The bloc that failed : Soviet - East European relations in transition 9780253205612, 0253205611, 9780253325310, 0253325315

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THE BLOC THAT FAILED

Soviet-East European Relations in Transition

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Charles Gati

THE BLOC THAT FAILED Soviet-East European Relations in Transition

Published in association with the Center for Strategic

and International Studies,

Washington, D.C.

Indiana University Press

Bloomington

&

Indianapolis

c 1990 by Charles Gati All rights reserved part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses' Resolution on Permissions

No

constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,

Manufactured

in the

ANSI Z39.48-1984.

United States of America

Library of Congress Ca taloging-in-Publication Data Gati, Charles.

The bloc that failed Soviet-East European relations in transition / Charles cm. p. :

Gati.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-253-32531-5

(alk. paper).

alk. 1.

— — —

— ISBN 0-253-20561-1 (pbk.

:

paper)

—

Europe, Eastern Foreign relations Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Foreign relations Europe, Eastern, 3. Europe, Eastern Foreign relations 1945- 4. Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Union

—

I.

DJ45.S65G37 327.47— dc20

Title.

1990

89-36971 CIP 1

2

3

4

5

94

93

92

91

90

To Daniel and Adrienne, with love for what they are and envy for what they can be

CONTENTS PREFACE

IX

Part One: Looking I.

Back

STALIN AND SOCIALISM IN Strange Bedfellows, 3 9

I

Early Problems, 13

I

ization,

18

I

What Did

ONE REGION

3

Satellization, I

Soviet-

Stalin Achieve?

23 II.

FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO CHERNENKO: AN OVERVIEW Post-Stalin Soviet Concerns, 29

29 I

Recasting Policy toward Eastern Europe,

32

I

Yugoslavia and National

nism, 35

I

Commu-

Crises in the Bloc: Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, Poland (1956-81), 39

I

From Khrushchev to Chernenko: What Changed? What Didn't? 55 Part Two: III.

The Era of Reform, 1985-88

POLITICAL RELATIONS

65

The Early Gorbachev Era: Cure or Relief? 65 I The Gradual Demise of the "Brezhnev Doctrine, " 71 I The Institutional Framework, 79 I The Ties They Are A-Changin 87 I Summing Up, 99 ,

Contents

viii

IV

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

104

The Elusive Concept of Socialism, 104 I The Urgency of Change, 106 I The Economics and Politics of Trade, 113 I Why CMEA Does Not Work, 124 I Summing Up and Looking Ahead, 132

V MILITARY RELATIONS

136

Whom?

136 I The East European Militaries, 143 I Causes of Tension in Military Relations, 147 I Gorbachev's Choices, 150 I Courting Trouble, 154 Defense against

Part Three:

The Era of Revolutionary Change, Since 1988

VI.

MOSCOW RETREATS

161

From Reform to Revolution, 161 From Poland to Romania, 167 I

I

Summing

Up, 185 VII.

THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF EASTERN EUROPE The Soviet Factor, 191 Prospects, 197

appendix:

A

Soviet

I

View

I

191

East European

Western Concerns, 201 of Eastern

SOURCES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING INDEX

Europe

205

220 223

Preface

revolution swept each of the six Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe in 1988-89. The dramatic events began somewhat gradually in Poland and in Hungary, then continued in rapid succession during the fall and early winter of 1989 in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and finally Romania. Amazingly, the region's old communist guard stepped aside, peacefully, except in Romania where a tragic and gruesome civil war claimed hundreds and perhaps thousands of lives. Equally surprising is that the East European revolutions have far outstripped the reforms Mikhail S. Gorbachev introduced in the Soviet Union. This will lead to increased popular demand for more drastic and comprehensive changes within the Soviet Union itself in the 1990s. With Moscow unwilling to use force to protect the East European communist parties from their own people, these unpopular and mostly corrupt parties have lost their monopoly of power. Popular expectations in all six

countries cal

now

Warsaw Pact

suggest a desire to adopt Western-style politi-

and economic

institutions

and

practices. Thus, the Soviet

has existed since Stalin has in effect disintegrated; the countries of Eastern Europe are now on their own. With the collapse of the region's one-party communist regimes, the first stage of Eastern Europe's remarkable revolu-

bloc as

it

which will involve the creand economic pluralism, ation of new will take several years. The third stage will be an even slower process, during which a variety of internal measures and intion has ended.

The second

stage,

institutions of political

ternational guarantees will consolidate the gains of the revolution, allowing Eastern

munity of nations.

Europe

to rejoin the

European com-

.

Preface

x

When these stages of the revolutionary process will pass now be known; predictions about the region's more

cannot

more East Euroof the enormous

distant future remain hazardous. In one or

pean countries even a partial reversal changes of 1988 and 1989 is conceivable; revolutions tend to produce new problems and spark new uncertainties. I examine these uncertainties throughout this book, particularly in Part III, where I consider the key questions they raise for the final decade of this century. The first set of questions concerns Soviet policy in Eastern Europe:

1

How will Moscow define the new threshold of Soviet

tolerance toward Eastern Europe?

Can

the example of

Soviet-Finnish relations serve as a model for Soviet-East

European relations? Can there be an Eastern Europe that in its relations with the Soviet Union is cordial but not subservient, independent but not inhospitable, and thus influenced but not dominated by its large and powerful neighbor?

On what means

Union rely in order Europe? As it withdraws its forces from the region, as the East European economies turn West, and as Marxist-Leninist ideology ceases to underlie common policy and joint action, will the Soviet Union become but a "pitiful giant" to its closest 2.

will the Soviet

to exert influence over Eastern

neighbors?

Moscow permit East Germany, the keystone of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's leading trading 3.

Will

partner, to enjoy free choice in domestic policy

eign relations as well?

If so, will

and

for-

the next decade witness

the establishment of a reunited or otherwise reassociated

Europe and the cold war thus end and Europe become one, with its eastern and western parts living peaceably in what Gorbachev has called a "common European home"?

Germany? Will

4.

the division of

Will the upsurge of national assertiveness in East-

—

.

Preface

xi

ern Europe hasten the efforts of the nations of the So-

Union

viet

— from Estonia to the Ukraine to Armenia more autonomous existence under Soviet

to press for a

demand complete independence? In either how will Moscow respond to nationalist chal-

rule or to case,

lenges to

its

authority?

Poland but deny 5.

If

it

Can

it

grant independence to

to Lithuania?

the Soviet leadership resorts to the use of mas-

sive force either within the borders of the Soviet

or in Eastern Europe,

how

perestroika, glasnost,

and Gorbachev's own

will

it

Union

affect the future of

political

life? 6.

If,

for

whatever reason, Gorbachev

fails,

will the

end of his rule stall or reverse the trend toward cal and economic pluralism in Eastern Europe? Of course, much depends on developments rope

itself.

in Eastern

Eu-

Uncertainties over the prospects within Eastern

Europe center around a second 1

politi-

set of questions:

Will the region's crumbling

internal security forces

acquiesce in their

communist

parties

and

— the KGBs of Eastern Europe

own demise without attempting

either

a comeback or at least a bid to sabotage the transition to predominantly Western values and institutions?

—

2. Will the emerging mixed economies state-owned and free-market succeed and economic performance improve so that free, Western-style democracies can take root? If not, will frustration and despair prompt the peoples of Eastern Europe to escape from freedom and em-

—

brace populist, nationalist, or military rule drift 3.

—or

even

toward anarchy? Will the end of Soviet domination of Eastern Eu-

rope lead to the escalation of old nationalist rivalries as between

Romania and Hungary, or between Poland

and Germany,

for

example?

— Preface

xii

4.

Will any of the region's countries withdraw from the

Warsaw Pact and opt for neutrality? Will they give up their membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and seek to join Western economic institutions? Finally, a third set of questions addresses the role

West in general

and that of the United States

of the

in particular:

1. How should the West help to make permanent the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?

2.

Will the redefinition of the role, or the possible dis-

solution, of the affect

Warsaw Pact

Western security?

its allies

will the

United States and

protect their security interests

threat to Western 3.

—and therefore of NATO

How

How

Europe appears

to

when

the Soviet

have diminished?

should the West respond to the unification of

Germany? Should

be directed only by the principle of it be guided also by a historically justified concern over the role a strong Germany might play in European politics? it

national self-determination, or should

Given the magnitude of the problems ahead, it is tempting to draw unduly pessimistic conclusions about the future. Those who are inclined to do so should keep in mind that in 1988 and 1989 the unexpected became the norm in Eastern Europe. Why couldn't Poland and Hungary move from dicta-

democracy in the 1990s in more or less the same and Portugal did in the 1970s and 1980s? Conversely, those impressed by the momentous change that has already taken place may be tempted to draw unduly optimistic conclusions about the future. They should remember that the road ahead is very difficult. History offers too many examples of unfinished revolutions and, alas, failed ones as torship to

way

as Spain

well.

Because of the uncertainties of the

moment — because

this

Preface

book

is

times

—

I

xiii

an assessment in the midst of such fast-changing have selected as the subtitle "Soviet-East European

Relations in Transition." Part

One reviews

the evolution of Soviet policy in Eastern

Europe from Stalin to Chernenko. Part Two examines the "early" Gorbachev reform era (1985-88) and its effect on Eastern Europe. Part Three considers the revolutionary upsurge of 1988-89 the extraordinary events of the recent past that will shape the future of Europe, East and West. The three

—

chapters in Part

Two

that deal with the reformist, pre- 1989

Gorbachev era are written largely is

partly because

some

in the present tense. This

of the information they contain

pertinent, partly because

is still

most of Part Two was drafted

prior to or during the 1989 revolutions.

I

just

kept the present

tense in order to stress the dramatic difference between the

and the revolutionary develmy main purpose is to explain pass and to examine their implica-

early Gorbachev era of 1985-88

opments since then. Indeed,

how

these events

came

to

tions for the rest of this century.

I

am

pleased to acknowledge the generous financial sup-

port of the Ford Foundation and of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Grants received from

two sources were initiated and administered by the Soviet and East European Studies Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. Successive directors of the program, Thane Gustafson and Stephen Sestanovich, nudged me along in a friendly but persistent way. Professor Gustafson was also responsible for creating and organizing a study group of leading scholars who reviewed my work over a period of two years and helped clarify what should and what should not be included int his essay. I wish to thank Sarah Terry, who chaired the panel of experts, and my colleagues who participated at its meetings: these

Madeleine Albright, Ed Hewett, Ross Johnson, Andrzej Korbonski, Ronald Linden, and Angela Stent. The coordina-

Preface

xiv tor of the

program

at CSIS, Alice Young,

Claire Rosensen of CSIS I

am

was

helpful all along.

my most able research assistant. my friends Paul Marer and Ivan

was

also indebted to

Volgyes for their detailed critique of an earlier version of

Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, and to students at Georgetown University (where I was a visiting professor in the fall of 1988)

who I

read and evaluated the manuscript.

am

grateful to

Anne Mandelbaum, editor and friend

traordinary, for being there at the end

when

ex-

needed her advice most. I will say it in Slakan, the immortal East European language invented by Malcolm Bradbury and reserved for special occasions: Multo grussi! Any errors of fact and interpretation are, of course, mine. I

January

1,

1990

Part

One

LOOKING BACK

STALIN AND SOCIALISM IN ONE REGION

Strange Bedfellows

—

new terms come into currency or old terms acquire new meanings. Take "Eastern Europe." Before 1945 geographers had seldom identified such a region; when

as times change,

they had, the region so described was the European part of the Soviet Union, the area west of the Ural Mountains. Of the

—

what is now called Eastern Europe, four (East) Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had been recognized to be in Central Europe, while two Romania and Bulgaria in Southeastern Europe (or the Balkans). The map provides ample justification for questioning Eastern Europe as a geographic entity. Look at a map. While six states of

—

—

—

Prague (the capital of Czechoslovakia) is to the northwest of Vienna (the capital of Austria), Czechoslovakia is now said to belong to Eastern Europe and Austria to Western Europe. Curious, isn't it? More confusing yet, in some accounts Greece is now placed in Western Europe despite the fact that it is located to the southeast of every state that has been assigned to Eastern Europe. It doesn't make sense, does it? In terms it certainly does not; yet, politically, the new terminology has served a purpose. The Soviet Union perpetrated a hoax in the aftermath of

of geography,

World War II. When

it

forcibly reoriented the politics

and

eco-

The Bloc That Failed

4

nomics of these six states in Central and Southeastern Europe at that time, it began calling them the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe. Its apparent goal was to make it appear that the Soviet Union had more in common with them than it in fact did. If all seven were in Eastern Europe, did they not all have a common heritage, and hence was it not natural and logical that they should be marching together toward the

same destiny?

—

and despite similarities among the and cultures of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

In point of fact Slavic languages

Poland, and Russia

rope" had not had

— the six countries of "Eastern Eu-

itself

much

common

with their large eastern neighbor or even with one another. For example, their foreign trade had been oriented largely toward Germany, certainly not toward Russia. The political tradition of such Slavic neighbors as the Czechs and the Poles was no more similar than that of the very different Hungarians and Bulgarians. Moreover, though they had all belonged to the sphere of influence of one hegemon or another before World War I, they had in

nonetheless exercised considerable internal autonomy; of

them were particularly

skillful at

some

maneuvering between

such contending empires as the Habsburg Monarchy, Russia, and Prussia, playing off one against the other. Later, between the two world wars and hence on the eve of the communist takeovers, they enjoyed full independence.

In the domestic realm,

it is true that Western-style democon institutionalized pluralism and the merits of diversity, had not taken root in pre-communist Eastern Europe except in Czechoslovakia and Germany. The practice of limiting executive power by constitutional means had remained but a legal fiction. The treatment of national and religious minorities had reflected widespread intolerance toward these minorities' "unusual" habits and life styles. It is revealing that in most languages of the area, then as now, the word "compromise" has always signified something unprincipled and perhaps even shameful.

racy,

with

its

insistence

—

Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

Yet even as they belonged to or operated in the

5

shadow

of

a powerful empire, these transitional or borderland states be-

tween East and West used to have functioning legislatures and indeed very lively and contentious parliamentary debates. As recorded in the parliamentary diaries of Hungary in the late nineteenth century or of Poland and Romania in the interwar years, such debates were also serious and at times significant. The rights of parliament were seldom violated. Within limits, the region's major parties could always be heard in their countries' legislatures. There was also considerable freedom of the press, private enterprise, and religion throughout Eastern Europe during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That these freedoms were not absolute need not be interpreted to mean that they did not exist. Living in what may be called semiauthoritarian environments, Poles and Romanians, Bulgarians and Hungarians enjoyed access to information in their newspapers, pursued individual economic ambitions, and practiced religious beliefs. In short, the pre-communist domestic order in the area no doubt more so in Central Europe than in Southeastern Europe had signified strong parliamentary traditions as well as certain limited freedoms granted by a normally powerful executive. Given the semi-authoritarian tradition of Eastern Europe prior to 1945, it is therefore misleading to speak about a shared heritage and parallel development in Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe. They used to be (and still are)

—

strange bedfellows indeed.

—

It is

equally misleading to suggest

and (at least in 1945) totalitarian Soviet model on fertile soil in Eastern Europe. After all, Poland's political past had been no more authoritarian than Finland's and Hungary's no more authoritarian than Austria's and yet both Finland and Austria have grown to become properly functioning, pluralistic democracies. The postwar evolution of Poland and Hungary on the one hand and Finland and Austria on the other or, indeed, of East and that the harsh

of socialism

fell

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

6

West Germany

—

has had little or nothing to do with their was the imposition of the Soviet pattern on Poland, Hungary, and East Germany and the absence of similar measures against Finland, Austria, and West Germany traditions;

it

that account for their markedly different postwar development. In another sense, however, postwar conditions did favor the extension of Soviet power into the heart of Europe. For it had become clear during the course of several wartime conferences of the allies notably in Teheran (1943), Moscow (1944), and Yalta (1945)— that neither the United States nor Great Britain was prepared to challenge Soviet primacy in Eastern Europe. With the Red Army liberating almost the whole region from Nazi Germany, the West could

one thing,

—

not easily counter Soviet expansion. Also favoring the Soviet side

was the change

political elites

of guard

— throughout

— the extensive turnover of the Eastern Europe. With the ex-

ception of Czechoslovakia, the pre-war regimes, having lost

whatever legitimacy they might have enjoyed previously, had collapsed and hence there was to be no continuity with the past under any circumstances. Moreover, some of the programs that the communists managed to champion did have considerable popular appeal at first. Land reforms proposed and largely implemented by them and their political allies could at least partly neutralize the peasantry in Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere. As even in Western Europe, the nationalization of large banks and industries was another popular issue the communists could promote and claim credit for. They could also stimulate Polish nationalism by identifying themselves with the new Polish-German border and with the postwar expulsion of ethnic Germans from "new Poland." Although popular acceptance of such policies did not necessarily translate into active

—

political support for the local

for the Soviet Union,

some

communist

parties, let alone

of the highly cherished changes

Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

7

were nevertheless seen as a result of Soviet victory in World

War

II.

It was especially because of the absence of countervailing power in the international system, but also because of the domestic power vacuum that came to exist, then, that the com-

munists enjoyed such an extraordinary positional advantage in postwar Eastern Europe. The lack of Western interest or will to contain the Soviet Union so soon after World War II provided Stalin's historic opportunity to transform the Red Army's momentous victories into an unparalleled expansion of Soviet power and influence. Having followed an essentially defensive foreign policy course in the interwar period, a time

when a weak

Soviet Union had focused on protecting "social-

one country," Stalin presently perceived a power vacEurope and hence a chance to create "socialism in one region." It should be recalled that back in the mid- 1920s Stalin had been the main advocate of the concept of "socialism in one country." In his heated debates with Leon Trotsky, Stalin had cautioned that the new Soviet state should first solidify itself, overcome internal opposition and deflect external hostility, and only when the correlation of forces in the world would favor such a policy should the Soviet Union extend significant support for revolutionaries abroad. By contrast, Trotsky's concept of "permanent revolution" signified a more immediately militant position. In Trotsky's view, Moscow should make it a priority to press for communist revolutions for two reasons. One was that, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, the revolutionary process cannot be confined to victory in one country; it must be followed by others. The other, more pragmatic reason had to do with the defense of the Soviet homeland, which in Trotsky's view required the establishment of communist regimes that would

ism

in

uum

in Eastern

help protect the world's

first socialist state.

then, Trotsky even at this early date

Unlike Stalin,

was prepared

to take

— The Bloc That Failed

8

chances and indeed to use Soviet power to promote communism. As he once put it, "Not believing in force is the same as not believing in gravity."

Of course, Stalin also believed in force and in promoting abroad; he was no wishy-washy nationalist. He had relied on force at home to consolidate his power. His rise to unquestioned preeminence after 1928 was followed by the death of some twenty million Soviet citizens, many of whom were murdered; his victims had greatly outnumbered Hitler's. Nor did Stalin shy away from helping revolutionary causes abroad. Under Soviet control from the beginning, the Third International or Comintern (1919-43) directed the ac-

communism

tivities of

dozens of militant communist parties in Europe,

cluding Eastern Europe. Without

much

in-

success, to be sure,

had nevertheless worked ceaselessly to overthrow established governments until the mid- 1930s when Stalin's and the Comintern's new party line called for the these parties

—

coalitionary, so-called Popular Front strategy of cooperation

with

ail

countries and political forces opposed to nazism

and

fascism.

In contrast to his brutal policies at home, however, Stalin

did not pursue an aggressive or even particularly ambitious

World War II. He had calculated the and decided against an expansionist course. He had signed treaties and made deals with capitalist states the "international class enemy" in the 1930s and of course during World War II. In 1939, when he saw the survival of the Soviet Union at stake, he concluded the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Indeed, his major expansionist drive foreign policy prior to

correlation of forces in the world

—

—

the forceful reabsorption of the three independent Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia,

and Lithuania

in 1940

—

took place only after Hitler had explicitly consented to it (in exchange for Stalin's consent to the German occupation of Poland in 1939). Even after the war, fearful of Western reaction, he was cautious enough not to attempt the formal incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union even though many in

—

Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

9

the region and in the West feared he would make just such an attempt. Yet even this most circumspect guardian of Soviet state interests could not but rejoice when faced with the postwar opportunity to project Soviet power into the heart of Europe. At last, the correlation of forces in the world favored the ex-

port of

communist revolutions to a large, diverse, and in critical region that was to be known as "Eastern

many ways Europe."

Satellization

Initially, the

and the eight

Soviet bloc

was made up

of the Soviet

Union

so-called "people's democracies." In addition to

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,

and Romania, it included Yugoslavia and Albania as well. But Yugoslavia, where indigenous communist forces under Marshal Tito's leadership had liberated that country largely on their own, was able to defy Stalin, leave the bloc, and establish an independent communist state in 1948-49 still under Stalin's watch and to his utter dismay. Albania, which was by far the smallest and least developed member of the Soviet orbit, and which has continued to revere Stalin to this day, was to adopt an independent if extremely militant com-

—

munist course in the early 1960s. The formation of the Soviet bloc comprised two, frequently overlapping processes. Completed by 1947-48, the

was the process of what is often called satellization: the binding of the region's states to the Soviet Union. Increasingly after 1944, key decisions were made in Moscow rather than Warsaw or Sofia. The other process that began in 1944-45 but greatly accelerated only after 1947-48 is often first

called Sovietization: the transformation of the region's do-

mestic political, economic, and social structures, institutions,

and patterns according

to Soviet

norms and

values.

— The Bloc That Failed

10

While satellization ensured that the East European states would be Soviet allies, Sovietization ensured that they would imitate and even duplicate the Soviet model in their internal arrangements. Despite differences in timing and circumstances, the procof gradually inducing compliance with ess of satellization Soviet objectives in each of the East European countries

—

followed more or less the same general pattern.

During the

first

phase, the region's

communist

parties

—

tended to cooperate with other political parties social democrats, agrarians, liberals within the framework of broadly based, genuine coalition governments. The aim was to make

—

use of practically help in the

war

all

still

elements in society in order to gain their being waged against

Germany and

in re-

building the region's war- torn economies. In the second phase, the multiparty governments gave

way

bogus or pseudo-coalitions in which the communist preponderant force, still allowed for the participation of such non-communists who would do their bidding mostly feeble opportunists known as fellow-travelers. They were used to help placate Western and domestic to

parties, already the

—

critics.

during the third phase, with the process of satcompleted and hence the commanding heights of power already in hand, Sovietization became the primary task. The monolithic communist regimes could thus press for domestic transformation along Soviet lines. Finally,

ellization

Within

this general pattern, details varied

from country

to country:

The genuinely in Czechoslovakia.

pluralistic coalition

With the

liberal

regime lasted longest

and ambitious Eduard

BeneS as president, Czechoslovakia sought a special role for itself that of becoming a "bridge" between East and West. Mindful of Soviet preferences, BeneS was prepared to reject what he called "the purely political conception of democracy in a liberalistic [Western] sense." But his concessions failed

—

— 1

and Socialism

Stalin

in

One Region

1

to appease Stalin long, at least partly because the Czechoslovak Communist Party unlike all others in the region enjoyed widespread support: in the free elections of May 1946

—

it

received 38 percent of the vote.

Still,

the

communists did

not seize power until February 1948, a few months after the

newly founded Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) had ordered all communist parties in Europe to adopt a more militant strategy.

In Hungary, the multiparty coalition government sur-

vived until mid- 1947.

It

was dominated by the popular

Smallholders' Party, which obtained an absolute majority of the votes (57 percent) in the

November 1945

elections

— in

Communist Party's 17 percent. Yet, given the Red Army's intimidating presence and the effective penetration by the communists of all other parties, the communists

contrast to the

could have seized

war was

full

control of the country as soon as the

They decided not to do so. Like its counterpart the Hungarian Communist Party was under instructions from Stalin to support the pluralistic over.

in Czechoslovakia,

phase for a few years in deference to Western sensitivities. "The Soviet Union must win the diplomatic battle in order to

win

decisive influence in

Hungary"

is

how Erno

Gero, the

party's deputy leader, explained the rationale for the co-

alitionary strategy at a closed meeting of activists in 1945,

adding that the Hungarian (and, presumably, Czechoslovak) communists must "not scare the Anglo-Americans" for the time being. Elsewhere in the region, the pluralistic phase lasted but a few months or not at all and free elections were never 1

—

held.

In Bulgaria, the government

was

initially in the hands of group that was to do what the Bulgarian communists, lacking in popular appeal, could

Zveno (The

For the source of Gero's statement, and the circumstances in delivered, see Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 21.

1

was

Link), a semi-military

.

which

it

The Bloc That Failed

12

not effectively do: organize Bulgaria's reentry into the

war on

the Soviet side. Having played that role for a few short

and early winter of 1944-45, and then having outlived its usefulness, Zveno was promptly reduced to a supportive role in the emerging pseudo-coalition government thoroughly dominated by the Bulgarian Communist

months

in the late fall

Party.

In Romania's

tary

men

also

first

cabinet,

outnumbered

formed

in

August 1944, mili-

civilians, including representa-

Romanian Communist Party. The reason was the same Moscow needed the prestige of noncommunist generals to mobilize the Romanian army against tives of the tiny

as in Bulgaria:

Germany. With King Michael as the nominal head of state and with the leader of the Communist Party and the leaders of the three other major parties serving as ministers without portfolio, the first government's composition reflected a measure of continuity with the past. But the days of the coalition were numbered. Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinski presented the king with an ultimatum at the end of February 1945. Either the king would appoint the fellowtraveler Petru Groza as premier or Romania would cease to exist as a sovereign state. Vyshinski is said to have given the king two hours and five minutes(!) to comply. Fearing annexation, the king did what he was ordered to do. In Germany's Soviet zone of occupation the area that was to become East Germany a four-party coalition was formed to administer the zone's affairs soon after Berlin's liberation. Its authority was defined, and strictly limited, by the

—

Soviet military

composed

command. In Communist

of the

less

—

than a year, the coalition Democratic

Party, the Social

Democratic Party, and the Liberal Democame to an end. In April 1946, the communists forced the social democrats into a new Socialist Unity Party (SED), hoping that the traditional popularity of German social democracy would help the united party to sweep the forthcoming local elections in the fall. The results were indieParty, the Christian

cratic Party

Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

13

and cheating: While the SED received about half of the votes cast in the provinces under Soviet occupation, in the three Western sectors of Berlin it could draw only 10.3 percent (British sector), 12.3 percent (U.S. sector), and 21.2 percent (French sector) of the vote. In Poland, then as always the key East European country ative of intimidation

government formed June 1945 was between the "Lublin Poles" who were proSoviet, and the "London Poles" who were pro-Western. With sixteen of the twenty-one ministries held by members of the "Lublin" group (named after the East Polish city where the first provisional government was formed), the government was a pseudo-coalition from the beginning. The few noncommunists included in it were either such fellow-travelers as the social democrat Jozef Cyrankiewicz, or were effectively isolated and powerless, such as Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, in Soviet eyes, the actual division in the in

However short-lived game that Moscow had devised for much of Eastern Europe, it was apparently not meant for Poland, by leader of the People's (Peasant) Party.

the coalitionary

far the largest,

most

most populous, most important, as well as the emerging Soviet bloc.

volatile country in the

Early Problems In compelling all Eastern will

and turning them

European

states to

submit to his

into Soviet satellites, Stalin encoun-

tered several difficulties. First,

throughout the second half of the 1940s Stalin

re-

mained deeply concerned about Western reactions; he could never be sure what the United States and Great Britain might do. Of course, most of Eastern Europe was occupied by the Red Army, and during the war the Western allies had all but conceded the region to Soviet influence. Yet it was not clear whether Soviet domination would be accepted; if not, what was the likely course that the West, especially the United

— The Bloc That Failed

14

would adopt? By 1947 in particular, with the cold war underway, what should Stalin make of President Harry S Truman's promise that the United States would "support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"? While Truman was apparently referring only to Greece and Turkey, what if his doctrine applied, or would be applied, to Eastern Europe as well? Stalin could States,

2

not be sure.

about Western intentions and reactions had prompted him to instruct the Czechoslovak and Hungarian communists to proceed only gradually toward the seizure of power. Among the initiated few, his policy was Stalin's uncertainty

known

as the "Polish trade-off": an attempt to

compensate and often brutal takeovers in Poland and elsewhere along the Soviet border and in East Germany by allowing for a somewhat longer pluralistic interlude in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Zoltan Vas, a Hunthe West for the rapid

—

garian Politburo

member

at the time, has since revealed that

Communist Party leadership was uncertain even in 1946 whether "Stalin might not let Hungary [and presumably Czechoslovakia] come under the political influence of the [Western] allies in exchange for Soviet demands on Poland and Germany." Given what is known today, the thought of such "trade-offs" may seem fanciful; yet, at that time, Stalin's concern about Western countermeasures was very the Hungarian

real indeed.

—

Second, learning how to govern alone or with other parties—proved to be a novel and difficult task for all of the East European communist parties. The "revolutions" ex-

ported to the region by the Soviet Union lacked authenticity; they did not arise from domestic circumstances. Although only in Poland was there armed resistance, the communist parties— with the exception of Czechoslovakia's did not

—

2. The text of the the Bear, pp. 3-8.

Truman Doctrine

of 1947

is

reprinted in Gati, Caging

—5 Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

enjoy any significant popular support. As the

membership stood

1

war came

to

an

about 25,000 in Bulgaria, in Hungary, Poland, in 2,500 2,000 in Romania, and 20,000 probably no more than a few hundred in East Germany (of whom many were so-called "Muscovites": communist exiles returning from the Soviet Union). Thus, Czechoslovakia aside, the Soviet Union could count on no more than only 50,000 or so dedicated supporters in these five countries, whose population was about 75 million at that time. The communist parties had to work hard to gain new adherents. Intimidation was not enough. They had to prove themselves to be genuine patriots rather than Moscow's agents. Anticipating the problems ahead, Stalin had advised a group of communist leaders in 1944: "Soviet power cannot do everything for you. You must do the fighting, you must do the work." But "doing the work" meant that the parties had to preoccupy themselves with practical, local issues of politics and economics at the expense of fulfilling their revoluend, party

at

tionary, so-called "internationalist" duties.

The leader of Pol-

communists, Wladyslaw Gomulka, had to remind some of his puzzled, "sectarian" comrades, who, he said, had failed to understand the "new situation," to "think with the categories of the nation, of the state in which we now cogovern": they should be or should appear to be Poles concerned with Poland rather than communists concerned with the "international ish

class struggle."

Looking inward and thus giving domestic issues rather than international

communism

dency Zbigniew Brzezinski would later

mes ticism"

of the

communist

—a

ten-

call the early

" do-

top consideration

parties of Eastern

contributed to the region's incipient diversity.

Europe

A forerunner

communism, "domesticism" contained the seeds of conflict between the Soviet Union and its new dependencies. One example of this occurred in the summer of of national

1947 when, guided by domestic needs, three East European countries Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary ex-

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

16

pressed interest in accepting an American invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan. They saw nothing wrong at first

with trying to gain access to hard currency and foreign creduntil Stalin abruptly reminded them that the Marshall its Plan was but an "imperialist machination." In this case as in so many others, the East European communists learned the hard way how in the end they must subordinate their domes-

—

tic

concerns to Soviet-dictated internationalist obligations. Third, the most acute specific problem for

Moscow

in

Eastern Europe was Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet orbit in 1948-49. As mentioned previously, Marshal Tito's forces

had liberated

their country without

sistance, certainly without

much

much

foreign as-

Soviet assistance. Even

then, during World War II, the Yugoslav communists were having some differences with Stalin who had repeatedly cautioned them against a too-rapid seizure of power. Although in the aftermath of the Yalta conference of the Big Three in February 1945, Tito obliged Stalin by coopting a few noncommunists into his government, he still wanted to make Yu-

goslavia the

first

Soviet Union yet deeply

"dictatorship of the proletariat" outside the

itself.

proud of

Loyal to Moscow, admiring of Stalin, and his own achievements too, Tito resented

what Stalin regarded as wise Soviet counsel and assistance and what Tito regarded as unduly cautious advice as well as Soviet interference in the internal affairs of another socialist country.

For

its

part, to

no avail did the Soviet Union mobilize

its

own and

Eastern Europe's armed forces, use so-called "Cominformist" agents Yugoslavs who were loyal to Corninform to undermine the Tito regime from within, un-

—

—

dertake what amounted to economic warfare, and even ex-

communicate the "Tito clique" from the communist camp. To no avail did the Soviet and the satellite press engage in namecalling referring day in and day out to "Judas Tito and his

—

abettors," to "this bankrupt group of sharks," to "dogs tied to

American

leashes," to these "sinister heralds of the

camp

of

Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

17

worthy heirs of Hitler," and to "a gang and murderers." Backed by an almost completely united Yugoslav leadership and by the Yugoslav

war and death,"

to "the

of spies, provocateurs,

people, too, Tito stood firm.

Yugoslavia's ability to withstand such extraordinary pressures

and then pursue an independent communist course

to

be called "national communism" revealed for all to see the limits of Stalin's power even in his own backyard. The SovietYugoslav split shattered both the communist claim and the Western illusion that those who shared the same MarxistLeninist ideology could not develop significant differences

among themselves; that the usual conflict of national interests among sovereign states somehow did not apply to communist states. Perhaps most important, Yugoslavia's independence offered an alternative to others in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. This is why it is all but impossible to exaggerate Yugoslavia's impact on subsequent developments in several East European countries and their relationship with Moscow. Without Yugoslavia it is impossible to understand what the likes of the Hungarian Imre Nagy and the Polish Wladyslaw Gomulka were to do in the mid-1950s or what the Czechoslovak Alexander Dubcek would do in the late 1960s. Tito established a precedent for autonomy and, later, reform in the communist world in Soviet eyes, a very dangerous prece-

—

dent at that time. As subsequent developments would amply demonstrate,

drawn the proper lesson from encounter with Yugoslavia. He could have realized that

Stalin did not appear to have his

—

heavy-handed Soviet policies particularly the overcentralization of the bloc were counterproductive. He could have realized that while the region's small- and medium-sized countries might have learned to live with an influential Soviet Union, excessive Soviet interference was bound to breed strong opposition among the East European people and ultimately even among their communist leaders as well. Instead

—

The Bloc That Failed

18

European realities, howcompel Eastern Europe to du-

of adjusting Soviet policies to East ever, Stalin

was determined

to

plicate Soviet realities. Instead of taking at least a tactical or

—

temporary step backward as he had done in his dealings with capitalist states before and during World War II this time Stalin wanted to show that the Soviet way was the only way, that the Soviet model he had shaped at home had uni-

—

versal applicability.

In part, Stalin

was dizzy with

success.

The Soviet bloc was

one region" was to be his historic accomplishment. Six countries with a population of about 90 million at that time (the same as Great Britain's) and covering an area of 380,000 square miles (over four times the size of Great Britain) were under his control. In military terms, the Soviet Union was the most powerful state in Europe. In part, Stalin was also prompted by his failures and fears: his in place, "socialism in

and his fear that othwould follow Tito's example. In part, finally, his inability to divide and immobilize the West induced his anxiety that the new cold war then underway would lead to a new world war, an anxiety reinforced by the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and then, much later, by the Korean war of 1950-53. failure to prevent Yugoslavia's defection

ers

Sovietization

Hence, at the end of 1947, Stalin proceeded to accelerate the processes of Sovietization. He attempted to turn the satellites into small replicas of the Soviet Union and in that way further consolidate his hold over his

new dominion. The peMarch 1953 also be-

riod from about 1948 to Stalin's death in

came known

as the era of "high Stalinism" in Eastern Europe.

In the political realm, Sovietization entailed substantial

changes in East European domestic institutions and policies. The governments were assigned the role of implementing de-

Stalin

cisions

made

and Socialism

in

One Region

19

partly by Moscow, partly by the several

munist parties' Politburos, Secretariats, and the

com-

offices of the

general secretaries. As in the Soviet Union, the head of the

government was no longer called "premier" or "prime minister" but "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers." Following the Russian word soviet, local governments became "coun"the ears and eyes of the cils." The power of the secret police revolution" so increased as to generate fear among all, communists included. If earlier an average citizen had been harassed and punished for being against the regime, he could

—

—

now be

shown insufficient support for the regime. Formerly that citizen had been told only what not to do; now he was also told what he must do. tortured even for having

Sovietization thus signified the introduction of Soviet to-

One of its features was the of what had happened in the So-

talitarianism into Eastern Europe.

on a smaller scale Union in the 1930s: the widespread purges the jailing and killing of communists. Those who were so purged in Eastern Europe were loyal supporters of the Soviet Union. They showed no signs of favoring "Titoism" or "national communism" of which they were accused and they did not deviate from the Moscow-ordained party line. For example, the Czechoslovak Rudolf Slansky, his party's general secretary, or the Hungarian Laszlo Rajk, formerly a minister of internal affairs and hence the person in charge of the secret police, were actually thought to have belonged to the more militant wing of their parties. Now they were charged of conspiring with all sorts of countries, including Yugoslavia and the United States, against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. Years later, when it was publicly admitted that the charges had been fabricated, the victims were posthumously rehabilitated. Why the Stalinist show trials in Eastern Europe then? Why the killing of fellow communists? The only explanation was, and is, that in the aftermath of the Yugoslav affair Stalin felt compelled to fight "domesticism" and reaffirm his leaderrepetition

—

viet

—

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

20

—

communist movement and he did it, so to speak, by flexing his muscles. It was a Stalin-style power play, with thousands of victims whose trials were meant to demonstrate who was in charge.

ship over the international

In the economic realm, the postwar nationalization of

banks and industry was also followed by measures modeled on Soviet conditions and practices. These measures included the collectivization of agriculture (everywhere but in Poland) and the closing of even the smallest privately owned services and retail outlets as well. The local equivalents of Gosplan, the huge Soviet planning bureaucracy, took control of the East European economies. These new offices were staffed by members of the party apparatus who were devoted to planning and centralization as the rational alternative to the

ills

of the capitalist marketplace.

Despite the existence of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance by 1949, and despite

much

talk thereafter about

and regional integration, CMEA was a dorfrom the beginning. Indeed, economic Sovietization between 1948 and 1953 meant the opposite of the division of labor; it meant economic autarky or selfsufficiency. For, in practice, each East European country was directed both to duplicate the Soviet experience and develop whatever it needed on its own. Hence the extraordinary build-up of heavy industry in countries that in most cases lacked energy for, say, new steel mills. The same countries also lacked the infrastructure, the personnel, and in all too many instances even the possibility to sell what they made. Stories abound of wasted resources, misplaced investments, and unnecessary products. If anything, the damage done to agriculture was even greater. In effect, collectivization negated the early postwar achievements and good will of the East European peasantry. After the 1945 land reforms had realized the age-old dream of peasants to own their land, they responded by division of labor

mant

institution

—

—

bringing food to the

cities;

they

made

a significant contribu-

Stalin

tion to

and Socialism

in

One Region

21

postwar reconstruction. After collectivization de-

prived them of their land, however, the peasants responded

by withholding food; they obstructed in a major way the policies of the emerging Stalinist economic order. Why such centralization, autarky, and rapid collectivization? The simple answer is that Stalin knew no economic alternative. The more complex answer is that, in addition, he sought to synchronize the region's economies with the Soviet Union's in preparation for World War III. As he was presently doing in his own country, he squeezed consumption below reasonable levels, increased investments in heavy industry beyond realistic levels, and hence, in effect, militarized the East European economic systems. This can be presumed to have been his intention. In practice, his economic policies made Eastern Europe neither stronger nor more self-sufficient. Not incidentally, these policies only served to further discredit the ideals of socialism in Eastern Europe.

Sovietization

in

the

"Zhdanovshchina," so

cultural

named

realm has been called

after the Kremlin's cultural

watchdog and ideological czar at the time, Andrei Zhdanov. In Eastern Europe the period marked the introduction of "socialist realism" and the Leninist notion oipartinost or "partymindedness" in literature, music, and the arts. Writers and artists whom Stalin had called "the engineers of human soul" were told to produce works featuring "positive heroes" the people would want to emulate. The positive heroes worked hard for the common good and admired the wise

— —

Stalin.

The period also marked the celebration of Soviet achievements, real or imagined, in every possible area of human activity, from science to culture to sports. For one example, high school students were taught that a Russian scientist had discovered the x-ray before the German physicist Wilhelm

Roentgen had ever thought of gion's educational system

it.

At the same time, the re-

was changed

to correspond to the

Soviet pattern. Admission to the universities

was based

less

The Bloc That Failed

22

on talent and promise than on social origin, meaning that the sons and daughters of workers and so-called "poor peasants" received highly preferential treatment.

main contribution was the theory of was what Marx and Lenin had expected, social-

In ideology, Stalin's

the "constantly sharpening class struggle." His point that, contrary to ist

construction did not signify the gradual disappearance of

Though it was said to have been defeated, continued to work ceaselessly to recapture "remnants"

the class enemy. its

their old power and reverse the gains of socialism. The class enemy was to be found both at home and abroad. At home, is to say in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it included not only former capitalists and rich peasants but also all others who were still influenced by a reactionary,

which

petit-bourgeois mentality.

Abroad the

class

enemy included

the reactionary, capitalist states, notably the United States.

East Europeans were told day in and day out to be vigilant against the machinations of domestic and foreign enemies.

Thus the new theory served to draw the sharpest possible distinction between the forces of light (led, of course, by the Soviet Union) and the increasingly dangerous forces of darkness (led, of course, by the United States). In the Manichean image of Stalin and Zhdanov, the world was divided into "two camps."

and early 1950s signified the penetration of Eastern Europe by Soviet institutions, policies and values. It also signified what, after his death, would be called Stalin's "personality cult." Indeed, with Stalin's pictures and statues everywhere, with the most prominent boulevards and squares named after him, with All in all, Sovietization in the late 1940s

poets saving their best lines for odes devoted to him, with

people forced to rise at the mention of his

name (and

of

and burst into long and rhythmic applause Long live Stalin! Long live Gottwald! or Rakosi! or what with all that and more Stalin made himself at Bierut! home in Eastern Europe. This was Sovietization. Conversely, the local party leader's)

— —

— Stalin

and Socialism

the East European people

own

countries. This, too,

What Did

One Region

decreasingly at

felt

was

in

home

23 in their

Sovietization.

Stalin Achieve?

The long-held, historical dream of czars and commissars, the postwar conquest of Eastern Europe served a number of Soviet military, economic, and political objectives. Alas, proper understanding of the nature and scope of these objectives could not be gained from Stalin's or other Soviet or East European officials' self-serving statements, which tended to conceal more than they revealed. Denying the role of coercion, of course, these statements pointed to a natural historical evolution that

from

its

was

said to have transformed the region

"semi-feudal" condition into "people's democracies,"

a transitional political order on the road to socialism. In the realm of Soviet-East

European

relations, Soviet as

well as official East European writings claimed that relations

were basically harmonious from the beginning, that "international relations of a

new

type"

came

to characterize the re-

Such harmony could be achieved, it was said, because the "wise Stalin" his name was seldom mentioned without this and other flattering adjectives properly understood the dynamics of history and offered "fraternal advice" rooted both in Marxist-Leninist ideology and

gion's inter-state relations.

—

the

momentous experiences

of the world's first socialist state.

Nothing could be further from the truth. While it is admittedly difficult to ascertain what combination of interests guided Soviet policy, it is clear that geopolitical interests concerns about security topped Stalin's list. However, security signified full control; Stalin was not satisfied with the prospect of an Eastern Europe that would not become an anti-Soviet Eastern Europe. Because of the peculiarities of Russian history, Leninist ideology, and his own psychological make-up, Stalin believed that those who were not

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

24

with him were against him, that those who did not actively and even blindly support the Soviet Union were "objectively" the enemies of socialism and the Soviet state. Thus, to repeat, the Stalinist notion of security signified Eastern Europe's complete subordination to Soviet geopolitical interests. To Stalin, these interests meant that the region must be turned into something more than a mere defensive buffer zone; it was also to be used as a staging ground from which Western Europe could be politically and even militarily intimidated and indeed kept off balance.

was was accom-

In Stalin's time, the region's economic exploitation certainly another Soviet objective. In part, this

plished by

demanding and receiving

large reparations

from

such wartime enemies as East Germany, Hungary, and Romania. In part, Soviet economic benefits accrued from the Red Army's theft of whatever could be moved, including

whole factories and technical personnel; from the so-called companies whose output, instead of being shared by the Soviet Union and an East European country, was largely transferred to the Soviet Union; and, after the East European economies had come to life, from buying the region's products at unreasonably low prices. According to Paul Marer, a leading American expert on the subject, the total value of Soviet economic benefits so obtained in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s approached a stunning $14 billion. In effect, Eastern Europe was forced to subsidize the Soviet Union's postwar economic recovery and its preparation for World War III. Soviet political and ideological interests seem to have mattered as much as or more than economic considerations. For with the gradual decline and eventual collapse of every other European empire, the Soviet Union emerged from the war

joint

not only as a military but as a political arbiter of the old continent.

Gaining ground

wisdom

of Stalin's

country") and his

in Eastern Europe also pointed to the prewar circumspection ("socialism in one postwar expansion ("socialism in one re-

Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

25

postwar success proved him right on the issue of when communist revolutions should be attempted (i.e., only when the correlation of forces in the world favored gion"); after all, his

them).

