The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East 9781350988491, 9781786731623

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¨ zyu¨ksel is Professor of History and Political Science at Istanbul Murat O University.

‘In the era of globalization and Great Power rivalry before World War I, construction of railroads not only provided access to raw materials and markets, it was also a means for Germany, Great Britain and France to carve spheres of influence especially in the Middle East. The Ottoman government was also interested in railroad construction in order to bring about political centralization and economic development. Each project unfolded through many stages of coalitions, negotiations and high-level ¨ zyu¨ksel, a leading historian of railroads in the Ottoman politics. Murat O Empire, has skilfully combined Ottoman and European archival sources with secondary materials to produce a fascinating and up-to-date account of the Berlin–Baghdad Railway from 1888 to 1914.’ S¸evket Pamuk, Professor of Economics and Economic History, Istanbul Bosphorus University

THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East

MURAT O¨ZYU¨KSEL

Published in 2016 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com ¨ zyu¨ksel Copyright q 2016 Murat O The right of Murat O¨zyu¨ksel to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Library of Ottoman Studies 47 ISBN: 978 1 78076 882 3 eISBN: 978 1 78672 162 4 ePDF: 978 1 78673 162 3 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Translated from Turkish by Adnan Tonguc Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations Map Introduction

vi vii 1

Chapter One

Historical Development of Railway Construction in the Ottoman Empire Chapter Two The Struggle for the Baghdad Railway Concession Chapter Three From Concession to Constitution (1903– 8) Chapter Four The Second Constitutional Period Chapter Five The Process of Delayed Agreements

42 85 127 170

Conclusion

226

Notes Bibliography Index

240 286 307

8

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Admin.Reg. AfEW B.D. B.D.F.A. B.O.A. CUP D.S.I. G.B.D.S. G.D.D. G.P. HHStA MFA N.A. PA/AA P.D.H.C.

Administrative Registratur Archiv fu¨r Eisenbahnwesen British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 British Documents on Foreign Affairs Bas¸bakanlık Osmanlı Ars¸ivi Committee of Union and Progress Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis, 1911 –14 Graf Benckendorffs Diplomatischer Schriftwechsel German Diplomatic Documents, 1871– 1914 Die Grosse Politik der Europaeischen Kabinette Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of State Archives, National Archives Washington, D.C. Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes The Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons

Map 1

Ottoman Railways. Used courtesy of Tu¨rkiye I˙s¸ Bankası Ku¨ltu¨r Yayınları.

INTRODUCTION

Devant de tells temoins, o secte progressive Vantez-nous le pouvoir de la locomotive Vantez-nous le vapeuret les chemins de fer.1 Very few inventions have influenced the destiny of humankind to the extent that railways have. There can be no doubt that railways have brought about radical change in the economic, political, social and intellectual structures of many societies. While the politics and the ideology of the nineteenth century were determined by the French Revolution, the economic history of the era was determined largely by the British industrial revolution. One of the important dynamics in this process was the tremendous progress achieved in transportation thanks to railways. Railways both introduced the meta-production process to rural areas and contributed extensively to the solution of problems related to labour, raw material and markets. Industrial products manufactured by means of steam engines could be swiftly delivered to far-off markets by locomotives, and raw materials could also be dispatched to industrial hubs. Moreover, railways facilitated the flow of labour from rural to urban areas, thus contributing to the solution of the manpower shortage. The function of the railways was significant not only in that they connected the rural areas of an industrial country to its own market, but also because they tied underdeveloped countries into this chain. Put differently, railways were one of the major determining factors in the formation of the capitalist world economy.

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THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY

The first railway was inaugurated between Manchester and Liverpool on 15 September 1830. In 1832 in France, in 1835 Germany and in 1836 in Belgium locomotives started to operate. Meanwhile, the American continent was in no way lagging behind Europe. In order to grasp the speed of the growth, it should suffice to say that the length of railways, which had totalled around 5,000 miles in 1840, reached up to 500,000 miles in the year 1900. Rails, bridges, viaducts and tunnels had transformed the landscape of the earth. Naturally, the rates of railway construction were not the same everywhere. The speed of this development was very high in industrializing countries, where railway construction was driven by the internal dynamics of their own economies. The more the railways gave momentum to industrialization, the greater the need for new lines to cater to the requirements of industry. In the first two decades of railways, iron and coal production in Britain tripled. This increase is understandable, since approximately 300 tons of iron per mile was required for the rails alone. As railway investments speeded up, it became clear that steel lines were much more durable than iron ones. Therefore, railways became one of the main factors leading to the establishment of the modern steel industry. Production of cheap and high-quality steel paved the way for the development of new industries such as shipbuilding, construction and the heavy chemical industry. In addition to capital accumulation, railways contributed to the establishment of the new lifestyle called capitalism by creating new areas of employment and, with them, needless to say, new problems. In 1847 around 50,000 workers were employed on existing lines, while 250,000 workers were constructing new lines. Thousands of others were producing iron, rails, construction material, locomotives and coal for these railways. By 1907 the number of people working only on the railways exceeded 600,000. For the first time in history, workers were working very intensively and under the same conditions as their peers. This resulted in the first labour movements. Factory smokestacks, clanging rails and mushrooming workers’ districts – all a harbinger of a new era that would be marked by political freedom. Capital accumulation had started to accelerate in the nineteenth century. The capital which was previously exported as external loans then started to gravitate to specific investments in mines, irrigation systems and gradually railways. Railroad companies that engaged in investments

INTRODUCTION

3

abroad received the political backing of governments because railroads provided outstanding means of economic and political expansion. The Ottoman empire was one such area for competition among the imperialist states for investment; yet the foreign companies could not avoid competing with one another to get railroad concessions. Since it first appeared, the Baghdad Railway question was a constant and important element of the agenda of international relations. A country granted a railroad concession by the Ottoman state would gain influence in that region. It was known that railways previously constructed by the British and the French had carried out similar functions. Naturally enough, the Germans would use their concessions in the Ottoman empire for similar aims. Even more so in this case since the railway subject of concession was planned to begin in Istanbul, go all through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia and reach the Persian Gulf. The potential demand of the people living all along this long route and the natural resources of the area – for example the cotton of Adana and Konya or the oil of Mesopotamia – greatly increased the value of the railway. In addition the country controlling the Baghdad Railway would, at the same time, be controlling the route to India. In this study, the defining role played by the Anatolian – Baghdad Railways within the process of development of Ottoman –German relations, has been clearly spelt out. Naturally enough, different parts of German society had different approaches towards the Baghdad Railway. According to official German policy, the railway was a solution to growing imperialist competition. Within this context, the Baghdad Railway was a way for Germany to increase its economic and political influence within the Ottoman Empire. Even a superficial study of German official documents will be enough to show that it was German officials themselves, who viewed railways as a peaceful means of expansion. It is for this reason that supporters of straightforward colonization of the Ottoman Empire, like Alldeutscher Verband, openly opposed official state policy. As for capital spheres led by the Deutsche Bank, which had the railway concession, they supported nationalist policies so long as they contributed to profits. It was for this reason that from time to time they were in disagreement with statesmen like Marschall, who gave precedence to “Germany’s interests” over the profits of banks. Albeit in limited numbers, in German society there were those like Rosa Luxemburg, who analysed the Baghdad Railway enterprise

4

THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY

from the point of view of social class within the context of the exploitation of Ottoman peasants. However, we shall see in this study how even German social democrats did not protest too much in those cases when foreign investments like the Baghdad Railway served a purpose within the context of imperialism. The basic sources of this study consist of Ottoman, German, British, Austrian, American and, in so far as they were translated into English and German, Russian documents. These are documents that I researched in Ottoman, German, Austrian and American archives or that were published by these institutions. Naturally enough, consulate reports make up the most important group of foreign documents. It is obvious that reports sent to their own foreign offices by upper level officials and diplomats, who witnessed events as they unfolded, are extremely important from the point of view of our study. Within this context, reports sent to Emperor Wilhelm, who was at the very centre of the matter, and the notes added by the Kaiser himself to these documents, have contributed greatly to our study. The fact that very frequently we had the opportunity of comparing views written by different British, German or Ottoman sources in relation to the same events has increased the soundness of the conclusions reached by us. Of course it would be unfair not to mention the wealth of information present in Ottoman documents. Not only did the documents I researched in the Ottoman archives have the above-mentioned characteristics, but they were also extremely useful as far as understanding the transformations within Ottoman society, resulting from the introduction of railways, was concerned. During the same time, various articles, brochures and books by scientists, politicians, journalists and associations of all stripes, have been studied since they represented the views concerning railways of a variety of spheres. Apart from all of this, I obviously have tried to study a vast majority of the work of scholars who have distinguished themselves in this field. Among these secondary sources I have to mention the special place occupied by Karl Helfferich’s studies. Helfferich, who took part actively in the Baghdad Railway process and who made it possible for us to shed light on many an obscure point thanks to his threevolume, wide-ranging biography of George von Siemens, managing director of the Deutsche Bank and of the diaries he kept. In 1906, Helfferich was appointed assistant general manager of the Anatolian

INTRODUCTION

5

Railways and, one year later, was elected a managing director of the Deutsche Bank. The Anatolian – Baghdad Railways can be considered to have been the locomotive of Ottoman – German relations; 1888 on the other hand, which was the year when Deutsche Bank was awarded its first railroad concession in Anatolia, can be considered the date when the locomotive started operating. It was following this event that Germany’s presence in the Ottoman empire began to be felt in a concrete way. Before following step-by-step the long route of the Baghdad train, we shall be studying the history of the period, as this will help to better comprehend the process. The social dynamics behind railways built before 1888 have been studied, so as to try and understand the circumstances in which the Anatolian Railway was born. It is because of this same consideration that the historical development of Ottoman – German relations has been stressed, and the meaning of rapprochement from the point of view of both countries has been presented. Following the description in this way of formative circumstances, the “Anatolian Railway” consisting of the Haydarpas¸a – Ankara and of the Eskis¸ehir – Konya lines has been studied in all its aspects within first chapter of this work. The second chapter, which focuses on the struggle waged for the part of the railroad extending after Konya, makes up a rather detailed part of the study. The struggle to obtain the Baghdad Railway concession is a perfect laboratory as far as the comprehension of economic and political history is concerned. Chiefs of state, prime ministers, ministers and diplomats acted in unison with private citizens in the pursuance of this enterprise. The active participation of these people, who directed political and economic life, is one of the concrete signs of the importance of this railroad. Elements like the appointment of as important a diplomat as Marschall to Istanbul and his success there, Emperor Wilhelm’s visit to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid and his famous speech in Damascus, the concession wars, the Kuwait problem, colonization theses, efforts to internationalize railways, the preliminary protocol signed with Deutsche Bank and finally the contract in 1902 are the milestones of this chapter. The third chapter has been dedicated to the period beginning on 5 March 1903 when the Baghdad Railway contract was signed. In consideration of its importance, the 1903 Baghdad Railway contract

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THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY

has been presented in detail. The fact that, even though in 1903 there were also British and French entrepreneurs wishing to take part in this venture and even governments ready to support them, the opportunity for compromise should have been missed made it necessary to analyse this process in detail. This sub-chapter deserves to be read as an exemplary case describing the results of irrational nationalism. In the following sub-chapter, the reasons why for many years not even a single kilometre of rail was laid out, thus dashing the high hopes resulting from the speedy completion of the Ereg˘li line, have been analysed, and the dynamics developing within the framework of the Baghdad Railway, which remained as an international problem up to the declaration of the constitution, have been presented. Beginning from late 1905, Edward Grey and his quadrilateral conference thesis took centre stage within this process. At the end of this process, Germany realized that it had been surrounded by entente powers, but did not lose its hopes that it could break this chain at its weakest point. The fourth chapter describes the transformations resulting from the declaration of the constitutional monarchy. This chapter might be considered interesting since it shows us the increase in importance of internal dynamics within this new stage in the history of the Ottoman empire. The half-hidden opposition to the railway surfaced in the new parliament. Apart from this, the workers of the Baghdad Railway went on strike in an organized way for improved working conditions. All of these were new developments that were not customary for the Ottoman empire. For the first time ever, society and the state came across to new concepts like strikes, the working class and socialism. The other important matter taken up in this chapter concerns the way the change in regime brought about a big transformation in the nature of the struggle for influence of the great powers within the Ottoman empire. With the inclusion of the USA, the struggle for the Baghdad Railway concession became much more complicated. The last chapter focuses on the 1911–14 period when pre-war efforts for compromise continued by means of multilateral negotiations. This chapter will begin with the study of the dynamics behind the process, through which the Germans managed to break the encirclement of the entente powers by unexpectedly reaching an agreement with the Russians, and will continue with the Ottoman– British, German – French, German –British and multilateral oil wars/agreements. One of

INTRODUCTION

7

the interesting ironies of history has been the way that all conflicts related to the Baghdad Railway were solved at an international level by means of multilateral agreements. This notwithstanding, I think it would be a mistake to claim on this basis, as some researchers have done, that the Baghdad Railway matter did not have an effect on the outbreak of war, because it should not be forgotten that the Baghdad Railway continued to be a nightmare poisoning the political atmosphere in Europe for 18 years, beginning from the signing of the preliminary contract. Later developments demonstrate how important it was not only to win the war, but also to sign just and permanent peace treaties. Were all the necessary lessons learnt during and after the struggle for the Baghdad Railway? Present-day developments in the Middle East, with Baghdad still at the centre of the region’s problems, permit only “I am not sure” as the most optimistic answer possible.

CHAPTER ONE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Introduction to the History of the Ottoman Railways The economic structure of the Ottoman empire was not mature enough to support railway construction. Nevertheless, as early as the 1830s, a British officer named Chesney had formulated the very first railway project to be carried out in the Ottoman territory. Given the conditions at that time Chesney’s project, one of those initiatives put by the British to reach out to India through the Persian Gulf, could not be realized. The first railway concessioners in Anatolia were also British, who obtained a concession in 1856 for the I˙zmir – Aydın Railway. The incentives for British capital to construct this line were the raw material resources of the region, and its potential as an assured market for finished goods. However, the company could not complete the first 70 km of the railway in due time. In such cases, even though the agreement entitled the Ottoman government to seize the precautionary money and take over the management of the company, Ottoman authorities instead decided to extend the period by three years. The reason behind the decision of the Ottoman government, of granting additional privileges to the company, instead of enjoying its aforementioned rights, explains the increasing importance attached by Ottoman rulers to railway construction in the country. The same two general reasons that led Ottoman rulers to support railway construction throughout the country

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

OF

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

9

also held true for the Izmir– Aydin region. The first was the hope that railway construction would help ease the financial bottleneck that the country was besieged by. As predicted, between 1856 and 1909, agricultural taxes collected from the regions where the Izmir– Aydin Railway passed soared by 13 times. The second reason was that mounting internal and external unrest could be averted by rapid soldier deployment. Such unrest had an adverse impact on the economic life of the region as well.1 Meanwhile, the British constructed a second railway that would connect Izmir to Kasaba. Thanks to the Aydin and the Kasaba Railways, the British could hold sway over the western Anatolian region very rapidly. Railway constructions were followed by an upswing of the British trade in the region and British investments shifted to other sectors like mining and municipal services. Besides these, the completion of the railway and the newly enforced Ottoman land law in 1866, which enabled foreigners to possess land, led the British to next establish capitalist ranches.2 To a great extent the expectations of Ottoman rulers were also met in that, with the resolution of the transportation problem, security was ensured and production increased.3 Since the period of Ottoman Reform, the Tanzimat, Ottoman rulers had attached great importance to political integration with Europe. The positive atmosphere created in Europe after the Crimean war fuelled the aspiration to construct a railway that would connect the Ottoman empire with Europe. The Tanzimat bureaucrats had underlined the significance of railways for the Ottoman empire in the proposals that they submitted to the sultan.4 Moreover, the 1856 trip of the Ottoman Sultan Abdu¨laziz to Europe with his nephews Murat and Abdu¨lhamid had created a positive influence on the sultan and the princes about railways.5 Therefore in 1869, an agreement for Rumeli Railways was signed with the banker, Baron Hirsch. However, after a short time it was understood that Hirsch did not have the financial capacity to execute such a project. Although the Ottoman empire would in the end have a railway of 1,279 km, these lines would not ultimately be connected to the Austrian network. That is to say, the Ottoman dream to connect to Europe via the railways did not come true.6 In spite of these shortcomings Rumeli Railways nevertheless realized significant military services. According to the contemporaneous historian Engelhardt these

10

THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY

examples indicated how much the Ottoman empire could be successful in the future if it constructed railways in an efficient manner.7 Although the Ottoman empire lacked the capital accumulation necessary to finance railways, and it was short of experienced technical personnel, in 1871, Sultan Abdu¨laziz issued a decree for surrounding the entire Asian territory with a railway network. Because the mishaps with Baron Hirsch had shattered the credibility of private entrepreneurs, the government decided to construct the railway on its own. When the government started laying the rails from Haydarpas¸a to I˙zmit, Abdulaziz realized the difficulties of such a gigantic project. In February 1872, he invited and commissioned the German engineer Wilhelm von Pressel to the Directorate General of Asian Ottoman Railways to design a railway project to meet his goals. Pressel had already proved his merit in fulfilling the missions that he undertook in Germany, Switzerland and the Roumelia railways.8 In the years 1872– 3, Wilhelm von Pressel formulated a detailed railway project, which was 4,670 km in length. In line with the sultan’s requests, Pressel’s project commenced from Haydarpasa and reached Basra.9 In those years, the Ottoman economy was foundering because of the unrestrained debts that it had begun to incur during the Crimean War. At the end of this process, the government had to reduce the interest rate of the internal and external debts by half for five years.10 The government was unable to operate the line that was constructed up to I˙zmit and leased it to a British company for 20 years.11 Apparently, with the bankruptcy of the Ottoman treasury in 1875, Pressel’s project had to be shelved, which marked the end of the dream to construct a railway by government initiative. When a similar project was being prepared by Minister of Public Works, Hasan Hilmi Pasha, in 1880, it was already obvious that initiatives of such scale could not be realized without collaboration with European investors.12 After 1875, European financial circles ceased to apply for concession to the Sublime Porte. It was natural that capital holders were reluctant to undertake new investments on the territory of an empire, which was swirling in a spiral of debt. The revival of European investors’ interest in the Ottoman railways after 1881 can be explained with the establishment of the Office of Public Debts, known as Du¨yun-ı Umumiye.13 This office was in charge of collecting the revenues allocated for kilometre guarantees and reimbursing them to railway

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

OF

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

11

companies.14 That is to say, the existence of the Public Debts Council removed the risks associated with the Ottoman empire’s insolvency. In later years, organic bonds between the railway companies and the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye appeared. Members of the board of directors of the railway companies were also at the same time members of the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye Council. The British representative on the Council, Sir Vincent Caillard, was elected to the board of the Anatolian Railway Company immediately. Major Sir Edward Fitzgerald, who was elected British representative to the Council in 1897 in place of Caillard, was at the same time appointed also to Caillard’s place on the board of directors of the Anatolian Railway Company.15 Managers, who served in both the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye and in a railway company, would naturally enough pursue the interests of the companies whenever there was a disagreement between the Ottoman government and railway companies.16 The elimination of the risks associated with the Ottoman empire’s insolvency once again attracted foreign capital to undertake railway investments in the Ottoman territory. The Sublime Porte started to receive applications for railway concessions one after another. Among these applications were British entrepreneurs like Cazalet and French entrepreneurs like Collas.17 However, the Deutsche Bank was also among the competitors and Abdu¨lhamid would opt for the Germans in granting concession. The Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, which would be constructed by Deutsche Bank, were to become the engine of Ottoman –German relations. By then, imperialist states had to also take into consideration Germany in their competition in the Ottoman empire.

Historical Development of Ottoman – German Relations A) The Bismarck period (1871– 88) Germany managed to establish its union after winning the 1870–1 war with France. At the end of the war Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine and obliged France to pay war reparations. In the following years, Bismarck’s policies were influenced by a concern to prevent France from waging a war of revenge by isolating it within Europe. In any case, conflicts concerning colonial expansion were preventing Britain and France from acting in unison in those years. The powers, the alliance of

12

THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY

which with France would worry Bismarck, were the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. It was for this reason that in 1872 Bismarck reached an agreement called the League of the Three Emperors with the Austrian and Russian emperors. This agreement accepted the European status quo as something that was not to change, and in this way the German– French border was confirmed by Austria and Russia.18 Relations with Russia influenced Bismarck’s attitude towards the Ottoman empire. He did not want problems related to the Ottoman empire to damage relations with Russia. It was during a speech in 1876 at the Reichstag that he pronounced the widely quoted and famous statement “I would not exchange the bones of a single Pomeranian soldier for all of the lands of the Balkans”, that is related to this matter.19 However, the main contradiction of Bismarck’s policy consisted of the impossibility of keeping Austria and Russia within the same alliance. Both countries asked for Germany’s help in the policies they followed against each other in the Balkans. When in 1878, during the Congress of Berlin, Austria sided with Britain against Russia, Russia left the League of the Three Emperors. Following this, Germany understood that their conflicting interests in the Balkans made it impossible to keep Russia and Austria together, and established a new alliance with Austria in 1879. Considering all, Bismarck had reached the conclusion that keeping a united “German Block” was necessary for a permanent and long-term policy.20 Following these developments, Bismarck was able to follow a more flexible policy towards the Ottoman empire. For example, he accepted Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s request for a German Military Commission to help in the reform of the Ottoman army. The intention of using an Ottoman army directed by German officers during a probable war with Russia had led Bismarck to take this decision. Vice-chairman of the General Staff Graf von Waldersee went even further stating that war with Russia was inevitable. It was for this reason that Waldersee championed the idea that the Ottoman army had to be strengthened and turned into an ally of Germany.21 This statement by Waldersee led to conflict with Bismarck, because Bismarck still considered the Ottoman army to be a reserve force to be used in case panslavist and anti-German ideas should gain dominance in Russia, but at the same time he continued to make efforts not to sever ties with Russia more than was absolutely necessary.22 Sure enough, in 1881 he took the opportunity presented by the increase in disagreements

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

OF

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

13

between Russia and Britain and led the way for a restoration of the League of the Three Emperors. In this way, he made sure that in case of a war between Germany and France, Russia and Austria would remain impartial. However, because of contrasts between Russia and Austria in the Balkans this alliance was short lived. It was upon this, and with the aim of preventing Russia from going over completely to the side of France, that he signed a treaty of guarantee with this state in 1887.23 In conclusion we can say that during the time of Bismarck, the Ottoman empire was not very important for Germany. Bismarck’s main worry related to the contrast between Germany and France. It was for this reason that while, on the one hand, he was establishing an alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he was, on the other hand, simultaneously making efforts to at least prevent Russia from going over to the opposing camp. Within this framework, Bismarck did not follow a policy of containment of Russia’s aspirations concerning the Ottoman empire; however, he refrained from actively supporting it. Another aspect of the flexible policy Bismarck followed in the case of the Ottoman empire was his hope that in case of an inevitable conflict with Russia he could use the help of Ottoman armies.24

B) Wilhelm II and Weltpolitik In 1888, following the ascension to the throne of Wilhelm II as emperor, there was a substantial change in Germany’s Ottoman policy. Wilhelm thought that the cautious approach of Bismarck was needless, and opted for an expansionist policy like other imperialist states. As a result of this divergence in opinions, Bismarck had to resign in 1890.25 Germany’s expansionist policy known as Weltpolitik is generally identified with Emperor Wilhelm. But actually, what led Wilhelm to follow a colonialist policy was not so much his personality and political views as the need for new markets and for cheap sources of raw materials of German industry, which had developed enormously in a very short time span. If, in addition to this economic factor, you also take into consideration Germany’s political conditions of the time, you will see that it would have been difficult to follow a different policy, because there was no party that might formulate an alternative policy and stand behind it in a determined way. The SPD (Sozialistische Partei

14

THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY

Deutschland) was not strong enough and, what is more, as far as imperialism was concerned it followed an unreliable policy of compromise rather than a socialist one. The only current with which they might form a political alliance consisted of the liberals, but the liberals were openly in favour of Weltpolitik. As for cooperation between socialists and conservatives, who were not happy with Germany’s policy of strengthening its navy, the fact that in domestic policy matters they had completely opposite views, prevented it.26 Scho¨llgen thought that the source of Weltpolitik consisted not so much of the will of politicians championing this ideology, but rather of the process by which Germany turned into a nation state on the basis of the “verspaetete Nation” (delayed nation) phenomenon. He explained Bismarck’s abandonment of his status quo, preserving practices in favour of Weltpolitik, as a situation resulting from the speedy development brought about by internal dynamics, and studied the matter within the context of the theoretical legitimization and practical application of belatedly having become a world power.27 Also France’s war reparation payments and the annexation of the two rich provinces of Alsace and Lorraine contributed to the speedy industrialization of Germany.28 The development of Germany’s steel and textile industries was in great part due to the contribution of this area. Lorraine’s iron reserves were around 700 million tonnes. While in 1871 1,564,000 tonnes of raw iron were processed in Germany, in 1910 a production of 14,794,000 tonnes had surpassed all European countries. As for steel production, the German empire had surpassed its British competitor with 7,372,000 tonnes as early as 1900.29 Also coal and machinery production increased surprisingly fast. Besides these, the armaments industry had an extraordinary rate of development. The taxable income of Krupp, which was 119 million marks in 1895, rose to 187 million marks in 1902.30 Electricity generation and the chemical industry were also among the sectors getting stronger. The fast rate of growth can be seen also from foreign trade data. German foreign trade, which in 1890 amounted to 7.5 billion marks, had reached the level of 10 billion in 1900 and of 21 billion in 1913.31 During this process of rapid industrialization, Germany solved its transportation problem by means of a rapid expansion of its railway web. In this way, iron production was also supported. The following table summarizes the rapid expansion of the German railway web.32

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Table 1.1

OF

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

15

Expansion of the German railway web.

Years

Length (km)

10-Yearly Increase (km)

1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915

6 2,300 8,290 14,690 27,930 37,650 46,560 56,980 62,410

2,300 5,900 6,400 13,240 9,720 8,910 10,420 5,430

A strengthening German industry provided employment opportunities to an ever-growing mass of people. This notwithstanding, Germany’s population growth continued to be a problem. Beginning from the early nineteenth century, Germans began to emigrate in great numbers, and their main destination was the USA. Chancellor Caprivi, who was appointed in place of Bismarck in 1890, described the situation by saying, “We have to export either goods or people.” Sure enough, Germany’s need for markets and raw materials was growing rapidly as a result of its equally rapid industrialization, and this was straining the pro-peace policy that Bismarck would have liked to follow. The change in the nature of Germany obliged even Bismarck during his last years to take steps concerning the question of colonization; in 1884–5, Germany took over eastern and south-west Africa, Cameroon, Togo and some islands on the Pacific Ocean.33 However the colonies that Germany had managed to take over were far from satisfying the needs of German industry. What is more, Germany had no possibility of expanding its colonies. The reason for this was that Germany had appeared as a capitalist state much later than Britain and France, and by the last quarter of the nineteenth century all lands that could be colonized had already been shared out.34 All of these conditions led the German empire to follow a “policy of peaceful expansion” by various means. With the introduction of the expansionist policy of Wilhelm II, known as Weltpolitik, the importance of the Ottoman empire increased

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enormously. While in the early 1880s Bismarck thought that “It is not worth to read correspondence from Istanbul”, in 1889 the German emperor went in person to Istanbul and visited the sultan. This trip also led to the divergence of opinions between the emperor and Bismarck gaining visibility. Sure enough, Bismarck tried to minimize the effects of Emperor Wilhelm’s visit to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid within the international arena, and did all he could to prevent this trip from leading to an estrangement between Russia and Germany. For example, he tried to ease the worries of the tsar by stating that the aim of this trip was for the emperor to also see Istanbul, once he had gone as far as Athens. In addition to this, the chancellor had added his son Herbert von Bismarck to the delegation, so that he could check the emperor’s exuberance.35 As for Wilhelm, he had used his visit to the Ottoman empire to escape from the shadow of the powerful chancellor. The statement by the kaiser, “I realized that my ministers saw themselves as Bismarck’s employees”, explains very well the conflict between Emperor Wilhelm and Bismarck.36 The following statement by Gooch expresses the matter as seen by Bismarck: “The chancellor hated the emperor for having stopped his projects and never forgave him.”37 For reasons that we shall explain a little further on, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid realized that the visit by the German emperor was an important occasion and received his guests with a care unseen up to then. The sultan had commissioned the building of a special pavilion (Seyir Ko¨s¸ku¨) so that the kaiser and his entourage should be able to follow the ceremony of him going to Friday prayers, and of the Chalet Pavilion (S¸ale Ko¨s¸ku¨), which was a sumptuous mansion, as a residence for the emperor and empress. In other words, the kaiser and his wife lived, as Empress Augusta put it, “in a dream land out of [a] thousand and one nights” for exactly five days and nights.38 When the imperial yacht carrying Wilhelm sailed into the Bosphorus, the German flag was flying on all towers and battlements, and a military band was playing the German national anthem. This enthusiastic welcome impressed the newly enthroned young kaiser. In their meetings, the sultan and the kaiser spoke directly in French without the use of interpreters. Abdu¨lhamid treated Wilhelm as if he were a confidante of his, and complained to him about the imperialist powers’ intrigues aiming to increase their influence within the Ottoman Empire. And with his answer, “my visit must have ruffled them quite a bit”, the kaiser did

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not refrain from going further even than Bismarck had feared. All through the trip, Wilhelm did not miss any opportunity of conversing at length with the German engineer Wilhelm von Pressel about the advantages brought about by railway construction in the Ottoman empire. There was an exchange of extremely precious gifts, and during the farewell banquet the emperor raised a toast to Ottoman–German friendship. In other words, it had become clear that a new actor had joined the Eastern question.39 With its not yet exploited raw material sources and the potential demand for industrial products of its population of more than twenty millions, the Ottoman empire seemed to be the country that could satisfy Germany’s needs. Previously, the Austro-Hungarian empire had been integrated to the German economy by means of a series of commercial treaties. Following this, treaties with Romania made the oil reserves of this country available for the use of German industry. From then on, the Germans set their sight on the vast and virgin lands of the Ottoman empire and most of all of Anatolia and Mesopotamia. As Karl Helfferich stated it, the course of German economic development led Germany to take an active interest in the Ottoman empire.40 In a way, the dream of a “Mitteleuropa” put forward by Friedrich List in the 1840s was coming true. According to many writers, an economic union, the nucleus of which would consist of Germany and Austria, with the Ottoman empire being added to Balkan countries like Romania and Bulgaria, was the objective of Germany.41 Among the writers championing this view, Ernst Hasse, Friedrich Naumann, Anton Sprenger and Paul Rohrbach are the first that come to mind.42 This new programme meant also the abandonment of Bismarck’s principles concerning relations with Russia, because, in a way, competing over this geographical area meant that the ideas of a Greater Russia and of a Greater Germany would clash.43 With the following statement, Ambassador Marschall, who was to play an important role within Ottoman –German relations, implied that for this objective they were ready to wage war: The enormous industrial rise in the United States, English imperialism, and the development of things in the Far East threaten our old and best markets [abroad]. A substitute for that we can only find in the Orient. If political frictions arise from that,

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so be it: that is the price we will have to pay, though we should also be ready to come to understandings in particular instances.44

C) Circumstances of the Ottoman Empire During those years when Germany was searching for raw materials and markets, the Ottoman Empire found itself in extremely dire straits. Since the Ottoman State was not able to pay back its debts, the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye, made up of the representatives of creditor countries, was founded in 1881 with the authority to collect certain important sources of income of the state. This development “was a a humiliating confession of inferiority and incapacity on the part of what had been one of the greatest powers of Europe”.45 The Ottoman – Russian war of 1877 – 8 had shown that the Ottoman empire could not hope to survive without foreign support anymore. The Treaty of Saint Stephen, which contained conditions that were extremely onerous for the Ottomans, contrasted also with British and Austrian interests. Following the intervention of these two countries the Treaty of Berlin, which had slightly better conditions for the Ottoman state, was substituted for the Treaty of Saint Stephen. However, in exchange for blocking the Treaty of Saint Stephen, Britain had taken over the administration of Cyprus. This action by Britain had shown that as a result of the Ottoman empire’s inability to maintain control over its lands, the British government would follow a policy of taking over those Ottoman lands that were of strategic value.46 Sure enough, Britain’s de facto occupation of Egypt in 1882 led to an increase in the suspicion felt by Sultan Abdu¨lhamid and his court towards Britain. However, these steps by the British did not mean that they had abandoned completely their traditional policies towards the Ottomans. Sure enough, Edward Grey was still defining their Ottoman policies as, “preventing the fall and break up of the Empire”. The reason for this was that a final collapse would lead to unsolvable problems, like whose was I˙stanbul going to be, and thus to an inevitable European war.47 There was another reason deriving from domestic policy for the mistrust felt by Abdu¨lhamid towards Britain; he thought that the British were supporting the Young Turk opposition in the country. In his memoirs, the sultan wrote, “The way that the British support the Young Turks at every occasion, is noteworthy.”48 As was to become clear

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later on, an important aspect of Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s approach was to be able to hold on to the Muslim areas of the empire. According to the sultan, the Ottoman empire looked like a majestic sycamore. Losing the provinces in the Balkans meant losing the dead branches. However, it was absolutely necessary to keep the main trunk consisting of the Muslim provinces.49 And with their new policies targeting Muslim areas, the British had directed their attention towards the main trunk. The sultan expressed his ideas on this matter by saying, “The Arab tribes incited by the British are revolting one after the other.”50 Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was justified in not trusting great powers like France, Austria or Italy. France had occupied Tunisia in 1881. The fact that the French were governed as a republic was an additional source of worry for the sultan. He expressed his suspicion of France in the following way: “We find the French to be less attractive than in the past. This is due not just to the fact that they took Tunis from us, but also to the fact that they are governed by a republic, because, as we see it, in a place not governed by a monarch there can be no order.”51 Russia’s goals concerning the Balkans and the Straits, Austria’s goals for the Balkans and Italy’s for Ottoman Africa were well known. Looking at it from this point of view, Germany was the only European country never to have expressed territorial requests concerning Ottoman lands. The fact that there were no Muslim lands among the colonies of the German empire was another significant element in the eyes of Ottomans. The aim of the Ottoman administration was to hide collapse in morale, resulting from economic and political weakness, by means of the dream of assembling the Muslims of the entire world under the leadership of the caliph, against imperialist European countries. It was for this reason that attempts by European countries and most of all by Britain, to incite Muslim nations against the empire, increased the enmity felt towards these countries. The suspicion felt by the sultan on this matter towards Britain can be seen in the following statements: “With the aim of weakening my sovereignty, Britain is spreading the idea of nation within Islamic countries. Without realizing it, Egyptian patriots serve British interests, and weaken the power of Islam and the prestige of the caliphate.”52 As for the Germans, they refrained from such provocations and continued to increase goodwill towards them.

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It was at a late stage that Germany became an imperialist power, but this nevertheless disturbed the balance of power in Europe. It was because of this that Ottoman diplomacy found once more the opportunity of following its characteristic foreign policy based on a careful use of the existing balance in power. Sure enough, later developments led to Germany filling the void created in Ottoman foreign policy by Britain’s exit. Actually, it could be claimed that from the point of view of the Ottoman administration this process had begun with the Berlin negotiations, since the only leader in Berlin who had not requested anything from the Ottoman state had been Bismarck. Even though this attitude had been the result of his foreign policy aiming for stability in Europe,53 it was enough for him to gain the friendship and gratitude of Ottoman administrators. In this way, and probably without realizing it, Bismarck had made the best investment for his country at the Congress of Berlin. The more the enmity of the sultan and of Ottoman administrators against other imperialist countries increased, the more the sympathy they felt towards Germans increased. Rather than resisting German political and economic power from penetrating the country, they welcomed it. Sultan Abdu¨lhamid expressed the personal sympathy he felt towards Germans by saying, “Sometimes they call Turks the Germans of the Orient. And sure enough the character of Germans is similar to ours and it might be because of this that we are turning towards them [. . .] Courage, honesty, courtesy and honesty are properties of Germans as much as they are ours.” It is obvious up to which point a sultan made the Germans’ job easier, and who in his political memories could say, “If, rather than making useless efforts to conquer colonies of no use to herself almost everywhere, Germany had been able to extend its influence to the Persian Gulf, this would undoubtedly have been better for both ourselves and for Germany”.54 The fact that, contrary to Britain and France, the German empire should have had an autocratic government was another element that endeared Germany to the sultan. And sure enough, while the other two states put pressure on Ottoman administrators with their requests for reforms and “democratization”, German diplomats like Ambassador Marschall relieved the anxieties of the sultan with statements like, “Turkey will be [an] autocratic country or it will not be.” According to Marschall, the requests for reforms of Young Turks, who lived in a world

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of dreams, were fantasies with no realistic basis, which would bring about the end of the empire. It was because of these views that in 1899, when the sultan asked for his help, Marschall notified German intelligence and made sure that all information about the “destructive activities” of Young Turks residing outside the empire should be sent to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid. Marschall also praised the sultan’s foreign policy for his ability in “playing the greed of certain powers against one another” within the context of the Eastern question.55 We see that in addition to Ottoman functionaries, intellectuals also were in favour of increased German influence. The following statement by Mehmet Akif is another example of pro-German sentiments brought about by a sense of crisis and despair: “If we are ruined, the key of the east will fall not into the hands of the Germans, but of its competitors. Safeguarding and civilizing the east, advancing towards the east together with the Ottomans, taking over the east for German commerce and industry [. . .] This is a magnificent programme for Ottoman and German governments, who really know what they are doing.”56 The circumstances in which the Ottoman Empire found itself created a mood of readiness to accept the influence of Germany,57 and rapprochement between the two countries became practically inevitable.

D) Ottoman– German economic and military relations Efforts by German industrialists for a systematic penetration of near eastern markets began in 1880 with the establishment of the Deutscher Handelsverein. Before the beginning of Deutscher Handelsverein’s activities, its President Loehnis toured the places that had been targeted as the company’s area of activity. At the end of this tour, Loehnis wrote a book, in which he analysed the potential value for German trade of all the cities he had visited.58 However, notwithstanding all efforts, the company was not successful and Deutscher Handelsverein closed down in 1889. During that period, the cheapest kind of transportation continued to be sea transport. Regular trips between Kiel and Istanbul introduced by German shippers in 1884 and between Hamburg and I˙zmir in 1888 were not successful. The reason for this failure was that Ottoman – German trade had not yet reached the level necessary to justify regular sea trips. The Deutsche Levante Linie, founded in 1889, did not find

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itself in the circumstances suffered by its predecessors and managed to continue with regular trips. The fact that a great quantity of railway material had begun to be transported for the railway being constructed by Deutsche Bank played a great role in the company’s success.59 In addition to this, by carrying for lower prices from various parts of the country to the port of Hamburg the goods being exported to the Ottoman empire, German railways supported regular sea trips.60 After Deutsche Bank was granted the railway concession, the rate of growth of trade between Germany and the Ottoman empire became dramatically high.61 Sure enough, Flaningam, who explained the development of German trade in Ottoman lands on the basis of four factors, underlined the presence of newly available transport facilities as a vital factor. In addition to this he considered the readiness of Germans to provide more favourable credit conditions and lower prices in comparison to their competitors; the fact that they established personal relations with consumers to be one of the other factors leading to their success in this field.62 Even though during the 1880–8 period Ottoman–German trade did not reach very high levels, military equipment exported to the Ottoman empire by the German weapons industry grew at an exceptional pace. This fast growth is one of the results of the activities of a German Military Commission that in 1882 began to reform the Ottoman army. Following the disastrous defeat of the Ottoman empire in the 1877–8 Ottoman–Russian war, the Ottoman government decided that the army needed reforming. Because Sultan Abdu¨lhamid did not trust Britain and France, he decided to grant responsibility for this mission to a headquarters staff from the German army, which had demonstrated its power during the war with France in 1870. The days in May 1880 when Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had submitted an official request for a headquarters staff team to be sent by Germany coincided with Russia’s withdrawal from the League of the Three Emperors and this situation led to the request being accepted by Bismarck. While submitting the request of the sultan to the emperor, Chancellor Bismarck stated his own opinion that in this way their influence over the Ottoman empire would increase.63 In addition to this, the requirements of the German weapons industry increased the attractiveness of such a proposal. The first to be sent to Istanbul in 1882 were Colonel Kaehler, and Captains Kampho¨vener, von Hobe and Ristow. Von der Goltz’s long

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adventure in the Ottoman empire began when in 1883 Sultan Abdu¨lhamid requested a German officer for military training. In 1885, Goltz claimed that German officers had not accomplished anything in the Ottoman army up to then. According to Goltz, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was not actually sincere in his intention to reform the army. This is probable because the sultan lived in constant dread of a plot against him by the army.64 Nevertheless, Goltz did not refrain from pointing out certain defects resulting from the failures of German officers. His main criticism was that these officers were trying to apply the Prussian system to the Ottoman army as it was, without taking into consideration the particularities of the country.65 All this notwithstanding, the contracts with the Germans was renewed in 1885. Why had Sultan Abdu¨lhamid done all he could to renew the contracts, even though the Germans themselves admitted that they were not contributing much to the Ottoman army? A statement by the military representative of Austria in Istanbul can be considered to be a partial answer to this question. According to Baron Wladimir Giesl, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was trying to project an image of readiness for war of the Ottoman empire in the eyes of both friend and foe. Giesl thought that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid perceived the officers at his service, and the great amounts of armaments that began to be bought with their arrival, as the means of establishing an alliance with Germany.66 In 1886, von der Goltz was appointed chief of mission in place of Kaehler, who had died the year before. Goltz’s most important duty was to train the young staff officers in the army. During a 12-year teaching career he had prepared more than 4,000 pages of notes. It could be said that he had played a key role in increasing German influence within the Ottoman army, thanks to the good relations he had established with young officers.67 Beginning from 1883, Ottoman officers were sent to Germany for training, as well as having German officers serve in the Ottoman army. The aim of this was to let European countries know that military relations with Germany were intensifying. In addition to this, the Turkish officers, who returned to their country following their training in Germany, were leading the pro-German current within the Ottoman army.68 The greatest success of the German Military Commission within the Ottoman army had been to open up the Ottoman market to the German weapons industry. The German Krupp company had received orders

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from the Ottoman army even before these developments. However, back then the sale of armaments to the Ottoman state had been dominated by British or French companies like Vicker-Armstrong or Schneider Creusot. It was only after the establishment of a German Military Commission and especially after the successful and intense efforts of Goltz,69 that German weapons manufacturers like Mauser, Loewe and Krupp managed to increase their competitiveness and to gradually become monopolists. The order from Krupp in 1885 of the 500 heavy cannons to be deployed for the defence of the Dardanelles was Goltz’s first big success in winning orders for the German armaments industry. In the years 1889 and 1890, the value of armaments bought from Germany reached a total of 15.3 million marks and from then on the orders of the Ottoman state from Germany continued to increase. Whenever a German officer was sent to the Ottoman empire, Goltz Pasha would have him presented personally to the German armaments monopolists. In 1893, Ludwig Loewe rewarded Goltz for his services to the German war industry with stock certificates.70

Anatolian Railway A) Construction of the Ankara line As a matter of fact one of the above-mentioned weapons agreements played an important role also in Deutsche Bank being awarded the Ankara Railway concession. Since 1897, Alfred Kaulla, director of Wu¨rttembergische Vereinsbank and also sales director of Mauser,71 had been carrying out negotiations for a big arms deal in Istanbul.72 During this process, he met Wilhelm von Pressel, the General Director of Ottoman Railways. For years, Pressel had been applying to strong financial institutions in Germany, Britain, France and Italy so as to finance the railway project that he had prepared for the Ottoman empire, but he had not had success. Wilhelm von Pressel told Kaulla about his own project and about the details of his applications to the Sublime Porte and had convinced him of the need to begin negotiations with Ottoman functionaries.73 Among the first persons to whom Pressel had applied there was George von Siemens, managing director of Deutsche Bank. However, as a result of the aloofness towards the Ottoman empire in German official policy in those days, Siemens had not shown any interest in the project.

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However, after various negotiations Kaulla managed to get Siemens interested in railways to be constructed in Anatolia. Finally on 9 August 1888, Siemens notified Kaulla that he had accepted to try and receive a concession.74 Kaulla’s convincing style played a role in Siemens taking this decision. Kaulla provided detailed explanations about the seriousness of the sultan concerning railways and about the privileges that he was ready to award. In addition to this, the fact that the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye was a guarantor of the kilometre guarantees was another important factor in the eyes of Siemens. Before beginning the process, Siemens wrote on 15 August to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to learn the ministry’s view about this matter. The general director was asking whether or not there were political problems concerning the request for a concession and asked to have the German embassy in Istanbul support Kaulla, who was going to carry out the negotiations.75 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered on 2 September stating that the consulate in Istanbul had been asked to provide Deutsche Bank managers all the support they needed. However, it was also stressed that laws regulating investments in Ottoman lands were inadequate, and that such investments were quite risky because of the insecure environment resulting from internal and external circumstances. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated clearly that in those cases the German empire would provide no support, and that responsibility for this kind of risk would rest solely on German entrepreneurs.76 The Ankara Railway concession was signed on 4 October 1888 by the Ottoman government and Deutsche Bank. The fact that Deutsche Bank granted a 30 million mark credit with an as low an interest rate as 5 per cent, played a very important role in the parties reaching an agreement in such a short time.77 A while before this agreement, credit request by the Sublime Porte was rejected by the Ottoman Bank. A great part of the credit granted was used for the Ottoman state’s weapons purchases from Germany. In this way Kaulla killed two birds with one stone. The contract established the construction and operation conditions of the 486 km I˙zmit – Eskis¸ehir– Ankara line. As part of the concession agreement, the Haydarpas¸a– I˙zmit line was also transferred to Deutsche Bank for 6 million francs,78 despite the fact that the Haydarpas¸a– I˙zmit line had been leased in 1880 to a British company. The awarding to Deutsche Bank, of the concession for this line, created a legal conflict

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between the British company and the Sublime Porte, and the British put pressure on the Ottoman administration through various means, including the press. For example, on 11 January 1889, the Financial News published an article claiming that by transferring the line to the Germans, the Ottomans had done something against the law, since the Ottomans had transferred the concession to Deutsche Bank without any consultation with the British, even though in the contract, precedence in case of an extension of the line had been granted to the British.79 Finally, in an Ottoman document dated 1 August 1894, it was stated that the parties had got closer to an “auspicious result” as far as the indemnity to be paid to the British company was concerned.80 In conclusion, following long negotiations, an agreement was reached on the amount to be paid by the Sublime Porte.81 The concession of the Ankara line had been granted for 99 years, and the construction time had been set at three years. The kilometre guarantee of the Haydarpas¸a – I˙zmit line, which had previously been constructed, had been set at 10,300 francs, and of the I˙zmit – Ankara line to be constructed at 15,000 francs. However, if operational incomes were to be above 15,000 francs, 25 per cent of this was to be transferred to the Ottoman treasury. In addition to this, the railway company was granted the right to prospect for minerals and fell trees within an area extending for 20 km on both sides of the line. The source for the guaranteed payments consisted of the tithe income of the provinces of I˙zmit, Ertug˘rul, Ku¨tahya and Ankara, through which the line was to pass. Du¨yun-ı Umumiye was to collect these taxes and pay the railway company.82 The consortium, which was going to construct the I˙zmit – Ankara line, consisted of Deutsche Bank, of Deutsche Vereinsbank and of Wu¨rttembergische Vereinsbank. On 23 March 1889, a joint-stock company called the Socie´te´ du Chemin de fer Ottoman d’Anatolie was founded. Otto von Ku¨hlmann, who had been operations director of the Rumeli Railways, was appointed general manager of the company.83 The capital of the company consisted of stock certificates for a value of 45 million francs, of which 60 per cent were paid up.84 The agreement with Graf Vitali, which was known as being specialized in its field, was signed on 23 March 1889 for the construction. However, Siemens also wanted a German company to take part in the construction of this first railway in Anatolia. It was because of

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this that it was decided that together with French Vitali the German Philipp Holzmann Company would also take part in the railway construction. The companies formed a company called Gesellschaft fu¨r den Bau der Anatolischen Bahnen. By taking part in the construction of the Ankara line, Philipp Holzmann gained experience for the Ankara– Konya and Baghdad line construction that was going to be carried out later by Deutsche Bank.85 The British representative in the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye Council, Caillard, was made a member of the company’s board of directors. The aim of this was to have favourable relations between the company and the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye. Caillard’s services to the company were a concrete example of the close relations between the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye and European capital investing in the Ottoman empire.86 In 1889 Wiener Bankverein joined the consortium led by Deutsche Bank. The consortium made a new move and took over the control of the railways that Baron Hirsch had set up in the European lands of the empire.87 Of the 100,000 stock certificates of Hirsch, 88,000 were bought by the consortium. That Deutsche Bank should have taken over the above-mentioned Istanbul – Edirne – Plovdiv – Bellova line, was very important from the point of view of the railways it was going to construct in Anatolia, because with the arrival to Istanbul on 4 October 1883 of the train that would later become famous as the Orient Express, the capital of the Ottoman empire had been connected by rail to the important cities of Europe.88 There were many celebrities among the first passengers of this train that was later to be the subject of various adventure novels and films. Belgian Minister of Public Works M. Ohlin, novelist Edmont About who was later to write a book about Istanbul and Henry Stefan Opper de Blowitz who was the first foreign journalist to interview Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, were a few of these.89 In addition to the Rumeli Railways, the consortium was granted a new railway concession for the 219 km Salonica– Manastır line. According to the contract, which was signed on 28 October 1890, the concession was for a 99-year period and the Ottoman government undertook to pay a 14,300 franc per kilometre guarantee. The guaranteed payments would be done by the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye, and the source would be the tithe income of the Salonica and Manastır. In this way, Germany, which up to 1888 did not possess a single kilometre of railway line in the Ottoman

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empire, had become by late 1890 the holder of around 2,000 km of railway concessions. Holding the concession for the construction and operation of such a vast web of railways brought with it financial, administrative and political problems. Most important of all, majority control in the abovementioned railway operations had to be maintained. The facts that the concessions had been obtained in an extremely competitive environment and that Ottoman railways were of a nature that was political as much as it was economic, made it important to own a majority of stock certificates. So as to solve this kind of problem, the consortium led by Deutsche Bank founded in the second half of 1890 a bank called Bank fu¨r Oriantalische Eisenbahnen; up to 1907, it kept all its stocks in this bank, which had its headquarters in Zurich. The 88,000 stocks bought from Baron Hirsch were included in this. Beginning from 1907 the stocks began to be sold in the market. However, the majority was still held.90 Construction work proceeded quickly under the energetic management of Otto Kapp, and the 50 km I˙zmit – Adapazarı line was inaugurated officially on 2 July 1890.91 In his speech during the inauguration, Raif Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, expressed his wish for the German company to extend this railway as far as Baghdad.92 According to Ambassador Radowitz’s report about the inauguration of the line, Georg von Siemens, Kaulla, and Ku¨hlmann, as well as a “great part of Turkish officials”, were present at the inauguration ceremony. Radowitz stated that notwithstanding all the efforts of the French to obstruct the project, railway construction work was continuing with success. According to him, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid and other officials were quite satisfied with the work of Germans. It is for this reason that they wanted to begin negotiations with the Anatolia Railway Company for the extension towards Mesopotamia of the railway, as soon as possible. The “good” note added by Emperor Wilhelm II at exactly this point of the report was a concrete sign of the importance he attributed to the construction of railways in the Ottoman Empire.93 In consideration of the positive evolution of its relations with the Ottoman state, the German empire signed a new commercial treaty with it in 1890; and was the first and only country to do this. However, article 35 of agreement stipulated that for the treaty to be valid, the other countries had also to sign agreements with the same conditions.94

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This article meant that the treaty was of no practical value, since the other European countries were not going to sign new trade agreements along these lines. As a matter of fact the Germans had used an opportunity to be courteous to the Ottoman state without incurring any cost.

B) Extension of the Ankara Railway 1) New applications That the Anatolian Railway would not end in Ankara was a truth known by all those pursuing concessions in the Ottoman empire. Sure enough, on 9 February 1889, a “company with the aim of obtaining a concession for the construction of a railway between Ankara and Baghdad was formed by respectable capital holders of America” even before work for the Anatolian Railway had begun. Ottoman officials decided to “invite the company representative with no undertaking to negotiations” so as to increase their negotiating power vis a` vis the Anatolian Railway Company.95 In 1891, a Belgian– French group applied for a concession for the Samsun– I˙skenderun Railway. The applicants had brought a reference letter from the king of Belgium. In his letter, King Leopold praised the Belgian applicants and stated, “I hope that Your Magnificence will deign to accept this application of my subjects for a concession.”96 The other concession application from Belgium was the one submitted by Member of Parliament Baron de Makar. The baron had stated that if the sultan so wished, he could have connected the railway he wished to construct between Samsun and Sivas with the Anatolian Railway. He undertook not to damage any of the rights of the Anatolian Railway Company while doing this.97 However, in a letter dated 6 October 1891, the Anatolian Railway Company listed the disadvantages from their point of view of the concession requested by the baron and stated in very clear terms their opposition to this concession.98 Consequently, the Sublime Porte stated that the construction of the Baghdad Railway had precedence and rejected this application.99 Also in 1891, Staniforth presented a proposal that might have been in competition with the Anatolian Railway Company. The railway that this British entrepreneur, who enjoyed the support of the British ambassador, wanted to construct was supposed to begin in Ereg˘li and through Ankara

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to extend to Baghdad. As for the aim of a French group led by the Belgian Nagelmakers, it was to extend an existing railway from Mudanya to Bursa, as far as Konya over Ku¨tahya.100 In that same year, another interesting application was the one submitted by a Parisian entrepreneur named Charles Cotard, for the construction of a railway between Samsun and Sivas. In a letter to the Sublime Porte, dated 8 April 1891, Cotard “dared to submit” his availability to construct the railway without asking for kilometre guarantees, and in extremely courteous language expressed his surprise at “the Sublime Porte’s preference for the other offer” this notwithstanding. In a report he wrote on this subject, S¸akir Pasha claimed that Monsieur Duparchy’s representative Cotard’s offer was not realistic, and that the true aim of the application was to eliminate its competitors. It was for this reason that the pasha asked for a “big bid bond” to be requested from the Duparchy group.101 Apart from these, it seems that in 1892 another American company made a serious attempt for a railway concession and that it enjoyed the full support of the imperial adjutants, the Dervis¸ and S¸akir pashas. In a letter dated 19 July 1892, the pashas repeated the requests that they had already expressed in their report dated 27 June, and having stated that the company had made the best possible offer.102 The representative of the company interestingly stated that because they were American their offer did not present “any kind of political problem” for the Ottoman state. Upon this, in a report they wrote on 7 September, the Dervis¸ and S¸akir pashas renewed their request for the aforesaid company. According to the pashas, “the active presence of such a strong company would at least contribute to the other companies’ conditions and offers” being better for the state. However, the insistence of the pashas was of no use, and in his answer in the name of the sultan to the report of the two, Chief Secretary Su¨reyya stated that no other offer would be taken into consideration until the Germans made an offer for the construction of the Baghdad line.103 Meanwhile, there were also officials that claimed that due to its military/political importance, the Baghdad Railway should be constructed by the state. For example, in one of the reports written to the sultan, the fact that the Germans’ proposals contained onerous conditions was underlined.104 However, both this kind of view and also requests for concessions containing favourable conditions were not enough to prevent

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Sultan Abdu¨lhamid from granting the concession to the Germans. When in February 1892, the ambassador in Berlin met Siemens and asked him about Deutsche Bank’s intentions, the director of Deutsche Bank stated, “the construction of such a big and important railway will be a source of pride not just for the Ottoman Empire, but also for Germany, and the completion of the construction will require a lot of time and cash”, but the Emperor was ready to provide them with the necessary support.105 Two months later, the sultan expressed very clearly to Goltz Pasha his wish for the Germans to continue with the construction of railways in Anatolia, and praised the railway work of Deutsche Bank.106 2) The Ankara Railway and the urban/social transformation Meanwhile, by late 1892 the Anatolian Railway had reached Ankara over Eskis¸ehir. Since German ideologues considered Anatolia to be Germany’s source of raw materials and outlet for its products, they wrote many travel stories and studies within this context, especially after the completion of the Ankara Railway. Thanks to these travel notes, we have the opportunity to observe, albeit partially, the urban/social transformation underwent especially by Eskis¸ehir and Ankara, as a result of the construction of the railway. A point on which all the travellers like Schlagintweit agreed was that Eskis¸ehir’s importance was gradually increasing as a result of meerschaum production. In his travelogue, Schlagintweit wrote that Eskis¸ehir consisted of a new and an old city, with only Turks living in the old city. As for the new city, Tartars, Armenians and Greeks lived there, as well as Turks and refugees from Rumeli. Schlagintweit also mentioned a settlement where Europeans, including mainly his own compatriots the Germans, lived. This settlement had been established around the train station. The writer claimed that this complex demographic structure of the city was an ideal area for ethnographic studies. Schlagintweit wrote that the most interesting places to see were the shopping district in the area inhabited by Turks of the new city, and the hammams.107 Along the lines of Schlagintweit’s statements it was said in Servet-i Fu¨nun on 22 July 1893 that the city had developed quite a lot during the previous year, that a new station building and new houses had been built at a distance of 15 minutes from the city centre, that new shops had opened, that a macadamised road had been paved between the city and the station and that newly built homes had begun to embellish the two

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sides of this new road.108 Grunzel, another researcher to make a study trip to the area had stated that nowhere else had railway construction led to such a high rate of building construction as it had done here. In a very short time a big neighbourhood inhabited by Europeans had sprung up around the station. The refugees of the 1877 – 8 war had been settled in another part of the city, with the result that an important neighbourhood consisting of newly constructed buildings had appeared.109 In those days, Eskis¸ehir’s population was of around 15 – 20,000. Apart from meerschaum, also sugar, leather, textile, silk yarn and brick manufacturing were other important items of the city’s economy. The high rate of population increase in Germany, and the consequent increase in the need for food, had led Germans to introduce potato cultivation in the Eskis¸ehir area, as well as laying out a railway. Following this, potato cultivation had fast spread and the crop had grown.110 The Germans had built with great care a station building and they had also set up a big repair workshop. Right beside the station building “they had built a school for the education and instruction of the children of railway employees and workers”. Children of Ottoman subjects could study at this school, as well as the children of the German colony in the city.111 In 1905, a reporter for the Berliner Tageblatt wrote, when he had the opportunity of visiting, that he had noticed that this 120 student school had a very high level of education and was financially sound thanks to the support of the Baghdad Railway Company.112 Also Professor Diering, who consentrated on this matter, said that there was an absolute need for schools with specially trained teachers educating pupils both in German and Turkish near every station, and stressed the importance of speaking German all along the line.113 Another German traveller, Karl Kaerger, observed that establishing a German consulate in Eskis¸ehir would be extremely useful from the point of view of colonization by German settlers.114 In conclusion, Eskis¸ehir was one of the important milestones of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, which were the most basic means of Germany’s policy towards the Ottomans. “On November 27, 1892, the first train of the Anatolian Railway Company covered with flowers and Ottoman flags reached the station of Ankara.”115 In those days, Ankara was headquarters of the 16th Army Corps and an improvement in law and order in the city was observed

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after the arrival of the railway. The rise of both the income items of the provincial budget and also of tithes and of other tax items116 was a result of the production-increasing effect of the Ankara Railway. And what is more, the refugees from the Rumeli lands that the Ottoman empire had just lost, who were more expert in agriculture, had been settled all along the line, thus solving the problem of population scarcity.117 The administrators of the Haymana, Aziziye and Mihalic cik counties of Ankara stated that there were lands suitable for the settlement of refugees also in their own counties and that this practice would bring about great “advantages and beauties” and “begged” for refugee families to be sent to their counties for resettlement.118 All these steps, together with the transport and irrigation advantages brought by the railway, turned the area into a grain source, and a short while later, Istanbul’s need to be fed by means of wheat imported from Russia and Bulgaria ended.119 From 1893 onwards, both agriculture and animal husbandry improved visibly in the areas crossed by the railway lines.120 However, the fact that railway equipment was not being produced within the empire, but being imported from foreign countries, meant that the railway construction’s function of encouraging industrialization, had not worked within the context of the Ottoman economy.121 3) The concession is once more granted to Deutsche Bank and the reactions of the Great Powers Even though Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was strongly in favour of an extension of the line, the Anatolian Railway Company preferred to follow a prudent policy. The letter written a while before the lines reached Ankara by General Director Ku¨hlmann shows very clearly the approach of the company. Dear Raschdau, Thinking that the railway can be extended to Baghdad now, is nothing but a silly dream [. . .] The line that has been constructed should be able to pay back with its income the interest of bonds issued and the depreciation costs, within a few years [. . .] This is why, precedence should be given to the construction of lines, the construction costs of which are not too high [. . .] In the case of the Eskis¸ehir– Konya railway for example, this railway can not only be

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constructed for a lower cost, but can also attract a lot of traffic [. . .]122 The approach of the German ambassador that made an analysis of the statement to Ottoman officials on 6 February 1892, was, even if only for tactical reasons, more hopeful: I state and guarantee that we are making efforts and applying care at a maximum level to construct the Baghdad Railway [. . .]. We shall also strive to find the enormous capital needed for this venture, the exact amount of which will depend on the results of the survey, at the most advantageous conditions, and in connection to these efforts His Majesty the Emperor has already asked the help of Germany’s greatest capital holders [. . .].123 The railways, for which in November Kaulla had asked for concessions from the Sublime Porte, were, just as Ku¨hlmann had proposed, the Ankara – Kayseri and the Eskis¸ehir – Konya lines. In this way, the number of new applications had risen to four by late 1892. Also in this case, the German Foreign Office had provided all its support to the Anatolian Railway Company. According to information sent by the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, German officials had provided guarantees concerning the fact that the group of banks led by Deutsche Bank “was reputable enough” and had “a sufficient and big capital” to a degree that would permit them to extend the existing line as far as Baghdad.124 In his report Ambassador Radolin provided detailed information about the requests for concessions of Staniforth, Nagelmakers and Kaulla. Radolin’s claim was that in all three cases the applicants for concessions were behaving in bad faith by proposing attractive conditions that they could not realize. Radolin stated that there was no way that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid would grant a concession to the British, because the sultan thought that a railway extended by them from Anatolia towards India would provide the British with the opportunity for a second Egypt. This being the situation, the only remaining competitor was the French group led by Nagelmakers.125

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In a wire he sent to Abdu¨lhamid in July 1893, Nagelmakers stated that they had the “capital necessary for the purchase of the construction of new lines”, that they had even “established a railway operations company” and that their engineers “were about to finish their surveys of the certain routes of ancillary lines”, and finally and insistently had renewed their request for the concession to be granted to them.126 Nagelmakers proved that he was a tough competitor when in February 1893 he bought a majority share in the British owned I˙zmir –Kasaba line and gained control of it.127 Actually, Nagelmakers’s offer to construct the I˙zmir – Kasaba line without asking for kilometre guarantees to Konya had convinced some Ottoman officials and consequently German capital had begun to worry. For example in the report dated 1 December 1892 that he sent to the sultan, Grand Vizier S¸akir Pasha, had openly criticized the awarding of the concession to Kaulla for a high kilometre guarantee, even though the alternative of constructing the line without paying kilometre guarantee existed.128 Nagelmakers’s application must have been taken seriously by the Anatolian Railway Company, because in a letter it had sent to the Sublime Porte, the company had stressed the fact that the offers of the French would damage both the Ottoman state and the railways that they were constructing, but that if the concession were to be granted to them it would be the Ottoman state to gain from this, as much as themselves.129 Deutsche Bank’s requests to extend the Anatolian Railway to as far as the provinces of Konya and Kayseri, led to intense efforts by the French and the British to prevent this. In his letter submitted to the sultan on 12 January 1893, French Ambassador Chambon was openly asking for “railway concessions in other parts of Anatolia to be granted to French capital holders” so as to compensate for the concession granted to the Germans. In this way, “not only would His Majesty the Sultan be relieved of certain serious political problems, but there would also be the added advantage that French public opinion would be extremely grateful for the masterful solution of such an important problem”.130 Five days before this date, Chambon had personally gone to the Sublime Porte and had spoken to the grand-vizier, in a tone as if calling him to account for not having granted the concession to Nagelmakers. Following this, “he had been told in appropriate terms that foreign ambassadors’ pressure on the Sublime Porte for this kind of domestic and public work affairs was a

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source of sadness and disappointment”.131 Helfferich wrote that Chambon had defined the rejection of the requests for concessions as a show of disrespect towards the Republic of France.132 It seems that Chambon’s efforts to hinder Deutsche Bank’s activities continued also after it had been awarded the concession. For example, he had opposed the handling by the French Lyon Bank of the bonds issued for the Eskis¸ehir– Konya line, and he had accused Lumvani, the director of the bank, of “serving Germany” and of not being worthy of “French honour”.133 The reaction of the British was even harsher than that of the French. First of all, on 12 December 1892, the interpreter of the British embassy had gone to the Sublime Porte and asked not to be in a hurry in granting the concession, because “the concession of the Konya Railway would have deleterious effects on British interests”.134 Following this, on 5 January 1893, Sir Clare Ford, the British ambassador, officially notified the Sublime Porte that their view was that the granting to Germany of the Konya concession would damage British interests.135 Clare Ford threatened the Ottoman administration with sending the British Fleet to I˙zmir.136 The British ambassador was also supported by the Russian and French ambassadors. Additionally, the British press was angry that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid should have granted the Konya concession to the Germans, even though it was the British who had constructed the first railway in Anatolia and who consequently had precedence in the concessions for Anatolian Railways.137 A report sent to the office of the grand-vizier on 26 August 1890 shows clearly that the Ottoman administration was determined not to grant the concession to the British in spite of these threats.138 Following this strong opposition by the British and the French, Radolin wrote an article in Ko¨lnische Zeitung on 3 August 1893. Radolin commented about the negative effects of opposition towards them, in the following way: The political intrigue and attempts carried out in relation to the concession for the extension of the Anatolian Railways are of a kind never before seen. This matter, which is a purely commercial matter, has been turned into a great political matter and things have gone so far that Britain has even uttered threats about cutting

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off ancient and friendly relations. The French have been requesting concessions to them, to compensate concessions granted to German capital holders. As for the British State, it has been uttering threats. Things had got to such a state that the claims of Germans were about to be rejected.139 As for the Russians, they expressed their worry that the tithe income of the province of Konya that had been set aside to pay war reparations to them would be used to pay the guaranteed payments for the Konya Railway. Russia’s real problem was not as in the case of Britain and France that the railway would be constructed by the Germans, but that railway construction in Anatolia would strengthen the empire. The strengthening of the Ottoman state was contrary to the Russian empire’s traditional policies aiming for the break-up of the Ottoman empire. The Russian press claimed that in the long-term the Anatolian Railway would threaten them militarily. For example, the Nvoye Vremya claimed that if the Anatolian Railway were to be extended to Erzurum, the Ottomans would gain an advantage towards them.140 It was impossible for the sultan not to be influenced by the pressure originating from Britain, France and Russia. Ambassador Radolin wrote that Abdu¨lhamid had told him that at night he could not sleep, because of the above-mentioned threats.141 The resistance of Britain was finally broken after a series of meetings between German and British officials. The threat by German officials that they would stop being so understanding towards Britain’s policies in Egypt played a key role in breaking British resistance.142 As for the softening up of resistance by the French, Abdu¨lhamid had granted the I˙zmir – Kasaba Railway Company the concession to extend their railway to Afyon. A short while after Deutsche Bank had received the Konya concession the French received also the Beirut – Damascus – Aleppo Railway concession.143 After having softened up British and French reactions, the Anatolian Railway Company and the Ottoman government signed on 15 February 1893, the contract for the Ankara – Kayseri and Eskis¸ehir – Konya Railways.144 As you can see, on this occasion, the consortium led by Deutsche Bank had not been able to obtain the railway concession as easily as the case had been in 1888. The identity of those competing for concessions

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proved that the construction of railways in Anatolia was not just an economic, but also to a high degree a political matter. Sure enough, the heroes of the struggle for concessions had not been just railway company administrators, but also high level officials from the foreign offices and from other public bodies of the interested states – including especially their embassies in Istanbul. That von der Goltz Pasha, Ambassador Radolin, Prime Minister Caprivi and even Emperor Wilhelm should have personally taken part in the struggle to obtain the concession, are all concrete examples confirming the abovementioned observation. 4) The Eskis¸ehir – Konya Railway According to the new concession, the tithe income of the Trabzon and Gu¨mu¨s¸hane provinces would be used to pay for the 13,800 francs kilometre guarantee set for the Eskis¸ehir– Konya Railway.145 However, in consideration of the difficulties in which the Ottoman treasury found itself, the company accepted to renounce the part of the 13,800 franc kilometre guarantee exceeding 5,000 francs.146 In later years, this counter-guarantee was amended in favour of the Anatolian Railway Company. The Eskis¸ehir – Konya Railway Construction Company was founded in March 1894. Philipp Holzmann was active in the new company, but on this occasion, Vitali’s French company was not taking part.147 From then on, many German engineers would come to the Ottoman empire to work on the railway construction, and remain there for many years. The reasons encouraging these engineers to work far away from their motherland, and what is more in rather difficult conditions, were the attractiveness of the remuneration and the potential of a professional career in the mysterious atmosphere of the East.148 As work for the construction of the Konya Railway was beginning, the German researcher Kurt Zander, who would later become general director of the Anatolian Railway Company, was publishing his first study of Anatolian railways. Zander had calculated the amounts of aˆs¸aˆr (tithes) collected in the areas crossed by railway lines in operation. Increases in taxes showed that production had increased, since tithes were a kind of tax collected in proportion to production. According to Zander’s calculations, the situation in the provinces of I˙zmit, Ertug˘rul and Ku¨tahya, and Ankara was as follows:149

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Table 1.2

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Increase of tithes in the provinces crossed by rail line.

Years

Increase in tithe

Increase from income (in kurus¸)

1889 (%)

3,329,098 4,499,357 3,989,947 4,158,271

32.14 78.60 58.33 65.06

7,600,018 10,839,192 11,496,365 11,828,034

13.55 23.29 30.76 34.54

2,214,349 3,646,711 4,962,933 5,521,247

33.03 13.77 54.83 72.25

I˙zmit Province (1.3.1889 –28.2.1890)

2,519,220 (1890 –1) (1891 –2) (1892 –3) (1893 –4) Ertug˘rul and Ku¨tahya Provinces (1.3.1889 –28.2.1890) 8,791,536 (1890 –1) (1891 –2) (1892 –3) (1893 –4) Ankara Province (1.3.1889 –28.2.1890) 3,205,244 (1890 –1) (1891 –2) (1892 –3) (1893 –4)

As you can see, Zander was claiming that railways supported production in the area. This view was mostly true. However, one should be cautious and not attribute all of the increases in tax income in the area to the effect of railways, because the increases shown by Zander were in part due to a general increase in prices and to more effective tax collection by the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye. We should also notice that in the provinces of Trabzon and Gu¨mu¨s¸hane that were not connected to the railway, there had been great increases in the tax collected, once Du¨yun-ı Umumiye officials had begun tax collection.150 However, it is also certainly true that the Anatolian Railway had begun to satisfy Ottoman administrators’ expectations concerning security, production and consequent increases in taxes, from the very first years of operation of the railways. We have already underlined with examples the effect of the settlement policy as far as increase in

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production was concerned. As an additional example that the policy of settling refugees from Rumeli all along the line continued uninterruptedly, is the Council of Ministers decree dated 20 December 1900. In this decree, the sources from which the financing of “the daily allowances and other essential expenses of the Bosnian refugees, whose settlement along the route of the Anatolian railway had been decided [. . .] and of the houses being built and of the grains for food and agriculture and of the agricultural implements” would be carried out, were listed.151 All these measures, together with the transportation and irrigation advantages brought by the railway, turned the area into an agricultural powerhouse and, what is more, the prices of land had risen. Ottoman peasants had managed to double, and in places to triple, wheat production and, thanks to the railway, were able to market surplus wheat in other areas; even the Ottoman army was being fed with bread made of Anatolian flour.152 Work on the Eskis¸ehir – Konya Railway was successful just as in the previous cases, and the rails had reached Konya station on 29 July 1896. In this way the due date indicated in the contract had once more been respected. From then on it became possible to travel from Istanbul to Konya on trains the average speed of which was 23 – 28 km per hour,153 and to reach Konya in two days.154 By then, the consortium led by Deutsche Bank owned a railway web of more than a thousand kilometres in Anatolia that was connected to Europe. As of 1896, the lengths of railways in the Ottoman Empire were as follows:155

Table 1.3

The length of railways in the Ottoman Empire in 1896.

