The Apology of Justin Martyr: Literary Strategies and the Defence of Christianity (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2.Reihe) 9783161557613, 9783161557620, 3161557611

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Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament · 2. Reihe Herausgeber / Editor Jörg Frey (Zürich) Mitherausgeber / Associate Editors Markus Bockmuehl (Oxford) · James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala) Tobias Nicklas (Regensburg) · J. Ross Wagner (Durham, NC)

462

David E. Nyström

The Apology of Justin Martyr Literary Strategies and the Defence of Christianity

Mohr Siebeck

David E. Nyström, born 1975; B. A. in Theological-Historical Studies from Oral Roberts University; M.A. in Theology and Religion from Durham University; PhD in Divinity from the University of Cambridge; worked at several universities and theological seminaries in Sweden, including the universities of Gothenburg and Uppsala, teaching New Testament and Historical Theology. orcid.org/0000-0002-4093-812X

ISBN 978-3-16-155761-3 / eISBN 978-3-16-155762-0 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-155762-0 ISSN 0340-9570 / eISSN 2568-7484 (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 2. Reihe) The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

© 2018 by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany. www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was printed by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany.

To Filippa and Edwin

Preface This book is the lightly revised version of a doctoral thesis which was defended at the Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge in April 2012. The bibliography has been updated, the language revised, and some points have been clarified or reformulated. The majority of the text, as well as all major conclusions, nonetheless remain the same. My interest in Justin Martyr and the Christian movements of the second century was sparked already during my undergraduate studies, but developed when I conducted my master studies at the University of Durham. At first, my primary interest rested in the relationship between Christianity and Judaism and therefore my early encounter with Justin was largely limited to the Dialogue with Trypho. As I moved into doctoral studies at Cambridge, I began to study the Apology and its rhetoric mostly as a preliminary exercise, and I had the intention of eventually continuing into the Dialogue. However, the Apology proved to be an enormously captivating and rich text, and I was never able to leave it. This study, thus, is the product of what was intended to be only a cursory investigation carried out in the initial stages of the project. Most of my research took place in the Tyndale House Library which, though primarily a library for biblical studies, proved to host a surprisingly vast variety of resources which the present project could benefit from. I would like to thank the Tyndale House community for the opportunity to live and do research at the premises, but also for all the inspiration, encouragement and fellowship I experienced during my time there. Further, I would like to direct my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Judith M. Lieu, without whose competent guidance, sharp analyses and probing questions directed towards drafts in different stages of this project, the final result would indeed have looked very different. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, whose unyielding support during all the years of study and research cannot be measured or valued, as well as all friends and members of family who have offered help and encouragement in different ways.

Table of Contents Preface………………………………………………………………………..VII List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………...XIII

Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................... 1  A. Justin and His Works ..................................................................................... 3  I. Life .......................................................................................................... 3 II. Works........................................................................................................ 4   III. Social and Cultural Sitz-im-Leben........................................................... 5  B. Question and Methodological Approach ....................................................... 6  C. Review of Previous Literature ....................................................................... 8  D. The Apology ................................................................................................ 11  E. Outline and Summary of Chapters............................................................... 15  F. Definitions ................................................................................................... 17 

Chapter 2: Justin and the Early Christian Apology .......................... 19  A. Apologetics in Antiquity ............................................................................... 19  I. An Apologetic Genre?........................................................................... 19  II. The Purpose of Apologetic Arguments ................................................. 23  III. The Christian Apologists of the Second Century................................... 26  B. Justin’s Apology: Form, Audience and Purpose.......................................... 29  I. The Form of the Apology ......................................................................... 29  1. Aristides’ Apology .............................................................................. 30  2. Formal Royal Addresses ..................................................................... 32 

X 3. Formal Apologies and Josephus’ Against Apion ................................ 32  4. Petitions and Libelli ........................................................................... 34  5. Final Considerations........................................................................... 35  II. Audience and Purpose ........................................................................... 36  1. External Audience? ............................................................................ 38  2. Internal Audience? ............................................................................. 54  III. Justin and the Emperor .......................................................................... 60  C. Apologetics, Audience and Purpose: Conclusions ...................................... 64 

Chapter 3: The ‘Theft Theory’, The Logos, and the Problem of Newness ........................................................................................................ 67  A. The Problem of Novelty in Antiquity ............................................................ 67  B. The Argument from Antiquity in Hellenistic Judaism .................................. 68  C. The Question of Novelty in Early Christianity............................................. 73  D. Justin and the Newness of Christianity........................................................ 75  I. ‘Others Teach the Same Things We Do’................................................ 76  II. The ‘Theft Theory’................................................................................. 78  III. The Logos Doctrine ............................................................................... 82  1. Christianity is Rational ....................................................................... 85  2. The Persecution of Christians is Neither New, Nor Peculiar ............. 87  3. The Logos and the Argument from Antiquity .................................... 87   IV. A Note of Inconsistency? ...................................................................... 89  V. Justin and Hellenistic Philosophy .......................................................... 96  E. Justin and the Christian Tradition ............................................................. 100  F. Conclusions: The Christian Gospel – Old or New?................................... 102 

Chapter 4: The Proof from Prophecy.................................................. 105  A. Justin’s Epistemology ................................................................................ 105  I. Truth and Evidence ............................................................................... 105  II. Prophecy as Proof ................................................................................. 108 

XI B. Tradition and Innovation ........................................................................... 110  C. The Proof from Prophecy in the Apology .................................................. 112  I. Chronology, not Antiquity ................................................................... 112  II. Scripture as Prophecy, Prophecy as Text .............................................. 113  1. Prophecy and Fulfilment in the Life of Jesus .................................... 116  2. Prophecy Fulfilled before ‘Our Own Eyes’....................................... 118  D. The Agent of Prophecy .............................................................................. 122  I. Justin and the Prophetic Spirit ............................................................... 122  II. Spirit and Logos .................................................................................... 124  E. Conclusions ............................................................................................... 129 

Chapter 5: Mythographers, Heretics, and Demons ......................... 132  A. The Rise of Philosophical Discourse and the Critique of Myth ................. 132  I. Allegory ................................................................................................ 135 II. Gods and Demons ................................................................................. 136 B. The Apology and the Agents of Evil ........................................................... 137  I. Justin and the Demons ........................................................................ 138 II. The Origin, Nature and Activities of Demons ................................... 139 III. Demonic Instruction ........................................................................... 141 IV. Plagiarizing and Corrupting Truth ...................................................... 142 V. Demons and the Heretics .................................................................... 144 VI. Demons and Christian Persecution ..................................................... 147 VII. Demons as Deities .............................................................................. 147 C. Conclusions ............................................................................................... 151 

Chapter 6: Apology and Construction of Reality ............................ 153  Appendix: Summary Outline of the First Apology......................... 158  A. The ‘Deliberative Part’: Chapters 1–14 .................................................... 158  1. Address.............................................................................................. 158 

XII 2. Formal demands ................................................................................ 158  3. Confutation and Refutation ............................................................... 158  4. Conclusion ........................................................................................ 159  B. The ‘Demonstration Part’: Chapters 15–67 .............................................. 160  I. Chapters 15–22 Introduction to Exposition ..........................................160 1. Teachings of Christ ..........................................................................160 2. The Emperor’s Accountability .........................................................160 3. Christian Teachings are Similar to those of Others ..........................161 II. Chapters 23–53 Proof from Prophecy .................................................. 161 1. Preliminary Remark. Chs. 23–29 .....................................................161 2. Exposition chs. 30–51 ......................................................................162 3. Conclusion chs. 52–53 .....................................................................165 III. Chapters 54–60 Arguments in the Negative ........................................ 166 1. Demonic Imitation in Greek Myth ...................................................166 2. Demons and the Heretics..................................................................166 3. Plato’s Debt to Moses ......................................................................167 IV. Chapters 61–67 Christian Worship...................................................... 167 1. Baptism, Eucharist and Sunday Celebration ................................... 167 C. Peroration: Chapter 68 ............................................................................. 168 Bibliography………………………………………………………………….169 Subject Index……………………………………………………………...….181

List of Abbreviations AGJU

Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums

ANF

The Ante-Nicene Fathers

AZK

Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte

BJRL

Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester

BZHT

Beiträge zur historischen Theologie

CH

Church History

DTT

Dansk teologisk tidsskrift

HTR

Harvard Theological Review

JbAC

Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum

JBL

Journal of Biblical Literature

JECS

Journal of Early Christian Studies

JES

Journal of Ecumenical Studies

JR

Journal of Religion

JRS

Journal of Roman Studies

JSNT

Journal for the Study of the New Testament

JTS

Journal of Theological Studies

LCL

Loeb Classical Library

NT.S

Novum Testamentum Supplement

MSMG

Mnemosyne Supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature

XIV RAC

Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum

RHPR

Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses

SecSen

Second Century

SMSR

Studi materiali di storia delle religioni

SP

Studia Patristica

ST

Studia Theologica

STAC

Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum

TH

Théologie Historique

ThQ

Theologische Quartalschrift

TRE

Theologische Realenzyklopädie

TU

Texte und Untersuchungen

VC

Vigiliae Christianae

VCSup

Vigiliae Christianae, Supplements

WUNT

Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament

ZKG

Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte

ZNW

Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft

Chapter 1

Introduction Sometime around 112 CE, Pliny, imperial governor over the Roman provinces Pontus and Bithynia (parts of modern day Turkey), writes a personal letter to his old friend and master, the emperor Trajan, and asks for guidance in a particular question (Letters 10:96–97). He wants to know what his policies should be in dealing with an apparently red-flagged religious group of people, a superstitious cult, whose members call themselves Christians. Admitting that he has never been present at a trial of a Christian, he expresses concerns as to what guidelines he should follow when dealing with them in court. What punishment should they be given? Should the age of the accused be factored in? Should the charges be dropped and a pardon be given if the Christian recants? And perhaps most importantly, is the name ‘Christian’ prosecutable in itself, even if no criminal actions (lat. flagitia) can be proven to have been committed? His present practice is to repeatedly ask the accused ones if they are Christians, and if they persist in so affirming they are sentenced to death on the grounds, if nothing else, of sheer obstinacy. Yet the problem is that more and more people are being denounced as Christians, even by anonymous accusers, and as his own investigations into the allegedly criminal activities1 of the group have yielded no significant results, the governor has postponed all further trials, awaiting the emperor’s counsel and ruling. The emperor’s reply is brief, and it reassures Pliny that he has acted correctly. Christians are not to be sought out, but if they are denounced (by identifiable accusers) and found guilty in court, they shall be punished unless they repent and show this by praying to the Roman gods. This is the first Roman source which mentions and discusses the imperial legal policies adopted against Christians, and it has been of great importance to the effort of mapping the legal situation of second century Christians.2 It is also one of our earliest testimonies to how the pagan world reacted to and 1

Pliny does not specify which crimes he had expected to find evidence for. They may have been ordinary crimes, but more likely they were crimes which through rumours were especially associated with Christians. Possibly, these would have included promiscuous orgies, infanticide (Thystean banquets), Oedipean unions and other crimes we know were ascribed to Christians not long after the time of Pliny. Cf. Robert Louis Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them, 2 ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 17– 18. 2 For further reading on Pliny’s and Trajan’s exchange, see ibid., 1–30.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

interpreted the rise of the Christian movement. And as the surrounding world reacted, Christians, in due turn, began to counter-react and respond. It is along this chain of reactions and counter-reactions during the second century that the formation of early Christian identity begins to take place. One of the earliest and most influential of these “counter-reactors” was Justin Martyr, the great Christian apologist of the time. Though the Christian movement, from its slender beginnings in Jerusalem, to a large extent had been shaped and defined through the production and dissemination of texts, and though these texts certainly bore testimonies to persecutions from different authorities, the first direct response to the imperial policies discussed by Pliny, and in some respects created by Trajan, was given by Justin. Earlier Christian literature, by and large intended for an inward audience, rarely, if ever, directly engages in political, legal or philosophical questions which would have made any sense to outsiders, especially those of Pliny’s stature and education. In Justin’s Apologia pro Christianis (Apology on Behalf of the Christians, hereafter the Apology) we encounter, for the first time, an attempt to give a comprehensive Christian response to imperial politics and culture, and a defence for the Christian faith which intersects deeply with and challenges inherited cultural notions of truth and validity, political reason and civic morality. Condemnations of legal practices, whether real or perceived, such as judging citizens based on rumours and ascribing guilt on the basis of a mere name, are juxtaposed with philosophical arguments concerning the nature of truth and a protreptic defence of Christianity over and against Graeco-Roman culture and religion. With Justin’s Apology, Christian discourse takes a large step forward. Breaking out from the idiosyncratic circles which inevitably characterize all sectarian literature, Justin frames his discussion in a language, and in accordance with intellectual standards, understandable and acceptable to the literate elite of the contemporary Roman society. This makes the Apology one of the most important texts produced by the early Christian community, and crucial to the study of early Christian identity formation. This study is an attempt to analyse this epoch-making text, with particular interest given to the different literary strategies used by Justin in his defence of Christianity. How did Justin react to the challenges Christians faced from the surrounding society and, more importantly, how and for what purposes did he formulate his response? But before proceeding to the specific questions which will be addressed in the chapters to come, a short introduction to Justin’s life, work and circumstances is needed.

A. Justin and His Works

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A. Justin and His Works1 A. Justin and His Works

I. Life We know little of Justin’s life, except that he was born ca. 100 CE in Flavia Neapolis, a town in Syria Palestine near biblical Shechem, which was founded by the emperor Vespasian. Though referring to the Samaritans as his γένος (Ap. 2:15:1; Dial. 120:6), the names of his father and grandfather (Ap. 1:1) are Roman and Greek, and it is therefore likely that he belonged to a family that had immigrated to the area from elsewhere in the Roman empire. Having acquainted himself with the major schools of philosophy,2 he was eventually converted to Christianity by an old man whom he, according to his own account, met on a seashore (Dial. chs. 3–7). What convinced him of the truth of Christianity was partly the lifestyle and courage of the Christians, which he had earlier marvelled over (Ap. 2:12:1), and partly the fulfilment the words of the Hebrew prophets in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ (Dial. 7:2; 8:1). Eventually, Justin came to reside in Rome, where he seems to have founded some sort of school of philosophy, in which he taught Christianity to any who came to him (Mart. Just. 2).3 Already by Tertullian, (Adv. Val. 5:1) Justin was called both philosopher and martyr, and it was as a philosopher he presented 1 This introduction will be kept short and concise. For recent and more comprehensive introductions to Justin’s life, works and thought, see e.g. Charles Munier, Justin, Apologie pour les Chrétiens: Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2006), 9–99, and Denis Minns, “Justin Martyr,” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 258–269. 2 In the account of his martyrdom, Justin claims that he had attempted to understand the teachings of ‘all schools’ (πάντες λόγοι, Mart. Just. 2:3) and in the introduction to the Dialogue, he gives a description of his philosophical wanderings from teacher to teacher, which included a Stoic, a Peripatetic, a Pythagorean, and finally a Platonist (Dial. 2:2–6). The authenticity of the latter account has been debated, not the least because of its similarity to other stylized accounts of ‘philosophical journeys’, such as those of Lucian and Galen; see Niels Hyldahl, Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins, Acta Theologica Danica (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Munksgaard, 1966), 154–158, for an argument against its historicity, and the critique in Peter Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 158, n. 154. 3 On the role of philosophy teachers in Rome’s cultural life, see Judith M. Lieu, Marcion and the Making of a Heretic: God and Scripture in the Second Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 303–306. Cf. Bernard Pouderon, “Réflexions sur la formation d'une élite intellectuelle chrétienne au IIe siècle: les écoles d'Athenes, de Rome et d'Alexandrie,” in Les apologistes chrétiens et la culture greque, ed. Bernard Pouderon and Joseph Doré, TH (Paris: Beauchesne Éditeur, 1998) and Tobias Georges, “Justin’s School in Rome – Reflections on Early Christians ‘Schools’,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 16, (2012): 75–87.

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himself. In Dial. 1:2 he is greeted by his interlocutor, a prominent Jew called Trypho, because he is wearing a pallium, a philosopher’s cloak. He also referred to Christianity as the ‘true philosophy’ (Dial. 8:1) and he apparently took part in debates with other philosophers.4 Around 165 CE, Justin and six of his students were brought before the prefect of Rome, Rusticus, and were ordered to make an offering to the Roman gods. Refusing to comply, they were all brought away to be scourged and executed through beheading. At least some of the students who followed Justin to his death claimed to have been raised as Christians by their parents (Mart. Just. 3), but presumably Justin’s students and followers would also have included converts – perhaps catechumens and neophytes who wanted to learn more about Christianity and be strengthened in their new faith, and possibly also sympathetic though yet unconverted pagans who took an interest in Christianity. II. Works Justin was a prolific writer, but from the time of Harnack5 only three surviving works bearing his name have generally been considered authentic: the First Apology, the Second Apology and the much longer Dialogue with Trypho, a Jew. The Apologies, framed as letters or petitions to the emperor, argue for the rights of Christians to be treated fairly in the imperial courts, and try to present a case for the rationality and soundness of the Christian faith. The relation between the two apologies is, however, complicated and will be discussed below. The Dialogue is cast as a conversation, loosely modeled on Plato’s dialogues, between Justin and a distinguished Jew called Trypho. Their discussion, which turns into more of a monologue on Justin’s part, centers on the validity of the Mosaic Law and the true nature of the people of God. Several pseudepigraphies ascribed to Justin have also survived, and apart from these there are references in ancient Christian literature to lost works as well as a few fragments.6 Justin himself mentions a work (the so called Syntagma) he has written against ‘all the heresies that have arisen’ (Ap. 26:8). Irenaeus (A.H. IV:6) refers to a treatise against Marcion written by Justin 4

In Ap. 2:3(8):1–7, he refers to a vitriolic debate between himself and a Cynic philosopher called Crescens. According to Eusebius, this same Crescens was later instrumental in the arrest and execution of Justin and his friends (H.E. IV:16:3–6). 5 Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius, vol. 1 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs Verlag, [1893] 1958), 99–114. 6 A substantial fragment from a work ascribed to Justin called On the Resurrection, preserved by John Damascene, has been considered authentic by some scholars (cf. e.g. Pierre Prigent, Justin et l'Ancien testament: l'argumentation scripturaire du traité de Justin contre toutes les hérésies comme source principale du Dialogue avec Tryphon et de la première Apologie, Études bibliques (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1964)), but this is not the majority view.

A. Justin and His Works

5

(which could possibly be the Syntagma) and Eusebius (H.E. IV:18:1–6) mentions several additional works, now lost: one Address to the Greeks, a book called Refutation, one treatise on the unity of God and one on the soul, and finally a work called Psalmist.7 III. Social and Cultural Sitz-im-Leben The eighteenth-century church historian Philip Schaff famously called Justin the first Church Father who may be considered a ‘learned theologian and Christian thinker.’8 Justin’s texts do indeed move the propagation of the Christian gospel to a new level and in academia he is often treated as constituting a watershed between the disciplines of New Testament Studies and Patristics. In his writings we encounter, for the first time, a deep engagement with the surrounding culture, rivaling faiths and philosophies, as well as a sustained, logic-based and philosophical argument for the superiority of the Christian faith. The second century was a time of great developments and changes taking place in the Christian community – a time during which the relatively small and confined Jesus movement transformed from a largely inner-Jewish sect into a predominantly gentile religion and spread all over the known world attracting people from all backgrounds and walks of life. As a religion, it must be seen as a novelty, mixing universal claims similar to those of the most prominent philosophies with an intolerance rivaling that of the most exclusive, national religion and the exclusivity of a mystery cult. Its message and call to repentance and conversion pertained to everyone, everywhere, but at the same time it was unyielding to the customs and beliefs of the society into which it sought admittance. In addition, the moral demands put on its followers were high. The new religion was indeed something very foreign, and at times quite provoking, to the ancient mind. In this context, a need for a distinct and recognizable Christian identity began to emerge. What was true Christianity and what was not? Who was a Christian and who was not? And perhaps most importantly: how and in what way did the Christian faith distinguish itself from its cultural, religious and philosophical rivals? These were questions that concerned the Christian writers of the second century. The two first ones, although addressed by Justin and other early writers as well, came into bright focus first with Irenaeus and the later heresiologists, but the third question is one with which Justin is deeply concerned. How can 7 For lists and/or descriptions of lost works, fragments and the pseudo-Justin literature, see e.g. Leslie W. Barnard, Justin Martyr, His Life and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 172, André Wartelle, Saint Justin: Apologies: Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction, Commentaire et Index (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987), 24–28, Munier, Justin, Apologie, 19–21, or Minns, “Justin Martyr”, 260–261. 8 Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. 2 (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, [1882] 1996), 715.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

it be shown and proved that Christianity is equally valid, rational and sound – in fact, even superiorly so – to its competitors, specifically Judaism, pagan philosophy and Graeco-Roman religion? With this sketchy background in place, it is time to move on towards the specific questions which will govern this study.

B. Question and Methodological Approach B. Question and Methodological Approach

Justin often goes under the title apologist which, of course, refers to him as a writer of texts which are called apologies. As will be discussed in the next chapter, ‘apology’ is not an unproblematic term, and neither is it easy to define, but used in its widest sense it simply refers to some sort of defence. What Justin defends in his work entitled the Apology is both the rights of Christian individuals and, primarily, the reasonableness of the Christian faith as such. Yet, this defence is anything but defensive; it is rather both protreptic and triumphant. Certainly, Justin spends time refuting misconceptions about Christianity and Christians, but his most important aim is to present Christianity as not only an acceptable religion, but as a faith or philosophy far superior to any of its contemporary rivals. The present project seeks to focus solely on the Apology in an attempt to analyse the literary-rhetorical strategies Justin uses in his defence of Christianity. Attention will thus be given to what actually happens in the text: how and why Justin formulates his arguments the way he does, how he negotiates between traditions, and why he shapes his material in certain ways. These analyses build upon three important assumptions, which will be clearly stated from the beginning. The first is that in order to understand the Apology it must be treated as a separate text and thus independently from the Dialogue. The reason is that Justin employs literary and apologetic strategies differently in each text and that his intended audience and purpose are not necessarily the same. For example, a reconstruction from both texts of how Justin uses the so called ‘Logos doctrine’ may possibly yield a fuller picture of Justin’s ideas on the logos than if only one text is used, but it is not helpful for understanding the dynamic and function of the argument in the Apology; for this the Apology needs to be analysed on its own. The second assumption is that Justin is in control of his sources and thus that what is found in the text of the Apology serves a function and is included for a reason. This study will not take interest in unveiling or identifying Justin’s direct literary sources, and will thus not engage heavily with the meticulous scholarship of Skarsaune and others on this subject.9 It will, at times, briefly attempt to locate Justin on the large canvas which features the philosophical and literary traditions of his 9

See discussion below.

B. Question and Methodological Approach

7

time, but more importantly it will seek to understand what Justin does with the traditions he is in receipt of and how he shapes them into serving his purposes. The third assumption is that the Apology can and should be seen as a text which can be understood on its own terms and thus that it is a fruitful endeavour to look for inner consistency in the text and to treat the different literary strategies as pieces of a puzzle which, understood correctly, together depict a coherent message. Having established these basic assumptions, it is time for a more detailed discussion of the chosen methodological approach. To anticipate the conclusions of the review of literature below, most of the research on the Apology which has been done to date can be categorized into three groups: a) research which aims at a reconstruction of Justin’s position on different theological questions, b) research into Justin’s philosophical background and context or c) research into Justin’s literary sources and traditions. This study will fit into none of these categories but will attempt to approach the Apology from a different angle. Instead of trying to get ‘behind’ the text in various ways – either by probing into the mind of its author or by trying to identify or reconstruct its different sources – an attempt will be made to analyse and understand the text on its own premises. This means that focus will be given to what really happens in the text, i.e. to what goes on in the narrative and in the argumentation. The method chosen could be described as literary-rhetorical analysis. The aim will be to map the most important apologetic arguments Justin uses in the Apology and analyse them as literary-rhetorical strategies employed for certain given reasons. ‘Rhetorical’, in this context, should not be understood as a reference either to oratory techniques or the standards associated with the art of Graeco-Roman rhetoric, but to the inner-text dynamic between words and purpose and to the complicated relations between text, argument and function. In plainer language, the point of interest lies in seeking an understanding of how Justin’s different strategies and arguments are used and shaped, why they are used and shaped this way, and how they work together with the purpose of reaching specific argumentative goals. Consequently, I am less interested in Justin’s ideas as such than in how they function and are expressed in the text, and how the text itself functions as a defence for the Christian faith. Yet, as the reader will notice, the following chapters still do contain some lengthy context-related discussions. These discussions, as a rule, do not take interest in the background to Justin’s thought, as much as in the socio-cultural circumstances which formed his argumentation. For example, when the ‘argument from antiquity’ in the Apology is treated, the background discussion focuses on the importance of this type of argument in the ancient world. Rather than mapping Justin’s historical/literary sources or philosophical influences, the interest lies in mapping the background to his concerns, as well as the more general traditions his apologetic responses draw upon.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

C. Review of Previous Literature C. Review of Previous Literature

There are several rich bibliographical resources available for Justin, for example Skarsaune’s article in Theologische Realenzyklopädie,10 Stephan Heid’s in Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum11 and Wartelle’s exhaustive historical bibliography on Justin and the second century apologists,12 and as these will show, there is no lack of secondary literature on Justin. Yet, no comprehensive review of this literature will be undertaken here. As I will not engage heavily with earlier interpretations of Justin, differing from them primarily in method, what constitutes relevant literature will vary between the different parts, and consequently particular works will be introduced at the appropriate place. A short description of the state of recent research is nonetheless warranted, and as an admirably well summarized one has been provided by Michael Slusser in the recent edited publication Justin Martyr and His Worlds,13 it will serve as a good starting point for the present discussion. Slusser rightly observes that Justin scholarship in the last 50 years has taken two different paths: one which has focused on Justin’s relation to Hellenistic philosophy, and one which has centered on his relation to Judaism.14 In correlation, the first trajectory has been more concerned with the Apology15 and the second with the Dialogue. Obviously, the first trajectory of scholarship, which focuses on the Apology, is more important to the present study and will therefore be focused upon here. In the modern study of the Apology, two major interests can be detected. One interest has been in Justin as a theologian, and its aim has been to recon10

Oskar Skarsaune, “Justin der Märtyrer,” in TRE, ed. Gerhard Müller, Gerhard Krause, and Horst Robert Balz (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988). 11 Stephan Heid, “Iustinus Martyr I,” in RAC, ed. Theodor Klauser (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1999). 12 André Wartelle, Bibliographie historique et critique de saint Justin, philosophe et martyre, et des apologistes grecs du IIe siècle, 1494–1994, avec un supplément (Paris: Lanore, 2001). 13 Michael Slusser, “Justin Scholarship: Trends and Trajectories,” in Justin Martyr and his Worlds (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007). 14 Ibid., 15. 15 The first nine chapters of the Dialogue are also of great interest to students of Justin’s relation to philosophy, and some contributions have majored on these (e.g. Hyldahl, Philosophie, J. C. M. van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher (Leiden: Brill, 1971), Robert Joly, Christianisme et Philosophie: Etudes sur Justin et les Apologistes du deuxième siècle (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1973), 9–74, Torben Christensen, “Bemärkinger og overvejelser til Niels Hyldahl: Philosophie und Christentum: eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justens [sic],” DTT 29, (1966): 195–232, and Niels Hyldahl, “Bemærkninger til Torben Christensens analyse af indledningen til Justins Dialog,” ibid. 30, (1967): 129–146).

C. Review of Previous Literature

9

struct Justin’s theology, often pertaining to questions which are of interest to the modern theological community. The conviction underlying these works, as formulated by Chadwick, is that though Justin ‘never sets out to give a single, succinct statement of his beliefs, it is possible to piece together a mosaic providing a clear and surprisingly full account of his doctrines of God, Creation, Incarnation, Atonement, the Church, the sacraments of baptism and eucharist, and the Last Things.’16 Further, Chadwick asserts, ‘every essential element in the traditional Christian pattern could be expounded on the basis of Justin's statements and allusions, together with some other elements that may be thought less essential.’17 In this category we find (apart from Chadwick’s own just quoted contribution) the comprehensive monographs on Justin, such as Goodenough’s18 classic opus, and the more modern contributions of Barnard and Osborn,19 but also more specialized works such as Trakatellis’ excellent study on the pre-existence of Christ in Justin’s writings.20 Typical for these reconstructive works is that they, for understandable reasons, make use of both the Apology and the Dialogue, and thus they rarely contribute directly to the exclusive study of the Apology. The other interest which has dominated research on the Apology is Justin’s relation to Greek/Hellenistic philosophy. It was propelled by the publication of Carl Andresen’s article in 1952, in which the author argues that Justin’s philosophical outlook should be understood as fundamentally Middle Platonist.21 This generated a wealth of further scholarship which had as its goal to analyze Justin’s philosophical framework in greater detail.22 This, in turn, also stirred an interest in a more general research into Justin’s literary sources. Already Goodenough had argued that Justin’s knowledge of Hellenistic phi16

Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 18–19. 17 Ibid., 19. 18 Erwin R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conceptions of Early Christian Literature and its Hellenistic and Judaistic Influences (Jena: Verlag Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1923). 19 Barnard, Life and Thought, Eric Osborn, Justin Martyr (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973). 20 Demetrius C. Trakatellis, The Pre-Existence of Christ in the Writings of Justin Martyr: an Exegetical Study with Reference to the Humilatio and Exaltation Christology (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1976). A number of important articles have been written on different aspects of Justin’s theology, but space does not allow for them to be listed here. Many of them will be found in the bibliographical works already referred to. 21 Carl Andresen, “Justin und der mittlere Platonismus,” ZNW 44, (1952). 22 Examples of important contributions to this debate are Ragnar Holte, “Logos Spermatikos: Christianity and Ancient Philosophy according to St. Justin's Apologies,” ST 12, (1958), Henry Chadwick, “Justin Martyr's Defence of Christianity,” BJRL 7, (1965), Joly, Christianisme, Mark J. Edwards, “On the Platonic Schooling of Justin Martyr,” JTS 42, (1991), and “Justin's Logos and the Word of God,” JECS 3, (1995).

10

Chapter 1: Introduction

losophy was mediated through Hellenistic Jewish sources, Philo par excellence, but no comprehensive research had been done into the matter. In 1964, Prigent made an attempt, through an analysis of Justin’s use of the Hebrew Scriptures, to prove that Justin’s lost Syntagma served as the source for both the Apology and the Dialogue.23 Though his conclusions failed to convince the majority of scholars, Prigent’s method of tracing Justin’s sources through their use in the text served as inspiration to Oskar Skarsaune’s seminal work on Justin’s proof-texting tradition, Proof from Prophecy, which was published in 1987.24 This work, which Slusser identifies as the launching point for the ‘Dialogue trend’ in modern Justin research,25 deals nonetheless (which Slusser acknowledges), with the Apology as well, and constituted a groundbreaking research into the literary sources and traditions behind Justin’s texts. Research on ancient apologetic texts was given a substantial contribution in the edited volume Apologetics in the Roman Empire,26 which, among other things, deals with questions of genre and audience of ancient apologetic works. These questions were then readdressed, more specifically pertaining to Justin, in the above-mentioned edited volume Justin Martyr and his Worlds,27 especially in Sarah Parvis’ article “Justin Martyr and the Apologetic Tradition.”28 In the same volume, Paul Parvis also introduced a radically new perspective on the history of the text of the Apology, which was then further developed and implemented in his and Denis Minns’ recent critical text and translation.29 Several of these works will be given fuller introductions in the pages to come. To date, no work has given specific interest into comprehensively analyzing Justin’s apologetic strategies or into exploring how the different arguments and apologetic topoi function together in the text, which is the aim of the present volume. This short review is, obviously, far from exhaustive but it is sufficient to provide a grasp of the state of the present research on Justin’s Apology. 23

Prigent, Justin et l'Ancien testament. Oskar Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile, NT.S. (Leiden: Brill, 1987). 25 Slusser, “Justin Scholarship”, 16. 26 Mark J. Edwards, Martin Goodman, and Simon Price, eds., Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagan, Jews and Christians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 27 Sara Parvis and Paul Foster, eds., Justin Martyr and His Worlds (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007). 28 Sara Parvis, “Justin Martyr and the Apologetic Tradition,” in Justin Martyr and His Worlds (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007). 29 Paul Parvis, “Justin, Philosopher and Martyr: The Posthumous Creation of the Second Apology,” ibid., Denis Minns and Paul Parvis, Justin, Philosopher and Martyr: Apologies, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 24

D. The Apology

11

D. The Apology D. The Apology

Having sorted out the preliminaries, it is now time for a closer presentation of the text which will concern us for the remainder of this book. The Apology was written by Justin, probably ca. 155 CE,30 and it purports to be a petition written to the emperor seeking relief for the persecuted Christian minority. It survived the Middle Ages, together with the Dialogue, in one single manuscript, the Parisinus graecus 450.31 The manuscript is dated to 11 September 1364, and on 2 April 1541 a copy was made which still exists under the name Phillippicus 3081.32 This poor manuscript tradition may seem strange when one reflects upon the strong influence Justin exerted on later Christian tradition, but in fact such cases are more norm than exception for second century Christian texts. The works of many Christian writers from this period, whether mainstream or sectarian, are completely lost to us save for the occasional fragment33 found in later Christian writers, and one must assume that there were quite a number of authors whose names or works we know nothing of today at all.34 Even in the case of the greatest Christian writer of the period, Irenaeus of Lyons, the manuscript tradition is fairly weak and had history taken but a slightly different turn, even his works might have been lost to the modern world.35 In the last half-century, a number of critical editions and/or translations of the Apology have appeared.36 The latest contribution is that of Minns and

30

For a long discussion on dating, cf. Munier, Justin, Apologie, 24–28. For a description of this MS., see Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 3–5. 32 That Phillippicus is a straight copy of Parisinus has been convincingly demonstrated by Bobichon (Philippe Bobichon, “Œuvres de Justin Martyr: Le manuscrit de Londres (Musei Britannici Loan 36/13) apographon du manuscrit de Paris (Parisinus Graecus 450).” Scriptorium 57, (2004): 157–172.). 33 Examples of second century authors whose works only survives in fragments are Papias, Marcion and Hegesippus as well as the apologists Quadratus, Apollinaris, and Militiades. 34 See Lorenzo Perrone, “Eine ‘verschollene Bibliothek’?: Das Schicksal frühchristlicher Schriften (2.–3. Jahrhundert) am Beispiel des Irenäus von Lyon,” ZKG 116, (2005): 1–29. 35 See e.g. Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. Cf. Slusser, “Justin Scholarship”, 13–14. 36 Cf. Wartelle, Apologies, Miroslav Marcovich, Iustini Martyris Apologiae pro Christianis, Patristische Texte und Studien (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), Munier’s minor edition (Charles Munier, Saint Justin, Apologie pour les chrétiens: édition et traduction, Paradosis (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1995)), L. W. Barnard, St. Justin Martyr: The First and Second Apologies, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), and finally Munier’s critical edition which includes a full introduction (Munier, Justin, Apologie). 31

12

Chapter 1: Introduction

Parvis, which was published in August 2009,37 and which, as mentioned, supplies some radical critical work on the Greek text along with a new English translation. The observant reader will no doubt have noticed that references consistently have been made to the Apology, rather than the Apologies of Justin, and a discussion on the relationship between the First and the Second Apology, and how they will be treated in the present work, is necessary before proceeding. In his earlier-mentioned article, Paul Parvis brings forth some fresh perspectives on the transmission of Justin’s text which henceforth will need to be considered in any study of the Apology.38 Parvis suggests that Justin first wrote a petition, which cannot be reconstructed today, but which included much of the First Apology, and also most of the Second Apology (including the story of ‘a certain women’ (γυνή τις), which begins in 2:2:1, and the last two chapters (14–15)). This petition, it is argued, may well have been submitted to the emperor and Justin may also have hoped for a response.39 At some point thereafter, so the hypothesis goes, this document was reworked into what now exists as the First Apology, whereas the Second Apology should best be seen as ‘clippings from the cutting-room floor,’ collected and published by Justin’s disciples after his death.40 On this theory, chapters 14–15 of the Second Apology concluded the original, longer petition, and probably also the later version today known as the First Apology. In their new critical edition of Justin’s apologies Parvis and Minns have consequently chosen to move the last two chapters of the Second Apology to the end of the First, i.e. directly after the rescript of Hadrian.41 If Parvis is correct, it may have implications for how the imperial address of the Apology should be understood.42 He mentions several aspects of such a Vorlage which might reinforce the impression that the treatise was really intended for submission to the emperor. Though these arguments will appear 37

Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr. Parvis, “Posthumous” Cf. Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 21–31. 39 Such responses could, in fact, come from the emperor’s own hand. That emperors were engaged in creating all kinds of documents has been shown e.g. by Williams (Wynne Williams, “Individuality in the Imperial Constitutions: Hadrian and the Antonines,” JRS 66, (1976): 83). 40 Parvis, “Posthumous”, 35–37, quote from 35. 41 Cf. Ibid., 28. An argument for the authenticity and correct placement of Hadrian’s rescript has been provided by Minns (Denis Minns, “The Rescript of Hadrian,” ibid. ). For a thorough discussion on the history of the text of the apologies, see also Paul Parvis and Denis Minns, “Justin Martyr's ‘Apologiae pro Christianis’,” JTS 52, (2001): 349–353. 42 It should, however, be noted that this theory of a single original apology has not been universally accepted in scholarship. A recent argument for viewing the apologies as two originally distinct writings is given in Runar M. Thorsteinsson, “The Literary Genre and Purpose of Justin's Second Apology: A Critical Review with Insights from Ancient Epistolography,” HTR 105, 94–114. 38

D. The Apology

13

in clearer light upon reading the next chapter, they are given a brief summary here. First, when chapters 14 and 15 of the Second Apology are allowed to conclude the First, the latter receives a shape that more clearly conforms to standard imperial addresses; it would, in Parvis’ words, begin ‘as a libellus should, with the names of petitioner and recipient, and would end with the request that “this petition” [...] be subscribed and posted.’43 Second, if Justin’s original petition included the issues brought before Roman authorities as well as the naming of names, such as Lollius Urbicus (2:1:1), who we know of from other sources,44 and Crescens the Cynic, mentioned e.g. in Ap. 2: 3[4]:1,45 it reinforces the case for a genuine imperial address, as such specificity would not be expected in work of fiction. Third, if the original Apology included the story of ‘a certain woman’ then we may for the first time be able to positively identify a real occasion for the treatise, which also increases the probability of the imperial address being authentic.46 Yet, though these are important observations, they are not particularly helpful to the study of the text which has been preserved. If the view is adopted that two versions of the same apology have existed, we are, namely, faced with the task of trying to decide what the purpose and intended audience was for both of them, and these may or may not have been the same. And here is where the problem lies. Even if the theory is true (though from existing data this can never be conclusively verified), nothing based on textual analysis can be said about the first version, as a hypothetical text of this kind cannot be reconstructed. At our disposal is only the version that has come down to us, which according to the theory is a later composition, to some extent a re-draft of the earlier version. We are thus back at the beginning in terms of deciding upon purpose and audience, since Justin could have redrafted his original petition for entirely new purposes and with an entirely new audience in mind. Or, to further complicate matters, nothing excludes the possibility that the second version was created by Justin’s disciples, rather 43

Parvis, “Posthumous”, 28. Cf. Barnard, Apologies, 56, 187, n. 182. 45 See discussion in Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC – AD 337), 2 ed. (London: Duckworth, 1992), 562–563. 46 Cf. Parvis, “Apologetic Tradition”, 23. Up to this point, no consensus has been reached regarding the occasion for the First Apology. It has been suggested that there was no specific occasion at all (Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 81, and William R. Schoedel, “Apologetic Literature and Ambassadorial Activities,” HTR 82, (1989): 74), or that Justin reacted against the accusations of the Roman historian Fronto (R. M. Grant, “Five Apologists and Marcus Aurelius,” VC 42, (1988): 30), or that the occasion was the martyrdom of Polycarp (another suggestion by Grant in Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1988), 53, and repeated by Norris (Richard A. Norris, “The Apologists,” in The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature, ed. Frances Young, Lewis Ayres, and Andrew Louth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 38). 44

14

Chapter 1: Introduction

than by the apologist himself. Parvis argues47 that this was the case with the Second Apology, and there seems to be no reason the same could not be true for the First. There is consequently no way of knowing how much of the original apology – again, granting that the theory is correct – remains in the existing one(s), and how much has been changed to suit its potentially new audience and purpose. At this juncture decisions have to be made. The path chosen in the present work is to focus on the text as it has been preserved,48 and therefore hypothetical previous stages of the text are not taken into consideration. The assumption will be that the treatise, at some point, was consciously and purposefully given the shape it has today, and – in the absence of contrary evidence – that this essentially was done by Justin himself. This is an important clarification, because later in this study an argument will be presented against the view that the Apology was ever intended for submission to the emperor. These conclusions, thus, pertain only to the text in its present form; a hypothetical Vorlage might or might not have been evaluated differently. Therefore, any analyses and text-based conclusions are drawn from existing critical editions of the First Apology, with references made to the Second mainly for purposes of comparison, contrast and clarification.49 References to the Apology should be understood as references to the First Apology, if nothing else is stated. Unless context indicates otherwise, chapter and verse references are always to the First Apology, with a ‘2’ augmented in references to the Second Apology (i.e. 1 Ap. 1:1 may be referenced simply as (1:1) whereas 2 Ap. 2:1 may be referenced as (2:1:1)). Minns’ and Parvis’ edition will be used both for renderings of the Greek text and for English translations, if nothing else is stated; chapter and verse references will, however, be given in accordance with Goodspeed’s50 universally accepted and employed numbering, with the alternate numbering of Minns and Parvis given in square brackets where applicable.51 With these clarifications and considerations made, it is time for a brief summary of the different chapters ahead.

47

Parvis, “Posthumous”, 35–36. The critical work of Minns and Parvis and others on the existing texts will, of course, be considered. 49 In chapter 5, an exception to this rule is made when Justin’s demonology is discussed on the basis of a quote from 2 Ap., but the reasons for this are stated and explained there. 50 Edgar Johnson Goodspeed, Die ältesten Apologeten: Texte mit kurzen Einleitungen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1914). 51 This will mostly apply to 2 Ap., as Minns and Parvis have changed the order of chapters of this text quite substantially in their edition. 48

E. Outline and Summary of Chapters

15

E. Outline and Summary of Chapters E. Outline and Summary of Chapters

In the second chapter (i.e. the chapter following this introduction) the discussion centres on the genre of ‘apologetics’ in ancient literature and how it should best be understood and defined. The term ‘apologetic’ is usually used in reference either to formal apologies, i.e. texts consciously and clearly modelled on forensic defence speeches, or to any text which offers a protreptic defence or promotion of, for example, a community, philosophy or religion. It is argued that the best way to understand the concept of ‘genre’ in relation to ancient apologetics is to think of it in terms of purpose and strategies, rather than as a specific literary form. Next, the chapter discusses the purpose of ancient apologetic literature in general and engages with Viktor Tcherikover’s seminal study on ancient Jewish apologetics which convincingly argues that the so called Alexandrian Jewish apologetic literature was intended for an internal (Jewish) consumption. From there the discussion moves into the second century Christian apologists in general, and eventually to the purpose and audience of Justin’s Apology in particular. Through an analysis of the unique form of the Apology, its implied author and textual audiences as well as Justin’s socio-cultural circumstances, it is concluded that the Apology’s intended audience probably should be understood as an internal, Christian one, possibly with a focus directed toward people who were either newly converted or on the verge of converting to Christianity. In other words, the kind of people Justin envisaged reading his Apology probably correlates well to those he presumably would have had much contact with through his philosophical ‘school’ in Rome. This understanding of the Apology’s purpose and audience is intended to inform and serve as the basis for the subsequent analyses of Justin’s apologetic strategies throughout this study. In the third chapter, two of Justin’s major apologetic strategies – the ‘Logos doctrine’ and the ‘theft theory’ – are analysed in relation to the problem they are both used to solve, which is Christianity’s late appearance on the world scene. In addition to a discussion of why this problem was important to Justin, an attempt is made to show how the different strategies work rhetorically in the text, and what exactly their employment is meant to achieve. It is argued that they constitute two interrelated, though different theories which address different aspects of the problem. Thus, they are neither contradictory nor redundant; whereas the ‘theft theory’ approaches the problem from a textual horizon and deals with the question of plagiarism, the ‘Logos doctrine’ is used to solve problems surrounding ethics, morality and personal accountability. It is concluded that Justin presents the Christian faith through a language of both antiquity and newness, where old age is credited to the philosophy/religion as such and newness to its full experience.

16

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the fourth chapter, what is identified as Justin’s most important apologetic strategy, the so called ‘proof from prophecy’, is discussed at some length. Justin frames the argument from fulfilled prophecy as the clinching evidence which irrefutably proves the validity of the Christian truth-claims. The logic of this argument in its ancient setting is analysed as is the way it works together with other major apologetic topoi in the Apology (i.e. the ‘Logos doctrine’ and the ‘theft theory’). Justin’s rhetorical use of the Hebrew Scriptures in relation to Christian doctrine is also explored, and it is argued that though the Hebrew prophets are immensely important to Justin’s defence of Christianity, there is no clear theology of Scripture at work in the Apology. The function of the prophetic texts is to provide evidence for the validity and truthfulness of Christian narrative and doctrine, but no intrinsic authority is bestowed upon them. Finally, prophetic agency in the Apology is discussed as an example of how Justin negotiates between received tradition and apologetic needs in the construction of his apologetic narrative. If chapters 3 and 4 deal with strategies Justin uses in the positive, i.e. with the purpose of actively and positively proving the truthfulness and excellence of the Christian faith, the fifth chapter deals with Justin’s arguments in the negative, i.e. his, often deriding, criticism of Christianity’s competitors. The chapter treats the way Justin, playing on the tense strings of the ancient conflict between myth and philosophy, seeks to frame Christianity as the rational and enlightened alternative to a myth-based, irrational, deluded and ultimately depraved paganism. The function of the pagan mythographers and the Christian heretics within Justin’s apologetic is explored, as well as the dominating role of the evil demons, posing as pagan gods, in the corruption of truth, the deception of humankind, and the persecution against Christians. After this, in the concluding sixth chapter, the findings of this study are summarized and briefly analysed, and suggestions for future research are proposed. Appendix: every critical edition of an ancient text should provide some sort of outline or delineation of its structure and/or contents, and when it comes to the Apology there are several to choose from. Marcovich includes a fairly comprehensive outline for both the First and Second Apology which is structured as a content summary for each chapter with references to possible sources in the margins.52 Minns and Parvis include an outline which attempts to structure Justin’s different arguments in the First Apology in accordance with the standards of Graeco-Roman rhetoric,53 and both Munier and Wartelle include short structure outlines in their respective editions.54 The outline appended here, though benefitting from the above-mentioned ones, will differ 52

Marcovich, Apologiae, 11–29. Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 49–54. 54 Munier, Justin, Apologie, 34–38, and Wartelle, Apologies, 36–39. 53

F. Definitions

17

in some ways. Most importantly, it will aim to highlight and bring to attention the different strategies and themes discussed in the present work and thus, although all summaries necessarily inflict violence on the original text, this one has a consciously interpretative and selective approach. The reader is encouraged to refer to it whenever a need is felt for a clearer textual context of the discussions. As this summary has shown, this monograph does not seek to analyse the Apology in chronological sequence, but rather from a thematic angle where major apologetic themes and strategies are addressed one by one. The most important of these strategies will be the ‘Logos doctrine’, the ‘theft theory, the ‘proof from prophecy’ and the negative argumentation, which in turn takes different expressions. The textual structure is not insignificant, and the appendix is intended to help the reader get an appreciation of the textual context, but more important for the discussion is the logical structure of Justin’s arguments. The logic and rationale of the apologetic strategies are crucial to obtaining an understanding of their function and purpose in the text.

F. Definitions F. Definitions

This introduction will be concluded with a brief discussion of a few terms and expressions, commonly used throughout the book. ‘Pagan’ and ‘Paganism’: The word ‘pagan’ is never used by Justin, and it is clearly a problematic term. The Latin noun paganus, meaning ‘villager’ or ‘country-dweller,’ was used, probably pejoratively, by Christians of a later age (when Christianity had become the majority religion) to describe their religious opponents. Ironically, as what Christians described as ‘paganism’ was really ‘a varied group of cults and observances,’ which from the beginning ‘never constituted a single coherent religious movement analogous to either Christianity or Judaism,’55 they were themselves instrumental in forming a distinct ‘pagan’ identity for those who still preferred traditional religiosity over Christianity.56 In Justin’s time, neither the term nor the concept of a single pagan ‘movement’ existed. In the Apology, Justin does entertain the Jewish division between gentile and Jew, and into this distinction he forges Christians as a third, though different, category of people, but he has no clear sense of a ‘pagan’ identity. In this study, therefore, ‘pagan’ and ‘paganism’, 55 Robert A. Markus, The End of Ancient Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 28. 56 Only ‘directly under the influence of Christianity [is it] possible to speak of ‘paganism' as a system rather than as an amalgam of different cults’ (Mary Beard, John North, and Simon Price, Religions of Rome, vol. 1, A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 312).

18

Chapter 1: Introduction

in want for better and less loaded terms, will be used to refer to traditional Graeco-Roman religion.57 ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’: In the last decades, research into the emergence of a Christian identity58 as distinct from Judaism has problematized the idea of an early separation between the two religions as well as the whole notion of a clear and visible ‘parting of the ways’.59 Realizing that the terms ‘Jewish’ and ‘Christian’ may have meant different things to different people in Justin’s time, and that a clear distinction between these two identity designations may not always have existed, I will nonetheless attempt to use the terms the way Justin uses them, i.e. in clear contradistinction to each other. Precisely how Justin shapes Christian identity in the Apology will be discussed at the appropriate place, but though Christianity’s relation to Judaism is more the topic of the Dialogue, also the Apology defines a Christian as something altogether different than a Jew. On a related note, the word ‘gentile’, will be used in its biblical sense, i.e. as referring to anyone who is ‘from the nations’, that is, who is not a Jew. ‘Hebrew’ or ‘Jewish’ Scriptures: These terms will be used to refer to the Tanach (the Torah, the Prophets and the Writings, including their Greek translation, the Septuagint (LXX)), i.e. the body of writings to which later Christian theologians would refer as the Old Testament.

