The Collapse of China's Later Han Dynasty, 25-220 CE: The Northwest Borderlands and the Edge of Empire (Asian States and Empires) [1 ed.] 1138692395, 9781138692398

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The Collapse of China’s Later Han Dynasty, 25–220 CE

In the Later Han period the region covering the modern provinces of Gansu, southern Ningxia, eastern Qinghai, northern Sichuan, and western Shaanxi was a porous frontier zone between the Chinese regimes and their Central Asian neighbors, not fully incorporated into the Chinese realm until the first century BCE. Not surprisingly the region had a large concentration of men of martial background, from which a regional culture characterized by warrior spirit and skills prevailed. This military elite was generally honored by the imperial center, but during the Later Han period the ascendancy of eastern-based scholar-officials and the consequent increased emphasis on civil values and demilitarization fundamentally transformed the attitude of the imperial state toward the northwestern frontiersmen, leaving them struggling to achieve high political and social status. From the ensuing tensions and resentment followed the capture of the imperial capital by a northwestern military force, the deposing of the emperor, and the installation of a new one, which triggered the disintegration of the empire. Based on extensive original research, and combining cultural, military, and political history, this book examines fully the forging of military regional identity in the northwest borderlands and the consequences of this for the early Chinese empires. Wicky W. K. Tse is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Chinese Culture at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Asian States and Empires Edited by Peter Lorge Vanderbilt University

The importance of Asia will continue to grow in the twenty-first century, but remarkably little is available in English on the history of the polities that constitute this critical area. Most current work on Asia is hindered by the extremely limited state of knowledge of the Asian past in general, and the history of Asian states and empires in particular. Asian States and Empires is a book series that will provide detailed accounts of the history of states and empires across Asia from earliest times until the present. It aims to explain and describe the formation, maintenance and collapse of Asian states and empires, and the means by which this was accomplished, making available the history of more than half the world’s population at a level of detail comparable to the history of Western polities. In so doing, it will demonstrate that Asian peoples and civilizations had their own histories apart from the West, and provide the basis for understanding contemporary Asia in terms of its actual histories, rather than broad generalizations informed by Western categories of knowledge. Rethinking Prehistoric Central Asia Shepherds, Farmers and Nomads Claudia Chang Tropical Warfare in the Asia-Pacific Region, 1941–45 Kaushik Roy Early Modern East Asia War, Commerce, and Culture Exchange Edited by Kenneth M. Swope and Tonio Andrade The Collapse of China’s Later Han Dynasty, 25–220 CE The Northwest Borderlands and the Edge of Empire Wicky W. K. Tse For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/AsianStates-and-Empires/book-series/SE900

The Collapse of China’s Later Han Dynasty, 25–220 CE The Northwest Borderlands and the Edge of Empire Wicky W. K. Tse

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Wicky W. K. Tse The right of Wicky W. K. Tse to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-69239-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-53233-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For my mentors, who taught me how to dedicate myself to intellectual pursuits.

Contents

Acknowledgements List of tables List of maps The emperors of the two Han dynasties 1

Introductory orientations: the Later Han, its northwest frontier and regional identity

viii ix x xi

1

The Later Han 4 The northwestern frontier of the early Chinese empires 10 2

Opening new territory and partitioning the space: natural and administrative geographies of the early imperial northwest

25

Physical landscape 26 Political landscape before the Former Han 29 Political landscape in the Former Han period 33 Political landscape in the Xin and Later Han period 41 3

Being peripheralized: the northwesterners in the Later Han empire

55

Peopling a frontier 56 Peripheralization of the northwestern frontier 71 4

The others within: the Qiang Wars and the abandonment of the northwest

98

Who were the Qiang? 99 Enduring rivalry between Han and Qiang 105 Seeds of destruction 113 5

Epilogue: the beginning of the end

137

Bibliography Index

142 158

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the help and generosity of many mentors, friends, and colleagues. For their insight, inspiration, and unwavering support, I am most indebted to Professors Paul R. Goldin, Arthur Waldron, and Lynn Hollen Lees – my academic advisors while I was working towards a doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Lai Ming-chiu of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Professor Chu Hung-lam of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University have provided me unfailing support and guidance since I was still an acolyte finding the way of studying Chinese history. I also owe an unpayable debt to the late Professors Hok-lam Chan and Tsang Shui-lung, who initiated me to pursue an academic career and provided constant help and encouragement before their untimely demise. I would not have been able to embark on the academic journey without the care given by these mentors, to whom I have dedicated this book. Throughout the research and writing process, I have received financial support from the Early Career Scheme (project no. 25608215) offered by the Research Grants Council (RGC), the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the Start-up Fund for New Recruits provided by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. My colleague Professor King-Fai Tam took time from his own work to read my manuscript and give constructive critiques. In addition, my former research associate Zhang Fanjing, on whom I have relied heavily, and former research assistants Chow Yuen Man, Deng Chen, and Guo Feng have helped me in various ways so that I could concentrate on preparing this book. I would like to express my gratitude to all of them. I must also express my appreciation to Peter Lorge of Vanderbilt University for kindly admitting my work to the series of Asian States & Empires, which already included the military historians whose works I have long admired. And it has been a great pleasure to work with Peter Sowden and Leela Vathenen at Routledge, Kate Fornadel of Apex Covantage, as well as their colleagues, for their patience and swift help have made the publication of this work go smoothly. Needless to say, any remaining mistakes in this work are my sole responsibility. Finally, I would like to thank my friends Li Yuk Fai, Jenny Tse, Jimmy T. C. Ngai, Stephen Mak, Gary Ng, Chan King Yeung, Dr. Leung Wai Kei, and Dr. Cai Yanchuan, for their friendship and curiosity of my works encourage me to move forward. I am also grateful to my mother for her love and support. Along the way, my greatest debt is to Daai Jan, whose affection, humor, and tolerance preserve my life.

Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Founding dates of the four commanderies of Hexi Population data of northwestern commanderies in 2 CE Population data of northwestern commanderies in 140 CE Comparison of the two sets of data

38 40 44 45

Maps

1 2 3 4 5 6

The empire of Qin The northwestern region of the Qin empire The Former Han empire The northwestern region of the Former Han empire The Later Han empire The northwestern region of the Later Han empire

xii xiii xiv xiv xv xv

The emperors of the two Han dynasties

Former Han (206 BCE–9 CE) Emperor title

Personal name

Reign

Gao Hui Empress Dowager Lü Wen Jing Wu Zhao Xuan Yuan Cheng Ai Ping –

Bang Ying Zhi Heng Qi Che Fuling Bingyi Shi Ao Xin Jizi Ying

206/202–195 BCE 195–188 BCE 188–180 BCE 180–157 BCE 157–141 BCE 141–87 BCE 87–74 BCE 74–49 BCE 49–33 BCE 33–7 BCE 7–1 BCE 1 BCE–6 CE 6–9 CE

Later Han (25–220 CE) Emperor title

Personal name

Reign

Guangwu Ming Zhang He Shang An Shun Chong Zhi Huan Ling Shao Xian

Xiu Zhuang Da Zhao Long You Bao Bing Zuan Zhi Hong Bian Xie

25–57 CE 57–75 CE 75–88 CE 88–106 CE 106 CE 106–125 CE 125–144 CE 144–145 CE 145–146 CE 146–168 CE 168–189 CE 189 CE 189–220 CE

Map 1 The empire of Qin

Map 2 The northwestern region of the Qin empire

Map 3 The Former Han empire

Map 4 The northwestern region of the Former Han empire

Map 5 The Later Han empire

Map 6 The northwestern region of the Later Han empire

1

Introductory orientations The Later Han, its northwest frontier and regional identity

In the spring of 190 CE, capitalizing on the chaos after a palace coup and the ensuing power vacuum, Dong Zhuo (d. 192 CE), a warlord from the northwestern region who had just arrived in the imperial capital city Luoyang with his troops, suddenly assumed military dominance over the imperial center. To further shore up his power, Dong tried to make use of the remaining political legitimacy of the imperial house by deposing the reigning boy emperor and replacing him with another young prince, who was then no more than a puppet of the warlord. Nevertheless, Dong was not the only one to profit from the upheaval in the imperial center. Regional governors and local strongmen across the empire wasted no time in exploiting the opportunities to expand their military forces and territories. Meanwhile, some governors and officials based on the eastern sector of the empire decried Dong’s self-proclaimed regency and, in the name of restoring legitimate order, forged a military alliance against him. Since all diplomatic means of pacifying those rivals had failed, Dong announced at a court meeting that he was going to raise a large army to crush the resistance in the east. In a submissive atmosphere that permeated the imperial court in Dong’s grip, nobody but one courtier named Zheng Tai (ca. 152–192 CE) dared to object. Upon Dong’s query, Zheng addressed the warlord in winged words, Now, the eastern provinces and commanderies have forged alliances with one another and mobilized their people. One would not say that they are not strong. However, since the reign of Emperor Guangwu [founding emperor of the dynasty], there has been no military alert in the interior of the empire. For a long time, the people have enjoyed peace and have forgotten about war. As Confucius said, “To send the people to war without giving them training is equal to throwing them away.” Even they [i.e. the populace in the interior] are numerous, they are unable to cause us any harm . . . Your Excellency is a man from the western province and has been a general of the empire since a young age. You have profound knowledge of military affairs and have frequently engaged in battle. Your name resounds over the whole realm and everyone is awed by Your reputation. [Leaders of the eastern provinces such as] Yuan Benchu [Yuan Shao (d. 202 CE)] is a descendent of grand ministers and was born and grew up at the imperial capital; Zhang Mengzhuo [Zhang Miao (d.

2

Introductory orientations 195 CE)] is a gentleman from Dongping, well-known for his strict adherence to the principles of courtesy; Kong Gongxu [Kong Zhou (fl. 160s–190s CE)] is good at pure conversation and abstruse talk that he is able to bring withered things to life and living things to die with his eloquence. None of them, however, have the ability of commanding armies. They are no match with Your Excellency in wielding arms and facing enemies in decisive moments . . . It is a commonplace that there is no well-trained and brave soldier in the east . . . Even if they have capable people, their ranks are in disorder and they lack the legitimation from the throne. Each of them will rely on his own strength and end up in a stalemate, in which wait for others to take action rather than coordinating with each other in their advance or retreat. [People of] various commanderies in the west are accustomed to the business of warfare. Since they have long been fighting with the Qiang, even women and girls can carry and use halberds, spears, bows and arrows. How could the ignorant [eastern] people resist the strong and brave soldiers [of the west]? The victory [of the west] is assured . . . The men of Bing and Liang, as well as tribes of the Xiongnu and the Tuge, the voluntary followers from the Huangzhong area, and the eight stocks of the Western Qiang are the most vigorous fighters under Heaven and are feared by the people. They are all under the command of Your Excellency and serve as your teeth and claws. [Sending them to the east] will be like driving tigers and rhinoceros into packs of dogs and sheep . . . Moreover, Your military officers are as close to you as your heart and stomach; they have gotten along with You for a long time. There is mutual trust between you. Their loyalty can be counted on; so is their sagacious advice. Despatching our solid cohort against the loose alliance [of the east] will be like scattering dead leaves with a violent wind . . .1

By comparing and analyzing the leadership, the martial quality, and the preparedness of the two sides, Zheng pointed out the overwhelming advantages Dong and his men enjoyed and concluded that Dong would match no rivals on the battlefield. A large-scale campaign of the kind Dong was planning to mobilize would not only be unnecessary but also cause disturbances for those who were afraid of being enlisted, which would only undermine Dong’s administration. Not knowing that Zheng was a partisan of the eastern alliance, Dong was very flattered by the flowery words and halted his plan. When the eastern forces later continued on their advancement into the surrounding area of the imperial capital, Dong eventually abandoned the city of Luoyang and moved all residents, from the emperor to the commoners, westwards to Chang’an, an erstwhile imperial seat of the preceding dynasties that was now in his domain. The forcible exodus wreaked terrible havoc on the city of Luoyang as Dong’s troops looted and finally burnt it to the ground.2 The fire of Luoyang in 190 CE not only destroyed a splendid imperial capital but also drew the curtain on the reign of an empire that had ruled China for over one-and-a-half centuries (its formal and somewhat dramatic end, however, did not come until 220 CE when the emperor installed by Dong Zhuo, in response

Introductory orientations 3 to the presumably drift of heaven’s mandate from his dynasty, abdicated in favor of a scion of another warlord family).3 Burning down the capital was the physical destruction of the political and cultural center of the empire, and the brutal dethronement and enthronement of monarchs by Dong Zhuo, an outsider of the imperial court, was undoubtedly an act of sacrilege against the sovereign’s authority.4 With the imperial authority reaching its nadir as the emperor was held in captivity by Dong Zhuo and his generals, Dong’s rivals in the east were given a free hand to pursue their own goals – some of them were even tempted to ascend the throne themselves. The imperial realm consequently devolved into various warlord domains, and thereafter unveiled a period of political disunity for almost four centuries in Chinese history. The empire dismembered by Dong Zhuo and his foes is conventionally known in Chinese histories as the Eastern Han or the Later Han (sometimes given as the Latter Han), which formally lasted from 25 to 220 CE. To be sure, other factors also contributed to the decline and fall of the Later Han empire, but Zheng Tai’s speech quoted above hinted at a crucial one. It provides a contemporaneous perception of what befell the empire. While Zheng Tai’s purpose was to please Dong Zhuo, in the hope of dissuading him from his plan to summon a large army, his words were not entirely flattery. It must have pointed to something that, to a certain degree, Dong and his military officers recognized as the truth. Zheng, in fact, depicted a vivid picture of the division of the empire between its western and eastern halves. Dong Zhuo and his men, a group of seasoned warriors, were from the highly militarized west; on the opposite side was the eastern coalition constituted by people who, compared with their western counterparts, were weaker and slacker in the arts of battle, and led by highly cultured men who were famed for their prestigious background and personal networks but not their martial prowess. Zheng Tai provided a lens through which a sharp difference between the martial west and the civil east in the last days of the Later Han empire can be discerned. Such a regional contrast, however, was not a new phenomenon in Zheng’s times but antedated the establishment of the Later Han empire. This monograph is a study that aims at investigating and depicting how and why the east-west regional contrast came into existence in early imperial China and analyzing how the regional confrontation triggered the disintegration of the Later Han empire. The nature and character of the Later Han dynasty will also be discussed throughout this book. For a long time, the significance of Later Han as a transitional period between the early unified empires that began in the last quarter of the third century BCE and the nearly four centuries of political disunion that ensued from the turmoil in the 190s CE has been downplayed.5 Studying the collapse of the Later Han will therefore not only enrich our understanding of the dynasty but also shed light on the rise of the various regimes from the ruins of the empire in the third and fourth centuries CE. Since it was the warlord Dong Zhuo and his troops from the northwest who dealt a fatal blow to the imperial authority by desecrating the throne and the imperial capital, the question should be asked as to why the northwesterners, rather than other groups, played the role of harbingers of doom. In order to answer

4

Introductory orientations

this question, this study traces the political, social, and cultural development of the northwestern region in the pre- and early imperial ages, then analyzes how a highly militarized frontier society was formed, in which forging a regional identity that progressively aliened the northwesterners from the imperial center. On the other hand, the attitudes of the imperial state towards the northwest also estranged the center from the periphery. The conflicts between the periphery and the center of the Later Han state tells a story that beneath the façade of a unified empire, regional cultures and identities would function in their own ways, but when the imperial grip was loosened, they would come into conflict with the center, at worst in a catastrophic way. To set the stage for the unfolding of this story, the remainder of this chapter will address the study of the Later Han period and the role of the northwestern frontier region in early China.

The Later Han At the very beginning of the Later Han dynasty, the founding emperor and his associates proclaimed that their regime was the glorious restoration of the Han empire whose mandate was once disrupted by the notorious usurper Wang Mang (d. 23 CE). Riding the waves of the anti-Wang Mang sentiment and the nostalgia for the Han times that resulted from the failure of Wang’s administration, Liu Xiu (6 BCE–57 CE, r. 25–57 CE), posthumously known as Emperor Guangwu, and his supporters translated his distant kinship of the Han imperial house into valuable political capital and gathered support from regional military strongmen.6 They promoted in their propaganda the idea of Liu Xiu as the legitimate person to revitalize the Han empire and to restore order and prosperity.7 They based their own regime’s legitimacy on the unbroken linkage with the Han empire. Their newly built dynasty was, therefore, not entirely novel but rather a revival and continuation of the Han empire that had ruled China in the preceding 200 years. This self-fashioned image was tremendously successful and was generally accepted not only by contemporaries but also successive generations. Liu Xiu’s feat of establishing a dynasty was praised in traditional histories as the “Guangwu Restoration” (Guangwu zhongxing), a rightful revival of the Han dynasty. The early fifth-century historian Fan Ye (398–445 CE), as an example, lamented the aforementioned 220 CE abdication in his History of the Later Han Dynasty (Hou Han shu) by using the phrase “to end Our four-hundred [years of rule]” (zhong wo sibai), lumping the reigning years of both Han dynasties together.8 To distinguish the Han dynasty founded by Liu Xiu and the one to which he claimed to be the heir, later generations conventionally dubbed the earlier one as Former or Western Han (206 BCE–8 CE) and the latter as Later/ Latter or Eastern Han. For the people of Later Han times, their dynasty was Han, nothing more or less, and referred to Former Han as the era of the Western Capital (xijing) when the imperial capital was located at Chang’an – the west of Louyang.9 Nevertheless, despite the same title of Han, the two Han dynasties were different in various aspects. As I have argued elsewhere, and will reiterate at appropriate points throughout this book, modern scholarship will benefit from

Introductory orientations 5 taking the Later Han as an empire on its own terms rather than regarding it as a sequel to the Former Han.10 In the conventional studies of the Han empire(s), the two Han dynasties do not receive equal treatment. The state of the scholarship of Han history as a whole is shaped like a dumbbell, with much emphasis placed on the first century of the Former Han, roughly from the establishment of the dynasty until the end of the reign of Emperor Wu (r. 140–87 BCE), and the last years of the Later Han leading to the well-known Three Kingdoms era (220–265 CE), leaving the second half of the Former Han and most of the Later Han in between understudied. Comparing the scholarly treatments on the two Han dynasties, including the widely read general histories of the subject, in any language, one detects that the Former receives considerably more attention than the Later Han. For example, Qian Mu, an eminent Chinese historian in the twentieth century, ended his general history of Qin (221–207 BCE) and Han dynasties in the Wang Mang interregnum (9–23 CE) without any discussion on the Later Han; Nishijima Sadao, a renowned Japanese scholar of ancient China, spent nearly 300 pages on the Former Han but less than 100 on the Later Han in his general account of early Chinese empires; Yoshinami Takashi, another Japanese scholar in the field, offered not even a single chapter on the Later Han in his work on the Qin and Han empires; Chun-shu Chang focused on the Former Han and rarely mentioned the Later Han in his two-volume work on early China; Mark Edward Lewis also spilled more ink over the Former than the Later Han in a recently published general history on early imperial China.11 These few examples will suffice to show the imbalance in the studies of the two Han dynasties. The Japanese scholar Goi Naohiro commented in 1970 that the studies on Former Han both quantitatively and qualitatively outmatched that of Later Han and that the latter was still an underexplored field.12 Almost half a century after Goi made the remark, the balance of research is still in favor of the Former Han, albeit with the publication of a number of studies in the field. As a monograph dedicated to the Later Han, this study is part of my overall project of re-examining the historical significance of the Later Han empire as a transition period between classical and early medieval China. Although this study aims to provide new insights in the field, it builds upon the foundation of past scholarship and is especially inspired by the works of Japanese scholars which have contributed important theses and theoretical frameworks for studying the subject. Among others, three themes merit particular attention. The Later Han as a coalition of powerful families Since the Sinologist Yang Lien-sheng published his seminal paper on the powerful families of the Later Han in 1936,13 the political, socio-economic, and cultural roles of such families during the Later Han dynasty has become a consistent scholarly concern. Studying the relationship between the powerful families and the imperial state also help scholars depict the nature of the empire.14 To be sure, the powerful families – haozu in Chinese and gōzoku in Japanese – were never made up of single and unified groups, as they were composed of families of different

6

Introductory orientations

regional origins, each with its own agendas in dealing with the imperial state and other social forces,15 but their active participation in the Later Han politics and society on various levels was a salient feature of the Later Han history. According to Yang, a powerful family was, first and foremost, a strong and influential family in the local community, commanding a certain number of dependent households and individuals; some of them would be able to advance their network and influence to regional and even national levels. The emergence of a powerful family as a social force antedated the Later Han, but it was during the Later Han times that those families reached an unprecedented height of their power and had wide influence on political and social affairs of the empire. Quite a number of the Later Han’s founding members, including Emperor Guangwu himself, were of powerful family background. The Later Han state can therefore be regarded as a regime established and dominated by powerful families, whose members occupied central, regional, and local offices; owned vast land property; assumed leadership in their own communities; and commanded a large number of servants and retainers. Their economic power grew hand in hand with political influence. The imperial state in turn represented the interests of the powerful families, and the power struggles among these families unavoidably undermined the political stability of the empire.16 Following the line of Yang’s reasoning, but with questions about some of his minor arguments, Japanese scholars such as Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi and Yoshikawa Mitsuo delved into the political and socio-economic aspects of the development of powerful families and showed how the powerful families constituted the backbone of the Later Han ruling elite.17 To define the nature of the Later Han state and society in relation to the powerful families, Japanese scholars coined the terms gōzoku rengō seiken, literally “powerful-family coalition regime,” and gōzoku kyōdōtai, literally “powerful-family community,” respectively.18 On the other hand, some critics took the thesis of gōzoku rengō seiken as an overstatement. Among others, Goi Naohiro stressed that the state had absolute power over the families, who enjoyed their political positions and social prestige only at the imperial mercy. The powerful families, however resourceful and influential, were only privileged subjects of the emperor but not his equals.19 Recently, Kojima Shigetoshi also challenged the thesis of gōzoku rengō seiken as a serious underestimation of state power and exaggeration of the influence of powerful families. Different from past scholarship that emphasized the role of powerful families in the war of founding the dynasty, Kojima argued that Emperor Guangwu succeeded in rising to the throne by collaborating with incumbent regional and local officials instead of powerful families.20 Both Goi and Kojima, however, only focused on the relationship between the emperor and the powerful families in the formative phrase of the dynasty without further elaborating whether such a relationship changed in new circumstances in the succeeding years. The English literature on the subject also generally echo Yang’s research. The Sinologist Hans Bielenstein lays a solid foundation of modern Anglophone scholarship in the field by producing a series of magisterial book-length studies under the title of The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, in which he analyzes the key role

Introductory orientations 7 of powerful families, or what he terms “influential clans,” in the civil war leading to the establishment of the Later Han dynasty.21 Based on the extant textual sources that he collects and translates in Han Social Structure, Ch’ü T’ung-tsu points out that the powerful families “dominated the government to such an extent that the history of the Later Han may be seen as the history of powerful families.”22 But he also reminds his readers that, in theory, the emperor was the ultimate source of power and was able to remove any powerful family from the state hierarchy.23 The rise and fall of political status of powerful families also interests Patricia Ebrey, and she sketches as a case study the development of an “aristocratic family” from the Han times down to the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE);24 in a later article, she further analyzes the cultural aspect of the powerful families and the stratification among them.25 The cultural capital held by the powerful families constituted an important factor in facilitating their social and political advancement, and this will bring us to the next topic. The Later Han as a Confucian state ( jukyō kokka)26 The eighteenth-century scholar Zhao Yi (1727–1814) once noted that many founding members of the Later Han dynasty had a classical education background,27 and modern scholars also seize on the relationship between the Later Han ruling elites and Confucianism as a key to study the period. Such a relationship is also indispensable for the understanding of the development of powerful families in the Later Han times. By the last decades of the Former Han dynasty, Confucianism was a crucial component of the state-sanctioned curriculum. Training in Confucian classics opened a path to government positions and even a rewarding career. The Later Han state inherited and advanced this tradition.28 Members of powerful families, with their economic and intellectual resources, gained easy access to Confucian education and then official posts. Meanwhile, individuals with inferior resources would still try to obtain Confucian education as a way to make themselves eligible for official appointments; some of them would successfully found powerful families. Once having entered government service, office-holders would invest in the required Confucian education for their descendants so as to attain, preserve, and extend family fortunes, including political influence, economic privilege, and social status.29 Against this backdrop, powerful families progressively constituted a major source of official recruitment and transformed themselves into hereditary official families.30 It is obvious that Confucianism played a significant role in shaping Later Han culture and politics and germinating powerful families. Japanese scholar Watanabe Yoshihiro coined the term jukyō kokka (Confucian state) to characterize the Later Han state as a regime highly integrated with state-sanctioned/canonized Confucianism.31 According to Watanabe, the Confucian state fully developed during the reigns of the first two Later Han emperors when Confucianism was canonized under the imperial auspices and was institutionalized as the orthodox ideology; Confucians constituted a mainstay of the imperial state and promoted the ideas

8

Introductory orientations

of Confucianism from top down to local communities.32 Although Watanabe’s depiction of the Later Han dynasty as a “Confucian state” is not unanimously accepted among Japanese scholars,33 it points to Confucianism and the associated Confucian officials as an important perspective on investigating the relationships between politics and culture as well as state and society in the Later Han period.34 The Later Han and the end of the early imperial model The majority of scholars working on the history of early Chinese empires focus on the short-lived Qin dynasty, which marked the establishment of the first unified empire in Chinese history, and the Former Han, which basically inherited and further consolidated the imperial system, in their investigation of the formation of Chinese empire. As for the lesser-studied Later Han dynasty, these scholars find that its downfall showcases the end of the early imperial model, and for the study of this topic the Japanese scholars coined the term kodai teikoku hōkai ron (thesis of the collapse of the early empire). In line with the studies of development of powerful families, scholars suggest that powerful families represented the force that not only founded the Later Han but also undermined the regime. Yang Lien-sheng asserted in his pioneering survey that political chaos during the last decades of Later Han was caused by political infighting among great families, including imperial consort families, eunuchs and their dependents, and scholar-officials.35 Vicious political struggles finally resulted in the two Great Proscriptions (danggu) in 166 and 169 CE – the two events that Yang defined as the “internal strife among the great families” (haozu neizheng).36 Since the eunuchs who controlled the imperial court purged and proscribed the rival officials, scholars, and their supporters at the imperial academy, the imperial court frustrated many scholar-officials, who in turn chose to retreat to their home counties and to preserve their power for familial rather than imperial interests.37 Although he criticizes Yang for including consort families and eunuchs into the category of power family, Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi agrees that powerful families contributed to the downfall of the empire.38 Focusing on the socioeconomic aspect, Utsunomiya points out that the powerful families advanced their economic interests at the expense of the empire by wrangling taxpayer households out of state control and turning them into private retainers and tenants, an act that finally drained the human and financial resources of the imperial state.39 Later studies continue the above discussion, focusing on the relationship between the growth of powerful families and the failure of the empire. Both Hsu Cho-yun and Rafe de Crespigny are concerned with the role powerful families played in the rise of regionalism, which finally triggered the fragmentation of the Later Han.40 As Hsu points out, regionalism was “a significant factor in causing members of the Han elite to place local interest above the imperial interest.”41 It was the political and social elites who, with their strong sense of regionalism, withdrew their pledge of allegiance to the imperial house that brought the empire to an end. Closely related to the attitudes of powerful families toward the imperial state, the two Great Proscriptions especially attracted scholarly attention since they are

Introductory orientations 9 said to have profoundly undermined imperial authority and shattered the confidence and allegiance of scholar-officials towards the imperial court.42 In addition, historians, ancient and modern, are generally sympathetic towards the scholarofficials and their followers for their cause of fighting against the corrupted political power; the two incidents consequently earn more space in the historical records. Compared with the two Great Proscriptions, the widespread Yellow Turban Rebellion that broke out in 184 CE has received lesser scholarly attention. This large-scale revolt, though it once posed a serious threat to the empire, lasted only one year and ended abruptly under the imperial suppression with the support of the powerful families. The Yellow Turbans were therefore a sign of the dynasty’s decline rather than a cause of its collapse.43 In fact, it was not the rebellion per se but the devolution of military power in the midst of the campaigns of suppression that threatened the very existence of the dynasty.44 In the end, both the Great Proscriptions and the Yellow Turban Rebellion point to the key role played by the powerful families in the Later Han politics. Apart from internal factors such as political infighting among powerful families and rebellions resulted from corruption, maladministration, and natural disasters, external factors also interest scholarly investigation on the decline of the Later Han empire. Unlike the Former Han, which generally was an expansionist empire, the Later Han adopted a defensive stance in its dealings with its neighbors. In fact, the Later Han faced a much more complicated situation than its predecessor. Beside the Xiongnu, the long-term rival since the Qin and Former Han times, the Later Han also had to cope with the Qiang, the Wuhuan, and the Xianbei along the northern and western frontiers.45 As Rafe de Crespigny suggests in a detailed study of the Later Han’s foreign policy and strategy, the failure of the dynasty was to a large extent due to its inefficient frontier policies that single-mindedly pursued the destruction of the Xiongnu confederacy without giving thorough consideration to and preparing sufficiently for the ensuing power vacuum along the northern frontier, which finally allowed other alien peoples to invade the Chinese realm and put heavy political and financial burden on the empire.46 Based on the previous scholarship, we can summarize factors such as the political infighting at the imperial court, popular rebellions, and external warfare that caused serious political, social, and financial problems to the Later Han empire and reduced it to shambles in the second century CE. Against this backdrop, this book aims to further investigate why the northwestern military force, of all other alternatives, played the role of harbinger of the empire’s destruction. While it is generally accepted that powerful families played a significant role in the Later Han politics and society, they by no means represented all the ruling elites of the empire. Some scholars have already pointed out that powerful families largely concentrated in certain areas of the empire. Even though local powerful families existed everywhere in the imperial realm, those who had empire-wide influences and networks and close connections with the imperial center, as extant historical records show, mainly concentrated in the eastern regions where the political, cultural, and economic cores of the empire located.47 Different from

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the powerful families rooted in the areas of prosperous and “advanced” economy and culture, Dong Zhuo and his troops were mainly from a frontier society with a comparatively “backward” culture and economy in the eyes of their contemporaries. Eastern-based powerful families usually provided well-educated scholar-officials for the imperial state, whereas the northwestern frontier region where Dong and his men came from was a land well-known for breeding warriors. Dong’s army was also a mixture of Han and non-Han soldiers, who were strangers to the refined culture prevailing among the eastern elite. The contrast between the east and the northwest sharply marked the conflict between the imperial center and its northwestern periphery. Needless to say, the so-called “Confucian state” was mainly confined to the imperial center and other Confucian cultural prosperous regions and by no means covered the whole imperial realm. While the eastern-based elite with Confucian education triumphed in the official recruitment system, the uncouth and rustic northwestern frontiersmen had little hope to compete with them on political advancement, which further estranged the two sides.48 Finally, after Dong Zhuo and his northwestern troops came to control the imperial capital, various regional power-holders refused to recognize the imperial center, thus marking the unveiling of the disintegration of the empire. This book does not focus on the powerful families and “Confucian state” in the Later Han period but aims to study the martial peoples who, living in the frontier society outside the orbit of the “Confucian state,” were in conflict with the powerful families dominating the imperial center. This work can supplement past scholarship by expanding the horizons of study beyond the powerful families and Confucian scholar-officials and fashion a different view for understanding the factors contributing to the downfall of the Later Han empire. But why would the northwest frontier region play such a crucial role? The next section will give us a closer look at the region.

The northwestern frontier of the early Chinese empires To understand why and how the northwestern frontier of the Later Han empire bred martial men like Dong Zhuo and his troops and fostered its distinctive regional culture as well as identity, it is necessary to trace the formation and characteristics of the physical and cultural space of the region and its interactions with the imperial center. Such an investigation will situate the present research in the burgeoning field of frontier studies of China. In recent decades, there is a growing number of works in the frontier history of China, in particular, of the late imperial or early modern period. This body of work studies the emergence of frontier regions in relation to the political center, examining the various kinds of interactions between the frontier and the core area and analyzing the integration and conflicts between different peoples and ethnic groups along the frontiers – generally leading to a larger enquiry of the formation of the modern Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu). The frontiers studied mainly cover, but are not limited to, the modern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and

Introductory orientations 11 Guizhou as well as Sichuan-Tibet in the southwest,49 Xinjiang (formally named Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) in the northwest,50 and the regions of Manchuria in the northeast and Taiwan facing the mainland’s east coast.51 These studies show how these frontier areas became Chinese under the process of territorial expansion, migration, and colonization. In the midst of conquest and coalescence, they also helped shape modern China’ national boundaries, which is one of the key apparatuses that comes with the birth of the nation-state in modern world history52 and a major reason that scholarly interest has been aroused. These frontiers, however, are only the latest additions to the long history of China’s territorial growth. As a scholar who studies modern Chinese frontiers points out: the core of the empire, or China proper, bounded by oceans on the east and south, the Tibetan Plateau on the west, and the Great Wall on the north, came together more than two millennia ago. Territories of equal size, including Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan, were attached to this core in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.53 The territories of Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet formed a vast frontier zone stretching from the northeast to the west of modern China, with their distinctive topography, climate, economy, languages, and ethnicities, that screens between China and Central Asia. This area is well known as the “Inner Asian Frontiers of China,” a term dubbed by Owen Lattimore in the first half of the twentieth century.54 It is, however, anachronistic to take the Inner Asian Frontiers, as well as the southwestern borderlands of Yunnan and Guizhou, as an absolute and consistent frontier in Chinese history, since the boundaries of historical China were ever-changing – mostly expanding outward – and the Inner Asian Frontiers as the peripheral areas of the Chinese realm appeared in our consciousness only when the edge of Chinese state(s) reached there.55 Taking both the spatial and temporal factors into consideration, the historical frontiers of China was multi-layered, like an onion, and was dynamic as the frontiers waxed and waned, echoing the geo-political shift that resulted from a variety of internal and external factors. Even the so-called “China proper,” the area regarded as the core that was densely populated with ethnic Han Chinese and is associated with the notion of the Central Country/State/Province/Plains of Chinese civilization,56 took a long process to come into place, and its boundaries sprawled outward progressively. As in the early imperial era when the Qin and Han empires were newly born, the area of China proper was much smaller, and the frontiers were still in flux. Regions like modern provinces of Gansu and Sichuan, mostly accepted as China proper in later dynasties, were frontiers then. As the next chapter will make clear, it was the Qin at the westernmost among the regional states of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) that successfully conquered its rivals and established the first centralized empire in Chinese history and demarcated the boundary of a consolidated Chinese realm following a series of territorial expansion campaigns.57 The Qin dynasty cut out a core area which

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Chinese people of later ages would consider to be integral to China proper and upon which all Chinese empires to follow would build. The Qin state expanded in stages on its way to becoming an empire. Before marching to the east, Qin moved southward and conquered the regions of Ba and Shu, in modern Sichuan province;58 meanwhile, it progressively expanded westward at the expense of the various Rong peoples located to its northwest.59 The territories that Qin obtained from the Rong constituted its northwestern frontier and that of the Han dynasties. This region would later serve as a springboard for the Han’s expansion of power into the Western Regions (known as Xiyu in traditional Chinese histories, roughly corresponding to the present-day Xinjiang) and established its sphere of influence there when the imperial military might reached its peak.60 The Qin and Han empires had frontiers in the north, west, and south,61 but it was the northwestern frontier that was characterized as a highly militarized region before and during the early empires and played a major geo-political role in the defense and expansion of the empires. In addition, the militarized nature of the northwest frontier was highly associated with the geographical role of the region as a bridge or a corridor, as well as a zone of contested control, between the Chinese states and their Inner Asian neighbors, which consequently brought to the region its heterogeneous population and cultures. Conventional studies often center on a vast stretch of land in the northwestern frontier zone called the “Hexi Corridor” in present-day northern Gansu province. Hexi, literally “west of the river,” lies for the most part west of the Yellow River. It is an area located in the mountainous terrain connecting China proper and the Western Regions. At several points along the Corridor were formed the transportation and commercial hubs of pre-modern Inner Asian economic and cultural exchanges. With the groundbreaking discovery of Han period wooden and bamboo documents in the area of Juyan (also known as the Edsen-gol) at the northern tip of the Corridor in the early twentieth century, providing important first-hand information of the local military outposts and livelihood of sentries within the enclave, the region has attracted much scholarly attention.62 The geographic focus of this study, however, covers a broader northwestern frontier of the Han empires, largely corresponding to the modern provinces of Gansu and Ningxia (officially named the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region), with the addition of small portions of the northeastern Qinghai province and western and southern parts of Inner Mongolia; the Hexi Corridor is only a piece of the whole puzzle. As subsequent chapters will show, the northwestern region of the Han times went through a process of expansion and coalescence to bring together several areas sharing common topographical, ethnic, socio-economic, and cultural features but differing considerably from the imperial center. The focus of this study lies in this area, from where Dong Zhuo and many other northwestern military elites of the two Han dynasties flourished. Studying the northwestern frontier of the early Chinese empires is in essence a study of the subtle relationship between the imperial center and its periphery and, most significantly, from a peripheral perspective.63 The Chinese empire was in fact built on a diverse foundation with different regions that, in various degrees,

Introductory orientations 13 followed their own paths of development and preserved their own cultures.64 To adopt a peripheral perspective will help us explore the regional diversity under the façade of a unified Chinese empire and understand how the regional identities were forged and fostered in strikingly different ways from what the imperial center would have liked to see and which it would even try to suppress. Compared with the imperial court, the view of the empire might be different in a frontier region. The frontier might also develop at a tempo determined by regional interests and conditions. The center always desired unification and cohesion, but its control over the frontiers were often bedraggled by loose and slow implementation, delayed responses, discordant practices, and centrifugal inclinations of the regional agencies. Frontier people would pursue their own interests different from what the imperial center had in mind. Several recent studies on regional groups, cultures, and identities in pre- and early imperial periods as well as the early medieval era are in line with the peripheral perspective and depict interactions between specific regions or ethnically distinct populations with the mainstream Huaxia culture.65 Among them, Xiaolong Wu’s newly published book on the Zhongshan state during the Warring States period, with its focus on the formation of regional identity rather than the more unstable concept of ethnicity, especially foreshadows the findings of the present study.66 It was the military traits that shaped the regional identity of the northwest frontier and set it apart from the core area. The northwestern frontier of the Qin-Han empires was mostly incorporated through military conquests and was highly militarized to serve as a bulwark or bridgehead in the early empires. On the other hand, the central and eastern parts of the empire mainly served as the major sources of fiscal and material supplies. The two sides therefore produced distinctive forms of regional cultures and spatial organizations. To borrow the sociologist Charles Tilly’s words, it reveals the distinction between military and fiscal geographies.67 The militarized nature of the northwestern region was commonly recognized by the Han contemporaries. During the Han times, the region was set to serve three strategic functions. First, it was a military base to launch offensive attacks against the western sector of the Xiongnu and to defend the Han realm from the incursion of the Xiongnu from northwest. Second, it served as a bridgehead for supporting the imperial ventures to the Western Regions, which was also a crucial part of the grand strategy against the Xiongnu since the Han strategy makers believed that controlling the Western Regions would cut the right arm of the Xiongnu. Third, it functioned as a wedge between the Xiongnu and the Qiang and hence prevented any possible collaboration between the two from threatening the Han’s security. As the following chapters will show, the natural geography and the composition of population played a positive role in the militarization of the region. In a harsh and violent frontier zone, only the rough and tough could survive, and not surprisingly it came to have the largest concentration of martial men. The northwest was famed for supplying military talents in the Qin-Han dynasties. The autochthonous population was composed of various non-Huaxia peoples who were regarded as natural-born warriors. During the Han times, not only garrison and expeditionary soldiers but also refugees, convicts, and other people who were

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considered by the state as social malignant elements were sent to the northwestern frontier as vanguards of colonization. The influx of Huaxia people, on one hand, intensified ethnic conflicts and resource competitions between different groups and therefore contributed to the outbreak of large-scale rebellions in the Later Han times; on the other hand, assimilation also took place among the colonizers and autochthonous peoples who consequently forged a shared identity of northwesterners, which fostered a military force to challenge the imperial center. The salient feature of militarization of the northwest frontier is in fact not only a military process but also a social phenomenon.68 By definition, militarization refers to the condition where most resources and institutions of a society are directed to cope with the exigencies of war and where members of society are accustomed to being in a state of intensive military preparedness. There are two types of militarization: sanctioned militarization and spontaneous militarization.69 Sanctioned militarization is a top-down process initiated and controlled by the state to transform society into an efficient military force to serve its military purposes; it generally represents the strengthening of state power and constitutes a centripetal force. By contrast, spontaneous militarization is a bottom-up process triggered by local armed communities for their own interests and usually releases a centrifugal force to undermine the state’s authority and its military monopoly. The nature of the two types of militarization is such that they would keep each other in check, as strong sanctioned militarization would usually keep the spontaneous one in bay, and vice versa. In early imperial China, the state of Qin adopted an array of measures to militarize its population and transformed it into a strong military, which enabled it to destroy the rival states and establish the first unified empire in Chinese history.70 In contrast, when the spontaneous militarization of the northwest grew stronger than the military control of the Later Han state, it heralded the disintegration of the empire. As a frontier, the northwest was undoubtedly militarized under the imperial initiation, but the multiethnic makeup of its population and the constant military challenges that it encountered from within and outside unavoidably accelerated locally initiated militarization.71 The situation was extremely intense after the outbreak of the Qiang Wars in the second century CE when most of the northwest rapidly militarized and turned into battlefield. Violence was widespread and became an integral part of everyday life.72 Worse still, when the Qiang got the upper hand on the battlefield, the desperate Later Han state was tempted to give up the northwest and leave those local subjects behind who did not evacuate with the local functionaries. While facing the chronic violence without sufficient support from the imperial center, local communities could only rely on themselves. As a result, the war-ridden northwest unleashed rapid spontaneous militarization, which in turn de-legitimized the imperial state and emboldened ambitious men like Dong Zhuo. The paucity of sources of the Later Han northwest frontier naturally present a certain degree of uncertainty and ambiguity to the investigation of the development of its regional identity. Even though there are relevant entries in the historical records, they must be used with caution, as most of the textual sources were written or compiled by the literati and their ilk who were generally unsympathetic

Introductory orientations 15 towards the martial men and uninterested in practical military affairs, unavoidably leading to biases in the histories of events and lives in the highly militarized northwest. Such attitudes, incidentally, was one of the factors that served to stir up the disgruntled northwesterners. Besides the received textual sources like the standard histories and the literary writings by the contemporaries, epigraphic sources, especially stone steles and epitaphs, also make up the critical resources for studying the Later Han world.73 Needless to say, relevant archaeological sources like unearthed bamboo and wooden strips will also provide useful information for certain topics. After this introductory chapter, which has provided an overview of the themes and the general orientations of this study, the story of the northwest frontier will be unfolded in the following chapters. To set up the spatial stage, Chapter 2 focuses on the physical and human geography of the northwestern region. It analyzes how the topographical and climatic factors contributed to the cultural features of the region and also highlights the region as an essential section of a distinct cultural belt, namely, the “Northern Zone” or “Northern Bronze Complex” of China, as well as its interactive relationship with diverse cultures in Inner Asia. It shows that the northwestern frontier had long been a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic region, and its character should be considered in a Eurasian rather than merely a Chinese context. Temporally, Chapter 2 adopts a longue durée approach of tracing the trajectory of development of political and administrative landscapes of the region in pre- and early imperial periods to sketch how the region was gradually incorporated into the Chinese realm as a result of the territorial expansion of the early Chinese empires. The strategic reasons, both political and military, of setting up administrative and defensive units and of re-structuring them in various periods will also be elucidated in this chapter. While Chapter 2 focuses on the land, Chapter 3 centers on the people who inhibited the region. It analyzes both the elite and common people, but the availability of sources may slant the discussion in favor of the former. Also, the military elite did play a more major role in the regional communities’ interactions with the imperial center. This chapter gives an account of the rise of the military men in the northwest before the Later Han times. It first traces the composition of population of the region in pre-Qin and Qin times, then analyzes the backgrounds of the people sent by the Qin-Han states, including soldiers, paupers, and convicted criminals, as colonizers and garrison forces. These new migrants and the non-Huaxia people in the region who had become the imperial subjects constituted, willingly or unwillingly, a mighty military force for the offensive and defensive strategic tasks in the process of northwestward expansion of the Former Han empire. Standing out from the other military elites of the region was a group known as “sons of impeccable families from the six commanderies” who progressively played a key role in various military operations and even in the imperial court politics. The rise of the northwestern military elite benefited from the imperial territorial expansion, and their success in turn fostered a regional identity. The good times, however, did not last long for them after the establishment of the Later Han dynasty. A gradual decline in the political and social stature

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of the northwestern military men and commoners was witnessed in the Later Han period. Because of the transfer of the imperial core from the western part of the empire to the east, changes in strategic priorities, and other factors, the strategic importance of the northwestern frontier declined, which led to the peripheralization of the northwestern military elite. The growing emphasis on civil values at the imperial center and the ensuing adoption of demilitarization policy benefited the eastern-based nobles and scholar-officials, who occupied the major positions of influence of the empire, whereas the status of the northwestern military elite suffered and their careers stalled. The career paths of several representative military figures of the northwestern region will be studied to show the degraded treatment they received in comparison with their Former Han predecessors. In fact, not only the elite but also the commoners of the region were denigrated by the eastern-based imperial court. The discrimination they suffered indeed strengthened the regional identity among them. Chapter 4 first investigates the background and the course of the protracted warfare between the Later Han and the Qiang people who scattered along the western frontier of the empire. This incessant warfare lasted over 100 years and inflicted devastating impact on various aspects of the Later Han empire – the imperial coffers were exhausted, and an enormous number of people were dislocated. As a countermeasure to the worsening situation of the war, some scholar-officials at the imperial court proposed the abandonment of the northwest. This chapter will put emphasis on the three court debates over the question of abandonment. Although the imperial court finally did not formally implement the abandonment, ensuing forcible withdrawals of the residents of the region caused catastrophic harm to the people comparable to war. The proposals of abandonment and forcible withdrawals disclosed the court’s indifferent attitude towards the northwestern region and its residents, which in turn intensified the estrangement and conflicts between the northwesterners and the scholar-officials at the imperial center. This chapter will also discuss the ethnic problems in the northwestern region and examine the role that ethnic factors play in the rivalry between the frontier and the imperial center. Finally, in addition to summarizing the main themes and arguments of the book, the concluding chapter will also consider the implications of the present work in the advancement of our understanding of the history of early empires and the early medieval era in Chinese history. Topics such as regional culture and identity, civil-military relations, and the process of militarization of society, which this book explores, are all worthy further investigation.

Notes 1 Fan Ye (comp), Hou Hanshu (hereafter HHS) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), 70: 2258–9. 2 A detailed survey on the Later Han capital city can be found in Hans Bielenstein, “Loyang in Later Han Times,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities (hereafter BMFEA) 48 (1976): 1–147. 3 For the abdication and the relevant contemporary theoretical discussions, see Carl Leban, “Managing Heaven’s Mandate: Coded Communication in the Accession of

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4

5

6

7

8 9 10 11

12 13

Ts’ao P’ei, A.D. 220,” in David T. Roy and Tsuen-hsuin Tsien eds., Ancient China: Studies in Early Civilization (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1978), pp. 321–4; Howard Goodman, Ts’ao P’I Transcendent: The Political Culture of Dynasty-Founding in China at the End of the Han (Seattle: Scripta Serica, 1998), pp. 122–5; Rafe de Crespigny, Fire Over Luoyang: A History of the Later Han Dynasty 23–220 AD (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 465–73. The significance of the destruction of Luoyang in marking the de facto end of the Later Han empire was also noted by de Crespigny in his recent book entitled Fire Over Luoyang: A History of the Later Han Dynasty 23–220 AD. My comment on the book can be found in “Review of Rafe de Crespigny, Fire Over Luoyang: A History of the Later Han Dynasty, 23–220 AD,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Series 3 (2017): 529–32. For further discussion of the Later Han’s historical significance, see Wicky W.K. Tse, “The Latter Han Empire and the End of Antiquity,” in Paul R. Goldin ed., Routledge Handbook of Early Chinese History (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 186–201. Meanwhile, Mark Edward Lewis has offered a lucid analysis of the institutions of the preimperial period that served as models for the early empires and their transformation; see his “The Warring State in China as Institution and Idea,” in Robert A. Hinde and Helen E. Watson eds., War: A Cruel Necessity? The Bases of Institutional Violence (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995), pp. 13–23. For detailed studies of Wang Mang’s fall and the ensuing civil war, see Homer H. Dubs trans., The History of the Former Han Dynasty, Volume Three (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955), pp. 112–24; Hans Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: With Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou Han shu,” BMFEA 26 (1954): 82–165, and “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, Volume II: The Civil War,” BMFEA 31 (1959): 11–256. On the background of the civil war contenders and the founding members of the Later Han, see Yü Ying-shih, “Dong Han zhengquan zhi jianli yu shizu daxing zhi guanxi,” in his Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun: gudaipian (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980), pp. 109–203; Shigetoshi Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai: gokan kokkaron kenkyū josetsu (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2009), pp. 73–123. Liu Xiu and his followers also employed certain legitimation theories to justify their claim of succession. A comprehensive study can be found in Yang Quan, Xin wude lilun yu liang Han zhengzhi: “Yaohou huode” shuo kaolun (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006). HHS, 9: 392. Tse, “The Latter Han Empire and the End of Antiquity,” pp. 186–87. See Tse, “The Latter Han Empire and the End of Antiquity,” pp. 186–94 and Tse, “Review of Rafe de Crespigny, Fire Over Luoyang: A History of the Later Han Dynasty, 23–220 AD.,” pp. 529–32. See Qian Mu, Qin Han Shi (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi, 1994); Nishijima Sadao, Shikan teikoku (Tōkyō: kōdansha, 1974); Yoshinami Takashi, Shikan teikoku shi kenkyū (Tōkyō: Miraisha, 1978); Chun-shu Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume One: Nation, State, & Imperialism in Early China, ca. 1600 B.C.–A.D. 8. and The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume Two: Frontier, Immigration, & Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.–157 A.D. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007); Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). Goi Naohiro, “Gokan ōchō to gōzoku,” in his Kandai no gōzoku shakai to kokka (Tōkyō: Meicho Kankōkai, 2001), p. 228. Yang Lien-sheng, “Donghan de haozu,” Qinghua xuebao 11.4 (1936): 1007–63; an English version is available in “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” in E-Tu Zen Sun and John de Francis eds., Chinese Social History: Translations of Selected Studies (Washington, DC: American Council of Learned Societies, 1956), pp. 103–36.

