The Bismarckian Policy of Conciliation with France, 1875-1885 [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512804454

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THE BISMARCKIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION WITH FRANCE

THE BISMARCKIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION WITH FRANCE 1875 -1885

By

Pearl Boring Mitchell

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS

Philadelphia London: Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press 1935

Copyright

1985

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS Manufactured, in the United State» of America by the Lancaster Pre», Inc., Lancaster, Pa.

TO MY MOTHER

PREFACE

T

H E program adopted by Prince Bismarck for safeguarding the German Empire from the revenge attack he feared included, a f t e r 1875, a series of efforts to win the good will of his recent enemies and divert their attention from the Rhine until they could accept their loss without reserve. T o that end, he honored the ambassadors of France, supported their views in international conferences, suggested joint action in specific instances, and encouraged her imperialistic enterprises. When German interests conflicted with those of Great Britain in A f rica, Bismarck turned to France f o r support. H e proposed that she take the leadership of the navies of Europe to balance the power of the British fleet. H e urged her to resist the British advance in E g y p t , and reached an agreement with her to limit British pretensions in Africa. Successive French ministries, eager to restore their country to her former position among the great powers, responded to these overtures to the point where association with Germany might entail a conflict with England or the formal acceptance of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. These reservations, together with the adjustment of the Anglo-German difficulties and the temporary revival of revenge alarms, led Bismarck after 1885 to abandon his constructive policy of appeasement. I t was to trace the story of this Bismarckian policy of conciliation as it is unfolded in the recently published official documents of Germany and of France that this study was undertaken. Effort has been made to check the official accounts against contemporary material such as memoirs, letters, and current periodicals, to search biographies and annals of parliaments f o r the attitude of leaders, and finally to weigh with care the evidence of writers of both countries in support of their respective national views. vii

viii

BISMARCKIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION

The research and the assembling of this material have been done with the inspiration and guidance of Dr. William E . Lingelbach, whose helpful criticism and encouragement have been invaluable. Grateful acknowledgment is also due Dr. Arthur P. Watts for his generous g i f t of time and labor in reading the manuscript. Warmly appreciated too is the assistance of the: librarians of the University of Pennsylvania, the British Museum, the Bibliothèque Nationale, and the Library of Congress.. P . B. M. 19S5

CONTENTS CHAPTER

I II III

PAGE

THE CURVE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS

1

POST-WAR CHAUVINISM

8

THE RÔLE OF BISMARCK IN THE CRISIS OF 22

1875

IV V VI VII VIII IX

DETENTE

SO

DEFERENCE NEAR EAST TO THE FRENCH VIEW IN THE

97

FRENCH EXPANSION WITH GERMAN SUPPORT 114 ENTENTE

150

ATTEMPTED COOPERATION IN EGYPT

168

THE REVIVAL OF DISTRUST

201

BIBLIOGRAPHY

216

INDEX

230

ix

I

THE CURVE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS

M

U C H has been written of the antagonism of Germany and France. Emphasis on their hostility is one more result of the heritage of rivalry which has given rise to the traditimi that war is in the logic of their history. Yet there have been two periods since 1870, each almost a decade in length, when the two countries were working together in fairly complete harmony. The temporary tranquillity was not due to the absence of incidents which politicians could capitalize; nor was it due to the efforts of liberals, striving to promote amity. I t was the result of the reasoned policy of realistic statesmen, of ministers who weighed the advantages of accord, adjusted difficulties amicably, and deliberately set out to discover spheres of common action which would foster the vital interests of their respective countries. Though France rarely took the initiative in these enterprises, her leaders were quick to seize any opportunity, first to restore and then to increase her prestige in the councils of Europe, even when the proffer came from across the Rhine. I t was Prince Bismarck who embarked upon a policy of conciliation. When he finally realized that France could not be permanently suppressed, the German Chancellor adopted a plan of appeasement which, he hoped, would by diverting her attention from the blue line of the Vosges at once insure the security of the western frontier, grant time to consolidate the empire and afford a valuable counterweight for the furtherance of his policies elsewhere. The general curve of friendly relations is not difficult to trace. Naturally it is not visible for nearly five years after the treaty of Frankfort. From 1870 to 1875 the cry for revenge was sounding in France, and from Germany came the threat of preventive war. But in the midst of the war scare of 1875, when Europe was momentarily expecting the outbreak of hostilities, the two countries were discussing academically the question of a 1

2

BISMARCKIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION

common policy. From 1876 to 1880 there was a distinct détente in their relations. I t was a period of friendly gestures, exchange of courtesies, and occasional cooperation. It served as preparation for the period of close association from 1881 to approximately 1886 when the Foreign Offices were openly following the same policies and seriously discussing an entente on specific and definite problems. France needed the support of Germany for her colonial adventures, and Germany was glad to divert French attention from the Rhine and to seek French aid when conflict with England threatened. These five years of active cooperation were followed by five years of mutual distrust and recrimination. Responsibility for the strained relations rests largely with the Nationalists of France. The policy of colonial expansion with the support of Germany, long denounced by the chauvinists as the "crime of Jules Ferry," was abandoned for a continental policy which looked toward rapprochement with Russia. Under the lash of the League of Patriots the nationalist press began a campaign to arouse the quiescent spirit of revenge and to prepare for the increase in armaments demanded by the new Minister of War, General Boulanger. The hostility waxed and waned with the extraordinary rise and decline of the Boulangist movement. Germany, alarmed, made her usual reply. Her press inaugurated an anti-French campaign and her government demanded credits for greater armaments, citing as its cause the danger of attack by her traditional enemy.1 When the German army bill was safely passed and Boulanger no longer endangered peace, the press attacks gradually ceased and relations grew more friendly. No one was more active in cementing this renewed friendship than the young emperor of Germany. He neglected no opportunity to express his firm resolution to maintain peace. France was impressed by his pacific utterances. The Nationalists, silenced for a while by the Boulangist threat, could only scoff at " the constant amiability of the Kaiser " and profess to find therein only a new " expedient for trickery and guile." 2 Mme 1 Annual Register 1887, pp. 238-239. 2 André Tardieu, France and the Alliances,

p. 150.

THE CURVE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS

3

Adam, whose pleading for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and fervent advocacy of the Russian Alliance had been appearing in her organ of " Revanche," La Nouvelle Reime, since 1879, was especially vehement in her denunciation of the emperor : " What are the qualities which distinguished the victories of Moltke," she asked, " the patient tenacity of William I and a continuous policy of trickery raised by Bismarck to the level of genius. William II is a mind diseased, infatuated with itself . . . a thing of somersaults, and his will is subject to capricious whims and sudden outbursts of temper." 3 " All France should realize that the German Emperor will make war on her without warning and without formal declaration. Sentinels of France, be on your guard ! " * Whatever the motive, it was evident that William II was deliberately trying to be gracious to his neighbor. On May 8, 1890, he instructed his ambassador at Paris to invite the French to participate in the Industrial Conference to be held in Berlin in March.® During the two weeks of the convention, he singled out the chairman of the French delegation for special courtesies. Jules Simon returned home an even wanner advocate of rapprochement with Germany.® His enthusiastic accounts of his gracious reception did much to modify the French attitude toward the Kaiser.7 Meanwhile the acts of neighborliness continued. Imperial notes of sympathy arrived at the death of Meissonier and of MacMahon. French artists were invited to take part in the exhibition at Berlin. At the time of the assassination of Carnot at Lyons, June 24,1894, the German Emperor sent a letter of condolence and as an evidence of sympathy released two French spies who were in prison at Kiel. When Count Münster, the German ambassador at Paris, conveyed the message of sympathy, he was received by the entire cabinet. The President of Council gripped his hand as he said, " Tell His s J. O. P. Bland, trans., The Schemes of the Kaiser, p. 70. * Ibid., p. 66. Die Grosse Politik der Europäischer Kabinette, VII, 272. Hereafter this work will be cited by the abbreviation D.O.P. « Jules Simon as early as 1879 had advocated closer association with Germany. See Hanotaux, Contemporary France, IV, 158. ι Tardieu, op. cit., p. 151.

