The Chinese in Modern Malaya

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First Pnfrlix/ved I956

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Published by Donald Moore, Singapore and printed by the Malaya Publishing I-Iousc Limited, Singapore.

CON"[IF,N"1IS

e

Part I From the earliest times to 1941

I-

*

Page

1

Part II

The Chinese Position revolutionized, 1942-1955 . .

Page 32

PREFACE I have given this little book the title, The Chinese in Modern Malaya, not only to distinguish it from my study, The Chinese in Malaya, pu"o].ished in 1948, but also to emphasize that it is not merely a summary of that work but includes other material and brings the story of the Chinese comImmity in Malaya right up to date. For permission to use material contained in The Chinese in Malaya and in Chinese in Southeast* Asia (2nd Edition, 1952), I am indebted to the Royal Institute of International Aiiairs which sponsored. both these works and to the Oxford University Press which published them. VICTOR PIMCELL,

Cambridge, 1955.

PART I

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 1941 At the present time the total population of Southeast Asianamely Burma, Siam (or Thailand), Indochina, Malaya, British is in the neighloour~ Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines hood of one hundred and seventy million, and of these something

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like twelve million regard themselves as being of Chinese race. The only reliable recent figures are those for Malaya and those for the other countries are largely conjectural, but the present distribution of the twelve million is about three million in Malaya and British Borneo, three to four million in Siam, a qttarter of a million in Burma, two million in Indochina, and a quarter of a million in the Philippines. That is to say that one person to every fourteen or fifteen in Southeast Asia is a Chinese. The Chinese have been c o i n ] down from China into Southeast Asia from remote times and the' *l" had conqucre U a large portion of Annam before the Christians era, but they did not, generally speaking, approach the region by sea until after the Arab navigators had shown the wav in the. ninth century onwards. Under the Mongols, in 1292, Kublai Khan sent a military expedition against lava (without, howe l establishing; any lasting control over the island).

Then, in the early fifteenth

century, during the Ming dynasty, there was a period of great ,lIL maritime expansion on the part of China. Between us 1431, Admiral Cheng Ho and his colleagueI got as far as the iii

Persian Gulf and other Chinese navigators I cached Africa. M was at this time that many of the princes! of Southeast Asia

acknowledged tlle overlordship of China. m. short outburst of activity up , however, suddenly ceased and was not renewed.

The first permanent Chinese settlements seem to have been made in the fourteenth century at Palembang in Sumatra and at Tumasik, or 'Old Singapore'. But the number of Chinese who ventured abroad was comparatively few, and it was their

ambition to return home as soon as possible. Ancestor 1

wo1'~

ship was 1n8 force in discouraging the Chinese from emigrating, since those who left the spirits of their ancestors w§1i'out sacrdiciail olterings were guilty of unfilial conduct. Moreover, the Emperors of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties (especially the latter) set their face against their subjects going albroacl. They took the view that people were 'capital' and that a loss of subjects was not one to be compensated for by any trade advantages. The Manchus added to Huis a fear that revolutionaries might go overseas in order to plot against the dynasty and they thus punished illegal emigration (when the culprits | 11

returned or could be apprehended) with death.

It was not until the Europeans (the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English) had formed settlements that the numbers of Chinese who- found it worth while to go abroad became considerable, for the Europeans not only increased the trade but established conditions of security. But while the Chinese were protected against the oppression or exactions of native princes, fear and trade jealousy sometimes brought them into conflict with the European colonists. Thus in 1603 and again in 1639

there was a great massacre of Chinese at Manila by the Spaniards and in the next century, in 1740, many thousands of them were killed at Batavia by the Dutch. But before the latter half of the nineteenth century the Chinese in the whole region amounted only to a few tens of thousands and it was only early in the present century that their emigration increased to a Hood.

TL1masik (above-mentioned)

was the First Chinese settle-

ment in Malaya and an account of it is given as early as 1849 by a Chinese merchant named \Vang Ta-Ycan. The Chinese who came to the Malay kingdom of Malacca (established c, 1400 ) were mostly merchants who remained there only during the trading season and it does not seem that they made any per-

manent settlement there until after the Portuguese had conquered the kingdom in 1511. Even so, the total number of Chinese residing there when the Dutch captured Malacca from the Portuguese in 1641 was only about four hundred. Nor did they greatly multiply under the Dutch and their maximum number was 2,500 in 1750.

Most of them came from the region of

Annoy.

2

THE CHINESE IN MALAYA UNDER THE BRITISH (1786-1874) During the eighteenth century, when the British were frequently at war with the French, the East India Company found the need for a station where its ships could resit during the period of the northeast monsoon in the Bay of Bengal and eventually, in 1786, obtained through Captain Francis Light a lease from the Sultan of Ked ah in perpetuity of the island of Penang, A strip of the mainland, Province "Wellesley, was added in 1800. After the foundation of Fenang the immigration of Chinese into Malaya greatly increased. In a letter dated 1st October 1786, Captain Light said, 'Our inhabitants increase

very fast. Chooliahs (TanNls), Chinese, and Christians; they are already disputing about the ground, everyone building as fast as he can', and in another letter he adds, 'Did not the Dutch keep a strict watch over the Chinese, most of them would leave Malacca." In the year of his death (1794) he wrote an official report to his superiors in which he said, 'The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants: they are men, women, and children, about 3,0005 they possess the diilerent trades of carpenters, masons, and smiths, are traders, shoplceepers, and planters: they employ small vessels and prows and send adventurers to the surrounding countries. They are the only people from whom a revenue may be raised without expense and extraordinary effort of governments They are a valuable acquisition, but speaking a language which no other people anunderstand, they are able to form parties and combinations in a most secret manner against any regulations of Government they disapprove, and were they brave as iNtelligent they would be dangerous subjects, but want of courage will make them bear many impositions before real.' (Like many other Europeans before and after him, Light mistook Chinese amenity to control as a sign of a lack of courage instead of what it was, namely a long-established social tradition.) -.--.-.T

In addition to trading, the Chinese immigrants cultivated in Penang and Province Wellesley pepper, gambler, eoconuirs, tobacco (in small quantities) and sifeh ( a leaf for chewing with betel-nut). But their principal crop was sugar of which between

1800 and 1840 they had the monopoly. 3

Penang, however, proved to be only a limited success as a settlement and it was not until after the foundation of Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819 that the Chinese became really well established in Malaya. On II Tune, 1819, Rattles wrote to the Duchess of Somerset, 'My new colony thrives most rapidly. We have not been established four months, and it has received

an accession of population exceeding 5,000-principally Chinese, and this number is daily increasing.'as Raffles directed that all Chinese should leave the northern side of the river where they

had located themselves and form a new village from a bridge down to the river on the site of the present Boat Quay. By 1821, there were 3,374 yards of road, 15 yards wide in Chinatown. Rallies considered that the Erst in importance among the immigrant peoples was 'beyond doubt the Chinese 'From the number of Chinese already settled, and the peculiar attraction of the place for that industrious race,' he added, 'it may be presumed that they will always form the largest part of the community." (Rattles was certainly right, tor in 1955, of a total population of about 1,200,000, the Chinese accounted for 85 per cent)

Problems of Government: the Secret Societies The Chinese who migrated to Singapore and Penang were of diilerent tribes Hokkiens, Cantonese, Hakkas etc. - and they did not form a social unit as they did in China where they lived

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side by side in settled districts. There was thus to-orn for friction between the several unamalgamated tribes. Nor were they exclusively composed of enterprising merchants arid industrious artisans and workmen: they had brought with them some of the worst characters for whom China itself had no room. There

were frequent robberies, even in broad daylight, and for the first years of Singapore's history most of these went unpunished. Moreover, there was only a handful of police (Indians from Bengal and Madras) and as yet no code of laws under which criminals could be punished.

In the early days, both in Penang and Malacca as well as in Singapore, the British left the Chinese very much to themselves. ggoverned them through headmen appointed by themsel@| E Only when robbery increased did the Chinese realize Necessity of contributing towards their own protection and -o subscribing to the Night Watch Fund. T. Rraddeli, however, in he more careful cxammaiflon shows that

in

1878 the total population of Singapore was 10,683 of which the Chinese were only '5,31'7.

4

The Chinese Secret Societies had undoubtedly been imported with the first immigrants, but it was not until 1831 that there is any mention of their existence in Singapore. In that fear riot broke out and r u m o r s placed the responsibility for it at theirs . I I ~ so, El vas twenty years before another such riot occu1'1°ed_ Then from 1851 to 1854 a series of incidents took place which culminated in the great riot of the latter year when some 400 Chinese were killed, (As early as 1799 Secret Society disturbances were reported in Penang and between 1846 and 1885 I31ere were a series of outbreaks in and Malacca as well as in Singapore.) Chinese Secret Societies were generally believed to be all oilshoots of the Toian To Hui (Heaven and Earth League), known as the Hung (Food) League or Triad Society* Originally religious or self~help associations, they had assumed an anti-dynastic character at the time of the Manchu conquest of China and later on they degenerated into criminal associations. Europeans have made a distinction between the benevolent kongsis, or district and clan associations, and the malevolent huts, but this is not historically justifiable. In their early days in Malaya the huts (which at that time included the kongsis ) did indisputably useful work among the Chinese community in the matter of welfare, but when the 'reformed' kongsis were recognized by the Government while the huts became illegal as 'unregistered societies' (in 1889), this came to be a distinction with a difference.

