Guerilla Communism in Malaya 9781400877676

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GUERRILLA COMMUNISM IN MALAYA

OTHER BOOKS FROM THE CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PRINCETON UNIVERSITY Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism William W. Kaufmann (ed.), Military Policy and National Security Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations Charles De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law. Translated by P. E. Corbett

Guerrilla Gommunism in Malaya ITS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MEANING

BY LUCIAN W. PYE

El PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1956

Copyright © 1956 by Princeton University Press London: Oxford liniversity Press All Rights Reserved L. C. Card: 56-10827

LUCIAN W. PYE wrote this book while he was with the

Center of International Studies at Princeton University. He is now Assistant Professor of Political Science and a staff member of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author did his field work in the Federation of Malaya from September 1952 to January 1953, interview­ ing former Malayan Communists.

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

FOR

MY

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FOREWORD The menacing advances of Communism in Asia have led the United States government to try a variety of policies there in the interest of the preservation of freedom. These include the formation of military alliances, the provision of economic assistance and technical aid, the dissemina­ tion of information, and the encouragement of cultural exchange. However, the results to date have raised some question as to whether the real character of the problem confronting us in Asia has yet been fully explored. It is necessary to know more about the nature of Communism as a social and political force in Asia. What distinguishes those who are recruited to this movement? What do they expect to find in Communism and what does it mean to them to become members of this international revolutionary cult? What considerations are likely to be the most com­ pelling in causing them to reject Communism? In the following pages Professor Pye seeks answers to fundamental questions of this order. The bulk of his work is based on detailed interviews which he conducted with Chinese who had been members of the Malayan Com­ munist Party. Through his analysis of the personal and psychological problems of people who have experienced the great social and political upheavals of contemporary Asia, we can gain a better understanding of what motivates their political behavior. Although this is a case study of the Malayan Communist Party, the findings have far broader implications. They provide new insights into the relationships of Communism and Chinese culture, and they give us a better understand­ ing of many features of political behavior in economically underdeveloped societies. In the concluding chapter, the author offers a discerning analysis of the basic problems which must be overcome if underdeveloped societies are to realize free and representative institutions. This study bears a close relationship to Professor Gabriel

FOREWORD

A. Almond's volume, The Appeals of Communism, which was the first book in the series published under the auspices of the Center of International Studies. The Center was established at Princeton University in 1951. Its basic purpose is to bring to bear on the elucidation of foreign policy problems the full resources of available knowledge and modern methods of analysis. To this end it engages in and publishes research directed toward the development of sys­ tematic, disciplined, and comprehensive appraisals of the varied aspects of international relations, with special em­ phasis on the foreign policy of the United States. The mem­ bers of the Center work at all times in close association, but each member is free to formulate his research project in his own way and each published study represents an individual analysis of a problem. FREDERICK S. DUNN Director Center of International Studies Princeton University April 26, 1956

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS MANY people have made this study possible. I am espe­ cially anxious and happy to express my deep sense of in­ debtedness and obligation to Gabriel Almond for his encouragement and wise counsel at every stage in the planning and preparation of this work. He conceived of the potentialities of the study of Communism by means of interviews, and I have drawn upon his model work, The Appeals of Communism, more than mere footnotes can document. I greatly appreciate the confidence Professor Frederick S. Dunn has shown in me. All of my colleagues at the Cen­ ter of International Studies at Princeton have given in­ valuable assistance in numerous ways. I owe a warm debt of gratitude in particular to Percy E. Corbett and Bernard C. Cohen for their thoughtful and cogent criticisms, and to William W. Kaufmann for all the time he has given to discussing with me the problems of this study. James Coleman, William W. Lockwood, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Morris Watnick, and Bryce Wood have read some or all of the chapters, and many improvements have come from their comments. I owe an intellectual debt to Nathan Leites for his many stimulating ideas about both the char­ acter of Communism and social science methodology. It is impossible to acknowledge individually all of those who facilitated my interviews in the Federation of Malaya; many became friends and some I never met. I cannot be­ lieve that any independent investigator, especially one of a different nationality, could possibly have been given greater cooperation and access to information than I re­ ceived, and nowhere could greater respect have been shown for the conventions of freedom in research. I am grateful for the personal interest that Mr. J. H. A. Watson of the British Embassy in Washington took in arranging for the project. The then High Commissioner, General Sir Gerald Templer, in ensuring the freedom and the ease of my op-

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

erations displayed his great faith in research, and in speak­ ing of the ethical dilemma of the statesman showed an understanding that exceeds that to be found in Max Web­ er's classic statement. A. W. D. James, D.F.C., Reginald J. Isaac, and C. C. Too of the Emergency Information Serv­ ice freely shared with me as friends the penetrating in­ sights and great knowledge about the ways of the Malayan Communists which they had accumulated through their rich experience in psychological warfare. Mr. J. P. Mor­ ton, Director of Intelligence, Sir Robert Lockhart, Deputy Director of Operations, and Mr. A. D. C. Peterson, O.B.E., Director General of Information Services, were extremely helpful in personally facilitating my work. Mr. W. C. S. Corry, C.B.E., British Advisor, Pahang, and Mr. M. C. ff. Sheppard, M.B.E., British Advisor, Negri Sembilan, went to great lengths to be helpful and hospitable. It is to the men in the Federation of Malaya Police Force and especially those of the Special Branch, with whom I had the pleasure of working closely, that I owe a debt of special gratitude. I want to acknowledge in par­ ticular the assistance of W. L. R. Carbanell, C.M.G., who was in charge of the Special Branch and who is now the Commissioner of Police, and of John Barlow, Paul Barnes, Kerr Bovell, Euan Davies, T. Q. Gaffikin, B. C. Halahan, David Henchman, Heng Soon Poh, P. Howes, Roland G. Kibble, Robert C. Thom, and D. W. Yates. In particular, Lance A. Searle, whose great intellectual curiosity paral­ leled the lines of my investigation, was of enormous help to me, and his tragic death while on military operations was a severe personal loss. At the risk of seeming ungrateful to the many other members of the Malayan Civil Service, I must single out John Davis, Philip Egerton, George W. Rothery, and James Patrick for special thanks. Mr. Austin Voon worked diligently to ensure that most of the interviews were tran­ scribed verbatim. I spent many entertaining hours with John Brazier, learning about the difficulties of organizing χ

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

a free trade-union movement in an Asian society. I have many warm memories of all that Robert N. Lindsay did for me. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the kind assistance and advice I received from Charles F. Baldwin, Hendrik van Oss, Frank Welsh, and the other American foreign service officers in Malaya. Louise Tompkins with great care helped to tabulate the interviews, and did the statistical calculations that resulted in over one hundred tables. Although these tables provided the basis for much of this study, they have not been repro­ duced because they might give a false sense of precision that would be in violation of the spirit of scientific in­ quiry. Instead, most of the findings on the attitudes of those interviewed will be reported in the text in a manner that can more accurately indicate the extent to which they are approximations. No writer could owe more to his editor than I do to Jean MacLachlan. If this book possesses any degree of clarity and style, it is due entirely to her thoughtful and skillful editing. Martha Sivier and Nancy Atwood with great speed and accuracy deciphered my script and typed the first drafts. Geraldine Fletcher, Sheila Hendry, and Karen Stern did the final version. Finally, I wish to thank my wife for all her contribu­ tions to this book and for cheerfully reading the final re­ vision to determine whether it is entirely understandable to a thoughtful and intelligent layman, even though the study represents something that has kept me absent, either in Malaya or in my thoughts, for so long. Since so many people have assisted me, it should be clear that all the errors and failings in this work are entirely of my own doing. Center of International Studies Princeton University January 1956

LUCIAN W. PYE

CONTENTS Foreword

vii

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

3 PART I. THE DOCTRINE

1. Communist Doctrine and People's Liberation Parties Marx and Lenin on Asia Violence Is the Key and Armed Struggle the Strategy "Liberated Areas": A Geographic Dimension to Revolution Taking Gambles and Being Reckless United Fronts and the Vanguard of the Pro­ gressives The Test of Indoctrination

17 22 27 30 32 33 39

PART II. THE PARTY

2. From Conspiracy to Terrorism The First Phase: The Spirit of Conspiracy Malays and Communism The Immigrant Communities and Com­ munism Organizing Professional Revolutionaries The Second Phase: War Communism Communism in the Jungle The Third Phase: "Peaceful Agitation" Organizing Front Groups in a Disorgan­ ized Society The Party as Employer 3. The Emergency Organizing for Violence Life in the Jungle

47 47 49 51 58 62 64 70 73 79 83 86 91

CONTENTS

Failure as Guerrillas and the Development of Terrorism The Politics of Terrorism The Prisoner of Terrorism

95 102 104

PART III. THE INDIVIDUALS

4. Surrendered Enemy Personnel: A Note on the Sample The Interviews Impressions of the SEP's

115 119 124

5. Potential Communists Trying to Get Ahead Heroes and Daydreams

128 129 136

6. The Experiences of Youth Family Relations Personal Friendships Education Pragmatism and the Nature of Fate Hardships and Personal Suffering

140 143 147 149 154 159

7. Understanding Politics Politics in the Home Personal Problems and Politics Elite Status and Politics Politics Belongs to Youth Politics Is Violence First Political Discussions Initiation by Friends Initiation by Front Groups Initiation in Schools Reliability of Media Sources of Political Power Propaganda Skill in Violence The Power of Organization Knowledge Is Shrewdness Morality and Popular Support

161 162 163 165 167 168 168 169 173 175 177 181 182 187 189 191

193

CONTENTS

8. Perceiving the Social Environment Perception of Government Racial Identity Personal Situation at the Time of Joining Occupation Career Expectations Marital Status Consequences of Underemployment

198 201 207 210 210 211 213 214

9. Joining the Communist Party Perceptions of the Goals of the Party The Doctrinal Aspect The Propaganda Versions of the Party's Objectives Non-political Perceptions Relations with the Recruiter Reaction to the Ritual of Joining

218 221 222 226 234 240 243

10. Adjusting to Life in the Party The Spirit of Discipline The Spirit of Self-Criticism The Atmosphere of Exhortation The Acceptance of Assignments

248 251 256 260 262

11. Understanding the Communist Movement Militancy Becomes Aggressiveness The Virtues of Authoritarianism Acceptance of Authoritarianism The Nature of Authority The Potency of Internationalism Ambivalence toward the West The Nationalism of Internationalism

269 269 272 274 277 281 282 284

12. Learning Communist Theory The Emotional Climate of Learning Perceptions of Marxism-Leninism The Reality and the Mystique of Symbols The Blinding Powers of Prediction

289 293 297 302 304

CONTENTS

13. Personal Relations and Promotion Personal Problems and the Party Isolation by the Party Isolation in the Party The Quest for Promotion Qualities Necessary for Getting Ahead The Dilemma of Promotion

309 309 311 313 315 318 321

14. The Process of Disaffection Periods of Doubt and Critical Incidents Types of Crises Requirements of Status and Hierarchy Sacrificing Oneself to a Losing Cause The Party Is "Corrupt" Attitudes after Leaving the Party

324 325 328 329 334 336 338

15. The Problem of Political Development

343

Index

365

GUERRILLA COMMUNISM IN MALAYA

INTRODUCTION THIS BOOK is a case study of "People's Liberation" Com­ munism, the type of Communism that is common to the less industrial areas of the world, and of Asia in particular. This is the still dynamic and revolutionary form of Com­ munism that now constitutes a most serious problem for political freedom. As is the nature of a case study, our ap­ proach will be intensive and limited: we will seek pri­ marily to understand this form of Communism according to the meaning that it held for Malayan Chinese who joined one such party, the Malayan Communist Party. One of the most profound effects of the Second World War was a dramatic alteration of the traditional relation­ ships between the West and Asia. In the countries of Asia, the war not only greatly accelerated the tempo of political and social change; it gave to these developments a new direction and a new character. The more gradual process of cultural change was pushed aside as whole societies were cast willy-nilly into new political prominence. For the West, the war brought about a sharp decline in its capacity to participate directly in the political life of Asian societies. An end came to the variety of factors which had governed the preceding century of colonialism. As a re­ sult, the West has had to assume a new role in its relations with Asia. These momentous developments in themselves would have placed a heavy burden on Western statesman­ ship. But, in addition, there has arisen that most immedi­ ately disturbing problem, the phenomenal expansion of Communism in Asia during the postwar period. And the threat of further expansion remains. In attempting to meet this challenge, any policy ad­ vanced by the West and by the free governments of Asia must contain assumptions about the character of Commu­ nism as a force in Asia. Whatever the counsel may be—be it to rely on military means, or to engage in programs of economic and technical assistance, or to utilize any other

INTRODUCTION

instrument of policy—it must be predicated on views as to the nature of Asian Communism. What political and social roles has Communism come to occupy in these so­ cieties? What significance does the movement have for those who have been led to support it, and what consider­ ations might encourage more of these people to reject it? For many Westerners one of the most perplexing fea­ tures of the rise of Communism in much of Asia has been the phenomenon of peoples who have always been con­ sidered far removed from the Western tradition of rational and scientific thought suddenly announcing to all that they are now champions of the most "scientific," most "ad­ vanced," and most "progressive" theories of social or­ ganization. What has happened to the non-materialistic outlook, the lack of faith in progress, and the blend of otherworldliness and simple utilitarianism which were sup­ posed to characterize them? Why have peoples who have generally been viewed as politically undisciplined chosen this most disciplined of political forms? How is it possible for those who have traditionally acted according to the rules of private relationships and nepotism now to seek their salvation in the impersonal climate and structure of Communism? What has made a seemingly pragmatic peo­ ple whose loyalties used to be of a most parochial nature suddenly appear to be fanatical supporters of the abstract and universalistic ideas of Communism? It is from such questions as these that we are led to raise the more general query as to whether these people really know what Com­ munism is, or, rather, whether their understanding of the movement is the same as that of Western Communists. It is possible to distinguish different types of Communist parties without denying in the slightest the monolithic ambitions of Communism as a whole. Communist doctrine calls for many of the differences between the behavior of the People's Liberation parties and of the Communist parties in the more industrialized Western countries. In the Communist view, fundamental distinctions exist be-

INTRODUCTION tween the capitalist societies of the West and the pre­ capitalist social orders of what they call the "colonies and semi-colonies," and parties operating in the two environ­ ments are expected to differ both in their social composi­ tion and in their revolutionary mission. In Part I of this study, we will note what some of these differences in doc­ trine are. A second major factor in accounting for the differences among Communist parties is the historical experience of the individual parties in their particular political and so­ cial settings. Although the Communists make a great deal of the capacity of the separate national parties to share their experiences and to benefit from the example of the model Russian party, in actual fact each Communist party has in varying degrees been the captive of its own par­ ticular history. In Part II we shall see how the various stages in the development of the Malayan Communist Party have contributed to the creation of a People's Libera­ tion party. A third area of great importance in comparing Com­ munist parties has to do with the types of individuals whom the different parties tend to recruit. The character of any political group is conditioned by the way it gains its mem­ bership and by the types of people it can attract and hold. In the case of Communist parties, the recruitment process is especially critical because of their peculiar need to find people who can successfully approximate all the exacting qualities required of one who joins their ranks. That is, they must find people who can become "good" Commu­ nists in the sense of meeting the standards of the true rev­ olutionary, the Bolshevik. It is the Communists' expecta­ tion that they can take people from all of the various cul­ tures in the world and mold them into the image of the proletarian revolutionary, the disciplined party member who is a new breed of man. This is, of course, only another example of the extraordinary confidence of the Commu­ nists in their power to manipulate people. However, in

INTRODUCTION

actual fact, the various Communist parties cannot fully escape the consequences of being human institutions that appeal in their different settings to particular types of peo­ ple at particular times. As a result, the separate parties have become committed to somewhat different social and political roles according to the differences in the raw ma­ terials—the recruits available to them in building their organizations. In Part III, which is the bulk of this study, we will be concerned with the types of persons attracted by the Malayan party and the problems they face in trying to adapt their behavior to the model of the good Com­ munist. Gabriel Almond, in The Appeals of Communism,1 has shown that the British and American parties represent one type of Communism and those of France and Italy another. From extensive interviews with former Western Com­ munists, he found that the British and American parties appeal primarily to individuals who feel themselves alien­ ated from the general society. Many of their recruits are psychologically maladjusted. Also, the large proportion of foreign-born and first-generation native-born in the Amer­ ican party is related to the problems that some of these people encounter in adjusting to American culture. Hence, the British and American parties find themselves operating almost entirely on the fringes of the political process. In sharp contrast, Professor Almond found that the Italian and French parties receive mass support through their appeal to certain distinct elements in the total society. These parties seem to meet a real political need for seg­ ments of the French and Italian working classes and for a type of intellectual—a need that as yet no other political group has been able to fulfill. They thus play a role in their country's political life that enables them to neutralize and hamper the operation of the main political process. Professor Almond also suggested that a third general type ι Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1954.

INTRODUCTION

of Communism is to be found in the People's Liberation movements. Viewed in these terms, what are the characteristics of People's Liberation Communism? It would seem that People's Liberation Communism is intimately related to a general process now going on in most underdeveloped areas of the world. Large numbers of people are losing their sense of identity with their tra­ ditional ways of life and are seeking restlessly to realize a modern way. In this setting, Communism seems to gain the support of those who have already been affected by what is generally called the impact of the West. They are the people who feel isolated from, and even hostile to­ ward, the ways of their forefathers. But they are also the people who find that as yet they are not personally a part of the new; they are anxious to belong to the future, but they are concerned lest it pass them by. These people see the Communist organization as a stable element in their otherwise highly unstable societies. In modern times, these societies have generally been subjected to war and violence to an extreme degree. In addition, they have experienced all the unsettling consequences of new and more industrial modes of life. At the very time when it seems urgently necessary to be able to foresee future developments, life has become far less predictable. Thus, to those who feel that they are caught up in a hostile and impersonal world, the party seems to offer hope of personal security. The structure of Communism is something to which these people can hitch their ambitions. In the hierarchy of the party they can discover potentialities for advancement. They come to believe that in the structure of the party they can find a closer relationship between effort and reward than in anything they have known in either the static old society or the unstable, unpredictable, new one. They feel, too, that Communism can give them a formal status or rank

INTRODUCTION

that is commensurate with their estimates of their own abilities and that commands the respect of others. Communism also offers to such persons a means for un­ derstanding and explaining the social realities that have been disturbing them. Events and developments that they have had to accept as the workings of an unknown fate become comprehensible through Communism. The promise of knowledge is also a promise of action; a sense of fu­ tility can be replaced by the spirit of the activist. Thus, it seems that People's Liberation Communism can best be explained by the role it has assumed in an acculturation process involving whole societies. Those who resort to this form of Communism are not the same as the psychologically maladjusted people who join the marginal American and British parties. They are members of a generation in transition. What primarily distinguishes them from the Asians who do not turn to Communism is that, on the one hand, they seem to find less of merit and of lasting value in their traditional cultures, and, on the other, they have generally been less fortunate or less able in discovering some other vehicle by which to become a part of the new way of life. The spirit of impatience that grips such people as these gives to this form of Communism impetuous ambitions. A sense of the imminence of unlimited success runs through these movements. Moreover, these parties are guided by a tradition of political violence, accentuated by the fact that those who make up the movements no longer feel bound by strong standards of morality and decency, since they are experiencing what we euphemistically call a "social revolu­ tion." Thus it is that these parties, driven on by a rootless people in search of power and success, carry to extreme lengths and by extreme measures the Communist ideal of sacrificing all to the tactics of political success. These characteristics of Peoples' Liberation Communism are the important hypotheses that come out of this case study. They are the themes which run through the book.

INTRODUCTION

We shall see, for example, the peculiar place of violence in this form of Communism: first, in the doctrinal concepts of revolution in the colonies and semi-colonies; then, in the history of the Malayan party; and, finally, in the basic atti­ tudes toward politics of those who have been personally in­ volved in this movement. In the same manner, we shall meet with the extraordinary emphasis on tactical calcula­ tions that characterizes People's Liberation Communism as we examine, first, its doctrinal model; then, the develop­ ment of the Malayan party; and, lastly, the fundamental pattern of social behavior of individual former Malayan Communists. In a sense, we shall be investigating the character of People's Liberation Communism in the light of three sets of data. In Part I, it is the literature of Communism that provides the evidence of what Communism is intended to be like in underdeveloped countries. Here we discover the peculiarities that might be expected of a Leninist move­ ment in such a setting and, more particularly, the assump­ tions about the nature of their societies that guide the leaders of these parties. In Part II, we turn to the experi­ ences of the Malayan Communist Party to find out how it grew with respect to the doctrinal model of People's Liber­ ation Communism. This is an account of the way in which social and political forces have worked to mold a particular party. Part III, which provides the human dimension of this form of Communism, is based upon the words of those who have personally experienced it. Our interest here is in the life histories of sixty Chinese who joined the Ma­ layan Communist movement and subsequently left it. Since we are concerned with the personal and psychological ex­ periences of these people, we will examine how they grew up; how they came to understand politics in general, and Communism in particular; how they sought to adjust to the demands of the party; and why they broke with the movement. The pattern of these experiences provides a further basis for comparing the type of Communism that

INTRODUCTION

the Malayan party represents with other types of Com­ munist parties. The primary focus of the major portion of our study is at the level of the personal, human experience of Commu­ nism. The apparently formless character of politics in most underdeveloped countries often suggests to the West­ ern observer that people in such a setting behave only in direct response to general social and economic considera­ tions. The existence of poverty, limited technology, over­ population, and the like seems to provide an adequate explanation for all developments, including the rise of Communism. As a result, the impression is often given that in such societies people do not seek to influence their destinies through individual and group actions that are guided by an understanding of the potentialities of human effort. In short, such societies are often pictured as having no significant political life. A fundamental assumption in this study is that if we are to learn why people in underdeveloped areas have turned to Communism, it is just as essential here as else­ where to determine how they understand the nature and the possibilities of political action. Thus, we will explore in some detail the relationship between the general experi­ ences of Malayan Chinese who became Communists and their attitudes toward what they considered the sphere of politics. We will be interested in discovering how they per­ ceived their lot, the lines of reasoning they followed in seeking solutions to what they felt were their problems, and the patterns of calculations and emotional responses that led them to Communism. Such considerations as these may provide us with a basis for understanding how the process by which people break from their traditional ways can take certain forms which encourage susceptibility to Communism. Then, by relating the political behavior of these people to social conditions on the one hand, and to the character of Communism on the other, we will be able to see how People's Liberation Communism derives

INTRODUCTION

both its strength and its weaknesses from a process of social change. Needless to say, the fact that we shall be concentrating largely on the behavior of a particular group of Chinese means that care must be taken in generalizing from their behavior to that of other people in underdeveloped coun­ tries who have become Communists. Indeed, as we have suggested, Communist parties differ according to the types of people they attract and the historical circumstances of their growth; and thus it must be kept in mind that in many respects the Malayan party is unique. Without com­ parable studies of Communist movements in other under­ developed countries, it is, of course, difficult to single out all of these differences. It is possible, however, to suggest some of the reasons why the Malayan party is of particular interest as a type of People's Liberation movement. Like all the other Communist parties in Southeast Asia, the Malayan party became a significant political movement only as a result of the disruption caused by the Second World War. During the period of Japanese occupation it led the most effective Communist-dominated resistance movement in the entire region. It emerged from the war as probably the best organized and most experienced party in Southeast Asia. After 1948, when all the parties initiated violent revolts, the Malayan party made the fullest com­ mitment to a program of guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the Malayan party has had the closest associations with the Chinese Communists, mainly because it is composed almost entirely of Chinese. This means that a study of those who have joined it may shed light on how some people in China have reacted to Communism. In addition, the Malayan movement is of particular in­ terest because of the geographical importance of Malaya. As the peninsula that divides the South China Sea from the Bay of Bengal, Malaya occupies a strategic position in Southeast Asia. Its strategic significance is further height­ ened by the fact that it is one of the leading tin- and rubber-

INTRODUCTION

producing areas of the world. Malaya is slightly larger than England without Wales. Four-fifths of the land is covered with dense jungles and mountain ranges; the rest consists of rubber plantations, tin mines, towns, and kampongs (na­ tive villages). The population of Malaya is composed of Malays, Chi­ nese, and Indians. (The term "Malayan" is commonly used to cover all people who live in Malaya regardless of ethnic origins, but increasingly it is being used to describe those who have identified themselves politically with Ma­ laya.) In 1951, the total population of the Federation of Malaya was 5,377,222, of which approximately 2,600,000 were Malays and 2,000,000 Chinese. The Colony of Singa­ pore has over a million people, about 80 per cent of whom are Chinese. Thus, if Singapore is included in Malaya, the Chinese are the country's largest ethnic group. The Indian population consists mainly of Tamils who came from Ma­ dras to work in the rubber plantations. The people of Malaya have one of the highest standards of living in all Asia. In particular, the Chinese immigrants have been able to find many economic opportunities there. In 1952, Chinese owned almost 600 of the approximately 700 tin mines in the country, and these mines produced nearly 40 per cent of Malaya's tin. In 1951, Asian small­ holders produced 46 per cent of Malaya's rubber output, and the estates, many of which are Asian-owned, produced 54 per cent. The Chinese have contributed greatly to the urban life of the country by energetically developing most of the retail and building trades. However, it must be made clear that these achievements reflect the success of only a few Chinese; the vast majority have a standard of living that leaves much to be desired. Malaya is also of significance because it currently repre­ sents a major attempt of the British to develop democratic institutions in an Asian society. British control of the coun­ try is based on treaties with local rulers or sultans. The Federation of Malaya was established on February 1, 1948,

INTRODUCTION

and consists of nine Malay States and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca. Through the Federation government, the British have been seeking to encourage a sense of Malayan nationalism so that the country may soon become independent. Beginning first with an appointed legislative council and then in 1955 introducing national elections for a majority of the council members, they have endeavored to establish the basis for a strong, independent government. Some of the measures which the British have adopted in order to advance self-government have come as a response to the Communist challenge, and many more have been undertaken in spite of the fact that they have complicated the struggle against the Communists. Indeed, it is a great tribute to British and Malayans alike that they have been able to make such substantial advances toward self-govern­ ment during a period when they have had to devote much of their resources and attention to combating Commu­ nism. It is the hope of responsible British officials that Malaya may soon become one of the more stable inde­ pendent countries in Southeast Asia. However, if this is to happen, the threat of Communism must first be met and Malayan society must develop its own defenses against subversion. Thus, while we shall be interested in the Malayan Com­ munist Party as an example oi People's Liberation Com­ munism, it is also necessary to keep in mind that the Ma­ layan movement is a distinctive and important one in itself.

PART

I

THE DOCTRINE

CHAPTER 1

COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES THE present power of the Communist parties of Asia and

their capacity to influence world events could hardly have been predicted from the apparently insignificant gather­ ings of men who first organized these parties in the early 1920's. All the Asian parties were founded under the most inauspicious circumstances, and their charter members were generally considered nothing more than frustrated intellectuals who had lost touch with social reality. Start­ ing most often as Marxist study groups, these gatherings had to rely for leadership mainly upon the determination and idealism of individuals with no political experience and little sophistication about practical affairs. The studygroup quality of these parties in their first years was con­ genial to people with intellectual ambitions and preten­ sions. Dominated by such individuals, the parties tended to view the path of revolution as a path to the library and the study of the classical writings of Marxism-Leninism. The struggle for power was often confused with the strug­ gle for knowledge. The early organizers recognized that if they were to make a distinct contribution to the transfor­ mation of their societies, it would be as a result of their command of a new body of wisdom. Through their own self-education, they would be able to reform the world about them. The dramatic success of the Russian Revolu­ tion only convinced them further of the power of Com­ munist doctrine. Ideas devoutly held by a few had over­ thrown a great empire and were creating a new and glori­ ous society. However, emotionally stimulating as their quest for understanding was, these early Asian Communists generally failed to find the spirit of Bolshevism in their preoccupation

I. THE DOCTRINE

with the letter of its doctrine. Apparently, many of them felt unsure of their grasp of this new knowledge, and pe­ rused the classics for mechanical solutions to particular problems. Also, they tended to lean heavily upon the in­ structions, no matter how vaguely worded, of the honored leaders in Moscow. Thus, we have the pathetic figures of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai, early leaders of the Chinese party, pleading that they had faithfully complied with all directives from Moscow, but unaware that the essence of Bolshevism is the gaining of power, and that the politics of Communism is complex. Failing to understand this, they failed to understand why they were not yet true Communists. Three facts stand out in relation to this extraordinary concern with doctrine and theory on the part of the early Asian Communists. First, there is the slowness with which the leaders of these parties came to comprehend the esoteric qualities of Communism—that is, that all their thought and effort must be bent to the realization of power. It was not that they were unconcerned with power, for they gave much thought to how desirable it would be to rule their societies. But they realized only gradually that the major focus of Marxism-Leninism was on tactics and organiza­ tion, and not on the subtleties of dialectical materialism. Secondly, in spite of all the attention they gave to ques­ tions of theory, none of them became particularly note­ worthy theoreticians and their writings on matters of doc­ trine were not impressive. From the beginning, these leaders seem to have looked upon theory as dogma and to have sought only to repeat the pronouncements of their Western comrades. They welcomed with eagerness the blinders of doctrine and, in consequence, failed to under­ stand the distinction between the need for rigidity in party discipline and the equal need for flexibility in party strat­ egy. Although conceiving of themselves as leaders o£ par­ ties, they behaved as rank-and-filers. Thus, the study-group phase of all the Asian parties had none of the intense in-

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

tellectual life that characterized the conspiratorial or Iskra period of the Russian revolutionaries. Third, and most important, is the great hesitancy with which these early Communists accepted the idea that in the setting of Asia it might be necessary to adopt distinct and unique policies and tactics in order to bring about revolution. Only reluctantly and as a result of costly ex­ perience did these leaders recognize that their problems differed somewhat from those of their Western comrades. Even when theory taught them that Asian societies were distinct and that the "colonies and semi-colonies" repre­ sented special problems, they continued to think of their tasks as being essentially similar to those of the Western Communists. In part, the explanation of this tendency may lie in the fact that Communist theory lent a certain dignity to Asian backwardness, since it stressed the revo­ lutionary potential of the "colonies and semi-colonies." If their societies were assumed to be on the brink of socialist Utopia, Asian Communists could feel that they were on an equal footing with their comrades in the industrial so­ cieties. To suggest that their problems were different was to introduce a note of discrimination which reminded them again that they were members of non-industrial societies and underdeveloped parties. Whether or not this was the case, it remains true that one of the amazing features in the development of Com­ munism in Asia was the slowness of the domestic Commu­ nists to exploit the revolutionary potentialities latent in nationalism and the peasant class, even after Lenin had explicitly told them that it was in these areas that they would find the key to revolution. At the important Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, when far-reaching decisions were made about the revolutionary pattern for the underdeveloped areas of the world, it was Lenin who argued that the lack of capitalistic development and class consciousness among the workers and peasants of Asia meant that the Communists must first take advantage

I. THE DOCTRINE

of the spirit of nationalism and unite the people against the imperialists. At the same Congress, Lenin also pointed to the importance of the peasantry as a revolutionary ele­ ment.1 In spite of this advice, the Eastern leaders seemed reluctant to admit that such might be the case. Traditional Marxian views continued to be more appealing, and just as these early Communists dreamed of establishing indus­ trialized societies, so they dreamed of leading urban workers in revolution.2 However, as the Asian parties became increasingly con1 Defending his draft of the "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" at the third sitting of the Congress, Lenin said: "The peasantry is usually the support of such national-revolutionary move­ ments [as deserve Communist backing], . . . The struggle of agricul­ tural toilers against landlord exploitation is the basis upon which you can build an organization of toilers even in backward countries. In such countries it is quite possible to establish a Soviet authority. . . . The Soviet idea is very simple, and can be understood not only by the proletariat, but also by the broader nonproletarian masses." Pravda, July 28, 1920, translated in Department of State, The Second Congress of the Communist International as Reported and Interpreted by the Official Newspapers of Soviet Russia, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1920, pp. 38-39. 2 I n much of the literature on Communism in Asia, some confusion exists as to whether it was international Communism or the Asian parties, particularly the Chinese, that tended to place the greatest importance on the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. Possibly as a result of the issues that were raised when the Chinese party re­ ceived its setback in 1927, there has been a tendency to overlook the extent to which the Comintern has always recognized the revolutionary value of the peasants. In the record of Comintern activities before 1927, there is ample evidence that Moscow was not ignoring the im­ portance of the peasants in Asian societies. For example, on May 4, 1925, the Comintern instructed the Indonesian Communist Party that "the experience of the international Communist movement has shown that there is not a single country in the world where the proletariat can count on success . . . , unless it obtains the active support of the peasantry." (Quoted by Harry J. Benda1 "The Communist Rebellions of 1926-1927 in Indonesia," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. xxrv, No. 2, May 1955, p. 142.) It is true that the Comintern also constantly warned that a peasant revolt could not in itself result in Socialism; such a revolt would have to be led by the "proletariat." However, on this point, it is essential to recognize that in Communist practice the "proletariat" is to all intents and purposes synonymous with the "party."

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

fronted with all the problems of survival common to po­ litical organizations, their leaders had to adopt more realis­ tic views in planning their strategies for revolution. As a consequence of developments that were largely beyond their control and that included pressures from established authority, decisions from Moscow, and, most important of all, the experiences of the Japanese conquests, the Asian leaders came to a better understanding of the true place of theory in the Communist scheme. They learned that the ideology they subscribed to was not a highly rigid one when it came to questions of tactics, and that great ma­ neuverability and ingenuity were both possible and essen­ tial. The place of ideology was to provide revolutionaries with a common orientation, so that their parties could be highly disciplined organizations operating in disorganized societies. Theory became less and less an intellectual ex­ ercise and more a common bond in the struggle for po­ litical power. They learned that Communist literature was essentially a literature of power, not in the sense of either glorifying power or calling for the maximizing of power at every opportunity, but in the far more fundamental sense of, first, ascribing political significance to all aspects of life, and then identifying politics as power. Their central con­ cern thus became the complex problem of calculating poli­ tics. In short, the Asian leaders were becoming Bolsheviks. In this process, many of the early leaders dropped by the wayside. In most instances, it was simply a case of their being unable to keep up with the changing character of their parties. Although they were usually charged with various forms of deviationism—it has been popular to liken them to Trotsky and the Old Bolsheviks who were purged from the Russian party—it is questionable whether many of them had ever fully understood Communism even though they had sat on Politburos. Those who remained with the movement saw that their mission was to apply in an Asian setting the Leninist principles of an elite party exploiting existing conditions to gain revolutionary power.

I. THE DOCTRINE

They tended in their choice of strategies to exaggerate cer­ tain Bolshevik practices and to minimize others, so that in time the Asian parties developed characteristics which distinguished them from those of the West. However, these differences are a matter of degree, and do not suggest a break in the Communist tradition. It is not our purpose to trace the historical development of the distinctive features of People's Liberation Commu­ nism; this will be done with respect to the Malayan Com­ munist Party in the next two chapters. Our concern at this point is to examine the peculiar characteristics of People's Liberation Communism in terms of Communist assump­ tions about the nature of Asian societies. In doing this, we are not suggesting that the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism "predicted" or "determined" that the Asian parties would develop as they have; this would be taking the same view of the nature of Communist doctrines as the early Asian Communists did. On the contrary, the assumption of this study is that many factors have contributed to the de­ velopment of People's Liberation Communism. One of these has been the intellectual perspective in which the Asian Communists have viewed their social environment. Thus, we are suggesting that the manner in which their world is depicted in Communist doctrines has affected their calculations of strategy. Marx and Lenin on Asia

Marx recognized that the historical development of the East required unique treatment and he attempted to char­ acterize what he called "oriental society."3 However, he produced little that was ever to be used by Asian revolu­ tionaries as a guide to action. The hopeless backwardness of the East as seen by Marx was enough to chill the revolus Itv discussing Communist theory, we -will be using terminology pe­ culiar to Communist literature, and such expressions as "imperialism," "colonies and semi-colonies," "contradictions," and the like are to be understood in this context alone.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

tionary ardor of most Asians interested in social change. The appeal of Marx for Asians has been based almost en­ tirely on his theories relating to the European scene, while his passages on Asian society itself have generally been viewed by Asians as being so unkind as to be lacking in the sympathy they identify with true knowledge. In fact, it has been precisely those sections of Marx's works most specifically devoted to Asia which have been least known and least appreciated by Asians. Marx was too much the product of the nineteenth century to have patience with societies that did not show the seeds of progress; he was a social Darwinist who thought in terms of "backward" peoples and not of "underdeveloped" economies.4 It remained for Lenin to develop theories which could appeal to Asian revolutionaries and serve as meaningful guides for their dreams of erecting a new society. Begin­ ning with an interest in colonial questions which culmi­ nated in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin, at first incidentally and then quite explicitly, drafted the theories and theses which were to provide a conceptual framework for the leaders of People's Libera­ tion movements.5 The significance which Lenin placed on the development of "imperialism" in the advanced indus­ trial nations brought about a dramatic elevation in the importance of the "colonies and semi-colonies" in the scheme of world revolution. Although these areas were considered to be still in the precapitalist stage of develop * For a well-documented but somewhat extreme view of the scorn Marx had for what he considered to be "backward" peoples, see Judd L. Teller, Scapegoat of Revolution, Scribner's, New York, 1954. Marx's own comments on "backward areas" are scattered throughout his writings, but they have been used in such works as David L. Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1950; and the writings of Karl A. Wittfogel, especially "The Ruling Bureaucracy of Oriental Despotism: A Phenomenon That Paralyzed Marx," Review of Politics, Vol. xv (July 1953), pp. 350-59. β For a discussion of Lenin's first interest in the problems of im­ perialism, see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Macmillan, London, 1955, Vol. m, Chapter xxvi.

I. THE DOCTRINE

ment, the introduction of imperialism added a new feature to the historical process. No longer could these areas be viewed by Marxists as dormant and stifled by feudalism. For Lenin, the colonies and semi-colonies abounded in "contradictions," and in terms of dialectical materialism these contradictions gave them a new revolutionary sig­ nificance. While for Marx the East was the last place to look for revolutionary currents, under Lenin it became the focal point of so many dynamic forces that the difficulty became one of distinguishing at any particular moment which were the most significant guides for the revolu­ tionaries. Contradictions were observed between the various im­ perialist powers as they sought to expand or hold their colonial territories, and these could lead to a cycle of wars and world revolution. Other contradictions existed between the subjugated peoples and their imperial masters, and in particular between the rising native capitalist class, or the "national bourgeoisie," and international capitalism in the form of the imperialists. Within the domestic society of the colonies and semi-colonies were to be found other dynamic class conflicts. The national bourgeoisie in its attempt to introduce capitalistic modes of production was in conflict with the remnant feudal class. The class rela­ tionship of the peasants and the newly born proletariat to the domestic and foreign capitalists, as well as the feudal landowners, was one of contradiction. The small mer­ chants, students, and intelligentsia who constituted the "petty bourgeoisie" were expected to find in time that both the national bourgeoisie and the imperialists were their enemies. Thus, in the colonies and semi-colonies were to be found all the class conflicts known to the Marxian view of history. However, while in the West these class conflicts had played themselves out in successive struggles, each one marking a distinct stage in the historical process, in the East the same contradictions were all compressed into

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

a single historical moment. This contraction of the process of history, confined both in time and space, produced in the East a massing of potentially revolutionary forces. Al­ though some of the classes were weak and hence could not perform singly the functions of their counterparts in the West, -when all were brought together, the resultant o£ their complementary as well as contradictory impulses was a revolutionary potential of great magnitude. The ruth­ less and authoritarian features of the East which Marx had ascribed to the rule of Eastern despotic potentates could now be viewed by the disciples of Lenin not as perverse qualities of ancient civilizations but as manifestations of historic class struggles. The social chaos and tension which had characterized twentieth-century Asia and had frus­ trated the intellectuals' dreams of a better society could now be considered as meaningfully explained by and re­ lated to the great dynamic forces of history. The Asians' sensitiveness to their lack of modernity could give way to the dignity of living in societies that were struggling toward their historical destiny. Armed with an apparently rational theory which placed the responsibility for the evils of their societies at the foreigner's door, Asians no longer had to feel that their backwardness was their own fault. In the future, they could find in themselves the po­ tentialities for great improvement that would put them ahead of the West. From this new development in theory, Lenin came to the conclusion that the experience of the Eastern nations would differ fundamentally from the European pattern. New methods and strategies would have to be devised, and Lenin was willing at times to give the local revolutionaries a relatively free hand in developing them. He told a group of Asian Communists: "Here you are being confronted with a task, one which has never yet been placed before any Communist of the world, that is, the application of the general theory and practice of Communism to conditions not to be found in

I. THE DOCTRINE

Europe. It is imperative for you to make a success of ap­ plying Communist theory and practice under conditions where the peasant is the primary class of the masses, where the task of struggle pending solution lies in the fight against the remnants of mediaevalism, but not the fight against capitalism. "It is up to you to discover the exceptional form where­ by a link can be maintained between the progressive pro­ letariat of the world and the workers and the exploited masses of the East. . . . "The solutions to the above tasks, though not to be found in any published Communist writings, can nevertheless be seen in the over-all struggle already started in Russia. It is up to you to single out the tasks and to have them solved through your own particular experience."8 Even in this speech Lenin could not resist giving explicit directions, and soon the "published Communist writings" made up for any previous lack of precise solutions to the revolutionary problem in the colonies and semi-colonies. Lenin himself added more, and his writings on the role of the peasants in Russia were in time taken to apply also to the peasants of Asia. Stalin was called upon to explain the nature of the Chinese Revolution, and in the struggle with Trotsky his assumptions about the revolutionary proc­ ess in the colonies and semi-colonies became sanctified as official pronouncements. Congresses of the Communist In­ ternational and meetings of its executive committee pro­ duced even more specific statements about the problems of the East. Finally, as the Chinese Communist Party proved its ability to succeed, the writings of the Chinese leaders, β V. I. Lenin, "Report Before the Second All-Russian Representatives Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Eastern Peoples," Sochinenya [Works], Moscow, 1932, Vol. xxiv, pp. 542-51; first printed in Izvestia, December 20, 1919. Quoted in Ch'en Po-ta, Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution Is the Combination of MarxismLeninism with the Chinese Revolution, Current Background Series, No. 126, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, October 15, 1951, pp. 11-12.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

following in the same tradition, were accepted as a basic part of the classics of Communism. These doctrines have encouraged the development of certain tendencies and propensities in the People's Libera­ tion parties. They have not, however, provided the move­ ment with a set of predetermined strategies. Thus, al­ though it is possible to label some of the characteristics of People's Liberation Communism as examples of a "Maoist strategy" because it was the Chinese party which first dem­ onstrated them, it would probably be a misinterpretation of the nature of Communism to assume that these "strat­ egies" are considered by the Communists unique formulas which, if followed in detail, can guarantee success to other parties. Violence Is the Key and Armed Struggle the Strategy The interpretation that Communist doctrine gives to class relationships in the colonies and semi-colonies sug­ gests that in these areas violence has a peculiar importance. This assumption is related to one of the most important characteristics of People's Liberation Communism: the ex­ traordinary emphasis placed upon the revolutionary role of "armed struggle." Conceiving of themselves as existing in an environment dominated by violence and as struggling against enemies who seek to maintain their control by military means, the People's Liberation parties have readily turned to the task of creating their own military forces. In spite of the labored and empirically unsound reason­ ing in Communist doctrines about the colonies and semicolonies, it is an incontestable fact that violence has played a major role in the politics of modern Asia. For reasons quite unrelated to any Marxian categories of class conflict, the process by which Asian societies have broken with their traditional systems has been marked by strife. The clash between the old and the new, between the traditional way of doing things and the imported Western way, has in-

I. THE DOCTRINE

escapably resulted in tensions within these disorganized societies, and military power has been one of the few ef­ fective means for achieving political goals. In China, since the end of the traditional imperial system, the political scene has been dominated by politico-military leaders with armies at their command. Indeed, there have been few major political developments in China which have not fol­ lowed from the threat or the use of force. First came the era of the warlords, whose struggles set the tone of politics in republican China; then the armies of the Nationalists, who sought to unify the country and were finally defeated by the Chinese Communist armies. The long history of stable administration in the colonial areas of Southeast Asia was only infrequently disturbed by revolt and vio­ lence. Historically, of course, the colonial powers estab­ lished themselves in the area with the aid of superior mili­ tary technology; but, contrary to Communist doctrine, their rule was characterized by what now seems a remarka­ bly inconspicuous use of force. However, military power in the form of the Japanese conquests and the Pacific War brought about dramatic changes in political relationships throughout the area. Thus, for these peoples as for the Chinese, an awakening interest in politics was associated with tests of military strength. Because of the fundamental role that military affairs have played in the modern politics of much of Asia, it is not surprising that the Asian Communist parties have been inclined to see their revolutionary struggle in military terms. For Communist and non-Communist alike, it has been impossible to ignore military considerations when planning political strategies. However, what is significant is that the Communists obtain from their theories an ap­ parently rational explanation of the role of violence and a justification for its use. While in non-Communists the use of military force often evokes apologetic and even shamefaced attitudes, the Communists are not troubled by

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

such inhibitions; they feel that there is glory and respecta­ bility in the use of "armed struggle." Thus, basic to the spirit of People's Liberation Commu­ nism is a readiness to perceive the revolutionary struggle in military terms. It was Lenin who established the doc­ trinal model and resolved the issue of whether it is appro­ priate for revolutionaries to seek their objectives by mili­ tary means.7 And it has been the Chinese Communists who have set the example of practicing "armed struggle." The Chinese leaders, and especially Mao Tse-tung, have pro­ duced a voluminous and repetitious body of literature on revolutionary warfare. Indeed, the major focus of Mao's writings, with respect to both quantity and originality, has been on this general subject. In justifying his concern with military topics, Mao has repeatedly emphasized that the need for "armed struggle" stems from the intense contra­ dictions inherent in the colonies and semi-colonies: "Confronted with such enemies, it is inevitable for the Chinese revolution to take on a 'protracted' and 'ruthless' nature. . . . Confronted with such enemies, the method and principal form of the Chinese revolution must necessarily be militant and not peaceful. . . . It is absolutely correct for Stalin to say, 'One characteristic peculiar to the Chinese revolution is opposition against the armed counter-revolu­ tionaries by the armed revolutionaries.' Hence any tenden­ cy to make light of armed struggle, of revolutionary war, of guerrilla warfare, and of the work of the armed forces, is altogether wrong."8 The other Communist parties in Asia have also been cautioned not "to make light of armed struggle." The Chinese experience has led them to believe that their chance of eventual success probably depends upon the use 7 See V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Insurrection," Selected Works, 2 vols., Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1947, Vol. n, pp. 120-24. 8 Mao Tse-tung, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China, quoted in Ch'en Po-ta, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

I. THE DOCTRINE

of military means. This belief has been strengthened by the direct and open advice of the Chinese Communists: "It is necessary to set up wherever and whenever possible a na­ tional army which is led by the Communist party, and is powerful and skillful in fighting the enemy. . . . Armed struggle is the main form of struggle for national liberation of many colonies and semi-colonies."9 The importance of the strategy of "armed struggle" in People's Liberation Communism has had its effect on the training and indoctrination of Communist recruits. All Bolsheviks are expected to adopt a militant posture in a world filled with conflict.10 In the People's Liberation parties, the traditional Communist quality of militancy has been associated with the need to accept the "spirit of armed struggle."11 There is, thus, a military atmosphere in most of the Asian parties. The party organizations tend to assume a quasi-military form in which discipline is that of the soldier and militancy suggests physical courage. "Liberated Areas": A Geographic Dimension to Revolution

The military emphasis in People's Liberation Commu­ nism introduces a geographic dimension that is peculiar to the revolutionary strategies of these Asian parties. In the course of revolution, they are expected to establish "liber­ ated areas" as military bases. For the Western Communist parties the focus of activity can be the centers of estab­ lished power, and their battles can be carried on within the institutional arrangements of the capitalistic society. In the colonies and semi-colonies, on the other hand, doctrine β Liu Shao-ch'i, speaking at the opening meeting of the Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference at Peiping on November 16, 1949 (New China News Agency, November 23, 1949). io On the place of militance in Communist doctrine, see Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism, Part I. n See Liu Shao-ch'i, "Liquidate the Menshevist Ideology Within the Party," written in 1943 and published as an appendix in Liu Shao-ch'i, On Inner-Party Struggle, Foreign Language Press, Peking, n.d.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

holds that the rural areas far from the centers of formal government control are the weakest link in the enemy's defenses. It is therefore in the less accessible regions that the People's Liberation parties have raised the banner of revolt. By exploiting the limited power of unstable gov­ ernments and the lack of effective communications common to much of Asia, the parties expect to create their "liber­ ated areas." From these bases they hope to wear down their enemies and conquer the rest of the country. Until the situation is "ripe for revolution," the parties may engage in other forms of activity, but the expectation is that eventual victory will come from the rural areas and not through urban insurrection, as has been the Western tradi­ tion of revolution.12 12 The conditions necessary for the creation of "liberated areas" are extensively discussed within the People's Liberation parties. In early 1935, an extremely significant controversy over this issue appeared in the Communist International. In the February 20 issue, an article by V. Myro (pseudonym) entitled "The Struggle to Establish Inner Soviet Regions in Semi-Colonial Countries" stated the conditions neces­ sary for such a policy and encouraged the other Communist parties in semi-colonial countries to follow the example of the Chinese Com­ munists. In the following issue of March 5, a reply by Li (pseudonym) accepted the basic arguments of Myro but added some significant qualifications. The most important of these were the warnings that (1) it is essential for Communists to join with the "national bourgeoisie" and other "progressive" elements on a national basis to oppose the imperialists when the latter are particularly menacing, and (2) a policy of creating "liberated areas" can succeed only if the Commu­ nists have some support in the urban centers at the enemy's rear. Historically, Li's article is of interest both for its interpretation of the events of 1927 in China and for its suggestion that there was an aware­ ness in high Communist circles that the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 faced a situation comparable to that of 1927. That is, at both times, the Chinese party had to decide between proceeding on its own to capture mass support or allying itself in some fashion with the Kuomintang against the common enemy, "imperialism." On both occasions, essentially the same decision was made to seek an alliance with the Kuomintang. In 1927, when the party was weak, setbacks occurred, while the strategy initiated in 1935, with a far stronger party, led to eventual victory. All of this is of interest in appraising the role of Stalin in 1927 and that of Mao in 1935.

I. THE DOCTRINE

This belief that victory is likely to follow from the establishment of physical bases of operations affects other features of People's Liberation Communism. It reinforces the conviction that the rural population or the peasantry is a revolutionary element that can be relied upon in the struggle. It also heightens the expectation that the party will have to assume, at an early stage in the revolutionary process, some of the responsibilities of government. The parties are thus encouraged to look upon themselves less as political parties competing for popular support than as actual alternative governments that will need to be ac­ cepted as legitimate by as large a proportion of the popula­ tion as possible. This, in turn, introduces a strong career aspect into party membership, which is often regarded as comparable in many respects to membership in a potential governmental service. Therefore, when matters of disci­ pline and differences in rank in the Asian Communist parties are not those of an army, they are likely to become those of a civil bureaucracy. Taking Gambles and Being Reckless A third characteristic of People's Liberation Communism is the spirit of boldness and daring which guides its activi­ ties. The picture that Communist doctrine gives of the intense conflicts in the colonies and semi-colonies suggests that frequently the "objective situation" will call for an extreme form of action. The danger of mistaking a "rev­ olutionary surge" for a "revolutionary crisis," and thus committing the error of Putsch-ism, is recognized. But the expectation is that any defeat can be only a temporary set­ back, since the alignment of the counter-revolutionary forces cannot long remain stable. Thus, there is little in the doctrinal model of People's Liberation Communism which suggests the need for re­ straint and caution. Led often by extraordinarily young men or by those whose introduction to politics coincided with bursts of youthful enthusiasm, these parties encourage

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

an atmosphere of boldness. The fact that the ideals of the movement seem so far removed from immediate social realities strengthens the feeling that spirited and extreme measures are necessary. This attitude is frequently found among Asian intellectuals, who tend to minimize any con­ sideration of costs when planning social change. As a result, the Asian parties have tended to behave as though there was little need to be overly cautious in ad­ vancing policies which in the European setting would ap­ pear reckless and foolhardy. Where the Western parties, since the failure of the Spartacists, have hesitated to initiate revolts without the backing of the Russian army, the far weaker Asian parties have gambled boldly for total power. The Malayan Communist Party challenged the might of the British. Empire; the Burmese and Philippine parties turned to organized violence when their relative strength was considerably less than that of the European mass par­ ties. In Indonesia, revolts were instigated in 1926 and 1948 when the probabilities of success, by any standard of ap­ praisal, were dim; and in independent India, the Commu­ nists in Hyderabad were ordered to commence the fight for "liberation" when they were still poorly organized and ill prepared. Even when they are not engaged in open revolt, there is boldness as well as a measure of cockiness in the manner in which the People's Liberation parties seek popu­ lar support and outside alliances. United Fronts and the Vanguard of the Progressives

A fourth major characteristic of People's Liberation Communism is the extensive use that these parties make of united fronts and of appeals to all the important classes in their societies. Rarely do they consider themselves to be seeking only the support of the working class. Rather, they usually describe their current strategy as representing one of a variety of possible alliances with other groups or classes; it may be a "united front from above" or a "united

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front from below," a "bloc without" or a "bloc within," or involve a "four-bloc" approach (workers, national bour­ geoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and peasants). Communist doctrine informs these parties that, in spite of all the intense class contradictions common to the colo­ nies and semi-colonies, individually all of the classes in these areas are weak and underdeveloped. As a consequence, the classes are expected to manifest unstable attitudes and to be unable to act in a manner consistent with their ultimate role in history, as assigned to them by Marxian theory. The rise of imperialism, in large part, is thought to have retarded the development of these classes. However, imperialism has been "marshaling the army of its own gravediggers," by op­ pressing all classes and forcing them to take on some rev­ olutionary characteristics. Hence, in the "era o£ imperial­ ism" and in a time that is "ripe for a world socialist revo­ lution," the parties in the colonies and semi-colonies are expected to take advantage of the revolutionary potentiali­ ties of all classes. In doing so, the parties must remember, however, that these classes also have qualities that are potentially counter-revolutionary. Perceiving their revolutionary problems in these terms, the People's Liberation parties do not view their United Front policies simply as temporary tactical maneuvers. They feel that they are seeking to establish more perma­ nent relationships, as they try to capture and lead the more "progressive" elements of all social classes and utilize them for more than momentary advantage. The People's Libera­ tion parties have supreme confidence in the ability of Communism to woo and to hold the support of nonworking-class groups. Even while announcing their ulti­ mate intentions, these parties unashamedly proclaim that they are supporting the interests of several classes and that they are the vanguard of all "progressive" peoples. It is their conviction that without the leadership of the Com­ munist party, these peoples can no more realize their des-

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

tiny than can the Western proletariat achieve revolution through "spontaneity." However, as a result of having to depict all classes as both friend and foe, the People's Liberation parties are unable to characterize any class clearly and unambiguously. The unstable and wavering qualities of all underdeveloped classes make for profoundly ambivalent feelings toward each of them. In People's Liberation Communism, even the traditional enemy of the workers, the capitalist class, cannot be por­ trayed unambiguously. On the one hand, the national bour­ geoisie is seen as too weak and cowardly to carry out its own revolution against feudalism, and, on the other, it is still the terrible enemy of the people and the proletariat. It can be easily led by the party and yet it is also engaged in viciously oppressing the toiling masses. Most important of all, although the national bourgeoisie can be expected to take part in the struggle against the imperialists and contribute to the first stages of national "liberation," do­ mestically it will try to sabotage the ultimate objectives of "liberation," the creation of socialism.13 It is this readiness to oppose imperialism and to answer to the appeals of nationalism that is the "progressive" fea­ ture of the national bourgeoisie. Whenever the bourgeois class demonstrates its defiance oi the imperialists, it can be welcomed as a friend by the party. However, there is also a recognition that it is not easy to exploit such an unruly isThe confusion over the position of the national bourgeoisie is deeply implanted in Communist doctrines concerning the colonies and semi-colonies because of the issue of whether such societies can "pass over" a "bourgeois-democratic revolution." Such a prospect was sug­ gested in Lenin's theories about imperialism, but after Trotsky in­ corporated the idea of "growing-over" in his theory of "permanent revolution," it became a subtle and dangerous question for the ortho­ dox Communists. The hedging manner in which the Communists have treated the problem can perhaps be best seen in the conflicting statements made at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Interna­ tional, which met soon after the expulsion of Trotsky. See Inter­ national Press Correspondence, Vol. vm, No. 88 (December 12, 1928), pp. 1661, 1665.

I. THE DOCTRINE

sentiment as nationalism. The meaning of nationalism can be too diffuse and can represent too many things to be easily channeled and manipulated. It can provide a unity of purpose for some specific goals, but not for all. Thus, even the "progressive" character of the national bour­ geoisie is of an uncertain nature, suggesting both possibili­ ties and dangers.14 In spite of the great indebtedness of most of the Asian parties to the peasant, there has not developed in People's Liberation Communism an image of the peasantry that is in any important respect different from the traditional Marxist-Leninist one. People's Liberation Communism has the same mixed feelings toward the peasants that charac­ terized Lenin's thoughts on their revolutionary role.15 On the one hand, the Asian parties recognize that the ageold complaints of the peasants against their traditional an­ tagonists (the landowners, tax collectors, and money­ lenders) which have produced a long history of peasant re­ bellions in the Eastern agrarian countries can be harnessed to generate energy for their revolutionary movements. However, there is another side to the peasantry which, ac­ cording to Communist doctrine, drastically limits its rev14 The origins of this uncertainty about the nationalism of the bourgeoisie in the colonies and semi-colonies are to be found in the disagreements between Lenin and Manabendra Roy at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920. See such studies as Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford Uni­ versity Press, Stanford, Calif., 1953, pp. 14-20; Carr, op.cit., pp. 251-59; Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924, Columbia Uni­ versity Press, New York, 1954, Chapter HI. isThe single most complete source of Lenin's writings on the peas­ ant is Vol. XII of his Selected Works (12 vols., New York, n.d.), which is devoted entirely to the agricultural question. For the development of Lenin's views on the peasantry and his indebtedness to Narodnikism and the Russian Social Revolutionaries, see such studies as Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power, Harvard Uni­ versity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, pp. 46-51; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 11-20, 41-51; Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, Dial Press, New York, 1948, pp. 112ff.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

olutionary qualifications. Violent as a peasant revolt can be, it can also be satisfied by very limited changes in the social order. Once the peasant receives more land or fairer treatment, he is prepared to revert to his traditional way of life. Even the landless peasant, a member of the rural proletariat, is so earth-bound and tradition-bound that he lacks the "rootless" quality of the industrial proletariat, and thus he is far from the ideal agent to build the shape of tomorrow. The peasant's horizon is far too near at hand and much too cluttered up with his immediate needs and desires for him to dream of the limitless wonders of a Socialist revolution. He lacks the flexibility of thought and action essential for maneuvering along the winding and shifting road of real revolution. In short, the peasant is interested, not in a Socialist revolution, but in a bourgeois one. An awareness of these limitations of the peasant has prevented People's Liberation Communism from degener­ ating into mere peasant or populist movements. Although the peasantry may provide a mass base for the party, espe­ cially during periods of armed struggle, the peasant is still regarded as one who must be led, trained, and manipulated. Even while honoring their revolutionary potential, the party feels it is still necessary to teach them that their rev­ olutionary illiteracy is matched only by their lack o£ general education. From this follows the rationale that justifies exploiting the ambitions of the peasants without letting them color the ultimate objectives of the party. There is a peculiar similarity between the Communist view of the peasant and the traditional Confucian attitude which, after paying formal deference to the social status of the peasant by placing him second only to the elite class of the scholarofficial, ended by considering him both a worthy and a bumpkin.18 ie For a different interpretation of the consequences of a Communist party's heavy dependence upon peasants for mass support, see Benja­ min J. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Harvard

I. THE DOCTRINE

The People's Liberation parties also seek to lead a third major class, the petty bourgeoisie, toward which they again have strongly ambivalent feelings. They view this class in much the same way as do the Western parties. The only important difference is that because of the "semi-feudal" qualities of the colonies and semi-colonies, the petty bour­ geoisie is considered to have greater political and social significance in Asia than in other areas. In particular, it is the students and the intelligentsia who are seen as likely candidates for Communism. Traditionally, these groups have been recognized as occupying a place of great im­ portance in their societies, and yet in modern times they have become frustrated and dissatisfied with their lot. Thus, in spite of their wavering, vacillating, and liberal attitudes, they are believed to possess great revolutionary potential. Indeed, the leadership and the hard core of all the Peo­ ple's Liberation parties are composed mainly of people with petty-bourgeois backgrounds. An awareness of this fact University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, Chapter xm. Schwartz con­ cludes that even a Leninist elite party that relies primarily on peasants for mass support has broken faith with Marxism-Leninism. This theory follows from his contention that Marxism-Leninism demands that a party have "visible" and "organic" connections with an industrial proletariat, and thus that where there is no industrial proletariat, there can be no true Communist party. With respect to the general question of the relationship of the party to the peasantry, it is well to remember that in 1924, before the Chinese Revolution became a major issue between Stalin and Trotsky, Stalin proclaimed in his usual emphatic way that the error in Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory was simply that it underestimated the revolutionary role of the peasantry and that it underestimated the ability of the proletariat, i.e., the party, to lead the peasantry. (Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, International Publishers, New York, 1939, pp. 41-42.) By repeating the argument with the usual citing and praising of his own earlier words on the subject, Stalin raised it to such importance that any party would have been faced with the charge of upholding the incorrect "permanent revolution" theory if it failed to exploit to the fullest the revolutionary potential of the peasants. (Joseph Stalin, Problems of Leninism, International Pub­ lishers, New York, 1934, pp. 13-15.)

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

colors much of the attitude toward the petty bourgeoisie in these parties. The dilemma for the Communists is that in their view the very qualities of petty-bourgeois thought which encourage members of this class to support the rev­ olution will also tend to dilute the true revolutionary char­ acter of the party. Thus, the struggle against the petty bourgeoisie becomes an ideological one that must be waged constantly within party ranks. These considerations affect not only the main subjects of inner-party struggle and in­ doctrination but also the spirit in which these activities are carried out. Self-criticism becomes extremely personal criticism, and, although the dangers of petty-bourgeois at­ titudes are recognized as being real, redemption and re­ training are always felt to be possible. Incorrect thoughts must be stamped out, but they are not likely to be related to any "agent" of an external source of danger. The Test of Indoctrination

In attributing to the party a leadership role in relation to these three classes, as well as to a proletariat so under­ developed as to be different from the Western proletariat, People's Liberation Communism has carried to the extreme an ever-increasing tendency of twentieth-century Commu­ nism. This is the tendency to minimize Marxism as a doc­ trine for explaining sociological reality, and instead to em­ ploy its terminology to express the ideals of a political movement. It was Lenin who gave great impetus to this process by placing the party clearly above the opinions and ambitions of the proletariat. Just as Lenin conceived of the party as the "vanguard of the proletariat," so in People's Liberation Communism the party has become the vanguard of all "progressive elements" and, hence, of history. As a result, what were in Marxism considered stages in the his­ tory of social evolution have become only phases in the history of the party. For example, the historical phenom­ enon of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was originally regarded as a step in the development of capital-

I. THE DOCTRINE

ism, has now become a "bourgeois-democratic revolution led by the proletariat," which represents little more than the policies the party follows at a given stage in its rise to power. This development is related to the final important char­ acteristic of People's Liberation Communism: the great emphasis that these parties place on the indoctrination of recruits. This feature, conspicuous long before the term "brain-washing" became a label for the technique of the Chinese Communist Party, is in part a necessary corollary of the other characteristics of this form of Communism. The stress on "armed struggle," "liberated areas," and "united fronts" might lead to a weakening of the true Communist revolutionary qualities of these parties if its effect were not checked by constant indoctrination of the faithful. The lack of political sophistication among the re­ cruits also makes it essential to develop fully the poten­ tialities of enforced "education." The process of indoctrination is, of course, known to all Communist parties, but among the People's Liberation parties it is usually carried to extreme lengths. Even under the most adverse circumstances, attempts are made to hold almost daily "political sessions." It is the technique of indoctrination which produces revolutionaries and makes possible both the party and its hope for eventual success. Lacking the advantages of an industrial proletariat whom they believe to be potentially good revolutionaries, the People's Liberation parties feel that they must work zealously to mold those whom they can attract into the image of the good Communist. From a recognition of the backwardness of their societies and of the revolutionary limitations of those they would lead, comes a need to prove that all is possible if those who call themselves Commu­ nists are trained in the right spirit. In outlining some of the most distinctive characteristics of People's Liberation Communism in terms of the doc-

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

trinal model of what is expected of Communism in the colonies and semi-colonies, we are not suggesting that they provide the basis for a limited number of set strategies to which these parties are likely to adhere. On the contrary, as the Asian parties have come of age they have accepted fully the basic Communist outlook that flexibility in the choice of strategies is essential and that the party can never limit itself to particular methods. The doctrinal model only suggests that in the peculiar setting characteristic of the colonies and semi-colonies, calculations of what is wise and expedient can take forms that are less acceptable in other environments. This was the lesson that the early Asian leaders had to learn; they found that their readings of the classics of Communism were meant to provide them mainly with a distinctive logic or "code" for the calcula­ tion of power and not with an account of how history de­ velops. In essence, then, the unique characteristics of Peo­ ple's Liberation Communism represent peculiar exaggera­ tions in the basic Communist pattern which are felt to be appropriate because of the nature of the colonies and semicolonies. Lenin, in addition to providing a doctrinal basis for these developments, further encouraged many of these exag­ gerations. He believed that in "backward" areas it was safe and expedient to employ extreme policies because in his view the moral standards of these societies were generally lower than those of the West. In particular, Lenin seems to have felt that closer associations with the "enemy" and a greater reliance upon deception were permissible in such areas. Although Lenin after 1905 would have con­ sidered it immoral and inexpedient for the Western parties to pretend to collaborate closely with non-proletarian groups and especially the representatives of the bourgeoisie, he did not hesitate to advise the Asian Communists to fol­ low such a course. The standards of expediency that Lenin asked the Asian revolutionaries to accept foreshadowed the general standards of Communism under Stalin. However,

I. THE DOCTRINE

Stalin further encouraged the Asian parties to adopt more extreme policies than the Western parties as a result of his feeling that the former were more expendable in the world struggle of Communism. Most important, however, the exaggerations of People's Liberation Communism seem to represent developments which are congenial to these parties and their members. Once the Asian leaders recovered from their initial awe of Marxism, they became extremely impatient for revo­ lution. Stimulated by all the dynamic forces of social change in their societies, they became aware that they were latecomers to the cause of revolution and that they would have to devote their attention and energies to questions of power. Thus, the early study-group atmosphere of these parties was replaced by an extraordinarily open concern with questions of tactics. As this development made the ex­ pectation of victory the basis of morale in these movements, it also drove their leaders to more extreme actions in order to realize tactical successes. The almost complete lack of concern in these parties with the basic problems of Asian societies—problems which would have to be faced in a post-revolutionary situationis a further reflection of the extent to which the People's Liberation parties have become essentially tactically ori­ ented movements that are always seeking the most ex­ pedient means of achieving power. Such matters as over­ population and the lack of capital accumulation are brushed aside as reactionary matters which are advanced by the imperialists to confuse the issue. The expectation is that with the removal of the oppressors, all problems will be eliminated. Just as the workers of the world are asked to break their chains, so these societies are expected to break theirs and, in doing so, realize Utopia. The exam­ ple of what happened in backward Russia is enough to make these parties feel that the ancient problems of their societies need provide no obstacles, so long as they keep faith with the cause of true revolution.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTIES

Moreover, as the People's Liberation parties became in­ creasingly dedicated to the tactics of revolution, the basis of their subservience to Moscow changed. Initially, it was their insecurity with respect to Marxism that made them look to Russia for leadership. However, when they came to accept the whole body of Marxism-Leninism as a way of politics, they recognized in the Russian leadership a superior in calculating power whose system of reasoning they must adopt. The relative ease with which Moscow has been able to bring about changes in policy and even leader­ ship in these parties can be explained only as the result of a self-imposed submission on the part of the Asian Commu­ nists to a system of political strategy. Physical coercion has generally been impossible and the power of Moscow's logic could impress only those who have fully accepted both its premises and its method of deduction and inference about the course of real revolution. We may now turn to a consideration of how the Ma­ layan Communist Party, guided by these concepts of the nature of revolution, developed into a virile and aggressive movement that has been capable of overlooking the sub­ tleties of Marxism in its dedication to the principles of Leninism.