4

BISMARCKIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION

Majesty that this act of grace goes straight to the heart of the French people." 8 Warm appreciation found expression among all classes. Attention was called to the sharp contrast between the cool telegram of their ally, the Tzar, which arrived late, and the friendly one of their old enemy, the Kaiser. So the old hostility gradually disappeared. France, secure in the alliance with Russia, occupied with internal affairs, undisturbed by alarming incidents, thought less of revenge.® By 1894, public opinion was ready f o r new cooperation with Germany. There followed five years when the two governments were in almost as close association as they had been between 1881 and 1886. The new foreign minister, Gabriel Hanotaux, favored the policy of colonial expansion pursued by Ferry ten years before, a policy which involved a truce with Germany, and as its inevitable corollary, conflict with the interests of Great Britain. Germany too had become interested in the acquisition of colonies. Her interests likewise ran counter to those of Great Britain. Consequently, the relations of France and Germany turned upon the status of the relations of either or both of them to their rival in Africa and Asia. The activities of Rhodes and Jamieson in the Transvaal inspired Holstein, that mysterious factor of the German Foreign Office, with the idea of asking all the continental powers to unite against England. By his plan, however, no vital British interest, such as E g y p t or the Orient, was to be touched. Then, he believed, England would not be forced to take up arms but would still be under the necessity of drawing closer to the Triple Alliance.10 France, who felt that her own interest lay in E g y p t , could see no advantage in such a partnership, refused to consider the proposition, and seized the opportunity to enter into negotiations with Great Britain over the Upper Nile. 11 These failed and two months later a change in ministry brought Hanotaux to power. 8 Z ) . e j , V I I , 341. » Bourgeois et Pagès, Let Origins et le» Re»poiuibilité> de la Grande Guerre, p. 239. 10 For details of this extraordinary scheme and the compensation to be meted out to each member of the combination, see the note of Holstein, dated December 30, 1895, published in D.G.P., XI, 67-69. 11 Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., p. 257.

THE CURVE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS

5

H e at once began a series of overtures to win German help against England in Egypt. 1 2 Germany refused, first, because France had rejected her Transvaal project, and second, so the Chancellor alleged, because she was convinced that France subordinated all her foreign policy to the hope of regaining AlsaceLorraine. 13 Actually, it was because Germany always held before her eyes the possibility of an alliance with Great Britain. While the negotiations for such an alliance were under way from 1898 to 1901, Chamberlain was kept informed of the cordial relations between the former enemies, but Germany permitted France to take the initiative in any overture f o r a common policy. During those years it was nearly always France acting alone or with the help of Russia or Spain which approached Germany with a proposal of joint action. 14 In refusing, Germany never quite closed the door, f o r Great Britain was not yet in the fold of the Triple Alliance and she might still have the need of France. Yet on at least two occasions when the negotiations between Chamberlain and Bülow were not running smoothly, Germany took the initiative in discussing the possibility of an entente with members of the French embassy at Berlin. 1 ' After the Fashoda incident, even the Germanophobe Delcassé thought of such an accord until the British ceased their efforts to reach an alliance with Germany and turned toward France. 18 Then Delcassé pressed his advantage. An entente with Great Britain was preferable to one with Germany. With the settlement of the African dispute, France would receive a fair field for expansion and remove the fear of the British navy which had disturbed her since Fashoda. In addition England 12 D.OJ-., XI, 320-330. is Ibid., XI, 83, Hohenlohe to Radolin, German Ambassador to Russia, May 20, 1896. i*For Russian attempts, see D.O.P., XIII, 265, for the suggestion on the Turkish Orient; XV, 500, for the intervention in the Boer War, March 3, 1900; XVII, 157-179, for the protest against the Anglo-Japanese treaty. For the Spanish attempt, see XV, 113-119 and XVII, part 9, 773-780. ie For German overtures see Millet, Notre Politique Extérieure, pp. 6-7 for proposition about Mosambique; Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., p. 279 for general proposition at the time the Samoan negotiations with England were failing, also p. 278 for the naval plans of the Kaiser. i I D . O . P . , XIII, 247-54.

6

BISMARCKIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION

would make no embarrassing conditions which would involve the recognition of the treaty of F r a n k f o r t , and the possibility of regaining the lost provinces would remain open. 17 A f t e r the exchange of visits by King Edward VII and the President of the Republic, conversations began f o r the adjustment of AngloFrench differences. By the end of the following year, they had reached an agreement on all the m a j o r questions where their interest conflicted. By cementing the friendship of England and France, the E n t e n t e Cordiale removed all necessity f o r France to look to Germany f o r support. T h e policy of F e r r y and Hanotaux, which was predicated upon the hostility of Great Britain, could now be abandoned with complete safety. T h o u g h France and Germany would later reach agreements upon separate questions and though the Kaiser worked f o r rapprochement f r o m the time his efforts to placate his uncle failed until the completion and rejection of the Björkö Agreement with Russia, the vital need f o r an entente was ended. Thus the curve of friendly relations rose steadily f r o m 1875 to 1885, to bend sharply downward f r o m 1886 to 1890, only to rise again f r o m 1891 until the Entente Cordiale and the First Morocco Crisis sent it down once more. I t is broken and j a g g e d by many incidents when war seemed to be inevitable. Gambetta once said, " W e are constantly at the mercy of an incident. W h a t would happen to us if we had not learned to dodge them, or if we fell into them as we fell into the t r a p of the Ems dispatch? " 18 I t is broken also by the disheartening attempt by both countries to exploit national fears in order to force through domestic legislation. Does either government want an army bill passed? Its spokesmen discourse at length on the danger threatening across the Rhine. H e r r von Bleichsroeder, a confidant of Bismarck, assured the French Ambassador in 1880 " that all this would stop when the law is voted." 19 " Consistently since 1898, Germany had made the mutual guarantee of European territory the condition upon which she would agree to an entente with France. is Paul Deschanel, Gambetta, p. 216. Quotation from an unpublished letter to Rane, dated March 3, 1876. ie Ernest Daudet, La France et L'Allemagne après le Congrès de Berlin, I, 196.

THE CURVE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS

7

Saint-Vallier declared that when the Chancellor received from the Reichstag the votes he wished, " t h e r e was no question of the bellicose projects attributed to us." Accusations were suddenly replaced by the most satisfactory assurances. 20 The line of curve is broken in the third place by the fear of French politicians that the open and frank discussion of good relations with Germany would give the nationalist party an opportunity to overthrow the ministry. In moments of political crisis they did not hesitate to denounce Germany in order to save themselves. Finally, good relations were constantly menaced by the curious belief of Bismarck that he could frighten France into friendliness by showing her how dangerous it would be not to be friendly. Much of his bluster and many of his threats had no other object. Neither Bismarck nor Holstein seemed to realize the stupidity of dealing with a proud, sensitive people by sword-rattling and fist-shaking tactics. Frequently when one hand was raised to strike, the other was extended in good will." I t is obvious that a detailed account of these changing relations cannot be compressed into the limits of this study. I t is necessary to select f o r discussion one of the two periods when association between the two countries was closest. Of these two, the period between 1875 and 1885 is less known. During those years the governments were working together fairly closely. Their interests did not conflict. There were fewer reservations to the discussion of rapprochement. At the same time it is illustrative of the forces motivating the policy. W i t h amazing candor, Bismarck explained his reasons f o r supporting French colonial activity. While Ferry is somewhat more reticent in his statements, he leaves little doubt of his motives f o r turning toward his traditional enemy. This study, therefore, will be limited to the years 1875-1885, and special emphasis will be given to three formal overtures f o r rapprochement which occurred in that period. 20 Daudet, op. cit., I, 330. 21 Of the German statesmen, Prince von Biilow seems best to have understood the French character. Compare his interpretation given in Imperial Germany, pp. 84r-86.