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14 The literature on the Han powerful families is vast. For a recent review of the twentiethcentury Chinese studies on the topic, see Cui Xiangdong, Handai haozu diyuxing yanjiu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2012), pp. 12–20; Lai Ming-Chui, Fucou yu zhixu: Han diguo difang shehui yanjiu (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2013), pp. 27–70; and for Japanese studies, see Momiyama Akira, “Kandai gōzokuron he no ichi shikaku,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 43.1 (1984): 165–73 and Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 11–15. 15 There were different types and categories, as well as terms, to define and describe the powerful families in the Han historical records. The customary usage adopted by most Chinese and Japanese scholarship is the term haozu/gōzoku, with “powerful family” or “great family” as the English equivalence. To review the different names and types of powerful families in Han sources, see Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi, “kandai gōzoku kenkyū,” in his Chūgoku kodai chūseishi kenkyū (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1977), pp. 376–82; Lai, Fucou yu zhixu, pp. 29–32; Patricia Buckley Ebrey, “Toward a Better Understanding of the Later Han Upper Class,” in Albert E. Dien ed., State and Society in Early Medieval China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1990), pp. 49–72. 16 Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” pp. 1007–63 and “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” pp. 103–36. 17 See Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi, “Dōyaku kenkyū,” “Ryōshū to nanyō,” and “Kandai niokeru ka to gōzoku,” in his Kandai shakai keizai shi kenkyū (Tōkyō: Shibundō, 1967), pp. 256–374, 375–404, and 405–72, respectively; also Utsunomiya, “Kandai gōzoku kenkyū” and “Kandai kenkyū gūkan,” in Chūgoku kodai chūseishi kenkyū, pp. 351–88 and 389–401, respectively. For Yoshikawa Mitsuo’s research on the same topic, see his “Gokan shoki niokeru gōzoku taisaku nitsuite,” Rekishigaku kenkyū 7.9 (1939): 644–68. 18 A recent review of Japanese scholarship on these two concepts can be found in Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 6–35. 19 Goi, “Ryōkan kōtaiki no hanran,” in Kandai no gōzoku shakai to kokka, pp. 141–60 and “Gokan ōchō to gōzoku,” pp. 228–81. 20 Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 73–123. 21 Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: With Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou Han shu”; “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: Volume II, the Civil War”; “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: Volume III, the People,” BMFEA 39 (1967): 1–198; “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: Volume IV, the Government,” BMFEA 51 (1979): 1–300. 22 Ch’ü T’ung-tsu, Han Social Structure (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 202. 23 Ch’ü, Han Social Structure, p. 212. 24 Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: A Case Study of the Po-ling Ts’ui Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 25 Ebrey, “Toward a Better Understanding of the Later Han Upper Class,” pp. 49–72. Another work focusing on the cultural background of the Han powerful family is Chen Chi-yun, Hsun Yueh (AD 148–209): The Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 26 The term “Confucian State” used here is an English translation of the Japanese term Jukyō kokka, by which the Japanese scholars refer the rubric Ju (Ru in Chinese) to the school constituted by Confucius, his disciples, and later generations of followers, and the term Jukyō kokka is coined to refer to the state which upheld the teachings and classics of the Confucian school as orthodoxy and whose bureaucracy was staffed by officials with Confucian educational background. In short, the English term “Confucian” used in this context is in the most conventional way as the self-identified followers of Confucius and his teachings, as well as the later thinkers who regarded themselves and/ or were regarded by others as followers of this tradition.

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27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Michael Nylan and some other scholars, however, suggest that the rubric “Confucian” is not a suitable English translation of the Chinese term Ru in the context of Han times, since Ru was a heterogeneous group with different intellectual orientations in the Han dynasty and there were no necessary connections between Ru and Confucius. According to Nylan, Ru could refer to three groups of people: classicists, Confucians, and bureaucrats, with distinct intellectual orientations and diverse political views. Ru is thus a category broader than “Confucian.” For detailed discussions, see Michael Nylan, “A Problematic Model: The Han ‘Orthodox Synthesis,’ Then and Now,” in Kaiwing Chow, On-cho Ng, and John B. Henderson eds., Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 17–56, and also Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 1–41. Other recent discussions can be found in Anne Cheng, “What Did It Mean to Be a Ru in Han Times?” Asia Major 14.2 (2001): 101–18; Nicolas Zuferey, To the Origin of Confucianism: The Ru in Pre-Qin Times and During the Early Han Dynasty (New York: Peter Lang Pub Inc, 2003); Paul R. Goldin, Confucianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Liang Cai, Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), pp. 45–63. As I agree with Nylan that those people who claimed themselves and were regarded as Ru in the Han times were not necessarily Confucians by a strict definition, the rubrics “Confucian” and “Confucianism” are employed in this section only for the conventional purpose to translate and review the relevant Japanese literature. Zhao Yi, Nianershi zhaji xiaozheng, annotated by Wang Shumin (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), pp. 90–1. For the development of Later Han Confucian education, see Higashi Shinji, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995), pp. 143–93. For the Later Han official recruitment system and its relation to powerful families, see Higashi Shinji, “Gokan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 46.2 (1987): 33–60. On the relationship between Confucian officials and powerful families, see Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, pp. 143–93 and 247–90; Watanabe Yoshihiro, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō (Tōkyō: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1995), pp. 124–42. Besides the aforementioned Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, Watanabe’s another book, Gokan ni okeru “Jukyō kokka” no seiritsu (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2009) is also on the same topic. Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, pp. 422–5 and Gokan ni okeru “Jukyō kokka” no seiritsu, pp. 23–5. For example, see Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 39–44. Miranda Brown, The Politics of Mourning in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), provides a case study of the intricate relationship between politics, culture, and Confucian ideals in the Later Han times. Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” pp. 1042–63 and “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” pp. 122–36. Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” pp. 1052 and 1056 and “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” pp. 129 and 131. Ch’ü, Han Social Structure, pp. 210–29 and 232–43. Utsunomiya, “Kandai kenkyū gūkan,” pp. 389–401. Utsunomiya, “Kandai niokeru ka to gōzoku,” pp. 405–72 and “Kandai gōzoku kenkyū,” pp. 395–401. Hsu Cho-yun, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han Dynasty,” in Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill eds., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), pp. 176–95; Rafe de Crespigny, “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han,” in Von Helwig

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43 44

45 46

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48 49

Introductory orientations Schmidt-Glintzer, hrsg. ed., Das andere China – Festschrift für Wolfgang Bauer zum 65. Geburtstag (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), pp. 533–58. Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han Dynasty,” p. 190. For analyses of the two Great Proscriptions, see Masubuchi Tatsuo, “Gokan tōko jiken no shihyō ni tsuite,” in his Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), pp. 296–317; Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, pp. 367–418; Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, pp. 291–326; Rafe de Crespigny, “Political Protest in Imperial China: The Great Proscription of Later Han, 167–184,” Papers in Far Eastern History 11 (1975): 1–36 and “Politics and Philosophy Under the Government of Emperor Huan 159–168 A.D.” T’oung Pao 66 (1980): 41–83; Burchard J. MansveltBeck, “The Fall of Han,” in Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe eds., The Cambridge History of China, Volume 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220. (hereafter CHOC v.1) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 327–30. Christopher Leigh Connery, however, has questioned the extent to which the two proscriptions contributed to the collapse of the Later Han; see his The Empire of the Text: Writing and Authority in Early Imperial China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 86–92. Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han Dynasty,” p. 194. For a comprehensive survey of the Yellow Turban Rebellion, see Paul Michaud, “The Yellow Turbans,” Monumenta Serica XVII (1958): 41–127, also Mansvelt-Beck, “The Fall of Han,” pp. 334–40. For the ideological background of the rebellion, see Barbara Hendrischke, The Scripture on Great Peace: The Taiping Jing and the Beginnings of Daoism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 3–38, especially pp. 16–24. Tse, “The Latter Han Empire and the End of Antiquity,” pp. 190–94. See Rafe de Crespigny, Northern Frontier: The Policies and Strategy of the Later Han Empire (Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1984). Three works of Yü Ying-shih also provide background information of the foreign relations of the Han dynasties, see Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); “Han Foreign Relations,” in CHOC v. 1, pp. 377–462; “The Hsiung-nu,” in Denis Sinor ed., Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 118–49. For the regional variation of the powerful families, see Utsunomiya, “Kandai gōzoku kenkyū,” pp. 383–8; Masubuchi Tatsuo, “Gokan gunkensei no chiiki betsuteki kōsatsu,” in his Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka, pp. 537–66; Ueda Sarae, “Gokan makki no sōyō no gōzoku,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 28.4 (1970): 283–305; Tsuruma Kazuyuki, “Kandai gōzoku no chiikiteki seigaku,” Shigaku zasshi 87.12 (1978): 1–38; Satake Yasuhiko, “Kandai jyūsanshū no chiikisei ni tsuite,” Rekishi hyōron 357 (1980): 37–65 and 79; Tada Kensuke, “Kōkin no ran zenshi,” in Tada Kensuke ed., Kan Gi Shin shi no kenkyū (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 1999), pp. 49–76. Higashi, “Gokan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai,” pp. 33–60; Hsing I-tien, “Dong Han xiaolian de shenfen Beijing,” in his Tianxia yijia: Huangdi, guanliao yu shehui (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), pp. 285–354. For examples of Yunnan and Guizhou, David G. Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Laura Hostelter, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Charles Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Leo Kwok-yueh Shin, The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John Herman,

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50

51

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53 54 55

Amid the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 1200–1700 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Jodi L. Weinstein, Empire and Identity in Guizhou: Local Resistance to Qing Expansion (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013). For examples of the Sichuan-Tibet frontier, see Dai Yingcong, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009) and Wang Xiuyu, China’s Last Imperial Frontier: Late Qing Expansion in Sichuan’s Tibetan Borderlands (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011). For example, James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Inner Asia, 1759–1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). For the northeast frontier, see James Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers: China’s Expansion Northward, 1644–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) and Christopher Mills Isett, State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644–1862 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). For Taiwan, see John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Emma Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 2; Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” Journal of World History, 8.2 (Fall 1997): 216–17. Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers, p. 2. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940). There are a lot of discussions about the definitions of the concepts of “border,” “borderland,” “boundary,” and “frontier” across various disciplines. Based on the current scholarship, this study adopts simple and general definitions: “boundary” is the most general of these terms and can be defined as a line, tangible or intangible, that indicates the bounds or limits of anything; “border” is a dividing line that is fixed in a particular space and demarcated territorial boundary between sovereign polities such as states and empires; “frontier” a region, a zone of transition, rather than simply a dividing line, and can include many kinds of boundaries within, such as ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.; “borderland” also has zonal quality, but it is sometimes used to referred to the newly conquered area with the existence of autochthonous societies after the frontier moved forward, and some researchers proposed that there is a process of transformation of frontiers into borderlands. The definition of frontier as a loosely defined, extensive zone of transition and interaction, and a region that forms the margin and peripheral zone of a settled polity, with various boundaries overlapping and intersecting within, serves well for the present study. For further references of the above four concepts, see Ladis K.D. Kristof, “The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 49 (1959): 269–82; Baud and van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” pp. 216–29; Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” The American Historical Review 104.3 (June 1999): 814–41; Michael Khodarkousky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), especially pp. 46–7; Lars Rodseth and Bradley J. Paker, “Introducation: Theoretical Considerations in the Study of Frontiers,” in Bradley J. Paker and Lars Rodseth eds., Untaming the Frontier in Anthropology, Archaeology, and History (Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 2005), pp. 9–14.

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56 For the making of the notion of the Central Province/Country or so in pre-modern China, see Roger V. Des Forges, Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 1–14; Peter Bol, “Middle-Period Discourse on the Zhong Guo: The Central Country,” on Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard, www.ceps.com.tw/ec/ ecJnlIntro.aspx?Jnliid=3243 (2009): 1–31. 57 For Qin’s transformation from a regional state to an empire, see Kudō Motoo, Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no kokka to shakai (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1998), pp. 85–118; Gideon Shelach and Yuri Pines, “Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local Identity: Change and Continuity in the State of Qin (770–221 B.C.),” in Miriam T. Stark ed., Archaeology of Asia (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 202–30; Ōta Yukio, Chūgoku kodai kokka keiseishi ron (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2007), pp. 127–87; Teng Mingyu, translated by Susanna Lam, “From Vassal State to Empire: An Archaeological Examination of Qin Culture,” in Yuri Pines, Lothar von Falkenhausen, Gideon Shelach, and Robin D.S. Yates eds., Birth of an Empire: The State of Qin Revisited (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 71–112. 58 A detailed account of the incorporation of ancient Sichuan into the Chinese regime is found in Steven F. Sage, Ancient Sichuan and the Unification of China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 83–119. 59 Shelach and Pines, “Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local Identity,” pp. 205–19. For the conflicts between the Rong peoples and the pre-Qin Chinese regimes, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China: The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou 1045–771 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141–232. 60 For the Former Han’s enterprise in the Western Regions, see Anthony F.P. Hulsewé, with an introduction by Michael Loewe, China in Inner Asia: The Early Stage: 125 B.C–A.D. 23. An Annotated Translation of Chapters 61 and 96 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979); for the Later Han’s relations with the Western Regions, see John E. Hill, Through the Jade Gate to Rome: A Study of the Silk Routes During the Later Han Dynasty 1st to 2nd Centuries CE (Charleston: BookSurge Publishing, 2009). 61 The Qin-Han empire also extended to other directions and explored many new frontiers. For a general survey of the Han frontiers, see Nicola Di Cosmo, “Han Frontiers: Toward an Integrated View,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 129.2 (2009): 199–214. On the Han southern frontier, see Sophia-Karin Psarras, “The Han Far South,” Asiatische Studien Etudes Asiatiques LI.3 (1997): 757–78; Francis Allard, “Frontiers and Boundaries: The Han Empire from Its Southern Periphery,” in Archaeology of Asia, pp. 233–54; John Herman, “The Kingdoms of Nanzhong: China’s Southwest Border Region Prior to the Eighth Century,” T’oung Pao 95 (2009): 241–86. On the northern frontier, see Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 161– 252; Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, 2 vols.; de Crespigny, Northern Frontier. 62 The literature on this subject is vast. For a general overview, see Momiyama Akira, Kan teikoku to henkyō shakai: chōjō no fūkei (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1999); Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration: Volume I, Historical Assessment and Volume II, Documents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). 63 Among others, Hsu Cho-yun has pioneered the adoption of the model of center and periphery in studying early China; see his “Handai Zhongguo tixi de wangluo,” in idem et al. eds., Zhongguo lishi lunwen ji (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), pp. 1–28, and also his Han Agriculture: The Formation of Early Chinese Agrarian Economy (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980), especially Chapter 6. For a recent evaluation of Hsu’s center-periphery network model, see Wang Dequan, “Gudai Zhongguo tixi de tuancheng,” Xin Shixue 14.1 (March 2003): 143– 201; and Hsu’s response in “Dui Wang Dequan xiansheng ‘Gudai Zhongguo tixi de

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64

65

66 67 68

69

70

tuancheng’ de huiying,” Xin Shixue 14.1 (March 2003): 203–8. A recent archaeologybased study that focuses on the interactions between centers and peripheries in early China is Rowan K. Flad and Pochan Chen, Ancient Central China: Centers and Peripheries Along the Yangzi River (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For the regional cultural differences in the Warring States and early imperial periods, see Yan Gengwang, “Zhanguo shidai lieguo minfeng yu shengji: jianlun Qin tongyi tianxia zhi Beijing,” in his Yan Gengwang shixue lunwen xuanji (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi, 1991), pp. 95–112; Wang Zijin, “Qin Han wenhua de tongyi fengge yu quyu tese,” in his Qin Han quyu wenhua yanjiu (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1998), pp. 1–23; Zhou Zhenhe, “Qin Han fengsu dili quhua,” in idem ed., Zhongguo lishi wenhua quyu yanjiu (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1997), pp. 107–28; Hu Baoguo, “Handai zhengzhi wenhua zhongxin de zhuanyi,” in his Han Tang jian shixue de fazhan (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003), pp. 214–29. Fujita Katsuhisa, Shiki Sengoku shiryō no kenkyū (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1997), also provides insightful reference for the subject. For examples of the pre-and early imperial periods, see Erica Fox Brindley, Ancient China and the Yue: Perceptions and Identities on the Southern Frontier, c. 400 BCE-50 CE (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Alice Yao, The Ancient Highlands of Southwest China: From the Bronze Age to the Han Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Xiaolong Wu, Material Culture, Power, and Identity in Ancient China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). For examples of the early medieval period, see Andrew Chittick, Patronage and Community in Medieval China: The Xiangyang Garrison, 400–600 CE (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009); Catherine Churchman, The People Between the Rivers: The Rise and Fall of a Bronze Drum Culture, 200–750 CE (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). Here, I use the term “Huaxia” rather than “Han” to refer to the Chinese civilization in early China since “Huaxia” is a name of culture and ethnicity that designates the people living in the Central Plains region with a shared culture that they inherited from the traditions of the Zhou dynasty (c. 1045–256 BCE), whereas the “Han” was more of a political label during Han times. For the distinction of the two terms in early China studies, see Brindley, Ancient China and the Yue, pp. 5–6 and Yao, The Ancient Highlands of Southwest China, p. 10. Wu, Material Culture, Power, and Identity in Ancient China, pp. 180–2. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 125. In his study of militarism, Emilio Willems sheds light on the understanding of the process of militarization; see A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of PrussianGerman Militarism: An Anthropological Approach (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1986), pp. 1–13. Militarization and militarism are not necessarily the same thing. For the differences between the two concepts, see Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 247–8. My definition and classification of militarization benefits from the relevant discussions in Willems, A Way of Life and Death; Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially pp. 32–5 and 64–5; Szonyi, Cold War Island; Huang Jinlin, Zhanzheng, shenti, xiandaixing: jindai Taiwan de junshi zhili yu shenti, 1895–2005 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2009). For the militarization initiated by the state in the Warring States period in general and the Qin state in particular, see Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 53–96; Robin McNeal, “Acquiring People: Social Organization, Mobilization, and the Discourse on the Civil and the Martial in Ancient China,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 2000); Tu Cheng-sheng, Bianhu qimin: chuantong zhengzhi shehui jiegou zhi xingcheng (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1990), pp. 49–96 and 373–91.

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71 Jonathan N. Lipman treats northwest China as a “middle ground” of contact and adaptation between cultures and peoples in his case study of the Muslims in northwest China during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). He points out that violence is an important theme that is always associated with the discussion of the northwest between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. For details, see Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997). 72 David M. Robinson has provided a case study on how spreading violence led to rapid militarization during the transition of the Yuan and Ming dynasties. See his Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia Under the Mongols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), pp. 81–2 and 269–71. Diana Lary’s work on modern China also discusses the relationship between violence and militarization; see her Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers 1919–1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 4–5. 73 For the origins and developments of the Later Han steles, see Tomiya Itaru, Mokkan, chikukan no kataru Chūgoku kodai: shoki no bunkashi (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), pp. 28–56. For an overview of using epigraphic sources in studying Later Han history, see Hans Bielenstein, “Later Han Inscriptions and Dynastic Biographies: A Historiographical Comparison,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Sinology: Section on History and Archaeology (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1981), pp. 571–86. Some examples of epigraphy-oriented research in Later Han culture and history are Patricia Ebrey, “Later Han Stone Inscriptions,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40.2 (1980): 325–53; Brown, The Politics of Mourning in Early China; Ken E. Brashier, “Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Stelae,” in Martin Kern ed., Text and Ritual in Early China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 249–84; also Brashier’s two books: Ancestral Memory in Early China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011) and Public Memory in Early China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014).

2

Opening new territory and partitioning the space Natural and administrative geographies of the early imperial northwest

When Zhang Qian (fl. 140s–110s BCE) first set foot on the soil of Longxi, the westernmost commandery ( jun; a level of regional administrative unit, with the empire dividing into dozens of it) of the Former Han dynasty, sometime during the 130s BCE, he must have seen a scenery very different from that of the imperial capital Chang’an and of his native commandery in the southwest called Hanzhong. Travelling northwestward across Longxi, Zhang finally left the Han territory and entered the Xiongnu-dominated Hexi region. Unfortunately, he was captured by the Xiongnu and detained for over a decade until he managed to flee and continue his commissioned journey to Central Asia. Zhang Qian is a household name in Chinese history as a pioneer and explorer in establishing a diplomatic relationship between China and various Central Asian polities.1 His saga of exploration is set against the backdrop of the enduring rivalry between the Former Han empire and the Xiongnu steppe nomadic confederacy.2 When Emperor Wu of the Former Han dynasty learned that the Yuezhi people were defeated and dislocated by the Xiongnu from the Hexi Corridor,3 he called for volunteers to take up a mission to the Yuezhi, hoping to forge a military alliance with them to launch a joint attack against the Xiongnu. Together with others, Zhang Qian, an attendant at the imperial court, responded to the emperor’s call. The clandestine nature of the mission is all too clear when, instead of appointing officials to lead a formal emissary, the Han court decided to recruit volunteers to take on an adventure. Crossing boundaries stealthily to conduct diplomatic mission without prior notice to the Xiongnu was unquestionably an act of violating certain bilateral protocol between the Former Han and its nomadic neighbor in the north. As the Xiongnu Chanyu questioned Zhang Qian when the latter was under his custody,4 “The Yuezhi is to our north. How could the Han send a mission there? If I wanted to send a mission to the Yue [the southern neighbor of the Former Han], would the Han let me?”5 Yet, it is worth noting that such a secret mission only played an auxiliary role in the Former Han’s grand strategy against the Xiongnu, since the main thrust of the Former Han’s diplomatic endeavor was its military forces – neither Zhang Qian’s long-term detention in the Xiongnu nor his failure in reaching any agreement with the Yuezhi stopped the Former Han from raising military campaigns against the Xiongnu. Although Zhang Qian did not accomplish his goals, his mission was not futile, for it brought new knowledge

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about Central Asia back to the Former Han court, which provided valuable information for the empire’s westward expansion. And not long after Zhang Qian’s detention did the situation of the Han-Xiongnu confrontation change. Within two decades after the Chanyu interrogated Zhang Qian, the Former Han seized the Hexi Corridor from the Xiongnu and forced the steppe power to retreat from the region. When Zhang Qian proceeded to Central Asia for his second mission in 119 BCE, he was safe from Xiongnu interdiction in his travels through the Hexi Corridor. The newly obtained Hexi Corridor and the neighboring commanderies that were already in the Han realm collectively formed the northwestern region of the Former Han empire and was named Liang province (Liangzhou) in the last years of Emperor Wu’s reign, when the whole imperial realm was divided into thirteen inspectoral jurisdictions called provinces (zhou; each supervised several commanderies) that gradually transformed into full-fledged administrative regions equipped with their own military forces in the Later Han times.6 As for the northwest, the word Liang means “cool” or “chilly,” and the province was designated as “Liang” because “it is located in the west and [its weather] is always severely chilly.”7 Such a description sheds light on the Han people’s perception of the natural geographical and ecological characteristics of the province. Climatic and topographical features provide us with a geographical setting for understanding the character and development of the northwestern frontier region. Besides the physical landscape, the political landscape also constitutes an integral part of our investigation of the frontier society in the Liang province, as “administrative geography – the way a state divides space – can also tell us much about conceptions of political community and its modes of inclusion and exclusion.”8 The establishment and development of administrative jurisdictions in the QinHan northwest tell us about not only the flux of penetration and retrenchment of the imperial state in the region but also the imperial vision of territory over the region. At the same time, the designation of an administrative space also influenced the identity of the inhabitants there and their attitudes toward the imperial center. Focusing on both the natural and political landscape of the early imperial northwest from a longue durée perspective, this chapter will first introduce the natural geography of the region, then provide a chronological account of the progressive formation of administrative units in the region from the pre-Han to the Later Han times.

Physical landscape In terms of both natural environment and culture, the northwestern frontier was a transitional or intermediate zone connecting China proper and Central Asia. The northwestern region was never fully integrated into China proper and was persistently regarded by the Chinese regimes as a perilous area full of uncertainty and potential rivalry. The northwestern frontier zone had consistently been a prime security concern of the imperial defense, and control over the region was an oft-discussed topic in statecraft writings down to the early twentieth century.9

Opening new territory 27 Nevertheless, it is important to study the northwestern region in a contemporary context, bearing in mind the differences, though minor, in the definition and delimitation of the region in different historical periods.10 The present study focuses on the Liang province, which constituted the core of the northwestern frontier of the Han dynasties, whose geographical space is not exactly the same as what is called the northwestern provinces in China today.11 The territories of Liang province, as the area under study in this book, largely correspond to the present-day provinces of Gansu and Ningxia, with the addition of small portions of northeastern Qinghai and western and southern Mongolia. Although it is somewhat anachronistic to call this area the “Liang province” before its formal establishment during the reign of Emperor Wu of the Former Han dynasty, this study will sometimes, for convenience, employ the term to refer to the whole area. Given that the ecology and geography of the region have been changing since antiquity under natural and human influences, such as desertification and deforestation, the following descriptions can only aim to portray some important geographical and ecological features of the region in general terms. Chinese geographers generalized the natural environment of the northwestern region to four salient features. First, it is an arid area with an average annual precipitation of less than 200 millimeters, with the amount of rainfall diminishing from east to west. Second, the terrain is generally flat, as most of the region is made up of semi-deserts, sand deserts, stony deserts (specifically the Gobi Desert), mountain deserts, and terrene flatland. These areas have been subject to enduring erosion under the arid climate, which in turn contributes to the coarse soil texture of the region. Third, the region suffers from a chronic scarcity of water resources. Except for the drainage areas along the Yellow River valley, most places only have in-ward flowing rivers which lack a permanent flow. Streams sourcing from the glaciers on the surrounding mountains are quickly absorbed by the arid soil once they reach the flatland. Fourth, layers of vegetation in the region are generally thin and scattered; except for certain areas of pasture and forest, most areas are covered by desert shrubs.12 Practically speaking, the natural landscape of the Liang province can be divided into four sectors, namely the southeast, northwest, northeast, and southwest. 1

The southeastern sector corresponds roughly to the southeastern part of present-day Gansu province. It is on the eastern bank of the Yellow River and is part of the loess plateau of North China. The deepest layer of the loess in this sector reaches 400 meters, which is also the thickest in the world. Compared with the others, this sector enjoys a lower altitude (800–2,200 meters in elevation), warmer weather, and larger amounts of rainfall.13 According to the archaeological and phytogeographic research, the loess plateau was more humid and more fertile in ancient times than it is today. During the Qin-Han period, lush forests existed over large areas in this sector. Although it underwent a gradual process of deforestation since the pre-Qin period, dense forests could still be found in some areas up to the mid-eleventh century CE.14 This sector was suited for both agricultural and pastoral activities;

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3

4

Opening new territory meanwhile, conflicts between farmers and pastoralists over its land resources also happened persistently in Chinese history.15 During the Qin-Han times, with the help of irrigation facilities under state sponsorship, this sector was capable of yielding a considerable amount of agricultural products. The pastures also provided an ideal environment for horse breeding. The Former Han state therefore set up a certain number of horse ranches there as a major supplier of war horses. Needless to say, this zone was an important base of military resources for Liang province. The northwestern sector consists mainly of the famous Hexi Corridor. It is on the western bank of the Yellow River and corresponds to the western part of the modern province of Gansu. Being confined by the mountain ranges on the north and south, the Hexi Corridor is a long and narrow stretch of land measuring around 1,000 kilometers east-west and varying from several kilometers to more than 100 kilometers south-north. The altitude of this sector, rising from south to north and east to west, ranges from 1,000 to 1,500 meters. This sector forms a flat passageway between mountain ranges, where desert and semi-desert areas are studded with oases.16 Although precipitation in this sector is low, rivers flowing down from the surrounding mountains sustain the oases, which provide good havens for both human and animals.17 According to the Hanshu, the standard history of the Former Han dynasty, the good pastureland there provided the most abundant sources of cattle, sheep, and horses in the empire.18 This sector had long been an important land of strategic resources for the Xiongnu before it was captured by the Former Han, a great triumph of the Chinese empire that consequently inflicted great damage to the nomadic power. The northeastern sector corresponds to the modern province of Ningxia and is located between the desert areas and the loess plateau. The climate is shaped by the joint influence of the monsoon zone to its east and the arid zone to its northwest. The mountainous terrain and the widely scattered basins make the area looks like a checkerboard. It is an area of dry weather, little rainfall, high evaporation rates, and strong sandy wind, with an annual temperature of 5–9 degree centigrade. In general, it is a semi-desert area and not ideal for any farming activities.19 Nevertheless, after conquering this area, the Former Han state put great efforts to transform it into an area of military and farming colonies by sending labor forces in and digging ditches for irrigation; certain parts of this sector were then capable of consistently providing farm produce.20 The southwestern sector occupies the northeastern portion of present-day Qinghai province, where is also the northeastern tip of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. The annual temperature of this sector is between 3–9 degrees centigrade. Under the influence of the easterly monsoon, this area enjoys a relatively warmer climate with a higher amount of rainfall than other sectors. As the Yellow River and its tributary Huang River (Huangshui) pass through this area, the river valleys also provide well-suited places for both planting and livestock breeding.21 The He-Huang (Yellow River and Huang River) region therefore became a focal point for resource conflicts in Chinese history

Opening new territory 29 between autochthonous peoples and the Han settlers. It was also the hotspot where military conflicts between the Qiang people and the Han settlers usually broke out. As we now have a general picture of the natural landscape of the northwestern region, we can turn to the political landscape in the following sections. I will first give a general description of the human geography in the northwest in the prehistoric era, followed by a chronological account of the processes of formation and expansion of the northwestern frontier during the early imperial age. Based on the division of the four zones mentioned above, we will start our journey from the southeastern zone, which was close to the Jing River and Wei River valleys where the political centers of the Western Zhou (ca. 1045–771 BCE), Qin, and Former Han were located. We will then follow the footsteps of the Han armies and advance northwestward to the Hexi Corridor. Since the main focus of the following sections will be on the political landscape of the northwestern frontier, the cultural and ethnic characteristics of the region will only be mentioned here when necessary, but will be discussed in full in the succeeding chapters.

Political landscape before the Former Han Due to the advancement of recent archaeologist studies, it is now generally recognized that a broad cultural belt gradually came to being along the northern frontier of the Huaxia realm during the Bronze Age, in which peoples shared similar ways of life, economic activities, social customs, religious beliefs, and the use of a style of bronze tools that were different, in varying degrees, from the civilization of Huaxia or China proper. This distinct cultural belt is called the “Northern Frontier,” “Northern Zone,” or “Northern Bronze Complex,” or beifang wenhuadai (northern cultural belt region) in Chinese.22 The cultural belt extends geographically from the east to the west, covering the modern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Shanxi, Shannxi, Gansu, Ningxi, Xinjiang, and parts of Qinghai. It comprises various natural landscapes such as forest, steppe, and desert.23 The Northern Zone was also a cultural complex in which “different communities shared a similar inventory of bronze objects across a wide area,” which “cannot be regarded as a single culture.”24 In fact, it served as a cultural transition zone between the civilization of China proper and bronze cultures that originated from Central Asia and Southern Siberia. Located near the western end of the Northern Zone, the northwestern frontier being studied in this book came under its influence and shared with it a certain degree of commonality. The northwestern frontier per se was in fact not only a frontier of China but also a frontier of today’s Tibet, Mongolia, and Central Asia. Simply put, as a frontier of all these places, it is also a meeting ground of four civilizations.25 Since prehistoric times, the northwestern frontier had already served as a crossroads for cultural transmission and trade exchange, which in turn significantly shaped the culture of the region. Based on the analysis of the wide range of artifacts excavated in the provinces of Gansu and Ningxia, it is clear that material cultures from

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the Eurasian steppes already reached southeastern Gansu and southern Ningxia through the Hexi Corridor no later than the late fourth and third centuries BCE.26 Among other things, the large quantity of bronze weapons, including axes, daggers, and spears, of Eurasian steppe origin and style found in the region bear significant evidence of cultural transmission and absorption.27 The adoption of imported weapons also reveals the violent character of the region and the surprising result of cultural exchange by means of warfare – both presaging the militarized nature of the region in the early imperial age.28 Evidence of human activities and settled communities in the northwest frontier zone can be traced back to no later than the third millennium BCE. Various sites of two Neolithic cultures, namely the Majiayao culture (ca. 3300–2050 BCE) and the Qijia culture (ca. 2200–1700 BCE),29 were found widely scattered across the He-Huang valley, the Hexi Corridor, and their environs. They were settled and agrarian-based cultures. The scale of agriculture found in the Qijia sites is lower than that in the Majiayao sites, whereas that of pastoral activity is higher in the Qijia sites than in the Majiayao’s. Swine husbandry, more than that of other animals, seems to have played an important role in the daily life of the Qijia people, who also reared domesticated horses.30 The presence of horses that originated from the Eurasian steppes reveal the connection between the Qijia culture and Central Asia, while the rather sudden appearance of metallurgy in the area could be attributed to the technological transfer from the neighboring steppe peoples.31 Through the northwest, the bronze weapons and the techniques of their production further spread to the Central Plains no later than the early Shang period (ca. 1570–1045 BCE).32 Four other archaeological cultures dating later than the Qijia culture were found in the northwestern region, and they correspond roughly in time to the periods of Shang and Western Zhou. They are known as Siba culture (ca. 1900–1500 BCE) in the western part of the Hexi Corridor; Xindian culture (ca. 1600–1000 BCE), spreading along the Tao River and the Huang River valleys and the upper course of the Yellow River; Siwa culture (ca. 1300–1000 BCE), mainly in modern eastern Gansu province; and Kayue culture (ca. 1600–600 BCE) in the He-Huang valley. There were long-term local developments and results of interactions between these cultures in the northwest.33 The large amount of animal remains that were excavated from human graves, including those of dogs, pigs, horses, sheep, and cattle, reveals the importance of animal husbandry among these cultures. According to archaeological research, the Kayue culture shows a gradual evolution from a mixed farming and pastoral culture with settled life to a predominantly nomadic economy. This transition is reflected not only in an increased number of animal bones and sacrifices, but also in the composition of the animal stock.34 Scholars proposed that it was probably the climatic change that contributed to the demise of the agrarian-based Qijia culture and the rise of these four pastoral-based cultures that practiced predominantly migratory pastoralism and crop farming

Opening new territory 31 only ancillarily.35 In other words, when the climate turned cold in the late second millennium BCE, a gradual transition from agrarian-based to pastoral-based economy took place in the region.36 Some Chinese archaeologists even proposed that, through comparisons, the Majiayao and Qijia cultures were culturally related to the Huaxia civilization, whereas the other four cultures had a closer relationship with the Qiang and other non-Huaxia peoples, although further evidence is needed to substantiate these hypotheses.37 Chinese archaeologists further suggested that there were already clear connections between the northwestern region and the Central Plains during the legendary Xia dynasty (ca. 2200–1766 BCE), on the assumption that the site of Erlitou was where the Xia state was located.38 Nevertheless, the beginning of documented history of the northwest as a violent frontier dates to the Shang dynasty, when there were records of hostile groups of people named Gongfang, Guifang, and Tufang located approximately in the north and northwest regions of the Shang corresponding to the present-day northern Shaanxi and Shanxi and extending even to the fringe of Gansu and Ningxia.39 In addition, Qiangfang, or simply Qiang, on the northwest was frequently mentioned in the Shang sources as one of the major rivals in armed conflicts. After the Zhou conquered the Shang in the eleventh century BCE, it established its political center in the Wei River valley, close to its western border. Consequently, the Zhou faced threats from its western neighbors, namely the Xianyun or Quan Rong.40 In the last decades of the Western Zhou, when relations with the Rong deteriorated quickly, military confrontations broke out quite frequently in the area between the lower reaches of the Jing and Luo Rivers and the Wei River valley.41 The relationship between the two sides became even more complicated since the Zhou people were not always victims of “barbarian” invasions, as later records would lead people to believe. Rather, the Zhou state expanded northwestward to incorporate the Rong tribes and their lands into its domain.42 In the process of expansion, the Zhou’s northwestern frontier carved into the sphere of the Siwa culture, which was developed in the upper Wei River and Tao River valleys in modern eastern Gansu. Archaeologists point out that the Zhou and Siwa cultures “overlapped each other both temporally and spatially as their sites were often located side by side, together forming an important aspect of the landscape in these regions.”43 Furthermore: although the Zhou culture was predominant during the early Western Zhou as a result of territorial expansion, the Siwa culture constituted another important cultural layer that coexisted with the Zhou culture throughout the entire Western Zhou period. Some non-Zhou elements in the bronze culture of the upper Jing River valley were clearly associated with the northern steppe region. By the late Western Zhou, even tombs with overwhelming northern features began to appear in the region.44 There was no strong link between the Siwa culture and the historical Xianyun, but both traditional written sources about the Xianyun and archaeological findings of the Siwa culture clearly depict a crescent-shaped alien cultural sphere along the

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northwestern frontier of the Western Zhou.45 The frequent military clashes between the Western Zhou state and the Xianyun revealed the chronic conflicts between the expanding Huaxia people and the autochthonous peoples and also the violent nature of the northwestern frontier. In 771 BCE, the Quan Rong sacked the Western Zhou capital and killed the Zhou king, whose heir-apparent assumed the kingship and moved east to the city of Luoyang, leaving the Zhou homeland for contest between the various Rong peoples and Qin, which was the westernmost polity in the Zhou network of enfeoffed states.46 Up to this point, the Qin people had already had a long history of interacting with the various Rong tribes.47 According to the Shiji, a Qin leader married a woman from the Western Rong in the mid-Western Zhou period. Later, King Xuan of Western Zhou (r. 827–782 BCE) appointed a Qin leader named Qinzhong as the commander of a military campaign against the Western Rong. Qinzhong, however, was killed in the campaign, and his five sons subsequently avenged him and defeated the Western Rong with the reinforcement of the Zhou royal army.48 With the Zhou court fleeing east, the Qin people engaged in recurring military clashes with the various Rong in the Wei River plain in modern Shaanxi.49 The territorial boundaries between the two sides oscillated. Facing the large-scale migration of the Rong tribes after the collapse of the Western Zhou state, Qin had to fight for its own survival and control over the erstwhile Western Zhou royal domain. The conflicts were so fierce that Qin was once forced to abandon its home in the west, leaving the entire region west of the Longshan mountains to the Rongs, and did not retake the region until seventy years later (around the mid750s BCE).50 The Qin leaders then successively expanded to the north and northwest, annexing the various groups of Rong and their lands, for which the state of Qin would therefore be recognized as “the hegemon of the Western barbarians.” As a result, there was a large presence of Rong and other non-Huaxia peoples in the Qin territory, although some of them would retreat farther west to avoid the Qin domination.51 Reaching west to today’s Gansu and Ningxia, the state of Qin now possessed huge areas that had never before been part of the Zhou culture sphere, but had for centuries been inhabited by nomadic or semisedentary live-stock-raising populations. The original inhabitants were presumably either pushed out or forced under the repressive, revenue-producing agricultural regime of Qin.52 To consolidate its control over the newly acquired vast territories from the so-called barbarians, the Qin state first set up counties (xian) to take charge of routine local administration and later commanderies to coordinate the counties for military purposes.53 In 688 BCE, Duke Wu of Qin (r. 697–678 BCE) conquered the Gui Rong and Ji Rong and subsequently established two counties over the two places, designating Gui county and Ji county.54 During the reign of Duke Mu (r. 659–621 BCE), the Qin westward expansion reached a peak by launching large-scale expeditions against the Rong tribes and conquering a large area.55

Opening new territory 33 The reign of King Zhaoxiang (r. 306–251 BCE) marked another tide of westward conquest that annexed the land of Yiqu, a strong power among the various Rong, in 271 BCE. The Qin state then divided the Yiqu territory into three commanderies, namely Beidi, Longxi, and Shang.56 There were thus many Qin counties of non-Huaxia origins. In Neishi, the metropolitan area covering the Qin capital and its vicinity,57 there was the Linjin county acquired from the Dali Rong and Liyi county from the Li Rong;58 in the Beidi commandery, the Yiqu county was named after the Yiqu Rong and Wuzhi county after the Wuzhi Rong; in the Longxi commandery, the counties of Shanggui, Ji, and Mianzhu were all named after the Rong tribes. In addition, the Qin state set up a county-level special district called dao for areas with a sizable “barbarian” population.59 To name only a few, there were Didao, Gudao, Yuandao, Biandao, Rongdao, Wududao, Yudao, and Bodao, in which Chinese characters such as Di, Yuan, and Rong all carry “barbarian” connotations.60 Among the newly founded commanderies, Longxi marked the furthest extent of the westward territorial expansion of Qin. Long walls were constructed in the commandery during the reign of King Zhaoxiang to delineate the western boundaries. In 220 BCE, the year following the establishment of the Qin empire, the First Emperor (r. 246–221 BCE as king; 221–210 BCE as emperor) embarked on a tour of inspection to the northwestern commanderies of Longxi and Beidi. Later the First Emperor launched a construction of long walls, pushing the northwestern section of the wall forward to the western bank of the Yellow River,61 hence enclosing the northwestern territory into the empire.62 The completion of the First Emperor’s long walls signaled an end of the Qin westward expansion, and the early Chinese empires would not cross the northwestern boundaries until the reign of Emperor Wu of the Former Han.

Political landscape in the Former Han period In the Hanshu chapter on the Western Regions (Xiyu zhuan), there is an account of the advancement of the northwestern frontier during the Qin and Former Han times that, in enumerating the significant events in the process of Qin-Han northwestward expansion, provides a good outline for the subject of this section: Since the decline of the Zhou, the Rong and Di always intermingled in the north of the Jing and Wei River valleys. The First Emperor of Qin expelled the Rong and Di, building the long walls and demarcating a boundary for the Central State, but did not cross Lintao to the west. When the Han flourished during the time of the Filial Emperor Wu, [he] launched punitive expeditions against the barbarians in the four directions, extending his mighty power, and Zhang Qian began to open up the trails to the Western Regions. Later, the General of Rapid Cavalry [Huo Qubing (d. 117 BCE)] captured the territory of the Right Sector of Xiongnu, bringing the surrender of the Kings of Hunye and Xiuchu, and emptying [the Xiongnu] out of the land. The construction [of the Han fortifications] thus began west

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Opening new territory from Lingju. At first, Jiuquan commandery was established. Later, migrants were gradually sent in to settle in it. The land was then divided into [the three commanderies of] Wuwei, Zhangyi, and Dunhuang, making a total of four commanderies. Two passes [i.e. Yumen and Yang] also came to Han’s possession.63

As mentioned in the previous section, the Qin state expanded in the northwest at the expense of the “barbarian” neighbors. During the reigns of the energetic monarchs like King Zhaoxiang and the First Emperor, Qin’s territorial boundary pushed extensively in the west, and long walls were built to enclose the newly conquered areas.64 The western end of the Qin long walls was in the Lintao county of the Longxi commandery. Adjacent to the northwestern frontier, the northern boundary of the Qin empire was also extended since the First Emperor dispatched General Meng Tian (d. 210 BCE) with an expeditionary army to expel the Xiongnu from the Ordos region around the great bend of the Yellow River.65 Fortified counties were subsequently built in the region, which were then settled with soldiers and convicts. Long walls were also built along the new northern frontier and connected with those in the west. Upon the time of completion of the First Emperor’s long walls, the territorial boundary of the Qin empire was clearly defined.66 It is not easy to redraw the exact territorial boundaries of the northwestern commanderies in the early years of the Former Han dynasty. The frontier between the Xiongnu and the Former Han was in flux, since the Xiongnu not only returned to the Ordos region and the northwestern areas from where they were once expelled, but even pushed southward.67 Several features regarding the Han-Xiongnu struggles along the frontier, however, can be learned from the sources available. First, the Former Han retained the Qin administrative divisions of Longxi, Beidi, and Shang commanderies in the northwest. Second, the boundaries between Beidi and Shang receded southward, and their size shrank as a result of the Xiongnu re-conquest.68 Third, the commanderies of Longxi, Shang, and Beidi bordered the right/western sector of the Xiongnu confederacy69 and made up the thoroughfare that afforded the Xiongnu inroads into the Han territories; Longxi was in particular heavily devastated by the Xiongnu,70 who even posed at times very serious threats to the Han dynasty. For instance, in 166 BCE, cavalry led by the Xiongnu Chanyu invaded Beidi and killed the commandant of the commandery (the officer who was in charge of military affairs) and burnt the Huizhong Palace, an imperial resort in Beidi, while their scouts intruded deep into the Ganquan Palace in the vicinity of the Han capital. As a response to the crisis, Emperor Wen (r. 180–157 BCE) appointed three officials as General of Shang commandery, General of Beidi, and General of Longxi to garrison along the northwestern defense line of the metropolitan area until the crisis eased. The commanderies of Shang and Beidi would not be safe from the Xiongnu’s harrying until Emperor Wu launched his large-scale counterattack and northwestward expansion. As the above example reveals, once the Xiongnu forces intruded the northwestern commanderies, they could easily threaten the security of the Former Han’s capital, underscoring the strategic value of those commanderies to the political center

Opening new territory 35 of the empire. The Qin and Former Han metropolitan area was located in the area known as Guanzhong or Guannei, literally “within the passes,” which in a narrow geographical sense refers mainly to the southern portion of modern Shaanxi province, especially the Wei River valley, but in the broadest sense covers the whole Shaanxi, eastern Gansu and Ningxia, northern Sichuan, and the southern portion of Inner Mongolia within the Yellow River loop.71 The name Guanzhong points to the special position of the area. Surrounded as it was by formidable natural barriers of mountains and rivers, it could only be accessed through several strategic passes and fords. The guan (pass/gate) in the name Guanzhong mainly refers to the Hangu Pass, literally the pass at a box-shaped gorge. Guanzhong lay in the area west of the pass and was for that reason alternatively called Guanxi (west of the pass), whereas the area east of the pass was called Guandong. The Guanxi area was also known as Shanxi (west of Mount Yao; different from the modern province of Shanxi), and Guandong as Shandong (east of Mount Yao, including but not limited to modern Shandong province). The distinction between Guanzhong/Guanxi/Shanxi on the one hand and Guandong/Shandong on the other constituted a crucial pair of geographical concepts of the early empires.72 The relationship between these two halves of the empire and its significance in Han politics and society will be an important thread in the following chapters. Since the founders of Qin and Former Han based their power in Guanzhong where they then launched a west-to-east conquest to complete their imperial enterprise, both empires adopted a consistent policy of promoting the prominence of Guanzhong and relying on it to control the whole imperial realm. While there were enfeoffed kingdoms and marquisates of imperial kinsmen and meritorious aristocrats scattering across the Guandong area during the Han dynasties,73 such was not the case in Guanzhong.74 The whole Guanzhong region, with the metropolitan area as its core, was under the direct governance of the Han court. So were the northwestern commanderies on the western flank of Guanzhong. As a frontier region, the Han northwestern commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, Tianshui, Anding,75 Shang, and Xihe contained diverse populations including both Huaxia and non-Huxia peoples, who were accustomed to preparing for fighting against the so-called barbarians not under the jurisdiction of the Chinese state(s). Hunting and fighting prevailed in the region and helped foster a martial ethos. As a result, there was a large concentration of men with skillful marksmanship and horsemanship. In the early imperial times, or even earlier still, the northwest had two famous products: horses and skilled fighters. Military talents of qualified family background from these six commanderies were therefore recruited by the Former Han dynasty to form the elite corps of cavalry and were responsible for guarding the emperor.76 They were entitled the Liujun liangjiazi, literally “sons of impeccable families from the six commanderies,” and generally started on a bright career path. Quite a number of talented generals and cavalrymen of the Former Han were of this origin.77 More of the martial characters of the six commanderies and the Liujun liangjiazi will be discussed in the next chapter. We shall now return to the process of the Former Han’s northwestward expansion and the ensuing establishment of new regional administrative units.