_

Effective action to suppress the Chinese Secret Societies called for a knowledge of their organization and modus operandi,

but for nearly a century after Light landed at Penang the British administration was completely in the dark not only as regards the Secret Societies but as regards the social organization of the Chinese community in general. In 1857 (says N. Oliphant) there were 70,000 Chinese in Singapore but not a single European who understood their language. It was not until the publication of the epoch-making work, Thian. To Hui, the Hung League or Heaven-Ear the. League, by the Dutchman, Gustav Schlegel, in 1866, that anything definite was known about the Secret Societies. *But the late Mr. Melvyn 'Wynne of the Malayan Police, in

all

im-

the subject, Triad, and Tzzbut, advanced a theory of the independent origin of rival societies from the Thian To Hui and the Hung League Icspcctivcly. portant work

011

5

In 1877, the Chinese Protectorate was established under the direction of Mr. VV. Pickering, a member of the Civil Service who had qualified in the Chinese language. This new department was intended to deal not only with the problem of the Secret Societies but also with those of Chinese labour and immigration and with the traffic in women and girls for the purpose of prostituhlon which had grown into a very profitable business owing to the preponderance of males over females among the immigrants from China.

But these social shortcomings were, comparativelsr speaking, minor, and the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, and Malacca) flourished in spite of the piracy that was a menace to trade in these waters until the 1830's. 'Piracy', however, needs redefining in the light of the researches of Mr. P, N. Tarling. It often meant the collection by the Malay princes of their traditional clues.

And the Chinese community both contributed

to their success and flourished with them.

THE CHINESE IN THE MALAY STATES AND BRITISH INTERVENTION The immigrant Chinese had not eoniined their attention to the Straits Settlements but many of them had penetrated to the Malay States in search of a fortune. In 1827, an Englishman named Gray who visited Pahang mentions a tin-mine about to

be opened at Lemar for 800 Malays, as well as a number of Chinese, to work on. In 1838, Rattles' frrrunshi (teacher), Abdullah, on his way to Kelantan sailed up the Pahang River to

Kampong China (Pecan Baharu). There he found hundreds of Malays and Chinese, armed to the teeth, awaiting him on the bank. The Bendahara, with the Chinese headmen, was away at the time at the goldmines at ] l a i . The Chinese at Kampong China were Hakkas and they intermarried with Malay women or with Balinese slaves

slavery was common in the Malay

States at this time).

.

It was the demand for pepper and gambler that brought the Chinese squatter to Johore. Those who could satisfy the

Malay autllorities as to the sufficiency of their means were allowed to form settlements up some named river and the titles they received from the Sultan were called Sumt Surged, or 'river cloeuments'. The system was called the Kangchu system (literally 'master or owner, of a river').

6

In Sungei Ujong ( a State since absorbed into the modern Negri Sembilan), Captain Nev bold in 1832. found four hundred that • Chinese employed on the tin-mines. (It is worth noting at this time the wages of Chinese miners were 5-8 dollars a month as compared with the 3-5 dollars earned by Malay miners.) Already at l u k e in 1824, Anderson speaks of two hundred Chinese tin-miners. By 1874, there were about 10,000 Chinese miners working there. into Selangor there was an influx of Chinese miners after the '1'iJEties, and in 1871 there were 12,000 altogether in Selangor (Luke at that time being part of Selangor). Nev bold mentions that in 1828 the number of Chinese miners in Sungei Ujong was nearly a thousand, divided into nine kozrlgsis, chiefly of the Th.ian Ti Hui. Jealous of their fastincreasing power, or the commission of some alleged oilenee, but more probably by a desire on the part of the .L\/Ialays to obtain, a share of the treasure amassed by the brotherhood o f the Triad (whose Droporty was held be members in common) led in 1828 to the massacre of the Malays on a considerable scale. But by 1830 the mines were being worked again by some four hundred Chinese who continued there until the disasters of 1833, when many returned to Malacca. see,

_

at wherever the Chinese went they took

their Secret Societies with them. These, indeed, were practically the only social organization they had. In Perak, Chinese miners appeared in Lariat from Penang whence they also had brought their Secret Societies, namely the rival Ghee His and

Had San.

.

Then it happened that about 1850 Che Long Ja'afar discovered a patch of rich mining land at Khan Path, the site of the present Taiping gaol, and soon Chinese miners from Penang

were Hocking to Lariat. Further discoveries of tin land in the area followed soon after this. Before long the inHux of Chinese into Lariat and its neighborhood was so great that it was . to keep order, and the beyond the capacity of the Malays Chinese, free from any control from above, began faction tights among themselves.

These disorders continued for years. The rival Chinese Secret Societies repeatedly petitioned the Governor of the Straits Settlements to help one or the other against its rival, but he

declined to interfere. Chinese merchants having trade dealings

'7

with the Malay States, who also sought British help, were told that they must accept the risks as well as the profits of their enterprise. Later on these Chinese faction lights became mixed up with the question of the succession to the throne of Perak. Rival candidates for the throne, which had become vacant by the death of Sultan Ali in 1871, appealed for the support of one

or other of the Chinese Societies (the members of the Ghee His were mostly Cantonese and of the Had San mostly Hakkas, but this was not the invariable rule). It was at this juncture that British policy' towards the Malay

States changed.. These States had been falling more and more into decay for several decades, but hitherto the British had declined to interfere in their affairs. But the new Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew Clarke, was instructed by

the Secretary of State for the Colonies to 'bring about limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States . . . to rescue, if possible, those fruitful and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them if the present disorders continue unchecked." The result of` this intervention was that the Malay Sultans, one by one, accepted treaties with the British whereby they agreed 'to ask for, and to act upon, British advice in all matters

except those touching the Mohammedan religion and Malay custom." This formula proved to be the foundation of the 'Pro~ electorate system' which was still adhered to in the Federal Constitution of 1948. U

GROVVTH OF THE CHINESE POPULATION IN MALAYA In the years following the Perak \Var (which was fought

by the British in order to enforce adherence to the treaty of Pangkor), there was great influx of Chinese into the State. By 1882, the number of Chinese miners had increased from about 9,000 in 1871 to nearly 50,000. In 1888, the total population of Pahang consisted of about 50,000 Malays and a few hundred Chinese (located mostly' at Ber tong), but when the British intervened in that State in that year, the Chinese began to flow in to take advantage of the consequent openingmp of the State.

By 1891, the population of Perak was estimated at 215,000 of

8

whom 100,000 were Malays and 90,000 Chinese. The story of population growth is similar for Selangor and Negri Sembilan. The result of British intervention in the Malay States was that order was e s t a t e d Ami Vie country became ripe for development. B`ulE` time Tack otElan adequate l a b o r force delayed the investment of British capital. Tin-mining remained largely in Chinese hands until the First British mining company was coated in the 'eighties, and as late as 1920 the Chinese still owned two-thirds of the tin-mines. But the introduction of modern methods of mining, especially by dredges which called for large capitalization and special technical skills, resulted in the British and Chinese changing places and within a few years the British share of the mining was ho-thirds and the Chinese one-third. At the turn of the century the output of tin was greatly increased to meet the expanding world demand and Chinese Hooked in to provide l a b o r for the mines. The theory behind the treaties of protection with the Malay Rulers was that the Malay States belonged exclusively to the Malays. But in spite of this theory, immigration remained completely un1~estri.cted until the Great Slump of 1929-32. The consequence of this was a complete revolution in the racial pattern of Malaya. This will become clear from the following statement of population. I

I

Between 1911 and 1941 the population of Malaya (Straits

r'1

LJ

lm -

II

Settlements and MaII 7 States together) more than doubled, :increasing from 2,673,000 in the former year to 5,511,000 in the latter. In 1911, the; including other Malaysians from ] Ava, Sumatra, etc.) accounted - .s ?o ent of the total, the Chinese for 35 per cent, and the Indians for 14 per cent: in 1941,

the respective percentages were 41 per cent, 43 per cent, and 14 per cent (the last figure, it will be noticed, unchanged), Malaya, in fact, had become a 'plural society' with the main communities living side by side without intermarrying and with quite different methods and standards of life and sentimental ties.

9

ANCLO-CHINESE RELATIONS IN MALAYA As the British were, by and large, interested mainly in the immigrants to Malaya as traders, artisans, and laborers, they

were not at all concerned with their social behavior so long as they did not interfere with their authority or with the other communities. They appointed headmen for the Chinese, Indians, Bugis, etc. and farmed out the collection of taxes to the highest bidder. The communities were only too pleased to accept this arrangement since it guaranteed them the maximum freedom to lead their own lives while scouring the advantages of British protection. But as time went on, the shortcomings of the several native social systems (which, EU. .. f . . were divorced from their original setting) manifested themselves, injustice was caused by the rapacity of criminal elements, and in the interests of the people as a whole the administration found itself obliged more and more to intervene. |

The history of the government of the Chinese by the British in Malaya may be described therefore as a transition from direct

to indirect rule. This is made clear in the legal his Straits Settlements. The process was from rule by Chinese custom administered by Chinese headmen (called 'captains' 01° 'Kay-itan'), to the rule by English criminal law side by side with Chinese custom administered by British judges, and, then, as the law was interpreted, to rule by the law of England taking account of Chinese custom. The interpretation of the law meant

progressive restriction of the operation of die custom of the Chinese. At the same time, a body of statute law was growing up in the Colony which was further to restrict Chinese custom. An instance of Chinese custom being followed and not English law occurred in 1848, when it was decided that the adopted children ( a Chinese were entitled to joint administration of his estate in presence to his nephew. Polygamy was held to be a Chinese institution in a number of cases (the leading one, well known as the 'STIr l?VliH°ows asg= was in 1908) and in 1867 it was decided that a secondary wife was entitled to a share in an intestate's prop§§ On the other hand, Chinese custom was departed from § a number of legal decisions.