Moreover, with the Soviet model transferred there, Eastern Europe could also serve as a more relevant example for

—

in the West, perhaps, but especially in the former Western colonies of Asia and Africa. Finally, by having generated considerable pride in Soviet power and prestige abroad, Moscow's postwar gains appeared to strengthen the Soviet system at home. As these gains conferred a measure of legitimacy to Stalin's domestic order, they also reinvigo-

others to follow

rated the revolutionary zeal and enhanced the

momentum of

communist movement everywhere. Guided by these interests, how did Stalin manage to obtain such an extraordinary military, economic, and political/ ideological gain for the Soviet Union? The question is importhe

tant because victory in war, the intimidating presence of the

Red Army, and Western reluctance Eastern Europe

made

to confront

Moscow over

Soviet expansion possible. While these

were necessary conditions, there were other factors, techniques and circumstances that mattered as well. For one thing, the region's communist parties, however small at the beginning, turned out to be more united than their social democratic or agrarian political opponents. Here and there in the communist parties there was tension between those who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union (the "Muscovites") and those who had stayed behind participating in the resistance movements (the "native"

commu-

and of course there were the usual personal rivalries everywhere, but on the whole the communist parties were nists),

more

disciplined and cohesive than their political adversarThere were few communists at the beginning, but Stalin could count on their blind loyalty. Some of their leaders even ies.

retained their Soviet citizenship.

Second, the early capture throughout the region of the

se-

The Bloc That Failed

26

— of whom had been aided by high— provided an opportunity to intimidate

cret or political police level Soviet advisers

all

who dared to criticize or even express reservations about communism or the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of World War II, any critic called "fascist" or "anti-democratic" could all

be charged, detained, and tortured. Tens of thousands of innocent people simply disappeared. Later on, during the years of high Stalinism, many more disappeared without being charged at all. Third, Stalin held extraordinary authority

among com-

munists everywhere. For the admittedly few but energetic name was synonymous with Marxism, Leninism, progress, the communist Utopia. No one ques-

"true believers," his

tioned his version of

Marxism or Leninism. Of

course, he

ruled by terror. Of course, his terror eventually aimed at leading

communist

officials too. Yet

Stalinist tyranny there

even in those years of

remained an

among communists who believed in

idealistic orientation

and

promise of a harmonious socialist future. Blind fanatics, perhaps, but their seemingly unshakable confidence and faith were inspired by Stalin's charisma. Under the spell of communist fundamentalism, many of those who served Stalin in Eastern Europe genuinely believed that the sacrifices he had asked for were needed to purify the movement; only then could the sacred goal of communism be realized. This is why Stalin's apparent lack of interest in establishing proper institutional ties between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe did not yet matter. Of course, there was the Stalin

in his

Cominform after 1947 and the CMEA after 1949, and there were numerous bilateral treaties and agreements that constituted the formal foundation of the Soviet bloc. But the institutions that Stalin created were few and hollow. What mattered was Stalin's will and his immense personal authority among communists everywhere (even, to an extent, in Yugoslavia). This is what made it possible for Soviet interests to

Stalin

and Socialism

in

One Region

27

be implemented either directly through Stalin's agents or indirectly through his band of loyal and fanatic East European supporters.

What

did he achieve then?

his successors?

What does

What

did he leave behind for

the balance sheet

show?

On

the positive side of the ledger:

(1)

Anticipating another conventional war, Stalin en-

dowed

the Soviet Union with an impressive dominion of con-

He enhanced

Soviet power both more by the impression Soviet Union was a great power capable

siderable geopolitical worth.

by the territory he gained and even he created that the of, and perhaps even entitled its

to,

having client states under

control. (2)

He

extracted substantial economic benefits for the So-

time of great need. To his own people, he demonstrated that Leninist systems can be built outside the Soviet Union and that the Soviet system therefore represented the wave of the future.

viet state at a (3)

(4)

He

significantly

advanced the process, begun

1920s, of subordinating international

communism

in the

to Soviet

With the exception of Yugoslavia, he prevented defections from what was then the world communist state interests.

movement.

On

the negative side of the ledger:

(1) Stalin failed to establish

and economic

a workable system of political

inter-state relations in the Soviet bloc.

Because

and centralized style of running it, he deprived the communist leaders of Eastern Europe of selfconfidence, self-respect, and self-reliance in making decisions. They did not learn how to govern under conditions prevailing in their own countries. They could never know which decisions should be made by them and which ones should be made by Stalin. (2) The rigid imposition of the Soviet economic model not only entailed excessive reliance on Soviet natural resources,

of his highly personalized

The Bloc That Failed

28 it

also signified the inhibition of proper East

nomic specialization all of

too,

European ecoThe result for

in areas of local strength.

Eastern Europe, and ultimately for the Soviet Union,

turned out to be catastrophic.

Because of his policy of satellization and Sovietization, Europe of even the illusion of autonomy and of a decent standard of living. (4) Most important, the way Stalin brought the East European communist parties to power deprived them of any claim to legitimacy. Its absence then, and the inability of the East European communist regimes to obtain legitimacy subsequently, remained the underlying source of the region's (3)

Stalin stripped the people of Eastern

chronic instability. Less inflicted by ideological imperatives and the black-

and-white dichotomies of the Russian tradition, another

hegemon might have interpreted

his country's interests so as

to seek only extensive influence rather

than complete domi-

nation over Eastern Europe. But, given the geopolitical opportunity that presented itself, the political culture of which

he was a product, and his personal predeliction for controlling others, Stalin could do no less than what he did. By the time of Stalin's death in March 1953, his policies had led to high tension among the elite and widespread popular dissatisfaction in several

East European countries. To remained for his successors in the new solutions and to initiate remedial

cope with Stalin's legacy,

Kremlin action.

to look for

it

II

FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO CHERNENKO An Overview

Post-Stalin Soviet Concerns

at stalin's funeral, Foreign Minister

and Politburo member man "whom we have

Vyacheslav Molotov paid homage to the

much and who will others who spoke on the

our hearts forever." occasion expressed similar All the sentiments. They also underlined the need for unity and continuity. Did they mean what they said? Did Molotov recall that his own wife had been exiled to Siberia by Stalin for no apparent reason except that she was born Jewish? Did the others recall that while Stalin was around their own lives were never safe, that a show trial was an ever-present possiall

loved so

live in

bility? felt cannot be known, of would show their awareness that with the old tyrant gone things would not be the same again. It was also obvious, though, that they did not agree what should be changed and how much, and above all they did not agree on who should lead the pack. During the course of Byzantine maneuverings for power between 1953 and 1957, the Soviet Union was first run by the triumvirate of Georgi Malenkov (Stalin's designated successor), Lavrenti Beria (the security chief), and Molotov; then

What

Stalin's heirs

thought or

course, but subsequent actions

The Bloc That Failed

30

by Malenkov, and then by Khrushchev (both, supposedly, as only first among equals). Only in May 1957 did Khrushchev emerge as the Kremlin's preeminent boss. Having won the struggle for power after four long years, he and his supporters immediately labeled the opposition as the "antiparty group."

was made up of the Politburo majority that the Central Committee had defeated under highly unusual circumstances. The group included Malenkov, Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and others (but not Beria, who had In point of fact, that group

been shot in 1953). While applying the term "antiparty group" to Khrushchev's opponents recalled Stalin's sharp rhetoric, it was a sign of changing times that, with Beria out of the way, obscurity rather than death awaited the losers. Thus, the major domestic innovation of the post-Stalin era

was

the reduction of political terror

elite.

aimed against the ruling

Called de-Stalinization only in the West, the

approach was

officially

new

Soviet

designated as "socialist legality," a

more accurate term because the Soviet leadership certainly did not reject all of Stalin's legacy. For example, in his momentous speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, Khrushchev attacked Stalin but almost exclusively for the show trials of the 1930s (as well as for his "personality cult"), declaring that the

charges against the victims had been total fabrications. Those

who had

survived the trials would be released, he added,

while those tated. At the

who had same

praise Stalin for his effort to build

not would be posthumously rehabili-

time, the

many

new

Soviet leaders continued to

other contributions, including his

and protect the first socialist country in the its power and influence. What the Kremthen, was Stalin's seemingly permanent and

world and to expand lin

did reject,

certainly excessive terror against the Soviet leadership itself, the effect of which was the demoralization and hence the

weakening of the CPSU. Of course, the Kremlin's focus on "socialist legality" did not obviate the necessity of dealing with other pressing prob-

From Khrushchev

Chernenko

to

lems. In the economic realm, a so-called fied a

modest

effort

31

"New Course"

signi-

— soon shelved and then reinstated — to

and the vastly underdeveloped consumer death was followed by an early version of glasnost called "thaw" the term taken from Ilya Ehrenburg's novel by the same name that was intended to ease cultural rigidities and broaden the scope of instress light industry

sector. In the cultural realm, Stalin's

—

—

tellectual discourse.

In foreign policy, the Kremlin's

new emphasis on

the Len-

inist notion of "peaceful coexistence" with the West, combined with the now publicly stated recognition that nuclear wars were not inevitable, indicated a desire to reduce international tension in order to gain a breathing spell. In 1955,

the surprising withdrawal of the Soviet

Army from

the Soviet

zone of occupation in Austria, coupled with the signing of a peace treaty that guaranteed that country's neutrality, raised new hopes in both the East and the West of finding a simi-

—

—

Germany and hence reviving during World War II between the

lar solution for divided

the

good relations Union and the West.

So-

spirit of

viet

Though the evidence

is

inconclusive, there were reports in

1953 and even later of a Soviet interest in modifying the sta-

two Germanies. (In March 1952, similar reports had circulated under Stalin, too.) Presently, Khrushchev claimed that, after the bloody East Berlin riots of June 1953, Beria had considered the abandonment of East Germany an unlikely tale. The Kremlin had no clear idea of what to propose, if anything, and what to take for what it might give if it were to propose something. If nothing else, the acute power struggle then underway excluded the adoption of any proposal of historic significance. Moreover, Soviet interests were not likely to have been served by changing the German status quo under any circumstances. As Adam Ulam has noted, the Kremlin merely hoped that the Austrian treaty "would have an educative effect on the [West] Germans," who would then consider removing themselves from NATO and "settle down tus of the

—

The Bloc That Failed

32

to enjoy opera, beer,

and

such unexa neighbor of both Czecho-

tourists" instead. Still,

—

pected developments in Austria slovakia and Hungary in Eastern Europe

—and the

first

U.S.-

both in 1955, brought new attention not only to the unnatural division of Germany but to Eastern Europe as well. After all, any consideration of Germany's future was likely to have far-reaching implications for the future of Eastern Europe too. Soviet

summit

in a decade,

Recasting Policy toward Eastern Europe

It

was the immediacy

of reports about tension in Eastern

Europe rather than the desire to eventually resolve the German issue that prompted the new Soviet leaders to place the condition of the bloc at or near the top of their agenda. For soon after Stalin's death, some of that long-suppressed tension in the area began to surface, especially in Hungary and Poland, and thus there

June

17,

was no time

to waste.

ously crushed by Soviet tanks, the Kremlin

Hungarian leadership tal

Even before the

1953 riots in East Berlin, which were unceremonifor

what turned

had called

in the

into a harsh, even bru-

reprimand.

At that unannounced meeting, held on June 13-14, 1953 with every important member of the Soviet Politburo in attendance, the Hungarians were told that the Kremlin was deeply dissatisfied with their performance. Whether similar sessions were held with other East

known.

If not, it is

not clear

European leaders

is

not

why the Hungarians were singled

out for such criticism. In any case, Matyas Rakosi, Hungary's

was presently ordered to give up either his government or his seat at the head of the party. The Kremlin's charges were serious: Rakosi held too much power, the Hungarian economy was on the verge of collapse, the forced collectivization campaign had gone too far, the show trials had decimated the party. Stalinist dictator,

position as head of the

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

33

There and then, the Soviet leaders "proposed" the appointment of Imre Nagy as head of the government; Rakosi was to share power with Nagy and take others in the Politburo into his confidence as well. As it was said to be the case in the Soviet Union, there was to be "collective leadership" in Hungary, too. The program that the Hungarians were instructed to pursue also reflected prevailing Soviet priorities: light industry, consumer goods, improvements in the standard of living, rehabilitation of the victims of the purges, greater tolerance for cultural diversity.

The new personnel and the substantive changes introduced in Hungary so early constituted the first indication of the new Soviet leaders' approach to Eastern Europe. For one thing, by blaming the Hungarians for Stalin's policies, they accepted no responsibility for the past. During the meeting with the Hungarians, neither the Soviet nor the Hungarian leaders present pointed out that whatever Rakosi had done was with the approval and indeed under orders of Soviet authorities. After all, did Rakosi decide on his own to favor heavy industry instead of light industry? Did he conceive of the bloody purges on his own? That the Soviet leaders were silent on this point was due in part to the still-professed infallibility of the CPSU and Moscow's still-professed "leading role" in the world communist movement. As to the Hungarians' silence, their fear of contradicting the Kremlin was no doubt a function of the pervasiveness of what might be called the "satellite mentality." On the other hand, however, the Kremlin was also delivering a vague if significant message about the future division of responsibility in the bloc. At least

Hungarians

some

of the

—Imre Nagy, for sure — understood that in the fu-

ture the East European communist leaders would be held accountable for what might go wrong in their countries. What they could decide and what would still be decided by the Kremlin was not made clear. But it was understood that from

now on

the East Europeans were on a longer leash. Presum-

The Bloc That Failed

34

ably within general guidelines set by Moscow, they would be

allowed to make more decisions on their own than in the past. They would have greater responsibility and a bit more lee-

much more power. It appeared, then, new post-Stalin leadership in Moscow envisaged a

way, perhaps, but not that the

\J

minor

shift in the

Soviet-East European decision-making

process, believing that a

become a more

somewhat decentralized bloc would

stable bloc.

Put another way, the message conveyed to the Hungaricombined with what the Kremlin was actually doing in

ans,

the aftermath of Stalin's death, suggested that the modified,

post-Stalin Soviet approach to Eastern

Europe comprised two basic propositions: (1) What was unchanged was the Soviet Union's continued commitment to the twin goals of bloc endurance and the maintenance of one-party communist regimes in Eastern Europe. (2)

What was changed was the Soviet Union's new willingmake such concessions as were necessary to assure the endurance and the maintenance of one-party commu-

ness to bloc's

nist regimes.

To say that the new Soviet leaders thus wanted to have and eat it too was, of course, true. To repeat, they were not about to relinquish Stalin's dominion. Yet some of their cake

the concessions they were prepared to make indicated considerable flexibility. It was a concession that they would gradu-

withdraw most Soviet advisors from the region and that they would leave the selection of even some high-level ap-

ally

pointments to the discretion of each country's Politburo. It was a concession that they would begin to end Eastern Europe's economic exploitation, not because their own eco-

nomic conditions had improved so much but because they were apprehensive about the impact of low living standards on the region's stability. Thus, given their concern about the endurance of the bloc, the

new

Soviet leaders were hoping to find a solution that

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

35

would let them save what they had without conceding more than what they deemed absolutely necessary to give up. Between the autonomy that they were unwilling to grant and the old subservient relationship that was proving to be counterproductive, they were looking for a happy middle ground made up of old hegemonical habits and slowly evolving pragmatic

What was

flexibility.

the Kremlin thus perceived as a "middle ground"

to guide Soviet policy

toward Eastern Europe

for dec-

ades after Stalin's death. The underlying issue of Soviet he-

gemony was apparently never discussed or debated. The issue discussed and debated was the extent and scope of conciliatory measures needed to assure continued Soviet hegemony.

How much

would provide for efand yet calm the region? What sorts of reform, economic and possibly political, should be tolerated to retain the bloc as a cohesive unit and yet help the region's communist regimes become viable? Could Moscow modify its insistence on communist unity by allowing for "national peculiarities" and hence diversity in the bloc? decentralization in the bloc

fective Soviet control

—

—

Yugoslavia and National

Communism

Allowing Eastern Europe a longer leash turned out to be little, and it came too late. By the mid-1950s, there was growing pressure for more substantial economic and political changes in the region, especially in Poland and Hungary. too

Hungary's intellectuals were particularly vocal in demanding the expansion of "socialist democracy." In Poland, intellectuals and workers pressed for more freedom and more bread. The Kremlin's apparent flexibility was, of course, adding fuel to the fire: unwittingly, Moscow encouraged the rise of an atmosphere of national assertiveness.

Whatever the

specific issues

and demands, the underlying

cause of discontent was the denial of nationalist aspirations.

The Bloc That Failed

36

Under prevailing conditions, these aspirations signified oppodomination and hence pressure for selfdetermination. What made the situation different from earlier times was the fact that some of the region's communist sition to Soviet

leaders themselves responded favorably, if cautiously, to the growing appeal of national assertiveness. Specifically, deep divisions within the ruling elites set the so-called "national

communists" sionists"

—also

—against

known

as

"home communists" or

"revi-

the orthodox or dogmatic defenders of

the Stalinist past.

The "national communists" could derive some courage not only from Tito's successful defiance of the Soviet Union but

from Moscow's current efforts to normalize SovietYugoslav relations and indeed to entice Yugoslavia to return also

to the fold. For, in an attempt to contain Tito's radiating influence on Eastern Europe that had the potential to disrupt

Moscow's hegemonical relations with the bloc, the Soviet Union took a dramatic step in 1955 to improve relations with Yugoslavia. Going well beyond what had only recently become imaginable, a group of high-level Soviet officials led by Khrushchev descended on Belgrade to apologize for past Soviet behavior.

Although the Soviets blamed Stalin and Beria for the vicampaign of the recent past, the world was still properly impressed (and East European national communists greatly encouraged) when Khrushchev began his speech at Belgrade airport by saluting "Comrade Tito"— the

cious anti-Tito

man whom the Kremlin only a few short months earlier had called "a chained dog of the imperialists." Tito did not bark, though. Behaving like the statesman he had become, he welcomed the Soviet comrades, promised improved relations, and then in no uncertain terms affirmed his country's inde-

pendent road to socialism. If the Kremlin had hoped to convince Tito to join the Warsaw Pact, formed also in mid- 1955, As one of the distinguished founders of the nonaligned movement, Tito's Yugoslavia would join neither bloc,

it

failed.

From Khrushchev as

it

would prefer

From

to benefit

to

Chernenko

37

from cordial relations with both. its rapprochement with

the Kremlin's point of view,

Yugoslavia was at best a partial success.

On

the one hand, it contributed to a growing impression West that the new Soviet leadership was seriously reviewing Stalin's legacy and might yet be persuaded to conduct businesslike relations with the rest of the world. On the other hand, however, the Soviet-Yugoslav truce did not stem the national communist tide in Hungary and Poland. To the contrary, Titoist factions around Nagy in Hungary and around Gomulka in Poland interpreted the Moscow-Belgrade accord to mean that they could, and perhaps even should, try in the

to translate into practice the old Soviet theory of "separate

roads to socialism"; that, given the example of Yugoslavia, the strict emulation of the Soviet

model was no longer

obli-

gatory.

In this sense and for this reason, Yugoslavia was to have an extraordinary impact on Eastern Europe in the mid-1950s and even in the 1960s less on the people who remained skeptical about any form of communism, national or otherwise, than on the region's communist elites. Of all the external influences, it was Tito's national communism that seemed to contribute most to elite divisions, which, in turn, were to prompt some of the major challenges to Soviet authority in

—

Eastern Europe. Analytically speaking, these challenges were of

Moscow had

two kinds.

respond to popular, spontaneous movements, riots, uprisings, and revolutions, such as those that erupted in East Berlin (1953), Poznan (1956), Budapest First,

to

Warsaw (1968), several Polish cities (1970 and 1976), and most dramatically throughout Poland under the banner (1956),

of the independent "Solidarity" labor

When

facing such popular

movement

(1980-81).

movements, the Kremlin

invari-

ably and in the end successfully used force to reestablish authority through

its

direct or indirect interventions. (The "Prague Spring" of 1968, discussed below, does not easily fit

38

The Bloc That Failed

into either category of East

European "challenges";

it

con-

tained elements of both.)

Second, Moscow also had to respond to demands for autonomy advanced by such independent-minded, if otherwise very dogmatic and repressive, communist parties as those of Albania (1961) and Romania (1964). When facing more or less controlled challenges of this kind initiated and tightly regulated by a ruling communist party-the Kremlin refused to use force and failed to reestablish its authority. Albania left the Soviet bloc altogether, while maverick Romania still a member of both the Warsaw Pact and CMEA pursued a

—

—

—

semi-independent foreign policy course in the second half of the 1960s.

Challenges of the first kind were more distressing to the Kremlin because they were spontaneous and because they threatened a communist party's monopoly of power. Hence the use of force to counter them. Challenges of the second kind were less alarming because they involved countries in the region's less important southern tier (e.g., Albania and Romania). They were also more difficult to confront because effective resistance could be organized by a regime in power. (The Soviet Union never removed the leadership of a rebellious communist party in Eastern Europe by force if that leadership showed signs of being prepared to defend itself.)

Of the two kinds of post-Stalin challenges in Eastern Europe, it was the Hungarian crisis in 1956 and the Czechoslovak "Prague Spring" in 1968 that prompted Soviet military interventions, while the Polish crisis in 1980-81 was "resolved" with a declaration of martial law by Polish security

and military forces. As the Hungarian crisis occurred under Khrushchev's watch, the Czechoslovak crisis under Brezhnev's watch, and the Polish crisis while Brezhnev

was formally

at the helm (but with Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko already locked in a struggle for succession), Soviet handling of the three major crises shows as-

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

39

pects of both continuity and change in the Kremlin's postStalin approach to Eastern Europe.

Crises in the Bloc: Hungary, Czechoslovakia,

Poland (1956-81) Hungary, 1956. Because the 1953 East Berlin uprising to one city and because it was crushed in less than 48 hours, the 1956 Hungarian revolution was the first major challenge to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe in the postStalin era. Preceded by a reformist prelude in 1953-55 led by Imre Nagy, who lost his premiership in March 1955, the revo-

was confined

lution itself

23, 1956, with a peaceful demdemands centered on Nagy's re-

began on October

onstration by students whose

instatement, and ended with Soviet military intervention on

November

4, 1956.

The Hungarian revolution was largely a function of longrepressed popular opposition to the Soviet Union and to communism. The Hungarians sought cordial and even friendly but not servile relations with Moscow. The students and intellectuals and workers, who were promptly joined by the military as well, succeeded in returning tion as

head of the government

Nagy

to his old posi-

—a body that was to include muchthere was no

representatives of several political parties. While the

hated collective farms quickly disintegrated, talk at all of returning large factories to their former owners. To the extent that the revolution had time to develop a domestic program, it was social-democratic in character and purpose.

The Kremlin displayed considerable hesitation about the Hungarian events. It dispatched two high-level emissaries, Politburo members Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, to Budapest twice. Between October 24 and 31, they spent four days there. Looking for a political solution, they seemed to assume that Nagy, a Titoist or "national communist" who

The Bloc That Failed

40

genuinely welcomed the post-Stalin changes in the Soviet

Union, could

save the "cause of socialism"

still

if

not

Moscow's preeminent position in Hungary. During the course and chaotic negotiations with the Nagy government, the Soviet emissaries agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory, approved the replacement of the party's Central Committee with a small executive committee more attuned to the country's mood, and in yet another major concession supported Nagy's decision to recreate the 1944-47 multiparty system. Radio Moscow praised "the newly formed Hungarian government headed by Imre Nagy," and the Soviet government formally declared its willingness to settle all outstanding issues by negotiations. With all Soviet forces withdrawn from the capital city of Budapest and the hated political police (AVO) dissolved, the revolution appeared victorious. On October 30 or 3 1 however, the Kremlin reversed itself. During the night of October 31, new Soviet forces entered Hungary and invaded the country. Khrushchev would subseof frantic

—

—

,

quently recall in his memoirs that the Soviet leadership had

between "crushing the mutiny" and "getting out of "I don't know how many times we changed our minds back and forth," he added. In the end, having consulted with leaders of the neighboring Warsaw Pact states and Yugoslavia, too, the Kremlin dispatched its troops, which reached Budapest on November 4, and crushed the revolution. There was some resistance, and many factories remained idle for weeks and months. In 1958, after a secret trial, Nagy was executed and several of his supporters jailed

vacillated

Hungary."

or put to death.

The Soviet intervention was not prompted by two of the most radical decisions made by the Nagy government: the decision to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and the decision to declare the country's neutrality.

only on

November

1

,

the

morning

They were made and hence in response Hungarian territory. Then

after

to the reentry of Soviet troops into

From Khrushchev

why

longer to allow the solution that tical

Why

the intervention?

would

to

Chernenko

Kremlin wait a

didn't the

Nagy government satisfy at least

work out a

to

most

41 bit

political

of the basic, geopoli-

Soviet interests?

Khrushchev provided a plausible

if

vague answer to the

question of Soviet motives during his discussions with the

Yugoslav leadership on November If

we

let

2:

things take their course, the West

either stupid or weak,

and

cannot possibly permit

it,

that's

either as

tionalists or as the Soviet state.

would say we are

one and the same thing.

We

communists and interna-

1

By saying "if we let things take their course," Khrushchev seemed to be referring to the future to what might happen. More members of the political police being lynched, perhaps? Capitalism? Nationalism today, NATO tomorrow? What then

—

of the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe, who's next to go?

Whether these developments were or were not likely did not much matter; what mattered was that they might come about. Therefore the Soviet leaders decided to respond by force in order to overcome their fear of all the uncertainties Hungary implied. Most disturbing among these uncertainties was the fear of losing control over the bloc and then being seen in the West as weak. As the Kremlin's leading anti-Stalinist, Khrushchev knew his power was also on the line. His name was synonymous with the pathbreaking Twentieth

CPSU

Congress, with de-

The Hungarian revolution would not have happened without Khrushchev's policies, which between 1953 and 1956 had the effect of dividing the Hungarian communist elite into Stalinists and "national communists." His colStalinization.

Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, As the Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time, Micunovic was a participant in and took detailed notes at the YugoslavSoviet summit on the 1956 Hungarian crisis, held two days before the Soviet intervention in Hungary on November 4, 1956. 1.

1980), p. 133.

—

—

— The Bloc That Failed

42

leagues knew, and Khrushchev feared they remembered, that he was ultimately more responsible than anyone else for deStalinization

— for

the process that

had

set in

motion the

events and currents leading to October-November 1956.

Thus the Hungarian revolution found Khrushchev politically vulnerable, so much so that he had to prove anew that he could be firm and indeed brutal. Despite their similar antiStalinist sentiments, then, Khrushchev had to desert Nagy to save his

own

position.

The timing of the Soviet intervention almost certainly had something to do with a concurrent international crisis Suez that presently so preoccupied the West. With British, French, and Israeli forces landing in Suez in a move strongly opposed by the United States, the West's attention centered on the Middle East. Would Moscow come to Egypt's defense and thereby possibly precipitate World War III? No, but Moscow did use the opportunity provided by Western preoccupation with Suez to invade Hungary. For whatever chance the Kremlin might have otherwise assigned to Western measures in defense of Hungary was now gone, and Hungary certainly could not defend itself against the Soviet Union on its own. In retrospect, the initial Soviet concessions Moscow's search for a political solution might have implied a willingness to tolerate deviations from Soviet policies and pre-

—

—

—

ferences. Yet, in the final analysis, the ultimate decision to

intervene must be seen as affirmation of the Kremlin's unwillingness to tolerate significant departures from existing patterns. Early hopes in Eastern

Europe and in the West that Union would lead to a major Soviet-East European relations proved un-

de-Stalinization in the Soviet

overhaul of founded.

In the aftermath of the lin still

Hungarian revolution the Krem"equality" in such relations, and decentralization— the result of which was called

paid

the bloc's

lip service to

"polycentrism" in the West—also continued. Nevertheless, the Soviet position essentially reverted to old, more rigid for-

— From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

43

mulations and policies. Stressing "socialist internationalism" (code words for bloc cohesion and the CPSU's "leading role" in world communism), a Soviet-sponsored gathering of communist parties declared in 1957:

The

socialist countries

base their relations on principles of

equality, respect for territorial integrity, state

independence

and sovereignty, and noninterference in one another's internal affairs. These are vital principles. However, they do not exhaust the essence of relations between them. Fraternal mutual aid is part and parcel of these relations. This aid is a striking expression of socialist internationalism. 2

The "Prague Spring" of 1968 difHungarian revolution in that there was no violence in Czechoslovakia and that Soviet intervention this time actively supported by several Warsaw Pact states came after considerable vacillation and long debates in the Kremlin and within the Pact. Despite spontaneous expresCzechoslovakia, 1968.

fered from the

—

sions of political sentiments, the Czechoslovak movement for change was directed largely by the Communist Party. Journalists, economists, workers, and others were both active and vocal, but the major goals of the "Prague Spring" expressed in the reformist slogan of "socialism with a human face" signified changes sought within this communist system rather than as in Hungary basic changes of the system. For this reason, the "Prague Spring" combined characteristics of the two types of challenge to Soviet authority identified

—

—

—

above.

The movement for change began within the party, not in 1953 as in Hungary but for reasons that remain obscure in the 1960s. Only then did the winds of de-Stalinization reach Czechoslovakia. Only then did the rehabilitation of the victims of the Stalinist purges get underway and discussions about economic reforms commence. Unable to resist growing pressures for change, the

—

2.

Pravda,

November

22, 1957.

—

The Bloc That Failed

44

country's orthodox party chief, Antonin Novotny,

made an

attempt in December 1967 to silence his critics. His obvious purpose was to put an end to what he regarded as dangerous reformist tendencies in the party. But

it

was too

late to rees-

tablish his rapidly fading authority. Lacking sufficient sup-

port both in the party and even in Moscow, Novotny actually lost his position.

His successor, Alexander Dubcek

trained Slovak party apparatchik

known

to

—a Soviet-

be interested in

—

reforms but opposed to radical change was quite acceptable to the Kremlin. (Brezhnev had personally endorsed his appointment.) Yet, between the time of his appointment in January 1968 and the Soviet-led intervention in August 1968,

Dubcek became the symbol

if

human

not the leader of the

movement

To what extent he embraced the program of the "Prague Spring" out of conviction or under popular pressure is still unclear. During the early months of 1968, Moscow was concerned about but not opposed to Dubcek's reformist course. The Soviet leaders knew that the previous decades had witnessed a marked decline in the growth of the Czechoslovak economy. They knew that prior to World War II Czechoslovakia had been one of the six or seven leading industrial nations in the for "socialism

with a

face."

world, a position long lost since the late 1940s. Even more than elsewhere, the Soviet model had proved inapplicable to this developed Central European country, and hence eco-

nomic conditions called leaders also

knew

(or

for a

change of direction. The Soviet

thought they knew) that, since the peo-

ple of this country

were traditionally pro-Russian, economic reforms would not likely turn into anti-Soviet political de-

mands. They seemed confident

that, in contrast to

Hungari-

ans, the people of Czechoslovakia

would not embrace antiRussian or anti-communist sentiments. Indeed, what the Czechs and Slovaks at least initially sought in the political

realm— "socialist

legality"— largely corresponded to that which the Soviet Union was professing to advocate at that time.

— From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

45

International circumstances also pointed to the utility of

Soviet restraint. West Germany's ible

approach

nomic or benefits

political contact

well

as

new Ostpolitik

—a more

flex-

no ecooffering Moscow economic was

to the Soviet bloc after years of little or

as

the

advantages that might be

—

possibility

of dividing

NATO On-

lost in case of intervention.

new

going SALT negotiations with the U.S. and China's

stance against Soviet "hegemonism" also argued for Soviet

was the already nebulous "unity" of communist movement, particularly in the area of Soviet relations with some of the more independent-minded West European communist parties. This is why even Mikhail Suslov the Kremlin's otherwise hard-line pointman in charge of relations with communist parties reportedly farestraint. Also at stake

the world

—

—

vored a wait-and-see attitude vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. In short, intervention was not to be without cost or consequences. A similar view was held in the councils of the Warsaw Pact

by Romania and Hungary. Professing

to stand

of international law, Nicolae Ceau§escu's

on principles

Romania even

re-

fused to attend a meeting of the Pact in mid-July to discuss

a

common

policy toward Czechoslovakia

—and

then

it

ex-

pressed opposition to intervention in the internal affairs of

another socialist country under any circumstances. Guided by more pragmatic considerations, Janos Kadar's Hungary was concerned lest the suppression of the "Prague Spring" have a negative effect on Hungary's own reformist orientation. (In

Romanian troops did not join the invading Warsaw Pact, but 5,000 or so Hungarian troops

August,

forces of the did.)

The contrary view in the Pact was advanced by Gomulka's Poland and especially by Walter Ulbricht's East Germany. Ulbricht was an early and vehement critic of Dubcek's policies, arguing that West German "revanchism" and U.S. "imperialism" were manipulating the Czechoslovak reform movement from behind the scenes. He maintained that "socialism with

The Bloc That Failed

46 a

human

face"

was but an empty slogan intended

to hide a

determined Western attempt at restoring Czechoslovakia's prewar, capitalist democracy. As for Moscow, it was only after June 27 when a group of Czechoslovak intellectuals issued a manifesto known as the "Two Thousand Words" that Soviet pressures visibly intensified. The planned withdrawal of Soviet troops that were in Czechoslovakia for "exercises" was suddenly and several times delayed. On July 3, Brezhnev stated, "We cannot remain indifferent to the fate of socialism in another country." On July 11, Pravda compared developments in Czechoslovakia with those of Hungary in 1956, thus both warning Dub£ek and preparing the Soviet public for what the Kremlin might

—

—

decide to do.

On July

15, the

Warsaw Pact formally demanded

by reinstating censorship and thus silencing the intellectuals. The Soviet side repeated the same demands, and added others, during the Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations that followed. Ominously, all but two or three that Prague restore order

members

of the Soviet Politburo attended these negotiations.

Yet the immediate cause of Soviet intervention

on the was almost certainly not what had already happened but what was about to happen. In August, Dubcek called for an Extraordinary Party Congress that was to meet on September 9. Had party officials been elected at that congress by secret ballot, as planned, Dubcek would night of August 20-21

have immeasurably strengthened his position in the Czechoslovak Communist Party. His remaining opponents in the leadership, and perhaps even his reluctant supporters, would have been ousted. The congress would have taken the next steps toward democratization and reform. It would have confirmed the lifting of censorship and included non-

communists in the country's political life. In effect, the congress would have consolidated and legitimized the achievements of the "Prague Spring." As in Hungary twelve years earlier, then, it was to a large extent the Kremlin's fear of what might happen rather than

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

47

—

what had already happened combined with a strong preference for that which was familiar and hence for the Soviet road to socialism that tipped the balance in favor of inter-

—

vention.

The subsequent

to that put forth after

trine" in the

West and

justification for

it

was

also similar

Hungary. Called the "Brezhnev Doc-

"socialist internationalism" in the East,

was outlined in an authoritative artiand the International ObCountries." Published in Pravda on Sep-

the Kremlin's position

cle pointedly entitled "Sovereignty

ligations of Socialist

tember

26, 1968,

included the following key paragraph:

it

is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interest of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Com-

There

munist Party

is

responsible not only to

its

own

people but also

and to the entire communist movement. Whoever forgets this by placing sole emphasis on the autonomy and independence of communist parties lapses to all the socialist countries

into one sidedness, shirking his internationalist obligations.

These words

— the "Brezhnev Doctrine"— signified the two

and hence it was an attempt to square the circle. On the one hand, the East European states were said to be sovereign and therefore free "to determine their path of development." On the other hand, however, what they do cannot run counter to the bloc's "common interests." It was also understood without being explicitly stated that the Soviet Union reserved the right to decide both what these "common interests" were and what had to be done to protect them. In short, the "Brezhnev Doctrine" explicitly confirmed the postwar Soviet policy of "limited sovereignty" for the states of Eastern Europe. The people of Czechoslovakia did not resist the invading faces of "socialist internationalism"

.

forces of the

.

.

Warsaw

their quiet revenge

have taken by apparently abandoning their tradiPact. Yet, since 1968, they

The Bloc That Failed

48

Czechs and SloHungarians, Romanians, and vaks have joined most East Germans in adopting an altogether contemptuous attitude toward almost everything Soviet and even Russian. tional Russophile orientation. Since '68, both Poles,

1980-81 began in August 1980 in the coastal city of Gdansk, where workers struck and established the independent labor union "SolidarPoland. 1980-81.

ity."

It

ended

in

The Polish

crisis of

December 1981 when Poland's

security

forces, supported by the military, cracked down on the union and declared martial law. In some very significant ways, the Polish crisis differed from both the "Prague Spring" and the Hungarian revolution. First, from a small group of workers in Gdansk, "Solidarity" grew almost overnight to become a national labor union whose membership included one-third of the country's population and whose supporters included almost every Pole. It was organized by the industrial proletariat, the presumed mainstay of communist regimes, and led by Lech Walesa, an

electrician.

Second, the 1980-81 movement for "socialist renewal" led by "Solidarity" was but the largest of the Polish people's postwar confrontations with the proprietors of power in Warsaw. Alone among East Europeans, Poles had fought against the communist regime in a civil war right after World War II. They rebelled against the authorities in Poznan and indeed throughout Poland in 1956. There were strikes and demonstrations stressing mainly economic demands in 1970 and 1976 as well, and in each instance workers played a critical role. The "Solidarity" era of 1980-81 was thus the culmination of many efforts and many sacrifices over the years in the struggle for more food and better housing conditions, as well as for political rights and independence. Third, the extraordinary significance of Poland for the Soviet Union cannot be compared to the importance Moscow attached to any other East European country. Historically,

—

—

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

49

Russia or the Soviet Union played a role in the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, 1795, and 1939. Russia or the Soviet Union was invaded by or through Poland in 1610, 1709, 1812, and 1941. When toward the end of World War II Stalin instructed the communist parties of Czechoslovakia and Hungary to seize power in ten to fifteen years, the delay was explained to party cadres by the need to draw Western attention away from the rapid takeover in Poland. That country's future was nonnegotiable because, aside from Germany's defeat, its capture constituted the most meaningful wartime or postwar gain for the Soviet Union. Moreover, today as much as in the past, Poland is at the gateway between Europe and Russia; Polish roads and railroads carry all military and commercial traffic between (East) Germany and the Soviet Union. Poland has the largest territory of all states in Eastern Europe, its population of 37 million makes it by far the most populous in the region, and the size of its military is second only to that of the Soviet armed forces among members of the Warsaw Pact. For reasons of history, geography, and size, as well as a multitude

and ideological factors, Poland's place in the Sowas always seen by the Kremlin as crucial to vital

of political viet bloc

Soviet interests.

Under the circumstances, the Kremlin watched the rise of "Solidarity" with deep interest and growing anxiety. Even before the Polish government agreed to the formation of the independent labor union in the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, 1980, Moscow had resumed the jamming of Russianlanguage Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union. (They had not been jammed since 1973.) Clearly, Moscow was concerned about the spreading of the "Polish disease." The Soviet press spoke of occasional work stoppages taking place in Poland, not strikes. Even at that early stage, however, references were also made to Western and domestic "antisocialist" forces supposedly hard at work to undermine Poland. By December 1980, the Warsaw Pact formally and ominously de-

The Bloc That Failed

50

clared that Poland "was,

is,

and

will

remain a

socialist state."

In point of fact, "Solidarity" did not advocate a return to capitalism.

It

did not advocate the establishment of a multi-

party system.

It

did not advocate either neutralism or

Poland's exit from the

Warsaw

Pact. Instead,

it

affirmed the

"leading role" of the Polish United Workers' [Communist]

Party (PUWP). Acknowledging Poland's proximity to the Soviet Union,

it

also affirmed

Warsaw's existing international

obligations.

—

Of course, "Solidarity" stood for radical change for "sorenewal." It insisted on the right of workers to belong to a free and independent trade union, not to the company unions run by the PUWP and the government. It demanded higher wages and lower prices for consumer goods, especially food. In the political realm, "Solidarity" sought freedom of the press to guarantee that its voice could not be stifled. The rapid rise of "Solidarity" and its survival for sixteen long months sparked an extraordinary social upheaval that touched 3 11 organizations, groups, individuals. Though displaying its traditional circumspection, the Catholic Church cialist

—

gave "Solidarity"

its

writers in particular

—journalists and — welcomed the opportunity to express blessings. Intellectuals

thoughts long considered taboo. In the countryside, millions joined "Rural Solidarity" in an attempt to extend the gains of "Solidarity" to Poland's agricultural population.

The new spirit of "socialist renewal" left its mark on the and members of the PUWP as well. At an Emergency

leaders

Party Congress held in July 1981, a new Politburo was elected, only four of whose fifteen members had been in the Politburo

The majority of the new Central Committee was also made up of newcomers. Though the party's first secretary, Stanislaw Kania, was seen as a centrist, he proved to be an opponent of harsh measures against "Solidarity." Despite enormous pressure from Moscow and from Polish hard-liners, Kania reportedly refused to endorse plans prepared in the before.

fall

of 1981 to declare martial law

and crush

"Solidarity."

— From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

51

what amounted to an almost completely a momentous and unparalleled upheaby the industrial working class the led and val generated Kremlin found itself on the horns of a dilemma. Nothing had prepared it for anything like this. Aside from the ideological problem of how to justify crushing another communist state's proletariat, one had to ask what a Soviet military intervention could accomplish. At least in its immediate aftermath, before the opportunists would climb back on the communist bandwagon, could Moscow find more than a few hundred loyal followers? Conversely, if the Kremlin were to let things take their course, what would be next? Would others in Eastern Europe follow suit? What would happen then In the face of

peaceful revolution

to the

—

Warsaw Pact? Could

would even spread

—

it

be that the "Polish disease"

to a Soviet republic like Lithuania

Poland's neighbor with a very large Catholic population?

Moreover, was

it

not likely that "Solidarity," having gained

recognition as a representative of the workers' economic interests, If

would soon focus on radical

political

demands

the Soviet Union needed any specific reasons

too?

—or ex-

—

to move against "Solidarity," it had to wait till the and early winter of 1981. In September, the "Solidarity" Congress adopted a message addressed to the workers of the whole Soviet bloc. While rather carefully phrased, the message was nonetheless explosive: "We support those among you who have decided to follow the difficult struggle for a free trade union movement. We have the firm hope that our representatives will be able to meet each other." The Polish government called the message a "demonstrative interference in the internal affairs of other socialist states." The Soviet news

cuses fall

agency TASS charged "extremist circles" with turning the congress into an "anti-socialist and anti-Soviet bacchanalia." Against the background of persistent provocations by Poland's political police and the government's repeated attempts to cancel concessions already made, it would have been surprising to see "Solidarity" retain its composure and

The Bloc That Failed

52

by the fall of 1981, some of the began to think that Lech Walesa was leaders of "Solidarity" too conciliatory. In December, despite Walesa's reluctance to

relative moderation. Indeed,

support the motion, "Solidarity" called for a national referendum on two highly provocative political questions. One had

do with the military relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union. The other raised the question of whether Poland should continue to have a one-party political system. Although "Solidarity's" call for a national referendum was issued on December 11, 1981 and the government of General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law on December 13, 1981, the two events were unrelated. Plans for a crackdown had been made months before; the date for the crackdown had been set weeks in advance, probably in October. Thus, to

,

Poland's struggle for "socialist renewal"

came

to a not unex-

sudden and brutal, end. The Polish crisis of 1980-81 and its resolution by an internal crackdown raised a multitude of questions, of which one stands out more than any other: Why did the Soviet Union wait sixteen long months to suppress "Solidarity"? The answer should begin with a clear understanding of the pected,

if still

Kremlin's unhesitating determination to contain this independent labor union. From the moment of its birth in

Gdansk, "Solidarity" was publicly accused by Soviet leaders and the Soviet press of every imaginable endeavor Moscow had deemed contrary to the "best interests" of Poland and the "socialist community." Its demands were said to be "antisocialist." It sought to subvert the Polish government. It created chaotic conditions. It was but the mouthpiece of U.S. imperialism. Brezhnev himself stated at the Twenty-sixth CPSU Congress in February 1981 that "opponents of socialism supported by outside forces are seeking to channel events in a counterrevolutionary course" in Poland. He added that "Polish communists, the Polish working class and the working people of that country can firmly rely on their friends and allies;

we

will not

abandon

fraternal, socialist

Poland in

its

.

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

53

hour of need, we will stand by it." Such charges against "Solidarity" were never-ending; threats to destroy it were ominous.

Moscow had three alternatives. One was to find a political solution to the crisis. What, presuch an arrangement would have entailed cannot be known, but it might have included the following: The Soviet Union would have accommodated itself to 1 the existence of "Solidarity," provided that the union focused only on economic matters, and in the expectation that a revived PUWP could gradually arrest the union's mocisely,

mentum. 2. The Soviet Union would have tolerated a relatively free press, provided that the PUWP resumed control over television and radio, and in the expectation that the press as a whole would refrain from criticizing Soviet policies. 3. The Soviet Union would have accepted a Polish legislature whose members were chosen in competitive elections, provided that the

PUWP

still

retained controlling influence

over the nominating process. 4. The Soviet Union would have endorsed even a radical economic reform, provided that it was implemented under

the party's supervision. In short, a political solution along these lines would have allowed a more narrowly defined renewal process to continue. However, while attesting to some flexibility in the Soviet position, such a course would have asserted that the issue of ultimate control was not negotiable. The Soviet Union and the PUWP would have been the final arbiter of Poland's future.

Unfortunately, this option

was

rejected. Efforts

by the

Catholic Church to bring about a compromise solution

proved unsuccessful. Perhaps more important, the aging leaders of the Soviet Politburo could not make a decision substantially different from the precedents set in 1956 and 1968, because their fear that Poland would slip away apparently

— The Bloc That Failed

54

overwhelmed

their

hope of gaining a measure of legitimate

authority in that country.