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Until the second decade of Emperor Wu’s reign, Longxi and Beidi were the two westernmost Former Han commanderies, but the situation changed when the empire acquired the Hexi Corridor from the Xiongnu, in a somewhat unexpected manner amid the mounting Han-Xiongnu confrontation. In 133 BCE, the young Emperor Wu determined to adopt an offensive stance in dealing with the Xiongnu and thus plotted to ambush the Chanyu in a northern frontier town, but the plot ended in a failure and soured the hitherto stable bilateral relationship – in which the Former Han always paid tribute to the Xiongnu.78 From 129 BCE, Emperor Wu launched a series of expeditionary campaigns against the steppe foes. In 127 BCE, General Wei Qing (d. 106 BCE) scored a major victory by driving the Xiongnu out of the Ordos region and reconquering the lost territories of the Qin empire south of the Yellow River loop. In 121 BCE, Huo Qubing (d. 117 BCE), the emperor’s most favored general and the General of Rapid Cavalry mentioned in the beginning of this section, led a cavalry force that marched northwestward from Longxi to assail the Xiongnu. The expedition was a remarkable success, and Huo launched another successful attack later from Longxi and Beidi. Angered by General Huo’s successive victories in the western sector of the Xiongnu domain, the Chanyu summoned the King of Hunye and the King of Xiuchu, both of whom were governing the region, to his court. Fearing that they would meet their doom at the Chanyu court, the two kings contacted the Former Han to negotiate a surrender. As a response, Emperor Wu sent General Huo to escort the two kings to the Han territory. The King of Xiuchu, however, changed his mind when he saw the Han forces. The desperate King of Hunye immediately killed his companion and surrendered the two tribes to General Huo.79 The former domain of the two kings, the Hexi Corridor, was suddenly at the Former Han’s disposal. Such a dramatic turn of events not only tipped the balance of power between the Former Han and the Xiongnu but also profoundly changed the geographical composition of China forever. The Former Han state, however, had no immediate plan regarding the surprising great spoils.80 Since the Xiongnu had been expelled from the Ordos region and the Hexi Corridor, the pressure facing the commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, and Xihe was greatly eased. The Former Han state subsequently moved the paupers from Guandong to populate the newly restored Ordos region and reduced half of the garrison soldiers from the west of Beidi.81 Nevertheless, the Former Han court left the status of the Hexi Corridor ambiguous. It basically left the region as it was and only constructed fortified works along the west bank of the Yellow River, showing no further intention towards the territory beyond the fortified boundaries. The different management between the two regions of Ordos and Hexi was probably due to the different values the Former Han policy makers saw in them. The Ordos region was not only a strategic zone of protection for the metropolitan area but also a former territory of the Qin empire, so much so that the Former Han rulers might feel obliged to restore and to strengthen control there. In contrast, the Hexi Corridor lay outside the Qin boundaries and had never been part of the Huaxia realm; it was indeed a foreign country where there was no precedent for governance from the Huaxia states.

Opening new territory 37 It was only in 112 BCE, nearly a decade after the capture of the region, that the Former Han state formally set up administrative units in the Hexi Corridor. The change of policy resulted mainly from the unfolding of new situations during the interlude: the shift of geo-strategic point in the Han-Xiongnu war and the failure of Zhang Qian’s second mission to Central Asia. First, the Chanyu moved the Xiongnu’s center westward after suffering from a series of defeats from the Han armies. The relocation of the center indicated that the Xiongnu were no longer a serious menace to the Ordos region, which left the Former Han time and space to consolidate its control over the region by constructing irrigation facilities, setting up farming colonies, and moving in people.82 Meanwhile, the focal point for the Han-Xiongnu confrontations accordingly shifted west, and the strategic importance of the Hexi region was now recognized by the Han policy makers, who needed to reconsider how to make use of the Hexi region. Zhang Qian, who was now a leading expert of Central Asian affairs, started his second mission to the Western Regions in 119 BCE, aiming to invite the Wusun people to move in to the vacant Hexi Corridor and to forge a military coalition with the Former Han against the Xiongnu.83 According to the Han records, by the second century BCE, the Yuezhi people had inhabited the Hexi Corridor, along with a smaller group named Wusun. When the Yuezhi were strong, they slaughtered the Wusun king and captured his land. The Wusun people then fled to the Xiongnu and sought sanctuary there.84 Between the 200s and 170s BCE, the Xiongnu successively launched attacks on the Yuezhi and finally drove them from the Hexi Corridor. The majority of the Yuezhi moved further west to the Amu River valley, where Zhang Qian made his first mission to visit them. Some of the Yuezhi fled south to today’s Qinghai, and others dispersed in the neighboring areas. As Zhang Qian had failed to secure an alliance with the Yuezhi, this time he turned to the Wusun, who had already settled in a new home and whose relationship with the Xiongnu was now ambivalent. He tried to persuade them to move back to the Hexi Corridor as an ally on the Former Han’s western flank. The Wusun, however, were too afraid of challenging the Xiongnu and had no intention of going back to the Hexi region.85 When Zhang Qian brought the news of rejection back to the Han court in 115 BCE, it left the Former Han no choice but to consider the possibility of governing the Hexi region directly. In 112 BCE, two events helped bolster the Former Han’s formal territorial control over the Hexi Corridor. First, the associates dispatched by Zhang Qian during his second mission finally returned in that year with delegates of various Central Asian polities, thereupon beginning the stable and formal communications between the Former Han and the Western Regions.86 The importance of the Hexi Corridor as the main route connecting the Han territory with Central Asia was recognized by the Former Han state. Second, in the same year, the Qiang people who were dispersed along the western frontier caused a disturbance. Emperor Wu immediately sent an army to suppress it and followed it with the mobilization of tens of thousands of labors crossing the Yellow River to build fortified towns on the west bank. The chaos caused by the

38

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Qiang people aroused the Former Han’s fear that the Qiang would launch collaborative attacks with the Xiongnu. Aiming “to segregate the Qiang from the Xiongnu and cut off the communications between the north [the Xiongnu] and the south [the Qiang],”87 the Former Han had to make use of the Hexi Corridor as a wedge between the two foes and prevent any potential threat to the security of the empire’s west. The new situation now requiring that the Former Han maintain a more intensive military presence in the region, new regional administrative units had to be created to anchor state activities. The commanderies of Zhangye and Jiuquan were accordingly established. Large-scale state farms and fortifications were set up in the frontier commanderies; 600,000 people were moved into the new northwestern frontier for garrisoning and farming.88 Based on Zhangye and Jiuquan, two more commanderies, namely, Wuwei and Dunhuang, were established, the four forming the well-known four commanderies of Hexi (Hexi sijun). Famous though they were, the exact dates of their establishment are still under debate. Dynastic histories such as the Shiji, Hanshu, and Hou Hanshu provide no accurate data; past scholarship could only rely on their interpretations on the relevant entries in these transmitted texts to infer the date. The discovery of the Han strips along the northwest outposts in the early twentieth century onward, however, enables historians to re-examine and narrow the time span of the founding dates of the four commanderies, though clear-cut dates have yet to be ascertained. Since the question of the exact founding dates of the four commanderies is outside the scope of this study, I will only list the three representative views held by Japanese, Chinese, and Western scholars in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Founding dates of the four commanderies of Hexi Hibino Takeoi

Chang Chun-shuii

Michael Loeweiii

Hexiiv Jiuquan Zhangye Dunhuang

115 BCE 111 BCE 108–107 BCE 100–97 BCE

– 111 BCE 111–109 BCE 98 or 94 BCE

Wuwei

67 BCE

78–67 BCE (most likely 72 BCE)

– 104 BCE 104 BCE Certainly before 91 BCE 81–67 BCE

i Hibino Takeo, “Kasei shigun no seiritsu ni tsuite,” in his Chūgoku rekishi chiri kenkyū (Kyōto: Dōhōsha Shuppanbu, 1988), pp. 69–92. For a Japanese review of different theories of the founding dates of the four commanderies, see Ikeda Yūichi, Chūgoku kodai no juraku to chihō gyōsei (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2002), pp. 326–336. ii Chang Chun-shu, Handai bianjiangshi lunji (Taipei: Shihuo chubanshe, 1977), pp. 19–122. For a recent summation of the different dates proposed by traditional Chinese sources and modern Chinese scholarship, see Wang Zongwei, Handai sichouzhilu de yanhou: Hexilu (Beijing : Kunlun chubanshe, 2001), pp. 219–221. iii Loewe, Records of Han Administration Volume 1, 59–60. iv Hibino believed that a Hexi commandery was established in 115 BCE and was later abolished. Most scholars, however, questioned the existence of the Hexi commandery.

Opening new territory 39 Regardless of when exactly the four commanderies were set up, their establishment marked the official annexation of the region into the Former Han empire. The Former Han state then moved people, through compulsory and recruited migrations, from Guandong to the Hexi region and set up new counties and farming colonies to strengthen imperial control over the area.89 Besides garrison soldiers, most of the people who moved to the new frontiers were the poor, convicted, and other groups of low social status, a way for the state to remove the potentially troublesome elements from the east. For example, Emperor Wu once moved over hundreds of thousands of Guandong people, victims of flooding and the ensuing famine in the home regions, to the Ordos region and the southern part of modern Gansu, with government subsidies, as a way to lessen the pressure the natural disasters inflicted on Guandong.90 Meanwhile, the state had to mobilize various kinds of resources to support the costly colonization enterprises.91 A historian of Emperor Wu’s court even lamented that the costs were so enormous that the imperial coffers were thus left empty.92 While this might be an exaggeration, it is by no means completely fictional, since there was little arable land in the newly conquered northwestern frontier that could sustain a large agrarian population.93 The benefits of controlling and maintaining the new territories were certainly minimal compared to its cost. But for the emperor and his courtiers who supported the expansive colonization policy,94 the economic costs were bearable given the strategic needs. In this case, Guandong assumed the role of financial/fiscal geography to provide economic support to the newly conquered northern and northwestern frontiers which assumed the role of military geography.95 Nevertheless, the imperial policy makers might have different calculations and perceptions of the cost of maintaining the northwest. When their concerns changed, their attitudes toward holding the region would accordingly change. This was exactly what happened in the Later Han period, to which we will return in the succeeding chapters. In the process of forming new northwestern regional administrative units, a new commandery named Jincheng was set up in 81 BCE by detaching two counties each from the commanderies of Longxi, Tianshui, and Zhangye. Jincheng straddled the Yellow River and was set up mainly to manage and supervise the Qiang people. Apart from commanderies, the Former Han also set up dependent states (shuguo) along the frontier to settle surrendered “barbarian” tribes.96 When Emperor Wu divided the whole imperial realm into thirteen inspectoral units named provinces, the one located in the northwestern region was the Liang province, covering the commanderies of Longxi, Tianshui, Anding, Jincheng, Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan, and Dunhuang.97 Among them, Longxi was the oldest administrative unit, with a history that could be traced back to the Qin times, whereas the rest were recent establishments during the reign of Emperor Wu, and if the founding year of Wuwei was as late as some scholars suggest (Table 2.1 above), the reign of his great-grandson Emperor Xuan (r. 73–49 BCE). The territories of Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan, and Dunhuang, as well as a portion of Jincheng, became for the first time part of the Chinese empire, their Han

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population made up of various kinds of migrants from the interior of the empire.98 It is also worth noting that the establishment and finalization of the commanderies in the Liang province spanned the reigns of Emperor Wu and Emperor Xuan, extending through the era of Former Han’s territorial expansion.99 With the massive influx of migrants from other parts of the empire, the Han population constituted the backbone of the region’s registered households. The “Treatise on Geography” (Dili zhi, literally “Treatise on Terrestrial Management”) of the Hanshu contains figures of the population census carried out in 2 CE, which provides important demographic data of the Former Han empire in its last decade.100 The information gives a general picture of the administrative units of Liang province and its population figures, as Table 2.2 shows.101 According to the figures listed above, the population distribution was such that the more southern the region was, the larger the population and the number of counties there tended to be. The household and population figures, needless to say, are made up of only the people registered by the state; the number of people who were not on the official register, especially the tribal people, is nowhere to be found.102 Besides, there were several dependent states established in the jurisdiction of the Liang province for settling the surrendered alien people, but the population figure is unknown. Although the Han records stated that the Hexi Corridor was empty around 112 BCE as a result of the surrender of King Hunye,103 it might just be the rhetorical way of describing the retreat of Xiongnu military forces from the area. In fact, it would be hard for an area to become a “no-man’s land” where there was not a trace of single Xiongnu or non-Huaxia people. As for the southern commanderies of the Liang province such as Jincheng and Longxi, there was a long history of autochthonous communities there. The area was permeable to the “barbarians” who lived along or beyond the Han political boundaries. All in all, the combination of autochthonous inhabitants of Huaxia or non-Huaxia origins, new migrants from different parts of the empire, and the newly surrendered tribal peoples made the Liang province a multi-ethnic frontier society, which in turn contributed to the potential estrangement between the northwest and the imperial center in the Later Han times.104

Table 2.2 Population data of northwestern commanderies in 2 CE

Longxi Tianshui Anding Jincheng Wuwei Zhangye Jiuquan Dunhuang

Number of counties

Number of households

Population

11 16 21 13 10 10 9 6

53,964 60,370 42,725 38,470 17,581 24,352 8,137 11,200

236,824 261,384 143,294 149,648 76,419 88,731 76,726 38,335

Opening new territory 41

Political landscape in the Xin and Later Han period With the finalization of administrative units within the Liang province during the reign of Emperor Xuan, the Former Han accomplished its large-scale migration and colonization of the northwest. The tension between the empire and its foreign rivals along the frontier was greatly reduced after the suppression of a Qiang rebellion in 61 BCE and the submission of Xiongnu Chanyu to the emperor in 51 BCE. As a line of defense, the pressure of the Liang province in general and the Hexi Corridor in particular was therefore lessened;105 it was followed by nearly five decades of relative stability. The Former Han military forces gradually retreated from some outposts along the northwest, and some fortifications were consequently left deserted.106 The administrative structure of Liang province did not change until Wang Mang came to power and launched a series of reforms to reshape the administrative geography of the empire. In 4 CE, Wang Mang divided the imperial realm into twelve provinces and renamed some of them in accordance with the records in the officially sanctioned canons such as the Shangshu (Classic of Document) and the Zhouli (Rites of Zhou). The Liang province was coalesced with the metropolitan area to form the Yong province. In 12 CE, Wang Mang redivided the provinces into nine and designated them with the names of the nine provinces in the classics.107 The territory of Liang province remained as part of the Yong province under the new division. The restructuring of administrative geography also went hand in hand with Wang Mang’s aggressive foreign policy. Shortly before the division of twelve provinces in 4 CE, Wang Mang forced some of the Qiang tribes to surrender their land adjacent to the Liang province and set up a new commandery called Xihai, literally West Sea. According to the Hanshu, Wang was eager to acquire the land and give it the name of Xihai since the Former Han empire already had the commanderies of Donghai (East Sea), Nanhai (South Sea), and Beihai (North Sea). As proof of his legitimacy of ruling all under heaven, Wang desperately pursued the completion of the “Four Seas” commanderies. The drama of the Qiang people submitting their land was presented as a testament to Wang Mang impressing the “barbarian” with majesty and benevolence.108 The new Xihai commandery was added to the Liang province and later became part of the Yong province. It also served as a depository of tens of thousands of convicts who committed offenses under Wang’s new law code; exiling criminals to the West Sea was itself an anecdote in the ancient classics.109 The Qiang, however, were in fact reluctant to give up their land and thus tried to retake it by force.110 In the meantime, Wang Mang broke up with the Xiongnu and therefore needed to deploy numerous soldiers and laborers along the northern and northwestern frontiers for a possible all-out confrontation. The Zhangye commandery served as one of the important depots for the planned campaigns.111 Needless to say, the mounting tension between the two sides stirred up instability in Liang province. In the last days of Wang Mang’s Xin dynasty, which lasted only fifteen years, the imperial order had already devolved into chaos. Various regional military

42

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strongmen rose to capitalize on the chaotic situation. Among the contenders, Wei Ao (d. 33 CE), Dou Rong (fl. 5–30s CE), and Lu Fang (fl. 10s–40s CE) wielded their power in or near the northwest frontier.112 Wei Ao was from a magnate family in Tianshui commandery and had been serving a range of government offices since his youth. When the Xin dynasty was in turmoil, a paternal uncle of Wei Ao gathered clansmen and other local headmen to raise a rebel army. Famous for his stratagems, Wei Ao earned wide support to be the leader and quickly became the strongest power in the Liang province.113 When Emperor Guangwu of the Later Han started to extend to the west, he tried to appease Wei at first by showering him with lavish honors and acknowledging him as the supreme commander of the west.114 The honeymoon period, however, did not last long, since Wei was inclined to be the master himself rather than to join the Later Han’s unification project. On the other hand, Emperor Guangwu would not allow the Liang province, as a Former Han territory, to break away from his “restored” Han dynasty. Conflicts between the two sides were unavoidable. To defeat Wei Ao, the emperor needed to have Dou Rong as his ally. The Liang province was in fact partitioned between Wei Ao and Dou Rong during the civil war. While Wei based his power in the southern part, Dou controlled the Hexi Corridor. Although a native of the Fufeng commandery – a part of the Former Han metropolitan area – Dou Rong had a very close relationship with the northwest and inherited a solid power base in the Hexi Corridor, since two of his family members had been grand administrators of commanderies in the Liang province and one had been military officer supervising the Qiang in the region. In addition, Dou himself was the commandant of the Zhangye Dependent State (Zhangye shuguo duwei) under the Xin dynasty. With such a distinguished family background, Dou Rong maintained a rich network with senior officials, local leaders, and the Qiang tribal chieftains in the Hexi Corridor, and consequently assumed leadership in the region during the chaotic period.115 He ruled the Hexi region for fifteen years and entitled himself the Great General of the Five Commanderies of Hexi. Different from Wei Ao, Dou Rong was willing to follow Emperor Guangwu, which led to different fates for the two men. Dou Rong submitted to the Later Han dynasty and made crucial contributions in the final conquest of Wei Ao’s regime. Dou therefore received great honors and a high position from the imperial court, and his family would become one of the most influential consort families in Later Han history. While Dou Rong and Wei Ao were locked in conflict over the question of allegiance to the Later Han dynasty, there was another contender from the Liang province. He was Lu Fang, a native of the Anding commandery.116 According to the standard histories, which undoubtedly took the side of the Later Han, Lu Fang was an imposter who gathered followers around him on the claim that he was a descendent of Emperor Wu. Partly due to his frontier origin, Lu established a very close relationship with the Xiongnu, the Qiang, and other “barbarian” groups. Later, Lu Fang proclaimed himself emperor of Han under the auspices of the Xiongnu and collaborated with the steppe power in harrying along the Later Han’s northern and northwestern frontiers.117 When Emperor Guangwu consolidated his

Opening new territory 43 governance over the empire, Lu Fang gave up any hope of pursuing his own emperorship but sought asylum in the Xiongnu, where he stayed over a decade until his death. The death of Wei Ao and Lu Fang and the submission of Dou Rong marked the full incorporation of the northwest into the newly formed Later Han dynasty. In its early years, the Later Han state adopted the regional administrative division of the Former Han. The Liang province officially restored its name and status as a toplevel regional administrative unit.118 It was during the reign of Emperor Xian (r. 190–220 CE), the last sovereign of the Han, who was installed by Dong Zhuo, that the Liang province as an administrative unit was once again abolished. In 194 CE, rebels occupied the southern part of the Liang province. With the area now out of imperial control, the Later Han state separated the Hexi commanderies, including Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan, Dunhuang, and Xihai, from the Liang province, putting them under a new Yong province and leaving the Liang province with only the old commanderies. Later in 213 CE, Chancellor Cao Cao (155–220 CE), who was then the de facto ruler controlling Emperor Xian, initiated a program of redividing the whole empire into nine provinces. Although Cao Cao could only control the northern part of the empire, and the effect of his reform was limited, the Liang province as a name was removed and its territory were incorporated into the Yong province. The nominal abolition of Liang province was also Cao Cao’s attempt to dilute its regional identity after he defeated a coalition of northwestern military strongmen in 211 CE and managed to establish a strong foothold in the region. It was not until 215 CE that Cao Cao finally destroyed the last of his rivals and further consolidated his sphere in the region. But neither Cao Cao nor his successors succeeded in controlling the whole northwestern region, which remained for most of the time divided among various regimes in the following centuries.119 During the Later Han times, the northwest frontier still served the same important military function as in the Former Han dynasty. As a result of Wang Mang’s provocative foreign policy, the whole northern and northwestern frontiers, as well as the Western Regions, were once again the frontline of military confrontations between the empire and the Xiongnu in the early years of the Later Han. The Liang province was part of an imperial defensive line in general and a depot for expeditions against the Xiongnu to the northwest in particular. It also served as an artery connecting the imperial center and the Western Regions. As the struggle between the Later Han and the Xiongnu over the control of the Western Regions grew fierce, the Liang province took up the role of supplying manpower and other resources for the maintenance of the Han military presence in Central Asia. Follwing the usual practice of the Former Han, soldiers, convicts, laborers, and their families were sent, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the northwest. The military atmosphere was further heightened by the devastating wars between the Later Han and the Qiang people since the middle period of the dynasty, which turning the southern part of the Liang province into a battlefield. When the Qiang gained the upper hand, the Later Han state evacuated its officials and subjects from the war-ridden area and left the southern Liang province at the mercy of its enemies. The Liang province consequently devolved into chaos in the last decades of the

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Later Han and was one of the first regions to resist the authority of the imperial center. Ambitious military strongmen like Dong Zhuo capitalized on the complicated situation to build his power and finally took control of the imperial court and triggered the disintegration of the Later Han empire. Different from the Former Han times, the Laing province or the northwest frontier was often in turmoil during the Later Han period. The administrative divisions and population also underwent sea changes. The “Treatise on Commandery and Fief-state” (Junguo zhi) of the Hou Hanshu kept data of population of the 140 CE census and the information of the administrative units across the empire.120 The general statistical figures of the administrative geography and demography of the Liang province in the middle period of Later Han appear in Table 2.3. The province of Liang in the times of the Later Han consisted of twelve administrative units: ten commanderies and two dependent states. Needless to say, the population and household numbers only refer to those on the government register, like the 2 CE data mentioned above. Even the numbers of the two dependent states did not contain all of the surrendered “barbarians” in their jurisdiction, not to mention those not registered by the state. Moreover, the treatise does not fully reflect the actual situation in the Liang province in 140 CE. For example, under the threats of the Qiang, the commanderies of Anding and Beidi moved inland in 111 CE, moved back in 129 CE, and moved inland again in 140 CE. This kind of oscillation and other changes in administrative structure are not mentioned in the Treatise, which only provides “the situation of the empire at its greatest extent – even if it entails anachronisms.”121 By comparing the population data of 140 CE with those of 2 CE (see Table 2.4), one may take note of the demographic changes over the one century of the Later Han northwestern region.122 From the table above, that the Liang province lost 1,100,000 registered population in the Later Han times catches one’s attention. Among the twelve Table 2.3 Population data of northwestern commanderies in 140 CE

Longxi Hanyang (formerly Tianshui, name changed in 74 CE) Wudu Jincheng Anding Beidi Wuwei Zhangye Jiuquan Dunhuang Zhangye Shuguo Zhangye Juyan Shuguo

Number of counties

Number of households

Population

11 13

5,628 27,423

29,637 130,138

7 10 8 6 14 8 9 6 5 1

20,102 3,858 6,094 3,122 10,042 6,552 2,706 748 4,656 1,560

81,728 8,947 29,060 18,637 34,260 26,040 – 29,170 16,952 4,733

Opening new territory 45 Table 2.4 Comparison of the two sets of data Former Han

Longxi Tianshui/ Hanyang Anding Jincheng Wuwei Zhangye Jiuquan Dunhuang Wudu Beidi Zhangye Shuguo Zhangye Juyan Shuguo Total

Later Han

Counties Households

Population Counties Households

Population

11 16

53,964 60,370

236,824 261,384

11 13

5,628 27,423

29,637 130,138

21 13 10 10 9 6 – – –

42,725 38,470 17,581 24,352 8,137 11,200 – – –

143,294 149,648 76,419 88,731 76,726 38,335 – – –

8 10 14 8 9 6 7 6 5

6,094 3,858 10,042 6,552 2,706 748 20,102 3,122 4,656

29,060 8,947 34,260 26,040 – 29,170 81,728 18,637 16,952

–

–

1

1,560

4,733

Household 362,636

–

Population Household 1,517,573 92,491

Population 409,302

administrative units of the Later Han Liang province, the commanderies of Wudu and Beidi were newly added from the neighboring Yi province and Bing province, respectively, and the two dependent states were newly established at the northwestern tip of the province. For those “old” commanderies that existed in the Former Han period, there was a drastic drop in population, especially in the southern portion of the province. The commanderies of Longxi, Tianshu/ Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng suffered tremendous population loss; the county numbers of Tianshu/Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng also decreased, with Anding experiencing the most drastic decline. Those once-populated areas became numerically sparsely populated. The main factor contributing to such changes was the Qiang Wars. It went without saying that large numbers of people took advantage of the chaotic situation of fleeing the war-torn region to hide away and erase themselves from the taxpayer roster. In addition, the incessant chaos caused heavy death toll. Along with the tremendous loss of registered population, state control of the affected area diminished. In contrast, a large number of Qiang people and other “barbarians” who had previously lived along the borders rushed into Liang province, occupying the southern portion in particular. The massive influx of non-Han peoples finally resulted in their overwhelming population in Guanzhong, leading to the ensuing chaotic situation of the area in the period after the fall of the Later Han.123 This chapter outlines the salient features of the natural geography and administrative geography of the northwestern region, corresponding roughly to the Liang province in the Han dynasties, and touches upon the militarized nature

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and multi-ethnic characteristics of the frontier society. Against this backdrop, the next chapter will examine how the friction between the northwestern frontier and the imperial center grew and intensified and finally threatened the stability of the empire.

Notes 1 The expeditions of Zhang Qian were praised in traditional histories as zao kong, literally carving out space, as a feat of opening the contacts between the Han empire and its Central Asian neighbors, with the assumption that there had been no communication at all between the Han empire and the outside world before his time. Recent archaeological studies, however, have provided abundant evidence of various kinds of exchanges between China and Central Asia centuries before the Former Han. For the latest research by Chinese archaeologists showing the connection across Eurasia before Zhang Qian, see Yang Jianhua, Shao Huiqiu, and Pan Ling, Ouya caoyuan dongbu de jinshu zhilu: sichouzhilu yu xiongnu lianmeng de yunyu guocheng (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2017); for an updated discussion of the multilayered cultural exchanges between the east and the west across Eurasia before and during Zhang Qian’s times, see the papers in the volume edited by Berit Hildebrandt, Silk: Trade and Exchange Along the Silk Roads Between Rome and China in Antiquity (Barnsley: Oxbow Books, 2017). 2 On the war and peace between the Former Han and Xiongnu, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, pp. 206–52; Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume 1, pp. 161–84; Sophia-Karin Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (I),” Monumenta Serica 51 (2003): 55–236. 3 As Sophia-Karin Psarras points out in her article, “Yuezhi” is the uniform Western pronunciation, given in Chinese as “Rouzhi” or “Ruzhi,” reading Yue as Rou. I follow her practice and adopt Western convention in this work. See Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (I),” p. 74. Also, for the origins and history of the Yuezhi, see Craig Benjamin, “The Origin of the Yuezhi,” in Craig Benjamin and Samuel N.C. Lieu eds., Walls and Frontiers in Inner Asian History (Sydney: Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, 2002), pp. 101–30. 4 “Chanyu” is the transcription for the title of the supreme leader of the Xiongnu confederacy. Most English-language literature adopt the term “Shanyu.” In fact, according to the ancient Chinese lexicon Guangyu, Chanyu is preferable to Shanyu. For the explanation of this title, see Edwin G. Pulleyblank, “The Hsiung-nu Language,” Asia Major (New Series) IX.2 (1963): 256; Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (I),” 127–8. 5 Sima Qian, comp., Shiji (hereafter SJ ) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), 123:3157. 6 For a recent and comprehensive overview of the development of the province (zhou) as an administrative unit in the Han dynasties and the extension of its function, see Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 167–243; Zhou Changshan, Handai difang zhengzhishi lun: dui junxian zhidu ruogan wenti de kaocha (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006), pp. 76–93; Xin Deyong, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” in his Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009), pp. 93–177. Different from the traditional views, Xin Deyong proposes a new explanation that the province system and the inspectoral jurisdictions were two separate institutions, and not until the last decades of the Former Han did the two systems merge. 7 Fang Xuanling et al., comp., Jinshu (hereafter JS) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 14:432.

Opening new territory 47 8 Justin Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northern Territory and Development in Early Twentieth-Century China (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 1. 9 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, pp. xxx, 14–17. For a comprehensive overview of the geo-strategic importance of the northwestern region in Chinese history from antiquity to the first half of the twentieth century, see Du Wenyu ed., Xibei Diqu Lidai Diyuan Zhengzhi Bianqian Yanjiu (Beijing: Kexue Chubanshe, 2015), Chapters 1–7. 10 Li Xiaocong, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2004), p. 10. Tighe has also pointed out that “Exactly what the term Northwest included was imperative. Different writers and users of the term intended different spatial meanings.” See Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan, p. 92. 11 The northwestern provinces of the People’s Republic of China generally refer to Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xingjiang. See Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, p. 10. 12 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, p. 11. 13 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, pp. 13–15. 14 Shi Nianhai, “Huangtu gaoyuan jiqi nonglinmu fenbu diqu de bianqian,” in idem ed., Huangtu gaoyuan lishi dili yanjiu (Zhengzhou: Huanghe shuili chubanshe, 2001), pp. 386–91. 15 The contenders of conflicts over land resources in this zone cannot be easily placed in the conventional and yet questionable dichotomy between Inner Asian pastoral nomads from the steppes and sedentary Chinese farmers, as those pastoralists were not necessarily nomads, nor did they all come from the Inner Asian steppes. In fact, in order to adapt to the natural conditions, most people of this sector practiced a mixed economy with various degree of reliance on agriculture and animal breeding. For the pastoralists, pastoralism was the predominant economic activity, but agriculture was still carried out in a secondary and supplementary capacity. On the other hand, farmers also practiced animal husbandry to a certain extent. Conflicts between the two groups were mainly caused by farmers’ encroachment, usually under state sponsorship, on the grazing lands and attempts to turn them into arable lands. For the definitions and classifications of nomadism and pastoralism, see Anatoly M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World. Julia Crookenden trans. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), pp. 15–25. 16 On the natural landscape of this area, see Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, pp. 163–8. 17 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, pp. 13–15. 18 Ban Gu, comp. Hanshu (hereafter HS) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 28B:1645. 19 Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, pp. 163–8. 20 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, pp. 18–21. 21 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, pp. 26–8. 22 For a general survey of the Northern Zone in Chinese history at the dawn of the imperial age, see Nicola Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” in Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 885–966; Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, pp. 44–90. A recent and comprehensive English-language archaeological research on the Northern Zone in prehistory is Gideon Shelach, Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China: Archaeological Perspectives on Identity Formation and Economic Change During the First Millennium BCE (London: Equinox Publishing Ltd, 2009). The latest Chinese archaeological studies on the subject, stretching from prehistoric times to the Former Han dynasty, include Yang Jianhua, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2004); Han Jinqiu, Xia Shang Xizhou zhongyuan de beifang xi qingtongqi yanjiu (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2015); Jiang Lu, Beifang diqu hanmu

48

23 24 25 26

27 28

29

30 31

32 33 34 35

36

37 38 39

Opening new territory de kaoguxue yanjiu (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2016); Yang et al., Ouya caoyuan dongbu de jinshu zhilu. Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” pp. 885–8. For a detailed analysis of the territorial extent of the Northern Zone, see Yang, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng, pp. 8–95. Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” p. 886. Lipman, Familiar Strangers, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv, 14 and 221. For details, see Emma C. Bunker, Nomadic Art of the Eastern Eurasian Steppes: The Eugene V. Thaw and Other New York Collections (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2002), pp. 24–9; Yang, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng, pp. 8–62; Han, Xia Shang Xizhou zhongyuan de beifang xi qingtongqi yanjiu, pp. 60–1, 66–8, 185–6. Han, Xia Shang Xizhou zhongyuan de beifang xi qingtongqi yanjiu, Chapters 1–4. War chariots, according to some scholars, were also imported from Central Asia to China via the northwest region. See Edward L. Shaughnessy, “Historical Perspective on the Introduction of the Chariot Into China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 48 (1988): 189–237; Anthony J. Barbieri-Low, “Wheeled Vehicles in the Chinese Bronze Age, c. 2000–741 B.C.” Sino-Platonic Papers 99 (2000); Wu Hsiao-yun, Chariots in Early China: Origins, Cultural Interactions, and Identity (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2013). The dates listed here are generally adopted in Chinese scholarship, whereas Shelach in Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China, p. 19, proposes a different set of dates, with the Majiayao culture ranging between 5800–4000 BCE and the Qijia culture 2100–1800 BCE. Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, p. 59. For the view that the Late Neolithic northwest hosted the earliest metal producing cultures in China, see Gideon Shelach-Lavi, The Archaeology of Early China: From Prehistory to the Han Dynasty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 146; Christoph Baumer, The History of Central Asia, Volume One: The Age of the Steppe Warriors (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 122–3; Han, Xia Shang Xizhou zhongyuan de beifang xi qingtongqi yanjiu, pp. 60–1. Han, Xia Shang Xizhou zhongyuan de beifang xi qingtongqi yanjiu, pp. 67–8, 185–6. Shelach-Lavi, The Archaeology of Early China, p. 237. Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 918. Yong Jichun, Longyou lishi wenhua yu dili yanjiu (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2009), p. 97. However, Shelach suggests that climate change as a factor contributing to the socio-economic change in the Northern Zone is not as important as past scholarship has led us to believe; see his Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China, pp. 62–8. Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, p. 60. On the relationship between climate change and the development of pastoralism in ancient North China, see Han Maoli, “Lun Zhongguo beifang xumuye chansheng yu huanjing de hudong guanxi,” in Hou Renzhi and Deng hui eds., Zhongguo beifang ganhan banganhan diqu lishi shiqi huanjing bianqian yanjiu wenji (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2006), pp. 294–303. Yong, Longyou lishi wenhua yu dili yanjiu, p. 97. Han, Xia Shang Xizhou zhongyuan de beifang xi qingtongqi yanjiu, p. 68. In the Shang oracle bone inscriptions, rival peoples against the Shang are usually referred to as fang 方, which means country or tribe, preceded by a character probably indicating their ethnic name. See Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” pp. 907–8. These peoples were probably not pastoral nomads but pastorals practicing farming. For a specific study of the mixed economy of the Guifang, see Tang Xiaofeng, “Guifang: Yin Zhou shidai beifang de nongmu hunhe zuqun,” in Zhongguo beifang ganhan banganhan diqu lishi shiqi huanjing bianqian yanjiu wenji, pp. 263–70.

Opening new territory 49 40 The relationship between the Xianyun and Quan Rong has long been a debated topic among scholars. In recent research, Li Feng suggested that the name Quan Rong was a term used in the later texts to refer to the same people who were called Xianyun in the Western Zhou sources. In short, Quanrong and Xianyun were the same group of people, and they were also called the Western Rong since they were located to the northwest of the Zhou. The term “Rong” has a much broader meaning, as it covers many hostile groups beyond the frontiers of the Western Zhou state. See Li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China: The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045–771 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 142–5 and 343–6. 41 For the gradual decline of the Zhou’s power in the area as revealed in archaeological evidence, see Du, Xibei Diqu Lidai Diyuan Zhengzhi Bianqian Yanjiu, pp. 24–5. 42 On the Zhou-Rong relations in war and peace, see Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, especially Chapter 3. 43 Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, p. 176. 44 Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, p. 187. 45 Catacomb tombs, for example, as a tomb form different from that of the Zhou, are commonly seen in the Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures of the western fringe of the Zhou domain, such as Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai, and hence yield evidence of the existence of alien cultures along the Zhou’s northwestern frontier. See Lothar von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000–250 BC) (Los Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology at UCLA, 2006), p. 207. 46 In traditional historical sources like the Shiji, the Qin leader is said to be entrusted by the new Zhou king as the custodian of the royal domain that fell into the hands of the Rong people. But the reliability of such a record is disputed by modern scholars and is now believed to have been fabricated by the Qin rulers to legitimize their possession of the region. See Li Feng, “A Study of the Bronze Vessels and Sacrificial Remains,” in Edward L. Shaughnessy ed., Imprints of Kinship: Studies of Recently Discovered Bronze Inscriptions From Ancient China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2017), p. 221. 47 Discussion on the relationship between the Rong and Qin peoples tends to raise the question of the ethnic origins of the Qin people, which has long been a controversial topic in the studies of early China. Some scholars traced the origin of Qin to the Western Rong, while others argued that the Qin people were originally from eastern China. For recent discussions on the subject, see Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, pp. 262–78; von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000–250 BC), pp. 213–43; Martin Kern, The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-Huang: Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Imperial Representation (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2000), pp. 59–105; Shelach and Pines, “Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local Identity,” pp. 202–30; Teng Mingyu, Qin wenhua: cong fengguo dao diguo de kaoguxue guancha (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2002); Teng, “From Vassal State to Empire: An Archaeological Examination of Qin Culture,” pp. 71–112; Zhao Huacheng, translated by Andrew H. Miller, “New Explorations of Early Qin Culture,” in Pines et al. eds., Birth of an Empire, pp. 53–70. 48 SJ, 5: 177–8. 49 For details, see SJ, 5: 173–221. 50 Li, “A Study of the Bronze Vessels and Sacrificial Remains,” pp. 229–30. 51 According to some archaeologists, people of the Xindian culture were forced to retreat to the Huang River valley, the sphere of the Kayue culture, under the pressure of the aggressive Qin. The consequences were the coalescence of the Xindian and Kayue cultures and the intensification of cultural confrontations between the Qin and the Qiang or proto-Qiang people. Archaeologists also suggest that the Qin influence reached as far as the eastern Hexi Corridor, as Zhou-Qin-style pottery has been

50

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54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

Opening new territory found at the sites of the non-Qin Shajing culture, whose chronology is probably later than the Xindian and partly overlapping with the Kayue. See Li Shuicheng, “Huaxia bianyuan yu wenhua hudong: yi changcheng yanxian xiduan de taoge weili,” in his Dongfeng xijian: Zhongguo xibei shiqian wenhua zhi jincheng (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2009), pp. 176–99. von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000–250 BC), p. 409. The commandery-county system was a product of long-term development between the eighth and third centuries BCE and was generally implemented during the Warring States period. When Qin established a centralized empire in 221 BCE, the system was employed to structure the whole empire. It was inherited by the Han dynasties with minor adjustments and thereafter became the core format of regional and local government units in imperial China. Xian (county) as a level of local district still exists in China today. There are many scholarly works in Chinese and Japanese on the origins and development of the commandery-county system from the pre-imperial to the Qin-Han times. It will suffice to name a few here. The most classic and comprehensive study is Yan Gengwang, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi: Qin Han difang xingzheng zhidu (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1961). A detailed study in Japanese is Kimura Masao, Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei: Toku ni sono seiritsu no kiso jōken (Tōkyō: Hikaku Bunka Kenkyūjo, 2003), pp. 221–44 are especially devoted to the commanderies of the Liang province. Both Yan and Kimura base their research mainly on transmitted texts, but for recent studies taking account of new archaeological discoveries, see Fujita Katsuhiso, Chūgoku kodai kokka to gunken shakai (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2005), which makes use of many recently released wooden and bamboo slips, and Shimoda Makoto, Chūgoku kodai kokka no keisei to seidō heiki (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2008), which uses bronze weapons as historical evidence to examine the development of commanderies in the Warring States period. For a general study in English-language on the subject, see Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Chapter 3. For the latest examinations on the Qin commanderies and counties, see Hou Xiaorong, Qindai zhengqu dili (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009); Xin Deyong, “Qin Shihuang sanshiliu jun xinkao,” in Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu, pp. 3–92. SJ, 5: 182. SJ, 5: 185–95. SJ, 110: 2885. On the establishment and functions of Neishi, see Kudō, Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no kokka to shakai, pp. 21–56. For the history of the two counties, see Hou, Qindai zhengqu dili, pp. 133–4 and 137–8. HS, 7A: 742. For the dao system in the Qin-Han dynasties, see Kudō, Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no kokka to shakai, pp. 85–118. For the history of these districts, see Hou, Qindai zhengqu dili, pp. 149–77; Wang Shoukuan, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2009), pp. 21–7. Meanwhile, the territory of Beidi commandery also greatly extended northward as the result of expelling the Xiongnu from the Ordos region. For the history of building long walls in the Warring States period and the Qin dynasty, see Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 13–29; Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, pp. 138–58. On the archaeological examination of the Qin walls, see Xu Pingfang, translated by Taotao Huang and John Moffett, “The Archaeology of the Great Wall of the Qin and Han Dynasties,” Journal of East Asian Archaeology 3.1–2

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63 64 65

66

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68

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73 74 75 76

(2002): 259–81. Alternatively, the Chinese historian Xin Deyong suggests a new perspective to locate certain spots of the Qin and Han long walls along the northern frontier. See Xin, “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi,” in his Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu, pp. 181–255. HS, 96A: 3872–3. Xin, “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi,” pp. 181–255; Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, pp. 138–58. Some sources say that Meng Tian’s army numbered as many as 300,000 troops, but other sources provide a much smaller number of 100,000. For the counting of the numbers, see Xin, “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi,” p. 202. For the strategic importance of the Ordos region in Chinese history, see Waldron, The Great Wall of China, pp. 61–71. In fact, the wall marked not only the physical territorial demarcation of the Qin empire but also the formation of Chinese identity. For further analysis of this point, see Paul R. Goldin, “Steppe Nomads as a Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” in Paula L.W. Sabloff ed., Mapping Mongolia: Situating Mongolia in the World From Geologic Time to the Present (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2011), pp. 220–46. For the early Former Han’s conflicts with the Xiongnu along the northern frontiers, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, pp. 206–27; Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume 1, pp. 135–59; Jonathan Markley, “Gaozu Confronts the Shanyu: The Han Dynasty’s First Clash With the Xiongnu,” in Benjamin and Lieu eds., Walls and Frontiers in Inner Asian History, pp. 131–40. According to the Shiji, the Xiongnu recaptured the lost territories south of the Yellow River loop and pushed the boundaries back to the former boundary/line of fortifications (gusai) of the Qin, see SJ, 110: 2887–8. Xin Deyong suggests that the former fortifications refer to the line of long walls built by King Zhaoxiang; see his “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi,” pp. 200–55. For studies of the Han tombs found in the area, see Jiang, Beifang diqu hanmu de kaoguxue yanjiu, pp. 171–3. The Xiongnu divided their realm into three sectors: the Chanyu court in the central, the Left King’s domain in the east, and the Right King’s domain in the west. See SJ, 110: 2891 and HS, 94A: 3751. On the Xiongnu political structure, see Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757 (Cambridge, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 36–41. HS, 49: 2278. On the geographical definition of Guanzhong area, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” pp. 112–19. For the geographical definition of the two areas, see Fu Lecheng, “Handai de Shandong yu Shanxi,” in his Han Tang shilunji (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1977), pp. 65–80; Hsing I-tien, “Shishi Handai de Guandong, Guanshi yu Shandong, Shanxi,” in idem, Zhiguo anbang: fazhi, xing heng yu junshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), pp. 180–210. On the co-existence of the commandery-county system and enfeoffed kingdoms and fiefs in the Han times, see Yan, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi, pp. 10–30 and 35–57. Goi Naohiro has conducted a detailed analysis of the geographical distribution of the Former Han kingdoms and fiefs of marquis. See Goi Naohiro, “Chūgoku kodai teikoku no ichi seikaku,” in his Kandai no gōzoku shakai to kokka, pp. 51–70. The commanderies of Tianshui and Anding were established in 114 BCE by extracting some lands from Longxi and Beidi. Besides martial skill, good family background without criminal records was a crucial criterion of recruiting elite cavalry or even ordinary cavalry in the Former Han times. Families of agrarian tradition and/or officer background were the most favorable. Physicians, merchants, and artisans were excluded from the list. See HS, 28B: 1644.

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81 82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

92 93 94 95 96

Opening new territory A sound financial base was also essential, as the cavalry had to be responsible for their own horses and equipment. For a detailed analysis of the eligibility of the Han cavalrymen, see Takamura Takeyuki, Kandai no chihō kanri to chiiki shakai (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2008), pp. 57–87. HS, 28B: 1644. Hsing I-tien suggests in an article that the emperor personally participated in the operation. See Hsing I-tien, “Han Wudi zai Mayi zhiyi zhong de juese,” in his Tianxia yijia, pp. 136–59. HS, 110: 2905–9. As Michael Loewe points out, “the stages of the Han advance can hardly be explained as an ordered and systematic process, planned as coordinated measures to extend the scope of Han authority. We cannot expect evidence of a scheme for founding commanderies, whose centers were deliberately and logically placed so as to exercise the maximum degree of strategic and administrative considerations. Rather must the process be regarded as one of exploration and improvisation.” See Loewe, Records of Han Administration, Volume 1, p. 58. SJ, 110: 2909. But it also caused an atmosphere of laxity among the local officials of the northwestern commanderies and the Ordos region. Hence, when Emperor Wu proceeded on a tour of inspection to the Longxi commandery, the governor killed himself as he had not prepared the meal for the emperor’s entourage. The emperor then proceeded north and found that there was no sentry in the Ordos region. The governor of Beidi commandery and his subordinates were subsequently executed for their dereliction of duty. See SJ, 30: 1438. SJ, 123: 3168; HS, 96B: 3902. HS, 61: 2691–2. SJ, 123: 3169. SJ, 123: 3169–70. HHS, 87: 2876. SJ, 30: 1438–9. For a detailed analysis on the process of colonization and administrative establishment on the northwestern frontier, see Yūichi Ikeda, Chūgoku kodai no juraku to chihō gyōsei (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2002), pp. 272–336 and 381–406. SJ, 30: 1425. In the early years of the Former Han dynasty, an official named Chao Cuo (d. 155 BCE) put forwarded a proposal of encouraging people to move to the northern frontier with an accommodation policy of building settlements for the migrants and their families to stay. The proposal was accepted and implemented – though not many details were left. Chao’s plan was the precedent for setting up frontier colonies/ settlements for state-sanctioned migrants. See HS, 49: 2283–9. SJ, 30: 1421–8. For the harsh climate and environment in the northwest and their impact on the inhabitants’ everyday life, see Wang Zijin, Hanjian Hexi Shehui Shiliao Yanjiu (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2017), pp. 20–45. I borrow the term “expansive colonization policy” from Peter C. Perdue, “From Turfan to Taiwan: Trade and War on Two Chinese Frontiers,” in Paker and Rodseth, Untaming the Frontier in Anthropology, Archaeology, and History, p. 40. For the classification of financial/fiscal and military geographies, see Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, p. 125. The Dependent State was an institution that the Han government employed to settle surrendered alien people. See Liu Pakyuen, “Lun Handai xizhi bianjiang minzu yu saini zhi zhengce,” in Jilindaxue gujiyanjiusuo ed., “1–6 Shiji Zhongguo beifang bianjiang, minzu, shehui guoji xueshu yantaohui” lunwenji (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2008), pp. 62–85; Rafe de Crespigny, A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (23–220 AD) (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 1229.

