point of view, all the things that are in constant flux must be brought into a state of permanence, i.e., true existence.355 John Amos offers a theological explanation, too, saying that during the seven days of creation, God created seven worlds. On the first day, He created the Mundus idealis; on the second day, He created the angelic world; and on the third day He created the material world. On the fourth, fifth, and sixth day, He created the Mundus artificialis, Mundus moralis, and Mundus spiritualis,

351 352 353 354 355

CC I, p. 663, col. 1134. CC I, p. 698, col. 1204. CC I, p. 620, cols. 1048–1049; CC I, p. 715, col. 1238. CC I, p. 729 (the column number is unclear); CC I, p. 731, col. 1263. CC I, p. 732, cols. 1264–1265.

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respectively. On the seventh day, which was the Sabbath, God created the seventh world – an image of God’s rest.356 The other theological explanations that Comenius offers are based on the First Book of Moses and his own interpretation of it (Gen. 1:28 or Gen. 1:31).357 In an anthropologically interesting argument, Comenius says that all living beings thirst for the highest good for themselves. Man, however, cannot find this good on Earth, and therefore cannot consummate his humanity. There must be a higher, eternal world, in which he can find the highest good and actualise himself – that is, fulfil his purpose.358 For Comenius, the ultimate meaning of man’s selfcreation is his preparation for eternal life.359 The last world, which contains in itself all the previous worlds, holds everything that is good. Man will be given to know (notitia) everything, will be allowed to use everything (fruitio), and to do everything (actio). The three basic principles of the human mind, scire, velle, and posse, which form the highest part of the image of God, will be fully restored.360 All creatures other than man will cease to exist in the material world and man will be absorbed into eternal unity (unitas aeterna) with the one God (Deus solus unus), in which he will achieve complete happiness.361 Everything will return to its origin and be perfect again. That applies to the whole visible world and even more so to man, who is the true image of God.362 The eternal world is and has always been in God, like everything else. When man dies, his immortal soul passes into eternity.363 Comenius writes that man cannot determine when eternity will begin because his senses and mind are clouded over by the existing worlds. Comenius, nevertheless, ventures to say that eternity will begin when the wheel of time has ground to a halt and the population has reached the highest level that the world’s matter (materia mundana), spirit (spiritus), and light (lux mundana) can support.364 After that, the dead will be resurrected (mortuorum resuscitatio seu resurrectio). In support of his assertion, Comenius offers a variation on the anthropocentric argument he presented 356 Ibid., col. 1264. 357 See CC I, pp. 732–733, cols. 1265–1266. 358 CC I, p. 732 col. 1264. 359 See what Comenius says in Mundus materialis: CC I, p. 315, col. 471. 360 CC I, p. 742, col. 1285. 361 CC I, p. 744, col. 1289. 362 CC I, p. 750, col. 1300; CC I, p. 752, col. 1304. 363 CC I, p. 733, col. 1267. 364 CC I, p. 734, col. 1268.

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earlier in substantiation of his claim about the existence of the eternal world: God gave man the capacity to be eternally happy. Man could not be eternally happy if he did not live eternally. He would not be able to live eternally if he did not have a body and soul, which are his essential parts. In the temporal world, bodies are subject to decline, so it is impossible for man to achieve happiness on this earth. The human body, therefore, has to be remade into something else.365 The resurrection of the dead will be followed by the Last Judgement (judicium extremum), during which Christ will try all members of humankind.366 Let us now return to Pansophia and take a look at a few philosophicalhistorical circumstances that shaped the text. Structurally speaking, Comenius was certainly influenced by the existing Neo-Platonic conceptions, in particular, the teachings of Tommaso Campanella.367 In the 1640s, he significantly improved upon the Campanellian theory of successive worlds by revising his original linear ascendent model (which can be found in the treatises Pansophiae praeludium and Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio; see the fifth chapter) and replacing it with a cyclical model. The new model is built around the Mundus artificialis, a greatly original philosophical concept that refers to the world made by autonomous man, which serves to bring the universe to completion and to its last end, God.368 This modification of the traditional Neo-Platonic schema, together with Comenius’s recognition of the freedom and agency of man as co-creator of the world, has been recognised as an important contribution to philosophy.369

365 CC I, p. 734–735, cols. 1269–1270. Comenius refers to an argument by Taurellus, Nicolaus: De rerum aeternitate metaphysices universalis partes IV. Marburgi 1594. See Komenský, Jan Amos: Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských. Volume II. op. cit., note 15 on p. 463. On more arguments, see CC I, p. 734–736, cols. 1269–1272. On the number of the resurrected, see CC I, p. 745, col. 1290. 366 CC I, pp. 736–738, cols. 1272–1276. 367 On Campanella’s conception, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 160–161; Červenka, Jaromír: Die Weltenschichten bei Campanella und Comenius, op. cit., pp. 118–132, 142–150. 368 Červenka, Jaromír: Mundus possibilis (Ein Versuch der Analyse des Eintrittsgradus der Pansophie). In: AC 6 (XXX), 1985, pp. 6–7; Floss, Pavel: Filosofické předpoklady Komenského demokratismu (příspěvek k analýze Komenského novoplatonismu a jeho kořenů) [The Philosophical Premises of Comenius’s Democratism (A Contribution to the Analysis of Comenius’s Neo-Platonism and Its Sources]. In: SCetH 5 (III), 1973, p. 82; Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 118, 172–179. 369 E.g. Červenka, Jaromír: Ontologické základy Komenského filosofických a pedagogických názorů [The Ontological Foundations of Comenius’s Philosophical and Pedagogical Views]. In: SCetH 13 (VI), 1976, p. 27; Floss, Pavel: Komenský a problematika času

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Several historians of philosophy have also aptly pointed out that there had been no such conception in philosophy before Comenius and that Comenius, therefore, occupies a special place in the Neo-Platonic tradition. In the opinion of Comenius’s predecessors, the world was created by πρόοδος, which precludes unity. For Comenius, the power that created the world was ἐπιστροφή, which participates in the creation of new worlds.370 In the Neo-Platonic schema, new worlds are created by moving away from the original unity, through increasing disharmony; in Comenius’s conception, the activity of man gives rise to a new reality and a new harmony.371 The Czech Comenius scholars Jan Patočka and Pavel Floss describe the philosopher’s conception as Aristotelian and refer in particular to Comenius’s unshakeable belief in man’s ability to rise to the fullness of his nobility.372 Patočka argues quite convincingly that Comenius’s indebtedness to (s přihlédnutím k vývoji chápání této filosofické kategorie [Comenius and the Question of Time (with Respect to the Evolution of the Understanding of this Philosophical Category]. In: SCetH 3 (II), 1972, pp. 22–24; Floss, Pavel: Proces divinizace světského a dílo J. A. Komenského [The Divinisation of the Profane and the Work of John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, pp. 77–82; Blum, Paul Richard: Warum ruhte Gott am Siebten Tag? In: Id.: Das Wagnis, ein Mensch zu sein. Geschichte – Natur – Religion. Studien zur neuzeitlichen Philosophie – Philosophie: Forschung und Wissenschaft. Band 31, Vienna – Zurich – Berlin 2010, pp. 300–305, which shows that a similar emphasis can be found in the works of St. Augustine. 370 Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 160–161; Floss, Pavel: Grundriss der Philosophie des Johann Amos Comenius. In: SCetH 57–58 (XXVII), 1997, p. 6. On the influence of Christian Neo-Platonism (in particular, of Johannes Scotus Eriugena) on the formulation of the final NeoPlatonic triad of moné – proodos – epistrofé, see Floss, Pavel: Proces divinizace světského a dílo J. A. Komenského [The Divinisation of the Profane and the Work of John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, p. 79. 371 Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 170–171, in which the author shows that Comenius may have been inspired by German mysticism, which was characterised by an emphasis on human agency. Červenka (Ibid., p. 60) demonstrates that Comenius was familiar with the following authors: Bernard of Clairvaux, Johannes Tauler, Thomas von Kempen, Sebastian Franck, Johann Arndt, Johann Gerhard, and Jakob Böhme. He also shows that Comenius was familiar with the treatise Theologia Germanica. On Comenius’s familiarity with Theologia Germanica, the first mention of which in Comenius’s work appears in 1640, see Wernisch, Martin: Mystika a reformace. Theologia Deutsch. Text a dějinný context [Mysticism and Reformation. Theologia Deutsch. Text and Historical Context]. Prague 2007, p. 135. 372 Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 208; Floss, Pavel: Grundriss der Philosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 11–12; Čapková,

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Aristotle originates from his exposure to the Greek philosopher’s texts in youth. However, we think that it may be worthwhile to look into the potential influence of Franciscus Patricius, whose philosophical works represent a striking and original marriage of Neo-Platonic descendancy and Aristotelian ascendancy towards the original cause.373

3.4 Pampaedia Comenius already repeatedly stresses in Pansophia that education is one of the most important avenues of self-actualisation and self-creation available to autonomous man. The most common cause of inadequate understanding, perverted will and weak agency is people’s own negligence of their innate gifts. The only way to achieve our true human potential is through education, the negligence of which leads to our ontological degradation.374 Education in its universal form (cultura), which will be the main subject of our exposition of this part of the Consultatio, is meant to shape and transform (transformare) man into a being that truly reflects God.375 Pampaedia is more than education – it is the cultivation (in the broadest sense of the word) of all members of mankind (omnes), all their aspects (omnia), and by all means (omnino).376

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374 375 376

Dagmar – Červenka, Jaromír – Floss, Pavel – Kalivoda, Robert: The Philosophical Significance of the Work of Comenius. In: AC 8 (XXXII), 1989, p. 9. Consider the title of Patricius’ principal work, which indicates his affinity for Aristotelian methodology: Nova de universis philosophia, in qua Aristotelica methodo, non per motum, sed per lucem, et lumina, ad primam causam ascenditur. Deinde propria Patricii methodo, tota in contemplationem venit Divinitas: Postremo methodo Platonica, rerum universitatis, a conditore Deo deducitur. Jakob Böhme is another likely influence. See Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě [Comenius’s Views and Pansophic Literary Plans from the Consolation Works to the General Consultation]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie II [Comeniological Studies II]. Prague 1998, p. 268. See the sub-chapter on Mundus artificialis. On similar ideas in Pansophia, see also CC I, p. 208, col. 296. CC II, p. 11, col. 1; CC II, p. 55, col. 85. CC II, p. 15, col. 4. For a more detailed discussion of this part of the Consultatio, see e.g. Schaller, Klaus: Die Pampaedia des Johann Amos Comenius. Eine Einführung in sein pädagogisches Hauptwerk. Heidelberg 1957; Schaller, Klaus: Die Pädagogik des Johann Amos Comenius und die Anfänge des pädagosischen Realismus im 17. Jahrhundert. Heiderbelrg 1962; Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 202–216.

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Everyone, regardless of age, social status, wealth, sex, or nationality should be educated to his or her full humanity (ad plenam humanitatem).377 According to Comenius, there is no doubt that we also have to educate our physically and mentally disabled fellow men who deserve even more attention than those who are healthy.378 We should cultivate such skills that perfect our human nature (humanam naturam perficiunt). First, we need to cultivate our reason and our ability to recognise the truth; then we need to cultivate our human will so that it will want good things; and lastly, we need to cultivate our agency so that it will do what it should do.379 Education must be comprehensive, for only then will it be possible for man to achieve perfection and restore in himself the perfection of the image of God. When the three basic principles of the human mind, i.e., reason, will, and agency, have been reformed, there will be no obstacles to the emendation of the human things which are based upon them.380 Human fallibility (or the tendency to err epistemologically, morally, and theologically) is caused by the immaturity (insufficient cultivation) of the basic faculties of the mind. Man has such affinity for truth that he will believe lies that appear to be true. He thirsts so much for goodness that he will desire a bad thing if it appears to be good. He will strive to achieve the impossible, if it appears to be possible.381 These statements attest to Comenius’s ethical intellectualism. The emendation of the human things and the rectification of earthly affairs are, however, not the main purpose of Pampaedia, although it is often interpreted that way. 382 The purpose of Pampaedia is to remove all obstacles on the way to the future eternal life. Comenius says that the principal mission of Pampaedia is to equip man for his future life (vitae futurae notitia instruantur) – in other words, to give him such knowledge that will awaken his desire for eternity and point him towards it.383 377 CC II, p. 15, cols. 4–5. 378 CC II, p. 23, col. 20. 379 CC II, p. 15, col. 5. In line with some parts of Pansophia, Comenius mentions the faculty of speech and the need to perfect it. 380 CC II, p. 15, col. 5. 381 CC II, p. 39, col. 52. 382 On literature which boils down Comenius’ anthropology to purely pedagogic or didactic conceptions, see the end of this book (Chapter 9). 383 CC II, p. 16, col. 6. Pavel Floss is one of the contemporary scholars who have called attention to the constant undervaluing of Comenius’s philosophy, which has for many years been taken as ancillary to Comenius’s pedagogical and didactic work. Compare e.g. Floss, Pavel: Grundriss der Philosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., 1997, p. 5.

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Neither death nor the world can put an end to a human life. Every being born as a man must try to go beyond that and towards eternity, towards the academy in heaven. Everything that comes before is a journey, preparation, and apprenticeship – in other words, a lower school.384

Pampaedia is understood in relation to Pansophia as a way to distribute the pansophic light to the minds of people through language and actions.385 The main purpose of Pampaedia, as we have said, is to educate people to their humanity (ad humanitatem). Without Pampaedia, people will be barred from participation in God’s beatitude, and as a result, God’s intention for man will not be fulfilled. God created man in His image so that he would govern himself and all creation. Man must, therefore, do everything he can to ensure that he does not deviate from his predestined path.386 It is in man’s best interest to fulfil this purpose, because to stop short of achieving the beatitude that awaits him in eternity is to fail in life, which is worse than not living at all. If we fail to take care of the eternal principle of our created soul, we will never be redeemed. Every man must cultivate the faculties that were given to him by God (reason, will, and agency).387 Whether people sin in thought, in wanting, or in deed, their sinfulness always lies in the negligence, or better yet, the ignorance of proper goals, means, and options, and especially of the final end of man’s life, which is salvation and participation in eternal beatitude.388 We cannot achieve eternity in any other way than by dying. Preparation for death, therefore, is an important component of man’s education and cultivation.389 Man can achieve the last end of his life (perfection), but he must want it. Wanting a good thing presupposes knowledge and, by extension, education. Comenius’s strong emphasis on freedom of the human will, which is such that it cannot be overruled by the will of anybody else, is retained in Pampaedia. An

384 CC II, p. 40, cols. 54–55: “Imo hominis vitam ne mors quidem ipsa, aut mundus ipse terminat. Ultra omnia haec in aeternitatem ipsam eundum est cuique homini nato, tanquam ad Caelestem Academiam. Quicquid ergo antecedit, iter est, praeparatio est, officina est, schola inferior est.” 385 CC II, p. 16, col. 7. 386 CC II, p. 17, cols. 8–9. An identical formulation appears later on, see CC II, p. 82, col. 138. 387 CC II, pp. 17–18, col. 9–10. 388 CC II, p. 18, cols. 10–11; CC II, p. 67, col. 109. 389 Ibid.

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individual’s will, nevertheless, can be admonished, instructed, and corrected. The last decision, however, always rests with the individual.390 By cultivating his faculties, man will regain his lost paradise, in which he will join God, other people, and other created beings and live with them in joy. Although this will only take place in eternity, man must already prepare for this future during his life on this earth, not least because the end of the world is approaching.391 The foregoing exposition indicates that Comenius returned to his view of free will as man’s highest faculty. Pampaedia sees Comenius mostly repeat the philosophical-theological assertions that he made in Panegersia and Pansophia, namely that the image of God in man, and especially the noblest part of it, which is freedom of choice (libertas electionum), must be protected against damage. If damaged, the human will becomes a non-will (noluntas) and man turns into a non-man (non-homo).392 Emphasis is now put on education, including the education of the will, which should enhance its freedom and enable it to make better decisions.393 Education should also enhance reason, another defining feature of man’s nature that is mentioned in the previous parts of the Consultatio. The instability and changeability of Comenius’s triadic view of the basic principles of the human mind is evidenced in many passages of Pansophia and in a few passages of Pampaedia. In the latter book, agency is often named as the third component, but sometimes the author mentions the faculty of speech (sermo) instead, or speaks of a tetrad of perfections.394 There are two different definitions of man in Pampaedia, which are tucked away in the treatment of the individual levels of education, seemingly without much purpose. According to the first definition, man is the image of God (imago Dei) that is endowed with similar power (simili quadam potentia), reason, and will.395 In the second definition, Comenius approaches the question of What is man? (Homo quid est?) very similarly: Man

CC II, pp. 19–20, cols. 13–14. CC II, pp. 22–23, cols. 18–20. CC II, p. 26, col. 27. CC II, p. 26, col. 27. On the conception of freedom of the will in Pampaedia, see CC II, p. 31, col. 37; CC II, p. 37, col. 48; CC II, p. 38, col. 50. 394 See also e.g. CC I, p. 24, col. 22. Comenius even posits five or twelve essential features of man. See CC II, p. 25, cols. 24–25. In CC II, p. 39, col. 52 Comenius operates with two different triads in subsequent paragraphs (another example is CC II, p. 61, cols. 96–97). 395 CC II, p. 90, col. 154. 390 391 392 393

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is the image of the omnipotent, omniscient, holy, and eternally beatified God.396 These explicit assertions are in fact less informative than Comenius’s previously presented philosophical and theological view of man, in which man’s essential characteristics were only implied. Education, which is aimed at cultivating man and his most essential faculties, crowned by his free and unlimited will, should eventually enable man to see that his thoughts, actions and will have become corrupt and are leading him to perdition. Once cultivated, the human mind should be able to understand that the only way to salvation is by obeying God and submitting to His will. We see that the idea of surrender, which is an important element of the anthropological system of Pansophia, was retained and integrated into Pampaedia, a book which shows, in similar terms, how man can be led to his resignatio. In Comenius’s view, man’s preparation must commence in his early childhood, when he must be taught to accept the will of other people rather than do what pleases him.397 In terms of education (and not just this, see Pansophia), Comenius divides the life of man into seven stages, which correspond to seven schools, each of which has its own educational goals and its own means to achieve those goals. These are the school of birth (geniturae), the school of early childhood (infantiae), the school of puerility (pueritiae), the school of adolescence (adolescentiae), the school of youth (iuventutis), the school of adulthood (vitilitatis), and the school of senescence (senii).398 The belief that man’s education should commence at an early age seems progressive even from the vantage point of our time, but it can be easily explained by the intended goal of the Consultatio, which was the emendation of the central faculties of the human mind, resulting in the restoration of the human things to their former perfection. After the reformation, human society should become a model for the future arrangement of things in the eternal world. The full restoration of reason, agency, and will presupposes an early intervention, before corruption has had a chance to take root.399 We can thus ensure that everybody knows, wants, and does everything that he should know, want, and do, i.e., everything that is true, good, and necessary.400 The human will will be united (uniatur) with God’s will; human wisdom (prudentia)

CC II, p. 97, col. 169. CC II, p. 38, col. 51. CC II, p. 41, col. 57. CC II, p. 72, col. 119; CC II, p. 43, col. 61; CC II, p. 46, col. 67. The same argument appears in Panorthosia: CC II, p. 323, col. 584. 400 CC II, p. 56, col. 86; CC II, pp. 58–59, cols. 91–92. 396 397 398 399

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will be subordinated (subordinetur) to Divine providence (providentia divina); and human agency will seek God’s mercy and rely on it.401 Comenius’s belief that man’s education should commence at an early age can also explained by recourse to his concept of dying well. As we said earlier, man’s surrender to death is a precondition of his entry into eternal life. The preconditions of dying well include being educated and leading a virtuous life, for which people have to be prepared from childhood. To lead a virtuous life means to behave morally. Man decides to behave morally out of his own free will, which chooses between what reason appraises as good and what it appraises as evil. Reason cannot make such appraisals unless it is properly instructed, i.e., educated and cultivated. The three basic faculties of the human mind, which can be reformed through education, determine the quality of man’s life on this earth and in eternity.402 A special school in Comenius’s system of education is reserved for the dying: schola mortis. Comenius recommends that old men turn away from the world and earnestly engage with religion and morality as they grow older and lose vigour. This approach to dying is the only way to eternal life and to developing the ability to die well (bene mori).403 Just for completeness’s sake, it should be noted that Comenius’s alteration of the original schema and the addition of a new level cannot be attributed to a lack of intellectual rigour. In fact, Comenius’s addition of an eighth school to Pampaedia (the school of dying) corresponds to the addition of an eight world to Pansophia (Mundus aeternus). In terms of the microcosmmacrocosm analogy, the school of birth corresponds to the pansophic Mundus idealis; the school of early childhood to the possible world (possibilis); the school of puerility to the angelic world; the school of adolescence to the material world; the school of youth to the world of human artifice; the school of adulthood to the moral world; the school of senescence to the spiritual world; and as we said earlier, the school of dying corresponds to the eternal world.404 Echoed in Pampaedia are other elements of Comenius’s conception of man that we have seen in Pansophia. Man is described as a being whose existence is open-ended and indeterminate, a being that is completely self-sufficient in creating himself.405 Comenius illustrates this uniquely human feature with the example of children, whom he believes know everything in potentia, but in actu can 401 402 403 404 405

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CC II, p. 59, col. 93. CC II, pp. 67–68, cols. 109–110; CC II, p. 115, col. 204. CC II, pp. 127–129, cols. 228–232. CC II, p. 129, cols. 232–233. See e.g. CC II, p. 111, col. 197.

only demonstrate knowledge of what they have actually learned.406 Pampaedia contains the same emphasis on moral conduct which derives from an awareness of man’s freedom of self-realisation. If man behaves like livestock (pecudes), he lives like livestock; if he concerns himself with things that are essential to his humanity, he lives a human life. If he concerns himself with things that are essential to the angelic nature, he lives an angelic life.407 In conclusion, we should say that education (or for that matter the principles of the human mind once restored to their former perfection) is not what truly defines man, despite the important role that education plays in man’s salvation. Comenius makes it clear that an individual endowed with a human form, but possessed of an empty mind (mens vacua), halting speech, and idle hands, a person of bad morals and ignorant of God (Dei ignarus), is a crude man (homo rudis), but a man, nonetheless.408

3.5 Panglottia, Panorthosia, and Pannuthesia The fifth part of Comenius’s Consultatio catholica, titled Panglottia, is not very relevant to our anthropological concerns.409 The only notable part is the first 406 CC II, p. 77, col. 128. 407 CC II, p. 93, col. 161. 408 CC II, p. 73, col. 120. This statement runs counter the conclusions made by Joan Luís Llinàs Begon who argues to the contrary. See Begon, Joan Luís Llinàs: Millenarianism and Symbolism in Comenius. In: SCetH 67–68 (XXXII), 2002, pp. 32–33. It also runs counter to the assertions made by Jiřina Popelová. See Popelová, Jiřina: Pojetí lidské přirozenosti u J. A. Komenského [The Conception of Human Nature in the Works of John Amos Comenius]. In: Pedagogika – Časopis pro pedagogické vědy 5 (XX), 1970, p. 684. 409 In his conception of panglottia, Comenius drew on previous attempts to construct a universal language. The authors who may have inspired him include Juan Luis Vives, Jakob Böhme and the circles of scholars assembled around Marin Mersenne and Samuel Hartlib. Comenius himself refers to Vives, Mersenne and Le Maire. See Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia. Vol. 14, p. 352, par. 8 and p. 356, par. 21. See also Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., p. 118; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 366–376 or Přívratská, Jana: Evropský myšlenkový vývoj jako inspirační zdroj Komenského pojetí jazyka [The European Developments in Philosophy as a Source of Inspiration for Comenius’s Conception of Language]. In: SCetH 30 (XV), 1985, pp. 21–32. On other sources of inspiration and the general philosophical background of the attempts to develop a new, universal language, see Miškovská-Kozáková, Vlasta Tatjána: Comenius’s Linguistic Theory and Experiment. In: AC 4/2 (XXVIII/2), 1979,

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chapter, in which Comenius repeats his previously presented view of man and the human mind as the highest part of man and the image of God. In another instance of inconsistency, Comenius says that the mind has three principal tools (organi): reason (ratio), speech (oratio), and freedom to act (operatio libera).410 The two most important components (reason and will) are included in almost every triad, but agency, which is usually mentioned in third place, is replaced in some passages of the Consultation by other faculties. We must also mention the intended goal of Panglottia, because it is pertinent to our ongoing effort to analyse and systematise Comenius’s conception of man. Comenius intended Panglottia as a means to renewing the ability of people to understand each other. Language is what binds people together and the multitude of languages in existence causes the deterioration of social relations and impedes linguistic reform. The confusion of languages ultimately leads to conflict, violence, and wars between people and nations.411 Of more relevance to our study is the following part of the Consultatio, Panorthosia.412 Comenius writes that everything he has said in the previous parts of the Consultation had one purpose only, viz., to demonstrate the exigency of the reformation of the three Divine gifts to man, namely reason (intellectus), will (voluntas), and power (potestas), which are the basis of all human actions (actiones). When all people understand the truth, have a desire to be with God, and do everything they can to ensure peace (tranquillitas), they will find a way to set the human things right. True emendation (vera emendatio seu reformatio, pp. 291–319; Miškovská-Kozáková, Vlasta Tatjána: Coménius philosophe du langage. In: SCetH 10 (V), 1975, pp. 21–58; Přívratská, Jana: Panglottia – the Universal Reform of Language. In: AC 5 (XXIX), 1983, pp. 133–142; Přívratská, Jana: The Methodological Approach in the Linguistic Studies of Comenius. In: AC 7 (XXXI), 1987, pp. 91–102. Several authors have pointed out that Comenius may have been influenced by Bacon. See Patočka, Jan: Komenský a Bacon, op. cit., pp. 580–581. However, Comenius is the only author who incorporated his idea of a universal language into a more comprehensive work that covers other than linguistic topics. 410 CC II, p. 155, col. 256; CC II, p. 189, col. 324. 411 CC II, pp. 155–156, cols. 257–258; CC II, p. 165, col. 276. 412 Before Comenius presented his proposal for universal emendation, there had already been plans to reform human knowledge and the human things; however, those attempts did not match the breadth or universality of Comenius’s conception. Authors of important reformation proposals include Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon, whom we mentioned earlier, the Rosicrucians, and various pansophists, who drew primarily on Paracelsus and Böhme. For more on this subject, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 46–47.

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et reparatio, et restitutio, aut etiam regeneratio) will mean not only the reformation of the basic faculties of the human mind (reason, will, and agency), but also the rectification of the three basic human things that are rooted in them. The proper knowledge and use of things will give rise to true philosophy (philosophia vera); proper relationships between people and the proper relationship of every individual to himself will give rise to true politics (politica vera); and the proper relationship with God will give rise to true religion (religio vera).413 This plan did not call for a mere rectification, but a universal emendation (Παν-Ορθωσίαν), i.e., a sweeping reformation of all people (omnium), regardless of sex, social status, occupation, or nationality. Panorthosia would be affected in everything (in omnibus) that makes man what he is, namely his governance of things (philosophy), his governance of other people (politics), and his relation to God (religion), and through everything (omnino) that would lead to the establishment of a philosophy which is not just true, but also comprehensive (catholica). This philosophy would be so faithful a representation of all apprehensible things (apprehensible through reason and through the senses) that it would be impossible to disagree with. Furthermore, the new religion would be not only true, but also comprehensive (catholica), meaning that it would reveal so much of God’s mystery that nobody would remain untouched by it. There would be also true and comprehensive politics, which would absorb all people into a safe and peaceful order.414 For Comenius, that was the only way to achieve beatitude on this earth (beatus mundi status).415 Panorthosia does not represent a departure from Comenius’s basic anthropological schema, which we discussed earlier. Man is understood as the image of God, characterised by a mind consisting of three basic components and the corresponding inherent common notions, instincts, and capabilities that give rise to the three human things.416 According to Panorthosia, man’s freedom is such that

413 CC II, pp. 211–212, cols. 360–362. 414 CC II, p. 212, cols. 362–363. See also CC II, pp. 311–312, cols. 561–562. For a more detailed discussion of Comenius’s view of the reformation of politics, see Válka, Josef: Komenského pojetí politiky a pokus o překonání machiavelismu [Comenius’s Conception of Politics and An Attempt to Overcome Machiavellianism]. In: Id.: Husitství na Moravě. Náboženská snášenlivost. Jan Amos Komenský [Hussitism in Moravia. Religious Tolerance. John Amos Comenius]. Brno 2005, pp. 283–292. 415 CC II, p. 213, col. 365. 416 CC II, p. 270, col. 478; CC II, p. 245, col. 428; CC II, p. 257, col. 453.

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not even God can curtail it. God can admonish or persuade man, but He cannot force him or overrule his will.417 Comenius was strongly convinced of the feasibility of the reformation of the human things. He offers three types of arguments for why such emendation can be accomplished: rational arguments, arguments based on interpretations of the Scripture, and arguments based on his own observations of reality. All three arguments have pronounced eschatological overtones, which resonate through not only Panorthosia, but are in fact one of the distinctive features of the entire Consultation.418 In line with the previous parts of the Consultatio, emphasis in Panorthosia is placed on man’s responsibility to cooperate with God. This partnership is central to the work of creation, the completion of which will be preceded by the great reformation of the human things. Panorthosia will be the result of the joint effort of New Adam, Christ, and people. Although God could reform the world without the involvement of people, he will not do that. As far as spiritual affairs are concerned, man cannot do anything without God, but God does not want to do anything without the involvement of man either. Comenius bases his argument on the Scripture and on St. Augustine’s interpretation of it.419 Simply put, just as the fall of man was caused by Satan, but made possible by man’s cooperation, so reformation will be the work of Jesus Christ who will, nevertheless, need man’s cooperation.420 The definition of man as a being endowed with free will seems even more compelling in the light of these ideas. God tells man not to stand aside, but to be an active collaborator who is honoured to participate in his own salvation. Man praises the Lord by doing what he sees his archetype do.421 Idleness of any sort is an affront to God.422 In Comenius’s opinion, the human things are in a pitiful state. Only a few people realise that they become members of the human society through education,

417 CC II, p. 245, col. 428–429. 418 CC II, pp. 215–230, cols. 369–399. 419 CC II, p. 232, col. 402. On sources, see Aurelius Augustinus: Sermo 169,11 (Migne PL 38, 922–923) and Komenský, Jan Amos: Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských, op. cit., note 95 on p. 442 for an overview of allusions to the Scripture. On St. Augustine’s conception of the cooperation of man with God, see Blum, Paul Richard: Warum ruhte Gott am Siebten Tag?, op. cit., pp. 300–305. 420 CC II, p. 232, col. 403. 421 CC II, p. 233, col. 405. 422 CC II p. 234, col. 406.

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religion and politics and that the goal of their earthly existence should be to cultivate God’s image in themselves and to lead the world to the gates of eternity. However, the main goals in life for most people are money, comforts, wealth, and pride. Such a perverted view of one’s purpose leads people to choose perverted means: schools, being the domain of the first human thing, i.e., philosophy, fail to impart wisdom; churches, representing systems of organised religion, do not lead people to piety; and polities which embody the principles of politics are not concerned with maintaining peace.423 The layer of dirt in schools, churches and communities is so thick, says Comenius, that it cannot be removed by human effort alone.424 With God’s mercy, man will be able to reform the three basic human things and purify them. This process should be centred on the three fundamental innate faculties of the human mind, which should be taught to draw exclusively from the three lanterns of God, i.e., the three sources of enlightenment that Comenius describes in Panaugia.425 Man must first focus on these sources of knowledge and on removing obstacles to proper understanding. People are not fully cognisant of the book of nature, or the acts of God within the natural realm, because they are preoccupied with their own acts and their own ceaseless hustle. The second book, which is represented by the human mind, which reflects God’s wisdom, is obscured by innumerable human falsities. The third source of light, the Divine books, cannot penetrate to the mind of man because of the proliferation of human books in the world.426 As we have said, a great reformation can only be accomplished by Christ in cooperation with man. It follows that the reformation must be initiated by Christians, who are the only group that belongs in the Divine books, and can thus participate in God’s wisdom as it is revealed in them. Christians have to keep in mind that reformation is not their work, but the work of Jesus Christ, whose power is brought to perfection in their weakness.427 The purpose and the de facto definition of the reformation is to restore things to their former state and to open up the road to a new arrangement of things. All the human things will be rearranged based on the original models, which Comenius describes in the Ideal world.428

423 424 425 426 427 428

CC II, p. 236, col. 411. CC II, p. 237, col. 412. CC II, pp. 237–238, cols. 413–414. CC II, p. 239, col. 417. CC II, pp. 240–241, cols. 419–421. On the source, see 2 Kings 12:9. CC II, pp. 269–270, cols. 477–478.

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As we saw in our treatment of Panegersia, the human things are not entirely corrupt (which would make any reformation impossible); rather, they are tainted by fragmentation and confusion. Emendation, therefore, is feasible.429 The reformation, however, cannot be merely partial, but comprehensive and universal.430 Another prerequisite of Panorthosia and a proof of the cohesiveness of Comenius’s anthropology is that the universal emendation must be carried out step by step and the most important things must be left for the end. First, we must reform our treatment of things and then we must rectify our senses, which enable rational apprehension. The reformation of rational apprehension is followed by the reformation of free will, which, being the noblest and most important faculty of man, must be reformed last.431 The fact that Comenius attributed the highest nobility to the will is also evident from his own plan for reforming the human things. He says that we should first reform philosophy (which stems from human reason), then politics (which is based on power, or agency), and then religion (which stems from the will). These three human things will be not only restored, but also transformed into a new philosophy, a new politics, and a new religion. These areas of human activity are in a dismal state: they are tainted by individualism, tribalism, and brutality.432 There is only one way to set them right: in our reform effort, we must return to the common path of universality (via universalitatis), simplicity (simplicatiatis), and voluntariness (spontaneitatis), which we have strayed from.433 The coherence and internal unity of Comenius’s view of man is thus demonstrated again. In Pansophia, the book which contains the most detailed and comprehensive discussion of man’s nature thus far, the human being is defined, at the profoundest level, by his mind, crowned by his free will. However, the individual’s salvation is contingent on his voluntary surrender of his will to the will of God. These strict demands are not softened one bit in Panorthosia. Comenius leaves no doubt as to the necessity of surrendering one’s will to the will of

429 CC II, p. 242, col. 422. To demonstrate the state of corruption of the human things, Comenius drew on his own observations as well as on the observations of his philosophical and theological predecessors. Without much explanation, he cites the testimonies of the Church Fathers and the ideas of Huss, Luther, Calvin, and Campanella. See CC II, pp. 365–366, cols. 669–670. 430 CC II, p. 243, col. 425. 431 CC II, p. 244, col. 426. 432 CC II, p. 246, col. 431. 433 CC II, p. 248, col. 435.