PART

II

T H E PARTY

CHAPTER 2

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM IN THE process of developing into a People's Liberation movement, the Malayan Communist Party passed through four distinct periods of growth. During each of these stages, the Malayan party followed a different general policy, had a different organizational arrangement, and, most important of all, occupied a different position in the social and politi­ cal setting of Malaya. The first, or prewar, phase lasted from the initial efforts of Communism to gain a foothold in Ma­ laya until 1937 and the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. During this period the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), as a small illegal organization, discovered that its best prospects lay in appealing to elements in the Malayan Chinese community. It was, however, an insignificant group whose influence could not match even that of the tradi­ tional Chinese secret societies. In the second, or war, period the MCP became the champion of the Chinese commu­ nity, and in organizing the principal guerrilla opposition to the Japanese conquerors it assumed leadership of a popular movement. In the third, or postwar, phase the MCP became a recognized political force in Malaya, dis­ playing its power mainly in its ability to organize front groups and dominate trade unions. The last stage in the party's history to date is that of the Emergency. Starting in the spring of 1948, the MCP returned to a policy of open violence and, failing as a guerrilla force, turned to terror­ ism as a technique of political control. The First Phase: The Spirit of Conspiracy

During the 1920's, Communism in Malaya passed through its customary initial study-group phase and emerged as an ill-organized movement dedicated to con­ spiracy. In the process it learned that in the communal

II. THE PARTY

divisions of Malayan society there were great differences in the relative receptiveness of the Malays, the Indians, and the Chinese to the idea of revolution. On being rebuffed by the Malays, Communism established its first hold among a few elements of the immigrant Indians and Chinese. Dur­ ing this phase, it displayed in abundance its abiding capac­ ity for issuing pompous statements, conceiving elaborate organizational forms, and confusing aspirations with re­ ality. The first efforts to found a Communist party in Malaya were more incidental than planned and soon ended in failure.1 Since Singapore was proud of being the crossroads of the East and eager to expand its entrepot role, it was appropriate that Communism should first appear there in the guise of providing sanctuary for itinerant comrades of the more active parties of Southeast Asia. In particular, members of the embryonic party in Indonesia found that their adventures with Dutch officials or heated factional fights made it desirable to seek refuge in the metropolitan anonymity of Singapore. Here they could brood about de­ velopments in their homeland and scheme passionately for the moment of their return, while hoping that the Comin­ tern would give them greater moral support. Such leaders as Alimin, Tan Malaka, Subakat, and Djamaludin Tamin huddled in Singapore, engrossed in the task of deciding the right course for revolution in the Dutch Indies. Their dis­ cussions and the polemics they published at this time were focused on the situation across the Straits of Malacca. Singapore was only a convenient way-station on the road ι For details on the emergence of the Malayan Communist Party, see such studies as Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Ma­ laya, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1954; Reni Onraet, Singapore—A police Background, Dorothy Crisps and Co., London, 1947; Victor Purcell, The Chinese in South­ east Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1951; Virginia Thompson and Richard A(IlofT, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia, William Sloane Associates, New York, 1950; Harry Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1954.

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

to and from Moscow. However, while they were there, the unlimited energies and the missionary zeal of these com­ rades led them to attempt to spread the enlightenment of revolution among the local Malays. This extracurricular activity ended in complete failure at about the same time that the revolution of 1926-1927 in Java and Sumatra met defeat and the need arose for greater concentration on af­ fairs in Indonesia. MALAYS AND COMMUNISM

The failure of these early attempts to enlist Malays under the banner of revolution was the first demonstration of the difficulties that the MCP was to experience in finding sup­ port among the largest racial group in Malaya. In spite of the traditional interest that many Malays have shown in the activities of their co-religionists in Indonesia, their sense of kinship with the Indonesians has never been strong enough for them to adopt the marginal Communists as brothers and comrades. There are many reasons for the cool reception that the Malays have given to the overtures of Communism. The hold of tradition is still strong among most Malays and it has enabled them to find great personal contentment in a simple pattern of life. Over the centuries they have de­ veloped adequate methods for resolving localized social con­ flicts and thus have felt little need of, or desire for, compli­ cated political activities. For those Malays who have left the kampong, the break from their village ways has not been extremely harsh or impersonal. For the vast majority, urban life has meant employment in service industries and in the government. The better-educated have been able to look to careers in the civil service and government-sup­ ported schools, and for the rest the customary practice has been to enlist in the police and the military. Of all the pos­ sible careers in a modern society, these are perhaps the most capable of providing a sense of personal security and the least likely to encourage attitudes favorable to Commu-

II. THE PARTY

nism. Those few Malays who have turned to the country's main industry and become rubber tappers have been able to maintain closer ties with their traditional communities than have the immigrant Chinese and Indians. Thus, for the Malays, the process of meeting the impli­ cations of a more modernized society has not in general been harsh. Even for those who feel less bound by their Moslem faith, there has been no need to challenge or di­ rectly oppose their traditional religion. Generally, they have had happy relations with the British, whom they have seen as protectors and advisors and thus performing a role that is compatible with the legal position of the British in Malaya. They have been able to recognize the authority and the sternness of the British as those of a teacher and not a political foe. Such considerations as these have minimized the appeal of Communism for the Malays and have made that rev­ olutionary creed appear to them excessively demanding, harsh, and dogmatic. When Utopia is to be found near at hand, and when an important element of it is a gracious and easy approach to life, there can be little attraction in a system which promises a distant millennium built upon struggle and self-sacrifice. Thus, even though the vast ma­ jority of the Malays have had little chance to determine the social and political development of Malaya, and even though they have had in general the lowest standard of life of any of the peoples in the country and the least opportunities for material advancement, they have shown little sympathy for the promises of Communism. Indeed, whenever Malays in any number have attempted to replace the cosmos of Allah with the sociology of Marxism-Leninism they have tended only to become muddled. As the tempo of the transition from their traditional way of life to one more appropriate to modern times increases, it may create greater problems for the Malays. However, up to the present, the extremely few Malays who have sup­ ported Communism have been the conspicuous deviants

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

of their community. In general, they have had more in common with the marginal criminal elements found in any society than with people who turn to political activities in response to social needs. THE IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNISM

It remained for the Chinese rather than the Indonesians to import Communism successfully to Malaya. It would be hard to determine the exact time when the Chinese first began to bring ideas about Communism to Malaya, since they arrived in the motley baggage of the immigrants, who remained relatively isolated from the general society. It has been suggested that even before the Chinese Revolu­ tion of 1911, the followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Malaya were toying with doctrines of Marxism.2 I£ such was the case, they must have been working with rather poor fac­ similes, since at that time there were few Chinese who were well grounded in Marxism and they were not likely to be foVind in Singapore. Actually, just as was the case in China, the Russian Revolution stimulated the first serious in­ terest in Malaya in the possibilities of Communism. How­ ever, until the formal establishment of the Chinese Com­ munist Party in July 1921, the few Malayan Chinese who were predisposed toward the new revolutionary creed had no organizational basis for their activities. Then, follow­ ing the decision of the Second Congress of the Chinese party to work within the Kuomintang, Communism was represented in Malaya by the Malayan Revolutionary Com­ mittee of the Kuomintang. In 1926, a Communist Youth League was established in Singapore, but this group barely expanded beyond its charter membership. After the break between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang in 1927, the Nan-yang (South Seas) Communist Party was created to direct the few revolutionary groups in South­ east Asia. However, during the next few years, the con2 Thompson and Adloff, op.cit., p. 125.

II. THE PARTY

cerns of the Chinese Communists and the Comintern were far too pressing elsewhere for them to pay much attention to Malaya. It was not until 1930 that the Malayan Com­ munist Party was formed—appropriately enough, as the result of meetings held in Shanghai.3 The danger always exists that, in recording these early organizational activities and the frantic and often bizarre comings and goings of Comintern agents, they will be made to seem more significant to the subsequent rise of Commu­ nism in Malaya than they actually were. It is far more important to understand the character of the Chinese com­ munity in Malaya, and to appreciate why it was potentially vulnerable to Communism but was also able to resist any serious penetrations until the Japanese occupation caused drastic alterations. Most of the Chinese who arrived in Malaya came not as isolated individuals but as members of a group or with personal connections with Chinese already in the country. In order to pay their passage or to arrange for their entry, many arrived as indentured laborers and had to accept the control of labor contractors. There were also the secret so­ cieties, the clans, the provincial and benevolent associa­ tions, the guilds and the kongsis (Chinese business enter­ prises), to any of which the new arrival might already be­ long or which he soon joined. These groups performed the critical function of introducing the bewildered arrival to the Malayan scene and protecting him from all kinds of pitfalls, ranging from complications with the authorities to the knavery of less scrupulous but more urbanized com­ patriots. The rewards that the associations demanded for 8 The few publicly available details of these early developments and the record of the relations of the Malayan Communist Party with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern at Shanghai are to be found in Hanrahan, op.cit., ChapteT i, and Miller, op.cit., Chapter I. In Singapore—A Police Back­ ground, Reni Onraet, who was Commissioner of Police at Singapore during this period, has revealed some of the extensive information possessed by the British authorities on these Communist activities.

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

the protection they offered were usually smaller than the external dangers, but as early as 1877 the government had been forced to establish the office of Protector of Chinese to save the less wary from, among other things, such "benev­ olent associations." Thus the Chinese immigrants sought security in a strange land by joining their traditional informal associations or by clinging to the leadership of individual labor contrac­ tors. To the Chinese, security could be found only in per­ sonal and highly particular relationships, and not in im­ personal and formal relations with government agencies. Their attitude of distrust toward the government, implant­ ed in them in China, was nourished by those who had a vested interest in the various informal associations. Wheth­ er or not the government did all it might have to assist the Chinese immigrant, the Chinese certainly had no inclina­ tion to identify it with paternalism. On the contrary, they continued to believe that the course of wisdom was to avoid the government, and that security and riches were to be found in precisely those places where the government was least conspicuous. This meant that they were not par­ ticularly disturbed about joining associations which oper­ ated on the outer fringes of legal respectability. However, in spite of all the efforts that the Chinese made to retain their traditional organizations and customs, they were gradually forced into an industrial and urban pattern of life. Many of them had left the village and the tradi­ tional agrarian life even before they came to Malaya. The physical mobility of these people was the first indication that they were capable of appreciating the values of an in­ dustrial economy. After they arrived in Malaya, they con­ tinued to display an extraordinary sensitivity to wage dif­ ferentials, moving readily about the country in response to more favorable terms of employment. Although the vast majority arrived as laborers, many soon found in the sta­ bility and order of Malaya opportunities for demonstrating their entrepreneurial talents. Becoming the largest element

II. THE PARTY

first in the urban centers, and then in the country as a whole, they came to dominate the retail and the commercial life of Malaya.4 During the prewar period, the Chinese community, through the diversity of its informal organizations, was able to absorb and provide advancement opportunities for its socially mobile members. These arrangements had enough of the traditional features of Chinese life to smooth over the process of transition. They not only provided a sense of security, but also channeled the energies of the vast majority into a drive for economic betterment. The little attention the Malayan Chinese were ready to give to po­ litical matters was focused mainly on the activities of the Kuomintang in China. In this situation, only two significant groups in the Ma­ layan Chinese community displayed much sympathy for the ideas of Communism. The first was a minority element among the teachers in the Chinese schools. Many of them were aspiring intellectuals who had failed to find positions in China and who had come to Malaya with embittered radical views. The Chinese groups in Malaya were pros­ perous enough to give them employment in small inde­ pendent schools, in night schools, or as private tutors. These arrangements, however, were usually very informal and did not carry with them much security or status. The other principal source of Communist support was found among some immigrant elements in the industrial working force. However, even among these people, the Communist agitators soon discovered that they were at a «In 1931, there were 1,710,000 Chinese in Malaya, including Singa­ pore, and they represented about 65 per cent of the urban population and 38 per cent of the total population. It is estimated that the Chi­ nese became the largest ethnic group in Malaya by 1941; by 1947, their numbers had increased to 2,600,000 and they constituted about 68 per cent of the urban and 45 per cent of the total population. For an analysis of demographic trends in Malaya, see Τ. E. Smith, Population Growth in Malaya, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1952.

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

disadvantage so long as they presented the MCP as just another organization competing to serve the interests of those Chinese who found themselves in a new and strange land. The MCP was too foreign in nature to offer a sense of security; it lacked the advantages of representing institu­ tions well-known in the homeland and of appealing to pro­ vincial or "tribal" sentiments.5 Therefore, the Commu­ nists tended to concentrate on infiltrating the leadership ranks of the existing groups. When they were successful, they did change the tone of the organizations, but this did not appear excessively disturbing to the immigrants, who were prepared for things to be not quite the same in Malaya as in China. The traditional relationship between Chinese labor con­ tractors and their gangs of workers provided a further entering wedge for the Communists. The bond between contractor and worker was usually a personal one, sup­ ported by provincial and dialect ties as well as by economic necessity. With the depression and the sharp decline in the world demand for tin and rubber, many of the labor con­ tractors had difficulty in finding work for their men, for whom they still felt responsible. In some cases, the con­ tractors accepted the MCP's promise of help. In other cases, seeing the helplessness of their leaders, the men themselves turned to the party, expecting it to perform the same role as the contractors had. Before we turn to the activities of the MCP in these early years and the reasons why the party subsequently had greater success among the Malayan Chinese, it is neces® The terminology employed in describing Chinese institutions in Malaya is often surprising to one who was introduced to Chinese so­ ciety in the homeland. The term "tribe" is commonly applied to the various dialect groups. Such a classification is readily appreciated when it is realized that the tight organizations formed by the various provincial or dialect associations do give them the appearance of a "tribal" organization in Malayan society. In this study, the terms em­ ployed in Malaya will be used, and explained when they seem remote from those common in China.

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sary to consider why the Indian immigrants were so unreceptive to Communism. The conditions under which the Indians came to Malaya were quite different from those obtaining in the case of the Chinese. While the Chinese came to Malaya in response to individual initiative and under informal auspices, most of the Indians were recruited under governmental supervision. The interest of the gov­ ernment of India and the Madras government in the wel­ fare of those Indians who went to Malaya, and the pos­ sibilities for close cooperation between these governments and Malayan officials, resulted in numerous safeguards of a legalistic nature for the Tamils. The cost of transporta­ tion and medical and general care was met during the interwar years by the Indian Immigration Fund, which was maintained by fixed contributions from all employers of Tamil labor and distributed by the government. The laborers incurred no obligation to work for particular em­ ployers or labor contractors. Government officials con­ tinued to be responsible for their welfare in Malaya, and whenever they were ready to return home, the fund took care of their passage. Thus, the Indian immigrants arrived with a far more positive orientation toward the government than was the case with the Chinese. They tended to look to legal au­ thority for guidance and advice and to the government for protection from their informal leaders and com patriots. While the Chinese sought to avoid all contacts with legal authority, the Tamils welcomed the security of a paternal­ istic government. In contrast to the Chinese, who tended to move away from their initial role as laborers and estab­ lish themselves as a complete society in Malaya, the ar­ rangements for the Indians encouraged them to remain laborers throughout their stay in Malaya. This meant that the size of the Indian population remained fairly stable at about 600,000, fluctuating according to the demand for laborers in the rubber industry. In proportion to the total population, however, the Indian population declined from

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about 18 per cent in the early 1920's to hardly 10 per cent after Indian independence. Aside from the laborers, the other Indians in Malaya were mainly of the middle class, educated in the English language and employed in positions that brought them into close contact with the government and the British. In con­ trast to the middle-class Chinese, these Indians, when they had occasion to oppose government policies, appreciated from their experience of British rule at home that the Malayan government could often be made sensitive to open, legal pressures, but that it would always be harsh with illegal conspiracy. To the extent that the Indians identi­ fied themselves with the cause of Indian independence, they could participate in a recognized and fairly coherent move­ ment that had some sense of direction. On the other hand, while the nationalistic Chinese tended to consider the British an evil force that had encroached upon Chinese sovereignty during the entire preceding century, they had no organizational basis for expressing political opposition to the British; they could show their feelings only by per­ sonal spite and pathetic gestures that merely intensified their sense of humiliation. As a result of these circumstances and the attitudes they fostered, the immigrant Indians were not generally vulner­ able to the Communist appeal. Because oi the importance of the communal divisions in Malayan society, the failure of either the Malays or the Indians to take much early interest in Communism increased the tendency of all the racial groups to consider the MCP a Chinese activity. In time, this development created a racial barrier that made it increasingly difficult for Indians and Malays to accept the idea of joining a predominantly Chinese party. The Chinese in the party came to recognize that those Indians and Malays who joined them were outcasts from their racial communities and generally misfits with extremely limited abilities. Efficiency required that the language used in the party be Chinese, and since good communications were

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maintained with the Chinese Communist Party, the great bulk of Communist literature available in Malaya was in Chinese. However, it is significant to note that in spite of its very close operational ties with the Chinese Commu­ nist Party, the MCP always placed great emphasis upon its spiritual bonds with the Russian party. The heroes of the party were first Lenin and Stalin and only secondly Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese leaders. Indeed, the more the MCP came to depend upon the Chinese Communist Party for guidance, the more it seemed to stress the over-all leadership role of the Russian party. ORGANIZING PROFESSIONAL REVOLUTIONARIES

Until the mid-1930's, the MCP organization had little central direction. Accidents of personal relationships and the successes of individuals in penetrating particular Chi­ nese groups determined the extent of Communist control. Whenever a group was so dominated, it was immediately elevated in importance by the simple device of giving it the title of a "labor union." Most of these groups were nothing more than traditional Chinese guilds, or associations of employees and employers, and they did not resemble West­ ern trade unions either in organization or in function. The workers were asked to contribute funds to the party, but there was always a great gap between the pledges and the actual sums collected. The party took pride in its lists of "sympathizers" and tried not to be too easily depressed by the state of its treasury. Most important, the individual party member who could claim that he had succeeded in gaining control of a group would be made an "official" and be placed on the party pay roll. The rest of the activities of the MCP were carried out mainly by professional agita­ tors who were dispatched by the Comintern from China. Thus, even when the MCP was politically insignificant and poorly organized for concerted action, it was building up a disproportionately large group of full-time professional revolutionaries.

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

In 1935, after the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the MCP received orders to strengthen its organization and raise its "ideological level." The reorganization that fol­ lowed rendered the party a somewhat more effective force, but one that was still capable of little more than vexing the police and the government. Its structure remained diffuse and pretentious. At the top was the Secretariat, operation­ ally hardly distinct from the Central Committee. Below it were three bureaus of supposedly equal rank: (1) the Racial Bureau (which sought to recruit Malays and Indians), (2) the Propaganda and Education Bureau, and (3) the Or­ ganizational Bureau, or Orgburo. This last had under it several sections which changed from time to time, but the most active sections were: (1) Cultural, (2) Students, (3) Women, (4) Shop Assistants, and, most important of all, (5) Overseas Laborers. The Overseas Laborers section was further subdivided into a multitude of trades and indus­ tries: building trades, Navy Yard workers, communications, agricultural workers, estate laborers, tin miners, barbers, etc. Sections were established either because a particular audience could be defined or because the party had achieved some success in recruiting members of a given trade. The greatest advantage the MCP derived from the re­ organization was to increase substantially the numbers of middle-rank executives and thus bring the rank and file into closer association with the leadership. The tendency of the party to give impressive titles to offices that hardly existed encouraged an illusory impression of power. But at the time this weakness was compensated for by the fact that it afforded the membership the feeling that no one was far removed from important officials and that all could aspire to higher status in a hierarchy which had more breadth than height. None of the sections representing the various trades were overstaffed, and as new sections were opened it was necessary to appoint even more officials. The relations between the rank and file and their section leaders

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appear to have been quite close and all the functionaries were acquainted with individuals at the top of the hier­ archy. One former member of the MCP who joined the party during this period recalled: "We were all friends, and although we were from all levels of society, we were united and treated each other in the same manner. The intel­ lectual was with the worker and the leaders were not so far off that no one knew who they were." The new organization of the MCP facilitated the estab­ lishment of and control over various front groups. The Cultural Division sponsored a Proletarian Art League and the Students' Division a Youth Corps. The Racial Bureau was responsible for a Racial Emancipation League. The most effective front organization and the only one with an extensive history was the General Labor Union, which in less than a year's time became the most effective instrument the party had in its agitation for revolution. However, in its efforts at agitation, the MCP was still able to gain little respect from friend or foe. The improve­ ment of world economic conditions in 1936 and 1937 was felt in Malaya through increased demands for tin and rub­ ber. The MCP, operating mainly through the General La­ bor Union, sought to exploit the desire of labor for in­ creased wages to match rises in rubber and tin prices. The party was able to set in motion a wave of strikes, often ex­ tremely violent in their initial stages, but it lacked the staying power to carry any of them through effectively. Strikes broke out in various sections of the country, but since the party was without the funds necessary to finance such activities and since its disciplinary control over labor was weak, these strikes generally lost their impetus and slowly died out. However, the MCP would then instigate another series of outbursts in other areas. Strikes at Batu Arang, the only coal mines in Malaya, were followed by work stoppages in the Kinta Valley tin mines, and when these failed, the MCP shifted to the Perak hydroelectric stations and then to the Selangor tin fields.

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Such actions achieved few direct benefits for the MCP, but they did establish in Malaya an attitude on the part of labor which at the time was unique in most of Asia. Al­ though the Chinese laborers usually lost their savings and had to depend upon secondary employment, many of them did learn the theory of group action and came to appreci­ ate the idea that a strong organization might make strikes an effective means of backing up wage demands. The prin­ ciple of organized labor and collective action was no longer completely foreign to the minds of Malayan workers, and the groundwork was prepared for the subsequent develop­ ment of labor unions. The only question remaining was whether these unions would be Communist-controlled or whether they would follow in the tradition of the freelabor movement of the West. Unfortunately for all except the MCP, no one in the West encouraged the development of a free movement and the Communist party gained by default more than by skill. However, the MCP had to pay a price for its role in in­ doctrinating Malayan labor. The government had little difficulty in discovering which were the most active cadres in these strikes, and since they were almost entirely com­ posed of alien Chinese who, as members of the MCP, be­ longed to an illegal organization, it was possible to banish them. The MCP lost few of its top leaders through the enforcement of the Banishment Ordinance, since they were not to be found where trouble was brewing. It was the more vigorous and spirited comrades who were whisked out of the movement and deported to their homeland. The recep­ tion that local Chinese authorities gave former MCP mem­ bers was by far the most severe sanction they faced and made banishment a serious threat to party morale. It was one thing to talk about, and even to accept, the general notion that the revolution would require the letting of blood, but quite another to be shipped off to the legally unencumbered jurisdiction of strongly anti-Communist Chinese authorities, particularly those at Swatow.

II. THE PARTY

By 1937 the MCP had reached a point of development beyond which it had little hope of advancing if Malaya remained relatively isolated from external events. As a conspiratorial body, the MCP could score few successes be­ yond strengthening its internal discipline. Once this was done, it could add little to the political power of the party. Infiltration in Malaya, in addition to the risks in­ volved, could produce few rewards of any meaning. The top reaches of the government were beyond touch and the lower ranks carried little weight. Communist ideas could penetrate more and more schools, but Malayan society was highly mobile and, once the student turned his back on formal education, all his attention had to be devoted to the competitive effort of getting ahead, and the struggle for society was soon forgotten. The field of labor agitation ap­ peared to hold the richest possibilities, but Asian labor was slow to accept the MCP as its champion because the party was so weak that it could offer only sacrifice where economic betterment was wanted. Identity with the party could bring only complication and distress, and with fur­ ther MCP agitation these were certain to increase rather than decline, since both government and management had shown they would have little patience with a stronger Communist conspiracy. Left to its own devices, and un­ imaginative as these devices often, were, the MCP's hope of realizing its ambitions was slight. The Second Phase: War Communism

It was as the result of developments initiated abroad that the MCP changed from a curious, at times annoying, but never profound movement into one of rising political power. The first such event was the Japanese attack on China. With the Chinese Communist Party calling for a union of all Chinese to oppose the expansion of Japan, the Malayan Communists shifted their emphasis from labor agitation to patriotic appeals to the Chinese community to support the motherland in its time of need.

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Calling for collaboration with the previously hated Kuomintang, the MCP threw its full organizational strength be­ hind the effort to raise funds for the war in China. The Kuomintang and other established Chinese associations had set yp the National Salvation Association to contribute to the China Relief Fund, which was the remitting agency for the entire Malayan Chinese community. However, the party supplemented the collection system of the Kuomintang by introducing a front organization, which soon ex­ panded into a significant force despite the fact that it bore one of the quainter names in the party's lexicon, the AntiEnemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS). With the skill and experience which it had developed through directing the General Labor Union, the MCP rapidly made the AEBUS one of the most vocal and active organizations in the Chinese community. The China Re­ lief Fund, gaining prestige from its world-wide role of rep­ resenting overseas Chinese, remained the staid banker for the Malayan Chinese, but its managers were incapable of arranging the dramatic campaign drives which character­ ized the activities of the AEBUS. The MCP found that, with the simple instrument of the AEBUS, it could ex­ ploit all the particularized and indiscriminate emotions aroused by the knowledge that Japanese troops were pour­ ing into China and that the homeland was resisting. In the first flush of excitement, audiences no longer had to be as carefully differentiated, and any message cloaked in the dress of country and race had appeal. Emphasis was placed upon mobilizing Chinese youth into organizations where inhibitions about expressing emotions and idealism could be broken down but where little direct action need be asked or expected. Tours were arranged for special propa­ ganda teams which produced patriotic dramas and intro­ duced nationalistic songs to Chinese groups throughout the country. Speakers were dispatched to Chinese schools to make vivid to the young the heroic struggle taking place at Shanghai, Nanking, and Hankow. Special headquarters

II. THE PARTY

were founded in all centers of Chinese population and fulltime workers as well as volunteer supporters were recruited. These headquarters became social centers for the Chinese youth who, when they returned from collecting subscrip­ tions and selling flowers, could enjoy the facilities provided and, incidentally, read Communist propaganda. The work of the AEBUS made the Communists a more accepted part of the Chinese community. Some of the wellestablished elements among the Chinese, and particularly the business groups, found satisfaction in the AEBUS sponsorship of anti-Japanese boycotts which seriously af­ fected the position of Japanese traders, while Chinese own­ ers of tin mines and rubber estates were happy to see the MCP reveling in its new-found patriotism and staying away from labor agitation. However, all this did not add up to independent political power for the MCP, a fact which was demonstrated after the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in August 1939, when the party was directed to return to labor agitation in order to disrupt the British war effort. Not only was the govern­ ment far less inclined to be patient with politically in­ spired labor unrest, but the Communists themselves ap­ parently were in little better position than before to carry out effective strikes. The Malayan authorities met the chal­ lenge by reemploying the Banishment Ordinance and intro­ ducing legislation which provided a basis for a free tradeunion movement. However, before the effects of these legal measures could be tested, the Nazis had attacked the Rus­ sians and the MCP suddenly became a champion of the Allied cause. COMMUNISM IN THE JUNGLE

Where the Japanese attack on China had made it pos­ sible for the MCP to expand its influence in the Chinese community, it was the Japanese invasion of Malaya that gave the party its opportunity to become the dominant force among the Malayan Chinese. As the Japanese moved

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south from landings at Kota Bharu, Besut, and southern Thailand, it soon became apparent that only the MCP had the type of influence in the Chinese community which would be of value in planning and conducting large-scale resistance operations in an occupied Malaya. The power of the towkays, or merchants, and the traditional Chinese associations were adequate for peacetime pOlitical organization but ill-suited for the task of military mobilization. Thus, a great cleavage in the Chinese society slowly began to appear-a cleavage which eventually was to render the MCP the only effective group among the Malayan Chinese. With the Japanese occupation, the entire Chinese society in Malaya was violently disrupted, more so than any other Asian community in the country. Some members of the old Chinese elite fled from Malaya, but in exile they were unable to maintain the old ties and associations upon which their position had depended. Others were the direct targets of Japanese pressures and, coerced into contributing to the Japanese regime, they lost their prestige and power. 6 The economic dislocation caused by war, occupation, and postwar readjustment destroyed the power base of other leaders. All these traditional leaders found that they were unable to perform what had been their most important function: offering security to those who accepted them. Only the MCP, through its monopoly of the resistance effort, was able to promise any meaningful security to the Chinese who felt themselves threatened by the Japanese or by general economic distress. The MCP was able to assume its new leadership role because it was quick to realize the possibility of carrying out underground resistance from secure bases in the thick jungles of Malaya. The British, seeing that only the MCP was capable of organizing any significant form of guerrilla 6 For a graphic description of conditions among the Chinese during the Japanese occupation, see Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down, Jitts and Co., Singapore, 1946. It has been estimated that nearly 5,000 Malayan Chinese were executed by the Japanese.

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II. THE PARTY

opposition, assisted the party by hurriedly training many of its members in the arts of sabotage.7 Once the Japanese had overrun Malaya and Singapore, the MCP set about establishing an army and a civilian organization which would be able to supply the guerrillas, seek recruits, spread propaganda, and obtain funds and intelligence. Thus were born the Anti-Japanese Army and the Anti-Japanese Union which, in time, grew into the Malayan People's Anti-Japa­ nese Army (MPAJA) and the Malayan People's Anti-Japa­ nese Union (MPAJU), respectively.* In all this organizational activity, the MCP continued to τ Not only for the details of these early contacts of the British with the MCP, but also for the best firsthand account of life in the jungle throughout the war, see F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle Is Neutral, Chatto and Windus, London, 1952. The manner in which the gradu­ ating classes of the British-organized 101 Special Training School be­ came the cadres for some of the "regimenis" in the jungle is recorded in Hanrahan, op.cit., pp. 33-35. 8 Serious tensions developed in the party hierarchy as it organized for war. In the first year of the Japanese occupation, an almost com­ plete change in the composition of the Central Committee occurred. Apparently, some of the leaders opposed committing the party en­ tirely to the jungle, while others were anxious for it to carry out more aggressive actions against the Japanese. These changes took place without the formalities of a "purge." In August 1942, as the result of what must have been an act of betrayal, all the top party leaders in Singapore were arrested and killed by the Japanese, except Lai Teck, the Secretary-General of the party. Then, on the first of September of the same year, Japanese troops advanced directly on one of the in­ numerable caves in the Batu Caves area of Selangor and interrupted a gathering of the Central Committee and the top officials of the MPAJA by capturing and killing most of the ranking men present. Again the Secretary-General, who claimed that fortuitous accidents had prevented him from arriving at the appointed hour, escaped the trap—something the party never ceased rejoicing over throughout the war years, while their leader continued to live a charmed life as the only top Communist who dared to travel about Malaya by car. The most complete and the most nearly accurate account of Lai Teck's relations with the Japanese is that given by Harry Miller (op.cit., pp. 39-40, 65-70). However, Miller's interpretation that Lai Teck was not devoted to the cause of the party overlooks the fact that all of his contacts with the Japanese resulted in strengthening the MCP, often precisely because they reduced the party's opposition to the Japanese.

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give the impression of great substance and importance to those groups it controlled by labeling them with impressive and misleading titles. Thus the MPAJA was composed of numerically designated "Regiments" and "Independent Forces." In manpower and organization, they in no way resembled what are usually thought of as regiments. Indeed, the total military effectiveness of the entire MPAJA never equaled that of a conventional regiment. However, in other respects, the MPAJA did perform some of the functions expected of an army. In a remarkably short space of time, these groups, separ;tted by dense jungle and isolated from normal communications, adopted standardized procedures and even common daily routines. The MPAJA, in spite of the irregular warfare it was expected to conduct, was an extraordinarily homogeneous organization. The influence of the MCP was unmistakable, but throughout the war years the party remained underground to such an extent that not even the members of the MPAJA could be sure who were the party members in their midst. It was, of course, recognized by all that the leadership ranks of the army were staffed by trusted party members, but there were also rank-and-file party members among the regular soldiers. On the other hand, in the day-to-day camp activities, no attempt was made to hide the Communist coloration of the whole movement. Almost daily classes in political indoctrination were conducted; the clenched-fist salute, the "International" and the "Red Flag Song," and all the other formal trappings of Communism had to be accepted by all. Most important, the members of the MPAJA and the MPAJU had to recognize the absolute disciplinary power of the central headquarters. Chapman reports: "The control of guerrilla general headquarters, in spite of its geographic vagueness, was absolute and all-embracing, being limited only by the difficulties of communication. Policy, discipline, routine, ethics, and above all political ideology were entirely regulated from above-and

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as the penalty for disobedience was death, opposition in word or spirit was practically unknown."9 The great effort expended by the MCP in organizing the MPAJA did not mean that the party leaders contemplated engaging in extensive military operations against the Japa­ nese. Rather, it was recognized that the function of the army was to provide an opportunity for individuals to feel that they were contributing something to the defeat of the hated Japanese without forcing them to expose themselves to the risks involved in fighting. Since the Japa­ nese had introduced personal insecurity in Malayan society and the MCP sought to present itself as a sanctuary, it would have been foolhardy, in terms of the purposes of the party, to require the members of the MPAJA to face unnecessarily the insecurities of actual warfare. The leader­ ship of the MCP had the task of effectively substituting in­ doctrination, propaganda, and camp life for actual military operations, thus ensuring that all members of the MPAJA felt they had gone through the rigors of combat without at the same time risking the organization in any serious test of battle. Not only did the men have to believe that they were warriors who had proved themselves in a struggle of great violence, but the entire Chinese community had to be convinced that the MPAJA was a champion of all loyal Chinese and a powerful force striking against the Japanese enemy. The MPAJU in the meantime was busy propagandizing the civil population and collecting funds, food, supplies, and recruits for the MPAJA. Mixing highly emotional ap­ peals for racial unity with cajoleries and outright threats when necessary, these workers of the revolution spread the impression of the great power of the MPAJA. Usually ap­ pearing at night at the dwellings of Chinese, they an­ nounced that any contribution would be well remembered at the time of "liberation." As signs of introduction they 9 Chapman,

op.cit., p. 147.

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depended upon conspicuous displays of weapons and the wearing of some parts of the MPAJA uniform (often just the cap with the three-star emblem representing the three races: Chinese, Malay, and Indian). The danger from the Japanese was not great enough to prohibit holding public meetings at the edges of the jungle. The Chinese squatters who attended them received a mixture of entertainment and propaganda that extolled the prowess of the MPAJA and held out the vision of a new society for Malaya after the war. The very clandestine nature of these meetings, combined with the apparent daring of such actions as openly singing anti-Japanese songs, served to create an atmosphere of MPAJA power, and this illusion was aug­ mented by the sight of fully uniformed and armed soldiers of the "liberation army." Since few of the squatters had ever seen the army but all had talked about it, the pres­ ence of a mere handful of soldiers suggested that else­ where in the jungle there was a mighty force composed of equally bold heroes. It is a great credit to the MCP's skill in propaganda that it was able to make so many believe so much with so little to go on. Even in terms of nuisance value, the MPAJA was so insignificant that it in no way altered the planning of the Japanese army. Throughout the three years and eight months of the occupation, the MPAJA inflicted only a few hundred casualties on the Japanese. (Total Japanese losses in Malaya throughout the Second World War, in­ cluding the capture of Malaya and Singapore from the British, totaled 2,300 killed and wounded.) In contrast, the MCP claimed that it executed during this period 2,542 "traitors," that is, Malayans, mainly Chinese, who opposed it.10 However, when the war ended, about 7,000 guerrillas came out of the jungle fully convinced that it was their might which had defeated the enemy, and they were wel­ comed by large elements of the civil population as heroes. io Hanrahan, op.cit., p. 44.

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If the war had lasted longer, the MPAJA might have made a greater contribution to the defeat of Japan. Fol­ lowing negotiations between the guerrillas and representa­ tives of the Southeast Asia Command who had landed in Malaya from a submarine, the MPAJA began in Novem­ ber 1944 to receive large quantities of air-dropped supplies from Force 136.11 However, most of the arms and ammuni­ tion so delivered were never used against the Japanese, but were hidden by the party to be later used against the Brit­ ish during the period of the Emergency. In the meantime, the MCP was able to concentrate on planning for the postwar political struggle. The Third Phase: "Peaceful Agitation"

The defeat of the Japanese Empire created a temporary political vacuum in Malaya. The country was confused and demoralized, its economy at a standstill. Left with a worth­ less currency, a war-weary people found that there was not enough food or other necessities of life to meet their needs. What had been a happy land was now a country filled with hungry, frightened people. It was under these conditions that the MCP was able to become a major ele­ ment in Malaya, one that could no longer be controlled by police measures. The party recognized full well that it did not have the capacity to reorganize and bring ad­ ministrative order to the country. These difficult tasks it was willing to leave to the British, while it directed its efforts toward strengthening its political position. British forces were rushed to Malaya to accept the Japai1 For a personal account of these negotiations and the difficulties Force 136 had in maintaining contact with the MPAJA, see Chapman, op.cit., Chapter xn. Some indication of the value that the Allied Com­ mand placed on the fighting worth of the MPAJA can be seen from the fact that even at the height of wartime spending, it provided the guerrillas with only about £3,000 a month. Moreover, Force 136 had to parachute in or deliver by submarine over 500 of its own men in an effort to bolster guerrilla activities, and it planned to increase this number greatly before invading Malaya.

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

nese surrender and to establish a semblance of responsible government. Before the British arrived, the MPAJA moved out of the jungle and, ignoring the Japanese, were soon busily engaged in quasi-governmental activities. Even as the members of the MPAJA were basking in the glory of their reception as heroic liberators—which accorded well with the MCP's desire to monopolize the symbol of "Allied Forces"—they were also fast at work confiscating "enemy properties" and punishing "collaborators." Whether these punitive measures reached the real culprits is open to ques­ tion, but there is little doubt that the methods and juridi­ cal techniques employed were not sufficiently refined to prove anything. "People's courts" sprang up, and commis­ sars appeared as magistrates, dispensing a law foreign to all except the party and the jungle. Striking against not only Chinese who opposed them but also Malays and Indians, the Communists introduced a wave of fear into a country which had hoped to realize peace and security after surviving the terrors of the Japa­ nese occupation. Since large numbers of Malays and In­ dians had worked for the Japanese and the majority of these peoples had not openly opposed the conquerors, the MPAJA's announced objective of punishing and even kill­ ing all who had assisted the recent enemy produced serious racial tensions. Fear of the MPAJA became fear of the Chinese, and just as the MPAJA casually confused "col­ laboration" with opposition to Communism, many Malays lost sight of the distinction between Chinese who were Communists and Chinese in general. In some areas shock­ ing racial riots erupted; in Batu Pahat, a group of Malays attacked any and all Chinese, while in other areas the MPAJA tested its military skill by raids on isolated Malay kampongs. Under such conditions, it is to the credit of the British Military Administration that a semblance of peace and order was restored as fast as it was. Although a heri­ tage of racial tension and communalism remained, it was not again to be expressed in quite such violent form.

II. THE PARTY

These activities of the party not only impressed the Chi­ nese with the new power of the Communists in their com­ munity but also made them realize that they needed a protector, and in their disorganized state this could only mean the MCP itself. At the same time, the Chinese were faced with all the insecurities that came from the disap­ pearance of most of the old cohesive factors which had given stability to the prewar Chinese community and created opportunities for its members. Some new order would have to be created before there could again be a Chinese community that could provide them with the op­ portunities they sought. The MCP was determined that out of these processes of social reorganization it would emerge as the principal force among the Chinese. However, before the MCP could realize this objective, it had to meet its own organizational problems. In par­ ticular, there was the pressing question of demobilizing the MPAJA. After carefully hiding most of its weapons in jun­ gle dumps, the party accepted the British offer to pay gratuities to all MPAJA soldiers who handed in arms. In all, about 6,800 members were paid $350 (Malayan) apiece. However, the party seems to have recognized that if there was to be a later clash with the British, it would hardly be prudent to provide the enemy with a complete roster of those who would be taking up arms. Thus, except when British officers attached to Force 136 already knew them, the MPAJA did not identify its more trusted men. As a result, many veterans of the "3 years and 8 months" did not appear for their gratuities and new recruits proudly collected in their stead.12 12 Owing in part to the great contrast between existing conditions and the generous promises of the MCP about what life would be like after victory, many veterans were dissatisfied with the size of the gratuities. While the party encouraged this feeling, it required party members and others under its discipline to pass on the bulk of their gratuities to the party treasury. In some instances, the contempt that party members displayed toward their gratuities as they handed the money to their leaders was so infectious that even non-party members

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM ORGANIZING FRONT GROUPS IN A DISORGANIZED SOCIETY

Even before the MPAJA was demobilized, the party was busy creating new front groups that would be more ap­ propriate to postwar conditions. During the war, the MCP had flourished because of its ability to offer a means both for expressing opposition to the Japanese and for realizing security from the same enemy. Now it had to provide op­ portunities for those seeking political action and personal security from the threats inherent in the general social and economic dislocation of postwar Malaya. During the war, the target for action and the source of insecurity were un­ ambiguously the Japanese, and thus the problem of or­ ganization was relatively simple. Now the sources of in­ security and the exploitable ambitions to be found in the general society were far more diffuse and often unrelated. The task of organizing both for action and recruitment was thus far more complex; indeed, it proved to be too great for the talents of the MCP. However, its successes were not negligible. The MCP found itself confronted with the di­ lemma common to all Communist parties: the basis of its appeal for recruits limited its ability to engage in revolu­ tionary action, while its determination to carry out such who had no idea what was taking place also scorned their payments and left them for the party, only to realize too late what they had

done. It is doubtful whether larger gratuities would have been a wise investment, as some have contended. Although increased payments might have reduced the dissatisfaction, it would also have greatly inflated the MCP's treasury and hence the ability of the party to create other problems. It must be remembered that the expectation established by the Communists' propaganda was that Britain would pay all members of the MPAJA for their period of service, a demand which was completely out of the question since the Allies had had no control over the guerrillas. The objective in granting gratuities, aside from demonstrating appreciation for services possibly rendered and encouraging a more constructive peacetime employment than banditry, was to recover arms and to disband the MPAJA. The gratui­ ties given were adequate for these purposes, since larger payments would not have resulted in the recovery of more weapons.

II. THE PARTY

actions alienated its potential supporters. But in struggling with its problems, the MCP produced an increasing num­ ber of men who understood and could act in the true Bol­ shevik spirit. In its impatience to play a leading part in the reestablishment of the Chinese community, the MCP set up more front groups than its few skilled organizers could direct. During their short existence, many of these groups amounted to little more than small staffs with imposing titles. However, at a time when there were almost no other organized groups among the Chinese, even these efforts created an exaggerated impression of MCP power. And there were other groups that did have a significant history. The former members of the MPAJA were provided with the Ex-Service Comrades' Association, which maintained local headquarters throughout Malaya and kept alive the memory of the party's power during the war years. The New Democratic Youth League established offices in centers of Chinese population and became a major focus for the activities of students who were uncertain of what to ex­ pect in postwar Malaya but who wanted to make sure that they missed no opportunities. Many of those who joined its chapters were sensitive about the fact that they had been too young to serve as guerrillas and were anxious to belong to something that was identified with a heroic movement. In its effort to attract the Chinese youth, the party also sought to replace many of the old Chinese associations and community groups by sponsoring numerous schools. Most of these were at the elementary level and consisted of little more than a few teachers tutoring children who otherwise would have had little opportunity for any formal education. The war had made a shambles of the Malayan educational system. Even after the Department of Educa­ tion was able to rehabilitate its schools, large numbers of Chinese, just as before the war, still had to depend upon non-government-supported institutions for the education

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

of their children. Aside from the more obvious advantages that the party gained from these enterprises, they also provided employment opportunities for party members. It was, however, in the field of labor organization that the MCP soon displayed its greatest ability. Fully prepared for the task of organizing unions, the MCP found that the economic insecurity of the postwar period presented great opportunities. At a time when industry was still disorgan­ ized and unemployment high, the labor force was swelled by large numbers of people who in better years had worked in other capacities. In its campaign to recruit all these people into its labor unions, the MCP found a further advantage in the fact that the traditional labor contractors had lost their ties with their former working gangs during the war period. Those -who still had some control over their men were often unable to provide them with jobs. Thus, during the immediate postwar period, labor tended to move freely about the country, seeking employment wherever estates, mines, or other industries were being restored to opera­ tion. By reestablishing the General Trade Union and set­ ting up its offices throughout the country, the party made union membership an important means of introduction for the itinerant workers. Although the unions were unable to provide work for all those it recruited, the workers began to look upon their union cards as an essential prerequisite to employment. Again it must be noted that the "labor unions" of the MCP were quite different from the types of associations known in the West. While some genuine trade unions were established and older trade unions were captured or op­ posed by new competitors, the party also continued to label as "trade unions" all the guilds and labor-contracting gangs that it controlled. The General Labor Union con­ sisted not only of these local unions, but also of individuals from all categories of workers—"trishaw and rickshaw pull­ ers, artisans, rubber and tin workers, coal miners, barbers,

II. THE PARTY

clerical workers, dance hostesses, and cabaret girls and so on."13 The General Labor Union soon ran into difficulties with the government, since it had developed an organiza­ tion too broad and too irresponsible to be adjusted to the registration requirements of the Trade Union Ordinances of 1940, which again became operative in 1946. Desiring to maintain legal status, the General Labor Union gave way to two separate organizations: the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions and the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, each of which was duly registered with its respec­ tive government. However, the British soon realized that there was a need to expand the area of legal control over union activities because of the MCP's ruthless and devious approach toward organizing labor and its use of the unions for political objectives.14 With the improvement of condi­ tions in the country, the problem became increasingly seri­ ous, as the party resorted more than ever to extortion, threats, and the use of physical violence to control laborers who had no interest in the Communist unions.15 18S. S. Awbery, M.P., J.P., and F. W. Dalley, Labour and Trade Union Organization in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, Fed­ eration of Malaya Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1948, p. 26. l4In May 1948, just as the Emergency was about to begin, the gov­ ernment introduced new legislation which (1) prohibited anyone from holding office in a trade union except as secretary unless he had had three years of experience in the industry or trade concerned; (2) pro­ hibited persons convicted of extortion, intimidation, and like crimes from holding office; and (3) prohibited any federation of trade unions except on an industry or occupational basis. The Trade Union Enact­ ment, 1940, Incorporating All the Amendments to Date, Federation of Malaya Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1948; Trade Union Regis­ try: Annual Report, 1948, Federation of Malaya Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1949. is For some discussion of these practices, see Awbery and Dalley, opxit., pp. 27, 43, and Appendix No. 7. Although this report was pub­ lished after the Emergency started, it was written when there was still some hope among government officials that the Communist hold on the unions could be broken, and thus it generally understates the seriousness of the situation. At the same time, it should be recognized that it reflects the patience of government officials which, combined

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

The MCP's determination to ensure that the unions re­ mained under its influence regardless of any steps the gov­ ernment might take resulted in three separate systems of control over most of the unions. First, there was the level of true open leadership, generally consisting of a president or secretary and two or more full-time organizers. Although they were usually party members, these union officials were ordered to avoid party meetings and any activities that the public would recognize as Communist-sponsored. The open leadership reported to and received its orders from the General Labor Union at first, and then from the feder­ ations when they were organized. They were always ex­ pected to give the appearance of being primarily concerned with the interests of trade unionism and to operate within the law. However, the MCP considered them expendable in the event that the government took action against the union. The second, and usually far more important, level of control was that of the underground party workers in the unions. These were always full-time party members, but they held no office in the unions, and supposedly even the open leadership did not know their identity. Their func­ tions were mainly to serve as activists among the rank and file; to recruit new members for both the union and the MCP; and, under orders, to present demands to the open leadership in the guise of "grass-roots" sentiments that would have to be respected. By means of this last technique, the open leadership could announce a policy as being based on popular demands and avoid the charge that it was dictated either by themselves or by the MCP. The under­ ground workers also provided the party with what appear to have been remarkably detailed reports on the financial status and general attitude of all the union members. It with the skill of John Brazier, the Trade Union Advisor, made it possible for a free trade-union movement to develop and survive under difficult conditions.

II. THE PARTY

was largely on the basis of these intelligence reports that the MCP made its decisions about policies for the various unions and formulated its program of general political agi­ tation. The underground workers reported directly to that section of the party which was responsible for trade union activities, a section which was usually separate from the regular party organization in the area. Generally, these underground workers were more trusted party members than the open leaders, and they were well aware of their key role. As one of them described the situation: "It was like a pot; the British could arrest the union leaders, but they would just be grabbing hold of the lid, and you can't move a pot by holding its lid. We held the pot and all that was in it." The MCP maintained its third check on the unions through the regular party members who were also mem­ bers of the union but held no official posts. At their cell meetings, union members were asked to report on the activities of their unions, and in turn they were given orders which affected the unions. The sum effect of all these activities in the trade unions as well as in the other front groups was to give the MCP a strong position in influencing the general climate of opinion among Malayan Chinese. The numerous news­ papers that the party controlled added to the impact of the Communists on the attitudes of all classes of Chi­ nese. Nevertheless, by mid-1947 conditions had so im­ proved in Malaya as to provide a basis for other leadership elements among the Chinese. Those who were more strong­ ly anti-Communist identified themselves with the Kuomintang in China. However, uncertainty as to how the struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists would come out, and the memory of all that the MCP had recently represented for the Chinese community, combined to make most of these potential leaders hesitate about showing hostility toward the Communists. On many issues they were prepared to follow the lead of the MCP. The

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

Communists, on the other hand, soon recognized that these developments were likely to set limits on their po­ litical influence with both the Chinese and the government. The increasing stability in all phases of life in Malaya left the MCP in a position that was a dramatic improve­ ment over prewar days but also one that fell short of its ambitions to monopolize the leadership of the Chinese and influence the policies of the government. Even though the party gave promise of continuing to be a significant po­ litical force in Malaya and one toward which the majority of the Chinese were not unfriendly, its leaders were seri­ ously disturbed. If demoralization was to be prevented, the nature of the relationship between the party and its mem­ bers required constant evidence that the party's influence was growing. THE PARTY AS EMPLOYER

Throughout its history the MCP, like most Asian Com­ munist parties, has tended to expect its members to be full-time party workers. This was, of course, almost a uni­ versal practice during the guerrilla period, when few party members could have any form of outside employment. In the postwar period they continued to look upon their work for the party as their main source of income. Thus, for the bulk of the MCP membership, including the rank and file, their personal standard of living was tied to the pros­ perity of the party. By controlling the income of its members, the MCP was able to reinforce the usual Communist techniques of main­ taining party discipline and make its workers view them­ selves as professional revolutionaries. Aside from the his­ torical basis for this development, the nature of political activity in Malaya made it desirable for the MCP to try to employ most of its members on a full-time basis. The political life of the country was not geared to a system of elections and it contained few features that were immedi­ ately responsive to public opinion. Thus, without elections,

II. THE PARTY

there was no need to appeal periodically to as large a body of opinion as possible, in the way Western political parties in general and even Western Communist parties must do. Although it was sometimes helpful to have large numbers of "sympathizers," the MCP was engaged in a more direct form of struggle with those who had political or govern­ mental powers. Fundamentally, the MCP conceived of it­ self as an alternative government with its own administra­ tive organization. In the immediate postwar period, even though the party membership had grown to nearly 3,000 men and a few hundred women, the MCP was able to meet their income needs. The MCP treasury was filled not only by the front groups, the unions, and the schools, but also by various forms of business enterprises which were Communiststaffed. These ranged from bookstores that sold party liter­ ature to coffee shops and even to small general stores. How­ ever, with the rehabilitation of the Malayan economy, many party members found that they were being denied more lucrative employment opportunities in the general society. Dissatisfaction among the lower ranks was intensified by the gross differences in the material advantages that they received as compared with their leaders. When the MCP had been operating as an illegal organization, and during the war years as well, risks and rewards had been more equitably shared, or at least inequalities had been less conspicuous. However, after the party came to enjoy the freedom associated with legal status and recognized politi­ cal influence, many of the leaders sought and obtained the more generally accepted features of social respectability. Western-style homes, cars, and other elements of bourgeois life were adopted, and MCP funds were diverted to the maintenance of these officials. The key underground work­ ers in the unions became restless as they were required to continue living on a plane that was no better than that of the other workers, while the open leaders of the unions were free to adopt the standards expected of executives.

FROM CONSPIRACY TO TERRORISM

Particularly disturbing for many of the rank-and-file mem­ bers was the fact that they were assigned menial tasks, some even finding themselves in the role of domestic servants to high party officials. A former chauffeur for members of the Central Committee in Singapore recalled: "At first I thought it was pretty good that the party had Jaguars and MG's, but when they only offered me talk about party loyalty instead of paying me as much as mechanics got on the outside, I began to think a bit. They never lost any weight from all their secret meetings, while I was on call twenty-four hours a day, always taking them to one place and picking them up later at another. I began to wonder what they did in between." Questions began to be raised at cell meetings about what happened to the party dues. However, because of the nu­ merous secret operations, it was impossible to publicize the accounts of the party treasury. The answers that were given to the rank and file failed to dispel their suspicions that excessive sums were being allocated to the support of high officials. Even as Communists, the rank and file, whenever they themselves were dissatisfied with their lot, appear to have clung to their Chinese propensity to expect corruption among those in high office. And the leadership did many things to justify their suspicion. Many of these problems might have been overcome if the party leadership had permitted more members to find out­ side employment and had demanded only their political allegiance. But this would have meant changing the entire character of the party, something that no element at the top was prepared to do. However, as tensions began to build up within the MCP, some of the members of the Central Committee felt that the time had arrived to insti­ tute drastic policies. Unless the party could show constant progress toward the goal of revolution, the situation could only get worse. For the party to sustain its power position, no slackening in the efforts of the rank and file could be permitted. The MCP had gained much, but at the expense

II. THE PARTY

of asking much of its supporters. To ask for more would be impossible without tangible evidence of progress, and all that had been achieved could be lost if routine replaced extraordinary effort. The returns of exhortation were di­ minishing. Thus, by the end of 1947, in spite of its apparent in­ fluence among Malayan Chinese, the MCP was faced with serious problems. In the previous few years, it had been able to make remarkable gains by appearing to many in­ secure Chinese to promise them a better life. It had at­ tracted impatient, ambitious people who could not be con­ tent without hope of increased opportunities. In each of its periods of growth, it had been recruiting, for different reasons, precisely those people who were highly sensitive to the dangers of being unable to keep up with a changing society. The MCP could not afford to fall behind the gen­ eral pace of development in Malaya. Pressures in the party therefore called for an end to the period of "peaceful agita­ tion" and for the adoption of more extreme policies.

CHAPTER 3

THE EMERGENCY AN ACCUMULATION of pressures convinced the Central Com­

mittee of the MCP of the need for a drastic change in the party's policies. As members of the Central Committee be­ came increasingly aware of all the dissatisfactions within the ranks, they became more critical of the leadership of the Secretary-General, Lai Teck. The questions that mem­ bers were raising at cell meetings about the party's finan­ ces and its plans for revolution were being passed up the hierarchy, and at the level of the Central Committee they took the form of questions as to why the Secretary-General was not urging more aggressive policies. Doubts about his wisdom led to suspicions of his motives. Evidence that Lai Teck had dealings with the Japanese, which had for­ merly been brushed aside, was now reexamined by mem­ bers of the Central Committee and a special meeting was called for March 6, 1948, at which the Secretary-General was to explain his actions. In the meantime, changes were occurring in the policies of international Communism. With the establishment of the Cominform, Moscow was announcing the end of its uneasy wartime relations with the Allies and the need for more militant programs, especially in the colonies and semi-colonies. During the last months of 1947, members of the MCP Central Committee made trips to China, Hong Kong, and Thailand to confer with other Communist leaders. In February 1948 a delegation from the MCP at­ tended the Calcutta meeting of the Asia Youth Conference, at which were present members of various Asian New Democratic Youth Leagues and the Southeast Asia Stu­ dents' Associations. During the meetings speeches were made that exhorted the Malayan comrades to become more militant, and a resolution was passed advocating "the cap­ ture of power by the peasants and workers by any means."

II. THE PARTY

The Australian Communist Lawrence Sharkey, who at­ tended the Calcutta meetings, stopped off on his way home for two weeks in Singapore and conferred with MCP lead­ ers.1 Various responsible and informed British officials have indicated that decisions made outside of Malaya were critical in causing the MCP to turn to open revolt.2 Sup­ porting evidence of a coordinated plan is provided by the fact that only a few months separated the decisions of all the various Communist parties in Southeast Asia, from India to the Philippines, to resort to armed struggle in wars of "liberation."3 As those within the MCP were alerted to the thinking of international Communism, further suspicions arose that Lai Teck had been mishandling the party's policies. Lai Teck must have realized that, despite the achievements of the MCP under his leadership, his position had become untenable. There appears to have been nothing in his record that could not be justified as according either with the more esoteric doctrines of Marxism-Leninism or with standard Communist practice. However, he could not help but feel the weight of a powerful precedent: whenever a major change in the Communist party line becomes neces1 Cecil H. Sharpley, who at the time was a member of the Victoria State Executive but who subsequently broke with the Australian Com­ munist Party, reports: "Sharkey told us, too, how he had been com­ missioned by the Cominform representatives at the Indian Congress to convey decisions to the Malayan Communists. . . . It is therefore no coincidence that only a few months later the Communists began open revolt in Malaya." The Great Decision: The Autobiography of an Ex-Communist Leader, William Heinemann, London, 1952, p. 111. 2 High Commissioner Sir Edward Gent, in a press conference of June 13, 1948; Commissioner-General Malcolm MacDonald, in a radio broadcast of August 3, 1948, and a press conference of October 27, 1948; the Earl of Listowel, in a House of Lords debate on Malaya, November 10, 1948; Anthony Eden, writing on his visit to Malaya, in North American News Service, London, May 2, 1949. 3 For a discussion of the shift in Soviet policy and the resulting be­ havior of the Asian parties in early 1948, see Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and the Revolution in Asia," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 276 (July 1951), pp. 91-98.

THE EMERGENCY

sary, guilt for the failure of past policies must be laid at someone's door. A purge was due in the MCP, and Lai Teck could do little to escape the peculiar logic that claimed him as victim. He was experienced enough in Com­ munist affairs to realize that his utility as a leader had ended and his sacrifice as a scapegoat was about to take place. He failed to attend the March meeting and chose to make his getaway but not, according to the new Central Committee, before he had dipped rather freely into the party treasury.4 Chin Peng, who had been both Lai Teck's trusted aide during the war and the man responsible for 4 For obvious reasons, many of the charges that the new MCP leadership brought against Lai Teck after his disappearance did not square with the facts. Many of the accusations were designed to ex­ plain why the party was not in a stronger political and financial posi­ tion. Other charges were apparently added to the list so as to make sure that any party member who criticized the decision to employ armed struggle could be accused of being under the influence of the "traitor" and "wrecker," Lai Teck. Also, in examining the history of Lai Teck's leadership, the MCP found that none of its members knew the details of much of his career or even how he came to his position as Secretary-General. They were only able to find out that he first became important in Malayan affairs during the reorganiza­ tion of the party in 1934-1935, and that he had come to the MCP from the Hong Kong regional office of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau. Since none of the people who had been important in the party at the time had survived, it was impossible for the new leader­ ship to discover whether this man, who had been known under the name of Lai Teh, Ah Nyok, Chang Hung, and, in English, Wright, had been actually appointed by the Comintern to lead the MCP or whether through his known associations with the International he was able to impose himself upon the Malayan comrades. He had led an extraordinarily secretive life, and although he had been personally responsible for elevating them in the party during the war years, the new Central Committee members knew little about him except that he spoke Chinese with a heavy accent and had to rely upon secretaries for any involved use of Chinese script. The most nearly accurate pub­ lished account of what facts are known about Lai Teck and his disappearance from the MCP is that of Harry Miller (op.cit., pp. 6571). Mr. Miller mentions the hypothesis that Lai Teck was originally brought to Malaya by the Singapore police and subsequently served as a British agent—a hypothesis familiar to many informed people in Malaya but one which no government source will officially confirm.

II. THE PARTY

investigating his leadership, was immediately chosen to head the new Central Committee. For the first time in its history the MCP was being led by men who had risen with­ in its own ranks and who had received all their Commu­ nist training in Malaya. They had all learned well the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, and in mind and spirit they were mature Communists. Thus, as long as they knew the current policy line of international Communism they needed only a minimum of guidance in calculating the ap­ propriate implications for Malaya. With the establishment of the new Central Committee, orders were immediately drawn up to change the party's strategy. Organizing for Violence

With the decision of the new Central Committee to re­ sort to "armed struggle," the MCP entered the fourth phase of its history. Conceiving of itself as the champion of a "four-bloc" coalition in the struggle against the imperial­ ists, the MCP felt that it had come of age as a People's Liberation party. The party leadership was confident that the task of "liberating" Malaya could be accomplished in three successive phases of operation. Modeled after the strategy of the Chinese Communists, the first stage in­ volved the establishment of "liberated areas" that would serve as bases for the army and provide the necessary re­ cruits. The second stage, the expansion of these "liber­ ated areas," would lead into the third, in which the areas would be joined together to produce a completely "liber­ ated" country. Events were to prove that even the first stage was a highly unrealistic goal, since the MCP has failed to dominate any populated area for more than a few hours. Indeed, the history of the MCP during the Emer­ gency has been that of a highly disciplined organization tenaciously trying to carry out its set plans but always fail­ ing because it was confronted with a more skillful and re­ sourceful opponent and because its decisions were based

THE EMERGENCY

on faulty notions about reality. As a result, the experience of the party has been one of replacing the large and the impressive with the small and the barely functional; big organizational units had to give way to smaller and more scattered ones, minimum objectives became only ambitious plans, and audacious actions degenerated into ineffective plots. In its enthusiasm to undertake a "war of liberation" in the spring of 1948, the MCP secretly organized a military force. Initially, it was named the Malayan People's AntiBritish Army, in an attempt to make explicit its relationship to the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, which many elements of the Chinese population still respected and con­ sidered to have been all-victorious. At the end of 1949, it •was retitled the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) in order to benefit from the prestige of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which had just achieved its major vic­ tories in China. The impression was thus strengthened in the Chinese community that there was a close tie between the two Chinese-led armies. The task of reverting to a military basis of operation was not simple, and the MCP was faced with new organi­ zational problems as it moved from the cities to the jun­ gle. Much of the difficulty arose from the need for strict secrecy in order to prevent premature counteraction by the government. Cadres could be alerted to the change in party line only as it became necessary for them to assume their new roles. This meant confusion and last-minute de­ cisions for the party membership, but in the end the majority of the rank and file had no alternative but to fol­ low orders, for if they had stayed out of the jungle re­ treats, they would have been easy prey for the police. Most of those who were inclined to drag their feet felt the force of the party's argument that they could hardly convince the government, at such a late hour, that they had decided to break with Communism. Nevertheless, the MCP found

II. THE PARTY

it necessary to employ threats and to coerce many members into accepting the requirements of the new line. One of the early steps in the campaign for "liberation" was the formation of "Blood and Steel Corps." These con­ sisted mainly of trusted party thugs who, in addition to perpetrating acts of extortion and intimidation against those designated by the party, were ordered to strengthen the treasury by engaging in pay-roll robberies and raids on business establishments, chiefly Chinese-operated. Since the political motives behind such attacks were hardly dis­ cernible to the public, the impression became current among the European community that the Malayan com­ rades were more like hoodlums than students of political analysis.5 It now appears that, in their eagerness, these "corps" gave premature notice of the new strategy of the party, and provoked earlier and more extreme measures of re­ taliation by the government than the MCP leadership had anticipated. The British first took public cognizance of these acts of violence on June 6, when the CommissionerGeneral, Malcolm MacDonald, announced that the Com­ munists were "making a desperate effort to impose the rule of the knife and gun in plantations, mines and factories," and that as a consequence of Communist reverses in 5 The conduct of members of the MCP during the early days of the Emergency encouraged the government to label them "bandits," a term certainly appropriate and accurate in describing much of their behavior in the jungle. Unfortunately, however, it had peculiar con­ notations for the Malayan Chinese, since it was the identical one employed, and for much the same reason, by the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek, neither of whom in the view of most Chinese had dis­ tinguished records in defeating Communism. The term encouraged the Malayan Chinese to believe that the British were simply adopting the same role as other unsuccessful antagonists of Communism in Asia and that they would probably fail to recognize the nature of their enemy. In general, the Chinese continued to refer to those in the jungle as "Communists." It was finally decided by the government that to recognize the enemy officially as being "Communists" would not give them excessive prestige, and thus the term "Communist Terrorist," or "CT," replaced that of "bandit."