The second option was

direct Soviet military intervention.

and a high-level

According to both U.S. intelligence sources

Polish defector, this option was close to being adopted in December 1980 and again in March 1981. Why the mobilization of Soviet armed forces on those two occasions was not followed by intervention is not known. One possibility is that mobilization was only part of the ongoing war of nerves

part of the Kremlin's strategy to intimidate the Polish people

and "encourage" the Polish government order on its own.

to put its

house in

was intimately tied to crackdown to be carried out by Polish security and military forces. The connection was obvious: had the internal crackdown failed to suppress "Solidarity" and return Poland to the Soviet fold, the Kremlin could In this sense, Soviet intervention

the third option: an internal

still

have dispatched

own

was Moscow was prepared to use, Dominant among the many reasons for its

troops. Soviet intervention

thus the "backup option" that

but preferred not that reluctance

to.

was the

fear of protracted fighting pitting the

Soviet Union against the whole Polish nation.

The

ciated with conducting two wars concurrently

ghanistan and one in Poland

risks asso-

—one

in Af-

— were also too high.

Why

then did Moscow wait for sixteen months? Because did not have confidence in a political solution and because direct intervention was but a last resort. Moscow waited for it

economic conditions

to become so desperate and political, conditions so chaotic as to convince someone like General Jaruzelski that "law and order" must be restored. True, initial

planning for an internal crackdown began in the fall of 1980, within days after the government had deceitfully signed the

Gdansk Agreement with "Solidarity" on August 31st. Yet, according to circumstancial evidence and the testimony of a high-level Polish defector, Jaruzelski ordered actual preparations for the crackdown only in October 1981 Whether he had .

— From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

55

he was hoping for a political and thus peaceor rather he was a simple Soviet stooge waiting for a signal from Moscow is a matter of in-

stalled because

ful resolution of the crisis

terpretation.

What

is

clear

is

that by his actions Jaruzelski

once again proved the continued validity of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in Soviet-East European relations. As a TASS commentary stated in 1981, "The socialist community is indissolvable and its defense is a matter not only for each state but for the entire socialist coalition as well."

From Khrushchev to Chernenko: What Changed? What Didn't?

What do

the three case studies reveal about Soviet crisis

behavior in Eastern Europe? What about other trends in the bloc between crises during the long period from Khru-

—

shchev through Chernenko? First, in the area of crisis behavior, the case studies suggest important similarities in Soviet conduct. In each case, for example, the Kremlin professed to be deeply concerned about forfeiting the "gains of socialism," maintaining that it was acting on behalf of the "people." According to Moscow, the "people" as a whole did not cause the problem; all would have been well were it not for Western imperialists (and especially their voice, Radio Free Europe) and a few misguided Hungarians, Czechoslovaks, and Poles. This was presumably why the Kremlin kept looking for a political solution, hoping that "healthy elements" its local supporters could muster suf-

—

—

ficient strength to reestablish the

ing role"

and obviate the need

Communist

Party's "lead-

for military action.

In each case, moreover, the Kremlin consulted with

East European allies or at least informed them of what

it

its

was

about to do; in 1956 China and Yugoslavia were also consulted. Then, as the time for intervention or crackdown neared, Moscow greatly exaggerated existing disorder

56

The Bloc That Failed

"chaotic conditions"

—on the scene in order to prepare the So-

viet public for

what was

to

come. Before the day of reckoning,

and deception. weak position when the crisis occurred, with neither of the two Soviet leadKhrushchev or Brezhnev at the height of his power. ers As for selecting an East European leader once the crisis was it

also engaged in a good deal of intimidation

In each case, finally, the Kremlin

top

in a

—

—

Moscow appeared

over,

was

to prefer relatively

new

faces at the

— Kadar, Gustav Husak, Jaruzelski — to create the impres-

sion of change

and thus help along the process of "normaliza-

tion."

There were important similarities in East European perceptions and conduct too. In all cases, intellectuals played a key role in the events that

had

led to the crises, while peasants tended to be quite

passive. Those lief in

who sought change

strongly affirmed their be-

a socialist society, though their concept of socialism

appeared to be limited largely to the ideal of some form of egalitarianism. Their hope for change turned into widespread

—

—

euphoria in Poland in particular about the chances for lasting change. In all cases, anti-regime sentiments were there for all to see. Deep divisions within the local communist parties, both before and during the crises, resulted in

mixed

signals to the

population as to what the authorities might or might not do. Such mixed signals only encouraged the open expression of anti-regime sentiments. In the end, the Kremlin could be sure

about the loyalty of only the local security forces; party memnumbers were deserting the Soviet cause everywhere. Differences in Soviet policy had to do mainly with the timing and means of ending the crises. In Hungary, only the Soviet armed forces intervened and they did so less than two weeks after the revolution had begun. In Czechoslovakia, the "Prague Spring" lasted about seven or eight months, and the Soviet Army was assisted by contingents from other Warsaw

bers in great

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

57

Pact countries, with the exception of Romania. In Poland, the to an end after sixteen months, when and the military executed a domestic crackdown, an action instigated by the Soviets and to a lesser extent by the East German and Czechoslovak regimes. As for differences in the outcome in Eastern Europe, Hungary after a few years of terror embarked on a reformist course; the Czechoslovak regime became one of the more loyal Soviet supporters in Eastern Europe; and Poland moved toward a peculiar mixture of military/party rule while Polish society quite remarkably ignored the authorities and managed to live by its own rules.

"Solidarity" era

came

the security forces

Concerning trends in the bloc between crises, important developments both in Soviet foreign policy and in Eastern Europe affected the course of Soviet-East European relations from the 1950s on. For one thing, the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin era began to face the classic problem all major powers with global interests and ambitions often face that of trying to ap-

—

peal to

many

diverse states, groups,

stituencies at the

reconcile it

its

same

political con-

time. In the process of trying to

often conflicting goals,

could not easily have

and other

all

Moscow had

to learn that

the benefits of detente

same time keep invading other easily befriend the "moderate"

countries; that

it

and

at the

could not

Arab states and at the same

time support the "confrontationists" of the Middle East; and, indeed, that it could not easily maintain a stable Eastern Europe and at the same time demand strict adherence to its own, alien norms and policies. Thus, like other great powers with diverse interests, Moscow too was compelled to make painful choices, and in some cases its gains did not outweigh the costs. In

its

policies

toward Eastern Europe, however, what the

Kremlin regarded as

vital to Soviet interests did not

change.

From Khrushchev to Chernenko, there remained an unqualified Soviet commitment to the endurance of the bloc and to

The Bloc That Failed

58

communist parties, a commitment rooted primarily in geopolitical and ideological considerations. Yet, by the 1960s at least, these interests were no longer the only determinants of Soviet policy, nor were they applied uniformly to all countries or on all occasions. At least four additional considerations growing out of Soviet experiences and circumstances, as well as domestic and international pressures, produced a somewhat broader definition of what Moscow would come to seek or at least accept in Eastthe "leading role" of the region's

ern Europe. First, in

response to expressions of nationalism and the re-

began and distinctive features of their East European dependencies. Whereas between 1948 and 1953, Stalin could and did subordinate Eastern Europe to the Soviet state's foreign-policy interests and to his own personal and ideological inclinations, his successors on encountering open and persistent anti-Sovietism seemed willing to accommodate adaptations fostered by local conditions, traditions, and customs. The dilemma was obvious: if Soviet leaders were to follow a Stalinist approach, the expected result might be real or pergion's chronic political instability, the Soviet leaders to recognize

some

of the particular needs

—

—but

—

dangerous political instamore circumspect course and allow for national peculiarities, the East European regimes might be more viable but also more difficult to control. As there was a price to be paid in either case, Moscow at times acquiesced in gradual, controlled change away from Soviet patterns, especially when an East European country could make the threat of instability credible. For example, the hard-earned Romanian, Polish, and Hungarian reputations for national self-assertiveness probably helped these countries rather than their neighbors to obtain more elbow room in recent years. The second factor affecting Soviet policies was the deterio-

ceived ideological cohesion bility.

Conversely,

if

the Soviets were to adopt a

—

—

—

From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

was a time impose its will short-term gain, such a Soviet

rating economies of Eastern Europe.

when Moscow,

59

Though

there

overlooking local needs, could

and exploit these countries for approach in more recent periods tended to exacerbate economic problems and ignite political explosions. With Stalin's apparatus of open terror largely dismantled and its use dysfunctional, the Soviet Union began to develop a genuine, vested interest in the viability

if

not the prosperity of the re-

gion's economies.

This

was so because Moscow's trade with Eastern

— with East Germany and Czechoslovakia in particular— had become essential to the Soviet economy; beEurope cause

it

needed increased East European military contri-

butions to the modernization and general upgrading of the Warsaw Pact; and especially because serious East European

economic problems were expected to create political tensions which, in turn, would have necessitated either costly economic rescue operations or military interventions, or both. As Moscow learned, the cost of sustaining an ineffective or nearly bankrupt East European regime could be exorbitant, and the political cost of intervention in terms of Soviet setbacks elsewhere in the world even higher. It might appear, then, that the Soviet Union even before Gorbachev would have best served its interests by actively encouraging gradual and controlled economic reforms throughout the area. With the exception of Hungary's post- 1968 New Economic Mechanism (NEM), this did not

—

—

turn out to be the case. Partly because of political inertia, but

mainly because of the Kremlin's conviction that economic reforms, however carefully guided, would likely erode the region's political structures, Moscow generally relied on the old formula: fewer

new

investments, organizational shake-ups,

forecasts of future benefits accruing tion via

CMEA,

and, in the 1970s,

from regional integra-

some Soviet

adequate as this old formula proved to be,

it

subsidies. In-

nonetheless sig-

The Bloc That Failed

60 nified a

more accommodating Soviet approach

Europe than

Stalin's policy of outright

to Eastern

economic exploita-

tion.

A seldom-recognized third factor affecting Moscow's East European policies was the Soviet leaders' preoccupation with the struggle for power in the Kremlin. The years 1953-56, 1964-68, and 1979-85 marked major succession crises in Moscow and concurrent trouble in Eastern Europe.

—

In the

first

instance,

Khrushchev extended the processes

of "socialist legality" (or domestic de-Stalinization) to East-

ern Europe in the 1950s, partly in order to discredit political opponents (principally Malenkov and Molotov) and partly in order to release regional tension pent up during Stalin's last years. In the second instance, several of the East European regimes, such as Romania, Hungary, and of course Czechoslovakia, exploited the opportunity for maneuver afforded by the Kremlin's absorption in internal political matters in the mid-1960s. When released from these concerns, the Soviet leaders could once again clarify and implement policies which culminated in interventions in Hungary and Czecho-

—

—

slovakia. In the third instance, the Polish era of "socialist re-

newal" in 1980-81 should be understood against the background of Brezhnev's illness in the late 1970s and the brief tenures of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko in the early 1980s a long period of immobilism in the Kremlin, which in turn contributed to weakness and confusion at the top in Poland as well. While in some cases such immobilism in the Kremlin culminated in a crackdown, in several other cases the East European reaction was to take advantage of the Soviet leaders' preoccupation with the struggle for succession and make such changes as an attentive and vigorous Kremlin might have opposed. When the cat's away the mice will play.

—

—

Finally, the fourth factor influencing Soviet policies to-

ward Eastern Europe was Soviet

relations with the West. Al-

— From Khrushchev

to

Chernenko

61

though the Soviet Union did not accommodate itself to the prospect of any East European country denying the "leading role" of its communist party or removing itself from the Warsaw Pact for the sake of Western trade and whatever else detente denoted, Moscow nonetheless remained sensitive to the damage its East European policies could cause to the fabric of East-West relations.

Accordingly, while the West could not the Soviet Union from protecting ests in Eastern

Europe,

it

made

its

and did not deter

real or perceived inter-

the ultimate option of mili-

somewhat more difficult to adopt. It should be recalled that Moscow intervened in Hungary in 1956 when the West was deeply involved with the Suez crisis, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 when the United States was thoroughly occupied with the Vietnam war. That the Kremlin waited for an incredible sixteen months in 1980-81, and then tary intervention

tried

an "internal crackdown" rather than outright

vention in Poland, was due not only to the Soviets'

inter-

own

unusual attention the West was paying Moscow's perception of Western preoccupation elsewhere in the world appears to have influenced though presumably never determined Soviet choices in dealing with its East European depen-

immobilism but

to the

to the fortunes of "Solidarity." In short,

—

dencies.

The four factors discussed above suggest that changes in the Soviet Union were important enough to temper Moscow's interventionist urge. From Khrushchev to Chernenko, the evolution of Soviet policy in the region pointed toward tolerance for a measure of controlled change, economic experimentation, and even political liberalization. The very fact that Eastern Europe was as diverse as it was showed that dethough not the ultimate decicisions of some magnitude sions had come to be locally made; the Soviet bloc had been decentralized. Stalin's heirs acted on what the old tyrant had once said but did not practice: "Soviet power cannot

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

62

do everything

for you.

You must do the

fighting,

you must do

the work."

was both much continuity and change in Stalin's death and Gorbachev's rise. between the Soviet orbit What Gorbachev inherited in the political, economic, and military realms and how he has coped so far are treated in Parts Two and Three. In short, there

—

—

Part

Two

THE ERA OF REFORM, 1985-88

m POLITICAL RELATIONS

The Early Gorbachev Era: Cure or Relief? after the Soviet Union abandoned its communist allies in the fall and early winter of 1989 after the Berlin Wall was breached, a new "Prague Autumn" burgeoned, and the old dictators of Bulgaria and Romania fell it is easy to forget the early Gorbachev: the man who from his rise to power in

—

—

1985 to 1988 held a different conception of and had pursued

toward Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, in 1985-88, appeared to view the East European crisis (to employ Seweryn Bialer's distinction) as a "crisis of performance" rather than a "crisis of the system." True, he understood even then that Eastern Europe was the Soviet different policies

Union's Achilles heel, a vulnerable spot that would generate acute problems Soviet Union

for,

and might even end,

his policies in the

even as he realized that the region's political and economic conditions were unhealthy, Gorbachev believed that these conditions could be remedied by a dose of perestroika and glasnost. He seemed to assume that only the regimes would have to change their ways, and that although here and there new leaders were needed too, the communist systems were eminently capable of rebirth, revival, and even renaissance. Until 1988, the East European communist elites with the exception of a very few truly radical reformers in Poland and Hungary had shared the Soviet view of the essentially limitself. Yet,

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

66

ited scope of the crisis they faced and what had to be done about it. They, too, wanted to improve performance and rerather than change the systain their monopoly of power tem by adopting genuine political pluralism and developing market-based economies. For several years, then, Gorbachev failed to come to terms with the depth of popular East European disillusionment with and opposition to any form of communism, reformed or otherwise. He did not seem to understand, or concede, that what he sought a more efficient and more humane commuwas anathema to most of the peoples of Eastnist system ern Europe, who rejected the system itself and regarded Gorbachev's reforms as "too little and too late." In a July 1988 interview with The New York Times, Polish historian Bronislaw Geremek (then a top political strategist for "Solidarity") gave this view of Gorbachev's imminent visit to Po-

—

—

—

—

land: I

hope Mr. Gorbachev

will be able to

understand that what

quite satisfactory for Soviet problems

is

not satisfactory for Polish problems. In Poland you have to confront the real potential for revolt

and a lack

is

and mass movements

for dissatisfaction,

of consensus here [even] creates a danger to his

policies.

In a nutshell, the choice confronting Gorbachev in Eastern

Europe relief

after 1985

was whether

this troubled region

needed

only or cure, palliatives or surgery, reform or transfor-

He did Eastern Europe knew all

mation. For several years, Gorbachev opted for not recognize what the peoples of along: that the postwar

communist

political

relief.

and economic

order imposed on the region by Stalin and sustained by his successors lacked legitimacy and was therefore inherently unstable and potentially explosive. They

—

knew what Gor-

bachev would not acknowledge that the seemingly permanent crisis that had bedeviled Eastern Europe for four long decades required cure rather than relief. The pre- 1988 Soviet view that relief was sufficient was

Political Relations

67

supported by the experience of Kadar's Hungary in the second half of the 1960s. At that time, during the era of "goulash communism," that country was stable and its people quite satisfied. There was even a mood of optimism about the future, and Kadar himself enjoyed considerable popularity. Despite its dubious origins, the early revenge against the revolu-

and the absence of genuine political pluralism, the Kadar regime managed to earn a measure of support primarily because of its consumer-oriented economic policies, relative political tolerance, and the occasional distance it kept from some of the unduly harsh features of Soviet patterns and policies. By the 1980s, such "relief" became insufficient to satisfy growing expectations in most of Eastern Europe, including Hungary. East European public opinion, which once looked at Kadar's "goulash communism" with both envy and admitionaries

ration,

of

1956,

appeared to view even Gorbachev-style reform with

skepticism, seeing

it

as possibly beneficial for the Soviet

Union but considerably less so for Eastern Europe. In a 198687 survey conducted for the highly regarded Audience and Opinion Research Department of Radio Free Europe, citizens not emigres of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania were asked to respond to these questions: "Do you believe that Gorbachev's leadership is good or bad for the Soviet Union?" and "Do you believe that Gorbachev's leadership is good or bad for [respondent's own

—

—

country]?"

1

makes an interesting suggestion: (1) Against the background of decades of persistent antiSovietism permeating Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev seems to have improved its image and repuEach

of the tables

tation in Eastern Europe, to a small extent even in Poland.

1. The results of this survey, including the tables reproduced here, were published in East European Perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Reforms (Munich: Radio Free Europe Audience and Opinion Research Department, July 1988).

The Bloc That Failed

68

"Do you believe that Gorbachev's leadership is good or bad for the Soviet Union?" table

1.

Bulgaria

Czechosl Hungary Poland Romania

Good Bad

79%

75%

4

3

10

7

9

Neither

16

18

17

28

19

Other / no answer No. of cases

65%

51%

63%

1

4

8

14

9

556

436

385

247

541

2. "Do you believe that Gorbachev's leadership good or bad for [respondent's own country]?"

table is

Bulgaria Czechosl Hungary Poland

Good Bad

64%

53%

8

Neither

Other / no answer No. of cases table

3.

Romania

38%

20%

8

23

23

10

24

34

26

44

38

4

5

13

13

12

556

436

385

247

541

40%

Evaluations of Gorbachev's leadership

own country

for the respondent's

to the Soviet

(Tables

&

1

as

compared

Union

2 combined)

Bulgaria Czechosl. Hungary Poland

-15%

Romania

-22%

-27%

-31%

-23%

Neither

+4 +8

+5 + 16

+ 13 +9

+ +

16

+1 + 19

Other / no answer

+3

+

+5

-1

+3

Good Bad

(2)

Still,

1

16

the vast majority of East Europeans were not

convinced that what was good for the Soviet Union was good enough for them. One of every four respondents believed that

69

Political Relations

Gorbachev's reforms were less relevant for Eastern Europe than for the Soviet Union. There were also major differences within the region on this issue. While almost two- thirds of the

Bulgarian

respondents

rated

Gorbachev's

leadership

as

"good" for Bulgaria, only one-fifth of Polish respondents

thought that he was "good" for Poland. The reasons for the striking gap between the East Europeans' approval of what Gorbachev was doing in the Soviet

Union and

their uncertainty about the merit of his leadership

Europe were not self-evident at that time. Was the gap due to the East Europeans' traditionally cynical attitude toward the Soviet Union (i.e., "It's good for 'them' but not for us")? Was it only that East Europeans, in their lethargic mood, thought their leaders lacked the courage, dynamism, skill, and imagination to be innovative like Gorbachev? Or was it due to a growing conviction that their countries' communist system was beyond repair that it needed cure? Alas, only in retrospect can the results be interpreted to mean East European popular rejection of anything short of systemic

for Eastern

—

transformation. (3)

Nevertheless, the survey also hinted at considerable

among some East Europeans about the Gorbachev phenomenon. Admittedly, the evidence was slim.

political

excitement

But Gorbachev's high approval rating in Table 1, which was surely unprecedented for the leader of a country that had suppressed Eastern Europe for over four decades, implied that there were East Europeans who had become hopeful "cautiously optimistic" that Gorbachev would manage to find new leaders for the region and still make a difference. Reports from Eastern Europe generally confirmed this impression. Gorbachev's very warm welcome from the people of Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1987 was both a protest against local leaders and an expression of hope that Gorbachev would find a way to replace them. In Poland and Hungary, two countries that had already surpassed Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost by then, his program

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

70

—

prompted radical questions about the "next steps" about measures that would go beyond "democratization" to political pluralism, beyond "restructuring" to a mixed economy, and thus beyond what Gorbachev had in mind for the Soviet Union.

Europe could not have been raised without Gorbachev. They were raised because a growing number of Poles assumed that if the spirit of perestroika and glasnost were applied to Polish cir-

Such questions about the next steps

in Eastern

—

cumstances, for example, the next step there the formation of an independent labor union and perhaps even the introduction of genuine pluralism was no longer unthinkable. If the spirit of perestroika and glasnost were applied to Hungar-

—

ian circumstances, the reorientation of that country's foreign

trade toward the West and a correspondingly reduced relationship with the Soviet-sponsored CMEA would be conceivable. If the spirit of perestroika

and glasnost were applied

—

to

Czechoslovak circumstances, the next step there the wholecould sale removal of that country's Brezhnevite leadership

—

be achieved. Indeed, given the expectations Gorbachev aroused, some East Europeans began to believe that even the next big step the gradual transformation of the Soviet "sphere of domination" in their region into a Soviet "sphere of influence" was no longer a pipe dream. While by 1988 the Soviet Union had begun to be tolerant

—

—

toward and even supportive of Polish and Hungarian experiments along these lines, it was still reluctant to pressure either its Brezhnevite allies elsewhere in Eastern Europe or the Stalinist Ceau§escu regime in Romania to undertake serious reforms. Gorbachev seemed to believe that the era of "stagnation" in the 1970s could be ended, stability restored, and suffiwithout cient progress made by improving the system

—

attacking

its

structural,

systemic

deficiencies.

He was

concerned that radical change would spark persistent instability. He sought reform, not transformation. By contrast, most East Europeans tended to believe that only more drastic

Political Relations

changes

71

— those that would take them beyond Gorbachev's — could resolve the region's chronic economic and

program

political crisis. In that difference

between most Soviet and

East European leaders, on the one hand, and the East Euro-

—

pean peoples, on the other in their very different perceptions of reality and what had to be done lay Gorbachev's initial challenge and dilemma. The choice Gorbachev made at first was to prescribe for Eastern Europe no more than what he thought the Soviet Union needed relief, not cure.

—

—

The Gradual Demise of the "Brezhnev Doctrine"

The concept that served as the guiding principle of Sowas still socialist internationalism. Its two components professed (Soviet) respect for (East European) sovereignty and (East European) respect for the bloc's (Soviet-defined) common interests were introduced in the previous chapter. Initially, these components of the old Soviet concept of intra-bloc relations remained essentially unchanged under

viet-East European relations in the early Gorbachev era

—

—

Gorbachev. Historically, socialist internationalism derives

from the

Marxist notion of internationalism, which posits the identity

on class rather than on nationality or ethnic origin. In the Marxist view, the world is divided by the underlying conflict of economic interests between workers and their exploiters and not by national antagonisms. The conflict of economic interests was expected to end only in a communist world. of interests of industrial workers based

According to Soviet political writers, internationalism developed in three stages. The first stage was the period before the 1917 Russian revolution, to

have manifested

itself in

when the

internationalism was said

common

struggle of workers

against capitalism, and in the assistance that workers in one

country were giving to workers elsewhere. The second stage

The Bloc That Failed

72

covered the period from 1917 to the end of World War II. As the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the only communist party in power at that time,

sumed

Moscow

as-

the "leading role" in the struggle against capitalism,

helping workers as well as the communist parties that

claimed to represent the workers' interests. During the third stage the post-World War II era, when several Soviet- type systems came into existence to form "the world socialist system" internationalism emerged in two forms. When socialist states assisted workers and communist

—

—

parties in the capitalist world, they did so in the letarian internationalism;

when

name of pro-

socialist countries related to

one another, their cooperative association was called internationalism. The latter relations, the absence of

was meant

fundamental

socialist

to indicate fraternal

conflicts of interests.

was explained,

Such harmonious

relations could exist,

cause

countries, in the absence of class conflict

at

all socialist

home,

reflected the

common

it

interests of

foreign relations across national frontiers.

be-

workers in their

Hence the repeat-

edly proclaimed "identity of views" on basic questions

among

the socialist countries.

Because the theory posits the common interests of socialist states, it was always difficult to find appropriate explanations for existing differences between such states. As their interests were presumed to coincide, what caused the rift between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia or between the Soviet Union and China? How would a Marxist ideologist come to grips with high tension between Hungary and Romania over the Romanian suppression of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Transylvania? In general, why were intra-bloc relations so seldom harmonious, to say the least? Even at the beginning of the Gorbachev era, the simple answer given by Soviet and East European ideologists was that as long as capitalism exists,

U.S. "imperialism"

— will

ploit "contradictions"

its

representatives

instigate conflicts

(i.e.,

— particularly

and indeed

ex-

problems) in the socialist world.

73

Political Relations

The argument was (largely)

We have

familiar:

a problem and

it

is

your fault. But there was a more sophisticated explaIt was that even in countries where socialism

nation as well.

remnants of the old, so-called petty-bourgeois mentality survived, and thus external forces could still count on the support of some misguided individuals. According to this more complex version, faulty decisions by the regimes or their leaders could also contribute to or exacerbate such problems; for example, Stalin and Beria were blamed for the

was

victorious,

Soviet-Yugoslav Significantly,

rift. it

was

also the concept of socialist interna-

tionalism that provided justification for the need to be vigilant in defense of the gains of socialism everywhere.

Hence the "Brezhnev Doctrine"

— the application of the the-

ory of socialist internationalism to contemporary circumstances in Eastern Europe. As Brezhnev once explained

it:

The CPSU has always advocated that each socialist country determine the concrete forms of its development along the path of socialism by taking into account the specific nature of its national conditions. But it is well known, comrades, that there are common natural laws of socialist construction, deviation from which could lead to deviation from socialism as such. And when external and internal forces hostile to social-

ism try to turn the development of a given

socialist

country

in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system,

when

a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all

—

—

socialist countries. It is

quite clear that an action such as military assistance end a threat to the socialist system

to a fraternal country to is

an extraordinary measure, dictated by necessity.

It

can be

called forth only by the overt actions of the enemies of socialism within the country and beyond its boundaries, actions that

create a threat to the

common

Under Gorbachev the Soviet 2.

Pravda,

November

13, 1968.

interests of the socialist

camp.

2

definition of socialist interna-

For an English translation, see Current

The Bloc That Failed

74 tionalism

—and

its

—

"Brezhnev Doctrine" was What was new from the beginning was autonomy of the East European commu-

corollary, the

gradually modified. the emphasis on the

and Moscow's rather convincing disavowal of its communist world. Speaking in Prague answering his own question about the "major in 1987 and principles" of the Soviet-East European relationship, Gorbachev himself reiterated some of the old Soviet views and at the same time hinted at intriguing modifications: nist parties

"leading role" in the

First

and foremost we proceed from the premise that the

entire system of the socialist countries' political relations can

and must be

built

on the basis of equality and mutual respon-

No one has the right to claim special status in the socialist world. We consider the independence of every party, its responsibility to the people of its own country, and its right sibility.

to decide the questions of the country's

development

to

be un-

conditional principles.

At the same time, we are of the firm conviction that the community of socialist nations will be successful only if every party and country is concerned not only about its own interests, and only if every party and country treats its friends and allies with respect and is sure to take their interests into account. 3

In his

1987 book Perestroika, written for the English-

speaking world and phrased accordingly, Gorbachev elaborated on the

The

same

entire

points:

framework of political relations between the somust be strictly based on absolute indepena view held by the leaders of all fraternal coun-

cialist countries

dence. This

is

The independence

of each Party, its sovereign right to decide the issues facing its country and its responsibility to its nation are the unquestionable principles. tries.

Digest of the Soviet Press 20, No. 46

(December

4, 1968),

pp. 3-5.

Mikhail Gorbachev, For a "Common European Home," For a New Way of Thinking, Speech by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Meeting, Prague, April 10, 1987 (Moscow: Novosti, 1987), p. 10. 3.

75

Political Relations

We

are also convinced that the socialist community will be if every party and state cares for both its own

successful only

and common

interests,

if it

respects

its

friends

and

allies,

heeds their interests and pays attention to the experience of others. Awareness of this relationship between domestic issues and the interests of world socialism is typical of the countries of the socialist community. We are united, in unity resides our strength, and from unity we draw our confidence that we will cope with the issues set forth by our time. 4

Comparison of Gorbachev's statements with Brezhnev's prompts these observations: (1) The underlying justification for "fraternal assistance" by the Soviet Union the "Brezhnev Doctrine" still remained largely unchanged. The code words were still there: the "socialist community" had a "common responsibility" and "common interests," and the socialist countries "will be successful only if every party and state cares for both its own and common interests." The phrasing was less threatening than Brezhnev's but the argument was similar. What was unclear was whether the Soviet Union, having disclaimed its "leading role," was still ultimately in charge of interpreting the meaning of, and determining when to act on behalf of, the

—

—

bloc's

"common

interests."

(May Gorbachev specifically addressed the issue of past Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe. When asked about Soviet military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, he had an opportunity on the eve of his Moscow summit with President Reagan to break with the past. Instead, this is what he said even then: In a subsequent interview with The Washington Post

22, 1988),

—

—

When you

speak about interference, I understand what you mind. But when I recall those situations, I had something else in mind. I have in mind that before what you are

have

4.

in

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika:

the World

(New

York: Harper

and Row,

New

Thinking for Our Country and

1987), p. 165.

The Bloc That Failed

76

talking about happened, another kind of interference

had

oc-

curred.

was an old argument: The Soassistance" ("what you are "fraternal Union extended viet talking about") to Hungary and Czechoslovakia because "another kind of interference" presumably by the West had Implicit in Gorbachev's reply

—

—

made

it

unavoidable. In other words,

order to protect the

common

Moscow intervened

cause of socialism not

in

from the

Imre Nagy and Alexander Dub£ek but from the West. With past Soviet interventions so justified, Gorbachev declined to repudiate the "Brezhnev Doctrine." (2) At the same time, Gorbachev was placing far greater stress than his predecessors on "the independence of each [Communist] Party" in the region. He repeatedly affirmed Moscow's intention to deal with the East European parties likes of

"on the basis of equality," effectively disclaiming the Soviet Union's "leading role" in world communism. "No one has the right to claim special status in the socialist world," he said.

Moscow in November 1987, Gorbachev added: "We have become convinced of there being

In a major speech delivered in

no 'model' of socialism It

was

to

difficult to sort

viet position; clearly,

it

be emulated by everyone." out the precise meaning of the So-

was under

review.

Some Soviet representatives said that Gorbachev's words about the East European parties' autonomy should be taken at face value. For example. Oleg T. Bogomolov, the reformminded and of the

influential director of the Institute of

World

Economics

The Washington Times

Socialist System, told

"We have completely changed our relations [Today the] "Brezhnev with the East European countries. Doctrine" is completely unacceptable and [its application]

(July 8, 1988),

.

unthinkable.

.

.

.

We

gave too

much

.

.

advice before to our part-

ners, and it was actually very damaging to them. It's time to keep our advice to ourselves." In a similar vein, Fyodor Burlatski, chairman of the Soviet Human Rights Commission, told the Austrian

paper Die Presse in April 1988, "We

77

Political Relations

have given our

we

allies so

much bad advice them a piece

in the past that

now

good advice." A few writers went even further, denouncing the history of Soviet policy toward the communist movement. In the government paper Izvestia (July 11, 1987), Alexander Bovin, a senior foreign policy analyst, blamed the Soviet Union for the harm it had done to communist parties abroad, including [even] hesitate to give

of

those in Eastern Europe:

The prospects

for socialist transformation in

developed capi-

countries has been shunted into the indefinite future. The situation in a number of countries of socialist persuasion retalist

mains unstable and is susceptible to regression. And in capitalist have and Third World countries [most] communist parties been unable to transform themselves into mass organizations and secure the support of the bulk of the working class and working people. There are a number of reasons for this and one of them is undoubtedly the failures, contradictions, and phenomena of crisis and stagnation in the development of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and world socialism as a whole. [Emphasis added.] .

.

.

—

Looking at these comments, Western analysts and probwere inclined to shake their heads in disbelief. Could it be that the Soviet Union recognized the sovereignty and independence of the countries of Eastern Europe? Could it be that the old rhetoric about nonintervention now actually signified a prohibition not only against military intervention but even against "good advice" as well? Was the "Brezhnev Doctrine" really "unacceptable"? ably most East Europeans

Did

—

socialist internationalism acquire a different

meaning?

No one could be sure. It appeared, however, that the concept of socialist internationalism was being modified to stress the responsibility and autonomy of the East European communist parties. Moscow was showing more tolerance toward its allies. Clearly, there was more room for experimenMoscow's vision of the Soviet-East European relationship was not what it had been in the 1960s and the 1970s, let alone in Stalin's time, when the Kremlin's

tation than ever before.

The Bloc That Failed

78

Mikhail Suslov could litburo

members

—and did — dismiss East European Po-

at will.

Gorbachev was giving the old theory of "separate roads to socialism" a new lease on life. He was telling the communist leaders of Eastern Europe to take charge of their own affairs. The countries of Eastern Europe were not (yet) on their own, but the region's communist parties were granted far more autonomy than they had before; it was not primarily their responsibility and not the Soviet Union's to improve economic performance under (if at all possible) stable conditions. Gorbachev's apparent intention was to accelerate the bloc's decentralization that had begun after Stalin's In effect,

death. All in all, the

words emanating from Moscow did not

yet point to a radical break with the past; they suggested a

gradual evolution in Soviet thinking.

On

the one hand,

Gorbachev's affirmation of the socialist states' terests"

was a

Eastern Europe.

tonomy

"common

in-

sign of continuity in the Soviet perception of

On

the other hand, his emphasis on the au-

of the region's

communist

parties

was a hopeful sign

of the fading of Moscow's imperial mentality.

On

the basis of Soviet statements, most Western analysts

could not yet conclude that Soviet hegemony over Eastern Eu-

rope was giving

way

to full respect for the principles of sover-

eignty and non-intervention. They, and probably most East

Europeans, assumed that under certain circumstances Mosresort to the use of military force on behalf of its real or perceived security interests, though no longer on behalf of its real or perceived ideological interests. Indeed, the important question was not whether the "Brezhnev Doctrine" was dead. Saying that it was in statements not from Gorbachev but from lesser officials and commentators did

cow would

—

—

not really answer the question; East Europeans remained

They wondered how far an East European country could go without inviting Soviet skeptical of future Soviet intentions.

— 79

Political Relations

"fraternal assistance."

What was

the

new

threshold of Soviet

tolerance?

was that as long as an East European country remained in the Warsaw Pact and accepted "socialism" or at least called itself "socialist," there would be no intervention. A second answer was that the threshold of Soviet tolerance might be higher for the region's small and strategically insignificant countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary) than it was for the northern tier countries (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). The third answer the safest and the best was that only if and when an upheaval occurred would Gorbachev himself (or his successor) know and decide what to do, and therefore the outside world Until 1988-89, one answer

—

could not

By trine,"

was

know

in

advance

either.

1988, growing uncertainty about the "Brezhnev Doc-

threshold of tolerance, produced

Moscow new pres-

European people, who wanted

their lead-

combined with the widely held

raising

its

sures from the East

feeling that

ers to undertake radical experiments that

suddenly seemed

be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Emboldened by the spirit and logic of perestroika and glasnost, by the presumed erosion of Moscow's imperial mentality, by informal Soto

"Brezhnev Doctrine," and by subtle changes of emphasis in the official definition of socialist internationalism, East Europeans were putting their leaders on the defensive in Gorbachev's name.

viet disclaimers of the

—

The Institutional Framework

The

bloc's extensive institutional

network was no barrier

to Gorbachev's placing Soviet-East European relations on a more equal footing but it was of no particular help either.

—

In point of fact, the existing network could be used for all

types or kinds of relations.

The Bloc That Failed

80

Throughout the Gorbachev era, as before, most of the political business transacted between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been through bilateral ties, including party-to-party and government-to-government relations as well as numerous semi-governmental and semi-official contacts.

In the

CPSU, important decisions concerning Eastern Eumade by the Politburo and imple-

rope have always been

mented by the

Secretariat. Until mid- 1988, a key post in that

institutional setting

was

the Central

Committee secretary

in

charge of relations with the socialist countries, a post Vadim Medvedev occupied for several years. Unlike his predecessors (including Suslov), Medvedev was not a Politburo member at that time. His large staff of specialists on every socialist

country in Eastern Europe and elsewhere worked for the awkwardly named Department for Liaison with the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. This depart-

ment maintained "liaison" with all ruling communist parties, but not with those that were competing for power in Western Europe and elsewhere. Prior to the mid- 1988 reorganization of the CPSU apparatus (see Chapter 6), two other major departments shared responsibility for Eastern Europe.

One was

the general Interna-

headed at the time by Anatoly Dobrynin, the long-time Soviet ambassador to the United States; the other was the Information and Propaganda Department, led by Politburo member and strong Gorbachev ally Aleksandr Yakovlev. (One of Yakovlev's deputies was Nikolai Shishlin, a veteran East European specialist.) Whether, or to what extent, either Dobrynin or Yakovlev was authorized to supervise the work of the Liaison Department was not known. Nor was it clear how responsibilities for East European affairs were divided among the several Central Committee departments (including Medvedev s) on the one hand, and Gorbachev's very influential "personal advisor" on Eastern Europe (the highly regarded political scientist, tional Relations Department,

Political Relations

Georgi Shakhnazarov) on the other. However, icy

81 all

the top pol-

—Medvedev, Dobrynin, and espeShakhnazarov, and Shishlin — belonged to

makers mentioned here

cially Yakovlev,

the CPSU's reformist wing.

As for government-to-government relations, they have

al-

ways constituted the other major channel for bilateral contacts. Most of the business transacted this way involves economic issues bilateral trade in particular. When the head of the Soviet government currently Nikolai Ryzhkov or one of his ministers meets his East European counterpart, the principal subjects under discussion are trade, financial matters, deliveries, and the like.

—

—

—

As for non-economic issues, there are at least four ministries, institutions, or semi-governmental agencies keeping an eye on or maintaining close contact with the region. Until 1989, the most important of them was probably the KGB, the Soviet secret police and intelligence service. The

KGB's

—

its East European equivalents except the independent-minded, if huge and brutal, Romanian service were presumed to be extensive and frequent. Its main task was believed to be the collection of information about the reliability of East European leaders. Except in Romania, KGB agents also advised, though no longer supervised, their East European counterparts. Presumably in cooperation with Soviet military intelligence, the KGB was also in charge of coordinating joint East European activities in the West, including the collection of technical intelligence, such as the purchase and theft of high-technology information and blueprints.

contacts with

—

Until the 1988 reorganization of the foreign-policy hierar-

headed by Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze, was to facilitate rather than to decide. Under the supervision of one of Shevardnadze's deputies, the ministry dealt only with the chy, the role of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

formal aspects of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe, such as protocol; his staff was divided, as are such staffs elsewhere in the world, into geographic divisions and country

The Bloc That Failed

82

The ministry staffed the embassies, of course, and it most of the cables from the region's capitals and distributed them to appropriate officials throughout the bu-

desks.

also received

reaucracy, including party headquarters.

The Soviet Ministry of Defense has maintaineds bilateral, government-to-government contact with the region's ministries of defense. While military relations are conducted

framework of the Warsaw Pact below and Chapter 5), wherever Soviet forces are stationed in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czecholargely via the multilateral

(see

—

slovakia at present

must be

— there are numerous practical issues that

settled bilaterally. Normally, these issues relate to

the implementation of agreements previously

councils of the

Warsaw

made by

the

Pact.

an important role in Soviet-East European relawas reserved for the Soviet Academy of Science's Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, directed by Academician Oleg Bogomolov. The institute's staff conducts extensive research on contemporary economic, political, and social developments in Eastern Europe; it is by far the largest Soviet think-tank focusing on the region. Aside from research, the institute also advises the party and the government on what policies they should adopt. Members of the staff are frequently assigned to the Soviet Union's East European embassies, where they serve as economic officers, cultural attaches, and the like. The Bogomolov Institute, as it is often called, Finally,

tions

is

known

to

have long advocated a tolerant Soviet approach

to Eastern Europe.

As for multilateral ties, there are two major, well-known inthe Warsaw Pact and the Council for

stitutions in the bloc

—

Mutual Economic Assistance. Their respective military and economic roles are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, while some of the more recent changes are treated in Chapter 6. The Warsaw Pact's political activities and significance can be summarized here as follows:

The Warsaw Pact was formed

in 1955.

Why

it

was created

83

Political Relations

then

is still

a matter of controversy. Formally,

it

was

pre-

—

the Soviet Union and its East Euroits founders pean allies as a response to NATO in general and to West Germany's imminent decision to join NATO in particular. The problem with that explanation is that NATO had been in

sented by

—

existence for six years, since 1949. Moreover,

Moscow did not

need the Warsaw Pact to counter NATO, with or without West Germany as its member, for wartime agreements provided for the stationing of Soviet troops in several East European countries. (The legal rationale for stationing Soviet troops in Poland was that they maintained links between the Soviet homeland and the Soviet occupation forces in East Germany, while Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania were supposed to be there to maintain links with Soviet occupareally

tion forces in then-divided Austria.)

Why

then was the

that time?

The most

Warsaw Pact formed

in 1955

likely explanation is that

it

—why at

was created

in response to the neutralization of Austria in 1955, the conse-

quence of which was the withdrawal of Soviet forces (as well as of the occupying armies of the U.S., Great Britain, and France) from that country. The new circumstances required Moscow to find a new legal basis for keeping Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania. The Warsaw Pact provided the necessary legal justification: Soviet troops could remain on the territory of any member state to protect all members against foreign

(i.e.,

Western) aggressors.

A second controversy has involved the primary function Warsaw Pact. According to its treaty, it is a defensive

of the

organization intended to act as a military counterweight to

NATO and to offer its members a forum for foreign-policy consultation

and coordination.

Many Western Warsaw Pact

observers have seen the main role of the

—as

an instrument for the Soviet Union to keep Eastern Europe in line. One Western analyst wrote that with the Pact operating as an agent of Soviet control over the region, its "main uses are political rather than differently

The Bloc That Failed

84

purely military, and

it

serves as an iron corset to hold to-

gether the communist bloc. In a larger sense, the

Warsaw

Pact serves as an alliance system through which the Soviet leaders seek to entangle their unwilling allies in a

web

viet national interests." 5 Since 1989, as discussed in 5

and

6, this is

Still,

the

of So-

Chapters

a role the Pact has ceased to play.

Warsaw

Pact has brought together the region's

top leaders once or twice a year for meetings of

its Political

Consultative Committee (PCC), the Pact's highest organ. An-

other political channel has been the Pact's Committee of Foreign Ministers. Meetings of both committees have rotated

among

the capitals of the

member states, with

try in charge of arrangements

ing the inevitable after the

meeting

communique is

the host coun-

and protocol as well as of draftthat

is

released to the press

concluded.

At these very high-level discussions, foreign-policy issues intra-bloc relations used to come up for discussion. For example, the meetings usually generated some proposals, rec-

and

ommendations, or "appeals" that dealt with arms control and European security. It is a fair guess that the primary objective was to add weight to a Soviet proposal which would be presented later as the Warsaw Pact's "new approach" to peace and security. Only since the formation of a largely noncommunist Polish government in 1989 have East European representatives begun to debate such routine Soviet propo-

Warsaw Pact meetings. To discern a new idea in a PCC communique dealing with

sals at

"peace and security" required extraordinary patience and erudition, as well as considerable familiarity with previous pro-

communist jargon. At what appeared to be a an old proposal issued by the

posals and with the intricacies of times, Western analysts confronted slightly modified version of

Pact.

What followed then was speculation: Does

the modifica-

5. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance," Survey, No. 70/71 (Winter/Spring 1969), p. 101.

85

Political Relations

tion signal a possible

new approach

or

is it

only propaganda

intended to divide or confuse Western publics eager for change? Generally, to decipher the meaning and possible sig-

Warsaw Pact communiques and documents, it was necessary to solicit more information through diplomatic contact with Soviet and East European officials. nificance of

In times of past crises in Eastern Europe, however, the

PCC conducted important

business. During the 1968 Czecho-

slovak and the 1980-81 Polish crises, for example, leaders of the

Warsaw Pact met on

several occasions to figure out

what

Thanks to the subsequent defection of Gomulka's interwhose testimony has been generally confirmed by other sources, it is known that the July 1968 PCC meeting dealing with the "Prague Spring" was long and contentious. Led by Brezhnev, the Soviet delegation had not indicated what it wanted to do except that it did not approve of the changes then underway in Czechoslovakia. Because Moscow was not yet ready to propose or undertake intervention, its to do.

preter,

—

felt free to express their own views. According Gomulka's interpreter, the debate was heated. Hungary's Kadar showed so much "patience" toward Dubcek's reformist course in Czechoslovakia that East Germany's Ulbricht could not contain himself. He is reported to have turned to the Hun-

junior allies to

garian, shouting:

you think, Comrade Kadar, that you are helping the cause and reservations, you are making a big mistake. And you have no idea what will happen next. Once the American-West German imperialists have got Czechoslovakia in their control, then you will be next to go, Comrade Kadar. But that is something you can't or won't un-

If

of socialism with your objections

derstand! 6

In 1981, at the time of the Polish crisis, there was also heated debate in the councils of the Warsaw Pact. This time, according to another Polish defector a high-level Polish

—

6.