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God.434 Going down any other route is described as extremely dangerous and self-destructive. The most important decision in a man’s life, which sets him on a course towards either salvation or perdition, is the decision to surrender one’s will, or not. In Panorthosia, this requirement is extended to the whole mind and the innate principles that the mind is based on. We are urged to surrender our thoughts and actions to the thoughts and actions of God; surrendering one’s will, nevertheless, remains the most imperative.435 Only if we submit to God will we be able to set right our thoughtless actions against Him, to eliminate profanity (profanitas), and to open up the road towards salvation and eternal life, which are the principal goals in a man’s life. To be able to mend the affairs of the world and to transform this world into an anteroom of eternal life, we must eliminate profanity, which mars modern man’s relationship with God. We must also eliminate inhumanity (inhumanitas), which mars interpersonal relationships. Because the human reason is impaired, there are frequent disagreements between people; because the will is perverted, hate has tainted human relationships; and because power is being abused, there is rampant injustice and persecution. Comenius refers to these faults with the umbrella term ‘inhumanity’. No other animal apart from wild dogs (degeneres canes) behaves so vilely to other members of its species.436 To do away with inhumanity and restore humanity (humanitas), there has to be an amnesty (amnestia), i.e., the expunction and pardoning of old wrongs, restoration of tolerance (tolerantia), and reconciliation (reconciliatio) between all people.437 In Panorthosia, Comenius’s anthropological system is enriched by another element. The reformation of the human things and the achievement of the final end of man’s life, which is participation in salvation and eternal life, is unimaginable without man’s voluntary submission to the will of God. In Pampaedia, Comenius adds that this endeavour should be facilitated, or perhaps even enabled by, the cultivation of the three faculties of the human mind (of which the will is the most important faculty) by means of education. To purify the potentialities of the will even further, another, last obstacle must be removed, namely widespread violence, a subject first discussed in Panorthosia. The eradication of violence is the only way to restore the philosophical (philosophica), religious (religiosa), and political (politica) liberties of mankind (genti humanae).438 Comenius’s long and 434 CC II, p. 249, col. 437. 435 CC II, p. 249–250, cols. 437–439. 436 CC II, p. 251, cols. 440–441. 437 Ibid. 438 CC II, p. 271, col. 481.

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arduous journey towards a coherent anthropological system culminates in his identification of man’s nature with freedom: Freedom, I dare say, is the most wonderful human possession, created at the same time as man and inseparable from him unless he be doomed to perdition.439

There is no doubt that for Comenius freedom of the human will was the true defining feature of man’s nature and was inseparable from him. Let us now return to the principal mission of Panorthosia, which is the reformation of the human things. In the previous paragraphs, we explained that the goal of universal emendation is the merging of the old order revealed by God with a new approach to people, God, and things, which brings about the dawn of a new, true, and comprehensive philosophy; a new, true, and comprehensive religion; and a new, true, and comprehensive politics. All these areas of human activity will be combined in one joint effort, resulting in one common philosophy based on Christ the teacher, in one common religion led by Christ the high priest, and in one politics governed by Christ the king.440 The basic tenet of the new philosophy will be the perfection of the human mind, i.e., the bringing of the mind into a state in which it represents the true and genuine image of the eternal mind and understands everything correctly and without distortion, using the three Divine lanterns (the book of nature, the human mind, and the Scripture). Since the particulars of the proposed reform of philosophy are not directly related to the subject of the present study, we shall limit ourselves to saying that after this reform, philosophy will not be merely a philosophy, but a pansophy – not an ancillary (ancilla) to theology, but its sister (soror), along with politics.441 The mission of the new, comprehensive politics will be the elimination of wars and maintenance of peace (pax) and tranquillity (quietas) in all human societies.442 Comenius places the utmost emphasis on the emendation of the most important of the human things, viz., religion, which should be transformed into a new, comprehensive and universal religion. The new religion will be characterised by man’s total and perfect union with God, the details of which Comenius describes in his pansophic Mundus spiritualis. By spreading hope, love, and faith (spes, 439 CC II, p. 272, col. 482: “Libertas inquam, delicatissimum hominis bonum, et illi concreatum, et ab illo inseparabile, nisi cum intereundum est.” 440 Ibid. 441 CC II, pp. 280–285, cols. 499–508. 442 CC II, pp. 285–288, cols. 508–514.

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amor, fides), the new religion will lead to the transformation of the world into the Kingdom of God and Heaven on Earth (Regnum Dei et Caelum in Terra).443 For all that has been said and the very strong emphasis on the reformation of the human things, and hence of this temporal world, we should not forget the main goal of Panorthosia and the Consultatio catholica as such. The universal good (bonum universale) that will be created by reformed philosophy, religion, and politics, would mean the end of temporal (sub Caelo) desires. The new, comprehensive philosophy must, therefore, reflect God’s wisdom (sapientia) and harmonise the works of man with nature. The new, comprehensive politics must represent an image of God’s power (potentia) and must promote and maintain peace and tranquillity. Religion must represent an image of God’s goodness (bonitas) and reconcile fully the human will with the will of God (voluntatis humanae cum divina plenus consensus).444 All three disciplines must be oriented towards achieving the final end (finis ultimus), which is to bring man to God and to eternal beatitude (in beatam aeternitatem). We can see that the monumental and complex edifice of Comenius’s anthropology acquires another mainstay. The cultivation and purification of the potentially unlimited human will, which is the only part of man that determines whether an individual will be saved or lost, is unthinkable without education, the eradication of violence and reformation of the human things as such. The perfection of religion is impossible without man’s submission to the will of God.445 That, however, cannot be accomplished without first mending the current state of the will, which is the most important of human faculties.446 Because the human things permit neither the satisfaction of man’s desires nor the consummation of his perfections, religion must lead man to transcend himself (elevare hominem supra se) and rise above all things and towards God.447 The exigency of the reformation of religion and the other

443 CC II, p. 291, col. 520. 444 CC II, p. 277, cols. 492–493. 445 CC II, p. 289, col. 517. Later on in the text, Comenius stresses the importance of mass and prayer for harmonising man’s will with the will of his Creator. A sermon encourages the human will to submit to the will of God and prayer asks God to align His will with the will of man. See CC II, p. 347, col. 633. 446 The nobility of the human will and theology, which is based on it, is made clear by Comenius’s identification of the will with the image of God in man. See CC II, p. 279, col. 497. See also CC II, p. 284, col. 506 on another statement to the same effect. The nobility is also confirmed in Panegersia, where religio is emphasised over the other two human things. See CC I, p. 58, col. 44. 447 CC II, p. 277, col. 493.

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two human things for Comenius is evidenced by his strong eschatological conviction: in the last age of the world (ultimo mundi seculo), humanity must settle the ultimate and the most important matters in the best way possible under the circumstances of the temporal world.448 Although it is not our aim to analyse and interpret the entire philosophical and theological system of the Consultatio, we must mention some other important aspects of Panorthosia. To bring the reformation successfully to completion and to keep the human things from falling back into a state of corruption, people must establish institutions (forum) which will bring in philosophers (Collegium Lucis), theologians (Consistorium), and politicians (Dicasterium), and which will ensure understanding in philosophy, piety in religion, and peace in interpersonal and international relations.449 It is unnecessary to go into detail on Comenius’s ideas regarding the process of reformation. We shall limit our discussion to a few of the most important and anthropologically relevant comments. As mentioned several times, the reformation is inconceivable without man’s endeavour and God’s (Christ’s) grace. According to Comenius, the first human thing that should be reformed is philosophy, which – once reformed – will rectify man’s relationship to things, which will in turn permit the reparation of man’s relationship to God (religion). The reformed religion will make possible the rectification of politics and interpersonal relationships (the order in which the human things should be reformed was altered from the one that the author presented earlier). There is one more prerequisite to this: to reform the whole of mankind, we must first reform individuals, which will not happen before we have improved our schools and the tools which are used there, i.e., books. The schools and books cannot be improved unless we reform the method by which they interact with their subjects of study (i.e., things), and that method is philosophy. The unusually strong (for Comenius’s time) emphasis on universal education and the importance of education for the perfection of mankind is much in evidence here.450 It is therefore imperative that 448 CC II, p. 278, col. 494; CC II, p. 289, cols. 516–517. 449 CC II, p. 299, col. 536. For more on this subject, see CC II, pp. 297–310, cols. 533–559. On Comenius’s predecessors and followers in this strand of thought, see Patočka, Jan: Epilogue [to Gentium salutis reparator – Posel míru a blaha národů]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 130–134 or Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., pp. 223–227. On similarities between Collegia lucis and Bacon’s Solomon’s House, see Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., p. 73. 450 CC II, pp. 313–313, cols. 562–564.

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every individual start reforming himself (reformatio suiipsius) and regenerating (renasco) himself, i.e., realigning his reason, will, and agency with the image of God (ad similitudinem Dei).451 Self-reformation should be extended to include the reformation of the family and of schools and education (see above and in Pansophia), which is now identified with philosophy.452 The reformation of education will make possible the reformation of churches (ecclesiarum)453 and public affairs (politiarum).454 The universal reformation will be initiated by the convocation of a world congress (Comitia Orbis) or ecumenical council (Concilium Oecumenicum).455 To conclude our discussion of Comenius’s view of man as expressed in Panorthosia, let us say that methodologically, Panorthosia is based on Panaugia and Pansophia and as such, helps to define the contours of Comenius’s philosophical-theological system. Comenius understands philosophy as the application of Panaugia (i. e. the universal rational light) on things; politics as the application of panaugia on people; and religion as the application of Panaugia on man’s relationship with God. From the vantage point of Pansophia, the new philosophy is understood as an instance of the pansophic Mundus artificialis, politics as an instance of the Mundus moralis, and religion as an instance of the Mundus spiritualis.456 Several passages relevant to our study can be found in the seventh, and the last part of the Consultatio, Pannuthesia. In it, Comenius repeats his firm conviction about the balefulness of violence and war and presses for eradicating them. Philosophers, theologians and statesmen should be the first groups that take up arms against these evils, followed by the rest of the people.457 The eradication of violence and strife between the representatives of the basic human things is the only way to convert non-believers (infidelis) to true religion, making them see the light and salvation emanating from Christ (lucem et salutem agnoscere).458 The continuation of the current animosities and warfare will necessarily mean

451 CC II, p. 315, col. 569 and CC II, pp. 317–318, cols. 573–574. 452 For more on this, see CC II, pp. 318–330, cols. 575–598. 453 For more on this, see CC II, pp. 330–349, cols. 598–637. 454 For more on this, see CC II, pp. 349–360, cols. 637–658. 455 For more on this, see CC II, pp. 360–371, cols. 658–681. 456 See CC II, pp. 293–294, cols. 525–526. 457 CC II, p. 386, col. 703. 458 CC II, p. 399, col. 728–729; CC II, p. 401, col. 732.

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the undoing of all three basic human things and subsequently all of mankind’s undoing.459 Pannuthesia retains the basic eschatological motif of the Consultation. The progress of reformation can be accelerated by any individual who sets out on a journey of self-reformation (as was mentioned in Panorthosia). This requirement is made all the more imperative by the imminent end of the world and the onset of eternity.460 Another notable aspect of Comenius’s anthropology is the identification of the human mind with a perpetual motion machine (motus perpetuus).461 Comenius already announces in the opening paragraphs of Pansophia that he has begun a search for perpetual and endless motion (motuus perpetuus spontaneus), which would match celestial movement (Coeli amemulum). Comenius eventually locates this motion in the mind (mens), will (voluntas), and emotions (affectus) of man.462 Although the terminology applied to the basic principles of the human spirit is slightly different than the terminology used in other passages of the Consultatio, we are of the view that these three principles can be identified with the pansophic triad of reason, will and agency (with agency often being replaced by emotions, the faculty of speech, etc.). These three basic principles constitute the human mind, which represents infinity in the finite world, and is therefore the true image of God.463

459 CC II, p. 403, col. 736. 460 CC II, p. 399, col. 728; CC II, p. 414, col. 758. 461 Nováková, Julie: Spisy Komenského o perpetuum mobile [Comenius’s Treatises Concerning Perpetual Motion]. In: SCetH 12 (VI), 1976, pp. 36–37. 462 CC II, p. 407, col. 744. On Pansophy, see the following note. 463 This is evidenced by a statement in Mundus possibilis to the effect that “the human mind is a perpetual motion machine” (“[…] perpetuum mobile est hominis mens”). Quote based on CC I, p. 207, col. 294. On the ceaseless activity of the human mind, see also Mundus materialis, CC I, p. 362, col. 565.

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4. Comenius’s conception of man in the Consultatio as a system? 4.1 Terminological inconsistencies As is clear from our interpretation of Comenius’s Consultation and our analysis of its individual parts, the philosophical-theological system presented by the author contains substantial terminological inconsistencies. The terms central to Comenius’s conception of man and to his system of thought as such are often inaccurately defined or mixed up with other, semantically related terms. For example, in the introductory passages of the Consultatio, Comenius gives an exposition of the basic human things, which will become the leitmotif of the book. These res humanae include politics (politia), religion (religio), and education (eruditio), as the author states in the dedicative preface to the Consultatio titled Europae lumina, viri docti, pii, eminentes, salvete, or politics, religion, and philosophy (philosophia), as he states in Panegersia.464 The conflation of education with philosophy, however, cannot be considered a terminological inconsistency on the author’s part, because in Panorthosia, he writes of a connection between the two or the identity of the two.465 Let us reiterate that in Comenius’s opinion, universal emendation must begin with the reformation of philosophy, which will lead to the rectification of man’s relationship to things and subsequently to the reformation of religion and politics. According to Comenius, the reformation of the individuals precedes the reformation of society. The individual can be reformed only when we have reformed schools and the tools that are used there, i.e., books (in other words, the practical aspects of education). Schools will, however, not be reformed before we have reformed the method by which they interact with their subjects of study (i.e., things), and that method is philosophy (in other words, the theoretical aspects of education).466 However, there are much more serious terminological inconsistencies than the one described above, namely, those related to the question of what defines man, or in other words, what the most fundamental component of his inner being is. In the Latin text of the Consultatio, centrality is given variously to the soul

464 CC I, p. 28, col. 4; CC I, p. 51, col. 30. 465 CC II, pp. 318–330, pp. 575–598. 466 See CC II, pp. 313–313, col. 562–564; CC II, p. 315, col. 569 and CC II, pp. 317–318, cols. 573–574.

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(anima), the spirit or intellect (animus, animus humanus, rationalitas), the mind (mens), and the spirit (spiritus).467 This inconsistency and ambiguity cannot be fully accounted for by the different timing of the writing of the individual parts of the Consultation, as one would be tempted to think. The first three concepts are already identified as the highest part of man in different passages in Panegersia or in Panaugia.468 The pansophic Mundus materialis can be considered an improvement in terms of terminological consistency. In it, Comenius introduces his tripartite conception of man as consisting of a body (corpus), a soul (anima), and a spirit (spiritus, mens).469 As evidenced by a subsequent sub-chapter in Comenius’s exposition of the pansophic level in question (De Spiritu seu Mente), the terms spiritus and mens (and another term, the intellectual soul) are used by the author as absolute equivalents.470 For completeness’s sake (and to illustrate the terminological instability of Comenius’s system), it should be noted that included in the triad of the basic components of man’s nature in Mundus moralis are animality (animalitas), which relates man to animals, rationality (rationalitas), which relates him to angels, and spirituality (spiritualitas), which makes him similar to God.471 However, the way that these concepts are defined makes it clear that

467 See e.g. CC I, p. 51, col. 30; CC I, p. 111, col. 142; CC I, pp. 70–71, cols. 69–70; CC I, p. 79, col. 86; CC I, p. 356, col. 554. Guido Giglioni demonstrates that the term spiritus takes on an array of meanings in Comenius’s writing. See Giglioni, Guido: Spiritus plasticus between Pneumology and Embryology, op. cit., p. 84. 468 On Panergesia, see e.g. CC I, pp. 70–71, cols. 69–70 or CC I, p. 79, col. 86. In Panaugia, the terms “spirit” (animus) and “mind” (mens) are entirely conflated. See CC I, p. 111, col. 142. On other occurrences of the terms, see CC I, p. 353–354, cols. 548–550. Comenius acknowledges that he uses the terms anima and spiritus (and other similar terms) interchangeably. See CC I, p. 356, col. 554. On discrepancies between the paragraphs of the individual books that make up the Consultatio, see Matlová, Jana: Problémy jazyka a stylu Komenského díla De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica z hlediska vznikajícího českého překladu [On the Problems of Language and Style in Comenius’s De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica in View of the Emerging Czech Translation]. In: SCetH 38 (XIX), 1989, p. 224. 469 CC I, p. 356, col. 554. The tripartite model was probably inspired by 1 Thess. 5:23. 470 See CC I, pp. 360–365, cols. 561–572. 471 CC I, p. 556, cols. 929. A similar model is presented in Lexicon reale pansophicum. See CC II, p. 548, col. 1008.

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they fully correspond to the Biblical triad of body – soul – spirit (or mind), as discussed by St. Augustine.472 Nor does Comenius stick to one model of man’s inner constitution (i.e., the components of his inner being such as the mind, spirit, or the soul). Most of his statements indicate that the three basic parts of the man’s inner being for him were reason (ratio, or intellectus), the will (voluntas or liberum arbitrium, or alternatively libera operatio) and agency (facultates operativae, potestas or vis). A careful reading of the Consultatio, however, reveals that the first two components of the triad are retained throughout the text, whereas the third component changes frequently.473 The inconsistencies suggest that Comenius’s anthropological system may not have been stable. Agency is replaced variously by emotions (affectus),474 conscience (conscientia),475 and the faculty of speech (oratio or sermo).476 In Mundus artificialis, Comenius also writes of a spirit (animus), the characteristics of which, however, fully correspond to the perfections of agency.477 Other deviations from the triadic formula of ratio – voluntas – facultates operativae appear in the occasional passages in which another aspect is mentioned, creating in fact a tetrad of human perfections. In Panegersia we can find the tetrad of intellect, will, capabilities, and conscience (conscientia). Conscience, being closely related to reason, is nevertheless treated as a special faculty of the mind.478 This apparent discrepancy can be explained though an analysis of Mundus materialis – a text which we think presents Comenius’s most elaborate and systematic description of man’s nature. In it, the three fundamental faculties of the human mind are further segmented. Reason is divided into imagination

472 CC I, p. 556, col. 929. On St. Augustine, see e.g. his De fide et symbolo. Migne PL 40, 193, par. 23. 473 On the occurrences of these concepts, see e.g. CC I, p. 50, col. 29; CC I, p. 103, col. 126; CC I, p. 353, col. 548; CC II, p. 155, col. 256; CC II, p. 189, col. 324; CC II, pp. 211–212, cols. 360–362; CC II, p. 251, cols. 440–441. 474 CC I, p. 103, col. 126 or CC II, p. 407, col. 744. 475 CC I, p. 103, col. 126. The inclusion of conscience apparently harks back to Comenius’s earlier works. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 69. 476 CC I, p. 354, col. 550; CC II, p. 24, col. 22; CC II, p. 155, col. 256 and CC II, p. 189, col. 324. See also CC II, p. 39, col. 52 or CC II, p. 61, cols. 96–97, in which Comenius operates with two different triads in subsequent paragraphs. 477 See CC I, p. 456–457, cols. 739–740. 478 CC I, p. 58, col. 45.

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(imaginatio),479 judgement (judicium), and memory (memoria). The will is divided into desires (desideria), emotions (affectus), conscience (conscientia); and freedom to act (operatio), is defined by the force of motion (vis movendi), the ability to use instruments and appendages (instrumenta, membra), and dexterity (dexteritas).480 In another passage within the same part of the Consultatio, Comenius argues that emotions, together with attention (attentio), imagination (imaginatio), and memory (memoria), belong not to the highest part of man, i.e., the spirit or mind, but to the middle part, i.e., the soul, which man shares with animals.481 Although contradictory, these statements clearly indicate that the three perfections most frequently mentioned in the Consultatio, namely reason, will, and agency, must be the essential principles of the noblest part of man. All other features are of an accidental, ontologically inferior nature.482 Just for completeness’s sake, let us mention that in other passages of the Consultatio, Comenius introduces a mere dyad of the basic components of man’s inner being: reason and the will.483 Nevertheless, we are convinced that despite the terminological inconsistencies and imprecision, Comenius’s philosophical, theological, and anthropological views can be regarded as systematic, coherent and consistent. Although it is clear from the previous paragraphs that Comenius did not stick to one conception throughout the Consultatio or within the individual books or parts thereof, we can say that the discrepancies we have identified are mostly of a terminological nature and there are no serious philosophical contradictions. We can conclude this sub-chapter by saying that the component which seems best to define man is his noblest faculty, which is referred to variously as the soul, spirit, or mind and is represented as a combination of reason, will, and agency or power (other faculties are sometimes named in third place). The terminological instability (i.e., the author’s referring to the same concept with different words) by no means takes away from the coherence of Comenius’s philosophical-theological and anthropological system. If we look at the inconsistencies from a historical perspective, we can say that they may have been caused by Comenius’s need to come to terms with previous 479 In another passage, this component is replaced by talent (ingenium). See CC I, p. 364, col. 570. 480 See the sub-chapters on Pansophia and Mundus materialis. See also CC I, pp. 360–361, cols. 562–563. 481 CC I, p. 358, col. 558. 482 See also CC I, pp. 371–372, cols. 583–586 or CC I, p. 361, cols. 563–564. 483 See CC I, pp. 70–71, cols. 69–70 or CC I, p. 456, cols. 738–739.

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philosophical traditions. There is, for example, a hypothesis that Comenius arrived at his final triadic formula of ratio/intellectus – voluntas – facultates by consolidating his previous triad of ratio – voluntas – conscientia with the triad of mens – manus – lingua, as postulated by Gerolamo Cardano. We cannot put an exact date on Comenius’s conception of his triadic formula; we are, however, quite sure that the formula had not taken its final form before 1645.484 Granted, we have reason to think that Comenius’s terminological inconsistency, as apparent throughout the Consultatio, is to some extent (certainly not wholly – see the first lines of this section) attributable to the different timing of the writing of the individual parts of the Consultation and particularly to the unfinished status of the work, as the author could not review the whole work and harmonise the terminology across all its parts.485 Still, the terminological inconsistencies within the individual parts of the Consultatio are most probably due to a lack of thoroughness and terminological precision on the author’s part.486 484 Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., p. 200. 485 A similar conclusion is made by Matlová, Jana: Problémy jazyka a stylu Komenského díla De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica, op. cit., pp. 223–225. More generally, see Chyzhevsky, Dmytro: Hallské rukopisy děl J. A. Komenského [The Halle Manuscripts of the Works of John Amos Comenius]. In: AJAK XV, p. 97, 105–107. 486 See also Kyralová, Marie: Definice člověka u Komenského [Comenius’s Definition of Man]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, p. 49. For a more detailed discussion of the author’s use of Latin and his work with terminology, see the invaluable study: Nováková, Julie: Jazyk latinských spisů J. A. Komenského [The Language of the Latin Treatises by Comenius]. In: SCetH 13 (VI), 1976, pp. 45–50. On the specifics of Comenius’s language and terminology generally, see Brambora, Josef: Jak překládat Komenského [Translating Comenius]. In: SCetH 21 (IX), 1979, pp. 65–74; Nováková, Julie: Comenius’s De Rerum Humanarum Emendatione Consultatio Catholica from a philologist’s point of view. In: AC 1 (XXV), 1969, pp. 213–220 (see p. 216 for a reflection on Comenius’s terminological inconsistency); Nováková, Julie: Das Problem des Lateins Komenskýs. In: AC 3 (XXVII), 1972, pp. 411–419; Kyralová, Marie: Comenius’s Apologie seiner eigenen Latinität. In: AC 2 (XXVI), 1970, pp. 221–227; Steiner, Martin: Komenského latina. In: SCetH 38 (XIX), 1989, pp. 200–208. Jana Matlová says that the terminological inconsistencies may have been motivated by an attempt to make the language more varied. See Matlová, Jana: Problémy jazyka a stylu Komenského díla De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica, op. cit., p. 225. Pavel Floss points out that terminological and conceptual inconsistencies were the price that Comenius had to pay for choosing the approach to building a philosophical system that he chose. Comenius did not intend his philosophy to be as a fixed, logical, and well-ordered system of theses, in which all terms would be properly defined, but as

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4.2 The ontological primacy of reason, or will? Paunagia versus the rest of the Consultatio In all of the parts of the Consultatio catholica which we have discussed so far, we have been able to identify Comenius’s strong emphasis on the nobility of man’s free will which uniquely defines man against inferior creatures. Man’s freedom is repeatedly stressed in all parts of the Consultation, save Panaugia. Certain parts of Pansophia, especially the Material world and the World of human artifice, present a more complicated schema. A more thorough analysis, however, has demonstrated that ontological nobility can be attributed without reservation only to the unlimited and unconquerable will, whereas reason has only chronological primacy. Reason is the first tool of the mind that man starts using and the use of reason is always for the good of the will. According to Comenius, the will commands reason. Reason serves the will by carrying the torch of knowledge, by the light of which reason apprehends all objects perceived by the senses. Based on this apprehension, the will decides whether it should follow reason, or not (see Mundus materialis). In Pansophia, the will is identified as the highest part of man and the central perfection of the mind, which elevates man above other creatures and makes him similar to God. Comenius even goes so far as to say that the will and freedom of choice have such nobility and are so profoundly bound up with human nature that to take them away from man would mean to destroy him and degrade him to a non-man. In Pansophia, ontological priority and the highest degree of excellency are given to man’s free will: Everything that has been weighed in the brain, passes into the palace of the heart, which houses Queen Will that independently decides for or against it.487

The foregoing conclusion can be drawn from not only Mundus materialis, but other parts of Pansophia as well. For example, Mundus possibilis contains similar assertions:

“a way to approach a goal; a dogged effort to draw attention to problems that had heretofore not been satisfactorily resolved”. See Floss, Pavel: Filosofická problematika J. A. Komenského [Philosophical Questions around John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 6 (III), 1973, pp. 18–19. 487 CC I, p. 363, col. 568: “Quicquid sic in cerebro trutinatum est, transmittitur ad cordis palatium, ubi regina voluntas residet, quae pro arbitrio eligit aut reprobat.”

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So the senses and reason always come first and show the way? Always in the rational order characteristic of a rational being. Foolish is the man who does not discriminate between good and evil, yet approves of one and disapproves of the other.488

The different starting points and the insistence in Panaugia on the significance of reason as the fundamental and constitutive element of the human being invite us to use the same perspective as the one we used in our analysis of Pansophia, where we proved by means of thorough content analysis that the primacy of reason over the will was of a mere chronological nature and that reason submitted to the will and became its servant and aide. In the second chapter of Panaugia, Comenius explains that to remove the darkness from the spirit, man must follow the ways of the rational light (lux intellectualis). Provided that this light is pure and bright (pura et fulgida), it is able to carry its torches before the will.489 The following chapter can be interpreted along the same lines. In it, Comenius holds that the root of all human actions is reason. Man’s appendages, however, carry out the commands of Queen Will (Regina Voluntas). Her commands reflect her decisions and choices. She decides and chooses based on her understanding, which is mediated by reason. Her understanding is based on the perception of things by the senses.490 The validity of this interpretation may be (and is), however, compromised by Comenius’s other statements. In the sixth chapter of Panaugia, Comenius uses the microcosm-macrocosm schema to draw a parallel between man’s inner being (here understood as the soul, anima) and its three basic constituents (reason, will, and agency) with the Sun, Moon, and stars. The force of reason is analogical to the unlimited power of the Sun (solus unus sufficiens omnibus). The will is like the Moon, whose brightness is secondary to that of the Sun, from which the Moon borrows. Analogically, the will relies on the force borrowed from reason. Agentive capabilities are likened to the profusion of stars in the sky.491 In Panaugia, unlike in all the other parts of the Consultatio, the greatest nobility (i.e., not just chronological primacy) is given to reason, not the will. This is evidenced by several passages of the second book of the Consultatio, which we discussed in the part of our study dealing exclusively with Panaugia – a book in which Comenius argues that man is a reasonable creature (creatura rationalis), elevated 488 CC I, p. 209, col. 297: “Ergone sensus aut intellectus semper praecedunt? Semper in rationabili rationalis creaturae processu. Stultus enim est, qui bonum an malum sit aliquid distinguere neglecto, tamen probat vel reprobat hoc vel illud.” 489 CC I, p. 103, col. 126. 490 CC I, p. 104, col. 128. 491 CC I, p. 113, col. 146.

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above other living beings by the force of his reason, which the author identifies with the mind as such.492 The other important human features, namely the will and agency, are components of the triad of the basic faculties of the human mind; however, ontologically, they are secondary to reason.493 In Comenius’s early texts, man is defined by his reason, whereas the will is pushed into the background. According to Jan Patočka, Comenius only changed his opinion in favour of the primacy of the human will at the time when he began to reshape his philosophy into a pansophy, placing increased focus on the activity of man. This shift is believed to have occurred during the 1630s.494 Marie Kyralová, however, posits that the pansophic idea first appeared in the 1640s and was only fully articulated one decade later.495 Nor do historians agree on the causes and motivations of this shift. The first scholar to have dealt with the question was Josef Hendrich, who argued in his Comenianae that Comenius had deviated from his emphasis on reason in favour of the accentuation of the free will, typical of his late works owing to the influence of Cartesianism.496 According to Hendrich, Comenius was also influenced by the ideas of Jan Baptist van Helmont (to whose treatise De venatione scientiae Comenius refers in the seventh chapter of the Material world). Van Helmont is known to have stated that man’s nature was not defined by reason.497 Comenius’s shift towards the primacy of the free will was allegedly precipitated by his reading of the works of Descartes. Jan Patočka says that while it is beyond doubt that John Amos was familiar with Descartes’ texts, an analysis of the French philosopher’s ideas reveals that Comenius’s shift towards the primacy of the human will could not have been inspired by his reading of Descartes. Descartes had a distinct view of the difference between man and animals, namely, that man was composed of both res extensa and res cogitans, where only the latter is defined by freedom. Patočka goes on to say that in Descartes’ opinion, only the will was infinite, whereas reason was

492 CC I, pp. 111–112, cols. 143–144; CC I, pp. 123–124, cols. 167–168. 493 CC I, p. 112, cols. 144–145. 494 Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., p. 182. 495 Kyralová, Marie: Definice člověka u Komenského, op. cit., pp. 49–52. On a similar argument, see Čapková, Dagmar: Pansofie a Komenského pojetí činnosti [Pansophy and Comenius’s Conception of Agency]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, pp. 42–43. 496 Hendrich, Josef: Comeniana. VI. Komenský pod vlivem Descartovým [Comeniana VI. The influence of Descartes on Comenius]. In: Věstník Královské české společnosti nauk, Třída filosoficko-historicko-filologická, no. 7, 1950 (1951), pp. 17–20. 497 See CC I, p. 356, col. 554.

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limited – a view that is incompatible with Comenius’s conception of man as we described it earlier.498 Patočka does not merely try to challenge previously held beliefs by looking at the possible philosophical and theological sources of Comenius’s anthropology. He also concludes that Comenius may have been influenced by Bacon (see the former’s view of man as a microcosm and ruler over all creation); however, he was influenced the most by Nicholas of Cusa, who said that man differed from animals in having a free and unlimited will.499 Another scholar who has noted the influence on Comenius of Nicholas of Cusa is Dagmar Čapková, who connects Comenius’s shift towards the primacy of the will, as apparent in his later texts, to his elaboration on Cusa’s triadic formula of materia – forma – connexio, the third and the noblest component of which corresponds to the will.500 We can indeed find passages in Cusa’s works in which the author argues in favour of the primacy of free will over reason,501 as well as passages that are almost identical to the letter with the anthropological statements made by Comenius.502 Interestingly, John Amos’s anthropology comes full circle to the philosophical ideas in which he became interested in his early youth.

498 See CC I, p. 360, cols. 561–562. See also Patočka, Jan: Josef Hendrich: Comeniana. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 330–331. On more fundamental differences, see Červenka, Jaromír: Ontologické základy Komenského filosofických a pedagogických názorů [The Ontological Foundations of Comenius’s Philosophical and Pedagogical Views]. In: SCetH 13 (VI), 1976, pp. 28–29. On the evolution of Comenius’s relationship to Descartes more generally, see e.g. Mout, Nicolette: Comenius, Descartes and Dutch Cartesianism. In: AC 3 (XXVII), 1972, pp. 239–243. 499 Patočka, Jan: Josef Hendrich: Comeniana, op. cit., pp. 332–333. 500 Čapková, Dagmar: Ordo – usus – amor: K otázce propojení některých triadických principů pansofické metafyziky a jejich uplatňování v oblasti lidské činnosti [Ordo – Usus – Amor: On the Connection Between Some Triadic Principles of Pansophic Metaphysics and Their Application in the Activity of Man]. In: SCetH 62/XXIX, 1999, pp. 99–101. 501 Cusa, Nicholas of: De ludo globi I, 58; Cusa, Nicholas of: De apice theoriae 21, 4–5 and 23, 2–10; Cusa, Nicholas of: De Visione Dei 4 (12,10–12); Cusa, Nicholas of: De Visione Dei 7 (27); Cusa, Nicholas of: De Venatione Sapientiae 20 (58, 1–7); Cusa, Nicholas of: De Venatione Sapientiae 27 (82,13–14). Retrieved from: http://www. cusanus-portal.de/ [ 2016-01-31] (for more detailed bibliography, see chapter 10 of the present volume). 502 Compare e.g. Nicholas of Cusa’s De ludo globi (Cusa, Nicholas of: De ludo globi I, 34–36) with Comenius’s CC I, pp. 362–363, cols. 566–567.