THE EMERGENCY

Europe an offensive in Asia might be expected. On June 12, three important Chinese Kuomintang leaders were killed, and on the following day High Commissioner Sir Edward Gent announced at a press conference that in the wave of violence ten murders and three attacks on European managers of estates had been perpetrated. Three days later, in Perak, three planters were killed, and on the following day, June 17, a state of emergency was declared for Perak and Johore and was extended the next day to the whole of the Federation. On June 21, police raids were made throughout the Federation and 600 persons were arrested. Although the police moved against known Communist headquarters and front organizations, most of the MCP members, and especially the important leaders, were able to escape into jungle hidings. Malayan officials were not entirely unaware of the MCP's plans. The real problem for the government was the de­ termination of a policy which would be firm where strength was required and flexible and tolerant where education and social measures would be efficacious. The government had good reason to believe that its policy of supporting the right of labor to organize, of being attentive to the real grievances of workers, and of applying legal sanctions to extreme Communist tactics was checking the growth of MCP power. However, by 1948, such measures had achieved the maximum success that could be hoped of them and new policies were needed, especially in view of the change in MCP tactics. On the other hand, the govern­ ment hesitated to accept full responsibility for more drastic measures before the danger was fully apparent to all, lest what had been gained would be lost. There was a danger that the public would interpret any sudden change in the position of the government as an admission that its previ­ ous policies had been incorrect. The long-run policy of fostering trade unionism had to be supported. The gov­ ernment was also sensitive to the theory that strong action against the MCP might weaken rather than strengthen the

II. THE PARTY

labor movement. As a result, it continued to exercise mod­ eration toward the MCP long after such an approach could have been expected to influence the party's decisions. By May, the party's political line was firm and the organiza­ tion was fully committed to a test of strength. If the government tended to underestimate its difficul­ ties at the beginning of the Emergency, the MCP certainly overrated its powers. Once again, the MCP organized what appeared to be an impressive structure for carrying out its operations, but as usual the titles it employed gave the impression of greater power and coordination than in fact existed. Initially, the MRLA was intended to be a distinct military organization with its own supreme headquarters and its own hierarchy and chain of command. At the same time, the Min Yuen, or "People's Movement," was to be a civilian organization which would support the MRLA in the same fashion as the MPAJU assisted the guerrillas during the Japanese occupation. However, the criterion for command positions in the MRLA and in the Min Yuen was rank in the party itself. Although orders were issued in the name of particular MRLA commands and Min Yuen groups, decisions were made solely within the party hier­ archy. As communication within the jungle became in­ creasingly difficult, the only chain of command that was preserved was that of the party. As a result, the formal structure of both the MRLA and the Min Yuen became significant only at the lowest levels, at which party mem­ bers were commanding and disciplining non-party re­ cruits. Relations between the various levels in the party hier­ archy were maintained by having the senior members or secretaries of the lower committees serve as members of the next highest committee. Thus the secretaries of the State Committees were all members of the Central Committee, and the secretaries of the District Committees belonged to their respective State Committees, and so on down the line. Likewise, in most cases the regimental commanders of

THE EMERGENCY

the MRLA belonged to their respective State Committees, and leaders of important Min Yuen units were usually of District Committee rank, while those responsible for smaller groups might be Branch Committee members or even rank-and-file party members. By 1950 it was no longer possible for groups as large as MRLA "regiments" to operate as single units. By 1952 even the platoons were being broken up, and some of the sections were assigned to work directly with small Min Yuen groups. This process not only placed a greater strain on the party organization but made the District Committee level increasingly the critical point in the hierarchy. Guid­ ance on most forms of operation had to come from mem­ bers of the District Committee rather than from the state level. These changes were accompanied by a decline in the number of people in the jungle. In 1950 there were over 5,000 men and some 500 women; in 1955 the respec­ tive figures were roughly 3,000 and 300. (Throughout the Emergency the Communists have maintained a remarka­ bly consistent ratio of about ten men to every woman.) In general these figures have been matched by equal num­ bers of people outside the deep jungle who might be considered to be formal members of the Min Yuen, in the sense that they operated under fairly strict Commu­ nist control. As for the size of the party organization, it seems that the MCP has at no time in its history had more than 3,000 full-fledged party members. Life in the Jungle During the early period of the Emergency, it was pos­ sible for the MRLA to maintain large camps in the jun­ gle, just as the MPAJA had done during the Japanese occupation. Some of these camps were able to take care of from two to three hundred men and women, while the average contained from forty to fifty. Although the MRLA groups varied greatly in size, they all seem to have fol-

* Self-Protection Corps, Cultivation Corps, Anti-British Alliance

MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION DURING THE EMERGENCY

THE EMERGENCY

lowed fairly standardized daily routines. The pattern de­ scribed in the following account by a former MCP member who was a "political warrior" seems to have been typical: "At that time, we followed a very strict schedule; every day it was pretty much the same thing. Reveille was at 5:30. Then, after bathing and brushing our teeth at 6:00, we had the flag-raising ceremony. We would sing the Inter­ national or the Red Flag Song and then we had roll call. After this, they would read parts of the laws and regulations of the MRLA. Then we had calisthenics until 6:30, when we got a cup of tea and a rest period. At 7:00 we began drilling again—this time with weapons, as we practiced jungle warfare tactics. We used to race up and down the hills, climb trees, and practice jungle ambush positions. This would last until 8:30, at which time we rested again and cleaned up. At 9:00 we had breakfast and then another rest period. At 10:00 classes began. On Monday, Wednes­ day, Friday, and Sunday they were political classes, and on the other days military classes. The military classes covered such subjects as map reading, how to compare our own strength and the enemy's, how the Russian Army fought, how the Chinese Communist Army fought, and the gen­ eral principles of guerrilla warfare, such as to strike only at the enemy's weak points, avoid major battles, save your own ammunition, and capture the enemy's ammunition. The political lectures would be on Marxism-Leninism and the current international situation. These classes would last until 11:00 or 12:00 o'clock, depending upon the length of the lectures. At 12:00 we had a snack, some biscuits, a cup of coffee, and then a rest period which lasted until 1:00. From 1:00 to 3:00, we had individual assignments. New recruits would get special instruction in study groups, those who gave lectures would prepare their next ones, the rest would be assigned to do jobs around the camp, collecting firewood, cleaning up, and the like. At 3:00 it was drill again with weapons. This lasted until 4:00, when we would get another half-hour rest period. At 4:30 we

II. THE PARTY

had our evening meal. Then we would have a free period until 6:00. During this time, you could study or practice your drills. At 6:00 we had coffee and then the 'political research' would begin. We were divided into small groups of about ten people and we would discuss either the last political lecture or some new subject. A political warrior would lead the discussion in each group and we would try to help each other learn the doctrines of Communism. This was the time of day at which periodically we would have 'self-criticism' and 'mutual criticism' meetings. From 8:00 until 9:00, we had another rest period and then we went to bed at 9:00." The routine in the larger Min Yuen camps was much the same, except for the military training. In spite of all the rest periods—or perhaps because of them—most of those in the camps seem to have felt that they were leading very full and strenuous lives. However, when the British proved to be a far bolder foe than the Japanese, the large camps had to be abandoned. As this happened, the excitement of living in a large group was replaced by the spirit as well as the tensions of a smaller group. The comforts of the more elaborate camps were sacrificed as the units of MRLA withdrew into deeper jungle retreats. In the case of the Min Yuen, it became difficult for its workers to live in or near the settled areas, and they had to move to crude camps within the edges of the jungle. All of these changes greatly increased the problems of survival, especially as the British efforts to maintain strict controls over food supplies be­ came more effective. Much of the effort of the Min Yuen had to be devoted to the single task of trying to collect food and transport it through the jungle to dumps where it could be picked up by those in the deeper jungle. How­ ever, in spite of all these obstacles, the political indoctrina­ tion program was not relaxed. Even the smallest groups tried to maintain regular political discussion sessions.

THE EMERGENCY FAILURE AS GUERRILLAS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TERRORISM

At the start of the Emergency, there was at all levels in the MCP an extraordinary faith in the benefits of guerrilla warfare. In its instructions to the membership and in its propaganda, the party leadership fostered the impression that it possessed the secret of how to defeat a superior mili­ tary force. As evidence of the almost magical success to be expected from guerrilla warfare, the party's experiences during the Japanese occupation and the victories of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalist armies in China were cited. However, very soon after the Emergency began, it became apparent that, despite the formation of the MRLA, the MCP was unable to carry out military activities that met its own definition of guerrilla warfare. Something had gone wrong. In spite of its" spirit of confidence and its careful study of the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung and the practices of the Chinese Communists, the MCP was not directing guerrilla operations. Instead, all of its military efforts led only to a greater reliance upon the device of terrorism as a means to achieve its political objectives. Al­ though the party steadfastly continued to use the military terminology of guerrilla warfare to describe its activities, and although within its jungle camps it insisted on adher­ ence to all the forms of military life, it could not obscure the fact that it was practicing terrorism, not warfare. Aside from giving some indication as to the future po­ litical prospects of the party in Malaya, this failure of the MCP is significant as a demonstration that guerrilla war­ fare cannot achieve victories over an enemy vastly superior by conventional military standards. Although the Security Forces in Malaya have had a difficult and thankless task in fighting the Communists, they have proved that superior technology and resources provide the same advantages in irregular as in regular warfare. The foremost reason for the MCP's military failure was

II. THE PARTY

its inability to limit the freedom of the British to concen­ trate their forces against any MRLA group they chose. Even at the beginning of the Emergency, none of the MRLA units were strong enough to tie down the main British forces and thus permit the other MRLA units to conduct telling guerrilla operations. In the writings of Mao Tse-tung, the MCP received ample warning that guerrilla warfare cannot be a complete substitute for conventional forces and that guerrilla activities must be coordinated with the campaigns of main armies.® During the Japanese oc­ cupation, the MPAJA had been able to carry out guer­ rilla operations to the extent that it wished because the Japanese army had to meet a main enemy elsewhere and thus could send large forces against the guerrillas only at great cost. During the Emergency, however, the British have been able to concentrate their superior forces against the MRLA without fear of having to engage in major battles that would be critical to the struggle. There were only two considerations which served to tie down the British forces after a fashion and, by limiting their mobility and their freedom to concentrate, provided a partial substitute for a main Communist army. First, the heavy commitments of the British army throughout the world, especially in respect to the cold war, placed limits on the reinforcements that could be brought to Malaya.7 β Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, op.cit., Vol. n: "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare," pp. 132-34; "On the Pro­ tracted War," pp. 222-26; "Problems of War and Strategy," pp. 275-80. 7 At the time the Emergency was declared, the military forces sta­ tioned in Malaya consisted of six battalions of the Gurkha Rifles, one battalion each of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, the Seaforth Highlanders, and the Devon Regiment, two battalions of the Malay Regiment, and the 26th Field Regiment of the Royal Artil­ lery. Soon after, a battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers ar­ rived from Hong Kong and the 2nd Guards Brigade was sent from the United Kingdom. Subsequently, elements of other British regi­ ments, as well as colonial troops in the form of contingents from the King's African Rifles and the Fijian Regiment, joined in the strug­ gle. The maximum number of troops which the British felt they

THE EMERGENCY

The other restriction was the need for the British forces to preserve order and protect civilian life throughout the country. Particularly during the early period of the Emer­ gency, this responsibility limited the army's freedom to concentrate against the MR.LA. However, with the ex­ pansion of the Federation of Malaya Police and the crea­ tion of Home Guard units and a Special Constabulary, the army was increasingly released from its policing obligation.8 Although these considerations made the British prob­ lem more difficult, they did not compensate for the MCP's lack of a main army. Without strong enough forces to draw the British into any important engagements, the MRLA was unable to realize the two principal advantages of guerrilla operations. It could neither use its smaller units to compel the British to reduce their concentration of forces and thus risk defeat in major battles, nor by raids on the British supply lines could it interrupt at critical times the flow of essential items to a main force that was engaged in serious fighting. As it was, the MRLA attacks on British communications and supply lines could be annoying but not militarily significant. The fact that the British were able to concentrate their forces while break­ ing up any concentration of the MRLA meant that in tak­ ing offensive action the party could select only exceedingly weak targets. In particular, it could do little more than strike against civilians or small isolated groups of the could commit to the Malayan fighting was nearly 40,000. These in­ cluded 25,000 from Britain (including Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel), 10,500 Gurkhas, and five battalions of the Malay Regiment. 8 The total number of regular and armed auxiliary policemen reached approximately 100,000. Most of these were Malays who joined the Special Constabulary or served as Kampong Guards and Home Guards. The additional trained personnel for the regular police consisted mainly of men who had worked in Scotland Yard, as well as former members of the Palestine police who had had experience with terrorism, and men from the Hong Kong police and even the prewar Shanghai International Settlement police who spoke Chinese.

II. THE PARTY

Security Forces. But this was terrorism and not guerrilla warfare. The MRLA was unable to organize any major forces mainly because it could not solve its own logistical prob­ lems. The party had anticipated that through its extensive Min Yuen units it could procure food and supplies in the settled areas of the country and move them into the jun­ gle to the MRLA camps. With possibly 10,000 people en­ gaged in Min Yuen work, the 5,000-odd armed members of the MRLA were expected to be adequately supplied. However, the system was much too crude and unpredictable to give sufficient mobility to the MRLA. The need of the Min Yuen to apply coercion to its "sympathizers" in order to obtain even the minimum supplies necessary for the survival of those in the jungle was itself a major factor in increasing terrorism. More important, government meas­ ures for controlling Min Yuen activities drastically reduced the maneuverability of the MRLA and increased its logis­ tical problems to the point where it could not support large concentrations of men. In particular, the program of resettling nearly half a million "squatters" in new villages greatly affected its freedom of movement. By mov­ ing these people from their scattered and isolated homes along the edges of the jungle and by introducing other measures o£ iood control, the government, "while unable to cut off all supplies completely, forced the Communists to channel their supply lines. After 1950, it was the Securi­ ty Forces rather than the MRLA who were laying most of the ambushes. At the same time, as the MRLA found its lines of supply curtailed, the Security Forces were becom­ ing increasingly mobile within the jungle itself. By means of their superior military technology, including the use of air drops and helicopters, they were able to maintain strong units for longer and longer periods of time in a jungle where the Communists had expected to be safe. In short, it was the British who were really carrying on guer­ rilla warfare operations.

THE EMERGENCY

In part, the MCP owed its difficult logistical problems to the fact that it had been misled by Communist doctrines about the importance of rural areas in the conduct of armed struggle. The writings of Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders had indicated that the hinterlands of colonial and semi-colonial countries could provide safe bases for building up military strength. However, nearly 75 per cent of Malaya is dense and mountainous jungle, considered habitable only by aboriginal peoples. For a while, the MCP attempted to bolster morale by rejoicing over its new control of "rural areas" and its plans to "work more closely with the peasantry." To call the deep jungle "rural areas" and the only people who lived there, the Sakis, "peasants" was to make a mockery of both terms, and the party soon had to drop the practice except in re­ ports for consumption outside Malaya. Although the thick jungle made it easy to hide from the Security Forces, it could not provide the MRLA with secure base areas. The party could always withdraw into the deeper jungle in order to avoid the enemy, but in doing so its food problem was further complicated. Survival might be possible, but from these positions strong attacks on the populated areas were not. So again the MCP was forced to select terrorist rather than military targets. A final important reason why the MCP was unable to organize militarily significant guerrilla operations lay in

the lack of an efficient and rapid system of communication. The necessity of depending entirely upon couriers and prearranged meetings in the jungle meant that the actions of the separate MRLA units could not be coordinated or given adequate centralized direction. The crude methods of communication also encouraged certain tendencies of the MCP leadership with respect to planning which in themselves furthered the development of terrorism. In par­ ticular, it became increasingly necessary for the Politburo to depend on a method of quota planning in directing the organization. That is, party leadership tended to conceive

II. THE PARTY

of its task of planning as primarily one of establishing cate­ gories of action for the entire organization and then de­ termining upon particular quotas for each category. The performance of the party was periodically reviewed in terms of the fulfillment of the quotas, and new quotas were set for the next time period. During the Emergency, this involved the periodic establishment of quotas for such categories of activities as attacks on enemy military forces, isolated police stations, telecommunications, railroads, buses, rubber estates, tin mines, and the like. However, because of the inadequacy of communication facilities and the need to do nearly all the planning at yearly meetings, the Politburo plans had to be drawn up in very broad terms, covering the entire country. Unable to plan a par­ ticular operation or even a series of operations, the Polit­ buro could do little more than present new quotas to each State Committee, after a review of its previous record. On receiving its general directives, the State Committee, equally handicapped by problems of communication, again as­ signed particular quotas to each of the District Committees under it. By the time the instructions arrived at the level of the operating units, the commanders received fairly explicit quotas to be met by the group within a designated period of time.9 This quota system of planning failed to provide coordi® Generally, during the Emergency it has taken about one year's time for the decisions of the Politburo to reach all the cells in the MCP. After the Politburo has decided and the Central Committee has discussed the new directives, meetings of all the State Committees have had to be called. Several weeks and even months have usually passed before it has been possible to reach all the members of a State Committee and have them travel to the place of meeting. Once such meetings are convened, they usually last several weeks, since all manner of questions are discussed and guidance is received from whatever members of the Central Committee are present. The same procedure is then followed in calling meetings of the District and the Branch Committees. Another consideration which may account for the delay in the execution of Politburo directives is the proba­ bility that some of the more important annual decisions have to be sent abroad for review and approval.

THE EMERGENCY

nation even in the actions of adjacent units of the MRLA. With each commander free to fulfill his quotas at moments of his own choosing, no concerted and systematic attacks could be made against particular key targets. Rather than creating serious havoc by fully disrupting such essential operations as the country's telecommunications system or the railroad lines, the attacks proved to be only isolated and random blows that produced little more than tempo­ rary inconveniences. The party's method of planning its military operations was thus deficient in that it neither took into account the time factor essential for rational planning nor was capable of systematically relating par­ ticular actions to the end objectives.10 The only advantage of the system was that it forced all the MRLA units to be active and aggressive. However, even this advantage did not result in militarily significant actions because com­ manders were encouraged to over-fulfill their easier quotas 1OIt should be noted that during peacetime the MCP had also employed this method of quota-planning in directing the activities of its individual cells and front groups, and so long as its activities involved little more than attracting new recruits and collecting "sub­ scriptions," the system did result in the party's moving closer to its objectives. However, when it was applied to political activities—such as the calling of strikes—the consequences were much the same as when it was used to guide military operations. It should also be observed that the quota approach seems to have been very congenial to the party planners. The method did not bring out clearly, but instead deemphasized, all the problems inherent in the implementing of plans, and these were usually precisely the types of problems that the MCP leaders were ill-equipped to handle. The quota approach emphasized only the blueprint stage, on the one hand, and the final results, on the other. This seems to have given added encouragement to the tendency for MCP planning activities to be characterized by a great deal of fanfare, in which the participants easily confused planning with results. All the problems that lay be­ tween plans and goals were assumed to be overcome by spirited dec­ larations about "sacrifice" and heroic work. For a discussion of the relationship of planning and execution in Chinese culture which ap­ pears to be relevant to this characteristic of the MCP leadership, see John H. Weakland, "The Organization of Action in Chinese Culture," Psychiatry, Vol. xm, No. 3 (August 1950), pp. 361-70.

II. THE PARTY

to make up for any failures to carry out more dangerous assignments. The cumulative effect of these practices was that the actions of the MRLA never fell into a pattern which, if carried out over time, might have weakened the military strength of the government. Instead, the sum of MRLA activities appeared to be so meaningless as to be unguided by any form of logic. However, this very irrationality tend­ ed to encourage irrational responses in a civilian popula­ tion who could see no way of guaranteeing personal se­ curity. Thus, for another reason, the party was employing terrorism and not guerrilla warfare. The Politics of Terrorism

The inability of the MRLA to carry out guerrilla war­ fare meant that the struggle in Malaya was not one be­ tween two armed opponents in which each sought to de­ stroy or weaken the other in order to impose its political will, as is the character of war. Instead, with the develop­ ment of terrorism, the conflict became essentially one in which both the government and the MCP sought to achieve direct political objectives in their relations with a common civilian population. Although the government has been steadfastly determined to annihilate the organization in the jungle, and the struggle has thus retained some of the characteristics of warfare, the terrorist techniques of the MCP have given the conflict this new political form. The Emergency became a peculiar and violent type of po­ litical struggle in which both the government and the MCP were essentially concerned with affecting the political be­ havior of the general public in order to determine the future role of the MCP in Malayan society. This meant that its position in the Chinese community again became the party's major problem. The government, especially under the new High Commis­ sioner, General Sir Gerald Templer, increasingly viewed

THE EMERGENCY

the struggle as one of winning over "the hearts and minds of the Malayan people" to the ideas of a free and demo­ cratic political process.11 In practice, the government set itself the task of encouraging greater and greater public participation and involvement in the country's affairs. In­ itially, the Malayan authorities were primarily interested in public cooperation during the Emergency as a means of denying to those in the jungle food, supplies, informa­ tion, and new recruits. However, as time has gone on, the government has been asking for more and more direct and extensive commitments from the public in order to isolate the Communists from the general process of Ma­ laya's political development. The MCP, on the other hand, had far less ambitious de­ mands to make of the public. Although the party's objec­ tive was still that of ruling the country, its immediate pur­ poses could be served by maximizing all the desires for neutrality and non-involvement among the population. Only in very selective situations did the party require posi­ tive cooperation. Aside from ensuring that individuals felt compelled to assist in providing food and supplies or to become converts when desired, the MCP counted on strengthening its influence, especially in the Chinese com­ munity, by making participation in any form of political activity seem excessively dangerous. In terrorism, the party had a weapon that encouraged precisely this development. Thus the Emergency progressively took the form of a political struggle in which the MCP desperately sought to create a political vacuum among the Malayan Chinese and the government tried to encourage the Chinese to de­ velop a political community committed to a free and demo­ cratic country. Aside from the fact that the government n Sir Gerald Templer emphasized this objective of the government iti each of his semiannual reports to the Legislative Council; see Re­ port of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Federation of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, March 19, 1952, November 19, 1952, March 18, 1953, and November 25, 1953.

II. THE PARTY

objectives were inherently more difficult to realize, the situation in Malaya gave the MCP many advantages. The traditional uneasiness of most Malayan Chinese about establishing relations with formal governmental authority was a strong barrier to greater cooperation with the gov­ ernment. In addition, with China itself under Communist rule, large numbers of Malayan Chinese felt there were strong reasons for not associating themselves with any move­ ment that opposed the Communists unless it could pro­ vide personal security. And the MCP's propaganda that it was attacking "racially bad characters" and the "running dogs of the British" further discouraged cooperation. Faced with these difficulties, as well as those fundamental to any effort on the part of a colonial government to en­ courage political development, the government called upon potential leaders among the Chinese to identify them­ selves as opponents of the Communists. As such individuals stepped forward, it soon became apparent that they could provide only a partial form of leadership in the Chinese community. While in their relations with the government they could represent the interests of the Chinese in the future development of Malaya, they were acting as little more than private individuals; their political role did not depend upon extensive popular support. Without having to organize their power on a popular basis, they could not readily fill the political void that the MCP was seeking to maintain among the masses of the Chinese. At best, these new leaders could only hope to overcome gradually the attitudes of non-involvement among the Chinese and to create a new sense of community. In the meantime, the MCP kept up its efforts to prevent the recreation of a Chinese community which it could not dominate. The Prisoner of Terrorism By the fall of 1951, the MCP leadership had to recognize the complaints of its Min Yuen leaders that the indiscrimi-

THE EMERGENCY

nate actions of the MRLA units were making even routine Min Yuen work difficult and that there was a danger that they might drive the masses into greater cooperation with the government. After three years of terrorism, it was apparent that the party had to find new techniques to en­ sure the continued neutrality of the masses of the Malayan Chinese. Efforts would have to be made to exploit the advantages of the political vacuum so as to provide a more permanent basis for the party's influence. In its October 1951 directive, the Central Committee called upon the party to return to political infiltration and underground activities. Violence was to be used with more discretion. It was easy for the Politburo to decide upon such a change in tactics, but it was nearly impossible for the organization to carry out the new directive. How was in­ filtration of labor unions and schools to be effected when the government was fully alert to the possibilities of such activities? The leaders, and especially those who had de­ veloped agitational skills in the trade union period, were known to the police and would be identified and arrested if they left the jungle. New activists might be trained in the jungle, but it would be asking much of even the most disciplined party member to expect him to maintain his morale while training others to do the kind of work he had enjoyed and which now he could never hope to do again. Those skilled in such activities would be destroying their utility to the party as they taught others, and they would be committing themselves to an indefinite stay in the un­ healthy jungle. After evaluating the effects of its directive at its October meeting of the following year, the Politburo felt it neces­ sary to reverse itself again. The party had scored few suc­ cesses in its infiltration efforts. The order for the MRLA to be more selective in its "anti-spy work" had caused the military leaders to become less aggressive, and, with the slackening of terrorist activities, more and more people were beginning to believe that the party had spent its

II. THE PARTY

strength. The 1952 directive from the Central Committee ordered an increase in terrorist activities to support further attempts at infiltration and subversion. However, by the time the word had been passed down through the party hierarchy, there were few MRLA units strong enough to adopt more aggressive tactics. The MCP was now clearly a prisoner of terrorism. It could neither give up the use of violence nor employ it effectively. With a strong and ef­ ficient government opposing it, the party could not hope that by simply announcing that it was giving up "armed struggle" it would gain freedom to carry on a more peace­ ful form of revolutionary activity, as has been the case with other Communist parties in Southeast Asia. There are several reasons why the MCP has had to carry on its attempts at guerrilla warfare far longer than any of the other Communist parties of South and Southeast Asia which also in 1948 adopted policies of violent insur­ rection. The MCP emerged from the Japanese occupation as the strongest party in the region. Then in 1948 it made a greater initial commitment to a policy of guerrilla activi­ ties because it had had considerably more experience than the other parties in organizing a resistance movement. Also, of course, the Malayan struggle held particular importance for the objectives of world Communism in that it sought to weaken British power and disrupt the flow of rubber and tin to the free world. Subsequent to 1952 the MCP has found it difficult to reverse its policies because of British determination that it should not be permitted to end its insurrection under conditions whereby it could become one of the leading political parties in the country. Malayan officials are disturbed by the example of the Indonesian and the Indian Communists, who have been able to re­ cover from their revolts of 1948 and become major political forces. Malaya's progress toward self-government since 1954 has introduced new considerations which will influence the de­ cisions of both the government and the MCP. Under-

THE EMERGENCY

standably, the new elected political leaders would like to receive credit for being able to "end the Emergency." There are thus strong pressures on the responsible officials to make concessions to the Communists. In campaigning for the first national elections, which were held in July 1955, Tengku Abdul Rahman, the leader of the strongest party in the country, called for putting an end to the Emergency by permitting the Communists to come out of the jungle and join the democratic parties. The prospect of the democratic parties' being so infiltrated was naturally dis­ turbing to many officials who had been working to the best of their abilities for the preceding seven years to prevent Communist subversion of democratic institutions. Since becoming the first Chief Minister of the Federation, Tengku Abdul Rahman has sought to end the Emergency on more realistic terms. He was instrumental in causing the government to announce, on September 9, 1955, a declara­ tion of amnesty which clearly stated that the government would neither recognize nor negotiate with the MCP, but that ". . . all those who have taken up arms against the government and those who have consorted with them and who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offense connected with the Emergency which they have committed under Communist direction either before this date or in ignorance of this Declaration of Amnesty." In the following months, the number of surrenders ac­ tually declined, and the MCP increased the tempo of its terrorist activities, especially in the state of Johore. The government was forced to respond by declaring that, while the offer of amnesty would remain in force, full-scale mili­ tary operations would be resumed and the Security Forces would cease to follow the "shout before shoot" procedure. On November 17, shortly after a news leak that Tengku Abdul Rahman would set December 25 as the deadline for the amnesty offer, after which he would mobilize the en­ tire country to wipe out the Communists, Chin Peng, the Communist leader, agreed to negotiate. A cease-fire was

II. THE PARTY

arranged which covered about 400 square miles just below the Thai border in upper Perak and eastern Kedah. On December 28 Chin Peng and his staff came out of the jungle and met with Tengku Abdul Rahman; David Mar­ shall, the first elected Chief Minister of Singapore; and Sir Chenglock Tan, president of the Malayan Chinese As­ sociation. During the two days that the meeting lasted Chin Peng indicated he was anxious to end the fighting but only under terms that would ensure the party a political future. In particular, he asked for legal recognition of the Com­ munist party, complete freedom for all Communists im­ mediately after coming out of the jungle, and the right of surrendered Communists to form new political organiza­ tions, i.e., front groups to propagate their ideology. Tengku Abdul Rahman firmly upheld the position that Malaya would under no circumstances recognize the MCP in the light of its record of terrorism. It was clearly apparent in the negotiations that Chin Peng was seeking to salvage vic­ tory from defeat by asking that the Emergency end in such a fashion as to make it possible for him to lead his men out of the jungle as a conquering army. However, the newly elected leaders of Malaya proved that they knew what would be best for the country. The meeting broke up with Chin Peng declaring that the MCP "will never accept sur­ render at any time and will continue the struggle to the last man," and Tengku Abdul Rahman announcing that "The war of ideologies in Malaya is a fight to the finish." Thus, although the Emergency is not over and the Ma­ layan government will continue to press its attack against those who still remain in the jungle, it can be said that another phase is about to be completed in the history of the MCP. In the past, the rate at which individuals have left the Communists and surrendered has fluctuated with the fortunes of Communism outside the country as well as in response to domestic developments. Thus, the sur­ render rate dropped sharply at the time Britain recog­ nized Red China and when the Communists were scoring

THE EMERGENCY

their greatest successes in the Korean War. During the lat­ ter part of 1952 and early 1953, the number of surrenders ranged from 40 to 60 a month, only to drop again after the Korean War ended. However, by the end of 1953 they were up in the high 30's again. But then in the spring of 1954 came the victories of the Vietminh in Indo-China and the French defeat at Dienbienphu and another sharp drop in the number of surrenders. In July, the month after Gen­ eral Templer left the country, an all-time low was reached when only three people came out of the jungle. At the time there was a general feeling in Malaya that after the dy­ namic leadership of Templer the struggle against the Com­ munists would be carried out with less vigor. Thereafter the numbers gradually increased again until the national elections in July 1955 brought another decline. Apparently many who might otherwise have been prepared to give up the struggle decided that with the possibility of a nego­ tiated ending of the Emergency it would be wise to remain with the party. It can be expected that with the resumption of full-scale fighting the number of surrenders will in­ crease.12 If it can be assumed that Malaya can defend itself against external Communist pressures, the future of the MCP will depend primarily upon the party's ability to penetrate and infiltrate a still disorganized Chinese com­ munity. So long as there are large numbers of Malayan Chinese who remain uncertain about committing them­ selves to cooperation with the other racial groups in Ma­ laya and with the government, the MCP will continue to be an important factor in Malayan politics. With the prog­ ress of events forcing more and more of them to a decision, both the government and the party will be trying to indii2 As of the end of January 1956 the total Communist casualties for the entire Emergency were: killed, 5933; surrendered, 1752; cap­ tured, 1173. The casualty figures reflect the fact that the movement is predominantly composed of Chinese, since over 90 per cent of the Communist losses were Chinese.

II. THE PARTY

cate to them the character of Malaya's future. Each will be trying to persuade them that the best opportunities lie with it and that great risks will follow from identifying with the other. In this struggle, it can be expected that the MCP will not cease to use some forms of terrorism, so that even such apparently innocent activities as the extracur­ ricular programs of schoolboys will be marked by incidents of violence and murder. This review of the main phases in the history of the MCP suggests that through all the vicissitudes of the par­ ty's program and tactics, its position in Malayan society has been essentially determined by the extent to which other groups, by formal or informal arrangement, have been able to provide a sense of security to Malayans in periods of drastic social change. The changes following the First World War were caused by the apparently insatiable de­ mand of the Western world for rubber and tin. In giving Malaya one of the highest standards of living in all Asia, this demand forced the people of the country to adapt themselves to a more industrialized and more urbanized pattern of existence than that common to most of Asia. Then there were the more intense and violent changes brought about by war and economic dislocation. As long as other social institutions, including those with origins in a traditional society, were able to provide a sense of com­ munity, even the Utopian promises of Communism could not give the party significant influence. It always found its strength among those who for various reasons had rejected the help of other groups in meeting the problems of social change. With the almost total disruption of Malayan so­ ciety during the war, the number of such people increased. The extraordinary thing is that the MCP has been able to absorb these ambitious, restless, and apparently undis­ ciplined and opportunistically inclined people and from them create a highly disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries. Behind all the tendencies of the party to

THE EMERGENCY

make titles and labels stand for substantive organizations remains the undeniable fact that it has been able to build up a following that has shown itself remarkably disciplined in the ways of Communism. These findings all raise questions about the kinds of people who have made up the MCP. Have they indeed been people who felt themselves "rootless" in Malayan society? How have they perceived the nature of their prob­ lem? What manner of calculations did they follow in de­ ciding upon Communism? And, once within the party, how did they adjust to its demands? What considerations have been most compelling in making them break with Com­ munism? For guidance on these questions, we must turn to the men and women who were once members of the party in Malaya.

Ill

PART

III

T H E INDIVIDUALS

CHAPTER 4

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL: A NOTE ON THE SAMPLE THE Malayan Chinese who have broken with the Com­ munists and have surrendered to the Security Forces have been key figures in the struggle between the government and the MCP. The immediate consequence of the simple act of a man coming out of the jungle and presenting him­ self to the police is a series of hurried decisions by both the Security Forces and the Communists. The combat in­ telligence gathered from such a surrender can lead to large deployments of British troops. As soon as the Communists learn that one of their men has changed sides, they must move all units in the area before the British learn of their location. Action is called for on both sides, and each must make quick calculations as to the probable moves of the other. Important as these immediate effects may be, the less dramatic consequences of a surrender are still more sig­ nificant. The loss of even a single individual is a blow to the strength of the MCP organization. This is not the case primarily because of quantitative considerations of manpower. On the contrary, the very fact that a surrender has taken place can be exploited by the party to coerce new recruits into the jungle. Individuals who, by choice or circumstance, have compromised themselves by assisting the Communists in what they considered to be relatively in­ nocent ways can be hurriedly contacted and told that some­ one who knows of their violations of the law is now work­ ing with the government, and that if they are to avoid arrest they must forthwith go into the jungle. A Malayan Chinese to whom this happened explained after he had surrendered: "It is very strange how I became a fighter for the revolution. My tapping post on the rubber estate

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

was on the edge of the jungle and one day three Min Yuen men came up and talked with me. I was afraid of them; they were armed, but they just asked me how my work was going. Then they left. A few days later they came again and, after talking a bit more, they asked me to do a few favors for them. Simple things, getting them some tobacco and the like. Before I knew it, I was doing a lot more things for them. It just seemed like the safest thing to do. Then one day two of them came and said that the third had surrendered and that he wanted to tell the police I had been helping the Communists. I was very agitated and went into the jungle with them and before I knew what was happening I was made a 'fighter of the revolution' and assigned to a Min Yuen group. Ai yah, a strange country, this Malayat" One former Min Yuen worker in Selangor estimated that by the end of 1952 about 80 per cent of all new recruiting was based on some combination of coercion and trickery, and that by such devices each surrender could be matched by a replacement. However, there has usually been a great difference in respect to ability and skill between the new recruits and those who leave after years of experience with Communism. The MCP has never had an abundance of capable and talented men for its lower-echelon positions and the surrender of any full party member can be a seri­ ous drain on one of its scarcest resources. Even though the man who surrenders did not hold a position in the party hierarchy, these basic resources are affected, because each surrender creates problems which can be met only by making a greater demand on the time and energies of the lower-echelon leadership. Trusted party workers must see that the new recruit is trained not only politically but in field work. Moreover, to prevent the surrender from af­ fecting the morale of others, added attention must be given to the program of political indoctrination. Because the MCP, like most Communist parties, is extremely sensitive to the problem of maintaining internal security, any sur-

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL

render must be followed by detailed investigations which can be carried out only by the trusted few. It is incon­ ceivable to the MCP leadership that a man could decide to break with Communism on the spur of the moment, and every effort must be made by the party to discover in the man's history the seeds of his treason. Incidents have to be unearthed that show he has always been an "enemy of the people," and his whole record must be discussed by all so that everyone will learn from it. All of this places a further strain on the internal security system of the MCP and pre­ vents the trusted lower-echelon leaders from performing other tasks. For the British, each surrender has all of these advantages in weakening the MCP organization. Also, over the period of the Emergency, the British have found the former sup­ porters of the Communists increasingly valuable in other ways. In 1954, it was announced that three hundred of those who had once worked for the Communists were now members of the Special Operational Volunteer Force and had returned to the jungle to fight their former comrades. In the early days of the Emergency, there was consider­ able uncertainty over what should be the status of those who surrendered. Out of legal considerations it was argued that since the struggle was a police action, all who came into police custody ought properly to be given a fair trial according to the Emergency regulations. However, since anyone who surrendered would certainly have violated some of these laws and in all probability could expect a death sentence if brought to court, to adopt such a policy was impossible if any effort was to be made to encourage those in the jungle to change their minds and surrender. On the other hand, it was also impossible during the early years of the Emergency to accept the idea that those who were known to have committed terrorist acts should be treated as prisoners of war if they surrendered. Out of this dilemma came the two categories, Surrendered Enemy Personnel and Captured Enemy Personnel. All of

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

those who come into police custody involuntarily and who insist that they are still loyal to the MCP are identified as Captured Enemy Personnel. They are generally required to face trial. On the other hand, all of those who surrender voluntarily, regardless of their subsequent willingness to cooperate with the authorities, and all of those "captured" who later decide to assist the government become Sur­ rendered Enemy Personnel, and as such they possess a peculiar status. Although they are not members of the police force, they live in police compounds and receive salaries commensurate with the lowest ranks in the force. Many have joined the Special Operational Volunteer Force, which operates alongside the Police Field Force, and thus have reentered the jungle to fight against the Com­ munists they formerly supported. Others work with the Special Branch of the Police, Some are assigned to the Department of Information to assist in carrying out propa­ ganda; some have been able to win raises in pay and su­ perior status.1 Aside from considerations of their own safe­ ty, they are given freedom of movement during their offduty hours once their reliability has been established. Eventually, when their value to the police is ended, they ι During most of the Emergency, the policy has been that those who have surrendered can receive rewards equal to one-half those given to the general public for information leading to the capture or killing oi those still in the jangle. At present, the SEP's receive rewards on this basis during the first three months after they surrender. There­ after, if they become voluntary members of the Security Forces, they are no longer eligible. If they are released for rehabilitation, they qualify as members of the public and receive the full amount of re­ ward. The minimum rewards offered by the government to the general public are based on rank in the MCP, so that at least 120,000 (Ma­ layan) is paid for information leading to the capture or surrender of leaders above the rank of District Committee, $12,000 for leaders of District Committee rank, $4,000 for Branch Committee rank, and $2,000 for persons of inferior status (U.S. $1.00 = Malayan $3.00). Slightly lower sums are paid for information leading to killings. As a result of this policy, some of those who have surrendered have been able to accumulate rather sizable sums of money with which to start life anew.

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL

will be encouraged to find employment in the general community. It is hoped that this step will mark the end of their careers with Communism. These are the people who have been interviewed, and it is their attitudes and experiences which are the subject of the rest of this study. The Interviews

By custom, the designation "Surrendered Enemy Per­ sonnel" has been abbreviated to SEP, a term which has also come to stand for the individual. In all, 60 SEP's were in­ terviewed for this study. Of these, 23 had held responsible posts in the MCP organization. The other 37 respondents were classed as rank-and-file members. Among them, how­ ever, were a few who, although they had served the MCP, had not been accepted as party members. These were in­ cluded in order to determine significant factors in the MCP's selective process as distinct from the factors which make a person want to join the party. All of them would have been willing to become party members at one time, if they had been asked to join. All had assumed the risks and deprivations associated with commitment to the MCP during the Emergency, and they fully understood that it was a Communist movement that they were supporting. Thus the extent and nature of their commitment were quite different from those of the fellow-traveler in the West. In almost all cases, it was apparent in the interview situa­ tion that the probable reason why they had not been ac­ cepted by the party was that by almost any standard of evaluation they were less able than those who had become party members. Indeed, most of the former party func­ tionaries were conspicuously more capable than most of the former rank-and-file members.2 2 This fact has meant that it has generally been former party func­ tionaries who have been able to win whatever rewards for merit the British have given the SEP's, much to the disappointment of some of the former rank-and-file members, who had expected that after they

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

The sample included 6 women who had served as couri­ ers, propagandists, Min Yuen workers, and "nurses" with the MRLA in the jungle. The men represented almost all the important activities of the MCP: 29 had served in the MRLA, 14 in the MPAJA, 15 had been full-time under­ ground workers or officials in the trade unions, and 11 had been assigned to propaganda and press sections. Included also were persons who had worked in the AEBUS, the MPAJU, the New Democratic Youth League, the Farmers' Association, the Ex-Service Comrades' Association, as well as former teachers in party-controlled schools, managers of party-run business enterprises, and personal bodyguards. Since some of the SEP's had served long periods either as probationary party members or as full-time workers for the MCP before they became regular party members, it was not always easy to classify them according to the peri­ ods in the MCP's history during which they had an intimate knowledge of Communism. However, their own statements as to when they felt they had been fully committed to the MCP indicated that for 23 this commitment occurred dur­ ing the Emergency; for 10, during the peace period; for 18, during the Japanese occupation; and for 9, before World War II. Of those who were former party functionaries, only one could be said to have served at the level of the State Com­ mittees. Nine were of District Committee rank and thir­ teen were of Branch Committee rank. Those who served as "leading figures" in the cells were classified with the rank and file, since their executive responsibilities were usually about the same as those of the ordinary members who di­ rected the work of non-party members. Slightly over half the SEP's interviewed were Hakkas, and the rest included representatives of all the other dialect groups common to Malaya. Of those who were party funcsurrendered things would be reversed and they would be able to lord it over those who had been their superiors.

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL

tionaries, a disproportionately high number were Hailams, which seems also to be the case in the party itself. However, after a fashion, all of them were able to speak Kuo-yii, the national dialect of China and the lingua franca of the jungle. Thirty-six were born in Malaya, 21 in China, and the remaining 3 in Hong Kong, Borneo, and Sumatra. Cul­ turally, however, they seem to have been a remarkably homogeneous group. In all the tabulations on attitudes, the only important differences between those born in China and the others were that the China-born tended to be a little older when they joined the party, and tended to have slightly longer party careers. The explanation seems to lie in the fact that the China-born did not find them­ selves in situations in which they were exposed to Com­ munism as early in life as those born elsewhere and, once committed to the party, they felt less confident of their ability to find another career in Malaya if they broke with Communism. The sample is not intended to be representative of SEP's in general; it is heavily weighted toward those who were functionaries and party members. The vast majority of those who have surrendered were never MCP members, al­ though they all, of course, were exposed to a great deal of Communist propaganda. It is difficult to determine how representative the respondents may be of MCP members in general, since so little is known of the larger group from which the sample was taken. The fact that all of them had left the party might at first seem to qualify their repre­ sentativeness. However, since our primary concern is the process by which people become assimilated to Commu­ nism, this may not be an important limitation. Indeed, it seems that the process of becoming and remaining a Com­ munist consists of several stages that have to be hurdled if one is to remain in the party, and the manner in which the early ones are surmounted influences the way in which the later ones are approached. The sample includes those

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

who were unable to meet the initial problems or adjust to them, as well as those who overcame most of them dur­ ing more than a decade of full-time work for the party. It can be assumed that at any point in time the MCP is composed of people at each of these stages, and that all new recruits will be faced with approximately the same problems as those experienced by the SEP's. Thus, al­ though it is impossible to determine the proportion of the total MCP membership faced with each particular problem of development, it is possible from the sample to learn what these problems are and how they can and cannot be successfully met. In these terms, then, the sample is of value in giving an­ other dimension to our understanding of a particular form of Communism. The doctrinal model of People's Libera­ tion Communism contained in Part I suggests some of the more general characteristics of Communism in the un­ derdeveloped areas of the world by indicating how the Communist leaders are expected to see their revolutionary tasks. The historical and institutional study of the experi­ ences of a particular party reveals some of the problems that arise in trying to conform to the doctrinal model. It also provides some explanations for the party's political successes and failures; it indicates the role that the move­ ment has occupied in the society; and it suggests hypoth­ eses about the sociological bases of the attitudes of those who have turned to this form of Communism. However, through interviews with those who have participated in the movement we can further enrich our understanding by the introduction of a personal and psychological dimension. Although these interviews may not meet the exacting stand­ ards of scientific sampling, they constitute a body of rele­ vant data that can suggest a whole range of hypotheses in spheres which can only be crudely approached by more conventional historical and institutional methods of study, methods which are usually based on admittedly incom­ plete data.

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL

For the interviewer, the problem of establishing an ac­ ceptable degree of rapport was never difficult, since all the SEP's were accustomed to an interview situation as a result of their experiences in the party and the lengthy in­ telligence interrogations they had undergone.8 An effort was made in the interviews to employ the vocabulary and expressions which had been common to the SEP's during their careers as Communists so as to encourage them to recapture the spirit of that period. A conscious attempt wiis made to assume varying attitudes and approaches to­ ward the respondents to determine what differences these might produce. In some cases, the interviews were con­ ducted in a straightforward and matter-of-fact manner. On other occasions, the interviewer assumed an extremely solicitous and sympathetic posture. (This did not always lead to the frankness of a confessional, as it caused some respondents to give greater consideration to their future problems and to seize the opportunity to request personal favors.) In other interviews, a skeptical approach was em­ ployed in which the validity of most of the respondent's answers was questioned. Each approach had its peculiar advantages and disadvantages; in sum, they brought out a wider range of attitudes and responses than could have been uncovered by adhering to a set pattern. In order to capture their style of speech and the pat­ terns of reasoning common to the SEP's, every effort was made to record the interviews verbatim. On the basis of the interviews, 126 tables were constructed. These tables are not reproduced in the pages that follow; the sample was small, and to include them might appear as a pre­ sumptuous claim to scientific accuracy. However, the tabSSome were so at home in the interview situation that on being seated they immediately showed they expected the customary cigarette. The introductory remark that the interview was being conducted in the interest of social science by one attached to an American uni­ versity, and that it was in no way an intelligence operation, seemed so unlikely and even fantastic to the SEP's that it had to be eliminated for the sake of achieving frankness.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

ulating stage was an essential one in the study, for without the tables it would have been impossible to determine many of the dominant attitudes of the SEP's, to say noth­ ing of less conspicuous differences. Often the interviewer was impressed with particular responses, and he might have given them undue weight had the tables not revealed that they represented quite marginal attitudes. Thus, the tables provided a firm guide for all quantitative considerations. It is hoped that the manner in which the interviews have been reported will sufficiently indicate the results of the tabula­ tions and at the same time suggest the spirit and the mode of thinking of the SEP's, matters that cannot be easily quantified. Impressions of the SEP's

In conversation the SEP's generally gave the impression that they were an exceedingly alert group of people with very active minds. They always seemed anxious to create a favorable impression. By their personal appearance and their dress, they endeavored to suggest that they were more sophisticated and more a part of the Western world than was actually the case. In their desire to prove them­ selves knowledgeable to some extent about all matters, they revealed not only a great thirst for knowledge but also an extraordinary accumulation of information about petty de­ tails, an accumulation surrounded by great ignorance. Their speech was usually colorful and vigorous, like that of most semi-literate people for whom the spoken word is more important than the written; conversation serves as a means of entertainment and precision is of little importance. Like many Chinese with similar back­ grounds, they displayed little sense of the limits of the probable, and permitted their accounts of events to become yarns for the sake of humorous effect. (But they them­ selves were almost never the butt of their jokes.) The lan­ guage of the SEP's was rich in similes and metaphors. They

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL

saw wisdom in the form of adages and proverbs. The clever saying and the witty remark were the sign of the wise and knowledgeable man. As we shall see, by identifying wis­ dom with the clever use of words and by failing to dis­ tinguish sharply between reason and emotion, the SEP's tended to leave themselves peculiarly vulnerable to slo­ gans and symbols. As might be expected of people for whom understanding is basically an intuitive and not an analytical process, the SEP's showed little ability to think in terms of abstractions and generalizations. They clung to the particular and the concrete. Aside from their heavy reliance upon analogies, they did not seem to be particularly aware of the character of systematic reasoning. As a result, when what appeared to be logical inconsistencies in their statements were pointed out to them, they tended to assume that they were being questioned about their veracity in recalling facts and not about their ability to reason.4 The only general framework that the SEP's seemed to employ in viewing experience was a simple chronological one in which isolated events followed one another and each incident had its own setting. Since the purpose of the interviews was to gain life histories, this did not create serious problems; it did mean, however, that the SEP's made no attempt to order their responses so as to make their accounts of their earlier experiences a justification or «The difficulties that the SEP's had with questions which required them to formulate generalizations out of their particular experiences and with those which demanded that they view their experiences in terms of given generalizations are to be expected of people who have not had extensive intellectual training. It may also be that the prod­ ucts of Chinese culture tend to be less concerned with analytical thought than Westerners of comparable education. In their formal philosophy, their religion, their ethical and moral system, their legal practices, their medicine, and their technological development, the Chinese have generally tended to emphasize other qualities of thought. For a very suggestive discussion of the characteristics of Chinese thought, see Lily Abegg, The Mind of East Asia, Thames and Hud­ son, London, 1952.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

an explanation of their subsequent behavior. In recalling particular events, they generally displayed an extraordinary memory for detail, a faculty which has been of invaluable help to the British intelligence. There are many possible explanations for this characteristic, including the fact that their world was largely limited to their personal experi­ ences, that their social life was dominated by the telling of stories which were based on the important incidents of their lives, and that their schooling had emphasized to an extreme degree memorizing by rote. However, in spite of this reliance upon a chronological framework, the SEP's generally had a very elementary con­ ception of time. This is not to say that they were unaware of the calendar or the clock; indeed, their phenomenal faculty for recalling details often meant that they could date an unusually large number of events in their lives. Rather, what they appeared to lack was a strong sense of development or progression through time. Although they were generally an impatient group of people, anxious to realize their objectives, they were poor judges of the length of time that might be appropriate or "reasonable" for the achievement of a particular goal. As a result, at many peri­ ods in their lives, the SEP's had been easily misled about the progress of their fortunes.5 Related to all of these characteristics was the SEP's lack of consistent or clear concepts of causality. Although, as BThere are several possible explanations for this lack of a strong sense of the relationship of events in time that go beyond the fact that the SEP's did not employ an analytical approach in viewing developments. One of these may lie in the nature of the Chinese language, which does not require that acts be conceived of in a relative time sequence to the same extent that an inflected language does. Time is not divided into the general categories which tenses represent in other languages, and every action need not be related to a general scheme of time relationships. The lines between the past, present, and future are less clear, and within each of these broad di­ visions there exists less feeling for subtle distinctions in time. As a result, there is less implicit suggestion in the Chinese language that the sequence of events may in itself be important in explaining their development.

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL

we shall see, the SEP's were generally extremely interested in finding explanations for what was happening in their social world, they tended to the view that questions of causality were beyond their powers of comprehension. Aside from the great importance which they attached to personal relationships and personal attitudes, they had great difficulty in explaining why events had occurred as they did. It seemed that they did not normally view events and phenomena in terms of cause-and-effect relationships, and that only in rather limited spheres did they employ a mechanistic concept of causality. These general characteristics of the mode of thinking of the SEP's, revealed so conspicuously in conversation, all seem to have played an important part in determining their understanding of politics in general and Gommunism in particular. In subsequent chapters, as we analyze what the SEP's had to say about their life experiences, we shall see that as a group they were peculiarly dissatisfied with the traditional life their parents had known and yet were unsure of themselves and their ability to succeed in a more modern world. Out of their sense of insecurity, they cus­ tomarily behaved in what appeared to be an extremely op­ portunistic fashion. Yet, after they came to Communism, the manner in which they adjusted to its impersonal de­ mands resulted in their becoming remarkably disciplined individuals. In time, they learned that it was impossible to find a solution to their problems of personal security in Communism and, breaking with the party, they continued their search. Through all of their experiences, they were able to maintain an emotionally tough front toward the world; intellectually, their active minds were capable of scheming but not of understanding or solving their prob­ lems.

CHAPTER 5

POTENTIAL COMMUNISTS As THE SEP's recounted their life experiences, they gen­ erally revealed very early one of their most distinctive char­ acteristics and one which seems to have played a major part in bringing them to Communism. From their youth, keenly aware of social gradations, they had entered on an endless quest for advancement and personal security. They viewed their world as a far from vague social hierarchy in which social and economic status was the main basis of security and influence. They were sensitive to the fact that it was not a stable hierarchy; one was neither hopelessly ordained to the lower ranks nor invulnerable in positions of higher status. While they professed to have been con­ fident of their ability to advance themselves, the SEP's showed that they had been uncertain of their future. To the Western eye, it is difficult to perceive in Asia, with its appalling poverty and great differences between rich and poor, anything that resembles a finely graduated social hierarchy. The general welfare standards appear so low as to make meaningless more refined distinctions than those of wealth and poverty. Yet all the SEP's readily placed their families in a hierarchy that extended from an upper class down through a middle and a lower class to the level of bare subsistence. Only two would admit that the status of their parents was that of poverty. At the other extreme, eight said that they had come from upper-class families, while the rest divided themselves almost equally between claims of middle- and lower-class backgrounds. However, according to more objective standards based on a broader perspective of the social and economic re­ lationships common to Malaya, it would seem that the liv­ ing conditions which the vast majority of the SEP's de­ scribed suggested that they were of lower-class background. Those who identified their parents with an upper class did

POTENTIAL COMMUNISTS

not come from the extremely wealthy Malayan Chinese families, but seem to have belonged to an urban class of small merchants and professional people. On the whole, the SEP's were so preoccupied with the social hierarchy of their immediate sphere of life that their world did not include the wealthy Malayan Chinese. More important, the levels in this social hierarchy were not based on absolute standards; the SEP's were thinking in terms of the relative positions of their families in the largest social community that they knew. Those who had greater aware­ ness of the size of and the relationships in the Malayan Chinese community as a whole were not only more knowl­ edgeable about the standards of the upper-class Chinese, but were impressed by the large numbers of Chinese who were less fortunate than. they. This greater awareness on their part gave them a feeling of superiority to their fel­ lows. In this connection, it is significant that the former party functionaries, who were generally more sophisticated, tended to consider that they came from better-off families than the rank and file. The accounts they gave of their childhood indicate that this was probably the case. The extent to which the SEP's thought of social and eco­ nomic status in relative terms was demonstrated by their belief that regardless of all the upheavals which the Ma­ layan society and its economy had undergone, it was still possible to classify their own and their parents' position. Despite the impact of the depression, the Japanese oc­ cupation, and the postwar period of economic dislocation on absolute standards of living, most of the SEP's felt that they could distinguish whether or not their families had clung to their relative position in the social hierarchy. Times might be bad for all, but it was still important where one stood in relation to others. Trying to Get Ahead

If the SEP's had been generally disturbed by the pros­ pect of a lower status than that of their parents, it would

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

have been far easier to explain the appeals of Communism for them. However, this was the case for only a marginal few. When asked to compare their own career prospects before they became Communists with the social and eco­ nomic status that their parents had realized, the vast ma­ jority claimed that they had fully expected to surpass their parents. Less than 10 per cent expected to drop to a lower status, and most of these were faced with exceptional prob­ lems. One SEP, for example, after a comfortable childhood had the disturbing experience of seeing his prudent father enter upon a gambling spree shortly before his death that dissipated the family fortune and left a quantity of debts to be met by the two sons. Another SEP, Ah T'ung—to add another name to the list of aliases by which this former underground worker was known—grew up with the expec­ tation that in time he would take over his father's position as a respected labor contractor for several large Asian rub­ ber estates. In preparation, Ah T'ung's training before the war had included keeping the pay accounts and work­ ing-time records and being responsible for the general wellbeing of over a hundred men and their families. After the war, when the estates began production again, Ah T'ung's father sought to reestablish himself, but the competition of the Communist labor unions convinced him that the days o£ the labor contractor were over and he retired. Be­ ing young and more adept at changing with the times, Ah T'ung recognized that his training might still have value, especially to those who had destroyed his original career prospects. He began working for the Communist unions, reluctantly at first, and then with enthusiasm. In general, however, the SEP's seemed at no time to have had much doubt that they would surpass the achievements of their parents. They considered themselves far more worldly-wise. For those whose parents had been peasants and unskilled laborers, even the lightest exposure to a more urbanized environment was enough to convince them that they could easily learn a way of life that would place them

POTENTIAL COMMUNISTS

far above their more simpleminded parents. In the case of those whose parents had achieved success in an urban setting, there was still the feeling that the skills and knowl­ edge their parents possessed were appropriate to an oldfashioned social order which offered only limited rewards. They conceded that their parents had prospered by the old standards—they had been able to play well the game of the old traditional societies and the benevolent associa­ tions, for example—but these standards belonged to the past. In the future, one could expect far greater rewards for comparable ability. In expressing their confidence in being able to surpass their parents, the SEP's were also expressing their sense of identity with a younger generation and with all that was modern and new. In numerous ways, the SEP's indi­ cated that they were strongly oriented to modernity. This was enough to qualify their estimates of their parents' success; any success by the new standards was preferable to even great success by the old. "My father was a member of the Hakka Association and many people looked up to him. But these people were just like my father—they didn't know very much, they just worked and talked and then worked some more. Even a simpleton could have done everything my father ever did." "My mother and father were old people. They were al­ ways able to get over the days, but they never did anything interesting. Nowadays people wouldn't think much of them." "My father ran a little business. He started with a few dollars. After the war, my brothers and I started a business. We sold things which we brought into Johore from Singa­ pore at a price a little lower than most of the other people did. We were soon making more money than my father ever made. But then the customs officials came around and stopped it all. You understand? So we had to look for something else." It was when the SEP's compared their career prospects

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

with those of others of their own generation that they be­ came unsure of themselves. For every three who expected to surpass their parents, only one was confident of his ability to realize superior status among his contemporaries. The majority of the SEP's felt that while it might take little effort to rise above the level of their parents, it would require all the skill at their command just to keep up with their peers. The all-important problem for them was this competition with their own generation. The sub-group dominated by their contemporaries thus set the standards of achievement for the SEP's. Almost all of them had considered that they must look to their peers for guidance if they were to find the ways of success. Parental advice was viewed by nearly all as being meaning­ less and likely to lead one astray. As will be seen, the pat­ tern of authority associated with the traditional Chinese family seems hardly to have existed for these people. The time-honored claim of filial piety could be easily satisfied by ritual, which the SEP's recognized as such, but it could not be allowed to interfere with personal decisions of any consequence, since to follow the standards of one's parents would be to accept a low social status and economic in­ security. In rejecting the guidance of their parents, the SEP's were going well beyond the normal reactions of youth to the standards of its elders. They were people who at best were only one generation removed from a strongly traditionoriented culture. They had adopted a view of the world in which the possibilities of social mobility and the con­ stant need to seek advancement were recognized as being far more important than had been the case with their par­ ents. Although they had abandoned the "cake of custom," the SEP's still carried with them many traditional attitudes, but these possessed a new significance. In particular, many of the attitudes which in the traditional setting had en­ couraged stable social relationships now produced pre­ cisely the opposite effect. In the old order which the par-

POTENTIAL COMMUNISTS

ents of the SEP's had known, the expectations of social mobility were minimized and the individual was made constantly aware of the forces of group censure. Behavior had to conform fairly rigidly to the demands of the par­ ticular group to which an individual belonged. The group, in its need for stability, sought to formalize most acceptable patterns of conduct. The cues for individual action could be well learned, and they were almost always found in the context of the immediate group. The situations which a person might encounter were usually fairly well defined by tradition and he could learn the safe and acceptable re­ sponses. Given a fair degree of social stability, the individ­ ual could be confident that traditional modes of behavior would offer both security and effectiveness in action. The SEP's, on the other hand, found themselves in­ volved in far less clearly defined social relationships and they believed strongly in the possibilities of social advance­ ment. However, their standards of success or failure were still those common to the group to which they felt they belonged. Thus, just as in the case of their parents in the traditional social order, they tended to orient their be­ havior to a particular group. In some cases, the group was fairly clearly defined; in others, it included those with whom they had the most face-to-face dealings. Although, like their parents, they felt that the pressures of group con­ formity were all-important, there was little stability either in their groups or in the status of the individual. As a re­ sult, the cues for individual behavior could not be stand­ ardized. They still felt that the answer to how one should act was to be found in the context of particular situations, but they realized that there was little stability in any situation. The behavior of most of the SEP's, therefore, seems to have been premised on the need for flexibility in meeting all situations. It was of paramount importance for them to be aware of the changing attitudes and demands of the

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

immediate group. They had small faith in the possibility of self-improvement that was in any way independent of, or unrelated to, their group ties. Because of the uncertain­ ties of their social world, they seldom felt required to adopt a set of fixed attitudes and values which might stand them in good stead regardless of changing circumstances. On the contrary, the chance for improvement lay in learning well how to maneuver and adjust to the changing demands and expectations of their associates. The best guarantee of suc­ cess and security was to be always sensitive to the attitudes of others and to respond to those cues for behavior which were inherent in any situation. In the view of the SEP's, some people were more clever than others in sensing these cues and they were the ones who got ahead. This basic characteristic of the SEP's gave to much of their behavior an opportunistic quality. It might be said that they were a highly "tactically" oriented group of peo­ ple who had few "strategic" concepts. That is, they sought to be skillful in adjusting to and handling any situation which arose, but they did not attempt to plan beyond such concrete situations; "strategic" objectives could not be set by the individual independently of others. The same over­ powering need to conform to the expectations of others which had given stability to the behavior of their parents made the conduct of the SEP's seem all the more oppor­ tunistic and unstable. At the same time, most of the SEP's showed that they had little respect for many of the traditional values of their parents. They felt that the probable reward for diligence, hard work, patience, and the like was to be a peasant. They were too urbanized, too attached to a cash economy, and also much too close to having been peasants themselves to have any desire for such a fate. They were wise enough to know that for generations most Chinese had had to accept the lot of the peasant, but they themselves valued too greatly all that was modern to be content with a life of

POTENTIAL COMMUNISTS

such limited possibilities. Instead, in exploiting any given situation, they tended to prize shrewdness and cleverness, qualities which they did not associate with traditional atti­ tudes. This did not mean that they sought to avoid hard work or that they were incapable o£ diligence and great effort. It was only that these qualities were not viewed as being valuable in themselves. Effort had to be expended to some purpose, and success depended upon one's ener­ gies. In their view, anyone could work hard but only a few could be smart. In spite of these attitudes, the SEP's were not particularly cynical. They were generally too compulsively concerned and enthusiastically involved with the problem of ad­ vancing themselves to have room for cynicism about their behavior. They were capable of true admiration for those who had done well by their wits. At the same time, they could not help but be scornful of those who lacked skill in taking advantage of developing situations. For example, one SEP indicated the admiration he had once felt for the Communists by speaking of how clever the Chinese party had been; in return for giving the naive peasants paltry pieces of land, the Communists had gained all the power and riches in China. However, in viewing the Chinese Com­ munist successes as in effect one of the most extraordinary confidence games ever perpetrated, this SEP only appeared to be trying to explain a phenomenon in terms that he could understand. Those who had peasant mentalities de­ served the life of the peasant, but he preferred to identify himself with those who knew better things.1 lit will be noted that in many respects the personalities of the SEP's coincided with David Riesman's "other-directed" category. This suggests that his view of the progression from "tradition-directed" to "inner-directed" and then to "other-directed" may not hold in the case of those societies in which the weakening of the traditional order is caused by external forces of a modern, industrial character. The situation in societies now in the process of breaking from tradition may provide little encouragement for the development of "inner-directed" personalities.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

Heroes and Daydreams

Even when the SEP's were not speaking directly about their efforts to find social advancement, they demonstrated a strong attachment to the immediate and the concrete and a belief that it was always essential to act according to the circumstances of the moment. These tendencies were evi­ dent, for example, in their answers to questions about the heroes of their youth and their experiences in daydreaming. Only four of the SEP's said that they had felt any sense of identity with what might be considered public heroes during their youth. The rest had grown up without such examples, until in Communism they found Stalin, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. All of these SEP's, to the extent that they admitted having consciously patterned their behavior on the actions of others, said that their models were people whom they had seen and known in a social context to which they felt themselves directly related. In most cases, these heroes were a few years older than they were and were doing things that the SEP's could also expect to do: they were upper-classmen, workers who had become foremen, former soldiers in the MPAJA, and Communist recruiters. The heroes of the SEP's were therefore people who had figured prominently in their own personal experiences. The SEP's had grown up without anything comparable to the Western child's acquaintance with an array of idealized heroes from history, fiction, and sports who belonged in a different social setting. They had not had to engage in even the simple exercise of isolating those qualities they admired in a distant hero and then determining how these general qualities might be applicable to their own be­ havior. They found it difficult, in fact, to assume that those characteristics which had made others great might be rele­ vant for them: the situation was so obviously different and to generalize was dangerous. Although many of the SEP's had read popularized accounts of Chinese history and most of them enjoyed Chinese operas, the heroes in these works

POTENTIAL COMMUNISTS

belonged to a world so different from their own that it never occurred to them to hold them up as models. The complete engrossment of the SEP's with the cir­ cumstances of their daily lives was also revealed in their responses to questions about their youthful daydreams. Most of them emphatically denied that they had ever per­ mitted themselves to engage in such a "silly," "useless," and "dangerous" pastime. Only a few would admit to having indulged in fantasies.2 The majority felt that it was social misfits, ne'er-do-wells, and loafers who had a monopoly on daydreaming and that this practice was a major cause of their misfortunes. Less extreme reactions assumed the form of dismissing daydreaming as a pointless activity which could lead neither to inspiration nor to ideas of any utilitarian value, unless it was confined to one's immediate problems. One of the more articulate respondents expressed his feelings thus: "I used to daydream a lot about going home, but this also required money, so most of my dreaming was about how to make money. All of my daydreaming was done for a pur­ pose. There is no point in thinking about things that are impossible; when you think about things that you want, you should think only about how you can get them. Dream 2 One o£ the respondents who did admit to daydreaming also had had some public heroes. His comments reveal something of his ex­ pectations about Communism. "Before I joined the party, I had quite a few heroes: Robinson Crusoe, Lincoln, Newton, Edison, Napoleon, Gorki, and Lu Hsun. I also did a great deal of daydreaming as a young person. I loved adventure and used to daydream about going to strange places and seeing new things. The daydream I liked the best and the one I engaged in often was thinking about taking a lot of friends with me to a small island and establishing a new society— a sort of Robinson Crusoe. In fact, Robinson Crusoe was my greatest hero. It was hard for me to daydream, though, because my spirit was always darkened by economic reality. Some Chinese can afford to do so, but they do not have the spirit for it; once they have made money, they are only interested in making more. On the other hand, the poor people cannot pause long enough to daydream—they have to keep working in order to live and improve their station. Therefore, very few Chinese are able to daydream."