(New

Erwin Weit, At the Red Summit: Interpreter behind the Iron Curtain York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 193-217.

The Bloc That Failed

86 military officer

— the

Romanian

representatives expressed 7

various "objections and reservations." In the early Gorbachev era, too, East European participation continued to depend on the issues under discussion: (1) "Distant" foreign policy issues having to do with South Africa or Nicaragua were of no immediate concern to East Europeans. Romania, an exception under Ceau§escu, quib-

bled about the phrasing of a particular

Warsaw Pact

declara-

but on issues of this sort Moscow generally prevailed. There was little or no payoff for the East Europeans in trying to counter such "distant" Soviet policies. (2) For both economic and political reasons, issues having tion,

were of more immediate concern to the East Europeans. Even before Gorbachev's rise to power, in 1983-84, as Moscow initiated a harsh campaign against West Germany for permitting American missiles to be deployed there, East Germany demurred. (Still, having expressed "reservations," eventually all East European states fell in line; under Soviet pressure, the East German and Bulgarian leaders at the time, Honecker and Zhivkov, soon cancelled their planned visits to Bonn.) By contrast, when Hungary criticized a Soviet draft resolution that condemned West Germany during the "later" Gorbachev era (in 1989), the text was modified to accommodate Hungarian objections. those (3) Issues directly related to Eastern Europe itself more exprompted that are "closest to home" have always tensive discussion and debate. The East Europeans expressed to

do with intra-European

affairs

—

—

strong views, for example, military

interventions

when

—as

the

it

came

nasty

to the possibility of

1968

debate about

7. Former Colonel Ryszard J. Kukliriski, who escaped to the West a few weeks before martial law was declared in December 1981, was an officer of the Polish General Staff during preparations for martial law. See his lengthy interview under the title "Wojna z narodem widziana do sYadka" in Kultura (Paris), April 1987, pp. 3-57. An abridged version appeared in English under the title "The Crushing of Solidarity" in Orbis 32, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp.

7-31.

87

Political Relations

Czechoslovakia showed. More recently, under Gorbachev,

tough bargaining has come to characterize talks especially with respect to the individual countries' contribution to Warsaw Pact military expenditures and with respect to foreign trade

among

the

CMEA

countries.

Indeed, while the region's formal institutional structure established in the mid-1950s and refined in the 1960s

1970s

is

more

or less intact, a

little

story here

and

and a leak there

indicate that in the early Gorbachev era the atmosphere at

various bilateral and multilateral forums changed in the

fol-

lowing ways:

On most

have enEuropean counterparts without dictating the final terms of an agreement or declaration. The arrogance of the past was fading; at times, Soviet officials conceded that they did not know the answer. They wanted to hear not what others imagined they would like to hear, but what the East Europeans really thought. (2) The East Europeans, in turn, were more inclined to speak up and take exceptions to Soviet proposals on critical economic issues as well as on political ones. Even before the watershed year of 1989, they were emboldened by Moscow's reluctance to publicly criticize an East European country, an East European leader, or even an East European decision. Apparently, Gorbachev was determined from the beginning to stop public polemics against East European "deviations" once a regular occurrence and favorite pastime of Soviet ideological watchdogs. As a result, East European officials have become more confident in their opinions and hence more willing to share them with their Soviet counter(1)

issues, Soviet negotiators are said to

tered into discussion with their East

—

—

parts.

The Ties They Are A-Changiri

That neither the ideological nor the institutional structure European relationship changed dramati-

of the Soviet-East

The Bloc That Failed

88

Gorbachev years was interpreted to was still conceivable. The same institu-

cally during the early

mean

that a reversal

tions could once again serve a hegemon-satellite relationship

much as they could provide the framework for relations among more or less equal partners. Yet structure has mattered much less than the hope generas

ated by the Gorbachev

phenomenon

since 1985. Especially as

the end of the 1980s approached, East Europeans were correctly sensing a promising trend

toward raising the threshold meaning of this

of Soviet tolerance in their region. While the

trend escaped precise definition, the following generalization

was an approximate guideline

to

Gorbachev's

initial policies:

Moscow regularly and repeatedly reminded the East European leaders of what they must not do as well as what they should do; it issued both prohibitions and imperatives. Under Gorbachev, Moscow was beginning to be satisfied with indicating to the East European leaders what they must not do; it Before Gorbachev,

issued only (non-specific but

still

well-understood) pro-

hibitions. As seen by East Europeans (until 1988-89), the most important Soviet prohibitions were against

leaving the

Warsaw

Pact, against relinquishing the

one-party political order, and against abandoning "socialism."

While, to repeat, the

new

Soviet attitude thus did not yet

independence to the states or freedom of choice to the peoples of Eastern Europe, it did provide the region's communist parties a good deal of autonomy or "elbow room" to determine what sort of socialist arrangements would best suit their interests and circumstances. Given what Gorbachev inherited from his predecessors, this was a substantial concesoffer

sion.

There were at least two ways to assess the Soviet decision to undertake this initial step toward decentralizing the bloc. One was a historical perspective. Consider a few episodes in the history of Soviet-East

European relations and speculate:

Political Relations

89

have happened in the early Gorbachev years? years after World War II, Stalin invited a group of Polish leaders to Moscow. One night, in the Kremlin, he deStalin-style. He played dance music cided to have some fun on his record player and told Boleslaw Bierut, the top Polish leader, to dance with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. Cheek to cheek or not, they danced. This could not have happened in the early Gorbachev years. • In 1955, Hungarian Prime Minister Andras Hegediis attended the founding meeting of the Warsaw Pact and signed the new treaty on his country's behalf. Prior to the elaborate ceremonies in Warsaw, Hegediis did not even have an opportunity to see the text of the treaty, let alone discuss it with members of his cabinet. This would not have happened in the early Gorbachev years. • In 1968, during the course of his discussions with Dubcek, Brezhnev expressed his "disappointment" that the Czechoslovak leader had not cleared some of his decisions with Moscow earlier that year. "I believed in you," Brezhnev began, "and I stood up for you against the others [in the Soviet Politburo]. Our Sasha [Dubcek] is a good comrade, I said. And you disappointed us so terribly," remarked Brezhnev as if lecturing a small child. Then he added: "From the outset I wanted to help you against [the Stalinist] Novotny, and immediately in January [after Novotny 's ouster] I asked you: Do you want to replace the minister of the interior? And the minister of national defense? And is there anyone else you want to replace?" 8 Such excessive Soviet involvement in personnel matters was still possible but unlikely in the early Gorbachev

Could •

this

A few

—

years. •

8.

In June 1981 during the Polish crisis, ,

ZdenSk Mlynaf, Nightfrost

in Prague:

Moscow addressed

The End of Humane Socialism

The author was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation that negotiated under duress with Soviet leaders in Moscow after the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Although Mlynaf cites Brezhnev from memory, the quotation rings true.

(New York: Karz,

1980), pp. 238-239.

The Bloc That Failed

90

an "open letter" to the Polish party. Against the background of its growing concern that the "gains of socialism" were in jeopardy, the CPSU stated: "S. Kania, W. Jaruzelski and other Polish comrades expressed agreement with our point of view. But nothing has changed, and the policy of concession and compromise has not been corrected." 9 On another occasion, Brezhnev asserted, "We will not abandon fraternal, socialist Poland; we will stand by it." 10 If such ominous language could be used publicly, it is easy to imagine the tone of warnings and threats voiced behind closed doors. In the early Gorbachev era, given comparable circumstances, the Soviet Union would have been concerned but would not have publicly chastised another communist party. Looking at the four cases from the past suggests both important changes and possible continuities in Soviet conduct i.e., after 1985 and before 1988. The obvious prohibition Poland must not leave the Warsaw Pact, must not abandon socialism, and must not give up the party's "leading role" still remained. But the incessant and irritating lecturing about what the East Europeans should do the imperatives was passe. Instead of polemics and admonition, there was far more give and take. (And it was impossible to imagine Gorbachev compelling an East European leader to dance with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.) There was of course another way to look at the East European parties' newly granted autonomy not from a historical but from a contemporary perspective. The question then was not "how things changed over the years" but this: Before 1988-89, were the leaders of Eastern Europe taking advantage of the new "elbow room" to intro-

—

—

—

—

—

9.

June

The Soviet

"letter,"

dated June

5,

1981, appeared in Polish dailies

on

11, 1981.

10. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Immediate Tasks of the Party Home and Foreign Policy, delivered by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary

the in

of the

CPSU

Central Committee, 23 February 1981 (Moscow: Novosti, 1981).

91

Political Relations

duce glasnost and perestroika and undertake the "next steps" in their countries' national interests? Alterna-

were they using their expanded authority to circumvent the processes of change for fear of losing their privileges and possibly their power? The answer to this question was that, Poland and Hungary excepted, the East European regimes were still desperately trying to resist the spirit of perestroika and especially glasnost. The Romanian and East German authorities, in particular, disclaimed any need to follow Gorbachev's path. One tively,

German

member put

way: Just because one of our neighbors changes the wallpaper in his house, should we all follow his example? East

Politburo

it

this

A country-by-country survey showed pack

that Bulgaria led the

commentaries on Gorbachev's "hiseconomic proposals and their relevance for Bulgaria.

in offering daily

toric"

In one speech after another, particularly in early 1987, party

Todor Zhivkov went out of his way to praise perestroika though he barely mentioned glasnost. Claiming that the Bulgarian Communist Party had followed a corleader

—

rect course since its April 1956

plenum

—

— the

first

party gath-

and that the country had up with the industrialized world, Zhivkov still kept insisting on the adoption of literally hundreds of new economic measures. In his own words: "We can and must transform our ering he dominated

since caught

already transformed Bulgaria."

Unlike Gorbachev, Zhivkov offered no criticism of the He could not. In power since 1956, he was responsible

past.

decades of Bulgarian history. There was no talk in Sofia of reassessing Bulgaria's poor treatment of its large Turkish minority or of improving relations with Yugoslavia, another neighbor with whom Bulgaria had an uneasy relationship. Nor was there any indication of a cultural thaw; Bulgarian intellectual life continued to reflect conditions similar to those in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev rather than

for over three

under Gorbachev.

The Bloc That Failed

92

All the same, Zhivkov's rhetoric was still full of plans for economic restructuring, decentralization, self-management, increased independence for the country's industrial plants, agricultural units and banks, "new types of management structures," income differentiation to reward hard work, closure of inefficient enterprises, construction of small- and medium-sized factories, and the like. It was widely assumed that this ambitious rhetoric was no more than hot air. Zhivkov's advanced age, his personal stake in continuity rather than change, the abrupt dismissal in mid- 1988 as of his heir apparent, Chudomir Alexlate as mid- 1988! androv (who was reportedly accused of "new thinking"), and the apparent absence of a reformist wing in the party that could challenge him all combined to make it doubtful that this most (and perhaps only) pro-Russian state in the region would experience radical reforms while Zhivkov was at

—

—

the helm.

Czechoslovakia was a test case for Gorbachev's impact on

Eastern Europe. This was so because, having waged war against reformism for over two decades, the post- 1968 Czechoslovak regime was particularly vulnerable to the winds of reform emanating from Moscow. Western-oriented advocates of human rights, led

by the eminent playwright Vaclav Havel, were very active. In Alexander Dubcek there was also a well-known reformist and pro-Gorbachev alternative to

—

—

the country's Brezhnevite regime.

There was no adequate explanation as to why Gustav Husak, party leader from 1969 to 1987 and then president for two years, allowed the Czechoslovak economy to slide and its polity to degenerate. Although, prior to

World War

II, it

was

a cultural mecca and one of the six or seven most highly industrialized countries in the world, Czechoslovakia under

Husak became a showpiece while

its stifling

for

an economic antique shop

cultural atmosphere resembled the vibrancy

of a political cemetery. According to one theory,

—

Husak

himself a victim of Stalinist purges in the 1950s and an

93

Political Relations

erstwhile supporter of the "Prague Spring" to

compensate

this theory all

—

for his reformist inclinations.

was

these years,

felt

A

compelled

corollary to

Husak was no more than a figurehead with the real power being held by Central that

Committee Secretary Vasil Bil'ak, a man with neo-Stalinist views and close ties to the pre-Gorbachev Soviet leadership. Be that as it may, the fact remained that certain Czechoslovak policies were even more rigid and conservative than those pursued by Brezhnev. In the meantime, Moscow could not yet decide what to do (see also Chapter 6), for any Soviet attempt to ease out this united Czechoslovak leadership ran counter not only to Gorbachev's professed principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the East European countries;

as seen at that time,

it

also entailed the risk of consider-

able instability.

Under Erich Honecker's leadership, East Germany, once ally, approved of perestroika and

Moscow's most loyal glasnost cials

— for the Soviet Union. Typically, East German

expressed agreement with the Soviet Union on

damental

issues,"

—and

all "fun-

endorsed Gorbachev's policy of seeking

to raise "the Soviet people's material

standards"

offi-

and cultural

living

denied Western "suspicions of the existence

and nuances" between Moscow and East Berlin. There were, indeed, no significant differences between the two countries on foreign policy issues. Back in 1983-84, before Gorbachev, there was a tug-of-war over intermediaterange nuclear weapons, European detente, and intra-German relations. At that time, the Soviet Union was in the midst of an anti-West German campaign, accusing Bonn of becoming Washington's stooge and of reverting to an anti-Soviet, so-

of differences

called "revanchist" policy (of trying to take revenge, as

it

World War II). East Germany, by contrast, continued to act on the basis of its national economic interests, which dictated improved or at least civilized relations with West Germany. With its economy so heavily dependent on West German credits, investments, and trade,

were, for

German

losses in

The Bloc That Failed

94

East Berlin was reluctant to join Moscow's campaign against Bonn and echo its belligerent rhetoric. However, after the end of that

campaign

—

—after Gorbachev also began to court West

foreign policy issues no longer stood between the two countries. But East Germany found no reason to adopt Gorbachev's policies at home. Kurt Hager, the East German Politburo's

Germany

leading ideologist at the time, asserted in 1987 that the

"forms and methods" of perestroika were "not transferable to other socialist countries." Officials in East Berlin claimed that since their so-called "streamlined" economy was performing well and since respective conditions differed, East 11

Germany should only continue to "improve" its economic mechanism but should not need not experiment with

—

—

—

untested, radical reforms. As for glasnost, they said only that they had a particular, German version half-jokingly

—

of glasnost: West

German

television that could reach all of

East Germany. Indeed, that anti-Stalinist Soviet film Repentance was shown only on West German TV in early 1988 and was promptly criticized in the East German offi-

—

Neues Deutschland and other papers for its "hostile life. (The film had packed movie houses throughout the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland.) More-

cial daily

caricature" of Soviet

over, also in 1988, East

German

distribution of Soviet journals

authorities prohibited the

whose content was contrary

to

own, orthodox views. Incredibly, many other Soviet publications were verboten in East Germany as well. Honecker and his colleagues also denied that there was an inherent link between economic reform and political liberalization. They argued that political reform especially would mean trouble for a country as exposed to the West as East Germany. When they saw East German youth demonstrate against the Berlin Wall in 1987 by invoking Gorbachev's their

1 1

.

As quoted on East Berlin radio on April 9, 1987. For an English transBroadcast Information Service (FBIS), April 10, 1987, p. El

lation, see Foreign

Political Relations

95

name, they concluded that the wind of change emanating from Moscow threatened the stability and perhaps the existence of East Germany. Their point was similar to that of Prague's beleaguered leaders and Moscow's response was nearly the same in both cases. For the time being, Gorbachev was too preoccupied with other matters to do more than to ask Honecker to change his ways. The embarrassing gap between Soviet reformism and East Germany's orthodoxy notwithstanding, Gorbachev waited. Only in 1989 did he assert himself (see Chapter 6), apparently telling Honecker to change his ways or else. Hungary's initial reaction to the Gorbachev phenomenon was both complicated and confusing. Before Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Hungary's Janos Kadar had already set in motion the most comprehensive economic reform in Eastern Europe. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM), begun in 1968, had introduced a measure of rationality into the economy. By focusing on agriculture, small-scale industry, and the service sector, the reforms succeeded in creating an economy in which plan and market could somehow co-exist and living standards rise as well. Kadar 's "goulash communism" perhaps an early version of perestroika was also assisted by his regime's relative politperhaps an early version of ical tolerance and openness glasnost. In the process, Kadar himself acquired considerable popularity and his country became the envy of East Europe-

—

—

—

—

ans.

The 1980s witnessed a dramatic downturn in the Hungarian economy as well as a growing sense of hopelessness about the future. In May 1988, at the age of seventy-six, Kadar was forced to resign as his party's general secretary, and his whole old guard in the leadership went with him. In the shake-up, eight of the thirteen members of Kadar 's Politburo were ousted; of the eight, six were ousted even from the large Central Committee.

The leadership chosen

in 1988

was a curious

coalition of

The Bloc That Failed

96

pseudo-reformers, reformers, and radical reformers.

What

united them momentarily was the desire to get Kadar's old guard out; the new Politburo's average age was only fifty-two.

The

coalition

was

led by the party's

new

general secretary,

Karoly Grosz, a long-time party functionary with a decidedly "law and order" mentality. Soon after his appointment, Grosz began a harsh campaign against the country's pro-Western, "liberal opposition." When on June 16, 1988, members of the opposition organized a small, peaceful demonstration to

commemorate

the 20th anniversary of Imre Nagy's execuexample, Grosz called the demonstration an "incitement toward fascist propaganda, chauvinism and irredentism." Asked why the police had used truncheons to break it up, Grosz replied, "We do not like our policemen to be beaten tion, for

up.

12 .

.

.

Because of actions and statements of this kind, Grosz proved to be unpopular immediately, both among ordinary Hungarians and even within his party. From the beginning, he found himself on the defensive against the real party reformers led by Imre Pozsgay, who had openly embraced the goal of democratic socialism years before even Gorbachev ever though of it. Although, as discussed in Chapter 6, Grosz's "holding operation" marked him as a man of the past, Moscow was apparently satisfied for now. According to Grosz, Gorbachev told him in June 1988 that "it is probably the Hungarian endeavors and the Hungarian perceptions that are closest

now

to those of the Soviet Union." 13

was the main East European program and policies. After 1985,

Poland's General Jaruzelski beneficiary of Gorbachev's

Moscow's once grudging approval of Jaruzelski 's relatively moderate course turned into enthusiastic support. The Soviet press stopped questioning Jaruzelski 's courting of the Catholic

Church, the open discussion of controversial issues in Pol12.

Newsweek (International

13.

The

New

Edition), July 18, 1988, p. 24. York Times, July 10, 1988.

97

Political Relations

punishment for leadprominent Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta published a long and apparently uncensored interview with Jozef Cardinal Glemp. On numerous occasions, Gorbachev himself endorsed Jaruzelski as "a man of high morality, of huge intellectual caish newspapers, or the absence of severe

ers of the Polish opposition. In 1987, the

pacities," a

man "who loves his country." Gorbachev's ringing

—

endorsement of the Polish leader Jaruzelski 's de facto elevation as Moscow's "favorite son" in Eastern Europe was undoubtedly due to what he did for the Soviet Union in December 1981; his crackdown on "Solidarity" rendered Soviet intervention unnecessary. But because Gorbachev also approved of the Polish regime's policies after 1981, Jaruzelski enjoyed wide latitude to do what he deemed necessary to make Poland stable. Earlier than others could do elsewhere in Eastern Europe, he was free not only to introduce major economic reforms but to experiment with new forms of political participation

—

— such as competitive elections, legislative

innovations, consultation with the Catholic Church. ish press, already the freest in Eastern

The

Pol-

Europe, could even

deal with such sensitive subjects as Soviet-Polish relations. is why the general returned Gorbachev's compliments by welcoming the same "historic current of change" in the two countries. "Poland has not experienced such a happy convergence for the whole of the past millennium," Jaruzelski declared in 1987, commenting on the smooth state of his rela-

This

tions with Gorbachev. Still, until late 1988 and despite the very favorable eastern winds helping with the Polish regime, it was far from certain how far Jaruzelski would go. True, he allowed more glasnost in Poland than there was in the Soviet Union. For several years now, even before Gorbachev, the Polish regime had closed its eyes to the publication of uncensored and illegal books and periodicals, some of which appeared regularly and enjoyed wide circulation. The Catholic Church was an acknowledged and seemingly welcome pillar of the Polish es-

The Bloc That Failed

98

tablishment, opposition leaders spoke their minds to Western reporters

and

visitors,

almost any Pole could travel to the company unions made an occa-

West, and even the country's

sional effort to represent the workers' interests

European standards at that time, Jaruzelski's initial measures proved to be insufficient. The public was in no mood to support what the regime regarded as the necessary economic sacrifices unless the regime made what the public regarded as the necessary more extensive political concessions. Even more so than in Hungary, the key to economic change in Poland was political pluralism. The institutionalized form it would have to take would surely entail the legalization of "Solidarity," a move which remained perhaps even harder for Jaruzelski to accept until, as discussed in Chapter 6, his sudden and dramatic change of mind in late 1988 than it was for Gorbachev to

However

radical by Soviet or East

—

—

—

—

advocate in the early years. Romania, unlike any other

member

of the

Warsaw

Pact,

openly questioned the ideological soundness of glasnost and peres troika. The Romanian press all but ignored Gorbachev's very important January 1987 speech to the CPSU Central

Committee; the party newspaper Scinteia printed only a brief, innocuous summary, after a three-day delay. The CPSU's 1988 party conference received almost no coverage at all. While Romania continued to follow a maverick course on some foreign policy issues, the country's economic structure and political atmosphere failed to respond to Gorbachev's call for change; "reform" was but a dirty word in the Romanian political dictionary. Under the brutal tyranny of Nicolae Ceau§escu and his family, and even by comparison with Brezhnevite East Germany, Bulgaria, or Czechoslovakia, Romania remained an isolated, Stalinist holdout a cruel anachronism in the Warsaw Pact. When Gorbachev visited Bucharest in 1987, his facial expression strongly suggested that he had no respect for the egomaniacal Ceau§escu. For his part, Ceau§escu even questioned Gorbachev's ad-

—

—

99

Political Relations

herence to "the invincible principles of scientific socialism." Alluding to the CPSU's new platform, for example, he said that a truly revolutionary party would not let "enterprises or economic sectors manage themselves" and thus abdicate its obligations to society. "Self-management and revolutionary democracy," he declared, "are inconceivable without the leading role of the Party ... as the vital center from which all creative energies" should originate. Ceau§escu also ridiculed the idea of "improving socialism by developing socalled small private property," asserting that "Capitalist

be it small or large." Although there was a marked expansion of trade between Romania and the Soviet Union after 1984, it was not due to political considerations. Ceau§escu was simply determined to eliminate Romania's hard-currency debt as quickly as possible, irrespective of cost or consequences; trade with the Soviet Union was simpler and more advantageous under the circumstances. In the political and ideological realms, however, Ceau§escu defiantly dissociated Romania from glasnost and perestroika, signaling both his contempt for what the Soviet Union was doing and his unequivocal opposition to emulat-

property

is

capitalist property,

ing the Soviet example at

Chapter

6,

home. In the end, as related

in

only a massive, bloody revolution in December

1989 finished the tyranny

—and

this tyrant,

on Christmas

Day.

Summing Up A review the early

of the Soviet-East

Gorbachev era shows

European relationship during

how

fore the critical year of 1989. This

Soviet policy evolved be-

is

how

the 1985-88 period

looked at that time: (I)

"Radical change" in Soviet policy toward Eastern Eu-

rope did not yet signify independence for the states

and peoples

of the region. In comparison to the respect Gorbachev showed

— The Bloc That Failed

100

toward China, Eastern Europe remained but a Soviet depen-

was able to set "three obstacles" that it said if Sino-Soviet relations were to improve: removed must be Moscow must withdraw from Afghanistan, thin out its forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and force Vietnam, its ally, to get out of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Incredibly, Gorbachev promptly reconsidered his predecessors' policies and began to remove the "three obstacles." The change in Soviet policy was radical, even dramatic. Moscow showed that it was pre-

dency. China

pared to relate to China by shelving,

monic

if

not

stifling, its

hege-

aspirations.

no such radical change was yet apparent in the Soviet-East European relationship. True, the situation in many respects was not analogous. But the key question could Moscow treat other communists as equals? was similar, and yet, for the time being, the Soviet answer to China was "yes" and to Eastern Europe "no" or "not yet." There were possible scenarios the abrupt withdrawal of an East European state from the Warsaw Pact, for example that could spark strong Soviet pressures and (as a last resort) perhaps

By

contrast,

—

—

—

even Soviet military intervention. (2) Still,

the threshold of Soviet tolerance

was markedly

beginning of 1989 it was impossible to predict how Moscow would respond to the next East European outburst of popular sentiment. On the one hand, the So-

raised.

viet

Even as

late as the

Union did not yet repudiate the principle of

socialist in-

ternationalism and hence the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

On

the

other hand, Gorbachev seemed most anxious not to use military force in defense of the region's "common interests." This

was indicated by his own statements, his representatives' comments, the evolution of Soviet foreign policy in general and its emphasis on improved relations with Western Europe apparent priority that Moscow domestic concerns. According to conventional wisdom in the West at that time, one way to distinguish between the old threshold of Soviet tolerance and Gorbachev's in particular, as well as the

assigned to

its

Political Relations

101

to surmise that if another "1956" (Hungary) were to happen the Soviet Union would but if another "1968" (Czechoslovakia) were to happen it would not intervene militarily. That conclusion, between 1985 and 1988, was probably valid; by late 1989 it became, or turned out to be, patently wrong. (3) The most visible sign of Gorbachev's early policies was the growing autonomy of the East European parties. One of the

was

—

phenomena

—

was the disappearEast European parties

clearly observable after 1985

ance of public Soviet criticisms of the and their policies. The CPSU's long-standing practice of exercising its "leading role" by lecturing other communist parties about what is or is not an "ideologically correct" policy, approach, or formulation was passe.

Moscow ceased

to pontifi-

was eroding. The East European parties gained much more "elbow room" than ever before. There was much they could now do in accordance with their judgment and their countries' national interests. Indeed, and somewhat inconveniently, they could no longer blame Moscow for all that went wrong in Eastern Europe. cate; its imperial mentality

(4)

Four of the East European regimes chose not

to take ad-

vantage of their newly granted autonomy. The one word that best describes these regimes' response to the Gorbachev phe-

nomenon

is

"resistance." For the reasons given below,

Roma-

—

Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria the region's gang of four— were all unwilling to follow Gorbachev's path and adopt his perestroika and glasnost. nia, East

First, the region's

old leaders could not duplicate

Gorbachev was doing: obtain

political

against the record of their predecessors. After

had

led Bulgaria since 1954; Ceau§escu

since 1965;

and Honecker had

led East

had

all,

led

Germany

Zhivkov

Romania

since 1971.

Nor could Milos Jakes, Czechoslovakia's party chief since dissociate himself

had belonged still

what

momentum by turning

from the recent past

1987,

in that country:

he

to the leadership since at least 1969

and was

surrounded by the old guard. Even Jaruzelski,

who had

The Bloc That Failed

102

led Poland since 1981, faced political circumstances quite dif-

from Gorbachev's. Second, the East European gang of four's resistance to reform was a function of skepticism (widespread throughout the region) about Gorbachev's staying power. Privately, many East European leaders believed that his tenure would not last long. Even reform-minded officials, those who shared Gorbachev's ideas and rooted for him, tended to doubt that the general secretary could decentralize the Soviet economy, modify the present system of subsidies, alter the artificial ferent

pricing system, cope with nationalist

demands

for indepen-

dence, and enact political reforms. They stressed the limits

and dangers of

growing tenand the Baltic republics as signs of more trouble to come. In the meantime, assuming that Gorbachev had only a few years to prove himself, most East European communist leaders preferred to wait and see if his reforms were indeed "irreversible." Third, and most important, the East European communist regimes were concerned about the risk of instability associated with glasnost and even perestroika. The risks were presumably much higher in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union because the Soviet system was seen perhaps mistakenly to enjoy a measure of domestic popular support that the East European systems lacked. More than four decades of communist rule did not perceptibly improve the East European regimes' standing with the vast majority of their people, young and old, who appeared to dream of a European future. Hence, almost irrespective of what they did, the region's communist leaders were walking on thin political ice. For this reason, they were fearful that any change in glasnost, pointing especially to

sion in Armenia, Azerbaijan,

—

—

the region carried with

it

the danger of serious political tur-

bulence. (5) Policy aside, Soviet perceptions of Eastern Europe were changing. As the future evolution of Soviet political relations with Eastern Europe were a function of Moscow's percep-

tions, the

reassessment taking place in the early Gorbachev

Political Relations

1

03

era foreshadowed the possibility of smoother Soviet relations

with the region.

The bad news seemed

to

be that Moscow continued to un-

derestimate the persistence of anti-Sovietism in Eastern Europe, taking comfort, perhaps, in Gorbachev's personal appeal.

While realizing that there was a

"crisis" in the region,

showed an apparent lack of understanding about popular East European sentiments, which pointed toward the need to cure the system preferably by replacing it. Moscow appeared to believe, as did some Westerners, that new, one-party regimes headed by reformminded communist leaders could assure long-term stability. The good news was that the Soviet Union was beginning to come to terms with the realities of its past policies toward the region. A paper prepared in mid- 1988 by Soviet scholars at the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System Soviet spokesmen and analysts

—

conceded, for example, that the "administrative-state type model did not withstand the test of time" in Eastern Eu.

.

.

rope; that changes after Stalin were "of a contradictory character"; that

under "the leadership of Brezhnev-Suslov

era of stagnant neo-Stalinism began";

.

.

.

the

and that "the hege-

monic aspirations of the Soviet leadership" contributed to the "deep political crises in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1956, 1970 and 1980." (This paper is reprinted in the Appendix.)

Such

self-critical perceptions of the

past portended differ-

By mid- 1988 it seemed possible that some day Moscow would begin to prescribe surgery rather than palliatives and would thus accept systemic transent Soviet policies in the future.

formation instead of promoting only its own version of insystem reform. As related in Chapter 6, that extraordinary change, first in Soviet thinking and then in Soviet policies, occurred much sooner than expected. No one in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or in the West was prepared to predict even at the beginning of 1989 that within less than a year

Moscow would its feet

and allow Eastern Europe own.

step aside

and stand on

its

to get

on

iy_

ECONOMIC RELATIONS The Elusive Concept of Socialism

there was a time when "socialism" had a more or less identifiable meaning in Marxist lexicons, under Gorbachev it is no more. Who is to say what a socialist economy is or should if

be? Soviet political literature continues to affirm "socialist" goals and decry "anti-socialist" tendencies, but what it is specifically that is being affirmed and decried is unclear. Was highly centralized, Romania— with more — socialist? Hungary — with oriented economy — less so?

Ceau§escu's

economy

its

its

Is

planned market-

Even the word "socialism" came under review in the early Gorbachev era. In 1985, Gorbachev was reported to have warned East European officials not to abandon socialism:

Many

of you see the solution to your problems in resorting to market mechanisms in place of direct planning. Some of you look at the market as a lifesaver for your economies. But, comrades, you should not think of lifesavers but about the ship, and the ship is socialism. 1

Yet,

by 1988, Gorbachev was praising Hungary's ("mar-

oriented")

ket

version

of

socialism

without giving

Ro-

1 As quoted in Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World," Foreign Affairs 64, No. 3 (America and the World 1985), p. 612. .

— Economic Relations mania's

(still

105

"directly planned") version of socialism its due.

The Soviet people were apparently confused as well. Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbachev's economic adviser, related in 1987 that Soviet tourists returning from Hungary in the mid-1980s had questioned that country's socialist character. Why? Because the tourists found that in Hungary people did not have to stand in line for food! The Soviet economist, trying to allay comrades, socialism does not mean shortages; no, socialism does not mean a poor

his people's concern, assured them: no,

distribution system; yes,

Hungary

is

a socialist country. But

he did not say what socialism or a socialist economy was. Even as they enter the 1990s, the economies of Eastern Europe still have some common characteristics, of course. Their

ownership patterns, planning mechanisms, organizational forms, even investment priorities as well as most of their problems remain similar. As in Stalin's time (see Chapter the means of 1), almost all the large factories, mines, banks production throughout the region are still state-owned. Most smaller plants, agricultural and service units are also

—

—

—

either directly

owned or

— in

—

the case of cooperatives

and regulated by the government. Each country has an extensive economic apparatus, too, including the Planning Office and numerous ministries; together, they make plans for the whole economy, determine allocations and most prices, and regulate wages, employment practices, and of course foreign trade. At the heart of all Soviet-type economic systems is the plan. It sets production goals, the means by which they should be achieved, and the way the products are to be distributed. At its excessive worst, the plan specifies when, how many, and what size nails and screws a particular factory must make, with little or no allowance for changing needs during the course of the plan. The original reason for creating such a centrally planned economic system was to overcome the ups and downs the fluctuations and "chaos" inherent closely supervised

—

—

in market-oriented or capitalist economies. Instead,

even de-

The Bloc That Failed

106

velopment and central planning were expected to assure steady growth and full employment. Communists long believed that an unplanned economy would signify the absence of political control and even "conditions of anarchy." To be sure, the "ideal" Soviet- type system was never transferred in full to all of Eastern Europe; there

was some

diver-

gence even under Stalin. In Poland, agriculture was not collectivized as elsewhere; in East Germany, a number of repair shops and

mained

retail outlets of the

"Mom and

in private hands. Existing diversity

Pop" variety

was

justified

re-

by

the theory of "different roads to socialism."

Since Stalin, and especially since the mid-1960s, the trend toward diversity has accelerated. Most of the region's economic systems have lost some of their once-common characteristics Bulgaria more so than Romania, Poland more than Czechoslovakia, Hungary more than any other, and until Gorbachev's perestroika the Soviet Union less than most. Changes introduced in Soviet- type systems have all sought to rationalize economic policy by making decisions according to economic factors rather than only political criteria. By allowing market mechanisms to play a role in the allocation and distribution of resources, some countries have decentralized economic decision making and hence reduced reliance on the central plan. The reason why more fundamental changes were neither attempted nor accomp-

—

—

—

was that the authorities had only tried to make more productive and more efficient withpolitical control. The goal was to reconcile plan

lished earlier

—

the old system

out losing

and market, to

make

to use as

few "capitalist" techniques as possible

"socialism" as viable as possible.

The Urgency of Change

Why changes at all then? And why first in some of the East European countries rather than

in the Soviet

Union?

— Economic Relations

107

The obvious answer to the first question is that all communist or, especially, post-communist regimes are dissatisfied with the performance of their economies. They want to improve them, although they want to improve them without harmful social consequences. The less obvious answer to the second question is that popular demands for a better life have always been greater in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union. East Europeans view their conditions more critically, and hence they have always pressed harder for improvements.

The difference between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in this respect is paradoxical. According to economic indicators, which are unfortunately seldom comparable and never precise, Eastern Europe as a whole is ahead of the Soviet Union, and its people are better off than the Soviets. In the 1980s, for example, the region's standard of living was probably about a third higher than the Soviet Union's, and the difference was even greater when Soviet living standards were compared to those of East Germany, Czechoslovakia,

and Hungary. By Soviet standards, moreover, the availability and consumer goods the distribution system in Budapest, East Berlin, and Prague is efficient and impressive. Yet it is the East Europeans who keep pressing more vigorously for change because they do not compare their economic conditions to those of the Soviet Union. Czechs have not been known to be happy just because they are better off than the Russians; they are unhappy because they are worse off than their neighbors in Austria and West Germany. For this reason and by these standards, economic problems have always been more challenging to the political order in Eastern Europe

—

of food

—

than in the Soviet Union. As East European economists and most politicians readily acknowledge, these "problems" became far more serious reached crisis proportions by the time of Gorbachev's acces-

—

power

The main reasons were the following: Among the objective reasons was an extraordinary slow-

sion to

in 1985.

The Bloc That Failed

108

down

in

economic growth. Keeping

in

mind, again, that such

data are less than fully accurate, the average per capita growth rate for the region as a whole was apparently still a healthy 4.2 percent in 1970-75, but in 1975-80 it was 1.4 percent, and in 1980-85 it was only 1.0 percent. In 1985 there

was no growth

at all (0.2 percent),

and even that

figure

was

but a function of East Germany's still-growing economy (supposedly 2.4 percent that year). Nor did it seem to make much difference whether an East European economy was or was not pursuing reforms. At least in terms of growth, Bulgaria (only very slightly reformed)

and Hungary (most reformed)

were actually the worst performers. In 1985, the record showed a dismal minus 3.3 percent "growth" for Bulgaria and a minus 2.3 percent "growth" for Hungary. Another important indicator per capita standard of pointed toward the same trend. Between the periods living 1970-75 and 1980-85, the rates of growth in per capita living standards apparently declined from 3.6 percent to 2.0 percent in Bulgaria, from 2.5 percent to 1.4 percent in Czechoslovakia, from 4.9 percent to 1.6 percent in East Germany, from 3.1 percent to 0.6 percent in Hungary, from 4.6 percent to 0.5 percent in Poland, and from 4.0 percent to 1.2 percent in Romania. And these were official figures; Western analysts suspected mainly because of "hidden" inflation that there was an absolute decline in living standards in several if not

—

/

—

—

—

of the countries of Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's net hard-currency debt to the West dramatically increased over the years. Outside the Soviet Union, the region's total debt (in current U.S. dollars) was only $4 billion in 1970; it jumped to $26 billion by 1976 and to $60.7 billion by 1981. In 1989 it was about $90 billion and rising. Especially Poland (whose Western debt approached $40 billion in 1989) and Hungary (about $20 billion) were in bad shape. Poland could not meet its interest payments, while Hungary has had to borrow more to avoid rescheduling or default. Both countries lived on borrowed

all

Economic Relations

109

money and borrowed

time; they could afford to import less and less of the technology they needed and popular (Western and Japanese) consumer goods they wanted. Hungary would have needed a surplus of about $1 billion from its hardcurrency trade every year just to pay interest on its outstanding debt; the comparable figure for Poland was over $2 biland they lion. Even if they had been able to manage that could not their total outstanding debts would only have

—

—

stopped increasing. Such poor performance, and poorer prospects, "feel" even worse in the context of prevailing subjective economic circumstances. ^ Of these circumstances by far the most upsetting has been mentioned. It is the comparison the average East European makes with the prosperity he knows about or thinks he

—

—

knows about in Western Europe. These comparisons were becoming particularly painful by 1980 or so, a time of renewed economic health and prosperity in Western Europe. In 1980, for example, the average East European GNP per capita (expressed in U.S. dollars and representing no more than an informed estimate) was about $4,000, while the corresponding figure for West European members of NATO was $7,000. Although the

level of economic development of Czechoslovaand Austria was about the same on the eve of, and right after, World War II, in 1980 Czechoslovakia's GNP was about $4,700 while Austria's approximated $8,500. The second subjective circumstance is implicit in the figures cited above. It is the contrast East Europeans draw between their improving living standards in the first half of the 1970s (made possible, in part, by Western credits) and the current situation. What amounted to an economic upswing

kia

—

especially in Poland but also in East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria is now seen to belong to the distant (but well-remembered) past. East Europeans feel that the "good times" are gone, perhaps forever. And when the future seems bleak, the present is all but unbearable.

in the early 1970s

—

1

The Bloc That Failed

10

Mainly for these reasons there was talk of economic change in Eastern Europe well before Gorbachev's call for perestroika in the Soviet Union. What did these changes set out to do? What can be said about the "reform" of Soviet-type economic systems in Eastern Europe? It is important to make some distinctions. First, there has always been much more talk of change than change. Second, policy change also called perfecting or streamlining the exhas always been permitted, at times encouristing system

— —

aged. Third, reform or partial reform of the Soviet-type sys-

tems (see below) was officially discouraged; until 1985-86 even the word "reform" was banned. Fourth, the term radical reform, which was made palatable by Gorbachev only in January 1987, has come to signify a comprehensive overhaul of the region's economic and political systems. Even a "pure" comprehensive reform would of course retain state ownership of the major means of production. But, in

Ed

A. Hewett's words,

truly comprehensive reform of this system would affect all the institutions simultaneously: the hierarchy, the informa-

A

tion system, and the incentive mechanism. A comprehensive reform designed to enhance the role of the market and increase the autonomy of the enterprises would simultaneously change the price system so that prices could move more freely to reflect shifts in supply and demand; change the financial system to give more authority to banks to decide on competing applications for funds to finance working capital and investment needs; change the wage system to enable enterprises to compete more freely for labor and to allow wage rates to reflect more accurately the supply of, and demand for, various kinds of labor; and change the role of the party so that enterprises could operate in search of higher profits without party interference. The legal system would require a massive overhaul in which much of the law on enterprise rights and obligations would have to be resolved; and an entire new section of the law relating to monopolies, unfair competition, price gouging, and so on would have to be developed. 2

2.

Ed

A.

Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus

Effi-

Economic Relations In the 1980s, only

come

111

Hungary and Poland can be said

to

have

close to adopting a "comprehensive reform" so defined,

—

but even they did not fully implement it. Elsewhere such as there were in Bulgaria, and lately in the Soviet Union, too

— — the introduction of one or more parts of comprehensive reform — but most countries experi-

"partial reforms"

the

mented only with "policy changes" that sought

to

improve

the existing system.

While broad conclusions about reforms should not be the basis of one country's experience, the Hungarian case shows both the advantages and the limits of reforms. Though the reforms offer no panacea, they are certainly helpful. Introduced in 1968, Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (it could not be called a "reform" at that time) had several ups and downs. Because of political concerns about inequality and the rise of a so-called "petit-bourgeois mentality," as well as Soviet pressures, the reform process was interrupted in the early 1970s; because of the economic cost of retrenchment, however, it was allowed to start again at the end

drawn on

of the 1970s. Generally,

NEM was considered a success in the

and early

1970s; in terms of such indicators as the

availability of food

and consumer goods, the Hungarian

late 1960s

economy proved

superior to all of the neighboring economies for many years. The Hungarian economy appears to have come to a dead end in the 1980s. The reforms probably did not go far enough to keep improving living standards, to reduce Western indebtedness, to produce sufficient economic growth, and to make the quality of Hungarian products competitive in world markets. Conversely, the reforms probably went too far to make it advantageous or profitable for Hungary to continue trading extensively with the Soviet Union and other members of CMEA. While the reform's emphasis on qualitative improvements and market mechanisms made a Western trade itself

ciency (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 16.

The Bloc That Failed

112

orientation feasible, trade with the East called for the opposite

approach

— for stressing quantitative growth (partly be-

cause of the commodity composition of a

CMEA

trade)

more centralized economic structure (because

of

and for CMEA's

long-term plans for foreign trade transactions). In very simHungarian experience suggests that (a)

ple terms, then, the

market and plan do not easily coexist in a reformed economy and (b) foreign trade relations can suffer when significant disparity develops between the trading partners' economic structures and needs. Consider now the case of Romania, which, even after Ceau§escu, has the least reformed economy in the region. If its statistics are to be believed, Romania produced the highest rate of industrial growth in the 1970s. (Internal contradictions in and hence the inaccuracy of Romanian data are of such magnitude that all that can be stated is that industrial growth might have reached over 5 percent a year.) Yet even if the statistics were accurate, Romanian gains in industry were neutralized by the absence of comparable growth in agriculture and personal consumption. Romania remained a predominantly agrarian country and the people certainly did not benefit at all from rapid industrialization. Moreover, as even industrial growth was financed by Western loans, the economy as a whole cannot be said to have performed

—

—

well.

In the 1980s Ceau§escu decided to repay Romania's net hard-currency debt, which had reached $10 billion in 1981. No country has ever attempted to do so much in a short period of time. But he did

what he had

set out to do:

by

—

was under $5 billion paid for by deimmense price increases, and drastic cuts in imports and by 1989 the debt was all but gone. Meanwhile, the Romanian people had little to eat, electricity was 1987 Romania's debt

clining real wages,

—

often in short supply, especially in the winter, even

TV broad-

casting time had to be shortened, the streets of Bucharest

were

at times dark,

apartments remained unheated

— while,

Economic Relations in order to earn

113

hard currency, the country was exporting

fuels.

—

Of course, Romania was not at all typical it was by far the worst example of conditions characteristic of centralized, Soviet- type economic systems; East Germany and Czechoslovakia have certainly done much better. But the Romanian extreme still illustrates what can happen when a rigid, Stalinist economy undergoes no change and dogmatically rejects reform.

East European econotoward the introduction of free-market

Indeed, only in the 1990s will

all

mies begin to move mechanisms, led by Poland, which has announced the first major economic program for the post-communist era. How many will do so successfully remains to be seen. Certainly, the transitional years in the early 1990s, during which they will try to combine plan and market, will not yet yield substantial results. For one thing, in order to guide the processes of supply and demand effectively, markets cannot be merely "simulated," they have to exist and function and that takes both time and a spirit of entrepreneurship. For another, the shortage of capital will hinder genuine marketization. Hence the immediate future through the early 1990s looks gloomy; the gap between Eastern and Western Europe is bound to widen. Aware of the political implications of this trend, Gorbachev is no longer known to warn his allies, as he did in 1985, about the dangers of "market mechanisms" and of abandoning "the ship of socialism." It seems that any "ship" is now "socialist" as long as it does not sink.