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We can think of two possible explanations for the contextual uniqueness of Panaugia, which presents a problem that has so far not been resolved by Comenius scholars.503 We shall first consider the chronological aspect. Given that Panaugia largely repeats the ideas that were presented in Via lucis (for more on this treatise, see Chapter 5), which was written in the years 1641 and 1642, and given that Comenius apparently did not conceive of writing Panaugia later than 1646,504 and finally, given that Panaugia was one of the first parts of the Consultatio to have been completed, we venture the assertion that the argument of Panaugia regarding the primacy of reason over the will is related to the fact that Panaugia was written earlier than the other parts. The assertion that man is defined by reason may be a throwback to Comenius’s previously held beliefs, which were, as we shall see, based on Aristotelianism.505 Comenius definitely held these views when he wrote Via lucis. The literal correspondences between Panaugia and Via lucis are indeed quite striking, as we shall see in the fifth chapter of the present volume. Comenius’s early beliefs persisted well into the 1640s, when they gave way to a new theory, which meant a radical departure (note that a number of important passages of Pansophia, Panglottia, and Panorthosia were written as late as the 1660s).506 503 Dagmar Čapková surprisingly considers the conceptions embodied in Panaugia and Mundus materialis identical. See Čapková, Dagmar: Vztah vědy a víry u Komenského [The Relationship between Science and Faith in the Work of Comenius]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, p. 93. Similarly, Jiřina Popelová in her study of Comenius’s anthropological views considers the Consultatio homogeneous in this respect. See Popelová, Jiřina: Pojetí lidské přirozenosti u J. A. Komenského, op. cit., p. 682. 504 See Comenius’s correspondence with Hartlib. John Amos Comenius to Samuel Hartlib (Elbląg, 27 December 1646). Retrieved from: http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/ profile/work/bf980e7b-ce21-46b5-a795-f04b8b942085 [ 2016-01-31]. 505 See the Aristotelian view of man as a being that differs from animals in that he has reason and the faculty of speech. For a more detailed discussion, see e.g. Ricken, Friedo: Věčné hledání v přirozenosti člověka. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al.: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, p. 9. For a similar conclusion, see Kyralová, Marie: Obraz člověka u Komenského [The Image of Man in Comenius’s Work]. In: Prázný, Aleš – Schifferová, Věra (eds.): Pojetí světa v díle Jana Amose Komenského [The Conception of the World in the Work of John Amos Comenius]. Pardubice 2009, p. 106. 506 Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 158, 176, 179, 186, 198. On Comenius’s early conception of man characterised by the primacy of reason, see Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 141–162. It

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Let us now attempt a comparison of Panaugia and Panergesia, which may yield interesting insights insofar as the latter was written and completed around the same time as the former (probably in 1647 or 1648).507 As we have shown, the conception of man embodied in Panegersia affirms the primacy of man’s free will, in line with other parts of the Consultation. We can therefore only assume that in Panaugia, Comenius reused many conclusions from his previous works (in particular, Via lucis) without bringing them in line with the other parts of the Consultatio that he worked on.508 This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that the third faculty of the human mind mentioned in Panaugia is mostly emotions or conscience – an apparent throwback to Comenius’s earlier works.509 Jaromír Červenka says that the belief that God created the world and people in number, weight, and measure and that He imprinted those principles upon them can be found only in Comenius’s early writings (Červenka mentions Theatrum universitatis rerum, Prima philosophia, Physicae synopsis, and Panaugia). In his later works, emphasis is put on the principle of number, while the other two principles are pushed into the background.510 This would seem to bear out our own theory; however, we must say that Červenka’s statements do not survive scrutiny, for occurrences of the complete triad of numerare – mensurare – ponderare can be found in some of Comenius’s later works (Mundus materialis, the final version of Janua rerum), as well.511

should be noted that some historians of philosophy have suggested that the different conceptions of man found in Comenius’s work may be used as a key to determine the chronology of the Consultation. See Kyralová, Marie: Definice člověka u Komenského, op. cit., p. 52. 507 Čapková, Dagmar: A Manuscript Copy of the First Part of the Greatest Work by John Amos Comenius in the British Museum. In: AJAK XXIV (1970), pp. 69–71; Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky [On Comenius’s Metaphysics]. In: SCetH 6 (III), 1973, p. 44 similarly argues that Panegersia had been completed by 1648. 508 On the chronological layering of Panaugia, see Matlová, Jana: Problémy jazyka a stylu Komenského díla De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica, op. cit., p. 224. On the indebtedness of Panaugia to Via lucis, see Nováková, Julie: Comenius’ De Rerum Humanarum Emendatione Consultatio Catholica from a philologist’s point of view. In: AC 1 (XXV), 1969, pp. 213–214. 509 See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 69, 240. 510 Ibid., p. 163. 511 CC I, pp. 361–362, cols. 564–566 or CC I, p. 528, col. 883; Comenius, John Amos: Janua rerum reserata. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, p. 158 (Ad academias Europae praefatio).

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So much for this chronological theory. The second possible explanation will be outlined in the following section.

4.3 The ontological primacy of free will, or the immortal human mind? If we leave aside the aforementioned terminological ambiguity and the related fact that Comenius referred to the highest part of man variously as mens, anima, animus, spiritus, and rationalitas, we can say that the Platonic-Augustinian model of the human mind is arguably one of the mainstays of Comenius’s conception of man.512 On the other hand, Comenius’s numerous statements indicate that there is only one faculty of the human mind which can be considered the true defining feature of man’s nature, viz., free will. As we saw in our discussion of Mundus materialis, Comenius attributed one feature to each level of the hierarchy of existence, a feature that set it apart from the other levels. We can therefore assume that man is defined by one feature alone.513 If we look at the individual books of the Consultatio, in Panergesia, the one feature that set man apart from animals was his superior soul (animae praeeminentia); in all other aspects he could be surpassed by animals.514 Comenius said there that the human soul contained the essence of man, which represented the living image of the living God and had three basic faculties: reason, will, and agency.515 It was the soul, Comenius said, to which man owed his humanity.516 However, in other passages of the same book, the author said that there was only one part of the human soul that represented the Divine in man and reflected God’s greatest nobility, viz., free will. If man had been deprived of his free will, he would have been deprived of his humanity.517

512 On the practically identical formulations of Plato and St. Augustine, see Floss, Pavel: Profil antropologických názorů Mikuláše Kusánského [A Characterisation of Nicholas of Cusa’s Anthropology]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al.: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, p. 106. 513 CC I, p. 338, col. 518. 514 CC I, p. 50, col. 29. 515 Ibid. 516 CC I, p. 51, col. 30; CC I, p. 78–79, cols. 85–86. 517 CC I, p. 79, col. 87.

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More contradictory statements can be found in Pansophia, in which emphasis is put on the nobility and autonomy of the human mind, which consists of the three parts mentioned earlier, but arguments are also offered in favour of the primacy of free will. The supremacy of the mind is often explained by recourse to its Divine origin and by extension, to the fact that the mind participates in infinity and immortality (the mind was given to man, the image of God, by the Creator Himself, who thereby made man a participant in immortality). Furthermore, Comenius points out that if man could somehow be deprived of his mind, he would become a brute.518 In another statement, Comenius clearly espouses the idea that man is uniquely defined by his will: The main difference between man and animal is that the former is αὐτεξουσιóτηs, meaning that he has the free will to do anything, and therefore is the governor of everything, including himself.519

That the will has priority for Comenius is also evidenced by the fact that in Pansophia, he calls the liberum arbitrium God’s throne in man and the central perfection of the human mind. In line with Panegersia, Comenius repeats that to take the free will away from man would be to destroy him and degrade him to a non-man.520 It is unnecessary at this point to recite Comenius’s arguments for the primacy of the human mind or the centrality of man’s free will, which we have discussed in our analysis of the Consultation. It is now our aim to explain the illusive or real inconsistencies regarding Comenius’s attempts to define man. In our view, Comenius’s anthropological statements can be interpreted in two different ways. The first one is by recourse to coincidence, that is, the concordance of seemingly contradictory statements. This interpretation would be validated by the passage of Mundus moralis, in which Comenius widens the original triad of the basic and infinite principles of the human mind (scire, velle, posse) into a tetrad (scire, velle, posse, possideare in aeternum).521 If we look at this formulation in view of the seeming discrepancy between the ontological primacy of the

518 CC I, p. 360, col. 561; CC I, p. 244, cols. 356–357. 519 CC I, p. 354, col. 550: “Deinde, hominis ab animali differentia principalis nobis est, quod sit αὐτεξουσιóτηs hoc est liberum agendi quicquid libet arbitrium, atque ita in omnia, etiam seipsum, dominium.” 520 CC I, p. 369, cols. 579–580. 521 CC I, pp. 556–557, cols. 930–931.

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immortal mind versus the priority of free will, we can see that both these features are in fact comparable and related. Indeed, if we study Comenius’s statements regarding man’s nature and its defining features in more detail, we shall see that the three principal faculties of reason, will, and agency, which stem from the three fundamental principles of scire, velle, posse, together define the human mind as an instance of infinity in the finite world, which as a whole (and as a sum of its parts as well) represents the true image of God in man. The two distinct concepts are in fact not materially different, but closely related in the sense of being starting points for interpretation. To put it simply, without freedom of the will, there would be no man, and hence no mind; without the human mind, there would be no free will. Comenius repeatedly refers to the tripartite division of the human mind, which he considers a reflection of God’s mind. Man’s inner being can thus be regarded as a reflection of the tri-unity of God, being based on the indivisible unity of reason, will, and agency in the unity of the human mind.522 The infinity of man, therefore, lies in his mind and the three unlimited principles it is based on – reason, will, and agency, crowned by the middle and central perfection of free will.523 The other way to interpret the anthropological statements that Comenius makes in the Consultatio is to write them off as inconsistent, marred by the constant vacillation between the ontological primacy of the mind and the priority of the will. Indeed, if we revisit Mundus moralis, we can find a statement that affirms the primacy of the immortal mind: […] immortality gives us hope for the future and our togetherness with God. Therefore, the true and the most obvious difference between us and animals is that we can rise to God and participate in His beatitude by respecting His will. This is denied to other creatures.524

We must not fail to mention that in another passage, Comenius recognises the centrality of man’s free will, which he calls the essential feature of man’s nature:

522 On this metaphor, see e.g. CC I, p. 377, cols. 594–595. 523 For a similar interpretation, see Kalivoda, Robert: Význam J. A. Komenského pro rozvoj novodobé filozofie [The Significance of John Amos Comenius for the Development of Modern Philosophy]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, p. 118. 524 CC I, p. 556, col. 930: „[…] Immortalitae denique ad spem futuri seculi, et ipsum usque Dei consortium ascendere. Et proinde, hanc inter nos et bruta veram esse maximeque nobilitatem differentiam, quod nos numinis cultu ad Deum usque ispsum ascendere, deque illius beatitudine participare possumus: id quod aliis creaturis negatum est.”

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Freedom, I dare say, is the most wonderful human possession, created at the same time as man and inseparable from him unless he be doomed to perdition.525

Man’s free will even transcends his mortality. Man’s freedom to act is such that there are no limitations to his thought, faith, desire, and actions (unless he chooses to limit himself) or to his life. The creator made man’s mind in His image, so that it would be subordinated to nothing at all. It does not have to submit to anything, think anything, believe in anything, choose anything or do anything, unless it wants to itself. It does not even have to die, unless it decides to destroy itself.526

Surprisingly enough, Comenius locates man’s freedom in the mind, which includes the freedom to give up one’s immortality, and consequently, salvation. If we compare and analyse all the passages of the Consultatio that are of relevance to our study, we shall see that the problem is very difficult to resolve conclusively. In Mundus materialis, Comenius raises the question of whether the particular innate principles differ from the soul and answers himself thus: I negate that. Nor do capabilities differ from each other; they may differ only in our understanding. The soul sees with the eyes, hears with the ears, understands with the mind, and desires with the will. It is referred to with different words based on the prevalent effects it has. If it animates the body, it is called the soul; if it has intellection, it is called the mind; if it hopes, it is called the spirit; if it remembers, it is called memory; if it assesses the truth, it is called judgement; if it breathes, it is called breath; if it perceives, it is called a sense.527

In the light of this statement, all of the seeming ambiguity of Comenius’s assertions and shifting ontological preferences can be boiled down to the function of the current perspective from which we view man’s nature and its noblest part.528

525 CC II, p. 272, col. 482: „Libertas inquam, delicatissimum hominis bonum, et illi concreatum, et ab illo inseparabile, nisi cum intereundum est.“ 526 CC I, p. 362, col. 565: “Ita Creator mentem ad sui similitudinem efformavit, ut nulli prorsus rei mancipata sit, nec se submittere, opinari, credere, consentire, agere quidquam cogatur, nisi velit ipsa. Nec perire denique nisi seipsam perimat.” 527 CC I, p. 361, col. 564: “Nego. Nec ergo facultates inter se modo tantum concipiendi nostro. Eadem nempe anima oculo videt, aure audit, mente intelligit, voluntate vult. Sed pro efficientiis causarum diversa nomina sortitur. Dum enim vivificat corpus, anima est. Dum scit mens. Dum vult, animus. Dum recolit, memoria. Dum rectum judicat, ratio est. Dum spirat, spiritus est. Dum aliquid sentit, sensus est.” An identical description of the human mind (with minor differences in formulation) appears also in Lexicon reale pansophicum. See CC II, p. 581, col. 1074. 528 See also Kyralová, Marie: Definice člověka u Komenského, op. cit., p. 49.

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This statement above is qualified a few paragraphs later, when Comenius calls the immortal mind the primary feature of man’s nature. Without the mind, man, who was made in the image of God, would not be a true reflection of his Creator and would lack the infinite parts of the mind, including the infinite free will. The principal difference between man and a brute (summa est hominis a bruto differentia) lies in the immortality of the former’s soul (animae immortalitas). It was by virtue of the immortal soul that communion is established between man and God. Religion and free will were also created for the same purpose.529 Although free will can turn on itself and bring destruction upon the individual (exclusion from salvation), it cannot repudiate the foundation that it is based on, viz., the immortality of the human spirit. Generally though, we could say that despite the ambiguity of Comenius’s statements and the inconsistencies between them (which we refuse to interpret with definiteness), freedom of the human will and the immortality of the human mind are inseparably bound in Comenius’s conception of man. To sum up, human beings can, without a doubt, be understood as the image of God, defined by a mind composed of three basic components and the corresponding innate common notions, instincts, and capabilities that give rise to three human things.530 If we look at the problem from this perspective, the philosophical content of Panaugia, which is the only part of the Consultatio in which ontological priority is given to reason as opposed to the will, does not seem so inconsistent after all. The conflation of the mind and reason does not rule out the coincidental conception which we hinted at previously. There is another possible (though less easily defensible) explanation for the uniqueness of Panaugia – a book which, in contrast to the other parts of the Consultatio, postulates the primacy of reason over the free will.

4.4 The question of human nature In our discussion in the third chapter of this monograph, we allude to another problematic aspect of Comenius’s Consultation, viz., the question of human

529 CC I, p. 364, col. 570. See also CC I, p. 393, col. 627. 530 See also CC II, p. 122, col. 218. An alternative and more straightforward interpretation of Comenius’s views, which puts emphasis on the primacy of free will, is offered by e.g. Floss, Pavel: Komenský a Kusánus [Comenius and Cusa]. In: SCetH 2 (I), 1971, p. 21 or Popelová, Jiřina: Pojetí lidské přirozenosti u J. A. Komenského [The Conception of Human Nature in the Works of John Amos Comenius]. In: Pedagogika – Časopis pro pedagogické vědy 5 (XX), 1970, p. 681.

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nature. The term natura humana appears frequently in all books of the Consultatio, but its meaning is obscure and very little is offered in the way of a definition. In Panegersia, human nature is already described as the aggregate of the human things.531 A slightly more specific description is given in the pansophic Mundus materialis, in which Comenius explains that the world made by the perfect Creator would not have been perfect unless God had filled it with all kinds of creatures: animate and inanimate, free and unfree. Comenius also says that the perfect wisdom of God reigns over both creatures limited by their nature and creatures endowed with free will.532 On the one hand, Comenius seems to be contrasting the nature of the human being and the freedom of his will; on the other hand, he says in the Material world that the liberum arbitrium, which is inherent to man, is the centre of his nature (centrum naturae nostrae).533 Before we attempt to resolve this paradox, we suggest taking a look at another passage of the Consultatio which deals with an issue we did not analyse in the previous chapter. In Panegersia, Comenius says, in addition to what we allude to above, that if one looks into the depths of the human soul, he will be able to see that human nature contains three God-given signs (divinitatis characteres), namely the will to knowledge (velle scire), the will to domination (velle dominari), and the will to eternal beatitude (velle beatitate frui aeterna). He who does not desire that which is inseparable from human nature (inseparabiliter humanae naturae conveniat) is not a man (non homo), but a human monster (monstrum hominis).534 In the following chapters (five and seven) of the same part of the Consultatio, we read that human nature is immutable, defined mainly by the will to freedom and a free and unlimited will, which was given to man by God.535 Moreover, the natura humana is shared by all people. All people were created from the same matter, imprinted upon which was the same image of God. All people grow out of the same root, i.e., the first man (this makes people a more homogeneous group compared to angels, who were each created individually). Each person adds to the size of the trunk of mankind. Human nature as a whole is a reflection of the nature of the first man.536 Comenius continues: “There is only one human nature among all people, regardless of the part of the world they live in”. In the concluding paragraph 531 532 533 534 535 536

CC I, p. 52, col. 33. CC I, pp. 355–356, cols. 552–553. See also CC I, p. 364, cols. 569–570. CC I, p. 356, col. 553. CC I, p. 52, col. 32. CC I, p. 59, col. 46 and CC I, p. 67, col. 63. CC I, p. 77, col. 83. See also Panaugia: CC I, pp. 146–147, cols. 213–214.

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of Panegersia, which deals specifically with human nature, the author equates human nature with man’s senses, reason, will, desires, and agency – in other words, the human mind in the broadest sense of the word.537 In contrast, in Panaugia we can find only general statements to the effect that man is defined (per quam homo est) by a human nature which is shared by all people.538 If we leave aside the numerous general statements found in the subsequent book of the Consultatio, Pansophia, we are left with only a few specific observations regarding human nature. For example, in Mundus idealis Comenius says that everything must remain what it was created as (facta est). This continuity of identity is ensured by a force called nature (natura): May everything have its nature, a seal that has been placed upon it so that it would not deviate from this nature, i.e., from itself.539

Significantly more space is devoted to the issue under consideration in the second chapter of Mundus materialis, titled, revealingly, De Mundi Materialis Architectrice, Natura, cujus vi fiunt, sunt operantur et sustenantur omnia. According to Comenius, God gave all creatures the abilities they need to preserve themselves, namely, the force referred to as nature, which imposes the laws of birth and death and of activity and inactivity upon all things.540 Once again and this time in more specific terms, Comenius defines nature as the power to exist (essendi), act (operandi), and rest (quiescendi) in a certain way – a power that is inherent (vis innata) to the whole world (toti mundo) and all earthly bodies (cuique mundano corpori).541 This power comes into existence at the same time as the beings and is inseparable from them for the duration of their existence. There is nothing in the whole universe (in toto Universo) that lacks a nature.542 Although man is not mentioned in the long list of examples, it is clear that he must also have a nature. All visible differences between people are in fact negligible, caused by either different climatic conditions or different customs that translate into differences in language, talents, etc.543 Just as there is only one God, there is only one human

537 CC I, p. 72, col. 73. 538 CC I, pp. 113–114, cols. 147–148; CC I, p. 152, col. 224. 539 CC I, p. 256, col. 381: “Habeat res quaeque naturam suam, tanquam nostrum sibi impressum signaculum. Quod violare, et a natura sua (hoc est a seipso) abire, nihil audeat.” 540 CC I, pp. 301–302, cols. 444–445. 541 CC I, p. 302, col. 445. 542 CC I, p. 302, cols. 445–446. 543 CC I, pp. 303–304, cols. 448–450.

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nature.544 Human nature originates from the Divine mind (Mundus archetypus). The mode of existence that the Divine mind has assigned to a being is the existence that the being retains throughout its life.545 Granted, it is surprising that even though Comenius says that all people share one nature, he repeatedly calls the human being a creature endowed with an unlimited and unconquerable will, one whose quiddity lies in open-endedness and unlimited freedom of self-realisation. We can cite many more examples in addition to those given in the third chapter: in the seventh chapter of the Material world, Comenius speaks of four basic human temperaments that translate into inclinations, talents, and habits. These temperaments influence people, but cannot make them do anything, because people have free will.546 We also read that imagination and desirousness and the expression thereof by animals are limited by their animal nature; man, in contrast, has no limits (homini omnia data sine termino), and is therefore capable (potencialiter) of anything.547 Another passage worth mentioning is that in which Comenius points out that everything natural is active because it has a purpose.548 If we realise that man’s primary goal in life is salvation, and hence participation in eternal beatitude, it becomes clear that the view of man as a creature that has no limits and at the same time is shut up in his own immutable nature is not self-contradictory. Human nature is based on the open-endedness of man’s existence, which in turn is based on his free and unlimited will. This interpretation is confirmed by Comenius’s own words, when he says in one passage of Mundus materialis that man is born and formed and prepared for eternity for the whole duration of his earthly existence.549 Other pansophic levels also bear out this interpretation of Comenius’s view of human nature. For example in Mundus artificialis, Comenius asserts that nothing in all of human nature (in tota enim humana natura) is at rest; everything is active.550 Human nature is described as permanently active – it derives pleasure from action and languishes in inaction. Closely related to this is the question of man’s innate talents (humanum ingenium). Man is a blank sheet at birth, endowed only with the innate capacity for understanding. The humanum ingenium as such is both nothing and everything at the same time (nihil, omnia). It acquires 544 545 546 547 548 549 550

CC I, p. 360, col. 561. CC I, p. 302, col. 446. CC I, p. 366, cols. 573–574. CC I, p. 392, col. 624. CC I, p. 387, col. 614. CC I, p. 315, col. 471. CC I, p. 462, col. 750.

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its final form based on the content it is filled with. This statement is another confirmation that for Comenius, human nature was absolutely open-ended.551 In line with Panegersia, Mundus artificialis contains assertions to the effect that human nature is defined by the human mind and the principles that the mind is based on.552 This, however, does not take away from the coherence of Comenius’s view of human nature as infinitely open-ended, because – as we showed in the third chapter – man’s reason, will, and agency (the three most frequently mentioned principles of the human mind) are in essence infinite, and therefore permit man’s unlimited self-realisation. Nor is this interpretation undermined by Comenius’s repeated assertion that all people share the same nature. Each individual has an infinite mind made up of three infinite parts, and therefore is able to create himself endlessly and eternally.553 Human nature must be entirely open-ended, not least because man brought about his own fall, partially damaging his own nature.554 It is no wonder, then, that in Mundus spiritualis, the connection between human nature and free will is likened to the connection between the noblest work of creation (creaturarum sublimissima) and a dark abyss (cum abysso tenebricosa), which can lead to both salvation and eternal damnation.555 Comenius’s most specific statement regarding human nature, which confirms our interpretation, can be found in the Mundus spiritualis. In it, Comenius restates his conviction that in the beginning, God gave man free will to do both good and evil, because He made him in His own image (ad imaginem sui), absolutely free and governed solely by his own will. If man did not have free will, he would be a mere brute (brutus), bound by the shackles (vinculis constrictus) of his nature and destined to one path in life only. Man was created changeable (mutabilem) and unstable (labilem), a creature whose existence is not pure being, but becoming and enduring (fieri et durare); a creature consisting of both being and non-being, essence and nothing (ex essentia et nihilo). Comenius says: “Creation, by definition, cannot be other than changeable”. This is another statement that affirms Comenius’s view of human nature as infinitely open-ended and mutable. In Comenius’s view, man – a being endowed with reason – is changeable because he was created free. God created man free because without freedom he would not be like Him. The freedom of a being that must navigate the extremes 551 CC I, p. 463, cols. 752–753. See also CC I, p. 620, col. 1045. 552 See e.g. CC I, p. 491, col. 809. 553 See CC I, p. 549, col. 916. 554 CC I, p. 557, cols. 931–932. 555 CC I, pp. 605–606, cols. 1019–1020.

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and contradictions of life cannot be other than changeable: “Creation was not endowed with immutability, because it could not be endowed with Divinity.”556 In support of his assertions about the freedom of the human will and openendedness of human nature, Comenius repeats the arguments which we discussed in the third chapter above, namely that it would be below God to deal only with unchangeable creatures that lack agency.557 As far as theological arguments go, the only thing that may have restricted (and probably still restricts) human nature is original sin and the corruption it has wrought.558 Original sin caused the partial dislocation of man’s infinite reason, the partial blinding of his infinite free will, and the warping of his otherwise unlimited agency. All this may have disrupted the process of self-creation in individuals and caused their failure to realise their purpose in life.559 Having once received his essence, man could not have descended into nothingness. However, he lost the fullness and grace of his essence, because he lost the root of all essences, God. And because he produced offspring in his likeness, we are born corrupt to this day.560

To restore human nature in its entirety, it is not enough just to try (although man’s endeavour is a necessary component); we also need the intervention of God’s mercy. It is God’s mercy that will renew, rectify, and complete our human nature. Recited in these statements is one of the basic arguments of Comenius’s Consultation, namely that man must cooperate with God in the reformation and consummation of creation. People must first realise that their nature is corrupt and then, with the help of God’s mercy, purify it and bring it to perfection: “Our regeneration requires God’s power that restores us and our cooperation for the regeneration to last”.561 Man realises that his nature, however open-ended and indeterminate, is ultimately dependent on God.562

556 CC I, pp. 621–622, cols. 1051–1052: “Ergo creatura per naturam non potest nisi mutabilis”; “Immutatabilitas ergo creaturae dari non potuit, quia divinitas dari non potuit.” 557 CC I, pp. 622–623, cols. 1052–1054. 558 See e.g. CC I, p. 715, col. 1239. 559 CC I, p. 630, col. 1068. 560 CC I, p. 625, col. 1059: “In nihilum redigi quidem homo non poterat, accepta semel substantia. At substantiae suae plenitudinem et gratiam amisit, amissa substantiarum omnium radice DEO. Cumque posteros ad sui similitudinem postea genuerit, inde factum est, quod omnes corrupti hodieque nascamur.” 561 CC I, p. 660, col. 1128: “Ad regenerationem nostram virtute Dei nos restituente opus est; ad continuationem ejus cooperatione nostra.” 562 CC I, p. 463, col. 753.

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The philosophical and theological content of the other books of the Consultatio is in line with this observation. In Pampaedia, Comenius repeats his conviction that all people have the same nature, the central element of which is the mind and its infinite faculties. This nature is in essence active (est activa tota), and hence open to cultivation (“idonea ergo excoli”):563 Children can theoretically speak any language, but speak only the language that they have acquired. To put it more generally, children know everything in possibility, but in actuality they know only what they have learned; their possibilities and capabilities are limitless and equally suited to anything.”564

What is new here is the emphasis on the impossibility of making free man act against his own will. When one forces something upon his fellow human being, he abuses (vim inferre) and violates (violatio) his nature.565 There is nothing in nature that is more unstable (nihil volubilius) than man, who is the most difficult to contain in any boundaries (cancellis includi).566 The requirement expressed in Pampaedia that human nature must not be abused through violence is echoed in Panorthosia. According to Comenius, things may be treated in no other way than what their nature permits. Metals ought to be smelted, wood ought to be chopped, animals ought to be domesticated, and man ought to be persuaded, because he was created free and as such cannot be forced to do anything by other beings or God Himself.567

563 CC II, pp. 20–21, cols. 15–16; CC II, p. 20, col. 14; CC II, p. 39, col. 52. In line with this view is also the requirement for a universal teacher who should educate others in the skills that lead to the perfection of human nature, in particular, the ability to recognise the truth (which corresponds to the cultivation of reason), the ability to make good decisions (which corresponds to the cultivation of the will), and the ability to take care of everything that needs to be done (which corresponds to the cultivation of agency). See CC II, pp. 55–56, cols. 84–87. For a similar interpretation, see also Popelová, Jiřina: Pojetí lidské přirozenosti u J. A. Komenského, op. cit., p. 680. 564 CC II, p. 77, col. 128: “Infantes sciunt omnes linguas, loqui autem illam tantum quam actu discunt. Generalius ita possumus dicere: Infantes omnia scire potentia; actu tantum illa omnia quae didicerunt. Est enim indefinita, et ad omnia indifferens eorum potentia et habilitas […].” 565 CC II, p. 26, col. 27; CC II, p. 31, col. 37. 566 CC II, p. 37, col. 48. 567 CC II, p. 284, col. 506; CC II, p. 286, col. 510; CC II, p. 370, col. 679.

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5. The conception of man in selected works of the panorthotic period 5.1 The transition between the pansophic and panorthotic periods As we mention in the second chapter, we agree with Jan Patočka’s view that the transition between Comenius’s pansophic and panorthotic periods coincides with the philosopher’s stay in London from 1641 to 1642. If we take a more indepth look at the texts written prior to this stay, we find no explicit mentions of a great reformation (i.e., panorthosia) of the so-called human things. Comenius’s treatises from the close of the 1630s, or the first year of the following decade, are pansophic in character, not panorthotic.

5.1.1 Pansophiae praeludium This observation is borne out by Comenius’s treatise Pansophiae praeludium,568 published without the author’s knowledge in Oxford in 1637 under the title Conatuum Comenianorum praeludia569 and in a slightly revised version (this time approved by Comenius) at the beginning of 1639 under the title Pansophiae prodromus.570 In the introduction, Comenius states his intention to write

568 The full title is Pansophiae praeludium, quo sapientiae universalis necessitas, possibilitas facilitasque (si ratione certa ineatur) breviter ac [di]lucide demonstratur. 569 Conatuum Comenianorum praeludia ex bibliotheca S[amuelis] H[artlibii]. Oxford 1637. See Klosová, Markéta: O Předehře pansofie a jejím Objasnění [On the Prelude to Pansophy and Its Elucidation]. In: Comenius, John Amos: Předehra pansofie. Objasnění pansofických pokusů [Prelude to Pansophy. Elucidation of pansophic attempts]. Prague 2010, p. 10; Patočka, Jan: Komentáře ke spisům z díla Opera didactica omnia [Commentaries on the Treatises from Opera didactica omnia]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp, 252–255 or Turnbull, G. H.: Hartlib, Dury and Comenius: Gleanings from Hartlib´s Papers, op. cit., pp. 342–349. 570 Reverendi et Clarissimi viri Johannis Amos Comenii Pansophiae prodromus, in quo admirandi illius et vere incomparabilis operis necessitas, possibilitas utilitas solide, perspicue et eleganter demonstratur. Ei, quae nova hac editione accesserint, indicat praefatio S[amuelis] H[artlibii] ex promixa post eam pagina. Londini 1639. See. Klosová, Markéta: O Předehře pansofie a jejím Objasnění, op. cit., pp. 16–17. On the treatise more generally: Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky. In: SCetH

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a small encyclopedia or pansophy (Encyclopaediolam seu Pansophiolam).571 This pansophy would be a lively image of the universe of things; a brief summary of all knowledge (universae eruditionis breviarium solidum); the torch of human reason; the fixed norm of the verity of things; a reliable overview of life goals; and a ladder to heaven.572 Comenius adds that the primary aim of education reform should be to make education universal (ut eruditio sit universalis), understandable, well-organised and reliable.573 The Praeludium represents a detailed proposal for a pansophic project. If we manage to build a pansophy, we will have found a way to teach everything to all people and to bring the mind of man closer to the image of our wise God. We will also have accelerated the approach of the golden age.574 All mentions of emendation (emendatio) in the Praeludium are related exclusively to education (eruditio).575 There is no mention (save one cursory remark) of the other human things, the emendation of which would become a priority in Comenius’s later works. The phrase res humanae comes up a few times, but no fixed definition or an attempt at one is presented (for example, ‘how best to serve the human things’ or ‘to deal with the human things’).576 There is very little in the way of a conception of the universal reformation of the human things, although in one passage of the Praeludium, Comenius mentions the church (ecclesia) and politics in this connection. He says only that people should pray for God’s mercy to heal the wounds of schools, churches, and politics and spread peace all around the Christian world.577 This isolated and perhaps rather rhetorical plea cannot be considered a definition of panorthosia. Pansophiae praeludium is, more than anything else, an assortment of the author’s generic and implied wishes.578 At best we could

6 (III), 1973, pp. 36–38; Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., pp. 252–255; Young, J. T.: Faith, Medical Alchemy and Natural Philosophy. Johann Moriaen, Reformed Intelligencer, and the Hartlib Circle. Aldershot 1998, pp. 121–127. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae praeludium. In: Id: Opera omnia 15/II. Prague 1989, pp. 11–53. 571 Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae praeludium. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15/II. Prague 1989, p. 9. 572 Ibid., p. 28. 573 Ibid., pp. 28–29. 574 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 575 Ibid., p. 15 or p. 24. 576 Ibid., pp. 14, 18 or 26. 577 Ibid., p. 30. 578 Ibid., p. 29.