π POST-WAR CHAUVINISM

T

H E days may pass and the years be added unto them, but never until the hour strikes f o r the deliverance of our brethren, now handed over to the Prussians, will the wound I received this day be healed." 1 M a n y were the patriots who echoed the thought of " L a Grande Française " when the N a tional Assembly formally ratified the T r e a t y of F r a n k f o r t . T o the pathetic protest of the twenty-five deputies f r o m AlsaceLorraine, they could only answer t h a t France would not f o r g e t . I n his farewell to them, Grosjean voiced sorrow f o r their loss and hope f o r their restoration : " W e shall ever cherish with a filial affection France absent f r o m our hearths until the day when she returns to her place there." 2 In those simple words he sounded the note t h a t was to reëcho t h r o u g h France until 1918. T o keep alive the hope of the restoration of the lost provinces became the task of the French nationalists. T h e y worked with limitless energy and devotion to stir the spirit of revenge. France came to believe t h a t some day the injustice of 1871 would be made right. 8 T h e r e were those who hoped that a diplomatic stroke would b r i n g back Alsace-Lorraine. Others talked openly of war and reconquest. T h e m a j o r i t y , however, realized t h a t the first task was t o p a y off the indemnity and rid French soil of the presence of the invader. T h e story of that superb achievement needs no retelling here. Once it was accomplished and French industry had restored something of the old prosperity, then the minds of the most t h o u g h t f u l leaders ι Juliette Adam, Souvenir», V—Mes Angoisses et nos Luttes 1871-1873, p. 44. 2 Henri Galli, Gambetta and Alsace Lorraine, Annex II. s The League of Patriots, according to Article II of its by-laws, had as its object the revision of the Treaty of Frankfort and restitution of Alsace-Lorraine. This was not formally organized, however, until 1882. An organization called the Alsatian League of Paris, of which Bismarck complained in 1871, was ordered suppressed by the French government. Documents Diplomatiques Français, Ser. I, vol. I, no. 4®. 8

POST-WAR CHAUVINISM

9

turned to practical plans to regain the position in Europe which had been lost by defeat. France must come out of the isolation that Bismarck had created for her. Allies were necessary. Carefully they considered the possibility of winning either Austria, Great Britain, or Russia to their side. Of the three, Russia seemed at that moment the most friendly. It is true that Russia had seized the opportunity offered by the war to win concessions for herself, but Jules Favre, who was foreign minister in 1871, declared that France never considered the neutrality of the Black Sea to be a lasting settlement and that if the investment of Paris had not prevented communication, the French government would have voluntarily offered the concession. The Foreign Office had received "precious testimony of the sympathy of Emperor Alexander when the definitive Treaty of Frankfort was concluded." 4 Gambetta also thought seriously of such an alliance. " I want to see our enemies," he wrote to Rane, " become Russia's enemies as well. It is clear that Bismarck is angling for an alliance with Austria. I think before long, England and Russia will be on our side, if we only adopt a suitable policy at home. . . . Our cue is to work hand in hand with Russia, to associate ourselves with her schemes, and to modify them as need arises." While these ideas were finding expression in his private letters, Gambetta was traveling from province to province sounding the cry of revenge. Thiers, facing the practical problem of negotiating for payment of the indemnity, felt more than ever that Gambetta was the " fou furieux," an obstacle in the way of peace with Germany. There the speeches were creating an unfavorable impression and rendering the task of the aged French President more difficult. It was this critical moment which Gambetta chose to declare to a delegation from Alsace that if France ever descended to such depth of impiety as to put away the image of bleeding and mutilated Alsace, then and then only should the Alsatians give way to despair. When the news of this statement reached Thiers he exclaimed impatiently, * Documenté Diplomatique* Français, Ser. I, vol. I, no. 21. Hereafter this work will be indicated by the abbreviation DJ)·ί\

10

B I S M A R C K I A N P O L I C Y OF

CONCILIATION

" This is not the time f o r such a declaration.

L e t him wait.

L e t him wait." 5 There is reason to believe, however, that the sage old President was also thinking of the possibility of gaining an ally in Russia.

On hearing of the meeting at Gastein between the

emperors of Germany and Austria, Thiers f e l t that Russia might turn to France.

W i t h that thought in mind, he in-

structed General Flo to let the Tsar know so adroitly that he aroused no suspicions of his own intention, that he was convinced an alliance between France and Russia would establish European equilibrium and be advantageous f o r all states menaced by Prussian ambition.

Though Russia had not shown

herself especially well disposed, still " if the door should open, it would be necessary to enter."

Thiers felt the Polish ques-

tion was the key to that door and that of all Frenchmen he himself was the one best able to use it, f o r he had always opposed the encouragement of Poland.

" I t would be well to

indicate that to Russia and make her secure on that point." * During these discussions of revenge and of alliances, the attitude of the French government had been strictly correct. Official assurance of pacific intention was given to the German ambassador, and the first chargé d'affaires to the German Empire was instructed to devote himself to the loyal execution of the treaty. 7

On January 5, 1872, the newly appointed am-

bassador to Berlin, M . Elie de Gontaut-Biron, said to Bismarck : " I am charged by M. Thiers expressly to declare the fixed intention of the government is to maintain peace and to discharge the terms of the treaty.

As a member of the assembly, I can

add that the entire assembly shares these views and that any warlike intention is f a r from their thoughts." 8 Though the statement can hardly be true of individual members of the legislature, it was true of the official policy. 9 s Juliette A d a m , Souvenirs, V , 185. β D.D J"., Ser. I, vol. I, no. 54r. 7 Ibid., no. 49. β Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., part 2, » Pinon, France et Allemagne, p. 25. taneous gesture of the abuse of power. . the soul of the nation, it could never be

Any

p. 152. " R e v e n g e was the natural spon. . It lived as the sacred ideal in the program of the government."

POST-WAR CHAUVINISM

11

other plan would have been folly. Jules Grévy, then President of the Chamber of Deputies, said to an Alsatian who had chosen to return to France and had been elected to the Chamber : I know you are for war. Well I tell you, my friend who voted against the conclusion of peace, France must not think of war; she must accept a fait accompli; she must renounce Alsace. . . . Do not believe the fools who tell you the opposite and who are the reason that our misfortunes have been aggravated by a hopeless struggle.10 While part of France was cherishing revenge, and the government and the people were putting their house in oi'der, Bismarck was impressed by the sincerity and peaceful intentions of the President, Thiers, whom he had learned to respect during the negotiation of the treaty. 11 As long as that moderating influence was present in France, the Chancellor believed Germany had nothing to fear. In the activities of the Monarchists and the agitatimi of the Nationalists, however, Bismarck saw real danger. I t was his conviction that restoration of the monarchy meant war. If a union of the forces opposing Thiers should succeed in placing a Bourbon on the throne, then France would be tempted to seek the help of other countries for revenge. I t would be particularly dangerous if the Catholic party came to power. In that case Austria might join France on the ground of their common Catholicism.1* Russia would transform such an alliance into a powerful coalition that could by constant diplomatic pressure keep Germany in a state of tutelage. 1 * I t io Scheurer-Kestner, Souvenir» de Jeunette, p. 261. This man was a leader of League of Alsace and determined upon revenge. n Thiers had said in 1873 that they were signing a definite peace. See D.DJ?., Ser. I, vol. I, 234. 12 Bismarck had feared such a combination since 1866, especially because there were Catholic elements in Germany which would welcome it. See his Reflection*, II, 184. ι» Arnim and Heckle were under the impression that Thiers did not want the territory evacuated because it would mean his fall. From a remark of Arnim, Manteufle was led to ask Bismarck if he was modifying his confidence in Thiers. The answer given to Saint-Vallier to read was : " It is to the interest of the German government and its policy to encourage M. Thiers to continue his work, to support him morally and to contribute to his success." D.O.P., vol. I, no. 68. D.D.F., Ser. I, voL I, 226.