—

—

—

—

The Economics and

Politics

of Trade

hard enough to unit is even more difficult, however, to separate facts from rhetoric in the trade relationships between the Soviet Union and Eastern Particularly for non-specialists,

it is

derstand the intricacies of "socialist" economics;

— 1

The Bloc That Failed

14

Europe and among the East European countries. The difficulties only begin with statistics. The problem here is that although each country publishes volumes of foreign-trade statistics, some have proved to be inaccurate, others have been only occasionally reliable, and Romania's has been viewed by Western and even some East European analysts as a pure fabrication. The official data are at times contradictory, too, for what Country As yearbook reports as export to Country B may not always appear in Country B's yearbook as import from Country A. So far, there has been a little improvement in this respect under Gorbachev. The pricing mechanism used in foreign trade presents another problem for evaluation. The primary unit for transactions is the so-called "transferable ruble," which was originally intended to provide an alternative standard to the dollar in intrabloc trade. In fact, it

transferable (or usable as

it is

neither a ruble nor

is

And

it

money) within the

bloc.

cannot be converted to Western currencies. It is but a piece of paper a primitive accounting device that is used to assign an artificial value to goods exchanged in old-fashioned barter deals. To make things more complicated, the transferable ruble accounts used in intra-bloc trade are supplemented by dollar accounts, which are apparently used for some of the items traded above and beyond those stipulated in long-term trade agreements. Normally, the dollar account is reserved for goods deemed to have a ready market in the West. Although there are plans to make the ruble and some of the East European currencies "transferable" and eventu-

—

—

—

the issue is on Gorbachev's agenda expected to be enacted by CMEA until the mid-1990s. (However, Hungary has declared its intention to use the dollar account as the basis of its future trade relation-

ally "convertible," too

no change

is

ship with the Soviet Union and Poland.)

How "prices" are thus determined is also complicated, to say the least. To begin with, the actual cost of producing certain

goods

— especially within an unreformed economy—

is

Economic Relations

115

not always known; the absence of such "details" legacies of the Stalin era.

ket can bear

Nor do

—because there

is

is

one of the

what the marmarket. Hence some to prices of compara-

prices reflect

no

real

of the prices in intra-bloc trade are tied

works reasonably well bauxite, or coal where qual-

ble goods in the world market. This

such natural resources as oil, important. Accordingly, their price is determined by averaging recent Western prices as reported on the pages of The Financial Times of London. But the same method cannot be applied to manufactured goods and especially high technology items, because their particular for

ity is relatively less

attributes

— especially their quality — define their value. How

much should

Czechoslovakia pay for Bulgarian software? pay as much as it would have to pay for Japanese software? Should the transaction qualify for entry in the dollar account if Sofia claims to have a Western market for its software? The existing system provides no standard answer to these questions. Prices are as elastic as in a Middle Eastern bazaar. Under Gorbachev, attempts are being made to find

Should

it

answers. Still

another problem that both hinders and complicates

the region's foreign trade has to do with translating Soviet

and East European currencies into reasonably accurate dollar terms. What East European currencies are really worth is anyone's guess; none of them are convertible into Western currencies. Of course each country has an official rate of exchange for its currency, but its relationship to reality varies from country to country. (For a dollar American tourists in mid- 1989 got only about 60 kopeks in Moscow [vs. ten rubles or more from taxi drivers], 12 kronas in Prague, and 58 forints in Budapest. In Warsaw, there were several official exchange rates in addition to those quoted on the black market.) The end result is that any statistic expressed in dollar terms is even less accurate than a statistic reported in Soviet or East European currencies. Despite

immense

difficulties of this sort,

and the resulting

1

The Bloc That Failed

16

distortions, there are

still

certain identifiable facts

and trends

about the nature, volume, and composition of trade within the Soviet bloc.

conducted on a bilateral basis. "Bilateralism" means trade between two countries, and in practice it also means barter deals: Country A sells certain goods to Country B in exchange for which Country B sells certain goods for Country A. No money changes hands. To repeat, the "transferable ruble" is only an accounting de(1) It is clear that

nearly

all

trade

is

vice.

In economic terms, an important concern in such bilateral

and preferably the elimination of imbalances over a period of time. The ideal is a "break even" situation or something close to it because the surplus cannot be used elsewhere. Imports by Country A from Country B are therefore based less on what Country A's domestic market needs or could absorb than on Country A's export capacity to Country B. The result is that trade turnover is likely to reflect the export capacity of the weaker of two trading partners. In the event, it makes little difference that the "weak partner" has a good market for the other's products. Nor does it much matter that the "weak partner" (Country A) has a trade surplus with a third country (Country C). Such surplus from that third-country transaction is not transferable and thus cannot buy products elsewhere (in Country B). If, for example, Bulgaria has a trade surplus with Romania, it cannot use that surplus to buy computers in East Germany (let alone West Germany). Indeed, Bulgaria will not want to trade

is

the reduction

have a trade surplus with Romania at all, because it gets little or no interest on the credits it grants (via the surplus) and because it cannot use that surplus to settle its purchases from any other country. In addition, the ultimate value of the surplus is uncertain; it depends on what Romania will be willing to sell Bulgaria to settle it. This is why bilateralism impedes the growth as well as the efficiency of trade countries.

among

the

CMEA

— Economic Relations To say the thus a very

least, then, foreign

117

trade in Eastern Europe

cumbersome and old-fashioned way

is

of conduct-

ing business. As individual enterprises are at best only

"consulted"

—even about their own transactions, nearly

all

of

which are still government-to-government transactions market mechanisms are effectively prevented from playing any role. Moreover, intra-bloc trade effectively curtails trade with the West because surpluses in the region's inconvertible currencies cannot be applied to import Western products. (2) The problems just discussed are all the more serious because the volume of trade is very high. Ballpark figures indicate that approximately two-thirds of the total Soviet trade

turnover East

— exports

and imports

—

is

Germany and Czechoslovakia

with Eastern Europe. are Moscow's

two

lead-

ing trading partners in the world. Of the total East European trade turnover, about 40 percent is with the Soviet Union and 25 percent is with other CMEA members, while trade with less-developed countries accounts for about 10 percent and with the industrialized West about 25 percent of the total.

Such general, area- wide figures do not show individual variations in the trading volume of the several East European countries. Hidden, for example, is the difference between Czechoslovakia whose Western exposure is low but whose Eastern exposure is high and the rest of the region. Nor do these regional percentages show the impact of growing Western indebtedness on Poland and Hungary both of which have had to reduce their Western trade exposure significantly in the 1980s. (The value of exports by the non-communist industrial countries to Poland dropped from $6.3 billion in 1980 to $3.1 billion in 1985; and exports to Hungary declined from $3.2 billion to $2.8 billion during the same time period.) Finally, the percentages cannot show how much CMEA trade

—

—

—

matters to countries for

whom foreign

trade

is

of critical im-

portance (about half of Hungary's national income involves exports or imports) and others (such as the Soviet Union) for

1

The Bloc That Failed

18

whom

foreign trade

makes but a minor contribution

to the

national economy.

volume of trade, especially between the Soviet Union on the one hand and East Germany and Czechoslovakia on the other, suggests that economic interdependence has become a way of life over the years. Eastern Europe desperately needs Soviet fuels; the Soviet Union depends on East European manufactures whose technological level is well matched to Soviet circumstances. Thus, even though the 1989 political miracle has reduced Moscow's controlling influence over Eastern Europe, bilateral trade (its volume reduced) is Still,

the large

likely to continue. (3)

The relationship

will continue

mainly because of the

—

—

is composition of trade, whose essential feature to repeat that the Soviet Union supplies Eastern Europe with most of

the energy the region needs in exchange for East

European

manufactures. In a sense, the composition of trade reflects a relationship between a developing country rich in vital natural resources and a more developed region capable of pro-

ducing machinery and consumer goods that meet Soviet specifications but might not always meet Western needs or tastes. The products include Polish ships, East German computers, Czechoslovak nuclear power plants, and Hungarian

—

busses.

The commodity composition of Soviet-East European trade shows that for several decades, with only minor varia-

from year to year, about half of Soviet exports have been and primary products. Yet that continuity is more apparent than real. For while in the mid-1950s approximately 80 percent of that total comprised primary products and only 20 percent fuels, by the late 1980s 80 percent was fuels and 20 percent primary products. The reason is obvious: Eastern Europe is energy hungry, and its growing, energy-inefficient industries consume ever-increasing amounts of Soviet oil and gas. As for East European exports to the Soviet Union, the tions fuels

Economic Relations

1

19

share of manufactures has grown from about 60 percent in

more than 80 percent in the 1980s. weight in the composition of trade, Soviet energy supplies to Eastern Europe deserve special attention. The point of departure here is the doubling of Soviet fuel deliveries in the 1970s. Because of that increase, and because the world price of energy so suddenly and so dramatically the mid-1950s to

Given

its

shot up at that time, changes in the terms of trade (i.e., changes in export prices relative to changes in import prices

some "base" year) eventually resulted in windfall gains for the Soviet Union and still further probas

compared

to

—

lems for Eastern Europe in a few short years. During the decade that began in 1974, the Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe improved by about 50 percent. Another way to explain the problem is to focus not on total trade where increases in the prices of some East European imports are partly compensated by increases in the prices of some East European exports but on the "terms of exchange" between single important import and export commodities. The following illustrates the extraordinary change that has taken place in the "terms of exchange": To pay for one million tons of Soviet oil, Hungary sold Moscow some 800 "Ikarus" busses in 1974. By 1981 it had to sell 2,300 such busses for the same amount of oil. By the mid-1980s the "price" of one million tons of Soviet oil was over 4,000 "Ikarus" busses. Did the Soviet Union take advantage of Eastern Europe's great appetite for energy? Alternatively, did the Soviet Union allow the price to rise only gradually, over a period of years, in order to limit the damage to the region's economies and, hence, help reduce political tensions? The question of whether the Soviet Union extended implicit subsidies to Eastern Europe was first raised in a study published in 1983 by Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous. Others, including Paul Marer and Raimund Dietz, have addressed the issue since then. At least one East European econ-

—

—

—

— The Bloc That Failed

120

omist, the Hungarian Andras Koves, has also joined the

much

both complicated and significant; it has to do with the politics of Soviet-East European eco-

nomic

relations.

debate. The issue

is

In their original study, Marrese that in

the 1970s— from

1971 to

and Vanous concluded Soviet Union pro-

1980— the

vided a subsidy of about $80 billion to Eastern Europe. In a subsequent study, this time using 1984 dollars, they concluded that between 1970 and 1984 the subsidy amounted to $118.2 billion. Reduced to simple terms, their calculations were based on two considerations: (1) Since the price of Soviet

energy sold to Eastern Europe did not keep pace with

ris-

ing world market prices, the East Europeans paid less than

they would have had to pay had they bought energy in the open market. (2) Concurrently, the East Europeans got more for the

manufactures they sold to the Soviet Union than what it bought these manufactures

Moscow would have paid had in the West.

The "implict subsidy" was therefore the difference between what Moscow would have been paid for its energy in the West and what it would have paid for comparable Western manufactures, on the one hand, and what it was paid for its energy by the East Europeans, on the other. However, according to Marrese and Vanous, the subsidies were "implicit" because the Soviet Union granted them surreptitiously hidden from the Soviet people in order to keep this potentially controversial domestic issue "under the table," so to speak. (It should be pointed out that other Western scholars, like Paul Marer, suggest that the subsidies resulted mainly from the so-called "Bucharest pricing formula," which links CMEA trade to world market prices of an agreed-upon earlier period. Together with several other considerations, this, according to Marer, explains the relatively cheap price of Soviet energy and hence the "subsidies.") Neither Marer nor Marrese and Vanous addressed the broader meaning of Soviet subsidies. Indeed, Marrese and

—

Economic Relations Vanous stressed that

ment

121

their data did not constitute a "judg-

which individual CMEA countries are CMEA association with the Soviet Union."

of the extent to

better off owing to

Nevertheless, their readers could not help but reach a conclu-

Europe was an ecoand that Moscow in

sion "implicit" in their data: that Eastern

nomic burden

for the Soviet Union,

order to maintain a semblance of stability there

— — bailed out

the region for political reasons.

Both the data Marrese and Vanous presented and their "implicit" conclusions have generated

much

controversy.

Marer, for example, questioned the amount, though not the existence, of Soviet subsidies. He found the Marrese-Vanous estimate of East European underpayment for energy in the 1970s "acceptable." However, he viewed the estimate of Soviet overpayment for East European manufactures to be "unacceptable" because of "statistical uncertainties,

upward

bi-

and omitted compensatory gains to Moscow." Marer came up with subsidies for the years 1971-78 of $14 billion, which was only a third of the Marrese-Vanous figure of $42 billion for those years. Equally important was his conclusion ases,

that since the subsidies related almost exclusively to the en-

ergy crisis of the 1970s, they can be said to have effectively

ended in 1982-83. The Austrian scholar Raimund Dietz shared Marer s conclusion that the Marrese-Vanous estimates were greatly exaggerated. Dietz 's calculation,

made

in

transferable rubles

TR9.8 billion for the years 1973-78. As the Marrese-Vanous study had also pro-

(TRs), produced a Soviet subsidy of

vided estimates in transferable rubles for 1973-78, Dietz

could be compared with Marrese-Vanous for the same years.

The Marrese-Vanous estimate was TR29.1 billion. Thus the Dietz's figure, like Marer 's, was only about a third of what Marrese-Vanous had found. A devastating critique of the whole idea of calculating Soviet subsidies to Eastern Europe came from an East European economist. In an article published in 1983 in the Hun-

— The Bloc That Failed

122

garian journal Acta Oeconomica, Andras Koves put forth the important point that "advantages and disadvantages resulting from economic relations should not be judged only on the basis of foreign trade prices." In a remarkably candid (if cumbersome) passage, he identified what he considered the miss-

ing issue in the Western debate, alluding to the compulsory nature of the Soviet-East European economic relationship: it was very advantageous to buy oil from the USSR world market prices and against ruble payment but if this oil is used for example as the fuel for [Soviet] trucks whose specific consumption is about double of the average international [Western] consumption level, then this advantage will disappear. Of course, it is also true that in the short run the trucks available in a country should be filled with the cheapest possible fuel. But, in the longer run, trucks with high fuel consumption (in general terms, a less efficient energy consumption and a too energy-intensive economic structure) are a consequence of the same system of economic relations that 3 enabled buying oil cheaper than on the world market.

No

doubt,

—

at half of

In plain language, Koves argued that Soviet price support for energy must be seen in a broader political and economic con-

which was that Moscow, having imposed an unworkable economic structure on Eastern Europe, had kept the region from adopting and developing its own economic order according to its own traditions, customs, and needs. The Soviet trucks symbolized the damage caused by text, the

main aspect

of

CMEA relationship, while the short-lived subsidies merely reflected Moscow's interest in mitigating the political consequences of the economic damage it had done to Eastern Europe since World War II. the

It is clear,

then, that there are at least

two ways

to look

3. A. Koves, "'Implicit Subsidies' and Some Issues of Economic Relations within (Remarks on the Analyses Made by Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous)," Acta Oeconomica 31, No. 1/2 (1983), p. 127. For more details, see also A. Koves, The Countries in the World Economy: Turning In-

CMEA

CMEA

wards or Turning Outwards (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1985).

Economic Relations

123

—

—

both the subsidy issue and more generally the SovietEast European economic relationship. If one takes pre- 1989 political realities as a given, there is no question that Eastern Europe has benefitted from the Soviet economic connection in recent decades, especially in the 1970s. How much the region benefitted from cheap Soviet at

energy

is

debatable; that

it

did

is

not.

on the other hand, one does not take pre- 1989 realities as a given if one assumes an Eastern Europe without Soviet hegemony then there is room for speculation and doubt. Suppose Stalin had not exploited Eastern Europe to the tune of about $ 14 billion after the war. Suppose the region had not been required to emulate the structure of the Soviet economy, to invest so heavily in the building of heavy industry for which it lacked natural resources, or to collectivize agriculture. Suppose Eastern Europe did not have to buy inefficient Soviet trucks. Instead, assume that Eastern Europe developed along the lines of such "capitalist" welfare states as If,

— —

Finland or Austria. Would

economy be

shape? Would it need so much energy to maintain inefficient and unprofitable heavy industries? Would East Europeans be so dissatisfied with their economic conditions that they would need its

in better

extensive foreign loans and subsidies?

Koves, and apparently most East Europeans, seem to take it

for

granted that

all

would be well

only they were free to choose their cal institutions. In that case,

— or at least better—

own economic and

if

politi-

would not Poland do as well as

Finland, Czechoslovakia as well as Austria, East

Germany? In the early Gorbachev about the past became relevant because

Germany

as

well as West

era, the ques-

tion

it

—

reflected a

widespread East European view that the region's dismal economic condition was due to its place in the CMEA orbit. However, the question is more relevant, if as yet unanswerable, when rephrased to confront the central issue for the 1990s: "Will post-communist Eastern Europe repair the eco-

124

The Bloc That Failed

nomic damage left behind by the Soviet connection, rescue itself from the dependency signified by Moscow's 'implicit subsidies,' and then begin to match its Western neighbors' impressive achievements?"

Why CMEA Does Not Work many "problems" and even "crises" European economies and in the Soviet-East European trade relationship, the Western reader may well ask at this point: "What about the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance? Isn't Eastern Europe served by the vast market CMEA offers? Can't the region's economies benefit from the division of labor and the moves toward integration that CMEA has attempted? Isn't it possible that, especially under Tired of hearing of so

in the East

Gorbachev's vigorous leadership,

—

CMEA could yet become the

Common Market the Soviet/East European response West Europeans' impressive European Economic Community (EEC)?" Formally, CMEA is often presented as a rough equivalent the of Common Market. Founded under Stalin in 1949, it was in fact a dormant organization until Khrushchev made an attempt to give it a mission in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That mission was to develop multilateral economic ties, encourage the "socialist division of labor" among member states (meaning that each country would specialize in what it can do best), and move toward "socialist integration." Alas, none of these goals could Khrushchev realize. CMEA's multilateralism, in Robert L. Hutching 's apt phrase, still amounts to no more than "multiple bilateralisms." Division of labor has foundered on account of national or nationalist suspicions. Integration has signified but a few joint projects. CMEA has been an institution with a large bureaucracy and large headquarters in Moscow. The number of its comEast's

to the

Economic Relations

125

mittees and the frequency of their meetings, together with ambitious declarations about the promise of "socialist economic integration," create the impression of an active organization that promotes fresh initiatives and benefit of

its

members. In

CMEA

fact, the

new

ideas for the

yearly or bi-yearly sessions

policy-making body, are quite predictable. Normally, a Soviet leader unveils a grand, "longterm" proposal. In the debate that follows, it will be applauded for the acuity of its vision and reduced to broad of the

Council,

its

Once the meeting is over, implementation will suffer from the members' overriding interest in their national generalities.

priorities.

Khrushchev, for example, pressed for the adoption of a new charter (1960), followed by a more detailed statement on "The Basic Principles of the International Division of Labor"

The emphasis

was on the coordination of was expected to lead to a better division of labor. However, the call for a division of labor was perceived by some of the less developed CMEA members, notably Romania, as an attempt to justify and retain the developmental status quo. As each country was to do what it could do well, Romania was asked to concentrate on agriculture, food processing, and the like; in the meantime, the more advanced industrial countries, such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia, would further develop their industrial base. The gap between the region's northern and southern tiers would deepen. In the event, Romania not only vetoed Khrushchev's plans, but by 1964 it also took a more general position in defense of its national interests and sovereignty, a position that effec(1962).

at the time

national plans, which

—

—

tively

countered the Soviet-sponsored idea of multilateraland integration. Indeed, the original

ism, division of labor,

source of differences between the Soviet Union and Romania in the 1960s was Khrushchev's initiative to give content to

CMEA. Years

later

it

was Brezhnev's turn

to

try.

His

1971

— The Bloc That Failed

126

—

called "Comprehensive Program for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Development of Socialist Integration by CMEA Member Countries"

proposals

had as their main objective the development of joint investments in general and of Soviet energy resources in particular. To obtain broad support for his proposals from all members, including Romania, Brezhnev introduced a new mechanism the so-called "interested party" rule. It meant that only those member states would participate in a particular joint investment project that had an interest in it. At the same time, those who declined to take part in such a project

—

did not have the right to veto

and

essentially bilateral

then, the

—

Romanian concept

and the Soviet concept of

it.

In effect, while a few useful

underway was preserved

projects could thus get of "sovereignty"

"socialist integration" received a

setback.

Following the adoption of the "Comprehensive Program," Brezhnev did obtain East European participation for a few only about ten joint investment projects. The largest such project was the building of the Orenburg natural gas complex in Siberia, together with a pipeline from the complex to the Soviet-Czechoslovak border near Uzhgorod. Though Roma-

—

nia played only a limited role,

all

member states made

a con-

tribution to the project. Jointly financed at a cost of about

$5-6 billion, and jointly built, the facilities belong to the SoUnion alone. Moscow keeps the profits too. Eastern Europe benefits as the Soviet Union makes a guaranteed supply

viet

of natural gas available.

CMEA

was

also instrumental in creating a few joint

com-

panies in Eastern Europe whose activities range from the

production of cotton yarns (the "Friendship Mill" in Poland) to computer programming ("Interprogramma" in Bulgaria). There are only about a dozen such companies, none very large or significant, and participation in almost all cases is limited

to only

two

CMEA

countries.

Chernenko also tried

to bring

CMEA

to

life.

He had

Sofia

Economic Relations host a

summit

127

of party general secretaries (rather than only

—

meeting of the CMEA Council the first and half. The "Basic Guidelines" decade such summit in a (1984) adopted at that meeting made some (largely verbal) concessions to the more reform-minded members (particularly Hungary), which had sought to encourage enterprise-toenterprise rather than only government-to-government trade within the CMEA framework. But the main purpose of this high-level summit was to provide Chernenko with an opportunity to remind the East Europeans of their obligation to "supply the USSR with the products it needs" and thus "create economic conditions ensuring the implementation and continuation of deliveries from the USSR of a number of

prime ministers)

types of

for a

raw materials and

energy.

..."

Chernenko 's warning reflected Moscow's growing economic nationalism, which stemmed from dissatisfaction with the poor quality of products Eastern Europe was selling to the Soviet Union (while offering the region's better goods for sale in the West) and from impatience with late deliveries. Ironically,

it

may

even be that Western studies of "implicit

had awakened the Soviet leadership to the possiit was not getting a fair deal from its junior allies in Eastern Europe. While the issue had more to do with bilateral than multilateral relations, the CMEA Council was a convenient forum for airing Soviet complaints. If viewed as a multilateral organization, the CMEA that Gorbachev inherited was an institution that could not boast of any major achievement. It was a framework without much substance. As an economic institution, it facilitated East European participation in the development of Soviet natural resubsidies"

bility that

sources. As a political institution,

framework

for

Moscow

to insist

it

provided a convenient

on bloc cohesion and

unity.

CMEA sought to project a spirit of cooperation within the region and abroad, encourage "socialist interdeIdeologically,

pendence," and uphold the idea that benefits accrue accrue

— from a joint future.

—or will

The Bloc That Failed

128

quite understandable, then, that Gorbachev, not un-

It is

has been profoundly dissatisfied with symbolic role and minimal accomplishments. Soon after his accession to power in 1985, another session of the CMEA Council was devoted to a discussion of like his predecessors,

CMEA's

largely

Gorbachev's "Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress" (1985). As the title of this latest CMEA

program suggested, the task

come

for

member

states

to over-

technological backwardness. Gorbachev focused on five

areas where speedy action

was needed:

electronics, robots,

nuclear energy, research and development of gies,

was

and

biotechnology. In effect, the

new

technolo-

program was meant

to

extend the Soviet Union's "scientific-technological revolution" to the member states of the CMEA. Again, a number of committees and even a few new, smaller organizations were created to implement the proposals that were intended to

bear fruit by the year 2000. What will actually come of them remains to be seen. Meanwhile, Gorbachev's major preoccupations appear to be somewhere else. First and foremost, he is concerned with perestroika in the Soviet Union viet subsidies to

of perhaps as

members

Cuba, a

much

of the

itself.

While the enormous So-

CMEA member, continue to the tune

as $4.5 billion a year, East

CMEA

European

get stern lectures from Gorbachev, as

they did from Chernenko, about their obligations and responsibilities.

Moscow

is

known

to

East European products, and

have already rejected inferior it

has called for penalties for

has also concluded literally hundreds of new, so-called "Specialization Agreements" with CMEA members in order to assure the supply of products it needs late deliveries. It

make CMEA members dependent on

the Soviet market come. These agreements have produced no results so far. As a matter of fact, the volume of Soviet-East European trade failed to increase in the second half of the 1980s. The East Europeans have not been able to buy either more energy and

and

to

for years to

Economic Relations

129

raw materials or high technology goods from the Soviet Union. Perhaps because it is now looking out for its own interests more than it ever had before or since the Stalin years, the Soviet Union has not offered "hard goods" for additional

has put considerable pressure on Eastern Europe to deliver more. At the end of the 1980s, the value of what even (poor) Poland was exporting to the Soviet Union purchases. Instead,

it

was thought to exceed Polish imports from the Soviet Union. Hungary found itself in the same position. Perhaps most troubling for at least some East Europeans, the Soviet Union is also asking for a different mix of products from its allies to satisfy its current and changing needs. Instead of machinery,

CMEA,

for

example

Moscow —at the July 1988 meeting of —expressed interest in importing food

and food-processing equipment, "products that are

made with

light

consumer goods, and

the application of high technol-

new Soviet shopping list preimmense problems for the East Europeans because they would have to modernize and expand old facilities, and build new ones, to satisfy Soviet needs. They lack the necessary money both in their own currencies and, especially, in the hard currency needed to import Western equipment and know-how. The deeper problem is that most of the items Moscow now wants food and food-related products in particular would have to be sold below the already very

ogy" from Eastern Europe. The sents

—

—

cheap prices that Soviet customers pay for their (subsidized) food. The purchase price would be considerably below the world-market price, and hence the East Europeans could not make a profit on the deal. Implicit in the new Soviet shopping list and the continued absence of a realistic CMEA pricing mechanism are two new problems that are surfacing under Gorbachev. One is the inflexibility of the CMEA economies, a particularly acute problem today when perestroika calls for new investment priorities at home and new trading mechanisms abroad. As years of misspent investments and the old, artificial pricing system

— 1

The Bloc That Failed

30

cannot be quickly or easily remedied, the region's as yet centrally planned economies find themselves unable to meet the new requirements of their trading partners. The broader controversy stems from growing economic insome uncompatibilities in the region. Economic structures changed, some streamlined, and some partially reformed

—

are out of sync;

interaction

within

CMEA

suffers

from had to

While past difficulties do with the coordination of long-term plans among member states, resistance to Soviet-inspired multilateralism and integration, and different levels of economic development between the more advanced and the less advanced countries, now, in addition, diverse domestic economic structures make intra-CMEA trade quite disadvantageous for several of the member states, especially those that embarked on the road

significant domestic disparities.

to

reform in the 1980s. This calls for explanation.

terprises are

A reformed economy whose

becoming autonomous

is

en-

reluctant to enter into

long-term trade agreements with countries whose enterprises are

still

centrally run.

An autonomous enterprise wants

the best possible price for

its

to get

products at home, in the West,

in the Third World, or in the bloc.

Once the government another CMEA

en-

govern-

long-term agreement with ment, the autonomy of the enterprise is curtailed. It has to deliver at a price specified in the agreement. Its flexibility is gone. Its ability to earn hard currency is gone. It cannot increase its profits by taking advantage of changing world marters into a

ket conditions.

With one foot in a real market and with another in the world of CMEA, reformed economies as a whole cannot function efficiently and continue the reform process beyond a certain (admittedly undefinable) point. The requirements of the two markets are vastly different. As long as CMEA trade remains predominant and hard currency earnings are therefore limited, the East Europeans can neither repay their debts nor modernize their facilities. To repay debts, modernize facili-

—

— Economic Relations ties,

and

raise living standards,

131

comprehensive reforms are needed. But

including tough austerity measures

—

if

CMEA members

do not all follow the same path, the unreformed economies, by insisting on old-fashioned trading patterns that suit their needs, will stifle the reform process everywhere. In other words, CMEA as presently constituted hinders the introduction of a truly comprehensive reform in

any one CMEA country alone, for unless all members begin to adopt such reforms none will be able to do it well. This is not to say that the reformed economies cannot benefit at all from the extensive ties they have with each other and with the Soviet Union. In the short run, they often do. In the long run, however, the lack of a real market (something like the European Economic Community) in the CMEA orbit curtails innovation and such other measures as Eastern Europe would need for even a chance of closing the gap with its Western neighbors. More realistically, the gap that must be closed first is that between the reformed and unreformed economies.

For CMEA to be more than a framework for consultation and, increasingly, a debating society all of its members, in-

must not merely pay lip must implement, "radical reforms." Indeed, as the acute problems of the already reformed Hungarian economy demonstrate, these reforms must be truly comprehen-

cluding especially the Soviet Union, service to, but

sive. In the

realm of foreign trade relationships, for example,

they must entail the replacement of bilateral barter deals with: (a)

rapid progress toward introducing a truly trans-

ferable ruble; (b)

a decision to

make

ally convertible into (c)

line

national currencies eventu-

hard currencies;

the adoption of foreign-trade prices generally in

with those that prevail in world markets;

(d) the

extension of the rights of enterprises in differ-

ent countries to trade with one another;

and hence

— 1

The Bloc That Failed

32

(e) the opening of domestic markets from other CMEA producers.

Gorbachev's chances of persuading his

to competition

CMEA

allies to

enact

such changes are discussed below.

Summing Up and Looking Ahead The empty house that

CMEA has built is not a proper mea-

The which constitutes over 95 percent of all trade transactions among CMEA members. Most East European and Western analysts agree that there has come to exist a natural trading relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. So energy-thirsty, Eastern Europe cannot help but welcome Soviet energy supplies. Needing manufactures, consumer goods, and food, the Soviet Union cannot help but welcome East European products sure of the Soviet-East European economic relationship. best signpost

is

bilateral trade,

suited to Soviet requirements.

A condition

dence, one from which each side benefits

come

of interdepen-

at least for

now, has

into being. In particular, each side has gained a steady

market

for its exports,

some

of

which could not be

easily sold

elsewhere.

Under Gorbachev, and perhaps starting under Chernenko, Eastern Europe has lost some of the benefits it once enjoyed. Whatever the precise amount of implicit subsidies in the 1970s, Eastern Europe got a "good deal" at that time. Due to the decline and apparent disappearance of Soviet energy subsidies since 1983 or 1984, however, the overall amount of implicit subsidies has diminished all.

if

they

still

exist at

Concurrently, the steady deterioration in the terms of

Soviet-East European trade until 1986 or so has meant that

European countries have had to sell much more to the Soviet Union in exchange for the same amount of goods mainly fuels than they received from the Soviet Union. An additional major problem now is that the East Europeans are

the East

—

Economic Relations

133

unable to get more of what they really need from the Soviet Union. From a purely economic point of view and especially from a Soviet perspective, at least some of the changes Moscow is introducing into the Soviet-East European trade relationship are justified. As Gorbachev has made it clear, the Soviet

Union must cope with

now and

at the

its

own

serious economic stringencies

same time finance

its

still-expensive military

establishment as well. As the availability of cheap Soviet energy is on the decline and the cost of producing new Soviet oil is rising,

why should Moscow not receive the world market

price for the energy

its

Warsaw Pact

allies so

desperately

need? And why should it from Eastern Europe? The answer from East Europeans as suggested by Andras Koves's statement (quoted earlier in this chapter) is that Moscow bears responsibility for having not receive goods of higher quality

—

—

made

this

unfortunate region, in Seweryn Bialer's phrase,

the Soviet Union's "co-stagnation sphere." Irrespective of

whether the Soviet-East European economic relationship has since evolved into a natural relationship, Eastern Europe must somehow try to make the best of a condition not of its own making. Can Gorbachev make a difference? Under his guidance,

CMEA develop into a genuine multilateral organization, one that will encourage rather than hinder reforms? It is perhaps of some significance that at the July 1988 seswill

sion of the

solved to

CMEA

Council,

work toward movement

all

members except Romania

re-

the "gradual formation of conditions

and other productoward forming a unified market in the future." The new CMEA policy goal thus broke with tradition by promising to replace central controls with the mechanisms of the market. When read carefully, however, it is clear

for the free

of goods, services,

tion factors, with a view

that to

CMEA was alluding only to the "formation of conditions"

accomplish

this goal

— in the long run. By referring to the

period 1991-2005, even the

title

of the

document

("Collective

The Bloc That Failed

134

Concept for the Socialist International Division of Labor for 1991-2005") indicates a distant goal. Moreover, as the fate of past resolutions of this kind suggests, the

document

is

un-

likely to be implemented. Especially in the post-communist era of the 1990s, Gorbachev's vision of a unified CMEA market is unrealistic. If

Soviet perestroika begins to yield results at home, the

maintain a mutually beneficial, if limited, trade relationship with a reformed Soviet economy. By bringing an end to government-to-government barter deals and replacing them with enterprise-

mixed East European economies

will still

—

to-enterprise trade, realistic prices, convertibility at least

within CMEA, and hence with a competitive, market-oriented economic environment Gorbachev can look forward to continued foreign trade with the East Europeans. Even under

—

such optimum circumstances, however, integration is almost certainly a dead letter, because both popular sentiment and the region's economic needs indicate a strong westward draw.

Worse

yet,

viet Union,

if

perestroika fails to

make headway

in the So-

and the Soviet and the East European economies

further diverge,

the possibility for the marketization of

CMEA

and of the Soviet-East European trade relationship simultaneously disappear. In that case even the volume will of bilateral trade will decline. So will any realistic hope for reversing the conclusive separation of the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent the whole CMEA region, from the industrialized West. Indeed, as CMEA and most of its constituent economies are entering the 1990s as beggars, they will be as unable as ever to offer an alternative to the Common Market and its visionary plan for a "Europe without frontiers" in 1992. Vlad Sobell explained

it

well:

The EEC intends to abolish all the remaining barriers to the uninhibited movement of goods, services, labor, and capital among its

members

[by 1992]

—a

move

that

may

eventually entail

such forms of economic integration as the creation of a com-

Economic Relations

mon West European

135

and The CMEA, on the

currency, a European central bank,

the harmonization of monetary policies.

other hand, is merely beginning to plan the introduction of preconditions for such a final goal. After all, the CMEA's member economies are not even market economies; their prices (as well as intra-bloc prices) are not real prices and their currencies are not convertible; and the movement of goods, capital, and labor within CMEA is completely subjected to bureaucratic agreements. In short, the CMEA is light years behind the EEC; and the prospect of a unified CMEA market is a very long

way

off indeed.

4

In the final analysis, only full participation in a competitive

world economy

is

likely to

such great political significance Europe.

—

narrow the gap that gap of between the two halves of

—

4. Vlad Sobell, "The CMEA's Goal of a 'Unified Market'," Radio Free Europe Research, July 12, 1988.

MILITARY RELATIONS

Defense against

Whom?

like many European philosophers and politicians before him,

Gorbachev is also fond of invoking the idea of one Europe. Speaking in Prague in 1987 and echoing French President Charles de Gaulle's vision of the 1960s of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," the Soviet leader called for a

European home' [which] assumes a degree of if its

"

'common

integrity,

even

and opposing What kind of Europe did Gorbachev

states belong to different social systems

military-political blocs."

1

have in mind? When did he envisage a new Soviet concept of European security that would entail the dismantling of the Wall and the Curtain? Or did Gorbachev merely revive his predecessors' old hope that Western Europe would prod the United States out of Europe, leaving Moscow in charge of the security of the "common European home"? Even as late as 1988, Europe in the vivid phrase of The Economist of London was but "a pair of semi-detached houses, in which two different sorts of people live two different kinds of life." The partition that Stalin built still stood.

—

—

2

True, there

was much more

contact,

more

high-level visits,

German TV

sets brought in West German programs, and Austrian television enjoyed con-

trade, tourism; almost all East

1.

2.

Gorbachev, For a "Common European Home," The Economist, April 23, 1988, p. 13.

p. 28.

— 137

Military Relations

siderable popularity in the western parts of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Also, the East European people took an ex-

traordinary interest in "rejoining Europe." As part of that interest, the ideal of Mitteleuropa, which upholds the common heritage

and

began to

fill

spiritual unity of the peoples of Central

many

Europe,

a page in unofficial and even official publi-

one Europe notand military map of Europe continued to show the old until the very end of 1989 continent split into East and West, East and West Germany, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. More than anything else, security and defense concerns still explained the division of Europe into a "pair of semidetached houses." Consider that in the late 1980s, four and a half long decades after the end of World War II, there were about still three million Soviet and East European troops 145 divisions in central Europe (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary) and in Moscow's so-called western military districts, located in the European part of the So-

cations. Still, such expressions of longing for

withstanding, the political

—

—

—

viet

Union.

The estimated breakdown even during the chev era •

is

"later"

Gorba-

as follows:

Thirty Soviet divisions (about 565,000 troops) are de-

ployed in central Europe and 70 divisions (about 1,400,000 troops) in the western military districts for a subtotal of 100

—

Soviet divisions or almost two million troops. •

on

Of the East European troops,

their

home

territory, there are

150,000 Romanians,

all

of

which are stationed

295,000 Poles under arms,

145,000 Czechoslovaks,

123,000 East

—

Germans, 105,000 Bulgarians, and 83,000 Hungarians for a subtotal of 45 East European divisions or about 900,000 troops. •

Of the

total of 145 Soviet

and East European divisions or

three million troops in Europe, approximately half are de-

ployed in Eastern Europe and the other half in the European part of the Soviet Union.

— 1

The Bloc That Failed

38 •

In the critical central

ison with

vantage

NATO shows

is

about 2 to

European region

that the

As for

1.

compar-

only, the

manpower adarmaments, the Warsaw Pact vs. NATO's 1,250; the Warsaw Warsaw

Pact's

has 2,650 fixed winged aircraft Pact has 16,700 main battle tanks in units the Warsaw Pact has 9,200 artillery pieces

vs. vs.

NATO's NATO's

7,800; 3,000;

and the Warsaw Pact has 5,000 anti-tank missile launchers vs. NATO's 2,000. When comparable figures are considered for all of Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals rather than only in the central region), the ratios are similar.

Western assessments vary significantly about what these figures actually mean, because the numbers by themselves the "bean counts" cannot predict either victory or defeat in an actual conflict. Much depends on the combatants' level of readiness, the quality of their equipment and training, lo-

—

gistical support, leadership, motivation,

command,

control,

communications, and intelligence capabilities. The

effects of

a surprise attack are also incalculable. In 1940,

Germany

reached the English Channel in four weeks despite the fact that a numerical count had shown its forces to be roughly equal to those of France and England combined. If one re-

duced the conventional balance to "bean counts," how would one explain Israel's 1967 victory over the numerically superior forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan? Yet, looking only at the raw numbers, no one can deny that the conventional balance strongly favors the

Therefore, the question

troops and

armaments

is

pertinent:

still

Why are

in the heart of

Warsaw

all

Pact.

these Soviet

Europe? Three ex-

some complementary, some not. The Soviet and East European official explanation

planations are current, (1) is

that they have been there for the defense of the Soviet

—

Union

and Eastern Europe defense against NATO's "aggressive designs" and West German "revanchism." From Stalin to Chernenko, and to a lesser extent under the early Gorbachev, too, Moscow claimed that it was only because of the mighty forces of the Soviet Union and its allies that the West

— 139

Military Relations

and overthrowing one or several communist regimes. Stalin is known to have expected a Western attack especially around 1950, at the height of the refrained from marching east

cold war.

The fear of Germany was always widespread in Russia and perhaps still is in the Soviet Union, in Poland, and in Czechoslovakia. Reinforced by Soviet propaganda, the memory of the Nazi invasion and brutalities during World War II is

particularly vivid. Call

it

political paranoia, realism, or

good memory, there is genuine fear that under certain circumstances German militarism could revive once again. On the other hand, considering NATO's fundamentally defensive strategy and deployments as well as West Germany's devotion to detente since the late 1960s, the source of Soviet anxiety.

it is

difficult to see

Was an unprovoked Western

at-

tack on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union ever conceiv-

Western aggression has been only "unlikely" rather than "inconceivable," does the Warsaw Pact need three million troops to fulfill its defensive mission? (2) By contrast, the usual Western explanation is that the heavy concentration of Warsaw Pact troops and armaments able? Even

if

indicates offensive goals vis-a-vis the West.

goals are primarily military or political

is

Whether these

in dispute.

The argument that the Soviet threat has been primarily military rests on numbers, on the steady modernization of Soviet (and to a much lesser extent East European) offensive weapons, on the concentration of offensive military deployments in the central region (primarily in East Germany), on aspects of Soviet strategy, and on the history of Soviet foreign policy. In the official Western view, only NATO's deterrence has contained Soviet military expansion. The (much more complex) view that the Soviet threat has been primarily political that the Soviet goal has been to di-

—

vide and intimidate rather than to attack Western Europe rests

on the Soviet conventional buildup. In

plicit Soviet

purpose was to force

NATO

this view, the

to choose

im-

between

— The Bloc That Failed

140

two politically equally unpopular options. One option was to match the Warsaw Pact's conventional strength. This is not only a very expensive proposition, of course, but it would also require the introduction of additional U.S. and other NATO troops into the Central European theater (which is already one of the world's most heavily militarized regions). The second option based on the doctrine of "flexible response" was to counter the Pact's conventional strength by relying on short-range nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe and asserting NATO's willingness to use such shortrange weapons first if necessary. Followed by NATO since the 1950s, the second option is both cheaper and politically more acceptable to the U.S. and to European governments. On the other hand, it is a major source of strong anti-nuclear and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe. Instead of, or in addition to, blaming Moscow for having prompted this nuclear strategy by its conventional buildup, many West Europeans ask, "Why should Europe become the 'first candidate' or the testing ground in a nuclear war? Why does the U.S. introduce or seek to modernize such short-range nuclear weapons in Europe that would limit the damage only to Europeans while leaving the United States safe and secure?" Whether Moscow had anticipated its conventional buildup to cause division in NATO cannot be known. What is clear is that Soviet policies even in the early Gorbachev era had the effect of exacerbating political differences within

—

the alliance. (3)

The

last

Western explanation

is

that the primary mis-

sion of Soviet forces was to police Eastern Europe. Readers of this book need not be reminded of Moscow's traditional un-

popularity in the region, nor of the burning East European

and even neutrality. Afghanistan Europe has the Soviet Union military might directly since World War II. So-

desire for independence

aside, moreover, only in Eastern

had

to use its

141

Military Relations viet troops

and tanks had

to

be called in to put

uprisings in East Berlin (1953),

Hungary

down popular

(1956),

and Czech-

oslovakia (1968). too, the region's importance to the Soviet Brezhnev so bluntly told the reformist leaderUnion. What ship of Czechoslovakia in 1968 still held as late as 1988 even

Consider,

—

if

history has of course disproven his last sentence.

Your country lies on territory where the Soviet soldier trod in the Second World War. We bought that territory at the cost of enormous sacrifices, and we shall never leave it. The borders of that area are our borders as well. Because you do not listen to us, we feel threatened. In the name of the dead in World War Two who laid down their lives for your freedom as well, we are therefore fully justified in sending our soldiers into your country, so that we may feel fully secure within our common borders. It is immaterial whether anyone is actually threatening us or not: it is a matter of principle, independent of external circumstances. And that is how it will be, from the Second World War to "eternity." 3 Accordingly,

it is

the combination of East

European

anti-

Sovietism and the Soviet commitment to keep the Warsaw Pact alive that has propelled Moscow to keep some of its best troops

— those with the highest level of readiness — in Eastern

Europe (rather than attempt to police the region from the nearby military districts in the western part of the Soviet Union). Their presence in Eastern Europe was needed because, as the case of Romania suggests, the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops (1958) provides an opportunity for assertions of limited independence (since 1964). Whether a somewhat smaller Soviet contingent could also accomplish the task of policing Eastern Europe is, of course, another question. In the final analysis, however, all three objectives can be

assumed 3.

to

have played a role in Soviet calculations and de-

Mlyn&f, Nightfrost in Prague, p. 240.

The Bloc That Failed

142

How much

importance one assigned to each objective was always a matter of judgment. In this writer's view, Moscow's professed concern about defense was both out-of-date and exaggerated. In the absence of Soviet provocations and particularly in an era of East-West detente, the very idea of a Western attack on the Soviet Union has been no more than a flight of fancy. A Soviet-led offensive military operation against Western Europe has been another unlikely Soviet motivation so long as NATO maintains a credible deterrence and so long as Gorbachev's first priority is the rebuilding of the Soviet economy. Hence the most compelling, though certainly not the only, reason for the continued presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe was to police Eastern Europe, including East Germany. Soviet contingents were particularly needed between 1985 and 1988 because of growing uncertainty about the applicability of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (see Chapter 3). These contingents were needed at that time to make sure that East Europeans did not interpret Gorbachev's opening to the West, the growing autonomy of the region's communist parties, and other expressions of change and retrenchment in Soviet policy to mean that Moscow was prepared to sacrifice Eastern Europe on the altar of domestic perestroika and East-West deployments.

—

tente. Stationing Soviet troops in East

Germany, Czechoslo-

and Poland was the most credible signal of a Soviet commitment to protect vital Soviet interests. Their presence served as a powerful deterrent, making a politically

vakia, Hungary,

costly military intervention in the future less likely.