57 As Clark notes ‘[t]he word “pagan” is widely, but reluctantly, used by historians: reluctantly because it was Christian disparagement of non-Christians, widely because it is difficult to find an alternative.’ (Gillian Clark, Christianity and Roman Society, Key Themes in Ancient History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 35). Cf. Beard, North, and Price, Religions, 1: A History, ix. 58 As often noted, the term ‘identity’– and in particular corporate identity – is itself problematic as it is of recent origin and not easily applicable for describing ideas of ‘self’ and community constructs in the minds of people living in the second century. Yet, settling for a more rudimentary definition, such as the one proposed by Judith Lieu, according to which the concept is seen as involving ‘ideas of boundedness, of sameness and difference, of continuity, perhaps of a degree of homogeneity, and of recognition by self and by others,’ it can still be useful in speaking about the ancient past; see discussion in Judith M. Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1–26, quote from p. 12. 59 Cf. e.g. Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), Judith M. Lieu, “‘The Parting of the Ways’: Theological Construct or Historical Reality?” in Neither Jew Nor Greek?: Constructing Early Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2005), and Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed, eds., The Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007).

Chapter 2

Justin and the Early Christian Apology Before setting out to explore any specific historical question, there are always preliminaries which must be covered and dealt with; for example, background, context, settings, and definitions are features which should always be outlined in order to provide a structure for later discussions. This chapter, which also is the longest, will venture into such domains, in particular when it discusses the definition of apologetic literature and the form of Justin’s Apology. Yet, what is covered here is more than mere preliminaries, and this will justify the chapter’s relative length. A major part of it features a substantial discussion on the intended audience of the Apology, which should be perceived as a distinct contribution to scholarship and an integral part of the overall argument. As the purpose of this study is to analyse the literaryrhetorical function of Justin’s apologetic arguments, the question of intended audience will constitute an essential part of the analysis, rather than just a preliminary consideration. In the pages ahead, thus, the concept of ancient apologetics in general will be discussed in terms of both definition and purpose and after this, the form and audience of Justin’s Apology will be discussed at some length, in order to provide a foundation for the discussions found in the chapters which follow.

A. Apologetics in Antiquity A. Apologetics in Antiquity

I. An Apologetic Genre? In recent years, the difficulty of categorizing ancient writings into different genres has been increasingly recognized, especially if genre is conceived of as a clearly defined ‘recipe’ unto which a particular writing conforms more or less successfully. Though current criticism recognizes the necessity of sorting ancient material for the purposes of analysis and intellectual engagement,1 it must be remembered that so called ‘genre theory’ is a relatively modern phenomenon and that ‘when we come to look for it in the critics of antiquity, as of course we must, it appears a much more patchy and incomplete thing than 1

Cf. Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, “Ancient Literary Genres: A Mirage?,” in Ancient Literary Criticism, ed. Andrew Laird, Oxford Readings in Classical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 423.

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Chapter 2: Justin and the Early Christian Apology

is commonly supposed.’2 In consequence, there exists today no consensus as to how many genres existed in antiquity or indeed how genre should be defined.3 When attempting to discuss the potential existence of an apologetic genre in antiquity, it is thus first necessary to arrive at a definition of some important terms. In addition to genre, these terms are apologetic, form, purpose, and strategy. The word ‘apologetic’ comes from the Greek (and Latin) term apologia, which means ‘defence’. In a broad sense, therefore, the term, in an ancient context, always refers to some form of defence and/or promotion, commonly of a person, community, philosophy, religion or praxis.4 ‘Form’ refers to the literary form/convention in which a text is written (which, yet, may not always be easy to identify), ‘purpose’ refers to the questions of why and to what ends a text was written and ‘strategy’ refers to the literary methods and approaches an author uses in order to achieve a given set of goals. When efforts have been made to define an ancient apologetic genre, the term has typically been linked to or identified with either form or purpose, which has contributed to its notorious opaqueness. This tendency correlates to the two ways in which the word ‘apologetic’ is most commonly used in reference to ancient texts. Normally, an apologetic text is perceived as belonging to one of the following two categories: The first is what will be referred to as formal apologies (apologiae, ἀπολογίαι).5 This category constitutes the classic understanding of the term and it refers to texts modelled on forensic speeches given in courtroom settings. The category may include texts more tightly modelled on the courtroom scenario and therefore explicitly addressed to a judicial authority,6 as well as those not addressed to an authority but still loosely modelled on a forensic scenario, in that they are framed around accusations and responses.7 2

D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity (London: Duckworth, 1981), 148–149. Rosenmeyer, “Literary Genres,” 421. 4 Cf. Anders-Christian Jacobsen, “Apologetics and Apologies – Some Definitions,” in Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics, ed. Jörg Ulrich, AndersChristian Jacobsen, and Maijastina Kahlos (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009). 5 The Latin transliteration of the Greek word occurs only in Late Antiquity, and then sparingly; cf. Robert D. Sider, ed. Christian and Pagan in the Roman Empire: The Witness of Tertullian, Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 6, n. 4. 6 This address can be actual or fictional; what is discussed here is the rhetorical form of the text, not purpose or audience. 7 According to the organisation of ancient Greek rhetoric, the ἀπολογία (defence speech) belongs together with its opposite, the κατηγορία (accusation speech). Thus, the ἀπολογία is, per definition, a response to accusations (cf. Aristotle Rhet. 10). Cf. Philo, Leg. 350, where he describes his expectations before the audience with Gaius. He had expected that both sides would have been given the chance to present their cases (κατηγορία and ἀπολογία respectively) before the autocrat. 3

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An example of the latter is Josephus’ Against Apion, which consciously invokes courtroom rhetoric when, for instance, ancient writers are called as ‘witnesses’ to the author’s thesis.8 The formal apologies originated within rhetoric (as they were given orally in court), but eventually developed into literature.9 The prototype and most obvious example of this category of texts is Plato’s Apologia, which retells the story of Socrates’ trial. The second category consists of treatises defending and promoting e.g. a community or religion (usually in protreptic language), though not explicitly responding to any specific charges or accusations. Texts belonging to this category may include propagandistic Jewish Hellenistic works, such as the fragmentary authors of Polyhistor, The Letter of Aristeas, some of Philo’s works, as well as what Gregory E. Sterling has labelled ‘apologetic historiography,’10 examples of which could be the Acts of the Apostles and Josephus’ Jewish Antiquities. The main difference between these categories is that though texts from both groups could have an apologetic purpose, e.g. the defence and/or promotion of a certain ethnic community, only texts from the first category are apologetic in form. Texts from the first category belong rhetorically within a legal or semi-legal context, where real or invented accusations are responded to, whereas texts from the second category may belong to different rhetorical contexts in which explicit opposing parties may not be part of the picture. In short, the latter category of texts is less narrow and more inclusive in its scope than the former.11 8 See Niclas Förster, “Geschichtsforschung als Apologie: Josephus und die NichtGriechischen Historiker in Contra Apionem,” in Making History: Josephus and Historical Method, ed. Zuleika Rodgers, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 168–171. 9 Cf. John M. G. Barclay, Against Apion: Translation and Commentary, Flavius Josephus Translation and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2007), XXXIV. Yet, one should not overemphasize the difference between oratory and literature in antiquity. For example, listening was the norm for poetry as much as it was for oratory; Greek and Roman poetry was not written to be read in silence, but to be spoken or intoned in front of an audience. Conversely, forensic defence speeches delivered orally in courts, were in general written down in advance for rehearsal (though what has survived from this genre are usually later revised versions of the original speech); see Elaine Fantham, “Oratory and Literature: The Spoken and the Written Word,” in The Roman World of Cicero's De Oratore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 132, 138. 10 Gregory E. Sterling, Historiography and Self-Definition: Josephos, Luke-Acts and Apologetic Historiography. NT.S (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), see esp. 16–19 for definition. Cf. Mendels on ‘creative historiography’: Doron Mendels, Identity, Religion and Historiography: Studies in Hellenistic History. Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha Supplements Series (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 357–364. 11 Yet, as the categories are defined on the basis of different criteria, they should not be understood entirely in terms of being ‘broad’ or ‘narrow’. For example, if it is argued that a specific text, apologetic in form, has a non-apologetic purpose – i.e., if the form is per-

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How, then, should the term ‘genre’ be understood in relation to these categories? Barclay, in his commentary on Josephus’ Against Apion, claims that one must distinguish between the rhetorical genre and the pragmatic purpose of a text, and thus he has chosen to identify genre with form.12 Others prefer to define genre in terms of purpose.13 In this study, the term ‘apologetic genre’, inasmuch as it is used and insofar nothing else is stated, will be understood as encompassing texts from both of the above defined categories, i.e. both texts which may be called apologetic in form, and those that may be called apologetic in purpose. Yet, as purpose is a broader defining element than form, it will serve as the prominent characteristic. This not only provides for a greater variety of texts to be brought to the same table, but it also allows form to be analysed as strategy rather than as mere literary convention. In other words, form may be seen as part of or as caused by purpose rather than as something governing it. The editors of the earlier-mentioned and important publication Apologetics in the Roman Empire,14 have similarly opted for a broad understanding of the term ‘apologetics’. They contend that for ‘genre’ to be a useful concept in this context, it should not be understood as referring to fixed taxonomies (i.e. forms), but rather ‘as a way of talking about the strategies of writers (and readers) in different cultural traditions and particular contemporary situations.’15 Understanding apologetics in terms of strategies which are employed with the purpose of achieving certain goals makes it easier to find links and common patterns between texts which may be written in different forms, have ceived as literary fiction – it will have to be excluded from the latter category, though still belonging to the former. 12 The rhetorical genre should, according to Barclay, be seen as ‘a feature of the text itself,’ whereas the pragmatic purpose ‘concerns what lies behind the text,’ i.e. ‘the intentions of the author in the context of its composition’ (Barclay, Apion, 10, XXX). 13 See Frances Young, “Greek Apologists of the Second Century,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 90–91. For another broad understanding of the concept of early Christian apologetics, see A. J. Droge, “Apologetics, NT,” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992). 14 Edwards, Goodman, and Price, Apologetics in the Roman Empire. 15 Ibid., 3. For similar views, see Michael Fiedrowicz, Apologie im frühen Christentum: Die Kontroverse um den christlichen Wahrheitsanspruch in den ersten Jahrhunderten (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000), 21–22, Averil Cameron, “Apologetics in the Roman Empire – a Genre of Intolerance?,” in 'Humana Sapit'. Études d'Antiquité Tardive Offertes à Leillia Cracco Ruggini, ed. J.-M. Carrié and R. L. Testa, Bibliothèque de l'Antiquité Tardive (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2002), and Anders Klostergaard Petersen, “The Diversity of Apologetics: From Genre to a Mode of Thinking,” in Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity, ed. Anders-Christian Jacobsen, J. Ulrich, and David Brakke (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009). For an argument in favour of a more narrow definition, see John M. G. Barclay, “Josephus' Contra Apionem as Jewish Apologetics,” in ibid.

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different stated addressees and agendas as well as different ostensible purposes. II. The Purpose of Apologetic Arguments Christians were by no means first with presenting defences and propagandistic literature in favour of their own group in antiquity. One can easily envisage apologetic literature being produced by several small ethnic communities who were trying to relate to the larger Hellenistic culture in which they found themselves, though very little from such literature has survived.16 What remains from pre-Christian apologetic literature belongs almost exclusively to one of these small communities, namely the Jewish one, and it is mainly because of the Christian church that it has survived.17 Thus, when trying to find a precursor to Christian apologetics it is to the Jewish literature one has to turn. There are also a number of other reasons to why specifically Jewish writings are interesting for such purposes. First, the social situation of the Jewish community in antiquity was in many places and in many ways similar to that of the early Christians. It was an outsider community, with habits and rituals often looked upon with suspicion by the surrounding society, and at times the Jews were also treated unfavourably by the local governments. Second, as Christianity grew out of Judaism, and because of their theological affinities, Christians came to share many problems with the Jews. Most importantly, their shared ethical monotheism made little sense to their pagan neighbours and it often got them into conflict with the religious expectations of the surrounding society. Christians were often slandered and accused of the same things with which Jews had been charged for centuries before the rise of Christianity. Only one Jewish text remains which can be regarded apologetic in form, and that is Josephus’ Against Apion. Yet, apologetic themes can be found in several other Jewish texts (for example Philo’s writings, Josephus’ other works and the Letter of Aristeas), and fragments from a number of Jewish writings have survived primarily through Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius, which contain different apologetic topoi and themes that were later reiterated and developed by Christian apologists.18 What function then, did this literature serve for the Jewish community? About fifty years ago, Viktor Tcherikover published an article which came to strongly impact the scholarly understanding of the Alexandrian Jewish litera16

Cf. Grant, Greek Apologists, 9. There are, however, surviving examples from non-Jewish authors as well; see Sterling, Historiography, 137 n. 132. 18 These fragmental authors came down to Clement and Eusebius primarily through a collection made by the Greek historian Alexander Polyhistor. Examples are Eupolemus, Artapanus, Cleodemus, Aristobulus and Ezekiel the Tragedian. 17

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ture. Up and until the time of this article, the dominating view among scholars of ancient Judaism was that texts within this corpus which contained apologetic arguments were directed towards outside communities, i.e. that the purpose of this literature was, through defence and praise of Judaism and denunciation of pagan polytheism, to make proselytes.19 In the introduction to the article, Tcherikover summarizes the understanding of Alexandrian Jewish literature that had been dominating until then in the following words: 1.) The Jews were compelled to defend their religion against antisemitic attack – hence the self-defence; 2.) the most effective defence is that which represents Judaism as the ideal of all religions and ethics – hence the panegyric; 3.) the defence of Jewish doctrines and, above all, of monotheism leads naturally to an attack on polytheistic religions – hence the polemics; and 4.) since the whole apologetic literature is directed at Gentiles, it had a practical purposes as well: to spread the Jewish religion among the Gentiles in order to make proselytes – hence the propaganda.20

In short, the literature was perceived as having a missionary purpose and hence its intended readership was gentile. In his article, Tcherikover fundamentally challenges this conception and attempts to create a new approach which understands the literature produced by this community ‘as a mirror reflecting various opinions within Jewish Alexandrian society,’ which ‘were influenced by continuously changing political, economic and social factors.’21 As a result, he questions not so much the idea that the literature contains elements of self-defence, polemics and propaganda, as the conclusions often drawn from this fact, namely that the literature was directed outwards, i.e. to the Greek community.22 On the contrary, Tcherikover claims, this so called apologetic literature was probably directed inwards, i.e. to the Jewish community itself. Tcherikover bases his argument on both socio-political and textual considerations. First he investigates the technical possibilities of spreading literary propaganda in Antiquity. He points to the fact that no systematized distribution or even production of books and scrolls existed at the time, and that it was very unlikely that a book would receive wide circulation outside the author’s own social network. Exceptions were if an author was well known, well respected and well rooted in society, in which case a publisher might 19 Cf. e.g. M. Friedländer, Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik als Vorgeschichte des Christentums (Zurich: Verlag v. Caesar Schmidt, 1903), A. Causse, “La propaganda juive et l'hellenisme,” RHPR 3, (1923), and Peter Dalbert, Die Theologie der hellenistischjüdischen Missionsliteratur unter Ausschluss von Philo und Josephus (Hamburg: H. Reich, 1954). 20 Victor Tcherikover, “Jewish Apologetic Literature Reconsidered,” Eos 48, (1956): 169. 21 Ibid., 170. 22 Ibid., 171.

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show interest in copying and selling a text. As the Jewish community in general was neither highly respected nor seen as an integral part of the Alexandrian Greek society, it seems unlikely that a Jewish author, writing on Judaism, could hope to receive wide circulation of his works.23 Given such social circumstances, Tcherikover questions if Jews would really try to produce texts for mass-propaganda towards gentiles. Second, Tcherikover questions the idea that elements of self-defence, panegyric, polemic and propaganda would only make sense in works written with an outside audience in mind. On the contrary, praise of one’s own culture and polemic attacks against outsiders makes much sense in literature with an inward audience, especially when found within the context of a community that itself, at least occasionally, experienced much pressure from the outside.24 Thirdly, Tcherikover argues that a Jewish audience often is implied in the texts themselves. This is shown both from the fact that biblical knowledge is often assumed,25 but also that pagan religion is caricatured.26 Tcherikover also suggests that the bulk of Alexandrian Jewish literature which was produced after the creation of the LXX, and which consists mainly of Scriptural commentaries, hardly was suited for pagan readers.27 If, therefore, the exegetical works and commentaries were directed towards the Jews, then ‘every passage which shows a special interest in the prescriptions of the Torah, or in which some biblical events are mentioned,’ must have been so as well, since a gentile would not know what to make of such references.28 This would include the literature popularly labelled ‘apologetic’. Taken together, Tcherikover claims, evidence suggests that this literature should best be understood as directed towards an inward audience. By and large, most scholars seem to have accepted Tcherikover’s conclusions,29 though there are also those who disagree with some of his argu23 In more recent times, Erich Gruen, among others, has argued for a more positive view on Alexandrian Graeco-Jewish relations (cf. Erich S. Gruen, Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks and Romans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), Heritage and Hellenism: the Reinvention of Jewish Tradition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998)). However, even if the situation of the Jews was not as grim as has sometimes been suggested, it does not disarm Tcherikover’s claim that the Jewish community existed as separated from the Greek one, and that a Jewish author hardly could have taken for granted that Greek readers would take an interest in works on Jewish religion. 24 Tcherikover, “Apologetic Literature,” 180–181. 25 Ibid., 179. 26 Ibid., 181–182. 27 For detailed arguments, see ibid., 176–177. 28 Ibid., 178–179. 29 Cf. e.g. Scot McKnight, A Light Among the Gentiles: Jewish Missionary Activities in the Second Temple Period (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 57–62, Martin Goodman, Mission and Conversion: Proselytizing in the Religious History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 65–66, 78–80, and John J. Collins, Between Athens and

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ments.30 A convincing argumentation to why Tcherikover’s general conclusion (i.e. that Jewish ‘apologetic’ literature primarily was intended for an inward consumption) still remains largely viable has recently been provided by Michael Bird.31 The primary purpose of the apologetic literature, then, must not necessarily be either propagandistic or missionary, but could rather be interpreted as attempts to self-definition and to the strengthening of a group’s own cultural identity. Turning now to considering early Christian apologetics, which has often been assumed to have had a missionary purpose, Tcherikover’s findings will be important to keep in mind. III. The Christian Apologists of the Second Century Though Tertullian, as far as known, is the first Christian author who had a work of him referred to as an apologia,32 subsequent tradition has bestowed the term on many Christian writings before him. Indeed, the period leading up to the end of the second century, and which Tertullian only concludes, is often referred to as ‘the age of the apologists’33 in surveys of early ChristianiJerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora, 2 ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 271–272. 30 E.g. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Miracles, Mission, and Apologetics: An Introduction,” in Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity, ed. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), Louis H. Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 305–324, and James Carleton Paget, “Jewish Proselytism at the Time of Christian Origins: Chimera or Reality?,” JSNT 18, (1996): 85. 31 Michael F. Bird, Crossing over Land and Sea: Jewish Missionary Activity in the Second Temple Period (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2010), 109–121. This is not to claim that Jewish literature never found its way into gentile hands, or received gentile attention. There is enough evidence to conclude that this, at least on occasion, did happen (cf. John M. G. Barclay, “Apologetics in the Jewish Diaspora,” in Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman Cities, ed. John R. Bartlett (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 142, and Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 311–314). A survey of the extant references is found in John Granger Cook, The Interpretation of the Old Testament in Greco-Roman Paganism, STAC (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 1–54. Cf. Menahem Stern, Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974). 32 Lactantius (Divine Institutes 5:4:3) knew the work as Apologeticum, and Jerome (Ep. 70:5) refers to it as Tertullian’s [liber] apolgeticus. 33 The term ‘apologist’ is, however, of modern provenance. It was first used by Otto in reference to the authors of the Christian second century texts he considered to be apologetic (J. C. Th. Otto, Corpus apologetarum christianorum saeculi secundi, 9 vols. (Jena: Mauke, 1847–72)). Cf. Oskar Skarsaune, “Justin and the Apologists,” in The Routledge Companion to Early Christian Thought, ed. D. Jeffrey Bingham (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 121.

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ty. Nevertheless, as the term apologetics has been notoriously difficult to define, opinions on which writings should be considered part of this group differ. Among Christian texts traditionally labelled apologetic are found such diverse literary devices as orations, addresses to individuals or communities, common letters and dialogues. The works have different addressees, intended audiences and even different enemies.34 In the fourth century, Eusebius explicitly refers to seven works from the second century as apologies. These are texts ascribed to Aristides and Quadratus (H.E. IV:3:1–2), Justin (IV:18:2), Melito and Apollinaris (IV:26:1–2), Militiades (V:17:5), and Tertullian (II:2:4). Unfortunately, all but three of these texts (those of Aristides, Justin and Tertullian) are lost or remain only in the short fragments Eusebius presents.35 Eusebius’ list is interesting in that it only includes writings which are explicitly addressed to the authorities, and it seems as if this feature is what defines an apologia for him. In consequence, early Christian writings which have traditionally been seen as apologetic but do not conform to this pattern (such as, for example, Tatian’s Exhortation to the Greeks, Theophilus’ Ad Autolycum, or Justin’s Dialogue) fall outside this ‘Eusebian’ category of Christian apologetics. Sara Parvis’ assertion that a Eusebian apology ‘presents itself as apologia in the normal classical sense of the trial speech of the defence,’ seems, however, to outrun the evidence; since most of these writings remain only in fragments it is simply not possible to comment on their form.36 However, that they all are addressed to the authorities (at least according to Eusebius) is important and that Eusebius labels them apologies probably indicates that he saw them as following the tradition of Plato’s Apologia.37 Parvis argues that Aristides’ work does not match the criteria set up by Eusebius, since there is nothing forensic about it,38 but as the latter did not seem to have read the work himself,39 he might just have failed to realize this. A 34

See Young, “Greek Apologists”, 82, and Bernard Pouderon, Les apologistes grecs du II:e siècle, Initiations aux pères de l'église (Paris: de Cerf, 2005), 14–15. 35 For a comment on each of Eusebius’ apologists, see Wolfram Kinzig, “Der ‘Sitz im Leben’ der Apologie in der Alten Kirche,” ZKG 100, (1989): 295–301. 36 Parvis, “Apologetic Tradition”. Cf.: ‘Christians had reserved the name apologia for works in the forensic mode.’ (Mark J. Edwards, “The Flowering of Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 201–202). 37 Ancient writers typically saw themselves as writing in the tradition of some venerated raw model (such as Homer, Sophocles, Sappho or Plato), rather than producing literature of a certain mode or kind. Thus, ancient critics often employed craft terminology, rather than genre, in order to classify literary products (Cf. Rosenmeyer, “Literary Genres”, 435– 437). 38 Parvis, “Apologetic Tradition”, 118. 39 Cf. Andrew James Carriker, The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea, VCSup (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 188–189.

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work that, on the contrary, would fit perfectly within this category is the Embassy of Athenagoras, and the fact that Eusebius never mentions it probably indicates that he simply did not know of its existence.40 Thus, according to Parvis, the apologies of Justin, Athenagoras and Tertullian are what really remains today from this group of early Christian writings. The inclusion of Athenagoras into the category of Eusebian apologies seems unproblematic. Given its address to the emperor and that it appears to be modelled on and, as far as structure, rhetoric and logical argument go, could well be seen as an improvement of Justin’s apology, it seems reasonable to assume that had Eusebius known about it, he would have counted among his apologies.41 Parvis’ second suggestion, i.e. that Aristides’ apology should be removed from the list, is more difficult to accept. Even though the legal or semi-legal rhetoric is much less pronounced in Aristides than in e.g. Justin and Athenagoras, and though Eusebius probably had not read Aristides himself, the fact remains that we do not possess enough information to conclude which were Eusebius’ criteria for calling a text an apologia. The only conclusion that can be drawn from his own text is that an apologia probably had to be explicitly addressed to a judicial authority and contain some sort of defence for the Christian faith,42 and this is certainly true for Aristides. Setting out to studying Justin’s apology in greater detail, it is in this context, and as a part of this particular corpus, that the text will have to be understood. As a protreptic defence-writing, Justin’s apology stands in a long and broad tradition within the Hellenistic world, but relating to its form and rhetorical character, it belongs to a small and unique group of Christian writings which emerges during the second century, and then, again, disappears from history.

40

Parvis, “Apologetic Tradition”, 118. Another possibility has been suggested by Harnack. He identifies Athenagoras’ Embassy with a second (now lost) apology of Justin mentioned by Eusebius as addressed to Marcus Aurelius (H.E. 4:16:1, 4:18:2). In this case, Eusebius did know of the treatise and also referred to it as an apology, though he was mistaken about its author (Adolf Harnack, “Judentum und Judenchristentum in Justins Dialog mit Trypho,” TU 39, (1913): 172–173). (That the two Justinian apologies mentioned by Eusebius do not refer to what has come down to us as 1 and 2 Ap. is clear from internal evidence, cf. e.g. Lorraine Buck, “Justin Martyr's ‘Apologies’: Their Number, Destination, and Form,” JTS 54, (2003): 46–49). 42 On this question, cf. Michael Frede, “Eusebius' Apologetic Writings,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 225–229. 41

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B. Justin’s Apology: Form, Audience and Purpose B. Justin’s Apology: Form, Audience and Purpose

I. The Form of the Apology Seeing that Justin’s apology belongs to a group of Christian texts from the second century which have in common that they present a defence for Christianity and that they are rhetorically addressed to the authorities, the next question is where these writings, and Justin’s in particular, fit within the literary traditions in antiquity. Which literary models, if any, did Justin draw upon and what kind of rhetoric does he engage in? Several alternatives have been suggested and in the sections ahead a few of them will be explored. The primary reason as to why Justin’s text is so difficult to categorize is that the Apology roughly can be divided into two parts (excluding the peroration). One (chs. 1–14, here referred to as the ‘deliberative part’) focuses on the imperial address, Justin’s judicial demands, his defence against slanders and his pleas for a change of imperial policies in relation to the treatment of Christians. The other (chs. 15–67, referred to as the ‘demonstration part’) contains what Justin refers to as his demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) of the rationality (and superiority) of Christianity as a religion and/or philosophical system. There is no known text prior to Justin which was organized in quite the same way, and thus attempts in the past of finding exact literary models for his treatise as a whole have failed. Therefore, it is important, already from the beginning, to recognize Justin’s originality in combining these two parts into one treatise, so that when one looks for literary models and inspirations for Justin, one must do so for these parts separately. First, the inner relation of the Christian apologies needs to be addressed. If several writings of a peculiar character emerge during a particular timeframe within a given community, there is a good chance that one of the texts will have served as a model for the others. Chronologically, there are only two of the Eusebian apologies that possibly predate Justin (and which therefore could have served as inspiration for him) and those are the ones written by Aristides and Quadratus. As already mentioned, the apology of Quadratus remains only in a short Eusebian fragment. It provides no information relating to its literary form other than that it was addressed to the emperor, and what can be gleaned from it in regard to content finds no echo in Justin’s apology at all. Thus, if Justin knew of or used Quadratus, we are in no position to know about it. Aristides’ apology, in contrast, has survived in two full, though redacted, versions (one in Syriac and one in Greek), and is therefore entitled to some consideration.

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1. Aristides’ Apology The Apology of Aristides is commonly perceived as having been written some 30–40 years before Justin’s. This dating is, however, neither certain nor undisputed and Sara Parvis has argued that Aristides’ apology very well could have been written after Justin’s.43 If true, this would rule the former out as a possible literary model for the latter. Nonetheless, Parvis’ arguments are not conclusive, and a comment on the literary relation between these two texts is therefore both warranted and necessary. To anticipate conclusions, Aristides is an unlikely candidate for a model to Justin’s apology, and the reason for this is that the two texts are crucially different in several important ways. Aristides, like Justin, addresses his treatise to the emperor,44 but almost immediately after the address, all similarities between the two treatises fade away. The imperial address in Aristides is a poorly worked out theme, and serves only as a thin literary framework for the treatise. This is accentuated by the fact that the autocrat, in the few instances he is readdressed directly, is wrongly given the title ‘King’, rather than ‘Emperor’. There are few similarities between Aristides’ apology and any formal addresses to authorities. Any notion of a genuine case is absent from the text; there are no legal concerns mentioned or implied, and the absence of any remarks which could be interpreted as pleas or complaints against imperial policies raises the question what the purpose of the treatise could have been, if interpreted as a genuine petition to the emperor. The content of the treatise is structured as a comparative account of the ‘four races’ of humankind; Barbarians, Greeks, Jews and Christians (Ap. 2).45 Aristides describes these races in a U-shaped sequence, in which they are ordered according to their vices and virtues. The first batch of races are described in order of declining virtues, or inversely, in increasing wickedness. The vain idolatry of the Barbarians is trumped by that of the Greeks, which in 43

Parvis, “Apologetic Tradition,” 119–120. Eusebius claims that Aristides presented his treatise to the Emperor Hadrian in 125 CE. The Syriac version of the text, however, contains an explicit address to Hadrian’s successor, Antonius Pius. It is possible that Eusebius simply confused the two emperors since the latter emperor’s full name also included ‘Hadrianus’: Imperator Caesar Titus Aelius Hadrianus Antonius Augustus Pontifex Maximus. 45 This according to the Syriac recension. In the Greek recension there are only three ‘races’: pagans, Jews and Christians. The Syriac recension, which is longer, is generally preferred over Greek one, and for the sake of simplicity and brevity, it is followed here. Yet, as has been pointed out by Lieu, it should be kept in mind that also the Syriac recension undoubtedly has undergone editing and therefore ‘any reconstruction [of the text] must be eclectic.’ See discussion in Judith M. Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 164–177, quote from 165. 44

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turn is trumped by that of the Egyptians,46 who ‘are more evil and ignorant than all peoples upon the earth’ (12:1).47 After this, the Jews are described as more virtuous and wise than the preceding races, though in the end, they also fall short of attaining the truth. Though worshipping God as one and practising philanthropy, their service does not reach all the way to God, but only to the angels (ch. 14). After this, attention is turned to the fourth race, the Christians, who are described as ‘nearer to the truth and to exact knowledge than the rest of the peoples’ (ch. 15). The virtues and moral superiority of the Christians in contrast to the rest of the peoples are described in some detail, after which the treatise is concluded with a wish that the tongues of those who slander and harass this pious group of people be silenced. Though some of the content of Aristides’ apology corresponds to themes which can be found in Justin, nothing points to a direct literary dependence. Critique of pagan religion and myth was widely spread in philosophical circles,48 and the caricaturing attacks on pagan worship of statues and images (ch. 13) was, as pointed out earlier, a common theme in earlier Jewish apologetics. In large, Aristides betrays a fairly strong influence from earlier Jewish apologetic traditions. It will later be shown that Justin differs significantly from Aristides also on some other important issues, for example the relation of Christianity to the problem of newness in antiquity, as well as the shape of Christian communal identity. In this case, as always when analysing literary dependencies in antiquity, it is wise to take a minimalist approach. It is certainly not impossible that Justin may have read Aristides, and that he may have received some ideas from him (such as addressing the emperor in writing), but any idea of a significant or extensive influence from this text cannot be sustained. In short, what Justin does in his apology differs significantly from what Aristides does in his. In conclusion, there are no indications that Justin was inspired by earlier Christian apologies, and as there are no other Christian documents which could have served as a direct model for him, possible influences need to be sought for elsewhere.

46

The Egyptians are not part of Aristides’ original four races, but have been imbedded in the discourse on the Greeks. There, they illustrate a folly even more severe than that of both the Barbarians and the Greeks, in that they extended their idolatry to the worship of animals (ch. 12). 47 Translations are taken from J. R. Harris, The Apology of Aristides on Behalf of the Christians: From a Syriac Ms. Preserved on Mount Sinai (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2004). 48 See chapter 5 of this study.

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2. Formal Royal Addresses Moving beyond the world of Christian literature to explore other possible literary models for Justin’s text, focus will first be given to so called formal royal addresses. The ‘deliberate’ part of Justin’s apology contains clear parallels to the different standards for rhetorical addresses to a king set out and explained by Menander, a late third century BCE Greek rhetorician, under whose name two treatises on epideictic oratory have been transmitted.49 For instance, in the λόγος πρεσβευτικός, ‘The Ambassador’s Speech,’ Menander recommends that the ruler be treated as a philosopher and lover of learning, which is precisely what Justin (at least ostensibly) does.50 Now, Menander’s speeches were short and formal address meant to be accompanied by the handing over of a decree to the emperor,51 and as Justin’s apology is neither short nor particularly formal, they cannot have served as models for the treatise as a whole. Also, and more importantly, the conformist approach which was essential to all of Menander’s speeches, does in fact not characterize Justin’s apology.52 Yet, in spite of these important differences, the parallels between the opening of Justin’s Apology and these short formal addresses are similar enough for one to conclude that Justin most likely was familiar with recognized standards in antiquity for how to address a king or a ruler. 3. Formal Apologies and Josephus’ Against Apion The apologetic framework of Against Apion is established right at the beginning of the treatise, where Josephus explains his purposes as refuting malicious charges of novelty and proving the antiquity of the Jews (Ag. Ap. 1:2– 5). On the Antiquity of the Jews, may actually have been the original title of the work.53 As noted earlier, the text should be seen as standing in the formal apologetic tradition, since it is built up around accusations and defences. The scenario is not a courtroom, but the rhetoric is forensic as clearly identified 49 These standards are the λόγος βασιλικός, the λόγος στεφανωτικός and the λόγος πρεσβευτικός, in Menander 368.3–377.3; 422.5–424.2. The parallels are even more obvious in the case of Athenagoras’ Embassy; cf. Schoedel, “Apologetic Literature,” 55–57, and “In Praise of the King: A Rhetorical Pattern in Athenagoras,” in Disciplina Nostra: Essays in Memory of Robert F. Evans, ed. Donald F. Winslow, Patristic Monograph Series (Cambridge: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979). For further reading on Menander, see Malcom Heath, Menander: A Rhetor in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and for a modern edition of his texts, see. D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson, eds., Menander Rhetor (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981). 50 Ap. 1:1. Cf. Grant, “Five Apologists,” 8–9. 51 Schoedel, “Apologetic Literature,” 56–57. 52 This will be discussed further later in this chapter. 53 It is so referred to by Origen in Ag. Cel. 1:15, 4:11. Cf. Martin Goodman, “Josephus' Treatise Against Apion,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 45.

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accusers and the client Josephus defends (the Jewish community) shape the character of the treatise. Josephus’ treatise reiterates several motifs found in earlier Jewish propagandistic works,54 but there is no other Jewish work which assumes a form so similar to a formal apology.55 Therefore Goodman is right to point out the circularity of treating Against Apion as a specimen of a certain apologetic genre within Hellenistic Judaism;56 if only one specimen of a genre has been preserved, how can we be sure that the genre really existed and that the preserved text is not a hapax? It can be shown that Josephus, in some instances, used the same or at least a very similar source as Philo’s Hypothetica, but this does not prove that the source itself was written in apologetic form57 and of the Hypothetica itself not enough remains for us to be able to determine what form it was written in. Also in subject-matter, Against Apion is interesting for comparison with the Christian apologies. In this treatise we find a forceful defence of a religion and/or a people, an unappreciated minority in the Roman empire, as well as refutation of malicious slander and an implicit plea for acceptance, which is quite similar to what we seem to find in Justin.58 Justin also parallels several of the apologetic strategies used by Josephus, and responds to similar charges and problems. In a broad sense, Justin’s apology, like Against Apion, has often been placed within the tradition of formal apologiae, but it contains important peculiarities which need to be noted. William Schoedel has shown that the Christian apologies, including Justin’s, would have been of appropriate length for a forensic defence speech. However, as also pointed out by Schoedel, what is then missing from the picture is the sense of an actual legal or semilegal case, where accusers are involved.59 Justin is not on trial, and his apology is not framed as a defence for himself or a client in court. Rather, he is writing on behalf of a certain group of people whom he considers to be maltreated by government officials. Justin, on a textual level, appeals to the emperor for justice; he takes the initiative of ‘approaching’ the authorities, rather 54

On Josephus’ Jewish forerunners, see i.e. Daniel R. Schwartz, “Josephus on his Jewish Forerunners (Contra Apionem 1.218),” in Studies in Josephus and the Varieties of Ancient Judaism: Louis H. Feldman Jubilee Volume, ed. Shaye J. D. Cohen and Joshua J. Schwartz, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 55 Cf. Barclay, Apion, 10, XXXVI. 56 Goodman, “Against Apion”, 46. 57 This also assumes that the Hypothetica itself was not Josephus’ source. 58 On the rhetorical methods and apologetic strategies used in Against Apion, see Aryeh Kasher, “Polemic and Apologetic Methods of Writing in Contra Apionem,” in Josephus' Contra Apionem: Studies in its Character and Context with a Latin Concordance to the Portion Missing in Greek, ed. Louis H. Feldman and John R. Levinson, AGJU (Leiden: Brill, 1996). 59 Schoedel, “Apologetic Literature,” 57–59.

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than being summoned to court, as would have been the occasion for a ‘real’ formal and forensic apology. In one way, the Apology is more strongly modelled on a courtroom scenario than Against Apion, as it is explicitly addressed to a judicial authority, but the absence of any clear opponent and accuser and (as will be seen) the vagueness with which Justin describes the accused party, undermines the forensic character of the scene. There are accusations and defences, certainly, but the identities of the opposing parties are curiously blurred. There can be no doubt that Justin consciously invokes the literary tradition of formal apologies, but it is not a question of straightforward modelling. And in fact, though Justin obviously knows Plato’s apology, and the tradition following it, he never refers to his own work as an apologia.60 4. Petitions and Libelli When looking at how Justin does refer to his own work, one will find that he uses several different words; βιβλίδιον (small book), προσφώνησις (address), ἔντευξις (petition) and ἐξήγησις (exposition/explanation).61 It has been recognized that βιβλίδιον probably should be understood as referring to a libellus.62 The Latin term libellus could refer to any small written document or book, but in Justin’s time it also had the technical meaning of a request or petition presented to an office-holder.63 The fact that Justin’s apology is not presented as, and lacks many of the formal characteristics of, an apologia, led Paul Keresztes64 to conclude that Justin is not engaging in forensic but deliberative rhetoric.65 This means that Justin is trying to effect a change of policy rather than legally defend himself or the people he represents in a court-like scenario, i.e. against real and present accusers. This is an attractive hypothesis, as it would both explain the absence of a legal case as well as the presence of decidedly protreptic elements in the text. If Justin’s rhetoric can be understood as deliberative rather than forensic, it would reinforce the understanding of the form of the text as constituting a petition or a plea for justice.66 Schoedel seems to have reached 60

Cf. Young, “Greek Apologists”, 91, and Munier, Justin, Apologie, 38–40. Ap. 1:1, 68:3, 2:14:1. 62 Cf. e.g. Parvis, “Posthumous,” 25, R. M. Grant, “Forms and Occasions of the Greek Apologists,” SMSR 52, (1986): 215–216, and Wolfgang Schmid, “Ein Inversionsphänomen und seine Bedeutung im Text der Apologie des Justin,” in Forma Futuri: Studi in onore del Cardinale M. Pellegrino (Turin: Erasmo, 1975), 346–347. 63 Cf. Millar, The Emperor, 240. 64 Paul Keresztes, “The Literary Genre of Justin's First Apology,” VC 19, (1965). 65 Forensic (δικανικόν) and deliberative or political (συμβουλευτικόν) speech were two of three main rhetorical methods of discourse first developed by Aristotle (Rhet 1:3, also Cicero De Or. 2:115). The third one was epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν) discourse. 66 Cf. Sterling, Historiography, 13, n. 69. 61

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a similar conclusion, when he describes the Christian apologies as a type of communal documents which he labels ‘apologetically grounded petitions’. He defines these as petitions, containing apologetic elements, which were presented to the emperors by an ambassador on behalf of a community.67 5. Final Considerations It was stated in the opening of this section that in order to identify literary models for the Apology, one must keep in mind that it consists of two different parts, the ‘deliberate’ and the ‘demonstration’ part, and that different models may have been used for these two parts. In the ‘demonstration’ part, there are clear echoes from earlier Jewish apologetic writings, and particularly Josephus’ Against Apion. In this part, we find the protreptic promotion of a certain community over and against the dominating surrounding culture, executed through the careful employment of different apologetic strategies. The way in which Justin makes use of such themes will explored in future chapters; here, it will suffice to simply note that Justin is in receipt of such a tradition, and that it shapes the form and structure of parts of his apology. Any straightforward modelling on Josephus’ Against Apion is, nonetheless, difficult to detect, and it cannot be concluded with certainty whether Justin knew the document or not. Models for the ‘deliberate’ part, which constitutes the formal framework of the treatise, may include standard models for addressing royalty (such as Menander’s) as well as real petitions submitted to the emperor. The rhetoric of this part should probably, with Keresztes, best be identified as deliberate rather than forensic (hence the chosen designator ‘deliberate’ rather than ‘forensic’ part), and the model invoked is that of a community making a plea for an imperial policy change, rather than a lawyer presenting a defence against actual accusations delivered by real opponents. Thus, it is not structured as an apologia in the classic sense of a defence speech in court. This does not exclude the possibility of Justin having been inspired by e.g. Plato’s Apology, but in form this part of his treatise seems closer to a communal petition. We conclude then with restating the observation made in the beginning of this section, that the peculiar composite form of Justin’s apology has no real precedence in antiquity. No potential model explored so far could have functioned as a sole source of inspiration. To compare with Against Apion and the Apology of Aristides, one notes that the former displays similarities to Justin in subject-matter but lacks an address to authorities or any equivalent to Justin’s ‘deliberate’ part, and the latter differs from Justin both in form, subjectmatter and structure. The imperial address in Aristides is extraordinarily thin 67

Schoedel, “Apologetic Literature,” 78.

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and could be removed without the structure or message of the treatise being affected in the slightest. Thus we are in a position to agree with Sara Parvis’ claim that with his Apology, Justin essentially crafts a new apologetic genre for himself.68 It certainly draws on earlier traditions, conventions and texts, but due to its peculiar form – which combines an imperial address and formal claims with a protreptic defence of the Christian faith – it has to be treated as a novel invention which, without doubt, provided a model for the later works of Athenagoras, Tertullian and possibly others.69 II. Audience and Purpose It should be stressed that the above conclusions pertain only to the form of the Apology. As of yet, nothing has been said about the purpose or intended audience of the treatise, and it is now turn to direct attention to these matters. Questions concerning the audience of Justin’s Apology have become among the most debated ones in Justin scholarship, as the evidence could be interpreted as leading in several different directions. Schoedel will serve as a good example of the uneasiness scholars have shown to come down to a position on this topic. Without dismissing the possibility that Justin did send his treatise to the emperor, Schoedel concludes that he also addressed his apology ‘to the whole world.’70 However, he also recognizes that ‘the fact that Christian apologies of this kind were preserved and handed down in Christian circles is surely not inessential but had something to do with the intentions of their creators.’71 Thus, Justin’s apology may have been sent to the emperor, was certainly directed toward gentiles, and may possibly also have been intended for a Christian readership. This is, of course, not very helpful, but it illustrates how difficult it is to determine who ancient authors intended to read their works, as this would entail entering into the minds of people who lived a very long time ago and about whom we have but sketchy information. In literary criticism, distinction is usually made between several types of audiences. The intended audience is the one which the author actually had in mind, and for reasons stated above it is also the most difficult one to establish. It is not a feature of the text itself, and can therefore not be identified 68 Parvis, “Apologetic Tradition,” 117, 127. Cf. Skarsaune, “Justin and the Apologists,” 21–24. 69 What is suggested here is a model in form only; in regard to audience and purpose, each of the Christian apologies must be evaluated separately. 70 Schoedel, “Apologetic Literature,” 77. Cf. Ap. 53:1. 71 Ibid., 78. Cf. Anders-Christian Jacobsen, “Main Topics in Early Christian Apologetics,” in Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity, ed. Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich, and David Brakke (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), for a similar reasoning.

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with any certainty solely on a textual basis. Therefore, attempts to unveil the intended audience usually need to involve more than a literary analysis, for example enquires into the author’s socio-cultural situation, and conclusions will always have to be tentative. Apart from the intended audience, literary critics also speak of the declared, implied and actual audience of a text.72 Beginning in reverse order, the actual audience refers to the group of people which eventually did read a given text. In Justin’s case, this audience was primarily, if not exclusively, the Christian community. It was the Christians who were to preserve and copy his writings, so that it eventually would come into the possession of later Christian writers such as Irenaeus, Tertullian and Eusebius. We have no direct evidence of any pagan author having read or quoted Justin (or any other early Christian apologist).73 One hypothesis is that Celsus formulated his attacks on Christianity in response to Justin’s teaching, in which case he may have had access to one or more of the apologist’s works, but this cannot be established with any certainty.74 The actual audience is not necessarily equal to the intended one, but in cases where it is reasonable to assume that the author would have been aware of who would eventually receive his or her work, one may also assume that this, at least to some extent, reflects the author’s intentions. 72 A brief but enlightening introduction to the terms is given by Barclay (Barclay, Apion, 10, XLV–XLVI). 73 Cf. A. D. Nock, Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion From Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo, Brown Classics in Judaica (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985 (1933)), 192, and Mark J. Edwards, “Apologetics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David C. Hunter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 550. 74 This hypothesis was proposed a century ago by Pélagaud (Élysée Pélagaud, Un conservateur au second siècle: étude sur Celse et la première escarmouche entre la philosophie antique et le christianisme naissant (Lyon: H. Georg, 1878), 272–273 and 413–419), and has been argued at length by Andresen (Carl Andresen, Logos und Nomos: die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum, AZK (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1955), esp. 345–372); cf. A. J. Droge, “Self-definition Vis-à-vis the Graeco-Roman World,” in The Cambridge History of Christianity, ed. Margaret M. Mitchell and Frances M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 237–241. See also the criticism of Andresen’s thesis in Gary T. Burke, “Celsus and Justin: Carl Andresen revisited,” ZNW 76, (1985). Yet, even if Andresen is right, it does not detract from the point being made. Celsus was an educated, probably Platonist (though Origen persistently calls him Epicurean), philosopher who apparently took pride in ‘knowing all’ of the Christian doctrines (Ag. Cel. 1:7), before formulating his criticisms (a statement repeatedly mocked by Origen). We know of one written Christian source which Celsus had consulted, The Dispute between Jason and Papiscus concerning Christ, since he himself refers to it (4:52), and it is certainly possible that he actively had tried to obtain Christians texts, among which Justin’s apology may have been one. This does, nonetheless, not prove that the Apology or other Christian writings commonly circulated among pagans.

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Turning to the declared and the implied audiences one must first note that, unlike those previously discussed, these are both features of the text itself,75 and therefore they are the only audiences we can identify with any certainty and without referring to external inquiries. The declared audience is the stated addressee, who in the case of Justin’s apology is the emperor and his two sons (cf. below). An address may be real or fictive (e.g. a rhetorical device with the purpose of achieving a certain effect) and therefore the explicit addressee of a certain writing does not necessarily give information about a supposed intended audience. Rhetorical performances of different kinds were very common in antiquity; neither an author’s voice, nor his/her stated audiences were necessarily authentic.76 Last, there is the implied audience. This is the audience that is assumed in the text itself, i.e. it is unveiled through an analysis of how well the text would work for different possible audiences. In order to identify the intended audience of Justin’s apology both an inquiry into the social circumstances under which it was written as well as careful analyses of the textual audiences of the treatise will be necessary. In the scholarly debate on Justin’s audience two main alternatives, still championed by different scholars, have predominated; one holds that Justin directs his treatise to outsiders, or more specifically, pagans, while the other holds that the intended audience is an internal one, i.e. members of the Christian community. Both of these theories will need to be examined. 1. External Audience? Those who favour an external audience for Justin’s apology can be subdivided into two groups. There are those who believe that the imperial address is a mere literary foil for what is essentially a missionary text aimed at proselytizing pagans. Then there are those who hold to the authenticity of the imperial address, and therefore believe that Justin’s apology was intended as a real defence writing to be submitted to the emperor. 77

75

Therefore, the implied and declared audiences may be referred to collectively as textual audiences. 76 Thus, when Cosgrove claims that there is agreement concerning ‘the audience toward which the two apologies of Justin are directed,’ and then identifies this audience as the emperor and his sons, he seems to have confused the declared audience with the intended one, even though he does recognize that Justin may also have had ‘a wider audience in view’ (C. H. Cosgrove, “Justin Martyr and the Emerging Christian Canon: Observations on the Purpose and Destination of the Dialog with Trypho,” VC 36, (1982): 211). 77 For a brief summary of these different positions in regard to the early Christian apologies in general and to Justin’s in particular, see Kinzig, “Sitz,”. For himself, at least in relation to Justin’s apology, Kinzig claims a middle position which holds to the authenticity of the address to the emperor, but also insists that the text has a protreptic and missionary character. While maintaining that the imperial address is genuine, he claims that the

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a) Missionary Purpose The appeal of maintaining an external audience for the Apology is that it takes the form of the treatise seriously. Whether or not one accepts the authenticity of the imperial address, the Apology is partly framed as a defence writing, and the charges Justin counters are real accusations which pagans directed against Christians. In his Octavius, Minucius Felix gives examples of accusations formulated against Christians by the Roman rhetorician Marcus Cornelius Fronto. Several of these, e.g. incestuous banquets, ritual infanticides and the shame of worshipping a punished criminal (Oct. IX), are directly refuted by Justin, which indicates that he either was aware of Fronto’s slander or (more likely) that such accusations and conceptions about Christianity were quite commonplace among the pagan populace. This defence against slanders and misconceptions, along with a promotion of the Christian religion in general, have often been taken as evidence that the text was written with a missionary purpose, i.e. that its main focus was to convert pagans to Christianity.78 The weakness of this view is that it does not seem to factor in how these ostensibly outward-directed arguments would work rhetorically for an inward audience.79 It is here that engagement with Tcherikover’s findings, as discussed earlier, become both relevant and necessary. In an illuminating article, Monique Alexandre has shown how the second century Christian apologists drew from Jewish apologetics when formulating responses to several of the popular charges Christians came to face from the pagan world.80 As it were, Christians came to ‘inherit’ many of the misgivings, accusations and prejudices which had circulated, probably for centuries before the rise of Christianity, concerning Jews and Judaism in antiquity, and in response, they came to utilise and further develop refutations of these charges which had been transmitted through the Hellenistic Jewish literary tradition. Thus, in response to the charges of atheism, Christian apologists develop their Jewish predecessors’ presentation of monotheism as well their anti-idolatry polemic; in response to the charges of incest, ritual murder and misanthropy, they praise their own high ethical standards and turn the charge around by criticising purpose of the text really is to reach the citizens of Rome. That Justin asks the emperor to publicly post his petition with a response, is understood as an attempt to reach pagan readers using the emperor as a messenger, with the purpose of decreasing the risk of denunciation for Justin himself. 78 For arguments along these or similar lines, cf. e.g. Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. John Austin Baker (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973), 7–15, Fiedrowicz, Apologie, 15, and Johannes Quasten, Patrology, vol. 1, The Beginnings of Patristic Literature (Westminister: The Newman Press, 1962), 186. 79 Though at least Fiedrowicz does consider this as well (Fiedrowicz, Apologie, 17). 80 Monique Alexandre, “Apologétique judéo-hellénistique et premières apologies chrétiennes,” in Les apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque, ed. Bernard Pouderon and Joseph Doré, TH (Paris: Beauchesne Éditeur, 1998).