Opening new territory 53 97 Beidi was at first under the Shuofang inspectoral region and returned to the Liang province during the Later Han times. 98 There was also a mobile population known as ke (guest/visitor). Members of this group were not registered, but their presence and activities in the northwest, especially the Hexi Corridor, were frequently mentioned in the unearthed documents. See Wang, Hanjian Hexi Shehui Shiliao Yanjiu, pp. 68–82. 99 For a detailed examination on the expansionist policy during the reigns of the two emperors, see Michael Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China 104 BC to AD 9 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd), pp. 211–51. 100 HS, 28A and B: 1543–640. For research on the 2 CE population census, see Hans Bielenstein, “The Census of China During the Period 2–742 A.D,” BMFEA 19 (1947): 125–63, and Lao Kan, “Population and Geography in the Two Han Dynasties,” in Sun and de Francis, Chinese Social History, 83–102; Ge Jianxiong, Zhongguo renkoushi v.1 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2002), pp. 311–95 and 479–93. 101 HS, 28B: 1610–15. 102 Wang, Hanjian Hexi Shehui Shiliao Yanjiu, pp. 68–82. 103 SJ, 110: 1912. 104 The “Treatise of Geography” lists all the number and names of counties and number of registered households and population under each entry of commandery, and according to both textual and archaeological sources, there were boundary stones within and/or between commanderies of the Han empires to serve as markers of the boundaries of jurisdictions and especially the taxable areas. A case study of boundary stones in the Former Han dynasty can been seen in Satake Yasuhiko, Chūgoku kodai no densei to yūsei (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), pp. 417–43. On the other hand, the texts do not clearly indicate the territorial limits of the empire – when the territorial boundaries of the empire as a whole are mentioned, it is generally described in vague terms such as noting the farthest extent of a region or referring to some topographical features. The contrast in details might reveal that the empire was thought of in terms of the peoples that were subject to imperial rule rather than as a territorial entity. Population census and household registration were thus important means of imperial governance, as through them the imperial state could control the mobility of its subject and know who the potential soldiers and taxpayers were and where they could be found. Hence, the boundaries of the empire demarcated not territories but the people who were subjects of the state. This might also help to explain why the Later Han state was inclined to give up readily the northwestern territories but pulled the officials and registered households out of the area when the Qiang Wars seemed to be uncontrollable. For the different perspectives between territorial state and jurisdiction state, see Sahlins, Boundaries, pp. 6–7. 105 For the submission of the Xiongnu Chanyu, see Ellis Tinios, “‘Loose Rein’” in Han Relations With Foreign Peoples” (Department of East Asian Studies, University of Leeds, 2000); Sophia-Karin Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (II),” Monumenta Serica 52 (2004): 37–42. For the alleviation of military conflicts between the Former Han and the Xiongnu along the northwestern borders, see Takamura, Kandai no chihō kanri to chiiki shakai, pp. 344–79. 106 Takamura, Kandai no chihō kanri to chiiki shakai, pp. 344–79. 107 For Wang Mang’s reforms of regional administrative units, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” pp. 144–61. For general studies on Wang Mang’s classicsorientated reforms, see Dubs, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, Volume Three, pp. 506–36; Hans Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the Restoration of the Han Dynasty, and Later Han,” in CHOC v. 1, pp. 223–90; Michael Puett, “Centering the Realm: Wang Mang, the Zhouli, and Early Chinese Statecraft,” in Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern eds., Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian History (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 129–54. A biography of Wang Mang in English is Rudi Thomsen, Ambition and Confucianism: A Biography of Wang Mang (Aarhus:

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109 110 111 112

113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120

121 122 123

Opening new territory Aarhus University Press, 1988), and in Japanese is Higashi Shiji, Ō Mō: juka no risō ni tsukareta otoko (Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2003). HS, 99A: 4077. Wang Mang was indeed completely obsessed with the nomenclature of the administrative unit as an integral part of his classics-oriented blueprint of the ideal world. As a result, the names of not only provinces but also of most commanderies and counties were subjected to frequent changes, which finally threw the administrative system into chaos. For details, see HS, 99B: 4136–7. HS, 99A: 4077–8. HS, 99A: 4087. HS, 99B: 4121. For the history of the regimes of Wei Ao, Dou Rong, and Lu Fang during the Wang Mang interregnum and the early Later Han period, see Kano Naosada, Gokan seijishi no kenkyū (Kyōto: Dōhōsha, 1993), pp. 34–41 and 124–40; Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 101–4; Ukai Masao, translated by He Shuangquan,“Jianwu chuqi Hexi diqu de zhengzhi dongxiang: ‘Hou Hanshu Dou Rong zhuan’ buyi,” in Xibei shifan daxue lishixi and Gansusheng wenwu kaogu yanjiusuo eds., Jianduxue yanjiu vol. 2 (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2009), pp. 227–32. HHS, 13: 513–14. HHS, 13: 522. HHS, 23: 795–7. HHS, 12: 505. HHS, 12: 506. For the development of the province system in the Later Han period, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” pp. 162–76; Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 244–71. Wicky W.K. Tse, “Fabricating Legitimacy in a Peripheral Regime: Imperial Loyalism and Regionalism in the Northwestern Borderlands under the Rule of the Former Liang (301–376),” Early Medieval China 24 (forthcoming). HHS, 19–23: 3385–533. On the Later Han population, see Bielenstein, “The Census of China During the Period 2–742 A.D.,” pp. 125–63; Lao, “Population and Geography in the Two Han Dynasties,” pp. 83–102; Ge, Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, pp. 399–425 and 493–500. For a general survey of the Junguo zhi in a historiographical perspective, see Burchard J. Mansvelt-Beck, The Treatises of Later Han: Their Author, Sources, Contents and Place in Chinese Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 175–95. Mansvelt-Beck, The Treatises of Later Han, pp. 193–4. HHS, 23: 3516–21. de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, pp. 417–37.

3

Being peripheralized The northwesterners in the Later Han empire

In 167 CE, General Zhang Huan (104–181 CE) might have been relieved when his request to transfer his registered place of residence from the northwestern frontier to the interior of the empire was granted. Transference of registered residence from a frontier commandery to an inner one was prohibited according to the Later Han law code; it was only by his remarkable military feats did Zhang Huan earn an unprecedented imperial favor.1 Zhang Huan, whose style name (zi) was Ranming, was a native of the Yuanquan county in the Dunhuang commandery of the Liang province and was regarded as one of the three most celebrated generals of the Qiang Wars during the last decades of Later Han. He and two other fellowLiang generals, Huangfu Gui (104–171 CE), whose style name was Weiming, and Duan Jiong (d. 179 CE), whose style name was Jiming, were named by their contemporaries the “Brilliant Three of the Liang Province” (Liangzhou Sanming),2 which, in referring to the Chinese character ming (literally, bright or brilliant) found in all, paid tribute to their illustrious career. Even though he was a prominent figure of his native province, Zhang Huan was not willing to have his household registered in the Liang province. Instead, he was emboldened by his success in the suppression of the Qiang rebels to ask for the imperial favor of a transference to the Huayin county in the Hongnong commandery, near the Later Han capital.3 Later, when Duan Jiong assumed the position of the superintendent of the metropolitan region with the Hongnong commandery under his jurisdiction, he intended to move Zhang and his family back to Dunhuang as a way to settle his personal vendetta with Zhang Huan that dated from the Qiang Wars. Hearing about the plot, Zhang Huan missed no time to write a supplicating letter to Duan asking for mercy. Duan was so moved by Zhang’s words that, in the end, he spared him.4 This anecdote of Zhang Huan raises several questions pertaining to the subject of this study: Why did Zhang Huan want to register in an inner commandery instead of one in the frontier? What made such a senior military figure of the empire so desperate to stay in an inner commandery that he would humble himself in front of his enemy? What was the motivation behind this move? What advantage(s) would Zhang Huan and his family enjoy by being a registered resident of an inner commandery?

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The prohibition of transferring registered residence from the frontiers to the interior of the empire indicated the state effort of preventing any such potential movement, without which one could expect a large number of transferences. Furthermore, Duan Jiong’s means of revenge – to move Zhang Huan back to the Liang province, was intriguing, just as Zhang Huan’s plea for mercy revealed how desperate he was to save himself and his family from returning to the northwest frontier. Zhang Huan’s successful transference might be a unique case, but his desire to move was not exceptional. Some of his contemporaries in a similar situation to his might have wished the same. Zhang Huan’s story therefore provides us with a glimpse of the perception of the people living in the Later Han empire on the northwest frontier and the status of the frontier resident. Also, the very fact that the three famed generals in the Qiang Wars were all from the Liang province cannot be taken as a mere coincidence. It is compelling evidence of the military character of the northwestern frontier – the land tended to breed martial men. While the previous chapter focuses on the land, this chapter concentrates on the people. In the following sections, I shall first introduce the settlers and their descendants in the northwestern frontier during the two Han dynasties and the military nature of this frontier society. I shall then discuss the factors that changed the political status of the northwestern military elite in the Later Han period and analyze how the changes affected the relationship between the frontiersmen and the imperial center. Given the available historical sources, this study generally focuses more on the military elite than the common and usually nameless martial men of the region but, whenever possible, also covers the lives of this latter group since they formed on occasions their own military culture.5

Peopling a frontier As the preceding chapter has shown, quite a large portion of the Liang province came as the spoils of the northwestward expansion of the Qin and Han empires. Since the pre-imperial ages, the gradual territorial sprawl of the Huaxia into the northwest not only brought the various autochthonous peoples under the suzerainty of the Chinese regime but also sent substantial number of migrants from the east to the newly conquered territories. During this long course of development, waves of migrants, including soldiers, cashiered officials, political exiles, amnestied convicts,6 refugees, adventurers, and indentured laborers, as well as their families, moved to the frontier region and took up the roles of garrison soldiers, pioneers, and colonists. They thus constituted the backbone of the imperial projects of expansion into and consolidation of the region. Even after the tide of northwestward expansion ebbed, the Han state still kept up the flow of migrants. The influx of large number of settlers fundamentally changed the political, economic, cultural, and ethnic landscapes of the region. Meanwhile, the settlers were also deeply influenced by the environment and their autochthonous neighbors. To be sure, the settlers came from different places of origins with diversified social backgrounds and arrived in the northwest at different times. Nevertheless, after several generations they gradually took roots in the region and slowly fostered their own regional identities.

Being peripheralized 57 Based on the limited extant sources, we can roughly put the Qin-Han northwesterners into two categories as the elite and non-elite, based on their political status and family fortunes in the Qin-Han period. There was no strict division between the two groups, however, since the non-elite could climb up the social ladder and attain the place of the elite, just as the elite could, for various reasons, lose their privileged status. Needless to say, the sources available provide comparatively detailed stories of the elite but only sketchy information on the nonelite. I shall introduce in this chapter first the elite and then the non-elite. As for the autochthonous tribal peoples and others who were assimilated into them, they will be a topic for the next chapter. Jonathan Lipman characterizes the Chinese northwest in this way: “in harsh natural conditions, with potential enemies on all sides, none of the frontier peoples could have survived without a martial tradition, without both weapons and the skill to use them,” and so “such frontier zones often create communities in arms, ready to resort to the martial arts, men who sleep with their weapons close at hand.”7 Although Lipman is concerned with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, his description fits well with the northwest frontier of the Qin-Han times. In such a land of tough natural environment and incessant struggles between different peoples, one of the quickest and most common ways of making a name for oneself and achieving upward social mobility would be through military merit. In fact, even the Qin-Han state encouraged sanctioned militarization of the region as a means to strengthen territorial control, not to mention as a base for launching further expansion. Serving as the frontier between the Han and the Xiongnu and the strategic artery connecting the interior of the empire and Central Asia, the northwestern commanderies therefore were highly militarized. The Hanshu describes that the grand administrators of the region “all put military affairs as their top priority.”8 The Former Han empire not only repaired and strengthened the Qin long walls in the old commanderies but also extended the walls and set up dense defense networks in the newly founded Hexi commanderies.9 Not only the garrison soldiers but also other settlers and the autochthonous peoples were potential fighters. The prevalence of martial spirit and military preparedness became a custom of the region during the two Han dynasties. Zheng Tai’s speech, quoted in the first chapter, describes the Liang province as the seedbed of the strongest and fiercest soldiers of the empire, where even women and girls were accustomed to wielding weapons.10 A Han primer named Jijiu pian sets down in words the Later Han people’s impression of the northwest as the battlefront against the alien enemies: The strong crossbows of [the soldiers of] Jiuquan and Dunhuang, garrisoned along the frontier to guard against the Hu and the Qiang. Would they come together from near and afar to kill the king of the Rong, the realm of Han would prosper so that all under Heaven would enjoy peace.11 The Liang province, with its old and new commanderies, was designed as a bastion to protect the western flank of the Han empire. It went without saying that the martial spirit would be particularly prevalent among the people of the region. In fact, well before the reign of Emperor Wu,

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when the power of the Huaxia was still limited to the east bank of the Yellow River, some of the early settlers in the western commanderies, such as Longxi, Tianshui, and Beidi, were already famous for their skillful marksmanship and horsemanship. They established themselves as an important group of military elites, and they came to prosper with the imperial expansion under Emperor Wu and his successors. Their splendid military prowess enabled them to climb up the social and political ladder and attain an illustrious military career. As the “Treatise on Geography” of the Hanshu describes, Tianshui, Longxi . . . as well as Anding, Beidi, the Shang commandery, and Xihe, are all located near the Rong and the Di. [Their people] are in a state of war preparedness. They admire bravery and martial prowess, and pay the utmost attention to the skills of shooting and hunting. Therefore, the Odes of the Qin says . . . “The king mobilizes the troops, polishes our armors and weapons, and goes for campaigns with our sons.” When the Han rose, the sons of impeccable families from the six commanderies were selected and recruited to [the elite corps of] the Yulin and the Qimen. Their martial prowess made them officers, and many celebrated generals emerged among them.12 It is clear that valor and martial prowess were highly valued in the six commanderies along the northwest frontier of the Former Han dynasty: Longxi, Beidi, Tianshui, Anding, Shang, and Xihe. The military elite among them, known as liujun liangjiazi (the Sons of Impeccable Families from the Six Commanderies), were in particular a major provenience of the members of the imperial guards, namely, the Yulin and the Qimen, which produced many famous generals of the Former Han dynasty. As shown in the preceding chapter, the Qin-Han people commonly held a view on that the areas of Shanxi/Guanxi (the west of Mount Yao or the Hangu Pass) were known for martial prowess which produced military men whereas Shandong/Guandong (the east of Mount Yao or the Hangu Pass) was famous for refined culture which bred scholars.13 The six commanderies of Longxi, Tianshui, Beidi, Anding, Shang, and Xihe were essential components of the former. Among the six commanderies, Longxi, Tianshui, Beidi, and Anding were within the jurisdiction of the Liang province and played a crucial role in the military history of the Former Han dynasty. Besides the “Treatise on Geography” mentioned above, the compiler of the Hanshu also has this to say on the martial atmosphere in these four commanderies: Since the times of the Qin and Han, [the region of] Shandong has been known to produce civil ministers and [the region of] Shanxi military generals. . . . The Han rises, Wang Wei and Gan Yanshou of the Yuzhi county, Gongsun He and Fu Jiezi of Yiqu, Li Guang and Li Cai of Chengji, Su Jian and Su Wu of Tuling, Shangguan Jie and Zhao Chongguo of Shanggui, Lian Bao of Xiangwu, Xin Wuxian and [Xin] Qingji of Didao, were all well known for their valor and martial prowess. The fathers and sons of the Su and Xin were

Being peripheralized 59 famous for their feats and were thus recorded with compliments. Besides them, there were still innumerable [fathers and sons like them] but they were not recorded. Why is it so? [The commanderies of ] Tianshui, Longxi, Anding, and Beidi of Shanxi region are located near the Qiang and the Hu. The people [of these commanderies] are accustomed to be in a state of war preparedness, and they honor valor and the skills of horsemanship and archery. As the Odes of the Qin says, “The king mobilizes the troops, polishes our armors and weapons, and goes for campaigns with our sons.” It is the traditions and customs of the place since antiquity. The legacy is still with us today. The folk songs of that region are known of their style of heroic abandonment.14 Since the compilation of the Hanshu was completed in the reign of the third emperor of the Later Han dynasty, the above lines were written in the late first century CE. They allow us to see that the Later Han compiler(s) and his contemporaries perceived the Shanxi region, especially the four commanderies, as a land for producing military men during the Qin and Former Han periods. An entry of the Hou Hanshu expresses the same opinion. An official named Yu Xu is recorded to have quoted in his memorial an adage, “Guanxi produces military generals whereas Guandong produces civil ministers,”15 showing once again that the civil and military dichotomy between the regions of Shanxi/Guanxi and Shangdong/ Guandong was commonly held by the Han people to the point that it amounts to a stereotype of the two regions. The names mentioned in the above passage were famous military officials and diplomats of the Former Han dynasty. Except for Su Jian and his son Su Wu, who were natives of Duling county of the Former Han metropolitan region (still part of Shanxi/Guanxi region), all were of northwestern provenance. The following biographical vignettes introduce these and other prominent military figures of the Liang province in the two Han dynasties, from which we can gain a general impression of their military career path and the role that the military elite of the Liang province played in the Han times. For the men of the Former Han dynasty, I list them in the order that their names appear in the above passage of the Hanshu. 1 Wang Wei was from the Yuzhi county in the Beidi commandery. No detail of his life was given in the Hanshu, but according to the “Treatise on Arts and Letters” (Yiwen zhi, basically the catalogue of the imperial library) of Hanshu, there was a text entitled Shefa (The Method of Archery) by a Wang Wei who held the title of General of the Strong Crossbow (Qiangnu Jiangjun).16 Considering that Wang Wei of Yuzhi was a famous military figure, it is not impossible that he was a master of archery, a commander of crossbowmen, and also a writer of marksmanship. 2 Gan Yanshou (d. 24 BCE), also from Yuzhi, earned his fame in the Han history because of a remarkable military achievement. Gan was a typical liujun liangjiazi and started his career by serving in the elite corps of the Yulin and, later, the Qimen. He was good at archery and horsemanship and well

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known for his amazing physical strength. In 36 BCE, he was appointed Protector General of the Western Regions (Xiyu Duhu), which was the superintendent of Han forces in the Western Regions.17 Following a plan designed by his associate Chen Tang (d. 12 BCE), Gan mobilized the Han and nonHan troops under his command to launch a preemptive strike against Zhizhi Chanyu of the Xiongnu, who was staying at a makeshift fortress in Central Asia after his failure in a power struggle over the leadership of the Xiongnu. Gan’s troops killed and beheaded the Chanyu after a fierce battle, and thus brought an unprecedented victory to the Former Han dynasty. Gan was therefore ennobled as a marquis.18 3 Gongsun He (d. 91 BCE), a native of the Yiqu county in the Beidi commandery, was a grandson of Gongsun Hunye (fl. 150s–140s BCE), who was a renowned general during the reign of Emperor Jing (r. 157–141 BCE).19 As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the Yiqu county was named after the Yiqu people of the Western Rong. The Gongsun family was good at fighting and horsemanship, and as the name Hunye was perhaps a transliteration of a non-Han name (given that one of the Xiongnu kings who surrendered the Hexi region to the Han empire was the King of Hunye), the Gongsun family was possibly non-Huaxia in origin. Gongsun He himself served with credit as a cavalryman when he was young. He was promoted rapidly during the reign of Emperor Wu and achieved outstanding military merits by taking part in the expeditions against the Xiongnu, for which he was ennobled. He was appointed Chancellor in his old age. In a response to the appointment, Gongsun He described himself as “a man who grew up in rustic periphery, and became an official because of horsemanship and archery.”20 He and his son, who was also a senior official, were implicated and executed in the notorious case of witchcraft (wugu) that triggered a widespread purge in the last years of Emperor Wu.21 4 Fu Jiezi (d. 65 BCE), another native of the Yiqu county, started his career by serving in the military and made his name in two adventurous diplomatic missions. About 77 BCE, Fu as the Inspector of the Imperial Stables was sent to the Western Regions as the delegate to interrogate the kings of Qiuzi and Loulan for their involvement in killing the Han envoys. The two kings surrendered themselves to Fu, who seized the opportunity to kill the Xiongnu envoys visiting Qiuzi. Fu was rewarded and promoted after his return to the imperial capital. He then persuaded the regent Huo Guang (d. 68 BCE) to take the lives of the two kings as a preemptive strike against any potential betrayal. With the regent’s permission, Fu went on his second journey and beheaded the king of Loulan; he was thus ennobled as a marquis.22 5 Li Guang (d. 119 BCE) was a native of the Chengji county in the Longxi commandery. Well-known as the “Flying General” (Fei Jiangjun), Li Guang was not only renowned among his contemporaries but was also one of the most famous military figures in Chinese history. He was an archery talent growing up in a family of long military tradition. According to the “Treatise on Arts and Letters,” a work entitled General Li’s Art of Archery (Li Jiangjun

Being peripheralized 61

6

7

8

9

10

Shefa) was attributed to him.23 He served the emperors Wen, Jing, and Wu of the Former Han dynasty, and spent nearly his whole career fighting against the Xiongnu. His three sons were all famed military officers of their times.24 Li Cai (d. 118 BCE), also from Chengji, was a cousin of Li Guang and served the court concurrently with him. Although not as famous as his cousin, Li Cai had a more prosperous career. During the reign of Emperor Wu, Li Cai was appointed General of Light Chariots (Qingju Jiangjun) under the command of the Grand General Wei Qing and was granted a marquisate as a reward of his military achievements. In 121 BCE, Li Cai was appointed Chancellor at the peak of the imperial bureaucracy.25 Shangguan Jie (d. 80 BCE), from the Shanggui county of the Tianshui commandery, served in the elite corps of Yulin and Qimen when he was young. He impressed Emperor Wu with his spectacular physical strength and was promoted Director of Palace Stables and later Minister of Transport (Taipu).26 He might have taken part in a large-scale military expedition to the Western Regions.27 At his deathbed, Emperor Wu entrusted his eight-year-old heir to Huo Guang, Ji Midi (d. 86 BCE), Shangguan Jie, and San Hongyang (152–80 BCE). To secure his prominent position, Shangguan Jie married his granddaughter to the young emperor. The fortune of the Shangguan family, however, did not last long. Both Shangguan Jie and his son met their execution after losing in a power struggle against Huo Guang.28 Zhao Chongguo (137–51 BCE) was from a family of Shanggui provenance and moved to the Lingji county in the Jincheng commandery when it was established in the reign of Emperor Zhao (r. 87–74 BCE). Zhao started his career as a cavalryman and was later recruited to the elite corps of Yulin in the name of liujun liangjiazi with skillful archery and horsemanship.29 He served successively emperors Wu, Zhao, and Xuan. While still a young military officer, Zhao Chongguo had engaged in the wars against the Xiongnu and suffered severe wounds in battle. Hearing of his brave performance on the battlefield, Emperor Wu summoned Zhao to the court to see his battle scars and rewarded him with promotion. Thereafter, Zhao gradually rose to the top echelon as General of the Rear (Hou Jiangjun). In 73 BCE, Zhao was ennobled for his support of Emperor Xuan’s ascension to the throne. At a ripe old age of seventy, Zhao still took charge of a campaign against the Qiang rebels. When Zhao died in 51 BCE at the age of eighty-six, Emperor Xuan had his portrait displayed in the palace in commemoration of him. Later, Emperor Cheng (r. 33–73 BCE) ordered a famous writer to compose a eulogy of Zhao’s feats in suppressing the Qiang revolts.30 Lian Bao (fl. 10s BCE–3 CE) was from the Xiangwu county in the Longxi commandery. According to the fragmented records in the Hanshu, Lian Bao was once Protector General of the Western Regions and was promoted in 13 BCE to General of the Right (You Jiangjun), a senior position at the imperial court.31 Xin Wuxian (fl. 60s–50s BCE), a native of the Didao county in the Longxi commandery, was the Grand Administrator of the Jiquan commandery when

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Emperor Xuan summoned and made him General Who Crushes the Qiang (Po Qiang Jiangjun) and sent him to join General Zhao Chongguo in a campaign to suppress the Qiang.32 Later, Xin led a force to help Wusun in the Western Regions to restore order after a political turmoil.33 His younger brother Xin Tang (fl. 50s BCE) was the Colonel Supervising the Qiang (Hu Qiang Xiaowei), a position responsible for dealing with the Qiang people within and beyond the Han boundaries.34 With the official positions they occupied, the Xin brothers were undoubtedly experts in Qiang affairs. 11 Xin Qingji (d. 11 BCE), the son of Xin Wuxian, received his first official position through his privilege as the son of a senior official. While he was serving at a Han colony in Wusun of the Western Regions, to which his father once led an army, he successfully fought off the enemies and defended the area from falling out of the Han control; he was promoted to colonel as a reward. During the reign of Emperor Yuan (r. 48–33 BCE), Xin Qingji was widely admired by the courtiers for his ability and was subsequently promoted to various important posts, including grand administrators of Zhangye and then Jiuquan. He also enjoyed a good reputation among the Xiongnu and the states in the Western Regions. At the peak of his career, Xi Qingji assumed the office of General of the Right. His three sons were all talented in military affairs and entered government service; among them, the eldest inherited the family tradition and served the position of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang. With the solid foundation laid by Wuxian and Qingji, the Xin clan developed into a strong local family in the Longxi commandery, with influences reaching the entire Liang province. The prosperity of the clan, however, provided an excuse for Wang Mang, the would-be usurper of the Former Han who tried to remove all obstacles en route to the throne, to prosecute the Xins for misconduct. He put Qingji’s three sons and other important members to death. The Xin family was hence ruined.35 Besides the above names, there were several other famous northwesterners recorded in other entries of the Hanshu: 12 Li Xi (fl. 140s–110s BCE), of the Yuzhi county in the Beidi commandery, started his career by serving Emperor Jing. He was once General of Infantry (Caiguan Jiangjun) during the reign of Emperor Wu and fought in the wars against the Xiongnu.36 13 Gongsun Ao (fl. 130s–90s BCE), a native of the Yiqu county in the Beidi commandery, entered government service as Palace Attendant (lang) at the court of Emperor Jing. He became a senior military officer at Emperor Wu’s court, taking part in a series of campaigns against the Xiongnu, and was appointed general four times. When his wife was implicated in a case of witchcraft, Gongsun Ao and his family were all sentenced to death.37 14 Li Ling (d. 74 BCE) was a grandson of the celebrated “Flying General” Li Guang. While still in his youth, Li Ling had already been appointed Palace Attendant and later Supervisor of the Palace Cavalry. Like his grandfather, Li

Being peripheralized 63 Ling was famous for his skillful horsemanship and archery, while Emperor Wu held high regard for his prestigious military family background. In the last years of Emperor Wu, Li Ling was in charge of training archers in the commanderies of Jiuquan and Dunhuang. In 99 BCE, Li Ling participated in a large-scale expedition against the Xiongnu but was only assigned to lead 5,000 infantrymen as an auxiliary force. The small troop, however, accidentally ran into the main body of the Xiongnu forces. After several days of fierce fighting, Li Ling and his men were exhausted and were left with no choice but to surrender to the Xiongnu. The Chanyu highly respected Li Ling, marrying him to his daughter and granting him a title of king. Li Ling spent the rest of his life in the Xiongnu. Since Li Ling chose to surrender rather than to die for the honor of the Han empire, in contrary to what Emperor Wu expected him to do, his family was exterminated under imperial order. The renowned Li family of Longxi commandery was thus ruined and, according to the sources, the disgrace of the Li clan was acutely felt by the military men of the commandery.38 15 Duan Huizong (d. 3 CE), a native of Shanggui in Tianshui, advanced from Magistrate of the Duling county to Protector General of the Western Regions during the reign of Emperor Cheng. Duan earned great respect from the Central Asian people. When Duan was transferred to other postings, the delegates of the Western Regions kept sending petitions to the Han imperial court asking for Duan’s return, a wish that was finally granted several years later. Duan was ennobled for his feats of leading a small force to suppress the rebels in Wusun. When he died in Wusun at the age of seventy-five, some states of the Western Regions built shrines to commemorate him.39 As will be discussed in the next section, the political and social status of the northwestern military elite declined in the Later Han period, but there were still some important figures who played influential roles in the dynastic politics. They will be introduced below in chronological order. 16 Liang Tong (d. 40 CE) was from the Wushi county in the Anding commandery. His great-grandfather moved from the Hedong commandery to the Beidi commandery. His grandfather then moved twice before finally settling down in Anding. During the civil war in the last years of Wang Mang’s reign, Liang Tong joined Dou Rong’s regime in the Hexi Corridor and was appointed Grand Administrator of the Wuwei commandery. Liang Tong finally surrendered to Emperor Guangwu and was ennobled. He held senior official positions at the Later Han court for the rest of his life and raised the status of his family through marriage with the imperial house. The Liang family thereupon developed into one of the most influential consort families of the Later Han dynasty.40 17 Liang Qin (d. 115 CE) was a native of the Geju county in the Beidi commandery. His father was a military officer serving in a campaign against the Xiongnu in 89 CE. Liang Qin himself was renowned for his bravery. Liang Qin

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18

19

20

21

22

Being peripheralized reached the peak of his military career when he was appointed Vice-Colonel of the Western Regions in 106 CE. He played an active role in the Qiang Wars and also took part in the campaigns against the Southern Xiongnu and the Wuhuan in the northeast.41 Huangfu Gui, one of the “Brilliant Three of the Liang Province,” grew up in a military family in the Chaona county in the Anding commandery. His grandfather was a general and his father a commandant. Huangfu Gui initially entered government service via a civil position, but he quickly showed his military talent and was dispatched to suppress local bandits. After 161 CE, he served commanding positions in a series of operations in the northwestern and northern frontiers and was remembered as a meritorious general of the Later Han dynasty.42 Zhang Huan, the protagonist of the story quoted at the beginning of this chapter, was a native of the Yuanquan county in the Dunhuang commandery. He started his career with a civil service position but later changed to the military track. Zhang Huan for the most part served as frontier commander and dealt with alien peoples such as the Qiang, the Wuhuan, and the Xianbi.43 It was his military feats in the Qiang wars that earned him the unprecedented permission to transfer his registered residence. Duan Jiong, one of the “Brilliant Three,” was from the Guzang county in the Wuwei commandery. It was said that his great-great-uncle was Duan Huizong (numbered 15 above) of the Former Han dynasty. Since his youth, Duan Jiong was a skillful archer and horseman; but he started his career with a civil position and only later took to the military. He had been commandant against the invasion of the Xianbi in the northeast and suppressed local rebels in the eastern commanderies. Later, he was appointed the Colonel Supervising the Qiang and spent a long time in fighting against the Qiang. In his later years, Duan Jiong ingratiated himself with the powerful eunuchs in the imperial court, reaching thereby the top echelons of the bureaucracy. His collaborative relationship with the eunuchs finally brought him to his doom when his eunuch patron lost in a power struggle with another clique. Duan Jiong was forced to commit suicide.44 Fu Xie (d. 187 CE), a native of the Liangzhou county in the Beidi commandery, entered the government through civil service, and like others that have been mentioned, Fu Xie finally established himself on the battlefield. In the last decades of the Later Han, Fu took part in the campaigns in suppressing the Yellow Turban Rebellion, which broke out in 184 CE and quickly spread across the eastern part of the empire. Later, when the Liang province was in chaos and fell into the hands of the Qiang and their allies, prominent officials at the imperial court suggested giving up the province. Fu Xie was a staunch opponent of such a plan. He was later appointed Grand Administrator of the Hanyang commandery in the Liang province. He met his end in a battle when, under siege, he was killed by the rebels.45 Gai Xun (140–190 CE) was from an old official family in the Guangzhi county in the Dunhuang commandery. Starting his career with a civil

Being peripheralized 65 assignment, Gai Xun proved himself a military talent and a brave fighter in the battles against the rebels in the Liang province. When Dong Zhuo controlled the imperial court, Gai Xun was one of the very few officials who dared to criticize the warlord to his face.46 23 Huangfu Song (d. 195 CE) was a nephew of the illustrious Huangfu Gui. While still a young man, Huangfu Song had already shown his talent in archery and horse riding. He became famous as a commander of a campaign against the Yellow Turbans. Fu Xie, mentioned above, was his aide-de-camp. The successful suppression made Huangfu Song the most meritorious general and an indisputable military leader of the time. He was later sent to the Liang province against the local rebels, with Dong Zhuo under his command. He was unable to stop Dong Zhuo in his rise to control the imperial court, however, and was taken out of his command of the troops and put under custody.47 24 Dong Zhuo, the warlord who destroyed the Later Han dynasty, was a native of the Lintao county in the Longxi commandery. He made his name as a warrior while he was young and enjoyed friendship with the Qiang chieftains. He started his career as a military officer of the Liang province and was recruited to the elite corps of the Yulin guard in the name of liujun liangjiazi, probably among the last in history. In the Qiang Wars, Dong Zhuo first served as an aide-de-camp of Zhang Huan in a campaign against the Qiang in the Hanyang commandery and later under the command of Huangfu Song. Dong rose quickly thereafter and assumed an influential role in the northwestern region.48 Needless to say, the names mentioned above are only a handful among many others of the Liang province during the two Han dynasties whose military careers were recorded in history. All in all, they represented only a very small portion of the northwesterners who entered government services. Since little is known of the non-elite with northwestern provenance,49 it is not possible to have a full picture of career patterns of the northwestern population as a whole. Nevertheless, the general features of the life of the military elite still provide clues to the political status of the northwestern aspirants to government office in the period under discussion. Of the twenty-four men listed above, fifteen lived in the Former Han dynasty, eight were active in the Later Han dynasty, and one was active in the interval between the two. First, all of the fifteen Former Han characters started their official career and received promotion on the basis of their military valor, skill, and merits. Some of them were clearly stated as members of the liujun liangjiazi and were therefore recruited to the prestigious Yulin and Qimen guards, which offered them proximity to the sovereign and advantages in developing a prosperous career. Even those who were not in the elite corps also started as military officers or cavalrymen. At the peak of their careers, Gongsun He and Li Cai assumed chancellorship, and others like Shangguan Jie, Zhao Chongguo, Lian Bao, and Xin Qingji reached the highest echelon of the government and played important

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roles in imperial politics. Some of them were even ennobled for their military feats. Second, these men almost all held offices on the military track, including imperial guards, various positions of military officers, and different ranks of generals. Even when they were not in active military service, their positions were still related to military affairs. For example, Fu Jiezi and Shangguan Jie took charge of the breeding of horses and maintaining chariots. Third, most of them were veterans in military operations against the Xiongnu, the Qiang, and other Central Asian peoples. These men therefore constituted an important corps in the defense and expansion of the Former Han empire. In contrast, the career pattern of the Later Han northwestern military elite listed above is slightly different. Liang Tong, who was born in the Former Han times and active during the interval between the two dynasties, took part in the civil war that broke out in the last years of Wang Mang’s reign and finally chose to serve the Later Han court. His career was thus exceptional compared to the eight men of the Later Han group. Among the eight persons, except for Liang Qin who started his career as a military officer like his Former Han predecessors, the career pattern of others reveals a deviation from the traditional track. While they were remembered as military talents and meritorious generals, Huangfu Gui, Zhang Huan, Duan Jiong, Fu Xie, Gai Xun, and Huangfu Song all entered government service via civil positions and only shifted to military offices later. It is quite revealing that most of the Former Han cohort started their careers from the bottom rungs of the military hierarchy – serving as the rank-and-file members in the imperial guards or cavalry where they gained first-hand experience in combat, whereas the Later Han cohort generally entered government service through civil offices and later shifted to the military line as middle- or high-level officers. Some were, therefore, deprived of the experience of serving in frontline combat roles. In other words, unlike the Former Han group who grew up in the military, the Later Han group was transplanted into the military. It does not necessarily mean that they were not good fighters, but, for reasons which will be discussed in the following section, there was not room in the Later Han bureaucracy for them to maintain a pure military career if they wanted to climb up the ladder of success. Furthermore, even though the Later Han military elite could boast of remarkable military exploits, they seldom reached the highest echelons as their Former Han predecessors did (Duan Jiong was able to reach the highest position in the central government only on account of his collaborations with the dominant clique of eunuchs, making him an exception to the normal rules). In addition, while it was common for the Former Han northwestern military elite to enter government service as members of the liujun liangjiazi, the same cannot be said about the Later Han. Except Dong Zhuo, none of the aforementioned Later Han figures were recorded as liujun liangjiazi in the historical sources. As for Dong, his career path was slightly different from that of the “Brilliant Three of the Liang province” and others. He grew up among the troops and served consistently on the military track, which accounts for his comparatively inferior early career and the very image of him as an uncouth military man. This seems to indicate the diminishing role of the liujun liangjiazi in the Later Han times.

Being peripheralized 67 Furthermore, the Former Han elite, and the liujun liangjiazi in particular, came mainly from the old commanderies, such as Longxi, Tianshui, Beidi, and Anding, whereas the Later Han elite like Zhang Huan, Duan Jiong, and Gai Xun were from the new commanderies like Dunhuang and Wuwei. It perhaps indicated the fact that the new commanderies in the Hexi region founded by Emperor Wu and his successors had by then developed to such a degree that they became capable of producing their own military elite. A closer look at the available records reveals that quite a number of northwestern martial elite were of migrant origins, whose ancestors moved to the region from other parts of the Qin-Han empire. The two most celebrated martial families of the region provided good examples. The ancestors of the “Flying General” Li Guang were forcibly moved by the Qin state to the Chengji county in the Longxi commandery as a result of the war of conquest.50 The history of migration of Zhao Chongguo’s family, moreover, indicates that some migrants did not settle down in the first place they reached but would move again within the region in response to further imperial expansion or retreat. A Later Han stele discovered in 1943 provides details of the movement of the Zhao family and sheds light on the development of the elite martial families in the Liang province. The stele dates to 180 CE and was dedicated to Zhao Kuan (d. 152 CE),51 who was a local notable52 of the Haomen county in the Jincheng commandery of the Later Han dynasty and a fifth-generation grandson of the famous Former Han general Zhao Chongguo. According to the stele inscription, which traces the history of the Zhao family, Zhao Zhongkuang, the great-grandfather of Zhao Chongguo, was the Superintendent of the Privy Treasury (Shaofu) sometime during the reigns of Emperor Wen and Jing. His son Sheng, was appointed Advisory Counselor (Jianyi Dafu). Sheng had two sons: the elder one was a magistrate of a county and the younger, Chongguo’s father, was a Palace Attendant. The Zhaos suffered a setback when Chongguo’s father committed a serious offense in the imperial palace, and the family was accordingly exiled to the Shanggui county in the Longxi commandery. That was the beginning of the Zhaos as inhabitants of the northwest. Zhao Chongguo enlisted in the local cavalry in his early age and was later recruited to the imperial guard with the qualification of liujun liangjiazi. Since Chongguo had developed a successful official career, his family subsequently grew strong in hometown, and most of his offspring enjoyed a prosperous career. Some of them moved out of the Liang province for postings in other sectors of the empire, but the main line of the family remained in the northwest. According to his biography of Hanshu, probably as a result of military campaigns against the Qiang, Chongguo moved to the Lingju county in the Jincheng commandery, which was set up in the former Qiang domains.53 This is an example of migration as a complementary measure of territorial expansion and consolidation. The stele, however, makes no mention of Chongguo’s migration but only states that the protagonist Zhao Kuan moved from Shanggui to the Poqiang county in Jincheng when he assumed the office of Deputy Major of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang (Hu Qiang Xiaowei Jia Sima) in the Later Han times. That the stele recorded Zhao Kuan’s but not Chongguo’s movement may

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be attributable to the fact that Chongguo moved to Lingju with the troops but left some of his family members in Shanggui, while Kuan grew up in the family that remained in Shanggui and moved to Poqiang only for his new posting. Assuming a frontline office, Zhao Kuan engaged in a battle against the Qiang, in which the imperial army met a devastating defeat and Kuan’s four sons who joined the fighting were slaughtered. In the ensuing evacuation, Kuan fled from the Liang province with the refugees to the erstwhile Former Han metropolitan area. Some years later, he moved back to Poqiang and then again to the Haomen county, where the stele was excavated.54 The case of the Zhao family paints a vivid picture of the experience of some settlers in the northwestern region. The settlers, for various reasons, moved from their ancestral places to the northwest. Some of them settled in the first spot they reached, but others moved again as a result of further imperial expansion, war, and natural disasters. The Qiang Wars in the Later Han times especially triggered waves of outward migration in the northwest, as told in Zhao Kuan’s story. Like the Zhao family, some Later Han northwestern elite benefited from the movement of their ancestors to the northwest during the Former Han times, where they accumulated wealth and influence. The aforementioned Liang Tong was an example of those who made use of family background and thus attained official positions in the Liang province and even at the imperial court. According to the sources, Liang Tong’s great grandfather moved from the Hedong commandery in the east to the Beidi commandery in the northwest. When the Liang family had amassed a great fortune, they were moved by the Former Han government to the metropolitan area as a measure to curb the growth of strong local magnates. In the last years of the Former Han, however, the Liang family returned to the northwest and settled in the Anding commandery.55 With their great fortune and influence, the Liangs became local leaders. Accordingly, Liang Tong easily assumed power in the region during the civil war and was highly esteemed by Emperor Guangwu of the Later Han after his surrender.56 From the family histories of migration of Li Guang, Zhao Chongguo, and Liang Tong, it is clear that the state played a crucial role in the process. As a matter of fact, a large number of the population of Hauxia provenance living in the Liang province were migrants themselves or descendants of migrants who moved into the frontier region because of state-sanctioned migration during the Qin-Han period.57 As a policy with implications of social engineering, state-sanctioned migration had a long tradition in early imperial China. During the war of conquest in the third century BCE, the state of Qin relocated its own population to newly conquered areas and the captured subjects of rival states to the frontier regions as a means to strengthen its control over the newly acquired territories on the one hand and to uproot the local power bases of its new subjects on the other. Once Qin had conquered all the states in the east, it continued the policy of sanctioned migration by first dislocating the erstwhile rival aristocrats and local magnates, for instance, forcibly exiling the royal family members of the defeated Zhao state to the Tianshui county in the Longxi commandery,58 and later moving convicts and poor people as well as those of low social status to the northern and

Being peripheralized 69 southern frontiers of the nascent empire.59 The Former Han dynasty carried on the same policy and periodically relocated enormous numbers of local magnates and wealthy families to the metropolitan area under the direct surveillance of the state.60 It was known as the strategy of “strengthening the roots and weakening the branches,”61 which was especially crucial for consolidating state power in the early phase of the dynasty. Meanwhile, migration towards the northern frontier was carried out in response to the threat posed by the foreign enemies, particularly the Xiongnu. During the reign of Emperor Wen, a courtier named Chao Cuo put forward his proposal of state-sponsored migration which encouraged people with material provision to move to the northern frontier for the purposes of strengthening the imperial defense, turning wild borderlands into arable lands, and lessening the population pressure of the interior regions. The essence of Chao’s plan was the militarization of the people who moved to the frontiers, with an expectation that the migrants would transform into staunch defenders of the frontiers where they settled and that they would be better than the rotating garrison soldiers from the interior who were not familiar with the frontiers and were afraid of the Xiongnu, to say nothing of saving the costs of transporting the soldiers back and forth between their home counties and the frontier.62 Moreover, as Hsu Cho-yun points out, the “policy of redistributing the population” has the effect of making “more farmers independent and self-sufficient” as taxpayers, which served the economic benefit of the state most.63 State-sanctioned migration was in addition a contingent policy to settle the refugees when natural disasters struck the empire. The imperial state would move the needy of the disaster-stricken area to the frontier region as a kind of relief effort and a way to utilize their labor in developing the frontier territories.64 For example, it is said that in 119 BCE Emperor Wu moved 725,000 poor people who were affected by floods in Guandong region to several commanderies, including Longxi, Beidi, Xihe, and Shangin in the northwest.65 Such a large number of refugees of different backgrounds would definitely complicate the population composition of the northwestern frontier, which was itself a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic region. Additionally, the imperial state exiled criminals to the northwest quite frequently. A notorious example was that Emperor Wu sent a large number of offenders implicated in the infamous witchcraft hunting to the Dunhuang commandery in 91 BCE.66 There are also many recorded examples of discharged officials and their families being exiled to the northwest frontier.67 As a result, not only the composition of population of the northwest became more complicated but also the ethos of violence in the region became all the more widespread when “the paupers of Guandong area, or those who had committed transgressions in revenge, or the family members of those who had committed betrayal and disobedient”68 kept moving in under the state’s direction. Considering their backgrounds, some of the poor, amnestied convicts and exiles from different parts of the empire might well be those who had nothing to lose. They would have no scruples about using violence to achieve what they wanted or to protect what they had. Since they were the potential rebellious and restive factors

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of society, it seemed therefore economical for the state to relocate them in the newly conquered northwestern frontier, where their labor and strength could be used to serve imperial projects, either defensive or expansionist. At the same time, the northwest frontier was fashioned into a distant and perilous land exclusively for the underclass. Meanwhile, as the number of settlers in the region gradually increased, the population of certain spots reached a threshold that necessitated the transformation of a cluster of farming colonies into a full-fledged administrative region.69 For example, a garrison named Yuze (literally, a marsh full of fish) in the Dunhuang commandery was upgraded to a county named Xiaogu (literally, efficient in crop cultivation) in 105 BCE as a result of its flourishing agriculture and increased farming population.70 Furthermore, the Former Han state divided the commanderies of Wuwei and Jiuquan into the new commanderies of Zhangye and Dunhuang and resettled people there.71 A recently excavated source reveals that even as late as 28 BCE the Dunhuang commandery still sent officers to collect and lead the homeless roaming people in the commanderies of Donghai and Taishan, both located in Guandong, to the northwest.72 According to the estimate of a Chinese scholar, around 1.5 million people had migrated to the northwest by the end of the Former Han dynasty.73 Migrants made up nearly all of the registered population of the commanderies of Dunhuang, Jiuquan, Zhangye, Wuwei, and Jincheng, half of Beidi, and a sizeable portion of Longxi, Tianshui, and Anding.74 Needless to say, there were still many autochthonous subjects and other alien peoples settled in the region. The above discussion has mainly focused on the civilian migrants in the Former Han northwest, but we should not underestimate the size of the military personnel that constituted another major part of local population. The northwest frontier in its very essence was a militarized region. Since the reign of Emperor Wu, the Former Han state steadily sent troops into the region. In 118 BCE, around 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers were deployed as pioneers in the farming colonies in the immediate area of the west bank of the Yellow River to strengthen the defense there.75 In 111 BCE, 600,000 soldiers were said to be dispatched as colonists to the newly acquired Hexi region and the neighboring commanderies of Shang, Shuofang, and Xihe.76 The Later Han dynasty did not deviate from the policy of state-sanctioned migration. Specifically in the northwest, the early Later Han policy makers relied upon local magnates like Liang Tong to help restore order in the aftermath of civil war and brought in settlers as a measure to rehabilitate the region. The southern sector of the Liang province was particularly devastated during the civil war, and many people were dislocated. The Hou Hanshu states that “although the area west of Long mountain had been pacified, people were starving and many of them on the roam.”77 The Later Han state therefore needed to provide relief to the roaming population and sent those who fled from the war back to their former home. In 50 CE, Emperor Guangwu issued an edict ordering all those who fled to the interior during the civil war to return to the frontiers.78 For the Liang province, the emperor once ordered the Grand Administrator of the Wuwei commandery to

Being peripheralized 71 send 3,000 refugees in his jurisdiction back to the Jincheng commandery79 and issued another edict to emancipate those who were forced to be slaves in the province as a means to increase the taxable population.80 Meanwhile, the Later Han state resumed farming colonies in the northwest to settle soldiers, commoners, amnestied convicts, and their families, as well as the surrendered Qiang people, to strengthen the defensive efforts along the frontier – especially from the middle period of the dynasty on when the northwest was beset by intermittent Qiang revolts. Furthermore, the imperial state regularly commuted death sentences to exile, sending convicts to the frontiers with their families. The Hou Hanshu recorded examples in the years of 73, 74, 82, 84, 87, 96, 124, 126, 130, 144, 147, 150, 153, and 154 (all in CE).81 While the Former Han dynasty practiced commuting death sentences to exile occasionally, the Later Han state turned it into a routine practice until its final years when it was losing control of the northwest. It turned the Liang province into a land of exile, with the Dunhuang commandery becoming particularly infamous for being a destination for amnestied convicts. It might partly explain why Zhang Huan was so desperate to leave Dunhuang permanently. Needless to say, draconian measures like the use or threat of violence played an important role in keeping criminals there and imposing discipline on them, which would be compatible with the martial spirit in the region.82

Peripheralization of the northwestern frontier The notoriety of the Dunhuang commandery as the host of amnestied convicts might have aroused Zhang Huan’s dislike of the place and dissuaded him to stay, but it did not fully explain why he requested to move to the interior of the empire rather than to other commanderies in the Liang province. Here, we first investigate the factors that played a part in urging him to leave. The northwestern frontier region had long been a land of settlement for convicts, cashiered officials, refugees, paupers, and so forth since the Qin and Former Han times. For the settlers, the region provided opportunities to start a new life. The martial elite were especially proud of having come from the liujun liangjiazi, which positioned them well for political and social advancement. Elite families like the Zhaos mentioned in the preceding section even moved progressively to new commanderies in line with the furthering of imperial enterprise. The difference in attitudes between Zhang Huan and his Former Han counterparts towards the region in fact reveals changes in the status and the self-perception of the martial elite as well as the importance of the northwest vis-à-vis the imperial state. In addition, the Later Han prohibition of transferring one’s registered residence from the frontiers to the interior might imply that there were always frontier inhabitants who wanted to move inward, and the state had to use legislative means to prevent it. The prohibition itself was not only a preventive measure but also a sign of restriction and discrimination against the frontiersmen. Although the northwest was geographically periphery to the empire, it was never peripheral to imperial politics. In the Former Han times, especially during the reigns of emperors Wu and Xuan, the northwest was an important imperial

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concern, and its military elite subsequently reached the apogee of their prestige. The northwest, however, underwent a gradual change of political status from the Former Han to Later Han, when the confidence, glory, prestige, and privilege of the northwestern military elite were undermined, and the resources injected into the region by the imperial state were reduced. While the Later Han northwestern military elite still upheld the tradition of pursuing honor, the chance of earning it was remote to them now. As this section will show, the lackluster role of the northwest and the low self-esteem of its military elite during the Later Han came as a result of the changes in contemporary political and social perception of the region and its people. As the Later Han dynasty progressed, the northwest was treated not only as a geographical but also as a political periphery. In what follows, I shall trace the changes and identify the factors that contributed to the full-fledged “peripheralization” of the northwest in the Later Han times. Three interrelated aspects will be put under examination, namely, the declining significance of the northwest in imperial defense, the impact of the eastward shift of the political center, and the ascendancy of the scholar-officials. The declining significance of the northwest in imperial defense The northwest was in essence a militarized zone and performed an important function in the imperial grand strategy during Qin-Han times. On the defensive side, the northwestern frontier played a crucial role in protecting the western flank of the imperial core when the Qin and Former Han dynasties located its capital in the Guanzhong area. On the aggressive side, the northwestern region, particularly after the annexation of the Hexi Corridor, served as a long arm facilitating the projection of the imperial power to and as a bridgehead supporting the imperial military presence in the Western Regions. The strategic importance of the northwest afforded its military elite opportunities to participate in the imperial enterprise. The significance of the northwestern region, however, dropped in the imperial strategic priorities when the Later Han dynasty situated its capital in Luoyang – the Guandong area. The perception towards the importance of the Western Regions accordingly changed. The move of imperial capital from the western to eastern half of the empire subsequently deprived the northwestern region of its function as an immediate defensive line of political center, adding distance between the martial men and the imperial state. More will be said about this in the next sub-section, while this part will focus on the fluctuating relationship between the Later Han empire and the Western Regions and how it determined the ups and downs of the strategic significance of the northwestern frontier. In contrast with the Former Han predecessors’ ambition in the Western Regions,83 the Later Han rulers generally held a restrained attitude. They were reluctant to involve their empire in foreign adventures, as proponents of active interference in Central Asia usually met with a lukewarm response. The “Tradition of the Western Regions” (Xiyu chuan) of Hou Hanshu and other complementary sources provide a vivid picture of the Later Han’s retrenchment policy