With the "Brezhnev Doctrine" apparently

still

on the

books at this time, the question posed at the beginning of this chapter "Defense against whom?" thus lent itself to an answer that was as clear as it was incongruous: With its allies unable to obtain popular approbation, the Soviet Union still had to commit tremendous resources to defend them not so much from the West as from the peoples of Eastern Europe.

—

—

143

Military Relations

The East European Militaries

Under Gorbachev, especially, policing Eastern Europe was a task that the Soviet Union would rather let the East European militaries perform. Ideally, they should be able to maintain or restore domestic order in their

and make a greater contribution

to the

tive military missions as well. Before

goals could not be achieved.

own

Warsaw

countries

Pact's collec-

Gorbachev, these Soviet

However much Moscow

—

tried to

improve the national armies through joint exercises and by training their officers, for example their effectiveness and reliability were in doubt. Consider first the past performance of the East European 4 when faced militaries as summarized by Ivan Volgyes with internal disturbances: • Pilsen, 1953. The Czechoslovak military refused to sup-

—

—

—

press the riots. •

East Berlin, 1953.

Some East German army when ordered to stop

not leave their barracks

would demon-

units

the

strators. •

Poznan, 1956.

When

the Polish

had

the workers, the authorities rity police to •

put down

the

army

to rely

failed to disperse

on the

(secret) secu-

riots.

Budapest, 1956. After a short period of hesitation, the

Hungarian army refused

to defend the old Stalinist regime,

supporting instead the revolutionary government of Imre

Nagy. •

Prague, 1969. After the Soviet invasion, the majority of

—

—

young Czechoslovak officers those under thirty resigned. • Gdansk, 1970. While the Polish military was instrumental in suppressing the demonstrations, it refused to follow an order to use "overwhelming force" against the workers. 4. Cf.

ern

Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact: The South-

Her (Durham: Duke University

Press, 1982), p. 9.

The Bloc That Failed

144

L6di and Warsaw, 1976. After General Jaruzelski, then

•

Minister of Defense, stated that "Polish soldiers will not

fire

on Polish workers," the regime cancelled the price increases that had prompted widespread work stoppages. • The eighth case the Polish army's behavior during the

—

"Solidarity" era of 1980-81

— calls for a somewhat more de-

tailed treatment. In this case, the military declared

and then

supervised the implementation of martial law. Had the Polish military not acted, the Soviet Union would have had to

Contrary to widespread Western impressions, however, the Polish military played a lesser role and assumed that role more reluctantly than it would subsequently claimed to have done. At the beginning of the crisis (August 1980), when the government was in the process of concluding the "Gdansk acintervene.

—

—

commander of the Polish navy urged approval of the accords, adding that Polish troops would not apply force to end the shipyard workers' strike. On cords" with the workers, the

—

December 13, 1981, when the military after months of hesitation and several postponements, and now under immense Soviet pressure

—finally declared martial law,

it

found

it

nec-

essary to leave enforcement and implementation largely in the hands of the small but reliable security forces. As Dale R.

Herspring described the situation, military involvement was minimal. Regular military units were often not even aware of the declaration of martial law. Furthermore, I am not aware of a single incident in which regular military units were involved in the use of force against civilians. The task of implementing the more onerous aspects fell on the shoulders of the security forces, in particular the dreaded ZOMOs. Military participation in the early days was limited to actions such as manning checkpoints on highways and at main urban intersections; conducting two or three soldier patrols in major cities; transporting ZOMOs around the country (by the air force); providing communications sup.

.

.

port to the media; or occasionally driving past key points in

145

Military Relations

tanks or similar equipment in an effort to intimidate the populace. 5

from the eight cases is that the much-hated KGBs of Eastern Europe played a key role in maintaining domestic order; their loyalty to the local regimes and to the Soviet Union should not be doubted. Yet their effectiveness in the face of large-scale riots and disturbances has been and is still limited. On their own, or even in combination with the

The conclusion

to be inferred

the region's professional security forces

—

—

so-called "worker's militias," their

numbers were, and proba-

bly remain, insufficient to contain or suppress major popular uprisings.

why the proprietors of power in Eastern Europe Moscow must seek to obtain the active support of the

This

and

in

is

which are generally far more reluctant to use force against their fellow countrymen. This is particularly true of conscripts, who make up more than half of the national armies. Their pay is very low, and they receive no unusual benefits (such as special housing and access to special stores). Their average length of service is only two years, and hence their views tend to reflect the dominant political values of their families and friends. "Order" and "stability," values which inform the professional soldier's world view, mean less to conscripts than nationalism and loyalty to one's home environment. To ask an East European conscript to fire on people of his country is to ask him to turn against his family. Some have done it under fear of retribution and will do it again; many cannot and will not. As for external disturbances, only in one case have the East European armed forces been ordered to go abroad to suppress region's militaries,

5. Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviets, the Warsaw Pact, and the East European Militaries," in William E. Griffith, ed., Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain? (An East-West Forum Publication; Boulder: Westview

Press, 1989), p. 142.

146

The Bloc That Failed

an enemy. That was

in 1968,

when

five

Warsaw Pact member

end Czechoslovakia's "Prague Spring." During the night of August 20-21, the 24th Soviet Tactical Air Army occupied Czechoslovakia's major airports. The important task of sealing the Czechoslovak-West German border was assigned to four Soviet tank divisions and one East German division. The next most important task that of enwas left for five additional circling and occupying Prague Soviet divisions to accomplish. In the meantime, four Soviet divisions from the western military districts, along with Polish soldiers, moved in to take up positions along the Czechoslovak-Soviet and the Czechoslovak-Polish border, while Soviet, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops occupied states intervened to

—

—

much

of Slovakia. In the end, twenty-three Soviet divisions,

two East German and two Polish divisions, one truncated Hungarian division, and a Bulgarian brigade participated in the invasion. In contrast to the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary,

time it was a multilateral Warsaw Pact force which was dispatched to subdue Czechoslovakia's experiment with "socialism with a human face." In reality, however, this was not a collective or multilateral military action either. Romania this

refused to take part in the invasion.

Hungary

reluctantly

agreed to contribute fewer than 5,000 troops while Bulgaria sent a token contingent. Given Gomulka's and Ulbricht's anxiety about the erosive effect of "Prague Spring" on Poland

and East Germany

respectively, the size of the Polish

and

East German forces were larger. Whether or how well they would have fought will never be known, however. They did not have to fight, and hence their reliability was never tested. Nor did they stay long. All the East European troops were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia within weeks after the invasion, while five Soviet divisions none of which had been stationed in that country prior to 1968 have stayed on to this day. (They are scheduled to leave by 1991

—

—

.)

147

Military Relations

It

seems that Moscow did not ask the East European miliperhaps the Romanians) to make a greater con-

taries (except

tribution to the defense of the "gains of socialism" in Czechoslovakia. their

Nor did the East European militaries volunteer on to make a greater contribution.

own

Causes of Tension in Military Relations

What are the main reasons for the inadequate mance of the East European militaries and the poor

perforstate of

Soviet-East European military relations?

Both before and under Gorbachev, East European perceptions of the identity of the enemy have been fundamentally different from Soviet perceptions. The Soviet Union, a superpower, is concerned with NATO in general and the United States and West Germany in particular; its smaller allies have been more concerned with their traditional adversaries. For Bulgaria, these are Turkey and Yugoslavia; for Hungary it is Romania, and for Romania it is Hungary; for Poland, it is neighboring East Germany more than faraway West Germany. Only East Germany the communist regime, not the people felt threatened by West Germany, and even that threat was perceived to be more political than military. Worst of all, all East Europeans seem to know that they have little to fear from their Western neighbors and much more to fear from their large Eastern neighbor. As a result, it would be far easier to mobilize Romania against Hungary than against NATO, Poland against East Germany (a "fraternal" ally) than against West Germany (a "revanchist" foe), and any East European country especially Poland, Romania, and Hungary against the Soviet Union than against the United States. (1)

—

—

—

(2) Soviet

—

domination of the institutions of the Warsaw

Pact has been another source of friction in military relations.

The Bloc That Failed

148

Under the

Political Consultative

Chapter

control over the

3),

Committee (discussed

Warsaw Pact and hence

in

the East

European militaries has been exercised by the Joint Command. All the chiefs of staff of the Joint Command are, and have always been, Soviet officers. Only Soviet marshals have served as the Pact's commanders-in-chief. No East European officer has held an operationally significant, top-level position in the Pact. While each member state's Deputy Minister of Defense is concurrently the Pact's "deputy commander," his main responsibility is to convey orders from the Joint Command to his defense ministry at home. In peacetime, organizational subordination to the Soviet

complete; in time of war,

it is

command

is all

but

complete.

The main critic of Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact was Romania. Since the mid-1960s, it has significantly reduced its participation in the Pact's activities: Romania did not permit troop maneuvers to be held on its territory, and it did not participate in joint exercises of combat forces in other countries. Romania has pressed for an East European voice in Warsaw Pact decisions about nuclear weapons, and has proposed a system of rotation for the position of the Pact's commander-in-chief. It is a fair guess that on at least a few of these issues, the Romanian position expressed the unspoken opinions of other Warsaw Pact countries as well. it

The

have been resentful of the inferior equipment they have had in comparison with what Moscow provides for its own troops. Moscow has supplied the most up-to-date weapons to (in descending order) the East Germans, the Czechoslovaks, the Poles, the Bulgarians, the Hungarians, and then the Romanians. Thus the countries of the Pact's northern tier (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) are far better equipped than their neighbors in the southern tier, but all East European countries even East Germany have been denied access to the latest Soviet weapons. At a time when the Soviet armed forces and even Soviet client states such as Syria receive (3)

—

region's military establishments

—

149

Military Relations

modern equipment lery,

(including

and sophisticated

new

tanks, self-propelled artil-

air defense missiles), the arsenals of

the East European militaries

still

include obsolete weapons

and weapon systems from the 1950s and say,

it

1960s. Needless to

has been very difficult to motivate ill-equipped armies.

Of the many reasons for Moscow's refusal to supply the East Europeans with more modern weapons, three were given by an East European specialist on military affairs (in

make money off the sale of weapons and we don't have the hard currency. Second, they don't think we will do our part in an East-West conflict and don't want to waste the weapons. Third, they don't trust us and are afraid some of our pilots, a private conversation): "First, the Soviets want to

for

example, will defect to the West with the latest equip-

ment." 6 The fourth reason was Moscow's concern that, in a potential conflict between the Soviet Union and an East European country, some of the best Soviet weapons could be used

against the Soviet Union. (4)

Another source of tension in Soviet-East European

military relations has had to do with military expenditures. Military budgets have always been

among

the most tightly

held secrets throughout the region. They are hidden under so

many

categories in the various budgets that usually wellinformed Soviet scholars and even some East European Politburo members claimed to have no knowledge of what the military really costs. The official figures, which appear to be understated, range from about two to six percent of the gross national product; some, though not all, Western estimates are higher.

Even during Gorbachev's era of glasnost, the only cerwas that (a) East European expenditures continued to

tainty

lag behind Soviet expenditures significantly (in terms of

per capita); 6. Ibid.,

(b) the

Soviet Union believed that

pp. 145-146.

its allies

GNP

spent

The Bloc That Failed

150

and (c) the East Europeans believed they were spending too much. In 1978, when Moscow demanded substantial increases in defense spending, Romania's Ceau§escu responded by saying that the socialist countries "should offer an example to all peoples: not to choose the road of augmenttoo

little;

ing military expenditures but, instead, of inducing a strong

current of opinion for their reduction." Ten years 1988, Ivan

T.

later, in

Berend, President of the Hungarian Academy of

Science and a

member

of the party's Central

Committee

at

that time, publicly complained that Hungary spent as much on the military as it did on health, education, and research together, and he called for a review to see if the military budget could be reduced. A more widely voiced East European complaint was that, because of excessive secrecy, the civilian economy did not benefit from research conducted for the military sector. Indeed, civilian research actually suffered

—

—

it

became less productive and more expensive when the best minds and the best available technologies were used for military purposes.

With the Warsaw Pact thus beleaguered by a variety of and economic difficulties, the Soviet Union was left to ponder this question: "Given the relatively poor performance of the East European armies both at home and in the region over the years, is there any reason to believe that they would perform better against NATO?" If the answer was negative, as it probably was, the next question was this: "Is there anything the Soviet Union can do to make the Warsaw Pact more effective as an instrument of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and as a counterweight to NATO?"

psychological, structural, political, technological,

Gorbachev's Choices Before attempting to answer these questions, stress that

we should

— before the revolutionary upheavals of 1989— the

151

Military Relations

military alliance with Eastern Europe

Union both tangible and symbolic

still

offered the Soviet

benefits.

In a strictly military sense, having Eastern Europe as a buffer zone

was seen

as providing for advance

warning

in

case of Western aggression; as permitting the forward deployment of Soviet forces in Europe; and, given the subordination

European armies to the Soviet high command, as putting these armies side by side with the Soviet Union in a po-

of East

tential East-West conflict is

—at least as long as the Soviet side

the winning side.

was seen as helping reinforce the image of the Soviet Union as a military superpower and indeed as the major European power. Politically, the alliSymbolically, the alliance

ance allowed Moscow to advance various security-related proposals on behalf of a group of European states in the Warsaw Pact rather than on its own behalf alone. In related areas, the Soviet Union benefited from close co-

operation with East European military intelligence, particularly in the realm of illegal technology transfer from the West. With Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia among the top fifteen arms exporters in the world, East Europeans also promoted Soviet military objectives in the Third World. Another Soviet-sponsored activity was the training of pro-Soviet security forces in countries such as Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. (The secret police forces trained abroad by East Germans, who took the lead in this activity, were dubbed in the West as the "Red Gestapos" of the Third World.)

Notwithstanding such real or perceived benefits, the prob-

lem remained: How could Moscow make the national armies more effective, if not fully reliable, in joint operations? What were Gorbachev's options to remedy the situation? (1)

His

first

option

— the "radical reform" of Soviet-East —

European military relations was to entail an effort to begin to dilute Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact, giving the national commands more control over their forces. By concurrently making modern weapons available to the national ar-

The Bloc That Failed

152

mies at reasonable prices, Gorbachev would move the Soviet Union toward a decentralized and more voluntaristic military alliance with Eastern Europe. In the resulting atmosphere of growing camaraderie, the national officer corps might develop a larger stake and take greater pride in their work; their nationalism could then be exploited to promote rather than hinder Soviet policies. While Moscow would retain its "leading role" in the Warsaw Pact and still obtain most of what it wants and needs, the contribution of the East Europeans would also increase because the officers, and perhaps the conscripts, would have gained a sense of identification with the alliance.

—

—

The opposite, old-fashioned option was to strengthen Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact and at the same time further weaken East European command over the national armies. There is no question that this was the "early" Gorbachev's approach to Soviet-East European military relations. The evidence suggests that Moscow was merely doing more of what it had done under previous leaders. As identified by Dale R. Herspring, 7 these were some of the (old) policies that Gorbachev also pursued: (2)

•

were

All top-level still

command

positions in the

Warsaw Pact

held by Soviet officers. With a secret 1979 statute

ordering the transfer of effective control over the East Euro-

pean militaries to Soviet command, "the ability of an East European national command to obviate Soviet orders" was still all but nonexistent (except in Romania). • Even when East Europeans received the same weapon systems as their Soviet counterparts, certain advanced features were usually withheld so as to ensure Soviet superiority as well as a continued reliance on Soviet supplies. At times it was difficult for the East European militaries to hold exercises

7.

without Soviet participation or supervision because not Ibid., pp.

146-148.

— 153

Military Relations

enough ammunition was available. Moreover, both multilateral and unilateral (Soviet) military exercises were used to stifle tendencies toward autonomy in the East European

armed •

forces.

Soviet military doctrine provided exclusive guidance for

Warsaw

was the Pact's operaThe political literature offered to the several armies was aimed at reinforcing the Soviet view of international events in general and of the identity of the enemy in particular. An apparently large number of East European officers were invited to study at Soviet military academies; the purpose was to develop a pool of Soviet-trained officers the

Pact's activities; Russian

tional language.

throughout the region. Attendance at Soviet military schools

was also used to recruit reliable cadres ready work for the Soviet Union.

to report to

and

Given the tendency toward political decentralization under Gorbachev, it is not quite clear why the East European militaries were not given a greater measure of autonomy why the first option mentioned above ("radical reform") was not adopted. Perhaps the best answer is that Gorbachev needed more time to overcome decades of hegemonical habits and pursue an uncharted and potentially dangerous path all in exchange for an uncertain outcome that could have very negative consequences for Soviet security. He needed time to convince his military to take a chance. In Soviet eyes, diluting Soviet domination of the Pact in the hope of improving East European military performance was initially considered too risky. Finally, the (Western) idea that a

more

voluntaristic

normally stronger than its individual components was long regarded by Soviet military authorities as strange, far-fetched, and probably wrong. For the time being, then, Gorbachev opted for policies whose obvious goal was to intensify Moscow's ability to control and indeed dominate the Warsaw Pact. Concurrently, the Soviet Union apparently abandoned all efforts at improving the effectiveness of the East European militaries as a means alliance

is

— The Bloc That Failed

154 of

making them more

reliable.

tween the minimal goal of

The key distinction here is beand the more ambi-

availability

tious goal of developing the capacity for joint action. In sim-

ple terms, availability

means presence or readiness

for use,

while the capacity for joint action entails, inter alia, motivation, a commitment to fight. As the various Soviet policies (as listed above)

were almost exclusively compulsory, they en-

sured only East European availability in a potential conflict. They had little to do with motivation with the goal of gener-

—

and competent East European participation which would have to stem from a common purpose and ating active

shared responsibilities, as well as at least a tional

autonomy

in military matters.

modicum

of na-

8

For Moscow to be satisfied with an East European military that is merely available for, but is not necessarily committed to

engage

in, joint

action suggests that the "early" Gorbachev

was already aware of the limits of East European contributions to the Warsaw Pact. It is almost as if he resigned himself to the fatalistic conclusion that, while the Soviet Union might be able to lead the East European armies to the battlefront, under no circumstances could it make them fight well.

Courting Trouble initial course in Soviet-East European miliwas thus cautious and circumspect. His objecwere limited: he was interested in improving existing

Gorbachev's tary relations tives

mechanisms. 8. Along similar lines, Christopher D. Jones has written: "The purpose of the military-administrative structure of the Warsaw Pact is to fragment national command over national armed forces. The fragmentation of East European military organizations does not solve the problem of the reliability of East European military personnel. It solves the problem of availability." See Christopher D. Jones, "Agencies of the Alliance: Multinational in Form, Bilateral in Content," in Jeffrey Simon and Trond Gilberg, eds., Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S.

Army War

College, 1985), p. 164.

155

Military Relations

It

was already obvious during the reformist era

of 1985-

—

88 that Gorbachev's approach to the Warsaw Pact the "second option" he adopted would not serve Soviet interests

—

Once a larger number of Soviet troops was withdrawn from the region, the need for a reliable and effective East European military would become paramount to deter or confront political trouble. Without such reliable East European military forces, it was simply much more likely that the Soviet Union would either abandon its empire or else be obliged to return to protect the East European regimes from popular

well.

challenges to their authority.

Consider that after mid- 1986 Gorbachev put forth several new ideas about the East-West conventional balance in Europe.

Reduced

to their essentials, they pointed to a Soviet in-

terest in a military doctrine that

offense (and

the

Warsaw

argued

was

to the

toward

less

As Gorbachev was "time the two milistrategic concepts to gear them

Pact's current military doctrine.

in his

tary alliances

more

was oriented

therefore less threatening to the West) than

book

Perestroika,

amended

aims

their

it

of defense." In accordance with this

in strategic doctrine,

Gorbachev announced

in his

change

December

1988 speech at the United Nations that the Soviet Union

would unilaterally withdraw 50,000 of its 565,000 troops from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In the spring of 1989 some Soviet forces actually left Hungary. These proposals and measures, however, were definitely out of sync with Gorbachev's early approach to the Warsaw Pact. The conventional arms measures, by reducing Soviet military strength in Eastern Europe,

made it imperative that own capacity if they

the region's military forces develop their

were called upon to maintain order. Yet the initial Soviet policies toward the Warsaw Pact had the effect of weakening the self-reliance and hence the effectiveness of the East European militaries.

Put another way,

it

was

clear in 1988, at the time of Gorba-

chev's adoption of a Soviet "defensive doctrine," that

by

itself

— 1

The Bloc That Failed

56

it would not have a direct impact on Eastern Europe. But what would inevitably follow substantial reductions in manpower and armaments would have a direct and indeed significant impact. Even the partial withdrawal of Soviet forces would have two major consequences for Eastern Europe: First, the news and especially the sight of Soviet troops leaving the region would generate new popular pressures for

—

fundamental political change. Rightly or wrongly, East Europeans would assume that military retrenchment signified political retreat,

"gains of socialism" in

ond,

it

commitment to preserving the Eastern Europe was on the wane. Sec-

that the Soviet

would become clear

that, since security forces alone

cannot contain major disturbances, it would be left for the individual East European militaries to maintain order. However, in the face of massive demonstrations, without Soviet troops at hand to back them up if necessary, would the East European militaries stand up and be counted? Would they obey civilian (communist) authority? Might they possibly opt for military rule?

Would they be neutral? In 1988, no one could predict the scope or intensity of popular risings under such circumstances, or precisely where they might occur. Nor could anyone be sure about the behavior of the East European militaries. What was certain was that the expected reduction of Soviet troops would mark the beginning of a new political ball game in Eastern Europe. With the people on the offensive on one side and the regimes on the defensive on the other side, the East European militaries would either act as powerful referees

—unless they wanted Moscow to return—or stay in

their barracks.

In the original draft of this chapter, written before the re-

markable uprising of 1989, "Will the region's their

new

armed

1

concluded

forces face

this

up

responsibilities? In their present condition, they

are available to do the job; their presence it

is

way:

to the challenge of

is

a deterrent. But

doubtful that they are capable of reestablishing order,

— 157

Military Relations

motivated enough to be reliable defenders of Soviet-type systems. Only Gorbachev's "first option" which he has not adopted would prepare the East European militaries to take proper precautions, to develop appropriate capabilities, and to acquire the political finesse necessary to for they are not

—

handle such a new and complex task. This is why Gorbachev's military approach to the Warsaw Pact, effective as it may be in Soviet foreign policy toward the West,

is

not so realistic or useful in other respects. For, to re-

peat, even the partial

withdrawal of Soviet troops will expose

communist regimes to unparalleled challenges to their authority and also present the East European militaries with a complex assignment that they might well find 'mission impossible.' Under such circumstances, the Warsaw policing Eastern Europe would Pact's principal mission the region's

—

—

be once again

left for

In the end, as

was

that

the Soviet

we shall

Army

Gorbachev abandoned the

mission." His troops stayed put. that the East

European

to carry out."

see in Chapters 6

and

7,

the surprise

Pact's de facto "principal

What was

not surprising

was

militaries stayed in their barracks

except in Romania, where they supported the people's cause. In

any case, the military alliance Stalin welded together was

now

in

shambles.

Part Three

THE ERA OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE, SINCE 1988

VI

MOSCOW RETREATS From Reform

to

Revolution

"the most dangerous time for a bad government," according to Alexis de Tocqueville, "is when it starts to reform itself." His time-honored observation has come to apply to the Soviet Union. But for Moscow's imperial domain in Eastern Europe

—

—for

the bloc that failed a variation on de Tocqueville 's theme is closer to the truth: For bad governments whose survival depends on a foreign protector, the most dangerous time is when their protector has begun to retreat. In 1988, the Polish and Hungarian regimes began to respond both to growing domestic challenges to their rule and to mixed signals from Moscow. By July of that year, Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly national security adviser to President Carter, identified the region's condition as "prerevolutionary."

Phrasing more cautiously,

1

I

ance

is

end of 1988 European alli-

also noted at the

that as the ideological "foundation of the East

sinking [and as] the edifice of

its

socialism

is

cracked,"

shadow of its former self." becoming a political misno-

the Soviet bloc has turned into "a

Even "the term mer,"

I

'Soviet bloc'

is

added. Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations in

December

2

1988,

announcing that Moscow would unilaterally

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Special Address," Problems of Communism 37, No. 3-4 (May-August 1988), pp. 67-70. 2. Charles Gati, "Eastern Europe on Its Own," Foreign Affairs 68, No. 1 (America and the World 1988/89), pp. 99-1 19.

The Bloc That Failed

162

withdraw some of its forces from Eastern Europe independent of any corresponding measures by NATO, was particularly illustrative of the fading of Moscow's imperial aspirations.

The Soviet military decision to retrench contained a critimessage to the region's communist leaders: The Soviet Union would no longer protect unpopular East European regimes from their own peoples. Once that message was conveyed and absorbed, reformers and diehards alike were left with the choice of either making the best deal they could with cal political

their

own

populations or using force to break the people's

will.

The Romanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East Ger-

man regimes — the region's "gang of four"— opted to maintain repressive, one-party rule. Their decisions

were based on assumed that

their desire to stay in power. Mistakenly, they

they had greater popular support than in fact they did; they certainly did not regard the political situation in their countries as explosive or, in Brzezinski's phrase, "prerevolution-

ary."

Even without Soviet protection, they believed that they

could handle what they assumed was a small minority of oppositionists seeking radical change. At

pected that

Moscow would change

its

any

rate, they ex-

hands-off postion

if

faced with an actual anticommunist revolution. They con-

vinced themselves that Gorbachev or his successors would inevitably revert to the principles of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" rather than permit large-scale defections from the

commu-

nist fold.

The

less rigid Polish

and Hungarian communist regimes

interpreted the Soviet message to

mean

that they, like Gorba-

blame current problems on and proceed toward the implementation of radical, if unspecified, reforms. Unlike Gorbachev, however, they entered into formal discussions, first in Poland and

chev, should reassess the past, their predecessors,

later in Hungary, with leaders of the democratic opposition. Although their original intention was no doubt to coopt the

Moscow Retreats

163

opposition into the existing governments and thus to create the appearance of power-sharing, the roundtable discussions

eventually produced the transformation of one-party rule

under peaceful, if often contentious, conditions. Hence these reform-minded communist regimes ended up with changes far more extensive than the ones they had originally intended to make. Gorbachev's motives for letting his East European allies fend for themselves remain controversial and, indeed, unclear. His preoccupation with Soviet domestic problems was undoubtedly a compelling factor. Other factors included his desire to reduce the Soviet military budget and in service to that goal, to withdraw Soviet forces from the region. Yet these eminently sensible and rational motives must be viewed in the context of Gorbachev's personal frustration with the "gang of four" and their resistance to his own peres troika and glasnost. As the ambitious Soviet leader of a huge empire, Gorbachev could ill afford to tolerate a Ceau§escu, Zhivkov, Honecker, or Jakes forever.

Whether Gorbachev his decisions

fully anticipated the

consequences of

remains uncertain as well. It is quite possible European popular sentiments by as-

that he misjudged East

suming that

his version of reformist

root in the region. Deluded

may

communism would

take

by shouts of "Gorby! Gorby!", he

well have confused the East Europeans' genuine respect

courage and for what he was doing in the SoUnion with their support for reform-communism in Eastern Europe. While Gorbachev may have expected his policies to prompt the reform of the region's orthodox communist regimes, he may not have foreseen revolutions against communism itself. In the end, most of Eastern Europe experienced a series of stunning revolutions rather than step-by-step reforms. The for his personal

viet

changes came about in this manner not only because the old regimes had delayed making the concessions necessary to appease their peoples but also because both Moscow and the

164

The Bloc That Failed

East European regimes had seriously underestimated the among the East European peoples, mis-

passions emerging

taking their past apathy for permanent acquiescence. The Soviet leadership, in particular, failed to anticipate that the

East Europeans would interpret Soviet military retrenchment as political retreat and would press for a change in the

system rather than replacement of the current regimes. Although it does not speak well for Gorbachev's prescience that he failed to discern the region's anticommunist, prerevolutionary condition, it is to his credit that he refused to fight fire with fire. Indeed, in October 1989, when East Germany's Honecker recognized that only massive force could stem the tide against communism in his country and directed his security forces to shoot at the demonstrators in Leipzig if necessary, it appears that Moscow actually encouraged Egon Krenz, the second in command in East Germany, to countermand Honecker 's order. At this critical juncture, Gorreform he had hoped for to turn into revolution. Elsewhere, too, Gorbachev refused to be drawn into a costly and potentially dangerous effort to save his dominion. Even when, in November, the Berlin Wall was

bachev had decided

to allow the

breached and thus the most vital of all Soviet geopolitical interests was threatened, Gorbachev was silent. He may well have believed that in the end the East European revolutions would not damage his country's long-term interests and, indeed, that they might even improve his own position. One of the first clues to Gorbachev's so-called "new thinking" about Eastern Europe emerged in April 1988, when the CPSU abolished the old Department for Liaison with the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. At the same time, the Politburo created a Commission on International Policy and appointed Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, one of Gorbachev's closest advisers, as its chairman. The purpose of

was to coordinate Soviet foraround the world. The orand eign policy in Eastern Europe ganizational change had the effect of lessening the importhe newly created commission

Moscow

Retreats

165

would no longer be European policy was the context of global and geopoliti-

tance of the region, signaling that

it

treated as a special case. Moscow's East

henceforth to be

made

in

than ideological considerations. 3 No comparable organizational changes occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1988 or thereafter. However, the role of the ministry in handling East European affairs has markedly expanded from handling routine matters to becoming an active participant in both making and implementing policy. The department responsible for East European affairs has been upgraded within the ministry. The growing importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in matters relating to Eastern Europe, as well as on all issues of foreign policy, appears to stem from the position that Politburo member and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has come to occupy cal rather

in the Soviet hierarchy.

Another early clue to Soviet intentions that appeared in and mid- 1988 was a series of what were termed unofficial interviews, articles, and comments about the region by Soviet foreign policy specialists (see also Chapter 3). At the early-

3. In practice, it remains unclear how responsibility for Eastern Europe divided among the several Central Committee commissions and departments. While the Politburo has retained responsibility for making basic decisions, of course, it appears that policy originates either in the CPSU's International Department (which operates under the Yakovlev commission) or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since mid- 1988, the International Department has been headed by Valentin M. Falin, a German specialist and member of the Central Committee. Of the three First Deputy Heads in his department, only one Rafael P. Fedorov deals with Eastern Europe. His staff includes specialists on the East European countries, who perform the functions of the formerly separate Liaison Department. There are others with East European expertise within the Central Committee apparatus. The Ideology Commission, led by Politburo member Vadim Medvedev, the former director of the Liaison Department, remains a key player. There is also Gorbachev's "personal advisor" on Eastern Europe, the highly regarded political scientist, Georgi Shakhnazarov. Since early 1989, whenever Gorbachev has met with the head of an East European communist party, only Shakhnazarov has accompanied him. Together with Yakovlev, but not Medvedev and Falin, Shakhnazarov is known to belong to Gorbachev's inner circle of like-minded officials. is

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

166 time,

it

was unclear whether these observations (by Academi-

cian Bogomolov, Fyodor Burlatski, and others) reflected cial thinking.

When

offi-

they declared the "Brezhnev Doctrine"

"dead," but the official spokesmen of the Soviet government

had not yet done so, Western analysts were uncertain whether this was merely the wishful thinking of individuals. However, by the time a long, substantial, and strikingly self-critical assessment of past Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe was published in July 1988 (see Appendix), there was a growing sense in the West that its authors staff members of the Instirepretute of Economics of the World Socialist System sented either the official position or the dominant official position. But important differences of opinion remained. In February 1989, when Academician Oleg Bogomolov asserted that even Hungarian neutrality would not necessarily repre-

—

—

was Bogomolov sub-

sent a threat to Soviet security interests, his statement

disavowed by a high-ranking Soviet

official.

sequently issued a professed retraction that turned out to be

no retraction at all. Only in retrospect has it been possible to confirm that, with the Politburo undecided and Gorbachev still deflecting questions about the history and the future of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," wide-ranging debates over Moscow's East European policy were taking place throughout 1988. Officially, the new policy began to take shape only in the immediate aftermath of Gorbachev's United Nations speech of December 1988, when the Soviet leader announced that by the end of 1990 some 240,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 guns, and 820 combat aircraft would be withdrawn from Eastern Europe and from the European regions (the so-called western military districts) of the Soviet Union.

More than any other

single event, that

announcement

the stage for the dramatic developments of 1989.

By

set

suggest-

Moscow was prepared to remove Soviet forces from European dominion, Gorbachev put the region's comEast its munist leaders on notice that Soviet tanks would no longer ing that

Moscow Retreats protect their rule.

It

167

did not take long for the peoples of East-

ern Europe to understand that their leaders were therefore vulnerable

— that some of them were, in From Poland

It

was

to

new

on the run.

Romania

the Jaruzelski regime in Poland that

to the implications of the

first

responded

Soviet position. After

history of denigrating Lech Walesa ity" as

effect,

its

long

and dismissing "Solidar-

a relic from the past with no significant popular sup-

port, the Polish

government reconsidered

its

position at the

very end of 1988 and accorded legal status to the independent

union in January 1989. Fearful of losing their privileges and unwilling to give up their "leading role," many party leaders so strongly opposed the move that Jaruzelski and his three closest advisers threatened to resign if the party failed to follow their recommendation. 4 Having swallowed its pride, the Jaruzelski regime also agreed to hold free elections in June 1989 on the condition that the communists and their parliamentary allies, who were nominally noncommunist and until then insignificant, could remain dominant in the Sejm, the lower chamber of the legislature. The results of these partly free, partly arranged elections turned out to be as unexpected as they were stunning. In the new upper chamber, the Senate, "Solidarity" won all but one seat (99 out of 100). In the Sejm, all but two of the thirty-five top party

run unopposed

ment and

and government officials who had between the govern-

(as a result of the deal

"Solidarity") lost their seats

of the voters crossed out their

Nothing

like this

when more than

half

names.

had happened

in Eastern

Europe

in four

4. The change was very sudden indeed. Only a few months earlier, in mid- 1988, one of the three told me that he would rather cut his own throat than negotiate with Walesa.

The Bloc That Failed

168

decades. The novelty of the situation provoked considerable tension as well as the reemergence of political maneuvering. For example, in order to avoid a crackdown by the communists and the secret police, "Solidarity" supporters in the new legislature helped reelect Jaruzelski as president, albeit

by

only one vote. Sensing the direction of the political winds, the former allies of the travelers

communists

who had supported

politics since the late 1940s

— the

obedient fellow-

every twist and turn in Polish

— rediscovered their democratic

noncommunist side. With that move, became the majority force in the legislature. In August 1989 President Jaruzelski had to decide who would be Poland's next prime minister. Because many party past and joined the "Solidarity"

hardliners opposed the appointment of a representative of "Solidarity" to the post,

deemed

and because

their consent

essential for a peaceful transition,

was

Gorbachev made

a critical telephone call to Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the party leader. Given the party's subsequent decision to abide by the

and the legislature, the tenor of Gorbachev's message seems clear. He presumably told Rakowski that the Soviet Union would accept a Polish government with a communist minority. The man who was then appointed prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was a prominent Catholic intellectual and senior "Solidarity" leader. The communist were allowed to retain control of defense and internal af-

will of the people

new government. There were many reasons why the Polish communists agreed to hold largely free elections. The polls they had commissioned, publicized, and may even have believed did not indicate that they would be swept away. At the end of 1988, for example, their polls revealed that popular support for "Soli-

fairs in the

had waned as Jaruzelski 's personal popularity had increased. Thus, although the communists did not expect to win the elections, they believed they would receive one-third darity"

of the vote in the Sejm.

If

their calculations

proved accurate,

they would be able form a government with the help of the

Moscow

169

Retreats

and deliver a crushing blow

allied parties

to "Solidarity"

and

Western supporters. At worst, they would grant "Solidarity" a few insignificant cabinet posts and thus create the illusion of a coalition government. But their polls completely misinterpreted the popular mood. As it turned out, only the preelection deal and tactical considerations by the "Solidarity" leadership after the elections saved the communists and Jaruzelski himself from being completely eliminated from its

Polish politics.

The ultimate decision to abide by the results of the elecmay have been prompted in part by Gorbachev's telephone call, coupled with increasing public hints in mid- 1989 that the Soviet leadership was utterly serious about retreating from Eastern Europe. Speaking to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on July 7, 1989, a time of postelection maneuverings in Poland, Gorbachev went further than ever before to emphasize "new thinking" in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. While maintaining that "existing realities" in Europe must be respected and that Western attempts at "overcoming" socialism in Eastern Europe would provoke "confrontation," his central message was a firm rejection of the "Brezhtion

nev Doctrine": and

one or another country changed But this change is the exclusive affair of the people of that country and is their choice. Any interference in domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states, both friends and allies or any others, is inadmissible. 5 Social

in the past

political orders in

and may change

in the future.

Another consideration undergirding the Polish communist decision to respect the election results

was the condition

of

With good reason, many party members assumed that no Polish government would be able to cope with the problems ahead. If a "Solidarity "-led government were to the economy.

5.

The Economist, July

15, 1989, p. 53.

The Bloc That Failed

170

if prices were to increase, and unemployment develop, the people would blame whatever party was in power. Why not, these commuand then to fail? nists reasoned, permit "Solidarity" to try In the meantime, the communists would have the opportunity to regroup by shedding the communist name and reemerging as social democrats. In their new guise, they would support some austerity measures and oppose the most unpopular ones, while pointing out that they were responsible for neither the high prices nor unemployment. They would thus await their turn. Moreover, by remaining in charge of the main sources of power (such as the presidency, defense, and internal security), they were not without options even

introduce austerity measures, or

factories close,

—

—

if,

to the extent these options entailed the use of force, they

would

result in a civil war. For after all that

the Polish people

would not

had been gained, what they had

easily relinquish

achieved. first major step toward democracy in January 1989, when the parliament aplegalizing the right of assembly and asso-

As in Poland, the

Hungary was taken proved several

bills

in

ciation. In February, the ruling party, abdicating its leading role, also

approved the creation of independent

political par-

Unlike in Poland, however, the pressure for change originated primarily in the communist party, formally known as

ties.

(HSWP). The opposition, while vocal, was initially small and isolated; it also lacked a leader of Lech Walesa's stature and broad the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

appeal.

supremacy within the party set two factions in contention. One, led by General Secretary Karoly Grosz, was kept on the defensive by reformers and their rapidly rising star, Imre Pozsgay. Of the many issues debated, a question of particular importance was that of the party's past

The struggle

for

in general and, specifically, its role in the 1956 revolution. In

February, the party resolved that

its

historic position

on the

upheaval of 1956 as a "counterrevolution" had been wrong

— Moscow

171

Retreats

and that what had taken place should instead be regarded as a popular, national uprising against oppression. Without explicitly stating it, the document produced by the party under Pozsgay's guidance also rejected the party's earlier positions

accepting and justifying the Soviet intervention.

How first,

a communist party evaluates

seem

to

its

past

may

not, at

be of practical importance. But in Hungary the

issue helped mobilize the public against Grosz

and his follow-

Responding to the popular mood, the majority of his Central Committee colleagues disassociated themselves from Grosz's more orthodox values. He suffered a striking political setback in June when, with the participation of the party's reformist wing, the Committee for Historical Justice (a newly formed independent group) arranged for a ceremonious reburial of the leaders of the 1956 revolution. Broadcast live on Hungarian radio and television, reported around the world, and attended by hundreds of thousands in Budapest's Heroes Square, the event showed that freedom of association was a reality and not merely a hypothetical right. Although Grosz retained his post as the party's general secretary, he was demoted. In the newly created four-member party presidium, Party Chairman Rezso Nyers became first among equals; the other three members were all dedicated

ers.

reformers.

No week be

it

in 1989 passed

without some significant sign

a statement, a demonstration, or an actual measure

May, for example, the disassemble the barbed-wire fence and

of the dismantling of the old order. In

government began electronic devices

to

— the paraphernalia of the iron curtain

its border with Austria. The same month, in an interview with Magyar Hirlap, the official daily, Pozsgay acknowledged for the first time what had been obvious to all but never conceded by the party: that competition with other parties "entails the possibility of losing [the monopoly of] power." In

along

principle (although not yet in practice as in Poland), the

HSWP

was thus moving well beyond a Gorbachevian

"re-

The Bloc That Failed

172

form" or "democratization" and on toward the introduction of a multiparty political system and a true, mixed economy. Many thought and even more hoped that a new Hungary would eventually follow the Austrian model.

seemed that the HS WP's reformist wing might still play an important, if no longer dominant, role in Hungarian politics. The reformers were doing For a brief

moment

in July,

it

well in the public-opinion polls; their democratic opponents, largely 7,

unknown, were

not.

The death

of Janos

1989, offered the party the opportunity to

the country's problems,

and indeed

thirty-two-year rule. But the nity passed quickly.

for the

moment

The fragmented

Kadar on July blame him for crimes of his

of political opportu-

party, divided against

itself,

could neither take advantage of the popularity of some

of

leaders nor adequately disassociate itself from

its

Kadar 's

legacy.

Not that the party did not

try to increase its

port. In September, for example, the trolled

by the party

— made

popular sup-

government

—

still

con-

the unprecedented decision to

allow tens of thousands of vacationing East

German

tourists

Hungary for West Germany, Hungary's treaty with East Germany. The purpose of the decision was to demonstrate to the Hungarian public as well as to Western public opinion, and particularly to the West German government, that Hungary was different; that it would apply the Helsinki Accord's provision concerning the free movement of people even to the citizens of another state. The intended effect at home was to encourage the Hungarian public to view the party and the government as its own. West German opinion was important as well because West Germany was, and remains, Hungary's most generous economic beneto leave

in clear violation of

What is not known is whether the Hungarian authorities made their decision in collusion with the Soviet Union. If they did, an additional purpose of the move may well have

factor.

been to undermine the Honecker regime by depriving East

— Moscow Retreats

173

Germany of precisely those citizens who could afford to travel and who thus tended to be members of East Germany's professional elite.

gambit, which would lead Honecker regime in East Germany, the Hungarian communist party continued to lose ground. At its ex-

But despite

this extraordinary

to the fall of the

traordinary congress in October, the

HSWP

not only aban-

doned Leninism and declared itself in favor of "democratic socialism," but it also ended its existence as the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and reconstituted itself as the Hun-

What mattered, in practice, was members were asked to reenroll in the party, a decision that was intended to emphasize the difference between the new HSP and the old HSWP. But the decision turned out garian Socialist Party (HSP). that party

major blunder. Of the approximately 700,000 party members, only 30,000 chose to join the new party. Even several members of the government, including a deputy prime minister and the minister of justice, failed to reenroll. Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, although a party member, subsequently resigned from the HSP's presidium. Even more ominous for the party, the hardliners who had supported Grosz denounced the HSP for embracing "bourgeois democracy" and then recreated the old HSWP to compete for the very to be a

small

By

leftist vote.

the end of the year, as the

the opposition

parties

communists grew weaker,

quarreled

among

themselves. Al-

though all were agreed that parliamentary elections would be held in early 1990, they were divided over whether the country's president should be elected before or after the parliamentary elections. Hoping to get a head start and seeking to take advantage of Pozsgay's remaining popularity, the Hungarian Socialist Party sought an early date for the presidential elections. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, the largest opposition party at that time, agreed, partly because it was not entirely opposed to Pozsgay's candidacy, but

The Bloc That Failed

174

mainly because

it

wanted an elected rather than an interim

president to occupy the office as soon as possible.

On

the

other hand, the Association of Free Democrats and the Young

Democrats, the most consistently pro-Western of the Hungar-

would manage dominate the political scene before parliamentary elections. To widespread surprise, they collected enough signatures to hold a popular referendum on the issue, and, although only by a small margin, they won. As provided in the constitution and validated by the referendum, an elected parliament the main source of legitimate authority would thus choose Hungary's next president. The issue was significant because it demonstrated the HSP's inability to achieve its goals even with the active backing of the major opposition party. Even Pozsgay, who was "Hungary's Gorbachev" years before Gorbachev's own perestroika and who was far more radical than the Soviet reformer, could not overcome his communist past in the eyes of the electorate. The referendum also demonstrated the atomization of Hungarian politics on the eve of free elections. Indeed, the country was in a state of great anxiety. The most persistent fear was that Hungary might experience the synian parties, feared that Pozsgay as president to

—

—

drome long associated with

Italian politics: serial govern-

ments, each attempting to cope with the country's problems and only briefly in power. A more optimistic, and perhaps even more accurate, interpretation would emphasize that in 1989 Hungary underwent only the

first

phase of

its

peaceful revolution. That phase sig-

nified the destruction of the old system,

which was accom-

plished without violence or bloodshed. The second phase,

begun

would entail the construction of a democratic, pluralistic political and economic order. Given the need for harsh austerity measures in the economic realm and the prosin 1990,

pect of continued discord in the political realm, this phase also promised to be difficult,

if

ultimately successful. For de-

Moscow

175

Retreats

was a broad consensus among Hungarians that the historic opportunity of the moment, a unique chance to be independent and to build lasting democratic institutions, could not and should not be missed. In East Germany, the first phase of the revolution took no more than a few weeks. After eighteen years in power, and faced with massive demonstrations and considerable Soviet pressure, Erich Honecker stepped down as president and spite disagreements over details, there

party leader on October Politburo

member and

on November

bered, East

9,

His

initial

replacement, a

Egon Krenz,

on December 3. During his ten1989, a day that will be long remem-

resigned forty-six days ure,

18, 1989.

the former security chief, later,

Germany

effectively dismantled the Berlin Wall by physically removing sections of it and allowing unrestricted travel from East to West and from West to East. Yet even this extraordinary measure failed to help Krenz and his party. The communists were already so discredited

that they chose as their next leader a political unknown, Gregor Gysi, while another reform-minded communist from Dresden, Hans Modrow, became prime minister in a cabinet still dominated by communists. Even so, Honecker 's old guard was gone, expelled from the party they had served for decades. Some were sent to jail, while others were placed under house arrest, awaiting trial on charges of corruption. In a matter of days, the East German communist system collapsed.

