Energy and the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Politics After Stalin 9781501737619

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Energy and the Soviet Bloc

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ENERGY AND THE SOVIET BLOC Alliance Politics after Stalin

William M. Reisinger

Cornell University Press Ithaca and London

Copyright © 1992 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1992 by Cornell University Press.

Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Reisinger, William M. (William Mark), 1957Energy and the Soviet bloc: alliance politics after Stalin/William M. Reisinger. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8014-2657-X (cloth: alk. paper) 1. Energy industries—Political aspects—Soviet Union. 2. Energy industries— Political aspects—Europe, Eastern. 3. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Europe, Eastern. 4. Europe, Eastern—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. I. Title. HD9502.S652R45 1992 333-79 °947—dc20 9^55530 © The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

To Kathy and Mark

Contents

Preface 1. Soviet-East European Relations 2. Analyzing International Bargaining

i* i 26

3. Energy Cooperation and the Soviet-East European Political Economy

37

4. Energy Trade Patterns and Bargaining Behavior

70

3. Polish-Soviet Bargaining, 1971

m

6. Bargaining over the 1973 Price Formula Change

128

7. Conclusions

M9

Appendixes 1. Selected Sources of Information on Soviet-East European Energy Projects 2. Location of Texts of Agreements Cited 3. Western Estimates of East European Military Expenditures Index

Vll

163 167 178

Preface

Before the Gorbachev era, Soviet and East European officials liked to describe their countries' interactions as "International Relations of a New Type." In contrast, many in the West viewed Soviet dealings with the East Europeans as international relations of no type—as suffi¬ ciently Soviet-controlled that the very phrase "international relations" was misleading. Western theorists generally distinguish international relations from other types of politics by the absence of an overarching authority able to make rules and enforce obedience on members of international society (primarily entities known as states). Interna¬ tional politics therefore consists of states autonomously competing and cooperating with one another in pursuit of their individual inter¬ ests. The supreme authorities in international politics are those in charge of the various states of the world. Though rules do exist, their enforcement relies ultimately on actions by the states, not by any higher authority. This concept, many argue, does not accord with Soviet dominance of the Eastern bloc because that dominance was such as to prevent the leaders of the East European "states" from being the supreme powers over their territories and the activities of these "states" from determining events in the region. In short, in this view, Moscow ruled, and Soviet-East European policy making was domestic imperial politics rather than international relations. The Soviet and East European claim to have forged Interna¬ tional Relations of a New Type, ironically, only bolstered the Moscowruled position. What was supposedly "new" about Soviet-East Euro¬ pean relations was the socialist states' acknowledgment that a higher authority did govern their relations. They claimed that this higher authority—a self-imposed acceptance of the ideals known collectively IX

Preface

x

as "socialist internationalism"—governed without impairing the sover¬ eignty of the individual states. Dubious Western analysts pointed out that Moscow defined "socialist internationalism"; they denied that restric¬ tions on sovereignty could leave sovereignty intact. These viewpoints both discouraged scholars from examining actual Soviet-East European interactions: one by asserting rather than dem¬ onstrating the international socialist harmony of interests, the other by begging the question of the degree of control Moscow had. Those who held the latter view tended to forget that disparities in power are central to theories of international relations. Even very large dis¬ parities produce genuine international relations if the states have distinguishable interests, have some independent resources with which to pursue those interests vis-a-vis other states, and must rely only on those resources to protect those interests. In fact, scholars have been paying a good deal of attention of late to the bargaining between states with very different amounts and types of power. Soviet domi¬ nance of the region's politics per se does nothing to disqualify those politics from scrutiny by international relations theorists. In fact, international relations theory ought to provide tools for learning more about Soviet-East European relations, and this book adds to the body of research that, since the late 1960s, has been demonstrating that it can. The findings consistently indicate that Soviet—East European relations in the post-Stalin but pre-1989 period were neither "Interna¬ tional Relations of a New Type" nor "International Relations of No Type." Soviet-East European relations were, simply, international relations. I focus on a particularly salient issue in these relations, the devel¬ opment of and trade in energy resources. I employ both case studies and statistical analyses. Even lacking information on precise posi¬ tions decision makers held—memoirs or minutes of meetings, for example—we can still learn much by employing these different but complementary approaches. Statistical analyses of aggregate data provide valuable clues to trends and correlations. Case studies illuminate and clarify the trends. Chapter 1 presents an overview of Soviet-East European relations and the role of energy policy. As back¬ ground for the later analyses, it discusses the countries' goals, their sources of strength, and the institutions they developed to handle their relations. It also elaborates on the validity of viewing Soviet-East European relations as international relations and, in particular, of viewing the Soviet goal as "alliance management" rather than "empire management."

xi

Preface

Chapter 2 then introduces the theoretical elements I employ in the analyses. In particular, I characterize Soviet-East European politics as bargaining over outcomes. Through this bargaining, officials repre¬ sented their nation-states and sought to influence the behavior of the others. Because the Soviet Union controlled the preponderance of the sources of power, the bargaining was asymmetrical. I therefore review the literature on asymmetrical international bargaining, which pro¬ duces expectations about Soviet-East European relations. As a tool for deriving such expectations, 2X2 matrices are quite useful, so the chapter concludes by introducing and discussing these matrices. The succeeding chapters present analyses of Soviet-East European bar¬ gaining with particular attention to energy politics. Using a variety of Western, Soviet, and East European sources. Chapter 3 demonstrates that, from the 1950s on, these states' energy agreements and projects grew more numerous and more complex. The resources devoted to energy relations expanded rapidly while new forms of cooperation arose. Energy politics both mirrored and influenced Soviet-East Euro¬ pean relations. Chapter 4 presents statistical analyses of long-term patterns in Soviet exports of fuel to Eastern Europe. These trade data show that a variety of nonpolitical factors fare poorly in explaining which East European states tended to benefit, year after year, from Soviet fuel exports. Indeed the rankings of the East European haves and havenots in Soviet energy exports were remarkably consistent over the years. Moreover, one can explain the patterns in the data by examining the contributions the different East European states made to Warsaw Pact security through their defense spending. Finally, important politi¬ cal events in Eastern Europe led to departures from the normal energy-defense relationship. Those departures are, moreover, in the expected direction, reinforcing the conclusion that energy trade played a political role in Soviet-East European relations. Chapters 5 and 6 supplement the statistical analyses in Chapter 4 by presenting case studies of two important episodes in Soviet-East European relations. Soviet-Polish interactions following the December 1970 riots in Poland are the subject of Chapter 5. Soviet and Polish leaders bargained over how the Soviet Union would assist Poland and what concessions would be required from the Polish side, with energy relations playing a significant role in the process. Chapter 6 focuses on the bargaining that took place from April 1973 until January 1975 over a change in the formula for determining CMEA commodity prices. The

Preface

xii

Soviet Union seemed to hold all the cards and should have been able simply to name its price. Still, the change in CMEA rules involved a lengthy period of bargaining between the Soviet Union and its allies, bargaining that resulted in gains for the East European states as well as for the Soviet Union. The final chapter relates the books findings to the increased feeble¬ ness of Soviet-East European relations in the 1980s and to the dramatic way the bloc dissolved in 1989. Energy politics reflected the internal and external changes taking place from the beginnings of genuine Soviet-East European relations following Stalin's death to the begin¬ ning of the Gorbachev era. Even in one aspect, such as energy rela¬ tions were complex, involving numerous officials, agreements, and issues. Nevertheless, we can understand these relations as the work¬ ing out, through bargaining, of the common and conflicting interests of these countries, interests that Western scholars can observe. When citing material published in Russian, I transliterate the Cy¬ rillic titles and provide an English translation. Translations of text into English are mine unless a translation service, such as Current Digest of the Soviet Press or Foreign Broadcast Information Service, is cited. I am grateful to the people who have assisted me in writing this book and getting it into publishable form. This project began at the University of Michigan, where four excellent teachers—William Zim¬ merman, Harold K. Jacobson, Zvi Gitelman, and Alan Deardorff_ helped prepare me to do the research and improve the resulting manu¬ script. Bill Zimmerman in particular has been a wonderful mentor and adviser; I greatly appreciate his continued support. Besides these four, those who read most or all of the manuscript at various stages of my work on it include James Cunneen, Kathlyn Cunneen, James Reisinger, John R Willerton, and anonymous reviewers. Thanks to you all. Since I came to the University of Iowa, several students have assisted me, most of whom were supported by graduate research assistantships from the University of Iowa's Graduate College. These students were Steven Frantzen, Claudio Hildalgo-Nunez, Anne Hildreth, Hyung Joon Kim, Kevin Leyden, Carol Pruisner, Timothy Rask, Claire Robertson, and Hyung-min Joo. My research in Moscow for the 1983-1984 academic year allowed me to collect invaluable documents and greatly improve my understand¬ ing of Soviet-East European relations. That research was funded in

xiii

Preface

part by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board, with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information Agency, and the U.S. Department of State. I thank them for making the trip possible. The U.S. Board of Foreign Scholarships and the U.S. Department of Education made the stay easier by granting me a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed in this book. I also benefitted from other institutional support. The Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan provided me with personal and financial support for several years, including the period immediately after my return from the Soviet Union, when I received a Mellon Dissertation Write-Up Fellowship. The Program in International Peace and Security Research at the University of Michigan generously granted me a Fellowship in Arms Control and International Security to support my writing. The De¬ partment of Political Science at the University of Iowa has provided a tremendous research environment, including a semester of reduced teaching load early in my stay. I thank the faculty chairs and the staff of these units. Chapter 5, in slightly different form, first appeared in The Journal of

Communist Studies 3 (September 1987), 250-266.1 thank Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., for permission to reprint. Finally, I thank my family, especially my mother and my late father for continuous support and encouragement, Kathy for helping me maintain the endurance needed to write a book, and Kathy and Mark both for accepting and adjusting to my late-night and weekend work. William M. Reisinger

Iowa City, Iowa

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

CHAPTER

1

Soviet-East European Relations

Students of international politics continue to strive to understand how nation-states harness their resources to pursue their goals. Scholars have extensively analyzed the many processes involved. Yet key questions remain: What gives a state effective influence over others? How are military force and other types of power related? How are power resources distributed? How do different capabilities come into play to produce outcomes? These questions, in addition to being fundamental to international relations theory, would seem paramount for better understanding Soviet-East European relations. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ger¬ man Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Poland, and Romania, together with the USSR, comprised the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO or Warsaw Pact) and formed the core of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).1 The Warsaw Pact and the CME A were the main military and economic international organizations, respec¬ tively, in Soviet-East European relations beginning in the mid-1950s. Soviet-East European relations have received significant scrutiny from scholars and policy makers. Not everyone, however, accepts the relevance of international relations theory in this area. Many special¬ ists on the region—Soviet and East European as well as Western— have claimed that Soviet-East European relations had characteristics distinguishing them from "normal" international relations. For Soviet 1 In 1990, the GDR ceased to exist, its territory becoming part of the Federal Republic of Germany. On February 25, 1991, representatives of the remaining six states signed an agreement to disband the WTO by the end of the year. The states also agreed on June 28,1991 to replace the CMEA with a coordinating body known as the Organization for International Economic Cooperation.

1

2

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

and East European specialists, these characteristics were positive ones; for Western analysts, they were negative. Many scholars have, nonetheless, recognized that the core questions in the study of inter¬ national politics were indeed applicable to the study of Soviet-East European relations. They also saw the richness of the theoretical tools that approach made available, and numerous strong applications be¬ gan appearing in the 1970s and 1980s.2 Their findings shed important new light on the region's politics. These attempts had the benefit of calling into question, and thus provoking empirical investigations of, the extent to which the Soviets dominated the East Europeans. In many minds, the Soviet prepon¬ derance of military force in the region and willingness to use it had resolved the issue of Soviet power, its sources, and its uses. The inter¬ national relations perspective reopened this issue to investigation. From this perspective, I focus in this book on these countries' efforts to provide energy for their economies: trade in fuels, transfers of electricity, joint construction of pipelines and power plants, jointly owned enterprises and scientific institutions, and a variety of less formal exchanges of information and assistance. From the mid-1950s until 1989, these projects grew steadily in intensity and complexity. They came to play an increasing part in broader Soviet—East European bargaining over the direction of the bloc and the allocation of values among the states. Applying theories from international relations to Soviet-East Euro¬ pean relations can elucidate both. The Soviet bloc was, after all, one of the two major postwar alliance systems, one which is also a complex regional political system. Soviet-East European relations can clarify a 2 William Zimmerman examines the utility of dependency theory in "Dependency Theory and the Soviet-East European Hierarchical Regional System," Slavic Review 3/ (December 1978), 604—623. Andrzej Korbonski shows how the East Europeans can influence Soviet foreign policy through bargaining in "Eastern Europe as an Internal Determinant of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer, ed.. The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981), pp. 313-332, especially pp. 32B330. For an international political economy perspective, see Ellen Comisso and Laura D' Andrea Tyson, eds.. Power, Purpose, and Collective Choice: Economic Strategy in Social¬ ist States, a special issue of International Organization 40 (Spring 1986), 187-598. Ronald Linden examines domestic-international linkages in Communist States and Interna¬ tional Change: Romania and Yugoslavia in Comparative Perspective (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). Comparisons of Soviet-East European relations and U.S.-Latin Amer¬ ican relations are in Jan Triska, ed.. Dominant Powers and Subordinate States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986). I discuss applications of the collective-goods approach in Chapter 4.

Soviet-East European Relations

3

superpower's strategies for alliance management and also the role of smaller states in a regional system dominated by a superpower. It has been difficult for those developing international relations theory to construct arguments that hold true in numerous settings. As scholars take such theory and apply it to Soviet-East European relations, the latter's distinguishing features will test whether the theory is suffi¬ ciently general and broadly grounded. In 1989, an era in Soviet-East European relations came to an end. The loss of power by the Communist parties of most of the East European countries within a six-month period called into question all aspects of these countries' interrelations. Although leadership changes, technological developments, and international events had wrought some change over the years, fundamental aspects of these relations did remain in place from the mid-1950s to the end of the 1980s. The 1990s, in contrast, have already seen major shifts in the military, diplomatic, and economic ties among these states and be¬ tween them and the West. Even so, past patterns will weigh heavily on those attempting to fashion new organizations, norms, and deals. It is against the past structures and behaviors that many new leaderships will be reacting. Also, the new regimes cannot alter their economic interrelations quickly. They must make use of the infrastructure for trade that remains in place, since developing a new one will take time. The first efforts at restructuring Soviet-East European relations in 1990 were confused and heated in the face of these difficulties. Ulti¬ mately, with Soviet use of military force in Eastern Europe less likely, Soviet influence will rest even more strongly on economic levers, which since the mid-1950s have been a significant component of Soviet domination. In several ways, Soviet-East European energy collaboration partook of broader political issues. The Soviet Union used its exports of fuels, especially oil and natural gas, to reward those East European states that were most pro-Soviet, as measured by high rates of defense spending. It had to modify its fuel policies when the security of the East European regimes was in question. Moreover, the relative strength of the actors, their different energy positions, and the norms governing Soviet-East European economic relations influenced bloc decision making on such issues as the change in the CMEA pricing formula for raw materials (announced in January 1975). For Soviet and East European officials, then, energy politics was high politics, crucial to short-term and long-term goals. Their efforts to resolve energy

4

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

issues were a key component of their overall interrelations prior to 1989 and are likely to remain so.

Soviet and East European Goals and Strengths Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe changed in important ways when Mikhail Gorbachev took over as Soviet leader in 1985. The kev shift came when the Soviet Union renounced any right to intervene to control internal political changes in Eastern Europe, making it possi¬ ble for the East Europeans to end communist rule in 1989. Clearly, new political thinking" among Soviet foreign policy makers resulted in new definitions of short-term Soviet priorities in the region and how they should pursue them. The long-term importance of the region to the Soviet Union re¬ mains; in geostrategic terms, Soviet leaders want Eastern Europe to be a defensive buffer zone, not a bridgehead. The states should be nonhostile and should not host contingents of Western forces. In the past, Soviet leaders also valued the East European states because their membership in the Warsaw Pact allowed the Soviet Union to lead an alliance system to counter NATO in Western Europe. It was with great unease that many Soviet officials watched the removal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union sought to benefit from its economic relations with Eastern Europe. Proximity to both Western Europe and the USSR made the East European countries natural trading partners of the Soviet Union, which could use its size and political prominence to promote region-wide cooperation that increased regional gains from trade.3 Developing an "international socialist division of labor" was a sincerely held, though poorly realized, goal of Soviet policy makers. Depending on the Soviet Union's posture toward involvement with the Western economies, trade with Eastern Europe could help the Soviet economy remain autonomous or could increase Soviet access to Western technology. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the GDR received financial support from West Germany, to the benefit of the entire region. This is not to say that orienting their trade more extensively toward Western Europe might not have produced even bigger returns for the East European econ¬ omies. Rather, given a certain level of Soviet-East European trade, multilateralism and collaborative investments can increase the returns to the states. 3

Soviet-East European Relations

5

Of course, because of the USSR's role as a superpower and the alliance leader, Soviet goals were region-wide. Although the Soviet Union pursued its interests vis-a-vis each ally, it was willing to carry economic or other burdens in its bilateral relations with a given state if Soviet leaders considered that necessary to bolster the region or alli¬ ance as a whole. I discuss this regional perspective below as an alliance-management strategy. In pursuing Soviet goals in Eastern Europe, the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes placed strongest priority on alliance membership, Communist party control, central economic planning, and partici¬ pating in the CMEA. East European participation in the Warsaw Pact was of prime importance. When events in Eastern Europe raised the possibility of an East European country withdrawing from the WTO, the Soviet Union took a strong stance in opposition. Given their economic goals in the region, past Soviet regimes stressed the impor¬ tance of central planning of the East European economies. Soviet central-planning officials could deal more easily with representatives of other centrally planned economies. Also, their having centrally planned economies helped ensure that the East European states would have to maintain strong ties to the Soviet economy. These Soviet requirements constituted the main elements of a Sovietsponsored ideological orthodoxy that the East European states had to consider. It is important to keep in mind that the communist regimes in Eastern Europe shared most Soviet goals and values. They certainly were aware that the political and social structures in which they had prospered and on which their power depended rested ultimately on Soviet support (though, by all accounts, they did not expect these structures to disintegrate so quickly as they did). In terms of relations among the political leaders, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact was at least as much an alliance of like-minded states as NATO. The Soviet Union as alliance leader had genuine authority as well as power. Even with this core of agreement, the allies naturally disagreed on some central issues.4 For example, several East European states placed less emphasis on building up the military capability of the WTO than did the Soviet Union. The East European regimes looked to the Soviet Union to deter and, if necessary, repel military attack from the West. Evidently, they had confidence in the credibility of the Soviet nuclear 4 See also the discussion in Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, amt Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 34-37.