10

A Chinese Marriage Committee was appointed in 1926 by the Governor of the Straits Settlements (consist.ing._of Chinese members presided over by the Secretary for Uhinese Rll'airs'j report OI1 the customs, rites, and ceremonies relating to Chinese III

marriage in the Colony. The committee, however, found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute a marriage because there were no essentials for the Chinese marriage in the Old Style common to all the districts of South China. The evidence taken revealed a practically unanimous opposition among the Chinese in the

Straits Settlements Hom in China to any divorca

fislation.

-Sel

In the Inrails | the Chinese 'Captains' disappeared early al direct mic was substituted for indirect; in the Federated Malay States, in .; less developed state of society, they were retained, though with diminishing

powers, until

e. decade or so before \Vorld War I. The .intermediary between the Government and the Chinese

people of Malaya was the Chinese Protectorate. This was a unique institution with It() near counterpart elsewhere in the world. It was staffed by Chinese-speaking British officers of" the Malayan Civil Service to deal with specifically Chinese questions such as the suppression of the Secret Societies and the protection of Chinese immigrants, and with the protection of women and girls of all races. More and more, in the exercise of these functions, the Protectorate became the medium of contact between the Chinese and the people of the country. The common people readily adopted the Department and accorded to the Protector the title reserved in China for the Mandarin, namely Tai fin (Hokkien) or Tai Yan (Cantonese), meaning literally 'The Great Mari .

Taking them all in all, the relations between the British and the Chinese were singularly felicitous: it was only when in the 1930's the British theory of Malaya as a purely Malay country derived from their interpretation of the treaties was more and more seen as denying rights to those Chinese whose families had been domiciled in Malaya. for generations that dif-lerences of opinion and political friction between the two began to arise.

As regards the relations between the China-born Chinese and the British, this was complicated by

the rise of

Chinese

Nationalism which is dealt with later on in this book. 11

CHINESE RELIGION IN MALAYA In the Straits Settlements there was no religion established by law and all sects enjoyed equal freedom of worship. In the Malay States, Mohammedanism was the established religion but here also freedom of worship was guaranteed to everyone.

The Chinese have always been regarded as the most tolerant (or eclectic) of people in the matter of religion. They have no scruples like Mohammedans 01' Jews; they have no caste system like the Hindus. They had. in Malaya, no special restrictions about entry to their toemnles (they themselves often frequented them in easy undress ) Many of them adhered simultaneously to the tenets of Buddhism and Taoism (Buddhism had admitted a number of Taoist gods into its pantheon. ) Conxtueiaxlism was also professed by a cultivated minority and its principles formed the basis of Chinese custom here as in

.

_

China itself. In Malaya, as in China, Kwan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy, was probably the most popular of the Buddhist deities. Another populer deity was Kwan Ti, the Cod of 'Wan wTlo was worshibped in practically every Iiousehol He had `._;- .adopted also as the patron saint, so to speak, of various trades and professions. This llad led to his being regard-ed as tTle tutelary ty of money-maldng and enterprise in - generaTe, .ul he had deity gradually developed into a god of wealth and a god of literature into the bargain!

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In addition to the worship of the standard deities of the Buddhist and Taoist cults, there was ancestor worship, wEIE1 was Confucian in authority but much older than Confucianism itself, and the worship of local heroes known as the when, Fu, and yan. lt was in their Shea and Fu worship that the Malayan Chinese, and indeed the Chinese in Southeast Asia generally, differ from their fellows in China except in those districts where the emigrants kept their families and where Nanyang' (literally Southern Ocean, i.e. Southeast Asian) custom was therefore followed. The outstanding example of this in Penang

-

and Malacca especially, was Sarn Po Shan among the s h e , and

Toh Peh Kong (Ta ?at Kung) among die 12.

Fu.

Sam Po Tai Shan is none other than the spirit of the famous eunuch-admiral Cheng Ho of the Ch'ing dynasty. The miracles he performed to his countrymen from the perils of their travels in unknown lands are among the marvels of religious romance. Ten Peh Kong, however, is the most popular legendary hero in Malaya. I-le seems to be a purely overseas god, for although he is celebrated in the overseas COII1-

munities of Fukien and some parts of Kwangtu1 . , . . will search for him in vain in books on Chinese religion. He ... .. . .

probably derives from To Ti (the Earth God), but overseas he is primarily 'the spirit of the pioncGrs'. Toh Pch Kong seems to he the personification of the pioneer spirit generally and is not tl1er trees to Chinese to tap.

ii/falaya's importing and 1 rowir mdary industries were very largely in Chinese hands pineapple industry, the creation of the two decades 'befog ld War TI, was entirely a Chinese enterprise. 'qanned pines.gg.L~. in 1938 accounted for 1.2 per cent of Malayzfs entire export trade. In Singapore, Fenang, Kuala Lumpur, Klara, Ipoh, and else here the Chinese owned oil mills, biscuit factories, rubber works for the manufacture of shoes, tires, etc., iron foundries, saw-mills, and sauce factories; there were Chinese shipping companies; the Chinese ran motor agencies and repair shops; the bull: of the retail trade everywhere was in their hands. Market gardening and pig and poultry rearing were almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese, though Malays contributed J

eggs and poultry to the country s supplies, sellingD their produce to the Chinese middlemen.

The Chinese also practically mono-

polized the building and skilled artisan trades, though northern. and southern Indians also found ernplovment in them. Tailoring, dress-malcing, and cobbling were mainly in the hands of the Chinese, who by 1937 were ousting the northern Indians from their former monopoly of ladies' dressmaking. Laundering was

shared by Chinese and southern Indians. Chinese were in the majority in the logging and timber industries, also as rickshawpullersf and in felling and draining the jungle for cultivation. 1

Rickshaw were abolished

in Singapore after World War

most other places in M alaya as well.

24

I I , and in

THE CH]NLZ'.gE IN MALAYAN POLITICS 1911-41 Dr. Sun Yet-sen is believed to have visited Singapore before 1900, but the statement that he was arrested there and deported for five years is not borne out by the ofHcial record. The Hsing Chung Hui, formed by him in 1394 in Honolulu, was responsible for every armed rising in China between 1900 and 1905. In the latter year the Hsing Chung Hui was combined with certain other revolutionary societies under the title of the Tung Ming Hui, with Ur. Sun as President. The Singapore branch of the Tung Ming Hui was formed in February, 1906. There was already in existence in Singapore a political party known as the Chung Hui Tang which had been founded by Lau Yit, an original member of the Hsing Chung Hui in Hong Kong. Dr. Sun returned to Singapore in 1966 and proceeded to form another branch of the Tung MiIig Hui in

Kuala Lumpur. .He failed, however, to do the same in Ipoh because of the opposition of the Royalist Party (pro-Manchu). Branches nevertheless were formed in Penang, Seremban, Malacca, and Kuala Pilah. Between 1905 and 1909, Dr. Sun was more than once in Malaya and contributed many articles to revolutionary papers and he received a warning from the Protector of Chinese concerning his attitude towards the Manchu Government with which Great Britain was in friendly relations. '__

»to that between 1909 and 1911 a (It is interesting to Triad society in lvlalayal red out a number of gang robberies, the proceeds of which were sent to China to aid the revolution-

ary cause! ) Dr. Sun remained in Penang during 1910 and part of 1911 where he made appeals for funds to Bnance risings in Canton. His activities here led to a walling by the Protector of Chinese that he Faust leave the country. He accordingly left for Europe, later going to America, where he remained until the Revolution had succeeded. 2.5

As a result of the Revolution, the Kuomintang came into being in China on the 13th August, 1912, and was a fusion of Eve societies including the Tung Ming; Hui. The Host Malayan branch of the KIT was registered in Singapore in December, 1912. In 1913, of the eight principal oflicc bearers, seven were British subjects and one of these was Dr. Lim Boon-kong. r

Dr. Sun's teaching, however, became of political importance only after he had been dead for some years.

of " 'With .tiii

];""¢.;1

into power of the .Kuomintang from 1926 onwards under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the 'Three Principles' were adopted as the basis of the policy of the Central Government. The fundamental law of citizenship, for exain; 'as based on the first of the 'Three Principles of the! To e lam Min Chu I ) of Dr. Sun, namely 'Nationalism This was Io have considerable importance in Malayan politics. Al in 1909, under the Manchus, a citizenship law had been passed ~ declared that descendents of Chinese through in male .. should be Chinese for ever, and this idea was adopted by Dr. Sun. He said that 'China is the only country where "race" and "nation" arc the same with common blood, common language,

'P

_

and conlrnon customs a "single race" '. (lt is perhaps needless to observe that this statement is not supported by science.) Dr. Sun's argument was that the Chinese were in danger from a

'White PcriI'.

.

'

The Malayan Governments suppressed the KMT m 1925 because its activities were considered to be subversive. It was the agent for the distribution of a considerable quantity of nationalist propaganda printed in Canton which strongly

1

anti-British in tone ( 'British imperialism feeds on quotation. from it sufficiently indicating its tone).

J

ood" inn.

Apart from the actually subversive KMT activities, the attitude of the Malayan Governments was decided by the consideiration that recognition of the KMT would legalize the position of an imperizmz in imperia and it would legalize a rule of the KMT which provided that Chinese l a b o r unions, clubs, chambers of commerce, schools. ci.ty councils, and district councils, \ _'VhOS€ members were Chinese, must conform to the KMT organization in order to strength en the power of the KIT which issued instructions to them. g The triumphant progress of the KMT in China in 192. and 1927 put the Malayan Governments in somewhat of a quandary. The recognition of the National G O V -

26

Britain with

the KMT in its position of dictatorship, caused the British Foreign Office to consider that non-recognition of the KMT in Malaya was an anomaly. Thereafter ensued an agitation by KMT supporters and the Chinese Government for the removal of the had, which the IMalayan Governments resisted. The argument of the KMT was that there was a general sympathy among the Chinese for the Nationalist cause, and that there was no disposition by KNIT headquarters in China to recognize the extremist branches. The policy of these Leftist elements was to support Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle of uniting Soviet Russia with #is Chinese Communists and to join with the peasants dlahourers. Buck a policy, however, found little -l*l_ the_ Chinese middle classes and among Cantonese skilled labour. The purging of the Kuomintang of its Communist elements

had its repercussions in Malaya. The Malayan Governments now denied that they regarded Chinese Nationalism as a thing to he suppressed- All that they asked for was that when aliens came to Malaya they should leave their domestic politics behind them, particularly such manifestations thereof as conflicted with the interests and the ideas of the country in which they were temporary residents.