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say that it contains a germ of the idea of universal emendation, but certainly not any explicit and coherent definition of it.579 As indicated above (and in the second chapter), we agree (although not without reservations) with Jan Patočka’s periodisation of Comenius’s work, including his arguments in support of it. In his study titled Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského [The Evolution of Comenius’s Pedagogical Thought], Patočka points out that Comenius’s stay in London marked a turning point for the philosopher in that he adopted not only the panorthotic idea, but also the idea of universalism. Prior to the stay, Comenius had been an advocate of the so-called ‘minor restoration’ of the Czech nation. It was only in the 1640s that his latent universalism metamorphosed into the ‘overt and resonant’ universalism of the late period.580 However, in the treatise Pansophiae praeludium, Comenius addresses his pansophic plans to the whole human race (gens humana) and especially to all Christians regardless of social status, age, sex, or language: For every being born as a man should direct himself toward the singular goal – the glory of God and his own beatitude. Nobody, not a man or a woman, not a child or an old man, not a nobleman or a commoner, not a craftsman or a farmer, may be excluded.581

One of the traditionally cited reasons for classifying the treatise as pansophic is somewhat weakened; nevertheless, the main philosophical-theological argument of the work is in line with our initial view.

5.1.2 Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio The argument of the Praeludium is repeated in the brief treatise Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio (published for the first time at the end of 1638 in Leszno and for the second time several months later in 1639 in London), which Comenius wrote as an attempt to explain and defend the Praeludium.582 The Dilucidatio, too, 579 See also ibid., p. 43. See further Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., p. 29. 580 Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského ve všenápravném období, op. cit., pp. 73–74. As we mention in the second chapter, this has been interpreted by some Comenius scholars, e.g. Jiřina Popelová, as proof that a panorthotic dimension was present in Comenius’s work even prior to the philosopher’s stay in London. 581 Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae praeludium. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15/II. Prague 1989, p. 52: “Omnes enim, qui homines nati sunt, ad eundem gloriae Dei beatitudinisque suae finem dirigendi sunt, nec excludendus quisquam, non vir, non foemina, non puer, non senex, non nobilis, non plebeius, non opifex, non rusticus etc.” 582 See Klosová, Markéta: O Předehře pansofie a jejím Objasnění, op. cit., pp. 16–18. On the treatise more generally: Čapková, Dagmar – Pavlíková, Děvana: Nález prvního vydání Komenského spisu Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio [The Discovery of

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embodies Comenius’s desire for more comprehensive knowledge, which would be made available to the minds of people by constructing an image of the universe (imago Universi), a faithful reflection of the quantity and quality of all things.583 The treatise does not contain any mentions of the human things or the need to reform them (the res humanae are vaguely described as possibilities available to man).584 The Dilucidatio, however, presents an elaboration on the universalistic theme which was outlined in the Praeludium. Comenius says that universal wisdom (omni-sapientia or sapientia universalis), i.e., pansophia would help to find a way for all people on Earth to know and follow God.585 He goes on to say that once built, pansophy would benefit not only Christians, but every being born as a man (omnibus qui homines nati sunt).586 The concluding passages in which Comenius outlines his plan for the pansophic work (it was meant to be divided into seven parts, as would be Pansophia in the Consultatio), make it clear that the treatise indeed falls into the pansophic period as opposed to panorthotic.587 Interestingly, Patočka considers the Dilucidatio the first treatise in which Comenius argued that there were only three books or sources of knowledge. Patočka concludes that the Dilucidatio was an important step forward from the Praeludium and the philosopher’s other early works. Content analysis, however, reveals that this conclusion is only partially valid. In the Praeludium, Comenius discusses not only knowledge of God (Deus) and nature (natura), but also art (ars), which together with the first two constitutes human knowledge (scientia). Comenius uses the term ars to refer to certain aspects of the activity of man (cogitationes, sermones, opera), which take place in the human mind. Patočka’s assertion that the Dilucidatio is characterised by the appearance of the notion of

the First Edition of Comenius’s Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio]. In: SCetH 50/ XXIII, 1993, pp. 26–34; Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., pp. 247–250; Patočka, Jan: Komentáře ke spisům z díla Opera didactica omnia, op. cit., pp. 256–257. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio. In: Id: Opera omnia 15/II. Prague 1989, pp. 57–82. 583 Comenius, John Amos: Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15/II. Prague 1989, pp. 60–61. 584 Ibid., p. 69. 585 Ibid., p. 66. 586 Ibid., p. 68. 587 Ibid., p. 70–73. On the development of Comenius’s pansophic conception in the panorthotic period, see Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského ve všenápravném období, op. cit., pp. 75–79.

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three sources of knowledge, which is supposed to set the treatise apart from the philosopher’s earlier works, is only partially true.588

5.1.3 Pansophiae diatyposis Comenius’s works which belong to the period under consideration, i.e., preceding the publication of Via lucis, and which illustrate the evolution of Comenius’s pansophic thought also include the first two books of the so-called Premises of Pansophy, positively written before 1636, and the treatise titled Praecognitorum liber tertius, published later. Considering that the third book of the Praecognitorum mostly draws on the previous two, which are substantially older, and considering also that the entire philosophical content of the corpus is restated in Comenius’s subsequent publication, Pansophiae diatyposis,589 we suggest focusing on the Diatyposis only.590 Comenius started working on the Diatyposis in 1639, but published it only in 1643 (and for the second time in 1645). In terms of content, the treatise represents a collection, synthesis and refinement of the ideas expressed in Praecognita pansophiae, Praeludium and Dilucidatio. It is therefore worthy of our attention.591 Content-wise, the Diatyposis, which is divided into three independent parts (ichnographia, orthographia, scenographia) characterised by an increasing level of detail, also belongs to the pansophic period. In the introduction, Comenius contemplates the construction of a Templum sapientiae, a book that would encompass everything that ever was, is now and ever will be; a book which would

588 See e.g. Comenius, John Amos: Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15/II. Prague 1989, p. 64. Cf. also Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 165, 194. 589 The full title is Pansophiae diatyposis ichnographica et orthographica delineatione totius futuri operis amplitudinem, dimensionem, usus adumbrans. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae diatyposis I. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 169–278. 590 On this subject, see Ludvíkovský, Jaroslav: Komenského Praecognita Pansophica [Comenius’s Praecognita Pansophica]. In: AJAK XVI–2, 1957, pp. 165–169. On the treatise more generally, see Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky [On Comenius’s Metaphysics]. In: SCetH 6 (III), 1973, pp. 39–43; Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., pp. 251–256. 591 See Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., p. 257.

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lead man back to the origin – God.592 Human knowledge would thus be made universal (universalem), true (veram) and easy (facilem).593 The text is concerned solely with pansophy. As for panorthosia, there are only a few mentions of the res humanae, however, the usage of the term is vague and inaccurate.594 When the human things are identified (however, not yet defined), it is done in a roundabout way by mentioning the groups that represent them: scholars (eruditi), politicians (politici) and theologians (ecclesiastici), but also commoners (vulgi) and all the world’s nations (omnium totius orbis gentes).595 In the subsequent passages, Comenius adds artium et scientiarum studiosi, authores and medici.596 Despite the vagueness, we see in Pansophiae diatyposis an adumbration (nothing specific or determined) of the idea that the human things have fallen into disarray and that they need to be put back in order. The vision of the final state of the human things following their reformation is, however, a far cry from Comenius’s late conception of a new and comprehensive philosophy, new religion and new politics. The idea of the reformation of the human things set forth in the Diatyposis is still much too vague. The reader can glean only that the reformed philosophy should be a true philosophy, which is the true knowledge of things.597 The basic human disciplines should be restored to their original, intact state. This mere return to ancient paths (Comenius alludes here to Jer. 6:16) is, however, a far cry from the conception of universal emendation embodied in the Consultatio.598 The philosophical-theological conception of man presented in the treatise is in line with Comenius’s earlier works. Man is described as a being endowed with a mind (mens), which cannot be separated from him without turning him into an animal. The basic faculty of man’s mind is definitely its capacity for thinking.

592 Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae diatyposis I. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 175–176. 593 Ibid., p. 175. 594 See e.g. ibid., p. 178. 595 Ibid., p. 182. 596 Ibid., pp. 183, 230. 597 Ibid., p. 186. On similar statements, see also pp. 188–189, 228. 598 Ibid., p. 193. Jan Patočka makes a similar commentary on the Diatyposis, although his reasons are different. He says, among other things, that the treatise does not even remotely suggest that not one, but a whole raft of books imbued with the pansophic spirit of harmony would be necessary to mend the human things. Patočka calls the Diatyposis an obscure nucleus of the Consultatio. See Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., p. 261.

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It is as natural for the mind to think (cogitare) as it is for the eye to see and for the ear to hear.599 Like the Dilucidatio, the Diatyposis is informed by Comenius’s universalism. The motto πάντες, πάντα, παντως is, nevertheless, related to pansophia, not to panorthosia. It is also quite clear that the treatise belongs to the pansophic period, of which it is the apogee.600 Just for completeness’ sake, it should be mentioned that the Diatyposis operates with the concept of three sources of knowledge, being nature, the human mind and the Scripture, and the three corresponding ways of knowing (senses, reason, faith).601 Another important difference between the two periods, one which we have hinted at and of which we should be reminded again, is related to Comenius’s evolving pansophic conception. In the treatises from the earlier period, i.e., prior to Comenius’s stay in London, pansophy was conceived of as an upward spiral, proceeding from Prolegomena generalia and systema notionum communium (Dilucidatio; in the case of the Diatyposis, we can speak of Praeparatoria [seu] generales illas et communes rerum rationes602) to the Material world, to man and the world of human artifice, to the angelic world and finally, to God. In the later period, Comenius adopts a cyclical model, as can be found in the Consultation (proceeding from the Mundus possibilis, to God and His mind, to the angelic world and then to the material world and the worlds co-created by man and to the eternal world, at which point the ontological circle is completed).603 In this connection, Patočka ventures a speculation about Comenius’s familiarity with the work and ideas of Descartes (in particular, his concepts of ego cogitans and

599 Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae diatyposis I. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 225–227. 600 Ibid., pp. 194–195 and 240–241. See also Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., p. 257. 601 Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae diatyposis I. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 176, 177. On the content of the treatise, see also e.g. Patočka, Jan: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., pp. 216–217. 602 Comenius, John Amos: Pansophiae diatyposis I. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 207, 228. 603 On the original conception, see e.g. Comenius, John Amos: Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15/II. Prague 1989, pp. 70–73; on the subsequent transformation of it, see the third chapter of the present volume. On the evolution of Comenius’s pansophic conception during the panorthotic period, see e.g. Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského ve všenápravném období, op. cit., pp. 75–79.

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ens infinitum) and about the hypothetical influence of Campanella’s Universalis philosophia seu Metaphysica.604

5.2 Texts from the panorthotic period 5.2.1 Via lucis The first treatise from the panorthotic period which is of relevance to our study of Comenius’s philosophical and theological conception of man is Via lucis, written in 1641.605 As Jan Patočka has pointed out and as should become clear from the following analysis, Via lucis presents a vision of the great reformation of the human things that is similar to that embodied in the Consultatio.606 Before we set out to analyse the philosophical and theological ideas contained in the text, we should realise that Comenius wrote the body text of the treatise during his stay in London, however, the long dedicative preface was only written in 1668, that is, shortly before the first publication of the treatise in Amsterdam.607 As we shall see later, there are important discrepancies between the body text and the preface. 604 See Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 77, 173, 177. On the hypothetical influence of the Cartesian cogito on Comenius’s thought, see the exhaustive study by Jan Patočka: Filosofické základy Komenského pedagogiky, op. cit., pp. 205–212; see also Floss, Pavel: Filosofická problematika J. A. Komenského [Philosophical Questions around John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 6 (III), 1973, p. 22. On the other hand, Jaromír Červenka points up the substantial limitations of Descartes’ metaphysical conception and argues that Comenius’s ideas, which are often put down to the Cartesian inspiration, are in fact the philosopher’s original notions (if Comenius was influenced by anybody at all, it was St. Augustine). See Červenka, Jaromír: Mundus possibilis (Ein Versuch der Analyse des Eintrittsgradus der Pansophie), op. cit., pp. 15–20. 605 Via lucis vestigata et vestiganda h. e. Rationabilis disquisitio, quibus modis intellectualis animorum LUX, SAPIENTIA, per omnes omnium hominum mentes et gentes jam tandem sub mundi vesperam feliciter spargi possit. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 281–385. 606 Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského ve všenápravném období, op. cit., p. 88. On the treatise more generally, see Voigt, Uwe: Illegitime Säkularisierung oder berechtihe Selbstverweltlichung? Die Bedeutung der ‚Via lucis´ für die Geschichtsauffassung des Comenius. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, pp. 45–65 or Young, J. T.: Faith, Medical Alchemy and Natural Philosophy. Johann Moriaen, Reformed Intelligencer, and the Hartlib Circle. Aldershot 1998, pp. 127–137. 607 Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 373–374. On the circumstances of the writing of the treatise during Comenius’s stay in London, see Turnbull, G. H.: Hartlib, Dury and Comenius: Gleanings from Hartlib’s Papers. London

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If we consider the body text alone, we shall see that Comenius defines man, in line with the Consultatio, as a being created in the image of God (ad imaginem Dei conditus), whose rational soul (anima rationalis) was breathed into him by God.608 Man was placed in the temporal world, which represents a school that precedes the school of eternity, i.e., the heavenly academy. God gave man three sources of knowledge, or three books, that represent apographa of their common archetype (archetypi apographa) and reflect God’s sublimity, power, wisdom and goodness. In line with the Consultation, the three books include the visible world (mundus visibilis), man (homo) and his mind and the Holy Scripture,609 corresponding to the three basic ways of knowing – sensory, rational and religious.610 Also adumbrated in Via lucis is the open-endedness and indeterminateness of human existence, which will be fully developed in the Consultatio. In Via lucis, man is described as a being that determines his own fate, relying in this respect mainly on education.611 He can debase himself if he so chooses, as evidenced by the example of the contemporary adherents of Epicureanism.612 This assertion reappears in Mundus materialis. The importance of human freedom for Comenius is evident from his description of human nature in Via lucis as mindful of its innate freedom (concreatae sibi libertatis memor) as well as from his assertion that the love of freedom is so important to the human mind that there is nothing or nobody that can subdue it.613 Echoed in Via lucis are some of the most remarkable passages of the Consultatio, for example: The Creator God made man free in His own image with such determination that not even He can force anything upon him. For everything that God asks of man He asks without threat; He teaches, dispenses advice, exhorts, entreats, promises rewards and announces punishments not to force man against his will, but to make him want it too.614

1947, pp. 342–370 or Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 285–306. 608 Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 293–294, 305. 609 Ibid., pp. 293–294. 610 Ibid., pp. 337. 611 Ibid., p. 295. Comenius goes on to say that our hope for the reformation of the world is in educating the youngest generations. See pp. 345–346. 612 Ibid., p. 296. 613 Ibid., pp. 298–299. 614 Ibid., p. 302: “Liberrimum agens Deus hominem ad imaginem sui condidit tam fixo consilio, ut ne ipse quidem vim ei inferat. Quicquid enim ab eo exigit, non vi exigit,

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Closely related to the foregoing is another characteristic of man, which appears in both texts under comparison. If God does not force man or treat him like a stone or a piece of wood, in other words, if God Himself does not turn man into a non-man (ex homine non-hominem faciat), why should man not treat his fellow men in the same way? In Via lucis, Comenius pleads that people cast away their violent ways of treating others and things, because violence is totally incongruous with human nature.615 Only when we have managed to settle our disagreements and have eradicated violence and its causes will there be universal peace (pax universalis) on earth. In an allusion to the Prophets, Comenius says that nations will beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks and that no nation will take up sword against nation.616 In another passage, Comenius particularises his conception of human nature, attributing to it a Divine character and a desire to return to its infinite origin.617 As far as the internal division of man is concerned, it is interesting that Comenius returns to the tripartite conception of the human mind (mens) as consisting of reason (intellectus), will (voluntas) and conscience or emotions (conscientia seu affectus).618 Jan Patočka calls Via lucis ‘the Consultatio in a nutshell’.619 This point needs to be qualified by adding that the philosophical and theological content of Via lucis is largely similar to only one part of the Consultatio, namely Panaugia.620 This is evident from not only the fact that in Panaugia, the aspect of the mind mentioned in the third place is emotions or conscience, but also, and more importantly, from the fact that in both Via lucis and Panaugia, Comenius positively identifies reason as that which ultimately defines man, although in his conception, man is constituted by three components and significant emphasis is put on his freedom. The primacy of reason postulated in Via lucis may have a chronological explanation. Like in the Consultatio, John Amos says here that reason serves as a

sed docendo, suadendo, hortando, obtestando, praemia promittendo, aut poenas denunciando; non ut nolentem cogat, sed ut volentem efficiat.” 615 Ibid., pp. 295–296, 300, 302. 616 Ibid., pp. 359–360. On sources, see e.g. Isa. 2:3, Mic. 2:3, Jer. 60:18. 617 Ibid., p. 293. 618 Ibid., pp. 310–311. 619 Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 178–181; Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., pp. 266. 620 See ibid., p. 373. On the relationship between Via lucis and Panaugia or the Consultatio as a whole, see the fourth chapter of the present volume.

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guiding light for the will which comes after it. But there is a possible ontological explanation as well. Comenius reiterates that the light of the mind is superior to the other faculties of the spirit and if reason was separated from the mind, the whole mind (mens) would be destroyed, because it would be deprived of the images and forms of things.621 This interpretation of Comenius’s view of man and the human mind is also borne out by the fact that in the entire body text of Via lucis, John Amos says that the mind was endowed only with innate notions (notiones innatae universales) in the act of Creation, and therefore all people, regardless of sex, age, religion and nationality, share one human nature.622 Other important philosophical and theological notions that appear in both the Consultatio and Via lucis include echatology, the microcosm-macrocosm schema623 and an emphasis on man’s responsibility to cooperate with God in the reformation of the human things. The human things are not spelled out in the body text, but it is clear from the context that they are regarded by the author as corrupt and in need of a thorough reformation. This is also in line with the Consultation.624 Speaking of man’s responsibility to cooperate with God, let us reiterate that in Via lucis, the task of reformation is described as highly exigent. However, without God’s mercy, any human endeavour is futile and any attempt at reformation that does not seek God’s help is an act of imprudence or even pride.625 Just for completeness’ sake, let us mention that Comenius primarily addressed his proposal for reformation embodied in this brief treatise to the Christians, whom he regarded as equal, in keeping with his non-denominationalism. Once the Christians receive the message, the light of God (Lux Dei) can be spread

621 Ibid., pp. 310–311, 319. For the same opinion, see Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., p. 295. 622 Ibid., pp. 301, 312. We believe that the same can be said of Panaugia, although Jaromír Červenka maintains that the chief difference between Via lucis and Panaugia lies in the fact that this conception is absent from the former and fully developed in the latter. See Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky, op. cit., pp. 44, 49. 623 On this, see esp. Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, p. 311. 624 See e.g. ibid., p. 335. Patočka, with whom we agree on this point, says that Comenius’s conception of the reformation of the human things as set forth in Via lucis does not have the cohesion of the later conception embodied in the Consultatio catholica. See Patočka, Jan: Vývoj pedagogického myšlení Komenského ve všenápravném období, op. cit., p. 88. 625 See Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, p. 363.

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to the Mohammedans (Mahumedanis), whom Comenius considered the closest relatives of Christians, and then to heathens and Jews.626 In relation to what we have said, the dedicative preface to Via lucis, which saw the light of day a whole 26 years later than the treatise itself, shows a number of striking deviations. The most obvious is the increased emphasis on the division of man’s inner being into three parts: reason, will and agency (instead of conscience or emotions), which correspond to the three basic principles of scire, velle, posse. These principles are inherent to everybody in the form of common notions (communes notitiae), common instincts (communes instinctus) and common capabilities (communes facultates). Comenius calls attention to his original philosophical treatment of common instincts and capabilities by saying that philosophers have so far only dealt with common notions and this without the needed precision and thoroughness.627 Thus, Comenius expands on his conception of human nature by saying that the three basic principles of scire, velle, posse looks similarly (similiter) in all people, regardless of nation, age and status.628 Another important deviation is that the preface spells out the human things, which include eruditio, religio and politia – the same ones as those in the Consultatio. There are also repeated calls for the emendation of the human things.629 The long preface to Via lucis leaves no doubt as to which period of Comenius’s career the treatise belongs to. While the body text of Via lucis does not deviate in any way from the philosophical-theological tenor of the Consultation (being related especially to Panaugia), the dedicative preface is even more similar to the Consultatio (particularly in the two aspects we mention above).630 This conclusion comports with Jan Patočka’s observation that Via lucis was Comenius’s first treatise in which he indicated the necessity of writing not one general book (a pansophy), but several general books – a clear adumbration of 626 Ibid., p. 366. On Comenius’s view of Jews, see Bartoň, Josef: Židovské otazníky u J. A. Komenského [Jewish Question Marks around the Work of John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, pp. 131–138. 627 Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 286, 287. 628 Ibid., p. 286. 629 Ibid. 630 The same conclusion was arrived at by e.g. Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., p. 293. For completeness’ sake, let us mention that the treatise Via lucis is plagued with the same inconsistencies that beset Comenius’s Consultatio. The flagrant terminological inconsistencies are in evidence here as well. For example, man’s inner being is referred to variously as mens, anima and animus. See the previous discussion and also Comenius, John Amos: Via lucis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 302, 305.

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the Consultation, of which Panorthosia would be the most important part.631 We can see the metamorphosis of pansophy into panorthosis, the aim of which is not mere education, but an education towards the reformation of the three basic human things. Emendation is thus elevated to the level of man’s fundamental goals in life along with the goal that was mentioned earlier, namely, salvation and participation in eternal life. Pansophy remains the primary goal of Comenius’s new work, but it is equally important as the other six parts of De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica, of which it forms an inseparable part.632

5.2.2 Angelus pacis The short treatise Angelus pacis633 is another representative of Comenius’s panorthotic work in terms of both content and dating. It was written in 1667 and addressed to the representatives of the two rival maritime powers of England and the Netherlands who gathered for a meeting at Breda. The title of the treatise betrays the foundations it was based on. In an allusion to Isa. 33:7, Comenius proclaims himself one of the angels of peace (angelus pacis) and proceeds to argue that the two enemies, meaning the English and the Dutch, should make peace.634 By and large, Angelus pacis rehashes the anti-violence arguments found in the Consultation. The main focus is on the theological dimension. Comenius says that Christ spread the message of love and service to others and that our Gospel is the Gospel of peace.635 The practical nature of the text is evident from the passages in which John Amos tries to convince the representatives of the two nations, to whom the treatise was addressed, to make peace by marshalling a wide array of pragmatic arguments in favour of the armistice. First and foremost, the nations had already demonstrated their might and were now under a moral obligation to settle the matter in order to ensure the continued protection of 631 See Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., p. 263. 632 See ibid., p. 266. 633 The full title is Angelus pacis ad legatos pacis, Anglos et Belgas Bredam missus indeque ad omnes Christianos per Europam et mox ad omnes populos per orbem totum mittendus ut se sistant belligerare destitant pacisque principi Christo, pacem gentibus jam loquuturo, locum faciant. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Angelus pacis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 13. Prague 1974, pp. 177–211. For a more detailed discussion of the treatise, see e.g Polišenský, Josef: Comenius, the Angel of Peace and the Netherlands in 1667. In: AC 1 (XXV), 1969, pp. 63–66. 634 Comenius, John Amos: Angelus pacis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 13. Prague 1974, p. 181. 635 Ibid., pp. 134, 182.

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the Christian world against external enemies.636 Although this may indicate that John Amos stood in favour of waging wars against non-Christians, it is not so. The author corrects himself later, saying that not even the Christians who wage war against heathens can justify their actions, as they do something that God did not ask of them; moreover, Christ expressly forbade violence.637 Speaking of Comenius’s various arguments against the use of violence, we should mention that unlike his other works from the same period which also deal with the subject, Angelus pacis presents only pragmatic and theological arguments; no philosophical motives for the rejection of violence are mentioned. This is all the more surprising considering that Angelus pacis includes mentions of the human things, although upon closer inspection, we see that the term is used to mean jura et leges, i.e., politics, to which Comenius later adds divina, i.e., the Divine things. The explicit mention of this dyad by Comenius makes the absence of the third traditional human thing, namely philosophy, all the more conspicuous.638 When Comenius later writes of the need to restore the human things, he suggests that people first reform religion, so that they can proceed (after having disposed of irreconcilability) to reform politics and reconcile all people.639 We can only speculate about the reasons why Comenius altered his older conception. The alteration may have been motivated by the practical nature of the treatise, the comprehensibility and straightforwardness of which might have been compromised by the inclusion of philosophical material (just for completeness’ sake, we should mention that Jan Patočka, among others, characterises the treatise as grounded in theories and constructions – an opinion we do not share).640 The treatise contains one occurrence of the term ‘human nature’, used in connection with human freedom (in the same sense as in the Consultatio)641 and several passages with marked eschatological overtones, just to mention a few aspects that are of relevance to this study.642

636 637 638 639 640

Ibid., p. 186. Ibid., p. 188. Ibid., p. 202. Ibid., p. 197. See Patočka, Jan: Epilogue [to Gentium salutis reparator – Posel míru a blaha národů]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, p. 126. 641 Comenius, John Amos: Angelus pacis. In: Id.: Opera omnia 13. Prague 1974, p. 134. 642 See e.g. ibid., pp. 197–199.

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5.2.3 Unum necessarium Comenius’s late treatise Unum necessarium643 contains yet another restatement of the author’s basic philosophical-theological conception set out in the Consultatio. Man is described as an intermediary (medium) between God and creation, the image of God (Creatoris sui imago); and the governor and ruler (gubernator et dominus) over the visible world. In line with the Consultatio, man is called a small world and a small God (parvus mundus et parvus Deus).644 Unum necessarium also retains the tripartite model of man as consisting of a body (corpus), a soul (anima), and an immortal spirit (animus [seu] spiritus immortalis), which we have seen in the Consultatio.645 The one thing necessary is for man to be wise, i.e., to know how to treat things, people, and God. This wisdom translates into the proper practice of philosophy (philosophia), politics (politia), and religion (religio), without the knowledge and use of which a man is not a man, but a brute.646 The commonalities between Unum necessarium and the Consultatio include the concept of the three human things (res humanae647); the conviction that these things uniquely define man; and the concept of the three fundamental sources of wisdom and knowledge. The word of God is believed to have three forms: the mind’s light (lumen mentis), which God breathed (inspiratum) into all rational beings (i.e., angels and people); wisdom, which was given to corporeal beings that constitute the world; and wisdom expressed in words and recorded in prophecies. The knowledge available to the human mind lends itself to rational apprehension; the visible world is perceived through the senses; and the Holy Scripture is studied through faith.648 Comenius calls the human mind the true image of God in man. As such, it was endowed with knowledge of numbers, measures, and weights, i.e., the principles based upon which God created the world (see Wisd. 11:21).649 The mind is uniquely equipped to apprehend the world in its entirety, because it was endowed with three kinds of norms (normae). Inhered in the mind are innate notions 643 The full title is Unum necessarium scire quid sibi sit necessarium in vita et morte et post mortem. Amsterodami 1668. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Unum necessarium. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, pp. 71–145. 644 Comenius, John Amos: Unum necessarium. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, p. 94. 645 Ibid. 646 Ibid., p. 101. 647 See ibid., pp. 80–81. 648 Ibid., pp. 101–102, 104. 649 Ibid., p. 104.

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(notitiae innatae), which light the way for reason; hidden instincts (instinctus occulti), which lead the will to choose good over evil; and capabilities and tools (facultates et organa), which help man do good and escape evil. The common notions (communes notiones), common instincts (communes instinctus), and common capabilities (communes facultates) are inherent to any being born as a man.650 What is important to our study is that the basic (and the most common) triad of the fundamental faculties of the human mind (infinite reason, infinite will, and infinite agency, stemming from the three principles of scire – velle – posse) is retained in Unum necessarium.651 Primacy (again, in line with the majority of the Consultatio) is assigned to the infinite and unconquerable free will. In the seventh chapter, Comenius defines freedom as a shared principle of human nature and a shared aspect of the image of God in man (communis naturae humanae dos communique in nobis Divinae imaginis character).652 Man’s nature was made in the image of God and as such is reasonable, free, and sovereign. It cannot be subdued in any way; it can only be governed and persuaded, but never forced.653 Unum necessarium is not a mere summation of the ideas embodied in the Consultatio catholica. Rather, it is an interesting elaboration and expansion on its central themes, particularly with its emphasis on the virtuous use of free will. Man must learn to refrain from doing what he is not allowed to do and to consider carefully what he is allowed to do in order to determine if it is necessary. Thus, man avoids abusing the free will he was endowed with. The prudent use of the free will should be recognised as the supreme virtue (virtus). For he who cannot govern himself, is not really free.654 Comenius’s radical insistence on freedom of the human will and the resultant open-endedness of human existence (man chooses between a spiritual life and the life of a brute655) comes with a necessary qualification. To fulfil his purpose in life, man must willingly surrender his free will to the will of God (resignatio).656

650 Ibid., pp. 104–105. 651 Ibid., pp. 82, 91, 96. Furthermore, Unum necessarium is plagued by the same terminological inconsistencies as the Consultatio. See e.g. p. 114, where the triad of the basic faculties of the human mind is widened to a tetrad by the addition of emotions. On this, see ibid., p. 77, 81, 83. 652 Ibid., p. 109. 653 Ibid. 654 Ibid., p. 96. 655 Ibid., pp. 83, 86. 656 Ibid., pp. 93, 97.

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If he surrenders his will, reason and capabilities completely and humbly to God, he will find a way to salvation and eternal beatitude.657 To this last end of human existence, we must make provisions in our lives on this earth. In line with Pampaedia, Comenius stresses the importance of teaching all people the art of living and dying well (ars bene moriendi), which is the art of all arts (ars artium). Dying well requires good preparation. Man should not be pulled from life kicking and screaming, but should give up his life willingly. Death is the culmination of life, the moment that determines how we will spend eternity; there is nothing in the world that man should be more concerned about than his preparation for this moment.658 People should be led from their early youth to this awareness: instead of investing themselves in ephemeral, temporal existence, young people should prepare for their future existence.659 To return to the question of the human things, Unum necessarium includes Comenius’s reflections on the pitiable state of philosophy, religion and politics and suggestions on how to improve them. Comenius likens the contemporary Christianity to a very complicated labyrinth. A vast number of denominations make Christianity the least united religion in the world.660 Politics have been beset by the same kinds of problems, namely fighting and rifts between nations and individuals, since the times of Nimrod. All violence, wars, and injustice are rooted in the violation of human nature, which was made free, and can therefore be enslaved only by coercion.661 In Unum necessarium, human nature is identified with the innate freedom of the human will. Human nature, which is based on man’s free will, and the second of the three human things – politics – are related to the belief that when man learns to govern himself, he will be able to govern others as well. This belief is based on one of the central tenets of the Consultatio, namely that all people have the same nature.662 Comenius’s view of wars is no less interesting. He vehemently condemns wars, but he also grapples with the question what should be done if war becomes inevitable. For him, no wars should be permitted in the first place and any looming conflict should be averted by entering into peace talks. However, if somebody is in war already, they should bring the conflict to an end as soon as possible or behave sensibly if the war cannot be stopped. Although at 657 658 659 660 661 662

Ibid., pp. 105, 106, 114. Ibid., pp. 79, 100. Ibid., p. 98. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., pp. 84–85. Ibid., p. 94.

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the conclusion, Comenius calls war an exercise in brutality (bellunium quiddam est) and recommends that people settle their disagreements peaceably, we cannot help but hear echoes of a similar argument in the pansophic Mundus materialis, which – as we have shown – is fairly unique in the context of the Consultatio in that it admits that violence may be justifiable.663 Last but not least, philosophy is the human thing that is most beset by fragmentation and fallacies, as evidenced by the proliferation of books and summaries of those books.664 The only way to mend the human things is to reject plurality (pluralitas), which mankind has fallen into, and restore the original unity (unitas).665 That, however, cannot be accomplished by man alone; the intervention of God’s mercy is required.666 Anything great that man attempts alone only leads to suffering, says Comenius.667 He suggests that people purify the basic human things of all superfluities (non-necessaria) and keep only that which is truly necessary (necessaria). As far as philosophy goes, they should avoid making any statements that are not demonstrably true, they should not desire anything that is not clearly good and they should strive only for that which is possible and easily attainable. As far as politics go, people should strive only for such things that deliver happiness to the entire human society. As far as religion goes, people should cultivate their relationship with the one true God.668 By far the most space is devoted to the reformation of religion. In Comenius’s opinion, the only cure is to return to the primeval and essentially simple religion (primaeva religio) which the first man received immediately from God.669 The body of all believers, the Christian church (Ecclesia Christiana), must return to universal harmony (concordia universalis),670 which existed in the times of the apostles (apostolorum tempore) and in the short period afterwards. Then the Christians forgot Christ’s teachings about the one thing necessary and began to thirst for the unnecessary. Infinitely fragmented, the church no longer was an antithesis of the world, but became one with the world.671 According to 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671

Ibid., p. 113. Ibid., pp. 102–103. Ibid., p. 89. Ibid., p. 92. Ibid., p. 99. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid., pp. 113–114. Ibid., p. 115. Ibid., p. 115, 118–120.