6

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

deterrents In part because of this confidence, they emphasized the easing of tensions, stronger East-West ties, and disarmament.6 In the economic sphere, the East European regimes focused on enhancing Soviet contributions to the development of their economies, not on supporting Soviet bilateral or region-wide economic goals. This led to important, long-term differences among the CMEA states about the proper kind of trade and cooperation. On ideological matters, the East Europeans sought not unity but flexibility. Thus they wanted CMEA and Warsaw Pact ideological for¬ mulations to be vague enough that each regime could pursue its country's development in the way it preferred. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union acknowledged the possibility of "different roads to socialism."/ For some regimes this step permitted quite striking departures from the Soviet pattern of domestic politics or economics. Yet the Soviet Union did not want the different roads to socialism to diverge too widely from the road it had chosen. Thus, the Soviets and East Euro¬ peans continually debated the limits of true socialism.7 8 9 The East European regimes supported some Soviet goals and op¬ posed others, in varying mixtures. Some tried to advance their inter¬ ests by being largely consensual and hoping for reward. Others sought as much autonomy as possible within the constraints of Soviet inter¬ ests^ Such autonomy could focus on a more independent foreign policy or on internal departures from the Soviet model. Moreover, developments internal to the countries, including regime changes, meant that the goals of any regime could differ over the post-Stalin period. Bulgaria was generally the most supportive ally Since the Bulgarian population was less hostile to Soviet/Russian domination than other East European publics, the Bulgarian leadership never faced the presSee Glenn Palmer and William M. Reisinger, "Defense Allocations in Eastern Europe: Alliance Politics and Leadership Change," International Interactions 16 (Win¬ ter 1990), 53-67. 5

h Ivan Volgyes, "Troubled Friendship or Mutual Dependence?" Orbis 30 (Summer 1986), 325-328. 7 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 206-209. ^

„ 8 For ^cent examples from this debate, see Karen Dawisha and Jonathon Valdez, Socialist Internationalism in Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism 36 (MarchApril 1987), 3-6. 9 See the like distinction between consensual bargainers and circumventing and constrained bargainers in Jeffrey L. Hughes, "On Bargaining," in Triska (fn. 2), pp. 168-199, on PP- 190-193.

Soviet-East European Relations

7

sure to distance itself from Moscow. Moreover, it had a good deal of success by being consensual and loyal. Its economic, political, and cultural ties to the USSR were strong and beneficial; it received, for example, considerable energy supplies on good terms.10 East Germany also sought reward for its loyalty. Given the country's strategic importance in Soviet eyes, the GDR leadership was hardpressed to seek significant autonomy. The consensual tack of East German policy resulted, as with Bulgaria, in more economic profit, foreign policy prestige, and intra-alliance influence than would other¬ wise have been possible. One area in which the Soviet Union encour¬ aged East German autonomy was in building closer ties to West Ger¬ many during the 1970s and 1980s. When East German leader Walter Ulbricht resisted Soviet calls for a softer stance toward the Federal Republic of (West) Germany, Soviet pressure led to his ouster from power. Erich Honecker then helped construct a special relationship between the two Germanies that allowed the GDR to benefit from European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) tariffs and to receive substantial West German aid. Later, in seeking to pro¬ tect these ties, the GDR resisted some aspects of Soviet policy toward the West, including nuclear weapons policy. Overall, though, the East Germans behaved as loyal allies.11 Except for the eight-month "Prague Spring" in 1968, Czechoslovakia eschewed autonomy for loyalty. It sought neither to reform the domes¬ tic political arrangements nor to stake out an independent stance in foreign policy matters. While it desired reform of the CMEA beyond what the Brezhnev leadership wanted, the Czechoslovak leadership remained circumspect in proposing reforms. Czechoslovakia's contin¬ ual loyalty allowed it, too, to claim a good measure of Soviet fraternal assistance. Poland mostly tried to have its cake and eat it, too. Like the GDR, Poland had high strategic value to the Soviet Union, which was there¬ fore very sensitive to threatening developments there. At the same time, however, the Polish people were hostile to the idea that Russians were dominating Poles and imposing their institutions and rules in Poland. Poland's leadership wavered between desiring the rewards of a loyal, consensual ally and seeking the autonomy necessary to convince 10 On Bulgarian departures from the Soviet line, see Robert J. McIntyre, Bulgarin (London: Pinter, 1988), pp. 77-78. 11 On East Germany's relations with the USSR and the ouster of Ulbricht, see Mike Dennis, German Democratic Republic (London: Pinter, 1988), pp. 32-41 and 188-190.

8

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

the Polish populace that the leaders were not Soviet lackeys. Different regimes sought to solve this dilemma in different ways, sometimes changing in midstream. Wladislaw Gomulka came to power during the 1956 unrest as a nationalist communist who would find a Polish road to socialism. Poland maintained such things as a strong church and noncollectivized agriculture, but by the late 1960s, Gomulka was suppressing reform and curbing Polish calls for new Soviet-East Euro¬ pean relations. His successor, Edward Gierek, sought to stall internal reforms by pursuing an aggressive policy of borrowing hard currency from the West to invest in Polish industry. The failure of this policy by the end of the 1970s set the stage for the rise of the Solidarity movement and the domestic unrest of the 1980s. The Polish leadership could not appeal to the Soviet Union for assistance as a loyal ally of the Bulgarian type, although precisely because of its weak internal legitimacy, it needed Soviet support. Hungary and Romania were the two most consistent mavericks in the region. Hungary's pursuit of autonomy involved trading off strict loyalty to Soviet foreign policy initiatives for domestic policies that took Hungary quite far from the Soviet economic and political model. This pursuit of autonomy was surprising, of course, because it oc¬ curred relatively soon after Soviet troops had invaded Hungary in 1956. Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, approved in 1965 and introduced in 1968, reduced central planning and state control of the economy far beyond the limited economic reforms, soon to be dropped, which Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin was then introducing in the Soviet Union. Politically as well, the Hungarian leadership encouraged nonparty sources of activism unique to the region. Hun¬ gary was also quite active in economic ties with the West and opposed Soviet calls in the 1970s for strengthening large-scale, jointly planned CMEA projects. Hungary was, however, quite careful to adhere to Warsaw Pact and Soviet military-political policy.12 Romania went further than any of the other Soviet allies in depart¬ ing from Soviet alignment policy. Beginning in the late 1950s, and accelerating in the 1960s, Romanian foreign policy became quite inde¬ pendent, though Romania did not actually seek to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Romania withheld its troops from alliance military exer¬ cises, roundly condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia, did not 12 See Hans-Georg Heinrich, Hungary (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Riener, 1986), pp. 4142 and 176-180.

Soviet-East European Relations

condemn China in the 1960s and 1970s as the Soviet Union wished, and, in numerous other ways, refused to follow Soviet leadership. This policy was popular within Romania, among both elites and the popu¬ lace. Nicolae Ceau§escu's clever pushing back of the boundaries of foreign policy behavior helped solidify his support within the country. Romania under Ceau§escu was also a maverick in its internal politics, though not, like Hungary, because it was attempting to de-Stalinize its society. Rather, Romania remained Stalinist and repressive in ways that disappeared from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. By choosing to depart so far from Soviet desires, Romania was unable to argue for the kind of Soviet economic and other assistance given to other allies. On almost any aspect of Soviet-East European relations, then, di¬ vergent interests existed. Of course the seven participants had un¬ equal resources with which to pursue their goals; the Soviet Union was at a clear advantage.1! Although Soviet military might remained in the background most of the time, it was unchallenged in the region. Moreover, one of the functions of the Warsaw Pact seems to have been to prevent any East European state from developing the ability to counter Soviet forces, m The Soviet Union could exercise influence through, for example, interparty consultations, secret police coopera¬ tion, and Soviet training of East European military officers. In addi¬ tion, the Soviet Union possessed the predominant economic capa¬ bilities in the region. Trade with Eastern Europe had a minor role in the Soviet economy, while the East European economies relied on trade with the Soviet Union. Most of the East European countries, including Romania since the mid-1970s, needed to import basic mate¬ rials, including fuels, from the Soviet Union. This dependence gave the Soviet Union a lever and raised the stakes for East Europeans. A final Soviet resource was that in the East European societies prior to 1989, the top stratum benefited from Soviet oversight.1! 13 My list of sources of Soviet strength follows that of Dawisha (fn. 4, pp. 287-291). It does not include Soviet control over the appointment of East European officials because this is not as much a source of Soviet power as an outcome for which the Soviet Union must use its power. See, for example, Dawisha's (p. 77) own description of Soviet involvement in East European successions. For a more generalized categor¬ ization of sources of power, see Hughes (fn. 9), pp. 174-188. 14 Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1981). 15 Marcin Sar calls this "Moscow's main asset in the Eastern European countries"; see "The Evolution of Centripetal Fraternalism: The Soviet Union and Eastern Eu¬ rope," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 481 (Septem¬ ber 1985), 92-103. See also Jones's argument that "Muscovite" factions exist within the

10

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

The East European leaderships brought a much smaller comple¬ ment of capabilities to their bargaining with the Soviet Union.16 There were goods and foodstuffs the East Europeans provided to the Soviet Union that would have been inconvenient for the Soviets to replace. In some areas, an East European state had superior proficiency or indus¬ trial skills. The GDR had links with the EEC through the Federal Republic of Germany that gave it options unavailable even to the Soviet Union. Most important, however, the local regimes were more familiar with conditions in their countries and therefore had greater relevant expertise in formulating policies. The Soviets, unless they wished to reimpose the ideological straitjacket of the Stalinist era, had to ac¬ knowledge that expertise and allow the East Europeans to modify policies promoted by the Soviet Union. The Soviets and the East Europeans thus had differing policy inter¬ ests and different sources of influence to use when coordinating those interests. Each side wanted something from the other in such forms as exchanges, joint activities, and common positions. Despite Soviet predominance, a political process arose for defining more precisely what they would exchange, which joint activities would commence, and how they would spell out their common position. All the activities involved in this political process constitute international bargaining.

Soviet AJliance Management While my analyses focus on the activities that constituted SovietEast European energy-related bargaining, I also address the Soviet perspective on its relations with its less powerful allies. I characterize the various Soviet goals in the regions as forming a strategy of "alli¬ ance management" (as distinguished from empire management), which allows me to compare Soviet-East European relations to rela¬ tions found within other alliances. It is quite common for journalists and commentators to refer to the Soviet Union and its East European allies as "the Soviet empire," a shorthand designation much like "the Soviet bloc." The use of the term empire, though it has the advantage of being pithy, creates an image in the reader's mind that may be inaccu-

East European Communist parties (fn. 14), as well as Paul M. Johnson, "The Subordi¬ nate States and Their Strategies," in Triska (fn. 2), pp. 297-298. 16 For a recent list, see James F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 57-59.

Soviet-East European Relations

11

rate and impedes—by taking certain things as given—an accurate examination of Soviet-East European relations. Unfortunately, the journalists and commentators have company Academic observers of Soviet-East European relations commonly em¬ ploy the designation empire, usually without a definition.^ Charles Wolf is an exception; for he defines the term and explains his reasons for employing it. Wolf defines the general, traditional sense of an empire as "a special degree of influence, control or constraint exercised or imposed by the imperial power over the component parts of its empire/'18 Since the second half of his definition makes it tautological, we can substitute "largest state" for "imperial power" and "other political units" for "component parts of its empire." Even with this new wording, however, the definition has several shortcomings. First, it covers too many kinds of authority relations to be useful. "A special degree of influence" depicts the relationship between the United States and Canada, between the USSR and Finland, and nu¬ merous other interstate relationships throughout history which few would refer to as imperial. Wolf admits the variety of relationships that would fall into his category of empire, stating that his definition includes "simply more or less friendly and cooperating regimes.All utility of the term disappears, however, with so broad a definition. Besides including such clearly nonimperial relationships as those mentioned above, it fails to do what Wolf seeks to have it do: refer only See, for example, Vojtech Mastny, "Eastern Europe and the Future of the Soviet Empire," SAIS Review 5 (Winter-Spring 1985), 137-150; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II: Imperial and Global, id ed. (New York: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 83; Seweryn Bialer, "Lessons of History: Soviet-American Relations in the Post-War Era," in Arnold L. Horelick, ed., U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 97; and Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), p. 195. Van Oudenaren foresaw SovietEast European relations becoming more like an empire in the future; see The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Options for the 1980s and Beyond, Rand Report R-3136-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1984), pp. 86-90. Rubinstein does not provide a defini¬ tion of the term empire, and the developments he refers to as having "de-Stalinized the empire" 1 would characterize as making the term inapplicable. 18 Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Costs and Benefits of the Soviet Empire," in Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., eds., The Future of the Soviet Empire (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), p. 121. Wolf also notes an alternative meaning of empire unique to the Soviet Union. It is based primarily on two factors: (1) the existence of three layers of political units surrounding the Russian heartland (the non-Russian republics within the USSR; the contiguous allies, such as Eastern Europe; and Third World allies) and (2) the use of interparty contacts as a source of influence. Ibid., p. 121.

12

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

to those countries he views as part of a Soviet empire. The Third World, for example, contains more than ten countries more or less friendly to and cooperating with the Soviet Union; yet Wolf intends to focus on the ten closest Soviet partners during the Brezhnev era: Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria, Mozambique, Libya, Nicaragua, and North Korea. Wolf's definition does not delineate well because it omits the feature that, for most observers, sets empires off from other forms of political relationships: not a special degree of influence exercised by one state over another, but a centralized authority extending out from one state to a different state or territory For example, most dictionaries define an empire almost identically as "a single political unit, comprising a number of territories or nations, ruled by a single supreme author¬ ity."20 Several scholarly uses of the term mirror this definition. Gilpin, for example, defines it as "an aggregation of diverse peoples ruled over by culturally different people and a political form usually charac¬ terized by centralization of power in an emperor or sovereign."21 Michael Doyle defines an empire as "a relationship, formal or infor¬ mal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society."22 He specifies that an imperial power must control both the foreign and domestic policy of a subordinate society and that its control must be sovereign control, not just unequal influ¬ ence of the former over the latter. The dictionary definition, that of Gilpin, and that of Doyle converge and provide an empirical standard for deciding whether some political unit is part of a Soviet empire: Is that unit under supreme, centralized Soviet authority? Moreover, the dictionary definition—which would be what comes to the minds of those who read the phrase "Soviet empire"—differs from the reality of Soviet-East European relations. The phrase was suggestive, though not fully accurate, during the Stalinist period, but the de-Stalinizing of Soviet relations with the East European states proceeded very rapidly after Stalin's death.23 To view Eastern Europe 20

American Heritage Dictionary, New College Edition (1969), p. 428. Examples of similar wordings include Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (1968), p. 476: "supreme rule; absolute power or authority; dominion"; and Random House College Dictionary (1973), p. 434: "an aggregate of nations, tribes, clans or peoples ruled over by one supreme sovereign." 21 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer¬ sity Press, 1981), p. 110. 22 Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 45. 23 Brzezinski (fn. 7) describes this process in chs. 8-9.

Soviet-East European Relations

13

in the post-Stalin era as part of a Soviet empire would lead one to expect a very different course of events than transpired. A functioning empire would exhibit effective control by Moscow over those aspects of the East European polities that concerned Moscow Moscow's con¬ cerns, moreover, were rather broad. Yet, on all but the most basic issues of politicomilitary alignment, post-Stalin Soviet leaderships allowed the East European regimes to take decisions that differed from Soviet wishes.24 Even on major issues, such as participating in the Warsaw Pact, a country like Romania was able to defy Soviet requirements openly in such realms as joint maneuvers, level of defense spending, and policy toward China.25 The Soviet Union did not establish formal methods of imperial control, and it seems the informal methods func¬ tioned quite imperfectly. Perhaps more critical for the utility of the empire approach, the periphery should bring profit to the imperial center. Gilpin, for in¬ stance, writes, "Because empires are created by warriors, bureaucrats and autocracies in their own interests, the primary function of the imperial economy is to advance the wealth and power of these domi¬ nant elites."26 There is now general agreement, however, that the Soviet Union suffered a net economic cost, a rather large one, from trading with Eastern Europe.27 Regarding Soviet exports of fuels, for example, an empire image would lead one to expect that Soviet exports to Eastern Europe would provide more recompense than simply sell¬ ing the fuels on world markets. The pattern of trade, however, had the Soviets accepting insufficient quantities of poorly made commodities in return for its fuels. Moreover, the Soviet Union, increased its fuel shipments after political difficulties in any of the East European coun24 Studies that illustrate East European independent action include Brzezinski (fn. 7); Michael Kaser COMECON, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971); Henry Schaefer, COMECON and the Politics of Integra¬ tion (New York: Praeger, 1972); and Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Transformation of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset into a Soviet Liability," International Organization 39 (Winter 1985), 1-46. 25 On Romania's maverick role, see Aurel Braun, Romanian Foreigti Polic1/ since 1965 (New York: Praeger, 1978); and Ronald Haly Linden, Bear and Foxes (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly Press, 1979), ch. 5. 26 Gilpin (fn. 21), p. 112. 27 See, for example, Bunce (fn. 24); and Keith Crane, "Soviet Economic Policy towards Eastern Europe," in Marco Carnovale and William C. Potter, eds., Continuity and Change in Soviet-East European Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 75133.