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

about what you want only enough so that you will think harder about how to get it, and when you can't think of any way to get it, then stop thinking about it and think about something else. This is the way men think, and not the way animals or women think—they can't plan." The anxious concern of the SEP's regarding social mo­ bility, their great sensitivity to the attitudes of their peers, and their constant efforts to find in every situation guidance for their own behavior were all fundamental in making them susceptible to Communism. Although these tenden­ cies gave an opportunistic and even desperate character to much of their behavior, they also caused a great deal of the conduct of the SEP's to fall into an understandable pattern. In later chapters, we will see how these character­ istics of the SEP's governed their acceptance of Com­ munism. It may be noted here that in the nineteenth century, when Communism was developing its image of the "prole­ tarian revolutionary," the newly emerging class of urban workers in Europe was also composed largely of people who were not far removed from a traditional setting. However, while the Communists have steadfastly continued to insist that the proletariat must retain its "rootless" quality be­ cause of its dependence upon wages in a vicious capitalistic system, the industrial workers of the West have generally been able to find in the rich diversity of urban life a great variety of social relationships and social attachments. While the characteristics that the Communists identify with the proletariat therefore no longer seem to apply to Western industrial workers, they furnish a not too inaccurate de­ scription of the people who are breaking from tradition in societies that still lack a proletarian class. The "rootless" quality that Lenin spoke of as fundamental to the "true revolutionary" can be perceived in those who are just be­ ing exposed to the modern world and have not as yet

POTENTIAL COMMUNISTS

found their place in it. For this reason, it seems likely that in areas of the world in which the hold of traditional cultures is being weakened, there are large numbers of people who have many of the characteristics of the Malayan SEP's.

CHAPTER 6

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH ALTHOUGH the SEP's were generally quite young at the

time when they joined the party, the mean age being twenty-three, most of them had already acquired consider­ able knowledge of life. In recounting the experiences of their early years, they revealed much about the nature of their alienation from the ways of their parents and the manner in which this process had affected their general out­ look. They also indicated the character of their new ambi­ tions and their expectations of satisfying them. The atti­ tudes at which they had arrived governed both their ap­ proach to the Communist movement and their adjustments to its demands. In recalling their childhood experiences, most of the SEP's displayed an extraordinary degree of detachment, showing little sense of identity with or involvement in the events they described. At the same time, most of them appeared to find some enjoyment in reflecting on what they felt already belonged to a distant past. Many spontaneously said that it was the first time in years that they had freely thought and spoken of these events. They readily adopted a perspective from which they seemed to be watching them­ selves as children in a drama. Even when speaking of what must have been tragic experiences, they did not dwell on the emotions they had felt at the time, but sought only to make vivid the situation and what was said and done. In fact, they often seemed to find a certain impersonal amusement in looking back at their own vicissitudes. The SEP's explained their detached view of their child­ hood by insisting that the experiences of youth were in no way related to adult behavior. They generally rejected any suggestion that their emotional reactions to the events they described might in any way have influenced their subse-

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

quent behavior.1 Even the fact that they had had to give the party a detailed record of their life histories did not seem to have impressed them with the idea that one's earlier experiences might mold one's attitudes, and apparently lit­ tle else had suggested this possibility to them.2 Even when the accounts of the SEP's progressed beyond the period of their childhood, they continued to display the same attitude of detachment. They were always in­ clined to disassociate themselves from their past experi­ ences, once these experiences were no longer pertinent to a new situation. In their concern for their future, they ig­ nored their past. In the case of most of the SEP's, the picture they drew of their childhood was one of general happiness. The ma­ jority appeared to hold as a firm assumption the notion ι One SEP told of how at the age of eight he had a serious conflict with his father over smoking. According to the SEP, the issue was mainly that he had been stealing his father's cigarettes. His father was indignant, but his mother was principally worried about her son's habits and what the neighbors would think. The SEP ran away from home for a day and, while hiding under a bridge, was amused to hear his mother's wailings. When he returned home, he ceased smok­ ing. Early in the interview he had refused a cigarette, saying that he had given up smoking when he left the Communist party and surrendered. At the time of the interview, he was attempting to re­ establish relations with his father. When it was suggested to him that there might be some relationship between his smoking habits and the two occasions of his return to the family fold, he rejected the idea violently as an absurd proposition, insisting that his cur­ rent abstinence was based solely on a desire to save money and live within a budget. 2 The experiences of youth have not been entirely ignored in Chinese biographical and autobiographical writing, but treatment of the relationships between childhood and maturity has been gen­ erally limited to a consideration of family connections or manifes­ tations of peculiar talents and skills, felt to be inborn, which again appear in adulthood. The Chinese literary tradition has thus con­ tained less implicit notions about the process by which a child is emotionally molded into the man than has been the case in Western biography, with its fascination with "the man and his times"—a tradi­ tion which may have encouraged and made more generally acceptable many of the theories of modern psychology.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

that childhood was, by nature, the happiest period of one's life, inasmuch as children were entirely free of responsibili­ ties. In fact, they equated the very pointlessness of the activities of childhood with happiness. "I was very happy as a child, because I just did what I wanted to and didn't have to worry about anything." "It was a lot of fun just playing with my other school­ mates. I didn't have to think about anything. We just did silly things or sat around and did nothing. It didn't matter what one did, so we were very happy." "I didn't have to think then. I didn't have to plan or figure out what I ought to do. So you can see that I was very happy." In speaking thus, the SEP's revealed the great earnest­ ness that lay behind much of their adult behavior. They disliked admitting that in later life they had failed to evaluate their actions pragmatically or had been incapable of shrewd calculations. However, in continuing to identify the happiness of childhood with a freedom from utilitarian considerations, they suggested that their adult need to think constantly in such terms was a burden. When specifically asked whether they had had a happy childhood, nearly a third of the SEP's introduced a new and, for them, decisive test—the social and economic posi­ tion of their parents. Several who had described apparently carefree days of play and numerous mischievous pranks in­ sisted in the end that it be recorded that they had had an unhappy childhood because their fathers were poor. Some of those who came from better-off homes contended that this fact alone must have meant that they were happy. It is difficult to tell whether they had actually felt this way as children or whether their answers were only a manifes­ tation of their later attitudes. In any case, it is certain that most of them adopted at a very early age a highly ma­ terialistic outlook in which happiness and contentment were closely associated with social status.

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

Family Relations

As we have indicated, for most of the SEP's the peer group had largely replaced the family as a source of advice and as an example in making their way in the world. In their experience, it would appear that the forces which have been breaking down the traditional Chinese family system were remarkably successful. The family relation­ ships they described usually had little resemblance to those that were basic to the traditional pattern. In speaking of their families, the SEP's did not seem to be referring to an institution that had, or that they felt should have had, a great deal of control over their behavior. Instead, the pat­ tern of relationships between parents and children seems to have been a highly permissive one; by the time the child was capable of undertaking a career, the parents were not expected to play an important role in his decisions. In the case of the vast majority of the SEP's, this step had been taken by the time they were eighteen. Nearly a third were working and living away from home when they were sixteen. In general, their parents seem to have accepted the idea that a young man must go out into the world and seek his fortune; if he was successful, he would remember his parents, but in the process parental wishes were likely to be ignored. The Chinese father did not often appear in the inter­ views in his traditional authoritarian and central role. From a very early age, most of the SEP's respected the at­ titudes of their contemporaries more than the desires and commands of their parents. When it came to their de­ cision to join the Communist party, only a small number indicated that they had given any thought to their father's opinion. In the few cases in which conflict over the son's becoming involved with Communism did arise, it generally took the form of the father maintaining that the son -would be wasting his time in a career that could not be financially rewarding.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

"My father told me that I was foolish to join the Com­ munists because I would not be able to make a good living and there were better jobs elsewhere." "My father said that I should not work for the Com­ munists because they would cheat me and not pay me enough for all 1 did for them. But since he knew nothing about affairs, I didn't pay any attention to his words." "I had to leave home when I joined the New Democratic Youth League because my father was so mad at me. He kept arguing all the time and saying that I was wasting my time. Since I was making as much money as he was, I didn't have to listen to him." Insofar as their first notions about the character of au­ thority were based on their relations with their parents, it would seem that most of the SEP's developed at an early age the expectation that authority is not likely to be par­ ticularly predictable. The traditional Chinese doctrines and demands of filial piety had not occupied an important place in their childhood training. Their fathers had been unable to impose the detached and generally unquestioned authority that used to be a stabilizing element in the Chi­ nese family structure. Rather, the SEP's learned early that the manner in which their parents exercised their power depended almost entirely upon temporary moods. The treatment they received from their parents often seemed quite unrelated to their own conduct and behavior. "When my father was feeling good, there was nothing we couldn't do, but when he came home mad, he would scold and beat us no matter what we did." "I was punished whenever my parents lost their temper. Sometimes it was one thing and sometimes it was another. I just used to get out of the house, and when I came back, they had usually forgotten all about it." As they grew older, the SEP's appear to have become skillful in manipulating the moods of their parents; it was thus that they learned how authority might be influenced. Many of them were quite frank in discussing the techniques

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

they had employed in "negotiating" with their parents and "bribing" them. The majority seemed to have been con­ fident that if they could get their parents in the right mood, there was little they could not do. In their later dealings with other forms of authority, including the Communist party, the SEP's continued to expect that they could in some way or other always negotiate with those in power. Although the SEP's sought to circumvent and ignore the demands of their parents, it would be wrong to think of them as having been in active revolt. It is true that they did not want to associate themselves with the ways of their parents, but at the same time they were under almost no pressure to do so. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, the parents seem to have made no serious attempts to control them. The older generation did not constitute a force against which they had to struggle; the problem was not that of escaping from the old but of finding oneself in the new. In this respect, the SEP's did not face quite the same problem that many children of American immigrants do in rejecting their parents' ways and conforming to the standards of American society. It is usually necessary for these first-generation native-born Americans to oppose their parents' attitudes to a greater degree, even though they are aware that the culture they are seeking to adopt places great importance on positive emotional ties between parent and child. The result is not only a more intense form of revolt than was the case for the SEP's, but also one accompanied by more complicated emotional feelings, including those of guilt. Most of the SEP's indicated that their families had made few demands on their emotions. Even those who said that theirs had been a close family group described one that was well-functioning rather than emotionally warm. To them, the "close" family was one in which all had to co­ operate and pool their earnings. The emotional tone of many of these families seems to have been characterized by a great deal of bickering and nagging, since each member

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

was primarily concerned with whether the others were doing their share. Such questions could be resolved only by argument, since there was no clearly recognized source of authority. About a fourth of the SEP's said that they had had serious family problems. All of those who had had step­ parents claimed that this in itself was enough to have made their home life unhappy. Although they assumed that the presence of a stepparent was a "natural" cause of unhappiness for children, the descriptions of their family re­ lationships did not differ greatly from those of most of the SEP's. The difficulties of the remainder who reported family problems were those common to broken homes. Five said that in the confusion of the war, or faced with eco­ nomic hardships, their fathers had deserted their families and never returned. In all of these cases, the mothers and the older siblings had been able to keep the rest of the family together. Almost twice as many had grown up with­ out seeing much of their fathers, who followed the practice of working away from home for years at a time. Two of the female SEP's had accompanied their mothers when they went to live with other men. These were the more extreme examples. However, none of the families of the SEP's had escaped the effects of the major social and economic upheavals of modern Asia. Under the stress of these conditions, the response in most cases had been not a drawing-together of the family unit but a disruption which in the most extreme cases resulted in an almost total breakdown of the group. Even under the best of circumstances, the family failed to provide a primary focus for the activities of the SEP's.8 * There arc two considerations, both of which may have been ex­ aggerated by the interview situation, that could account in part for the fact that the SEP's appear to have been influenced and controlled by their families even less than might have been expected of modern Chinese. First, since the SEP's generally became more knowledgeable about politics and current affairs than their parents had been, they were inevitably subjected to outside influences; they may have been

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

Personal Friendships

Only four of the SEP's would admit that they had had social difficulties in making friends with those of their own age. Three others said that they had not had many friends because they lived in places where there were few other children. All the rest claimed that they had had satisfying friendships and they generally seemed proud of their ability to get on well with others. The emphatic manner in which they denied that they had ever had difficulties in making friends suggested the importance they placed on personal relations and their sense of insecurity when they were un­ sure of how they stood with their acquaintances. Since the SEP's looked primarily to their contemporaries rather than to their families for guidance, it is not surpris­ ing that they tended to expect a great deal of their personal friendships. It was through their friendships that they had been able to identify themselves with a new way of life and they spoke frankly of the advantages they had hoped to gain from them. The SEP's felt that basic to the process of forming friendships was the need to excel in competition with others: anyone who could prove his superiority over his fellows would be well liked and have many friends. Since they believed that their eventual social status would depend upon how they were accepted by others, the key to advancement lay in the popularity that came from suc­ cess in competition. "I was very well liked and had many good friends. We used to fight a lot and although I lost to those who were bigger, I was able to beat those who were smaller and those my own size. Thus, I was well liked." "I had many very good friends. I was better than most in basketball and thus got on well with the other children." excessively sensitive to this gap between themselves and their par­ ents. Secondly, some of them may have felt that their experiences with Communism might compromise their parents, and thus they may have sought to minimize the influence of their families.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

"I did well in my schoolwork and the other students liked me for this. I had a lot of good friends." This attitude of expecting others to accept them because they had demonstrated superiority in any form of recog­ nized competition continued to characterize the SEP's in later life. Those who became informal leaders of one sort or another tended to assume that their position was based on the popularity which, in their minds, was synonymous with having large numbers of friends. After they joined the party, most of them clung to the belief that they would have better personal relations with their fellows if they could prove themselves to be good Communists and win promotions. Apparently, most of the SEP's were so anxious to get ahead that it never occurred to them that in their efforts to prove their superiority they might be antagoniz­ ing others. Owing in part to the great amount of moving about which was common to their lives, few of the SEP's reported that they had maintained particular friendships over long periods of time. Only three said that they had lived con­ tinuously in the same community until they joined the MCP. New friendships had to be established after each move and until this was done they felt isolated and in­ secure, unable to learn the important cues for their own behavior in the new situation. Once they were part of a new group, it became the major focus for their activities, and from the relationships they had within it they derived a sense of security and accomplishment. "When I first went to Port Dickson, I knew no one and I didn't know what I ought to do. I didn't know the local customs and many people took advantage of me. Then I found some friends and I didn't have to worry any more." "When we moved from Kuala Kangsas to Batu Gajak, the only person I knew was my uncle. After I made some friends, everything was all right and I got on well." "No one was friendly to me at Teluk Anson and I de-

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

cided I wouldn't be able to make a living there, so I moved again." The practical attitude of the SEP's toward personal re­ lations made it difficult to evaluate the emotional intensity of their friendships. When they were asked specifically how close particular friendships had been, they customarily answered in terms of how willing they would have been to lend each other money. This pragmatic test was ac­ cepted by most as a valid indication of the closeness of personal bonds. It would be dangerous, however, to conclude that the SEP's placed no value on friendship apart from its useful­ ness to themselves. There is ample evidence that they found much satisfaction in male comradeship; the possibilities for such relationships were to be one of their most important compensations when they first took up the arduous life of the Communists. Indeed, despite their scorn for tra­ ditional attitudes, the SEP's still retained the time-honored Chinese respect for the sentiments of male comradeship, sentiments which have figured more largely in Chinese liter­ ature than those of romantic love. The reason why the SEP's continued to manifest this particular attitude so strongly is a key to much of their behavior. They knew of no important impersonal considerations that could explain an individual's fate or account for general social develop­ ments. They still held the view, basic to traditional Chinese culture, that personal connections are the prime force in human affairs. Thus, since they depended upon personal relationships for so many things, it is not surprising that their descriptions of individual friendships were a mixture of sentiment and hard calculation. Education

The SEP's had considerably more education than is com­ mon among Malayan Chinese in general. According to the 1947 census of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore,

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

55.7 per cent of all Chinese over fifteen years of age were illiterate and among the males the comparable figure was 37.1 per cent.4 Only three of the SEP's—two of whom were women—had been illiterate when they were first exposed to Communism; they were later to become propaganda "show pieces," lecturing on how the party had taught them to read and write. It is difficult, however, to evaluate the extent of the schooling that the rest of the SEP's received. The number of years of school attendance can be misleading because of the great differences in standards among the Chinese schools in Malaya as well as in China. Some of these schools attempted to uphold high standards of instruction, but the majority were quite inferior, especially at the elementary level. Instruction often consisted of little more than teach­ ing the children Kuo-yu, the national dialect of China, and a few Chinese characters. Among those interviewed, the median was six years of schooling. Twenty per cent had re­ ceived three years or less, and about the same number had attended or graduated from middle school (the Chinese equivalent of high school). There was an appreciable difference between the amount of formal schooling received by those who became party functionaries and those who remained in the rank and file. Only two of the functionaries had had less than four years of instruction. Education, particularly when it went beyond just learning to read and write, was to become a necessary qualification for the more exacting tasks expected of party officials. Also, as might be expected, those who took part in propaganda work tended to have had more schooling than the other party functionaries, and were definitely better-educated than the military officers of the MRLA. The fact that the functionaries had more formal educa­ tion than the rank and file seems to be typical of all Asian Communist parties. In contrast, the hard-core professionals «"Literacy" was defined as the ability to read and write a simple letter in any language.

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

of most Western Communist parties are not usually the most highly educated members, and the majority of the intellectuals who pass through these parties have little advantage over the less-well-educated in terms of winning promotion. The probable reasons for this are not hard to find, but they are worth noting since they suggest one of the more important differences in the position that Com­ munism has been able to occupy in Western societies, on the one hand, and in Asian societies, on the other. In the West, there is a greater likelihood that with more education there will be increased career opportunities in the society as a whole and, as a result, a career in the party seems less attractive to Western intellectuals. Aside from those who are unable to cope with special personal prob­ lems or hardships encountered during periods of economic depression, most Western intellectuals are prepared to fol­ low careers that are an accepted part of the general society. In contrast, those Asians who have received more education than the vast majority of their compatriots often find it difficult to fit into their societies and are faced with intense frustrations. In part, the difficulty follows from the fact that many of the better-educated Asians expect to be ac­ corded the social deference and, hence, the influential posi­ tion of the scholar in the traditional social order. Granted more recognition and prestige than their Western counter­ parts, some Asian intellectuals have confused the respect they have received as "students" with their own functional importance, and have cherished exaggerated expectations about their career prospects. Their situation is further complicated by the inherent difficulties in providing an appropriate type of education for members of a society in transition. At one extreme there are those who have received advanced training in a body of knowledge that is mainly relevant to a more industrialized society. These are the highly Westernized intellectuals who discover that under existing conditions their societies can­ not fully appreciate or use their new talents. Unable to find

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

employment that matches their training, they become frus­ trated. Often their frustrations are intensified because they are keenly aware of the underdeveloped character of their societies. While they were receiving their education, many of them were driven by a sense of mission and expected to be able to spread the benefits of their new knowledge. In their subsequent disappointment, they may turn to extrem­ ist forms of political action. All of the Asian Communist parties appear to have a few leaders of this type. However, in spite of the highly articu­ late criticisms that frustrated Asian intellectuals make of existing conditions in their countries, only a marginal few have gone so far as to become Communists. The fact that such intellectuals frequently communicate in a Western language has made them more conspicuous to Westerners, who often assume that they are expressing the problems common to those Asians who do become Communists. Ac­ tually, it seems that most of those who in fact turn to Com­ munism are faced with somewhat the opposite problem. These are the people who, like the SEP's, have received a more limited and a more traditional form of education, but in a school environment that has encouraged an en­ thusiasm for many aspects of modern life. The formal or­ ganization of their schools may appear to follow Western practices and thus encourage them to believe that they are receiving a modern education. However, the content of the instruction does not meet modern standards. As a result, their formal education provides them with few skills that are of career value in even their transitional societies. In spirit, they belong to a world that is more modern than that of their training and abilities.6 ο In the case of the Chinese Communist Party, some of the top leaders and some types of cadres did receive a Westernized university education. However, the vast majority of the hard-core party mem­ bers appear to be the products of provincial middle-schools where they were exposed to modem ideas but received inferior training. Without these people, it is doubtful whether the "frustrated intel­ lectuals" would have been able to produce a mass movement.

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

Thus, in the case of the SEP's, their faith in the superi­ ority of the educated person became the basis of one of their deepest frustrations. They had come to expect that any investment of time and energy in schooling would be proportionately rewarded by better career opportunities. In childhood, most of them had been told that their school­ ing would be of material value, and even as young students they appear to have developed strongly utilitarian expecta­ tions about the value of formal education. "I liked school very much, because I knew that if I learned all the things they taught, I would be able to get a better job when I grew up. I wanted to learn English for this reason." "My parents wanted me to go to school, but I didn't care for school because I didn't understand the usefulness of learning characters. When I did understand this, I liked school, but it was too late and I have always been at a dis­ advantage." Then, when they did leave school, they found that they were not qualified for jobs that would give them the social status they were expecting. Disappointed in their hopes, they were jealous of the little schooling they possessed and continued to believe that they should get better jobs on the basis of it. Most important, neither their expectations nor such schooling as they had prepared them for a life of man­ ual labor. They had firmly believed that through education they would be able to escape hard physical work. Associa­ tion with other workers who had received even less educa­ tion was a constant reminder to them that they themselves deserved better jobs. "None of the other workers on the estate had received a primary-school education. The people who had tapping sta­ tions on each side of me were illiterates, but we all were paid about the same -wages." "Most of the people working in the tin mine were un­ educated. I wanted to be a bookkeeper, but the only work

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

I got was the same kind as those with no education at all got." The one compensation the SEP's received was that among their fellow-workers some remnants of the traditional re­ spect for the educated person still existed. Their associates readily turned to them for advice and informal leadership. The SEP's themselves assumed that anyone who had re­ ceived more education—in no matter what field—was a superior person, deserving of leadership; in fact, they seemed to feel that such a person would be unable to avoid being a leader. Thus, although they could not achieve a superior economic status as a result of their education, they were apt to become recognized as leaders by those less fortu­ nate than they. In the party, also, this deference accorded the educated person made it important for the leadership to be better-educated than the rank and file. Pragmatism and the Nature of Fate

Of his childhood, one SEP reported, "I observed all the religious festivals and enjoyed the special days. My grand­ mother took care of the religion for the whole family. I never practiced any religion after I left home." The atti­ tude of this SEP toward religion was typical of the majority. Religion played almost no part in their lives and was con­ sidered to involve little more than the performance of rit­ uals which could be either fun or boring. Although most of them had received some religious training, it was their accepted attitude that religion meant little to young Chi­ nese. "I received some religious training from my mother, who was a devout Buddhist and taught me what she knew. However, I was not very interested in religion. Young peo­ ple in Malaya have more interesting things to think about. . . . It is only when you get old that you begin to worry or think about religion." Thirty per cent of the SEP's claimed that they came from religiously indifferent families. "I had no religious training

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

and my parents did not believe in anything, so far as I know. They just tried to live out their lives." For the rest, religion had been little more than a matter of ritual in childhood and of memories of burning joss-sticks. What­ ever religious powers there might be could be propitiated by the elders and particularly by the women in the family, who performed the necessary rituals for all. "My mother believed and took care of the ceremonies for the family. Therefore, I didn't have to do anything about religion." The attitude that religion belongs mostly in the domain of the women was also held by some of the girls who were former party members. "My mother gave me some religious training, but I was not interested in it. I don't have to worry about religion until I have some children. That's when women have to think about religion. They also have to think about it before they die. If women didn't think about religion, who would think about it?" For the SEP's, religion presented no obstacle to their acceptance of Communism. In fact, the doctrinaire Com­ munist attacks on religion had little meaning to them, since they were generally so indifferent to religion that it hardly seemed worthwhile to view it as an enemy. As one of them said: "I was just not interested in religion, so I neither opposed nor supported it. As a Communist, I could never get interested in the attacks on religion, since it meant nothing to me. When they attacked religion, it seemed silly and pointless to me." Although the MCP faithfully upheld the Communist views on religion, it was unable to make them into issues that were meaningful to its membership. Lacking the Western tradition of both organized religion and its counterforces of anti-clericalism and militant athe­ ism, they could not understand why Communist doctrine attached such importance to taking a strong stand in the matter. Most of the SEP's had been willing even before they were exposed to Communism to accept the view that religion was probably little more than superstition. How­ ever, it seemed rather ridiculous to them to engage in

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

violent campaigns against such superstitions, since little harm could come from old women enjoying themselves with their rituals.® Not unrelated to the lack of any strong feelings one way or another on the part of the SEP's about religion was their almost complete inability to see in human affairs a depth or dimension that reached much below surface manifesta­ tions of emotion. In their general vocabulary and in their view of human behavior, there was little recognition of anything deeper. They neither spoke of nor appeared to have been bothered by inner conflicts and painful soulsearching experiences. Almost entirely missing was any­ thing comparable to the whole range of Western attitudes, both religious and secular, about a level of experience that lies beyond the immediately empirical. Such concepts as a psyche, a soul, an aesthetic longing, and the like were foreign to them. Many former Western Communists tend to characterize their experience with the movement as involving a crisis for their whole personality, for their very being. The process of entering and leaving the party is a matter of deep emotion and inner anguish. Moreover, it is easy for other Westerners to believe that the experience may have been of such an order; they can understand the former Commuβ One of the former political commissars, when speaking of his difficulties in instructing others, unintentionally revealed how ques­ tions in Communist doctrine that were originally related to impor­ tant religious issues in the West were meaningless to the Chinese in the party. Apparently himself unaware of the religious significance of Darwinism and thus of why questions about the creation of man might be important to political theory, he reported: "One time I had to give a lecture on the writings of Engels. We were in a small jungle camp and I stood up and began, 'Comrades, as good Communists, we all believe because of what Engels wrote that long ago all men were apes." Then one of those who always asked silly questions in­ terrupted me and asked, 'Is it possible that the Central Committee is trying to prove how right Engels was by making us all back into apes?' After that, it was very hard to talk about Engels, so I just dis­ cussed his theories on the development of society. Who cares what men were before they were men?"

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

nist who expressed his disillusionment in the words, "The God That Failed." The SEP's, on the other hand, would characterize the same experience far more simply and di­ rectly as "The Bastards That Cheated Me." In effect, the outlook of the SEP's meant that they denied themselves the possibility of explaining or even of ration­ alizing their own behavior by ascribing it to inner con­ flicts which they could not be expected fully to control. Indeed, even if they had had the words, there were other considerations which would have made it difficult for them to introduce such concepts in their responses. They were quite prepared, and usually tried, to gain the sympathy of their listener, but they seemed to feel that it was undesira­ ble and even improper to expose him to whatever soulsearching experiences they may have had. Rather, they constantly strove to leave the impression that they had always acted with clear heads, that their calculations had never been influenced by their emotions. They were pre­ pared to recognize that their emotions could be manipu­ lated by others—this was natural in all phases of life—but they frowned on self-manipulation. This is not to say that the SEP's were incapable of deep feelings, but rather that they would not admit to an interviewer, or probably even to themselves, that they had ever allowed their actions to be guided by uncontrolled responses to feelings that were not directly relevant to the immediate situation. The secular culture of the SEP's failed to provide them with a vocabulary for expressing notions about the possible intensities and complexities of human emotions. Romantic and sentimental feelings had little place in their lives, and there was nothing close at hand to suggest that they should be swayed by such considerations. They were without po­ etry and literature; they did not even have popular music, the lyrics of which might have made them more sensitive to emotional matters and possibly articulate about them. Unaccustomed to hearing others describe their emotions in exaggerated language, the SEP's tended to be quite matter

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of fact. They would identify their feelings, but rarely elab­ orate on them, and almost never claim that they had acted solely in terms of them. Their culture did not teach them that people could "fall in love," be "carried away," or in any way fail to be responsible for their actions because of the intensity of their emotions. The only technique the SEP's possessed for disclaiming responsibility for their actions was to speak of what lay outside themselves: it was the "circumstances" and the "situation" which placed limits on their behavior. To them, fate worked in terms of the surrounding situation, and in no way invaded their emotions or their rational faculties. They were quite prepared to say that they had been help­ less because of the circumstances in which they found them­ selves. Their protestations that it couldn't be helped, that they had no choice, might often sound unconvincing to Westerners, who have higher expectations about an in­ dividual's ability to overcome external obstacles. On the other hand, the SEP's would probably find equally uncon­ vincing the former Western Communists who justify their actions by attributing them to the rationally uncontrolla­ ble workings of the inner self, who explain that in their former emotional state they had not been able to under­ stand fully what they were doing. The SEP's did not recog­ nize this Western form of fatalism, since they assumed that man's rationality need never give way to the forces of emotion and irrationality. On many occasions they indi­ cated that they held it vulgar if not shameful to admit that one had acted out of emotionalism, idealism, or senti­ mentality. Only after they had made what they considered to be a hard-headed appraisal of the circumstances—an ap­ praisal that usually was governed by the dominant attitudes of others—did they feel that it was proper or safe to give rein to their emotions. The time for sentiment was after the prudent decision, much as in the traditional Chinese scheme of planned marriages.

THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUTH

Hardships and Personal Suffering

This tendency of the vast majority of the SEP's to view human experience in a limited pragmatic fashion seems to be related to the manner in which they reacted to hardship and suffering. The effects of war and economic crisis that have been the misfortune of modern Asia are to be found in the life histories of most of them. Many had known the loss of their father and brothers, and almost all had under­ gone severe hardships during the Japanese occupation of Malaya. From their remarkably objective accounts, it would appear that most of them had been confronted with far more damaging experiences than most Westerners, espe­ cially Americans and British, who have become Commu­ nists. While among most Western Communists there is little hesitancy to cite such personal experiences in order to explain or rationalize membership in the Communist move­ ment, this was the case with only a small and distinct group of SEP's—the few who did seem to be governed by deep feelings of hostility. The vast majority made little attempt to connect their misfortunes and sufferings with their sub­ sequent political behavior. Some of the SEP's who joined the party after the war had suffered greatly during the occupation and were fully aware that the Communists had led the only important opposition to the Japanese. Never­ theless, they insisted that neither their previous experiences nor the wartime role of the MCP were relevant to their decision to become Communists. In their minds it was silly to suggest that earlier experiences of suffering under Japa­ nese rule could have influenced their behavior when a new and different situation arose. This does not mean, of course, that the SEP's were neces­ sarily able to isolate themselves completely from the con­ sequences of hardship and suffering. The very intensity of their sudden emotional outbursts suggests otherwise. At the verbal level, however, they showed little skill in relating

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these experiences to their later behavior. Their inclinations were all in the direction of picturing themselves as people who—to use one of their favorite expressions—"understood affairs." They seemed to mean by this that they could grasp the realities of any particular situation and thus avoid behaving "stupidly"—another favorite word. In order to do so, they felt it necessary to prevent their decisions from being clouded by emotions that they identified with other circumstances. This often meant that they seemed extreme­ ly clumsy when they sought to influence the feelings of their interviewer toward them. They passed over rich oppor­ tunities to speak about what must have been real hardships in their early lives. At the same time, by repeatedly seeking sympathy at the level of pity and by trying to make much o£ their petty complaints of the moment, such as their de­ sire for higher pay, better food, and the like, they destroyed any impression that they were people of strong character. These, however, were the things that were important to them in their current situation, a situation in which they felt their listener's attitude might carry some weight. The most conspicuous feature of the formative years of the SEP's is the very early age at which most of them came to the conclusion that if they could keep their wits about them and readily adapt themselves to their con­ stantly changing world, they could expect to realize far more than their parents ever had. Through their school­ ing and their relations with their peers, they had developed ambitions which they expected to be able to fulfill. To do this, however, they felt a necessity to conform to the atti­ tudes and standards of their dominant peer group, to try to make the best of all situations, and to distrust the pulls of emotion. Ready to rely upon their ability to make shrewd calculations, they were on the lookout for a vehicle for realizing their ambitions.

CHAPTER 7 UNDERSTANDING POLITICS IN THE last two chapters we surveyed the social characteris­

tics of the SEP's and their dominant attitudes toward life in general. In doing so, we noted some of the important con­ siderations that motivated them. However, there is always a gap between a person's social background and his political behavior which is bridged by his intellectual and emotional understanding of the sphere of politics. Indeed, because of the complexities and subtleties of human reason and prejudice, the realm of politics cannot be viewed simply as a manifestation of sociological and psychological problems, important as these may be. Thus, we must ask why the SEP's sought to solve their problems and to realize their ambitions by turning to political action. To understand how they came to participate in politics, we must know what their attitudes were about the nature of politics. Since they were people who generally fancied themselves as capa­ ble of shrewd judgments, we must learn how they tended to explain and calculate political developments if we are to understand why they picked Communism as the par­ ticular movement to which they were prepared to make great commitments. In attempting to reconstruct the general orientation to­ ward politics which appears to have been characteristic of the Malayan Chinese who became party members, we will be making explicit patterns of thought which were often only implicit and unsystematically formulated in the minds of the SEP's. The requirements of analysis may leave the impression that the SEP's had quite exact and clear con­ cepts about politics. Actually, none of them had fully de­ veloped political philosophies which consistently deter­ mined how they perceived, explained, and evaluated political developments. Rather, they had many attitudes

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and assumptions which were vaguely tied together in their general pattern of reasoning. Some things were good and others bad, some things were likely to happen and others not, because of certain lines of reasoning which they felt were valid in explaining human affairs. However, as they talked about their own experiences, and as they sought to explain their own behavior and the behavior of others, the SEP's provided data for understanding their view of politics. Politics in the Home

Only one of the respondents said that he had grown up in a family where political questions had been frequently dis­ cussed, and only two reported that their fathers had been members of groups that were openly engaged in politics. Slightly less than a fourth said that their parents had be­ longed to social or benevolent associations, including pro­ vincial clubs and secret societies. About the same number denied any knowledge of participation by their parents in political or social organizations. The majority claimed that their parents had never been identified with any political or social group. Probably some of the SEP's sought to minimize their parents' political activities because they felt that their own involvement with Communism might cast suspicion on their families. However, when asked about their parents' political views, only five said their fathers had been strongly anti-Communist. Over 60 per cent claimed that their par­ ents had no understanding of politics and that they were completely a-political in their thoughts and actions. About 10 per cent went even further and said that their parents were anti-political, in the sense that they disliked anything related to politics. The rest claimed that their parents were sympathetic in varying degrees to the Kuomintang. There is little doubt that the SEP's generally received little guidance at home as to how they should understand politics. Most of them claimed that at a very early age they

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

had felt that they were politically more sophisticated than their parents. Indeed, this was one of the principal reasons that many of them gave as to why they expected to surpass the social and economic status of their families. Although the SEP's did not feel that they had learned much about politics from their parents, it is possible to learn something of their own assumptions about the nature of politics from the way in which they characterized their elders' views. Thus, as we listen to them discuss the po­ litical attitudes of their parents, we are introduced to themes which recur in their own thinking about politics. PERSONAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICS

In contending that their parents were a-political, the SEP's suggested their belief that people with either very serious and pressing personal problems or no personal problems at all were unlikely to participate in politics. "My father was not interested in politics as he had to work hard to build up his business. . . . He had too many problems and worries to have any time for politics. As long as we had these problems, there was no talk of politics at home." "My father never talked politics with me. He was a heavy-spirited person and had problems, and so naturally he could not be concerned with politics." At the other extreme: "My father had no politics; he was not a party-faction man at all. Both my father and mother were happy people and we had a happy home, and thus we never talked about politics." "I am sure my father never thought about affairs, be­ cause he was a jolly man who was happy with his family and friends. I know of no reason why he should be inter­ ested in politics, as he had very few personal problems." Between these two poles were those who participated in politics: people who had problems but who were not com­ pletely overcome by them. In contrasting their own be­ havior with that of their parents, most of the SEP's indi-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

cated their belief that although the worries of life are private matters, one can look to political activity for solu­ tions to personal problems. Many explicitly said that they felt that their parents had worked hard but had not ad­ vanced their social and economic status because they had failed to establish satisfactory relations with politically significant groups. When they failed to do this, their prob­ lems had in time become so demanding that even if they had wanted to participate in political activities, it would no longer have been possible for them to do so. In indicating that they expected to avoid the mistakes of their parents by not ignoring the importance of political activities in meeting personal problems, most of the SEP's displayed one of their dominant characteristics: they were an "overly politicized" group of people. That is, they seemed to have little discrimination as to what types of values or objectives might be appropriately sought in the field of politics. On the one hand, the SEP's felt that de­ velopments in the political arena could have profound eifects on an individual's life. They themselves had experi­ enced war and political crises and knew that it was difficult to make predictions about their future without taking prob­ able political developments into account. They seemed to feel that many of the problems which their parents had encountered -were the result oi a failure to be alert to the probability of such major developments or of an inability to adjust to the realities of such events after they occurred. On the other hand, the SEP's also seemed to feel that most personal problems could be best solved by establishing strong personal relationships with others who had some social status. As we have seen, their desire to conform to the expectations of their peers was a reflection of their feeling that security was to be found in personal relations. At the same time, they seemed to view all political groups as offering them an opportunity to establish the personal relations they wanted. We shall see later what some of the problems were which

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

the SEP's expected to solve through political activities; it is enough here to quote the words of one: "My wife wasn't happy about having to work so hard. Therefore, I decided to become a party-faction man and in this way find a better job." ELITE STATUS AND POLITICS

In speaking of their parents as being both a-political and having little social status, most of the SEP's indicated their belief that politics was the concern of those people who stood above the masses. If one became involved in politics, one would be establishing relations that would lead to elite status. "There was no talk of politics in our family, as we were hard-working people. Only people who are well-off can think about affairs. . . . I thought I would be better off if I could learn more about affairs." In many cases the SEP's had been taught by their parents that politics was a game that belonged to the important and distinguished members of the community. While most of them accepted this basic outlook, they had quite dif­ ferent concepts of who should constitute the elite. "My father did not believe in politics, as he felt that the old system was the best for China, and he said that it should be scholars and not generals who told people what to do. I thought my father was right and I respected him until I came to Malaya and found out that he really knew nothing about affairs. I then realized that it had to be generals, because people don't listen to scholars, and be­ cause China is a very weak country and thus only gen­ erals can make it strong." "My father was not very politically inclined—he was not even very patriotic during the Japanese War, when even simpletons were saying how much they loved their country. However, I think my father was capable of being a sympathizer of political groups, but he didn't want to join them. He would follow whichever group he thought was best. My father used to talk a lot about what was

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

good and bad for people to do. He used to tell me that politics was something that women should not be inter­ ested in. He said that he realized that in China it was neces­ sary for women to take part in politics and fight the Japa­ nese. However, he said this was not good. When women had to enter into politics, it was a sign that the country was weak and the leaders could not rule." The elites that the parents of the SEP's associated with politics appear to have been mainly those common to the traditional system of authority in China—the scholars, the officials, the mandarins. They were leaders who were far removed from the masses, and although their elite status may have been theoretically based on achievement stand­ ards, it would have been unrealistic for anyone without a special background and the advantages of early training to aspire to such status himself. In contrast, the political world of the SEP's was populated with elites who were nearer at hand. They were the leaders whom the SEP's en­ countered in their daily lives: the schoolteacher, opinion leaders, the leading merchant, the union organizer, and the like. As the SEP's developed ambitions and aspirations to take part in political activities, they were able to per­ ceive a political arena in their immediate community. The SEP's employed quite pragmatic and utilitarian standards in distinguishing elites: the elites were the people who had achieved social and economic status in various walks of life. Thus, the SEP's did not seem to make any important distinction between skill in politics and skill in other fields. What made a man successful in, say, amass­ ing wealth was also likely to make him successful in poli­ tics, and vice versa. In this respect, the SEP's reflected the traditional Chinese practice of ignoring the specialized nature of a man's qualifications and accepting anyone who has excelled in any field as a deserving leader of men. This attitude reinforced their basic view that the relationships of politics are nearly identical with those which determine

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

social and economic status. Since they drew no sharp dis­ tinction between the world of politics and the world of general social relations, they had no doubts that all people whom they considered important—and this included all Westerners—were involved in politics. POLITICS BELONGS TO YOUTH

In comparing their own involvement in politics with their parents' lack of interest in such matters, the SEP's suggested that in their view politics was a field which be­ longed primarily to youth. They seemed to feel that their elders were too old-fashioned to understand the world of political relationships. "My father was a very old person and naturally had no political ideas. . . . When I was a young child, I used to obey my parents, but as I got older, I realized they knew very little about affairs and that only young people under­ stand politics." "My aunt and the man who was living with her never talked about politics. They gave money to the Commu­ nists, but only when they were forced to. Only young peo­ ple voluntarily support the Communists or any other po­ litical group. Old people only do anything political when they have to. I soon learned this." The SEP's also tended to picture political activities as having the characteristics of youth. Politics was excitement and it required alertness and a great deal of physical and mental activity. One had to be quick-witted and mentally agile to follow and understand political developments. "My father never got excited about anything, so he had no interest in politics." "My uncle could only think of one thing at a time. He was too slow-minded to understand affairs." "My father was very old and he had only three or four ideas. His thinking was not very clear, so he taught me nothing about politics."

III. THE INDIVIDUALS POLITICS IS VIOLENCE

The most striking attitude toward politics that came out of the discussions by the SEP's of their parents' political views was their own belief that politics involves conflict and struggle. They not only expected that physical violence was likely to be the final arbiter, but believed that hostility and aggressiveness were characteristic of political activities. The expressions and words common to political activity that suggest violence were accepted by the SEP's as having more than symbolic meaning. Later, when they were in the party, they continued to interpret the violent expressions characteristic of Marxism-Leninism in a surprisingly literal fashion. The SEP's believed that one had to assume risks and take chances in entering politics. In contrast to the hostility of the political arena was the peace and serenity of private life. However, such a serene life could also leave one isolated and thus socially insecure and unlikely to get ahead. Therefore the risks of political participation had to be weighed against the likelihood of advancement and the costs of social isolation. "My father never talked about politics. He only came home to rest. He was not a party-faction man, as he had no interest in struggling and fighting. He was a peaceful man." "My father knew nothing about politics. If he ever heard any fights or quarrels, he would get afraid. I never heard him discuss political questions or argue with people. He never swore at people, and therefore I know he never belonged to any party or associations. He was a person who was afraid of affairs." "My father was a quiet man. . . . I used to like to argue a lot and fight with people. That is why I was interested in politics." First Political Discussions

If the SEP's learned very little about political matters from their families, where did they gain their understand-

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

ing of politics? Some clues are offered by the answers that they gave to questions about the first political discussions in which they remembered taking part. In trying to recall their earliest political opinions, they referred to the set­ ting in which they first felt they knew enough about politics to be able to talk intelligently about particular issues, and had a basis for evaluating, explaining, and reasoning about political questions in general. Moreover, as the SEP's talked about their first political discussions, it was possible to learn something about how they were drawn into political participation. Since it is often assumed that lower-class Chinese in general, and Malayan Chinese in particular, are usually politically apa­ thetic, the manner in which the respondents came to take an interest in political affairs is particularly significant. There were three main settings or groups within which they were introduced to political discussion: peer groups, Communist-front associations, and schools. Some of the SEP's had much more experience with one setting than another, but in many cases the respondents indicated that at a certain time they became more generally aware of po­ litical issues and hence found themselves taking part in discussions in various settings. INITIATION BY FRIENDS

Although almost half of the SEP's said that they first discussed politics with their fellow workers, their neighbors, and their peers, they had difficulty in describing the po­ litical nature of these discussions. What was significant was their feeling that even though the substance of their con­ versation mainly concerned those things which affected their daily lives, it was still proper to consider such discus­ sion political. Their conversations seem generally to have concerned their current working conditions; they would then discuss the possibilities of finding better employment elsewhere and explore their chances oi getting ahead. Through their conversations, they sought information that

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

might lead to new contacts which would give them greater security, and this was an activity they identified with politics. Thus, at this stage, the SEP's were turning to those around them for cues as to how they might advance them­ selves. In the process they tended to seek out those whom they could accept as opinion leaders. These were usually people who had more information about conditions in the Chinese community as a whole. Through them many of the SEP's were introduced to the political relationships im­ portant in the community—mainly personal relations among the more influential elements. Because their opinion lead­ ers seemed to know what others above them were thinking, the SEP's began to feel that they had some personal rela­ tionship with influential persons. At the same time, they began to pass on to others the information they had re­ ceived, and thus they themselves became opinion leaders simply by serving as a link in a vaguely defined chain. As more people began to turn to them, they grew increasingly aware of the role that they were playing. As will be seen, the fact that so many of the SEP's both recognized and found satisfaction in their role of dispensing information was important in attracting them to Communism. At the same time, many of the SEP's felt that they were becoming politically sophisticated by seeking out opinion leaders. They were now making their own calculations as to the actions which might give them greater economic and social advancement. In making these calculations, they gen­ erally ran up against the fact that their world was an un­ stable one. They vaguely perceived that the source of this instability was at a higher level of politics: the level that produced war, changes in government, economic crises, and administrative decisions. If they were to make any im­ portant decisions about their course of action, they could not ignore the iact that events at this distant level o£ po­ litical activity were likely to have a direct consequence on their own lives.

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

Thus, from their peers the SEP's were seeking the best information possible for predicting what major develop­ ments were likely to occur and how their own lives might be affected. Those who had career interests before the Japanese occupation had not in those more peaceful days felt that it was necessary to concern themselves with de­ velopments at the highest political level. However, the experiences of the Japanese occupation and the unsettled postwar years had altered this attitude. In seeking to understand more fully the national and international level of politics, the SEP's were not actually seeking to identify themselves with those who participated in it, nor did they seem to have strong opinions about the issues involved. They had no expectation that their own behavior could affect such major developments and they did not seek to influence their outcome. The values and issues which at any time might be central to this level of politics seemed to be of little interest to the SEP's. Their problem was that of seeking their own values, and they felt that it was only prudent to recognize that major po­ litical developments were likely to alter the conditions of the search. Thus, some of the characteristic attitudes of the SEP's grew out of their introduction to politics through discus­ sions with their fellow workers and peers. From these ex­ periences, they came to view politics as a complex net of personal relationships. Where one stood depended upon whom one knew. Secondly, they came to expect that taking an interest in political developments would enable them to obtain information important in making calculations for their own careers. Thirdly, they accepted as natural that people might participate in politics, not because they strongly believed in the values professed by those with whom they were identified, but because they felt they might thus be better able to realize their own personal values. Fourthly, they seem to have been led to believe that the appropriate test of the political effectiveness of any group

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

was the extent to which it could protect the private in­ terests of its supporters and not the extent to which it could make its objectives publicly acceptable. In this respect, it should be noted that in the traditional pattern of Chinese politics, there were always a large num­ ber of groups and associations, such as the secret societies, the trade guilds, and the provincial, clan, and benevolent associations, that represented special interests. However, the focus of their activities in the political arena was not at the level of formal law-making, as is the case with most Western pressure groups. Rather, the groups concentrated their attentions on the points of law enforcement, seeking to protect the special interests of their members in spite of the formal laws. Thus, instead of attempting to make others accept their special interests as part of the public good, they were content to adopt a more defensive political pos­ ture by protecting their interests, regardless of what might take place at the level of formal law-making. In part, in­ stitutional arrangements made it impossible for extensive political activities to occur at the "legislative" level, since this was the preserve of those individuals and factions who were identified with the court and the administrative ap­ paratus. As a consequence of the fact that the various in­ terest groups focused their pressures on the final opera­ tional level of administration, there seemed on the surface to be more widespread political "apathy" under the tradi­ tional system than is common to the Western democratic pattern. This was the case because skill in obtaining special considerations in the application of the law requires less conspicuous activities than are necessary to gain general support for particular interests. Also, according to the Western democratic rules of the game—rules that place great value on administrative integrity and that hold that laws must be universally respected until they can be changed by pressures at the legislative level—there was much "corruption" in the system. Of course, these practices were also considered "corrupt" according to the idealized

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

standards of traditional Chinese political morality, but probably no more so than it is considered morally im­ proper in the West for pressure groups to try to influence legislators, who are supposed to think only of the interests of the general public. It would seem that the focus of group pressures in different political processes is not un­ related to differences in political style, types of respect for law, tolerance for what are considered human frailties, and general political behavior. To the extent that the SEP's conceived of political groups as offering the individual pro­ tection from the consequences of governmental or ad­ ministrative decisions, they appear to have had attitudes and a set of political calculi that were common to much of Chinese political behavior. INITIATION BY FRONT GROUPS

Over half the SEP's (about 60 per cent) said that they first took part in political discussions in a Communist front organization. However, of all the SEP's who joined front groups, only two said that they were unaware at the time they became members that the groups were led by the Communists. Thus, in maintaining that they had never been dupes but had always had a firm hold on reality, these SEP's seemed to cast some doubt on their statements that it was in front organizations that they first engaged in political discussions. What appears to have happened was that although these people originally learned something about politics elsewhere, it was under the auspices of a Communist organization that they received the ideas and concepts which gave them a feeling of confidence in speak­ ing about political issues. Thus they were probably correct in saying that it was within a front organization that they first began to discuss politics. It was the front groups which provided them with information about issues and a fairly explicit conceptual framework for evaluating and explain­ ing political developments. One former Branch Committeeman described his intro-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

duction to politics by a Communist trade union in the following words: "At that time, I had no political thoughts, as I knew nothing about affairs and I never worried about them. However, after the union was set up, I used to go to the union hall quite often. They had newspapers and magazines there, and they used to give us many lectures. It was only then that I began to get quite interested in politics. For one thing, they had material to read and they would explain all the questions I had when I read the ma­ terial. At first, I was rather embarrassed about asking ques­ tions, but later I found out that if I asked one question, they would explain to me not just one thing, but many things. I thought this was very kind of them and I ap­ preciated it. In time, I found that I was extremely interested in many of the questions they brought up, and then I be­ gan to spend more and more time with the training pro­ gram they had for us. Previously, whenever I had looked at a newspaper, I did not understand what I read and thus I had no interest in affairs. However, after they talked to me about politics, I understood whatever I read. After that, I liked to read newspapers, because I could say this is good and that is bad, they are right here and wrong there." The implications for an individual's subsequent po­ litical views of arriving at an understanding of politics un­ der the guidance of an organization actively engaged in furthering particular political objectives seem to be rather obvious. In terms of Malaya, this role of the Communists is especially significant, since not one of the respondents was introduced to politics by an anti-Communist group or party engaged in political activities. Nor were any of the SEP's subsequently exposed to any group that had a clear anti-Communist orientation. Also with respect to political developments in Malaya, it is significant that over 75 per cent of those who joined the party before the end of the Japanese occupation said that they had first discussed political questions in front

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

groups, while only about 50 per cent of the late joiners did. Given the far greater extent of Communist front activities after the war, it might have been expected that such groups would have played a greater role in introducing potential Communists to politics. It appears that the increase in Communist activities coincided with and stimulated a greater general interest in politics, so that a large propor­ tion of the late joiners had been exposed to political discus­ sion before they encountered the front groups. However, these discussions were with their peers and fellow workers, and not in the context of any organized political movement. It would seem that during this period more people were talking about politics, but that the Communists remained the only group organized to meet this increase in interest. INITIATION IN SCHOOLS

The third important source of interest in political discus­ sion was the schools the SEP's attended. A little over a quarter of the respondents said they had first come to un­ derstand political issues through discussions in their class­ rooms. However, from their account of these experiences, it was obvious that these discussions had not taken place in the non-partisan atmosphere of "civics" or "citizenship" courses. Rather, individual teachers appear to have as­ sumed the responsibility of explaining to their students their own views on political questions. From what is known about conditions in some of the Chinese schools in Malaya and from the comments of the SEP's, it may be assumed that some of the teachers were themselves members of the MCP, and the classroom thus constituted another form of Communist front. Those who were exposed to political discussions by their teachers seem to have developed the attitude that an in­ terest in and a degree of knowledgeability about political matters was essential for anyone who wished to be con­ sidered modern. It was mainly the young teachers and those who were alert to general developments who intro-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

duced political discussions in their classes. The older teach­ ers, those who taught more traditional subjects, seem to have avoided political questions. As a result, some of the SEP's said that they had come to believe that if one was going to be up-to-date, it would be necessary to learn some­ thing about politics. "I was very much influenced by the man who taught us geography and history. He was a young man; he had traveled a lot and he talked a lot about po­ litical matters. I hated the man who tried to teach us the classics; he knew nothing; and he dressed in an old-fashioned manner." This attitude was reinforced by the respect the SEP's felt for the utilitarian value of knowledge. They were pre­ pared to show deference to some of their teachers, ap­ parently not because of any traditional Chinese respect for the role of the scholar, but because these teachers could give them useful instruction. The outright contempt that some had for those who taught the Confucian classics seems to have been based on their feeling that traditional wisdom was useless. Their general attitude was that what is new is best, because it can be of use. The fact that those teachers who taught them the most useful knowledge—that is, the more modern subjects—were also the ones who introduced discussions about politics made some of the SEP's feel that a knowledge of politics had utilitarian value. Some of the SEP's also seem to have been impressed with their teachers' skill in articulating about political matters. They recognized that their teachers had this ability because they possessed some standards for evaluating and explain­ ing political developments. "My first political thoughts came from my teacher at school. . . . He was my idea of modern China, and naturally he was a great influence in the development of my thoughts and ideas. Also, he was very clever, and when he got angry about things, the words would just pour out of his mouth. I first thought that this was very strange, because when other people get angry, they can only swear, but he always talked with reason when he

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

was agitated. I then learned that he could do this because he knew something about a lot of things. He knew why Japan was bad, Communism was good, why religion only cheated the people and the imperialists only wanted our money. When he was angry, what he knew made him wise, •while my iather was silly "when he got angry." Reliability of Media

In evaluating and understanding political developments, it is usually necessary to depend upon some form of com­ munication. Few people are in a position to learn about political events through direct observation, and thus most have to depend on reading and listening to reports by others. Being dependent upon others for information makes it necessary, if one is to be informed on political develop­ ments, to seek out or expose oneself to the various systems of communication that exist in a society. This in turn means that the available pattern or systems of communica­ tion become key factors in determining an individual's understanding of political issues. The communicators, whether professional or informal opinion leaders, are in a position to govern the way in which particular issues are structured or formulated. In performing their function of dispensing information, they play a major role in deter­ mining what is and what is not considered relevant in ex­ plaining political developments. In doing so, they sug­ gest the pattern of logic appropriate to reasoning about issues, and they often indicate the moral considerations in­ volved in the events they are reporting. On the other hand, an individual has to evaluate the various communications he receives. In arriving at his own decision about political events which he cannot observe, he may have to choose between alternative sources of in­ formation, and he must in any case decide whether to use all or only certain parts of any particular communication. The criteria a person employs in determining the medium

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

he can trust to provide him with information can suggest something about the bases of his general understanding of politics. From what we have already seen of the attitudes of the SEP's toward politics, it should not be surprising to learn that they were inclined to evaluate communications media mainly on the basis of the strength of their personal rela­ tionship with the source of information. Lacking any gen­ eral standards for evaluating the reliability of information, they tended to be unsure of impersonal sources. Only 10 per cent of the respondents felt that it would be wise to act upon information received in a printed form without first having face-to-face contact with someone directly as­ sociated with the source of information. This attitude of the SEP's might seem to be at variance with the importance and prestige generally ascribed to the written language in Chinese culture and the respect that people who are not highly literate usually have for the written word. How­ ever, the SEP's appear to have been aware that the printed word was usually beyond their ability to test and thus they were inclined to be suspicious of it. On the other hand, they were fully confident of their ability to appraise individuals in face-to-face situations. As a former party member from Kuala Lumpur said: "When people talk with you, you can tell whether they are sincere or not and thus you can tell whether their in­ formation is reliable or not. You can't do this with a news­ paper. You can read the newspapers and you can find all kinds of ideas, but how do you know which ones are true and which ones are false? You don't know who wrote it, or why he wrote it, and therefore he might be cheating you." Any form of oral communication seemed to offer pos­ sibilities for establishing the personal associations with the communicator which most of the SEP's felt were essential. Over 70 per cent of the former rank-and-file members and nearly 45 per cent of the former functionaries either said

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

that it was not unintelligent to act according to rumor or indicated that they themselves had made important de­ cisions on the basis of what "people said." Indeed, none of those who were questioned in detail about their attitude toward rumor indicated that they were predisposed to ex­ pect this form of communication to be generally inaccurate. Rather, they seemed to assume that what was in fact their most common source of information was also about as re­ liable a source as could be hoped for. Their readiness to rely upon rumors was due in part to the general importance they attached to conforming to the attitudes and opin­ ions of their peer groups. To ignore what others about them were saying would be to isolate themselves from their main source of security. "When, all the people I knew said that something was going to happen, I of course believed them. My father never paid any attention to what others were saying and that's why he had so much trouble." "When the Emergency began, everyone said that all those who had been members of the trade unions would be arrested if they didn't go into the jungle. I knew that it would be impossible for the police to arrest that many people, but if I hadn't listened to what everybody was say­ ing, where could I have found anyone to help me?" The faith in rumors of the SEP's was not based solely on the fact that they heard these rumors mainly from friends whom they trusted. Over 35 per cent said that they placed great confidence on information from strangers. Their rationale seems to have been that strangers were likely to have access to important information and could give them "tips." Because of their confidence in their own ability to determine the sincerity of people in face-to-face relationships, the fact that they knew little about a stranger did not bother them. Of course, their attitudes were also influenced by the fact that in their communities a wellrecognized role of travelers in general and of peddlers in

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

particular was the passing-on of news about the places they had visited. The former party functionaries appeared to have been far more sensitive to information they received from those whom they considered influential individuals than were the rank and file. Many of those who later were to gain status in the party indicated that they had actively sought out information from those who held some status in the general community, something that none of the rank and file ap­ pear to have done. This was one of the first of many indica­ tions that most of the SEP's who gained rank in the party were more status-conscious than those who remained ordi­ nary members. Moreover, the former functionaries were generally more sophisticated, in the sense that they made more elaborate calculations about politics, and hence felt a need to seek out information. They consciously turned to people with prestige because they assumed that such individuals were more likely to have significant knowledge about events which might affect the community. In general, most of the SEP's displayed a deep distrust of most forms of communication about politics. They seemed to doubt whether there could be such a thing as "objective" information—an attitude which was more sus­ picious than sophisticated. Their feeling was that anyone who was in a position to know about political develop­ ments and who was engaged in telling others about them must be doing so for some special reason. They recognized that the interests of a communicator were not likely to be the same as those of his audience, because of the differences in their positions. It was only after they had established some definite relationship with the communicator that they felt that they could be certain of his interests and motives. Often, merely by talking with their source of information and judging his character to be reliable, they arrived at the conclusion that he was "one of them." Once satisfied that his interests were either the same as their own or did not

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

conflict with them, they were generally willing to act on the information he gave. Two rather basic attitudes of the SEP's toward politics emerged from their discussions about the reliability of media. First, most of them seemed to assume that whatever information they received about general developments con­ tained implications for their own actions. Here again we are observing their tendency to be overly politicized. Re­ peatedly, they said in the interviews, "I heard such-andsuch and so I decided to do such-and-such." Rarely were they able to give coherent explanations of their reasoning; it was enough that they had heard that something new was taking place and thus they considered that it might be wise to do something different. One received the impression from some of the SEP's that they almost felt that they were involved in a game of chance in which they were seeking "tips" to enable them to pick a "winner" for themselves, and that they had little interest in the inherent operation of the game. A second significant attitude of the SEP's consisted of the belief that one could not expect complete information about what was happening in the field of politics because no important development takes place in the open. They assumed that no one with influence would announce all of his plans, motives, and intentions, because this would com­ promise his influence. Most important events, they felt, resulted from decisions made in private and thus much of politics had to take place behind the scenes. The best the SEP's could hope for was to get a hint every now and then about what might be happening out of sight. This attitude was reinforced by their concept of politics as mainly involving personal relationships. Sources of Political Power Another feature of learning about politics is the develop­ ment of explicit or implicit assumptions about the sources

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

or elements of political power. As the individual learns to make calculations about political events and seeks to ex­ plain what happens, he begins to attribute reasons for po­ litical success or failure. In this reasoning, he introduces considerations of what in his mind constitute the most significant factors in determining political influence or power. From the reasons that the SEP's gave for particular cases of political success or failure, it is possible to find sug­ gestions as to what they considered the most important sources of political power. Further indications are to be found in their explanations as to why certain political developments occurred as they did.1 PROPAGANDA

Slightly over 65 per cent of the SEP's suggested that the political success of any group depended upon its propa­ ganda activities. The proportion that cited this source of political power was slightly higher among the former party functionaries. No doubt their experiences as Communists had made them more sensitive to the importance of propa­ ganda. AU of them had been aware of the prestige of the political commissars and the propaganda workers in the party. Moreover, in the sample there was a high propor­ tion of respondents who had done propaganda work for the MCP, and several were at the time of their interviews engaged in propaganda activities for the government; cer­ tainly, as a group the SEP's were not prone to underesti­ mate their own importance. However, in spite of these ι It should be noted that the instruction that they had received in the party and their experiences as Communists no doubt influenced their reasoning. Although it was possible to ask them to give the explanation they had believed valid at the time for events that oc­ curred before they joined the party, their responses were, of course, mainly the explanations which they considered most important at the time of the interviews. However, their answers are still significant, inasmuch its they felt they were giving non-Communist explanations and ones which they would have accepted without their Communist training.