12

BISMARCKIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION

was to the interest, therefore, of Germany to keep France weak and divided so that she could not contract alliances. " I consider it contrary to the interest of Germany and of peace for us to promote the restoration of the monarchy in France and I will oppose persons who represent this idea." 14 This opposition was directed against two persons chiefly, first, against the French Ambassador at Berlin, M. Elie de Gontaut-Biron, a member of the Legitimist Catholic party, a close friend of Bismarck's rival, Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, 15 and second, against the German Ambassador in Paris whom he suspected of working f o r the restoration of the monarchy. Count von Arnim had written on November 12, 1872, that the continuance of the provisional republican institutions was dangerous to Germany, especially if the radical republicans under Gambetta got to power, and that consolidation under Thiers was not desirable because he would unite with the Pope to overthrow the present European equilibrium which was the basis of German prosperity. A month later Bismarck accused Von Arnim of holding views contrary to his own, and in June of the next year accused him of paralyzing his efforts for the conservation of Thiers and of influencing the Emperor against the Chancellor's policy. " It is in rivalry with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and also little authorized by l a w . " 1 6 Because of his monarchist activities Von Arnim was recalled early in 1874 and Prince Clodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst was appointed to succeed him. In his instructions to the new ambassador, Bismarck gave a definitive statement of the German policy toward France. " W e are interested most," he said, " that France should not become powerful enough at home or considered enough abroad to gain allies." A republic and internal disturbances would be less dangerous than a monarchy which would foster all sorts of Unfug on the outside. From his point of view the Bonapartiste i« Bismarck, Reflection», II, 184-86. 1 6 Bismarck disapproved of the friendship of the Empress for the French ambassador. Their joint influence over the Emperor was frequently disturbing to the plans of the Chancellor. ι ' Otto von Loe, Let Antecedenti du procès d'Arnim, pp. 31—i6.

POST-WAR CHAUVINISM

13

would be the best government f o r France because they would divide it most. But if the present government could continue, so much the better. I t was good f o r France to be occupied in Tunis—here he suggested the policy he was later to adopt— and held fast there even though German trade should suffer. 17 F o u r days later, Prince Hohenlohe asked Bismarck how he should conduct himself toward the Bonapartiste. " Do nothing f o r them or against them," was the answer. I t would be the best monarchy f o r France because it would create internal difficulties.18 On leaving, the Ambassador was again told that the reddest sort of republic would best serve the interests of Germany." In addition to weakening France so that she would be unable to attract allies, it was part of Bismarck's plan to isolate her by drawing other countries toward Germany. Such association, he felt, would secure the tacit assent of the powers to the Treaty of F r a n k f o r t . As he was unwilling to raise the question of the peace with France in an open conference, he could not propose common action in case either the radical republicans or the monarchists should come to power. 20 Circumstances favored rapprochement with Russia and Austria. In 1870, the Tsar had declared his neutrality, but indicated that if Austria should intervene in behalf of France, Russia would support Germany. Later, when he denounced the clause of the Treaty of 1856 relative to warships on the Black Sea, it was Bismarck who suggested that the matter be settled at a conference where, over the protests of England and Austria, he supported the Russian view. In 1871, the Kaiser told the " F ü r s t Clodwig Hohenlohe-SchillingsfUrst, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 118. ι» Ibid., II, 120. ιβ Ibid., II, 137. After the publication of these memoirs, the monarchist group in France seized upon these instructions to prove that the French Republic was the creation of Bismarck. See Bainville, Bismarck and France. 20 Rumors were afloat that a conference of all the powers was to be called to confirm the Treaty of Frankfort. Thiers discounted the rumor, but declared that France would never submit to the humiliation of signing the treaty again. When the three emperors met in 1872, the foreign ministers of each of the powers assured the French ambassador that nothing had occurred to disquiet his government. DJ)J1., Ser. I, vol. I, nos. 18285.

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Tsar that his services in keeping the war from becoming general would never be forgotten. The sympathies of Austria during the war were inclined toward France. Negotiations for intervention were carried on till the first defeats. Buest, the Foreign Minister, favored the plan as an opportunity for weakening Germany. Through the influence of Andrassy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Austria proclaimed her neutrality. His colleague, however, continued to feel that neutrality was imposed on his country only by the necessity of completing armaments and preventing a sudden attack. This view was communicated to France, and Gramont seems to have regarded it as a promise of eventual help. Within a year Buest fell and Andrassy became his successor. The new minister favored the abandonment of the policy of intervention in German affairs. Thus the way was clear for the meeting of the three emperors and their ministers at Berlin in September 1872. No formal agreement was concluded, but the conversations rendered relations sufficiently close to assure Bismarck that France would not be able to win an ally. Italy too had begun to make overtures to Germany as a result of the demands of the Ultramontane party in France. Victor Emmanuel visited Berlin and Vienna in 1873, and the emperors planned to return his visit in 1875. This exchange of courtesies seemed to draw Italy into the League. France was completely isolated.21 Bismarck had become the arbiter of armed peace. In the caustic words of Hanotaux, he had played the honest broker to the uneasy and dissatisfied ambitions of all the powers. If it is true that " the art of foreign politics consists in promising and selling to the highest bidder that which costs you nothing," then by that art he had rendered Germany secure. Hand in hand with this policy of isolating France went a fairly consistent policy of intimidation. France was to be made to realize that if she were planning for war, Germany was ready 2i D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I, no. 247. Gortchakoff told General Flô that France should know that if she began war she would be alone, because Russia, Austria, and Germany had mutually agreed to maintain peace by their common efforts.

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to strike first in order to ward off the threatened blow. Bismarck told the French chargé in one of the first interviews after diplomatic relations were restored that he did not believe that France wished to break the truce which existed ; they would pay the two thousand millions, but when in 1874 it became necessary to make the final payment, then he was convinced that France would make war. " Well, understand that if you want to recommence hostilities, it would be preferable to us that this be sooner than later." 22 This policy was prompted by the Chancellor's desire to bind France tightly to the terms of the Treaty of Frankfort. Peace must not be broken or even seriously threatened, because the new Germany needed quiet to pursue her own development. On his part he had no intention of attacking France, but he was determined that France should not listen to the advocates o f revenge and that she should be thoroughly alive to the results of a war policy. H e called it the " policy of a dash of cold water." 28 And he employed it with nerve-racking persistency. Internal difficulties in France frequently afforded him opportunities to use it. From the spring of 1878 to the summer of 1875 a series of crises in both countries strained relations between the two. The German union, made safe by his consummate skill from external aggression, seemed to Bismarck to be endangered from within. Loyal Catholics, eager f o r the restoration of temporal power and ready to accept the new doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, had organized to bring pressure upon the Chancellor to further their own interests. T o Bismarck the political activity of the churchmen and their followers was equivalent to the formation of a state within a state. It was a question of the unity of the empire. Consequently he launched the Kulturkampf. The first of the Falk laws was passed on May 9, 1873. The clergy refused to obey and the Pope declared the laws null and void. It was in this month that the party of the Right in France succeeded in overthrowing Thiers and electing MacMahon presi22 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I, no. 42. Gabriac to Remusat, August 14, 1871. 23 See Herzfeld, Das Geschlagene Franckreich, 1871-1873.

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dent. Church influences dominated the party in power. Bismarck suspected the ministry of holding Ultramontane views and though he assured Gontaut-Biron that there was no occasion for a change in policy toward France, he demanded new letters of credit f o r the Ambassador. T h e situation was precisely the one he had most feared, augmented moreover by the presence in Germany of a strong opposition controlled by the Church and feeling itself persecuted. Might not the French seize this moment f o r revenge? In order to reassure him, it would be necessary for French Catholics to avoid any manifestation of sympathy. This they were not ready to do. Instead they gave open encouragement to their German brethren by speaking and writing in defense of the defiance of the laws of the empire. 24 Bismarck became alarmed and angry. His policy at home was becoming increasingly difficult to enforce, and the country grew more and more troubled. Other governments had refused to intervene to stop the protests of their own bishops. 25 Moreover, there was opposition in the Reichstag to his plan to reorganize the army. His demand that France silence the bishops coincided with his efforts to force the army bill through the legislature. Gontaut-Biron wrote that the excitement over a war of revenge in Germany was aroused by the Chancellor in the hope of obtaining an anti-Ultramontane election and the military law. Still he urged his government to quiet the press and the bishops and to talk less f o r a while about increasing armaments. 26 On December 26, 1873, Biilow told Gontaut-Biron that the indiscretions of the French bishops, if they were repeated, would produce grave complications. It was a question of security, he said, for revolt was being fomented in the empire. The French minister of cultes at once sent a note to the bishops asking them to modify their statements, which were alarming the authorities of neighboring governments. Biilow declared Bismarck satisfied, but advised France to take action against the Bishop of Nîmes under the procedure of d'appel comme 2« D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I, pp. 276-77 and footnotes. 25 Ibid., no. 242. Dreux, op. cit., p. 39. 2e Ibid., no. 251, pp. 286-89.