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pagan behaviour and mocking the immorality of pagan gods; in response to the charge of novelty and innovation, they develop the argument from antiquity, in which the antiquity of Moses and the prophets is contrasted against the novelty of Greek philosophy and poetry.81 As can be seen, all four of the elements in Alexandrian Jewish literature which Tcherikover discusses in his article – self-defence, panegyric, polemic and propaganda – recur in the second century Christian apologists, often in connection to the very same themes and topoi as are found in earlier Jewish apologetic writings. Also the social situation of the Christians, being an outsider community, was quite similar to that of the Jews, though probably worse. Though also the Jews experienced periods of unrest during the Hellenistic and Roman era, it was still lawful to be Jewish, whereas the legal situation of the Christians was much more complicated. Though the question of why exactly the early Christians were persecuted is not yet completely resolved, most scholars today agree that Christians could be, and indeed were, sentenced to death merely for refusing to deny their Christian faith.82 According to Justin’s account in Ap. 2:2:9–19, Ptolemy, a Christian teacher, was sentenced to death after having given an affirmative answer in court to the single question: ‘are you a Christian’. This situation must be borne in mind when considering the sociopolitical possibilities of having texts distributed. If a Jewish author in Alexandria at 100 BCE would have had problems with getting his work circulated, this was even more true for a Christian apologist anywhere in the Roman empire at 150 CE. If Jews were regarded as being on the fringe of society, Christians experienced this even more acutely, and occasionally found themselves in direct conflict with the social authorities. The only way a Jewish or particularly a Christian author could entertain hopes to see a work spread 81

Ibid., 4. Research on the legal position of the early Christians and why they were persecuted by the authorities has received its most fruitful contribution in the classic debate between A. N. Sherwin-White and G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, which was published as a series of articles and responses in the 1950–1960:s. A summary of the debate, including more recent contributions by T.D. Barnes, is found in Wayne C. Kannaday, Apologetic Discourse and the Scribal Tradition: Evidence of the Influence of Apologetic Interests on the Text of the Canonical Gospels, Text-Critical Studies (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004), 200–206, and the articles of Sherwin-White and de Ste. Croix, four in total, have been published together in Everett Ferguson, ed. Church and State in the Early Church, Studies in Early Christianity (London: Garland, 1993), 1–59. De Ste. Croix’ articles, together with other texts written by him on persecution and martyrdom, are also found in the posthumously published G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). On the same theme, see also Paul Keresztes, “Law and Arbritariness in the Persecution of the Christians and Justin's First Apology,” VC 18, (1964), and, for a recent and more radically sceptical take on early Christian persecution, see Candida Moss, The Myth of Persecution: How Early Christians Invented a Story of Martyrdom (New York: HarperOne, 2013). 82

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outside a close circle of friends, was if support was given from a rich and/or influential patron. This was the case for Josephus,83 and there are no reasons to believe that he could not have had reasonable expectations for his Against Apion to be circulated within the upper strata of Roman society. However, there is no evidence that Justin or any other second century Christian apologist was in receipt of any such support, and it is difficult to envisage any of them maintaining similar hopes. Tcherikover’s argument that elements of self-defence, panegyric, polemic and propaganda makes sense in Jewish literature with an inward audience, seems equally valid when applied to the Christian community, due to the similarity of their social situation. With all the vicious rumours circulating about Christians, one should not be surprised to find literature written by Christians for Christians which focuses on the truth, rationality and excellence of the Christian faith in contrast to rival pagan religions. The fact that Justin counters real pagan charges need thus not imply that he is actually addressing pagans. Also, that Christians would have benefited much from a text such as Justin’s seems beyond doubt. Already, a culture of copying and passing on of Christian literature had developed within the church84 (something Justin certainly was aware of) and the forceful way in which Justin refutes charges and defends Christianity would have ensured its appreciation among his fellow believers, and hence the survival of his work. In addition to this, the implications that the low literacy rates in antiquity (ca. 10 per cent, according to William Harris’ classic, though not uncontested, estimate)85 bring to the questions should also be noted. While a limited reading proficiency among the populace would not necessarily constitute a prob83 Tcherikover emphasizes that his findings do not apply to Josephus or his treatise Against Apion, which, so scholars agree, almost certainly has an outside audience in sight. This may also be true in regard to some of Philo’s works (e.g. the Hypothetica, Against Flaccus, and Embassy to Gaius). The point made, however, is that both Philo and Josephus belonged to the small part of the Jewish community which in fact could expect to have their works read by pagans. Josephus was the official historian of the Flavian dynasty and under the direct protection of the Emperor. For him to write an apology for the Jews with a pagan audience in mind would not be peculiar at all, since he could be more or less assured that it would actually be read by influential Roman citizens. Philo, likewise, belonged to the cream of Alexandrian society and could also entertain reasonable hopes for his works to reach an audience outside his own Jewish community. Tcherikover, “Apologetic Literature,” 182–183, see esp. n. 132. 84 ‘If Judaism may be called a religion of the Book, Christianity shaped its cultural identity as a religion of many books!’ (Charles Kannengiesser, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: The Bible in Ancient Christianity (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 145). 85 W. V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). For responses, see Mary Beard et al., eds., Literacy in the Roman World, Journal of Roman Archaeology, Supplementary Series 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

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lem for influencing the Christian community, in which Justin’s texts would be warmly received and probably read aloud in a congregational setting,86 circumstances would be different in a hostile pagan context. Certainly, Justin’s writings would never be read aloud during any pagan gatherings, and thus any influence a Christian text could exert in a pagan community would have to be on the fortunate few who were able to read it directly. It is safe to assume that Justin would have been aware of this fact, and thus it should be taken into consideration in any analysis of his intended audience. If an outward intended audience were ever to be conceived for the Apology it would, under any circumstances, have to be limited to the educated elite. To conclude: Justin’s refutation of real pagan accusations along with the propaganda/polemic found in his treatise would certainly make sense for an outward audience but equally so for an inward one. Therefore, a missionary purpose for the Apology cannot convincingly be argued on grounds of subject-matter alone. What in the end tilts the scale against a missionary purpose, as far as socio-political considerations go, is the unlikelihood of someone like Justin being able to publish and spread his work to a pagan audience (at this point his circumstances were widely – and crucially – different from those of e.g. Josephus), and the even less likelihood of his texts, in such case, standing a chance of being 5read or heard by any significant number of non-Christians. b) Real Petition If a missionary purpose of the Apology seems problematic from a purely social perspective, then what can be said about the other alternative, i.e. that Justin’s apology is nothing but what it purports to be, namely a petition sent to the emperor arguing for the just treatment of Christians?87 This theory also has the benefit of taking the form of the Apology seriously, as it accepts what Justin writes, seemingly, at face value. Since the first publication of Fergus Millar’s seminal The Emperor in the Roman World in the late seventies, it has been widely recognized that it was not unreasonable for private citizens to expect or at least hope that the emperor would read their petitions and possibly even hear their cases in person.88 As a consequence, earlier assumptions, expressed e.g. by Goode86

Cf. Feldman on oral persuasion; Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 322. Keresztes, as an example, argues against a missionary purpose but for the authenticity of the imperial address: ‘All the places, scattered throughout the Apology, that could possibly suggest a missionary-protreptic purpose on Justin’s part are rhetorical devises and, in the context, serve the one and only purpose of advising the Emperor to change the current course of justice in Asia’ (Keresztes, “Genre,” 109). 88 A second edition has since been published (Millar, The Emperor). For a more concise treatment, see “Emperors at Work,” JRS 57, (1967). 87

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nough,89 which held that someone like Justin could not reasonably have expected the emperor to read his address, have had to be abandoned.90 On the contrary, there are factors speaking in favour thereof. Even if Justin’s apology does not entirely conform to any known established literary model or genre, there is little reason to doubt that he could have had it delivered to the emperor, and that he could have expected a response.91 Millar claims that the Embassy of Athenagoras, largely similar to Justin’s Apology in form, ‘has the form of those innumerable speeches delivered before the emperors in order to gain requests’92 and he concludes that the theory of Christian apologists such as Justin and Athenagoras intending for their treatises to be presented before the emperor in one way or another (i.e. in writing or as a speech), is the most economical explanation and that it is at least as convincing as the alternatives.93 Yet, though there seems to be little doubt that someone like Justin could have composed a petition with the intention of having it delivered to the emperor, the question remains if this is what he really did. Though we may never be able to get a conclusive answer to this question, the best indications are likely to be found in the text itself, and therefore, this is where we must turn. Attempting to decide, on a textual basis, the degree of likelihood of Justin’s apology having been intended as an authentic petition, one will need to pose questions which relate to three different factors: (1) the addressee (how well is the imperial address maintained and sustained?), (2) the petitioner (how is the petitioning party framed?) and (3) the structure of the text. The Imperial Address Justin begins his apology by addressing the emperor Antonius Pius and his sons, future emperors Verissimus (Marcus Aurelius) and Lucius (Verus),94 and he claims to write ‘on behalf of a group [...] drawn from every race of human beings [τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων], who are being unjustly 89

Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 82. See e.g. Schoedel, “Apologetic Literature,” Kinzig, “Sitz,” Grant, “Forms,” and notably Millar, The Emperor, 210, n. 243. 91 One may also assume that Justin was aware of this possibility, as his work does indicate a certain knowledge in legal matters (cf. Lampe, Paul to Valentinus, 267–268). 92 Millar, The Emperor, 565. 93 Ibid., 61–66. 94 On the addressees of the Apology, see Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 34–41. The MS includes an address to the ‘Sacred Senate and all the Roman people’. Parvis and Minns consider this to be a redaction (ibid., 35–36.), which seems plausible seeing that the rest of the Apology is framed as an address to the emperor (and occasionally his sons) alone. This is shown perhaps most clearly in ch. 56, where Justin explicitly asks the emperor to consult the Senate and the people before making a judgment. Consequently, he does not see the latter groups as recipients of his own address. 90

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hated and abused,’ whom he later defines as the Christians (1:1). The imperial address is maintained throughout the apology and is mainly expressed through a dialectic structure of the treatise. There is an almost exact correspondence between the first person plural pronoun ἡμεῖς and its second person counterpart ὑμεῖς (110 instances of the former, in its various cases, are found in the First Apology, along with 106 instances of the latter)95 and as these are evenly spread throughout the writing they create the feeling of a dialogue taking place between the abused people whom Justin represents on the one hand and the addressed party on the other. In this ‘dialogue’ the emperor is quite consistently framed as Justin’s partner in conversation. This is seen most clearly in Justin’s frequent and explicit references to his addressee’s ruling and judicial powers (3:4; 4:2–6; 5:1; 7:2– 5; 12:3–4; 14:4; 45:6; 55:6), but also in other contexts. In ch. 17, Justin claims that Christians try to pay their taxes to ‘those appointed by you,’ (1) and that they recognize ‘you as kings and rulers,’ (3). In 47:6 he recognizes that Jerusalem is ‘guarded by you,’ and in 55:6 he refers to the symbols on Roman military standards and trophies as ‘your’ symbols. At times, Justin seems to have had the imperial office as such in mind (for example when he refers to Quirinius as ‘your first procurator in Judea’ (34:2), or to Pilate as ‘your procurator’ (40:6)), but often it is quite clear that it is the emperor in person who is addressed (as when Justin, in 68:3, refers to the previous emperor Hadrian as ‘your father’). The declared audience, i.e. the emperor and his sons, is therefore a consistently worked out theme in the text. Sometimes Justin seems to address both the emperor and his sons, and sometimes only the emperor. In general, a carefully worked out and consistently sustained address speaks in favour of its authenticity, and in consequence this is how Justin’s address has often been perceived. A fictive address, which is thought only to serve as literary foil, is often dropped when the author moves into the real subject-matter of the text.96 The alternative is if a specific rhetorical purpose could be identified for sustaining an imperial address throughout the treatise. If the imperial address is genuine, then presumably Justin’s demands to the emperor are as well. And vice versa, if the imperial address is merely a rhetorical device, then presumably the same is true about the demands. A closer investigation of Justin’s demands to the emperor and how they connect logically to the rest of the treatise, will therefore yield a clearer picture of how the imperial address should be understood. Justin makes three basic demands to the emperor, which all are interrelated. First, he asks that the emperor pass judgment in accordance with reason 95

This according to Edgar J. Goodspeed, Index Apologeticus: Iustini Martyris Operum Aliorumque Apologetarum Pristinorum (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, [1912] 2003). 96 A lucid example of this is Aristides’ Apology.

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instead of following the desire to please irrational and superstitious people (2:3). Second, he asks that the emperor investigate the charges made against Christians and that his judgment be informed by the outcome of these investigations (3:1). Third, he asks that Christians be investigated and judged as individuals rather than collectively ‘as Christians’ (4:1–6; 7:4). These demands constitute the formal framework of the petition, and they are referred back to at the end of the treatise when Justin asks that the emperor rule in their favour (68:3) and that the subscribed petition be posted in a conventional manner.97 It will here be argued that it is in relation to these formal demands that the framework of an authentic petition to the emperor eventually breaks down. First, as noted above, the imperial address is maintained throughout the treatise, but that does not equate to it being logically sustained which, in fact, it is not. Justin’s demands for a just evaluation of the charges against Christians imply that the emperor himself is not their instigator. The ‘you’ of the addressed party is contrasted to the implied ‘them’98 of the accusers. The emperor is merely asked to investigate the charges brought forth by others. However, as the text progresses, the distinction between the accusers and the imperial throne become blurred; the ‘you’ and the ‘they’ merge together. Right from the beginning, the emperor is accused of judging Christians out of ‘senseless passion’ [ἀλόγῳ πάθει], rather than through reason (5:1), but only gradually does he also assume the role of the accuser. In 11:1, the emperor (or the ‘you’) implicitly accuses Christians of sedition and in 27:5 it is again the ‘you’ who bring the popular charges against Christians: ‘[a]nd the things which are openly done and honoured by you, as if the divine light were overturned and absent, you ascribe to us.’ The second factor which corrodes the logical consistency of the imperial address is that Justin repeatedly undermines his own demands. At the core of Justin’s petition is found a plea for sound and fair judgment. However, Justin makes some remarks that would be blatantly counter-productive to such a purpose. Echoing Socrates’ famous words in Plato’s Apology,99 he repeatedly claims that the emperor has ‘the power to kill, but not to harm’ the Christians (2:4, cf. 17:4; 19:7–8; 27:5; 45:6) and he triumphantly points out that Chris97 The request that the petition be posted is found in Ap 2:14:1. According to Minns and Parvis this passage belongs to 1 Ap., and therefore it appears in their critical edition in 69:1. 98 As already noted, the accusers are curiously anonymous in Justin. Several times accusers figure only as implied agents in passive constructions such as ‘we ask that charges made against our own people be investigated’ (3:1) and ‘... we are accused of being Christians,’ (4:5) though on occasion they surface also in active constructions such as ‘[f]or it is there they declare our madness to be manifest ...’. (13:4). 99 Plato Ap. 30c. This quote is much repeated in ancient literature, see Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 83, n. 82.

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tians are not afraid of death (39:3–5; 57:2). Even disregarding the subversive tone and the implied mockery of imperial authority in such statements, it would completely disarm Justin’s pleas for just treatment. If indeed the emperor cannot harm the Christians, then why address him at all? Why ask for fair treatment in one instance and claim that it does not matter how Christians are treated in another? In 45:5, Justin explicitly remarks that whether the emperor reads his words with hostility or not really is a matter of indifference, as he can do no more than kill ‘which bears no harm to us, but which works punishment through eternal fire to you and to all who are unjustly hostile …’ These factors make Justin’s apology incomprehensible if conceived as a genuine petition. If taken seriously, all of this would mean that Justin asks the emperor to investigate his own accusations while at the same time asserting that in the end it does not matter what the emperor decides to believe or do. Another peculiar aspect of Justin’s demands is his claim that the heretics, i.e. so called ‘Christians’ who, in Justin’s view, do not live in accordance with the teaching of Christ, are not punished by the emperor, though they carry the name (26:6–7). The inconsistency of this argument has often been pointed out and it is indeed striking. If, as Justin claims, Christians were persecuted because of the name only, without their doctrines and actions having been investigated, the authorities would have no means by which they could distinguish ‘true’ Christians from ‘false’ ones, even if they would be interested in doing so (which, of course, there is no reason to assume). How then can ‘true’ Christians be persecuted on account of the name, while ‘false’ Christians are not? And Justin’s demand that the heretics, in the name of fairness one assumes, also be punished (16:14) is extraordinary as this would only reinforce the very unrighteous legal practice he seeks to see abolished. These elements of contradiction and blatant logical inconsistency found in Justin’s presentation of his requests, do not speak in favour of them or the subservient imperial address being perceived as authentic. The Implied Petitioner Having explored the maintenance of the imperial address in the Apology, and having found its logical sustention less than convincing in relation to Justin’s claims and requests, it is now time to analyse how the implied writer, i.e. the petitioning party, is framed throughout the text. In the opening address of the Apology, Justin presents himself and his background and claims to be writing on behalf of a certain group of people, and throughout the rest of the treatise, the implied writer is Justin the representative. The first person singular pronoun is found in quotes mostly from the LXX or in sayings of Jesus Christ, but it is never used to refer to Justin himself. On only six occasions (one in the beginning, one at the end and four dispersed within the treatise) are first

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person singular verbal constructions used. Except for these few instances, where the person of Justin resurfaces as an individual, first person plural constructions and pronouns are consistently used throughout the treatise. The effect achieved is that this is understood as a petition written and produced by a specific group of people, consistently referred to as ‘we’, and that only once in a while the reader is reminded of who is actually holding the pen. However, though the Apology is clearly structured as a communal petition, the contours and identity of this community are strangely blurred. The introduction in the first paragraph of the Apology reads as follows: I, Justin, son of Priscus and grandson of Bacchios who both come from Flavia Neapolis in Syria Palaestina, have drawn up this address and petition on behalf of a group, to which I myself belong, drawn from every race of human beings, who are being unjustly hated and abused. (1:1)

It is a peculiar opening. The reader learns about Justin’s name and family background, as well as that the people he represents consider themselves to be ‘unjustly hated and abused’, but there is no disclosure of the real identity of this group of people. Official petitions had to be very specific as to who the petitioner was, which is not difficult to understand; if the petitioning party was not clearly stated, it would do them no good even if the emperor or magistrate decided to rule in their favour. In fact, due to the sheer number of them submitted, an imperial libellus had to be organized, clear and quick to the point.100 Seneca, in an address to a member of Claudius’ secretariat, provides insight into the volume of petitions dealt with by the imperial court: You must give audience to countless thousands of men, countless petitions [libelli] must be disposed of; so great is the pile of business, accumulated from every part of the world, that must be carefully weighed in order that it may be brought to the attention of a most illustrious prince in the proper order. You, I say, are not allowed to weep; in order that you may be able to listen to the many who weep – in order that you may dry the tears of those who are in peril and desire to obtain mercy from Caesar's clemency, it is your own tears that you must dry.101

To hold the identity of the petitioner in tension, like Justin does, would be an unconventional and risky tactic. One must assume that this would only increase the risk of it being dismissed on formal grounds or for lacking in seriousness.102 There are, however, reasons for Justin’s vagueness, and they are related to his definition of what a Christian is as well as to its implications for the idea 100

Millar, The Emperor, 250. Ad Polybium 6:5. Translation from Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Moral Essays, trans. John W. Basore, LCL (W. Heinemann, 1928–1935). 102 Buck goes so far as claiming that because of the general disorganization of Justin’s apologies, and in light of the volume of libelli submitted, they would have been ‘ruthlessly rejected’ (Buck, “Apologies,” 51–53; quote from 51). 101

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of a communal Christian identity. In the Apology, the word Christian is not used until 4:5, and it is not until then that the identity of the people Justin represents is fully disclosed. Even then, the identification of the persecuted group seems more incidental than intentional. Justin argues against what he sees as the absurdity of being accused on the basis of a name only, and he illustrates this by making a word-play relating to the name (or designation) ‘Christian’. In earlier community literature, the word ‘Christian’ is first encountered in Acts 11:26, which informs that it originated as a designation given followers of Jesus in the city of Antioch. Though the term probably was first conceived among opponents to the young Jesus movement, it was soon adopted as a self-designation by the community itself. Figuring in contexts of accusation and defence from the beginning,103 the name Christian appears to have developed into a ‘badge of honour’ proudly carried by believers and one which was associated with suffering, persecution and martyrdom.104 Yet, a problem, not uncommon in questions relating to terms and designations, was that ‘Christian’ came to carry different associations to different people. In contexts of persecution, for example, it typically became associated with disloyalty and moral depravity by the oppressing authority. Thus, confessing to be a Christian involved coming to terms with these various associations maintained by the surrounding society and its authorities. Another problem was that the early followers of Jesus did not constitute an ethnically or religiously homogenous group, and the name Christian came to be claimed by different groups of believers who denied the designation to one another. As construction of ‘self’ inescapably implies construction of ‘other’ it became as important for the believers to establish what did not signify a true Christian as to make clear what did. In the Apology, these tensions and concerns of early Christian identity-making are present, and they shape the way Christian communal identity is framed. Having mentioned the term in 4:5 of the Apology, it is not until chs. 7–8 that Justin explicitly uses it in reference to the group of people he represents. This should be compared to Athenagoras’ Embassy and Tertullian’s Apology, in both of which the writers identify the abused community as Christians already in the first chapter; in Tertullian it is even stated in the opening para103

Lieu, Identity, 251. On martyrdom in early Christianity, see Clark, Christianity, 38–

59. 104 The common reoccurrence of the confession ‘I am a Christian’ in early martyrologies (e.g. Mart. Poly. 10:1) testify to the importance of suffering and affliction to the selfunderstanding of the early believing community. Thus, the author of 1 Pet could encourage his readers to suffer as Christians (4:13–16) and somewhat later Ignatius (Rom 3:2) could express his desire ‘not only to be named but be proved a Christian’ (cf. Lieu, Identity, 250– 259).

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graph. In Justin’s Apology, the designation ‘Christian’ is overall used economically,105 and it obviously presents a problem to the apologist. On the one hand, ‘Christians’ is clearly the self-designation of the people Justin represents, but on the other, the fact that the believers are persecuted because of their association with this name is something Justin is acutely aware of. His solution, which runs contrary to the trend among other early Christian authors, is to destabilize the term and to make Christian faith an individual matter. The corporate Christian identity is problematic to Justin precisely because it makes individuals responsible for flagitia imputed to the Christian name. His contention is that people should be judged as individuals; i.e. on the basis of their own beliefs and actions. At the same time, Justin is concerned with the reputation of the Christian name, and in order to rescue it from becoming completely relativized, he equates it to good citizenship (cf. 65:1). A true Christian, in Justin’s understanding, is defined by sound and rational beliefs, a moral life and undeserved suffering. In 14:2–3, he argues that it is precisely the moral transformation which signifies a genuine follower of Christ: ‘Of old we rejoiced in promiscuity, but now we embrace only temperance,’ Justin claims, and ‘then we hated one another and murdered one another, and, because of custom, would not even live under the same roof as those who were not of the same race, now, after the appearing of Christ, we eat at the same table, and we pray for our enemies, and try to persuade those who unjustly hate, so that those who have lived according to the good counsels of Christ might have a good hope with us of obtaining the same things from the God who is Ruler of all.’106 As the above mentioned criteria (sound doctrine, moral life and undeserved suffering) define who is a true Christian, it follows that whoever does not match them is not. Thus heretics can be identified as false Christians on the basis of their unsound doctrines, but also on that of their immoral behaviour and/or of the fact that they are not persecuted by the authorities (16:8, 14; 26:7). Since Christians are more or less defined as good citizens, it fol105 15 times in all cases and numbers. In 2 Ap. it is used more frequently, 17 times altogether. 106 Celsus’ deriding remarks on Christian outreaching activities suggests that conversion to Christianity, also in the eyes of pagan spectators, was associated with a change of lifestyle as well as a change in beliefs: ‘We see, indeed, in private houses workers in wool and leather, and fullers, and persons of the most uninstructed and rustic character [...] when they get hold of the children privately, and certain women as ignorant as themselves, they pour forth wonderful statements, to the effect that they ought not to give heed to their father and to their teachers, but should obey them; that the former are foolish and stupid, and neither know nor can perform anything that is really good, being preoccupied with empty trifles; that they alone know how men ought to live, and that, if the children obey them, they will both be happy themselves, and will make their home happy also.’ (Ag. Cel. III, 55, emp. added.), cf. Christoph Markschies, Between Two Worlds. Structures of Early Christianity (London: SCM Press, 1999), 45–46.

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lows that evil people, who may have committed deeds which Christians were generally accused of, are – by definition – not really Christians, even if they are called or call themselves so.107 As the fact that one calls oneself a Christian does not mean anything in and by itself, the term Christian is relativized and loses any independent meaning. In 16:9, Justin quotes the dominical saying that ‘not everyone who says to me “Lord, Lord” will enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but the one who does the will of my Father who is in Heaven’ (cf. Matt 7:21). Actions, thus, speak louder than words, and a godly lifestyle is a more reliable designator of a true Christian than confession. ‘[T]hey are all called Christians,’ Justin explains to the emperor, ‘[so] we ask that you always make their actions the subject of your judgement, so that a person who is found guilty might be punished as a wrongdoer, rather than as a Christian; while if anyone is seen to be guiltless he might be acquitted as a Christian who does no wrong’ (7:3–4). Judgments deciding whether someone is a wrongdoer or what Justin would accept as a true Christian can obviously only be made on an individual basis, and because of this, the Apology lacks any real sense of communal Christian identity. This is what is hinted already in Justin’s opening phrase when he claims to represent, not a people or a community, but a group of people that has only this in common that they suffer unjustly. In consequence, the Christian community is never referred to with ethnical language or terms such as γένος, ἔθνος, or λαός in the Apology. In early Christian apologetics, Christianity was generally ‘mapped into the imaginary and constructed national and ethnic landscape’ and the ‘others’ against which Christianity was defended were often particular ethnic identities.108 The first explicit presentation of a Christian identity constructed in this way is found in Aristides.109 In Justin’s Apology, however, the opposite is true. Christians are not conceived of as a race, but as an enlightened group of people gathered from all nationalities and 107

This is an early example of what philosopher Antony Flew has called the ‘no true Scotsman’ argument, and which he claimed Christians have often used in order to escape responsibility for all the atrocities committed in the name of Christianity throughout the centuries. The argument is a self-sealing logical fallacy, in which the meaning of a term is redefined in order to make an assertion about is true. E.g: ‘No Scotsman is a vegetarian.’ ‘McDonald is a vegetarian, and he is Scottish.’ ‘Yes, but no true Scotsman is a vegetarian.’ 108 Aaron P. Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1–10, quote from 9. As Buell has pointed out, ethnicity should primarily be understood in social rather than biological terms: ‘Ethnicity is a flexible type of discourse about collective identities and the boundaries between groups, but it is one in which naturalizing appeals to common origins regularly feature’ (D. K. Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 105). 109 Cf. Marco Rizzi, “Conclusion: Multiple Identities in Second Century Christianity,” in Hadrian and the Christians, ed. Marco Rizzi, Millennium Studies (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 141–144.

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races, and inclusion or exclusion from this group is decided on individual merits. The fact that Christians consist of people from all races is even an important part of Justin’s argument, as he perceives this to be evidence of fulfilment of prophecy (cf. e.g. 31:7; 40:7; 42:3). Thus, Christianity is not the same sort of thing as Jewishness or Greekness. It is an enlightened way of life – an ethos rather than an ethnos. This focus on individuality and personal commitment should probably be understood as the backdrop to Justin’s strong emphasis on free will over fatalism. In the middle of his exposition of prophetic evidence Justin, in ch. 43, pauses to stress that the Christians’ belief in the fulfilment of prophecy does not undermine human free will. The Stoic idea of Fate governing everything, including people’s choices and actions, is one that Justin cannot tolerate, and the reason is that it seems to do away with human responsibility. If people cannot choose their actions they cannot be held accountable for them, and if so the whole concept of virtue and vice is illusionary. This, Justin repeatedly declares, is the greatest folly and impiety of all (28:4; 43:6; 2:7[6]:9).110 The idea of free moral choices is absolutely fundamental to Justin’s presentation of the gospel and of salvation, and it is also intrinsic to his construction of Christian identity; one can only become a Christian by freely and willingly adopting Christian beliefs, a Christian life-style, and by virtuously and piously accepting the suffering which will follow these decisions. Renouncing one’s Christian identity is, equally, a matter of personal decision-making. If there are no free moral choices, neither vice nor virtue exists. And if vice and virtue do not exist, the Christian God does not exist, and Christian doctrine is fundamentally wrong. In effect then, though Justin does accept ‘Christian’ as a self-designation, he at the same time renders the term useless. If nothing can be inferred by the use of the name Christian, which is what Justin implies in 4:1,111 then who does the apologist represent? He obviously does not represent the heretics, who are called Christians but do not live ‘according to [Jesus’] teachings’.112 110

In his polemic against fatalism, Justin draws upon earlier Platonizing philosophers, such as Alcinous and Carneades. See John Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism, Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 160–164, and David Amand, Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque: Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1945), 206–207. Yet, his arguments, including those dealing with determinist objections that arise from prophecy, are similar also to what his younger contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias has to say in his De Fato (30–31), which suggests that there was a live philosophical current which Justin drew upon (cf. Minns, “Justin Martyr”, 268). 111 ‘Now, something is not judged to be either good or bad by the name it is called without consideration of the actions which are associated with that name.’ 112 16:14. Cf. 4:5,7; 7:4; 16:8; 26:6.

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Rather, Justin demands that such people ‘be punished’ by the emperor (16:14). Nor does he represent Christians who commit evil and therefore are no ‘true’ Christians. In the end then, the ‘unjustly hated and abused’ people Justin claims to represent and rhetorically tries to secure justice for are so loosely and arbitrarily defined that they do not assume the contours of any particular group of people at all. Justin’s argument therefore emerges as more of a general plea that citizens be judged according to their own actions, rather than according to a name rightly or wrongly imputed to them. How, then, can Justin be said to seek imperial favours for a group of people, when he clearly avoids closer definition of this group? It seems obvious that he cannot, and therefore, also the way in which the petitioning party is framed suggests that the imperial address of the Apology is fictional rather than genuine. Evidence from Structure Lastly, it will be seen that also the structure of the Apology as a composite treatise gives support to the picture that has begun to emerge. Upon reading the whole treatise it becomes apparent that the address to the emperor and the appeal for just treatment is best understood as a literary foil for the real subject-matter, which is the defence and proclamation of the Christian faith. The transition between the ‘deliberative’ part of the Apology to the ‘demonstration’ part,113 is so awkward that Justin provides two different justifications for it. Justin opens up the Apology as a petition, and in the first chapters he states his formal demands. Yet, he also sets out another agenda already in 3:2 when he claims that ‘subjects should give a straightforward account of their own life and teaching’114 to the authorities for inspection. This clearly points forward to the ‘demonstration’ he has planned for later in the treatise. Nevertheless, before leaving the ‘deliberative’ part of the text, he seems to feel the need to provide another justification for an account of what Christians believe. After only 12 chapters (in 12:11) Justin declares his petition-oriented purposes accomplished by claiming that nothing more needs to be added in favour of his cause, but he excuses a demonstration of the truth and rationality of Christian doctrine (cf. 13:3) with the observation that ‘it is not impossible to escape ignorance when truth has been presented’. In other words, the emperor is (unbecomingly) ignorant of the truth and needs enlightenment. Yet, in 14:4 Justin excuses a digression into the teachings of Christ before this ‘demonstration’ (ἀπόδειξις) by explaining that if he did not include it he might ‘appear to be tricking’ the emperor. He exhorts the emperors (plural 113

I.e. chs. 1–14 and 15–67 respectively. See earlier discussion. Translation from Barnard, Apologies, 56. Greek text: ‘τὸ τοὺς ἀρχομένους τὴν εὐθύνην τοῦ εἁυτῶν βίου καὶ λόγου ἄληπτον παρέχειν.’ 114

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this time) to examine whether Justin and the Christians he represents have taught and do teach these things faithfully. This, in contrast, implies knowledge about Christianity on the part of the emperor, and thus the passages are contradictory. Either the emperor is ignorant of Christianity and is therefore in no position to evaluate Justin’s exposition thereof, or he does possess some knowledge about Christianity, in which case Justin’s justification for the ‘demonstration’ part in 12:11 is weakened. Further, in 67:8, at the end of the treatise, Justin claims to have fulfilled the duty he laid upon every citizen in 3:2 to give an account of one’s doctrine for imperial inspection: ‘[Christ] taught his disciples these things which we have submitted to you for inspection.’ However, his following remark in 68:1 again calls into question what the purpose of the demonstration really is. He writes about Christian teachings: And if they seem to you to be not far from reason and truth, honour them. But if they seem to you to be portentous nonsense, despise them as nonsensical matters and do not decree death against those who do nothing wrong, as though they were enemies.

This unveils Justin’s attempt in 12:11 to find a connection between his ostensible ‘demands’ to the emperor and his ‘demonstration’ as merely a rhetorical attempt to create logical continuity in the text. In 12:11 he claims that the reason for the demonstration is to reinforce his demands through enlightenment, but in 68:1, he suggests that the demonstration has no implications for his demands whatsoever. Whether the emperor approves of disapproves of the doctrines presented is irrelevant to the question of how Christians should be treated in court. To summarize, Justin states his formal demands in a comprised and limited section of the Apology (chs. 1–14, the ‘deliberative part’). Then he ventures in to what is the major and most elaborate part of the treatise (chs. 15–67) which, according to himself, is meant as a demonstration of the rationality of the Christian faith. The logical connection between the two parts is, however, very vague. In 3:2, he suggests that giving an account of one’s life and teaching to the ruler is what every subject ‘should’ do. Thus, the ‘demonstration’ is framed as merely an appropriate courtesy and has no connection to the demands made in the ‘deliberative’ part of the treatise. Perhaps realizing this, Justin tries in 12:11 to create such a connection, but this attempt is weakened by poor consistency in the text. In conclusion, the ‘deliberative’ and ‘demonstration’ parts of the Apology are logically disconnected and ill thought through attempts to create a fictional logical juncture between them are effectively undone by Justin himself. This points towards a conclusion that the imperial address together with Justin’s requests – and therefore the whole deliberative part of the Apology – is merely a literary framework superimposed on and aimed at giving rhetorical character to what is the real subject-matter of the text, namely that which

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Justin himself refers to as ἀπόδειξις, the demonstration of the truth and rationality of the Christian faith. The rhetorical function of this framework is, however, a different question, and we shall return to it in due time. This concludes our examination of the different theories which hold to an external audience for Justin’s apology. It has been found that a missionary purpose for the Apology is unlikely, not the least for socio-political reasons, and that a textual analysis of the logical consistency of the imperial address as well as the framing of the implied writer and the structure of the Apology renders implausible the theory that it was ever intended to be submitted to the emperor as a real petition. It is now time to turn our attention to the other dominant theory on the subject, i.e. that which holds that Justin wrote his defence writing with an internal audience in mind. 2. Internal Audience? So far this investigation has focused on the problems with perceiving an external intended audience for the Apology. Following the conclusion drawn, it would be convenient to default over to the alternative view, i.e. that since an external audience is problematic, Justin must have had an internal audience in mind. Though there is certain legitimacy to such logic, it will not be enough to settle the case. There are, namely, some questions which still need to be asked and answered. First, it has yet to be discussed which audience is implied in the text. Will conclusions from a positive analysis of the audience yield results which concur with the negative115 analyses above? Second, one will need to ask that if the form of the Apology is a literary fiction, what rhetorical function does it serve? Why, given the intended audience, was it fictionally framed as a petition to the emperor? a) The Implied Audience of the Apology If the declared audience equates to the rhetorical addressee, the stated ‘you’ of the conversation, the implied audience refers to those for whom the discourse would make most sense. It is identified through posing questions to the text in order to uncover underlying assumptions that the author carries towards his readers. As the general aim here is to decide whether the implied audience is internal or external, two particular questions are brought into focus: 1. How much knowledge about and interest in Christianity is assumed in the audience? 2. How are pagan beliefs and religious practices represented?

115

I.e. analyses which seek to show what is not the case.

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Christian Faith and Practices There is no comprehensive presentation of Christian beliefs and surprisingly little distinctively Christian theology to be found in the Apology. The teaching of Jesus, consisting of material similar to what is found e.g. in the Sermon of the Mount, is quoted and framed as a universal ethical message, which in principle could have been delivered by any ancient sage; there is nothing which typically would have been offensive to a Greek or Roman audience (cf. chs.15–17). When distinctly Christian theology is found it is most commonly so in short creedal formulations (6:2; 13:3–4; 31:7; 46:5) or when Justin tries to provide justifications for specific and controversial beliefs, such as the bodily resurrection (19:1–8). Not only is the text economic in its exposition of Christian theology and narrative but it also seems to presuppose at least some basic knowledge thereof. In 6:2 the Christian Godhead (Father, Son, and Spirit) is introduced without much explanation of the identity of the different divine personae, or what their inner relation looks like, and in ch. 15 Justin gives an exposition of the ethical teachings of Jesus without any elaboration on the person of Christ or any attempt to explain who he is or why he is important to Christians. In 26:1 Christ’s ascension into heaven is mentioned as a matter of fact – without clarification or explanation – and in ch. 35 Justin gives a summary of the Christ narrative so rough and concise that no one without prior knowledge could reasonably be expected to be able to follow it. These are but examples of the succinct language Justin uses in reference to Christian beliefs. He cuts corners and navigates so swiftly between theological themes and episodes in Christian narrative that it is impossible to here perceive an implied audience other than one which is fairly well acquainted with Christianity. What contradict this picture are merely two instances where Justin feels compelled to translate the meaning of two Hebrew words commonly used by Christians (‘Jesus’ and ‘Amen’, 33:7; 65:4). In sharp contrast to the brevity with which Justin presents Christian doctrine stands his sharp and sometimes detailed criticism of close standing religious opponents such as Jews and heretic Christians. When it comes to creating demarcations between ‘true’ Christianity on the one hand and false Christianity as well as Judaism on the other, no small matter is insignificant to Justin. For example, in ch. 63 Justin attacks the Jewish understanding of God and stresses that while the Jews affirm that the Father spoke to Moses from the burning bush it really was the Son, thereby assuming that both the difference and the significance of this difference is clear and important to his readers. Likewise, Justin describes the heresiarchs Simon (Magus), Menander and Marcion and their actions in surprising detail. Of Simon it is learned that he practised magic, was thought to be a god, was honoured by the emperor (the ‘you’ of the text) with a statue, is worshipped, and that he consorted with a

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prostitute (26:2–3). Of Menander that he was a disciple of Simon and that he also practised magic and taught his disciples that he would never die (26:4). Marcion is said to have taught ‘many from every race of humankind to utter blasphemies,’ making them deny the Creator of the universe and confess some other god beyond him (26:6). People following these teachers are false Christians (26:6), and the doctrines they teach are referred to as αἵρεσις (26:8). Though some knowledge of Christianity is assumed in the text, Justin is careful to describe and make plain important differences between Christianity and its close-standing rivals. Justin’s extensive use of the Hebrew Scriptures will be treated at the appropriate place, but for present purposes it is important to note that Scripture is not quoted as authority in the Apology, but rather as evidence. The Hebrew writings are presented as a collection of prophecies, but they are prophecies that draw their validity from the Christian theology or narrative that they confirm. They are important, not because they constitute a body of sacred writings, but because they provide evidence for the Christian faith If Justin’s exposition of Christian theology is fragmentary at best, the opposite is true relating to Christian ritual practices. In fact Justin, together with the Didache (chs. 7, 9–10), provides the most detailed description that remains from the early church of how the Christian rituals of baptism and Eucharist were practised. These descriptions, found in chs. 61–67, are intertwined with different arguments in defence of the practices. From 62:1, for example, one learns that the demons have created a counterfeit baptism in the form of the sprinklings of water at the entrance of pagan temples and in 66:4 Justin claims that the ritual of the Eucharist is plagiarized in the Mithra cult. In summary, the Apology yields a mixed picture in answer to our initial question: knowledge about Christian theology and narrative is assumed, but knowledge of Christian ritual practice is not. Yet, all of these features are defended throughout the treatise, often in strong protreptic language and in contrast to opposing or counterfeit views and practices. Further, the Hebrew Scriptures feature as prophetic evidence and a testimony to the Christian faith, rather than as authority, and lastly a keen interest is taken in refuting (and defaming) Christianity’s close standing religious competitors. Representation of the Opponents’ Views The criticism of Judaism and heretic Christianity notwithstanding, the major religious opponent of the Apology is the Graeco-Roman religion, and Justin’s severe criticism of it shines through from even a cursory reading. This would not surprise any audience of his as he, after all, is a pagan who converted to Christianity and also since he frames himself as a philosopher. Criticism of popular myth had been an established topos within ancient philosophy from

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the time of Plato. What is striking in Justin is therefore not that he criticises Graeco-Roman mythology, but rather the extent to which his criticism goes. Found in the Apology is nothing less than a mockery of a pagan religion which, at times, is also blatantly misrepresented. In 9:2 Justin claims that craftsmen take ‘dishonourable vessels’116 and turn them into images which they then worship as gods. This is, of course, a serious misrepresentation of pagan religion, which echoes similar pronouncements in earlier Jewish apologetic writings, as well as in the prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures. Practitioners of the Greek and Roman cult certainly did not imagine that the images they prayed in front of were gods in and by themselves; rather, they were merely representations of the divine. Therefore, the accusation of worshiping crafted images would have appeared positively absurd to them. Further, Justin establishes and emphasizes an evil demonic origin to pagan mythology and he repeatedly and vividly describes the immorality and wickedness of the pagan deities.117 Implied Audience: Conclusions Attentiveness to one’s audience was a well-developed theme in classic rhetoric. In Cicero’s De Oratore, for example, one of the characters (Antonius) makes the following disclosure of his methods for presenting a legal case: [W]hen setting about a hazardous and important case, in order to explore the feelings of the tribunal, I engage wholeheartedly in a consideration so careful, that I scent out with all possible keenness their thoughts, judgements, anticipations and wishes, and the direction in which they seem likely to be led away most easily by eloquence. If they surrender to me, and as I said before, of their own accord lean towards and are prone to take the course in which I am urging them on, I accept their bounty and set sail for that quarter which promises something of a breeze. If however an arbitrator is neutral and free from predisposition, my task is harder, since everything has to be called forth by my speech, with no help from the listener's character. (De Or. II:44:186–187)118

What is suggested here is that a well-disposed audience, for example, allows one to make assumptions and assert things without giving evidence to a larger extent than a hostile or indifferent audience does. If the audience is of the latter sort, the author must be careful to represent the opposition’s views correctly and respectfully, in order to refute them convincingly. If, on the 116

‘ἐξ ἀτίμων πολλάκις σκευῶν’: possibly a vague reference to Rom 9:21, where the same words (σκεῦος and ἀτιμία) – if yet not the exact phrase – are used. If so, Justin is shrewdly ironic; the passage in Romans depicts God as a potter who creates certain vessels (people) for dishonourable use, whereas Justin’s passage concerns people creating gods out of such vessels. 117 Justin’s relation to Graeco-Roman myth will be explored in more detail in chapter 4. 118 Translation from Cicero, De Oratore 1–2, trans. E. W. Sutton, LCL (London: Heinemann, 1967).

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other hand, the audience is already well-disposed to and agreeing with the author’s overall thesis, the views of the opposition could be caricatured or even ridiculed. And likewise, in relation to assumed knowledge: if the audience is expected to be well acquainted with the subject-matter under discussion, the author might well omit explanations and elaborations which, in other situations, would have appeared crucial to the case being made. The present question, then, is how Justin’s apology, in the light of the above findings, would have worked rhetorically for his possible different audiences. The first category of questions, i.e. those that relate to the presentation and knowledge of Christianity, yields mixed answers. The brevity of the explanation of Christian doctrine points towards an audience well acquainted with Christianity, but the translations of the words ‘Jesus’ and ‘Amen’ do not. The usage of the Hebrew Scriptures implies an audience for which the Tanach is not necessarily an established authority. The criticisms of heretics and Jews probably exclude these groups as potential audiences and imply an inward ‘orthodox’119 Christian audience, as pagans would hardly be interested in intra-Jewish/Christian theological sophistry. Finally, the detailed description of Christian rituals could work both for an internal and external audience. For a pagan audience they would work as refutation of the malicious slanders circulating about what took place when Christians met secretly. For an internal audience, they would provide model responses to such accusations or, in the case of new converts, they could serve as brief introductions to Christian ritual life. The second category of questions yields a clearer picture. The implied audience here are people who share contempt for popular religion. This would include upper class educated and philosophically minded pagans to whom the crudity of popular religion often was both problematic and embarrassing. However, in positively mocking and severely misrepresenting Graeco-Roman religion and culture, Justin would eventually have alienated any pagan audience, even a sophisticated one. The implied audience of these remarks are clearly people who stand outside the popular religious system altogether, which translated into social realities would equate to Jews and/or Christians. How then, should the implied audience of the Apology as a whole be understood? It is here suggested that the audience for which the Apology would make most sense are people from a pagan background who are on the verge of or who recently have converted to Christianity. Such an audience would explain why a rudimentary knowledge of Christian doctrine is assumed among the readers, but also why Justin occasionally found it helpful to explain Hebrew words commonly used in the Christian community. The fact that one may have heard a foreign word repeated several times does not mean that one automatically is able to grasp its meaning. A protreptic defence of 119

I.e., what Justin would regard as orthodox.

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the Christian religion, and a stark denunciation of pagan beliefs could be expected to have a reassuring (or admonishing) effect on new converts, and the detailed description of Christian rituals could serve as a way of preparing the catechumen for what Christian fellowship involved. That the Tanach is presented as evidence rather than as authority is one of the factors which point to converts of a pagan rather than a Jewish background. Jews on the verge of converting to Christianity would need no validation of their own Scriptures. To a pagan, however, the Tanach would not automatically carry more authority than any other text. Through Justin’s proof-texting scheme, however, the emerging Christian Old Testament canon is validated at the same time as it gives credibility to Christian doctrine (which is Justin’s primary goal). Another factor pointing against a Jewish or Jewish-Christian audience is not so much that Justin occasionally criticises Judaism as the fact that he describes Christians as precisely Christians with a pagan or gentile background. In 49:1, 5 he writes: And again, how it is said through the same Isaiah that the peoples of the nations who did not expect him will worship him, but that the Jews who always expect him will not recognise him once he comes [...] For the Jews, who have the prophecies and who were always expecting the Christ to come, did not recognize him when he came, and not only that, but they also treated him with contempt. But those who were from the nations never heard anything about the Christ until the time when his apostles went out from Jerusalem…

Here, ethnic Jews are explicitly contrasted with believers, Christians, who according to Justin are ‘from the nations’, i.e. gentiles. That Justin elsewhere, on two occasions, asserts that gentile believers are ‘more genuine’ than Jewish ones, only reinforces the picture (53:3, 10). A final factor which points towards a gentile-Christian audience is the ‘others’ against which Christian identity is constructed. Jews and heretics have already been mentioned, and though these are important in fulfilling certain functions, the most significant ‘other’ in the Apology is not a certain group, community or nation, but evil people in general, i.e. those who live without the Logos (46:4; 57:1). As was shown in the discussion on the implied writer, the Apology lacks any real sense of a communal Christian identity, and that more than anything else, it portrays the individual Christian as the ideal citizen, who adheres to a supreme ethical teaching (that of Jesus) and leads an excellent moral life. Such images could imply a pagan audience before which Justin tries to make a case for Christianity, but as already seen, other factors make this alternative unlikely. Yet, along with the refutation of popular charges against Christians, and the denouncement of pagan religion, they would work equally well for a gentile-Christian audience – especially if consisting of new converts, catechumens or would-be converts who may have become unsettled by all the rumours circulating about Christians. Through the language of the Apology, Justin reassures his readers of the soundness of their

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(possibly newly discovered) faith, he offers ‘those of like mind but fragile faith some matrix of rationality on which to pin their piety,’120 he admonishes and corrects those who may still have attachments to their old religion, and he declares that whatever social and political unrest there is, the fault does not lie with the Christians. III. Justin and the Emperor Having now landed on the side of the debate which sees an inward audience for Justin’s apology, one question remains to be addressed. Those who in the past have argued for an inward audience and therefore that the form of the Apology is a literary fiction, have often failed to explain why this form was chosen.121 The peculiar form of Justin’s apology, which frames a protreptic discourse as a legal petition to the emperor, was recognized earlier in this chapter, and it was concluded that it finds no direct literary precedence in antiquity. Why, then, did Justin choose this form, if he was communicating with believers? Why, as Kinzig asks, not write in the popular form of a philosophical dialogue (which he later does in the Dialogue) or the kind of polemical Traktatliteratur we find with e.g. Tatian and Minucius Felix?122 This is not an insignificant question. The address to the emperor is, as shown earlier, a carefully worked through theme in the text, and the ‘deliberative’ part of the Apology sets the framework for and infuses rhetorical character to the whole treatise. Therefore, any interpretation of the text must take it seriously.123 The form of the Apology is unique and so consciously crafted that it must be seen and analysed as strategy rather than as convention. The question, as the topic is approached, must therefore be what rhetorical function the address to the emperor plays in the text, and how Justin actually portrays his addressee. One reason to why the Justin’s address to the emperor has often been perceived as genuine is that the language of the Apology sometimes is very similar to what one would have expected in a real petition. For instance, Justin has often been read as trying to form an alliance with the emperor against the accusers. As already seen, this reading breaks down in logical consistency, as 120

Kannaday, Apologetic, 40. E.g. Ibid., 37–43. 122 Kinzig, “Sitz,” 293. 123 If one accepts Parvis’ and Minns’ description of the history of the text, one could, of course, argue that the form is just a left-over from a previous original (and authentic) petition. This will, however, not be enough as it does not explain why the treatise was reworked (given that the theory is true) with the form intact. If the form was insignificant, a new treatise could easily have been crafted from only the essential didactic parts. This would then also have had the benefit of shortening the treatise and thereby making it less expensive to reproduce. 121

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the emperor sometimes assumes the role also of the accuser. Yet more important is the fact that the dark irony of Justin’s seemingly conformist approach has often been missed altogether. On closer inspection it will become clear that the text of the Apology, in fact, does not seek an alliance with the emperor; if anything, it does the opposite. Peculiar to Justin’s Apology is its use of strongly protreptic language, not only in relation to pagan religion but also as directed towards the emperor. There is nothing similar found in e.g. Athenagoras, who shows deep loyalty and appropriate deference to the emperor throughout the whole of the Embassy. Also Aristides, though his rhetorical address to the emperor is a less worked through theme, portrays the autocrat in a positive way. This is all to be expected, as anyone purporting to address a judicial authority – and the emperor par excellence – was expected to show appropriate courtesy. Even Pliny, a high-ranking Roman official and a personal friend to the emperor, addresses the autocrat in deferential and eulogistic terms; ‘The people of Nicaea, Sir, have officially charged me by your immortal name and prosperity, which I must ever hold most sacred, to forward their petition to you.’124 Justin, in contrast, does nothing of the sort; in fact, he deals astonishingly harshly with the emperor, and does not shrink either from accusing him in person or threatening him with judgment from God. In the beginning of the text (3:5) he boldly exhorts the emperor to listen carefully to his words, ‘[f]or there will be no excuse [ἀναπόλητος] before God if, once you have learnt these things, you do not do what is right,’ and in the end (68:2) he warns the ruler with the assurance that ‘you will not escape the coming judgement of God, if you remain in wrongdoing [ἐπιμένητε τῇ ἀδικίᾳ].’ Once, he even goes so far as to implying that the emperor is at risk of receiving a more harsh judgment than anyone else: [E]ach of you will pay penalties in eternal fire according to the worth of his actions; and in proportion to the capabilities which he received from God an account will be required, as Christ indicated, saying ‘To whom God gave more, more also will be required of him. (17:4, emp. added)

Here, Justin not only transcends any conventional way of addressing a political authority, but he also betrays his blatant subversion of the genre he is writing in. The emperor is not a just ruler but a wrongdoer and it is not Justin or the Christians who need a defence before the emperor, but rather the emperor who needs a defence before God. Thus, the emperor is really the one on trial. This dark image is confirmed by a study of how Justin really portrays the emperor throughout the text. In his opening address (1:1), Justin describes the emperor and his sons with the words ‘philosopher’ and ‘lover of culture’ 124

Pliny, “Letters and Panegyrics II,” LCL, (1969), letter 83.