I. IN EUROPE Length (km) Edirne – Philippopel –Bellova Edirne – Dedeag˘ac Salonica – Skopje –Sibec ke Skopje – Mitrovitza b) Salonica –Manastır c) Salonica –Dedeag˘ac (not completed) Total

1,265 218 500 1,983

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II. IN ASIA a) Haydarpas¸a– I˙zmit – Eskis¸ehir –Ankara b) Eskis¸ehir – Konya c) Mudanya – Bursa d) I˙zmir – Manisa – Alas¸ehir and Manisa –Soma e) I˙zmir – Aydın – Dinar f) Mersin –Tarsus –Adana g) Jaffa– Jerusalem Total

Length (km) 578 440 40 259 515 45 70 1,947

CHAPTER TWO THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY CONCESSION

Before even the completion of the Eskis¸ehir–Konya line, Abdu¨lhamid reintroduced the subject of extending the railway as far as Baghdad. In his report dated 28 February 1895, Radolin informed the chancellor of the sultan’s wish for the railway to be extended to Baghdad, and then of the views of the Anatolian Railway Company about the matter. Representatives of the company had underlined the impossibility in those days’ circumstances of covering the expenses of a railway extending to Baghdad. Nevertheless, Radolin’s proposal was that German financial authorities should not completely disappoint the sultan, but rather that they should continue with the negotiations so as to gain time. When Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was not successful in his attempts, he wrote personally to the Emperor Wilhelm in February 1896. He asked the emperor to convince a specialist German company to carry out the railway projects.1 Meanwhile, railway concession applications continued to be submitted to the Ottoman state. For example, Alexis Duparchy and Charles Cotard made a new request together with Sarkis Bey, to extend to the Persian Gulf over Baghdad a railway they were going to construct between Antakya and Diyarbakır.2 “The concession of said line under the responsibility of the Sublime Ottoman State will become one of the biggest commercial routes of the world [. . .] just like the Suez Canal.” No “expense or guarantee or cash help” was being requested from the Ottoman state.3

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Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was trying to use these new applications to convince the Germans to get into action. The extraordinarily advantageous offers by those requesting concessions showed how their true intentions were not just to construct a railway, but mainly to prevent the Germans from getting new concessions extending from Europe to the heart of Anatolia. A report on this matter sent to Abdu¨lhamid by an Ottoman official was quite realistic on this point. “Nobody, of those who up to then had submitted requests for concessions, seemed to be strong enough to be able to extend the railway as far as Baghdad.”4 The increase in the mid-1890s in both the domestic and external troubles of the empire highlighted the importance that Abdu¨lhamid attributed to the Baghdad Railway. In 1895– 6, the Armenian matter had become one of the most serious of the troubles creating difficulties for Abdu¨lhamid. With the excuse of safeguarding Armenian rights, Britain, France and Russia had intensified their interventions in the empire’s domestic matters. However, since the scope of the support provided to the Armenians by these three states depended on their own interests, it differed greatly. To explain why they had not left the British by themselves, Prince Lobanoff told Radolin that they had done so to prevent certain results that could not otherwise have been prevented.5 Especially after the murder of Tsar Alexander II, Russia began to follow a policy of oppression towards the Armenians, and Tsar Alexander III, who was a real despot, closed down all Armenian schools, with the result that the development of Armenian identity was dealt a severe blow.6 As for the Germans, they continued to gain the trust of the Ottoman administration, by adopting a passive attitude as far as the Armenian matter was concerned.7 Count Rotenhan had written to the chancellor saying that Europe had to choose between the Ottoman state and reforms. According to him, while the other great powers were putting pressure for reforms on the Ottoman state, there was no reason for Germany and Austria to support reforms.8 Meanwhile, Abdu¨lhamid’s mistrust towards the various nations making up the empire, and particularly towards the Armenians was growing, with the consequence that various steps, including purges among railway employees, were taken. For example, “in consideration of the necessity that all persons employed in the public services should be trustworthy and dependable, which is a necessity that has now gained in

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urgency, it has been decided that all people of the Armenian nation and all those hailing from Van and Bitlis”, employed in the stations between Haydarpas¸a and I˙zmit, should be investigated and all untrustworthy elements should be sent back to their home towns.9 From the point of view of the Ottoman administration, the transportation of Ottoman armies, in the case of both internal revolts and of probable wars, was extremely important. However, those same reasons were also the reasons that led Deutsche Bank to approach the matter with caution. Investing in the lands of a state, the political future of which was in doubt, could not be considered a rational approach. And, what is more, the continuing economic crisis in the empire made it doubtful that the Ottoman treasury would be able to pay the kilometre guarantees. There were also reasons unconnected to the Ottoman empire for Deutsche Bank’s reluctance. Like all financial institutions, Deutsche Bank had also been affected by the crisis of 1893, which was one of the periodic crises of capitalism. Deutsche Bank had taken part in a big capital investment in the extension of the Northern – Pacific Railway, which had been inaugurated in the USA in 1882.10 The transfer of the Northern – Pacific Railway to state management as a result of the crisis was the biggest blow suffered by Deutsche Bank since its foundation.11 And anyway, since conditions in financial markets had also affected other institutions, there was no fear that any other financial institution might compete seriously as far as Anatolian railways were concerned. Meanwhile another crisis led Sultan Abdu¨lhamid to forget about railways for a while. In 1897, a new revolt broke out in the island of Crete. The Greeks sent a warship to support the revolt. The result was that on 17 April, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid declared war.12 The war ended with defeat of the Greeks at the hands of the Ottoman army. During the Ottoman– Greek war, Germany had not maintained the passive stance that it usually had in relation to political matters connected to the Ottoman empire, and it had openly supported the Ottoman state.13 Ambassador Marschall had stated that it was the emperor’s “intention to maintain the rights of the Sublime State while maintaining peace and order in Europe”.14 Marschall stated that the war was won thanks to the training offered by German officers in the Ottoman army, and in particular by Goltz Pasha. The ambassador also stressed the fact that the

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trust of Ottoman functionaries in the Germans’ abilities and experience had increased.15 Another interesting statement concerning German support of the Ottomans during this war was Kannenberg’s. This writer had said that the Turks were the “Germans of the East”, while the Greeks were the “French of the East”.16 However, since his entire book was dedicated to the study of Anatolia’s mineral wealth that could be exploited by the Germans, this admiration must have been of a mostly economic nature.

1) The Importance of Marschall’s Appointment as Ambassador Most German historians consider the year 1897 to be the beginning of the period of Weltpolitik. The editor of the Die Zukunft summarized rather clearly the needs of the new policy: “But we are not satiated. We need fertile land, large open areas, which could buy our goods at decent prices [. . .] Otherwise, we shall be so dwarted that we shall become a second Belgium.”17 This process coincided with the beginning of a policy of increased aggressiveness on the seas that was inaugurated with Admiral Tirpitz’s appointment as commander of the navy. In addition to being the result of the above-mentioned reasons, the new process should also be perceived as a method that was used to counter requests for socialism and democracy in domestic politics by means of glorious victories in foreign policy. At the end of a fast process of industrialization, which was not accompanied by political modernization, Germany’s pre-capitalist classes maintained their position within the political arena as important elements of an authoritarian regime. The executive branch and the army were under the emperor’s control and not of parliament. In a way, we can state that during this process the bourgeoisie did not manage to liquidate the feudal land holders known as Junkers, but on the contrary it was the Junkers that liquidated the bourgeoisie, or in other words that the bourgeoisie turned into a feudal class. As a result of this, a policy of social imperialism in foreign policy designed to incite nationalist sentiments, was followed to neutralize opposition forces that had effectively organized within unions and the SPD, and to maintain the status quo.18

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The reviving of negotiations between Ottoman and German functionaries on the subject of the Baghdad Railway, beginning from late 1897, cannot have been a coincidence. In addition to the abovementioned reasons, the effects of the crisis of 1893 had by then weakened, as a result of which, competition for the Anatolian Railway had once more heated up. What is more, victory in the Ottoman –Greek War had weakened doubts concerning the future of the empire and had increased Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s prestige. However, notwithstanding all these favourable changes in objective conditions, we have to underline the role within this process of two new appointments to the General Directorate of the Anatolian Railway Company and to the German embassy in Istanbul. The new general manager of the Anatolian Railway Company was Kurt Zander, whose study on the production increasing effects of the Anatolian Railways we have been quoting from. Zander’s energetic personality played an important role within the process of negotiating for the Baghdad Railway. However, the person who played the starring role in getting the Baghdad Railway concession to be granted to the Germans was undoubtedly Marschall von Bieberstein, who on 15 February 1897, took over as ambassador in Istanbul. Beginning from that day, and all through the 15 years during which he served as ambassador, Marschall spent all his energies spreading German influence within the Ottoman empire. Bieberstein believed in the necessity of the foreign policy based on Weltpolitik carried out by Wilhelm II and attributed an important position to the Ottoman empire within this policy.19 Experts in this subject agree unanimously that Marschall was a very capable diplomat and that he had been extremely successful as ambassador to the Ottoman empire. The most interesting comment among all of these was that of Lindow, who wrote a book about the ambassador, and that of Friedrich Rosen, one of the most significant diplomats of Germany. Lindow joined Rosen in his explanation that the ambassador’s performance in the Ottoman empire could be expressed with the following analogy: “if you give a secondary role in a play to a superior theatre actor”, he will nevertheless have the ambition and capacity to turn this role into a starring role.20 A short while after his arrival to Istanbul, Marschall was received by the sultan. On this occasion, the new ambassador had told Sultan Abdu¨lhamid that while the other great powers wished for the weakening

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and destruction of the Ottoman empire, it was only Germany that wished not just to protect it, but also at the same time to strengthen it. As you can see, Marschall, who was capable and fully confident in his abilities, knew very well how to gain Abdu¨lhamid’s trust.21 It was during this very first meeting with Marschall that the sultan broached the subject of extending the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad. During another meeting that he had a short while later with Abdu¨lhamid, Marschall told him that for the extension of the Anatolian Railways, it was necessary to have the Anatolian Railway Company also construct the Haydarpas¸a Port. In this way, goods from Anatolia would be exported to Europe with great ease.22 What Marschall was trying to do was to take advantage of what he deemed to be a suitable moment to get the concession for the Haydarpas¸a Port, for which the Anatolian Railway Company had long been fighting. As for Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, during this meeting with Marschall he introduced a brand new project of his to the agenda of Ottoman – German relations. What the sultan proposed was to set up a system of riverine transport on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers with the help of German capital.23 As you can see, following Marschall’s appointment, relations between the two countries revived, and the Baghdad Railway once more became the most important point of the agenda. In his report dated 6 August 1898, Marschall wrote that they had won Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s sincere and heartfelt friendship, and that the sultan trusted their honest approach.24 According to Marschall, the Germans serving in the empire had increased the trust felt by Ottomans towards Germans.25 Meanwhile, naturally enough, negotiations on the same subject continued to be carried out between Marschall and Kurt Zander, the general manager of the Anatolian Railway Company. Zander was of the opinion that because of the amount of capital needed for this project, the participation of British capital was necessary. But Marschall was opposed to this, claiming that such a situation would if nothing else weaken the trust that the sultan felt towards the Germans, and championed the idea that the Baghdad Railway should be realized as a German enterprise. Participation of foreign capital in the venture would be an invitation to foreign influence.26 In response to this, Kurt Zander had claimed that Deutsche Bank would not refrain from a venture that concerned the national interest,

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but that carrying out a project of this scope would be possible only if the bank were to be supported by the state. According to Zander, the bonds issued to finance the Baghdad Railway should be issued through the intermediation of the Seehandlung (Prussian Central Bank). In this way, German public opinion would understand the interest that the state had in this matter, and would consequently trust the company constructing the Baghdad Railway.27 Following his negotiations with Marschall, Zander went to Germany to discuss the matter with Deutsche Bank officials. While Marschall was carrying on with negotiations concerning the Baghdad Railway, competitor groups were continuing to apply to the Sublime Porte. M. Cotard, manager of the I˙zmir – Kasaba Railway, had let the Ottoman administration know that his company would lay out the railway from Konya to Baghdad without asking for per kilometre guarantees.28 Also Count Wladimir Kapnist, brother of Russia’s ambassador in Vienna, was after a railway concession, extending from Tripoli in present day Lebanon to the Persian Gulf. As you can see, during the late 1890s, the struggle for railway concessions in Anatolia had once more heated up, and Russia as well had joined the competing powers. J.A. Zahm, a traveller and writer, who among other things also mentioned the application of Italian entrepreneur Tonietti in the name of British and Italian capitalists for the I˙skenderun–Baghdad Railway, wrote that in no other time or place had diplomats been more active than they were at that time in Istanbul, and also that in no other place had intrigues been this complicated or pressure on the government been this intense.29 In this kind of circumstances, Marschall had decided to take over matters and had presented a report to Chancellor Hohenlohe, in which he wrote that the offers by the groups that were competing for railway concessions had reached the point where they could damage German railways. Marschall stressed the need for actually embarking on the realization of projects from then on, rather then just offering good wishes to the sultan. During a meeting of the board of directors of Deutsche Bank held in Germany in 1898, George von Siemens had put forward views that were similar to those of Marschall on the necessity of starting to take up seriously the Baghdad Railway project. According to Siemens, this railway could become a promising venture only if rather than ending in Baghdad it could be extended to the Persian Gulf. In this way, British

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interest in the venture would increase. Siemens was of the opinion that the participation of British and even French capital was necessary for the completion of this gigantic project.30 At this stage, Siemens and Marschall had completely opposing views. Because of his professional formation, Siemens had a more realistic approach as far as the commercial aspect of the project was concerned, and in his capacity as an entrepreneur, he gave precedence to profitability calculations. Marschall on the other hand, with his nationalist politician personality bordering on chauvinistic, considered it necessary to look at the project first and foremost from the perspective of the “national interest”. In later years, Siemens was going to complain openly about Marschall’s rigid approach.31

2) Wilhelm’s Visit to the Ottoman Empire A) The Kaiser’s show of force The visit to the Ottoman Empire by Emperor Wilhelm was the harbinger of a new rapprochement in Ottoman– German relations. The yacht Hohenzollern anchored off the Palace of Dolmabahc e on 18 October 1898, and the emperor and empress were welcomed in Istanbul with great pomp and circumstance. The ceremonial kiosk that had been built to house the kaiser and his wife during their first visit in 1889 had been completely restored in their honour. The value of the presents given by the sultan to the emperor was close to 30 million francs.32 The kaiser responded by making a present to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid of the “German Fountain”, which in all its majesty has survived to our day in Sultanahmet Square. On 21 October Wilhelm began a tour of Anatolia on a special wagon provided by the Anatolian Railway Company. During this trip he was favourably impressed by the German railway in Anatolia. Having once more been hosted in an atmosphere of “a thousand and one nights”, as the empress expressed it, the emperor and empress sailed away from Istanbul and arrived to the port of Haifa on 25 October. The Imperial Ertug˘rul Regiment had been sent to Haifa just to receive the emperor, and new uniforms had been prepared for the soldiers. The “Emperor of all Germans” was received with great majesty also by the Protestant and Catholic German colonies in Syria and Palestine.33

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The fact that the kaiser had made his entrance into Jerusalem in white silk clothing similar to those of pilgrims and that he had knelt in prayer at the centre of the dusty road had impressed deeply the Muslims watching him. After Jerusalem, the trip of Wilhelm, which had turned into a show of force, continued in the provinces of Beirut and Damascus. All through his trip, Wilhelm followed an approach designed to satisfy the religious leaders of the German colonies. On 31 October, which was the anniversary of the day Martin Luther issued his 95 theses, he inaugurated the Lutheran Church in Jerusalem. On that same day he donated to Catholic priests the land of the Catholic Church of the Virgin Mary.34 In Damascus, the kaiser, dressed like a Bedouin sheikh, had placed a wreath on the tomb of Salah-ad Din Yusuf ibn Eyyub, whom he called the most gallant warrior of all times, and had hung a magnificent silver lamp and commissioned a mausoleum of extremely expensive marble. In a speech he made at the site of ibn Eyyub’s tomb, he had thanked Sultan Abdu¨lhamid for his hospitality, promising enthusiastically that he would always remain the friend of 300 million Muslims, of whom the sultan was the religious leader. What is interesting is that these acts by the kaiser, which might be considered to be requirements of realpolitik, might also have contained a certain degree of sincerity. Indeed, he had declared that he had such an admiration of Islam that “if I had gone there without having any religion I would certain have converted to Islam”.35 Those who have analysed this matter have observed that the abovementioned 300 million Muslims did not include just the subjects of the sultan, but also the Muslims living in the British and French colonies.36 And sure enough, a British journalist who was following the kaiser’s trip could not when he heard this statement refrain from observing, “I hope this friendship does not extend to India.”37 In a report written following British entry into Baghdad in 1917, this speech was described as one of the main gaffes of the kaiser that led to German isolation.38 Von Bu¨low’s efforts to soften the text of the speech so as to minimize its effects in foreign countries, were for naught, because Marschall had immediately transmitted the entire speech to the news agencies. The next day, all Ottoman newspapers published this news item within a framework of hopeful and enthusiastic commentary.39 For example,

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in Malumat it had been said that this second trip by the kaiser was proof of the close friendship between the Ottomans and the Germans, and that the people had been united with the sultan in receiving with great enthusiasm the emperor. As for Sabah, it had exaggerated its enthusiasm for Emperor Wilhelm’s visit to such a degree as to advise its readers to learn German, which it considered to be the language of industry, the arts, science and literature. Pan-Germanist publications in Germany had not been able to refrain from expressing their happiness at the tone of the newspaper.40 As for foreign journalists, they had described the attitude of the Ottoman people towards the emperor as seen from their own perspectives. As is to be expected, the Germans gave more visibility to the people’s sympathy towards the kaiser. In Vossische Zeitung it had been said that the emperor was reaping the fruits of his support of the Ottomans in matters concerning Crete and Greece,41 that the people felt great sympathy towards him and that they considered the Germans to be their brothers. Der Reichsbote had exaggerated to such an extent as to claim that the Arabs had been so impressed by his speech in Damascus that they had described the emperor and the empress by saying, “they are not royalty but angels” and “it was like seeing the prophet”. In quite the opposite style, the British press had stressed the fact that the people had not been able to express their true feelings, because of the regime of fear established by Sultan Abdu¨lhamid. In The Daily Chronicle it had been stated that “the mollahs and religious school students looked with great fear and anger at the German and Ottoman flags flying side by side at the top of the Tower of Galata and grumbled unhappily”.42 The visit of Wilhelm echoed very strongly in Germany, all over the Ottoman lands and also in rest of the world. The pope and European countries expressed their dissatisfaction in various ways. The kaiser had carried out his visit at a time when nobody else would dare to visit the “Red Sultan”. The pope was annoyed that Wilhelm should have taken upon himself the function of protector of Catholics. And other countries were not happy that the kaiser’s influence had increased in Syria and Palestine. The French Ambassador Chambon had expressed his feelings in a mocking way, saying, even though the kaiser enjoys talking about land and sea battles, and exhibiting his military uniforms, he is neither a land nor a sea military man; he is just a

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traveller looking for profit and in the sultan he has been successful in finding a perfect cow to milk.43 Towards the end of the century, German religious institutions like Jerusalem Verein, Evangelische Bund and Deutsche Orient Mission increased their activities in Syria and Palestine, in parallel to the requirements of German foreign policy. Now, thanks to the open support of their emperor, German missions felt themselves to be stronger. During the late nineteenth century, 450 German missionaries and hundreds of assistant preachers were sent to the area to spread German cultural influence.44

B) Discussion of the Baghdad Railway during the Emperor’s visit It was impossible for the subject of the Baghdad Railway not to be broached during the emperor’s visit. Also Georg von Siemens must have thought in a similar way, because in those same days he went to Istanbul, and stayed for a while at the Bristol Hotel in the Pera.45 In Istanbul, Siemens found the opportunity of meeting Emperor Wilhelm. Contrary to the views of Helfferich and Baykal, it is obvious that during this visit there had been negotiations about the Baghdad Railway between the sultan and the emperor.46 Friedrich Rosen, who was an important German diplomat, serving in Istanbul at the time, stated that on the occasion of this visit, the sultan had offered the concession for the Baghdad Railway to the kaiser as a present for his visit (gastgeschenk). According to him, Siemens hollered in joy upon hearing about this. Bu¨low’s report dated 3 November 1898, is also another proof on this matter. In his report, Bu¨low stated that the emperor and the sultan agreed on the fact that in parallel to a ship service to be established on the Euphrates, the Anatolian Railway had to be extended down to Basra.47 According an editorial analysing of The Morning Post, the new railway concessions obtained by the Germans were said to be the most important result of the visit. The editor underlined the fact that an extension of German railways to the Euphrates would create an area of German influence in between the British and Russian areas of influence. In the article it was also said that if the Germans were to reach the Persian Gulf they could extend their area of influence towards the Far East.

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According to the writer, the time had come for British statesmen to decide how to react to these developments.48 In France, Firmin Faure, who was one of the greatest opponents of the Baghdad Railway, made a speech in parliament, during which he claimed that this visit by Wilhelm had raised German wishes to a new summit and that also German influence in Anatolia had increased the most during this visit.49 And some of the comments that the Germans made about the results of the visit of the emperor seemed to be designed expressly to confirm the suspicions of their opponents. For example Bu¨low used to say that the time had come for them to find “their place in the sun”. Wilhelm’s visit was a turning point not just because of its ideals, but also because it opened new horizons for German industry. By saying, “I hope that the advantages reaped from the visit of the emperor will reach the shores of the Euphrates”, Bu¨low had revealed the scope of their expectations. In his memoirs, Bu¨low wrote, “at the return from the visit I am of the opinion that we have gained a vast area of economic activity for our industry and also a heroic friend, the value of whom will be clear during difficult times”, and added, “however, let us not get too hopeful about this state of affairs, because even though the Ottoman Empire may not be a sick man as is claimed, he certainly is an old man losing his strength”.50 In his memoirs, Tahsin Pasha interpreted the visit of the kaiser in the same way when he wrote, “The greatest success attained by the German Emperor during this trip was that he managed to have the sultan grant the concession for the Baghdad line to a German group.”51 What is obvious is that, from whichever perspective you look at it, the kaiser’s visit was an important milestone in the acceleration of Ottoman– German relations.52

3) Report and Response A) Stemrich’s report against the Baghdad Railway The fact that General Consul Stemrich should have prepared a report full of unfavourable views about the Baghdad Railway, and should have sent it to the chancellor while the emperor was still travelling through Palestine, was another interesting development concerning this matter. The timing of Stemrich’s report can be explained easily. In his report, Stemrich expressed views that were diametrically opposite to those of Marschall.

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It was because of this that he sent his report to Germany while Marschall was accompanying the emperor in his trip. I am going to quote parts from Stemrich’s report dated 31 October 1898: The Baghdad Railway is an investment that requires a capital of at least 500 million francs. And when such a big capital is invested profitability calculations have to have precedence. The number of passengers carried by Anatolian Railways decreases the further you go into Anatolia. And in the export of agricultural products, transportation stops being profitable once you go beyond 1200 kilometres. As for the import of European goods, the most important element is that the people of the area should be demanding this kind of goods [. . .] And what is more, whether or not the Ottoman State will be able to pay the kilometre guarantees is in question. That Deutsche Bank should be so insistent in looking for the support of an official institution shows that also the bank has doubts on the profitability of the venture. Investing 500 million francs in for example developing the German Navy would be more rational than investing in the Baghdad Railway.53 Later, Stemrich was sent to the area as the chief of the Baghdad Railway Study Commission. The job of the commission was to determine the route and to study the potential sources of income of the railway. The trip began in September 1899 in Eskis¸ehir and then, having gone through Konya, Ereg˘li, Adana, Mersin, Aleppo, Diyarbakır, Mossul and Baghdad, Basra was reached, and on 5 April 1900 the group returned to Istanbul. All through the trip great importance had been given to find out whether or not the tithes collected in the areas to be crossed by the probable route of the railway were sufficient to cover the expenses of the railway. Following this trip, Stemrich had kept his view that the Ottoman treasury did not have the resources to pay the kilometre guarantees of this line, and once more he underlined this matter in his report.54 Also Friedrich Rosen had told Siemens that he was pessimistic about the prospects of the Baghdad Railway, and had not refrained from stating that he was at a loss to comprehend why it had been decided to lay out the line notwithstanding Stemrich’s unfavourable report.55

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B) Marschall von Bieberstein’s response The report that Marschall wrote on 3 January 1899 in response to Stemrich and that he sent to Chancellor Hohenlohe, contains some information that is very important because it shows in a concrete way the then current views about Weltpolitik that was dominant in those days. I will quote some important parts of Marschall’s wide-ranging 46-page report: The extension to Baghdad of the Anatolian Railway, which was realised with great success by the German spirit of enterprise, will mean opening the Asian lands to German culture. Opening up foreign countries to German trade, is the most important aim of German economic policy. The importance for our industrial sector that has an export problem and is located in a country the population of which increases as much as 600,000 in a year is obvious [. . .] And what is more, there is also a new danger threatening our trade. Various countries that up to now had been buying our products have begun to manufacture these products themselves as a result of their economic development. The step to be taken as a precaution against this danger is to create areas that will provide new markets.56 Since our colonies are insufficient, countries that are impatiently waiting for such a development should be included in our sphere of influence even if they are not colonies. And constructing railways is not just the most effective means for this aim, but also at the same time the most profitable. Apart from the fact that all the material used to construct and set up a railway will be provided by German industry, the railway will connect to the German market the areas it goes through [. . .] The construction of railways that are going to connect to the market areas that up to that moment have remained closed requires undertaking a series of risks [. . .] An a priori rejection of such ventures just because they carry certain risks will mean rejecting also the Weltpolitik approach that in itself contains risks.57 Marschall was of the opinion that after the construction of railways, demand would increase as a consequence of the increased needs of the people in that area, and that this would lead to a rise in railway income.

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The ambassador underlined the importance from the point of view of the raw material problem of German industry, of the fertile lands and mineral deposits of Anatolia that up to then had not been used to the necessary degree. Marschall championed the idea that the extension to Baghdad of the Anatolian Railway was a “national economy” duty to be followed by the whole nation. Marschall was not overlooking the probability that it would only be gradually that the fruits of the abovementioned venture were reaped and that the enterprise would be profitable only years later, and because of this he thought it inevitable that the Ottoman government should pay kilometre guarantees. However, the kilometre guarantees should not be so high that the Ottoman government could not pay them, but at the same time they should provide sufficient support for the company to continue running the railway. According to Marschall, the source of the problem depended on the choice between setting up the Baghdad Railway as a national German enterprise constructed and run by the Germans as in the case of the Anatolian Railway, and setting it up as an international company the vision and nationality of which was determined by the holders of the majority of the stocks.58 In the second case, the majority of the stock certificates might be taken over by another country as had happened in the case of the Suez Canal, in which case this other country would reap the fruits of the German effort. Marschall expressed his views about this matter in the following way: Both ways are possible for a financial institution. Deutsche Bank’s potential is such that even without state support it can carry out the above-mentioned railway through financing obtained in the international financial market. This notwithstanding, Deutsche Bank is ready to choose the first alternative. It is because of this that the government should help the bank or at least offer moral support to prevent the national character of the railway from being lost [. . .] The fact that the German Imperial Administration should not be ready to share responsibility is not something that goes well with the reality that Germany has become a colonialist power.

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Marschall’s worry was not that the railway would not be constructed in case state support was not forthcoming; quite the opposite, it derived from his realization of the fact that the railway would be constructed in any case. Marschall’s worry was that in case the Baghdad Railway were to be financed in the second way, Germany’s interests in Anatolia would suffer. Marschall believed that the precedence given by the sultan to the German nation regarding the concession was an opportunity not to be missed. Also Marschall’s views concerning relations between the economy and politics that he expressed in his report are interesting: The idea according to which the economy and politics are separate from each other has nowadays lost its validity. Nations that have managed to develop their economies have also managed to increase their political influence; while nations with backward economies are weak also politically [. . .] The next century will accentuate this process. If Germany continues to increase its economic activities in the East, and if the Haydarpas¸a Port is constructed so as to speed up the process of carrying German goods with German ships, and from there the Anatolian Railway is extended to Baghdad as a German enterprise by using only German material, then the expression, “I would not exchange the bones of a single Pomeranian soldier for all of the lands of the Balkans,” will turn into a memory of a past that has lost all reality in the present.59 Marschall had criticized this famous statement by Bismarck and the mindset behind it, in a previous report. According to the ambassador, this mindset played into the hands of those within the Ottoman administration who were against Germany. Marschall underlined the fact that at the moment, policies in favour of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State were gaining strength within the Ottoman administration. According to Marschall, being able to further Germany’s advantages required an open and honest explanation of what they could do for the Ottomans, and a stress on the importance of the Ottoman empire for them, rather than uncertain statements and expressions.60 As you can see, Marschall’s report contains observations that are interesting from the point of view of the Weltpolitik approach imposed by

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the realities of the stage attained by German industry and of the importance attributed to relations with the Ottomans as a result of this approach. At this point, it might be useful to mention what the German orientalist/diplomat Oppenheim, whom we encounter from time to time, wrote in parallel to Marschall’s views. In his gigantic work titled Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Gulf, Oppenheim expressed his view, according to which, even if a German railway connecting Istanbul, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf to each other, and going through Mesopotamia, might at the beginning require a great cost, the profit it would bring in the long term would more than compensate for this sacrifice. “Once the railway reaches Baghdad, a very vast area in Mesopotamia will be at the service of German industry, of German trade and of the spirit of German enterprise [. . .] Undoubtedly, Germany is a country that is well received in the Ottoman Empire.” Oppenheim also wrote that the visit by the German emperor consolidated the friendship between the two countries and increased German prestige. According to him, the Ottomans trusted the Germans and believed that contrary to other great powers they did not behave in egotistic ways. Oppenheim also explained the advantages of the Baghdad Railway not just for the Germans, but also for the Ottomans.61 What is interesting is that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid also praised this book in his memoirs: “Oppenheim’s book about Mesopotamia, explains very well the economic importance of the Tigris and Euphrates valley. This noteworthy book, the summary of which was submitted to me, confirms the correctness of the reports written by our governors on the future of Mesopotamia.”62 Another article enthusiastically championing similar views was written by Rogalla von Bieberstein. Bieberstein had mostly written about all the potential wealth of the areas to be crossed by the railway that could be exploited by German agriculture, industry and trade. At the conclusion of his article, the writer joyously announced that thanks to the Baghdad Railway, “new and rich horizons that were very promising for German industry, trade and colonization would open up in the Near East.”63 Also Hermann Mu¨ller wrote in his article titled “The Economic Importance of the Baghdad Railway” that thanks to German capital, German scientific methods, German machinery and equipment, and German labour, German industry would find all the raw materials that it needed.64

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4) Application Process of the Anatolian Railway Company The first of the results of the visit of Wilhelm II was the granting on 29 April 1899, of the Haydarpas¸a Port concession to the Anatolian Railway Company. Marschall informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the granting of the concession by saying “in this way it has become possible to realize a great work, which is extremely important from the point of view of the future of the Anatolian Railway, of German commerce and of German sea transportation”. Marschall also wrote that this result was at the same time a victory against the French Embassy and the managers of the I˙zmir – Kasaba Railway, “against the obstruction of which we have been fighting for exactly a year”.65 Sure enough, in February, the French Ambassador Constanz complained officially about the concession granted to the Germans. Also the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Muraviev let it be known that the construction of the port was against Russian interests in Istanbul. The German ambassador in St Petersburg Radolin responded to Muraviev by stating that they had only commercial interests in Anatolia and that political requests were out of the question. The same statement was repeated by Bu¨low to the Russian ambassador in Berlin Graf Osten Sacken.66 Meanwhile there were negotiations about the matter between Siemens and Foreign Affairs officials. One of the points in the agenda was letting the British take part in the Baghdad Railway venture. Foreign Affairs functionaries supported this proposal by Siemens, for both financial and political reasons. In the autumn of 1893, Siemens had met with managers of the I˙zmir– Aydın Railway to negotiate this matter, but no result had been reached.67 When it proved impossible to have the British take part in the Baghdad Railway investment, there were negotiations with French authorities, and unexpectedly favourable results were obtained. Actually, it is clear from an Ottoman document dated 23 June 1897 that French and German bankers had begun to sound out the intentions of each other as early as two years before.68 The French had understood that a continuing contrast with German capital in the Ottoman Empire was not good for them. It was obvious that at a time when the area was at least in part escaping from being within the area of interest of the British, French and German capital would profit from acting in unison.69 Negotiations being carried out between Deutsche Bank, the

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Ottoman Bank, the Anatolian Railway Company and the representatives of the I˙zmir –Kasaba Company ended with an agreement being reached, on 6 May 1899. According to this agreement, the French would take part in the Baghdad Railway Company with a capital contribution of 40 per cent. The remaining 60 per cent would be owned by the group led by Deutsche Bank. In addition to this, the I˙zmir– Kasaba Railway Company and the Anatolian Railway Company would be represented in each other’s boards with two members each.70 The partnership would be kept open for participation by a third country. During negotiations, it had also been decided to join the I˙zmir –Kasaba Railway and the Anatolian Railway at Afyon. And sure enough the fact that the two railways had not been joined at any point was an extremely irrational situation from a commercial point of view. At the time when he was in Afyon, C. Woods had observed how because of the distance of a few hundreds of yards between the two stations, passengers had missed their connections incurring losses of time.71 Since the agreement reached with France was perceived as being important for the solution of the finance problem, on 29 May 1899, Kurt Zander applied officially to the Sublime Porte for an extension of the Anatolian Railway to the Persian Gulf.72 A short while after the application, a commission was formed to study from the economic and technical points of view, the areas through which it was thought that the railway would pass.73 Meanwhile, in a party held in honour of the Study Commission, Kurt Zander claimed that the concession would be granted to a consortium consisting of the Ottoman Bank and some other financial institutions lead by the Anatolian Railway Company.74

5) Opposition to German Capital The fact that applications for concessions continued incessantly made the Germans’ job more difficult. For example, Monsieur Cotard, who was acting in the name of French businessman Bartisol, submitted a proposal for the construction of a railway that would begin in Konya and would reach Baghdad.75 Cotard guaranteed that he would construct and operate the railway without kilometre guarantees. Views recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Public Works Council

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held on 24 August 1898 show that members were openly in favour of Cotard’s offer.76 As you can see, the Bartisol/Cotard group had turned out to be an important competitor. However, the application that would become the biggest problem for the Germans and for Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was undoubtedly Rechnitzer’s. This Hungarian banker represented British capital, and in a way similar to the offer of the French engineer, he had proposed a railway project that would reach Basra over Konya– I˙skenderun– Baghdad. His project included also the construction of ports in the Persian Gulf and in I˙skenderun.77 What is interesting is that like Cotard, Rechnitzer was also not requesting kilometre guarantees for such a gigantic project. Rechnitzer had won the support of British Ambassador O’Connor. That the British should have pushed Rechnitzer forward must have been the result of the view according to which a citizen of the AustroHungarian Empire must have seemed more trustworthy than a British citizen in the eyes of Sultan Abdu¨lhamid. During a meeting he had with Marschall, Sir Nicholas O’Connor had claimed that to overcome the difficulties concerning the Baghdad Railway, the German – French group had to reach a compromise with the British Rechnitzer group.78 Under the influence of the British ambassador, Damat Mahmut Pasha79 and his son Cavit Bey had also actively supported the project. In a report he wrote to Abdu¨lhamid on 22 July 1899, the pasha championed the view that because of its interests the Ottoman state had to support the project of Rechnitzer, who “in the most effective way has undertaken to carry out the construction without asking for guarantees”. According to Mahmut Pasha, the Germans were making efforts by means of various excuses to “procrastinate and to make their competitors desist”.80 The pasha was one of those who thought that Ottoman policy should be pro-Britain, because Britain “was still interested in the preservation of the Sublime State”.81 Rechnitzer’s project was actually a product of British efforts to delay the Germans’ railway concession. Since early 1896, the British had been worrying about the Germans’ advance towards the Persian Gulf, and the more they felt that the route to India was threatened, the more they hardened their opposition. Whenever it was a question of the Persian Gulf, British opposition was quite radical, and not just towards

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Germany, but also towards Russia. For example, in May 1899, “even the news that the Russians were about to take control with Iran’s permission the port known as Bender Abbas facing the Strait of Hormuz” had led the British Foreign Office to “be in a constant state of communication with the British Embassy in Tehran”. It was because of this that the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin had let it be known that it was thought that Britain would “make efforts to strengthen its naval force in the Persian Gulf”.82 Alongside British and Russian opposition, there were also some Ottoman administrators, who because of the economic difficulties that the Ottoman empire was having were against the treasury undertaking the burden of new kilometre guarantees.83 In a report submitted to the sultan, the fact that lines without kilometre guarantees were in great trouble was underlined, but at the same time the fact that the Ottoman treasury was not in a state to pay guarantees for railway lines of more than 2,000 km was also stressed.84 In another report, dated 14 December 1899, the German Railway Company was accused of having swindled the Ottoman treasury. The writer of the report, Yusuf Kenan Bey, was requesting an immediate investigation concerning the company, which he described as being ignoble and immoral, and which he accused of having “robbed during five or six years a sum that was estimated to be as big as 6 –7 hundred thousand liras”. Yusuf Bey had not refrained from stating that “he was ready at a moment’s notice and anytime to prove his claims”.85 Yusuf Kenan repeated the same claims around two months later on 9 February 1900.86 Another complaint concerning the illegitimate profit of the Anatolian Railway Company was the one presented in 1896 by “Mehmet Abdu¨lkadir Efendi, who while he had been an engineer of the aforementioned artillery works and a subject of the prestigious German state, had been honoured with the Muslim religion”. Mehmet Efendi’s claim was that the company was paid according to the assumption that the distance between I˙zmit and Ankara was 400 km, while in reality the line was 30– 40 km shorter than this, with the result that the company received around 20 – 25,000 Ottoman liras per year more than it should have.87 In another report, the granting of the concession to the Germans had been opposed, because it would have led to “all of the central parts of Anatolia being under the economic control of a single tribe” and to a “cession to the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye of a great part of state income”. At the

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end of his report, the writer was “begging His Imperial Majesty to take a decision in accordance with his glory and honour” so as to “prevent from happening a noxious operation that would make all loyal subjects cry and evil people laugh”.88 In another report, submitted to the sultan on 6 April 1899, it was stated that concessions for investments like railways or ports, to be granted to great powers, including Germany, would lead to the creation of areas of influence. In conclusion, “No matter how friendly Germans might be now, they cannot remain as such for ever, since they are infidels and they have their own interests”, because of which, something that has absolutely to be refrained from is to grant big concessions “in fields like railways and ports to Germans or to other states”. According to Cavid Bey, the writer of the report, the only right way for states was to have this kind of important public investment be carried out by capital holders from “small states that do not have political power and that are not considered to be dangerous”. The great powers were waging a desperate struggle for concessions in the Ottoman Empire. For example, the French were requesting new concessions for themselves in response to the important concessions obtained by the Germans. Their ambassador Constanz expressed this openly and at same time put pressure on authorities for concessions for ports on both sides of the Bosphorus. The writer, stating that if they were to submit to this pressure “in the future the Bosphorus might turn into a French colony”, addressed Sultan Abdu¨lhamid by saying, “our patron lord is not approving either this kind of dangerous concessions or even the smaller ones”. With the following analysis, Cavid Bey very successfully placed his views within a theoretical framework: “The present day partition of Africa by the big powers by means of colonization has been the result of a policy that has always begun with this kind of public works ventures and commercial operations”, and in a similar way “it has been observed that also the ruinous partition of even China has been the result of the big powers having been granted many big concessions in areas like the railways and ports in those parts”.89 Indeed, the fact that Syria was finally separated from the empire and turned into a French mandate supports the thesis that the establishment of regions of influence often led to partition.90 Similar worries were expressed in another report submitted to the Ministry of the Navy on 6 October 1899, in connection to concessions granted to foreigners in Ereg˘li.91 As one can see, at least some Ottoman

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intellectuals managed even back then to analyse foreign capital in the Ottoman empire within a theoretical framework similar to the one existing in our times. This means that we should not view the economic policies followed by Ottoman functionaries as being solely the result of a lack of awareness. The necessities imposed by conditions existing at the time decisions were taken played a rather great role.

6) Marschall’s Solution: Preliminary Contract The murder of Mahmut Pasha’s son Cavit Bey delayed for another while the negotiations for the Baghdad Railway concession. As a result of various internal and external interventions, not even the general outlines of a draft of the contract had begun to be discussed. This being the situation, Marschall proposed the signing of a preliminary agreement that would eliminate the other competing forces. In this agreement, the Ottoman government would declare that it would grant the concession to the Anatolian Railway Company, and the company would undertake the commitment to construct the railway in exchange for kilometre guarantees to be determined in the future. The parties were going to begin to study the details immediately after the preliminary protocol.92 The French writer Geraud observed sadly how thanks to this tactic Marschall had very adroitly managed to eliminate the British and French ambassadors.93 While on the one hand Marschall was trying to rush through the contract, on the other hand it was not just the sultan, but also Ottoman functionaries who were proceeding very cautiously. And sure enough, even though in a communication issued by the Council of Ministers it had been stated “that the granting of the concession to the Anatolian Railway Company was in accordance with state interests”,94 it had also been said that the contract should be prepared with great caution so as to protect all state interests as much as possible. Among the points to be underlined there were also matters like the construction of the line in the name of the imperial government and the possibility for the state to be able to buy back the line at an equitable price whenever it wished to do so. In a report, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had tried to explain the situation with the Prussian example. In this report it had been said that in those cases when “the financial situation in Prussia” was not suitable to the realization of such big enterprises “railways [. . .] were constructed

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and operated by companies in their own accounts, but later these same railways became state property through the enforcement of the right to purchase”, and it had been also said that the Ottoman government wished to follow this procedure.95 There were other matters on which the Council concentrated with great attention. For example, the necessity to “include in the contract with clarity” a ban on the settlement of foreign immigrants along the railway line, and a ban on the transfer of the line to another company was stressed. The report was going to be formally submitted to the German embassy.96 According to the note submitted to the German embassy on 17 December 1899, the Anatolian Railway Company undertook the Baghdad Railway construction in eight years. The level of guarantee payments and other details were going to be determined during later negotiations.97 When the moment finally came for the parties to sign the preliminary contract, Siemens came to Istanbul on Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s request. In a letter he sent to his colleagues from Istanbul, he complained that everything was still in doubt and confused. Ottoman authorities were adamant that before the preliminary contract a contract for a credit to be granted by Deutsche Bank had to be signed. Siemens expressed his feelings by saying, “If it were not that I would embarrass my dear friend Marschall, I would immediately return to Germany. They have called me here to ask for money.” In conclusion, before the preliminary contract was signed, Deutsche Bank had to accept to grant the Ottoman State a credit of 200,000 pounds (3,500,000 marks) at 7 per cent.98 The preliminary contract was signed on 24 December 1899, by Siemens and Zihni Pasha. According to this protocol, the company “undertook to construct in approximately eight years and then to operate, a railway from Konya to Baghdad and Basra”. “The company undertook also never to transfer to another company any part of the railway” and the “Imperial Government kept the right and authority to purchase at any moment the Konya and Basra Line.”99 On 29 December 1899, Wilhelm II sent a wire to the sultan to thank him for trusting German industry, and to express his wishes for this great enterprise to be completed as soon as possible so that it could contribute to peace. In his response to the emperor sent the very next day, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid shared Wilhelm’s hopes concerning the future of the railway, and “expressed his thanks especially since his aims

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concerned the progress of the trade and prosperity of the country”.100 Die Zukunft stressed the fact that in his telegraph of thanks to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, the kaiser had praised the wisdom of the sultan. The writer of the editorial agreed that by choosing the German project among so many applications, the sultan had truly proved his wisdom.101 Meanwhile, the Young Turks in exile, who had hardened their opposition to Abdu¨lhamid, were also opposing the Baghdad Railway concession. In their newspaper Osmanlı on 15 May 1899, they wrote that the only thing that Abdu¨lhamid had not pawned in foreigners’ favour was air, but that sooner or later he would, in which case the people would suffocate. In the Osmanlı they had written, “Railways, ports, mines [. . .] They are all in the hands of foreigners as a result of granting concessions [. . .] And the foreigners are supported by embassies, banks and economic privileges.”102

7) Problems during the Final Concession Process A) Accusations of colonization Rumour, according to which Germans were going to use the Baghdad Railway to establish German colonies in Anatolia, especially by that part of the press closer to Pan-Germanist ideas, had disturbed the sultan and the Sublime Porte. Opponents of the railway were clearly doing all in their power to spread these suspicions further. For example, the Ottoman embassy in St Petersburg had sent the Foreign Office an editorial titled “Establishing a German colony in Anatolia through Deutsche Bank”, which had appeared in the influential Russian newspaper Novosti.103 Actually, it had been since Moltke’s appointment to the Ottoman army that articles championing German colonization in the Ottoman Empire had begun to appear. Moltke had said that Germany should also take its share of the Ottoman empire’s lands and that the land of Palestine was suitable for German colonization.104 And later in 1848, the German economist Roscher had claimed that should the Ottoman empire disintegrate, Anatolia should be the Germans’ natural share.105 In 1850, Ludwig Ross had claimed that the colonization of “Asia Minor” was both an aim and also a “means for the construction of the future Greater Germany”.106 As for Professor Sprenger, he viewed the

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Middle East as an area that had not yet been colonized, but that was the “best area for colonization”, and had claimed that Mesopotamia and the lands to the east of the Tigris needed 10 – 15 million colonisers.107 In the years following the beginning of the construction of the railway by the Germans, various associations had intensified their activities with the aim of directing German expanionism and of establishing new areas of expansion. Among these associations, the one with the most radical views was the Alldeutscher Verband. The union had no more than 12,000 members, but was nevertheless influential on public opinion.108 In a brochure of 1896 of the Alldeutscher Verband, the existence of “areas, which thanks to their climate and rich land were waiting for German colonization and culture” was mentioned. What the Pan-Germanic ideologues meant was the Ottoman empire.109 As for Hugo Grothe, who openly declared Upper Mesopotamia to be an “area of German interest”, in his book he expressed his wish for railway construction to be carried out in parallel with a serious effort for colonization.110 Another writer, Ewald Banse, stated in 1913 at the end of his book that in exchange for having relinquished all claims on Morocco, places like south-eastern Anatolia, northern Syria and Mesopotamia should be areas of German expansion. Banse must have been quite serious, because he had toured the areas to be crossed by the Baghdad Railway and had published in his book the life, climate and agricultural conditions of those places.111 Bodies like Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft, Militaerische Gesellschaft and Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee, all championed similar ideas to different degrees. In their publications they all attributed important functions to the Anatolian Railway Company as far as colonization was concerned. For example, Karl Kaerger in his brochure stated that colonization should be carried out by a company that was strong both economically and politically, and that this “noble” task should be undertaken by the Anatolian Railway Company, because of its strong position within the Ottoman empire. According to Kaerger, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state should be defended in exchange for the right to settle German colonisers along the railway lines, and a big customs union encompassing Austria, Italy and the Ottoman empire should be established. Within this common market, Kaerger assigned to the

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German colonies in Anatolia the job of providing the raw materials required by German industry.112 The Alldeutscher Verband literally jumped on Kaerger’s ideas. In articles supporting these theses, the society expressed its view according to which, the only means of controlling the route to India, which for centuries had been in British hands, was the Baghdad Railway. However, it was not enough to construct the Baghdad Railway; what also had to be done was to settle German colonisers all along the line. In the society’s article, it had been stated that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had approached Goltz Pasha with a similar plan, and this information was obviously false.113 As we have said many times in this study, reality was quite the opposite, since the matter about which Abdu¨lhamid and Ottoman authorities were most sensitive was the settlement of German immigrants along the line. Similar proposals had also been put forward by Major Max Schlagintweit. Schlagintweit wrote that German emigrants lost their “Germanness” once they went overseas, and that those in the USA, “became Americans”. On the other hand, Anatolia, Syria and Palestine were areas very suitable for colonization, where German colonisers could continue to be in contact with their motherland.114 Schlagintweit went to Anatolia to study these areas’ suitability for colonization and discussed the matter with Germans living there. Following his return to Germany, on various occasions he explained what needed to be done for Anatolia’s colonization, and recommended establishing official relations with the Anatolian Railway Company. For this purpose, Siemens, managing director of Deutsche Bank, was invited as a guest of honour to one of the conferences. However, Siemens’s speech was a real disappointment, because on this occasion Siemens had openly stated that the Anatolian Railway Company was subject to Ottoman law, and had stressed the fact that their only aims were economic ones, and definitely not colonization. He had said that success in these enterprises would bring great advantages for Germany, opening new horizons for German industry, and had added that this important enterprise should not be put in danger with ideas of colonization.115 That the German government and Deutsche Bank, which were in great harmony with the government, should not have taken supporters of colonization seriously is perfectly comprehensible. Naturally enough, Siemens looked at the matter from a commercial point of view, and

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did not want to subject the future profits of the company to any risk. There was no need to endanger everything because of radical procolonization views, at a time when the influence of German commanders who had been serving in the Ottoman army since 1883 was gradually increasing, and when thanks to the railway constructed by Deutsche Bank all the area as far as Baghdad was rapidly advancing towards being a German sphere of influence. In other words, the idea of colonizing Anatolia was in contrast with the policy of peaceful expansion that had been woven with such great care. It was because of this reason that in a directive he sent to Marschall, Undersecretary Bu¨low asked him to tell the sultan very clearly that the idea of settling German colonisers in Ottoman lands was completely out of the question. Bu¨low asked him also to specify that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not consider it necessary to even answer the proposals by the Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee concerning the colonization of Ottoman lands in Asia.116 The tension within this context between supporters of the official view and those of colonization was also going to continue in later years. For example, Bethmann Hollweg wrote that in 1909, after having been appointed chancellor, “he had to put in its place the Alldeutscher Verein, which established a strong base for the national liberals and conservatives.”117 Before ending the subject of colonization, it would be well to underline a point. The only matter that was opposed by influential “liberal imperialists” like Jaeckh, Rohrbach and Naumann, who expressed views in parallel to official views, was the settlement of German colonisers along the railway. The reason for this was that they knew how sensitive Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was on this matter. Otherwise, nobody objected to the use of railways for the creation of a German sphere of influence. One of the concrete examples of this approach was Naumann’s statement that “we have to make the Ottoman country economically dependent on us so that in the future we can control it also politically”. In a similar way, Davis Trietsch’s wish for “a strong Ottoman country, where the German language, German culture, German science and German technique” were dominant, is certainly significant.118 In other words, albeit to different degrees, all segments of the political spectrum, from the Alldeutscher Verband to the social democrats, thought that the Ottoman empire should be used in favour of German interests. For Kautsky, who thought that colonization was

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necessary for capitalism to develop, the problem was that the cost should be borne by the bourgeoisie. Scheidemann, a social democrat member of parliament, stated that the social democrats were the least likely to oppose the cultural importance of the Baghdad Railway. His only note of caution was that tension with other imperialist countries should not escalate.119 It was only a few Marxists like Rosa Luxemburg, who on the basis of a real class analysis reached the brilliant conclusion that German capital was savagely exploiting Ottoman peasants.120 In 1912, the Sozialdemokratisches Fluggblatt explained this situation by stating, “nowadays all bourgeois parties are champions of weltpolitik and admirers of the military and of the navy, and all criticism of these matters has become a thing of the past”.121

B) Mahmut Pasha flees Mahmut Pasha’s surreptitious escape to a foreign country came on top of the unease felt as a result of the wish for colonization revealed by extreme nationalist spheres in Germany. As we know Mahmut Pasha and his son Cavit Bey supported the Rechnitzer group in the struggle for the Baghdad Railway concession.122 Mahmut Pasha’s escape, following the mysterious murder of his son Cavit Bey, had strongly increased the nervousness of Sultan Abdu¨lhamid. According to a Belgian newspaper, Mahmut Pasha, who was a pro-British statesman, “must have disturbed His Majesty the Sultan by submitting to him many times applications supporting the Rechnitzer project, because through His Excellency the Imperial Chief Secretary he was warned not to interfere in this matter”. As soon as he heard that his request for a concession had been rejected, Rechnitzer, who was quite hopeful that his project would be accepted, left Istanbul. Immediately after this, “on Thursday December 14, the pasha went by train to Pendik from where he sailed away to London with a British steamship, on which his sons had been waiting for him”. When His Majesty the Sultan had heard about this situation, he had been greatly saddened, and according to the newspaper, in tears he had told authorities to do all that were necessary to find Mahmut Pasha and his family. Authorities had even sent a wire to the French Consulate for permission to search a French steamship, on which it was thought that the pasha was hiding.123 In a wire he sent to Berlin, Marschall wrote that the claims that the Rechnitzer group was behind the escape of Mahmut Pasha seemed to be

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true. The ambassador also explained that Mahmut Pasha had stated some conditions for his return. In addition to certain personal requests like the payment of all his debts and a 300 lira salary, Mahmut Pasha had also requested the granting of a concession to a company to be founded for the draining of the swamps between Baghdad and Basra.124 It seems that Emperor Wilhelm was among those agreeing with the claim that Rechnitzer was behind this request. Right at this point of the report, Wilhelm II had scribbled the note: “Can’t be anybody but Rechnitzer.” The above-mentioned newspaper stated that the fear was that “since Mahmut Pasha was a person with an extremely independent mind he might lead the group of opponents and join the elements against Abdu¨lhamid present in foreign lands”.125 And Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had told Marschall that he was worried that Mahmut Pasha might contact the Young Turks. It is clear from various Ottoman era documents that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was having the pasha followed very closely while he was abroad.126 And Abdu¨lhamid’s fears turned out to be well founded, because Mahmut Pasha and his sons met Ahmet Rıza, who was one of the leaders of the Young Turks and, having joined the Young Turks, they brought a new dynamism to this movement. Sabahattin, who was one of the sons of the pasha and who later would be known as Prince Sabahattin, became an important theoretician of the movement. In a statement he made to Le Matin, Mahmut Pasha said, “Yes, I have fled from my country, because the entire empire has turned into a prison.”127 British– German competition within the Ottoman empire had manifested itself also within the struggle for a constitutional monarchy, and in response to the Germans’ increasing influence, the British had increased their support for the Young Turks. And within this context, the pasha and his sons had become a convenient element that the British might use within the context of the Eastern question. As for German newspapers like Die Post and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, they tried to explain the escape of the pasha with reasons like his supposed spying for the British, and the rejection of the Rechnitzer project, which they claimed he was supporting only out of personal interest, and in this way the newspapers had continued to support the sultan.128 This being the case, it is inconceivable that Mahmut Pasha’s fundamental wishes were those indicated in Marschall’s report. Probably knowingly, Marschall must have been informed about Mahmut Pasha’s conditions in an erroneous way or at least with some

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elements missing, because Mahmut Pasha had also presented extremely important political conditions like calling back the suspended parliament to meet, the resignation of some high level dignitaries within Abdu¨lhamid’s court, and limiting the expenditures of the sultan to 15,000 liras per month.129 Mahmut Pasha had also sent a letter full of accusations to the sultan.130 Whether or not it was official British policy to support Rechnitzer’s venture directly, up to now it has been impossible to shed light. However, we can comfortably state that the British, who in those days were sufficiently in trouble with the Boer war, could not have openly opposed the Baghdad Railway.131 This situation was in part the result of the fact that following the occupation of Egypt, Anatolia’s importance within the context of the route to India had decreased. In addition to this, Germany creating a buffer zone between British interests and the sphere of interest of Russia, which in the Middle East was Britain’s real competitor, was not something that disturbed Britain.132 Within this context, Colonial Secretary Chamberlain had in November 1899 told Emperor Wilhelm that rather than seeing the Russians or the French in Anatolia, he would have preferred seeing the Germans.133 If you take into consideration the fact that in those days German and British administrations were looking for ways to cooperate against the “socialist threat, and against unions and strikes”, you can reach the conclusion that relations cannot have been all that bad.134 It is because all of these reasons that we can say that, in general, Britain’s opposition to the Baghdad Railway was based on the worry that the Germans might get hold of the entrance to the Persian Gulf, since the main principle of British foreign policy was to oppose strenuously all changes that might endanger their control of the route to India.135

C) The Kuwait problem Looking at it from this point of view, it is obvious why since the early twentieth century Kuwait has been an important problem in international politics. In his report to the chancellor, Marschall had written that following centuries long efforts, the British had created a kind of monopoly in Indian trade, that this situation had been consolidated following the granting to the Lynch company of a monopoly concession on the rivers of Mesopotamia, and that they might

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gain the possibility of competing with the British only if they were able to extend the railway as far as Kuwait,136 because in those days’ technological conditions, the Persian Gulf was not suitable for port construction. It is clear that it was also Ottoman authorities who wanted the Baghdad Railway to end in Kuwait. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Pasha had told Marschall that having the railway end in Kuwait would be useful from the technical and political points of view for both countries.137 Meanwhile, a German study team had gone to Kuwait in late January 1900. On 23 January 1899, the British signed a binding treaty with the sheikh of Kuwait, which at the time was autonomous and exempted from taxes, and only formally part of the Ottoman empire. According to this treaty, Sheikh Mu¨barek could not, without Britain’s consent, reach any kind of agreement concerning Kuwait’s territory with any foreign power.138 Notwithstanding this secret treaty, the sheikh had been very hospitable towards the Baghdad Railway study team, and had reiterated the fact that he recognized the absolute sovereignty of the sultan over Kuwait.139 Stemrich, the head of the team, had offered a conspicuous sum to the sheikh as a bribe. The sheikh had ignored this offer, but at the same time he had been upset because of the danger of a threat by Ottoman and German forces. Even though the British administration in India had recommended notifying the Ottomans about their agreement with the sheikh of Kuwait, so as to officialize their domination of the area, the British Foreign Office had found this proposal premature, since it would have greatly damaged relations with the Ottomans.140 When in April 1900 the Russian warship C¸ilyak anchored in the Persian Gulf, regional British– Russian hostility increased, and the problem acquired a new aspect.141 In August 1901, when an Ottoman warship tried to land soldiers in Kuwait to quell some local unrest, the British commander had, in the name of the government, declared the area to be a British protectorate.142 Germany protested against this action by Britain as being an infringement of the Treaty of Berlin. The British were told that for more amicable relations between Germany and Britain to be possible, both parties had to behave responsibly in this kind of circumstance.143 Metternich, the charge´ d’affaires in London, told British authorities that rather than sending warships to

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the area, it would have been better for both countries if they joined the railway venture. The flexible approach eschewing conflict followed by the Germans led to a softening of the British and to their negotiating the matter with the Ottoman government.144 Even though the British declared that they had given up their attempt to establish sovereignty over Kuwait, they made a similar attempt on 14 December.145 They then later said that they had acted in this way to prevent Russian efforts to establish domination in the area. For many years, Kuwait continued to be a problem between the Ottoman empire, Germany, Russia and Britain. Britain was, on the one hand, trying not to accentuate its contrasts with Germany and, on the other, because of the importance it attributed to the route to India, it was trying to show that it would never accept the activities of a foreign power in the Persian Gulf. All these conflicts in the area had led to a weakening of Ottoman authority; so much so that in 1903 the French ambassador in London, Monsieur Cambon, had stated that the area was truly under British domination.146

D) Russia’s railroad concession in the Black Sea area While the British concentrated their opposition at the point where the Baghdad Railway joined the Persian Gulf, the Russian government showed its unhappiness much more openly. Russia’s dreams concerning the straits were known, but Russia did not have the means necessary to establish areas of influence in the Ottoman empire. Among the imperialist powers, Russia was the only one not to have investments or railway concessions in Ottoman lands. Its own backward and vast lands and limited resources had made this kind of a development impossible. Russia did not have a representative at the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye. The only means of financial coercion that Russia had against the Ottoman state consisted of the indemnities for the 1877– 8 war.147 According to a news item in The Times dated 23 December 1899, a “Russian committee of gold dealers” with state support had asked for a railway concession between Kars and Erzurum.148 On 6 January 1900, Maksimov, the first interpreter of the Russian consulate, let Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Pasha know that, like the Germans, the Russians were also asking for a concession in Anatolia. Later, on 10 February 1900, Russian Ambassador Zinoviev submitted a draft agreement to

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Tevfik Pasha, and asked him to grant priority to Russia for the construction of a railway in the Black Sea area. According to Zinoviev’s draft, the Ottomans were not supposed to construct railways by themselves in the above-mentioned areas.149 During one of the meetings between Russian and Ottoman authorities on this matter, Zinoviev had revealed his true intentions when he had said that in case the Sublime Porte were to give up its plans for the Baghdad Railway, Russia would give up its own request for a railway concession from the Ottoman empire.150 Russia’s aim was to have the Ottoman empire give up completely its plan for the railway, because this was something that might strengthen it. It was impossible for Russia to make the Ottoman empire desist from its plans for the Baghdad Railway. However, it nevertheless reaped the fruits of its policy of threats and pressures when it got precedence in the construction of a railway on the shores of the Black Sea151 On 5 March 1900 the Ottoman embassy in St Petersburg submitted a letter to Count Muraviev, in which it was said that the railway concession that they had requested would be granted to them, and statements of mutual friendships were expressed during the meeting.152 Following two months of negotiations with Russia, the railway agreement was signed on 4 April 1900. According to the agreement, the Ottoman empire kept its right to construct a railway in the Black Sea area.153 “In case it did not lay out these lines itself, it was going to grant the concession for the lines to Russian capitalists.”154 Since in the economic conditions of those days it was impossible for the Ottoman state to construct a railway, Russia had in practice prevented the construction of a railway within its own area. In addition to this, Russia had not accepted to let the Ottoman state have the right to transfer the concession to the capitalists of another country in the case that Russia should not go ahead and construct the railway. In other words, Russia had reached its aim by preventing the construction of a railway that would pose a military threat to it. Germany did not react strongly to the fact that Russia had received a railway concession in the Black Sea Area. Germany believed that every event that increased Russian– British competition would be useful for itself. Mu¨hlberg from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told “We can lay out our railway lines as far as Baghdad by bowing to British lions and kneeling in front of Russian bears.”155 The German Minister of Foreign

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Affairs told Ahmed Tevfik Bey from the Ottoman embassy that since the Russians did not have the capital necessary to construct this kind of a railway their real aim was to prevent the Ottomans from initiating ventures that might threaten them militarily or financially. The Russians had “made this proposal to take advantage of the present busy state of Britain”.156 The British Daily News interpreted the matter as the Russians having turned their eyes from the Far East to once more towards “Asia Minor”. According to what was written in this newspaper, because of their problems in the Middle East, the Russians had almost forgotten about the existence of the Ottoman empire, and they had given free rein to the sultan even in the Armenian question. And finally, having realized the seriousness of the German threat, they had notified the Ottomans that they would not permit the granting of concessions that would be deleterious for Russia’s interests. And they had accomplished this by reaching a railway agreement with the Ottomans.157 This agreement, which meant having bowed to Russian pressure, was obviously not received well by Ottoman spheres. And most of all, it provided once again an opportunity for opposition spheres abroad to raise their voices. In the Young Turk newspaper Osmanlı, published in London, the sultan was ironically thanked for his success in offering the Baghdad route to the Germans, the Erzurum – Trabzon – Sinop areas to the Russians, Syria to the French and Tripoli of Syria to the Italians and Mahmut Pasha described the rights granted to the Russians as being the beginning of a Russian invasion.158 As these events were unfolding, those within the Ottoman administration, who were against the granting of railway concessions to the Russians, found the opportunity of expressing their views. For example, in his submission dated 16 March, the undersecretary of foreign affairs stated that there was a connection between the Russians’ request to construct a railway between Erzurum and Kars, and projects to invade the area, and claimed that the aim of the new policy of winning the support of the Armenians of the Caucasus was the same. The undersecretary’s aim in explaining Russia’s new policy in detail was to warn the Ottoman administration during the decision-taking process.159 As for Minister of Justice Abdullah Pasha, he had resigned rather than sign this treaty.160

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Marschall communicated the dissatisfaction all over the empire concerning the treaty signed with Russia. It was because of this that according to Marschall it was just the right time to begin negotiating the final agreement concerning the Baghdad Railway.161 After all, the agreement previously reached was only a preliminary protocol.162 According to the preliminary agreement, “in case there is no agreement between the two parties, both parties have the right to request and sue for an indemnity”.163 Apart from all of this, Marschall was having difficulties resisting Ottoman authorities in their continuous attempts to turn the conditions of the final contract in their favour by mentioning all the companies wishing to construct the railway without asking for per kilometre guarantees.164

E) Searching for foreign capital In 1900, a project for a bridge that would make it possible for trains connecting European and Asian continents to cross the Bosphorus was submitted to the Sublime Porte.165 In a work published in the same year, Schneider enthusiastically wrote in detail about this project, “twenty years ago a German engineer called Victor Sasemann spent years to prepare a project for a bridge across the Bosphorus”. Schneider stated that by then technological developments had made this new project feasible and provided some technical information about the planned bridge.166 Another development also in 1900 was that the route of the Baghdad Railway was determined. Germans had insisted on having the railway pass along the shores of the Mediterranean, because its construction would be easier and low cost, while the most significant criteria for the Ottoman representatives was the railway would connect the military garrisons in Anatolia with those in Mesopotamia. Following long negotiations, on 8 October, Ottoman representatives finally accepted the route that the German study team had determined, with the condition that once construction of the Baghdad Railway was completed, a new line that would begin from Ankara and through Sivas and Diyarbakır reaching Harput would be made. It seems that Marschall glided over this request of Ottoman authorities rather demagogically by claiming that this matter had to be negotiated later with Deutsche Bank.167 Meanwhile in the same year in spite of Miquel’s obstruction the Prussian

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finance minister, Marschall persuaded Emperor Wilhelm to let the Seehandlung (the Prussian Center Bank) support Deutsche Bank’s Baghdad Railway investment.168 During negotiations carried out in the 13 – 21 May period, representatives of the Anatolian Railway Company and of the Ottoman Bank reached agreement on various matters. Among the issues negotiated there was the matter of the transferral to the Baghdad Railway Company of the Mersin– Adana Railway, which was a French/ British joint venture that started operating in 1886. This made sense, because once the Baghdad Railway was completed not only would the Mersin– Adana line lose all hopes concerning expansion, but there would also be the problem that the connections to other areas of Adana, which fed the line, would be severed. Deutsche Bank solved the problem by buying the majority of stocks, and in this way the Baghdad Railway had reached the Mediterranean.169 Financing the railway was the most difficult problem requiring a solution. This being the situation, either the income of the Ottoman state had to be increased or new partners, who would take part in the financing of the railway, had to be found. The first to be invited to be partners were the British, because increasing the customs duties of the Ottoman state required first of all the approval of Britain. The only way to convince Britain to sign this kind of a treaty was to encourage it to join the Baghdad Railway enterprise. A series of political agreements signed at that time had led to a thaw in British–German relations. Siemens went to Britain to take advantage of these favourable political conditions. But Siemens did not get any concrete result from all this flurry of interviews. When no practical result was obtained from the meetings with the British, the Germans turned their attention to Russia. Siemens claimed that up to then the French had remained loyal to the agreement that they had reached, but that this situation could change under increasing Russian pressure. Siemens thought that the solution lay in arousing Russian interest in the railway.170 It quickly became apparent that Siemens’s worries that Russian pressure would affect France were justified. Novoye Vremya, which was Russia’s most influential newspaper, was not just defining the Baghdad Railway as a hostile plan against Russia, but was also fiercely attacking German– French cooperation on this matter. In one editorial, which was

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translated at the Ottoman state’s embassy in St Petersburg, it was said that Germany was directing the Russians towards Iran. According to the writer, Russian politicians had to be very careful not to fall into this trap. The writer stated that Russian newspapers were already paying attention to the Persian Gulf, but warned that “Anatolia should not be forgotten for the sake of the Persian Gulf”, because, Anatolia was “a pier” that would make it possible for Germany to reach Iran.171 During a trip to St Petersburg on 20 – 6 April, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Delcasse carried out Siemens’s wish.172 Delcasse told the tsar and his ministers that even though the railway concession was German property, its construction would be carried out by the Germans and the French, and that if the Russians wanted to take part, the French would very gladly serve as intermediaries. The introduction into the agenda of the possibility of the Russians participating in the Baghdad Railway was met with great apprehension by the British. Previously, the British had always rejected German proposals concerning this matter. However, when in this case there was the danger of their political competitors the Russians taking part in the partnership, they suddenly began to show great interest in the venture. On 25 June, Sir Nicholas mentioned the necessity of taking part in a venture for a “railway that would cross all of Asia Minor and end at the Persian Gulf”.173 Actually, British Foreign Office officials had worried for nothing about the possibility of Russia joining as partners the Baghdad Railway, because notwithstanding the thaw between Russia and Germany at the level of official policy, the Russian press continued with its campaign against the Baghdad Railway. Pan-Slavist spheres were leading the opposition against the Baghdad Railway. In August 1901, an article in Novoye Vremya defined the project as a Teutonic highway that would make it possible for the Germans to dominate the area from Hamburg to Kuwait, and that would sever the Slavic world from the Latin world.174 Also other Russian newspapers were fiercely attacking the Baghdad Railway. For example, according to the Vyestnik Finansov, the Baghdad Railway was an enterprise that was against the interests of Russia from every point of view. First of all it would make it possible for the Ottoman empire to grow stronger. Anatolian wheat would become competitive against Russian wheat in European markets. And, what is more, the newspaper was warning Russian capital holders, saying that the railway

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was an extremely speculative enterprise, and claiming that the only person to end up making a profit was going to be the Ottoman sultan. Apart from this, the most effective theme of the Russian press was that by supporting the Baghdad Railway, French officials had betrayed the alliance with Russia. This negative attitude of the press had also got French politicians worried. Delcasse thought that the most sensible way to dispel the Russians’ worries was to convince the Russians to join the Baghdad enterprise and in this way to control it jointly.175 However, this approach had not been satisfactory in convincing Russian officials, and as we shall see further on, under pressure from public opinion among other things, the Russians continued to be the main opponents of the Baghdad Railway, up to the time when they signed the Potsdam treaty with the Germans. So much so that Marschall had said, “I was never mistaken in all of the times when I sensed a Russian presence in all kinds of intrigues against the Baghdad Railway.” And Russia’s ambassador in Istanbul had told him “The Baghdad Railway contrasts with the final aims of Russia’s Eastern policy, because it would strengthen the Ottoman Empire, both economically and militarily.”176

F) The final contract and the Hedjaz Railway By late 1901, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid told Kurt Zander that if certain conditions were met he was ready to sign the final contract. The main one of these conditions was a reduction in kilometre guarantees. And also that the kilometre guarantees should be covered with new sources of income for the Ottoman treasury, that Ottoman debts had to be consolidated and that efforts had to be made to raise Ottoman customs duties. Another condition stated by Abdu¨lhamid was that until this kind of new income source became operational, the Anatolian Railway Company should provide the necessary financial support. Zander saw this latest condition as the wish of the sultan to get a conspicuous advance from the Anatolian Railway Company as the concession contract of the Baghdad Railway was being signed.177 Negotiations were interrupted by the death on 23 October 1901 of Deutsche Bank managing director Siemens.178 Zander went to Germany to be present at the funeral of Siemens, who had dedicated the last years of his life to the realization of the Baghdad Railway. Following Zander’s

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return, negotiations continued at an intense pace. Marschall wrote that they would be going to work for around eight hours per day, for two weeks, to prepare the concession agreement.179 However, in his report submitted to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, Justice Minister Abdurrahman Pasha complained that the negotiation process had been carried out without a full discussion of concession conditions. According to the pasha, since this was the situation “reform and amendments of the articles contrary to the interests of the state and of the country was not possible anymore”, he was not in favour of “accepting the contract in this shape”,180 Notwithstanding the minister’s warning, the decree was prepared and sent to court five days after the end of the end of Ramadan festivities. On 16 January 1902 the royal decree was ready. Finally with a contract dated 21 January 1902, the Anatolian Railway Company was granted a 99-year concession for the Baghdad Railway181 As soon as he received this news, Emperor Wilhelm sent a telegraph of thanks to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, in which he stressed the point that the trust that the sultan had shown in the expertise of German industry would prove to be well deserved.182 In addition to this, Marschall “had gone to the residence of His Excellency the Pasha Minister of Foreign Affairs to present the thanks of His Majesty the Emperor and his own congratulations for the granting of a royal decree concerning the concession of the Baghdad Grand Line to the Anatolian Railway Company.” The German ambassador had expressed his confidence that “this question of the train would serve the interests of both states and that because of this the friendship of the government of Germany” would increase even more.183 The preparation of the final document had happened extraordinarily fast considering the usual pace of Ottoman state bureaucracy. The most significant encouragement for Sultan Abdu¨lhamid on this matter was the fact that the construction on the Hedjaz Railway, for which the sultan had great enthusiasm, had already begun. The most ambitious aspect of this project that was introduced with a decree on 1 May 1900 was that the entire line would be constructed and operated by the Ottoman state. Foreign capital would not take part, and the “sacred line” would be constructed by Muslim engineers and be entirely the work of Muslims. Among the factors that led Sultan Abdu¨lhamid to undertake such an ambitious project notwithstanding the extremely unfavourable financial

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circumstances, economic factors occupied the last place. The construction of the railway was being done for religious and military purposes. Following the loss of land in the Balkans, the composition of the empire’s population had changed radically in favour of Muslims. Abdu¨lhamid believed that following this change in identity, he could hold on to the remaining lands of the empire by means of an Islamist policy. As part of this policy, relations with Muslim countries were developed. Abdu¨lhamid’s new policy was interpreted as pan-Islamism by Europeans and was perceived as something to be concerned about. But these fears were unfounded, because it was not to be expected that a sovereign like Abdu¨lhamid, who knew the limits of his power, would embark on an effort to assemble the Muslims of the entire world within a political union under his own leadership. This being the situation, what were the aims of the sultan? The best answer to this question was provided by Goltz Pasha, as he explained that the sultan’s aim was to “conquer the inside”.184 And sure enough Abdu¨lhamid was trying to keep together the Muslim elements of the empire, within the framework of the theme of the caliphate. In other words, he was trying to prevent the virus of nationalism being contracted by non-Turkish Muslim people. In this case, what we have is domestic pan-Islamism, not an overseas one. It had become obvious that in their new foreign policy following the Ottoman– Russian war of 1877– 8, the British would be playing their Arab card. Propaganda for an Arab caliphate had begun in Arab newspapers, and in cities pamphlets calling on the Arab people to get rid of the Ottoman yoke were being distributed. The sultan wanted to prevent the Arab nationalist/separatist movement from developing, and as a measure against this danger he transferred more state resources to Arabia and gave more prominence to Arabs in state functions. Also the function of the Hedjaz Railway should be evaluated within the context of this framework. In other words, the “sacred line” was an element of an Arab policy that the sultan was trying to follow in extremely volatile conditions. If it is considered that every year, just from India and Iran, around 100,000 pilgrims visited the holy cities and that one fifth of them lost their lives during the hajj trip,185 it is obvious that by constructing the railway, the sultan/caliph would strengthen his leadership not just of Ottoman Muslims, but also of the

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Muslims of the entire world. And sure enough, Abdu¨lhamid got support from the Islamic world to a degree that probably even he was not expecting, and his reputation rose considerably. Die katholischen Missionen magazine summarized the situation by saying: “with a single move [he] became the hero of the day and the most popular man of the entire Islamic world”.186 Maintaining this reputation that had been won within the Islamic world depended most of all on being able to hold on to the holy cities, and this in its turn depended on being able to send troops to the area in very short notice whenever necessary. But in reality, the fact that the Suez Canal should have fallen into British control meant that in this matter the Ottomans had become completely dependent on Britain. If the Hedjaz Railway were to be constructed, the Ottoman state would gain the capability of sending its troops to Syria and Hedjaz quickly without needing the Suez Canal. In this case, Ottoman authority in the area might increase, and having ensured control over Bedouin tribes the plunder of hajj caravans might be avoided. And what is more the overly independent behaviour of the emirs of Mecca might be stopped, and in this way it would become possible to carry out military and administrative reforms in Arabia.187 It was because of these reasons that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had introduced the subject of the Hedjaz Railway even before the conclusion of negotiations for the Baghdad Railway. Actually, in the eyes of the sultan, the Hedjaz and Baghdad railways were elements of a single project. Abdu¨lhamid had told Zander, that his wish to reach Mecca from Istanbul by rail was something that he felt in his heart. It is because of this that he had asked Zander to construct in the shortest possible time a line connecting the Baghdad Railway to the Hedjaz Railway.188 The Hedjaz Railway would inevitably create problems for the Beirut– Damascus–Mu¨zeyrib and Jafa– Jerusalem Railways that were already operating by French railway companies in the area. For instance, the fact that the Ottomans had to construct the part of the Hedjaz Railway from Damascus to Mu¨zeyrib in parallel to the existing French line had led to intense competition between the two companies. Within this state of competition, the administration of the Hedjaz Railway was able to get the upper hand, because being a state body they could neglect economic rationality and reduce prices. However, French diplomacy intervened, and got guarantees from Ottoman authorities that transport

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fees would not be reduced below a certain level.189 The French did not want any competition for the railways that they operated in Syria, and by using their economic and political influence they knew how to stop this kind of venture. The fact that the conditions in which the Ottoman treasury found itself made it necessary to get new credits from France was the reason why Ottoman authorities had to bow to French pressure. As for the British, it was clear that they would oppose the Hedjaz Railway just as they had opposed the Baghdad Railway. When in 1906 the Ottomans introduced the subject of the Aqaba ancillary line, British opposition to the Hedjaz Railway toughened, because reaching Aqaba on the shores of the Red Sea would mean that also the British presence in Egypt was threatened. It was because of this that Britain carried the matter so far as to present the Ottoman government with an ultimatum. In contrast to the French and the British, the Germans fully supported the Ottomans on this matter. So as to be able to create spheres of influence in an area in which they had not been able to penetrate up to then, the Germans were trying to take advantage as much as possible of their friendship and alliance with the Ottomans.190 For example, the fact that Haifa had quickly developed both socially and economically, following the construction of the Haifa line, had been of use to the Germans most of all. The title of the report sent to Chancellor Hollweg was “German interests related to the Hedjaz railway” and the plenitude of notes taken by Emperor Wilhelm indicated that greater emphasis was put on reinforcing the German influence in the region. According to Hardegg, the changes brought by the railway to Haifa had served most the German colony. Thanks to the Germans in high position in railway construction, the reputation of Germans had increased and German industry had up to that moment exported 20 million francs of railway material.191 It is normal that in that period when Germany’s influence over the Ottoman empire was rapidly increasing, German authorities should be interested in the Hedjaz Railway. The Germans welcomed the Hedjaz Railway with regards to its the military benefits as well. If the Baghdad and Hedjaz railways could be joined at Aleppo, then it would be possible to attack the British both from the Red Sea coasts and the Persian Gulf.