Erich Honecker, as the self-appointed chief of the "gang of four" and the rigid guardian of communist orthodoxy, a supporter of Romania's Ceau§escu, and the only Warsaw Pact leader to condone China's brutal oppression of the prodemocracy movement at Tienanmen Square in the summer of 1989, had been a Stalinist in Brezhnevite clothes. He had

paid

lip service to

perestroika but did not practice

kissed Gorbachev on both cheeks, as he ideologically he kept his distance.

He

it.

He

had Brezhnev, but

ruled East

Germany

as

The Bloc That Failed

176

he could both defy Gorbachev and depend on the 360,000strong Soviet garrison stationed in his country to preserve his if

rule.

Honecker's calculation was not without merit.

He may

even have expected that Gorbachev would one day attempt to replace him with a younger and more reform-minded leader.

But he could not imagine that the Soviet Union would

acquiesce in the dismantling of the Berlin Wall or consider the reunification of Germany under West German auspices

and

thus, in effect, relinquish without a fight or even a serious

complaint ever

its

most valuable parcel of land

dawned on Honecker

in

Europe.

Had

it

that this could happen, this ever-

suspicious Stalinist might have concluded that Gorbachev set out to undermine communism from within. The ultimate challenge to Honecker and indeed to the East German regime came from an unexpected source. When Hungary allowed about 60,000 East German tourists to leave for the West, thousands of other East Germans flooded Prague and Warsaw as well. To stop these refugees from escaping, Honecker would have had to seal his country's borders with Czechoslovakia and Poland and thus transform all of East Germany into a prison. While under normal circumstances he might well have ordered a new "iron curtain" between East Germany and its socialist neighbors, he was reportedly bed-ridden from late July to September and thus took no ac-

was a renegade who had

tion to stop the flood of refugees.

The sight of so many East Germans escaping to the West prompted massive demonstrations for free travel and other

human

rights throughout the country.

It is difficult

to iden-

a particular day as the one on which the revolution against the old order began, but if there was such a day it was tify

October

7,

1989,

when Gorbachev attended

the fortieth anni-

versary celebration of the foundation of East Germany. In his speech, Gorbachev did not praise Honecker; he praised perestroika. Ten days later,

Honecker resigned. The party was

Moscow Retreats over. His departure only

111

encouraged the oppositionists to

crease their demands. Led by the

New Forum,

a

in-

new and

amorphous political group, they pressed for free elections and the complete removal of the Berlin Wall. As the new leadership promised to consider reform, including more permissive travel regulations and election laws, growing numbers of East Germans joined the protest movement. By now de Tocqueville's formula fully applied: the promise of reform by the regime sparked the promise of revolution by the people. The post-Honecker regime was on the defensive. On November 4, a crowd of half a million people demonstrated in East Berlin while an additional half million turned out in other cities

throughout the country. Five days

later,

the Berlin Wall

was open. By the end of 1989 new political parties and movements had appeared on the East German political scene. While some advocated a united Germany, others preferred a separate East German entity. More East Germans sought a new economic order that would combine the productivity associated with capitalism with the security associated with socialism. All, however, desired political pluralism. In the upcoming elections, the social democrats appeared to have the edge.

Although communists still controlled the government, the government no longer controlled the population. In fact, the popular revolution against the communist system and not

—

only against the Honecker regime

—

proved victorious. With

and genuine, parliamentary democracy within reach, the most serious issue remaining on the agenda (see Chapter 7) was the future of the press already free, travel unrestricted,

East

Germany and

the rise of a

new German

state,

an issue

that involved the future of all of Europe.

Until

its

stunning and successful transition from dictator-

ship to democracy in

November

1989, Czechoslovakia

had

been an anachronism in Gorbachev's world of reform and renewal. In political, cultural, and economic matters, orthodoxy prevailed. The main roadblock was the leadership's

The Bloc That Failed

178

need to defend and justify its old policies. Before he retired in 1988, for example, Politburo member Vasil Bil'ak spoke for the entire leadership when he stated that the only policies that should be adopted were those that demonstrated "the strengths and advantages of socialism." He repeatedly warned against what he termed the "opportunistic" emulation of Gorbachev's program, emphasizing the lessons of "the struggle against the enemies of socialism in the 1960s." In an earlier speech, he had reaffirmed the validity of a resolution adopted by the Czechoslovak Central Committee in De-

cember 1970 which had

laid out the country's harsh, oppres-

sive course since the 1968 "Prague Spring." "There are those,"

said Bil'ak, alluding to Gorbachev, that

document

nullified,

"who would

like to

have

but this will not be done." 6

As early as 1987, Moscow sought to discredit and even to dislodge the very leaders it had put in power after the 1968 Soviet intervention. Gorbachev visited Prague in the spring of 1987 and was asked by Western reporters to clarify the difference between Dubcek's "Prague Spring" and his own perestroika and glasnost; his spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, replied in two memorable words: "Nineteen years." But Gorbachev himself shied away from openly criticizing Brezhnev's proteges in Prague. At that time, he was guided by the belief that extending his process of renewal to Czechoslovakia might destabilize that country. That is why Gustav Husak, who resigned as party leader in December 1987, remained president, and why his younger replacement as head of the party, Milos JakeS, was equally hardline.

Only

in the

summer and

early

fall

of 1989 did overt signs

of increased Soviet concern about the Czechoslovak leader-

ship begin to emerge: •

6.

On August

8, Izvestia

carried a long interview with Ru-

The Washington Post, March

18, 1987.

Moscow Retreats

179

head of the Czechoslovak Central Comfor State Administration and thus the party's direct supervisor of the secret police. The interview was unusual in that Hegenbart had taken a most critical view of Czechoslovak conditions. Because they did not reflect the party line, Hegenbart 's remarks were not published in the Prague press, as would have been customary, and he was reprimanded by his Politburo superiors. Since Hegenbart 's position in the Czechoslovak party suggested that he was closely associated with the KGB and since the interview appeared in dolf Hegenbart, then

Department

mittee's

the Soviet government's official daily, it is quite likely that he was encouraged by Soviet officials to state the views he voiced. •

In an interview broadcast September 4 on Hungarian

television, Kiril

member

Mazurov, a former candidate (or associate)

of the Soviet Politburo, expressed regret over the

1968 Soviet intervention. This was another extraordinary in-

terview because Mazurov also revealed that, under the pseu-

donym

"General Trofymov," he himself had led the War-

saw Pact

forces against Czechoslovakia in 1968.

also stated, "In

my

Mazurov

view, the old guard [in Prague] should,

without any special

fuss,

step

down from

the stage of

politics." •

On September

17, Izvestia

published a letter to the edi-

tor from Jifi Hajek, Dubcek's foreign minister, doyen of the Czechoslovak democratic opposition since 1968, and a political persona non grata in Prague. In his letter, Hajek clarified Dubcek's role during the "Prague Spring." In Czechoslovakia itself, even the publication of Hajek's name had been forbidden since 1968. • In the second half of September, a Soviet television crew

appeared in the Slovak capital of Bratislava for a long interview with the great hero of the "Prague Spring," Alexander Dubcek. Although Czechoslovak authorities are said to have protested the crew's presence, excerpts from the interview were broadcast on Leningrad television in October.

The Bloc That Failed

180

Such evidence

in the public record thus

that in August 1989

Moscow began

against the post- 1968 leadership in Prague.

tember,

party

it

was

the opposition

who was

Jifi Dienstbier,

to

campaign

the end of Sep-

we

don't

know

yet

me

a leading

at that time:

when

and

to

old guard did not

member

become Czechoslovakia's

minister in December 1989, told

dead, but

By

clear both to leaders of the opposition

officials as well that the country's

have Moscow's support.

is

demonstrates

a persistent

of

foreign

"The party

the corpse will be bur-

ied."

The corpse was buried far sooner than anyone, including Dienstbier, had ever expected. By October, the party found itself caught between its habit of using force and its fear of confrontation without Soviet backing; it appeared divided and hesitant. With the danger of arrest or injury thus diminished, Czechoslovaks took to the streets in ever greater

num-

They were also encouraged by the sight of so many East German refugees in their midst and, especially, by the bers.

breaching of the Berlin Wall. as helpless

If

and as vulnerable as

the East it

German regime was

appeared to be, then surely

the Czechoslovak regime could not last

much

longer either.

Another demonstration, on November 17, turned into a final attempt by the Prague regime to use force in defense of its waning authority. But by then it was too late. Three days later, in

response to police brutality, 200,000 people massed

in Prague's historic

tions

Wenceslaus Square to demand free

and the resignation

Czechoslovakia's

of the

momentous

elec-

communist leadership.

revolution of 1989 had begun.

General Secretary JakeS, who resigned on November 24, was replaced by Karel Urbanek, a man not widely known, and therefore not widely hated. Prime Minister Ladislav

Adamec

resigned on December 7 and

was replaced by a communist reformer and political novice, Marian Calfa, whose coalition government included more independents than (reform) communists. On December 10, at last, President Husak also resigned.

The new president, Vaclav Havel, a playwright, was

— Moscow Retreats

181

and cultivated leader of the post- 1968 Czechoslovak opposition who had spent years in prison for his political activities. His countrymen as well as many in the West conthe brave

sidered

him

the conscience of democratic Czechoslovakia. 7

In addition to Havel, Czechoslovakia's

cluded Dubcek, the hero of 1968, the oblivion to

become head

new

leadership in-

man who returned from

of parliament; Dienstbier, the

minister of foreign affairs, who,

when

new

not in prison for politi-

had for years earned his living as a coal stoker; Deputy Prime Minister Valtr Komarek and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning Vladimir Dlouhy of the Academy of Science's Institute of Forecasting, who would both soon resign from the communist party; Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus, lately of the same institute, an economist who had long been unemployed for his role in the 1968 "Prague Spring" and who converted to the free-market philosophy of Milton Friedman; and still another political miracle Jan Carnogursky, put in charge of internal affairs and

cal activities, First

—

—

thus also of the police, a Slovak Catholic

human

campaign

who was

in prison

two weeks before his appointment to the cabinet in November. The background of such leaders and the relative ease with which the new political order was born were favorable signs for Czechoslovakia's future. Divided and defeated, the communists still retained a few government posts, but they for his

rights

until only

7. If the spirit of the East German revolution was captured by an unnamed young man cheerfully riding his bicycle at the top of the Berlin Wall one night in November 1989, the symbol of the Czechoslovak revolution was

Vaclav Havel. Yet I must also recall here an incredibly moving scene broadcast at that time from Prague's old Symphony Hall. There, the conductor a bearded man of middle age led the country's symphony orchestra in a performance of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. The house was packed, and the audience included President Havel. As the fourth movement began and led into the "Ode to Joy," the television camera showed the conductor leading his orchestra with tears pouring down his face. It occurred to me that even

—

though the cheerful German bicyclist and the tearful Czech conductor were separated by hundreds of miles, they both managed to convey the same feeling of joy snared by all East Europeans and indeed by all who valued free-

dom.

The Bloc That Failed

182

had in fact lost all credibility. The working-class support they had counted on never materialized. Moscow welcomed developments in Prague by endorsing the Czechoslovak party's latest position on the "Prague Spring" and thus, finally and formally, renounced the "Brezhnev Doctrine": In 1968, the Soviet leadership of that time supported the stand of one side in an internal dispute regarding objective pressing tasks. The justification for such an unbalanced, inadequate approach, an interference in the affairs of a friendly country, was then seen in an acute East-West confrontation. We share the

view of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Government that the bringing of armies into Czechoslovak territory in 1968 was unfounded, and that that decision, in the light of all the presently known facts,

was erroneous.

8

If Czechoslovakia experienced a peaceful, successful, and profoundly democratic "revolution with a human face" in

1989,

what happened

in Bulgaria

was

essentially a Soviet-

For the day before Todor Zhivkov's dismissal as head of the party on November 10, his long-serving minister of foreign affairs, Petur Mladenov, was in Moscow, holding talks with high-level Soviet officials. In Moscow, he learned of the accommodating Soviet attitude toward the breaching of the Berlin Wall. On his return to Sofia, inspired

"palace

revolution."

—

the Central Committee elected Mladenov immediately and unanimously to be the party's new leader. Before his ouster, Zhivkov had attempted to save his regime by agreeing to implement some of the reforms he had long promised to introduce. After he assumed power, Mladenov also promised immediate, if moderate, reforms that would guarantee freedom of expression, the separation of the functions of the party and the state (and thus a larger role for parliament), and the gradual decentralization of the economy. Initially, the new Bulgarian leader was not prepared to relinquish the party's leading role, and he rejected

—

8.

The

New

York Times,

December

5,

1989.

— Moscow Retreats

183

multiparty system. But as the news of momentous changes in East Germany and Czechoslovakia reached the Bulgarian people and as the crowds at the opposition rallies grew, the Gorbachev-like reforms that Mladenov had promised proved insufficient to satisfy the country's increasingly radical mood. The various independent groups, all small and ineffectual individually, created a new umbrella organization, the Union of Democratic Forces, which demanded greater concessions. By mid-December, with the communist party in disarray, Mladenov acceded to some of the demands by announcing that competitive elections would be held in the near future. In effect, Bulgaria was following a reform-communist calls for a

course on the Soviet pattern.

By comparison

to

Poland or

Czechoslovakia, the changes were limited. Yet the potential

was

With Zhivkov and on charges of corruption, the Bulgarian palace revolution against the old communist order had succeeded. Meanwhile, another popular revolution against the new, reform-minded communist system had begun. As the country entered the 1990s, it seemed that although several transitional regimes might well come and go, Bulgaria would not remain far behind in the East European surge toward political and economic for further progress

also considerable.

several of his colleagues facing trial

—

pluralism. Bulgaria's neighbor to the north, Romania, experienced

and the only violent revolution in Eastern Europe. The reasons for its being the last and for its violence were one and the same: Nicolae Ceau§escu. His resistance to change over the years and his order to shoot demonstrators in the Transylvanian city of Timisoara in mid-December unleashed national passions of hatred and vengeance against him, his family, and communist rule. The immediate cause of the Romanian revolution was Ceau§escu's decision on December 15 to arrest a Protestant minister, Laszlo Tokes, a champion of the rights of the two the last

The Bloc That Failed

184

million ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Tokes sought refuge in his

Timisoara parish, which his followers surrounded in

order to prevent his arrest; agents of the Securitate, the notorious secret police, attempted to remove him by force. In the ensuing riots, Securitate forces opened killing

hundreds and giving

hours,

all

of

Romania was

fire

on the crowd, Within

rise to a local rebellion.

inflamed.

In the capital city of Bucharest, Ceau§escu

made an

fated attempt to mobilize his supporters. At a rally on

ill-

Decem-

ber 21, 1989, he demanded an end to the "counterrevolutionary" uprising. In a barely veiled reference to Moscow, he railed against "foreign conspirators"

who were supposedly

trying to overthrow his "socialist" regime. As his obedient

lowers in the square applauded his words on

fol-

command, a few

courageous students suddenly interjected shouts denouncing the egomaniacal ruler. They were immediately arrested, but, because the event was being broadcast live on television, millions of Romanians witnessed the incident. The longsustained myth of Ceau§escu's invulnerability was shaken, and an uprising against his despotic rule swept the entire country.

With the Ceau§escu family

in flight

from Bucharest, des-

perate Securitate agents, fighting for their lives, took on both the army and waged in the

the revolutionaries. Ferocious battles were

under the capital and especially near the radio and television station. On Christmas Day, an unrepentant Ceau§escu and his wife, both captured two days earlier, appeared before a military tribunal which found them guilty after a short trial and ordered their execution. Two hundred

city, at

streets, in secret tunnels

the Bucharest airport,

soldiers reportedly vied for the privilege of participating in

the firing squad.

many unanswered questions about the RomaIt was unclear who ordered the army to join revolutionary side and why that order was so promptly

There were nian uprising. the

and widely obeyed.

It

was unclear what

role a

group of

Moscow Retreats

185

reform-minded, anti-Ceau§escu officials (who had previously served his regime) had played in instigating the revolt, and how they then seized its commanding posts. It was also un-

whether the Soviet Union had communicated with and had encouraged these officials who so promptly formed a provisional government under the auspices of the newly established Council of National Salvation. One tentative answer was that in 1989 Romania had simultaneously experienced both a popular revolution, there for all to see, and a "palace revolution" that had taken place behind closed

clear, finally,

doors.

Because the revolution against the Ceau§escu regime had been decisively won, there was much to celebrate. No European regime in recent decades had been more oppressive,

more

brutal,

more

corrupt,

more oblivious

to international

standards of behavior, or more self-righteous than the one the

Ceau§escu family had established and controlled. Its immediate successors in the provisional government, who appeared to be transitional figures, would be expected to shed Ceau§escu's legacy and, indeed, lead

Romania from

dictator-

ship to democracy.

Summing Up The East European revolutions of 1988-89 may be classiand analyzed according to the following categories and

fied

considerations:

Time. If one thinks of the Polish revolution as having begun with the founding of "Solidarity" in August 1980, then it took Poland nine years to reduce the communists to a secondary role. If the the Hungarian effort to replace "goulash communism" with pluralism began with Kadar's resignation in May 1988, it took Hungary two years to eliminate the communists' monopoly of power. If the East German revolt began with the removal of Erich Honecker from leadership in Octo-

The Bloc That Failed

186

ber 1989,

it

took East

Germany

a competitive political order.

three

If

months

to

move toward

the Bulgarian revolt against

Todor Zhivkov's despotic rule began with his ouster in November 1989, it took one month for his successors to promise free elections. If the bloody Romanian uprising began with the clash in Timisoara in December 1989, it took ten days to remove the Ceau§escu family (and one month for the new provisional

government

to call for competitive elections). Fi-

Czechoslovak pro-democracy movement can be its first major achievement with the resignation of MiloS Jakes in November 1989, it took four days for that country to scrap the communists' leading role (and one month for Vaclav Havel to become president of Czechonally, if the

said to have registered

slovakia).

Internal causes of the revolutions.

up

to the

momentous changes

of 1989,

In the events leading

what mattered most

Poland were the rapidly deteriorating condition of the of consumer goods and inflation in particular), universal contempt for the communist party, the continuing appeal of the Catholic Church, deep-rooted antiSovietism, and Lech Walesa. What mattered most in Hungary were the early collapse of communist unity and the rise of a sincerely reformist and thus disruptive faction led by Imre Pozsgay, a nationalist revival prompted by concern over the fate of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, persistent antiSovietism, inflation, and the growing realization that communism could not be reformed. What mattered in East Germany were the Berlin Wall and what it signified, a fierce hatred of the secret police, and a rapidly declining standard of living in the 1980s. What mattered in Bulgaria were thirtyfive years of one-man rule, widespread knowledge of corruption among the political and economic elites, and strong nationalist sentiments that the Zhivkov regime could not effectively harness. What mattered in Romania were Ceau§escu and all that he and his family stood for, including, especially, the Securitate's persistent terror against the popuin

economy (shortages

Moscow Retreats

187

and a degree of economic deprivation (such as the absence of food and heat) otherwise found only in the poorest Third World countries. And what mattered in Czechoslovakia were shame about this once highly advanced country's condition after forty years of communist mismanagement, the official lies about 1968, the party's total and often brutal rejection of diversity, a feeling that Czechoslovakia was and should once again belong to Central Europe, and leaders of the stature of Alexander Dubcek and Vaclav Havel. The Soviet role. Through his telephone call to Rakowski in August 1989, Gorbachev played a direct and critical role lation,

As early as May 1988, Gorbachev encouraged the removal of Kadar from the leadership of the Hungarian party and thus unwittingly contributed to the process of that party's subsequent dispersal. By permitting Krenz to countermand Honecker's order to fire on the protesters in October 1989 and by remaining silent and inactive when the Berlin Wall was breached, the Soviet leader effectively withdrew Moscow's support from the East German in convincing the Polish party to step aside.

its collapse. By inviting Mladenov to Union one day before an important Bulgarian Central Committee meeting in November 1989, Gorbachev signaled Moscow's strong dissatisfaction with the Zhivkov regime. By his longstanding and barely veiled contempt for Romania's Ceau§escu, Gorbachev on more than one occasion conveyed Moscow's position to the Romanian people. By his spokesman's 1987 allusion to the similarity between perestroika and the "Prague Spring," and by a series of unmistakable signals to the Czechoslovak regime in August and September 1989, Gorbachev undermined the Czechoslovak communist party's unity and thus its ability to resist change. The Western role. Prior to 1989, the West in general and the United States in particular gave moral and material support to "Solidarity" for many years. Hungary, because of its early reformist course, was granted most-favored nation (MFN) status by Washington and generous credits by Bonn.

regime, thus assuring the Soviet

The Bloc That Failed

188

The United States' policy of "differentiation," of favoring those East European countries that embarked on the road to democracy, clarified the American position to pro- and antireform governments alike. Yet far more important than what the West did was what it was: free and prosperous. The sharp contrast between East and West was a powerful message to East Europeans, perhaps the East Germans in particular. That message reached them by growing contact with West Europeans, by Western radio broadcasts, and even by Western television programs that could be seen in many parts of the region. Since 1989, Poland and Hungary have both received considerable Western assistance, the purpose of which has been to aid the transition from economies based on the plan to economies based on the market, and thus to help reduce all

the threat of political turbulence.

While the old regimes have been crushed seems that the countries of Central Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany) have moved ahead of the two states in the Balkans (Bulgaria and Romania). Politically, the Polish coalition government is in Results so

everywhere,

far.

it

noncommunist hands, although

at the beginning of the 1990s

the country's president as well as internal affairs were

its

ministers of defense and

communists. Representatives of a number of independent Hungarian political parties have entered parliament, and several ministers belong to no party at all. In East Germany, eight political parties have joined that country's reform-communist government, with the social democrats apparently setting the agenda. Forthcoming elections in Bulgaria and Romania are expected to produce coalition governments in which communist influence will undoubtedly decline. As to Czechoslovakia, its coalition is a shining example of how to build a democratic government based on principle and consensus. Economically, only Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary have taken significant steps toward eliminating the legacy of the command economies of the past and embracing the free-market economies of the fustill

Moscow Retreats ture.

189

Elsewhere, similar measures are to be adopted later in

the 1990s.

The question that remains to be raised again (see also the beginning of this chapter) is why the revolutions all occurred in 1988-89. Why not earlier? After all, the Polish economy was already in desperate straits many years ago. Division in the ranks of Hungarian

communists has long been the norm

rather than the exception. The people of Czechoslovakia have

known

for decades that they

were

falling

behind Western Eu-

Germans have never enjoyed living in a cage behind the Berlin Wall. Romanians have always despised Ceau§escu and communism, and it did not take the Bulgarians thirty-five years to discover that Zhivkov, who had once promised to make their country "the Japan of the Balkans," was a fraud. Although the answer to the question "Why now?" is unsurprising and, indeed, self-evident, it is important enough to bear repetition: Overwhelmed by an extraordinary domestic

rope. East

crisis in its

1988-89, the Soviet Union lost

its

ability to sustain

imperial domain in Eastern Europe. Resorting to the use

under the circumstances would have called into question the very survival of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the indication that it would not use force on behalf of its allies effectively undermined the region's communist regimes, not only members of the "gang of four" but the reformist contingent as well, thus revealing that all East European commu-

of force

regimes lacked legitimate authority. Moscow's inability to use force unwittingly sparked the fire next door. "Unwittingly" because the Soviet Union could not have wished to reduce its role in Eastern Europe to that of an interested bystander; Gorbachev's colleagues did not knowingly select him to preside over the dissolution of the

nist

Soviet empire. Indeed, the Soviet goal

was

to replace ortho-

doxy with reform and to replace its sphere of domination based on the imposition and exercise of force with a sphere

190

The Bloc That Failed

of influence based mainly tual interests. To

on voluntary concessions and mu-

have failed so completely to achieve

this

was unrealistic, the result of Moscow about East European

goal suggests that the goal itself

a historic miscalculation in conditions and aspirations.

Yet neither the Soviet domestic crisis nor Soviet foreign

born of that crisis were the original causes of the East European revolutions. The region had always smoldered with rage beneath the surface; that it would ignite one day was

policies

never in doubt.

VII

THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF EASTERN EUROPE the soviet bloc has passed into history. Although democracy has yet to be learned, lived, and thus won, East European independence, after four harsh decades of alien rule, is within reach. From now on, the region's future will be decided in Warsaw and Prague and Bucharest rather than in Moscow. Having neither recent experience nor truly comparable models elsewhere to guide them, East Europeans must now learn for themselves the skills and values needed for self-governance: how to cope with diversity, how to assume personal responsibility, how to conduct themselves democratically. The widely shared East European goal of achieving "capitalism with a human face" will require drastic austerity measures and therefore tremendous sacrifice. Destructive political quarrels will inevitably follow, because economic hardship and the resulting social tension will be made more acute by the legacy of intolerance. It will be a long time before a democratic mentality takes hold. Yet, because they are independent, the East Europeans appear to have a reasonably good chance to solve many of their problems in the 1990s.

The Soviet Factor

The major cause for cautious optimism is that communist Eastern Europe as a geopolitical and ideological entity has ceased to exist. The Warsaw Pact and CMEA may remain as

The Bloc That Failed

192

forums for the exchange of views, but as time passes, there be even less business to discuss and fewer decisions to make than in the past. On the military agenda, there will be

will

the question of

Moscow no

what

tasks to assign to the

Warsaw Pact when

NATO

or an uprising in Eastern Europe a potential challenge to Soviet security. The economic agenda will include the issue of what tasks to assign to viet

longer considers either

CMEA

Union

at a time

and

when

its

members, including the So-

are in the process of expanding both their

itself,

West rather than with one another. On the political and especially on the ideological agenda, the issues have all been decided. Thus, as Eastern Europe enters the constructive stage of multilateral

its

revolution

nomic and

bilateral ties with the

—as

it

begins to build

new

institutions of eco-

political pluralism that will

ated in Western Europe after World

resemble those cre-

War II

— the Soviet Union

will find itself with nothing of significance to contribute to

the region's emerging order. Its political system has been in disarray. Its

economy has become bankrupt.

credited at home, has lost

its

Its ideology, dis-

appeal even in the Third World.

has retained the means to remain a military power, but power by itself will not readily translate into political influence. Most East Europeans seem to have concluded that they need not fear Moscow's wrath. Thus, with little leverage left, the Soviet Union may have missed the opportunity to do what it could and should have It

military

done

earlier

and what most East Europeans would have

gladly accepted in the past: to transform

its sphere of domination into a sphere of influence. In an acceptable sphere of influence, both sides must be ready to make concessions. Specifically, the strong state set-

tles for

being influential rather than dominant, because the

price for hegemony,

which normally entails the use of force, The weak state, in turn, accepts to be influenced rather than insisting on full sovereignty because the is

far too high.

The Brave

New

World of Eastern Europe

which normally requires armed

price for full independence, resistance,

is

193

too high.

Thus, steering carefully between that which is desirable (full sovereignty) and that which is unacceptable (domina-

weak state settles for partial satisfaction. It thus accommodates itself to being in a sphere of influence for fear tion), the

that the strong state

come dominant.

—

may one day

In the end,

it is

decide to use force to be-

that fear of being

the fear of losing all of its independence

dominated

— that propels the

weak

state to acquiesce in a subordinate status. Although Finns strongly resent the word and deny that they have such a relationship with the Soviet Union, the term "Finlandization" is often used to characterize Moscow's implicit understanding with its small Northern neighbor. In practice, "Finlandization" has come to mean a free Finnish political order and an economy based on private ownership, 1

while Finnish foreign policy parties currently

— irrespective of which political —

make up the coalition government is national commitment to harmonious rela-

guided by a firm tions with the Soviet Union. On the whole, despite a few irritating incidents over the years, the formula has worked. Finland has retained some leeway in foreign affairs, while its domestic order has remained free from Soviet interference. Moscow has been satisfied with the situation as well. During his visit to Helsinki in October 1989, Gorbachev praised the Soviet-Finnish relationship and implied that it might become a model for Soviet ties with Eastern Europe. The New York Times interpreted his

comments

zation' [for Eastern Europe]

is

OK."

2

to

mean that " 'Finlandi-

Yet, despite

Gorbachev's

Vloyantes, Silk Glove Hegemony: Finnish-Soviet Relations Soft Sphere of Influence (Kent: Kent University Press, 1975). For a view that denies that Finland belongs to a "soft sphere" of Soviet influence, see Roy Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985). 1.

Cf. J.

1944-1974.

2.

P.

A Case Study of the Theory of the

November

1,

1989.

The Bloc That Failed

194

apparent endorsement, the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe was by then an idea whose time had passed. In Eastern Europe, the choice was no longer seen as one between being

domination or in a Soviet sphere of inbetween domination and independence. With Soviet troops withdrawing from the region and with Moscow anxiously attending to disorder at home and so deeply preoccupied with the very survival of the Soviet Union itself East Europeans saw no reason to exchange subservience for subordination. With the lessening of the old, pervasive fear of Soviet intervention, "Finlandization," once seen as a respectable formula for a relationship based on mutual concessions, has come to be regarded in Eastern Europe as a needless comproin the Soviet sphere of

fluence, but

—

—

mise.

Thus, having finally ended forty years of Soviet rule in 1988-89, few East Europeans consider "Finlandization" an appealing alternative. Gorbachev's personal popularity notwithstanding, they want nothing to do with either the Soviet

Union or with those ies of forty

whom they regard as the local beneficiar-

years of Soviet domination. Simply put, East Eu-

ropeans have no use for communism, socialism, "reforms," or indeed for the Soviet Union. 3

When their passions subside, East Europeans will come to dependence on the Soviet Union must cononly for one reason: the region's need for energy. Until Eastern Europe can afford to buy energy with hard currency, there will be no alternative to reliance on Soviet supplies. Hard currency, in turn, will not be available until the generally poor quality of East European goods improves sufficiently to make them competitive in Western marrealize that their

tinue for years,

if

kets.

Yet even

when

the East Europeans succeed in improving

3. The small turnout at the Polish election and the Hungarian popular referendum of 1989 suggests a mood of resignation about politics in general and political parties in particular as if the anticommunist parties were cut from the same cloth as their communist predecessors.

—

The Brave

New

World of Eastern Europe

195

problem will confront them. The Soviet Union, which is by far the largest market for East European manufactures, does not demand high-quality products. Indeed, in most cases the Soviet Union prefers not the quality of their products, another

purchase high-quality products because it cannot put them Under the circumstances, the East Europeans will find it difficult to assemble small quantities of highquality goods for Western consumption while producing to

to effective use.

large quantities of similar goods of lesser quality for the vast

Soviet market. Given limited resources, relatively small pro-

ductive capacities, and the initially prohibitive cost that the

development of high-quality products will entail, the East European economies cannot efficiently serve these two very different markets. If

the East Europeans were to base their economic strat-

egy on trade with the West, they would eventually achieve independence from Soviet energy. They would also pay a high price for their efforts. During the long process of transition,

they would risk losing the Soviet market for their traditional

products while seeking, perhaps in vain, Western markets for their

new

most East Europeans will continue trading their food and manufac-

ones. For this reason,

probably decide to

tures for Soviet energy.

such continuity in the Soviet-East European economic relationship will begin and end with bilateral trade. There will be no Soviet-dominated coordination of one-, two-, or five-year plans among CMEA members because there will no longer be either a CMEA or any all-encompassing planned economies in the region. With energy as its sole (albeit compelling) source of leverage, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe is not likely to be reversed. Soviet domestic conditions, in particular, militate against the reemergence of an assertive Soviet foreign policy in the near future. With Stalinism condemned and Leninism rebuked, the Soviet Union will seek to incorporate West European social democracy into its new ideology and attempt to Still,

The Bloc That Failed

196

movement of the prerealm, Moscow may soon per-

recreate the unity of the socialist

Leninist period. In the political

mit institutionalized (if limited) pluralism and allow the transformation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into something closer to an Association of Semi-Independent Soviet Republics. Economic need would thus leave Moscow with a modicum of influence over Lithuania, Armenia, and the other republics that have so forcefully asserted their national identities.

With or without Gorbachev, it is reasonable to expect major setbacks in the Soviet Union during the 1990s. Although it is unclear where or when, it is certain that Moscow will eventually draw the line on nationalist pressures in order to save the integrity of the Soviet state. Yet even though massive force could be used to restore domestic law and order, the application of sanctions against an East European country has

become

unlikely. After all,

Moscow

consistently re-

frained from using economic sanctions against recalcitrant

East European regimes even under Gorbachev's predecessors. (Stalin learned

during the Yugoslav

crisis of

1948-49

that the harsh sanctions he applied only intensified Yugoslav resistance and were thus counterproductive.) There are therefore many in the West as well as in Eastern Europe who believe that the Soviet Union has become a "pitiful giant," pitiful even in its own backyard. The available evidence suggests that as long as Moscow continues to experience such acute difficulties at home this view may be correct. Confused about its values, overwhelmed by extraordinary pressures from within, and exhausted economically, the Soviet Union appears to have lost its will to pursue its old ambitions and defend its traditional interests. After withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Soviets have retreated both

—

militarily

and

politically

—

from Eastern and Central Europe as

well. At the time this chapter

dicated

many,

its

its

was being

willingness to relinquish

its

written,

Moscow

in-

hold over East Ger-

most precious postwar geopolitical acquisition.

In-

— The Brave

New

World of Eastern Europe

197

deed, because the Soviet Union is now unwilling to use force abroad on behalf of its interests, it is likely that the Soviet Union will even accede to the reunification of Germany, which will signal the effective absorption of East Germany into West Germany. As its domestic crisis abates, perhaps in the next century, the Soviet Union may well attempt to regain its military grandeur and corresponding global role in world affairs. However, its condition at the start of the 1990s argues against an early recovery. Thus, the answer to the question posed in the Preface "Can there be an Eastern Europe that in its relations to the Soviet Union is cordial but not subservient, independent but not inhospitable, and thus influenced but not dominated by its large and powerful neighbor?" is that although the Soviet Union will be unable to dominate or even significantly influence the course on which Eastern Europe has embarked, the East Europeans will treat Moscow cordially. They will do so both before the Soviets leave the region completely mainly to ensure that they actually do leave and also after they are gone to ensure that they will not return.

—

—

—

East European Prospects

The chances for the successful completion of the second phase of the East European revolution vary from country to country. To the extent that generalizations apply, however, the transition from independent existence to political democracy and a free enterprise system will depend mainly on each country's management of economic change and the strength

emerging coalition governments. most difficult dilemma will be how to combine economic productivity and efficiency with social sensitivity and responsibility. Understandably, most East Europeans want the best of both worlds: the econoof the

In the economic realm, the

— The Bloc That Failed

198

mic productivity associated with capitalism and the associated

benefits

with

socialism.

social

Unfortunately,

the

models of Sweden or Austria cannot be followed in Eastern Europe: the region's six countries are too poor to subsidize housing, medical care, long maternity leaves, or even public transportation. Extended social benefits will have to result from (and thus cannot precede) economic recovery. Above all, present subsidies to inefficient enterprises about one-third of the budget of an average East European government will have to be reduced and eventually eli-

—

minated.

The

and

be unavoidable. On the one hand, the introduction of hard-headed, marketoriented economic policies such as the reform of prices and the monetary system and a shift from public to private ownership are both essential and long overdue. On the other hand, social responsibility, coupled with the prevailing sense of egalitarianism, argues for a slow transition to free enterprise in order to minimize the harmful side-effects of a new economic order. If in fact the economic changes are resolutely pursued, the bankruptcies of inefficient enterprises will increase and unemployment will rise. Moreover, if the free enterprise system moves toward greater wage differentiation in order to reward talent and hard work, the income of the average and less gifted workers will fall below the poverty line. If economic policies turn into half- measures, however, the East European economies will do no better than in the past when some, such as Hungary and Poland, unsuccessfully tried to "reform" their economic mechanism without changconflict of values

priorities will

—

—

ing the system.

Economic hardships and dislocations, which appear to be have the most serious social and political consequences. Support for political democracy may decline in an economic environment that is perceived to favor the few at the expense of the many. If dissatisfaction gives rise to maniinevitable, will

The Brave

New

World of Eastern Europe

199

festations of social turbulence such as prolonged general

economic recovery and social justice and a stable, democratic political order may not

strikes, the struggle for

will suffer

—

long survive.

How the region's emerging coalition governments will handle these problems will mark the difference between order and anarchy, economic advance and economic decay, progress toward democracy and regression away from it. If these governments turn out to be weak coalitions made up of weak parties led by weak leaders, they could even be swept away by a combination of popular rage and populist demagoguery. In that case, they could be replaced by unstable and equally weak coalitions or by nationalist, populist, or au-

—

thoritarian regimes.

As Eastern Europe enters the final decade of the twentieth it seems likely that in a majority (but not in all) of the region's six countries democratic governments will nevertheless acquire sufficient legitimacy to govern. While the initial coalitions, composed of honest but inexperienced parties and politicians, may not last long, they may be strong enough and resilient enough to undertake the first measures neces-

century,

sary to smooth the way for a relatively peaceful transition to economic and political pluralism. East Germany, for example, because of its association with West Germany, is a particularly promising candidate for successful transition, as is Czechoslovakia, which has a fine democratic tradition, an economy that is not beyond repair, and Vaclav Havel a leader of immense popularity and stature. Hungary, despite its overwhelming foreign debt and contentious politics, has made considerable progress toward dismantling the communist system. The country's entrepreneurial spirit and its highly educated labor force bode

—

well for the future. It is

cess.

far

more

Unable

to

difficult to assess

pay the

interest

on

Poland's chances for sucits

debts, the country

is

The Bloc That Failed

200 bankrupt. Inflation

is still

unchecked.

Its activist

industrial

which brought the "Solidarity "-led government to power, could also be that government's and Poland's undoing. On the positive side of its ledger, Poland has Lech Walesa at home and the Pope abroad. It also has an energetic and competent government, which in December 1989 introduced the region's most promising economic program. 4 While there is no cause for euphoria, then, there is none for excessive alarm. The region's discredited communist parties and demoralized security forces are unlikely to reemerge as a major force on the East European political scene. Despite extensive speculation in the Western press, there are no indiworking

class,

—

—

cations of nationalist rivalries seriously disturbing the re-

on the contrary, there are good prospects for the creation of a Central European or a Danubian confederation. Nor have any of the new East European governments prematurely confronted the Soviet Union about withdrawing from gion's peace;

the

Warsaw Pact

or

CMEA,

although, over time, several will

undoubtedly leave both organizations. Popular sentiment favoring neutrality cannot be long denied. Indeed, the absence of such divisive or violent developments (or even the prospect of such developments) offers the best hope and suggests grounds for a cautiously optimistic outlook. Economic, social, and political conflicts notwithstanding, most East European countries may well emulate the examples of Portugal and Spain, which emerged from decades of dictatorial rule in the 1970s to become constructive and stable members of the European community of free and independent nations.

4. These forecasts were made in December 1989, in the midst of a revolutionary process. It is too soon to estimate Bulgaria's and Romania's chances for a successful transition from dictatorship to democracy.

The Brave

New

World of Eastern Europe

201

Western Concerns

The East European revolution has caught the West by surprise. In particular, earlier West German statements predicting the inevitability of change in Eastern Europe have turned out not to reflect official expectations; they were apparently meant to keep hope alive. When change did occur when instability turned into revolution, when it became evident that Moscow would not intervene and that communist rule would thus end there was both incredulity and concern. Looking ahead, the West will face three major challenges. The first area of concern is the extent of Western economic

—

—

assistance to Eastern Europe. Financial constraints will be the

first

ample,

obstacle.

is

The problem

is

not that Washington, for ex-

not sympathetic to East European needs;

The problem

how

it is

and

determine the criteria for the allocation of limited resources. So-called humanitarian aid aside, is Poland more important to the United States than it

will be.

is

to

the Philippines?

Assuming that Poland

Western asheated be political debate as to whether assistance should include what that country needs most: debt relief. For if the West decides to give preferential treatment to Poland, will indebted nations in Latin America and elsewhere not ask for and expect similar concessions? Will Poland itself not conclude that its future debts will be sistance, there will

forgiven as well?

prudence and

will continue to receive

still

The choice

for the

West

is

between financial

political opportunity.

Nevertheless, the West will play an important role in attempting to make permanent the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe, because these changes serve Western interests and because they conform to Western ideals. Western Europe more than the United States and West Germany more than any other West European state can be expected to support particularly those countries that will initiate rad-

—

—

The Bloc That Failed

202 ical

economic and

tries

political

measures. East European coun-

with a free-enterprise system will easily persuade pri-

vate Western firms to invest and do business there, especially if the resulting profit is available in hard currency. East European countries that practice political democracy will persuade Western governments to encourage such business activity and also to remove existing barriers from the free flow

of goods, including products that reflect advanced, although

probably not the most advanced, technology. The second Western concern involves the Soviet Union. The problem is that the West does not and will not have sufficient influence to

make

a significant contribution to the So-

democratic evolution. For the sake of Western security interests as well as Western ideals, the West has a stake viet Union's

both in what Gorbachev stands for and, indeed, in the rise of an increasingly democratic Soviet political order. Given the limits of outside influence on the Soviet domestic scene, however, the West can do no more than applaud Gorbachev's efforts,

conclude arms control agreements that serve the inter-

both sides, and ease trade restrictions. Whether these otherwise important steps will make a difference for Soviet domestic developments is highly doubtful. Almost irrespective of what the West does, it appears that the Soviet Union will encounter greater convulsions in the early 1990s than those experienced by Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s. For the West, a key issue is determining how to prepare for the international consequences of Gorbachev's probable failure to implement his ambitious objectives. A third Western concern is the future of European security. That it is a concern is the paradoxical result of the end of the cold war: as the dangers associated with the cold war disappear, the sense of clarity it offered will disappear as well. Being somewhat removed from the scene, Americans, in particular, will no longer be able to distinguish between

ests of

and adversaries, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, demoand communists. The end of the cold war is a concern,

friends crats

The Brave

New

World of Eastern Europe

203

then, because in the 1990s there will be no alternative to exchanging the simplicity of a divided Europe for the complexity of a united Europe. Without the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall, novel security arrangements will have to be created, taking into account both the new geopolitical reality and the possibility that a convulsive Soviet

Union

will turn unpre-

dictable.

While American influence over Soviet domestic developments will be marginal, and while its role in Eastern Europe will be secondary to that of Western Europe, the United States will have to lead the West in the search for a dependable and lasting security formula for Europe. As the only superpower in the world of the 1990s, the United States can no more abdicate its responsibility for Europe than it can relinquish

its

What,

own

security interests.

in the end, will replace

cannot be predicted. Yet the

new European

it is

NATO and

the

Warsaw Pact

clear that, despite Soviet retreat,

security formula for the 1990s

next century will have to be

more than

just

and

NATO

for the

in a

new

have to provide stability for a new Europe, West and East. To devise such a formula and thus to ease Eastern Europe's reentry into the European community of nations is a task worthy of the legacy of the East European revolutions. guise. It will

Appendix A SOVIET VIEW OF EASTERN EUROPE the Staff of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System (Moscow)

By

[The following paper was presented at the first conference on Eastern Europe at which American and Soviet scholars discussed the region's past, present, and future problems. Held in Alexandria, Virginia, on July 6-8, 1988, the conference had as its title and subject "The Place and Role of Eastern Europe in the Relaxation of Tensions between the USA and the USSR." The Soviet delegation was led by Academician Oleg T. Bogomolov, Director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System. The American delegation was led by

the present author.

Drafted primarily by Vyacheslav I. Dashichev, a prominent Soviet expert on Eastern Europe and East-West relations at the Institute of

Economics of the World

Socialist

System, the Soviet paper was nonetheless a collective work

(known as the "Bogomolov Inwas subsequently published in the journal Problems of Communism 37, Nos. 3-4 (May-August 1988). The paper is included here for two reasons. by the

staff of the institute

stitute").

It

First, it offers an original Soviet overview of East European developments. Although it was written for an American audience and, as of this writing, has not been published in the Soviet Union, it represents the most comprehensive semiofficial Soviet perspective on Eastern Europe. Second, and more specifically, the paper is of great poten-

pedagogical value for college or university courses dealing with Soviet foreign policy or Eastern Europe. At Georgetown University, for example, it served as the background for

tial

an assignment

in

which students were asked

to write

an essay

206

Appendix

in response to the following: "Suppose you are an adviser to an East European party leader. Suppose further that he has asked you to read and study this Soviet view of Eastern Europe. How would you summarize the Soviet position? What are the implications for this particular East European party

(or country)? Finally, given the Soviet view,

what recommen-

dations would you offer to your boss about the policies he should adopt and follow?" More advanced students were asked to advise two East European leaders one favoring re-

—

form (Poland or Hungary) and one resisting reform (Romaand to nia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or Bulgaria) state the reasons for different advice submitted to the two

—

leaders.

— C. G.]

