The Anatomy of a Small War: The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for Changkufeng/Khasan, 1938 [1 ed.] 0837194792, 9780837194790

Citation preview

The Anatomy of a Small War

CONTRIBUTIONS IN MILITARY HISTORY SERIES EDITORS: Thomas E. Griess and Jay Luvaas

The River and the Rock: The History of Fortress Westpoint, 1775-1783 Dave R. Palmer Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945 Jay Luvaas, editor

Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Pacific, 1898-1902 John M. Gates American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889 Kenneth J. Hagan The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views C. Robert Kemble

The Memoirs of Henry Heth Henry Heth, edited by James L. Morrison, Jr. Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917 John P. Finnegan The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775-1783 Dave R. Palmer History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History Hans Delbruck, translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.

The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925 Allan R. Millet

The Twenty-First Missouri: From Home Guard to Union Regiment Leslie Anders The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943 Mark A. Stoler

•

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR THE SOVIET-JAPANESE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGKUFENG/KHASAN, 1938 by Alvin D. Coox foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer cartography by Dana Lombardy

CONTRIBUTIONS IN MILITARY HISTORY, NUMBER 1 3

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Co,ox, Alvin D The anatomy of a small war, (Contributions in military history ; no. 13) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Changkufeng Incident, 1938. I. Title. II. Series. DS784.C64 957'.7 76-51924 ISBN 0-8371-9479-2

Copyright © 1977 by Alvin D. Coox

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 76-51924 ISBN 0-8371-9479-2 ISSN: 0084-9251

First published in 1977 Greenwood Press, Inc. 51 Riverside Avenue, Westport, Connecticut 06880

>

Printed in the United States of America

(

First shot point-blank, then finished off with bayonets. What for? For his freckles? For his blue eyes? Yevtushenko

Valiant warriors fell where now the summer grasses wave, remnants of a dream. Basho

8.96020

Contents

ix

Illustrations

Foreword by Edwin 0. Reischauer

Preface Prologue Notes to Reader

Abbreviations

xi ,

xv

xix

xxiii xxv

1.

The Setting

2.

Early Rumblings

11

3.

The Tokyo Command Level

21

3

4.

Reconnaissance in Force

25

5.

First Involvement of the 19th Division

35

6.

The High Command Consultants

47

7.

The Failure to Win Imperial Sanction

57

8.

The Effort to De-escalate

71

9.

Shachaofeng: Japanese Curse or Boon?

83

10.

Crossing the Tumen

11.

Mounting the Assault Against Changkufeng

128

12.

The Night Attack

138

13.

14.

95

The Anchor Heights: Sato Kotoku and

the Loneliness of Command

156

Postmortem: Costs, Claims, and Critiques

167

viii

CONTENTS

15.

Fait Accompli and Problems of Rapport

173

16.

Russian Retaliation

187

17.

Intensification of the Ground War

199

18.

Reorganizations, Frustrations, and Restraints

217

19.

The Second Soviet Offensive

229

20.

Crisis on the Crest

238

21.

Continuation of the Soviet Offensive

249 264

22.

Developments of 8-9 August

23.

Attrition's Toll

278

24.

Escalation or Break-off?

287

25.

The Role of Diplomacy

297

26.

Achievement of a Cease-fire

306

27.

Stilling the Guns

319

28.

Implementation and Pull-back

332

29.

Military Wind-up and Unfinished Business

348

30.

Lessons

355

31.

Questions of Causation and Cartography

362

32.

Changkufeng in the Context of Limited War

370

Appendix: Dramatis Personae

375

Bibliography

383

Index

395

Illustrations

MAPS

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Changkufeng and Environs Disputed Boundaries, Changkufeng Area Changkufeng, Evening, 30 July 1938 Changkufeng, Noon, 11 August 1938 (Ceasefire) Soviet Version of Events, 29 July—11 August 1938

4 6 129 324 356

FIGURE

1. Soviet Positions on Changkufeng, 30 July 1938

139

PHOTOGRAPHS Gen. Nakamura Kotaro, Korea Army Commander Prince Kan'in, Chief of Army General Staff Col. Inada Masazumi, Chief, AGS Operations Section Lt.-Gen. Itagaki Seishiro, Minister of War

112 113 114 115

Lt.-Gen. Suetaka Kamezo, 19th Division Commander Col. Sato Kotoku, 75th I nfantry Regiment Commander Capt. Yamada Teizo, 1st Infantry Company Commander Maj. Nakano Toshichi, 1st Battalion Commander, 75th Infantry Regiment

116 117 118 119

ILLUSTRATIONS

Soviet Bombing of Chiangchunfeng and Changkufeng, 4 August 1938 Soviet Tank Destroyed on 6 August 1938, Takenouchi Front '

Japanese and Soviet Positions, Changkufeng Crest, 11 August 1938 75th Infantry's Regimental Colors, Changkufeng Crest, 11 August 1938

120 121

122 123

Soviet Photo of Zaozernaya Peak with Red Army Standard Soviet Positions Seen From Changkufeng Crest

124 125

Soviet Cartoon Japanese Cartoon

126 127

Foreword

During the murky decade that preceded the outbreak of the Pacific War, no name was more clouded in sinister mystery than Changkufeng. It belonged to an insignificant hill in a remote corner ot the world. In the hilly back country of the eastern portion of China's northeastern provinces—then known as Manchuria, or the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo—a tiny finger of land protrudes close to the Japan Sea, all but cutting off what was then Japan's colony of Korea from the Mari­ time Province of Siberia. Here stood Changkufeng in a desolate area, populated mainly by a handful of Korean peasants. It is a name that never would have been known to history but for three facts. The exact border at this point between Manchuria and the Soviet Union was some­ what obscure; on either side stood the growing military might of Japan and the Soviet Union, bristling with suspicion and animosity toward each other; and Changkufeng, in strictly local terms, could be regarded as a strategic height. From these ingredients, there developed in the midsummer of 1938 a desperate two-weeks' battle, fought over and around Changkufeng be­ tween the Japanese 19th Division, stationed in northern Korea, and some­ what larger Soviet ground forces with air support. The battle remained limited because both sides had good reason to avoid a full-scale war—the Japanese because of their unfolding conflict with China, the Russians be­ cause of the threatening situation in Europe. The rest of the world, appre­ hensive of Japanese and Soviet military power, did its best to discover what really had happened and what it portended, but it was not easy to

xii

FOREWORD

make sense of the scraps of contradictory reporting from the two sides. A year later, a larger conflict at Nomonhan on the western borders of Manchuria clarified Soviet-Japanese relations less than it added to the mystery of Japanese and Soviet intentions. Professor Coox has been on the trail of the Changkufeng "Incident,” as the Japanese called it, for close to three decades, trying to track down every available bit of evidence. The result is this book, which he hopes will be definitive. And this it undoubtedly will be, except in the unlikely eventuality that all Soviet archives become open to scholarly perusal and surviving Soviet participants to questioning. Professor Coox has tracked down all documentation on the Japanese side and interviewed all the Japanese survivors who will ever be interviewed. From these materials and such Soviet documents as are available, he has drawn an extremely complex but fascinating picture of the Japanese in­ volved, their various attitudes, motivations, and subsequent rationaliza­ tions, and an almost minute-by-minute account of the fighting as seen from the Japanese side. But the view of Changkufeng Hill is perforce seen mostly from the one side. The Soviet participants are known only in gen­ eral terms, their motives and attitudes remain uncertain, and there is no detail or feel of the tide of battle on their side. It is a bit like a football game in which the spectator sees one team in sharpest detail but the other is largely invisible and can be perceived clearly only when in direct con­ tact with the visible team. It is not quite a full view, but it is probably the best we shall ever have. Changkufeng was a very significant event in its time, but it also has more than mere historical interest for us today. It is a case study of the decision-making process, the problem of the control of military units in the field by the authorities back home, and the possibilities and dangers of limited war. Once, Americans presumed that such problems applied only to the Japanese and other foreign nations. In recent years, we have discovered that they are our problems, too. The decision-making process seen in this study is typically multilayered and confused. The 19th Division and its officers on the spot had a large role; the Korea Army to which it belonged, unlike the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, played a more passive role; the Army General Staff was the direct controlling force at home, though it had to operate with the coop­ eration of the Cabinet and was subject to Imperial sanction. How much ? Imperial sanction was the product of the attitudes of the high-court bureauc­

FOREWORD

xiii

racy that surrounded the throne and how much it reflected the Emperor's individual preferences will probably never be known. Within this frame­ work, decision making was Byzantine. It was perhaps clearest at its two extremes. Unwarranted actions by the 19th Division clearly started the battle. It was limited and contained on the Japanese side largely thanks to the clear Imperial opposition to its spread. The military on the spot, while able in an obscure situation to act on its own at first, eventually had to swallow the bitter limiting orders from Tokyo. The battle at Changkufeng was a small, limited war—limited to two weeks, limited to a few kilometers of frontier, and limited on the Japanese side to one division of ground troops with some supplementary artillery, despite the participation of Soviet air power and their more lavish use of ground forces. The battle probably would never have started if each side had not been convinced that the other could not afford a full-scale war, and it certainly was contained as strictly as it was because this estimate was essentially correct. It would no doubt have been much more difficult to limit the conflict if either government had been a democracy and there­ fore open to the influence of popular passions. Changkufeng was much smaller in scale, though in some ways not en­ tirely unlike, our two limited wars of recent years in Korea and Vietnam. It bears even more resemblance to recent border clashes on the same Man­ churian frontier between China and the Soviet Union. The unclarities of the Japanese decision-making process and the problem of control over field forces both had a peculiarly prewar Japanese stamp, but nonetheless they do contain analogies with problems the United States faces. Profes­ sor Coox's study of Changkufeng clarifies a fascinating and significant event in history, but at the same time it throws light on continuing human problems. Edwin O. Reischauer Cambridge, Massachusetts

Preface

In the summer of 1938 my curiosity was piqued by daily newspaper accounts of a fierce Russo-Japanese struggle on a disputed frontier for the obscure hillock called Changkufeng. Pundits dreaded or looked forward to inevitable full-scale war between the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan. After mid-August 1938, however, the name of Changkufeng disappeared from press and conversation. One wondered whether the true story would ever be known, given the impenetrability of the curtain that masked Japan­ ese-Russian relations. When I went to Japan during the postwar Occupation, I retained my interest in the mystery of Changkufeng. By then there were thousands of pages of the partisan, shallow, but presumably definitive transcript of the Tokyo trial, as well as the gossipy Saionji-Harada memoirs. Used judiciously, these oft-garbled materials might yield valuable information, but one still derived no feeling of comprehensiveness or of intimate detail. Perplexed scholars, Japanese and non-Japanese, continued to produce speculative concoctions larded with misinformation and bias. Rehashes relied on un­ enlightening passages from Pravda and Izvestiya. I hoped for a breakthrough in 1955 when I was historian with the Japan­ ese Research Division, the Tokyo branch of the U.S. Army's Office of the Chief of Military History. From the Historical Records Branch of the Repa­ triation Relief Bureau, I received for editing the manuscript of an official Japanese postwar report on the Changkufeng Incident. In typescript, the materials came to 26 pages. Drawing on collateral data available to me, by 1956 I prepared an anonymous, unclassified 158-page monograph subse­ quently distributed by the Department of the Army.1 Although this pub­ lication represented the largest, most authoritative treatment of the Chang-

xvi

PREFACE

kufeng hostilities, I realized that it contained errors and was very incom­ plete. Therefore, I determined to prepare my own definitive account one day. I had conducted my first important private interview for the Changku­ feng project in 1954 when I conferred with Kitano Kenzo at my home in Shiga Prefecture. Later, I visited Sato Kotoku at Gokokuji Temple in To­ kyo. Between 1961 and 1963, thanks to postdoctoral research grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, I traversed Japan and tracked down veterans. The interview program proved indispensable, since mortality continues to take its toll. For example, Marshal Hata and Generals Kitano and Sato died soon after I had been able to confer with them. Approximately 75 Japanese granted me interviews, while another 25 individuals assisted me in other ways. During field work in Japan, I was able to uncover unpublished primary materials, including diaries, letters, journals, albums, photographs, sketches, maps, and notes, as well as official records only recently made available. The crop of postwar Japanese historians has also begun to produce sub­ stantial studies incorporating concrete data whose absence was long de­ cried.2 For faculty research grants which enabled me to maintain my currency in the literature, I thank the San Diego State University Foundation. The University of Hawaii, my academic sponsor at the time, administered the grants awarded me by the Rockefeller Foundation. I am grateful to Dr. Laurence H. Snyder, former President of the University of Hawaii, and Dr. Robert W. Hiatt, former Vice President, for their cooperation. Instrumental in getting my project under way were two distinguished friends, now deceased: Hattori Takushiro, ex-Colonel, IJA, and Ben Bruce Blakeney, barrister and scholar in Japanese studies. Four experts enriched my raw manuscript by counsel and honing: Charles Burton Fahs, Profes­ sor Emeritus of Political Science and Director of International Programs, Miami University (Ohio); Maurice Schneps, former Editor-in-Chief of Orient/West; Arthur Marder, Professor of History, University of California, Irvine; and Ward D. Smith, Far East hand. I am also pleased to acknowledge the special helpfulness of John Erickson, George Furness, Seong-hoon Koh, Anne L. Leu, Michael Parrish, Glynnis Sears, Shirley Seip, and Billie K. ; Walsh. To record my indebtedness to the Japanese who provided assistance and encouragement is a responsibility and a pleasure. First, I must mention

PREFACE

xvii

the invaluable services of my senior adviser, Omae Toshikazu (ex-Captain, UN), my military consultant, Imaoka Yutaka (ex-Colonel, IJA), and my peripatetic friend Fujii Makoto. The impossibility of establishing preced­ ences of other professional debts may be mitigated by alphabetical listings of sources. These men, singly or in groups, consented to lengthy and often numerous interviews in Japan. Frequently, they followed meetings with correspondence and with loans of important personal materials. Japanese veterans' organizations were especially cooperative. For the following mil­ itary and diplomatic personnel whom I have interviewed, I indicate the main expertise or level of acquaintance with matters under study. The spectrum of military ranks ranges from enlisted man to field marshal.

ARMY HIGH COMMAND, COURT

Arao Okikatsu, Asada Saburo, Ayabe Kitsuju, Hashimoto Gun, Hata Shunroku, Inada Masazumi, Iwakuro Hideo, Kato Michio, Kotani Etsuo, Matsumura Tomokatsu, Miyashi Minoru, Miyoshi Yasuyuki, Sawamoto Rikichiro, Shishikura Juro, Sugai Toshimaro, Takei Seitarb, Tanemura Sako, Usami Oki'iye, Yabe Chuta, Yano Mitsuji DIPLOMATIC, ATTACHE, GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Doi Akio, MakiTatsuo, Miura Kazu'ichi, Nishi Haruhiko, Nishimura Kb, Shimanuki Takeji (Takeharu), Takahashi Tsuruo KOREA ARMY HEADQUARTERS Iwasaki Tamio, Kitano Kenzo, Tsuchiya Sakae

19TH DIVISION, 38TH BRIGADE, INFANTRY REGIMENTS3

Hayano Ichimi, Horiguchi Yoshio, Ichimoto Yoshirb, Miyajima Sei'ichi, Murakoshi Kimio, Nakazawa Makoto, Otsuka Masahiro, Saito Miyoshi, SaitoToshio (19th Division), Sakata Hideru, Sasai Shigeo (19th Division), Sato Kbtoku, Tatsuno Tornio (38th Brigade), Tezuka Masayoshi, Tominaga Kametaro (73rd Infantry Regiment)

PREFACE

xviii

KWAN TUNG ARMY

Giga Tetsuji, Harada U'ichiro, Hattori Takushiro, Katakura Tadashi, Morita Norimasa, Morita Sutezo, Noguchi Kamenosuke, Nyumura Matsu'ichi, Ogoshi Kenji, Shoji Tatsumi, Suemori Isamu, Sumi Shin'ichiro, Takumi Hiroshi

NA VY HIGH COMMAND Kusaka Ryunosuke, Tomioka Sadatoshi, Yamaguchi Suteji Thanks are also due the following Japanese for innumerable courtesies: Hata Ikuhiko, Inaba Masao, Inoue Tadao, Ishijima Tatsu, Ito Masanori, Kato Takeo, Misawa Shigeo, Nagashima Kiyoshi, Nishihara Yukio, Nishiura Susumu, Ohata Bunshichi, Ohi Sadako, Mrs. Sato Kotoku, Shirai Masatatsu, Takagi Hajime, Tokugawa Yoshitoshi, Toyoda Kumao, Ueda Toshio, Ugaki Matsushiro, Utsunomiya Naokata, and Yano Muraji. Last, I must record my special gratitude to Hisako Suzuki Coox and to my son Roy, who fairly cheerfully vacated the Tokyo premises when called upon so that interviews could proceed without juvenile interruption. To each preceding individual, as well as to others unnamed, the present volume owes whatever merits it may possess. Needless to say, errors of omission or commission are entirely my own. Alvin D. Coox Tokyo and San Diego, California

NOTES 1. Japanese Research Division, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Small Wars and Border Problems: The Changkufeng Incident, vol. 11, pt. 3, bk. A (hereafter cited as JRD/JSM 11,3/A). 2. Inoue Kiyoshi, "From the Meiji Restoration to the Present," in Le Japon au Xie Congres international des sciences historiques a Stockholm (Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, 1960), pp. 33-39. 3. All from the 75th Infantry Regiment, unless otherwise noted.

Prologue

If a nation should seek an insurance policy of alternative options, where could we locate actuarial tables for the assessment of premiums? Specific­ ally, where could we encounter significant evidence of Soviet Russian pat­ terns of contingency warfare? Military theoreticians have usually turned to the Russo-German experience.1 That choice, however, does not accord with the most concise and accurate definition of limited war: "war limited consciously in three dimensions—terrain, weapons, and objectives."2 The cases of Korea and Vietnam, duels by proxy, offer scant evidence. Episodes of the suppression of revolts, in Hungary and East Germany in the 1950s and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, furnish even less material for meaningful study of limited war. We must move back in time. The RussoFinnish war of 1939-1940 approximates the desired conditions; yet, for all of their valor and limited successes, the Finns can hardly be termed a first-rate antagonist in the geopolitical and military sense. As for the Soviet invasion of outmatched Poland in 1939, by mid-September Polish military resistance had been smashed by the Germans prior to Russian entry from the east. We must similarly discard the White and Polish campaigns shortly after the Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet mop-up of the warlord Chang Hsueh-liang in 1929. Nevertheless, the USSR had engaged in major undeclared wars against a formidable power: Imperial Japan. Despite an incredible lack of substan­ tive literature on the pocket wars in the Far East, we know that the Japan­ ese alone, in 1938-1939, suffered at least 20,000 casualties in action against the Red Army. On the Soviet side, no less a personage than Marshal Blyukher directed operations at Changkufeng in 1938; Marshal Zhukov, at Nomonhan in 1939. Ely correctly calls these actions "the first international

XX

PROLOGUE

test" of the Red Army, and Dinerstein concludes that Soviet "defensive campaigns" in the late 1930s demonstrated "willingness to fight a limited war for limited ends."3 Inspired by Kennan's rummagings and working primarily with Soviet newspapers and periodicals, Tinch found that a quasi-war had been fought between Japan and the USSR but that facts were hard to come by.4 Yet the headlines of August 1938 were ominous: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border—Russia Warns that 'Playing with Fire' in Local Clashes May Bring on War."5 After World War II, Soviet prosecutors contended that "a battle in which participated a [Japanese] division with artillery cannot be considered as a minor fron­ tier incident... it was not a spontaneous clash."6 A folklore born of ignorance has developed. Some have called Chang­ kufeng a strategic village, not a hill.7 Many authors insist that Japanese operations in 1938 were conducted by the Kwantung Army, not the Ko­ rea Army.8 The Changkufeng Incident has been termed a border clash, a midget Russo-Japanese war, a little world war, a trial of strength. Dates have been fuzzy, motives obscure. One author solves his dilemma by term­ ing the affair a Russian gamble at one point, a Japanese gamble at another.9 Until recently, the supposedly best documented versions have derived from Soviet sources.10 The most important reason was that the USSR won its case at the postwar Tokyo trial, charging Japan with "conspiratorial and aggressive responsibility." With respect to the Changkufeng affair, "the Japanese imperialists made an open attack against the USSR . . . the Japanese militarists knew that they were consciously and deliberately committing a violation of the established state borderline." Events at Changkufeng were not separate and isolated but a link in the general system of aggressive actions of the Japanese imperialists against the USSR and, moreover, a link in the aggression of imperialistic powers against all democratic nations.. . . The actions of the Japanese imperialists in the Lake Khasan area did not develop as planned. This was so only because of the ... powerful blow delivered by the Soviet army in reply.11

j

The evidence adduced by the defense witnesses, affidavits, and documenta­ tion "could in no way change or alter the charges." While defense testimony

I

r

xxi

PROLOGUE

was "of absolutely fabulous nature" or stemmed from ignorance and clumsy fabrication, Soviet documentation was termed incontestable and confirmed, and Russian witnesses reliable.12 The tribunal, by a majority, found for the prosecution, not unexpect­ edly. The court described the Changkufeng hostilities as war and the oper­ ations of Japanese troops as clearly aggressive.13 The member from India lodged a vigorous dissent and defense counsel appealed in vain.14 Japan stood condemned by an international court. Unless some effort was made to study the affair more thoroughly, posterity would be burdened by the flimsy verdict. The present study represents such an effort, of necessity mounted mainly from the Japanese side. Apart from vicarious historical pleasures, we seek insight into the techniques of contingency war and escalation practiced by the USSR and Japan (surrogate for the People's Republic of China in today's context). That the subject, remains alive in Kremlin thinking is shown by recent Soviet allegations that the Changku­ feng Incident represents only one of a series of "imperialist soundings" of Russian strength.15 From Changkufeng in 1938 to the Sino-Soviet border warfare at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River in 1969, we have thus come full circle.

NOTES 1. See B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Red Army (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. xiv, and The Other Side of the Hill (London: Cassell, 1951). 2. W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Simon and Schuster, Clarion Books, 1969), p. 319. 3. Colonel Louis B. Ely, The Red Army Today (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1953), p. 155; H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 28-29. 4. George F. Kennan, "Is War with Russia Inevitable?" Reader's Digest 56 (March 1950): 1-9; Clark W. Tinch, "Quasi-War Between Japan and the USSR, 1937-1939," World Politics 3 (January 1951): 174-199. See also Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 98-101. 5. New York Times, 3 August 1938, p. 1. 6. See "Introduction by the Prosecution," Minister Golunsky, International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Transcript of Proceedings (mimeo­ graphed), 8 October 1946, pp. 7250-7251; ibid., "Summation by the Prosecution," General Vasiliev, 17 February 1948, pp. 39851-39852. 7. Aitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union (New York: John Day, 1950), pp. 272-273. From Moscow on T August 1938, U.S. Charge' Alexander Kirk

xxii

PROLOGUE

referred to "the town of Changkufeng, the original center of disturbances." U.S., National Archives (NA), Dispatch No. 215, 761.93 Manchuria/135. 8. Tinch, for one, claims that "the elite Kwantung Army had lost prestige in the mire of Changkufeng." "Quasi-War Between Japan and the USSR," p. 182. 9. Martin Blumenson, "The Soviet Power Play at Changkufeng," World Politics 12 (January 1960): 250. 10. For detailed discussion see my "Changkufeng: One Face of War," Orient/ West 7 (September 1962): 77-88. 11. "Summation by the Prosecution," General Vasiliev, IMTFE, Transcript, 17 February 1948, pp. 39830-39832, 39853-39854. 12. Ibid., pp. 39840-39841,39848. 13. "Judgment," IMTFE, Transcript, 10 November 1948, p. 49395. 14. "Judgment of the Honorable Mr. Justice Pal, Member from India," IMTFE (typescript), pt. 3, pp. 807-808. 15. Thus, in February 1968 Marshal Kyril Moskalenko, a deputy defense minister, charged that "the imperialists tried more than once to sound out the strength and power of our state, but each time got what they deserved." He referred specifically to Changkufeng, Nomonhan, the 1929 affair of the Chinese Eastern railway, and the Soviet-Finnish war. "Fifty Heroic Years," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report 2 (28 March 1968): 24.

Notes to Reader

Japanese names follow the Japanese style, family name first. Military ranks are stated as of the time of the Changkufeng Incident. Korean place names in the battle zone are generally given Chinese readings, which are most familiar in Western literature. Thus, the hill it­ self is called Changkufeng, not Chbkoho as in Japanese, and Shachaofeng is the reading for Shasoho, Fangchuanting for Bosenko, and Chiangchunfeng for Shogunho. Macrons are generally reserved for footnotes and bibliography. In chapter notes, only the author and title are given for Japanese-language sources. Full bibliographical details are to be found in the bibliog­ raphy. All translations of Japanese-language sources are by the author ; unless otherwise stated. The names and positions of Japanese military and diplomatic interviewees are detailed in the preface. The following format is used in chapter notes referring to volume, part, book, and page: For vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 22—1/3:22. For vol. 3, p. 482—3:482. For vol. 1, pt. 3, bk. A, p. 22-1/3A:22.

Abbreviations

AAA ADC AGS AP AT BGU CG C/O CP C/S GPU HE HFA H.M. HMG HQ IGHQ IJA UN IMTFE KIA LMG MG MIA mt arty

antiaircraft artillery aide de camp Army General Staff armor-piercing antitank border garrison unit commanding general commanding officer command post chief of staff Soviet Russian secret police and paramilitary border guards; State Political Administration high explosive heavy field artillery His Majesty heavy machine gun headquarters Imperial General Headquarters Imperial Japanese Army Imperial Japanese Navy International Military Tribunal, Far East killed in action light machine gun machine gun missing in action mountain artillery

xxvi

NCO NGS NKVD OP OSS

S/O WIA

ABBREVIATIONS

noncommissioned officer Navy General Staff People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs observation post IJA secret intelligence organization {Tokumukikan, special service agency), resembles U.S. wartime Office of Strategic Services most closely staff officer wounded in action

The Anatomy of a Small War

The Setting

1

Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations. Lord Curzon

A tongue of poorly demarcated land juts southeast from Hunchun, along the east side of the Tumen River, between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within it, Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors to the sea, stands in the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The twin-peaked hill reminded the Korean natives of their changgo, a long snare drum constricted in the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they reproduced the phonetic sounds in three ideo­ graphic characters that meant "taut drum peaks''—Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese saw the excellence of the imagery and retained the Chinese read­ ings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their vantage points to the east, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops thought of it as a sugar-loaf hill.1 For many years, the natives and few officials in the region displayed a relaxed attitude toward matters of boundaries and sovereignty. Even for a while after the Japanese took over Manchuria (renamed Manchukuo) in 1931-1932, matters were not brought to a head, partly, it is said, because an island people cannot easily visualize border lines. With the buildup of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Five-Year plans, both sides paid increasing attention to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party chose to act aggressively, force majeure was adduced as the justification

MAP 1. Changkufeng and Environs.

the setting

5

for that unexpected and disruptive event known to international law. Most often erupting along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each affray contained the seed of all-out warfare.2 The borders dated essentially to pacts consummated by the Ching dynasty and the tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the agreement of Mukden in 1924, there had been a dozen ac­ cords governing the borders. Affecting the region of Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, which supplemented the Tientsin Treaties (November 1860), the maps of 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun (Yenchu) Border Protocol of 1886. By the basic treaty of 1860, the Chinese empire ceded to tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia. What was meant by "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained vague. As a consequence, a further border agreement was worked out in June 1861 (the Lake Khanka Border Pact), by which map demarcations were drawn and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to pass from Khanka along the ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, to reach a terminus 20 Chinese // (some six miles) from the mouth of the Tumen.3 A Russo-Chinese commission, established in 1886, drew up the Hun­ chun Border Pact, with new or modified markers to be set up along the lines of the agreements of 1860-1861 and a Russian resurvey. To the Japan­ ese, in 1938 as at the war crimes trial in Tokyo after World War II, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the Hunchun agreement of 1886 were con­ trolling:

The red line on the map marks the border all along the water­ shed, and the water which flows westward and pours into the river Tumen belongs to China, while the water which flows eastward and pours into the sea belongs to Russia. . . . Pro­ ceeding northwestward from the border mark Tu ["T"], crossing a hill, and reaching a sand hill via the west side of Lake Khasan, the border mark no. 1 is established. (Italics added.)4 On the assumption that "the hill crossed by the red line" is the same as Hill 52 (which the Japanese asserted was the intent of the original text of the Hunchun Protocol), the boundary must have extended east of Chang-

MAP 2. Disputed Boundaries, Changkufeng Area.