The purging of the KMT resulted in the extremists splitting into organizations of their own, such as the Modern Revolu.tion~ any Committee of the Kuomintang of China, the Southseas Provisional Commission of the Communist Party, and the Nanyang Labour Unions. These groups devoted their energy to spreading Communism among the Malayan Chinese. The aggressive propaganda policy of the Chinese Contra]

Government did not improve the atmosphere. For example. in Duly, 1929, they published a list of 'Humiliation Days' together with abridged accounts of the events they commemorated. These included the "Shanghai" and 'Shalneen' Incidents, and the list was calculated to cause bitter ill-feeling against the British. It was suspected also from maps published by the KMT that the latter regarded Indochina, Hong Kong, and even Malaya as terra irfedenta. Sir Cecil Clemens, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, summoned the members of the local executive and supervisory committees before him and told them that they must dissolve. In November, 1930, the British Government considered that

the time had come to modify this policy. Capital was being 27

made out of it by Hu Han~min and others to stir up feeling against the Malayan Governments. Discussions then took place between Sir Miles Larnpson (later Lord Killearn) and Mr. Wang Cheng-ting, and in consequence of this a compromise was reached whereby the Malayan Governments were to take steps to amend their legislation making it clear that the Kuomintang of China. was not, as such, an illegal society in Malaya, that there was no objection to any Chinese in Malaya being a member of the KIT in China, and that there would be no

interference with the members of the Tang so long as their activities were not inimical to the interests of the local governments and provided no attempt was made to re-establish control of branches or other forms of Tang organization in Malaya itself. The amending legislation was passed, but it did not make any practical difference to the situation since the KMT continued to organize locally in defiance of the ban. But it "w the start of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937 that the Malayan Governments had any real cause for complaint. In 1939, ET Chinese Central Government organized its own Overseas Department. The situation hereafter turned upon the eonliicting policies of the Chinese and the British Governments. The Chinese were at war with the Japanese and naturally used every .iT1CEi.I1S in their power of consolidating sentiment on behalf of their country among persons of their own race and of embarrassing the Japan r ese in commerce. The sums of money remitted from Malaya ( M$Il0 in. (£12,833,000) in 1941) and elsewhere in the Nanyang were an important factor in the Chinese resistance to ]apart. Britain, on the other hand, was at peace with Iapan and was

therefore bound to suppress any activity! in British territory directed against her. The Malayan Governments none the less were not at all unsympathetic to Chinese Nationalism during this period and were as lenient as possible, allowing the remission of large sums of money to China for the China Distress Relief Fund which was used to help resistance to the Iaoanese. Chinese Communism in Malaya

The Chinese Communist Party was September, 1923, Michael Borodin arrived tation of Dr. Sun. In Ianuary, 1924, the KMT at Canton adopted the 'Three Great

formed in 1921. In at Canton at the inviFirst Congress of the Policies' (i,e., alliance

with the Soviet Union, alliance with the CCP, and support of

the workers and peasantry 28

The Chinese Communists

w ~ »

._

nil?

all became

active in

Malaya in 1924. During the period of CCP and KMT collaboration in China, there was little to distinguish the attitude of the Malayan Chinese Communists from the KMT which was 'anti~i§o1'eign' and 'Leftist'. After the anti-Communist coup, however, launched by Chiang Kai-shek in April, 1927, the KMT and the Communists split and their action was independent. To begin with, the Malayan Communist Party, which had now been founded as a separate organization, was orthodox Ma1'xist~ Leninist but followed the trends and changes in the policy of the CCP. In the early days, the KIT was more of an embarrassment to the Malayan Government than the MAP but from 1930 onwards the latter became increasingly active, working especially through teachers and schools. In 193-4, directions were issued by the Comintern Parties in Shanghai to the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party. Mass activities were ordered, to include strikes, sabotage in the Naval Base, transport boycotts, demonstrations against increased taxation, etc. etc. On receipt of these directions, the MCP and the Malayan Communist Youth Corps launched a 'purification campaigN, and a 'rushing period' was presented to give impetus to the Party's forward march to its Final goal, namely 'The Malayan Revolutions During the Iubilec celebrations in 1935 die Malayan General Labour Union (Communist-controlled) demonstrated against them.

Following the coup deter in China on the 12th December when Chiang Kai~shek was kidnapped by Chang Hsueh-Iiang and Yang Ho-chleng at Sian, and a truce was finally signed between

the CCP and the KMT in common enmity to Japan, the National Salvation Movement, which resulted from the incident, was brought prominently before the... Malayan Chinese public and in Malaya a central committee formed to raise money to assist . . . . . . .. . .

the troops fighting the 'Japanese in Suyuan.

The outbreak of war between China and Tapan in July, l93T, was exploited by the CCP which brought new recruits of its own to the National Salvation Association, and in order to foster Japanese feeling an overseas branch of the Association was formed with two committees one underground and one open. a l . responsible for recruiting Communists among % members While the latter was designed to attract anti-C-Toinmunists and members of other party organizations who

would not have joined had they been aware of the Communist 29

influence. By 1938, there was an outcry against 'Trotskyites' and a new policy was put into practice with an anti-]apanese and anti-imperialist front for organizing strikes. The organization of the MCP was very complex with a Central Committee directing all activities, a Communist Youth Section, a General Labour Union, a Picket Corps (used for intimidation purposes), a Special Branch ( a sort of Communist 'Gestapo'), and a Malayan Racial Emancipation League to bring Malays and Indians within the Communist fold. Added to this were an Overseas Chinese National Salvation Association to play on the patriotic feelings of young Chinese, and a Proletarian Writers' Association.

The names of the various Communist organizations in Malaya were changed to suit the general anti-Iapanese policy e.g. the GLU now became the Labouring Classes' Anti-backing up Society.

-

After the outbreak of war with Germany in 1939, the IVICP began to turn its attention to the possiloility of war between Great Britain and Japan. It issued pamphlets setting forth the terms on which it would be prepared to assist the local Governments in such an event. These terms w re similar to those presented by the CCP to the Central Government of China and included ( a ) the abandonment of reactionary policy, ( b ) the adoption of a democratic system, and (c) the improvement of the livelihood of the people. But, receiving no response, from the Governments, the Communists continued their anti-British

propaganda. About the middle of September, 1940, the MCP

no

received instructions from the GCP?" discontinue anti-British action, but while the MCP decided to accept the orders agitation in industry continued..

It seems certain that the Malayan Communists were in a dilemma. Between the 22nd June, 1941, when Germany invaded Russia, and the 8th December, 1941, when Japan invaded Malaya, their position was anomalous. However, alter the of the German~Russian war, the MAP became s bitter in Es attacks on Britain, and, after the invasion of Malaya had started, its policy entirely changed. The Party then came out wholeheartedly on the side of the local Govern-

we

ment. 30

It was not, however, until the invasion had been in progress for over a month that any effort was made to get the Chinese political parties together in a common war front, but at the and of Deeeinber, 1941, the Chinese Mobilization Committee was formed under the chairmanship of Mr. Tan Kah-kee. The Committee had the approval of the Governor, Sir Shelton Thomas. But this was a last moment development and was too late to be effective. The end came with the fall of Singapore on the 15th February, 1942.

l

31

PART II THE CHINESE POSITION HEVOLUTIONIZED, 1942-55 THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION The Chinese, beyond all others, regarded the Japanese 35 their implacable enemies, and, among the Chinese, the Communists in their eyes stood First. Soon after the surrender of Singapore, identification parades were organized to pick out those Chinese who had been active against the Japanese or who were likely to be so. Informers men, women, and boys, hooded like members of the Ku Klux Klan-picked out victims by their hundreds. Thereupon ensued a mass execution lasting for days. The numbers of those who perished in this purge have been variously estimated, but from the evidence given at the War Crimes Trials in 1947 it would appear to have been in the neighborhood or 5,000. Some victims were shot as they stood, others were tortured to death, fund am were put onto lighters, towed out into the harbor, and forced to jump into the water. From the launches or naval vessels which had towed them out the Japanese rnaehinegunned them as they swam or struggled in the water.