CHAPTER THREE FROM CONCESSION TO CONSTITUTION (1903—8)

1) The Baghdad Railway Concession The 1902 agreement had caused the protests of older investors in the Anatolian Railway Company, because investors in the Baghdad Railway would also get a share of the older Anatolian line. What is more, a discussion about the disadvantages of having all the railways between Istanbul and Baghdad managed by a single entity had begun.1 1902 was spent with discussions about the way of solving problems, and a new contract signed on 5 March 1903 compensated the deficiencies in the 1902 agreement. The final concession contract solved the matters lying behind the objections of Anatolian Railway Company stockholders. The Ankara and Konya lines constructed previously as part of the Anatolian Railway continued to be owned by their old owners. As for the new lines to be built beyond Konya, a new company called the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company (Socie´te´ Impe´riale Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Baghdad) chaired by Arthur von Gwinner was going to be established.2 And sure enough, this company was founded on 5 March 1903, with a 15 million franc capital, of which 10 per cent was owned by the Anatolian Railway Company. The new company was to have a board of directors made up of at least 11 members, and at least three of them were to be appointed by the Anatolian Railway Company and three Ottoman citizens were to be appointed as directors.3

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The contract consisted of 46 articles and its validity period was of 99 years. The Ottoman state was to contribute to the line’s construction expenses with an 11,000 franc per kilometre guarantee. The guarantee payments were to be financed with Ottoman bonds with a nominal value of 269,110 francs 65 c. for each kilometre to be constructed. The tithe income of some provinces, which the railway was going to cross, were once more assigned to cover the 4 per cent interest and redemption of these bonds. During this period, Du¨yun-ı Umumiye was supposed to go on with its usual functions. In addition to this, the Ottoman government had also guaranteed a 4,500 franc per kilometre operation income for the company. If the operation income of the railway were to rise above 10,000 francs, the surplus would be split between the government and the company, with shares of 60 and 40 per cent respectively. If the operation income were to be between 4,500 and 10,000 francs, then the surplus above 4,500 francs would go to the government.4 It had been decided, as a way of solving the difficulty in finding financing, to build the railway in 200-km segments independent from each other. This article gave the company a great advantage. Each 200-km segment was legally independent. In case the company were to fail in its obligations in any of the segments, then it would be freed from its obligations concerning the other segments as well. The company would not have the right to operate the part between Baghdad and Basra before completing the part between Konya and Baghdad, because, as Ottoman functionaries saw it, the last part being potentially profitable might be completed in advance and the construction of the main part might be delayed. It was because of this reason that Siemens’s proposal to begin construction from Baghdad because it would be more profitable had been rejected.5 The Ottoman government granted the company the right to construct an ancillary line that would reach the Mediterranean. As for the Kuwait problem, no mention of it had been made, preferring to postpone the choice of the exact point where the railway would end, and to see how things developed.6 The Baghdad Railway would begin from Konya, would cross the Tauruses and join the Adana – Mersin Railway on the C¸ukurova plain. Beyond the Tauruses, the railway would overcome the obstacle of the Amanos mountains and would reach the city of Aleppo in Syria. After Aleppo, it would follow the

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valley of the Tigris river, and would reach Baghdad. In addition to this main line of around 2,264 km, the concession also included the construction and operation of many important ancillary lines for a total of 800 km. For example, connections were to be established between Aleppo and other important centres in Syria like Hama, Humus, Tripoli of Syria, Damascus, Beirut, Jaffa and Jerusalem.7 The company had the obligation to lay out ancillary lines from Nusaybin to Diyarbakır and Harput, in case the Ottoman government were to deem it necessary.8 In addition to this, if a decision to construct ancillary lines to provinces like Maras¸, Antep, Birecik, Mardin or Erbil was to be taken, the company would have precedence. The company was to complete the railway by 1911; this deadline could be extended in case of war, a great economic crisis or the Ottoman treasury suffering from financial difficulties.9 The Baghdad Railway Company would have the right to prospect for minerals along both sides, up to a distance of 20 km from the rails, and would have the right to exploit them on the basis of agreements to be reached with the Ministry of Public Works. For the construction, the company would use the wood obtained from felling trees in state forests without having to pay for it, and would be using water sources on the same basis.10 The company’s representatives had had this article added to the contract after having done a lot of geological research during the previous years. Their aim was to make all the many kinds of raw materials needed by German industry readily available. In particular, it was thought that there was iron and tin in the area between Adana and Aleppo, and plenty of silver around Diyarbakır. Title on the public land crossed by the railway was to be transferred for free to the holders of the concession, and also the quarries and sandpits were to be used free of charge. In addition to all of this, the company had the right to set up brick and roof tile works and also power stations along the lines. The Anatolian Railway Company had also been granted the concession for the ferry line between Haydarpas¸a and the European side of the city. Another interesting privilege granted to the company was the right to conduct archaeological excavations all along the line. That Ottoman authorities were extremely indifferent to the value of antiquities had become apparent as far back as 11 May 1900, when an imperial decree had been issued, according to which, German Professor Gustav Ko¨rt had

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obtained the right to excavate for antiquities in certain areas along the Anatolian Railway in exchange for just 20 Ottoman gold coins and the licence fee.11 By 1910, a circular of the Interior Ministry was stressing the need for all antiquities found along the line “to be sent immediately to the Administration of the Imperial Museum, paying the utmost attention to ensure that they are not damaged”, and from this we can reach the conclusion that following the declaration of the constitutional monarchy, sensitivity about this matter had risen slightly.12 And anyway the new constitutional regime had annulled this privilege of the company. And sure enough, in 1914 authorities confiscated the antiquities that Oppenheim was trying to export.13 Article 8 of the contract had provided an additional privilege to the company, by exempting from all customs duties the machinery, equipment and all other imported goods to be used in the construction. In addition to this big advantage, the company was exempt from all taxes on its goods, capital and income.14 The contract granted the railway company the right to carry out shipping activities on the Tigris and Euphrates and on the Shatt al Arab.15 Since 1831 this had been an exclusive privilege of the English Lynch brothers. It is not surprising that the Lynch brothers should have been the greatest opponents of the Baghdad Railway. Another article that led to a reaction by the British, was article 23 that granted the Germans the concession to construct and operate port facilities in Basra, Baghdad and in the terminus on the Persian Gulf.16 The Anatolian and Baghdad Railway Companies accepted certain requests of the Ottoman government in exchange for the privileges granted by the government to them. Since the status of both companies was that of an Ottoman company, in case of legal proceedings they would be tried in Ottoman courts and their correspondence with state bodies would be carried out in Ottoman. Once the first part of the railway was in service, all its employees apart for upper level managers would have had to be Ottoman citizens. In addition to this, state post and its officials would be carried free of charge, and there would be limits on how high fees applied to passengers and cargo owners could be. The companies were not supposed to sign transport contracts with foreign postal administrations without notifying the government. Apart from this, the fees charged for the transport of goods and passengers, and the service offered, would not differ according to

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nationality, and the top limit of fees would be established together with Ottoman authorities. Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had managed to reflect his military priorities in the text of the contract. In peacetime, the railway would be used for military purposes or in the suppression of revolts, while in wartime it would be used solely for military purposes. The government would be responsible for law and order all along the railway, and would defend the railway in case of war. As for the Baghdad Railway Company, it had been assigned the obligation of setting up stations to be used for military purposes, all along the lines. Once the term of the concession ended, ownership of the Baghdad Railway, including all its facilities, would be transferred to the Ottoman state.17 The Ottoman state had the right to take back the railway, on condition of carrying out the requirements indicated in article 19. Heated discussions in the Council of Ministers before the signing of the contract prove the sensitivity of Ottoman authorities towards this matter.18 Even though Abdu¨lhamid accepted many proposals concerning the Baghdad Railway, he refused, as he had always done, to accept the settlement of colonizing German farmers along the line. This matter had been something about which Ottoman authorities had been sensitive as early as 1899, when a preliminary agreement was about to be signed.19 And sure enough, a secret article added to the final contract of 1903 forbade the encouragement of the settlement along the railway of citizens of foreign countries.20 The company had had to sign a separate document that had been sent to it together with the contract. Gwinner mentioned this document for the first time in an article he wrote in 1909, and stated that back then he had informed the British entrepreneurs, who were potential partners in the venture, about this.21 And sure enough, Ottoman authorities had formulated in the following way the text of the statement that the company had to sign: “With reference to today’s contract about the Baghdad Railway, we are honoured to submit the fact that the Anatolian Ottoman Railway Company has undertaken not to invite foreign immigrants for settlement along the above-mentioned line.”22 The company had had to sign a similar document together with the 1902 contract.23 However, Ottoman authorities were also aware of the importance of settlement all along the line. What they were sensitive about was that the settlers should be Ottoman subjects. A report written for the

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chancellor by Max von Oppenheim,24 an Orientalist who was aware of this situation and who wanted to increase the productivity of the railway, is rather interesting. His aim in writing this report was to take as example successful railways in America so as to be able to formulate proposals for the solution of the problem of how to regulate the density of population along the Baghdad and Hedjaz railways. Oppenheim thought that refugees, who had come from the lands lost by the Ottoman empire, could solve the population problem. His proposal was that immigrants from various places like the Balkans, Crete, northern Africa, Turkestan or Malaysia, should be settled along the railway lines in a planned way. The sultan/caliph using his prestige among Muslims on this matter and his guiding the people, might have a positive effect. Once also security was established, the areas crossed by the lines could be livened up. Success in the first settlements would encourage new settlers.25 According to Oppenheim, pilgrims going to Mecca were the main group of potential customers of the Hedjaz Railway. For this to come true, it might be possible to establish immigration offices in Mecca so as to encourage Muslims from all over the world to settle along the lines. In this way, it would be possible to raise the population density along the Baghdad/Hedjaz lines to their optimal level.26 Another German writer stated that thanks to the irrigation of the plain of Konya, refugees from the former Ottoman provinces in Europe would gain a new homeland.27 In fact, the main reason why the agricultural potential was not realized was the inability to increase the population density. The best, albeit with limited results, among the efforts to increase the population of the area, was the refugee-settling policy proposed in Oppenheim’s report. Muslim Circassian refugees, who had fled from Russia during the Ottoman – Russian War, had been settled in Syria as well as in various other areas of the empire. Ottoman authorities had given the Circassians land that they could cultivate and also draught animals.28 Apart from this, the newly settled Circassians had been exempted from military service, and for a few years from taxes. For example, the Circassian refugees settled in the Cevlan area south of Damascus had begun cultivating empty lands, with the result that the production and sales of grains had increased.29 The settlement policy followed along the Anatolian Railway has been explained in the relevant chapter.

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2) Completing the First Part of the Baghdad Railway On 13 April 1903, the Baghdad Railway Company officially began its operations. The 15 million franc founding capital was made up of stock certificates with a nominal value of 500 francs each.30 On 26 November 1903, the Baghdad Railway Company founded the Konya–Ereg˘li– Bulgurlu Railway Construction Company for the construction of the first 200 km segment. The board of directors of the company, the headquarters of which were in Frankfurt, included besides representatives of the Philipp Holzmann company and related banks, also a representative of the Ottoman Bank.31 The first series of Baghdad Railway stock certificates with a 4 per cent interest for a total value of 54 million francs was issued to finance the construction of this part.32 The Ottoman government had set aside the tithes of Konya, Aleppo and Urfa so as to cover these payments. The Russian government objected to the setting aside of the tithes of Konya province as a guarantee for the payments for the Baghdad line, claiming that it was contrary to the agreement for war reparations payments that they had signed in 1882.33 Apart from this, the Ottoman government was going to pay to the Baghdad Railway Company a 4,500 franc per kilometre operation guarantee. However, this amount did not bring a new financial burden for the Ottoman treasury, because the guarantee amount would be covered with the tithes set aside for the Anatolian Railway. By then, the operations income of the Anatolian Railway had risen above the per kilometre guarantee, with the result that there was a surplus income that could be channelled to these lines.34 The Konya– Bulgurlu Railway Company had not met any difficulty. The part between Konya and Bulgurlu was an area suitable for railway construction. Work proceeded at a fast pace. The first 200 km segment began operating on 25 October 1904. The inauguration ceremony, which was followed by a crowd, “ended with religious offerings and prayers for the well being of the sultan and three shouts of ‘long live the sultan’ following musical salutes by the Konya mayoralty band”.35 On the occasion of this inauguration, Abdu¨lhamid sent a telegraph to Emperor Wilhelm to thank him once more. After having mentioned the “existing friendly relations and feelings” between his “Majesty” the emperor and himself, the sultan expressed his happiness at “repeating

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even now my satisfaction for your Majesty having deigned to visit Istanbul twice”. He added that the line was perfect from every point of view thanks to the “able and effective efforts” of the engineers and specialists, who had “worked on the construction of this line” and that he was going to “honour them with medals in recognition of their services and ability”.36 The railway company had made an unexpectedly high profit on the Konya–Bulgurlu line. Not only had the per kilometre guarantee paid by the Ottoman government covered completely the expenses of construction, but it had also generated a six million franc profit, including the commissions from stock sales. The fact that it had been possible to construct the first part with great speed and that it had generated an unexpectedly high profit even before a single train had gone over it had led to the expectation that the construction of the Baghdad Railway might proceed speedily. However, those with this expectation soon discovered that they were mistaken. The first 200 km segment was completed in 19 months, but during the following five years the railway did not advance at all. The following 38 km was completed in mid-1911.37 There were two overlapping reasons why the construction of the Baghdad Railway had stopped for years. These reasons, of which one was of an economic and the other of a political nature, were financing problems and obstruction by other imperialist powers. The facts that the completion of the Baghdad Railway required a capital of around 600 million francs, and that the German financial markets could not provide this capital by themselves, had been repeated many times by Deutsche Bank officials. And as for the Ottoman empire, it was not in a fit state to pay 16,500 francs per kilometre. Interest and redemption payments for the first part Baghdad Railway bonds issued for the Konya – Bulgurlu line were by themselves a very onerous burden for the Ottoman treasury. This being the situation, it was impossible for the Ottoman State to issue a new 50 – 60 million francs debt. In the case that the railway’s part between Konya and the Persian Gulf were to be constructed, the yearly amount that the Ottoman state would have to pay as kilometre guarantees would rise to 31 million francs.38 In addition to this, some German diplomats were complaining that the Central Bank was not providing the support it had promised.39

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The reason why the Konya–Bulgurlu line was completed with great ease was that from a geographical point of view that area was extremely suitable for railway construction. On the other hand, crossing the Tauruses and the Amanos mountains with tunnels had brought with it great technical problems and consequently also financial ones. A tunnel of around 5 km was dug across the Amanos mountains between Adana and Halep.40 Other examples of these difficulties were the way work proceeded on “rocks as tortuous as snakes” at a height of around 3,000 metres on the Tauruses, and the construction of a bridge over the Euphrates.41 At this stage of construction, infrastructure with a cost of 500–600,000 francs had to be completed along the 130 km line.42 Meanwhile, it seems that an interesting practice inspired by the 1907 Hedjaz Railway began to be followed. A decision was taken to establish “railway battalions” consisting of officers and soldiers of various ranks, who had gained experience along various railway lines and especially along the Hedjaz Line. These battalions would consist not just of military personnel, but also of people from different professions like engineers, doctors, pharmacists, secretaries and lieutenants.43 Overcoming all these difficulties seemed to depend on two requisites. The first was that Siemens should continue with his efforts to attract foreign capital to the railway. On the other hand, the Ottoman treasury had to be raised to the level whereby it could manage to carry out the required guarantee payments. The second condition depended on the realization of the first. In those days it was the British who were continuously obstructing efforts to raise Ottoman customs duties. If the British could be convinced to take part in the railway, this obstacle would automatically disappear.

3) An Opportunity for Compromise Missed Somebody – was it Burke? – called journalism the fourth estate. That was true at the time, no doubt. But at the present moment it really is the only estate. It has eaten up the other three. The Lords Temporal say nothing, the Lords Spiritual have nothing to say, and the House of Commons has nothing to say and says it. We are dominated by Journalism. Oscar Wilde

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In early February 1903, the British businessmen Clinton Dawkins and Ernest Cassel had joined forces for the purpose of investing in the Baghdad Railway, and had won the support of Foreign Secretary Landsdowne.44 Thereon German and French entrepreneurs met on 18 February, and reached an understanding on a solution that took into account the British request for equal participation. According to the agreement, German, French and British capitalists would take part in the construction, management and operation of the railways at rates of 25 per cent each. Fifteen per cent was the rate reserved for the other partners, and the remaining 10 per cent was the share of the Anatolian Railway Company. Every country would have eight representatives each in the 30-member board of directors to be reappointed, while the Ottoman government and the Anatolian Railway Company would have a total of six representatives.45 Negotiations with potential British partners concerning this draft had ended with a positive result, and in early April the British Prime Minister Balfour, Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, Revelstoke, representing British bankers and Gwinner, representing Deutsche Bank, met in the house of Lord Mount Stephen and approved the conditions under which British capital would invest in the Baghdad Railway. Lord Lansdowne and Balfour had provided to the bankers guarantees concerning the support of the British government for the railway construction.46 However, once the matter began to be debated in the British Parliament, it became clear that contrary to expectations, the matter was not going to be approved easily, since there was an intense reaction to the idea of Britain joining the Baghdad Railway. The first attempt against the Baghdad Railway was carried out by Conservative Member of Parliament Gibson Bowles, who represented also the Aydın Railway. During the Chamber of Commons’ session on 7 April, Bowles submitted a question for the prime minister, in which he asked the details of the developments concerning participation by British entrepreneurs in the Baghdad Railway. Balfour responded by stressing that there had been no official negotiations between the parties, but that there had been certain negotiations amongst British, French and German entrepreneurs, and also that the British had set participation in equal rates as a precondition, but that the government was in no way bound by this kind of negotiations. He had added that all this notwithstanding, if the principle of participation in equal rates were to be accepted, they would

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not be against British capital joining this enterprise. However, there was nothing to worry about, because the government was paying great attention to the matter.47 Not having been satisfied with Balfour’s evasive answer, Bowles once more spoke in the chamber of the Commons the next day and having underlined the fact that the Baghdad Railway was a German enterprise, he repeated the conclusion that this would greatly damage British interests in the area. He added that the payment of kilometre guarantees of the Baghdad Railway would be possible only if Ottoman duties were to be raised and that it would be British trade to be most affected by this rise. Quoting from Sarrel, the vice-consul in Istanbul, he stressed the fact that since 1893 the Germans had been increasing their trade in Anatolia at the expense of the British, and that if this railway were to be supported, this trend would accelerate. He also claimed that negotiations to join the Baghdad enterprise, which he called hanging on to the skirts of German financiers, would have an unfavourable effect on the negotiations about Anatolia being carried out with Russia. In his answer, Balfour stated that the railway was destined to be completed, independently of their own wishes. Since this situation had to be accepted as a given situation, would ceding control to France and Germany of this shortest route to India be the right way to follow? And what is more, in the case that the British should join the enterprise, the terminus of the railway might be set up within the lands of the sheikh of Kuwait, and in this way the possibility of controlling the situation would increase. Apart from all of these considerations, and looking at the matter from an economic point of view, was it more reasonable to become partners in a railway that was going to cross areas with a great wealth of mineral resources and in the profits resulting from an increase of trade thanks to the railway, or to cede all of these profits to German and French capitalists?48 The following day, The Times published three news/commentary items on this matter. In the first of these, the parliamentary debate was cited with no commentary. But another article was dedicated solely to the prime minister’s answer to Bowles’s criticism. After having underlined the importance for them of the Persian Gulf, the writer stated the need to never weaken their position in the area, and added that their treaty with the sheikh of Kuwait was also a card up their sleeve. In the article, it was also stressed that rather than carrying the postage

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for India with the Baghdad Railway for the purpose of shortening delivery time, as had been proposed, it would be better to increase the speed of the existing shipping facilities, or in other words of the “Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company”.49 In a third article, the writer analysed the population of the cities along the route of the line and their living conditions, and claimed that the investment to be carried out would not turn out a profit for a long time. He also claimed that the only way to cover the expenses of the railway was to raise customs duties and that this would affect mostly British traders, who had the greatest share of commerce in the area. It was because of this reason that, preservation of the status quo in the Persian Gulf required having the British complete the part of the line after Baghdad. The writer supported the proposal, expressed in the previous article, to increase the speed of the ships of the Peninsular Company.50 In a news item/commentary published in The Times the following day, it was said, and examples from the National Zeitung and Vossische Zeitung newspapers were provided to confirm it, that Germany had received with great satisfaction Balfour’s speech. The point that The Times was making indirectly was that Balfour’s statement was of a kind that was useful for the Germans.51 Many other successive articles on 11 April had also been dedicated to the subject of the Baghdad Railway. The view taken up in one of these articles was that the reason why Germany felt itself isolated was its own aggressive policy.52 In the next article, a report by the British viceconsul had been used to prove that the burden of Ottoman customs duties on British trade was actually higher than was reflected on statistics.53 In another article, the fact that Balfour’s speech had been met with apprehension in Britain, while it had been very well received in Germany was stressed.54 According to another writer’s claim, the Baghdad Railway contract had been formulated in such a way as to ensure that the enterprise should remain in German control. In other words, later injections of foreign capital would not weaken the railway’s control by Deutsche Bank.55 The vice-consul’s report was not just commented upon on The Times, but also became the subject of a question asked in parliament by Bowles.56 The matter was broached once more in the issue of 14 April, of The Times by the same member of parliament. This time, Bowles claimed that thanks to the Baghdad line the Germans would be

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gaining a dominant position in the Persian Gulf area.57 Another news item on the same day, by their St Petersburg correspondent, quoted from the Novoye Vremya newspaper, and described Russia’s opposition to the Baghdad Railway and the unfavourable reaction to Balfour’s speech.58 The Times continued with its bombardment on 18 April, with three articles. According to the editor, who penned the long and rather detailed editorial, the French had their own reasons to wish to take part in this enterprise, because once the I˙zmir– Kasaba and Mersin–Adana lines were connected to the Baghdad Railway they would become part of a great network. But the British run I˙zmir –Aydın network on the other hand, would remain isolated. And what is more, if it was true, as Balfour claimed, that the railway would be constructed in any case, independently of whether of not there was British participation, why was Gwinner literally imploring to get the participation of British capital? According to the editor, British capitalists were not very keen on joining this enterprise, and it was government policy that was leading them towards participation.59 In the same issue there was another article explaining the seriousness of Russia’s opposition to the Baghdad Railway. In this article, it was claimed that rather than watching the completion of a Baghdad Railway extending from Europe to Asia, Russia would even stoop to provocations that might lead to war with the Ottoman empire.60 In The Times’ issue dated 18 April, there were also three letters to the editor. One of these was a letter by H.F. Lynch, boss of the Lynch Brothers company. It was absolutely natural that because of the company’s interests, H.F. Lynch should be waging the fiercest opposition to the Baghdad Railway. Since Lynch’s points were a sum of the views of the opposition that we have been taking up there is no need to go into details.61 Another letter from the Indian Mail, reiterated the fact that the railway would not speed up the mail for India, and that the solution lay in increasing the speed of British ships.62 And yet another letter explained the irrationality of the per kilometre guarantees promised to the German company and the damage that the line would do to British trade.63 On 20 April, Bowles appeared once more in the pages of the newspaper and reiterated his view according to which vice-consul Waugh’s report proved the certainty of the enterprise’s German nature, and to

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support this view he quoted from French writer Cheradame, who was an opponent of the Baghdad Railway.64 In his article, Bowles listed, quoting from the French writer, all the items of the privileges that the Baghdad Railway contract granted to the company.65 The issue of The Times dated 22 April, played an important role in the British government’s complete reversal in the evening of that same day, of its position concerning British capitalists’ participation in the railway. It was as if that day’s issue was designed to attack the Baghdad Railway. So as to stop the rumours that were circulating, Arthur von Gwinner, president of the Baghdad Railway, sent the text of the contract to the newspaper, and the newspaper published the important articles of the contract, quoting the source of the news item.66 However, Gwinner’s effort backfired, because the newspaper’s editor wrote an aggressive piece interpreting these articles of the agreement, and in this way used Gwinner’s letter against the Baghdad Railway enterprise.67 According to the editor, the Germans had been careful in making sure that the enterprise should maintain its German character. According to article 12, the board of directors was going to consist of 11 members, of which three would be appointed by the Anatolian Railway Company. Even though the remaining eight members were going to be appointed by the board, taking into consideration the rates of participation in the capital, three of them had to be Ottoman citizens.68 In that same issue of The Times there was also a news/commentary item from its Berlin correspondent. The correspondent quoted from the Cologne Gazette and stated that speeches in parliament in favour of the Baghdad enterprise had led to an atmosphere of optimism in Germany. According to the correspondent, liberal Germans like Siemens were dreaming of a German – British alliance against Russia. This meant that such visions should absolutely not be taken serious, and that the Baghdad Railway should in no way ruin relations with the Russians.69 On that same day, three more “letters to the editor” concerning the Baghdad Railway were published. The first of these had been sent by Trevor C. Plow, who had served as the general consul in Baghdad for four years. On the basis of his experiences in the area, he championed the idea that the terminus of the Baghdad Railway must absolutely be under British control. The writer of another letter signed T., objected

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to Balfour’s view, according to which the railway would be constructed even without British contribution.70 Undoubtedly, the most important of the letters to the editor was the one written by Sutherland in the name of the “Peninsular and O. Navigation Company”. Also Peninsular, like Lynch and the Aydın Railway, was among the companies that felt threatened by the Baghdad line. Sutherland claimed that the idea that the railway would speed up the mail to and from India and that because of this it would take the place of shipping, was based on an extremely erroneous assumption. This was that the speed of their own ships would remain unchanged by the time the railway line began operating ten years from then as expected. And anyway, it was unacceptable not just for commercial reasons, but also for political reasons that Britain should let this transport fall into the hands of a foreign power.71 The reason why we are focusing on the The Times within the context of the 1903 discussions is that it was the most influential newspaper of the British press in those days. But let us add that in the month of April, following Balfour’s speech, articles attacking the Baghdad Railway were appearing in most of the British press – Daily News, The Daily Chronicle, The Morning Post, The Globe, The Westminster Gazette etc.72 For example, the weekly Economist expressed openly its opposition to the enterprise. In this article, it was said that even thinking of taking part in a venture that the public opposed to such an extent was wrong. In the article, the despotic policies of the Ottoman Empire, with particular attention paid to those against the minorities, were also criticized, and the moral hazard connected to the establishment of this kind of a relation with Sultan Abdu¨lhamid was expressed. Since apart from these points, the writer repeated almost all of the complaints in The Times, there is no need for us to repeat them.73 The statement, “The final aim of the Baghdad Railway is India” is enough to show us the degree of opposition in the article that appeared that same day on The Saturday Review.74 The view analysed in another article in the same issue was that from the point of view of the importance of India, Ceylon, Australia and the Far East, it was impossible to tolerate the extension to the Persian Gulf of a railway under the control of a foreign power.75 In its April 1903 issue, The National Review, which was another publication to have adopted a similar approach, called the Baghdad

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Railway a plot that the Germans had organized to increase their influence in the Middle East and to damage Britain by preventing a British – Russian rapprochement. Maxse, the writer of the article, hoped that the public and patriotic British entrepreneurs would spoil this plot. As for Strachey writing for the Spectator, he stated, “We should tell the Germans openly that we have no intention of joining this venture that is bound to ruin our relations with the Russians.” On 18 April, the Investor Review also published an article against participation in the venture. It was only the Stock Exchange Gazette, the St James Gazette and The Daily Telegraph that adopted a different attitude. While the first of these stated that on condition of having equal shares of participation in management, there was no problem in joining the enterprise,76 the St James Gazette underlined the fact that British bankers were extremely intelligent entrepreneurs, who knew much better than those rushing to offer advice to them where to invest their money, and stated that in case said railway were to be constructed, the volume of trade would grow and this would benefit not just German merchants, but also entrepreneurs from other countries.77 As for The Daily Telegraph, it supported Foreign Secretary Landsdowne and repeated his view that they had missed the opportunity of turning into an international venture a strategic railway under complete German control. Landsdowne had stressed the fact that because of “Germanophobia” it had been impossible to reach a reasonable and just agreement. If such an agreement had been reached, the railway would have served all nations in equal ways.78 Landsdowne, whose views were reported and supported by The Daily Telegraph, called the construction without British participation of the Baghdad Railway a “national disaster”, and because it would be constructed in any case, with or without British participation, and repeated all of Balfour’s views concerning this matter.79 And in his letter to Landsdowne, also Revelstoke, the representative of British entrepreneurs, mentioned the success of the Anatolian Railway and underlined also the fact that the profit expectations of the line were satisfactory from the point of view of the British entrepreneurs.80 The government met on the evening of the same day and decided to rescind its decision to support participation in the Baghdad Railway.

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Obviously, the government, which had a weak position in parliament and contained opposition members like Chamberlain, had not been able to resist pressure.81 In particular, Chamberlain’s approach in this matter had encouraged attacks on the Baghdad Railway by editors with an inimical attitude towards Germany, and chief of all by Maxse and Strachey.82 And Lord Curzon had also stated that the construction of the Baghdad Railway was against their interests, because Ottoman customs duties would have to be raised, and this would damage British trade most of all.83 In his famous speech, which he made in the autumn of 1913 during his tour of the Gulf, and which would later frequently be referred to, Curzon stated that they would maintain at any cost British influence in the Persian Gulf, which had been opened up to the trade of all countries thanks to Britain’s great sacrifices.84 The following day, Balfour declared in the Commons that in no way would they take part in the Baghdad Railway or provide support for it. Balfour had had to justify this decision by stating that the necessary guarantees concerning the internationalization of the line had not been forthcoming.85 All through the negotiating process, the prime minister had to keep his negotiations with German and British capitalists secret. Balfour’s declaration of the government’s new decision led to rejoicing in the British press. The newspapers published articles congratulating the government for not having insisted on an erroneous path, and in parliament amidst applause, Gibson Bowles congratulated the government for its latest decision.86 Benstorff, Germany’s charge´ d’affaires in London, wrote to Chancellor Bu¨low to inform him with great sadness about the joy that the British press felt about Balfour’s speech.87 Also the Ottoman embassy in London wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describing the attitude of the press saying, “All of the London newspapers approve of this speech of the Prime Minister.”88 And in Germany the dominant feelings were disappointment and anger towards the British press and business spheres. German entrepreneurs stated that the untrue information provided by opponents of the railway had played a great role in getting this result. German newspapers like the Bo¨rsen Courier wrote that British entrepreneurs and the government were sufficiently informed about the matter, but that they had not been able to stand fast against the rising anti-German wave.89

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It was very natural that following this declaration by the government, German and British bankers should have been both disappointed and surprised. When a new opportunity for compromise appeared in 1909, six years after this first unsuccessful attempt, Deutsche Bank’s managing director Gwinner wrote an article for the British magazine The Nineteenth Century in which he clearly spelled out certain truths that he had not been able to declare back then, so as, according to his own words, prevent the repetition of the same mistakes. Gwinner wrote: “If these mistakes had not been committed in 1903, all of the Baghdad line would have by now been completed with British participation, there would have been not just German, but also British and French businessmen in the board of directors, and very probably an entrepreneur from the entente cordiale would have been chairing the board of directors rather than me.”90 And sure enough, the board of directors would have consisted of 30 members, and not 11 as the railway’s opponents claimed and the board would have contained eight members each from among German, French and British entrepreneurs. Considering that the following year Britain and France signed the entente cordiale, we can see clearly that these two countries had missed the opportunity of having between them an absolute majority on the board of directors. Considering that later the authorities of these two countries would make great efforts to obtain a majority, the magnitude of the opportunity that they missed becomes obvious. This is confirmed by Gwinner, who in his article wrote that later on many British businessmen and politicians confessed to him that they regretted having missed an opportunity for compromise in 1903. For example, British Ambassador O’Connor confessed his regrets to him very sincerely. And what is more, Clinton Dawkins from the Morgan group wrote to Gwinner to express his regrets, and apologized to Deutsche Bank in the name of British capitalists. According to what was written by Dawkins, Gwinner was right in being disappointed by the new developments, but his disillusionment should be directed not to British capitalists, but to the British press and to the British government. This undesirable situation had been the result of the meaningless anti-German frenzy whipped up by the press. It was not to be expected that the British government should disregard the intense anti-Baghdad Railway storm. Dawkins had stated that just as they were about to attain their objective, a magazine and a newspaper had begun a

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violent attack. The magazine and newspaper referred to by Dawkins were The Times and The National Review that we have been quoting from.91 Other newspapers had joined the campaign initiated by these two publications, and London had fallen into the grips of a veritable Baghdad Railway phobia. In those days it was almost impossible to go against this atmosphere created by the press. Dawkins had put forward a very interesting interpretation of the cause of these developments: “Who instigated these newspapers, which were their sources? Even though I cannot say anything with certainty, I think that the source of the instigation is to be found at the Russian embassy in Paris.”92 Even though it is obvious that the main reason for these developments could not be a Russian provocation, it is also true that there is a grain of truth in Dawkins’s claim. In those days in Britain, there was a group of journalists who had connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, Serge Tatischeff, a correspondent of the semi-official Novoye Vremya,93 which was inimical to the Baghdad Railway, was writing against Germany and in favour of a British– Russian rapprochement. And M. Wesselitzki also generally wrote for The National Review, directed by his close friend Maxse, where he either wrote articles against Germany and the Baghdad Railway or very irresponsibly spread untrue news supporting his articles. E.J. Dillon, another journalist/writer, who had close connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a Daily Telegraph correspondent and his articles were also published in the Contemporary Review.94 In conclusion, when it looked as though Siemens’s and his successor Gwinner’s efforts to have the British join the railway were to bear fruit there had been a complete defeat. We have to note that it was not just opposition in parliament and public opinion led by the press, but also capitalists who felt their interests to be threatened that played a role in this failure. And it was them who incited most of all the Commons Chamber and the press. This sphere of interest was led by the Lynch shipping company.95 The fact that the Ottoman state itself should in 1881 have begun shipping activities along these rivers had not affected too much the profit of the Lynch Brothers.96 In 1912, 146 of the 162 ships operating along this line were owned by this British company. In a report, Marschall stated that in existing conditions it had become impossible to

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compete with the brothers, because the Lynch Company had obtained great privileges in the area not just from the Ottoman empire, but also from Iran.97 Since the fact that the Baghdad Railway contract had granted great privileges in Mesopotamia to Deutsche Bank was the harbinger of a new period, it was natural that the Lynch Brothers should have interpreted this as a serious threat to their monopoly profits. The railway between Baghdad and Basra might deal a deadly blow to river transport, by shortening the 14-day trip.98 H.F. Lynch, had constantly mentioned “British interests” in Mesopotamia during his stint in parliament in 1906– 10. It barely needs to be said that it is useless to state that these interests mentioned by Lynch corresponded to the interests of his own shipping companies. The sincere and even flagrant statement to Gwinner in 1905 by Lynch reveals his influence in the anti-Baghdad Railway campaign in 1903. Having stated to Gwinner that if their participation in the railway was desired it was absolutely necessary to grant them control of the railway’s section in Mesopotamia, Lynch went on to underline the really interesting point. This interesting point is that he stressed the fact that he had sway over both the Foreign Office and the press. He promised in all sincerity he would make all efforts to gain the support of the British press on condition that his interests in Mesopotamia should be satisfied. Among the newspapers that he meant there were also “enemies of Germany” like The Times, The National Review and The Morning Post. He even promised that he would use his influence over the British Foreign Office and that he would make all efforts to find the necessary capital.99 As we shall see in the following chapter, at a time when within an international context the Baghdad Railway problem had become even more complex, Lynch felt that his interests were once more being threatened, and wrote two consecutive articles for the Fortnightly Review. In the first article he expressed his worry that the enterprise might increase the military might of Ottomans and that this military power might be used by Germany.100 In his other article, in which he criticized the complementary contract signed in 1911 by Deutsche Bank and the Sublime Porte, he championed his view that rather than investing in a railway that would damage British interests to such an extent, it would be better to develop shipping lines under British control.101

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Another group that opposed the Baghdad Railway, because of their own interests, consisted of the managers of the I˙zmir– Aydın Railway Company. They were worried about the possibility that the Anatolian Railway might join at Afyon the French controlled I˙zmir –Kasaba Railway. The Baghdad Railway might lead to the growth of the I˙stanbul, I˙skenderun and Mersin ports, with the result that the importance of the port of I˙zmir might decrease, and it might sever this port’s connection with the hinterland of the I˙zmir – Aydın line and lead to a decrease in its income. We have already mentioned extensively how Gibson Bowles, who was the spokesman in parliament of the I˙zmir – Aydın Railway Company, wrote and spoke in favour of strongly opposing the Baghdad Railway. Also British shipping companies serving the East opposed the Baghdad Railway. Thanks to its capacity of faster delivery, the Baghdad Railway Company would be a strong competitor. Undoubtedly, the main one of these companies was the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which had one of the biggest fleets in the world. This company had begun shipping between the Mediterranean and India as far back as the 1840s.102 We had already mentioned the letter that the company’s chairman Sutherland wrote to The Times’s editor as part of the bombardment of 22 April. British textile manufacturers might also be added to this list. It was only indirectly that the textile manufacturers would be affected. If the British were to take part in the construction of the railway, they would have had to accept an increase in Ottoman customs duties. And an increase in customs duties might have led to a decrease in exports of textiles to the Ottoman empire by these manufacturers.103 Following these developments, British participation in the Baghdad Railway was definitely out of the question. An unexpected development increased the disappointment of Germans. France banned transactions of Baghdad Railway bonds in the Paris stock exchange.104 As you might remember, an agreement had been reached on 6 May 1899 between Deutsche Bank, the Ottoman Bank, the I˙zmir – Kasaba Railway Company and the Anatolian Railway Company, and it had been decided that the French should join the Baghdad Railway venture with a 40 per cent stake. And what is more, the French chairman of the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye I˙daresi was an enthusiastic supporter of the Baghdad Railway.

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Support of the Baghdad Railway by French railways in Anatolia and also by institutions like the Ottoman Bank and the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye should in both cases be considered natural. If the Baghdad Railway project were to be carried out, the French owned I˙zmir– Kasaba and Damascus–Hama Railways would become part of a vast network connecting the Ottoman empire to Asia and Europe. Laying out a railway web all over the Ottoman lands was desirable also from the point of view of the Ottoman Bank and of the French representatives in the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye, because most of the Ottoman debt certificates were held by the French. The French had showed so much interest in Ottoman bonds since 1860 that by 1898 at least half of Ottoman debt was held by the French.105 It was in 1902 that the French government’s policy regarding the Baghdad Railway was radically criticized for the first time, in a speech in parliament by Firmin Faure. And what is more, this member of parliament also submitted a proposal according to which Baghdad Railway bonds could be bought and sold on the Paris stock exchange only with parliament’s approval. According to Faure, contrary to what was claimed, French participation with a 40 per cent stake did not make this venture a Franco-German venture. Since the French would be in a minority in this project, they would be serving only as crutches.106 And what is more, in an article he wrote for a newspaper, Faure claimed that the political risks of this venture were much above what was expected. While France should have been developing its alliance with Russia as a counterbalancing element against the triple entente, it was instead endangering it by supporting this project that would increase Ottoman military might against her allies. According to Faure, the project to take part in the Baghdad Railway was a Zionist plot led by the bank of the Jewish businessman M. Rouvier.107 The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Delcasse responded to Faure by stating that French diplomacy did not meddle in this affair, that it was according to their own interests the French entrepreneurs had acted and that not only did they not have the authority to prevent it but also that, even if they had, it would be wrong to prevent it, because since this enterprise was bound to be carried out it was better from the point of view of French interests to take part and to be able to control it. At the end of the debate, the proposal was discussed and rejected with 393 votes against and 72 in favour. The Ottoman embassy in Paris had communicated to the

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs all the details of this debate, and basing itself on a trusted source it had claimed that it was the Russian government that supported Faure against the Baghdad Railway.108 However, by 1903 the proposal submitted by Faure the year before was put in practice, and transactions of Baghdad Railway certificates were banned on the Paris stock exchange. We notice that the dynamics of this process of change were similar to those in Britain. Also in France, the press had constantly harped on about how the Baghdad Railway was against French interests and had managed to impress public opinion and to squeeze the government into a corner. Obviously, all capital holders worried that their interests might suffer because of the Baghdad Railway were doing all in their power to stop the project. For example, capitalists from southern France were worried that the Baghdad railway would supplant the trade route that through Calais, Marseilles and Suez reached India. In a similar way, weavers in Lyon were afraid that they would be cut off from their suppliers of silk in Syria. Let us learn about the rest, from Member of Parliament Deschanel, who strenuously opposed the Baghdad Railway during the French parliament’s session held on 10 November. According to Deschanel, by supplanting the trade route reaching the East through the Suez Canal, the Baghdad Railway would weaken the importance of the port of Marseilles and of French railways. By then, colonialism had become something done with capital rather than with weapons and, by investing in this enterprise, the French were giving up of their own free will, their own weapons to their competitors. And what is more, thanks to this line, the Ottoman’s army would increase its power directed towards France’s main allies. By saying, “the Russian alliance is the corner stone of our foreign policy and that is how it should stay”, Deschanel had underlined the political/military disadvantages of the line.109 The fact that the Germans should be spreading very fast in Ottoman lands, both from a religious and a cultural point of view, was another factor disturbing French public opinion, because France’s centuries-long mission of protecting the Catholics in the Ottoman empire had thus begun to face German competition. German nationalists did not want to accept the fact that German missions in Ottoman lands, be they Catholic or Protestant, should be under the protection of another country. It is also because of this reason that the visit by Emperor Wilhelm in

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1898 had been perceived as a show of force directed towards them. And what is more, the kaiser’s Damascus speech was an indirect threat to France and Britain’s Muslim colonies, because it was in favour of the unity of Islam. The schools being set up by the Germans all along the line were another threat concerning France’s cultural presence in the Ottoman empire.110 It was this series of reasons that, together with the contribution of the press, mobilized French public opinion against Germany. The result was that notwithstanding the fact that the I˙zmir –Kasaba Railway Company and the Ottoman Bank were partners in it, the Paris stock exchange was shut to Baghdad Railway certificates. However, even this official policy of opposition to the Baghdad Railway by the French government, was not enough to stop French entrepreneurs in Anatolia from investing in the Baghdad Railway. In other words, even though the French government was actively opposed to the Baghdad Railway, French bankers were the main foreign shareholders in the railway. The result was that a short while after the signing of the Baghdad Railway contract, Germany had had to begin construction of the lines by itself. This being the situation, of the 30,000 Baghdad Railway shares issued, 8,000 had been assigned to Deutsche Bank, 8,000 to Austrian, Swiss Italian and Ottoman bankers, which were partners of Deutsche Bank, 3,000 to the Anatolian Railway Company, 3,000 to the Ottoman government, and another 8,000 to the French group.111 And the number of members of the board of directors had been raised to 27. Even though French official policy was opposed to the Baghdad Railway, not only were seven of these 27 members French citizens, but also nine of the non-French members were directly connected to French capital spheres.112 The German press was trying to provide moral support by claiming that the Germans would have been able to complete the railway by themselves. In the Mu¨nchener Allgemeinen Zeitung dated 29 April 1903 it had been underlined that the failure to obtain British participation was actually a good thing, since in this way there would have been no competition for German influence in the Baghdad Railway. And when the first segment of 200 km between Konya and Bulgurlu was completed notwithstanding all the difficulties, the idea that the Germans would be able to construct the railway by themselves had spread within the public. For example, Metternich, Germany’s

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ambassador in Britain, had not been worried when Britain had changed its mind and decided not to take part, and had claimed that as work for the railway progressed the British Foreign Office would have to rethink its decision not to join.113 Marschall had reacted in a similar way. However, all these expectations were not enough in themselves to guarantee the continuation of construction work. As far as solving the problem of financing was concerned, neither the necessary amount of foreign capital had been found, nor had an agreement been reached with other imperialist powers as far as raising Ottoman customs duties was concerned.

4) Emergence of the Baghdad Railway as an International Problem A) Edward Grey’s Quadrilateral Conference Thesis Notwithstanding all these unfavourable developments, the Germans believed that each additional kilometre of railway that they laid out in Ottoman lands would strengthen their position in new bargaining that they thought was inevitable. The inevitability of new bargaining derived from the impossibility for great powers to remain unconcerned towards the Baghdad Railway. In this kind of a situation, timing was of the utmost importance. So as to make it possible to have other imperialist powers join at conditions that were as suitable for them as possible, the Germans had to create the impression that they would have been able to complete the Baghdad Railway by themselves. As Marschall observed, the British would have preferred that the Baghdad line should not have been constructed at all, but it was also certain that once they realized that they would not be able to prevent the construction, they would join the project so as to be able to control it. It was because of this that they had to make all efforts to continue with construction work with the aim of reaching the border of Mesopotamia beyond the Tauruses. Any effort to ensure British participation that they might embark upon before attaining this objective would create the impression that they would not be able to complete the line by themselves. Actually, by purchasing the Mersin– Adana Railway114 they had once more proved their determination to reach beyond the Tauruses. This 66-km long railway had been in operation since 1888. But the

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Baghdad Railway Company had taken advantage of the fact that it had not been as commercially successful as expected, and had added the Mersin– Adana Railway to its own network.115 In those days, 55 per cent of the shares of the railway were held by the British and 45 by the French. Following their purchase in block of the shares held by the French, the Baghdad Railway Company had at the first opportunity also bought shares from the British, so as to have a majority say in management.116 What is interesting is that the British were also approaching the matter in a similar way. Following the failure of the negotiations in 1903, they had retreated with the intention of coming back at the time most convenient for them. In a memorandum, the British general staff underlined the political, commercial and strategic dangers of having a railway reaching the Persian Gulf that was under German control.117 In addition to this, both the Board of Trade and the Committee of Imperial Defence submitted reports about the matter to the government. In the report of the Board of Trade, it was claimed that the Germans would construct the railway, with or without Britain’s participation. It was because of this that if British capital had to take part in the enterprise, it would have to join before the Germans constructed the part that, because of the Taurus Mountains, was the costliest. Otherwise, after completion of this expensive and most difficult part, negotiations with the Germans would get even more difficult.118 As you can see, without being aware of it, the committee confirmed Marschall’s approach to this matter. So long as Germany remained a European continental colonial power, this was tolerable and there was nothing for Britain to worry about. But it was not to be thought that a Germany that was fast turning into a gigantic economic and political power should stay in the place wished for it by Britain. And sure enough, by the turn of the century Britain had begun to worry about Germany’s development. Each passing day, competition from Germany was threatening British trade more and more.119 On top of all of this, the growth of the German navy was increasing Britain’s worries, because the colonial policy of Britain, which was an island state, was based solely on its superiority on the seas. According to the British point of view, why would a continental state like Germany be investing so much in its fleet if it did not want to threaten Britain?

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Among those thinking in this way there were those like Lewin who were so suspicious that they thought that the Germans’ aim was to gain supremacy over the seas by destroying the British fleet.120 As for Germany, she thought that strengthening its navy in parallel to its economic and political growth was its most natural right. According to Chancellor Bu¨low, “creating a strong fleet means reviving the national spirit and establishing supra-party solidarity in the country”. In other words, a strong fleet meant, “Raising German prestige internationally, and ensuring harmony domestically.”121 That the title of German ideologue Jaeckh’s should have been “Deutschland 5 England 8” as if it was reporting the result of a football match was a sign of the sensitivity concerning the ratio of the respective navies’ power. With this title, Jaeckh was expressing the fact that they had five fleets, while their adversaries had eight, and since this ratio was in accordance with the 10/16 ratio championed by both Tirpitz, the German Secretary of the navy, and by Churchill, according to the writer there was nothing to object to.122 In summary, German competition was reaching levels that were unacceptable for Britain. In other words, by then the equation had changed, and while the former foes France and Russia had turned into powers with which compromise was possible, Germany had become the real threat.123 It is because of this that in 1904 Britain solved its outstanding questions with France and signed an entente cordiale agreement. Since France and Russia were already allies, it was not difficult for Britain to reach a compromise with Russia in the issues of Iran and central Asia and to sign an agreement in 1907.124 As a result of these developments, Germany suddenly found itself isolated and surrounded by the states of the entente. In parallel to these developments, the Baghdad Railway had completely ceased to be a matter that interested only bankers and had definitely taken an important place in the list of international matters. So much so that the fact that British and German entrepreneurs had reached an agreement about the Baghdad Railway was absolutely irrelevant when compared to the fact that the governments of the concerned states did not approve of this agreement. The fact that Mr Block, the British chairman of the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye, should not have been able to convince British authorities illustrates this point rather well. Thanks to Block’s intermediation important British financial

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spheres were keen to join the Baghdad Railway, but their efforts to influence British authorities did not lead to any result. No matter how profitable British entrepreneurs might have thought the project to be, they did not dare to join the Baghdad Railway against the British government’s disapproval.125 Following these developments, the Germans retaliated and began to obstruct all British enterprises in Ottoman lands as much as possible. For example, all through 1905, the German embassy obstructed attempts to extend the Aydın Railway, notwithstanding all the efforts of the I˙zmir –Aydın Railway managers,126 who had influence within British authorities, and of the British embassy in Istanbul. Also in the matter of extending a credit to Egypt, the British did not have Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s approval. The Germans reminded the sultan of the way that the Ottomans had lost Egypt as a result of a fait accompli and tried to convince him that “Preventing all attempts to increase British influence in Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia were an existential matter for the Ottomans.”127 British Ambassador O’Connor, who was observing very realistically the influence of Germans over Ottomans, initiated contacts with Gwinner, on the basis of his view expressed since 1899 that British capital should join the Baghdad Railway. In the meantime, the Germans had made the best possible proposal for British participation. In October 1905, Gwinner and Sir Fitzgerald Law had met in Berlin and Gwinner had told Law that if British entrepreneur Mackay wanted to construct the Baghdad – Basra section of the railway, it might be possible to reach an agreement. Gwinner had also stated that they might also help the British to get the concession for the extension of the I˙zmir – Aydın railway. And what is more, Gwinner had added that he was ready for negotiations for joining the Aydın Railway with the Anatolian Railway. The Germans had even accepted the idea that the line should end in Kuwait. Let us also add that James Mackay, whom we shall be meeting further on as Lord Inchape, was in those days keen to construct the Baghdad – Basra line.128 As you see, it could be said that Gwinner, who was in difficulty on the matter of financing, was ready in 1905 to accept almost all of the conditions of the British. This being the case, the constructive approach of O’Connor, which we have mentioned, and the fact that Landsdowne

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was the architect of the compromise of 1903, might lead us to believe that the solution of the problem was close. However, the Balfour government, which was going through its last days in power and which in domestic politics had been cornered by the opposition, had neither the power nor the time to solve this problem. And what is more, by 1903, the nationalist wave whipped up by the press and by concerned spheres of interest had not yet calmed down. Meanwhile, the problem of finding financing sources for the Baghdad Railway continued to be unsolved. The income to be obtained by raising Ottoman customs duties might have been a source of hope, but because of capitulation treaties this was subject to the approval of great powers. The British government began to use this opportunity as a mechanism for obstructing the Baghdad Railway. All through 1906 and 1907, the matter was brought up frequently, and especially by opposition parties. 129 Within the context of negotiations on this matter in the British parliament, both the government and the opposition were in agreement. When Lord Newton had said, “We hold a trump card”, he had expressed a shared view. It was in 1907 that customs duties were finally raised from 8 per cent to 11 per cent. However, the condition that 75 per cent of the extra income should be used in the reforms in Macedonia had been imposed. And the remaining 25 per cent was not to be used for the per kilometre guarantees of the Baghdad Railway.130 All attempts by German and Ottoman authorities to overcome this ban were stopped by Britain. Within this context, Marschall had complained that “it is as if even mentioning the Baghdad Railway is banned”.131 When in December 1905 the Liberal Party came to power, Edward Grey, who would head British foreign policy for a decade, became foreign secretary. Grey had been undersecretary for foreign affairs in the Gladstone government in 1892– 5. From his memoirs we notice that he was anti-German and pro-France and Russia, because he criticized the foreign policy followed in 1896– 1904 as being a surrender to the Germans.132 By the time he returned years later, this time as head of the foreign office, the foreign policy desired by Grey had already begun to be followed. We can see that Grey had long since been interested in the Baghdad Railway problem, by the directive he wrote to Francis Bertie, the

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British consul in Paris, around five months after being appointed. The main point of this report was that in one way or an other the Baghdad Railway would end up being constructed. As this process unfolded, an eventual opposition to be carried out independently from the others by Britain, France or Russia would be ineffectual. It was because of this reason that Grey believed that these three states should attribute priority to reach an agreement amongst themselves about the conditions at which they might join forces in constructing the line.133 Grey’s priority was understanding Russia’s position, because he knew that France was opposing the Baghdad Railway so as not to damage relations with its ally Russia, but he also knew that if its new ally Britain were to accept the project France would not have objections on principle against the construction of the line.134 And sure enough, looking at it from a commercial point of view, it was a known fact that France had an interest in this investment. Deutsche Bank managers, who were aware of this situation, continued from time to time to sound the opinion of French capitalists to see if they would invest in the Baghdad Railway. For example, in late 1907, Karl Helfferich approached M. Auboyneau, director of the Paris branch of the Ottoman Bank, on this subject. Auboyneau’s response was that in existing conditions it would not be easy for French investors to join the venture.135 The statement made by Auboyneau to the correspondent of The Times explains the situation very well. The French capitalist had told the correspondent that while as an investor his interests required him to work with the Germans, as a Frenchman he had to remain loyal to the alliance with Britain. He had expressed his hope that for this contradiction to end, the British had to reach a compromise with the Germans as far as the Baghdad Railway was concerned.136 In his directives sent to Nicolson, Britain’s ambassador in Russia, Grey had asked him to learn the Russians’ approach in this matter, without scaring them off. What had to be stressed was that no action that would not be approved by Russia or France would be taken.137 Notwithstanding all these sincere and cautious expressions, the wished for answer from Russia had not been forthcoming, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister Isvolski had only asked Britain to clarify its position by means of a note.138

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When no concrete answer was received, on 4 June 1907 the British Foreign Office sent a memorandum to Cambon and Benckendorff, the ambassadors of the two countries. This time, Britain’s position had been spelled out clearly. That so long as definitive and just conditions were not ensured, Britain’s participation in the venture would not be considered, was repeated once more. In the meantime, not to be caught unprepared, France, Russia and Britain had to reach a preliminary agreement on this matter. However, the key point of the text was that it was stated that Britain wished to construct the part of the railway between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. This request had been justified with a detailed description of Britain’s historic influence in the area. In this way, the British had underlined the commercial and strategic importance for them of the Persian Gulf. Also the construction of the ports of Baghdad, Basra and Kuwait would have had to be carried out by the British.139 In other words, even if indirectly, Britain was asking its allies to confirm that the area was its own area of influence. The Russian and French ministries of foreign affairs received this new memorandum with a little surprise and a little worry. Isvolski told Nicolson that he perceived the memorandum as an abandonment of the principles held by Britain up to then.140 And sure enough, the matter had been debated in Britain all through the spring of 1907 and the government had substituted its thesis in favour of the internationalization of the line that it had been championing up to then, with a request by Britain to control the part of the railway south of Baghdad.141 Also Chambon had interpreted the memorandum as being definitely negative, and had summarized his criticism in three points. First of all, it was impossible that Abdu¨lhamid should cede control of the last part of the Baghdad Railway to Britain. And, what is more, it seemed impossible that Russia would accept these conditions. On top of all this, Britain’s proposal was in contrast with the idea that the Baghdad Railway problem could be solved only by internationalizing the whole line, which was an idea championed also by France.142 Also in French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon’s memorandum, right on the eve of Emperor Wilhelm’s Windsor visit, the view according to which the problem could be solved only by internationalizing the line was repeated. And what is more, the thesis underlined by Britain that Mesopotamia was a British area of influence was rejected.143

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B) The Windsor’s visit and German– Russian negotiations Wilhelm’s Windsor visit that began on 11 November 1907 was seen as a great opportunity to weaken the tension in international relations.144 The Baghdad Railway occupied first place in the list submitted by Grey to King Edward, in which the Foreign Office views concerning the matters to be discussed during the emperor’s visit were explained. The day after he arrived at Windsor, Wilhelm had an interesting conversation with Grey, during which he tried to justify the Germans’ mission of developing the Ottoman empire, by portraying it as some kind of civilizing mission on the part of the white man. What the Germans were trying to do in Mesopotamia was the same as what the British had done in Egypt. Emperor Wilhelm told Grey that in the days when the idea of the Baghdad Railway had just started taking shape in his mind, he had had an extremely fruitful conversation with Cecil Rhodes, the founder of British imperialism in southern Africa. Rhodes had told him that every night he got into bed with a map so as to see which parts of the world required Europe’s civilizing mission. Mesopotamia was one of the main areas of this kind and, according to Rhodes, Germany should undertake this mission. Rhodes had promised Wilhelm that he would do all he could to make sure that British public opinion and the Foreign Office should give him full support on this matter. And Wilhelm had not only promised Rhodes that he would support him in his railway and telegraph projects in southern Africa, but he had also given him permission to have his railway cross the German area of influence.145 Immediately after his arrival, the German Emperor met also with the British War Minister Haldane and asked him to have the British government declare in concrete terms what its wishes concerning the Baghdad Railway were. The minister’s answer to Wilhelm was a “gate” at the point where the Persian Gulf led to India. It was upon this that the kaiser had pronounced his oft-quoted answer, “I will give you the gate”. Haldane had not been able to go into details during this quick meeting, but had been so overjoyed by the answer that on that same evening he had tried to gauge to emperor’s seriousness during a play being staged in his honour. The following morning, as soon as he received the positive answer of the kaiser,146 he took the first train to London to talk about this important development with Grey.

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During this meeting between Grey and Haldane, the need to maintain Britain’s strategic superiority in Mesopotamia had once more been underlined.147 Grey had given Haldane a memorandum that he had prepared, so that he could submit it to Emperor Wilhelm. That same evening Wilhelm invited Haldane to his residence to talk about the matter. Apart from the emperor and Haldane, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Schoen, Ambassador Metternich and War Minister von Einem were also present at that night’s meeting. When Haldane saw all these German functionaries at Wilhelm’s residence he observed that he felt as if he was gate-crashing at a German cabinet meeting, and Wilhelm had said, “You can be a member of my cabinet for tonight.” Haldane having accepted this proposal, the meeting began in a jocular mood.148 The idea that because of its economic, political and strategic aspects, the matter could be solved only by means of quadrilateral negotiations, in which France and Russia would also take part, was championed in the memorandum, which was the basis of that night’s negotiation. Wilhelm had not received favourably the idea of a quadrilateral negotiation that had been submitted to him before that night’s meeting. But when Schoen had said that there already were negotiations with Russia about the Baghdad Railway, he had accepted to negotiate on this basis.149 In this way the fact, which we shall be mentioning a little further on, that Russia was secretly negotiating with Germany had been revealed.150 Haldane observed he had been expecting an atmosphere of “Teutonic autocracy”, and that he had been surprised by how German officials could be arguing with the emperor with a “corps a` corps” struggle.151 Metternich had strenuously opposed the idea of a quadrilateral conference and, as he had already said to Grey,152 he had repeated that he was in favour of bilateral negotiations. Also Schoen stated in his memoirs that he was not in favour of this kind of a conference, in which the Germans would be facing by themselves three opponents.153 It is obvious that notwithstanding differences of opinion, the meetings were carried out in a cordial atmosphere. So much so that Haldane must have reached the conclusion that this hour-long interesting session had ended with agreement. But actually, contrary to Haldane’s perception, the Germans were not happy about the meeting. As was expected, Metternich declared that the German government had rejected the proposal of quadrilateral negotiations. The reason for

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the rejection had been declared to be the fact that the Germans would be by themselves against three opponents and that such a conference was fated from the very beginning to be unsuccessful. However he had also added that they were ready to negotiate the matter with Britain, including the part closest to the Persian Gulf of the railway.154 Britain was not at all happy about this proposal. Grey thought that if they were to remain alone with Germany in the negotiations they would not be able to get a good result and what is more that their relations with Russia would suffer because of this.155 So as not to have misunderstandings and to show his determination to have a trilateral block of solidarity, all through the meetings at Windsor the foreign secretary had kept the French and Russian ambassadors informed about developments.156 When they expressed their satisfaction about this, he had said “and well they should, because it is obvious that the kaiser is ready to solve the problem by means of bilateral negotiations with Britain”, and added that not treating France and Russia in this way would lead to a great crisis of confidence.157 Following the meetings at Windsor, Germany had realized that from then on it would find itself facing a tripartite block. Schoen had even gone so far as to suspect Grey of wanting to use the Baghdad Railway problem as a way to oblige all great powers to clarify their position.158 Britain’s plan to prevent the matter from being negotiated separately seemed to have been successful for the moment. However, it was also true that Germany was on its guard and was trying to find an occasion to break this tripartite block chain. Germany was aware of the fact that the only element uniting the front facing it, was opposition to the Baghdad Railway, and that apart from this they had very few points in common. In other words Germany was not unjustified in hoping to be able to break this chain at some point, and we shall see how this would come true during the 1910– 11 Potsdam process with Russia. And anyway, we can perceive how Russia was the weakest link in the chain by studying certain secret meetings that Russia had with Germany without telling anything to Britain and France, before the Windsor visit. When Isvolski became minister of foreign affairs in 1906, Russia was trying to recover from an attempted revolution and from the wounds of the defeat in the Russian– Japanese war. The new minister was of the opinion that a new war might spell the end of Russia and because of this he was trying to minimize differences with both Britain and Germany.