14

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

tries, and Eastern Europe played at best a modest role as a way station for Western technology to enter the Soviet economy In all these ways, Soviet economic policy departs from expected imperial policy This rejection of the term empire is not a denial of Soviet ability to apply strong pressure on these regimes through both promises and threats. I argue, rather, that when the Soviets apply such pressure, and when the East Europeans make counterarguments, they are bar¬ gaining as international relations scholars understand that term. Volgyes has pointed out an important component of the pre-1989 relationship: However much Soviet leaders might prefer a return to the "good old Stalinist days," today's East European leaders would severely object if the Soviet comrades failed to accord them proper respect. And that implies a measure of non-interference in their domestic affairs. . . . Thus, the Soviets must tolerate East European leaders who, recognizing national interests clearly divergent from those of the USSR, need to be reminded of Soviet policy desiderata. They are well aware that their countries could always be invaded, their oil cut off, and their goods rejected. But because these leaders consider themselves to be legitimate representatives of their fellow citizens—regardless of their vulnerability to replacement or to pressure in a crisis—in normal times they must be treated as "sovereigns."28

Even though the Soviet Union is superior in relative capabilities, how its leaders employ its resources—in other words, how they bargain—is a crucial component of its power. East European power, like that of other small states, depends much upon skillful use of limited re¬ sources. Speaking of a Soviet empire in Eastern Europe denies ab initio what analysts are most interested in understanding: the politics of Soviet-East European relations. Each party has had to interact with the others to advance its interests. These political interactions have taken on intriguing and possibly unique variations that deserve anal¬ ysis rather than dismissal. Describing post-Stalin Soviet-East Euro¬ pean relations as imperial is unhelpful and misleading. The related claim that the WTO is not a "real" international alliance seems to rest on misunderstandings of the workings of past alli¬ ances. 29 Closely linked considerations of domestic policy, ideology, 28 Volgyes (fn. 6), p. 345. 29 Those who question the Warsaw Pact's status as an alliance include Malcolm

Soviet-East European Relations

15

and military policy are not unique to the Warsaw Pact. 3° Moreover, the WTO is not the first (nor the only existing) alliance composed of one dominant member and several smaller ones.31 A "classical alliance of equals" has been a very rare beast. 32 Tension concerning the amount of input granted to the weaker members is also a recurrent theme in the history of alliances, 33 as is the strong coercing the weak. 34 Finally, other alliances besides the Warsaw Pact have been "inward-looking," in Hutchings's phrase.35 As Osgood put it, "Alliances, although osten¬ sibly or actually directed against an external threat, may additionally or even primarily be intended to restrain a member, limit its options, support its government against an internal threat, or control its foreign policy in some fashion."36 Studies of Soviet-East European relations do need to consider the specific distribution of power and interests that characterize these relations. An alliance perspective is however, perfectly capable of incorporating such elements—indeed they are central to the writings of alliance scholars. Studying Soviet-East Euro-

Mackintosh, The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Papers 58 (London: Interna¬ tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969); A. -.Ross Johnson, Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview, Rand Corporation Memorandum P-5383-I (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1977); Robert L. Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), pp. 4-5; and Condoleeza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 16. Volgyes (fn. 6), pp. 319-321, provides a useful description of Soviet predominance and East European popular resentment against the WTO, but he concludes that, nonetheless, the Warsaw Pact is indeed an alliance. 3° Hutchings (fn. 29), p. 5, stresses such links in arguing for the uniqueness of these states' relations. On ideology in alliance affairs, see George Liska, Nations in Alliance, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 61-69; and Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," American Political Science Review 59 (September 1965), 589-601. 31 See Liska (fn. 30), ch. 2; and Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 226. 32 The phrase is that of Hutchings (fn. 29), p. 5; Cf. Rice (fn. 29), p. 16. 33 See Liska (fn. 30), pp. 73-77; also Volgyes's (fn. 6) comment that "any examination of issues of stress in East European-Soviet relationships must begin with an under¬ standing that stress is a normal component of any alliance system" (p. 347). 34 See Liska (fn. 30), pp. 73-77; and Hans Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Arnold Wolfers, ed.. Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), pp. 17-54. 35 Hutchings, (fn. 29), p. 4. 36 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hop¬ kins University Press, 1968), p. 18; contrast with Liska (fn. 30), pp 103-105; and James Lee Ray, Global Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), pp. 330-331.

16

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

pean relations as a sui generis phenomenon sacrifices broader histori¬ cal context and comparative perspective. The Soviet and East European states, then, were allies who had to bargain with each other to advance their interests. It is worth point¬ ing out, however, the particular perspective of the Soviet Union in this situation: when interacting with its allies, it sought alliance management. This term does not refer to how WTO military doctrine has evolved nor to broader issues of the military functioning of the pact. 37 Rather, it stresses the Soviet Union's self-conscious role of leading a group of nation-states who must resolve issues that affect their internal matters, their interactions, and their place in global affairs. This role often translated into a primary concern with pursu¬ ing multilateral, region-wide goals during bilateral bargaining with each ally. To return, then, to the central question, what are the methods the Soviet Union used to pursue alliance management? The Soviet Union relied upon numerous indirect, but still powerful, ways of halting unacceptable social, political, and foreign policy changes in the region while keeping the option of military invasion for extreme cases. A better grasp of why Soviet leaders opted to invade an East European country has much value.38 It is equally vital, however, to understand why Soviet leaders opted to refrain from invading (e.g., Poland, 1971 and 1980-1981; Romania, late 1960s) and how they prevented crises from developing. Because the Soviet Union could assist or hurt the East European economies owing to their dependence on Soviet supplies and mar¬ kets, it could link assistance to those East European policies that promoted alliance cohesion and adherence to Soviet values. Such policies included economic aid to the Third World, sharing in Warsaw Pact support costs, pronouncements supportive of Soviet policies, and ^ 37 On these issues, see A. Ross Johnson, The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe, Rand Corporation Paper P-6583 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1981); Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds.. The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1982); Jeffrey Simon, The Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985); and Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Union and the East European Militaries," in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds.. The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1986), pp. 243-265. 38 On Czechoslovakia, see Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); and Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985).

Soviet-East European Relations

17

military missions to Soviet client states.39 If alliance management was in fact Soviet policy, Soviet officials probably did decide how much economic support to give an East European state based in part on that state's policies. Marrese has demonstrated that Soviet foreign-trade procedures allow its leaders "to discriminate bilaterally in a way that provides differential benefits to its trading partners."4° With other factors equal, the states that did the most to further Soviet alliancemanagement goals should have received the most Soviet support in return. 41

The Importance of Energy Policy My focus in this book is on a particular set of issues that, over a long period, loomed large among these regimes' priorities. These issues arose in connection with providing energy to the states' economies. To keep their economies functioning, all governments must pay great attention to ensuring adequate supplies of energy. Most countries strive to improve and modernize their economies, which means striving to make them more energy intensive. In addition to providing for the long-run func¬ tioning of the national economy, of course, states must also secure in the short run enough fuel to operate modern military equipment. Energy issues are thus a basic concern of any country. The East European states had to face these issues. They were, moreover, dependent on outside sources for much of the energy they consumed. For example, in 1965 the East European states, excluding Romania, imported 88 percent of their petroleum.42 By 1975, this dependence was 78 percent even with Romania included and 96 per39 See also Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," in Dan Caldwell, ed., Soviet International Behavior and U.S. Policy Options (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 11-60; John P. Hardt, "Soviet Energy Policy in Eastern Europe," in Terry, ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 207; and Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidiza¬ tion of Trade with Eastern Europe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), ch. 4. 4° Michael Marrese, "CMEA: Effective but Cumbersome Political Economy," Inter¬ national Organization 40 (Spring 1986), 287-327, on 298. 41 Rubinstein (fn. 17), p. 107, for example, argues that the Soviet Union bargained this way; see also Hardt (fn. 39), pp. 189-220; and Volgyes (fn. 6), p. 337. 42 All figures for Soviet and East European energy trade, production, and con¬ sumption from i960 on are taken from the energy databank of PlanEcon, Inc., Washington, D.C.

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Each CMEA member-state signs two bilateral five-year agreements with every other member-state at the beginning of each planning period, late 1975 or early 1976 for the 1976-1980 period. One agreement covers economic cooperation activities and projects; the other details imports and exports. The 1971 Comprehensive Program specified that these agreements would be negotiated earlier in the preceding period and would be more closely meshed with the states' domestic plans. See Thomas W. Hoya, "The Legal Framework of Soviet Foreign Trade," Minnesota Law Review 56 (November 1971), pp. 1-45; Ladislav Matejka and Arnost Bohm, "New Forms of Joint Planning by Comecon Member Countries," Planovane Hospodarstvi 11 (1974), in Soviet

and East European Foreign Trade (Summer 1975), 3-18. 21 Such meetings had become a summer routine since 1971. 1 he reports of the 1973 meetings are in FBIS (USSR), August 2, 1973/ PP- E2-F8; FBIS (Eastern Europe), August 2, 1973, pp J1-J2; and FBIS (Eastern Europe), August 6, 1973' PP- Fa-E} H1-H6. 22 The prime ministers leading the delegations were Jaroszewicz of Poland on August 14; Fock of Hungary on August 16-17; Stoph of the GDR on August 19-20; Todorov of Bulgaria on August 20-21; Maurer of Romania on August 23-24; and Strougal of Czechoslovakia on August 29; see FBIS (Eastern Europe), August 15-30.

138

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

suited from decisions taken at the recent Crimea meetings of the party leaders and that their purpose was to outline new proposals for those working on the 1976-1980 cooperation agreements. In sum, even though the Yom Kippur War and the resulting OPEC price hike were several months away, and even though the West did not realize it until early 1974,23 CMEA negotiations over the price formula seem to have commenced in 1973. A Soviet decision on its oil prices in April resulted in a flurry of attention to CMEA energy issues and to new thinking on the foundations of future CMEA trade. This new thinking influenced the revamping of ongoing efforts to plan eco¬ nomic strategies for the second half of the decade. By August, then, the seriousness of the Soviet intent as well as the need to move quickly on new initiatives had become clear to the East European states. East European Concessions. With this realization, a second stage be¬

gan. The states facing the "bully" situation followed a dual strategy: concede on issues of joint investment at the verbal level while bargain¬ ing for the Soviet Union to be moderate in implementing the price formula change. They began complying with some Soviet aims rather quickly. For one thing. East European officials began making public admissions that the pricing system then in place disadvantaged the Soviet Union and that a change was in order. 24 Indeed, by late 1974 and early 1975, the Hungarian finance minister seemed to be seeking to put a good face on submitting to change: "Even in cooperation among socialist countries, the more enduring trends in world economy—such as, for instance, shortage of certain raw materials or price changes— cannot be ignored. Now we can also expect price changes stemming from this lasting trend in the development of world market prices, devoid of elements of boom, and we must take into account trends in production and trading conditions of specific countries and reciprocal interests. "25 Of course the East Europeans disagreed with some aspects of the Soviet proposal despite their willingness to reappraise the pricing formula. Their discussions balanced their acknowledgments of the need for change with warnings of the harmful effects that could arise from too sudden a change. For example. East European spokesmen 23 Dusko Doder, "Comecon Debates Oil Price," Washington Post, March 4, 1974, pp. Ai and A13.

24 See references in fn. 17. 25 Faluvegi (fn. 17).

Bargaining over the 1975 Price Formula Change

139

stressed_publicly at least—the damage that would be done to their internal planning processes if prices changed annually and were therefore unstable throughout each five-year period. Bulgaria's deputy foreign minister, for example, argued as followed: As a rule, foreign trade prices must be stable over the period that the concluded long-term agreements are in effect. . . . For the commodities which have long-range significance for the economic development of the CMEA nations such as raw materials, fuels . . . and so forth, stable prices must be set in the long-term agreements for the delivery of goods. ... In such agreements, it is essential to determine ahead of time the prices for the agreeing parties and the conditions for changing the prices.26

Another line of argument was that any price change should only come about as part of a broader reform of CMEA currency and finan¬ cial matters—a reform against which the CMEA had decided while negotiating the 1971 Comprehensive Program. An article in the Polish foreign-trade journal made this point explicitly in late 1973.2? Also, an article that appeared in the Czechoslovak party daily in late 1974 supported the general idea of monetary reform and praised the ideas of a Hungarian economist.28 The latter is particularly surprising since in the post-1968 period, Czechoslovakia's stance toward monetary reform within the CMEA had been quite hostile. Czechoslovakia had sided with the Soviet Union in denouncing Hungarian calls for more liberal currency reform during the negotiations over the Comprehen¬ sive Program.29 Thus the prospect of higher fuel prices seems to have brought at least two of the East European states closer together. While East European officials would continue to pursue such argu¬ ments until the CMEA finally revised the formula, their attention to investing in Soviet fuel extraction rose sharply during this second stage.3° Gerhard Schuerer, the East German planning chief, put it this 26 Ivanov (fn. 17), p. 15. 27 Maria Bogacka and Tadeusz Leszek, Handel Zagraniczny 10 (1973), in JPRS transla¬ tion 60905 (1973), pp. 17-28, on 26. 28 L. Alster, “Inflation and Foreign Trade," Rude Pravo, December 2, 1974, in FB1S (Eastern Europe), December 19, 1974, pp. AA1-2. 29 For examples of Hungarian and Czechoslovak views in the late 1960s, see Henry Schaefer, COMECON and the Politics of Integration (New York: Praeger, 1972). 3 See Lubomir Strougal's report on the results of the June CMEA session to a

plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, held July 3-4, 1973, “Speech to Central Committee Plenum of CPCz," in I BIS suppl. 26 (August 8,1973), 45-50, esp. 47; Polish planning chief Mieczyslaw Jagielski s speech to the Sejm in September, Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Situation Report 34,

140

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

way: "The USSR performs extensive services to insure our raw mate¬ rials, fuels and power balance. We are convinced that it will also do great things in this regard ... in the future. For this, in any case, greater advance payments in the form of investment contributions are required; for no one can avoid the fact that these fuel and raw material resources must be made accessible under complicated conditions in the Siberian region and must be transported over great distances."31 These East European verbal statements preceded the signing of a number of agreements to further the extraction and transportation of Soviet fuels and raw materials. Although the East European states had been entering into such projects from the late 1960s on, the deals became much more frequent and extensive after mid-1973. The agree¬ ment to construct a high-voltage power line from the USSR to the Mir system of electrical power lines came in February, 1974 [25J. In April 1974, at a meeting of the CMEA Executive Committee, the memberstates signed an agreement to develop ferriferous raw materials inside the Soviet Union. 3^ The participants in the 1974 CMEA session in June signed their most expensive and complicated joint project—the Soyuz project to construct a pipeline linking the Orenburg gas field to East¬ ern Europe. 33 This agreement capped a period of roughly a year that witnessed a sharp turnaround in East European behavior on the subject of fuels and raw materials. Once the Soviet Union had displayed its resolve to redress its grievances, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and Poland had little choice but to react quickly. Joint investment in energy infrastructure continued after this period as well. The states signed the General Agreement on a United Electric Power System— which involved East European investment in nuclear power plants located within the Soviet Union—in November 1977 l29b They then agreed, in March 1979, to construct the first such plant jointly. Also, from December 1974 to February 1976, several countries (Bulgaria and

October 5, 1973, pp. 2-4; an unsigned article in Hazai Tudositasok 15 (August 1973), in JPRS translation 60193 (1973), pp. 27-29, and the following quotation from Schuerer. 31 Gerhard Schuerer, "Unequivocally Oriented toward Further Intensification," Neues Deutschland, May 30, 1973, in JPRS translation 59618 (July 25, 1973), p. 12; cf. Hans-Joachim Dubrowsky and Eugen Faude, "Policy on Participating in CMEA Projects Explained," Einheit, December, 1973, in JPRS translation 61013 (January 17, 1974), pp. 1486-1489. 32 Pravda, April 26, 1974, in CDSP 26 (May 22, 1974), 18. 33 For a description of this project and its completion, see Hardt (fn. 2), pp. 202204.

Bargaining over the 1975 Price Formula Change

141

Romania were the exceptions) signed bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union to assist its petroleum industry [29-34]. As expected from its different situation, Romania's response to the Soviet call for change varied from this pattern. Its officials denied a need for new prices.34 In his speech to the November 1973 plenum of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party—a plenum devoted to resolving pressing energy issues—Ceau§escu failed even to mention the CMEA or the Soviet Union!35 Romania did not sign the February 1974 power-line agreement. It played a restricted role in the Soyuz project. While it signed the 1977 General Agreement [19], it did not take part in the nuclear plant agreement of 1979 [76] or the corre¬ sponding power-line agreement [20]. Romania also continued to denounce Soviet attempts to promote new planning activities and cooperative projects. For example, in a meeting of economists from the CMEA countries, the Romanian rep¬ resentatives laid out their country's position as follows: At the same time, a number of other viewpoints are at issue, and some of them, in our view, do not correspond to objective reality. . . . These viewpoints and opinions, if they are put into practice, can cause insuper¬ able difficulties. We have in mind, for example, such viewpoints as "the rational distribution of energy-intensive production in the whole region of the socialist commonwealth," the creation of a "unified electrical power system for the CMEA member-states," and the formation of an "interna¬ tional mechanism for the coordination and direction of it under condi¬ tions of socialist economic integration," the working out of a "unified general scheme for the division of labor" and the formation of the "struc¬ ture of a general economic complex of the CMEA member-states," the "creation of a joint economic or foreign-trade organization" for the coor¬ dination of economic relations of the CMEA member states with the developed countries, etc. In our view, such viewpoints are unrealistic and therefore unacceptable.36

This quotation presents, in plain language, several long-standing Ro¬ manian objections to plans that involved a decrease in national control over economic activities. The new situation after April 1973 done nothing to change Romania's stance on these matters. 34

When they did refer to the price situation, they stressed the importance of stable

prices; see, for example, Stoian (fn. 17), p. 13. 35 Nicolae Ceau§escu, "Address to RCP Central Committee Plenum," Scinteia, November 30, 1973, in FBIS, suppl. 1 (January 1974), 1—35• 36 n. Belli and O. Radulescu, "Opyt Rumanii v Razvitii Syryvoi i Energeticheskoi Bazi v Sootvetstvii c Trebevaniyami yeyo Ekonomicheskogo Rosta,

in Institute of

142

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

Seeking to Minimize the Damage. The third phase of the bargaining

extended from July 1974 until January 1975. The East European states (excluding Romania) had demonstrated their willingness to meet So¬ viet demands for greater assistance in exploiting Soviet resources. If this had been the primary Soviet goal, then the bargaining could have ceased with no change in the price formula. The Soviet Union, how¬ ever, was unsatisfied. It continued to seek a favorable change in the method of determining CMEA trade prices. An article in the organ of the Soviet central planning agency in December 1974 stated explicitly that East European investment in joint projects was insufficient: One of the most important approaches is to expand the above-considered practice of credit involvement of interested countries in expanding pro¬ ductive capacities in the Soviet Union in the extraction and processing of raw materials. But this is not enough. Exploiting new mineral deposits in the areas of the Polar Circle, Siberia, and the Far East, requires more than the allocation of concomitant credit funds forexploiting these territories, for building roads, settlementsand so on. These could be paid by bringing in funds from the CMEA countries. As shown by calculations, today there are to be found ongoing opera¬ tional outlays significantly above the mean level associated, in particular, with the necessity of paying increased wages to personnel, with the operation of enterprises in difficult weather conditions, the complexities of material-technical supply, increased transportation costs, and so on. Consequently, the problem of improving the price structure for defi¬ cient products from the fuel and raw materials sectors is becoming more urgent. In our view, higher production costs for suppliers must be taken into account when determining contractual prices for these products. [Italics added.R7

While the East Europeans must have grasped that the Soviets were determined, the last half of 1974 saw a great deal of East European action designed to minimize the damage to their economies from the change.