THE SETTING

7

kufeng and west of Khasan. Acceptance of the Russian interpretation of "all along the watershed" might imply that the border passed through every summit west of Khasan and would thereby have given the Soviets jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all the heights, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng—precisely what the Russians did claim. Since the Ching dynasty and the house of Romanov were by now defunct, the new sovereignties appealed publicly to the opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not admit that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by Ching commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or at least could be located. What the Japanese could ascertain on their own about the Russian-language version derived from a partial text.5 Too much has been made of Japanese diplomacy's alleged disdain for the Russian copy of the Hunchun Protocol produced in Moscow in July 1938. At worst, even the Japanese Army took the position that the Hun­ chun accord was a secondary attachment and that the Peking agreement was the basic document. The Japanese not only knew about the Hunchun instrument but also about other significant but conflicting cartographic documents bearing on the boundary problem. First, there were Imperial Chinese Army maps of the region, dated 1911. Both the Chinese and Russian military maps drew the frontier gen­ erally along the watershed east of Khasan; this seemed to be in accord with the 1861 readings, which were based upon the Khanka agreement. A major Japanese newspaper, Asahi, in the midst of the Changkufeng In­ cident, told its readers that the Soviet government's claims in 1938 were based on tsarist AGS maps, while it was the Japanese side that insisted upon upholding the "true" Hunchun pact.6 Second, the Chinese (Republican) Army had conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than tra­ versing the highland crest ridges. Japanese AGS maps demonstrated a marked preference for this interpretation of the Hunchun agreement.7 None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by of­ ficial agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or unknown, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers. Still, there can be little doubt that the matter of borders was extremely complicated around Changkufeng

8

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Hill. The red lines drawn on the musty map of 1886 were not unambiguous in the first place, as the commissioners of that year realized. In addition to efforts to assure the permanence of markers, the officials had agreed to increase their number. Between 9 and 11 lettered markers and 26 num­ bered markers replaced the wooden posts of 1861. Nevertheless, the fron­ tier to be demarcated, between Lake Khanka and Marker' "T" near Podgornaya, stretched 400 miles. Neither ditches, wire, nor fences supplemented the few markers. By 1938 the situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features— mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley—would have complicated even honest men's discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact all the way between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—one every 25 miles, at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that, of the 20 markers originally set up along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefec­ ture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938.8 The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk!9 The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary to mean the road line just west of Khasan, in practice at least. Free road movement, how­ ever, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931-1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted or inherited the Chinese interpretation, which was based upon the agreement of 1886 on border roads; the key clause was that the frontier west of Khasan was to be the road along the lake. Japanese sources insist that the rancor of local residents mounted against gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory. Many of the natives seemed of the opinion that the original boundaries lay east of the lake but that the Soviets chose to adjust the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were preventing use of the roads just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Ko­ rean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to a takeover of the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the ManchukuoSn-Japanese side. Villagers who went to the streams or the lake to launder their cloth­

THE SETTING

9

ing found themselves sniped at. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans who were acquainted with the Tumen area mentioned agrarian, seasonal Korean re­ ligious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, replete with the sacrifice of fattened pigs and the thumping of changgo.10 Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill,11 Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, none could doubt that the easy days were past. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) observers described the explosive situation along the Korea-Manchuria-USSR borders: it was strictly a matter of de facto fron­ tiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy atti­ tude seemed to be summed up in the colloquial phrase, "Take another step and we'll 'let you have it.' "12

NOTES 1. Nakamura Bin, Man-So kokkyo funso shi, p. 278; Sato, Tominaga, Koh interviews; John Erickson, personal letter; Ward Smith, personal letter. 2. Akinaga butai, Jinchu bidan, p. 353; Matsumura Shuitsu, Miyakezaka, p. 164; B. Nakamura, Man-So, p. 14; Imaoka Yutaka, "Man-So-Mo kokkyo funso nitsuite no gaikan," pp. 5-14. 3. Masuda Tadao, Manshu kokkyo mondai, pp. 102-104; Akamatsu Yusuke, Showa 13-nen no kokusaiiosei, pp. 342-344; Gaimusho [Foreign Ministry], SP No. 234, pp. 4-8; ibid., SP No. 232, pp. 36-41,51-58; IMTFE, Transcript, 21 May 1947, pp. 22695-22698. 4. From Collection of Border Treaties Between Manchukuo and the USSR, Bureau of Treaties, Gaimusho (July 1943), pp. 78-80, IMTFE Defense Document No. 2706 (from personal files of Ben Bruce Blakeney, Tokyo; hereafter cited as Blakeney Collection). 5. Rikugun sanbo honbu [AGS], Chokoho jiken shi soan, pp. 271-274 (here­ after cited as AGS, Chokoho soan}-, Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 36-41,51-58; ibid., SP No. 234, pp. 10-11; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, pp. 344-345; Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 164; "Kokkyo mondai," Chud Koron (August 1938): 125-127. 6. Tokyo Asahi, 17 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 7. JRD/JSM 11,3/A: 11-13; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, fig. 1, p. 343; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 66; ibid., SP No. 234, pp. 10-12. 8. Tsuji Masanobu tells how he "corrected" an instance of Russian relocation of markers by personally hauling a stone 200 meters eastward in a sector north of Changkufeng in early June 1938. Nomonhan, p. 17.

10

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

9. Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 29-30; Gaimusho, SP No. 234, p. 8; B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 23-24; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, pp. 8, 342-343; Masuda, Manshu, pp. 110-125; Kanafu Kizo, Kokkyoron, p. 264; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 277-278. 10. In Moscow in 1938 Nishi and Shigemitsu attempted without success to demonstrate that religious rites conducted for many years atop Changkufeng proved that the locality belonged to Manchukuo. At the postwar trial, the Russians denied that ceremonies were conducted; the president of the tribunal prevented defense counsel's exploration of the point. IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, pp. 7802-7804; also Nishi and Sato interviews. 11. Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 36-37, 56-57; ibid., SP No. 234, pp. 9-11,17-29; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, pp. 5, 9, 341; Kunimatsu Hisaya, Kokkyo no hanashi, p. 206; Imaoka, "Kokkyo funso," pp. 5-14; Koiso Kuniaki, Katsuzan koso, p. 640; Hoshino Naoki, Mihatenu yume, p. 277; B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 13-14, 279-280; Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 164; Jinchu bidan, p. 354. 12. Gaimusho, SP No. 232, p. 62.

Early Rumblings

2

Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog that swirled over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian-Man­ churian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and threw up his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the po­ lice searched and questioned the dark-haired, husky, 38-year-old man. It did not take long to realize that this was no routine border-trespassing case. The defector was no less than a Russian general—the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he was wearing full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class. The card was countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military author­ ities, who transferred him to Seoul and thence to Tokyo under close es­ cort. On 1 July the Japanese press was allowed to reveal that Lyushkov was in the refuge of Japan. Ten days later, to exploit the publicity value of the commissar and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyush­ kov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign corres­ pondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far Eastern strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique fund of high-level intel­ ligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk.1 Polish intelligence, reputedly the world's best anti-Soviet service, picked up news of Lyushkov's defection as early as 24 June. From Warsaw emanated the most specific predictions of the consequences so far as Japan was con­ cerned. On 2 July, the day after the Russian general's escape was announced

12

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

by the Japanese war ministry, Polish informants advised the Japanese that the Lyushkov affair, or the revelation of it, had heightened the possibility of conflict along the borders between the USSR and Manchuria.2 This es­ timate proved accurate and timely. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been re­ ported. The natives of the hamlet of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol had appeared in June, apparently for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More important, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a flurry of Soviet mes­ sage traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After the defection of Lyushkov, there had apparently been a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command, which must have been held responsible for laxity in border surveillance. Japanese AGS records indicate that the Novokievsk security force com­ mander was relieved and that the sector garrison was replaced by one from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a Soviet border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector.3 Kwantung Army signal monitors intercepted a pair of significant front­ line messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region which were addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded and translated, the items revealed (1) a complaint that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the re­ quired supply; and (2) a recommendation to higher headquarters that Russian elements ought to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan. In justifying the proposed action, the Soviet commander com­ mented on the terrain advantages; construction of emplacements would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presum­ ably Changkufeng) and to set up four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July that conveyed the import of the deciphered messages.4 On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng.5 The disconcerting intelligence from the Kwantung Army and from the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Japanese mil1, itary authorities were not sure about the significance of the developments, but there was no doubt that trouble was brewing: the arrival of Russian^

EARLY RUMBLINGS

13

horsemen might represent the first stage of Soviet headquarters' sanction­ ing of aggressive local requests for action. One Kwantung Army Intelli­ gence officer, however, admits that he is no longer so sure that the Russian messages were not a deliberate plant designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng.6 On 7-8 July all staff officers in Seoul assembled at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but, on the basis of maps and other data, it seemed that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex in the Man­ churian border area just west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to all subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. Not even a patrol was to enter zones that lacked definitive demarcation. Now, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at the village of Fangchuanting. The matter of ownership of the high ground arose early. One officer remarked that, when he served on the AGS in Tokyo, some studies had been conducted. It was his understanding that the border extended west of Khasan and east of the hill complex. This implied that the hill lay within Manchuria and that the Russians had committed a trespass. Such a view seems to have been shared by the staff officers present. A number of other points were raised:7

1. As yet, negligible Soviet elements had been reported in the area. 2. The intrusion should not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit weakness. Halfway measures would not suffice, especially in terms of the Japanese defensive mission along 125 miles of frontier. 3. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the adjacent sector of the Manchurian tongue. 4. Troubled by dissidence and purges, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal gaps on the border, particularly after Lyushkov defected. Additionally, the Russians may have wanted to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese domination of high ground lying north. 5. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate sta­ tus quo and could lead to a contest for control of observation posts of comparable value.

14

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

6. In overall terms, it mattered little if the Russians sought to establish a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor importance. Japan's main con­ cern was the China theater; Changkufeng was irrelevant. The Japanese ought not to expend their limited strength or allow themselves to be distracted. 7. The high command in Tokyo must be consulted. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army ought to pursue a policy of ignor­ ing or disregarding the Soviet actions, at this stage at least. Meanwhile, a watchful eye should be kept on the area. The consensus was conveyed to Maj. Gen. Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon hearing the recommendation to adopt a low posture, Koiso asked only whether this represented the unanimous opinion of the staff. Assured that it did, he approved the policy.8 Koiso, who was 58, was on the verge of departing from his post in ac­ cordance with the routine personnel changes that took place about 15 July each year. He had just received the unexpected news that he was being retired and that General Nakamura Kotaro would be his replace­ ment.9 To those who knew Koiso well, he appeared to be viewing the dif­ ficulties on the border as a petty anticlimax to his tour of command. He seemed to be unenthusiastic or relaxed about matters generally as he pre­ pared to leave the post he had held for 216 years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff relished the Soviet activities that appeared to be under way, his reaction probably reflected reluctance to reach decisions which might commit his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized dispatch of a warning to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) branch at Hunchun.10 These units were to take every precaution and tighten security along the frontier north of Shuiliufeng. Alerted by the appearance of the first Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit (BGU) of the 76th Infantry Regiment conducted close watch from across the Tumen. Patrols detected a dozen Russian troops beginning construction atop Changkufeng at about noon on 9 July. Somewhere between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to 40; there were also 30 horses and 11 camouflaged tents.11 s Working in shifts on the west side 30 meters from the crest, the Russians

.

r

EARLY RUMBLINGS

15

set up barbed wire and firing trenches; 50 meters forward, they dug ob­ servation trenches. In addition to existing telephone wires strung between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a port­ able phone net. Logistical support was supplied by three boats on the lake. About 20 kilometers to the east, indubitably inside Soviet territory, large forces were being assembled. Steamship traffic into Posyet Bay increased.12 As soon as the 19th Division commander, Lt. Gen. Suetaka Kamezo, learned of the "intrusion” at Changkufeng on 9 July, he dispatched staff officers to the front and made preparations to send elements to buttress the border units. Col. Sato Kotoku says that the first he heard of any in­ cident at Changkufeng (or the name of the hill for that matter) was on 11 July, when Suetaka inspected Sato's 75th Infantry Regiment in Hoer13 yong. The special importance of Suetaka and his division derived from a num­ ber of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province—including the zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had ap­ peared—lay within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the shape of the territory enclosed by the frontiers, as well as the terrain and transportation facilities, more closely linked the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80 percent of the people were of Korean origin, which meant that they were Japanese, not Manchukuoan subjects. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the OSS detachment located there.14 In case of war, the Korea Army's mis­ sion was defined clearly: to mobilize and carry out subsidiary operational assignments against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army, which was based in Manchuria. The Korea Army ordi­ narily disposed of two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot (Replacement and Cadre) Division at the Ko­ rean capital. Apart from sparse ground units, devoid of armor and weak in heavy artillery, there were but two air regiments in all of Korea, the nearest to Changkufeng being the unit at Hoeryong.15 The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security in Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army hardly re­ quired a full-time operations officer, and there was none as such. When need arose, as it did in mid-1938, the task was assumed by the senior staff

16

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

officer, in this case Col. Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training was the main concern. The problems of the army in 1938 were accentuated by the development of a situation that was neither war nor peace in a locale ill-defined so far as the USSR was concerned and even ambiguous, in terms of jurisdiction, with regard to the neighboring Kwantung Army. Logistics and ordnance were not strong points of a garrison army, whose work centered on security and upkeep. Koiso seemed most concerned with civil administration and the development of natural resources. This was understandable in view of the scantiness of his combat elements, his overall mission, and the comparative tranquility and narrowness of the border sector. Korea Army Headquarters tended to delegate defensive responsibility to its division commanders.16 Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with the defense of northeast­ ern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a dedicated infantryman, was galled by the fact that his elite force was one of only two standing divisions which had never seen combat in China.17 Suetaka turned to training with fury. His emphasis was on the strictest of discipline, bravery and sincerity, aggressiveness, and perfect preparation. In characterizing him, Japanese veterans have used such terms as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hotblooded, high-strung, unbending, and stubborn. His moods were transient, his partialities immovable. One sophisticated Japanese officer, Sasai Shigeo, called Suetaka "a Patton type in public.” But there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, which he kept under firm, even violent or excessive, personal surveillance. His men agreed that Suetaka was a pro­ fessional, an old samurai who whipped the division into superb condition. In private, he had a reputation for sensitivity and warmth. A Japanese phrase, yakamashii oyaji, possessing connotations of both stern father and martinet, sums up the Japanese Army's characterization of Suetaka. There is a character in a play by Shaw who claims that "the people who get on in this world are the people who get up and look for the cir­ cumstances they want and, if they can't find them, make them." To date, circumstances had not smiled. Did Suetaka "make” his own in July 1938? Sources higher than division headquarters have surmised that, from the first appearance of Russian patrols at Changkufeng, Suetaka "licked his chops" and expected or even hoped for a "good scrap." Some have gone so far as to say that, to Suetaka, the Soviet-induced incident appeared to be a heaven-sent opportunity. Division officers deny the second-hand con­ clusions. As reports came from the border, they recall, no stir was caused at headquarters. The gist of the initial thinking was that |

EARLY RUMBLINGS

17

it is just another border fracas with a new serial number at­ tached. So far as we are concerned, the Russians can have the damned hill. It lies in an unmarked, disputed zone. Of course it is irritating to see the Russians atop a nice little hill which we too would have liked to occupy, especially since the place has been left unmanned till now by implicit understanding.18

The staff officers say that if they had been convinced of a Soviet invasion, the intruders would have had to be evicted. But at the beginning, at least, Suetaka was not at all aggressive. Although it is not known widely, he did not appreciate the orders that were forthcoming from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until near the end of July he was somewhat op­ posed to the idea of evicting the Soviets from the crest, an idea which did not originate within the division staff. Sato adds that, for a week after the Russians were reported digging in on Changkufeng, "we did nothing more than prepare against a possible emergency, for we were thinking it was a local affair that would be settled by diplomacy."19 Sources outside division circles believe that Suetaka was more enthu­ siastic than diffident. There is even more important evidence of Suetaka's role. As revealed in Koiso's notes, on 14 July Suetaka arrived to pay his respects in Seoul. No interviewee mentioned this visit or the import of the discussions that ensued. The question arose whether. . . the 19th Division . . . would be placed in an unfavorable position if the Russians were to advance. Therefore, Suetaka would like to concentrate forces in Korean territory on the right shore of the Tumen . . . and what did I think of this? I replied: "It is my interpretation that there is nothing objectionable for a division commander to handle matters as he sees fit, in terms of assigning impor­ tance and strength, so long as it falls within his zone of respon­ sibility. Nevertheless, since Soviet forces, whose intentions are unknown, are on the move facing the Manchurian area, one cannot venture any predictions. Hence, I am going to ask the high command about its desires at once and will notify you accordingly." Suetaka replied, "Please do so."20

Although one can speculate about Suetaka's influence on army think­ ing at this early stage, a number of sources suggest that the first escalation, so far as the Japanese side was concerned, stemmed from Kwantung Army

18

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Headquarters in Hsinking. Kwantung Army staff officers, dynamic and positive, did not enjoy what they felt was timidity on the part of the Ko­ rea Army. We are an operational field army with considerable experience against the Soviets. Last summer we showed how to deal with the Russians during the Amur River incident. That is the only way to cope with their outrageous actions around Changku­ feng; they are always probing weak spots where they can get something "free.” The Changkufeng locale happens to belong to Manchukuo, our administrative zone, although the Korea Army, unfortunately, is responsible for its defense; we are very interested in seeing that our concerns and honor are up­ held. The Russians are obviously attempting to upset the Ko­ rean natives at the expense of their Japanese protectors. Al­ ready, the Manchurians are saying that the Kwantung Army is a tiger in the south but a pussycat in the north.21

Korea Army officers admit that at about the time the Soviets built up their outpost strength at Changkufeng, a personal and unofficial telegram appeared at Seoul from a field-grade officer in Kwantung Army Intelli­ gence who was an expert on Soviet affairs. Although the telegram cannot be found today and the staff officer mentioned is dead, a number of in­ terviewees agree as to the gist: if the Korea Army was hesitant, the Kwan­ tung Army would be obliged to evict the Russians; the affair could not be ignored. Although the telegram required no reply and struck some officers as high-handed and nonsensical, the message was shown promptly to Koiso. Some say that he was goaded into taking instant action—he wired Tokyo that the Korea Army alone could and would handle the incident. Koiso's senior staff officer, however, insists that his reaction to the unofficial tele­ gram was remarkably mild, considering his customary temper.22 Messages had continued to come from the 19th Division concerning reports it was receiving about developments at the border. Some sources recall no particular comments accompanying the communications, and Tokyo provided no guidance. Was it Suetaka's urgings that led to Koiso's wire to Tokyo, or was it because the Kwantung Army "came along and. booted the Korea Army in the rear"? Proponents of the latter interpreta­ tion assert that the Seoul authorities had, until then, been pondering quietly, in full realization that defensive responsibility was theirs but with

EARLY RUMBLINGS

19

the idea that unilateral action was not warranted. One staff officer remem­ bers: “Now we felt that we had to act, out of our sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference."23 The Korea Army staff was convened shortly after receipt of the unof­ ficial telegram from Hsinking. On the basis of the latest intelligence re­ ceived from the division on 13 July, the officers prepared an estimate for submission to the army commander. Hypotheses were reduced to three: 1. The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion-. Slightly possible. 2. The USSR is seeking to restrain Japan on the eve of the crucial operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize the Chinese provisional capital at Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. 3. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by taking the Changkufeng ridges, he would be proving his loyalty, impressing his superiors, and gain­ ing glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on the 14th, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the AGS deputy, the vice min­ ister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff.

Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming ... in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian ac­ tions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and request­ ing pullback, directly on spot. ... In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force.24

The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly.

NOTES 1. See my "L'Affaire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Defector," Soviet Studies 19 (January 1968): 405-420. 2. Tokyo Asahi, 4 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3 (Warsaw dateline, 2 July 1938).

20

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

3. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 2; Gaimusho, SP No. 232, p. 34; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 78. 4. Inada Masazumi, "Soren kyokutogun to no taiketsu," p. 279; Inada, "Kantogun to Chokoho jiken," p. 48; Ogoshi, Inada interviews; Gendaishi shiryo (here­ after cited as GSS], 10/3:xxxii; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 7 July 1938. 5. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, p. 642; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 15. 6. Ogoshi interview. 7. Composite of interviews with Iwasaki, Tsuchiya, Kitano, and Inada. 8. Iwasaki, Tsuchiya, and Kitano interviews. 9. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, pp. 641-642; Tokyo Asahi, 31 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 1. 10. Tokumukikan, literally "Special Service Agency," was the Japanese Army's secret intelligence organization, most resembling the U.S. wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 11. Japanese records differ widely as to the sequence of events. The first troops to dig in on top of Changkufeng may have arrived on 9, 11, or 12 July; the figure of 40 men may have been reached on 11, 12, 13, or even 14 July. I have selected the classified Korea Army report of August 1938 as the most authoritative. Chosengun shireibu, Chokoho jiken no keii, p. 2 (hereafter cited as CS, Chokoho}. 12. AGS, Chokoho soan. Chronology, 8, 9, 11 July 1938; ibid., p. 15; CS, Chokoho, p. 2. 13. Sato interview. 14. Since 1918 the Japanese forces in Korea had been designated Chosengun (commonly called the Korea Army or, misleadingly, the Korean Army). 15. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 4-5; Iwasaki and Kitano interviews. 16. Iwasaki, Tsuchiya, and Imaoka interviews. 17. For a biographical sketch of Suetaka, see my "Qualities of Japanese Military Leadership: The Case of Suetaka Kamezo," Journal of Asian History 2 (1968): 32-43. 18. Composite of interviews with Saito, Sasai, Iwasaki, and Arao. Also see Akaishizawa Kunihiko, Chokoho, pp. 57-58. 19. Sato interview. 20. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, p. 643. 21. Composite of interviews with Ogoshi, Katakura, and Kotani. In late June 1937, Kwantung Army gunners had attacked Soviet warships which had allegedly violated the Manchurian side of the Amur River. 22. Iwasaki and Tsuchiya interviews. 23. Tsuchiya, Iwasaki, and Sasai interviews. Imaoka believes that, although it is dif­ ficult to substantiate the existence of the famous but "implausible" telegram, it is true that some of the staff officers at Hsinking were thinking along those lines. "Chokoho jiken," p. 33. AGS staff officer Nishimura Toshio, however, heard in specific fashion about the Kwantung Army's "indirect warning" to Seoul. Boeicho boeikenshusho ; senshi shitsu (Defense Agency, Institute for Defense Studies, Office of Military History) [Tokyo], hereafter cited as BBSS Archives. 24. CS, Chokoho, p. 2. Also Hashimoto, Inada, and I. Hata interviews.

The Tokyo Command Level

3

The members of the Japanese cabinet who had the closest relations with the overall handling of the Changkufeng Incident were Premier Konoe Fumimaro and his ministers of foreign affairs and of war, Generals Ugaki Kazushige (Kazunari) and Itagaki Seishiro, respectively. The vice minister of war was Lt. Gen. Tojo Hideki. The latter's navy counterpart was Vice Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku, who served under the minister of navy, Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa. Within the war ministry, the key post of military affairs bureau chief was held by Maj. Gen. Nakamura Aketo. The Japanese Army chief of staff was Prince Kan' in, in the post since 1931 and 73 years old by 1938. Under such a feeble but venerable personage, a key role had to be played by a younger deputy. The deputy was Lt. Gen. Tada Shun, who was 57. At AGS working levels, the most influential element was the 1st (Operations) Bureau. The chief from January 1938 was Maj. Gen. Hashi­ moto Gun, 52 years old, who had a reputation for intelligence, remark­ able memory, and ability. In terms of Changkufeng, the key figure serving at the AGS level was Col. Inada Masazumi, 42 years old, "project officer” for the affair. A star graduate of the military academy, Inada had gone through the war college course and had seen line service as well as instructor and staff duty at the war college, AGS, and war ministry. In March 1938 Inada became chief of the 2nd (Operations) Section under the Operations Bureau. He was known as a sharp and driving personality of great ability, although some found him enigmatic. Perhaps the greatest compliment comes from Inada's ( counterpart in naval operations, the able Capt. Kusaka Ryunosuke, who considers Inada the best type of army staff officer—lavish praise, consid­ ering the embittered relations that often existed between the services.1

22

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Dominating Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the troubles at Changkufeng were a digression. As Inada says, the Changkufeng Incident cannot be understood without reference to the situation in China. An impressive series of Japanese tactical victories had been achieved before summer. Tsingtao fell in January. In March the Yellow River was reached; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later. The port of Amoy was taken in early May, strategic Suchow on the 20th. The northern and central battle fronts could now be linked by the Japanese. But Chinese resistance continued. Although the Japanese spoke publicly of the im­ minence of fatal dissension on the part of the Chinese, there were private admissions that the secondary effects of the fall of Suchow were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese de­ fiance might accelerate, and the USSR might become involved. A drive against Hankow appeared inevitable to symbolize that the military phase of hostilities was at an end. On the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns, the Japanese were in full accord with their foes. Even after Suchow fell, the Japanese government had the domestic press and radio discourage assumptions that enemy resistance was collapsing. At the time that Chiang was exhorting his people on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe declared, "The war has just begun."2 Inada and his operations section had been working against this compli­ cated background. After the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Head­ quarters (IGHQ) on 18 June ordered the field forces to undertake opera­ tional preparations for a drive to secure the Wuhan complex—Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow. Inada's idea was not to play an endless game, but to seize trumps with a view toward early consummation of a political set­ tlement. Inada admits that it would have been critical if the Soviets had inter­ vened in 1938 when the Japanese were so involved in China. While the Japanese forces could undoubtedly have continued to defeat the Chinese, against the Russians the overcommitted Japanese Army might have been trapped fatally. Soviet assistance to China had already proved galling. The Russians disposed of an estimated 20 rifle divisions, four or five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a' range of 3,000 kilometers—twice the distance from Vladivostok.,,to Tokyo. Soviet manpower strength in Siberia probably approached 370,000? The Japanese central authorities had accordingly been stressing a no-troubled policy vis-a-vis the USSR while seeking to "wall" the border and to rein^ ? 8V'“

THE TOKYO COMMAND LEVEL

23

force the Kwantung Army as soon as possible. Still, the target date for correction of the imbalance could be no earlier than 1943. The army not only lacked surplus strength for new theaters of operation but also was suffering from supply deficits in existing battle zones in China. There was scarcely enough ammunition for regular divisions, yet the Suchow-Hankow operations required vast amounts of men, materiel, and shipping. Logis­ tical considerations dictated that the drive be completed by autumn 1938. By the end of 1937 Japan had already had to send 16 of its 24 divisions to China. The grand total of troop strength—700,000 men—approximated the number of soldiers in the entire standing army to date. The AGS plan­ ners had to shift three ground divisions, indirectly earmarked for a north­ ern contingency, from north to central China, with full knowledge that the Kwantung Army was operating in an inferior posture.4 Although oppressive concern about the northern problem may have been widespread in senior military circles, it was not universal.5 But while the campaigns on the mainland grew wider in scope and longer in duration, planning began to deteriorate at the high command level. Confusion and worry inevitably spread to the field armies in China.6 Japanese Navy chiefs had their ideas why the AGS was raising the specter of the USSR. Was it because the army had a notion of commencing something serious against the Russians? This would have affected the navy's desperate competition with the army, aimed at focusing highest-level Japanese attention on the main hypothetical enemies of the navy, the United States and Britain, al­ though army leaders denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time.7 Thus, the plan to reduce Hankow had encountered considerable internal opposition in high places. A two-front war, army planners admitted pri­ vately, would be premature from the standpoint of operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were the hew senior war-ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking AGS officers also shared their apprehen­ sions, as did Court circles.8 Violent but private arguments were reported even among staff experts. Of aggressive temperament, colored by forceful subordinates and by influences emanating from the Kwantung Army, Inada is known to have visited Tada, the deputy army chief of staff, throughout the drafting of the Hankow operation. He was striving to convince Tada of the validity of his conviction that the Wuhan drive was imperative and feasible and that, regardless of gnawing concern in certain quarters, the USSR was not going to intervene against Japan. Inada argued that the Soviet Union stood to gain immensely from the weakening of both bel­

24

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

ligerents, without any cost in blood to itself. Stalin was no fool; time was working for the USSR in the Far East, where Siberian industrialization and a military buildup were well under way. The Soviet purges militated against adventures with Japan, as the Amur Incident of 1937 had proved. Nazi Germany was evolving into a critical threat on Russia's western fron­ tiers; Stalin ought to be preparing against war on that front in the near future. The Japanese and the Russians, insisted Inada, should steer clear of each other—Japan because of China, and Russia because of Germany. While most of the army was locked in combat in China, Tada did not wish to weaken the defenses of Manchukuo or to transfer Kwantung Army forces south. Not until he had completed an inspection tour of the Man­ churian borders in April 1938 did he finally concur with Inada's repeated proposals, so far as they applied not only to the north but to China. Mean­ while, Inada had been studying the daily stacks of intelligence from the Kwantung Army. After the startling news of Lyushkov's defection in June, word came that the Soviets appeared to be implementing their sector com­ mander's recommendation. Russian troops had been sighted on Chang­ kufeng, and it looked as if they were digging in to stay. Inada remembers his reaction: "That's nice—my chance has come."9

NOTES 1. Kusaka interview. 2. Chiang Kai-shek, broadcast of 7 July 1938, Hankow, in Vital Speeches of the Day 5 (1 November 1938), pp. 60-61; Konoe Fumimaro, statement of 7 July 1938, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Japan: 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 1: 470; FRUS 1938 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 3: 162-163 (Tokyo dateline, 28 April 1938); ibid., 3:172 (Tokyo dateline, 21 May 1938). 3. The best summary of army intelligence estimates is in Imaoka Yutaka, ''Nihon no tai-So handan," pp. 14-15, 34, 44. 4. See my "Effects of Attrition on National War Effort: The Japanese Army Experience in China, 1937-1938," Military Affairs 32 (Fall 1968): 57-62. 5. See Harada Kumao, Saionji ko to seikyoku, 6:248 (24 February 1938); I. Hata et al., Taiheiyo senso e no michi (hereafter cited as TSM), 4/2: 43, 368. 6. Imaoka interview. , 7. Kusaka, Yamaguchi, Toyoda, Inada, Hashimoto, Arao, and I. Hata interviews; Harada, Saionji ko to seikyoku, 7:56, 65-66. ■” 8. Hata Ikuhiko, Ni-Chu senso shi, pp. 248-249. ' 9. Inada interview.

Reconnaissance in Force

4

Once the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Chang­ kufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. A search of documentation indicated maps new, maps old, and concordances various. It was certain, however, that Chang­ kufeng was by no means the highest land feature in the area. From far more useful eminences in Japanese possession, telescopes swept Soviet terrain across the borders. Nor were the advantages exclusively Japanese. Wherever the borders were ill defined, the Russians, almost by tacit un­ derstanding, had divided the occupation of commanding terrain on a rough basis of parity since the Manchurian Incident. Indeed, Changku­ feng may have been overlooked because it was situated at the southerly edge of the line of leapfrogged hills, although its location seems to have given it more of the quality of an anchor point.1 Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers were impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Chang­ kufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers called rowing across the stream "rather difficult." Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles could move easily; the Maanshan section constituted the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line be­ tween the harbor and town of Novokievsk (Kraskino). Near Changkufeng,

26

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for ve­ hicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover versus aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiang­ chunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited.2 Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no men­ tion of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, however, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use—as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Rus­ sian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Man- , churia from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changku­ feng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation be­ tween Hongui and Shikai stations. From Changkufeng to the railway,

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

27

it was only 2/2 to 4/2 miles. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, was 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of myth­ ical Japanese shelling of Vladivostok (at an incredible range of 80 miles) which was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border.3 Hills and questions are supposed to have two sides. It is the consensus of Japanese participants that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to the Japanese, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights: "The calm outlook of the Korea Army vis-a-vis the disputed hillock was admirable. Even we in Tokyo, under ordinary circumstances, would have ignored matters, giving the matter an 'Oh, really?' reaction at most, although the Kwantung Army would probably have grumbled."4 Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts were crystallizing. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force (iryoku teisatsu} in the strategic sense.5 Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat in­ telligence, at the IGHQ level the concept was far more sweeping: to test, "fish for," and quickly prove (so far as Inada was concerned) the degree of seriousness of Soviet intentions of intervening on the side of China against Japan in the "China Incident," which had been raging since July 1937. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome co­ incidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese ex­ ploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostil­ ities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Jap­ anese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Chang­ kufeng sector, "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artil­ lery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control

28

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by IGHQ working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces ("quite an unusual occur­ rence in our history," Inada has observed wryly). Calm, clear, and dispas­ sionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demar­ cation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not in­ sist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the lo­ cal forces would be withdrawn. "In the process," says Inada, "we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved."6 The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal—the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had been wisely keeping the aggressive division away from Chang-, kufeng Hill, but now IGHQ had its own overriding ideas and need£. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain; limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one in:

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

29

fantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada has answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on IGHQ's re­ sponsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians.” In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overcom­ mitted in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight IGHQ control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. "How would the Rus­ sians react?” Inada asked himself. "That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it."7 By the middle of July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan entitled, "IGHQ Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Con­ sidering the fact that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the fron­ tier of Korea, IGHQ would immediately get the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest.8 Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntardy. On the basis of the guidance received from IGHQ, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July.10 Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal.