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(ἐραστής παιδείας). As already seen, addressing the ruler or king as a philosopher was encouraged already by the rhetorician Menander, and in an imperial libellus such an opening would be customary and expected. According to Millar, the language of the petition should be ‘suitably obsequious and appealing,’ recognizing the emperor’s authority, justice and generosity. 125 In Justin the tone is, however, quite different. Almost immediately after calling the emperor a philosopher and lover of culture, he retraces his steps modifies and his statement: ‘[Y]ou hear on all sides people calling you pious and philosophers and guardians of justice and lovers of learning. But whether in fact you are remains to be seen’ (2:2, emp. added). Thus, calling the emperor a philosopher is not meant as flattery (cf. 2:3), and nor is it simply an innocent expression of propriety. Rather, Justin subverts the purpose of a conventional and courteous greeting by setting it up as a standard against which the actions of the emperor will be measured. Throughout the Apology Justin not only reminds the emperor of what is fitting for someone who loves the truth, values philosophy and is guarded by reason, but he also implies that the emperor fails on all accounts. Thus, the initial greeting is turned into a subtle accusation. In 2:1 he writes that ‘those who are truly [κατὰ ἀλήθειαν]126 pious and philosophers should honour and hold in affection the truth alone’ and in 3:1 he claims that ‘true reason’ should prohibit the emperor from wronging innocent people. Yet, the emperor does not value truth alone and he continuously wrongs the innocent. Justin, therefore, evaluates to what extent the emperor is a true philosopher, and in fact he finds the latter wanting. Already in 2:3, Justin holds forth that the emperor is moved by a ‘desire to please superstitious men,’ and that he is guided by prejudice, rumours and irrational impulse (ἀλόγῳ ὁρμῇ). In 3:2, he implies that the emperor follows violence and tyranny rather than piety and philosophy, and in 3:1 and 5:1 he accuses the emperor of instigating action based on passion rather than ‘sober judgement’. Further in the text, the autocrat is accused of hypocrisy (27:5)127, charged with punishing Christians ‘unreflectingly,’ ‘driven under the whip of wicked demons’ (5:1) and claimed to be honouring ‘custom before truth’ (12:6). On top of this, Justin reminds the emperor of his own mortality (18:1), threatens him with the retributive punishment of God (3:5; 4:2), and assures him that eternal punishment awaits the wicked (21:6). At times Justin’s tone becomes almost mocking, as when he claims that the emperor does not even seem to

125

Millar, The Emperor, 543. Cf. Buck, “Apologies,” 53. Presumably as opposed to those who are only called so. 127 ‘And the things which are openly done and honoured by you, as if the divine light were overturned and absent, you ascribe to us.’ The overturning of the ‘divine light’ is probably a reference to the allegations that Christians, in their meetings, turned out the candle lights and engaged in illicit sex. Cf. Tertullian Ap. 8:7. 126

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wish that people live righteously, since this would deprive him of subjects to harass and punish (12:4).128 What we find in the Apology is thus something very different from what Menander arguably had in mind when he suggested that rulers be addressed as philosophers; the latter surely meant it as a way of honouring the ruler, whereas for Justin it becomes a tool to be used against the emperor. This understanding is reinforced by the fact that Justin sometimes addresses the emperor as a pagan ‘other’ as opposed to a presumably allied philosopher. In ch. 18, the emperor129 is associated with the practice of necromancy through innocent children and in chs. 21–25 the emperor is addressed as a believer in and practitioner of pagan cult. In essence, a picture is painted of a supreme ruler who does not live up to his own philosophical ideals, as he defends irrational pagan beliefs and persecutes those who live in accordance with reason. In 3:3, Justin quotes Plato’s remark that philosophers should become kings, or kings embrace philosophy (Rep. 473c), and since the emperor is not a true philosopher, he thereby directly, though subtly, challenges the legitimacy of imperial authority. Needless to say, it is unthinkable that a treatise presented to the emperor with the purpose of obtaining favour for an afflicted community would be framed in this way. To accuse the emperor of injustice and threaten him with divine retribution would, mildly speaking, have run contrary to all standard formalities and to common politeness in any situation, and the fact that Justin represents a community that already is suspected of disloyalty and subversion makes such statements even more incredible. This confirms the earlier conclusion that the Apology was never intended for actual submission to the emperor. What purpose, then, would framing the emperor as a hypocrite (which essentially is what Justin does) serve rhetorically? And more specifically; what purpose would it serve for Justin’s intended audience? Certainly, there is a decidedly subversive and defiant tone in the text, but it would be a mistake to understand the treatise in primarily political terms. Justin is not out to instigate political defiance or insurrection. Rather, he engages in a phenomenon commonly known in group psychology: by demonizing the ‘other’, he aims to strengthen the bonds between the members of his own group. By nourishing the idea of Christians as innocent and pious victims in a cruel, hostile society, 128

For more on Justin’s abusive language against the emperor, see Buck, “Apologies,” 53–54 Cf. Pagels, who recognizes that in his address to the emperor, Justin ‘turns abruptly from appeal to invective’ (Elaine Pagels, “Christian Apologists and ‘The Fall of the Angels’: An Attack on Roman Imperial Power?,” HTR 78, (1985): 305). 129 The emperor, as the stated addressee must be seen as included in the rhetorical ‘you’ (found in the Greek text, but omitted in Minns’ and Parvis’ translation) of this passage; even if Justin did not mean that the emperor in person practised these abominations, he seems to hold him responsible for them.

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for which the emperor is made the symbol, Justin is playing strings which create a core tone of the early Christian identity. As already seen, suffering, persecution and martyrdom were ideals essential to Christian selfunderstanding. Justin’s purpose with the Apology is to present Christianity as a faith or philosophy which is superior to any of its rivals. This is achieved through describing Christianity in eulogistic terms, but also through denouncing its competitors and detractors as this creates a contrast through which the Christian faith shines even clearer. Yet, as Christianity is defined as much in terms of a way of life as of intellectual beliefs, Justin also seeks to contrast the Christian experience and life against the alternatives. This is achieved through the creation of a distinct dualism between two types of people – those who live according to the Logos (Christians) and those who live without it (the rest) – and through providing concrete examples of the depraved morality of pagan practitioners. It is within this scheme that Justin’s address to the emperor fits, because lastly, Justin also creates a contrast between the demonically ruled political powers of this world, ultimately represented by the emperor, and the oppressed minority, which has God on its side. That the emperor assumes the role of a representative symbol is accentuated by the fact that Justin actually names the rulers he is accusing, something pagan critics of government would rarely do.130 To be good in a world of goodness is no great feat, but to be virtuous in a world of vice, where the evil oppress the good, is true heroism. The function of the emperor in the Apology is thus to represent the oppressing forces of the world, and to bring the suffering of Christians to the forefront. That the followers of the Christian faith are oppressed and suffering is, namely, part and parcel of Justin’s argument for its intrinsic authenticity and nobility.

C. Apologetics, Audience and Purpose: Conclusions C. Apologetics, Audience and Purpose: Conclusions

It is now time to summarize the findings of this chapter, and suggest a path forward. Our inquiry as to how the intended audience of Justin’s Apology should be understood has been based on both textual and socio-political considerations. The conclusion that Christian literature, if not primarily aimed towards Christians, was at least almost exclusively read by them, seems to have been recognized already by Tertullian, who concedes that no one comes for guidance to this literature ‘unless he is already a Christian’ (de Test. Ani130

‘Criticism /…/ preferred the written word, and spoke in code’ (Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire (New York: Routledge, 1966), 36). Cf. Pagels, “Christian Apologists,” 309–310.

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mae 1). Such a perception – i.e. that Christian literature was consulted only by Christians – cannot be easily dismissed when expressed by one of the socalled apologists themselves, as it undoubtedly has implications for how he understood the purpose and function of his own literary production.131 Concerning Justin’s Apology, it was earlier concluded that a missionary purpose is unlikely due to the practical problems someone like Justin would be likely to encounter if trying to have a text published and distributed. It was also noted that the ostensible missionary character of the apologetic arguments in the text does not necessarily imply a pagan audience, as an inward audience would benefit equally much from it. Further, it was concluded that the theory that the Apology is an authentic petition, which was intended for submission to the emperor, is socio-politically possible, but that textual considerations make this alternative implausible as well. Left with only a few possibilities, attention was drawn to further textual analyses which focused on the implied audience of the text. On the basis of this, it was then suggested that Justin probably had Christians, as well as people on the borderline between Christianity and paganism, in mind when he wrote his Apology. In his illuminating treatment on ’the individual’ in the early Christian community, Christoph Markschies shows that conversion to Christianity in the early centuries did not necessarily entail a clean and radical break from paganism.132 There are numerous examples from this period of lingering syncretism (called ‘Semi-Christianity’ by Markschies) within the Christian community. Here is one provided by Origen: But also those introduce anathema into the churches who, for example, celebrate the solemnities of the nations even though they are Christians. Those who eagerly seek the lives and deeds of humans from the courses of the stars, who inquire of the flight of birds and other things of this type that were observed in the former age ...133

The presence of such practices within the Christian community, which suggests the existence of a loosely defined group of people inhabiting the twilight borderlands between paganism and Christianity (possibly including catechumens, neophytes, sympathetic pagans and others), would correspond very well to our earlier reconstruction of the implied audience for the Apology. For Justin in particular, running his own ‘school’ of philosophy in Rome (however we are to understand this), it seems reasonable to assume that he would come in contact with many people from this category.134 Education in 131

Cf. McKnight, Light, 62. Markschies, Between, 39–126. See esp. 52–54. 133 Homilies on the Book of Joshua VII:4 (translation from Origen, Homilies on Joshua, ed. Cynthia White, trans. Barbara J. Bruce, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002). 134 As Tobias George has recently shown, the witness from the Martyrium points in the same direction (Georges, “School,” 76–80). 132

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‘the philosophy of Christianity’ might well have attracted people from various backgrounds, but at least some of his students would probably fit within a category ranging from pagans interested in Christianity to new converts wishing to learn more about their faith. On a wider scale, it is not difficult to envisage a need felt among Christian authors and leaders to address such a group of people in order to gather it in safely on the right side of the borderline. This necessitates the creation of clearly defined borders in the first place (i.e. construction of ‘self’ in contradistinction to ‘other’), as well as a protreptic defence of the ‘right’ side. Both of these elements, as already noted, are found in abundance in the Apology. Moving into the next parts of this study, in which the major apologetic strategies used in the Apology will be analysed, this picture of whom Justin is primarily targeting will help our understanding of how, and for what purpose, the different apologetic themes are used and developed. The findings of this chapter will thus form a backdrop for future discussions and will constitute one of the lenses through which Justin’s apologetic strategies will be viewed, analysed and discussed.

Chapter 3

The ‘Theft Theory’, The Logos, and the Problem of Newness Shifting focus from the question of the audience and purpose of Justin’s Apology, though bringing with us the findings from these discussions, it is now time to start exploring Justin’s apologetic more systematically, and from a literary-rhetorical horizon. Two of the most famous apologetic strategies Justin uses in his defence of Christianity are his doctrine of the Logos and the so called ‘theft theory’, i.e. the idea that various pagan sages and philosophers had plagiarized or ‘stolen’ ideas from the Hebrew prophets. In this chapter, these two strategies will be discussed on the basis of their function in the text of the Apology as well as in relation to the problem which they are both addressing. This problem, which in antiquity was not a negligible one, consists of the consequences and implications brought by the relative recent origin of the Christian faith.

A. The Problem of Novelty in Antiquity A. The Problem of Novelty in Antiquity

In the poet Hesiod’s Works and Days, probably written in the eighth century BCE, the early history of humankind is described as a sequence of different ages. Among these, the Golden Age is the earliest and happiest one,1 and at the bottom of the list features the present age, which is worse than any of the preceding eras. This view of humankind as trapped in a spiral of perpetual moral and cultural decline was typical for many ancient writers, and it came to foster a popular attitude in society which favoured antiquity over novelty and innovation, particularly in relation to areas such as philosophy, religion or cultural customs. In the first century BCE, the Greek historian Diodorus Siculus, wrote in his Bibliotheca Historica: Again, with respect to the antiquity of the human race, not only do Greeks put forth their claims but many of the barbarians as well, all holding that it is they who were autochtho-

1

II:109–126. On the ‘primitive man’ in Greek thought, cf. G. R. Boys-Stones, PostHellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1–27.

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nous and the first of all men to discover the things which are of use in life, and that it was the events in their own history which were the earliest to have been held worthy of record.2

At the core of the ancient debates referred to in this account lies, apart from a fundamental assumption which favours primitive wisdom over modern culture, also a competitive search for communal recognition and validity, which is expressed through rivalling claims to discoveries and inventions. Thus, the rationale for what has come to be called the argument from antiquity, builds on the notion that truth and authenticity are inseparable from old age. Antiquity meant distinction and respect, while novelty implied corruption and therefore was generally received with scepticism. This general attitude that whatever is old is valuable served as the basis for what could be described as the argument from antiquity in its absolute form – that is, if something can be proven to be old, it is proven to be good. However, in the context of cultural rivalry such as is implied in the quotation from Diodorus, arguments from antiquity are more often found in relative forms. In a relative form, the argument does not aim at claiming supreme antiquity, but merely the superior age of one group of people, writings, or customs etc, in relation to a rival group. The question in these cases is not when something valuable was said or invented, but who said or invented it first.

B. The Argument from Antiquity in Hellenistic Judaism B. The Argument from Antiquity in Hellenistic Judaism

Attempts to establish the superiority of one’s own group of people through apologetic historiography were, as far as we can tell, not uncommon in the ancient world. In the centuries preceding the common era, a tradition in the Greek East emerged, which had developed as an offspring to (though sometimes also in reaction against) Greek ethnography (as found in Hecataeus of Miletus and Herodotus), through some transitional works (by e.g. Hecataeus of Abdera and Megasthenes) into a pronounced apologetic historiography (Berossos and Manetho).3 Jewish authors were not slow to follow, and sometimes they borrowed ideas from earlier authors, while sometimes they refuted claims made by competing historiographers. In the third century BCE, the Alexandrian biographer Hermippus wrote that Pythagoras had imitated the opinions of the Jews and Thracians, and claimed them to be his own.4 As intertestamental Judaism was a particularly 2 Bibl. Hist. 1:9:3. Quote from Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, vol. 1, LCL (London: W. Heinemann, 1933). 3 An excellent presentation of this process and the authors involved is found in Sterling, Historiography, 1–136. For discussion and definition of the concept of apologetic historiography, see pp. 16–19. 4 Josephus, Ag. Ap. 1:165. Cf. Origen, Ag. Cel. 1:15.

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historically-minded culture, ‘prolific in historical thought,’5 this view of Hermippus along with similar ones6 was taken up and advanced by Jews in Alexandria and elsewhere and became an important part in the process of self-identification of Hellenistic Judaism. One of the most significant results of the encounter between Jewish and Hellenistic culture7 was the production of a corpus of Jewish writings in the Greek language. As seen in the previous chapter, the largest literary unit of apologetic historiography which has been preserved for posterity is found within this corpus. The factor which more than anything else triggered the emergence of this literature was the translation of the Jewish Scriptures from Hebrew into Greek, which took place during the third and second centuries BCE. The myth surrounding this monumental event has been preserved primarily in the Letter of Aristeas (with near-copies in Philo and Josephus8) but also in the fragments from Aristobulus.9 The Jewish authors who wrote in Greek all, in varying degrees, drew inspiration from the LXX.10 The Greeks themselves apparently knew very little about the Jews before the time of Alexander the Great.11 The standard perception by intellectuals (such as Hecataeus of Abdera and Megasthenes) at the beginning of the Hel-

5 Tessa Rajak, The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in Cultural and Social Interaction, AGJU (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 19. 6 The extant references to Jews in Hellenistic literature are given a thorough treatment in Bezalel Bar-Kochva, The Image of the Jews in Greek Literature: The Hellenistic Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 7 The locus classicus for the confrontation between Jewish and Hellenistic culture is found in 2 Maccabees, where the terms ἰουδαίσμος and ἑλληνίσμος are found for the first time, but the encounter as such predates this text. A widely held scholarly opinion on the nature of this encounter, summarized by Rajak, is that ‘the Jews absorbed and internalized many aspects of Greek culture,’ making it ‘impossible coherently to talk about Hellenism as something separate, outside or antithetical to Judaism.’ (Rajak, Jewish Dialogue, ix). 8 De Vit. Mos. 2:25–44 and Ant. 12:12–118. 9 The probable background, though, is that the Hebrew Scriptures, starting with the Pentateuch, were translated by Alexandrian Jews for a Jewish consumption (so P. M. Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972 (reprint 1984)), 1:687). Cf. further discussion in Jennifer M. Dines, The Septuagint, ed. Michael A. Knibb, Understanding the Bible and Its World (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 42– 45. 10 The first evidences of a Greek translation of the Pentateuch are found in the writings of Demetrius and Ezekiel the tragedian (Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, 1: 693). 11 A lucid account of ‘the Hellenistic discovery of Judaism’ is provided in Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 74–97.

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lenistic age seems to have been that Jews were a people of philosophers.12 Megasthenes, wrote in his Indica, ca 290 BCE: All that was said about nature by the ancients is said also by those who philosophise beyond Greece: some things by the Brahmins among the Indians, and others by those called Jews in Syria.13

Such ideas opened the door for Jewish authors to offer their own account of the history and achievements of their people.14 Much of what has been preserved of early Jewish apologetic historiography comes down to us through one man, the already mentioned Greek author Alexander Polyhistor. We know very little of Polyhistor’s life – only that he was brought to Rome as a slave during Sulla’s eastern campaigns (ca 82 BCE), where he served as a παιδαγωγός, before he was set free and eventually became a rather significant figure. This provides us with a terminus ante quem of the mid first century BCE for all the authors quoted in his fragments.15 Both Eusebius and Clement used Polyhistor independently,16 and it is mainly through them (especially through the ninth book of Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica) that the fragments have reached our days.17 Apart from these fragmentary authors, our two main sources to how the argument from antiquity was used in the Jewish community are Josephus and Philo. The Jewish writers referred to above can be categorized into two groups – historians and philosophical writers – in an attempt to reflect the main interest of each author, though the distinction certainly is not waterproof. Among the ‘historians’ are usually counted Artapanus, Eupolemus, Ps-Eupolemus, Cleodemus and, prominently, Josephus. What characterises this group of authors is the engagement in competitive historiography, where the aim is to portray the Jews as benefactors of civilization and culture. Jewish forefathers, primarily Moses and Abraham, are portrayed as Kulturbringer and inventors of 12

This assessment was first offered by the pagan author Theophrastus (372–288/7 BCE, fragment in Porphyry 2.26.1–4). Cf. Alan Mendelson, Philo's Jewish Identity, ed. Jacob Neusner, et al., Brown Judaic Studies (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 80–81, and BarKochva, Image, 15–39. 13 Clement, Strom. 1:15 (ANF, vol. II). For discussions on the passage, see Stern, Authors, 1, 45–46, and Bar-Kochva, Image, 136–163. 14 Sterling, Historiography, 140–141. 15 Gruen, Heritage, 112. Thorough discussions on the textual transmission in Polyhistor’s fragments are provided by Ben Zion Wacholder, Eupolemus: A Study of JudaeoGreek Literature (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1974), 44–52, and Jacob Freudenthal, Alexander Polyhistor und die von ihm erhaltenen Reste jüdischer und samaritanischer Geschichtswerke, Hellenistische Studien (Breslau: Gras, Barth und comp., 1875), 1: 16–35. 16 Clement cannot have used Eusebius (as he wrote earlier) and Eusebius has additional material which shows that he did not depend on Clement. 17 More on Polyhistor’s life and works in Sterling, Historiography, 144–152.

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everything beneficial to humankind, from astrology and laws to military techniques. The ‘philosophers’ include Aristobulus, The Letter of Aristeas and, of course, Philo. The interest of this group of writers is, as expected, more philosophical and seems to centre on attempts to portray Judaism as more of a philosophy than an ethnical designation.18 The most striking surviving example of a worked out argument from antiquity among these Jewish writers is without doubt that which Josephus gives in Against Apion, and we shall need to revisit this work in order to get a fuller understanding of how the argument could work in practice. In the introduction Josephus clearly states the purpose of his work: I thought it necessary to write briefly on all these matters, to convict those who insult us as guilty of malice and deliberate falsehood, to correct the ignorance of others, and to instruct all who wish to know the truth on the subject of our antiquity.19

The insults Josephus refers to in this passage seem to have been responses to his work Jewish Antiquities, and therefore Against Apion can be seen as an attempt by Josephus to clarify or defend some of the statements made in his earlier published magnum opus. Josephus’ concern in this text here is not to prove the splendour of the Jewish people, but only to establish and defend its antiquity.20 Already in the first paragraph of the work it is stated that the Jewish people is ‘extremely ancient.’ This is stated as a direct refutation of ‘slanders’ spread by some, which suggested that the Jews were of more ‘recent origin’.21 Josephus then proceeds to unfold his argument through a lengthy comparative historiography, with the Greeks as his main target. His critique against the Greeks is severe. Not only is Greek history writing recent in origin, it is also untrustworthy and riddled with contradictions. The Greeks do not use official records and are more concerned with style than with truth.22 Josephus wonders why one expects to find truth with the Greeks but not with ‘the rest of humanity,’ as everything pertaining to the Greeks is ‘recent’ (1:6–7), and concludes, not surprisingly, that the Jewish people can claim antiquity over the Greeks in almost any area of culture and civilization. We 18 For closer studies on the contributions of these Jewish writers, see e.g. John M. G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: from Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), and Collins, Athens. 19 Ag. Ap. 1:3. Translation used: Barclay, Apion, 10. The fact that Josephus uses the word ἀρχαιολογία three times (1:1, 2, 4) and ἀρχαιότης once (1:3) in the first four paragraphs of the treatise, tells us something about his zeal for this question. (cf. Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 178). 20 I.e. extravagant reinterpretations of Jewish history as found in Artapanus, Eupolemus and also in Josephus’ own J. A., is absent from Ag. Ap. On the subject of antiquity in Graeco-Egyptian anti-Judaism, see Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic, 60–75. 21 Ag. Ap. 1:1. 22 Cf. Sterling, Historiography, 244.

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learn, for example, that the Greeks were late in learning the alphabet (1:10) and that their written sources are late, unreliable and contradictory (1:15–22). Evidence from Greek literature which testifies in favour of the Jews’ antiquity can be secured though (1:161–218) along with testimonies from the Egyptians (1:73–105), the Phoenicians (1:106–27) and the Chaldeans (1:128–60). The last part of the Book One is dedicated to forceful rebuttals of pejorative Exodus accounts relayed by several pagan historians (Manetho, Chaeremon and Lysimachus).23 It is not until Book Two that Josephus begins interacting with the person after whom the work subsequently was to be named, namely Apion. The first half of the book is a refutation of Apion’s claims relating to the Exodus (2:8– 27), his charges against the Alexandrian Jews (2:33–78) and his accusations against certain Jewish practices such as the temple-cult (2:79–144).24 In the final part of his treatise (2:145–286), Josephus cites some new accusations from critics (Apollonius Molon and Lysimachus 2:145–50) and refutes them, but he also returns to earlier charges and addresses them again. He concludes his work with stating that though Jews have no reason to emulate other people’s customs (2.270–78) others have freely emulated theirs and he sums up his argument with an eloquent proclamation of the antiquity and splendour of the Jewish culture.25 It is notable that Against Apion takes an opposite view to the Antiquities regarding the development of culture and civilization. The Antiquities paints the human past in golden colours and describes subsequent history of culture as a corruption of the original glory and excellence. Ironically, however, it seems to have been precisely this view that made Josephus’ account vulnerable to the charge that the Jewish people, then, had not contributed anything to the development and betterment of human civilization. In Against Apion, Josephus responds to such accusations and, as a result, completely changes his approach. In this treatise, the history of culture is portrayed in a positive light, as progressing, with the Jewish people framed as its chief benefactors.26 Against Apion is an excellent study in how the argument from antiquity worked in an apologetic context, and within a dispute between ethnic communities; it shows with illuminating clarity which strings the argument was designed to play as well as which assumptions it was built upon. It also gives examples of apologetic strategies, in particular that of rebutting an accusation

23 Manetho, as we have seen, was Egyptian, but Chaeremon and Lysimachus are introduced without any references to their nationality being made. 24 Barclay, Apion, 10, 167. 25 Ibid., 243. 26 I am here indebted to Droge’s enlightening comparison of the two treatises: A. J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture, Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr, 1989), 35–47.

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by turning it around and redirecting it towards one’s opponent, which, as will be seen, also Justin makes use of.

C. The Question of Novelty in Early Christianity C. The Question of Novelty in Early Christianity

Through Judaism the problems surrounding the question of antiquity came to influence also the way the early Christians conceived of and presented their own faith and identity. As often noted, it was generally assumed in antiquity that nothing could be new and true, and it was therefore inevitable that the question of novelty should become important to Christian apologists. Christianity was, after all, not only a new religion, but a new religion which – outrageously in the eyes of its opponents – claimed possession of the one ultimate truth. Here, the situation for Christians was decidedly different from that of the Jews. Although pagan authors would deride Jewish customs and debate its relative antiquity within the context of cultural rivalry (as discussed above), Judaism was generally accepted as an ancient culture, and thus a religio licita. In fact, it was probably not until contrasted against Christianity that Judaism even started to be understood in religious rather than primarily cultural terms.27 Thus, his disparaging criticism of Judaism notwithstanding, a pagan historian like Tacitus could still accept its legitimacy on the basis of its great antiquity.28 Christians, for obvious reasons, faced much worse difficulties in the antiquity question, and because of this the charge of novelty would become an effective weapon for antagonists to the Christian movement. Suetonius’ description of Christianity as ‘a new and harmful superstition’ (‘superstitio nova ac malefic,’ Nero 16:2), seems to have become widely accepted, and it is reflected, for example, in Celsus’ critique of the Christian movement as a novel corruption of Judaism (Ag. Cel. 3:5). Tacitus, further, calls Christianity a ‘hateful superstition’ (‘exitiabilis superstitio,’ Annals 15:44) while Pliny refers to it as a ‘depraved and immoderate superstition’ (‘superstitio prava et immodica,’ Letters 10:96).29 The word superstitio was widely used in a negative sense, often in reference to religious practices which the Romans did not accept, and among these innovations and novelties were certain to be count-

27 Frances Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49–51. 28 Hist. 5:4–5. Cf. Droge, Homer, 3, and Young, Biblical, 51–52. 29 For a study of how the early Christians were perceived by their pagan contemporaries, see Wilken, The Christians. Cf. Clark, Christianity, 16–37 and Peter Pilhofer, Presbyteron Kreitton: Der Alterbeweis der jüdischen und christlichen Apologeten und seine Vorgeschichte (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1990), 221–226.

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ed. In other words, a supserstitio was often seen as the opposite of a religio licita.30 It is in propleptic defence against such ideas and accusations that the Christian author of the Letter to Diognetus (Ad. Diog. 1) puts the antiquity question in its most fundamental form: why did Christianity appear so late? At a basic level, there are two types of defensive response one can give to an accusation. One is to refute the validity of the facts, and the other is to recognize the facts but reinterpret their significance.31 Both of these approaches were used by Christian apologists when engaging the charge of novelty. In the fragments which have survived from what is probably an early second century Christian writing, referred to by Clement and Origen as the Kerygma Petrou, it is argued that Christians, through Christ, have learned to worship God in a new way. The author notes that in the Hebrew Scriptures, God had promised that he would make a new covenant and then he asserts: ‘He made a new covenant with us; for what belonged to the Greeks and Jews is old. But we, who worship Him in a new way, in the third form [γένος], are Christians.’32 Aristides, who may have known the Kerygma, embraces newness in a similar way, claiming that Christians constitute a new γένος, separated from the other races of humankind, which, as we have seen, he identifies as Barbarians, Greeks and Jews. Just as other peoples trace their origin to a common progenitor, Aristides claims that Christians can trace their origin to Christ (Ap. 2).33 The ethnic construal of the Christian community is intrinsic to the rationale behind the defence of Christianity found in these texts. Here, the newness of Christianity is not seen as a problem, but is rather emphasised in conjunction with a negative description of the history of culture. The peoples of the earth have erred or strayed and have not produced anything beneficial to humankind. The hope lies now with the Christians, a new and different people, who, as shown through the excellence of their lives, ‘have come nearer to truth and genuine knowledge than the rest of the nations’ (Aristides, Ap. 15:1). The same idea is later echoed in Melito who sees a correlation between the emergence of Christianity and the flourishing of the Roman empire since the time of Augustus.34 In this way, potential charges of novelty are proleptically and anticipatorily dismissed. To these writers, truth and the proof of 30

Cf. Beard, North, and Price, Religions, 1: A History, 215–227. Certainly, as rhetoricians will point out, there are a number of strategies for how to respond to a claim. Fundamental to any argument is, nonetheless, the question: ‘do we agree on the facts?’. 32 Clement, Strom. VI. 5:39 (trans. from ANF, vol. 9). How γένος best should be interpreted here is unclear, but also not important for present purposes. 33 On the Kerygma and Aristides in relation to the question of newness, see also Pilhofer, Presbyteron, 227–234. 34 Eusebius H.E. IV:26:7. 31

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moral and cultural superiority among the Christians, trump any claim to antiquity other peoples may produce. Turning a charge into a positive affirmation, which is what both the Kerygma and Aristides do, can be a powerful rhetorical strategy. The argument from antiquity was, namely, primarily an emotional one, appealing to culturally inherited mechanisms of trust. By directly challenging the argument’s validity, the ball is, as it were, sent back into the court of the opponent, who will then have to develop and substantiate the claims.

D. Justin and the Newness of Christianity D. Justin and the Newness of Christianity

Justin, by contrast, chooses an entirely different path in the Apology. Unlike the above-mentioned writers, he recognizes and takes seriously the problem of novelty, and responds to it with a series of combined strategies, which will be explored in the following pages. Strikingly, Justin right at the beginning of the Apology tries to defuse the damaging potential of the antiquity argument by problematizing the cultural assumption of there being, of necessity, a correlation between truth and old age. In 2:1, he writes: Reason prescribes that those who are truly pious and philosophers should honour and hold in affection the truth alone, refusing to go along with the opinions of the men of old, should these be of no value.

The potential contrast Justin paints between ‘truth’ and ‘the opinions of the men of old’ is a direct challenge to the Roman idea of mos maiorum, that is, the perceived obligation to respect time-honoured customs and traditions. This conservative attitude is well summarized in an alleged edict of the Roman censors of 92 BCE, preserved by Suetonius, which reads: ‘[a]ll new that is done contrary to the usage and the customs of our ancestors, seems not to be right’ (De Rhet. 1).35 Yet to Justin, truth and customs are not necessarily equated. Later, when Justin is in the middle of presenting his proof from prophecy, he alludes to the same idea. And that it was foreknown that these calumnies would be spoken against those who confess Christ, as was how those would be wretched who spoke ill of him while saying it was good to preserve the ancient customs, hear the things said briefly through Isaiah. They are these: ‘Woe to those who say the sweet is bitter and bitter sweet’. (49:6–7)

What is said here is simply that those who speak ill about Christ as one who leads people away from honouring ancient customs, are wretched souls who

35 Cf. Adolf Berger, “Mores (mos) maiorum,” in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, [1953] 1991).

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purposefully confuse truth with falsehood. Thus, what matters in the end is only what is true, and truth trumps anything, including antiquity. However, if Justin rejects the notion that whatever is old is true, he does seem to accept its inverse formulation, i.e. that whatever is true is old. Antiquity does not guarantee truth, but novelty still implies corruption, and thus Christianity must be rescued from the charge of novelty. Justin’s primary strategy to this end is to point to the similarities between Christianity and older and more established beliefs. I. ‘Others Teach the Same Things We Do’ A dominant characteristic of the Apology is the effort put into the creation of links between, on the one hand, Christian doctrine and narrative and, on the other, both Greek wisdom and Greek myth. For example, in 8:3–4, 18:5–6 and 20:3–21:1 Justin draws parallels between Christian doctrine and the teachings of Plato, the Stoics and other Greek philosophers, and in chs. 21–22 a number of similarities between pagan myth and Christian teaching are explored. Yet, Christianity’s relations to philosophy and myth are different. It has often been claimed that Justin is positive towards pagan philosophy but negative towards myth, a sentiment he shared with many contemporary and earlier philosophers.36 This observation, though only partly true, is important and will be discussed at length in the fifth chapter of this study. Nonetheless, all links between Christianity and pagan beliefs, whether drawn from philosophy or myth, serve two fundamental functions in the Apology, and the difference between myth and philosophy does not become important until a later stage in the logical structure of Justin’s argument, which is when he attempts to give an explanation for the corruption of truth. This means that the reading which holds that Justin’s positive portrayal of Greek philosophy should be understood as an attempt to reconcile Christianity to pagan philosophy through bridge-building needs to be problematized. Such a reading fails not because it recognizes that bridge-building is taking place, but because it does not pay enough attention to its purpose. As will be seen, Justin does not try to reconcile Christianity to pagan philosophy; rather, he does quite the opposite. There are, thus, two primary functions which the parallels between Christianity and paganism serve. The first one relates to the persecution of Christians. In 24:1, Justin writes that ‘although we say similar things to the Greeks, we alone are hated on account of the name of Christ, and, although we do nothing wrong, we are killed as sinners,’ and earlier in 20:3, he asks: ‘If therefore we say some things similarly to the poets and philosophers whom you respect, and some things that exceed them and are divine, and for which we alone offer proof, why are we unjustly hated more than all?’ 36

E.g. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 11.

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Here, the purpose of identifying similarities between Greek philosophy and Christianity is clearly to construct a foundation from which Justin can challenge the unjust treatment of Christians. Justin does not try to forge an alliance with Greek philosophers; rather, he questions the fairness of persecuting the Christians on account of their faith, when he can show that their faith is not so different from what the Greeks already have believed. ‘[We] are killed as sinners,’ Justin claims, ‘while others elsewhere worship both trees and rivers, and mice, and cats, and crocodiles, and most other irrational animals’ (24:1). Though not stated explicitly, this is a reference to the Egyptians, who were believed to entertain animal cults which were despised by Jews, Christians and Greeks alike.37 Justin’s point is that if even these cults, abominable though they are, are tolerated by the emperor, why are Christians, the teachings of whom are really not that different from the best of Greek philosophy, persecuted? The second function of the parallels is more important, and it relates to Justin’s primary apologetic strategy in the Apology. This strategy is often referred to as the ‘proof from prophecy,’ and it will be treated at length in the next chapter. For present purposes, a short introduction to the term will suffice. A major theme in Justin’s defence of Christianity is that both Christian doctrine and narrative can be proved to be true, because they can be shown to have been predicted hundreds of years in advance by the Hebrew prophets. In order for the proof to work, two foundations are necessary which the argument from antiquity can provide. These foundations are in practice two phases in the same argument, and the first of these relates to the parallels discussed above. First, Christianity must be rescued from novelty, the damaging implications of which not even Justin could ignore. The proof from prophecy does not require supreme antiquity in order to work, but neither does it allow for complete novelty. Therefore, the charge of novelty, or the innovation of religion, must be repudiated. Christianity must independently be established an ancient religion, if not necessarily the most ancient one. Refutation of the charge of novelty is achieved through identifying common factors between Christianity and Greek philosophy and religion. If Christianity teaches things similar to what the Greeks say, then their doctrines are de facto not new. At this point, Christianity is certainly still open to the charge of plagiarism, but that is a separate problem. The two charges are different and plagiarism need not imply novelty.

37 Aristides (Ap. 12), for example, refers to the Egyptians as ‘more stupid than the rest of the nations’ because of their animal cults and Josephus describes them as an ‘[e]mptyheaded and utterly foolish people, inured from the beginning to depraved opinions about Gods’ (Ag. Ap. 1:225).

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The refutation of any charges of plagiarism is therefore what constitutes the second phase of the argument. The charge of plagiarism, which Justin makes possible by pointing out similarities between Christianity and Greek wisdom/mythology, could be almost as damaging to his cause as that of innovation.38 If Christianity is but a conglomerate of ideas copied from the Greeks and others, the proof from prophecy is seriously undermined. The evidence provided through this argument is precisely that the prophecies are divinely inspired, and that the prophets through the inspiration of the prophetic Spirit (or the Logos39) had predicted events in Christian narrative as well as anticipated Christian teaching. The argument would, needless to say, lose its convincing potential if it were shown that what Christians taught had in fact been gleaned from Greek mythology and philosophy. In summation, Justin can refute the charge of innovation, or that Christianity is of recent origin, by pointing out the similarities Christian doctrine shares with Greek philosophy and myth, but in doing so he lays himself open to the accusation of plagiarism. In order to anticipate this charge, Justin has to show not only that Christianity is an ancient and venerable religion, but also that it can claim a relative antiquity over the Greeks. It is in order to show this that Justin develops and employs an apologetic strategy which has often been called the ‘theft theory’, and which serves the purpose of simply turning the charge of plagiarism around. II. The ‘Theft Theory’ The so called ‘theft theory’ is not original to Justin but is a strategy which he borrows and develops from earlier Hellenistic, and primarily Jewish, apologetics. It builds upon a widespread idea in antiquity, which can be traced back already to Herodotus and which holds that Egypt is the cradle of civilisation and that the Greeks learned their wisdom from the Egyptians and the Orient. Describing his encounters with Egyptian priests during a visit to their country, Herodotus writes: They [i.e. the priests] claimed that the Egyptians were the first people to discover the year, and to distribute throughout the year the twelve parts into which they divided the seasons. They said that they discovered this from the stars. It seems to me that the Egyptian monthly system is cleverer than the Greek one […] The priests also told me that the Egyptians

38 As independent charges, innovation is worse than plagiarism, but in relation to the proof from prophecy, the charges are almost equally damaging. 39 The relation between the prophetic Spirit and the Logos will be discussed in chapter 4.

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were the first to establish the epithets of the twelve Gods and that the Greeks got these epithets from them.40

In conclusion, Herodotus writes that the priests also ‘demonstrated the validity of most of these claims.’41 In Hecataeus of Abdera’s history of Egypt, mainly surviving in paraphrased form in Diodorus Siculus’ Bibliotheca Historica, the theme is developed further in the claim that Plato had visited Egypt. In fact, Hecataeus presents a pan-Egyptian view of the origin of civilisation in which all the famous Greeks had at some time visited Egypt and learned their wisdom from Egyptian priests. But now that we have examined these matters, we must enumerate what Greeks, who have won fame for their wisdom and learning, visited Egypt in ancient times, in order to become acquainted with its customs and learning. For the priests of Egypt recount from the records of their sacred books that they were visited in early times by Orpheus, Musaeus, Melampus, and Daedalus, also by the poet Homer and Lycurgus of Sparta, later by Solon of Athens and the philosopher Plato, and that there also came Pythagoras of Samos and the mathematician Eudoxus, as well as Democritus of Abdera and Oenopides of Chios. As evidence for the visits of all these men they point in some cases to their statues and in others to places or buildings which bear their names, and they offer proofs from the branch of learning which each one of these men pursued, arguing that all the things for which they were admired among the Greeks were transferred from Egypt.42

Jewish writers were not slow in making use of this theme, although in their version the Greek civilisation did not ultimately depend on Egyptian priests but on the Jewish nation, and in particular on its progenitors Abraham and Moses. Thus Pseudo-Eupolemus claims that the Egyptian priests had been taught their secrets by Abraham himself when he lived in Heliopolis (Eusebius P. E. 9:17:8), while according to Artapanus the Egyptians can thank Moses for basically everything in their culture, from their religious cults to weapon designs and philosophy. According to Artapanus, Moses was also the teacher of Orpheaus (P.E. 9:27:3–4). As seen earlier, Josephus’ Against Apion is dedicated almost exclusively to proving the antiquity of the Jews relative to that of the Greeks, and in Philo’s expositions of the Torah, the dependence of Plato and other Greek philosophers (and lawgivers) on Moses is presupposed.43 In line with this theme, the details of Plato’s journey could also easi40 His. 2:4. Translation from Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 41 His. 2:4. 42 Diodorus Siculus Bibl. Hist. 1:96:1–3. Cf. Cicero, De fin. 5:87, Plutarch, De Is. Et Osir 354e, and Diogenes Laertius 3:6. See also Droge, Homer, 5–8, 63–64. 43 See e.g. Philo’s exposition of the creation story (De Opificio Mundi), Spe. 4:61, and Her. 213–214. Cf. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 13–14, and Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: foundations of religious philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), 141–143.

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ly be changed. According to a tradition retold by Origen, probably with Jewish origin, Plato had indeed visited Egypt, but instead of visiting priests in Heliopolis or elsewhere, he had come across a copy of the Torah, left behind by Moses at the Exodus, and derived his philosophy from there (Ag. Cel. 5:39). It is not difficult to see how this tradition would be attractive to Christian writers, to whom the newness of Christianity was a serious problem, and to Justin in particular, who needed a defence against potential accusations of plagiarism. Claims such as that Plato depended on Moses may not have convinced everyone in antiquity, but they were certainly not extravagant. One who seems to have made use of this tradition is the 2nd century CE Platonist/Pythagorean44 philosopher Numenius of Apamea, who according to Clement rhetorically asked ‘[w]hat is Plato but Moses uttered in Attic Greek?’ (Strom. 1:22:150:4).45 Though in a strict sense this quote argues similarity rather than dependence, the latter can be inferred as few would have questioned Moses’ antiquity over Plato, and as reasoning along the lines of post hoc, ergo propter hoc,46 seems to have been commonplace in ancient antiquity debates. In fact Pythagorean philosophers were themselves not averse to framing Plato as the great populariser of their own philosophy. One example would be the anonymous biography of Plato summarized by Augustine and Photius.47 The great antiquity of Moses seems to have been more or less generally accepted and the already existing traditions which made Greek philosophy dependent on him obviously constituted very useful raw material to a Christian apologist such as Justin. However, Justin does not reiterate the Jewish traditions straightforwardly, but carefully shapes them into serving his purposes. To the Jews it would make sense to portray Moses, being the giver of the law and the founder of their religion, as something equivalent to the source of human wisdom. Therefore, in the Jewish apologists referred to earlier, Moses is often described as the lawgiver48 or simply as ‘the first wise man.’49 Inventions and all types of knowledge and wisdom are ascribed to this one man (or, alterna44 Numenius is commonly called a Pythagorean, but some argue that he should be seen as a Platonist; cf. Mark J. Edwards, “Numenius of Apamea,” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 45 A good case for the view that the idea was not original to Numenius is made in “Atticizing Moses? Numenius, the Fathers and the Jews,” VC 40, (1990). 46 ‘After this, therefore because of this.’ 47 Augustine, De Doctr. Chr. 2:28:43 and Photius, Bibl. 249. Cf. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 14–15, and Droge, Homer, 63–64. 48 Philo calls Moses a lawgiver ca. 20 times in his writings, e.g. Mut. 1:126, Mos. 1:1, and Mig. 1:23. Cf. e.g. Aristobolus, in Eusebius P. E. 8:10:3. 49 Eupolemus, P. E. 9:26:1.

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tively, to Abraham, in accordance with the preference of each writer), in much the same vein as such things were credited to Solon, Musaeus or Orpheus by the Greeks.50 Yet, to Justin this was not enough, for the obvious reason that Moses – so everyone knew – was not a Christian. In our modern age, in which the Hebrew Scriptures, as the Old Testament, constitute an equally integral part of the Christian tradition as the writings of the New Testament, conceiving Moses as part of the Christian (as well as the Jewish) heritage may seem very natural. Yet, in the eyes of the ancient public of the second century, Moses, along with all the other ‘Old Testament’ characters, was not associated with Christians but with the Jews only. Because of this, one of Justin’s most difficult tasks in the Dialogue is to explain why the Christians have the right both to claim the Hebrew Scriptures as their own and to provide interpretations of them which differ from those of the Jews. Therefore, to argue for the antiquity of Judaism or any of its ‘heroes’ did not, in and by itself, help the cause of Christianity. Consequently, the Jewish tradition which Justin received needed to be altered. In Justin, Moses is not presented as the progenitor of the Jews or as the wise source to human civilisation. In fact, Justin is not at all interested in the history of cultural development. Instead, Moses is described as one of the Hebrew prophets, or more specifically, as the first of them (32:1). This is important to the proof from prophecy, but also in relation to the argument from antiquity. That Moses is described as a prophet who receives divine inspiration, rather than just a wise person in general, is crucial to Justin’s argument, because it is precisely this which allows him to connect Moses to the Christian faith. Moses is not a wise man, but a prophet, i.e. a mediator and a messenger. The importance of the mediating role of Moses and the other prophets becomes apparent when Justin ties them (and thus the theft theory) to his famous Logos doctrine: But when you hear the phrases of the prophets spoken as though from a character, do not suppose that they were spoken as from the inspired ones themselves, but rather from the divine Logos moving them. (36:1)

50 Solon was a Greek lawmaker born in the 7:th century BCE, who was credited with laying the foundation for the Athenian democracy. Also Philo refers to him as ‘the Athenian lawgiver’ (Opi. 1:104, Spe. 3:22, cf. Prb. 1:47). Musaeus and Orpheus were mythical or semi-mythical characters who, among other things, were associated with poetry and music. Euripides, in his play Rhesus, calls Musaeus a ‘holy citizen, of all men most advanced in lore.’ The references to Orpheus in Greek literature are many, and he gave rise to a mystery cult called Orphism, see Robert J. Lenardon, “Orpheus and Orphism: Mystery Religions in Roman Times,” in Classical Mythology, ed. Mark P. O. Morford and Robert J. Lenardon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

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The Logos, which for Justin is Christ himself (cf. below), is the source of the wisdom and prophecies of Moses and the other Hebrew prophets, and therefore Christ is the origin of wisdom, and Moses merely a vessel through whom he spoke. Thus, when Plato and the other philosophers plagiarized Moses and the prophets, they really plagiarized the teachings of Christ: ‘And so that you might learn that when he said, “God made the world by changing formless matter”, Plato took this from our teachings [τῶν ἡμετέρων διδασκαλιῶν] – we mean the words from the prophets ...’ (59:1, emp. added). And after having given further examples of how Plato borrowed ideas from Moses, Justin concludes with asserting that ‘[i]t is not we, then, who have the same opinions as others, but everyone speaks in imitation of what we say’ (60:20). The theft theory constituted a powerful reversal of the potential charge of plagiarism, but when used by Christians, it needed an extra element which connected the Hebrew heroes and prophets – the national symbols of Judaism – to Christianity. It needed something like Justin’s Logos doctrine, and this is one instance where the intricate system of Justin’s apologetic becomes visible. One reason why his apologetic has been so difficult to analyse is that all the different strategies interconnect, and that they lend and draw support from each other in such a way that what in the end emerges is a sophisticated web of different argumentative threads, rather than single progressing thoughts. In conclusion then, Justin makes use of the theft theory, which he has ultimately received from Jewish apologetic tradition, in order to refute any potential charge of plagiarism from the Greeks, and then, with the help of the Logos doctrine, he re-shapes it and makes it work for the benefit of Christianity. III. The Logos Doctrine Serving as an important part of a reworked theft theory is, nonetheless, not the only role for the Logos doctrine in the Apology. Justin also uses it separately from the theft theory, and, in that context, for slightly different purposes. Exerting a great influence on the Christological developments of later church fathers, the Logos doctrine is often counted as one of, if not the, most important contributions Justin made to the formulation of Christian orthodoxy. It is probably safe to say that no part of Justin’s theology has stirred, and still does stir, more debate than his Logos doctrine, and much of the debate has been related to its connection to Hellenistic philosophy. It is not part of our purpose to reconstruct Justin’s thought on the Logos, and nor shall we try to determine its primary philosophical sources.51 Instead, in line with the focus of this work, we shall concentrate on what function the Logos doctrine 51

An introduction to the modern debate on the sources of Justin’s Logos doctrine, as well as his relation to Platonism , is given in C. Nahm, “The Debate on the Platonism of Justin Martyr,” SecSen 9, (1992).