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It was not to be expected that Russian authorities should renounce their policy of opposing something like the Baghdad Railway, which was bound to strengthen the Ottoman empire militarily. Isvolski on the other hand approached the matter solely from the point of view of realpolitik; if it proved to be impossible to stop the Baghdad Railway from being constructed, then it would be better to adapt to existing circumstances and preserve Russia’s interests in the area. When the German minister of foreign affairs enquired about the truthfulness of an article that had appeared in The Standard, Isvolski gave the first signal of a change in their approach to the Baghdad Railway. The item in the newspaper concerned rumours that Britain and Russia were negotiating about the Baghdad Railway. This news worried German and Ottoman authorities.159 Bu¨low told the German ambassador in Russia, Schoen, to ask Isvolski how matters stood and to remind them that the Germans would be annoyed if the matter were to be negotiated without consulting them.160 After having told Schoen that the news item was invented, Isvolski stated that in no way had the matter of the Baghdad Railway been broached during the meetings.161 Isvolski had stressed the fact that they recognized Germany’s precedence concerning the Baghdad Railway, and that they did not wish to solve this problem without first having negotiated in good faith with the German administration. And Schoen had thanked enthusiastically Isvolski for his sincere and detailed explanations.162 When Isvolski visited Berlin, he told Mu¨hlberg, undersecretary for foreign affairs, that he believed that they could solve this problem in good faith together with Germany. But for this to be possible he had first of all to break the traditional opposition of the Russian public on this matter. He said that for him to be able to do this, Germany had to recognize the Russians’ area of influence in northern Iran, because the public would never have countenanced a foreign power’s threat on this area, which Russia had obtained through a century of efforts. Following this positive approach of the minister, Mu¨hlberg had said that Germany’s single wish in Iran was that Russia should respect the open door principle. In conclusion the parties had agreed on having Russia communicate its proposals in writing to the German ministry of foreign affairs.163 The reason why Isvolski used Iran as a trump card in the bargaining for the Baghdad Railway was that in 1906 Germany had begun to focus

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its attention on this country. Germany had appointed Stemrich, its undersecretary for foreign affairs, as a special representative in Iran, a German banking group had obtained a concession to operate in Tehran, and the Hamburg – Amerika Linie had begun to run a regular shipping service between Germany and the Persian Gulf. Isvolski had openly stated his worries to the German ambassador and had stated that they were aware that the Germans were trying to have the shah of Iran’s son get a German education and that the German charge´ d’affaires was intervening in Iran’s political problems. When the ambassador had stated that Germany’s efforts in Iran were of a purely economic nature, Isvolski had claimed that it was very difficult to draw a line between economic and political objectives, and had proved this by mentioning the example of railway concessions.164 This timeframe was when the Russian ministry of foreign affairs asked Grey to submit in writing his proposals for the Baghdad Railway. It is clear that this was a ruse to gain time and to play a double game. The Russian minister had not informed either the British or the French about the meetings with the Germans, nor had he informed the Germans about the developments concerning the British.165 As we have already mentioned, when he did not get any answer to his first memorandum, Grey wrote a second memorandum, in which he spelled out his views very clearly. In one of the cabinet meetings held in between these two memoranda, Isvolski introduced the discussion of problems related to Germany. During that same meeting, Isvolski stated his view according to which they should on the one hand establish an alliance with Britain and on the other hand reach a compromise with Germany as far as matters like the Baghdad Railway and Iran were concerned. The justification for this approach of the minister was that by then Germany was already well established in Iran and also that an alliance with Britain was not enough by itself to solve problems. If Russia wished to gain peace of mind as far as Iran was concerned, it had to reduce its problems with Germany to an acceptable level, and the Baghdad Railway might serve as a concrete basis for this. During this important meeting, the other ministers also supported Isvolski, but without forgetting to mention the disadvantages of the Baghdad Railway. The minister of finance stated that construction of the Baghdad Railway would lead to Germany taking over the trade route between Europe and India, that ancillary lines extending to Iran would

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threaten Russia’s area of influence in Iran and, what is more, that by increasing productivity in Anatolia, the railway would threaten Russia’s grain export.166 But on the other hand, how were they going to stop the construction of the line? The only way was to put pressure on France to stop it from supporting this venture, but for how long? As for extending Russian railways over Afghanistan to India so as to compete with the Baghdad line that was something that Britain would not have accepted. And the option of taking part in the Baghdad Railway was impossible considering the financial circumstances in which Russia found itself. In this case the best way seemed to be that they should renounce opposition to the Baghdad Railway in exchange for Germany granting concessions that would compensate their losses. In conclusion, even though the objective of obstructing the Baghdad Railway was not dropped completely, all cabinet members supported the idea of negotiating with Germany so as to pursue as much as possible Russia’s interests.167 As a result, Isvolski sent to Ambassador Schoen a letter of proposals, which had been written on the basis of the meetings with Mu¨hlberg.168 And the German ministry of foreign affairs sent this document to Marschall to have his opinion.169 Marschall was strongly against it. Germany’s ambassador in the Ottoman empire said that apart from its first sentence – ending Russia’s opposition to the Baghdad Railway – it was completely unacceptable, since it entailed Russia chasing away Germany from Iran and tying Germany’s hands as far as the Baghdad Railway was concerned. For example, even the Hanikin ancillary line that was to reach the border with Iran would be subjected to Russia’s approval.170 The German ministry of foreign affairs prepared a group of counter-proposals, taking into consideration Marschall’s views, and sent it to the Russian government.171 At the time when Wilhelm was beginning his visit to Windsor, the Russian ministry of foreign affairs was busy writing a new memorandum in response to Germany’s proposals. Grey’s insistence during the Windsor visit on having quadrilateral meetings, and the way he communicated instantaneously all meetings with Wilhelm to his allies, within the framework of his efforts to keep France and Russia satisfied, had a direct effect on relations between Russia and Germany. When the positive atmosphere in the meetings with the Germans was described to Isvolski,172 he became hopeful that by acting in unison

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with their allies they might be able to postpone the construction of the Baghdad Railway, which was their first preference. It was because of this that no answer was sent to Germany and in this way negotiations on this matter were suspended.173 In other words, there was no need for plan B, and plan A was back in force. Looking back at all this, German historian Bode is saddened that, at the time, or in other words before the tripartite entente ring closed around them, Germany missed the opportunity of reaching an agreement with Russia. According to Bode, by refusing the conditions, which it would later accept in Potsdam, the German government had made a great mistake. The writer notes how once their proposals were not accepted by the Germans Isvolski turned to Britain and France.174

5) Germany Increases its Activities in Anatolia Even though construction of the Baghdad Railway stopped completely in 1904 – 9, negotiations between Ottoman and German authorities continued to look for solutions for the financing problem. Negotiations were being managed by Karl Helfferich, the world famous economist, and also George von Siemens’s son-in-law.175 In 1906, Helfferich was appointed assistant general manager of the Anatolian Railways, and one year later was elected a managing director of the Deutsche Bank. In 1901 he became assistant secretary in the colonial department as well. The choice of such a distinguished person as directing genius of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways gave renewed confidence in Germany that the Baghdad Railway project would succeed.176 The matters negotiated by Helfferich with Ottoman authorities were not limited to the Baghdad Railway, and included various other areas of activity that were designed to increase Germany’s influence in Ottoman lands. An example of this consists of the negotiations Helfferich was running, as the representative of Augsburg-Nu¨rnberger Fabrik, for the construction of the Galata Bridge.177 German capital’s participation in the Ereg˘li coal operations, and Deutsche Bank setting up a branch in Istanbul can be counted among Helfferich’s other efforts. And sure enough, these efforts had born fruit, and in 1906, Deutsche Bank had established a “perfectly organized” branch office in Istanbul.178

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Helfferich’s most important project was the irrigation of the Konya plain. We see from his memoirs that only two days after his arrival to Istanbul Helfferich introduced the matter.179 The concession for the irrigation of the Konya plain was granted to the Anatolian Railway Company on 27 November 1907. According to the agreement, the company was going to transport water from Beys¸ehir lake to areas requiring irrigation by means of a 200 km canal.180 So, 53,000 hectare area would stop being dependent on weather conditions, and, following an increase in production, the purchasing power of peasants would also go up.181 In this way, it would become easier for Germany to export to this area, and the transport income of the company would increase. Most of all, Deutsche Bank wanted to stimulate the rise in production of cotton and wheat in the region. The fast rate of growth of population in recent years had given priority to Germany’s search for foodstuff. Increasing cotton production on the other hand, was important because it would make it possible for the German textile industry to free itself from an American monopoly.182 During a congress on colonial matters held in 1902, Paul Rohrbach announced: “In the near future we shall be free from being dependent on America for cotton, because we shall be satisfying the need for it from the areas crossed by the Baghdad Railway.”183 Since 1902 experts had been going to Anatolia to find ways of turning Asia Minor into the primary source of cotton for the German textile industry. The work for an irrigation system for the Konya plain was successful, and the system became operational before the outbreak of war. According to the concession, the project would be carried out in the name of the government and would be completed in six years.184 This capital would be provided to the Ottoman state by the Anatolian Railway Company with an interest of 5 per cent. The Anatolian Railway Company together with the Philipp Holzmann Company founded the Konya Plain Irrigation Company headquartered in Frankfurt. The new company would have a founding capital of 500,000 marks, of which 200,000 would be provided by the Anatolian Railway Company.185 The Germans had been carrying out similar work for years in the area around Adana, which was extremely suitable for cultivating cotton. The Deutsche Levantinische Baumwoll Gesellschaft had been

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established two years before the signing of the Konya plain irrigation contract.186 The partners in the company were Deutsche Bank and the Deutsche Levante Linie shipping company. The company was trying to develop cotton cultivation in I˙zmir, Aleppo and in particular in the C¸ukurova (Adana) plain. The Levantinische Baumwoll Gesellschaft was planning to set up farms equipped with agricultural machinery in C¸ukurova and was granting credits at low rates to cotton producers. Courses were being set up to train farmers in the cultivation of cotton, and on the other hand work was being carried out to raise the quality of cotton. In addition to all of this, the company had also leased a thousand acres near Osmaniye, where it was directly cultivating cotton. The cotton purchased was sent to Hamburg where it was processed in big yarn factories. Deutsche Bank had also set up cotton pressing, cleaning and baling facilities in Adana. As a result of this, it had become possible to export in the shortest possible time the cotton bought. A company called Anatolische Baumwoll– Dampfpresse– Gesellschaft had been founded to speed up exports.187 In 1913, the Baghdad Railway Company prepared a gigantic project for the irrigation of the Adana Plain and managed to get a concession from the Ottoman government also in this case.188 If this project were to be realized, an area of 500,000 hectares would become suitable for cotton cultivation. However, the outbreak of the world war made the realization of the project impossible. Nevertheless, the efforts of the Anatolian and Baghdad railway companies were enough to raise cotton production in C¸ukurova from 45,500 bales of cotton, each of which were 200 kg, in 1904–5, to 85,000 bales in 1910– 11.189 “By 1913, the Adana Plain had become the area of the empire, the agriculture of which was most commercialized, and which was dominated by big commercial farms producing cotton for export.”190 In the short time span between 1904 and 1913, the German cotton industry managed to get more cotton from Anatolia than from all its colonies in Africa.191 Meanwhile, negotiations for the Baghdad Railway were continuing.192 Finally, the negotiations resulted in the signing on 3 June 1908 of a new agreement for the continuation of the construction of the Baghdad Railway. This additional contract determined the conditions at which the part of the railway between Bulgurlu and El Helif, which since it required crossing the Tauruses and the Amanos mountains was the most difficult part, would be constructed. The new

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line to be constructed was 840 km long. It had been decided to construct an ancillary line from Tel Habes¸ to Aleppo, also as a result of insistent requests by the people of Aleppo.193 In this way, the railway would be extended to Syria and Mesopotamia. The problem of the kilometre guarantees would be solved thanks to credit supplied by the Baghdad Railway Company. As was to be expected, Britain was not at all happy about this development and did all it could to prevent the new agreement. Grey had told the charge´ d’affaires in Istanbul that if the raising of customs duties in Macedonia were to be used in any way to contribute to the railway, they would take back their approval.194 The grand vizier had to provide guarantees that the rise in customs duties would not be used for the kilometre guarantees of the railway.195 While we are mentioning British attitudes, let us not finish this chapter without mentioning Oppenheim’s proposed solutions for German–British relations within the context of the Baghdad Railway. Oppenheim was an interesting person, who was first an archaeologist/ researcher and then a specialist/consultant of Deutsche Bank on the subject of the Baghdad Railway, and finally a state official who spent many years as an attache´ at the embassy in Cairo.196 He was knowledgeable about Islam and Arabs. His name is frequently mentioned within the context of Germany’s Middle East policy, and in particular as a key figure in the incitement of jihad against entente powers.197 In a report he wrote for the chancellor in early 1907, Oppenheim drew a framework for negotiations between Germany and Britain. Since Egypt was of primary importance for the British and the Baghdad Railway for the Germans, then the problem could be solved by means of concessions on these two matters. The Germans could officially recognize Britain’s de facto domination over Egypt, including economic privileges, and Britain could respond by renouncing officially all opposition to the Baghdad Railway.198 Oppenheim said that in recent times the British press had begun to offer Anatolia to the Germans in exchange for Egypt, and he stated that this was something to be opposed vehemently. And anyway there could not be any bargaining for the Anatolian Railway that they had already completed. The British wanted to settle in Mesopotamia, “which was an area as rich as Egypt”, and from there wanted to gradually spread out to

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Syria and to all of the Arabian peninsula. The next step would be to sever these areas from the Ottomans, thus eliminating the strength of the caliphate.199 In a report dated 22 June, Oppenheim clarified his interesting claims. The baron underlined the fact that the restlessness in Egypt, India and other Islamic colonies showed that Islam’s end had not yet come. It was on this basis that he claimed that Britain’s biggest fear was that its Muslim colonies might revolt under the leadership of the caliph, surrounding it. According to Oppenheim, a “less fearful” Ottoman sultan might be able to turn the potential in the Islamic world against the British. So long as this potential threat existed, Britain would refrain from waging a European war, and in particular it would refrain from attacking Germany. It was because of this that the German emperor had to maintain good relations with the sultan. Undoubtedly, Britain was also aware of this situation and was trying to follow a carrot and stick policy towards the sultan.200 As one can see, Oppenheim was openly advocating a policy of inciting the caliph/sultan to follow a pan-Islamist policy. Notwithstanding all the efforts of obstruction by the entente powers, Deutsche Bank and Ottoman authorities had once more shown their determination to continue with the construction of the Baghdad Railway. However, on this occasion, alongside the usual international difficulties, there also occurred an unexpected development arising from the Ottoman empire’s own internal dynamics, which would once more upset all plans and not only prevent the railway construction from commencing immediately, but also endanger the future of the project.

CHAPTER FOUR THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

1) A Significant Shift in the Western Struggle for Influence The summer of 1908 witnessed the start of a new period for the Ottoman empire. Following the declaration of constitutional rule, the balance of power of foreign influence in the Ottoman empire suddenly turned against Germany in favour of Britain and France. The main reason for this was Committee of Union and Progress (thereon CUP), the leader of the 1908 revolution, had the kind of liberal approach that was typical of these two countries. The close relations between German authorities and Abdu¨lhamid’s regime led the Unionists to look askance at this country. The Young Turks were suspicious about all the concessions granted to the Germans during the reign of Sultan Abdu¨lhamid. According to the yearly report by the British foreign office, since the arrival of the German general staff committee headed by Goltz, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had very consciously been running his foreign policy on the basis of the principle of developing friendship with Germany. In the report, there was a study of the sultan’s policies carried out to win the support of 300 million Muslims and of the construction of the Hedjaz Railway that was one of the most visible manifestations of these policies, and in it it was observed that these caliphate-centred policies were being run in harmony with Germany.1 Also Fitzmaurice, the chief interpreter of the embassy, was of a similar opinion.2 In his memoirs, Edward Grey made comments along the same lines:

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German policy seems to have been based upon a deliberate belief that moral scruples and altruistic motives do not count in internationals affairs [. . .]. The highest morality, for a German Government, was the national interest; this overrode other considerations, and as such she pursued it at Constantinople. Her policy was completely successful; ours was deadlock and failure. Germany pushed her commercial interests in Turkey; the wealth of Asia Minor was passing into her hands [. . .].3 It is interesting to see how both German and British foreign office officials were caught completely unprepared by the new circumstances brought about by the declaration of the constitutional monarchy. Up to then, the British had not taken the Young Turk movement as seriously as they should have. It was because of this that the fact that the request for reform should have voluntarily come from the inside came as a surprise.4 On 22 July, while embassy functionaries were playing tennis in Tarabya, some of their guests had informed them about rumours circulating in the city concerning the restlessness resulting from the movement for a constitutional monarchy.5 As soon as it became clear that the rumours were true, the British embassy expressed the congratulations of the British government to the Sublime Porte.6 Also King Edward sent his congratulations to the “veteran Anglophile” Kaˆmil Pasha, whom Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had hurriedly appointed grand-vizier.7 On 31 July, an editorial stressing the historic depth of Turco-British friendship and enthusiastically supporting the constitutional monarchy appeared in The Times.8 Sympathy for Turks had begun to spread everywhere, and Mark Sykes had gone so far as to claim the presence of something positive “in the Turks’ nature that would astound the world”. Edward Grey described this event as one of the most auspicious developments in history and Kaˆmil Pasha as a kind of an “oriental Mirabeau”.9 It is certainly an interesting coincidence that a new ambassador should have set out from Britain to follow up Britain’s new Ottoman policy, just as the constitutional monarchy was being declared. It seems that contrary to his predecessors, Ambassador Lowther was received in Istanbul with great enthusiasm. In his memoirs, Mahmut Muhtar Pasha wrote that even at the train station there had been a great crowd acclaiming him.10 And Philip Graves, who served many years as the

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Istanbul correspondent of The Times, described in his book about TurcoBritish relations the enthusiastic way with which Lowther was received, and the great interest shown him by the crowds that had assembled all along the route to Yıldız Palace. He mentioned also the enthusiastic atmosphere that reigned both while he was presenting his letter of credentials to Sultan Abdu¨lhamid and while he was being received by viziers and other dignitaries at the Sublime Porte.11 And the news in The Times confirms all this.12 Lowther himself stated, “The reception accorded to me along the entire route from Yıldız to the Sublime Porte furnished ample evidence of the popularity of Great Britain.”13 Referring to the same matter in a directive he sent to Lowther, Grey stated: “You have reached Constantinople at a most favourable and interesting moment. How little we either of us foresaw, when you were appointed, the reception you would actually get!”14 The foreign secretary made an important speech about Turco-British friendship and their new Ottoman policy in the chamber of the Commons, specifying that as long as the new government continued to carry out the reforms it had promised they were ready to provide all the support that was possible.15 On the basis of a study of Grey’s private correspondence, Temperley underlined the sincerity of the support for the constitutional monarchy.16 British efforts for rapprochement with the Ottomans, carried out within the new atmosphere, were well received by Unionists. The proBritish stance of the new government was quite visible, and all the proposals of the British consulate were taken seriously. Immediately after the declaration of the constitutional monarchy, a request was made for a British admiral to be sent for the reorganization of the Ottoman navy. And a few months later, the Sublime Porte assigned the duty of reordering the Ottoman customs to a British customs functionary called Crawford, and the famous engineer Wilcocks was appointed as a consultant for the irrigation projects in Mesopotamia.17 Even Abdu¨lhamid had received the British ambassador with great warmth, stating that from then on he would have reigned in respect of the constitution and adding that on this point he was hoping for Britain’s support.18 In their correspondence among themselves, British foreign office functionaries concentrated on one point in particular. Whatever the cost, they absolutely had to jump on this “golden opportunity”19 and do all they could to push back Germany’s influence in the Ottoman empire and

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substitute British influence in its place.20 According to the British authorities, Germany was paying the cost of having shared the “privileges” offered by the ancien re´gime.21 British experts were also underlining the fact that, thanks to this unexpected change, the time had come to turn developments concerning the Baghdad Railway in their favour. It was not for nothing that they concentrated so much on the Baghdad Railway. This interest derived from the fact that the Baghdad Railway was right at the centre of the struggle between the British and the Germans for influence in the Ottoman empire.22 “Discussions about the Baghdad Railway were perceived by the British as the real weather vanes of British– German feelings.”23 Within this context, the observations of British traveller/writer David Fraser penned after a trip of his in 1909 are certainly interesting. We have no other wish in regard to Turkey but that she may be strong and prosperous and progressive. Her strength is an asset to us in the Mediterranean, her prosperity gives us a good market for our wares [. . .]. By participating in the Baghdad Railway project we should be taking a step leading to results exactly opposite to those we desire, for we should be weakening Turkey and strengthening Germany. If ever there was a line clearly marked for British policy it is this – to refrain from supporting the Baghdad scheme and to do everything possible to save Turkey from further involving herself in it [. . .]. The German idea in appearing to be intent upon building the next four sections is to convince Great Britain that Germany is able to proceed without our aid, and that when we see how splendidly she is getting along we will hurry to come in before it is too late. But we are not such fools as we look. Instead of coming in, we will stand behind the Young Turks in their entirely laudable intention to be rid of an incubus that was forced upon their country by a corrupt court [. . .].24 And sure enough, the circumstances in which Germany found itself, seemed to confirm British hopes. An air of panic could be sensed in the embassy reports sent from Istanbul. However, it is interesting how when all were in such despair it was only Kaiser Wilhelm who was not in a panic. And also the reason behind

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this attitude of his is extremely interesting. What is more, the fact that events would unfold in a way justifying him makes it necessary to study with attention his views about this matter. The kaiser underlined the fact that the revolution had not been carried out by Young Turks in Paris and London but, on the contrary, by the army, or in other words by officers, who had been trained by Germans and who had been imbued with the German spirit. In addition to this, according to Wilhelm, Britain would have more difficulties in the long term. The reason for this was that Russia would not accept the Ottoman empire’s strengthening with Britain’s support.25 First of all let us repeat that Wilhelm’s views were an exception and then let us have a look at Karl Helfferich’s report that reflects the general atmosphere rather well.26 In his report, the famous economist explained the unfavourable feelings against Germany by saying, “Because of the approaching parliamentary elections, there is the chance of seeing the flags of almost all countries here; it is only our flag and Austria’s that are absent.” Following this, Helfferich reflected on how they had reached this state of affairs, stating that the wide spread perception was that Turco-German friendship was limited to friendship between the kaiser and the sultan, and that while the principles of the French revolution and of the British parliamentary system were glorified, the Germans were identified with despotism, and reached the conclusion that they had been caught unprepared for this kind of development.27 What really saddened Helfferich was that by then Marschall had no influence left: “It is saddening to see how as a result of circumstances that have changed completely, Marschall’s position is not the same as well. In the past he had the power to accomplish almost everything, but now he is condemned to impotence.”28 Helfferich was scared of two main developments that could worsen the situation even more. The first of these was the probability that the Ottomans might extend the boycott against Austrian products, so as to include German goods as well.29 The second and most worrying was the one related to the Baghdad Railway. The following statement by Helfferich reveals very clearly his despair concerning the Baghdad Railway: “The dream of a German Baghdad Railway reaching the Persian Gulf has collapsed completely.” According to Helfferich, the time had come to be realistic and to find new solutions to solve the matter: “No matter how much our pan-Germanists might shout

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treason, we have to reach a compromise with the British and eliminate their opposition to the Baghdad Railway”. The Baghdad –Basra section of the line might be ceded to them. And following this line of thought, Stumm, the first secretary at the embassy in London, had sounded Grey’s opinion to gauge the possibility of a compromise. Even though Grey had told him that they were against the kilometre guarantee system, he had not shut the door on the possibility of compromise.30 What really worried Helfferich was the possibility that the Baghdad Railway might be discussed in the Ottoman parliament. According to intelligence received by him, the British were lobbying for this and there was the possibility that the Baghdad Railway concession might be bought back or even annulled. Helfferich added that there was not much that they could do if a question against the Baghdad Railway were to be submitted in parliament with British support.31

2) A Difficult Period for the Baghdad Railway Company A) Opposition to the Baghdad Railway within the Ottoman parliament On 19 January 1909, I˙smail Hakkı, the member from Baghdad, submitted a detailed question to parliament on the subject of the Baghdad Railway. Hakkı Bey criticized the fact that the Baghdad Railway contract had been kept secret, claiming that a 2,800 km enterprise had to be discussed openly and offered to the best bidder. Also Mehmet Emin Efendi, member from Konya, had stated that he had asked many times to see the contract related to the construction of the Konya – Ereg˘li line, but that he had not been able to obtain it, and had added that he found this to be something done on purpose.32 Another deputy, Cavit Bey, member from Salonica, claimed that the conditions in which the Ottoman empire found itself were not at all suitable for the realization of such a gigantic project. Cavit Bey expressed his views by stating that when it was a matter of constructing a railway requiring a capital between seven and eight hundred million francs “[. . .] even nations with budgets of billions have to reflect and ponder and only after that can they dare to proceed”.33 Cavit Bey noticed also the heavy burden that the kilometre

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guarantee payments would place on Ottoman finances and added: “If the case had been that we were to receive a commensurate interest from the construction of the railway in the near future, we might have accepted it. [. . .] The Baghdad Railway will cross partially empty territories and we cannot hope for big returns in the near future from a line that will cross places with a minimum population, since the majority of its people lead a nomadic life.”34 The most vital criticism during the negotiations concentrated on the financial aspects of the Baghdad concession. I˙smail Hakkı, Cavit and member of parliament from Istanbul Zohrap Efendi, had shown very clearly that the concession provided fat profits for the railway company, and what is more thanks to credits obtained by the Ottoman government.35 For example, the yearly repayments for the 54 million francs obtained by issuing bonds, which were used for the financing of the Konya –Bulgurlu line, were covered with the tax income of the provinces of Konya, Aleppo and Urfa, set aside by the Ottoman government for this purpose. In other words, not a single kurus¸ came from the accounts of the company. All that the company had to do was to issue Baghdad Railway stock certificates. And the taxes set apart where the guarantee of the company’s profit. All three parliamentarians thought that spending 269,000 francs per kilometre for the construction of the railway was too much. I˙smail Hakkı had said, “nowhere in the world is so much spent for a railway, even in the toughest and most difficult territories”.36 These deputies criticized also the fact that while in other places the kilometre guarantees were not more than 8 –9,000 akc e, in the case of the Baghdad line this had risen to 15,500 akc e.37 I˙smail Hakkı had claimed that some of the privileges granted with the contract ran counter to the interests of the Ottoman state. According to him, the right to mine in the area around the line of 20 km from both sides that had been granted to the company, was actually a monopoly in mining activities in an area greater than Switzerland.38 Another article vehemently opposed by I˙smail Hakkı was the one related to customs exemption. In addition to this, the fact that the company should have been granted the right to set up brick and roof tile kilns all along the line was also considered to be extremely dangerous. Hakkı Bey observed that these establishments to be set up would import free of duty all kinds of machinery, equipment and the coal they were

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going to use, and as a result of the unfair competition created by these circumstances, the company would take over all the factories along the 2,800 km line. Hakkı Bey opposed also the right to export ancient artefacts that had been granted to the company. He underlined the historic and moral value of these ancient artefacts, and claimed that the ruins of Babylonia, which he called an inexhaustible treasure, were worth millions.39 The reason why these parliamentarians did not ask for the complete annulment of the project was that “to maintain its honour and credibility, the state had to be loyal to its signature”. They supported the view that rather than annulling the contract, its problematic articles should be amended.40 It should be said that apart from this serious criticism voiced in parliament, the most radical opposition to the Baghdad Railway was expressed by member of parliament from Erzurum Karakin Pastırmacıyan. Pastırmacıyan claimed that as a result of the dire circumstances he had made the empire precipitate into, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had constantly had to grant concessions to foreign powers. According to him “there was no doubt that it was Germany that had profited the most in those days from the government’s immorality [. . .] The foundations of that great enterprise, the Baghdad Railway, which was the basis of the ‘peaceful conquest’ [penetration pacifique] carried out by Germany and of its foreign policy, had been laid out thanks to Abdu¨lhamid’s reign.” And what is more, during this process, Germany changed the line’s route, which had been planned as Sivas –Harput– Diyarbakır– Mossul– Baghdad, and had it go through Eskis¸ehir– Konya so as to avoid problems with Russia. This, notwithstanding the fact that the first route was “the most natural, best and less costly route connecting the see of the throne to the Persian Gulf”. The Konya– Baghdad route was longer and costlier than the first route and did not contribute at all to the defence of the eastern border.41 Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had on the one hand granted the concession of the Baghdad Railway to the Germans and on the other had granted the concessions for railways to be constructed in the Black Sea area to Russia, and in this way had “openly subdivided the country into two separate areas of influence”. In other words he had not only bowed in acceptance of the Germans’ programme of “peaceful conquest”, but he had also lowered the country’s defences against the Russians, who for centuries had been

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waiting for an opportunity to advance towards the south. The causes of this distressing situation were Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s corrupt “immoral regime” and its functionaries, and “those who carried out profitable financial operations over the ruins of public wealth, had very capably profited from this situation”.42

B) Baghdad Railway as an area of social conflict When, in addition to all these unfavourable reactions coming from various segments of society, railway workers also organized and went on strike, the company found itself in even bigger trouble. Conditions of the working class were extremely bad in the Ottoman empire. The environment of relative freedom brought about by the constitutional period made it possible for workers to organize and to struggle for the betterment of their working and living conditions. Workers in companies from various sectors were striking in quick succession. Labour in the railway sector, because of the nature of its work, had the greatest ease in organizing, and was thus leading all the others as far as strikes were concerned.43 The most important one of these was the Anatolian –Baghdad Railway strike. The salaries of the workers of the railway were low, and their working hours long. Not only did they not have any social rights, but their conditions were also worsening day by day. A circular about working conditions issued by the company in 1899 is rather enlightening: “Beginning from the first of November, the wages will be calculated on a per hour basis. No wages will be paid for lunch hours and other times of rest [. . .]. Undoubtedly, if the work has to be interrupted for operations, rain, frost or snow, wages for idle hours will not be paid.”44 Gavriel Arhangelos, who wrote the above-mentioned lines observed: “The degree of iniquity and cruelty of the orders issued with this circular is obvious.” According to Arhangelos, thanks to this system, the wages of workers had been reduced by 25 per cent.45 Arhangelos was of Greek origin and a doctor. He became chief of health services in the company and became an Ottoman citizen.46 However, it seems that Gavriel was behaving rather soft-heartedly towards the workers, and this resulted in his being dismissed, because even when ill railway workers still had to work.47 The workers had wanted to take advantage of the new atmosphere of freedom and had founded a union so as to solve their problems.

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On 17 August 1908, the union submitted a petition to the management of the company. The wording of the petition was of a kind that could be considered to be rather innocent. The railway workers were asking for a raise in wages, so that “Their abodes that were dark dens of misery might turn into houses of felicity, and a bit of welfare might reach their barely endurable lives.”48 Union leaders had forbidden all disrespectful behaviour towards railway managers and all provocative behaviour. Nevertheless, it was inevitable that a union would have been considered an extremely radical organization in Ottoman society at that time.49 Huguenin, the general manager of the company, informed the authorities that the union consisted of revolutionaries and anarchists.50 All of the demands of the workers had been rejected. Upon having their demands rejected, union leaders assembled on 27 August and decided to send telegraphs to the grand-vizier, the CUP, Marschall, the headquarters in Berlin of Deutsche Bank and to Huguenin. In the telegraph it was said that since all their requests to Huguenin to end the tyrannical and despotic practices that had been going on for 19 years had not met with a positive response, the general manager should be fired. Following this development, company management had to take the union a bit more seriously. Even though firing Huguenin was out of the question, there was a newfound flexibility concerning a raise in wages.51 Following these developments, negotiations between the company and union leaders began. The requests of the railway workers can be summarized with the following points: 1) Official recognition by the company of unions as the only organization authorized to conduct relations between the workers and the employer; 2) Payment of a premium once a year to all railway employees; 3) Raising the wages of workers according to their seniority; 4) A raise in daily wages of three kurus¸ to all workers, and of four kurus¸ to qualified workers, and a ban on overtime; 5) Payment of double wages to the night-shift; 6) Payment by the company of the medical expenses of sick workers, and a ban on the firing of sick workers; 7) Shortening the working day; 8) Declaring Sunday to be the weekly holiday; 9) Four weeks per year of paid holidays.52 Deutsche Bank management decided to reject all the demands of the workers, save for those concerning a raise in wages. If the workers were

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to give up these demands, the company might accept a una tantum premium of 10 per cent and a 10 per cent raise in wages. Otherwise, the workers would have to pay for the consequences of a strike. The company was not overly worried, because if as a result of the strike income should happen to fall below the guaranteed per kilometre level, the difference would be covered by the Ottoman government.53 It was because of this that the CUP was doing all it could to solve the problem before a strike became inevitable. However, it is not for having the workers’ demands to be accepted that government representatives were putting pressure on company management, but on the contrary to be able to repress the workers’ movement. For example, in a telegraph sent by the ministry of police, it was said that workers were determined to strike and that they had been threatening Huguenin. The ministry was adamant that because of the material and moral damage that the state would suffer as a result of the strike, all the leaders of this kind of actions should be arrested and all steps to prevent stoppages in transport should be taken.54 Meanwhile, union representative Adil Bey was called to the ministry of public works and threatened about the strike.55 All these efforts were not enough to prevent the workers from striking on 14 September.56 The strike had been effective on all lines between Istanbul and Bulgurlu, and strike committees established in every area had directed the strike. On 15 September, as the strike was continuing, the company granted a raise of 20 per cent on average to all salaried personnel and the equivalent of one and a half salary as a premium. It seems that this new proposal led to a disagreement within the strike committee. While one group of the workers were in favour of striking until all requests were accepted, another group was in favour of being content with the rise of wages and of going back to work.57 Probably, while salaried employees were in favour of ending the strike, workers receiving daily wages were in favour of continuing with the strike. There was an ethnic-based subdivision of work among railway workers and this entailed very big differences in pay. Upper level positions were usually occupied by Europeans, the mid-level jobs were carried out by Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, and the unqualified menial jobs were carried out by Muslim Turkish workers. Even workers doing the same job were not getting equal wages, with foreigners getting double or

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even higher wages, and incredible things being said to excuse this state of affairs. According to Tanin, when the workers complained about this situation, the railway company told them “you are not used to eating steaks, or drinking champagne; your needs are slight, you can do with bread and cheese.”58 It was for these reasons that Turkish workers thought that union leaders were too submissive, and consequently were in favour of continuing to strike. As for union leaders consisting of Ottoman and European Christians, they had ended the strike, because they were afraid that things might spin out of their control. The Union and Progress’s threat to send foreign workers back to their countries seemed to have played a role in this.59 Police pressure also played a role in turning some workers and especially union leaders in favour of stopping the strike. Sami Pasha, the minister of police, had said that as a result of the strike, the Ottoman treasury was in difficulty and, because of this, the strikers had to get back to work, otherwise the police would have to arrest them. And sure enough, the ministry of war had sent troops to Haydarpas¸a, and the workers had been expelled from the telegraph offices and the other buildings of all stations.60 Differences among the strikers and government intervention had suddenly strengthened the company’s hand in the negotiations. The company had a meeting with union leaders and offered raises of 150 and 200 kurus¸ per month for workers with a seniority of between five and ten years and between 10 and 15 years respectively, while the union had asked for 200 and 250 kurus¸. Even though, following pressure by the minister of police, this amount was raised slightly, the union had to renounce all of its other requests. Thus it was that the strike was brought to an end.61 Even though in general the Ottoman press had been in favour of having the strike end as soon as possible, because of the material and moral damage that the state would suffer, it at least admitted that some of the workers’ complaints were justified. It could be said that the following statement in the news item that appeared in Tanin reflected the general opinion of the press: “Those amongst the requests of the employees that are justified will certainly be taken into consideration. In summary, we expect the company to be wise and compromising, and the employees and workers to be charitable and docile.”62 On that same day the I˙kdam newspaper accused the company of “dithering rather

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than taking the steps necessary to eliminate the reasons for a work stoppage”.63 Even though the Anatolian and Baghdad railways strike had ended with relatively low damage, it had served as a warning to the government and to the Unionists as far as the use of freedoms was concerned. The ministry of the interior began to concentrate on the dangers of socialism and in an article published by the Istanbul Ottoman chamber of commerce permitting workers to organize and strike had been compared to letting a baby play with a double-edged sword. And representatives of foreign capital were encouraging Ottoman authorities to take steps in this direction. Apart from Huguenin, representatives of the French chamber of commerce were also warning the government that if it did not take the necessary steps to prevent strikes, the danger of a revolution in the country would appear. It was within this kind of a political environment that on 25 September the Ottoman government banned strikes and closed down the unions.64

3) The Winds Blow in Favour of Germany Again In summary, following the establishment of constitutional rule, difficult days had begun for German politicians and investors in the Ottoman empire. However, events did not unfold at all as was expected, and the anti-German storm that had begun to blow quickly calmed down. This was due to the sophisticated and balanced policies that the Germans were following as far as the Ottoman government was concerned, but also to the unpleasant attitude of other great powers. This situation can be perceived in the correct light only if studied within the framework of realpolitik within the European balance of power, rather than as the result of subjective choices by politicians. Immediately after the declaration of the constitution, there had been certain foreign developments, which together with existing domestic conditions had further weakened Germany’s reputation in the eyes of the new regime. However, those same developments were also beginning to weaken the trust that Ottoman authorities felt towards Britain. In October 1908, not only had there been the annexation by Austria of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also at the same time Bulgaria had declared its independence; as for Crete it had declared that it was joining Greece. Naturally enough, these events had stirred up great anger within the

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empire. The Sublime Porte was unable to do anything save complain to the great powers that these developments were a breach of the treaty of 1878. It was obvious that Germany, which was Austria’s ally, could be of no help.65 As for Britain’s attitude, it was gradually becoming apparent that the promises of support for the constitutional regime were irrelevant once realities were faced, and this was a harbinger of future disappointments for the Unionists. For example, Edward Grey had openly told Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha that as far as Bulgaria’s independence was concerned, Britain could not take actions that might disturb the European balance, without consulting with other powers. If the Ottoman state were to demand an indemnity, the British would willingly support it. In conclusion, at a time when they thought that they had the full support of Britain, the only things that constitutional authorities obtained were support for a request for indemnity and Britain’s good wishes.66 In those days, it was impossible for Britain to be pro-Ottoman without being anti-Russia and in an atmosphere of rising international tension, Britain had limited her capacity of autonomous action by allying herself with Russia and France. Russia was an ally that Britain would not forsake for the Ottoman empire. And sure enough, when Bulgaria declared its independence, Grey tried to find a solution within the framework of these limitations and wrote to Nicolson that on condition of convincing Russia, the Ottoman state’s right of protesting and asking for an indemnity should be supported.67 Notwithstanding the attentions of the British on this matter, it is clear from Russian diplomatic correspondence that the Russians considered British policy to be too pro-Ottoman.68 Within existing conditions, Britain was not really in a state to help the Ottomans. And this situation was a disappointment for Ottoman authorities. This is confirmed by the fact that nine months after the declaration of the constitution, Edwin Pears observed that Britain’s prestige had fallen quite a lot since the first days of the constitution.69 In addition to the disappointment concerning Britain caused by foreign developments, there was also the fact that domestic dynamics had begun to evolve in favour of Germany. The way events evolved proved that Kaiser Wilhelm’s trust in the deep-rooted German influence within the Ottoman army was justified. The fact that after the unexpected uprising against constitutional rule on 31 March 1909

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could be repressed only with army intervention, the army should gradually have become an important internal dynamic as far as determining policy was concerned, was a great opportunity for Germany to get back the prestige it had lost. This line of development is clearly reflected in the way Goltz Pasha was called for a second time to Istanbul to reorganize the Ottoman army. Immediately after the declaration of constitutional rule, Ambassador Lowther reported that the responsibility for reforming the Ottoman navy had been entrusted to a British admiral and added with great pride that the reason why the project of entrusting the land army to von der Goltz had been given up was the fear of offending Britain.70 Following the logic of the British ambassador, by the summer of 1909 nobody must have been worried about offending Britain anymore, because Ottoman authorities officially and insistently asked Germany to send Goltz once more for this important duty.71 Chancellor Bu¨low could not refrain from adding the note “Very true” near vice-undersecretary Stemrich’s observation, “If we do not wish to push them into the arms of other powers, we should not even dream of rejecting this request of the Turks.” And in addition to this, he entrusted Goltz Pasha with the mission of winning the military, economic and political loyalty of the Ottomans and to “chain” them to Germany.72 As for German Military Attache´ Strempel, on 16 June he reported the good news that Goltz Pasha had been received by the Ottomans with sincerity and great pomp and majesty. The general had been warmly greeted in newspapers’ editorials, and his former students, who had meanwhile risen to high ranks in the army, had accompanied him with feelings of “gratitude and admiration”.73 In parallel to these signs of improvement in the political climate, the Baghdad Railway Company intensified its activities. In October 1909, Marschall carried out an interesting attempt to lift the obstacles faced by the Baghdad Railway. The ambassador invited Minister of the Interior Talat Pasha and Minister of Finance Cavit Bey to a train trip to show them the quality of the work carried out by the Germans. According to Marschall, these two influential Unionist dignitaries had been much impressed by the trip and in particular by the way that the train had reached a speed of 120 km per hour along the Konya–Ereg˘li line.74 Marschall tried to take advantage of the favourable impressions that they had, to gain support for the work of the company and it seems from what

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he said that their reactions were surprisingly favourable. And sure enough, within a week the Ottoman government had granted the company a temporary authorization for construction work on the Tauruses and the mountains. To prove their seriousness company management decided to begin construction at their own expense. It was for this purpose that the company founded a construction company called CCRT (Company for the Construction of Railways in Turkey). The company established the headquarters of this construction company, for which, with the aim of giving it a more international look, French, Italian, Austrian and Swedish partners had been found in Switzerland. But in reality, this company was also going to be managed by the Philipp Holzmann construction company. Construction in the Ereg˘li and Adana segments had resumed in early 1910.75 Actually, it could be said that during this transitional period the struggle for influence over the Ottomans between the Germans and the British, and the struggle within the empire between civilians and soldiers, were running a rather parallel course. We might claim, at the risk of oversimplifying this matter, which is actually rather complex, that while the military was in favour of the Germans, the CUP was in favour of the British. The military had made it possible to reinstate a constitutional regime, but the declaration of martial law had increased the power of military officials – and in particular of Mahmut S¸evket Pasha – over civilian authorities. On the other hand, all-important matters related to the Ottoman empire had become areas of British– German competition. Unless it is a coincidence, the fact that in the very days when Goltz came to Istanbul, a delegation of the Ottoman parliament should have been visiting London and Paris is interesting. Criticism of Germany that might be published in one of the newspapers of the comittee might actually be an indirect criticism of the army. For example, the pro-Unionist press could even claim that opposition to the merger between the British Lynch and Ottoman Hamidiye steamboat companies was a German provocation.76 They went so far in their criticism that they even accused Mahmut S¸evket Pasha and von der Goltz of planning to destroy the CUP and establish a pro-German military regime. These continuous attacks on the army led to the closure on 22 December by the war council of the Tanin newspaper.77 By then, the power of the army over politics was gradually becoming clear.78

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Also the overthrow of Kaˆmil Pasha has been the subject of speculation within the context of German – British competition. Those interpreting the matter on the basis of German documents have in general found a direct relation between the fall of Kaˆmil Pasha and a loss of power by Britain.79 For example, according to Marschall, Ambassador Lowther had got closer than necessary to the Kaˆmil Pasha government. Marschall stated that the identification to such a degree of a foreign representative with the prime minister had always proved to be a great mistake. And sure enough, Marschall’s rule had once more been confirmed, Lowther had paid for this mistake of his with Kaˆmil Pasha’s overthrow.80 Also in the report written by Zimmermann and von Griesinger, the diplomats established a connection between the overthrow of Kaˆmil Pasha and the rise of the military within politics on the one hand, and Britain’s loss of power on the other. According to them, Kaˆmil Pasha had made the Ottoman State completely dependent on Britain. In this way, Britain and Kaˆmil Pasha had become the most effective centres of power within the Ottoman state. When the unexpected uprising in the spring could be repressed only with army intervention, the Unionists had been obliged to opt for military dictatorship and, as a result, while the prestige of the British had diminished, the Germans found the opportunity of winning back their former position. That Goltz should have come to Istanbul to reorganize the Ottoman army and the fact that 20 Ottoman officers were sent for training to Germany, showed that Germany’s prestige was rising just like in the old days. According to the reporters, this situation was very important for the future of economic enterprises in Ottoman lands and in particular for the future of the Baghdad Railway.81 And sure enough, the fact that Ottoman– German relations revived after having reached the bottom, was closely related to the way that the constitutional regime evolved from liberalism to absolute rule. During the reign of Abdu¨lhamid, the Ottoman Empire had turned into Germany’s most important area of influence. It is because of this reason that the Germans were in favour of a stable/authoritarian government that might prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman state. The reason why they supported Abdu¨lhamid was based on this kind of perception rather than on feelings of personal sympathy. They had perceived the Young Turks as a threat to Ottoman stability. According to Marschall, the

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Young Turks were bright people actively involved in the welfare of their country. But “unfortunately they had studied political sciences in European countries and especially in France.” During this process, they had forgotten the conditions of their own countries, and the traditions and way of thinking of their own people; and by following ideals like “rule by the people”, which had no sense within the Ottoman empire, they had, albeit without realizing it, wrought great damage on their country. Since the Ottoman people were made up of various nations and followed various religions, they could only be governed by means of an iron fist; the moment “the reins were slackened even a bit,” or in other words the moment talk of “rule by the people” began, collapse would become inevitable.82 During the days following the revolution, as the relatively libertarian approach at the beginning evolved into absolutist rule, the suspicion felt by Germans towards the Unionists slowly turned into the kind of trust similar to the one they felt towards Abdu¨lhamid. While problems between the empire and countries like France and Britain were met with interest, steps leading to an absolutist rule like the limitation of freedom, and the banning of unions and strikes were met with satisfaction. In other words, the problem was not so much the Abdu¨lhamid vs CUP dilemma, but rather the necessity of an administration that would not endanger German interests in the Ottoman empire. So long as Abdu¨lhamid maintained this stable authoritarian structure, there was no problem, and there still would not be any problem if the Unionists managed to ensure the same conditions. According to Wangenheim, who succeeded Marschall as ambassador, the suit that the Unionists had purchased from the West had not fit the empire, and there was the need for adjustments by a capable tailor. The characteristics of Ottoman society were such that only a “very modest version of constitutional rule” would suit it. Before Wangenheim his predecessor Marschall had also expressed his satisfaction for how even though the system seemed to be a parliamentary system, in reality it was ruled by a “12 person committee”. He had compared this new kind of government to an “interesting caricature that was a mixture of monarchy and oligarchy, authoritarianism and democracy, parliamentarism and military dictatorship. The point on which these two notable statesmen agreed was that only the army could save the empire from the chaos in which it had precipitated.83 Since the dethronement of Abdu¨lhamid was

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something that had happened and could not be changed, the best solution in the mind of the Germans was to have a strong, centralizing party and the army share power. Even in Germany, the system of government that looked like a parliamentary system was actually a coalition between the emperor, the army and certain bureaucrats within the ministry of foreign affairs. To get back to Kamil Pasha’s overthrow, Philip Graves, the then correspondent of The Times, thought that the overthrow of Kaˆmil Pasha was a direct consequence of a careless mistake by the British foreign office. In the message written by the British foreign office, it was stated that they were certain that in the “capable hands of the distinguished grand vizier” the future of the Ottoman state would be bright. According to Graves, the Unionists interpreted this message as being a declaration by the British that they had taken the grand vizier under their wings and that he would remain in power so long as they wanted him to.84 I do not think that this message played as big a role in Kaˆmil Pasha’s fall; Kaˆmil Pasha’s loss of his position was something that had happened within his struggle for power with the CUP. Kaˆmil Pasha could not bear the fact that the CUP should be directing the government even though there was no legal basis for this. On the other hand, the Unionists thought that Kamil Pasha was an oldfashioned despot. In brief, the alliance between them was temporary. Kaˆmil Pasha’s dismissal was interpreted by the British embassy as a hostile act towards them. The embassy-supported Levant Herald published articles in favour of Kaˆmil Pasha and against the comittee. It was upon this that with the aim of not losing British support the Unionists visited Lowther and having stated that the only reason for Kaˆmil Pasha’s dismissal were his unconstitutional acts, promised that also the government yet to be established would continue with Kaˆmil Pasha’s policy of friendship towards Britain.85 Also the appointment of Hu¨seyin Hilmi Pasha in place of Kaˆmil Pasha was seen as a Germany’s gain. For example, the Belgian minister of foreign affairs interpreted the appointment of Hilmi Pasha as a victory of the cabinet in Berlin over the cabinet in London.86 In reality, even though Hu¨seyin Hilmi Pasha was not as pro-Britain as Kaˆmil Pasha had been, he nevertheless could not be considered pro-German either. I think that since his relations with Marschall seemed to be close, people thought that he was a bit friendlier towards Germany. But we should not forget that he

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was the one who submitted the Lynch concession to parliament. What he said on this subject shows how realpolitik limited his options. It was because of these problems that he had said that they had found themselves between the hammer and the anvil, adding that he was aware of the political risks in granting the Lynch company the concession it wanted, but that it was not easy to reject the British, the help of whom in many matters they needed.87 He had escaped this situation by resigning; his political past was of the kind that proved that he was the type to flee when faced by difficulties. But it can be stated with certainty that Hakkı Pasha, who succeeded him, was pro-German. And sure enough Marschall called him the “good friend of the Germans” and in his reports frequently stressed the trust he felt in Hakkı Pasha.88 Actually, it could be said that also the pro-Ottoman approach of the British at the beginning of the constitutional regime was a result of their wish to gain advantage in their struggle for concessions, rather than of their good will towards the Ottomans. When, just before the introduction of constitutional rule, Grey had expressed his sadness for how Anatolia’s wealth had fallen to the hands of the Germans, he had, albeit indirectly, confessed his true intentions. Obviously, German politicians and capitalists were aware of this situation and it was natural for them to do all that they could to convince Ottoman authorities. According to Marschall, “The British were not interested in whether a country was run on the basis of a constitution or by an authoritarian regime; the reason why they were against Abdu¨lhamid was not that he was a despot, but that he was suspicious of and inimical towards Britain.”89 During a conversation Grand Vizier Hilmi Pasha had told Marschall that his impression was that the British were approaching the Ottomans in an amicable way as far as the strengthening of their interests in Mesopotamia were concerned, and Marschall had not resisted the temptation of observing how their “latest friends” were a big threat for Ottomans.90 Finally “the new owners of the empire had remembered the value of the Baghdad Railway”.91

4) Tensions and Compromises: A Dialectical Struggle A) British pressure for concessions in Mesopotamia Intense pressure by the British for concessions had inevitably also made the Unionists suspicious. First of all the British had asked for a new

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railway concession between Kuwait and Baghdad;92 following this, they had tried to have the Lynch company regain its monopoly of transportation on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and they had tried to carry out Wilcocks’s irrigation project that was supposed “to turn Mesopotamia into paradise, just as it was in the past”,93 and for this purpose they had even proposed to colonize the area with people they would have brought from India.94 When the Ottoman treasury came to the brink of bankruptcy in the spring of 1909, the picture became a bit clearer. The Ottoman government decided to solve the problem by raising customs duties from 11 per cent to 15 per cent, but this required the approval of the great powers. Britain interpreted this situation as an opportunity to gain advantage in the Baghdad Railway problem. As a matter of fact, from the moment when in November 1908 the Ottoman ambassador in London unofficially suggested this request of the government to British authorities,95 the problems of the Baghdad Railway and raising Ottoman customs duties from 11 per cent to 15 per cent became an indivisible whole. In those days, the British foreign office was in the process of deciding what in existing conditions the best Baghdad Railway policy would be. The fact that the Young Turk government should have introduced the subject of the Baghdad Railway into the agenda of parliament led to a reawakening of hopes in British hearts that the concession would be annulled or at least that the conditions of the concession would be modified in a way detrimental to German interests. And sure enough, Grand Vizier Hilmi Pasha had told Lowther that since the Baghdad Railway contract contained certain financial conditions that were also quite onerous for them, changes were inevitable.96 However when the expectations of the British foreign office on this matter did not come true, Britain’s aim became to obtain a railway concession in the area of the Persian Gulf and to use it in their negotiations with the Germans. By then, the British had a very strong trump card that would help them get the concession: not letting the Ottomans raise their customs duties. As we have seen in previous chapters, the British had for years been requesting control of the last segment of the Baghdad Railway project between the Persian Gulf and Baghdad.97 Following these new developments, British specialists began to work on railway projects that were an alternative to this one. First of all they decided to ask for a new

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railway concession from the Persian Gulf up to Baghdad, all along the Tigris valley. They would have the option of extending this line along the Euphrates valley towards a port on the Mediterranean. The idea was, not to ask the Ottoman state for any kilometre guarantees for the construction of this railway.98 In those same days, Ramsey, the British chief consul in Baghdad, championed the idea that a railway for Mesopotamia should connect Baghdad directly to the Mediterranean.99 To all these projects we might add also the Damascus–Baghdad line proposed to Grey by Wilcocks. According to this British engineer, this project, which would be integrated with the French railway web, was more profitable than the other alternatives.100 In this way, the British projects for railway concessions had risen to four. The Mesopotamia Railway Committee, which had to carry out an in-depth study of these projects, submitted its report to the British government on 24 July 1909. The committee decided to concentrate on two projects worthy of consideration. The first of these was the project for a Tigris line between the Gulf and Baghdad. And the other was a project for British capital to take part in the Baghdad Railway line, on condition of having the control of the Baghdad– Basra part. In its report, the committee advised not to make the acceptance of the railway request a prerequisite of approval of the customs duties raise, because getting results might depend on their not being such a clearly stated connection between these two matters.101 The same had already been expressed on 6 July by Lowther. As for Edward Grey, he had asked the ambassador to provide a more detailed explanation on this matter. While stating this request he had also expressed his doubts on how it would have been possible to prevent the Germans from extending the Baghdad Railway as far as the Persian Gulf without the use of the customs duties raise weapon.102 Those claiming that it would be better to keep these two matters separate were saying that presenting the request for a concession as a prerequisite would have led to hatred for the new constitutional regime on the grounds that it was letting the British obstruct reforms. In the end the British government opted for keeping these two matters separate.103 Meanwhile, on 14 September 1909, Tevfik Pasha introduced once more the subject of the British foreign office’s approval of the raise in customs duties. The increase obtained from this rise, would not be used for the Baghdad Railway, but for planned reforms.104 Charles Harding

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presented very clearly their position concerning the raise in customs duties and the Baghdad line. Tevfik Pasha recounted Harding’s statement in the following way: The Ottoman Government, so long as income separate from the income deriving from the 4 per cent raise is being spent, there is no reason for the British government to interfere in the part of the line as far as Baghdad. What the British government wishes at the moment is to increase its trade along the Tigris valley and to have British capital holders preferred in case the Ottoman Government should want to have the new line between Baghdad and Basra constructed by a foreign company. If the Imperial Government were to construct this line with its own means, nobody would have the right to object.105 Harding and Tevfik Pasha met again on 3 May 1910 to discuss the same matter. Harding had once more stated that the part of the line from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf should be done by British capital and had added that if this should prove to be impossible, that at least this part should be constructed by a partnership of British and German capital.106 Meanwhile, Grey entrusted Lowther with the duty of applying for a concession for the Gulf –Baghdad line along the Tigris.107 Following this request, Lowther talked about the matter with Grand Vizier Hilmi Pasha. The Pasha told him that he personally was in favour of the proposal, but that he had to talk about the matter with his colleagues in the cabinet. At the same time, he could not refrain from stressing the fact that the granting to the British of this kind of a concession would disturb the Germans deeply and that as a result of this they would have to face many difficulties.108 Immediately after this meeting, the British undersecretary for foreign affairs asked Tevfik Pasha to put pressure on the Sublime Porte for it to respond favourably to their requests for concessions.109 Concerning a new railway concession, during these meetings the British intentionally did not bring up the issue of raising custom duties. However, the fact that the request for a railway concession and the note containing the conditions for approving a raise of customs duties should have been submitted in the same days, revealed, albeit indirectly, the

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true intentions of the British. And anyway, a little further on we shall see how later the British began to express openly the fact that their request for a concession was a pre-condition for the raise of customs duties. The way Britain was relentlessly pursuing its own interests was noticed by Ottoman authorities, who began to state it openly. For example, Hilmi Pasha could not refrain from telling Marschall, “British friendship for Turks is based on their own interests.” Hilmi Pasha told the German ambassador, “I would rather pay a couple of million pounds as kilometre guarantees than grant the British this concession.” But on the other hand it would have been very difficult to explain in parliament the reasons for refusing a railway, for which there would not be kilometre guarantee payments. It was because of this reason that Hilmi Pasha almost implored Marschall to help him convince Germany to construct this last part of the Baghdad Railway in a way that would make it possible for Britain and, if needs be, even France to join on an equal standing. If this condition were to be accepted, he could guarantee that there would be no difficulties in the construction of the part of the railway as far as Baghdad.110 Actually, conditions at the time might be considered to have been suitable for accepting Hilmi Pasha’s request, because British–German tension, which had been gradually increasing had reached dangerous levels. The two sides had taken contrasting positions in a series of international problems, and the fact that, after France, Britain should also have reached an agreement with Russia, had increased German politicians’ sense of isolation. Various kinds of the German press, and the masses supporting them, had sharpened this state of mind. As for the rapid expansion of Germany’s fleet and the way its commercial competition was increasing everywhere, these were developments that were worrying British politicians. Rising anti-German nationalism in Britain had pushed the situation to boiling point. In conclusion, authorities in both countries had come to believe in the necessity of a thaw. And to make a thaw possible, these two main problems that were raising tensions had to be solved by means of negotiations. It is also to be remembered that a few months before this new approach of Hilmi Pasha, an article by Deutsche Bank managing director Gwinner on British participation in the Baghdad Railway was published in a famous British magazine. In this article, in which the developments of 1903 were

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analysed, Gwinner wrote that the opportunity for British participation was missed in 1903, solely because the press and certain spheres of interest had misled public opinion.111 In this way Gwinner was trying to clear the ground for new negotiations that he hoped would soon begin. And sure enough, a little further on we shall see how, six months after this article was published, the Gwinner –Cassel negotiations began in Berlin.

B) The Gwinner / Cassel negotiations and British request for Tigris Railway concession Strive mightily, But eat and drink as friends. Shakespeare The negotiations between Gwinner and Ernest Cassel, founding president of National Bank of Turkey proceeded under the supervision of German and British governments. This process was supported by the Sublime Porte as well. And sure enough, the Sublime Porte asked the London ambassador Tevfik Pasha to do anything necessary to “eliminate the conflict that has appeared between the Germans and the British caused by the Baghdad Railway and that unfavourably affected our relations with both countries”.112 At the start of the process Gwinner met Edwin Whittall, one of the directors of the National Bank of Turkey. According to Gwinner, Whitall was a banker in favour of a compromise between the Germans and the British regarding investments in Ottoman lands.113 It was Sir Henry Babington Smith, a partner of Ernest Cassel and president of the National Bank of Turkey, who had introduced Gwinner to Whittall. Gwinner also negotiated with Babington Smith, and told him that with the Ottomans’ approval, the railway’s Baghdad –Persian Gulf part could be ceded to British control.114 Following these developments, Whittall went to London to coordinate the Gwinner – Cassel meetings. Whittall informed not just Cassel, but also Edward Grey and Harding about the preliminary negotiations he had been carrying out.115 Following the end of preliminary meetings, Cassel went to Berlin for the

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actual negotiations. Babington Smith also left Istanbul for the same purpose.116 Cassel had been received amicably in Berlin, and in addition to Deutsche Bank managers he had also met many German politicians. Gwinner’s proposal to him was very clear. A new company was to be established to construct the part of the Baghdad Railway from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. Of the shares of this new company 50 per cent would be held by the British, 30 per cent by the Baghdad Railway Company, 10 per cent by the Anatolian Railway Company and the remaining 10 per cent by the Ottoman government. Gwinner had stressed the fact, as clearly stated by Grand Vizier Hilmi Pasha, that the reason why the British could not get more than 50 per cent was the decision of the Ottoman administrators.117 Gwinner’s offer of 50 per cent was not enough for absolute control, and because of this neither Cassel118 nor British authorities had been satisfied with it.119 Cassel had told Gwinner on 22 December that British participation had to be at least 60 per cent.120 The great worry of the British authorities was the danger that a treaty with the Germans might damage harmony amongst entente states. Therefore Russian and French diplomats were constantly being informed about the negotiations.121 It was because of this same situation that Goschen, Britain’s ambassador in Berlin, also stated that the negotiations for the Baghdad Railway could be completed only in six stages. First of all, bankers had to agree amongst themselves, and the British government had to check whether or not this agreement was in accordance with British interests. In the second stage, French and Russian requests would have to be satisfied so as to obtain their approval. Following these stages, on condition of having obtained the approval of German and Ottoman governments, the British government could officially approve the 4 per cent raise in customs duties.122 As one can see, Grey was thinking about a rather long and difficult process. Also the approach of German politicians contained elements that might endanger negotiations. And sure enough, on 15 December, Minister of Foreign Affairs Schoen said sincerely to British Ambassador Goschen that even if Gwinner and Cassel were to reach an agreement, this would not mean that the agreement would be automatically approved by the German government, because they would have to convince German public opinion that what they had received in

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exchange for ceding to the British a critical and very valuable part of the concession they held was precious enough. Schoen had implied that this price might be a general political agreement of the kind envisioned by Chancellor Hollweg.123 As for the British, they were of the opinion that their approval of the customs duties raises and of the use for the Baghdad Railway of the surplus deriving from this raise was a big enough concession. And sure enough, in Goschen’s report, in which Grey’s views had been included, the fact that any concession beyond this would not be accepted by British public opinion was stressed.124 Grey had said that the 4 per cent raise of customs duties would affect British trade most of all, and that spending this surplus to be provided by British merchants, for the Baghdad Railway, which was going to endanger British interests in the area, was a big enough concession.125 Meanwhile, a constitutional crisis and elections in Britain led to the matter being postponed. When the matter was reintroduced onto the agenda following the elections, Hollweg reiterated his country’s position with its reasons to Goschen.126 When asked what kind of a concession they were expecting, Hollweg had said that an agreement concerning the Baghdad Railway would become meaningful only in conjunction with a general political agreement.127 When Goschen communicated to the foreign office the chancellor’s views, some foreign office officials like Louis Mallet and Eyre Crowe, who in general were suspicious about German proposals, were angry about this situation. Harding considered the chancellor’s views to be so unacceptable that he thought it pointless even to answer. The general attitude was to end discussion of these “unreasonable” requests of the Germans that would for the sake of the Gulf line endanger the unity of entente states. What had to be done was to use all available opportunities to get the Ottoman state to grant a railway concession in the area. According to Mallet, in this way it would become possible to negotiate with Germans on an equal standing.128 According to Goschen, Hollweg was using the Gulf part of the Baghdad Railway to get a political treaty that would make it possible for Germany to act as it wished in Germany.129 During a process in which negotiations between governments were leading nowhere, it was impossible for entrepreneurs to reach an agreement amongst themselves. And sure enough, Ernest Cassel had

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written to Gwinner telling him that negotiations between politicians had been unsuccessful because of the attitude of the German government. In his answer Gwinner had said that he believed that Cassel had not been fully informed about this matter, because it was not the German but the British government that was obstructing things. He had also said that it was the Ottoman government that had rejected the idea of the British having a 60 per cent share in the Gulf line, and that there was nothing the Germans could do for this.130 Gwinner described this negotiating process with Cassel and Smith, which contrary to the negotiations amongst politicians was rather amicable, with a quotation from Shakespeare: “Strive mightily, But eat and drink as friends.”131 Actually, in the midst of this process, Babington Smith had stated openly that it was the politicians who were obstructing British and German entrepreneurs. In a letter he wrote to Harding he had stressed the fact that if it had not been for political factors, it would not have been difficult for them to reach an agreement and had implied that in a way the Germans’ proposals could be considered to be convenient for both countries.132 In the same way, Cassel had told Osman Nizami, from the Ottoman embassy in Berlin, that if politics did not get in the way, he was hopeful about negotiations.133 Gwinner’s letter to Cassel was delivered to the British foreign office by Babington Smith. Following this, Grey sent a confidential letter to Smith in which he stated that on condition of having a 55 per cent share in the Baghdad – Basra line and of being granted the right to construct a port in Kuwait, they could continue with negotiations, but he also underlined once more the fact that for them it was impossible to sign any treaty without first consulting France and Russia.134 In his answer to Grey, Smith stated that the new proposals had been sent to Gwinner, but that no answer had been received, and added that it had been Ottoman authorities who had not wanted them to have a share bigger than 50 per cent. By underlining an important element obstructing negotiations, Smith had also criticized indirectly British attitudes. As if implying that they were following a policy that was too dependent on entente states, he had underlined the necessity of having to know what the French and the Russians wanted, before negotiating with the Germans.135 It was in this way that the British once more began to put pressure on the Ottoman state so as to be granted a concession for the construction in

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their own name of a railway from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. Grey complained to Tevfik Pasha that even though they were providing material and moral support to the new regime, they had not received a favourable response with regards to the Tigris line concession.136 The extremely detailed directive that Grey wrote to Lowther is significant in that it lays out clearly the approach of the British towards the Baghdad Railway in the spring of 1910.137 At the end of the report, he instructed the ambassador to stress the fact that so long as these requests were not satisfied, there would be no raise of customs duties, and that the future of relations between Britain and the Ottoman state depended in great part to the satisfaction of these requests. At the beginning of the report, Grey stressed the fact that they were extremely disturbed by the negotiations being carried out with the German railway company, without first having reached a compromise with them. Britain had an exceptional commercial position in Mesopotamia that had been gradually growing since the establishment of the first British factory two and a half centuries before. Britain had acquired this position along the shores of the Persian Gulf thanks to the sacrifice of many gallant men and to millions of pounds spent. During the early nineteenth century, Arab pirates and slave traders were wreaking havoc in the area. Britain had made it possible for the ports of the area to be open for the trade of merchants from all countries, and had done this without aiming for any territorial gain. And now, the Baghdad Railway would end the position that Britain had acquired thanks to centuries of sacrifices. Britain was trying to find legitimate ways of countering this threat. His Majesty’s government had decided that the best way for this was to ask the Ottoman government for a Tigris railway concession. The British were not asking for kilometre guarantees for this line. And what is more, their line would not be competing with the Baghdad Railway. In some places the distance between the two lines would be as great as 160 km. Their aim was the perfectly legitimate one of safeguarding threatened British interests.138 On 29 April, Mallet explained to Cevat Bey, from the Ottoman embassy, similar ideas.139 In a way, all the pressure that the British applied all through the spring of 1910 served their purpose. Ottoman authorities realized that they would not be able to overcome British opposition, and submitted a new proposal to the Germans. In exchange for a guarantee for the construction of the railway as far as Baghdad, the Germans would

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renounce in favour of the Ottomans the right to construct the part of the line after Baghdad. When in May, Hakkı Pasha mentioned this to the British ambassador, the ambassador did not take this seriously, because he did not believe that the Germans would renounce their rights.140 He had told Harding that the hopes that the grand vizier had as far as the Germans were concerned were just dreams.141 A few days later, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs Rıfat Pasha went to London to take part in King Edward’s funeral, and while there he talked about the Baghdad Railway matter with Grey, Harding and Louis Mallet. When Grey repeated his known views about the Baghdad Railway, Rıfat Pasha asked openly whether on condition of the Germans renouncing the construction of the last part of the line and of the Ottoman State itself constructing this part, the British would end their opposition. Even though Grey was careful not to commit himself and repeated his doubts concerning the Germans’ intention to renounce this right of theirs, he seemed to be a little closer to a compromise. He said that if foreign capital were in any way to take part in the construction, the British should get at least a 60 per cent share. In his interview with Mallet, Rıfat Pasha had said that on principle it was impossible for them to grant a railway concession in exchange for the approval of the customs duties rise, and had explained also the reasons for this. If this approval were to be made conditional to this kind of a retribution even once, it would then become impossible to counter similar requests by all other great powers.142 There was a good deal of truth in this claim of the pasha. The French were taking into consideration the probability of the British reaching a satisfactory agreement with the Ottomans, and were planning new railway concessions in Mesopotamia, so as to be able to compensate such a situation from the point of view of their own interests. Their main project was to connect Baghdad to the Syrian railway web.143 The French entrepreneur M. Ornstein, architect of this project, was in contact with the French railway companies in Syria, with the Ottoman Bank and with some other French banks. In addition to this, he wanted to set up in cooperation with the National Bank of Turkey a railway web that would in part carry out Wilcocks’s irrigation projects.144 The French ambassador in Istanbul had stated that if the British or Germans were to be granted a new concession, they too would want to carry out this project. In response, the

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ambassador had been informed that the subdivision of the Ottoman State into areas of influence centred on railway concessions would not be permitted.145

C) The debt problem and the German diplomatic victory: the 1911 supplemental contract By the summer of 1910, while Minister of Finance Cavit Bey was making efforts in Paris to find the money desperately needed by the Ottoman treasury, the French Ornstein project was still on the table. Cavit Bey, who was known as a Francophile, was quite hopeful that this money would be found in France. “But the French in Paris placed conditions that would have meant placing the Ottoman treasury and its Ministry of Finance under French control and that were of a kind that no self respecting government could accept.”146 They even set the acceptance of the Ornstein concession they were pursuing as a condition.147 It is certainly interesting that while reading Marschall’s report on this matter, Kaiser Wilhelm should have added the note, “yes, this really is blackmail the Gauls are treating the Turks like a negro colony”.148 It is obvious that Ambassador Lowther had been notified in advance of the negative attitude that Cavit Bey would have faced in France. In a confidential missive he sent to Grey, Lowther stated that the French bankers’ intention was to play for time during the meetings with Cavit Bey and not to provide any money until yearend. In this way, financial problems would increase, and the French would be able to set all the conditions they wanted and meanwhile they would get the concessions they craved the most. A short while later, it became clear that the intelligence Lowther had received was correct. Once Cavit Bey realized that there was no possibility for compromise, he began to negotiate with another group of French banks and managed to get a credit. According to the agreement, a group, consisting of Credit Mobilier, Louis Dreyfus, BernardJanislowsky and the syndicate of provincial banks, was going to provide a credit at 4 per cent.149 However, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon told the banks that so long as the Ottoman government did not accept having its budget managed by a French consultant, he would not permit this credit.150 Seeing the conditions that would

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have meant outright dependency, Cavit Bey had to stop his search for a credit. Cavit Bey decided to make an attempt in Britain. However, since Grey and Pichon had already reached an agreement, Cavit Bey stood no chance in London. Ernest Cassel advised Ottoman authorities to get a credit in Paris. Babington Smith’s advice was similar.151 Meanwhile, Cavit Bey talked about the Baghdad Railway problem with Alwyn Parker. After Parker repeated the British view,152 Cavit Bey introduced the idea of having the Gulf section of the railway constructed by the Ottoman state. Parker was not completely against this new proposal, but he nevertheless expressed certain worries.153 A few days later, Lowther told Rıfat Pasha that he had to get a written document from the Germans stating that they were transferring the right to construct the Gulf part of the Baghdad Railway back to the Ottoman government.154 It looked as if they might reach an agreement at the end. Cavit Bey was rather desperate. All through the summer, he had toured the capitals of Europe, without getting any result. In September, during his visit to Berlin, he had made an acceptable offer to Deutsche Bank managing director Gwinner. The offer was extremely straightforward. If the Baghdad Railway Company were to renounce its concession for the last part of the line, on condition that the Ottoman government should construct it, the Ottoman government was ready to provide the financial resources to construct the railway as far as Baghdad. If the Ottomans were to prove unable to complete the construction of the line within a certain deadline, the concession would revert to its former holders. In addition to this, the company would be granted concessions for a few ancillary lines from Aleppo to I˙skenderun, and from Urfa to Mardin, and the right to construct and operate a port in I˙skenderun. Before giving a final answer, Chancellor Hollweg asked for Marschall’s views. However, from the tone of his letter we can feel that he was in favour of the proposal.155 In a rather detailed answer, Marschall used cautious expressions. If this offer had been made during Abdu¨lhamid’s reign, it might have been accepted without any hesitation, because since said line could not have been constructed in time, the concession would have reverted to them. However, since the Young Turks were rather keen on independence and on being the masters of their own home, they were bound to somehow construct the line. If this probability was to come

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true, the last 700 km of the Baghdad Railway would not be of the same quality as that of the German lines. Marschall observed that the character of the Baghdad Railway would have changed, because their original plan envisioned the Baghdad Railway as a first class German Weltbahn that would connect Europe’s heart with the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. There was no reason for this not to be accomplished, because Ottoman authorities attributed as much importance to the construction of the Baghdad Railway as the Germans did. In this part of the report, Marschall added that the Ottoman government was capable of finding the necessary funds to complete the railway even if the customs duties raise were not to be approved, observing that this was just a matter of time and that time was in their favour. On the basis of the experience he had got during the years spent in Istanbul, he stressed the fact that the Germans still occupied a key position within the Ottoman empire, and consequently he advised caution.156 Following Marschall’s report, the last months of 1910 were spent with negotiations between the Ottomans and the Germans, for the Baghdad Railway and in particular for the Baghdad– Persian Gulf line. But let us add that the real interest concentrated on the problem of the credits that Cavit Bey had not managed to get from British and French financial markets. The Germans had followed the problems created by the French and the British, and had used this situation to their advantage to increase their influence over the Young Turks. For example, Miquel, the charge´ d’affaires in Istanbul, reported that following Paris and London, Cavit Bey, who felt sympathy for the French, but not much for the Germans, would be going to Berlin to ask for a 200,000 mark credit, and his advice was to receive him in Berlin in the best possible way.157 In November 1910, a group of German/Austrian banks organized by the German government came to the help of the by then desperate Cavit Bey. Following the intervention of the German chancellor, Karl Helfferich came to Istanbul once more and signed an agreement for an 11 million credit under the support and supervision of the Ottoman government and of Marschall.158 After the signing of the agreement, Cavit Bey wrote that the Germans followed the matter “with great astuteness and sophistication”, that they did not introduce “any matter not related to the credit during negotiations”, and that “They did not put forward any condition that might hurt the pride of the Ottoman Empire.” “This approach of Germany was received with great gratitude

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by the Ottoman government, which at the time found itself in great difficulties.”159 The sultan in person expressed his satisfaction and thanks to Marschall, and also his wish for the Baghdad Railway to be completed as soon as possible.160 From Helfferich’s comment concerning the success they attained thanks to the credit agreement, it is obvious that he must have thought that the matter had been resolved once and for all: “The British–French attack was repulsed in this way. The position we acquired in the new Ottoman Empire was of a nature that we had not been able to attain even during the reign of Sultan Abdu¨lhamid.”161 At this point, we might wonder why Britain and France had set conditions that were bad and were bound to have so many unfavourable repercussions, and what is more at a time when it was known that Germany was lying in ambush. I think that the answer to this question lies in the Unionists’ intention and efforts to abolish economic privileges as a precondition for the creation of a modern state. Since they could not have abolished unilaterally these economic privileges for foreigners, they were trying to attain these aims by enacting new laws within a strong legal framework. Thanks to new regulations, the administrative structure would begin to function in a more efficient way, and these privileges would become needless. And what is more, according to the plans of the Unionists, who were not against foreign capital, the investment opportunities of the country would be opened up for the benefit of the capital holders of all great powers, and in this way they would reap the benefits of the competition between them. However, this assumption overlooked the possibilities of cooperation amongst imperialists.162 And sure enough, the Unionists’ efforts to lessen the load of economic privileges did not escape the attention of the British.163 In his reports, Lowther stated that in almost all new laws there were elements infringing upon these privileges, and because of this recommended taking all necessary steps. It is clear that these kinds of worry were shared by the French. Pichon expressed this worry by saying that he thought it would be useful if Western states joined forces to prevent this campaign that threatened all foreign investors, while it was still at the initial stage. In those days when they were about to embark upon a financial reform, the Ottoman government should be told that not being hostile towards foreign capital would be in its best interest. And sure enough, the French were

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rather worried that the Ottomans would be nationalizing the Tobacco Regie, because Cavit Bey had set up a commission studying this matter.164 And the British were afraid that the Ottomans would perceive the Lynch company as an intervention in their independence. Grey had begun to mention this kind of nationalistic tendency immediately after the declaration of the constitution.165 In conclusion, the Ottomans had to be taught a lesson in a language they would understand. However, the lesson ended up being too strong and the result was unexpectedly radical. As Muhtar Pasha said, it might be that they pushed the Ottomans into an alliance with the Germans and that in this way they were the cause for the war lasting for years.166 It was natural that following the credit agreement, the Baghdad Railway negotiations should have gained momentum once more. And anyway we know that the construction of the railway had resumed in 1910 in the Ereg˘li and Adana sections. At the end of the same year, the number of workers employed by the company had reached 6,000, and construction work had progressed enormously.167 By then, following these developments, both the Germans and the Ottomans were rather keen on reaching a satisfactory agreement concerning the completion of construction activities. The Baghdad Railway Company accepted to renounce in favour of the Ottoman state the right to construct the part between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, which was being strenuously opposed by the British. This time, Marschall let the German government know that he considered it a good idea to accept this latest Ottoman proposal. However, according to Marschall, if foreign capital were to take part in the construction of this line, the Germans would have to have a share equal at least to that of the other foreign capital group with the greatest share in the enterprise.168 In this way, the ambassador let it be known that they would be minimizing their losses from the part, the rights of which they had renounced, and that they would be helping Grand Vizier Hakkı Pasha, whom he considered to be a friend of the Germans, in solving the problem.169 The negotiations ended on 21 March with the signing of a new supplementary contract, which consisted of three complementary contracts. One of these, guaranteed the construction of the part of the railway from Bulgurlu to Baghdad, and at a time when the Ottoman government was undertaking to find the necessary funds, it made the Germans accept the fact that the surplus funds resulting from an

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eventual rise in customs duties could not be used for the construction of the railway.170 Thanks to this contract, the Germans were getting hold of an approximately 2,700 km railway web in Anatolia, which was longer than the Berlin– Cologne– Paris– Madrid line. The other two contracts granted the company the concessions for the construction of an ancillary line from Osmaniye to I˙skenderun, and for the construction and operation of a new port in I˙skenderun, with the same conditions of the Haydarpas¸a Port concession.171 In this way, Syria’s main port had fallen into German hands. This new situation greatly affected the French railway system in Syria and consequently, the unhappiness of the French charge´ d’affaires was not unfounded. In a way, the Germans had retreated from British Mesopotamia, but had begun to violate the French area of influence.172 And what is more, according to German experts, the concession for the Persian Gulf had been given up, but the more profitable and important I˙skenderun ancillary line concession was acquired.173 It was only the previous year when Austria’s consul in Beirut had stated that because of the inadequacy of the port of Mersin a port had to be constructed in I˙skenderun so as to be able to reach the Mediterranean.174 Also German orientalist Ernst Jaeckh thought that it would be better if Baghdad Railway reached Ottomancontrolled I˙skenderun rather than British-controlled Kuwait.175 The famous French journalist Cheradame interpreted the situation in a similar way. According to him, thanks to this concession, the Germans had acquired a port on the Mediterranean, the importance of which would become clear only later.176 Another interesting review of the agreement was an article titled “The solution of the Baghdad Railway problem” that appeared in the Die Grenzboten magazine. According to the editor George Cleinow, this agreement, reminded everyone once again that the Baghdad Railway, which for a while had been the object of political speculation, was actually an economic enterprise. Britain had raised the level of her opposition to the railway, claiming that this line, by reaching the Persian Gulf, would be threatening India. But then Deutsche Bank had shown a spirit of compromise and had given back the concession for the last part of the line. According to the writer, Britain also had to accept this situation.177 Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kiderlen described this agreement as a, “great victory of the German spirit of enterprise,

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attained notwithstanding all the obstruction and intrigues of competing powers and the unexpected changes in the Ottoman administration”.178 We cannot claim that after these developments, Germany’s struggle for influence in Ottoman lands resumed without problems. For example, because of Italy’s occupation of Tripolitania the following year, Germany once more found itself in difficulties. However, even if with ups and downs, the general trend had become clear and it was a trend that would lead to the secret treaty with Germans, and from there to the war that would be the end of the Ottoman Empire.