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

considerations, they did seem to have an impersonal respect for the importance of propaganda. They had all, of course, been exposed to extensive propa­ ganda campaigns. For some, this exposure began during the excitement of the first years of the Sino-Japanese War. Then there were the propaganda activities that accompanied the Japanese occupation, the return of the British, the turbu­ lent trade union period, and finally the Emergency itself. Most of the SEP's were also aware of the intense propa­ ganda conflicts between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. These experiences were enough to make them recognize that all political groups placed a great importance on persuasion. It might at first seem that their general distrust of mass communications on political matters would have made the SEP's discount the importance of propaganda. The reason that this was not the case seems to lie in their assumptions about its nature and function. None of the respondents seemed to have negative feel­ ings about even the word "propaganda." Propaganda was to them an inherent part of politics, and without propagan­ dists there could be no real politics. In the party they had learned that "propaganda" and "propagandists" were hon­ ored terms. Three of the SEP's, when asked what they would like to do in the future, said that they hoped to have careers in the field of propaganda. The fact that they did not feel that there was any need to decide for whom they wanted to be propagandists, or that this was even an im­ portant question, suggests that their attitude toward such activities was comparable to Western attitudes toward the fields of public relations and advertising. Many of the SEP's had been exposed to so much political agitation that, in comparison with their lack of sophistication in other mat­ ters, they were practically connoisseurs of propaganda. Their attitudes resembled those oi Westerners who realize that advertising is essential to the operation of the econ­ omy, but who feel that they are emotionally invulnerable

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

to such appeals. They are, however, prepared to give credit to what they consider to be a particularly clever adver­ tisement. Several of the SEP's were quite explicit in distinguish­ ing between the content of propaganda and the technical skill of its presentation, and they gave several reasons why the latter seemed to them to be far more important. To begin with, like most of the others, these SEP's assumed that any group would put its best foot forward in its propaganda. Thus, they believed it would be impossible to make any morally meaningful distinctions among the prop­ aganda messages of various groups. Any group would make sure that its position was morally defensible. At the same time, and quite significantly, none of the SEP's indicated that they felt that it was either proper or important to criticize a particular political program on the grounds of whether it proposed the most efficient and intelligent way of achieving the objectives it set forth. The policy pro­ posals that were expressed in propaganda messages were not to be taken as serious attempts at stating a choice of means for particular ends. As a matter of fact, few of the SEP's would have been able to engage in more than the simplest form of such rational criticism, since they were unaccus­ tomed to thinking in abstractions and generalizations. How­ ever, it is significant that those who attempted to criticize political policies rationally did so only after they had be­ come identified with a particular group and they did not ask such questions of the group's propaganda. Thus, be­ sides generally lacking the criteria necessary for an intel­ lectual examination of propaganda, the SEP's seem to have assumed that propaganda messages were not the place where any group stated in detail its plans and intentions. Rather, the more sophisticated SEP's regarded propa­ ganda as offering an opportunity to observe a political group in action and hence a chance to judge whether it was skillful and clever. Thinking in terms of analogies, they seemed to assume that if a group was skillful in carrying out

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

its open propaganda, it must also be skillful in making other policy decisions and thus was likely to be successful. The cleverness of a group in manipulating propaganda symbols was to them an indication of cleverness in other fields. The less sophisticated seemed to appraise political propa­ ganda more in terms of its entertainment value, and they felt that it was appropriate to show some appreciation to any group that provided interesting entertainment. They approached demonstrations of political propaganda in very much the same state of mind as they viewed the show of the traveling medicine man. If the medicine man was en­ tertaining, if his skills as a prestidigitator were impressive, if the show seemed to be a prosperous one capable of sup­ porting itself, then it would not be unwise to buy some of the drugs. Less explicitly, but in much the same manner as the more sophisticated, they assumed that there was a relationship between propaganda skill and general political skills. In the view of most of the SEP's, the function of political propaganda was mainly to act as a rallying device which made it possible to determine who stood with whom in the political arena. When a group put on a propaganda show, one learned who was prepared to identify himself with that group, and who was already with it. Thus, in a sense, propaganda served to clarify so far as possible the relationships that existed among those who were in any sense politically active; successful propaganda indicated that many were prepared to support a group and few to oppose it. The SEP's also seemed to expect propaganda to offer an opportunity for political participation. They assumed that the propagandist was seeking to elicit action on the part of his audience so as to demonstrate the power of his cause. That this was an important expectation of many of the SEP's is clearly indicated by their praise of Commu­ nist propaganda activities and their criticism of govern-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

ment and non-Communist propaganda. According to the SEP's, the Communists had better propaganda because they always made sure that those who attended their propa­ ganda shows could in some way indicate their position by taking concrete action in support of Communism. They could contribute money, join a front group, or in some way become involved on the side of the Communists. Gov­ ernment propaganda was poor because it failed to make those who observed the show demonstrate their sympathies by meaningful action. It would seem that the general attitude of the SEP's toward propaganda was related to the fact that the political processes they knew, either in China or Malaya, were not based on some other device, such as elections, which could indicate in a general fashion the political positions that were being adopted by the increasing number of people who were becoming politically involved. Without elections to give the "score," the main device for reckoning had to be the propaganda demonstration itself. A group could not win elections, but it "won" or "lost" at each propaganda show. These attitudes of the SEP's can perhaps best be sum­ marized by quoting several of the respondents. A former Branch Committeeman in Pahang said: "The Communists put on several propaganda meetings at the edge of the labor 'lines.' I went to them, as there was noth­ ing else to do in the evenings. I was quite impressed with how much work they put into the shows. The Communists all seemed to be very clever and worked hard. I decided they were probably pretty good. I can't remember what the shows were all about—probably the usual thing about how if you are with them and they win, you will be happy— the same kind of thing the British say, if you are with them and the Communists are defeated, you will be happy. Both are right, it all depends upon where you stand." A former rubber tapper commented: "I believed the Communists' propaganda. I thought they were very clever

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

people and that it was nice of them to spend so much time talking with us." An SEP who came to the party through the trade unions had this to say: "The Communists had very good propa­ ganda in 1947. When you went to their meetings, they al­ ways made it possible to join the trade union when the show finished. The British propaganda was very poor. The government would tell you to be a good citizen. All right, you don't spit on the streets, but who is going to know you are against the Communists if you only stop spitting on the streets?" Another young rubber tapper who served in the MRLA reported: "Everyone seemed to be going to the Commu­ nist propaganda meetings, so I thought I ought to go, too. The meetings were in the evening and they lasted a long time. I used to get sleepy listening to them lecture. But I thought that if these people could talk and shout for four hours, they couldn't be too bad. They must have some ability in thinking up ways; they must have some plans and know what they are doing. You know what I mean?" Repeatedly the SEP's spoke of the Communists as hav­ ing very "fierce" propaganda; if you listened to their propa­ ganda, it would give you "strength." One of them even went so far as to say: "After you have had their fierce propa­ ganda, you can't do without it. It gives you so much strength that you feel weak when you don't have it." Al­ though many of course pictured propaganda as duping and confusing the intellect, most saw in it a source of power for the individual as well as for the group that was skillful in its use. SKILL IN VIOLENCE

We have already seen how most of the SEP's conceived of politics as involving violence. It is therefore not surprising that a majority indicated that skill in the command of violence was a decisive factor in influencing political de­ velopments. The attitude of the SEP's was a straightfor-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

ward, pragmatic one, based on the fact that throughout their lives the character of politics was always determined by the actions of the military. They had all had firsthand experience with war and they accepted as fundamental the fact that those who won such tests of strength would de­ termine the general framework of future political activities. In the minds of a few, there seemed to be very little difference between the military commander and the im­ portant politician. Most of the SEP's felt that generals played a decisive role at the highest level of politics and that no group could be politically effective without mili­ tary power. They also seemed to assume that skill in military affairs and the ability to command large numbers of men were valid indications of skill in political affairs.2 These attitudes led most of the SEP's to believe there was reason and probably truth in the Communist claims that a close association existed between Wall Street and the Pentagon, between the capitalists and the militarists, and they did not seem to feel that there was anything improper or immoral in such a relationship. To them, it was much the same as that which existed on their side between the political commissars and the military officers, and they rec­ ognized a similar relationship between the Chinese Com­ munist Party and the Red Army, the Kuomintang and the Nationalist armies, the Japanese occupation authorities and the Japanese army, the Malayan government and the Security Forces. Thus, the SEP's generally assumed that military skill de­ termined political developments in Malaya and elsewhere. At their own level of political participation, it was always necessary to remember that the situation could be drasti2 One of the respondents, when asked to compare what he had learned about America in the party with his post-Communist im­ pressions, predicted an Eisenhower victory in the 1952 election by saying: "Eisenhower is an important general. That other man has never commanded the army, has he? Eisenhower will win then. I remember that Truman was a soldier, too."

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

cally altered as a consequence of military activities. At the same time, there could also be advantages in identifying oneself with a group that was skilled in violence. A young student who joined the Min Yuen when he was sixteen said: "I knew that the Communists had a big army. You had to take them seriously. Nobody else that asked you to join them had soldiers." THE POWER OF ORGANIZATION

The fact that 55 per cent of the respondents indicated they believed that organization was important to political success may be a testimony to the effectiveness of the train­ ing they had received in the party. They had all been taught the Leninist principle that a disciplined organiza­ tion can expect political power out of proportion to its numbers. It was clear from their repeated references to the importance of organization and discipline that they felt this to be a fundamental truth. They seemed to be quite at home with the notion and, in explaining their private opinions, accepted as self-evident the political significance of a well-organized group. "I was thinking about leaving the party in 1947. It was not as well-organized as it had been and I didn't see how it could do much." "The Malayan Chinese Association is not very impor­ tant. They can make a lot of noise, but they have no real organization." "The free trade unions aren't as well-organized as the Communist ones were, and so the workers don't believe they are much good." Even though the terminology was Communist, the SEP's often seemed to be using it to express attitudes that were more basic to their way of thinking. In particular, "organi­ zation" appeared to mean to them a clarification of the personal relationships that were the basic stuff of politics. In the Chinese community, they saw a pattern of such relationships through which the play of influence took

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

place. However, the ties between individuals were personal ones, and as such they were usually vaguely defined and often unstable. Since one's influence depended upon know­ ing someone who in turn had some connection with a per­ son generally recognized as being influential, it was de­ sirable that the relationships be clearly defined so that others could appreciate that they existed. For many of the SEP's, "organization" meant little more than that these relationships were explicitly recognized. A particular group was "well organized," and thus had influence, because those who belonged to it knew how they stood with each other; they could have confidence in the stability of their relationships and outsiders would be aware of this fact. The term "organization" thus covered the sense of personal security the SEP's were seeking by identifying themselves with those whom they felt to be important. Feeling that they increased their own influence by being a member of a "well-organized" group, they also assumed that the group itself had greater power from being "organized." These attitudes about the power of organization appeared in their most explicit form when the SEP's were discussing the weaknesses of the traditional Chinese associations and why they themselves had not joined one of the benevolent associations, provincial clubs, or secret societies. Aside from holding that such groups were "old-fashioned" and not interested in young people, they made the major criticism that they were not "well organized." The implication was that even if one joined such a group, there was little cer­ tainty as to what benefits he might expect. Although there might be influential people in them, the relationships among the members were not precise enough to make it possible for the recruit to know whether or not he himself could claim a meaningful relationship with them. In ex­ plaining his views, one Hakka said: "There were several important people in the Hakka Association, but it was not well organized. For some people it might be good to join it, and for others it would be no good at all. You couldn't

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

tell, so I didn't see why I should join it. Sometimes the Hakka Association did something and other times it didn't; you couldn't tell much about it." It is interesting that those SEP's who at the time of the interviews were working on definite assignments for the police or the Department of Information tended to say that the government was "well organized." On the other hand, those who had no specific roles and might be given different tasks each day remembered the Communists as being "better organized." So long as their own relations with the government were imprecise, they were not cer­ tain that the government had the advantages of "organi­ zation." KNOWLEDGE IS SHREWDNESS

In all, 35 per cent of the respondents indicated that they attached paramount importance to knowledge or wisdom in determining political success. However, their attitudes reflected little of the traditional Chinese respect for the scholar as official and ruler. The political significance of knowledge was that it met utilitarian standards; the suc­ cessful politician had to be clever in his policy decisions. Wisdom became shrewdness and those who could devise clever stratagems could expect success. Just as they were prepared to respect the individual who by his wits achieved economic and social advancement, they were ready to ad­ mire the clever leader. Many of the respondents showed that they still had admiration for some of the shrewd and tricky maneuvers of the MCP, even though they themselves had been the victims. As will be seen, several of the SEP's said that they found themselves with the Communists be­ cause they had been outwitted by the recruiters. Their re­ action, however, had not been hostility toward the party but, on the contrary, a respect for its skills. Such an atti­ tude may not be uncommon to a culture in which the acts of bargaining and trading are approached in an elaborate and spirited manner. This may be especially the case if

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

transactions are often not far removed from a barter basis. In such situations, the negotiators are more conscious of calculations of mutual utility, and since it is more difficult to achieve mutual satisfaction, a greater expectation exists that there will be a "winner" and a "loser" in any act of negotiation. In comparing the public figures of whom they heard, often the highest praise the SEP's could give was that cer­ tain statesmen were shrewd and clever men. Such men always had a "plan" and were never without a "method" for handling any situation. The SEP's seemed to have special admiration for those who had the ability to appear to be doing one thing when in fact they were up to some­ thing else. They felt that such people were practically un­ beatable.3 In telling of how greatly impressed they had been with the voluminous literature of Communism, the SEP's re­ vealed their firm belief that knowledge was a fundamental element of political power. They accepted as a significant clue to the real strength of the Communists the quantities of books, pamphlets, newspapers, and leaflets that the party seemed to be constantly producing. A typical reaction was that of a former rubber tapper who became a Branch Com­ mitteeman in Pahang: "When I began to work for the s One of the SEP's explained that it was by such reasoning that he

first came to doubt the Communists. He had served with the MPAJA throughout the Japanese occupation and he had been rewarded by being made a party member. He had been led to believe that America and Britain had done no offensive fighting against either Japan or Germany but had withdrawn to their respective island positions. "I first began to doubt the Communists when in 1946 I heard all about how America had dropped the atomic bomb on Japan. I wondered if this might not have been the reason why Japan was defeated. I decided that the Americans and British were very clever. Of course, they had not fought and had a lot of their men killed during the three years and eight months because they were secretly making the atomic bomb. I realized how clever they were and that it would be hard to beat such people. The Communists no longer seemed so clever."

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

trade union, I realized right away how important and powerful the Communists were, because they had books for everyone: books on the rubber industry and on the life of the rubber tapper, books for tin miners, for factory workers, for students. I saw that they knew everything, and I realized then that they would be able to figure out how to bring about the revolution." MORALITY AND POPULAR SUPPORT

A basic tenet in Confucianism is the power of moral persuasion: the good ruler rules by moral example. How­ ever, only 20 per cent of the SEP's indicated any confidence in moral virtue as a factor in determining political suc­ cess. The majority held to the position that all groups and parties had some virtues and some vices and that the bal­ ance between them was of little relevance to their political power. Any group could claim enough virtues to satisfy its followers, and any group could be criticized by all others for its evils. This belittling of the significance of morality was matched by an equal discounting of the importance of spontaneous public support, something to which only 18 per cent at­ tached importance. Most of the SEP's had far too much respect for the role of propaganda to believe that the masses could ever play a political role without extensive manipulations by political leaders. The idea of mass sup­ port for any political group growing out of popular and spontaneous demands seemed highly unrealistic to them. Most of the SEP's recognized that they were more sensitive to politics than many of their acquaintances and they them­ selves had not become involved in politics without propa­ ganda inducements. Moreover, most of SEP's claimed that even during the period of their greatest loyalty to Communism, they were fully aware that it was the party itself which stimulated and brought about what it called "popular demands." They gen­ erally seemed to have the recruiter's outlook as to why the

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

party sought to create "popular support": an individual would be more likely to go along with a point of view if he felt it had the backing of a strong majority. One of the SEP's who had had considerable experience with Com­ munist trade unions indicated surprise that anyone might suspect that the Communists had sought to hide behind front groups. "Everyone knew that the unions, the Wom­ en's League, and the New Democratic Youth League were all being run by the Communists. It made the party look more powerful to have all these different groups. We wanted to make the worker believe that all the other workers were supporting the Communists." Thus, the SEP's placed pri­ marily an instrumental or tactical significance on "spon­ taneous" and "popular" demands; they did not particularly believe that what people wanted they should have. In their own lives, they had learned that one had to scheme for what one wanted; the intensity of one's desires had little relationship to expectations of their realization. About a quarter of the respondents were asked if they understood what was meant by the "Mandate of Heaven."4 * This is a concept, usually intriguing to Western students of Chi­ nese history, that can perhaps be best understood as an ingenious way of stretching the Divine Right of Kings to cover successive dynasties, all based on the same claims of legitimacy. The right of each, dynasty to rule was held to be based on its having received a mandate to carry out the affairs of state according to the will of heaven. Any group in revolt could thus claim that the dynasty had "lost" its mandate and, if successful, it usually had no difficulty in citing examples of mal­ practice, corruption, and the like on the part of its predecessor. Of course, no dynasty, even in the face of defeat, ever admitted it had done anything to '"lose" the mandate, and no revolutionary group, even in the face of defeat, ever held that it was opposing the divine will; legitimacy went to the successful. Since natural disasters were generally felt to be the result of the wrath of heaven (and in an agrarian society they were, in fact, the main cause of personal crises and popular complaints), a dynasty could expect to feel somewhat less secure when they occurred with undue severity or frequency. In prac­ tice, the concept of the Mandate of Heaven may have made the ruling dynasties more sensitive to popular feelings, more respectful toward ritual, and more diligent in stamping out all opposition.

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

Only four indicated that they had any comprehension of the term, and they all identified it as an old-fashioned idea that belonged to a distant imperial past. In the case of all of them, the process of secularization had gone far enough so that they put no store in anything that suggested the supernatural. But it had not gone sufficiently far to provide them with secular concepts or myths about the power or morality of public opinion. Oriented as they were toward self-advancement, their pragmatic outlook left them with the belief that, although it might be nice for virtue to coincide with power, in reality political success or failure was usually independent of moral considerations. Since we are primarily concerned with the manner in which the SEP's became politically active and in doing so turned to Communism, it may be best to summarize the findings of this chapter around the theme of what the SEP's took to be the basis of political involvement. Clearly, in seeking to participate in politics, the SEP's were not aspiring to a position in the national scene. They were not trying to associate themselves with political elites who dom­ inated the entire society—the only kind of political leaders their parents recognized. Their political "awakening" did not bring with it the conviction that the common man should have his say in national affairs. Rather, they had awakened to the fact that in their immediate community there was a significant political arena. They did recognize that what happened at the national and international level might affect what happened in this political arena and thus what happened to them. However, they began their politi­ cal activities with no illusions about their ability to influ­ ence in any way the broader level of politics. As the SEP's saw it, their initial step in becoming politi­ cally active consisted primarily of seeking to establish ad­ vantageous personal relations with those whom they con­ sidered influential. In doing this, they felt that they had had to make a choice of association with a particular, con-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

crete group of people. However, they did not consider it necessary to select their affiliation according to the professed values or objectives of the alternative groups. Quite frankly, they held that this identification should be based on their estimate of the likelihood of realizing personal benefits. Among the vast majority oi the SEP's, there was a con­ spicuous lack of any belief that people might seek to be­ come identified with abstract values and that politics might be used to serve the public good. For them, some particular group always benefited from each political development and some other group suffered. Having little appreciation of the possibility of complex human relationships, the SEP's were unable to find meaningful or plausible even such simple political slogans as "What's good for business (labor, or the farmer) is good for all." The few who were specifically asked for their reactions to such slogans all answered that such could not be the case; in their minds, what's good for the merchant is cheating the customer, and what's good for the worker is "obviously" bad for the own­ er. A more profound implication of this tendency to view political relationships only in terms of direct personal re­ lationships was that the SEP's had little ability to conceive how it might be possible for a total society, economy, or country to be improved, advanced, or aided. To them, the political self was a concrete group and only such particular groups could be advanced or improved. It is significant that when the Communists in Malaya spoke of improving social and economic conditions, they almost always did so in terms of advancing the lot of particular elements, usually to the disadvantage of others. Thus, as will be seen, the SEP's felt that they could benefit from such policies even though they could not understand them, because all that was required of them was to identify themselves personally with the particular groups that would be better off. When non-Communists spoke of aiding and developing Malaya, it was often in general terms, with the result that the SEP's

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS

continued to suspect that the advantage would go to par­ ticular groups, but since these were not specified, they felt that they had no way of personally associating themselves with such improvements. In turning now to the process by which the SEP's came to identify themselves with Communism, it will be necessary to be particularly concerned with the problems that con­ fronted them in respect to their personal relations with the party and its agents. It should be apparent that the reason for this approach is the propensity of the SEP's them­ selves to conceive of their larger political self in terms of personal ties. Had they been more inclined to conceptualize and reason in general terms, and had their minds run more toward general values, the primary focus would have been different.

CHAPTER 8

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT THE general tendency of the SEP's to relate their under­ standing of politics to their personal problems and to adapt their behavior to their immediate circumstances makes it particularly important to find out how they perceived their social world at the time they came to Communism. What were to them the most salient features of their environ­ ment? How did they understand their personal situation? Only four of the SEP's said that they had gone out of their way to find Communism. For the rest, it was a case of the party coming to them; or, more exactly, they per­ ceived Communism as an active part of their social en­ vironment. Seventy per cent claimed that one or more of the various Communist-directed organizations had been powerful groups in their community, and a third of them singled out the MCP itself as the most conspicuous and influential organization available to them. Although Com­ munism was, of course, in no case a part of the family scene, as it is with second- and third-generation Western socialists and Communists, it was for the vast majority an easily discernible feature of their social world, once they looked beyond their family circle. In part, the picture the SEP's drew of the importance of Communism in their communities seems to be a testimony to the success of the MCP in establishing itself as a power­ ful force among the Malayan Chinese. However, it also re­ flects the tendency of the SEP's to attach significance only to what came within their range of personal associations. All except one of the SEP's indicated that they had been directly approached by a representative of the MCP or one of its front groups, while only twelve of the sixty said that they had ever been so contacted by any other group or

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

association. Thus, Communism was something about which they had to make a decision and, very significantly, the issue was raised within the context of a face-to-face relation­ ship. To have learned more about any other group or asso­ ciation would have required greater initiative. Not that the SEP's were generally lacking in initiative—the real problem lay in their inability to discover a personal basis of associa­ tion with groups that did not seek recruits by means of individual recruiters. Without such personal contacts, the SEP's tended to feel that the other groups in their com­ munity were distant, inaccessible, and even unfriendly. They also seemed to feel that such groups could not be very powerful or influential. "I knew about the Hailam Association and the secret societies, but I had no friends in any of them. They never paid any attention to me and I never had any dealings with them. The only important people I met were the Com­ munists." "Some of my friends did join the Hakka Association, but they never asked me to join. I don't know what the associa­ tion ever did. It was not very important and nobody was afraid of them. There was no point in trying to join them, and even if I had wanted to, I don't know how I could have arranged it." "I knew that the Communists were the only important group in town because they were always coming around and talking to us. It didn't matter what I was doing, there always seemed to be a Communist hanging around trying to become my friend." Several of the SEP's stated that the MCP was fully aware of the importance of personal introductions in influencing the decisions of those predisposed to join a group. When they were assigned to recruiting likely candidates, they were instructed first to establish personal relations with the potential recruits. They -were told to pose as individuals who knew quite a bit about Communism and who might even have some personal contacts in the party or front

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

group. Then, at the appropriate time, they were to suggest to a potential recruit that as personal friends they should both join a particular front organization. The intention was to create an expectation on the part of the recruit that he would be entering an organization as the "runningmate" of one who already was fairly knowledgeable about the group and who could thus facilitate his identifying with it. Almost 60 per cent of the respondents said that they had taken their first steps toward becoming Communists along with one or more persons whom they considered to be their friends; in the case of slightly less than a quarter of the respondents, one of these "friends" later turned out to have already been a member of the MCP. The SEP's generally claimed that they were unaware of any strong hostility toward Communism in their communi­ ty. Only seven said that they had ever heard any antiCommunist propaganda before they joined the party. How­ ever, their high regard for propaganda as a source of po­ litical power and their tendency to associate propaganda exclusively with political activity probably caused them to underestimate whatever anti-Communist sentiment they encountered. For example, all of the SEP's knew that the Japanese, the Kuomintang, and the Malayan government were opposed to the Communists. However, in their view these were struggles that took place on a distant plane; in their immediate world, they were generally unaware of any effective opposition to the party. Thus, within the context of their own social environ­ ment, they had not been presented with a strongly negative image of Communism, as is the case for most Westerners. In the United States and Britain, the great mass institu­ tions—the schools, the churches, the mass media, the trade unions, and the like—all serve to create a climate of opin­ ion in which Communism is clearly defined as a deviant movement. Even on the Continent, where Marxism has a long intellectual tradition, the Bolshevik is generally rec­ ognized as being on the periphery of acceptability. In Ma-

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

laya, since there was little reason for the SEP's to equate Communism with deviance, they had little feeling that they were stepping beyond the bounds of respectability in associating with it. In most cases, they considered that they had no real alternative in their search for a group that would provide the benefits they expected of political action. Perception of Government

Even though there was little in their immediate social environment to make the SEP's question the wisdom and propriety of becoming Communists, there was the Malayan government, an institution that was the target of the Com­ munists and that supposedly had the power to punish those who attacked it. To what extent did the very existence of the government enter into their calculations when they joined the party? What is extraordinary is the lighthearted and even cavalier attitude with which most of the SEP's began a career of subversive activity. Once in the party, they were to be taught much about the "ruthlessness" of the British Imperialists, but in making the decision to affiliate with the Communists few of them seemed to appreciate the risk of government reprisals. The reason for this seems to lie in the fact that the majority felt they lived in a world quite far removed from the Malayan government. Indeed, over 70 per cent of the respondents indicated that they per­ ceived the colonial administration as existing completely apart from the Chinese community in Malaya. The gov­ ernment operated in distant and limited spheres, and they could not always comprehend how its acts might impinge upon their daily lives. This attitude was strengthened and sustained by the fact that the government's system of communication with the Malayan Chinese was imperfect. Most of their knowledge about official policies came to them by word of mouth from people who were only slightly better informed than

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

themselves. As a result, the SEP's tended to assume that since they knew little of what transpired at the level of officialdom, the government could be cognizant of little of what they did. The possibility of a central government effectively and consistently concerning itself with the wellbeing and activities of the great masses of the population was apparently a completely foreign idea to them. Indeed, for many of the SEP's, the most unnerving experience of their surrender was the discovery of how much, in fact, the government had known of their former activities as Com­ munists.1 Whenever the government did intrude in their world, the SEP's felt that it did so in an arbitrary manner. As we have seen, they had grown up with the expectation that authority was likely to be unpredictable and to act on whim. Characteristically, they found an explanation for the actions of the government in the personal motives of its agents. Thus they were convinced that whenever the police arrested anyone, it was not because he had violated a law—even though they knew he had—but because he had had a falling out with an individual policeman. Prudence therefore dictated that one should avoid establishing rela­ tions with anyone connected with the government, unless one could reap some immediate advantage. Only a few of the SEP's indicated that they had any strong sense of hostility toward the government before they joined the party. The colonial administration was too re­ mote for the majority of them to react to it either emo­ tionally or intellectually. They usually said of their attitude toward the government, "I had no feelings toward them; they had nothing to do with me and I had nothing to do with them." At the same time, however, some of the SEP's indicated that after they surrendered they had been uni Three of the SEP's reported that when they broke with the MCP they sought to hide from both the Communists and the government. They were all surprised with the speed with which the police learned of their whereabouts.

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

easy about beginning a career in government service. They seemed to be unsure as to whether modern Chinese should do such a thing. On the one hand, they recognized that those Chinese who worked for the government had a com­ mand of English, considerable schooling, and skills that they admired and yet, on the other hand, they were sus­ picious of the motives of these people, especially since they felt that with their talents they could be making more money in civilian pursuits. Above all, the SEP's were dis­ turbed by the fact that those Chinese who did work for the government seemed to be willing to associate with nonChinese, and especially with Malays and Indians. They spoke of these people as being "bad" Chinese, because they appeared to be unwilling to discriminate in favor of other Chinese. It seems that almost all of the SEP's had such a limited knowledge of the government that they were un­ aware of any issues about possible discrimination against Chinese in the administrative services. On the contrary, they saw the government as an institution which demanded cooperation and close association between people of dif­ ferent races, and hence as something to be distrusted. In characterizing the attitudes of the SEP's toward the government, it is important to note that most of them did not tend to differentiate between government officials and European civilians.2 Thus it is necessary to consider their experiences with individual Europeans. Sixty-five per cent 2 It was apparently inconceivable to most of the SEP's that there might be any conflict of interests between elements in the European community such as the rubber planters or the tin miners and the government. For the SEP's, the fundamental basis of politics was per' sonal relationships and they assumed that all Europeans had somt associations with the government. Once in the party, even though they could not fully comprehend the subtleties of the theories about the relationship between "capitalism" and "imperialism," they had little difficulty in appreciating the Communist contention that a re­ lationship existed between the government and European civilian*. Moreover, during the Emergency, they had no pronounced feeling that a differentiation ought to be made between European civilian· and members of the Security Forces as targets of attack.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

of the SEP's reported that they had had no personal ex­ perience with Europeans before they surrendered, and for about 80 per cent the individual European was as distant as the government itself. Most of those, however, had picked up from their culture a far from complimentary picture of the European as a person. "I never met or talked with any red-haired devils before I surrendered. All I knew about them was what everybody said: they have very bad and strong body odors, and they have very hot temperaments and get angry very easily." "They used to say that the red-haired devils were very strong and fierce people sexually. Their men were always looking for women and their women were always anxious for men." "I didn't know whether it was true or not, but they used to say that the red-haired devils had very thick blood and they had to drink a lot. They could get very drunk." Six of the SEP's, all former party functionaries, had had unhappy personal relations with Europeans, and there is no doubt that these experiences intensified their hostility toward the British. "The easiest way to get to our house from the main road was to take a path that went past his [a European's] house. He used to get very mad at us for using it, and several times he came to our house and scolded and swore at my father for letting us use it. Every time he saw us children taking the path, he used to come running and throw stones at us." On the other hand, five of the SEP's had happy memo­ ries of relations with Europeans, but these experiences seem to have had little effect on their subsequent attitudes toward those whom the party identified as their enemies. One of these was Wang Chia-fu, whose father had been a Number One boy in the family of a major in the British army. "My father said that the major was a much better man than any of the Chinese he had worked for. I remem­ ber how his wife used to take care of me and my sisters

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

when we were sick. I grew up with the master's children and we used to play together every day. We were very good friends, and every time they had any troubles they would talk to me about them. When the major Ieit Singapore, he gave my father enough money to send me to school for several years. It was only when I got to school that I learned how bad the British were to the Chinese. I learned how the British were the ones who first fought the Chinese and how they imposed all the unequal treaties on China. I discovered then that the British had never been the friends of the Chinese and that they had always been very unreliable in all their relations with China. Later, I learned that the British had not helped China to fight the Japanese, as the Russians and the Americans had. I also learned from the Communists that the British were not trustworthy in their dealings with China because they were only interested in getting what they wanted from whoever was strong in China. That is why they could forget their old friendships with the Kuomintang so fast and recognize the Commu­ nists. The party told us that the Chinese Communists knew better than to trust the British." It would, however, be wrong to conclude that the mood of the SEP's was one of hostility toward the West; as we shall see, they were much more prone to a sense of deep ambivalence. The fact that most of the SEP's perceived the govern­ ment as being quite distant from themselves appears to have led many of them to assume that it was also weak. Thus, when the Communists announced that they were seeking to drive out the British, the SEP's were generally unimpressed with the difficulties this might involve. The successes of the Japanese during the war were mentioned by most of the late joiners in justifying their expectations of Communist successes. However, even those who joined before the war appear to have felt that the British rule was weak. Wang Shih-ming, a man from Fukien who rose

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

to a position on a District Committee, told of how he con­ cluded that the government might be a "paper tiger." "When I first arrived in Singapore, I was very influenced by everything I saw. Everything was so much better than in China and I decided the British must be very skillful and very powerful. However, once I started working as a waiter in a restaurant, I didn't have enough time to think about the government any more. I was very unhappy with my job; I had to work long hours, and the customers would swear at me all the time. I couldn't speak the other dia­ lects, so I used to get the orders mixed up. When I took one customer another's order, both would get mad at me; you can never make a single mistake when you are waiting on tables. It is the same way in the party: when you make one mistake, they can always think up a lot of other mis­ takes you have made. I then got a job in a construction com­ pany and I became a carpenter." At this point, Wang Shih-ming met an MCP recruiter and they became friends. It was Wang's first friendship in the new country. They spent their evenings talking and Wang began reading the literature his friend brought him. "I was beginning to think about joining the party and I wasn't sure whether it was a wise thing or not. I knew the party was illegal, but I decided that the government was not very powerful. There was an Englishman who was the building inspector and a government official. He would come around to our jobs carrying a walking stick. He couldn't speak Chinese and none of us could speak English. Whenever there was anything wrong with the job, he would get very emotional and his spirit would rise up and he would make us pull down what we had done. I decided then that Englishmen don't act according to reason: they are very excitable peo­ ple. As soon as he left, we would continue the job the way we had been doing it. His assistant was a Malay who was lazy so long as our boss gave him gratification money, and thus he never noticed what we were doing. From this, I de­ cided that the government was very weak, as it didn't know

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

what conditions really were and it didn't act according to reason. This made me feel that it might not be too hard to carry out a revolution against such a government." It was usually only after they had committed themselves to Communism that the SEP's began to develop a greater appreciation of the power of the government. When the Emergency began, nearly 35 per cent of the rank and file (but only one functionary) said that they decided to flee to the jungle for fear of being arrested. Racial Identity The fact that most of the SEP's thought of the govern­ ment as remote from them was in large part a function of life in a plural society composed of distinct racial com­ munities. For the SEP's the barriers between the races were very real. A little over 40 per cent of the respondents said that before the time of their surrender they had never had any personal relations with Malays in general, and only eight said that they had close associations with individual Malays. Seventy per cent indicated that they had had no personal dealings with Indians, and none would admit that he had ever had friendly relations with an individual In­ dian. The SEP's left little doubt of their strong sense of racial superiority to Malays and Indians, and at times of their downright contempt for them. In their efforts to minimize their relations with Malays and Indians and to preserve their identity as Chinese, the SEP's perceived Communism to be of value. Communism, as a result of both its record in Malaya and its history in China, was considered by the vast majority of the SEP's to be a movement of and for the Chinese. Only one of the respondents said that he felt that the MCP sought to reduce racial discrimination. Be­ cause of their recognition that Communism belonged to the Chinese community, the SEP's had little feeling that it was a "foreign" movement or that they might be acting in

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

an extreme manner by joining it. At the same time, their realization that the other communities took small interest in Communism encouraged them to think of it as an elite movement. Several said they had concluded that Commu­ nism represented something that was beyond the grasp of the inferior Malays and Indians. Those who had known Malays and Indians in the MCP were particularly con­ temptuous of them. They seemed to realize that the few members of those communities who had ventured into the party were misfits who belonged neither with their own people nor with Communism. The strength of their racial sentiments was such that they were not prepared to admit that an individual Malay or Indian might rise above his race and achieve equality with the Chinese in Com­ munism.3 Through various policies and practices, the MCP en­ couraged the attitude that Communism was an elite move­ ment among the Chinese and that one was conforming to Chinese behavior by becoming a member. Several of the SEP's who had lived in areas with a predominant Malay population reported that the Communist recruiters had persuaded them that they were defenseless against the Malays unless they joined a party-sponsored organization. Within the MCP, the expression "racial bad character" was used to identify those Chinese who opposed Commu­ nism, thus suggesting that participation in the movement was a valid norm for correct Chinese behavior. Indeed, the whole atmosphere of party life was one of striving to con­ form to what the Chinese in the homeland were doing. Even on leaving the MCP, some of the SEP's seemed to feel that the Communists still represented modern Chinese and that they were breaking with their racial peers.4 8 Even those who had worked in the Racial Section went out of their way to inform their interviewer that they had tried to minimize their contacts with Malays or Indians. They reported that the Chinese assigned to the section, when speaking among themselves, usually referred to the Malays and Indians as "blacks." * When one of the SEP's was taken to lunch in a Chinese restaurant,

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

To call the racial attitudes of most of the SEP's a manifestation of Chinese nationalism would be to make a mockery of the true Chinese nationalist, who is capable of thinking in terms other than contempt for those with darker skins. Few of the SEP's seemed able to speak for long about Malays or Indians without expressing their prejudices openly and frankly. Indeed, it would seem that the MCP was peculiarly attractive to the Chinese who had strong prejudices against the physical and cultural char­ acteristics of non-Chinese in general and colored people in particular. Given this sense of racial prejudice, it is not surprising that although the SEP's were presented with much material on the evils of the United States while they were in the MCP, and all of them had been instructed about Wall Street and the American capitalists, about Tru­ man and his militarists, about the unemployed and the decadent rich, only four of them indicated any knowledge of the American race problem. At the same time, the racial sentiments of most of the SEP's were not entirely unrelated to a feeling of na­ tionalism. Such sentiments provided a basis for distinguish­ ing the outsider from a member of their own community. This was the one area in which they were prepared to employ categorical thinking. Certain types of behavior were identified as "Chinese," others as "Malay," "Indian," or "English." Out of their very crude generalizations about racial characteristics, the SEP's arrived at an understanding of the broader Chinese community to which they belonged emotionally. The feeling of racial identity common to he asked the waiter for a knife and fork in place of the chopsticks that had been brought. He explained to his interviewer that during his four years in the jungle he had gotten out of the habit of using chopsticks, and preferred Western utensils. It was suggested to him that possibly in being a Communist it had been necessary to give up many Chinese practices and habits of mind. For the rest of the day, he seemed preoccupied with the question of whether he had been meeting Chinese standards of behavior to a greater extent while he was in the MCP or after he had broken with it.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

most of the SEP's thus engendered the seeds of a kind of nationalism which, when fostered by the MCP, was hardly distinguishable from racism. Personal Situation at Time of Joining

The accounts the SEP's gave of their personal situation at the time they were exposed to Communist recruiting propaganda suggested that only a very few had serious frustrations which they felt the realization of the political objectives of the MCP might help to resolve. Most of them did not depict themselves as persons who were acutely sen­ sitive to values denied them by the established society or who were seeking redress in the Communist movement. In fact, most of the SEP's neither perceived their own prob­ lem as being of an extreme order nor considered that Communism provided an extreme answer to it. OCCUPATION

Ten of the respondents were students at the time they were attracted to Communism. In addition, however, nine­ teen others reported that their education had been inter­ rupted by the Japanese occupation. Many of them con­ tinued to conceive of themselves as students, even though they had taken jobs and assumed family responsibilities. They seemed to have the attitude, not uncommon among Chinese, that there is nothing odd about a man in his twenties proudly continuing on as a middle-school student. The traditional prestige of the scholar and the need of those from poor families to begin working at a very early age may be the bases of this attitude. In the case of the SEP's, the attitude was supported by the fact that they had the greatest opportunities to feel that they were a part of an exciting new world while they were students. Once they gave up the status of the student, they had had to fit into a world that seemed less exciting because it was less modern. At the same time, some of those whose educa-

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

tion had been interrupted felt that they had been denied better career prospects. A few also indicated that they had been disappointed in not being able to do many of the things that they had looked forward to enjoying as older students, such as participating as a leader in various school activities, being admired by the younger students, and be­ ing able to bully and haze others as they themselves had been bullied and hazed. On the other hand, there were, of course, the marginal few who were quite happy that the war had brought them escape from the classroom. Slightly over half of the SEP's considered themselves skilled workers. This category included those who had performed specialized work on rubber plantations and in tin mines, as well as those who were machinists, tinsmiths, construction workers, and employees of the Singapore Navy Yard and small processing factories. Only nine called them­ selves unskilled, and most of them had done menial work on rubber estates and in lumber and logging camps. Six had been self-employed, mainly as peddlers and small merchants. The remainder included teachers, barbers, shop clerks, bookkeepers, house "boys," and one who can best be called a professional gambler. All of the female re­ spondents had either been students or rubber tappers. Seven of the respondents had supplemented their incomes with agricultural work as "squatters." CAREER EXPECTATIONS

The general outlook of the SEP's makes it difficult to characterize them either as satisfied or as strongly dissat­ isfied with their employment prospects. They had gen­ erally been somewhat restless and yet optimistically be­ lieved that if they kept alert they would probably be able to discover profitable opportunities. Only a very few of them complained about their wages or their hours of work; they seemed to feel that they had received a reason­ able compensation for their particular jobs. What bothered them most was a recognition that if they remained in those

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

jobs, they could expect little advancement. Even if they increased their skills and worked harder, they could not look forward to any corresponding or appreciable increase in their incomes. Significantly, their main complaint about their working conditions had to do with personal mistreatment by their immediate superiors. They would describe in detail how their foreman had insulted them, called them names in front of others, and even attacked them physically. Un­ questionably, many were speaking of genuinely harsh treat­ ment. However, in the cases of most, their strong reactions to sharp criticism seem to have stemmed from the great importance they placed on personal relations. Within the limited sphere of their work, the majority of the SEP's could hope to gain prestige and a sense of security only by being recognized as a close associate of their supervisor or by being accepted as an informal leader of their fellow workers. Any harsh criticism by their superiors destroyed their opportunities. A great sense of impatience on the part of the SEP's came out very clearly as they spoke of their career expecta­ tions. They believed that if success was to be realized, the critical period was that of youth, and they felt that time was running out for them. Although they were still young, they told of missed opportunities and the dangers of fac­ ing old age as failures. "I was almost twenty-three and I wasn't any better off than I had been at eighteen. I would soon have no hope." "I was nineteen and I was making enough to get over the days all right. But if I didn't improve my income, what would I do when I got old and couldn't work any more?" "There is a saying that what you are when you are thirty is what you will be when you are sixty. In six years, I would be thirty." At the time of the interviews, most of the SEP's were in their twenties and yet they characterized themselves as people past their prime. Much of their hostility toward

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Communism after they left the party sprang from their contention that it had ruined their lives by absorbing the critical years of their youth, leaving nothing to show for them. Others indicated that one of the reasons they had not broken with the party earlier was that they already felt that their life had been a failure and that it was too late to start a new career outside the movement. This point of view appears to be the result of living in a culture in which earning power was still closely related to physical strength and endurance. Although few of the SEP's had jobs that demanded great exertion, the attitude related to a pre-machine technology lingered on in them. Moreover, the life expectancy of the members of their community was short, although considerably longer than it had been for the preceding generation. Thus, they con­ tinued to feel that to achieve the age of fifty was note­ worthy, and that when one arrived at forty, it was time to think of reducing one's activities. MARITAL STATUS

Another reason why so many of the SEP's were im­ patient and concerned about the passing of their youth was that most of them saw little prospect of getting mar­ ried in the foreseeable future. Slightly over three-quarters of those interviewed were unmarried at the time they joined the party. A large proportion of them indicated that they had been anxious about their ability to support a family. This was another conspicuous example of the in­ ability of the SEP's to divest themselves completely of tra­ ditional attitudes or to accept fully a new orientation more appropriate to modern conditions. They continued to feel that a man should be married by the age of twenty, an ex­ pectation not entirely unreasonable under the traditional Chinese arrangement by which the family supported the marriages of its sons. However, at the same time, the SEP's had accepted in part the view that no man should take on the responsibilities of a family before he had the means

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

to support one. This became an increasingly difficult prob­ lem for them, because they were not prepared to compro­ mise any advances they managed to make in their scale of living for the sake of acquiring a wife. Although they accepted the necessity for postponing marriage, they con­ tinued to feel that the delay was unjust and unnatural. Once they reconciled themselves to this denial, they tended to turn even more to male companionship, and to build their social relationships around distinctly masculine groups. Of those who were married when they joined the MCP, all had to leave their spouses in order to become Commu­ nists or to remain with the party. Eighty-five per cent of this group had children. However, in only a few cases was this factor of separation referred to as an important con­ sideration which influenced their feelings at the time. In general, they tended to accept such separations as cor­ responding to their customary practice of moving to a new area to find employment: if they were successful and pros­ pered, they would send for their families; if not, they would return. It was only when the latter possibility was denied them by the nature of the jungle war that they be­ gan to regret their separation. All of them maintained that they were on the best of terms with their spouses at the time they joined, and most insisted that they had not in­ formed their families of the nature of their decision. Some may have desired to protect their spouses from any charges of association with, or knowledge about, Communism; most felt they had to respect the demands of secrecy im­ posed by the MCP; and all of them considered that ques­ tions of public affairs were not the proper concern of wives. CONSEQUENCES OF UNDEREMPLOYMENT

Nine of the SEP's were unemployed at the time they joined a Communist-front organization. However, these were all men who had been unable to continue their work because of the Japanese occupation and who had joined

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

the MPAJA. The problem of finding some fofm of em­ ployment did not seem to be a serious one for most of the SEP's, although nearly half of those who considered that they were skilled laborers said that it had been necessary to join a Communist trade union in order to get work or to hold their jobs. The labor shortage in Malaya and the fact that they were all able-bodied and above average in initiative meant that they were generally confident of find­ ing some way to "get over the days," as they expressed it. A far more serious problem was that of underemployment. Almost all of the unskilled workers and even the majority of the skilled did not have jobs that demanded their full time and energy, and they often underwent periods of enforced leisure. In discussing their employment, the SEP's repeatedly mentioned that they had been bored with their work and that they had had little with which to occupy themselves during their leisure time. This was especially the case among the rubber tappers, who started their workday at four or five in the morning and were finished by noon or one o'clock. Although some of them utilized their after­ noons to maintain gardens and small farms, the majority felt unoccupied. For these, the existing commercial forms of entertainment were too expensive to be indulged in often or freely, and failed to satisfy their desire for activity. Gambling and other forms of vice commanded their at­ tention but did not satisfy their interests. After school years, athletic competition was to be found mainly in Communist-organized groups. From the time of the AntiEnemy Backing-Up Society through the New Democratic Youth period, Communist organizations often constituted the only, or at least the most active and conspicuous, anti­ dote to boredom. Individuals might join trade unions be­ cause they wanted economic security or because they felt coerced, but the additional step of frequenting the union hall and participating in union activities was often taken in answer to the problem of leisure.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

Anothrf consequence of underemployment and inade­ quate activities to offset boredom was a constant indulgence in gossiping. Almost all of the SEP's said that they had been accustomed to spending considerable time each day chat­ ting and arguing with their fellow workers. In this respect, they were carrying on practices which are highly developed in Chinese culture, as well as in other peasant societies which are plagued with underemployment. By constantly exposing themselves to gossip and by refining the art of transmitting information by word of mouth, they devel­ oped the respect for rumor which we have already observed. In particular, they appear to have relied upon such ses­ sions for comparing and elaborating on their grievances and speculating about the advantages of employment in other areas of the country. Thus, the tone of such discus­ sions encouraged attitudes which left many of the partici­ pants peculiarly vulnerable to Communist agitators. The workers were relatively receptive to any well-articulated statement of grievances, and the setting was appropriate for considering the possibilities of a better life. The former agitators reported that the MCP taught them to exploit such opportunities. One of the more loquacious of the former underground union workers de­ scribed his activities in the following words, not without a note of satisfaction: "I used to wander among the work­ ers when they were resting and talking. In this way, I would learn all the grievances that the workers had. It was not hard to learn of their troubles, because people like to talk about what bothers them. They would speak about their children being ill and having to pay the doctor, their wives being unhappy, or their foreman swearing at them. Happy people don't have to talk. Who ever says that his children are well, his wife is happy, or his foreman praised him? Then I would repeat to other groups the grievances I had heard in different places and thus let each group know all the problems that other people had. The workers all felt a great deal of respect for me, because I

PERCEIVING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

knew so much about the suffering and bitterness of work­ ers. Because I had so many of these stories to tell, they all liked to listen to me and it was never difficult for me to advise them to do whatever the party wanted at the time." From the reports of the SEP's on their situation at the time of their introduction to Communism, we find that most of them had more in the way of ambitions than actual career plans. They recognized that life could offer them wider opportunities than they had as yet realized. They were very anxious to be modern Chinese, but they were unsure as to what this really meant. In their scorn for Malays and Indians, they seem to have been trying to assert what they considered their rightful superiority to lesser peoples. Their attitudes toward the government and toward Europeans were more complex and more ambiv­ alent, and were to become increasingly so after their initia­ tion into Communism. Before they joined the party, how­ ever, the government existed only in the distant back­ ground, and in their perspective the Communists were much nearer at hand. Starting with no strong feelings against Communism, they increasingly came to believe that they saw in the party a means by which they could satisfy their personal ambitions and become more closely identified with a modern world.

CHAPTER 9

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY ALL of the SEP's who were interviewed had been members of one or more of the various organizations sponsored by the MCP. Although it is not required by the constitution of the Malayan party, it is apparently almost a universal practice for a person to serve in a front organization be­ fore he is considered for membership in the party itself. All of the SEP's who became party members recognized that this service in a front group had been a major step in their eventual acceptance of Communism. However, only seven said that they had had membership in the MCP in mind when they joined an organization that was Com­ munist-controlled. This does not mean that the SEP's were unaware of the role of the MCP in manipulating these front groups. Al­ though all of them were subsequently disillusioned about Communism and its various activities and felt that they had been misinformed about the nature of the movement, none of them claimed that they had been duped into join­ ing such an organization without knowledge of its Com­ munist affiliations. The majority were clearly informed that the organization was under the domination of the MCP, while the rest appear to have prided themselves on figuring it out almost immediately. In this respect the SEP's contrast sharply with the many Westerners who have joined a Communist front organiza­ tion without suspecting the nature of its control and who have had to face a crisis of decision when they discovered its actual purpose. Furthermore, the general feeling against Communism in the West, when combined with a tradi­ tion of justice, has made most people hesitate to label a group as Communist-dominated without good evidence. In contrast, the SEP's did not feel they were raising a seri-

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

ous issue or making strong charges in calling an organiza­ tion Communist-controlled. The fact that an attempt was sometimes made to keep secret the role of the Communists in the front groups did not particularly disturb the SEP's. In their scheme of things, authority always operated out of the public view. Furthermore, they tended to attach great importance to form and ritual; these were the clues that they depended on for an understanding of reality. They were prepared, therefore, to accept as significant and important many things which to a Westerner might seem to be only trap­ pings. For those who served in the MPAJA, it was quite enough that they sang the "International" and the "Red Flag Song," used the clenched-fist salute, listened to lec­ tures on the virtues o£ Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and viewed the Chinese Eighth Route Army as their model; they needed no further evidence that they were being led and organized by Communists.1 Those who joined labor unions, on observing that the union favored the sign of the ham­ mer and sickle or that red was commonly emphasized as a decorative color, were usually quick to conclude that their leadership was Communist. On the basis of these attitudes, the SEP's tended to view the step from membership in a front group to mem­ bership in the MCP as a promotion into the circle of the elite. They assumed that to become influential in a front group, one had to become a party member. The fact that at times important union officials were not party members 1On the other hand, some Westerners who made similar observa­ tions felt that it was necessary to reserve judgment on whether the MPAJA was actually dominated by real Communists. Of course, most of these observers were unable to understand Chinese and thus could hardly appreciate the lectures. F. Spencer Chapman, in The Jungle Is Neutral, appears to have assumed that many of the activi­ ties and practices of the MPAJA were examples of the peculiarities of Chinese behavior. The fact that some of his descriptions suggest standard Communist procedures should not lead one to the conclusion that there are strong similarities between Communist and traditional Chinese group behavior.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

was not appreciated by most of the SEP's before they them­ selves joined the MCP. For them, the party was the elite, and to be asked to join it was tantamount to being taken into the ranks of the influential. This attitude of the SEP's made it possible for the MCP to use its front organizations less as traps for the unwary than as testing places for potential party members. Aside from being the main instruments for carrying out MCP policies, the front groups provided the Communists with an opportunity to bring together different categories of peo­ ple—workers, students, women, and the like—and to ob­ serve who among them were informally recognized as leaders. All those with potentialities could be subjected to special pressures and inducements to join the party. Thus, much of the selective process of determining who might de­ velop into good Communists could take place before admit­ tance to the ranks of the party itself. Since it was possible to expose the members of these front groups to a fair amount of Communist indoctrination, a realistic basis existed for predicting how the different candidates would react to further training as party members. Several of the SEP's testified to the use of front organiza­ tions as a means for uncovering potential leaders: "We [as underground union workers] were ordered to watch carefully everyone in the union and to report to our superiors the names of those workers whom the others respected the most. If there was any man whom the others liked a lot and of whom they asked advice, we would re­ port him. Then they would either tell us to approach these people or they would send others to find out if they wanted to join the party." "One of my duties as a schoolteacher [in a Communistorganized school] was to talk to the popular students and find out if they might be interested in Communist propa­ ganda." The importance of the front groups as observation lab­ oratories is also to be noted in the comparative lengths of

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

time the SEP's served in them. For those who eventually became party functionaries, the average time in a front group was less than eighteen months. During this period, they were able to demonstrate the characteristics and talents which marked them as potential leaders. Several spent less than six months in front groups before they were selected to be probationary party members, and the speed with which they were promoted into the party was later to be matched by further promotions in the party hierarchy. In contrast, the rank and file averaged over two years in front organizations before they were admitted to the party. In several cases, their apprenticeship lasted over three years. Slow to attract attention because of their limit­ ed abilities, they gained promotion to the party only after they had proved their loyalty by long service. It was quite apparent that those SEP's in the sample who had not been party members were mainly people who were unsuccessful in passing the test of front-group service. Some had served a long time and had become discouraged about their pros­ pects of ever being accepted as party members, while others felt they were being unjustly discriminated against because they had not been brought into the MCP itself. Perceptions of the Goals of the Party

As a result of their experiences in front organizations, all of the SEP's possessed some knowledge of Communism and opinions about the goals of the movement by the time they joined the MCP.2 In order to understand better the significance Communism held for them, it is helpful to distinguish three different aspects of their perceptions of the movement. First, there is the understanding of the goals of the party that they gained through exposure to the basic doctrines of Communism in the writings of Marx, 2 Por those SEP's in the sample who had not been full party members, we have classified this "time of joining" as the point in their careers at which they recognized themselves to be fully committed to the MCP, serving it full-time and completely subject to its discipline.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and other leaders of the Chinese party.8 The second aspect to be considered is their perception of the propaganda versions of the goals; this includes their understanding of the policy objectives of the movement and the purposes for which it sought power. Finally, there are the perceptions of the SEP's as to how the party treated its members and what they them­ selves might personally expect to gain from identifying with it. This third aspect involves not only their career expectations but also their view that the movement might provide them with excitement, a sense of social relatedness, a feeling of intellectual mastery, and an opportunity to realize other personal values. We may call these "non-po­ litical perceptions," but in doing so it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the SEP's themselves did not tend to make sharp distinctions between politics as a means of realizing general values and politics as a means of realizing personal ones. THE DOCTRINAL ASPECT

As might be expected, all of the SEP's were able to report on their perceptions of the propaganda versions of the party's goals and on their non-political perceptions, but a number of them indicated that they had been un­ aware of the doctrinal aspect of Communism when they joined the party. Three-fourths of those interviewed said that they had read some passages of the classics (26.7 per cent) or had attended lectures on Marxism-Leninism (48.3 per cent), but over a third of this group claimed that de­ spite their exposure they had no comprehension of the doctrine. In a subsequent chapter, we will examine the content of our respondents' understanding of Marxism-Leninism. What is significant here is that such a large proportion of the SEP's were at least aware that the party "was guided by 3 For an analysis of the content and role of the Communist classics as the esoteric doctrines of the movement, see Almond, opxit., Part i.

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a body of inner doctrine, especially since it is so often assumed that the mass of Asian Communists have little appreciation of the place of doctrine in Communism when they join the movement. Indeed, it seems that the SEP's had far more awareness of the existence of the esoteric doc­ trines of Communism than most former Western Commu­ nists have had at the time when they entered the party. In Almond's study of former Western Communists, only 27 per cent had been exposed to the esoteric goals of the movement at the time they joined it.4 It should be noted, however, that the SEP's were generally inclined to inflate any estimate of their knowledge. Also, as we have observed, they did not like to admit that they were ever unaware of the realities of a situation, since this would cast doubt on their alertness, a quality on which they placed great value. Even when rationalizing their actions, they were not in­ clined to suggest that ignorance of facts might be a mitigat­ ing circumstance. Possibly Westerners are likely to be biased in the opposite direction. Much more important, however, is the fact that in the front groups to which the SEP's had belonged there was far more open and intensive use of indoctrination than is common in most Communist front organizations in the West. In both the MPAJA and the MRLA, whenever a •unit found itseli in a relatively secure camp, at least three afternoons a week were devoted to political sessions. In­ deed, when it is considered that life in these armies in­ volved long periods of relatively little military action and that the only reading material available was Communist literature, including parts of the classics, it is surprising that more of the SEP's did not claim knowledge of the doctrines of Communism at the time they became party members. Although they were less driven by a hunger for reading material than Westerners would be in a compara* Almond, op.cit., pp. 100-110. His figures for the separate national parties are: American, 28 per cent; British, 16 per cent; French, 46 per cent; and Italian 14 per cent.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

ble situation and although they generally found reading a somewhat laborious task, the SEP's nonetheless did have some appreciation for it. But their most common explana­ tion for the lack of popularity of the sacred texts was that, boring as life in the jungle might be, reading the literary products of Lenin or Stalin only made it more tedious. Moreover, their sense of the appropriate and, indeed, their sense of humor made them feel that there was something incongruous about people voluntarily studying such sub­ jects as dialectical materialism while huddled in the heart of a jungle. For most of the SEP's, their awareness that the party had a secret doctrine was more significant in influencing their behavior than their reaction to the specific content of that doctrine. First of all, it was this awareness that made it possible for many of the SEP's to conceive of Communism as a serious movement. Since in their view any form of authority or political power operated mainly be­ hind the scenes and on the basis of private calculations, a group without secrets was not likely to be significant. If a group stood for no more than what it openly professed, the SEP's would have been inclined to consider it a frivolous organization. The fact that they did not know the details of the inner code was not essential; they would learn more about it as they achieved higher status in the organization. Jn the meantime, they could be confident that the leadership of the party had a sophisticated body of knowledge that only a few could appreciate. In some re­ spects their attitude was similar to that of people who on joining a particular church feel that it is unnecessary for them to understand the details of its theology, but that it is important for the church to have a theology of its own. The fact that most of the SEP's were aware that the movement had a distinctive inner doctrine made them more sensitive to the atmosphere of secrecy in the party, and this in turn increased their receptivity to the idea of strict party discipline. Their consciousness of this spirit of

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secrecy had a sobering effect and made them feel that the demands of party discipline were not unreasonable. One of the former trade unionists said: "Before I was made a party member, I knew that there are many secrets in Com­ munism and that few people really know all about it. When I was made a party member, I knew right away that it would not be a good thing to ask many questions. I just did what I was told and worked hard." Finally, their awareness that Communism had its esoteric doctrines conditioned the manner in which most of the SEP's perceived the propaganda versions of the party's ob­ jectives. On the one hand, most of them were prepared to learn that all of Communism was not to be found in the propaganda statements. Thus, few of the SEP's reported that they had been disillusioned or shocked on learning, shortly after they became party members, that the spirit of the party was not that of its recruiting propaganda. In contrast to the large number of Westerners who have gone into Communism because they accepted its propaganda at face value, most of the SEP's viewed the Communists' re­ cruiting promises as a qualified statement of the move­ ment's objectives. Just as they had entered the front groups with the expectation that these groups were guided by an inner group, so they moved on into the party itself expect­ ing that it, too, was led by people responsive to ideas which they did not publicly announce. On the other hand, their recognition that the Commu­ nists had a secret body of knowledge made many of the SEP's feel that they could take more seriously some of the propaganda versions of the party's objectives. It seemed to them that the party was more likely to be successful if it had a hidden formula for making the implausible possible. For example, a former rubber tapper reported: "When the Communists first began to talk to me, I thought they were foolish people because they said that the workers should run the country. This would be very nice, since I was a worker, but who has ever heard of workers being men

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

of affairs? However, when they began to tell me more about Marxism-Leninism, and how Lenin was able to organize a few Russian workers into a party of iron that made them the rulers of Russia, I began to think that maybe this talk about having a revolution in Malaya wasn't so silly." In most cases, the SEP's admitted that at the time they joined the MCP they did not know enough about Com­ munist doctrines to judge whether they might be of use in realizing the party's propaganda objectives. Their own concepts of causality were much too limited for them to attempt a rational explanation of how doctrine might be relevant to action. Their apparent reaction was simply that secret doctrines suggested a store of hidden wisdom, and they believed that wisdom was important to political success. Since they could not determine whether this par­ ticular body of wisdom was applicable to specific goals, they were acting on faith. However, their outlook was still highly pragmatic and not one of accepting magic. They were already curious to learn more, and they hoped to find in Communism the explanation for the social realities of their world. They knew that this was to be an intellectual exercise. THE PROPAGANDA VERSIONS OF THE PARTY'S OBJECTIVES

Only seven of the sixty respondents indicated that they had accepted in full faith the MCP's propaganda statements about its objectives. These were the few who at no time in their lives, either before or after their introduction to Communism, seemed to have any clear notion of what was taking place around them. The obvious retardment in the mental development of some of them made them pathetic figures who were the constant butt of the often cruel jokes and abuse of their fellows. One reported that in going into the jungle he had expected to find barracks and parade grounds, laundry services and post exchanges, for this was how his recruiter had described life in the MRLA. Ready

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to believe all they were told by those they considered their intellectual and social betters, these SEP's accepted most of the party's propaganda literally. In contrast, the vast majority of the SEP's viewed the propaganda statements of the party with reservations, both because of their awareness that the movement had an inner doctrine and because of their attitude toward propaganda in general. It was difficult for most of them to report the impressions of the party's objectives that they had gained from listening to its propaganda. All of them had been exposed to such a vast quantity of propaganda themes that they felt there were few spheres of life about which the party had not made some statements. It is significant, however, that although they recognized the diversity of the party's announced interests, the ma­ jority of the SEP's also considered that the movement had a singleness of purpose. That this could be the case sug­ gests the extent to which the SEP's generally felt that the party's propaganda should not be interpreted as statements of its specific intentions. Only a very few indicated that they had attempted to judge Communist propaganda ac­ cording to whether it suggested feasible means for realizing stated objectives. The rest seem to have had such a limited concept of causality that they found it difficult to deter­ mine rationally the appropriateness of different courses of action to the achievement of a given objective. The specific themes that the SEP's listed as having been most meaningful to them reveal how most of them in­ terpreted the party's propaganda. Apparently they were mainly impressed with statements which explained what the party was prepared to do for those who supported it. Relatively few suggested that they had been influenced primarily by statements regarding the party's policies on particular objectives. They saw the movement as being essentially concerned with its own people, even though it had to ask them to suffer much before they could realize a better life.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

For both the functionaries and the rank and file, the theme of racial unity was cited most often as being of para­ mount importance. The Communists were seen as pri­ marily concerned with the well-being of the Chinese com­ munity. In becoming Communists, the SEP's understood they were conforming to "Chinese behavior." Nearly a third of the functionaries made statements to the effect that they understood the party was representative of Chi­ nese nationalism and that they were acting patriotically in joining it. Almost all of this group came to the movement during the excitement of the early years of the Sino-Japanese War. At that time, the party's propaganda coincided with and stimulated further the sentiments of nationalism prevalent in the Malayan Chinese community. Those who came to the party during and after the Japanese occupa­ tion did not speak so frequently of patriotism. Rather, they stressed the fact that they understood the party was inter­ ested in them because they were Chinese. In turn, they expected to find in Communism a chance to associate with the elite element among the Chinese community. The SEP's who joined the MCP after the Communist successes in China said that they understood the party's propaganda as offering them an opportunity to relate them­ selves to what was then taking place in the home country. With the Communists ruling China, the MCP appeared to offer an immediately available link with the powerful lew at home. As one of the SEP's said: "I thought their propa­ ganda said that if I joined them, I would be like those who were running China. I knew the Communists were very powerful in China and no one dared oppose them." In spite of the importance that the SEP's attached to the Communists' claim of representing the interests of the Chinese, it is significant that three times as many respond­ ents said they were influenced by propaganda about the Russian Revolution as compared with those who had the Chinese Revolution in mind. The idea of a "Chinese Rev­ olution" apparently was to most of them a much over-

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

worked theme. All the Chinese politicians and parties they had ever known spoke about "completing" the Chinese Revolution and thus, to their way of thinking, the term symbolized the rather sorry state of affairs they had so long been acquainted with in China. In contrast, they under­ stood the "October Revolution" to symbolize one of the most miraculous transformations in history, in which one of the poorest and most downtrodden of peoples had be­ come the greatest power in the world. The "Russian Rev­ olution" thus represented a society's achievement of Utopia. The fact that the MCP, as well as the Chinese Commu­ nists, claimed a relationship to the Russian Revolution sug­ gested that the party knew how to bring about such a miracle. Even after they left the movement, some of the SEP's contm\ied to have respect ίοτ -what they xmdeistood the Russian Revolution to mean. As one former trade union leader and party propagandist said: "It is still quite true what Mao Tse-tung said. Until the Chinese learned about the Russian Revolution, we were no good at politics and we made fools of ourselves. However, now the Chinese Communists have learned from the Russians how to have a revolution, and no one laughs any more about the Chi­ nese Revolution." Second to the theme of racial unity was that of general social welfare. Nearly a half of the SEP's indicated that they believed the party wanted to better living conditions in Malaya. However, only a few of the SEP's were able to single out any particular innovation that appealed to them and which they understood the party sought to achieve. Apparently, to most of them the idea that the party might improve the lot of the workers was closely associated with their understanding of what Communism had achieved in Russia. Until they were exposed to Communist propaganda, few of them had much understanding of Russia. There­ fore, the accounts they heard of what had taken place under the Bolsheviks suggested to them that Communism

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

had the power to bring about changes which they had previously considered beyond the capabilities of man. Although they do not seem to have been greatly im­ pressed by expectations of particular improvements, the SEP's had no doubts as to who would be the beneficiaries: the workers, the peasants, and the "progressive" members of the petty bourgeoisie. These were groups with which they could identify themselves, and thus it was clear that they were the ones who would profit from the party's suc­ cesses. The third most important propaganda theme cited by the SEP's as an indication of the intentions of the party was that of furthering trade unionism. For several of the respondents, trade unionism and Communism became practically synonymous; they did not believe it possible to have trade unions without Communists. The fact that the party was obviously interested in organizing unions con­ vinced the majority of the SEP's that the Communists were indeed a party of the working class. About a quarter of those interviewed said that they had been impressed with the argument that if all the workers were organized, it would be possible for them to force the managers and owners to respect their interests. However, far more said that they understood trade unions to be simply a modern form of labor contracting and hence mainly an employ­ ment agency. Also, slightly over half the respondents said they had thought it appropriate for the trade unions to be concerned with political questions and not just with the economic welfare of their members. These respondents were impressed by the argument that the party was es­ sentially a laborer's movement and that the trade unions were the device that workers should use in political action. In the trade unions, they saw a means whereby workers could achieve prestige in the Chinese community and thus extend their influence into areas previously denied them. As might be expected, most of these were men who had been

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

leaders in the trade unions and who had gained personal prestige from their positions. The fourth major theme mentioned by a majority of the SEP's was the anti-Japanese, anti-British one. Here they saw in the party's propaganda an intention to drive the Japanese, and later the British, out of the country. In the case of the Japanese, the emphasis was more on the party's providing its recruits with security from the excesses of the occupying power. Anti-British propaganda appears to have been interpreted mainly as meaning that the party would occupy the offices of the government and perform all the functions that were being carried out by the Brit­ ish. Only a few of the SEP's said that they had expected the party to change the form of rule. Thus, they spoke in such terms as: "I learned from their propaganda that we would drive out the British and there would be a Commu­ nist as the new District Officer." And again, "I remember they told me that a Communist leader would live in King's House and that we would live in government quarters." On the basis of their comments on these four major themes, as well as of more scattered responses, it is apparent that most of the SEP's perceived the MCP's propaganda statements as being in actuality recruiting propaganda. That is, they recognized that the party was asking them to identify with an organization and not just to be inter­ ested in abstract ideals. They were led to understand that the organization was capable of having many goals and that these would change with circumstances. To a large extent the SEP's did not feel that the party was commit­ ting itself to the achievement of particular goals; it was only promising that those who joined it would realize benefits. In turn, the propaganda idiom represented a style of communication which one could adopt if one wished to associate with the movement. This attitude can best be frustrated by quoting a former rubber tapper from Kajang.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

"As I remember it, they first came to me and spoke of op­ posing the Japanese. I told them how bad the Japanese were and how I was sympathetic with the Chinese who were fighting them. This made them come back, and they then began to talk about the welfare of the working class in Malaya. By then, I knew how the Communists liked to talk, so I told them that I believed the working class should have higher wages and that laborers should be united and organized—that's a word the Communists like very much to hear. I said that the Communist party was the only party that could do this for the workers. This pleased them very much. After that, they gave me literature to read. It was secretly printed and told about the antiJapanese war, the sufferings of the workers of the world, and how the capitalists cheated them. There was nothing in any of this propaganda about the objectives of the party. At that time, I was not a member of the party, so of course they wouldn't tell me their objectives. The party can't ever tell what its real objectives are in its propa­ ganda, because, if it did, its enemies would find out what it's going to do and be able to stop it. All it can do is to say that it's a party for the working class." Of the few SEP's who did profess to have seen in the MCP's propaganda a statement of ideals worth working for, most were impressed with what they considered to be the party's support of a new kind of humanitarianism. There is little doubt that some of them were sincerely moved by ideas that were simple and yet powerful because of their novelty. "The party told me that by working for the union I would be helping other people. I thought that this was a very good idea—to help people without asking for any­ thing in return. Nobody ever told me before that it was a good thing to help other people, but once the party told me this, I saw the merit in it. Always before, people would help others because they were afraid of them or because they thought it would be good to become their

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

friends. The party said that you should help others and not ask for anything yourself." In another case: "I was quite impressed with many of the arguments of the Communists at that time. In par­ ticular, I was extremely impressed with the argument that the individual should sacrifice his own personal interests for the good of society. This was a new idea to me, and I thought it was a doctrine which had a great deal of mean­ ing. It would give great power to any society that accepted it. I realized that the Chinese had never thought this way. I still think that it might be a good thing if everyone did it, because it could make China very strong. However, now I think that many of the Communist leaders were demand­ ing this only of the rank and file, so they could get what they ^wanted. What happens is that ii many people forget about their own personal interests, but a few people re­ member them, then these few people can get a great deal more. I learned from the Communists to be more careful." Most of the SEP's, however, clung to their basically pragmatic outlook. At the same time, as we have observed, they were intellectually ill-equipped to examine the feasi­ bility of achieving selected objectives by particular means, and they were not inclined to apply rational standards to the party's propaganda. And, of course, the party's propa­ ganda practices did not encourage logical examination of how its objectives were to be realized. The question of techniques was left explicitly or implicitly to the inner doctrines—something one might learn, but only after be­ coming a party member. Meanwhile, the MCP appeared to have a standard answer for the potential recruits who raised questions about how the goals of the movement could be realized. Its argument was cited by several of the SEP's. In the words of one of them, it went as follows: "When I asked the party member how it was going to be possible after we established the Malayan People's Repub­ lic to reduce all the taxes, increase the number of schools and hospitals, and have everyone drive around in cars and

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

live in big bungalows, he told me that they had done just that in the Soviet Union, and if it could be done in Russia it could also be done in Malaya. He also said that if the MCP people didn't understand Marxism-Leninism well enough to do this, then the Russians would send us people who did and they would be able to arrange it all. I be­ lieved what he said about Russia, so I decided it would be possible." NON-POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS

For the vast majority of the SEP's, the key to their ex­ pectations at the time they joined the MCP was their un­ derstanding of what the party could be to those who were its members. Their awareness that the movement had an inner doctrine and their exposure to statements of its propaganda goals affected their actions, but in such a man­ ner as to make even more important what we have called their non-political perceptions of the party. Any political movement is likely to attract adherents for personal and non-political reasons.8 In Almond's study, over half the former Western Communists perceived the party as a means of achieving personal objectives.® How­ ever, in the case of the SEP's, all of them said that they had seen in the party the possibility of realizing values un­ related to the announced policy objectives of the moveβ However, the character of Communist parties may make them more apt to attract recruits for non-political reasons than is the case with more conventional political parties. The almost unlimited con­ cept of what constitutes the political aspect of life held by the Com­ munists encourages them to take stands on matters most parties con­ sider to be outside their sphere of concern. Thus, the recruit, unini­ tiated to this view, may feel he is being attracted to the movement by what he considers non-political considerations. Also, of course, the more definite and fully developed standard of conduct demanded of members of Communist parties creates the impression that Com­ munists are, in fact, interested in more than the achievement of particular political goals; they seem to be concerned with every aspect of their members' lives. «Almond, opxit., p. 100.