30

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Even today, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident are not in agreement that everybody at com­ mand level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada says he was. Some think that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youth­ ful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; other deny the existence of such an idea. Inada remains clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insists, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restric­ tions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved by 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the AGS and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease."11 The only real opposition, Inada recalls, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN opera­ tions section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly.12 The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as op­ posed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If we are to lend credence to comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallowminded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army.13 Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, are astringent, ! cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command tp the new Korea Army commander, Gen. Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to’ leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the \

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

31

course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristically displayed a wariness that was rein­ forced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10 A.M. on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by IGHQ of­ ficers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalls that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserts, promised full cooperation. There is no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force.14 When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area.15 Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the AGS chief.16 The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters.17 Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Col. Arisue Yadoru (Operations) and Maj. Kotani Etsuo (a specialist in Soviet intelligence). Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada says that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration,” he admits that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalls hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of

32

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

the Wuhan operation. Koiso has disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division.18 By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem."19 Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff.20 Its commander had been allotted prime responsi­ bility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the com­ mand and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. IGHQ would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It was not the type of inci­ dent which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. IGHQ had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explains that operational guidance by IGHQ and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars." "One must highly rate the fact," concludes Imaoka, "that this field army tried its best to localize matters and loyally obeyed the intentions of the central authorities."21 There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission, of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after

33

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two AGS experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalls that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue per­ formed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order.22 Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures” were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japan­ ese press was not according the incident page-one treatment yet. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japan­ ese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japan­ ese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. In­ formants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937.23

NOTES 1. Inada, Sasai, and I. Hata interviews. 2. Terrain analysis based on AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 9-12. 3. See my "Changkufeng and the Japanese 'Threat' to Vladivostok, 1938," Journal of Asian History 5 (1971): 119-139; Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 17-18, 22; Tominaga, Matsumura, Sasai, Arao, Inada, Kitano, and I. Hata interviews. 4. Inada interview. 5. Sometimes called iryoku sosaku, "search in force." 6. Inada interview. 7. Ibid. 8. AGS Message No. 143 (to Korea Army and Kwantung Army commanders), CS, Chokoho, p. 2. 9. War Ministry, Manchukuo Affairs, Message No. 118 (to Korea Army and Kwantung Army commanders), CS, Chokoho, p. 3. 10. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 15 July 1938. 11. Inada interview. 12. Ibid. 13. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:65-66. 14. Hashimoto, Inada interviews.

34

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

15. IGHQ Army Order No. 154 (sanctioned by the Throne on 16 July 1938), CS, Chokoho, p. 4; Inada and Iwasaki interviews. 16. AGS Message No. 160 (to commanding generals in Seoul and Hsinking), CS, Chokoho, p. 4. 17. See ch. 2, n. 24. 18. It has been suggested that Major General Kitano was operating as acting army commander during the brief but important interregnum. 19. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, pp. 643-644; Iwasaki interview. Also see IMTFE, Transcript, 21 May 1947, pp. 22742-22743, 22751 (suppositions of Tanaka Ryukichi), and 31 October 1947, pp. 32232-32233 (rebuttal by Koiso). 20. See ch. 2, pp. 15-16. 21. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," pp. 29-30. 22. Kotani and Iwasaki interviews. 23. Tokyo Asahi, 16 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3; New York Times (Tokyo) 17 July 1938, p. 21.

First Involvement of the 19th Division

Omnia prius tentanda. [Fair means should first be tried.] Livy: Hannibal to Scipio

Irked by the Korea Army's so-called timidity and anxious to obtain first-hand information, the Kwantung Army sent two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu, a "hawk" famous for interventions throughout a stormy career. In his memoirs, Tsuji says that he and Ogoshi clambered up Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian ter­ ritory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion."1 Although his account is similar, Ogoshi asserts that Tsuji could not accompany him. According to sources serving with the 19th Division, when Koiso heard that Tsuji and Ogoshi were de­ riding the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted! Ogoshi replies that the army staff was not angry but that Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Koiso's concern, Ogoshi surmises, was that if emotional outsiders such as Tsuji came to Changkufeng, they could only cause trouble, perhaps war. Such a view is shared widely. Inada says that he made it a practice to keep away in order to maintain that degree of detachment and impar­ tiality required of high command authorities.2 One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by ob­ servers from Hsinking has been provided by Lt. Col. Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which dealt with Manchukuo

36

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

affairs, primarily political direction. When he visited the Operations Sec­ tion, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways of evicting the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. Gen. Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff. The latter was already in possession of the draft of an operations order call­ ing for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Rus­ sians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a problem to be handled only by the operations staff. Bor­ ders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section as well as the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions on the basis of having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participa­ tion by forces under Kwantung Army command.3 Upon receipt of the text of IGHQ's policy reply to the Korea Army's proposals, the Kwantung Army responded again. On 15 July Hsinking wired Seoul that "the Kwantung Army will gladly cooperate in matters related to . . . operational movement, operational materiel, and the like."4 Insight into the aggressive counsels prevailing in Kwantung Army Head­ quarters is found in navy captain Takagi's notes recorded during the last week of July:

1. It is imperative to make the Soviet forces withdraw from Changkufeng; use of force is necessary. 2. Even if there is resort to force, the Russians will not escalate the incident on a big scale because aggravation of the situation (such as pre­ parations for combat or troop reinforcements) has not been observed on the Soviet side; the relationship between the Red Army and the GPU [secret police] is extremely tense.5 Staff officers in Tokyo felt that Hsinking could not see the forest for; the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate aggravation of a negligible frontier affair undoubtedly stemmed from fail­ ure to comprehend the strategic requirements of national defense—pro- •: secution of the campaign in China, the nurturing of Manchukuo, and the;

FIRST INVOLVEMENT OF 19TH DIVISION

37

buildup of operational readiness for ultimate solution of the Soviet prob­ lem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities were pressing for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Thus, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as "background." Meanwhile, it was the Imperial will that utmost pru­ dence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautionary instructions to subordinate units, especially the forces on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions neither ended the dis­ content and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Head­ quarters nor stilled the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki.6 Nevertheless, the Kwan­ tung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army sought naively to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Hsinking regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements.7 On the spot, the situation was becoming inflamed. During the after­ noon of 15 July a Japanese military police patrol from Korea was recon­ noitering at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claim that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria; OSS Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro told a reporter that GPU soldiers dragged Matsushima's corpse into Soviet territory.8 The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier which had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, has asserted that Ma­ tsushima's effects included a notebook containing the results of recon­ naissance and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled on being challenged.9

38

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the dis­ puted border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a coun­ terprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the nego­ tiations. In his memoirs, he states that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. This interpretation is supported by Nakamura Bin, the correspondent who first learned of the death of Matsushima: "Compounded by the Russians' illegal occupation of the crest, the killing proved to be the direct cause of the Changkufeng Inci­ dent."10 The shooting occurred at the same time the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter seemed to have no such intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they were claiming to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might be imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north asTungning on the eastern Man­ churian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers were fortifying the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence esti­ mated that Soviet troop strength in the vicinity of Changkufeng had been built up to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July.11 As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair has become increasingly difficult."12 In Tokyo, public concern mounted. The press gave full play to reports from the scene, and foreign correspondents reported that the trouble at■ Changkufeng was virtually the only subject of public discussion. An Ameri­ can newsman cabled that conversations with Japanese in all walks of life’ revealed uneasiness lest Russia seize the opportunity of the Chinese war •>

FIRST INVOLVEMENT OF 19TH DIVISION

39

to attack Japan. The crisis might develop into another incident such as the one that had started the war with China in 1937.13 Local Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities were ordered to give the Russians “one last chance.” The following message was addressed by the commander of the Hunchun detachment to the Soviet Border Garrison Unit (BGU) at Novokievsk: Your country's border guards have invaded Manchukuo ter­ ritory in the neighborhood of Changchih [Lake Khasan] and have been constructing fortified positions which can never be permitted. From the standpoint of our border defense, we cannot overlook acts of invasion. . . . Therefore it is desired that [your soldiers] speedily evacuate the area. ... In case this demand fails to be responded to favorably, necessary action will ... be taken. . . . with firm determination. The entire responsibility, we now declare, will have to be borne by your troops.14

Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya had two emissaries bear the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,” set out on 18 July, message in one hand, white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report, next day, that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which was transmitted to higher authorities.15 Still the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. The Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles be­ hind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front in­ creased from the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping inci­ dents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on day­

40

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

time reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese said that their for­ bearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged “Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair on the Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Jap­ anese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mor­ tars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; of­ ficers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory.16 Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the “brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces were infuriating the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because of fear that fighting would begin soon in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was monopolized by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo pub­ lisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 „„„ "17 sen. Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached in­ dependently. Either it had taken almost a week for the decision to be made in Moscow or the diplomatic conversations in the Russian capital had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." At midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the “flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "My assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident,


POSTMORTEM

171

something in mind for that night. Yet, although we also oc­ cupied Hill 52 in broad daylight, the Russians took no counter­ action, such as sending scouts or sentries; only guards were posted in front of their works. Our troops managed to breach the second entanglements without being spotted; not until military dogs detected our clearing teams and let loose with an infernal barking were hostile patrols attracted. But even after the Russians found something amiss, they took no ag­ gressive steps to search out the exact direction of advance by our units.13

The Soviet troops at Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, the Japanese judged, were generally dull-witted or stolid; "they lacked an aggressive sense of re­ sponsibility." Many of the higher ranking tactical commanders were ob­ served fleeing by motor vehicle or boat during the fighting.14 In the area of Nakano's battalion, although most of the hostile forces were wiped out, not one officer's body was left behind; yet officers' belongings were still in the tents. At about 4 A.M., enemy vehicular movement became frequent, and all the boats on the west side of Khasan were withdrawn.

Against our organized fire, the Russian fighting will was ex­ tremely passive. For example, our dawn attack against the heights southwest of Shachaofeng was conducted after our side had laid down concentrated artillery fire; the enemy ran immediately. This must be only natural for a foe who relies exclusively on firepower. A defeat sustained by the Russians in one local area seemed to spread across the front like wild­ fire.15

On occasion, the Soviet Army was capable of obstinate resistance; several Russian soldiers clung to their trenches as long as their weapons were opera­ tional. Enemy armor operated even at night; many tanks were assigned to key locations. Some were deployed halfway up the slope of Changkufeng, where they served as firing points. Japanese intelligence heard that, after Changkufeng, the Soviet Army began to stress night combat training.16

172

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

NOTES 1. Akaishizawa gives the exaggerated figure of almost 400 Russians killed at Changkufeng; the regimental album claims over 70 Soviet bodies were abandoned. See Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 137-1 38; Jinchu bidan, p. 24. Also Sato, Tezuka, and Miyajima interviews; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July 1938. For Soviet admission of 68 killed and wounded, see ch. 16, p. 187. 2. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July 1938. 3. Suetaka in Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 325, 330-331. Akaishizawa called the operations amazingly clever. Ibid., pp. 136-138. 4. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 53-54. 5. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July 1938. 6. JRD, Japanese Night Combat, 1:45-46, 3:496-497; Hayano and Miyajima interviews. 7. Saito interview; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 53. 8. JRD, Japanese Night Combat, 3:497. 9. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 30-31 July 1938. 10. Akaishizawa, Chokoho, p. 138. 11. Sasai interview. Miyajima adds, "Under the circumstances [lack of informa­ tion] , we could hardly have done better." Miyajima interview. 12. The Russians were able to inflict "avoidable casualties" because, technically speaking, Japanese grenades proved to have a longer fuse delay than theirs. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 52-54; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July 1938; Hayano, Tezuka, Sakata, and Miyajima interviews. 13. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July 1938. Russian use of a canine corps should have occasioned no surprise. Japanese infantry schools had been studying the use of dogs, and all line regiments, not excluding the 75th and 76th, possessed sentry dogs. Akaishizawa mentions dogs with Takenouchi's assault unit near Shachao­ feng. Akaishizawa, Chokoho, p. 141. Also Sakata and Imaoka interviews. 14. G. A. Batarshin, then a noncommissioned officer, asserts that he and Lieu­ tenant Tereshkin, both of whom had been wounded, swam across Lake Khasan (SO­ SO meters at this point), as did all other survivors who could swim. The Japanese, claims Batarshin, fired artillery and trench mortars against the swimmers. IMTFE, Transcript, 30 October 1947, pp. 32074-32075, 32127; ibid., 31 October 1947, pp. 32145-32147, 32150-32151. 15. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 52. 16. JRD, Japanese Night Combat, 1:46.

Fait Accompli and Problems of Rapport

The first phone call to Seoul was made by the division only after Chang­ kufeng had been assaulted and cleared. At 5:40 A.M. on 31 July, Korea Army Headquarters received Report No. 1 by phone from Division Staff Officer Yamazaki: "(1) Since the enemy in the Shachaofeng area moved forward, the Sato unit launched a counterattack; there has been fighting since about 2:40. (2) The sound of artillery is heard east and west of Lake Khasan. (3) Fog hangs deep on the spot now."1 There is no mention of the assault on Changkufeng; the operation is made to sound like counter­ action in the Shachaofeng sector; it is suggested that Soviet artillery was firing. An excuse for the vagueness is the report of obscuring fog. But since division headquarters not only knew about the premeditated nature of the regiment's attacks—to the extent of the jump-off time—and since Suetaka had visited Sato on the 30th, it is impossible to say that Seoul was mis­ informed out of ignorance. Having finally alerted army headquarters to the eruption of a fire-fight in unspecified strength and at an unspecified locale, the division continued to release statements to Seoul. Phoned Report No. 2 said: "(1) According to accounts from the Sato force, a portion of the unit captured enemy positions located between Changkufeng and the line south of Shachao­ feng at about 2:30 A.M. (2) The rest of the unit captured the first line of positions at Changkufeng at approximately 2:40 and the attack is con­ tinuing."2 The geographical objectives were thus defined, although the only apparent justification for attacking Changkufeng was the allegation in Report No. 1 about the Russians' prior advance in the Shachaofeng

174

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

sector. Report No. 2 added that the major Japanese effort was being made at Changkufeng, not at Shachaofeng; artillery was not mentioned. Perhaps the division was doling out information to soften higher head­ quarters' reaction. Equally possible, communications from the desperately engaged front-line elements were poor or confused. Still, the division had a staff captain (Sasai) observing the action—another proof that the divi­ sion thinking was interlocked with that of the 75th Infantry. A major at advance division headquarters phoned for news throughout the night. "Finally Sasai wouldn't even come to the phone!"3 Around 5 A.M. the division learned that victory had been achieved at Changkufeng; the first reports mentioned no Japanese casualties. "Thank God!" was the reaction. Suetaka and the major took outsa/re cups and reverently toasted Sato's victory. The division's telephoned Report No. 3 asserted jubilantly that Changkufeng had been occupied at 5:15 A.M. The necessity to have counterattacked was again justified: "From the facts that the enemy delivered rather accurate artillery bombardment from the beginning, although the night was black, and three tanks were also com­ mitted, there can be no doubt, at first glance, that it was a premeditated attack on the part of the foe." Division Report No. 4 crowned the night's successes with glory: "At 6 A.M., one company of the Sato unit occupied Shachaofeng and expelled the Soviet forces across the border.''4 Not long afterward, the division, like the 75th Regiment, began to learn the extent of the casualties. Although feelings of personal sorrow supplanted the first elation, there was grim satisfaction that the insolent Russians had been ousted and the dignity of the Imperial Army maintained. It was hoped and expected that the Korea Army would share this view. Seoul had heard about the Japanese assaults only after the fact and in a rather cursory fashion. Nakamura learned that "the front-line units had dealt a firm counterattack against the offensive advance and unlawful challenge of the enemy in the Shachaofeng area, and that Changkufeng had been captured at once."5 This exculpatory wording does not explain the situation in army headquarters, where initial response was not placid. Since most of the division was supposed to have returned to duty stations, Iwasaki thought that the affair must have been staged by the Kyonghun BGU, which had been admonished against imprudent action. Iwasaki was furious, as was General Nakamura, at first. "Casualties had been .frightful. Till now the Japanese Army had fought only Chinese whom we made > light of, yet here we were acting the same way against the Russians. The-

FAIT ACCOMPLI AND RAPPORT PROBLEMS

175

army commander said that matters should have been handled much more carefully." Nakamura had the front-line units secure the heights, "while having them endeavor to localize the affair by limiting the strength used in that area to the minimum and by ensuring cautious action."6 Iwasaki feels strongly that Suetaka should have elicited prior approval. But the general was not reprimanded. "After all, he was the division commander on the spot, and he only did what he concluded was best." Tsuchiya agrees: "In this sense, perhaps, one might say that we were taken in by him. Yet if he had not staged the night attack, our troops at Shachaofeng would be in danger of annihilation. So we approved what was done." Since the Korea Army did not seem to have authority to direct operations in detail, Tsuchiya is not sure that Suetaka was obliged to report everything beforehand. Division staff officers do not share this explanation. The decision not to advise the Korea Army, they admit, was taken because of lack of rap­ port with Seoul, and not because of the chain of command. Most tend to blame Suetaka for a premeditated lapse. "Liaison between us and Seoul," Saito said with a smile, "was good—after the night attack!" The Korea Army authorities seem to have been more understanding of the division's "unavoidable" problems than the other way around. Still, the question arose early whether Suetaka should be provided major reinforcements to secure his dangerous conquests. "Because the division commander was so enthusiastic," the senior staff officer observes, "we were concerned that if he was allowed to use the entire division, on his own initiative, we could expect the worst. Suetaka might even launch an arbitrary offensive against the USSR."7 Although piecemeal commitment of forces was not good, Nakamura and Iwasaki decided to handle matters that way because of the decisions of higher headquarters. The role of Nakamura has attracted considerable comment. Tsuchiya claims that no full-fledged staff conference took place at army headquarters even after news of the unexpected night attack. "The decision was taken too easily. Maybe some had covert feelings of opposition, but no one spoke up. I think that there was a certain misunderstanding of individual positions. Yet the crisis should have been analyzed carefully. It's too bad that there was no direct supervision by the AGS." To Tsuchiya, the Korea Army would have been in trouble if the incident had dragged on because of the Soviet buildup and the Japanese casualties and low level of mobilization. Although Nakamura must have wanted the 19th Division to abandon its unnecessary actions irrespective of considerations of victory or defeat, he

176

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

did not seem to care; he showed no intention of inspecting the local scene. Yet Tsuchiya felt such a keen sense of responsibility in case matters went wrong that he was prepared to commit suicide. Inada retorts that it was to avoid expanding the troubles and exciting the troops that Nakamura did not visit the front.8 Analyzing this matter of the Korea Army's nebulous control, Imaoka notes that Nakamura had only recently arrived in Korea and little time had elapsed before the fighting began, but that something seemed to be lacking in the army's exercise of command. Thus, Nakamura never met Suetaka until the incident had been settled, although the governor-general came from Seoul to visit Suetaka at the battlefront and to express his appreciation in person. "It was quite proper to adhere to the policy of nonenlargement, but the Korea Army should have furnished more positive operational guidance in such a case when a subordinate division was in serious trouble."9 There were very important lessons to be learned precisely here, Tsuchiya suggests: "The 19th Division attacked the Russians twice in 36 hours, with­ out army orders or approval. How is it that the division commander, a lieutenant general and assuredly no irresponsible type, could have been allowed so much margin to act independently?" Some suggest that Sue­ taka had a tendency to violate the spirit of the law, especially when force majeure was involved.10 Others think that Suetaka was loyal, deliberate, and law-abiding, a worrier who could be expected always to follow orders.11 Why risk one's career—one's life, for that matter, since harakiri was never out of mind—when headquarters' decision was available for the asking? Military discipline and national interest dictated prior consultation and compliance. Or did Suetaka, like other generals of note, think gambles are justified by the goddess Victory? Japanese historians now admit that the reporting of the incFdent seems to have been warped by the division: Although the messages to headquarters providing details of the arbitrary assault were worded to suggest that our side had sustained an unprovoked Soviet attack right before our own night assault—which was, therefore, in the nature of a counteraction—the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng sectors had remained quiet after the little clash on the afternoon of the 29th. There was no such thing as the Soviet forces' having attacked. But the central authorities were apparently led to

FAIT ACCOMPLI AND RAPPORT PROBLEMS

177

believe that the Russians had trespassed, even by the Soviet contention, and had attacked us wantonly [between 29-31 July] .... Clearly, the actions of Suetaka and Sato contra­ vened the principle of the Imperial order; one could surmise that both officers were mightily conscious of that fact.12 As the Pentagon Papers show, it is valuable to compare public versions of events and classified accounts, when they are disclosed, with respect to completeness and honesty. Japanese documentation on Changkufeng reveals a remarkable similarity between open and classified versions. Topsecret Gaimusho records mirrored military reporting.13 Public accounts are embellished and contain discrepancies but are consistent in theme and import. Although figures on the alleged Russian buildup are unimpressive, the central charge is made that Soviet forces mounted an unprovoked and premeditated attack early on 31 July against outnumbered Japanese bor­ der guards. Korea Army Headquarters admitted publicly that the Japanese casualties were thought to be high.14 Foreign press coverage emanated mainly from Tokyo where, undoubtedly influenced by government policy, the press was minimizing the border strug­ gle. The Japanese assault had come as a "complete surprise, since the govern­ ment's previous statements indicated that only diplomatic means would be used to settle the bitterly disputed border sovereignty." Contested territory had been seized by Soviet troops backed by armor and heavy artillery, but Japanese forces had regained control of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng after a "terrible fight." Assurances were being offered that the Japanese Air Force would not be unleashed and that ground troops "absolutely obey orders from Tokyo." It was taken for granted that neither Tokyo nor Moscow desired all-out war, but there was a disquieting similarity with the situation in China a year earlier; "the Japanese public is worried." The Russians, a Gaimusho spokesman suggested, "might have mistaken recent Japanese activities along the border as a sign of weakness and . .. hence they assumed an aggressive attitude." It was Japan's stance that, with the recapture of Changkufeng, "the status quo ante . . . had been restored and must be maintained." Russia was expected to reopen negotiations for a border settlement.15 From Moscow, Tass merely stated that on 31 July, Japanese militarists had violated the Soviet frontier on the hills west of Khasan and attacked Russian border guards suddenly by night under artillery cover. After several hours of fighting, the Japanese troops managed to occupy

178

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

"Soviet territory" to a depth of 21/2 miles, but they suffered heavy losses in men and equipment.16 Until the full impact of the crisis at Changkufeng on 31 July was felt in Tokyo, all had been relatively quiet at the governmental level. On the 27th, when Harada visited Konoe, the prime minister said that there was nothing new. On the next day, the Imperial household minister remarked that the Emperor was going to visit Hayama from 30 July. On the morning of the 29th, a routine cabinet session was convened. Konoe decided to go to Karuizawa for the weekend. On the 30th, the Emperor and Empress were free to board the train for the planned ten-day rest at the seaside villa. Sunday the 31st found the monarch at sea, collecting marine specimens.17 First reports of the latest action in Korea reached the AGS on the morning of 31 July—ex post facto, of course. " 'Well, they have gone and done it!' was our first reaction," says Inada. "This was exactly our original hope, but the best thing for us to do now was to stop firmly where we were."18 Initial intelligence indicated that both Shachaofeng and Chang­ kufeng had been cleared completely. Japanese casualties reportedly totaled 97 officers and men, but losses inflicted upon the Russians were thought to be at least double.19 Suetaka was reversing the pullout and was having the rear units head back for the front from Nanam and the garrison towns. Hashimoto sheds light on AGS thinking: In general, the incident had developed in accord with what we had had in mind—quite the opposite from our experience with the Kwantung Army! In Japanese thinking, retreat was out of the question in the face of challenge; one had to fight for one's rights. Distances were great, communications were not good, and local commanders had to be empowered to react immedi­ ately. We agreed fundamentally with the Korea Army that the situation had grown so bad, by the 30th or so, that it was im­ perative to concur in the use of force, confined strictly inside our frontiers. It was not a question of "covering" the Korea Army; we just could not evade what we considered to be our duty.20

Another AGS operations officer, Arao, feels that matters at ShachadfengChangkufeng had transpired inexorably: everyone wanted to demonstrate that if the Soviets acted threateningly, the Japanese could and would re- ;

-k

FAIT ACCOMPLI AND RAPPORT PROBLEMS

179

spond, and that one infantry division could do the job. The sole condition was that Japanese troops not enter Russian territory. "Contrary to the experience at Nomonhan the following year, there was no criticism from any quarter. Nor was there dissatisfaction with the Korea Army. They trusted us; we trusted them and provided reassurances of support and assent."21 As for the latest information being provided by the military authorities in Korea to the highest levels in the homeland, the diary of Sawamoto, an Imperial aide, reveals rationalized intelligence which the senior aide-de-camp, Usami, passed on to the Emperor at Hayama on the afternoon of,31 July: "Since the enemy launched an attack at 2 A.M. today, our forces decisively counterattacked, completely occupying Changkufeng after 4 A.M. and Shachaofeng at about 6 A.M. Eleven tanks, two mountain pieces, and two machine guns, etc., were captured."22 Sawamoto understood that it was His Majesty's pleasure that, if the foe had attacked first, counteraction was satisfactory. The AGS was determined to set the Emperor's mind at rest, but it was not a task for the aged Kan'in to seek His Majesty's understanding. The mission was vital, for soon the army intended to apply formally again for Imperial sanction to use force in the Changkufeng area, something which still had not been elicited when 19th Division troops struck the Russians. The only question, says Inada, was the Emperor's attitude. It had been less than a week since matters had finally been straightened out between the command and the Throne.

But what if His Majesty should think that we had entered into cahoots with the front-line troops? It was somewhat rare for the deputy to be received by the monarch. . . . Now Tada would have to report about the arbitrary night attack as well as other matters. From one point of view, though, this crisis had occurred at an opportune time. The Emperor must have had the impres­ sion that the army was deceiving him because of the unsolved chief-of-staff problem—the need for closer relations—which had come to a head in July. I [Inada] went to see Tada. He pre­ dicted that he'd be bawled out. What could he say? Should he quit? I asked him to explain the situation honestly. This mat­ ter could not be dodged. Tada agreed.23

180

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

At 5 P.M. on the 31st, Tada appeared before the Emperor with deep dread for, not too long before, the use of force had been prohibited by the monarch. His Majesty was in good humor. After listening to the ex­ planations, "which were entirely candid and cleared away any misunder­ standings or doubts," the Emperor said: "What was done was done. We appreciate the troops' having stopped there. Convey to the front-line of­ ficers and men our desire that, although it may be very difficult, they must not cross the border, even a step. Nevertheless, they must not yield the lines they hold." Unforgettably relieved and deeply touched by the Imperial grace, Tada left happy and smiling. Inada was equally grateful.24

Thus, we could return to our original idea at last. As long as the Emperor's comments were not adverse, everything was all right. The measures taken by the front-line division commander on his own initiative corresponded perfectly with the intentions of his superiors and broke the impasse. Still, we would never allow this headstrong, dauntless, but loyal commander to de­ viate from the central will. IGHQ was adhering to the policy of nonenlargement and had decided to entrust the field units with the handling of the affair. Sato Kotoku had seized the hill, but he'd be held up at the border line instead of overdoing things as usual!25

Imaoka speculates about the cloudy background: Since immense problems would have been caused if the division commander had advised the central authorities that he conducted the night attack on his own, he must have said that his front-line troops had acted spontaneously but that he had promptly taken steps necessary to cope with the new situation. "Possibly, His Majesty was relieved to learn that Suetaka had given instructions that there must be no violation of the border line which had just been occupied."26 Meanwhile, there had been much bustling about in Tokyo. A troubled Harada received reassurance from Konoe's chief secretary that the situa­ tion was not too serious, but that it did seem to have been started by the Soviets. Since the authorities were concerned, the premier was asked to come back from Karuizawa. "This whole problem ought not to cause a disquieting impression nor should it be exaggerated, so there will be no , extraordinary cabinet conference tonight. Later we shall ask the navy, : army, and foreign minister^ to discuss countermeasures.''27 When Konoej.

FAIT ACCOMPLI AND RAPPORT PROBLEMS

181

returned, he was brought up to date. Between 8 and 8:45 P.M. on the 31st, he saw Itagaki, the war minister, after which he conferred separately with Ugaki, the foreign minister, to 9:20. Immediately afterward, Ugaki called a meeting of his subordinates to discuss "countermeasures." Itagaki had left his conference with Konoe and convened key war ministry and AGS officers. On the next afternoon, he was to be received in audience at Hayama. The command felt that the situation had undergone sharp change, but the fact that Japanese troops had seized the disputed points by force must have posed a great threat to the Russians. Under such salutary circumstances, matters would be transferred to diplomacy. Since an Imperial command would be necessary. War Minister Itagaki, as well as Army Chief of Staff Kan'in, would have to report to the Throne again on 1 August. The unfurling of the incident was not understood clearly at all levels in Tokyo. Even after a visit to Hayama on 3 August, Imperial Household Minister Matsudaira gave Baron Harada a fuzzy account, admitting that the truth of the matter was not known. Although neither Tanaka nor Cho had been involved in the attack on Changkufeng, Japanese Navy and foreign ministry officials understood that those "notorious colonels" were "in charge." The vice foreign minister, Horinouchi, heard that Itagaki was so upset about the possibility of the local forces' taking rash action that he had bypassed the AGS chain of command because "infamous schemers" such as Tanaka and Cho would not obey ordinary military com­ manders; Tanaka could be checked only by Itagaki. At no point does the name of Suetaka or of K. Sato appear. Horinouchi called the Japanese Army's attitude "outrageous" and a circumvention of the Imperial will, while Navy Captain Takagi was also unhappy with the forces in Korea. On 3 August Takagi asked Harada for his cooperation, for the sake of the country, and specifically mentioned naval objections to the use of air­ craft.