Being peripheralized 73 towards the Western Regions and its subsequent effect on the strategic role of the northwest.84 In the early years of the Later Han dynasty, the Xiongnu had reasserted their control over the Western Regions by capitalizing on the retreat of the Han power triggered by the turmoil during the Wang Mang period. In 45 CE, a group of delegates from the Western Regions approached Emperor Guangwu and supplicated the throne to reinstate the Protector General of the Western Regions as a means to liberate their states from the overbearing Xiongnu domination. The top priority of the emperor, however, was internal rehabilitation, and the request from the delegates was denied.85 The emperor’s restrained foreign policy is evident in another incident in 51 CE when the Northern Xiongnu asked for a marriage-alliance with the Later Han as their ancestors had done in the Former Han times.86 Aiming to exploit the weakness of the Northern Xiongnu, two courtiers submitted a petition, saying, Now, the caitiffs [Northern Xiongnu] are suffering from the plague that has killed their people. The drought and the locusts have devastated their land and depleted their herds. They are exhausted and feeble, and their strength is no match to that of a single commandery of the Han. The life and death of these people living ten-thousand li away now hinge on the decision of Your Majesty. Is it still wise to hold steadfastly to uphold the principle of civil virtue at the expense of military affairs? We propose we dispatch armies to the frontiers, issuing warrants that promise handsome rewards for the killing and capturing of the Xiongnu, ordering foreign allies such as the Gaogouli [Korean: Koguryŏ], the Wuhuan, and the Xianbei to attack the Xiongnu from the left, and launching the troops of the four commanderies of Hexi and the commanderies of Tianshui and Longxi, as well as the forces of the Qiang and the Hu to assault the Xiongnu from the right. If we undertake this course of action, the northern caitiffs will be eliminated in a few years.87 Emperor Guangwu, however, rejected their proposal and explained his decision in an edict, saying, The Book of Huang Shigong reads, “The soft can overcome the hard, and the weak can overcome the strong. The soft is virtuous, whereas the hard is vile. The weak benefits from benevolence, whereas the strong incurs discontent.” Thus it is said, “The virtuous monarch employs what pleases him to please the people, while the monarch without virtue employs what pleases him to please himself. He who pleases others will enjoy pleasure for a long time, whereas he who only pleases himself will not last long. He who ignores the nearby and plots for the distant will trouble himself without gaining any merit; whereas he who ignores the distant and focuses on the nearby will enjoy ease and meet with a good ending. A regime enjoying ease is filled with loyal ministers, whereas a regime belaboring under trouble is filled with disorderly men.” It is further said, “He who focuses on expanding his territory

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Being peripheralized will become destitute, whereas he who focuses on expanding his virtues will become strong. He who satisfies with what he has is contented, whereas he who covets what others have is ruthless. Though a ruthless administration might attain initial success, it will fail eventually.” Now, the empire has yet to establish a good administration, and there are unceasing natural disasters. The people are frightened, feeling insecure. How could We turn our labour to the land beyond the frontier? Confucius says, “I am afraid that the worries of the Jishi do not lie with the Zhuanyu (external enemy).” Besides, the northern barbarians are still strong, and most of the rumors that circulate around the farm colonies and sentry posts along the frontiers are unfounded. If it is possible to destroy the arch enemy by mobilizing half of the empire, how could it not be Our utmost wish? But if the time is not right, We would rather let the people rest.88

Henceforth, according to the historical record, no senior officials dared talk about military affairs in front of the emperor again. What Emperor Guangwu said reveals that he was reluctant to spend military efforts against the foreign enemies and incur costs for his empire and subjects. Such a restrained attitude towards foreign affairs set the basic tone for the foreign policy of the dynasty. Emperor Guangwu’s unwillingness to return to the Western Regions left it to the mercy of the Xiongnu and also opened it to competition for ambitious states seeking for regional hegemony in the area. The Hexi region was subsequently exposed to frequent raids by the Xiongnu and their Central Asian satellite states. During the reign of Emperor Ming (r. 58–75 CE), it was reported that the towns of the Hexi region had to shut their gates even in daytime to avert havoc.89 The year of 73 CE marked a respite from the period of retrenchment as the Later Han empire launched an expedition against the Northern Xiongnu, reopened official relations with the Western Regions, and reinstated the Protector General.90 The Protector General and his men, however, were slaughtered by rival forces in the Western Regions two years after the resumption of office. The imperial state sent reinforcements from the Jiuquan commandery to rescue the remaining Han troops that were besieged. Then, the newly enthroned Emperor Zhang (r. 76–88) decided to withdraw Han power from the Western Regions. Only a major named Ban Chao (32–102 CE) and a handful of his followers chose to stay behind, making their adventure more a self-motivated action than a plan of the state. Ban would spend the following thirty years upholding the Han presence in the southern part of the Western Regions.91 The pinnacle of the Later Han’s enterprise in Central Asia came during the reign of Emperor He (r. 89–105 CE), when the Later Han army defeated the Northern Xiongnu, and Ban Chao was appointed Protector General.92 Ban Chao’s effort, however, was tarnished after his retirement when the rival forces attacked his successor and finally forced the Later Han to withdraw once again from the Western Regions. In 119 CE, the Grand Administrator of the Dunhuang commandery put forward a proposal to recapture the Western Regions but met with rejection from the imperial court. In view of repeated raids by the

Being peripheralized 75 Northern Xiongnu and its allies on the Hexi region, some courtiers even discussed the possibility of closing the Yumen and Yang passes along the boundary between the Liang province and the Western Regions to prevent further invasion, in effect abandoning the Western Regions.93 In 123 CE, another Grand Administrator of the Dunhuang commandery suggested a plan of dealing with the situation in the Western Regions, which was supported by the Imperial Secretariat Chen Zhong (d. 125 CE). Chen warned the emperor that giving up the Western Regions would enable the Xiongnu to collaborate with the Qiang and put the Hexi Corridor in a dangerous situation of facing a two-pronged attack; the cost of defending the Hexi commanderies would then be very high without the Western Regions as a cover.94 Simply put, the Hexi Corridor and the Western Regions should be treated as an integral whole in the defense setting. The possible chain effect of losing the Western Regions finally persuaded the emperor to take action. Ban Yong (fl. 120s CE), son of Ban Chao, was then dispatched to the Western Regions, but with only 500 convicts under his command, indicating that he lacked the full support from the imperial court. Despite the fame of his father and his own strenuous efforts, Ban Yong was unable to fully restore Later Han’s influence over the region.95 From the 130s CE on, the authority of Later Han over the region diminished with time; the imperial state was neither willing nor able to make any commitment to the region and could only let its influence fade away. The general attitude of the Later Han court was to avoid expending resources on controlling the Western Regions. Although some concerned regional officials such as the grand administrators of Jiuquan and Dunhuang advocated the retaking and defending of the Western Regions, which was critical to the security of their territories, the imperial court seldom sympathized with their views. Central officials like Chen Zhong, who supported the campaign of regaining the region, were rare. The prevailing opinion was to avert troubles, to the point where closing the frontier passes or abandoning the region was an acceptable option.96 For the Later Han rulers, the costs of maintaining Han presence in Central Asia largely outweighed any benefit that could be reaped from the region. Such reluctance to get involved revealed that the Later Han empire no longer held the Western Regions in high strategic value as the Former Han did. As Rafe de Crespigny points out: the Western Regions presented the imperial regime of Later Han with potential for some strategic advantage against the Xiongnu, and it was naturally desirable that trade across central Asia should be maintained. The territory, however, was not considered critically important, and the great days of ambition had passed.97 I agree with de Crespigny but would take the enquiry one step further to ask why the Western Regions became less important to the Later Han and why the empire lost its ambition in the region. A simple explanation would be that due to their internal problems and the expeditions launched by the coalition forces of the Later Han and the Southern Xiongnu in 73 CE and 88 CE, the Northern Xiongnu had

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been greatly weakened and were no longer a serious threat to the Later Han. As a consequence, the Western Regions as well as the northwestern frontier lost their strategic positions in the Han-Xiongnu confrontations. Meanwhile, the Later Han had to shift its attention and resources to deal with the Southern Xiongnu along the northern frontier and the newly emerging Xianbei in the northeast. In other words, the Later Han had to deal with threats from elsewhere. Yet, this did not explain why the Later Han staunchly carried out the retrenchment policy when facing challenges in the Western Regions and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, even chose to abandon the Liang province when it was losing the Qiang Wars. Obviously, the Later Han state had a different perception of threat and a different reconnoitering of strategic circumstances, leading to a different set of strategic priorities from the Former Han, which were all determined by the political and cultural contexts in which they found themselves. These will be the subjects of the following analysis. The impact of the eastward shift of the political center The difference in attitude toward the northwest between the two Han dynasties not only indicated their own regional concerns but also revealed their respective visions of the empire. During the Qin and Former Han periods, the Guanzhong region was the heart of the empires and assumed a superior political position over the Guandong region, which had the result of widening the divergence between the two.98 The Guanzhong region, the base upon which the Former Han state exercised its rule over the whole realm, was a magnet for aspirants to official careers, who tried by all means to access the area and to seek imperial favors or official advancement. Even well-off officials wanted to reside in the area as a mark of prestige. Here is a vivid example: in 114 BCE, the General of Towered Warship (Louchuan Jiangjun) Yang Pu (fl. 120s–100s CE), who had achieved successful military feats, was ashamed of being a resident outside Guanzhong (Guanwai min) and therefore asked Emperor Wu to move the boundary of the Hangu Pass, the dividing line between the east and the west, slightly eastward so that his hometown would be included in the sphere of Guanzhong.99 The emperor did move the Pass eastward, not so much to satisfy a general’s desire but out of a strategic consideration to redraw the defense line of Guanzhong.100 Nevertheless, the anecdote is evidence that the idea of being a resident of Guanzhong promised prestige and high social status in the Former Han period. Defending the western flank of Guanzhong (the northwestern frontier zone was also regarded as part of the greater Guanzhong area) was under the direct supervision and governance of the Former Han state. The Former Han empire divided the eastern half of its realm into various fief-states ruled by princes and marquis, while no fiefs were granted in the whole Guangzhong area, including the metropolitan area and the area immediately northwest .101 This policy was strictly implemented in the Former Han times and adhered closely to in the Later Han, even though its capital was in the Guandong area.102 To cope with the widespread revolts in its last years, the Later Han appointed several senior officials as Regional Commissioner

Being peripheralized 77 (zhou mu, literally provincial shepherd), which was the highest administrative and military official of a province and was given plenary authority in the jurisdiction. This measure, however, was not carried out in the provinces in Guanzhong, which, at least nominally, was under direct central control. The distinctive position of the Guanzhong area also enabled the northwestern frontier zone to play a crucial role in the protection of the flank of the metropolitan area, i.e. Guanzhong. The northwestern military elite, particularly those that belonged to the category of liujun liangjiazi, subsequently enjoyed geographical convenience to access the imperial center and share the prestige of being “the people within the Pass.” While Guanzhong was the political and military center of the Former Han empire, Guandong/Shandong served as the key economic and cultural core. With its fertile soil, dense population, and other natural advantages, Guandong had enjoyed economic prosperity since the pre-imperial age and its economic development outpaced the Guanzhong area.103 As the Former Han dynasty progressed, the economic growth of Guandong greatly benefited from the peace and prosperity brought by the unified empire, and it became the central region of commerce, finance, and manufacturing of the empire. The Former Han state set up agencies of manufacturing in eight commanderies: Henei, Henan, Yingchuan, Nanyang, Taishan, Jinan, Guanghan, and Shu, with the first six in Guandong and the remaining two in the Yi province of the southwest.104 There were also several manufacturing agencies specializing in textiles located in the Qi and Chenliu commanderies of the Guandong area.105 Agriculture in Guandong was also flourishing, and the area was known as the breadbasket of the empire that provided substantial provisions to Guanzhong whose own agrarian surpluses were not sufficient to support the mouths of the imperial court, government apparatus, and troops.106 According to a memorial from an official in the mid-50s BCE, the amount of grain transported from Guandong to the metropolitan area was vast, and 60,000 laborers were needed to fulfill the task annually.107 The metropolitan area’s reliance upon the grain supply from Guandong was so great that once an imperial advisor even suggested Emperor Yuan move the capital to the east to guarantee a full granary.108 As a key economic region in an agrarian empire that practiced intensive farming, Guandong needed a large input of farming labor. Meanwhile, the prosperity of the commerce sector provided opportunities for fortune-seekers, which encouraged the concentration of population in the region. As a matter of fact, a great proportion of the overall population was living in Guandong, and the population density of the area was extremely high. Based on the data of population censuses preserved in the two Han dynastic records, it is clear that an overwhelming proportion of the registered population was clustered in Guandong or the mid-eastern part of the imperial realm.109 Even though the overall recorded population of the Later Han was lower than that of the Former Han, the comparative concentration of population in the east is still beyond question. In contrast, the population of the Guanzhong area experienced a drastic drop and was distributed even more sparsely in the Later Han times when the imperial capital moved east. The area of Guandong has also been a cultural and intellectual powerhouse since the pre-imperial age. During the sixth to third century BCE, in the era of the

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“Hundred Schools of Thought,” so called by modern scholars and remembered as the golden age in Chinese intellectual history, most, if not all, of the philosophers and their disciples originated and flourished in Guandong. The Qin state located in the Guanzhong area was despised by its eastern rivals for its cultural backwardness and barbarism.110 Even though the political center of the Qin-Former Han empire was in the Guanzhong area, it did not alter the leading role of Guandong in intellectual and academic development. Meanwhile, as the Former Han dynasty progressed, an increasing number of scholar-officials of eastern origins held government offices and gradually constituted the mainstay of imperial bureaucracy by the last decades of the dynasty. The establishment of the Later Han capital in Luoyang was in part a result of its proximity to the main source of scholar-officials and many strong local families, which only further strengthened the dominant cultural position of the east.111 Guandong thus attained an unchallengeable position in fashioning the political culture of the Later Han, to which the next section will allude. For now, I will only focus on the Later Han founders’ decision of locating the capital in the east and its influence on their vision of the empire. Although the founders of the two Han dynasties both rose in the east, they had very different considerations of the location of capitals, which were related to their experience of regime-building and the strategic circumstances that they faced. The core founders of the Former Han were at first roaming armed forces without a strong local base in the beginning of the civil war. When they entered the Guanzhong area and won local support, they established a solid footing that contributed to their final victory in the competition for imperial power.112 Based on the support of Guanzhong, the Former Han repeated the Qin’s conquest of the east and maintained the pattern of the west ruling over the east: part of the political legitimacy of the Former Han was even based on the notion of succeeding the Qin.113 In fact, Guanzhong provided strategic and geographical advantages to the Former Han state to safeguard itself and project its power to the east.114 Needless to say, when the capital was located in Guanzhong, the northwest was recognized as a region of key strategic value. In contrast, the Later Han founders followed an entirely different trajectory of regime-building. Unlike their predecessors who were of plebian origins and generally less educated, most of the founding members of the Later Han were from better-off backgrounds. Emperor Guangwu himself was from a wealthy landlord family and was well educated as a student of the Imperial Academy during Wang Mang’s reign. The first army of Emperor Guangwu was constituted by his clan members and retainers and other neighboring strong families summoned by him and his elder brother. On his road to emperorship, Emperor Guangwu benefited greatly from kinship networks and was aided by strong local families very much like his.115 After Emperor Guangwu passed away, his son Emperor Ming ordered the portraiture of twenty-eight generals who had assisted his father in the building of the dynasty to be displayed at the Cloud Terrace (Yuntai) in the imperial palace. The well-known “Twenty Eight Generals of the Cloud Terrace” (Yuntai ershiba jiang)116 were Deng Yu,117 Ma Chen,118 Wu Han,119 Wang Liang,120 Jia Fu,121 Chen Jun,122 Geng Yan,123 Du Mao,124 Kou Xun,125 Fu Jun,126 Cen Peng,127 Jian Tan,128

Being peripheralized 79 Feng Yi,129 Wang Ba,130 Zhu You,131 Ren Guang,132 Zhai Zun,133 Li Zhong,134 Jing Dan,135 Wan Xiu,136 Gai Yan,137 Pei Tong,138 Yao Qi,139 Liu Zhi,140 Geng Chun,141 Zang Gong,142 Ma Wu,143 and Liu Long.144 In addition to four other men, namely, Wang Chang,145 Li Tong,146 Dou Rong,147 and Zhuo Mao,148 were regarded as the thirty-two meritorious officials of the founding of the dynasty.149 Most, if not all of these thirty-two figures were well educated.150 To name only a few, Zhuo Mao was a famous scholar of his time. Deng Yu, Zhu You, and Jing Dan all studied at the Imperial Academy; Deng and Zhu were classmates of Emperor Guangwu. In economic terms, many of them were members of welloff and influential families like Emperor Guangwu and possessed strong kinship networks and large landholdings with troops of retainers and tenants, which could no doubt be transformed into military forces when needed. Some of them already had official background, either having come from bureaucratic families or serving as local officials themselves before they joined Emperor Guangwu.151 Most importantly, except for Dou Rong whose place was secured by his surrendering the Hexi region to the new emperor, all these meritorious officials were deeply rooted in the Guandong area and preferred to stay close to their power base when they considered the location of the new imperial capital. The Later Han capital had already been settled in Luoyang before Dou Rong’s surrender. Even when there were voices suggesting the imperial capital be moved back to Chang’an, the Former Han capital, Dou Rong did not express an opinion. As a former warlord and a new member of the Later Han ruling class, Dou Rong was very cautious about committing himself to any position in serious discussions at the imperial court, especially when he was honored by the emperor but was not granted any real power. In such an eastern-dominated court, the vested regional interests and the sense of attachment to the home county inclined the Later Han founders to stay in the east. In addition, there were strategic considerations that made it impossible for the Later Han to locate its seat of authority in Guanzhong. During the civil war and the early years of the Later Han, the area of Guanzhong was divided into domains of contending power that took the Later Han state some years to conquer and pacify.152 The city of Chang’an was devastated by fighting. Locating the capital in Luoyang therefore was the Later Han founders’ way of responding to the new strategic realities. The Later Han state was based in the east and launched its campaign of re-unification to the west, in reverse direction of the Former Han, making the eastern-centric attitude inevitable. Luoyang indeed had its own merits to win the position as the capital. The strategic importance of Luoyang had long been recognized by the Former Han rulers.153 For example, Emperor Wu once rejected his favorite concubine’s request of enfeoffing her son at Luoyang because of its crucial military and economic value.154 When Wang Mang was in power, he initiated a plan of building Luoyang as the ancillary capital. Besides military and economic considerations, Wang had his ideological goal to pursue. As a usurper who entertained Confucian conviction to win popular support, Wang Mang found Luoyang an important component in his project of establishing political legitimacy. According to the classics, Luoyang

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was a city founded by the Duke of Zhou, a cultural hero of antiquity and also a model of emulation for Wang Mang. By building Luoyang as his capital, Wang Mang aimed to model his image as the “Duke of Zhou” of his time – a living sage.155 Wang’s plan therefore strengthened the association between the city of Luoyang and Classicism, a notion that enjoyed prevalence in the east. Although the Later Han dynasty was born of the failure of Wang Mang, it in fact inherited and carried on the political culture fostered in the last decades of the Former Han as much as the reign of Wang Mang.156 Wang’s building of Luoyang had prefigured the city’s role as the capital in the Later Han times.157 Some westerners, however, had not prepared themselves to accept the new situation. Since the day Emperor Guangwu captured Guanzhong, they had strongly advocated the restoration of the seat of authority in Chang’an. One example was when Du Du (d. 78 CE), a scion of a renowned family in the erstwhile Former Han metropolitan area and a celebrated writer of his time, composed the “Rhapsody on the Capitals” (Lundu fu), urging the imperial court to return to Guanzhong.158 Such nostalgia of the westerner for the old capital persisted at least until the reign of the third emperor of the dynasty. In sum, an eastern-based regime, with its easterner-dominated imperial court, and the strategic, economic, and cultural importance of Luoyang provided the city an arguably ideal seat for the state. A deep-rooted nexus gradually unfolded between Luoyang and the area of Guandong that made the relocation of the capital back to Guanzhong impossible. Luoyang became a magnet attracting all aspirants to an official career. The northwesterners who had once enjoyed easy access to the central authority during the Former Han times henceforth lost their geographical advantage. Moreover, the northwesterners now found themselves facing a foreign political environment to which they were trying hard to adapt, which is the last point I want to examine in this chapter. The ascendancy of the scholar-officials While the decline of the strategic significance of the northwest hampered its military elite’s path to official advancement, a new political culture that emerged in the later years of the Former Han and prevailed in the Later Han dynasty further widened the estrangement between the northwestern martial men and the imperial center. This new political culture fostered a new political environment in the empire, in which the northwestern military elite faced a dilemma: whether to adjust themselves to the new rules for advancement or to uphold their traditional way at the risk of landing themselves in an inferior position. Coming hand in hand with the ascendancy of the scholar-officials, the new political culture was in fact a product of the prevalence of eastern-based civil culture, which determined the official recruitment criteria and influenced the vision of empire in the Later Han period. Wen (the civil) and wu (the martial) were a notable pair of concepts that constituted a dichotomy in pre-modern Chinese society.159 The relative strength between civil and military values always played an important role in the process

Being peripheralized 81 of empire-building and the development of imperial politics. A sophisticated ruler would know how to maintain the balance between the two and how to make use of them to serve his own interests. The emphasis on either side would shift in accordance with the need of the state. Not surprisingly, the relations between civil and military officials were not always harmonious. Tensions inevitably resulted from the differences between the two – in training, experience, mindset, and worldview.160 In the process of building the empire, the Qin state launched a large-scale militarization program to transform itself into an effective war machine. Both agricultural production and military achievements were given top priority by the state. A system of ranks of merit, namely “meritorious military ranks” (  jungong jue), was introduced. Under the system, every able-bodied male who served in the army and rendered meritorious service would be granted a military rank of nobility accompanied with material rewards, economic benefits, and qualification for official positions. Not only did the rank holder enjoy various privileges but his heir could also inherit a certain level of rank. The system was an effort of statesanctioned militarization policy through which martial spirit was promoted and military discipline was indoctrinated in the populace so that they would be easily mobilized for military operations. Since the rank holder was respected and honored by the state, military men were held in high esteem politically and socially which in turn further enticed people to pursue such a career. The system of ranks of merit thus reshaped the Qin social structure and served as an underpinning for Qin-Han society.161 The early Former Han dynasty not only carried on the ranks of merit system but also inherited the martial spirit and respect for military feats. Emperor Gao (r. 206–187 BCE), the founding emperor of Former Han, was very proud of “taking the realm under Heaven with a three-foot sword”162 and winning his empire on horseback.163 The early Former Han imperial court was full of meritorious veterans who had served the founding emperor and formed a rather close-knit class of military aristocracy.164 Senior official positions, whether civil or military, were usually in their hands, and the position of Chancellor, for example, was an exclusive privilege for them.165 As late as the reign of Emperor Jing, about half a century since the establishment of the dynasty, Shentu Jia (d. 155 BCE) was appointed Chancellor mainly because he was the last veteran alive who had served Emperor Gao as a captain of crossbowmen.166 Militarization reached a high point under Emperor Wu’s reign, and military affairs became a top priority of the state. Military leaders like Wei Qing and Huo Qubing enjoyed special privileges and honors, and the liujun liangjiazi also earned opportunities to showcase their military talents and martial skills in the imperial expansionist enterprise.167 Emperor Wu himself was very interested in military affairs and paid serious attention to those who attained spectacular military achievements. There was a telling story that when Emperor Wu learned that the young Zhao Chongguo, an exemplary liujun liangjiazi, was severely injured in a battle, he summoned Zhao to the court to see his battle wounds. The emperor was so impressed with Zhao’s injuries that he rewarded Zhao with a promotion for

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his courage and service.168 The rather easy ascent of the military men to important positions reflected the imperial emphasis on the military heritage of the empire. Against this background, the northwestern military elite were the favorite sons of the empire. From the reign of Emperor Yuan (r. 48–31 BCE), however, the importance of the military was gradually surpassed by the civil. The ranks of merit, as a symbol, lost their military meaning and degenerated into a superficial system. Military men in general and the northwestern military elite in particular entered a period of gradual decline. Their loss of significance in politics went hand in hand with the empire’s increased employment of scholar-officials. In the early years of the dynasty, a courtier named Lu Jia (fl. 220s–180s BCE) once questioned Emperor Gao whether “the empire he conquered on horseback could also be governed on horseback,”169 and suggested to the dumbfounded emperor that employing both civil and military talents was the way to make for an enduring regime. The emperor realized that he could not rule his empire solely by military might once the chaotic period was over and the people were hoping for a return to normalcy. In order to bring his realm back to stability and prosperity, the emperor needed the aid of men of letters.170 Since the founding members of the Former Han dynasty were generally less educated, the emperor needed to recruit educated men from outside his caucus, and these men, like Lu Jia and the famous classics scholar and ritual expert Shusun Tong (fl. 200s–180s BCE), were mostly from Guandong – the breeding ground of men of letters. Educated men did make a great contribution to the long-term development of the civilian government of the empire. For example, it was Shusun Tong and his disciples who formulated the court etiquette and ceremonial rites that laid the foundation for the rites of the empire. Shusun was therefore remembered by the Han intellectuals as a paragon of his day and a master of Han classical studies.171 Shusun Tong’s success revealed the value of men of letters to the imperial rulers and also presaged the flowering of the scholar-officials in the coming era. It should be noted that the dichotomy between civil and military presented in this study is deliberately general and simplistic for the convenience of analyzing and showing the changing relative strength between the two and the preponderance of the scholar-officials in the two Han dynasties. In fact, neither the civil nor the military wing of the government was a homogeneous entity. The military side included military men of different backgrounds and with competing interests, and the northwestern martial elite was only one group, among others, who did not always share the same concerns. The same is true of the civil side.172 From its very beginning, the civil sector of the Han bureaucracy contained not only men of letters and classics scholars but also a large team of clerical officers who were familiar with administrative and legal routines, procedures, protocols, and practices. The former group was usually identified as rusheng (Confucian/classicist) and the latter wenli (clerical officer).173 The clerical officer was a legacy of Qin dynasty’s meticulous clerical system174 and played an extremely influential role in the early years of the Former Han. The first Chancellor of the dynasty, Xiao He (d. 193 BCE), was a consummate clerical officer of a local government office

Being peripheralized 83 during the Qin times and finally assumed a leading role in shaping the Former Han legal and administrative framework.175 Benefiting from the modern historian Yan Buke’s meticulous studies on rusheng and wenli, we now have a clear picture of the development and relations of the two groups during Han times.176 In the early years of Former Han, clerical officers constituted the backbone of the civil service system, but as the dynasty progressed, more rusheng entered government offices, with literary writing and classical studies gradually recognized as the criteria for entering civil service since the reign of Emperor Wu. The trend grew overwhelmingly from the time of Emperor Xuan onward. Increasing number of classical students entered the bureaucracy and even reached the senior echelons.177 Since the classics studied by the scholar-officials and aspirants to office were associated with Confucian teachings, the success of official-scholars was hailed as a victory of Confucianism.178 The usurpation of Wang Mang was also a product of the prevailing Confucianism, as promoting Confucian teachings was an important means by which Wang Mang earned popular support inside and outside the government. With the growing prosperity of scholar-officials, the relative importance of the clerical officers declined. Since classical knowledge became desiderata for the success of officialdom, most aspirants who sought to advance their official career studied the classics; possession of classical knowledge was also valued as a criterion of political and social superiority. In the meantime, the administrative and legal knowledge that distinguished the clerical officers from others was gradually held in disdain by scholar-officials as trivial matters better left to the minor functionaries. From the viewpoint of scholar-officials, they deserved high positions since they studied teachings passed on from the sages of antiquity, whereas clerical officers should have been content with junior positions, for what they were doing was secular and repetitive paperwork. It certainly did not mean that scholarofficials thought clerical knowledge was useless, merely that it was not the prime knowledge that a scholar-official should pursue. Some scholar-officials studied legal and administrative knowledge to enable them to handle government affairs more effectively and efficiently, just as there were clerical officers who received classical education to qualify themselves for senior positions. As a result, a tendency for the two groups to combine emerged in the last decades of the Former Han. Such an integrated training was in fact encouraged by Emperor Guangwu of the Later Han dynasty, since he and his meritorious generals were, as noted above, classical students and were also interested in administrative and legal affairs essential for rebuilding the empire.179 Needless to say, however, classical knowledge took the primary place, whereas clerical knowledge was secondary. The ascendancy of scholar-officials not only sidelined clerical officers but also hindered the advancement of military officials. In principle, civil and military officials had their own career trajectories. In reality, however, the predominance of scholar-officials transformed the political culture of the empire into a civil one that honored civil officials with classical training and placed them in comparatively advantageous positions in bureaucratic recruitment. Although equipping oneself with both civil and military virtues and skills was the embodiment of the

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ideal official in Han times, it was in most cases no more than an ideal.180 With the growing prosperity of scholar-officials, military knowledge and skills were in fact not being treated as equal to civil skill. A principle of recruitment gradually developed in the last years of Former Han and was practiced by the Later Han that is based on the appearance of the recruit: a candidate could not bear wounds made by weapons beyond a certain level of official position.181 But who would have such kinds of wounds other than the military men? In effect, the recruitment principle, which contradicted the ideal type of officials, placed a barrier to the military men’s advancement. The circumstances had dramatically changed since the time of Emperor Wu’s solicitous enquiries of Zhao Chongguo’s battle wounds and Zhao’s ensuing promotion. The transformation of the title and duty of the position of military general bears witness to the civil official’s encroachment of the privileged territory of their military counterparts. By the time of Emperor Wu, the various titles of general (Jiangjun) were granted to those who took charge of military operations as commanding officers. People who carried the title of general were usually military men.182 The circumstance gradually changed after Emperor Wu. During Emperor Xuan’s reign, civil officials started to take up the title of General. For example, the renowned classics scholar Xiao Wangzhi (d. 47 BCE) was appointed General of the Vanguard (Qian Jiangjun) in 49 BCE,183 even though Xiao did not once involve himself in military affairs before or after the granting of title. Certainly, Xiao and other civil officials’ appointments to the position of General were political, but the predominance of civil officials in bureaucracy was arguably an important factor in his assumption of a military title. During the Later Han dynasty, it was more common that the position of generals were occupied by civil officials unrelated to military affairs.184 On the other hand, the men who really took charge of military operations and commanded troops were in many cases not entitled General but appointed as General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household (Zhonglang Jiang), which was subordinate to General. Civil officials would occupy the position of General but did not take part in military operations, whereas military officials who were intimately engaged in military affairs might only reach the second rank of the military hierarchy. A recruitment system practiced by the two Han dynasties, known as chaju, literally “observation and recommendation,” and usually called the “Recommendation System” in modern scholarship, also significantly contributed to the expansion of scholar-officials in the imperial bureaucracy.185 In the early years of the Former Han, founding members and their descendants enjoyed hereditary advantages in accessing official positions, even though other ways of entering government service also existed.186 Later, when the need for acquiring talents outside of this immediate circle became urgent, new measures of recruitment were introduced. In 178 BCE and 165 BCE, Emperor Wen issued decrees asking nobles and officials to recommend “worthy and upright persons and persons who are outspoken and not afraid to criticize the superiors.” In 134 BCE, he promulgated a new law which ordered every commandery and fief-state to recommend “filial and incorrupt” (xiaolian) persons to the state. These marked the incipient phase

Being peripheralized 85 of the Recommendation System.187 The system at first comprised a wide range of subjects other than filiality and incorruptibility mentioned above, including the “understanding of the classics” (mingjing), “understanding of the law” (mingfa), “capability of managing the river” (nengzhihe), “courage and knowledge about the art of war” ( yongmeng zhibingfa), “incorruptible official” (lianli), “abundant talent” (maocai), “extraordinary excellence” ( youyi), and so forth.188 The system, however, gradually concentrated on the virtues of “filiality and incorruptibility.” Provinces and commanderies were required to recommend candidates with these virtues to the central government annually. In principle, “filiality and incorruptibility” were virtues that everybody could develop; in reality, they were interpreted as derived from the Confucian ethics, and the title of “filial and incorruptible” person gradually slipped into the hands of the men of letters who identified themselves as disciples of Confucian teachings. The rights of recommendation also gradually fell into the hands of senior officials with Confucian backgrounds. As a consequence, men of letters controlled the system, earned a greater presence in government officialdom, and further strengthened the system as the chief way of recruitment to protect their vested interests. Meanwhile, powerful local families rooted mainly in Guandong and who had resources to provide their members classical education took advantage of the situation to become the main sources of providing scholar-officials in the Later Han times.189 Furthermore, they developed a rather exclusive system based on their own ties and networks to recruit candidates.190 Scholars such as Watanabe Yoshihiro and Higashi Shinji have presented detailed studies on the composition of the Later Han bureaucracy, which show the dominance of Guandong-based scholar-officials.191 Once the imperial state opened the gate of officialdom to the powerful families, the “Confucianization” championed by the scholar-officials was largely self-directed and became a tool for expanding and protecting vested interests.192 Scholar-officials reached their predominance in fact at the expense of the advancement of other groups, including the military men. Under such a “Confucianized” recommendation system, aspirants to official position in the frontier regions found themselves in a disadvantaged situation. The northwestern military elite particularly suffered from a “relative deprivation.”193 They were known for their military ability and skill and thus enjoyed privileges in their official career paths during the Former Han dynasty, but when the recommendation system gradually put absolute emphasis on civil over martial value, they lost their traditional advantages in the competition. In the last years of the Later Han dynasty, the Liang province was still looked down upon by scholar-officials as a land of backwardness. In 184 CE, for example, an official named Song Xiao (fl. 180s CE) told Gai Xun (number 22 on the above list of northwestern elites) his understanding of the cause of rebellion in the Liang province and the solution to the rebellion: “As the Liang province lacked learning, revolts always broke out. Now, I would propose to produce more copies of the Classics of Filial Piety and let every household study it. People might then be led to understand righteousness.”194 The Classics of Filial Piety was a primer for children in the Later Han times.195 Song’s suggestion of teaching the people of the Liang province the text indicated the low opinion he

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had of the education level of the province and their lack of loyalty. Song might well be hyperbolic in his pronouncement, but it nevertheless reveals how some scholar-officials regarded the Liang province with contempt. As a military elite of the Liang province, Gai Xun warned Song that his words would only arouse the hatred of the entire province.196 The people of the Liang province were discontented with being treated as culturally backward and might detest the cultural arrogance of the eastern-based scholar-officials. Certain Han rulers were already aware of the disadvantaged position of the frontier regions in producing civil officials and therefore tried to maintain balanced recruitment. In 12 BCE, Emperor Cheng ordered all interior commanderies and fief-states to recommend “upright and outspoken persons” to the court and separately asked twenty-two commanderies on the north frontier to recommend “persons who are courageous and knowledgeable about the art of war.”197 Obviously, the emperor acknowledged that the interior and frontier commanderies produced different kinds of talents and thus made an attempt to provide the military men on the frontier an opportunity to advance. The predominance of scholar-officials and the increasing importance of the “filial and incorrupt” in the recommendation system, however, were too strong to be altered. In 101 CE, Emperor He of Later Han acknowledged openly that the frontier provinces such as You (in the northeast), Bing, and Liang had a low population and that the official path of their elites were narrow. The emperor therefore assigned the frontier commanderies quotas of recommendation in proportionate to their population. Accordingly, frontier commanderies which had 100,000 or more people could recommend one “filial and incorrupt” annually; those with populations below 100,000 could recommend one biennially; those with populations below 50,000 could recommend one triennially.198 Although the emperor’s goal was to assure the rights of recommendation of the frontier regions, the population along the frontiers was categorically outnumbered by that of Guandong and was quantitatively too weak to compete with the interior commanderies. According to Hsing I-tien with his statistical research on the 324 Later Han “filial and incorrupt” recruits whose names were recorded in historical sources, of the 265 people whose origins were known, only two came from the Liang province. The remainder was distributed in the middle, eastern, and southeastern part of the empire and the Yi province in the southwest. Among them, the majority was in the commanderies of Guandong such as Runan, Nanyang, Yingchuan, Henan, and Chenliu, all traditional power bases of the powerful families.199 Although the sample size is small and the textual records were left by the scholar-officials, the number still give us a clue to the tiny role the Liang province played in the recommendation system. Since military ability was no longer a guarantee to a bright career as it once was, some Later Han northwestern elite realized that they had to adapt to the new rules of the game in order to move upward in the bureaucracy of the “Confucian State.”200 In other words, they tried to transform themselves into scholar-officials or to seek at least recognition from the scholar-officials. Such a tendency explains why the “Brilliant Three of the Liang province,” Huanfu Gui, Zhang Huan, and

Being peripheralized 87 Duan Jiong, all started their official careers with civil positions. Although they changed to the military later in life, their experience of civil office might have enabled them to have a similar career outlook and to communicate easily with their civil colleagues. When the first Great Proscription (166 CE) happened and many renowned scholar-officials and literati were arrested,201 Huangfu Gui was ashamed that he was not included in the names of the wanted though he thought of himself as an outstanding man of the western province. He therefore submitted a petition and claimed his relations with the proscribed parties. His efforts to get himself implicated were in vain, but he still tried his best to rescue the accused.202 The reasons for Huangfu Gui’s attitude might be complicated, but his eagerness to be accepted by the scholar-officials was probably a crucial consideration. Duan Jiong, albeit a tough warrior, studied classics when he was mature and was recommended as a “filial and incorrupt” recruit to enter government service.203 Among the three men, Zhang Huan was the most “Confucianized” one. He studied classics with famous scholar-officials and edited classical texts, and his edition was later kept in the imperial library collection. He taught 1,000 students, and authored many literary works, including an exegesis of a Confucian canon. He even took his students to the battlefield and lectured calmly to them in the midst of fighting while he was the commander of a campaign.204 Perhaps due to his “Confucian” background, Zhang Huan was desperate to move out from the Liang province. Even though the “Brilliant Three of the Liang Province” tried very hard, they met with only very limited success. Duan Jiong seemed to be the most successful of them since he was twice appointed Grand Commandant (Taiwei), which was on the level of Chancellor, with the patronage of eunuchs. Duan was thus despised by most scholar-officials. When his patron lost in a factional struggle among the eunuchs, Duan was forced to commit suicide, and his family was exiled to the frontier.205 During the second Great Proscription (168 CE), Zhang Huan was tricked by the eunuchs to lead troops to suppress their rivals – the leaders of scholar-officials and students of the Imperial Academy. In the aftermath, Zhang Huan bitterly regretted having been deceived by the eunuchs.206 This episode compellingly shows that Zhang Huan lacked connections with the leading scholar-officials and was not included by them. Not surprisingly, the absolute majority of the proscribed scholar-officials and students of the Imperial Academy, no doubt the cultural elite of the time, came from the eastern part of the empire. A modern scholar has analyzed the places of origin of the proscribed and related people recorded in Later Han history and arranged the regions in accordance with the numbers of the proscribed: 1

2

The Guandong area, including the commanderies of Henan, Hongnong, (where Zhang Huan requested to move to), Taiyuan, Shangdang, and the region to the east of the Nanyang commandery and the north of the Huai River. The regions along the middle and lower courses of the Yangzi River, including the Nan commandery and the area to the east of the Wuling commandery.

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The regions along the upper course of Yangzi River and the southwestern commanderies. The metropolitan area of the Former Han and the northwestern commanderies.207

It is clear that most prominent cultural elite were mainly concentrated in the commanderies along the mid-lower reach of the Yellow River and the commanderies such as Henan and Hongnong adjacent to the Later Han imperial capital, revealing an uneven distribution in favor of the core area. For the periphery, nine of the twelve people recorded in category 4 above were from the former metropolitan area, and the remaining three were Zhang Huan, Huangfu Gui, and Gai Xun. Nevertheless, these three men were only indirectly involved in the incident. On the other hand, among the men who were praised as martyrs and heroes in the Great Proscription, only two had ever taken part in military operations on the frontiers.208 Military figures such as the “Brilliant Three” received no mention at all, which reflected the “essential lack of sympathy and contact” between the scholar-officials and the frontier military men.209 These statistical data further evidence the minor significance of the northwestern elite vis-à-vis the cultural elite of the empire and their poor participation in high politics. The domination of the “Confucian State” by eastern-based scholarofficials was difficult to challenge except by resorting to brutal violence. It would be realized by Dong Zhuo, a military strong man and also one of the last generation of liujun liangjiazi, who, with his overbearing ambition, dared to break the existing rules of the game of power. To conclude this chapter, the geographical character and the composition of the inhabitants determined the military nature of the region called the Liang province. When the empire was in an aggressive mode, the northwestern military elite enjoyed the opportunity to showcase their talent and reached the pinnacle of their career. When the empire shifted to the defensive, their significance diminished. Constrained by the geographical and cultural conditions of the frontier society, the northwestern martial elite could only be the latecomers and losers in the game of imperial politics that was reshaped and dominated by the eastern-based scholarofficials. The new political culture did not bring a broader cultural unity to the empire, with its new cultural elite of the empire drawing a firm line between what they deemed as the core of the empire and its rustic, if not barbaric, periphery. They dominated the Later Han state and held a disproportionate share of central government offices, favored as they were by their classical education, the provincial quotas of the recommendation system, and their geographical proximity to the imperial center. On the other hand, some of the northwestern elite adapted themselves to the new political culture, whereas others felt estranged from the imperial center and finally resorted to violence – the means with which they were most familiar – to pursue their interests. In the end, not only the elite were aggrieved but the commoners also became increasingly disaffected. All in all, the frustrated military elite needed a discontented people against the imperial state. How the northwest was treated by the imperial center as a barbaric periphery and

Being peripheralized 89 how the northwesterners were further alienated from the Later Han state will be discussed in the next chapter.

Notes 1 HHS, 65: 2140. 2 The biographies of the three generals are in the same chapter of Hou Hanshu, see HHS, 65: 2129–54. For a full English translation of the three biographies, see Gregory Young, Three Generals of Later Han (Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1984). On the three generals in Later Han politics, see Chen Yong, “Liangzhou sanming lun,” Zhongguoshi yanjiu (1998.2): 37–48. 3 HHS, 65: 2140. 4 HHS, 65: 2141–2. 5 As a military historian pointed out, the military culture in a hierarchical society is primarily determined by those men who lead it. In other words, the elite. Meanwhile, soldiers often form a subset of non-elitist military culture. See Wayne E. Lee, “Warfare and Culture,” in idem ed., Warfare and Culture in World History (New York: New York University Press, 2011), p. 7. 6 Amnesty here does not mean that the state set the convicts free but commuted sentence of death to hard labor or exile. For punishments, including death penalty, hard labor, and exile, and amnesty of the Former Han, see Anthony F.P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, Volume 1: Introductory Studies and Annotated Translation of Chapters 22 and 23 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), pp. 102–34 and 225–50. Although the abundant evidence unearthed in recent decades has made the book a bit dated, Hulsewé’s work is still the most comprehensive Englishlanguage introductory study of the transmitted textual sources on the topic. 7 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, pp. 106 and 217. 8 HS, 28B: 1645. 9 For a general overview of the Former Han’s efforts on building defensive works along the northwestern frontier, see Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, pp. 116–49. For a comprehensive archaeological study of the Han defensive constructions in the Hexi region, see Wu Rengxiang, Hexi Hansai Diaocha Yu Yanjiu (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2005). Loewe, Records of Han Administration, Volume 1 and Momiyama, Kan teikoku to henkyō shakai are examples of non-Chinese scholarship that study the unearthed documents and trace the development of the Han defense line. 10 HHS, 70: 2258–9. 11 Si You, Jijiu pian, in Siku Quanshu vol. 223 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1987), p. 61. Most of the contents of the Jijiu Pian were written by Si You of the Former Han dynasty, but the last 128 words in the extant version, including the above quotation, were added by an anonymous Later Han author(s). For a general introduction to and the history of circulation of the text, see Zeng Zhongsha’s annotated Jijiu Pian (Changsha: Yuelu shushe,1989). For a recent study of the excavated version of the Jijiu pian, see Zhang Nali, Seiiki shutsudo monjo no kisoteki kenkyū: Chūgoku kodai ni okeru shōgakusho dōmōsho no shosō (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2006), pp. 85–131. 12 HS, 28B: 1644. 13 Fu, “Handai de Shandong yu Shanxi,” pp. 65–80; Hsing, “Shishi Handai de Guandong, Guanshi yu Shandong, Shanxi,” pp. 180–210. 14 HS, 69: 2998–9. 15 HHS, 58: 1866. 16 HS, 30: 1761. 17 For the establishment of the position of the Protector General of the Western Regions and its duties, see HS, 19A: 738 and 70: 3006.

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18 HS, 70: 3007–15. For modern studies on the battle, see Jan J.L. Duyvendak, “An Illustrated Battle-Account in the History of the Former Han Dynasty,” T’oung Pao xxxiv (1939): 249–64; Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, pp. 211–51. 19 HS, 66: 2877. 20 HS, 66: 2877. 21 HS, 66: 2877–8. On the case of witchcraft, see Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, pp. 37–90; Poo Mu-chou, “Wuguzhihuo de zhengzhi yiyi,” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 57.3 (1987): 511–38. 22 HS, 70: 3001–2. 23 HS, 30: 1761. 24 SJ, 109: 2867–76; HS, 54: 2439–50. 25 HS, 54: 2446. 26 HS, 97A: 3957. 27 According to the sources, there was a military officer named Shangguan Jie in an expeditionary campaign to the Western Regions, which might point to another man with the same name. But given the fact that the Shangguan Jie on the list above had a strong martial background and the Shangguan Jie found in the account of the campaign commanded cavalrymen of Shanggui county, it is highly possible that the two Shangguan Jie were the same person. See HS, 61: 2702–3. 28 HS, 68: 2932–6. 29 HS, 69: 2971. 30 HS, 69: 2971–95. For a recent study on Zhao Chongguo, see Edward L. Dreyer, “Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of China’s Former Han Dynasty,” The Journal of Military History 72.3 (2008): 665–725. 31 HS, 77: 3252 and 96B: 3908. 32 HS, 69: 2977–8. 33 HS, 96B: 3907. 34 HS, 69: 2993. For an outline of the duty of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang in historical sources, see Sun Xingyan ed., Hanguan liuzhong, annotated by Zhou Tianyou (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), p. 154. For modern research on the subject, see Gao Rong, “Handai Hu Qiang Xiaowei shulun,” Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu (1995.3): 10–16; Liu Pak-yuen, Shizhe yu guanzhi yanbian: Qin Han huangdi shizhe kaolun (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 2006), pp. 291–302. 35 HS, 69: 2996–8. 36 SJ, 111: 2942; HS, 55: 2491. 37 SJ, 111: 2942–3; HS, 55: 2491. 38 SJ, 109: 2877–8; HS, 54: 2450–9. For the legend of Li Ling in Chinese folk culture, see Tomiya Itaru, Gobi ni ikita otokotachi: Ri Ryō to So Bu (Tōkyō: Hakuteisha, 1994). Sima Qian, the compiler of the Shiji, was castrated as a punishment for expressing sympathy for Li Ling’s surrender during a court meeting with the furious Emperor Wu. 39 HS, 70: 3029–31. 40 HHS, 34: 1165–70. 41 HHS, 47: 1591–3. 42 HHS, 65: 2129–37. 43 HHS, 65: 2138–44. 44 HHS, 65: 2144–54. 45 HHS, 58: 1873–8. 46 HHS, 58: 1879–83. 47 HHS, 71: 2299–307. 48 HHS, 72: 2321–32. 49 Wooden and bamboo strips showing fragments of records regarding the garrison soldiers, the cavalry, and the colonists in the Han northwestern frontier have been unearthed in the region since the early twentieth century, which provide certain

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50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73

information about the routine duty and daily life of those personnel but are barely sufficient to reconstruct a big picture of the lives and career patterns of the northwesterners as a whole. A recent research on the daily lives and duties of garrison officers and soldiers along the Hexi defense lines is Zhao Chongliang, Xingyi shubei – Hexi hansai lizu de tunshu shenghuo (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2012). Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, p. 33. The inscription of the “Stele for Zhao Kuan” can be found in Gao Wen, Hanbei jishi (Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1985), pp. 432–5, and Nagata Hidemasa ed., Kandai sekkoku shūsei (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1994), v.1, pp. 225–9 and v.2, pp. 226–7. Zhao Kuan was appointed by the local government as “Thrice Venerable” (Sanlao), whose duties were to serve as intermediary and facilitator between local authorities and common people and as consultant for local officials. HS, 69: 2971. Gao, Hanbei jishi, p. 433; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1, pp. 225–9 and v.2, pp. 226–7. HHS, 34: 1165. Another Later Han stele named the “Stele for Cao Quan” (Cao Quan Bei; produced in 185 CE) traces the protagonist Cao Quan’s family history, saying that the Caos were moved to the northwestern commanderies such as Anding, Wudu, Longxi, and Dunhuang as a result of the expansion under Emperor Wu of the Former Han, and the Caos became local magnates in those commanderies. See Gao, Hanbei jishi, pp. 472–6; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1, pp. 252–9 and v.2, pp. 246–7. For an English translation and analysis of the inscription of this stele, see Ebrey, “Later Han Stone Inscriptions,” pp. 339–53. For an introduction of the Qin-Han forcible movement of the people and exile of criminals to the frontiers, see Wang Zijin, Qin Han jiaotong shigao (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), pp. 419–54. For a general survey of state-sanctioned migration in Chinese history, see James Lee, “Migration and Expansion in Chinese History,” in Williams H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams eds., Human Migration: Patterns and Policies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 20–47. Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, p. 33. Ge, Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, pp. 517–23; Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, pp. 31–4. Ge, Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, pp. 523–6; Ge Jianxiong, Zhongguo yimin shi vol. 1 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), pp. 88–116. HS, 43: 2123. HS, 49: 2286. Hsu, Han Agriculture, p. 28. Luo Tonghua, Handai de liumin wenti (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1989), pp. 221–7. HS, 6: 178. HS, 66: 2282. Examples in HS, 66: 2898, 75: 3193–4, 77: 3261, and 83: 3396. HS, 28B: 1645. On the structure and organization of the civil and military administrations of the Hexi region, see Loewe, Records of Han Administration, Volume 1; Shao Taixin, Handai Hexi sijun de tuozhan (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1988), pp. 103–77; Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, pp. 116–49. HS, 28B: 1614–15. HS, 6: 189. Hu Pingsheng and Zhang Defang, Dunhuang Xuanquan Hanjian shicui (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001), p. 44. Ge, Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, p. 529.