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serves in Justin’s argument, and what goals it is used to achieve. Yet, for these purposes a sketchy, and therefore necessarily controversial, introduction to the concept of Logos in Justin is nonetheless warranted.52 The concept of Logos was important in ancient philosophy, especially within Stoicism where it referred to the universal rational principle according to which all things existed. To a Stoic, this equated to God. In other circles, prominently within the mixture of philosophical ideas which often goes under the name of Middle Platonism, the Logos was often conceived of as a cosmic intermediary entity or principle; i.e. as that which connected an untouchable and transcendent Absolute with the changing world of humanity.53 Jewish exegetes found evidence in Scripture for ‘two powers in heaven,’54 and in Philo the intermediary Logos is explicitly hypostasised and even called a ‘second God.’55 This theme was, probably indirectly, picked up by Justin in the Dialogue.56 In Justin’s Apology the word ‘logos’, apart from common uses such as ‘word’, ‘discourse’ and ‘doctrine,’ refers primarily either to human reason,

52 Thorough introductions to the concept of Logos both in Justin and in Antiquity in large have been provided e.g. by Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 139–175, and Barnard, Life and Thought, 85–100. Cf. Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, 345–357, Eric Osborn, The Beginning of Christian Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 206–257, Wartelle, Apologies, 42–43, 57–61, Sylvain Jean Gabriel Sanchez, Justin apologiste chrétien: travaux sur le Dialogue avec Tryphon de Justin Martyr, Cahiers de la Revue Biblique (Paris: Gabalda, 2000), 185–194, Allen Brent, A Political History of Early Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 209–223, and Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 61–66. 53 A majority of modern scholars, following Andresen see Middle Platonism as the major source to Justin’s Logos theology (Andresen, “Mittlere,”). E.g.: ‘Justin se dit et se veut le disciple de Socrate et de Platon’ but ‘[e]n réalité il professe le syncrétisme du moyenplatonisme, qui est éclectique …’ (Adalbert G. Hamman, “Dialogue entre christianisme et culture greque,” in Les apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque, ed. Bernard Pouderon and Joseph Doré, TH (Paris: Beauchesne Éditeur, 1998), 49). Two exceptions are Price and Edwards, who see the Hebrew Scriptures and the Jewish tradition as a stronger and more plausible source: R. M. Price, “'Hellenization' and Logos Doctrine in Justin Martyr,” VC 42, (1988), and Edwards, “Justin's Logos,”. 54 Cf. Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 122. 55 De Somniis 1:227–229. 56 Cf. Dial. chs. 56–62. On Philo’s Logos theology, see e.g. David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985). Yet, echoes of this idea can be found also in the Apology, cf. 63:15. A strong and direct influence of Philo on Justin was championed by Goodenough (Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 168–173), but has since been problematized by a number of scholars (e.g. Barnard, Life and Thought, 93–95); cf. David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 97–105.

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or, typically in conjunction with the words ‘whole’ or ‘divine’,57 to Christ himself.58 In 2 Ap., the Stoic term λόγος σπερματικός59 is used to denote the Logos which sows seed into the minds of humankind. Arguably, this should also be seen as a reference to Christ himself.60 The identification of Christ with the universal Logos was a brilliant, if yet somewhat bold, move on the part of early Christian writers, and one which had the potential to attract the attention of any philosophically minded member of ancient society. Through this, Christians, apart from achieving their own particular purposes, were able to present a Christian solution to an important philosophical problem of the day, namely the relation between transcendence and immanence in the divine sphere. Christ became that Logos which bridged the gulf between a remote God and human reality. At one point in the Apology Justin draws upon this, essentially Platonic, concern when he criticises the Jewish belief that Almighty God in Person spoke to Moses in the burning bush. Such an immanent God was unthinkable to Justin (as for any Platonist philosopher), and as a solution he proposes that it really was Christ, God’s intermediary Logos, who addressed Moses.61 Nonetheless, in the Apology, the Logos doctrine is not primarily used to solve the problem of God’s transcendence and immanence. In fact, Justin’s concern here is not fundamentally theological – strange as it may seem, not

57

Cf. Edwards, “Justin's Logos,” 270. More than 20 times in 1 Ap. and about another 10 times in 2 Ap. ‘logos’ is used in reference to Christ. The exact number of references is a matter of interpretation, as in some instances it is unclear whether Justin refers to Christ or reason in general. When Christ is called God’s Logos, it is almost invariably his pre-incarnate state which is referred to (though there are a few exceptions). For a study of the theme of the pre-existent Christ in Justin, see Trakatellis, "Pre-Existence". 59 Justin, however, uses the term quite differently from the Stoics, to whom the seeds referred to human moral potential. C. Andresen’s attempt to, as an alternative, find a Middle Platonic source for Justin’s use of the term was later criticised by Holte: Andresen, “Mittlere,” and Holte, “Logos Spermatikos,” 145–146. Price, in turn, has suggested a more generic solution: ‘... by Justin’s time the metaphor of the sown seed had become a standard way to refer to innate knowledge of divine truth, without expressing any particular philosophical loyalties.’ (Price, “Hellenization,” 20). This lack of consensus points to the conclusion that from wherever Justin received the idea of the Spermatic Logos, he reshaped it, filled it with at least partly new content, and used it for his own specific purposes. 60 For a view that distinguishes the λόγος σπερματικός from Christ, see Edwards, “Platonic Schooling,” 33–34. 61 Ap. 62–63. Minns’ and Parvis’ suggestion that these two chapters ‘evidently’ incorporate material from a different source ‘which has been poorly adapted to [Justin’s] present purpose,’ does, however, seem plausible. Neither the argument Justin makes nor his use of the Logos doctrine seem to synchronize well with the rest of the Apology. Minns and Parvis even suggest that the chapters may be ‘a very early editor’s conflation of materials from Justin’s pen.’ Cf. Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 245, n. 5. 58

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even Christological62 – but it rather refers back to his major theme in the Apology, which is the nature of truth. And it is in relation to this theme, and in particular to certain issues which arise within this theme, that the Logos doctrine is developed. The Logos of the Apology is not primarily the mediator between divine and human but rather the cosmic, and profoundly Stoic, ‘rational principle,’ according to which the world is organized and in which all soundness and rationality is rooted. Our doctrines, then, are shown to be more majestic than every human teaching through the fact that the whole rational principle [ὁ λογικός ὁ ὅλος], became the Christ, who was made visible for our sake, body and logos and soul. (Ap. 2:10:1)

The incarnation of the Logos is repeatedly mentioned from early on in the Apology,63 but for the better part of the treatise the theme is never developed or majored upon; in fact, it is not until ch. 46 that Justin begins to untap the more profound apologetic potential of his Logos doctrine. In the following pages, we shall explore the four major functions which the doctrine serves in the Apology. 1. Christianity is Rational The first and most straightforward function of the Logos doctrine is to establish Christianity as a rational and sound faith. For this end, the understanding of ‘logos’ as ‘reason’ in conjunction with its identification with Christ, is used in attempts to equate Christianity to rationality and soundness. Justin’s repeated references to how reasonable people act and think, as well as to what reason demands or permits, is part of a strategy to associate all things good and wise with the Universal Reason, Christ, and thereby with Christians. Consider the following passages: Socrates attempted with true reason [λόγος ἀληθής] and judicious inquiry to bring these things into the open [...] For these things were brought to light not only among the Greeks by reason [λόγος], through the words of Socrates, but also among the barbarians by the Logos himself, who acquired physical form and became a human being and was called Jesus Christ. (5:3–4) For just as no one chooses to succeed to inherited penury or illness or infamy, so the wise man will not choose whatever the Logos commands should not be chosen. (12:8)

The perceived continuity between the wisdom and reason of Socrates and the Logos of the barbarians, i.e. the incarnated Christ, as well as the slightly tautological statement that wise men only chose whatever Reason demands, 62 Contra Goodenough, who believed that the Logos doctrine in Justin ‘is merely an explanation of the really Christian doctrine of the Son of God’ (Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 140). 63 Cf. 5:4, 12:7, 21:1, 22:2, 23:2, 32:10, 33:6.

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shows that Justin’s argument, though effective and important to his case, builds on little more than word-play. It is the dual understanding of ‘logos’ as ‘reason’ and as ‘Christ’ which provides the backbone of this strategy. First, Reason is set up as the standard against which all things ought to be judged. In 2:1 Justin writes: ‘Reason prescribes that those who are truly pious and philosophers should honour and hold in affection the truth alone,’ and in 2:3 he demands that the emperor give judgment in accordance with ‘careful and exacting reason’ [ἀκριβής καὶ ἐξεταστικὸς λόγος]. In 3:1, Justin claims that true reason [ἀληθής λόγος] forbids that innocent should be harmed just because they are slandered, and in 5:3, Socrates, exposing the evil demons, is reported as having acted with ‘true reason and judicious inquiry’ [λόγος ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐξεταστικῶς]. Secondly, the ambiguity of the term allows Justin to forge a link between this general wisdom or ‘reason’ and the Christian faith. In 12:7, the Reason which, according to Justin, demonstrates the futility of trusting in pagan omens, is the very Logos which was begotten by God. In 2:9:4, also, the ‘right reason’ [ὀρθὸς λόγος] which ‘having come forward,’ – possibly a vague reference to the incarnation – ‘demonstrates that not all opinions nor all beliefs are noble, but that some are wicked and some are good,’ should probably best be seen as referring to Christ. Further, Christians are portrayed as those who only follow reason. In 13:1–2 the Christian practice of not sacrificing food to idols, but instead giving thanks to God for his creation, is described as being διὰ λόγου. And in the clearest example of all, Justin’s whole demonstration of the truth of the Christian faith, is described primarily as rational. In 13:3, introducing his ἀπόδειξις,64 Justin claims that what will be demonstrated is that Christians worship Christ μετὰ λόγου. In ch. 53, when this demonstration is summed up, Justin also concludes, using the same phrase, that ‘[w]hen such things are seen they can reasonably [μετὰ λόγου] provide those who embrace the truth, and are not lovers of opinion, or ruled by passions, with persuasion and assurance as well’ (53:12). The strategy is as simple as it is powerful; through cleverly shifting the meaning of a single word – ‘logos’ – Justin can argue that all who through Reason are able to understand fundamental ethical values in life (e.g. that innocent people should not be persecuted, and that wise men should only pursue truth) will also be able to understand that what Christians teach is true and sound. After all the Reason through which we see the one thing is the same as that through which we understand the other: ‘According to sound judgement our teachings are not shameful, but superior to all human philosophy’ (2:15:3 [70:2]).

64

Again referred to in 14:4 and 52:1. Cf. discussion in the next chapter.

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2. The Persecution of Christians is Neither New, Nor Peculiar The second use of the Logos doctrine is related to the situation of the Christians. Through reference to the Logos, Justin elevates the persecution of Christians to a cosmic level. The persecution of Christians is not new, but part of an epic, cosmological battle between Reason and Evil/Irrationality. By framing the persecution as a struggle between the Logos and the demonic forces and by claiming that it is really the Logos, Reason, which is being persecuted by irrational people, at the instigation of demons, Justin can show that the plight of the Christians is underserved, but not peculiar. In 46:4, he writes that ‘even those who were before him, and who lived without Logos, were without value and enemies to Christ and murderers of those who lived with Logos.’ Thus, those who have chosen to live according to Reason (or Christ the Logos – the dual association is also here effectively in use) have always been persecuted, and this is illustrated most prominently through the fate of Socrates who becomes a pre-incarnational model for the persecuted Christian: And those born before Christ who attempted by human reason to see into things and to expose them were dragged into court for being irreligious and meddlesome. But Socrates, who was in this regard the most vigorous of them all, was accused of the same things as we are, for they said of him also that he brought in new divinities, and that those whom the city recognized as gods he did not. (2:10:4–5)

These first two uses of the Logos doctrine do not require much elaboration on Justin’s part and can be put to use as soon as an association between Christianity and rationality is in place through an identification of Christ with the universal Logos. 3. The Logos and the Argument from Antiquity The third and fourth uses of the Logos doctrine both relate to the problem of newness, and they are the most important ones to Justin. In fact, when Justin eventually begins to elaborate on his Logos doctrine and explain it in more detail, it is done in explicit response to charges which draw upon the argument from antiquity. At this point, the crucial and oft-quoted 46th chapter of the Apology, needs to be cited at some length: But lest, in order to dissuade from our teaching by foolish argument, some should say that we say that Christ was born 150 years ago in the time of Qurinius, and that he taught the things we say he taught still later under Pontius Pilate, and should object that all the human beings who lived before that time were not accountable, we will anticipate and solve the difficulty. We were taught, and we mentioned before, that Christ is the first-born of God, being the Logos in which the whole race of human beings shared. And those who lived with Logos are Christians, even if they were called atheists, such as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus and those similar to them, and among barbarians [...] So that even those who were before him, and who lived without Logos, were without value and enemies

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to Christ and murderers of those who lived with Logos. But those who lived or do live with Logos are Christians and fearless and unconfounded. (46:1–4)

Much ink has been spilt over this chapter, and many questions, some more warranted than others, have been raised by its interpreters: Is Justin an inclusivist? Does he see philosophy as way of obtaining knowledge about God in rivalry with the Scriptures? Can people be saved without direct knowledge of Christ? 65 Yet, many debates stirred from the chapter fail to consider its introduction, which clearly states what question and concern Justin addresses. The claims which Justin, in prolepsis, sets out to refute are (1) that Christ and his teachings are novelties and (2) that because of this people who lived before his advent cannot be held responsible for not having followed his teachings. It is interesting to note the structure of the objection. As it is framed here, (1) is not an argument in and by itself, but only serves as the foundation for (2), which is the main objection. The primary charge Justin faces here is not just the charge of innovation, though this certainly is part of it, but rather an intricate problem which the newness of Christianity creates. Christianity, as Justin proclaims it, not only makes claim to respectability and reasonableness, but to represent the ultimate and uncorrupted truth. And even more importantly: it claims universality over both time and space. Unlike that of many cults and religions in antiquity, the Christian message challenged every human being in every age. According to Justin, the teaching of Christ aspired at nothing below ‘the alteration and restoration of the human race’ (23:2), and the Christian message held that everyone, without exception, would eventually end up before the judgment seat of Christ and be required to give an account for one’s life. In Justin’s message to the emperor, the theme of judgment and the just punishment for the wicked, which not even the emperor can escape, is very much in the foreground. It has already been noted that one reason why the novelty of Christianity needed to be repudiated was that it undermined Justin’s proof from prophecy. Here, Justin presents another problem, which is related to Christianity’s grandiose claims. How could all the people living before Christ be held accountable for not believing in a person who had yet to be born or for not adhering to a message yet to be preached? This is the question Justin is faced with, and it is in response to this challenge that his Logos doctrine is expounded. Justin does not argue that the Christian faith is old and therefore true. Rather, he claims that Christian doctrine equates to what has been recognized as wise and true in all ages, and therefore it is relevant for everyone, everywhere and 65

For discussions on ‘exclusivism’ viz. ‘inclusivism’ in Justin, cf. Graham A. Keith, “Justin Martyr and Religious Exclusivism,” in One God, One Lord: Christianity in a World of Religious Pluralism, ed. Andrew D. Clarke and Bruce W. Winter (Grand Rapids: Paternoster Press, 1992), and Adam Sparks, “Was Justin Martyr a Proto-Inclusivist?,” JES 43, (2008).

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in every age. Christianity is the true, universal wisdom, which every wise person in history has recognized and expressed, through the partly innate Logos. Therefore, foolish and wicked people are without excuse. They have chosen to live ἄνευ λόγου, they have allied themselves with evil demons and will, therefore, justly receive their judgment, ‘... the punishment in eternal fire that will come to those who live senselessly and not according to right reason’ (2:2:2). IV. A Note of Inconsistency? As may then be seen, both the theft theory and the Logos doctrine are used by Justin to refute the charge of novelty, even though the Logos doctrine also fills other functions. The theft theory is dependent on the Logos doctrine, as the prophets must be described as having received their inspiration from Christ, the Logos, if Christians are to have any claims to them. But the Logos doctrine is also used independently from the theft theory in the claim that certain ancient pagan sages were able to achieve insights from and to live in accordance with the Logos. The seeming contradiction between these strategies has received some attention in scholarship. Did, in fact, the Greek philosophers apprehend their wisdom directly through the Logos, or did they find it in the Hebrew Scriptures? Are Justin’s arguments and strategies contradictory, or can they be reconciled? There are several possible answers to these questions. One is that Justin simply uses the different apologetic traditions he is in receipt of along with any arguments he can muster himself in an attempt to generate as much force as possible. This means that he does contradict himself and that he either is not aware of this fact or that he simply is not concerned with maintaining consistency. 66 This is a highly unsatisfactory answer, since it assumes that Justin only passes on arguments as he has received them without much afterthought, even though this demonstrably is not the case with the theft theory, which he in fact does reshape and adapt, as seen above. Another solution is to note, as done above, that the Logos is the ultimate disseminator of truth in both theories. In the theft theory, the Logos inspires the prophets, and in the ‘inspiration’ theory, the philosophers receive knowledge directly from the Logos.67 However, although this shows that the two theories are not contra66

Harnack comes close to such a position when he claims that the Logos doctrine was Justin’s ‘real’ opinion, while the theft theory was a theme more or less straightforwardly incorporated from Jewish traditions (Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, [1901] 2005), 165, n. 345). Osborn, in a similar vein, asserts that ‘[e]ither God has given seeds of truth or the Greeks have stolen them. Both accounts cannot be true.’ (Osborn, Justin Martyr, 201). 67 A. J. Droge, “Justin Martyr and the Restoration of Philosophy,” CH 56, (1987), also published in Droge, Homer, 49–72, and Pilhofer, Presbyteron, 251.

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dictory, it provides no explanation to why Justin chose to include both in his Apology.68 A third reading has been suggested by Edwards, who indeed only finds one theory in Justin.69 According to Edwards, pagans did not actually share a part in Logos, in the sense of the Logos being part of their nature. Pagans could live μετὰ λόγου, i.e. according to the seeds of truth sowed into them, but not μετὰ τοῦ λόγου, i.e. as partaking of the Logos, which is Christ.70 These seeds of truth, according to Edwards, are the truths which pagan authors had appropriated through the Hebrew Scriptures, as referred to in Ap. 44:9–10.71 Hence, Justin really only propagates one theory, namely that pagans received their wisdom, their seeds of truth, through plagiarizing the Hebrew Scriptures. This is an attractive theory, but it does fail to explain why Justin calls those who lived μετὰ λόγου before the advent of Christ Christians. Ap. 46:4 does seem to imply that the Logos, in which these people shared part, indeed is to be understood as Christ, and in Ap. 2:10:8 this, at least in relation to Socrates, is even stated explicitly: ‘[t]his is the Christ who was also known in part by Socrates’ (Χριστῷ δὲ τῷ καὶ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἀπὸ μέρους γνωσθέντι). The solution, it is here suggested, lies in the recognition that when Justin speaks of Plato having plagiarized Moses and of Socrates living μετὰ λόγου, we are neither dealing with a single theory nor two rival ones; Justin simply speaks of two different things. It will be argued below that Justin differentiates between two different groups of pagan philosophers and sages and that these groups feature in different apologetic themes. 72 This conclusion is not based on a minute analysis of Justin’s choice of words – it is granted that his terms and expressions sometimes do overlap – but on the function of these groups in Justin’s larger argument. When Justin refers to people who lived μετὰ λόγου before Christ and therefore were Christians, Plato is not among them. Nor are the Stoics or the poets. None of the pagan authors, the writings of whom contain truths stolen or borrowed from the Hebrew prophets and then, in various degrees, corrupt68 Holte’s suggestion that Justin saw certain fundamental doctrines, akin to Pauline ‘natural revelation’, as mediated through the Logos, and everything else which is good in philosophy as derived from the Hebrew Scriptures, does seem rather forced and difficult to substantiate (Holte, “Logos Spermatikos,” 159–168). 69 Edwards, “Justin's Logos,” 70 Ibid., 278–279. 71 ‘And everything whatever both the philosophers and poets said [...] they were enabled to understand and they explained because they took their starting-points from the prophets. And so there seem to be seeds of truth amongst all. But they are revealed as not accurately understanding whenever they contradicted themselves.’ 72 This section will, out of necessity, contain several references to the Second Apology as well as to the First. This is for purposes of clarification and illustration, based on the assessment that the texts yield fundamentally coherent and corresponding pictures on this subject.

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ed them, are described as ‘Christians’. Also, their writings do not contain the truth or lead to Christ.73 It is a significant, though in scholarship overlooked, fact that in these discussions there are two different groups to which Justin refers. One includes Socrates, Heraclitus and certain Hebrew characters, (46:3) and the other Plato, Pythagoras, the Stoics and the poets – or simply the ‘writers’ (οἱ συγγραφεῖς).74 In the former group, there are no writers present, not even among the Hebrews (Abraham and Elijah wrote no books) but only idealized humans who lived rationally. In the latter group, the defining characteristic of the members is that they are all writers,75 and that they have had an influence through their texts. Socrates is never contrasted against, or framed as inferior to, his Hebrew counterparts in the way that Plato is contrasted against the prophets.76 In Ap. 46 one learns that in ancient times there were certain men who lived μετὰ λόγου, and that some of them belonged to the Greeks and some to the barbarians,77 but there is no distinction between them. In fact, if anything, it is a 73 As will be seen, this is consistent with the picture painted by Justin in the introduction to the Dialogue, i.e. that Plato’s teachings ultimately failed in leading him to Christ. The corruption is too strong, and the light is veiled too heavily. 74 In 23:1, Justin claims that only the things are true which he has learned from Christ and the prophets ‘who came before him [...] and [...] are older than all those who were writers (συγγραφεῖς),’ and in 44:8, 54:5 and 59:1, he notes that Moses is older than all ‘writers’ (συγγραφεῖς). Cf. 18:5–6, 20:3–5, 22:1. Poets are mentioned 15 times in both apologies, on Minns’ and Parvis’ count (Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 131, n. 4). Most of the times, when associated with mythmaking, the notices are negative, but five times, when they are associated with philosophers, i.e. seen as ‘writers’, the notices are positive (Ap. 20:3–4, 44:9, Ap. 2:8[7]:1 and 2:13:2). 75 In agreement with traditions perpetuated by the Pythagoreans themselves, some ancient writers (e.g. Plutarch, Galen, Diogenes Laertius and Porphyry) claimed that Pythagoras never wrote anything. Apparently Justin was not impressed by these traditions, and neither was Origen who claims (Ag. Cel. 5:57) to have himself read books written by the ancient sage (see R. M. Grant, Heresy and Criticism: The Search for Authenticity in Early Christian Literature (Louisville: Westminister/John Knox Press, 1993), 23–24). 76 On a related and interesting note, Jacob Howland has identified several parallels between how Socrates describes himself in Plato’s Apology and how the Hebrew Scriptures portray their prophets: Jacob Howland, Plato and the Talmud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 119–125. 77 Justin here seems to conflate two different sets of ethnic constructions. ‘Barbarian’ is a Greek concept which simply refers to anyone who did not speak Greek. To a member of the Greek – or in extension Hellenistic – society, there basically existed only two groups of people: the Greeks and ‘the rest’. To Jews and also to the early Christians, the Jewish people possessed the centre stage. In Paul’s famous Jews/Greeks dichotomy, the Jews are the point of reference and the Greeks represent ‘the rest’. In Justin’s use, the term ‘Barbarian’ is synonymous with ‘Jew’, and in his rhetoric, both the Jews and the Greeks possess a centre stage. When Justin refers to the Greeks, he means specifically the Greeks and not ‘the rest’ in a Pauline sense, and the when he refers to Barbarians, he means the Jews. As

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reversed distinction as Socrates – a pagan – is framed as the primus inter pares (cf. 2:10:5). Whereas some of the ‘writers’ are sometimes implied to have been inspired by demons, which is what caused the corruption of the truth they had gleaned from the prophets, Socrates is said to have exposed the demons. When Socrates attempted with true reason and judicious inquiry to bring these things into the open and to draw people away from the demons, the demons, using people who delight in evil, worked it that he too was killed, on the pretext that he rejected the gods and was irreligious – alleging that he introduced strange new divinities. And likewise they are working to bring about the same thing for us. For these things were brought to light not only among the Greeks by reason, through the words of Socrates, but also among the barbarians by the Logos himself, who acquired physical form and became a human being and was called Jesus Christ. (5:3–4)

This passage reveals three things. First it should be noted that the nature of Socrates’ wisdom is practical and related to ethics. In this, Justin is following a tradition which saw Socrates primarily as a moral philosopher,78 which is given expression in Plutarch’s summary of the Socratic legacy: ‘Socrates was the first to show that life accommodates philosophy at every time and part and in all states and affairs without qualification.’79 The things which Socrates attempted to ‘bring into the open’ were primarily the immoralities of the pagan gods (cf. 5:1–2). He is portrayed by Justin, not mainly as a preacher of sound doctrine but as an ethical example, much like Jesus,80 i.e. as someone who lived rationally and taught others to live so. Second, Socrates’ fate is closely paralleled to that of Christ and the Christian martyrs,81 which probaalready noted, the Christian community is not portrayed in similar terms, but consists of both Jews and Greeks. 78 A. A. Long, “Socrates in Later Greek Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, ed. Donald R. Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 358– 359. 79 An seni resp. ger. 26: 796d. 80 On Jesus as a moral example, see Luke Timothy Johnson, “The Jesus of the Gospels and Philosophy,” in Jesus and Philosophy: New Essays, ed. Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 68–74. 81 2 Ap. 10 is the first known comparison between the death of Socrates and Jesus (see Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 86) but the parallel lives and fates of Socrates on the one hand and that of Jesus and the Christian martyrs on the other, have been widely recognized and commented upon throughout history; see e.g. Adolf Harnack, Sokrates und die alte Kirche (Giessen: J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Alfred Töpelmann), 1901), J. M. Pfättisch, “Christus und Sokrates bei Justin,” ThQ 90, (1908), E. Benz, “Christus und Sokrates in der alten Kirche,” ZNW 43, (1950–1951), I. Opelt, “Das Bild des Sokrates in der christlichen Literatur,” JbAC Erganzungsband 10, (1983), and more recently Emily Wilson, The Death of Socrates: Hero, Villain, Chatterbox, Saint (London: Profile Books, 2007), 142–169, Mark. J.

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bly is a contributing factor to him being called a ‘Christian’.82 Elsewhere (2:10:8), in comparison, Socrates is in this respect implicitly contrasted against his own followers (i.e. the Platonists), who, according to Justin, were never willing to give up their lives for their beliefs. This further underscores the uniqueness of the ancient sage. As discussed earlier, a Christian in the Apology is defined by true doctrine, a moral life and persecution, and Socrates seems to fit well into this category, in which the emphasis is placed on how life is lived. Thirdly, this passage shows that the things which Socrates, through the Logos, brought to light are identical to those which Jesus, the full Logos, taught when he had ‘acquired physical form’ (5:4). As noted, Justin primarily frames the teachings of Jesus as an ethical message, and one with which Socrates easily could have concurred. In large, Socrates is portrayed quite differently from Plato, and he plays an inverse role to that of the poets and mythmakers in Justin’s rhetoric. Socrates did not ‘steal’ his ‘doctrines’ from the prophets, but through reason he was able to draw ethical conclusions, and order his life in conformity with the very moral teaching of Christ himself. This is precisely what Christians do, and thus it is only logical that Socrates be named one as well. With the ‘writers’, matters are quite different. Here the focus lies not on the people behind the books, but on the doctrines conveyed by the literature itself. The writers are treated precisely as writers and not as individuals, whether idealized or not. Justin never comments on Plato’s life or informs his readers of whether or not he lived in accordance with the Logos, but he lets the reader know only that Plato, along with the other writers ‘through the presence of the implanted seed of the Logos /…/ were able dimly to see what actually is’ (2:13:5). This seed it is quite possible to identify, with Edwards, as parts of the Hebrew Scriptures. Nonetheless, it must be distinguished from the Logos which Socrates knew ‘in part’ (2:10:8). Socrates did not ‘see things dimly through the seed of the Logos’ but he lived his life in accordance with his rational ability.83 Nothing of the sort is claimed for Plato, Pythagoras or any of the other writers. When philosophers are said to have lived in accord-

Edwards, “Socrates and the Early Church,” in Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, ed. Michael Trapp (London: Routledge, 2007), and Michael Frede, “The Early Christian Reception of Socrates,” in Remembering Socrates, ed. Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 82 According to Justin, Heraclitus was also martyred (2:7[8]:1) though today there exists no evidence to support this (cf. Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 297 (n. 6)). On the significance of Socrates’ martyrdom, see also R. M. Price, “Are there ‘Holy Pagans’ in Justin Martyr?,” SP 31, (1997). 83 The fact that neither Jesus nor Socrates wrote books has received attention in Christian history as another common factor between them. Thomas Aquinas’ comparison is a well-known example (Summa theologica IIa:3a:42:49).

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ance with the Logos, and to have been persecuted for this life, it is always philosophers from the same group: Socrates, Heraclitus and Musonius.84 Common to the ‘writers’ is that they are all plagiarizers. Whatever good is found in any of their texts is ‘stolen’ from the Hebrew prophets.85 These prophets, on the other hand, are not among the ‘writers’ but clearly superior to them. Unlike the writers, they did not produce texts from themselves but merely functioned as vessels through whom the Logos spoke (cf. 2:10:8).86 But also in the case of the prophets, the focus is nonetheless on the message and the doctrine, i.e. the text itself, rather than on the life or moral quality of the author. Moses, Isaiah and Jeremiah, all quoted by Justin as prophets, do not belong to the group of ch. 46 who lived μετὰ λόγου. Instead, Abraham and Elijah are mentioned who, of course, did not leave any writings behind. If there is a fundamental difference between the prophets and the pagan writers, there are also differences among the pagan writers. MacMullen’s observation that the pairing of ‘poets and philosophers’ was common among Christian apologists in attempts to ‘define the written basis of their opponents’ beliefs,’87 may be correct in a wide sense, but at least in the case of Justin this pair does not stay intact and unbroken. The poets are framed primarily as corrupters of truth which they have ‘stolen’ from the prophets, at the instigation of demons,88 but with Plato, things are different. In Justin’s argument, he structurally belongs with the Stoics and the poets, but he is nevertheless cast in a much more positive light. Plato represents the best the pagan world has to offer in terms of written wisdom, but in the end it still does not lead to the truth. Plato’s doctrines are not described as inspired by demons, but nor are they entirely true and Justin is clear in pointing out that the esteemed philosopher did misunderstand certain things: ‘Praying and fighting with all my might to be found a Christian, I confess not that the teachings of Plato are alien to those of Christ, but that they are not in all ways the same as them’ (2:13:2; cf. 60:5). Justin’s love of Platonism, so evident from his self-biography in the first chapters of the Dialogue, dies very hard. Though finally convinced of Plato’s inability to present the ultimate truth,

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5:3–4, 46:1–6, 2:7[8]:1–2, 2:10:1–7. ‘And everything whatever both the philosophers and poets said concerning the immortality of the soul or punishments after death or contemplation of heavenly things or similar teachings they were enabled to understand and they explained because they took their starting-points from the Prophets.’ (44:9) 86 ‘[The Old Testament] is the only collection of books through which the Logos has spoken directly’ (Otto A. Piper, “The Nature of the Gospel According to Justin Martyr,” JR 41, (1961): 163). 87 Ramsay MacMullen, “Two Types of Conversion to Early Christianity,” VC 37, (1983): 174–175. 88 Cf. further discussion in chapter 5. 85

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Justin remains loyal to and appreciative of his former master and offers his criticisms of the ancient sage wrapped up in as much cotton wool as possible. In conclusion, hence, we note that the theft theory and the Logos doctrine are strategies used within two different argumentative progressions, and as part of responses to two different problems. The first refers back to the problem of newness. The reason a new philosophy or faith had difficulties in gaining respect was that it did not really matter what doctrines were taught. If the teachings met with disapproval they were dismissed as new and corrupted, and if they cohered with what was already considered good, they were open to the charge of plagiarism. Justin has to respond to both possible objections. First, he has to show that the teachings of Christianity were not new, which he does through pointing out similarities with Greek philosophy and myth: ‘If therefore we say some things similarly to the poets and philosophers whom you respect [...] why are we unjustly hated more than all?’ (20:3). Secondly he has to respond to the charge of plagiarism,89 which he does by simply turning it around through the theft theory. Certainly, Justin cannot argue that Plato had listened to the teachings of Jesus (there were limits to how much history could be re-written also in antiquity), so he lets the Greek writers be dependent on the prophets instead. Not just the Hebrew Scriptures in general, but specifically the prophets, who had prophesied about Christ. This allows Justin to kill another bird with the same stone, since this argument also protects the integrity of his proof from prophecy. The prophets, namely, were also open to the charge of plagiarism, and obviously the proof from prophecy cannot convince if the prophets were plagiarizers rather than inspired oracles. The only function of the Logos doctrine within this argumentative thread is, lastly, to forge a connection between the prophets (who, after all, were Hebrews) and Christianity: the prophets were inspired by the Logos, who also is Christ. The argument here is a literary one – what is discussed is texts rather than people – and it is concerned primarily with two questions of relative antiquity: ‘Who wrote these things, which we all believe and respect, first?’ and ‘Are the prophecies and stories about Jesus authentic, or were they copied from Greek mythology?’ The second problem is of an entirely different character. It is introduced in the beginning of ch. 46, which makes it reasonable to assume that the following discussion on ‘Christians before Christ’ is meant to serve as a response to precisely this problem. The objection Justin anticipates is that that people who lived before Christ cannot be held responsible for their ungodliness, since they had never heard his teachings. Justin’s argument is that it was possible, even for pagans, to live a moral life in accordance with the innate 89 Christians were indeed met with charges of plagiarism. Celsus, for instance, claimed that Paul had read Heraclitus and that Jesus plagiarized Plato (Ag. Cel. 6:12:16).

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Logos and therefore, in a sense, become Christians. In essence, what Justin claims is simply that being human, i.e. a rational being, is enough to make anyone eligible for judgment.90 It is an entirely different argument made, for entirely different reasons, than is the case with the theft theory, and the Greek characters involved are also different. Therefore, Justin certainly does propose two different theories, but they do not rival, and they are not incompatible with each other. They are simply used to solve two very different problems. Finally, there is another dimension to Justin’s argument, and that is the triumph of life over knowledge, and of morality over sophistication and παιδεία. In 60:11 Justin places the wisdom of God on the lips of those ‘who do not even know the formation of letters.’ One does not become wise through the study of books but through embracing the eternal Logos, who is Christ. This dimension of Justin’s argument is significant, because it echoes a general philosophical trend of his day. In the time of the early empire, philosophy was understood more as a way of life than as theoretical knowledge or wisdom.91 The philosopher was seen as a master in the art of living. Seneca’s famous assertion that ‘nec philosophia sine virtute est, nec sine philosophia virtus,’92 (Ep. 89:8) is one that Justin would have fully agreed with, and the latter’s emphasis on life over doctrine is one that would also have been recognized and understood by his pagan contemporaries. V. Justin and Hellenistic Philosophy This last observation leads us, finally, to the question of how Justin describes pagan philosophy in relation to Christian faith. As mentioned earlier, Justin’s seemingly positive view of Greek philosophy has often been noted in scholarship. Often contrasted to his disciple Tatian, who had nothing but contempt to show for pagan philosophy, Justin, at times, almost seems to regard select parts of Greek philosophy to be on par with Christianity.93 As will be seen, 90 In his polemic against Stoicism, Justin argues that free will and the capability to vice and virtue is fundamental to what it means to be human (cf. 2:6(7):4–7). 91 Cf. the classic treatment in Samuel Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, 2 ed. (London: Macmillan, [1905] 1925), esp. 289–333, and a more recent discussion in Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, [1994] 2009). This sentiment can, at least in part, be traced all the way back to Plato’s Apology, in which the virtuous life of Socrates features as a prevalent theme. As Howland writes, ‘[Socrates’] wisdom and virtue are demonstrated in his philosophical way of life, which is why he tells a story about himself in his defense speech’ (Howland, Plato, 119). 92 ‘[P]hilosophy cannot exist without virtue, nor virtue without philosophy.’ 93 Harnack, famously, argued that Justin’s primary intention was to reconcile Christianity to Hellenism in what he called ‘der weltgeschichtliche Bund zwischen kirchlichem Christentum und griechischer Philosophie’ (Adolf Harnack, Lehrbuch der

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this is certainly not the case, but that Justin shows some appreciation towards philosophy is beyond doubt. Though echoes of Hellenistic philosophy may be found also in earlier Christian literature, it is in Justin we for the first time find a thorough engagement with pagan philosophy from a Christian writer and, indeed, something which justifiably can be called Christian philosophy.94 As seen above, Justin makes a distinction between life and doctrine among the ancient pagan sages, and the only continuity he confirms is in fact one of life. Certain individuals managed to live in accordance with the Logos, by means of their rational powers, also in the pagan world. This was possible, however, not because of the philosophical/intellectual climate of their surroundings, but rather in spite of it. Like the Christians of Justin’s day, these men were also persecuted by irrational people at the instigation of demons. Socrates was as much an alien in the Athens of philosophy, as Christians are in the Rome of paganism. As far as pagan philosophical doctrines are concerned, Justin is pessimistic. There are good bits and pieces to be found, but they are scattered, corrupted, misunderstood and, above all, in the first place stolen from the prophets. On its own, and discounting the parts it has gleaned from the prophets, pagan philosophy is next to worthless. Ultimately, it does not lead to the truth, and as we shall see, this is a fact that Justin himself had personally experienced. It is impossible to discuss Justin’s relation to Greek philosophy without reference to the first 9 chapters of the Dialogue, and therefore we shall now make a short excursion outside the Apology. In these chapters, Justin gives an account of his philosophical journey and of his conversion to Christianity.95 As noted earlier, the historicity of the account has often been questioned on account of its similarity to other stories of people going through different philosophical schools in their quest for truth. Nevertheless, Goodenough is right in noting that while Justin’s conversion story is ‘probably not autobiographical in detail, [it] is thoroughly autobiographical in spirit;’96 as pointed out by Skarsaune, ‘[i]n defending his conversion, Justin is defending Christi-

Dogmengeschichte, vol. 1, Die Entstehung des kirchlichen Dogmas (Tübingen: Mohr, 1901), 498). 94 Cf. e.g. Henry Chadwick, “The Beginning of Christian Philosophy: Justin: the Gnostics,” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970 (reprint)), 158. 95 For closer studies on the introduction to the Dialogue, see e.g. Hyldahl, Philosophie, “Bemærkninger,” Torben Christensen, “Bemärkinger,” Cullen I. K. Story, The Nature of Truth in “The Gospel of Truth” and in the Writings of Justin Martyr: A Study of the Pattern of Orthodoxy in the Middle of the Second Christian Century, NT.S (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 53–67, van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher, Joly, Christianisme, 9–83, and Oskar Skarsaune, “The Conversion of Justin Martyr,” ST 30, (1976). 96 Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 72.

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anity, and vice versa.’97 It is the search for the ultimate truth which eventually leads Justin to Christianity, which in turn he comes to regard as the one, true and original philosophy (Dial. 8:1). Justin’s hunger for truth leads him to philosophy, and to him, truth and philosophy really are interrelated concepts. Attempting a definition of the latter, Justin says that philosophy ‘is the knowledge of that which exists, and a clear understanding of the truth’ (Dial. 3:4, emp. added). In the role of a yet unconverted pagan philosopher, he introduces his account with the assertions that philosophy is humankind’s greatest possession, that it was sent down from heaven and alone leads us to God, and that true philosophers are holy men (Dial. 2:1–2). The idea of a single original philosophy may indirectly derive from Posidonius98 or possibly a Platonizing version of a Stoic conception of the history of philosophy.99 Nonetheless, philosophy has since become diversified (or many-headed, πολύκρανος), as is manifest in the existence of all the various schools which Justin himself had explored.100 At the end of the narrative, when the converted Justin acknowledges that Christianity indeed is the one true philosophy (Dial. 8:1), he seems to refer back to the original philosophy mentioned in ch. 2, though it is not clear whether his view of the nature of philosophy and of the philosophical history of humankind remains unchanged. One of the most important observations from Justin’s conversion story is that Hellenistic philosophy ultimately failed to lead him to the truth. Contra some popular readings101 of Dial. 1–9, philosophy is not portrayed as a ‘bridge’ to Christianity, but rather as a dead end.102 Justin’s journey does indeed prove fruitful in that it leads him to the best of human wisdom, which is represented by Platonism, but yet it does not lead him to Christ. Therefore, though there is a connection between Justin’s ‘journey’ and his conversion, it is one of disjunction rather than progression. The old man does not simply provide Justin with the last part of the puzzle; he shows him a completely alternative path to truth. By pointing to the words of the prophets, the old man challenges Justin’s entire epistemological foundation.

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Skarsaune, “Conversion,” 55. Hyldahl, Philosophie, 134–140. 99 Minns, “Justin Martyr”, 262. 100 Cf. Story, Nature, 53–54. 101 Cf. e.g. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede, “Introduction,” in Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 6–7, esp. n. 10. 102 For this insight, I am indebted to Skarsaune, “Conversion,” 56. For a contrary view, see Runar M. Thorsteinsson, “By Philosophy Alone: Reassessing Justin's Christianity and His Turn from Platonism,” Early Christianity 3, (2012). 98

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In ch. 7 Justin, seemingly confused and disillusioned, asks the old man: ‘If these philosophers [...] do not know the truth, what teacher or method should one follow?’ The old man’s answer is direct and clear: ‘A long time ago,’ he replied, ‘long before the time of those so-called philosophers, there lived blessed men who were just and loved by God, men who spoke through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and predicted events that would take place in the future, which events are now taking place. We call these men the prophets. They alone knew the truth and communicated it to men, whom they neither deferred to nor feared [...] In their writings they gave no proof at that time of their statements, for, as reliable witnesses of the truth, they were beyond proof; but the happenings that have taken place and are now taking place force you to believe their words.’ (Dial. 7:1–2)

The old man thus tells Justin two things: first, Justin has turned to the wrong sources – the philosophers do not know the truth but the prophets do; second, his method of aspiring to truth through the exercise of reason is not enough. Earlier, Justin the Platonist, had told the old man that reason ‘rules all’ and that the one ‘who rules reason and is sustained by it can look down upon the errors and understanding of others’ (Dial. 3:3). The old man, however, shows him that what compels us to believe the prophets is not rational inquiry but evidence. The fact that what the prophets predicted is being fulfilled provides the epistemological foundation for faith in their message. This preference for empiricism over rationalism, to use some grossly anachronistic terms, will resurface when we, in the next chapter, explore Justin’s most important apologetic strategy, the proof from prophecy. Ending this digression and refocusing attention to the Apology, it can thus be concluded that Justin’s conversion account concurs with what has already been found. In the Apology, Greek wisdom appears in what must be described as a less positive light. The Greeks have not really contributed anything to the formulation of sound philosophy, but have plagiarized from the prophets whatever truth can be found among them. Hence, Justin can assert that ‘[i]t is not we, then, who have the same opinions as others, but everyone speaks in imitation of what we say’ (60:10). Justin’s engagement with Greek philosophy must therefore be interpreted as nearly opposite to that of an attempt of building bridges between Hellenism and Christianity. Rather, we are in a position to agree with Chadwick when he writes that Justin not merely uses Greek philosophy, but also passes judgment upon it.103 The apologist has no interest in crediting pagan beliefs with truth, but he seeks to refute, through the theft theory, the claim that Christianity is a new religion and that its wisdom depends on the Greeks, and through the Logos doctrine he wants to eliminate any objection that not everybody can be held responsible viz-à-viz the Christian gospel. Similar to what Paul argues in Rom 1, Justin claims that there simply is no excuse for anyone to reject the truth: 103

Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 20.

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And in the beginning [God] made the human race with intelligence and able to choose what is true and to behave well, so that all human beings are without excuse with regard to God, for they have all come into existence as rational and with power of perception. (28:3)

E. Justin and the Christian Tradition E. Justin and the Christian Tradition

We began this chapter by exploring the problem of novelty in the ancient world, and then we explored two major apologetic strategies Justin uses in the Apology to come to terms both with Christianity’s late appearance on the world scene and its implications. Yet, there is one more strategy Justin uses which relates to this question, and that is his frequent references or allusions to Christian tradition and received wisdom. In the Apology, Justin never makes any claims to originality. On the contrary, he purposefully frames himself as standing in a tradition; that is, he is a mediator who merely passes on the teaching of Christ exactly as he has received it. The alternative to originality is authority, and in the Apology Justin frequently refers back to authority. Interestingly, and contrary to what might have been expected, this authority is not the Hebrew Scriptures. As already mentioned, and as will be explored further in the next chapter, the sole function of the Scriptures in the Apology is to serve as evidence. Instead, the authority Justin refers back to is ‘reason’ or logos. References to what reason demands or permits, creates the framework for several of Justin’s discussions, as already seen. As Justin identifies the universal Reason with Christ, what Reason, or the Logos, demands becomes equated to Christian teaching, i.e. the doctrines which were taught by Christ to his disciples, and which have been then been handed down through the Christian tradition. This tradition, then, is what constitutes the ultimate authority to Justin, because it is identical to the mind of the Logos. A reference to the Christian tradition is therefore equal to a reference to what ‘Reason demands’. In the Apology Justin primarily refers to the received tradition with the phrase ‘we have been taught’ (ἐδιδάχθημεν five times104, and δεδιδάγμεθα five times105) or with similar words/phrases (e.g. μεμαθήκαμεν (8:3), προσειλήφαμεν (10:1, 2), παρειλήφαμεν (19:6), μαθόντες παρὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (23:1), τὰ ἀληθῆ μαθόντες (65:2)). Sometimes he also refers to the active teaching of Christ and/or his apostles (e.g. 6:2; 13:1; 23:2; 33:5; 44:1; 50:12). The verb which is most commonly associated with the early Christian tradition – παραδίδωμι – is used in different ways in the Apology. Three times it is used (in active voice or as a participle) as referring to the active process of transmitting Christian tradition: in 6:2, Justin says that Christians ‘hand on 104 105

6:2, 13:1, 17:1, 46:2, 66:2. 10:1, 10:2, 14:4, 21:6, 27:1. Cf. 2:4:2.

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[παραδιδόντες] ungrudgingly /…/ exactly what we were taught,’ in 66:1 he speaks about living ‘in just the way that Christ handed down’ (παρέδωκεν), and a couple of verses later (i.e. in 66:3) Justin asserts that the apostles ‘handed down [παρέδωκαν] in this way what Jesus had commanded them.’ However, twice (54:6, 66:4) the word is also used to refer to a demonic tradition. There is thus, according to Justin, a true and a false tradition. The true tradition flows from Christ and his apostles, whereas the false tradition (which is taught by the heretics) finds its origin in demonic activity. In 60:11 Justin writes: Among us, therefore, it is possible to hear and to learn these things from those who do not even know the formation of letters, being simple and uncouth in speech, but wise and trustworthy in mind, so that one may understand that these teachings have come about not by human wisdom, but were spoken by the power of God.

The tradition repeatedly referred to is a living tradition, which certainly includes dogmatic elements in both literary (such as the ‘memoirs of the apostles’ or ‘the gospels’) and oral form. Yet, what has been handed down is more than doctrine; it is a way of life which includes basic ethical values. We are reminded again that the Apology defines a Christian both through doctrine and lifestyle, and heretics are identified not only through their spreading of false teachings, but also through their leading lives not worthy of a Christian. After all, what sets Christians apart in the world is not only that they hold the right opinions, but also, and perhaps primarily, that they live their lives in accordance with the Logos. As seen, it was through living μετὰ λόγου that Socrates and his ilk could come to be counted among the ranks of the Christians. That the wisdom of the Logos can be heard from simple analphabets provides an understanding of the nature of that which is handed down. The wisdom of Christian doctrine is, according to Justin, obviously not generated by these uneducated people themselves, but it was rather ‘spoken by the power [δύναμις] of God.’ The word ‘logos’ is not used, but there cannot be any doubt that this is what Justin has in mind. We may note the similarity with 36:1 where Justin points out that the words of the prophets were not ‘spoken from the inspired ones themselves, but rather from the divine Logos moving them,’ and in 23:2 Christ is, indeed, called both the Logos and the first δύναμις of God (cf. 2:10:8). What we find on the lips of these uneducated Christians, and that which they have acquired through the tradition of the Church, is thus the same Reason which Socrates and other sages of old were able to see and live by. And as in the case with Socrates, it is a Reason which is more related to life than doctrine. What has been ‘received’ by Christians, is wisdom of how life is to be lived in combination with ethical values. Through the tradition of the Church, Christians have received a true understanding of who God is, but they have also learned such things as that the

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exposure of children is evil (27:1), and that God only will accept those who through their lives ‘imitate the good things that are his divine attributes’ (10:1). The life – the imitation of Christ and the practical implementation of his teachings – defines the one who God will accept, i.e. the Christian. The function of Justin’s references to Christian tradition, or ‘that which has been received’, now begins to crystallize. The Christian tradition is intimately connected to the Logos, and cannot be understood apart from the Logos doctrine. The received tradition is that which connects Christians to Christ the Logos, thus forming continuity with the past through which Christians in Justin’s own generation may find their place in God’s saving economy. The centre of this plan of salvation is the advent of Christ himself. Before the incarnation, people could only know the Logos in part. Through following the guidance of their rational faculties, they could lead their lives in accordance with the mind of Christ and thus be called Christians, but their knowledge of God was limited. After the incarnation, the Logos has been revealed in full, and both the knowledge of God and of how life should be lived is encapsulated in the teachings of Christ himself. It is this teaching which has been transmitted through the Church and which now has reached the Christians in Justin’s own time. Today, only Christians can claim possession of the Logos, and they can do so in full measure. Christians represent the revealed Logos, and therefore their religion is older, more pure and more true than anything else in the world.