It is a source of deep disappointment to me to see the develop­ ment of the situation through clumsy, arbitrary decisions reached by the local forces. Although the navy ministry and NGS are eagerly cooperating to avoid an unfortunate situation we can­ not expect our aim to be achieved. My sole regret is that not only the AGS but also the NGS are optimistic concerning the scale of Soviet counteraction after our use of force.28

182

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

According to Korea Army sources, on the evening of 31 July, a first message was received from Tada concerning the news of the victorious night assault: "(1) We understood the telephone report made by Staff Officer Iwasaki that a counterassault was concluded successfully against the Soviet forces' attack and that front-line troops are being guided in consonance with policy of non-aggravation. (2) We have immediately requested foreign ministry to undertake negotiations concerning Soviet Army's unlawful attack.”29 The next message from Tokyo was transmit­ ted near midnight, after Tada had returned from his audience at Hayama.

Concerning incidents at Shachaofeng and Changkufeng, cen­ tral authorities have decided to shift matters to diplomatic negotiation in accord with policy of not aggravating situation further. Korea Army's actions will be governed by forthcoming Imperial order but for time being kindly handle matters as fol­ lows: (1) As long as foe does not challenge, our actions should not be extended beyond situation now. (2) Your army's de­ ployments and actions are to be left "as is" for a while, except preparations against enemy counteraction; activities are to be guided with utmost prudence.30

The audiences on 1 August proceeded without a hitch. First, there was careful coordination between ministers. At 9:30 A.M., Itagaki went to see Ugaki. They discussed the information from Seoul for an hour. Itagaki conferred next with Konoe, and after lunch visited Navy Minister Yonai. At 2:52, Itagaki left Tokyo by train for Hayama where, according to Sawamoto, he was received after 4. This time, Kan'in followed rather than preceded Itagaki; he was seen by the Emperor at 4:30. Sawamoto commented, "It seems the policy for the incident is nonenlargement, moving matters to diplomacy, and deciding on the border locally."31 At 6:52 P.M. on the 1st, Kan'in dispatched to Nakamura the text of an IGHQ order: "(1) Korea Army commander will occupy ChangkufengShachaofeng area, in general vicinity of present advanced lines, for the time being, and will tighten security of army's Manchukuo-USSR border frontage. (2) Details will be provided in directive by chief of AGS."32 Two hours after receipt of the new order, Nakamura was issued the IGHQ directive:

FAIT ACCOMPLI AND RAPPORT PROBLEMS

183

As long as Soviet forces do not challenge Changkufeng-Shachaofeng vicinity, development of military action beyond present extent is prohibited. Army's deployments and actions will be maintained as of present, except preparations against hostile counteraction. (2) Although defense shall be particu­ larly strict on army front along Manchukuo-Soviet frontier in addition to above-mentioned district, our troops must be careful to avoid irritating enemy. (3) Korea Army's activities in general must be handled with utmost care.33

Additionally, the air force was kept on leash. The import of the Imperial order and directive does not differ basically from the messages sent to Korea Army Headquarters late on 31 July. The memoirists and chroniclers can find nothing to sensationalize or to deplore; Kan'in's and Itagaki's failure of July is played up, not their success on 1 August. We find only one complication. A Japanese mono­ graph published after World War II makes note of the Imperial order of the 1st but records what purports to be another IGHQ order dated 30 July: "The Commanding General, Korea Army, may resort to force against the illegal border crossing of the Soviet Army in the vicinity of Changku­ feng."34 Such a hypothetical order, predating the night-dawn actions of 31 July, is a neat rationalization, but it shifts responsibility away from the divisional level. This version not only contradicts the facts but also is denied by considerations of common sense, for Imperial orders are not run-of-the-mill occurrences and must be recorded at some point. Nor would one expect a helpful deus ex machina to suppress local actions at every level, including Korea Army records. Division Staff Officer Saito asserts: "If there had been such an order, would the Korea Army have hesitated to unleash our division?" Adds Inada: "Imperial approval for use of force was post factum in this case, but not retroactive. Sanction was granted at Hayama only after Tada explained the situation." Imper­ ial orders could not be predated. We know the trepidation with which Suetaka's staff awaited word of the decision of higher headquarters, on which might hinge life itself for the officers concerned.35 This traumatic experience was shared by Suetaka, who was ready to assume responsibility in case the operations had failed. Imaoka comments, "One can imagine the extreme pleasure of Suetaka when he learned of the Imperial order of 1 August... from the fact that

184

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

he said, 'This order is worth a million reinforcements.' "36 In addition, a Korea Army staff officer visiting Tokyo at the time sent a coded telegram to Seoul, strictly on his own and through commercial channels, lauding the troops, suggesting Imperial pleasure, and conveying the "delight” of the high command. This communication was retransmitted to Kitano, who assembled the division forward staff to receive the message formally. Much moved, Suetaka sent a message of loyal and fervent appreciation for the Imperial beneficence to Tada and Tojo.37 As for Harada'a recording of Itagaki's alleged crackdown on trouble­ makers Cho and Tanaka, the nearest to a pertinent order from the war ministry to the authorities in Korea is a long message sent by Tojo at 7:25 P.M. on 1 August, a half hour after issuance of the IGHQ order. With respect to the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents, there had been no change in the policy of adhering to localization. Prompt solution is anticipated by immediately referring inci­ dents to diplomatic negotiation for treatment as a local ques­ tion, viewed in light of justice, propriety, and sake of peace. Details. Military activity will not be developed further as long as there is no hostile challenge. Diplomatic negotiations are to be commenced promptly in effort to solve matters quickly as a local question. In case parleys fall through, approximate present situation will be maintained. Troops at other points along Manchukuo-Soviet frontier will be particularly careful to prevent recurrence of trouble.38

The authorities in Tokyo were apprehensive lest the division, perhaps overly applauded by now, lose its head. Private injunctions to the Korea Army reinforced official communications. Nevertheless, the war ministry supported the interpretation by local forces. The telegram sent by Tojo on 1 August stated: "Direct causation was the fact the Soviets crossed the frontier (even by their own contention), particularly on 29 July, night of 30th, and morning of 31st, and illegally assaulted our guard units. It is evident that responsibility for the affair lies solely with the Russians."39 Only one other message approaches the curbs that Horinouchi claimed were instituted by Itagaki personally. On the night of 3 August, the Korea Army received a shorter wire from Tojo: "In connection with Changku­ feng Incident, it has been decided to adhere to the fullest to nonenlarge­ ment policy and to conduct diplomatic parleys based on predetermined

FAIT ACCOMPLI AND RAPPORT PROBLEMS

185

policy to prevent aggravation of situation. Kindly be especially cautious at this time, seeing to it that actions of front-line units do not run con­ trary to above-mentioned policy."40 The war ministry did not take cog­ nizance of two mere regimental commanders, although Tojo and Itagaki knew who was at the front and who was not. More important, official high command response to the fait accompli of 31 July was favorable. There were private "victory celebrations" in AGS inner sancta, where much was made of the front-line forces' zeal to defend the frontier, in­ trepid performance, and prowess in antitank combat.41 Private feelings of resentment or apprehension may have existed at the Tokyo level, but even Harada's memoirs pinpoint these emotions as the reactions of a few officials, and there was no real knowledge of what had transpired at 19th Division Headquarters between 29 and 31 July.42 The Japanese Army itself hoped that the Changkufeng crisis had been ended after the meting out of the decisive "one blow." This outlook not only reflects an unshakable Japanese refrain but also illustrates the general problems inherent in small wars and escalation.

NOTES 1. Telegraphed text received at Seoul, 10:05 A.M. CS, Chokoho, p. 41. 2. CS, Chdkoho, pp. 41-42. 3. Saito interview. 4. CS, Chokohd, p. 42. 5. Ibid., p. 44. 6. Ibid. 7. Iwasaki interview. 8. Arao agrees that Changkufeng was not the type of incident which required the presence of the army commander to direct operations. 9. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," pp. 30-32. 10. I. Hata interview. 11. Hashimoto interview. 12. I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:87-88, 376. From the command standpoint, Inada says, it did not matter whether the action was called an attack or counterattack in terms of his strategic reconnaissance concept. "The foreign ministry, no doubt, dubbed it a counterattack for purposes of diplomatic bargaining." Inada interview. 13. See K. Nakamura, Affidavit No. 2, paragraph 18 (Blakeney Collection); Gaimusho, SP No. 312, "Sasoho jiken" [The Shachaofeng affair], p. 68. 14. By 2 August the authorities admitted that three officers and 27 men had been killed and another 67 soldiers wounded. See Tokyo Asahi, 1-3 August 1938; B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 257-259, 292-295. 15. See New York Times, 31 July-2 August 1938.

186

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

16. FRUS 1938, 3:460-462 (Moscow, 1-2 August 1938). 17. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:56-57; Tokyo Asahi, 30 July-1 August 1938; Kido diary, I MT 2, 30 July 1938, p. 205. 18. Inada interview. 19. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. The total given for Japanese casualties sounds like the figure for 75th Regiment wounded. 20. Hashimoto interview. 21. Arao interview. Also Iwakuro interview. 22. Sawamoto, "Nikki," 31 July 1938. 23. Inada interview. 24. The preceding account is based on interviews with Inada and portions of his articles bearing on Tada's audience. Also Hashimoto and I. Hata interviews. 25. Inada interview. 26. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," p. 23. 27. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:57. 28. Ibid., 7:58, 61-62, 64-65. 29. CS, Chokoho, p. 44. Time of transmission is not stated. 30. Ibid., pp. 44-45; copies to Kwantung Army commander and Military Attache Doi in Moscow. Transmitted at 11:15 P.M., 31 July 1938; recieved by Kitano at 12:10 A.M., 1 August, 31. Sawamoto, "Nikki," 1 August 1938; supplemented by Tokyo Asahi, 1-2 August 1938. 32. The text of IGHQ Army Order No. 1 63 was contained in AGS Message No. 302. At 11 P.M. on 1 August, the retransmitted text was received by the 19th Divi­ sion. CS, Chokoho, p. 45. The recorded times differ in AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 84-85. 33. The text of IGHQ Army Directive No. 215 (pursuant to Order No. 1 63) was contained in AGS Message No. 303. AGS records suggest that the Imperial order and the directive stemmed from "guidance essentials" hammered out on 31 July and approved by a five ministers' conference on 1 (not 2) August. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 31 July-1 August 1938. 34. JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:141, appendix C. 35. Saito interview. 36. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," p. 27. 37. According to admission by lhara Junjiro, BBSS Archives. 38. War Ministry Message No. 134, Manchukuo Affairs; received by Kitano at 10:30 P.M. CS, Chokoho, pp. 46-47. The IGHQ Army Order is No. 163. 39. CS, Chokoho, p. 46. 40. Ibid., p. 47. 41. Statement by lhara, BBSS Archives. 42. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:56-57.

Russian Retaliation

16

Comparative slowness characterized reactions by the Soviet command in the Far East during the period from 1937 to 1939. In the case of Chang­ kufeng, there was no immediate counteraction to Japanese seizure of the crest. Nevertheless, having admitted the loss of Changkufeng and Shachao­ feng by dawn of 31 July, the Russian government issued a communique on the next day, asserting that Soviet troops had "hurled back a Japanese division . . . after a two-day battle" involving tanks, artillery, and planes. "Some hours" after the Japanese penetration, Soviet regulars had rushed to the scene and driven out the invaders. The Japanese lost 400 men; the Russians, 13 killed and 55 wounded.1 On "Soviet soil," the Japanese abandoned 5 cannon, 14 machine guns, and 157 rifles, while the Russians admitted losing one tank and one gun. A Soviet "reconnaissance" pilot may have fallen into Japanese hands after bailing out. "Both before and during the Japanese attack .. . Soviet troops did not once cross the Manchukuoan frontier—which deprived them of the possibility of surrounding or outflanking the invaders."2 By 1 August not only were Russian ground forces being deployed, but the Soviet Air Force went into action. Russian aircraft appeared at 12:30 P.M. and reconnoitered. Soon afterward, more than ten planes flew over in formation and launched strikes against forward units. Eight times, light bombers and fighters (120-150 in total, operating in flights of two or three dozen) bombed and strafed. Artillery was raided several times by as many as 30 planes but reported no losses. The Russians also struck targets located on the Korean side of the Tumen.3 During the raids of 1 August, according to Japanese documentation, two Russian planes were shot down by ground fire; the press retailed claims of four or five.4 Privately, the military con­ fessed to disappointment with antiaircraft capabilities; the 75th Regiment

188

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

judged that the Soviet Air Force had the intention of "intimidation.” In the afternoon, Japanese soldiers on the Shachaofeng front mistook 37 Soviet light bombers for long-awaited Japanese aircraft and cheered them by waving maps and blankets. The troops were soon disabused.5 Soviet aircraft usually appeared in sequence: reconnaissance, fighters, and bombers, the last always escorted by fighters. Bombing was conducted from high altitude, accuracy was poor, and bombs were dropped at places possessing no tactical value. "Our troops became convinced that the bomb­ ings and air-to-ground fire were ineffective. But since our antiaircraft unit fired wildly, the pilots felt free to descend to a mere 500 or 600 meters."6 The regiment instructed its gunners not to engage high-flying planes but to lure them down to effective firing range. Japanese sources were unanimous, however, in judging that the "incessant" Soviet air at­ tacks on 1 August did not jolt the defenders. Russian planes had dropped several dozen bombs against the Kyonghun bridge, but the span was not struck and damage was limited to hits on the railway; therefore, "the im­ pression of severity was misleading." The absence of air cover troubled the troops most. Sato grumbles: "The policy of localization undoubtedly encouraged Soviet use of aircraft." To cope with the air and artillery at­ tacks, he had instructed his units to "make every effort to ensure that not one soldier is hurt." Actually, Japanese casualties on 1 August were sur­ prisingly light: three men wounded in the 75th Infantry, and one man wounded and a horse killed in the 76th. The three Japanese battalions expended over 15,000 machine gun and 7,000 rifle bullets that day.7 Even if the Japanese soldiers were adjusting to assaults from the skies, the command and government were concerned deeply about the develop­ ment, which contained a threat of all-out hostilities. While Itagaki and Kan'in were at Hayama on 1 August, Kido learned that Soviet aircraft had bombed North Korea; he phoned Konoe immediately. Pending receipt of definitive intelligence, it was decided that there should be no extraordi­ nary governmental sessions on the 1st. Nevertheless, according to public reports, the government was taking a serious view of the Russian bombings, and there would be detailed considerations during the regular cabinet meeting on the next morning. From evening, meanwhile, army authorities conferred at length. At 8 P.M. there was a high-echelon conference of Itagaki, Tojo, and their senior subordinates. Tada came to see Itagaki, too.8 The introduction of Russian air power at Changkufeng drew anxious attention abroad. Reports from Shanghai called the news electrifying. Major

RUSSIAN RETALIATION

189

Russo-Japanese hostilities would change the China campaign overnight. Some observers were "undisguisedly dismayed,” for they saw the main­ land war prolonged interminably, with special benefit to Soviet interests. Japanese Army spokesmen sought to play down the situation. Officers at Hsinking told correspondents that although they took a serious view of the bomber raids, the latter represented only a face-saving measure. The Red Army was seeking to counter its loss of Changkufeng and other dis­ puted positions, but, except for the bombings, the border remained quiet. "If the Russians really meant business, they would have bombed the vital railway bridge near [Unggi]. It was untouched in today's raid, which was concentrated on minor railway bridges, and . . . damage was slight."9 In Tokyo, foreign observers thought that the appearance of 50 Soviet heavy bombers over North Korea represented an extension of the incidents that had caused tension, and the Japanese government was taking an urgent view. Japanese military leaders had apparently decided not to complicate the situation but, at the same time, to prepare for an emergency. The army command considered the aerial invasion a demonstration, not an offensive. Korea Army Headquarters denied that Soviet aircraft had bombed Harbin in Manchuria or Najin and Chongjin in Korea. As for the major question of retaliation by the Japanese Air Force, an American corres­ pondent cabled on 2 August that he had authoritatively learned that the military had no intention of sending aircraft over Russian territory.10 On 2 August, as the day became fair, Soviet air activity at the front began early. Between 5:15 and 7:30 A.M., Type-I fighters and SB heavy bombers attacked in flights of 10 to 30. Between 9 and 10 A.M., 42 fighters and bombers attacked; a third formation of 21 heavy bombers came at 11:10. Thirty SB bombers struck in a last wave at 6 P.M. All attack altitudes were 2,000 meters. Targets included Changkufeng, Hill 52, Shachaofeng, railheads, artillery sites, and objectives as far north as Wuchiatzu. Of the 100 planes sighted, the Japanese claimed to have shot down none. Japanese newspapers reported that, after their reverse of the 1st, Russian aviators, now "not too aggressive in general," operated at altitudes exceeding 1,000 meters. Therefore, the bombing accuracy of the "berserk devils" was poor.11 When the Japanese cabinet convened at 11 A.M. on 2 August, details of the latest aerial strikes were not available. Enough was known, however, about Russian air actions on the 1st, as well as about Japanese ground activities on 31 July, to warrant a 116 hour meeting.12 Konoe told Harada

190

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

that Suetsugu, the home minister, insisted that it would be very wrong for the Japanese to use aircraft,

but Railways Minister Nakajima was strong in his assertion that "we could settle the dispute locally—if we took power­ ful action locally." No other ministers heeded Nakajima's opinion. The navy said it could not dream of starting hostil­ ities because of lack of reserve strength and voiced strong objections. It was the government's policy to "avoid, by all means, the opening of fire against the Soviets." The army concurred fully and was hastening to leave the problem to parleys. The general intention was to settle at least the con­ troversy in the Changkufeng area, even if over-all [SovietJapanese] problems were not solved, by setting up a border commission if necessary.13 According to Kido, the cabinet decided that, "to avert the outbreak of Soviet-Japanese hostilities, a policy of nonenlargement of the incident is to be pursued. Dependent on the outcome of diplomatic negotiations, it would be all right for our forces to pull back from the Changkufeng line."14 Afterward, the five ministers met. Harada heard that the con­ ference decided to open negotiations immediately, on the basis of the policy already determined, "provided that local military action (including aerial operations [by the Soviets]) is stopped.... We are requesting the foreign minister to commence parleys." Thereupon, at 2 P.M., Konoe drove to the Hayama villa to report.15 Although the domestic press boasted about the combat readiness of Japanese military air units, the authorities in Tokyo had long ago decided on a policy of restraint in the air.16 As early as 16 July, when an offensive to clear Changkufeng was first mulled, Inada had transmitted a significant restraining message to Arisue:

It is hoped that special caution will be exercised concerning the use of air units. Although it is imperative that ground units and air bases be on strict alert against possible air raids, kindly prevent absolute use of air units in any way that might bring about aerial combat. Liaison flights within our borders are permissible, but please bear in mind that activities such

RUSSIAN RETALIATION

191

as reconnaissance over the site of the incident could result in air battles.17 When Soviet planes first struck on 1 August, Tada sent a wire to the Korea Army; in it, he conveyed the policy that air units were not to be employed except in self-defense. Fighter units were to stand by, but use of bomber units depended on further orders.18 To play safe, the governor-general of Korea decreed antiaircraft defense measures in North Korea.19 But neither fighters nor bombers were ever unleashed by the Japanese—a remarkable instance of command resistance to the enticements of battlefield escala­ tion. For three days Soviet air activity was not pronounced, probably be­ cause of cloudy weather. The regimental journal for 3 August mentions air raids in the Changkufeng sector and a strafing by nine fighters at Shachaofeng at 6:30 A.M.; AGS records speak of only ten Soviet air­ craft, mainly scouts.20 On the next morning, Suetaka and the new 37th Brigade commanding general, Morimoto, went to visit 75th Regiment Headquarters. Sato took the opportunity to remark on the advantages of having friendly aircraft in action, even if only inside the frontier and for restricted periods. Suetaka saw the need for aviation and artillery; the draft of a recommendation was prepared for submission to higher headquarters. Later, an AGS air staff officer arrived for an inspection; Sato's explanations treated the air force problem again. No Soviet bomb­ ers were observed from regimental headquarters on 4 August, but five reconnaissance planes were spotted.21 Capt. Kaneko Yosuke's antiaircraft battery, emplaced early on 4 August, finally went into action at 1:42 P.M., driving off two Russian reconnais­ sance aircraft over Changkufeng. Another Soviet scout plane was forced away, over Yangkuanping, at 5:55. The battery under 1st Lt. Murakawa Ryo observed aircraft frequently, but the targets were out of range. Finally, at 6:20 P.M. Murakawa's unit engaged two aircraft which appeared from the downstream Tumen and drove them off. An American correspondent who was allowed to visit Hongui was shown numerous ten-foot-wide craters that were allegedly made when Soviet planes dropped 20 bombs on 1 August. One bomb, aimed at a passenger train, had struck the TumenNajin tracks, but there had reportedly been no casualties. On 4 August the Gaimusho scaled down the number of Soviet planes claimed to only two confirmed and two or three possibles.22

192

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

The seriousness with which Tokyo viewed the Soviet aerial menace was betokened by reports of blackout precautions in the capital from nightfall on 4 August at army instruction. Strict light controls had been enforced in Fukuoka Prefecture where the Yawata steel works and arsenal were located. Leaflets were prepared. "This is no drill," announced the civil-defense police chief in Tokyo. Orders to provide emergency anti­ aircraft protection for North Korea were revealed, as were reports that residents of villages near the battle zone were being evacuated. Japanese meteorologists reduced the number of their weather reports to the public. The measures were real, but an American observer reached the conclusion that although the populace believed

this was done because of the fear of Soviet air raids. . . the chief reason was the . . . government's desire to inspire ... war consciousness. This. . . has been eminently successful. . . . Whether or not [the Japanese] government seriously expected a raid, the spectacular precautions—never taken because of the Chinese war—certainly served to jog the Japan­ ese public into awareness of danger. So, too, did full "war dispatches" from the Changkufeng "front" in Japanese newspapers.23

This was in striking bontrast to the relative silence of the Soviet press. The partial blackout in the Japanese homeland remained in effect until 18 August, by which time the fighting had ended at Changkufeng. On 5 August enemy aerial activity remained negligible. In all sectors, a total of perhaps 20 reconnaissance aircraft were sighted. The 6th of August cleared after 10 A.M. Nine Soviet aerial waves appeared over front-line positions and artillery sites until 7:20 P.M. The 5th Antiair­ craft Regiment claimed to have downed one plane, damaged a second, and driven off the remainder. In the evening, the gunners reported forcing back three scout planes. "The bombings and strafings went on from morning until sunset; it resembled a Soviet air show."24 Because of enemy bombings of railheads in the daytime, as well as artillery bombardments, supply became difficult from the 6th. In the left sector, the regimental battery commander of the 73rd Regiment recalls, Russian fighters escorted four-engine heavy bombers, which the Japanese were seeing in action for the first time.25

RUSSIAN RETALIATION

193

Japanese press reports indicated that Soviet bombers were striking nonmilitary targets. On 6 August over 100 planes had released 600 bombs inside North Korea, and passenger trains were attacked in day­ light on the Najin rail line, only three kilometers behind the front. One Japanese correspondent at Hongui asked publicly: "Why don't friendly planes fly?"26 This rhetorical question was answered, so far as Suetaka was concerned, the same day. Higher headquarters disapproved the gen­ eral's formal recommendation concerning use of Japanese aircraft.27 But Soviet aerial actions on 6 August commanded the attention of the world press, which picked up a Korea Army warning that "it was only a question of time until the Japanese would retaliate." The New York Times featured this news under a three-column head, "Soviet Planes Raid Korea, Bombing Railway to Sea; Japan Threatens Revenge." Ac­ cording to military sources, the day's attacks brought total Russian aerial incursions to 77.28 The 7th of August was a fine day, and again the Soviet Air Force struck hard on a broad front as far north as Wuchiatzu. Nine waves appeared be­ tween 10 A.M. and 6 P.M. in formations as large as 18 heavy bombers and 20 fighters. In all, it was estimated that 100 planes were in action that day. Japanese units made no claim to have shot down any. On the 75th Infan­ try front, Russian planes raided Hill 52 from 11 A.M., after the fog had cleared. Air attacks against Changkufeng were frequent. Despite the in­ creased number of planes in action, the Japanese considered that the Rus­ sians were not operating as vigorously as on the previous day. Runs were conducted generally between 2,000 and 3,000 meters; altitudes remained comparatively high even during strafing attacks. But, filing through censor­ ship, the Domei news agency was allowed or encouraged to emphasize the scale of the "blind and illegal" raids, the depths of penetration, and the appreciable losses of noncombatants at places to the rear in Korea.29 Skies were fair on 8 August; again Russian planes thundered in against forward defenses, Kyonghun and the bridge, Shikai and Wuchiatzu, and gun sites. In the morning, Suetaka inspected Chiangchunfeng. There were seven Russian air strikes throughout the afternoon, but they involved only 70 planes. The regiment reported that 15 planes bombed Hill 52 at 3:30 P.M., causing no losses, in the left sector, 20 fighters struck at 2:30. The ground troops answered with machine guns for 30 minutes and reported driving the aircraft back. An antiaircraft battery claimed an 1-15 fighter after 4 P.M., while another gun unit reported attracting a bombing and several strafings against a dummy site. War ministry spokesmen "confirmed"

194

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

the shooting-down of a total of six aircraft, two behind Japanese lines. Contrary to earlier boasts of fictitious commitment of planes, however, Japanese newsmen were reporting that "our wild eagles are maintaining their prudent attitude and not even one has gone into action yet." An American observer noted ten large holes caused by bombs ten miles in­ side Korea. From the Japan Sea coast fronting Siberia came information that the residents were fearful of Soviet night raids. Tension was partic­ ularly acute at the ports of Niigata and Tsuruga.30 Clouds obscured the sky most of 9 August. In all sectors a total of only six aircraft were sighted. But even the conservative staff at Seoul was becoming disgusted with the situation of "fighting with one hand tied behind its back." The feeling of the Korea Army was that the daily bombings had become extremely severe. With planes spotting for artillery, Russian shellfire was increasingly accurate. Nakamura sent a desperate telegram to the war minister and AGS chief on 9 August: there were limits to the effectiveness of antiaircraft ground-fire. The enemy was dragging out the parleys and exploiting the weakness of Japanese counteraction to dom­ inate the skies. The delaying process would enlarge military losses and exert a baleful influence on the populace in Korea. Nakamura concluded: "Would you please give consideration to authorization of fighter plane operation? I presume hypothetical contingencies would not arise if activities of our planes were limited strictly to battlefield zone—expelling hostile aircraft beyond border line at most."31 While Nakamula and the local forces were awaiting Tokyo's reaction, the skies cleared the next day, the 10th. Thereupon, the Soviet Air Force resumed its attacks, although only with fighters, perhaps 70 in all, from late afternoon. Targets again included forward positions, Shikai railhead, Kyonghun bridge, and artillery emplacements. The 75th Regiment reported that a dozen fighters strafed Hill 52 at 5 P.M. at an altitude of only 30 meters but that no losses ensued. The defenders could not resist firing with all available small arms; they hit nothing. Two hours later, 36 fighters struck Changkufeng and made strafing passes for 15 minutes before dis­ appearing toward Novokievsk; enforcement of precautions was credited with preventing casualties. One 1-15 fighter was shot down by antiaircraft fire at 7 P.M.; another, at 7:15. It was the estimate of the 37th Brigade that the Russians had been pursuing a policy of exhausting Japanese re­ sistance by the use of artillery and air strikes. Soviet aerial assaults were furious on 10 August; the antiaircraft battery at Sozan lost half of its men that day.32

RUSSIAN RETALIATION

195

The fighting was near an end when, at 6:50 P.M. on the 10th, Tada replied to Nakamura's recommendation to unleash the air force: "Kindly understand that use of air units remains within purview of predetermined policy because of overall bearing. However, two fighter squadrons will be sent from homeland to [Yenchi] area [in southeast Manchuria, only 30 miles from squadrons at Hoeryong] where they will wait for moment in readiness for possible emergency."33 The most significant feature of the message was the command's restraint on air power, even so late in the incident when Japanese ground forces had been mauled. Yet fighters were being deployed from strategic reserve, just in case. On 11 August, it was fine in the morning; no Soviet aircraft sortied against the infantry lines, but 20 fighters struck artillery positions.34 The question of the use of the Japanese Air Force had become academic by now, since the cease-fire was effected this day. A number of consider­ ations had entered into the central authorities' decision regarding aviation. If the air force had been committed, Hashimoto feels, it would have been difficult to limit operations within Korea. Overflights of the border were too easy; this would have posed the danger of aerial war, whereas the high command's policy toward the incident was "very negative." Inada was asked whether he had been convinced that the USSR was disinclined to enter into hostilities. "Even if we had known for sure," he replied, "had we thrown in aircraft, the affray would certainly have escalated to some extent. The Nomonhan affair grew so huge in the next year because of the Kwantung Army's offensive use of air power."35 But the Russians did not seem to share Japanese apprehensions. Soviet aircraft, Hashimoto explains, were only hitting villages and railway stations to annoy us, more or less. Hence, there was no need to "heat things up." Admittedly, our forward troops were also being pounded from the air, but not in the true sense of "operation­ al" attacks. The Russians were using their planes separately, not in close coordination with ground forces, which is what would have been meant by true operational employment.36

This view is substantiated by a foreign correspondent's report from Tokyo on 4 August. Although it had been noted publicly that Soviet front-line flights were frequent and large, with 60 planes in one wave, "That little bombing is done leads to the belief in official [Japanese] circles that the

196

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Soviet's motive is a demonstration rather than a serious aerial attack at ,,-57 present. To Nakamura's lament that his recommendation concerning use of Japanese air power was not accepted must be added Suetaka's rationali­ zations, prepared soon after the Changkufeng affair was over and decidedly contrary to his classified views. Although fighter and bomber units were only waiting for the request, Suetaka said that the reasons he did not ask for them were:

(1) The fighting front would naturally have been enlarged and civil losses accelerated as the result of the gradual buildup of aircraft participating on both sides once our planes went into action; (2) there was no real need for friendly planes because our front-line soldiers were not daunted by the enemy air force. I thought that it would be better for us not to employ aircraft in order to let the world see just how aggressive the USSR really was.38 An AGS air staff officer, Miyashi Minoru, recalls the difficulties in re­ straining the forces on the spot: Although we shared the sentiments of the eager, patriotic units, we had to view the big picture—the international scene, the China Incident, the strengthening of Japanese armaments as a whole. We could neither ease nor remove the leash. Facing the dangerous USSR, Japan could not allow its armies to wear themselves out at such a trifling spot as Changkufeng. This was the nub of the command's nonexpansion outlook.39

In 1938 Japanese military aviation was still undergoing a protracted build­ up at a time of fiscal and material problems which were intensified by the attrition in China. "Our air force," asserts Miyashi, "was like mere 'fireworks' in those days."40 From Tokyo's standpoint, every squadron had to be hoarded. NOTES 1. Batarshin says that from 15 to 20 men were killed and the rest wounded out of about 30 frontier guards and a 30-man army platoon. IMTFE, Transcript, 30 October 1947, p. 32074. Also see Grebennik, IMTFE, Transcript, 26 January 1948, p. 38296.