--

Those Chinese who were in particular Singled out for execution were (1) all who had anything to do with the China

Distress Relief Fund, (2.) rich men who, presumably, had given most generously to the Relief Fund, ( 8 ) adherents of Tan Kahkee, an indefatigable organizer of the Fund, ( 4 ) newspapermen, schoolmasters, and Chinese High School students, (5) l-lainanese ( Hailams) whom the Japanese regarded as Communists to a man, (6) newcomers to Malaya who presumably had left China because they disliked the ]apanese,. ( 7 ) men with tattoo-marks who, according to the Japanese, were all members of Secret Societies, ( 8 ) Volunteers, Volunteer Reservists, and members of 'D`alforce' l the organization formed to utilize Chinese Communists is as soldiers), and ( 9 ) Government servants and men such as justices of the peace, members of the Legislative Council

who were likely to have pro-British sympathies. 32 r

The next item on the prograrnme of the 'Liberators of East Asia' and the creators of the 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' was to squeeze every cent they could out of the Chinese community. The leading Chinese were told that a 'gift' from the Chinese of $50 million had been decided on. This was to be handed over on 20th. April, 1942, but when the day came the amount had not been fully subscribed. All that could be obtained in actual cash was $29 million. The rest was to be raised, said the Japanese, by loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank on security furnished by the contributors themselves and guaranteed by the respective Chinese Associations in each State or Settlement. When the 'gift' was presented, General Yamashita somewhat ungraciously declared that it in no way redeemed the previous3 Malayan Chinese in having supported Britain and Chungking. 'What really matters', he said, ' i.s the attitude. of the Malayan Chinese in the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere H Greater East Asia." M

m

To the insatiable ]apanese, the 'gift' was, %nurse, only a whetted of the appetite. Within five months of the fall of Singa~ pore, the economic exploitation; of Malaya had fairly begun. The Kaishas arrived: the Mitsui and Mitsubishi Were the list in the Held in the wake of the conquering army. Lesser, Japanese civilian traders came in shoals for what was left of the spoils. They formed Kumiui i.e. syndicates or guilds. They became, in effect, Government-protected compartments of the Black Market. They held the monopoly to Heece the public, but

they were assisted by unscrupulous get-rich-quick among the Chinese.

elements

The gambling propensities of the Chinese and other Asians

were obvious sources of prost to the conquerors of Malaya and gambling farms, long since abolished by the British, were resusli'aEated in 1943.

.Meanwhile the population and the urban Chinese in particular were su{5Foring_terrible hardship. Those who lived in the country districts and could produce a little for themselves were somewhat better oft than the town-dwellers, but all over Malaya malnutrition was general. The Iapanese had no shipping to spare for the importation of rice from Burma and Siam, even if they had been willing to authorize the expenditure. . . . . . .. ...

Outwardly there was compliance end Oriental acceptance

of the conqueror; inwardly there was an ever-growing hatred. 33

The Chinese have a capacity for subtle obstruction, for appearing to co-operate when they are working in the opposite direction all the time. They used their ingenuity to escape the face-slapping and other indignities which Japanese soldiers were fond of inflicting without excuse; they kept out of the way of the Japanese as much as possible; but they did nothing willingly for the conqueror and avoided him by all sorts of devices. There was, indeed, a minority who 'co-operated' with the Japanese for what they could get out of them, but they despised them as much as did their nobler brethren.

Soon after the capitulation a campaign was started to compel the population to learn the Japanese language, but it was barren

of enduring results. The general Japanese policy was that vernacular schools for Malays and Indians should continue as before the occupation, with Japanese teaching added to the syllabus. No Chinese schools were permitted, but Governmentmanaged Nippon Go (Japanese language) schools were instituted and attended by Chinese children and children of other races as well, Ilffsistawzce

Very soon after the Japanese occupation resistance groups began tO be organized in the country. The Chinese were the only ones in the field, however, for the first two or three years of the occupation, but towards the end, when the Allies were obviously winning the war, Malay groups were formed under British officers in north Perak and in Ked ah. There were

two

kinds

of Chinese. resist

groups.

Firstly there were the armed military groups living hidden in the hills mi jungles, and secondly . there were un ergrouncl . a

organizations whose members lived openly in the towns 1.-..l villages and who either helped the guerilla troops or resisted the Japanese in some other way. Most important in the underground movement was a political association called the Malayan People's Anti-Iapanese Union (MPAIU), an almost entirely Chinese organization controlled by the Malayan Communist Party. The MPAIU supported the Communist guerillas known as the Malayan People's a ii-Iapanese Army (MP;\],#\ ) . latter was also known as the 'Three Star Army from its badge -. one star for each race, Chinese, Malay, and Indian, but it 'ad |

in essence a Chinese force. 34

At the same time the KIT branches continued to exist underground, but the only guerilla force claiming to be asso-ciated with the KMT was one led by pre-war professional robbers whose total number was less than five hundred. (There was a temporary alliance between this forc°e and the MPAIA,

but the methods, aims, 51d way of life of the two groups differed so greatly that there was before long a clash between them ending jithe dejection of the 'KIT robbers. E The MPAIA was divided into several provincial groups, each under its commander. The disposition of the groups was Group I, Selangor, Group 2, Negri Sembilan, Group 3, north Shore, Group 4, south Iohore, Group 5, Per-ak, Group 6, west Pahang, Group '7, east Pahang, and Group 8, Ked ah. The groups l themselves were spilt up into a number of" small '1 camps P hidden in the jungle. Their food supplies were received from the outside, especially from the MRAIU, and augmented with the produce of small gardens in the §ungle. Q some Q eas they were greatly assisted by the 'Sakai' tribes (the aborigines, negrite, Serrano, Temiar ete.), who gave them more than they

could really spare from their own slender stocks of food. In May, 1943, reconnaissance parties of Force 136, the'Commandos' serving under Lord Mountbatten, arrived in the country bev slfbmarine. The First oilioers of Force 136 to make contact with the guerillas were Lieutenant-Colonel Cohn Davis' and Major Richard Broome. Eventually an agreement was drawn up by which the MPAIA pledged itself to co-operate with and accept orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Mountbatten, during the reconquest of lVlalnya and the period of military occupation thereafter in return for supplies of

arms, ammunition, and explosives, and the equivalent of 150 t e l s of gold a month (roughly M$3,000). The MPAIA was not to 'be used for political purposes and no political questions were to be discussed between the parties to the agreement. 'While Malaya was still in Japanese hands, the MCP published its programme of Nine Points which were, ( 1 ) to drive the 'Japanese Fascists' out of Malaya and to establish a Republic; (2) to establish a government with representation for all nation-alities, in improve living conditions, and develop industr , agriculture, and commerce; ( 3 ) to give freedom of speech, association etc., and abolish the old onpressive laws; (4) to increase wages, abolish high taxation and tnoney-lending at high. rates of interest; (5) to re-organize the guerillas into a National 35

.Defense Army; ( 6 ) to establish free education in the several languages, ( 7 ) to collBscate Fascist p1'oper'qt and restore property confiscated by the Japanese; (8) to practise tariH: auto-

nomy; and (9) to combine with Russia and China to free the oppressed peoples "of the East,

After the agreement had been made wit la Admiral Mountbatten, the establisltmerrt of a. Republic was placed in abcyarrce. The propaganda issued at this time by the MPAIA was not antiHritisll but very definitely anti~impe1°ialist.

I

The total strength of: the MPAIA prior to 1944 was about -3-4,U{l0, and in 1945, before the intenclecl invasion of Malaya to drive out the Japanese, it had grown to 6-T,0G0. The function allotted to the guerillas was similar to that allotted to the Maqzsis in France during the Allied invasion. But the surrender of the Japanese, in August, 1945, changed all these plans and instead -of the invasion there was peaceful re-occupation. THE ALL[Bi]PLA"llION OF MALAYa'& The British forces of liberation reached Malaya early in September, 1945. Forces landed at Penang on the 3rd, at Singapore on the 5th, they reached Kuala Lumpur on the 12th, and Ipoh on the 16th, but some outstations were not reoccupied until the end of the month. In the interval between 'the Japanese evacuation of the administrative centres in order .of to assemble to surrender and 'the arrival; of the Q81'itish l`*»..iilita1'y Administration, the ll»'II'A]A came out of the jungle and assumed control.

Malaya's welcome to the British forces was entirely spontaneeus and genuine, but a widespread assumption was that the liberating forces would be Chinese Nationalist troops not British troops. The trinrnphal arches erected in the larger towns were inscribed to the 'Allied Armies' (in Chinese characters), but in the villages of the peninsula they were L1.suaI1}=' inscribed to the various groups of the MPAIA alone. (There is no doubt that roost of the guerillas had been isolated from the world for so long and separated from all information except what was contained in their own propaganda that they honestly believed that the Japanese surrender had been due to their own exclusive eitorts, and this impression was encouraged by the MPAJU and

-

the MCP headquarters behind the scenes.) 36

The Changed Scene in Malaya There had been a complete alteration in the political atmosphere of Malaya since 1941. Until then, thanks to British infly once, the relations between the Chinese and the Malays, in spite of the frequent competition of their interests, had beenharmonious. The Iapancse occupation had changed all that. To begin with, at least, it seems that the bulk of the Malays were not particularly hostile to the Tapanese occupation, and many indeed welcomed the change since it promised to put an end to what they considered to be the economic and political encroachments of the Chinese on their preserves. lt was only

later that the clumsiness and greediness of the invader alienated the Malays as

21

whole.

Meanwhile, the Iapanese were using the Malayan Police Force, mainly composed of Malays, to keep the Chinese COIIIIIIU.-* city under control and to suppress the Chinese resistance movement. This naturally led to strong resentment on the part of

the Chinese, and after the news of the Japanese surrender there was retaliation by the Chinese against the LMalay police. The result was that the latter became demoralized, and a complete reorganization of the force was necessary after the liberation before it could be of any practical use again. In the clashes which took place before the Japanese surrender and again from November, 1945 onwards, the Malays were the aggressors and many Chinese, men, women, and children, were killed. In March, 1946, the Chinese at length retaliated against a Malay village on the Perak River and killed thirty or forty Malays. The measures taken by the authorities to suppress the troublenock the form of military patrols including the use of tanks when feasible and the sending of propagandist parties of Chinese and ICl?1'Ft.is into Mile:red areas to keep the peace. At the moment of the return of the British to Malaya, the old Towlray (head of a business) had for the time being com-

pletely lost his leadership of the Chhiese community. Upon the liberation, this leadership passed to the MPAIA leaders who were now converting their organization into a 'People's Democratic Movement'. In Singapore and other large towns the MCP and the New Democratic Youth Corps were more to the front, but after a while the old KMT San Min Chu I Youth made its reappearance. It was clear from the beginning that the Leftist

leaders were making a determined bid for power37

One of the outstanding tasks 0%-" the British Iviilitary* Admins1 . without incident. traction (BMA) was to disband the MPAIA The regular MPAJA now numbered about 3-4,069 and, at the invitation to the 1°elnaini.ng bona fide guerrillas to become part of the MPAJA, a couple of thousand responded. Then, at the beginning of December, the MPAJA was disbanded, each man handing in his arms and equipment and receiving ET gratuity of M$350. Altogeilber 6,800 handed in a weapon of some sort

.

and were paid off.