Economics of the World Socialist System, Vzaimnoye Sotrudnichestvo Stranami v Reshenii Toplivno-Syryvykh Problem (Moscow: Institute of Economics of the World Social¬ ist System, 1976), p. 131. This publication had a total printing run of only two hundred, reflecting the frank nature of the exchanges. 37 V. Usipov, "Foreign Trade of the USSR with the CMEA Member-Countries," Planovoye Khoziastvo 12 (December 1974), in JPRS translation 64139 (1975), p. 12. Another article in the same issue also deals with fuel prices: O. Rybakov, "The

Bargaining over the 2975 Price Formula Change

143

For example, Soviet officials and their East European counterparts consulted each other frequently, especially from September 1974 to January 1975. Table 6.1 shows those visits that were publicized. In particular, the chairmen of the central planning agencies and the foreign-trade ministers traveled more than normal. The party leaders also had ample opportunity for top-level diplomacy. Besides the meet¬ ings held in August in the Crimea, Brezhnev met with East European leaders on six other occasions, including meetings with Kadar of Hungary and Zhivkov of Bulgaria on the same day, December 23, 1974.38 During such meetings, as well as through statements in the press, the East European states were trying to accomplish two things. First, they wanted to make the price formula revision as mild as possible. Second, they wanted to reach agreements with the Soviet Union that would ameliorate the impact of the higher fuel prices on their economies. The East Europeans had several arguments against the Soviet calls for approximating Western fuel prices. For example, an article in the Czechoslovak party daily stressed that the OPEC price hikes were inflationary and stemmed from monopolistic actions; thus the states should cleanse CMEA prices of them.39 In fact, a Hungarian journal claimed in September that CMEA prices would only rise by 10 percent, and it was referring to price hikes in 1976.4° In pointing out that CMEA prices would not match the levels reached in Western Europe, it gave a clue to the arguments the East European states were employing against Soviet plans to bring the two sets of prices closer together. It stressed that temporary factors of a cyclical and speculative nature were forcing prices up unnaturally in the West. If they could support such arguments, the East Europeans would be in a good position to point out that the whole rationale behind CMEA pricing since the 1950s had been to prevent cyclical and speculative price changes from harming the socialist economies the way that they could harm capital¬ ist economies. It therefore made no sense to abandon the pricing principles when the member-states most needed them. The final Soviet push for change must have come in the fall, begin¬ ning perhaps with the sixty-ninth meeting of the CMEA Executive Committee, held in Moscow October 15-17. After this meeting, the Economic Effectiveness of Foreign Trade," in Soviet Review 16 (Winter 1975-197^)» 84-105. 3* Prnvcin, December 24, 1974. 3s> Alster (fn. 28). 4 Magyar Import, September 1974, untitled article quoted in Radio Free Europe

144

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

Table 6.1. Dates of high-level bilateral meetings between Soviet and East European officials, September 1974-January 1975 Highest official in delegation Party leader

Bulgaria Czechoslovakia 8/11 10/16 12/23

8/1

Prime minister Deputy prime minister, incl. head of planning organ

GDR 8/7 10/8 12/23

Hungary

Poland

Romania

8/3-4 9/25-30

7/19 8/15

8/13

12/4 12/9 12/22-26

12/10 12/17-19

12/10 12/21-24

7/17 12/? 11/1-5 11/25 12/24-27

11/19-20 12/6-7 12/9 12/20

12/11

Foreign minister

12/3

12/9-13

Deputy foreign minister

12/20-23

Foreign-trade minister

8/1 1/6 1/15

7/30-8/2 9/3 1/13

Central Committee secretary for economics

8/21 1/8

12/20

8/6

9/4-6

Sources: Various published reports.

top pricing officials of the member-states met in late November to discuss the new price formula.4* The East Europeans reacted by re¬ doubling consultations with the Soviet Union (Table 6.1 shows the numerous meetings that took place) and preparing their elites for more strenuous efforts to increase exports during 1975. Each of the East European Central Committee plenums held thereafter dealt with energy matters and stressed the need for conservation and increased exports.^2 At the East German Central Committee plenum, on Decem¬ ber 15, a report on foreign trade praised the stable prices within the

Research, Hungarian Situation Report 38, October 1, 1974, p. 15. 41 Radio Free Europe Research, Hungarian Situation Report 48, December io, 1974, pp. 3-4. 42 These meetings are reported in Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Situation Report 36, October 25, 1974; Hungarian Situation Report 46, November 26, 1974; Czechoslovak Situation Report 46, December 4,1974; FBIS (Eastern Europe), Decem¬ ber 24, 1974; and FBIS (Eastern Europe), December 20, 1974.

Bargaining over the 2975 Price Formula Change

145

CMEA. The report, though, argued that they had been stable "over the past few years,"43 without suggesting they would continue so. After the CMEA members consulted with each other extensively, and after the Soviet Union completed 1975 trade protocols with all the East European states except Romania,44 the seventieth CMEA Executive Committee approved the new price formula in late January 1975.

Explaining Soviet Concessions The Soviet Union came away from this bargaining a winner. In addition to the East European investment in extracting Soviet fuel. East European payments took an immediate jump. The common ex¬ pectation among Western observers had been that any change in formula would take place only in 1976—the beginning of the next fiveyear planning cycle. Another component of the Soviet victory was that the revised formula was a moving average, which allowed CMEA prices to change annually. In that period of steadily rising world oil prices, CMEA prices would thus go up much more quickly 45 Given these elements of the Soviet victory, some Soviet concessions were predictable merely as a way to facilitate agreement even though one side held all the cards.46 Yet, Soviet concessions went beyond the predictable. The East European states genuinely seem to have altered the nature of the outcome. For one thing, there had been discussion, according to one Western analyst,47 not just of implementing the formula change in 1975 but of making the price hike retroactive to include prices for 1974 fuel ship¬ ments. This did not take place. Another option floated by the Soviet Union during this period was to calculate the moving average of Western prices over a three-year period rather than the five-year pe43 Werner Jarowinsky, "Speech to 13th SED Central Committee Plenum," Neues Deutschland, December^, 1974, in FBIS(Eastern Europe) January 6,1975, pp. E7-E10. 44 These were signed December 18 (Czechoslovakia); December 20 (Poland); De¬ cember 22 (GDR); December 27 (Hungary); and January 17 (Bulgaria). 43 A clear statement of the Soviet position on the need for annual adjustments is provided by N. M. Mitrofanova, "Prospects for the Further Improvement of the Socialist Countries' Foreign Trade Prices," Platiovoye Khoziastvo 4 (April 1974), in CDSP 26 (November 23, 1974), 17-18. 46 See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 11), pp. 491 and 332-533. 47 See John M. Kramer, "Soviet-CEMA Energy Ties," Problems of Communism (JulyAugust 1985), 32-47, on 41.

146

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

riod to which they agreed.4» Based on fewer years, the CMEA price would have risen to world market levels more quickly In addition, the Soviet Union allowed the East European states, except Romania, to run deficits in their bilateral trade balances, 49 in effect, providing interest-free Soviet credit for East European imports of fuel and par¬ tially offsetting the difficulties arising from the price increases. More¬ over, the Soviet Union granted outright credits to the same five coun¬ tries. 50 Finally, and perhaps most important, Soviet fuel shipments continued to grow in quantity throughout the 1970s; the cutbacks in quantity which the Soviets had mentioned as a possibility developed only later, in the 1980s. 51 What, then, explains the East European bargaining successes? Con¬ servation was a minor element; from late 1973 on, the East Europe regimes focused sharply on conserving energy52 Czechoslovakia went so far as to increase its domestic gasoline prices in early 1974.53Although the public reason given was the sharp rise in the price of Middle Eastern oil, Czechoslovakia had imported only 8.3 percent of all its petroleum from the West or South in 1973, so the prospect of hikes in the price of Soviet petroleum surely loomed much larger in Czechoslovak thinking. Hungarian officials discussed a similar do¬ mestic price hike during 1974.54 Alongside efforts to reduce domestic consumption came several initiatives to import oil from Middle East¬ ern states.55 These East European efforts to reduce their dependence on the Soviet Union had a minor impact (for their reliance on Soviet

48 Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1983), p. 66. 49 Keith Crane, The Soviet Economic Dilemma of Eastern Europe, Rand Report R-3368AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1986), Table 9. 5° Michael Marrese, "CMEA: Effective but Cumbersome Political Economy," Inter¬ national Organization 40 (Spring 1986), 287-328, on 306; Crane (fn. 49), Table 1. 51 The increased quantities, at prices that were still lower than those prevailing in the West, provided the East Europeans with much larger implicit trade subsidies than they had previously been receiving; see Marrese and Vanous (fn. 48). 52 For example. Radio Free Europe, Romanian Situation Report 2, January 14,1974, p. 3; and Romanian Situation Report 8, February 19, 1974, pp. 2-3. 53 Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak Situation Report 14, April 3, 1974, pp. 1-3. 54 See the remarks of the Hungarian minister of heavy industry, Gyula Szeker, as reported in ibid., p. 2. 55 See, for example, FBIS (Eastern Europe): February 11, 1974, p. G3; February 14, 1974, p. Di; February 22, 1974, p. Fi; December 27, 1974, pp. D3 and Hi; January 13, 1973, p. H3; and Radio Free Europe, RAD Background Report 179 (Hungary), Decem¬ ber 3, 1974.

Bargaining over the 1975 Price Formula Change

147

petroleum imports remained extremely high), but they signaled a willingness to consider alternatives to meeting all the Soviet demands. A more substantial factor in the East European ability to hold off the worst of the possibilities was that a change in the formula for deciding trade prices was a CMEA decision. Because of this, CMEA rules and norms came into play. During the post-Stalin period, the CMEA member-states had come to share a number of values with implications for permissible and nonpermissible actions. Most impor¬ tant had been the rule that the members of the organization are sovereign nation-states and that therefore any agreement was sub¬ ject to the CMEA's interested-party voting procedure: all "interested" parties must decide upon CMEA policy unanimously. 56 All the states, of course, were "interested" in an alteration of the general price for¬ mula for intrabloc trade; opponents of the Soviet plan were unlikely simply to opt out and remain silent. This means that Soviet officials had to sell their East European counterparts on the need for the new formula. That is a bargaining process, even if an asymmetrical one. As Kormnov and his associates put it, the states expected certain general CMEA principles to form the basis for "mutually-acceptable compromise": This non-concurrence [of the short-term interests of the CMEA mem¬ bers] sometimes is expressed as dissimilar views on the role of particular forms and methods of economic integration, on the tempo and forms of the development of specialization and cooperation, on the principles of price

formation, etc. However, contradictions in the world socialist system do not have an antagonistic character. The search for the correct resolution of one or another theoretical problem or concrete approach to practical matters is continually the subject of comradely discussions between brotherly parties and countries. This is an effective and democratic method of removing differences of opinion and of finding the truth, and

sometimes even of mutually-acceptable compromise on the basis of general principles and in the interest of general affairs. [Italics added •l57

s6 For more on the interested-party rule, see Michael Kaser, COMECON, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 111; and Robert L. Hutchings, Soviet East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968-1980 (Madison: University of Wis¬ consin Press, 1983), pp. 81-82. 57 Yurii F Kormnov et al., Sotsialisticheskaya Ekonotnichcskaya Integratsia (Moscow:

Znanie,

1974),

p. 8.

148

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

While the Soviet Union had the ability to convince its allies of the need for the change in the formula, it had to go through the process of gaining agreement from all the members. This institutional feature of the situation promoted greater East European gain than would have been possible in the context of bilateral dealings. In addition, the East European states shared a common interest in minimizing the impact of a change in the price formula. Each, except for Romania, imported raw materials and fuels from the Soviet Union and exported machinery and other goods with more slowly rising prices. Each stood to face serious economic constraints as a result of higher CMEA prices for fuels. Unlike other cases of CMEA multi¬ lateral bargaining, in which the East European states reacted sep¬ arately to Soviet proposals, in this case, they formed a coalition with greater bargaining power than any single state could muster. The East European officials consulted among themselves many times during the second and third stages of the bargaining. Not counting the multi¬ lateral gatherings such as CMEA sessions, each prime minister met with two to five of the other East European prime ministers during the period from September 1973 until January 1975.58 Lower officials trav¬ eled even more frequently. These consultations provided the oppor¬ tunity to discuss positions and strategies. Finally, Soviet bargaining strength on energy issues has to be put into the perspective of Soviet alliance-management strategy. As events in Poland in 1971 had shown, the Soviet Union was committed to a policy of economic support for its allies to ensure domestic stability. Therefore, as Marer has pointed out, the danger of domestic instability following an economic recession induced by Soviet oil hikes had to be an effective East European argument.59 Although the Soviet Union would allow subsidies and credits.60 In sum, then, the obverse side of the Brezhnev doctrine—that is, the necessity of Soviet patronage to¬ ward the East European regimes—continued to have a strong influ¬ ence on Soviet policy choices. "Mutually-acceptable compromise" has occurred in Soviet-East European relations. The East European states displayed "behavioral power" despite Soviet dominance of most power capabilities. 58 The GDR and Hungary had such top-level meetings with all five of the other

East European governments; Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania with four others; and Czechoslovakia with two. 59 Marer (fn. 8), p. 75. 60 Lavigne (fn. 1).

CHAPTER

7

Conclusions

A chapter in Soviet-East European relations ended on Christmas

day in 1989. From the mid-1950s into the 1980s, a core group of Communist party officials maintained control of the East European and Soviet regimes. Todor Zhivkov, for example, was leader of Bul¬ garia from 1954 to 1989. Nicolae Ceau§escu was Romanian party first secretary from 1965 through 1989 and second secretary for eight years before that. The Brezhnev era in the Soviet leadership lasted from 1964 until 1985 and consisted, moreover, of politicians who already had held high office under Khrushchev. The leadership stability in the region provided continuity in the basic features of Soviet-East European relations for over three decades. In 1989, pressures for change came to a head in each of the six East European countries. Mass political action forced the ouster of the Communist leaderships; five of the top leaders were removed in that year: Wojciech Jaruzelski in Poland, Eric Honecher in the GDR, Gustav Husak in Czechoslovakia, Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and, in Ro¬ mania, Nicolae Ceau§escu, whose execution on December 25 con¬ cluded the year's drama. Even more remarkable than the elite turnover was that the popular movements brought the complete downfall of the Soviet-style political and economic systems in Eastern Europe. The new regimes pledged to make their countries democratic, Westernoriented, and marketized. Of course a crucial precondition for these revolutions was the great change in Soviet politics that Mikhail Gor¬ bachev had ushered in. The Soviet leadership watched the revolts without protest and, when the new regimes asked, quickly agreed to withdraw their troops from their former allies' territories. They also agreed in 1990 to allow the GDR to become part of a single Germany. 149

150

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

The Warsaw Pact and the CMEA were disbanded in 1991, removing most of the foundation of Soviet-East European relations during the post-Stalin decades. Yet the period through 1989 retains its importance because of the bearing this complex brand of regional international politics has on key questions in the study of world politics and the dramatic dissolving of the bloc. Ultimately of course, it represents the starting point for these countries' future relations.