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87 88 89 90 91 92

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Being peripheralized Ge, Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, p. 529; Ge, Zhongguo yimin shi, Volume 1, pp. 153–4. SJ, 110: 2911. HS, 24B: 1173. HHS, 15: 588. HHS, 1B: 78. HHS, 24: 836. HHS, 1B: 64. For slavery in the Han period, see C. Martin Wilbur, Slavery in China During the Former Han Dynasty 206 B.C.–A.D. 25 (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1943); Ch’ü, Han Social Structure, pp. 135–59. HHS, 2: 121, 122; 3: 143, 147, 156, 157, 158; 4: 182; 5: 240; 6: 253, 257, 276; 7: 291, 296, 298, 300. Some vivid examples in the European history can been seen in Julius R. Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 73–116. For the Former Han’s relations with the Western Regions, see the introduction written by Michael Loewe in Hulsewé, China in Inner Asia; Yü, “Han Foreign Relations,” pp. 405–22. HHS, 88: 2909–34. A book-length study and annotated English-language translation of this text is Hill, Through the Jade Gate to Rome. On the relations between the Western Regions and the Later Han, see also Rafe de Crespigny, “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han,” Journal of Asian History 40.1 (2006): 1–30. HHS, 1B: 73 and 88: 2909. For Emperor Guangwu’s attitude towards the Western Regions, see Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: Volume III,” 131–4; Bielenstein also has an overview of Guangwu’s foreign policies in his Emperor Kuang-wu, 25–57, and the Northern Barbarians (Canberra: Australian National University, 1956). During the reign of Emperor Guangwu, fierce struggles over leadership broke out in the Xiongnu. As a result, the Xiongnu was split into two in the 40s CE. The Southern Chanyu then allied with the Later Han and moved into the northern frontier of the empire, while the Northern Chanyu remained in the steppe and was in conflict with his southern counterpart and the Later Han. For the relevant historical records, see HHS, 89: 2940–8. For modern scholarship on the division of the Xiongnu, see Yü, “Han Foreign Relations,” pp. 398–405; de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, pp. 219–75; Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (II),” pp. 49–64. HHS, 18: 695. HHS, 18: 695–6. HHS, 88: 2909. HHS, 88: 2909. HHS, 47: 1571–82. The Later Han army launched an expedition in 89 CE and dealt the Northern Xiongnu a heavy blow. To commemorate the victory, the famous writer Ban Gu, the elder brother of Ban Chao, who also served in the general staff of the commander of the expeditionary force, composed a eulogy and had it carved on a cliff in the steppe. The stone inscription has recently been discovered in Mongolia, which basically matches the version of the text preserved in historical records such as the Hou Hanshu. For the news of the discovery of the stone inscription, see www.scmp.com/news/china/ society/article/2107500/archaeologists-discover-story-chinas-ancient-military-might (accessed on 21 August, 2017) HHS, 88: 2911. HHS, 88: 2911–12. The complete translation of Chen Zhong’s memorial can be seen in Hill, Through the Jade Gate to Rome, pp. 8–11. HHS, 47: 1587–90. de Crespigny, “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han,” pp. 24–5.

Being peripheralized 93 97 de Crespigny, “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han,” p. 6. 98 The recently unearthed “Statutes of the Second Year” from the Han tomb at Zhangjiashan of Hubei province contains the “Ordinances of the Fords and Passes” that states the discriminatory policies between Guanzhong and Guandong and the limitations imposed on travelling between the two regions, see Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu, Zhangjiashan Hanmu zhujian (ersiqi hao mu): shiwen xiudingben (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2006), pp. 83–8. 99 HS, 6: 183. 100 Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” pp. 114–16. 101 Goi, “Chūgoku kodai teikoku no ichi seikaku,” pp. 51–70. 102 Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 323–32. 103 For the economic abundance of the Shandong area in early China, see the relevant discussion in Hsu, Han Agriculture, especially Chapters 2, 4, and 6. 104 Hsu, Han Agriculture, p. 133. The Yi province in the Han times largely corresponds to the modern Sichuan province, which has been famous for its affluence of natural resources since antiquity and is entitled “heaven’s storehouse.” For Han people’s depiction of the economic prosperity of Yi province, see HS, 28B: 1645. 105 Hsu, Han Agriculture, p. 133. 106 For the recent research on the agricultural development in Qin-Han Guanzhong area, see Wang Yong, Dong Zhou Qin Han Guanzhong nongye bianqian yanjiu (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004). 107 HS, 24A: 1141. 108 HS, 75: 3176. 109 Hans Bielenstein drew two maps which provide a clear visual image of the difference between the population distribution of the two Han dynasties. See Bielenstein, “The Census of China During the Period 2–742 A.D.” 110 For the Warring States period’s derogatory remarks on the Qin and the modern assessment based on archaeological findings, see von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius, pp. 233–43. 111 For the leading cultural role of Guandong in the Later Han period, see Martin J. Powers, Art and Political Expression in Early China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), Chapter III. 112 For the composition and background of the Former Han founders, see Li kaiyuan, Handiguo de jianli yu Liu Bang jiduan: jungong shouyi jieceng yanjiu (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2000), pp. 119–79; Wang Aihe, “Creators of an Emperor: The Political Group Behind the Founding of the Han Empire,” Asia Major 14.1 (2001): 19–50. 113 Tian Yuqing, “Shu Zhang Chu: Guanyu wang Qin bi Chu wenti de tantao,” in his Qin Han Wei Jin shi tanwei (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), pp. 1–27; Li, Handiguo de jianli yu Liu Bang jiduan, pp. 124–46; Tse, “Lun Han Gaodi yichao de beijing dongluan,” pp. 31–58. 114 SJ, 55: 2043–4, 99: 2715–17. 115 For Emperor Guangwu’s relationship with powerful clans of different regions, see Cui, Handai haozu diyuxing yanjiu, pp. 258–74. 116 HHS, 22: 789–91. 117 HHS, 16: 599–605. 118 HHS, 22: 778–9. 119 HHS, 18: 675–84. 120 HHS, 12: 774–5. 121 HHS, 17: 664–7. 122 HHS, 18: 689–91. 123 HHS, 19: 703–13. 124 HHS, 22: 776–8. 125 HHS, 16: 620–6. 126 HHS, 22: 782.

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127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149

HHS, 17: 653–62. HHS, 22: 783. HHS, 17: 639–52. HHS, 20: 734–7. HHS, 22: 769–71. HHS, 21: 751–2. HHS, 20: 738–42. HHS, 21: 754–6. HHS, 22: 772–3. HHS, 21: 757. HHS, 18: 686–9. HHS, 21: 757–9. HHS, 20: 731–3. HHS, 21: 760. HHS, 21: 761–5. HHS, 18: 692–6. HHS, 22: 784–6. HHS, 22: 780–1. HHS, 15: 578–81. HHS, 15: 573–6. HHS, 23: 795–808. HHS, 25: 869–71. Besides these meritorious officials, there were others who made great achievements in establishing the Later Han, such as Ma Yuan and Lai Xi. Ma was from Guanzhong and was one of the most celebrated Later Han generals. According to the official explanation, in order to avoid any suspicion of the consort family intervening in court politics, Ma Yuan, who was the father-in-law of Emperor Guangwu and grandfather of Emperor Ming, was excluded from the list of Cloud Terrace meritorious generals. For a similar reason, Lai was absent from the list because he was a cousin of Emperor Guangwu. Zhao, Nianershi zhaji xiaozheng, 90–1. For the background and composition of the founding members of Later Han, see Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty,” pp. 82–165 and “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, volume II,” pp. 11–256; Yü, “Dong Han zhengquan zhi jianli yu shizu daxing zhi guanxi,” pp. 109–203; Utsunomiya, “Ryōshū to nanyō,” pp. 375–404; Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, pp. 73–123. After Wang Mang met his downfall in 23 CE, the Guanzhong area fell into the hands of Liu Xuan (d. 25 CE), the leader of a rebel army. He was proclaimed emperor because of his distant kinship with the Former Han imperial house. Liu Xuan’s domination in Guanzhong was quickly replaced by another rebel group called the “Red Eyebrows,” who brought another distant member of the Former Han imperial clan to the throne. In 27 CE, Emperor Guangwu defeated the Red Eyebrows, and in 30 CE, the Later Han finally came to control the Former Han metropolitan area. This area, however, remained insecure. as the territory of the Liang province was divided between Wei Ao and Dou Rong, and in the Yi province next to Liang, Gongsun Shu (d. 36 CE) also proclaimed himself emperor. Wei and Gongsun allied against Emperor Guangwu and posed great threats to the Guanzhong area. Emperor Guangwu even once intended to set aside Wei and Gongsun temporarily so that he could focus on the consolidation of his control in the east, see HHS, 13: 526. The area surrounding Luoyang had long been regarded by Chinese people dating back to Zhou times as the core of the central state, which was also the center of the known world. For an overview of such a cultural centrality, see Des Forges, Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History, pp. 1–4. SJ, 126: 3209.

150 151

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Being peripheralized 95 155 Thomsen, Ambition and Confucianism, pp. 151–3. For Wang Mang’s reform after the fabricated Zhou model, see Puett, “Centering the Realm,” pp. 129–54. 156 For Emperor Guangwu’s and his successors’ dependence on the classics, see Powers, Art and Political Expression in Early China, Chapter IV. For the institutional legacy of Wang Mang that was inherited by the Later Han dynasty, see Pu Xianqun, Qin Han Guanliao Zhidu (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002), pp. 96–103, and Puett, “Centering the Realm,” pp. 148–53. 157 For a detailed study of the Later Han Luoyang, see Bielenstein, “Lo-yang in Later Han Times,” pp. 1–147. 158 HHS, 70A: 2595–609. 159 Derk Bodde, “What and Why in Chinese Civilization,” in Willard J. Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks, and Ying-shih Yü eds., The Power of Culture: Studies in Chinese Cultural History (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994), pp. 352–3. 160 For the cultural differences between the civil and military officials in early China, see David A. Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300–900 (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 24–6. 161 For details of the system and its effect on the Qin-Han society, see Tu, Bianhu qimin, Chapter 8; Zhu Shaohou, Jungong juezhi kaolun (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2008); Nishijima Sadao, Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei to kōzō: nijittō shakusei no kenkyū (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1961); Tatemi Satoshi, “Zen Kan ni okeru ‘Teishi’ no kōzō to hensen─nijittō shakusei no kinō wo megutte─,” in Kudō Motoo and Ri Sonshi eds., Higashi Ajia kodai shutsudo moji shiryō no kenkyū (Tōkyō: Yūzankaku, 2009), pp. 82–110; Michael Loewe, “The Orders of Aristocratic Rank of Han China,” T’oung Pao Second Series 48, Livr. 1/3 (1960): 97–174; Michael Loewe, “Social Distinctions, Groups and Privileges,” in Michael Nylan and Michael Loewe eds., China’s Early Empires: A Re-appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 296–9; Mark Edward Lewis, “Gift Circulation and Charity in the Han and Roman Empires,” in Walter Scheidel ed., Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 122–4. For other aspects of the militarization promoted by the Qin state, see Robin D.S. Yates, “Law and the Military in Early China,” in Nicola Di Cosmo ed., Military Culture in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 38–42. 162 SJ, 8: 391. The three-foot sword was in Han measurement; one Han foot is equivalent to 23.1 cm. 163 SJ, 97: 2699. 164 Li, Handiguo de jianli yu Liu Bang jiduan, pp. 119–79; Wang, “Creators of an Emperor,” pp. 19–50. 165 See SJ, 18 and 22. 166 HS, 42: 2100. 167 Fu Lecheng studied the conflicts between the military talents from the northwestern commanderies and the generals with martial relations with Emperor Wu, such as Wei Qing and Huo Qubing; see Fu Lecheng, “Xi Han de jige zhengzhi jituan,” in his Han Tang shilunji, pp. 20–6. 168 HS, 69: 2971. 169 SJ, 97: 2699. 170 A comprehensive treatment on the development of men of letters in the Han times is Yu Yingchun, Qin Han shishi (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000). 171 SJ, 99: 2721–6. The original text called Shusun Tong “Hanjia ruzong,” literally the progenitor of Han Ru. As discussed in Chapter 1, the term Ru was not necessarily Confucian in the Han context; I use other neutral terms like classics scholars, men of letters, scholar-official, literati, intellectuals and so forth to describe those who called themselves Ru in the Han times. 172 See Fu, “Xi Han de jige zhengzhi jituan,” pp. 9–35.

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173 The most comprehensive survey on the two groups and their relationship during the Han times is Yan Buke, Shidaifu zhengzhi yansheng shigao (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1996). 174 Thanks to the archaeological findings in recent decades, we now have quite a number of Qin legal statutes and relevant documents which shed light on how the clerical system operated in the Qin times. The literature on this topic is enormous and still growing; a comprehensive study in English on the earlier excavated texts is Anthony F.P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law: An Annotated Translation of the Ch’in Legal and Administrative Rules of the 3rd Century B.C., Discovered in Yün-meng Prefecture, Hu-pei Province, in 1975 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985). 175 SJ, 53: 2013–20; HS, 39: 2005–12. 176 Yan, Shidaifu zhengzhi yansheng shigao, especially Chapter 6–10. 177 Qian Mu has a lucid analysis on this development in his Guoshi dagang, pp. 160–7. 178 On the traditional view of the victory of Han Confucianism, see Homer H. Dubs, translated and annotated, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, Volume II (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955), pp. 196–8, 285–6, and 341–53. Recently, Liang Cai has a detailed treatment of the success of Confucians in the Former Han bureaucracy; see her Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire. 179 Yan, Shidaifu zhengzhi yansheng shigao, Chapter 10. On the changing status of legal knowledge in the Han bureaucracy, also see Hsing I-tien, “Qin Han de luling xue,” in his Zhiguo anbang, pp. 1–61, and Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, pp. 43–9. 180 Hsing I-tien, “Yunwen yunwu: Handai guanli de yizhong dianxing,” in Tianxia yijia, pp. 224–84. 181 Hsing I-tien, “Lun Handai de yimao churen,” in Tianxia yijia, pp. 377–95. 182 On the institution of the General in the Former Han, see Liu Pakyuen, “Shilun Xi Han zhu jiangjun zhi zhidu jiqi zhengzhi diwei,” in his Lishi yu zhidu: Handai zhengzhi zhidu shishi (Hong Kong: Xianggang jiaoyu tushu gongsi, 1997), pp. 138–203. 183 HS, 78: 3283. 184 On the institution of the General in the Later Han, see Liu Pakyuen, “Dong Han jiangjun zhidu zhi yanbian,” in Lishi yu zhidu, pp. 204–308. 185 For detailed studies on the system, see Huang Liuzhu, Qin Han shijin zhidu (Xi’an: Xibei daxue chubanshe, 1985); Fukui Shigemasa, Kandai kanri tōyō seido no kenkyū (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1988); Yan Buke, Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1997), especially Chapters 1–4. 186 For the various recruitment methods of the early Former Han, see Huang, Qin Han shijin zhidu; Yan, Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao, pp. 22–7. 187 Yan, Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao, p. 3. 188 Yan, Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao , p. 4. 189 As Hsing I-tien points out, the chance of a man of humble origins to become a candidate of the “filial and corrupt” is very limited if not impossible. See Hsing, “Dong Han xiaolian de shenfen Beijing,” pp. 285–354. 190 On the ties and networks established among the scholar-officials which influenced the recommendation system, see Yan Buke, “Xiaolian tongsui yu Hanmo xuanguan,” in his Yueshi yu shiguan: chuantong zhengzhi wenhua yu zhengzhi zhidu lunji (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2001), pp. 209–25. 191 Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, pp. 99–191, especially pp. 115–24; Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, pp. 337–9. 192 “Confucianization” was a multi-faceted phenomenon during the Han dynasties, especially in the Later Han times, with the system of recruitment being but one facet of it. Paul Goldin has examined the concept of “Confucianization” in the context of Han law. See his “Han Law and the Regulation of Interpersonal Relations: ‘The Confucianization of the Law’ Revisited,” Asia Major XXV, Part I (2012): 1–32. 193 Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 13. 194 HHS, 58: 1880.

Being peripheralized 97 195 Emperor Ming of Later Han held in especially high regard the moral teachings of the Classics of Filial Piety. See Powers, Arts and Political Expression in Early China, p. 161. 196 HHS, 58: 1880. 197 HS, 10: 326. 198 HHS, 4: 189. 199 Hsing, “Dong Han xiaolian de shenfen beijing,” pp. 285–354. 200 For the Later Han as a “Confucian State,” see Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō and Gokan ni okeru “Jukyō kokka” no seiritsu. 201 For the Great Proscription, see de Crespigny, “Political Protest in Imperial China,” pp. 1–36. 202 HHS, 65: 2136. 203 HHS, 65: 2145. 204 HHS, 65: 2138–44. 205 HHS, 65: 2153–4. 206 HHS, 65: 2140. 207 Jin Fagen, “Dong Han danggu renwu de fenxi,” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 34(1963): 505–58. Besides Jin’s article, one can refer to Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, pp. 367–418 and Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, pp. 292–326. Watanabe’s research in particular criticizes Jin’s and provides a more detailed analysis of the origins and backgrounds of the proscribed members. 208 de Crespigny, Fire Over Luoyang, p. 377. 209 de Crespigny, “Political Protest in Imperial China,” p. 25.

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In the past, when the Qiang caitiffs launched rebellions, they began in the provinces of Liang and Bing, then spread to Sili (the metropolitan area), wreaked havoc on Zhao and Wei to the east, and plundered Shu and Han to the west; five provinces were devastated and six commanderies were uprooted. In the surrounding areas of more than a thousand li,1 nothing remained in the countryside. There was no end to the pillage and destruction day in and day out. For months, people were killed and their bodies burnt until they were charred. However, the gentlemen of interior commanderies who were not affected by the disasters proposed to keep their hands off while waiting for appropriate right time to deal with the situation. How could such a plan be what the people was hoping for?2

When the disheartened Wang Fu (ca. 90s–160s CE) wrote the above passage, which was part of an essay entitled “Rescuing the Frontiers” (Jiubian), during a respite from fighting the intermittent Qiang Wars sometime in the mid-second century CE, the terrible images of the war-torn northwest were still haunting him. Nearly 2,000 years later, readers can still feel Wang’s frustration and anger with the imperial center when he recalled the Qiang Wars. Wang Fu, a native of the Linjing county in the Anding commandery of the Liang province, was a noted yet eccentric literatus of his time. With no detail of his life left in the historical records, we only know that he was active in the first half of the second century CE that covers two intense periods of the prolonged Qiang Wars (107–118 CE and 140–145 CE).3 He might not have entered government service but was only an outspoken critic of politics and social issues. His commentaries were preserved in the work entitled Qianfulun, literally The Comments of a Recluse.4 Having experienced first-hand the Qiang Wars and the concomitant chaos, Wang Fu left in his work an eyewitness account of the suffering of the northwestern people and his criticism of the failure of the imperial policy dealing with the situation. Three essays in the Qianfulun concern frontier problems, and particularly the Qiang Wars, namely, “Rescuing the Frontiers” (Jiubian), “Opinion on the Frontiers” (Bianyi), and “Fortifying the Frontiers” (Shibian). The values of these essays in understanding the history of the Qiang Wars and the related matters cannot be overemphasized. When Fa Ye compiled the Hou Hanshu nearly 300 years later, he adopted Wang Fu’s report as one of the

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main sources in the account of the Qiang Wars.5 In the twentieth century, the French Sinologist Etienne Balazs praised Wang Fu as being “the most important eyewitness of his times, about which we would know very little if it were not for his account.”6 Nevertheless, other scholars alert the reader with the caveat that Wang Fu was extremely hostile to the imperial state and that his essays on the Qiang Wars were highly partisan as well as emotional.7 While it is true that Wang Fu’s criticism of the imperial state’s handling of the disaster showed discernible bias, his attitude also showcases the viewpoints and perceptions of some of his northwestern countrymen toward the imperial center. Before moving on to the history of the Qiang Wars, I shall first turn to the Qiang people, whom I have hitherto mentioned many times in this study. Who were the Qiang? It is a question that I shall deal with in the first section of this chapter. In the second section, I shall outline the military conflicts between the Qiang and the Han empires in order to provide a backdrop for our understanding of the extent of the devastation of the Qiang Wars. The final section will focus on two interwoven subjects: first, the catastrophic impact of the Qiang Wars on the Later Han in general and the Liang province in particular; second, the court debates over abandoning the Liang province during the intense periods of the Qiang Wars and the ensuing forcible evacuations. We shall see how the Qiang Wars exposed the underlying conflicts between the northwesterners and the imperial center, aggravated the feelings of alienation of the former from the latter, and deepened the distrust and estrangement between the two sides.

Who were the Qiang? The military confrontations between the Later Han and the Qiang constituted a “Hundred Years’ War” in that they continued intermittently through the mid-first century CE to the late-second century CE, which also spanned nearly the whole life of the dynasty. It was indeed a war of attrition in that the Later Han, entangled in the military conflicts, exhausted an enormous amount of resources and drained the imperial coffers to the verge of bankruptcy without achieving clear and decisive military and political victories. The Qiang wore down the Later Han and triggered the failure of the empire. In this section, I shall examine who the insurmountable Qiang were. According to the conventional viewpoint in Chinese history, the Qiang as an ethnic group has a very long history. In the People’s Republic of China nowadays, the Qiang are one of the fifty-five officially designated minority groups (shaoshu minzu), or so-called “brotherly groups” (xiongdi minzu), who join the ethnic Han majority to constitute the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu).8 The modern Qiang people are officially and commonly regarded as the descendants of the ancient Qiang since both of them lead a pastoral way of life and reside basically in the same area corresponding generally to the modern provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and Sichuan. Many modern studies contend that the history of the Qiang can be traced back to the prehistoric era. Over the long course of history, the Qiang have passed down their ethnic identity and culture generation after generation up to the present.9

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Chinese archaeologists also manifest such a conventional presumption in archaeology. Findings excavated in modern Gansu province and its environs are characterized as the remains of the Qiang, and the sites of Neolithic civilizations found in the areas such as Xindian, Siwa, and Kayue, mentioned in Chapter 2, are regarded as the settlements of the ancient Qiang.10 Nevertheless, since no written evidence or other concrete traces left by the Qiang have been recovered, no clear linkage can be established between those ancient civilizations and the ancient or the modern Qiang. That the Qiang were the ancient inhabitants in the northwest and they had always lived in the same area is not beyond doubt. It is, however, difficult to prove that the people who inhabited the area in earlier times were the ancestors of the Qiang in the Han times or later dynasties. Without concrete evidence, the lineage of the Qiang from the prehistoric to the Han periods should not be taken more than as an imaginative construction. Such an invented lineage of the Qiang people has a long tradition in Chinese historical records. The fact that there are no independent accounts of the Qiang in the Shiji and the Hanshu might indicate that the Qiang had not yet been qualified as an important group in the eyes of the empire. When the Qiang became a menace to the Later Han empire, historians felt the need to understand and record such a dreadful enemy. As a result, the first detailed account of the Qiang appears in the Hou Hanshu. In the “Account of the Western Qiang” (Xi Qiang zhuan) of Hou Hanshu, the compiler Fan Ye traces the origins of the Qiang to the San Miao, a tribe in the legendary period. According to Fan, the San Miao originally lived in the south and was a branch of the clan of Jiang. When the sage-emperor Shun expelled the Four Villains (sixiong) to the frontiers, the San Miao was exiled to the northwest, an area that was part of the Jincheng commandery of the Han times.11 The story goes on to narrate the relationship between the Qiang and the ancient Huaxia polities – Xia, Shang, and Zhou in chronological order – and the Qiang were categorized as a tribe of the various Western Rong.12 It was not until the time of the legendary chieftain Wuyi Yuanjian that the Qiang people distinguished themselves from the Rong. According to the sources, Wuyi Yuanjian was a fugitive slave of the ruler of the Qin state. He hid in a cave and survived the fire set by his pursuers. Then, he married a woman with a cut-off nose whom he met in the wild. Since the Qiang people believed Wuyi Yuanjian was protected by divine power from the harm of fire, they honored and followed him as the leader. The story goes on to tell how Wuyi Yuanjian and his wife taught the Qiang to practice animal husbandry. As his wife wore her hair hanging down to cover her nose-less face, the Qiang people emulated her in their hair style.13 The descendants of Wuyi Yuanjian gradually divided into various tribes living along the western frontier of the Han empires. In his account, Fan Ye provided his readers with a full story of to explain who the Qiang were, where they came from, and why they emerged in the northwest as they did in the Han dynasties. In tracing the origins of the Qiang, Fan constructed a fictive relationship between the Qiang and the Huaxia people by associating the Qiang with legendary figures such as Emperor Shun and the San Miao in order to lead his readers to believe that the Qiang were the people whom the Huaxia

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ancestors had already encountered.14 Similar to Sima Qian’s effort to rationalize the Xiongnu in the Shiji by placing them as “a legitimate component of Chinese history from the very beginning,” and making them “part of the family” of Huaxia,15 Fan Ye aimed to demystify the Qiang and familiarize the Huaxia with them in his accounts of the Qiang. Fan Ye also cast the Qiang in a role that would explain their adversarial relationship with the Later Han. The Qiang were descendants of the evil San Miao who had come into conflicts with the sage Emperor Shun; the Qiang then became a member of the Western Rong, who were the enduring enemies of the Zhou and Qin regimes. These two cases revealed the vicious nature of the Qiang as ingrained, and one should not be surprised by the enmity that prevailed between the Qiang and the Han. Besides, as an enemy of the Han dynasties, the Qiang were depicted as debased and barbarous as possible. They were the offspring of the ostracized San Miao and then a member of the barbarous Western Rong. The legendary leader Wuyi Yuanjian was originally a slave of the Qin state, which was regarded as a culturally backward regional state in the Zhou dynasty. Hence, the ancestors of the Qiang were constructed as being the worst of the worst. Moreover, Wuyi Yuanjian hid in a cave like an animal to escape from his hunters; he later married a nose-less woman he met in the wild. Although Fan Ye did not explain why the wife had her nose cut off, it probably indicated that she was a convict since amputation of the nose was one of the official punishments in early China. It is clear that the couple was described as the lowest kind in society. Furthermore, that the couple met and married in the wild meant they did not go through the proper marriage rites. “Meeting in the wild” (implied having sexual intercourse in the wild) was in particular an uncouth and shameless practice criticized severely by the Han Confucian scholars. Needless to say, the descendants of a fugitive slave and a convict who married in the wild like animals were a degenerate people. One instance of the Qiang’s barbarism was that they felt no shame in following Wuyi Yuanjian’s wife, probably a convict, in letting their hair hang loose (pifa). From the standpoint of Huaxia culture, untied hair was a gesture of rejecting refined culture and turning oneself into a barbarian, which I will discuss more later. All these depictions clearly show that the Qiang were being despised and de-humanized in the standard history.16 Although Fan Ye compiled the “Account of the Western Qiang” nearly three centuries after the Later Han, it does not necessarily mean that the reconstruction of the Qiang story was his own invention. He must have based his writing on the sources transmitted from the Later Han times.17 For instance, Ying Shao (d. 200 CE), a famous scholar-official in the last decades of Later Han, described the Qiang in his work entitled Fengsu tongyi (Comprehensive Discussion of Customs) as “originally from the Western Rong and were of low and degraded status.”18 It seems that, at least in the last years of Later Han, there was a view that the Qiang were members of the Western Rong, a group of barbarians in the west of Huaxia realm. Since the 1990s, the Taiwanese scholar Wang Mingke has published a plethora of works about the Qiang people and provided, from my point of view, a quite

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persuasive theory of the identity of the Qiang in history. Wang proposed that even though “Qiang” as a name was mentioned in various Chinese texts, from the oraclebone inscriptions of the fourteenth century BCE to the records of the Han dynasties, the Qiang were in fact not a “people” with any continuity in time and space but rather a general label used by the ancient Huaxia people to call the non-Huaxia people living in the west.19 The name “Qiang,” according to Wang, was an exonym (a label used by outsiders to refer to a given group) used by the ancient Huaxia people with other ethnic labels such as Di, Yi, and Rong, rather than an autonym (which people use to identify themselves).20 It carries with it therefore a sense of otherness to the ancient Huaxia people, that the Qiang people are “those in the west who are not us.”21 In other words, the Qiang were so called because the Han Chinese believed that they were the people who lived along China’s western frontiers generation after generation.22 Wang further suggested that the demographic and geographic implications of the term “Qiang” changed over time. From the Shang to Han dynasties, the term “Qiang” was generally applied to the people(s) widely distributed across the west and northwest of China, and its ethnic boundary kept shifting towards the west along with the Chinese westward expansion.23 During the Han dynasties, when the Han people reached the west, the autochthonous people who lived there were subsequently named “Qiang” by the Han empire. In fact, given the limited historical sources, particularly without direct evidence left by the ancient Qiang, it is difficult to establish a clear connection between the Qiang of the Han times and the ancient peoples who inhabited the same area. In the rest of this study, therefore, I will isolate the Qiang people of the Han times from the periods before and after and adopt Wang Mingke’s view of treating the term “Qiang” as an ancient ethnonym and a catch-all category for the people living in the west of the Han empires. This does not necessarily mean that the people who were called “Qiang” ethnonymously cannot be treated as an ethnic group. Here, I follow the definition given by Siân Jones that an ethnic group was “any group of people who set themselves apart and/or are set apart by others with whom they interact or coexist on the basis of their perceptions of cultural differentiation and/or common descent.”24 By this definition, people who were called “Qiang” (as an exonym) during the Han times constituted an ethnic group because they were regarded as and set apart by the Han people and also because, as will be shown below, their culture was different from that of the Han people. Conflicts with the Han empires made the Qiang acutely aware of their common boundaries, forcing them to define their differences from the Han and leading them to build defenses or launch assaults against their common adversary. As the Qiang were distinct from the Huaxia people, we may ask what kind of marker(s) of distinction the Han people adopted. Since antiquity, the Huaxia people have been in contact with peoples dissimilar from themselves; some of them could be distinguished by notions of physical appearance such as “deep eyes and high noses,” salient features that became a stereotypical description of foreigners in later periods.25 There was, however, no record that the Qiang were seen to possess different physical features from the other people within the Han imperial realm.

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Hairstyle was definitely an essential marker of ethnicity in Chinese history. In contrast to the hairstyle of the Han people, the Qiang left their hair untied, which was regarded by the Han people as a signifier of cultural barbarism.26 In the early Later Han, celebrated scholar Ban Biao (3–54 CE) once warned Emperor Guangwu that there were large numbers of surrendered Qiang intermingling with the Han people in the Liang province, and it would cause tremendous problems if the imperial state did not take any measure to forestall them. He described the Qiang as a people who “let the hair unbound and fold the robes to the left” ( pifa zuoren), pointing out that the customs between the Han and the Qiang were different (xisu jiyi), and their languages were mutually unintelligible ( yanyu butong).27 It was true that the Qiang left their hair unbound, but we have no record of the Qiang’s clothing. In fact, whether the Qiang really folded their robes to the left was not the crux of the matter. What Ban Biao said, pifa zuoren, was of symbolic meaning. It draws a line between civilized people and barbarians. Since Confucius first used the phrase pifa zuoren to refer to the non-Zhou people,28 the phrase had become a metaphor of primitiveness commonly used by ancient Chinese literati to describe alien people who led a barbarous and uncivilized way of life.29 By using this phrase, Ban Biao intended to emphasize the fundamental cultural differences between the Qiang and the Han, with the different customs and languages as supporting evidence. According to the available sources, the most significant markers that distinguished the Qiang from the Han people were their way of life and social organization.30 The “Account of Western Qiang” says, [The Qiang] have no fixed abode, but go where there are water and pasture. Their lands produce little of the five grains, and they make their living by raising and herding animals . . . When the father dies, [the son] marries the step-mother; when the elder brother dies, [the younger brother] marries the widow. Hence, there are no widowers and widows in their country, and their breeds are prosperous. There are no monarchs or officials; no one tribe is superior to others or tries to unify the others. When [a group is] strong, people will splitter off from their original tribe and have their own leader; when [the group is] weak, people will attach themselves to a stronger one. They raid and plunder each other and worship the strong as heroes . . . They are good at fighting in mountain valleys but weak on the plains. They are not known for prolonged fighting, but are unflinching in short frontal attacks. [They] regard dying in battle as auspicious, and dying from illness inauspicious. [They] can withstand extremely cold weather just like the animals.31 Ying Shao also provided a similar entry in the Fengsu tonyi, which Fan Ye probably copied into his work: [The Qiang] have neither monarchs and officials nor superiors and subordinates. Those who are physically strong are named the headmen. [They] would not be brought under a unified command, and divide themselves into

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Both passages depict the most notable features of the Qiang that to the Han writers distinguished them from the Han people. The first and foremost striking contrast between the Qiang and the Han was that the former led a pastoral way of life, raising and herding animals for livelihood, while the latter was composed mainly of a sedentary agrarian population. Benefiting from modern geographical and archaeological studies, we now understand that the Qiang and the ancient people who inhabited the same area led a pastoral way of life as a strategy of survival and an adaptation to the natural environment.33 Herding cattle, horses, sheep, and goats constituted the Qiang’s production portfolio. The Qiang were, in particular, known as shepherds. The Later Han scholar Xu Shen (d. 120s CE) explained in his etymological classic Shuowen jiezi (Explanation of Simple and Compound Graphs) that the character “Qiang” was formed by the two words “sheep” and “man.” The Qiang were, therefore, shepherds in the west.34 Ying Shao also mentioned that the Qiang “work mainly as shepherds, therefore the character Qiang is formed by putting together the words sheep and man, and they are thus called.”35 The image of the Qiang as shepherds was engraved in the memory of the Han people. The image that the Qiang had neither fixed abodes nor cities/towns and had to move with their cattle in search of pasture marked the utmost fundamental differences between them and their Han neighbors. For the Han people, a sedentary way of life was an indisputable signifier of civilization, which served as a criterion that separates them from the cultural and ethnic other. Social customs and organization forms another distinctive contrast between the Qiang and the Han. The Qiang practiced levirate marriage, where a man was obliged to marry the widow of his brother, and a son of a deceased man to marry his step-mother.36 This practice, considering the difficulty of surviving in a tough natural environment, was a strategy to help the Qiang continue their family lines. In the eyes of the Han people, however, the Qiang’s marriage practices were animalistic and sacrilegious and should be denounced since they severely violated the moral standard and social order of the Han society, especially during the Later Han dynasty when the scholar-officials of classical training were influential in the intellectual word.37 The Han literati believed that their moral principles and social customs were universal in nature, and the deviant behavior of the Qiang could only prove that they were uncouth barbarians. Furthermore, from the Han point of view, the Qiang’s lack of a centralized political system and social stratification were clear signs of backwardness and barbarism. As early as in the pre-imperial age, the Huaxia people already believed that their political system, administrative institutions, and social hierarchies were superior to those of their neighbors. This kind of belief was strengthened by the unification of a centralized empire in the Qin-Han period. The absence of monarchs, officials, and social stratification and the presence of a loose political organization clearly defined the inferiority of the Qiang people.38 Meanwhile,

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the lack of a centralized authority and the division into various competing tribes made the Qiang a difficult enemy for the Han empires to find a consistent strategy to deal with. The sources also mentioned the Qiang’s respect for physical strength and military prowess in order to showcase the Qiang as brutal and belligerent warriors, a trait which distinguished them from the civilized Han people. Fan Ye further described the Qiang in animal terms and mocked the Qiang’s capability of enduring extremely cold weather for being no different from the animals. Since the Qiang were animals or animal-like people, it went without saying that they had a different nature from the Han people, which explains why they were a restive crowd always in conflict with the Han state.39 Besides these cultural differences, political allegiance also played an increasingly important role in defining the Qiang against the Han, especially from the mid-Later Han period onward. During the tumultuous years of the Qiang Wars, the destruction and havoc deeply changed people’s way of living, obscuring a clear distinction between the Qiang and the Han. Over the course of the protracted conflicts, as will be shown in the following sections, the ethnic boundaries between the two sides in the northwestern region gradually became blurred. Both Han and Qiang united to fight against the empire, and some ethnic Han people were thus called Qiang by their imperial adversary. The warlord Dong Zhuo, for example, was called a Qiang by his contemporaries since he was close to the Qiang chieftains and, most importantly, commanded a military force constituted by a large number of Qiang officers and soldiers.40 Also, during the last decades of Later Han, many local strongmen in Liang province married Qiang women and commanded Qiang forces. On the political spectrum of the time, there were no sharp differences between the ethnic Qiang and ethnic Han in the northwest when they were all enemies of the imperial state and were “those who are not part of us and live in the west” in the eyes of Guandong-based scholar-officials. In other words, “Qiang” was a label used to refer to a hostile population living west of the Later Han imperial core. At this point, “Han” and “Qiang” are malleable terms that define the people who either swore allegiance to the imperial state or did not.41

Enduring rivalry between Han and Qiang The intermittent military conflicts between the Later Han state and the various Qiang tribes constituted a “Hundred Years’ War.” Their devastating consequences for the Later Han empire cannot be overemphasized. The Later Han state found it difficult to overcome the Qiang on battlefield; even though it could in the end quell the so-called Qiang rebellion, it was a Pyrrhic victory. The prolonged conflict also aggravated the feelings of discontent and enmity of the northwesterners towards the imperial center. This section will first introduce the bellicose relations between the Former Han and the Qiang as a backdrop for the understanding of the enduring rivalry between the Later Han and the Qiang, then sketch the course of the protracted Qiang Wars in the Later Han times.

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The adversarial relations between the Former Han and the Qiang The Qiang were not a main concern in the Former Han imperial strategy. The fact that there is no specific account for the Qiang in the Shiji or the Hanshu tells of the relative insignificance of the Qiang to the Former Han state. Even though military conflicts occasionally broke out between the Former Han and the Qiang, in the eyes of the Former Han policy makers, the Qiang as a group played only a minor role on the Former Han’s strategic setting against the Xiongnu.42 When the Former Han counted the Qiang in its strategic agenda, it was mostly for the purpose of cutting it off from contact with the Xiongnu as a way to undermine the Xiongnu’s power. The first recorded formal contact between the Qiang and the Former Han happened during the reign of Emperor Jing when a Qiang tribe submitted themselves to the Han state. This Qiang tribe was settled in five counties: Didao, Didao (with a different Chinese character), Qiangdao, Angu, and Lintao.43 Among them, there were three “dao” – special districts for settling alien populations.44 When Emperor Wu initiated the imperial expansionist project, there was an influx of Han troops and settlers into the Qiang domain. Conflicts subsequently broke out as the Qiang felt the threat of being dislocated by the encroaching Han power.45 On the other hand, the Xiongnu sometimes resorted to using the Qiang to threaten the Former Han’s backdoor – the southern part of the northwestern region. The Qiang and the Xionunu raised a collaborative assault against the Han in 112 BCE. The various Qiang tribes gathered about 100,000 men and launched an eastward attack on the Former Han to echo a concomitant southward attack from the Xiongnu. In response, Emperor Wu dispatched the cavalry of the northwestern region and the infantry of the interior commanderies, totaling 100,000 soldiers, to suppress the Qiang.46 In the aftermath, the emperor set up the official position of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang to take charge of the Qiang affairs.47 In 81 BCE, the imperial court of Emperor Zhao took two counties each from the commanderies of Tianshui, Longxi, and Zhangye to form a new commandery called Jincheng as a means to strengthen the imperial control over the area and the defense against the Qiang. The famous general Zhao Chongguo, who would spend his last years dealing with the Qiang problem, also moved to the new commandery with other pioneers, as the previous chapter mentioned. The Qiang offensive in 112 BCE was not merely a collaborative invasion with the Xiongnu but also an armed resistance against the Han encroachment. In contrast to the conventional explanation given in standard dynastic histories that conflicts arose between the Huaxia regimes and the surrounding peoples because the avaricious barbarians looked for opportunities to plunder the Huaxia realm, the Qiang were in fact victims of Han territorial expansion and colonization.48 Accompanying the inroads that Han power made into the region was a large number of Han garrison soldiers and settlers who competed with the Qiang for the pasture and arable land. The state-sponsored conversion of pastures into agricultural settlements or state-owned grazing land forced the Qiang people to retreat to the rather unproductive uplands in the west. A focal point of struggle between

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the Han and the Qiang was the Great and Little Yu Valleys (Daxiao Yugu), which are principally alluvial plains and loess-covered low hills and therefore a major agricultural area in the upper Yellow River Valley.49 The area was an ideal place to various Qiang tribes for their mixed economy before the influx of the Han settlers which led to the retreat of the former to isolated enclaves. The deprived Qiang then looked for opportunities to fight and recover their lost land.50 In the meantime, an increasing number of surrendered or captured Qiang were relocated by the Han state into the northwestern counties. In the new environment, these alien newcomers usually came under discrimination, abused and exploited by the Han local officials and magnates, which in turn exacerbated tensions and unease between the Han and the Qiang. During the reign of Emperor Yuan, for example, an official named Hou Ying (fl. 40s–30s BCE) once reported that the Qiang living along the frontiers were suffering from Han exploitation as the greedy Han officials and people seized their wives, sons, and animals.51 Seeds of hatred were sowed. The Qiang launched another large-scale assault in 61 BCE. Although the Xiongnu did play a role in abetting the Qiang in rising against the Han empire, the crucial factor that triggered the offensive was the Han-Qiang conflicts over grazing lands. A few years earlier, a Han emissary named Yiqu Anguo (the surname Yiqu probably reveals that his family was of Yiqu Rong provenance, a group of the Rong people active in the northwest during the Warring States period) visited the Qiang region, and a Qiang tribe asked for permission to move eastward from the barren mountains they were living to the no-man’s area in the valley of the Huang River, where they could herd their animals. When Yiqu Anguo reported to the imperial court, General Zhao Chongguo opposed the request. The Qiang, however, assumed that they had already notified the Han emissary and thus led their herds across the Huang River. Local authorities were unable to handle the situation, and conflicts arose. In 63 BCE, several Qiang tribes forged an alliance and swore to fight together against the Han regime. The imperial court then sent Yiqu Anguo again to settle the dispute. Upon his arrival, Yiqu summoned forty chieftains and had them beheaded. He then ordered troops under his command to raid the Qiang and killed over 1,000 of them. The massacre provoked uproar among the Qiang, and widespread revolts broke out.52 When the situation got out of control, the seasoned General Zhao Chongguo, who was in his seventies, volunteered to head the military campaign. Unlike his colleagues who favored a heavy-handed policy of suppressing the Qiang, Zhao set up colonies of Han settlers in the region instead; he believed it was the most effective way to throttle the Qiang.53 Finally, Zhao managed to quell the disturbance, but his victory was no more than a short-term palliative measure. The Former Han never found an optimal solution to the deep-rooted conflicts with the Qiang.54 Sporadic revolts of the Qiang broke out in the last forty years of the Former Han.55 The empire did not relax its grip on the Qiang, especially when it came to preventing the Qiang from allying with the Xiongnu to threaten the communication lines between the imperial center and the Western Regions.56

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Documents on wooden boards and bamboo strips excavated in the northwest also speak of the mounting tensions between the Han and the Qiang during the Former Han times. An official document found in the Juyan site states that family members of government staff who were killed by the Qiang would be granted 30,000 qian (coins) for burial.57 On another strip is a letter written by a poor writer to express his gratitude to his patron who had helped him resettle in the midst of the Qiang area (Qiangzhong).58 This kind of resettlement exemplifies the Han policy of moving poor people into the Qiang-populated area, which further disturbed the lives of the Qiang tribes. Also in Xuanquan, at an excavated site of a Han postal relay office near Dunhuang, remnants of late Former Han official documents concerning the Qiang were discovered, including dossiers of the offices of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang and an array of official postings that were not mentioned in the received dynastic histories.59 Among these dossiers, there are reports of the Han army suppressing Qiang revolts and records of the management of the surrendered Qiang people.60 The Former Han and the Qiang maintained a fragile peace until the beginning of the first century CE when Wang Mang became the regent of the last Former Han emperor. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Wang Mang forced some of the Qiang tribes to surrender their lands to establish the Xihai commandery, a move which eventually backfired as the Qiang attacked the new commandery in order to retake the territory. Wang Mang’s failure once again showed that scramble for land was a deep-rooted cause of conflicts between the two sides. The Qiang Wars during the Later Han dynasty61 From the standpoint of the Later Han state, the Qiang who engaged in the Qiang Wars were composed of both foreign invaders and internal rebels. The Qiang forces were constituted not only by the Qiang tribes beyond the imperial realm who had conflicts with the Han people over land resources and other causes but also by those who lived inside the empire and were its subjects. For the Qiang people living outside the imperial realm, the Han colonization in the northwest encroached upon their territories. Competition for grazing and arable lands between the two sides was intense. The Later Han never stopped setting up colonies in the Qiang area. For example, around 100 CE, a local official proposed reinstating the Xihai commandery, which had been abolished under the Qiang attacks. The imperial court empowered this official to set up thirty-four colonies in the area as preparatory measures for the reinstitution of the Xihai commandery. The increase in the number of colonies threatened the Qiang’s living space and therefore intensified rivalry between the two sides. As historical records show, when the Han colonists moved into the Qiang’s territory, various Qiang tribes forged alliances and united forces to resist the Han troops. Within the imperial realm, the availability of large numbers of Qiang, who had been settled by the Former Han dynasty along the northwestern frontier, complicated and vastly magnified the Qiang problem. The vacuum created by the civil war between the two Han dynasties enabled some of the Qiang living originally

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outside the empire to move in and to occupy counties in the Jincheng commandery. In the midst of the civil war, both Wei Ao and Dou Rong recruited the Qiang and other non-Han peoples to form multi-ethnic military forces.62 When Dou Rong surrendered and Wei Ao died, not all their Qiang followers or allies shifted their allegiance to the newly established Later Han regime; some of them were still openly hostile towards the dynasty and raided the Han territory. The Later Han state carried on its predecessor’s practices by sending military forces to crush the restive Qiang, reinstating the Colonel Supervising the Qiang to oversee the Qiang area, and resettling captured and surrendered Qiang in the northwestern region.63 In 35 CE, General Ma Yuan resettled more than 8,000 Qiang in the commanderies of Tianshui, Longxi, and Fufeng.64 The first two commanderies were in the Liang province, but Fufeng was in the erstwhile Former Han metropolitan area, and it was the first time that the Qiang were resettled in a non-frontier commandery; Ma’s decision incurred criticism from later generations of Han literati for sowing the seeds of Qiang rebellion in inland areas.65 In 58 CE, Later Han troops defeated a Qiang tribe and settled 7,000 of them in the Former Han metropolitan area.66 Henceforth, the Qiang spread to the core of the Guanzhong area. In 77 CE, a certain number of Qiang living in the Former Han metropolitan area were moved to Hedong, an interior commandery adjacent to the Later Han metropolitan region. In 101 CE, the Grand Administrator of the Jicheng commandery defeated the Qiang and resettled the 6,000 surrendered to the commanderies of Hanyang, Anding, and Longxi.67 In addition, the commanderies of Beidi, Shang, and Xihe were filled with the Qiang population. Different Qiang groups received different treatments. The Later Han state settled some of the Qiang along the frontiers and allowed them to retain their tribal organization in order to utilize their military strength for frontier garrisons. Spreading along the frontiers, however, gave these groups opportunities to collaborate with their fellow Qiangs who lived outside the empire. Retaining tribal organization also enabled them to preserve solidarity and autonomy, which would become their weapons in anti-Han operations. On the other hand, the Later Han state disbanded the tribal organization of some Qiang groups and resettled them in counties to live with Han people as common subjects of the empire. Some of them were recruited by the imperial state as special troops, whereas others were reduced to being retainers and slaves of the local magnates. The Qiang generally suffered from exploitation which exacerbated their hostility towards the Han. The Qiang Wars broke out against such a backdrop. After Ma Yuan’s suppression of the Qiang in 35 CE, fights between the Qiang and the Han broke out consecutively in 56, 57, and 58 CE in the commanderies of Wudu and Longxi.68 Although the Han forces managed to overcome the Qiang, the strength of the Qiang in the northwest remained intact. When the newly appointed Acting Colonel Supervising the Qiang, Guo Xiang (fl. 50s CE), arrived in the Longxi commandery, he was frightened by the fact that the Qiang were prevalent in the Liang province and immediately retreated to the capital. Guo was dismissed for his timidity, and the office of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang was left vacant, which reflected the inactive attitude of the imperial court. In 76 CE, a

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new round of military conflicts broke out, and the Later Han state reinstated the Colonel Supervising the Qiang and spent great effort in quelling the Qiang.69 The situation got out of control again in 86 CE, and the Colonel was killed in a battle in the following year. Shortly afterwards, 800 Qiang tribal chieftains who agreed to make peace with the new Colonel Supervising the Qiang were ambushed and executed. This aroused widespread anger among the Qiang and triggered another wave of the fierce Qiang offensive, which lasted until 89 CE when a new Colonel managed to pacify the Qiang.70 Military confrontations, however, resumed in 92 CE, and the Later Han state had to spend the following six years coping with the situation. In addition to the large-scale disturbances mentioned above, skirmishes happened intermittently, which were mainly ignited by the Han mismanagement of the Qiang along the frontiers. When there were Han officials who were capable of maintaining a good relationship with the Qiang, the region could enjoy peace and stability without recourse to the armed forces.71 However, when the Han officials mishandled the situation, such as killing the surrendered tribal chieftains, widespread discontent and hatred spurred the Qiang to fight against the Han. Yet, while the management ability and diplomatic skill of the officials were important in dealing with the Qiang, they were neither a stable institutional mechanism nor a long-term method to resolve the deep-rooted antagonism between the Han and the Qiang. Depending on capable officials was only a stopgap measure that would only maintain a fragile peace. In the second century CE, three wars broke out between the Han and the Qiang and brought devastating impact to the empire. The first began in 107 CE and ended in 118 CE, the second from 140 to 145 CE, and the third from 159 to 169 CE. In 107 CE, a Han emissary to the Western Regions forcibly conscripted several thousand Qiang cavalrymen in the commanderies of Jicheng, Longxi, and Hanyang as his escort. Those unwilling Qiang cavalrymen all fled when they arrived at the Jiuquan commandery because they were afraid that would be deployed in the Western Regions with no promise of returning alive.72 To catch the Qiang mutineers, the Han troops raided many Qiang settlements and caused widespread discontent and fear. Nearly all the Qiang in the Liang province thus rose up against the Han authorities. They attacked towns and killed Han officials. According to the sources, since those Qiang had already settled in the empire for a long time, they lived as common subjects and had no armor and weapons. They therefore sharpened bamboo and wooden sticks as spears and halberds and used wooden boards as shields. Some of them even wielded bronze mirrors to mislead the Han soldiers into thinking that they were holding bronze weapons.73 Poorly equipped though they were, the Qiang were able to defeat the Han forces repeatedly. Facing a large-scale revolt of the Qiang, the Later Han state deployed 50,000 troops under the command of the General of Chariots and Cavalry (Juji Jiangjun) Deng Zhi (d. 121 CE), who was also the brother of the regent Empress Dowager Deng and a descendant of Deng Yu (a founding member of the Later Han and the first of the “Twenty-Eight Generals of the Cloud Terrace”), with the assistance of Ren Shang (d. 118 CE). Appointing such a prestigious person as Deng Zhi

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as the commander-in-chief demonstrated that the imperial state began the campaign with high hopes. The result, however, was disappointing. Deng’s army was defeated in 108 CE. Dianlian (d. 112 CE), a Qiang chieftain, seized the opportunity to establish a regime in the Beidi commandery and proclaim himself Son of Heaven. He then called upon the Qiang people everywhere to invade the regions of Zhao and Wei (modern northern Henan and southern Hebei provinces) in the east and Yi province (modern Sichuan province) in the south. The Guanzhong region was at the Qiang’s mercy, and its communication with the east was cut off. The modern provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, southern Hebei, and the northern portion of Sichuan were all subjected to the Qiang assault. The price of grain in the counties in the Huangzhong area, where the conflict was most intense, skyrocketed. Innumerable civilians were killed in the chaos. Facing such a challenging situation, the imperial court immediately called back Deng Zhi in order to protect him from further defeat, which would undermine the authority of the Deng family, and left Ren Shang to take over the command.74 Between 109 to 110 CE, the Han army suffered a series of defeats. The imperial court then ordered Ren Shang to retreat to Chang’an and to strengthen the defense of the core of the Guanzhong region. Meanwhile, upon the request of local officials, the government seats of the Jicheng commandery and the Colonel Supervising the Qiang were removed from their original locations. The evacuation of imperial troops and government seats prefigured the Later Han state’s intention of withdrawing from the war-torn region, which will be discussed in the next section. In 111 CE, Ren Shang was dismissed for having achieved nothing in the campaign. On the other hand, the Qiang became even stronger and crossed the Yellow River to attack the interior commanderies, including Hedong, Shangdang, and Henei, and further threatened the regions of Zhao, Wei, and the imperial capital. The imperial court was frightened and immediately mobilized all the capital defense forces to guard the chokepoint access to the capital. Over 600 fortresses were built in north China.75 In the meantime, the imperial court forcibly evacuated the residents of the Longxi, Anding, and Shang commanderies eastward to the Former Han metropolitan area. For those who were reluctant to move, the Han armies reaped all their crops in the fields and demolished their houses.76 These measures only fueled the apprehension among the people of the Liang province and finally provoked the homeless among them into acts of violence against the Han authorities. Those northwestern residents finally joined Dianlian’s anti-Han regime. Starting from 112 CE, the war entered into a stalemate. The Later Han state attempted to break through by setting up thirty-three fortresses in the interior commandery of Henei in 114 CE to strengthen its defense line, then replacing the commanding military officers with a new cohort and calling in the Xiongnu cavalry for help.77 It was not until 118 CE that the Later Han forces finally destroyed the Dianlian regime, though by then Dianlian was already dead and the leadership had passed to his son. Order was temporarily restored in the affected region, but the magnitude of devastation in the ten-year conflict was unprecedented.