Also pp. 292-83.

POST-WAR CHAUVINISM

17

27

d'abus. This Bismarck desired in the interest of internal German politics. If it were not done he would himself take action under a law of 1819, not abrogated, which set penalties for an offense against the persons of sovereigns or against the heads of foreign governments. 28 Bourgeois and Pagès, who had access to the records of the Foreign Office, quote as part of this interview a threat which does not appear in the published documents. According to their account, Bülow warned the French Ambassador to be careful " that the masses do not become fanaticized in the name of the persecuted Catholic religion, because then the clerical party will come to power, espousing the cause of Rome and you will be thrown into war against us. " Nous ne devons pas nous laisser prevenir votre attaque. Dans ce cas, plutôt lutter dans deux ans, dans un an, que d'attendre que vous ayez achevé vos preparations."29 Here is the threat of preventive war, pronounced not in a political speech to win support for a projected policy, but in a serious conference with the ambassador of the threatened country. 80 The published account of this interview, however, ends with the request of Bülow that the French government examine the question without haste and with the assurance that failure to proceed would not alter the good relations between France and Germany.81 About the same time the official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung published the statement that " the moment France identifies herself with Rome, she becomes our sworn enemy. A France subject to the papal theocracy is irreconcilable to the D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I, no. 258. 28 Ibid., p. 295. 2» Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., p. 161. so In 1870, Bismarck made this statement to the Minister of Württemberg about the reliability of his own statements in the Reichstag: " Remember that you must not take my discourse in the Reichstag as the word of gospel. Regard as sincere the things I say to you here where no one hears us, but there at the tribune, it is not the same and I must vary things more or less according to parliamentary exigencies." See Daudet, op. cit., II, 69. si D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I, p. 295, note of Gontaut-Biron, January 14, 1874. It is fair to add that a footnote in the documents refers to a supplementary letter which may have contained the threat quoted by the authors of Let reipomibilité» de la grande guerre.

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peace of Europe." 32 Decazes sent dispatches to the ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, and Vienna with copies of the letters of Gontaut-Biron. T h o u g h assurances came t h a t these governments could not follow the policy of Bismarck, there was little evidence of any desire to make common cause with France. 33 In the face of the talk of war which it would have been folly to risk the Foreign Minister saw the necessity of taking some conciliatory steps. He did not, however, bring suit against the bishops. T h a t would have been submission to dictation in internal affairs. Instead he suspended the Univers, the journal which had printed the pastoral letter of the Bishop of Perigueux denouncing the " acts of Caesarism " in Germany. 84 In addition, Decazes declared in a speech in the Chamber that France gave the Pope respect in all spiritual interests, but would entertain with Italy peaceable and friendly relations. 85 These steps satisfied the Chancellor, and the incident was closed. T h e air was still charged, however, with hostility. The other powers had watched the episode with considerable anxiety. France was conscious of their approval of her moderation and of their opposition to the church policy of Bismarck. Russia and England had expressed impatience. 36 T h e British ambassadors to Paris and Berlin had discussed in their private correspondence not only the possibility of war, but even the advisability of intervention. Lord Russell felt that nothing could save France if Bismarck was determined to fight again, advice or interference would only add to his excuses, and that the pacific assurances of Russia were of no importance because Bismarck was prepared to buy the T s a r ' s cooperation with anything in the Near East. 8 7 82 Quoted by Hanotaux, op. cit., II, 425. se D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I, p. 298. ** Ibid., p. 299. 85 Annales d'Assemblée Nationale X X I X , 208; Séance du 20 janvier 1874. se D.DJF., Ser. I, vol. I, nos. 277, 282, 283, 284, 294, S39, 343. 87 Lord Newton, Life of Lord Lyon», II, 52-53. Russell believed that Bismarck's policy was directed toward weakening Austria, even to the extent of annexing the German-speaking portions, so as to render her useless to Russia, France, and Italy. His view recalls the fears expressed by Bismarck in his Reflection» in regard to a union of the Catholic powers.

POST-WAR CHAUVINISM

19

While L o r d Russell was expressing this gloomy view of the situation, Russia was placing a different interpretation upon it. I n 1874, Gontaut-Biron visited St. Petersburg where he held long conferences with Gortchakoff and the T s a r . I t is this visit which Bismarck blames f o r the f u r o r created by his demands on France a few months later. H e claimed to believe that the French Ambassador and the Russian Minister, who was his personal enemy, plotted a t this time f o r his humiliation."* André Dreux, who completed the b i o g r a p h y of Gontaut-Biron, believed t h a t these interviews presaged the Franco-Russian alliance. 38 N o reason is given f o r the visit a t t h a t critical moment, but since the reports of the Ambassador to the Due Decazes indicate t h a t he was careful to discover the attitude of Russia toward Bismarck, it is reasonable t o conclude t h a t the m a j o r purpose of his j o u r n e y was t o sound o u t the T s a r and his Minister. I f his reports are t o be trusted—Gontaut-Biron was decidedly Russophil—he received warm assurances of good will. " I believe," Gortchakoff is quoted as saying, " t h a t Bismarck has invented his religious policy with a double end; that of securing an advantageous position against Catholic France which will assure him the cooperation of Italy, and also t h a t of creating in the German parliament a l a r g e and docile m a j o r i t y . " 4 0 In a letter to the D u e Decazes dated March 9, 1874, GontautBiron reports an interview in which Gortchakoff declared that Bismarck could n o t make war having the moral support of E u r o p e against him, and he would have it." I n the same letter he tells of an interview with the T s a r who said: I t would be monstrous to make war on yon upon such pretexts. You know the value which we attach to peace; it shall not be troubled, I hope. Count Bismarck knows your situation as well as you do, and he knows perfectly that you have no intention of taking the offensive; but he wishes to get the vote for his military law in the Reichstag and all the noise has no other object. 41 88 Bismarck, Man and State/man, II, 188-95. se Dreux, op. cit., p. 47. Ibid., p. 39. These letters do not appear in the Documents Diplomatiques Français, but the footnotes, Ser. I, vol. I, pp. 296, 302, confirm their substance. « Dreux, op. cit., p. 49. Gontaut-Biron to Due Decazes, March 9, 1874.

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Gortchakoff made the same assertion in Berlin, May 4, 1874. Thus reassured, Gontaut-Biron could return from his mission convinced that France was no longer friendless. Did he gather from these conversations the idea that Russia would stand by France against future extreme demands and that the Tsar might even be persuaded to check Bismarck? " I do not want to urge as a consequence," he wrote, " that an alliance should be attempted; no, France is not ready for that; but it will come." 42 The contention that the isolation was not complete is maintained by Bourgeois, Dreux, Hanotaux, and Pages, all of whom had access to the French archives, and present documentary evidence of the dissatisfaction of the powers with what they call " the pretentions of Bismarck." Bourgeois affirms, and the published documents sustain his assertion, that after 1871 the Tsar and Gortchakoff neglected no opportunity to let Thiers and the rest of official France see their object of sustaining France as a necessary counterweight to the military empire erected on the Russian frontier.43 In 1872 the Tsar told General Flo, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he attached much value to the need of France remaining strong.44 That same year during a visit to Berlin, Gortchakoff said to Gontaut-Biron: " We are not indifferent to your army, to your reorganization. On this point Germany has no right to make any remark. I have told you and I am glad to repeat it . . . a strong France is necessary to us." 45 On the same occasion the Tsar asked that his assurances be conveyed to Thiers that there was nothing to be feared from what was happening during his stay in Berlin.46 Great Britain likewise was exhibiting impatience. Hanotaux quotes an unpublished letter from Taine, the historian, dated Oxford, May 23, 1870. " Odo Russell maintains that at Versailles the representatives of the other powers were treated like ., I l l , no. 662. 10 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I l l , no. 83. 11 Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., p. 201.