Comenius, Christians must return to the one thing necessary; they must look only to Christ and live a life according to His example. Then they will achieve unity again.672 In the tenth chapter of Unum necessarium, which was intended as the philosopher’s testament, Comenius expresses some of his very private views. This makes the treatise a unique one. Comenius says here that if he was asked to explain his theology, he would take a Bible and say: “I believe in everything that is written in this book”. If he was asked about his creed, he would recite the Symbolum apostolicum, with which he identifies fully.673 To conclude, let us only mention that Unum necessarium is strongly eschatological – Comenius repeatedly states his conviction that the world might come to an end soon.674 At the same time, the treatise is characterised by an unmistakable epistemological and anthropological optimism. Any person whose five senses are in good health can know the whole world. Anyone with a sane mind can understand absolutely everything and choose the best course of action based on what he has understood.675 The foregoing is closely related to Comenius’s activism. He says that human nature is active – it derives pleasure from action and languishes in inaction.676 However, there are also slight deviations from the basic conception of the Consultatio catholica. For example, in the sixth chapter of Unum necessarium, we can find an outline of a hierarchical schema of the stages of creation (creaturarum gradus). In the beginning of creation, there were things that were endowed with mere being (esse): elements (elementa) and element-based meteorological phenomena (meteora), metals (metalla), and stones (lapides). One level above them were entities endowed with life (vivere) such as trees and plants (arbores et herbae). One level above plants were entities endowed with sentience (sentire) and locomotion such as animals of all kinds. In addition to all these endowments, the most complex creatures – man and the angel – were endowed with the highest part of the image of God: the understanding (intelligere) of oneself and of other beings.677 Here, the treatise deviates from the pansophic Mundus materialis, according to which man is defined by the free will. Although Unum necessarium retains elements found in Comenius’s later works, such as anthropological and metaphysical optimism, and an emphasis on 672 673 674 675 676 677

Ibid., p. 116. Ibid., pp. 126–127. “Credo quicquid in hoc libro scriptum est.” See e.g. ibid., p. 82 or p. 88. Ibid., p. 95. Ibid., p. 96. Ibid., p. 104.

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the free will and the partnership between man and God regarding the restoration of the human things, the emphasis on man’s involvement in the reformation efforts is somewhat pushed into the background in favour of an emphasis on the formative and reformative powers of God.678 Leaving these slight inconsistencies aside, it remains only to mention that the ideas expressed in Unum necessarium are echoed in Pampaedia and especially in Panorthosia.679 The latter includes a discussion of the one thing necessary, which is for man to reject plurality and embrace the oneness of God (see Luke 10:42, which was a likely inspiration). The idea is restated in Unum necessarium.680

5.2.4 Janua rerum reserata Anyone who sets out to compare the ideas embodied in the Consultatio with the philosophical-theological content of Janua rerum reserata must keep in mind that the latter treatise, published posthumously in 1681, was the fruit of Comenius’s life-long labour, as evidenced by the author’s admission to having rewritten the treatise more then twenty times during the last three decades of his life.681 We have to take into account that the period in question also saw the publication of another treatise with the same title (in 1643 or one year before that).682 This unfinished sketch, however, does not give us any new insights into Comenius’s pansophic metaphysics. In it, Comenius describes man as the supreme being made in the image of God ([creatura] ad similitudinem Dei facta)683 and characterised mainly by his reason, if the fragment can be interpreted thus.684

678 Ibid., p. 122. 679 See e.g. CC II, p. 111, col. 196; CC II, p. 114, col. 202; CC II, p. 118, col. 210. 680 CC II, p. 213, col. 365. See also CC II, p. 246, col. 430; CC II, p. 272, col. 483 and CC II, pp. 315–316, cols. 569–571. 681 See Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky, op. cit., p. 27; Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., p. 67. 682 See Jan Amos Komenský: Janua rerum reserata 1643. In: SCetH 62 (XXIX), 1999, p. 211. On the treatise and the various attempts to date its writing, see Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky, op. cit., p. 45. Critical edition: Komenský, Jan Amos: Janua rerum reserata (fragmentum). In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, pp. 153–168. 683 Comenius, John Amos: Janua rerum reserata (fragmentum). In: Id.: Opera omnia 14. Prague 1974, p. 162. 684 See ibid., pp. 155, 157.

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In contrast, the version of Janua rerum reserata published in 1681 by K. V. Nigrin in Leiden allows us a better insight into Comenius’s view of man.685 In the text of the Janua, which was intended as a basis for the whole pansophic Mundus possibilis (to which it was to be appended),686 Comenius mentions the three human things (res humanae), namely philosophy, politics, and religion, which form the basis of all other things.687 In this respect, the Janua is almost perfectly consistent with the Consultatio, the only slight deviation being Comenius’s assertion that while all the human things are in need of reformation, the least corrupt is philosophy, which, unlike the other two, has not descended to complicity in murder.688 In line with the other texts we have analysed so far, man is described as the image of God, the pinnacle of creation and the most perfect being. He was endowed with an immortal spirit (animus), inhered in which are the numbers, measures, and weights of all things.689 In addition to the capacity for counting, weighing, and measuring (i.e., generally understanding, intelligere), the human mind (mens)690 has the ability to make the right choices and carry them out, provided that they are doable. Once again we are presented with Comenius’s basic conception of the human mind, soul, or spirit (the terminology is typically inconsistent) as consisting of three basic components – reason (intellectus), will (voluntas), and

685 The full title is Janua rerum reserata hoc est Sapientia prima (quam vulgo metaphysicam vocant) ita mentibus hominum adaptata, ut per eam in totum rerum ambitum omnemque interiorem rerum ordinem et in omnes intimas rebus coaeternas veritates prospectus pateat catholicus: simulque ut eadem omnium humanarum COGITATIONUM, SERMONUM, OPERUM fons et scaturigo formaque ac norma esse appareat. Lugduni Batavorum 1681. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Janua rerum reserata. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, pp. 149–236. On the background of the genesis of the treatise, see Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., p. 170. 686 See CC I, p. 216, col. 311 or the full title of Janua (see the previous note) or see also Comenius, John Amos: Janua rerum reserata. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, p. 158. For a more detailed discussion of the treatise and a comparison between Janua and Pansophia of the Consultatio, see Červenka, Jaromír: Mundus possibilis (Ein Versuch der Analyse des Eintrittsgradus der Pansophie), op. cit., pp. 8–15. 687 Comenius, John Amos: Janua rerum reserata. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, p. 151. 688 Ibid. 689 Ibid., p. 158. 690 Ibid.

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capabilities (facultates). Understanding (scire), will (volle), and power (posse)691 can function well because the mind was endowed with innate common notions, instincts, and capabilities.692 The human mind as a whole is described as a triunity (triunitas, triunum).693 A closer reading reveals that Comenius assigns some priority to reason. However, there is no doubt that this priority is only of a chronological nature. Comenius describes reason as a torch bearer that sheds light on everything that man perceives through the senses, enabling his will to choose the good it recognises as such or to turn away from the evil it sees for what it is. Finally, the agentive capacity is responsible for carrying out what the will desires.694 In the concluding chapters of the treatise, Comenius posits a spiritual system (systematae animae), in which the will is the president (praeses) and queen of all (regina omnium), and reason is her advisor (Collega Intellectus seu ratio, reginae consiliarius); these two perfections are followed by agency.695 Another passage that deals with this subject calls on us to revisit one of the central questions of the Consultatio, viz., what is more essential to man: his immortal human mind or his unlimited free will? The following excerpt speaks for the hypothesis that we put forward in the fourth chapter of this monograph, namely that the three basic constituents of the mind are inseparable from the mind itself: Hence, these three things or constituents of the soul differ solely by name. We shall call them reason, will and power, or capability or spirit or desirousness for things. It is by virtue of these three things that man is man (not a brute), as is self-evident.696

Reason encompasses everything that is thinkable; the will encompasses everything that is desirable, and the capabilities encompass everything that is doable. For Comenius, all the constituents of the human mind are infinite and

691 On the principles of the human mind, see ibid., p. 168. In Janua rerum reserata, Comenius gives specific and fairly extensive definitions of the terms scire, velle, posse. See ibid., p. 201. 692 Ibid., pp. 160, 170. 693 Ibid., pp. 164, 214. 694 Ibid., pp. 169–171, 219. 695 Ibid., p. 214. 696 Ibid., p. 170. “Quae proinde tria veluti tres animae partes sunt, ita nominibus suis distinctae, ut INTELLECTUS, VOLUNTAS, POTENTIA seu FACULTAS aut etiam animus seu impetus in res dicantur. Per quae tria hominem esse hominem (alias fore brutum) per se patet.”

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their infinity comes from God.697 Naturally, the whole mind is infinite as well. Comenius once again likens the mind to a perpetual motion machine.698 In line with the Consultatio catholica, the Janua includes a discussion of the process of apprehension, during which the human mind turns to the three sources of knowledge, three theatres (theatra), or three books (libri): the world (mundus), the mind (mens nostra), and the word of God as embodied in the Scripture (Scriptura). The three books correspond to the three ways of knowing (knowing through senses, reason, and faith) as well as the three basic methods (analysis, synthesis, and syncrisis).699 In Janua rerum reserata, we can find one mention of the term human nature, which is, however, so general that no conclusions can be made.700 Just for completeness’ sake, it should be noted that elements of Comenius’s eschatology are also present.701 If we wanted to identify any deviations from the conception of man embodied in the Consultation, we would find only imprecise formulations and not very cogent passages, rather than deliberate attempts to re-examine the original conception. For example, Comenius proposes a bipartite model of the human being (body and soul, the latter being constituted solely by reason and will).702 Such deviations, however, do not detract from the coherence of Comenius’s anthropology (see the fourth chapter of this monograph).

5.2.5 Clamores Eliae The unfinished manuscript of Comenius’s treatise best known under the title Clamores Eliae is probably the most valuable source of information on the evolution of the philosopher’s view of man in the late and the last periods of his life.703

697 698 699 700 701 702 703

Ibid., pp. 172, 175. Ibid., p. 184. Ibid., pp. 166–167. See ibid., p. 163. See ibid., p. 214. Ibid., p. 195. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992. For a more detailed discussion of the treatise, see e.g. Škarka, Antonín: Komenskýs Schrift Clamores Eliae als Variante der Consultatio. In: AC 1, 1969, pp. 203–211; Škarka, Antonín: Tajemství Komenského spisu Clamores Eliae [The Secret of Comenius’s Clamores Eliae]. In: Galla, Karel (ed.): Universita Karlova J. A. Komenskému 1670–1970 [Charles University to John Amos Comenius 1670–1970]. Prague 1970, pp. 60–102; Nováková, Julie: Sociálně-politické názory a tužby Komenského v Clamores Eliae [The

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Comenius gave a lot of thought to the title of the treatise, in which one can find evidence of the evolution of the author’s thought during the last period of his life, from 3 January 1665 to his death.704 It is clear from the text that Comenius considered other titles besides Clamores Eliae, Ultimi seculi clamores ad genus humanum being the most frequently mentioned. Comenius also considered many other subtitles, such as Vox Eliae Pandochei, Coelum in terra or Consultationis finis Jerusalem nova descendens de coelo in terram, totiž ex aeternis ideis or Sicut in coelo, ita et in terra: Consultatio a coelo abscondito ideali: voluntas humana a voluntate Dei (note that the treatise remained unfinished and that many of the ideas outlined in it remained undeveloped).705 The list clearly indicates that the Clamores was closely related to Comenius’s masterpiece, the Consultatio. The manuscript contains many references to the individual parts of the Consultatio. The most frequently mentioned are Pansophia and Panorthosia, closely followed by Pannuthesia.706 In the Clamores, Comenius intended to cover even more ground than he had in his Consultatio. Naturally, the ultimate goal was again the reformation of the human things, the preparation of the world for its impending end, and the opening of the door to salvation. The only difference between the Clamores and the Consultatio is that the latter was intended as only one of three means to this end.707 The other two means were revelations (both old Social-Political Views and Desires Embodied in Comenius’s Clamores Eliae]. In: SCetH 16 (VII), 1977, pp. 47–62; Nováková, Julie: Drabík a Komenského Clamores Eliae [Drabík and Comenius’s Clamores Eliae]. In: SCetH 17 (VII), 1977, pp. 119–127; Nováková, Julie: Proč Clamores Eliae Komenského zůstaly jen pracovním textem [Why did Clamores Eliae Remain a Draft?]. In: SCetH 27 (XIV), 1984, pp. 3–23. The importance of the Clamores as a source of information on Comenius’s philosophical influences was shown by Beneš, Jiří: Letters and Relations – One of the Strata of the Manuscript Clamores Eliae. In: AC 12 (XXXVI), 1997, pp. 79–83. On the background of the treatise, see also Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, pp. 320–335. 704 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 15. Julie Nováková points out that the first record is from as early as 29 October 1664. Compare ibid., p. 320. Nováková also shows that some of the sheets included in the Clamores are even older: the oldest one is dated 1658; the oldest one without any indication of date is believed to be from 1642. The author, however, may have used the blank reverse side of an older manuscript. Compare ibid., p. 328. 705 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 194. 706 See ibid., pp. 56, 90, 97, 135, 149. 707 In one particularly insecure remark, which indicates his progressive physical and mental fatigue, Comenius even entertains the idea of abandoning work on the Consultatio catholica and publishing only the shorter machinam reformatoriam, i.e., Clamores. See ibid., p. 93. On the relationship between the Clamores and the Consultatio

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and new) and the machynka, or the invention of motus perpetuus, the feasibility of which Comenius did not doubt.708 When it comes to the philosophical-theological content of the Clamores and especially Comenius’s conception of man, the treatise is a direct heir to the Consultatio. The human things are represented by philosophy (or education), politics, and religion and fragmentation is cited as the reason why they have become corrupt. The only way to mend the human things is by doing away with fragmentation and restoring unity (omnium reconciliationem universalem).709 By far the most space in the Clamores is devoted to the reformation of religion. Comenius contends that all denominations should be dissolved and all Christians should be united in one true religion. In line with the Consultatio and Unum necessarium, Comenius says that the new universal denomination should not be a human “edifice”; rather, it should come immediately from God.710 Comenius later particularises this requirement by saying that the new theology should be built on the foundations laid by the prophets and apostles.711 For Comenius, disagreements within the Christian church appeared when the early Christians turned away from the prophets and apostles and commenced to elect their own earthly masters. This coincided with the onset of the institutionalisation of Christianity.712 To reform religion, we must proceed in the reverse direction: we must set out along the only road to Heaven, which is Christ, and discover the only truth (Christ), and the only eternal life, which is life in Christ.713 In line with the Consultation, heretics and non-Christians are not excluded from the

(and the commonalities and differences between these works), see Škarka, Antonín: Komenskýs Schrift Clamores Eliae als Variante der Consultatio, op. cit., pp. 203–211. 708 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, pp. 64, 70, 102. On the subject of machynka, see ibid., pp. 32, 213–214 or Nováková, Julie: Comenius’s First Report on Perpetual Motion. In: AC 4/2 (XXVIII/2), 1979, pp. 389–406; Turnbull, G. H.: Hartlib, Dury and Comenius: Gleanings from Hartlib’s Papers, op. cit., p. 381. 709 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, pp. 17, 135, 186. 710 Ibid., pp. 20–21. 711 Ibid., p. 163. As far as influences go, Comenius mentions the works of Johann Valentin Andreae, Francis Bacon, Tommaso Campanella, and Thomas More; however, he does not give any details apart from a note saying that the philosophical-political works of these authors should be read. See ibid., p. 176. 712 Ibid., p. 21. 713 Ibid., p. 24.

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process of universal emendation. Jews, Muslims, and heathens may have (and do have) “fine concepts” too and they must be engaged.714 Comenius’s assertions about the reformation of religion in the Clamores are even more radical than those in the Consultatio. The new comprehensive and truly catholic religion will be above all denominations and their disagreements. Comenius says that some denominations teach acts without faith, while others teach faith without acts. The new theology that he envisions will teach that being a true Christian means to regenerate oneself spiritually and find faith, love, and hope.715 Thus, the Clamores can be considered a valuable commentary and perhaps even an elaboration on Comenius’s principal ideas, embodied in the Consultation.716 When it comes to the reformation of politics, emphasis in the Clamores is put on the eradication of violence and of conflicts between social groups.717 Comenius famously says in the Clamores that armouries should be converted into libraries and cannons should be recast into musical bells.718 As far theological arguments are concerned, he says that Nimrod was a hunter before God, but not from God. The use of violence against people or things is, therefore, a violation of the Scripture.719 By the same token, Comenius criticises the institution of monarchy, which was created by people themselves, and argues that before the Great Flood (ante diluvium) there had been no monarchy and that Christ explicitly forbade it.720 For late Comenius, a republic was the safest form of government.721

714 Ibid., p. 52. On Jews and Muslims, see ibid., pp. 65–66, 180–181 or Bartoň, Josef: Židovské otazníky u J. A. Komenského, op. cit., pp. 131–138. 715 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 170. 716 See ibid., pp. 55–56 for Comenius’s discussion of ceremonies; p. 58 for Comenius’s meditation on the abuse of titles in the church and on avarice and vanity (p. 64). 717 Ibid., pp. 21, 153 a 249. 718 Ibid., p. 43. 719 Ibid., p. 44. For Comenius’s refusal of violence in Clamores see Nováková, Julie: Sociálně-politické názory a tužby Komenského v Clamores Eliae (1665–1670), op. cit., p. 51 or Schaller, Klaus: Komenského Clamores Eliae jako poučný politicko-pedagogický text [Comenius’s Clamores Eliae as an Instructive Political-Pedagogical Text]. In: SCetH 16 (VII), 1977, pp 70–71. 720 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, pp. 45, 206. 721 Ibid., p. 102. For Comenius’s refusal of monarchy in Clamores see Nováková, Julie: Sociálně-politické názory a tužby Komenského v Clamores Eliae (1665–1670), op. cit., pp. 53–54.

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The paragraphs in which Comenius ponders the reformation of politics represent an often interesting addition to the Consultation. For example, he says in the Clamores that the most corrupt country in the world is the “House of Austria”, in which all the walls have been inscribed with the words mene, mene, tekel. The treatise thus reveals Comenius’s private view of the Hapsburg monarchy, which he regarded as his political arch enemy.722 On the other hand, Comenius spoke highly of the Ottoman Empire, which he thought might convert to Christianity, unite the Christian world, and spread Christianity to other continents.723 As far as the reformation of philosophy is concerned, the greatest emphasis is put on the reconciliation of differences between various doctrines and the establishment of a unified and true philosophy. Comenius believed that he had himself given an important impetus for unification by writing his pansophy, which in his opinion eclipsed all pre-existing philosophical schools.724 He disapproved strongly of Cartesianism, pointing out its failure to pay equal attention to the sensory, rational, and religious ways of knowing – a failure which according to him led to atheism, a view that only the insane can subscribe to.725 The description of the reformation process in the Clamores is in line with the Consultation. It consists in the return to the old, unspoiled order726 and the acceptance of a new, universal meaning of the three basic human things.727 Also mentioned in the Clamores is Comenius’s division of the basic sources of knowledge and the corresponding ways of knowing (senses, reason, and faith).728

722 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 78. 723 Ibid., p. 134. On other possible reasons why Comenius placed such high hopes in the Ottoman emperor, see Čapková, Dagmar: Vztah vědy a víry u Komenského [The Relationship between Science and Faith in the Work of Comenius]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, p. 107; Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 327–330. On Comenius’s complicated relationship to the Turks more generally, see Kumpera, Jan: Turci v politicko-náboženských představách Komenského [The Turks in the Political-Religious Views of Comenius]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, pp. 158–165. On the phenomenon of Calvinoturcism and Comenius’s role in it, see Mout, Nicolette: Calvinoturcismus und Chiliasmus im 17. Jahrhundert. In: Pietismus und Neuzeit. Ein Jahrbuch zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus. Band 14, 1988, pp. 78–84. 724 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 24. 725 Ibid., p. 35–37, 40–41, 190. Comenius did not spare the Copernicans either. See e.g. ibid., pp. 99, 238. 726 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 727 Ibid., pp. 37, 61, 165, 209. 728 Ibid., pp. 25, 36.

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Man is characterised by his spirit or mind (which together with the soul and the body constitute the human being). The spirit (or mind) consists of three faculties: reason, will and capabilities (power), and the corresponding innate common notions.729 In the Clamores, the original conception of man is enriched by a new elaborate and prominent element, namely the Elijah narrative. For Comenius, the appearances of Elijah the Thesbite and Elijah the Baptist (i.e., John the Baptist) signalled that people should expect the coming of a third Elijah, an artist who would, according to Comenius’s interpretation of Matt. 17:11, reconcile mankind and restore all human things.730 The first Elijah taught the doctrine of the one God, the second Elijah taught the doctrine of the one Christ, and the third Elijah will teach the doctrine of the one Holy Spirit.731 The coming of the third Elijah is the precondition of complete unification (panhenosia). The third Elijah will show people that every one of them represents the same image of God (imago Dei) – a fact that is currently obscured due to fragmentation.732 The first Elijah killed people who erred, but the third Elijah will kill the errors.733 The third Elijah will not be alone. Comenius says that in each nation of the world there will rise an Elijah who will feel the impetum divinum. This will be a person with a spirit of zealousness (citing the prophecy of Annika Denis, Comenius predicts in another passage that there will be 77 Elijahs).734 According to Comenius, the Czech nation will have two Elijahs, namely Comenius’s friend Mikuláš Drabík, whose revelations the author discusses at length in the Clamores, and Comenius himself.735

729 Ibid., pp. 32–33, 36, 73. 730 Ibid., p. 19. 731 On Comenius’s take on the narrative of Elijah and the genesis and theological background of the idea, see e.g. Kopp, Christian: Die Gestalt des Elia in den Clamores Eliae (Ein Betrag zur Verwendung der Bibel in den Schriften des Comenius). In: SCetH 69–70 (XXXIII), 2003, pp. 5–21. The study includes speculations about the possible sources of inspiration for Comenius’s take on the figure of Elijah. According to Kopp, the idea most probably came from J. H. Alsted (see ibid., p. 9). See also Kubáč, Vladimír: Komenský, Starý zákon a Židé [Comenius, the Old Testament and the Jews]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, p. 22; Nováková, Julie: Sociálně-politické názory a tužby Komenského v Clamores Eliae (1665–1670), op. cit., p. 48. 732 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 20. 733 Ibid., p. 28. 734 Ibid., pp. 39, 78. For more on revelation, see p. 112. 735 Ibid., pp. 186, 208.

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The most important task of the third Elijah will be to convene a world congress (Concilium orbis, Concilium oecumenicum), which will discuss the reformation of religion, philosophy and politics and the recognition of new revelations.736 The concilium is summoned by Comenius himself in the concluding paragraphs of the Clamores.737 There is another reason why the Elijah theme is important. Clamores Eliae and the genesis of the Elijah theme provide insight into the evolution of Comenius’s thought in the last period of his life. Comenius proclaims himself the third Elijah. In one passage, he even enumerates twenty similarities between his own efforts and the acts of the first two Elijahs (e.g., “He went for forty days: I trod the barren lands of my exile for 40 years”; “He was visited by winds, fire, earthquakes and the sinking of mountains and rocks – I was visited by even more” or “You showed him three tools to punish the godless and delight the pious: Elisha, Hazael and Jehu; you showed me the screaming of wood and stones, the screaming of reason and conscience and your new voice.” The last quote contains an obvious allusion to the machynka, Pansophia, and new revelations).738 However, the text also exudes the uncertainty and misgivings of an old man who, as his own journal entries indicate, was in doubt about the rightness of his own actions: “How can a mind conceive of such an idea? Wouldn’t it be more befitting an old man at the threshold of death to write a testament than to pose as an Elijah?”739 The eschatological emphasis is in line with the Consultation and also chimes in with the Elijah theme,740 which itself is related to another motif, viz., the perpetual motion machine (machynka), which should be the third Elijah’s main

736 Ibid., pp. 103–106. 737 Ibid., p. 199. 738 Ibid., pp. 194–195: “Šel cestou 40 dnů: já po pustinách vyhnanství svého přes 40 let”; „Okolo něho vítr, oheň, zemětřesení, podvracení hor a skal – okolo mne víc – “ or „Ukázals mu k ztrestání bezbožných a potěšení pobožných prostředky tři, Elizea, Hazaela a Jehu – mně křik dříví a kamení, křik rozumu a svědomí, a hlas tvůj nový.“ 739 Ibid., p. 28: “Což to na mysl jde? Nebylo-li by modestius tobě, starci a umříti majícímu, kšaft raději psáti nežli se Eliášem dělati?”. Similarly see ibid., p. 93. Julie Nováková points out the circumstances which may have led to Comenius’ bout of pessimism. The most important of those was the disinterest of the French court in Comenius’ reformation efforts which was aggravated by the improbable prospects of the collapse of the House of Hapsburg and the papacy. See ibid., pp. 322–323. 740 Ibid., pp. 74, 77. For eschatology of Clamores see ibid., p. 122.

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tool.741 The advent of this invention (referred to in Clamores almost exclusively with the abbreviation MP) is proof that history is coming to an end.742 The three fundamental motifs of Clamores Eliae, i.e, the Elijah theme, the eschatological perspective, and the invention of motus perpetuus, are clearly related. Closely related to the subject of eschatology is the author’s argument for the recognition of the new revelations which were coming mainly from Central Europe. Based on his own interpretation of Isa. 42:21, Comenius predicts that God will send more prophets, especially to the Czech nation, because the Austrian monarchy has become the successor to Antichrist and a great oppressor of the Czechs (this wording seems to have been inspired by Isa. 49:24). The foregoing is clearly evidenced by the fact that while many nations have tried to invent perpetual motion, a machine that embodies its principles had allegedly been constructed by a Czech.743 For all those reasons, the centre of the reformation of the whole world must be located in Moravia (in Brno, to be specific).744 Let us now mention a few other similarities between the Consultatio and the Clamores. In the Clamores, for example, the panorthotic concept of Collegium lucis is conflated with Schola Eliae.745 Some conceptions introduced in the Consultation are developed even further in the Clamores. For instance, the system of pansophy is expanded to include concepts such as constitution (which belongs to God and will be dealt with in Pantaxia), destitution (which is attributed to Satan and will be dealt with in Panphthoria), and restitution (which will be entrusted to Christ and dealt with in Panorthosia).746 As in the Consultatio, the subject of human nature rarely comes up, and if it does, there are only vague statements; unlike the Consultatio, very little space is devoted to the discussion of the freedom of human will. The idea of man’s unlimited freedom is retained, but the will no longer seems to play such an important role in the author’s anthropology.747

741 Ibid., p. 82. See alo Kopp, Christian: Die Gestalt des Elia in den Clamores Eliae (Ein Betrag zur Verwendung der Bibel in den Schriften des Comenius). In: SCetH 69–70 (XXXIII), 2003, s. 15–16. 742 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 122. 743 Ibid., pp. 184–185, 201. 744 Ibid., p. 187. 745 Ibid., p. 36. 746 Ibid., p. 125. 747 Ibid., pp. 146–147, 242. Contrary to our opinion, Julie Nováková concludes that Comenius “strongly insists on the principle of freedom of the will (liberum arbitrium) in the philosophical-theological portions of the Clamores”. See Nováková, Julie:

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Besides explicit and implied references to Comenius’s older works mentioned above, Clamores Eliae also refers to Angelus pacis. Comenius expresses his regret at dedicating Angelus pacis to the Dutch and English who were at loggerheads, because the bid was met with no positive response.748

Sociálně-politické názory a tužby Komenského v Clamores Eliae (1665–1670), op. cit., pp. 51–52. 748 Comenius, John Amos: Clamores Eliae. In: Id.: Opera omnia 23. Prague 1992, p. 49.

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6. The conception of man in the works of the preparatory and pansophic periods Having described Comenius’s conception of man embodied in the works of the panorthotic (later) period, we shall now focus on the Comenian anthropology of the earlier periods. We said that in its mature form, Comenius’s conception of man was based on the idea of a being defined (but not limited) by his nature, endowed with a free and unconquerable will, from which stems the openendedness of human existence. The main defining feature of man’s nature was the mind: a tri-unity of central faculties – the will, reason, and agency, of which the most excellent was the unlimited will. We also pointed out that in the texts written after 1635 and during the first years of the following decade, Comenius still held his older anthropological views. For example, in Via lucis or in Panaugia, man was described as a being defined not by the will, but by reason. We also saw that the definition of the human things (and of the problems that beset them) and the idea of universal emendation only crystallised during the 1640s. We shall now focus on Comenius’s initial anthropological views and on how they had developed before acquiring their mature (panorthotic) form that we have seen in the Consultatio catholica.

6.1 Theatrum universitatis rerum Comenius’s monumentally laid-out but unfinished and partially destroyed encyclopedic work Theatrum universitatis rerum gives evidence of the author’s earliest philosophical and theological views.749 Comenius probably worked on the treatise between the years 1616 and 1618, while drawing on the knowledge he had gained during his studies with Johann Heinrich Alsted in Herborn. His main 749 The full title is Theatrum universitatis rerum: To jest Divadlo světa a všechněch všudy předivných věcí jeho, kteréž na nebi, na zemi, pod zemí, u vodách, v povětří a kdekoli ve světě jsou aneb se dějí a díti budou od počátku světa až do skonání jeho, a až na věky věkův [Theatrum universitatis rerum: Or the Theatre of the world and all the strange things in it, which are found in the sky, on earth, in water, in the atmosphere, and anywhere in the world and which have been occurring there since the beginning of the world and will be occurring there till the end, forever and ever]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Theatrum universitatis rerum. In: Id.: Opera omnia 1. Prague 1969, pp. 95–181. On the treatise generally and the circumstances of its writing, see Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 32–48.

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aim was to write an encyclopedia that would bring cutting-edge knowledge to the Czechs, including readers without higher education. For this reason, Comenius intended to write the book in Czech.750 The question of anthropology comes up immediately in the introduction, in which Comenius deals with the subject of God’s creation. God created man and one other being that surpasses man in nobility, namely the angel. He reserved the lower part of the world for people and the higher parts for angels. Angels are not the only beings in the world that dutifully obey God; His commands are also carried out by animals. Man has, however, upset the harmony and neglected his duties.751 There is other material in the preface that is immediately relevant to our study. Comenius raises three questions: What does human wisdom consist in? What do acts of wisdom and art consist in? What are the ways and means to achieve wisdom? In an allusion to Solomon, Comenius says that the art of wisdom makes man a friend to God and a true man.752 Wisdom stems from knowing the created world and from Scripture. We can discern in these statements the rudiments of the eventual triad of the sources of knowledge: the three books or God’s lanterns (Lucernae Dei), which we have seen in e.g., Panaugia. Everybody who wants to achieve wisdom and true humanity must become acquainted with both these sources (Comenius meant to treat the Scripture in a planned treatise titled Theatrum Scripturae).753 Proper understanding, however, does not guarantee broader knowledge, will, or agency. In the preface to Theatrum, Comenius says that understanding leads man to the realisation of his own futility (ničemnost).754 It should be noted that the anthropological pessimism of the preface is not completely unlimited. Mortal man is similar to immortal God because he is the image of His omniscience. Man was made the ruler and steward of all creation. It was mainly for his sake that God created all existence.755 Man was endowed with a rational soul, penetrating intelligence (vtip), good memory, acute senses, and a noble body which is erect, unlike the bodies of other animals. In line with the Consultation, the human mind is described as incessantly active and incapable of rest. There is 750 Comenius, John Amos: Theatrum universitatis rerum. In: Id.: Opera omnia 1. Prague 1969, pp. 167–170. 751 Ibid., p. 99. 752 Ibid., pp. 102–105. 753 Ibid., pp. 105–106. 754 Ibid., p. 108. 755 Ibid., p. 109.

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one important difference, though – in the preface, Comenius makes no mention of human will.756 In the concluding passages of the preface, Comenius calls the highest form of wisdom the awareness that earthly life has no value and that we should hasten our advance towards eternal life.757 As far as the body text of the treatise is concerned, the first part titled Theatrum naturae contains a Mosaic interpretation of creation and statements to the effect that the world was created by God out of nothing, that it is temporal, spherically shaped, etc.758 There are repeated assertions that man is the pinnacle of creation and that everything else was created for his sake.759 Man was made from earth and the elements just like other animals, but unlike them, he was endowed with a rational and immortal soul, which makes him the most dignified of all creatures, destined for immortality and eternity.760 His supremacy is also evidenced by the fact that he was created both visible and invisible – in other words, that he has both a corporeal and spiritual nature.761 The concept of human things, which plays an important role in Comenius’s late anthropology, comes up as well, but no details are provided (e.g., “our home, our cities, and our walls of all kinds and other human things”).762 Comenius also uses the term ‘human nature’, but only in a very general sense (e.g., in connection with parts of the human body).763 The ‘human will’ is explicitly mentioned once in connection with procreation. Comenius says that man cannot control the sex of his offspring, nor can he control its growth and development or its success or lack thereof. He can accept a meal and sow seeds, but he always has to pray for God’s mercy and help.764 If one thinks that Comenius’s view of man was optimistic from his earliest writings, a closer reading of the Theatrum clearly shows that it was not so. The text is actually marked by a deep anthropological pessimism, which is in sharp

756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764

Ibid., p. 110. Ibid., p. 114. Ibid., pp. 121–134. Ibid., pp. 128 or 153. Ibid., pp. 138 or 152–153. Ibid., p. 149. Ibid., p. 126: “domove náši, města a hradby jakékoli, a i jiné věci lidské.” Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., pp. 157–158.