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ment. Indeed, not to do so would have seemed to them the mark of a fool. As one of them said, "If you didn't think about how it might benefit you personally and only thought of the nice-sounding propaganda, you would be just a dog that runs to anyone who whistles or makes pleasant sounds." A few of the SEP's—and, interestingly enough, they were men who had worked as propagandists—insisted that the party was interested only in those who felt they might bene­ fit personally from joining the party and was wary of any­ one who appeared to be unduly idealistic. One of them said, "We had to make sure the person had a good reason for wanting to join, so that he would be sure to work hard and stay with us. If he was too excitable and not interested in who gave him the money to buy his meals, he might be a petty-bourgeois dreamer and later have different dreams." Most of the SEP's suggested that the party's emphasis on selflessness became a dominant theme only well after they were committed to the party; in the recruiting phase, the party emphasized matters of personal interest. There was considerable diversity among the SEP's in respect to their personal or non-political perceptions of the movement—a diversity that reflected both their individ­ ual differences in character and the activities of the party at the time they joined it. Thus, while over a third said they saw the party as a means of gaining excitement and over­ coming boredom, these were mainly people who joined before the Japanese occupation or during the early post­ war years. The extensive Communist propaganda activities following the Japanese attack on China created the im­ pression that the party was an active, vigorous organiza­ tion that provided its members, and those of its front groups, with considerable excitement and relief from rou­ tine and boredom. As one SEP said: "I saw that the AntiEnemy Backing-Up Society was the most exciting and interesting thing that any of us knew. I thought that if the Communists could organize interesting things like

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

that, the Communist Party itself must be even more stim­ ulating and interesting." For those who joined during the immediate postwar period, the party was still closely associated with the ad­ ventures of the MPAJA. A boy who had been twelve when the Japanese occupied Malaya and who joined the party in 1947 reported: "I used to listen to all the older men talk about the exciting times they had had in the MPAJA. I was a rubber tapper and the leaders of our union were all former MPAJA soldiers. I liked being with them because it was always exciting, and I wanted to be like them." The party was also seen as providing excitement because it was identified with the activities of youth in a modern age. For example, there is the case of a girl who came from a fairly well-to-do family and a relatively liberal home at­ mosphere. "A group of us girls used to get together at each other's houses. We usually talked about clothes and the like, until we were joined by a young Communist girl. She used to tell us about life in the Communist countries. She told us how the young people in China were doing all kinds of interesting things, how they were helping to run the country, and how they went into the towns and country­ side and had a great deal of freedom. It sounded very ex­ citing, because boys and girls were doing things together and getting to know each other well." This girl was to serve in the jungle for nearly two years, during which time she lost her taste for excitement. Fundamentally, the SEP's regarded Communism as ex­ citing because they recognized its political nature and, given their view of politics, this meant that it was an ac­ tive, aggressive movement of youth. Most important of all, the party belonged to the world of tomorrow. About a third of the SEP's believed that Communism could provide them with intellectual skills which would enable them to comprehend better the social world in which they lived. The Communist claim of a near monop­ oly on knowledge led them to hope that by becoming party

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

members they too would be able to understand more about reality. In the case of these SEP's, there is no doubt that the party's propaganda stimulated a true sense of intel­ lectual curiosity. The idea that man could explain and predict social and economic developments captured their imagination. They might now be able to understand what they had previously had to accept as the operations of an inscrutable fate. This desire for knowledge was reported by many more in speaking of the subsequent training they re­ ceived in Communist theory, and we shall therefore post­ pone further discussion of it until a later chapter. For twenty-one of the SEP's, the party represented a sanc­ tuary from the Japanese during the war or from the British when the Emergency began. Several were afraid that their association with trade unions would make them suspect. Some also reported their fear of the government's pro­ posed manpower draft. And then there were those who had compromised with the law and who were informed by the party that they could expect to be arrested on information from a comrade who had surrendered. By about a quarter of the SEP's, the party was seen as a means for maintaining friendships. They found that their close friends were becoming party members and they recognized that if they, too, did not join, the friendships would have to end. For two of them, it was a case of fol­ lowing the example of an older brother. However, in spite of the variety of non-political per­ ceptions reported by the SEP's, the vast majority indicated as either a primary or a secondary consideration that they were influenced by what we will call, for the lack of a bet­ ter term, career prospects. That is, they perceived either the possibility of a career in the party or the likelihood that party membership would give them better employ­ ment opportunities elsewhere, as in the case of those who looked on the trade unions as employment agencies. Nearly three-quarters of the respondents said that they had seen

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

in the party itself the chance for a rewarding career. Among Westerners, there may be a general feeling that it is inappropriate to speak of choosing one's politics because of career reasons. Most Westerners, however, have alterna­ tive political parties to choose among and party affiliation is thought to affect only a limited aspect of one's life. And, even in the West, it is considered perfectly appropriate to take career prospects into account when there is only one major possibility for public service and when this must be of a full-time nature, as in the case of government work. Certainly it cannot be assumed that those who enter gov­ ernment service after careful consideration of their per­ sonal career interests are unable or unlikely to develop strong loyalties to their particular government organiza­ tion. Similarly, the attitudes of the SEP's did not prevent them from becoming emotionally identified with the party. For several reasons, the analogy with government serv­ ice is helpful in understanding the attitudes of the SEP's toward becoming Communists. The organization of the MCP encouraged them to view it as offering career pos­ sibilities. As we have seen, the MCP had a far higher pro­ portion of full-time workers than is common among conventional political parties or even among Western Com­ munist parties. In addition to the functionaries, the vast majority of the rank and file depended upon the party treasury for their entire income. This was not the case just during the Japanese occupation or the Emergency, when they were all living in jungle camps. The ideal of the party member being a professional full-time revolutionary was basic to MCP procedures. Thus, career considerations could hardly have been ignored by those about to decide whether or not to join the party. Moreover, the extensive activities of the MCP during and following the Japanese occupation caused many of the SEP's to think of the party as a shadow government. Claim­ ing to maintain an army and directing numerous front

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

organizations which were able to apply severe sanctions and demand fixed dues, the MCP was accepted as an in­ stitution capable of governing. It seemed to be more than just a group of people with a common political outlook striving for political power. Even those who only had a vague knowledge of the party's structure sensed that it represented a ladder to officialdom. "I knew nothing about the party organization at the time, because it was an ex­ tremely secret matter. Its propaganda was open and all could see its mouth, but its organization was secret and few could see its body. I knew that all the officers in the MPAJA had been party members and so were the union officials. I had had a better education than most of the people in the union, so I thought I might be able to be­ come an official, too. If the revolution succeeded, I might also get a good government post." Generally, the former party functionaries spoke in greater detail of the career possibilities which the party appeared to offer them. The fact that the rank and file had not achieved any great success in the party may have affected their recollections of the way in which they orig­ inally perceived the movement. However, as we shall see, the recruits with strong career ambitions did have a great advantage over the more idealistic members when it came to becoming good Communists and winning pro­ motions. To appreciate why the SEP's expected to be able to look for career outlets in Communism, it is only necessary to recall their belief that political participation in itself opened up opportunities for advancement by providing contacts with the more influential members of the com­ munity. Behind this assumption lay their firm belief in the importance of personal ties. Thus, the experiences of the SEP's with the particular people who introduced them to the party played a large part in shaping their attitudes toward Communism.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

Relations with the Recruiter All of the SEP's spoke of key situations in which an in­ dividual or, more often, a group of two or three party members spoke to them about joining the MCP. Their general knowledge of the party and all the propaganda to which they had been exposed affected their attitudes in these confrontations. Moreover, the coercive power of the MCP was usually present, sometimes in the form of men who were conspicuously armed, and at the least in that of several more knowledgeable people who brought pressure to bear on the intellectually undefended recruit. There was often an element of education in the situation, as the recruiters encouraged the SEP's to take into account argu­ ments and considerations that were new to them. However, in spite of these features, recruitment was an event which the SEP's felt capable of meeting. The situa­ tion was adequately structured for them to foresee the ad­ vantages and disadvantages of alternative behavior. Most important, it enabled them to judge the party at the per­ sonal level. The type of personal relations they established with the recruiters was to them a key to the type of rela­ tions they could expect to have in the party. Because of their confidence that they could judge a man in a faceto-face encounter, the SEP's often felt that they were being given a fair opportunity to find out what Communism was really like. In the recruiters, they had a basis for esti­ mating what life would hold for them as Communists. In describing these meetings, most of the SEP's indi­ cated that they had been impressed by the recruiters' moral attitudes. They found the party representatives speaking in moral terms which seemed to be eminently correct and against which no reasonable person could take issue. They felt that they were being approached in a respectable fash­ ion and that they were being asked to follow a course of action which was morally justifiable. A few of the SEP's said that they interpreted the moral

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

correctness of the recruiters to mean that life in the party would in general be on a rather high moral plane. These respondents considered the moral tone of the Chinese community extremely low, and although they spoke freely of their own indulgences in the vices of this society, they also said they found attractive the idea of a less sordid life in the party. More of the SEP's, however, took the re­ cruiters' attitudes to mean that they could have confidence and trust in the personal relations they might establish in the party. The recruiters seemed to be people who re­ spected personal integrity. Many of the SEP's also appear to have thought that the recruiters were worthy of re­ ceiving attention because of their moral attitudes; to them, anyone who stressed morality and seemed to be personally upright deserved a respectful audience. The fact that the recruiters brought to their minds the importance of virtue caused the SEP's to feel that they were deserving of leader­ ship and that their advice should be taken seriously. As might be expected, most of the judgments of the SEP's were based on a personal morality. Throughout the interviews, the majority of them felt it necessary to indi­ cate whether the people they were speaking of were "good" or "bad," and they generally passed judgment on most of their actions. Since their decisions were usually based on personal considerations and not on the probable conse­ quences of their actions, they often seemed to have little sense of proportion. Thus, after they were in the party, examples of personal decency on the part of officials were more important to them than the implications of the of­ ficials' policies. The second thing that impressed most of the SEP's about their recruiters was how very sincere they seemed to be. The test of sincerity reassured them that their moral eval­ uation had been correct. Proud of their ability to calculate the intentions of others, the SEP's felt that they had been able to determine the true quality of their recruiters, who spoke so sincerely that the SEP's were convinced that they

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

must be reliable. This was a test that they had been accus­ tomed to applying in all their personal relations. Most of the SEP's claimed that they were distrustful of the re­ cruiters at first, suspecting them of ulterior motives; but after talking with them for some time they came to feel that the recruiters had passed all the possible tests for sin­ cerity. (Some of the SEP's seemed to have rather odd tests: "He spoke clearly and fast—didn't mumble his words—so I knew he was sincere." And in another case: "I felt they were sincere because just as soon as one stopped talking, the next one would start, but they all had the same ideas.") The fact that the recruiters were aware of their personal circumstances, the wages they received, and any problem that was troubling them also impressed many of the SEP's. This occurred often enough to convince them that the party was interested in improving their lot. They were con­ vinced that the party must look after its own, if it bothered to inquire into the affairs of potential recruits. In other respects, too, the recruiters gave many of the SEP's the impression that they were extremely knowledge­ able. They seemed to know a great deal about affairs and thus were worthy leaders; they were, in fact, the type of person whom the SEP's were accustomed to accepting as obvious leaders. Their advice was worth heeding, and to ignore it might mean passing up an opportunity for ad­ vancement. In forming their critical judgments of Communism on the basis of their personal relations with the recruiters, the SEP's laid the groundwork for the type of disillusionment to which they were to be the most vulnerable. For the former Western Communists, the basis of disillusionment has usually been the belief that the party stood for par­ ticular ideals; for the SEP's, it was more that the party represented certain desirable personal relations. The party was to make them question their ability to judge the in­ tentions and character of other people in a face-to-face re-

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

lationship. This was to constitute a challenge to the very basis of their security. Reaction to the Ritual of Joining

Ml those who became members o£ the MCP were re­ quired first to pass successfully through a probationary period. According to Article π of the MCP Constitution, the length of probation varies according to the class back­ ground of the candidate. Workers and peasants need only undergo a two-month probation; supervisors, foremen, and intellectuals are required to serve for three months; mem­ bers of the bourgeoisie have to be under observation for four. These official requirements reflect the Communist attitude toward the relationship of class background to the ideal image of the "proletarian revolutionist," which was discussed in Chapter 1. In actual practice, it appears that the length of proba­ tionary membership has varied more with the need of the MCP to expand or maintain its size than with the class backgrounds of the candidates. Thus, during most of the Japanese occupation, the party could bring in candidates from the MPAJA in a rather leisurely and highly selective fashion, with the result that many of the workers had to serve six or more months as probationary members. How­ ever, at the end of the war, when the party realized that it might no longer be able to control large numbers of men through the MPAJA, the process was accelerated and re­ cruits were sworn into the party after only the briefest period of probation; in many cases, the party simply pre­ dated the probationary period. It was hoped that by rapidly expanding the size of the party, it would be possible to maintain discipline over many who would otherwise pass out of its control.7 7 I t should also be noted that another feature of Article n—the re­ quirement that candidates be nominated by individual party mem­ bers who would be held responsible for them—was often disregarded in practice. In many cases, the nominators recognized their responsibili-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

For most of the SEP's the period of probationary mem­ bership entailed daily checks on how well they had car­ ried out their assigned tasks and performed in their formal class sessions. Although it was not a standardized procedure in all the cells, most of the probationary members carried little record books which listed the work they were expected to accomplish and in which their instructors and super­ visors recorded their performance. The party officials, of course, in all cases kept more detailed and secret records. The end of the probationary period was marked by the formal ceremony of becoming a full-fledged party mem­ ber. Although, again, there appears to have been some variation in ritual according to local circumstances and to the period in the party's history, by and large, it was an experience common to all the SEP's. Usually each recruit was introduced into the party at a separate meeting of the cell, but in a few cases two or more shared initiation at a single meeting. When the party was not confined in the jungle, such meetings took place in private homes or in back rooms of Communist establishments. In the jungle, the candidate was led off to a secluded retreat or clear­ ing. All the members of the cell to which he would belong were present and the ceremony was usually presided over by a Branch or even a District Committee member. In al­ most every instance, the place of meeting was decorated with the Red flag and pictures of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. In the case of none of the respondents was the picture of Mao Tse-tung or any of the leading Chinese or Malayan Communists present, an omission which is highly significant in explaining the attitudes of the SEP's toward the Rus­ sian and Chinese Communist parties. ties only formally; and during the peace period, and more especially during the Emergency, it became impossible to hold them accounta­ ble for those who left the party and surrendered. The MCP could hardly afford to punish those of its members who were still loyal— often officials who had achieved some status—for the desertion of men they had backed only in a routine fashion.

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The ceremony usually began with the singing of the "International," followed by a period of three minutes of silence in memory of all the workers of the revolution throughout the world who had died fighting for the cause. The initiate was then ordered to step forward and bow to each of the portraits of the revered leaders of Communism. Next, giving the clenched-fist salute, he rendered the party oath from memory. The oath involved six pledges: to be truthful to the party; to be truthful to the people; never to betray the party to its enemies; never to waver in one's loyalty to the party in the face of hardship and death; never to betray the people; and, finally, to learn Marxism-Leninism.8 The candidate then signed a document which was stamped with the party seal to indicate that the correct ritual had been performed. The senior party representative present was called upon to give an appropriate lecture, usually on the requirements and qualities expected of a good Communist. Then the newly initiated comrade in­ formed the group of his resolve to live up to all that was expected of a worker of the revolution. The formal cere­ monies were then closed with the "Red Flag Song." No other official business was conducted at these special meet­ ings, and during times of peace the group would usually fall into informal conversation over cups of tea. It is not surprising that only a few of the SEP's who went through this ceremony claimed that they were unimpressed or unmoved by it. Of the thirteen who said that they felt the ritual was not particularly exceptional, almost all had already had several years of familiarity with Communist organizations. It appears that they had learned enough about Communism to recognize such a ritual as normal Communist procedure. β It might be noted here that the six points in the oath are hardly separate; all center on the idea of complete loyalty to the party and the !evolution. This piactice of claiming to identify separate points which can hardly be distinguished from each other appears to have played an important part in the pedagogic techniques of the MCP which we will note in Chapter 12.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

For the great majority, however, it was an exciting and important experience. For a few, it was by far the most exciting event of their lives, and they said that they could think of little else for days afterward. It appears to have served well the function of setting most of the SEP's off on their party careers with a high degree of έΐαη and de­ termination to succeed. None of the SEP's seem to have been surprised or dis­ turbed by the conspiratorial aspects of the ritual. Possibly they knew enough about the nature of the traditional secret societies common to Chinese communities to expect that any group or organization would have a comparable initia­ tion ceremony. In any case, the ritual served to remind them of the subversive quality of the movement they were joining; the first pledge to secrecy they took was that they would not reveal to others the nature of the ceremony. Thus, the very words in which they accepted the responsi­ bilities of party membership were devised to impress upon them the fact that the party had its enemies and that only by discipline and determination could they be overcome. This was not a ceremony designed to symbolize an organi­ zation of free-thinking but like-minded people. It was clear to all who experienced it that the ways and the methods of the party were both secret and determined. However, the most important reaction of the SEP's to the ritual of joining was an awareness of the great power of the party. They appear to have come away from the meeting with the feeling that they had entered into some­ thing which represented far more than merely the dissatis­ factions and grievances of the depressed elements of a so­ ciety. They had become a part of a world-wide movement, led by men of great wisdom and organized to meet the most powerful of enemies. The MCP was not just a group of Chinese Malayans who had complaints about the nature of British rule; it was an integral part of a movement which embraced men and women in all countries of the world. One Branch Committee member reported nine years later:

JOINING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

"It was the most exciting thing I have ever known, be­ cause I knew that night that the party was powerful. At that time, my mind was their mind and I was as excited as they were with the idea of a revolution taking place all over the world at the same time. I knew that there were people in England, Europe, and America who were doing the same thing that I was. The party was working for a world revolution. It was not just something that happened; it was something that was being planned and worked for. That is why I accepted the party discipline so completelyonly with discipline and parties organized all over the world, working for the same thing under the single leader­ ship of Stalin, would it be possible to have a world rev­ olution." Although this is a more articulate and extreme state­ ment than most of the SEP's were capable of, it is clear that the ritual of initiation impressed the majority with the power of the Communists. The very pictures of the sainted leaders of Communism reminded them that this was not a parochial movement. They still could not identify the source of leadership of the MCP, but they felt that they possessed some clues, and generally they were happy in their belief that it involved more talent and skill than could be found in Malaya.

CHAPTER 10

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY WITH the initiation ceremonies the SEP's achieved a new status. They were aware that a step had been taken that was likely to affect their whole future. Many reported a marked change in their behavior. They often found them­ selves in the grip of intense emotions, and propaganda statements that had merely interested them in the past now moved them to great excitement. Previously, they had liked to picture themselves as keeping their feet on the ground and acting solely on the basis of cautious and pragmatic calculations. They had had a constant aware* ness of the dangers of being outwitted in a generally hostile world. Now they felt a greater sense of security and thus less need to be wary of permitting their emotions to cloud their judgments. A decision had been taken, a commit­ ment made, and the future of the party was their future. One of the more articulate said: "It was as if I had climbed on the back of a tiger. It was very exciting and I had the power of the tiger; I moved as he moved. But when I finally wanted to get off, it was more dangerous than stay­ ing on his back." Once they were taken into the ranks of the party, the SEP's were expected to act in accordance with the stand­ ards of a good Communist. Enthusiasm was not enough; they had to adjust their behavior to the role of party mem­ ber. The experience and training they had received in front groups meant that these standards were not new to them. During their period of probation, they had been tested and made aware of what was expected of a Com­ munist. However, as full-fledged members, their failure to meet the requirements of party conduct could bring more severe sanctions. In attempting to adapt to the role of party member, the SEP's were trying to meet the expectations of others.

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

Throughout their lives, they had been seeking a group to conform to; at last they had found it. Their lifelong habit of trying to meet the immediate demands of any situation in which they found themselves and their strong pro­ pensity to be sensitive to the attitudes of others were now to be of great value. Because of these characteristics the SEP's quickly realized that if they were to continue to feel secure in the party, it would be necessary to learn how best to act in this new situation. They were committed to a relationship that reduced some of their problems, but they discovered that it was still essential to keep their wits about them. "Before I was a full party member," said one SEP, "I was always careful about what I said or did when there were any Communists around. After they made me a party member, I had to be even more careful. I was with them all the time, and I always watched what they said or did so I wouldn't make any mistakes." And again: "I thought it was good to be a party member. I knew they were still watching me all the time, so I was very careful not to do anything that would displease them or make them sore at me. In trying to adjust their behavior to the expectations of others, the SEP's had a choice of alternatives. They could attempt to make their actions conform to the official de­ mands of the party hierarchy, or they could pattern their conduct on that of their fellow comrades. If they chose the former course, they looked to their leaders as the representatives of the party's authority and accepted the demands of the party in the spirit in which they were made. That is to say, they learned what the party expected of them in terms of formal Communist doctrine. On the other hand, if they turned to the example of their fellows, they modeled their behavior either on those who, like themselves, held no official position, or on their superiors, but as individuals, not as men with a formal role in the party hierarchy. These informal standards to which the SEP's Λ

tt

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

sought to conform were not necessarily in direct conflict with the formal ones; indeed, this was rarely the case. They were, however, apt to be less exacting, more casual, and more concerned with the avoidance of trouble than with positive action. As might be expected, few of the SEP's accommodated their behavior solely according to one or the other of these alternatives. With respect to some matters, they favored the demands of the official doctrine, and in others they ac­ cepted the more informal standard. With time and ex­ perience, they sometimes changed their source of guidance. However, the majority of them tended to look more to one than the other when they were faced with critical questions. For most of the SEP's, there were four major aspects of party life which raised problems of adjustment. First, and most important, was the problem of meeting the de­ mands of the party for complete, unquestioning discipline. Secondly, there was the need to respond to the party's in­ sistence that its members expose themselves to it com­ pletely and keep back no personal secrets. This issue arose in its most acute form in the frequent self-criticism and mutual criticism sessions. The third major problem of the SEP's was that of accustoming themselves to an atmos­ phere of constant exhortation; they were to find that they were always being called upon to work harder, to suffer more, and to be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the revolution. Finally, they were all expected to perform as­ signed tasks which became such important parts of their daily lives that they could not escape forming definite attitudes toward them. If they could adequately adjust to these four major de­ mands, the new party members were likely to encounter few other insurmountable problems. Failure to adjust usually meant a drastic modification in their attitude to­ ward Communism and the probability of finding them­ selves in trouble with the party. For those who succeeded,

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

the manner in which they met these problems determined in large part their subsequent behavior as Communists. It is particularly important to observe fairly closely how the SEP's adapted to the requirements of the party, since it is here that we first see how Communism was able to give a purposefulness to their behavior. Previously, they had been able to express their rejection of their traditional culture and their desire to enter the modern world only by restless, unstable, and opportunistic activities. Once they felt themselves under the control of the party, their conduct underwent a major transformation. Very sig­ nificantly, however, this change seems to have occurred precisely because they still followed the same guides for their actions as they always had. That is, as the SEP's re­ sponded to life in the party in much the same way as they had tried to cope with earlier situations, the total effects of their actions took on a new character. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that other people who are also in the state of breaking from their traditional cultures are likely to react in much the same way as the SEP's did to the framework of Communism. The Spirit of Discipline

The first and most important fact that the SEP's learned about Communism when they came under its control was the absolute and unqualified nature of party discipline. Every technique that the party possessed was employed to convince the new recruit of the necessity of accepting any order and any command in an unquestioning manner. From lectures, songs, and informal chats, and from mem­ orizing the rules of the army or the Min Yuen, the new member learned that the central feature of Communism was the acceptance of party discipline. One of the reasons why the SEP's were quickly impressed with the importance of this aspect of Communism when they entered the MCP was that they were introduced to whole vocabularies of discipline. Their officers spoke of

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

the party's "power of discipline" and of the need for every­ one to respect this power. Their fellow comrades told them of the importance of obeying all orders. Discipline and obedience were honored values; expressions of praise generally referred to these qualities. The language the SEP's heard around them and in which they were ex­ pected to speak was laden with expressions about the importance of discipline. Almost 80 per cent of the SEP's reported that they were impressed very early with the severity of the party's means of enforcing discipline, and fear of punishment remained with them throughout their careers in Communism. Only three said that no actual fear of reprisals influenced their behavior at any time. Although most of the SEP's at­ tributed their feelings about party discipline to the fear of bodily harm, the real reasons for their attitude appear to have been more subtle. It is true that the MCP employed death penalties, and all the SEP's were aware that the Traitor Elimination Corps was organized to handle "ene­ mies" both within and outside the party. However, physical torture was not often applied to those within the jungle and their mobile life precluded incarceration. Moreover, those who joined the party before the Japanese occupa­ tion—when physical violence was less frequently used in punishments—reported the same fear as those who joined during the war and the Emergency. Thus the incidence of severe physical punishment seems to have had little relationship to the MCP's ability to evoke fear of dis­ cipline. A clue to the real basis of the fears of the SEP's is to be found in their general agreement that the party's practice of disciplining its members by depriving them of their firearms was a very harsh and severe form of punishment. They claimed that this was something to be dreaded be­ cause, without their weapons, they would be defenseless. But it was also clear that none of them contemplated hav­ ing to use his weapon to defend himself against the other

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

members of the party. Actually, it seems that their sense of physical defenselessness was only a reflection of a much deeper feeling of being psychologically defenseless when the party punished them. A fundamental feature of every form of punishment employed by the MCP was the "re­ forming" of the individual before his comrades, a process that was accompanied by social ostracism for a period of time. By making him feel completely isolated from those about him, the party was directly threatening the very basis of the man's sense of personal security. His anxie­ ties were raised and he felt defenseless because he could not satisfy his need to be accepted by others. As one of the SEP's reported: "It was very bad. No one would talk with me. My friends wouldn't even look at me. I didn't know what would happen to me. I couldn't sleep at night. When we had our meetings, no one would sit beside me." However, this basic orientation which made most of the SEP's so vulnerable to the MCP's forms of punishment also facilitated their initial adjustment to the spirit of regimentation in the party. The extraordinary degree to which they accepted the party's demands for discipline is possibly the most remarkable feature in the entire record of their behavior as Communists. All the evidence sug­ gests that despite their desire for conformity these SEP's had been an unruly lot before they came under the control of the MCP. Yet, once in the party, they tended to accept quickly the leadership of their officers and to establish harmonious relations with their fellow comrades. The explanation seems to lie in the fact that in the party the SEP's found a very clearly structured situation; the cues to guide their actions were distinct, and they felt they could predict with assurance the consequences of any re­ sponse on their part. It was not just that they could expect punishment when they violated the party demands. They also seem to have had no doubts of their ability to evoke positive responses, such as praise, friendly and warm atti­ tudes on the part of others, and possibly even promotions.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

The expected modes of behavior and the possible types of relationships were so clearly defined that, given their pro­ pensity for trying to make the best of any situation, they readily conformed to the discipline of the party. Aware that they were involved in a new situation, they were alert to learn the cues that would ensure success. Thus, accept­ ance of discipline coincided with the course of expediency. Before they entered the party, the SEP's had been just as anxious to conform to the expectations of those whom they considered knowledgeable and influential, but this had not usually been an easy thing to do. The power and influence of others could change with circumstances, and new conditions usually demanded new relationships and an adjustment in old ones. It must also be remembered that the SEP's habitually sought to manipulate personal ties to their own advantage. When these ties were only vaguely defined, their attempts to exploit them caused them to act as though they were unamenable to any form of discipline. This was doubly the case when they found themselves in unstable situations, since their advantage was constantly shifting. The behavior of the SEP's in the party, therefore, was not without consistency. The fact that they suddenly seemed to become extraordinarily amenable to discipline was mainly due to the great differences between the types of situations they were accustomed to on the outside and those they found in the party. At the beginning of their careers in Communism, less than a fourth of the SEP's accepted in full the party's atti­ tude about and justification for strict obedience. Those who did were mainly men who later became party func­ tionaries. The majority initially sought to learn from the be­ havior of their equals how to keep out of trouble. In doing so, they discovered that although the party spoke in terms of an unqualified and universal acceptance of discipline on all matters, it was in fact necessary to be more careful in some respects than others. Their method of adjustment was very much the same as

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

that of any group of professional soldiers who recognize that there is a standard of discipline which is supposedly applicable to the entire army, but that in actual fact any particular military post tends to stress certain aspects of the general code. Thus, when transferred to a new post, these soldiers follow the course of prudence until they determine which rules are strictly enforced and which are stressed to a lesser degree or even ignored. However, it seems that as the SEP's spent more time un^r MCP discipline they tended to accept more and more wholeheartedly the official party attitude. In fact, nearly all of them claimed that there was a period in their party career during which they actually came very close to accepting it completely. When they reached this point, they thought nothing of reporting on their comrades' be­ havior, even if it resulted in a friend's being punished. It also is significant that most of them claimed that it was during the periods when they most completely identified themselves with the MCP's position that they were the most happy. "I really believed in the party's discipline then; my mind was their mind. When we got our orders at the cell meetings, nobody questioned them, nobody asked that they be explained or justified. Everybody just wanted to obey the orders, and we were proud of the way we accepted the orders and carried them out. It was very exciting and I was happy to be a Communist. Once people began to question the orders, I knew that we might not be able to realize the revolution." In some cases, this shift in attitude occurred after the SEP's found that it was not enough just to try to avoid trouble. On occasion, they had to adopt a more positive attitude and demonstrate the extent of their commitment to the spirit of Communism. However, in most cases, the change seems to have been related to their basic sense of insecurity. That is, in the first stages of adjusting to the party their primary concern was protecting themselves from extreme sanctions. Safety could best be achieved by

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

learning how others had adjusted to the party's require­ ments. However, as they overcame this problem and felt themselves more closely identified with the fortunes of the party, the SEP's became more anxious about the MCP's chances of success. It must be remembered that most of them had few illusions about their own ability to cal­ culate general policies. Indeed, they recognized that they, individually, were no match for the British and the other enemies of the party. Thus they desperately had to believe in the wisdom of their leadership. To admit that rfhey themselves might have the capacity to question the good sense of the orders they received would have been to sug­ gest that their leadership was no better than they and thus that it was inferior to its enemies. Their own wisdom in joining the movement would be put to question if they doubted the wisdom of the party's orders. They had gambled on the skills of the MCP leadership and now they felt entirely dependent upon it. The Spirit of Self-Criticism

The second major problem for all the SEP's was the official party demand that all members expose their inner thoughts to the scrutiny of the hierarchy. The process began when they were required to provide their leaders with detailed accounts of their entire life histories. In these, they had to record their past opinions, characterizing them with the appropriate Communist label. Examples of "bourgeois mentality" and "reactionary" views had to be cited, and "progressive" proletarian positions could be claimed. The process continued with the frequent sessions of self and mutual criticism. They were called upon to announce to all their comrades any errors in their thoughts, and they were expected to be publicly critical of the be­ havior of their fellows. Only twelve of the respondents said that they had at any time in their party careers attempted to be completely frank with their leaders. Just as the party had secrets from

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

them, so they thought it advisable to keep some things secret from the party. Although the party functionaries were on the whole more cautious and calculating in their actions, it seems that they also tended to be more open in exposing their thoughts to the party at the beginning. Actually, the vast majority started with a not unfriendly attitude toward the principle of self-criticism, although their view was by no means identical with formal Com­ munist doctrine. Most of the SEP's were interested in self-improvement, and they initially interpreted the party's position as one of helping them; they felt that the prac­ tice of self-criticism provided an excellent opportunity to establish good relations with their comrades as well as with the party itself. The fact that the MCP was interested in their past history suggested to them that it was prepared to give them a better future. Thus, they appear to have assumed that the party, in asking them to be completely sincere and to bare all their thoughts, was extending them a chance to build up strong and profitable personal rela­ tionships. However, in practice, almost all of the SEP's soon under­ went extremely trying moments as they took part in the process of public confession. For several of the SEP's these were traumatic experiences. Again, the source of their difficulties seemed to be that, out of confidence in their own ability to meet the demands of a clearly defined situa­ tion, they had expected to gain prestige in the eyes of others, and yet the result was social isolation. They felt a keen sense of shame—an emotion based not upon a recog­ nition of wrongdoing but upon the realization that others considered them a failure and, more important, that in fact they had failed to evoke a desired and favorable re­ sponse to their own behavior. Although they had not hoped to be able to command the situation, the SEP's had expected that they could to some degree manipulate the responses of their leaders and gain the approval of their equals. Inasmuch as they were

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

anxious to please and to be accepted by others, any failure to do so was deeply disturbing, especially when it occurred in public. Apparently most of the SEP's, once they realized they were not meeting the test, tended to grope for some means of reducing hostile criticism. In their desperate at­ tempts to influence their leaders' attitude toward them, they were likely to speak in extremes that had no relation to reality. On finding their leaders critical of their con­ fessions, several of them tried at first to reestablish a sym­ pathetic attitude by confessing to more and more serious offenses. When this attempt to adopt a posture of complete frankness and sincerity failed, they would deny all they had said and claim they had been misunderstood. When this too brought no relief, they were overcome by a sense of utter helplessness and a feeling that the party didn't "act according to reason." The way in which nearly 80 per cent of the SEP's finally adjusted to this problem was to ritualize all of their confessions. They learned the types of exposures which would please the party and keep them from getting into difficulty. They discovered that if they reported their thoughts and actions in too favorable a light, the party would be suspicious. Most of the SEP's said that they came to calculate carefully the extent of their confessions in advance of the meetings. The mood of some meetings tolerated more extreme confessions and on such occasions it was safe and even desirable to make somewhat more serious admissions. With experience, the majority of the SEP's learned to sense what constituted appropriate and adequate criticism of their own thoughts. In so doing, they were able to reduce their fears of the sessions of self and mutual criticism and even to look upon them once again as opportunities for winning prestige and general favor. One gets the impression from the SEP's that there were actually strong pressures in the MCP to ritualize the entire practice of confessing one's thoughts. Although the party kept detailed records and although any statements

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

of self-criticism might be later used against one, the po­ litical commissars seemed to accept rather mild confessions. The most frequent admission in the MCP was that of laziness and not working as hard as one was capable of doing. So long as the confessions remained at this level, the leaders could respond with the appropriate admonish­ ment about all having to struggle harder. However, when­ ever anyone who had been in the party for any length of time confessed to a serious error in thought or deed, an immediate crisis was likely to develop in the unit. To fail to punish the man would create disciplinary problems, especially since he had acted in the officially correct man­ ner by confessing. However, any punishment was also likely to have far-reaching consequences on the morale of the entire group. Faced with such a dilemma, the leader usual­ ly had no choice but to report his problem to a higher authority, with the result that he himself was likely to receive a reprimand for permitting one of his charges to commit a serious error. Thus, for all concerned, it was desirable to treat the problem of self-criticism as an elab­ orate game in which each member went through the ap­ propriate confession of some minor sin, promised to do better in the future, and in this way set the stage for the leader to reprove and exhort one and all. Thus, while the SEP's tended to accept the official party position on discipline, they generally adjusted to an in­ formal standard of behavior in the case of self-criticism. This did not mean that the latter problem completely disappeared. With every change in political commissars, it was necessary for the members of the unit to discover what the new official expected and would tolerate. It is sig­ nificant that none of the SEP's reported that he had ever had an informal conversation with his fellow comrades about how to ritualize the self-criticism sessions. Appar­ ently, they could not trust even their closest friends in the party enough to discuss this delicate problem, and each had to find his own solution.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

The Atmosphere of Exhortation

The third major problem the SEP's encountered in adjusting to party control was that of accustoming them­ selves to the constant exhortations which characterized the atmosphere of Communism. Although no serious threats to their persons were involved, it was nevertheless neces­ sary for each of the SEP's to adjust his own behavior to the repeated demands of the party for all to work harder, suffer more, and if necessary die heroically. To move from the prosaic life they were accustomed to in the community at large to the supercharged climate of the MCP required adaptability. However, only one of the SEP's said that he was unnerved from the beginning by the violence of the exhortations. The rest reported that only as they began to break with Communism did they find this atmosphere an unbearable strain. To a truly remarkable extent, most of the SEP's began their party careers by accepting in a literal sense the ex­ hortations of their leadership. They seemed to want to adopt on the party's terms the ideals of sacrifice and strug­ gle. Not only did they consider that it was correct and praiseworthy of the party to speak in such terms, but they said that they themselves had at one time felt prepared to act in the same spirit. Much evidence on the way the SEP's responded to emo­ tional and idealistic sentiments when they joined the party is revealed in their comments on their leaders' ap­ peals to them to make sacrifices and work harder. The security they found in being identified with a strong move­ ment seems to have made them less wary of emotion. At the same time, they also seem to have felt that in Com­ munism they had discovered a purer, more morally mean­ ingful existence. They had escaped from the drabness and sordidness o£ their past lives, and they reacted with all the idealism of youth and all the emotionalism common to adolescent group activities. The Chinese society in which

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

they had lived had so circumscribed and checked the pos­ sibilities of purposeful emotional expression as to make such demonstrations self-defeating. Anger, hostility, and intense animosities had always been possible, but the SEP's had had almost no opportunity to experience more con­ structive emotions. As a consequence of their ready adjustment to the party's appeal for sacrifice, the SEP's adopted an idealistic attitude toward, not the goals or ends, but the means and tactics of Communism. Struggle, sacrifice, and hard work all be­ came ends in themselves and did little to change their earlier and less idealistic concepts of the goals of the movement. By accepting struggle and conflict as desirable, they could become power tacticians—that is, model Com­ munists—without possessing the tactician's rational skills. In short, the degree of emotionalism and idealism that they experienced in Communism only encouraged the SEP's to adopt the basic Communist attitude that all else is secondary to the achievement of power. Their idealism and enthusiasm were still not identified with any specific goals for the movement, and thus they were not in a posi­ tion to experience the type of disillusionment common among former Western Communists. Although the majority of the SEP's began by accepting the exhortations in a relatively literal manner, in time most of them were unable to maintain the same emotional responses, and they tended to accept the pleas for sacrifice and the like as ritualistic expressions. The meetings at which their leaders harangued them became ceremonies that served to maintain their confidence that all was still going well with the party. As the exhortations lost their power of emotional stimulus, they became symbolic as­ surances of the power of the party. Although the SEP's did not respond by working any harder, they tended to assume from these rituals that the party was working, struggling, and succeeding. Once the SEP's began to question Communism, their

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

adjustment to the exhortation of their leaders was one of the first things that collapsed. The constant appeals to struggle harder began to unnerve them and even led them to question the sanity of their leadership. "The Com­ munists kept on talking all the time about working harder for the revolution and dying heroically. Who could work any harder? Who could fight any harder? The turtle eggs spoke of heroic death, but we were dying like animals without any funerals or caskets. They told us we must work harder but all we could do was to sit around in the jungle and wonder when we would eat rice again. When you couldn't do anything, all they would do was to talk more about working harder and eating bitterness." However, this disillusionment occurred late in their party careers. It is only important to note here that once the SEP began to doubt Communism, it was difficult for him—even though he did not leave the party right away— ever again to adjust to its supercharged atmosphere. The Acceptance of Assignments

The fourth major problem of the SEP's in adjusting to life in the party was accustoming themselves to their assignments and duties. In performing these tasks, they were meeting Communism on a mundane level. Almost 40 per cent claimed that irom the beginning they disliked many of their duties, but they were able to re­ late this feeling to particular assignments and did not permit it to color their attitudes toward other aspects of Communism. In contrast, about 15 per cent found some of their duties so onerous as to modify from the first their attitude toward the movement as a whole. They were not able either to rationalize these duties or to discover emo­ tional satisfactions elsewhere in the party to compensate for them. The rest of the SEP's did not encounter this problem initially. Either because of their enthusiasm for the move­ ment or because they realized that their personal prefer-

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

ences carried no weight, they accepted all duties in the same spirit. "We had liaison meetings for the various cells every six or seven days and at that time each cell would be assigned its new tasks. The cell leader would inform us of the orders he had received and then each of us would be given our personal assignments. It didn't make any difference what you were assigned. It was all strenuous work, but we enjoyed it. The cell never complained about what its orders were and we personally never complained about our tasks. We were so proud that we just carried out orders, whatever they were. You would have only gotten into trouble if you said you didn't like some kinds of work. They would have said your spirit was not right and that you had reactionary views and things would be very, very bad for you. It was much better to like what you were told to do." In time, of course, most of these men began to adopt more definite attitudes toward particular jobs. However, they seem to have found it harder to compartmentalize their responses than those who entered the movement with a greater sense of discrimination about their assignments. Also, it is significant that a clear majority of those who were to become party functionaries began their careers with the recognition that they disliked some types of work. In part, their success in gaining promotion appears to have been related to this more realistic attitude. Moreover, the skills they employed in seeking to avoid the duties they disliked were helpful in obtaining advancement in the party. It is significant that the most popular assignments were those related to the propaganda activities of the MCP and its front organizations. Taking part in the public propa­ ganda shows, attending meetings at which party songs were sung and plays were enacted, and engaging in private, face-to-face propaganda activities were the types of assign­ ments most enjoyed by a majority of the SEP's. Here again we note their characteristic attitude toward political propaganda. Not only did they like to observe

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

experts in propaganda in action, but they themselves had ambitions in the field of persuasion. They prized highly the opportunity to influence others and to prove their per­ sonal superiority without assuming great risks. While the field of public propaganda offered more drama and emo­ tional satisfaction, the recruitment of private individuals provided them with a sense oi power and security. "I liked to go around and talk to people and find out what their troubles were. However, sometimes in these conversations the workers would forget how powerful you were and they would talk back and swear at you. When they did this, I would have to remind them that the Communists would not forget how they had behaved." Another reason why propaganda activities appear to have been so popular is that they gave the SEP's a sense of iden­ tity with the policy-makers of the party, without requiring them to make decisions themselves. In propaganda work, the SEP's were presenting the party's policy to the public at large and they were in a position to observe the gap be­ tween the party's public statements and its actual motives. Although they did not have full knowledge of the inner secrets of the party elite, they felt not too far removed from those who made the decisions. Thus they were able to con­ sider themselves the right-hand men of those who were clever and skilled in understanding affairs. Propaganda work also served to bolster the morale of those who took part in it. When the party talked and sang of its eventual victories, the day of revolution seemed near at hand. Since no other group in Malaya was staging com­ parable propaganda activities during the immediate post­ war period, they tended to assume that the party would soon have a monopoly of power. The words and the tunes of the party songs alone were enough to convince many that the MCP was powerful. As one of the SEP's said: "I used to like best to take part in singing the Communist songs. When a group of us got up in front of our audience and sang some of them, I always got very excited and knew that

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

we would conquer all. Nobody else had songs as fierce or as brave as the Communist ones. After you had heard them, how could you not believe that Communism would win?" Next in popularity to propaganda work came military training, the planning of cell activities, and organizational work in the unions. The satisfaction the SEP's derived from military training appears to have been related to their ability to find meaning in symbolic activities. Drilling, physical training exercises, and lectures on military opera­ tions all contributed to their sense of the growing power of Communism. "I liked very much all the military train­ ing we received. I knew that it was making the party strong and that we could defeat all our enemies. When we were practicing, we would all think about how strong the Com­ munists were, and we were always much better when we drilled than when we actually fought." This capacity of the SEP's to find significance in practice and drill no doubt helped to account for the ability of both the MPAJA and the MRLA to maintain high morale with a minimum of actual combat. Most armies would find it difficult to sustain the morale of their troops during war­ time if they engaged in so much training with so little fighting. However, in the MCP's organized "regiments" the training activities not only built up morale but were suffi­ cient to convince most of the soldiers that they were win­ ning campaigns. Although few of the SEP's who were interviewed had been responsible for even minor party decisions, in their cell meetings all of them had been involved in planning how to carry out many of the directives they received. Regardless of their lack of freedom of choice, it was still possible for them to gain great satisfaction from talking over the party decisions. Many of these meetings appear to have resembled teashop gossip sessions; during them, each participant gave his views about the political scene, and all were involved in making calculations about what was likely to happen to the enemies of Communism. Each was

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

anxious to display his knowledgeability about affairs by pointing out how desirable the results of a given directive would be and then how clever the MCP leadership was. Once convinced that the objectives were worth while, the SEP's seem to have assumed that they would inevitably be realized. To translate plans into achievements mainly re­ quired belief in their desirability, and if no one could find an argument against the goals, there could be little criti­ cism of the plans themselves. In the end, all that was neces­ sary was for each one to pledge that he would work harder. Direction remained with the party leadership, but all felt that they had participated and that success was assured. In contrast with the other popular duties, work in the trade unions, and particularly in organizing workers, rep­ resented a substantive contribution to strengthening the Communist movement. Even more than propaganda activi­ ties, trade union work gave the SEP's some degree of execu­ tive power and a sense of identity with the party leadership. Particularly for those who considered that they had leader­ ship ability—and, as we have noted, many did—work in the trade union field was seen as an opportunity to display the full extent of their talents. Although the majority of the SEP's sought to avoid risks, most of them, and particularly those who later became party functionaries, were interested in achieving power and responsibility. They enjoyed the feeling that they were responsible for the success of their particular union. A former District Committee member who was highly articu­ late reported: "One never finds freedom in Communism, and everyone knows when he joins the party that he will have to accept the party's orders completely and that his life is the party's. However, the Communists do give you responsibilities, and this is something I never had as a carpenter. The party gives you an assignment and then it is up to you to do it. You either succeed or you don't, but it is you who are doing it. This is why I liked the trade union work so much. The party ordered me to organize the

ADJUSTING TO LIFE IN THE PARTY

workers in the town. I had no choice, but once I got the union organized and the workers all signed up, I knew that it was I who had done it and not the party. Where can I find a job now where people would trust me with such responsibilities? When the party trusts you, you have more power than when anyone else trusts you." It is significant that those duties which the SEP's most disliked were precisely those which contributed most to the MCP's success: collecting "subscriptions," fighting, engag­ ing in terrorist activities, pressuring people into becoming "sympathizers," housekeeping work in the camps, and learning Communist theory. Although the SEP's recognized that it was through such activities that the MCP had been able to build up its strength, they were frank to admit reluctance to take on these assignments. While having to engage in military operations was gen­ erally listed as the most unpopular assignment, after their surrender a good many of the SEP's, especially the adolescents, took a great deal of pride in their battle ex­ perience. They appeared typical of young people in many lands who, although happy to have escaped serious damage and to be able to avoid further exposure, enjoy reminiscing about their war experiences. In fact, many of them were so enthusiastic about retelling their combat adventures that it became difficult in the interviewing to guide their attention to other subjects without causing them to lose interest in the whole affair. Also, it should be noted that a very high proportion of the SEP's have indicated their willingness to fight on the side of the British against their former comrades and that many have responded enthusi­ astically to service in "jungle squads," especially since they are now far better equipped as soldiers. It is difficult to evaluate how strong the feelings of the SEP's may have been toward those assignments which they claim to have disliked. It was obvious that these were the duties which the respondents expected their interroga­ tor to consider morally indefensible. The fact that some

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

of them were prepared to defend terrorism at all suggests that in the atmosphere of party life they may not have found it too uncongenial. To sum up the pattern of adjustment to life in the MCP: it was generally a strikingly new experience for the SEP's but one which initially did not raise excessively dif­ ficult problems. The vast majority knew that they would be called upon to alter their previous mode of living, and they were aided by the excitement and interest they found in the party's demands. Less than a quarter of the SEP's began their Communist careers by accepting the spirit of the party without question, and most of these remained in the rank and file. In contrast, a large proportion of those who achieved higher status in the party had approached the problem of adjustment in a less emotional manner. For the majority, emotional responses played an important part in their adaptation to Communism, in spite of the fact that they had made the decision to join on the basis of more rational considerations. The high point of their enthusiasm for the movement came soon after they had fully committed themselves. By the time their enthusiasm had worn thin, they had learned much more about Com­ munism and had developed the necessary skills to cope with many of its demands. In most respects, the majority of the SEP's adjusted to informal standards rather than to the official code of Com­ munist behavior. However, these standards were not such as to weaken the MCP appreciably. In time, as they be­ came accustomed to life in the party, they were increasingly sustained by the knowledge that they were veterans. As such, they not only understood something about the or­ ganization of Communism, but also became engrossed with the problem of trying to get ahead in the party.

CHAPTER 11

UNDERSTANDING THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT As THE SEP's gained confidence in their new role as party members, their attention was increasingly directed to the broader characteristics of the movement they had joined. They became aware that they now belonged to an ex­ tremely militant group, organized on authoritarian prin­ ciples, and with a hierarchy that extended into the inter­ national sphere. Of course, even before they committed themselves to Communism, they had recognized many of its distinctive features. However, during the initial phase of their life in the MCP, they were generally absorbed in adjusting their behavior to the direct demands of the party. This continued to be a necessity, but as it became less of a problem a new stage was reached. Increasingly, their actions and attitudes were influenced by their greater understanding of the party organization. This was the case for all except the few who had such difficulties with the earlier problems of personal security that they broke with the party before they could fully comprehend the more general characteristics of Communism. Militancy Becomes Aggressiveness

In our initial discussion of Communist doctrines, we observed that in the People's Liberation parties the tra­ ditional Communist spirit of militancy has tended to be­ come associated with policies of "armed struggle." Thus, in these parties, militancy is often expressed literally by the use of violence and military means. Here we are concerned with the way in which individual members of the Malayan party assimilated the Communist spirit of militancy and how it affected their personal behavior. Even before they entered the party, the SEP's were fully aware of the militancy of Communism. The periods of war-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

fare and terrorism in the history of the MCP had indicated the readiness of Communists to adopt extreme measures. However, even when the MCP was engaged in what it called "peaceful agitation" rather than in "armed agita­ tion," its spirit of militancy was conspicuous to the out­ sider. One of the SEP's described this feature of Commu­ nism with reference to trade union policies: "I always knew which of the trade unions were Communist because these were the ones that always wanted to pick a fight. If there was no reason for striking, they would always find one. Other unions were afraid that strikes might hurt them and they acted strong only when they had to. Also, in the Communist unions they were always talking about strug­ gling and arguing with everyone else. Because they were always arguing, you could tell that they were mixed up in politics and that they must be Communists." The MCP's emphasis upon struggle was enough to sug­ gest to most of the SEP's (given their basic views on the place of conflict in politics) the party's political involve­ ment; it also convinced many that the party was likely to succeed. In their understanding of both Chinese and Malayan history, those who ruled had always triumphed through violence. Moreover, within the sphere of their daily lives, they had learned that it was the most aggressive and vigorous people who usually got ahead. Thus the militancy of Communism evoked their admiration and almost no feeling that it was inappropriate, unnecessary, or unde­ sirable. Once in the MCP, the SEP's began to learn more about the special qualities of Communist militancy in lectures and political classes. They were informed that the party struggled according to plan, that it always knew the correct form of struggle to apply under a different "objective con­ dition." A former District Committeeman indicated the ease with which most of the SEP's accepted the party's argument: "In our first political classes, we were told that the party believed that violence was necessary. We were

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

taught that only through fighting and the shedding of blood could the revolution come. The capitalist society would never permit the Communists to bring about so­ cialism without a fight. Therefore, there was no point in talking about elections, since there would have to be an armed struggle sooner or later. We all knew this to be the case, and I believed it all along; I still believe that if there is to be a revolution it will have to come through violence. They told us that the Kuomintang always talked about completing the revolution [in China], but were never able to do so because they were afraid to struggle and fight. Chiang Kai-shek would win a little bit and then he would rest; the Communists never rest and they are not afraid to use armed struggle. To be a Communist, you have to be brave." This last comment is typical of the way in which most of the SEP's tended to translate the idea of the militancy of the movement into bold personal behavior. They be­ longed to a strong fighting organization: they themselves must be bold and vigorous. Boldness, however, usually be­ came aggressiveness, and their model was often the bully and the tough. Even during periods when the MCP was not engaged in military operations, a great deal of empha­ sis appears to have been placed on physical and mental toughness. In their relations with outsiders, most of the SEP's became aggressive and domineering. Aware that they belonged to a militant elite, their response was to be cocky and even ruthless toward those who did not belong. Although they were informed in their lectures that the militancy of the party was disciplined and rationally guided, most of the SEP's tended to understand the spirit of militancy in terms of the personal aggressiveness of the party members. As a consequence, they were prone to be­ lieve all they heard in the political classes about Com­ munism being on the move throughout the world, and no­ where on the defensive. They were not surprised to learn in their course on "Analyzing the Current World Situa-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

tion" that it was Communists who were carrying off the steel strikes in America; that the Communists had driven the British out of oil-rich Iran; that Nehru could not be bold in foreign affairs for fear of the Indian Communists. It is significant that many of the functionaries reported a belief that the North Korean Communists began the Korean War by attacking South Korea. It was inconceiva­ ble to them that an old man like Syngman Rhee or the weak South Korean government could start a fight with anyone. The account given by most of the rank and file was not too different: North Korea had attacked South Korea, but it was not quite a case of open aggression, since the United States was about to begin the war. For them, the proof of American intentions lay in the speed with which the United States intervened with heavy equipment and planes. America was far away—how would the equip­ ment have arrived so soon if it had not been on its way before the fighting started? Thus, with respect to both individual Communist be­ havior and party policies, the SEP's had the same expecta­ tions of aggressive actions and they could take pride in belonging to an organization that was never caught off guard and that always landed the first blow in a fight. They knew that the MCP had initiated the resistance to the Japanese and that it had instigated the Emergency. By the same token, they themselves were aggressive, now that they were Communists. This was their understanding of Communist militancy. The Virtues of Authoritarianism

As we have seen, one of the first major problems the SEP's faced was adjusting to the party's disciplinary de­ mands. In time, they were given formal instruction about the party organization and they learned that their relations with their immediate superiors represented only the first link in a highly authoritarian hierarchy. They became aware of a structure that included cells and the Branch,

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

District, and State Committees, and at the top a Central Committee. However, only a few had a clear idea of the total size of the MCP or of how business was transacted at the higher levels. Because of security considerations, little exact information was imparted to the new members; the sketchy description of the MCP they did receive was usual­ ly presented in the context of the history of the movement. One consequence of this was the tendency of the SEP's to exaggerate in their own minds the total size of the party. To them, the concept of power suggested bigness. In spite of having been taught the Communist principle of maintaining the party as a small, disciplined elite, the SEP's were predisposed to believe only in the qualities of discipline and eliteness. Indeed, the fact that they were not given a detailed understanding of the total organiza­ tion strengthened their expectation that there was prob­ ably more to the party structure than they had been told. Their general experiences, especially in the front groups, had made them ready to suspect that there was likely to be more involved in the control of any group than was ever openly acknowledged. Also, the propensity of the MCP to assign formal titles to every new activity meant that throughout their careers the SEP's were continually hearing that the party had groups of which they had not previously been aware. The SEP's were informed that the party structure was governed by the principle of "democratic centralism." That is, the lower levels elected the membership of the upper levels; the orders of the superior echelons must be accepted unqualifiedly by the lower echelons; and the minority must always bow completely to the will of the majority. How­ ever, in their experience, the MCP never indulged in even the pretense of holding elections. In fact, throughout the history of the MCP, the practice had been for the higher authorities to select those who held any position above the rank and file. The principle of promotion had com­ pletely replaced that of election, and we shall see how

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

the SEP's accommodated themselves to the fact that it was better to win the favor of their superiors than to achieve popularity with their equals. The possibility of promo­ tions apparently eliminated any demand for elections. As for the need of the minority to accept the will of the majority, discipline was always strict enough to ensure that no minority views developed. It was only necessary to accept completely the operation of an authoritarian or­ ganization. ACCEPTANCE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Over 80 per cent of the SEP's claimed that the MCP was an unqualifiedly authoritarian organization, and none claimed that it either was democratic or made any pre­ tension of being anything except a disciplined group. Slightly less than 10 per cent said that at the cell level rank and status were not so important and free discussion in support of Communism was possible. None of them indi­ cated that they had ever heard any open criticism of Com­ munism as a whole or of the Central Committee's deci­ sions. Another group of slightly less than 10 per cent sug­ gested that the MCP had been less authoritarian in earlier periods. A few reported that before the war there had been a fair degree of equality among comrades, and others said that during the Japanese occupation the MPAJA was less obviously controlled by the MCP than the MRLA was during the Emergency. It is significant that the SEP's not only accepted com­ pletely the authoritarian nature of the MCP but did not ask that the party be more democratic. Even when they turned against Communism, they did not voice their dis­ satisfaction in terms of the undemocratic character of the party. Many felt that they had been unjustly treated by their superiors and that there had been excessive inequali­ ties, but they complained of the behavior of authority and not of the lack of democratic control. In explaining their acceptance of the authoritarian na-

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

ture of the party, most of the SEP's cited an argument that must have been frequently advanced by the MCP: armies and police forces have to be authoritarian organiza­ tions even though they are fighting for democratic values. As one of the SEP's said: "There was absolutely no equality in the MCP and no one expected any. "We were fighting for a society without any inequalities, but in order to do this you had to have discipline and leaders." Or, in the words of another: "Nobody ever argued about the orders we received; everybody just tried to carry them out. We knew that if the revolution was to succeed, it was neces­ sary that we have strict discipline. To ask for freedom in the party would be to ask for the revolution to fail." Thus in time the SEP's found a broader rationale for the party's insistence upon discipline, something they had accepted at first only out of considerations of personal security. They began to believe that the authoritarian char­ acter of the party increased its likelihood of success. How­ ever, consciously or unconsciously, they continued to un­ derstand the problem in much the same terms as those in which they had responded to the demands for discipline, with the result that they confused individual behavior with party behavior. That is, they tended to identify the sense of purposefulness they personally felt on finding them­ selves in a clearly defined situation with the purposefulness of the movement as a whole. Similarly, the fact that it was easier for them to deal with life when the demands on their behavior were unambiguous led them to believe that it is easier for authoritarian organizations to achieve success. This confusion of ideas helps to explain why the vast majority of the SEP's accepted so readily the authoritarian nature of the party. Indeed, it led them to the conclusion that an authoritarian organization was likely to bring out the best in the individual. As both the party and the in­ dividual found success, all would be experiencing selfimprovement. The SEP's were especially prone to speak

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

of the authoritarian qualities of the party as making the individual more diligent and less wasteful in his efforts. The words of a former District Committee member illus­ trate this attitude: "Of course, the Communist Party is not democratic. If you expect it to be democratic, you do not understand Communism. Life in the party is com­ pletely different from life on the outside. In the party there are no neutral thoughts; Communism knows that every­ thing is either good or bad, proletarian or bourgeois. You have to learn what the party line is on everything, and then all your thoughts have to be with the party. Once you are told what the line is, you no longer have any inde­ pendence of thought. In most ways this is good, because unless they have their thoughts corrected, people tend to think about things that are not important and begin to get confused. This is why most people never get anything done and cannot get rich. . . . Also, in the party there is no freedom of movement. You have to report to one place and stay there. Everything has to be done according to the work schedule. Many of the working-class people used to take time off from their work to do whatever they pleased. Once they get into the party, they can't do this. It is very hard on some of them. However, it is also good for them, because most workers used to take too much time off, and as a result they didn't get as much money as they could have. Even under socialism, nothing could be done if the workers took time off freely." Another SEP remarked: "The party organization was very strict. Each committee did just as it should and there was no freedom or democracy. The party never did any­ thing in a casual way. They were very firm and heavy in their actions and they didn't know how to be easy-going. Everything had a meaning; they always found exactly the right way to do things and then they made everyone do it. I think this is good, because before they became Commu­ nists most of the people used to waste their time and do many silly things."

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

The SEP's thus accepted the authoritarian nature of the party as more than just an expedient for realizing the goal of revolution. They seem to have gone so far in finding it desirable as to be well on their way to appreciating the Communist ethic of work for production's sake. Their be­ havior within the context of an authoritarian structure made them feel that there might be some value in diligence, a quality they had previously identified mainly with the senseless and helpless peasant. It is not hard to imagine that most of the SEP's would be able to find virtue in the authoritarian nature of Communism in a post-revolutionary situation.1 THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY

The fact that the SEP's found in the structure of the party a world of apparently more stable relationships than they were accustomed to, and hence a world in which it was easier to perceive the ways to success, only in part explains the extent of their acceptance of the authori­ tarian features of Communism. It is also necessary to take into account their basic concepts about the nature of authority. It must be remembered that before they came to Communism they had not on the whole had much experience with harsh or strict forms of authority. How­ ever, they did have some notions about how any type of authority was likely to act, and their feelings toward it were not entirely negative. In the first place, the SEP's tended to conceive of any form of authority in highly personal terms. In their minds particular people constituted authority and, as individuals, ι For the interesting view that Bolshevism has sought to bring about in cultures that did not experience the effects o£ the Prot­ estant ethic a comparable change in psychodynamics, with special emphasis upon idealizing inner discipline, see Erik H. Erikson, Child­ hood and Society, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1950, Chapter 10. However, in the case of the SEP's, it should be noted that they came to Communism anxious for self-improvement and they left, as we shall see, without internalizing most of the characteristics of the ideal Bolshevik.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

utilized institutions or organizations to support their positions of power. They had little concept of an imper­ sonal authority or system of control. It was such men as Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung, or, in Malaya, British or Malayan officials such as the District Officer and the like whom they thought of as authority. In personalizing authority, the SEP's also tended to attribute to it highly human qualities. Thus they spoke of the party or of the government as having moods, as being "angry" or "happy." The party could get "mad" at them, and it could "like" or "dislike" them. When the party "trusted" or "distrusted" them, it behaved just as an individual does in trusting and distrusting. Moreover, the party or the government was capable of "pity" and "sympathy," and indeed all the attitudes characteristic of person-to-person relationships. At the same time, the SEP's were generally inclined to the view that anyone in authority was controlled by few restraints, which meant that all forms of authority were likely to indulge in whims and to engage in extreme prac­ tices. Those who had power could be expected to use it to satisfy their unchecked desires, and hence the SEP's gen­ erally suspected the worst about the private lives of the powerful.2 Most important of all, they conceived of those in authority as being unaware of any restraints in dealing with persons below them. As individuals, they were unac­ customed to thinking of themselves as having any rights in relations with the powerful. They could try to avoid authority and keep clear of its sphere, but if this was im2 It is significant that in spite of all the efforts of the party to con­ vince them of the exemplary conduct of the leaders of world Commu­ nism, the SEP's had many doubts about Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. ("I could see from his pictures that ever since Mao got to Peking he was getting fatter.") Similarly, they had not felt it unreasonable to believe many of the Communist reports on the licentiousness of Kuomintang leaders, the vices of Churchill, and the immoral prac­ tices of the "Truman gang" in the "White Palace" in Washington.