5) An Uninvited Guest to the Railway Struggle: Admiral Chester During that time, a new great power from very far away unexpectedly joined the cutthroat struggle for railways in Ottoman lands. This great power was the USA. It could be claimed that until the time of the Taft administration, US Middle East policy had been shaped by the Monroe doctrine. Putting it concisely, it could be said that this doctrine was based on the assumption that Europe and its extensions were part of the sphere of influence of the European great powers; while the American continent was the USA’s sphere of influence. As far as the Middle East was concerned, the Monroe doctrine meant non-involvement for the USA. Thanks to this doctrine, the USA found the opportunity of carrying out imperialist activities in South America without having to worry about intervention by European states. As for the new foreign policy of the USA shaped by President Taft and Secretary of State Knox, it was based on the readiness for a corps a` corps struggle. Knox expressed this situation in the following way: “Today diplomacy works for trade, and the Foreign Offices of the world are powerful engines for the promotion of commerce of each country. With the expansion of American commerce it became imperative that American exporters should have equally efficient support from their government.”179 In a speech he made in Congress in 1911, along the lines of this conception of policy, he stressed the importance of the Ottoman empire for American trade, and of the fact that developing Ottoman/American commercial relations would be to the advantage of both countries.180 That the American government should have taken part in the struggle for railway concessions in the Ottoman empire in support of the

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Chester concession is the result of exactly this change in US foreign policy. The first time that Admiral Chester had gone to the Ottoman Empire was in 1900, and it was as the captain of the Kentucky that he visited. His mission was to put pressure on the Ottoman government to have the damage caused to American property as a result of the 1895–6 Armenian incidents compensated. Contrary to expectations, the admiral managed to establish very good relations with Ottoman authorities during this process, and realized that the Ottoman empire offered extraordinary opportunities for American entrepreneurs.181 In 1908, Admiral Chester visited once more, this time as a representative of the Boston and New York chambers of commerce entrusted with the mission of investigating investment opportunities in the Ottoman empire. In the USA, there was the belief that the 1908 revolution was the beginning of a new period of golden opportunities for American capital in the Ottoman empire.182 The Unionists’ interest following the interest shown by Sultan Abdu¨lhamid encouraged Chester so much that he submitted a gigantic railway project. This 2,000 mile railway would reach the Black Sea at Samsun, the Mediterranean at Aleppo, and would also have ancillary lines reaching Van and Bitlis.183 The railway would cross areas rich with mineral deposits and the company to be established would have the concession to operate mines up to a distance of 20 km from both sides of the lines.184 Following these developments, Chester returned to the USA, and founded the “Ottoman– American Development Company”, and gained the full support of the Taft administration. Undersecretary of State Huntington Wilson was pleased to announce by means of a letter to the company that the American embassy had sent them a telegraph promising full support.185 Chester’s company managed to sign a preliminary protocol in 1910 with the Ottoman ministry of public works.186 As a sign of goodwill, the company deposited 20,000 pounds in an Istanbul bank.187 In a directive he wrote to the embassy in Istanbul, Huntington Wilson underlined the importance of the matter and asked officials at the embassy to explain to Ottoman authorities the close relation between the development of Ottoman– American economic relations and acceptance of the request for this concession. As soon as the concession was granted, they would approve the raise of 4 per cent of customs duties. However, Wilson’s style reflected worry as well as enthusiasm. This was due to the

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fact that he had received intelligence, according to which there was very strong opposition to the Chester project in parliament.188 And sure enough, the fact that the contract’s approval by parliament was continuing to be delayed had made American authorities realize that there had been an intervention by Europeans. It was following this that the American government decided to carry out a “corps a` corps struggle” and made some goodwill gestures to convince the Ottoman government to support the Chester project. Taking 12 Ottoman officers to the USA for training, as well as approval of the raise of Ottoman customs duties, providing credits at convenient interest rates, not using certain economic privileges were examples of this.189 However, as early as the first months of 1910, the optimism of both the Ottoman– American Development Company and of the Taft administration received a severe blow. On 28 June Ambassador Straus communicated that the pressure applied by the Germans using their political influence had had results and that the grand vizier having changed his mind would not be submitting the Chester concession to parliament meeting on the following day.190 On the basis of his long diplomatic experience in the Ottoman empire, Straus was continuing to communicate the difficulties of the new Middle Eastern policy of the USA to Washington. The ambassador underlined the fact that this way would inevitably lead to a clear and deep involvement in the Eastern question, from which they had been able to keep their distance up to then.191 The American foreign office sent the plenipotentiary in Hungary, John Ridgey Carter, to Istanbul with a kind of special mission, because Straus was on leave.192 And what is more, Huntington Wilson had come to Istanbul on 21 October 1910 for what was officially a visit of courtesy to the sultan. But his real aim was to create an atmosphere favourable for the Chester project. During his visit to Sultan Mehmet Res¸at on 5 December he gave him the letter of President Taft.193 What is interesting is that Wilson had reached the conclusion that circumstances were unfavourable for the USA and that Chester had embarked upon an impossible mission. The plenipotentiary agreed with Straus that the Chester project might result in an excessive involvement in the Eastern question.194 However, when Wilson was asked once more to offer full support to the Chester project he carried out his duties as a diplomat in the best way by shuttling back and forth between the

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grand vizier and the interior, public works, finance and war ministers, according to the directives he received.195 Finally, on 25 April 1911, the secretary of state was notified that very soon the Chester project would be debated in parliament.196 And sure enough, the project was submitted to parliament by the grand vizier on 14 May.197 Following two days of negotiations, the final vote for the project was postponed to the autumn, with 77 votes in favour and 64 against.198 Some newspapers presented this postponement as a new victory of the Germans.199 That the Chester application should not have been approved led to such a big disappointment that some of the managers of the company even considered taking back the application. It was the American embassy that spurred them on and asked the company to proceed, since with the submission to parliament of the Chester concession the most difficult part of the matter had been solved.200 And what is more, at such a critical moment, W.W. Rockhill, who was one of the most influential American diplomats, was transferred from Petersburg to Istanbul as the new ambassador to the Ottoman empire.201 Following his appointment, Rockhill decided to play the game according to its rules, including bribery. However, all these efforts of the American Secretary of State were not enough to have the Chester project approved in parliament. The decree of the cabinet might have us reach the conclusion that more than a rejection we had a state of uncertainty.202 However, since most of the managers of the Ottoman American Development Company had lost all hope, conflicts appeared within the company and the deposit was taken back.203 It was in this way that the first serious attempt by American imperialism to intervene in the Ottoman empire resulted in failure. The obstacles faced by the Chester project in those days were not coincidental. By then navies had begun to use oil rather than coal. Demand for oil by both industry and transport was increasing day by day and it was known that Mesopotamia had very big oil reserves. This situation led the big powers to embark upon a great power struggle in Ottoman lands. In the next chapter, we shall see how closely connected the struggle for oil in the Ottoman empire and the Baghdad Railway question were. Even before the signing, it was obvious how the mine prospecting and operating concession for the area within 20 km on both sides of the lines would increase the importance of the Baghdad Railway contract.

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For example, in 1900 the British ambassador Sir Nicholas O’Connor wrote that discovering oil reserves in the area would increase the profitability of the Baghdad line. In 1902, the German ideologue Paul Rohrbach alerted authorities by saying, “We should appreciate the fact that the Baghdad railway will be crossing oil rich areas. The only matter we should worry about is that foreign speculators might receive a licence for oil extraction before German entrepreneurs do.”204 It was obviously impossible for the Germans to accept the take over by American capital of these rights, for which they had struggled so much. And sure enough, Marschall had protested to the Sublime Porte because the Chester concession infringed upon certain acquired rights of the German company.205 The American administration tried to counter German efforts to obstruct the Chester project in every way possible. These ways included corps a` corps struggle, but also steps to reach a compromise.206 When there was no positive response from the Germans,207 the Taft administration asked its ambassadors in Europe to investigate Germany’s Ambassador Marschall’s activities aiming to obstruct the Chester enterprise. It was obvious that Bieberstein had speculated over the Chester project. For example, on the occasion of a dinner he held for the Ottoman cabinet, he stated that Chester was actually a puppet, whom Standard Oil was using to gain control over the oil reserves of the area.208 Ambassador Straus’ reports were similar in content.209 Apart from German influence on Ottoman authorities, Straus mentioned also the 150,000 pounds in bribes that the Germans had distributed.210 Even though at first they denied it, Ottoman authorities also gradually began to admit that the reason for not approving the Chester project was German opposition. For example, during a meeting, the minister of war had told Carter, “Nothing can compensate the loss of German friendship for the Ottoman government.”211 And sure enough, a study of the correspondence between Gwinner, Helfferich and Huguenin shows the intrigues against the Chester project that they were carrying out. For example, these documents contain information about the way German spies obtained information from the Sublime Porte, and the way that the Germans were coordinating a campaign against the Chester project through the media of Istanbul that they controlled. It is obvious from the themes used by the abovementioned people that their pragmatism was above their moral values.

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For example they were claiming that Chester’s company was one of the fronts for Standard Oil and that the Jewish bankers Kuhn, Loeb & Co. were cooperating with Standard Oil.212 In a way, what Pastırmacıyan, the member of parliament from Erzurum, who championed the necessity of connecting by railway the eastern Anatolian provinces to the Black Sea, wrote from another perspective, confirms what we have been saying up to now on the basis of correspondence between the American foreign service and the embassy. In the first chapter of the book he wrote on this subject, Pastırmacıyan said that he had met with enthusiasm the constitution that ended the tyranny of Abdu¨lhamid and that they had the “Japanese example to prove what an oriental people could do in a short time”. However, he had also said that he had been disappointed because even though time had passed, state cadres, who had learnt their job during the reign of Abdu¨lhamid, were continuing with their old habits, and dependency on Germany had “unfortunately” not ended.213 According to Pastırmacıyan, the same misguided policy had been followed as far as railways were concerned, with the result that because of dependency on Germany there had been a useless insistence on the Baghdad Railway, and the Oriental Anatolian Railway which was what the country really needed, had been obstructed with all sorts of lies and excuses.214 Pastırmacıyan claimed that from whatever the economic, political, strategic point of view, the “Oriental Anatolian Railway”, which would reach east Anatolia through Ankara, Sivas, Erzurum and Diyarbakır, was much more useful for the country, in comparison to the Baghdad Railway, and prepared pages and pages of cost/advantage analyses to prove this.215 What Pastırmacıyan stated confirms what we have said about the Chester project in this chapter. “Another surprising aspect of the sad story of the Oriental Anatolian Railway is that the then Grand Vizier Hakkı Pasha managed with various excuses to delay the submission of this project to parliament for 14 months.” Pastırmacıyan stated that he had asked many times what the reasons for this delay were and that on 8 December 1910 Hakkı Pasha had told him that even though the construction of the lines in the Chester project was extremely useful for the country “The Americans had to reach an agreement with the Baghdad Company concerning the point of beginning of the line!”

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But according to Pastırmacıyan there was no such requirement in the Baghdad contract.216 Pastırmacıyan explained the situation in the following way and by saying that the only means in the hands of the pro-Baghdad people was “provocation”: It is true that in the days when this matter was being negotiated, there was subdued mention in parliamentary corridors of political problems that would arise with the construction of said network in these provinces partially populated by Armenians, and of a new Armenian question. Even another more serious danger of a spiritual nature was mentioned: according to rumours, said lines were to be constructed with American missionary money with the result that they would be coming to Ottoman lands and convert all of us, both Muslims and Armenians, to Protestantism?! [. . .] Since your faithful servant, who was one of the first supporters of this project, is also a former revolutionary and bomber, some functionaries have not refrained from claiming that I would be abusing of the simple mindedness of the Anatolian Muslim citizens.217 What is obvious is that the slander campaign by Germans, who had used elements like Zionist intrigue and Standard Oil puppet, had been continued by Ottoman authorities with concepts like Armenian provocation or the conversion to Christianity of Muslims. The fact that the Germans should have filled the void that appeared when Britain stopped championing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State, led to all contrasts being solved in favour of the Germans. However, the Ottomans were very good in playing off the great powers against each other. At first the Americans had seemed attractive to Ottoman authorities, because up to then they had never asked for land from the Ottomans, and because their aims were economic rather than political. It is because of these reasons that until the moment of final choice, when they had to chose in favour of Germans, with whom they had very strong bonds, they had continued with their policy of playing the competing powers off against each other.

CHAPTER FIVE THE PROCESS OF DELAYED AGREEMENTS

1) The Potsdam Process: Germany Breaks the Entente Chain at its Weakest Link In parallel to the dismissal of Chester, the Germans had concluded their negotiations with the Russians and had signed the Potsdam treaty, thus breaching for the first time the entente front.1 Foreign Minister Isvolski had begun to worry as soon as he had heard that the Gwinner/ Cassel negotiations had begun, and had reached the conclusion that the British had decided to solve the problem directly with Germany.2 But actually, Britain’s ambassador in Russia, Arthur Nicolson, had done all he could to dispel Russian suspicions, stressing constantly the way that the Gwinner/Cassel negotiations were being carried out within the framework of the quadrilateral conference and stating that a compromise not approved by the Russians was out of the question.3 Russian suspicions did not end completely even after the Gwinner/ Cassel negotiations had ended in failure. C¸rıkov, the ambassador in Istanbul, was of the opinion that rather than having ended in failure, British– German negotiations had been interrupted with the intention of continuing with them at a future date, and that the probability of these two countries reaching an agreement was not low at all. The Russian ambassador’s comment had been that in case of such a compromise being reached, this might easily be followed immediately by an agreement between the French and the Germans and that during this kind of a process they would be the only party to find itself in a

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difficult and isolated situation. This being the case, the best way for Russia might be to act in anticipation of these developments and resume the negotiating process with the Germans that had begun in 1906.4 A study of the correspondence between Grey and his ambassador in Russia makes it possible for us to reach the conclusion that the British had felt these suspicions and intentions of the Russians and that they had done all they could to prevent a rapprochmement between the Russians and the Germans.5 It seems that on this matter they even asked for French help, and that they put pressure on Pichon so that he might convince his colleague Isvolski by using the well-known reasons.6 The French were in agreement with the British on the need to convince Russia. However, discovering Russia’s real opinion about this matter proved to be impossible, notwithstanding all the efforts made. Isvolski, and in general the Russian foreign office were evading the issue by means of obscure answers.7 What is more, that new foreign ministers, who were in favour of reconcilement, should have been appointed in both Russia and Germany facilitated this compromise. Sazanov, who had replaced Isvolski, had during his tenure shown interest in the Baghdad Railway matter and had reflected on the solution of this problem.8 While this was happening in Russia, in Germany Kiderlen-Waechter, who was in favour of a thaw in relations with entente states and of a compromise with Russia about the Baghdad Railway as well as about many other matters, was appointed minister of foreign affairs. During the first week of November 1910, the tsar met Kaiser Wilhelm in Potsdam. The pomp and ceremony accompanying the visit in part hid the political meetings, which were of great importance for Europe. While Chancellor Hollweg told Sazanov that if Austria were to follow an aggressive policy in the Balkans they would not support this country, the Russian minister stated that if Britain were to follow an anti-German policy they would not stand by Britain.9 During the Potsdam negotiations, the parties expressed their absolute desire for the resumption of the Baghdad Railway negotiations that had been interrupted in 1907. The negotiations were supposed to be run within the framework of the first negotiations. According to this, the Germans were supposed to officially recognize the Russians’ sphere of influence in Iran, and the Russians were to stop their opposition to the railway and construct an ancillary railway line reaching Iran.10

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The Germans did manage to break entente solidarity on the matter of the Baghdad Railway. Sazanov did not inform the British and the French about the Potsdam negotiations, but did forward to them the draft proposal submitted to the Germans. The Russians’ readiness to reach a separate compromise with the Germans was making British officials nervous. And worries intensified when the The Evening Times got hold of and published the draft agreement.11 Grey, Nicolson and even King Edward of Britain in person warned the ambassador, telling him to keep the Germans far from Iran and not to let go of the 4 per cent customs duties card.12 Also the British press observed that the tri-partite entente had been dealt a severe blow, with the Observer stating that Britain had lost its greatest supporter in a vital matter and The Times sharing the same pessimistic atmosphere.13 The German– Russian treaty concerning the Baghdad Railway was signed in Petersburg on 19 August 1911. In this treaty, both countries stated that they would respect Iran’s open door policy, and Germany recognized Russia’s special interests in this country. The first article of the agreement banned Germany from pursuing telegraph, highway, railway and other similar concessions in northern Iran, which was considered a Russian sphere of influence. According to the second article, the Russians were going to ask the government of Iran to grant them a concession for the construction of a railway from Tehran to Hanikin, where it would connect to the Baghdad Railway. Construction on this railway was going to begin within two years after the Germans had completed the Sadiye-Hanikin ancillary line of the Baghdad Railway, and had to be completed in four years. If the Russians were not able to complete the construction within the agreed deadline, the Germans would acquire the right to ask for the concession of this line. According to the third article, the Russians would not oppose construction of this line and partnership by foreign capital, so long as this did not cause financial loss for them.14 Following the signing of this agreement, the British concentrated on the lack of any expression in the treaty that might be binding for the Russians on the matter of the increase in Ottoman customs duties, because this was their last card for opposing the Baghdad line. Grey was afraid that the Germans might bind the Russians by means of ambiguous expressions inserted in the text of the treaty. Actually, Grey’s

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fears were unfounded, because the German ambassador at the end had to declare that on the matter of the customs duties the Russians were free to act as they wished.15 Ambassador Buchanan’s report notifying London about this development was at least a consolation for British officials. In their comments added to the report, Grey and other upper level officials stated, “there is nothing more to be done, and things might have been much worse”.16 Russia’s biggest gain out of the Russian –German treaty had been the fact that it had been able to get the Germans to accept its sphere of influence in north Iran. According to Chapman, the price that Russia had had to pay for this gain had been very steep, most of all because by connecting the Baghdad Railway to Iran it would have to face very strong German competition in trade with Iran, but also because by signing this agreement without negotiating with its allies Britain and France it had damaged trust among entente states.17 Earle, on the other hand, interpreted the connecting of the Baghdad Railway with Iran from a different point of view, and claimed that Russia had gained great advantage from it. This was due to the fact that once the Russians connected the Baghdad Railway web to Iran new horizons would open for Russian merchants, who would be able to reach Mosul and Aleppo, and India via Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean via I˙skenderun.18 From the point of view of the Germans, the Potsdam treaty can be considered a full diplomatic victory. The only concession that they had had to grant to the Russians had been to recognize the Russian sphere of influence in north Iran. On the other hand, German trade penetration of Iran, which up to then had been completely controlled by Russia and Britain, would become less difficult, and the area of influence of the Baghdad Railway would expand.19 And what is more, thanks to this treaty, the Germans had put a stop to political opposition to the Baghdad Railway. Because of Russia’s opposition, France had also had to oppose the Baghdad Railway. With this treaty the most important obstacle obstructing the way to a compromise with France had been removed. It can be said that the treaty had not been at all well received in other countries and even in the Ottoman empire. In an editorial published in the Tanin newspaper criticizing an article in The Times concerning this subject it was said, “As if we were in no way connected to this railway,

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and as if Baghdad, Basra and the Persian Gulf were not ours, we were not even mentioned”, and a complaint that Germany had provided guarantees concerning Ottoman rights without asking them was stated.20 And sure enough, it is clear from reports sent by the embassy in London that the Ottomans had not been informed as they should have been, during the negotiations.21 Following the Potsdam negotiations, Hanotaux, a former minister of foreign affairs of France, criticized the treaty very harshly, stating that this being the situation, it was necessary to ask Russia whether or not it had abrogated the tri-partite entente. And French socialist member of parliament Jean Jaures spoke in the parliament stating that they had trusted the Russians and just because the Russians were against it, they had opposed the Baghdad Railway, even though it was obvious that this project would be profitable for French capital holders. And what is more, their opposition to the Baghdad Railway for Russia’s sake had led to a worsening of their relations with Germany. Notwithstanding all these sacrifices, Russia had reached an agreement with Germany without taking into consideration France. Jaures was asking the government how they were planning to solve this situation.22 Lloyd George was another politician who violently attacked Russia and asked similar questions in the British parliament. To explain the seriousness of the Baghdad Railway matter, Lloyd George also mentioned India’s security. “Every nation, that had lost its paramount position in the Persian Gulf had also very soon lost its paramount position in India. At it was then, so it is now, and so it probably will be all our life time.” What Lloyd George wanted to learn was what would the nature of the tri-partite entente be from then on and whether or not policies in general and Persian Gulf policies in particular would change in response to the way Russia had fled tri-partite entente ranks and had ignored its diplomatic commitments.23 In those days’ confusion, the unconventional views of a Commons member did not attract attention. According to Mr Pickersgill, this recent attitude of Russia was a good opportunity for getting rid of a foreign policy subordinated to Russia, because a relationship with Russia that was this close was extremely deleterious, not just from the point of view of their interests in Iran, but also from the point of view of European peace.24 Like Jaures, Pickersgill also stated that because of Baghdad Railway policies followed in conjunction with the

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Russians their relationship with Germany had been ruined. Pickersgill also observed that he failed to understand why the Liberals were continuing to follow the policy of enmity towards Germany that they had inherited from the Conservatives. Russia’s separate agreement with Germany should have taught them a lesson. From then on they had to search for a solution of the Baghdad Railway problem that would satisfy not just themselves, but also the Ottomans and the Germans. According to Pickersgill, if approached in good faith, solving this matter was not as difficult as it seemed. He also complained that even though international treaties’ usefulness in limiting arms races was frequently mentioned in parliament, in practice this peaceful principle was never enforced.25 And in the next pages we shall see how Pickersgill’s advice had been heeded and a wide-ranging compromise had been reached over the matter of the Baghdad Railway, by means of bilateral negotiations. Interestingly, this had been predicted also by Tevfik Pasha. Even before the end of the Potsdam negotiations he had stated that very probably the Russo-German treaty would be followed by British – German and British – French treaties and that because of this they themselves should begin negotiating with the British as soon as possible.26 Before beginning a study of this chain of treaties, we should see the criticism voiced by former British Prime Minister Balfour on 8 March 1911, and Grey’s response to this, so as to be better able to understand subsequent developments. Amongst the latest developments, what had worried Balfour the most was the decision to construct two ancillary lines. These were the Baghdad –Hanikin and the Baghdad– Gulf lines. The Baghdad– Hanikin railway was a great threat for them, especially from the point of view of their trade interests. Balfour claimed that the southward line from Baghdad threatened them, from an imperial, diplomatic and national point of view, as well as a commercial one. Balfour concluded his speech asking the government what they were thinking of doing to respond to these threats.27 Grey’s answer to Balfour described the outlines of the policy to be followed by Britain from then on. Grey began his speech stating that the Baghdad Railway concession had been granted at the time of Balfour. The point made by Grey was that objecting to a concession that threatened British interests so much would have been possible only

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before being granted, but following that stage, the concession had acquired the nature of a legitimate concession on the lands of the Ottoman empire. In his speech, Grey stressed the fact that Balfour had simply criticized the situation without proposing any kind of alternative, and then reminded his audience that in reality they were not as desperate as Balfour thought they were, because the construction of the Baghdad Railway would turn out to be quite costly, with the result that the Ottomans had already had to ask the British to approve a raise in their customs duties. Grey explained the policy to be followed in this way: The Baghdad Railway is a German concession in Turkish territory, and as such we have no right or title to object to the German Concessionaires and the Turks carrying it accordance with the concession in the Turkish territory; but, when we asked to give our consent to provide further sources of revenue to the Turkish Goverment, then we do come in, and come in naturally, because they are asking us to agree to certain increased burdens, and we have a right to demand that before we agree to those increased burdens the Turkish Goverment should make it clear that the revenue is going to be applied to the purpuses to which we wish to see it applied, namely, the good Goverment and strengthening of the Turkish Goverment may incidentally prejudice the interests of British trade. That is our position with regard to the Baghdad Railway. The last part of Grey’s response concerning Kuwait was rather interesting in that it showed that the British did not consider it as being part of the Ottoman empire any more: but, if the Baghdad Railway is to proceed further than Turkish territory, then of course our diplomatic position in the matter becomes very different from what it is so long as it remains purely in Turkish territory. [. . .] We are not anxious to have a forward policy in the Persian Gulf to acquire new territory, or to disturb the status quo, but if the status quo is going to be disturbed by others then we must undoubtedly use our resources to maintain the position we have in the Persian Gulf. Part of the status quo is

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that we have entered into treaty obligations with the Sheikh of Koweit, and in any negotiations which there may be or in any changes which may take place it is an obligation upon us to see our treaty obligations towards the Sheikh of Koweit in maintaining his position are fulfilled.28 The Times, in its editorial about Grey’s speech, also stressed that Kuwait was no longer part of the Ottoman empire when it stated, that Britain has no objection to make about concessions on Turkish lands, but areas beyond these lands are undoubtedly of interest to it.29 When opposition members of parliament reintroduced the subject two weeks later, Grey made another speech along the same lines and reiterated the fact that they were aware of the importance of the increase in customs duties as an element of bargaining. Grey stressed also the fact that they were going to make sure that the principle of equal treatment, according to which there would be no privileged capital groups, independently of which nation they belonged to, as far as Baghdad Railway contracts were concerned, should be enforced.30

2) The Ottoman –British Agreement It can be claimed that at a moment when it might be thought that relations had never been worse, a new process of compromise had actually begun. As Grey had stressed, the dynamic element of this new process would be the matter of the raise in customs duties, because to be able to finance the Baghdad Railway the Ottoman government would have to gain acceptance of this raise, or in other words it would have to reach an agreement with the British sooner or later. And anyway their request, during the negotiations for the 1911 agreement, for the Germans to relinquish their right to construct the part of the railway after Baghdad, was put forward so as to have an element for compromise. The Germans were subject to the same need if they wished to complete the Baghdad Railway. And the Manchester Guardian had reported that Grey’s “sincere speech” had been well received amongst foreign countries and especially in Germany, and that German newspapers and the German government were satisfied with the speech.31 According to Britain’s ambassador in Berlin, the speech was well received in Germany

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because it kept open the option of new negotiations.32 And sure enough, the semi-official North-German Gazette for example quoted extensively from Grey’s speech and found it more constructive in comparison to previous British approaches.33 Wishing to use the opportunity provided by this positive atmosphere, the German ministry of foreign affairs asked Marschall to talk to the grand vizier about Grey’s speech. During this meeting, Marschall had to concentrate on Grey’s admission that they did not have the right to oppose concessions granted to the Germans in Ottoman lands.34 Marschall had immediately carried out these instructions and Hakkı Pasha had expressed his satisfaction with this part of Grey’s speech. However, the grand vizier had at the same time not refrained from analysing in a realistic way the unfavourable parts of the British foreign secretary’s speech in parliament.35 The same was true also from the point of view of the British. Since, independently of whether they liked it or not, work on the Baghdad Railway was progressing, reaching a compromise that would safeguard their interests in the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia as soon as possible was something desirable also for the British. Meanwhile, certain red lines of both parties had appeared. One of these was that the Ottomans would not grant to the British a majority stake in the last part of the railway. And another was that the British would not be breaking up the trilateral entente, even though the Russians had signed the Potsdam treaty. As the Neue Freie Presse underlined, the fact that the Russians would not be opposing the Baghdad Railway anymore, would encourage the British to search for new formulae of compromise on this matter.36 Obviously, the main British red line was the safeguarding of their interests in the Persian Gulf. It was inevitable that reaching a compromise on so many variables required difficult negotiations amongst the British, the Ottomans, the Germans, the French and the Russians.37 It is clear even from the softening of the attitude of the opponents of the Baghdad Railway that the element that served as the key to the compromise had been the Ottomans’ annulling of the Baghdad –Gulf concession granted to the Germans. For example, even The Times, in its news item about the agreement, had considered as important the annulment of the Persian Gulf part of the concession, and had stated that this matter had been the main factor preventing British capital’s participation.38 In The Standard on the other hand, a more conciliatory

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language was used about the same matter; it was claimed that if British interests were to be taken seriously, with the economic aspect of the Baghdad Railway enterprise being given precedence and an amicable approach between the parties being set, then reaching a compromise within these new circumstances would be rather easy.39 In parallel to this process, certain signs of a thaw also began to appear in the British parliament. For example, Noel Buxton remarked in the chamber of the Commons that during the previous two years they had kept their distance from the Young Turk government, but added that he was happy to be able to state that recently the Ottoman government’s political style had improved.40 In an analysis of the Potsdam negotiations in The Times of India, it was stated that the first step to be taken was to have the British gain control of the part of the Baghdad Railway extending to the Gulf.41 Also Viceroy of India Lord Curzon stated on 23 March in the chamber of the Lords that reaching a compromise with the Ottomans had become much easier. Viscount Morley, who spoke in the name of the government immediately after Lord Curzon, stated, rather optimistically as far as an eventual compromise was concerned, that “with the latest agreement with the Baghdad Railway Company, the Ottoman Empire has gained freedom of manoeuvre in the Baghdad – Gulf section”.42 And Cevat Bey from the embassy in London informed the Sublime Porte that he had heard from different channels that Grey and British political spheres were determined to find a solution for these matters.43 It is clear that in these circumstances the Germans also were not hostile to this kind of a solution. Even ideologues like Dr Jaeck and Paul Rohrbach were of the view that the Ottoman/German agreement had made a solution easier. The agreement was in their favour, because the terminus of the railway would not be on the Persian Gulf, which in practice was under British control, but at the port of I˙skenderun, and in this way not only had the profitability of the line leading to the Mediterranean increased, but it had also become easier to defend militarily.44 According to German writers, this agreement was also in favour of the British, because it had prevented the danger of Russia reaching the Gulf. And what is more, Britain was happy that it had kept the railway far from the Gulf, about which it was sensitive because of its 100 million Muslim subjects in Egypt and in

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India, and there was no reason anymore for it to continue with its opposition.45

A) Milestones of the compromise: reciprocal notes On 1 March 1911 Minister of Foreign Affairs Rıfat Pasha submitted the first note containing Ottoman proposals to Ambassador Lowther.46 This note was the first text that initiated the new process of reaching a compromise. In this note, the wish of the Ottoman government for reaching a compromise on the approval of the raise in customs duties was stated very clearly. After having stated that the Germans had relinquished the concession for the part of the railway after Baghdad and that this was a new opportunity for compromise, it was proposed that this part should be constructed by an Ottoman company. The Ottomans would have a 40 per cent share in this new company, while the British, the French and the Germans would have 20 per cent each. Kuwait was proposed as the terminus of the railway, because of the suitability of its position.47 However, because of the need of the ending point of the railway to be in an area under direct Ottoman control, Kuwait’s position had to be made clear by the Ottomans and the British.48 That the subject of Kuwait should have been introduced during the same days in quick succession cannot be a coincidence. For example, an article by Lucien Wolf titled “What is Kuwait?” appeared in The Daily Graphic. The writer was of the opinion that on the basis of existing documents, there was no doubt that Kuwait was an autonomus province of the Ottoman state. But contary to wide spread assumptions, the writer interpreted this status of the sheikh, with whom they had amicable relations, as a situation in their favour, because since the sheikh was autonomous, this meant that he had the authority to grant concessions in Kuwait and the British government should take advantage of this situation and take action to solve the Kuwait question in a definitive way.49 In the issue dated 16 August of The Times of India there was an extremely critical article on the deadly danger for British interests deriving from the Baghdad Railway. According to the writer, with the appointment of Meissner Pasha50 the Baghdad Railway had become a living reality. Foremost amongst the developments that worried the

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writer so much was the inauguration with German government support of a German school in Baghdad. Thanks to this kind of school, the children of German businessmen in the area would be educated according to German tradition. According to the writer, they were at the dawn of a German occupation. In the short term thousands of Germans would be rushing into Mesopotamia. It was said that 20 stations would be built between Baghdad and Mossul and that each station would be the nucleus of a German settlement. Building so many stations on such a short stretch could not be explained in any other way.51 Meanwhile, the policy that Britain would be following during the process of reaching a compromise with the Ottomans was gradually taking shape. In the note he wrote on Lowther’s report, Grey said that the main aim was the safeguarding of British interests in the Persian Gulf. Otherwise, British domination over India and the surrounding area, as well as over Egypt and Iran, would be endangered; in other words, the “Pax Britannica” was threatened.52 Also Curzon described the main principle of British policy as not permitting the influence of any competing power in the Gulf, in his speech in the chamber of the Lords in March 1911.53 As one can see, there is no doubt that Britain’s primary aim was to safeguard its interests related to the Persian Gulf that it had gained over many years. However, it is also clear that at the point when concrete Ottoman proposals were presented in writing to them, they were caught without a clear strategy concerning the methods that would let them attain this concrete aim. It would be appropriate from a strategic point of view to hear the opinion of the India office, and of the board of trade from a commercial point of view. Meanwhile, the British had once more disappointed the constitutional government when they had said to the Ottoman embassy that the probability of accepting the Ottoman request to introduce income tax for foreigners was very low. Cevat Bey from the embassy in London underlined the need for the British to keep their intention secret, because otherwise the press would be publishing articles against Britain that would serve no other purpose but to make the matter even more difficult.54 He also mentioned as an example a British foreign office official, who had claimed to him that the Young Turks hated the British and were true “anglophobes”. In an addendum to his report, Cevat Bey said that Mr Chiroll, the foreign news editor of The Times, would be travelling to the Persian Gulf. There was no doubt that Chiroll’s articles

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would be critical of the conciliatory policies of the liberal government and that they would be very influential within British political spheres.55 On the other hand, Dr Wolf, whose views were the exact opposite of Chiroll’s, had asked for credible data concerning Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, to be published in his feature on The Daily Graphic. It was because of this that Cevat Bey was asking the minister to send credible, well-documented information on this matter.56 As Cevat Bey had predicted, in July seven harshly critical articles appeared in The Times. Chiroll stated that as a result of the British government’s too tolerant approach, the Young Turks had been straining British patience with their acts in Baghdad and Basra.57 The journalist observed that the British were very carefully carrying out certain services in the Persian Gulf, like lighting and buoying, that the Ottomans had neglected for years. But now, the Young Turks, under German influence had suddenly begun to claim that they themselves were going to carry out these activities.58 The last article of Chiroll mentioned by the pasha was a clear definition of the status quo, and an expression of the need to follow a more “aggressive policy”. In those days, when it seemed that the Germans had renounced the concession for the construction of the Persian Gulf part of the railway, the Ottoman government had to be obliged to sign a treaty that would legitimize the agreements reached by Britain with the sheikhs in the area.59 Chiroll went so far as to ask for British warships to be sent to the area to teach the lesson deserved by the Ottomans, if the problems could not be solved in a friendly way. We also have to say that in the meantime the opponents in Britain of the Baghdad Railway were also not sitting passively. For example, during a meeting held on 22 May, the famous French Middle East expert and journalist Cheradame had presented a paper titled “The Baghdad Railway and the Tripartite Entente”. Many influential and fanatical enemies of the Baghdad Railway, like Lynch, Sir J. Rees and Bowles, had taken part in this meeting. As Tevfik Pasha put it, these people were constantly criticizing and harassing the liberal government for its conciliatory policy towards the Ottoman state on the subject of the Baghdad Railway. Cheradame had said that the tripartite entente states had in the past missed the opportunity of intervening in the Baghdad Railway, and that the officials of said countries had to reach a compromise for a common stance.60 Later, in his book published in 1915, he defined the Baghdad Railway as the most important event from

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the point of view of its political, military and commercial results, since the Franco-Prussian War.61 When Lynch spoke, he as usual criticized the Baghdad Railway very strongly.62 During another meeting organized by the same group a short while after this meeting, Lynch once more did not mince his words as the main speaker.63 In the March and May issues of the Fortnightly Review two articles by Lynch on the Baghdad Railway appeared. In the first, Lynch quoted from Paul Rohrbach to support his claim that the railway would increase Ottoman military power and that this power would be used by Germany against the British.64 In the other article he tried to convince his readers that rather than supporting a railway so deleterious for British interests it would have been better to support fluvial transportation on rivers under their control, and most of all on the Tigris. This was an indirect request for support for his shipping companies that he identified with British interests.65 It will be enough to remember Lynch’s role in the crisis of April 1903. At this point, it might be interesting to say something about the comment made by German diplomat Ku¨hlmann about Lynch’s opposition. Ku¨hlmann had explained to Cevat Beymo¨ in confidence that Lynch’s opposition could be broken very easily, because behind all the patriotic bluster his personal interests were obvious. Ku¨hlmann seemed sure about the possibility of eliminating this opposition by means of an offer of material advantages to him. His proposal was to grant to Lynch the concession for the transport on the Tigris of the railway construction material.66 Getting back to said meeting, Lloyd George also stated that German influence in Baghdad had to be countered in every possible way. As for Reeds, he compared the German concession to a robbery contract and expressed his sincere sympathy to Ottoman taxpayers. Bowles and Novoye Vremya correspondent Vesilitsky spoke along the same lines. All these statements were acclaimed by the listeners.67 The process continued notwithstanding opposition to it. Finally, on 29 July 1911 the British submitted to Tevfik Pasha their proposals, which were grouped under three headings.68 The first part was directly related to the Baghdad Railway question. The British stated that the British share could not be less than that of any country, and made the counter proposal that also Russia should be made a partner and that each country should have a 20 per cent share. Apart from all of this, the

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company to be established could not set different price schedules for anybody. The Ottoman government could not set new taxes or duties on the Shatt al Arab without British government approval. As for the terminus of the Baghdad Railway, Basra was proposed in consideration of its already existing commercial infrastructure. The company to be established would have the right to construct and operate a port there. If the railway were to be extended to the Persian Gulf, this would happen at conditions determined together by the Ottomans and the British.69 The second heading concerned British interests in the Persian Gulf. In this part of the document, they claimed that the Ottomans should accept British influence over Bahrain, the Qatar peninsula, Oman and the Emirates. The British stated also that they had had a connection with the sheikhs of Kuwait for the last two centuries and that it was thanks to this that they had ensured safe passage for merchants in the area and added that it was because of this that they wanted the agreements that they had reached with the sheikhs of Kuwait to be officially recognized and that there should be no intervention in the autonomy of the sheikhs of Kuwait. In case their other conditions about Kuwait’s borders and the Sheikh’s rights were to be accepted, the British on their part would accept Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait and recognize the sheikh’s status as an Ottoman governor. Among the requests there was also Ottoman recognition of British activities in other areas of the Persian Gulf, like pilotage, setting up light towers, buoying, and security, that it had been long since been carrying out. The British proposed also the setting up of an Ottoman/ British fluvial commission that would regulate traffic on the Shatt al Arab and improve conditions in general. The commission would be made up of an Ottoman citizen and a British one and of an engineer approved by both sides. The third heading concerned the approval of the customs duties raise. In this heading, the Ottoman State’s acceptance of the conditions laid out in the document and its relinquishment of its right to limit Egypt’s indebtedness, were laid out as the conditions for the approval of the raise in Ottoman customs duties.70 In his communication informing the ministry of foreign affairs about Britain’s requests, Tevfik Pasha stated that the British had presented conditions that were much more onerous than he had been expecting. He said that, notwithstanding all these conditions, they should not interrupt the negotiating process just when they were about to reach a

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compromise with Britain, but that they could use delaying tactics, because it would take years for the railway to reach Baghdad and since up to then there would be many more political changes, it was highly probable that by then they would find more favourable negotiating conditions.71 A short while after the British proposals had been presented, Lowther found the opportunity to confer with Hakkı Pasha about this matter. Hakkı Pasha first of all asked why there were attempts to get Russia involved in the enterprise, and in this way expressed his opposition to this intention.72 The pasha was also at a loss to understand why the British were so worried about the danger of a differentiation in pricing, while there was nothing to confirm it. Naturally enough, the Ottomans would be worrying about the profitability of the line and they would be trying to maximize both the load and the number of passengers. As for the matter of the Gulf, Hakkı Pasha was not aware of the treaties signed by the British with the sheikh of Kuwait. He stated his hope that the British foreign office would be sending them these documents.73 In his report dated 19 December, Tevfik Pasha announced receiving the documents requested by Ottoman administration, although they were secret documents of the British ministry of foreign affairs. It seems that after having studied these documents, Tevfik Pasha found British claims to be more credible. Tevfik Pasha’s claim, on the basis of a cost/advantage analysis, was that even after having granted the proposed concessions, they would still be advantaged, because a British approval would lead to an increase in both the customs duties and in the patent tax to be collected from foreign merchants. In this way, they would obtain “enormous advantages like the fast completion of the Baghdad Railway, with the consequence that as a result of the increase in the national wealth and the connection by railway of the capital, Ottoman sovereignty over the farthest corners of the country would be ensured”. Also the “moral advantages” resulting from closer relations with Britain, deriving from the solution of the problem of the Baghdad Railway, which was a constant “source of envy” for Britain, had to be taken into consideration.74 In another report, Tevfik Pasha had asked to postpone until the end of negotiations the laying out of a telegraph line to Kuwait and the setting up of an Ottoman post office in Kuwait, because in such a critical period this kind of

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venture “would very probably obstruct negotiations by leading to misunderstandings”.75 In November, Lowther had discussed this matter with new Minister of Foreign Affairs Asım Bey. As was to be expected, Asım Bey objected to Russia’s participation, and presented a counter-proposal. Ottoman, British, German and French entrepreneurs would have equal shares of 25 per cent in the company to be established, but the chairman of the board would be an Ottoman citizen.76 Meanwhile, the Istanbul correspondent of The Daily Telegraph reported on the basis of information obtained from Huguenin and Cavid Bey, that a segment of the Baghdad Railway beginning from Aleppo and extending for 100–50 km towards Adana and El Helif would begin to operate in the autum under the supervision of Meissner Pasha.77 At this point we should say something about Meissner Pasha, who occupies an important place in the history of Ottoman railways. Heinrich August Meissner graduated in 1885 from the Higher Technical School in Dresden with top marks. Since he had learned Turkish in a foreign language course when he was still in Dresden, it must be that he was already planning to work in Ottoman railways. And sure enough, he attained this objective when his uncle Victor Tridon, who was an engineer in Istanbul, invited him there.78 During this first experience in the Ottoman empire, he was an engineer in the railroads of Istanbul and Roumelia.79 Meissner studied railway technology in a technical school in Prague for a while, and returned to Istanbul in 1887. It was during this second stay that Meissner undertook vital duties as a construction engineer for Ottoman railways. He was department chief for the I˙zmit–Ankara railway in 1889–92, and for the Salonica–Manastır railway in 1892–4 and then chief engineer in the 7th segment of the Salonica–Dedeag˘ac railway in 1894–6. In 1896, Meissner became a consultant for Ottoman Railways in Istanbul. The best chapter of the career in the Ottoman empire of the German engineer began undoubtedly when in December 1900 Sultan Abdu¨lhamid appointed him chief engineer at the Hedjaz Railway.80 All this shows that Meissner had all the characteristics required by Ottoman authorities. Apart from being a German citizen, his long experience in Ottoman railways, his familiarity with the conditions, traditions and people of the country, and his knowledge of Turkish, were

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truly fundamental advantages. Also Sultan Abdu¨lhamid must have been particularly satisfied with Meissner’s work, since on 7 March 1904 he bestowed upon him the title of pasha.81 According to Auler, who was another German pasha to have served in the Ottoman army, Meissner Pasha was someone, who had strengthened his vast knowledge with his experience, had spent a great part of his life in the Ottoman empire, spoke perfect Turkish and could also establish good relations with Ottoman authorities, railway personnel and common folk.82 It was because of this that Sultan Abdu¨lhamid bestowed upon him this high rank, and raised his salary to 1,000 liras. In addition to this, the sultan granted vast land holdings at Maan to Meissner, and permitted him to build a mansion there.83 When the Hedjaz Railway reached Medina, Meissner Pasha served for a while at the Baghdad Railway. The reason for this was that the construction of the Hedjaz Railway had had to stop, because of attacks by Arab tribes and that there was a need for his knowhow and experience at the difficult point where the Baghdad Railway had to cross the Tauruses and the Amanos mountains.84 We shall see further on that during World War I, Meissner was once more entrusted with the construction of the Hedjaz/Egypt section of the Hedjaz Railway.85 Returning to the British– Ottoman negotiations: the preparing of the new Ottoman note was proceeding rather slowly as a result of problems in the Balkans, and of the fact of having been at war with the Italians since September 1911. Finally, on 16 April 1912, Cevat Bey, the undersecretary at the embassy in London, submitted the Ottoman proposals in writing to Edward Grey.86 In this note, Asım Bey’s proposal to Lowther, according to which, Ottoman, German, British and French entrepreneurs would have equal shares in the company to be established, was repeated. In case of a tie in votes, the chairman of the board, who was to be an Ottoman citizen, would have the tie-breaking vote. The Ottoman government was ready to carry out the wishes of the British as far as the equal pricing schedule was concerned. Apart from all of this, the new company should pay compensation to the Baghdad Railway Company for having relinquished the concession, in consideration of the advantages it had lost. Even though guarantees that British ships and goods should not suffer discrimination on the Shatt al Arab could be provided, the condition according to which fluvial transit duties could not be set without British approval was unacceptable, because these

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duties were used for the maintenance of the Shatt al Arab and to improve the conditions of navigation. The British proposal for a fluvial commission that would solve these problems was regarded favourably, on condition of it having the characteristics of an Ottoman commission. The commission was to have also a British engineer appointed by the Ottomans. Ottoman officials did not intend to extend the line beyond Baghdad, but if this were to happen they guaranteed that British approval would be sought.87 Apart from the above-mentioned main part concerning the Baghdad Railway, the note included also an addendum. This addendum, consisting of two sub-chapters, one on Qatar and one on Kuwait, included a detailed answer to British claims concerning these two sheikhdoms. First of all it was said that British claims according to which there were no documents in the Ottoman archives proving Ottoman sovereignty to the south of Qatar and Ojeir were not true. The sheikhs of Qatar had always administered their land in representation of the empire. As for Kuwait, all the sheikhs of Kuwait, including the then Sheikh Mu¨barek, had carried their title of governor of Kuwait as Ottoman subjects, and in all official correspondence they had always reiterated the fact that they were loyal subjects of the sultan. The Ottoman flag flew over Kuwait and this was recognized by the British also. As in all other matters, the Ottoman government was ready to reach a definitive agreement with the British on this matter also. The Ottomans’ condition however was that all agreements between the sheikh and the British should be annulled and be substituted by a new and definitive agreement between the Ottoman and British governments that would safeguard both Ottoman sovereignty and British economic interests in the area. As for the islands of Bahrain, it had been implied that under certain conditions concessions might be granted.88 The job of preparing a draught text for the answer to this latest Ottoman note was entrusted to Alwyn Parker, who by then had become an expert on the Baghdad Railway question, and to Arthur Hirtzel from the India office. And these two experts worked very meticulously on the note to be given to the Ottomans and prepared a detailed draught text. This text, completed on 24 April, became the basis for the formulation of the new British set of proposals. And also Ottoman– British negotiations about the Baghdad Railway were by then being directed by these two experts.

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The experts stressed the fact that the Ottomans would not accept Russia’s participation and therefore resisting Russia’s participation would not bring them any advantage. Ottoman statements denying the possibility of their being diversified pricing schedules, had satisfied both experts. Also the idea that the new company should pay an indemnity to the Baghdad Railway Company had been found to be reasonable. As for the matter of taxes on fluvial transportation, it would be discussed within the context of the authority of the planned Shatt al Arab Fluvial Commission. The idea that Basra should be the terminus of the railway had been accepted, but if the railway was going to be extended to the Gulf, then the Ottomans would have to guarantee that Kuwait would be the ending point of the line.89 The second part of the draught was written under the heading of “Political and Regional Problems”. According to experts, a compromise was not possible until the Ottoman military forces in the area retreated and the Ottomans recognized the treaties between Britain and the sheikh.90 And sure enough, in another note he submitted to Tevfik Pasha, Grey once more asked the Ottoman government to recognize their treaties with the sheikh.91 And finally, after having received the opinions of the India office and of the board of trade, the note, which was an answer to all Ottoman proposals, was submitted to Tevfik Pasha on 18 July. On this occasion, the British foreign office had prepared a rather detailed note, with addenda on various separate subjects and draught texts for treaties.92 As usual, the first part contained all matters directly related to the Baghdad Railway question. The most surprising element in this new set of proposals was that the British had renounced their request to take part in the railway to be constructed between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. They had justified this change with the difficulties of reaching a compromise on the subject of participation in the railway, and in place of this they had proposed a basis of agreement that would solve all regional problems in a single go. British officials stressed with insistence the need to compensate this sacrifice of theirs with concessions by Ottomans on other matters. Otherwise, or in other words in the absence of a compromise that would safeguard fully all British interests in the Gulf and in Mesopotamia, they would not be able to justify themselves to their own public. Within the framework of these requirements, the British foreign office had listed its requests to the Ottomans in six

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points. In the first of these, it was requested that there should be no differentiation in pricing schedules in all of the railways and a draft agreement on this point had been added to the text. The second point was that the company that would construct the Baghdad– Basra railway would admit into its board of directors two British citizens approved by the British government. The railway was going to end at Basra and no line extending from this point towards the Gulf would be constructed without the approval of the British government. A separate draft text had been prepared also in conncection with the problems related to the Shatt al Arab. The British were to be permitted to add three more steamships to those they had already operating between Baghdad and Basra.93 The second main heading concerned problems related to the Persian Gulf area. The Ottomans should absolutely renounce their claims over the Qatar peninsula. And the usual claims over Kuwait were repeated. The right of the British to continue certain Persian Gulf related services like laying out buoys, operating light towers and security and quarantine operations had to be recognized. On this occasion, the British had added the request to have the Ottoman–Iran border determined in the Muhammara area. The reason for this new request was a new-found awareness that it was an oil-rich area. The third heading concerned the approval of the raise in customs duties and in it was stated as usual that this request of the Ottomans would be accepted only if the British conditions were met.94 This British set of proposals could be the basis for the beginning of official negotiations between the Ottomans and the British and, as we shall be seeing a little further on, an eventual compromise would be set along these lines. However, when as a result of the Balkan wars all priorities of the Ottoman government changed, the process was delayed for about a year. The British government did not want to put pressure on the Ottoman government, which was in difficulty, on this matter. Naradunkyan, Ottoman minister of foreign affairs, had told Lowther that his government wished to reach a definitive agreement with the British as soon as the Balkan wars ended.95

B) An analysis of the texts of the treaties Among the delegates, who in late 1912 went to London to end officially the 1st Balkan War, there was Grand Vizier Hakkı Pasha, who had

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resigned following the occupation of Tripoli. On this occasion, his duty was to negotiate and solve the questions of the Baghdad Railway, along the lines of the above-mentioned final British proposals.96 Following a lot of give and take, a compromise was reached on 12 August 1913 and the treaty was signed by Hakkı Pasha and Alwyn Parker. This treaty consisted of 12 articles and at its end there was a declaration publicized by the Ottoman government. With this declaration, the Ottoman government announced that the Baghdad Railway Company relinquished its right to extend the railway beyond Basra, which it had gained with the contract of 1903. The first eight articles concerned Ottoman guarantees of equal treatment to British trade. This is not surprising, because as Tevfik Pasha had stressed, the worry that different pricing schedules would be applied to British trade, “was an obsession that was so well entreched in British minds that no proof, no matter how incontrovertible, could erase it”.97 According to the next article the Ottoman government promised to convince the Baghdad Railway Company to admit two British citizens to its board of directors. If another company were to construct the Baghdad– Basra line, the same would be valid also for this new company. The appointment of said British administrators would be subject to British government approval. According to article 10, if the British and Ottoman governments could not reach a compromise, the railway would not be extended from Basra to the Gulf. It had been decided that in case of controversy on the interpretation of this treaty, the matter would be taken up at the council at The Hague (article 11).98 It may be noted that the matter of regulating shipping on the Shatt al Arab and fluvial transport on the rivers of Mesopotamia, which had been included in previous notes, was not present in this treaty. Even though these problems were actually elements of the same whole, it was thought that it would be better to include them in distinct treaties. The British foreign office had once again consulted the India office and the board of trade on these matters and had submitted to the Ottomans the resulting draft, as part of the memorandum dated 18 July 1912. Following some final minor amendments, the final text was signed officially by Edward Grey and Hakkı Pasha on 29 July 1913.99 This final treaty consisting of 21 articles, spelled out detailed solutions for all problems concerning the Shatt al Arab. The open door principle would be applied as far as shipping on the Shatt al Arab was

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concerned. The taxes and duties to be collected equally from ships, independently of their nationality, were going to be used to ensure the navigability of the Shatt al Arab. All merchants would be treated equally, independently of their nationality. The commission to be established would have an Ottoman nature, and would consist of two members appointed by the Ottoman government. However, one of these members would be a British citizen to be selected from a list of candidates to be presented by the British government. Apart from this, the chief engineer and the service inspector would be British citizens appointed by the Ottoman government. This commission would be responsible for the amelioration of the Shatt al Arab from the point of view of shipping. All piloting, laying out of buoys and lighting activities and the management of piers and dry docks were among the duties of the commission. The commission had been granted the right to collect transit duties so that it might finance the costs of this port. The commission had the right to manage all income and expenses. The treaty also regulated relations between the commission and the Ottoman government. The Sublime Porte would also support the commission financially and, on those occasions when income did not suffice to cover all expenses, would intervene to cover the deficit. If there happened to be disagreements between the British and Ottoman members of the commission an expert would be consulted and his views would be accepted by the commission. And article 21 stated that this treaty would be valid for 60 years from the moment of the signing.100 As for the sub-treaty concerning the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, Britain had obtained almost all that it wanted in relation with Kuwait, Bahrain and the Qatar peninsula. Formally, Kuwait continued to be part of the Ottoman empire, but in reality the parties had recognized that Britain had all the rights of sovereignty over this sheikhdom. So much so that in the secret declaration in this part it had been stated that Ottoman military and civilian officials would leave the sheikhdoms of Kuwait and Qatar as soon as possible. And anyway, Qatar and Bahrain had officially become independent sheikhdoms. However, as can easily be guessed, their independence was only apparent, because in reality they had become part of the British sphere of influence.101 While negotiations were still continuing, the matter had been discussed by the Ottoman cabinet. In the minutes of these meetings it

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had been stated that the council of ministers had not been able to resist British pressure on this matter.102 What is interesting is that his memoir shows very clearly that Mahmut S¸evket Pasha had no idea about the value of these areas. “We cannot have a conflict with Britain over two provinces consisting solely of desert like Kuwait and Qatar. What importance can these unimportant lands have for us? I have decided to cede Kuwait and Qatar to Britain and to concentrate on our rich province of Iraq.”103 What the pasha did not know was that in those days intense competition for the oil of these sheikhdoms had long since begun. The Germans, the French and the Russians had all been notified about these negotiations for a treaty, because due to the capitulations, certain articles of the treaty required their approval as well. Even though Grey had very meticulously informed Russian officials about the whole process, Russia had nevertheless created problems. The Russians had claimed that the Ottoman–British treaty would change the political balance in the Persian Gulf in favour of Britain, and had requested the presence of a Russian citizen in the Shatt al Arab commission. It was with difficulty that the British managed to convince the Russians. The British had stated that not only was it impossible for the Ottomans to accept their proposal, but that there was also the fact that not even the Germans, whose trade volume in the Gulf was at least six times bigger than the Russians’, had asked to be admitted into the commission.104 Finally, the Russian government let it be known that on condition of their being represented in the commission in case the citizen of any other country were to be admitted into the commission they approved the treaty.105 A short while after he had gone to London, Hakkı Pasha had been given on 26 February 1913 a note about British requests concerning the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as well. In this note, the problem of navigation on the rivers of Mesopotamia had been approached from a historical perspective and in the conclusion of this analysis it was claimed that the British had an unlimited right to operate ships on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for both historic and legal reasons, and at the end of the note the hope that the Ottomans would not oppose this was expressed.106 In response to a request by Hakkı Pasha, the British foreign office had on 9 May provided details about this matter. Even though the British had submitted three alternatives to Hakkı Pasha, they had made it clear that their real preference was to grant

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the concession to a new Ottoman/British partnership. During the negotiations, Hakkı Pasha proposed that said company should be founded with Ottoman, British and German capital.107 But the British insisted that the company should be a 50/50 partnership of themselves and of the Ottomans.108 The chairmanship of the board of the company would alternate.109 The declaration was finally signed by Hakkı Pasha, and added to the final British–Ottoman treaty dated 29 July 1913. In accordance with British wishes, the concession would be granted only to an Ottoman company, in which the Ottoman and the British would have equal rights. Also in the case of the board of directors the British and the Ottomans would have an equal number of members. While the chairman of the company would be an Ottoman citizen the chairmanship of the board would be held by one of the British members. Both chairmen would have a veto right.110 There was no limitation as far as the number of ships to be operated on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers by the above-mentioned company. One of the exceptions indicated in the declaration was the right granted to the Baghdad Railway Company with the 1903 contract to bring construction materials to the construction site by means of fluvial transport. Apart from this, the Lynch Company would continue to operate on said rivers and on the Shatt al Arab the two ships with British colours that it owned. And what is more, the company was authorized to operate a third ship, on condition that it fly Ottoman colours. The British government had decided that the businessman to hold the concession in the new company would be Lord Inchcape, who was particularly strong in the fields of shipping and oil. Among the companies in which he had a stake there were the Peninsular and Oriental and the British India Steamship Navigation Company that we have often mentioned in our study. And anyway, the negotiations on this new company that would hold the Tigris and Euphrates rivers concession were in general carried out by Hakkı Pasha, Alwyn Parker and Lord Inchcape, and in general were held in the house of the Lord. On 12 August, a draft agreement was signed by Hakkı Pasha and Lord Inchcape. During the next four months, following tense negotiations that at times ran the risk of ending in failure, Hakkı Pasha and Lord Inchcape signed the final contract on 12 December 1913.111 We can say that this contract was a new version of the declaration added to the 29 July treaty, which had been clarified

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with technical details. As in the case of the other agreements, for the Ottoman–British treaty on fluvial transport on the Tigris and Euphrates to be applicable, it needed to be harmonized with the treaties to be signed with the Germans. And sure enough, in its news item about the fact that the Ottoman–British treaty had been submitted for approval to the sultan, Vossische Zeitung stated that the Germans had been notified about the negotiations and expressed its hope that this treaty would be complemented by a German–British treaty.112 As one can see, before the end of 1913, no reasons were left any more for the British not to approve the increase of Ottoman customs duties from 11 to 15 per cent. Naturally enough, the British had approved this increase on condition that the treaty be approved by Germany. Another of their conditions was that the Ottoman government should lift its veto over Egyptian debt.113 And sure enough the Ottoman government lifted this veto according to British wishes in October.114 An analysis of the entirety of the process that led to the treaty shows that the British got all that they wanted as far as the matters of Mesopotamia and of the Shatt al Arab were concerned, but that they renounced completely their aim of controlling the last part of the Baghdad Railway, on which they had insisted since the beginning. One might wonder why, at a time when the Ottoman state was going through its most difficult days, from the political, military and economic points of view, Britain had compromised in this way. The answer to this question is to be found within a more general framework. Looking at it from a regional perspective, the most important thing for Britain was to maintain its position on the Persian Gulf and if possible strengthen it.115 Since it was obvious that the Ottomans would not accept British control over the terminus of the Baghdad Railway, they had to find other ways of having their position in the Gulf accepted and it can be said that within this general framework they had attained their aims, because in exchange of having renounced participation in the railway and by being strong along the shores of the Persian Gulf they had managed to guarantee both their commercial and strategic positions in the area. They had gained important advantages by having their influence over the coastal sheikhdoms accepted by the Ottomans, by obtaining the monopoly rights over the Tigris and Euphrates granted to the Germans with the 1903 contract and by gaining control of the passage from Basra to the Gulf by means of the Shatt al

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Arab commission. And what is more, by having gained two members on the board of the Baghdad Railway Company they had made it impossible to be subjected to discrimination in the pricing schedules. If they had insisted on controlling the Baghdad– Persian Gulf part of the Baghdad Railway, their chance of continuing with negotiations would have been lost and their position in the area might have been endangered. This new strategy had been laid out clearly as early as 1912 in a report by Grey. In it, it was said that so long as the terminus was in Basra and the Ottoman government satisfied Britain’s other requests in the area, it was not important who constructed the railway.116 The situation will become clearer if one looks at it not from a regional perspective, but within the context of balance in Europe. In those days, when relations where getting ever more tense, a thaw up to a point between Britain and Germany was necessary to prevent a probable war. There was no compromise in sight for the problem of the navy, which was one of the main sources of this tension. Germany’s quest for a general political treatment that would make it more comfortable in continental Europe was rejected by Britain that did not want to endanger even slightly the tripartite entente. It might be that if a compromise was reached on the Baghdad Railway matter, tension might also decrease up to a point internationally.