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contrast to Comenius’s panorthotic works. The author uses phrases like “mired in the dirt of human coarseness” or “all sons of man are futility itself ”.765 The text shares the substantial and conspicuous terminological ambiguity of the Consultation, including, for example, the synonymous use of the Czech terms duše, duch, and mysl (soul, spirit, and mind). The treatise was intended as a collection of four independent volumes: Theatrum naturae, Theatrum vitae humanae, Theatrum orbis terrarrum, Theatrum seculorum. The observations we presented in the previous paragraphs were made solely on the basis of the first volume titled On the World Publicly, which is the only part of the corpus that survives to this day. Considering the focus of the present volume, we would have particularly appreciated being able to analyse the four books of the second volume, which were to be titled I. On the corruption, confusion, and disorientation of man and all things that belong to him, in the soul and in the body; II. On God’s aids invented to reform man; III. On strange human acts, resolutions, and arts that people under the sun spoil themselves with; IV. On the strange and diverse human adventures that have happened to people and can happen to them again. As suggested by its title, the third volume of the Theatrum was meant to deal mainly with geographical subjects, while the fourth volume was meant to deal with chronological and eschatological questions.766

6.2 Amphitheatrum universitatis rerum The treatise Amphitheatrum universitatis rerum was intended as an amplification of the material included in Comenius’s first encyclopedia, which was written in the years 1624 to 1627.767 The only thing that has survived of the treatise are excerpts from the seventh book of the second volume, made by the Silesian nobleman Kryštof Bernard Skrbenský.768 The surviving text deals with anthropology, but it asks practical or ethical questions. It includes paragraphs dealing with subjects such as the misadventures which can happen to a person at the prenatal stage or during childbirth, why some people die early and others live long, etc. – in summary, questions that are

765 Ibid., pp. 100 or 108: “špínou neumělosti lidské zprznilý” or “marnost jsou všickní zespolka synové lidší”. 766 Ibid., p. 119. 767 Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Amphitheatrum universitatis rerum. In: Id.: Opera omnia 1. Prague 1969, pp. 183–200. 768 Comenius, John Amos: Amphitheatrum universitatis rerum. In: Id.: Opera omnia 1. Prague 1969, pp. 195–196.

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not of much relevance to this study. Comenius does not fail to mention, though, that every man, regardless of extraction or status, is an utter futility and his fate is not in his hands.769

6.3 Letters to Heavens The socially engaged treatise Letters to Heavens, written in the form of letters that are exchanged between the poor, the rich, and Christ and published in Olomouc in 1619, contains very little on the subject of man.770 Man was created in the image of God: a steward to whom God entrusted the created world.771 Citing Christ’s words, Comenius says that inequality (especially that of the social kind) is natural and in line with God’s wisdom. All people were created from the dust of the earth, but just as clay is shaped by the potter’s hand, so man’s fate is determined by God’s will.772 In the second letter addressed by Jesus Christ to the rich, Comenius points out that by showing their solidarity with the poor, the wealthy can prove that they have a human nature and are not brutes. He goes on to call man a rational creature of God.773 Although Comenius’s anthropological comments in the book are brief and vague, it is clear that his definition of man as a being endowed with reason whose fate is determined by God’s will is retained.

6.4 The Mournful The pessimistic tone of Comenius’s works dating from the 1620s is echoed in the first volume of the dialogue Truchlivý (The Mournful), dating probably from

769 Ibid., pp. 187–194. 770 The full title is Listové do nebe, v kterýchž chudí a bohatí před Kristem žaloby a stížnosti na sebe vespolek vedou a rozeznáni býti žádají: spolu i s odpověďmi oběma stranám danými, až i s odložením vejpovědi k budoucímu konečnému jenerálnímu, nejspravedlivějšímu soudu a jasnému rozeznání mezi stranami [Letters to heaven, in which the poor and the rich lament and complain about each other to Jesus Christ and request arbitration. Includes the replies given to each party and the postponement of testimony to a future, final, general, and fair trial and adjudication between the parties]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Listové do nebe [Lettes to Heavens]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, pp. 161–184. 771 Comenius, John Amos: Listové do nebe [Letters to Heavens]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, p. 165. 772 Ibid., p. 169. 773 Ibid., p. 171.

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1623.774 In it, the protagonist called the Mournful (probably the author’s alter ego) finally – after much mollification and pleading – partially rejects his view of the world as an unhappy place from which the only way to salvation, for at least some people, is through death775. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Comenius’s optimism (if we may use such a word) is quite limited, especially when it comes to the prospects of reforming the conditions of the existence of wretched man (bídný člověk) on this earth.776 The treatise veers into political, moral-philosophical and catechetical themes rather than sticking to abstractly philosophical or anthropological ones and does not give us much information on the philosopher’s view of man. It concludes with a telling statement: “All man’s aid is futile”.777 The second volume of The Mournful, which was written in 1624,778 describes the protagonist’s return to skepticism and uncertainty and his intent discussion with Reason, Faith, and Christ, who try to cheer him up.

774 The full title is Truchlivý to jest Smutné a tesklivé člověka křesťanského nad žalostnými vlasti a církve bídami naříkání: v  kterémž se jemu nejprve Rozum, potom Víra ozývají, potěšovati ho, ale nadarmo, usilujíce; za tim tedy Kristus vystoupě. zůřivě jej z netrpělivosti obviňuje, místné strašlivých svých ran příčiny ukazuje, bolesti jemu ulehčuje, časné i věčné vysvobození zaslibuje, i jak by se k obojímu hotoviti měl, poučuje [The Mournful, or A Christian’s sad and doleful complaint about the wretchedness of the state and the churches, in which the Christian is approached by Reason and Faith which try to console him to no avail, but then enters Christ, rebuking him for his impatience, explaining to him what caused his horrible wounds, alleviating his pain, promising him temporal and eternal deliverance, and urging him to make ready for it]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Truchlivý I [The Mournful I]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, pp. 19–65. 775 Comenius, John Amos: Truchlivý I [The Mournful I]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, p. 23. 776 Ibid., pp. 60–62. On wretchedness, see ibid., p. 64. 777 Ibid, p. 65: “marná jest všecka pomoc lidská”. 778 The full title is Truchlivého druhý díl to jest Rány obnovující a jitřící se v člověku tesknosti v čas dlouho trvajících nožích metel a těžkostí: kdež tělo déle již bíd snášeti se zpěčuje; a tesklení jeho ačkoli Rozům osvícený zahnáti všelijak se snažuje, nemůže však; jako ani Víra; až Kristus, opět se ozva, dokonalou jemu ku pozbytí hrůz a nabytí mysli dobré cestu ukazuje [The Mournful, Volume II, or Despairs which lacerate and tear open the Christian’s wounds in times of constant adversity and difficulty, when his body can no longer bear the torment; enlightened reason tries to drive away the desperation to no avail; not even Faith is of help; only Christ, showing up again, rids him of his fears and restores him to his right mind]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Truchlivého druhý díl [The Mournful, volume II]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, p. 67–101.

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The book contains very little anthropological material. In a few passages, Comenius describes man as a being composed of a body and a soul, characterised by reason (rozumný tvor).779 Man is still seen as a futility, a wretched, worthless creature: “Man: dust, a shadow”.780 The only aspect that comports with the anthropology of the Consultation (though the details are different) is the emphasis on surrendering one’s will to the will of God. Nevertheless, there is no mention that the will is free.781

6.5 Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart Comenius’s arguably best-known literary work, Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart, was written in 1623 during the philosopher’s stay at Brandýs nad Orlicí.782 In the introduction, titled To the reader, Comenius characterises man as a being endowed with reason that instinctively aspires to the highest good (summum bonum), which he seeks outside himself, i.e., in the world. Citing

779 Comenius, John Amos: Truchlivého druhý díl [The Mournful, volume II]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, pp. 70, 73, 79. 780 Ibid., pp. 73, 95: “Člověk: prach, stín.” 781 Ibid., p. 97. Considering that the third and fourth volumes of The Mournful were written in the years 1650 and 1660, respectively, we shall not deal with them here. 782 Labyrint světa a ráj srdce to jest Světlé vymalování, kterak v tom světě a věcech jeho všechněch nic není než matení a motání, kolotání a lopotání, mámení a šalba, bída a tesknost, a naposledy omrzení všeho a zoufání: ale kdož doma v srdci svém sedě s jediným Pánem Bohem se uzavírá, ten sám k pravému a plnému mysli upokojení a radosti že přichází [Labyrinth of the world and paradise of the heart, or A lucid exposition of how everything in the world is a mere bafflement and confusion, hustle and bustle, delusion and deception, misery and sadness, weariness and despair; however, he who shuts himself away in his own heart, at home with the one God, finds joy and true and utter satisfaction of the mind]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Labyrint světa a ráj srdce [Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, pp. 267–412. For more on the work, see e.g. Britschgi, Gertrud: Naturbegriff und Menschenbild bei Comenius. Zur Begründung der Bildungsidee im universalen Rationalismus. Zurich 1964, pp. 13–38; Čapek, J. B.: K otázkám kořenů, stavby a funkce Labyrintu Komenského [On the Sources, Structure and Function of Comenius’s Labyrinth]. AJAK 22, 1963, pp. 255–271; Michálek, E.: Traditionelle Elemente im Wortschatz des Labyrint von Comenius. AC 2 (26), 1970, pp. 229–238; Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., pp. 224–232.

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Solomon and David, Comenius holds that there is nothing in the world but futility and that all goodness resides in God (as we shall discuss later).783 In the Labyrinth, Comenius repeatedly argues that reason is man’s central and most characteristic perfection.784 In several longer discourses, he adds that man is the image of God, endowed with not only reason, but also immortality.785 The terminological confusion typical of the later works is already much in evidence here; the highest part of man is referred to variously as reason, mind, or soul.786 The text espouses the dyad of body and soul.787 Being devoted to spiritual (as opposed to physical) work is the only way in which man can become similar to God.788 The Labyrinth contains several occurrences of the term human things, but the term is used only in a very broad and general sense to refer to the things that people concern themselves with, i.e., human occupations.789 Although the Labyrinth is largely an allegorical, poetic book, we can read in it Comenius’s unchanged view of man and his destiny. In the city which the protagonist called the Pilgrim visits, new entrants passing through the Gate of Life (i.e., newborn individuals) receive their lot in life from Fate, which means that they do not freely choose their calling.790 Comenius looks with similar pessimism on the attempts of the learned men (especially philosophers and theologians) to find a way to mend human relationships: “And having thus settled nothing, they dispersed, and the learned men again returned to their quarrels; and this grieved me unto tears.”791 Incidentally, Comenius’s was skeptical about Rosicrucianism and its reform ambitions.792 The estate of soldiery which the Pilgrim comes upon during his wanderings around the world becomes for him the most tangible evidence of man’s cruelty, suggestive of the behaviour of wild beasts.793

783 Comenius, John Amos: Labyrint světa a ráj srdce [Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart]. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, p. 273. On sources, see Ecclesiastes 2:17, 12:13; Psalm 73. 784 Ibid., pp. 276, 279. 785 Ibid., pp. 282, 286. 786 See e.g. ibid., p. 294. 787 Ibid., pp. 298, 366. 788 Ibid., pp. 298–299. 789 Ibid., p. 275. See also p. 350. 790 Ibid., p. 281. 791 Ibid., p. 304. “A tak nepsravíc nic, rozprchli se; a učení k hadruňkům svým se navrátili.” 792 Ibid., pp. 314–316. 793 Ibid., pp. 334–336.

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The Pilgrim’s existential angst and world-weariness manifests itself in an aching urge to escape the world: he would sooner die than live in this fallen world.794 He eventually returns to the home of his heart, where he finds God, the only source of certainty and joy.795 Complete beatitude presupposes the surrender of oneself to God.796 The idea of surrender presented in the Labyrinth is, however, quite dissimilar from the panorthotic conception. There is no indication of the nobility of man’s free will, which is the part that man is required to give up.797 The world and man being its ruler are seen as evil and lacking dignity. To give up one’s self and one’s life on this earth is in fact the only option; as we said before, Comenius was sceptical of all plans to reform the world and its inhabitants. By giving up his self and his worldly possessions, man achieves freedom, which Comenius understood as disengagement from the power of the world: “For to be God’s serf is a far greater glory than to be the monarch of the whole world.”798

6.6 Centrum securitatis and Renuntiatio mundi Comenius probably wrote the philosophical-theological tract Centrum securitatis in 1625, though it was only printed in 1633 in Leszno, Poland. For this reason, the work falls partly into the pansophic period.799 Compared to Comenius’s previous works of consolation, the philosophical questions dealt with here are of a much more serious nature. Already the opening cosmogonic part, in which Comenius posits a dichotomy between the Creator God and the created image,

794 795 796 797

Ibid., p. 365. Ibid., pp. 366–368. Ibid., pp. 369–370. In some passages, Comenius seems to be saying the opposite: the will enslaves man. See ibid., p. 378. 798 Ibid., p. 379: “Nýbrž mamen božím býti větší jest sláva, nežli všeho světa monarchou býti.” 799 The full title is Centrum securitatis to jest Hlubina bezpečnosti aneb Světlé vymalování, jak v samém jediném Bohu a pokorném se jemu na všecku jeho vůli oddání a poddání všecka dokonalá přítomného života bezpečnost, pokoj a blahoslavenství záleží [Centrum securitatis, or The well of security: a lucid exposition of how the perfect security, peace, and beatitude of earthly life depend on the one God and man’s complete and humble submission to God’s will]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Centrum securitatis, Renuntiatio mundi. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, pp. 473–564.

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i.e., a world cleft into two opposing poles, is very interesting.800 The creatures closest to God are angels: the spiritual beings that reign in heaven. The material world is made up of four elements, which combine to create plants (herbs and trees) and animals, which inhabit the various elements (fire is the habitat of the pyrausta).801 Divine wisdom ensures that each creature born remains what it should be; in other words, that it retains its nature (přírození, centrum).802 In the case of man, the situation is much more complicated. Man has a dual essence. He has both a spiritual and a corporeal component, and hence two natures (centra). The body is elemental and subject to decline. Man’s spiritual component is rooted in his immortal soul which comes immediately (immediate) from God. By virtue of his soul, man was endowed with the light of reason that enables him to discriminate between things and a free will that enables him to choose and carry out anything he wishes. Last but not least, man is destined to be an intermediary between God and creation.803 In Centrum securitatis, man is conceived of as a fairly dignified being (in one passage, he is characterised as a being possessed of a mind, reason, will, memory, and governance).804 Upon closer reading, we discover that although the will is now included among the constitutive elements of man’s nature and emphasis is put on freedom of choice, reason (i.e., the light of God, světlo boží) is still understood as the most essential human feature.805 The inclusion of the will among the parts of man’s inner being does not exclude Centrum securitatis from the group of Comenius’s essentially pessimistic works, as evidenced by the author’s description of man as futile and wretched and the most treacherous and dangerous of all beings (“we are nothing but men; stupid, wretched, wan men”)806 as well as by his insistence (as in the Labyrinth) on turning away from the world and finding peace and security in its unmoving centre, i.e., God.807 Of all of Comenius’s works

800 Comenius, John Amos: Centrum securitatis, Renuntiatio mundi. In: Id.: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, p. 481. 801 Ibid., p. 482. 802 Ibid., pp. 483, 487–488. 803 Ibid., pp. 488–489. 804 Ibid., p. 492. 805 Ibid., pp. 484–485, 492. 806 Ibid., p. 521: “nic však nejsme než lidé; totiž hloupí, bídní, mdlí lidé”. 807 Comenius clearly drew on the ideas of Nicholas of Cusa. See ibid., p. 487: „The philosopher said, ‘Deus est circulus, cujus centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam’“. For more on the subject, see also ibid., pp. 507–510, 519, 544.

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of consolation, Centrum securitatis includes the most comprehensive description of the concept of resignatio: […] and having abandoned everything, including his self, he sets out towards the depths of God’s mercy in Christ and disappears from his will and reason; surrenders himself fully to God’s will and His providence in order to do with Him what He wants to do, the way He wants to do it, when He wants to do it, where He wants to do it, if He wants to do it. […] That is what we call resignatio: the surrender of one’s will to God.808

The strong and categorical emphasis on the primacy of reason, being the basic constituent of man’s nature, which can be found in Comenius’s pre-pansophic works, is also in evidence in Centrum (which falls into the transitional period between the pre-pansophic and pansophic periods), specifically in the conception of resignatio which is slightly different from what we have seen in the Consultation. In Centrum securitatis, Comenius says that man must surrender not only his will but also his reason.809 Far more space is devoted to the discussion of reason than to the description of human will.810 The text is characterised by terminological confusion; the terms mind, spirit, and soul are deliberately used interchangeably.811 The term ‘human things’ is again used in a broader sense to refer to all things concerning man.812 The world-weariness and the urge to reject all earthly things are even more pronounced in the short postscript to Centrum securitatis titled Renuntiatio mundi, which probably dates from before 1633.813 808 Ibid., pp. 514–515: “[…] a opustě tak všecko, i sám sebe, pustiti se na hlubinu milosrdenství božího v Kristu a tu zmizeti a ztratiti se vůli a rozumu svému; vůli pak a prozřetedlnosti boží tak se cele oddati a odevzdati, aby s nim on sám činil, co chce, jak chce, kdy chce, kudy chce, pokud chce. […] To slove resignatio: oddání a odevzdání vůle své Bohu.” On this subject, see Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení, op. cit., p. 45; see also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 186–187, 194. 809 Ibid., pp. 516–517, 527. 810 Ibid., pp. 527–533. 811 Ibid., pp. 487, 507. 812 Ibid., p. 492. 813 The full title is Renuntiatio mundi to jest Výhost světu, kterýmž jeden z utrápených, skrz práčata světa prohnaných, kolotáním rozličným zmatených, avšak do centrum milosrdenství božího již zase uvedených a Bohu na všecku jeho vůli cele oddaných, nehodných Ježíše Krista služebníků ode všech nepobožných, zemstvím čenichajících a v tělesných žádostech pohřížených světa synů zjevně se odděluje [Renuntiatio mundi, or A renunciation of the world in which one of the careworn servants not worthy of Jesus Christ, who has been beaten down by the world and befuddled by its various

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6.7 Didactics Comenius started working on Didaktika, his principal pedagogical work in the Czech language, which arguably falls into the pansophic period, in 1627, but completed it only after his emigration to Leszno, Poland. It remained a manuscript during his life and only appeared in print in 1849.814 The first chapter, titled Že člověk nejdokonalejší, nejdivnější, nejslavnější tvor jest [That man is the most perfect, the strangest and the most remarkable creature], includes interesting material relevant to our study of Comenius’s philosophicaltheological view of man. In it, man is represented as the image of God, destined to reign over all creation. Like other texts from the same period (Centrum securitatis and Prima philosophia), the Didaktika is concerned with the stratification of being. The lowest level of existence is represented by the elements (earth, water, air, and fire) and minerals (stones and metals), which were endowed with mere being. One level above them are plants, which were endowed with life. One level above plants are animals, which were endowed with all the gifts we have mentioned, but in addition have sentience, breathing, and capacity for movement. Man, who is one level above animals, has everything the animals have and in addition possesses reason, which comes from God. Angels, too, are endowed with reason, but man is superior to them, because he has both a mind (or alternatively, hustles, but brought back to the centre of God’s grace, emphatically distances himself from all disbelieving sons of the world, redolent of the earth and lost in their carnal desires]. Compare ibid., pp. 549–554. 814 The full title is Didactica to jest Umění umělého vyučování. Kterak by totiž člověk, dřív než na těle vzroste a stav svůj začne, všemu tomu, což ku potřebě a ozdobám přítomného i budoucího života přináleží, šťastně, snadně, plně vyučen, a tak potěšeně k životu obojímu nastrojen býti mohl. Což se mocně, základy z samého přirození vzatými, prokazuje; ustavičně, příklady jiných řemeslných umění, vysvětluje; dokonále, na léta, měsíce, dny, hodiny, rozměřuje; a ke všemu tomu, aby k cíli přivedeno bylo, i probuzení činí, i rada dává [Didactics, or the art of teaching. How a man, before he grows up and starts working, can be easily and fully educated about all the necessities and gratifications of both the present and the future life, and thereby be satisfactorily prepared for both. Supported by nature-based evidence; explained by examples of other crafts; perfectly laid out into years, months, days, and hours; providing awakening and advice that enable one to achieve these goals]. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Didactica. In: Id.: Opera omnia 11. Prague 1973, pp. 33–221. On the treatise generally, see e.g. Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., pp. 224–232 or Patočka, Jan: Didaktika a pansofie, op. cit., pp. 190–216, in which the reader can find a well-founded analysis and a long list of references to relevant literature.

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a soul) and a body, which makes him the only being that participates in the realms of the material and the immaterial, the visible and the invisible, the mortal and the immortal.815 Because his soul participates in immortality, the final end of his life cannot lie in the material world. Rather, man is destined to join his Creator for eternity and it is only then that his real life begins.816 The visible world was created only for the purpose of man’s multiplication, education, and training – in other words, as a school that prepares him for real life.817 In the Didaktika, Comenius attributes the greatest nobility to man’s reason, although a number of passages indicate the author’s growing interest in the phenomenon of the human will. For example in the second chapter, Comenius says that the will is the last faculty that man acquires; in other words, the will comes only after reason.818 However, if we read the whole book, it becomes clear that for Comenius the noblest faculty of man was still reason (it is reason that tells the will what it should want819). Man is destined for three things: to be a rational being, to be the ruler over creation, and to be the image of God. The gift of reason consists in several competencies: to grasp the essence of the world and the power of the elements; to recognise the beginning and end of time; to acquire astronomical, astrological, zoological, and medical knowledge, to learn crafts and arts, etc.820 In short, it is man’s nature to know himself and everything else, to be a good ruler and to lead others unerringly towards God: “In these three things lies man’s glory, for they constitute his nature”.821 Compared to Comenius’s panorthotic conception of man, the anthropology of the Didactics clearly accentuates reason and is philosophically less elaborate. Although the statements contained in it are informative and unambiguous, they are a far cry from the profound and well-founded conception of man embodied in the Consultation. Similarly, Comenius’s idea of human nature in the Didaktika is quite distinct from that found in his late works. For Comenius, all people were endowed with an immutable nature, which is based on enlightenment (i.e.,

815 Comenius, John Amos: Didactica. In: Id.: Opera omnia 11. Prague 1973, pp. 43–44. 816 Ibid., pp. 44–46. 817 Ibid., p. 48. 818 Ibid., p. 45. 819 Ibid., p. 57. 820 Ibid., p. 50. 821 Ibid., p. 51: “V tom trém všecka sláva člověka záleží: protože to podstata jeho jest.” See also Kyralová, Marie: Definice člověka u Komenského, op. cit., p. 49.

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reason), virtue (i.e., the ability to govern oneself and others) and piety.822 Man’s excellency thus derives from his position in the hierarchy of existence, not from his open-endedness, flexibility, and freedom, as Comenius would argue in his late works. Comenius’s assertion that the human reason is unlimited and infinite, and therefore capable of knowing absolutely everything (in this world) is an indication of his growing faith in man and greater optimism.823 The emphasis he places on education can be interpreted along the same lines. Ontogenetically, for an individual to become a true man, he must be trained in the disciplines of humanity, as he is born with a blank slate.824 If we fail to develop the individual’s nature through education, he will not become a man, but will come down to the level of animals. Citing various examples, Comenius illustrates that proper and adequate education can restore an individual to humanity; however, cultivation should commence at as early an age as possible.825 In the rest of the Didactics (Chapters VII to XXX), Comenius describes his idea of proper education. Considering that these chapters are not directly related to the anthropological questions under study (namely the author’s philosophical and theological view of man), we shall not be concerned with them here.826 822 823 824 825 826

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Ibid., p. 52. Ibid., pp. 53–54. Ibid., p. 59. Ibid., pp. 61–62. In 1633 and 1634, Comenius started revising his Didaktika and translating it into Latin. The year 1657 marked the publication of his Didactica magna. The text, which was revised in terms of both content and form, in fact espouses the same conception of man as its Czech predecessor. See Didactica magna. Universale omnes omnia docendi artificium exhibens sive Certus et exquisitus modus per omnes alicujus Christiani regni communitates, oppida et vicos tales erigendi scholas, ut omnis utrisque sexus juventus nemine usquam neglecto literis informaci, moribus expoliri, pietate imbui, eaque ratione intra pubertatis annos ad omnia, quae praesentis et futurae vitae sunt, instrui possit compediose, jucunde, solide, ubi omnium quae svadentur fundamenta ex ipsissima rerum natura eruuntur, veritas artium mechanicarum paralllis exemplis demonstratur, series per annos, menses, dies, horas disponitur, via denique in effectum haec feliciter deducendi facilis et certa ostenditur. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Didactica magna. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15/I. Prague 1986, pp. 33–209. On comparison, see Comenius, John Amos: Didactica magna. In: Id.: Opera omnia 15/I. Prague 1986, p. 437, where we can read the following comment: “Once again, we have to reject the hypothesis that the ideas contained in the three sequential versions of the Didactica (the Czech text – the Latin manuscript – the Latin print) went through gradual transformation”. See also Sousedík, Stanislav: K filosofickým

6.8 Prima philosophia Comenius’s first comprehensive treatment of metaphysical questions, the short treatise titled Prima philosophia, was written in 1630 in Leszno, Poland.827 In the introduction, Comenius presents his current conception of the hierarchy of existence. Existence is divided into the first being and everything else, which is derived from it. The first being is God, the essence of all essences (ens entium); derived from this is creation, i.e., the world and everything in it.828 God’s existence is unconditioned, whereas the existence of creation is conditional. God is eternal, independent, simple, and singular; the created world is dependent on its Creator, temporal, multifarious, and made up of matter, spirit, and form.829 The levels of being set forth in Prima philosophia are similar to those in Centrum securitatis and Didaktika. The lowest level is represented by basic substances such as ether, air, water, and earth. One level above them are complex substances like fire and meteorological phenomena. One level above fire and meteorological phenomena are minerals, which were endowed with mere being. Plants were endowed with both being and life. Animals were endowed with being, life, and motion. Man has everything that the animals have and in addition possesses intelligence (intelligunt).830 The treatise does not depart from the unquestioned preference for reason as the primary defining feature of man’s nature, which can be observed in Comenius’s earlier works. In line with those works, man is described as a being that is composed of a body and a soul (anima).831

základům Komenského výchovné soustavy, op. cit., pp. 107–109; Sousedík, Stanislav: Pojetí lidské přirozenosti v německé a české reformaci [The Conception of Human Nature in the Czech and German Reformation]. In: SCetH 35 (XVIII), 1988, pp. 51–57. On the differences between the individual versions of the Didactics, see also the earlier study: Ludvíkovský, Jaroslav: Komenského Praecognita Pansophica [Comenius’s Praecognita Pansophica]. In: AJAK XVI–2, 1957, p. 164. 827 Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Prima philosophia. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, pp. 11–34. For a comparison of the treatise with Mundus possibilis, see ibid., p. 29. On the treatise generally, see e.g. Červenka, Jaromír: Poznámky ke spisu Prima philosophia. AJAK 24, 1970, pp. 168–186; Patočka, Jan: Komenského názory a pansofické literární plány od spisů útěšných ke Všeobecné poradě, op. cit., pp. 233–236. 828 Comenius, John Amos: Prima philosophia. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, p. 13. 829 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 830 Ibid., p. 18. 831 Ibid., p. 23.

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The philosophically and theologically relevant terms appearing in the text include humanity (humanitas), which is used as an example of an abstract being similar to whiteness (albedo), i.e., not as a well-defined anthropological concept.832 In contrast, the term natura humana is used in a much more specific sense to denote the universal unity which stems from the participation of all people in one human nature. What this nature consists in Comenius does not say.833 Nevertheless, in another passage he maintains that man is tied down by his nature and is incapable of transcending it.834 Compared to inferior beings (animals), man is immensely dignified because of his enormous possibilities. By virtue of being more similar to God, who is good, he is necessarily nobler than inferior beings.835

6.9 Physicae synopsis Let us conclude this chapter with an analysis of Comenius’s textbook of physics, which gives evidence of the author’s preference for Mosaic conceptions in natural philosophy. The treatise titled Physicae synopsis was printed for the first time in 1633 in Leipzig (it was subsequently republished five times; we shall base our observations on the last edition, printed in Amsterdam in 1663).836 The long preface to the treatise, which Comenius wrote in 1632 in Leszno, Poland, prefigures several important changes leading up to Comenius’s late philosophy.837 There is the overt optimism regarding the reform of science, particularly

832 833 834 835 836

Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 27. The full title is Physicae ad lumen divinum reformandae synopsis. Post annos a prima editione 28 ab ipso authore recognita principiorumque Mosaicorum firmiori demonstratione aucta. Critical edition: Comenius, John Amos: Physicae synopsis. Ad physicam addenda. In: Id.: Opera omnia 12. Prague 1978, pp. 69–264. On the individual editions, see ibid., pp. 218–219. On the treatise more specifically and on the relationship between the treatise and Mundus materialis, see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 88–104; Červenka, Jaromír: Zur Quellenfrage des IV. Gradus der Comenianischen Pansophia, op. cit., pp. 154–190; Malíšek, Vladimír: Fyzikální obraz světa v době a díle Komenského [The Physical Image of the World in the Time and Works of Comenius]. In: SCetH 46–47 (XXII), 1992, pp. 191–206. 837 On dating, see Comenius, John Amos: Physicae synopsis. Ad physicam addenda. In: Id.: Opera omnia 12. Prague 1978, p. 84.

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of philosophy.838 Furthermore, Comenius, apparently drawing on Campanella, posits three sources of knowledge (cognitionis principia) – the senses, reason, and the Scripture, a schema which would become one of the mainstays of the Consultatio catholica.839 The impression that Physicae synopsis and Consultatio catholica are related is reinforced (leaving aside the fact that the former became a basis for the pansophic Mundus materialis, as we have averred) by even a mere cursory look at the body of the textbook. In it, creation is conceived of as a transition from the invisible to the visible and a manifestation of God’s power (potentia), wisdom (sapientia), and goodness (bonitas).840 The material world is based on three principles: matter (materia), spirit (spiritus), and light (lux).841 Matter is the physical substrate, crude, dark and passive. Light is the visible principle, mobile (capable of penetrating matter), bright, and active. The spirit842 is a delicate, invisible, imperceptible substance that animates bodies; more active than matter, but less active than light.843 The three principles combine to create motion (motus), quality (qualitas), and mutation (mutatio), in this order. These attributes characterise all entities of the material world.844 The basic qualities which arise from the combination of the three principles include the alchemical elements of mercury (mercurium), sulphur (sulfur), and salt (sal), representing serosity, oiliness, and solidity, respectively. Mercury arises from the combination of spirit and matter; sulpur from the combination of matter and fire; salt from the combination of spirit and fire.845 The first stricto sensu substance (substantia) of the material world arising from the combination of all three principles is an element (elementum). Comenius enumerates four elements (in contrast to Mundus materialis) – ether (aether), air (aer), water (aqua), and earth (terra). While Comenius’s conception is partially a revision of Aristotle’s view of the universe, his further views of the elements derive directly from Aristotle.846

838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846

Ibid., p. 76. Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., pp. 96–97. Elsewhere spirit, or the soul of the world (spiritus, anima mundi). Ibid., p. 99. Ibid., p. 103. Ibid., p. 107. Ibid., pp. 116–123. To support his conception, Comenius calls upon Tommaso Campanella, Francis Bacon and Thomas Lydiat (referring probably to Lydiat’s Prælectio

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The subsequent combinations of the elements give rise to vapours (vapores), winds (venti), tides (aestus marini), and earthquakes (terrae moti).847 From the condensation of vapours there arise solid substances such as stars, meteorological phenomena, and minerals. The condensation of ethereal vapours gives rise to stars (sidera) and comets (cometae).848 The condensation of air causes meteorological phenomena (meteora)849 and the condensation of fire causes fire phenomena (meteora ignita) such as sparks, lightning, smoke, etc.850 Water phenomena include bubbles (bullae), spume (spumae), ice (glacies), etc.851 The condensation of earth gives rise to minerals (mineralia), in particular, stones (lapides), and metals (metalla).852 A higher level of being is represented by plants (plantae), which are endowed with life (vita, spiritus vitalis) and characterised by their capacity for sustenance, growth, and procreation.853 One level above plants are animals (animalia), which are described as sentient mobile plants (planta mobilis). Motion as a criterion for the stratification of being had not been used by Comenius in his Physicae synopsis until this passage. For John Amos, the principal difference between plants and animals is the latter’s capacity for locomotion, which is referred to with the same term as in the Consultatio (αὐτoκίνησία). Comenius adds that animals were endowed with this capacity so that they would be able to find food, carry out the tasks that they were destined to do and to preserve themselves. Compared to plants, animals also have a soul (anima vitalis) and an animal spirit (spiritus animalis).854 Upon closer reading, Comenius’s conception of the hierarchy of being in the material world presented in Physicae synopsis and the conception of the universe embodied in the Consultatio appear to be very similar, with only minor differences. The only deviations worth mentioning are the inclusion of phenomena like tides and earthquakes in the model of the world presented in the textbook, and the different importance of motion as a stratification criterion. If we leave

847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854

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astronomica de natura coeli & conditionibus elementorum, published in London in 1605). Ibid., pp. 123–128. Ibid., pp. 128–133. Ibid., pp. 133–134. Ibid., pp. 134–135. Ibid., pp. 136–138. Ibid., pp. 138–140. Ibid., pp. 140–143. Ibid., pp. 144–158.

aside the fact that the textbook is much shorter than Mundus materialis and much more indebted to the Bible (see its mosaicity), we can say that the two texts present a de facto identical philosophy of nature. Important differences appear when we look at the 11th chapter of the textbook which deals with man (De homine). In the first paragraph, man is already defined as a rational animal (animal rationale), endowed with an immortal soul (anima immortalis), which was breathed into him by God. The soul is also called the mind (mens).855 Man is composed of three parts: body (corpus), spirit (spiritus), and soul (anima). The body is elemental just like the bodies of animals; the spirit originates from the spirit of the world (spiritus mundi); and the soul or mind comes immediately from God.856 In line with Comenius’s works written after 1635 and at the beginning of the following decade (including Via lucis and Panaugia), the mind is described as consisting of intellect (intellectus), will (voluntas), and conscience (conscientia). In the following passages, the human mind is conflated with intellect.857 Comenius devotes five paragraphs to the discussion of intellect, but only two to the will and one to conscience. The will is seen as a faculty of the rational soul (facultas animae rationalis) and a tool that is subject to reason. The central role of intellect in the model of Physicae synopsis is thus established.858 Despite the strong emphasis on reason being the basic defining feature of man’s nature, the text includes passages that foreshadow the recognition of the will and freedom of choice in the author’s later works. Comenius for example points up the dignity of man’s erect posture and his hand, which is unique as a tool, and mentions that the human body is unarmed, but man can put on any vesture or any armour.859 In the concluding lines of the 11th chapter we find the already well-known aphorism that man is everything, because he can become anything – the noblest creature, or the basest creature of all.860 The text presents a fairly elaborate discussion of micro- and macrocosms,861 which is another interesting aspect of Comenius’s anthropology. Unlike the Consultatio, the textbook operates with the dichotomy of natura versus ars only, i.e., 855 856 857 858

Terminological confusion is again much in evidence here. Ibid., pp. 160–161. Ibid., pp. 163–164. Ibid., pp. 163–165. See also Kyralová, Marie: Definice člověka u Komenského, op. cit., p. 49. 859 Ibid., p. 161. 860 Ibid., p. 165. 861 Ibid.