Energy Politics and the Evolution of Soviet-East European Relations 2956-2963. A central conclusion of the post-Stalin Soviet reappraisal of relations with East Europe was that more active economic collabora¬ tion was necessary. As a result, member-states upgraded and reinvigo¬ rated the institutions of the CMEA, turning it into a full-fledged international organization. Collaborative efforts began to expand and trade increased, but joint projects tended to be rudimentary. Agree¬ ments for Soviet assistance in the energy sphere placed a given value on Soviet activities and called for the East European participant to repay that value through future trade and to build any fuel transporta¬ tion sections on its territory. Changes in the pattern of Soviet fuel exports also occurred during this period (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). The GDR's share decreased, while the shares of Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia increased. Then the 1962-1963 fight over su¬ pranational planning within the CMEA suspended major collabora¬ tive projects for almost a decade. 2963-2972. Without a multilateral agreement on collaboration, member-states nonetheless initiated more complex forms of collabora¬ tion through bilateral accords, many of them dealing with producing and transporting energy—for example. East European aid to develop Soviet resources, repaid through Soviet exports of those resources. The trade-off between stability and alliance contributions also came into play as a result of the Prague Spring and the disturbances in Poland. In the aftermath of each, the residuals of the energy-defense relationship went up (Figure 4.6), meaning a state received more petroleum from the USSR for a given amount of defense spending than other states. Three weeks after Soviet tanks invaded Czechoslo¬ vakia, the Czechoslovaks agreed to assist in building a natural gas

Conclusions

151

pipeline within the USSR [9J, an accord that guaranteed Czechoslo¬ vakia what would turn out to be inexpensive natural gas. Fuels thus were a crucial part of Soviet bail-out packages for its allies. 2971-1974. The Comprehensive Program approved at the Twentyfifth CMEA Session in the middle of 1971 called for numerous new kinds of collaborative economic projects, which to a certain extent did result. Multilateral agreements such as the Soyuz project and the high-tension power line from the Soviet Union to Hungary [15] were ambitious attempts to combine forces in augmenting the re¬ gional energy infrastructure. But the three and a half years after the signing of the Comprehensive Program saw major changes in the energy realm which forced a sharp choice on the Soviet Union. With the rise in fuel prices on Western markets and the increasing difficulties of Soviet petroleum production, Soviet officials were eager to reduce the opportunity costs of exporting their fuels to Eastern Europe. Yet events in Poland had illustrated the dangers posed by economic troubles in Eastern Europe. Making fuels more costly would certainly complicate the economic dilemmas facing East European officials. Despite the potential for instability, the Soviet leadership opted to force more of the burden of providing energy onto the East Europeans. The result was a period of bargaining over how much of that burden they should share. The outcome was a compromise: a new price¬ setting formula came into force a year earlier than scheduled and dramatically raised the transferable-ruble price of Soviet fuels, but the fuels continued to flow at less than world market prices, and the Soviet Union arranged a variety of credits. The harsher Soviet stance led to tremendous pressure on the budgets of the East European states. The poor economic performance of all the East European economies after 1975 was partly a function of the energy crunch they faced. Although only one country (Poland) experienced political instability because of economic problems, the region as a whole suffered. The connection between defense-spending levels and economic size began to weaken within the WTO. Some of the smaller states (e.g., Bulgaria) began increasing their military expenditures while larger states (e.g., Poland and Romania) decreased theirs. The range from highest to lowest began to widen. What remained unchanged was that the states receiv¬ ing the highest levels of Soviet fuels were the best contributors to the alliance military burden.

152

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

1975-1981- The region's continuing economic troubles made energy

policy (as well as economic cooperation more broadly) even more pertinent. Yet the ambitious attempts at new methods of planned collaboration (such as the long-term target programs) proved difficult to implement and of little use in promoting economic growth or more efficient regional trade. Most of the enthusiasm engendered by the Comprehensive Program dissipated as collaborative projects became shorter-term, less costly, and less complex. A debt crisis arose as well. Poland, Hungary, and Romania, in particular, became seriously in¬ debted to Western banks.1 2 Western "stagflation" made it extremely difficult to repay the loans. The servicing of the external debt became onerous in the late 1970s and remains a serious problem. Moreover, the indebted states could not sell their goods to the West for currency to repay the loans because they had to ship them to the Soviet Union in return for oil and gas. 1982-1989. Several developments came together in the early 1980s

and created new circumstances for Soviet-East European energy rela¬ tions. A crucial one was the leveling off of world petroleum and gas prices in 1981 and their subsequent decline, which raised the likeli¬ hood that CMEA prices would surpass Western ones within a few years. Yet the Soviet Union increased its pressure on the East Euro¬ peans for better quality goods and for investment in Soviet fuel extrac¬ tion. Moreover, the overall level of Soviet fuel exports to Eastern Europe began to level off or decline, and these exports included more and more natural gas. It was a bad time for cooperative ventures. The number of bilateral accords shrank (Table 3.2), as did the number of multilateral projects. Both the deteriorating economies and the elderly leaderships contributed to this stagnation. The states made more serious efforts to reinvigorate their economic ties after Mikhail Gor¬ bachev took over the Soviet leadership in 1983. The frequency of bilateral accords rose, and the states agreed to the single large-scale multilateral project of this period, the Progress gas line. Moreover, the most serious discussion of reform since the late 1960s emerged. 1 For details, see Joan Parpart Zoeter, "Eastern Europe: The Hard Currency Debt," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, East European Economic Assessment, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 716-731; and Francis Urban, "East European External Debt: Its Effects on Production and Trade Prospects," Eastern Europe, Situation and Outlook Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1987).

Conclusions

133

The new Soviet leadership made it clear that it was willing to break with past practices to reorient Soviet-East European cooperation so that Eastern Europe would be a boon to the Soviet economy, not a drain on it. The Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Col¬ laboration of December 1983, the first attempt at this reorientation, called on the signatories to decentralize more transnational activities to the enterprise level.2 The CMEA had to scale down the ambitious objectives of this agreement within two years because many were already clearly unfeasible.3 The member-states then evidently began work to incorporate the Comprehensive Program into something re¬ ferred to as the "Collective Conception of the Socialist International Division of Labor from 1991 to 2003." They also agreed, at the Fortythird CMEA Session in October 1987, to eliminate many of the CMEA bureaucracies created to help the governments negotiate. At the next session in July 1988, the CMEA member-states (except Romania) agreed to move toward establishing a "unified market" for the CMEA, which meant currency convertibility within the CMEA was squarely on the agenda. Most important, of course, the Soviet Union renounced its claim to being the leading political partner. Gorbachev stressed that no socialist state has a monopoly on the truth and that socialism can embrace wide diversity. The Soviet Union, moreover, had no right to intervene in the internal affairs of another socialist state. He pushed this formulation most emphatically on his trips to Eastern Europe, especially to Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia in 1987 and 1988. When his pronouncements were put to the test during 1989, they turned out to be valid. The Soviet Union did nothing to prevent the loss of commu¬ nist power in Eastern Europe.

Energy and Soviet Alliance Management The Soviet Union naturally sought to lead the alliance it brought into being in 1936, and energy policy was one aspect of its leadership. Mutual involvement in energy collaboration helped link the alliance. The regional energy complex that grew out of this collaboration be- See Laszlo Csaba, "CMEA and the Challenge of the 1980s/' Soviet Studies 40 (April 1986), 266-289, at 283. .1 Yurii Shirvaev, "CMEA: Restructuring the Multilateral Cooperation Mecha¬ nism," International Affairs (January 1988), 20-32, at 21.

154

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

came a matter of major importance for all the regimes, creating even more powerful incentives to coordinate their activities. It also created the possibility of bringing other issues into the energy bargaining. Foreign trade data suggest strongly that an energy-defense nexus developed during the Brezhnev era. By selectively discriminating among the East European states, and manipulating energy exports in times of crisis, the Soviet Union linked its energy assistance to an East European state's cooperation on alliance matters, especially military burden sharing. An alliance will be more cohesive if it can distribute benefits (private goods) selectively to supplement the provision of the public good of deterrence from attack. 4 The Soviet ability to export fuel provided it with such a private good. Moreover, by bringing this private good into the bargaining, the Soviet Union had more flexibility than if the issue under debate were only alliance burden sharing. As Olson and Zeckhauser have argued, it is hard for a large state to threaten with any credibility to reduce its military spending.5 The resulting tendency for free riding by the smaller states is lower when a large state introduces private goods. So energy exports can bring forth defense spending, but energy issues are also linked with military matters in an obverse fashion: military intervention can bring forth energy exports. Soviet use or threatened use of coercive force in Eastern Europe became tied to the transfer of economic aid to the target country, in large part in the form of low-priced, above-plan fuel shipments. Perhaps the most discussed tool of Soviet alliance management was its ability and willingness to use military might to prevent too great a centrifugal movement by an East European state. The complexities of the so-called Brezhnev doc¬ trine, however, are often misunderstood. The Soviet desire to set limits on East European developments mandated that it take an active role in propping up the regimes Moscow favored and, if necessary, bailing them out, which could have a considerable economic cost, as it did in Poland in 1971.6 4 See Philip M. Burgess and James A. Robinson, "Alliances and the Theory of Collective Action," Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (1969), 194-218; cf. Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," American Political Science Review 59 (September 1965), 389-601, at 601. 5 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," in Bruce M. Russett, ed.. Economic Theories of International Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 25-50. 6 Weitz argues that such considerations of the relative costs of different Soviet

Conclusions

155

In sum, economic and political/military issues have been closely interwoven in the pattern of Soviet alliance management. Conclusions that the Soviet Union dominated Eastern Europe through political not economic means, that Soviet responses to East European crises were exclusively political, or that economics had primacy over politics all create a misleading dichotomy 7 The USSR mobilized all the tools in its possession—political, economic, and military—when it was con¬ cerned to preserve its standing in Eastern Europe.

Energy and Soviet-East European Cooperation Alongside the reality that a great power sought to manage its alli¬ ance with several smaller powers is the reality that all the WTO states had to cooperate. Keohane provides a useful definition of intergovern¬ mental cooperation: "Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination."* * * 7 8 9 Incontrovertibly, the East European leaderships had to focus closely on adjusting their behavior to Soviet preferences. Given Soviet predominance in the region, it is less clearly understood, however that Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was also a search for ways to cooperate with these countries' preferences. Keohane and others who use the term cooperation stress the distinc¬ tion between harmony of interests and cooperation.9 The latter refers to actions designed to reduce some area of disharmony. Soviet and East European interests have inevitably differed, given their differ¬ ences in size, international standing, military might, economic size, social tradition, and so on. As expected the weaker partners in the

policies played a key role in Soviet decision making vis-a-vis Poland during 1980-1981; see Richard Weitz, "Soviet Decisionmaking and the Polish Crisis," East European 'Quarterly 22 (June 1988), 191-212. 7 See, respectively, Jeffrey L. Hughes, "On Bargaining," in Jan F. Iriska, ed., Dominant Powers and Subordinate States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 168-199, at 169; David D. Finley, "The Dominant Powers and Their Strategies," in ibid., pp. 201-217, at 210; and Josef C. Brada, "Soviet Subsidization of Eastern Europe: The Primacy of Economics over Politics?" journal of Comparative Economies 9 (March 1985), 80-92. H Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 51. 9 Ibid.

156

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

alliance have stressed the existence of such differences and the need to respect them. Less expected but common, however, were authoritative Soviet acknowledgments of differing policy positions.10 Recognizing that they could not avoid different interests on almost every major issue, all the WTO members nevertheless sought cooperation. As Keohane notes, moreover, "If actors are to improve their welfare through coordinating their policies, they must do so through bargain¬ ing rather than by invoking central direction."11 Soviet-East European energy bargaining was one form cooperation took. The precise course of this cooperation grew out of political struggle among these states, and this struggle, in turn, had longer-range ramifications for power in the region. This focus on international cooperation meshes well with the func¬ tional approach to understanding why states create international gov¬ ernmental organizations. Functionalists argue that as governments seek to improve the standard of living of their populaces, they will increasingly cooperate toward this goal outside their own borders. They will therefore establish international governmental organiza¬ tions, usually limited in scope, to facilitate such cooperation.12 In 1955 the Soviet Union and the East European states were completely lack¬ ing in a regional energy complex. Each state faced large technical and financial hurdles in attempting to meet its energy needs on its own. The proliferation of international economic organizations of the CMEA states after 1955, including the upgrading and greater institu¬ tionalization of the CMEA itself, followed the functionalist logic. Or¬ ganizations specifically focused on energy issues, such as the Central Dispatch Administration and Interatomenergo, also grew in number, as did myriad bilateral and multilateral agreements establishing coop¬ erative energy projects. Despite the political overtones of many of these agreements and the difficult bargaining that went into them, the advantages of interna¬ tional energy cooperation pushed them forward. Thirty years of such functionally motivated cooperation produced much disagreement 10 See, for example, A. E Butenko et al., eds.. Consolidation of the Socialist Countries' Unity (Moscow: Progress, 1981); and Oleg Bogomolov, "Coordination of Economic Interests and Politics under Socialism," Kommunist 10 (1985), as translated in Soviet Review 27 (Winter 1986-1987), 3-20, on 16. 11 Keohane (fn. 8), p. 18. 12 See Harold K. Jacobson, William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," American Political Science Review 80 (March 1986), 143-159.

Conclusions

157

and conflict, but it also produced a regional energy complex that facilitated the shipment of oil and gas from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe and beyond, allowed transshipments of electricity to meet peak demands in different regions, and involved a division of labor in constructing and operating nuclear power plants. The Soviets and East Europeans no doubt gained enormous experience and expertise through the building and operating of this regional energy system. This cooperative effort and the resulting plants, pipelines, and so forth came about despite, not because of, the need to coordinate domestic economic plans. They were the result of the same dynamics that have driven states across the globe to cooperate and organize in the second half of the twentieth century. This bears stressing in light of the decisions taken in the 1940s and 1950s to seal the regional economy off from the global economy and to forego convertible currencies and decentralized trading. Soviet-East European energy relations gave rise to consensus and cooperation alongside the political struggle and bargaining.

Soviet-East European Relations and the Study of World Politics In Chapter 1, I posed three questions central to contemporary analyses of international relations: What gives a state effective influ¬ ence over others? How are power resources distributed? How do various capabilities come into play to produce outcomes? The answers will vary somewhat for each arena of Soviet-East European relations and each period, so of course my investigation of energy issues cannot provide complete answers. Still, the region's energy politics provide important evidence. Soviet structural power in the region was preeminent. The Soviet Union was dominant economically as well as militarily. Its dominance was comparable to, likely exceeding, that of the United States in Latin America. Moreover, in the period under study, the East European states had less opportunity to turn outside the bloc for political and economic support. This was as true about energy politics as in other spheres. Yet one cannot stop there. The East European regimes had capabilities they could and did bring into play. As in other arenas of world politics, the weaker states have ways to advance their interests, and those ways must be brought into any comprehensive understand¬ ing of the politics of the arena.

158

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

The very importance of Eastern Europe to Soviet foreign policy—a fact known to all in the region—made the preferences of both the East European leaderships and the East European publics significant (to different degrees) in Soviet eyes. The Soviet Union relied on the East European elites to conduct the actual governing of their societies. This reliance acknowledged that the East European leaderships were more aware of local conditions and had more control over the meshing of policy with local conditions. The Soviet Union could not ignore the statements of the East European leaderships about their needs and the realities of their countries. Thus, while the East European regimes required Soviet fuels, they could pry loose Soviet concessions. The Soviet Union's own long-term alliance-management strategies also mitigated its strength. Institutionalizing decentralized alliance ties required establishing rules and promulgating norms that limited the Soviet Union as well as the East Europeans. While the CMEA's success in producing better use of resources or more efficient economic ties is questionable, the normative foundation developed in its forums gave the CMEA a critical role in Soviet-East European relations. In fact, the performance of the East European states seems rather good. They extracted from the regional hegemon significant resources despite a cost to the hegemon. The flow of those resources went up in times of internal difficulties. They could slow down and modify rule changes pushed by the hegemon. They could, moreover, disregard or move beyond Soviet practice (e.g., in economic reform, party-state relations, or military maneuvers) if they desired. These are significant foreign policy successes for a small state so close to a large one. I began by assuming that the Soviet Union and its East European allies turn their various strengths into bloc policy though international bargaining. The primary advantage of such an assumption is that it highlights the politics—the give and take, the tacit and explicit struggles—involved. I defined bargaining as the process of conveying information (perhaps misleadingly) about one's own values or eliciting information about another's values in a situation in which the outcome depends to some degree upon the choices of all the actors involved. This definition stresses that bargaining is a process of communication. In energy policy, as in other areas, these states established elaborate institutions and practices designed to facilitate communications and consultation: the top organs of the CMEA; the appropriate standing commissions of the CMEA; international organizations such as Interatomenergo; bilateral meetings between top officials such as planning

Conclusions

159

chiefs, energy ministers, or Central Committee secretaries; frequent meetings of the Intergovernmental Economic and Scientific-Technical Commissions; and numerous conferences of experts. In these forums, representatives founds frequent opportunities to advance a state's interests through bargaining with one or more other states. They could also communicate without face-to-face meetings, through edi¬ torials in party newspapers, speeches by top leaders, and the formula¬ tion of an annual or longer-range economic plan. Both the direct and indirect forms of communication were vital channels in Soviet-East European relations. The analyses in this book reaffirm the utility of a bargaining per¬ spective in several ways. The degree of Soviet assistance

the amount

of nuclear generating capacity built with Soviet aid, for example varied across the six countries. Some of the differences in terms and amount of assistance flowed from the economic considerations neces¬ sary for cooperating in the development of a regional energy complex. More of these differences, though, came out of the energy needs of the states and their strategies for furthering their energy goals. My exam¬ ination of Soviet fuel exports provided evidence of bargaining: the Soviet Union rewarded those allies that contributed the most, politi¬ cally and strategically, to the alliance, by providing them with ample energy exports at low prices, although this energy-defense nexus was modified at key junctures when the East European states bargained for more advantageous arrangements. The price formula change nicely illustrated how the Soviets could not embark on a major shift in regional policy without careful preparation. The East Europeans failed to prevent the change in the price formula; they did, however, secure concessions through their bargaining. One cannot account for these concessions solely on the basis of the East European states capabilities; it was their appeals to CMEA norms and to the needs of their economies that brought about valuable Soviet concessions. Since the early 1960s, when Brzezinski saw the traditional pattern of interstate relations . . . becoming predominant in the Soviet bloc," *3 developments have only underscored the trend he noted. Soviet—East European energy relations reinforce a point currently being empha¬ sized in the study of world politics: the role of power is subtle. Even in

13 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 433.

160

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

highly asymmetrical relationships, it is difficult to predict the outcome of a struggle. Norms, rules, and institutions peculiar to Soviet-East European relations provide their own environment for these dy¬ namics but do not eliminate them.