3) The French –German Agreement The process whereby the British and the Germans reached an agreement will be studied in detail in the next part. Before that it will be right to focus on the process whereby the Germans solved their problems with the French, because not only did this treaty precede chronologically the German– British treaty, but also it was unthinkable that the Baghdad Railway problem could be solved before reaching a solution with the French. This was due to the fact that as well as being the country with the greatest investments in the Ottoman empire, France also had irrenouncable investments in the railways and especially in Syria, with the result that it was impossible for it not to have conflicts of interests with these countries. As of 1910, while German investments in the Ottoman empire had a value of around 36,000 pounds and those of the British a value of around 30,000 pounds, French investments were above 100,000 pounds. However, the difference was that as high a

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portion of these investments as 60,000 pounds had been invested in state bonds. The value of French investments in railways was around 15,000 pounds.117 Actually, that Russia should have reached an agreement with the Ottomans meant that from the point of view of the French, a great part of the problem had been solved, because the reason why France was opposing the Baghdad Railway was that it did not want to offend its ally Russia. That during the debt crisis of 1910, humiliatingly grievous conditions should have been imposed on the Ottomans, and that a group of German politicians/bankers should have profited masterfully from this, must have been a very useful lesson for the French. French officials had understood that continuing with these kinds of policies would lead to the Ottomans being gradually more dependent on German capitalism. It was obvious that this kind of policy aiming for a solution of the problems with France would be well received by the Ottomans. The Ottomans had granted to French entrepreneurs the concession to extend the I˙zmir – Kasaba Railway to Bandırma, for an as high as 18,800 franc kilometre guarantee. A short while after that, the Ottoman government negotiated with the Ottoman Bank for railway concessions in the Black Sea area. La Societe pour la Construction et l’Exploitation du Reseau de la Mer Noire was to be founded, and was going to construct the Ereg˘li, Samsun and Trabzon port and then connect these ports by railway to cities like Erzurum, Sivas, Harput and Van. Later, lines to connect this gigantic web with the Anatolia and Baghdad railways, with the aim of ensuring access not just to the Black Sea, but also to the Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea and to the Persian Gulf, would be constructed. But at present, the first area to come to mind when French railways were mentioned was obviously Syria. Negotiations were also continuing for the extension of the concessions of the DHP (Socie´te´ Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Damas-Hamah et Prolongements). Among the new requests of the DHP there was the setting up of port facilities in Jaffa, Haifa and Tripoli, and the prevention of “unfair” competition to the Hedjaz Railway.118 And sure enough, on 9 April 1914, in Paris, the parties signed important railway and port concessions.119 The preliminary agreement for the Black Sea and Syria lines was signed in 1911, but the wars in Libya and the Balkans led to the final

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contract being dropped from the agenda. Defeat in these wars had placed the empire in an even more difficult situation. Because of this, the Ottomans needed to reach a compromise with the French, as well as with the other great powers. For example, raising customs duties required French as well as British approval. And what is more, the Ottoman state was once more in desperate need for foreign credits, and the best source for this was yet more French capital. But for all of this, French and German interests in the empire had to be reconciled, and especially so within the context of railways. The Ottoman minister of finance Cavit Bey had once more to go to Paris. The Ottoman government had had to become an intermediator solving the conflicts on its own lands between Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman Bank. Once the conditions for an agreement were ripe, on 28 May 1913 Pichon notified the German ambassador that the time had come to solve the Baghdad Railway problem.120 The German ministry of foreign affairs directed Karl Helfferich to begin negotiations with French bankers. Helfferich’s first meeting with officials from the Ottoman Bank were not very auspicious. It was upon this failure that on 19 and 20 August and 24, 25, 26 September 1913, meetings with a wider participation were held in Zurich and Berlin. German interests were represented by Gwinner and Helfferich; while French interests were represented by Baron de Neuflize for Banque de France and by M. De Klapka for the Ottoman Bank. The interesting side of these negotiations was the togetherness of representatives of capital and of state officials. Even though a basis for reaching a compromise during these meetings had been formed, there were many problems yet to be solved.121 In those days, the Germans were afraid that the French might oblige Cavit Bey to grant them concessions that could endanger German interests.122 That Cavit Bey, who was known as a Francophile, should have been in Paris for credit negotiations increased the Germans’ worries. Obviously, the Germans realized how granting credits was a stepping-stone for new concessions. Even the grand vizier’s assurances were not enough to calm all of the worries of the German officials.123 As a precaution against this kind of a development, the Germans were implying that they might intervene in the credit-granting process, just as they had done in 1910. In addition to this, Karl Helfferich openly warned his friend the Ottoman Bank manager Baron de Neuflize not to

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let the French reach an agreement that would ignore German interests in the Ottoman empire. He also stressed the fact that if Ottoman, German and French interests were to be reconciled, this would be good for all parties.124 Meanwhile, Cavit Bey also expressed the view that for the agreement to be sound, a compromise should be reached with the Germans also.125 Warnings by the Germans and the Ottomans to the French proved to be effective, the negotiation process ended in success with the secret treaty signed on 15 February 1914. The Black Sea area had been recognized as part of the French sphere of influence within the context of railways and the parties had agreed that the railways to be constructed in this area would be connected to the Anatolian and Baghdad railways. The port of Ereg˘li would be constructed by a French –German partnership. In a similar way, Syria had also been approved as a French area of influence. On the other hand, the areas crossed by the Anatolian and Baghdad railways were recognized as a German area of influence. Since the construction of these gigantic lines depended on the Ottoman treasury making the necessary payments, the parties had decided to take the required steps on this matter also. This meant that there would be no problems as far as approving the raise of Ottoman customs duties was concerned. And finally, Deutsche Bank had accepted to buy the Ottoman Bank’s Baghdad Railway shares, the value of which were 69.4 million francs.126 This treaty was signed by M. Sergent vice-director of Banque de France, by M. Ponsot from the consulate of France, by M. Klapka the general secretary of the Ottoman Bank and by Karl Helfferich representing Deutsche Bank. In other words, officially it was a treaty between the capital groups of two countries. However, strangely enough, it was also signed by M. Ponsot from the French consulate in Berlin and by Herr Rosenberg from the German ministry of foreign affairs. And what is more, Hollweg spoke in parliament about the official nature of the treaty. In a similar way, the French government recognized the binding character of the treaty at an international level. The Ottoman government’s approach was also similar and it approved the railway concessions contained in the treaty. Edward Mead Earle, who carried out the first important academic study of the Baghdad Railway, could not refrain from expressing his surprise, and described this strange situation by saying, “Much has been written about governmental support of

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investors in foreign countries, but, so far as the autor has been able to ascertain, this is the first instance in which a financial pact and an international agreement have been combined in one document.”127 And the treaty really had elements that would satisfy officials from both countries. All of a sudden the French had obtained a railway concession in Ottoman lands that had a length of 3,500 km. And what is more, they had freed themselves very masterfully from the political situation into which they had fallen as a result of the Potsdam process. From then on, the Russian government had permitted the French to construct a railway network in the Black Sea area, on condition that it should not start operating before the railway that the Russians themselves were constructing in the Caucasus were completed.128 In other words, with this treaty, the Russians had renounced in favour of the French the concession to construct a railway in the Black Sea area that the Ottomans had granted them in 1900. In exchange for this, the Germans had had the areas crossed by the Anatolian and Baghdad railways accepted officially as a German sphere of influence and had eliminated another source of opposition to the Baghdad Railway. This same development was something that also made the Sublime Porte happy, because it meant that the increase of Ottoman customs duties would be approved. That the great powers should be weaving a network of railways on the lands of the empire, without obstructing each other, seemed to be a good thing to the Ottoman government. If this could be considered a success, then the Ottomans had been very successful, since in a map drawn by the German consulate showing the sharing of Anatolia within the context of railway concessions the only place left without a railway concessions was the Antalya area and even there the Italians were seeking a concession.129 And what is more, railway companies in cutthroat competition amongst themselves could very easily form an alliance against the Sublime Porte, whenever their interests required it. For example, whenever there was a problem in the payment of the kilometre guarantees, all these companies came together to protest the Sublime Porte and successfully carried out what needed to be done to get the payment. A good example of this is the way that in 1901 these companies managed to change the Ottoman representative in the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye, whom they perceived to be against their own interests.130 The situation that Ottoman officials did not see (or rather,

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of which they might be aware up to a point, but which out of desperation they preferred not to see) was described in a clear and interesting way by the Middle East expert Mark Sykes: These concessions, which have been extracted from Turkey in return for this loan [. . .] mean a monopoly of all Syrian transit; and, further, a native press is to be subventioned practically in the interests of these particular monopolies [. . .] In practice, loans, kilometric guarantees, monopolies, and a financed native press, must, whetever the financiers desire it or not, pave the way to annexation. I submit that that is not the spirit of the entente. The British people did not stand by the French people at Agadir to fill the pockets of financiers whose names are unknown outside Constantinople or the Paris Bourse.131 Mark Sykes, of the wartime Sykes/Picot treaty, could make very clearheaded analyses. Indeed, the fact that Syria was finally separated from the empire and turned into a French mandate supports his thesis.132 However, there was one point that he had missed, and that was that also the British used the methods so well analysed by himself. According to Sykes, the British enterprises in Ottoman lands did not aim for exploitation and this was why the unhappy subjects of the Ottoman state still perceived the British as a hope.133 I do not think that there is the need to say that this last analysis is extremely partial. First of all, even though the British did not receive kilometre guarantees, they had nevertheless constructed the Aydın line on condition of guaranteed profits. And what is more, as was underlined in the German answer to the editor of The Times, the Aydın Railway crossed extremely fertile areas.134 In conclusion, the reasons for investments in a foreign country did not vary a lot. The civilizing mission underlined by Sykes did not serve any other purpose apart from polishing their real intentions. Before concluding this part, let us quote the views of French General Sarolea, who was a sworn opponent of Germany and of the Baghdad Railway. His extremely coherent analysis deserves to be quoted in that it shows the limits to which the opponents of the Baghdad Railway were ready to go:

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There was a time when occupation and penetration of a foreign country took place by slow and peaceful steps – first the missionary, then the trader, then the consul, then the flag. Those were the antiquated British methods. To-day the railway engineer seems to be more and more the dues ex machina of colonization, and the soldier is almost certain to fallow in his wake. [. . .] Twenty-five years ago Germany declared she had no political stake in the affairs in Turkey [. . .] To-day Germany is wellnight supreme on the Bosphorus. She started by sending military instructors, amongst whom was the famous general Von der Goltz Pasha, and by reorganizing the Turkish army on the German model [. . .] She then sent her engineers, obtaining concessions, building railways, and practically obtaining the control of the socalled “Oriental” line. [. . .] Whoever knows anything about Turkish finances, knows that the Treasury may be placed in a position where it will be unable to pay the annual guarantee [. . .] Turkey will find herself in the same position in which Egypt found her-self before 1880 [. . .] I˙n fact, the Sultan of Turkey will become a vassal of Germany. Already under Abdu¨l Hamid the Turkish Government took its orders from the German ambassador. [. . .] But it is impossible, to understand how France and England without a protest should have allowed Germany to take possession of a country where the English had vital political interests, over which the French had exerted a religious protectorate for many centuries. [. . .] With regard to France [. . .] she actually offered to lend her own money and her political influence to further the schemes of her rivals. [. . .] A German railway largely built with French money. [. . .] [. . .] For the Baghdad Railway threatens the Imperial future of Britain on at least two vital points. [. . .] The following statement by Dr.Paul Rohrbach tells its own tale and needs no commentary [. . .] England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place – Egypt. [. . .] Turkey, howover, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria and until, through the progress of the Anotolian Railway to Baghdad, she

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is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Masopotamia. [. . .] The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of war with England.135 [. . .] German diplomacy may be contradictory and jerky, but it certainly is not deceitful. So far from working in the dark, the German politician trumpets his schemes, blurtsout his intentions. [. . .] In the case of the Baghdad Railway, the forewarnings have been so numerous that the neglect to profit by them would be inexcusable.136

4) The British – German Agreement. It Is Too Late . . . During 1911, Britain was grappling with domestic problems and the Agadir crisis had played an unfavourable role in relations between Germany and Britain. But it was not like there were no, albeit tiny, developments in the context of a rapprochement between the two countries. For example, according to Cevat Bey’s reports, the reason why Ku¨hlmann was appointed to London was that he could contribute to the elimination of negative feelings between Germany and Britain and establish a friendly atmosphere between them.137 By 1912, there was a new contribution to the thaw, when Lord Haldane visited Berlin as the guest of the kaiser. The Lord spent three days in Berlin, where he found the opportunity of exchanging views with high-ranking officials.138 Before his return, Haldane had been given by Hollweg notes containing German views about various matters. In the note about the Baghdad Railway, the Germans had stated that in exchange for the British ceasing their opposition to the railway, they would recognize the spheres of British influence in Iran and in the Persian Gulf.139 These German concessions must not have been considered to be sufficient, because this set of proposals was rejected by the British cabinet. Meanwhile Marschall was transferred from Istanbul to the embassy in London so as to reconcile German and British interests in the Ottoman empire,140 and at the same time Sir Harry Johnston, who was a champion of German investments in Anatolia, went to Germany for some conferences. The appointment in January 1913 of von Jagow as minister of foreign affairs, was another favourable development from the point of view of a British–German reconciliation, because Jagow was a

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statesman, who believed that if such an agreement was not reached a great war would break out in Europe.141 The revitalization with a new enthusiasm and dynamism of the British– German negotiations about the Baghdad Railway was the result of the motivation brought about by the positive developments in British– Ottoman negotiations. During this process when there were certain developments that would lessen tensions between these two countries, it was the Germans once more who made a new attempt for rapprochement. In February 1913, German diplomats heard from Hakkı Pasha that the British were negotiating with the Sublime Porte for the construction by the Ottomans of the Baghdad– Basra part of the railway.142 Also the Germans considered the general framework of the negtatiations acceptable. Following some introductory meetings with Alwyn Parker, Ku¨hlmann stated that they were ready to compromise with the British on the relinquishment of the right to extend the railway from Basra to the Gulf, on acceptance of Basra as the terminus of the railway, on the presence in the board of directors of two British citizens and on the construction and operation of the port of Basra. In exchange for these concessions, he had asked the British to state that they would stop opposing the Baghdad Railway and that they accepted the right of the company to construct the Baghdad– Basra part, and to guarantee that the Shatt al Arab would be kept open to shipping in a way suitable for ships from beyond the ocean. As one can see, on this occasion it was the Germans that had approached the British with rather sensible proposals. And sure enough, the British foreign office for the first time found the German attitude to be favourable. Both Parker and Grey openly expressed their hope that an agreement was possible.143 On 10 June 1913, the British foreign office sent the draft, in which they explained the conditions on which they would not oppose the Baghdad Railway.144 Following this development, in their set of proposals submitted on 16 July 1913, the Germans had been a bit bolder in their requests in comparison to their first position.145 This exchange of drafts and counter-proposals continued until 15 June 1914, which was the date that Grey and Lichnowsky signed the final agreement. In article 1, the British stated that they recognized the value for international trade of the Baghdad Railway and undertook not to act in a way that would make it more difficult for the Baghdad

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Railway Company to construct and operate this line and not to support this kind of action. In exchange for this, the Germans stated that they accepted the presence on the board of directors as indicated in clause (b) of the same article, of two British citizens approved by the British government, on condition of their being shareholders in the company.146 In article 2 of the treaty it was stated that both governments approved the agreement between the Baghdad Railway Company and the Sublime Porte. In other words, Basra as the terminus of the railway, the relinquishment by the company of its right to construct the railway beyond Basra and a port on the Gulf, and that the construction and operation of ports in Basra and Baghdad would be carried out by an independent Ottoman company were all accepted. Whatever the reason, there would be no special treatment for any kind of merchandise or trading group, either along all of the Baghdad line or in the abovementioned ports. The Baghdad Railway Company had been given the obligation of declaring raises in its transport fees with an advance of at least two months. Clause (b) of the same article concerned the plan to have the Germans participate in the above-mentioned Ottoman port company with a 40 per cent share and to be represented on the board of directors with the same proportion.147 With this agreement, the parties undertook not to compete with each other in some areas. The Germans had accepted the British request not to have the Baghdad Railway reach the shores of the Persian Gulf, and they were promising not to support a line that would connect the railway to the Gulf or an attempt to construct a port on the Gulf. In exchange for this, the British would not support any enterprise that might compete with the Baghdad Railway or that might damage the existing rights of the company. In an explanatory note added to the agreement the area in which no line in competition with the railway could be constructed was explained in detail, and the area was kept rather vast.148 So much so that it seems that Grey was afraid of being criticized harshly in parliament for having been too conciliatory on this matter.149 On the other hand, Grey must have felt more assured with the knowledge that a former opponent of the Baghdad Railway would on this occasion support it. This person was Gibson Bowles, one of the main actors of the storm whipped up in 1903 against the railway, and the representative in the chamber of the Commons of the I˙zmir – Aydın

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Railway. Since following new developments, the interests of the I˙zmir – Aydın line had been increased, there was no cause to worry about this kind of opposition. And sure enough, representatives of both the Baghdad and the Aydın railway, as well as British and German diplomats, with Hakkı Pasha acting as an observer, met various times in February and March 1914 trying to find a way to reconcile their interests. Actually, the solution of this problem was not difficult at all, since it was obvious that by joining the two railways at Afyon the transport of both passengers and goods of the two companies and consequently also their profits would increase. This solution was good also from the point of view of the Ottoman Empire, which instead of two lines separate from each other would gain an interconnected railway network. In this way, British entrepreneurs would have also gained the right to extend the railway as far as Afyon. And what is more, they had had accepted by the Germans the connection lines to the Eg˘ridir and Beys¸ehir lakes that they were to construct.150 Not content with this, the Aydın Railway entrepreneurs also sought the navigation right on said lakes.151 The Germans, who in those days had carried out irrigation projects around the Eg˘ridir Lake, had not accepted to share their potential profits. In conclusion, on condition of not damaging irrigation activities, the British acquired the right to shipping activities on the Beys¸ehir Lake, in equal measure as the Germans.152 Another main matter on which an agreement had been reached concerned shipping on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. As we remember that at the beginning, the Germans had approached this matter with a completely conciliatory attitude. But under the pressure of the public and of capital holders, the Germans had gradually increased their requests. And a short while later Gwinner asked for a share, even if small in said company. This share for the Germans would be deducted not from the British share, but from the Ottomans’. German officials had told the British that they should be a little tolerant on this matter, because otherwise they would not be able to explain to the German public, and in particular to its shipping companies, why they had relinquished this monopoly; for example the Hamburg –America Shipping Company (HAPAG), which was directly involved in the matter, would have made a lot of fuss about it. And sure enough, this attempt by the Germans was to a great extent due to pressure from the German ship industry. The matter was

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criticized in parliament from this point of view, and some newspapers wrote that the Germans’ rights concerning the rivers of Mesopotamia had not been defended, as they should. Apart from this, in a letter he sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Albert Ballin, the chairman of HAPAG, said that negotiators had not defended German interests as much as they should have.153 In conclusion, while the Germans had accepted to approve the Ottoman –British agreement, the British had approved the fact that the Baghdad Railway Company would have a 20 per cent share from Ottoman portion and that it would be represented on the board of directors with the same proportion.154 Let us add that during negotiations on this matter, great importance was given to Lord Inchcape’s interests. According to the agreement signed on 23 February 1913, by Inchcape and the Baghdad Railway Company, the company recognized the rights granted by the Ottoman government to Inchcape, and in addition to this it annulled its contract for the transport over the river of railway materials, which it had signed with the Lynch Company and its partner a Belgian company, and transferred this concession to a new company to be established by Inchcape.155 However, since this new agreement was in open contradiction with the acquired rights deriving from the agreement that had previously been signed with Lynch, it was amended on 27 March, with a contract between Inchcape and the Lynch Brothers. According to this new agreement, the Lynch brothers would take part in the Ottoman Fluvial Transport Company to be established by Inchcape, and F. Lynch would be one of the directors of the company. With this agreement, the Baghdad Railway Company transferred its right to construct the Baghdad and Basra ports to an Ottoman ports company, in which Inchcape and Lynch would have 40 per cent share. As usual, posts on the boards of directors would be distributed in proportion to the shares held.156 While, thanks to the open support of the British government, Inchcape’s power was gradually increasing, the Lynch Brothers, who up to then had been big fish in a small pond, had turned into small fish in a big pond.157 The last main point of the German –British agreement concerned the Shatt al Arab matter. The British had rejected the Germans’ request to be represented in the Shatt al Arab commission.158 It was upon this that the Germans proposed the establishment of a committee that would consist of the consuls in Basra of the countries, the ships of which made regular trips to the Gulf, and would serve as an advisory committee

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(comitee de surveillance). This committee would be in contact with the Shatt al Arab commission on all matters related to conditions of navigation.159 The British rejected this proposal too, because it would create a split in the administration. Meanwhile, the decision had been taken to establish a committee of specialists that would determine the technical difficulties between the parties and would make proposals for their solution. The committee consisted of the representatives of HAPAG and of the Baghdad Railway Company, of Lord Inchcape and some other representatives of British capitalist spheres, as well as of representatives of the foreign offices of both countries. It was proposed to take the Danube commission as a model. The commission had prepared wide-ranging proposals including technical details on matters like what kinds of customs duties and transport fees to collect from which kinds of ships. It seems that the meetings of this technical commission were carried out in an amicable way, without too much strain. The proposals were included in detail in the relevant article of the final agreement of 15 June 1914.160 Article 6 of the agreement stated that officials from both countries would use their influence on the Ottoman government to make sure that it should make the Shatt al Arab permanently navigable. Article 7 of the agreement stated that the German government would recognize the British– Ottoman agreement, so long as the Shatt al Arab commission carried out its duties in a satisfactory manner. In exchange for this, the British government accepted that the German consul in Basra should be in direct communication with the commission and that in case the commission should not carry out its duties as its should and the German consul complained, that then the matter would be taken up by an impartial expert.161 In the meantime, representatives of both countries had negotiated over irrigation activities in Anatolia. The Germans had carried out the Konya plain irrigation project, had obtained the C¸ukurova irrigation concession and had carried out widespread improvement work in Adana. As for the British, their irrigation projects concerned mainly Mesopotamia. When the Young Turks had come to power, they had appointed Willcocks as a consultant for irrigation matters, and Wilcocks had prepared a comprehensive project for the irrigation of Mesopotamia. The cost of the project was around 750,000 pounds.162 Even though in 1912 some British companies applied to the Sublime Porte to carry out

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Wilcocks’s project, this proposal was not accepted because of the financial crisis. While the Germans perceived irrigation activities in Mesopotamia as being an area of free competition where nobody had any privilege, the British thought that they had privileges, because even if these had not been carried out, they had been the only ones to prepare projects for the area. In conclusion, while the British had recognized the Germans’ irrigation rights in the area of Adana, they had made the Germans accept the fact that the British were privileged in Mesopotamia.163 In this way, the British government had first eliminated one by one all the problems that worried it, and then had signed the treaty. On 29 June, Edward Grey informed the chamber of the Commons about the content of the treaty.164 From then on, Britain would not object to the raising of Ottoman customs duties from 11 per cent to 15 per cent and to the use of the income deriving from this raise, in the financing of the Baghdad Railway; and what is more it would not object to the use of taxes collected from monopolies, alcohol, oil, matches, playing cards, cigarette rolling paper and sugar, for the construction of the Baghdad Railway.165

5) The End of the Process: The Oil Wars/Agreements Careful readers will have noticed that in this treaty there was nothing about oil, which was one of the main subjects of negotiations of those days. The reason for this is that in parallel to this process, oil had been negotiated separately by the British and the Germans. The British had been competing since the beginning of the century for oil extraction concessions with the Germans in the Ottoman empire. The main actor in this struggle was the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) owned by William Knox D’Arcy.166 D’Arcy had sent his most trusted men, Marriot in 1901 and Nichols in 1903, to Istanbul to negotiate for the concession of oil extraction in Mesopotamia.167 For this purpose, Nichols founded a company named the Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate in Istanbul. D’Arcy’s request for British government support in his quest for an oil concession in Mesopotamia was met with favour. The foreign office had instructed the British ambassador in Istanbul to support officials of this company in all possible ways.

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Article 22 of the Baghdad Railway treaty dated 1903 granted the German company the right to prospect for and extract all kinds of minerals including oil on both sides of the line, up to a distance of 20 km. Negotiations within this framework, between Ohannes Pasha, the minister of the imperial treasury, and Kurt Zander, ended in June of the following year. The oil contract that was signed granted the company the right to carry out studies in the provinces of Mossul and Baghdad for a year, on condition that the costs be covered by the company itself.168 If at the end of the studies the company made a request to operate the mines for which it had a concession, it would be granted this right “with imperial treasury participation and control, and with a special contract for 40 years”.169 Even though the company began its studies after this decision, by the end of the one-year term it had still not informed the Ottoman government in any way. It was because of this that on 8 August 1905, Ohannes Pasha wrote to the company reminding it that the term was up and asking it to fulfil its obligations. In its answer, the company explained the difficulties of the studies carried out in the area, that only recently had geological samples been received and then sent to Europe to be analysed, and requested an extension of a year.170 But the Ministry of the Imperial Treasury did not accept the company’s request and in October 1905 and July and August 1906 it insistently stressed the fact that the company had not fulfilled its obligations. Correspondence continued in this way on both sides, until in its letter dated 26 January 1907 the imperial treasury informed the company officially that since it had the obligation to complete the exploratory drilling activities during the first year, the contract was being annulled. Even though the company did not recognize this decree, in its letter dated 4 March the Ottoman government repeated its view that the contract had ended.171 The pasha underlined also that there had been new applications for oil concessions and added that there should be no delay in granting the concession to those who had proposed the best conditions.172 Obviously, on this occasion the German company must have overestimated its strong position within the Ottoman empire, and underestimated the competition and the Ottomans’ ability in playing competitors against each other. The minister’s claim of new proposals was not unfounded. On the one hand the increase in the oil need of the navy and of industry, and on the

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other the failure of the German Railway Company in fulfilling its obligations deriving from the 1904 contract, had led officials from D’Arcy to revive their requests for oil concessions submitted to Ottoman officials and to the British ambassador increasing pressure about this matter on Sultan Abdu¨lhamid. The continuous efforts of the embassy and of the company seemed to have got results in 1909, when Hilmi Pasha informed the D’Arcy group that they had taken a decision on principle to grant the oil concession to this company. However, this kind of half promise must have been part of the way that Ottoman officials played competitors off against each other. And anyway, taking a decision on principle did not mean that the concession would be granted to this group. And sure enough, when the negotiations did not lead anywhere, the British ambassador realized this and voiced the threat that if the concession was not granted to the D’Arcy group they would not approve the raise of Ottoman customs duties. In other words, the threat over customs duties had begun to be voiced within the context of all British requests concerning the Baghdad Railway and Mesopotamia. Meanwhile, the Royal Dutch Company and the British Shell Transport and Trading Company merged, creating the first international oil giant, and after having founded the Eastern Petroleum Syndicate in 1907 they intervened rather ambitiously in the struggle for oil in the Ottoman Empire.173 The representative in Istanbul of the company was Gu¨lbenkyan, a financial consultant for the Ottoman empire. As was to be expected, the Royal Dutch-Shell group had asked for political support from the British government for the oil of Mesopotamia. But the British government did not respond favourably to this request. The British foreign office explained this by saying that in this struggle they were already supporting the D’Arcy group and that on principle they could not support companies, the majority of the capital of which was not held by British entities. And sure enough, 60 per cent of the capital of Royal Dutch-Shell was held by the Dutch and 40 per cent by the British. But an oil giant of such strength was not to be subdued so easily, and it applied to the Ottoman government for an oil concession, with advantageous proposals like 300,000 pounds per year and a share of profits. Naturally enough, this proposal met strong German opposition. And as we have noted, even British official spheres did not support this application and, in a way, by continuing with its absolute

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support for the D’Arcy group, it tried to prevent the success of the Royal Dutch-Shell partnership.174 However, very soon the British foreign office realized that no matter how much it supported the idea of granting the concession to D’Arcy, this would not be at all easy. As the process unfolded, it became clear that the oil concession for Mesopotamia could be obtained only if German and British capital compromised and cooperated. And there were also some British individuals, who were aware of this from the very beginning. For example, Sir Adam Block, the British representative at the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye, and H. Wolf, the former ambassador in Iran, had stated as early as 1907 that the only solution was cooperation between the Germans and D’Arcy.175 In a way, when some British capitalists had founded the National Bank of Turkey in Istanbul, a first step in this direction had been taken. Gu¨lbenkyan and Sir Cassell from the bank’s board of directors had made great efforts to reconcile British and German efforts concerning oil. For this purpose, once again Cassell was in close contact with Arthur von Gwinner.176 And all these efforts led to the foundation on 31 January 1911 of a company named Africa and Eastern Concessions Limited, the purpose of which was to obtain concessions for Ottoman oil. The partners in the company were National Bank of Turkey (35 per cent), Royal Dutch-Shell group (25 per cent), Deutsche Bank (25 per cent) and Gu¨lbenkyan (15 per cent). The 25 per cent share of Deutsche Bank was given it without payment, in exchange for its transfer to this entity of its right for a concession that it had obtained from the Ottoman Empire in 1904 and that had become controversial because the bank had not fulfilled its obligations. The company’s name was changed in 1912 to Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) and from then on this entity became an important axis of the histoy of petropolitics.177 Meanwhile, Fischer and Churchill, who championed the idea of having the navy use oil as fuel, were appointed first lord of the admiralty one after the other. Fischer thought that this conversion was obligatory to stop the German navy from being a threat and championed the idea with such enthusiasm that he was known as the “oil maniac”.178 Since Churchill also shared the same views, this process had led to a constant demand for oil by the navy.179 In the end, it was decided that the safest way would be to have a majority stake in a trustworthy oil company. It is easy to see that it was APOC that corresponded to this description.

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In conclusion, the British state attained this aim by buying 51 per cent of APOC.180 Edward Grey made a speech in the chamber of the Commons concerning their participation in APOC, and affirmed the necessity to take these steps from the point of view of India’s security and of the British Empire’s supremacy over the seas.181 Let us also keep in mind that in 1913 Grand Vizier Mahmut S¸evket Pasha had decided to cede to Britain, “two unimportant pieces of land like Kuwait and Qatar”. Five months after this decision of the pasha the sheikh of Kuwait had granted the British the right of prospecting and extracting oil on his lands. The British government’s pressure for oil on the pasha did not end with this. Upon insistence by the foreign office and APOC, Lowther put pressure on the grand vizier asking him for the concession of oil in Mesopotamia. However, it is also clear from the ambassador’s reports that by then he was perceiving the problem and reporting it to the foreign office in a more realistic way. It seemed to Lowther impossible that the grand vizier, under intense German and British pressure, would grant the concession to one of the capital groups of either of these two countries.182 Meanwhile, Hakkı Pasha was continuing negotiating in London for the Baghdad Railway and all other related matters. The British began to take into account the fact that following the signing of the Baghdad Railway agreement between them and the Sublime Porte, their bargaining power concerning the oil concession might have weakened.183 Hakkı Pasha’s advice to the British during negotiations was that British and German officials should reach a compromise.184 Even though negotiations with Hakkı Pasha reached a conclusion on 29 July 1913, Grey reminded Tevfik Pasha that before the British could approve the raise in customs duties, there was the matter of the oil of Mesopotamia to be solved as well as one or two other conditions.185 While all this was happening, the British government was trying to solve the problem by negotiating a compromise between D’Arcy’s APOC and the Turkish Petroleum Company’s British managers, because the Ottomans had informed British officials that otherwise they would suspend the concession, because they had made friends of one side, but on the other they might create a new enemy. Even though the British government preferred a partnership between Deutsche Bank and APOC, if a partnership was absolutely necessary, and tried to get rid of Royal Dutch-Shell and National Bank of Turkey, which were the other partners

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of the Turkish Petroleum Company, the founding contract of the Turkish Petroleum Company made a reordering of the kind desired by the British government impossible.186 Since by then the British government had realized that a formula excluding the Royal DutchShell group was impossible, it had to be content with asking for a majority stake for APOC in an eventual union. From that point on, the British authorities did not retreat from their position, and at every occasion they insisted on a 50 per cent share for the D’Arcy group. Meanwhile, the news that the American Standard Oil Company had intervened in Istanbul for the oil of Mesopotamia was something that disturbed officials of both countries and led them to cooperate.187 It was within this optimistic atmosphere that on 14 November Emil Strauss, counsellor to Arthur Gwinner, made a proposal in the name of Deutsche Bank that cleared the negotiations that seemed to be blocked on the matter of oil concessions in Mesopotamia.188 At the end of this process, the parties that met at the British foreign office on 19 March 1914 reached an agreement on the basis of Gwinner’s proposal, and signed the contract that solved the oil problems between them. According to this contract, all competing forces would unite under the Turkish Petroleum Company umbrella and oblige the Ottoman government to grant them the concession. In the new organization, the D’Arcy group would have a 50 per cent share, and Deutsche Bank and Royal Dutch-Shell 25 per cent each. The Turkish Petroleum Company shares held by the National Bank of Turkey would be distributed equally between Deutsche Bank and the Royal Dutch-Shell.189 The board of directors of the new company would consist of eight members, of whom four would be from the D’Arcy group, two from Deutsche Bank and the other two from the Royal Dutch-Shell Company.190 There was no way that the Ottoman government could resist this united front. And sure enough, on 25 June 1914, Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha told Ambassador Mallet that they had decided to grant the Mesopotamia oil concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company.191 Three days later, Said Halim Pasha notified the German and British ambassadors in writing about this.192 Actually, the document sent by the grand vizier to the ambassadors was only a declaration of intent. This intent could turn into a valid concession only after the signing of a contract between the Ottoman ministry of finance and the Turkish Petroleum Company. Even though the outbreak of war prevented the realization of this second phase,

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the post-war sharing of Middle East oil was carried out according to this document, under the Turkish Petroleum Company umbrella. In this new structure, France and the USA took the place of Germany which had retired completely from the scene. It seemed that with the agreements of 19 March and 15 June all problems between the parties had been solved. However, contrasts between imperialists had risen to such a degree that compromise over the Baghdad Railway was not enough to prevent war. The outbreak of war all of a sudden nullified all efforts made to solve the Baghdad Railway problem.193 By then there was not enough time even to sign the agreement of 15 June. Prince Lichnowsky, who signed the final contract in the name of Germany, explained very clearly these multilateral agreements concerning the Baghdad Railway: The real object of this treaty was to divide up Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this term was anxiously avoided in view of the rights of the Sultan [. . .] By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra was included within our sphere of influence (without prejudice to already existing British navigation rights on the Tigris and the rights of the Willcox irrigation works), as well as the whole district of the Baghdad and Anatolian railway [. . .]. The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna– Aidin railway were recognized as the British economic sphere, Syria as the French and Armenia as the Russian.194

6) The Great Post-war Transformation and the Ironies of History That the following lines should have been laid out between 1911 and the outbreak of war, notwithstanding all the difficulties, can be considered a success.195 If we add the 200 km Konya– Bulgurlu railway constructed in 1904 to these lines, we see that up to World War I, 887 km of the Baghdad Railway project had been laid out. The as yet incomplete lines were 38 km in the Tauruses, 100 km in the Amanos mountains and the 690 km Samarra–Mossul – Tel Ebyaz line.196 On the eve of World War I, even though it was incomplete, around 600,000 passengers and 116,000 tonnes of goods were being transported per year on the Baghdad Railway. Merchandise transported

216 Table 5.1

THE BERLIN – BAGHDAD RAILWAY Lines inaugurated during the 1911 –14 period.

Lines

Date of Inauguration

Length

Bulgurlu – Ulukıs¸la Dorak – Yenice Yenice – Mamura Rads¸u – Aleppo – Tripoli Ulukıs¸la –Karapınar Toprakkale– I˙skenderun Baghdad – Sumike Tripoli –Tel Ebiad Sumike – I˙stabolat I˙stabolat – Samarra

1 July 1911 27 April 1912 27 April 1912 15 December 1912 21 December 1912 November 1913 2 June 1914 11 July 1914 27 August 1914 7 October 1914

38 km 18 km 97 km 203 km 53 km 59 km 62 km 100 km 57 km 57 km

between Konya and Istanbul was generally transported from inner areas to the seashore. Almost all of the equipment used all along the railway was imported from German companies like Henschel and Borsig. Just before the war, 200 steam locomotives and 3,500 freight wagons and passenger coaches were in operation. Between 1910 and 1913, 19 million gold marks worth of rails and traverse were imported from Germany.197 Construction of the Baghdad Railway proceeded also after the outbreak of war. However, lines had begun to be laid out only according to the requirements of war. Whenever the existing contract proved to be inadequate for the satisfaction of these requirements, temporary contracts were signed to gain flexibility198 and to make at least the parts from Istanbul to Nusaybin and from Baghdad to Samarra suitable for the transport of troops.199 Deutsche Bank managing director Karl Helfferich, Chief of the General Staff Falkenhayn and some other high officials like von Moltke discussed strategies for the construction of the Baghdad Railway according to war requirements. Dr Jaeckh insisted during this discussion that the part of the line crossing the Amanos mountains should be completed at all costs.200 When a campaign to Egypt began to be considered, Cavid Bey was sent to Berlin to negotiate with the Germans the speeding up of the construction of the Tauruses part of the railway.201 In those days, while the part of the line in Mesopotamia was proceeding quickly,

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construction on the Taurus and Amanos mountains was going rather slowly.202 As soon as war broke out, Meissner Pasha was sent again to Damascus on the orders of Enver Bey and of Liman von Sanders.203 Since the British were aware of the military value of the Baghdad/ Hedjaz line, it was to be expected that they would do all that they could to obstruct the use of the railway. Lawrence’s raids with Arab tribes on the Hedjaz Railway were successful in that they at least tied up a lot of Ottoman troops.204 Apart from this, the British also made some attempts to prevent transportation from Haydarpas¸a to Mesopotamia. A fire that broke out in 1918 in the ammunition depots around the Haydarpas¸a station led to large explosions, and during this disaster, the perpetrators of which were never discovered with certainty, a great amount of strategic material and ammunition was destroyed, and the railway was also greatly damaged. The general view was that the British had organized it to obstruct transportation to Mesopotamia. On the other hand, in the official statement it was said that the disaster was the result of negligence.205 The Baghdad Railway proved not to be as militarily useful as it had been hoped. The railway reached Pozantı to the north of the Tauruses. At that point there was an interruption, because the necessary tunnel had not been dug, and on the southern side of the Tauruses it reached Mamure passing through Dorak.206 At that point there was another interruption, because it had not been possible to cross the Amanos mountains and the lines stopped at the I˙slahiye station. From there it went through Aleppo in Syria, and having joined the Damascus and Hedjaz railway it reached Medina. As you can see, sending troops from Istanbul to Palestine meant changing trains twice, once on the Tauruses and once on the Amanos mountains. These gaps on the Baghdad Railway were filled only towards the end of the war. Until October 1918 it was not possible for a train to reach Aleppo directly.207 A third transfer after the Tauruses and the Amanos mountains was done because after Rayak the lines narrowed. As for sending troops from the Baghdad station, these could barely reach Samarra, because it was far from the main line of the Baghdad Railway. In conclusion, not only was the Baghdad Railway not as useful militarily during the war as it had been expected, but it was also the source of many problems between Ottoman and German officials.208

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Woods was of a different opinion and stated that the comparison should be between the benefit of having railways for the transport of the Ottoman military and not having them at all. In this context, in his article Woods rightly denied the claim of complete uselessness of railway during the war and reached the conclusion that notwithstanding all the above-mentioned problems, “the importance of the Baghdad Railway derived from the fact that during the war it had been the main axis for the transport of the Ottoman military”.209 The fact that the Baghdad Railway should have been used to facilitate the deportation of the Armenians during the war is a human tragedy that we cannot abstain from mentioning. It all began in November 1915 when all through that month more than 30,000 Armenians were loaded onto trains at the station in Konya and were sent to desert areas in the south in exceptionally harsh conditions. During this period when the decision to deport began to be enforced, the Baghdad Railway employed many Armenians at various levels at its construction sites on the Taurus and Amanos mountains, and of these 880 were qualified personnel. That railway employees should also have been included in the scope of the deportation created an additional problem for the Baghdad Railway.210 The company was already in economic difficulty, as a result of its obligation, deriving from the contract, to transport free of charge all loads of a military nature.211 When you also consider the difficulty of finding in wartime conditions replacements for Armenian manpower, active at every level, it becomes obvious why the company had found itself in difficulties that could not be solved very easily. And what is more, the human cost of the deportation tragedy happening in their sight had horrified German consular officials, missionaries and railway construction engineers in the area. It is clear that these local elements made great efforts to prevent the massacre of Armenians. For example, Walter Ko¨ssler, the German consul at Aleppo, had, in opposition to official German policy, insistently sent detailed reports about what was happening in his area; in a similar way, railway officials like Winkler, the engineer responsible for the railway construction in Adana, had at least done all that they could to save the Armenians employed by the railway. The only point that they could use in these efforts of theirs to convince the Unionists was that where Armenian employees were to be deported construction and operation of the railway would greatly suffer because of a lack of manpower.

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In wartime, the Ottoman administration could not face a delay in the construction of the railway. In particular, the stretch of the Baghdad Railway crossing the Taurus and Amanos mountains had absolutely to be completed as soon as possible because of its military and strategic importance. Thanks to this delicate situation, company administrators managed to postpone the deportation of their employees. However, high-ranking CUP extremists like Talat and Enver did not desist and gradually increased pressure on the company to oblige it to substitute these employees with Muslims and other “trustworthy” elements so that the Armenians employed by the railway could be deported and, with this in mind, they did not refrain even from putting to work the Indian and British prisoners of war captured at Kut-el-Amara.212 In conclusion, the deportation of the Armenians employed at the railway could not be prevented. The main reason for this was that the German military mission in the Ottoman Empire was in complete agreement with the unionists. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Bo¨ttrich, head of the railway department of the Ottoman general staff, had done all in his power to deport the Armenian employees. The efforts of all those trying to save the Armenian employees, including the German embassy, to have Bo¨ttrich removed from his post, were all for naught. And, considering the then existing German military traditions and methods, this was something to be expected, because within the context of the battle for survival being waged by the Germans against the entente powers, the Germans had to benefit as much as possible from the military might of the Ottomans, who were their allies.213 It was because of this that they could not afford to risk conflicts with the Ottoman administration or the weakening of Ottoman military power, for humanitarian considerations like saving the Armenians. And anyway killing civilians for the sake of Germany’s imperial objectives was not in conflict with the traditional policies of German military power. In conclusion, the policy to be followed in the case of this matter of vital importance, and what is more in wartime conditions, was determined by the German general staff and its extensions in the Ottoman Empire. This policy made it necessary to follow policies that ranged from ignoring certain actions or non-interference, to open support of the Ottoman administration. The different paths followed by some German engineers, missionaries, diplomats and up to a point even by embassy officials, be it

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for rational considerations or humanitarian worries, had no chance of success in conditions of intense Ottoman/German militarism. From the moment that the entente states felt that the winds of war had begun to blow in their favour, they had started to negotiate the sharing of Ottoman lands. In 1919, the sharing of the loot began on the basis of the secret agreements signed during the war. The Italians occupied Antalya. The French share was Syria, which they turned into their sphere of influence for centuries. Britain already occupied Mesopotamia. According to the Treaty of Versailles, all of the Germans’ rights concerning the Baghdad Railway and its extensions were abolished. It seemed that the process had ended with the Se`vres Treaty signed in 1920. The Ottoman government had to transfer all its powers concerning the Anatolian and Baghdad railways to the reparation commission. At this point in time, British authorities probably made their biggest mistake when they decided that the occupation of I˙zmir by the Greeks. The only way of encouraging the war-weary Anatolian people to rise under the leadership of the Kemalists was to impose the Se`vres conditions and to have the Greeks occupy I˙zmir.214 A process characterized by assemblies, the national pact (misak-ı milli), the representative committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) and parliament, clarified the new conditions: the time had come for the empire, which had long since become anachronistic, to be substituted by a nation state. Once the Kemalist cadres had mobilized national forces for this purpose, it became impossible for the occupying forces to hang on to Anatolia. For example, the French people were sick and tired of the war, and were not ready to make sacrifices for C¸ukurova, at such a great distance from France. As for the Italians, it was inconceivable that they would fight in Antalya after the promises made to them by the British were not kept. Rather than embarking upon an adventure towards the unknown, these two states preferred to reach a compromise with the Kemalists and to gain great concessions in the new state being founded. The Italians gained the concession for the operation of Ereg˘li coal. The French were granted the concession for the Ergani copper mines. With the Treaty of Ankara, the Turkish government recognized French rights over the Baghdad Railway. In the end, the Kemalist government vanquished the Greeks, and on 14 October 1922 it signed the Mudanya armistice.

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Four days later, the Turkish army made its entrance into Istanbul. By then, the Treaty of Se`vres was worthless. The Treaty of Ankara met with great resistance by the British government.215 Lord Curzon had claimed that France could not sign a separate treaty by itself, which meant ignoring the League of Nations. Besides according to him, Turkey could not ignore the objections of the other allies and cede a great part of the railway to the French, and Britain could not accept such a blatant infringement of the treaties of Versailles and Se`vres.216 To quote from Current History from that time, “The war has not yet ceased in the Near East, nor is there any hope that there will be peace in the near future.”217 Once the Lausanne negotiations began, the difference in Britain’s and France’s expectations became visible. Britain made it clear that it would never relinquish control of Mesopotamia and especially of Mossul. As for France, it supported Turkey, trying to gain points for when financial matters would be discussed, because it was not interested in these matters. And sure enough, the French showed their true intentions once financial matters began to be discussed. They insisted that Ottoman concessions should be confirmed in the peace treaty and met with great resistance by Turkish delegates. At this point it was the turn of the British, because the concessions that they had gained had ended up outside the borders of Turkey and they had no need to act in unison with the French on this matter. The rising disapproval of this French attitude, within Turkish public opinion had increased to such a degree that it was endangering the debate of the Treaty of Ankara in parliament and, to show its determination, Turkey was massing troops along the border with Syria.218 It was in those days that Chester played a role in the history of Ottoman/Turkish railways for a second time. On 10 April 1923, the Turkish government granted a concession to Chester for a railway of around 3,000 km, and as a result of this problems with France grew even more, because under these circumstances France’s Black Sea railway network and its Ergani copper mine concessions would be endangered. And what is more, the message was clear: Turkey considered pre-war Ottoman concessions to be invalid. If France were to claim the opposite, it would be considering the will of the Ottoman sultan to be above parliament, and would also have adopted an attitude of conflict with American interests.219

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After the outbreak of war, the prestige of the USA in the Middle East increased once more. Wilson was perceived as the champion of oppressed people, and America gave the impression of having entered the war for the sake of humanity and not for its own interests. However, the new policy was mainly motivated by the interests of American socioeconomical and political conditions. As a new world order was being established, the American economy had risen above Europe’s and a search for raw materials and new markets would lead America to seek new policies. In 1920, the American government sent a note to the British government in which it claimed the right of American capital to share in Mesopotamia’s oil resources.220 Meanwhile, Guarantee Trust Company of New York established a branch office in Istanbul revealing the intentions of American capital spheres. At the same time, the American chamber of commerce in Istanbul was discussing the many opportunities for the development of American interests in the near east. It was the result of this kind of development that the Chester concession became part of Turkey’s agenda. According to the Chester concession, the Anatolian Railway was going to be extended from Ankara to Sivas by the revived Ottoman American Development Company and was going to reach Samsun by means of an ancillary line. The Ankara – Sivas line was going to be connected to the Baghdad Railway. Lines were going to be laid out from Sivas to Erzurum and from there to the borders of Russia and Iran, and this railway would reach the Black Sea at Trabzon. A concession of this magnitude had never been granted in Ottoman days. And what is more, just as in the case of what had happened in 1911, the use of oil and natural resources up to a distance of 20 km from both sides of the lines had been included in the concession. Construction and operation of dams, hydroelectric power stations and ports were all included in this concession. It was as if the development of the Ottoman empire was being outsourced to the Americans. I think that saying that the capital city of Ankara and also three port cities would be constructed by the above-mentioned company should be enough to show that this expression was not exaggerated.221 The reasons why the Ankara government granted the concession to Chester were incredibly similar to the reasons why Sultan Abdu¨lhamid wanted to grant it to Deutsche Bank. In 1888

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Abdu¨lhamid believed that Germany was economically strong and that it did not have political ambitions. In the same way, the Ankara government was of the opinion that American capital was strong enough to develop the Ottoman empire and that on the other hand it did not have political ambitions. Just as Germany was perceived by Abdu¨lhamid, the USA had a clear past in the eyes of the Ankara government. It had not tried to occupy any Ottoman territory, it had not tried to establish areas of influence, there were no Muslims in its own territories, etc. In the same way that Abdu¨lhamid was suspicious about other states and trusted Germany, the Ankara government did not trust other states, but perceived the USA as a sincere friend. Chester stressed the fact that Mustafa Kemal and the other officials had a sincere wish for American investments in their country, and added that the Turks perceived “the Americans are the only powerful people in the world who are not seeking a political advantage to the detriment of Turkey”.222 At the beginning of the Lausanne negotiations Turkish delegates stated that they had granted the concession to Chester “not because Chester was an American, but because Americans knew how to do business on a business basis without appealing to their government for help or seeking to exercise any economic pressure against Turkey”.223 However, both the Turkish government and the Chester capital group suffered a great disappointment. Contrary to the situation in 1911, on this occasion there were no experienced European imperialists that could stop the concession. As for the Turkish government, it had granted the concession with great enthusiasm and there seemed to be no reason why it should change its mind. In which case, one naturally wonders what was the problem. The problem was that the support of powerful American capital groups and of the American government was lacking. It might be that not too much time had elapsed since the events of 1910–12, but things had changed enormously. This is why the American capitalists that in the first application had tried to get a share of easy Ottoman profits and the Taft administration that stood steadfastly behind them had been substituted by gigantic capital groups in harmony with the “new world order” that had begun to be formed after the war, and by a new American administration.224 In essence, the Ottoman American Development Company led by Chester was like a small family enterprise in comparison to this project.

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The entity that during all this confusion had not lost its importance was the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). And sure enough, this company managed to survive thanks to its flexible structure making it possible for it to adapt to change. This partnership was born on the eve of war like a herald announcing the new order taking shape. Certain far-sighted German and British capitalists, who had realized that because of a completely blocked struggle for obtaining oil concessions from the Ottoman government no single capital group would be successful, had founded this organization. Deutsche Bank had immediately resigned itself to this development, while the British government had at first insisted on getting the oil concession by itself, and then had ended up by accepting the situation. From then on, a new world order, ruled by a new conception defined by some as neo-colonialism, and as neo-imperialism by others, began to be established. The ideology of the new order consisted of principles such as the need for all major underground resources, especially oil, to be owned by all of humanity and to be extracted under international control. The practical result of this principle was that great powers could exploit the main sources of wealth only by means of multinational companies. By then both the USA and imperialistic European countries had realized that they would not be able to get hold of the oil deposits of the area by themselves nor by excluding each other. While Chester was in Turkey laying out only 8 km of rails with workers assembled here and there, and desperately and unsuccessfully trying to prevent the annulment of the concession, the real action was being enacted somewhere else. American capital and the American government were cooperating so as to grab a realistic share of the oil of Mesopotamia within the structure of the TPC. The US government had shown that from its own point of view it was interpreting correctly the new dynamics connected to the exploitation of Middle Eastern oil, when it had chosen an American group made up of big companies like Standard Oil, and then given full support to this group’s struggle for the sharing of oil resources with the European great powers. Britain had tried to prove the validity of its oil concessions on the basis of the concessions they had obtaimed as TPC from Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha right before the war, but the American government had refused even to consider it.225 Quite the opposite, since oil had begun to

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gain vital importance, Washington had asked American oil companies to concentrate on foreign lands, and in particular on Mesopotamia, and had also asked British officials to act in accordance with the “open door policy”.226 As a result of this determined stance of American government/ capital, Britain had to accept American capital’s participation in the oil of Mesopotamia. In conclusion, the sharing of the oil of Mesopotamia had happened according to these new dynamics.227 To get back to the the Baghdad Railway: the Baghdad Express, which left Istanbul in 1888, managed to reach Baghdad in 1940, or in other words exactly 52 years later.228 By the time this project was accomplished it had lost its initial importance, because it had been accomplished in circumstances that those who had signed a 99-year contract could not even imagine. The death in Istanbul a few months before this of Heinrich August Meissner Pasha, who undoubtedly was the one to have contributed the most to the Baghdad/Hedjaz line, must have been another of history’s ironies. With Walter Pick’s dramatic explanation “Meissner Pasha died on 14th January 1940 in Turkey’s capital, as a doctor-engineer and the holder of many other titles. Just a few months after his death, the first train of the Baghdad Railway, the construction of which he had directed for around five years, reached Baghdad from Istanbul.”229

CONCLUSION

On a gloomy and rainy day, 11 days after the signing of the armistice, or in other words on 22 November, a forlorn and unhappy looking group consisting of 800 German citizens were travelling through Haydarpas¸a station. Among these people there were railway engineers, upper level managers, statesmen, teachers and their families. Meissner Pasha, who was a railway engineer of international renown, and who had contributed greatly to the Baghdad and Hedjaz lines, was also there. Those, who with pride and great expectations, had built the Haydarpas¸a station that was the starting point of the German empire’s Anatolian Railway, were now going through the shock of realizing that there was no place for them any more in Ottoman lands and were watching French sentinels doing their rounds.1 Haydarpas¸a station, which they had built with such loving care, and which still stands as a great masterpiece of German architecture, was occupied by enemy troops and the port of Haydarpas¸a was full of enemy ships. It might be that all these people, whose only aim was to construct the Baghdad Railway and to do their job in the best way, had, albeit indirectly, contributed to the break out of war. As we have seen in the last chapter, all conflicts related to the Baghdad Railway had been solved internationally by means of multilateral treaties. But the fact that the Baghdad Railway had continued to poison the political atmosphere in Europe constantly for 18 years from the moment it was signed, should not be forgotten. No imperialist power managed to prevent this ghost from haunting the corridors of foreign offices. Within this context, the Baghdad Railway constantly accentuated existing

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imperialist conflicts. Just as throughout history, control of the route of the Baghdad Railway had once more become the key to the East and to the West. According to Jastrow, who wrote two books to prevent the same disaster from being repeated, the reason why Germany supported Austria on the matter of Serbia, which is what ignited the war, was its wish to ensure the security of the railway extending from Berlin to Baghdad, which was vital for its control of Serbia and Bulgaria.2 This study has tried to answer the question of how international relations had reached this point. Germany, which was late in becoming an imperialist power, faced a problem in finding raw materials and markets for its fast-growing industry. It was impossible to solve this problem with the methods of colonialism as seen up to then, because most of the lands suitable for colonization had already been shared out among the colonial powers. As for the great empires of the past – Persia, China, the Ottoman lands – they were countries not suitable for straightforward colonialism, where big powers struggled for influence. The great majority of the shapers of official German foreign policy were aware of the fact that the Ottoman empire could not be approached in the same way that a typical colony was approached. However, those same people were also perfectly aware of the importance for Germany of the Ottoman empire. Ambassador Marshall von Bieberstein, who for 15 years shaped Germany’s policy towards the Ottomans and whose views were constantly being approved by Emperor Wilhelm, claimed, “The value of a country, the growth of population of which is 600,000 per year, for our country that has problems concerning its exports, is obvious.” Railways were the most important part of Germany’s Ottoman policy. Again according to Marschall, considering the need to obtain influence in Ottoman lands in a peaceful way, “railway construction was not just the most effective, but also the most profitable” means. According to the ambassador, “the material used for the construction of the railway would be provided by German industry, and what is more, German trade would gain precedence as a result of the areas crossed by the railway being connected to the German market”. Marschall’s claim was that following the construction of the railways, demand would rise together with the needs of the people of the area and, as far as German industry’s raw material problem was concerned, he pointed out Anatolia’s fertile lands and its mineral deposits and especially coal.

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Germany’s railway adventure in Anatolia began in 1888, and continued with the completion of the I˙zmit – Ankara line in 1892 and of the Eskis¸ehir– Konya line in 1896. The opposition that other imperialist states intensified during the construction of the Eskis¸ehir– Konya line, became even more desperate once the Baghdad Railway project began to be discussed, because this railway was a Railway that would begin in Konya and, having crossed Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, would reach Baghdad, and it was obvious that the country that would construct this railway would turn the area crossed by the line into its own sphere of influence. Control of the precious raw materials of Anatolia and Mesopotamia, like cotton, oil and coal, would be acquired together with the Baghdad Railway concession. In addition to this, these areas could also be turned into a breadbasket. Even just the above-mentioned reasons in themselves were signs that gaining the Baghdad Railway concession would not be easy. And sure enough, the granting of the concession faced strong interventions that can be very easily followed in this study. The other imperialist powers tried every means available to them to prevent the granting to Deutsche Bank of the concession. In conclusion, Russia was bribed with what was in practice a railway monopoly in the Black Sea area. Since the French had realized that their attempts to prevent the venture were useless, they found it more logical, even if only for a while, to be partners in the venture and to expand their existing railway concessions. As for the British, as the railway advanced towards the Persian Gulf, they began to feel threatened as far as the way to India was concerned. And what is more, also their other interests in Mesopotamia, beginning from oil and river transportation, were being threatened. It was for this reason that Britain would increase its opposition, as work for the Baghdad Railway progressed. However, there were cyclical circumstances limiting Britain’s ability to oppose the granting to Deutsche Bank of the concession. In those days, Britain had problems with its colonies. The beginning of the Boer war prevented British politicians from concentrating their attention on the Baghdad Railway matter. In the early years of the century, even a British partnership in the Baghdad Railway was broached. Before long, both Britain and France realized that their domestic politics were not suitable for such a partnership, even though in both countries there were entrepreneurs keen to join this venture and

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governments determined to support them. Within this context, 1903 was full of lessons concerning the results of radical and irrational nationalism. Naturally enough, British capitalists were favourable to Deutsche Bank’s proposal, since they believed in the profitability of the venture. The fact that the Balfour government should be supporting this partnership had further increased the willingness of these entrepreneurs. The government then in charge was convinced that the Baghdad line would be constructed anyway, and had reached the conclusion that it would be more realistic to get a share of the riches of Mesopotamia and to keep under check the enterprise from the point of view of its own strategic interests, rather than follow a policy of all out opposition. And sure enough, in early April, British Prime Minister Balfour, Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, Revelstoke in representation of British bankers and Gwinner in representation of Deutsche Bank, agreed upon the conditions of British capital’s participation in the Baghdad Railway. However, during the following 20 days things developed in a totally unforeseen way and, in the end, on the evening of 22 April, Balfour had to declare in the House of Commons Chamber that participation in the Baghdad Railway was absolutely out of the question. Let us summarize the elements of the dynamics of this process, upon which we have focused in detail in the third chapter: capital holding sphere of interests which would be directly and unfavourably affected by the construction of the Baghdad Railway, the extensions in politics and especially in parliament of these spheres, strong press institutions led by The Times representing these spheres and shaping public opinion, the support, albeit not as strong as that of the above-mentioned spheres, of Russia, and British public opinion that had been inflamed by this coalition and that anyway was ready to be inflamed, because of its anti-German and ultra-nationalist feelings. The sincere and impudent confessions made in 1905 to Gwinner by Lynch, who was one of the leaders of these spheres of interest, exposed the key role he had played within the campaign against the Baghdad Railway in 1903. After having told Gwinner that for them to be able to take part in the railway, they should absolutely be given control of the line in Mesopotamia, Lynch stressed the really interesting point, which was that he controlled both the foreign office and the press. He practically guaranteed that if he were to be satisfied on the matter of Mesopotamia he would strive with all sincerity and energy to gain the

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support of the British press, and chiefly of newspapers “inimical to Germany” like The Times, The National Review and The Morning Post. In addition to this, he also promised that he would use his influence over the British ministry of foreign affairs and that he would make all necessary efforts to find the capital required. What is interesting is that something similar also happened in France, where stock of the Baghdad Railway was unexpectedly banned from being traded on the stock exchange. This ban notwithstanding, the French partners of this venture maintained their positions in the partnership, including their participation in management. Later developments are full of events and confessions that prove the irrationality of what happened, no matter from which point of view you look at it. As a result of these unfavourable developments, the Baghdad Railway could not turn into a multinational enterprise and, what is more, British–French –Russian cooperation sharpened opposition to the railway and lead to an increase of tension among the sides concerned. Meanwhile, in October 1905, through Gwinner the Germans once more made the best possible offer for British participation. However, the Balfour government, which was plagued by divisions and weakened by domestic policy developments, had neither the power nor the time to solve this problem. Meanwhile, the structure of international alliances, as perceived by British officials, had changed and, as a result of Germany’s surprising development, former foes – France and Russia – had become countries, with which to be allies against this new power. When in late 1905 the Liberal party came to power, Grey, who was the new head of the foreign office, stressed at every occasion the importance of this new direction in their foreign policy. According to Grey, and within the context of the targets of this new foreign policy, the Baghdad Railway problem was something that had to be solved with the participation of the four countries concerned, or in other words by means of a quadrilateral conference, rather than by means of direct negotiations with the Germans. Grey’s foreign policy activities continued mainly as efforts to convince France and Russia. The German emperor’s Windsor visit in 1907, which had given rise to hopes of reaching an agreement, was not successful, because naturally enough the Germans had not accepted a negotiation to be carried out with a front consisting of three rival powers.

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Following the Windsor visit, Germany began to feel surrounded in relation to Baghdad Railway related matters, just as it did in relation to every other matter. However, it did not lose its hopes of breaking the entente chain at some point, because after all the entente powers were managing to sustain their solidarity on this matter not because they had been able to formulate a shared position, but only thanks to their shared enmity towards Germany. And sure enough, thanks to its careful observations, Germany managed to find the weak link in the chain. It took the opportunity provided by the fact that Russia, which had lost its war with Japan, was also in trouble on its home front because of revolutionary forces, and by the suspicion felt by Russians towards Britain, and thus attained a happy ending through the Postdam meetings. In this way, Germany had got rid of the opposition towards the railway of at least one of the entente states. Grey had done all he could, but had not been able to keep the entente states united within the framework of a quadrilateral conference. It should be stated that in addition to problems deriving from the international balance of power, there was also domestic opposition towards the project that gained strength from time to time, in both the Ottoman and German empires. We have shown in our study that all the necessary warnings concerning this gigantic project of Germany were expressed even in the reports of statesmen of the reign of Sultan Abdu¨lhamid. It might be useful to remember the most interesting of these. In a report submitted to the sultan on 6 April 1899, it was stated that concessions for investments like railways or ports, to be granted to super powers, including Germany, would lead to the creation of areas of influence. In conclusion, “No matter how friendly Germans might be now, they cannot remain as such for ever, since they are infidels and they have their own interests”, because of which, something that has absolutely to be refrained from is to grant big concessions “in fields like railways and ports to Germans or to other states”. According to the writer (Cavid), the only right way for states was to have this kind of important public investments be carried out by capital holders from “small states that do not have political power and that are not considered to be dangerous”. With the following analysis, the reporter very successfully placed his views within a theoretical framework: “The present day partition of Africa by the big powers by means of colonization has been the result of a policy that has always begun with this kind of public works ventures and commercial operations”, and in a similar way “it has been

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observed that also the ruinous partition of even China has been the result of the big powers having been granted many big concessions in areas like the railways and ports in those parts”.3 The most effective opposition to the Baghdad Railway was the one waged by the famous statesman Damat Mahmut Pasha, who was married to a sister of the sultan. During the competition for the Baghdad Railway concession, the pasha had actively sided with the Rechnitzer project supported by the British, and when the concession was granted to the Germans he fled the country with his two sons and joined the Young Turk opposition. The fact that one of the sons of the pasha should have become, as Prince Sabahattin, one of the main leaders of the Young Turk movement, shows us the point to which the intensity of the struggle for the railway concession could rise. Undoubtedly the biggest domestic opposition was the one that began following the declaration of the constitutional monarchy in 1908. In this new period, the atmosphere in the Ottoman empire had turned in favour of Britain and France, and against Germany. The Baghdad Railway strike that happened thanks to the new atmosphere of relative freedom and in parallel to the Germans’ loss of prestige, and the fact that all the dirty laundry of the Baghdad Railway concession had been revealed in parliament, were obviously all developments that worried Deutsche Bank. Following the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, many sociological developments that up to then had not been familiar elements in the lands of the empire, happened, and both society and the state, met new concepts like strike, working class and socialism. Since the wave of strikes had not hit only foreign companies, but also the new government, the latter had had to enact restrictive laws and also to intervene forcefully against the strikers. The process whereby freedoms were restricted in the name of law and order and authority, and capital accumulation happened by preventing the working class from organizing, had begun. In conclusion, even though it had not been possible to prevent the Baghdad Railway strike from beginning, government pressure and discord among striking workers brought about by a new offer presented by the company, prevented the strike from continuing. Nevertheless, the workers managed to get some kind of a raise in their salaries. Another development that worried the Germans consisted of the sharp attacks against the Baghdad Railway by some members of parliament during a

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debate in parliament. This development had worried the Germans to such an extent that they had even suspected that sure concession might be annulled under pressure by the British. And sure enough the British had done all they could to have a decree of annulment issued. Another attack on the Ottoman/German partnership was the one carried out two years after the parliamentary enquiry related to the concession, by Pastırmacıyan member of parliament from Erzurum. According to Pastırmacıyan, the rapprochement with Germany carried out by the regime of the tyrannical Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had led to the Ottoman empire becoming part of Germany’s sphere of influence. And the Baghdad Railway had been the main instrument of Germany’s policy of “penetration pacifique”. Pastırmacıyan had also stressed how the constitutional regime, which at first he had welcomed with great enthusiasm, had a while later become a source of disappointment for him when it continued with Sultan Abdu¨lhamid’s Baghdad Railway policy. In Germany meanwhile, some officials were strongly opposing the Baghdad Railway, claiming that it was contrary to German interests. The document, in which this was expressed within the clearest and most straightforward framework, was the report of Chief Consul Stemrich. Even though there were also some other voices in opposition, the general level of opposition never reached a level sufficient to threaten this state policy. All political sides, from the AlldeutscherVerband to the Social Democrats, championed, albeit with nuances, the idea of using the Ottoman Empire for German interests. The problem that worried Kautsky, whose view was that colonization was necessary for the development of capitalism, was that the cost would be borne by the bourgeoisie. Social Democrat Member of Parliament Scheidemann, stated that the people least likely to deny the cultural importance of the Baghdad Railway were the Social Democrats. His only note of caution was that tension with other imperialist countries should not be made to escalate. And anyway the SPD was not strong enough and as the approach towards imperialism of the above-mentioned two leaders of the party shows us, rather than being socialists they preferred to act in a fickle and compromising way. It was only a few Marxists like Rosa Luxemburg who, on the basis of a true class-based analysis and thanks to a perfect reasoning, did not refrain from expressing openly that German capital was savagely exploiting Ottoman peasants.

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Apart from all of this, there were differences in approach even among the allies in the struggle for concessions. For example, since the very beginning, Ambassador Marschall had, with a nationalistic perspective, been making efforts to ensure that the Baghdad Railway project should be carried out as a purely German venture. As for Deutsche Bank managing director Siemens who, because of his profession, looked at the matter in a more realistic way that gave precedence to commercial interests,4 he had openly stated the fact that the Germans could not by themselves lay out more than 800 km of railway, and was pursuing foreign capital. At the end, Marschall, and even Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, who on this matter had views similar to his, had had to accept that on condition of management remaining in German hands, foreign capital other than German capital could take part in the venture, since chief among the reasons why the railway could not advance even for a single kilometre during the 1904–11 period there was the difficulty in finding financing. The importance attributed by Ottoman officials to railways was obvious. By connecting rural areas to markets, railways played a production-increasing role. However, officials, and especially Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, were keen in having railways laid out as soon as possible for military purposes, rather than for these economic reasons. In times when revolts succeeded each other in quick succession or a new war might break out any moment, constructing railways had become absolutely necessary for the dispatch of troops. The contribution of railways in the winning of the war with Greece in 1897 had strengthened this view. The wish of Abdu¨lhamid was that following the Anatolian railway, the Germans should also construct the Baghdad Railway. The way events were developing had made it impossible for the Ottoman state to trust Britain, France and Russia. Sultan Abdu¨lhamid had expressed this view by saying, “Among the great states, the one we can trust most for the construction of railways is Germany, since what counts for Germany is only the economic and financial aspect of the venture.” The sultan was considering the Baghdad Railway in conjunction with the Hedjaz Railway, and believed that in case a line connecting the two were to be added, the military value of both railways would increase even more. And what is more, the Hedjaz Railway was a venture that would add great prestige to him in his capacity of leader of the Muslims of the whole world. As seen from his point of view, being caliph, had a political aspect as well as a religious aspect, since in most of the British colonies and

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especially in India, there was a conspicuous Muslim population. By providing material and moral support to the Hedjaz Railway, Muslims living in the colonies were also protesting against Britain. In his famous Damascus speech, Emperor Wilhelm II had spoken on the basis of similar considerations. By asking for the eternal friendship of 300 million Muslims, the German emperor was expressing a wish to be in close connection not just with Muslims in the Ottoman empire, but also with Muslims in British colonies like India or Egypt, or in French colonies like Morocco. Baron von Oppenheim, a key figure of Germany’s Middle East policy, had whipped up this kind of claim. The baron had championed the idea that the greatest danger for Britain was that the Muslims might rise against Britain under the leadership of the caliph. According to Oppenheim, a “less timorous” Ottoman sultan might be able to use the potential in the Islamic world against the British. As you can see, Oppenheim was openly advocating an effort to incite the caliph/sultan so that he should follow a truly pan-Islamist policy. But it was clear that a master of realpolitik like Sultan Abdu¨lhamid, who knew the limits of his strength, would not fall for this kind of misleading incitement. Abdu¨lhamid was trying to keep together the Muslim elements of the empire, within the framework of the theme of the caliphate. In other words, his policy may be described as domestic pan-Islamism rather than an international pan-Islamism. Nevertheless, pan-Islamism remained an indispensable dream for Germany. And sure enough, Kaiser Wilhelm continued to pursue this dream during World War I also.5 In those days, when Germany’s influence over the Ottoman empire was rising rapidly, German officials were discovering the new opportunities that the Hedjaz Railway would offer them and quickly setting to profit from them. German engineers took over control of the construction, all railway equipment began to be imported from Germany and, as in the case of Haifa, the economic activities of some settlements fell into German hands. In case the Hedjaz and Baghdad railways were to be connected to each other, it would become possible during a probable war to strike against the British both along the Red Sea shores and in the Persian Gulf. This simple truth was expressed in exactly the same way by Paul Rohrbach and was mentioned frequently by opponents of the Baghdad Railway as proof of the real intentions of the Germans. As we have seen, circumstances had joined together the fates of the Ottoman and German empires. German politicians and scholars were

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aware of what the best approach towards the Ottoman empire should be. Colonization of the Ottoman empire was not just impossible, but also useless, since problems like finding raw material sources and new markets were being solved by means of perfect mechanisms. Hugo Grothe, the famous German writer and chairman of the Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee, stated that their economic successes in the Ottoman empire had come about “thanks to their peaceful expansionist policies”. It is for this reason that German politicians and businessmen formulated all the fine points of their peaceful expansionist policies within the context of their relations with the Ottoman empire. They gained the trust of Ottoman officials and, most of all, of the sultan. They managed to calm down with great mastery even the anti-German storm that raged in the Ottoman empire following the declaration of the second constitutional period. They refrained from the unpleasant attitudes of the British and French while granting the Ottomans the credits they needed. Cavit Bey expressed this situation by saying, The Germans managed the matter with great intelligence and sophistication. During negotiations they did not raise any matter that was not strictly related to the credits. They did not impose any condition that would hurt Turkey’s pride. This approach of Germany won the gratitude of the Ottoman government, which at the time was in dire straits. This result was the greatest diplomatic victory in the period between the revolution of 1908 and the Great War. The real victory of the Germans was the agreement of 21 March 1911, signed in the positive atmosphere created by the credit agreement. This agreement was a declaration announcing the end of the dark period for Germans following the declaration in 1908 of the constitutional monarchy, and also that everything had turned to how it was in the past. Kiderlen described this agreement as, “A great victory won by the German spirit of enterprise, notwithstanding all the stonewalling and intrigues of competing powers and the unexpected changes in the structure of Turkish administration”. On the other hand, this victory of the Germans also opened up a window of opportunity for compromise among competing interests as far as the Baghdad Railway was concerned, because with this agreement the Ottoman administration had annulled the concession for the Gulf

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section of the line and in this way had gained an element that it could use during its negotiations with the British. The British interpreted the fact that the part of the line, for which they had protested the most, had been taken back by the Ottomans, as a basis for compromise. As presented in detail in this study, the new circumstances had created good reasons within the framework of realpolitik, for all parties to reach a compromise on this matter. The German/Ottoman side had realized how difficult it would be to carry out this great project in its entirety without getting the approval of its opponents. The solution to the problem of finding financing depended on the participation of new partners, or at least on the hope that opposing powers would refrain from opposing an increase in Ottoman customs duties. The matter of the customs duties had turned into the key point of an eventual compromise. As for the entente states, they had realized that after having come this far, Germany would never accept to turn back, and would somehow complete the project. And so, the best solution for entente states was to acquire new concessions from this process and to guarantee at least their vital interests, by becoming partners in the railway or through other mechanisms. And what is more, a new competitor from far away was gradually growing stronger, and had come up with a gigantic railway project and within the context of the struggle for concessions had scared European powers. The way that the US administration had betrayed the Monroe doctrine for the first time with the result that it had got entangled in the morass of the Middle East has been described within the context of the Chester project. Following Chester’s exit from the matter, multilateral negotiations were carried out among European great powers during the 1911– 14 period and, contrary to expectations, a real agreement was reached amongst all parties. But by then it was too late. Just like the other problems deriving from imperialist plunder, the Baghdad Railway had also constantly been poisoning international diplomacy. It had become impossible to cure this poisoned structure by solving only one of the problems. The engine spreading German influence within the Ottoman empire was the Baghdad Railway. However, we should also underline once more the other important part of the basis of this influence. And that is the German military mission in the Ottoman empire. Within this context, it was in 1882 or in other words during the Bismarck period that an institutional relation had begun. As for von der Goltz’s visit the

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following year, it was an important turning point. This move by the Germans had made it possible for them to use Ottoman armies against Britain and Russia in case of a war. And sure enough, the way events unfolded during the following years proved how true these views were. Both the German commanders in the Ottoman army and the Ottoman officers sent to Germany for training, contributed greatly to the introduction of the German tradition into the Ottoman army. This process must be one of the factors leading to the gradual occupation by German officers of key positions within the Ottoman army. The final point of this process was the appointment of the Liman von Sanders mission to the Ottoman military. During the war, hundreds of German officers including Sanders served in important positions. Nevertheless, it was not that Ottoman– German relations were trouble free. For example, pan-Germanist spheres, but also other extreme nationalist elements, were in favour of straightforward colonization, and through various means of propaganda they were advocating the view that Anatolia and Mesopotamia were the most suitable areas for colonial settlement by Germany. This situation led Sultan Abdu¨lhamid and the Ottoman administrators to be suspicious. Abdu¨lhamid expressed his views on this matter by stating, “I am not at all in favour of the establishment of German colonies of the kind described and wished for by the German press, along the Baghdad Railway. They are mistaken if they think that we are going to abandon these lands conquered by our ancestors at great cost for themselves, in favour of German colonisers.” However, Emperor Wilhelm II and German politicians behaved in a realistic way on this matter, and did not take pan-Germanist and other chauvinistic elements seriously. Georg von Siemens, managing director of Deutsche Bank, responded to the proposal for the railways to be used for colonization purposes by stating that the Anatolian Railway Company was an Ottoman company established according to Ottoman laws. German officials knew that Ottomans would not accept such a proposal. It was for this reason that they did not want to broach the matter of colonial settlement. Conversely, they gave clear guarantees to the sultan on this matter. Nevertheless, Abdu¨lhamid left nothing to chance, and added an article prohibiting colonization to the 1903 Baghdad Railway concession contract. Tension within this context, between officials and supporters of colonization, was to continue

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during later years also. For example, Bethmann Hollweg wrote that in 1909, after having been appointed chancellor, he had to put the Alldeutscher Verein, in its place, which established a strong base for the national liberals and conservatives. Let us end our study by underlining an interesting element. During the years leading to World War I, Germany was the country that was able to increase its political influence the most within the Ottoman empire, even though during the same period its share of the Ottomans’ foreign trade was still behind Britain’s and France’s. In other words, Germany’s political influence within the Ottoman empire had not, contrary to what frequently happened, been the result of raw materials buying, industrial product sales, increases in budget deficits and loangranting mechanisms. The process that we have studied helps to understand partially different dynamics of this new kind of dependency relations. Sarolea, who was a sworn enemy of Germany and of the Baghdad Railway, expressed this situation in 1913 with the following interesting comment that sums up the argument of this study: There was a time when occupation and penetration of a foreign country took place by slow and peaceful steps – first the missionary, then the trader, then the consul, then the flag. Those were the antiquated British methods. Today the railway engineer seems to be more and more the deus ex machina of colonization, and the soldier is almost certain to fallow in his wake.

NOTES

Introduction 1. Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789 – 1848 (New York, 1964), 202.

Chapter One Historical Development of Railway Construction in the Ottoman Empire 1. Orhan Kurmus¸, Emperyalizmin Tu¨rkiye’ye Giris¸i (I˙stanbul, 1974), 62 – 7. 2. S¸evket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820– 1913 (Cambridge, 1987), 102. 3. Fatma Mu¨ge Go¨c ek and Murat O¨zyu¨ksel, “The Ottoman Empire’s Negotiation of Western Liberal Imperialism”, Liberal Imperialism in Europe, ed. Matthew P. Fitzpatrick (New York, 2012), 197. 4. Engin Deniz Akarlı, Belgelerle Tanzimat, Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Ali ve Fuat Pas¸aların Siyasi Vasiyetnameleri (I˙stanbul, 1978), 25. 5. Joan Haslip, The Sultan, The Life of Abdul Hamid II (London, 1958), 52. 6. Vahdettin Engin, Rumeli Demiryolları (I˙stanbul, 1993), 90. 7. Engelhardt, Tanzimat ve Tu¨rkiye (I˙stanbul, 1999), 376, 377. 8. B.O.A., A.MKT.MHM, 447/22. 9. Friedrich Kochwasser, “Der Bau der Bagdadbahn und die deutsche Orientpolitik”, Deutsch-Tu¨rkische Gesellschaft E.V., Bonn Mitteilungen (June, 1975), 1; A. D. Novic ev, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘u’nun Yarı So¨mu¨rgeles¸mesi (Ankara, 1979), 23 10. I˙. Hakkı Yeniay, Yeni Osmanlı Borcları Tarihi (I˙stanbul, 1964), 53. This overtly meant the bankruptcy of the state, Carl Anton Schaefer, Ziele und Wege fu¨r die jungtu¨rkische Wirtschaftspolitik (Karlsruhe, 1913), 42 11. Agreement, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 220/17.

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12. Celal Dinc er, “Osmanlı Vezirlerinden Hasan Fehmi Pas¸a’nın Anadolu’nun Bayındırlık I˙s¸lerine Dair Hazırladıg˘ı Layiha”, T.T.K. Belgeler Dergisi, Vols V– VIII (Off print from No. 9 – 12) (Ankara, 1972), 160. 13. W. J. Mommsen, Europaeische Finanzimperialismus vor 1914 (Go¨ttingen, 1979), 127. 14. Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt (New York, 1929), 128. Also see Helmut Mejcher, “Die Bagdadbahn als Instrument deutschen wirtschaftlichen Einflusses im Osmanischen Reich”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, No. 1–4 (1975), 465. 15. T. Morison and G. T. Hutchinson, The Life of Sir Edward Fitzgerald Law (Edinburgh/London, 1911), 228. 16. Blaisdell, 133 – 5. Shereen Khairallah, Railways in the Middle East 1856– 1948 (Lebanon, 1991), 43– 8. 17. Johann Manzenreiter, Die Bagdadbahn, Als Beispiel fu¨r die Entstehung des Finanzimperialismus in Europa (1872 – 1903), (Bochum, 1982), 39. For examples of applications in the Ottoman archives see, Strousberg’s application, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 168/53. British entrepreneur Staniforth wrote a letter to Abdulhamit to obtain a concession for a railway which would connect Istanbul with the Persian Gulf, B.O.A. Y.PRK.TKM, 7/36. For the Euphrates railway project proposed by the famous British businessman William Andrew, B.O.A. Y.EE. KP, 2/147, for the application of Williams, an American businessman, B.O.S., Y.PRK.A., 4/64. 18. Bismarck summarized rather well its aims during an interview with him; see Ignotus, “Germany and England”, Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXIX New Series (January – June 1901), 663. 19. Ann Elizabeth Smith, “European Imperialism and the Baghdad Railway”, unpublished Master Thesis (St John’s University, 1958), 17. 20. John Lowe, The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865– 1925 (London and New York, 1994), 44, 54– 7. 21. Wilhelm von Kampen, Studien zur deutschen Tu¨rkeipolitik in der Zeit Wilhelm II (Kiel, 1968), 18. 22. Gregor Scho¨llgen, Imperialismus and Gleichgewicht; Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871– 1914 (Munich, 1984), 33. 23. Michael Freund, Deutsche Geschichte (Munich, 1969), 115. 24. Hajo Holborn, “Deutschland und die Tu¨rkei 1878–1890”, Archiv fu¨r Politik und Geschichte, Vol. III, 136, 154–6. For an opposing view, that Bismarck gave more importance to Ottoman-German relations, see Jehuda L. Wallach, “Bismarck and the ‘Eastern Question’ – A Re-Assessment”, Germany and the Middle East 1835– 1939, ed. Jehuda L. Wallach (Tel Aviv, 1975), 23–9. 25. Alfons Raab, Die Politik Deutschlands im Nahen Orient von 1878– 1908 (Vienna, 1936), 31. 26. Imanuel Geiss, “Weltpolitik: Die deutsche Version des Imperiaismus”, Flucht in den Krieg, ed. G. Scho¨llgen (Darmstadt, 1991), 154, 155.