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The peace of 118 CE was short-lived. Armed conflicts broke out again in 120 CE and lasted till 122 CE with a heavy death toll on both sides. In 126 CE, the authorities of the Liang province suppressed another Qiang rebellion, and the area enjoyed a short respite from war.78 In the early 130s CE, the Later Han state resumed colonies in the Huangzhong region, which immediately ignited new fury in the Qiang, who raided the Han commanderies in 134 CE in retaliation and began a new round of military conflicts. The cumulative effect of the 130s CE conflicts was the second Qiang War (140–145 CE). The Qiang attacked the Jincheng commandery and the Former Han metropolitan region. Ma Xian (d. 141 CE), a hero in the previous war, was appointed General Who Conquers the West (Zhengxi jiangjun) and commanded 100,000 troops to suppress the Qiang. Three hundred fortresses were set up as a defensive measure. In 141 CE, however, a cavalry contingent of 5,000 to 6,000 personally led by Ma Xian met with a debacle at Mount Yegu. Ma and his two sons were slaughtered, and the contingent was decimated.79 Ma Xian was the highest ranking official ever killed by the Qiang, and his death indeed marked a military catastrophe for the Later Han imperial court. In contrast, the Qiang were emboldened within and beyond the imperial realm to unite against the Later Han empire, which historical accounts describe as “the subsequent great union of the Eastern and Western Qiang.”80 The Qiang then divided into three armies: one advanced eastward to Chang’an where they burnt the mausoleums of the Former Han sovereigns; another marched northward to the Beidi commandery and defeated the Han defensive forces there; and the third moved northwestward to raid the Hexi Corridor. The Liang province and the Guanzhong region as a whole was subsequently ravaged by the Qiang. In response, the imperial court relocated the government seats of Anding and Beidi eastward.81 In 142 CE, the imperial court appointed Zhao Chong (d. 144 CE) as the Colonel Supervising the Qiang to cope with the situation. Apart from employing military forces, Zhao exploited the disunity of the Qiang tribes and incited some Qiang chieftains to surrender. In 144 CE, however, one of Zhao’s attachés joined the Qiang rebels. When chasing this deserter, Zhao Chong and his men were ambushed and wiped out. It was not until the following year when the Han officials managed to bribe some Qiang chieftains that they were able to break the Qiang union and thus end the war.82 The third war broke out in 159 CE and lasted for ten years. In 159 CE, Duan Jiong, one of the “Brilliant Three of the Liang Province,” was appointed Colonel Supervising the Qiang. The ruthless Duan Jiong was well-known for his ironhand policy in dealing with the Qiang. Once he assumed the commandership, Duan defeated several Qiang groups in the Longxi commandery. In the following years, Duan and the Qiang fought back and forth in the northwest. When Duan was in a campaign in 161 CE, the Qiang and other non-Han people under his command mutinied because of their discontent with the prolonged military service. Duan’s troops collapsed as a result, and he was jailed by the imperial court. Duan’s successor was unable to suppress the Qiang, and the situation grew worse. The imperial court then appointed Huangfu Gui and Zhang Huan to take

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charge. Both Huangfu Gui and Zhang Huan were different from Duan Jiong in that they did not rely solely on coercive force but also adopted sympathetic stances in dealing with the Qiang.83 They therefore managed to alleviate the situation for several months. The deep-rooted antagonism between the Han and the Qiang, however, was far from resolved. In 162 CE, various Qiang tribes united again and launched another wave of an offensive. All commanderies in the west were ravaged, and the Later Han “nearly lost the Liang province.”84 Facing the uncontrollable situation, the imperial court released Duan Jiong from prison and restored him as the Colonel Supervising the Qiang. After returning to the frontline, Duan Jiong waged a large-scale counteroffensive campaign. Between 164 and 165 CE, according to the sources, there was not a single day that Duan was not fighting.85 The Qiang were exhausted and gave up fighting. Duan was ennobled for his victory. In 167 CE, Duan wiped out the Western Qiang. The history thus says, “the Western Qiang were thus pacified.”86 Nevertheless, the Eastern Qiang were still active in Guanzhong. With Duan Jiong’s success on the western front, the emperor summoned him to the capital for his opinion on how to handle the eastern front. Duan said that the Qiang could only be dealt with by “putting pikes between their ribs and blades on their necks.”87 The emperor found Duan’s view persuasive and therefore appointed him to take charge of the eastern front. Duan defeated and killed many Qiang once he arrived at the front. The imperial court showered him with honor and granted him the title of General Who Crushes the Qiang. To make good his promise to the emperor of ending the war quickly, Duan continued his offensive strategy and carried out widespread massacre to slaughter any Qiang people he encountered. In the end of the biography of Duan Jiong in the Hou Hanshu, the compiler Fan Ye praised Duan’s victory as making “the valley quiet and the mountain vacant,”88 as a result of the mass killings. It was, however, a Pyrrhic victory. The protracted warfare had drawn the Later Han to the verge of bankruptcy and, most importantly, deeply undermined the imperial authority in the northwest.

Seeds of destruction The magnitude of devastation caused by the Qiang Wars was unprecedented in the Later Han history. The protracted warfare not only resulted in the tremendous loss of life and property but also unleashed a maelstrom of unrest in the northwest, which finally bred hostility among the northwesterners towards the imperial center. Although it won the Qiang Wars, the Later Han state ironically lost control of the northwestern region. It was the northwestern warlord Dong Zhuo who gave a fatal blow to the Later Han imperial authority and triggered the disintegration of the empire. Economic losses and heavy casualties The sporadic conflicts with the Qiang during the first fifty years of Later Han had already necessitated the presence of large garrison forces in the northwestern

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region which incurred heavy maintenance costs. From the 100s CE onward, the prolonged Qiang Wars took a heavy toll on both sides and even left the Later Han on the brink of bankruptcy. According to the accounts given by the Hou Hanshu, military spending in the first Qiang War (107–118 CE), including feeding the troops and other logistical expenses, “cost over twenty four billion qian and emptied the state’s coffers.”89 In 111 CE, when the war “spread to the interior commanderies, a myriad of people on the frontier died; the resources of the provinces of Bing and Liang were consequently exhausted.”90 Although the historical records give no exact number of casualties, it would not be baseless to say that the death toll of the Later Han soldiers alone was high, not to mention that of civilians. For example, when Ren Shang met a devastating defeat in 108 CE, over 8,000 of his soldiers were killed. Also, from the “Stele for Zhao Kuan” discussed in the previous chapter, in around 108 and 109 CE when Zhao Kuan was the Deputy Major of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang, he was engaged in a battle which decimated the Later Han army, and Zhao Kuan himself barely survived but lost his four sons.91 Furthermore, when the Qiang forces invaded the interior commanderies, which had enjoyed a long period of peace and prosperity, it caused panic in those areas. A great number of fortresses were built in the interior, and residents were forced to evacuate. In a Later Han stele dating to 117 CE called Si Sangong shan bei, which was inscribed in commemorating an offering to a local deity carried out by local officials, the phrase “suffered from the Qiang’s raid” was used to describe the context behind erecting the stele.92 It is noteworthy that the stele was located originally in Changshan Guo (in modern Hebei province), an enfeoffed kingdom in the interior of the empire, and shows the Qiang Wars’ impact had reached beyond the Northwest. The threat of war, pillage, and the subsequent hyperinflation in grain prices all triggered large-scale dislocation of the population in the northwest.93 Once again, Zhao Kuan, who followed the refugees to move to Guanzhong area after the catastrophic defeat, provided a vivid example of dislocation. Moreover, a comparison between census data of the Later Han (140 CE) and the Former Han (2 CE), both listed in Chapter 2, shows clearly that the northwestern commanderies experienced a drastic drop in population after the first 100 years of Later Han. For example, the percentage of the Later Han’s registered households in Longxi and Jincheng commanderies was only 10 percent of the Former Han’s. In the case of the Beidi commandery, it was only 5 percent. The apparent population decrease in the northwestern region could have resulted from various reasons, but the Qiang War between 107 and 118 CE was undoubtedly a significant one. Many people were killed in the war and more fled and disappeared from the government household register to shirk their onerous duties and avoid military service. As a result, while the Later Han state had to inject enormous resources into the Qiang Wars, the taxable northwestern households were shrinking quickly. In order to compensate for the loss, local governments squeezed as much tax and service as possible from the remaining residents, which in turn induced them to evade the burden even more. A vicious cycle was thus formed.

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Although the second Qiang War was shorter than the first, it still cost the Later Han state over 8 billion qian. The death toll of soldiers was no less than that of the previous war. For instance, Ma Xin and his two sons and several thousand cavalrymen were slaughtered in the battle at Mount Yegu; most of the 100,000 men under Ma’s command finally died in the subsequent battles. History sums up the fatalities of the war in these terms: “the bones of the soldiers who did not attain a proper death were widely seen in the countryside.”94 Like the first two wars, the third Qiang War (159–169 CE) that lasted ten years incurred enormous costs. Duan Jiong fought 108 battles, killed over 38,600 Qiang, and captured 427,500 livestock from them. In total, Duan spent 4.4 billion qian.95 Surprisingly, only 400-odd of his soldiers were killed in battles according to the sources, a number uncorroborated by independent evidence. These were only the statistical data related to Duan Jiong’s military engagements. The expenses and causalities under other commanders during the ten years of conflict have yet to be accounted for. Although Duan Jiong’s mass killing finally brought the third Qiang War to an end, the protracted warfare had already exhausted the imperial coffers and left a trail of desolation across the northwest. Worse still, the northwestern region was also suffering from natural disasters during that period. Civilians died in the greatest numbers when war coincided with natural disasters, which dislocated survivors of the war, producing a large number of refugees. As the refugees spread to other areas, they caused disorder not only in the Liang province but also in other regions. Some scholars suggest that the influx of the northwestern refugees to the interior commanderies brought discontent and conflict to other regions, finally underlying the widespread popular uprisings such as the Yellow Turban Rebellion in the last years of the Later Han dynasty.96 Based on the historical records, we can make a brief list of the serious natural disasters that happened in the Liang province during the Later Han as follows:

93 CE 97 CE 109 CE 138 CE 144 CE 161 CE 180 CE 183 CE

Earthquake in the Longxi commandery.97 Earthquake in the Longxi commandery.98 Great famine in the whole province; cannibalism was reported.99 Earthquake in the Jincheng and Longxi commanderies.100 Earthquake in six commanderies of the Liang province. In a period of eight months, there were in total 180 earthquakes in the area.101 Earthquake in the whole province.102 Earthquake and flooding in the Jiuquan commandery.103 Flooding in the Jincheng commandery.104

This partial list gives us a glimpse of the situation in the Liang province during the period in question.105 It seems that the period from the late first century to the mid-second century was a period of frequent earthquakes in the northwestern

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region, especially in the Longxi and Jincheng commanderies. It might not be coincidental that the two commanderies were subject to the most attacks from the Qiang. Historical records indicate that the earthquake of 138 CE was immediately followed by a report of a Qiang assault on the fortresses in the Jincheng commandery, and after the 144 CE earthquake, there was another Qiang attack, which killed the Colonel Supervising the Qiang.106 The Qiang were probably affected by the earthquake and resorted to raiding as a way of relief. The combined effects of prolonged warfare and natural disasters indeed devastated the area and deeply disrupted people’s lives, but the northwestern writer Wang Fu complained repeatedly in his essays that if the regional and local officials were more concerned with the welfare of northwestern people and if the imperial army were more efficient, the Qiang Wars could have ended earlier and the effects of the wars could have been less devastating.107 In other words, from Wang Fu’s point of view, poor management and mishandling of the situation were the causes of the long suffering of the northwestern people. Wang Fu’s criticism was supported by other historical evidence. As mentioned before, the Qiang were exploited by regional and local officials. Even in times of peace, official corruption and embezzlement prevailed in the Liang province, for which both Han and non-Han people suffered. The malfeasance of local authorities became particularly serious since the middle period of the dynasty. During the late 150s CE, according to the wooden strips excavated in a family vault of the imperial kinsmen at the Gangu prefecture in modern Gansu province (which belonged to the Hanyang commandery in the Later Han times), there were cases where local officials of the Liang province infringed upon privileges of imperial clansmen who lived in their jurisdiction by encroaching on their lands and by exacting on them levies, from which they as royal kinsmen were supposed to be exempt.108 If even the privilege of imperial kinsmen (though distant) were violated, it will not be difficult to imagine that the commoners in the Liang province were all at the mercy of local officials.109 Therefore, one reason why both Huangfu Gui and Zhang Huan attained good reputations in the Liang province and earned even the respect of the Qiang adversaries was their upright and honest character and their denunciation of official corruption. After Ma Xian’s fiasco in 141 CE, Huangfu Gui submitted a petition to the imperial court in which he sharply pointed out that the Qiang revolts were mainly caused by the mismanagement of frontier commanders, that it was their exploitation that forced the Qiang to resort to armed resistance, and that it was their inefficiency and incapability of dealing with the situation and their attempts to cover up defeats that delayed the opportunities for pacifying the Qiang in the early stages.110 Later, when Huangfu Gui was appointed to command imperial forces in the northwest, he exercised his plenary authority to cashier corrupt regional and local officials as a necessary measure to pacify the Qiang.111 In the same manner, when Zhang Huan was in charge of the Qiang affairs in the northwest, he promoted incorrupt behavior, which earned him the trust of Qiang tribal leaders.112 However, despite their admirable behavior, what Zhang and Huangfu

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did was not an institutional mechanism for solving the Qiang problem and only served to reveal the prevailing corruption among the officialdom in the northwest. Therefore, when both of them were removed by their political opponents for their anti-corruption campaigns and other reasons, the relations between the Qiang and the Han regional and local officials soured again. Apart from malfeasance and corruption, the fact that quite a few officials advocated withdrawal from the Liang province during the Qiang Wars aggravated the chaotic situation even further, which will be discussed in the next section. Abandoning the northwest and forcible withdrawals The Han’s incessant armed conflicts with the Qiang and its successive military setbacks gave rise to the idea among some imperial courtiers of abandoning the northwest, which led to three court debates on the matter. The proponents of the idea insisted that it was a once-off solution to the Qiang problem, and the idea earned wide support among central officials as well as some of their regional and local colleagues who were sent to postings in the Liang province. On the contrary, the northwesterners found such an idea, which amount to abandoning them, unacceptable. Although the imperial court did not formally carry out the abandonment, it adopted an alternative way of evacuating the regional and local government seats and forcibly relocating the residents, which provoked widespread discontent among the northwesterners. The idea of abandoning the northwestern region first emerged in the early years of the Later Han dynasty. In 35 CE, when General Ma Yuan defeated the Qiang in the Jincheng commandery, some courtiers suggested giving up the land west of Poqiang county in the commandery – since the territory was distant and occupied by adversaries – as a preventive measure for potential troubles.113 Although the sources did not identify the courtiers, it may be reasonable to assume they were easterners. As already explained in the preceding chapter, from its establishment onwards the Later Han imperial court was dominated by officials of eastern background. The suggestion of abandoning the western counties might represent the eastern-based officials’ concerns and interests of not wasting resources on the far western borderlands. In response, Ma Yuan, a man from Guanzhong and an expert on northwestern affairs with firsthand knowledge of the area, pointed out that the walled settlements located west of Poqiang county were all in good condition and provided favorable circumstances for defense, and it would be a grave mistake to leave the land to the Qiang, who would in turn take this advantage to strengthen themselves and cause further harm to the empire. Emperor Guangwu agreed with Ma’s strategy evaluation and decided to retain the territory.114 The emperor’s decision was probably made with the consideration that by giving up the land recently acquired from the defeated adversary Wei Ao would undermine the authority and stability of the newly founded empire. The suggestion of ceding some western counties when facing only a small-scale conflict with the Qiang (which was

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quite easily suppressed by Ma Yuan), however, presaged the idea of giving up the whole province when large-scale and protracted warfare broke out. In 107 CE, when General Deng Zhi was dispatched to the Liang province to take charge of the Qiang campaign, a jailed ex-official named Pang Can (fl. 100s–130s CE) had his son submit a petition to the imperial court, urging it to halt the military operation since he believed that giving people relief from the burdens of extra taxes and labor service was more important for saving resources of the empire, and the imperial state could deal with the Qiang rebels later.115 In the meantime, a senior official named Fan Zhun (d. 118 CE) recommended Pang Can as a suitable person to be entrusted with the northwestern affairs. The Empress Dowager accepted Fan’s advice, and she released and appointed Pang to command garrisons in Guanzhong region.116 Pang Can’s main concern was to lessen the burdens of the people in the east as they had to “send grain across ten-thousand li” (wanli yunliang) to support the Liang province, which deeply disturbed the lives of farming households. The policy makers’ acceptance of Pang’s proposal revealed that they shared his view and preferred not to take immediate military action with respect to the Liang province. Pang Can was a native of the Henan commandery, which was located in the vicinity of the imperial capital Luoyang. He entered government service as a “filial and incorrupt” appointee. His view might therefore represent some other Guandong-based scholar-officials like him. In the spring of 110 CE, the Qiang grew stronger and inflicted a series of defeats on the imperial army. Natural disasters further deteriorated the situation in the northwest. Pang Can submitted another proposal to Deng Zhi, who was now the Grand General and the most powerful courtier, suggesting the state concentrate its defensive efforts on consolidating the region of Chang’an and its vicinity (that is, the metropolitan region of the Former Han dynasty) by reinforcing the military forces and moving the residents from the frontier commanderies to the region.117 Pang stressed that it was the best way to protect the imperial realm and not to harm the living of most people. Deng Zhi was worried about the enormous war expense in the Liang province and was therefore inclined to give up the province. The empire could then focus on the northern frontier against the Xiongnu. Deng thus found Pang’s plan persuasive. Deng then clearly manifested his intention to abandon the Liang province in a court meeting with senior officials, and all those present unanimously agreed with him.118 When the Grand Commandant (taiwei, ranked as Chancellor) Li Xiu (fl. 110s CE) told his staff about the decision shortly after the court meeting, however, one of the staff named Yu Xu was strongly against it. Yu pointed out that, first, the preceding emperors had put in great effort to conquer the northwestern region, and it was wrong to give up the territory for the sake of saving money. Second, if the Liang province were abandoned, Chang’an and its vicinity would become the frontier, and all the Former Han imperial mausoleums located nearby would be exposed to the enemies. To the Later Han, a regime which claimed its legitimacy from the Former Han dynasty, that would have been totally unacceptable. Third, the Liang province was well known for producing skillful warriors who were unrivaled anywhere. They were the bulwark against the Qiang from directly

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attacking Chang’an and its vicinity. Yu also emphasized that since the northwesterners were still loyal to the Han, they would be willing to fight for the empire, but if the state abandoned the northwest and moved the inhabitants from their homeland, they would definitely turn against the state, and nobody would be able to resist such a formidable force.119 Liu Xiu was terrified by the picture drawn by Yu Xu and asked for a solution. Yu reminded his patron that it was of utmost importance to win the allegiance of the northwesterners. In order to do so, Yu suggested that senior officials of the central government should recruit northwestern talents to serve on their staff to provide them good career prospects and also to hold them as hostages in the capital. At the same time, Yu also suggested that the imperial court could grant the male family members of incumbent regional and local administrators of the Liang province (a majority of them were not of northwestern background) with honorary official titles to encourage those in office to fulfill their duties of administrating and defending the northwestern region.120 Taking Yu’s advice, Li Xiu immediately called for a court meeting and elaborated Yu’s proposal to the senior courtiers, who agreed to put Yu’s plan into action. The Liang province was thus kept in the imperial realm. Yu Xu, however, earned no merit from his proposal but was hated by Deng Zhi and his brothers for opposing their views; he was later demoted and sent to serve a local office.121 Although Yu Xu frustrated Deng Zhi’s plan, neither of them took the interests of the northwesterners as top priority. Deng Zhi insisted on giving up the Liang province to save the empire from the turmoil in the northwest. The fact that he secured unanimous support from the court meeting for his plan in the first place was mainly due to his powerful status, but his views might also reflect those of the majority of senior central officials, most of whom were Guandong scholarofficials. Yu Xu was capable of turning the table because his arguments touched upon the core concerns of the policy makers by emphasizing the importance of keeping the Liang province for the legitimacy and security of the empire. His argument that abandoning the northwest would provoke the unruly northwestern forces to act against the imperial center especially struck fear into the heart of the senior courtiers. Yu Xu’s suggestion of employing northwestern talents in central government offices in fact served the interests of the imperial court but only partially the well-being of the northwesterners. The third debate took place in 185 CE. In the previous year, the Yellow Turbans’ uprising broke out and swept quickly across the eastern part of the empire.122 While the imperial court had to put all resources and energy into suppressing the Yellow Turbans, the Liang province was at war again. Although the Qiang Wars nominally ended in 169 CE as a result of Duan Jiong’s mass killings, the region was never restored to peace. With the deteriorating political, social, and economic conditions resulting from the Qiang Wars, discontent of the Han and non-Han inhabitants against the central government grew stronger and stronger. Finally, the people of the Fuhan and Heguan counties revolted against the local governments in 184 CE under the leadership of Beigong Boyu and Li Wenhou. Beigong was a member of the “voluntary Hu followers from the Huangzhong area” (Huangzhong

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yicong Hu), which was a group of alien origin. Judging by his name, Li Wenhou was probably of Han ethnicity. They joined the Qiang forces in the Beidi commandery to attack the Jincheng commandery. In Jincheng, echoing the rebels of Fuhan and Heguan counties, two local strongmen, Bian Zhang (d. 185 CE) and Han Sui (d. 215 CE), organized their own forces, killed the Grand Administrator, and gained control of the commandery. The united force then turned to other commanderies in the Liang province and even made an inroad to Chang’an and its vicinity in the following year. Facing the formidable forces of Bian and Han and their allies, the imperial court appointed Huangfu Song (nephew of Huangfu Gui) and Dong Zhuo to be responsible for restoring order in the Liang province. Shortly afterwards, Huangfu Song was dismissed for having achieved nothing and was replaced by a senior official Zhang Wen (d. 191 CE). As the commanderin-chief of the western front, commanding over 100,000 troops, Zhang Wen was still unable to defeat his adversaries.123 The Later Han was busy with a multi-front war, with the Yellow Turbans in particular threatening the imperial center and the eastern sector of the empire. Cui Lie (d. 192 CE), the Excellency over the Masses (Situ; ranked as Chancellor) and a man from a prestigious Guandong scholar-official family, convened a court meeting and advocated giving up the Liang province so that the empire could focus on the eastern front. Fu Xie (number 22 on the list of northwestern elite in Chapter 3), immediately shouted out, “Only beheading the Excellency over the Masses would all under Heaven be pacified.”124 Fu Xie was subsequently censured for failing to show respect to a senior official and was summoned by the emperor to give an explanation. Fu told the emperor that Cui Lei was wrong for suggesting the abandonment of the Liang province since the region was of crucial strategic importance in defending the western flank of the empire, and it would be a catastrophe to leave such a vast land and its strong soldiers to the “caitiffs who fold their robes to the left” (zuoren zhi lu).125 Fu’s emphasis on the strategic buffering function of the Liang province won the emperor’s ear. And the Liang province was retained in the imperial realm. A point meriting our attention is that Fu Xie used the phrase “caitiffs who fold their robes to the left” to describe the adversaries in the Liang province. Who these people were and whether they actually folded their robes to the left are of little significance. Suffice it to point out that Fu Xie’s words to the emperor provides another piece of corroborating evidence that the term zuoren (folding robes to the left) had become a metonymy for barbarianism, and the ethnicity in the northwest was to a large extent determined by political allegiance. By summarizing the three debates about abandoning the Liang province, I suggest that what lay at the heart of the debates were two different visions of empire held by the Later Han central officials. It was mainly the Guandong scholarofficials who put forward the plan of giving up the region. Their core argument was that by cutting off the chaotic northwest, the empire could protect itself from getting involved in any further trouble. It was indeed an eastern-centered point of view and a lesser-empire vision that the Later Han could be a self-contained and self-sufficient empire by preserving the resources and energy of the eastern sector. It should be noted that the idea of giving up the northwest was significant.

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Since the establishment of the Qin empire in 221 BCE, abandonment of imperial territory happened only once, in 46 BCE, when Emperor Yuan of the Former Han dynasty (his reign was the period that classically trained scholar-officials started flourishing in the imperial court) accepted the suggestion of an official named Jia Juanzhi of abandoning the far southern commandery Zhuya (modern Hainan island) due to the intermittent rebellions of the aboriginal people.126 Zhuya was annexed by Emperor Wu in 110 BCE. It was only a commandery in the administrative hierarchy and was much smaller and farther from the imperial center than the Liang province. To abandon a whole province was unprecedented. Behind such a view lay in fact the political message that “the northwesterners were not part of us.” It was only because the eastern scholar-officials did not regard the Liang province as an inseparable part of the empire that they would be determined to give up the region. The prevailing triumphalism that accompanied the conquest of the northwest in the reign of Emperor Wu had long dissipated by the Later Han. The Later Han political elite entertained lesser expectations and hopes of the northwestern frontier region. According to Wang Fu’s essays, the view of giving up the Liang province was not only advocated by central officials but also widely shared by regional and local officials in the province. The Later Han bureaucracy practiced the rule of avoidance, namely “Regulations of the Three Mutual Exclusions” (Sanhu fa), by which no regional authority was nominated to govern his region of origin, nor his adjuncts governed his home county, no grand administrator nor his aides governed his commandery of origin, no regional inspector exercised control in the region where his prefecture was situated.127 Simply put, the regional and local officials who governed the Liang province were non-native people. Since the mainstay of the Later Han officialdom consisted of eastern-based scholar-officials, a great proportion of officials dispatched to the Liang province would doubtlessly be men of eastern background.128 Some of them might even have various relations to the officials at the imperial center. Therefore, according to Wang Fu, these officials would not have the patience and determination to protect the Liang territory. When riots broke out, they just wanted to escape from the chaotic northwest as soon as possible. Little wonder that they echoed the voice of abandoning the Liang province from the imperial center. When Yu Xu suggested granting honorary titles to the male family members of those incumbent regional and local officials in the Liang province, he was aiming to encourage those officials to fulfill their duties. To criticize the easterncentered mindset, Wang Fu mocked those officials by suggesting that if their male family members, like people on the frontier, were under the menace of the Qiang, they would unanimously support the campaigns against the Qiang.129 On the other hand, the opposite side included officials of northwestern background like Fu Xie and eastern origin like Yu Xu, who held different views from the majority of the central officials. They emphasized the fact that the Liang

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province was inherited from the Former Han dynasty and was a significant strategic position, especially in its role protecting the western flank of the empire. It was a vision of a greater empire which aimed at upholding the integrity of the imperial territory. Wang Fu criticized the officials who supported the abandonment as unwise since no country could sustain itself without frontiers.130 Both Yu Xu and Fu Xie succeeded in preserving the Liang province by putting forward their strong arguments of the strategic importance of the region and the potential hostility of the northwesterners, which touched the core concern and the fear of the imperial court. Despite Yu Xu’s success in dissuading the imperial court from cutting the Liang province from the imperial realm, the imperial center in fact adopted an alternative way of withdrawal from certain northwestern areas temporarily. In 110 CE, after a series of military setbacks, the imperial court ordered the relocation of the government seat of the Jincheng commandery to the Xiangwu county in the Longxi commandery and the office of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang from the Jincheng commandery to the Zhangye commandery to avert the Qiang attack. In the following year, as the Qiang grew stronger, the regional and local officials, who were mainly from the interior commanderies, had no will to fight and defend the land, and sent petitions to move the seats of their commanderies and counties away from the menace of the rebels.131 The imperial court endorsed their request and moved the government seats of the Longxi commandery from Didao to the Xiangwu county of the same commandery, the Anding commandery to the Meiyang county of Fufeng, the Beidi commandery to the Chiyang county of Pingyi, and the Shang commandery to the Ya county of Pingyi.132 Both Fufeng and Pingyi were commanderies in Guanzhong region and situated next to Chang’an. The government seats of these commanderies were moved eastward or southward to escape from the Qiang. In addition to moving the government seats, the state ordered the people belonging to the respective commanderies to do the same. Most of the residents of the Liang province, however, were attached to their homeland and were unwilling to move. As a result, the officials carried out forcible movement by “reaping their crops, demolishing their houses, leveling their defensive facilities, and destroying their storage.”133 These actions provoked great discontent among the affected inhabitants. In the meantime, drought and locusts plagued the Liang province, worsening the living condition of the people. The historical accounts depict a tragic picture of many people who were forced to move either dying on the way or becoming refugees. The elderly and the weak were abandoned on the way, and many survivors were forced to become servants or slaves of local magnates.134 The immediate consequence was an uprising led by Du Qi (d. 111 CE), Du Jigong (d. 117 CE), and Wang Xin (d. 112 CE), all natives of the Hanyang commandery. Du’s force later allied with the Qiang chieftain Dianlian.

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In 129 CE, when order was temporarily restored in the Liang province, Yu Xu urged the emperor to move back the commanderies-in-exile. In his memorial, Yu criticized the myopic officials who ignored the strategic value of the Liang province, always to abandon the strategic defensive positions.135 The emperor accepted Yu’s proposal and order the reinstallation of the commanderies of Anding, Beidi, Shang, Longxi, and Jincheng. In 141 CE, however, the situation turned again. After General Ma Xian died in battle, the Qiang plundered Guanzhong and burnt the Former Han imperial mausoleums. When the Later Han found no way to suppress the Qiang, it resorted to the evacuation of the commanderies. The Anding commandery was relocated to Fufeng and the Beidi commandery to Pingyi.136 The defensive frontline was contracted and retreated to Chang’an and its environs.137 Although the Later Han state never openly announced the formal abandonment of the Liang province, the makeshift evacuation of government seats and the concomitant forcible movement of inhabitants exacerbated the tensions between the people of the province and the imperial center. These measures corroborated the northwesterners’ perception that the officials as well as the imperial court had no determination or ability to defend and protect the land and the people of the northwest. The forcible movement especially bred hatred among the northwesterners against the imperial state. The Qiang Wars and the ensuing withdrawals discredited the imperial authority among the northwesterners. As the imperial state was no longer reliable, they reasoned, the people of the Liang province could expect little from the state and chose to arm themselves for self-defense. The mounting discontent with the imperial state engendered unrest among the northwestern military forces and provoked them against the imperial center. The prophecy of Yu Xu was fulfilled. Spontaneous militarization flourishing in the Liang province As briefly mentioned in the preceding chapters, the Qin state instituted a top-down sanctioned militarization program, with universal military service as the most crucial component supplemented by the system of ranks of merit, which provided the Qin state with a formidable military force to establish the first empire in Chinese history. The Former Han dynasty followed suit. But as the dynasty progressed, the role of sanctioned militarization diminished in the Later Han dynasty. Universal military service was abolished by Emperor Guangwu, the value of ranks of merit depreciated, and the mechanism of rewarding service to the state, particularly in combat, transformed to a perfunctory practice of giving titles without any attendant respect and privileges.138 The extent of adoption of sanctioned militarization shows a notable difference between the two Han dynasties. Simply put, the Former Han was aggressive and militarized, whereas the Later Han was defensive and civilized. Since there are many discussions on the military institutions of the two Han regimes, especially the system of conscription, I shall not rehash them here.139 Instead, the foci of this subsection are directed to the impact of the abolition of universal military service on the development of bottom-up militarization

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in the Liang province and the process by which the imperial center lost control of the northwest. On the topic of Later Han’s abolition of universal military service, the Chinese historian Lei Haizong (1902–62) was arguably the best-known expert. In his 1940 essay, Lei blamed Emperor Guangwu’s decision to abolish universal military service not only for crippling the military prowess of the Later Han dynasty but also destroying the martial spirit of the Chinese people for many generations to come. It turned Chinese culture into what he called an “amilitary” or a “demilitarized” culture (wubing de wenhua), and as a consequence, Chinese people suffered deeply from foreign invasions up to Lei’s day.140 To the extent that the nationalist sentiments during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–45) might have greatly influenced Lei’s perception, he might have overstated the dire need of military elements in Chinese culture. His point, however, is valid that the abolition of conscription had undermined the overall military might of the Later Han dynasty. In a recent study on the topic, Mark Edward Lewis regards Emperor Guangwu’s decision as a product of rational calculation with the aims of “abandoning reliance on conscripts to form the elite forces and halting regular training while reserving the power to conscript in emergencies.”141 Lewis argues that the reasons for the abolition were due to three considerations. First, economically, the Later Han state could save costs by not holding annual military inspection exercises or maintaining a large standing army in commanderies. Second, consideration of security suggests that doing away with conscription could reduce the chance of mutiny, since during the last years of Wang Mang’s regime the annual assembly of commandery troops had provided opportunities for the power contenders to launch rebellions. The future Emperor Guangwu, for one, had once taken advantage of such an occasion to raise an unsuccessful revolt. Third, from the point of view of efficacy, a streamlined and professional army would replace the bulky farmerconscripts without disturbing most people’s daily lives.142 In short, the intention of Emperor Guangwu was to secure his regime by means of demilitarizing most of the population and minimizing military expenditure. With most of the populace nominally unarmed and untrained in military affairs, the standing imperial army would be the only military power in the empire, and the imperial state the sole possessor of military prowess. During most of the Later Han dynasty, the standing forces consisted of recruits stationed mainly in the imperial capital and deployed at several permanent strategic garrisons in the empire. To deal with threats from different directions, the Later Han set up, for example, the Liyang camp, the Duliao camp, and the Yuyang camp in the north; the Yong camp and the Chang’an camp in the west; and the Xianglin camp and the Fuli camp in the south. These camps, however, were not enough to carry out all the military duties; people along the frontiers were still required to provide service for frontier defense. Meanwhile, in order to have adequate manpower to guard the frontiers, an increasing number of convicts reprieved from death sentences were deployed to serve the frontier garrisons, and various groups of non-Han peoples such as the Xiongnu and the Qiang were widely employed in the frontier troops.

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For an empire as vast as the Later Han, however, a handful of military camps at strategic points would not be sufficient to meet protracted external and internal military threats coming from many fronts. In an emergency, the Later Han state needed to call up reservists that were mainly composed of untrained commoners.143 Needless to say, the untrained men could only provide reinforcements in quantity but not of quality. Since the common people were undertrained and undisciplined, a minor or partial setback on the battlefield would easily throw the whole army into panic, which would then create a snowball effect resulting in the collapse of the army. This happened in the Qiang Wars. The interior commanderies also lacked capable forces to defend themselves when the Qiang broke through the frontier defenses and penetrated the interior. The imperial court could only set up fortresses here and there as a palliative measure. Against this backdrop, Wang Fu complained in his essays that the imperial army’s incapacity to fight was one of the important reasons why the Qiang Wars lasted so long.144 Ying Shao, whose Fengsu tongyi I have cited in the discussion on the Qiang, made a harsh and yet revealing retrospective comment in his Han Guan (the Han Institutions) on the failure of the Later Han military system. In the beginning of the essay, Ying articulates his thoughts on military affairs by quoting words from the classic Zuo Zhuan (The Zuo Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals): Heaven produces the five materials, and the people utilize all of them. Since none of them could be discarded, who could give up using weapons?145 Ying then argues that the abolition of universal military service led to the failure of Later Han’s military capability: Since the commanderies and fief-states have abolished infantry and cavalry, the state lacks safety precautions, which had the effect of inciting rebellions. When turmoil strikes in one direction, [it needs forces from] the other three directions to come to rescue it . . . the requisitions make the common people rise in uproar. Without sufficient training in archery and horsemanship or proper disciplines and indoctrination, the people are suddenly sent to face strong adversaries . . . Therefore the imperial troops perform poorly and are defeated in every battle . . . As a result, [the state] recruits soldiers from the three frontiers with their distinct customs. These are not our kind . . . Looking at the failure of the imperial troops, it can be seen that the saying “to send people to fight without prior training is equal to throwing them away” is not vacuous!146 Ying Shao blames the abolition of the commandery troops, a direct result of that of universal conscription, for the sorry state of the imperial forces which became incapable of protecting the empire. Mobilizing the common people who had received no military training only aggravated the situation. Ying quotes from Confucius, “To send the common people to war without prior training is equal to throwing them away.”147 Such is Ying Shao’s diagnosis of the shortcomings of the

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Later Han military system. In fact, the same saying of Confucius was also quoted by Zheng Tai in his analysis of the weaknesses of the eastern alliance, which has been discussed in the beginning of Chapter 1. Moreover, Ying Shao pointed out a very important feature of the Later Han military system – the employment of non-Han troops. The imperial tradition of recruiting non-Han soldiers in the two Han dynasties can be traced back to at least the reign of Emperor Wen of the Former Han.148 Chao Cuo, the statesman who proposed the project of settling people along the northern frontiers and of setting up farming colonies, championed the benefits of using surrendered non-Han peoples as frontier garrisons to resist the Xiongnu invasions.149 Under the reign of Emperor Wu, the employment of non-Han soldiers went hand in hand with intensive external warfare and territorial expansion. Such a tradition was inherited by the Later Han dynasty and was taken as an economical way of settling and using the strengths of the surrendered non-Han people like the Xiongnu and the Qiang. With the abolition of universal military service and the poor performance of the imperial army, the Later Han empire came to rely increasingly on foreign recruits to fill the ranks of its army along the frontiers.150 For example, the troops under the command of the Colonel Supervising the Qiang were mainly composed of the Qiang and other non-Han peoples.151 Duan Jiong’s mass slaughtering of the Qiang rebels was in fact carried out by his Qiang soldiers. Needless to say, non-Han troops supplied the imperial military machine with some advantages, particularly in external warfare. Recruiting non-Han soldiers could minimize the laborious process of recruiting and training individual civilians since, comparatively speaking, the foreign soldiers were tough fighters and were familiar with the frontier terrain and climate. Another advantage was that those tribesmen could be brought into the army in groups, with their own tribal organization and existing structure of command and coordination, all of which made it easy for them to form an efficient army. Moreover, it was an ideal policy developed by the imperial policy makers in that by using barbarian against barbarian, the empire could rein the alien people without exhausting its own resources. Nevertheless, the fatal drawback of employing foreign troops was the question of allegiance. There was no guarantee of the loyalty of the non-Han troops to the emperor and his empire. Anecdotal evidence shows that non-Han military men would easily turn against the Han regime when they were not satisfied with the treatment they received. For those non-Han peoples who were allowed to retain their tribal organization, the preserved tribal solidarity, network, and command structure critically hindered their loyalty to the imperial center but provided motives and tools of mobilization against the empire when conditions changed. The first Qiang War in 107 CE, for example, was triggered by the mutiny of Qiang cavalrymen who were afraid of the possibility of a long-term stationing in the Western Regions. Even though they were nominally under imperial command, the political allegiance of the non-Han troops depended upon the patron–protégé relations with the imperial commander. It was a highly personal relationship rather than a wellregulated institution. As mentioned above, Duan Jiong commanded a large number

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of Qiang soldiers. When Duan was called back to the capital, discharged from his army, and later put to death as a result of eunuch factional struggle, many of his former officers and the men under their command turned into rebels. A central official named Liu Tao (d. 185 CE) sharply pointed out that the former subordinates of Duan Jiong were skillful fighters with good knowledge of the geography of the northwest; they were very hard to be defeated.152 Non-Han peoples also constituted the backbone of the military forces of Dong Zhuo, who grew up in the Liang province and had established very close relationships with the Qiang tribal leaders in his youth.153 It was for this background that Dong was appointed by the imperial court to deal with the Qiang problem. Dong then shrewdly exploited his networks with various groups in the Liang province and the imperial court’s reliance on him to establish his own forces in the northwest. The overwhelming number of non-Han members under his command earned his troops the name of “Qiang-Hu” army from the eastern-based scholar-officials,154 and Dong himself was called by his contemporaries a “Qiang-Hu.”155 Dong’s multi-ethnic troops, as he claimed, only followed his orders and would not take the command of others appointed by the imperial court.156 Various factors such as protracted warfare, natural disasters, corruption, and exploitation of local officials contributed to the difficult situation that provoked not only the non-Han troops but also the Han inhabitants of the Liang province to turn against the Later Han state. As analyzed in the preceding chapters, the Liang province was a highly militarized region and was well-known for breeding formidable martial talents and tough fighters. Since the imperial army from the east was incapable of restoring order in the northwest in the Qiang Wars, the northwesterners had to rely upon themselves for self-protection. Those who were discontented with the current circumstances even jumped on the rebels’ bandwagon. When the imperial court debated giving up the Liang province and later carried out forcible evacuations, it added to the fear and discontent of the northwesterners. In the eyes of the people of the Liang province, the imperial court’s idea of giving up the province was no different from abandoning them.157 The northwesterners’ distrust of the imperial center thus reached a peak. In order to protect their regional interests, various local forces, regardless of their ethnic and social backgrounds, rose in unison. A Japanese scholar called the united front of anti–Later Han forces in the Liang province as a multi-racial and multi-ethnic “united regime of Liang province.”158 As a matter of fact, during the long course of living together in the region, the Han and non-Han inhabitants gradually developed close relationships and adapted and accommodated to each other’s cultures and customs, though conflicts intermittently happened. In the last years of the Later Han, it was difficult to differentiate between the Han and the Qiang.159 Dong Zhuo was called by his contemporaries a Qiang, and many of his subordinates were of mixed Han-Qiang family background. Ma Teng (d. 212 CE), one of the important military strongmen in the Liang province and an ally of the aforementioned Han Sui, had a Han father who was an ex-local military officer and a Qiang mother.160 Both Ma Teng and his son Ma Chao (176–222 CE) earned wide support among the Qiang

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and the Hu partly because of their family background. Rebel leaders or military strongmen such as Bian Zhang, Han Sui, Ma Teng, and Wang Guo all commanded multi-ethnic forces like Dong Zhuo’s.161 The threat of facing a common enemy – the Later Han state – gradually helped the northwestern military men solidify a regional identity as men of the Liang province (Liangzhou ren). As the historical records show, this identity was strongly emphasized by the military leaders in the last years of the Later Han. Rebel leaders such as Ma Teng and Han Sui as well as subordinates of Dong Zhuo such as Li Jue (d. 198 CE) and Guo Si (fl. 190s CE) all declared themselves men of the Liang province. Even in 192 CE, when, after Dong Zhuo’s murder, there was factional struggle over the succession of the warlord among his subordinates, Li Jue and Guo Si, both from the Liang province, temporarily put aside their conflicts and promoted the regional identity of men of the Liang province to resist the attack launched by the anti-Dong eastern alliance. They were also called by their eastern adversaries as men of the Liang province.162 The identity of men of the Liang province was superimposed on the internal differences among the northwestern military men in response to attacks from the eastern foes. With the flowering of the regional identity among the people of the Liang province, imperial control over the province ended before the empire’s collapse. In 187 CE, while the Later Han state was still struggling to restore order in the northwest, a mutiny broke out among the people of the six commanderies of the Liang province who were conscripted in the army under the command of the Inspector of the Liang province (Liang zhou cishi), Geng Bi (d. 187 CE). The mutiny was said to have been caused by Inspector Geng’s corruption and exploitation. The mutineers killed Geng and his associates and then attacked other towns that were still under imperial governance. Ma Teng, originally an aide-de-camp of Inspector Geng, quickly grasped the opportunity and became the leader of the mutineers. With the outbreak of mutiny, the imperial power was wiped out from the Liang province. In 189 CE, Ma Teng and Han Sui formed an alliance and became the dominant power in the Liang province. Although the imperial court ordered Dong Zhuo to suppress the rebels in the Liang province, he established himself as a semi-independent power, ignoring the imperial orders and manipulating the situation between the northwestern rebels and the imperial court. Dong maintained connections with Ma and Han, and the two strongmen also wanted to benefit from collaborating with Dong. Even though the Liang province was still nominally a regional administrative unit of the empire, the imperial center found itself no longer able to control the region, which was already in the hands of warlords. To recapitulate, the chaotic situation in the Liang province caused by natural disasters and protracted warfare furthered the estrangement between the imperial court and the northwesterners. The poor performance of the imperial army in the Qiang Wars exposed the diminishing ability of the imperial center to protect its territory and subjects from the horrors of warfare. The intention of giving up the Liang province and the ensuing forcible evacuation further discredited the imperial center to the northwesterners. The disappointing performance of the empire in political and military terms left the people of the Liang province with no choice but to rely on themselves for self-protection. While the soldiers from other sectors

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of the empire generally declined in performance, the military forces in the northwest maintained its relative combative strength, as Yu Xu, Fu Xie, and Zheng Tai witnessed. When the people of the Liang province became less willing to support an imperial center that was unable to provide them with security and prosperity, they joined the rebels or formed self-armed forces. During the Qiang Wars and their aftermath, respect and support for the imperial center among the northwesterners evaporated quickly, and the imperial court finally realized that it was no longer able to rule the northwest. In fact, certain elites of the Liang province had foreseen or even tried to trigger the downfall of the empire. In 187 CE when Inspector Geng Bi was killed and the rebels were attacking towns, Fu Xie, the northwestern statesman who successfully kept the Liang province in the imperial realm in the 185 CE debate, was the Grand Administrator of the Hanyang commandery in the Liang province. Besieged by the rebels, Fu Xie’s son proffered advice to his father that all under Heaven had betrayed the imperial court, and it was no longer worth defending for the dynasty. Fu agreed with his son but insisted that he had to die for his duty. The rebels also sent a messenger to Fu Xie and tried to persuade him that the Later Han dynasty had lost its mandate.163 After entrusting a confidant to take his son out of the siege, Fu Xie chose to die in battle. Fu’s story reveals that people in the Liang province, regardless of their allegiance, had a feeling that the Later Han dynasty was coming to end. At about the same time, Yan Zhong (d. 189 CE), an ex-official and a Hanyang native, told General Huangfu Song, the hero who suppressed the Yellow Turbans and the nephew of the celebrated Huangfu Gui, that the Later Han was falling and nobody was able to save it. Yan then tried to persuade Huangfu Song, as the most prestigious military leader of his day, to march his army to the imperial capital, wipe out the corrupt imperial court, and take the Mandate of Heaven himself.164 Huangfu Song was terrified after hearing this and insisted that he would follow the principle of loyalty to the dynasty. Although both Fu Xie and Huangfu Song recognized the deterioration of the empire, they refused to betray it, probably because they were “centralized” and “Confucianized” by the imperial court and the dominant Guandong scholar-official culture. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Huangfu Song’s uncle Huangfu Gui made a great effort to be recognized by the eastern scholar-officials. Such a family background and education might have influenced Huangfu Song to become a staunch supporter of the dynasty.165 Other northwestern elite like Fu Xie’s son and Yan Zhong, however, did not uphold the principle of loyalty to the empire. They manifested clearly that the Later Han was close to its end. It was Dong Zhuo, an uncouth liujun liangjiazi, who dared to desecrate the imperial authority and led the northwestern troops to storm the imperial capital, deposed the emperor, and killed the Empress Dowager.166

Notes 1 One li (a unit of length) in the Han dynasty approximates 0.415 km. But in certain contexts of the Han records, such as this quotation, the term li is used rhetorically rather than as a precise indication of distance.