Soviet-East European Relations and the Fall of Communism No one expected the communist regimes in Eastern Europe to collapse as quickly as they did in the summer and fall of 1989. With hindsight, of course, we can see that a number of problems were coming to a head in the late 1980s. Were Soviet—East European rela¬ tions one of these? In a certain sense, the connection between SovietEast European relations and the events of 1989 was fundamental: ending communist power in Eastern Europe required that the Soviet Union renounce the use of force to preserve the communist regimes. In other words, civil revolt only became possible when the Brezhnev doctrine had ended, and the Gorbachev leadership's decision to re¬ nounce this doctrine was shaped by the state of Soviet-East European relations. From the Soviet point of view, these relations were a mixed blessing. While the geostrategic and political significance of Eastern Europe remained, the domestic and regional arrangements must have seemed of dubious benefit to the new Soviet leaders. When Gorbachev began shaping a new Soviet policy on East-West relations, the need for a tight East European alliance shrank. Also, the costs of maintaining the old arrangements were high. The East Europeans had shown themselves to be talented and stubborn negotiators whom the Soviets could not easily bring around to their viewpoint. The concessions the Soviets tried to extract—for example, in the realm of energy trade— had consistently been modified and dampened. Moreover, when the Soviet leadership pushed for CMEA reforms that might reinvigorate regional trade and thereby make Eastern Europe a boon to the Soviet economy, the East European regimes had resisted. Allowing those regimes to fall and the East Europeans to lead the way toward market economies and convertible currencies must have made more sense. Thus did developments in Soviet-East European relations through the late 1980s lead a new, reformist Soviet leadership to rethink what it wanted from its allies. The result was the end of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Conclusions

161

A more difficult question to answer, though, is whether the region's international politics had a more direct link to the domestic causes of the upheavals. To what extent, in other words, did Soviet-East Euro¬ pean relations contribute to the lack of popular support the regimes faced? Soviet and East European officials placed very high expectations on their collaboration. They acknowledged that international economic and political power, as well as improved consumer goods and services, depended upon the effective use of high technology. In the late twen¬ tieth century, robotics, computer networks, and VCRs are the signs of strong countries as much as tanks and jets. The Soviets and East Europeans also recognized that raising an economy's technological level required international trade and cooperation. Soviet-East Euro¬ pean agreements, particularly in the energy sector, made constant reference to this imperative. At a time when the global capitalist economy was promoting rapid technological advancement in dozens of areas, the CMEA dedicated itself to producing similar results. Yet the CMEA political economy set high barriers against replicat¬ ing the Western technological miracle. The states' centrally planned domestic economies created political constituencies opposed to rapid technological change. They also tended to dampen the impact of, or simply waste altogether, the new technology that was introduced. Because national-level planners had to synchronize exports and im¬ ports with the domestic plan, they also had to control trade decisions. The countries could not introduce a convertible currency, which would have promoted multilateral trade, because that would have severed this link between trade and the domestic plans. These features of the regional economy were reinforced by the political arrangements of Soviet-East European relations. Not only trade accords, but other agreements, required approval at the national level. Virtually all as¬ pects of these countries' interrelations sprang from negotiations among a few high-level bureaucracies. In contrast, Western economies were creating and disseminating new technology at an accelerating pace in large part because the pertinent decision making was decentralized. Multilateralism and low barriers to cross-national trade were (and are) the central principles of the postwar global economy. National governments have lost part of their control over their domestic economies. Many observers, of course, are troubled by the reduction in national control. Yet regard¬ less of its overall wisdom, the reduced national control has clearly been

162

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

an important precondition for the record levels of goods, services, and ideas traded today. Thus the problem was that the CMEA political economy respected sovereignty too much. This is, perhaps, an odd conclusion, since the East European states lacked the option (until 1989) to abandon the Soviet-style economic system altogether and to orient their economies toward the West. Within the framework that existed, though, nationallevel authorities controlled virtually all policy. Some sort of suprana¬ tional planning was probably the only way to achieve efficiency in trade among the centrally planned economies; yet numerous moves toward supranational authority were beaten back. From Khrushchev's proposal to create a central planning organ through calls for a regional "division of labor" and regional "integration," supranationalist efforts to overcome the logjam of state-to-state bargaining proved futile. Moreover, repeated, sincere efforts to devolve authority to lower-level institutions, either bureaucracies or enterprises, foundered as well. The governments were unable to allow genuine initiative from below while maintaining overall control of the economy via central planning targets. The result was that Soviet-East European relations involved so much of the kind of state-to-state bargaining that Western theorists view as international relations that a much larger share of Soviet-East European transactions depended on that bargaining than do transac¬ tions between capitalist economies. My examination of the energy sector shows that Soviet-East European political institutions, both formal and informal, were capable of working out increasingly com¬ plex arrangements, but they had limits. Despite periodic bursts of new initiatives, the available structures simply could not produce the vol¬ ume of agreements required to meet the goals set before them. Soviet leaders Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev upon coming to power, each in turn managed to inject a vitality into Soviet-East European collaboration, only to see it fade. The Gorbachev leadership acknowl¬ edged more fully than previous regimes the severity and urgency of the problems facing the CMEA political economy. It began, more than any previous Soviet leadership, to encourage new ideas, such as estab¬ lishing a convertible currency and a genuine regional market. By 1988, the CMEA was gearing up to transform itself in this way. By 1989, however, the forces that made it hard to devolve authority remained ascendant. So the Soviet-East European political economy failed to meet its

Conclusions

163

goals. Yet we must be cautious in concluding that this was a "Bloc That Failed."*4 The structures and policies of CMEA economic relations reflected the needs of the domestic economies of the member-states. The weaknesses of the domestic economic model that these countries shared have been much analyzed and do not need listing here. It is too much to expect that international trade and collaboration, under any institutional arrangements, could entirely offset the problems of the domestic economies. A more reasonable question is Did the interna¬ tional linkages help offset internal economic problems? Clearly they did, even if not to the extent many hoped. Their economies in autarky would have been even worse off. Moreover, even if the states had somehow fostered a more vibrant regional economy, would this have prevented the collapse of the East European regimes? The causes of this collapse were only partially economic. Certainly, higher standards of living for the East European populaces—in particular, avoiding the terrible downturn in condi¬ tions in the 1980s—would have somewhat bolstered popular support for the regimes. Yet the communist regimes failed to establish a foun¬ dation of popular legitimacy even during the periods when living standards improved. This failure has a variety of roots that cannot be explored here. It would have taken very large improvements in the standard of living indeed to overcome the roots of East European dissatisfaction. Thus Soviet-East European economic relations might have prospered without ameliorating public discontent. Furthermore, the bloc as a political entity was more successful than the CMEA as an economic unit. The political-military structures of the alliance proved flexible and reasonably effective in dealing with changing East-West conditions as well as with changing priorities of the allied states. Intra-alliance conflict was contained sufficiently, for example, that NATO strategists could discount only partially the East European contribution to Soviet war-fighting capabilities. 1 he alli¬ ance leader dominated the region's politics and got its way on most matters; yet it had as well to allow its junior allies to express their interests and to provide them with material support of various kinds. Only when the East Europeans overthrew their countries' entire exist¬ ing political structures did the alliance fold. 1 he East European re¬ gimes did not bolt from Soviet bloc as soon as Gorbachev pronounced '4 The title of Charles Gati's book. The Bloc That Failed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

164

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

the Brezhnev doctrine a dead letter (which he began doing as early as 1987). As a regional international political system, then, Soviet-East European relations could boast of certain successes.

Energy and the Future of Soviet-East European Relations The changes in the region that began in 1989 left intact the Soviet Union's interest in East European affairs along with the centrality of Russia and, to a lesser extent, other former Soviet republics for Eastern Europe's future. Energy politics was an important component of Soviet efforts to influence regional events in the past. For several reasons, it should influence the future policies of Russia or a successor to the Soviet Union. This government will continue to need flexible policy instruments. Further, even with centralized planning and state control of foreign trade gone, the East European governments will retain ways of promoting or restricting trade, by destination or commodity. Though no longer offering a price advantage over Western fuels, the successor to the Soviet Union will retain a strong position in negotiat¬ ing with the East European governments. The existing networks of pipelines and power lines are likely to give it a competitive edge in transport costs. Moreover, Russia will continue to have the potential, given its economic size, to support infrastructure ventures that are unattractive to Western corporations. It can make political calculations in evaluating projects. Two factors seem now to limit the potential of energy policy as a revitalizer of Russo-East European ties. First, the Soviet Union has bequeathed to its successor states serious problems in its energy industry, and they will be hard pressed to provide large amounts of energy to Eastern Europe. Soviet exports slowed in the 1980s and then began falling sharply in early 1990. Second, the East European govern¬ ments lack sufficient hard currency to buy all the energy they would like. For some time, until their domestic industries begin producing substantial amounts of goods valued on foreign markets, the East Europeans will seek to curb energy imports. If East European cash shortages and Soviet fuel problems can be overcome, though, energy trade and investment could be the basis of Russian cooperation with one or more of the East European countries. The types of cooperation sought and the policy instruments employed will certainly look quite different in the twenty-first century. Still, the governments will benefit both from the achievements of the pre-1989 cooperation and from the lessons learned in the failures.

APPENDIX

1

Selected Sources of Information on Soviet-East European Energy Projects

Fox, Lesley J. "Soviet Policy in the Development of Nuclear Power in Eastern Europe." In U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 457-507. Hannigan, John, and Carl H. McMillan. The Energy Factor in Soviet-East Euro¬ pean Relations. Research Report 18 of the Institute of Soviet and East Euro¬ pean Studies, Carleton University. September 1981. Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, Academy of Sciences, USSR. Vzaimnoye Sotrudnichestvo Stran SEV i Ikh Sotrudnichestvo s Tretiami Stranami v Reshenii Toplivno-Syrevikh Problem [The Mutual Collaboration of the CMEA Countries and Their Collaboration with Third Countries in the Resolution of Fuel-Resource Problems]. Moscow: Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, 1976. Kozlov, I. D., and E. K. Shmakova. Sotrudnichestvo Stran-Chlenov SEV v Energetike. [The Collaboration of the CMEA Member-Countries in Energy]. Mos¬ cow: Nauka, 1973. Kramer, John M. The Energy Gap in Eastern Europe. Lexington, Mass.: Lex¬ ington Books, 1990. McMillan, Carl H. "Soviet Efforts to Restructure the CMEA: The Case of Regional Energy Relations." In Aurel Braun, ed.. The Soviet-East European Relationship in the Gorbachev Era. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990, pp. 26-46. Petrosyants, A. M., etal. Mirny Atom v Stranakh Sotsialisma [The Peaceful Atom in the Countries of Socialism]. Moscow: Atomizdat, 1979. Polach, J. G. "The Development of Energy in East Europe." In U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 348433-

Popov, V., and L. M. Tomashpolsky. Toplivno-Energeticheskaya Baza Mirovoi Sotsialisticheskoi Sistemi [The Fuel-Energy Base of the World Socialist System]. Moscow: Ekonomika, 1964. 165

Appendixes

166

Savenko, Yu. N. "Elektroenergetika Stran-Chlenov SEV i Mnogostoronneye Sotrudnichestvo," [The Electric Power of the CMEA Member-States and Multilateral Collaboration], Planovoye Khoziastvo, January 1985. Sobell, Vladimir. The Red Market: Industrial Specialization and Cooperation in Comecon. London: Gower, 1984. Zbynek, Zemon, et al. COMECON Oil and Gas: Within the Overall Energy Context. London: Financial Times, 1977.

APPENDIX

2

Location of Texts of Agreements Cited

The texts of many of the agreements discussed can be found in various volumes of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik Deistvuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii zakluchennikh SSSR s Inostrannimi Gosudarstvennami [Compendium of Active Treaties, Agreements and Conventions Concluded by the USSR with Foreign States] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, various years). The citations below simplify this to "Compendium," followed by the vol¬ ume and page numbers of the text. The multilateral accords are in various editions of R A. Tokareva, ed., Mnogostoronneye Ekonomicheskoye Sotrudnichestvo Sotsialisticheskikh Gosudarstv [Multilateral Economic Co¬ operation of the Socialist States] (Moscow: Yuridicheskava Literatura, 1967); expanded 2d ed. (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1972); Dokumenti za 1972-2975 [Documents for 1972-1975] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1976); and Dokumenti za 1975-1980 (Mos¬ cow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1981). The citations to agreements from one of these volumes are followed by "Tokareva," the year of the particular edition, and the pages on which the text is located. General [ 1 ] "Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labor," in W. E. Butler, ed. A Source Book mi Socialist International Organizations (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff en Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 13-32. [2] "Comprehensive Program for the Intensification and Improvement of Cooperation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of COMECON Member Countries," in W. E. Butler, ed. A Source Book on Socialist International Organizations (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff en Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 33-120. 167

168

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

[3] The text of the Comprehensive Program on Scientific-Technical Collab¬ oration is reprinted in Pravda (December 19, 1985).

Pipeline and Electrical-Line Agreements [4] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR, Pravitelstvom GDR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Stroitelstve Magistralnogo Nefteprovoda SSSR-PNRGDR" (December 18, 1959) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, SSSR-GDR: 30 Lyet Otnoshenii, 1949-1979 [The USSR-GDR: 30 Years of Relations, 1949-1979] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), pp. 93-96. [5] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR, Pravitelstvom VNR i Pra¬ vitelstvom Chekhoslovatskoi Respubliki o Stroitelstve Magistralnogo Nefteprovoda SSSR-Chekhoslovatskaya Respublika-Vengerskaya Narodnaya Respublika" (December 19, 1959) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, SovetskoChekhoslovatskiyeOtnosheniya, 1945-1960 [Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations, 1945-1960] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), pp. 478-481. [6] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom Chekhoslo¬ vatskoi Respubliki o Stroitelstve na Territorii SSSR Vysokovoltnoi Linii dlya Peredachi Elektroenergii v Chekhoslovatskuyu Respubliku" (March 7, i960) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Sovetsko-Chekhoslovatskiye Otnosheniya, 1945-1960 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), pp. 482-483. [7] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom Chekhoslo¬ vatskoi Respubliki o Stroitelstve Magistralnogo Gazoprovoda Bratstvo SSSR-Chekhoslovatskaya Respublika" (December 3, 1964) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Sovetsko-Chekhoslovatskiye Otnosheniya: i96i-i9yi (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), pp. 93-95. [8] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvami SSSR, NRB, i RNR Otnositelno Postavki Elektricheskoi Energii iz SSSR dlya NRB i Tranzita Elektricheskoi Energii Cherez Elektroenergeticheskuyu Sistemu RNR" (August 14, 1965) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Repub¬ lic of Bulgaria, Sovetsko-Bolgarskiye Otnosheniya, 1948-19JO [SovietBulgarian Relations, 1948-1970] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 316-320. [9] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Postavkakh Prirodnogo Gaza iz SSSR v ChSSR i Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Gazoprovoda na Territorii Sovetskogo Soyuza" (September 10, 1968) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Sovetsko-Chekhoslovatskiye Otnosheniya: i96i-i9yi (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972b), pp. 264-267. [10] Untitled agreement (May 22, 1969) referred to in the communique of the Soviet-Bulgarian talks which is reprinted in Ministries of Foreign Affairs

Appendixes

169

of the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sovetsko-Bolgarskiye Otnosheniye, 1948-1970 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 482-483. [11] "Soglasheniya Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i VNR o Sotrudnichestve v Rasshirenii Nefteprovoda 'Druzhba'" (August 19, 1969) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic, Sovetsko-Vengerskiye Otnosheniye, 1948-1970 [Soviet-Hungarian Relations, 1948-1970] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), pp. 574~577[12] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i ChSSR o Transportirovke Cherez Territoriyu ChSSR Sovetskogo Prirodnogo Gaza v Strany Zapadnoi Evropy" (December 21, 1970) in Compendium, vol. 26, pp. 326-328. [13] "Soglasheniya Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Revoliutsionnym RabocheKrestianskim Pravitelstvom VNR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Gazoprovoda" (November 16, 1971) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic, Sovetsko-Vengerskiye Ot¬ nosheniye, 1971-1976 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), pp. 85-87. [14] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Gazoprovoda" (July 6, 1973) in Compen¬ dium, vol. 29, pp. 186-187. [15] "Generalnoye Soglasheniye o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve i Ekspluatatsii Linii Elektroperedachi Napryazheniyem 750 KV Vinnitsa— Zapadnoukrainskaya (SSSR)—Albertirsa (VNR) i Podstantsii Vinnitsa, Zapadnoukrainskaya i Albertirsa" (February 28,1974) in Tokareva (1981), pp. 253-258. [16] "Dopolnenie k Soglashenii Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Postavkakh Prirodnogo Gaza iz SSSR v ChSSR i Sotrud¬ nichestve v Stroitelstve Gazoprovoda na Territorii Sovetskogo Sovuza ot 10 Sentyabrya 1968 Goda" (June 25, 1975) in Compendium, vol. 31, pp. 341-342. [ 17] "Protokol k Soglashenii Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i ChSSR o Transpor¬ tirovke Cherez Territoriyu ChSSR Sovetskogo Prirodnogo Gaza v Strany Zapadnoi Evropy, Podpisannomy 21 Dekabrya 1970 Goda" (November 21, 1975) in Compendium, vol. 31, pp. 346-348. [18] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom VNR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Nefteproduktoprovoda" (June 3, 1976) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic, Sovetsko-Vengerskiye Otnosheniye, 1971-1976 (Moscow: Poli¬ tizdat, 1977), pp. 484-486. [19] "Generalnoye Soglasheniye o Sotrudnichestve v Perspektivnom Razvitii Obyedinennykh Elektroenergeticheskikh Sistem Stran-Chlenov SEV na Period do 1990 Goda" (November 23, 1977) in Tokareva (1981), pp. 244253[20] "Soglasheniye o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve i Ekspluatatsii Linii Elek¬ troperedachi Napryazheniyem 750 kv Khmelnitskoi AES (SSSR)— Zheshuv (PNR) i Podstantsii Zheshuv" (March 29, 1979) in Tokareva (1981), pp. 262-267.