F. Conclusions: The Christian Gospel – Old or New? F. Conclusions: The Christian Gospel – Old or New?

As evident, Justin chooses a radically different approach to the problem of newness than do Aristides and the author to the Kerygma Petrou. The answer Justin gives to the rhetorical question found in the Letter to Diognetus – Why did Christianity appear so late? – is simply: ‘it did not!’ Christianity is the original ancient philosophy, seen by the prophets, corrupted by the philosophers and mythographers and finally revealed through the teachings of the incarnate Logos and his disciples. Justin is not interested in ascribing cultural progress to either Judaism or Christianity. He does not make claim to any discovery of inventions or science. In this, he has more in common with the ‘philosophical’ Jewish writers mentioned earlier, than the ‘historians’. The reason is that Christians are not framed as a people in the Apology, and that the ‘others’ of Christianity are not Greeks, Jews or Barbarians (as is the case in Aristides), but more generally wicked people who live ἄνευ λόγου. What Justin defends is the faith or philosophy of Christianity – its truth and its antiquity – not the antiquity of the Christian community. Aristobulus’ and Philo’s framing of Judaism as a philosophy is therefore echoed in Justin and transferred to Christianity. Conse-

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quently, Justin assumes a view of cultural (or rather philosophical) history that in Josephus is more akin to the Antiquities than Against Apion. Yet, there are important differences, which also highlight inconsistencies between the Apology and the Dialogue. Though Christianity is framed as the original philosophy in Justin, the Apology never speaks of a time when it was first introduced to the earth. The idea presented by Justin, the pagan philosopher, in the beginning of the Dialogue of an original philosophy sent down to earth and then becoming multifaceted, is conspicuously absent from his other work. Yes, Christianity is that original philosophy, but when was it really sent down to earth and revealed? The first acquaintance humankind makes with this philosophy is through the words of the inspired prophets, and the existence of truth among pagans is explained as plagiarism of these very prophets, rather than as reminiscences of a more enlightened age. The latter is what would have been expected if the different philosophical schools were really different κρανία of the original philosophy, as suggested by Justin in Dial. 2. In the Apology the Logos exists from the beginning of time, but the twist is that it has been fully revealed only in Justin’s own time. The axis in Justin’s view of history is the incarnation of the Logos, through which the new era is introduced. There is no doubt that antiquity is prized in Justin, and that there is a sense of earlier decline, but it is a decline which leads up to, and in a sense ends with, Christ. Christ inaugurates what must be seen as the true Golden Age, but it is an age inhabited only by his followers, i.e. those who have turned from their previous wickedness. The rest of society is still in decline. In this way, Justin both denies and affirms the newness of Christianity. The doctrine or philosophy is not new, but flows from the same Logos which was active in the creation of the world. Nevertheless, the revelation of the full Logos is new, and it is demonstrated above all else through the moral transformation which takes place in the lives of those individuals who chose to follow him. It is precisely this inner moral transformation which proves a person to be a Christian, and it is the Christ-event which effects this change and thus separates the new from the old within a person. The contrast between the new and the old life of Christians is also a recurring theme in the Apology: Of old we rejoiced in promiscuity, but now we embrace only temperance; then we practised magical arts, but now we have dedicated ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; then we loved above everything the means of acquiring money and property, now we put to common use even what we have and share with everyone in need; then we hated one another and murdered one another and, because of custom, would not even live under the same roof as those who were not of the same race, now, after the appearing of Christ, we eat at the same table, and we pray for our enemies, and try to persuade those who unjustly

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hate, so that those who have lived according to the good counsels of Christ might have a good hope with us of obtaining the same things from the God who is Ruler of all.106

‘Then’ and ‘Now’, as opposite poles, meet only at a certain juncture – the event that brings the Now and replaces the Then – and that is the coming of Christ. This is, certainly, a language of newness, but it is a newness that refers to personal experience rather than to cosmological truth. Christianity is old, but the full experience of it is new. In 61:1, Justin refers to Christians having been ‘made new through Christ’ through the rebirth of baptism, and he stresses the words of Jesus that ‘[u]nless you are reborn you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven’ (4). The eschatological kingdom will thus only be inhabited by those who have been ‘made new’. Socrates had a foretaste of the Christian life, and knew the Logos in part, but Christians know him fully. In this transformation, Christians break out from the downward spiral of moral decay which otherwise signifies the surrounding society, creating, as it were, an alternative world. And this is where the circle connects. The novelty of the Christian way of life is that it, in contrast to the life of contemporary pagans, conforms to ancient wisdom, which is found in the teaching of Christ. What is really novel, then, is the pagan moral depravity. In this way, not only the charge of plagiarism, as we saw earlier, but also that of novelty is turned around. In 27:1, for example, Justin describes the habit of exposing children as a novel evil: ‘[...] just as the ancients are said to have gathered herds of grazing cattle or goats or horses, so now people gather children only to use them shamefully’ (emp. added). By describing the good and useful practice of cattle-herding as a thing of the past and by contrasting it to the novel – and evil – practice of gathering children in the same way, Justin paints a contrast between then and now which is analogous to the moral transformation of Christians, though here, it is reversed. Christianity is, then, the most ancient and true of all philosophies and religions. What is new is its transforming effect on those who embrace it in full – those who through dedicating themselves to the unbegotten God become new in Christ, abandon the novel evils of Graeco-Roman paganism and return to a more authentic – and ancient – way of life.

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14:2–3, emp. added. Cf. 16:4, 25:1–2, 39:3.

Chapter 4

The Proof from Prophecy Up and until this point, we have explored different strategies Justin uses to solve specific problems which the defence of Christianity presented – in particular problems related to the newness of the Christian movement. Thus, though the ‘theft theory’ and the Logos doctrine are two features which often strike readers of the Apology as dominant and important, their function is primarily related to the preliminaries of Justin’s apologetic. They are employed to deal with problems which otherwise a priori could undermine any defence or promotion of Christianity. In this chapter, focus will be given to Justin’s primary, and in fact only, positive and direct argument for the truthfulness for the Christian faith, which is usually called the ‘proof from prophecy’.1

A. Justin’s Epistemology A. Justin’s Epistemology

I. Truth and Evidence In the transition from the ‘deliberative’ to the ‘demonstrative’ part of the Apology,2 Justin sets out both his problem and his agenda for what is to follow embedded in a primitive creedal formulation: And we will demonstrate that we rationally worship the one who became the teacher of these things to us, and who was born for this, Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, the procurator of Judea at the time of Tiberius Caesar. For we have learnt that he is the son of the true God, and we hold him in the second place, with the prophetic Spirit in the third rank. For it is there they declare our madness to be manifest, saying we give the second place after the unchangeable and eternal God and begetter of all to a crucified man, as they do not know the mystery in this, to which we urge you to give your attention, as we expound it. (13:3–4)

Giving a rationale for the Christian worship of a crucified criminal3 constitutes the structural occasion for Justin’s proof from prophecy. He opens up 1

The term became popular after the publication of Skarsaune’s influential study, for which it features as the title (Skarsaune, Proof). 2 Cf. chapter 2 of this study. 3 Cf. 22:3 and Dial. 10:3. Anti-Christian polemicists indeed seem to have made use of the crucifixion in order to cast Christ and his followers as criminals or brigands. Lucian of

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the section by declaring that his task is to show that the worship of Christ, a crucified man, is not as preposterous as it may seem to be, but rather rational and part of a hidden mystery which will be unveiled through his exposition. Later, after this exposition, he closes the section with the following conclusion: For by what reason would we believe in a crucified man that he is the first-begotten of the unbegotten God and that he will himself undertake the judgement of the whole human race if we had not found testimonies concerning him proclaimed before he came as a human being and having happened thus? (53:2)

Worshipping a criminal is thus perfectly rational, and this, Justin contends, can be demonstrated. The verb ἀποδείκνυμι and the corresponding noun ἀπόδειξις approach a semi-technical sense in the Apology, as they are consistently used in reference to Justin’s own exposition. The most suitable translation (for the noun) is ‘proof’ or ‘conclusive evidence’, indicating that what Justin purports to present is something more than mere arguments; rather, he claims to be able to irrefutably prove his claims. Ten times the noun or the verb in its different forms, refer to Justin’s demonstration of his own claims4 and five times the same words are used in reference to the lack of proof provided by the accusers of Christians, the inventors of the Greek myths, or the Christian heretics.5 Proof, or evidence, therefore becomes a key element in the evaluation of the Christian message and the one factor which, according to Justin, separates the Christian faith from its rivals. Christians can provide evidence for what they believe; others cannot: ‘If therefore we say some Samosata’s mocking remarks that Christians worship ‘that crucified sophist’ (Pereg. 13) or ‘the man who was crucified in Palestine’ (Pereg. 11) as well as the accusation found in Minucius Felix (Oct. 9:4) that Christians ‘worship what they deserve’ point in this direction. Cf. William Horbury, Jews and Christians in Contact and Controversy (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 162–175. 4 ἀποδείκνυμι in 13:3; 22:4; 36:3; 43:4; 52:1 and ἀπόδειξις in 14:4; 20:3; 31:1; 46:6; 63:10. 5 3:1; 23:3; 53:1; 54:1; 58:2. This language of proof is original to Justin; nothing similar is found in any earlier Christian text. The word ἀπόδειξις occurs only once in the New Testament, in 1 Cor 2:4. In this verse Paul, ironically, makes opposite claims for his ‘demonstration’ from what Justin does. According to Paul his ἀπόδειξις is one of ‘Spirit and power’ rather than of ‘words of wisdom’. For Justin, reason, or rationality, is the basis against which his proofs may be assessed. Conversely, the foundation for persuasion according to the New Testament authors was not rational proof but the empowerment of the Spirit given to the apostles and evangelists as well as the grace to understand bestowed upon those to whom the gospel was preached (cf. e.g. Mark 13:9–13; 1 Cor 2:1–5). On ancient Judeo-Christian rhetoric, see George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 120–160. See also Wolfram Kinzig, “The Greek Christian Writers,” in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. – A.D. 400, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

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things similarly to the poets and philosophers whom you respect, and some things that exceed them and are divine, and for which we alone offer proof, why are we unjustly hated more than all?’ (20:3, emp. added).6 It is precisely on the point of evidence that Galen, a Roman physician and philosopher as well as a younger contemporary of Justin, directs some of his criticism against Christians. In a scientific dispute, Galen states that where no reason is given for one’s views it is ‘as if one had come into the school of Moses and Christ7 and heard talk of undemonstrated laws’ (De pulsuum differentiis 2:4).8 Though Justin wrote his Apology before Galen wrote this, it is not unlikely that he may have heard similar charges and objections and that they may have inspired him to try to present Christianity as a rational faith, securely founded on firm evidence. In 23:1 Justin tells the emperor that Christians ask to be accepted not because they speak the same things as others, but because they speak the truth. In the previous chapter, the fact was alluded to that though Justin values antiquity and recognizes the problem of newness, his final appeal is always to truth. Truth, we shall now see, is in turn ultimately established through evidence and thus, though Justin does argue that Christianity is reasonable and rational, it is an empirical rather than an abstract rationality to which he refers. It is reasonable to believe in Christianity, precisely because its truths can be empirically demonstrated. Likewise, it is unreasonable to believe in either pagan myths or in frivolous accusations against Christians, as these cannot be substantiated with hard evidence. Because of this, Justin is eager to direct his rhetorical audience (the emperor and his sons) to any source of verification he can muster for his claims. That Jesus was born in Bethlehem can be verified through a consultation of the census-lists produced under Quirinius, the first procurator in Judea (34:2), and that he healed the sick, suffered and was crucified is verified through the Acts Recorded Under Pontius Pilate (35:9; 48:1–3) and possibly other sources as well (38:7). Yet, the ‘hard evidence’ or, in his own words, ‘[ἡ] μεγίστη καὶ ἀληθεστάτη ἀπόδειξις’ (30:1) which shows that Christianity is not a ‘blind faith’9 and which ultimately proves the validity of its truth claims, is provided by the so called ‘proof from prophecy,’10 and that is the reason why this must be seen 6

Cf. 53:1, 54:1 and 58:2. Interestingly, Galen does not seem to differentiate between Jews and Christians either here or in other fragments, which reinforces the point made in the introduction to this study: even though the distinction may have been abundantly clear to someone like Justin, some of his pagan contemporaries may not have perceived one at all. Cf. Wilken, The Christians, 72–73. 8 Cf. Ibid., 72. 9 Cf. Joly, Christianisme, 88–89, and Lieu, Image, 179. 10 In a sense the term is a misnomer, as it really is the fulfilment of prophecy which constitutes the proof. Cf. Dial. 7:1, where the old man tells Justin that in the prophets’ writings 7

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as Justin’s most important apologetic strategy. This conclusion is confirmed also by the structure of the Apology, which the proof from prophecy dominates both in length and in terms of its central position.11 In this chapter, an attempt will be made to show how Justin uses this strategy, and what purposes it is meant to achieve. II. Prophecy as Proof Why, then, do Christians worship a crucified man? Justin’s direct answer to the question is that Jesus was not merely a man, but also the Son of God – the Logos which has existed from the beginning of time.12 As already seen, the identification of Jesus with the Universal Logos is an important theme in Justin’s larger apologetic narrative, and it is in relation to this claim that the argument from prophecy first becomes relevant. The primary purpose for this apologetic strategy is to show that Jesus is who Christians believe and proclaim that he is, viz. the Son of the one true God. This explains why, when Justin introduces the concept, he describes it as a refutation, in prolepsis, of the charge that Jesus was a mere magician and only appeared to be the son of God: What is to stop it being the case also of the one we call Christ, that, as a human being from among human beings, he worked the miracles which we speak of through magic art and for that reason seems to be son of God? Lest someone make this retort against us we shall now make proof, not giving credence to people who make assertions, but being persuaded of necessity by those who foretell things before they happen, because we see even with our own eyes that things have happened and are happening as they were foretold, which will appear also to you, as we think, to be the greatest and truest proof. (30:1) For God disclosed beforehand through the prophetic Spirit that things which people supposed would be incredible and impossible were going to happen, so that when they did happen they should not be disbelieved but should rather be believed because they had been foretold. (33:2)

In the New Testament gospel tradition, the miracles of Jesus function as evidence for his God-sent mission as well as for his identity as the Son of God. Yet, in the argumentation of the second century apologists, the miracles of Jesus play a subordinate role.13 The above passages suggest that the miracles ‘they gave no proof at the time of their statements, for, as reliable witnesses of the truth, they were beyond proof; but the happenings that have taken place and are now taking place force you to believe their words.’ 11 Cf. Pilhofer, Presbyteron, 251–252. 12 Cf. chapter 3. 13 The fragment from Quadratus’ apology is a notable exception (cf. Eusebius, H.E. IV:3, and Jerome, Illustrious Men 19), which does make an argument from miracles. This does not prove that the whole treatise was dominated by this theme, though especially the reference in Jerome seems to suggest that it was. Also in Justin, the miracles of Jesus are referred to (e.g. Dial. 69:6), but they play only a minor role in his apologetic.

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of Jesus, in and by themselves, could not be presented as conclusive proofs for either his divine mission or the truth of his teaching, whereas the fact that these miracles, along with many other aspects of Jesus’ life and ministry, had been predicted centuries ahead of time evidently could.14 The assumption, which would make sense to any ancient audience, whether pagan, Jewish or Christian, was that any demon can effect a ‘miracle’, whereas only God can predict the future. For Jews and Christians, the latter theme was well established in the Hebrew Scriptures, in which the authenticity of a prophet is judged precisely on the basis of whether his predictions come true or not.15 In other words, false prophets could not really predict the future; they could only pretend to do so. However, also in pagan mythology prophecy was the domain of the gods, and not just of any god, but of Zeus himself.16 Therefore, prophecy was held in high esteem and respect, and in Greek literature a true prophecy never fails. If it seems to have failed, it is only because it was misinterpreted.17 Thus, when Justin presents prophecy, and in particular fulfilled prophecy, as the clinching proof of the truth of Christianity, it is an argument which pagans would respect and which Christians with a pagan background would find reassuring.18 In light of this, the reason why the charge of Jesus having been a common magician is used as a springboard into and justification for Justin’s ἀπόδειξις becomes clear. There is often a close relation between magic and false prophecy in ancient polemic.19 The double accusation that Jesus had been a magician and a false prophet is found in rabbinic traditions dating back to the mid-second century, possibly with roots in the first, and it is probably implic-

14 Interestingly, no early critic of Christianity seems to have doubted that Jesus had really existed, and the notion that he had performed miracles was sometimes also accepted. The question was through which power the miracles were performed. (Cf. Luk 11:15–20, Matt 12:24. See also Graham Stanton, Jesus and Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 138). 15 Cf. Jer 28:9. 16 The Pythia in Delphi received her revelations from Apollo, but Apollo, in turn, only conveyed the words of his supreme Lord. 17 This is a common theme in the Greek tragedies, but it is also found e.g. in Herodotus’ History. 18 Pace Remus, who sees Justin’s argument from prophecy as consciously axiomatic, and thus intended to be convincing only to an inward audience. On the contrary, it seems clear that Justin sees argumentation from fulfilled prophecy as carrying objective, empirical validity (cf. Harold Remus, “Justin Martyr's Argument with Judaism,” in Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity, vol. 2, Separation and Polemic, ed. Stephen G. Wilson, Studies in Christianity and Judaism (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 63– 64). 19 Cf. Stanton, Jesus, 127–147.

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itly found in Dial. 69:7.20 Therefore, claims that prophecies concerning the life and teaching of Jesus had been fulfilled would to Justin have seemed an adequate response, and also the fulfilment of Jesus’ own prophecies serve as giving legitimacy to his earthly teachings (12:9–10).

B. Tradition and Innovation B. Tradition and Innovation

The theme of prophecies of the Hebrew Scriptures being fulfilled in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ is as old as Christianity itself. It is a dominant theme for instance in the Gospel of Matthew, where it constitutes the basis and interpretative framework for the entire narrative. In a strong sense, Justin is therefore arguing from a received tradition when he connects certain episodes in the life of Jesus to earlier Hebrew prophecies.21 Skarsaune has also convincingly demonstrated that the Greek translations of the Hebrew Scriptures which Justin quotes in the Apology, have come down to him as Christian collections of testimony sources, which probably contained interpretative comments as well.22 To what extent Justin innovates and reshapes his material is difficult to know, as none of these testimony sources have survived, but when one compares him with Matthew, from whom Justin (probably both directly and indirectly)23 has received much material, it is clear that there are differences in how the two authors present the prophecies, and in how they interpret their significance.24 That Justin indeed is active in reshaping his material is clearly seen also in the fact that his approach to the Hebrew Scriptures in the Apology differs from that in the Dialogue, as both relate to the specific purposes of each treatise. In the Dialogue, the controversy between Justin and his literary Jewish opponent over the right interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures, features as a major part of the subject-matter. In 51:1 Trypho responds to Justin’s exegesis of an Isaianic prophecy with the objection that ‘[a]ll the words of the prophecy which you just quoted are ambiguous [...] and they certainly do not prove what you want them to prove,’ and in 60:1 he counters another of Justin’s 20

The accusation that Jesus was someone who ‘misled the people’ echoes a common description of false prophets, ibid., 129–135. 21 Christological interpretations of passages such as Ps 22, Is 9 and Is 53, are among those we find in the earliest Christian document as well as in Justin. 22 Cf. Skarsaune, Proof, esp. 1, 17–131, “The Development of Scriptual Interpretation in the Second and Third Centuries - Except Clement and Origen,” in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation, ed. Magne Sæbø (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), and “Justin and His Bible,” in Justin Martyr and His Worlds (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007). 23 Proof, 130. 24 See below.

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interpretations with the words ‘[w]e do not draw the same conclusion from the words you quoted ...’ The sole authority in this debate is the Scriptures themselves. Arguments in favour of a certain interpretation as well as refutations of rivalling interpretations are mined only from the Scriptures, on the shared assumption that they represent the ultimate truth (92:6).25 References to Christian tradition or even to the words of Jesus are not given authoritatively, but rather as part of Justin’s exposition of his own views.26 On the whole, what we find in the Dialogue is a struggle over ownership and authenticity, and in this struggle Justin’s own position is well summarized in the following quote: For the words which I use are not my own, nor are they embellished by human rhetoric, but they are the words as David sang them, as Isaiah announced them as good news, as Zechariah proclaimed them, and as Moses wrote them. Aren’t you acquainted with them, Trypho? You should be, for they are contained in your Scriptures, or rather not yours, but ours. For we believe and obey them, whereas you, though you read them, do not grasp their spirit. (Dial. 29:2)

In the Apology, as briefly mentioned earlier, Justin’s use of the Hebrew Scriptures differs significantly. First one will note that the interpretation of the Scriptures is not an issue in the Apology. Here, it is simply assumed that the quoted Scriptures both say and mean precisely what Justin claims that they say and mean.27 The prophecies are clear and unproblematic; what Justin seeks to prove is merely that they also have been fulfilled in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ. Potential Jewish objections, textual as well as hermeneutical, which Justin attends so carefully to in the Dialogue, are largely ignored in the Apology. The second observation is that since Justin’s rhetorical addressees in the Apology are pagans (unlike the Dialogue in which the inter25 Horbury’s statements that Jews and Christians ‘shared a biblical culture focused on what can properly be called a common Bible,’ and that ‘[t]he exegesis of Jews and Christians diverged over differences of tenet and custom rather than hermeneutical method,’ apply well to the Dialogue (Horbury, Jews and Christians, 26). 26 This type of apologetic move, described by Barclay as ‘squeezing oneself into the other’s mould’ (Barclay, “Josephus' Contra Apionem”, 276), i.e. accepting the terms set up by the opponent, serves the purpose of defeating the same on his own turf and with his own weapons, which is far more devastating than if the apologist himself has prepared the stage. 27 The OT text of the Apology, which comes to Justin through testimony sources, sometimes differs from the text used in the Dialogue. Justin claims that the text of the Dialogue has been tampered with by the Jews (cf. e.g. Dial. 71:1–4, 84:3, 137:3) but he decides to use it in order to avoid unnecessary controversies (Dial. 120:3–5), whereas the variant readings found in the Apology apparently, as more authentic, hold higher authority to him. In reality, the text used in the Dialogue’s extended OT quotes is the LXX whereas the Apology’s variants bear the mark of Christian redactions. Cf. e.g. Oskar Skarsaune, “From Books to Testimonies: Remarks on the Transmission of the Old Testament in the Early Church,” Immanuel 24/25, (1990): 212–218.

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locutor is Jewish), the authority of Scripture cannot be taken for granted. Thus, Justin never quotes Scripture normatively in the Apology, and he never makes an argument from sacred history. As will be shown, Scripture equates to prophecy, and the importance of Scripture is derived from its prophetic nature.28 Prophecy as such needed no defence in Hellenistic times; whether people were Jews, pagans or Christians, everyone believed in the existence and importance of prophecy.29 There is no equivalent to the Matthean ‘that it might be fulfilled’ statements in the Apology. Justin’s concern here is not that the Hebrew Scriptures be fulfilled – they are not bestowed with any intrinsic value – but rather that Christian doctrine be vindicated. As noted in the previous chapter, the authority and normative foundation for the discussion in the Apology is reason, which Justin equates to Christian doctrine. Thus, there is a reversed balance of authority from what is found in the Dialogue. In the latter text, the Hebrew Scriptures constitute the authority, and Christian teachings are framed primarily as inferences drawn from them; in the former, Christian tradition/teaching, as identical to logos/reason, is the fundamental authority and the function of the Hebrew prophets is to confirm this fact.

C. The Proof from Prophecy in the Apology C. The Proof from Prophecy in the Apology

I. Chronology, not Antiquity The relation between the problem of antiquity, as discussed in the previous chapter, and the argument from prophecy is not entirely clear and therefore needs some further consideration. As already noted, proof from prophecy does not allow for novelty, and hence one of the functions of the theft theory is to bestow a relative antiquity of the Hebrew prophets over the Greek philosophers. If Plato had read Moses, then the prophecies are not new. Yet, the old age of the prophets is even more important in relation to the charge of plagiarism. That Moses is described as older than all the Greek writers (44:8) is primarily a way of saying that he did not copy or steal from the writers; the purpose is not to frame Moses as a πρῶτος εὑρετής (first inventor of useful things) or the ‘first wise man’ (πρῶτος σοφός), as he is often portrayed in Jewish apologetic literature. Justin’s primary concern is to preserve the integrity of the argument from prophecy, and this integrity is based on chronological relations rather than antiquity per se. In 38:8, he writes: And this was prophesied before he appeared, sometimes five thousand years before, sometimes three thousand, sometimes two thousand, and again a thousand and elsewhere eight hundred: the various prophets came to be according to the successions of the generations. 28 29

Cf. Osborn, Justin Martyr, 88. Cf. Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 177–178, and Barnard, Life and Thought, 103.

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Justin does not suggest that there is a difference between the prophecies uttered five thousand years and those delivered in more recent times. Quite the opposite, he seems to bestow on them equal value. Also, in his following exposition of the prophecies, there is no suggestion that he values the more ancient prophecies higher than the younger ones. The most prominent prophet in the Apology is the relatively young Isaiah, who is mentioned by name no less than fifteen times. Old age is therefore not an intrinsic part of the argument from prophecy. What is important is rather that the events predicted were ‘prophesied before he [Jesus] appeared’. It is the miraculous nature of this reversed chronology which constitutes the ‘hard evidence’. II. Scripture as Prophecy, Prophecy as Text Justin introduces his section of proof-texts by rendering his own version of the Septuagint legend. There were, then, amongst the Jews some people who were prophets of God, through whom the prophetic Spirit proclaimed ahead of time the things that were going to happen before they did happen. And those who were kings successively among the Jews acquired their prophecies and looked after them, spoken as they were in their own Hebrew language when the prophecies were being made, in rolls put together by the prophets themselves. But when Ptolemy, the king of the Egyptians, who was preparing a library and attempting to gather together the writings of all peoples, learnt also of these prophecies, he sent to the one who at that time was ruling the Jews, asking that the rolls of the prophecies be dispatched to him, written in their aforementioned Hebrew language. But since what was written in them was not familiar to the Egyptians, he again sent and asked that people be sent who might translate them into the Greek language. And after this the rolls remained among the Egyptians until now, and are also present everywhere to all the Jews ... (31:1–5)

Both the fact that Justin includes this legend in his work and the way in which he does it is significant. First, it is important that the translation ordered by Ptolemy is a translation of prophecies.30 In the Letter of Aristeas (as well as in Philo, Josephus and the fragments of Aristobulus31) it is the Torah which is translated into Greek, but unlike the Dialogue, in which the correct interpretation of the Torah features as a major theme, the Apology makes no reference to the Mosaic law whatsoever.32 The introductory line ‘[t]here were [...] some people who were prophets of God,’ suggests that it is the phenome30 On the LXX-legend in the Apology, see Martin Hengel, “The Septuagint as a Collection of Writings Claimed by Christians: Justin and the Church Fathers before Origen,” in Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways A.D. 70 to 135, ed. James D. G. Dunn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 41–45. 31 Philo, De Vita Mosis 2:25–44; Josephus, Antiquities 12:12–118; Aristobulus: Eusebius P.E. 13.12.2 and Clement Strom. 1.22.148.1. 32 For further studies on Justin’s relation to the Mosaic law, see Theodore G. Stylianopoulos, Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law (Missoula: Society of Biblical Literature and Scholars Press, 1975).

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non of prophecy which is central to the story. The Dialogue describes the Septuagint as a translation of the Scriptures (71:1, 84:3), rather than just ‘prophecies,’ though the prophetic nature of the Scriptures is also mentioned (32:2).33 The function of the Septuagint is also different than from in the Apology; in the Dialogue, Justin emphasises the inspired nature of this translation (71:1) and argues that the Jews have corrupted it.34 In the Apology, however, what is introduced is people, not Scriptures, and this personal relation to the prophets is maintained throughout the text. The prophets are introduced by names, eight in total,35 beginning with Moses. Moses is presented as ‘the first prophet’ rather than as the lawgiver,36 which he often features as in earlier Jewish apologetics. There is, hence, no real theology of Scripture at work in the Apology, and no idea of a divinely inspired corpus of writings. Certainly, the prophets are seen as inspired by the Spirit (or Logos, cf. below), but this is a conclusion drawn from the fact that the prophecies were fulfilled, rather than by their belonging to a literary body a priori considered to be inspired and divine. This is clearly seen in Justin’s references to oracles of the Sibyl and Hystaspes as being, at least in some respect, on a par with the Hebrew prophecies,37 and it is further underscored 33

The prophetic dimension of the Law is unveiled primarily through typological exegesis. Cf. Dial. 42:4’[...] if I were to enumerate all the other Mosaic precepts, gentlemen, I could show that they are types, symbols, and prophecies of what would happen to Christ and those who were foreknown as those who would believe in him, and, similarly, of the deeds of Christ himself.’ 34 The latter charge is common also in later Adversus Iudaeos literature; cf. Patrick Andrist, “The Greek Bible Used by the Jews in the Dialogues Contra Iudaeos (fourth-tenth centuries CE),” in Jewish Reception of Greek Bible Versions, ed. Nicholas De Lange, Julia Krivoruchko, and Cameron Boyd-Taylor, Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). 35 Moses (32:1), Isaiah (32:23), Micah (34:1), David (34:1, referred to in the Apology as ‘king and prophet’ or, alternatively, only as ‘prophet’ (40:1, 45:1)), ‘Sophonias (35:10, referred to as the author to a quote from Zech 9:9, which in part resembles Zeph 3:14), Jeremiah (51:8), Ezekiel (52:5) and Zechariah (52:10). 36 32:1. Cf. Dial. 30:1 where prophecy is said to have emerged only after the death of Moses. 37 44:12, cf. 20:1. Augustus had issued an edict prohibiting private citizens from possessing oracular books, which later was enforced by Tiberius as well. It is possible that such a prohibition existed also in Antonius Pius’ days even though, as implied by Justin, it may not have been enforced for a long time. Yet, it is highly questionable that offences against such an edict would have led to the death penalty. See H. W. Parke, Sibyls and Sibylline Prophecy in Classical Antiquity (London: Routledge, 1988), 142–143, 157–158. On the Jewish/Christian Sibylline Oracles, cf. Emil Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C. – A.D. 135), edited by Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar and Martin Goodman, vol. 3, 2 ed. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986), 618–654, or Mathias Delcor, “The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Hellenistic Period,” in The Cambridge History of Judaism, ed. W. D. Davies and Louis Finkelstein (Cambridge:

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by the fact that the demons, when plagiarizing or corrupting the prophecies, are referred to as having ‘heard’ rather than ‘read’ them – i.e. they actually heard the prophets speak; they did not study the Scriptures (cf. e.g. 54:3, 6; 62:1 and 64:1). The difference from the Dialogue in this respect could not be clearer. The Dialogue unveils a solid theology of Scripture, and though Shotwell’s suggestion that Justin entertains a ‘doctrine of verbal inspiration’ may be overstated and slightly anachronistic,38 it is clear that the Dialogue defends both the unity and complete truthfulness of Scripture. But you are sadly mistaken if you did so in the hope of embarrassing me into admitting that some passages of Scripture contradict others, for I would not be so bold as to assert, or even imagine, such a thing. If such a passage were quoted, and appeared to contradict another (since I am positive that no passage contradicts another), I would rather openly confess that I do not know the meaning of the passage, and I shall do my utmost to have my opinion shared by those who imagine that the Scriptures sometimes contradict one another. (Dial. 65:2)

It is a telling fact that the word γραφή, in its different forms, is found over a hundred times in the Dialogue, mostly in reference to the Hebrew Scriptures, whereas it is not found at all in the Apology. Yet, and secondly, it is as text we encounter the prophecies in the Apology, and this is not insignificant; ‘in the rolls [βίβλοι] of the prophets we found our Lord Jesus Christ, proclaimed ahead of time’ (31:7). The fact that the prophecies were written down (Justin emphasizes that this was done by the inspired ones themselves), that the prophecies were preserved as texts by the Jewish kings for generations, that they were translated into Greek on the command of a historical named king (Ptolemy) and that they were made available throughout the world, is important. First, it provides the foundation to Justin’s theft theory as described in the previous chapter. Greek philosophers could not plausibly be argued to have copied obscure texts in a Barbarian language, but with a Greek text ‘present everywhere’ (31:5), matters are different. Also, it serves the purpose of providing a context for the prophecies and of securely rooting them in historical reality. As the proof from prophecy is an argument from chronology it will only work persuasively as a literary strategy, and the argument Justin develops from the prophecies does depend on their transmission precisely as texts.

Cambridge University Press, 1989), 486–490. On Hystaspes, cf. Schürer, History, 3, Part 1, 654–660. 38 Willis A. Shotwell, The Biblical exegesis of Justin Martyr (London: S.P.C.K., 1965), 5.

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1. Prophecy and Fulfilment in the Life of Jesus After introducing the prophets, Justin, in 31:7, provides what has often been identified as a dispositional outline of the proof-text exposition which is to follow:39 Well then, in the rolls of the prophets we found our Lord Jesus Christ, proclaimed ahead of time as drawing near, being born of a virgin, and growing to manhood, and healing every disease and every illness, and raising the dead, and being resented, and not acknowledged, and being crucified, and dying and rising again, and going to the heavens, and being, and being called, the Son of God, and we found certain people sent by him to every race of people to proclaim these things, and that it was people from the gentiles rather who believed in him.

Here Justin lists all the different themes in the life and ministry of Jesus which beforehand had been predicted by the prophets. In the chapters following this section, he connects every episode to a prophecy and tries to show how the prophecy has been fulfilled. The name of the prophet is often mentioned in connection to the prophecies, which suggests that though there is unity among the prophets in that they all testify to Christ, each prophecy should be seen as a distinct testimony. Almost as if in a court scenario, Justin seems to be aware of the value of several voices saying the same thing as opposed to making references to a single source which could more easily be dismissed. Yet, it is the fulfillment reports of the prophecies which is the axis on which Justin’s proof-texting exercises really turn. Prophecy (which to Justin equals prediction) in and by itself does not prove anything, but a prophecy seen through its fulfilment is what constitutes to Justin ‘the greatest and truest proof’ (30:1). In Dial. 28:2, Justin says that ‘[s]ince I base my arguments and suggestions on the Scriptures and facts [ἀπο τε τῶν γραφῶν καἰ τῶν πραγμάτων] you should not hesitate to believe me.’ (cf. 131:5) The theme prevalent in the Apology is similar: Scripture (prophecy) in conjunction with facts (fulfilment) constitute irrefutable evidence for the truth of Christianity.40 The prophecies Justin lists in his outline and of which he then proceeds to show the fulfilment, are the following: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The coming of Christ (32:1–14) The virgin birth (32:14–34:2) Christ growing to manhood (35:1–2) The healings of Christ (48:1–2) 39

Cf. Skarsaune, Proof, 135. ‘Pour Justin, la certitude de l’origine divine du christianisme, la garantie de sa vérité reposent sur des preuves de fait, tangibles, inscrites dans les realisations de l’histoire’ (Munier, Justin, Apologie, 71). Cf. Osborn, Justin Martyr, 88. 40

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Christ being resented and unacknowledged (49:1–7) The passion of Christ (35:2–30, 50:1–11) The resurrection ascension of Christ (38:5, 45:1–5, 50:12, 51:6–7) Christ being and being called the son of God (32:7–11, 40:7–41:4) The sending of the apostles (39:1–3, 40:1–4, 45:5) Gentiles believing rather than Jews (53:1–11)

The exposition of these prophecies, accompanied by their fulfilment reports, is carried out in chs 30–53 of the Apology, 41 which constitute a logical unit; in 30:1, Justin claims that he will present proof which will reassure his readers of the truthfulness of the Christian confession, and in 53:1 he concludes that the evidence presented thus far will be ‘sufficient for the persuasion of those who have ears to hear and understand.’42 A couple of these prophecies are particularly interesting because of how their fulfillment reports are framed. Αs a prophecy predicting the coming of Christ, Justin renders Gen 49:10–11 in the following way: A ruler shall not fail from Judah nor a governor from his loins until the one for whom it lies in store should come. And he shall be the one awaited by the nations, tethering his colt at the vine, washing his robe in the blood of the grape. (32:1)43

The fulfilment of this prophecy is proven through the fact that the Jews – so Justin believed – always did have a king up and until the advent of Christ, and Justin challenges the emperor to investigate this on his own (32:2). This is an example of how Justin tries to tie the fulfilment of prophecy to that which can be objectively verified which, as will be seen, is very important to him. Further evidence of the fulfilment is given in the fact that people from every nation really do await Christ, which Justin assures that the emperor can see ‘with [his] own eyes’ in order to be ‘persuaded by the reality’ (32:4). Similarly, when Justin claims that the prophecies from Isaiah about the blind seeing, the lepers becoming clean and the dead raising, had been fulfilled in the ministry of Jesus, he refers the emperor to a source he presumably thought the latter would find trustworthy, the Acts Recorded Under Pontius Pilate (48:1–3), rather than to a Christian gospel stating the same thing. That Jesus was born in Bethlehem can be verified through the census-lists made 41 There are, interestingly, no examples of proof from prophecy in 2 Ap. Skarsaune sees the disposition as carried out in chs. 32–35 and 48–53. The above schema aligns better with Hubik, who recognized the disposition in chs. 32–35, 45 and 47–53., though here ch. 38 has also been added. (Skarsaune, Proof, 139–140), and Karl Hubik, Die Apologien des hl. Justinus des Philosophen und Märtyrers: Literarhistorische Untersuchungen, Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft (Vienna, 1912), 131–132. 42 For a thorough and detailed treatment of Justin’s exposition of these elements, cf. Skarsaune, Proof, 139–164. See also Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 167, n. 4. 43 On this quote, cf. Skarsaune, Proof, 25–29, 140–143.

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under Quirinius (32:2), rather than through Luke’s account, which Justin clearly knew, and for verification of the events of the crucifixion the emperor is, again, referred to the above-mentioned acts of Pilate. Credibility is a keyword for the fulfilment reports, and in these source references Justin’s attentiveness to his audience, rhetorical and real, shines through. The apologist, apparently, is keen on presenting an argument which would appear legitimate and trustworthy not only to Christians, but also to outsiders. Yet, most of the fulfilment reports which relate to Christ are simply stated as matters of fact, without any source references given. Justin never refers to his Christian documents, which included at least some of the gospels, though he uses them extensively and clearly views them as absolutely reliable historical sources. Thus, though Justin seeks ways to see the fulfilments of the Hebrew prophets independently verified, most of what can be known about the life and ministry of Jesus is found in and as texts, passed on through the Christian tradition. Though these texts are extremely valuable to Justin, they are, as proofs, nonetheless surpassed by what could be described as ‘observable reality.’ 2. Prophecy Fulfilled before ‘Our Own Eyes’ The prophecies about Jesus are certainly at the centre of Justin’s exposition, but they do not stand alone; towards the end of the exposition, new prophetic themes begin to appear. In 47:1, Justin introduces a prophecy which relates to the destruction of the land of the Jews, and in 49:1–7, he claims it to have been prophesied that the Jews would reject Christ when he came, not recognizing who he was, while the gentiles would embrace him and be persecuted for it. These themes are further developed in ch. 53, right after Justin has formally concluded his exposition. What is significant with these new prophetic themes is that they bring the argument from prophecy much closer to home. The proof-texting exercises related to the life and ministry of Jesus must be seen primarily as a literary strategy, building on an argument from reversed chronology; the Christian narrative about Christ as contained in Christian texts (since there was no one alive who had actually witnessed the events), which Justin later refers to as ‘gospels’ or ‘the memoirs of the apostles’,44 are confirmed by prophecies which are preserved in yet older texts. 44

66:3, 67:3. Cf. Dial. 103:8, 105:1, 106:3. Most scholars equate Justin’s ‘memoirs’ to the synoptic gospel traditions (e.g. Helmut Koester, Ancient Christian Gospels: Their History and Development (London and Philadelphia: SCM/Fortress Press, 1990), 37–38), though e.g. Charles Hill has argued that also the gospel of John should be included (Charles Hill, “Was John's Gospel among Justin's Apostolic Memoirs?,” in Justin Martyr and His Worlds (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), and The Johannine Corpus in the Early Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 338–342). Other scholars have argued that Justin at least probably had access to a four-gospel codex (e.g. Graham

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The gospels, then, function and are treated as trustworthy historical records which confirm the truthfulness of the prophecies, though they are sometimes also backed up by other sources.45 In these new themes, however, Justin firmly leaves the world of texts and brings his proof from prophecy right into the present reality.46 And as he does so, the evidence part takes on a new shape, as it no longer refers to texts or memoirs but to that which can be objectively observed. That this is a conscious move, and that Justin is aware of the fact that his expositions consist of different types of evidence, is suggested by his later remark to the emperor: ‘And having urged you on, to the extent that we can, by word and by the pattern of what is seen [καὶ διὰ λόγου οὖν καὶ σχήματος τοῦ φαινιμένου], we know that we are from now on without blame...’ (55:8, emp. added). Thus, Justin concedes that his argument refers to both λόγος and phenomenon, both text and reality. As Justin perceived it, prophecy was being fulfilled as he lived and wrote, and the theme which dominated the present prophetic fulfilment relates to the history and fate of the Jewish people and of the land of the Jews. There is an inseparable connection between the people and the land in the Apology; indeed, as noted by Lieu, Jews are primarily defined geographically – as Judeans – as opposed to the Dialogue, in which they are defined more theologically, i.e., in terms of their beliefs.47 The Jewish wars and particularly the Bar Kochba revolt, after which remaining Jews were finally evicted from Jerusalem, seem to have had a fundamental impact on Justin’s understanding of the prophetic texts (31:5–6; 47:1–6). This finds expression also in the Dialogue, at the beginning of which Trypho, Justin’s literary partner in conversation, is described as a refugee from this war (1:3). If one conceives of Trypho as mainly an invented figure, which most interpreters seem to do,48 this piece of information becomes even more interesting, as it must then be seen as part of a context which Justin purposefully creates for the discussion to take place in. The expulsion of the Jews from their homeland profoundly informs Justin’s Stanton, “The Fourfold Gospel,” in Jesus and Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75–78, and Skarsaune, “Justin and His Bible”, 54. 45 Cf. Koester, Ancient, 37–43. 46 Minns and Parvis suspects a major lacuna between verses 53:2 and 53:3 (Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 215, n. 2). This seems very likely as there is an abrupt change of subject – in v. 2 Justin speaks of prophecies related to Christ, and in v. 3 he speaks of the desolation of the land of the Jews. The missing text here probably contained scriptural exegesis for some of the prophetic themes introduced earlier. Yet, though the textual situation is complicated, it can still be observed that Justin moves in a certain direction; i.e. from prophecies fulfilled earlier with fulfilment reports preserved by Christian tradition and the ‘memoirs of the apostles’, to prophecies the fulfilment of which can be objectively observed by all. 47 Lieu, Image, 178. 48 Though see the discussion in ibid., 103–104.

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theological conclusions regarding their place in God’s saving economy, and also of how the Christian community should be understood viz-a-viz the Jewish one. In the Apology, Jews and Christians are not contrasted as communities the way they are in the Dialogue, and neither does Justin speculate theologically concerning the fate of the Jewish nation. As already noted, theological exposition for its own sake is not part of the Apology’s subject matter or purpose. Yet, what has happened to the Jews is important to Justin as it is seen as a fulfilment of prophecy. Three prophetic historical events, all relating to the Jews and all unfolding before Justin’s own eyes, seem to have made a great impression on him, and these are: 1. 2. 3.

The Jews rejected the gospel (49:5; 53:6). Because of their rejection of Jesus, the Jews have been judged and their lands been laid waste (52:10–12). The gospel has been spread all over the earth and the gentiles have received it. As a consequence, the gentile believers have become more numerous (and more genuine) than Jewish believers (49:2–5; 53:3,10–11).

These great shifts in salvation history are taking place in Justin’s time, just as they had been prophesied hundreds of years in advance, and as he summarizes the conclusions which can be drawn from the proofs from prophecy he has produced, these events stand out as his clinching arguments: We see the desolation of the land of the Jews, and those from every race of human beings persuaded through the teaching from his apostles, and scorning their old ways in which they had conducted themselves erroneously, knowing those from the nations to be more numerous and more genuine Christians than those from the Jews and the Samaritans [...] And those who wish are able to see the whole of their territory a wasteland and burnt and still sterile. But as to the fact that those from the nations were foreknown as more genuine and more faithful, we shall announce thus: ‘Israel is uncircumcised in heart, but the nations in their foreskins.’ When such things are seen they can reasonably provide those who embrace the truth and are not lovers of opinion, or ruled by passions, with persuasion and assurance as well. (53:3,9–12; emp. added.)

Thus, what Justin describes as the ‘the greatest and truest proof’ for the truth of Christianity involves, certainly, fulfilled prophecies in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ, but also, and in a sense even more acutely, contemporary historical developments, in which the acceptance of the Gospel among the gentiles, the Jews’ corresponding rejection of the same and God’s judgment over the Jewish people (as proved by the destruction of their land) play a pivotal role. The reason the latter prophecies provide stronger evidence is not that they are the most important ones – the prophecies and fulfilment reports in relation to the life of Christ are more important to Justin in terms of subject-matter – but because their fulfilment can be seen and verified. As the old

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man tells Justin in the Dialogue, ‘the happenings that have taken place and are now taking place force you to believe [the prophets’] words’ (7:2, emp. added). Justin even calls the emperor himself as a witness when he refers to the destruction of Jerusalem as something the autocrat himself could verify. In fact, the emperor and his predecessors are framed as executioners of God’s plan when they destroyed the land of the Jews (47:1–6, cf. 32:2–4). We are thus in a position to summarize our findings in the following way: Justin refers early in the Apology to his ἀπόδειξις, as the means of proving the rationality and truth of the Christian faith. The problem addressed is the Christian worship of Jesus Christ, a Jewish trouble-maker recently put to death by the Roman authorities through crucifixion. Christians claim that this Jesus was not merely a man but also God’s Son, the Universal Logos incarnated, and the proof presented for these claims is found in the fulfilment of ancient prophecies which relate to the life, ministry, death and resurrection of this man. This is the central theme of the Apology, and at its heart lies Justin’s exposition of the prophecies about Christ and their fulfilment, introduced through the outline in ch. 31 and concluded in ch. 53. Yet, it is from the observable and verifiable instances of fulfilled prophecy that credibility for the argument from prophecy is ultimately inferred. After introducing the charge of Christ having been a common magician, Justin states: ‘Lest someone make his retort we shall now make proof [...] being persuaded of necessity by those who foretell things before they happen, because we see even with our own eyes that things have happened and are happening as they were foretold’ (30:1, emp. added).Thus, the fulfilments which Justin and his contemporaries can observe and verify give credibility also to the fulfilment reports which they have not personally observed, such as those pertaining to the life of Christ. Further, Justin uses the same logic for all the prophecies which have not yet been fulfilled: Since, then, we demonstrate that all the things that have already happened were proclaimed beforehand by the prophets before that happened, it is necessary to have faith also concerning the things similarly foretold, but as going to happen, that they really are going to happen. For just as the things proclaimed beforehand that have already happened turned out to be true, even though they were not understood, in the same way the remaining things also will turn out to be true even though they are not understood and are not believed. (52:1–2)

The verifiably fulfilled prophecies concerning the Jewish nation are therefore of tremendous importance to Justin’s argument, as they provide the most tangible proof of the authenticity of the Hebrew prophecies.

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D. The Agent of Prophecy D. The Agent of Prophecy

The theological implications of the above-mentioned shifts in salvation history are developed in more detail in the Dialogue, and there it is the Spirit which is at centre stage of the developments. It is the Spirit who inspires the prophets and thus ushers in the new aeon, itself constituting the link of continuity between the old covenant and the new and personifying the guarantee of the elected state of the Christian community. One of Justin’s arguments in the Dialogue is that the Spirit has left the Jewish people and now resides with the Christians. The proof for this is that charismatic gifts, most notably the gift of prophecy, exist within the church, whereas there are no prophets left with the Jews (Dial. 82:1–4; 87:5). Thus, in the Dialogue, the presence of charismatic gifts in the church, along with fulfilled prophecies of judgment, prove that the Christian church has replaced the Jewish people as God’s elected nation. In the Apology, Justin never makes these points explicitly, as the purpose of his references to the fate of the Jewish people is apologetic rather than theological. It is the fulfilment theme, rather than the events themselves, which is important. In consequence, the role and function of the Spirit is much more subordinated in the Apology than in the Dialogue, and this has implications for how Justin deals with the agency of prophecy, which both Jewish and Christian tradition up to this point predominantly had ascribed to the Spirit. I. Justin and the Prophetic Spirit Justin’s thought on the Spirit has long been recognized as one of the most difficult aspects of his theology.49 It is notoriously difficult to give coherence to, as what the apologist has to say on this subject lacks both clarity and consistency. Particularly problematic are the questions concerning the identity and activity of the Spirit, not the least in relation to the divine Logos. The general scholarly verdict seems to be that Justin confuses the function of the Spirit with that of the Logos, though he manages to differentiate between their identities.50 As a result, the question of whether or not Justin’s 49 ‘There is no doctrine of Justin more baffling than his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and no doctrine which has been more differently understood’ (Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 176). This observation remains true today; cf. e.g. Bogdan G. Bucur, “The Angelic Spirit in Early Christianity: Justin, the Martyr and Philosopher,” JR 88, (2008): 191. 50 So e.g. Henry Barclay Swete, The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church (London: Macmillan, 1912), 38–39, and Jules Lebreton, Histoire du Dogme de la Trinté: Des Origines au Concile de Nicée, vol. 2, De Saint Clément a Saint Irénée, TH, 2 ed, (Paris: Beauchesne Éditeur, 1928), 464–465. Goodenough agrees with this judgment, asserting that ‘confusion of function is possible without confusion of personality’ (Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 181) and similarly, Barnard claims that ‘Justin confused the function of the

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theology can be described as properly trinitarian has been much debated. Some scholars have answered in the negative,51 while others have been cautious in their judgments.52 In a recent article, B. Bucur analyses the question in detail and suggests that Justin combines a Spirit Christology with an angelomorphic Pneumatology. These two features occur ‘in tandem [...] within a binitarian theological framework,’ which, in turn, suggests a ‘quasi-trinitarian structure of the divine world.’53 Though a fascinating question to pursue, Stanton’s observation that in and by itself it is anachronistic and guided by logos and the Spirit,’ while at the same time ‘clearly distinguishing’ between them in regard to rank (Barnard, Life and Thought, 104). See also Osborn, Justin Martyr, 88–89, and Graham Stanton, “The Spirit in the Writings of Justin Martyr,” in The Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D. G. Dunn, ed. Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker, and Stephen C. Barton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 330–331. A. Briggman, agreeing with the above general assessment, still claims that Justin also confuses the identities of the Spirit and the Logos on two occasions, namely Ap 33:6 and Dial 87– 88, which he sees as instances of Spirit-Christology (Anthony Briggman, “Measuring Justin's Approach to the Spirit: Trinitarian Conviction and Binitarian Orientation,” VC 63, (2009): 135). He explains Justin’s conflicting ideas as being the result of a tension between trinitarian convictions and binitarian logic – a combination which, according to Briggman, ‘obscures the activity and identity of the Spirit,’ and ‘explains the confusion scholars have attributed to [Justin],’ ibid., 108–109. 51 ‘Doctrine of the Trinity Justin had none,’ claims Goodenough. According to him the ranking of the divine persons is ‘entirely incompatible’ with trinitarian views (Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 186). Similarly, Barnard claims that ‘Justin does not set forth any real Trinitarian doctrine,’ as his language is one of ‘Christian experience and worship rather than theological reflection’ (Barnard, Apologies, 56, 16. Cf. Barnard, Life and Thought, 105). Grant goes so far as to suggest that the Spirit was not even personal to Justin (Grant, Greek Apologists, 62). 52 Wartelle allows for a rudimentary trinitarian theology in Justin, which consists of the right raw material but lacks organization (Wartelle, Apologies, 63). Sabugal notes that Justin’s contributes little to the development of trinitarian theology, though his remarks still constitute evidence for views which are close to a trinitarian perspective; ‘Tampoco representa un notable progreso, respect de la literature neotestamentaria, en el desarollo del dogma trinitario. Es, sí un importante testimonio cristiano a cerca de la existenciua de ese dogma. Pero nada más.’ (Santos Sabugal, “El vocabulario pneumatológico en la obra de S. Justino y sus implicaciones teológicas,” Augustinianum 13, (1973): 467). Cf. Munier, Saint Justin, Apologie, 109. 53 Bucur, “Angelic Spirit,” 208. This combination is not unique for Justin; in another publication Bucur draws the exact same conclusions regarding the trinitarianism of Clement of Alexandria. He claims that Clement’s view on the Spirit could be ‘described as “angelomorphic Pneumatology,” and that it occurs in a larger theological articulation, namely in tandem with binitarianism and Spirit Christology’ (“Revisiting Christian Oeyen: ‘The Other Clement’ on Father, Son, and the Angelomorphic Spirit,” VC 61, (2007): 413). Cf. Loren T. Stuckenbruck, “The Holy Spirit in the Ascension of Isaiah,” in The Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D. G. Dunn, ed. Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker, and Stephen C. Barton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004).