The countries of Eastern Europe constitute an international and political community of states marked by contradictions. Not only are they heterogeneous ethnically and linguistically, and in their levels of cultural, economic, and political development, but they lie within a region that has historically been in the magnetic fields of different major powers. This circumstance has imparted particular features to the policies of the East European countries. Over the centuries, they maneuvered between different power centers and blocs and exerted tremendous influence on the destiny of Europe. After World War II, the East European countries were united by the path of socialist development. But even socialism was incapable of eliminating the region's historical and new interstate contradictions, especially those regarding territorial and national questions. Thus, the administrative-state model of socialism, established in the majority of East European countries during the 1950's under the influence of the Soviet Union, has not withstood the test of time, thereby showing its socio-political and economic inefficiency. Moreover, the Soviet model erected serious barriers to direct communication among the nations of these states, impeding the intertwining of their political, economic, scientific, and cultural interests. The process of reform and renewal of socialism in East European countries was further hindered for a long time by the stagnation of the Soviet system and the related conceptual inertia and dogmatism of Soviet policy in the 1960s and 1970's. As a result, internal sociopolitical and economic contradictions accumulated in many countries of Eastern Europe and were not resolved in time. This only aggravated previous interstate controversies and domestic problems. Today, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe are at a turning

Appendix

207

—

point in their development a turning point characterized by societal understanding of the compelling necessity to change radically the political and economic structures, and to undertake profound reforms in all spheres of public life. The scope of work to be done is enormous indeed. It ranges from the recovery of an economy distorted by the administrativecommand methods of the past, to the democratization of a society emerging with difficulty from the suppression of the Stalinist period, to the improvement of cooperation among socialist countries a cooperation based on true partnership and mutual respect. Not only present-day problems, but those inherited from the

—

must be solved. The profound socio-political and economic reforms that have been started in a number of East European countries are intended to create radically new conditions for economic, social, and scientific-technological progress, and for the free development of the individual. The aim is to create in these countries a qualitatively new model of socialism that would be truly humane in nature. This would lead to drastic changes in the role of these countries in the all-European process and in the system of East-West relations that, in turn, would substantially enhance their importance and influence on international politics. past,

The USSR and the East European Socialist Countries The establishment and development of relations between the SoUnion and its neighbors in Eastern Europe have been complicated and contradictory. The conditions for good-neighborly relations were, frankly speaking, very unfavorable. As is well known, after World War I, the sponsors of the Versailles Treaty system tried to erect a "cordon sanitaire" around the young Soviet Russian state, and the system's bulwark in Eastern Europe was the Little Entente. The anti-Soviet orientation of the ruling circles of the countries of Eastern Europe in the interwar period caused considerable damage to the security of the Soviet Union. Serious collisions and conflicts also took place among the East European countries over national, territorial, and other issues. A new situation arose in Europe after World War II as a result of the defeat of the Axis powers and the downfall of the pro-fascist viet

regimes in Eastern Europe, creating favorable conditions for a radreorganization of relations between the Soviet Union and the East European states on the basis of neighborly and mutually beneficial cooperation. The course of events in Europe had been such that conservative bourgeois circles and the capitalist order were seriical

208

Appendix

ously discredited. At the same time, there was the unprecedented rise of a mass movement for social renewal, which had its origins in the context of wartime resistance. These two developments placed revolutionary transformations of the socio-economic system of the East European countries on the agenda. Clearly, the sympathy and support of the Soviet Union were with the mass movement; this led at first to the formation of the people's democracy regime, and then to the victory of the socialist system in the countries of Eastern

Europe.

Once socialism moved beyond the borders of one country, the issue of the theoretical and practical foundations on which international relations among socialist countries were to rest became a pressing one. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries faced a number of new and complicated problems which the international workers' movement and Marxist-Leninist theory had not previously encountered. The primary issue was how to align the specific national features and the ensuing political and economic interests of independent sovereign states with the international interests of the community of socialist states as a whole in other words, how to synchronize the specific interests of individual socialist countries that differed from one another in territorial size; in endowment with natural resources; in national habits, traditions, and historical experience; in the level of development of productive forces, as well as in production relations, social structures, forms of political organization, extent of democratic experience, etc. In dealing with these problems, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries embarked on an uncharted path in a difficult "cold war" climate marked by military, economic, and propaganda pressures from the West. It is quite understandable that everything did not turn out well immediately. There were illusions that had to be overcome, and mistakes, sometimes grave ones, were made which had serious consequences. For example, great damage was caused by the naive concepts prevailing in the 1950s and 1960s about the noncontradictory and conflictless character both of the sociopolitical and economic development of socialist states and of relations among them. The theory of "non-conflict" made it impossible to understand the nature and sources of contradictions and crises in the socialist community, and to elaborate mechanisms and procedures for their timely detection, prevention, and elimination. This, in turn, led to incorrect decisions that brought on deformations in the mutual relations of socialist states. Still greater difficulties and problems arose in applying the principles of equal partnership among socialist states. For objective reasons, the Soviet Union, as the first socialist state in the world, was in a special position relative to other socialist countries. When the Third International was in existence, solidarity with the Soviet

—

Appendix

209

Union and acceptance of its leading role in the world communist movement was regarded by communist parties as natural. But even at that time, this view hindered the realization of the principle of independence on the part of working-class parties and prevented the understanding of their role as a national force in their own countries. Moreover, it was inadmissible to extend the postulate of the primary role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to relations among socialist states. The urge of the Stalin leadership to do so resulted in a conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (as well as other socialist states) and affected the entire system of

among socialist countries and communist parties. Closely related to this erroneous policy was the practice of thoughtlessly copying and mechanically transferring the Soviet experience to the different social and historic situations of the East European countries. The period of the 1940s and 1950's, when relations between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were being established, was unfortunately marked by many of the abovementioned mistakes and distortions of the principles of socialism, a process aggravated by the voluntaristic practices and violations of law by Stalin. After his death, a process of eliminating deformations and purging the mutual relations of the socialist countries of unhealthy phenomena commenced. The need to observe strictly the principles of full equality, good will, respect for national sovereignty, and consideration for specific national features was acknowledged. The recognition that different roads of socialist development were rightful was also of great significance. However, the process of "rejecting evil" initiated after the 20th CPSU Congress was of a contradictory nature. It was influenced by a desire to overcome past inertia, by rigid stereotypes, by a dogmatic incomprehension of change and the new requirements for social development. Moreover, this process was interrupted after 1964, when the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov came to power and the era of stagnant neo-Stalinism began. Even reversion to the past, to Stalinist practices, became noticeable. Major deformations of socialism in East European countries, major mistakes in their internal policies, together with the hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet leadership of that period, were among the main reasons for the deep political crises in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1956, 1970, and 1980. These crises acquired an international dimension and seriously tested military and political stability in Europe. The negative consequences of Stalinist distortions in the domestic policies of the socialist countries and in the system of relations among them are being felt even today. The perestroyka initiated in the Soviet Union when the Gorbachev leadership came to power marked not only a drastic turn in Soviet links

Appendix

210

internal policy away from the Stalinist model of state-bureaucratic socialism in the direction of a qualitatively new model of democratic socialism; it also introduced profound changes in the system of political and economic relations among the socialist countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). New thinking, free of outlived stereotypes and dogma, underlies the policy of the Soviet Union with respect to the countries of Eastern Europe. The policy is directed toward a harmonious development of true good-neighborliness with these countries; toward a relationship free from dictate, pressure, and interference in each other's internal affairs; and toward strict observance of the principles of equal partnership, independence, and attentive respect for the national interests and the national forms of socialist development of each country. The countries of Eastern Europe now have broad opportunities to realize unhindered their national interests both within the framework of the socialist community and in relations with the West.

Political Perestroyka

of the Socialist System and

its

Effect

on East-West Relations In many countries of Eastern Europe, perestroyka of the system of political power has begun. The model for the existing system was created in the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s. This model was profoundly influenced by Stalin's perverted concepts of the character of political mechanisms in socialism, as well as by the insufficient political maturity on the part of Soviet society and a lack of democratic traditions and political culture. The administrativecommand system of power started in the USSR was replicated in other socialist countries. It was characterized by hyper-centralism, an absolute monopoly on decision-making, monolithic thinking, a disdain for the masses (who were seen as "small crews" and as objects of management), and isolation from the outside world. Political institutions aimed at securing political stability primarily through suppression and the leveling of diversity. This system, which demanded servile obedience, undermined the foundations of societal

dynamism and

viability.

The pyramidal, monocentric model of power could not help but behavior of socialist states in the sphere of international similar hierarchic structure, based on subordination of everybody to a "single center," long prevailed in relations among the affect the

relations.

A

Development in these countries was undertaken according to the same model; that is, national specificity was ignored. In relations with the West, the administrative-command syssocialist countries.

Appendix

211

tern of power was oriented first of all toward its own preservation, and toward counteraction and self-isolation. The existence of interests of civilization common to the two systems and requiring their cooperation and interaction was rejected. Dialogue as a form and means of international coexistence was neglected. The principle of kto kogo ("who bests whom") was mechanically applied to the exter-

nal sphere.

The image of the capitalist "enemy" impressed itself on the public psyche. To some extent, this image was used as a means to effect the internal consolidation and mobilization of the masses in individual socialist countries. However, its utilization as the motive force for vital actions undermined the creative stimuli, and the economic and democratic regulators, of socialism. The defensive reaction of the political system long delayed the formation of a civil society in socialist countries, the growth of the political maturity of the masses, and their creative progress. It should be noted, however, that this behavior was due largely to external reasons, to the constant pressure exerted by the West, a genuine external menace to socialism. The perpetuation of the administrative system of socialism was thus, in part, a consequence of the policies of some Western circles and their blatant anticommunism. The essence of the new model of power can be defined as the delegation of considerable responsibility to the local level, to labor and territorial collectives; the expansion of pluralism in public life; and the democratization of all institutions, including the vanguard party. The aim is to create more effective guarantees against the power monopoly of the layer of managers and professional politicians against the bureaucratic apparatus. The process of perestroyka is already shaping a new multifaceted political reality, one full of contradictions and conflicts, of collisions of interests of individuals and social groups. The renewal is just beginning, and there is a long road ahead before a new political system will be formed. The resistance of old, but still unbroken mechanisms is quite strong, and the force of inertia is quite great both "at the top" and "at the bottom." But the process of perestroyka has been started, and there are signs that it is becoming irreversible, and that a return to Stalinist methods is becoming impossible. The formation of a qualitatively new political system of socialism is occurring to some extent under the influence of international realities, of the general progress of civilization and technology. In the socialist countries, there is enhanced understanding that it is necessary to promote East-West cooperation to ensure the survival of humanity, and that such cooperation requires mutual confidence between the two systems. This, in turn, calls for a new quality in foreign policy, for a reconsideration of its priorities. This reappraisal is directly linked to the perestroyka of the entire system of power. The

—

Appendix

212

shift to the new model is intended to bring about not only greater efficiency and effectiveness in political decision-making; it is intended also to create conditions for the democratization of the foreign policy process, its control by society, so as to prevent a repeti-

tion of the past, namely, the taking of voluntaristic and, in many cases, quite risky steps in international relations. Legislative and institutional guarantees of public control over foreign policy must be

elaborated.

The results of political reform ought to include a more comprehensive evaluation by the socialist countries of the diversity of interests existing in the international arena, of different "balances of forces," and a renunciation of attempts at their equalization so as to preclude the development of hegemonistic intentions on the part of anyone. This stimulates greater flexibility, openness, and tolerance, which also result directly from the new atmosphere in individual countries. A country that rids itself of the command methods of management is unlikely to impose its position on others. This, however, does not mean renouncing one's own ideal values. In the socialist countries, the formation of a new political thinking is now under way in particular, the view of the West as a hostile force is being revised. This is reflected in a gradual retreat from the stress on autarky, on the defensive function in exercising power inside the country. Opportunities for exchange of ideas and experience are opening up, and justification of unpredictable actions in both domestic and foreign affairs is being eliminated. If society becomes more transparent, more democratic, if power is controllable, then a basis will be formed for greater mutual understanding in the international sphere as well. It should be noted, however, that the processes of renovation occurring in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries need suitable international conditions. Pressure, blackmail, derailment of agreements by the Western side can work in favor of the adversaries of perestroyka, may lead to restoration of the former order. This would also mean the aggravation of international tensions. For this reason, the successful renovation of socialism is one of the guarantees for the establishment of new international relations, and above all, of a qualitatively new East-West relationship.

—

Perestroyka of the Economic Cooperation Mechanism and East-West Economic Relations All the shortcomings and difficulties in the development of cooperation among the East European countries within the CEMA framework, as well as in economic relations with the West, stem from the

Appendix

213

mechanism of managing the national economy. With slight varimechanism was copied from the Soviet model created in the 1930's and 1940's. Its specific features were rigid centralism; administrative methods of management; arbitrary methods of price

old

ations, the

formation; the ignoring of the role of the market, of the intimate link between production and consumption, and of economic methods of management; and a primitive and simplified understanding of the character and functions of ownership under socialism. These features determined the nature of integrational cooperation among CEMA countries. Cooperation was based on macroeconomic decisions made by higher power echelons and, accordingly, on the basis of administrative methods of regulating the integrational processes and economic interaction. This doomed to inertia, passivity, and lack of entrepreneurship the micro-economic units of the economies of socialist countries, that is, the overwhelming majority of working people directly engaged in industry, agriculture, science, and services. This led to an abnormal situation, whereby there existed no direct contacts and business relations between cooperating collectives of enterprises and organizations of the CEMA countries. As a result, there was no real interest in the progress of economic cooperation and in deriving benefits from it. Integration in CEMA took an administrative-bureaucratic route. Instead of working for a true economic partnership leading to the extensive interweaving of genuine economic interests and the creation of cooperative links among basic units of the national economy and the entire social organism of socialist countries, spurious and pretentious measures and projects were substituted by the higher power echelons. The process of integration was reduced to one of bureaucratic organization of economic interaction among the state systems of self-contained individual countries which were separated from one another by virtually insurmountable administrative, financial, economic, legal, and other barriers. With time, these barriers grew even higher. The swollen bureaucratic apparatus could not keep up with, let alone regulate, the growing and increasingly complicated economic ties between individual enterprises, associations, and organizations of the CEMA countries. This led to reduced effectiveness in economic, scientific, and technological cooperation, to growing dissatisfaction with existing economic relations, and to the collapse of CEMA's prestige. In terms of the scale and depth of integration processes and the intensity of the interweaving of economic, scientific, and technological interests and relations, the CEMA countries turned out to be far behind the countries of the European Economic Community. The main imperative at the present stage of mutual economic cooperation among CEMA countries is to shift from interstate barter to direct commercial links between enterprises as economic entities.

Appendix

214

In fact, the process of transforming the directive-distributive model framework into a qualitatively of labor division within the new model of a market type, including the indispensable "rehabilitation" of price and currency tools, has begun. In this process, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance should turn into a body maximizing favorable conditions for the realization of direct cooperative relations among enterprises, associations, and organizations in the national economies of the socialist countries. It is necessary countries favorable legal, administrative, fito create in all nancial, and other conditions and prerequisites for economic, scientific, and technological contacts at the micro-economic level to should also be match the national economic mechanisms. sure to remove existing or emerging obstacles and barriers to setting up and realizing direct cooperative links. Special emphasis should be placed on the unimpeded movement across borders of all factors of production, including manpower, commodities, capital, and in-

CEMA

CEMA

CEMA

formation.

According to the new model of cooperation, the principals in economic interactions would be the producers and consumers of the supplied products; they would enter into contracts not because of a command from "the top," but because of the mutual expectations of economic benefits. The partners would naturally become the real "subjects" of price formation, setting prices according to contractual principles. The contract price itself, being part of an actual deal,

would acquire a structure-forming function that is now lacking, i.e., it would contribute in practice to the formation of a progressive structure of mutual exchanges. Since the contract price would be governed by demand-and-supply relations, this would ensure that only those products that meet real public needs and are manufactured at the lowest possible cost would be involved in mutual trade. The process of forming foreign trade prices would no longer be performed according to a predetermined rigid scheme but would allow freedom of maneuver. To ensure the viability of the new price-formation mechanism, the CEMA countries have to introduce radical changes in the monetary sphere of cooperation. First of all, it is essential to introduce mutual convertibility (though limited in the initial stages) of the currencies of the countries concerned, at exchange rates reflecting their real purchasing power. In practice, this will mean the use of national currencies in mutual accounting and in setting mutual trade prices. Under such conditions, a truly unified market of the CEMA countries will begin to take shape with mechanisms for en-

for considerable

suring multilateral (not just bilateral, as things now stand) balancing of commodity deliveries. The need for genuine convertibility of the currencies of the CEMA countries, including convertibility into hard currencies, will grow as their internal domestic mechan-

Appendix

215

isms are rearranged to foster the proliferation of market relations. The step-by-step implementation of the concept of a CEMA common market should not be seen as economic isolation of its members from the rest of the world. On the contrary, the course of forming such a market and, in the long run, a monetary and customs union of the CEMA countries is related to a considerable extent to the need to involve their economies more effectively in world economic relations. A successful implementation of the commodity-money model of economic interaction among the socialist countries will surely give a powerful impetus to the growth of East-West economic relations.

This model will make it possible to overcome the isolation of the economies of the CEMA countries not only from one another but from the West as well. It will make possible more joint East-West economic ventures. The creation of a market setting in which the actual subjects of external economic activity become the enterprises

themselves creates favorable conditions for them to carry out various mutually beneficial transactions with foreign medium- and small-size firms, thus providing truly unlimited opportunities for East-West economic cooperation. Reform of the economic cooperation mechanism by the CEMA countries will hinge directly on the success of the perestroyka of the political and economic system in the USSR and other CEMA members.

The United States and Eastern Europe The policy of the United States toward the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, both conceptually and in practice, is characterized by a certain contradictoriness. To a considerable extent, this stems from the inconsistent general methodological approach the United States takes to these countries. On the one hand, for nearly three decades, American scholars and politicians have been declaring that diversity and differences are inherent in the countries of Eastern Europe and, hence, that the US approach to each of them should be differentiated. On the other hand, there is an impression that in practice matters are quite different, that Washington takes the same approach to all the East European countries. Since Eastern Europe is, in fact, internationally one political region despite the considerable specificity of each East European country, it objectively forms one sphere for implementing a particular line in the foreign political strategy and tactics of the United States. In this context, it may be noted that there does exist a regional East European area in US

—

foreign policy

whose

specific features are

—

determined by

common

216

Appendix

and interests in the approach to all the countries of the region, by an overall policy conception, and by the general doctrinal setup. This does not exclude differentiation in US foreign policy, which naturally occurs in relations with the East European countries. Ingoals

deed, to a great extent, it explains the differences that exist in the US approach to the Soviet Union and to other countries of the social-

community. is known, the core of the most extensively elaborated, tested, and still operational US foreign policy doctrine of "building bridges" to Eastern Europe is a differentiated, long-term policy whose goal ist

As

is to develop varied relations of differing intensity with individual states in this region so as to gradually and carefully weaken the ties of the socialist community. This would, first of all, enfeeble the position of the Soviet Union by creating a situation in the East European community that would fully preoccupy the Soviet Union with main-

taining its coherence and prevent the Soviet Union from competing with the United States in other parts of the world. It is frequently alleged in American scholarly literature and the press that the United States has but limited possibilities for exerting influence in Eastern Europe. Hence, the conclusion is reached that it would be advisable to encourage European countries allied to the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to utilize their long-established and broad contacts with the East European states to exercise influence. Such reliance on Western Europe is hardly warranted. Although the interests of the allies on both sides of the Atlantic do coincide to some extent in this region, there are also significant differences between them. These differences are revealed in the general assessments of both sides concerning the importance of relations with socialist countries (out of security considerations and in terms of economic cooperation), and of such problems of particular importance to Europe as the German issue, the "legacy of Yalta," the varied and contradictory ideas about the restoration on the political map of the European continent of some sort of neutral interstate formation called "Central Europe," the further development of the all-European process and of disarmament, and so forth. There is a desire on the part of the United States to use the fact that Eastern Europe is, on the one hand, an integral part of the socialist community, and on the other, a part of a European system of ties. The desire is to obtain political advantages in relations with the Soviet Union, which reflects the obsolete stereotype of a bipolar evaluation of global politics. This oversimplified understanding of East-West relations does not correspond to today's complicated international realities. This US approach is also improper in the sense that it assigns to the states of Eastern Europe the function of serving as a means to

217

Appendix

—

exert influence on the main rival of the United States the Soviet Union. It unilaterally seeks to define the national and state interests of the East European countries, and thereby artificially narrows their positions and restricts their sovereign role in global relations, especially in the socialist community and the all-European process. This approach to Eastern Europe is especially dangerous today, since the present stage of the development of these countries is characterized by considerable difficulties in connection with reforms, aggravation of conflict regarding reform, and, in a number of countries, even crisis tendencies. In today's era of growing interdependence, no region, and especially not Eastern Europe, should be the arena of interstate rivalry the USA and the USSR. of the two systems, of the two great powers their basic interAfter all, in Eastern Europe as in all of Europe ests coincide, regardless of the acuteness of the contradictions existing between America and the Soviet Union. This confluence of interests derives above all from the need to prevent conflictual processes in international affairs, to maintain stability, and to strengthen international security.

—

Crises in Socialist Countries

—

—

and East-West Relations

The experience of recent decades clearly shows that crises in the countries of Eastern Europe have never been confined within the borders of the country in which they originated. Rather, they have quickly drawn into their orbit a whole number of actors on the international scene first of all, the USSR and the other East European allies who wanted to prevent the military-political, ideological, and economic destabilization of the socialist community. Crises in Eastern Europe also affected the Western powers, especially the United States, which has traditionally viewed the dramatic collisions inside the "Soviet bloc" in terms of the potential damage they might do to the bloc's consolidation and of the opportunities they offered for weakening Soviet positions in this region and/or Soviet control over its East European allies, thus negatively affecting the interests of socialism in Eastern Europe. The clash between the main objectives of the two sides has its origins in the acute military-political, ideological, and economic rivalry of the two social systems that has existed throughout the entire postwar period. This clash was intensified by the nuclear confrontation between the USA and USSR, and by the division of Europe into opposing military and political groupings. Inevitably, this meant that a crisis situation in any East European country was globalized and aggravated, and that it seriously destabilized East-West relations irrespective of whether the interna-

—

Appendix

218 tional political

barometer registered calm or storm when the

crisis

erupted.

Two vitally important circumstances require that East and West, USSR and the USA above all, must thoroughly rethink both

and the

the history of past East European crises and their response to present and future crises. First, unfortunately there is no reason to believe that crises in East European countries are a thing of the past. The present period in socialist countries where the new coexists with the old and the cumbersome but ingrained forms and methods of political and economic activity are still being overcome is pregnant with crises. Even the reforms as such, which aim at the eventual recovery of society and the improvement of socialism, might become in the course of their implementation new sources of public discontent and conflict. Second, not the USSR, not the USA, nor any other country can afford to make the success of normalization of East-West relations, dictated as it is by the nuclear imperative, dependent on crisis phenomena in any country including a socialist one. The stakes are too high. This necessitates an open-minded revision by each side of many aspects of traditional policy behavior during crisis situations

—

—

—

in Eastern

Europe.

particular traits of the "crisis" policy of the USA and USSR (as the most representative and influential powers in the two systems) appear from past experience to be most dangerous and destructive for a normal development of relations between the two systems? First, and this applies to both sides, is a tendency toward the excessive globalization and ideologization of any given crisis situation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have tended in recent years to regard every crisis in the context of their global policies, from the perspective of an inter-bloc confrontation, from the perspective of American-Soviet rivalry. (For justice's sake, it should be noted that in early stages of the existence of the world socialist system, the United States did not exclude the possibility of restoring capitalism in the countries where crises took place.) In their analyses of crisis situations in East European countries, American official circles placed the main responsibility for their origin on the USSR and explained them mainly as a rejection by these countries of the Soviet model of socialism "imposed" on them; they made much less effort to understand the domestic reasons for the crises. Soviet policy also frequently demonized the "subversive activity" of the opposite side to the detriment of a sober-minded analysis of the reasons for certain conflicts and crises in the allied countries. A dogmatic understanding of the essence of socialism and the fear in the USSR of novel solutions in the course of building socialism prevented the socialist countries from eliminating in time the causes of ripening crises. Once a crisis developed, the role played by the

What

219

Appendix

all the USA, in the situation was exaggeThe more so when Western countries provided pretexts for

Western powers, above rated.

doing

A

so.

specific feature of

American policy toward East European

cri-

ses was not to try to normalize the situation but to maintain a socalled "controlled tension" in close vicinity to the Soviet Union's borders for an extended period. As the situation became aggravated during crisis, a more realistic US policy came to the fore; in the initial stages of crises, however, propagandistic activities of a provocative character were generally carried out (which, by the way, were often resumed when the crises de-escalated). Under present circumstances, such a policy could have a destabilizing effect on the development of Eastern Europe and on the European continent as a whole. It could also result in undesirable complications for the United States as well in East-West relations, including in the field of arms control and arms reduction. Such diplomacy also does not correspond to the moral principles and political ethical norms espoused by the United States. The risks this policy posed for stability in Europe during recent years was well understood by the European allies of the United States. This was clearly evidenced by their markedly different approach to the Polish crisis of the early 1980s. Today, it is quite clear that Central and Eastern Europe, and Europe as a whole, is not the place for experimenting with maintaining a state of tension, especially when this involves countries belonging to different systems and military-political groupings. Interest in preserving peace, a prerequisite for which is the positive development of relations between the two systems, necessitates that new political thinking guide the policies of the great powers with respect to crisis situations in the whole world, including those in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. First, it is inadmissible that either side interfere in the internal problems of a country finding itself in a difficult position. Second, it is necessary to avoid globalizing crises, or attempting to use them to damage the interests of the opposite side and promote one's own interests. Should crisis situations develop, they should under no circumstances be allowed to deter progress in East-West relations. On the contrary, improvement of these relations should be the factor that facilitates the quick localization of the crisis. Moreover, cooperation between the USSR and the USA is possible in rendering assistance to East European countries that find themselves in difficult straits. Should this happen, everyone wins: a focal point of potential destabilization in Europe is eliminated, the country more easily comes out of the crisis, and the USSR and the USA expand the sphere of their cooperation so much needed for the improvement of international relations and the strengthening of peace.

—

—

—

Sources and Suggestions for Further Reading

—

A few

years ago I asked a friend a famous scholar of Soviet-East European relations who changed jobs to become a high-ranking official in the State Department the following question: "Now that you have access to all the secret information our government has, how much more do you know?" His answer was encouraging: "Only some details that add little or nothing to my general assessments." 1 persisted with a follow-up question: "To stay current, what should 1 read?" His reply: "If you regularly read The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Economist, and Le Monde [of Paris], you know

—

just

about as

much

as

I

do."

—

Since I do not read French, my "basic list" the way I try to stay current now includes the two American dailies and the British weekly (which offers in-depth coverage of international events). Next in importance are The Financial Times, The Los Angeles Times, and the Christian Science Monitor. Readers who happen to know Italian will find the Communist Party daily I'Unita very informative. For instant analysis, I often watch "The MacNeil-Lehrer Report" on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) or listen to "All Things Considered" on National Public Radio (NPR). Only selected libraries are likely to have the single best source on developments in the Soviet orbit. It is the weekly Research Papers of Radio Free Europe, a goldmine of timely information and balanced analysis on all the countries of Eastern Europe. Similar in content and quality, but covering Soviet affairs, is Radio Liberty's Weekly Report on the USSR. Most of the reports published in these two bulletins are signed; my favorite authors are Vladimir Kusin (on Eastern Europe) and Elizabeth Teague (on the Soviet Union). Scholarly or semi-scholarly journals published in English and dealing with the region include Problems of Communism, published by the United States Information Agency in Washington, D.C., as well as Survey and Soviet Studies, both of which are published in England. For an occasional piece on Soviet and East European topics, see the authoritative Foreign Affairs, the informative Orbis, and International Security, all quarterlies of high quality. From a journalistic perspective, the best- written think-pieces can be found in The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, and The New Republic.

—

Sources and Suggestions for Further Reading

221

The New York Review of Books quite frequently carries essays by Timothy Garton Ash, a British writer who is one of the most astute observers of Eastern Europe, and Istvan Deak, a professor of history at Columbia University who is an authority on Central Europe (especially Hungary). There are relatively few books that deal with Soviet-East Euroin the Gorbachev era. The most comprehensive single-authored study is J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), while the most up-todate multi-authored volumes are William E. Griffith, ed., Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain? (Boulder: Westview Press; An East-West Forum Publication, 1989), and Nicholas N. Kittrie and Ivan Volgyes, eds., The Uncertain Future: Gorbachev's Eastern Bloc (New York: Paragon House, 1988). For a brief, well-informed, and useful account, see Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University

pean relations

Press, 1988).

For a more general treatment of the crisis in communist systems Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere a book that is I recommend Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failfull of insights ure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (New York: Scribner's, 1989). Many books on Gorbachev do not deal extensively with Eastern Europe but may be most useful for an understanding of the problems of reform in Soviet- type systems. There is much to be learned, for example, from the writings of Seweryn Bialer, most notably from his book The Soviet Paradox (New York: Knopf, 1986). For a brief introduction that is as tightly argued as it is brilliantly written, see Timothy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986). The issue of perestroika is ably treated by a number of American economists. Focusing on the Soviet Union is Ed A. Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988). On economic relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see Franklyn D. Holzman, The Economics of Soviet Bloc Trade and Finance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), which is one of many books on the subject offering a in the Soviet

—

—

rather positive evaluation of trade relations in the region. The old subsidy issue was originally put forth in Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies of the University of California, 1983). For a critique of the Marrese-Vanous thesis, see Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," in Sarah M. Terry, ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 155-188. For a more up-to-date treatment of relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-

Sources and Suggestions for Further Reading

222

rope, see Paul Marer, "The

Economies and Trade of Eastern Europe,"

pp. 37-73. An overview of military developments in the Warsaw Pact is Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviets, the Warsaw Pact, and the Eastern European Militaries," also in Griffith, op. cit., pp. 130-155. For a broad treatment of conventional arms control issues in Europe, see Robert D. Blackwill, "Conceptual Problems of Conventional Arms Control," International Security 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 28-47. The issue of East European reliability has been treated systematically in Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982, and in Daniel Nelson, ed., Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe," in Terry, op. cit., pp. 255-283, is somewhat outdated but thorough and stimulating. Finally, a controversial book I like for its systematic, hardheaded treatment of the functions of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe is Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981). Finally, here is a list of seven books on the postwar history of Soviet foreign policy, Eastern Europe, or Soviet-East European relations, focusing on the pre-Gorbachev era: Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971); Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham: Duke Uniin Griffith, op.

cit.,

versity Press, 1986);

Robert tion

and

European Relations: Consolida(Madison: The University of Wisconsin

L. Hutchings, Soviet-East

Conflict, 1 968-1 980

Press, 1983);

Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989);

Sarah M. Terry, ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1968). for

And, when all is read and done in English, there is no substitute knowing Russian or an East European language and for traveling

in this rapidly

changing region.

Index

Adamec, Ladislav, 180 Aganbegyan, Abel, 105 Albania, 9 Alexandrov, Chudomir, 92 Association of Free Democrats, 174 Austria, 31,32, 83, 109, 198 Autonomy, 38, 101, 130

Carnogursk^, Jan, 181 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 98-99, 150, 18385 Censorship, 94, 97 Chernenko, Konstantin U.: CMEA, 126-27 China, 100, 175

Committee BeneS, Eduard, 10 Berend, Ivan T., 150 Berlin Wall, 164, 175, 177 Bialer, Seweryn, 65, 133 Bierut, Boleslaw, 89 Bil'ak, Vasil, 93, 178 Bilateralism, 116

Bogomolov, Oleg

Communist Communist

parties, 15, 25, 88, 101 Party of the Soviet

80, 89-90, 98-99, 164-65 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 20, 124-35, 191-92, 212-15 Cuba, 128

Union (CPSU),

Bovin, Alexander, 77

"Brezhnev Doctrine," 47, 71-79,

Justice,

Committee of Foreign Ministers, 84

76, 82, 166

T.,

Historical

for

171

142,

Czechoslovakia:

166, 169, 182

Brezhnev, Leonid: "Prague Spring," 46, 85; "Solidarity," 52-53; socialist internationalism, 73; Gorbachev, 75-76, Czechoslovakia, 89; 1980-81, 90; Polish crisis of CMEA, 125-26; neo-Stalinism, 209 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 15, 161 Bulgaria: satellization and sovietization, 11-12; perestroika and glasnost, 91-92; resistance to reform,

101-102; economics, 108; repressive regime, 162; revolution, 182-

sovietization,

satellization

10-11;

Spring," 43-48, 56, 85;

and

"Prague

outcome of

Gorbachev's

early Soviets and personnel matters, 89; perestroika and 92-93; resistance to glasnost, reform, 101-102; economics, 109;

crises,

57;

policies, 70;

trade, 117, 118; military, 143, 146; repressive regime, 162; revolution, 177-82, 186-87, 188; pluralism, 199; neo-Stalinism, 209

Burlatski, Fyodor, 76

Debt, hard-currency, 108-109, 112— 13, 117,201

£alfa, Marian, 180

Dienstbier, Jifi, 180, 181 Dietz, Raimund, 119, 121

83, 186, 187, 188,

200n

1

224

Index

Dlouhy, Vladimir, 181 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 80-81 Dubcek, Alexander: "Prague Spring," 44, 46; Brezhnev and personnel matters, 89; reformism, 92; revolution, 179, 181

East Germany: satellization and so12-13; East Berlin vietization, riots of 1953, 31, 32; "Prague Spring," 45-46; perestroika and glasnost, 93-95; resistance to reform, 101-102; economics, 106, 108;

trade,

military,

118;

143;

repressive regime, 162; revolution,

175-77, 185, 186, 187, 188; and Helsinki Accord, 172-73; pluralism, 199 Economics: sovietization, 20-21; Stalin, 24, 27-28; Soviet policies 164,

Hungary

in

post-Stalin era, 34, 58-59 Spring," 44; East and

"Prague

West Germany,

93; Hungary, 95 Poland, 98; concept of socialism 104-106; urgency of change, 10613;

politics

of

trade,

130-35; interdependence 132; military expenditures, 149Polish 169-70 elections, 50; revolutions of 1988-89, 188; second phase of revolutions, 197-99 Western concerns, 201-202; pere-

212-15

Elections, 167-70, 173-74

Energy, 118-23, 132-33, 194, 195-96 Europe: Warsaw Pact debates, 86; unified, 136-37; West and security, 202-203; Polish crisis of 1980-81, 219

European

Economic

176, 197

Gero, Erno, 1 Glasnost, 91-99, 102 Glemp, Jozef (Cardinal), 97 Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 15, 85 Gorbachev, Mikhail: early policies, 65-71, 87-103; socialist internationalism, 73-75; Brezhnev, 7576; modification of policies, 78; Warsaw Pact debates, 86-87; market economics, 104; CMEA, 12735; unified Europe, 136; military relations, 150-57; unilateral withdrawal, 161-62, 166; policies in 1988, 163; East German revolution,

changes

164, in

elections,

176;

institutional

CPSU, 164-65; 169;

Polish

Czechoslovakian

revolutions of 178; 1988-89, 187; "Finlandization," 193-94 Grosz, Karoly, 96, 170-71, 173 Gysi, Gregor, 175 revolution,

113-24

CMEA,

stroika,

Geremek, Bronislaw, 66 Germany, 31-32, 139; reunification,

Community

Hager, Kurt, 94 Hajek, Jifi, 179 Havel, Vaclav, 92, 180-81, 199 Hegediis, Andras, 89 Hegenbart, Rudolf, 178-79 Helsinki Accord, 172-73 Herspring, Dale R., 144-45, 152-53 Hewett, Ed A., 110-11 Honecker, Erich, 93-95, 164, 172-73,

175-77

Hungarian Democratic Forum, 173 Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), 170-75 Hungary: satellization and soviet-

(EEC), 124, 134-35

ization, 11; post-Stalin era, 32-33,

Falin, Valentin M., 165n

34, 35, 37; 1956 revolution, 3943, 56; "Prague Spring," 45; outcome of crises, 57; popularity of

Fedorov, Rafael P., 165n Finland, 193-94 Foreign policy: Stalin, 8-9; postStalin era, 31, 57-58; Warsaw Pact debates, 86; Soviet intentions in 1988, 165-66; Soviet domestic crisis and revolutions, 189-90; political perestroika, 211-12; U.S.East European relations, 215-16

Kadar regime,

67;

Gorbachev's

early policies, 70; perestroika and glasnost, 95-96; economics, 108109, 111-12; trade, 117; military, 143, 150; reform-minded regime, 162-63; revolution, 170-75, 185, 186, 187, 188; East German refugees, 176; referendum, 194n; plu-

225

Index Mladenov, Petur, 182-83 Mlynaf ZdenSk, 89n Modrow, Hans, 175 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 29

ralism, 199; neo-Stalinism, 209

Husak, Gustav, 92-93, 180-81 Hutching, Robert L., 124

,

Ideology, 22, 24-25, 87-99, 127 Industry, 20, 112, 118-19, 194-95 Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System ("Bogomolov Institute"), 76, 82, 166, 205-19 Institutions, 26-27, 79-87, 87-99

New Economic Mechanism (NEM), 95, 111-12

Intellectuals, 56

Internationalism, 71-72, 208-209 Jakes, MiloS, 178, 180 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 54-55, 96-98, 167, 168 Jones, Christopher D., 154n

Kadar, Janos, 67, 85, 95-96, 172 Kanis, Stanislaw, 50

KGB,

Khrushchev,

post-Stalin Nikita: struggle for power, 29-30, 60; YuHungarian revogoslavia, 36; lution of 1956, 40, 41-42; CMEA, 124, 125 Klaus, Vaclav, 181

Nyers, Rezso, 171

Eastern of Perestroika: leaders Europe before 1988-89, 90-99; fear of instability, 102; CMEA, 129-30, 134-35; Soviet-East Eurorelations, 209-10; political, 210-12; economic, 212—15 Poland: satellization and sovietization, 13; nationalism in post-

Kuklinski, Ryszard

"Prague Stalin era, 37; 35, Spring," 45; crisis of 1980-81, 4855, 57, 85-86, 89-90, 219;

of crises,

Valtr, 181

J.,

policies,

86n

143, 144-45; reform-minded regime, 162-63; revolution, 167-70, 185, 186, 187, 188, 199-200; elec-

Marer, Paul, 24, 119, 120, 121 Marrese, Michael, 119, 120-21 Marshall Plan, 16

Marxism, 71-72 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 168 Mazurov, Kiril, 179 Medvedev, Vadim, 81, 165n Michael (King of Romania), 12 Micunovic, Veljko, 41n Mikoyan, Anastas, 39-40 Military: East-West relations and tervention, 61; Gorbachev on

outcome

Gorbachev's early

57;

perestroika and 70; glasnost, 96-98; economics, 106, 108-109; trade, 117, 129; military,

Koves, Andras, 120, 122, 123, 133 Krenz, Egon, 164, 175

tions,

194n;

Western assistance,

201-202; neo-Stalinism, 209 Polish United Workers' Party, 50 Consultative Committee Political (PCC), 84-85

geographical identity of Europe, 3-4; pre-communist era, 4-5; Stalin, 24-25,

Politics:

Eastern

Kremlin power struggle in postWarsaw Pact, 83economics and trade, 113-24;

in-

27;

in-

Stalin era, 60;

tervention, 75-76; Soviet forces in late 1980s, 137-38; Soviet objec-

138-42; Gorbachev, 143-47, 150-54; tensions in relations, 147-50; unilateral withdrawal, 162, 166; future of Soviet policy, 196-97 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 165 tives,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 83, 138, 139-40 Novotn^, Antonin, 44

pean

81

Komarek,

Nagy, Imre, 33, 39-40 Nationalism, 35-39, 58, 127 Nazi-Soviet Pact, 8-9 Nemeth, Miklos, 173

84;

CMEA,

127;

NATO, 139-40;

repres-

reform-minded 162-63; Poland and regimes, Hungary in 1989, 194n; democracy and economic hardship, 198-200; perestroika, 210-12 Portugal, 200 sive regimes, 162;

226

Index

Pozsgay, Imre, 96, 170-71, 173-74

139; Yugoslavia, 196; Soviet of socialism, 209

model

Radio Free Europe, 67-69

Suez

Rajk, Laszl6, 19 Rakosi, Matyas, 32, 33 Rakowski, Meiczyslaw, 168 Roman Catholic Church, 50, 53, 96,

Suslov, Mikhail, 39-40, 45, 209 Sweden, 198

97

Romania:

satellization

and

soviet-

"Prague Spring," 45; perestroika and glasnost, 98-99; ization, 12;

resistance to reform, 101-102; economics, 112-13; CMEA, 125, 126; Warsaw Pact, 148; repressive regime, 162; revolution, 183-85, 186, 187, 188, 200n; Council of National Salvation, 185 Ryzhkov, Nikolai, 81

SALT

treaty,

45

Satellization, 9-13, 13-18

Secret police,

19, 26, 144,

145

Shakhnazarov, Georgi, 80-81, 165n Shevardnadze, Eduard, 81, 165

of communist parties, 77 "Solidarity": Polish crisis of 198081, 48, 49-53, 54; legalization, 98; elections, 167-70

Academy of Science's Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, 82

Soviet

Sovietization, 9, 10, 18-23 Soviet Ministry of Defense, 82 Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

81-82 Spain, 200 7;

Tito (Josip Broz), 16-17, 36 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 161 Tokes, Laszld, 183-84 Trade, 99, 113-24, 194-96 Trotsky, Leon, 7-8

Truman, Harry

S, 14

Ulam, Adam, 21-22 Ulbricht, Walter, 45-46, 85 Union of Democratic Forces, 183 United States: Stalin, 13-14; nuclear weapons, 140; revolutions of 1988— 89, 187-88; Cold War and security, 202-203; Soviet view of relations,

215-17; crises and East-West relations, 217-19 Urbanek, Karel, 180 1

19,

120-21

Vas, Zoltan, 14 Volgyes, Ivan, 143 Vyshinski, Andrei, 12

Socialism, 104-106, 206 Socialist internationalism: Czechoslovakia, 47; Soviet-East European relations, 71-72, 208-209; Brezhnev Doctrine, 73; autonomy

uum,

42

Vanous, Jan,

Shishlin, Nikolai, 80, 81 Slansky, Rudolf, 19 Sobell, Vlad, 134 Social democracy, 39

Stalin, Josef: post-war

crisis,

Walesa, Lech, 52. See also Poland; "Solidarity" Pact: "Prague Spring," 45, 46; Polish crisis of 1980-81, 49-50; institutional framework, 82-87; forces in central Europe, 138; Soviet domination, 147-48; Gorbachev, 151-54, 155; future, 191-92 West: Soviet relations, 60-61, 21719; Soviet fear of attack, 138-39; Soviet threat, 139-40; revolutions, perestroika, political 200-203; 210-12; economic perestroika,

Warsaw

212-15 West Germany, 45, 201-202

86, 93-94, 139,

power vac-

expansion of communism,

7-8; foreign policy, 8-9; satellization, 13-18; sovietization, 1823; objectives, 23-28; funeral, 29; strategic importance of Poland,

49; attitude, 88-89; economic exploitation, 123; threat from West,

Yakovlev, Aleksandr, 80-81, 164

Young Democrats, 174 Yugoslavia,

9,

16-17, 36-37, 196

Zhdanovshchina, 21 Zhivkov, Todor, 91-92, 182-83

DJK 45 .S65

Gati,

Charles.

The bloc that failed

G37 1990 47.0549 G2

DATE DUE At? 1 b 'yu 1 1

AGIO'S (16.

World Affairs Council

of

No.

Library

982-2541 312 Sutter

or St.,

982-0430 Suite

200

San Francisco, CA 94108

Calif.

Soviet/East European Studies

A

MB

Midland Book

561

International Relations

THE BLOC THAT FAILED Soviet-East European Relations

in Transition

BY CHARLES GATI ".

.

.

the most current and best-informed study of this rapidly changing

world."

— William H.

"Charles Gati's book of Soviet-East

is

European

revolutionary events

in

Luers, former U.S.

Ambassador

to Czechoslovakia

both a superb synthesis of the postwar evolution

and the

relations

up-to-date analysis of the

first

that part of the world

."

— Michael Mandelbaum, Council on Foreign Relations "Students and policy makers alike

will find this

book an indispensable

re-

source for understanding tomorrow's news."

— Sarah M. Revolution swept each of the in

1988-89. The Soviet

light of the final

Warsaw

it

Pact countries of Eastern Europe

had existed since

Stalin, disintegrated. In

key questions that the momentous events of

1

989

raise for the

decade of this century, Charles Gati assesses Soviet-East European

tions since the political,

end

of

World War

He

and summarizes developments

is

in

rela-

the

Union College and Consul-

Policy Planning Staff of the U.S.

Department of

author of Hungary and the Soviet Bloc which was awarded the

Marshall Shulman prize of the American Association for the Slavic Studies for

Published

in

the Gorbachev era.

Professor of Political Science at

is

on Eastern Europe to the

State.

II

economic, and military realms

CHARLES GATI tant

six

bloc, as

Terry, Tufts University

in

1

Advancement

of

986.

association with the Center for Strategic

and

Inter-

national Studies, Washington, D.C. Also available

in a

clothbound edition

ISBN 0-253-3253 -5 1

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS Bloomlngton and Indianapolis

Cover: East Germans flood through the wall to West Berlin, November 1989. A/P Wide World Photos

ISBN D-ES3-EDSbl-l