RUSSIAN RETALIATION

197

2. FRUS 1938, 3:461-462 (Moscow, 2 August 1938). 3. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 1 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 80, 84. 4. Tokyo Asahi, 2-3 August 1938. 5. Statement by Takenouchi Shigeo, BBSS Archives. 6. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 1 August 1938. 7. Ibid., ordnance chart. 8. Kido diary, I MT 2, 1 August 1938, p. 205; Tokyo Asahi, 2 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 9. New York Times, 2 August 1938, p. 10. 10. Ibid.. 11. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 2 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 87, 95, 97; Tokyo Asahi, 3-4 August 1938. 12. A Korea Army message at 12:10 A.M. on 2 August advised the high command of two afternoon raids on the 1st. CS, Chokoho, p. 60. 13. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:59-60. 14. Kido, Kido nikki, No. 100, pp. 48-49. In a few days, the command did con­ sider a unilateral pull-out. 15. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:59-60. A variant version of the policies and the dating is found in AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 84-85; JRD/JSM 11/3A:38. Also see I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:88. 16. See my "Restraints on Air Power in Limited War: Japan vs. USSR at Chang­ kufeng, 1938," Aerospace Historian 17 (December 1970): 118-126. 17. Arisue conveyed the instructions to 2nd Air Wing Headquarters at Hoeryong; Iwasaki notified Tsuchiya at the front. CS, Chokoho, p. 49. 18. Wire dispatched 10:59 P.M., 1 August 1938; received at Seoul, 2 A.M. CS, Chokoho, p. 49. 19. Tokyo Asahi, 4 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3; AGS, Chdkoho soan, Chronology, 2 August 1938. 20. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 3 August 1938; AGS, Chokohd soan, Chronology, 3 August 1938. 21. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 4 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 1 24. 22. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 129-130; New York Times, 5 August 1938, p. 8; ibid., 4 August 1938, p. 8. 23. New York Times, 4, 5, 7 August 1938. 24. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 5-6 August 1938; ibid., pp. 133, 142, 157-158. 25. Tominaga interview. 26. Tokyo Asahi, 13 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 27. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 169. 28. New York Times, 7 August 1938, pp. 1,29. 29. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938; AGS, Chokohdsoan, pp. 146, 159-160; Tokyo Asahi, 10 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. One account claimed that the Russians bombed Chigrovaya Hill, east of Hunchun but inside the USSR. Jinchu bidan, p. 25.

198

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

30. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 8 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 173, 181, 189, 237; Tokyo Asahi, 9 August 1938 (P.M. ed,), p. 1; New York Times, 9 August 1938, pp. 1,8. 31. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 9 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 237; CS, Chokoho, pp. 50-51 (2:40 P.M., 9 August 1938). 32. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 10 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 237. 33. AGS Message No. 445, CS, Chokoho, pp. 51-52. 34. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 11 August 1938. 35. Inada interview. 36. Hashimoto interview. 37. New York Times, 4 August 1938, p. 8. 38. Suetaka in Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 341-342. 39. Miyashi interview. 40. Ibid.

Intensification of the Ground War

Although Soviet use of aircraft introduced a new dimension of danger, the main efforts were made by both sides on the ground. After Japanese troops cleared Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, the Russians appeared to be redeploying to contract their defensive frontage; no troops or works remained west of Khasan. Four or five Russian infantry companies and ten artillery pieces were located between the lake and Paksikori. The main forces, with many gun sites, were being concentrated west of Novokievsk. On the Kwantung Army's front in southeast Manchuria, no changes were observed. "The Russians were apparently shocked by their defeat at Chang­ kufeng and must suddenly have resorted to negative, conservative measures. Korea Army Headquarters drew up its estimate as of evening on 31 July: "The enemy must fear a Japanese advance into the Novokievsk plain and therefore is concentrating his main forces in that district. Our interests require that we anticipate any emergency, so we must prepare necessary strength in the Kyonghun region and reinforce positions at Wuchiatzu."2 Reappraising the strategic situation, Suetaka focused attention on the neck of the geographic appendix lying north of Changkufeng-Shachaofeng. To Senda were now assigned his old 1st BGU Company, another infantry company and battery from Okido's regiment, and a mountain artillery platoon. These units were to take over the border mission hitherto handled by one BGU platoon and a Manchukuoan police company operating with the Hunchun garrison. Inada presents a perceptive analysis of the measures taken by Suetaka on 31 July: the general was dispatching Senda's force

200

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

to the vicinity of Wuchiatzu, a key point from which the Japanese could observe or cut off the Russians' line of communications extending toward Posyet Bay far to the rear. "If our forces ever pushed forward from there, the foe all around Changkufeng would be trapped like a rat in a sack. If both sides were in earnest, hostilities would have begun in that area."3 At 8:45 P.M. on the 31st, a detailed message was received by the 19th Division from the Hunchun garrison commanding general which described his supporting deployments to the north. Suetaka was heartened, for he "earnestly desired to bring about the end of the incident as a result of the fighting of 30-31 July but was equally resolved to defend the border firmly, based on Japanese interpretation of the Hunchun pact, in case the Soviet side did not perform intensive self-reflection." First, Suetaka had issued K. Sato instructions at 8:15 A.M. on the 31st from Kyonghun: "It is our intention that Changkufeng and the high ground northwest of Shachaofeng be secured, as well as the high ground south of Shachaofeng if possible. Enemy attacks are to be met at our positions, but you are not to pursue far." Second, Colonel Tanaka was not to fire as long as Russian artillery did not bombard friendly forces. "Except for preparing against counter­ assaults, your actions will be cautious. In particular, harassing fire against inhabited places and residents is prohibited."4 Suetaka's concern went beyond passive security. Although the Soviet "intruders" had been chastised, he was apprehensive lest the garrison in the Wuchiatzu sector be cut off in case the enemy decided to attack that unit in retaliation. The transfer of Japanese elements from the vicinity of Changkufeng was not feasible; front-line strength numbered a mere 900 men, sufficient only to secure the positions. Suetaka had in mind alerting and bringing up strong reinforcements from Nanam. On his own initiative, at 11 A.M. he issued orders calling for immediate movement by the main part of two more infantry regiments (Sato Tamenori's 73rd and Okido's 76th) and the rest of Tanaka's mountain artillery.5 The full text of the division order was not learned by the Korea Army until 2 August. Meanwhile, at 1:05 P.M. on 31 July, a post factum wire arrived via Nanam, requesting permission to reinforce the front with the four infantry battalions "to respond to the sudden change in situation." Nakamura did not concur. The sector west of Khasan had been cleared and the border restored; the Russians were apparently leaving only elements in the forward zone. A message from headquarters to Suetaka showed the gist of Korea Army thinking:

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

201

Hostile situation confronting our advance lines cannot yet be deemed critical. There is no need to be daunted by numerous foe if our positions in Changkufeng area are held strongly, taking advantage of terrain, as buttress to secure lines and as springboard for counterattacking.

Early reinforcement might provoke enlargement of the affair. It had been decided to pursue a wait-and-see policy with the present setup. In view of IGHQ policy for handling Changkufeng Incident as well as principle of withdrawing alerted units, reinforce­ ment and dispatch of strength is not approved for the time being. We would also like to know present front-line situation on both sides, particularly enemy rear; and division commander's proposed policy for handling matters.6

It was the Korea Army's understanding that Suetaka promptly cancelled his planned troop movements; the division commander reported no "great uneasiness" on the part of the Japanese.7 At much the same time, shortly after midnight on 1 August, Iwasaki sent a telegram to Kitano, who was at division advance headquarters in Kyonghun. Indicating that the division had again requested authority to bring up reinforcements but had been turned down, this message provided revealing details about Nakamura's outlook, particularly his concern about "the possible tendency to use reinforcements at the front-line." Such action would only complicate the incident and contravene headquarters' policies. Then followed a powerful passage: "The army commander feels overwhelmed at prospect of huge casualties sustained in unnecessary combat and he urgently desires to learn real status of this incident as well as situation to enemy's rear."8 One can detect the progression of another train of events which charac­ terized the relationship between divisional and army headquarters: Some­ times, the division presented a fait accompli. At other times, it first tendered a formal request based on vague justifications while setting wheels in motion, but the request was gently and often repeatedly turned down by higher authority. Thereupon, the division suspended action and swore compliance. With or without further harassment of army headquarters, the division then proceeded to execute its original intention somehow, pleading force majeure. Army headquarters gave in and, convinced or not, sanctioned what had been done. This scenario fits the sequences of 31 July-1 August precisely, as well

202

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

as those earlier. After Iwasaki's poignant wire, transmitted on behalf of Nakamura on 1 August, Suetaka did find a way to secure the reinforce­ ments he had been denied. The first the Korea Army heard of Suetaka's latest accomplished fact appears to have been an emotional message re­ ceived at 6 P.M. on the 1st from gentle Kitano, who was with Suetaka: "Exercising his own prerogatives," the division commander had decided to call up the four infantry battalions and one artillery battalion for "ma­ neuvers." Kitano concluded the message: "One can discern [Suetaka's] great resolve, which would be, difficult to check now. Please issue orders authorizing division to move up, bestowing compassion of a chivalrous samurai [bushi no nasake] ."9 Some sources overlook or are unaware of the role played by Suetaka's determination. The Korea Army's own re­ cords demonstrate that it was solely because of Kitano's report that the division's request was approved. Only a few hours after receiving Kitano's message, Nakamura had an important operations order phoned to Suetaka, with copies for the AGS chief, war minister, and Kwantung Army:

(1) During afternoon today North Korea Railway and vicinity of Kyonghun were bombed several times. ... (2) This army will perfect defense of Korean territory on lower Tumen by concentrating portion of its strength to Agochi area. (3) 19th Division commander will immediately concentrate unit com­ prising four infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion as core. A portion will cover railroad (including trains) to calm populace living along rail line. For above-men­ tioned units to cross Tumen, prior approval of army commander is mandatory.10 [Italics added.] Suetaka was at last armed with formal authority, received at 10:05 P.M. on 1 August. It did not take him long to implement it. At 11 P.M. he ordered immediate rail movement of powerful reinforcements: the alerted infantry brigade headquarters as well as the four infantry battalions and remaining mountain artillery battalion.11 Thus, Suetaka was able to deploy forward not only those forces which he had requested but also a brigade organi­ zation to assume control of the now-sizable combat elements which would be massed at the front for "maneuvers"! He took another significant step as early as afternoon on 1 August: he had his division message center shifted forward to Matsu'otsuho heights at the Tumen, and he regularly; posted at least one staff officer there "so that the center could function? as the division's combat headquarters." An additional matter of explosive

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

203

potential was built into the divisional order: provision of Japanese Air Force cover for rail movements forward, although use of aircraft had been prohibited by all higher headquarters, and Nakamura meant only ground cover.12 At the front, Japanese units spent most of the time consolidating their hard-won positions. As of 3 A.M. on 1 August, a column of Soviet forces, with vehicles, was observed moving from the east side of Khasan. Late in the day, the division received an extremely important telegram from the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the Kwantung Army: "According to special espionage report from our OSS in Khabarovsk city, Red Army authorities there have decided to retake the high ground along Changkufeng.''13 From other intelligence, the Kwantung Army concluded that the Russians were building up the Novokievsk region. Frequent movements observed imme­ diately to the rear of the Soviet battle zone caused K. Sato to become ap­ prehensive about a counterattack at dawn on the 1st, and he reinforced Changkufeng with the 6th Company. Starting near noon, the Soviet Air Force entered action. Losses were negligible, and Suetaka called the raids "terror bombing." On the basis of reports of heavy Russian troop movements, Sato concluded that the enemy, who had retreated near Kozando, were gradually concentrating on the heights east of Khasan again. Judging that Japanese deployments at vital Hill 52 were still weak, he sent Takeshita with his 10th Company from Changkufeng at 11 P.M. to assume command of the defenses. Some rather mauled 1st Battalion infantry and heavy machine gun reserves also were dispatched. Sato directed all units, under cover of darkness, to con­ solidate the signal network and take tight reconnaissance and guard mea­ sures: "Act aggressively to fathom any night-attack intention on the part of the foe." The Japanese were also to work hard on defenses and bend every effort to provide individual protection. Although the Japanese fired considerable amounts of ammunition (mainly small arms) on 1 August, casualties were trifling: a man wounded and a horse killed in Takenouchi's sector, and three men wounded in the 75th Infantry at Changkufeng. The Japanese troops were singularly unimpressed by the performance of enemy artillery: "Their firing techniques were absurd, and the shells dropped mainly into a pond at the foot of Chiangchunfeng. It was laughable! We sustained no casualties."14 Suetaka and his staff, however, were experiencing logistical difficulties which stemmed, as with reinforcement problems, from manpower shortages. For example, the units were still on alert status and lacked baggage trans­

204

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

portation. It had been intended to make up for this by hiring laborers, mainly Koreans, but the Soviet barrages and air bombings had side effects: the laborers who had been employed for supply work just behind the Tu­ men fled with their oxcarts, and transportation had been cut off for a while. Suetaka had to direct an infantry company of T. Sato's regiment to transport goods to the front by rail, and elements of line units were diverted to haul ammunition and rations. The division also had the local Japanese reservists' association in North Korea assume transportation re­ sponsibilities.15 On 1 August release of further details by the Japanese war ministry led the New York Times to run a two-column banner: "Japan Claims New Rout of Russians on Frontier; 250 Casualties in 2 Fights—Soviet Is Warned —Tokyo War Office Says 'Serious' Steps Will Meet Provocations—Japanese Leaders Meet—Capture of 13 Tanks, 4 Big Guns and Other Equipment Reported by Victors." Soviet forces had twice counterattacked at Chang­ kufeng and Shachaofeng but had been repulsed after hours of fighting. The ministry was "uncommunicative" regarding the many cabinet and army emergency meetings, except to say "semi-officially" that if Soviet provocations on the frontier continue the situation would become serious and the measures taken to deal with them would become serious,” too. In Moscow, Duranty understood that on 29 July a small Japanese force had occupied Shachaofeng, "presumably as a reply to the Soviet occu­ pation of Changkufeng," but had been evicted by frontier guards. Early on the 31st, the Japanese attacked in strength, although Duranty felt that Soviet use of the word "division" in a communique of 1 August could hardly mean "a full wartime complement of 12,000 men." After seizing the line of high ground to a depth of 21/2 miles, the Japanese had been ousted by regulars. Soviet denials of aerial commitment, plus warnings of "most serious consequences," led Duranty to judge that "from all this verbiage it is clear that the general Russian hope that the Japanese would not react to yesterday's [1 August] defeat [sic] is no more correct than the earlier opinion that the Japanese would not attack the heights."16 The second of August was marked by continuation of the Soviet air attacks and the beginning of the expected Russian counteroffensive. Ac­ cording to Japanese intelligence, Marshal Blyukher had arrived in Khabar­ ovsk, and Lieutenant General Sokolov was in Voroshilov. An offensive buildup, estimated at 3,000 men plus tanks and guns, was also reported > in the Kozando area by evening on the 1st.17 Hirahara, commanding the’ battalion at Changkufeng, grew concerned about Hill 52. With day nearing,

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

205

he decided to reinforce the defenses further. He also ordered the battalion medical officer to set up a dressing station at Fangchuanting. Around 7 A.M. Soviet artillery began firing at the forward areas, especially gun positions. The annals characterize the bombardments as quite severe. For their part, Japanese artillery sought to conserve ammunition and fire only at "worthwhile,” short-range targets. The main Russian ground actions were directed against the far-right (Hill 52) and far-left (Shachaofeng) sectors, not against Changkufeng. In accord with Hirahara's orders, two infantry companies and four heavy machine guns were transferred by 8 A.M. from Changkufeng to the heights 800 meters southeast. Soviet heavy artillery began to pound the zone between Fangchuanting and Hill 52; "even to observe the enemy became difficult.” Russian planes went into action at 9 A.M. on this front—fighters, then bombers—to soften the defenses and gun positions. Meanwhile, the Soviets deployed fire-power southeast of Khasan, while two infantry battalions and more than ten tanks began to advance through the pines on the western slopes. Japanese regimental guns and two machine gun platoons at Hill 52 "pounced on the enemy heavy machine guns and neutralized them.” By 10 A.M. the Russians had advanced, with many heavy weapons forward, to the high ground 800 meters from Hill 52. From Changkufeng, the battalion guns engaged heavy weapons. Hirahara went down Changkufeng with the engineers and battalion guns, reached the heights to which he had transferred reinforcements earlier, took personal command, and prepared an assault. At the outset, the Soviet troops had been observed pushing forward in formation, but after they reached a dip, they dispersed and moved onto the high ground opposite Hill 52. Bringing up heavy weapons, they drew as close as 700 meters; artillery and heavy machine guns covered them. Around 10 A.M. Sato requested Shiozawa's mountain guns, emplaced across the Tumen, to unleash a barrage against the front of Hill 52. For a half-hour the battery laid down fire. By 10:30 the advance of the Rus­ sian soldiers grew "listless." Deciding that the time was ripe to charge the foe's right wing, Hirahara deployed his men and instructed them to be quick in running and careful about flank fire from east of Khasan. On the heights at Fangchuanting, Inagaki was watching the struggle. Since the telephone was but of commission and the situation appeared urgent, he decided to bring up fire-power on his own initiative. Taking the main body of the 1st Machine Gun Company, together with the battalion guns, he set out at noon. His lead element made contact with the 10th Company on Hill 52 around 2 P.M., taking advantage of intervals in checking fire. Im­

206

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

mediately upon arrival, the Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. After losing their momentum, the Russians were shaken by Japanese heavy weapons and by the mountain guns from Hill 82. Hirahara's main battalion was able to advance, around noon, onto the high ground north of Hill 52. Near 3 P.M. two enemy companies began to fall back, ascending the western slopes of Hill 29 while the main forces retreated piecemeal to a dip. By 4 P.M. Suetaka had observed that his units were continuing to secure their positions and were "gradually breaking the hostile intention." Despite rain clouds which had drifted over since morning, "the heat was by now broiling, and considerable exhaustion of the front-line troops could be discerned." Between 11 A.M. and 4 P.M., Sato toured the lines and gave instructions concerning defensive positions, particularly at Hill 52. After their not particularly good initial performance, the Russians waited for reinforcements before trying again in the Hill 52 sector. They moved up a mechanized corps, and by 3 P.M. 50 tanks were massed east of Maanshan. Near 5 P.M. the Russians started moving south on the high ground across Khasan. Another two Soviet battalions advanced on the heights along the Tumen, led by armor. Hirahara had good reason for expecting an assault at twilight, especially after 6, when nine bombers hit Hill 52. Earlier, Takeshita had received reports from the antitank commander, Lieutenant Saito, that at 5 P.M. several enemy tanks and three infantry battalions were advancing from the direction of Hill 29. Convinced that the Russians would strike anew at day's end, Takeshita issued orders that the defense unit conceal its efforts and smash the foe by point-blank fire and hand-to-hand fighting. The captain strove to inculcate confidence that hostile infantry could never make it into the positions. Before 7 P.M. the enemy battalions came into effective range, whereupon the Japanese opened up with all their firepower. Rapid-fire antitank guns set the lead tank afire; the remaining machines were stopped. Support was rendered by Hisatsune's regimental guns and two antitank gun squads atop Chang­ kufeng (which was sustaining violent bombardment), as well as by the mountain battery. The Russian advance was checked. By the time dark­ ness came, Soviet elements had managed to displace heavy weapons 400 , meters from the Japanese positions. As early as 4 P.M., Suetaka had ordered a mountain artillery squad to cross the river. Sato told Takeshita, at 7:30, that there would be an enemy night attack against Hill 52. Takeshita was to annihilate the foe after lettipg

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

207

him get within 40 or 50 meters. The Russians did mount a night assault and began pressing close between 8 and 9 P.M. with three battalions led by four tanks. The main force was directed against Takeshita; all ten Rus­ sian heavy machine guns went into action on that side. The defenders at Hill 52 let the Soviet units come within point-blank range, sent up flares, and then let loose with machine guns and torrents of grenades. "Immense confusion was caused the foe in front of our positions. Enemy casualties were numberless and the assault was checked immediately. Frequent shouts and screams could be heard." On the exposed right wing, the Soviet night attack involved two companies with heavy weapons. Lieutenant Yamaguchi ordered grenade dischargers to illuminate the attackers. The Russians pressed as close as 30 meters, yelled "Hurrah! hurrah!" and hurled grenades before rushing forward another 15 meters. The Japanese smashed the first waves with grenades and emplaced weapons, then fell back, leaving light machine guns and grenade dischargers forward. The surviving Soviet soldiers sent up illuminating shells over the defenses to allow an approach within 100 meters. Barrages of Japanese grenade-discharger fire blasted those forces massed in the dead space ahead of the works. While the night attack against Hill 52 was collapsing, other Russian troops, in smaller strength and with one tank leading, moved against the hill on the left, which had not been occupied by the Japanese until morning. The Russians advanced along the Khasan slope north of Hill 52, came within point-blank range of the positions, and shouted loudly but did not charge. By 10 P.M. the Japanese, supported by machine guns, had checked the foe. Thereupon, the 6th Company, now under a platoon leader, Narusawa, launched a counterattack along the lake. "The enemy was bewildered and became dislocated. Buddies were heard yelling to one another and some could be seen hauling away their dead." The Soviet troops held up 300 to 400 meters away and began to dig in. Sato decided that it would be advantageous if artillery swept the zone in front of Hill 52. At 9:30 P.M. he requested support, but the mountain guns were unable to open fire. Still, "not even the shadow of an enemy soldier was to be seen after 11 P.M." on the Hill 52 front, where the Japanese spent the night on the qui vive. In the northern sector, eight Russian tanks lumbered across the Japaneseclaimed border at 5:25 A.M. and headed south until they arrived north­ west of Shachaofeng. Around 7 A.M. Russian artillery opened fire to "prepare" the Japanese while a dozen heavy bombers attacked. An hour later, the ground offensive began in earnest, with one to V/z infantry bat­ talions, a dozen machine guns, and several tanks. Supporting the attack

208

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

against Takenouchi's left wing were several batteries of mountain artillery and two heavy batteries. Well-planned counterfire stopped the offensive. There was little change all day north of Shachaofeng and in the southeast, where Kanda's company held its positions against attack.18 On Takenouchi's front, Akaishizawa mentions 120-degree heat by day and chill at night. The men suffered from damp clothes and constant mosquitoes. To keep warm at night, the soldiers moved around; during the day they sought to fend off the heat by covering themselves with twigs and weeds, which were also useful for camouflage. There was no defense against cold night rain. Nocturnal vigilance required napping by day when possible, but the powerful sun robbed the men of strength. For three days, Imagawa's company had nothing to eat except wild berries and dirty, stinking river water.19 Changkufeng sustained artillery and aerial attacks at the same times as Hill 52, but there were no ground assaults by day on the 2nd. At 6 P.M. several dozen aircraft bombed and strafed Shachaofeng and Changkufeng. Two and a half hours later, Takenouchi reported a battalion of the enemy pressing toward Changkufeng from Shachaofeng. Sato moved his troops, for there were only two infantry squads left on Changkufeng. Near 10 P.M., before Sato could receive Inagaki's reserves or Takenouchi could strike, a strong Russian patrol attacked the southern salient on Changkufeng crest. The two infantry squads from the 9th Company hurled grenades and drove off the foe, who had come along the lake. Into the night the sound of small-arms and shellfire could be heard, but the Russian ground attacks had come to a momentary halt. At 6 A.M. on 2 August, Colonel Tanaka had exhorted his artillery com­ mand to "exalt maximum annihilation power at close range, engage tar­ gets which are confirmed, and display fire power which is sniperlike [i.e., precise], concentrated, and as swift as a hurricane." Tanaka worked out interdiction sectors against daytime and nighttime attacks. At 10:30 A.M. the artillery laid down severe fire and eventually caused the enemy assault to "wither." Around 12:40 P.M. Rokutanda's battalion detected a Russian battalion of towed artillery entering positions on the skirt of Maanshan. When the first shells hit near the vanguard, a man on horseback, who must have been the commander, fled immediately; the rest dispersed, abandoning at least eight artillery wagons and ten vehicles. Suetaka, who had,.been observing from the Kucheng BGU, picked up the phone and commended1 the 3rd Battalion.20 '

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

209

Japanese casualties on 2 August were relatively light: ten men killed and 15 wounded. Of the killed, the 75th Infantry lost seven, the 76th Infantry two, and the engineers one. Of the wounded, the 75th suffered nine; the 76th, six. Infantry ammunition was expended at an even higher rate than on 30-31 July. In Hirahara's battalion area, small arms, machine guns, ammunition, helmets, knapsacks, and gas masks were captured. A considerable amount of the seized materiel was employed in subsequent combat, as in the case of an antitank gun and ammunition captured on 31 July. Soviet casualties to date were publicly estimated at 200-250, in­ cluding 70 abandoned corpses. Twelve (five?) enemy tanks had been cap­ tured, and five more knocked out on 1 and 2 August; several dozen heavy bombers and 5,000 Soviet ground troops were involved in the concerted offensives. On 3 August the Korea Army heard that Japanese casualties as of the 1st numbered only 44 killed and 52 wounded. Regimental data listed 45 killed and 139 wounded on 31 July-1 August.21 In general, the picture conveyed by the 19th Division was one of rela­ tively light cost, great success, and constant danger. But the forward com­ manders were beginning to have trouble with Pandora's box. As a stop-gap on the afternoon of the 2nd, Suetaka transferred Lieutenant Maeoka's tiny gun unit to support the 75th Infantry. Nevertheless, reports of an imminent Soviet night attack against the Hill 52 sector on 2-3 August alarmed Suetaka as much as his subordinates. Shortly after 8 P.M., accompanied by his intelligence officer, Suetaka set out for the hill, resolved to direct operations himself. Somewhat earlier, the division had sent Korea Army Headquarters a message, received by 6:30 P.M., which reflected Suetaka's current outlook: 30 to 40 Soviet planes had been bombing all sectors since morning, but losses were negligible and morale was high. The division had brought up additional elements in accord with army orders, was con­ tinuing to strive for nonenlargement, but was "prepared firmly to reject the enemy's large-scale attacks."22 Impressed by the severity of the artillery and small-arms fire, Suetaka deemed it imperative "quickly to mete out a decisive counterassault and thus hasten solution of the incident." But Japanese lines were held thinly and counterattacks required fresh strength. This state of affairs caused Suetaka to consider immediate commitment of the reinforcements moving to the front, although the Korea Army had insisted on its prior permission before additional troops might be allowed across the Tumen. Suetaka's customary and not unexpected solution was again to rely on his initiative

210

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

and to authorize commitment of every reinforcement unit. Nearest was T. Sato's 73rd Regiment, which had been ordered the night before to move up from Nanam. Under the celebrated but transient and rebuked cover of two Japanese fighters, these troops had alighted from the train next morning at Seikaku, where they were awaiting orders eagerly.23 K. Sato was receiving reports about the enemy buildup. In language almost identical with that of Suetaka, who may have incorporated the wording into his own plans, Sato concluded that a serious counteroffensive was in store and that a "decisive counterblow" was imperative. Hence, when Sato learned that reinforcements were being sent, he phoned the division to recommend the "advisability for him to assume command of those directly controlled division units which were to have arrived on the right shore." An affirmative answer was soon to come, despite Korea Army restrictions. At 8:10 P.M. orders were given to the 73rd Regiment to proceed at once to the Matsu'otsuho crossing and be prepared to support the 75th. Involved were T. Sato's two battalions—half of the total infantry reinforcements.24 Although his actions suggested a resolute but defensive concept, Suetaka had something else in mind: his trump, Okido's 76th Infantry. At 11:40 P.M. he ordered this regiment, coming up behind the 73rd, to proceed to Huichungyuan, on the Manchurian side of the Tumen, via Kyonghun, intercept the enemy, and be ready to go over to the offensive. On the basis of the exciting information that the division planned to employ Okido's regiment for an enveloping attack, K. Sato worked out details promptly. He would conceal the presence of the reinforcements expected momentarily from the 73rd Regiment and would move Senda's BGU and Shimomura's battalion to Huichungyuan to cover the advance of the 76th Regiment and come under the latter's control.25 During the night of 2-3 August, there was also a scare: a Russian battalion supposedly came across the Tumen and was advancing on Sozan. Suetaka took precautions to safeguard the artillery sites, but the disturbing police intelligence proved groundless, and he re­ turned to Kyonghun with Okido while the main 76th Regiment proceeded to Huichungyuan.26 Throughout this period, the general staff in Tokyo, which had been kept informed by the Korea Army as best it could, continued to apply the brakes. At 11:30 P.M. on 2 August, Nakamura received the following wire: The resolve to concentrate Korea Army forces within borders was understood over phone. Kindly understand IGHQ army order... of 1 August to authorize "concentration of strength

:•

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

211

on army's Manchukuo-USSR border front area also, to tighten frontier security." But it is imperative that military actions be very careful in compliance with principle laid down in IGHQ army directive based on above Imperial order.27