170

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

[21] "Soglasheniye o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve na Territorii NRB Tranzitnogo Gazoprovoda dlya Podachi Prirodnogo Gaza v Turetskuyu Respubliku" (November 18, 1986) in Compendium, vol. 42, pp. 217-220.

Agreements to Improve Oil and Gas Industries [22] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR ob Okazanii SSSR Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya PNR v Provedenii Geologopoiskovykh i Razvedochnykh Rabot na Neft i Gaz" (March 3, 1959) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Polish People's Repub¬ lic, Sovietskii Soyuz—Narodnaya Polska, 1944-1974 [The Soviet Union— People's Poland, 1944-1974] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 186-189. [23] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR ob Okazanii SSSR Ekonomicheskogo i Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya v Razvitii Heftyanoi i Gazovoi Promyshlennosti PNR" (June 3, 1964) in Compendium, vol. 23, pp. 392-395. [24] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom GDR ob Okazanii SSSR Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya GDR v Provedenii Geologopoiskovykh i Razvedochnykh Rabot na Neft i Gaz, a takzhe v Organizatsii Dobychi Nefti i Gaza" (June 12, 1964) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, SSSR-GDR: 30 Lyet Otnoshenii, 1949-1979 [The USSR-GDR: 30 Years of Relations, 19491979], (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), pp. 123-125. [25] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB ob Okazanii SSSr Ekonomicheskogo i Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya v Dalneishem Forsirovanii Razvitiya Fleftyanoi Promyshlennosti NRB i v Provedenii Geologorazvedochnykh Rabot na Neft i Gaz" (July 4, 1964) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sovetsko-Bolgarskiye Otnosheniya, 1948-1970 [Soviet-Bulgarian Relations, 1948-1970] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 274-275. [26] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Sotrudnichestve v Razvitii Neftyanoi i Gazovoi Promyshlennosti PNR" (August 2, 1969) in Compendium, vol. 26, pp. 269-271. [27] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom GDR ob Okazanii SSSR Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya GDR v Provedenii Geologopoiskovykh i Geologorazvedochnykh Rabot na Gaz i Neft, v Razrabotke Gaza i Nefti, a takzhe v Obogashchenii i Transportirovke Prirodnogo Gaza" (July 22, 1970) in Compendium, vol. 26, pp. 173-175. [28] "Generalnoye Soglasheniye o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v SSSR Obyektov Neftyanoi Promyshlennosti i o Postavkakh v PNR Tsennogo Vida Topliva i Syrya" (December 7, 1974) is how this accord is charac¬ terized in O. K. Rybakov, Planovoye Osnovy Ekonomicheskoi Integratsii StranChlenov SEV (Moscow: Mysl', 1979), p. 149. The announcement is in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (USSR), December 10, p. D5.

Appendixes

171

[29] Untitled agreement (December 17,1974) announced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Eastern Europe), December 19, 1974, p. F2. [30] Untitled agreement (December 20,1974) announced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Eastern Europe), December 23, 1974, p. D2. [31] "Dopolnenie k Soglashenii Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Sotrudnichestve v Razvitii Dobychi Nefti v SSSR s Tselvu Uvelicheniya ee Postavok v ChSSR Posle 1970 Goda, Podpisannomv 23 Sentyabrya 1966 Goda" (June 25,1975) in Compendium, vol. 31, pp. 342343[32] "Protokol o Sotrudnichestve SSSR i GDR v Sozdanii v 1976-1980 Godakh Dopolnitelnykh Moshchnostei v Neftyanoi Promyshlennosti SSSR" (July 26, 1975) in Compendium, vol. 31, pp. 197-198. [33] "Protokol o Sotrudnichestve SSSR i ChSSR v Sozdanii v 1976-1980 Go¬ dakh Dopolnitelnykh Moshchnostei v Neftyanoi Promyshlennosti SSSR" (August 21, 1975) in Compendium, vol. 31, pp. 343-346. [34] "Protokol o Sotrudnichestve SSSR i VNR v Sozdanii v 1976-1980 godakh Dopolnitelnykh Moshchnostei v Neftyanoi Promyshlennosti SSSR" (Feb¬ ruary 4, 1976) in Compendium, vol. 32, pp. 184-185. [35] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Sotrudnichestve v Zavershenii Stroitelstva Predpriyatii Chernoi Metallurgy v PNR i o Postavkakh iz SSSR v PNR Prirodnogo Gaza" (November 29, 1983) in Compendium, vol. 39, pp. 161-164.

Agreements to Construct Thermal Electrical Power Station [36] "Protokol ob Okazanii SSSR Tekhnicheskoi Pomoshchi Bolgarii v Stroitelstve Elektrostantsii 'Maritsa-Vostok' i O Provedenii Ekspertizv Plana Elektrifikatsii Bolgarii" (May 27, 1955) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, SovetskoBolgarskiye Otnosheniya, ig/\8-igyo [Soviet-Bulgarian Relations, 19481970] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 71-73. [37] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom GDR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve v GDR Teplovykh Elektrostantsii Tirbakh' i 'Boksberg'" (April 29, 1964) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, SSSR-GDR: 30 Lyet Otnoshenii, lgqg-igyg [The USSR-GDR: 30 Years of Relations, 1949-1979], (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), pp. 114-117. [38] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom RNR o Postavke Kompleksnogo Energeticheskogo Oborudivaniya i ob Okazanii Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya SSSR dlya Stroitelstva i Rasshireniya Ieplovykh Elektrostantsii v SRR v 1965-1967" (October 16, 1964) in Compen¬ dium, vol. 23, pp. 397-402. [39] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom RNR o Postavke Oborudivaniya i ob Okazanii Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya dlya

172

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

Osushchestvleniya RNR Gidroenergeticheskoi i Sudokhodnoi Sistemy 'Zhelezniye Vorota"7 (March 13, 1965) in Compendium, vol. 24, pp. 274293. [40] "Protokol k Soglasheniyu mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom GDR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Teplovykh Elektrostantsii 'Tirbakh7 i 'Boksberg7 ot 29 Aprelya 1964 Goda" (July 4,1966) in Compendium, vol. 24, pp. 141-146. [41] "Soglasheniye o Postavkakh iz SSSR Oborudivaniya, Priborov i Materialov, i Okazanii Tekhnicheskogo Sodeistviya v Stroitelstve Teplovykh Elektrostantsii i Drugikh Obyektov v SRR v 1967-1970 Godakh" (January 18, 1967) in Compendium, vol. 25, pp. 257-259. [42] "Protokol No. 2 k Soglasheniyu mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pra¬ vitelstvom GDR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Teplovykh Elektro¬ stantsii 'Tirbakh7 i 'Boksberg7 ot 29 Aprelya 1964 Goda77 (May 23, 1968) in Compendium, vol. 25, pp. 203-204. [43] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve v NRB Teplovoi Elektrostantsii 'Bobov Dol7 77 (November 22, 1968) in Compendium, vol. 25, pp. 183-184. [44] "Protokol No. 3 k Soglasheniyu mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pra¬ vitelstvom GDR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Teplovykh Elektro¬ stantsii 'Tirbakh7 i 'Boksberg7 ot 29 Aprelya 1964 Goda" (October 29, 1969) in Compendium, vol. 26, pp. 170-173. [45] "Protokol No. 4 k Soglasheniyu mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pra¬ vitelstvom GDR o Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve Teplovykh Elektro¬ stantsii 'Tirbakh7 i 'Boksberg7 ot 29 Aprelya 1964 Goda" (June 18,1971) in Compendium, vol. 27, pp. 91-92. [46] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom GDR o Sotrudnichestve v Rasshirenii i Stroitelstve Teplovykh Elektrostantsii v GDR i o Postavkakh dlya nikh iz SSSR Trub c Moshnostei 500 mvt." (June 1, 1973) in Compendium, vol. 29, pp. 146-148. [47] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom VNR ob Ekonomicheskom i Tekhnicheskom Sotrudnichestve v Stroitelstve v VNR Chetyrekh Ugolnvkh Shakht i Vtoroi Ocheredi Zadunaiskoi Teplovoi Elektrostantsii" (July 12, 1976) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic, Sovetsko-Vengerskiye Otnosheniye, 1971-1976 [Soviet-Hungarian Relations, 1971-1976] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), pp. 490-493. [48] "Protokol Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom GDR o Sotrud¬ nichestve v Sooruzhenii v GDR Teplovoi Elektrostantsii 'Einshvald'" (April 19, 1979) in Compendium, vol. 35, pp. 205-206. [49] "Protokol Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom GDR o Sotrud¬ nichestve v Sooruzhenii v GDR Teplovoi Elektrostantsii 'Einshvald'" (Jan¬ uary ii, 1984) in Compendium, vol. 40, pp. 93-94.

Appendixes

173

Agreements for Collaboration in Atomic Energy [50] "Soglasheniye ob Okazanii SSSR Pomoshchi RNR v Dele Razvitiya Issledovanii po Fizike Atomnogo Yadra i Ispolzovaniya Atomnoi Energii Diva Nuzhd Narodnogo Khoziastva" (April 22, 1955) in Compendium, vol. 17, pp. 119-122. [51] "Soglasheniye ob Okazanii SSSR Pomoshchi PNR v Dele Razvitiya Issledovanii po Fizike Atomnogo Yadra i Ispolzovaniya Atomnoi Energii Dlya Nuzhd Narodnogo Khoziastva" (April 23, 1955) in Compendium, vol. 17, pp. 116-119. [52] "Soglasheniye ob Okazanii SSSR Pomoshchi ChSSR v Dele Razvitiya Issledovanii po Fizike Atomnogo Yadra i Ispolzovaniya Atomnoi Energii Dlya Nuzhd Narodnogo Khoziastva" (April 23, 1955) in Compendium, [53]

vol. 17, pp. 122-125. "Soglasheniye ob Okazanii SSSR Pomoshchi GDR v Dele Razvitiya Issle¬ dovanii po Fizike Atomnogo Yadra i Ispolzovaniya Atomnoi Energii Dlya Nuzhd Narodnogo Khoziastva" (April 28, 1955) in Compendium, vol.

17, pp. 111-113. [54] "Soglasheniye ob Okazanii SSSR Pomoshchi VNR v Dele Razvitiya Issle¬ dovanii po Fizike Atomnogo Yadra i Ispolzovaniya Atomnoi Energii Dlya Nuzhd Narodnogo Khoziastva" (June 13,1955) in Compendium, vol. 17, pp. 108-111. [55] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu SSSR i GDR o Dalneishem Rasshirenii Sotrudnichestva v Dele Izpolzovaniya Atomnoi Energii v Mirnykh Tselakh" (December 28, 1961) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, SSSR-GDR: 30 Lyet Otnoshenii, 1949-1979 [The USSR-GDR: 30 Years of Relations, 1949-1979], (Moscow: Politizdat, [56]

[57]

[58]

[59]

1981), pp. 108-112. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii Atomnoi Elektrostantsii v NRB" (July 15, 1966) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Repub¬ lic of Bulgaria, Sovetsko-Bolgarskiye Otnosheniya, ig48-igyo [SovietBulgarian Relations, 1948-1970] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 336-340. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Dalneishem Rasshirenii Sotrudnichestva v Razvitii Atomnoi Energii v ChSSR" (November 18, 1966) in Compendium, vol. 24, pp. 371-371. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Revolyutsionnym RabochoKrestyanskim Pravitelstvom VNR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii Atomnoi Elektrostantsii v VNR" (December 28, 1966) in Compendium, vol. 24, pp. 126-130. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB o Dalneishem Razvitii Sotrudnichestva v Oblasti Ispolzovaniya Atomnoi Energii v Mirnykh Tselyakh" (April 27, 1967) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sovetsko-

174

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

Bolgarskiye Otnosheniya, 1948-1970 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 375— 378. [60] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Dalneishem Rasshirenii Sotrudnichestva v Oblasti Ispolzovaniya Atomnogo Energiya Mirnykh Tselakh" (June 20, 1967) in Compendium, vol. 25, pp. 252-255. [61] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii Dvukh Atomnykh Elektrostantsii v ChSSR" (April 30, 1970) in Compendium, vol. 26, pp. 317-320. [62] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom SRR o Sotrud¬ nichestve v Sooruzhenii Atomnoi Elektrostantsii v SRR" (May 26,1970) in Compendium, vol. 26, pp. 273-276. [63] "Protokol k Soglasheniyu Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Revolyutsionnym Rabocho-Krestyanskim Pravitelstvom VNR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii Atomnoi Elektrostantsii v VNR ot 28 Dekabrya 1966 Goda" (July 3, 1970) in Compendium, vol. 26, pp. 157-158. [64] "Protokol Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB o Sotrud¬ nichestve v Rasshirenii Atomnoi Elektrostantsii v NRB" (March 3, 1972) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sovetsko-Bolgarskiye Otnosheniya, 1971-1976 (Moscow: Poli¬ tizdat, 1977), pp. 78-79. [65] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v PNR Atomnoi Elektrostantsii" (Febru¬ ary 28, 1974) in Compendium, vol. 30, pp. 191-194. [66] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Sotrudnichestve v Poryadke Kooperatsii v Proizvodstve Oborudovaniya Dlya Atomnoi Elektrostantsii" (March 13, 1974) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, SovetskoChekhoslomtskiye Otnosheniya: 1972-1976 [Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations, 1972-1976] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), pp. 163-166. [67] Untitled agreement (March 21, 1974) as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Eastern Europe), March 22, 1974, p. Ei. [68] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Sotrudnichestve v Poryadke Kooperatsii v Proizvodstve Oborudovaniya dlya Atomnykh Elektrostantsii" (April 24,1974) in Compendium, vol. 30, pp. 194-198. [69] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom VNR o Sotrudnichestve v Poryadke Kooperatsii v Proizvodstve Oborudovaniya Dlya Atomnoi Elektrostantsii" (November 4, 1974) in Ministries of For¬ eign Affairs of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic, SovetskoVengerskiye Otnosheniye, 1971-1976 [Soviet-Hungarian Relations, 19711976] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), pp. 270-273. [70] Untitled agreement (December 25,1974) as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Eastern Europe), December 26, 1974, pp. C1-C2.

Appendixes

175

[71] "Protokol k Soglasheniyu Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom SRR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii Atomnoi Elektrostantsii v SRR ot 26 Maya, 1970 Goda" (December 30, 1974) in Compendium, vol. 30, pp. 204-206. [72] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB o Sotrudnichestve v Poryadke Kooperatsii v Proizvodstve Oborudovaniva Dlya Atomnoi Elektrostantsii" (July 22, 1975), in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, SovetskoBolgarskiye Otnosheniya, 1976-1976 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), pp. 42^* 429. [73] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Dalneishem Sotrudnichestve v Razvitii Atomnoi Energii" (November 13, 1976) in Compendium, vol. 32, pp. 327-330. [74] "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom SRR o Sotrud¬ nichestve v Poryadke Kooperatsii v Proizvodstve Oborudovaniya dlya Atomnykh Elektrostantsii" (August 19, 1977) in Compendium, vol. 33, [73]

[76]

[77]

[78]

[79]

[80]

[81]

pp. 189-192. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Osushchestvlenii Spetsialnoi Tekhnicheskoi Priemki Oborudovaniya, Izgotovlyaemogo na Predpriyatiyakh ChSSR Dlya Atomnykh Elektro¬ stantsii," (February 2, 1978) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Sovetsko-Chekhoslovatskiye Ot¬ nosheniya: 1977-1982 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), pp. 82-84. "Generalnoye Soglasheniye o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii na Territorii SSSR Khmelnitskoi Atomnoi Elektrostantsii" (March 29, 1979) in To¬ kareva (1981), pp. 238-262. The program was announced but not published. The announcement is reprinted in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Sovetsko-Chekhoslovatskiye Otnosheniya: 1977-1982 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), pp. 281-282. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v ChSSR Elektrostantsii 'Mokhovtse'" (November 27, 1980) in Compendium, vol. 36, pp. 213-218. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom SRR o Sotrud¬ nichestve v Sooruzhenii na Territorii SSSR Yuzhno-Ukrainskoi Elektro¬ stantsii i Svyazannykh s Etim Postavkakh Elektroenergii iz SSSR v SSR" (July 1, 1981) in Compendium, vol. 37, pp. 163-166. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v NRB Tretei Ocheredi Atomnoi Elektro¬ stantsii 'Kozlodui'" (October i, 1981) in Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sovetsko-Bolgarskiye Ot¬ nosheniya, 1977-1982 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), pp. 371-375. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom ChSSR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v ChSSR Pervoi Ocheredi Atomnoi Elek¬ trostantsii Temelin'" (November 27, 1981) in Ministries of Foreign

176

[82]

[83]

[84]

[85]

[86]

[87]

[88]

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

Affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, SovetskoChekhoslovatskiye Otnosheniya: Kyyy-1982 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), pp. 358-362. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom SRR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v SRR Atomnoi Elektrostantsii" (September 9, 1982) in Compendium, vol. 38, pp. 242-246. Announcement of the agreement was broadcast by TASS (December 8, 1982), as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Eastern Europe), December 21, 1982, p. F5. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom PNR o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v PNR Atomnoi Elektrostantsii 'Zharnovets'" (April 14, 1983) in Compendium, vol. 39, pp. 157-161. "Soglasheniye Mezhdu Pravitelstvom SSSR i Pravitelstvom NRB o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v NRB Atomnoi Elektrostantsii 'Belene'" (March 27, 1984) in Compendium, vol. 40, pp. 81-85. "Soglasheniye o Sotrudnichestve v Sooruzhenii v PNR Atomnoi Elektro¬ stantsii Obshchei Moshchnostiyu 4000 MVt" (February 19,1986) in Com¬ pendium, vol. 42, pp. 290-294. "Programma Sotrudnichestva Mezhdu Soyuzom Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublikoi v Oblasti Razvitiya Atomnoi Energetiki v PNR do 2000 Goda" (April 6, 1988) in Compendium, vol. 44, pp. 338-342. "Programma Sotrudnichestva Mezhdu Soyuzom Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Chekhoslovatskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Re¬ spublikoi v Oblasti Razvitiya Atomnoi Energetiki v ChSSR do 2000 Goda" (July 5, 1988) in Compendium, vol. 44, pp. 355-360.