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without the inclusion of Comenius’s highly original concept of prudentia. Art is understood merely as an imitation of nature, not something that can perfect nature even further.862 Unlike the pansophic conception, Physicae synopsis includes an exposition of angels – a subject that Comenius explores in his Mundus angelicus, as we have seen. In Physicae synopsis, angels are seen – in contrast to the Consultatio – as superior to man.863

862 Ibid., p. 91. The term natura is used to refer to the power to preserve one’s being. See ibid., p. 95. 863 Ibid., pp. 166–169.

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7. The conception of man in the works of John Amos Comenius If we are to summarise our findings about Comenius’s philosophical-theological view of man, we ought to point out that the works written in the pre-pansophic (preparatory) period, and for that matter, the pansophic period do not contain much in the way of a fixed and comprehensive anthropological conception. Such a conception can be found only in the panorthotic work, namely in Comenius’s masterpiece, De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica. Works from the pre-pansophic period are based on the view of man as the image of God and the pinnacle of creation, whose nobility is, nevertheless, of a lower order than that of angels. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of these works is their striking anthropological pessimism. Man’s knowledge does not serve to broaden his horizons, enhance his will or inspire his activity; on the contrary, it leads him to an understanding that his existence is futile. The works uniformly stress the importance of reason as the defining feature of man’s nature; the will – if mentioned at all – is pushed into the background. This is evident, for example, from the short treatise Listové do nebe [Letters to Heaven], in which Comenius maintains that man’s destiny is entirely contingent on God’s will (as opposed to man’s own self-creative actions). Man is seen, using the term that Comenius uses to describe the human being in all his preparatory works, as a futility in the hands of God. Comenius’s early works are already plagued by the terminological confusion that would beset all of the author’s subsequent works. In the preparatory works, the highest part of man is already referred to variously as reason, mind, and soul. Speaking of terminology, the works from this period contain the first occurrences of the term ‘human things’, which, however, is used in a very general and vague sense, and not in the precise and fixed sense in which it is used in the Consultatio. Closely related to this is the fact that John Amos not only avoids the topic of the dismal state of the human things and refrains from making any appeals to emendation, but is also extremely mistrustful of any reformative efforts here on earth. It should be noted that in this period, unlike in the late period, Comenius operates with a mere dyad of constituents of man (i.e., body and soul). Comenius recognises the importance of the human will for the first time in his Centrum securitatis, probably written in 1625, but published 8 years later in 1633, which is why it can be seen to have marked a transition between the pre-pansophic and pansophic periods. Comenius says that man’s immortal 179

soul consists of both reason and free will. Although this is probably the first time Comenius recognises the importance of the will, he still sees reason as the central aspect of human nature which elevates man above other material creatures. Comenius’s works from the pansophic period are characterised by an emphasis on reason being the innermost constitutive element of man’s nature. However, as the philosopher began to appreciate the importance of the will, he attributed greater nobility to man, who is the only material creature endowed with the will. Moreover, he now regarded man as superior to angels because of the fact that he has both a mind and a body, which makes him the only creature that participates in the realms of the material and the immaterial, the visible and the invisible, the mortal and the immortal. Furthermore, Comenius viewed human reason as unlimited and infinite, and hence considerably nobler. The emphasis on pedagogy and didactics found in Comenius’s works from the 1630s entailed the realisation that man is born as a clean slate and creates himself throughout the course of his life. Comenius’s growing optimism is evident in his treatise Physicae synopsis, in which he states his belief in the possibility of reforming human science (in particular, philosophy). However, Physicae synopsis also clearly illustrates the change in the author’s philosophical-theological view of man that had taken place in the following ten years, from the mid-thirties to mid-forties. While the naturalphilosophical content of Physicae synopsis can largely be considered a paradigm for the pansophic Mundus materialis (where only slight deviations from the former are found), the same cannot be said of the 11th chapter of Physics, dealing with the subject of man. In it, Comenius defines man as a rational animal, whose highest faculty is the mind. The mind consists of three parts – reason, will, and conscience – the most important of which is clearly reason. If we leave aside the growing optimism hinted at above, the only development suggestive of Comenius’s late anthropology is the introduction of a new tripartite model of man as a unity of body, spirit and soul (or mind). The following pansophic works demonstrate Comenius’s growing interest in the pansophic project and the reformation of philosophy. However, there is still no clearly formulated definition of the human things or any explanation of what is wrong with them and how it could be fixed. Contrary to Jan Patočka’s periodisation of Comenius’s work, the pansophic period may also be considered – based on the analysis presented in this volume and in view of Comenius’s evolving conception of man – to include one of the seven parts of Consultatio catholica, viz., Panaugia. In it, the highest part of man, 180

i.e., the human mind, is described as consisting of reason, will and conscience (or emotions), the most important of which is reason. The body text (not the preface, which was written several decades later) of Via lucis, which is similar to Panaugia, may be interpreted along the same lines. However, the turning point in the evolution of Comenius’s philosophicaltheological view of man came only with the writing of De rerum humanarum consultatio catholica. In the preface, Comenius already provides a fixed definition of the human things, explains what is wrong with them, and contemplates the possibility of reforming them. Later in Panegersia, he presents his view of man as a being characterised by his infinite reason, infinite will, and infinite agency – a view he would hold for the rest of his life. The endowments of reason, will, and agency are reflections of the essential attributes of God (scire – velle – posse). The most extensive and comprehensive treatment of man’s nature can be found in the part of Pansophia titled Mundus materialis. In it, man is described as the perfect image of the perfect God, a representative of God’s infiniteness, and the pinnacle of creation (or even as a second God). Reason is no longer considered the highest part of man and the middle and central component of his mind. Instead, primacy is given to his free, limitless, and unconquerable will. Man is described as an indeterminate being that creates himself endlessly and eternally. Having been endowed with a free and limitless will, he can determine his own destiny. The freedom of the human will is such that it cannot be curtailed by other people, angels, the devil, or God Himself. Man’s nobility is evident from the fact that he was entrusted with the task of perfecting the universe. In his description of the pansophical worlds (artificialis, moralis, spiritualis), Comenius makes the point that man participates in God’s creation and is a partner in the creation and preservation of all things and the universe as such. In the same discussion, Comenius brings up another anthropologically interesting matter, on which he elaborates later in Pampaedia, viz., education and autodidacticism. For Comenius, education is the tool of man’s ultimate humanisation and a way to regulate his self-creation. Only education, whose goal is to teach man how he should use his reason, will, and agency, can make man truly human. To sum up, the Consultatio catholica presents Comenius’s view of man as a being determined by his uniquely human nature, which permits his existential open-endedness that is founded on his free and unlimited will. In Comenius’s definition, man is a being that creates himself endlessly and eternally. In the background of Comenius’s terminologically inconsistent works, we can see the 181

evolution of his philosophical-theological view of man. He argues that man is defined by a God-given mind, which consists of a tri-unity of central faculties – the will, reason (these two principles are retained throughout the Consultatio), and agency (which is often replaced by other perfections). Mind, being the most faithful reflection of God’s attributes, elevates man above other material creatures and makes him similar to God. For Comenius, the central and the noblest faculty of the human mind was the will. In Mundus spiritualis, his anthropological system, which has heretofore been characterised by an effort to prove the reality of freedom and the limitlessness of the will on philosophical grounds, is enriched by a new element. Painstakingly (relying on both philosophical and theological arguments), John Amos establishes that there is only one way to reform the human things and for man to achieve the last end of his existence, i.e., participation in salvation and eternal life, namely the voluntary surrender of one’s free will to the will of God. He says that in order to purify the knowledge of his reason, the possibilities of his agency and, most importantly, the potentialities of his will, man must seek to remove yet another obstacle, namely widespread violence. When violence has been eradicated, the philosophical, religious and political liberties of mankind will be restored and the world will be prepared for the second coming of Christ and the Last Judgement – in other words, the onset of eternity. Our analysis of the Consultatio catholica has revealed several problematic aspects, which are also characteristic of Comenius’s other works. One of these aspects is terminological inconsistency, which may to some degree be attributed to the long breaks between the writing of the individual parts of the Consultatio and especially to the unfinished nature of the whole work, as the author was not able to review it in its entirety and harmonise the terminology. Yet the terminological inconsistencies within the individual parts of the Consultatio are most probably owing to a lack of thoroughness and terminological precision on the author’s part. The analysis of Comenius’s conception of man as embodied in the Consultatio led us to the question of whether the defining feature of man’s nature for Comenius was his free will, or his immortal mind. In general, we concluded that due to the apparent inconsistencies between Comenius’s statements and their ambiguity we cannot claim absolute certainty for our interpretations of the author’s views. Yet, we can say that freedom of the human will and the immortality of the human mind are inseparable components of Comenius’s conception of man. The human being is thus understood as the image of God, characterised by his

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mind consisting of three basic faculties and the corresponding innate common notions, instincts, and capabilities that give rise to three human things. If we look back at the Consultatio from the vantage point of the 1640s, we can say that Comenius’s conception of man had at that point reached its height, from which it did not descend. In a number of works from the panorthotic period (between approximately 1646 and 1670), we see the deepening, specification and refinement of the ideas which were set out in the Consultatio. A reader of Comenius’s works from the panorthotic period that contain material pertinent to philosophical-theological anthropology comes away (as in the case of the Consultatio) with the impression that Comenius’s terminology was still very much in flux. Despite the resultant difficulties in interpreting Comenius’s views, we can say that the author’s basic understanding of man – human nature, the elementary components of the human being, man’s faculties and position in the universe – remains largely unchanged. There is, nevertheless, a discernible shift in the interpretation of and answers to other questions closely related to the human things. The works of the panorthotic period thus amplify the principles of Comenius’s anthropology. For example, the treatise Unum necessarium provides a greater insight into Comenius’s views of freedom of the will. In it, virtue is defined as the quality of refraining from doing what one is not allowed to do and carefully considering what one is allowed to do in order to determine if it is necessary. Comenius says: “He who cannot govern himself is not really free”.864 Comenius’s unfinished manuscript of Clamores Eliae gives us an idea of the author’s late philosophical, theological, and anthropological views. Attention should be paid especially to Comenius’s new-found interest in the Elijah theme and his intense belief in the feasibility of constructing a machynka (a perpetual motion machine), which he incorporates into his conception. In conclusion, when we look back at Comenius’s conceptions of man as we have presented them, we can say that Comenius’s works from the pre-pansophic and pansophic periods are characterised by an identical conception of man’s nature. We can witness Comenius’s growing anthropological optimism, which goes hand in hand with his appreciation of freedom of the human will. The human will was, however, only recognised as the central faculty of the highest part of man, i.e., the human mind, in the second half of the 1640s, when Comenius wrote the most important passages of his De rerum humanarum consultatio catholica.

864 Comenius, John Amos: Unum necessarium. In: Id.: Opera omnia 18. Prague 1974, p. 96.

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The same conception of man would be retained in all of Comenius’s works written after 1646, that is, in the panorthotic period. The conception may have been amplified or some aspects of it slightly modified, but Comenius essentially did not change his basic view of man as a being whose existence is essentially openended and who creates himself, a being endowed with an infinite mind with three basic faculties crowned by an unlimited, free will, which man must – for the sake of his own salvation and participation in eternal life – surrender to the will of God.865

865 These conclusions also serve to show, as do our other studies dealing mainly with Comenius’s familiarity with the philosophy and works of Franciscus Patricius, that the view that Comenius’s stay in London marked a watershed in his development as a philosopher is in many ways an exaggeration of facts. Comenius only revised his older philosophical-theological views several years after his return to mainland Europe (and after his formulation of the idea of panorthosia). See Čížek, Jan: Johann Heinrich Alsted: A Mediator between Francesco Patrizi and J. A. Comenius? In: AC 26 (L), 2012, pp. 69–88.

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8. Possible sources of Comenius’s conception At the very conclusion of the present volume, it only remains to discuss the philosophical and theological sources of Comenius’s remarkable anthropology. Comenius’s pre-pansophic and pansophic view of man as a being defined by reason is essentially Aristotelian. It reached Comenius through his teacher Johann Heinrich Alsted. There are a number of striking similarities between Comenius’s treatises from the aforementioned periods and Alsted’s works, similarities related to anthropology and several other aspects.866 Comenius’s works of consolation are clearly indebted – in terms of both form and content – to the works of Justus Lipsius, Johannes Valentinus Andreae, and Jakob Böhme.867 With regard to Comenius’s anthropological pessimism and his early concept of resignatio, we might consider the influence of Sebastian Franck, Johann Arndt and Valentin Weigel.868 Comenius’s late conception of man, however, deserves much more attention. In addition to the impulses we touched upon earlier in the present volume, the ideas about the dignity of man’s free will and the open-endedness of man’s destiny (as well as a number of other important anthropological considerations) had already been articulated by the founding fathers of Christian philosophy.869 In his treatise De ressurectione, Pseudo-Justin says that man is a triune being composed of soul, spirit, and body (however, an antecedent to this can already be found in the Scripture, see e.g. 1 Thess. 5:23). Similar assertions appear in Irenaeus’ Adversus heareses, in which we can find, for example, the idea that if man lives for his body alone, he remains corporeal like other animals; however, if

866 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 13; Aristotle, De anima III, 11; Alsted, Johann Heinrich: Encyclopaedia Septem tomis distincta, op. cit., pp. 425–426, 603, 753–763. 867 Comenius, John Amos: Opera omnia 3. Prague 1978, pp. 131–135, 555–557. 868 Patočka, Jan: Dvojí filosofování mladého Komenského [Two Kinds of Philosophy of Young Comenius]. In: Id.: Komeniologické studie I [Comeniological Studies I]. Prague 1997, pp. 23–26. 869 For an overview of ancient philosophers whose conceptions of man, however, do not have much in common with Comenius’s, see: Karfík, Filip: Polidštění světa a zbožštění člověka v antické filosofii [The Humanisation of the World and the Divinisation of Man in Ancient Philosophy]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al.: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, pp. 17–28.

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he lives for his soul and spirit, too, he becomes spiritual and a perfect human.870 Another notable philosopher worth mentioning is Origen, whose treatise On Liberty of Choice presents a hierarchy of existence that harks back to the Stoics, in which entities are distinguished by mobility and man is described as a being endowed with freedom of choice, which, however, presupposes a rational component. According to Origen, man has autonomy, independence of others, and independence of spiritual powers. Man’s existence is a transition from nonexistence to existence, and is therefore mutable, indeterminate, and open-ended. Man’s freedom of choice, as we shall see, ultimately rests on God’s mercy. For this reason, among others, Origen posits that man must cooperate with God in the work of redemption.871 Similar ideas can already be found in the works of St. Jerome and Clement of Alexandria who discuss freedom of choice and man’s responsibility for his own salvation.872 Plotinus introduced the idea that the human mind was infinite.873 870 Recinová, Monika: Antropologické koncepce církevních otců přelomu 2. a 3. století v souvislosti s naukami o vzkříšení těla [The Anthropological Conceptions of the Church Fathers at the Turn of the 2nd Century in relation to Teachings about the Resurrection of the Body]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, pp. 55, 61, 65. 871 Navrátil, Martin: Órigenés. O svobodě volby [Origen. On Liberty of Choice]. Olomouc 2007, pp. 59–61, 65–66, 84–85, 107–109. 872 Hušek, Vít: “Nedokonalá dokonalost odpovídající lidské křehkosti”. Pojetí člověka u Jeronýma [“The Imperfect Perfection of Human Frailty“. Jerome’s Conception of Man]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, pp. 73–75; Havrda, Matyáš: Jak správně chytat míč. Přirozenost a cíl člověka v myšlení Klementa z Alexandrie [Catching the Ball: Human Nature and Purpose in the Thought of Clement of Alexandria]. In: Chvátal, Ladislav – Hušek, Vít (eds.).: “Přirozenost” ve filosofii minulosti a současnosti [“Nature” in the Philosophy of the Past and Present]. Brno 2008, pp. 68–72. 873 Floss, Pavel: Prostor a nekonečnost světa v Komenského Konsultaci [Space and the Infinity of the World in Comenius’s Consultatio]. In: SCetH 4 (II), 1972, p. 54. On Plotinus’ anthropology, see e.g. Chvátal, Ladislav: Kdo jsme my? Aneb hledání lidské přirozenosti v Plótínově pojednání I 1 [53] [Who are we? The Search for Human Nature in Plotinus’ Treatise I 1 [53]]. In: Chvátal, Ladislav – Hušek, Vít (eds.).: “Přirozenost” ve filosofii minulosti a současnosti [“Nature” in the Philosophy of the Past and Present]. Brno 2008, pp. 54–64.

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In his On the Creation of Man, Gregory of Nyssa, another Church Father whom we shall mention here, calls man, as John Amos would do much later, the observer, ruler, and king of creation, made in the image of God (this is an allusion to the Bible, see Gen. 1:27).874 In his principal work, Life of Moses, Gregory writes that every man determines his destiny by choosing the image he wants to imitate – every human being is in a sense his own father.875 It should also be noted that Gregory describes man as a being with very few corporeal endowments. This is, however, seen as an advantage – by using his capabilities, man can arm himself and adapt himself to the environment better than can other animals.876 There is ample reason to think that these ideas were an inspiration to Comenius.877 We have touched upon the role of St. Augustine several times already; however, let us mention at this point that he was probably an influence on Comenius’s conception of the three basic human principles of nosse/scire – velle – posse and other triadic models of human attributes (for example, Comenius’s amplification of the Biblical triad of body, soul, and spirit). We should also mention St. Augustine’s emphasis on man’s responsibility to cooperate with God in the completion of creation or the Church Father’s treatment of the relationship between free will and human nature.878 874 Karfíková, Lenka: Řehoř z Nyssy. Boží a lidská nekonečnost [Gregory of Nyssa. Divine and Human Infinity]. Prague 1999, p. 112. 875 Gregory of Nyssa, Vita Moysis II / GNO VII/1, 34,11 nn. This interpretation based on Karfíková, Lenka: Řehoř z Nyssy, op. cit., pp. 201–202. See also Chvátal, Ladislav: Der Mensch als Mikrokosmos in den Werken Gregors von Nyssa. In: Byzantino – Slavica. Revue internationale des études byzentines. LXII 2004, pp. 66–70. 876 Karfíková, Lenka: Řehoř z Nyssy, op. cit., pp. 113–114. Tomáš Nejeschleba, however, points out that similar assertions can already be found in the works of Plato (Protagoras 321c–d). See Nejeschleba, Tomáš: “Kníže svornosti” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola a jeho filosofické úsilí [“The Duke of Concord” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and His Philosophical Efforts]. In: Mirandola, Giovanni Pico della: O důstojnosti člověka – De dignitate hominis. Prague 2005, p. 24. 877 The same can be said of Gregory’s appreciation of man’s erect posture. See Karfíková, Lenka: Řehoř z Nyssy, op. cit., p. 114. 878 For more details, see 3.1 or Aurelius Augustinus, De fide et symbolo. Migne PL 40, 193, par. 23. “Et quoniam tria sunt quibus homo constat, spiritus, anima et corpus: quae rursus duo dicuntur, quia saepea anima simul cum spiritu nominatur; pars enim quaedam ejusdem rationalis, qua carent bestiae, spiritus dicitur: principale nostrum spiritus est; deinde vita qua coniungimur corpori, anima dicitur; postremo ipsum corpus quoniam visibile est, ultinium nostrum est.” See also Blum, Paul Richard: Warum ruhte Gott am Siebten Tag?, op. cit., pp. 300–305. On the relationship between freedom of the will and nature, see Karfíková, Lenka: Přirozenost završená vůlí: Augustin

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While indications of man’s uniqueness can be found already in medieval philosophy,879 the anthropological shift towards a greater recognition of the dignitas hominis was set in motion by the works of Nicholas of Cusa. In the third book of his De docta ignorantia, Cusa describes man as a microcosm and creatura mixta or creatura media – an intermediary between the spiritual and material spheres of the universe. In De coniecturis, Nicholas of Cusa speaks of the human soul as a mens, which possesses three perfections: the intellect, reason, and the senses. Man and all components of his nature are infinite, although this infinity is derived from God’s. In De beryllo, Cusa likens man to God and calls him the second creator or second God (secundus deus880). While God created natural beings and forms, man creates rational beings and artificial forms. Like Gregory before him, Cusa viewed human creativity as a way to overcome the inadequacy of the armaments of the human body. In Cusa’s view, man has free will and a high degree of ontological dignity, because he is the only creature that combines in himself all the qualities dispersed among other creatures (for a discussion of John Amos’s explicit borrowings from the works of Nicholas of Cusa, refer to the fourth chapter of this monograph).881 a Origenes [Nature Made Perfect by the Will: Augustine and Origen]. In: Chvátal, Ladislav – Hušek, Vít (eds.).: “Přirozenost” ve filosofii minulosti a současnosti [“Nature” in the Philosophy of the Past and Present]. Brno 2008, pp. 97–98, in which we can find the following cogent description: “In Augustine’s work, nature crowned by the will becomes nature which is still crowned by the will, however, this will is derived from an outside will, the will of an unfathomable God […].” Similar conceptions were articulated by Lactantius in his De opificio mundi, Ambrose in his De dignitate conditionis humanae and Nemesius in his De natura hominis. See Nejeschleba, Tomáš: “Kníže svornosti” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola a jeho filosofické úsilí, op. cit., pp. 20–21. 879 Karel Floss for example mentions Thomas Aquinas. See Floss, Karel: K obrazu člověka v De potentia Tomáše Akvinského [On the Image of Man in Thomas Aquinas’ De potentia]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al.: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, p. 98. See also Kristeller, Paul Oskar: The Dignity of Man. In: Id.: Renaissance Thought and Its Sources. New York 1979, p. 170. 880 Cusa, Nicolas of: De beryllo 7, 1–3. 881 Floss, Pavel: Komenský a Kusánus [Comenius and Cusa]. In: SCetH 2 (I), 1971, pp. 23–25, 31; Floss, Pavel: Profil antropologických názorů Mikuláše Kusánského [A Characterisation of Nicholas of Cusa’s Anthropology]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al.: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary

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Nicholas of Cusa prepared the ground for the recognition of the dignity of man in the Renaissance, which found its apogee in the works of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. In Heptaplus, Pico espouses the idea of man as a being composed of body, spirit (spiritus), and soul (anima) and puts strong emphasis (in Heptaplus as well as in Oratio de dignitate hominis) on man’s dignity, uniqueness, and freedom.882 The dignity of man is the central subject of Pico’s Oratio de dignitate hominis (originally published under the title Oratio quaedam elegantissima). In it, Pico presents for the first time his version of the myth of creation. Man was created last when there was no archetype (archetipus) left on which he could be modelled. Thus, man was created without a fixed quiddity or immutable nature. He was, however, endowed with free will and his nature is defined by his choices.883 All this shows that Comenius may have been influenced by Pico della Mirandola as well.884

Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, pp. 104–111. See also Červenka, Jaromír: Problematika Komenského metafyziky, op. cit., pp. 58–60. 882 Žemla, Martin: Paracelsovo pojetí člověka (a jeho předobrazy v díle Pika della Mirandola a Marsilia Ficina) [Paracelsus’s Conception of Man (and Its Precursors in the Works of Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino)]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, pp. 115–116, 119. See also Floss, Pavel: Příroda, člověk a společnost v díle J. A. Komenského [Nature, Man and Society in the Work of John Amos Comenius]. Přerov 1968, pp. 29–30. 883 Mirandola, Giovanni Pico della: O důstojnosti člověka – De dignitate hominis. Prague 2005, pp. 54–57; Kristeller, Paul Oskar: Osm filosofů italské renesance [Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance]. Prague 2007, pp. 74–75; Nejeschleba, Tomáš: “Kníže svornosti” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola a jeho filosofické úsilí, op. cit., pp. 19, 23–29; Schaller, Klaus: Komenskýs Humanismus. In: SCetH 1 (I), 1971, p. 27. 884 Floss, Pavel: Filosofické předpoklady Komenského demokratismu, op. cit., p. 83. Note that Pico della Mirandola’s treatment of man’s freedom and self-creation in Oratio is far more complex than we can possibly cover here. On contemporary interpretations of Pico’s philosophy and especially his Oratio, see e.g. Craven, William G.: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Symbol of His Age. Modern Interpretations of a Renaissance Philosopher. Geneve 1981; Euler, Walter Andreas: „Pia philosophia“ et „docta religio“. Theologie und Religion bei Marsilio Ficino und Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Munich 1988, pp. 101–112; Kristeller, Paul Oskar: The Dignity of Man. In: Id.: Renaissance Thought and Its Sources. New York 1979, pp. 172–178 or Nowakowski, Dawid: Absolutnie wolny? Wolność człowieka w filozofii Giovanniego Pico della Mirandoli [Absolutely Free? Man’s Freedom in the Philosophy of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola]. In: Acta universitatis Lodziensis – Folia Philosophica 24 (2011), pp. 9–18.

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In addition to Pico della Mirandola, we should also mention Gianozzo Manetti, Marsilio Ficino, and Paracelsus. In his De dignitate et excellentia hominis, Manetti writes that man occupies a unique position in the universe, because his endowments allow him to participate in God’s work of creation. Manetti says that man’s creativity and works of creation are constitutive of his dignity.885 Ficino and Paracelsus use triadic models of the human being which are similar to the one used by Comenius (Ficino in De amore and Paracelsus in Astrologia magna use the triad of mens – anima – corpus, but also operate with concepts like astral body or astral spirit, which are quite foreign to the Comenian conception).886 More to Comenius’s liking would have been Paracelsus’s view of man as a being endowed with free will and the potential to become anything, as he already, in a sense, is everything. Therein lies man’s moral responsibility, says Paracelsus. The attribution of John Amos’s anthropological views to the influence of Paracelsus is, however, complicated by the complexity and mutability of the latter’s ideas as well as by his emphasis on the role of celestial bodies.887 Ficino views man (or the human soul) as an intermediary between the higher and lower levels of being – a view that Comenius expressed in his Mundus materialis.888 Last but not least, we should mention that certain parallels can be drawn between Comenius’s anthropology and the emphasis on man’s freedom in the tradition of the Unity of Brethren or in German mysticism. Important textual correspondences exist between John Amos’s works and Theologia Germanica and the works of Jakob Böhme.889 885 Nejeschleba, Tomáš: “Kníže svornosti” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola a jeho filosofické úsilí, op. cit., pp. 21–22. 886 Žemla, Martin: Paracelsovo pojetí člověka (a jeho předobrazy v díle Pika della Mirandola a Marsilia Ficina), op. cit., p. 118. See also Jung, Carl Gustav: Paracelsica. Prague 2002, pp. 54–57, 83–85, 98–103. 887 Žemla, Martin: Paracelsovo pojetí člověka (a jeho předobrazy v díle Pika della Mirandola a Marsilia Ficina), op. cit., pp. 115–117, 123–124. See also Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení, op. cit., pp. 40–41. 888 Cassirer, Ernst – Kristeller, Paul Oskar – Randall, John Herman: The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Chicago 1948, pp. 190–191; Kristeller, Paul Oskar: Osm filosofů italské renesance [Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance]. Prague 2007, p. 52. On Ficino’s other (theological) views that may have been interesting to John Amos, see Blum, Paul Richard: Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance. Farnham – Burlington 2010, pp. 109–126. 889 Theologia Deutsch. Stuttgart 1851 (ed. Franz Pfeiffer), Das li. Capitel (pp. 103–110); Das liiii. Capitel (pp. 117–120). See also Červenka, Jaromír: K problematice vztahů Komenského ke Campanellovi [On the Question of Comenius’s Relationship to

In Chapter 4, we have discussed the possible influence of René Descartes. Although Jan Patočka claims that Descartes’s philosophical concept does not correspond with the anthropological system of Comenius, it is at least possible to speculate that Descartes’s concept of the limitless will – which he formulated at the turn of the 1640s – indirectly inspired Comenius to prefer the will over reason.890 This list of hypothetical influences on Comenius’s conception of man is by no means exhaustive (we have not covered Erasmus yet) or authoritative. Clearly, the idea that man is the most perfect being, endowed with creative power, and a second God, is almost the locus classicus of Renaissance and Early Modern thought.891 Campanella]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, pp. 17; Grunsky, Hans Alfred: Jacob Boehme. Stuttgart 1956, pp. 72–75, 134–135, 300–304; Grunsky, Hans Alfred: Jakob Böhme als Schöpfer einer germanischen Philosophie des Willens. Hamburg 1940, pp. 35–36; Žemla, Martin: Jakub Böhme a problém zla [Jakub Böhme and the Question of Evil]. In: Jednota a mnohost. Eckhart, Kusánský, Böhme, Ibn ‘Arabí. Sborník textů z českoněmeckého filosofického kolokvia [Unity and Plurality. Eckhart, Cusa, Böhme, Ibn ‘Arabí. Proceedings from the Czech-German Philosophical Colloquium]. Prague 2002, pp. 101–104 or Žemla, Martin: Theologia Deutsch: brisante Ideen zwischen „deustcher Mystik“. In: AC 22–23 (XLVI–XLVII), 2009, pp. 24–30. On Comenius’s relationship to Böhme, with whose works he had certainly become familiar before his exile, see Wernisch, Martin: Mystika a reformace. Theologia Deutsch. Text a dějinný context [Mysticism and Reformation. Theologia Deutsch. Text and Historical Context]. Prague 2007, pp. 133–137. Pavel Floss argues that Comenius had an ambivalent attitude to the German mystic. See Floss, Pavel: Filosofické předpoklady Komenského demokratismu, op. cit., p. 81. On Comenius’s relationships to other representatives of this strand of thought (Johannes Tauler, Tomas von Kempe, Sebastian Franck, Johann Arndt, Johann Gerhard, Meister Eckhart), see Červenka, Jaromír: Die Weltenschichten bei Campanella und Comenius, op. cit., pp. 135–136. 890 See Descartes, René: Meditationes de prima philosophia. Lipsiae 1913, p. 65: “Nec vero etiam queri possum quod non satis amplam et perfectam voluntatem, sive arbitrii libertatem a Deo acceperim, nam sane nullis illam limitibus circumscribi experior.” (Meditatio IV.). 891 See e.g. Michalík, Jiří: Člověk jako mikrokosmos v pozdní renesanci. Dílo Roberta Fludda [Man as a Microcosm in the Late Renaissance. The Work of Robert Fludd]. In: Nejeschleba, Tomáš – Němec, Václav – Recinová, Monika et al.: Pojetí člověka v dějinách a současnosti filosofie. I. Od antiky po renesanci [The Conception of Man in Past and Contemporary Philosophy I. From Antiquity to the Renaissance]. Brno 2011, pp. 127, 134. Any absolute interpretation would be impossible, as is clear, for example, from the attempts to interpret the works of John Wycliffe. While some scholars consider Wycliffe Comenius’s precursor (and an advocate of freedom of the

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We should also revisit the second aspect of Comenius’s anthropology. On the one hand, Comenius tries to prove that the human will is unlimited; on the other hand, he says that man must surrender his freedom. In order to gain his salvation and eternal life, he must voluntarily surrender his will to the will of God. In our opinion, this seemingly paradoxical892 requirement can be construed as evidence of the importance for Comenius of his vision (albeit not original in the context of Christian thought) of a synthesis between philosophy and theology.893 As we will), others describe him as an advocate of the idea that everything is inevitable. On the former of the two views, see e.g. Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení, op. cit., p. 39; on the latter view, see e.g. Sanetrník, David: Reformní theolog Erasmus Rotterdamský a jeho polemika s Lutherem [The Reformed Theologian Desiderius Erasmus and His Polemic with Luther]. In: Erasmus, Desiderius: O svobodné vůli – De libero arbitrio. Prague 2006, pp. 66–67. 892 It is seemingly paradoxical not least because similar ideas can be found in the context of (more pessimistic) Reformation anthropology (see also the following note). Comenius’s late view of man is, however, undoubtedly optimistic. 893 On this subject, see Kučera, Zdeněk: Komenský teolog, op. cit., pp. 43–45; Sousedík, Stanislav: Komenského filosofie v souvislostech myšlenkového vývoje doby [Comenius’s Philosophy in the Context of Contemporary Developments in Philosophy]. In: SCetH 8–9 (IV), 1974, pp. 18–28. In his useful study, Sousedík shows that this view was inspired by the so-called Mosaic philosophical tradition (which we have touched upon in Chapter 3.3 – Mundus materialis). According to Sousedík, this tradition stemmed from Reformation metaphysics and theology and from the disintegration of the old, unified religious and scientific worldview as a result of advances in astronomy, chronology, and philosophy (e.g. Cartesianism) at the onset of modernity. However, Sousedík’s theory that Reformation theologians and philosophers subscribed to the Mosaic worldview because of their essentially pessimistic view of man, founded on the belief that human nature was stained by original sin, which made human reason incapable of gaining adequate knowledge without the help of God’s grace and Scripture, does not apply to Comenius’s anthropology, as we have clearly demonstrated. Let us only mention that Sousedík repeated these views even two decades later. See Sousedík, Stanislav: Filosofie v Českých zemích mezi středověkem a osvícenstvím [Philosophy in the Czech Lands between the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment]. Prague 1997, p. 259. Jaromír Červenka suggests that Comenius may have been influenced by the synthesis between philosophy and theology found in Rosicrucianism. Moreover, he shows that Comenius and the Rosicrucians had the same understanding of the overarching concept of pansophy. See Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 52; Červenka, Jaromír: Die Weltenschichten bei Campanella und Comenius, op. cit., p. 148; Comenius may also have been influenced by the treatises Theologia naturalis and Liber naturae sive creaturarum written by Raymond of Sabunde. Červenka, Jaromír: Die Naturphilosophie