Suetaka was still planning to use the latest reinforcements for a twin offensive; this information reached Seoul during the morning of 3 August. At dawn, Suetaka reported, he had dispatched the two battalions of the 73rd Regiment across the river to reinforce Changkufeng, and the mountain artillery battalion to Tanaka. He added, rather incidentally, that the two battalions of the 76th Regiment were being sent to Huichungyuan, also across the Tumen, in preparation for an attack against the foe's right flank. The Russians had not relaxed their efforts; since dawn they had been bom­ barding the high ground near Changkufeng as well as Korean territory. Their strength was estimated at three infantry battalions, 24 or 25 artillery pieces (mainly heavy) in the front lines, and another four or five infantry battalions to the rear. Nakamura approved Suetaka's "arbitrary" actions easily since the latter's "intention was only to smash the forces which had pressed close against our lines in the Shachaofeng-Changkufeng area. There­ fore, enlargement of the incident would not be brought about."28 In later testimony, Nakamura was generous enough to omit reference to Suetaka: Our troops near Changkufeng could not pursue the enemy in spite of their gains .. . since we were obeying the policy of nonenlargement. Consequently, the Soviet Army made con­ tinuous counterattacks from every direction .. . and our posi­ tion grew very difficult. Our Changkufeng front was divided by the big Tumen River. The front nearest to the enemy was so narrow ... the troops could barely cover themselves. I thought it inadvisable to repeat frontal battles ... we had better settle things once and for all by a flank attack ... starting from the upstream Tumen.29 Undoubtedly, the Japanese side could have achieved good results and rendered the defense comparatively easy if only they had been permitted to counterattack elsewhere. Inada, however, is explicit in describing Tokyo's prompt but negative reaction on 3 August. Suetaka, says Inada, not only used the reserves to reinforce the Changkufeng front on his own initiative but also planned to attack lines of communication. In accordance with operational theory, trespassing might be inevitable in combat near

I

, ! j

[

j ] '

212

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

frontiers, and in view of the terrain Suetaka's concept was "highly ap­ propriate." Nevertheless, the goal of the fighting was neither the capture nor annihilation of the Soviet forces, and the principle of not crossing the border by even a step ought to have been well understood. The AGS was therefore resolute in putting a stop to the execution of the projected operation, "although we felt a certain degree of sympathy toward the division."30 Japanese forces on the spot, meanwhile, faced the danger of Soviet actions against Changkufeng from the Shachaofeng front after midnight on the 2nd. Takenouchi had been ready to strike when he learned that the enemy had launched an attack at 1 A.M. against one of his own com­ panies (Matsunobe's) southwest of Shachaofeng. Therefore, Takenouchi's main unit went to drive off the attackers, returning to its positions at 2:30. The Russians tried again, starting from 4 A.M. on the 3rd. Strong elements came as close as 300 meters; near 5 A.M. Soviet artillery and heavy weapons fire had grown hot, and nine enemy fighters made inef­ fective strafing passes. By 6:30 the Russians seemed thwarted completely. Hill 52 was the other front about which to be concerned. Although pummeled during the three battles on the 2nd and in an alleged state of confusion, the Russians apparently intended to seize Hill 52 on the next day. Taking advantage of night, they had been regrouping; east of the hill, heavy machine guns were set up on the ridgeline 500 meters away. From 5 A.M. on the 3rd, the Russians opened up with heavy weapons. Led by three tanks, 50 or 60 infantrymen then attacked from the direction of Hill 29 and reached a line 700-800 meters from the Japanese defenses. Here the Russian soldiers peppered away, but one of their tanks was set ablaze by gunfire and the other two were damaged and fled into a dip. Kamimori's mountain artillery reinforcements reached Nanpozan by 7:15 A.M. on the 3rd. Tanaka issued an order directing the battalion to check the zone east of Hill 52 as well as to engage artillery across Khasan. A site for the supply unit was to be selected beyond enemy artillery range; on the day before, Russian shells had hit the supply unit of the 3rd Moun­ tain Artillery Battalion, killing two men and 20 horses. The exposed force was ordered to take cover behind the crestline 1,000 meters to the rear. After 9 A.M. on the 3rd, the artillery went into action and Japanese morale was enhanced. Near 9 A.M. Soviet bombardment grew pronounced, accompanied by > bomber strikes. The Japanese front-line infantry responded with intensive * fire, supported by mountain pieces and the regimental guns atop Chang- £

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

213

kufeng. Enemy forces stayed behind their heavy weapons and moved no further, while their casualties mounted. At 11 A.M. the Russians began to fall back, leaving only machine guns and snipers. One reason the Soviets had been frustrated since early morning was that K. Sato had seen the urgency of closing the gap midway between Changkufeng and Hill 52 (a site called Scattered Pines) and had shifted the 2nd Company from Chang­ kufeng. Between 6 and 7:40 A.M., the company fired on Soviet troops which had advanced north of Hill 52, and inflicted considerable casualties. A corporal commanding a grenade launcher was cited posthumously for leading an assault which caused the destruction of three heavy machine guns. In the afternoon, the Japanese sustained two shellings and a bomber raid. Otherwise, the battlefield was quiet, since Russian troops had pulled back toward Hill 29 by 3 P.M. under cover of heavy weapons and artil­ lery. At Hill 52, however, defense was posing a problem, for each barrage smashed positions and trenches. During intervals between bombardments and air strikes, the men struggled to repair and reinforce the facilities. Changkufeng was again not attacked by ground troops during the day but was hit by planes and artillery. Trifling support was rendered by the moun­ tain gun which had been moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen.31 Japanese infantry reinforcements were on the way. By 11 P.M. on 2 August, T. Sato had left Shikai. His 73rd Regiment pushed forward along roads so sodden that the units had to dismantle the heavy weapons for hauling. The rate of advance was little more than one kilometer per hour, but finally, at 5:20 A.M., he reached Chiangchunfeng with the bulk of two battalions. The esprit of the other front-line troops "soared." K. Sato, who was commanding all forces across the Tumen pending Morimoto's setting up of headquarters for the 37th Brigade, had T. Sato take over the line to the left of Changkufeng, employing Takenouchi's old unit and the 73rd Regiment to cover Shachaofeng. T. Sato set out with his battalions at 6 A.M. amid heavy rain. By 7:30, under severe fire, he was in position to command the new left sector. According to division orders to Morimoto, this zone was to include the heights south and north­ west of Shachaofeng, but, in the case of the former, it was "permissible to pull back and occupy high ground west of the heights south of Shachao­ feng." T. Sato contemplated using his regiment to encircle the foe on the north side of the lake, while Okido's 76th Infantry formed the other prong. Most of the day afterward, Soviet artillery was active; the Japanese responded with barrages of their own. Eventually, from 3:30 P.M., the entire enemy front-line force in this sector began falling back under violent

214

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

covering fire. Morimoto's initial operations order, received at 6 P.M., ad­ vised T. Sato officially that he was coming under command of the 37th Brigade. The night of 3-4 August passed with the units uneasily striving to conduct security and reconnaissance while working on the battered defenses.32 Total Japanese casualties on 3 August were light again: six men killed and ten wounded, four of the dead and seven of the wounded being suf­ fered by the 75th Infantry, the rest by Takenouchi's battalion. Ammuni­ tion was expended at a lower rate than on the preceding day. The Japanese war ministry reported no significant change since nightfall on 3 August. Thereafter, the battlefield seemed to be returning to quiescence; Japanese morale was high. In the press abroad, Changkufeng attracted overriding attention. The world was no longer talking of "border affrays." Threecolumn headlines on page 1 of the New York Times announced: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border— 2 Claims Conflict—Tokyo Reports Victory in Manchukuo and Foes' Big Losses—Moscow Asserts It Won." The startling "fact" that six Soviet divisions were in action seems to have been spice for external consumption provided by Hsinking as well as Seoul. According to Nakamura Bin, the Russians employed 4,000 to 5,000 men supported by 230 tanks. Although Japanese casualties were moderate, Russian artillery bombardment had stripped the hills of their lush summer grass. According to the uninformed foreign press, "the meager information showed both sides were heavily armed with the most modern equipment. The Russians were using small, fast tanks and the Japanese apparently were forewarned of this type of weapon and were well supplied with batteries of armor-piercing antitank guns." On the 3rd the Russians lost 200 men, 15 tanks, and 25 light artil­ lery pieces. One feature of the fighting was Japanese use of "thousands of flares" to expose fog-shrouded enemy ranks during a Soviet night attack.33 During the "first phase counteroffensive" by the Russians on 2-3 August, the 75th Regiment judged that the enemy's choice of opportunities for at­ tacking was "senseless"; once they started, they kept on till dealt an anni­ hilating blow. "We did not observe truly severe attacking capacity, such as lightning breakthroughs." With respect to tactical methods, the Japanese noted that Soviet offensive deployment was characterized by depth, which facilitated piecemeal destruction. When Russian advance elements suffered losses, replacements were moved up gradually. Soviet artillery fired with- ■ out linkage to the front-line troops, nor was there liaison between the >

INTENSIFICATION OF GROUND WAR

215

ground attacks staged in the Shachaofeng and Hill 52 sectors. Since enemy troops fought entirely on their own, they could be driven off in one swoop. Additionally, although 20 or 30 Russian tanks appeared during the counter­ attacks, their cooperation with the infantry was clumsy, and the armor was stopped. Soviet use of artillery in mobile warfare was "poorness personified": "Our troops never felt the least concern about hostile artillery forces, which were quite numerous. Even privates scoffed at the incapability of Russian artillery." It seemed that "those enemy who had lost their fighting spirit had the habit of fleeing far." During the combat between 31 July and 3 August, the defeated Russians appeared to fear pursuit and dashed all the way back to Kozando "although we did not advance even a step be­ yond the boundary."34 On 4 August Suetaka prepared a secret evaluation: the enemy attacks by day and night on 2 August were conducted by front-line corps built around the 40th Rifle Division. "In view of the failure of those assaults, the foe is bound to carry out a more purposeful offensive effort, using newly arrived corps reinforcements." Russian actions on 2 August had been the most serious and persistent offensive efforts undertaken since the outset of the incident, but they were about the last by the front-line corps whose immediate jurisdiction lay in the region of the incident. Consequent­ ly, the enemy's loss of morale as a result of their defeat on 30-31 July, com­ bined with their lack of unity in attack power, caused the attacks to end in failure. "We must be prepared for the fact that enemy forces will now mount a unified and deliberate offensive, avoiding rash attacks in view of their pre­ vious reversal, since large new corps are coming up."35

NOTES 1. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 73-74, 84. 2. CS, Chokoho, pp. 53-55; Tokyo Asahi, 2 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. 3. JRD/JSM 11,3/A: 88-89; Inada, "Soren kyokutogun," p. 283. 4. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 74-75. 5. Ibid., p. 75; CS, Chokoho, pp. 55-56. 6. CS, Chokoho, pp. 56-57. 7. Ibid., p. 57. 8. Ibid., pp. 56-58. On 31 July Suetaka ordered the suspension of troop movements at 2:30 P.M. and reassured the Korea Army at 8:53 P.M., the latter mes­ sage being received after midnight on 1 August. Iwasaki's message left Seoul at 1:05 A.M. on 1 August. 9. CS, Chokoho, p. 58. 10. Inada, "Soren kyokutogun," p. 283; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:43, 98. Korea Army Operations Order No. 30 was prepared at 8 P.M. on 1 August 1938; the high com­ mand was notified at 3:40 A.M. on 2 August. The justification given for authorizing

216

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Suetaka's reinforcements was the army's desire "to perfect defense against air raids into Korea." CS, Chokoho, pp. 58-61; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 86. 11. Namely, the 37th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, two battalions each from the 73rd and 76th regiments, and the 2nd Battalion, 25th Mountain Artillery Regi­ ment. CS, Chokoho, pp. 59-60; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 86-87. 12. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 85, 87, paragraph 4. 13. Intelligence received about 11 P.M., 1 August 1938. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 85. 14. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July-1 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 77-80, 84, 86; Tominaga interview. 15. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 85. 16. New York Times, 1 August 1938, pp. 1, 7; ibid., 3 August 1938, p. 12. 17. AGS, Chokoho soan. Chronology, 2 August 1938. 18. Account based on 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 2 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 87-93, 96-100. 19. Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 171-205. 20. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 95-96, 100-103. 21. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 31 July-2 August 1938; CS, Chokoho, pp. 61-62, 78. As of 6 P.M. on the 2nd, according to published accounts, Japanese casualties to date were said to have been verified as 30 killed and 67 wounded. Tokyo Asahi, 3-4 August 1938; Jinchu bidan, p. 24; B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 260, 295-296. 22. CS, Chokoho, p. 50. Japanese planes, it was admitted, flew a "one-time trans­ portation covering mission." 23. See preceding footnote. 24. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 2 August 1938. At 8:30 P.M. Suetaka ordered antiaircraft coverage of the Kucheng-Shachaofeng-Changkufeng sector. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 104-106. 25. Suetaka Unit Operations Order No. A-120-3 (Kyonghun), AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 105. Okido was to await further orders concerning his advance and any crossing of the frontier. Suetaka issued the instructions to K. Sato at 8 P.M. on 2 August. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 3 August 1938. 26. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 106; Sasai interview. 27. AGS Message No. 308 was transmitted by the IGHQ Press Bureau chief to the Korea Army commander. CS, Chokoho, p. 61. The IGHQ Army Order is No. 163. 28. CS, Chokoho, pp. 62, 47. 29. K. Nakamura, Affidavit No. 2, paragraphs 24, 26 (Blakeney Collection). 30. Inada, "Soren kyokutogun," p. 283; Inada interview. 31. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 3 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 93-97. 32. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 97-98. The instruction to Morimoto was included in Suetaka Unit Operations Order No. A-121-2, 6:00 A.M., 3 August 1938 (Kyong­ hun); 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 3 August 1938. 33. Tokyo Asahi, 4-5 August 1938; New York Times, 3-4 August 1938; B. Naka­ mura, Man-So, pp. 261, 296-297. . 34. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 3 August 1938, attachment 3. 35. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 113-114. After the incident, AGS historians wrote; "One must conclude that the estimate was an appropriate one, even when examined with the advantages of hindsight." AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 114. ■

Reorganizations, Frustrations, and Restraints

18

For the Japanese command structure at the front, 3 August was of prime importance. Suetaka felt that he "could not merely direct the fighting around Changkufeng or leave Kyonghun because of his need personally to handle relations with Korea Army Headquarters and the central authorities, and because of the special characteristics of these battles as well as his grave concern about the Wuchiatzu front" to the north. Therefore, by 5 P.M. the newly arrived 37th Brigade commander, Morimoto Nobuki, was assigned control of all sectors from Hill 52 and Changkufeng to Shachaofeng and established his command post at the 75th Regiment's former site at Chiangchunfeng.1 With the brigade being organized and reinforcements deployed for an offensive, Suetaka decided to commit his entire division by bringing up Cho's intact 74th Infantry from Hamhung. Clearly, Suetaka's offensive plans required greater depth; intelligence of a Soviet buildup made him apprehensive about his ability to cover the sector beyond the Tumen. In addition, Cho, no retiring type, had pressed for permission to join other division elements in the "glory" of fighting the Russians. Hence, on the afternoon of the 3rd, Nakamura received a wire from Suetaka expressing the opinion that "the way to solve the incident quickly without expan­ sion is to employ all strength and materiel necessary to secure Changku­ feng and to demonstrate a powerful determination." The enemy had been reinforced by over 100 tanks; persistent recapturing attacks were expected. "I wish to put the 74th Regiment on alert and concentrate it between

218

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Agochi and Seikaku. Such action would also enable response in the event of Soviet aggressive intent."2 Although Nakamura had concurred with the proposed divisional of­ fensive to pincer Soviet forces, the Korea Army did not sanction the most recent recommendation. The official explanation was that Seoul believed that "even greater caution was imperative"; Suetaka's proposed action was "unnecessary under the circumstances, and only [heavier] casualties would be incurred by massing strength in so constricted an area."3 Tsuchiya, however, airs some Korea Army dirty linen: great conflict, centering on the extent of the commitment of forces, had existed at Korea Army Headquarters ever since approval had been granted to move units to the frontier. Iwasaki had felt that, to clamp down on the 19th Division's op­ erations and to restrict the incident, Suetaka should not be given more men. Tsuchiya countered that approval had been given the division to handle matters, "so why not authorize it as much strength as it needed to operate properly?”4 Suetaka's offensive concept had been approved by Nakamura and was still under consideration in Tokyo, but Suetaka, for once, was being rela­ tively cautious. At 5:30 A.M. on 3 August, he phoned Okido, commander of the 76th Regiment, and told him to limit himself to an advance as far as the Huichungyuan area on the Manchurian side of the Tumen, and to diversion of the foe on the Changkufeng front. The first objective—to drive as far as Yangkuanping to the south in connection with the projected of­ fensive—was being rescinded, or at least held in abeyance, in favor of a feinting action.5 The Japanese estimated that they had inflicted the following losses during the Soviet counterattacks of 2-3 August: Hill 52-Changkufeng— at least 300 Russian casualties and four tanks smashed; Shachaofeng— 300 casualties and several tanks as well as several heavy machine guns knocked out. As of 5 P.M. on 3 August, Russian strength committed at the front and the immediate rear was judged to total ten infantry bat­ talions, 40 artillery pieces, and 80 tanks. On the 2nd and 3rd, Japanese casualties numbered 16 killed and 25 wounded.6 It was Suetaka's opinion that Soviet bombardments on 3 August were rather powerful but that their infantry assaults were not particularly brave, probably because of their huge losses in the furious fighting on the 2nd. Although enemy morale was not high, there was evidence of reinforcement by elite units, including armor and large artillery formations with many heavy guns.

REORGANIZATIONS, FRUSTRATIONS, RESTRAINTS

219

Suetaka concluded that the Russians would again strive to retake the Shachaofeng sector and the positions around Changkufeng.7 Answers from higher authority were forthcoming on the night of 3 August. Nakamura turned down Suetaka's proposal to move up the 74th Regiment, and the high command rejected the idea of a Japanese counter­ offensive. At 11:45 P.M. a telegram from Tada was received at Seoul. Our policy is to endeavor to bring this incident to speedy ter­ mination through negotiations, which is exactly what you were already notified by war ministry. To broaden combat front positively [aggressively], as proposed, would run counter to principle of Imperial order and might provide Soviet side an excuse for attacking toward Shuiliufeng. Therefore I must ask you kindly to exercise strict prudence.8

The Korea Army did not delay when it received this warning {chUi} from Tokyo. Fifteen minutes later, retransmission messages were on the wires to Kitano at the front with Suetaka and to the division chief of staff, Col. Y. Nakamura. Attesting to the wisdom of the policy of restraint, Iwasaki recounts: Two and a half years after the Changkufeng affair, when I reported to Seoul as a brigade commander, I learned that Suetaka had come to Korea Army Headquarters after the incident and had remarked that that army's operational guidance had been quite correct, although he personally had wanted to push into Soviet territory at the time. Thus, had the army let the division have its full strength from the outset, there is no telling what would have happened. Suetaka could have touched off all-out war.9

The disapproving notification was received at the time Suetaka was bringing Okido's 76th Infantry back to the Korean bank of the Tumen. According to division records: But even if the appropriate order were issued right away, im­ plementation would have to be carried out in daylight; this would mean our intentions would be exposed—which, in turn,

220

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

might incite the enemy. Consequently, we had the 76th Reg­ iment stay at its location and make preparations to conceal its strength and activities. Withdrawal from the forward zone was to take place on the night of 4-5 August; concentration to the rear, on the 5th.10

The 76th Infantry did leave Huichungyuan on 4 August and pulled back to the Korean side of the Tumen by 2 A.M. on the 5th. During the night of 3-4 August, the 75th Infantry, still on the alert against resumption of enemy counterattacks, tightened security and worked "enthusiastically" to strengthen defenses. K. Sato remained at Chiangchunfeng to complete the turnover to the 37th Brigade and to brief Morimoto. Meanwhile, the regiment was setting up its new command post for the right sector at the foot of Fangchuanting. Throughout the night the Japanese could see Soviet vehicles, with lights blinking, move south along the high ground east of Khasan. A new buildup of mechanized and artillery strength appeared in process. At 5:30 A.M. 36 tanks were observed advancing to Hill 29. Afterward, 50 or 60 Russian horsemen were seen "disappearing" into the same area. At 7 A.M. on the 4th, Soviet artillery began a bombardment. There was a slight let-up around noon, but by 2 P.M. a peak of intensity was reached, "like millions of lightning bolts striking at once." After another slack period, enemy guns quickened their tempo at 7:30 P.M. and pounded Hill 52 and Changkufeng. The Russians' artillery was not properly zeroedin; "many of the shells plopped into the Tumen. This delighted us con­ siderably." Starting on the 4th, Soviet artillery sought to cut lines of communication.by bombarding the river crossing site. Daytime supply was disrupted. Japanese artillery records add: "Until today, this battalion has been fired on only by field artillery; now 122-mm. howitzers went into action against us. We sustained no losses, since the points of impact were 100 meters off. Apparently, the Russians conducted firing for ef­ fect from the outset, using data provided by the field artillery from be­ fore."11 Before noon, the 75th Regiment learned that six enemy tanks had moved west of Hill 29 and were delivering violent fire. The Soviet infan­ try, however, showed no sign of pressing forward all day, and their most advanced lines remained 800 meters away. Impressed by the urgency of

REORGANIZATIONS, FRUSTRATIONS, RESTRAINTS

221

completing position work and of redeploying to defend the right sector, K. Sato phoned orders to Hirahara and Hisatsune at 6 P.M. Thereupon, Hirahara ordered Noguchi to proceed with most of his 9th Company, plus machine-gun and battalion-gun platoons, and replace the 6th Com­ pany at the heights southeast of Changkufeng. Noguchi was to conduct flank defense of the battalion front and Changkufeng while also blocking Soviet forces advancing along the lake. At dawn, Hisatsune was replaced as commander of the Changkufeng zone by Ito, who had just returned from hospital. Sato was particularly concerned about support by artillery, which had been scanty till recently. Around 6 P.M. Kamimori Rokuro, the enthusi­ astic major who commanded the 2nd Mountain Artillery Battalion, came to see him, and they "exchanged opinions frankly." At 9 P.M. Kamimori departed after exhorting his liaison lieutenant, O. Fujiuchi, to "concen­ trate exclusively on perfecting infantry-artillery coordination." Soviet aerial activity this day was limited to three small-scale reconnaissance sorties over the 75th Regiment sector which were repulsed by the anti­ aircraft batteries.12 The continuing Russian movements on the 4th suggested to Morimoto, whose brigade was now operational, that there might be another serious offensive by morning. He called for his units to tighten defenses, strengthen their positions, and improve antiaircraft masking. Morimoto was partic­ ularly worried about antitank measures. He shared K. Sato's and the others' apprehensions about Japanese artillery inferiority. Morimoto advised Suetaka "to cope with emergencies by striving to replenish front-line com­ bat strength" and again raised the question of bringing up the uncommit­ ted 74th Infantry. Tanaka's staff sought to improve firing preparations by surveying and night reconnaissance. On the night of 4-5 August, the artil­ lery regiment conducted night plotting, "but good results could not be obtained." The artillerymen were concerned about neutralizing hostile artillery, particularly long-range pieces, "but we had no suitable counter­ measures using present fire power." It was therefore decided to authorize fire against small, long-range targets, to draw Soviet counterfire against Japanese gun sites and thus cut down the numbers of enemy shells falling on the front-line infantry. Tanaka judged that the amended firing policy was a success in practice after 4 August.13 On the left sector, ground action was nil but Soviet artillery fire was at times severe, especially after noon. Lines of trucks, "moving like a long

222

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

snake,” appeared and disappeared east of Maanshan. At 4 P.M. T. Sato reported that since noon enemy forces on the Shachaofeng front had ap­ parently been replaced by fresh, crack units, and their actions had be­ come vigorous. The battalions should reinforce positions, strengthen antitank and antiaircraft defenses, and reconnoiter. Much of the eager­ ness of all commanders to tighten security and plug gaps stemmed from front-line guidance provided by the energetic Suetaka from early on 4 August. Suetaka visited the 37th Brigade and then (with Morimoto) K. Sato, from 9 A.M. to 1 P.M. Morimoto was told to accelerate rein­ forcement of defenses in the Hill 52 sector to prevent the outflanking of Changkufeng. A strong unit was to be sentto occupy the crestline northwest of Hill 52. Additionally, Suetaka ordered T. Sato to protect positions east of Shachaofeng against raids and to be on strictest alert to prevent the Russians from approaching Changkufeng from that direction.14 According to information available in Tokyo, Soviet forces in action since midnight of the 3rd totaled four or five infantry battalions (the core of the 40th Rifle Division) with 130 tanks and 80 artillery pieces. Japanese intelligence prepared a classified roundup of reports received about enemy rear movements on 4 August: at 9:30 A.M. columns of in­ fantry and cavalry were moving south intermittently on the road to Khansi—approximately 500 infantrymen plus many horsemen. By 10:30 A.M. at least 50 tanks were massed in each of three areas. From 9:30 P.M. many trucks were moving south intermittently from the direction of Novokievsk to Khansi and Kozando; "the number of trucks exceeded counting." As of 11 P.M. Morimoto reported that Soviet strength in the forward areas did not seem to exceed an infantry regiment. Activity was reported on the left sector, but all was quiet on the right until, at 11:45 P.M., the Russians opened fire "blindly" in the darkness against the rear.15 Around midnight Ichimoto, the old commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion, arrived at 75th Regiment Headquarters to resume command of the unit. He was "itching to fight." K. Sato described the casualties in detail, but "he didn't look 'beaten' at all," Ichimoto recalls. "To the contrary, the colonel was strong and in excellent spirits. Yet while he wasn't pessimistic, one could not call him optimistic.” At the battalion site, about 100 men were in operational condition out of an original 400. Some soldiers were hauling ammunition, rations, and position materiel; others were cremating the dead, since corpses would rot in the August heat.16

REORGANIZATIONS, FRUSTRATIONS, RESTRAINTS

223

Japanese casualties on 4 August were light: The 75th Infantry lost five men killed and three wounded; among the attached engineers the platoon leader and two men were wounded. Ammunition expenditure was very low.17 The Japanese press noted that although the Russians had been reported to be retreating behind the lake to the northeast, in­ vestigation showed that the movements were a redeployment forward from south of Changkufeng.18 An American observer in Tokyo.stated that "the best information obtainable is that the Russians now occupy the lower slopes of Changkufeng, while the Japanese still occupy the heights."19 A US correspondent who visited the battlefront on 4 August reported:

The [Soviet] shelling of . .. Manchukuo and Korea ... is carried on daily. There were about 300 explosions today. The Japanese said that 700 shells had fallen yesterday on the deserted Korean village of Kucheng, near the river. The shelling has caused little damage. The farm land now is vir­ tually deserted except for Japanese soldiers who rise from their camouflaged positions to peer at a visiting press party. .. . Kogi [Hongui], where the party is, is a tiny mountain village overlooking the scene of the hostilities. Japanese and Korean soldiers have covered the tin-roofed buildings with green foliage for concealment. So far as could be observed, the Japanese did not return the artillery fire.20

Although Japanese ground troops were supposedly more amused than alarmed by the "inept" Soviet artillery fire, there was no doubt that the Russians possessed great numerical superiority. The regimental journal for 4 August admitted the ferocity of the Soviet bombardment and the difficulty of logistical movement by day. Among the visitors at K. Sato's command post were Suetaka and Morimoto, an AGS air officer from the Russian Intelligence desk, and the Kwantung Army observer team leader from Hsinking. In his briefings, Sato mentioned the necessity to increase the artillery.21 From this period dates a series of pleas from the 19th Division for the dispatch of long-range artillery from the Kwantung Army. After Suetaka returned to Kyonghun at 9 P.M. from his inspection of the lines, Kitano (who was still at the front) sent a "preparatory" wire to Seoul, asking

224

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

that the Korea Army "base its attitude on preliminary consultations with high command because this matter is tied to diplomatic negotia­ tions in process.''22 Suetaka's thinking was colored by the "fraternal'' views of the Kwantung Army staff officer (Kawame, an artilleryman) at the front with him. It was Suetaka's opinion that "the addition of long-range artillery is necessary and feasible."23 As predicted by Kitano, Suetaka submitted his recommendation (at 5 A.M. on the 5th) for the attention of the Korea Army commander and AGS deputy:

Please cooperate [by providing] long-range artillery. We are constantly being fired on by no less than 90 pieces operating from positions in Changkufeng area beyond firing range of own mountain guns. This is encouraging enemy morale; there is concern lest it affect our own. I believe it imperative to subdue foe once to settle incident quickly, and I therefore request arrangements kindly be made for expeditious dispatch and cooperation of following units from Kwantung Army: railway guns [10-cm.] —one battery; M-89, 15-cm. cannonone or two batteries; M-90 [7.5-cm.] field artillery—three batteries.24

As soon as the Korea Army received Suetaka's request, a message along the lines of Kitano's advice was dispatched to the vice minister of war and the AGS deputy; an inquiry was sent simultaneously to Hsinking. Mention was made that Soviet artillery on the Changkufeng front numbered from eight to ten batteries of field and mountain artillery, some 10-cm. cannon, and two or three 15-cm. howitzer batteries. These long-range pieces were conducting slow fire every day from beyond Japanese firing range.25 While the Japanese military in Korea were again awaiting the high com­ mand's decision, 5 August dawned cloudy at the front. Throughout the night, Soviet vehicular traffic had been observed along the high ground east of Khasan. By 6:30 A.M. 48 tanks were concentrating near Hill 29 and new artillery deployed "once the enemy discerned that our own guns were few." Intelligence from Hill 52 indicated lively movement of armor across the lake; at dawn from 10 to 15 tanks could be detected on the crestline ahead of the artillery sites. Even closer to Khasan, at the south end, another six Russian tanks were spotted. As early as 3 A.M. on the 5th, Changkufeng was bombarded. K. Sato asked the mountain artillery to lay down counterfire from dawn against