Agreements Establishing International Economic Organizations [89] "Agreement concerning the Establishment of a Central Control Office for the Combined Power Systems of the PRB, the HPR, the GDR, the PPR, the RPR, the ChSSR and the West Ukraine Power System of the USSR" (July 25, 1962) in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 506, no. 7387 (1964), pp. 184-195. [90] "Agreement on Founding the International Economic Association for Nuclear Instrument-Building Tnteratominstrument'" (February 22, 1972) in W. E. Butler, ed., A Source Book on Socialist International Organiza¬ tions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff en Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 657-664. [91 ] "Agreement on Founding the International Economic Association for the Organization of Cooperation in Production, Deliveries of Equipment and Rendering Technical Assistance in Building Nuclear Power Stations Tnteratomenergo'" (December 13,1973) in W. E. Butler, ed., A Source Book on Socialist International Organizations (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff en Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 706-718.

Appendixes

177

[92] "Soglasheniye o Sozdanii Sovmestnoi Organizatsii po Provedeniyu Geologorazvedochnykh Rabot na Neft i Gaz na Baltiiskom More v Predelyakh Kontinentalnogo Shelfa i na Territorialnykh Vod SSSR, GDR i PNR" (November 24, 1975) in Compendium, vol. 32, pp. 427-433. [93] "Soglasheniye o Sozdanii Mezhdunarodnogo Khozyaistvennogo Tovarishchestva Po Sotrudnichestvu v Oblasti Malotonnazhnykh Nefteproduktov, Prisadok i Katalizatorov /Internefteprodukt,,/ (June 9, 1978) in Tokareva (1981), pp. 426-434.

APPENDIX

3

Western Estimates of East European Military Expenditures

An ongoing debate among specialists concerns the best method for estimating Soviet and East European defense spending.1 Because the focus here is on comparisons among the WTO states, however, many of the difficulties of comparing U.S. and Soviet spending levels are avoided. I use the estimates of defense spending in national currencies calculated by the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, which is headed by Thad P Alton.2 These data are advan¬ tageous because a consistent methodology is employed for all the countries over the entire period from 1965 to 1987. In addition, because they are valued in local currencies, they do not need to be converted into Western currencies, which can cause distortions. Moreover, this choice of estimates has no grave practical implica¬ tions for my analyses. Since I am concerned with rank-order relation¬ ships among the East European states, a high correlation among the different estimates in terms of their ranking of the states in a given year suffices. Table A.i shows these correlations for Alton estimates 1 For discussions, see Donald F. Burton, "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending," Problems of Communism 2 (March-April 1983), pp. 85-93; Radio Liberty, "Military Expenditures and the Soviet Economy," Research Bulletin RL 120/85, April 24, 1985; Jonathan Eyal and Ian Anthony, Warsaw Pact Military Expenditure (Alexandria, Va.: Jane's Information Group, 1988); and Keith Crane, "Comment," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Pressures for Reform in the East European Economies, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 224-230. 2 See Thad P Alton et al., "East European Defense Expenditures, 1965-1982," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 475-495; and Thad P Alton et al., "East European Defense Expenditures, 1975 to 1987," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Pressures for Reform in the East European Econ¬ omies, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 208-223. 178

Appendixes

179

Table A.i. Rank-order correlation of Alton and other estimates of East European defense spending

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance High estimatest

Defense as a proportion of* NMP GNP GDP 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

.867

1.000 1.000 1.000 .800 .800 .738 .800

tures and Arms Transfers

.467 .690 .733 .645

1.000 1.000 1.000 .867 .966

1.000

1.000

.733 .867

.867 .733

1.000

1.000

.667 .667

.966 .867 .931 .867 .966 .867 .966

1.000 1.000 1.000

1.000

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World

.966 .929 .828 .733

1.000 .966 .467 .552 .772

.600 .733 .733 .828

1.000

1.000 .800 .800

1.000 1.000 .966

1.000

.276 .276 .333 .690 .733 .600 .600 .733 .773 .414 .600 .600 .467 .467 .500

^Various editions of the SIPRI yearbook have used different measures of the economic size of the country. NMP is net material product, the measure the CMEA countries employ; it excludes depreciation and certain services. GNP is gross na¬ tional product, the most commonly used benchmark in the West, which includes the items left out of NMP GDP is gross domestic product, or GNP minus the value of exports. tin 1978 and 1982, both high and low estimates were given.

with estimates from three other sources. All are positive, and most are strongly positive. In Rice's words, "The economics of defense spend¬ ing (the actual costs) are difficult to assess using these data, but they are adequate to address the politics of burden-sharing."3 Condoleeza Rice, "Defense Burden Sharing," in David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 59-86, on 60. 1

Index

Alekseev, A., 5on, 12311, 13m Alliance management (by U.S.S.R.), x, 5, 10-17, 29, 34, 70, 84-86, 148,153-155 Anthony, Ian, iy8n Asmus, Ronald D., 88n Atomic power. See Nuclear power Ausch, Sandor, 2on, 76n Averkin, A. G., 24n Axelrod, Robert, 3on, 330, 350 Baldwin, David A., 29n, non Bargaining, x-xii, 2, 6n, 14, 25, 26-36, 70, 76-79, 85-86, 114-117, 120-121, 132, 146-148, 154, 1550,158-159, 162 Basic principles (1962). See Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Behavioral power. See Power Belli, N., 14m Bennet, Douglas C., 2yn Berman, Maureen, 28n Berry, William D., 7m Bialer, Seweryn, nn Bobrik, M. N., 840 Bornstein, Morris, 2on Brabant, Jozef M. van, 38n, 45n, 47n, 56n, 6on, 6m, 73n, 76n, 8in, i29n, i3on, 13m Brada, Joseph C., 8m, 1550 Brams, Steven J., 34n Braun, Aurel, i3n Breslauer, George W., 1240 Brezhnev, Leonid, 121, 123-125, 137, 143, 162 Brezhnev Doctrine. See Czechoslovakia: invasion by Warsaw Pact forces Brown, James E, ion Brzezinski, Zbiginiew, 6n, i2n, i3n, 2in, 38n, 430, 159 Bueno de Mosquita, Bruce, 32n

181

Bulgaria: foreign relations with: Romania, 58 U.S.S.R., 6-7, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55/ 58, 59/ 66, 68, 77-78, 101, 133, 139-140, 143,150 policies toward: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 6-7, 59 Warsaw Treaty Organization, 6-7 Bunce, Valerie, i3n, 3m Burden-sharing in alliances, 85, 87-91, 121, 154, 178-179 Burgess, Philip M., i54n Burke, A. A., 27n Burton, Donald F., i78n Butenko, A. P, 840, 1560 Butler, William E., 23n Campbell, Robert W., 73n, i22n, 1240, 13m Caporaso, James A., 26n Ceau§escu, Nicolae, 9, 60, 85, 88, 141, 149 Charter (1959). See Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Checinski, Michael, 77n, 97n, 98 Childs, David, 10m Coal. See Solid fuels Collective goods, 87-91, 154 Commisso, Ellen, 2n Comprehensive Program, 1985. See Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Comprehensive Program of Integration Measures (1971). Set* Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Council for Mutual Economic Assis¬ tance (CMEA), 5-7, 21-25, 39, 60-63, 15°, 158, 160-163

Index

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) (cont.) collaboration within: Basic Principles (1962), 39, 45, 167 Comprehensive Program of Inte¬ gration Measures (1971), 23-24, 38, 49, 52, 132, 139, 151, 167 Comprehensive Program (1985), 61- 62, 66, 153, 168 integration, 24, 43, 52, 87, 98, 132, 141, 162 long-term target programs, 24, 56, 152 plan coordination, 24, 43, 56, 132 pricing policies within, 20, 47, 55-56, 62- 63, 72' 76-81, 83, 95-99/ 152 price formula change (1975), 3, 55, 95, 106, 128-148, 151, 159 structure of, 21-25, 39/ 45/ 52~53/ 98, 150-151, 153, 156, 158 Crane, Keith, i3n, i46n, i78n Csaba, Laszlo, 22n, i53n Czechoslovakia: foreign relations with U.S.S.R., 7, 43/ 45-47/ 49/ 50-51, 53/ 55/ 57/ 59, 66, 68, 133, 150-151 internal policies, 146 invasion by Warsaw Pact forces (1968), 38, 92-93, 99, 102, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 126, 150 policies toward: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 7, 45, 58, 139-140 Warsaw Treaty Organization, 7, 88, 104 Dawisha, Karen, 5n, 6n, 9n, i6n Deardorff, Alan V., 73n Defense spending, 3, 13, 71-72, 83, 87no, 112, 124, 150, 154, 178-179 Dennis, Mike, 7n de Weydenthal, Jan B., 66n, ii3n, ii5n Dienes, Leslie, 53n Diesing, Paul, 28n, 34, 35n, 86n, ii7n, i33n, 134, i45n Dinerstein, Herberts., i5n, i54n Dobozi, Istvan, i29n, i36n Doder, Dusko, i38n Doyle, Michael, 12 Dyachenko, A. A., 8on Dziewanowski, M. K., 1140 Electricity, 3S-43, 48-49, 54/ 57“59/ 66, 93-95, 140-141, 157 Mir electrical grid, 40-43, 59, 93-94, 140

182

Energy. See Electricity; Natural gas; Petroleum; Solid fuels Eyal, Jonathan, iy8n Feldman, Stanley, 7m Finley, David D., Fox, Lesley J., 43n, 52n, 550, 6yn, 165 Gas. See Natural gas Gati, Charles, nn, i63n Gereffi, Gary, 27n German Democratic Republic, 4, 7, 10, 21 133 /

foreign relations with U.S.S.R., 7, 43, 47, 48/ 51~57, 66, 68, 73, 81, 133-134/ Mo, 149-150 policies toward Warsaw Treaty Orga¬ nization, 101 Gibbons, J. D., 74n Gilpin, Robert, 12-13 Gomulka, Wladislaw, 8, 90, 104, 111, 114 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 4, 38, 60-62, 67, 149, 152-153, 160, 162-164 Gordon, David G., 32n, n6n Guyer, Melvin, 32n, n6n Habeeb, William Mark, 26n, 3on Haggard, Stephan, 26n Hannigan, J. B., 5on, 165 Hardt, John P, iyn, liqn, i4on Heinrich, Hans-Georg, 8n Herspring, Dale R., i6n, 12m Hewett, Edward, 2on, 47n, 7m, 76n, i3on Hirschman, Albert O., 3on, 110 Holden, Gerard, 22n Holzman, Franklyn, i2on Hoya, Thomas W., 22n, \yyr\ Hudson, Cam, 59n Hughes, Jeffrey L., 6n, 9n, i55n Hungary, 8, 56, 152 energy resources, 18, 146 foreign relations with U.S.S.R., 8, 4°/ 43/ 49/ 5T 53-54/ 57/ 59/ 62, 68, 77, 79, 134, 138, 140, 143 policies toward Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 8 Husak, Gustav, 149 Hutchings, Robert L., 15, ii3n, 1470 Implicit trade subsidies, 72, 80-81, 95-96, 110, 1460 Jacobson, Harold K., 1560 Johnson, Paul M., ion

183

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

Johnson, A. Ross, i^n, i6n Jones, Christopher, 9n Kadar, Janos, 143 Kaminski, Bartlomiej, 23n, 24n Kanet, Roger E., 1130 Kaser, Michael, i3n, 2m, 22n, 39n, 43n, 52n, 14 yn Keohane, Robert O., 28-31, 83, non, 155-156 Kindleberger, Charles R, 9m, non Kissinger, Henry, i5n Kolkowicz, Roman, 88n Korbonski, Andrzej, 2n Kormnov, Yuril F., 98n, 147 Kosygin, Aleksei, 8, 135-137 Kozin, V., 22n Kozlov, I. D., 5on, 5m, 8on, 1230, 13m, 1370,165

Kramer, John M., 76n, 94n, i29n, i45n, 165 Krasner, Stephen D., 3on, 32n Kugler, Jacek, 3on Lavigne, Marie, 76n, 8on, 8m, 87, 95n, i28n,i48n Levcik, Friedrich, 62n Lewis-Beck, Michael, 7m, io6n Liebetrau, Albert M., 72n Linden, Ronald, 2n, i3n Liska, George, i5n Mackintosh, Malcolm, 14-150 Mansbach, Richard W., 28n Marcinkowski, Adam, 98n Marer, Paul, 2on, 8on, 13m, 148 Mares, David R., 3on Marrese, Michael, 17, 2on, 72, yyn, 80, 84, 95, 110, 1460 Mastny, Vojtech, nn Mathers, Todd, 1560 McIntyre, Robert J., 7n McMillan, C. H., 5on, 165 Medish, Vadim, 112-113 Mikulski, K., 6m Military expenditures. See Defense spending Mitrofanova, N. M., 82n, 1450 Montias, J. M., 230, 450 Moore, Patrick, 88n Morgenthau, Hans, 150 Morrow, James D., 32n Most, Benjamin A., 870 Natural gas, 3, 19-20, 38-39, 45-54, 63-66, 68, 91-93, 95, 101-104, 129-130, 140, 150-152

Bratstvo pipeline project, 45-46 Progress pipeline project, 64 Soyuz pipeline project, 53-54 Nelson, Daniel N., 87-880 Niczow, Aleksandar, 98n Nuclear power, 38, 43-45/ 51~52, 54~55, 58-59, 66-67, 94/ 123-124, 129, 140-141, 157 Khmelnitsky nuclear plant project (1979)/ 59 Nye, Joseph S., 28-31, 83 Ochab, Edward, 21 Odell, John S., 3on Oil. See Petroleum Olson, Mancur, 88n, 89-91, 154 Olson-Zeckhauser hypothesis. See Col¬ lective goods Organski, A. F. K., 3on Osgood, Robert E., 15 Palmer, Glenn, 6n Petroleum: agreements to aid East European production of, 47-48, 68, 141 pipeline agreements, 37-41, 49, 53, 57

Druzhba oil pipeline project, 3941, 49 Soviet exports of, to Eastern Europe, 3, 17-19, 63, 68, 74-77, 91^3, 99-105,122,124,134,146-147, 150, 122, 124, 134, 146-147, 150, 152 Soviet production of, 50, 53, 57, 130, 151 Plan coordination. See Council for Mu¬ tual Economic Assistance Polach, J. G., i22n, i24n, i3on, 165 Poland: disturbances in December 1970, 111127 energy resources, 5 foreign relations with U.S.S.R., vi, 7-8, 21, 47, 53, 57-59, 6b, 77, 95, 104-105, 139, 159 Pominov, V. F., 8on Power, v-vi, 2, 5, 14-15, 26-27, 29-30, 87, 110, 148, 155-160 behavioral versus structural, 26-27, 29-30, 32, 157-160 Price formula change (1975). See Coun¬ cil for Mutual Economic Assis¬ tance: pricing policies within Ptichkin, N., 5011

Index

Radulescu, O., 14m Rapoport, Anatol, 32n, 116, 13311, 13411 Ray, James Lee, 1511 Remington, Robin Allison, i3n, 22n, 112 Rice, Condoleeza, i5n, 88n, 179 Robinson, James A., i54n Romania, 56, 152 Energy resources, 47, 67, 85 foreign relations with: Bulgaria, 48-49, 58 U.S.S.R., 8-9, 13, 40, 48-49, 51, 5356, 58-59, 65-67, 77-81, 85-86, 88, 99, 101, 107-109, 134, 141 policies toward: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 23, 45, 60 Warsaw Treaty Organization, 88, 99

Rosenau, James N., 3m, 83n Rubinstein, Alvin Z., nn, lyn, 113 Russett, Bruce M., 89n Rybakov, Oleg K., 66n, i42n, 170 Sar, Marcin, 9n Savenko, Yurii, 5on, 1230, 166 Sayrs, Lois, 106-1070 Schaefer, Henry, i3n, 23n, ii2n, i39n Schelling, Thomas, 27-28 Shabad, Theodore, 53n Sharpe, Kenneth E., 27n Shastiko, V. M., 76n Shibayev, Yurii, 66n Shiryaev, Yurii, 6on, 62n, 66n, i53n Shmakova, E. K., 5on, 5m, 8on, i23n, 13m, i37n, 165 Simon, Jeffrey, i6n Smith, Arthur J., i29n Snidal, Duncan, 32~35n Snyder, Glenn, 28n, 34, 35n, 86n, nyn, i33n, 134, i45n Sobell, Vladimir, 23n, 62n, 166 Socor, Vladimir, 58n, 64n, 6yn Solid fuels, 21, 58, 75, 95-104, 123, 129

184

Starr, Harvey, 830, 8yn, 8gn Stein, Arthur A., 3m Stimson, James A., io6-i07n Structural power. See Power Summerscale, Peter, ii2n Szawlowski, Richard, 23n Terry, Sarah Meiklejohn, iyn, li^n, nyr\ Transferable ruble. See Council for Mu¬ tual Economic Assistance: pric¬ ing policies within Trend, Harry, 13m, i35n Triska, Jan, 2n, 27n, 29n Tyson, Laura D'Andrea, 2n Ulam, Adam, 113 Usipov, V., i42n Valdez, Jonathon, 6n Valenta, Jiri, i6n, i2on Van Oudenaren, John, nn Vanous, Jan, lyn, 2on, 72, 77n, 80, 84, 95, 110, i46n Vasquez, John A., 28n Veliaminov, G. M., 25n, 52n Volgyes, Ivan, 6n, 14, i5n, i7n, 83n, ii3n

Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), m, 4-5, 8-9, 13-16, 22, 29, 83, 85, 88-91, 97-98,112-113, 125> 150 Weitz, Richard, i54n Wolf, Charles, Jr., 11 Yoffie, David B., 3on, 3m Young, Oran R., 3on Zartman, I. William, 28n Zeckhauser, Richard, 89-91, 154 Zhivkov, Todor, 143 Zimmerman, William, 2n, 29n, 56n,

96n Zoeter, Joan Parpart, i52n