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The other p a r t of the plan involved France. D u r i n g the crisis of 1879, the German cabinet remained calm. T h e German press spoke in eulogy of the new president and Biilow wrote t o representatives of Prussia t h a t the change of government in France had no significance f o r Germany, and expressed warm confidence in the moderation and wisdom of Waddington. 1 2 When the French Ambassador inquired about the need f o r new credentials, he was told that they were unnecessary. 13 Bismarck repeated his desire f o r accord with France and expressed symp a t h y with the policy of Waddington and the interests he attached to his maintenance in power. 14 I t was on this occasion of his return to Berlin, that Saint-Vallier was greeted by the E m p e r o r with the words, " You are twice welcome." 15 When General Chanzy, the French Ambassador to Russia, passed t h r o u g h Berlin, he was invited to see the Chancellor. Into this friendly atmosphere was projected the need f o r f u r t h e r cooperation in the Near East. T h e two countries, it will be remembered, had worked together to carry out the terms of the T r e a t y of Berlin. They had stood side by side when Waddington demanded that the signatory powers intervene between the P o r t e and Greece and also when Bismarck defended the interests of Roumania.1® On F e b r u a r y 25, 1880, Radowitz in discussing the question of the Greek boundaries had quoted the Chancellor in these words: My policy in the Orient is guided by one objective to which I subordinate all others; to support and second our ally Austria for whom affairs in the Balkans have an almost vital interest; in the second place to please France whose disinterested and pacific politics I have recognized and appreciated for two years and to aid her in all questions where her views are not contrary to any great interest of either Germany or Austria. 17 D.O.P., III, 390. is D.DJ?., Ser. I, vol. II, no. 380. i* Ibid., nos. 394, 398. i' See page 90 of this study. ie D.D.F., nos. 357, 358, 361, 371, 402, 412, 413. i ' Ibid., Ser. I, vol. III, no. 30.

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Somewhat earlier the French Ambassador at Constantinople wrote that his German colleague there had received instructions to support France and had expressed his personal willingness to follow where France wished and as far as she wished.18 Now the question of Montenegro was before the councils of Europe The territory granted her by the treaty had not come completely into her possession because of the objection of the Mussulmans of two provinces. Great Britain and Austria entered into negotiations to seek an indemnity for Montenegro in exchange for the disputed Albanian districts. It was agreed with the assent of Paris and Berlin that Turkey should cede a strip of land between the sea and the Lake Scutari, including the port of Dulcigno. 19 Turkey delayed in replying and the Albanians refused to yield the cession. Six weeks of waiting exhausted the patience of Gladstone and he proposed to give the Porte three weeks more in which to evacuate the territory before sending a joint Austrian and British fleet to Dulcigno. Germany expressed her willingness to join if the other powers did, and asked the intentions of France, who answered that such a demonstration must include all the powers in order to uphold the authority of Europe. The two cabinets finally joined on the same terms, with the reservation that they would not undertake any coercive action and that the six governments continue to act together for the settlement of the Greek boundaries.20 The naval demonstration had no effect. The combined fleet appeared under a British admiral on September 15, 1880; it was not until October 3rd that the Porte offered conditional withdrawal and demanded a delay of two months to regulate the Greek questions, and three months to execute reforms in Armenia. Then England proposed that the allied fleet go from the Adriatic to Smyrna and take the port as a material guarantee. Neither France nor Germany would risk the eventuality of war with Turkey if such a demonstration failed. 21 It was ι» Ibid., vol. II, no. 433. is D.DJ?., Ser. I, vol. Ill, no. 151; Livre Jaune 1880, Afaire» du Montenegro gives the correspondence with Turkey and an outline of events. 20 DJ).F., Ser. I, vol. III, nos. 199, 80S, 321, 245, 250, 262. zi Ibid., no. 271.

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clear to them that Gladstone was seeking the downfall of the Porte. England abandoned the project, but on October 9th, before the attitude of the powers was known, the Porte decided to yield Dulcigno immediately and without condition, and expressed the hope that the fleet would not be sent to Smyrna. I t was another six weeks, however, before a Turkish military force was sent into the city and formal cession made to Montenegro. Great Britain was inclined to feel that the French reservations encouraged the delays of the Porte, but Bismarck is said to have insisted to the English Ambassador that the French attitude was correct. France desired to act with the concert and to prevent the action of any single power, or group of powers.22 Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire, who held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, was steering his way skilfully toward that end, when Bismarck suddenly presented the proposal that France and Germany make a demarche commune upon the Sultan. His object, the Chancellor said, was not to substitute separate action f o r the action of the powers. He wanted, first, to have the two ambassadors at Constantinople act together upon the Sultan rather than on the Porte because the obstacles to yielding the territory came from the Sultan himself ; and second, he wanted to establish between the two ambassadors an entente which could be exercised effectively upon their colleagues whose " governments were not as disinterested and impartial as France." 23 T h e feeling of Saint-Vallier was that Bismarck wished to profit by the impossibility for the French " to follow the destructive and adventurous policy of Gladstone, in order to draw us toward and attach us to the Austro-German group." 24 He wrote to his chief that the step suggested by Germany would wound England and reduce France to vassalage. Nevertheless he believed it would be wise to give Bismarck the satisfaction of agreeing to act " tous et après entente " on the Sultan instead of the Porte. 25 Radowitz, in Paris, urged the plan. " I confine myself," he 22 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I l l , no. 279. 23 Ibid., nos. 280, 283. This proposal was first made by Radowitz, Oct. 23, 1880. 2* Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., p. 202. 25 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol III, no. 282.

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said, " to indicating that Germany has a great desire of entente and common action with you." 29 Saint-Hilaire answered reservedly that such a suggestion should be made to all the powers, the interest which dominated all others was to maintain the European accord and present that to the Porte as a " constant and durable fact." 27 The Chancellor closed the incident with the remark that it would be well to reserve such action for another incident. But the idea, in spite of the gentle refusal of the French minister, seems to have persisted. On November 16th, Radowitz remarked to Saint-Vallier that it seemed to him to be advisable for the agents of the two countries to coordinate their ideas and their actions in order to work in harmony as much toward the Ottoman government as toward their colleagues. The same day Saint-Hilaire placed a memorandum in the archives of the Foreign Office, saying that it was certain that France and Germany were the most disinterested powers in Constantinople and from that fact a rapprochement was natural and an éntente in this case would be extremely useful " as it already has been," still it would be necessary to act in such a way as not to awaken the susceptibilities of the other powers. He instructed his ambassador in Berlin to tell Bismarck that perhaps a too apparent accord would wound the other powers without obtaining politically good results. T o M. Tissot in Constantinople he gave orders to do nothing to compromise the European concert but to agree with Germany every time the situation indicated the need, because " already in one or another precedent followed with firmness and tact, it has produced good consequences." 28 The fleet was still at Dulcigno. Bismarck suggested and France agreed that they should withdraw their ships at the same time in order not to excite the resentment that would result if either withdrew alone. Gladstone proposed that the fleet disperse to points nearby and close enough together that they 26 Telegram quoted by Bourgeois et Pagès in footnote, p. 203. Does not appear in printed documents. Note of Saint-Hilaire to all representatives of France. D.D.F., vol. III, no. 380. 28 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I l l , footnote, p. 261.