REORGANIZATIONS, FRUSTRATIONS, RESTRAINTS

225

the high ground east of Khasan as well as against Hill 29. Between 5 and 5:40 A.M. the guns struck at concentrations of armor, knocked out two tanks, and drove the others to the east of Hill 29. Russian observation posts were also neutralized and cavalry was driven north. Meanwhile, from 5:30 A.M. Soviet guns had been delivering a barrage of their own against the Japanese rear, particularly against lines of communication crossing the Tumen. The link through Sozan became unusable by day, and phone lines to the artillery battalion were cut, although signalmen restored telephone communications promptly. Russian guns bombarded not only the river crossings but also Fangchuanting, Hill 52, and Shachao­ feng, where 15-cm. shell blasts were particularly jolting. "From today enemy shellfire was 'coned' and grew increasingly accurate, until every area along our front was deprived of its dead angles and our casualties mounted."26 Although Soviet bombardment of the Hill 52 zone continued at a slow tempo in the morning, tank fire from the high ground east of Khasan was "quite severe." Noguchi's company, deployed south of Chang­ kufeng, was caught in crossfire from artillery positions across the lake. The specter of inferiority in artillery continued to dominate the thinking of Suetaka and his front-line subordinates. The general did what he could within his organic resources. On the morning of the 5th, he transferred a battery of two 15-cm. howitzers from Kyonghun to the sector opposite Changkufeng—a trifling increment with relatively unimpressive range. Suetaka's order of 10 A.M. called also for replenishment of front-line combat strength. His evaluation of enemy power and friendly capabil­ ities is illuminating: the Russians apparently had deployed three or four infantry battalions, 120-130 tanks, 50-60 armored cars, 1,000 mounted soldiers, and three or four artillery battalions. But "the morale of our own units has risen, as we have been dealing grievous blows to the foe on occasion and have been steadily breaking hostile intentions"; by 5 August 50 enemy tanks had been knocked out. The division was "determined to accomplish ever more perfect border defense while continuing to adhere to the great policy of nonenlargement."27 Morimoto was worried about another ominous lull and the whole problem of attrition induced by the "special characteristics of this fighting.' It would be "dangerous to gauge our immediate actions merely by move­ ments of enemy forces in front of our eyes." Therefore, during protracted combat it was imperative, "even in case the situation becomes very quiet, that all units tighten security and reinforce positions. . . and thus allow not even an infinitesimal advantage which the foe could exploit."28

226

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

During 5 August, in the right sector, only four soldiers were wounded: three in the 75th Infantry, and one in the mountain artillery platoon. Am­ munition expenditure continued to be low. Japanese antiaircraft guns, set up west of Sozan since the night before, drove off two aircraft which ap­ peared over Changkufeng at 11:45 A.M., but this drew an artillery counter­ barrage from northeast of Khasan. Soviet planes, in small numbers, flew over Hill 52 and Changkufeng twice more in the afternoon but seemed engaged only in photography. Since morning, northeast of Khasan, col­ umns of Russian foot units and trucks—20 or 30 at a time, and sometimes 40 or 50—moved south intermittently all day; about 20 tanks also started moving south. The Soviets were constructing new positions on the heights line near Khansi. Since 4 August several steamers of the 2,000-3,000-ton class had been plying in and out of Posyet Bay. Between 2 August and the following morning, one infantry regiment and much military materiel had been shipped out of Vladivostok. Japanese intelligence also predicted that the negotiations in Moscow would be decided, "one way or the other, by about noon today, 5 August."29 At 6 P.M. Kitano dispatched a long wrap-up report from Kyonghun, together with recommendations: the Russians had not combined all arms in concert; hence, their attacks were not serious. But caution and alertness were imperative now because the Russians were stalling the diplomatic parleys. They might be intending to enhance the outcome of the incident by air bombing and particularly by long-range shellfire designed to exhaust Japanese fighting strength at no cost to them. Coordinating their combat power, the Russians might then try to retake Changkufeng, in which case the Japanese forces "had no particularly good ideas for utilizing forces on such a restricted frontage, from the standpoints of terrain and tactics." Kitano felt that the fighting was "not a type of wartime attrition benefiting from developments on other fronts." Japanese troops were "enduring gradual exhaustion by holding uselessly to the positions." Although division morale was high, protraction of the affair might eventually affect its esprit de corps. While the numerous enemy infantry and field guns "need not be dreaded" because of the terrain, it was vital to nullify the Russians' per­ sistent use of bombers and long-range artillery. As long as the numbers of enemy aircraft did not increase substantially, there were limited means of shooting them down by ground fire. But coping with the energy's big guns was another matter; only two possibilities existed: to employ Japanese long-range artillery or to conduct night operations against hostile batteries, using small raiding units. Night assault, Kitano admitted, "would entail

REORGANIZATIONS, FRUSTRATIONS, RESTRAINTS

227

censure for illegal crossing of the borders; therefore, to crush the enemy's intentions, the introduction of long-range [Japanese] artillery appears inevitable. This would not be deemed unlawful or contravene the principle of localization."30 Kitano's comments reflect the thinking of senior staff officers at the front. In the late evening of 5 August, the AGS transmitted to Seoul its reply to the Korea Army's request of that morning: "Informal instructions have been given to Kwantung Army that following be sent to Tumen as they become available: two batteries of M-90 field artillery, and an M-89 15-cm. cannon unit if possible. We plan to issue formal order placing these units under your command later."31 The Korea Army happily noti­ fied the division at 2 A.M. on 6 August. It was none too soon, for the 6th was the day the Russians launched the anticipated second major ground offensive in the Changkufeng area; the long-range artillery reinforcements could not be expected to go into action before the 8th. Meanwhile, in greatest secrecy, the AGS had decided on 5 August to break off the Chang­ kufeng Incident as soon as possible by voluntarily pulling out, the exact timing to be left to the chief of the AGS.32 The foreign press noted that Tokyo was optimistic about prospects for peace, but Soviet guns were pounding positions at Changkufeng every half-hour. While Japanese troops were merely "watching and waiting," the Domei news agency reported, Russian forces were apparently planning to retake Changkufeng before a settlement could be reached in Moscow. Troop-laden trucks were observed behind Soviet lines, and 20 planes were transferred from Khabarovsk to locations nearer the frontier on 4 August. Deployed along a four-mile front, the Russians apparently intended to envelop Changkufeng, although mists descending along the Posyet coast were expected to delay the effort. Japanese spokesmen insisted that Soviet infantry and artillery were not cooperating well yet.33

NOTES 1. The 38th Brigade commander, Ono Nobuaki, was unable to come from China until the incident was near an end; proceeding from Manchuria, Morimoto experi­ enced problems, too. Morimoto statement, BBSS Archives. Morimoto was to com­ mand 37th Brigade Headquarters and all or part of the 73rd Infantry, 75th Infantry, 25th Mountain Artillery, a heavy field-artillery battery, the 19th Engineers, and a cavalry platoon. Suetaka Unit Combat Headquarters Operations Order No. A-121-2, AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 106-110; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 3 August 1938.

228

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

2. Suetaka Unit Staff Message No. 17, 2:18 P.M., 3 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 75-76. 3. CS, Chokoho, p. 76; K. Nakamura, Affidavit No. 2, paragraph 25 (Blakeney Collection). 4. Iwasaki and Tsuchiya interviews. 5. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 3 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 98, 104-105. 6. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 2-3 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, attachment 3. 7. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 110-111. 8. Ibid., p. 111; CS, Chokoho, p. 48. Previous notification of policy by the war ministry was contained in a message from Tojo, received at Seoul at 10:15 P.M., 3 August 1938. CS, Chokoho, p. 47. 9. Iwasaki interview. 10. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 111. 11. Ibid., p. 128. 12. Ibid., pp. 125, 130; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 4 August 1938. 13. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 121, 1 29. 14. Ibid., pp. 114, 126. 15. Takagi letter, 5 August 1938, in Harada, Saionji ko, 7:65; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 111-112, 122; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, attachment 4. 16. Ichimoto interview. 17. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho,4 August 1938. 18. Jinchu bidan, p. 25. 19. New York Times, 5 August 1938, p. 8 (Tokyo dateline). 20. New York Times, 5 August 1938, p. 8 (Kogi dateline). 21.75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 4 August 1938. 22. Kitano Report No. 13, 1:05 A.M., 5 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 62-63. 23. K. Sato interview. 24. Suetaka Unit Staff Message No. 31 (Request), CS, Chokoho, pp. 63-64. The AGS history says that the Japanese were being fired on by 30 Russian artillery pieces, which is probably a typographical error. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 114-115. 25. Korea Army Message No. 155, morning of 5 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, p. 64. 26. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 5 August 1938. 27. Suetaka Unit Combat Headquarters Operations Order No. A-133, 5 August 1938, AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 118-120. 28. Morimoto's instructions (kunji) of 5 August 1938, AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 123. 29. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 112-113. 30. CS, Chokoho, pp. 64-66. Seoul received this message at 9 P.M. and immedi­ ately retransmitted the text to the vice minister of war, AGS deputy, and Kvyantung Army chief of staff. 31. AGS Message No. 368, 10:03 P.M., 5 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, p. 66. 32. This major development is discussed in ch. 24, pp. 290-292. 33. Tokyo Asahi, 6 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid. (A.M. ed.), p. 3: New York Times, 6 August 1938, p. 6.

The Second Soviet Offensive

19

Around midnight on 5 August, Morimoto noticed that the Russians' forwardmost elements seemed to have been pulled back; the front was quiet. He ordered energetic guarding, "but crossing of the border, tres­ passing, and fomenting of trouble are prohibited—on the part of units, of course, and even on the part of scouts. It is expected that there will be no such occurrences as challenges to the enemy and consequent exploi­ tation by the foe."1 Meanwhile, the Japanese had been getting ready for Soviet night attacks and had been consolidating. Throughout the foggy night, the watchful men could hear mechanized units moving on the crestline east of Khasan. At daybreak a platoon leader north of Chang­ kufeng reported tanks heading toward Hill 29. He estimated the total force at 70 tanks and 50 troop-laden trucks. The Japanese at Hill 52 detected new artillery positions on both sides of Hill 29 and 40 tanks on the crestline south of that hill. By 7 A.M. the high ground was covered with no less than 100 tanks, plus 8 or 9 infantry battalions de­ ployed ahead and behind. As early as 3 A.M. K. Sato enjoined his artillery liaison officer to ensure that friendly guns fired at daybreak against the Hill 29 sector and "thwarted the enemy's intention beforehand." When the morning fog lifted a bit at 6 A.M., Kamimori's mountain artillery battalion "hit the tanks very well," while front-line officers spotted shell impact; until 10 A.M. mist made this difficult. By 7 A.M. Soviet guns had begun to fire from near Hill 29; a duel ensued, with the Japanese outranged. Around 9, when the fog lifted from the higher crest of Changkufeng, Japanese

230

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

gunners there added their fire against the 40 Russian tanks near Hill 29. From Fangchuanting, the one Japanese mountain piece also engaged ar­ mor and troop lorries in the vicinity of Hill 29. As time went by, the Soviet guns "showed their power, and Hill 52 was turned into a beehive." From 11 A.M. the defenders began to suffer more and more casualties, and the works were shattered in succession. Flank fire from Gaho and heavy guns from the Maanshan direction took a particular toll. The 100 tanks deployed on the crestline north and south of Hill 29 delivered furious low-trajectory fire, "gradually transforming the front walls of our firing trenches into something that looked like the teeth of a saw." Russian shellfire rained destruction on the defenses at Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Changkufeng. Soviet guns, which between 2 and 5 August had fired in relatively dispersed fashion, were now focusing their barrages. The artillery also fired on the rear headquarters sites of the 37th Brigade and 75th Regiment. Even the crossings at Sozan and Matsu'otsuho were hit by Russian heavy guns and field artillery. Sato was concerned about the plight of friendly batteries because "the mo­ ment our close-support guns opened fire, enemy shells would roar down." A peak of intensity was reached near 1:30 P.M. when the Soviet ground advance began. Now 30 Soviet aircraft bombed Changkufeng, Fangchuanting, and Hill 52, after which Russian tanks began to move toward Hill 52, with foot soldiers 300 to 400 meters behind. Deciding that the best way to smash the assault was to lay down concerted fire at short range, Hirahara ordered that ammunition be cached and that the men not open up pre­ maturely. The Soviet infantrymen and tanks advanced until they reached a line 900 meters from the Japanese. There, they halted for a while but continued to fire. Around 2 P.M. the advance was resumed with a total strength of three battalions led by 50 tanks. Lieutenant Saito, the 3rd Battalion's antitank battery commander, directed by the regimental aide, waited until the tanks were 800 meters away and then ordered his three pieces to fire. In the course of furious shelling between 1:50 and 2:30, while the armor closed to 300 meters, the gunners stopped 14 tanks and seriously damaged others of the 60 to the rear. One antitank-gun squad leader, a corporal, would receive a posthumous citation for stopping more than ten tanks. Finally, the surviving tanks turned back, some es­ caping into a dip near Khasan. In the melee, some of the Soviet troops were reportedly crushed to death by their own tanks.

THE SECOND SOVIET OFFENSIVE

231

Supporting Saito's fire were Hisatsune's three regimental guns and the captured antitank gun at Changkufeng, from which the Japanese engaged armor along the slopes of the lake. Noguchi's unit even fired battalion guns against the tanks while the attached mountain pieces bombarded the Russians despite intense counterbattery fire. At Hill 52, liaison lieu­ tenant Fuji'uchi was observing the shellfire and coordinating infantry­ artillery operations with a platoon leader. Fuji'uchi "never flinched" although he was buried in the trenches three times by shell blasts. Near 2 P.M. he was killed by a projectile. Captain Shiozawa, the mountain battery commander, undertook to direct the fire and exposed himself to the cannonade; he too was slain. The Soviet troops held up while a dozen tanks appeared and disap­ peared in the second and third lines. By now, the Japanese antitank guns were falling silent as the result of overheating. By penetrating gaps in the antitank and artillery barrage, enemy armor managed to climb onto the northern side of Hill 52. Other tanks, which had advanced along the slopes of Khasan, continued to take clever advantage of the terrain and also approached the northern slope. The 22 Russian tanks laid down fierce cannon fire against the positions on the left from a line 300 meters away. Even walls V/2 meters thick were pierced by the tank guns, and breastworks were pulverized. Many casualties were suffered among the infantry, the machine gunners, and the engineers. After the vanguard tanks were knocked out by antitank fire, Soviet infantry to the rear—in battalion strength and led by five or six tanks—stopped at 800 meters. They moved heavy weapons another 100 meters to the front, redeployed, and resumed the advance. Behind them, two companies with draft horses proceeded in column along the Tumen. Japanese troops on the right fired fiercely against the heavy machine guns and infantry, "ig­ noring the tank fire," until the Soviet push bogged down in that quarter. By 4 P.M. the most advanced Russian troops had closed to 400 meters. On the extreme right, 1st Lieutenant Yamaguchi was calmly directing combat. He had "purified" himself the night before in the waters of the Tumen in samurai fashion. Now, at 4:40 on the 6th, a torrent of heavy machine-gun fire cut down the 11th Company commander and he per­ ished with the words "Tenno Heika BanzaiV' on his lips.2 On the Japanese left flank at Hill 52, Russian foot troops had closely followed 16 tanks advancing behind the crestline, moved very close to the defense positions by 2 P.M. and joined the tanks in firing, but got no farther. To the rear,

232

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

a large force advanced along the lake north of Hill 52 until checked by fire from Noguchi's positions. A dozen Russian tanks converged southwest of Khasan at 4 P.M. Master Sergeant Kobayashi, acting platoon leader of the engineers, decided that a close-quarter demolition attack ought to be mounted since the Japanese lacked antitank strength. After his recommendation was approved by Hirahara, around 4:30 he and 13 men crept forward 300 meters without being detected. Twenty meters from the tanks Kobayashi exhorted his soldiers: "One man, one tank! Unto death for us all!" The assault team blew off the treads or wrecked six to eight (or possibly ten) of the 12 enemy tanks and killed a number of crewmen inside or outside the machines, but Kobayashi and seven men were killed outright and another five were wounded. Only one man went unscathed: the medical soldier, Kabasawa, who had been sent for explosives. When Kabasawa got back to the blazing battlefield, he saw that Kobayashi was dead, so he went and "got himself" a tank. Then he picked up the platoon leader's body and returned safely.3 Of the 60 Russian tanks and at least four battalions which had rushed to the Hill 52 area, only one tank managed to charge into the hill positions. At 5:30 P.M. this machine came within 150 meters of 11th Company lines but was destroyed by armor-piercing heavy machine-gun fire. At the 75th Regiment command post, K. Sato had been receiving re­ ports from the line units, but hostile fire cut communications with Hill 52 in the afternoon. Sato grew apprehensive. His antitank guns were be­ coming inoperational and casualties had been mounting. He decided to reinforce Hill 52, first with heavy machine guns and then with an infan­ try company. North of Hill 52, Noguchi had been in position with an infantry pla­ toon, a machine-gun platoon, and the battalion gun battery. By 9:30 A.M. the enemy barrage forced him to pull back "temporarily" to the lower Scattered Pines area, 300 meters on the opposite slope, to avoid "use­ less casualties." At the site of the vacated positions on Akahage ("Red Bald") Hill, Noguchi left only lookouts. Near 4 P.M. about two (later increased to perhaps four) enemy companies were observed moving in the direction of Changkufeng. Noguchi had his men return to their old positions and directed that fire be concentrated against this threat, The Japanese, in turn, were attacked by the infantrymen and four tanks which approached 150 meters from the positions, as well as by infantry guns and

THE SECOND SOVIET OFFENSIVE

233

other tanks. The shelling continued until sundown. Casualties increased; the machine-gun platoon leader, Master Sergeant Harayama, fell with 20 of his soldiers. In all, the 9th Company lost about half of the men it had had at this hill. "It was a rather hard battle, but we retained our positions and the enemy advance toward Changkufeng was checked."4 After sunset there were occasional exchanges of fire and tanks could still be seen burning. Soviet troops who came to destroy barriers attracted hand-grenade attack. Much noise could be heard behind enemy lines—un­ doubtedly the evacuation of casualties and the salvage of tanks—but there were no further assaults. Perhaps it was also because of the effective ob­ struction barrages laid down on five separate occasions by supporting guns of the 2nd Mountain Artillery Battalion. Soviet aircraft were active from morning till dusk. Inagaki wrote: From 1 to 5 P.M. 80 enemy fighters and light and heavy bom­ bers circled over our Changkufeng positions in succession and conducted blind but incessant bombings, reportedly 50 tons' worth. Sand smoke billowed up and covered the region as far as Shuiliufeng. The very top of Changkufeng underwent a change in shape: the salient vanished and the outline became conical. The green of the mountain turned to red earth. Never­ theless, the morale of our men soared even higher, though they were eating only once a day. Rice balls were cooked on the shore of the Tumen but, since the weather was so hot, the rice arrived spoiled. Still, the troops said that they could sur­ vive, and they went on defending the frontier patiently.5

Once Soviet ground troops began their advance at 1:30 P.M., the Rus­ sians laid down a barrage of field, heavy, and mountain gunfire against Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Fangchuanting until sunset. Casualties were heaviest between 3 and 5 P.M. Soviet cutoff fire against the Tumen cross­ ings continued even after the sun went down. Japanese close-support ar­ tillery attracted instantaneous counterbattery fire. Enemy planes also seemed to be bombing in quest of the artillery sites. Defending antiair­ craft units claimed to have shot down one plane, damaged another badly, and driven off the rest. Reconnaissance aircraft flew in from the down­ stream Tumen in the evening but were repulsed.

234

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

The Soviet barrages cut communications at various times. Signalmen conducted phone repair under fire and restored the lines to infantry and artillery command posts; "no great interference with overall combat com­ mand was caused." At crucial times, runners and even swimmers substi­ tuted for knocked-out phones.6 Russian aerial and artillery attacks against the Shikai and Hongui railheads and the Tumen crossings rendered rear logistical movement by day "very difficult" from 6 August. The sole rail link was threatened, as illustrated by the fact that Hongui station was damaged by a barrage that day, and shortages of ammunition, grenades, rations, and construction materiel began to develop. On the sector defended by T. Sato, throughout the night of 5-6 August, Russian movements had been frequent on the Kozando-Paksikori road and east of Khasan—trucks and tanks making round trips. The roar of engines and rumbling of vehicles were especially pronounced on the lake heights. Headlights shone brightly, causing Japanese lookouts to specu­ late that the Russians were putting on a demonstration to suggest that their main offensive effort was being aimed against Hill 52. Nevertheless, the left sector unit was ready for an enemy dawn assault, which did materialize around 6 A.M. One or two Soviet battalions struck forward, encountered a torrent of fire at 300 meters, and fled, leaving 30 bodies behind. Near 9 A.M. the left sector experienced a fierce series of bom­ bardments; all of the men except lookouts took cover in trenches. The Soviet guns thundered unrelentingly, apparently in preparation for an of­ fensive. At 2:30 P.M. several dozen bombers struck. Simultaneously, a wave of 60 tanks moved forward, followed by three battalions of infan­ try. Major Obo, battalion commander on the right wing, had his heavy machine guns, battalion guns, and line companies engage the foot soldiers, while antitank and regimental guns concentrated against armor. The tanks fanned out and approached within 700 meters, stopping to fire on occa­ sion in "mobile pillbox" fashion. Despite unrelenting enemy tank and artillery shelling, the Japanese regimental guns, and the rapid-fire pieces in particular, shifted position and laid down raiding fire. In conjunction with heavy weapons belonging to Takenouchi's battalion, Obo's men succeeded in stopping 20 tanks. The rest of the armored group continued to push forward. The Russian infantry had pressed on another 200 meters behind the tanks, but eventually they lost momentum 400 meters from the Japanese positions. Having managed to separate the tanks from the infantry, the

THE SECOND SOVIET OFFENSIVE

235

Japanese units staged close-in assaults in concert with heavy weapons and smashed ten more tanks. Thirty machines had been immobilized by now after a furious struggle lasting five hours. Although Lieutenant Ikue was killed by machine-gun fire, his mountain artillery platoon, emplaced at Shachaofeng, rendered yeoman service, stopping 20 tanks. The forward elements of Soviet infantry, still firing from 400 meters behind the tanks, had apparently abandoned the attack. Second-line forces seemed to have pulled far back, northeast of the lake. Several dozen Soviet bombers struck Takenouchi's left-wing battalion around 2:30 P.M. and lost one plane to machine-gun fire. At the same time, 50 Soviet tanks closed to 800 meters. Engaging this armored for­ mation were battalion guns, heavy field artillery, and mountain artillery attached to the sector unit, as well as heavy weapons firing from the neighboring battalion. In succession the tanks were knocked out, perhaps 20 in all. Under cover of artillery and bombing, a battalion of Soviet infantry, who had been advancing behind the tanks, got as close as 30 or 40 meters before being checked by guns firing from the Nanpozan area and by the vigorous resistance of the defenders. The enemy with­ drew 600 meters and began to dig in. T. Sato noted at 7 P.M. that, al­ though the Russians on the right and left sectors seemed to have sus­ tained considerable losses, they apparently were "planning something at point-blank range in front of our positions." The 73rd Infantry would therefore cope with a twilight or night attack by the one battalion and several tanks immediately facing it. Captain Tominaga describes the actions of his infantry gun battery: there was no emplacement materiel or barbed wire, only holes covered with camouflage nets. The soil was sandy; each hit would cave in the site, and the men would have to start digging again. On 6 August, immediately after large-scale air attacks involving four-engine bombers between noon and 2 P.M., enemy barrages began. "Real Red Army tactics!" thought Tominaga. Enemy artillery positions, 6,000-7,000 meters away, were not engaged by the Japanese since their gunners were trained only at 1,000 meters. Longer ranges were ineffective, would betray the guns, and would waste ammunition. Near 4 P.M. 50 tanks appeared at 3,000 meters, and infantry could also be seen, wearing high boots and marching around the lake. Although the Russians may have closed to 200 or 300 meters, Tominaga received no impression that their foot soldiers were particularly aggressive. Soviet armored tactics were poor: some tanks were moving,

236

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

some stopped, but they did their firing from rises, which made them easy targets. Perhaps it was because of the terrain, undulating and swampy. Without armor-piercing (AP) rounds, the Japanese guns could not pen­ etrate the heaviest armor, so they aimed at the treads or at the belly when the tank was on a rise. Tominaga's weapons were aided by rapid-fire pieces and machine guns and by the 15-cm. howitzers from across the river. Of the ten targets which came within effective range, Tominaga's battery claimed five light tanks, for which they were commended by T. Sato.7 Another front-line Japanese commander on the Shachaofeng sector, Major Takenouchi, remembers a tank-led Soviet attack that day. The enemy infantry deployed in good order four kilometers from the defenses. As the formations drew closer, the Japanese counted more than 40 tanks and 3,000 ground troops. The commander knew he had a serious prob­ lem, for there were only 20 antitank shells for the rapid-fire guns. When the Russians got within 4,000 meters, the Japanese opened fire with all available heavy weapons. The attackers hit the ground and continued to advance in perfect creeping formation, although the terrain consisted of paddy fields. All the Japanese could see were Russians, wearing reddishpurple trousers and carrying rifles, deployed every 200 meters behind the front lines and apparently exhorting the soldiers. These must have been the "enforcers." The Japanese let the tanks close to 800 meters be­ fore opening fire with their precious antitank ammunition. Both the lead and the last tanks were knocked out, but there were by now only four or five shells left, and the firing had to be stopped. Fortunately for the Japanese, the tanks never again advanced, perhaps because of the wet terrain. The Soviet infantry, however, pressed forward tenaciously all day and wormed their way close to the front edge of the barbed wire under cover of artillery and machine guns. Throughout the day, pleas for reinforcement were made frequently by the two Japanese line companies, but the battalion had no reserves— only the few soldiers in the command team. Requests were met with the reply to "hold on for a while; help is coming." Luckily, there was no close-quarter fighting by the time night fell, but the Russians did lay down concerted machine-gun fire after dark. When dawn broke without a Soviet assault, Major Takenouchi surmised that the barrage of machine­ gun fire laid down by Russian infantry the evening before must have been intended to cover disengagement from the lines or to check a Japanese

THE SECOND SOVIET OFFENSIVE

237

attack. Now, in daylight, Russian assault troops which had closed to the entanglements the day before had pulled back to a distance of 400 or 500 meters and could be seen constructing positions.8

NOTES 1. Morimoto Unit Operations Order No. 7, 12:15 A.M., 6 August 1938, 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938, attachment 1. My account of the daytime battles is based on 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 130-140, 157-159, 161-163, 167. 2. Major Morikawa eulogizes Yamaguchi in Jinchu bidan, pp. 283-284. 3. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 135. Also see Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 221 -224. 4. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938. 5. Jinchu bidan, p. 185. 6. Ibid., p. 36; Miyajima interview. 7. Tominaga interview. 8. Statement by Takenouchi Shigeo, BBSS Archives. The rest of the description of the action in T. Sato's sector on 6 August 1938 is based on AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 141-144.