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

possible, they accepted its omnipotence and considered themselves helpless before it. That is to say, the SEP's felt defenseless except for one thing: authority was essentially corruptible. There always remained the possibility of manipulating authority by playing upon its human characteristics. One could hope to evoke pity and sympathy; or win favor by humoring; or stay authority's wrath by exploiting its lusts. Thus, in conceiving of authority in personalized terms, the SEP's assured themselves that no matter how terrible it became, there was probably a defense against it. These attitudes of the SEP's, apparently not untypical of their general culture and probably related to their childhood experiences with parental authority, conflicted with Communist ideals about the impersonal nature of the party's authority. In theory, it would seem that irrecon­ cilable contradictions would arise between two such views and that the concept of a personalized authority would be incompatible with that of an impersonal system of con­ trol. It might be assumed that the SEP's found them­ selves in an intolerable situation and that either they would have had to change their notions completely or the MCP would have had to compromise the Communist ideals. However, in practice, this does not seem to have been the case at all. Failing to intellectualize their problem in such sharp terms, and exhibiting the usual capacity of human beings to remain impervious to logical contradic­ tions, the SEP's actually had to revise their notions about authority only slightly. Among all the manifestations of the authoritarian nature of the party, they were able to find a great deal that was compatible with their views. At the same time, enough of the essential functions of party life were guided by impersonal standards for the MCP to maintain the Communist ideals of party control. Thus the SEP's found support for their views in such elements of party life as the emphasis upon all being "com­ rades" together, the enthusiasm of their leaders toward

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

granting rewards and punishments, the necessity of mak­ ing personal "apologies" for any mistakes, and the con­ stant encouragement they received to improve themselves. The party appealed to them and exhorted them in per­ sonal terms. Even the model of Bolshevik behavior did not have to be considered as representing abstract stand­ ards; it could be viewed as an indication of ways to win the favor of those in authority. A majority of the respond­ ents cited what they considered examples of their superiors' using their positions in the party for their own personal interests. Very few of them indicated any appreciation of the extent to which the power of their immediate superi­ ors was limited by the next higher level of the hierarchy. Although party regulations permitted one to address com­ plaints about one's leaders to the Central Committee, the SEP's were under no illusions about this privilege, since such complaints would have to pass through the chain of command and be read first by the very official they criticized, an impossible arrangement for people who placed so much importance on personal relations. On the other hand, conflicts did arise because of the impersonal nature of the party's authority. The SEP's were repeatedly impressed by the fact that the party never forgot anything. There were many examples similar to the following: "I got to have very good relations with my leader. He seemed to trust me and we had no trouble. I was good to him and he treated me well. I never said anything against him and I never did anything that might hurt our relationship. Then once he punished me when I hadn't collected all the subscriptions he expected. It was very unjust and it shows how bad the Communist leaders are." When the expectations of the SEP's about the per­ sonalized characteristics of authority clashed with the im­ personal demands of Communism, it often released in them extraordinary ambitions to get ahead in the party; but this feature of their behavior must be left for a later chapter.

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

The Potency of Internationalism It will be remembered that the elation the SEP's experi­ enced during the ritual of joining the party stemmed largely from their feeling that they were now a part of an international movement. Thereafter, their awareness of the international character of Communism was kepi alive by the daily political sessions and the courses on the "current world situation." Their own Central Committee was to them an anony­ mous group, since they did not even know the names of the men who sat on it. When they sought to picture their leaders as individuals, they were inclined to look to personalities at the international level and to think of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. At the same time, their im­ perfect knowledge of the personalities at the highest levels of the MCP encouraged them to idealize the abilities and skills of their anonymous Central Committee and even to assume that this leadership was Moscow-trained. The fact that they had few ideas about how the link between the MCP and the Russian and Chinese parties was main­ tained did not disturb the SEP's, for they had equally vague ideas about the way in which the Central Committee functioned. However, since they were fully conscious of the influence of the Central Committee at their own level, they were confident that strong ties existed between all levels in the party. When it is remembered that one of the strongest appeals in attracting the SEP's to Communism was their desire to conform to standards of Chinese behavior, the ex­ traordinary importance that they seemed to attach to the international character of Communism takes on added significance. Why were they so ready to emphasize in their own minds the international features of the move­ ment they had joined? The answer seems to lie in the character of their sense of nationalism, which in turn was

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

a function of their more general attitudes about Western culture and their own traditional heritage. AMBIVALENCE TOWARD THE WEST

To understand the problem which seems to have dis­ turbed most of the SEP's and which was resolved by the international qualities of Communism, it is necessary to recall their basic outlook before they joined the party. It will be remembered that all of them had turned their backs on their traditional cultures and were critical of indigenous elements in their parents' way of life. They were strongly, almost compulsively, oriented to all that was new and modern. In seeking out the new, the SEP's were trying to identify themselves with that which was Western. For those with more schooling, this meant in particular Western knowledge and education. (Those who had been forced to spend any time with the Chinese classics felt they had been most unjustly imposed upon; this feel­ ing was far stronger than that of the American child who can see no point in learning Latin.) Others took the pat­ terns of Western urbanized life as their standards of mo­ dernity, and the ambitions which drove them to seek social advancement and security included desires to approximate these standards. At the same time, the SEP's were aware of their inability to attain the very standards they admired—hence their deep sense of ambivalence toward the West. The more some of them appreciated Western ideas and practices, the more they appreciated the difficulties of realizing them. In par­ ticular, the SEP's who prized education became sensitive to the fact that despite years of study they were not the equals of those who were more at home in the Western tradition. It was much the same in fields other than intellectual en­ deavor; in speaking of their interests in athletics, a few of the respondents said that although they were better than most of their fellows, they could not live up to the standards of foreigners.

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

Able neither to ignore nor to achieve what they ad­ mired, the SEP's reacted in different ways before they came to Communism. Some were consumed with an emo­ tion that was not far from simple envy. Others sought to turn Western standards against the West itself, but they could find little personal satisfaction in pointing out failures in Western practices. They discovered that the West was too complacent or too concerned with other matters to take heed of their opinions, or else it acknowl­ edged its failings far too readily. For example, one SEP told of his carefully planned campaign of conversation with an assistant manager of a rubber estate, in which he would declare that life in England was not perfect and the Englishman, with a shrug of his shoulders, would al­ ways agree with him. Another SEP recounted how he had written with considerable self-satisfaction a little essay about the lack of complete democracy in England. When it appeared in a small Chinese periodical, he was left with a feeling of great dissatisfaction because, surrounded by notes on Chinese affairs, it seemed only to emphasize the hopelessness of conditions in China. In Communism, this ambivalence toward the West was resolved. The SEP's saw Communism as representing the most advanced form of modern knowledge and the way of the future. In spite of the difficulties involved in be­ coming a good Bolshevik, the standards were not impos­ sibly high. The intellectual effort necessary to become a recognized theoretician of Marxism-Leninism was not as exacting as that required to gain recognition in other fields of modern knowledge. Communism, as an interna­ tional movement, could give the SEP's the satisfaction of excelling in something that was new and modern and that was of the West. The SEP's expressed these attitudes in numerous ways, some quite explicitly, others in more indirect fashion. The manner in which many of them went out of their way to compare themselves with English and American Com-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

munists seemed to reveal their underlying feelings. Several of those who had become party functionaries announced with pride that in attaining high rank in a world-wide organization they had proved their superiority to the mass of the rank and file in the British and American Com­ munist parties. One of the SEP's reflected on his own pro­ motion in the following words: "I was very proud of being made a Branch Committee member. Every Communist Party in the world has branch committees, and if I had ever gone to these parties they would have had to treat me as an officer. Most of the British and American party members would have had to obey my orders. I thought a lot about how powerful the Communists were because they had branches and cells all over the world." Others seemed to find undeniable satisfaction in boasting of having been members of a party that had a revolutionary record superior to those of the British and American parties. The SEP's derived some amusement from their aware­ ness that those in London and Washington, whom they were accustomed to consider their intellectual betters, were disturbed and worried about Communism and what they as individuals were doing. Thus the SEP's could see in the international structure of Communism a means for entering a political arena in which the other participants were Wall Street, the Pentagon, and the leaders of power­ ful governments. They were now involved in something that was not local, petty, or inconsequential. In their environment, only Communism could give them an oppor­ tunity to take part in major political developments; and this was possible only because of the international struc­ ture of the movement. THE NATIONALISM OF INTERNATIONALISM

This constellation of attitudes common to the majority of the SEP's must be classified as a form of nationalism, even though it did not derive its strength from pride in

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

their own indigenous cultural heritage. Neither did it contain any awareness of a broader community of interests, any sense of shared values, or any conception of the state as an instrument for achieving or defending community values—elements usually considered basic to nationalism. Rather, it began with a keen awareness of racial identity on the part of the SEP's, which they often articulated in terms of the crudest form of racism. It was fed, however, by a driving sense of ambition and a need for recognition that was accentuated by a belief that personal security could be found in association with others. As a form of nationalism, it expressed itself in the need to be assertive, distinctive, and effective in the eyes of the most powerful— hence the great satisfaction and emotional stimulus from being in any sense a part of the world scene. We have observed that during the first years of the Sino-Japanese War there were SEP's who came to the party out of patriotism. We have also noted the strong sense of racial identity of all the SEP's and the importance they placed on the Chinese community in Malaya. How­ ever, for the majority, it was only within the context of Communism that the inchoate elements of their type of nationalism were brought together and given a definite form. This is not to say that a similar type of nationalism could not have been developed without the assistance of Communism. Indeed, it would be hard to believe that such a feeling was peculiar to the SEP's and not widespread in many of the more nationalistic-minded parties in the newly independent countries of Asia. What is significant, however, is that Communism, precisely because of its in­ ternational character, could create such a sense of na­ tionalism within its ranks. Again, this is not to say that the MCP was a nationalistic movement. It did not appeal for recruits on the basis of Malayan nationalism, something it has left for the government to develop out of the pluralis­ tic Malayan society. The MCP did not "capture" or "ex­ ploit" an already developed spirit of nationalism. Rather,

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

within its own ranks, as it sought to make good Commu­ nists out of people who had come to it seeking personal security, the MCP developed a type of nationalism. It did this by making its membership aware that they belonged to an organization that had a role in world affairs. In particular, it was the symbol of the Soviet Union that made this possible. As the SEP's went deeper into Communism, the Soviet Union became far more than just a symbol of Utopia. The Malayan party organization be­ came their channel to the wisdom, the power, and the sheer successfulness of their Russian comrades. Without the mystique of the Soviet Union, they would have been far less confident of their own revolutionary abilities. Their feeling of association with international Communism had destroyed in them any sense of personal inferiority toward all that Europe and the West represented. They could now have confidence in themselves as revolutionaries, for the Soviet Union was their leader. The single most potent argument in convincing them of the extraordinary power of the Soviet Union was a reading of modern history that was offered to them. Those who had been political commissars testified to the fre­ quency with which this account of world affairs was pre­ sented, and the fact that the majority of the SEP's could repeat it suggests that they took it more to heart than they did most other party doctrines. In the words of a former party propagandist, it went as follows: "We would explain how twenty-odd years ago Russia was the weakest and the most backward country in Europe. It was oldfashioned and ruled by a king. All the other European states took advantage of Russia because it was backward. Then came Red October. Russia became the Soviet Union. In a few years, she became the greatest power in all the world. Such are the powers of Communism. China was one of the weakest countries in Asia. All the Western pow­ ers took advantage of her. She could not protect herself. Then the Chinese Communist Party became the leader of

UNDERSTANDING THE MOVEMENT

China. In only two years' time, China was able to defeat the greatest of the capitalist-imperialist countries. She de­ feated the United States in Korea. China could do this even though America had Britain, France, and all the capitalis­ tic countries in the United Nations as allies. Such again is the power of Communism. How could this have hap­ pened without Communism? Communism will certainly win throughout the world." Impressed with the potency of Communism as demon­ strated in this argument, the SEP's were also left with the feeling that there were no grounds for conflict be­ tween Russia and China. In a world of Communist suc­ cesses, all could move toward greater power. Indeed, on the basis of this and other Communist arguments, the SEP's were so completely convinced that there could be no real clash of interests between China and Russia that even after they left the party they found it difficult to compre­ hend the possibilities of such a conflict. When they were asked if China had in any way compromised her inde­ pendence in her relations with Russia, a few did give what they considered the appropriate anti-Communist an­ swer. However, under further questioning they, like the majority of the SEP's, admitted that they could not under­ stand the contention that Chinese sovereignty had been compromised. As one of the SEP's said, "Half the world is afraid of China, so how could she have lost anything to Russia?" Another one observed: "The more people say that China has had to give in to Russia, the stronger China gets. This doesn't make sense." And still another said, "There is no example in history of a colony fighting and winning a war against powerful countries, so China must be independent." It was possible for the SEP's to hold to these opinions be­ cause they were incapable of conceptualizing the kinds of problems and interests that might engross the attention of decision-makers in Moscow and Peking. They had been introduced to most problems of international relations

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

within the context of Communist party organization. Thus, when asked about the nature of the relationship between the Chinese and Russian Communist leaders, their usual answer was one that justified the subordinate position of Mao Tse-tung to Stalin on the grounds of the latter's sen­ iority as a revolutionist. As one SEP said: "Stalin was a Communist for almost twenty years before Mao became one. Therefore, of course he and many of the Russians are superior to Mao. Even in Malaya, it takes a lot of time to get to be a Central Committee member." The fact that the SEP's could develop these attitudes differentiates them from most former Western Commu­ nists. Although probably far less influenced in their daily lives by considerations related to a sense of nationalism, many former Western Communists saw in Russian control of their local Communist parties the grounds for complaint and eventually even a reason for breaking with Com­ munism.8 None of the SEP's made any such complaint. On the contrary, their faith in success lay in their belief that the Soviet Union was guiding and leading them. Indeed, four of the SEP's said that one of the major reasons that they left the party was that they had finally come to the conclusion the Soviet Union was not, in fact, directing the efforts of the MCP. Once they realized this, the illu­ sion of power and the hope of victory vanished. As one of them said, "I began to think that if our leaders were really nothing more than a group of part-educated Chinese, how could we hope to defeat the British Imperialists?" a Almond, op.cit., Table 3, p. 329.

CHAPTER 12

LEARNING COMMUNIST THEORY IN Part I, we observed the peculiar significance that Com­ munist theory and doctrine held for the Asian parties. In particular, we noted the special importance of in­ doctrination in creating "proletarian revolutionists" in societies that lack a proletariat. With respect to the SEP's, we have seen that in the course of their adjustment to the demands of party membership, they attained some knowl­ edge of Marxism-Leninism. This was the inner doctrine which they had not hitherto tried to comprehend, but of which they expected so much when they came to the party. As full-fledged members, the instruction they re­ ceived reinforced their belief that they were not isolated from the wisdom of Moscow and Peking. In examining the intellectual experience of the SEP's it would serve little useful purpose simply to enumerate the great differences that exist between their concepts of Communist theory and the original ideas of Marx. To do so would only provide further evidence of the well-estab­ lished fact that the history of Communism has been marked by a progressive decline in the intellectual and moral standards of Marxism. What is significant about the re­ ception given Communist doctrines by the SEP's is its demonstration that the "corrupt" and "vulgarized" ver­ sions of Marxism have a tremendous appeal for certain audiences. It should be remembered that the decline in the standards of Marxism has coincided with the rise of Communism as a mass movement. Once Communist parties began to number their membership in the millions, changes in the character of the ideology were inevitable. Subtleties and refinements had to be dropped as large masses of people, many of them semi-literates, were trained in Communism. Doctrines had to be popularized to meet the requirements of utility. This process may have weak-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

ened the ideological appeal of Communism for Western intellectuals, but the example of the SEP's suggests that it has also given the movement a quasi-intellectual appeal for less sophisticated people. Had the SEP's been presented with an earlier and "purer" form of Marxism, they would have found it com­ pletely meaningless. The gap between their customary ways of thought and such theoretical formulations would have been too much for them. Of equal importance, the idealism of early Marxism that gripped the minds of Western workers and intellectuals was solidly based on the ethical standards of nineteenth-century Europe, standards far removed from the realities of the world of the SEP's. The SEP's are unsentimental people with little sensitivity to fine distinctions in moral choice; they are capable of admiring the ethics of modern Bolshevism. The SEP's themselves seemed to sense that they belonged to the Communism of Lenin and Stalin and not to that of Marx. In fact their lack of respect for the father of Com­ munism often bordered on contempt. Several of the SEP's confidently claimed that if they were shown passages from the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, they would be able to identify the authors. Their assurance stemmed from very simple yet definite concepts of the contributions of each of the three leaders. In particular, their stereotype of Marx was that of a dreamer and a wishful thinker. In contrast, Lenin and Stalin were pictured as men of action, skilled in calculation—men whom the tactically oriented SEP's could revere. It is worth quoting in detail the views of a former political commissar whose interpretations guided many members of the MCP: "Marx was a dreamer and he was the first to think of the revolution. He could write well about the evils of society and wonders of a new society . . . but many people can dream. Marx knew nothing about party organization and party tactics, and thus he knew nothing about Com­ munism. However, he is still, of course, extremely im-

LEARNING COMMUNIST THEORY

portant to Communism because he did explain how his­ tory develops and also because he pointed out how bad society is. For many reasons, there had to be a Marx be­ fore there could have been Communism, and maybe the most important reason is that, with all people who become Communists, the first step is to understand how bad so­ ciety is and how it can be improved. Once a man is made unhappy with his life, he can become a Communist, and Marx knew how to make people unhappy with their lives. "It was Lenin, however, who really made Communism. Lenin talked about force and the need to organize. He saw that organization, force, and the knowledge of the current situation at any place or time were the three es­ sential elements in revolution. From Lenin one can learn much of value, for he talked of affairs and was not a dreamer. He saw things clearly and did not work through a cloud of dreams. "So far as I can see, Stalin wrote mainly about the ob­ jective situation at particular places. The weakness of Stalin as compared with Lenin is clear from history. Stalin understands force, but not as Lenin did. Lenin under­ stood that force depends first upon organization. . . . Stalin underestimates the importance of organization. . . . Stalin would tend to expect Communist parties to act before they were well organized; Lenin was more cautious be­ cause he wanted to improve the organization first, and thus maybe he missed some opportunities. There is a lot to be learned from what all three wrote. If there wasn't, how could Communism be so strong all over the world?" Most of the SEP's initially looked forward with some eagerness to receiving instruction in Communist doctrine, suspecting that it would give them access to a personally useful body of knowledge. Most important of all, they hoped that Communism would be able to satisfy their craving for explanations of the realities of their daily lives that they had previously had no way of comprehending. The fact that they had lived through unsettled times seems

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

to have awakened in them a deep-felt need to under­ stand the social phenomena they had experienced. During the course of their instruction in the party, the SEP's were given not only the explanations they sought but the expectation that there was no end to their chances of learning more. This was possible because of what mod­ ern Communism had done to Marxism. In the process of reducing theory to dogma and elevating jargon to symbol, Communist doctrine had become something that could stir the imagination of the SEP's and release their energies for purposeful action. An illustration of the effectiveness of even the crudest form of Marxist-Leninist theory is the explanation which the Communists offered for the fluctuations of prices and wages in the rubber and tin industries. All of the SEP's were keenly aware of the tendency of prices of rubber and tin to rise and fall in an extreme fashion that affected the Malayan economy in general and, more particularly, their personal incomes. Few, however, had any clear notions as to why this happened, for the complexities of the inter­ national raw materials market were beyond their powers of comprehension. Over the years they had had to accept, in the same way as they accepted the vagaries of weather, the fact that at times they received the blessings of high wages and at others their wages unexpectedly dropped and they had difficulty in "getting over the days." They had no more understanding of the economic forces at work than the small Chinese merchant whose business is good at one time and bad at another. It was from the Communists that many of the SEP's first heard what was to them an elaborately reasoned ex­ planation. The Communists gave them a simple devil theory in which "Wall Street" was the prime mover. "Wall Street" consisted of a group of "capitalists" and "mili­ tarists" who, whenever they discovered that people were becoming happy with high wages, would suddenly force the price of rubber down and bring sadness to the people.

LEARNING COMMUNIST THEORY

However, before the workers could revolt against their misery, "Wall Street" would ease up the pressure and raise prices until the people again became happy. Then the cycle would start over again. The means that "Wall Street" employed in manipulating its powers were another list of symbols: "controls," "trusts," "monopoly capital," and, most important of all, "imperialism." "Wall Street" had its secret contacts with all non-Communist governments. This was called "economic imperialism." Essentially, the ways of "Wall Street" were those of the devil—dark and devious. The SEP's were easily convinced that such a force could be up to no good. At the same time, they felt that they could understand the behavior of "Wall Street," since it manifested the moods and attitudes they expected of all who were powerful; "Wall Street" was moved by "anger," "meanness," "cruelty," and the like. Through such explanations many of the SEP's felt that they had arrived at an understanding of the economic forces which dominated their lives. But this knowledge was not passive: they had been given a means of fighting the evil; they could uphold the Communists. They found support for the idea that such action might be effective in their increasing awareness that the capitalists and the gov­ ernment feared and hated the party. Moreover, their new knowledge gave them a greater sense of command over their destinies; they grew even more confident that their customary efforts to be shrewd and smart would be of avail. They were being introduced to the intoxicating powers of rationalism. This was a satisfying emotional ex­ perience in itself. The Emotional Climate of Learning The elation that the SEP's experienced in gaining an in­ tellectual command over social phenomena was apparently stimulated by the emotional climate in which this occurred. It was in the dramatic and super-charged atmosphere of public meetings and mass propaganda activities that they

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

were first introduced to the vocabulary of Communism. Before they came under the control of the party, they learned many of the slogans and symbols which were to remain key concepts in their understanding of Commu­ nist theory. These were presented to them by excited and intense orators. Thus, from the beginning, their sense of intellectual mastery was associated with a dramatic set­ ting, and throughout their party careers they found it difficult to separate logical arguments from emotional responses. One of the SEP's described what seems to have been the common reaction to these propaganda displays: "I got very excited at the meetings. They would put on plays, give lectures, and there was a lot of singing and shouting. Everyone took part in the singing and shouting, and I would lose track of the time. The speaker would get very excited—the words poured out of his mouth—and it was wonderful to watch. He would ask us if we wanted to suffer for the capitalists and we would shout, 'No!' Then he would ask if we were ready to suffer for the revolution and we would all say, Tesl' When I went home from these meetings, I used to think that the Communist Party was an extremely powerful thing. Even when they were excited, they knew exactly what to do and they never lost their reason as other people do." When the SEP's arrived at the more serious task of receiving Communist instruction within the party, they apparently found it quite natural for their instructors to maintain that intellectual progress was related to one's emotional attitude. They were not disturbed by the idea that intellectual errors could be traced back to their emo­ tional outlook. If they failed to understand a lesson, they were ready to admit that the fault must lie in their feelings toward the "proletariat" and the "revolution." Only one of the SEP's indicated that he was disturbed by this con­ fusion of reason and emotion. "I felt that there was some­ thing wrong in the party's always telling you that if you

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didn't understand something, there was something wrong with your spirit. One's spirit has very little to do with one's understanding. This is a question of one's mind. There is a distinction between the mind and the spirit. The Communists don't understand this; they think the mind and the spirit are the same. They tell you just to work harder, but you can't work harder if you don't un­ derstand something." Once the SEP's were under the direction of the party, their instruction took the form of lectures and group discussions. Generally they would be given a lecture by one of their political leaders and then they would break up into smaller discussion groups. Many of the SEP's came to find these discussion sessions highly satisfying ex­ periences. The questions they were given to discuss were not too difficult and could easily be answered if they had listened to the lectures attentively. Most of them found that they could gain a sense of achievement and respect from others by being the first to repeat the appropriate phrases. Although five of the SEP's said that they found the sessions too much like schoolwork to suit their taste, most of them appreciated anything which resembled a form of education. In addition, the rewards for excellence in performance were recognized to be far more substantial than the rewards given in an ordinary school. The brilliant student received praise and the possibility of promotion and thus a formal recognition of his abilities. In the sessions of self and mutual criticism, the SEP's again had cause to identify their emotional experiences with Communist concepts. We have already observed how they handled themselves in these often harrowing situa­ tions. In a quite dramatic form, they learned that many of the features of Marxism-Leninism could be used to characterize their actions. The learning of theory thus be­ came an exercise in behavior and not in reasoning. However, in spite of the dangers inherent in these ses­ sions it is significant that slightly over half of the SEP's

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

claimed that they appreciated the party's attempt to teach them the primary qualities of Communism. It must be remembered that they were generally intensely interested in self-improvement opportunities. Thus they could say such things as: "I saw that the party was trying to make me into a better person by teaching me Marxism-Leninism. They wanted to get rid of my bad anti-revolutionary attitudes and learn how to be a worker for the revolution." "I learned a lot that was valuable from the self-criticism sessions. They tried to make my spirit better, so I could think clearly about problems." "The political commissar told me he would help me learn about Marxism-Leninism, so that I would be able to get rid of my bad habits." This strongly moral attitude toward learning and selfimprovement is, of course, in the best Confucian tradition: a man should always try to improve himself, and this can best be done by education. Thus, the party could be viewed as doing a good thing in trying to improve the characters of its members. However, the sessions contributed to the emotional con­ notations which the terminology and the ideas peculiar to Communist doctrine held for the SEP's. On the one hand, they were reminded constantly of the element of risk; on the other, they were stimulated by moral considerations of self-improvement. Communist theories were not some­ thing they could treat impersonally, analyzing and dis­ cussing them in a coldly rational manner. Finally, as a morale measure the party sought to make the membership aware of the potency of Communist theories, and thus for many of the SEP's all the hopes and aspirations to be realized by a Communist victory were associated with the claims and predictions of MarxismLeninism. The sacrifices that were demanded of them were justified by the promises guaranteed by doctrine. The

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constant exhortations of their leaders were also made in the name of Marxism-Leninism. Even the excitement and tension of battle were related to doctrine. During the Emergency, when circumstances permitted, military operations were frequently preceded by a rather lengthy lecture and pep talk by the political commissar. Then each of the soldiers would step forward, give the clenched-fist salute, and declare that he was pre­ pared to sacrifice his life for the principles of MarxismLeninism. These announcements often took the form of long statements, and apparently the men sought to outdo each other in indicating both how heroic they intended to be and how devoted they were to the principles of Com­ munism. As one of the SEP's said: "After you have told everyone what a brave person you are and how you are not afraid to die, you have to be brave. It can't be helped. When you say that you believe everything that Stalin said, what can you do but believe it?" In telling of the same ceremony, another SEP reported: "When we had all finished making our speeches, and I had told them that I wasn't afraid to die like a true revolutionary, it didn't seem as though it would be very serious if we were all killed. That's how fierce Marxism-Leninism is." Aside from the reckless and fanatical attitudes which the ceremony seems to have encouraged, the practice of discussing in an extraordinarily open manner the proba­ bility of death meant that those who survived were fully aware of the extent to which they had gone to support Communism. Several of the SEP's said that after such an experience, they had considerably greater respect for Marxism-Leninism. Perceptions of Marxism-Leninism

The conditions under which the SEP's learned to use the vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism strongly affected their understanding of the basic doctrines. In the case of several, the emotional setting seems to have been such an essential

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part of their understanding of Communist theories that, once they were removed from it, they felt they had also lost their comprehension of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, one of the more intelligent SEP's, after having some dif­ ficulty in expressing his understanding of Marxism-Len­ inism, finally broke down and said: "It is very hard to explain all of this. At one time I understood it. That was when I was in the party and we talked about it all the time. When you leave the party, it is impossible to think again the way you did. When you are with them, somehow it is not so difficult to understand it." Speaking of the same reaction, another SEP remarked: "When we just sit here in this room and talk about Marxism-Leninism, it becomes a lot of foolish ideas that don't make much sense. But it was not like this in the party. Then it all seemed to be a lot of very heavy ideas that you couldn't laugh at. It is very embarrassing for me to try to explain MarxismLeninism. Couldn't we talk about something else?" Slightly less than a third of the SEP's claimed that the theories of Marxism-Leninism were the concern of the party leaders alone and that the rank and file were not expected to understand them. They recognized that the doctrines gave an element of legitimacy to those who held positions of authority in the party. This view was most commonly held by former rank-and-file members who had served a long time without receiving promotion. Appar­ ently most of the new recruits tended initially to be eager to learn more about the inner theories of the movement, but if they failed to advance in the party hierarchy they lost interest in their studies. Just a little over half of the SEP's made explicit state­ ments to the effect that Marxism-Leninism was a body of tactics and strategies for revolutionary activities. In their view the writings of the masters provided the necessary insights and knowledge for planning and executing suc­ cessful revolutionary operations. They pointed to the fact that all party decisions were justified in the name of

LEARNING COMMUNIST THEORY

Marxism-Leninism and that in criticism of past policies the words of the great leaders were frequently cited. By magnifying the tactical and operational aspects of Marxism-Leninism, these SEP's were able to reduce the complexities of Communist theory to a level that was meaningful to them. The fact that the SEP's generally thought of politics in quite pragmatic terms apparently predisposed them to find in Communist literature illus­ trations of the political skills of the revered masters. For example, those who were exposed to the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) came away with almost no comprehension of the intellectual issues that were basic to the development of the Russian party. On the other hand, they felt that in the struggles between the personal followings of individuals they were being given an account of true politics. They followed with interest Lenin's personal feuds with Plekhanov, Martov, and others, and they recognized a struggle of cliques in the Bolsheviks' relations with the Mensheviks and the Economists. Through all the argument and controversy, they perceived that Lenin was the one man who was al­ ways right, since he always won out. Thus they saw Lenin in what they considered a real political setting, and in their minds he had proved himself the master politician. His skill in overcoming personal opposition and in -win­ ning personal loyalty was to them the essence of politics and history. In Stalin they found a worthy successor who was equal to the task of defeating the later enemies of the Bolshevik leadership. The words of a former political commissar who had served in the MCP nearly seven years reveal the extent to which many of the MCP's conceived of Marxist-Leninist doctrines as being primarily concerned with revolutionary operations: "Communism is really very simple. All the theory and talk about it only serve to confuse what Com­ munism really is. Communism starts with a very simple idea: equality for all people, no capitalists, no poor peo-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

pie. Then the Communists claim that all of history is mov­ ing in this direction, and that in time all countries will be Communistic. This serves to frighten the enemies and make them waste their time arguing about why this will not happen. The Communists know that actually they will win only if everyone in the party works hard. Thus all the rest of Communism is purely tactics and strategy. The tactics of Communism are very simple, too. First of all, it is important to develop organizations. Only by having organizations can you have tactics and strategy, and to use organizations you have to have discipline. Discipline is all-important, as we learned in the trade unions. To have unions without discipline over the workers is pointless because nothing can be accomplished. Any group or party which has discipline is bound to obtain power. This is as true in politics as in armies. The Communists know this, and that is why there is so much talk in the party about 'right and left deviation,' and about 'individualism' and all the other words the Communists developed. The words themselves don't mean much; all they indicate is that discipline hasn't been maintained. It would be hard to tell people that they were just disobeying the party and being bad. It is much better to make them think they have committed some serious crime, like right or left de­ viation. The ordinary party member doesn't understand what this means, but he is frightened by what they tell him. The strategy of Communism is very simple, too: either peaceful agitation or bloody agitation. However, the decision of which strategy to follow is up to the top leaders and they have to take into account the objective situation and the world situation. What makes Commu­ nism seem so difficult and complex is that it includes every­ thing in life. Other groups are interested only in a few things. . . . The Communists are interested in everything, but for only a few reasons." Most of the SEP's came to the party with the under­ standing that Marxism-Leninism represented the secret

LEARNING COMMUNIST THEORY

doctrines of the party. However, once they became mem­ bers, the incessant demand that they themselves study these doctrines seems to have convinced them that the doc­ trines represented readily available knowledge which the Communists were anxious to share with others. The satis­ faction they felt in being given explanations about reality was associated with the belief that the Communists were generous with their knowledge. Several of the SEP's ex­ pressed this attitude. For example, a former platoon leader in Johore said: "Marxism-Leninism teaches one how to carry out a revolution and what history will be like. The Communists have books that tell how to be successful po­ litically, and they let everyone read them so that if you want to help them you will know what to do. The democ­ racies keep everything secret and tell no one what their plans are. Who knows what the strategy and tactics of Wall Street are? If I had wanted to work for the democ­ racies against the Communists, how would I have known what to do?" The eagerness of the Communists to spread their ideas was seen by many of the SEP's as evidence of the generosity of the Soviet Union. A former Communist in Ipoh gave the following explanation of his reasoning: "MarxismLeninism includes ideas about everything and the Com­ munists want everybody to have these ideas. This is why the Soviet Union is ready to help anyone who asks for help. The Russians have no secrets. They know how to bring about the revolution, construct a better society, and make socialism work, and they are glad to teach others how. They have no scientific secrets and they are doing every­ thing to help the Chinese Communists. If we had a rev­ olution in Malaya, they would tell us how to build a bet­ ter society. On the other hand, everyone else tries to keep secret how they do things. The capitalists all have patents and secrets and don't help anyone else, because they are interested only in themselves and their own businesses. The Russians, they told us, would be willing to teach others

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

how to build factories and make the best machinery. I believed this because I thought that Marxism-Leninism told people how to bring about the revolution and that they were willing to teach us all about this." The Reality and the Mystique of Symbols In contrast to the difficulties most of the SEP's ex­ perienced in explaining the theories of Marxism-Leninism systematically, almost all of them were quite familiar with the expressions and terms peculiar to Communist litera­ ture. In part, this was due to the fact that such words had been incorporated into the vocabulary of the movement. The MCP's methods of formal instruction made the SEP's feel that they had accomplished a great deal by simply learning the terminology of Communism. A former school­ teacher who had served as a propagandist described the party's techniques of instruction by saying: "One thing that happens in the training of a Communist is that they give you so much to read that you are never able to pause and think about it. You can't pick out what is good and what is bad—they only ask you to read more and more. The more you read, the more the words come and you begin to accept the words. You don't think about them or what they mean. It is not the way students on the outside study. Students on the outside read something and try to under­ stand the true meaning of all the words. The Communists just give you more words to explain any word you don't understand, but they never explain what these words mean either. Before long, you just learn a lot of words and the more you read, the more you become acquainted with the words, and you think you understand them. But actually you don't understand any more than you did at the be­ ginning." The MCP appears to have employed the method com­ mon to traditional Chinese schooling, requiring the stu­ dents to memorize verbatim extensive passages from Com­ munist literature. Once the party members could repeat

LEARNING COMMUNIST THEORY

the passages by heart, it was assumed they fully under­ stood them. Through rote memorizing they were expected to get a feeling for the material they were studying. It is significant that in studying anything that was directly rele­ vant to the operations that the SEP's were expected to perform, the practice was to proceed extremely slowly and to demand that short pamphlets be memorized sentence by sentence. It was customary to spend at least six weeks on the twenty-odd pages of The Duties of a Sentry, and the same care was given to The Regulations of the Malayan Communist Party. According to several of the SEP's, the result was that by the time they had finished a pamphlet they had pretty well forgotten its first pages and they never had a grasp of it as a whole. Out of this form of instruction, the new words and the jargon which the SEP's learned assumed the quality of symbols, representing in some respects the commonplace realities and ideas with which they were already acquaint­ ed. They had only acquired a new way of saying things they already knew. However, the very uniqueness of the words also made them feel that the symbols represented something more. An element of the uncommon had been added that bordered on the mysterious. Thus, for example, in a quite literal fashion, they thought of "dialectical materialism" as standing for some­ thing they had always known; politics involves conflict; the strongest side is likely to win; and the character of the victor is likely to be changed by the struggle. However, at the same time, they recognized that the symbol stood for more than just this. There was clearly something mystical and supernatural in the operations of the "trinity" of dialectical materialism, with the thesis and the antithesis always producing in an unfathomable fashion the syn­ thesis. In the same way, the "capitalist-imperialists" were nothing more than bad people who coveted the possessions of others. Yet, on the other hand, their behavior was gov­ erned by mysterious forces. The "proletariat" simply meant

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

workers who needed wages to live, and yet the symbol also stood for something of extraordinary power. As a result of this attitude, a feeling for the miraculous was introduced into the calculations of the SEP's regard­ ing actual or possible developments. The effect was to make them accept as plausible much that they might oth­ erwise have doubted. Thus, while they still felt that they were being quite pragmatic and realistic, the SEP's came to believe many extraordinary explanations and predic­ tions that were couched in Communist jargon. Of course, in all of this, the SEP's had only in their literal-minded way clearly perceived the essentially mys­ tical quality of much of Marxism-Leninism. The Blinding Powers of Prediction

The very imperfect training the SEP's received in Marx­ ist-Leninist doctrines was nevertheless sufficient to make them feel that they had gained access to a body of knowl­ edge that could be trusted to predict political develop­ ments. Many of the SEP's simply accepted on faith the party's claim that Marxism-Leninism gave the Central Committee powers of prediction that were superior to any­ thing found in other forms of wisdom. However, most of the SEP's went further than this, and by reasoning accord­ ing to the party's arguments came to believe in the sound­ ness of the party's predictions. It is apparent that in the process the SEP's in fact be­ came far less able to make sound judgments. They lost confidence in considerations which had previously been paramount in their thinking. They were still anxious to be shrewd and clever in their calculations, but their re­ liance on their new learning blinded them to factors which their old commonsense approach would have told them were of critical importance. In particular, they became less able to evaluate the party's chances of success. Events which they might once have recognized as signs of weak­ ness were ignored, and significance was attached to others

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that could actually have little influence on developments in Malaya. Either through the introduction of new symbols or through the manipulation of accepted ones, the political instructors were able to convince many of the SEP's that the party had accomplished much, when in fact nothing had been achieved. The SEP's could believe that the party had choices where none existed, and that it had plans when it was only responding to necessity. For example, the party leadership employed a large part of its limited resources in producing quantities of literature on the character of the war it was fighting. Repeated discussion sessions would be devoted to the question: "Is our war a war of annihila­ tion or a war of attrition?" Although in the end the party leadership would announce the current "correct" answer, the impression was successfully created that the party had the initiative in selecting between alternatives which, of course, did not exist. By discussing the virtues of the two symbols, "annihilation" and "attrition," realities could be ignored and the fact overlooked that the party had no meaningful plan for victory. The same effect was achieved by characterizing the par­ ty's plans as those of fighting a war of "maximum relative dispersion" according to the "tactics of exterior lines in a strategy of interior lines." The SEP's seem to have been greatly impressed when they heard these phrases in the jungle, since they were led to believe that the party had devised a strategy with all the virtues and none of the weaknesses of dispersion and concentration, and that the party benefited equally in attack and retreat. Thus, as the units in the jungle had to be broken up into smaller and weaker groups, they could continue to believe the party was getting stronger. Even more important in weakening the power of pre­ diction on the part of SEP's was the practice in political sessions of focussing their attention on world affairs. They were constantly reminded that they were part of an inter-

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national struggle. Over half of the time devoted to political sessions each year was given up to the course "Analyzing the Current World Situation." In this course the political commissar would survey the world scene and provide his students with "evidence" of Communist strength and the enemy's weaknesses. The SEP's, associating their own in­ terests with all that carried the label of Communism, were encouraged to believe that any success of Communismno matter how remote from Malaya—was relevant in fore­ casting the fortunes of the Malayan party. In the course the procedure was first to identify the United States as the main enemy of Communism. Al­ though attention was given to all the "evil" characteristics of the American imperialists and their allies, the emphasis was placed mainly on their weaknesses, in contrast to the strength of the Soviet Union and Communism. The SEP's seem to have felt that they were being presented with a balance sheet that was based on an unemotional weighing of the relative power of Communism and its enemies. Any example of American weakness became a matter of Com­ munist strength, and any success for the Communists was a demonstration of the inevitable collapse of the enemy. Particular attention seems to have been given to the Amer­ ican military establishment, discussion of which was largely based on a sixty-page book, Military Weaknesses of the American-Imperialists. Through a comparison of the vari­ ous models of American and Russian equipment, weapon by weapon, plane by plane, and tank by tank, the SEP's were taught that Soviet Russia was always superior in per­ formance. In addition, of course, they heard the standard Communist argument regarding the doom of the American economy.1 ι In accounting for the imminent collapse of American capitalism, the MCP seems to have looked in some non-Marxian directions and to have employed arguments that were peculiarly meaningful to Chinese. Thus, for example, the SEP's were taught that in the United States the capitalists personally collected the taxes from the workers (presumably this was their notion of the withholding tax). Since these

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In spite of this emphasis upon the material aspects of power, the MCP, like any group or country that has to fight from a technologically inferior position, placed a great deal of importance upon morale and spirit. The Americans were "soft in spirit and flesh," and their decadence was such that the American soldier had to be paid high wages, while the Russian and other Communist warriors gladly fought for practically no pay at all. (The high salaries of the American soldier and the need to pay him extra combat bonuses for fear he would strike was another factor that would lead to the bankruptcy and collapse of the United States.) Strangely enough, evidence of the Ameri­ can lack of a will to fight was found in the softness of the American Communist Party, which had become so con­ taminated with bourgeois decadence that it could not even start a revolution. The sum effect of all the attention that was given to developments far from the Malayan scene was to make the SEP's feel that these were critical considerations in de­ termining the local outlook for success. Isolated as they were from other sources of information, they had little chance to check on the accuracy of the picture that they re­ ceived. Moreover, they preferred to trust the "intelligence" they received from the party to "news" available to the general public. Thus, even when they were being chased from jungle retreat to jungle retreat, they believed that victory was near because they knew about the American defeats in Korea.2 What they heard of developments in capitalists did not pass on to the government all they collected, the federal treasury was always short of money and could not balance its books. The result could only be new taxes, more "squeeze" for the capitalists, and the eventual ruin of the country, a story which may have sounded plausible because of the popular idea that in China the local gentry served as officials and tax collectors, and the central treasury never received all that was gathered in its name. 2With respect to the Korean War, most of the SEP's seem to have believed that United States claims about powerful atomic weapons were a "myth." They reasoned that if these claims were true, the

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Indo-China was accepted as being terribly important for their personal future. One of the SEP's told of his excite­ ment when he learned that there had been a dock strike in the United States. Another spoke of how thrilled he had been on hearing of some riots in Japan, for he felt that victory was near at hand. Thus, although the SEP's were in no sense learned in theories of Marxism-Leninism, their exposure had been extensive enough to affect their way of thinking. They had accepted new standards of relevance to such an extent that they rejected as unimportant much that took place about them. They could still feel, just as they had when they first came to the party, that they belonged to a strong movement that would own the future. The difference was that they had a new basis for evaluating and predicting— a basis which blinded them to realities in Malaya. After they had left the party, one of the mysteries for most of the SEP's was how they could have believed for so long that the revolution would succeed. United States would certainly have employed them in Korea rather than accept defeat. They were taught that the United States re­ frained from using atomic bombs because the American militarists knew that they would not be effective, and their failure to do so proved to the world that America was only a "paper tiger." On the other hand, the argument that the Soviet Union had superior atomic bombs was based on the contention that all the capitalist powers, no matter how much they "hated" the Soviet Union, were afraid of Russia's bombs and thus were afraid to provoke her.

C H A P T E R 13

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION As WE HAVE SEEN, most of the SEP's came to Communism primarily out of personal considerations that often had little to do with the announced goals or the ideology of the movement. Through exposure to Communist doctrines, they were given a crude basis for intellectualizing about problems beyond their immediate experience. However, their sense of involvement in the issues of world Commu­ nism continued in the main to stem from their sense of personal identity with the Malayan party. Private con­ siderations, and especially personal relationships, still domi­ nated their behavior as party members. Despite the con­ fusion that existed in their minds as a result of their efforts to assimilate the theories of Communism, they did not forget why they had become Communists in the first place. Thus, in order to understand better their behavior as Communists, including many of the actions which made them appear to be fanatics, it is necessary to return again to the sphere of personal relations. Personal Problems and the Party

When the SEP's were asked whether the party gave them assistance in solving their personal problems, all but four indicated that the MCP never concerned itself with their private difficulties. Seven claimed that they had at one time or another turned to their leaders on an official basis to seek help and that they had been explicitly in­ formed that the party had no interest in such personal dilemmas. The view of the majority was summed up by one former Branch Committee member who said: "You could never ask the party to help you on personal prob­ lems. In most cases, the party couldn't help you anyway, because it had problems, too. It was useless to tell the

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

party your problems; it would be like playing on a harp— you could make sad music, but you could accomplish nothing. Also, if you had too many personal problems and began to worry about them, the party would begin to sus­ pect you. They would say you were not thinking about the revolution and were thinking only about your private affairs. They would call you an 'individualist' and that would not be good—it would be serious and you might be punished." During the Japanese occupation and the Emergency most of the SEP's recognized that the exigencies of war made it unreasonable to expect the party to be concerned with an individual's personal problems. However, of those who had been in the party during the period from 1946 to 1948, nearly half indicated that the MCP's inability or refusal to assist them in their private affairs lessened their enthusiasm for Communism. Several seriously contem­ plated leaving the movement. Their doubts about the party had nothing to do with its political activities or its objectives; they just began to question whether it rep­ resented a wise career choice. A man who was later to be­ come a District Committee member but who in 1945 was still in the rank and file recalled: "After the war, I con­ tinued to work for the Communists full-time, but in Sep­ tember 1946 I found that I could make more money on the outside. I had to support my family. Up until then, I had been very hot-hearted about Communism and I be­ lieved in the revolution. I never did anything to oppose the Communists. Even at that time, I had no ill thoughts against Communism. It was only that I couldn't support my family. Everyone else was living better now, as condi­ tions had improved. I didn't blame the party for not being able to help me because I knew the party had problems, too. It was just that I wasn't as excited about Communism after the war as I had been when the Japanese were in the country. When I told them of my problem, they just said I ought to think more about party affairs and less about

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION

my own. But when I did this, I only worried more about whether in the future it would be wise to work for the party. The party might or might not have a future, but I certainly had to have one." Interestingly enough, only one of the SEP's suggested that he had been bitter about the party's official position of refusing help on personal matters. The vast majority adopted the attitude that it was they themselves who had taken the initiative in turning to Communism as a means of improving their position, and so long as Communism offered a chance of success they did not feel it necessary to ask more of the party. The calculation was still their own, privately arrived at, and not dependent upon official policies toward the membership. Even though the party would not aid them officially, they could hope that their private problems would be resolved by remaining with it. Isolation by the Party

The tremendous demands that the MCP made on their time and energies seem to have caused many of the SEP's to feel less concerned about problems which had previ­ ously troubled them. When their commitment to Commu­ nism required their whole attention, as during the war and the Emergency, most of their personal difficulties seemed less pressing. More important, however, the demands of the party re­ quired the SEP's to move almost entirely within party circles, even during the peace period, and as a result they were able to maintain personal relations with few out­ siders. A quarter of the SEP's said that their relations with non-Communists were almost entirely instrumental to the objectives of the party. Only one reported that throughout his career in the MCP he was able to retain most of his outside friends, while seven said that they had kept up a few special friendships with non-Communists. The rest of the SEP's claimed that they had not realized on joining

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

the party that they were breaking away from their former associates. They discovered only gradually that their en­ grossment in party activities had caused them to neglect their old friendships and had prevented them from making new ones outside the MCP. The climate of secrecy in Com­ munism gave force to the party's contention that if they were permitted access to the secrets of the movement, it would not be proper for them to maintain close personal associations with outsiders. Several of the SEP's also re­ ported that they had felt the party was correct in arguing that if they were unable to bring their personal friends into the party, there was a danger that these friends might attract them out of it. Hence they felt it reasonable that the party would not tolerate continued friendship with outsiders that did not result in new recruits to Communism. As they lost their ties with the outside world, the SEP's found themselves increasingly dependent upon their Com­ munist associations. Once they discovered that they were isolated by the party, they saw little prospect of a profita­ ble career outside of Communism, since they still believed that personal relationships were essential in realizing se­ curity. "After I had been in the party for two years, I realized that I had no friends who were not Communists. I had no way of getting a good job if I had wanted to leave the party. I would have been all alone if I left them." "By this time, I didn't know anyone to turn to outside of the party. I no longer had any outside friends I could trust, so how could I have got along if I had left the party?" "About that time I did think about giving up Commu­ nism, but I had only one friend left on the ouside. If he wasn't able to help me, there would be no way. It was too big a chance, so I didn't ask him." Thus the fear of an impersonal world which had led the SEP's to Communism now made them increasingly the captives of the party. N

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION

Isolation in the Party

As the SEP's found themselves more and more isolated from outside associations, they became increasingly con­ cerned about their personal friendships within the party. During the early stages of their careers in Communism, about a third of them felt that they were forming far closer friendships within the party than any they had previ­ ously known. The vast majority claimed that during this period they had built up quite satisfying friendships with their fellow members. Many reported that they were greatly affected by the simple fact that everyone was re­ ferred to as "comrade." The atmosphere of comradeship, the warmth of group living, and the sense of shared ex­ perience all contributed to a feeling of intimacy which most of the SEP's had sought but failed to find in the out­ side world. In contrast to the impersonal relations of the modern and competitive labor market that had threatened their sense of security before they joined the party, they felt that they had discovered in Communism the highly per­ sonal relations they craved. It seemed to them that they were establishing the "sincere" friendships they had al­ ways prized and yet ones that were franker and less re­ served than their old friendships had been. Many of the SEP's spoke quite movingly of their excitement on finding themselves in an atmosphere of close male friendship. Their belief that they had realized an ideal led them to feel that most of their comrades were better people, more hard-working, and more morally upright than the people they had known before. However, the longer the SEP's were in the party, the more they came to realize that their new friendships did not in fact meet all their expectations. Those who were to achieve some status in the party grew particularly aware of an element of suspicion and distrust. They learned that behind the fa$ade of personal intimacy lay the impersonal

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

rationale of the party. They continued to consider their associations as being at least superficially warm, but they now knew that the sense of complete trust that they de­ sired was lacking. At first, the difficulty arose from the party's insistence that all members conform to the standards of equal com­ radeship. It was impossible to have any particularly close friendships, as it was necessary to treat everyone in the same fashion. This common complaint of the SEP's was expressed by one of them in the following words: "Every­ body had to be friendly with everyone else. There could be no arguments or fights, as the party always insisted that we cooperate and get on well with each other. However, the party doesn't really trust people. They only pretend they are frank, and everyone had to pretend they were frank with everyone else. The result is you have to be good to all the others. This is not being sincere in your relations with other people." As they gained more experience, they came to realize the danger of confiding too much in their fellow comrades. In a situation which was supposed to be characterized by mutual confidence, they found it exceedingly difficult to determine whom they could trust with the problems that concerned them most. They discovered that in actual fact they were socially isolated within the party. Just as they had learned in the formal self-criticism sessions to keep many things secret from their superiors, they now learned not to express their private views in informal conversation with any of their equals. The majority of the SEP's appear to have reacted to this development in a complex and contradictory fashion. On the one hand, they reported that they became more anxious for the party to succeed, and in their hope that victory would improve the situation they themselves be­ came publicly critical of their comrades. They thus directly contributed to the breakdown of mutual confidence. At the same time, however, they tried to prove to all that they

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION

were people of integrity. In their desire to have others trust them, they demonstrated even more conspicuously that they were hard workers, ready to make sacrifices for the common good. They insisted afterwards that they had done everything possible to make their fellow comrades realize that they were sincere. It appears that the major effect of their behavior was only to further the interests of Communism. Most important of all, however, it appears that the general reaction of the SEP's on finding themselves iso­ lated in the party was still an attempt to differentiate their personal relations with others in the hope that they might achieve the security of true comradeship. This encouraged a tendency to form cliques—precisely what the party most opposed. All of the SEP's said that their leaders were sus­ picious of cliques among the rank and file and that they acted swiftly to break them up. However, most of the SEP's also maintained that they never really believed that cliques did not exist in the party, even when they personally had never been a member of one. What seems to have hap pened was that most of the SEP's began to suspect that their superiors belonged to a clique based on personal ties with others at a higher level in the hierarchy. Thus they came to interpret the impersonality of the party as a mani­ festation of little more than the way a clique is likely to treat outsiders. Those above them were behaving in a distant and harsh manner toward them because they were not members of a personal group composed of their su­ periors in the party. Their own hope of escaping from the sense of personal isolation and of finding secure per­ sonal ties depended upon their ability to enter the inner circle of their superiors. The Quest for Promotion

From much the same motivations as those which had brought them to Communism, the majority of the SEP's set about trying to gain promotion in the party hierarchy.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

Stimulated by the satisfactions they had found in their initial relationships in the party and bolstered by the be­ lief that Communism might yet enable them to realize their personal objectives, most of the SEP's sought recog­ nition and advancement. In spite of all the evidence of the impersonal nature of the party organization, they con­ tinued to believe that within its structure they could find what they sought. "By then, I knew that I couldn't leave them, so I thought that it might be better if I worked hard and was made a member of the Branch Committee." "I was worried about being just a rank-and-file member of the party. It wasn't much better than being a common soldier. I thought it would be good if I could become an official." Many of the SEP's talked quite unashamedly of their ambitions in the party. In much the same way as they had in their youth associated popularity with excelling in com­ petition, they expected to gain the respect and admiration of their fellows if they strove for promotion conspicuously. Thus a man who was to become a platoon leader and a District Committeeman said, "I thought I might have a lot more friends and be better liked if I got on the Branch Committee." The fact that the majority of the SEP's at some time during their party careers engaged in a vigorous quest for promotion seems to be related to their encountering—for the first time in their lives—a clearly defined opportunity for advancement. Previously, in their desperate attempt to get ahead socially and economically, they had not known what it was like to be able to work up a definite ladder of promotion. Those who had been rubber tappers or tin miners could not expect to better their station in life, re­ gardless of how hard they worked. Their main hope had been to exploit some fortuitous development and to take advantage of changing circumstances. In the ordered struc­ ture of the party, there was a reasonable relationship be-

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION

tween effort and reward; their actions could bring about a change in their status, and there was even the possibility that they could work their way up to the top of the hier­ archy. "Before then, I had never thought that I could ever be anything except a worker, but the party made me dream that I could become an official. I thought I could get on the Branch Committee and I even thought of how nice it would be if in time I could get to the District or possibly the State Committee. Then if the revolution succeeded, it all would have been worth while. When I thought like this, I would get very excited and I worked as hard as I could to get promoted." "Working for the party is different from working for anyone else. When you work for other people, they scold you when you do something wrong, but nothing happens, except that you keep your job if you do the right things. The party made it hard for you if you did the wrong thing, but if you did what you were supposed to, they might make you into an official." To understand the extraordinary eagerness with which many of the SEP's went about the task of advancing them­ selves in the party, it is necessary to remember that they had regarded their admission to the ranks of the MCP as a formal recognition of their talent for leadership. Sub­ sequently, many of them learned that they had executive abilities that were equal to the demands of the party. They were wise enough to realize that nowhere else in the general society could they hope to find comparable recognition of their limited potentialities. The party was giving them more responsibilities than anyone else would entrust to them. In addition, it must be remembered that in the party they found more clearly defined cues for guiding their actions than had ever been the case before. The combination of these considerations and their per­ sisting search for security in personal relations helps to explain the energy with which many of the SEP's worked

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

for the party even after they had developed doubts about the virtues of the movement. Several of the SEP's sug­ gested that they had gone through periods when they felt misgivings about whether the revolution was worth while, but during these periods they had no misgivings at all about how worth while it would be to get a promotion. "By that summer, I no longer thought very much about Communism. I was much too busy working for the party, and they told me that if I kept up my work, I might get a better position." "I was very discouraged about how the war was going. However, I still worked hard for the party and they made me Branch Secretary. I then got to know the people on the District Committee and things seemed better." In the case of the majority of the SEP's, their invest­ ment of effort in trying to get ahead in the party also made Communism seem more meaningful to them. By placing great store on all the benefits they expected from promo­ tions, they had a rationale for many of the sacrifices they were required to make for Communism. Even more im­ portant, the prestige and the respect they received or hoped to receive from moving up in the party hierarchy de­ pended, of course, upon their own recognition and the recognition of others that Communism was a significant movement. In this respect the reactions of the SEP's were scarcely different from those of any people who seek status

in an organization, but until they came to Communism they had never known what it meant to have opportunity presented to them in the form of a promotional ladder. The very novelty of this situation offered extraordinary in­ centives and encouraged the SEP's to prodigious amounts of effort. Qualities Necessary for Getting Ahead

Since the prospect of advancement became in time such a critical consideration for most of the SEP's, their un­ derstanding of how one got ahead in the party affected

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION

much of their behavior. In turn, their response to the problem influenced the character of the party itself. It is significant that although all of the SEP's said that some knowledge of Communist doctrines was a prerequisite for advancement, none held that proficiency in this area alone was enough. No matter how learned one might be in doctrine, it was still necessary to meet other standards if one was to become a party official. However, those who remained rank-and-file members for a long period of time tended to stress the importance of understanding the theories of Communism even more than those who became party functionaries. The former often attributed their inability to advance in the movement to the fact that they could never make much sense out of Communist writings. There was general agreement among all the SEP's that it was much more important to demonstrate that one pos­ sessed qualities which were relevant to the functioning of the party as a militant organization. In particular, they stressed the importance of obedience and discipline. The rank and file spoke more about the need to win the respect of their immediate superiors, while those who became party functionaries emphasized the importance of a clean record of obedience and loyalty. Indeed, those who had once held posts in the party generally felt that unqualified loyalty and obedience to all orders were the most important of the factors that determined promotion. There was also a conspicuous difference between the rank and file and the functionaries in identifying the importance of skills of a general or technical nature. Only a very few of the rank and file mentioned such matters as communicating effectively in writing or speech, maintain­ ing records, organizing activities, commanding troops, or displaying general qualities of leadership. In contrast, the higher the SEP's rose in the party, the more they seemed inclined to stress such functional considerations as de­ termining promotion. They would often attribute their own success to a mastery of particular skills. It is also

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

significant that the functionaries attached importance to general intelligence, experience, and seniority, while the rank and file placed emphasis on physical courage. Although the SEP's recognized that these impersonal factors entered into the achievement of promotion, they still felt that personal connections and friendships played a major part. However, all except seven of them said that these relationships operated in a slightly different way in the party than on the outside. They claimed that this was the case because those who might be in a position to help them privately were so anxious for the revolution to suc­ ceed that friendship with them was possible only if one appeared to be equally committed to the party. This meant that even in seeking to develop or maintain personal ties it was necessary to comply with the party's impersonal standards of behavior. The result seems to have been that most of the SEP's never felt quite sure of how important personal connec­ tions were in ensuring promotion. Their confusion was heightened by the fact that at certain periods in the party's history personal connections seem to have been more criti­ cal than in others. Thus, during the early and late stages of the Japanese occupation and during the early days of the Emergency, people appeared to win promotions with little personal backing. These of course were the periods when the party was expanding rapidly. On the other hand, those who knew the party before the war, during the period of peace, and as the Emergency wore on said that at these times personal connections were critical. It therefore seems that so long as the party was expand­ ing and promotions were easier to acquire, the SEP's un­ certainty over the relative importance of objective and personal standards made little difference. However, once promotions were slow in coming, many of the members felt that even though they could meet whatever objective criteria the party wished to apply, the key lay in how well one knew one's immediate superiors. The simple fact that

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION

the party had at times been an expanding organization encouraged the SEP's to the view, usually rare among Chinese, that merit as well as personal ties might be im­ portant in determining one's fate. Just as they had never known before the meaning of a promotional ladder, so they had never realized what it was to be in an expanding organization. This did not mean that they discounted the role of personal relationships in general. It was only that, so long as Communism was on the rise, they did not have to place as great a strain on their personal associations. The Dilemma of Promotion

The reactions of those SEP's who rose to officer status suggest that in spite of the extent to which they appeared to accept the impersonal standards of Communism, their faith in the lasting importance of personal considerations was not greatly affected by their experiences. Most of them had hoped to be welcomed as a new member of a clique when they attained a higher position in the party. On dis­ covering that this was not the case, some simply assumed that it was at the next higher level in the party that they would find what they were seeking. They began to distrust their equals and turned once more to the task of rising above them. However, on becoming officials, the SEP's also learned that they had obligations and responsibilities that con­ flicted with their desire to be on good terms with as many people as possible. They had always been sensitive to the attitudes of others and in carrying out their duties they now found it difficult to ignore the feelings of those be­ neath them. When all was going well with the party, this often led to remarkably close relations between leader and followers. Some of the SEP's claimed that they had used their new positions in the party to establish better relations with those who had been their equals. Many assumed that they were popular with their men because they had proved their superiority to them. However, even during such

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

periods, there remained the constant necessity of keeping on good terms with their own superiors. The real trouble arose when the SEP's were required to enforce unpopular orders. When they told about such situa­ tions, they described themselves as pathetic individuals desperately trying to please their superiors while retaining the personal friendship of their subordinates. Had they themselves been better able to distinguish between their roles as party officials and as private individuals, they might have been able to act impersonally toward their men with­ out feeling that they were violating standards of personal decency and friendship. As it was, most of them seem to have felt their dilemma keenly, and to have seen themselves in an impossible situa­ tion. Confronted with what they considered unjust pres­ sures from above and below, they felt completely isolated. Some of the SEP's said that they tried to resolve this prob­ lem by sympathizing with their men and with their diffi­ culties. However, this usually resulted in the violation of party orders, and hence in difficulties with their superiors which in some cases led directly to their breaking with Communism. More often they chose the opposite course of siding with their superiors and the party. But in doing so they often appear to have adopted an extreme and unneces­ sarily harsh attitude toward their men. It was as though they had decided that it was best to give up any attempt to win the personal support of their followers. Some seem to have become quite arbitrary, and even ruthless, in their treatment of their inferiors. "I was always very good to my men and we got on well. When the new orders came to move against the security forces and not just collect subscriptions, many of the men didn't like it. There was nothing that I could do about it. They stopped coming around to talk with me. I didn't care any more what happened to them. I told them that it would be good if they all died for the revolution." "I treated my men very well, but they were ungrateful.

PERSONAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTION

I decided I couldn't worry about them any more. I just made them obey the orders, just as I had to obey those I received." On the whole, the faith of the SEP's in personal rela­ tionships did not always conflict with the impersonal re­ quirements of Communism. Indeed, so long as all was going well with the party and Communism was achieving successes, their personal orientations actually reinforced the party structure. Although they were far from accepting the standards of Communist behavior, they were acting in a manner that was not incompatible with the objectives of militant party discipline. Viewed in a broader perspective, the experiences of the SEP's exemplify the way in which a group of people who are unaccustomed to the impersonal standards of an indus­ trial society are able to adapt themselves to a movement such as Communism. People with backgrounds similar to those of the SEP's generally experience great difficulty in accepting the principles of a rationally organized institu­ tion. However, the peculiar mixture of apparent comrade­ ship and strict hierarchy basic to Communism seems to represent a compromise between the personal and the im­ personal that is readily acceptable to them. Generally, it was only when the party itself was in a difficult position that stresses began to develop between the need of the SEP's for persona] ties and the impersonal demands of Communism. In particular, once their sense of personal association with those above them was compro­ mised, the SEP's tended to become aware of "injustices" in the party. They grew more sensitive to the fact that risks and rewards were not equitably distributed. The personal amenities, the better food, medicine, and clothing which their superiors received became major sources of grievance. This growth of dissatisfaction brings us to a consideration of the reasons why the SEP's broke with Commnnism-

CHAPTER 14

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION THE considerations that led the SEP's to break with Com­

munism were, by and large, closely related to those that initially brought them into the movement. For many, the process of disaffection was essentially one of reemploying their pre-Communist notions about what constituted wis­ dom and correct behavior, and thereby arriving at the conclusion that it would be best for them to leave the party. In the explanations that many of the SEP's gave for their rejection of Communism, there is much which reaffirms the ideas that we have developed about the earlier motivations of these people. In particular, these explanations provide further evi­ dence that the attachment of the SEP's to the movement was not based primarily upon an emotional identification with the aims announced in the party's propaganda but upon their desire for personal security and social advance­ ment. The fact that not a single SEP cited a change in the party's "line" as the reason for his rejection of Communism also throws light on the way in which they identified them­ selves with the movement. Throughout their experience with Communism, they were able to take in their stride great shifts in the party's policies without letting these shifts affect their loyalty. They sensed a problem of loyalty only when new policies brought about a change in the conditions under which they had to work for the party. In part, this attitude was simply due to the inability of many of the SEP's to analyze the probable consequences of high-level policy decisions. This inability, however, rein­ forced their need to view their attachment to Communism in terms of their personal relationship with those who made up the party. The fact that questions of high policy did not play an important part in causing the SEP's to break with Com-

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

munism is also a reflection of the nature of Communism as a political movement. From what we have seen of the experiences of the SEP's both before and after they became full-fledged party members, it should be clear that Com­ munism is not like other political movements, which expect to receive support for popular objectives and to lose it for unpopular ones. It will be remembered that in discussing the manner in which the SEP's came to Communism we suggested the analogy of people entering government serv­ ice. This analogy may again be helpful in understanding the way in which the SEP's broke with the party. We do not expect members of, say, a foreign service to desert the service every time their government's current policies fail to coincide with their own policy preferences. Instead, it is generally recognixed that the personnel policies o£ such organizations are more likely to be critical in determining the rate at which people leave them. It was thus with the SEP's when they decided to part with Communism. Periods of Doubt and Critical Incidents

Since such a large proportion of the SEP's had con­ sidered that their association with Communism would offer them definite opportunities for status and career ad­ vancement, it is not surprising that the time factor itself seems to have raised doubts in their minds about the wis­ dom of remaining in the movement. Apparently few of the SEP's seriously considered leaving the party during their first year as members. During this period the vast majority were either so engrossed in their immediate tasks or had high enough expectations about their personal pros­ pects to be able to overlook or minimize the disagreeable features of Communism. The evidence suggests that for most of the SEP's a critical period was reached after they had been in the party for about a year and a half.1 By this time, many had hoped to iThis period of crisis in the party careers of the SEP's varied ac­ cording to periods in the party history. Whether it came earlier or

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

achieve some material recognition for their work as mem­ bers and were disposed to review the wisdom of their career choice. In turn, those who had received rapid pro­ motion to minor posts of responsibility were often faced at this time with the conflicts of status and personal rela­ tions that we spoke of in the preceding chapter. Thus, incidents that led to any kind of difficulty were generally viewed in a more serious light during this phase of their party careers. Indeed, it seems that of all the people who have left the MCP the vast majority have done so after two or three years of membership. Those SEP's who were able to pass through this critical stage did so either by accepting the fact that they were not going to get ahead fast in the party or, if they had gained some status, by being less sensitive to the attitudes of their subordinates. They still had faith that Communism as a movement was likely to be successful and hence that they still had a future as Communists. It must be remembered that, impatient as the SEP's were, they also seem to have had little sense of the appropriate amount of time required to complete a program of action or to realize particular policy objectives. Since they were without any clear standards for measuring the progress of the party, it was relatively easy for the leadership to suggest to them that the MCP was not falling behind in its timetable of revolution. Refer­ ences to the Communist successes in China, then in Korea, later appears to have depended upon how demanding party service was during the various phases of the MCP's existence. Of equal im­ portance was the estimate of the SEP's as to the career opportunities available to them if they broke with the party. Thus it seems that there was a fairly high turnover rate in the MCP membership during the prewar period. Promotions were slow, and alternative opportuni­ ties were enticing for those who did not achieve status soon. During the Japanese occupation party service was not excessively demanding and few alternatives existed. After the war, and as conditions of eco­ nomic and social stability improved, the sacrifices of party service seemed increasingly excessive and rewards less meaningful. During the Emergency the tensions of party life increased, but the risks involved in leaving the party also seemed great.