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2 Wang Fu, Qianfulun jian jiaozheng (hereafter Qianfulun), annotated by Wang Jipei and Peng Duo (Beijing: Zhinghua shuju, 2010), 22: 257. 3 For Wang Fu’s biography, see HHS, 49: 1630–43. For an examination of Wang Fu’s dates of birth and death, see Jin Fagen, “Wang Fu shengzu niansui de kaozheng ji Qianfu lun xieding shijian de tuilun,” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 40.2 (1969): 781–99. 4 For modern English-language research on the text, see Margaret J. Pearson, Wang Fu and the Comments of a Recluse (Tempe: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1989) and Anne Behnke Kinney, The Art of the Han Essay: Wang Fu’s Ch’ien-Fu Lun (Tempe: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1990). Pearson’s study focuses mainly on the political thought of Wang Fu, whereas Kinney’s focuses on the literary value of the texts. Both works provide partial translations of the essays in Qianfulun, but do not touch upon the essays on the Qiang Wars and frontier policy. On Wang Fu’s political thought, one can also refer to Etienne Balazs, “Political Philosophy and Social Crisis at the End of the Han Dynasty,” in H.M. Wright trans., Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 187–225. Among Chinese scholarship, besides Jin Fagen’s article mentioned in the previous note, see Liu Wenqi, Wang Fu “Qianfu lun” suo fanying zhi dong Han qingshi (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1995). Although styling himself a recluse, Wang Fu did not lead an isolated way of life. In fact, he had connections with some renowned intellectual figures of his time, including certain eastern-based scholar-officials. He was also highly admired by the northwestern military elite Huangfu Gui. 5 de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, p. 91. 6 Balazs, “Political Philosophy and Social Crisis at the End of the Han Dynasty,” p. 199. 7 de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, p. 91. 8 On the modern classification of minority groups under the PRC, see Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to Terms With the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 9 This is the dominant view in Chinese works, for example, Ma Changshou, Di yu Qiang (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984); Ren Naiqiang, Qiangzu yuanliu tansuo (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1984), in which the author asserts that the Tibetans are a branch of the Qiang people, see pages 38–42; Geng Shaojiang, Qiangzu tongshi (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010). Some western scholarship also follows the same view when narrating the Qiang’s story, for example, Terry F. Kleeman in his Great Perfection: Religion and Ethnicity in a Chinese Millennial Kingdom (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), pp. 54–8. 10 For example, Yu Weichao, “Gudai Xi Rong he Qiang, Hu kaoguxue wenhua guishu wenti de tantao,” in his Xian Qin liang Han kaoguxue lunji (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1985), pp. 180–92; Zhao Huacheng, “Gansu dongbu Qin he Qiang Rong wenhua de kaoguxue tansuo,” in Yu Weichao ed., Kaogu leixingxue de lilun yu shijian (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1989), pp. 145–75. 11 HHS, 87: 2869. 12 HHS, 87: 2870–4. 13 HHS, 87: 2875. 14 In the “Account of the Xiongnu” of Shiji, Sima Qian constructed a fictive kinship relationship between the Xiongnu and the ruling house of the Xia dynasty. For detailed studies on the topic, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, pp. 294–311; Wang Mingke, Huaxia bianyuan: lishi jiyi yu zuqun rentong (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 1997), pp. 292–5; Wang Mingke, Yingxiong zuxian yu dixiong minzu: genji lishi de wenben yu qingjing (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2006), Chapters 3 and 8.

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15 Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, p. 300. 16 In sharp contrast to the Qiang, the Xiongnu were given a noble origin of coming from the ruling house of the Xia dynasty in the Han historical records. It is probably because the Xiongnu were once a Eurasian hegemon and, most importantly, had established formal diplomatic and marriage relations with the Han dynasties, whereby they earned much respect from the Han historians. For a detailed discussion, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, pp. 294–311; Wang, Huaxia bianyuan, pp. 292–8; Wang, Yingxiong zuxian yu dixiong minzu, Chapters 3, 7, and 8. 17 de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, p. 55. 18 This is an entry not found in the present edition of Fengsu tongyi but is preserved in the tenth-century encyclopedic work Taiping yulan. See Ying Shao, Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu (hereafter Fengsu tongyi), annotated by Wang Liqi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), p. 488. For detailed study on Ying Shao and his works, see Michael Nylan, “Ying Shao’s ‘Feng Su Tung Yi’: An Exploration of Problems in Han Dynasty Political, Philosophical and Social Unity” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1982). 19 Wang first proposed this view in his doctoral dissertation; see Wang Mingke, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China Through the Han Dynasty: Ecological Frontiers and Ethnic Boundaries” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1992). He later expounds on this thesis in his Chinese works: Huaxia bianyuan; Yingxiong zuxian yu dixiong minzu; Manzi, Hanren yu Qiangzu (Taipei: Sanmin shujun gufen youxiangongsi, 2001); Qiang zai Han Zang zhjian: yige Huaxia bianyuan de lishi renleixue yanjiu (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2003); Youmuzhe de jueze: miandui Handiguo de bei Ya youmu buzu (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2008). 20 Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China Through the Han Dynasty,” p. 99. Not until the fourth and fifth centuries CE did the term “Qiang” become an autonym of the Qiang people. For the self-identity of modern Qiang people, see Wang, Manzi, Hanren yu Qiangzu, pp. 21–58 and 91–122; Wang, Qiang zai Han Zang zhjian, pp. 1–35 and 251–96. 21 Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China Through the Han Dynasty,” pp. 1–3. 22 Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China Through the Han Dynasty,” p. 98. 23 Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China Through the Han Dynasty,” pp. 129–32. 24 Siân Jones, The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present (London: Routledge, 1997), p. xiii. 25 Marc Samuel Abramson, “Deep Eyes and High Noses: Physiognomy and the Depiction of Barbarians in Tang China,” in Nicola Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt eds., Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 119–59. 26 As Abramson also points out in his article, in certain context, “hairstyles and head coverings also had significance in that they were viewed both in Inner Asia and China as makers of political allegiance.” See Abramson, “Deep Eyes and High Noses,” p. 125. 27 HHS, 87: 2878. 28 See Chapter 14 of the Analects (Lunyu). In Confucius’s day, the Zhou people knotted their hair, wore caps, and folded their robes to the right; on the contrary, leaving hair unbound and folding robes to the left was said to be a non-Zhou custom, which meant the violation of the Zhou rites. From the Zhou times onward, the proper combination of “robes and caps” (yiguan) has come to symbolize one of the essences of Chinese culture. 29 In the “Account of the Xiongnu” of Hanshu, which was mainly compiled by Ban Biao’s son Ban Gu, the phrase pifa zuoren was used to describe the barbarians. See HS, 94B: 3834. There is an example of the phrase being quoted in a memorial jointly submitted by two Han officials. See HS, 73: 3126. Goldin, “Steppe Nomads as a Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” pp. 220–46, has a brief discussion on the usage of the term pifa zuoren by the Han scholars. 30 For a summary of the living style and social organization of the Qiang in the Han times, see Guan Donggui, “Handai de Qiangzu (I),” Shihuo yuekan 1.1 (1971): 15–20 and “Handai de Qiangzu (II),” Shihuo yuekan 1.2 (1971): 87–97. Guan also doubts if

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The others within there exists any relationship between the Qiang of the Han times and their assumed ancestors in the same area of activity. HHS, 87: 2869. Fengsu tongyi, p. 488. For the natural setting and human ecology of the area of activity of the Qiang people and their presumed ancestors, see Wang “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” pp. 5–13; Wang, Youmuzhe de jueze, pp. 158–62. The character Qiang first appeared in oracle-bone inscriptions of the Late Shang period (ca. fourteenth to twelfth centuries BCE), and the pictograph is composed of two parts: sheep and man. Wang Mingke suggests that Qiang was a label used by the Shang people to refer to non-Shang or hostile population living west of them. Also, the fact that the Shang people captured the Qiang and used them as human sacrifices in ancestral worship ceremonies indicated that the Shang people did not treat the Qiang as human beings but animals. See Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” pp. 101–3. Fengsu tongyi, p. 488. On the role of female in Qiang society, see Wang, Youmuzhe de jueze, pp. 180–8. In contrast to the pre-imperial period, Chinese marriage and sexual relations and behaviors underwent a period of moral stringency in the Han times, in particular, during the Later Han dynasty. For details, see Paul Rakita Goldin, The Culture of Sex in Ancient China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), pp. 75–109. Considering that the Xiongnu established an empire with the Chanyu as an emperorlike supreme leader and a political hierarchy among the leaders as well as an institutionalized political-military organization, there should be no doubt why the Han paid much respect to the Xiongnu as “advanced” barbarians and treated the Qiang as “inferior” barbarians. For further discussion on the Han scholars’ view on the nature of non-Han people, see Goldin, “Steppe Nomads as a Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” pp. 220–46. A modern Chinese historian Zhu Ziyan coins the term Qiang Hu hua (Qiang-Huized) to describe the nature of the Liang provincial military forces in the last years of Later Han. See his “Lun Han Wei zhiji Qiang Hu hua de Liangzhuo junshi jituan,” in Jilindaxue gujiyanjiusuo ed., “1–6 Shiji Zhongguo beifang bianjiang, minzu, shehui guoji xueshu yantaohui” lunwenji (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2008), pp. 112–25. A Japanese scholar also points out that during the last years of Later Han all the military forces in the Liang province were constituted by both Han and Qiang peoples, and it is hardly possible to distinguish the two groups. See Morimoto Jun, “Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu,” in Zhongguo Wei Jin Nanbeichao shixuehui and Wuhandaxue Zhongguo sanzhijiu shiji yanjiusuo eds., Wei Jin Nanbeichao shi yanjiu: huigu yu tansuo – Zhongguo Wei Jin Nanbeichao shixuehui dijiujie nianhui lunwenji (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2009), pp. 178–85. Naomi Standen has shown political loyalty as a means to draw ethnic boundaries in a study on the late tenth-century north China; see her Unbounded Loyalty, pp. 64–104. Guan Donggui, “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de jiantao,” Shihuo yuekan 2.3 (1973): 129; Yang Yongjun, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang,” in Yichun shizhuan xuebao 20.4 (1998.8): 27–31. HHS, 87: 2876. According to the biography of the celebrated “Flying General” Li Guang, the general once repented of his undue killing of around 800 surrendered Qiang when he was the Grand Administrator of the Longxi commandery during the same period, which indicated the availability of surrendered Qiang population in the Longxi commandery. See SJ, 109: 2874; HHS, 87: 2876. HHS, 87: 2876. HS, 6: 188; HHS, 87: 2876–7. HHS, 87: 2877. See also Gao, “Handai Hu Qiang Xiaowei shulun,” pp. 10–16; Liu, Shizhe yu guanzhi yanbian, pp. 291–302.

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48 To challenge the conventional assumption that raiding is exclusively a nomadic phenomenon, Naomi Standen has shown in a study that raiding as a means of economic exploitation along the frontier was practiced by both nomadic people and the sedentary Chinese; see her “Raiding and Frontier Society in the Five Dynasties,” in Di Cosmo and Wyatt eds., Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History, pp. 160–91. 49 For the natural environment of the area, see Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” pp. 66–7. 50 Yang, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang,” pp. 29–31. 51 HS, 94B: 3804. 52 HHS, 87: 2877. 53 There is a detailed record in the Hanshu of the discussions on operational strategy between Zhao Chongguo and Emperor Xuan during the campaign. See HS, 69: 2975– 92. For an English translation of Zhao’s proposal, see Dreyer, “Zhao Chongguo,” pp. 665–725. There is also a discussion among central officials over the logistic problems in the campaign. See HS, 78: 3275–8. 54 There are opposing views among scholars as to whether Zhao Chongguo’s policy of setting farming colonies was effective or not. For the affirmative views, see Guan, “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de jiantao,” pp. 130–1; for the detracting views, see Yang, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang,” pp. 29–31 and Wang, Youmuzhe de jueze, pp. 174–5. 55 For example, in 42 BCE, see HS 79: 3296–9. 56 Yang, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang,” pp. 29–31. For the Former Han’s strategy of blocking the communication lines between the Xiongnu and the Qiang, see Wang, Handai sichouzhilu de yanhou, pp. 90–100. 57 See Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan kaoguyanjiusuo ed., Juyan Hanjian: jiayi bian (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), p. 191. 58 Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan kaoguyanjiusuo ed., Juyan Hanjian: jiayi bian (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), p. 253. Wang Mingke suggests that “Qiangzhong” was a geographic concept with changing territories; see his “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” pp. 129–32. 59 See Hao Shusheng and Zhang Defang, Xuanquan Hanjian yanjiu (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua chubanshe, 2009), 161–6. 60 Shusheng and Defang, Xuanquan Hanjian yanjiu, pp. 167–70. 61 Chapters 2–4 in Rafe de Crespigny’s Northern Frontier probably provide the most detailed study hitherto on the Qiang wars in any language. 62 HHS, 15: 588; 22: 796–7; 87: 2878. 63 On the resettlement policy during the Later Han, see Kumagai Shigezo, “Go-Kan no Kyozoku naishisaku ni tsuite,” Shiteki 9 (1988): 49–74. 64 HHS, 24: 835; 87: 2878–9. 65 HHS, 87: 2901. Different from the traditional view, de Crespigny suggests that Ma Yuan’s resettlement strategy was successful in weakening the Qiang’s power. See his Northern Frontier, pp. 73–4. 66 HHS, 87: 2880. 67 HHS, 87: 2884. 68 HHS, 87: 2879–80. 69 HHS, 87: 2881. 70 HHS, 87: 2882–3. 71 Guan, “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de jiantao,” pp. 131–2. 72 For the role of the Qiang soldiers in the Later Han’s enterprise in the Western Regions, see Li Zhengzhou, “Dong Han ‘sanjue santong’ Xiyu yu ‘Qianghuo’ zhi guanlian,” Yantai shifan xueyuan xuebao 21.3 (2004.9): 24–7. 73 HHS, 87: 2886; Qianfulun, 24: 279.

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74 Once back to the capital, Deng Zhi was appointed the Grand General, the highest status in the Han bureaucracy. 75 HHS, 87: 2887. 76 HHS, 87: 2888. 77 HHS, 87: 2889–90. 78 HHS, 87: 2892–3. 79 HHS, 87: 2895. 80 HHS, 87: 2896. 81 HHS, 87: 2896. 82 HHS, 87: 2896–7. 83 For an analysis of the different strategy of the “Three Brilliants” in dealing with the Qiang, see Yang Yongjun, “Shi bijiao ‘Liangzhou sanming’ de zhi Qiang zhengce,” Xibei shidi (1996.2): 73–80. 84 HHS, 65: 2147. 85 HHS, 65: 2147. 86 HHS, 65: 2148. 87 HHS, 65: 2148. 88 HHS, 65: 2154. 89 HHS, 87: 2891. 90 HHS, 87: 2891. 91 Gao, Hanbei jishi, p. 433; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1: 225–9 and v.2: 226–7. 92 For the full inscription, see Gao, Hanbei jishi, pp. 32–3; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1: 34–6 and v.2: 56–7. 93 On the refugees of the Liang province, see Zhang Shuang and Xue Haibo, “Shilun Dong Han Liang zhou liumin wenti,” Gansu shehui kexue (2006.2): 77–80; Luo, Handai de liumin wenti, pp. 77–80. 94 HHS, 87: 2897. 95 HHS, 65: 2153. 96 Zhang and Xue, “Shilun Dong Han Liang zhou liumin wenti,” pp. 77–80. 97 Sima Biao (comp), Hou Hanshu Zhi (hereafter HHSZ) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), 16: 3328. 98 HHSZ, 16: 3328. 99 HHS, 5: 214. 100 HHSZ, 16: 3330. 101 HHSZ, 16: 3330. 102 HHSZ, 16: 3331. 103 HHSZ, 16: 3332. 104 HHSZ, 15: 3312. 105 For further information on the natural disasters that happened in the Liang province and the problems that ensued, see Zhang and Xue, “Shilun Dong Han Liang zhou liumin wenti,” pp. 77–80. 106 HHSZ, 16: 3330. 107 Wang Fu mentioned this point several times in his works. See Qianfulun Chapters 21–24. 108 For details, see Xiao Kangda, “Gangu Hanjian yu dong Han houqi shehui zhengzhi,” Kaogu yu wenwu (1989.6): 78–85; Zhang Xuezheng, “Gangu Hanjian kaoshi,” in Gansusheng wenwugongzuodui and Gansusheng baowuguan eds., Hanjian yanjiu wenji (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 85–140. 109 Besides the corruption and malfeasance of local officials, the violations of imperial kinsmen’s privileges in the Liang province may also reflect the chaotic situation where under the turmoil of warfare and natural disasters even members of the imperial clan were deprived of any real protection. 110 HHS, 65: 2129. 111 HHS, 65: 2132. 112 HHS, 65: 2138.

The others within 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139

140 141

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HHS, 24: 835. HHS, 24: 835. HHS, 51: 1687. HHS, 51: 1687. HHS, 51: 1688. HHS, 58: 1866. HHS, 58: 1866. HHS, 58: 1866. HHS, 58: 1867. For detailed analyses, see Michaud, “The Yellow Turbans,” pp. 41–127; MansveltBeck, “The Fall of Han,” pp. 334–41. HHS, 72: 2320. HHS, 58: 1875. HHS, 58: 1875–6. HS, 9: 283; HS, 64B: 2830. Anthony Hulsewé, “Law as One of the Foundations of State Power in Early Imperial China,” in S.R. Schram ed., Foundations and Limits of State Power in China (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1987), p. 25. Yan Gengwang pieces together fragments of historical data to make a list of Grand Administrators of Liang province in the Later Han period, see his Liang Han taishou cishi biao (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1948), pp. 236–51. Qianfulun, 22: 262. Qianfulun, 22: 258. HHS, 87: 2887. HHS, 87: 2888. HHS, 87: 2888. HHS, 87: 2888. HHS, 87: 2893. HHS, 87: 2896. For detailed information of the back and forth movements of all the aforementioned commanderies, see Li Xiaojie, Dong Han zhengqu dili (Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999), pp. 136–7 and 139–53. For the decline of the system and the devaluation of the ranks of merit in the Later Han period, see Zhu, Jungong juezhi kaolun, pp. 133–64. There are many works studying the military systems of the two Han dynasties. It will suffice to name a few here. For Chinese scholarship, see Sun Yutang, “Xi Han de bingzhi,” and “Dong Han bingzhi de yanbian,” in his Sun Yutang xueshu luwenji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), pp. 269–327 and 328–55, respectively; Li Yufu, “Qin Han shidai de bingyi zhidu,” and “Qin Han shidai de junshi jianzhi,” in his Qin Han zhidu shilun (Jinan: Shandong daixue chubanshe, 2003), pp. 215–70 and 271–345, respectively; Huang Jinyan, Qin Han junzhi shilun (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1993), esp. Chapters 2–5; for Japanese research, see Hamaguchi Shigekuni, “Kōbutei no gunbi shukushō to sono eikyō,” in idem, Shin Kan Zui Tō shi no kenkyū (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku shubankai, 1966), pp. 291–325; in Western scholarship, see Michael Loewe, “The Western Han Army: Organization, Leadership, and Operation,” in Di Cosmo ed., Military Culture in Imperial China, pp. 65–89; Rafe de Crespigny, “The Military Culture of Later Han,” in Di Cosmo ed., Military Culture in Imperial China, pp. 90–111; de Crespigny, Fire over Luoyang, pp. 148–64. For the background of the initiation of universal military service, see Tu, Bianhu qimin, Chapters 2 and 9; Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, Chapters 2 and 3. Lei Haizong, Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1940), especially pp. 44–61 and 125–59. Mark Edward Lewis, “The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service,” in Hans van de Ven ed., Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000), p. 39.

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142 Lewis, “The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service,” pp. 39–48; also Sun, “Dong Han bingzhi de yanbian,” pp. 330–2. 143 See the examples listed by Lewis in “The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service,” pp. 36–7. 144 Qianfulun, 21: 250–3, 22: 267. 145 It is originally from Zuo Zhuan. See Yang Bojun annotated, Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu v. 3, the 27th year of the Duke Xiang (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), p. 113. For Ying Shao’s comments in the Han Guan, see HHSZ, 28: 3622. 146 HHSZ, 28: 3622. 147 Yang Bojun annotated, Lunyu yizhu (Hong Kong: Chunghwa Book, 1994), 13.30: 144. 148 Non-Han soldiers might probably have been used by Emperor Gao, the founding emperor of Former Han, during the civil war following the fall of the Qin dynasty. According to the sources, there were Loufan cavalrymen in the Han army. Loufan was a name of a northern tribe of the time. See SJ, 7: 328–9. However, we have no details about whether the cavalrymen called Loufan were alien people or not, nor do we know whether they were recruited on an individual basis or tribal basis. 149 HS, 49: 2282–3. 150 Hsing I-tien, “Dong Han de Hu bing,” Guoli zhengzhidaixue xuebao 28 (1973): 143–66. 151 Hsing, “Dong Han de Hu bing,” pp. 143–66; Liu, “Lun Handai xizhi bianjiang minzu yu saini zhi zhengce,” pp. 299–300. 152 HHS, 57: 1850. 153 HHS, 72: 2319. 154 HHS, 84: 2801. Zhu, “Lun Han Wei zhiji Qiang Hu hua de Liangzhuo junshi jituan,” p. 113; Morimoto, “Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu,” p. 183; Wang Xien, “Hanmo Liangzhou junfa jituan jianlun,” Gansu shehui kexue (1991.2): 72–3. 155 HHS, 84: 2798. 156 Wang, “Hanmo Liangzhou junfa jituan jianlun,” pp. 71–2. 157 Morimoto, “Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu,” p. 178. 158 Morimoto, “Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu,” p. 183. 159 Wang, “Hanmo Liangzhou junfa jituan jianlun,” p. 73. 160 Chen Shou, comp., Sanguo zhi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997) 36: 945. 161 Yang Yongjun, “Lüelun Handai Longyou difang shili de xingqi jiqi yu Qiang Hu de guanxi,” Dunhuang xue jikan (2000.2): 107–8. 162 HHS, 66: 2176. Chen Yong has provided a detailed study of the emphasis of Liangzhou identity among northwestern military men after the death of Dong Zhuo. See his “Dong Zhuo jinjing shulun,” Zhongguoshi yanjiu (1995.4): 112–21. 163 HHS, 58: 1878. 164 HHS, 71: 2303. 165 Chen Yong discusses the scholar-officials of the late Later Han period and argues that they were bound by the principle of loyalty and dared not directly challenge the throne. See his “Liangzhou sanming lun,” pp. 72–4. 166 For a detailed analysis of Dong Zhuo’s political actions after controlling Louyang, see Chen, “Dong Zhuo jinjing shulun,” pp. 109–12.

5

Epilogue The beginning of the end

In 215 CE, seeing that he had lost all ground to his rival, Ma Chao had no other options but to flee the Liang province and seek asylum in the southwestern province of Yi. Ma Chao and his father Ma Teng were well-known to their contemporaries as half-Han and half-Qiang and had earned wide support among the non-Han peoples and led one of the dominant military forces in the northwestern region since 190 CE. Ma Chao was welcomed by the southwestern warlords, who sought to exploit his influence in the Liang province for their own territorial interests. For his part, Ma longed to regain the northwestern domain and to avenge the death of most of his clan members. His short sojourn to the Yi province, however, soon turned into a lengthy exile as Ma and his new patrons failed to realize their ambitions in northern expeditions. Ma Chao died in despair in 222 CE, while his exile signaled the end of the last generation of military elite who grew up in the Later Han northwest. The doom of the Later Han northwestern military elite was spelt, however, long before Ma Chao’s tragic end. In 187 CE, various local military forces rose up against the imperial governance in the Liang province. Ma Chao’s father Ma Teng allied with Han Sui in 189 CE, and the two quickly emerged as two of the prominent warlords in the northwest. When Dong Zhuo moved the imperial capital from Luoyang to Chang’an, the northwestern powers kept a distance from him and maintained a fragile balance between the two sides. The murder of Dong in 192 CE, however, set off a power struggle among the northwestern military strongmen and threw the region into chaos again. Meanwhile, after years of campaigns, Cao Cao (155–220 CE) had put the emperor installed by Dong Zhuo under his custody and assumed chancellorship of the Later Han empire, which by then existed only nominally. As the de facto ruler of the Guandong region now, Cao Cao turned his attention to the west. In 211 CE, Cao led his army into the Guanzhong region with the aim of unifying north China. Various northwestern warlords, including Ma Chao, Han Sui, Cheng Yi (d. 211 CE), Li Kan (d. 211 CE), Yang Qiu, and Liang Xing (d. 212 CE), assembled to resist Cao Cao, whom they regarded as the common enemy. Cao Cao, however, dealt a decisive blow to the coalition forces; the remnants of the northwestern armies retreated farther northwest. In 215 CE, Han Sui was murdered by turncoats in the Tianshui commandery, and Ma Chao fled south as the situation got desperate. As a result, Cao

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Cao found there was no longer any strong power that could stand in the way of his conquest of the northwestern region. The conquest was finally completed by his son in the 220s CE, but the end of the turmoil in the northwest was yet to come; it was just the beginning of the end. The Liang province was nominally under the grip of the imperial state during the Wei dynasty (220–265 CE) ruled by Cao Cao’s descendants and then the succeeding Western Jin dynasty (265–317 CE). Central control, however, was ephemeral, since no later than in the 290s CE the northwestern region turned its back to the central government while the Western Jin imperial court had already devolved into internecine warfare among the imperial princes. A cluster of short-lived and multi-ethnic regimes emerged in the region, and not until the early seventh century CE was the northwest absorbed into the orbit of a strong unified empire again. The northwestern borderlands were always a restive region in imperial China. The seventeenth-century scholar Gu Zuyu (1631–92 CE) analyzed in his magnum opus Dushi fangyu jiyao (Essentials of Geography for Reading History) the significance of the northwestern region in Chinese history and made a remark on the role that the region played in the toppling of the Later Han dynasty: As I have observed that since the ancient times, he who wreaked havoc across the empire always originated from Shaanxi.1 In the years when the Eastern Han dynasty was enjoying peace and prosperity, the Qiang and Hu launched their revolt in the western frontier. Therefore, brilliant generals and vigorous soldiers all gathered in the region between the Yellow River and Long Mountain. In the end, [the northwestern rebels] were as avaricious as giant swines and as venomous as serpents; [they] desecrated the imperial palace, thereby throwing the empire into turmoil.2 Gu noted the militarized nature of the northwestern region during the Later Han period and traced the causal relationship between the concentration of military forces in the region and the downfall of the dynasty. In other words, the highly militarized northwestern region acted as the harbinger of the disintegration of the Later Han empire. In this book, I adopted a regional perspective by focusing on the role of the northwestern borderlands vis-à-vis the imperial center to explain one of the causes leading to the collapse of the Later Han empire. I emphasized the impact of regional conflicts on the decline and fall of the dynasty, paying particular attention to the incompatibility between the militarized culture of the northwest frontier region and the civil values promoted by the imperial center, which was dominated by eastern-based scholar-officials. The analysis of this book provides a case study of the relationship between the imperial state and a peripheral region with different regional cultures and identities. As a frontier region of the Qin-Han empire, the northwest constituted a new territory to the Chinese realm. Until the Later Han times, some portions of the northwestern region had only been part of the imperial realm for 100 years. Its coalescence into the Chinese empire was a result of the long-term Han territorial

Epilogue 139 expansion and conquest, which arguably defined the region’s military nature. Moreover, in the harsh natural environment of the borderlands, only the very tough could survive; unsurprisingly, the region fostered many vigorous warriors. A mixture of cultures and the coexistence of a multiplicity of ethnicities featured prominently in this highly militarized frontier society, which contrasted sharply with the imperial center that championed unified cultural values and territorial integration. When the Former Han empire was interested in marching to Central Asia, the northwestern frontier region played a crucial role in serving as a bridgehead, and the northwesterners, the linjun Liangjiazi in particular, constituted the mainstay of the imperial enterprise. At that time, the northwestern region was deemed part of the military and political core of the empire, though it was still in the periphery in the geographic sense. In short, it was the imperial expansionistic project based in the northwest that permitted the rise of the military elite from the comparatively culturally backward region. The Later Han rulers, however, had a different vision of empire from their Former Han predecessors. When the Later Han state adopted a policy of retrenchment, the strategic value of the northwestern region changed accordingly. The region lost the importance it once enjoyed in the expansionist era. It was dismissed as a borderland of cultural backwardness and was considered by the eastern-based scholar-officials as a peripheral region that could be readily given up in the times of trouble. The northwestern region and its inhabitants went through a process of political peripheralization during the Later Han dynasty. As a result, the Later Han northwest was not only a periphery geographically but also a periphery politically. When its strategic value was high, the imperial state was willing to spend resources on the northwest. Conversely, when its strategic value decreased, the imperial center would not waste resources on the region. What determined the calculation of strategic cost and benefit was influenced profoundly by the political culture that prevailed among the imperial policy makers. When the prevailing political culture of the Later Han state favored civil values and honored knowledge of classical studies, the northwesterners found themselves being accorded with a lower political and social status than their eastern counterparts. For the northwestern military elite, this new political culture hindered their career advancement; for the northwestern commoners, the giving up of the northwest in thought and in action on the part of the eastern-based scholarofficials showed that they were being abandoned by the imperial center. While the imperial state cared little about the welfare of the northwesterners, prolonged warfare and natural disasters exacerbated their hardship. It was the disaffected northwesterners who finally became the harbingers in the dismemberment of the empire. Although various factors had already weakened the Later Han empire, such as political infightings at the imperial court, popular rebellions, foreign invasions launched by the Xianbei and Wuhuan along the northern frontier, and the massacre of eunuchs at the capital unleashed by the official-scholars in 189 CE that brought the imperial center to chaos, the imperial authority was still untouchable for the outsiders of the imperial court before Dong Zhuo entered Luoyang. As outsiders, the warlord Dong Zhuo and his northwestern troops controlled the

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capital city of Luoyang, deposed and installed emperors according to their will, murdered the Empress Dowager, and desecrated the imperial authority. These actions gave the regional governors legitimate pretext to openly establish their own regimes in the name of opposing Dong Zhuo and other rebels from the northwest, further disintegrating the empire. Dong Zhuo’s march to the capital in 190 CE therefore marked not only the beginning of the end of the Later Han dynasty but also the breakdown of the early imperial system in Chinese history. A long period of political disunion ensued. Regional culture and identity always play important roles in Chinese history, especially in the processes of empire formation and dissolution. Taking regional factors into consideration provides a dynamic perspective of understanding the development of the cultural mix that we called Chinese civilization today. Morris Rossabi succinctly captured this feature in a general remark on Chinese history: there have been many Chinas. Starting with a base around the Yellow River, China expanded to the south and the west. As the Chinese added territory and peoples, they also incorporated new cultural patterns and values that they adopted from the native inhabitants. When they advanced along the current northern borderlands, they gained control over non-Chinese peoples . . . Localism prevailed, as many areas retained their own identities. Although these regions fell under central control, they often persisted in their own lifestyles. Yet historians cannot readily identify these deviations and regional variations because the written records, most of which derived from the central authorities, ignored both local patterns and opposition to the dynasties’ institutions and policies . . . There was considerable variation in this large land mass.3 Under the façade of a unified empire, there were in fact a multitude of regional variations and conflicts. Regional cultures and customs persisted in Chinese history and hindered the empire from achieving the ideal of cultural unification. For example, the Qin state had set up the Nan commandery on a newly conquered southern region in 278 BCE, but in 227 BCE, about fifty years after the conquest, the Grand Administrator of the Nan commandery still lamented in a public announcement that regional culture infringed the interests of the imperial state.4 When the central authority was prevalent, it was able to impose its political and cultural values on the various regions and bring them into its orbit; when the central authority was weak or the regions strong, regional cultures and identities flourished which could tear apart the empire. The Later Han empire was in fact not only facing the challenge from the northwest but also from other regions. The Later Han dynasty was a time when the powerful families had great influence on both the imperial center and various regions. The growth of the powerful families and regionalism went hand in hand during the Later Han. By the end of the dynasty, regionalism had already become a strong force that undermined the empire, and narrow parochial interests had predominated over imperial interests.5 What came with this trend was the devolution of military power to the regional

Epilogue 141 governors, which equipped them with means and resources against Dong Zhuo in 190 CE. The present study is only one of the many stories – albeit the most important – of the development of regionalism in the Later Han times, as well as in early imperial China. Besides the relationship between the Liang province and the imperial center, the bilateral and multilateral relations between other provinces and the imperial state and among the various provinces, not to mention the area of lower administrative levels, are topics that merit further study. Comparing and contrasting the varying conditions of the militarization of different frontiers of the Later Han empire will also provide important insights into the understanding of the emergence of great disunion in early medieval China. And a certain number of leading northwestern military figures deserve in-depth case studies as their stories will provide a lens for our understanding of the times in which they were living. All of these constitute an essential component of my next research projects, and the present study is just a beginning of the journey.

Notes 1 For Gu, Shaanxi was not confined to modern Shaanxi province but referred to the whole northwestern area. 2 Gu Zuyu, Dushi fangyu jiyao. He Cijun and Shi Hejin annotated (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005) v.5, 52: 2451. 3 Morris Rossabi, A History of China (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), p. 5. 4 Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu, Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1977), p. 15. 5 Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han Dynasty,” pp. 176–95; de Crespigny, “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han,” pp. 533–58.

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Index

abdication 4 Advisory Counselor (Jianyi Dafu) 67 all under heaven 41, 57, 129 Anding (Han commandery) 35, 39, 40, 42, 44–5, 58–9, 63–4, 67–8, 70, 98, 109, 111–12, 122–3 autochthonous 13–14, 29, 32, 40, 56–7, 70, 102 Balazs, Etienne 99 Ban Biao 103 Ban Chao 74–5 Ban Yong 75 Beidi (Han commandery) 33–6, 44–5, 58–60, 62–4, 67–70, 109, 111–12, 114, 120, 122–3 Beigong Boyu 119 Beihai (Han commandery) 41 Biandao (Han county) 33 Bianyi 98 Bielenstein, Hans 6 Bing (Han province) 2, 45, 86, 98, 114 Bodao (Han county) 33 border(s) 31, 45 borderland(s) 11, 69, 117, 138–40 boundary/boundaries 11, 25, 32–4, 36, 40, 62, 75–6, 102, 105 Cen Peng 78 Central Plains 30–1 Chaju (Recommendation System) 84 Chang’an 2, 4, 25, 79–80, 111–12, 118–20, 122–4, 137; Chang’an camp 124 Chanyu 25–6, 34, 36–7, 41, 60, 63 Chaona (Han county) 64 Chen Jun 78 Chen Tang 60 Chen Zhong 75 China proper 11–12, 26, 29

Chiyang (Han county) 284 Colonel Supervising the Qiang (Hu Qiang Xiaowei) 62, 64, 106, 108–14, 116, 122, 126 Confucianism 7–8, 83 Confucianization 85 Confucian State ( jukyō kokka) 7–8, 10, 86, 88 Cui Lie 120 Dali Rong 33 danggu see Great Proscriptions Daxiao Yugu 107 de Crespigny, Rafe 8–9, 75 Deng Yu 78–9, 110 Deng Zhi 110–11, 118–19 dependent state (shuguo) 39–40, 42, 44–5 Dianlian 111, 122 Didao (Han county) 33, 58, 61, 106, 122 Donghai (Han commandery) 41, 70 Dong Zhuo 1–3, 10, 12, 14, 43–4, 65–6, 88, 105, 113, 120, 127–9, 137, 139–41 Dou Rong 42–3, 63, 79, 109 Duan Jiong 55–6, 64, 66–7, 87, 112–13, 115, 119, 126–7 Du 80 Du Jigong 122 Duliao camp 124 Du Mao 78 Du Qi 122 Dushi fangyu jiyao (Essentials of Geography for Reading History) 138 Excellency over the Masses (Situ) 120 Fan Ye 4, 100–1, 103, 105, 113 Fan Zhun 118 Fengsu tongyi (Comprehensive Discussion of Customs) 101, 103, 125

Index Feng Yi 79 Flying General (Fei Jiangjun) 60, 62, 67 Fufeng (Han commandery) 42, 109, 122–3 Fu Jiezi 58, 60, 66 Fu Jun 78 Fuli camp 124 Fu Xie 64–6, 120–2, 129 Gai Xun 64–7, 85–6, 88 Gai Yan 79 Gangu prefecture 116 Gansu province 11–12, 27–32, 35, 39, 99–100, 111, 116 Gan Yanshou 58–9 General of Chariots and Cavalry (Juji Jiangjun) 110 General of Infantry (Gaiguan Jiangjun) 62 General of Light Chariots (Qingju Jiangjun) 61 General of the Gentleman-of-theHousehold (Zhonglang Jiang) 84 General of the Rear (Hou Jiangjun) 61 General of the Right (You Jiangjun) 61–2 General of the Strong Crossbow (Qiangnu Jiangjun) 59 General of the Vanguard (Qian Jiangjun) 84 General of Towered Warship (Louchuan Jiangjun) 76 General Who Conquers the West (Zhengxi Jiangjun) 112 General Who Crushes the Qiang (Po Qiang Jiangjun) 62, 113 Geng Chun 79 Geng Yan 78 Goi Naohiro 5–6 Gongsun Ao 62 Gongsun He 58, 60, 65 Gongsun Hunye 60 gōzoku 5 gōzoku kyōdōtai 6 gōzoku rengō seiken 6 Grand Commandant (Taiwei) 87, 118 Great Proscriptions 8–9; the first Great Proscription 87–8; the second Great Proscription 87 Guandong 35–6, 39, 58–9, 69–70, 72, 76–80, 82, 85–7, 105, 118–20, 129, 137 Guangwu (emperor) 1, 4, 6, 42, 63, 68, 70, 73–4, 78–80, 83, 103, 117, 123–4 Guangzhi (Han county) 64 Guanxi (west of the pass) 35, 58–9 Guanzhong 35, 45, 72, 76–80, 109, 111–14, 117–18, 122–3, 137 Gudao 33

159

Guo Si 128 Guo Xiang 109 Gu Zuyu 138 Han Guan (the Han Institutions) 125 Hangu Pass 35, 58, 76 Hanshu 28, 33, 38, 40–1, 57–9, 61–2, 67, 100, 106 Han Sui 120, 127–8, 137 Hanzhong (Han commandery) 25 haozu 5, 8 Hedong (Han commandery) 63, 68, 109, 111 Heguan (Han county) 119–20 Henei (Han commandery) 77, 111 Hexi Corridor 12, 25–6, 28–30, 36–8, 40–2, 63, 72, 75, 112 Hongnong (Han commandery) 55, 87–8 Hou Hanshu 38, 44, 59, 70–2, 98, 100, 113–14 Hou Ying 107 Huangfu Gui 55, 64–6, 87–8, 112–13, 116, 120, 129 Huangfu Song 65–6, 120, 129 Huang River (Huangshui) 28, 30, 107 Huangzhong 2, 111–12, 119 Huo Guang 60–1 Huo Qubing 33, 36, 81 Jia Fu 78 Jia Juanzhi 121 Jian Tan 78 Jijiu pian 57 Jincheng (Han commandery) 39–40, 44–5, 61, 67, 70–1, 100, 106, 109, 112, 114–17, 120, 122–3 Jing Dan 79 Jing River 29, 31 Jiubian 98 Jiuquan (Han commandery) 34, 38–40, 43–5, 57, 62–3, 70, 74–5, 110, 115 Jukyō kokka 7 Juyan (the Edsen-gol) 12, 44–5, 108 kayue culture 30, 100 Kodai teikoku hōkai ron (thesis of the collapse of the early empire) 8 Kojima Shigetoshi 6 Kou Xun 78 Lattimore, Owen 11 Lewis, Mark Edward 5, 124 Li Xi 62 Li Xiu 118–19

160

Index

Liang Qin 63, 66 Liang Tong 63, 66, 68, 70 Liangzhou sanming 55 Li Cai 58, 61, 65 Li Guang 58, 60–2, 67–8 Li Jue 128 Li Ling 62–3 Lingju (Han county) 34, 67–8 Lintao (Han county) 33–4, 65, 106 Li Tong 79 Liujun liangjiazi (sons of impeccable families from the six commanderies) 35, 58–9, 61, 65–7, 71, 77, 81, 88, 129 Li Wenhou 119–20 Liyi (Han county) 33 Loewe, Michael 38 Longxi (Han commandery) 25, 33–6, 39–40, 44–5, 58–63, 65, 67–70, 73, 106, 109–12, 114–16, 122–33 Lu Fang 42–3 Lu Jia 82 Luoyang 1–2, 32, 72, 78–80, 118, 137, 139, 140 Ma Chao 127, 137 Majiayao culture 30–1, 48 Ma Teng 127–8, 137 Ma Wu 79 Ma Xian 112, 116, 123 Ma Yuan 94n149, 109, 117–18 Meiyang (Han county) 122 Meng Tian 34 Mianzhu (Han county) 33 militarization 13–14, 16, 57, 69, 81, 123, 141

Qiang zhong 108 Qijia culture 30–1 Qimen 58–9, 61, 65 Quan Rong 31–2, 49n40 ranks of merit 81–2, 123 Regional Commissioner (zhou mu) 76–7 Ren Guang 79 Ren Shang 110–11, 114 Rongdao (Han county) 33 Runan (Han commandery) 86 rusheng 82–3 Sanhu fa 121 San Miao 100–1 Shandong (Han geographical concept) 35, 58, 77 Shandong (modern province) 35 Shang (Han commandery) 33–5, 58, 69–70, 109, 111, 122–3 Shangdang (Han commandery) 87, 111 Shangguan Jie 61, 65–6 Shanggui (Han county) 33, 58, 61, 67–8 Shentu Jia 81 shibian 98 Shiji 32, 38, 100–1, 106 Shusun Tong 82 Siba culture 30 Sima Qian 101 Si Sangong shan bei 114 Siwa culture 30–1, 100 Song Xiao 85 state-sanctioned migration 68–70

Nanhai (Han commandery) 41 Nanyang (Han commandery) 77, 86–7 Neishi 33 Nishijima Sadao 5

Taishan (Han commandery) 70, 77 Taiyuan (Han commandery) 87 Tianshui (Han commandery) 35, 39–40, 42, 44–5, 58–9, 61, 63, 67–8, 70, 73, 106, 109, 137

Ordos 34, 36–7, 39

Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 6, 8

Pang Can 118 Pei Tong 79 peripheralization 16, 71–2, 139 pifa 101 pifa zuoren 103, 131n29 Poqiang (Han county) 67–8, 117 Protector General of the Western Regions (Xiyu Duhu) 60–1, 63, 73–4

Wang Ba 79 Wang Chang 79 Wang Fu 98–9, 102, 116, 121–2, 125 Wang Liang 78 Wang Mang 4–5, 41, 43, 62–3, 66, 73, 78–80, 83, 108, 124 Wang Mingke 101–2 Wang Wei 58–9 Wang Xin 122 Wan Xiu 79 Watanabe Yoshihiro 7, 85 Wei Ao 42–3, 109, 117 Wei Qing 36, 61, 81

Qianfulun 98 Qiang 2, 9, 13–14, 16, 29, 31, 37–9, 41–5, 55–7, 59, 61–2, 64–8, 71, 73, 75–6, 98–129, 137–8

Index Western Regions (Xiyu) 12–13, 33, 37, 43, 60–3, 72–6, 107, 110, 126 witchcraft (wugu) 60 Wu Han 78 Wuhuan 9, 64, 73, 139 Wuwei (Han commandery) 34, 38–45, 63–4, 67, 70 Wuyi Yuanjian 100–1 Xianbei 9, 73, 76, 139 Xianglin camp 124 Xiangwu (Han county) 58, 61, 122 Xiao He 82 Xihai (Han commandery) 41, 43, 108 Xihe (Han commandery) 35–6, 58, 69–70, 109 Xindian culture 30, 100 Xin Qingji 58, 62, 65 Xin Tang 62 Xin Wuxian 58, 61–2 Xiongnu 2, 9, 13, 25–6, 28, 33–4, 36–8, 40–3, 57, 60–4, 66, 69, 73–6, 101, 106–7, 111, 118, 124, 126 Xiyu see Western Regions Xiyu duhu see Protector General of the Western Regions Xuanquan 108 Yang Lien-sheng 5, 8 Yang Pu 76 Yan zhong 129 Yao, Mount 35, 58 Yao Qi 79 Yegu, Mount 112, 115

161

Yellow Turbans 9, 64, 115, 119 Yingchuan (Han commandery) 77, 86 Ying Shao 101, 103–4, 125–6 Yiqu 33, 58, 60, 62, 107 Yiqu Anguo 107 Yong camp 124 Yuandao (Han county) 33 Yuanquan (Han county) 55, 64 Yudao (Han county) 33 Yuezhi 25, 37 Yulin 58–9, 61, 65 Yumen pass 34, 75 Yuntai 78 Yu Xu 59, 118–19, 121–3, 129 Yuyang camp 124 Yuzhi (Han county) 58–9, 62 Zang Gong 79 Zhai Zun 79 Zhang Huan 55–6, 64–7, 71, 86–8, 112–13, 116 Zhang Qian 25–6, 33, 37 Zhang Wen 120 Zhangye (Han commandery) 38–45, 62, 70, 106, 122 Zhao Kuan 67–8, 114 Zhao Yi 7 Zheng Tai 1, 3, 57, 126, 129 Zhizhi Chanyu 60 Zhuo Mao 79 Zhuya (Han commandery) 121 Zhu You 79 Zuo Zhuan (The Zuo Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals) 125