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‘fourth-century rather than second-century agendas’54 seems relevant, if our goal is to understand the apologist’s own thought and purposes. Justin had no ambition to present a coherent doctrine of the Trinity; indeed, and especially if one limits oneself to the Apology, Justin had no intention of presenting anything but a convincing defence of the Christian faith.55 As our present interest focuses on literary function rather than on thought and theology, an attempt will be made to locate the place of the Spirit in the Apology as well as to identify and explore the intricate links it contains between the Spirit, the Logos and Christian tradition. In the Apology, the references to the Spirit are largely connected to prophecy, which alone suggests that Justin’s primary interest in the Spirit is related to function rather than nature. The Spirit is mentioned twice in the early part of the Apology (6:2; 13:3), in what could be defined as two proto-trinitarian formulations, but it is not until ch. 31, when the concept of proof from prophecy has been introduced, that the Spirit becomes an important part of the apologetic narrative.56 Typically referred to as ‘the prophetic Spirit,’ (which Stanton has called Justin’s ‘stock phrase’)57 it is described as the driving force through history, and the agent who through prophetic utterances prepares the advent of Christ. Eight times the word ‘holy’ appears in conjunction with the word ‘Spirit’, among which the traditional construction ‘Holy Spirit’ is found five times. A quick survey of the relevant passages will show that in the few instances Justin uses the term ‘Holy Spirit’ he basically recites traditional material. In 33:5 he quotes gospel tradition, and in 61:3,13; 65:3 and 67:2 he recites liturgical formulas, which he evidently was keen not to alter. The formula ‘prophetic Spirit’, on the other hand, occurs 25 times in the Apology, in different settings, and it is clearly Justin’s designation of choice. Therefore one may safely assume that it can tell us something about how Justin conceived of the role of the Spirit. II. Spirit and Logos One of the most interesting and puzzling questions, alluded to above, in the study of the Apology, is how Justin describes the function of both the Spirit and the Logos in relation to prophetic agency. It is also an important study as it provides an excellent illustration of how Justin negotiates between and shapes his sources as well as how, in the end, his apologetic purpose is al54

Graham Stanton, “The Spirit in the Writings of Justin Martyr,” ibid., 321. The word τριάς, when applied to the mystery of God, appears for the first time in Theophilus; Ad Autolycus 2:15 (cf. e.g. Wartelle, Apologies, 63, and Barnard, Life and Thought, 101). 56 In total, Justin refers to the Spirit thirty-three times in the Apology, on Sabugal’s count (Sabugal, “Vocabulario,” 460). 57 Stanton, “Spirit”, 326. 55

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lowed to dominate and direct his narrative. In two famous instances in the First Apology plus one in the Second, Justin refers to the Logos, rather than the Spirit, as having inspired the prophets: And that those who prophesy are inspired by nothing other than divine utterance [Logos] you also will, I suppose, say. (33:9)58 But when you hear the phrases of the prophets spoken as through from a character, do not suppose that they were spoken as from the inspired ones themselves, but rather from the divine Logos moving them. (36:1) This is the Christ who was also known in part by Socrates, for he was and is the Logos which is in everything, and he foretold through the prophets things that were going to happen, and when he became a sharer in our experiences he taught all this himself. (2:10:8)

These passages led Goodenough to conclude that ‘Justin leaves unsettled the matter of the agent of inspiration,’59 and Stanton, though still holding that the inspiration of the prophets was ‘the most prominent feature in [Justin’s] understanding of the role of the Spirit,’ acknowledges that they, along with other passages, reveal a ‘lack of precision concerning the role of the Spirit’ in Justin.60 Briggman has shown that this failure to distinguish between the activity of the Spirit and that of the Logos is consistent in Justin,61 and a majority of scholars, with different degree of emphasis, seem to conclude that Justin was confused in regard to the functions of the Spirit and the Logos. The most vividly discussed example of this alleged confusion does, however, not concern the question of who inspired the prophets, but rather of who was the agent of Christ’s miraculous conception. It is found in 33:5 and reads as follows: And further, the angel of God sent at that time to this virgin announced good news to her, saying: ‘Behold, you will conceive in the womb from holy Spirit and you will bear a son and he shall be called Son of the Most High, and you will call his name Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins,’ as those who recorded everything concerning our savior Jesus Christ taught.62 We have come to believe these people because, as we have been disclosing, the prophetic Spirit also said through the aforementioned Isaiah that this would 58

Minns and Parvis argue that the fact that Justin uses a dative of instrument suggest that ‘logos’ should not be understood as the divine Logos, but rather as a general principle which also a pagan audience would recognize. Yet, apart from presupposing that a pagan audience is what Justin really has in mind (see ch. 2), they also miss the connection Justin makes to an earlier statement. In 33:6, Justin writes that the Spirit which overshadowed Mary should not be considered as ‘anything other than the Logos’ [οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις ἢ τὸν λόγον] which clearly is echoed in his assurance a few verses later that that the prophets are inspired ‘by nothing other than divine Logos’ [εἰ μὴ λόγῳ θείῳ]. 59 Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 181. 60 Stanton, “Spirit”, 327, 331. 61 Briggman, “Measuring,” 114–123. 62 Justin’s quote seems to be a fusion of Luke’s and Matthew’s narratives. A similar construction is found in the Protoevangelium Iakobi 11:3 (cf. Skarsaune, Proof, 145).

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happen. Moses, the aforementioned prophet, signified that it is not proper to consider the Spirit and the Power which is from God as anything other than the Logos who is also firstborn of God, and this came upon and overshadowed the virgin and caused her to be pregnant not through intercourse but through power.63

In this passage Justin explicitly substitutes the Logos for the Spirit as the agent of Christ’s miraculous conception. Though many scholars have attempted to explain what is going on theologically in this pericope,64 it is in fact more enlightening to ask the question of what is going on rhetorically and apologetically. A short analysis of the passage will yield the following observations: First Justin refers to received tradition by reciting the angel’s announcement in accordance with Luke’s gospel, which asserts that Mary was to conceive through the Holy Spirit.65 Secondly, Justin deliberately and purposefully moves beyond this tradition by – pedagogically – explaining that Spirit in this instance should be understood as Logos. This allows Justin, thirdly and finally, to conclude that Mary in fact did conceive through the Logos. Problematic as the passage may seem, especially to post-Nicene Christianity, it must be emphasized that this structure does not betray a theologically confused mind. On the contrary, Justin is highly conscious of the contradictory nature of his statements, which is precisely why he tries to give and explanation for them, if yet a rather unsophisticated one. The reason for the change of agent is clearly apologetic, rather than theological. The hermeneutical move of substituting the Logos for the Spirit allows Justin to portray the Logos as the agent of his own incarnation,66 which serves to make the identification of the Logos with Christ credible. As discussed in the previous chapter, this theme is important for Justin’s defence of the antiquity of the Christian faith, but it is also necessary for the creation and maintenance of continuity between the words of the Hebrew prophets and Christian teaching.67 Returning to the question of prophetic inspiration, the exact same concerns may be discerned. The reference in 33:9 which states that ‘the prophets are inspired by nothing other than the divine Logos,’ occur immediately after the above discussion on the incarnation and it is governed by the same reasoning. The second reference in 36:1–3 also addresses the question of continuity between the pre-incarnate Logos and Jesus Christ: 63

Cf. 66:2 which affirms that Jesus was incarnated by God’s Logos. Two recent contributions are Bucur, “Angelic Spirit,”, and Briggman, “Measuring,”. 65 Cf. Dial. 78:3 where Justin quotes Matt 1:18–20 to show that Mary conceived ‘by the holy Spirit’. 66 Cf. e.g. Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 182, and Bucur, “Angelic Spirit,” 196. As Wartelle has pointed out, 46:5 and 66:2 make clear that the incarnation was not just the result of the will of the Father, but also of that of the Son (Wartelle, Apologies, 62–63). 67 ‘What he [Jesus] said by the prophets, he confirmed by his teaching on earth’ (Osborn, Justin Martyr, 89). 64

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But when you hear the phrases of the prophets spoken as though from a character, do not suppose that they were spoken as from the inspired ones themselves, but rather from the divine Logos moving them. /…/ Since they did not understand this, the Jews who have the rolls of the prophets did not recognize Christ even when he came. But they also hate us who say that he has come, and who show that he was crucified by them, as was proclaimed beforehand.

What Justin thus tries to show is that the Christ whom the Jews crucified is the same Logos who beforehand had spoken to them through the prophets. The Jews did not recognize him. As discussed in the previous chapter, Justin needed to solve the problem of the inspiration of the prophets in order for his theft theory to work for Christians. The argument that the Greek writers had plagiarized the Hebrew prophets will only benefit Christians if a plausible link between the prophets and Christianity can be established. Certainly, the fulfilment theme is one such link, but though the dynamic between prophecy and fulfilment creates continuity between Christianity and the prophets, it does not establish Christianity as the philosophy which the Greeks plagiarized; it only argues that Christianity is what the prophets pointed forward to, and thus it provides no solution to the problem of newness or any of its implications. Because of this, the inspiration or divine source of the prophets had to be connected to Christianity, and for this purpose, two options are open to Justin. One is to retain the Jewish and early Christian tradition which ascribed prophetic agency to the Spirit, and then claim the possession of the Spirit for the Christians. This is primarily what Justin does in the Dialogue. In the Dialogue, as noted, Justin makes the claim that the Spirit has left the Jews and now resides with the Christians. Among the evidence for this is Justin’s claim that the charismatic gifts, including prophecy, are functioning within the church, whereas prophecy among the Jews has silenced. In the Apology Justin, in effect, makes the same claim, though he frames it differently. As the Apology is not interested in defining Christians as a people, or to contrast them against the Jewish nation (which he so clearly does in the Dialogue), Justin chooses a different path. In substituting the Logos for the Spirit as the divine agent of prophecy, on a couple of occasions, he succeeds in connecting Christianity to the prophets and establishing Christ as the source upon which the prophets drew. The third passage quoted earlier, 2:10:8, renders the same picture: that which the Logos foretold through the prophets is of the same nature as that which he taught when he became human. Again, fashioning continuity between the pre-incarnate Logos and the person of Jesus Christ is what seems to be Justin’s primary concern. What can be observed here, as so often, is that Justin’s apologetic needs take control over the narrative. The occasional interchanging between the functions of the Spirit and the Logos is a typical example of how Justin negotiates between received tradition, i.e. the apostolic κήρυγμα as he understands it, and his apologetic needs. It has been noted by some scholars that there

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probably was a tradition in place which ascribed divine agency to the Logos more readily than the Spirit, and it cannot be excluded that Justin may have been impressed by this tradition.68 However, the dominant tradition which Justin was in receipt of undoubtedly ascribed divine agency, at least in the areas discussed above, primarily to the Spirit.69 This is demonstrated by this theme being by far the most dominant one in the Apology despite the fact that the Spirit, in this text, does not really play a necessary part in Justin’s apologetic. As far as the Apology is concerned, Barnard is right in his observation that there is no logical place for the Spirit in Justin’s theology, since the Logos carries out his functions.70 When it comes to the Logos, in contrast, Justin does have an axe to grind; as seen, divine agency through the Logos constitutes an important part of Justin’s larger argument. Briggman’s criticism71 notwithstanding, one must therefore agree with Osborn’s conclusion that ‘[f]rom the subject matter of prophecy it is clear that only the logos can be its author,’ at least from a logical point of view.72 68 Cf. Bucur, “Angelic Spirit,” 196, n. 37, Briggman, “Measuring,” 126, n. 60, Barnard, Life and Thought, 101, Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, trans. John Bowden, 2 ed. (London: Mowbrays, 1975), 198–199, Wartelle, Apologies, 62, and J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (London: Longmans, 1952), 146–149. 69 Bucur writes: ‘Justin’s references to the Holy Spirit occur mainly in biblical quotations or are borrowed from catechesis or liturgy. In other words, they always constitute “prefabricated” elements of received tradition’ (Bucur, “Angelic Spirit,” 194). 70 Barnard, Life and Thought, 106. Cf. Stead on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the second century: ‘Belief in the Holy Spirit is upheld by Church tradition founded on the Bible; but failing clear guidance from the philosophers, his origin and function are much less clearly worked out, and sometimes He almost disappears behind the Logos, so that historians of doctrine can speak of a ‘binitarian’ tendency in the Second century’ (Christopher Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 155–156). 71 Briggman, “Measuring,” 122–123. 72 Osborn, Justin Martyr, 89. It should, at last, be noted that also in the Dialogue, Justin alternates between ascribing prophetic agency to the Spirit and the Logos, and also here apologetic concerns seem to be the reason for this alternation. Briggman writes: ‘[...] Justin refers only to the Spirit as the agent of revelation in the early portion of Dial, but changes his practice at the moment he begins a focused argument for the divinity of the Word in Dial 55–62. In a significant reversal, during the course of the discussion in 55–62 the majority of his references are to the Word as the agent of revelation. References to the Spirit as the agent of revelation predominate once again when the divinity of the Word ceases to be his primary concern, though the revelatory activity of the Word remains present. Justin’s emphasis on the revelatory agency of the Word during the course of his argument serves as a secondary justification for the Word’s divinity. The fact that he makes use of this additional device highlights the freedom with which he alternates the activity of revelation in Dial when it suits his purpose’ (Briggman, “Measuring,” 122). Thus, the Spirit as the agent of revelation or prophecy is the default position also in the Dialogue, though unlike in the Apology, it also serves a specific apologetic purpose in

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Briggman argues that it is ‘appropriate to classify Justin’s understanding of the Spirit as confused given his inability to construct a distinct theology of the Spirit, necessary to which are distinct conceptions of activity and identity.’73 However, here Briggman betrays a later trinitarian perspective, for in what way is ‘distinct conceptions of activity,’ necessary to a theology of the Spirit, or a trinitarian theology in large, if such a notion is not imposed by precisely the kind of doctrinal system we know did not exist in Justin’s time? The word ‘confused’ implies the upsetting or muddling of an existing order, but it is an order which Justin or other Christians of his time would not recognize. It does not logically follow that distinction of identity must lead to distinction in function or activity. In addition, to claim that Justin fails to construct a distinct theology of the Spirit, also presupposes that this is part of his purposes, which it most likely was not. A fairer description is probably that Justin is well aware of the different traditions he is in receipt of, but that he is even more aware of the apologetic purposes he has set himself to achieve. Because of this he negotiates between traditions and reshapes material in a way that he believes accurately represents the Christian faith, even though it is packaged in slightly different ways for different occasions.

E. Conclusions E. Conclusions

In this chapter we have explored the centre of Justin’s apologetic, the one clinching argument for the truthfulness and superiority of the Christian faith which all his strategies, at least to some extent, are employed to support or complement. We have seen how Justin frames the Hebrew Scriptures essentially as prophetic oracles, and how he presents a case for the Christian faith through the interplay between prophecy and fulfilment reports. After that, attention was given to the agency of prophecy as a case study for how Justin controls and reshapes his traditions and sources in order to serve his apologetic needs. It is not certain why Justin chose to make the proof from prophecy his primary strategy, as other alternatives certainly were open to him, but one can think of some possible reasons. An obvious reason would be that Justin himself found the argumentation from prophecy convincing and reassuring, and that it had been instrumental in his own conversion, which is clearly implied in the opening chapters of the Dialogue (7:1–8:2). Yet, this would still leave us with the question of why he found the arguments convincing. As seen, contrasting the Christians against the Jews. However, also in the Dialogue, Justin can alternate between traditions in order to bring forward different points in different contexts. 73 “Measuring,” 136.

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prophecy was a respected phenomenon in the ancient world, but that does not mean that everyone would believe anything which was presented with the claim to be a prophecy. For a pagan such as Justin, it would have been more natural to trust the classical Graeco-Roman agents of prophecy and divination (e.g. seers and oracles) than obscure texts produced by a small, suspect and foreign ethnic community. The answer, it seems, lies within the realm of observation and verification. Unlike the oracles of the ancient world, the prophecies of the Hebrews were finding fulfilment in Justin’s own time, especially in relation to the fate of the Jewish people. Possibly, the fact that Justin himself was born in Samaria, i.e. inside the ancient Israelite homeland, contributed to the impact these prophecies and their perceived fulfilments had on him. As seen, Justin uses these events of fulfilled prophecy to bestow credibility to the other fulfilment reports as well. In 2:12.1, Justin refers to his observation of Christian courage in the face of torture and execution as a factor which convinced him of their moral innocence, and which, one understands, was contributing factor in his own conversion: ‘[f]or when I myself took delight in the teachings of Plato, I heard the Christians slandered and saw that they were fearless in the face of death and everything thought fearful, and I knew it was impossible that they were involved in evil and the love of pleasure.’ As seen in the previous chapter, suffering and moral transformation are two criteria which to Justin define a Christian, but here they are also used as an argument for the Christian faith. Interestingly then, both factors which served as a foundation for Justin’s conversion – the fulfilment of prophecy which he mentions in his conversion account in the Dialogue (8:1), and the courage and morality of the Christians which he mentions here – can be seen as instances of verifiable reality; one set of observations relates to the development of history and the other to personal moral change.74 Thus, the transforming power of the Christian faith, witnessed as real-time historical events taking place in the life of Christian converts, and the proof from prophecy can be construed as evidences of the same type: Christianity can be objectively proven true, if only one cares to observe. At the core, then, Justin’s apologetic has a very tangible and almost scientific element, which might not be detected at a first, cursory reading of his text. At the same time, it is very personal, which is why beneath all the structured arguments we may detect a deep and moving engagement. To Justin, the defence of Christianity is not just the defence of intellectual beliefs or of a community of people he has come to associate himself with. It is an apology, in the classic sense, for his own person, his own journey and his

74 Thus, the two accounts need not be seen as contradictory, as has sometimes been suggested (e.g. Hyldahl, Philosophie, 49).

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own experiences – by validating Christianity, Justin validates his own life, his choices, and the person he has become. This chapter concludes our investigation into Justin’s positive argumentation for the Christian faith. In the previous chapter, we explored the problem of newness in antiquity as well as the strategies Justin employs to address both the problem itself and some of its implications, and in this chapter we continued with looking at Justin’s primary positive apologetic argument, the proof from prophecy. In the following chapter, we shall explore Justin’s argumentation in the negative, that is, how he portrays and rhetorically deals with Christianity’s religious and philosophical competitors.

Chapter 5

Mythographers, Heretics, and Demons As noted, the proof from prophecy is the primary positive strategy in Justin’s defence of Christianity and it is the only argument which, in his view, conclusively proves the truth of Christian doctrine and narrative. Other positive strategies, such as the ‘theft theory’ and the Logos doctrine, are mainly used for removing obstacles and ‘clearing the way’ for the proof from prophecy to be able to work and convince with full force. In this last chapter (excluding conclusions) we shall shift focus from these strategies, leave Justin’s promotion of Christianity behind, and take an interest in his arguments in the negative, i.e. in the arguments which focus on discrediting Christianity’s competitors rather than on affirming the Christian faith as such. Topics covered will be Justin’s relation to pagan mythology, the problem of the Christian heretics, and the fundamental and all-impacting role of the demons in Justin’s universe. To begin with, a short introduction to the epic struggle between myth and philosophy in antiquity is necessary in order to understand the background to Justin’s concerns.

A. The Rise of Philosophical Discourse and the Critique of Myth A. Critique of Myth

From ancient times, communal memory in Greece had mainly been passed on from generation to generation orally, through the rhythmic chanting of memorized poetry. The authority of this oral tradition was understood as founded on the direct inspiration of the Muses, daughters of Zeus, and as there were no literary sources, there was no possibility to examine or question the authenticity of what was transmitted in poetry. The content and form of the poetic myths existed in a constant state of development through the negotiating dynamic taking place between the performer and the expectations of the audience. In the eighth century BCE, a new system of writing in the Greek world led to the development of new types of discourses, one of which was philosophy,1 and when the myths were captured in definitive literary forms in Homer and Hesiod, it had the effect of freezing and preserving versions of the stories in archaic forms, even though they continued to develop and be reshaped 1 Luc Brisson, How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5–14.

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within a literary framework. Because of these preserved versions of the myths it is possible to note that peoples’ conception of the gods did develop and change over time, and that by the time of the common era ‘[t]he gods had grown up, in company with more advanced moral and intellectual standards than prevailed in the eighth century B.C.,’ i.e. in the age of Homer and Hesiod.2 Alongside this seemingly quiet departing from archaic conceptions about the gods, there also developed a more pronounced philosophical criticism of myth, which often had the ancient poets as their target. Xenophanes of Colophon, a philosopher from the sixth century BCE, is the first known critic of Homeric and Hesiodic myth, and his critique involved both moral and intellectual aspects:3 Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything that is a shame and reproach among men, stealing and committing adultery and deceiving each other.4 But mortals consider that the gods are born, and that they have clothes and speech and bodies like their own.5 The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black, the Thracians that theirs have light blue eyes and red hair.6 But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able to draw with their hands and do the works that men can do, horses would draw the forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they each had themselves.7

Xenophanes’ criticism is thus directed both against the immorality of the gods and against their anthropomorphic description. This type of criticism is later picked up by Plato with whom the conflict between μῦθος and φιλοσοφία ‘reaches its apex’;8 in a famous passage (Rep. 607b–c) Plato even refers to the ‘ancient quarrel between [poetry] and philosophy.’9 In essence,

2

MacMullen, “Two Types,” 176. A good treatment of Xenophanes’ ‘divine philosophy’ is found in Jonathan Barnes, ed. The Presocratic Philosophers (London and New York: Routledge, 1982), 63–77. 4 Fr. 11 (Sextus, adv. math. IX:193).Translations taken from G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, eds., The Presocratic Philosophers: a Critical History with a Selection of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983 (reprint 2003)), 168. 5 Fr. 14 (Clement, Strom. V:102:2). 6 Fr. 16 (Strom. VII:22:1). 7 Fr. 15 (Strom. V:109:3). 8 Brisson, How, 11. ‘From the early Ion through the more mature Symposium, Phaedrus, and Republic, until the late Laws – to mention only these dialogues – Plato’s own quarrel with the poets is well established, deep-rooted, persistent, recurrent, explicit, and intense.’ (Glenn W. Most, “What Ancient Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry?,” in Plato and the Poets, ed. Pierre Destrée and Fritz-Gregor Herrmann, MSMG (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 2). 9 Plato consistently associated ποίησις with μυθολογία, and thus Homer and Hesiod (often referred to in tandem) were called both poets and myth-makers (cf. Luc Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, trans. Gerard Naddaf (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), appendix 2). On Plato’s relation to these prominent poets, see Naoko Yamagata, “Hesiod 3

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the difference between these two types of discourse is the same as that between direct observation and hearsay. In an oral society, hearing, or reception, is as much part of the creation and shaping of communal memory as is the actual transmission (i.e. re-enactment or recital of poetry). The poet is thus an actor who tries to evoke the beyond through imitation, and to Plato, imitation equates to distortion. Plato’s criticism of myth can therefore not be separated from his well-known criticism of the fine arts.10 The φιλόσοφος, on the other hand, is one who seeks to attain that transcendent σοφία which is only accessible through direct vision and contemplation of the world of forms. Brisson argues11 that Plato, in practical terms, defines μῦθος as unverifiable discourse, since he frames it in opposition to λόγος, which is defined as verifiable discourse (Soph. 259d–264b, cf. Prot. 324d).12 The reason μῦθος is unverifiable as discourse is that its referents (gods, demons, heroes, inhabitants of Hades and men of the past, Rep. 376e – 403c) are ‘located either at a level of reality inaccessible both to the intellect and to the senses, or at the level of sensible things, but in a past of which the speaker of the discourse can have no direct or indirect experience.’13 In the words of Vernant, Plato criticises the story-tellers for not, like himself, ‘distinguish[ing] the truth from falsehood by insisting upon discourse that, at every juncture, can account for itself if challenged.’14 Aristotle, agreeing with Plato, complains that ‘[t]he school of Hesiod and all the theologians considered only what was convincing to themselves and gave no consideration to us’ and concludes that ‘it is not worthwhile to consider seriously the subtleties of mythologists. Let us turn rather to those who reason by means of demonstration’ (Metaphysics III, 1000a 11–20).15 Plato does recognize the in Plato: Second Fiddle to Homer?,” in Plato and Hesiod, ed. G. R. Boys-Stones and J. H. Haubold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 10 In Symp. 205b–c, Plato claims that all creations of art are a form of poetry and that every artist is a poet. Cf. Raymond Barfield, The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 14–15, Brisson, How, 6, and Catherine Collobert, “Poetry as Flawed Reproduction: Possession and Mimesis,” in Plato and the Poets, ed. Pierre Destrée and Fritz-Gregor Herrmann, MSMG (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 11 Brisson, How, 20–26. 12 ‘Before the rise of philosophy myth belonged to a special realm of undemonstrable truth that was the province of poets, sages, kings, and seers. The world of myth and the poet was defined by aletheia /…/ and this world was closely akin to that of the prophet and king. Discourse arising out of this world was sacred and mantic, and truth was asserted, not demonstrated.’ (Kathryn A. Morgan, Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 22). 13 Brisson, How, 23. 14 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 210. 15 Ibid., 10–11.

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usefulness of the ancient myths for teaching ethics,16 but apart from this, he does not seem to have much use for them. Later philosophers, however, recognized the value of myth as mediator of ancient wisdom, and started to seek ways and strategies for keeping the poetic narratives and motifs relevant for their time and day. This urge was born out of the deep commitment and emotional attachment also enlightened people felt towards the ancient myths, even though they had been intellectually persuaded of their literal inaccuracy. Also, despite their criticisms, all of the major philosophical schools accepted the existence of the gods.17 I. Allegory One of the approaches chosen, first by Plato’s own disciple Aristotle and later developed primarily within the Stoic school, was allegory. There were different types of allegory but their common purpose was to unveil deeper meanings beneath the superficial narrative structure of the text. In this way profound truths could be mined from texts which ostensibly seemed trivial, mundane and even aesthetically or morally offensive. Yet, to many philosophers (in fact, to most non-Stoics), allegory was not an acceptable solution to the problem of how to understand myth or the nature of the gods. To the first century CE middle Platonist philosopher Plutarch, Stoic and Euhemeristic allegory in particular seemed to lead to atheism, superstition and impiety18 though in fact also some of his own readings could be seen as allegorical.19 Yet, interested in preserving the relevance of the myths, Plutarch proposed two other methods to this end: one was to assimilate the myths into mystery (he himself was an initiate into the mysteries of Dionysos),20 and the other – for present purposes more interesting – was to interpret them demonologically.

16

Cf. Brisson, How, 26. Even the sceptics did not reject the gods. They thought citizens should abide by their local traditions through affirming the existence of the gods and worshipping them; what they rejected was simply any rational attempt to prove the existence of the gods, pointing out that for every argument in favour of their existence, one could find one equally strong against it (so Sextus, adv. math. 9:137, cf. A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 116). 18 Cf. Brisson, How, 65. 19 Dawson argues that Plutarch takes a middle position between approval and total rejection of nonliteral interpretations of myths (David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 58–66). 20 Brisson, How, 64–68. 17

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II. Gods and Demons Demons play an important role in Plutarch’s otherwise heavily dualistic worldview. The demons are a class of intermediate beings who allow contact between a totally transcendent, platonic deity and the world of humanity. They can be good or evil,21 and they possess both human and divine qualities, such as passion and immortality. The demonic nature, according to Plutarch, ‘possesses [both] human emotion and divine power,’22 and demons ‘serve as a link between men and gods, intervening in the details of human existence in a way that would be undignified for God, and inconsistent with his untroubled serenity.’23 Thus, demons solve two problems to Plutarch. The first is a cosmological problem always present in derivatives of Platonic philosophy, namely how the gap between the divine and human realm can be bridged. Secondly, Plutarch’s demonology helps him to find relevance in the ancient myths. Plutarch does not equate the gods of the pantheon with demons, as this would not only fail his ambition to save the gods from discredit, but also disqualify them as mediators between human and divine and recreate the above mentioned cosmological problem. Nonetheless, the demons are associated with the gods, in the sense that a demon can assume the name of a god and act under that name. This explains all the myths in which the gods are described in human terms, i.e. as controlled by human emotions and as yielding to human temptations and vices. In reality, thus, these myths refer to demons, acting under the name of a god. This way, the relevance of the myths is safeguarded, in that they do provide knowledge of the gods and of the spiritual world. At the same time, the integrity of the gods is preserved, as any inappropriate behaviour on their part can be ascribed to demons. Allegory and demonology were, thus, two fruitful strategies for ancient pagan philosophers to make sense of the ancient myths and to maintain loyalty to the religion of their forefathers without compromising their intellectual integrity. Turning now to Justin, it will be seen that he not only is well aware of the problematic relation between myth and philosophy in ancient philosophical circles, but that he also consciously takes advantage of and exploits this fact in his apologetic.

21

‘[A]mong daemons as among men, there are different degrees of virtue and vice.’ (Plutarch, approvingly quoting Xenocrates in De Is. et Os. 360e). 22 Def. Or. 416c. 23 John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 217. In this, Plutarch is modelling his demonology directly on Plato, who claims that demons are ‘of an intermediate nature, bridging the gap between man and god, and preventing the universe from falling into two separate halves’ (Symp. 202e).

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B. The Apology and the Agents of Evil B. The Apology and the Agents of Evil

As noted earlier in this study, and often elsewhere in scholarship, Justin’s attitude toward pagan myth differed from that toward pagan philosophy. The view has often been aired that though Justin vigorously attacked the stories about the gods, his sentiments towards philosophy could not be more positive. As seen in chapter 3 this picture is only partly true, and it builds, in fact, more on a reconstruction of Justin’s sentiments from the introduction of the Dialogue than from the Apology. In the Dialogue philosophy, though failing to lead Justin to Christ, is nonetheless described as having a divine origin. The existing schools of philosophy are deviations and corruptions from the one original philosophy, which was sent down from God (Dial. 2:1–2), but evidently elements of (divine) truth still exist in them. Christianity is later described as constituting this original philosophy (8:1), and thus a clear connection between Christianity and pagan philosophy is created. In the Apology, this divine aetiology of philosophy is absent, and in fact pagan philosophy is not described in any particularly beneficial terms; anything of worth among the words of the pagan sages has been stolen from the prophets. Yet, if the positive language does not indicate much difference between myth and philosophy in the Apology, the negative language does. Justin describes myth in the darkest of colours, and repeatedly stresses its demonic origin, something he will not do with philosophy. Like Plutarch, Justin accepts no allegorical interpretation of the myths,24 but neither does he dismiss them as mere fantasies. To Justin, the myths are not fiction, but deception. And just as the most dangerous poison consists of both that which is good and edible and that which is deadly, the myths contain both truth and falsehood. They are certainly not literally true, but neither are they entirely false; they contain some distorted and corrupted truths and they betray the fundamental depravity of pagan worship. As such, Justin’s critique of myth goes much further than any of his predecessors among pagan philosophers, and this critique is intrinsically linked to his understanding of the role of the demons. The demonological interpretation of myths, Justin shares with (and possibly partly draws from) philosophers such as Plutarch, though he uses it for entirely different purposes. In order to explore these purposes, as well as the rest of Justin’s negative argumentation, a closer investigation of his demonology is necessary.

24

There is one exception, found in Ap. 2:11:2–4. Here Justin paraphrases a mythical story from Xenophon (Memorabilia 2:1:21–34), involving Heracles having to choose between two women, allegorically identified as virtue and vice. As seen earlier, ethical instruction was the only use Plato could find for myths, and Justin’s one didactical reference to myth is also found in precisely such a context.

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I. Justin and the Demons Demons25 constitute the spanner in the works of Justin’s universe. They are responsible for nearly everything bad which happens and thus they play a pivotal part in Justin’s understanding of the world.26 Demons are responsible for leading the peoples of the earth astray into idolatry, they are responsible for the teachings of the Christian heretics, and they are the ultimate instigators of all persecution against Christians. This betrays a fundamental dualism in Justin’s cosmology, but it should be stressed that it is an unbalanced dualism. The classic Christian dualism between God and his powerful enemy, Satan, is all but absent in the Apology. Satan is mentioned only once (28:1), and then simply as the leader of the demons. These demons, though nearly ever-present, are nevertheless not particularly powerful. They do not share or even approach any truly divine attributes. They are not all-powerful, and therefore cannot realize their plans as they wish. They are not omniscient and they cannot predict the future.27 Their only knowledge of the future, or the Divine plan, comes from the prophets, to whom they have listened and the words of whom they plagiarize and distort but also fundamentally misunderstand. In consequence, their one successful modus operandi for manipulating humankind is deception. Only once in his extant writings does Justin mention the origin of demons, and given the central role of the theme of demons, especially in the Apology, it is notable that demonic aetiology does not interest Justin more.28 It is obvious that for his purposes the present workings of these wicked creatures are more important than their origin. Yet, when he does describe the origin of demons, he is quite elaborate and the description does shed some light also on the nature and function of the demons. The passage is found in Ap. 2:4:2–6: But providential care over human beings and of things beneath the firmament he handed over to angels whom he had established over them. But the angels transgressed this ap25 In the Apology, Justin prefers the term δαίμων, whereas the diminutive δαιμόνιον predominates in the Dialogue. According to Grant, the reason for this could be that δαίμον may have been perceived as a more respectable term by an educated audience with pagan background (Grant, Greek Apologists, 63). 26 It is entirely fair, as Korteweg does, to describe Justin’s worldview in terms of the universe being ‘demon-ridden’ (Theodoor Korteweg, “Justin Martyr and his DemonRidden Universe,” in Demons and the Devil in Ancient and Medieval Christianity, ed. Nienke Vos and Willemien Otten, VCSup (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011)). 27 According to Irenaeus, Justin (presumably in a now lost work) taught that prior to the advent of Christ and the proclamation of the gospel, Satan did not even know that he himself was destined for eternal punishment (A.H. V:26). 28 According to Goodenough, Justin may also have addressed the question in a corrupted passage of the Dialogue (79:1), though, of course, this is merely speculation (Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 199).

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pointed order, succumbed to intercourse with women, and begot children – who are called demons. They then went on to enslave the human race to themselves, partly through magical changes, partly through fear and through the punishments which they inflicted, partly through instruction about sacrifices and incense and libations – things they have needed ever since they were enslaved by passions and desires. And they sowed amongst human beings murders, wars, adulteries, licentiousness, and every kind of evil. Hence it is that poets and storytellers, not knowing that the things they have recorded were done to men and women and cities and nations by the angels and the demons they begot, attributed these things to the god himself, and to the sons who were begotten as if from him by the sowing of seed and from those who were called his brothers and their children as well. For they – that is, the poets and storytellers – called them by the names which each of the angels gave to himself and to his children.

There are several important points made in this passage, and because of this it will serve as point of departure for the following discussion, even though it is found outside the First Apology. II. The Origin, Nature and Activities of Demons Justin depicts demons as a hybrid species, i.e. as the offspring of angels and humans. He is here indebted to a tradition within Second Temple Judaism which goes back to the Book of the Watchers,29 an apocalyptic Jewish text from probably the third century BCE. This text, which came to exert widespread influence,30 provided an embellishment of the notoriously terse and enigmatic story in Gen 6:2–4, which states that the ‘sons of God’ took human wives and produced giant offspring. In the Book of the Watchers, many details to this story are added. The so called ‘Watchers’ (i.e. the ‘sons of God’ of Gen 6) are described as angelic beings (in 14:11, 18, they are identified as Cherubim), who normally reside in the heavens and before God’s throne.31 They descended from heaven and produced giant children with human women, who in turn started to destroy humankind.32 Because of this, the giants 29 The Book of the Watchers equates to chs. 1–36 of 1 Enoch. For a review of recent research on the document, cf. Archie T. Wright, The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6. 1–4 in Early Jewish Literature, WUNT (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 11– 50. 30 The influence of the Book of the Watchers can be traced in numerous later Second Temple Jewish texts, for example later Enochic literature, The Book of Jubilees, The Life of Adam and Eve, the Apocalypse of Abraham, Tobit, the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, some Qumran documents as well as the New Testament texts 2 Pet and Jude. Cf. Loren T. Stuckenbruck, “The Book of Enoch: Its Reception in Second Temple Jewish and in Christian Tradition,” Early Christianity 4, (2013). 31 This interpretation is suggested by the LXX itself. In Gen 6:2,4 the phrase ‫בְּ נֵי֣ ׇ ֽה ֱא ֔הימ‬ is correctly translated as οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ but in some MSS, as well as when the phrase reappears in the book of Job (1:6, 2:1), in reference to the beings who accompany Satan into God’s presence, it is translated as οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ. 32 The legend of the Watchers is found in chs. 6–16.

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were destroyed physically, but they lived on as terrestrial (rather than celestial) evil spirits roaming the earth (15:8–11). Already here, the offspring of the Watchers are identified as evil spirits, and thus Goodenough’s assertion that Justin is the first to equate the giants of Gen 6 with demons33 may possibly be true in a strict sense, but not in a wider; Justin is merely restating an old tradition.34 The Jewish literature following after the Book of the Watchers saw, namely, a merging of the category of ‘evil spirits’ with that of ‘demons’ (a development continuing in the Christian gospel tradition), so in identifying the giants with demons, Justin does nothing original or different from what had been done long before.35 His truly original contribution, which will be discussed below, comes in the next step, i.e. in identifying these demons with the Graeco-Roman pantheon.36 Justin’s account of the origin of demons is not only interesting for tracing the root of his beliefs, but it also helps us to understand his view of the nature and function of the demons in cosmos. The fact that demons are products of both spirit and flesh places them firmly within the framework of the natural order, and this, in turn, has two implications. First, that demons are partly spiritual but also partly earthly, serves as a natural rationale for their everpresent activity and interaction with human affairs. Demons are as much a force to be reckoned with in the world as are humans, and much of what takes place within the natural order can be ascribed exclusively to them. Second, this understanding of the nature of demons aids Justin’s identification of them with the pagan gods, who in classical religion in a similar way were under33

Goodenough, Justin Martyr, 199. Cf. Droge, Homer, 56. Dale Martin has recently argued that this idea of demons as a ‘species’ distinct from (fallen) angels was the most common view among ancient Jews and early Christians (Dale B. Martin, “When Did Angels Become Demons?,” JBL 129, (2010)). Cf. Kevin Sullivan, “The Watcher Traditions in 1 Enoch 6–16: The Fall of Angels and the Rise of Demons,” in The Watchers in Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. Angela Kim Harkins, Kelley Coblentz Bautch, and John C. Endres S.J. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014). 35 Apart from Jews and Christians, demons were seen as evil also by Gnostics and Zoroastrians. In Greek philosophy and religion, however, daimones could be benign or malign, but were most commonly the former. Philo, following this tradition, equates demons with angels and portrays them as primarily good creatures. In Justin, demons are always and exclusively evil. 36 Cf. Annette Yoshiko Reed, “The Trickery of the Fallen Angels and the Demonic Mimesis of the Divine: Aetiology, Demonology, and Polemics in the Writings of Justin Martyr,” JECS 12, (2004): 144, 148, n.113. This process was probably aided by the Jewish-Christian merging of the categories of demons and evil spirits, as in much Greek literature there existed no clear cut boundary between the terms δαίμων and θεός. In Homer, for instance, as well as sometimes in Plato, they are used as synonyms, cf. Fritz-Gregor Herrmann, “Greek Religion and Philosophy: The God of the Philosopher,” in A Companion to Greek Religion, ed. Daniel Ogden (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 392. 34

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stood as belonging to the natural order. The Graeco-Roman gods were not other-worldly, but belonged to and had a given place within the cosmos. The difference between gods and humans was similar to the way in which humans differed from animals. The gods, granted, possessed a higher form of existence but they were still part of the created order, and the difference between human and divine sometimes got blurred. The bridge between human and divine was also one that could be crossed. This is best illustrated in the Greek hero-traditions but it also finds expression in the famous words written above the entrance to the Apollo temple in Delphi, which discourages any attempts to such crossings. The meaning οf γνῶθι σεαυτόν (know thyself), at least originally, had nothing to do with soul-searching introspection, which a modern reader might be inclined to think, but should rather be understood as: ‘know your place in cosmos; know what kind of creature you are (i.e. not a god).’ Even the idea of giants turning into evil spirits, as found in the Book of the Watchers, may have triggered Justin’s association with pagan divinities, as the Graeco-Roman gods were often depicted and conceived of as large beings in human form. It is precisely this association of the gods with the natural order that philosophers such as Plutarch found disturbing and tried to sever by placing demons between humanity and the divine. III. Demonic Instruction From the earlier quoted passage (Ap. 2:4:2–6) we also learn that the demons enslaved humanity through different tricks, through fear as well as through teaching and instruction.37 They are also described as the ultimate source of human wickedness – murders, wars, adulteries, etc. Thus, Justin provides not only an explanation to the existence of demons, but also an aetiology of human – and in particular pagan – wickedness. These themes are echoed throughout the Apology, as Justin ascribes to the demons all sorts of mischief and iniquity.

37

In fact, the perpetrators according to the passage are both the (fallen) angels and ‘their children’, i.e. the demons (which explicitly shows that Justin perceives them as different kinds of beings). In the rest of the Apology, however, Justin never refers to these fallen angels (except for one brief reference in 2:9:4), or to their function in cosmos, but only to the demons. One can only conclude that his reference here to fallen angels is prompted by the fact that he had already introduced them when describing the origin of demons, and therefore felt compelled to include them in the following narrative. Yet, their absence from the rest of the Apology, and the fact that the actions here ascribed to them ‘and their children’ elsewhere are only ascribed to the demons, indicate that Justin did not have a clear idea of their function in the world, or in what way it differed from that of their offspring. Since Justin provides no additional information about the fallen angels, focus will here be given solely to the role of the demons, on which he – in contrast – has much to say.

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A strong theme in Justin’s polemic against pagan myth is that the stories as such are inspired by demons (25:3; 54:1). Demons are described as the authors of pagan wickedness, and as the ones who have deceived and led humanity astray (54:1; 58:3). Because of ignorance, and because they have rejected the Logos, irrational people (pagan worshippers) are being held as slaves by the demons (44:12, cf. 2:4:4). Reed has shown that also the theme of demonic instruction is one that Justin has received (ultimately but possibly also directly) from the Book of the Watchers.38 In 19:1, Enoch is warned that the spirits of the fallen angels ‘will harm men and lead them astray, to sacrifice to demons as to gods, until the great judgment.’ In addition to idolatry, the demons instruct humans in magic and sorcery (7:1; 8:3; 9:7) as well as introduce them to ‘all manners of sins’ (9:8, cf. 13:2).39 All of these strands are picked up by Justin in 2:4:4, and in other places. He makes the demons responsible for enslaving humans ‘through magical changes,’ for instructing them about ‘sacrifices and incense and libations’ (i.e. idolatry) and for sowing ‘murders, wars, adulteries, licentiousness and every kind of evil’ among them. However, unlike the heavenly culprits of the Book of the Watchers, Justin’s demons are not responsible for teaching humankind anything beneficial. The legend of the Watchers provides not only an explanation to the origin of evil, but it also presents a grander aetiology of human culture. Alas, in this, Justin is not interested. To him, the instruction of the demons is all evil, and it has the explicit purpose of tricking and enslaving humankind; ‘[f]or the demons we are talking about strive for nothing else than to lead human beings away from the God who made them and from his first-begotten Christ’ (58:3). Hence, there is no idea of a demonic origin to human civilisation in Justin; as seen earlier, the history of culture is a topic in which Justin does not show any particular interest. IV. Plagiarizing and Corrupting Truth Not only are the demons responsible for the introduction of impiety, idolatry and everything evil to humankind; they are also to blame for the loss and corruption of what truth there ever was in the world. This concerns primarily the Hebrew Scriptures which, as seen earlier, Justin equates to divine prophecy. According to Justin, the demons took a keen interest in the prophecies found in the Hebrew Scriptures. Yet, the demons’ relation to these prophecies is complex, and Justin fails to present it in entirely consistent terms. Some38

Reed, “Trickery,”. See also her larger work on the reception of the Enochic literature, esp. 160–189, Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 39 Translation from Matthew Black, The Book of Enoch or 1 Enoch: A New English Edition with Commentary and Textual Notes (Leiden: Brill, 1985).

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times the demons are accused of plagiarizing themes from the prophecies and incorporating them into their own teachings. Obviously, this idea is linked to the argument from antiquity and the battle over who plagiarized whom. The themes which the demons have plagiarized are typically prophecies which concern (and therefore testify to) distinct Christian theology. As it was difficult to claim that pagans, for instance, had copied the Christian ritual of the Eucharist centuries before the practice had been instituted by Christ, Justin asserted that the demons heard the prophecies which, according to him, point forward towards the Eucharist.40 Thus, in this and similar situations (62:1–4; 64:1–5), Justin uses demonology to add support to this particular strategy. Yet, the demons not only plagiarize prophecies; they also corrupt them. The versions of the ‘prophetic’ themes which demons incorporated into their mythology and/or religious practices were always corrupted at the core, so that what is found in pagan religion and myth are not glimpses of truth, such as may be found in philosophy, but deception. For I too, learning of the evil cloak placed around the divine teachings of the Christians by the wicked demons to divert other human beings, laughed at those falsely making these accusations and at their cloak and at popular opinion. (2:13:1)

The ‘divine teachings of the Christians,’ thus, have been so severely twisted and cloaked that they can only serve to lead people astray. The demons’ handling of the ancient prophecies consequently involves both plagiarism and corruption, and so far Justin’s argument is fairly clear. However, when he ventures into demonic epistemology, things become more complex. As already mentioned, demons are not portrayed as particularly powerful by Justin, and he certainly does not entertain any notion of demonic omniscience. Yet, the claim that the demons have plagiarized and corrupted the prophecies, with the purpose of leading people away from the truth, implies that they have also understood their true meaning and relevance. One cannot falsify that which one does not understand, and one cannot purposefully lead another on a wrong path, if one does not recognise the right one. And it is here we may detect a note of inconsistency in Justin’s argument, because apart from the plagiarizing, twisting and corruption of prophecy, Justin also claims that the demons misunderstood them, particularly in relation to Christian narrative. In ch. 54, Justin claims that when the demons, through the prophets, learned about the coming of Christ and that many gentiles would believe in him, they tried to incorporate the prophecies about Christ into their own stories, in order to make Christ look like just another mythical figure. However, because they severely misunderstood the words of the prophets, the stories about Dionysus, Perseus, Ascleipus et al. are but vaguely similar to those of Christ. The prophecies about the crucifixion they misunderstood altogether, 40

This argument is mentioned in Ap. 66:4, but most fully developed in Dial. 70.

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since these are entirely symbolic, and thus one finds no reference to or imitation of it at all in their myths (55:1). In conclusion, the question of exactly how much about future developments the demons knew and had learned from the prophets, prior to the advent of Christ, is one that Justin leaves somewhat unresolved. The demons’ function as instigators of evil and corrupters of truth is one of the major features in Justin’s demonology, without which much of the rest of his apologetic would suffer greatly. Demons are the reason the world looks the way it does, and they provide an answer to why people chose not to follow the Logos and live rationally. Justin does not explicitly use demonology as a theodicy, but he comes very close to it. Fundamentally, demons answer the question: ‘If Christianity is so good, sound and rational, how is it that many still do not recognize this?’ V. Demons and the Heretics This theme of demonic deception finds continuation in yet another arena, namely the activities and teachings of the Christian ‘heretics’.41 Heresy, i.e. the notion of false interpretations of the Christian faith, would eventually (starting with Irenaeus) become an important concept within Christian theological reflection.42 As one must always be careful not to read later understandings of a term in to the thought of early thinkers, a note on how the term may be used in relation to Justin is necessary. Justin does use the word αἵρεσις, though quite sparingly. In the Dialogue, it is used five times. Twice, it refers to the Jewish accusation that Christian faith is a ‘godless heresy’ (17:1, cf. 108:2), and twice it is found on the lips of Jesus as he prophecies about future false prophets and heresies (35:3; 51:2). Only once (62:3) does it refer to an identifiable and deviant teaching, though Justin seems to imply that the doctrine taught is a Jewish, rather than a Christian, heresy.43 Once (80:3), Justin also uses the term αἱρεσιώτας, ‘heretics’, and this in reference to people ‘who are called Christians, but in reality are godless and impious [ἀθέους καὶ ἀσεβεῖς] [...] [and] whose doctrines are entirely blasphemous, atheistic and senseless.’ In the Apology Justin only uses the word αἵρεσις once, and this is in 26:8 when he offers to send the emperor a copy of a work he has written against ‘all heresies’. He does not specify which heresies he refers to, but the offer concludes a description of several characters whom it may be assumed that he has in mind (26:1–7). Thus, though Justin, in the 41 Hereafter, the quotation marks which a term so lacking objectivity and clear definition deserves will be left out. 42 For a brief introduction to the concept, cf. Clark, Christianity, 30–34. 43 Possibly, the teaching of Cerinthus is what Justin has in mind, though we have no way of knowing this for sure (cf. Jean Daniélou, The Theology of Jewish Christianity (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1964), 68.

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Apology, never explicitly labels anyone a heretic, he does connect certain individuals to the term heresy. The characters mentioned in ch. 26 are Simon (Magus),44 Menander and Marcion,45 and Justin initiates the discussion with claiming that ‘the demons were putting up certain people who asserted that they were gods.’ Then he contends that at least Simon was also honoured as a god by the Romans themselves and others (26:1–3), while Menander is accused of deceiving people by magical arts, and of convincing his followers that they would never die (4). Simon and Menander seem to form a couple: they are both Samarians, Menander was the disciple of Simon, and they both committed similar crimes, which consisted in drawing worship and admiration to themselves. However, in v.5, Marcion is introduced and his offence is of a different kind; he drew people away from worshipping the true God through false teaching (cf. 58:1–2). The ‘crimes’ of these characters are therefore not identical; the offences of Simon and Menander are described in terms of conduct and lifestyle, whereas the sin of Marcion is described as teaching false doctrines about God. Yet, they are all described as people who receive glory from men and escape persecution (7), and in this they together form a negative mirror image of Justin’s definition of a true Christian which, as we have seen, is centred around life, beliefs and suffering. Common to them all is also that they have been called Christians, though they do not share true Christian beliefs, the same way as the name of philosophy has been bestowed on many diverse and contradictory opinions (6). The fact that these people have falsely been called, or perhaps even called themselves, Christians, seems to be what makes them eligible for inclusion in this group. Important to note is that the demons, again, are described as the agents who orchestrate the scene. These heretics (using the term with the above discussion in mind) have been ‘put forward’ (προβάλλω) by the demons, like puppets it seems, and are apparently merely tools used for the demons’ destructive purposes. What function then, do the heretics serve in Justin’s apologetic? A quote from later in the Apology, where these characters are discussed anew, will bring further light to this question: 44

According to Christian tradition, this Simon Magus is to be identified with the newly baptized character whom Peter confronts in Acts 8:9–24. The idea of a heretic as a lapsed or false Christian is thus particularly strong in the case of Simon. In Irenaeus’ account of heresies, which is widely believed to be at least partially based upon Justin’s lost Syntagma (which the latter refers to in Ap. 26:8), Simon features as an arch-heretic, ‘from whom all sorts of heresies derive their origin’ (A.H. I:23:2). In the Apology, he is not explicitly presented in the same way, though he is clearly framed as the most important heretic. 45 In the Dialogue, the list of heretics has increased; here Justin also mentions the Valentinians, Basilidians, and Saturnilians (35:6). The views of all these groups are contrasted to Justin’s own (orthodox) opinion, which is summed up in the word ὀρθογνώμον – right (or straight) thinking (80:5, cf. Grant, Heresy, 10).