The keynote of the BMA policy was the widest possible tolerance consistent with public safety: complete freedom of speech and association were therefore allowed. In its employment Of this freedom, however, the Communist Press soon showed itself to have little sense of truth or of proportion. The 'Voice of the People' (Minh Shang), the Co1nm'Lmi.st Chinese language organ in Kuala Lumpur, and the 'New Democracy' (Sin Min Chu) in Singapore were telling their readers that 'the savage British Fascists were worse than the Japanese' (lleeclless to say, during the Japanese occupation the writers had been silent and conspicuous by their absence).

The MCP obviously intended, if possU5le, Jo make the position of the British in Malaya untenable I they could. Against the BMA the obvious wcati was the strike. $0011 after the return of the British a series of strikes occurred which, while fundamentally economic in origin, were worked up for political ends. Then, in January, 1946, the MCP, acting through the GLU, became more ambitious in its at that about thirty ex-members of the MPAIA had been nu,.,,_,_, for oHnences ranging from possession oF stolen property to

murder alleged to have been committed during the interregnum between the Iapanese withdrawal to surrender and the arrival of the British troops, the GLU demanded their unconditional release under a threat of a general strike. This demand was refused, and on the 29-30th January about 150,000 persons stopped work, mostly in southern Malaya. About 3,500 Communist inhmidators operated in lorries and on bicycles threatening those who had not ceased to work- The strike ended suddenly without the GLU's demands being conceded, hut their success in causing a widespread stoppage whetted the appetites of the Communists for even greater success.

A run our now began to circulate that the next m o v e ] GLU would be to declare a public holiday on 15th Fe ruary,

nominally as a 'day of hu10niliation', but qui obviou.sl8i H 38

celebrate the defeat of the British by the Japanese four years before. But this time the BMA and the military had taken precautions. Nine of the Communist underground leaders were arrested and road bioeks of oil-drums were made to prevent the GLU pickets coming in by lorry from Iohore. The result was

that on the 15th February Singapore had every appearance of normality - the buses were running as usual, trishaws and rickwhows were on the streets, the markets were open, and all the essential services were in operation. The only disturbance was when the Communist leader, Lin Ah Liang, attempted to hold a -lsnonstration and two persons were killed. At Labis in Chore, however, there a more serious incident when the police were forced to open fire against a mob and fifteen people lost their .. . . ..

. ..

lives.

The immediate result of the iirin measures taken by the .authorities was that an almost audible sigh of relief went up from all races and classes throughout the country. Coolies and shop-assistants anti vegetable-gardeners, etc. in remote districts - in fact the great body of the ordinary people plucked up courage to resist the demands for 'subscriptionS Sade by the Communists and their ever-proliferating dependent societies. The membership of the Leftist orgenizatioxis fell oil in a spectacular " " " ' wqpess the revolutionary elements were by "'° means Hnahy dereatled, but henceforth they would have to re less 1hhn i. E oven than they had been permitted to do in the period of toleration. ...-

I

I

H

4.

CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT

When it became clear that the liberation of Malaya might not be very long postponed, the British Government decided 'flat T would offer # -unprecedented opportunity for constitutonal reform. Quite apart from any other consideration, it was obviously abs 1rd that a. country the size of England should have no Toss *Diallwm leparafre governments. It was decided, therefore, that as soon as the country had been regained and the period of the military administration was over, a Malayan. Union should bo created in order to promote a sense of unity and common citizenship among the people of Malaya. A Malayan Union citizenship would give equal citizenship rights to all who claimed Malaya as their homeland. For this purpose fresh agreements needed to be arranged with the Rulers of the Malay .I

39

States. The British Settlements of Penang and Malacca were to be included in the Union but Singapore would be constituted a separate Colony.

Simultaneously with the publication of the Government 'White Paper containing these proposals, Sir Harold Macmichael arrived in Malaya to arrange new agreements with tile Rulers

to make the Union legal. It was soon clear, however, that the new policy did not meet with the approval of many Malaya: and they were supported d in their discontent by several. British ex-Governors and senior civil servants who wrote to the London Times critizing the

proposed Union. From Iannary, 1946, onwards there were widespread demonstrations against the Union organized among' the Malays, and when ii: came into existence on the 1st April, the Sultans boycotted the installation ceremony. About this time :Data Onn bin ]a'afar organized the United Malays National

Organization (UMNO) which, he claimed, was supported by 70 or S() per cent of the Malay population, to agitate for the repeal of the Union.

although the Chinese were the race that would gain most by the creation of a common citizenshib, it cannot be said that they greeted the proposals for the Union with any great enthusiasm. The Sin Chew .lit Poo, for example, an old-estaly fished Singapore Chinese-language newspaper, asked why the Sultans had been chosen as the persons with whom arrangements were to he made since they represented only a small proportion of the Malays and had no claim at all to represent the Chinese.

The Leftist papers, of course, pooh-poohed the whole proceedings and the Sin Illa. Chu rernarltecl that the 'feudalistic Sultans

should he relegated to the realm of forgotten things' So impressed was the British Government with the Malay opposition (two Members of Parliament had visited Malaya during the height of the UMNO demonstrations) that they decided to accept the advice of the Governor of the Union, Sir Edward Gent, to abandon the Union. On the 25th Inly a `Working Committee, consisting entirely of Malay aristocrats, including representatives of the Sultans and of UMNO, with one or two British oilicials to assist them, was appointed to make recornrnendations regarding an alternative constitution- At the end of the year they submitted their report. Then ( b u t not until than

I

the report was referred to a Consultative Committee of the nonr

40

Malay races for comment, but, although this comment was lal'gely hostile, it was almost completely disregarded by die British Government. On the 1st February, 1948, the Malayan

Um'on was succeeded by a Federation whose constitution was practically as recommended by the \Vorking Committee.

The

Sultans, who, under the Union, had been relegated to a purely honorary position as chairmen of religious councils, were now given more power than they had ever possessed since the orighaal treaties of 1874 onwards came into force. The Legislative Council was to consist of about '75 members in addition tO the High Commissioner, of whom about 34 would be Malays and only 14 would be Chinese. Malaya was, in cttect, once again declared to be a purely 'Malay country' and the unity of Malaya was indefinitely postponed.

CHINESE PHOTEST AGAINST THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION The Ivialayan Federal Citizenship rules which were created under the new constitution laid it down that a Malay born in the Malay States was automatically a Federal Citizen; but a Chinese was only so if both parents had been born within the Federation. (In June, 1949, it was estimated that out of 1,952,682 Chinese resident in the Federation only 375,000 were Federal Citizens by operation of law.)

The reaction Of the Chinese to the new constitution was

strongly hostile. A 'liartal', or stoppage of work, was sponsored by the Pan-Malayan Council of _Iofoil 1111n1on with Mr. Tan -Cheng-lock (later to be Sir IE'Beng-Took Tail as President, will ported by the Associated Chinese Chambers of' Commerce, the Malayan Trade Unions, an an MCP, as #protest against the .proposals for the Federation. n.-in I l l October, 1947, virtually all business and transport were i n standstill. other protest took the form of boycottingg-ll new Singapore Legislative Council elections and in consequence about 20,000 out of 1,2:00IIU00 eligible electors registered themselves (one result of this was that in a colony predominantly Chinese, \

only one Chinese was elected).

41

-

THE RISE OF POLITICAL PARTIES Within live months of the crea-tlon 0? Phe Federation Malaya, the Communists came out as armed rebellion against the Government, creating wh. go; officially referred to I 'the Emel'gency'. 5 before we consid-er " l II us Shortly survey the political scene as it was, 1948, n7l.§et1 tlle insurrection commenced. in!

In December, 1945, the Malayan Democratic Union ( MDU ) was formed with the declared object of securing representative government for Malaya within the British Commonwealth. For some time the MDU was divided while the Communists were endeavoring to establish control over it, but when the inauguration of the Malayan Union on the 1st April, 1946, was followed by a campaign of agitation for its abolition led by Date Onn, the MDU came to the forefront under the leadership of Philip Hoalirn and Iobn Eber as a means for opposing UMNO. In December, 1946, the MDU leaders, in a determined attempt to of-Iset the influence of UMNO, formed a federation of all parties which opposed the UMNO programme. These included, in addition to the MDU, the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, the Malayan Union Congress, the MPAJA Old Comrades Association, the Malayan New Democratic Youth, the Angkatan Wanita Sedara (Women's Party), and the Angkatan Pemuda lnsaf (Youth Party). The federation called itself the All-Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCIA). Its six objectives were (1) the unity' of Malaya including Singapore, (2) a fully elected representative legislature, (3) equal political rights for all who regarded Malaya as their real home and the object of their loyalty, (4) the assumption by the Malay Sultans of the status of Tully sovereign constitutional rulers, (5) the control of Mohammedan affairs and matters aflecting Malay custom to be in the hands of the Malays, (6) the encouragement of the advancement of the Malay community. This collection of strange bed-fellows did not last long. The MNP with the Angkatan Permuda Insaf seceded from the AMCJA to form a Malay Council of Joint Action, and this was followed by the creation of yet another front, namely the Pus at

Tenaga Ra'ayat (People's United Front), or PUTERA, comprising 4:2

the main body of MNP, a youth organization, a women's organ-, ization, and many smaller bodies. The leading spirit in this new creation was Dr. Barhanuddin, the founder of the MNP. PUTERA added 'your points to the six-point programme of AECIA-namely that Malay should be the oilicial language of the country, that foreign affairs should 'be jointly controlled by the Malayan and British Governments, that the term Malaya

should be applied to all citizens of Malaya, and that the national -flag of the country should incorporate the Malay national colors.