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27. Gregor Scho¨llgen, “Deutsche Aussenpolitik im Zeitalter des Imperialismus: ein Teufelskreis?”, in Flucht, 181, 182. 28. A. Deborin, “Die Mitteleuropa Idee in der Propaganda der deutschen Imperialisten”, Neue Welt, Year 9, No: 206 (1954), 2733. 29. Gustav Stolper, Deutsche Wirtschaft 1870– 1940 (Stuttgart, 1950), 24, 27. 30. Bernhard Menne, Krupp Deutschlands Kanonenko¨nige (Zurich, 1937), 187. 31. Frederich Lenz, “Wesen und Struktur des deutschen Kapitalexports vor 1914”, Weltwirtschafliches Archiv, Vol. 18 (Jena, 1922), 43. 32. Stolper, Deutsche Wirtschaft, 46. 33. Fragen an die Deutsche Geschichte, Historische Ausstellung im Reichstagsgebaeude in Berlin Katalog (Bonn, 1983), 227. 34. Paul Rohrbach, Germany’s Isolation (Chicago, 1915), 17, 18. Further on, the writer criticised Bismarck era colonization policies for not having been supported by means of an adequate military force, see “Kritisches zur deutschen Kolonialpolitik”, Die Hilfe, Nr. 40 (2 October 1913) and Nr. 41 (9 October 1913), 628, 629. 35. Bernhard Schwertfeger, Die Diplomatischen Akten Des Auswaertiges Amtes, Erster Teil: Die Bismarck Epoche 1871 –1890 (Berlin, 1927), 191, 192. Haslip, 202. 36. G. P. Gooch, History of Modern Europe (New York, 1923), 194. 37. Ibid., Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (London/New York/Toronto, 1940), 27. 38. Georgeon, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid (Istanbul, 2003), 150, 151. Haslip, 189, 198. 39. Sean McMeekin, The Berlin – Baghdad Express, The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power (Cambridge, MA, 2010), 7 – 10. See also, C.A. Engelbrechten, Kaiser Wilhelms’ Orientreise und deren Bedeutung fu¨r den deutschen Handel (Berlin, 1890), 52. Dr Jaeckh claimed that the basis of the Baghdad Railway was laid out during this first trip, “Die Beziehungen der deutschen Industrie zum Tu¨rkischen Reiche”, Technik und Wirtschaft, Issue 5 (1916), 193, 194. Hugo Grothe was of the same opinion, Deutschland, die Tu¨rkei und der Islam (Leipzig, 1914), 6. On the subject of this first trip’s importance not having been understood by German public see Paul Rohrbach, “Deutschlands Weltstellung unter Wilhelm II”, Die Hilfe, Nr. 25 (19 June 1913), 387. For a narrative of the trip see Haslip, 189– 205. 40. Karl Helfferich, Die deutsche Tu¨rkenpolitik (Berlin, 1921), 8 41. Claus von Bichtlingen, “Die Bagdadbahn, eine Hochstrasse des Weltverkehrs in ihrer wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung”, Soziale Revue, Heft 1, XVI. Jahrgang, 1916, 1, 2. 42. G. W. Prothero, German Opinion and German Policy before the War (London, 1916), 29, 30. 43. Fritz T. Epstein, “East Central Europe as a Power Vacuum between East and West during the German Empire”, Germany and the West, Selected Essays, ed. R. F. Brynes (Bloomington and London, 1973), 52.

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44. Eric D. Weitz, “Germany and the Young Turks: Revolutionaries into Statesmen”, A Question of Genocide, ed. R. G. Suny, F. M. Go¨cek, N. M. Naimark (Oxford University Press, 2011), 187. 45. M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774– 1923 (New York, 1966), 226. 46. On the subject of the need to follow a more aggressive policy in the Mediterranean, as a result of the newly acquired strategic value of the area for Britain, due to the above-mentioned developments, see Willoughby Verner, “A Fool’s Paradise, Great Britain’s Position in the Mediterranean”, Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXIX New Series (January–June 1901), 951–958. In addition to this see Chatham House Study Group, British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East (London, 1958), 2, 3. 47. Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East, The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914– 1921 (London, 1987), 10, 11. 48. Sultan Abdu¨lhamit, Siyasi Hatıratım (Istanbul, 1984), 122. 49. Haluˆk U¨lman, Birinci Du¨nya Savas¸ına Giden Yol (Ankara, 1973), 144. 50. Sultan Abdu¨lhamit, 145. Hans Rohde, Der Kampf um Orient und Islam (Berlin und Leipzig), 1924, 38. On the subject of the way the British began to foment sentiments of rebellion amongst Arabs against the Ottomans, according to their new policies after the Ottoman-Russian war, see Ram Lakhan Shukla, Britain, India and the Turkish Empire 1853– 1882 (New Delhi-AhmedabadBombay, 1973), 186– 212. 51. Sultan Abdu¨lhamit, 137, 138. 52. Ibid., 180, 181. 53. The Bismarck administration was of the opinion that for the Eastern question to stop being a threat for European peace it was necessary for great powers to obey the conditions imposed by the Treaty of Berlin; see From Mu¨nster to Bismarck, 27 July 1880, G.D.D., Vol. 1, IV. 16, 153. For a similar view see Michael Wolfgang, “Deutschland und England”, Deutsche Rundschau (January, February, March 1912), 222. 54. Sultan Abdu¨lhamit, 147. 55. Weitz, 175, 179, 181. 56. Ortaylı, 43, 44. For an interesting analysis of how Germany became important in the eyes of Ottoman administrators see E. F. Benson, Deutschland u¨ber Allah (London/New York/Toronto), 1917. As an example on p. 3, “There is no God but backshish, and the Deutsche Bank is his Prophet”. 57. “There is no God but backshish, and the Deutsche Bank is his Prophet”, E. F. Benson, Deutschland u¨ber Allah (London/New York/Toronto), 1917, 3. 58. H. Loehnis, Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse einer Informatiansreise in die Levante (Leipzig, 1882), III, IV. 59. Rıfat O¨nsoy, Tu¨rk Alman I˙ktisadi Mu¨nasebetleri (1871–1914) (I˙stanbul, 1982), 26. 60. Kurt Wiedenfeld, Die deutsch-tu¨rkischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und ihre Entwicklungsmo¨glichkeiten (Mu¨nchenazır and Leipzig, 1915), 8.

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22 –26

61. For statistical data for the period 1880– 1888 see “Denkschrift zum DeutschTu¨rkischen Handelsvertrag von 1890”, Reichstagsdrucksachen, Nr. 170, 8. Legislaturperiode, 1890– 3, 127. For data concerning growth after 1888, Kampen, s. 24; Wiedenfeld, 11; Kurt Grunwald, “Penetration Pacifique – the Financial Vehicles of Germany’s ‘Drang nach Osten’”, Germany and the Middle East 1835– 1939, ed. Jehuda L. Wallach (Tel Aviv, 1975), 85 –101. 62. M. L. Flaningam, “German Eastward Expansion, Fact and Fiction: A Study in German – Ottoman Trade Relations 1890– 1914, Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XIV, No. 4, January 1955, 327. 63. Scho¨llgen, Imperialismus and Gleichgewicht, 33. Bismarck implied this by stating, “When the panslavists and opponents of Germany in Russia attack us, we will not be able to remain indifferent to the survival of the Sublime State and to its military-strategic value.” See Kemal Beydilli, “II. Abdu¨lhamid Devrinde Gelen I˙lk Alman Askeri Heyeti”, Tarih Dergisi, Issue 32, 1979, 484. 64. Haslip, 195. 65. Jehuda Wallach, Anatomie einer Militaerhilfe (Du¨sseldorf, 1976), 57, 58. 66. Ibid., 49. 67. Ibid., 66. For Goltz’s good relations with young Ottoman officers see Zwehl, “Colmar Freiherr v. d. Goltz”, Deutsche Rundschau, Band CLVI (July – August – September 1913), 304, 305. 68. Ortaylı, 67, 68; Wallach, 60, 61. 69. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, Denkwu¨rdigkeiten, bearbeitet und herausgeg. von der Goltz Friedrich Freiherr und Wolfgang Fo¨rster (Berlin, 1929), 108. 70. Lothar Rathmann, Berlin-Baghdad, Die imperialistische Nahostpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschlands, Berlin, 1962, 17 –19. 71. Mauser Armaments Industry was also at the same time a major stockholder of Wu¨rttenbergische Vereinsbank. 72. Lothar Gall and others, The Deutsche Bank 1870– 1995 (London, 1995), 68. 73. W. O. Henderson, The German Colonial Empire 1884– 1919 (London, 1993), 97. 74. Helfferich, Vol. III, 31, 33. 75. Rudolf Ibbeken, Das Aussenpolitische Problem Staat und Wirtschaft in der deutschen Reichspolitik 1880– 1914 (Schleswig, 1928), 191. 76. Ju¨rgen Lodemann und Manfred Pohl, Die Bagdadbahn, Geschichte und Gegenwart einer beru¨hmten Eisenbahnlinie (Mainz, 1988), 10, 11. Ibbeken, 191, 192. 77. Bode, 3. 78. “Die Concessionierung der anatolischen Eisenbahn”, HHStA (Botschaftsakten Konstantinopel). 79. “The Haidar-Pacha to I˙zmit Railway”, Financial News, B.O.A., Y.PRK.MYD, 8/33. 80. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 304/100. 81. On the subject of the way this problem was solved see B.O.A., Y.MTV, 126/16; Y. PRK.BS¸K, 36/80; Y.PRK.TKM, 13/63.

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26 –32

245

82. There are many documents that provide information about these articles: B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 220/17. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 2/54 (this document contains also the translation into French of the decree). For the text in German: Die Concessionierung der anatolischen Eisenbahn, HHStA, Botschaftsakten Konstantinopel. And also; Forchheimer, Die Eisenbahn von Ismid nach Angora (Berlin, 1891), 9. 83. Helfferich, Vol. III, 40, 41, 44. 84. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 2/54. 85. Kurt Zander, “Das Eisenbahnwessen der Tu¨rkei, mit besonderer Beru¨cksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmo¨glichkeiten der Bagdadbahn”, Das Tu¨rkische Reich (Berlin, 1918), 58. 86. Blaisdell, 133 – 46. 87. N. Heintze, “Eisenbahnen in der Tu¨rkei”, Mitteilungen der geographischen Gesellschaft, Vol. XI (Hamburg, 1896), 46. 88. B.O.A., Y.PRK.S¸H, 2/73. After the train had entered Ottoman lands, thousands of people in the settlements up to I˙stanbul had assembled along the line to see the train and to express their joy. Reports sent by Bergmann to the Fremdenblatt, Extra Blatt and Deutsche Zeitung newspapers, B.O.A., Y.PRK.PT, 3/104. 89. Michael Barsley, The Orient Express (New York, 1967), 23, 24. For information about the content of the interview see Haslip, 184– 8. 90. Helfferich, Vol. III, 50– 3. 91. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 235/79. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 2/45. 92. Helfferich, Vol. III, 48. 93. From Radowitz to Caprivi, 4 July 1890, G.P., Vol. XIV Section II, 441, 442. 94. Denkschrift zum Deutsch-Tu¨rkischen Handelsvertrag, 132, 133. 95. B.O.A., A.MKT.MHM, 498/79. 96. B.O.A., Y.EE, 62/16. 97. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 29/16. 98. B.O.A., Y.PRK.BS¸K, 23/94. 99. B.O.A., Y.EE, 5/38. 100. B.O.A., DH. MKT, 1713/62. For more information on this application see The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. S. Story (London, 1920), 240. 101. B.O.A., Y.EE, 140/6. 102. B.O.A., Y.PRK.BS¸K, 32/14. 103. B.O.A., Y.MTV, 67/12. 104. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 2/58. 105. B.O.A., Y.PRK.ES¸A, 15/34. 106. B.O.A., Y.PRK.BS¸K, 24/4. See also B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 251/177. 107. Max Schlagintweit, Reise in Kleinasien (Mu¨nchen, 1898), 5 – 8. See also Schlagintweinweit, Deutsche Kolonisetionsbestrebungen in Kleinasien (Munich, 1900), 12. 108. Burhan Og˘uz, Yu¨zyıllar Boyunca Alman Gerceg˘i ve Tu¨rkler (Istanbul, 1983), 182, 183.

246 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116.

117.

118. 119.

120. 121.

122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.

129. 130. 131.

NOTES

TO PAGES

32 –36

Joseph Grunzel, Die wirtschaftlichen Verhaeltnisse Kleinasiens (Vienna, 1897), 25. Paul Imbert, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘u’nda Yeniles¸me Hareketleri (Istanbul, 1981), 34. B.O.A, I˙.Hus., vesika no. 21 (50/1324-C-21). “Ein Angriff auf das Deutschtum in Anatolien”, Berliner Tageblatt, 4 May 1905, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. E. von Du¨hring, “Deutschland and die Tu¨rkei”, Su¨ddeutsche Monatshefte, September 1915, 909. Karl Kaerger, Kleinasien, ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld (Berlin, 1892), 90. Freiherr Colmar von der Goltz, Anatolische Ausflu¨ge, Berlin (undated), 272. B.O.A, Y.A.Hus., 267/26. B.O.A, DH.MKT, 21/11; Kurt Zander, “Einwirkung der kleinasiatischen Eisenbahnen auf die Hebung des Grundbesitzes”, AfEW, Berlin, 1894, 944 – 7. B.O.A, MV., 101/36; B.O.A, I˙.Hus., no.12. For an analysis within the context of Ottoman/Turkish history, of the settlement in Anatolia of refugees, see Wolf-Dieter Hu¨tteroth, “The Influence of Social Structure on Land Division and Settlement in Inner Anatolia”, Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives, ed. P. Benedict, E. Tu¨mertekin, F. Mansur (Leiden, 1974), 19 – 47. B.O.A, Y.PRK.KOM, 8/14. Memorandum communicated by Revelstoke, 21 April 1903, B.D., Vol. 2, No. 218, pp. 189, 190. I˙lber Ortaylı, “19. Yu¨ zyıl Ankara’sına ¨ retim Eylemlerinin Deg˘is¸imi”, Osmanlı Demiryolunun Gelis¸i ve Bo¨lgedeki U I˙mparatorlug˘u’nda I˙ktisadi ve Sosyal Deg˘is¸im, Makaleler 1 (Ankara, 2000), 112 – 18. E. R. Johan Bru¨nner, De Bagdadspoorweg (Groningen, Djakarta, 1956), 401. Donald Quataert, “Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890– 1908”, The Business History Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Summer 1977), 142, 159. Manzenreiter, 64, 65. B.O.A., Y.EE, 1/48. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 267/121, nr. 291. From Radolin to Caprivi, G.P., 23 December 1892, Vol. XIV/2, 447 – 51. Translation of Nagelmakers’ Telegraph, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 25/18. Zander, “Das Eisenbahnwesen”, 55. B.O.A., Y.EE, 140/13. In another submission to the sultan, it had been said that the granting of the concession to the Germans should be opposed, because it would lead to “all of the central parts of Anatolia to be under the financial control of a single tribe” and “to the transferral once more of a great part of state income to the Du¨yun-ı Umumiye”, see B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF 3/149. B.O.A., HR.TO, 535/9. B.O.A., Y.PRK.ES¸A, 16/78. Submission of Cevad Pasha, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 268/105.

NOTES TO PAGES 36 – 41 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142.

143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149.

150. 151. 152.

153. 154. 155.

247

Helfferich, Vol. III, 63. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 4/28. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 268/124. From Marschall to Hatzfeld, 6 January 1893, G. P., Vol. XIV/2, 452. From Radolin to Marschall, 9 January 1893, G. P., Vol. XIV/2, 456. For an example see “England and the Porte”, The Standard, B.O.A., Y.PRK. ES¸A, 17/26. B.O.A, Y.PRK.BS¸K, 19/7. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 29/43. Report of the Ottoman Embassy in Petersburg, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus, 233/53. From Radolin to Marschall, 9 January 1893, G. P., Vol. XIV/2, 460. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890– 1902 (New York, 1951), 635. Eugene Staley, War and the Private Investor (New York, 1935), 149, 150. Edmund Nauman, Von Goldnen Horn zu den Quellen des Euphrat (Munich and Leipzig, 1893), 437. Convention, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 27/16. In the same file see “Convention” in French. See also, B.O.A., DUI˙T, 191/12. Official Report of the Council of the Ministers, B.O.A., M.V, 93/74. Convention, B.O.A., DUI˙T, 191/12. Convention, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 27/16. Helfferich, Vol. III, 73, 74. Peter Heigl, Schotter fu¨r die Wu¨ste, Die Bagdadbahn und ihre deutschen Bauingenieure (Nu¨rnberg, 2004), 15. Kurt Zander, “Einwirkungen der kleinasiatischen Eisenbahnen”, 944, 945. Another German researcher stated that the increase in production was a result of the way the company had taught productivity increasing methods: Rud Staab, Die Unternaehmertaetigkeit Deutscher Banken in Auslaende (Lo¨rrach, 1912), 31. Another writer, who stressed the usefulness of the Anatolian Railway, on the basis of the increase of tithe income, was Carl Anton Schaefer, Deutschtu¨rkische Freundschaft (Berlin, 1914), 19. For a study of the increase in transportation income within the same context, see Max Schlagintweit, Verkehrswege und Verkehrsprojekte in Vorderasien (Berlin, 1906), 9. Donald Quatert, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Avrupa I˙ktisadi Yayılımı ve Direnis¸ (1881 – 1908) (Ankara, 1987), 69. B.O.A, MV, 101/36. For similar decrees see B.O.A, DH.MKT, 40/25 and B.O. A, I˙.Hus, no. 12. J. A. Zahm, From Berlin to Baghdad and Babylon (New York, London, 1922), 157. Also see “Central Anatolia and the Baghdad Railway”, The Economist (15 November 1913), 1079. Report number 60564, titled “Mesopotamische Bahn”, sent by the Austrian Embassy, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. Schlagintweit, Reise in Kleinasien, 29. Heintze, 48, 49.

248

NOTES

TO PAGES

42 –48

Chapter Two The Struggle for the Baghdad Railway Concession 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Manzenreiter, 90– 3. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 34/60. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 34/58. B.O.A., Y.PRK.AZJ, 29/102. From Radolin to Hohenlohe, 29 October 1895, G.D.D., Vol. II, Petersburg, 346. Haslip, 206, 207. From Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, G.D.D., Vol. II, 1 July 1895, London, 327, 328. From Rotenhan to Hohenlohe, G.D.D., Vol. II, 3 August 1895, p. 336. B.O.A., DH.TMI˙K.S., 1/37. Theodor Gertrud, Friedrich Naumann oder der Prophet des Profits (Berlin, 1957), 72. Helfferich, Vol. II, 250– 72. J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford, 1917), 336. The Cambridge History of the British Foreign Policy 1783– 1919, ed. A. W. Wardand and G. P. Gooch, Vol. III (London, 1923), 271. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TS¸F, 5/21. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 5 March 1898, Constantinople (secret), G.D.D., Vol. II, 468. Ahmed Emin Yalman was of the same opinion, see Turkey in the World War (New Haven, 1930), 38. Karl Kannenberg, Kleinasiens Naturschaetze (Berlin, 1897), p. xi. Lowe, 142. Ibid., 141 –6. This view was mostly expressed by historians of the Fischer school. For Fischer’s views see Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Du¨sseldorf, 1964), 15– 36. Lothar Rathmann, Strossrichtung Nahost 1914 – 1918 (Berlin, 1963), 25 – 6. Erich Lindow, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein als Botschafter in Konstantinopel 1897– 1912 (Danzig, 1934), 39. Friedrich Rosen, Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben (Berlin, 1931), 65. G. P. Gooch, D. Litt., F. B. A., Before the War, Studies in Diplomacy, Vol. 1 (New York, 1967), 190. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 20 February 1898, Pera, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. Ibid. Gooch, 190, 191. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 5 March 1898, Constantinople, G.D.D., Vol. II, 468. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 9 April 1898, G.P., Vol. XIV, Part II, 465, 466. Ibid. Armin Ko¨ssler, Aktionsfeld Osmanisches Reich (New York, 1981), 296, 299. J. A. Zahm, From Berlin to Baghdad and Babylon (New York, London, 1922), 154, 155.

NOTES

TO PAGES

49 –53

249

30. Helfferich, Vol. III, 85. 31. Siemens shared openly this feeling of his in his letter to Zander, 14 May 1900, Berlin, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 32. Klaus Polkehn, “Wilhelm II. in Konstantinopel, Der Politische Startschuss zum Bau Der Bagdadbahn”, Des Kaisers Reise in den Orient 1898, ed. Klaus Jaschinski und Julius Waldschmidt (Berlin, 2002), 70. 33. Friedrich Nauman, Asia, Eine Orientreise u¨ber Aethen Konstantinopel, Baalbek, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Kairo, Neapel (Berlin, 1913), 73. 34. Haslip, 241, 242. 35. McMeekin, 14 – 16. 36. A. S Jerussalimski, Die Aussenpolitik und Diplomatie des deutschen Imperialismus Ende 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1954), 682 and 85. 37. Jan Stefan Richter, Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms II 1898, Eine Studie zur deutschen Aussenpolitik an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1996), 89. 38. London Chamber of Commerce, Mesopotamia and Baghdad Railway, Nr. 95, London, 16 July 1917, 19. 39. McMeekin, 15; Baykal, 74; Richter, 75, 76. 40. Richter, 75, 76. 41. For a similar interpretation, Cambridge History, 271. 42. Richter, pp. 78, 79, 85. 43. In a French cartoon the Ottoman Empire had been depicted as a cow being milked by Germany, while its feet were held by Britain, Russia, France and Italy, see Haslip, 236. 44. Rathmann, Berlin-Baghdad, 50. 45. Friedrich Rosen, Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben (Berlin, 1931), 66. 46. On p. 89 of the 3rd volume of his famous biography of Siemens, Helfferich stated that all through his visit the German emperor had refrained from broaching the subject of the Baghdad Railway, because he was afraid that it might be interpreted as an attempt to put pressure on the sultan. It seems that also Baykal shared this view and that he quoted Helfferich as his source. 47. Rosen, 66; Manzenreiter, 118. 48. Manzenreiter, 118, 119. Let us also observe that in this period the British considered Russia to be their main point of discord with the Ottomans and were still rather tolerant about German activities. For a comment within this context and what The Times wrote see Gu¨nther Krebs, Die deutsche Bagdadbahnpolitik im Urteil der Entente Publizistik (Breslau, 1933), 59, 60. 49. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus. 427 / 65. For the French version of the same text see B.O.A, HR.SYS., 108/35. 50. Bernhard Fu¨rst von Bu¨low, Denkwu¨rdigkeiten, Band I (Berlin, 1930), 252, 253. Polkehn, 71, 72. When World War I began, another German writer wrote that the Ottomans, who had been diagnosed by European great powers as being sick, would recover thanks to German support and the Baghdad Railway would make up the nervous system and veins of the new healthy structure, see Freiherr von

250

51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

NOTES

TO PAGES

53 –61

Mackay, “Die Bagdadbahn im Spiegel der Weltkriegumwaelzung”, Koloniale Rundschau, Jahrgang 1915, 23. Tahsin Pas¸a, Sultan Abdu¨lhamit, Tahsin Pas¸a’nın Yıldız Hatıraları (I˙stanbul, 1990), 71. Klaus Jaschinski, “Des Kaisers Reise in den Vorderen Orient 1898, ihr historischer Platz und ihre Dimensionen”, in des Kaisers Reise, 34. Report from Stemrich to Hohenlohe, 31 October 1898, quoted by Manzenreiter, 24– 128. For a good summary of the same report and for the other disadvantages expressed by Stemrich see Immo Sievers, Der europaeische Einfluss auf die tu¨rkischen Bahnbauten bis 1914 (Bamberg, 1991), 35, 36. Sievers, 41 – 3. Rosen, 66, 67. The words were underlined by Marschall. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 3 January 1899, quoted by Manzenreiter, 130, 131. Ibid., 131 – 2. Ibid., 129 – 34. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 5 March 1898, Constantinople, G.D.D., Vol. II, 466. Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Golf, durch den Hauran, die syrische Wu¨ste und Mesopotamien, Berlin 1900, Vol. II, 254, 257, 258. Sultan Abdu¨lhamit, 94. ¨ ber die deutsche Bagdadbahn”, Die Umschau, VI. Rogalla von Bieberstein, “U Jahrgang, 1902, 287– 90. Karl Hermann Mu¨ller, Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn, Land und Leute der asiatischen Tu¨rkei (Hamburg, 1917), 80. Marschall’s report, 29 January 1899. G.P., Vol. XIV/2, 476, 473. Helfferich, Vol. III, 95. Ibid., 92. B.O.A., Y.PRK.PT, 14/35. From Marschall to MFA, 12 April 1899. G.P., Vol. XIV/2, 480 – 2. Helfferich, Vol. III, 96, 97. H. Charles Woods, “The Baghdad Railway and its Tributaries”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, July 1917, 37. Since this agreement was not applied, also the joining was not realised. In an official Ottoman document written in 1903, it was said that “absolutely no attempts should be made” to join the two lines, B.O.A, I˙.Hus 105/1321-S/4. From Marschall to MFA, 30 May 1899, G.P., Vol. XIV/2, 485. Helfferich, Vol. III, 98. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 42/55. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 42/44. For the details of the proposal see B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 6/73. B.O.A., Y.EE, 1/44.

NOTES

TO PAGES

61 – 66

251

77. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 6/73. In the same document, a similar concession request by another entrepreneur called Tonyeti, is also mentioned. 78. From Marschall to MFA, 15 August 1899, G.P., Vol. XIV/2, 490. 79. Damat Mahmut Celalettin Pasha had the title of damat (son-in-law), because he had married Seniha Sultan, daughter of Sultan Abdu¨lmecit and sister of Abdu¨lhamit. Abdu¨lhamit had appointed Mahmut Pasha Minister of Justice. See Sina Aks¸in, Jo¨n Tu¨rkler ve I˙ttihat ve Terakki (Istanbul, 1980), 37; Bernard Lewis, Modern Tu¨rkiye’nin Dog˘us¸u (Ankara, 1984), 199. For the sultan’s turbulent relation with the pasha see Georgeon, 58– 61, 88, 89, 101, 137 etc. 80. B.O.A., Y.EE, 84/42. 81. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 16/35. 82. B.O.A., Y.PRK.ES¸A, 32/82. 83. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 27 Novermber 1899, G.P., Vol. XIV/2, 494. 84. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 42/44. 85. B.O.A., Y.PRK.AZJ, 39/87. 86. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 6/60. 87. B.O.A., Y.PRK.AZJ, 32/33. 88. B.O.A., Y. PRK. TNF, 3/149. 89. B.O.A., Y. PRK. TNF, 6/33. 90. Murat O¨zyu¨ksel, “Rail and Rule, Railway Building and Railway Politics in the Ottoman Empire”, Comparing Empires, Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. J. Leonhard, U. von Hirschhausen, Go¨ttingen, 2011, 134. 91. B.O.A., Y.EE, 150/126. 92. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 7/29. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 27 November 1899, G.P., Vol. XIV/2, 495. 93. A. Geraud, “A New German Empire: The Story of the Baghdad Railway”, The Nineteenth Century, May 1914 and its continuation June 1914, 966, 967. 94. Decree of the Cabinet, B.O.A., I˙. TNF, 8/1317-B-02. 95. B.O.A., Y.MTV 196/113. 96. Decree of the Cabinet, B.O.A, Y.A.Res., 104/28. For another document abouts the sensitivity felt on these matters, B.O.A, I˙.TNF, 8/1317-C-12 and B.O.A., BEO, 106504. In another decree (1 October 1899), it was said that “having the railway built as the property of the Government, will eliminate all kinds of difficulties”, B.O.A, Y.A.Res., 103/103. 97. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 402/34. 98. Helfferich, Vol. III, 104, 105. 99. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 6/61. In 1900, Deutsche Bank tried to soften this requisite, but its proposal was rejected by Ottoman authorities. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 6/78. 100. B.O.A., Y. PRK. NMH, 8/11. 101. Lynteus, “die Weisheit des Sultan”, Die Zukunft, 29. Band (Berlin, 1899), 443. 102. Baykal, 94, 95. 103. B.O.A, Y.A.Hus., 403/45. 104. Helmut von Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwu¨rdingkeiten, Vol. II (Berlin, 1872), 279.

252

NOTES

TO PAGES

66 –70

105. Morris Jastrow, Jr., The Eastern Question and its Solution (Philadelphia and London, 1920), 33. 106. Ludwig Ross, Keinasien und Deutschland, Reiseberichte und Aufsaetze mit Bezugnahme auf die Mo¨glichkeiten Deutscher Niederlassungen’in Kleinasien (Halle, 1850), 175. 107. Aloys Sprenger, Babylonien das reichste Kolonisationsfeld fu¨r die Gegenwart (Heidelberg, 1886), 280. 108. Friedrich H. Kochwasser, “Das deutsche Reich und der Bau der Bagdadbahn” Araber und Deutsche, ed. F.H. Kochwasser, R. Roemer (Tu¨bingen und Basel, 1974), 308. 109. Alldeutscher Verband, Deutschlands Anspru¨che an das tu¨rkische Erbe (Munich, 1896), 3, 4. For one of many examples citing Anatolia as an area for German colonization see “Hedschas- und Bagdadbahn”, Alldeutsche Blaetter, No. 49 (8 December 1906), 395. 110. Hugo Grothe, Die Bagdadbahn und das schwaebische Bauernelement in Transkaukasien und Palaestine, Gedanken zur Kolonisation Mesopotamiens (Munich, 1902), 10, 11. 111. Ewald Banse, Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn (Weimar, 1913), 147 et al. 112. Karl Kaerger, Kleinasien, ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld (Berlin, 1892), 88 – 92. 113. Rudolf Wagner, “Deutschland und die neue Weltstrasse nach Ostindian”, Alldeutscher Blaetter, 30 March 1901, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152, No. 4820. 114. Max Schlagintweit, Deutsche Kolonisation in Kleinasien (Munich, 1899), 34 – 6. See also Schlagintweit, Deutsche Kolonisetionsbestrebungen, 38 et al. Similar views were later expressed by another researcher, Adolf Dirr, “Was kann uns die Bagdadbahn sein”, Su¨ddeutsche Monatshefte (January 1915), 501. 115. Helfferich, Vol. III, 76, 77. 116. Manzenreiter, 156. 117. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege (Berlin, 1917), 60. 118. Davis Trietsch,“Deutschland und der Balkankrieg”, No. 9, Die Hilfe (27 February 1913), 135. 119. Gregor Scho¨llgen, “Dann mu¨ssen wir uns aber Mesopotamien sichern”, Saeculum, Band 32, 1981, Heft 2, 132, 142, 144 et al. 120. Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, The Crisis in the German Social Democracy (New York, 1818), 41– 65. 121. Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 (Du¨sseldorf, 1969), 324. 122. B.O.A., Y.EE, 84/42. 123. Translation from L’Independance Belge dated 24 December 1899, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 16/35. In his memoirs, Vambery, who was known as being close to the sultan, wrote how Abdu¨lhamit had called him from Tirol with great urgency so that he should convince Mahmut Pasha to return. A. Vambery, “Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court” The Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXV (January– June 1909), 988.

NOTES

TO PAGES

71 –73

253

124. Manzenreiter, 159. 125. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 16/35. 126. Report of the Ottoman Embassy in Paris, 6 January 1900, B.O.A., Y.PRK. ES¸A, 34/74. 127. McMeekin, 57, 58. 128. Ibid. 129. Yuriy As¸atovic Petrosyan, Sovyet Go¨zu¨yle Jo¨ntu¨rkler (Ankara, 1974), 214. 130. E. E. Ramsaur, Jo¨n Tu¨rkler ve 1908 I˙htilaˆli (Istanbul, 1982), 77. 131. Paul K. Butterfield, The Diplomacy of the Baghdad Railway 1890–1914 (Go¨ttingen, 1932), 17. Apart from the Boer war, the British were also in trouble with Japan in the Far East, and with France in Sudan, see Gregor Scho¨llgen, “Instrument deutscher Weltmachtpolitik, Die Bagdadbahn im Zeitalter des Imperialismus”, Baghdad- und Hedjazbahn, Deutsche Eisenbahngeschichte im Vorderen Orient, ed. Ju¨rgen Franzke (Nu¨rnberg, 2003), 110. 132. From Eckardstein to Bu¨low, 22 January 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 373. See also “Railways in Asia Minor”, The Economist (24 March 1900), 414. For an article explaining why there was no reason for there being enmity between the two countries see “The Latest Manifesto of the German Emperor”, The Economist (28 April 1900), 590, 591. 133. Hermann Oncken, Die Sicherheit Indiens, Ein Jahrhundert englischer Weltpolitik (Berlin, 1937), 60. 134. From Salisbury to Frank Lascelles, 30 November 1896, Berlin, XIII. 8 (add.), G.D.D., Vol. II, 472, 473. 135. For an article, in which it was stressed that because of the need to ensure the security of India, the Persian Gulf could not absolutely be subjected to any risk, see “Persia and the Persian Gulf”, The Quarterly Review, Vol. 195 (January – April 1902), 245 et al. 136. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 26 May 1900, Konstantinopel, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 137. From Marschall to MFA, 28 December 1899, G.P., Vol. XVII, 465 and 27 December 1899, 469. 138. Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Persian Gulf, Vol. XIII (London, 1920), 52. For the full text of the agreement see G. U. Aitchison, B.G.S., A Collection of Treaties, Engegaments and Sanads, Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries (Delhi, 1933), 262– 7. 139. From Marschall to MFA, 1 January 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 469. 140. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), 188– 92. 141. From the Baghdad Consul Richarz to Hohenlohe, 19 April 1900, G. P. Vol. XVII, 473. 142. From Bu¨low to Eckardstein, 29 July 1901, G.P., Vol. XVII, 482. Franz Stuhlmann, Der Kampf um Arabien zwischen der Tu¨rkei und England (Hamburg Braunschweig Berlin, 1916), 227. 143. From Bu¨low to Metternich, 31 August 1901, G.P., Vol. XVII, 484.

254 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162.

163. 164. 165. 166.

167.

168. 169.

NOTES

TO PAGES

74 –78

For correspondence on this matter see G.P. Vol. XVII, 483– 99. Marschall’s report, 15 February 1901, G.P., Vol. XVII, 501. Baykal, 107. Alan Bodger, “Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. M. Kent (London, 1984), 85. Translation from the Times, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 16/35. Bu¨low’s note, 16 January 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 371. Marschall’s report, 26 February 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 380. Marschall’s report, 28 February 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 381. B.O.A., Y.PRK.HR, 28/54. The Russian embassy reiterated its “feelings of friendship”, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 405/37. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 4 April 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 383, 384. B.O.A., Y.PRK.HR, 28/54. From Mu¨hlberg to Eckardstein, 31 January 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 374, 375. See also C. Mu¨hlmann, “Die deutschen Bahnunternehmungen in der asiatischen Tu¨rkei 1888 – 1914,” Weltwirtschaftlieches Archiv, Vol. 24 (Jena, 1926), 373. From Ottoman Embassy in Berlin, B.O.A., Y. PRK. HR, 28/54. “Russian Exactions From Turkey”, Daily News (18 April 1900), 8. Baykal, 114. B.O.A., Y.PRK.HR, 28/54. From New York Herald dated 23 March 1900, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 43/32. Marschall’s report, 4 April 1900, Vol. XVII, 383. The request in 1900 for a binding declaration by the German Embassy, shows that the company was still not considering itself perfectly safe in this matter, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 6/74. Ibid., 6/61. B.O.A., Y.PRK.ASK, 163/69. Hayri Mutluc ag˘, “Bog˘azic i Ko¨pru¨su¨nu¨n Yapılması Yolunda I˙lk C¸abalar”, Belgelerle Tu¨rk Tarihi Dergisi, No. 4 (January, 1968), 32 – 8. Sigmund Schneider, Die deutsche Bagdadbahn und die projectierte U¨berbru¨cku¨ng des Bosporus in ihrer Bedeutung fu¨r Weltwirtschaft und Weltverkehr (Vienna, Leipzig, 1900), 9. Pressel on the other hand, proposed a tunnel under the Bosphorus connecting Asia with Europe, Zahm, 166. On the same subject see Werner So¨lch, Expresszu¨ge im Vorderen Orient, Ein Jahrhundert Eisenbahnen unter dem Halbmond, Du¨sseldorf, 1989, 30. Apart from these, in 1902 the sultan had three American engineers called E. Strom, T. Lindman and A. Hilliker draw a project for a tunnel under the sea connecting Yenikapı to Harem, O¨mer Faruk Yılmaz, Bog˘azici’ne Tu¨p Gecit (Istanbul, 2010), 9. Marschall’s telegraph, 8 October 1900, G.P., Vol. XVII, 391, 392. For the negtiation process, Murat O¨zyu¨ksel, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘u’nda Nu¨fuz Mu¨cadelesi, Anadolu ve Bag˘dat Demiryolları (I˙stanbul, 2013), 164, 165. O¨zyu¨ksel, Osmanlı, 165–8. Imbert, 42, 43.

NOTES 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190.

191.

TO PAGES

78 – 86

255

Helfferich, Vol. III, 126. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 403/6. Consultant Rosen’s note, 4 June 1901, G. P., Vol. XVII, 399. Baykal, 140. Ibid., 143, 144. John Baptist Wolf, The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad (1933), 37, 38. Marschall’s report, Pera, 31 January 1902, G. P., Band 17, 416, 417. From Wangenheim to Bu¨low, 18 January 1901, PA/AA, Tarabya, Tu¨rkei 152. Helfferich, Vol. III, 132. From Marschall to Bu¨low, 2 February 1902, G. P., Band XVII, 424. Abdurrahman Pas¸a’s report, B.O.A., Y.EE, 10/7. B.O.A., Y.PRKTNF, 7/20. See also B.O.A., YMTV, 232/79; B.O.A.,Y.A.Hus., 432/50. B.O.A., A.DVN.MKL, 43/7. Translation of telegraph from the Emperor to the Sultan, B.O.A., Y.EE, 62/15. B.O.A., I˙.Hus, vesika no: 27. Neue Freie Presse, 3 September 1908. Hugo Grothe, Meine Studienreise durch Vorderasien (1906 and 1907), Halle 1908, 38. “Die neu Mekka Bahn”, Die katholischen Missionen (1906/1907), No. 10, 219. Grand Vizier Ferid Pas¸a’s report, B.O.A., Y.A.Res., 129/3; From Oppenheim to Bu¨low, 18 April 1905, Cairo, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. From Bu¨low to Wilhelm, 28 September 1901, G.P., Vol. XVII, 405 – 407. Ranzi’s report, 4 June 1913, Damascus, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/33. Murat O¨zyu¨ksel, Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire, Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline (London/New York, 2014), 116, 117, 122, 123 et al. From Hardegg to Hollweg, 16 July 1914, Haifa, PA/AA., Tu¨rkei 152.

Chapter Three

From Concession to Constitution (1903– 8)

1. Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, The Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway, A Study in Imperialism (New York, 1923), 69, 70. 2. Wangenheim’s report, Pera, 13 April 1903, G.P., Vol. XVII, 439, 440. 3. Baghdad Railway, Convention of March 5, 1903, Statutes of Imperial Baghdad Railway Company, published by His Majesty’s Stationery Office (London, May 1911), 48, 49. 4. Bag˘dat Demiryolu Mukavelenamesi (Convention of the Baghdad Railway), B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 7/44 or Y.EE, 1/24. Baghdad Railway, Convention of March 5, 1903, 37, 45, 46. 5. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TKM, 41/13. 6. Max Wiedemann, Baghdad und Teheran (Berlin, 1911), 39.

256

NOTES

TO PAGES

87 –90

7. Bag˘dat Demiryolu Mukavelenamesi, B.O.A; Baghdad Railway, Convention, 37, 38, 40; Earle, Turkey, 71– 5. 8. From Wangenheim to Hollweg, 2 June 1913, Tarabya, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 9. Bag˘dat Demiryolu Mukavelenamesi, B.O.A; Baghdad Railway, Convention, 37, 38, 40. 10. Tevfik Nadir, Tehlikenin Bu¨yu¨g˘u¨, Uyanalım (Istanbul, 1324), 14. 11. B.O.A., I˙rade Maarif, Vesika No. 4. 12. B.O.A., DH.MUI˙, 98–1/39. 13. B.O.A., DH.I˙D, 129– 2/1. 14. Bag˘dat Demiryolu Mukavelenamesi, B.O.A: Baghdad Railway, Convention, 38, 39; Mohr, 45, 47. 15. The German companies wishing to carry out shipping on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers were, Deutsche Levante Linie and Norddeutscher Lloyd. See Lothar Rathmann, “Zur Legende vom antikolonialen Charakter der Bagdadbahnpolitik in der wilhelmischen Aera des deutschen Monopolkapitalismus”, Zeitschrift fu¨r Geschishtswissenschaft, Sonderheft IX (1961), 249. 16. Bag˘dat Demiryolu Mukavelenamesi, B.O.A; Baghdad Railway, Convention, 42. 17. Ibid., 42, 43, 44, 47. 18. For example, B.O.A, Y.MRZ.d, -1/11005. 19. B.O.A., BEO, 106504. 20. “The Baghdad Railway”, The Times (14 March 1903), 7. 21. Arthur von Gwinner, “The Baghdad Railway and the Question of English Cooperation” The Nineteenth Century and After, No 388 (June 1909), 1093. 22. B.O.A., Y.EE, 1/19. 23. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 7/19. 24. For Oppenheim see p. 125 25. From Oppenheim to Bu¨low, 29 April 1903, Cairo, PA/AA (Tu¨rkei, 152), 15, 16. 26. Oppenheim’s report, 29. And Mygind ended his book with a wish for the continuation of the efforts to settle immigrants in the area. According to him, all these railway construction activities would have favourable results only in case new settlements were established. See Eduard Mygind, Syrien und die tu¨rkische Mekkapilgerbahn (Halle, 1906), 76. 27. F. Frech, “Die Bagdadbahn und ihre Kulturbedeutung”, Die Naturwissenschaften, No. 2, 10 January 1913, p. 32. For another example of the view that Muslims fleeing from the Balkans would solve this problem see Hjalmar Schacht, “Neutu¨rkische Wirtschaftspolitik”, Die Hilfe, Nr. 42 (16 October 1913), 661. On the necessity for solving the population problem also in Mesopotamia see F. Lampe, “Kanal- und Eisenbahnbauten in O¨sterreich. Neues von der Bagdadbahn”, Die Umschau, VI. Jahrgang (1902), 475. 28. It seems that between 80 and 200 Circassian families had been settled in Syria and that 10 hectares of land had been given to each family, see Eugen Wirth,

NOTES

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

TO PAGES

90 – 97

257

“Die Rolle tscherkessischer Wehrbauern bei der Wiederbesiedlung von Steppe und O¨dland im Osmanischen Reich”, Bustan, Heft 1 (1963), p. 18. I˙lber Ortaylı, “19, Yu¨zyıl Sonunda”, 97. Willy Reibel, Die Gru¨ndung auslaendischer Eisenbahnunternehmungen durch deutsche Banken (Du¨sseldorf, 1934), 66, 67. Hans Meyer Heinrich, Philipp Holzmann Aktiengesellschaft im Wandel von Hundert Jahren (Frankfurt, 1949), 251. B.O.A., Y.A.Res., 127/23. B.O.A., Y.EE, 1/31. B.O.A., Y.EE, 1/30. B.O.A., Y.EE, 1/32. B.O.A., Y. EE, 1/34. B.O.A., BEO, 208527 and B.O.A., Y.EE, 1/26. B.O.A., Y.PRK.EV, 4/34. B.O.A., Y.PRK.NMH, 9/56. Reinhard Hu¨ber, Die Bagdadbahn (Berlin, 1943), 45. Anton Mohr, Der Kampf um Tu¨rkisch Asien. Die Bagdadbahn (Meissen, undated), 51. Report of Viceconsul Rosen, 11 February 1904, Haifa, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. F. Frech, “Die Taeler des Taurus and die Linie der Bagdadbahn”, Die Naturwissenschaften, Nr. 8 (1913), 62. E. Hoffmeister, “Die Bagdadbahn”, Deutsche Rundschau, No. 6 (1909), 323. Eisenbahn and Komminikationsbauten, dann Kulturarbeiten in der Tu¨rkei mit Abschluss des Jahres 1909, HHStA,Admin. Reg., F 19/32. B.O.A., Y.MTV, 297/126. From Landsdowne to Cassel, 4 February 1903, B.D., Vol. 2 (No. 206), 179, 180. Maybelle Kennedy Chapman, Great Britain and the Baghdad Railway 1888– 1914 (Northampton, Massachusetts, 1948), 50. Eaerle, 199, 200. P.D.H.C., fourth series, Vol. 120, 1247, 1248. P.D.H.C., fourth series, Vol. 120, 1365– 75. For both articles see The Times (9 April 1903), 7. “Railway Enterprise in Asiatic Turkey”, The Times (9 April 1903), 6. “The Baghdad Railway, German Press Opinion”, The Times (10 April 1903), 3. “Germany and the New Grouping of the Powers”, The Times (11 April 1903), 3. “British Trade with Turkey”, The Times (11 April 1903), 4. “The Baghdad Railway”, The Times (11 April 1903), 3. Ibid., 5. For an article claiming that the rates of participation in capital were actually a way of guaranteeing German control through a “Trojan horse” method, see Calchas, “The Latin Rapprochment and the Baghdad Imbroglio”, Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXXIII New Series (January – June 1903), 821, 826, and others. “Question asked in the House of Commons”, 23 April 1903, B.D., Vol. 2, No. 219, 190. P.D.H.C., Vol. 121, 1903, 222. Gibson Bowles, “The Baghdad Railway”, The Times (14 April 1903), 4.

258 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73.

74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79.

80.

NOTES

TO PAGES

97 –100

“The Baghdad Railway, A Russian Press View”, The Times (14 April 1903), 3. The Times (editorial) (18 April 1903), 11. B.O.A., HR.SYS., 108/36. “The Baghdad Railway”, The Times (18 April 1903), 13. H. F. B. Lynch, “To the Editor of the Times”, The Times (18 April 1903), 13. Indian Mail, “To the Editor of the Times”, The Times (18 April 1903), 13. Asiaticus, “To the Editor of the Times”, The Times (18 April 1903), 13. Cheradame’s views, which were often quoted by opponents of the Baghdad Railway, will be taken up in the last chapter. The main source for the writer’s views, Andre Cheradame, Le Chemin de Fer de Baghdad (Paris, 1915) and The Pangerman Plot Unmasked (New York, 1918). Gibson Bowles, “The Baghdad Railway”, The Times (20 April 1903), 7. “The Baghdad Railway”, The Times (22 April 1903), 7. Tevfik Pasha had sent the clipping of this article to MFA. B.O.A., Hr.SYS., 108/37. The Times (editorial) (22 April 1903), 9. The translation sent by Ottoman embassy in London, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 448 / 3. “The Baghdad Railway”, The Times (22 April 1903), 5. The Times (22 April 1903), 7. Sutherland’s letter, The Times (22 April 1903), 7. B.O.A., Hr.SYS., 108/38. An interesting article analysed the roots of the antiGerman wave in Britain. The writer claimed that this was a reaction to the anti-Anglo-Saxon movement in Germany. According to the writer, the origins of the Germans’ feelings of enmity towards Britain lay in the fact that at the time when Germany began its quest for colonies, the areas most suitable for colonization were in British hands. See O. Eltzbacher, “German Colonial Ambitions and Anglo-Saxon Interests”, Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXXIII New Series (January – June 1903), 469, 470 et al. For another article in the same volume, where the writer states his agreement with Eltzbacher’s views, see Vates, “The Policy of the German Emperor”, 581– 97. “The Baghdad Railway”, The Economist (18 April 1903), 683, 684. For another article in the same publication “The Lessons of Baghdad”, The Economist (25 April 1903), 729, 730. “Baghdad and India”, The Saturday Review, 18 April 1903. “British Interests on the Persian Gulf”, The Saturday Review, 18 April 1903. Alan Edward Schorr, “Britain, Germany, and the Baghdad Railway, with Special Reference to the Crisis of April 1903”, Hunter College of the City University of New York, 1966, unpublished Master’s Thesis, 50–2, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62. Earle, Turkey, 187, 188. The Daily Telegraph, 6 May 1903, B.O.A., Hr.SYS., 109/21. “Memorandum by the Marquess of Landsdowne, The Baghdad Railway”, F.O., 14 January 1903, B.D., Vol. 2, No. 216, 187, 188. For a severe critique of these views of Landsdowne see Lord Newton P. C., Lord Landsdowne, A Biography (London, 1929), 250– 3. Revelstoke’s Memorandum, 21 April 1903, B.D., Vol. 2, No. 218, 189, 190.

NOTES

TO PAGES

101 –105

259

81. In his letter dated 22 May, Viscount Esher wrote that the king had said that he thought the government to be weak and that it had taken the wrong decision concerning the Baghdad Railway. See Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, ed. Maurice V. Brett, Vol. 1 (London, 1934), 410, 397, 396. 82. Richard M. Francis, “British Withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway Project in April 1903”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1973, 172. 83. Lord Newton, 251. 84. Lord Curzon in India, 316. Curzon had since 1899 been warning the British government for not being sufficiently sensitive on this issue. See Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon (London, 1928), 305– 19. 85. From Ottoman embassy in London, 24 April 1903, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 448 / 3. “In the House of Commons, Yesterday”, The Times, 24 April 1903, 9. 86. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 108/39, The Times, 24 April 1903; B.O.A., HR.SYS., 109/21, The Times, 6 May 1903. 87. From Benstorff to Bu¨low, London, 24 April 1903, G.P., Band XVII, Nr. 5261, 440. 88. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 448/3. 89. “The Baghdad Railway, British Support Refused”, The Times, 24 April 1903, 5. 90. Gwinner, 1089, for the entire article see 1083– 94. 91. Gwinner, 1089 –91. 92. For Dawkins’s letter see from Clinton E. Dawkins to Arthur Gwinner, London, 23 April 1903, G.P., Band 17, Nr. 5262 (Addendum), 442, 443. 93. Novoye Vremya, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 108/40 and 108/42. 94. Schorr, 71 – 5. For an anti-German book by Dillon, see Ourselves and Germany (London, 1916). For an example of his articles in the Contemporary Review see “The Unforeseen Happens As Usual” (September 1908), 364– 84; “Fidis Germanica” (October 1908), 490– 512; “The Near Eastern Crisis” (October 1908), 513– 32. 95. “The Story of the Euphrates Company”, in The Near East and India, XLI (1935), Issawi, The Economist, 147. 96. “Eisenbahn and Komminikationsbauten”, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. 97. From Marschall to Hohenlohe, 26 May 1900, Konstantinopel, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 98. Mohr, 45, 46; Earle, Turkey, 190– 2. 99. From Richthofen to Marschall, Berlin, 24 October 1905, G.P, 25/1, 199. 100. H. F. B. Lynch, “The Baghdad Railway”, Fortnightly Review, No. 531, 1 March 1911, 381, 383. 101. Ibid., “The Baghdad Railway: The New Conventions”, Fortnightly Review, No. 533, 1 May 1911, 771–80. 102. Boyd Cable, A Hundred Year History of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 1837– 1937 (London, 1937), 46 – 52. 103. Hallgarten, Band II, 47. 104. Ibbeken, 255.

260

NOTES

TO PAGES

106 –111

105. L. Bruce Fulton, “France and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, The Great Powers, 141. 106. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 427/65. For the version in French of the same text see B.O.A, HR.SYS., 108/35. 107. Translation Faure’s article from La Libre Parol, B.O.A., Y.A.Hus. 427/65. And also, B.O.A, HR.SYS, 108/35. 108. B.O.A., Y.A.Hus., 427/65; B.O.A, HR.SYS, 108/35. 109. From the embassy in Paris, B.O.A., HR.SYS., 108/44. 110. Earle, 159– 62. 111. Kampen, 467, 468. 112. Angus Hamilton, Problems of the Middle East (London, 1909), 173– 5. 113. From Metternich to the Foreign Office, London, 12 April 1903, G.P., Band 17, 439. 114. “Eisenbahn and Komminikationsbauten”, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. 115. From the Consul in Beirut to Aehrenthal, 3 March 1910, Beirut, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/18. 116. Edwin Pears, Life of Abdul Hamid (New York, 1917), 158. 117. Editorial Note, B.D., Vol. 6, 325. 118. Memorandum of The Board of Trade, 23 June 1905, B.D., Vol. 6 (no. 211), 328. 119. Ross J. S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry 1875– 1914 (Philadelphia, 1933), 74. Also see, Suzanne Y. Frederick, “The Anglo-German Rivalry, 1890– 1914”, Great Power Rivalries, ed. W. R. Thompson (Columbia, 1999), 306– 36. 120. Evans Lewin, The German Road to the East (New York, 1917), 53. In another article, the Krupp company was mentioned as one of the powers supporting this process, see “The English Offer and the German Answer”, The Economist (8 April 1911), 732. For another article analysing the powers supporting the strengthening of the German fleet see “New Forces in German Politics”, The Economist (9 June 1900), 809. 121. Pauline Relyea Anderson, The Background of anti-English Feeling in Germany 1890 – 1902 (Washington, 1939), 9. For an article describing the uncompromising attitude of Germany on this matter, Aeneas O’ Neill, “Six German Opinions on the Naval Situation”, The Nineteenth Century and After, No. CCCLXXXVII (May 1909), 725– 43. For another article showing British worries about the balance of power amongst navies see Archibald S. Hurd, “The Balance of Naval Power and The Triple Alliance”, The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. LXV (January – June 1909), 1068– 82. On the same subject, “Our Endangered Sea Supremacy”, The Quarterly Review, No. 417 (October 1908), 476– 503. On the subject of the legitimacy and necessity of the Germans’ wish to strengthen their navy see, Kurt Simon, “Deutschlands Heer und Flotte unter Kaiser Wilhelm II” Die Hilfe, Nr. 26 and 27 (26 June 1913) and (3 July 1913), 420 et al. 122. Ernst Jaeckh, “Deutschland 5: England 8”, Die Hilfe, Nr. 8 (20 February 1913), 117, 118.

NOTES

TO PAGES

111 –144

261

123. G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London, 1971), 192. Clayton attributed more importance to military/strategic factors. For elements of this process that led the British to change their policies see Calchas, “Will Germany Fail?”, Vol. LXIX New Series (January–June 1901), 576–89 et al. 124. A. L. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire (London/New York, 1988), 116. For the full text of this treaty see Bernhard Schwertfeger, Dokumentarium zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, 1871– 1914 (Berlin, 1928), 337– 43. 125. From Marschall to Bu¨low, Pera, 6 April 1905, G.P., Band. 25/1, 178, 179 and from Marschall to MFA, Neuerhausen, 28 July 1905, Band. 25/1, 188. 126. From Bodman to Bu¨low, Tarabya, 9 August 1905, G.P., Band. 25/1, 190. 127. From Mu¨hlberg to Bodman, Berlin, 15 July 1905, G.P., Band. 25/1, 182, 183. 128. Sanderson’s memorandum, 3 October 1905, B.D.,Vol. 6, No. 219, 335. 129. B.O.A., HR.SYS 108/46, 108/48, 108/45, 108/52, 108/55. According to a different view, the last thing that Britain should do was to obstruct the construction of a railway in another country, H. J. Whigham, The Persian Problem, An Examination of the Rival Positions of Russia and Great Britain in Persia with some Account of the Persian Gulf and the Baghdad Railway (London, 1903), 245, 246. 130. Rothstein, 529; Ibbeken 255; Nadir, 31 – 6. 131. Wolf, 51. 132. Viscount Grey of Falladon, Vol. 1, Twenty-Five Years (1892 – 1916) (New York, 1925), 32, 100. 133. From Grey to Bertie, 6 April 1906, B. D, Vol. 6 (no. 222), 336, 337. 134. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon had reacted favourably to Grey’s approach, see from Grey to Bertie, 29 December 1906, B.D., Vol. 6 (no. 243), 351. For another example see from Spring-Rice to Grey, Petersburg, 24 May 1906, B.D., Vol. 4 (no. 218), 234. 135. From O’Connor to Grey, Pera, 6 December 1907, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18 (Doc. 34), 25. 136. From Braham, correspondent of The Times in Istanbul, to the Foreign Office, De Keyser’s Hotel, 19 December 1907, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18 (Doc. 35), 26. 137. From Grey to Nicolson, 15 June 1906, B.D., Vol. 6 (no. 229), 343. 138. From Nicolson to Grey, Petersburg, 7 November 1906, B.D., Vol. 6 (no. 237), 347. 139. “Memorandum communicated to Cambon and Benckendorff”, B. D, Vol. 6 (no. 250), 355, 356. 140. From Nicolson to Grey, 18 June 1907, B. D, Vol. 6 (no. 251), 357. 141. D. W. Sweet, “Great Britain and Germany, 1905– 1911, British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne, 1977), 220. 142. From Grey to Bertie, 31 July 1907, B. D., Vol. 6 (no. 252), 357, 358. 143. “Annual Report for France for the Year 1907”, 15 April 1908, B.D., Vol. 6 (no. 258), 361, 362. 144. John, Viscount Morley, Recollections, Vol. II (New York, 1917), 237.

262

NOTES

TO PAGES

116 –121

145. Grey’s memorandum, 13 November 1907, B.D.F.A (doc. 25), 18 – 20. For the same document see B.D. (no. 60), 92 – 4. 146. Haldane wrote that at 7.30 in the morning an attendant of the kaiser had brought him the emperor’s message. Viscount Haldane Before the War (New York and London, 1920), 63, 64. 147. Note of a Private Conversation between Grey and Haldane, 14, 14 November 1907, B.D.F.A, Vol. 18 (doc. 28), 22. 148. Richard Burton Haldane, An Autobiography (New York, 1929), 235. 149. “Memorandum dictated by Haldane”, B.D.F.A (doc. 27), 20 –2. For the same document see B.D. (no. 63), 96, 97. 150. From Grey to Nicolson, 19 November 1907, B.D.F.A (Doc. 30), 23. For the same document see B.D. (no. 68), 101. See also Grey’s memorandum, 15 November 1907, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18 (doc. 26), 20. Chambon had asked Grey about the details of the matter, see from Grey to Bertie, 26 November 1907, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18 (doc. 29), 24. 151. Haldane, Before the War, 65, 66. 152. From Grey to Count Salis, 26 November 1907, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18 (doc. 33), 24. 153. Freiherr von Schoen, The Memoirs of an Ambassador (London, 1922), 62, 63. 154. “Memorandum respecting the Baghdad Railway”, 3 July 1908, B.D., Vol. 6 (no. 266), 367, 368 and from Grey to Salis, 13 July 1908 (no. 267), 368, 369. 155. Ibid., 3 July 1908, B.D., Vol. 6 (no. 266), 368. 156. From Grey to Bertie, 16 November 1907, B.D., Vol. VI (no. 65), 99; from Grey to Nicolson, 19 November 1907 (no. 68), 101; from Grey to Bertie, 20 November 1907 (no. 69), 102. 157. From Grey to Nicolson, 21 December 1907, B.D., Vol. VI (no. 71), 105. For the letter of thanks on this matter of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Grey, see 6/19th December 1907, G.B.D.S, Band I (no. 2), 9, 10. 158. Schoen, 63. 159. From Undersecretary Tschirschky to Gwinner, Berlin, 12 July 1906, G.P., Band 25/1, 221, 222 and from Tschirschky to Bodman, Berlin, 15 July 1906, 222, 223. 160. Bu¨low to Schoen, Berlin, 19 May 1906, G.P., Band 25/1,11, 12. 161. From Schoen to MFA, Petersburg, 20 May 1906, G.P., Band 25/1, 13. 162. Ibid., 22 May 1906, G.P., Band 25/1,13, 14. See also from Grey to Nicolson, 23 May 1906, B.D., Vol. 4 (No. 216), 231, 232. 163. Memorandum by Mu¨hlberg, Berlin, 29 October 1906, G.P., Vol. 25/1, 231–4. 164. From Ambassador Pourtales to Bu¨low, Petersburg, 21 December 1907, G.P., 25/1, 147, 148. 165. Chapman does not believe that this was true, because when it became clear in Windsor that there had been meetings between the Germans and the Russians, Grey had not been surprised at all, Chapman, 84, footnote: 31. 166. Cabinet minutes, 1 February 1907, G.B.D.S, Band. I (Nr. 1), 5, 6. 167. Ibid., 1 – 9. 168. From Schoen to Bu¨low, Petersburg, 20 February 1907, G.P., Vol 25/1, 122, 123.

NOTES

TO PAGES

121 –125

263

169. From Tschirschky to Marschall, Berlin, 26 February 1907, G.P., Vol 25/1, 124, 125. 170. From Marschall to Bu¨low, Pera, 17 March 1907, G.P., Vol 25/1, 125– 9. 171. From Schoen to Bu¨low, Petersburg, 3 July 1907, G.P., Vol 25/1, 137– 40. 172. From Pourtales to Bu¨low, Petersburg, 21 December 1907, G.P., 25/1,149. 173. From Isvolski to the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, 13/26 December 1909, G.B.D.S., Band I, 175, 176. 174. Bode, 21, 22. The atmosphere present in those days, whereby the “German threat” was being exaggerated in Britain, played an important role in the acceptance of Russia’s efforts for a rapprochement. See “The German Peril”, The Quartarly Review, No. 416 (July 1908), 264– 98 and “The German Peril: A Rejoinder to Prince Bu¨low”, The Quartarly Review, No. 417 (October 1908), 576– 98. 175. Arthur P. Maloney, The Berlin –Baghdad Railway as a Cause of World War I (New York University, 1959), 2. 176. Earle, 97, 98. 177. Karl Helfferich, “Tagebuchaufzeichnungen waehrend seines Tu¨rkei Aufenthaltes in den Jahren 1906–1908”, Beitraege zu Wirtschafts und Waehrungsfragen und zur Bankgeschichte, Nr. 19 (1982), Helferich’s diary on 29 July 1906, 18. 178. “German Methods in Turkey”, The Quarterly Review, No. 453 (October 1917), 299. 179. Helfferich, “Tagebuchaufzeichnungen”, his diary on 24 May 1906, 15. 180. “Die Bewaesserung der Ebene von Konia”, Korrespondenzblatt der Nachrichtenstelle fu¨r den Orient, Sonderbeilage zu Nu. 4 des III. Jahrganges, 1916, 153. 181. Report of the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, B.O.A., I˙.DUI˙T, 84/53. O¨mer Faruk Yılmaz, Osmanlı’nın Konya Ovası Sulama Projesi (Istanbul, 2010), 7 – 12. 182. F. Frech, Die Laender der Bagdadbahn (Berlin, undated), 3. 183. Scho¨llgen, “Dan mu¨ssen”, 137. 184. Project on the irrigation of the Konya Plain, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 3/85. 185. Reibel, 48. B.O.A, MV, 174/48. 186. Rathmann, Berlin-Baghdad, 86. 187. O¨nsoy, 55, 56. 188. “Eisenbahn and Komminikationsbauten”, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. 189. Paul Rohrbach, Hatt-ı Saltanat Bag˘dat Demiryolu (I˙stanbul, 1333), 90. 190. S¸evket Pamuk, “Osmanlı Tarımında U¨retim I˙lis¸kileri 1840– 1913”, Toplum ve Bilim, Issue 17 (Spring 1982), 43. 191. Paul Uhlig, Deutsche Arbert in Kleinasien von 1888 bis 1918 (Grafswald, 1925), 140– 8. 192. B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 9/17. 193. Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey 1800– 1914 (Chicago and London, 1980), 193, 194. 194. From Grey to Barclay, 4 April 1908, B.D., Vol. 6, No. 256 and from Barclay to Grey, Pera, 7 April 1908, No. 257, 360.

264

NOTES

TO PAGES

125 –129

195. From Barclay to Grey, Pera, 19 May 1908, B.D., Vol. 6, No. 259, 363. 196. Peter Heigl, “Deutsche Bahnbauingenieure bei den Bauarbeiten der Hedjaz- und Bagdadbahn”, Bagdad und Hedjazbahn, Deutsche Eisenbahngeschichte im Vorderen Orient, ed. Ju¨rgen Franzke (Nu¨rnberg, 2003), 116. 197. Ulrich Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in The Great Powers (London, 1984), 121. 198. From Oppenheim to Bu¨low, 12 January 1907, “Kapitulationen in Egypten”, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 199. Oppenheim’s above-mentioned report, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 200. Oppenheim’s report, 22 June 1907, “Die Folgen einer eventuellen U¨bergabe des su¨dlichsten Teiles der Bagdadbahn an England”, Berlin, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152.

Chapter Four

The Second Constitutional Period

1. The Annual Report for Turkey for 1907, “The Hamidian Diplomacy (1907)”, B.D., Vol. V, 43. 2. From Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, 12 August 1908, B.D., Vol. V, 247. 3. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892– 1916, V. 1 (New York, 1925), 128, 129. 4. T. P. Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy from a Back Bench 1904– 1918 (London, 1932), 14. 5. Telford Waugh, Turkey Yesterday, Today an Tomorrow (London, 1930), 110. 6. “Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908”, B.D., V. 5, 251. 7. Allan Cunningham, “The Wrong Horse? Anglo-Ottoman Relations before the First World War”, Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century, Collected Essays, Vol. 2, ed. Edward Ingram (London, 1993), 238. 8. “The New Era in Turkey”, The Times, 31 July 1908, 13. This article was also a confession that they had not been able to notice the early signs of this unexpected revolution. 9. Cunningham, 238. For another article about the favourable atmosphere created at the international level by the Constitution, A. Vambery, “The Future of Constitutional Turkey”, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXV (January – June 1909), 361–74. 10. Mahmud Muhtar, Maziye Bir Nazar (Istanbul, 1999), 103. 11. Philip P. Graves, Briton and Turk (London and Melbourne, undated), 104. 12. The Times, 31 July 1908, 13. 13. “Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908”, B.D., V. 5, 253. 14. From Grey to Lowther, 31 July 1908, B.D., V. 5 (no. 204), 263. 15. Joseph Heller, British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire 1908– 1914 (London, 1983), 10. 16. Harold Temperley, “British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830– 1914)”, Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1933, 191. 17. “Eisenbahn and Komminikationsbauten”, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32.

NOTES

TO PAGES

129 –135

265

18. “Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908”, 256, 253. 19. From Fitzmaurice to Tyrell, 25 August 1908, B.D., Vol. V (no. 210), 269. 20. Marian Kent, “Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, 1905– 1914”, British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. F. H. Hinsley, Cambridge (London, New York, Melbourne, 1977), 150. 21. “Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908”, 272. 22. The Baghdad Railway was being constantly questioned in Parliament also before the declaration of the constitutional monarchy. For example see B.O.A., HR.SYS, 108/57. 23. Stuart A. Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903– 1914 (London, 1976), 98. 24. David Fraser, The Short Cut to India, The Record of a Journey along the Route of the Baghdad Railway (Edinburgh and London, 1909), 318– 28. 25. Report by the Ambassador in London Metternich, 14 August 1908, G.P., Vol. 25/2, 600– 8. 26. From Helfferich to Gwinner, 30 November 1908 (added to Schoen’s report), G.P., 27/2, 560– 6. 27. Aforementioned report, 560–2. For an abridged English translation, from Helfferich, XXVII. 560, G.D.D., Vol. III, 364, 365. 28. Same report, 562, 563. 29. F. R. Bridge, “The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire 1900– 18”, in The Great Powers, 38. 30. Memorandum by Stumm, 2 December 1908, London, XXVII. 566, G.D.D., 365, 366. 31. From Helfferich to Gwinner, 30 November 1908 (added to Schoen’s report), G.P., 27/2, 564, 565. For abridged translations in English see Memorandum by Schoen, 8 December 1908, XXVII. 559, G.D.D., Vol. III, 363, 364. ¨ kc u¨n, “Osmanlı Meclis-i Meb’usanında Bag˘dat Demiryolu I˙mtiyazı 32. Gu¨ndu¨z O ¨ .S.B.F. Dergisi, XXV, 2 (June 1970), 22, 23. U¨zerine Yapılan Tartıs¸malar”, A.U 33. Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol. 2, Ankara 1982, 73. 34. Zabıt Ceridesi, 76 35. O¨kc u¨n, 36. 36. Zabıt Ceridesi, 62. 37. For I˙smail Hakkı Bey’s criticism regarding this matter see Zabıt Ceridesi, 61. See also Hamilton, 162. 38. Zabıt Ceridesi, 63. 39. O¨kc u¨n, 46, 47. 40. Ibid., 51 – 6. 41. K. Pastırmacıyan, Anadolu-i S¸arki S¸imendu¨fer Meselesi (Dersaadet, 1328), 2. 42. Pastırmacıyan, 3. 43. For different examples see B.O.A., DH.MKT, 1215/45. B.O.A., Z.B., 325/125. B.O.A., Z.B., 325/125. B.O.A., Z.B., 326/117. “Bir Demiryolu Grevi”, Tarih ve Toplum, Issue 5 (May 1984), 32. 44. Gavriel Arhangelos, Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu ve Bag˘dat Demiryolu S¸irket-i Osmaniyesi I˙daresinin I˙yu c ¨ zu¨ (Istanbul, 1327), 165.

266

NOTES

TO PAGES

135 –140

45. Ibid., 166. 46. Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881– 1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration (New York and London, 1983), 76. 47. S¸ehmus Gu¨zel, “Anadolu-Bag˘dat Demiryolu Grevi”, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Tu¨rkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. III (1985), 828. 48. Arhangelos, 236, 237, 239. 49. B.O.A., DH.MKT, 1215/45. 50. Quataert, 82, 83. 51. Ibid., 84, 85. 52. Oya Sencer, Tu¨rkiye’de I˙s¸i c Sınıfı (Istanbul, 1969), 180. For the complete list of union requests see Zafer Toprak, “I˙lan-ı Hu¨rriyet ve Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu Memurin ve Mu¨stahdemini Cemiyet-i Uhuvvetkaranesi”, Tarih ve Toplum, issue 57 (September, 1988), 48, 49. For a summary of the requests see “Anadolu S¸imendifer Mu¨stahdeminin Terk-i Es¸gali”, I˙kdam (15 September 1908), 2. 53. Quataert, 87. 54. B.O.A., ZB. 621/59. For similar examples, B.O.A., ZB. 622/9; B.O.A., BEO, 254550. 55. “Anadolu Demiryolu Terk-i Es¸gali”, I˙kdam, 1 September 1908. 56. “Anadolu S¸imendifer Mu¨stahdeminin Terk-i Es¸gali”, I˙kdam (15 September 1908), 2. 57. “Anadolu S¸imendiferleri ve Terk-i Es¸gal”, I˙kdam (17 September 1908), 2. 58. “Anadolu S¸imendiferi”, Tanin (2 September 1908), 3. For this and other excuses like foreign workers being more productive, and thus requiring better nourishment see Toprak, 47, 48. 59. Toprak, 45; Quataert, 88 – 91. 60. Gu¨zel, 830. Toprak, 50. B.O.A., ZB, 622/8 and 622/9. 61. B.O.A., BEO, 164012. 62. “Anadolu S¸imendiferi”, Tanin, 2 September 1908, 3. For two examples of a similar approach see “Anadolu Demiryolu Terk-i Es¸gali”, I˙kdam, 1 September 1908. “Anadolu Demiryolu”, Sabah, 5 September 1908. 63. I˙kdam, 2 September 1908. 64. Quataert, 92, 93. Toprak, 48. 65. J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith (London, 1932), 244. 66. From Grey to Lowther, 5 October 1908, B.D., V. 5 (no. 296), 388. 67. From Grey to Nicolson, 5 October 1908, B.D., V. 5 (no. 301), 390. 68. Bericht des russischen Aussenministers an den Zaren u¨ber seine Reise nach England, Frankreich und Deutschland, St Petersburg, October 1912, No. 508, D.S.I., Vol. II, 298. 69. Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople (New York, 1971), 300. For a similar comment see Noel Buxton, “The Young Turks”, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXV (January – June 1909), 16 – 24.

NOTES 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76.

77. 78.

79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

94. 95.

TO PAGES

141 –147

267

“Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908”, 256. From Marschall to MFA, 15 May 1909, GP, V. 27/1, 277. Report by Stemrich, 17 May 1909, GP, V. 27/1, 277, 278. Report by Strempel, 16 July 1909, GP, V. 27/1, 281. Another report by Strempel confirming that Goltz had been fully successful in his duty, 25 January 1910, GP, V. 27/1, 282–4. Paul K. Butterfield, The Diplomacy of the Baghdad Railway 1890– 1914 (Go¨ttingen, 1932), 25; McMurray, 81. McMurray, 79 – 81. The fact that one of the main opponents of the above-mentioned merger should have been I˙smail Hakkı, proves that this claim is unfounded. As has already been said, I˙smail Hakkı had criticized strongly also the Baghdad Railway. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, The Committee of Union and Progress in tu¨rkish Politics, 1908– 1914 (Oxford, 1969), 56, 57. On the rise of the army in politics see Mu¨ge Go¨cek “What is the Meaning of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, A critical Assessment in 2008”, Siyasal Bilgiler Faku¨ltesi Dergisi, Issue 38, March 2008, 199– 203. For example see Wolf, 56. From Marschall to Hollweg, 22 November 1909, G.P., V. 27/2, 590. Zimmermann and Griesinger’s report, 17 July 1909, GP, V. 27/2, 569–73. Weitz, “Germany and the Young Turks”, 181, 187. Ibid., 185– 7. Graves, 107, 108. Ahmad, 36 – 8. Zur Europaeischen Politik, 1897– 1914, Unvero¨ffentliche Dokumente, Band III, ed. Bernhard Schwertfeger, Berlin, 1919 (add. 41), 120, 121. Ahmad, 67. For a report in which Marschall expressed his suspicions of Hilmi Pasha and the absolute trust he felt in Hakkı Pasha see Marschall’s reports, 6 March 1911, G.P., 27/2, 680, 681; and 5 March 1911, G.P., 27/2, 678– 80. From Marschall to Hollweg, 22 November 1909, G.P., V. 27/2, 590. From Marschall to MFA, 26 October 1908, Constantinople, G.D.D, Vol. 3 (XXVII. 579), 368. Richard Hennig, Die Hauptwege des Weltverkehrs (Jena, 1913), 234. From Marschall to MFA, 25 October 1908, Constantinople, G.D.D., Vol. 3 (XXVII, 576), 367. Report of Zimmermann and Griesinger, 17 July 1909, GP, 27/2, 569– 73. The Austrian Ambassador wrote that a British group had applied for a concession for the Damascus-Baghdad Railway, see from Pallavicini to Aehrenthal 24 November 1909, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. From Marschall to Hollweg, 22 November 1909, G.P., Vol. 27/2, 591. Memorandum related to the Baghdad Railway, 1909, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18, Doc. 58, p. 370.