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have seen, the first part of the equation (i.e., the attempts to prove the reality of freedom of the human will) was based on philosophical sources, whereas the second part of the equation was definitely based on theological impulses; man, according to Comenius, was endowed with free will and agency, which are, however, contingent on God’s grace.894 The concept of resignatio can be found in the Scripture (e.g. Mark 8:34–8:36, Matt. 19:21, John 16:18, and especially the works of Paul),895 as well as in the later tradition. In addition to Origen,896 St. Augustine,897 and Thomas Aquinas,898 we should also mention the German mystical tradition, in particular, the treatise Theologia Germanica899 and the works of Jakob Böhme900 (Comenius was des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., p. 80. In another study, Červenka discusses the hypothetical influence of Ramon Llull. See Červenka, Jaromír: Einige Bemerkungen zur Comenius’s Metaphysik. In: AC 3 (XXVII), 1972, pp. 124–126. On the two lastmentioned philosophers and their conceptions, see Blum, Paul Richard: Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance. Farnham – Burlington 2010, pp. 1–17. 894 A similar interpretation of Comenius’s thought is offered by Palouš, Radim: Komenského boží svět [Comenius’s Divine World]. Prague 1992, p. 80. The same conclusions were arrived at by Hotson, Howard: The Instauration of the Image of God in Man: Humanist Anthropology, Encyclopaedic Pedagogy, Baconianism and Universal Reform. In: Pelling, Margaret – Mandelbrote, Scott (eds.): The Practice of Reform in Health, Medicine, and Science, 1500–2000. Aldershot 2005, p. 18. 895 See Cimala, Peter: Svoboda jako soteriologická metafora v Listu Galatským [Freedom as a Soteriological Metaphor in the Epistle to the Galatians]. In: Tichý, Ladislav – Opatrný, Dominik (eds.): Apoštol Pavel a Písmo [Paul the Apostle and Scripture]. Olomouc 2009, pp. 52–54. 896 Navrátil, Martin: Órigenés. O svobodě volby, op. cit., p. 119. 897 Aurelius Augustinus: Confessionum Libri Tredecim. Migne PL 032, collumnas 0657– 0868, Liber VII, 16. See also Karfíková, Lenka: Přirozenost završená vůlí: Augustin a Origenes, op. cit., pp. 97–98. 898 Aquinas, Thomas: Summa Theologiae II, q. 109 a. 2 co. On St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, see Žemla, Martin: Jakub Böhme a problém zla, op. cit., p. 100. 899 Theologia Deutsch. Stuttgart 1851 (ed. Franz Pfeiffer), Das ander Capitel (pp. 4–5); Das xxvii. Capitel (pp. 52–53); Das xxxiiii. Capitel (pp. 65–66): “Sol der mensche zu dem besten komen, so muss er sinen eigen willen lassen, und wer dem menschen hilfet zu sinem eigen willen, der hilfet im zu dem allerbosten.” See also Žemla, Martin: Jakub Böhme a problém zla, op. cit., p. 100. 900 Žemla, Martin: Jakub Böhme a problém zla, op. cit., p. 99. Similar ideas can be found in other mystical texts, for example, those by Meister Eckhart. See Meister Eckhart: Kniha božské útěchy (Das Buch der göttlichen Tröstung) [Book of Consolation]. In: Sokol, Jan (ed.): Mistr Eckhart a středověká mystika [Meister Eckhart and Medieval Mysticism]. Prague 2000, pp. 167, 179. On Böhme’s conception and its relationship

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demonstrably familiar with both),901 in which we can find statements that are similar to Comenius’s. In the Consultatio, Comenius cites Jacopo Brocardo.902 We must also mention the hypothetical influence of the ideas of Erasmus, the most complete exposition of which can be found in his treatises De libero arbitrio διατριβή sive collatio (1524) and Hyperaspistes diatribe adversus servum arbitrium M. Lutheri (1526). In them, Erasmus discusses, among other things, the relationship between man’s will and God’s grace.903 As first pointed out by Jan Patočka and Robert Kalivoda (and as we have seen as well), the concept of resignatio can already be found in Comenius’s works of consolation.904

901 902 903 904

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to Eckhart’s ideas, see Miller, Arlene A.: The Theologies of Luther and Boehme in the Light of Their Genesis Commentaries. In: Harvard Theological Review 2 (63), 1970, pp. 276–278, 293–296. See Wernisch, Martin: Mystika a reformace. Theologia Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 133–137. CC I, p. 612, col. 1033. Comenius mentions the treatise Brocardus, Jacobus: Mystica et prophetica libri Geneseos interpretatio. Bremae 1585. Sanetrník, David: Reformní theolog Erasmus Rotterdamský a jeho polemika s Lutherem, op. cit., pp. 56, 89. This fact has been pointed out by Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení, op. cit., p. 45; see also Patočka, Jan: Komenského Všeobecná porada, op. cit., pp. 186–187, 194. Klaus Schaller has demonstrated that similar ideas can be found in the Labyrinth of the world and Paradise of the Heart. See Schaller, Klaus: Komenskýs Humanismus. In: SCetH 1 (I), 1971, p. 32.

9. Comenius’s anthropology in scholarly literature We shall now provide an appropriate and comprehensive answer to the question raised at the beginning of the present volume, viz., “How has the subject of Comenius’s conception of man been covered in scholarly literature?” Before we proceed, it must be noted that the majority of the literature on the subject is written in Czech (or in German) and that there are only very few English-language materials on Comenius. After some necessary simplification, we can say that the texts may be classified into three categories according to how they approach (or not) the subject of Comenius’s anthropology. The first category includes texts which do not deal with the subject at all (the number of such materials is surprisingly large, considering the importance of the topic). The second category includes texts that give some consideration to the subject, but either use Comenius’s own terms without analysing their meaning or view Comenius’s anthropology from one perspective only. An example of the former sub-category is Jiřina Popelová’s extensive, but otherwise rather general discussion of Comenius’s views of the humana natura, in which no attempt is made to define the term in question.905 Several other studies mention Comenius’s conception of man; however, it is nearly always regarded as unambiguous and unproblematic, a subject that does not warrant further analysis. In one of her studies, Dagmar Čapková uses the phrase “Comenius’s anthropology”, but does not provide any explanation of it and only demands that we analyse the relationship of this anthropology to the other disciplines reflected in Comenius’s work.906 In another study, she writes quite vaguely: “His [i.e., Comenius’s] conception of humanity is based on respect for man as an individual and a social being – a child, adolescent, and adult.”907 In his acclaimed study of Comenius’s conception 905 Popelová, Jiřina: Jana Amose Komenského cesta k všenápravě, op. cit., pp. 346–376, 386, 402–405. 906 Čapková, Dagmar: Otázky interdisciplinárního zkoumání díla Komenského [Questions Concerning the Interdisciplinary Study of the Work of Comenius]. In: SCetH 46–47 (XXII), 1992, pp. 18–19. 907 Čapková, Dagmar: D. Erasmus Rotterdamský, J. V. Andreae a J. A. Komenský v úsilí o mír a lidství [Erasmus, Andreae and Comenius and Their Efforts to Achieve Peace and

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of man, Robert Kalivoda says only that for Comenius man was “a free being, responsible for himself ”.908 Another example (for the complete list, see the footnote to each paragraph) is the study by Boris Uher, which explicitly mentions Comenius’s “conception of human nature”, which, however, is not described in detail (except for a few general statements). Without considering the complexity of the problem, Uher states that Comenius’s conception of man reached its final form in the first treatises published during the philosopher’s stay at Leszno, which would mean that the formulation of the conception predated the pansophic idea.909 The authors of texts that fall into the second sub-category analyse and interpret Comenius’s anthropology, but view it from one perspective only, thus reducing it substantially. In her analysis of the Consultatio, Jiřina Popelová mentions several times that for Comenius man was defined by cognition (she probably refers to Pampaedia),910 but fails to mention other (and more important) aspects that are attributed to man in the Consultation.911 The tendency to interpret Comenius’s anthropology from a didactic and pedagogical perspective (and to downplay its philosophical and theological significance) is characteristic of the majority of works in this category. This tendency is exemplified by Jaroslava Pešková’s study Humanity]. In: SCetH 35 (XVIII), 1988, p. 213. See also Čapková, Dagmar: Pansofickopedagogická struktura Komenského souboru Opera didactica omnia, op. cit., pp. 31–43; Čapková, Dagmar: Pansofie a Komenského pojetí činnosti, op. cit., pp. 37–48. 908 Kalivoda, Robert: Komenského pojem emendace a reformační myšlení, op. cit., pp. 46–47. See also Kalivoda, Robert: K povaze praxeologického myšlení J. A. Komenského [On the Nature of the Praxeological Thought of John Amos Comenius]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, pp. 58–59. 909 Uher, Boris: Pojetí člověka v Komenského pedagogických spisech [The Conception of Man in Comenius’s Pedagogical Treatises]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, pp. 137–140. On other similar texts, see e.g. Britschgi, Gertrude: Über J. A. Komenský: Zur Psychologie des Mikrokosmos und deren natürlichen Begründung. In: Colloquia Comeniana I, 1968, pp. 21–40 (esp. 29–31); Čapková, Dagmar: Úvod – Komenského Obecná porada a její význam, op. cit., pp. 18, 21, in which the author speaks quite generally about the concept of human nature; in relation to the Consultatio, she mentions the dyad of reason and will, but fails to mention agency); Schaller, Klaus: Komenskýs Humanismus, op. cit., pp. 25–35; Sousedík, Stanislav: K filosofickým základům Komenského výchovné soustavy, op. cit., pp. 95–109; Válka, Josef: Komenského sociální a politické myšlení v Konzultaci, op. cit., pp. 36–53. 910 See CC II, p. 73, col. 120 and Chapter 3.4 of this book. 911 Popelová, Jiřina: Komenského filozofie ve vztahu k filozofickým systémům 17. století [Comenius’s Philosophy in Relation to the Philosophical Systems of the 17th Century]. In: SCetH 30 (XV), 1985, p. 18.

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Der Natur- und Natürlichkeitsbegriff im Werk J. A. Komenskýs, which tries to shed light on these concepts and analyse them against the background of Comenius’s philosophy of education.912 Although the study is based on the analysis of, among other works, the Consultatio, it does not treat the philosopher’s conception of human nature (it only mentions Comenius’s emphasis on human agency, without providing any detailed explanation). The main part of the study deals with John Amos’s natural philosophy and his conception of the dichotomy between natura and ars; surprisingly though, anthropological questions are not discussed.913 The third category, which includes works that deal with Comenius’s conception of human nature, is the least numerous of all – a marginal category within the domain of Comenius studies. Marie Kyralová’s treatise Definice člověka u Komenského [Comenius’s Definition of Man] represents a valuable contribution to the study of Comenius’s anthropological views. In it, Kyralová takes note of the terminological ambiguity of Comenius’s statements and describes John Amos as a thinker who initially subscribed to the Aristotelian view of man as a being defined by reason and later, from about the 1640s onwards, started gravitating towards the idea that the central component of man’s nature is his free will. Kyralová gives a logically structured overview of the evolution of Comenius’s views, but she does not delve into details and devotes only a few lines to each of the works in which Comenius deals with the subject (as for the Consultatio, Kyralová does not acknowledge the differences between the individual parts of the work).914 Another valuable contribution to the subject comes from the pen of Pavel Floss. In one of his studies (to which we have referred in the third chapter of this book), Floss calls attention to the metaphysical rift between the component that makes man part of nature and the component that makes him radically superior to it. Citing the Cusanian dialectical doctrine, Floss explains, similarly as we have done, that there is nothing incongruous about the idea that man is a product of nature and at the same time is capable of transcending it. Moreover, man can perfect nature by creating new worlds, thereby becoming the creator of a new

912 Pešková, Jaroslava: Der Natur- und Natürlichkeitsbegriff im Werk J. A. Komenskýs. In: AC 7 (XXXI), 1987, pp. 27–36. 913 See futher e. g. Čapková, Dagmar: Die Beziehung zur Natur und die Bildungskonzeption Komenskýs. In: Colloquia Comeniana II, 1969, pp. 5–21; Soudilová, Věra: Philosophische Grundlagen des Irenismus bei J. A. Comenius. In: AC 9 (XXXIII), 1991, pp. 32–33. 914 Kyralová, Marie: Definice člověka u Komenského, op. cit., pp. 49–54.

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nature. This simultaneous definiteness and indeterminateness of man makes him the unique and exceptional being that he is.915 The intricacy of Comenius’s seemingly simple conception of man has been cogently pointed out by Radim Palouš, who says that for Comenius, man’s destiny was hypostatically open-ended, which made it impossible for man to shut himself up in any definite enclave. Palouš also points out the seemingly paradoxical nature of this conception, on which we have remarked several times as well. On the one hand, man’s existence is infinitely open-ended; on the other hand, this open-endedness is inseparable from man’s nature.916 Arguably the most important work in this strand of scholarly literature written in a world language is Gertrud Britschgi’s dissertation Naturbegriff und Menschenbild bei Comenius, published in book form in 1964. The study attempts a detailed exposition of Comenius’s understanding of the terms natura and natura humana and an overview of his anthropology. As typical of the time when the 915 Floss, Pavel: Grundriss der Philosophie des Johann Amos Comenius, op. cit., pp. 15–19. On other similar works by the same author, see e.g. Floss, Pavel: Comenius – Kosmogonie und Kosmologie, op. cit., pp. 83–110 (esp. pp. 103–106); Floss, Pavel: Homo faber a modi infinitatis. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, pp. 61–68; Floss, Pavel: Komenský a Kusánus, op. cit., pp. 9–38 (esp. p. 21); Floss, Pavel: Příroda, člověk a společnost v díle J. A. Komenského, op. cit., pp. 28–40. 916 Palouš, Radim: J. A. Komenský – náboženský myslitel [John Amos Comenius – A Religious Thinker]. In: SCetH 51 (XXIV), 1994, p. 10. On other studies in the same vein, see e.g. Kalivoda, Robert: Význam J. A. Komenského pro rozvoj novodobé filozofie [The Significance of John Amos Comenius for the Development of Modern Philosophy]. In: SCetH 29 (XV), 1985, pp. 113–119; Palouš, Radim: Komenského boží svět, op. cit., in which one chapter is devoted to discussion of John Amos’s anthropology (pp. 66–87). Palouš analyses all the important aspects of Comenius’s conception of man (man as the pinnacle of creation; man as a microcosm and microtheos; man as the image of God; the three infinite faculties of the human mind; Comenius’s conception of freedom of the will and the relationship between man’s will and God’s grace; and the open-endedness of human existence) against the background of the concept of chrésis and Cartesianism, covering a great breadth of ground; Popelová, Jiřina: Pojetí lidské přirozenosti u J. A. Komenského, op. cit., pp. 679–691; this study focuses on the anthropology of the Consultatio. It deals with all the relevant subjects (the relationship between Comenius’s anthropology and his understanding of the human things, the open-endedness of human nature, etc.), but does not acknowledge the anomalous nature of Panaugia and accentuates the pedagogical dimension of Comenius’s views. For the most recent treatment of the subject, see Kyralová, Marie: Obraz člověka u Komenského, op. cit., pp. 103–116; the study is largely a recapitulation of the author’s older views (see above).

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study was written, the focus is on Comenius’s didactic and pedagogical works; when it comes to the Consultatio, some space is devoted to Panegersia and Pampaedia, however, the parts that are the most relevant anthropologically (namely Pansophia and Panorthosia) are not treated. The chapter Das Menschenbild (pp. 85–119) provides an analysis of Comenius’s Physicae synopsis, Ad Physicam addenda, Didactica Magna, and Unum necessarium.917 A fairly brief, but accurate and comprehensive overview of the basic schema of Comenius’s anthropology can be found in one section of Howard Hotson’s study The Instauration of the Image of God in Man: Humanist Anthropology, Encyclopaedic Pedagogy, Baconianism, and Universal Reform. Hotson describes the evolution of the basic conception of the Consultatio from the formulation of the three principles of scire, velle, and posse, to the definition of the basic human things, to Comenius’s methodology and panorthotic vision.918 It must be said, though, that none of the aforementioned studies takes a really comprehensive view of Comenius’s conception of man or provides an exhaustive 917 Britschgi, Gertrud: Naturbegriff und Menschenbild bei Comenius. Zur Begründung der Bildungsidee im universalen Rationalismus. Zurich 1964. 918 Hotson, Howard: The Instauration of the Image of God in Man: Humanist Anthropology, Encyclopaedic Pedagogy, Baconianism and Universal Reform. In: Pelling, Margaret – Mandelbrote, Scott (eds.): The Practice of Reform in Health, Medicine, and Science, 1500–2000. Aldershot 2005, pp. 10–16. Other relevant studies written in world languages include: Lochman, Jan Milič: Comenius as Theologian. In: AC 10 (XXXIV), 1993, pp. 37–41, in which the key terms of Comenius’s anthropology (including the philosopher’s view of man’s freedom) are explained; Čapková, Dagmar – Červenka, Jaromír – Floss, Pavel – Kalivoda, Robert: The Philosophical Significance of the Work of Comenius. In: AC 8 (XXXII), 1989, pp. 9–12, in which all the relevant aspects of Comenius’s anthropology are briefly treated; Červenka, Jaromír: Mundus possibilis (Ein Versuch der Analyse des Eintrittsgradus der Pansophie). In: AC 6 (XXX), 1985, pp. 10–13, 19–20, in which the meaning of the key concepts of Comenius’s anthropology (nosse – velle – posse; the human mind; human agency) are illuminated against the background of a slightly different focus; Sousedík, Stanislav: Einige Züge der Philosophie des J. A. Comenius und deren bisher unberücksichtigen Quellen. In: AC 4/1 (XXVIII/1), 1979, pp. 98–106, in which the question of human nature is discussed in detail; Červenka, Jaromír: Die Weltenschichten bei Campanella und Comenius. In: AC 4/1 (XXVIII/1), 1979, pp. 117–118, 130–140, 144–145, which treats Comenius’s emphasis on human agency and creativity and presents an exhaustive overview of the sources of this particular aspect of the philosopher’s anthropology; Blekastad, Milada: Was sind die „menschlichen Dinge“ des Comenius – und warum? In: AC 3 (XXVII), 1972, pp. 79–88 presents a more general, nevertheless useful overview of Comenius’s anthropological views.

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analysis of the philosopher’s treatises (or a selection thereof) or thematises the discrepancies between them (as far as we are aware, the anomalous anthropology of Panaugia has not been properly studied so far) or the contradictions within the individual works. The thrust of our remark at the beginning of this study that a systematic and comprehensive analysis of John Amos’s anthropological views is still lacking remains valid.

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10. Summary Based on our own reading of Comenius’s work and our analysis of and comparison between the author’s individual works, we align ourselves with the periodisation proposed by the Czech philosopher and Comenius scholar Jan Patočka, who divides Comenius’s life into three qualitatively dissimilar periods: prepansophic (also called preparatory), pansophic and panorthotic (characterised by Comenius’s reformation efforts). Comenius’s works written in the pre-pansophic (preparatory) period, and for that matter, the pansophic period do not contain much in the way of a fixed and comprehensive anthropological conception. Such a conception can be found only in the panorthotic work, namely in Comenius’s masterpiece, De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica. Works from the pre-pansophic period are based on the view of man as the image of God and the pinnacle of creation, whose nobility is, nevertheless, of a lower order than that of angels. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of these works is their striking anthropological pessimism. Man’s knowledge does not serve to broaden his horizons, enhance his will or inspire his activity; on the contrary, it leads him to an understanding that his existence is futile. The works uniformly stress the importance of reason as the defining feature of man’s nature; the will – if mentioned at all – is pushed into the background. This is evident, for example, from the short treatise Listové do nebe (Letters to Heaven), in which Comenius maintains that man’s destiny is entirely contingent on God’s will (as opposed to man’s own self-creative actions). Man is seen, using the term that Comenius uses to describe the human being in all his preparatory works, as a futility in the hands of God. Comenius’s early works are already plagued by the terminological confusion that would beset all of the author’s subsequent works. In the preparatory works, the highest part of man is already referred to variously as reason, mind, and soul. Speaking of terminology, the works from this period contain the first occurrences of the term ‘human things’, which, however, is used in a very general and vague sense, and not in the precise and fixed sense in which it is used in the Consultatio catholica. Closely related to this is the fact that John Amos not only avoids the topic of the dismal state of the human things and refrains from making any appeals to emendation, but is also extremely mistrustful of any reformative efforts here on earth.

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Comenius recognises the importance of the human will for the first time in his Centrum securitatis, probably written in 1625, but published 8 years later in 1633, which is why it can be seen to have marked a transition between the pre-pansophic and pansophic periods. Comenius says that man’s immortal soul consists of both reason and free will. Although this is probably the first time Comenius recognises the importance of the will, he still sees reason as the central aspect of human nature which elevates man above other material creatures. Comenius’s works from the pansophic period are characterised by an emphasis on reason being the innermost constitutive element of man’s nature. However, as the philosopher began to appreciate the importance of the will, he attributed greater nobility to man, who is the only material creature endowed with the free will. Moreover, he now regarded man as superior to angels because of the fact that he has both a mind and a body, which makes him the only creature that participates in the realms of the material and the immaterial, the visible and the invisible, the mortal and the immortal. Furthermore, Comenius viewed human reason as unlimited and infinite, and hence considerably nobler. The emphasis on pedagogy and didactics found in Comenius’s works from the 1630s entailed the realisation that man is born as a clean slate and creates himself throughout the course of his life. Comenius’s growing optimism is evident in his treatise Physicae synopsis, in which he states his belief in the possibility of reforming human science (in particular, philosophy). However, Physicae synopsis also clearly illustrates the change in the author’s philosophical-theological view of man that had taken place in the following ten years, from the mid-thirties to mid-forties. While the naturalphilosophical content of Physicae synopsis can largely be considered a paradigm for the pansophic Mundus materialis (where only slight deviations from the former are found), the same cannot be said of the 11th chapter of Physics, dealing with the subject of man. In it, Comenius defines man as a rational animal, whose highest faculty is the mind. The mind consists of three parts – reason, will, and conscience – the most important of which is clearly reason. The following pansophic works demonstrate Comenius’s growing interest in the pansophic project and the reformation of philosophy. However, there is still no clearly formulated definition of the human things or any explanation of what is wrong with them and how it could be fixed. The turning point in the evolution of Comenius’s philosophical-theological view of man came only with the writing of De rerum humanarum consultatio catholica. In the preface, Comenius already provides a fixed definition of the human things, explains what is wrong with them, and contemplates the possibility 202

of reforming them. Later in Panegersia, the first book of Consultatio, he presents his view of man as a being characterised by his infinite reason, infinite will, and infinite agency – a view he would hold for the rest of his life. The endowments of reason, will, and agency are reflections of the essential attributes of God (scire – velle – posse). The most extensive and comprehensive treatment of man’s nature can be found in the part of Pansophia (the third book of Consultatio) titled Mundus materialis. In it, man is described as the perfect image of the perfect God, a representative of God’s infiniteness, and the pinnacle of creation (or even as a second God). Reason is no longer considered the highest part of man and the middle and central component of his mind. Instead, primacy is given to his free, limitless, and unconquerable will. Man is described as an indeterminate being that creates himself endlessly and eternally. Having been endowed with a free and limitless will, he can determine his own destiny. The freedom of the human will is such that it cannot be curtailed by other people, angels, the devil, or God Himself. Man’s nobility is evident from the fact that he was entrusted with the task of perfecting the universe. In his description of the individual pansophical levels, Comenius makes the point that man participates in God’s creation and is a partner in the creation and preservation of all things and the universe as such. In the same discussion, Comenius brings up another anthropologically interesting matter, on which he elaborates later in Pampaedia (the fourth book of Consultatio), viz., education and autodidacticism. For Comenius, education is the tool of man’s ultimate humanisation and a way to regulate his self-creation. Only education, whose goal is to teach man how he should use his reason, will, and agency, can make man truly human. To sum up, the Consultatio catholica presents Comenius’s view of man as a being determined by his uniquely human nature, which permits his existential open-endedness that is founded on his free and unlimited will. In Comenius’s definition, man is a being that creates himself endlessly and eternally. In the background of Comenius’s terminologically inconsistent works, we can see the evolution of his philosophical-theological view of man. He argues that man is defined by a God-given mind, which consists of a tri-unity of central faculties – the will, reason (these two principles are retained throughout the Consultatio), and agency (which is often replaced by other perfections). Mind, being the most faithful reflection of God’s attributes, elevates man above other material creatures and makes him similar to God. For Comenius, the central and the noblest faculty of the human mind was the will.

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Our analysis of the Consultatio catholica has revealed several problematic aspects, which are also characteristic of Comenius’s other works. One of these aspects is terminological inconsistency, which may to some degree be attributed to the long breaks between the writing of the individual parts of the Consultatio and especially to the unfinished nature of the whole work, as the author was not able to review it in its entirety and harmonise the terminology. Yet the terminological inconsistencies within the individual parts of the Consultatio are most probably owing to a lack of thoroughness and terminological precision on the author’s part. The analysis of Comenius’s conception of man as embodied in the Consultatio led us to the question of whether the defining feature of man’s nature for Comenius was his free will, or his immortal mind. In general, we concluded that due to the apparent inconsistencies between Comenius’s statements and their ambiguity we cannot claim absolute certainty for our interpretations of the author’s views. Yet, we can say that freedom of the human will and the immortality of the human mind are inseparable components of Comenius’s conception of man. The human being is thus understood as the image of God, characterised by his mind consisting of three basic faculties and the corresponding innate common notions, instincts, and capabilities that give rise to three human things. If we look back at the Consultatio from the vantage point of the 1640s, we can say that Comenius’s conception of man had at that point reached its height, from which it did not descend. In a number of works from the panorthotic period (between approximately 1646 and 1670), we see the deepening, specification and refinement of the ideas which were set out in the Consultatio catholica.

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Abbreviations and reference list Abbreviations The abbreviations of the titles of biblical books are based on the Chicago Manual of Style. CC AC AJAK

Migne PL ODO Opera omina

SCetH

Comenius, Iohannes Amos: De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica. Vol. I and II. Prague 1966. Acta Comeniana. Revue internationale des etudes comeniologiques. Archiv pro bádání o životě a díle Jana Amose Komenského (Acta Comeniana) [Archive for the study of the life and work of John Amos Comenius (Acta Comeniana)]; Archiv pro bádání o životě a spisech J. A. Komenského [Archive for the study of the life and treatises of John Amos Comenius]. Migne, Jacques Paul: Patrologia Latina. Comenius, Iohannes Amos: Opera didactica omnia. Amsterdam 1657. Dílo Jana Amose Komenského [Johannis Amos Comenii Opera Omnia] published by Department of Comenius Studies and Early Modern Intellectual History, the Czech Academy of Sciences. Studia Comeniana et historica. Recenzovaný časopis pro komeniologii, historii 16., 17. a 18. století a regionální dějepis moravsko-slovenského pomezí [Studia Comeniana et historica. A peer-reviewed journal of Comenius studies, the history of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, and the regional history of the Moravian-Slovak Borderland].

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Index of Names A Alsted, Johann Heinrich 9, 30, 36, 39, 41, 45, 46, 47, 61, 68, 71, 154, 159, 184, 185, 206, 213, 217 Ambrose 188 Andreae, Johannes Valentinus 11, 40, 46, 70, 151, 185, 195, 211, 214, 215, 218, 220, 221, 229, 230 Aquinas, Thomas 46, 68, 188, 193, 206, 214 Arndt, Johann 86, 185, 191 Artistotle 68 Augustine, St 29, 30, 35, 37, 56, 58, 81, 86, 96, 107, 116, 134, 187, 188, 193, 206, 207, 209, 211, 214, 218 Averroes 46 B Bacon, Francis 27, 28, 33, 38, 39, 40, 47, 81, 94, 102, 113, 151, 175, 223 Bernard of Clairvaux 86 Blekastad, Milada 16, 19, 20, 199, 210 Böhme, Jakob 39, 41, 86, 87, 93, 94, 185, 190, 191, 193, 216, 230 Bonaventure 30 Britschgi, Gertrud 11, 198 Brocardo, Jacopo 194 C Calvin, John 98 Campanella, Tommaso 17, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 42, 45, 48, 51, 56, 58, 68, 78, 85, 94, 98, 134, 151, 175, 191, 192, 199, 207, 212, 214, 222, 228 Čapková, Dagmar 11, 16, 19, 21, 22, 30, 71, 86, 112, 113, 114, 115, 129, 153, 195, 196, 197, 199, 211, 212

Červenka, Jaromír 11, 12, 17, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 58, 60, 62, 68, 71, 85, 86, 87, 94, 107, 113, 115, 127, 131, 134, 137, 146, 147, 173, 174, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 199, 212 Chelčický, Petr 9, 207, 209, 213 Chrysostom, John 30 Chyzhevsky, Dmytro 24, 109, 213, 223 Clement of Alexandria 186, 216 Comenius, John Amos 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230 231

Conimbricenses 68 Cusa, Nicolas of 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 41, 45, 53, 56, 60, 71, 113, 116, 120, 168, 188, 189, 191, 208, 215, 216, 222, 223, 230 D Descartes, René 16, 29, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 112, 113, 133, 134, 191, 217, 221, 223, 224, 228 –– Cartesianism 112, 113, 153, 192, 198, 221 d’Espagnet, Jean 41, 48, 49 Dionysius the Areopagite 43, 44, 56, 219 Drebbel, Cornelius 49 E Eckhart, Meister 46, 191, 193, 194, 209, 226, 230 Erasmus, of Rotterdam 11, 191, 192, 194, 195, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 217, 219, 225, 227 Eriugena, Johannes Scotus 86 F Ficino, Marsilio 189, 190, 214, 230 Figulus, Petr 20, 22, 206 Fleyder, Friedrich Hermann 66 Floss, Pavel 9, 11, 12, 16, 18, 29, 30, 39, 45, 46, 58, 85, 86, 87, 88, 109, 110, 116, 120, 134, 186, 188, 189, 191, 197, 198, 199, 212, 214, 215, 216, 221 Fludd, Robert 41, 45, 191, 220 Franck, Sebastian 46, 86, 185, 191 G Geer, Louis de 20, 22, 206 Gerhard, Johann 86, 191, 221 Gregory of Nyssa 187, 218

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H Hartlib, Samuel 17, 19, 20, 21, 93, 114, 127, 128, 134, 151, 206, 227, 230 Hartmann, Paul 22 Helmont, Jan Baptist van 112 Hendrich, Josef 16, 19, 21, 22, 112, 113, 208, 217, 222, 223 Herbert of Cherbury 71 Hotson, Howard 193, 199, 217 Hugh, of Saint Victor 30 Huss, John 98 I Irenaeus 185 J Jerome, St 30, 186 K Kalivoda, Robert 11, 12, 16, 39, 87, 118, 169, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 199, 212, 218 Kempen, Thomas von 86 Kinner, Cyprian 20, 205 Kircher, Athanasius 48 Kyralová, Marie 109, 112, 114, 115, 119, 171, 177, 197, 198, 220 L Lactantius 188 Lauremberg, Peter 39 Lipsius, Justus 185 Llull, Ramon 39, 193 Luther, Martin 98, 192, 194, 214, 219, 221, 225 Lydiat, Thomas 175 M Manetti, Gianozzo 190 Maresius, Samuel 21, 22, 208 Mersenne, Marin 93

Mirandola, Giovanni Pico della 187, 188, 189, 190, 209, 214, 221, 222, 230 N Nemesius 188 Nigrin, Christian Vladislav 22, 23, 147 O Origen 186, 188, 193, 218, 221 P Palouš, Radim 193, 198, 222 Paracelsus 41, 46, 94, 189, 190, 230 Patočka, Jan 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 68, 71, 74, 78, 81, 85, 86, 87, 93, 94, 102, 109, 112, 113, 114, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 146, 147, 159, 165, 169, 170, 173, 180, 185, 191, 194, 201, 219, 222, 223, 224 Patrizi, Francesco 9, 31, 36, 37, 46, 56, 87, 184, 209, 212, 213, 214 Pešková, Jaroslava 196 Philo, of Alexandria 39 Pinder, Ulrich 30 Plato 56, 116, 187 Plotinus 186, 213 Popelová, Jiřina 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 28, 33, 71, 93, 114, 120, 126, 129, 135, 137, 138, 153, 195, 196, 198, 224, 225 Pseudo-Justin 185

R Ramus, Petrus 39 Raymond of Sabunde 192 Rosicrucians 39, 94, 192 Rosicrusians 45 Rülz, Johannes 22, 205 S Schaller, Klaus 15, 87, 152, 189, 194, 196, 225, 226 Schröer, Henning 15 Sennert, Daniel 41, 61 Skrbenský, Kryštof Bernard 162 Sousedík, Stanislav 12, 46, 68, 172, 173, 192, 196, 199, 226, 227 T Tauler, Johannes 86, 191 Tertullian 30, 58 Turnbull, G. H. 17, 19, 20, 127, 134, 151, 227 U Unity of Brethren 9, 190 V Vives, Juan Luis 93, 210, 221 W Weigel, Valentin 46, 185 Wycliffe, John 191 Y Young, J. T. 17, 128, 134, 185, 223, 230

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