AMCIA was thought E... Chinese-dominated and Chinese-Enanccd, while PUTERA ostensibly represented the anti-UMNO Malay feeling and was guided, no doubt, by its founder. When it was announced that the Malayan Union had been scrapped and that a new constitution was to be drafted, the coalition became known as PUTERA-AMCIA. The followI of PUTEBA among the Malay population appeared to be

small. AMCIA was mainly, though not exclusively, based on the Labour unions, which were then under strong Communist influence and were principally composed of Chinese and Indian immigrant workers. A certain amount of bargaining ensued between the two federations, the Chinese element making concessions in the shape of proposing relays as the name of Malayan citizenship and agreeing to the retention of the Malay Sultans as constitutional sovereigns. PUTERA for its part kept

clear of Communist associations and omitted all reference to

the thorny question of immigration. Mr. Tan Cheng-lock accepted the chairmanship of the PanMalayan Council of Joint Action which subsequently changed its name to the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action. Its vicissitudes were complicated and call for some extra clarification. Originally, as has been described above, the Left \Ving Malay organizations were in the PMCJA, but in order to avoid the charge of being dominated by the Chinese they formed themselves into a separate organization when the PMCIA changed its name to AMCIA. As a result, the new organization became known as ACACIA-PUTERA. This organization was Communist-dominated. Mr. Tan Cheng-lock suggested that in order to secure adequate funds for running the organization a serious attempt should be made to bring in the Chinese business men. This suggestion. did not End favour with the Communist section of the organization as a result of which it broke up early in 1948.

In June, 1948, a month or two afterwards, the 'Emergency' started. 43

TI-IE EMERGENCY

I

It was at this juncture, when Malayan political parties were proliferating and Malaya was passing through its democratic infancy towards aclolescenee, that the Communist insurrection began and arrested the process. It was destined, in fact, to put the clock back by many years. Official accounts agree in attributing; the outbreak in Malaya to El. decision taken at the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India held under the cover of the Calcutta Youth Festival in February- 1948. How true is this? Certainly there were outbreaks in India, Burma, and Indonesia in the first part of the year before that in Malaya, but there is as yet no certain evade nee to conn r..t *he M malayan ms1.1rreet1

with the decisions

taken at Calcutta. The rebellions the appearance of being spontaneous and unco-ordinated. The CCP seems to have taken no direct part' in the decision. (It is interesting to note in this connexion that the official Cominform line is that the outbreak in Malaya was the result of deliberate Government aggression) The rebellion in Malaya in June was really only an accent-

nation of the violence and lawlessness that was already sporadic. The Commissione1°~General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, in a broadcast from Radio Malaya on the 6th June, spoke of Commu-

nist agitators making a desperate attempt to impose a rule of gun and knife and said that the bestial campaign must be streak down. Reports began to come in of shooting, violence, and loss of life on estates in the Federation. The Commissioner of Police reported a vast increase in crimes of violence, and Perak planters asked for drastic action to curl) the outbreak. On the 12th Tune, three KMT leaders were shot in daylight in Chore. On the 15th June, three European planters were killed on estates in Perak and thereafter incidents were frequent. A State of Emergency covering the entire Federation was declared on the 18th Lune and was extended to Singapore on the 24th June.

The MPAIA issued a manifesto calling on all former

comrades to take up arms against the British. On the 20th Lune, 44

45,000 guerillas were reported to be massing in the jungle. On same do, the police station at Mentakab in Pa113.n8 was attack l insurrection had begun in earnest.

11

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By the end of 19458, tile main plans of' the Communist terrorist Lad evidently iniscarried. A 'liberated' area had not been created as a nucleus for expansion nor had the plan to sabotage Britain's economic recovery, by cutting oft the supplies of rubber essential in obtaining dollar exchange, succeeded.

Nevertheless the insurrection continued, and the authorities had recognized that to kill terrorists was not enough since replacements were always y available; what was required was to break the Communist morale and to remove or disrupt the guerillas' source of supply. The latter was mainly the Chinese 'squatter' community.

THE CHINESE SQUATTERS The Chinese squatters had existed at all times during the period of British rule, but their numbers only became really considerable during the Japanese occupation when the shortage of food drove many thousands of people into the countryside. Many Chinese removed to remote spots to put as much. space between themselves and the IJapanese as possible. Land made available by the Japanese by cutting down rubber pau

room for food crops was also occupied by ChineslI The' outbreak f the terrorist campaign in June, 1948, brought the Chi; squatter conununity into unenviable prominem-e.» Much Tithe land occupied was O11 the fringes of the jungle and the squatter settlements were made use of for shelter and supplies by the terrorists who also reclln'ted, or conscripted, man-power from them. Since the squatters were easily intimidated into silence, the police and military could not obtain information regarding terrorist activity. This resulted in reprisals against the squatters collectively and huts were burnt

down and crops destroyed. Later on a policy was followed of either moving squatters from areas where they could be used by the Communists and resettling them (the 'Briggs Plan') or else repatriahhg them to China in considerable numbers. As a result of these measures, the squatters as a cornrnunitv became disaitectcd iron Government (even assuming that they had been

well disposed towards it in the first place), and a considerable propoft? on o? them W ere now willing to co-operate with the

terrorists. 45

It was inevitable that the rooting up of some 500,000 people should have a detennintal effect on the economy of the country. For one thing, agricultural pursuits, such as vegetable gardening, pig-reairing, and rubber-tapping were interrupted. The immediate effect on consumers, of cou.rse,wa5 that the price of foodstuffs steadily rose. Rubber production was also adversely affected. The resettlement measures, however, were not altogether without advantage to the squatters. The Government was forced to undertake a programme of betterment in the 'New Villages' (as the settlements were called) which might not otherwise come within the realm of practical politics 4 intro~ duction of electric lighting, the provision of agricultural assist-

ance, a policy of land alienation to squattcl, the building schools, ete.

an

The Briggs Plan was certainly the most successful measure against the Communist revolutionaries to date, for it compelled them to change their plans. On the 1st October. 1951, the 'Folitburo' of the MCP issued a new directive to members of the Party. This directive admitted serious errors which had been committed by Communist State organizations 'whose methods (it said) had been diametrically opposed to accepted principles By sabotaging industry, the directive admitted, they had alienated the people 'they wished to win over by cutting OHl: their source of livelihood and the indiscriminate murder of Chinese, Malays, Indians, and Europeans alike had weakened

their claims to he champions of the 'Malayan People'. Henceforth, to win over the masses, the Party must (1) stop seizing identity cards (which had been introduced by the Government), (2) stop burning New Villages and coolie-lines, (3) stop attacking post offices, reservoirs, power stations, and other public services, (4) refrain from de~raiiing civilian trains with high explosives, (5) stop throwing hand-grenades, and take great care that when shooting 'running dogs' (i.e. Government collaborators) found moving among the masses to avoid stray shots hurting the masses, and (6) stop burning religious buildings, sanitary trucks, Red Cross vehicles, and ambulances. Rubber trees, tin-mines, and factories must not be destroyed because of the resentment of the workers who lost their employment thereby. in future

* the . operations, the NICE? was to rely on restricted military

removal of selected individuals, and the infiltration of Labour. 46

It was some my* will before the mew directive reached all branches, but, when it did obedience to it revolutionized the external appearance of the Emergency, without, however, altcr~ ing its essential nature. Un the Sth October, 1951, the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was ambushed by Communist guerillas on his way up to Frase1"s Hill. and killed.

MILITARY REGIME Shortly after the murder of' Sir Henry Gurney there was a change of Government in Britain, and Mr. Oliver Littleton became Colonial Secretary. In November and December 'lr. Lyttelton visited Malaya. On. his arrival in Singapore on the 29th

November he declared that 'the restoration of law and order in Malaya had first priority and that political reforms must come alter . The local reaction to this statement, however was so unfavorable that he later modified his policy to aim at a military victory over the Communists which was to be aided simultaneously by y' judicious political reform. In January, 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as High Commissioner for the Federation in charge not only of the military operations but of the civil government as well. Henceforth the political evolution of Malaya was to be subordinated to military requirements. (Why a soldier should have been selected for a task which he himself described as '75 per dull political and only 25 per cent military is another matter.