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could be united in case of need. F r a n c e felt the idea was f r a u g h t with danger because it would violate liberty of action and would permit Gladstone to realize his goal of permanent military and naval pressure on T u r k e y . Germany shared this view and it was finally agreed t h a t the powers should decide upon a point of reunion in case of need, but each country should direct the dispersal of its own ships before Dulcigno. 29 In this way, Saint-Hilaire f o u n d his way carefully between his desire to cooperate with Germany in their common policy of prolonging the duration of the Turkish empire and his fear of wounding the susceptibilities of E n g l a n d . Several months later, Saint-Vallier summed up the view of his government: As long as we are on good terms with England, the friendship of Germany is precious to us; it is necessary to seek it, to cultivate it; no attempt would be made to render it shameful or humiliating to us because we would not suffer such a thing. But if England is hostile to us, if her hostility encourages that of Italy, then the friendship of Germany becomes indispensable to our security. I stand for this; that we have the friendship of Germany, but not her protection. I wish to be a friend, not a vassal.30 Useful as the good will of Germany would be, it was not to be paid f o r with the hostility of E n g l a n d . This incident is the first of a series of cases where Germany turned toward France when alarmed over some British policy. France, on her side, frequently appealed to Germany when dissatisfied with some British action. T h e attitude of France and Germany toward E n g l a n d came later to be a f a i r l y accurate index of their relations to each other. Neither, however, was ever willing to risk the complete alienation of their British neighbor, and negotiations f o r a common policy invariably ended a t t h a t point. 8 1 In this case, however, Russia and the entire Balkan situation was also involved. France and Germany were both so determined to maintain the status quo in the Near E a s t t h a t it is likely the negotiations f o r j o i n t action would have had another outcome, 2» Ibid., nos. 294, 296, 299, 301, 305. so Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 202. si Ibid., pp. 255-58. D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. III, nos. 3, 7, and 83. XI, Relations with France.

D.O.P.,

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if Russia had shown any tendency to unite with Great Britain. Saburov was at that time inaugurating his work on the project of rapprochement between Germany and Russia—a fact which did not escape the alert French Ambassador. The success of Bismarck's diplomacy in restoring amity between the two emperors kept Russia quiescent and removed the need for active and public cooperation of France and Germany to "influence less disinterested governments." 82 There is further evidence that France shared the anxiety of Bismarck over the effect of the advent of Gladstone on the Balkan situation in the abrupt change in her policy toward Greece. Freycinet had followed Waddington in upholding the Greek Claims to territory vaguely assigned by the protocol of the Treaty of 1878. A second conference was held in Berlin in June 1880. At the request of Austria and England, France suggested a boundary line as a basis for discussion. Bismarck promised to support the French proposition, saying he was indifferent to all Balkans alike, Greek or Turk, Christian or Mussulman. " My only motive is . . . to be faithful to the promise I made to France and to prove my good wishes, to second her views in this affair ; it is the French policy which determines mine." 88 The French line was unanimously adopted and a collective note—also at the suggestion of France—was sent to the Porte, declaring that the settlement was final.84 Austria and England now proposed a joint naval demonstration in case the Porte refused to execute the treaty. Russia offered to send twenty thousand men to secure prompt execution.88 Neither France nor Germany was willing to resort to force. Their ambassadors in Athens warned Greece to act prudently and avoid giving Turkey a pretext to open hostilities.88 82 At this time France refused to surrender the anarchist Hartmann, who was the author of an attempt to assassinate the Tsar. In the serious dispute that followed, Bismarck stood steadily by France, believing that the incident removed the danger of a Franco-Russian alliance for some years. Daudet, I, pp. 191-92. D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I l l , no. 58. sa D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I l l , no. 164. 34 Ibid., nos. 180, 187. 36 Ibid., no. 201. s« D.OJ>., IV, nos. 17-20.

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Greece was intent on occupying the t e r r i t o r y assigned to her. Contrary to the advice of the powers, she continued to make large purchases of war supplies. T u r k e y was ready to launch an attack. T h e German and French cabinets tried to urge moderation on both sides. Tissot was instructed to reveal to T u r k e y the Russian proposal to send armed forces, and Hohenlohe gave the same warning to the T u r k i s h Ambassador a t Paris. 8 7 When the Greek K i n g passed t h r o u g h the city on his way to Berlin, both Freycinet and Hohenlohe begged him not t o send reserves into the disputed territory. T h e K i n g , in t u r n , urged both the French and German governments to b r i n g pressure on the ardent Greek Minister whom he could not control. France was in a difficult position. H e r previous s u p p o r t had led the Greeks to expect material help. 88 I t was said t h a t France had really promised thirty thousand troops. 3 9 T h e Greeks were beginning to mobilize and T u r k e y remained recalcitrant. I n the meantime Gambetta had complicated the situation when in August he had taken the occasion f o r presenting the colors to the navy a t Cherbourg to deliver a patriotic oration which his enemies interpreted as the revival of revenge and a threat of war against Germany. There are moments in the history of nations when the right suffers an eclipse, but in such dark hours, it falls to the people to be masters of themselves without too much dependence on any individual; they must accept all disinterested help but not dominators. . . . Great reparation may come to us and our children. The future lies open to us all. . . . We are reproached with the devotion of too much study to the art of war which shelters our land from danger; yet surely it is no bellicose spirit which inspires this devotion, surely it is needful when we have seen our country lie so low to raise her to her rightful place among the nations. 40 st D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. I l l , nos. 183, 201. 38 Hanotaux, op. cit., IV, 572-74·. s» A British Blue Book published in February repeated these rumors as true. Gambetta was attacked in the Chamber for encouraging the Greeks. He denied that he had given either promises or counsel. „ III, 417. 2« To this statement, Bismarck's marginal comment ( D . G J I l l , 421) is " Richtig." D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. V, no. 372.

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upon which national feelings on both sides were centered. 24 Then he submitted the following concrete points : Since the mutual guarantee of trade could n o t be extended f r o m the equator to Cape Colony, without conflict with other claims, F e r r y proposed to extend the principle to the Congo and its tributaries where France had title on the basis of her treaties with P o r t u g a l , and to the entire west coast on the basis of effectiveness of occupation. I t would be useful, he felt, after the entente between France and Germany had been reached, f o r a European conference to determine the procedure f o r these two points. T o this Bismarck's marginal comment is " Ja." T h e French government also considered it necessary to come to an agreement over the freedom of navigation of the Niger where the erection of a barrier by E n g l a n d was to be feared. France was also desirous of g a i n i n g protection f r o m the encroachment of England on the Gold Coast, where the English occupied the extreme points and refused to admit the right of France to settle in the intervening f r e e space, in spite of claims of twenty years' standing. 2 5 Bismarck was pleased with the French response and late in August he invited Baron de Courcel to Varzin to thresh out the details of the agreement. 26 T h e plan was to use as a point of departure the journey of D r . Nachtigall which had b r o u g h t him in contact with French establishments and to make t h a t the occasion f o r an exchange of views on certain principles to regulate their relations in Africa. Prince Hohenlohe was to be charged t o propose an entente based on the recognition of effective occupation, and as soon as the two governments were in accord, to call a conferai In a letter to Freycinet, dated December 3, 1884, de Courcel states his personal policy in these negotiations: " To pacify the present, to reserve the future. . . . From the beginning of our discussions, I have specified to Count Hatzfeldt and to the Chancellor himself, that there would never be a question between us of Alsace-Lorraine. . . ." Bourgeois et Pagès, pp. 387-88. 25 D.G.P., III, no. 687. 2β On August 24, 1884, Prince Hohenlohe noted in his journal that Ferry had assented to an understanding, " which is certainly not an alliance but a considerable rapprochement." II, 320. D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. V, no. 385.