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

and later in Indo-China were enough to convince the SEP's that all was going well with the movement they had joined. Less than a quarter of the SEP's claimed that they ar­ rived gradually at the decision to break with Communism. Even fewer said that they had brooded over the decision or that it involved a great deal of soul-searching. In contrast, the majority cited quite specific incidents as the basis of their decision to leave the party. In a few cases, a single incident was held to be the sole cause of leaving; more often, one incident suggested retrospective doubts based on other incidents. Apparently almost all of the SEP's at one time or another during their party careers were faced with situations which brought them to the brink of defec­ tion, but as the situation altered they changed their minds and remained. Significantly, the vast majority seem to have been able to remain in the party without being bothered by lingering doubts and began working again just as though nothing had happened. In fact, most of those who entered the party during the Japanese occupation indicated that at some point between the end of the war and the begin­ ning of the Emergency in 1948 they had been about to leave the MCP. However, as a result of either a change in their working conditions or of the major change that the Emergency brought about, they renewed their allegiance. Only when they were faced with another crisis situation did their previous doubts recur, especially if a similar prob­ lem arose involving the same individuals. This meant that when the final break came, it could be caused by a rela­ tively undramatic incident and preceded by a period of intense activity in support of the party. Communists of this sort may give the appearance of high morale on the very eve of their defection. Only a relatively few of the SEP's indicated that they had found it difficult to overcome serious doubts, once the circumstances which had given rise to them were altered. These few were generally the people who early in their careers had developed strong emotions about Communism

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

and the cause of world revolution. Wang Shih-ming was one of them. He had become a District Committee member in spite of nearly breaking with the party on three occa­ sions. He described his problem in these words: "To be a real Communist, it is necessary to be completely involved in the spirit of the party and to accept the party completely. This was the way I was before the war. However, when­ ever you move away from the party, it is possible to move the body back into the party, but the heart can never come back into the party and be the same again. If one ever breaks from the party, he can never again recapture the same feeling. The real Communist has no self, but when you break from the party you find your self again and you can never lose it after that. This is why the party is abso­ lutely correct in paying so much attention to the thoughts of its members, and why it has to distrust anyone who has ever made even the slightest break from the party. Remem­ ber that Trotsky started to become an enemy of the revolu­ tion even before Red October—that is why Stalin was right in purging him. This is also the reason why Stalin was abso­ lutely right in purging all the others who had made even the slightest break. Once a person loses his feeling for Communism, he does become a danger to the party. I know this is true, because this is what happened in my case. Each time I moved back into the party, it was less a matter of my heart and more one of my body. Each time I became more critical of the leadership, each time I questioned more the wisdom of our orders. I was no longer a real Communist." Types of Crises

The problems the SEP's reported when they recounted the particular incidents that had made them dissatisfied with Communism covered a wide range. Each story had a distinctive aspect, but almost all of them fell into one of two general categories. First, there were the problems that stemmed from the personal inability of the SEP's to meet

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

the demands of party membership. For those who had made successful initial adjustments, problems of this sort were related mainly to matters of status. In the second category of problems were those that arose from the party's failure to satisfy the initial expectations of the recruits or those they developed after they had fully committed them­ selves to the movement. Communism failed to meet their needs, or it did so at what they considered excessively high costs. In general, problems of this kind caused the SEP's to feel that they were being called upon to make pointless sacrifices. It is significant that in almost all cases the decision to break with the party occurred when an initial problem of one type led to problems of the other. It also seems that there was a strong likelihood that such a development would take place if the first problem was not quickly re­ solved. Thus, when the SEP's were plagued with problems related to the nature and structure of the party, they began to question whether the party could provide them with the personal security they sought. Conversely, when they began to doubt that Communism was a strong enough movement to control the future, they found it increasingly difficult to meet the daily requirements of party membership. The pattern of defection was completed when they began to formulate more general criticisms of Communism and hence more respectable justifications for turning against the party. REQUIREMENTS OF STATUS AND HIERARCHY

In the previous chapter, we indicated the types of ten­ sions that many of the SEP's experienced as they were confronted with the impersonal structure of the party. Slightly over half of all the respondents and nearly threequarters of the former functionaries indicated that their troubles with the party originated in incidents that in some way involved their status in the party and their formal relations with those above or below them.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

The major proportion of these incidents arose when an SEP felt that his superior was exploiting his status in the party for his own personal benefit. Apparently the party was never able to define clearly the types of activities in which sharp distinctions between the ranks were necessary and those in which a spirit of comradeship and equality was appropriate. When it came to issuing and carrying out direct orders, there was little confusion. But with respect to numerous aspects of daily life, only vague standards seem to have existed as to the importance that should be attached to differences in party status. This problem was accentuated by the fact that many of the lower officials sought to gain popularity with their men by maintaining an attitude of comradeship. As a result, many of the SEP's reported cases in which they felt their leaders had arbi­ trarily "pulled their rank" in situations where the code of equality should have pertained. It also seems that the tensions which developed during the MCP's attempt to survive in the jungle often aggra­ vated status conflicts. Such a case was that of Lee San, who had joined the party as a result of his activities in a trade union. He had accepted the party's decision to resort to violence and had quickly adapted himself to life in the jungle. In time, he was promoted to the rank of section leader in the MRLA and maintained fairly close relations with his platoon leader. One day, after more than two years in the jungle, he was assigned to go with a group of men to pick up some food supplies from a Min Yuen group. The men received a large quantity of supplies and, since it was exhausting work to carry them, took turns in doing so. Suddenly, halfway back to their camp, the platoon leader announced that it was not up to him to help out with the load. Lee San was furious, but after they returned to the camp he again fitted into the daily routine and dis­ played no bitterness toward his superiors. A few months later, the same group was again given the task of picking up supplies. Once more, while everyone was fresh, the

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

platoon leader assisted in handling the load, but after half a day's march, and when he and Lee San found themselves ahead of the others on the trail, he again refused his turn. This time Lee San dropped the supplies and challenged the platoon leader. When his superior ordered him to pick up the goods, Lee San obeyed. "I was very mad. I began to think about how this was really what Communism was like. Everybody is supposed to work for the revolution, we are all good revolutionaries, and those who are the best revolutionaries become big officials. Then it is all just orders and doing what they say. Communism makes you realize that you are just a worker so that they can exploit you and make you think you should be happy about it. I decided that it was silly and it was bad. We were still ahead of the others, so I asked for another rest, but as soon as he sat down, I grabbed the rifle. I don't know what I said to him, but before he could answer, I shot him." One category of status conflicts stemmed from the fact that nearly 10 per cent of the people in the jungle were women. The party's official attitude toward sex was very strict and puritanical. All the women were supposedly liberated from the shackles of "feudalistic" customs, and hence were treated the same as the men. According to the rules of the party, sexual relations were strictly forbidden except in marriage. All marriages had to be approved by the party. The rank and file generally found it difficult to obtain such permission on the grounds that their undi­ vided attention was needed for the cause of revolution. As good Communists they were expected to work with their female comrades without developing any emotional and physical desires. In practice, it appears that after the party moved into the jungle, the women tended to gravitate toward the leaders for several reasons. Like the men, they found it desirable to be on good terms with their leaders! Most of the rank and file were strongly inhibited in even their most casual contacts with their female comrades since the party demanded the death penalty for rape, the defi-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

nition of which was left to the judgment of the party offi­ cials and not that of the women. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that, far more than the males, the fe­ male SEP's claimed that their leaders were more friendly toward them than their equals were. As might be expected, the vagaries of human emotions did not often coincide with the pattern of the party hier­ archy. When they did not, status differences began to carry implications which could not be rationalized as neces­ sary to the functioning of the party organization. For the rank and file, the presence of a limited number of women was a constant reminder of the sacrifices demanded of them and of the advantages that some of their leaders enjoyed. Moreover, the party's contention that thoughts about sex were symptoms of "counter-revolutionary" attitudes led a few of the SEP's to realize that they had indulged in subversive activities and, hence, to wonder whether they could—or even wanted to—join the "progressive element." One of the SEP's reported, after getting into a little trouble with his leader: "I decided that I would be an old man before I became a big enough official in the party. It sud­ denly seemed to me silly to go into a monastery in your youth with the hope that in your old age you would be able to know women. They wanted us to be eunuchs with­ out making us so. I'll tell you, if you check carefully, you will find that sex was one of the reasons why everyone who has surrendered did so." This statement, however, seems to be a gross exaggeration. Indeed, given the circumstances, the party appears to have been remarkably successful in maintaining morale and minimizing tensions with respect to this problem. Another category of status conflicts that influenced nearly a third of the SEP's in breaking from the party were those that developed out of clashes in personality. In many of these cases, personal characteristics of superiors which at one time had evoked admiration and even devotion became a source of irritation and annoyance under the stress of party

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

discipline. This seems to have been a particularly difficult problem for many of the SEP's because they had tended to view their leaders as personifying Communism. When they became critical of their leader's personal behavior, they were in effect critical of Communism in general. The case of Wang Tse-ming illustrates this typical pat­ tern. In 1946, while a student, Wang joined the New Demo­ cratic Youth League and became active in producing the local group's small propaganda sheet. In time he was given a job with a Communist newspaper and found himself working in the editorial department under the direction of a man who became his ideal. This man was all that Wang wanted to be: self-assured, clever with words, knowl­ edgeable on all matters. He represented to Wang the new world that was Communism. When the Emergency began, Wang was assigned to a propaganda section that was under the command of his mentor. After two years in the jungle Wang considered himself a skillful propagandist. As a result he began to argue with his superior over interpreta­ tions of the directives they received from the Central Propaganda Bureau. Where previously he had considered every change that his counselor made in his draft a sign of the man's genius, he now felt that they detracted from his own brilliant work. Wang's irritation grew into a dis­ trust of his superior, and he saw in all the latter's personal mannerisms a sign that he was a small, insincere man. "I got so I couldn't stand our meetings any more. We would all read the directives first and then he would announce in the most solemn way that we had the great task of planning the next issue. We would all talk a bit, until he would shout, 'Quiet, quiet, I am thinking!' We would all just sit there while he paced back and forth. Then, as always, he would suddenly bang on the table and shout, Ί have it, I have it!' But what did he have? It was always the same thing as in the directive, the same thing he always thought up, nothing new. I saw that this was what Com­ munism really was. It was a lot of running this way and

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

that to make you believe that we were about to create a great typhoon to blow away all that was old. But actually all that ever happened was that they would get the com­ rades in a circle, and then, after the shouting and singing was through, we would all with true discipline blow to­ gether at the same instant. And what would happen? We wouldn't even be able to blow out the candle in the mid­ dle of the circle because our discipline was so perfect." A final type of status conflict that contributed to the disaffection of nearly a third of the SEP's arose from their feeling that they were unable to communicate effectively with their superiors. In these cases, they had failed to get a hearing from their superiors when they were faced with a genuine problem. At times these problems grew out of a superior's refusal to assume the responsibility of in­ terpreting or clarifying orders that he had transmitted. Often the orders seemed to be self-defeating or pointless. Running up against a blank wall, the SEP's felt that they were being cut off from the party. In most cases they inter­ preted the refusal of the party to listen to their problems as a sign that they were now considered expendable. SACRIFICING ONESELF TO A LOSING CAUSE

The direct realization that Communism was not meet­ ing their needs or their expectations was the second major source of dissatisfaction which led many of the SEP's to break with the party. In these cases, an incident usually took place which made the SEP aware that he was sacri­ ficing himself for a losing cause. We have already com­ mented on the extraordinary inability of the SEP's to figure out how the struggle in Malaya was progressing. In spite of all the evidence that should have suggested to them that the party was losing ground, the SEP's generally became aware of the situation only at a very late date. When they finally realized it, however, it is equally amaz­ ing how fast they sought to disengage themselves from the party. They were not people who could appreciate the ro-

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

mantic sentiment of heroically and honorably fighting on for a losing cause. They had joined the party because they had perceived Communism as a strong and stable force, and when they saw it as weak they were quick to feel that they had made a great mistake. There were many types of immediate problems which made the SEP's aware of the deterioration of the party. For some, it was that they had to work too hard; for others, it was the exact opposite—being excessively bored. Nearly a third said that life was becoming too dangerous or that they had to endure too much physical suffering. For some, it took the death of a friend to make them realize the futility of their efforts. Most of them had shown them­ selves capable of making great sacrifices for Communism, but once they became aware that even greater sacrifices on their part and on the part of all their comrades would make no difference, they recognized the hopelessness of the party's position. The words of Ah Ming are typical of many of the SEP's: "We had been getting along on very little food for a long time. It wasn't impossible, because you get used to eating almost nothing. But things began to get worse. We lost some of our supply dumps and some of our men to the Gurkhas. Our political commissar kept calling upon us to struggle harder and to prepare the conditions for vic­ tory so that we could reach the point when outside help could come in and complete the revolution. This is the way all revolutions happen. The party told us how in Russia the local revolutionaries did everything they could, and then when all was ready Lenin returned and the vic­ tory was won. In China, the Chinese Communists had to work for twenty years before everything was set and Russia could come in and give the last bit of help necessary for success. In Indo-China, the Vietminh were doing their job and the Chinese Communists would soon be able to help them complete their revolution. But I just couldn't see how, even if we all struggled harder, we would be able to

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

bring things close enough to victory so that the Chinese Communists would be able to do their job of helping us finish it." Many of the SEP's gave similar accounts of the condi­ tions under which they might expect direct foreign help, and apparently the MCP leadership stimulated this hope as a means of bolstering morale. However, for several of the SEP's the effect was exactly the opposite, as it led them to realize only too clearly what they would have to ac­ complish before they could expect to benefit from world Communism. THE PARTY IS "CORRUPT"

Generally it was only after the SEP's had some personal difficulties with the party and were considering the advisa­ bility of defection that they began to be critical of the political nature of Communism, of its objectives and its means. Many of them reached this stage only when they were seeking reasons to justify the change in their own feelings toward the party. Very significantly, the majority of the SEP's began by finding fault with the rationality of the party leadership. Their criticism took the form of say­ ing that their leaders were "foolish" and that Commu­ nism was "silly" because the party's actions were not cal­ culated to bring success. In their view the party was no longer using the correct means for obtaining the objec­ tives of power; it was no longer skillful and clever. "They said they wanted to win over the masses, but what were they doing? They were frightening the tappers, they were burning the buses, and doing all kinds of things to make the people become our enemies. It didn't make sense." "I saw that the party was saying one thing and doing another. They were saying that we would win in 1950, but they were doing everything to make sure that we didn't." "I could see that the party didn't have any clear plans.

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

They were killing the wrong people and it wasn't helping us at all." In the vast majority of cases, it was only after the party was conceived of as a failure that the SEP's began to criti­ cize it on moral grounds. There was a strong element of personal resentment in their attacks; the failure of the party had made them failures themselves. Moreover, since their break with the party represented a break in their personal relations with the individual members, their moral attacks on the party generally involved considera­ tions of personal morality. Thus, when SEP's reached the point of having to label Communism as "bad," they articulated their charges in the form that is most meaningful to a highly personal type of politics. They expressed themselves in the manner that Chinese traditionally employ in attacking a political group they once supported: they said the party leadership was personally "corrupt." Originally, they had seen their rela­ tionship to Communism as a part of a web of personal relations that tied them to their leaders; now these leaders had destroyed the basis of the relationship by proving themselves evil, selfish men who had violated standards of personal morality. "The top leaders kept all the good food and the medi­ cine for themselves. They just thought of themselves and didn't care what happened to us." "What happened to all the money we collected? I could see that the corrupt people at the top were getting it all. They were getting rich. They were probably buying rubber estates. They were taking care of themselves all right." "The big party officials were getting fat. They were liv­ ing well. Anything that belonged to the party belonged to them." There is no evidence to suggest that there had actually been any change in the conduct of the party leadership. Indeed, during most of their party careers, the SEP's had fully accepted the idea that the higher officials were justi-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

fied in receiving greater personal benefits and amenities. They had hoped that as they themselves rose in the hier­ archy they too would be able to realize such benefits. It was only as they saw the party losing strength that they began to feel that their leaders were personally corrupt. According to the irame o£ reierence that they were accus­ tomed to use in thinking about politics, they thus were able both to justify their own break with Communism and to explain the failure of the party to succeed. It is significant that less than 15 per cent of the SEP's suggested that the party was corrupt according to more impersonal standards and had employed means that de­ stroyed the value of its ends or objectives. By and large, the SEP's merely regarded the party's record of indis­ criminate killing and ruthlessness as an example of its tactical mistakes, or else they believed that such actions followed from the personal corruption of the party leaders. To the SEP's, therefore, the evils of Communism were essentially those of a selfish and degenerate leadership. They knew that they could not hope to find in their re­ lationships with such people the security, prestige, and all the other personal values they had expected to gain from becoming politically active. In short, Communism was no longer the way of the future. Attitudes after Leaving the Party

The attitudes of the SEP's immediately after defection dramatically illustrate two of their basic characteristics. First, we see their extraordinary skill in adapting their behavior to what they considered the demands of the situation in which they found themselves. Secondly, they showed clearly that they thought of politics in quite per­ sonal terms. Almost immediately after surrender, the SEP's sought to take on all the attitudes that they considered appro­ priate to their new role. They quickly adopted what amounted to an entirely new political vocabulary, readily

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

repeating government propaganda views while trying to drop all traces of Communist terminology. They were not only generally prepared to cooperate with the authorities but usually eager to lead patrols back into the jungle to attack their former comrades. Even when this meant kill­ ing people with whom they had lived and worked for many years, they were not troubled by the prospect, since their break with the party had been a personal one. They no longer had any ties with those in the party; they had to establish new ones with those in the government. In the same way as they had tried to adopt the total orientation of Communism when they joined the party, they now felt it essential to assume completely the role of enemies of Communism. In their new situation they gen­ erally turned for guidance to those who had surrendered before them. They sought to learn from them the new cues for their behavior. In time, they learned that they could be more relaxed and that the British were far more toler­ ant toward their personal attitudes than the Communists had been. Also, they discovered that the authorities had a less rigid definition of what their role was to be than they had expected. In almost no time at all, the SEP's learned about the formal and the informal workings of the police as they affected them personally. They found out what all the differences in rank meant and to whom they might turn in the hope of receiving personal favors. They were soon confident that they knew what would please or displease their new superiors. The SEP's seem to have had even less trouble in de­ fining their new role in relation to Communism. "The Communists consider me to be their enemy; there­ fore, they are my enemy. They want to kill me, and I want to kill them." "The party hates me, so what can I do but hate them? I know them and I know what they do to all traitors to the party." Indeed, many of the SEP's indicated that they were dis-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

turbed and unhappy because they knew the party was vilifying them and calling them "traitors" and "enemies of the people." As a result, they felt personally involved in the struggle against Communism. "I know that since I surrendered they have had meet­ ings about what a bad person I am. All my old friends will get up and say that I was never a good Communist. They will say that I had many bad habits and that I am not a good person. They will all be telling a lot of lies. It is they who are the bad people. It is unjust of them to say such things of me, since I did work hard for them for many years. They are the unreliable people, not I." Practically all of the SEP's seemed to have come through their experience with Communism with no feeling of guilt or moral responsibility for the crimes of the party they had supported. They tended to the view that, given the external circumstances, they had always made the best or the only possible choice. They had been the victims of an external fate that no one could have expected them to have successfully opposed. After the SEP's became adjusted to their new role, one of their dominant attitudes was that of apathy and even outright hostility toward politics. Any form of political discussion seemed repugnant to them. They considered that they had taken the risks of politics when they joined the party and that they had been badly damaged in doing so. "In the future, I don't want to have anything more to do with politics. Politics is a dangerous thing. It is too much strife, and I am now getting too old to be interested in such things. [This SEP was 28 years old.] After I'm through working for the government, I'd like to start a small business." "I don't like to think about politics any more. It was all a big mistake to get mixed up in it." A man who had once enthusiastically worked for a Com­ munist trade union said: "I don't want to have anything

THE PROCESS OF DISAFFECTION

more to do with labor unions. My ideology is now 'all-formyself-ism.' I will never worry again about society. I just want to get enough to live on and get over the days. I'll be happy just worrying about myself. You can worry a great deal about society, but society never worries about you." However, in spite of these feelings, the SEP's were still generally a very impatient group of people. They had not lost all their ambitions. Many felt bitter about the fact that Communism had taken a good many years of their lives and they had nothing to show for it. "I have worked full-time for the party for over ten years and yet I am worse off than I was when I started. I know that if they had not cheated me, I might have been able to have had a fairly good job by now, a house and some sav­ ings. They have wasted my life and they have taken my future from me." "I lost a great deal by becoming mixed up with Commu­ nism. I have gained nothing from it. I read a lot of books and did a lot of propaganda work, but it hasn't helped me at all. If it wasn't for Communism, I might now be a teacher in a school and everyone would have a lot of respect for me." Their experience with Communism left most of the SEP's distrustful of people. They had had faith in personal relations when they joined the party and now their feel­ ing of hostility toward Communism colored their feelings about personal relations in general. "As I see it now, everyone is trying to cheat everyone else. Stalin is cheating the Russians, the Russians are cheating Mao, Mao is cheating the Chinese, and the Chinese are cheating each other. When I was called back to do Min Yuen work at the beginning of the Emergency, I left my coffee shop and rice mill in charge of a personal friend of thirty years' standing, and the turtle egg sold the place and kept the money. Who can you trust any more? Where can I find any real friends?"

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

However, the real dilemma of the SEP's was that they still felt they had nothing to turn to except their weakened faith in personal relations. Overwhelmingly, they rejected the idea that they might be able to benefit from a rehabili­ tation program of vocational or trade-school training. They considered themselves too old to go back to school again. They had achieved some status in Communism, and they were not ready to admit that they should start all over again as a student.2 As people who habitually thought of the future, what disturbed the SEP's the most was that their current status made it almost impossible for them to plan very far ahead. On the one hand, their work for the government demanded their attention and their energies. They could become absorbed in the problems related to their current status and concern themselves about such things as the adequa­ cies of their pay, the food and the living accommodations they received, and what to do with their free time. They could try to work for better assignments and hope that they would be given greater responsibilities. And yet, on the other hand, they were fully aware that their status was only a temporary one, and that in time they would have to find more permanent careers. Thus the SEP's find themselves today in much the same state as they were when they turned to Communism. They are still looking for personal security and a career that will make them a part of the modern age. They will proba­ bly be even more cautious and more calculating in the future. Their experience with Communism has made them tougher of mind. It is also certain that, after what they have been through, they are even less ready to settle down to the kind of life that satisfied their parents. 2 In sharp contrast to the SEP's who had been full party members and especially to the former officials—the majority of those who had not been taken into the party before their surrender have responded eagerly to the British program of rehabilitation and have made good progress in learning a trade.

C H A P T E R 15

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT As WE HAVE MOVED from a consideration of the general doctrines of People's Liberation Communism, through a survey of the history of the Malayan Communist Party, to a more detailed analysis of the personal experiences of a group of former Communists, we have noted much that may be of value in formulating policies to meet the menace of Communism in Malaya as well as in the rest of Asia. Needless to say, many of the problems we have been in­ vestigating are peculiar to Malaya, but one of the purposes of any case study is to suggest findings which may be of relevance in understanding comparable problems in other places and at other times. Thus we have been concerned not only with the situation in Malaya but also with the type of Communism that the Malayan party represents. In turning now to the problem of an appropriate orien­ tation toward questions of policy, it is essential to recog­ nize that the strength of Communism in economically un­ derdeveloped countries like Malaya stems from complex and profound social developments. The problem of policy would be far easier if we had found substantial evidence to support either the theory that there is a simple and direct relationship between poverty and the attractions of Communism, or the contention that Communism in Asia derives its greatest strength from the desire for na­ tional independence. This is not to say that reducing pov­ erty and supporting the cause of independence are not deserving goals for Western policy. On the contrary, such objectives are of the first importance in themselves and should not be viewed as instrumental only to the struggle against Communism. To do so is to debase their value. It is also to misunderstand the character of Communism as a social and political force in Asia.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

To the extent that we can generalize from the case of the SEP's, the majority of Asians who have turned to Commu­ nism are people engrossed in a restless effort to be part of the modern world. Becoming increasingly urbanized, they are scornful of the peasant standards and values of their parents. Most important of all, they have been set adrift by the violent repercussions of World War II, which de­ stroyed the traditional bases of their communities, and they are buoyed up only by the expectation that if they keep their wits about them they can realize their new ambitions. We have found in the social backgrounds of the SEP's, in their understanding of politics, in the manner in which they adapted themselves to Communism—indeed, in nearly every phase of their lives—evidence of the way in which people may react to finding themselves in an erratically changing world. It has not always been a pleasant sight. Moreover, we have seen that both the ethic and structure of Communism can provide a haven for them—at least temporarily. To think of those Asians who have turned to Commu­ nism as simply misguided is to ignore the extent to which the forces of modern technology and, more important, the impact of war have destroyed the old normative order in their societies and left only a few standards that still seem valid. It is true that many of them appear almost un­ believably naive and childlike in their thoughts and ac­ tions, but this may be only a reflection of their lack of adequate standards to guide them in an unpredictable world. They may turn to Communism because they see in it a means of becoming identified with the modern world, and in time, like the SEP's, they may perceive that they were mistaken. But so long as they are Communists, they are likely to be remarkably determined and far from childlike. This is largely the case because, as is common with people involved in a process of acculturation, they place great emphasis upon the form or the style of action, upon means rather than ends. It is this type of person

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

whom Communism needs. For, while Communism claims that its ends are so important that there can be no ques­ tioning of the means employed, it can flourish only with the support of people who are fascinated with its means and who lack the standards to appraise its ends. As we have seen, the SEP's admired the party's respect for power and felt no concern about their inability to question its policy objectives. At the same time, however, we observed that the SEP's wanted to associate only with the leaders and the respected, not with the misfits and the deviants. We also found that so long as there was an integrated and coherent Chinese community in Malaya, the Communists were unable to be­ come a significant movement in the country. In the past, whenever the Malayan Chinese leaders have effectively used their various informal associations as a means for com­ municating with the Chinese population and for provid­ ing it with a sense of social identification, very few Chinese have accepted the leadership of the Communists. Our findings point to the conclusion that the essential problem in checking Communism in Asia is one of finding some other auspices under which the transition from the tradi­ tional form of social relationships can be effected. All of the techniques by which material aid, technical assistance, and information can be given to the Asian peoples by the industrially advanced societies can help to provide the conditions necessary for a more modern way of life. Such efforts can make them feel that they are moving in the direction of their ambitions. But the result may be that their ambitions and expectations will grow at an even faster rate than the means of satisfying them, causing them to become increasingly the victims of their impatience. Thus the critical question still remains: Will these people who feel themselves caught in a changing world be able to create and strengthen the forms of political action that can meet their peculiar social needs? Will they be able to bring into balance their expectations and their appraisal

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

of reality by expressing themselves through more appro­ priate political forms than are offered by Communism? The problem of countering Communism in Asia is thus essentially a matter of political development. It is already certain that a substantial proportion of those Asians who are driven by new ambitions and who feel insecure will turn to some form of group action. The question is whether they will be able to apply their energies through arrange­ ments and by methods which will satisfy them without threatening the security of the rest of the world. If they can discover more appropriate ways of relating their ac­ tivities to their real and immediate needs, they may also find that a fundamental characteristic of political action is to make the gap between reality and aspiration less frustrating and more constructive. As they begin to work out their problems on the basis of shared interests, they will be contributing to a process of political development that is essential if the current efforts to establish the in­ stitutions of representative government are to succeed. This raises the question of how it is possible to have a creative, predictable, and accommodating political proc­ ess in societies comprised of people in various stages of transition. At one extreme are the few whose political ori­ entations are essentially identical with those common to a Western society; at the other extreme are those who have been little affected by modern developments. In such a situation there exist few standards or norms that can guide one's expectations about the likely political be­ havior of others. The requirements for a coherent and reasonably predictable system of politics are lacking. Even more serious, under such conditions the process of communication is so hampered that the extent to which differences and similarities in political outlook exist can­ not be demonstrated. In spite of all the babble and clamor, there is a profound inarticulateness in societies which are engrossed in extensive cultural change. There are few means of identifying the deeply held convictions latent in

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

public opinion. It is difficult for a Westerner to imagine himself in a situation where he cannot easily tell the ex­ tent to which his expectations, ambitions, and desires are shared by others: to be unable to say that these of his basic views are majority convictions, these are minority ones, and these are unique; or to be unable to distinguish that those are the people who represent this view, those are the ones who support that view, and that no group is ready to champion a third view. It is an awful fact that this inarticulateness and ambiguity should exist in much of Asia at a time when the need for political action seems more pressing than ever before. People realize that things are happening which affect them and—without any clear view as to what can be done—they feel impelled to act. Given this situation in societies that are struggling with the problem of cultural change, it is not surprising that the most coherent political theories and philosophies are those which are imported. Moreover, it is almost inevitable that those which appear the most explicit, the most formal, and the most embracing will be chosen—a fact which, at this stage in the history of Western political thought, means the ideas of the political left rather than the more eclectic and possibly more subtle ideas of the political center. Similarly, it is not surprising that many people in these societies are likely to react to the actual manifesta­ tions of such imports in much the same way as the SEP's reacted to the ideology and propaganda of Communism; that is, by employing their own private calculations about the personal desirability of supporting the group that pro­ fesses the ideology, with little regard for the content and substance of the ideology itself. They are ready to act in this manner because they can find no alternative that is appropriate to their real needs. Thus the process of political development requires that those who feel insecure discover some way of relating their immediate problems to a changing world. To do so they must break through the barriers of inarticulateness and

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

find others who share their problems, as well as those who can help them seek solutions. At the same time they must be able to relate their own interests to the complex de­ velopments that follow from events far removed from their immediate environment. For people accustomed to regu­ lating their behavior according to the most parochial of considerations, it is difficult enough that their immediate world has become so unstable. Now, however, they also feel it necessary to take into account what is happening in distant places—events whose significance they can assess only by employing more abstract and more generalized con­ ceptions than they have ever used before. To what extent should they base their political views on the international struggle that transcends their immediate world? What portion of their political views should be based upon their perceptions of their local environment? It would tax the abilities of far more sophisticated thinkers than they are to find a logic that could relate these two worlds which so often seem to be out of rhythm. It thus seems that the problem of political development in countries like Malaya involves many matters not gener­ ally conceived of as belonging to the political sphere. In particular, with the weakening of traditional social ties, people are likely in their quest for a new sense of social "belonging" to identify their personal problems as political ones. In the case of the SEP's we repeatedly saw people trying to solve their personal and social problems by turn­ ing to political action, with the result that they were un­ able to discriminate between the problems of their im­ mediate situation and questions of public policy. The problem of achieving a new form of basic social integration in such societies cannot be solved at the national level of politics, unless, of course, the society is to accept a totali­ tarian system. Rather, the situation calls for the develop­ ment of stronger informal associations and groups which can be directly concerned with the social and personal problems of people who feel they are adrift.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Among the Chinese in Malaya, many of the traditional associations may with assistance still be able to meet the social needs of even the younger generation. These groups, ranging from the "benevolent associations" to the Cham­ bers of Commerce, may find that by adapting to changing conditions they can again give the members of the Chinese community a sense of stability. However, there is also a need for new types of organizations that are specifically concerned with the social well-being of people entering a more industrial way of life. The free trade-union move­ ment in Malaya has already become one of the most sig­ nificant forces in countering the appeals of Communism, but this can be considered only a beginning. It is precisely such types of organizations which are most likely to pro­ vide a new basis for social security; they can also give people the sense of status and the opportunities for in­ formal leadership which the SEP's could find only in Com­ munism. It would seem that programs of economic development are likely to be the most immediately effective in counter­ ing the attractions of Communism if they can also con­ tribute to a greater sense of community among those being assisted. The SEP's were people who before they became Communists had achieved a standard of living above the average in Asia, but in their constant search for higher wages they had become increasingly restless because they could find little sense of social identity with the impersonal industrial labor market. In time, perhaps, economic de­ velopment will result in more jobs that offer promotional opportunities on the basis of merit, and thus people will be better able to find in their employment chances to satisfy their desire for respect and prestige. In the mean­ time, however, it is more likely that informal associations will be able to provide such opportunities. In poor coun­ tries, very few can realize satisfying social rewards in eco­ nomic activities. In contrast, in wealthy countries, there is a wide range of jobs that represent more than just a

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

means of making a living, jobs into which people can channel much of their quest for social recognition—a fact which, of course, makes these countries richer still. If it is possible to encourage some form of fundamental social development in countries like Malaya, it will be less likely that large numbers of people will feel that they must begin their political deductions on the basis of fidgety speculations as to what Peking and Moscow or Washington and London are likely to do. At the same time, if the policies of the West can be seen as firm and predictable on the major issues, a climate conducive to the development of a more appropriate form of politics can be created. Once assured that there is to be some stability in the conduct of the major actors on the inter­ national scene, the Asian peoples may be ready to turn with greater confidence and more creative imagination to participating in those forms of group action which can best meet their needs. With a more relevant basis for guiding their behavior, they are likely to become more effective in realizing their ambitions, more stable in their actions. Thus, as locally based organizations provide for more of the social needs of the people, the national political sphere may become better defined. In meeting the threat of Communism in underdeveloped countries, theie is also vhe problem o£ encouraging political development in the more conventional sense. This is es­ sentially the question of the creation of a national leader­ ship which can both cope with problems of public policy and provide guidance for people like the SEP's. In con­ sidering this problem in terms of Malaya, we encounter the profound dilemma of modern colonialism. This is not the dilemma of making great investments of energy and resources in an enterprise that will soon be turned over to a new management, nor that of determining the ca­ pacity of a people for self-government. The real dilemma of modern colonialism is that it brings into peculiarly sharp focus the fundamental clash between the demands

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

of modern government for efficient and rational adminis­ tration and the needs of a society to express its value pref­ erences according to the logic of politics. This is the clash between the administrator and the politician. The dif­ ficulty in Malaya lies in the fact that the administrator has usurped the role of the politician and, in doing so, has created an extraordinarily efficient apparatus of govern­ ment which gives the appearance of operating in a po­ litical void. With their strong rational-administrative orientation, the colonial civil servants have superimposed on Malayan society a structure of government which is technologically far in advance of almost all the other elements in the so­ ciety. However, by introducing high standards into the ad­ ministrative functions of government, they have also en­ couraged and stimulated the development of many key enterprises which are now dependent upon the continual smooth and efficient operation of the governmental ma­ chinery. These enterprises, especially the rubber and tin industries, have in turn assumed a critical role in deter­ mining the well-being of the rest of the society. Yet the vast majority of the population is not so organized as to feel the need for a highly efficient and elaborate govern­ ment. Thus, in effect, Malaya has a governmental structure appropriate to an industrialized society and the key seg­ ment of its economy is highly industrialized, but this super­ structure is not an expression of the immediately felt po­ litical and social needs of most of the people. As a result, the process of increasing politicization and the fumbling attempts at articulating the political needs of a people in transition to a more industrialized way of life are likely to be viewed by those who now have governmental re­ sponsibilities as examples of "irrational," "disruptive," and "immature" behavior. Their rational outlook enables them to predict the logical consequences of these crude efforts for the efficient operation of government and, hence, for the health of Malayan society.

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

It must be made absolutely clear that the vast majority of the greatly overworked officials in Malaya are men of good will who are seeking to create a healthy, vigorous society. The new breed of civil servant is generally com­ posed of administrators who have come from a university environment in which they learned to think of political problems as capable of solution through calm, systematic, and rational analysis of the consequences of alternative courses of action. When they find public opinion irrational according to their intellectual standards, their reaction is: here is a job of "public education" to be done. The Ameri­ can should have little trouble in recognizing this type. They are like the people he knows at home whose every inclination and bias are in favor of the specialist and the expert and who tend to see in the programs and policies produced by the administrative departments of his govern­ ment intellectual efforts which are constantly being com­ promised and weakened by the Congress and the "poli­ ticians" who cater to human prejudice and weaknesses. They are like the people who feel that the true democratic values of the country are best expressed in general ad­ ministrative programs that are rational and liberal, and that the politician is the spokesman for the petty, the selfish, and the unenlightened. This is not to say that the new Malayan official is strong­ ly doctrinaire in his outlook or that he is insensitive to considerations of social welfare. Quite the contrary, ques­ tions of social welfare dominate much of his thinking. However, basic to his entire approach toward problems of public policy is his faith in the powers of reason. In his mind the subtleties of public policy require meticulous and unimpassioned thought and action; he is likely to be sensitive to the dangers of demagogy to the point of dis­ trusting much of the emotionalism of politics. His attitude is revealed in the answer that one extremely sincere and liberal British official gave to the inquiries of an American about the significance of some Malayan Indians who, with-

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

out being embarrassed by the lack of a following, were quite impassionately vocal in their criticisms of some deli­ cate and complex operations of government. This official said, "They are our Senator McCarthys." Thus, at a time when the potentially articulate spokes­ men in Malaya are beginning to formulate political views appropriate for those who feel themselves uprooted from their old traditions and unsure of what the new ones should be, there are extremely heavy pressures on them to express themselves according to the standards fundamental to a highly rational system of government. If they appear to be too "irrational" and too "disruptive," then they lose any chance of having influence on the policy-makers, and in turn soon lose their capacity to command popular sup­ port. On the other hand, if they conform to the rational standards of government and operate according to the ad­ ministrative pattern of politics, they are likely to isolate themselves from the masses and fail to perform the task of articulating political views that can be meaningful for a people in transition. The very degree to which reason can influence administrative decisions makes it unneces­ sary and even at times disadvantageous to stir up popular support for matters than can be calmly talked over with the appropriate officials. With respect to questions in which popular sentiments are important, the orientation of the administrators is such that they are likely to distrust the views of the potential politicians and put their faith in the considered opinions of those whose welfare is most directly affected by the issue at hand. For broader opinions, many of them would probably prefer to rely on such devices as public opinion polls. It is certain, however, that a society cannot identify its values, its issues, and all shades of true public opinion without those who would be its politicians. This conflict between the role of the administrator and that of the politician is to be expected in a country at Malaya's stage of political development; it exists in most of the recently independent nations of Asia. With self-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

government, Malaya will no doubt face a period of adjust­ ment which will find many of its citizens who have devel­ oped the skills of the administrator losing out to those who succeed in commanding popular political support. However, it is essential to recognize that the struggle against Communism must eventually be fought out at the political level. It is true that in the short run the adminis­ trative capacities of an efficient governmental machine can check and render ineffectual the power of the Commu­ nists. However, in time this will not be enough, especially if there is a real prospect of a decline in the efficiency of administration with the realization of self-government. It is all too easy to fall back on the simple belief that when a society achieves self-government, forces are released which make it possible for the country to muddle through in its resistance to Communism. Indeed, if our theory is correct that the real basis of the Communist appeal in un­ derdeveloped countries is the sense of rootlessness of people separated from their traditional ways and unable to realize their ambitions according to new ones, the post-colonial period may prove to be the time when the appeals of Com­ munism are the greatest. Possibly the real struggle against Communism is still to occur in countries like India, Burma, and Indonesia. It must be emphasized that this is not an argument which can be used to justify any delay in the ending of colonial­ ism, for if there is any unnecessary delay unsurmountable difficulties would be created. The point is that the West should not feel that it will solve all problems and shed all responsibilities simply by writing "finis" to the era of colo­ nialism. It is possibly the ethnocentrism of the West that gives rise to the assumption that this can be done and that all subsequent difficulties can be ascribed to the "legacy of colonialism." To assume this is both to miss the basic problem and to adopt a patronizing attitude toward Asians by regarding them as insensitive to the realities of their societies. It is to fail to recognize that the West, because of

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

all that is associated with a modern way of life, will con­ tinue to cast a haunting shadow on less developed societies that are composed of intelligent and ambitious people. Certainly, one of the great human tragedies of the present time is the fact that individuals can become reasonably acculturated far faster than societies can be reconstituted. A person can aspire to participate in activities and perform roles which his society is as yet incapable of supporting except in quite marginal respects. The possibilities of reducing the extent and the dimen­ sions of this problem in any society in transition seem to depend upon the availability, first, of political ideas or theories which are relevant to the actual condition and, second, of the institutional or organizational arrangements that can provide a basis for furthering such ideas. By politi­ cal theories, nothing more is meant than patterns of po­ litical thought and behavior which are appropriate to the social problems common to a people in the process of sharp cultural change. However, realistic plans and ideas are not enough; there must also be a basis for group action that can enable the individual to see that his own efforts have effect and that he can realize personal status and security. We found ample evidence in the case of the SEP's that the very structure of Communism met many of their needs and that it gave them an opportunity to feel that they could realize personally meaningful objectives. The simple exist­ ence of such alternative opportunities for political action can in itself be a powerful factor in destroying much of the attraction of Communism. It is particularly important to recognize that in the politi­ cal struggle against the appeals of Communism there is a need for both counter-ideas and counter-organizations. For ideas to have a political force, they must be supported by some form of organization. As we have seen in the case of the SEP's, the attractions of Communism lie not only in its ideology and its propaganda but also in the fact that it appears to be a "going concern." The peculiar combina-

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

tion of a high degree of opportunistic behavior and an almost fanatical support of Communism which the SEP's manifested cannot be understood without recognizing the significance of an organizational structure for political action. Strangely enough, it is often the pragmatic West­ erner, and especially the American, who assumes that it is simply the grip of elaborate ideas or ideologies which accounts for political fanaticism. Among other reasons, this may be the case because fanaticism often suggests to us religiosity and hence the power of a theology. However, it should be apparent from such recent examples as the Nazis and the Japanese in World War II and the Com­ munist prisoners in Korea that with the destruction of an organizational basis for behavior, the strength of ideo­ logical beliefs can melt away. Indeed, in these cases, it turned out that most of those who had been capable of making great sacrifices in the name of grand ideologies actually comprehended little of and cared less for all the details and subtleties of those ideologies. The danger of assuming that the fanaticism of the Communists can be explained solely by their total system of beliefs is that it can lead to the conclusion that the only way to counter the challenge of Communism is to build up an equally fanat­ ical support for a democratic system of beliefs. From this can easily follow the attitude that all who do not seem to display the same intensity of conviction are not really opposing Communism, and this is only one step removed from considering them subversive to the cause of freedom. Unless those who believe strongly in the power of ideas can recognize the real and yet limited role that ideologies play in political life, they are likely to find themselves sup­ porting illiberal conclusions. For us to try to engage the Communists in a struggle of ideas in the underdeveloped areas of the world without contributing to the organizational basis of democratic ideas and beliefs is to court failure. On the other hand, if all the potential groups that now exist in these societies can see

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

that they can play a significant role, it seems likely that out of them may develop the political ideas that will be the most meaningful for the peoples of such societies. The West can do much to help in this process of political growth by assisting these groups to meet the needs of their potential supporters. If such a development is to take place, the matter of first priority must be to ensure that speculations about the outcome of violence cease to play such an important part in determining the behavior of large numbers of Asians. This means in particular that it must be made clear that any Communist resort to violence will be met and defeat­ ed. We should not forget that from India to the Philip­ pines, wherever countries in Southeast Asia have been given the opportunity to build up other defenses against Com­ munism, the opportunity has in each case followed from successful military opposition to the initial Communist challenge. Westerners should be able to appreciate why the political leaders in these countries have been anxious to minimize the roles that their armies have played and have stressed instead their welfare programs—programs that can win popular support and hence elections. It may be more difficult for Westerners to appreciate the relation­ ship of violence to political development, since we tend to assume that violence represents the last resort, the ex­ treme measure, and not the norm or the frequent occur­ rence; the soldier and the policeman belong on the pe­ riphery of politics and are to be called upon only when all else fails. However, the very nature of the Communist ap­ peal in societies involved in a process of rapid social change suggests that the use of force should be conceived of as an integral part of any counter-policy. If it is true that to a great extent the attraction of Com­ munism is related to profound social changes affecting the basic values of a society, it follows that the unambiguous character of violence is likely to be a matter of the first importance in decisions about whether or not to support

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

Communism. In a situation in which the old norms have lost their hold for many people, the fact that one side or another is likely to win in a test of force may be the only bench mark that these people can use in calculating what their own behavior should be. This is particularly true if violence and war played a major role in weakening the old norms which had provided a basis for prediction. We have already observed the peculiar place of violence in both the theories and the practices of Communism in underdevel­ oped areas. We have also noted that considerations of physical force were fundamental to the political views of the SEP's and that these considerations played a great part in determining their relationships with Communism. With respect to the problem of devising military tech­ niques to handle the Communist use of violence, it is un­ fortunate that so little attention has been given to the lessons that can be found in the Malayan experience. The scant publicity that has been given the struggle in Malaya has quite rightly been mainly devoted to the hardships and sacrifices of those who have fought in the thankless jungle campaigns. However, this has meant that some very sig­ nificant developments in the conduct of a type of warfare which may in the future become more rather than less frequent have not received general recognition. In par­ ticular, the Malayan experience has demonstrated that technological superiority does provide many advantages in the waging of guerrilla operations, a kind of warfare for which it is often assumed that a modern army is ill-pre­ pared. It would be wrong to believe that the great costs of the Emergency in resources and manpower have fol­ lowed simply from the nature of the military problem. To a large extent, the reasons why Malaya has made such heavy investments in the campaign against the Communists are to be found in the administrative orientation of her leaders. They have set for the country the highest stand­ ards of law and order. Indeed, just as colonial govern­ ments have often introduced a degree of rationality in the

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

administration of public affairs that is not matched in other spheres of life, so have they usually insisted on a level of law and order that is far above that common to such societies. At present, Malaya regards as intolerable a degree of lawlessness and weakening of administrative control that is conspicuously lower than that which is acceptable to the governments of some of her neighbors. Although the administrative orientation of Malayan of­ ficials may make them less than appreciative of the role of the politician, it is clear that their outlook does not cause them to underestimate the effects that widespread violence can have on the prospects for stable political de­ velopment. If it should become increasingly clear that Communism is not likely to achieve further successes through military action, it may be possible in such a climate of physical security for new considerations to become the basis of the political calculations of those who have been exposed to Communism. With the introduction of a new frame of reference, the choices that determine political behavior are likely to follow a different pattern. Alternatives to Com­ munism are likely to be more apparent and more attrac­ tive, and it will be possible for people to turn with more confidence to numerous kinds of informal groups and quasi-political organizations which can more nearly meet their actual social needs than can Communism. Were this to happen in countries like Malaya, the con­ ditions might exist for a more coherent political process. If many of the social concerns of the people could be adequately met by informal associations, their spirit of restlessness would no longer be such a major factor in creating political instability. Instead, national leaders would then be able to concentrate on matters of public policy and devote their efforts to resolving conflicts among the interests of the various local groups. With informal leaders providing a better answer to the private problems of people, it would be easier for the national leaders to

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

discern those problems which should legitimately demand their attention because they can be handled only at the national level. Politicians would then be able to build up their power on a solid basis by working out mutually satis­ fying relations with particular informal leaders. They could thus become truly representative leaders. As a result, they might feel less compelled to seek indiscriminate popu­ lar support by employing, in the main, emotional appeals which neither clarify the political issues of the society nor provide the intellectual basis for solving real problems. They might thus be less inclined to rely on symbolic and purely expressional activities which by their nature en­ courage more emotionalism than reason and which often lead to that kind of nationalism which is practically de­ void of patriotism. With respect to the problem of political development in Malaya, we are now privileged to observe a remarkable experiment in political engineering as the Federation gov­ ernment enters a period of constitutional changes. The initiation of popular elections for a majority of the mem­ bers of the Legislative Council has already significantly al­ tered the character of Malayan politics. Malayans can now calculate more accurately the political strength of their infant parties and factions. At the same time, the intro­ duction of elections has eliminated many participants who were cluttering the political stage and shouting their lines so loudly as nearly to drown out the voices of the main actors. Most important of all, however, the agreement to measure relative political power by popular appeal before the advent of national independence has forced those who would be political leaders to try to communicate their views to the broadest possible audience and not just to their friends, in and out of government. The arena for national political debate has thus been defined, and ad­ mission to this arena depends upon a readiness to back up one's views with serious political effort. Stable par-

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

ticipants in the political process can now be distinguished from the sporadic, the marginal, and the frivolous. At the same time, the newly elected members of the Legislative Council will be put to the test of trying to ful­ fill one of the most complex roles known to politics: that of bridging the gap between the sphere of governmental administration and the arena of national public debate. They will have to perceive clearly the problems of national policy as well as the demands, aspirations, and pretensions of their constituents. The role they are called upon to per­ form is difficult enough in any society that relies upon representative institutions; it is peculiarly difficult in Ma­ laya because at this time, as we have noted, there are so few reliable guides as to the priority of values and the lines of reasoning of public opinion. If these political leaders are to avoid becoming simply spokesmen for the administrative officials or purely negativistic, harping critics of govern­ ment, they must find the devices whereby they can sound out the less articulate political forces in the society. In particular, they must be ready to use their still frail po­ litical parties to seek out the successful leaders of the numerous sub-communities and potential interest groups and bring them into the open political process. In doing this, however, they must not become the captives of any interest group if Malaya is to have a truly representative system of government. Given the inchoate state of popular politics in Malaya, it is all too easy to make pretentious claims of representativeness: too often the accepted cre­ dentials have been simply a man's racial origin and how he spells his name. In this situation, it is not unlikely that some of those elected to the Legislative Council will forget that in a representative system their paramount task must be that of performing a fundamental bargaining role. To carry out this role they will have to develop and maintain communications with all significant political elements, in­ cluding the administrative officials; and then, guided by the logic implicit in democratic values, they will have to

III. THE INDIVIDUALS

act as negotiators among those advancing political de­ mands. To the extent that they manage this role success­ fully, Malaya can hope for the development of a coherent political process which will do justice to the political de­ mands of her people while maintaining an effective sys­ tem of public administration. The plural character of Malayan society may not be as great a deterrent to her political growth as might at first seem to be the case. It is not that racial tensions do not exist; on the contrary, her peoples are not likely soon to forget their racial and cultural differences. However, it may be that precisely because the communal problem is so conspicuous, her leaders will recognize that the function of politics is not only to further common objectives but also to accommodate differences. Thus, they are possibly less apt to lose contact with political reality by striving for the single value of independence while ignoring the basic questions that divide them. To date, the balance of the races has been a major factor in preventing any charis­ matic leader from arising and sweeping the country along an irrational course. Instead, Malayan leaders have sought to resolve their internal problems even as they are working for self-government. This could mean that Malaya will achieve independence with a far more stable and effective form of politics than some of the other countries in South­ east Asia, who won their independence without first com­ ing to a fundamental consensus as to what the character of their future political life should be. Paradoxically, Singapore, in spite of its more homo­ geneous and more sophisticated population, may be faced with greater problems as it begins to operate under a popularly elected Chief Minister. In large measure this is due to an odd demographic phenomenon: over half the population of that urban island is now under voting age. In a few years, it will be an extraordinarily young elec­ torate which determines Singapore's political life. In the meantime, a large proportion of Singapore's youth is

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

crowded into sub-standard and undisciplined schools. We have already seen in the case of the SEP's the consequences of exposure to schools which teach few skills of any career value and in which the only means of expressing youthful enthusiasms is political agitation. It would seem only pru­ dent for Singapore to make a considerable investment in a healthier school system. As it is now, the Singapore schools are the most likely spot through which the MCP may be able to break out of its isolation. In these schools, as the students are exposed to praise of Communist China, a testing process is now going on to find new cadres for the MCP. As the products of this indoctrination spill out from the schools and begin to affect the labor movement, it may in time become impossible to check them before they have seriously impaired all the efforts to create a sense of democratic community in the Federation of Malaya. If the Malayan leaders of all races can face up squarely to the questions that divide them, they will be able to go far in helping to realize Sir Gerald Templer's three great ambitions for Malaya. As General Templer repeatedly told his staff, Britain has the opportunity in Malaya of seeing through a successful transfer of power that is not accom­ panied by, first, violence and bloodshed; second, a decline in the efficiency with which the government can serve the people and their interests; and, finally—and most im­ portant of all—a decline in the standard of living of any appreciable group in the society. If, indeed, Malaya were to avoid these pitfalls, there would be little need for con­ cern over the possibility that the elation which naturally comes with independence will subsequently be deflated by frustrations and dissatisfactions. As a further result, the Communists would be isolated in the jungle by far more than just military means.

INDEX Abegg, Lily, 125η adjustment of SEP's, to party, 24868; to demands of discipline, 251-56; to self-criticism, 256-59; to exhortations, 260-62 Adloff, Richard, 48η, 51η Atimin, 48 Almond, Gabriel A., 6, 30η, 222n, 223, 234, 288η American Communist Party, 6, 8 Amnesty, Declaration of, 107 Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS), 63-64, 235 Anti-Japanese Union (AJU), 66 armed struggle, in Communist doctrine, 29-30; MCP use of, 84, 86, 269-70 Asian Communist parties, begin­ nings, 17-20; early leadership, 21; Lenin's instructions to, 2526; and use of violence, 27-32; bureaucratic nature, 32; and use of united fronts, 33-39. See also Communist doctrine, People's Liberation Communism, and individual parties Asia Youth Conference, 83 authoritarianism in MCP, 272-76 authority, nature of, to SEP's, 27780 Awbery, S. S., 76η Banishment Ordinance, 61, 64 bases. Communist military, 30-32. See also "liberated areas" Batu Caves, 66n Benda, Harry J., 20η benevolent associations, Chinese, 52, 162, 172, 349 Bolshevik Revolution, see Russian Revolution Bolshevism, essence of, 18. See also Communist doctrine Borneo,121 bourgeoisie, see Communist doc­ trine

Branch Committees, see Malayan Communist Party Brazier, John, 77η British Communist Party, 6, 8 British officials, perception of, by SEP's, 201-7; attitudes of, toward Malaya, 351-55 British policy in Malaya, 12-13, 351-54; toward immigration, 5657; during Emergency, 103-6 Burmese Communist Party, 33 Captured Enemy Personnel (CEP), 117-18 career opportunities, as aspect of MCP membership, 32, 79-80, 238-39, 325; of SEP's, 211-13 Carr, Ε. H., 23η, 36η casualties, of Japanese in Malaya, 69; of Communists during Emer­ gency, 109η Central Committee, 59, 81, 83, 86, 281. See also Malayan Commu­ nist Party, Politburo Chapman, F. Spencer, 66n, 67, 68η, 70η, 2ign Ch'en Po-ta, 26η, 2gn Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 18 Chiang Kai-shek, 78, 271, 278 childhood of SEP's, 140-42 China-born SEP's, 121 China Relief Fund, 63 Chinese, number of, in Malaya, 12, 54η; economic role, is; com­ munity in Malaya, 51-55, 65, 7879; and MCP, 51-55, 103-4, 109η, 228-29; immigrants in Malaya, 52*53 Chinese Communist Party, 11, 26, 31η, 5i, 62, 95, 183, i88 Chinese culture, 52-55, 125-26, 141η, 143, i9>. 213· 2i9n Chinese nationalists, see Kuomintang Chinese politics, traditional pat­ tern of, 172-73, 186

INDEX Chinese Revolution,

26,

29,

51,

228-29

Chinese schools in Malaya, 54, 7475 Chin Kee Onn, 65η Chin Peng, 85, 107-8 Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, 18 colonialism, g, 350-54 Cominform, 83 Comintern, 20η, 52, 58 communications, in MCP, 100; and politics, 177-81 Communist doctrine, on "colonies and semi-colonies," 5, 19, 23-26, 32> 34-39; and Asian parties, 18-21; on imperialism, 23-24, 35; on feudalism, 24, 35; on national bourgeoisie, 24, 35-36; on petty bourgeoisie, 24, 38-39; on class struggle, 24-25, 34; on use of violence, 27-30; on alliances, 3339; on proletariat, 35, 40; on peasants, 36-37; on bourgeoisdemocratic revolution, 39-40; perception of, by SEP's, 222-26, 303-4. See also armed struggle, democratic centralism, ethics of Communism, Marxism-Leninism, People's Liberation Com­ munism Communist International, Second Congress of, 19. See also Com­ intern Communist parties, types of, 4-6, g; in West, 6, 8. See also Asian Communist parties and indi­ vidual parties Communists, former Malayan Chinese, see Surrendered Enemy Personnel Communist Terrorist (CT), 88n Communist Youth League, 51 Confucianism, 37, 176 corruption, in MCP, 80-81, 336-38; in Chinese politics, 172-73 Dalley, F. W., 76η democratic centralism 273-74

in

MCP

discipline, in Asian parties, 32; in MCP, 251-56 disaffection, 324-38; and MCP policies, 324-25; and source of doubts, 325-36; and time of doubt, 325-27; and status con­ flicts, 329-34; and sense of selfsacrifice, 335-36; reaction after, 338-42 District Committees, see Malayan Communist Party Eden, Anthony, 84η education of SEP's, 149-54 elections, Malayan, 13, 360-62 Emergency, 47; declaration of, 89-90; MCP during, 91-108 Erikson, Erik H., 277η ethics of Communism, 41-42, 28990. 345 exhortation, MCP use of, 260-62 Ex-Service Comrades' Association, 74 Fainsod, Merle, 36η family relations of SEP's, 143-49 fatalism of SEP's, 158 Federation of Malaya, 12-13. $ also Malaya former Malayan Chinese Com­ munists, see Surrendered Enemy Personnel French Communist Party, 6 friendships of SEP's, 147-49, 311-15 front groups, 60-62, 73-79, 218-21; membership in, by SEP's, 173-75

ee

General Trade Union, 6o, 75-77 Gent, Sir Edward, 84η geography and Communist strat­ egy. 3°-32 government of Federation of Malaya, perception of, by SEP's, 201-7. See also British policy in Malaya guerrilla warfare, and Communist doctrine, 28-32; MCP failure in, 95-102; British use of, 96-97, 358 Gurkhas, 97η

INDEX Hanrahan, Gene Z.,

48η, 52η, 66η,

69

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), 299 Home Guards, 97η Hyderabad, 33 ideology, role of Communist, 35556. See also Communist doc­ trine, Marxism-Leninism Imperialism, the. Highest Stage of Capitalism, 23 Indian Communist Party, 33, 106 Indian Immigration Fund, 56 Indians, number of, in Malaya, 12, 56-57; as immigrants, 56-58; and MCP, 56-58 Indonesian Communist Party, 20η, 33, 48, io6 initiation ritual in MCP, 244-47 intellectuals and Communism, 54, 151-52 internationalism of MCP, 281-88 Iskra, 19 Italian Communist Party, 6 Japanese casualties in Malaya, 69 Japanese occupation of Malaya, 11, 47, 64-65

Kampong Guards, 97η knowledge and political power, relation of, to SEP's, 191-92 Korean War, 109, 287, 307η Kuomintang, 28, 51, 54, 63, 78, 95, 162, 183, 188

labor contractors, Chinese, 55 labor unions, see trade unions Lai Teck, 66n, 83-85 Legislative Council, 13, 360-61 Lenin, 19, 222; on Asia, 19-20, 41; on peasants, so, 36η; on im­ perialism, 23-24; on "colonies and semi-colonies," 23-26, 36η; on use of violence, 29; on party, 39; views of, held by SEP's, 290-9»

"liberated areas," Communist, 38. 86 Liu Shao-ch'i, 30η

30-

MacDonald, Malcolm, 84η, 88 Malaya, strategic location, 11; size, 12; population, 12; political de­ velopment, 350-54, 359-63 Malayan Chinese, see Chinese Malayan Chinese Association, 108 Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 3. 9. 11» 33; and Chinese commu­ nity, 47, 78-79, 102-4; as illegal party, 47-49; origins, 48-49, 51-52; and Malays, 49-51; and Indians, 56-58; organization, 5860, go-92, 105-6; during Japanese occupation, 64-70; use of front groups, 73-79, 218-21; and labor, 75-79; as employer, 79-81; size, 80; and planning, 99-101; seek­ ing end of armed struggle, 104-8; recruiting practices, 199-200, 231-32, 235, 240-43; initiation ritual, 244-47; duties of mem­ bers, 262-67; policy on personal problems, 309-11; policy on pro­ motions, 315-23 Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), 66-73, 87, 120, 236; combat record, 69; de­ mobilization, 72 Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU), 66-68, 120 Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA), 87; size, 91; organiza­ tion, 90-92; daily routine, 91-94; military operations, 95-102 Malayan Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, 51 Malayans, definition of, 12 Malays, number of, in Malaya, 12; and Communism, 49-50; attitudes toward, of SEP's, 20710

Mandate of Heaven, 194 Mao Tse-tung, 29, 95, 96, 229, 278, 281, 288

99, 222,

INDEX Marshall, David, 108 Marx, 221; on Asia, 22-24; views of, held by SEP's, 290-91 Marxism-Leninism, 17, 18; lec­ tures on, in MCP, 93; knowledge of, by SEP's, 222-26; training in, of SEP's, 292, 297-502. See also Communist doctrine, Lenin, Marx militancy, of Asian parties, 27-30; of MCP members, 269-72 military power, and imperialism, 28; and political behavior in Asia, 28, 357-59 Miller, Harry, 48η, 52η, 66η Min Yuen, 98, 104-5, ,20; organi­ zation, 90-91; size, 98 Mitrany, D. L., 23η Moore, Barrington, 36η Moscow, 18, 20tl, si, 43> 83 Mosely, Philip E., 84η mutual criticism sessions in MCP, 94, 250, 256-59 Myro, V., 31η

for SEP's, 170-71, 178, 195-96, 309. 3»3-J8, 321-23 Philippine Communist Party, 33 Politburo, 100, 105 political sessions in MCP, 40, 29495. 304-7 politicians, role of, in Malaya, 35¾62 popularity, quest for, by SEP's, 147-48, 316 Proletarian Art League, 60 promotion in MCP, 315-23 propaganda, role of, in politics, 182-87; on goals of party, 22634; interest in, of SEP's, 263-65 Purcell, Victor, 48η Putsch-ism, 32

October Revolution, see Russian Revolution Onraet, Rene, 48η, 5211 Orgburo, 59

Racial Bureau, 59 Racial Emancipation League, 60 racial identity, sense of, of SEP's, 207-10, 228-29 Rahman, Tengku Abdul, 107-8 Red October, see Russian Revolu­ tion religion of SEP's, 154-56 Riesman, David, 135η Roy, Manabendra, 36η rubber industry in Malaya, 12 rumor as source of information for SEP's, 178-83 Russia, 42, 286-88 Russian Revolution, 17, 51, 22829, 286

Pacific War, 28 Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, 76 People's Liberation Communism, 3, 22; characteristics, 7-9, 27-43; and use of violence, 27-30; and geographical dimension, 30-32; and recklessness, 32-33; and united fronts, 33-39; and in­ doctrination, 39-40; source of strength, 34¾-45 personal problems, MCP policy toward, 309-11 personal relations, importance of,

schools, Chinese, 54, 149-54, 21011, 362-63; political discussions in. 175-77 Schwartz, Benjamin J., 37n-38n Second Congress of the Commu­ nist International, 19 Second World War, 11 secret societies, Chinese, 47, 52, 162, 172 Security Forces, 95-98 self-criticism, in Communist doc­ trine, 39; sessions in MCP, 94, 250, 256-59

nationalism of SEP's, 284-88 New Democratic Youth League, 74, 120 North, Robert C., 36η

INDEX self-government, Malayan, 13,

106,

343. 353-55

Sharkey, Lawrence, 84 Sharpley, Cecil H., 84η Shop Assistants' Section, 59 Singapore, 363; population, 12 Sino-Japanese War, 47, 62-64, 183 Sino-Russian relations, 287 Smith, Τ. E., 54η Southeast Asia, Communist parties of, 11 Southeast Asia Command, 70 Special Constabulary, 97 Special Operational Volunteer Force, 117-18 Stalin, 26, 29, 38η, 42, 222, 278η, 28i, 288; views of, held by SEP's, 290-91

State Committees, see Malayan Communist Party strikes, MCP-directed, 60 students, 38, 54, 59-Θ0, 63-64, 210-11

Students' Division, 60-61 Subakat, 48 Sumatra, 49, 121 Sun Yat-sen, 51 Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP's), definition, 117-18; sam­ ple interviewed, 119-24; mode of reasoning, 124-27; socio-eco­ nomic status, 128-29, childhood, 140-42, family relations, 143-49; education, 149-54; religion, 15456; parents' politics, 162-63; introduction to politics, 168-77; basis of political involvement, 195-97; sense of racial identity, 207-10; occupations, 210-11; career expectations, 211-13; marital status, 213-14; service in front groups, 218-20; and Communist doctrine, 222-26; views of MCP propaganda, 22634; relations with recruiters, 240-43; reaction to ritual, 24346; and party discipline, 25156; and self-criticism, 256-59; and exhortations of leaders,

duties in MCP, 262-67; views of West, 282-84; concept of authority, 277-86; views of Russia, 286-88; knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, 297-302; after leaving MCP, 339-42 surrenders, rate of, 108-9; implica­ tions for MCP, 115-17; implica­ tions for British, 115, 117 260-62;

Tamils, see Indians Tamin, Djamaludin, 48 Tan, Sir Chenglock, 108 Tan Malaka, 48 Teller, Judd L., 23η Templer, Sir Gerald, 102, 103η, 109, 3^3 terrorism, MCP use of, 95, 102-6 Thompson, Virginia, 48η, 51η tin industry in Malaya, 12 towkays, 65 trade unions in Malaya, 59-62, 75-

79. 349

Traitor Elimination Corps, 252 Trotsky, 21, 26 underdeveloped countries, Com­ munism in, 3, 343-45; character of politics, 10, 346-48, 354-55, 359. See also Communist doc­ trine, People's Liberation Com­ munism underemployment, consequences of, for SEP's, 214-17 united front, 33-39, 51, 62-64 violence, and Communist doc­ trine, 27-30; in politics, 164; importance of, for SEP's, 187-89 Weakland, John H., 101η West, relations of, with Asia, 3-4, 7; attitudes toward, of SEP's, 282-84

Whiting, Allen S., 36η Wittfogel, Karl Α., 23η Wolfe, Bertram D., 36η working class in Malaya, 55 Wright, see Lai Teck