On arrival in Malaya, General Tempter at once attacked his taslc with a dynamic energy amounting at times to demoniac frenzy. 'I am your boss' was his opening message to Malaya, and by this he meant that everything in the country, animate or inanimate, was subject to his will. The war against the Communist guerillas he regarded as being in die Ilatllrc of a tex- or a dos(-hunt. Anyone who opposed him in the least degree or

H1116 _

offered him unpalatable advice was asking for trouble. The consequence was received no advice but aetecl on un-

assisted inspiration. Then New Village was suspected of collaboration with the Communists, General Trampler would descend upon it with his squadron of eight arm outed-cars, Hay the inmates alive with his tongue, and impose collective punishments upon them, which included curfews, cuts in the riee-

ration, and (in one ease) the obliteration of the offending village 47

and the removal of ifs inmates into an internment carp. The

Generals lnethods, based on the time-honoured fallacy that 'the only thing that Asiatics understand is force', was successful only in reducing British prestige to nil and making the C'-ainese 'squatters more willing than ever to supply the Communisms with 'food and man-power. The existence of the new MCP directive referred to above was not known until a copy of it was captured by the security forces late in 1952. and a translation of it appeared in the London Tifmes. It tlrerefore appeared to the unwary as if time decrease in incidents was due to the General's dynamic activity, but it

was now quite- clear -that this was merely the consequence of =cllanged Communist policy imposed on them by the eEorts-not of General Tempter - but of Sir Henry Gurney and General Briggs. In the last months of the Tempter experiment incidents :again increased as Communist tactics, modified once more to suit the situation, directed. As late as April 1955, the United Planting Association of Malaya was complaining that the incidence of violence and intimidation was as bad as it had ever been since the beginning of the Emergency, nearly seven years before. On the- civilian front, the 'reforms' introduced by General 'Templar in accordance with his directive from Mr. Lyttelton, proved to be steps not forward but backward towards the :feudal period of Malayan history. (The classic example was the G-eneraI's legislation which turned the nine Malay States into nine 'nations' in a country the size of England without Vlfalesl) .A committee of the Federal Legislative Council appointed by the General to consider the questions of elections which had been demanded by the UMNO-MCA Alliance, recoznrnended 'that in elections had to- be held in face of the rising popular demand, there should still be no elected majority on the Legis.lative Council, but that the Malay oligarchy established by the .1948 constitution should be in control as hctore. At the very end of his régime, however, the hands of General Ternpler and .1 Mr. Lyttleton were forced by the determined action of the ULINO-L-ICA alliance.

This is a mattei- which I will now

--describe in some detail.

48

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE EMERGENCY The outbreak of the Emergency had played havoc with Malaya's infant political parties. On the 24th Lune, 1948, the 8.'IDU had decided to dissolve 'in the present political situation-

and curtailment of civil 1°igl1ts'. The MCP and the SingaporeFederation of Trade Unions ceased to function ( at least openly ) at the same time. Soon afterwards, the MCP, the MPAIA Old Comrades' Association, the New Democratic Youth League, and PETA were declared unlawfiil by the Malayan Governments. The Malayan Indian Congress, the sole survivor of the AMCIA, called a truce with the Governments during the Emergency. There was thus a large void in the Malayan political scene so far as the Chinese were concerned. In September, 1948, Mr. a Tan Cheng-lock (now Sir Cheng-Lock Tan), the COC of Magyar politics, contemplated the formation of a Malayan Chinese League with the basic idea of the combination of the Chinese, not only in the interests of racial unity but to bring about SincMalay friendship. Eventually the Malayan Chinese Association was formed in February, 1949, with Mr. Tan as President. Its advent was welcomed by Sir Henry Gurney. The MCA was destined to play a big part in Mala;/an affairs during the nextfew years. It was from the beginning a political association butconcerned itself primarily with economic and welfare projects. At the same time a Comrnuniti(l" Liaison Eommittee fonded at the instigfafion of the Commissioner-Gomez-al Southeast Asia, Mr. Malcolm M a c lmmmmamm Miu leaders of the Malaya, Chinese Indian, Ceylonese, European communities.

was for the ami

In Iarluary, 1951, the Federal Legislarirfe Council approved in principle the introduction of a ministerial form of government under which there would be nine members holding portfolios who would have, in relation to The High Commissioner, thesame status as ministers in other countries.

as the 'Member System'. 49

This became known-

Independence

of

Malaya Party (IMP)

Another political development of two years later was the

formation on the 20th August, 1951 of the Independence of Malaya Party under the leadership of Dato Onn bin ]`a'afar, who had resigned from the presidency of UMNO in order to start this new venture. The chairman, Mr. Tan Cheng-lock, spoke at the inaugural meeting, and it looked at the time as if the IMP were likely to be the answer to the hopes of those who wished to see a party to which members of all communities in Malaya might belong on a complete equality. But, as time went on, it became clear that Dato Onn was not gaining the support for his new party from the majority of the Malays, or even from UMNO, the organization which he himself had founded. Dato Onn had contemplated a union of the communities in winning independence, with IMP as the rallying point. The constitution he en-

visaged was not revolutionary, but the powers of the Sultans were to be drastically reduced, there was inlommon citizenship, and Chinese and Indians were to be admitted into the administrative service.

The new President of UMNO, Turku Abdul Balkan, would have nothing to do with IMP and described its formation as a 'destructive no ove'. UMNO new passed EI. resolution expelling 'members of IMP, but the chairman of the Kuala Lumpur division. of UMNO, a staunch supporter of IMP, stated that lie would seek the decisions of the courts as to the legality of this expulsion. UMNO at the same time issued a statement that it was willing to work together with non-Malays who had undivided loyalty to Malaya and welcomed them as associate members. It was clear that the advent of IMP, founded on the principle of racial equality, had created profound misgivings in the min ds

of many Malays who feared that their special po§i'Ei?J?1' ?i75u1H be undermined, and this fear split UMNO from top to bottom. The major opposition seemed likely to be formed from the dissenting section of UMNO which was in a majority and under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rah ran of Ked ah.

From-Malayan Labour Party On the 26th Tune, 1952, delegates from Singapore, Selangor, Penang, and Perak decided to feral a Pan-Malayan Labour Party to co-ordinate the activities of Labour and Socialist organizations in Malaya.

This move was undoubtedly due to the fact

that IMP, to which the Labour leaders had pledged their support, 50 .r

showed no immediate likelihood of providing even an interim outlet for the political aspirations of Labour (as Mr. Narayanan, the Labour leader had hoped). The new party decided against laying down any pre-condition for the independence of Malaya. It was certain, however, that the PMLP would not 'be able to challenge UMNO or the MCA in the political field within the foreseeable future. Its power and development must depend on the growth of the trade union movement which was still in its infancy. (In December, 1952, there were 180,000 trade unionists in the Federation of whom less than 20,000 were Chinese.) The moving spirit in the new Labour Party was Inch Mohamed Sopiee, who had been a student at the London School of Economies.

The UMNO-MCA Alliance Owing to the suspicions engendered between Malays and Chinese by the Government policy of relying on the Malays in lighting the Emergency and nourishing their suspicions of Chinese motives, the relations between the communities during the first part of the Ternpler regime were far from harmonious, but already some of the leaders of MCA and UMNO felt that there could be a working agreement between the two parties to exclude IMP to which both were hostile. Thus in 1952 at the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections, a striking development took place. This was a local alliance between UMNO and MCA to defeat the IMP candidates. In this they were very successful. The MCA and UMNO candidates won nine seats and the IMP only two while one S w went to an independent. The elections were held on a very limited electoral basis (the majority of the

householders who were Chinese being disenfranchised by the Selangor State laws), but they aroused great interest throughout Malaya because of the test of party strength involved. To begin with, the merger was purely local Ami was inspired by expedience rather than by any principle, it had the excellent result of bringing the leaders of the two communities into closer contact and they began to realize that they had a greater extent of common interest and common ground than they had hitherto imagined. The result was the extension of the alliance to the conduct of municipal elections throughout the country.

51

A Malayan Ncctiotlal Congress?

Apart from the local rappro achement in connexion vi§h the Kuala Lumpur elections, the feeling between the Malaya and Chinese generally was at its worst about August, 1952, but thereafter, owing largely to the sldll of TUrku Abdul Ragman and Sir Cheng-lock Tan, it began to improve and many grounds for

mutual suspicion were removed. The growth and influence of the UMNO-MCA Alliance was positive evidence of this. The

.Alliance seemed also to revive the sinking fortunes of UMNO itself in a striking way. In September, 1952, these fortunes had reached their lowest ebb and the party had become only a rump of its former self, but after its alliance with the MCA it 'began rapidly to recover its membership so that early' in 1953 it was Credited with 100,000 supporters. 1What was even more important, an alliance which hitherto had been regarded by outside observers as a mere marriage of convenience in pursuit of personal and selfish interests, now made a bid for popular support in a far-reaching political programme. In March, it was announced that UMNO and the MCA had reached agreement on general elections to the- Federal Legislative Council. Tunku Abdul BRahman said that he saw no reason why the MalayChinese alliance should not be extended to the national level to contest the Federal elections. Four round-table conferences 'between the parties h.ad produced encouraging and concrete results. Turku Abdul BRahman welcomed eilorts by the Chinese improve the economic position of the Malays. 'While not

belittling contributions made by , he said, d other communities' is an essential pre'I feel that Chinese-Malay understanding reliisite for Malayan independence.

This platform represented 'independence before }.is]ayaniza~ tion°, coupled with a demand for immediate elections to the Federal Legislative Council, thus constituting a new power~ ful challenge to the Government. The move seemed to indicate that under certain circumstances Malays and Chinese could combine for constructive purposes, and to this extent at least it was a very encouraging development.

The idea of a Malayan National Congress was already in the air for at the Asian Socialists' Conference held at Rangoon 111

Ianuarv, .v

mm

a 1'esoILltlon had been passed supporting a

Malayan National Congress of all parties. At this juncture, however that@;~y.as a surprise move by an opposition group which apparently hoped to forestall the UMNO-MCA

Alliance

calling a 'National Congress' of its own. This move was made 52

by the Mentris Besar of Perak, Kelantan, Ked ah, Negri Se1nl)ilcLn, . Trengganu, and Selangor, and nine other persons (including four Chinese), who summoned a conference at Kuala Lumpur for the 27th April and called upon 'all those leaders who strove sincerely for a united, free, and independent Malayan nation to consider how they can best, in co-operation, forward this splendid ideal'. It would have been strange, however, considering the appointments and interests of the conveners, if this 'National Congress' were to have any but 'go slow' aims -- and so indeed it proved. The UMNO-MCA Alliance denounced the move as a concealed reactionary one, as did the PMLP.

.Chore,

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