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enee of all the powers. T h u s at the outset of the discussion the Chancellor accepted two of the principal suggestions of France. H e also ordered H a t z f e l d t to make the instructions to Nachtigall of the most general terms in order not to enter into rivalry with the rights and interests of a friendly nation: " I wish the written reports of Nachtigall when they finally go in may contain more points by which we can withdraw f r o m the claims raised by him. There must be no occasion f o r difference of opinion between the two powers." 28 T h e Chancellor told his guest that he was particularly happy to have recognized with him a ground where the interests of France f o u n d themselves in harmony with those of Germany, and where the two nations could act together. 2 9 " Tomorrow," he said, " we will talk about West Africa, and I declare to you in advance t h a t we shall find ourselves in perfect accord on that g r o u n d . " T h e result of the conversation was the practical acceptance of the propositions submitted by F e r r y . If the expedition of Nachtigall should touch on a French possession, Germany would withdraw all measures incompatible with French interests. I n the entire territory of the f u t u r e Congo state, complete f r e e t r a d e and the recognized r i g h t of preemption were t o be established. T h e f r e e navigation of the Niger was accepted. T h e French possession of a continuous stretch of coast a t Gaboun was recognized, and also the right of France to extend her jurisdiction over northern tributaries of the Congo and to oppose the formation of f u t u r e states in the t e r r i t o r y occupied by de Brazza on the r i g h t bank. 80 A f t e r these preliminaries, official notes were exchanged between Paris and Berlin. 81 H a v i n g thus reached an accord, the two powers sent the following j o i n t note of invitation to all great powers, including the United States, to send delegates to a conference at Berlin: 27 Ernest Daudet, op. cit., II, 62. 28 D.G.P., III, no. 688, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt. 29 Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., Document» Secrets, Courcel to Ferry, August 30, 1884. 30 D.G.P., III, p. 427. D.D.F., Ser. I, voL V, no. 385. 31 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. Y, no. 413.

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The expansion of the commerce of western Africa has suggested to the governments of France and Germany the idea that it would be to the common interest of the nations engaged in this to regulate in the spirit of accord the mutual conditions which would assure development and prevent conflicts. . . . To attain this end the government of Germany in accord with the government of the French Republic proposes that representatives of the different powers interested in the continent of Africa meet in conference at Berlin during the course of the month to reach an entente on the principles which have been announced.82 While warning against the French opportunists who " are temporarily for Germany," the German press found considerable satisfaction in the union of policy, and was inclined to credit the good relations to their own government. " F o r three years," said the Kölnische Zeitung, " the colonial policy of France has met the opposition of England and could not have been successful if Germany had shown a less friendly action and had not taken all precautions that France under no circumstances was to expect anything on the Rhine. The reaction to the attitude of England at the conference was to turn general ill will away from Germany and toward England. There is general talk of an approach to Germany. Slowly an Annäherung to Germany developed which has led to a FrancoGerman agreement in colonial questions, the significance of which is already great, but the principal significance lies in the fact that it was possible at all." 3 3 France, however, was not ready to close the door entirely against England. In his instructions to de Courcel, Ferry said the entente between Germany and France was not to be interpreted as a demonstration against another power, and though he must use every effort to establish the principles of the agreement he must avoid everything which could, except in absolute necessity, place him in opposition to a third power.34 The congress assembled on November 15 and discussions of African problems continued until the end of the following Feb32 Staatsarchiv, X L V , 42, no. 8592. 33 Kölnwehe Zeitung, October 12, 1984. D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. V, no. 446.

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ruary. As the conference proceeded there were moments when the preliminary accord reached at Varzin seemed threatened. Other powers frequently introduced propositions in which Bismarck saw advantage for German commerce but which Courcel, supported by Ferry, viewed as injurious to French rights already established. When a project for commercial liberty was drawn up, Bismarck proposed the appointment of a commission to limit the area to which the principle should be extended. Ferry opposed limitation. The Chancellor declared in anger that if France held to that view it would have been better for them never to have agreed on preliminaries. Germany and England were anxious to make the area as large as possible where their own claims were not involved. France was unwilling to have it extended to the coast lands belonging to her, and insisted that it be confined to the Congo as the preliminary agreement designated. Finally Courcel conceded extension to the line of 5° 12' South, and Bismarck decided not to separate from France, on the condition that she support the extension of free trade from the source of the Congo to the Indian Ocean.85 This was done with much grumbling about the French " appetite f o r land," but the German plenipotentiaries, "evidently obeying orders " according to Courcel, were most friendly toward their French associates and manifested a desire to keep the accord intact. 84 The International African Association with an able representation created dissension by contesting the right of France to certain sections of the Congo Valley. There was some evidence that Bismarck was in sympathy with their claims. This shred of evidence they exploited until they succeeded in giving the impression that the Chancellor was supporting them. As usual the French press seized the opportunity for disparaging the accord, and f o r a time public opinion was aroused to the point of imperiling the entente. Ferry would not yield territory on the left bank which de Brazza had won.87 Courcel was 35 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. V, nos. 455, 458. se Ibid., no. 466. 37 Ibid., no. 477.

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suspicious and impatient, and the Chancellor, if he indeed did feel strongly on the question, did not press the point. The third question which bade f a i r to wreck the accord concerned the formal guarantee of the neutrality of the territory where free trade extended. Such an arrangement would oblige the powers which controlled protectorates in the region to give up the right to make their f r o n t i e r s respected. I t was Mr. Sanford, the American representative, who suggested perpetual neutrality. H e also proposed the construction of a railway skirting the falls of the Congo. Both of these propositions interested Bismarck as an aid to German commerce. B u t not F e r r y — h e opposed them because they involved the territory over which he was quarreling with the Association. 38 H a t z f e l d t expressed regret over the r i f t in the accord. Courcel pointed out that neither of these questions had been touched in the preliminary notes and conversations. H e wrote confidentially to F e r r y t h a t he was convinced t h a t the activity of E n g l a n d with the Chinese problem had alienated Bismarck. B u t again the Chancellor yielded. H e gave u p the plan of neutralization which he earnestly felt would be vitally useful to Germany, rather than risk " p r o f o u n d public disagreement with France and perhaps the failure of his conference." s e Courcel, who never seemed to be able to acquire complete objectivity in his attitude toward Bismarck nor to overcome his resentment of the obvious and honestly voiced motives behind the Chancellor's policy toward France, allowed himself no illusions about the situation : The treatment which England has inflicted on us for several months makes rapprochement necessary for us under pain of the most absolute and dangerous isolation. Germany on her side desires and seeks it. But what are her motives? There are two; the hope of making us forget Alsace and the desire that we detach ourselves definitely and irremediably from England. 40 By the final act, the powers adopted the principle of free trade f o r the Niger and the Congo rivers. T h e y defined the 38 D.D.F., Ser. I, vol. V, no. 482. 39 Ibid., no. 486. Ibid., no. 500.

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conditions upon which claims to the unoccupied territory should become effective. The act also contained an agreement to suppress the slave trade and to encourage and protect missionary enterprises and the welfare of the natives. Enforcement of its provisions was delegated to an International Commission." Its thirty-eight articles stand as the result of serious effort not only to avert dangerous quarrels but to prevent exploitation and injury to the helpless natives. It was a fine attempt at international cooperation. In his address at the last session, Bismarck declared that the nations had taken a great stride forward in the improvement of their relations with one another. They had created a new bond of unity among civilized people. He thanked the delegates warmly for their hard, devoted work and singled out the French representatives for special praise.42 Thus after ten years of patient effort on the part of both governments an accord was consummated. The "united policy " which the two cabinets had finally found and developed was, upon their joint pressure, discussed and adopted by the great powers. France had beyond question retaken her place in the council of the nations. By her side stood Germany. In his speech from the throne in January, the Emperor said, " In agreement with the French government, I have invited the seafaring nations to a conference." " In agreement with France," exclaimed the Allgemeine Zeitung in Munich, " that is indeed more wonderful than alliance with Austria and the intermittent friendship with Russia. To turn a bitter enemy into a friend and advance the interests of a former enemy, that is the highest exemplification of the art of statesmanship." Ten months later another agreement was reached by the ancient enemies on the problem of West Africa. By the terms of the protocol signed on December 24, 1885, the two powers adjusted their boundary difficulties. It will be remembered that the negotiations for the agreement on West Africa were undertaken, and the Berlin Conference had met and adjourned, while «ι Schul thess, XXVI, 43-4.