268

NOTES

TO PAGES

147 –151

96. From Lowther to Grey, Tarabya, 11 October 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 276), 378. 97. For example on 12 May 1909, a member of parliament submitted a question concerning the construction of the Gulf line of the Baghdad Railway by the British. B.O.A., HR. SYS, 108/58. 98. Memorandum related to the Baghdad Railway, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18, 371. For a view on how vital the construction of a railway between the Mediterranean and India was for Britain, Charles E. D. Black, “A Railway to India”, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXV (January– June 1909), 164 –9. 99. From Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 25 May 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 270), 371, 372. 100. Robert O. Davies, “The British Attitude toward the Baghdad Railway 1903 – 1910”, (unpublished Master Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1937), 61. For Wilcocks’s alternative proposal, from Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, 15 December 1909, Konstantinopel, HHStA, Admin. Reg. F 19/32. See also from Mensdorf to Aehrenthal, 12 November 1909, London, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. 101. Report of Mesopotamian Railway Committee, 24 July 1909, B.D.F.A., Vol. 18, Doc. 55, 362– 4. 102. From Grey to Lowther, 14 July 1909, B.D., Vol. 6, No. 271 (Ed. Note), 374. 103. Memorandum related, Vol. 18, B.D.F.A., 375. 104. Aide-notaire communicated by Tewfik Pasha, 14 September 1909, B.D.,Vol. 6 (No. 273), 375, 376. 105. From the Ottoman Embassy in London, 28 February 1910, B.O.A, HR.SYS, 109/1. 106. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/5. 107. From Grey to Lowther, Vol. 6, Foreign Office, 18 August 1909, B.D. (Nr. 272), 374. 108. From Lowther to Grey, Tarabya, 14 September 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 274), 376, 377. 109. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 108/61. 110. From Marschall to MFA (secret), 25 October 1909, G.P., 27/2, 576–8. For the version in English, G.D.D Vol. III (XXVII. 576), 367. 111. See previous chapter, 102. Gwinner, 90. This article was sent by the Ottoman embassy in London to MFA, B.O.A., HR.SYS., 108/59. 112. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 108/62 and 108/65. Also see From Gwinner to Zimmermann, Berlin, 20 November 1909, G.P., Band 27/2, 587 113. Chapman, 105, 106. From Gwinner to Zimmermann, Berlin, 20 November 1909, G.P., Band 27/2, 588. Also in British documents, Whitall is referred to as a champion of British participation in the Baghdad enterprise, see from Marling to Grey, Constantinople, 9 November 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 282), 384. 114. From Marling to Grey, Constantinople, 5 November 1909, B.D., Vol. 6, No. 279, 380. 115. Ibid., 9 November 1909, B.D., Vol. 6, No. 282, 384.

NOTES

TO PAGES

152 –154

269

116. From Marling to Grey, Constantinople, 13 December 1909, B.D., Vol. 6, No. 307, 407. 117. From Cassel to Harding, London, 20 December 1909, attachment “Memorandum of Conversations between Gwinner and Cassel, December 13, 14, 15, 1909”, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 309), 409– 11. See the same memorandum in German documents, from Schoen to Marschall, Berlin, 22 December 1909, G.P., Band 27/2 (attachment), 605–7. 118. From Schoen to Metternich, Berlin, 31 December 1909, G.P., Band 27/2 (attachment), 609. 119. From Cassel to Harding, London, 20 December 1909 (minutes) B.D. (Vol. 6), 411. 120. From Schoen to Metternich, Berlin, 31 December 1909, G.P., Band 27/2, 609. For the text in English see G.D.D., Vol. 3 (XXVII. 608), 371. Also Tevfik Bey’s report from London, B.O.A., HR.SYS., 108/64. 121. From Cassel to Harding, 20 December 1909 (minutes) B.D., Vol. 6, 411. 122. From Grey to Goschen, Fallodon, 31 December 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 314), 418, 419. 123. From Goschen to Harding, Berlin, 15 December 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 308), 408, 409. 124. Pronotaria, “Vom englischen Botschafter in Berlin Sir Edward Goschen am 15. Januar dem Auswaertigen Amt gegeben”, 14 January 1910, G.P., 27/2, 616–18. 125. From Grey to Goschen, Foreign Office, 10 January 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 317), 420, 421. 126. From Goschen to Grey, Berlin, 11 April 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 344), 454–6. 127. Enclosure of the above-mentioned report, “Memorandum by the German Chancellor”, 458. 128. The (minutes) section of the above-mentioned report, 460. And the (minutes) section of Goschen’s report, 10 April 1910 (No. 343), B.D., Vol. 6, 452–4, 129. From Goschen to Harding, Berlin, 14 April 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 348), 463. For an example of articles of the time that exaggerated the German threat see Walter Frewen Lord, “The Lost Empire of England”, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXV (January–June 1909), 230–40. Erroll, “A Rude Awakening” The Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXV (January–June 1909), 565–9. For a dissenting opinion see C. S. Goldman, “A German View of the Anglo-German Problem”, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXV (January–June 1909), 346–60. 130. Footnote of Ku¨hlmann’s report, London, 5 May 1910, G.P., 27/2, 639. 131. Translation from Letter from Gwinner to Cassel, Berlin, 21 May 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 370), 485, 486. 132. From Babington Smith to Harding, Constantinople, 8 February 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 322), 426– 9. Chancellor Hollweg stated that also Edgar Speyer, a big City financier, agreed with them, From Hollweg to Metternich, 3 February 1911, London, XXVII. 668, G.D.D., Vol. 3, 374. 133. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 108/65. Cassel had implied similar things to Cevat Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in London, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 108/64.

270

NOTES

TO PAGES

154 –159

134. From Grey to Babington Smith, Foreign Office, 31 May 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 376), 491, 492. 135. From Smith to Grey, Constantinople, 19 July 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 383), 497, 498. 136. From Grey to Lowther, Foreign Office, 18 April 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 350), 466, 467. 137. Also the Ottomans must have considered this report to be important, because there are exact and careful translations into French and Ottoman of the report in the Ottoman archives. For the translation into Ottoman see B.O.A., HR. SYS., 111/33. For the translation into French HR.SYS., 109/7. 138. From Grey to Lowther, Foreign Office, 20 April 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 352), 468– 72. B.O.A., HR.SYS., 111/3; HR. SYS., 109/7. 139. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/4. 140. From Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 3 May 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 359), 475, 476. 141. Ibid., 16 May 1910, B.D., Vol. 6, No. 368 (minutes), 484. 142. From Grey to Lowther, Foreign Office, 6 June 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 377), 492, 493. 143. From the Russian ambassador in Paris to MFA, 7/20 January 1910, G.B.D.S, Band I (No. 152), 222, 223; see also G.B.D.S, Band I (No. 159), 230 – 1; from Smith to Harding, 8 February 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (Nr. 322,) 428, 429. 144. Wolf, 82. 145. From the Russian ambassador in Paris to the Russian MFA, 7/20 January 1910, G.B.D.S, Band 1 (No. 152), 222, 223. 146. Feroz Ahmad, “Dog˘makta Olan Bir Burjuvazinin O¨ncu¨su¨: Genc Tu¨rklerin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Politikası 1908 – 1918”, I˙ttihatcılıktan Kemalizme (Istanbul, 1985), 46. 147. From Lancken to Hollweg, Paris, 5 July 1910, G.P., 27/2, 642. 148. From Marschall to MFA, 17 October 1910, G.P., 27/2, 703. 149. Ahmad, The Young Turks, 77, 78. 150. Earle, 224, 225. 151. Ahmad, The Young Turks, 79. 152. Chapman, 99. 153. Memorandum communicated to Jevad [Cavid] Bey, 29 July 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 388), 503– 5. 154. From Lowther to Grey, Tarabya, 2 August 1910, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 389), 505, 506. 155. From Hollweg to Marschall, Berlin, 21 September 1910, G.P., 27/2, 655, 656. 156. From Marschall to Hollweg, Therapia, 14 October 1910, G.P., 27/2, 656 – 64. 157. From Miquel to MFA, Tarabya, 21 June 1910, G.P., 27/2, 693. 158. From Marschall to MFA, Pera, 15 November 1910, G.P., 27/2, 717. For how things developed, 693– 717.

NOTES

TO PAGES

160 –164

271

159. Feroz Ahmad, I˙ttihat ve Terakki, 1908– 1914 (I˙stanbul, 1984), 142. 160. From Marschall to MFA, Pera, 9 November 1910, G.P., 27/2, 717; Earle, 225, 226. 161. Karl Helfferich, Die deutsche Tu¨rkenpolitik, Berlin, 1921, 23. 162. I˙lhan Tekeli, “I˙ttihat ve Terakki Do¨neminde Dıs¸ Du¨nya ve Uygulanan Dıs¸ Politika”, Cumhuriyetin Harcı, Vol.1: Ko¨ktenci Modernitenin Dog˘us¸u (I˙lhan Tekeli-Selim I˙lkin) (Istanbul, 2003), 93. 163. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/10. 164. Ahmad, The Young Turks, 77. 165. Heller, 12, 14. 166. Mahmud Muhtar, 122. 167. McMurray, 82. 168. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/11. Marschall’s report, Constantinople, 26 February 1911, G.P., 27/2, 674. 169. Marschall’s telegraphs on this matter, G.P., 27/2, 669– 84, Nr. 10021, 10022, 10023, 10024, 10026, 10027, 10029, 10030, 10033, 10034. 170. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/11. 171. From Marschall to MFA, Pera, 21 March 1911, G.P., 27/2, 686, 687. For comments by Lowther, Grey and other British experts, see From Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 23), 34 – 6. 172. For French reaction, Marschall’s report, Pera, 19 March 1911, G.P., 27/2, 686. 173. From Zimmermann to Wedel, Berlin, 19 June 1914, G.P., Band 37/1, 450. 174. From the consul in Beirut to Aehrenthal, 3 June 1910, Beirut, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/18. 175. Ernst Jackh, Balkan Savas¸ından Sonra Almanya, in I˙mparatorluk Stratejileri ve Ortadog˘u (Istanbul, 2004), 184. 176. From Tevfik Pasha to MFA, B.O.A., HR.SYS. 110/13. 177. George Cleinow, “Die Lo¨sung des Bagdadbahnproblems”, Die Grenzboten, Zeitschrift fu¨r Politik, Literatur und Kunst, 70. Jahrgang, Erster Vierteljahr, 1911, 633– 7. 178. From Kiderlen to Hollweg, 24 May 1911, G.P., 27/2, 688. 179. John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900– 1939 (Minneapolis, 1963), 59. 180. Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830 – 1930 (Philadelphia, 1932), 58. 181. Chester mentioned these opportunities to the Los Angeles Times correspondent, with great enthusiasm, James B. Morrow, “An Admiral upon Turkey”, Los Angeles Times, 28 November 1909. See also Russell Yates Smith, “James Wood Colt and the Chester Project, 1908–1914” (unpublished master’s thesis, The Ohio State University, 1967), 5, 6. 182. “American Capital to Open Rice Fields in Turkey”, New York Times, 14 August 1910. 183. John A. DeNovo, “A Railroad for Turkey: The Chester Project, 1908– 1913”, The Business History Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Autumn, 1959), 304.

272

NOTES

TO PAGES

164 –167

184. Report of the Austrian Embassy, 18 February 1916, “Wiederauftauchen eines amerikanischen Bahnprojektes”, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. 185. From Huntington Wilson to Laidlaw, N.A., Microcopy no.353, roll 64, 867 602. 01 81 / – A (Thereon, N.A. Microcopy number 353, and roll number 64, 867 602. 01 will not be indicated to avoid repetition) Also the consul in Aleppo had stated that they would be providing all possible help, see from the consul to Wilson, 20 May 1910, Aleppo, N.A., roll 81/14. 186. Telegraph from Straus, 7 March 1910, Pera, N.A., roll 81. 187. From the Embassy to MFA, 1 April 1910, N.A., roll 81 / 13. 188. From Wilson to the Embassy, 12 March 1910, N.A., roll 81. 189. Henry Woodhouse, “American Oil Claims in Turkey”, Current History, March 1922, 958. DeNovo, American, 67. 190. From Straus to MFA, 28 June 1910, Pera, N.A., roll 81/30. 191. Ibid., 18 August 1910, Constantinople, N.A., roll 81/46. 192. Carter was told in Istanbul that having Ottoman authorities amend article 4 of the capitulation treaty of 1830 before the project was submitted to parliament would have a very favourable effect. From Carter to MFA, 19 December 1910, Pera, N.A., roll 81/61 and 81/62. 193. Bilmez Bu¨lent Can, Demiryolundan Petrole Chester Projesi (1908 – 1923) (I˙stanbul, 2000), 143. 194. From Wilson to MFA, 2 November 1910, Pera, N.A., roll 81/56. 195. DeNovo, American Interests, 76, 77. 196. From Carter to MFA, 25 April 1911, Pera, N.A., roll 81/86. 197. Ibid., 14 May 1911, Pera, N.A., roll 81/89. 198. Ibid., 1 June 1911, Pera, N.A., roll 81/99. Selim I˙lkin, “Chester Demiryolu Projesi”, in Tu¨rkiye I˙s¸ Bankası Atatu¨rk Sempozyumu (Istanbul, 1981), 743. 199. Translation by the American Embassy: “The Abandonment of the Chester Project, Another Triumph of German Diplomacy in Turkey”, Arevelk, 30 August 1911, see from Rockhill to MFA, 18 September 1911, Constantinople, N.A., roll 81/111 (an addendum). 200. From Carter to MFA, 4 June 1911, Pera, N.A., roll 81/101. 201. From Knox to Rockhill, 17 June 1911, N.A., roll 81/102 A. 202. B.O.A., MV, 164/77. 203. In 1913, the company was officially closed, from Colt to Murray, 1 July 1913, New York, N.A., roll 81/153. 204. Marian Kent, Oil and Empire, British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900– 1920 (London and Basingstoke, 1976), 16. 205. “Big American Deal, Chester Concessions in Turkey Have Vast Possibilities”, The Evening Star, 26 September 1910; B.O.A., HR.SYS. 67/47. 206. From MFA to the embassy in Istanbul, 3 June 1910, N.A, roll 81/18. 207. For a commentary that contrary to the general atmosphere in Germany was in favour of cooperation see “Amerikanische Unternehmungen in Kleinasien”, Mu¨nchner Neueste Nachrichten, 10 August 1910.

NOTES

TO PAGES

167 –171

273

208. From Laidlaw to MFA, 15 June 1910, New York, N.A., roll 81/23. The same claim appeared also in the German press see “Amerikanische Schlauberger”, Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, 21 June 1910. 209. From Straus to MFA, 18 June 1910, Pera, N.A., roll 81/27. 210. Ibid., 21 June 1910, Yeniko¨y, N.A., roll 81/28. 211. From Carter to MFA, 1 February 1911, Pera, N.A., roll 81/70. 212. John Carter, “The Bitter Conflict Over Turkish Oilfields”, Current History, Januaty 1926, 495. 213. K. Pastırmacıyan, Anadolu-i S¸arki S¸imendu¨fer Meselesi (Dersaadet, 1328), 3, 4. 214. Ibid., 25 – 8. 215. For a summary of Pastırmacıyan’s comparison see Mehmet Okur, “Osmanlı’nın Uygulayamadıg˘ı Bir Proje: Karakin Pastırmacıyan’ın Anadolu S¸arki S¸imendifer Projesi”, Toplumsal Tarih, issue 179, November 2008, 55, 56. 216. Pastırmacıyan, 13, 14. 217. Ibid., 44 – 6. Pastırmacıyan stated that his opponents had used against him also the fact that he had taken part in the occupation of the Ottoman Bank, 104, 105. The leader of the group, which in 1896 had occupied the Ottoman Bank to protest Sultan Abdu¨lhamit’s violence against the Armenians, was Pastırmacıyan, then known as Armon Garo. Following intervention by international diplomacy, Garo and friends had been permitted to go to exile, and the hostages had been freed. Following the declaration of the constitution, Pastırmacıyan had returned, and been elected to parliament from Erzurum. For Pastırmacıyan’s memoirs on this subject see Memoirs of Armon Garo, Bank Ottoman (Detroit, 1990), 96 – 139.

Chapter Five

The Process of Delayed Agreements

1. Karl Alexander von Mu¨ller, “England und die deutsche Kolonialpolitik”, Kriegshefte der Su¨ddeutschen Monatshefte (April 1915 – September 1915), 817. 2. D. W. Sweet and R. T. B. Langhorne, “Great Britain and Russia, 1907– 1914”, British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne, 1977), 249. 3. From Nicolson to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11/24 November 1909, G.B.D.S., Band I (No. 122), 172, 173. 4. From the Russian ambassador to MFA, Constantinopel, 11/24 December 1909, G.B.D.S., Band I (No. 141), 202– 6 and 8/21 April 1910, G.B.D.S., Band I (No. 225), 289– 91. 5. From Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, 19 December 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 290), 390, 391. 6. From Bertie to Grey, Paris, 1 December 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 303), 403, 404. 7. The obscurity of Russia’s answers is clearly seen in the reports of the British ambassador; for example see from Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, 27 December 1909, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 311), 412– 14.

274

NOTES

TO PAGES

171 –175

8. For Sazanov’s reports on the Baghdad Railway that he wrote before being appointed, see from the substitute minister of foreign affairs to Russia’s ambassador in London 3/16 April 1910, G.B.D.S., Band I (No. 219), 283, 284 and 3/16 April 1910, G.B.D.S., Band I (No. 220), 284, 285. For Hollweg’s satisfaction for Isvolski having substituted Sazanov, see from Hollweg to Kaiser Wilhelm, Berlin 1 November 1910, G.P., 27/2, 835– 7. 9. From Hollweg to Wilhelm, Berlin, 1 November 1910, G.P., 27/2, 835– 7. 10. From Hollweg to Portuales, Berlin, 8 November 1910, G.P., 27/2, 842. 11. Benckendorff, Russia’s ambassador in Britain, wondered how it was that this newspaper that had only recently begun to be published had been able to get hold of said draft, see from Benckendorff to Sazanov, 2/15 January 1911, G.B.D.S., Band II (No. 324), 5 – 7. 12. For Edward’s admonishment see from Benckendorff to Sazanov, 4/17 January 1911, G.B.D.S., Band II (No. 326), 10 – 14. 13. From Benckendorff to Sazanov, 2/15 January 1911, G.B.D.S., Band II (No. 325), 8. 14. For the text of the agreement see “Agreement between Germany and Russia”, B.D., Vol. 10/1, No. 741 (addendum), 719, 720; or from Kiderlen to Pourtales, Berlin, 27 July 1917, G.P., 27/2 (addendum), 957, 958. 15. And sure enough, when multilateral negotiations concerning the Baghdad Railway began, the Russians stressed the fact that they had not committed themselves as far as the raise in customs duties was concerned. See from Russia’s ambassador in Paris to the minister of foreign affairs, 10/23 March 1911, No. 40, D.S.I., Vol. I, 52. Within the same context, 13/26 March 1911, No. 42, D.S.I., Vol. I, 56. 16. From Buchanan to Grey, Petersburg, 10 August 1911, B.D., Vol. 10/1 (No. 739), 716. 17. Chapman, 132, 133. 18. Earle, 240, 241. 19. J. Holland Rose, The Origins of the War, 1871 – 1914 (New York and London, 1915), 87. Jackh, 304. For a comment claiming that both parties had profited from the treaty see J. L. Garvin, “From Reval to Potsdam”, Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXXXIX New Series (January – June 1911), 195 and others. 20. “The Turkish Press and the Times”, The Times, 18 January 1911. 21. For example, Report of Tevfik Pasha, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/13. 22. Earle, 241, 242. It seems that during his visit of Russia, Prime Minister Poincare expressed France’s disappointment on this matter, see “Bericht des russischen Aussenministers an den Zaren u¨ber die Unterredungen mit Poincare waehrend dessen Aufenthalts in St Petersburg”, 4/17 August 1912, No. 401, D.S.I., Vol. II, 224. 23. P.D.H.C., fifth series, Vol. 21 (London, 1911), 241– 5. 24. Ibid., Vol. 23, 273. 25. Ibid., Vol. 21, 79 – 82.

NOTES

TO PAGES

176 –180

275

26. Tevfik Pasha’s report, 13 January 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/13. 27. P.D.H.C., fifth series, Vol. 22, 1271– 5. See also B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/28. 28. Ibid., 1281– 5. For a translation of the speech sent by Tevfik Pasha to MFA see B.O.A., HR.SYS, 96/1. And also HR.SYS, 109/28. For another interpretation of the speech see “The Baghdad Railway”, The Economist, 18 March 1911, 557, 558. 29. From Tevfik Pasha to Rıfat Pasha, London, 10 March 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS. 104/22. 30. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/45. 31. “The Baghdad Railway”, Manchester Guardian, 14 March 1911; B.O.A., HR. SYS. 109/36. 32. From Goschen to Grey, Berlin, 10 March 1911, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 20), 31. 33. “Germany and Sir Edward Grey’s Speech’, Times, 15 March 1911, B.O.A., HR. SYS. 109/36. 34. From Kiderlen to Marschall, 10 March 1911, Berlin, G.D.D., Vol. 3 (XXVII. 682), 377. 35. From Marschall to MFA, 11 March 1911, Constantinople, G.D.D., Vol. 3 (XXVII. 682), 377, 378. 36. B.O.A., HR.SYS., 110/1, “der Ausbau der Bagdadbahn and die Maechte”, Neue Freie Presse, 20 March 1911. 37. From Pallavicini to Berchtold, 8 October 1913, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/18. 38. B.O.A., HR.SYS. 95/32. “Baghdad Railway, Effect of the New Agreements”, The Times, 23 March 1911. 39. Cevat Bey’s report, London, 7 March 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS. 109/29. 40. “Our Relations with Turkey”, The Morning Post, 9 March 1911, B.O.A., HR. SYS, 109/31. 41. B.O.A., HR.SYS. 95/25, Times of India, 13 January 1911. 42. Tevfik Pasha’s report, London, 24 March 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS. 109/40. 43. Cevat Bey’s report, London, 1 April 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS. 110/3. 44. Ernst Jaeckh, “Die neuen Bagdadbahn Vertraege”, Die Hilfe, No. 21 (22 May 1913), 124, 125. 45. Ernst Jaeckh, “Die deutsch– englische Verstaendigung”, Die Hilfe, No. 46 (13 November 1913), 724. 46. From Lowther to Grey, Pera, 14 February 1911, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 12), 22; B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/25. 47. From Marschall to MFA, 10 February 1911, Constantinople, G.D.D., Vol. 3 (XXVII. 670), 375. 48. Memorandum communicated to Lowther by Rifaat Pasha, Pera, 1 March 1911, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 15), 25, 26. 49. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/43, “Riddle of the Gulf, A Timely Question for Lord Curzon, What is Kuwait?, The Daily Graphic, 22 March 1911. 50. A little further on we shall see Meissner’s importance within the history of Ottoman railways, see pp. 186– 7.

276

NOTES

TO PAGES

181 –185

51. B.O.A., HR.SYS. 95/25, “Our Baghdad Letter, Advent of Critical Times”, Times of India, 16 August 1911. 52. Alwyn Parker, “The Baghdad Railway Negotiation”, Quarterly Review, No. 453, October 1917, 487. 53. Marian Kent, “Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1900– 23”, in The Great Powers, 173. 54. Later, also Tevfik Pasha warned about the need not to wage a press campaign against Britain, From Tevfik Pasha to Asım Bey, 9 May 1912, B.O.A., HR. SYS, 111/7. 55. In his book, Chiroll was thankful that the government had dropped its intention of supporting the Baghdad railway, and proposed to have the Mesopotamian section of the railway, ceded to them. Valentine Chiroll, The Middle Eastern Question or some political Problems of Indian Defence (London, 1903), 227– 9. 56. From Cevat Bey’s, London, 15 April 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/10. 57. Tevfik Pasha’s report, London, 7 August and 26 July 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 96/1. 58. From the embassy in London, addendum to the report dated 7 August 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS. 95/37. 59. The translation of the article, B.O.A., HR.SYS. 95/37. 60. Tevfik Pasha’s report, London, 25 May 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/13. 61. Andre Charadame, Le Chemin de fer de Bagdad, Paris, 1915, 226. Cheradame continued to write against Germany. According to him, Turkey, Austria and Bulgaria were not allies of Germany but rather its vassals, Cheradame, Pan – Germany, The Disease and Cure (Boston, 1917), 8, 9. 62. Tevfik Pasha’s report, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/13. 63. Ibid., London, 3 March 1911, B.O.A, HR.SYS, 109/27. 64. H. F. B. Lynch, “The Baghdad Railway”, 381, 383. 65. Ibid., “The Bagdad Railway: The New Conventions”, 771–80. 66. Cevat Bey’s report, London, 2 June 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/14. 67. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/13. 68. Ibid., 110/25. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/18. 69. Memorandum communicated to Tewfik Pascha, Foreign Office, 29 July 1911, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 34), 45, 46. For the text in Ottoman see B.O.A., HR. SYS, 110/16. 70. Above mentioned memorandum, 46 – 8. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/16. 71. From Ottoman Embassy, London, 31 July 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/16. 72. It is clear from Russian documents that more than taking part in the railway, their aim was to use this as a bargaining ploy, see from Sazanov to the ambassador in Paris, St. Petersburg, 4/17 June 1912, No. 330, D. S. I., Vol. II, 149. 73. From Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 18 August 1911, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 36), 50, 51. 74. From Ottoman Embassy, London, 19 December 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/25.

NOTES

TO PAGES

186 –190

277

75. Tevfik Pasha’s report, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/22. 76. From Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 26 November 1911, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 38), 52, 53. 77. The translation from The Daily Telegraph: “Baghdad Railway, Present Position”, B.O.A., HR. SYS, 110/31. 78. Wolfgang Korn, Schienen fu¨r den Sultan, Die Bagdadbahn: Wilhelm II, Abenteuer und Spione, Ko¨ln, 2009, 67. See also Walter Pinhas Pick, “Meissner Pasha and the construction of railways in Palestine and neighboring countries”, Ottoman Palestine 1800– 1914, ed. Gad G. Gilbar (Leiden, 1990), 179. 79. Wilhelm Feldmann, “Bei Meissner Pascha”, Berliner Tageblatt, Nr. 31, 18 January 1917. 80. Herbert Po¨nicke, Die Hedschas- und Bagdadbahn erbaut von Heinrich August Meissner-Pascha (Du¨sseldorf, 1958), 1, 2. 81. Po¨nicke, 9. See also Auler Pascha, “Besprechung”, AfEW, Berlin, 1907, 316. 82. Auler Pascha, Die Hedschasbahn, Auf Grund einer Besichtigungsreise und nach amtlichen Quellen, Gotha, 1906, 69, 70. Also Pick had a similar opinion about Meissner, see Walter Pick, “Der deutsche Pionier Heinrich August Meissner Pascha und seine Eisenbahnbauten im nahen Osten 1901– 1917”, Jahrbuch des Instituts fu¨r Deutsche Geschichte, 4. Band, 1975, 263. 83. Osman Erkin, “Demiryolu Tarihc esinden: Hicaz Demiryolu”, Demiryollar Dergisi, Issue 269 (1948), 23. 84. Eisenbahn and Komminikationsbauten, dann Kulturarbeiten in der Tu¨rkei mit Abschluss des Jahres 1909, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. Po¨nicke, 16, 17. 85. For an account of Meissner’s time in the Republican period, p. 225. 86. Tevfik Pasha’s report, London, 16 April 1912, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 111/3. 87. Aide-Memoire communicated by Tewfik Pasha, 15 April 1912, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 47), 59 – 61; B.O.A., HR.SYS, 111/20. 88. Ibid., addendum, 62 – 5. B.O.A., HR. SYS, 111/20. 89. Joint Minute by Hirtzel and Parker, Foreign Office, 24 April 1912, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 50), 67 – 70. 90. Ibid., 70 – 2. 91. Communication to Tewfik Pasha, Foreign Office, 10 May 1912, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 51), 73, 74. 92. From Grey to Tewfik Pasha, Foreign Office, 18 July 1912, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 55), 76 – 86. 93. Ibid., 76 – 8. 94. Ibid., 78 – 80. 95. From Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 23 December 1912, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 58), 88, 89. Meanwhile, opponents of the Baghdad Railway were writing that contrary to expectations, the German lines had not been militarily useful during the Balkan wars. For an article against these claims see “Die tu¨rkischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege”, Zeitung des Vereins Deutscher

278

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114. 115.

116. 117. 118.

NOTES

TO PAGES

190 –197

Eisenbahnverwaltungen, Nr. 23 (21 March 1914), 367. For another article on the usefulness of German lines: P. Dieckmann, “Kriegsbahnbauten im Nahen Osten”, AfEW, 1942, 818. From Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 10 February 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 59), 90. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/25. Also Cevat Bey had used a similar expression, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 110/14. Convention concernant les Chemins de fer en Turquie d’Asie, 12 August 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 133), 203– 6. B.O.A., HR.SYS., 113/24. Anglo-Turkish Agreement, 29 July 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 124), 183– 98. Anglo-Turkish Agreement, 183– 7. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 113/24. Above-mentioned treaty, Convention concernant le Golfe Persique, 190– 198, for the secret declaration, 196; B.O.A., HR.SYS, 113/24. B.O.A., MV, 175/25. Sadrazam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmut S¸evket Pas¸a’nın Gu¨nlu¨g˘u¨ (Istanbul, 1988), 45. Chapman, 159. From Buchanan to Grey, St Petersburg, 7 August 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 130), 201, 202. From Mallet to Hakkı Pasha, F.O., 26 February 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 60), 91. Minute of the Cabinet meeting, 11 March 1913, B.O.A., MV, 175/25. Statement communicated to Hakki Pasha, 9 May 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2, No. 69 (addendum), 119. Tevfik Pas¸a’s telegraph, 29 April 1913, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 113/1. Anglo-Turkish Agreement, 29 July 1913, declaration (4), B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 124), 189, 190. Concession pour la Navigation sur le Tigre et l’Euphrate, 12 December 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 188), 283– 98. B.O.A., DH. I˙D, 193/8. B.O.A., HR.SYS, 112/11, “Verstaendigung u¨ber Vorderasien”, 9 February 1914. The general attitude in German diplomatic correspondence was in favour of compromise, but at the same time the advantages of having a legally tangible concession were expressed. For example, from Jagow to Lichnowsky, 25 March 1913, Berlin, G.D.D., Vol. 4 (XXXVII. 154), 239, 240. Anglo-Turkish Agreement, 197, 198. B.O.A., HR. SYS, 113/27. This point was underlined also in the reports of the embassies of other countries. For example, from Austria’s ambassador in London Trautsmansdorf to Berchtold, 29 August 1913, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. From Grey to Bertie, F.O., 20 September 1912, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 57), 87, 88. “Baghdad Railway Question, French Government’s Attitude”, The Morning Post, 15 March 1911, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/36. ¨ zyu¨ksel, The Hejaz Railway, 120. Earle, 245, 246; Murat O

NOTES

TO PAGES

197 –203

279

119. Report of the Austrian embassy, 22 April 1914, Konstantinopel, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/33. 120. Schoen’s report, Paris, 28 May 1913, G.P., Band 37/2, 473, 474. As early as 1911, French Ambassador Chambon had told Metternich that he hoped that they could reach a compromise, from Metternich to Hollweg, 26 February 1911, London, G.D.D., Vol. 3 (XXVII. 673), 376. 121. For these problems, from Jagow to Lichnowsky, Berlin, 24 July 1913, G.P., Band 37/2, 495, 496. 122. Wangenheim’s reports, Tarabya, 1 November 1913 and 3 October 1913, G.P., Band 37/2, 520– 2. 123. From Jagow to Wangenheim, Berlin, 28 December 1913 and Mutius’ report, Konstantinopel, 30 December 1913, G.P., Band 37/2, 567, 568. 124. From Helfferich to Neuflize, Berlin, 13 January 1914, G.P., Band 37/2, 574, 575. 125. From the embassy to Hollweg, 26 September 1913, London, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 126. Earle, 247, 248. For the entire text of the treaty see “Abkommen zwischen der Banque Imperiale Ottomane und der Deutschen Bank vom 15 February 1914”, G.P., Band 37/2, 583– 8. 127. Earle, 249. 128. Iswolski’s report, Paris 12/25 August 1913, D.S.I., Band III (No. 1028), 260. 129. From Pallavicini to Berchtold, Konstantinopel, 8 October 1913, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/18. The Italians were also using the isles of the Dodecanese, which they had occupied, as a bargaining ploy in their quest to get a railway concession in the hinterland of I˙zmir. R. J. B. Bosworth, “Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in The Great Powers, 66. 130. “Tu¨rkische Eisenbahnen”, Wiener Politische Correspondenz, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152, Nr. 10030. 131. P.D.H.C., fifth series, Vol. 59, London, 2169– 71; Earle, 251, 252. 132. O¨zyu¨ksel, “Rail and Rule”, 134 133. P.D.H.C., Vol. 59, 2167. 134. “To the Editor of the Times”, The Times, 15 March 1914, B.O.A., HR.SYS, 109/36. 135. Rohrbach expressed this view in various writings, as an example see Paul Rohrbach, Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche Politik (Dresden, 1914), 19. He did not change his views even after the defeat, see Politische Weltkunde for den Deutschen, Postdam (undated). For Rohrbach’s life, views and a concise critique of these views see Walter Mogk, Paul Rohrbach und das Gro¨ssere Deutschland, Mu¨nchen (Munich, 1972). These views expressed openly by Rohrbach were used many times, and not just by Sarolea, but also by other opponents of the Baghdad line, as an example see Andre Cheradame, “The Strength and Weaknesses of the Triple Entente”, The Quarterly Review, No. 428 (July 19011), 257, 258. See also “The Baghdad Railway Negotiations”, The Quarterly Review, No. 453 (October 1917), 487.

280

NOTES

TO PAGES

203 –208

136. Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem (Paris, 1913), 247– 79. 137. B.O.A, HR. SYS. 110/14. For comments about the thaw in relations see “Anglo-German Relations”, The Economist, 21 June 1911, 1349, 1350. 138. Earle, 254. 139. Diary of Lord Haldane’s Visit to Berlin, F.O., 10 February 1912, B.D., Vol. 6 (No. 506), 683. 140. However, following Marschall’s sudden death Lichnowsky was appointed to this post. 141. Earle, 254. 142. From Lichnowsky to Hollweg, London, 24 February 1913, G.P., Band 37/1, 141, 142. 143. Minute by Parker, F.O., 7 May 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 66), 97 – 9. 144. Draft Anglo-German Declaration, B.D., Vol. 10/2, No. 89 (addendum 3), 139, 140. 145. From Lichnowsky to Grey, London, 16 July 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2, No. 118 (addenda 2 and 3), 177, 178. 146. German-British Convention, F.O., 16 June 1914, B.D., Vol. 10/2, No. 249 (addendum), 398–408. For an abridged version of the treaty, The Great Powers and the Near East 1774–1923, ed. M. S. Anderson (London, 1970), 146, 147. 147. German-British Convention, article 2, 398, 399. 148. Ibid., Explanatory Note (part 3), 403. 149. From Grey to Goschen F.O., 21 March 1914, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 215), 347. 150. Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Anatolia, No. 59 (London, 1920), 49. 151. Memorandum, F.O., 21 March 1914, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 216), 348, 349. 152. German-British Convention, Addendum: Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin, 404, 405. 153. Chapman, 190, 191. 154. German – British Convention, articles 4 and 5, 400. 155. Baghdad Railway Agreement, London, February 23, 1914, B.D., Vol. 10/2, No. 202, 329– 33. 156. From Lichnowsky to Hollweg, London, 4 April 1914, G.P., Band 37/1, 418, for the complete text of the treaty, 415– 19. 157. Earle, Turkey, 259, 260. 158. Minute by Mr Parker, F.O., 7 June 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 91), 143. 159. From Lichnowsky to Grey, Memorandum, London, 16 July 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2, No. 118 (addendum 3), 179. 160. German – British Convention, explanatory note part 4, 403. 161. Ibid., part 5, 403. 162. Eisenbahn and Komminikationsbauten, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. On Willcocks’s explanation of his projects see W. Willcocks, “Mesopotamia: Past, Present, and Future”, Geographical Journal, XXXV (1910), 1 – 18. Following the war, the British carried out in Iraq some of the projects that Willcocks had prepared, see Roland Gorbold, “Iraq Restored”, Asia, No. 11, November 1922, 892, 893.

NOTES

TO PAGES

209 –212

281

163. German – British Convention, 407, 408. In this way, the chain of multilateral international treaties concerning the Baghdad Railway was complete. For a short summary see C. Imhoff, “Das Eisenbahnnetz der Asiatischen Tu¨rkei vor dem Kriegsausbruch”, Petermanns Mitteilungen, 61, 266, 1915, 264. 164. Jean Lannin, “Lord Grey and Germany, His Attitude toward and Influence on Anglo-German Relations 1905– 1914, with special Reference to the Baghdad Railway and the Question of Naval Supremacy”, (unpublished Master Thesis, The Colleges of the City of Detroit, 1932), 18. 165. Edward Mead Earle, “The Secret Anglo-German Convention of 1914 Regarding Asiatic Turkey”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1923), 36 (the entire article, 24 – 44). For the same article see German– British Convention (explanatory note 1), 402. For the detailed text of the treaty see also Bode, 104– 10. 166. Helmut Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910– 1928 (London, 1976), 6. 167. Stephen Hemsley Longring, Oil in the Middle East (London, New York, Toronto, 1961), 28. 168. “Eine Konzession der anatolischen Bahnen auf Ausbeutung der Petroleumquellen in Mesopotamien”, Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 September 1904, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152, No. 14735. 169. Ohannes Pasha’s report, B.O.A., Y.MTV, 260/15. 170. Ibid., 279/23. 171. For all this correspondence see Kent, Oil and Empire (Appendix 2) Correspondence between the Minister of the Civil List and the Anatolian Railway Company, August 1905– March 1907, 163– 9. 172. B.O.A., Y.MTV, 296/69. 173. Longring, 28. 174. Reports from Lichnowsky to Hollweg, 2 July 1913 and 16 July 1913, G.D.D., Vol. 4 (XXXVII, 211), 244, 245; Kent, Oil and Empire, 24, 25; Can, 128. The D’Arcy group was constantly reminding the British government that the majority of the stock of the Royal /Dutch partnership was held by the Dutch, see G. Gareth Jones, “The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912– 1924: The Search for an Oil Policy”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 1977, 652. 175. Kent, Oil and Empire, 22, 218 (footnote 33). 176. Dietrich Eichholtz, Die Bagdadbahn, Mesopotamien und die deutsche O¨lpolitik bis 1918 (Berlin, 2007), 41. 177. Ulug˘bay, 60, 66, 67; Edward Mead Earle, “Turkish Petroleum Company, A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy”, Political Science, Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1924), 268 et al.; Longring, 29, 30. 178. Kent Marian, “The Purchase of the British Government’s Shares in the British Petroleum Company 1912– 1914”, Moguls and Mandarins, Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy, 1900–1940 (London, 1993), 35. 179. John A. DeNovo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I”, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 (March 1955), 645.

282

NOTES

TO PAGES

213 –216

180. Kent, “The Purchase of the British Government’s Shares”, 34 –67. This article studies in detail the purchasing process, especially within the context of the views of the Foreign Office, the India Office and of the navy. For the agreement between the navy and the company see Walter Schweer, “Navy Oil Fuel. Agreement with the Anglo Persian Oil Company, Limited”, Die tu¨rkisch – persischen Erdo¨lvorkommen (Hamburg, 1919), 179– 83. 181. Edward Grey, Speeches on Foreign Office 1904–1914 (London, 1931), 258–270. 182. Kent, Oil and Empire, 52. 183. From Ku¨hlmann to Hollweg, 24 October 1913, G.D.D., Vol. 4 (XXXVII. 251), 248. 184. Minute by Mr Parker, F.O. 11 June 1913, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 95), 152. 185. Anglo-Turkish Agreement, B.D., Vol. 10/2, No. 124, from Grey to Tevfik Pasha, 198. 186. Ulug˘bay, 111. 187. Lichnowsky’s report, 29 January 1914, G.D.D., Vol. 4 (XXXVII, 346), 253. 188. Kent, Oil and Empire, 76. 189. Once the National Bank of Turkey realised that it would not get the support of the British foreign office it lost its enthusiasm, and left the process in the above-mentioned way, see Marian Kent, “Agent of Empire The National Bank of Turkey and British Foreign Policy”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1975 (367– 89), 386. 190. Turkish Petroleum Concessions, Arrangements for Fusion of the Interests in Turkish Petroleum Concessions of the D’Arcy Group and of the Turkish Petroleum Company, Foreign Office, 19 March 1914, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 214), 345, 346. 191. From Mallet to Grey, Constantinople, 25 June 1914, B.D., Vol. 10/2 (No. 253), 412, 413. 192. From Said Halim Pasha to Wangenheim, Constantinople, 28 June 1914, United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. II, 1920, 662. 193. Wilh. Priath “Die Eisenbahnen der asiatischen Tu¨rkei und ihre Bedeutung in dem gegenwaertigen Kriege”, Verkehrstechnische Woche und Eisenbahntechnische Zeitschrift, Nr. 34 (25 May 1915), 445. 194. Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History 1913 – 1923 (Norman University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 60. See also Prince Lichnowsky, My Mission to London 1912 – 1914 (New York, 1918), 20. 195. For the geographical characteristics of these lines and for the construction difficulties deriving from these characteristics see S.F. Newcombe; J.P.S. Greig, “The Baghdad Railway”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 44, No. 6 (December 1914), 578– 80. 196. Mejcher, 477; Mu¨hlmann, 384; Rathmann, Berlin-Baghdad, 80. 197. Ulrich Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in The Great Powers, 117, 118.

NOTES

TO PAGES

216 –221

283

198. B.O.A., M.V, 202/115. It seems that during the war the Sublime Porte tried to nationalise the railway, but that the Germans opposed this, the Austrian embassy, “Plan einer Verstaatlichung der Bagdadbahn”, 18 February 1916, HHStA, Admin. Reg., F 19/32. As for the negotiations for the amendment requests for the contract that the company had presented in 1916, the Sublime Porte had postponed them to the end of the war, B.O.A., MV, 203/61. 199. Paul Hartig, “Die Bagdadbahn-Idee und Verwirklichung”, Zeitschrift fu¨r Geopolitik (Heidelberg, Berlin, 1940), 545. 200. Dr Jaeckh’s report, “Bericht u¨ber Verhandlungen von Dr Jaeckh mit dem Generalstabschef Exzellenz von Falkenhayn u¨ber Bagdadbahn and aegyptische Expedition”, 13 February 1915, Berlin, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. For the lines that were proposed in 1916 to increase the military usefulness of the Baghdad line see “Von den Eisenbahnen im Osmanischen Reiche”, Die Islamische Welt, Nr. 1 (November 1916), 47, 48. 201. B.O.A., MV, 198/1. 202. Panoloni’s report, 24.71914, Aleppo, HHStA, Admin. Reg. F 19/32. 203. Wangenheim’s telegraph, 10 November 1914, Tarabya, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 204. For detailed information see O¨zyu¨ksel, The Hejaz Railway, 200– 3. 205. Anna Grosser Rilke, Avrupa Saraylarından Yıldız’a I˙stanbul’da Bir Hos¸ Sada (Istanbul, 2009), 273, 274. For the same event, “Constantinople Bombed”, News Of The World, 29 September 1918. 206. It had been decided to grant the company exeptional rights so that it could strengthen the Dorak-Resu¨layn line, Minute of the Cabinet meeting, B.O.A., MV, 205/144. 207. Liman von Sanders, Tu¨rkiye’de Bes¸ Yıl (Istanbul, 1968), 44. 208. Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and Ottoman Empire 1914– 1918 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1968), 8. 209. H. Charles Woods, “The Baghdad Railway”, The North American Review, Vol. 208 (July – December 1918), 219. 210. Hilmar Kaiser, “The Baghdad Railway and the Armenian Genoside, 1915– 1916”, Remembrance and Denial, The Case of Armenian Genoside, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Detroit, 1999), 75 et al. 211. Bag˘dat Demiryolu Mukavelenamesi, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 7/44. 212. Kaiser, 89. 213. For similar approaches see Weitz, 196–8 and Kaiser, 83 –6. 214. William Linn Westermann had observed this as early as 1922, “Who are the Turks”, Asia, No. 12, December 1922, 1013. 215. Marian Kent, “British Policy, International Diplomacy and the Turkish Revolution”, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, Winter 1985– 1986, 38, 39. 216. Earle, Turkey, 328. For detailed information see Henry Woodhouse, “The Anglo-French Conflict over Turkey”, Current History, April 1922, 66 – 8 and “Anglo-French Discord in Turkey”, Current History, January 1922, 653– 9.

284

217.

218. 219. 220.

221. 222.

223.

224.

225. 226. 227.

228.

NOTES

TO PAGES

221 – 225

For Curzon’s objections see also “France’s Pact with Mustapha Kemal”, Current History, January 1922, 660, 661. J. G. Moskoffian, “French Policy in the Near East”, Current History, April 1922, 45. For some important resources about imperialist contrasts in the post-war period see Keith Jeffery, “Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 1982), 1029 – 38. Earle, Turkey, 333. Ibid., 334. For an article connecting this claim to the protocol signed by Chester in 1910 and to the following developments see Henry Woodhouse, “American Oil Claims in Turkey”, Current History (March 1922), 953– 9. Henry Woodhouse, “The Chester Concession as an Aid to New York”, Current History (June 1923), 396, 397. Colby M. Chester, “Turkey Reinterpreted”, Current History, September 1922, 946. For developments from the end of the war to the second time the subject of the Chester concession was introduced see Earle, Turkey, 292– 344. “U.S. Firms on Rights in Near East Peace”, The Washington Post, 24 April 1923, p. 1. Naturally there were critical views about America as well. For example, Hu¨seyin Yusuf published a pamphlet about the way America was trying to take over all of the mineral resources of the country and following these investments to impose its political influence, Hu¨seyin Yusuf, T.B.M.M. Aza-i Muhteremesine Acık Mektup, S¸arki Anadolu Demiryolları Cephesinde Amerikalılar, Istanbul, 1339. That the absolute support of 1911 had been substituted by a complete lack of interest is evident even with a cursory study of the American documents. The American administration was refusing its support with generalizations about how in a free market a group wishing to, could invest wherever it wanted to, on condition of undertaking all responsibility, or in other words that it was not possible to support one capital group in particular. See United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. II, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1923, 1198–252. Robert Dunn, “High Politics and Commerce in the Near East”, Asia, No. 11 (November 1923), 864. Leonard M. Fanning, Foreign Oil and the Free World (New York/Toronto/ London, 1954), 47. Can defined this new period as “Eurocentric and of modern standardization”, for detailed information see Can, 3– 40, 330– 6. For the new sharing process and for the role in this process of big companies like Standard Oil that were supported by the American government see Wallace Thompson, “World Oil-War or Entente?”, Asia, No. 5 (May 1923), 365– 8. W. J. Eggling – G. Ritter, Entwicklung und raeumliche Analyse der tu¨rkischen Binnenverkehrsnetze (Bochum, 1979), 8.

NOTES

TO PAGES

221 – 225

285

229. Pick, 262. Meissner had to leave the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and having worked for a while in Tirana he was invited to Turkey once more in 1924. Meissner worked at the Anatolian Railway in 1927– 33 and taught at the university. He spent all of the last part of his life up to 1940 in Turkey. See Po¨nicke, pp. 31, 32. See also Erkin, p. 23. For Meissner’s obituary and life see Dieckmann, “Dr h.c. Meissner Pascha, der Erbauer der Hedjasbahn”, Zeitung des Vereins mitteleuropaeischer Eisenbahnverwaltungen, 1940. For an account of Meissner’s time in the Ottoman Empire, see p. 186, 187.

Conclusion 1. S. K. Somerwil-Ayrton, The Train that Disappeared into History (Uitgeverij Aspekt, 2007), 17. 2. Morris Jastrow, The War and the Baghdad Railway, The Story of Asia Minor and its Relation to the Present Conflict (Philadelphia and London, 1918), 3, 114, 115. For a similar interpretation see “3,000,000 Dead For A Railway Line!”, Weekly Dispatch, 21 January 1917. See also “The Baghdad Railway”, Christian Science Monitor, 22 February 1918. 3. B.O.A., Y. PRK.TNF, 6/33. 4. Siemens had expressed this in the clearest way in the following letter: from George von Siemens to Kurt Zander, 14 May 1900, Berlin, PA/AA, Tu¨rkei 152. 5. Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, London, 1994. This book, narrates from the beginning to the end, the efforts of Germany to turn into allies militant Islamic forces with the aid of its ally the Ottoman empire. For example, for the efforts in Afghanistan of Wilhelm Wassmus, known as the German Lawrence, see 121.

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IV – RESEARCHED NEWSPAPERS Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, Berliner Tageblatt, Christian Science Monitor, The Daily Graphic, Daily News, The Daily Telegraph, Deutsche Levante Zeitung, The Economist, The Evening Star, Financial News, Frankfurter Zeitung, The Globe, I˙kdam, Ko¨lnische Zeitung, Manchester Guardian, The Morning Post, Mu¨nchner Neueste Nachrichten, Neue Freie Presse, News Of The World, New York Times, The Saturday Review, Tanin, The Times, Times of India, Sabah, The Washington Post, Weekly Dispatch, Wiener Politische Correspondenz, Zeitung des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen.

INDEX

Abdulaziz, 10 Abdu¨lhamid, 5, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18 –23, 27, 28, 31, 33 –7, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 58, 61, 63, 65, 66, 68 –72, 80 –3, 89, 99, 112, 115, 127, 128, 129, 134, 143, 146, 158, 160, 164, 168, 186, 187, 211, 222, 231, 233, 234, 235, 238 Abdurrahman Pasha (Justice Minister), 81, 255 Adana, 3, 41, 54, 78, 86, 87, 93, 97, 109, 110, 123, 124, 142, 161, 186, 208, 209, 218 Adana–Mersin Railway, 78, 86, 97, 109, 110 see also Mersin – Adana Railway Aehrenthal (Avusturya Bu¨yu¨kelc isi), 260n115, 267n93, 268n100, 271n174 Africa, 15, 19, 63, 90, 116, 124, 212, 231 Africa and Eastern Concessions Limited, 212 Agadir, 201, 203 Alexander II, Tsar, 43 Alexander III, Tsar, 4

Alldeutscher Verband, 3, 67, 68, 69 Alsace and Lorraine, 11, 14 Amanos mountains, 86, 93, 124, 187, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219 Anatolian –Baghdad Railway(s), 3, 5, 11, 32, 199, 200, 220 Anatolian Railway(s), 5, 24, 29, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52 –7, 59, 60, 85, 88, 91, 100, 105, 112, 122, 125, 168, 215, 222, 226, 228, 234 Anatolian Railway Company, 11, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 78, 80, 81, 85, 87, 93, 94, 97, 105, 108, 123, 152, 238 Anatolische Baumwoll – Dampfpresse – Gesellschaft, 124 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), 209 Ankara, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38, 39, 40, 62, 78, 168, 220, 221, 222 Ankara–Kayseri line, 34, 38

Ankara line, 24, 25, 26, 27, 85 Ankara Railway, 29, 31, 33, 186 Ankara Railway concession, 24, 25 Ankara–Sivas line, 222 Arabia, 82, 83, 112, 126 Arhangelos, Gavriel, 135 Augsburg-Nu¨rnberger Fabrik, 122 Augusta, Empress, 16 Auler, Pasha, 187 Australia, 99 Austria, 4, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 23, 43, 67, 108, 131, 139, 140, 142, 159, 162, 171, 227 Aydın Railway (line), 9, 94, 99, 105, 112, 201, 206 Aziziye, 33 Baghdad–Basra Railway (line), 190 Baghdad–Hanikin Railway (line), 175 Baghdad–Gulf line, 175 Baghdad Railway, 3, 4, 6, 7, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 43, 46 –8, 52 –4, 56 –9, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79,

308

THE BERLIN –BAGHDAD RAILWAY

80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94 – 125, 130, 132 –5, 141, 143, 146, 147, 148, 150 –3, 155, 156, 158 – 62, 166, 167, 168, 171 –9, 182 –9, 191, 195 –205, 209, 211, 213, 215 –20 222, 225 –38 Baghdad Railway Company, 32, 60, 78, 85, 87, 89, 91, 105, 110, 124, 125, 132, 141, 152, 158, 161, 179, 187, 189, 191, 194, 196, 205, 207, 208 Baghdad Railway concession, 5, 6, 46, 64, 66, 70, 85, 132, 175, 228, 232, 238 Bahrain, 184, 188, 192 Balfour, Arthur James, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 113, 175, 176, 229, 230 Balkan(s), 12, 13, 17, 19, 57, 82, 90, 171, 187, 197 Balkan wars, 190, 197, 277 Ballin, Albert, 207 Banque de France, 198, 199 Banse, Ewald, 67 Bartisol, 60, 61 Basra, 10, 52, 54, 60, 65, 71, 86, 88, 104, 112, 115, 132, 148, 149, 154, 174, 182, 184, 189, 190, 191, 195, 196, 204, 205, 207, 208, 215 Baykal, Bekir Sıtkı, 52 Beirut, 50, 87, 162, 260, 271 Beirut –Damascus –Aleppo Railway, 37 Beirut –Damascus –Mu¨zeyrib Railway, 83 Belgium, 2, 29, 45 Benckendorff, Alexander von, 115 Bender Abbas, 62 Berlin, 20, 31, 34, 59, 62, 70, 98, 112, 119, 136, 145, 151, 152, 154, 158, 159,

162, 177, 198, 199, 203, 216, 227 Berliner Tageblatt, 32 Bertie, Francis, 113 Bey, Adil, 137 Bey, Asım (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 186, 187 Bey, Cavit (Mahmut Pasha’s son), 61, 64, 70 Bey, Cavit (Minister of Finance), 132, 133, 141, 157, 158, 159, 161, 198, 199, 236 Bey, Cevat, 155, 179, 181, 182, 183, 187, 203 Bieberstein, Marshall von, 3, 5, 17, 19, 21, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81, 103, 109, 110, 113, 121, 131, 136, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 167, 178, 203, 227, 234 Birecik, 87 Bismarck, Otto von, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 57, 237 Black Sea, 74, 75, 134, 164, 168, 197, 199, 200, 201, 222, 228 Board of Trade, 110, 181, 189, 191, 260 Bode, Heinz Friedrich, 122 Boer war, 72, 228 Bo¨rsen Courier, 101 Boston chambers of commerce, 164 Bowles, Gibson, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 105, 182, 183, 205 Bristol Hotel, 52 British government, 18, 94, 98, 102, 112, 113, 116, 128, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 180, 182, 184, 188,

190, 191, 192, 194, 205, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 214, 221, 222, 224 British India Steamship Navigation Company, 194 Buchanan, Sir George, 173 Bulgaria, 17, 33, 139, 140, 227, 276 Bu¨low, Bernhard von, 50, 52, 53, 59, 69, 101, 111, 119, 141 Bursa, 30, 41 Buxton, Noel, 179 Caillard, Vincent, 11, 27 Calais, 107 Cambon, Paul, 74, 115, 261 Caprivi, Leo von, 15, 38, 245, 246 Cassel, Ernest, 94, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 170 Chamberlain, Joseph, 72, 101 Chapman, Maybelle Kennedy, 173, 257n45, 262n165 Cheradame, Andre, 98, 162, 182 Chesney, Francis, 8 Chester, Colby M. 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 221, 222, 223, 224, 237 Chester concession, 164, 166, 167, 222 Chester project, 165, 166, 167, 168, 237 Chiroll, Valentine, 181, 182 Churchill, Winston, 111, 212 Cleinow, George, 162 Cologne Gazette, 98 Committee of Imperial Defence, 110 Company for the Construction of Railways in Turkey (CCRT), 142 Congress of Berlin, 12, 20 Constanz, French Ambassador, 59, 63, 65

INDEX Construction et l’Exploitation du Reseau de la Mer Noire, La, 197 Contemporary Review, 103, 259, 292, 301 Cotard, Charles, 30, 42, 48, 60, 61 Crawford, Jack, 129 Crete, 44, 51, 90, 139 Crowe, Eyre, 153 Curzon, Lord, 101, 179, 181, 221 Daily Chronicle, The, 51, 99 Daily Graphic, The, 180, 182 Daily News, 76, 99 Daily Telegraph, The, 100, 103, 186 D’Arcy, William Knox, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214 Dawkins, Clinton, 94, 102, 103 Delcasse (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 79, 80, 106 Damascus, 5, 50, 51, 83. 87, 90, 102, 217, 235 Damascus –Baghdad line, 148 Damascus –Hama Railway, 106 Damascus –Mu¨zeyrib Railway, 83 Damat Mahmut Pasha, 61, 64, 70, 71, 72, 76, 232 Deschanel, 107 Deutsche Bank, 3, 4, 5, 11, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 44, 47, 48, 54, 56, 59, 60, 65, 66, 68, 69, 77, 78, 80, 92, 94, 96, 102, 104, 105, 108, 114, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 136, 150, 151, 152, 158, 160, 198, 199, 212, 213, 214, 216, 224, 228, 229, 232, 234, 238 Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft, 67

Deutsche Levante Linie, 21, 124 Deutsche Levantinische Baumwoll Gesellschaft, 123 Deutsche Orient Mission, 52 Deutscher Handelsverein, 21 Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee, 236 Die Grenzboten, 162 Die Zukunft, 45, 66 Dillon, E.J., 103 Diyarbakır, 42, 54, 77, 87, 134, 168 Dresden, 187 Duparchy, Alexis, 30, 42 Du¨yun-ı Umumiye, 10, 11, 18, 25, 26, 27, 39, 62, 74, 86, 105, 106, 107, 200, 211 Earle, Edward Mead, 173, 199 Edirne, 27, 40 Edirne– Dedeag˘ac Railway, 40 Efendi, Zohrap, 113 Einem, Karl von, 117 El Helif, 124, 186 Engelhardt, 9, 238 England, 111, 202, 203 entente cordiale, 102, 111 Ergani, 220, 221 Erzurum, 37, 74, 76, 134, 168, 198, 222, 233 Eskisehir, 31, 32, 54 Eskis¸ehir – Ankara Railway, 31, 41 Eskisehir – Konya Railway (line), 5, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 134, 228 Euphrates, 47, 52, 53, 58, 88, 93, 147, 148, 193, 194, 195, 206 Falkenhayn (Chief of the General Staff), 216 Faure, Firmin, 53, 106, 107, 260

309 Fitzmaurice, Gerald, 127, 264, 265 Flaningam, M.L., 22, 244n62 Ford, Clare, 36 Fortnightly Review, 104, 183 France, 2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20 22, 24, 36, 37, 43, 53, 60, 78, 84, 95, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 11, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 121, 127, 140, 144, 150, 154, 157, 160, 173, 174, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 215, 220, 221, 228, 230, 232, 234 Frankfurt, 91, 123 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 71 Frankfurter Zeitung, 281n168 Fraser, David, 130 Geraud, A., 64, 251n93 German Block, 12 German Fountain, 49 German Military Commission, 12, 22, 23, 24 Gesellschaft fu¨r den Bau der Anatolischen Bahnen, 27 Gladstone, William, 113 Globe, The, 105, 294, 306 Goltz, von der (Pasha), 22, 23, 24, 31, 38, 44, 68, 82, 127, 141, 142, 143, 202, 237 Graf Vitali, 26, 27, 38 Graves, Philip, 128, 145 Great Britain, 129, 130 Grey, Edward, 6, 18, 109, 113, 127, 128, 140, 148, 151, 187, 191, 209, 213 Grothe, Hugo, 67, 236 Grunzel, Joseph, 32 Gu¨lbenkyan, 211, 212 Gu¨mu¨s hane, 38, 39 Gwinner, Arthur von, 85, 90, 94, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 112, 150, 151, 152, 154, 158, 167, 170, 198, 206, 212, 214, 229, 230

310

THE BERLIN –BAGHDAD RAILWAY

Haifa, 49, 84, 197, 235 Haifa Port, 49 Hakkı, I˙smail, 132, 133, 265, 267 Hakkı Pasha (Grand Vizier), 146, 156, 161, 168, 178, 185, 190, 191, 193, 194, 204, 206, 213 Haldane, Lord, 116, 117, 203 Halep, 93 Hama, 87, 106, 197 Hamburg, 21, 22, 79, 120, 124, 212 Hamburg–Amerika Linie, 120 Hamburg–Amerika Shipping Company (HAPAG), 206 Hanikin, 121, 172, 175 Hardegg, 84, 255 Harding, Charles, 148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 156 Harput, 77, 87, 134, 197 Haydarpas¸a, 10, 44, 87, 138, 217, 226 Haydarpas¸a –Ankara Railway, 5, 41 Haydarpas¸a –I˙zmit line, 25, 26, 41 Haydarpas a Port, 47, 55, 59, 162 Haydarpas a Station, 217, 226 Helfferich, Karl, 4, 17, 36, 52, 114, 122, 123, 131, 132, 159, 160, 167, 198, 199, 216 Hilmi Pasha, Hu¨seyin, 145, 146, 149, 150, 152, 211 Hirsch, Baron, 9, 10, 27, 28 Hirtzel, Arthur, 188 Hohenlohe, Schillingsfu¨rst, 48, 55 Hohenzollern (yacht), 49 Hollweg, Bethmann, 69, 84, 153, 158, 171, 199, 203 Holzmann, Philipp, 27, 38, 91, 123, 142 Huguenin, 136, 137, 139, 167, 186

Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company (Socie´te´ Impe´riale Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Bagdad), 85 Inchcape, Lord, 194, 207, 208 India, 3, 8, 34, 50, 60, 68, 72, 73, 74, 82, 95, 96, 97, 99, 105, 107, 115, 120 121, 126, 147, 160, 173, 174, 179, 180, 181, 188, 213, 228, 235 India Office, 181, 188, 189, 191, 282 Indian Mail, 97 I˙skenderun, 60, 105, 158, 162, 173, 179, 216 I˙skenderun –Bagdad Railway, 48, 61 I˙stanbul, 3, 5, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 33, 38, 40, 46, 47, 50, 52, 54, 58, 59, 65, 70, 80, 83, 85, 92, 95, 105, 112, 122, 123, 125, 128, 129, 130, 133, 137, 139, 141, 142, 143, 152, 156, 159, 164, 165, 166, 173, 186, 203, 209, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 221, 222, 225 I˙stanbul – Edirne– Plovdiv – Bellova line, 27 Isvolski, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 170, 171 Italy, 19, 24, 67, 163 I˙zmir, 9, 21, 36, 41, 105, 124, 220 I˙zmir–Aydın Railway, 8, 9, 41, 59, 97, 105, 112, 205, 206 I˙zmir–Kasaba Railway, 35, 37, 48, 59, 60, 97, 105, 106, 108, 197 I˙zmit, 10, 12, 26, 38, 39, 44, 62 I˙zmit–Adapazarı line, 28 I˙zmit–Ankara Railway, 26, 186, 228

I˙zmit–Eskis¸ehir –Ankara line, 25, 41 Jaeckh, Ernst, 69, 111, 162, 216 Jaffa– Jerusalem line, 41, 83 Jagow, 203 Jaures, Jean, 174 Jerusalem, 41, 50, 87 Jerusalem Verein, 52 Kaehler, Colonel von, 22, 23 Kaerger, Karl, 32, 67, 68, 246 Kamil Pasha, 145 Kannenberg, Karl, 45, 248 Kapnist, Count Wladimir, 48 Kapp, Otto, 28 Kaulla, Alfred, 24, 25, 28, 34, 35 Kiderlen, von (Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 171, 236 Klapka, M. De, 198, 199 Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee, 67, 69 Konya, 3, 5, 27, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 48, 54, 60, 61, 65, 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 108, 132, 133, 216, 218, 228 Konya –Bulgurlu line, 92, 93, 133, 215 Konya –Ereg˘li line, 132, 141 Konya –Ereg˘li –Bulgurlu Railway Construction Company, 91 Konya Plain, 123, 124, 208 Konya Plain Irrigation Company, 123 Ko¨rt, Gustav, 87 Krupp company, 14, 23, 24 Ku¨hlmann, Otto von, 26, 33, 34, 183, 203, 204 Ku¨tahya, 26, 30, 38, 39 Kuwait, 5, 72, 73, 74, 79, 86, 95, 112, 115, 147, 154, 162, 176, 177, 180, 182, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 213

INDEX Lansdowne, Lord (Foreign Secretary), 100, 112 Law, Fitzgerald, 11, 112 Leopold, King (of Belgium), 29 Lichnowsky, Prince, 204, 215 List, Freidrich, 17 Lloyd George, David, 175, 183 Loehnis, H. 21 Loewe, Ludwig, 30 Lowther (Ambassador), 129, 141, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 155, 157, 158, 160, 180, 181, 185, 186, 187, 190, 213 Luxemburg, Rosa, 3, 70, 233 Lynch, H.F. 97, 99, 104, 142, 146, 182, 183, 207, 229 Lynch Brothers, 88, 97, 99, 103, 104, 207 Lynch company, 72, 103, 104, 146, 147, 194, 207 Mackay, James, 112 Mallet, Louis, 153, 155, 156, 214 Maras¸, 87 Mardin, 87, 158 Mauser, 24, 244 Maxse, 100, 101, 103 Medina, 187, 217 Mediterranean, 58, 77, 78, 86, 105, 130, 148, 159, 162, 164, 173, 179, 197 Meissner (Pasha), 180, 186, 187, 217, 225, 226 Mersin – Adana Railway see Adana – Mersin Railway Mesopotamia, 3, 17, 28, 58, 67, 72, 77, 104, 109, 112, 114, 116, 117, 125, 129, 146, 147, 149, 155, 156, 162, 166, 178, 181, 189, 191, 193, 195, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228, 229, 238

Metternich, 73, 108, 117 Moltke, Helmuth von, 66, 116 Morning Post, The, 53, 99, 104, 224 Morocco, 67, 235 Mosul, 173 Mu¨barek, Sheikh, 73, 188 Mudanya, 30, 41, 221 Muhammara, 190 Mu¨hlberg, 75, 119, 121 Muhtar Pasha, Mahmut, 129 Muraviev, Count Mikhail, 59, 75 Nagelmakers, 30, 34, 35 National Bank of Turkey, 151, 156, 212, 213, 214 National Review, The, 99, 103, 104, 230 Naumann, Friedrich, 17, 69 Neue Freie Presse, 178 Neuflize, Baron de, 198 Newton, Lord, 113 Northern –Pacific Railway, 44 Novosti, 66 Nusaybin, 87, 216 Nvoye Vremya, 37 O’Connor, Sir Nicolas, 61, 79, 102, 112, 167 Ohannes Pasha, 210, 281, 288 Oppenheim, Max von, 58, 88, 90, 125, 126, 235 Orient Express, 27 Ornstein, M. 156, 157 Ottoman– American Development Company, 166, 222, 223 Ottoman Bank, 25, 60, 78, 91, 105, 106, 108, 114, 156, 197, 198, 199 Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate, 209 Ottoman railways, 8, 10, 24, 28, 186 Palestine, 49, 52, 53, 66, 68, 217

311 Parker, Alwyn, 158, 188, 191, 194, 204 Pastırmacıyan, 134, 168, 169, 233 Pears, Edwin, 140 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 96, 99, 105, 194 Petersburg, 59, 66, 75, 79, 97, 166, 172 Philipp Holzmann company, 27, 38, 91, 123, 142 Pichon (Minister of Foreign Affairs, French), 115, 157, 158, 160, 171, 198 Pressel, Wilhelm von, 10, 17, 24 Prussian Central Bank, 48, 78 see Seehandlung Radolin, von, 34, 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 59 Radowitz, 28 Rechnitzer, 61, 70, 71, 72, 232 Red Sea, 84, 235 Revelstoke, 94, 100, 229 Rhodes, Cecil, 116 Rıfat Pasha, 140, 156, 158, 180 Rockhill, W.W. 166 Rohrbach, Paul, 17, 69, 123, 167, 179, 183, 202, 235 Roscher, Wilhelm, 67 Rosen, Friedrich, 46, 52, 54 Rouvier, M. 107 Royal Dutch Company, 211 Royal Dutch-Shell group, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 Rumeli, 9, 26, 27, 31, 33, 40 Sabahattin, Prince, 71, 232 Said Halim Pasha, 214, 224 S¸akir Pasha, 30, 35 Salonica –Manastır line, 27, 40, 86 Samarra, 216, 217 Samarra–Musul –Tel Ebyaz line, 215

312

THE BERLIN –BAGHDAD RAILWAY

Samsun, 29, 30, 164, 197, 222 Samsun –I˙skenderun Railway, 29 Sarolea, C. 201, 239 Sazanov, Serge, 171, 172 Schlagintweit, Max, 31, 68 Schneider, Sigmund, 77, 254 Schoen, Wilhelm von, 117, 118, 119, 121, 152, 153 Seehandlung, 48, 78 see Prussian Central Bank Serbia, 227 S¸evket Pasha, Mahmut, 142, 193, 213 Shatt al Arab, 88, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 204, 207, 208 Shell Transport and Trading Company, 211 Siemens, George von, 4, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 48, 49, 52, 54, 59, 65, 68, 78, 79, 80, 86, 93, 98, 103, 122, 234, 238 Smith, Henry Babington, 151, 152, 154, 158 Standard Oil, 119, 167, 168, 169, 178, 214, 224 Stemrich, Chief Consul, 53, 54, 55, 73, 120, 141, 233 Sublime Porte, 10, 11, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 42, 44, 48, 60, 61, 66, 75, 77, 104, 128, 129, 140, 149, 151, 167, 179,

192, 200, 204, 205, 208, 213 Suez Canal, 42, 56, 83, 107 Sutherland, 99, 105 Switzerland, 10, 133, 142 Sykes, Mark, 134, 201 Sykes –Picot treaty, 201 Taft, William Howard, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 223 Tahsin Pasha, 53 Talat Pasha, 141, 219 Tauruses (Taurus mountains), 86, 93, 109, 110, 124, 142, 187, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219 Tevfik Pasha, 73, 75, 76, 148, 149, 151, 155, 182, 183, 184, 185 Tigris, 47, 58, 67, 87, 88, 147, 148, 149, 151, 155, 183, 193, 194, 195, 206, 215 Times, The, 74, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 114, 125, 128, 129, 145, 172, 173, 177, 178, 181, 182, 202, 229, 230 Times of India, 179, 180 Tirpitz, 45, 111 Trabzon, 38, 39, 76, 197, 222 Treaty of Ankara, 220, 221 Treaty of Berlin, 18, 73 Tripoli, 48, 76, 87, 191, 197, 216 Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), 212, 213, 214, 215, 224

Vicker-Armstrong, 24 Vossische Zeitung, 51, 96, 195 Waldersee, Graf von, 12 Wangenheim, Hans, 144 Washington, 165, 225 Weltpolitik, 12, 14, 15, 45, 46, 55, 57, 70 Whittall, Edwin, 151 Wiener Bankverein, 27 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 4, 5, 13, 15, 16, 17, 24, 28, 38, 42, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 59, 65, 71, 72, 78, 81, 84, 91, 107, 115, 116, 117, 121, 130, 131, 140, 147, 171, 227, 236, 238 Willcocks, William, 208, 280, 305 Wilson, Huntington, 164, 165, 222 Windsor, 115, 116, 118, 121, 230, 231 Wu¨rttembergische Vereinsbank, 24, 26 Yıldız (Palace), 129 Young Turks, 18, 20, 21, 66, 71, 76, 127, 128, 130, 131, 143, 144, 147, 158, 159, 179, 181, 182, 208, 232 Zander, Kurt, 38, 39, 46, 47, 48, 60, 80, 83, 210 Zihni Pasha, 65 Zimmermann, 143