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But to say, before the appearing of Christ, that Zeus had the sons they said he had, was not enough for the evil demons. But – after he had been made manifest and lived among human beings – since they both learnt how he had been proclaimed beforehand by the prophets and recognized that he was believed in and expected in every race, they would again put forward others, as we made clear earlier, Simon, that is, and Menander from Samaria, who deceived many by the performance of magical feats and still hold them in a state of deception. (56:1)

Here, the work of the Simon and Menander is placed within the context of a larger historical narrative, and it is understood as an extension of the demons’ earlier corrupting activities. The demons put forward the heretics for the same reason that they earlier invented stories about the pagan demigods; they sought to prevent the prophecy of multitudes of gentiles coming to faith in Christ from coming true (cf. 54:1–3). Structurally and apologetically, Marcion, in particular, seems to function as a post-incarnation mythmaker, who distorts and corrupts the truth he has apprehended without providing any evidence for his novel teachings (58:1–2). Simon and Menander are not directly charged with disseminating false teachings, but they are rather set up as alternatives to Christ himself – i.e. as anti-Christs (though Justin does not use the term). There is thus a straight line from the ‘sons of Zeus’ to Simon and Menander, and in particular Simon, since he is said to have called himself a god. The demons invented the lives of the sons of Zeus and filled them with stories originating from misunderstood prophecies about Christ in order to prevent people from eventually believing in him. With Simon, the same scheme is at play: a magician, with the help of the demons, is worshipped as a god, with the purpose of deceiving people and preventing them from understanding the truth. If Marcion represents false teaching, Simon and Menander thus represent counterfeit ‘Christs’ (just as in some respect the ‘sons of Zeus’ also do). This is highlighted by the fact that Justin uses the exact same charges against them which he has rebutted when raised against Christ (cf. 30:1). As in so many other instances, Justin is not content with just dismissing a charge; he will also try to turn it around. Thus, when Jesus is accused of being a mere magician, Justin refutes the charge by referring to the proof from prophecy, but he also redirects it towards Simon and Menander. Whereas Christ can be shown to be God’s son, Simon and Menander only pretend to be gods, and whereas Christ’s miracles can be shown to have had a divine origin – all through the argument from fulfilled prophecy – Simon and Menander are simple magicians who deceive people. In summation, the heretics fill a very similar function to that of the poets, mythmakers and people in general who live without reason, but also, in the case of Simon and Menander, to some of the characters who feature within Graeco-Roman mythology; they are used by the demons to discredit Christianity and to corrupt the truth, but through Justin’s defence they end up on the

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receiving end of many of the charges which were first formulated against Christians. VI. Demons and Christian Persecution Lastly, Justin blames the demons for disseminating lies about Christians and for instigating persecution against them. This, also, is perfectly in line with the demons’ other activities. As noted by Peter Brown, the legend of the fall of the angels was not a distant myth to Justin, but rather ‘a map on which [he] plotted the disruptions and tensions around [him].’46 That includes the opposition Christianity faced from the surrounding society. In the realm of ideas the demons, as already seen, are active in both directions – i.e. they both suppress or distort the truth and actively introduce false religion and all kinds of iniquity. That the same should be true in relation to people is only logical; the demons inspire and promote myth-makers and poets (before Christ) as well as heretics (after the coming of Christ), and they persecute and try to silence those who speak and live according to the truth. Before Christ, these were the people who lived μετὰ λόγου, such as Socrates, and after the coming of Christ, his followers are persecuted. In Justin’s words: For as we have indicated, the demons have always been at work to stir up hatred against all those who, in any way at all, have taken pains to live according to reason and to flee from evil. It is hardly surprising, then, that the demons we expose are at work to stir up much more hatred against those who live not according to a part of the spermatic reason but according to the knowledge and contemplation of the whole of reason, that is, of Christ. (2:7:2–3, cf. 1 Ap. 5:3) 47

Yet, ascribing persecution to the demons does not diminish the responsibility of the emperor or the Roman officials;48 if anything it adds to the subversive tone of Justin’s argumentation. The persecution of Christians is not just unfair, unreasonable and illogical; it is positively demonic. VII. Demons as Deities Having explored the nature and activities of the demons it is now time to turn to another function they serve in Justin’s apologetic, which is to provide an explanation of the existence of the Graeco-Roman pantheon. Without doubt the most daring as well as the most important and influential part of Justin’s 46 Peter Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 75. 47 The demonic origin of the slander and persecution against Christians is a strong theme in the Apology, and references to it are given throughout the text: 5:1, 3; 10:6; 12:5; 23:3; 44:12; 57:1; 69:2 [2:14:2]. Cf. 2:1:2; 2:7:2–4; 2:12:3–4. Christ himself is also said to have suffered at the instigation of demons (63:10). 48 Pace Reed, “Trickery,” 160.

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demonology is his claim that the demons were indeed not just mysterious creatures of a realm invisible to humans. On the contrary, their existence and presence in the world was one that was tangibly felt and that one was constantly reminded of in ancient society. Justin’s radical claim was that the evil demons, the originators of everything wicked, and the corrupters of everything noble, pure and true, were in fact to be identified with the Roman (and Greek) pantheon.49 Since, in ancient times, wicked demons, in apparitions, committed adultery with women and seduced boys and made people see horrifying things, so those who did not rationally evaluate what the demons were doing were stunned with terror. Carried away with fear, they named them gods, not knowing they were wicked demons. And they called each of them by a name which each of the demons had given it. [...] We who have come to believe in him say that the demons who did these things are not only not gods, but wicked and unholy demons, and that their behaviour cannot be compared even to that of human beings who yearn for virtue. (5:2, 4) But neither do we use a multitude of sacrifices and garlands of flowers to honour those whom human beings formed and set up in temples and called gods, since we know that such things are dead and lifeless and do not possess the form of god – for we do not suppose that God has a form such that it can, as some say, be imitated to do him honour; rather, we suppose that these things have the names and shapes of those wicked demons who were seen in apparitions. (9:1)

If one pauses to think about the implications of such statements, any doubts concerning the existence of a subversive agenda in Justin’s Apology should quickly disappear. Denial of the gods was allegedly the reason Socrates had been executed, and refusal to sacrifice to the gods was the primary cause of accusation against Christians. Such a refusal was, namely, seen not only as an act of defiance or insubordination, but one of a disloyalty bordering on treason. In Hellenistic society, impiety (ἀσέβεια), was as much a crime against the πόλις as it was an affront to the gods.50 Refusing the gods their due worship and sacrifices meant jeopardizing the whole society through igniting divine wrath. The Roman Empire, further, was considered to owe its superiority and power to their gods, and for Romans citizens and subjects not to sacrifice, and this way keep the pax deorum, was seen as a severe offence. One can only imagine the type of feelings that Justin’s accusations against the gods were capable of stirring up, and this prominent feature of his apologetic should remove any lingering doubt concerning whether or not the Apology was really intended to be read by the emperor. If Justin’s purpose for writing 49 Justin is the first known author to have made this claim. Cf .Randall D. Chesnutt, “The Decent of the Watchers and its Aftermath According to Justin Martyr,” in The Watchers in Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. Angela Kim Harkins, Kelley Coblentz Bautch, and John C. Endres S.J. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 172. 50 Cf. Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks (New York: Zone Books, 2006), 353–354.

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had been to seek imperial favours for a persecuted minority, this would probably be as counterproductive a strategy as one could possibly imagine. Justin not only boldly defends Christians’ refusal to worship the gods of the Romans, but he also takes every opportunity he gets to blame these same gods for almost everything bad that has ever happened on earth; over and over again he dismisses Roman culture and religion as demonic and destructive.51 This theme in Justin is a magnificent and profoundly defiant statement against the Empire, and one that no Christian writer had ever made before him. What was then the background to this idea? The identification of the Graeco-Roman gods as demons stems from a convergence of several traditions, but the net result is a demonology original to Justin, which also meets some of his specific apologetic needs. Radical as the idea is, it is to Justin probably simply a matter of connecting dots. The conceptual foundation for a demonic interpretation of pagan gods is biblical, and in the Dialogue this is also the basis for the argumentation. ‘For all the gods of the nations are δαιμόνια,’ says the LXX version of Psalm 96:5,52 and the same idea can also be found in Paul (1 Cor 10:19–20), though Justin makes no direct reference in this direction. Yet, it would be wrong to understand Justin’s demonology only in terms of following earlier Jewish/Christian tradition. What Justin presents is an elaborate and thought-through understanding of the role of the demons which surpasses anything we meet in earlier Jewish-Christian sources. This is best seen in the Apology, where Psalm 96:5 is only quoted once (40:1), and without any specific point being made in the context. The Scriptural identification of pagan gods as demons is never contextualized or brought to bear on a specific pagan pantheon before Justin. Justin, on the other hand, draws direct parallels, not only to specific Graeco-Roman deities (each god in the pantheon corresponds to a demon by that name (5:2)), but also to specific narratives which betray the immorality of these particular gods and thus, to Justin, disclose them as evil demons. In this Justin’s theme is more akin to the philosophical criticism of myth, but his criticism is much more pointed and goes further than that of any of his Hellenistic philosopher predecessors. Stoic, Platonic, and even Epicurean philosophers all accepted the existence of the gods; what they disagreed on was their nature. In a sense, Justin can be added to this group. He does not deny the existence of the gods per se, but he denies their existence as gods. In formulating criticism of the immorality of pagan deities, Justin follows the pattern set by several philosophers before him. The promiscuity, envy and sometimes murderous nature of the mythical gods were, as already seen, 51

For further discussion on this theme, cf. Pagels, “Christian Apologists,”. In the Dialogue, where Justin is keen to anchor all of his ideas in the Hebrew Scriptures, this Scripture is quoted several times (55:2; 73:2, 3; 79:4; 83:4). 52

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sources of embarrassment for pagan philosophers. Justin takes advantage of this by reproducing a criticism many, at least in more educated circles, would no doubt already be familiar with. In fact, he differs from earlier philosophers only in conclusions, and his conclusions benefit from being more direct and less complex than theirs. To pagan philosophers, who were equally offended by the immorality of the gods, their different strategies for addressing the issue, whether through allegory or demonology, were ultimately aimed at defending the gods and saving them from these accusations. The embarrassment was rooted in the archaic stories as such, not in the gods. The conclusion, thus, was always that the gods, in fact, never did these things. Either the stories were interpreted as meaning something else from what was ostensibly being said, or they were true, in some respect, though the perpetrators were not gods but demons. Thus, for example, the Stoic Balbus uses etymological allegory to explain the story from Hesiod’s Theogony (159–161) about Ouranos mutilating his father Kronos and then, in turn, being imprisoned by his own son, Zeus. This was a famous and problematic story as it violated deeply embraced values in ancient society on showing respect towards one’s parents, and in particular one’s father. Balbus solves this by interpreting the gods as forces of nature. Kronos is identified as time (through assimilation with the word χρόνος – time), who devours his children (the years), and because of this Zeus finally must ‘put him in chains’, i.e. order time into regular movements.53 Now, in ch. 21, Justin refers both to this and other equally offensive stories, but unlike Balbus he makes no attempt to allegorize or reinterpret them. Yet, he ventures into something which at first glance could appear like a defence of the gods. Far let it be from a sensible mind to be schooled in such an idea concerning the gods – that even Zeus, according to them the leader and begetter of all, was both a parricide and the son of a father who was also such,54 and, enslaved by love to evil and shameful pleasures, had sex with Ganymede and with many women he debauched, and that his own children did similar things. But, as we said before, the evil demons did these things. (21:5)

This passage betrays that Justin indeed must have been familiar with demonological defences of the gods, for this is an obvious mockery. The above passage looks like something Plutarch or Xenocrates could have written in order to shift the responsibility of these vile actions from the gods over to evil de-

53

Cicero, De Natura Deorum II 63–65; cf. Brisson, How, 44–45. Justin charges Zeus and Kronos with killing, rather than mutilating and imprisoning, their fathers. It is an inaccurate charge, not primarily because it does not match any known version of the myth, but because in Graeco-Roman mythology the gods were immortal and thus could not be killed, not even by each other. 54

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mons.55 However, when written by Justin who has already equated the gods with demons, the result is devastating: all the iniquities presented come crashing down yet again upon the backs of the unhappy deities. Thus, Justin uses a tradition established to safeguard the relevance and dignity of the gods for opposite ends; by identifying the gods as evil demons, he disarms any defence from demonology and not only makes the gods responsible for all immoralities contained in the pagan myths, but also singles them out as the primary evil and destructive force in the world.

C. Conclusions C. Conclusions

In the beginning of this chapter we saw that Plato’s fundamental objection to myth was that it cannot be verified. Justin’s criticism, as we have seen, goes much further than this; myth, and demonic instruction in large, is not just unverifiable discourse; it is a discourse carefully crafted by demons with the purpose of deceiving, enslaving and leading humankind astray. These demons, who are identified as the one major source to all human wickedness, in turn present themselves in the world as the gods of the Graeco-Roman pantheon. In this way Justin paints a contrast between the Christian community and its surrounding pagan culture that could not be sharper; there is no middle ground – either one belongs to the community of people who live rationally and follow Christ, the Logos, or one is ensnared by a destructive and evil culture, which is allied with and indeed created by the darkest forces in cosmos. Yet, the platonic theme of verifiability is one that is also always present in Justin. Whether it concerns pagan myth, Christian heresy or vile accusations against Christians, the hallmark of demonically inspired ideas, propaganda and teaching is always the lack of evidence. But those who hand down the myths invented by the poets supply no demonstration at all for the youths who learn them by heart. These things we demonstrate to have been said by the working of the evil demons for the deception and misdirection of the human race. (54:1, emp. added) And as we said before, the evil demons were also putting forward Marcion from Pontus [...] Many, believing him as if he alone knew the truth, laugh at us, though they have no demonstration for the things they say. (58:1–2, emp. added) But what was foretold by these the evil demons, myth-making through the poets, spoke of as having happened. In the same way they brought about the allegation of infamous and

55 See for example the latter’s claim that phenomena such as ‘days of ill omen, and festivals which involve self-laceration, lamentation, obscenity, or such atrocities as human sacrifice can only be explained by postulating the existence of evil spirits that take delight in such things, and who must be placated’ (Is et Os 316b; Def Or. 417c = Fr. 25).

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impious deeds against us, of which there is neither witness nor demonstration. (23:3, emp. added)

The word ‘demonstration’, recurring in all three instances, that is, in reference to what is lacking in myth as well as in heresy and false allegations, is the to Justin semi-technical term ἀπόδειξις. Here, the teaching of demons is constructed as the direct antithesis to that of Christians, who can and do provide evidence for what they claim (cf. 3:13; 20:3). As seen earlier, the proof from prophecy constitutes, to Justin, ‘[ἡ] μεγίστη καὶ ἀληθεστάτη ἀπόδειξις’ (30:1), and he is convinced that ‘those who have ears that can hear and understand,’ i.e. rational people, ‘are able to understand that it is not true of us also, as it is of the myths made up about the supposed sons of Zeus, that we only make assertions, without being able to show proofs’ (53:1). It is in relation to this, i.e. to that which can be proven, trusted and ultimately believed, that Justin’s demonology finds a place within the apologist’s larger apologetic structure. The demons function here as the flip side of the coin, as it were; that is, they are used to create a vivid and dynamic, though also false, unverified, immoral and evil, mirror image to the truths found in the prophets and the teachings of Christ. As such, demonology works in tandem with and as balancing weight to Justin’s other apologetic strategies, and in particular to the proof from prophecy.

Chapter 6

Apology and Construction of Reality The encounter in the second century between the rapidly growing Christian movement and the Roman authorities could be described as that of an irresistible force hitting an immovable object. The Christians’ experience of personal transformation along with the conviction that a new age had dawned in Christ, that ‘all things had been become new’ and that history was drawing close to its consummation, did not square well with a culture steeped in tradition, suspicious of anything novel, and an administration convinced of its own divinely given superiority and indestructibility. The confrontation and contest of power was tangible and real, and in the end, something would have to give. This study started out with a look at the correspondence between the emperor Trajan and one of his provincial governors, Pliny, and a brief revisit is necessary as it is now time to summarize and draw some conclusions. In Pliny’s letter to the emperor, we may detect the foundation for the imperial policies towards, as well as allusions to invective conceptions about Christians, which many years later triggered a response from the Christian intellectual and philosopher Justin Martyr. The formal framework of the Apology is shaped around the legal precedents which Pliny describes and which the emperor approves in this correspondence. Pliny, quite unashamedly, concedes that he has never witnessed a trial of a Christian, and though interrogating (under torture) some Christian slaves, he had found nothing incriminating against Christians – only ‘depraved, excessive superstition’ (Letters 10:96). The language seems to imply that he had expected to find something more serious, which means that he had probably heard rumours circulating about Christians. The only thing he had discovered is that Christians used to gather together and sing songs to Christ ‘as to a god’ and to pledge themselves ‘not to commit fraud, theft, or adultery, not falsify their trust, nor to refuse to return a trust when called upon to do so’. Yet, in spite of all this, Pliny would allow Christians to be put to death, merely for refusing to deny their allegiance to their faith. He excuses this with the reasoning that if they were not guilty of anything else, surely the sheer obstinacy they showed in court would constitute grounds for punishment. Whether or not this could have served as the real basis for conviction is the point of issue in the famous debate between Sherwin-White and de Ste. Croix referred to in an earlier chapter, but the text seems to imply that in any

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case, at least for Pliny, it did not constitute the only reason. Pliny punished the Christians because he felt obliged to do so, possibly because there was a legal precedent in place which prompted him. Yet, what is most interesting with his account is its betrayal of his own personal sentiments, which indicate that in spite of not having found any incriminating evidence against Christians, Pliny does not seem to mind executing them. There was clearly something about this new movement which unnerved Pliny, and he gives voice to this towards the end of his letter: I therefore postponed the investigation and hastened to consult you. For the matter seemed to me to warrant consulting you, especially because of the number involved. For many persons of every age, every rank, and also of both sexes are and will be endangered. For the contagion of this superstition has spread not only to the cities but also to the villages and farms. But it seems possible to check and cure it. It is certainly quite clear that the temples, which had been almost deserted, have begun to be frequented, that the established religious rites, long neglected, are being resumed, and that from everywhere sacrificial animals are coming, for which until now very few purchasers could be found. Hence it is easy to imagine what a multitude of people can be reformed if an opportunity for repentance is afforded. (Letters 10:96)

Here, Pliny states in clear language what lies at the roots of his concerns. The ‘number involved’ seems not to refer only to the number of denouncements or the number of legal cases, which he comments upon earlier, but rather to the number of Christians as such. Pliny compares Christianity to a disease with spreads through society and threatens everyone – young and old, man and woman, rich and poor, slave and free. This, Pliny finds particularly disturbing as traditional Roman religion has started to flourish in the area lately. People, according to him, were finding their way back to the old ways again, visiting the temples and sacrificing to the gods. The advancement of Christianity could threaten to stifle this movement, but Pliny feels confident that if appropriate measures are taken, the advancement can be checked and Christians can be made to reconvert again. No doubt, this description of a pagan ‘revival’ in Pliny’s territory is part of a rhetorical construct intended to impress the emperor, making it difficult for the modern reader to decide how much and which parts of the account bears historical credibility, but the concern expressed does have an air of authenticity. There is a clearly detectable tone of religious competitiveness in the letter, and thus what can be heard is not simply the voice of a governor seeking to establish order within his domain. Rather, it the voice of a religious devotee who sees his beliefs and way of life challenged and threatened. Justin, with full certainty, had no knowledge of this correspondence when he 40 years later set out to write his Apology. Yet, he was very much aware of the imperial policies set down by Trajan, and in his treatise he even includes a rescript of Trajan’s successor, Hadrian, which he interprets as a prohibition against punishing on account of the nomen Christianum only. But even more

155 acutely, Justin is aware of the accusations alluded to in Pliny’s account, the rumours circulating about Christians, and the charge that Christian is nothing but a ‘novel’ or ‘depraved’ superstition. As has been seen, Justin refutes and defends Christianity against such charges throughout his Apology. Yet, the most interesting part of Pliny’s account is his concern over Christianity’s rapid spread and the implications he thinks this has to pagan worship. It is, namely, precisely within this framework of religious competitiveness Justin’s apology should be understood. The Apology is not first and foremost a defence for the rights of Christians over and against the Roman legal system, but a defence of Christianity as a faith and as a way of life. Whereas Pliny draws parallels between the rapid spread of Christianity and the spread of an infectious disease, Justin presents this fact as evidence of fulfilled prophecy, and thus as an argument in favour of the Christian faith. ‘We see […] those from every race of human beings persuaded through the teaching from his apostles, and scorning their old ways in which they had conducted themselves erroneously […]’ (53:3). Justin, in a manner of speaking, picks up the gauntlet thrown down by Pliny (and certainly by others) and explains, not only why Christians have the right to live and should be left in peace, but why Christianity represents the most rational and enlightened view of the world, and hence, why the spread of Christianity is really beneficial to the empire. Within this framework, the different apologetic strategies explored in this work all find their place. The defences against the novelty charge lay the foundation for respectability along with the emphasis on the moral transformation which takes place when a person turns to Christianity. These arguments then give support to the evidence for the authenticity of the Christian faith-claims presented through the proof from ancient Hebrew prophecies which both have been fulfilled in the life of Jesus and continuously are being fulfilled before everyone’s eyes. Finally the negative argumentation helps in further distinguishing and elevating the Christian faith from its contemporary competitors and also supplying a rationale to why not everybody can perceive the truth in Christianity and why Christians are being persecuted by the authorities. That the imperial power is ultimately responsible for the hardship of Christians is also an important part of the narrative, because it reinforces the image of the complete ‘otherness’ which signifies followers of the Logos. Just as Socrates was misunderstood and hated by the authorities and people of Athens, Christians are persecuted by the imperial Rome. The subversive tone of the Apology is much stronger than has often been recognized and it also constitutes a subtle, though important, apologetic strategy in and by itself. What we find in the Apology could thus be described as a competitive reality construction. It is an attempt at turning the tables, at shifting from defensiveness to offensiveness, at challenging ancient assumptions, as well as at inventing and re-inventing identity to meet the pressures from the outside

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world. But as argued in chapter 2, the effort is not aimed at the outside world. It is aimed at the Christian community itself. It is the Christian who will benefit from Justin’s apology and find comfort in its words. It is the Christians who need to make sense of the surrounding society and to understand why the world hates them. The Apology answers all of this kind of questions, and it does so not through smoothing out the edges or differences, but through making them even clearer. Hence, it constitutes an attempt at creating borders and demarcations, at constructing a Christian self-understanding as being wholly ‘other’ to its pagan surroundings. It is therefore anything but an outstretched hand towards potential allies, and nor is it a plea for acceptance directed towards the outside world. Rather, it is an admonishment to Christians to understand who they are and why evil things happen to the morally just and righteous. To this end, Justin’s apologetic focuses on truth. What matters in the end, is not peoples’ opinions, but what actually is. Christians are not to be believed because they say things similar to what others say, but because they speak the truth. Truth, in turn, is apprehended by reason and demonstrated through evidence. These three terms – truth, reason and evidence – really constitute the core of Justin’s apologetic: truth being the aim, reason the authority and evidence the basis for conviction. As for the strategies he uses, we have seen how they all interconnect, draw and lend support to each other and together create the intricate web of assumptions, traditions, arguments and rhetorical techniques which constitutes his defence of the Christian faith. And it is like this, as parts of a larger interconnecting argumentative flow, that the separate strategies must be understood. Since Justin has sometimes been accused of being unclear, repetitious and even rambling,1 it must be stated, with Chadwick, that though ‘Justin may be a poor communicator [...] he is not a poor thinker.’2 He has a clear idea of what he is doing. This also shows that it is as a defender of the Christian faith, as an apologist rather than as an early Christian theologian, Justin primarily should be understood. Those who look for a coherent and consistent theology in the Apology will end up disappointed and frustrated, but that is not because Justin is a poor theologian, but because theology is not what the Apology is about. When the Apology is read for what it is and understood in relation to its own agenda, it unveils perhaps not a well-structured mind, but certainly a mind with a clear sense of purpose. What, then, should be the next step in Justin research and where may we go from here? An obvious step will be to address the Dialogue with similar sorts of questions as this study has attempted to address to the Apology. Questions which relate to the literary apologetic strategies in the Dialogue would 1 2

Marcovich, Apologiae, VII. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 20.

157 include the function and purpose of the first 9 chapters, which introduce Justin’s philosophical journey, the function of the proof from prophecy, the description and definition of the Christian community, the function and use of the Hebrew Scriptures, the role of the Logos and of the demons, the use of the ‘theft theory’ and, not the least, a thorough analysis of the treaties’ implied audience. On all of these points, comparisons with the Apology should prove very fruitful. In regard to the proof from prophecy, Justin’s use of it both in the Apology and in the Dialogue might be compared and contrasted to earlier Christian use of the same theme, for instance that which is found in the gospel of Matthew. In the present study, references to the Dialogue have, quite purposefully, been sparse, and no real engagement with Justin’s most comprehensive work has been attempted, in spite of the fact that it contains much material which sometimes could have been used to further illustrate points made. The reason for this, as stated in the introduction, is that the purpose has been to attempt a reading and understanding of the Apology on its own terms, in the light of its own stated and implied purposes and presuppositions. Yet, a future study of the Dialogue from a similar perspective and a subsequent comparison of the two texts, with the explicit purpose of not trying to synthesize Justin’s thought, but rather to compare and contrast his rhetorical and literary strategies, would probably be highly enlightening. As noted, this study has but hinted at a few of such contrasts, but a comprehensive study would make possible much closer analyses of this sort in relation to all of Justin’s major apologetic strategies.

Appendix

Summary Outline of the First Apology A. The ‘Deliberative Part’: Chapters 1–14 A. The ‘Deliberative Part’: Chapters 1–14

1. Address 1–2. Justin addresses the emperor and his sons and presents himself. He states his purpose for writing, which is to challenge the emperor to judge fairly – worthy of his reputation of being philosophically minded – in regard to the group of people he represents. Yet, the identity of this group is curiously vague. 2. Formal demands 3. All charges should be investigated, and the people Justin represents should not be punished on the basis of mere allegations. All subjects should submit a statement of their beliefs to the authorities, and the authorities should give verdicts based on philosophy and piety. If the emperor does not do what is right, there is no excuse for him. 3. Confutation and Refutation 4–5. The identity of the people Justin represents is finally disclosed as Christians. Christians should not be punished for only their name, but their lives and actions ought to be investigated individually. It is unfair that all Christians be punished just because some who carry that name have been found to be evildoers. After all, many are called philosophers who do not lead lives worthy of that profession. The persecution of Christians is instigated by the same evil demons who appear as pagan gods and who managed to have Socrates killed when he – through reason – attempted to expose them. The charges that were raised against Socrates are the same as are now directed towards Christians. The same Logos that spoke through Socrates received physical form and became human in Jesus Christ. 6. Christians are not atheists. They do reject the demons posing as pagan gods but worship the true God, his Son, the good angels that follow him, and the prophetic Spirit.

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7. The crime should be punished – not the name! Many are called Christians, just as many are called philosophers, although they differ widely in their beliefs. [The name ‘Christian’ is here relativized and seen as potentially referring to all kinds of people.] When people are denounced to the emperor, their actions rather than designation should constitute ground for judgment. 8. These things are said for the benefit of the emperor, not the Christians, as they may always deny their faith and thus escape punishment. Yet, Christians will rather die than lie, as they seek and desire eternal life. Plato said that Rhadamanthus and Minos would punish the wicked and Christians believe the same, only that it will be Christ who does so. If they are deluded in this, it will hurt only them as long as they do nothing wrong to others. 9–10. To worship crafted images is irrational and an insult to God, whose glory and form are beyond description. The images, in contrast, have the names and shapes of evil demons, and were created by depraved men who defile their own female assistants. God has no need for material services (sacrifices), he has no given name and he only accepts those who imitate his own virtues. He created the world and all human beings, and those who choose reason will live forever with him. The divine Logos has accomplished what no human law could, even though the evil demons have spread lies about Christians. 11. Christians do not, as the emperor supposes, wait for an earthly kingdom but for a heavenly one. If they had been waiting for an earthly kingdom, they would have tried to avoid getting killed, but they don’t. In the end, everyone dies. 12:1–8. Christians are the emperor’s allies in the quest for peace. They do not commit evil since they know that no one can escape God’s judgment. The emperor, who claims to be yearning for piety and philosophy, should act in accordance with reason and honour truth over custom. If not, he is no better than a highway brigand. A wise man will not choose that which the Logos forbids. 4. Conclusion 12:9–11. Jesus Christ, from whom Christians take their name, has foreseen all this, and his teaching is reliable as everything he foretold has come about. The petition could end here, as what is asked for is just and true. Yet, since it is not easy to bring about change in an ignorant soul, a few things will be added in order that lovers of truth will be given a chance to learn it.

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13. Christians are not atheists. They worship the Creator of the world who need neither blood, nor libations or incense. It will be demonstrated that their worship of Jesus, the son of the true God who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, is sound and rational. Christians hold Jesus in the second rank after the eternal God and the prophetic Spirit in the third, and for this they have been declared mad by some who do not understand the mystery in this, which will now be expounded. 14. The emperor is warned against being deceived by the demons who seek to enslave those who do not strive after salvation. Christians have freed themselves from the demons, having been persuaded by the Logos, and now follow the only unbegotten God. Formerly, they engaged in all kinds of wickedness, but now Christians pray for their enemies and try to convert them who unjustly hate them. Before the promised ἀπόδειξις (proof from prophecy), Justin will mention a few of Christ’s teachings, in order that the rulers themselves might examine whether Christians have taught these things faithfully.

B. The ‘Demonstration Part’: Chapters 15–67 B. The ‘Demonstration Part’: Chapters 15–67

I. Chapters 15–22 Introduction to Exposition 1. Teachings of Christ 15–16. Justin presents several dominical sayings on temperance, repentance, philanthropy, divine providence, long-suffering, truth-speaking, and on the worship of God alone. Those who do not live as Christ taught, even if they profess his teachings and call him ‘Lord’, should not be recognized as Christians. 17. Christians are the best of citizens. They pay their taxes and though they only worship God they willingly serve the emperor in other respects, acknowledging and praying for him as ruler. Yet, if the emperor neglects the Christians they will not be harmed, but the emperor will pay penalty in eternal fire. In fact, the emperor is at risk of harsher punishments than others, because of the power he has been granted. 2. The Emperor’s Accountability 18–19. All the rulers of the past have died, and after death punishment awaits the wicked. If one considers all conjuring of the dead, those who have been possessed by the souls of the dead, all the ancient oracles, and the teachings of the writers (Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato and Xenocrates), it is reasonable that the Christian belief in a bodily resurrection also should be accepted.

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Certainly, it is difficult to believe that a dissolved human body could rise again, but it is equally difficult to imagine that one could grow from a tiny drop of semen. 3. Christian Teachings are Similar to those of Others 20. The Sibyl, Hystaspes and the Stoics all speak of destruction by fire, Plato speak of a creation by God and the poet Menander says that one should not worship inferior things. If Christians thus say the same things as them, whom the emperor respects, why are they hated more than all? 21. That the Logos was incarnated and born of a virgin, that he was crucified and died and that he rose and ascended into heaven is not stranger than all the stories of the sons of Zeus. Yet, the stories about the gods show their corruption. Zeus, the alleged leader and begetter of all the gods was both a parricide and the son of a parricide, and was shamefully promiscuous. In reality, the demons did these things. Thus, the actions of the gods should not be imitated. 22. All the writers call God the father of men and gods, but the Logos is God’s son in a special manner. The objection that Christ was crucified falls at a comparison with the sons of Zeus who also suffered in different ways, though Christ, as is apparent through his actions, is superior to all of them. That Christ was born of a virgin and that he healed the sick, also resembles the stories of Perseus and Ascleipus. II. Chapters 23–53 Proof from Prophecy 1. Preliminary Remark. Chs. 23–29 23. Christians ask to be accepted because they speak the truth, not because they say the same things as others. [The contents of Justin’s ἀπόδειξις is laid out.] It will be proven that 1) what Christians say is true, as they have learned it from Christ and the prophets, and the prophets are older than all the writers, 2) that Jesus Christ, the incarnated Logos, alone is the Son of God in a special manner and that 3) what was foretold by the prophets, the demons, through the myth-making of the poets, declared as having already happened. The demons also brought false accusations against Christians, without giving any proofs. 24–26. First, though Christians say similar things to the Greeks, they alone are hated, and they are killed as sinners though they have done nothing wrong. They do not worship the Roman gods, but neither do the Egyptians though the latter are tolerated. Second, Christians no longer worship pederast and licentious gods such as Dionysus, Apollo, Persephone and Aphrodite, nor

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do they take part in wickedness such as theirs. Rather, they are now dedicated to the unbegotten and passionless God, to whom the stories about Zeus do not apply; in fact the demons are the originators of these stories. Third, after the ascension of Christ, the demons brought forth certain people (Simon, Menander and Marcion) who claimed to be gods. Their followers are also called Christians, but they are not persecuted, at least not for their names. 27, 29. Christians abhor injustice and impiety, and therefore hold exposure of infants to be evil. First, because the practice fuels the prostitution industry – as the ancients gathered cattle, so now children are gathered for abominable purposes. Numerous boys and girls have been brought in to this defilement, and the emperor even benefits from it through taxes. Second, this practice makes it possible that someone will unknowingly have intercourse with his own child, sibling or relative. Others willingly prostitute their own children or wives or emasculates themselves. All this promiscuity, which is done openly in Roman society, the emperor falsely ascribes to the Christians. Yet, this will not harm the Christians, but rather those who actually commit these things and who falsely testify against Christians. Third, if the exposed children are not picked up, murder is committed. In fact, Christians only marry in order to raise children, and if they don’t marry, they live chaste. 28.1 The leader of the demons is called Serpent, Satan or the Devil, as can be learned from an examination of Christian texts. Christ has proclaimed that he and his army, as well as those people who follow him, will be punished in fire forever. God delays in doing this to give people a chance to repent. He created the human race with intelligence and with the power to choose the truth, so that all are without excuse before him. To claim that God does not care for human beings is to claim that he does not exist, or at least that virtue or vice do not exist, which would be the greatest impiety of all. 2. Exposition chs. 30–51 30. Lest someone claims that Jesus only seemed to be the son of God and worked his miracles through magic, proof will now be presented. Not giving credence to those who merely make assertions, Christians are persuaded by those who foretell things in advance, because they can see with their own eyes that things have happened and are happening just as predicted. This should be considered the greatest and truest proof of all.

1

Minns and Parvis are probably right in that ch. 28 is out of order in the manuscript, as it interrupts Justin’s arguments against the exposure of children (Minns and Parvis, Philosopher and Martyr, 159, n. 1).

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31. There were among the Jews prophets of God, through whom the prophetic Spirit predicted things before they happened. The kings of the Jews preserved these prophecies written down in scrolls made by the prophets themselves. When Ptolemy learned about them, he asked for a copy to have them translated into Greek, and since then these scrolls have remained among the Egyptians, and are also present everywhere with the Jews. In these prophetic scrolls one finds Jesus Christ proclaimed before he was born; him being born by a virgin, growing to manhood, healing the sick and raising the dead, being rejected and crucified, as well as him raising from the dead, ascending to heaven, being and being called the Son of God, sending out people to proclaim these things to all races of humankind and also that gentiles would believe in him. All this was prophesied several times thousands and hundreds of years in advance. 32. The coming of Christ was predicted by Moses, the first of the prophets. The fulfilment of several prophecies can be verified by the emperor himself. As prophesied, the Jews had kings only up and until the coming of Christ, and as predicted people from all races of humankind await the one who was crucified in Judea. 33. The virgin birth was prophesied by Isaiah. She conceived through the power of the Holy Spirit, without intercourse. Moses has shown that it is improper to consider the Spirit as anything but the divine Logos, and thus the virgin conceived through the Logos. Likewise, those who prophesied were inspired by none other than the Logos (i.e. Jesus Christ). 34. Micah foretold that Jesus would be born in Bethlehem. The Emperor can himself verify that this took place by consulting the census-lists produced under Qurinius, the first procurator in Judea. 35. That Christ would grow to manhood undetected and later be crucified was prophesied by Isaiah and David, and that this took place can be learned from the Acts Recorded Under Pontius Pilate. Further, Sophonias prophesied that Jesus would enter Jerusalem riding on the colt of an ass. 36. The prophets did not speak from themselves, but from the Logos who moved them. The Logos, however, prophesied and spoke in different characters; as God, as Christ, as the prophet himself or as someone who replied to God or Christ. The Jews did not understand this and thus failed to recognize Christ when he came, and now they hate the Christians who say that he has come, and that he was crucified by them, as prophesied. 37–38. Examples are given on how the Logos spoke through the prophets, both in the character of God and of the suffering Christ. That these things

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prophesied about Christ’s suffering were indeed inflicted upon him by the Jews, can be verified and learned. 39. The prophetic Spirit predicted that the word of God would spread to the whole world from Jerusalem, and this was fulfilled through the ministry of the twelve apostles. People who formerly were murderers now gladly die confessing Christ, rather than having to lie to their examiners. 40–42. David prophesied that Christ would be believed in by people from every race, that God calls Christ his Son and has promised to subdue all his enemies (the demons), and that everyone is called to repentance before the coming day of judgment. Sometimes the prophetic Spirit spoke of future events as if they had already happened, because he knew well that they would come to pass. 43. That Christians believe in prophecy does not mean that they believe in fate. The prophets teach that all people will be rewarded or punished according to their own deeds, but if it was governed by fate that one person be good and another wicked, no one could be either praised or blamed. If human beings do not by free choice have the power to avoid evil and choose what is good, they cannot be held accountable for their actions. This would mean that neither vice nor virtue exists, which, as the Logos makes clear, is the greatest impiety of all. 44. The prophetic Spirit, through Moses and Isaiah, also testify to the existence of free will. Moses is older than all the Greek writers, and everything useful the poets and philosophers teach, they learned from the prophets. There seems thus to be seeds of truth among all, though the ‘writers’ are shown to fall short in understanding when they contradict themselves. Therefore, when Christians say that things have been prophesied, it should not be understood as these things happening by necessity or fate, but rather that God foreknows everything which people will do. Therefore he speaks beforehand in order to lead the human race straight. But now the death-penalty, at the instigation of demons, has been imposed upon those who read the books of Hystaspes, the Sibyl or the prophets, but Christians read them without fear and are even willing to bring them to the emperor for inspection. 45. David prophesied about Christ’s heavenly ascension after the resurrection and the spread of the Gospel through his apostles, in spite of the decree of death spoken against all who embraced the name of Jesus. And if the emperor would read this with hostility, he could do no more than killing the Christians, which indeed would not harm them but only bring judgment back on the ruler himself.

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46. If someone argues that because Christ was born a mere 150 years ago, all the people who lived before him cannot be held accountable, the answer is that Christ is the first-born of God, the Logos in which all humanity take part. Those who lived according to the Logos before the coming of Christ, were therefore Christians even if they were called atheists: among the Greeks, Socrates, Heraclitus and those similar to them, and among the Barbarians, Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elijah and others. Those who lived without the Logos were enemies of Christ and murdered those who lived with the Logos. Why Christ had to become human, be born by a virgin, be crucified, rise from the dead and ascend into heaven should be easy to understand after so many testimonies, and no further demonstration of this is necessary. Instead, more important demonstrations will be given. 47. The prophetic Spirit predicted that the land of the Jews would be plundered, and the emperor can himself confirm that this has happened. 48. Isaiah prophesied that Christ would heal the sick and raise the dead, and that this took place is well documented in the Acts Recorded Under Pontius Pilate. He also prophesied about Christ’s death. 49–50. Isaiah also prophesied that the nations which did not expect Christ would worship him, but that the Jews who did expect him and who had the prophecies, would not recognize him. Further, he prophesied that Christ would be spoken ill of by dishonest people, that he would be crucified and killed, but also that his message would be spread by his apostles to all peoples after he had ascended to heaven. 51. Christ’s suffering, his subsequent triumph over his enemies and his ascension to heaven was predicted, and the prophet Jeremiah has also prophesied about his future coming in glory. 3. Conclusion chs. 52–53 52. Since it has been demonstrated that all things which has already happened was predicted in advance, one must also believe that the things which were foretold but have not happened yet, certainly will do so. The prophets proclaimed two comings of Christ – one in lowliness and dishonour which has taken place, and one in glory, which has not yet happened, when he will appear together with a large host of angels and when all who are dead will rise in their bodies, some to incorruptibility and some to punishment. At that time, all people will bow their knees before the Lord and confess him. 53. There are more prophesies to tell, but these will be enough to persuade those who have ears to hear and to understand. These will now see and under-

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stand that there is a difference between the truth-claims of Christians and the myth-makers. Christians present evidence rather than just assertions. For why should Christians believe that a crucified man is the first-begotten son of God, who will sit in judgment over the whole human race, if not precisely because they had seen all these prophesies about him come to pass? The desolation of the land of the Jews, and people from every human race embracing Christian beliefs and renouncing their old lifestyles, are phenomena that can be observed by all. That believers from the gentiles would be more numerous and true than those from the Jews and Samaritans was also predicted. When all this is seen, it should be enough to provide those who love the truth with assurance and persuasion. III. Chapters 54–60 Arguments in the Negative 1. Demonic Imitation in Greek Myth 54. The myth-makers provide no evidence at all for what they say. The myths were invented by the demons with the purpose of deceiving humanity. When they heard the prophecies about the future coming of Christ, they brought the sons of Zeus into the discussion, in order that people might think that the message about Jesus was just another myth. This was spread among the gentiles, whom the demons, through the prophets, knew would especially believe in Christ. But the demons did not understand the things they heard, and therefore imitated them poorly. Consequently, the stories about Dionysus, Bellerophon, Perseus, Heracles and Ascleipus are only vaguely similar to those of Christ. 55. Yet, the demons never imitated the crucifixion, as they never understood it. The cross is the greatest symbol of the rule of Christ, and it is found everywhere in the world as a symbol of strength and authority. 2. Demons and the Heretics 56. To invent the stories about the sons of Zeus before the coming of Christ was not enough for the demons; after Christ had come and lived among people, they brought forward others who would continue the deception – Simon, who was considered to be a god, and Menander, both from Samaria. 57. The demons failed keep the coming of Christ unknown, and they fail in persuading people that there will be no judgment. They only succeed in that they infuse hatred towards Christians into irrational people, so that they persecute and kill them. Yet, Christians do not hate these people back, but pity them and hope that they will repent. Nor are they afraid of death, since everyone dies and they expect to live again forever without suffering or need.

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58. The demons also put forward Marcion who teaches that the Creator and the Christ of the prophecies should be rejected in favour of another God and another son. Yet, his followers can produce no evidence for the things they teach. 3. Plato’s Debt to Moses 59. Plato took his ideas on creation from the Christians’ teachings, i.e. the words of the prophets. Moses, who is older than the Greek writers, taught that the world came into existence out of previously existing matter by a word from God, and Plato says the same thing. 60. Plato, though misunderstanding some things, also took from Moses the idea of the Logos arranged in the shape of a cross as well as the idea of the Spirit in the third place. The (Stoic) idea of a final conflagration also comes from Moses. Thus, it is not Christians who hold the same opinions as others, but others speak in imitation of their words, and among Christians these doctrines are taught also by the illiterate and uneducated, as they were not formed by human wisdom but by the Power of God. IV. Chapters 61–67 Christian Worship 1. Baptism, Eucharist and Sunday Celebration 61. Christians have dedicated themselves to God and have been made new through Christ. Everyone who believe what Christians teach, and wish to live as they live, are taught to pray and fast, asking forgiveness for their past sins. Then they are led to water and baptized into a new birth and a new life, in accordance with the words of Christ. This baptism is called ‘illumination’. 62–64. When the demons heard about this baptism which was proclaimed by the prophet they imitated it by incorporating washings and libations into their own cults. Also the taking-off of shoes before entering a pagan temple is imitated from the episode when Christ spoke to Moses through a burning bush. The Jews claim that it was the unnameable God, rather than Christ, who spoke to Moses, but in this they are refuted by both Isaiah and Christ himself. 65–66. After baptism the new Christian is welcomed into the fellowship of the believers. There, prayers are offered, and the Eucharist is celebrated with bread and a cup of wine mixed with water. The president leads those present in praise and thanksgiving, and when he has finished the assembly gives its assent by saying ’Amen’, which is Hebrew for ‘let it be so’. Then the deacons administer the bread and the wine to those present and carry it to those who are not present. The Eucharist is only offered to those who believe in Chris-

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tian teaching, who live according to the way Christ taught, and who have been baptized for the remission of sins and for rebirth. This bread and wine is received by Christians as the flesh and blood of Christ, in accordance with his own words, not as common food and drink, and the evil demons have imitated this ritual in the mysteries of Mithras, 67. On Sundays Christians from both the cities and the countryside assemble for a general celebration. The prophets and the memoirs of the apostles are read, after which the president gives a short address. After this, prayers are said, the Eucharist is celebrated and a collection is gathered for the benefit of the orphans, the widows, the sick, those in prison, foreigners and others in need. The reason the assembly is held on Sundays is that this was the first day of creation, and the day on which Christ rose from the dead. Christ was crucified on the day before Saturday, but he rose on a Sunday, and he taught his apostles the things which are here submitted to the emperor for inspection.

C. Peroration: Chapter 682 C. Peroration: Chapter 68

If the Christian doctrines seem reasonable and true the emperor should honour them and if not he might well dismiss them as nonsense, but he should not give the death-penalty to innocent people. If he continues in doing so, he will surely not escape God’s judgement. [Justin asks the emperor to rule that judgments be given in accordance with this petition, and the text is concluded with a reproduction of a rescript from the previous emperor, Hadrian, which states that Christians should be brought to trial and judged only if evidence of them breaking any law can be produced].3

2 In the edition of Minns and Parvis, chs. 14–15 of 2 Ap. have been added to the end as chs. 69–70, forming an extended peroration. 3 Justin clearly interprets this as the emperor ruling against Christians being judged because of their name only, but the text is ambiguous. It is equally, and possibly more, plausible that Hadrian’s intention was to rule against the practice of falsely accusing people of being Christians. Cf. Minns, “Rescript”.

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Subject Index

allegory 155–156 apologetics in antiquity 35–45 – apologetic genre 36–39 – Jewish apologetics 40–43, 48–50, 56– 57, 86–91, 133–134 – purpose of apologetics 39–43, 56–59 – audience 53–82 argument from antiquity, see problem of newness Aristides 43–48, 52, 62, 79, 92–93, 122 Athenagoras 44, 53, 60, 66, 79 catechumens 19, 77, 84 Christian community 39, 54–55, 57–59, 64–69, 83–84, 91–93, 140, 142, 172 Christian doctrine 32, 70–71, 74, 77, 78, 95, 97, 104, 108, 122, 133, 153 Christian identity 33–34, 64–69 Christian persecution 57, 65–66, 105– 106, 167–168, 173–174 Christian tradition 119–121, 131 demons 156–172 Dialogue with Trypho 19, 24–26, 78, 100, 102, 114, 116–119, 122, 131– 135, 140–142, 148, 157, 164, 169, 177 Enoch 162 – Book of the Watchers 159–162 Epistemology 125–128 Eusebius 20, 40, 43–45, 88–89, 94, 99, 100, 130, 135, 192, 194–195 – Eusebian apologies 43–46 evil spirits, see demons

Fronto 56 gospels 120, 138–139 Graeco–Roman mythology 152–156, 168–172 Graeco–Roman rhetoric 49–52 Hadrian 19, 44, 108, 116 Harnack, 20, 45, 109, 113, 117, 194 Hebrew scriptures 74–76, 99–100, 108– 114, 128–132, 135 Hellenistic Judaism 40–43, 49–50, 86– 91, 159–160 Hellenistic philosophy 24–25, 101–104, 115–119 heretics 63–69, 120, 126, 152, 164–167 Hesiod 85, 152–154, 170 Homer 97, 152–153 Holy Spirit 118, 145–146 – prophetic Spirit 96, 125, 128, 133, 143–146 identity, see Christian identity imperial petitions 51–52, 59–60, 64–65 Josephus 89–91, 122, 134 – Against Apion 37–39, 49–52, 58, 89– 91, 98, 122 – Antiquities of the Jews 37, 89–90, 122, 134 Justin Martyr – biography 18–21 – philosophical background 116–119 – school of philosophy 18, 31, 84 – writings 19–20, 26–30

182

Subject Index

Letter of Aristeas 37, 40, 87–89, 133–134 libelli, see imperial petitions literary–rhetorical analysis 21–22 logos doctrine 101–115 martyrdom 57, 65, 82 Martyrdom of Justin 18–19 Martyrdom of Polycarp 29, 65 Melito of Sardes 43, 93 memoirs of the apostles, see gospels middle platonism, see platonism mythology, see Graeco–Roman mythology novelty in antiquity, see problem of newness Philo 25, 58, 87, 99, 102 plagiarism 74, 96–101,109, 113,123–124, 132–133, 135, 147, 158, 163–164 Plato 97–100, 108–115, 153–155, 157 platonism 25, 69, 98, 101–103, 113–114, 118 Pliny the Younger 16–17, 79, 92, 173– 175

Plutarch 111, 155–158, 161, 171 problem of newness 85–119, 127, 132– 133, 163 proof from prophecy 25, 94, 96, 114, 125–151 Rescript of Hadrian, see Hadrian Samaritans 18, 141, 186 Simon Magus 73, 165–167 Socrates 37, 63, 104–116, 120–121, 123, 145, 167, 169, 175 Stoicism 68, 101–103, 115, 117, 155, 170 Syntagma 19–20, 25, 165 Tatian 43, 78, 11 Tertullian 18, 43–44, 53–54, 66, 83 theft theory 85, 97–101, 108, 114–115, 119, 125, 132, 135, 147, 152, 177 Theophilus 43, 144 Trajan 16–17, 173–175 Watchers see Enoch