Crisis on the Crest

At Changkufeng, an emergency was to confront the Japanese after sunset on 6 August. Probably because of Noguchi's effective defense in the afternoon, a Soviet advance against the hill had proved impossible. Phone calls received by K. Sato from Hirahara at Hill 52 were also re-, assuring; by 5 P.M. at least 38 Russian tanks had been stopped. From about twilight three enemy tanks were observed moving to the left, tra­ versing grassy fields near the Khasan shore in front of Noguchi Hill. Be­ hind the tanks, three infantry battalions could also be seen. At 7:10 P.M. Morimoto warned that while the Soviet offensive had bogged down, "all units are to be wary of attacks after twilight and are to crush them in good time."1 Ito, in charge at Changkufeng, was consequently alert al­ though regimental headquarters did not particularly share his concern. Ito had only two infantry squads from the 6th Company and Hisatsune's regimental gun battery—121 men in all. A little after 8 P.M., Ito received a report from lookouts that enemy troops were advancing onto the southern skirt. At 8:30 two Soviet companies attacked the advanced lines, hurling grenades. One Japanese squad was almost wiped out; "they died heroic deaths, leaping into a hostile force which outnumbered them 20:1." Immediately, the Russians surged toward the main Japanese positions farther up the hill, while other strong elements sought to encircle the crest on the left. Accompanying the Soviet troops were "wardens." From north, east, and south the Japanese defenses were being over­ run, and the regimental guns were in jeopardy. Wounded men were falling back and down the hill, one by one. Lieutenant Hisatsune personally sought to repulse the Russians. Taking his command team, a dozen men under a master sergeant, and the two regimental gun squads (which pos­

CRISIS ON THE CREST

239

sessed only captured rifles), he led a desperate charge at 9:10. With fixed bayonets, the Japanese rushed forward, yelling loudly and hurling rocks, since there were not enough grenades. The Russians retreated in confusion, pursued by the Japanese. Hisatsune cut down several Russians, was wounded badly by grenades, but plunged into the enemy one last time before meeting a "matchlessly heroic death" at 9:40. Almost all of the noncoms and soldiers fell with him.2 Suddenly, at 9:20 P.M., Ito's antitank squad leader staggered to the 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting, his face mangled. "Chang­ kufeng is in danger!" he gasped. "Avenge us!" But Sato had already, after sunset, dispatched his regimental reserves—the entire 2nd and 3rd infantry companies—to the river to haul construction materiel to Hill 52. Sato and the 1st Battalion aide, Lieutenant Nishimura, managed to scrape together 17 men to rush to Changkufeng immediately—battalion clerks, messengers, and several reserves on lookout duty. Nishimura and the reinforcements had to run 1,200 meters to reach the hill. Major Ichimoto also worked desperately to retrieve men from logistical chores; somehow he assembled 45. Grabbing every grenade available at the command post, Ichimoto ran with his men to the relief of Changkufeng. Next, Regimental Aide Suko sent 10 soldiers, the last being headquarters clerks and runners. When 16 men from the 2nd Company turned up, having delivered their supplies, Suko rushed them out, also. At regimental headquarters there now re­ mained only a dozen soldiers and one heavy machine gun. Survivors attest to the extemporary nature of the Japanese rush up Changkufeng Hill. Says Murakoshi: "We had to take off piecemeal with­ out concentrating." Another of the men (who somehow ended up un­ wounded) was "just pushed into the battle, utterly unready," and "ran like mad," carrying only a rifle, no ammunition. Some of the others had a little ammunition. There was nothing like unit formation, just "bodies." The unwounded survivor mentioned above cannot even remember with whom he was running; "everybody around joined in the dash." When they got to the front, they picked up the ammunition of the killed and wounded. Master Sergeant Murakoshi and his old platoon, which became the "main force" in the counterattack, dashed up 500 meters to the trenches on the crest. By now, the Russians had climbed up and across Changkufeng peak and were pushing halfway down the Japanese slope of the hill. Enemy machine guns were firing fiercely, but it was mainly grenades which felled Murakoshi's unit; although few were killed, half

240

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

of the lead platoon was wounded. Murakoshi, struck by a grenade frag­ ment, tied a cloth around his knee and kept on running.3 After retreating once, the Russians had brought up reinforcements, redeployed, and again pressed close from the north and northeast, throw­ ing grenades and rushing the defenders. "Crisis was again upon us," the records note.4 Clinging to Changkufeng, Ito now had little more than 50 men left—only seven of his own soldiers, the rest gunners. The latter had lost their pieces, however, and had never been armed with rifles in the first place. The survivors had to use stones, picks, and shovels to grapple with the foe in the trenches. Ito set the example for his soldiers, who "had tended to become uneasy, to recoil and become inactive." The men's morale revived.5 A little before 10 P.M., the 17-man contingent under Nishimura arrived. Ten minutes later, Ichimoto rushed up with his 45 men, bunched closely. The survivors, inferior to the reinforcements in numbers, were heartened immensely. Soon afterward, at 10:30, the regimental warrant officer, Nishizawa, caught up with another dozen soldiers, and Murakoshi brought 16 more at 11 P.M. Wild fighting ensued—furious grenade exchanges, the crisscrossing of fire, and shouts and flashes. Ichimoto remembers that by the time he arrived, the last remnants of Ito's company were fighting hand-to-hand in the trenches on the north side in utter darkness. Thirty meters from the peak, he and Nishimura scouted the situation. Then, having combined the 120 reinforcements into one line, Ichimoto drew his sword and led the charge. In the constant flashes, shapes could be discerned rather well. The Russian machine guns were firing "crazily," all tracers, probably to warn away their own troops. But the firing was very high, sometimes ten meters over the heads of the Japanese, perhaps because of the darkness, the 40-degree slope near the crest, and the angle of the guns. Much of the fire was considerably lower, but the Japanese had only to observe the roots of the tracer fire and stay down, ducking behind boulders. "We didn't fear the machine guns," says Ichimoto. "It was mainly a battle of our grenades against their tracers." The Soviets had been committing new troops steadily, and a consider­ able amount of heavy weapons had been emplaced. Near midnight the Russians were driven south, down the cliff, but most of the Japanese had been killed or wounded, and ammunition was exhausted. The mere dozen unscathed survivors were pushed pack, but Master Sergeant Isobe and his platoon from Inokuma's company reached the crest in the nick of

CRISIS ON THE CREST

241

time at 2 A.M. With this fortunate reinforcement, Ichimoto led a new charge and again drove the enemy below the cliff. "It was push, pull back a little, and push again," a soldier recalls. "There was no hand-tohand fighting as such." Meanwhile, the Russians threw in reserves, about one assault company, on the eastern face in addition to those on the south side, endangering the Japanese left flank too. Ichimoto ordered the grenade dischargers to fire till they used up their ammunition, after which there would be another charge. A discharger squad leader, then a 22-year-old corporal, explains what followed:

We set our dischargers straight up and aimed blindly. The fighting was from dark to dark; I only saw the foe at day­ break. We were short of ammo, so we also threw rocks. The enemy was so near that I swatted live Russian grenades back across the crest many times, before they could hit. The So­ viets were loaded with grenades. They hurled them or fired grenade rifles, which we lacked. Russian grenades looked like small beer bottles or bowling pins—a better ballistic shape than ours. To activate our special grenades, you had to smack them against something hard, such as a rock or the sole of your shoe. But the enemy version was activated by pulling the safety and then gripping hard. The range for gre­ nade throwing is about 30 meters, standing; 15 or 20, prone. Russian troop strength must have been dwindling, because the number of grenades they threw decreased by morning. By then, I had been hit three times by fragments.6 Murakoshi remembers that the Russians had lined up machine guns below the crest, 10 to 15 meters away. "We could hear 'Hurrah!' and the whistle of grenades. Then our discharger crews ran out of ammuni­ tion and yelled, ‘OwariV ['Finished!']." Thereupon, Ichimoto, with his last 30 men, rushed against the eastern slopes. Unnerved by this wild charge, the Russians finally fled to the eastern foot, leaving their machine guns behind. Some of the Japanese kicked the Maxims over the cliff. Al­ though Ichimoto thinks there had been 300 Soviet soldiers on the hill, no enemy corpses were found; all of the casualties must have been car­ ried away. It was now daybreak and the Japanese "automatically opened up formation loosely." Further losses had been sustained and, Ichimoto

242

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

observes, "one could hardly say I controlled a 'battalion.' " The Russians were holding up at the second hump 200 meters below in temporary positions. In the early morning snipers killed another three or four Japanese. Ichimoto was impressed by Soviet firing techniques and the telescopic sights on captured rifles but, he insists, "with grenades and cold steel we were far more formidable."7 Tominaga, of the 73rd Regiment, describes his deus-ex-machina action, of which the Japanese remnants atop Changkufeng were unaware at the time.8 From his infantry gun site 2,000 meters north of Changkufeng, he felt uneasy about the security of Shachaofeng and vainly recommended an attack against the enemy's rear. When daybreak came, Tominaga could discern nobody on Changkufeng peak; below, on the Soviet side, a truck or a tank was parked and 20 to 30 enemy soldiers were crouched behind it. On the Japanese side of the hill, he could make out five or six soldiers huddled just below the peak, either taking cover or staying behind the Japanese-claimed boundary. There may have been more Japanese behind them, but Tominaga could not see the lower slopes. This seemed to mean that the Japanese night attack had not succeeded and that both sides were merely confronting each other. Suddenly, Tominaga observed the Russians "pushing bravely over and around the peak. Our side was in mortal danger. I shifted my three 75-mm. guns against this target. On the second burst we got the Soviet vehicle. This scared off the enemy soldiers, who fled back down the hill."9 Okido's 76th Infantry records indicate that elements of his regiment helped to save Changkufeng. At 6 A.M. on 7 August, Brigade Commander Morimoto ordered an attack against the right rear of the enemy assaulting the hill; one infantry company under Maj. Sato Matasaburo plus a machine gun company were to take part.10 "Having also received a request from the unit on the spot," Major Sato launched such an assault "strictly on his own initiative" and "smashed Russian forces which had been outflanking the defenses on the south side of Changkufeng.”11 The 75th Regiment's journal indicates that at about 7:30 A.M., Major Sato took over the de­ fense of Changkufeng in accord with brigade orders. Ichimoto went down with his survivors—ten unscathed men and about 50 wounded. Murakoshi adds an amusing note: "In the morning I was evacuated to Hoeryong. The men kept asking me,'How many of the enemy did you slaughter, Sarge?' I looked at my sword; it was jagged. But I had only banged it up on the rocks while dashing up the heights!" Remaining at Changkufeng with the

CRISIS ON THE CREST

243

reinforcements were Ito's men, 40 in all, of whom only nine were survivors from his old company. Every regimental gun, and the captured antitank piece, had been knocked out.12 Although Changkufeng hill was deemed to be secure, 75th Regiment maps note the initial appearance of a red pennon to the front of the Japanese but across and below the crest—20 or 30 meters away, according to Ichimoto. Soviet military sources assert that Russian troops had seized Changkufeng crest by bayonet at 10:30 P.M., at which time, "to joyous shouts of 'hurrah' and a rifle salute," the red flag was hoisted by Lt. I. Moshlyak, the wounded secretary of the party bureau of the 118th Regiment of the 40th Rifle Division, and by Col. A. Panfilov, the brigade commander.13 Ichimoto's reaction was highly emotional. I could see the banner clearly below, but we had strict orders not to move a step across our peak. I can admit something now: I wanted to seize that noxious red flag for a souvenir and become a hero. When Lieutenant Nishimura, however, learned that I was taking off for my adventure, he grabbed my sword to restrain me. Enemy snipers, he wept, could easily shoot me down. I was disgusted—but he really saved my life.14

The night before, when the Japanese grip on Changkufeng was weak­ ening, Lieutenant Inokuma had arrived at Sato's command post, bringing his 7th Company. To ease the pressure on Changkufeng, K. Sato ordered Inokuma to lead a strike force around the hill and throw the enemy rear into confusion. If and when the foe retreated, Inokuma was to sever the route of withdrawal. For reasons of maneuverability, it was decided to reduce Inokuma's patrol to one of his platoons and three assault teams from the 3rd Company. A surviving raider, M. Saito, remembers the scene: After the company commander got his orders, he came out and instructed us to leave our knapsacks behind, change from boots to rubber-soled running socks, and carry as many grenades as possible. I took five in my trouser pockets. Into my haver­ sack 1 stuffed an antitank explosive charge. Major Suko came and told us to salute the colors. We lined up in front of the

244

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

headquarters. The bearer stepped forward, erect, and the order to present arms was given. Although it was night, the colors could be perceived distinctly. It was unforgettable to hear the regiment commander bark, "Inokuma, I possess your life!" To which the lieutenant replied resolutely, "Yes, sir!"15 At 10:50 P.M. Inokuma set out with only 49 men, crossed the border, and headed for the enemy's rear. At corpse-strewn Noguchi Hill, the unit was told its mission. Since there were Japanese forces on the other side of the foe, the men were also instructed to beware of clashing with their own troops. Instructions were given not to load any weapons except the light machine guns. The raiders got out of the trenches, one by one. "Rifle bullets and tracers were whizzing in from all over," says M. Saito, "but they were all high and I had no sense of danger. I felt as if we were on maneuvers."16 First to be encountered, probably at 1 A.M., were several dozen Soviet soldiers, armed with machine guns, who were sur­ prised and almost destroyed, abandoning more than 20 corpses. Inokuma veered north along Khasan, cutting down Russian phone lines on the way. The Japanese detected no evidence of enemy retreat. Instead, voices and the sound of oars on the lake could be heard from the eastern foot of Changkufeng—perhaps they came from Soviet reinforcements. Inokuma decided that the best course would be to plunge ahead and take the Rus­ sians by surprise. On his own initiative, he began his new operation, al­ though by now he had lost permanent touch with the assault teams.17 At 2 A.M. Inokuma's unit broke silently through the "imperfect" lines of barbed wire and charged through another enemy force of com­ pany size which was equipped with machine guns. Next, Inokuma directed an attack against a concentration just behind the company location—a unit estimated to number 114 battalions massing west of the Khasan cross­ ing. The Russians were "stunned" by the assault. According to Akaishizawa, the enemy were killing their own men by wild firing. A portion fled north, leaving over 30 bodies behind. At the same time, the foe called down fire from all areas, causing very heavy Japanese casualties: three squad leaders were killed outright, and 22 men (about half the force) were incapacitated.18 M. Saito recounts what happened to him: I had a feeling that our formation had spread out, fan-shaped. Illuminating shells exploded, lighting the area like day. We received concentrated machine gun fire from the peak in

CRISIS ON THE CREST

245

front and from both flanks; it seemed as if we were being shot at "from the second floor." The lieutenant ordered hand grenades thrown. I hurled two but could not observe the ef­ fects. My third grenade exploded—but in front of the enemy. Grenades and illuminating rounds were exploding in front of us, and fragments flew in. I heard the cry “Tenno Heika Banzai!” seven or eight times. When I heard those dying cries, I felt that the things written in newspapers and maga­ zines were not untrue. I had the amazing sensation that I had passed the point between life and death—that neither mat­ tered. I became serene ... all conception of time vanished. I was convinced that we would win if only we followed the commander's orders. I had no feelings of fear or hostility. Enemy grenades as well as friendly grenades thrown from our rear seemed to be hitting at the same place. There were gaps in the fire and momentary alternations between darkness and the brightness of the flares. It would be a terrible waste if our grenades did not reach the enemy positions, so I stood up and hurled my fourth grenade. At the moment I advanced a few steps further and threw a fifth grenade, I felt as if some­ one had clubbed my right shoulder. 1 pitched forward and blacked out.19 Inokuma instructed his wounded platoon leader, Oshima, to handle retrieval of the wounded; at 2:40 A.M. he himself led the last survivors up the eastern slope of Changkufeng where two companies of Russians, supported by heavy weapons, were deployed. Inokuma charged, managed to scatter the foe, and seized the cliff. By now he had only a half-dozen men left. His own sword had been shattered and his pistol ammunition exhausted; he picked up a Russian rifle and bayoneted several enemy soldiers. Now the Soviet troops, who had fallen back once, were approach­ ing again from the right rear. Inokuma charged once more, shouting. The Russians retreated to the foot of the heights on the northeast. Daybreak was near. Already hit several times, Inokuma sought to resume the attack, this time from the rear of hostile forces desperately engaging Ichimoto's elements on Changkufeng crest. Akaishizawa says his last orders were, "Ito is just ahead. Charge on!" Although he had only a few soldiers left, Inokuma was trying to move forward when a bullet or a grenade fragment struck him in the head, and he died at 3 A.M.20

246

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Sergeant Okumura, although wounded seriously, had remained with Inokuma to the last and defended the positions that had been reached. He saw to it that Inokuma's corpse was recovered first and next struggled to evacuate the wounded. Only then did he withdraw. Around 7 A.M. Okumura got back to Fangchuanting with one unscathed and two badly wounded soldiers. A day later, the seriously injured but indestructible M. Saito appeared at the regiment command post, somehow dragging a rifle and light machine gun with his one good arm, for "we were always trained to respect our weapons."21 Inokuma's posthumous citation says that his unit pincered strong enemy forces and put about three battalions to rout. Although the unit was an­ nihilated, survivors agree that the raid—against fantastic odds—was no failure from the psychological point of view. The regiment called it "the most critical action during the entire operational phase of the incident . . . rendering it impossible for the enemy to dare any aggressive assaults against Changkufeng thereafter."22 One thousand meters north of Changkufeng, a 6th Company warrant officer, Narusawa, was defending Hill 24 with an infantry squad and a machine-gun platoon. Around sunset on the 6th, when three Soviet tanks moved onto the eastern skirt of Changkufeng, Narusawa and his men forced the enemy to withdraw. After he detected the Russians massed for a night assault at about 8:30, he redeployed his forces to the north­ east foot of Changkufeng and was helpful in stopping enemy action from the eastern front. At dawn, Narusawa's unit, back at its old positions, fired at Russian troops on the eastern slopes and inflicted heavy losses.23 It was estimated that, during the fighting throughout 6 August, the Russians lost 1,500 killed and wounded as well as 40 tanks knocked out in K. Sato's right sector alone (plus another 10 tanks knocked out in the left sector). Japanese intelligence judged that, as of 8 P.M., the Soviets had concentrated 19 infantry battalions, 70 artillery pieces, and 200 tanks south of Maanshan. These estimates represented an increase of nine in­ fantry battalions, 30 artillery pieces, and 120 tanks over figures for the afternoon of 3 August. Behind Soviet lines, Russian trucks, in columns of 20 to 30, were on the move south from the Novokievsk area, even into the night; only a few trucks were sighted moving north. At the front, the Russians had deployed the following strength: Shachaofeng—three battalions, 60 tanks; Changkufeng—V/2 battalions, 15 tanks; Hill 52—four battalions, 50 tanks.24

CRISIS ON THE CREST

247

Japanese casualties were heavy on the 6th. The 75th Infantry lost three officers; 44 enlisted men were killed and 85 wounded. In the engineer platoon seven were killed and five wounded out of 19 men. The 54 killed and 90 wounded in the right sector amounted to 17 percent of the 843 men available. On 8 August the war ministry revealed that 70 Japanese had been killed and 180 wounded by the 6th.25 The melee atop Chang­ kufeng, into the night of 6-7 August, is specifically mentioned in only one open source.26 In introducing its secret journal of these critical days, the 75th Infantry observed: "The Soviet Army's counteroffensive of 6-7 August employed the crack troops of the Far Eastern forces, risking their 'face' before the entire world. Enemy air-ground coordination was close [sic], and they committed the newest equipment, straining their capacities to the utmost. Fighting was fierce in every battle sector."27 Abroad, the press gave prom­ inence to the fighting on the 6th. According to their account, Soviet artil­ lery, infantry, and air attacks had been constant but an assault by three Russian regiments had been beaten back at Changkufeng Hill by midnight after severe hand-to-hand fighting. The New York Times headline read, "Russian Push Seen—Drive Into Manchukuo Expected If Japanese Do Not Retreat."28 NOTES 1.75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938, attachment 2; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 137-138, 161. 2. Jinchu bidan, pp. 323-325; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938. The command team leader. Master Sergeant Yumoto Yoshio, "captured more than 100 shells from inside enemy tanks which had been stopped at the shore of Khasan, infiltrated hostile lines in search of the body of his commander, and re­ trieved Hisatsune's corpse despite hostile fire." 3. Tezuka and Murakoshi interviews. 4. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 137. 5. Jinchu bidan, p. 169. 6. Nakazawa interview. Also Tezuka and Ichimoto interviews. 7. Murakoshi, Ichimoto, and Nakazawa interviews. Ichimoto says the grenade duels lasted from around 9 P.M. until after 3:30 A.M. A retreating Russian sniper wounded Nakazawa at dawn. I prefer the version that no enemy corpses were found on the hill to the gory account in AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 1 39, which claims that Russian and Japanese bodies "lay heaped-up all over the area.” 8. Miyajima and Horiguchi interviews.

248

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

9. Tominaga adds that he was commended for this action by the brigade com­ mander. 10. M. Sato was the 2nd Battalion commander, 76th Regiment. 11. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 140-141, 162-163. K. Sato had cautioned Ichimoto against friendly forces' shooting at each other. 12.75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938; Ichimoto and Mura­ koshi interviews. 13. V. Dushenkin, " Fighting at Lake Hassan,” Soviet Military Review, July 1968, p. 45. The information on the Japanese Army's first detection of the red pennon comes from a map attached to 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938; and Ichimoto interview. 14. Ichimoto interview. 15. M. Saito-Miyajima interview. Saito was a PFC in the 7th Company's com­ mand team. 16. M. Saito-Miyajima interview. 17. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938. 18. Akaishizawa, Chokoho, p. 230; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shoho, 6 August 1938. 19. M. Saito-Miyajima interview. 20. Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 231-232; Jinchu bidan, pp. 185-186. 21. M. Saito-Miyajima interview; Akaishizawa, Chokoho, p. 233; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938. 22. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 139-140; Jinchu bidan, pp. 186, 188, 194-195; Nakazawa, Miyajima, and M. SaitoMiyajima interviews. 23. 75th Infantry Regiment,Sento shoho, 6 August 1938. 24. Ibid.; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:49, 115; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 131, 136, 143, attachment 3. 25. 75th Infantry Regiment,Sento shoho, 6 August 1938; Tokyo Asahi, 7 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid., 8 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 26. Jinchu bidan, p. 25. 27. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 6 August 1938. 28. New York Times, 7 August 1938, pp. 1, 29 (Hongui, Unggi, and Tokyo).

Continuation of the Soviet Offensive

21

While fighting raged at the front on 6 August, Tokyo was taking steps to provide the 19th Division with coveted long-range artillery and anti­ aircraft support. In the evening, the Korea Army learned officially from the AGS that, by Imperial order, the Kwantung Army would attach the strength which had been approved informally: four 7.5-cm. field guns, two 15-cm. cannon, two 10-cm. railway guns, and two 7.5-cm. antiair­ craft guns. The North China Area Army would furnish mobile antiaircraft forces. The Korea Army estimated that the field and heavy artillery rein­ forcements would reach the town of Tumen on 7-8 August.1 The new guns could be expected to ease the pressure on the division eventually. Meanwhile, there was another emergency: the shortage of troops at the front, especially since efforts by Suetaka to bring up more of the division had been disapproved. From 6 August, however, the Korea Army became impressed by the gravity of the military situation and the displacement of the Korean populace in the area of the incident. Seoul therefore ap­ proved the division's newest request for reinforcement of the front by Cho's entire 74th Infantry Regiment. Suetaka was phoned the enabling order on 7 August, with the significant addition of a second brigade head­ quarters (the 38th) from Nanam. The Korea Army justified its decision in a message wired at 4:50 P.M. to Tokyo and Hsinking: "Due to enemy artillery and air bombings, the railroad, etc., inside Korea sustained damage. Front-line combat strength has been weakened because about three com­ panies have had to be used for ammunition resupply; [railway] covering also requires considerable strength."2 This information hardly supports

250

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Nakamura's postwar claim that, in spite of his sympathy, he never acceded to Suetaka's requests for full divisional reinforcement.3 Suetaka lost no time in issuing his own order to Cho from Kyonghun at 2 P.M., with a number of cautions appended: "1. Be careful to provide [sufficient] grenades, armor-piercing machine-gun cartridges, rapid-fire guns and am­ munition, sniping guns and ammunition. 2. Drive home to all soldiers that this combat is no 'war of movement.' "4 The fighting raged on the 7th. The 75th Infantry observed that, despite the Russians' vigorous attacks designed to capture Hill 52 and Changku­ feng on 6 August, "they failed in both places and were punished mightily. Because of the Soviets' ignominious defeat at Changkufeng, they seemed determined to seize Hill 52 on the 7th."5 Apprehensive about possible Russian dawn assaults, Morimoto directed Okido's artillery to be vigilant and to concentrate all fire-power to crush the initial enemy wave. Morimoto had had to cope with the problem at Changkufeng first, for the enemy there was not evicted till after dawn. He pored over maps all night. At 6 A.M. he issued an order calling for a counterattack against the right rear of the enemy on the Changkufeng front.6 Most of the shallow and isolated Japanese positions at Hill 52 had been smashed by bombardments, but Hirahara and his troops struggled to re­ pair them by morning. Some of the men worked to retrieve Japanese corpses, which still lay heaped upon one another; the wounded were to proceed to the rear by themselves. Many had not had a thing to eat since morning of the 6th, but morale remained high. It was decided to knock out the Soviets' advanced tanks under cover of darkness, employing in­ fantry and engineers. At 3 A.M. these elements moved against the armor 150 meters behind the Russian wire, wiped out some infantrymen who tried to interfere, and blew up two tanks. The infantry platoon leader. Warrant Officer Kanaoka, jumped aboard a tank and pried open the tur­ ret. "He cut down the [two] soldiers inside the turret so fast that it did not seem possible for him to have had time to draw his blade. The eastern sky was brightening as he stood there smiling and holding his gory sword, from which blood was dripping. Just then PFC Kimura exploded a grenade inside the tank, which promptly blew up."7 Around dawn, the killer teams returned safely. Throughout the night, a din had been heard from among the Russians in front of Hill 52—the sounds of casualties being evacuated and of wrecked tanks being hauled out. At dawn, from heavy-weapon positions 200-300

CONTINUATION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE

251

meters in front, the Soviets opened fire, taking advantage of gaps between the smashed armor. Since 4 A.M. 60 Russian tanks had been moving south on the other side of Khasan. By daybreak, more than ten machines could be observed in the dip northeast of Hill 52. Several dozen other tanks were newly active along the Hill 29 crestline while infantry units were deploying in gullies. At 5:30 A.M. Russian artillery started firing from all directions. In addition to shelling from Gaho, Hill 29, and Maanshan, the Soviets directed flank fire against Hill 52, using two rapid-fire guns which showed up 700 meters northeast and three mountain guns on the skirt of Changkufeng. Since the works at Hill 52 were gradually being pulverized, K. Sato again dispatched 76th Regiment reinforcements there. When these units reached him at 10:A.M., Hirahara deployed the heavy machine guns into the lines and placed the infantry in reserve. Near 11 A.M. the Russian barrage grew intense and the concentrations accurate; positions were destroyed by the minute, and casualties increased. A new apex of fury was reached between 1:30 and 2:30, when a pall of smoke blanketed the region, giving observers a "ghastly impression." Russian planes also bombed and strafed Hill 52 from 11 A.M.; a raid by 12 bombers against the western slope at 1:30 was particularly fierce, although many of the bombs fell harmlessly into the Tumen.8 The Russian lines were built up gradually and all types of Soviet weapons went into action. The Japanese responded against likely targets while Hirahara waited to counterattack in front of the defenses. From 2:30 about 100 Russians approached, led by four tanks, and ripped into the defense positions. Close-quarter counterassaults were launched by elements of three Japanese infantry companies, a machine-gun platoon, and an en­ gineer platoon. "It was tough and costly fighting," says one officer. "Men were overrun by tanks, some lost limbs."9 Nine engineers linked up with the infantry, set explosives under tank turrets, and blew up two machines. At 3:30 P.M. a squad leader, Ishii, took over a machine gun when the crew was killed, laid down bursts of fire against the approaching lead tank, and stopped it a dozen meters away. Then he leaped from his trench, lugging his machine gun, and charged the tank'. With his own gun he blasted the tank's machine gun, then pried open the hatch and killed a crewman with a burst. Ishii himself was slain by a pistol shot from inside the tank. The onrushing last tank fell into a trench and bogged down.10 At the time of crisis, with tanks and infantry overrunning his lines, Hirahara took steps to cooperate with his engineers. His reserve company,

252

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

his battalion headquarters, the battalion gun platoon (armed only with rifles), and a company from the 76th Regiment went into action. “Not one enemy soldier must enter our positions!" Hirahara shouted. Around 3 P.M. he led a charge, but he was shot in the heart at 3:30 and died in front of the positions. His aide, 2nd Lieutenant Yoshida, was hit in the face and fell unconscious. Thereupon, 2nd Lieutenant Sonoda, acting as battalion commander, and 1st Lieutenant Inagaki joined in directing the counterassault, hurled grenades, and led a rush against the Russians' right wing. On his own initiative, 1st Lieutenant Osugi launched the attack of his 5th Company from the 76th Regiment. The Japanese gradually en­ circled the enemy, pressed them back, and eventually smashed two com­ panies after desperate fighting. In furious action since morning, the three weapons of Lieutenant Saito's antitank gun unit had overheated and were under repair when the Russians stormed the defenses. Saito took all available men and charged with the last infantry. At the center of the positions, Takeshita also led a counterattack and drove off the Russians who had come close to the breastworks and "outnumbered us by over 10:1," but at 2:30, charging in the van, he was shot in the head and killed. Dispersed on the left flank in the 10th Company sector, the 3rd Machine-Gun Company, under the "excellent command" of 1st Lieutenant Kubota, supported the counter­ attack by the battalion main force and meted out devastating blows. At 3 P.M., while directing fire, Kubota received a bullet in the head and died.11 From the right wing, in the 11th Company sector, the Japanese fired fiercely against Soviet heavy weapons and infantrymen who had approached to point-blank range. Master Sergeant Suzuki, now acting company com­ mander, on his own initiative ordered the main force to counterattack. By concerted action, the Japanese knocked out four tanks which had penetrated their positions. Two enemy battalions which had "come close bravely" were almost wiped out. Total Soviet strength committed in this sector amounted to three battalions and 40 tanks. It was now a little be­ fore 4 P.M. "Thanks to the strenuous combat by the late Major Hirahara and his men, the enemy never attempted another bold advance against Hill 52 till the cease-fire."12 Japanese veterans of the desperate fighting had this to say about Soviet use of armor:

The foe would advance tanks beforehand, near the crestline, a short distance from our works. Showing only their turrets,

CONTINUATION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE

253

the tanks would knock out our guns and heavy weapons, and lay down fire against our positions and troops. When enemy infantry charged, the tanks would operate cleverly in concert with covering artillery and plunge forward. Their actions war­ rant praise ... for our severe casualties can be blamed on them.13

Japanese losses on the Hill 52 front were heavy indeed: 74 had been killed and 85 wounded—159 out of 328 men in action. The vestiges of one infantry company were commanded by a superior private; sergeants headed two other infantry and two machine-gun companies. Seven of 13 heavy weapons were inoperable.14 An eyewitness description of the action at Hill 52 is provided by an enlisted loader. The Russians' sequence was to deploy, advance, get pushed back, but leave portions behind hiding in dips. Their snipers were superb. Our platoon's mission was to support the en­ gineers' antitank assaults. We fired at infantry and tanks at a range of 250-300 meters. Artillery and tanks smashed my platoon's two heavy machine guns that day; each time the gunners were killed, I took over the piece and fired as long as possible. In the afternoon the combat was really confused. I remember a charge: I had only a bayonet and had to take a rifle from a corpse. It was a matter of moving or grenades would get you. You took cover, getting deep into dead an­ gles. Only one other soldier and I in our whole company emerged unscratched, though we fought at Hill 52 to the end. Luck? No—you must stay calm, never "freeze." When you fear the enemy, you're lost.15

At Fangchuanting Hill, Lieutenant Maeoka's one mountain piece had been shooting hard and well since dawn, as had the reserve 2nd Battalion gun platoon, firing vigorously against targets northeast of Hill 52. The strenuous efforts exerted by the supporting artillery units not only earned the confidence of the front lines but also drew counterfire, which grew more effective as the day wore on. With the Russians operating heavy weapons and at least one artillery observation post from captured Noguchi Hill, the height at Fangchuanting became a honeycomb.16 The matter of strengthening the defenders at Hill 52 remained on K. Sato's mind. Reinforcements eventually became available from the

’l, J

j ' I;

254

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

203 men belonging to Kojima's battalion of the 73rd Regiment. "Having guessed Morimoto's intention," Sato had been thinking of using the bat­ talion for an attack from the zone south of Changkufeng. Yet, by the time Kojima's force came up at 9:20 A.M., daylight had arrived, enemy fire had become "tremendous," and the "strength of our own guns was no match." Kojima felt that exposure and movement would prove "rather unfavorable from the viewpoint of attrition." Sato's "resolve was a bit shaken, since the division commander's intentions included the stipula­ tion that, if unavoidable, Fangchuanting Hill alone should be secured." As a stop-gap, the colonel ordered Kojima to carry out the construction needed to secure the regiment command post.17 K. Sato considered abandoning Hill 52 temporarily to lure the Russians into that constricted zone and shatter them. Such a scheme was "not un­ favorable" from the tactical view, but Japanese weakness in artillery "did not permit so clever a plan." Sato was also worried about the fact that if he gave up Hill 52, Changkufeng would be encircled by Soviet fire. He finally called in Kojima and ordered him to relieve Hill 52. At 3:40 P.M. Kojima and his men recited from the Meiji rescript: ". . . with single heart fulfill your essential duty of loyalty, bearing in mind that duty is weightier than a mountain, death lighter than a feather." Then they set out, deployed in extended formation. Immediately afterward, Sato received a report that Hirahara had counterattacked and driven the Russians from Hill 52. The first element of Kojima's troops traversed the 500 meters to the hill by 5 P.M., under hostile observation and fire all the way. After his main force arrived at 7:30, Kojima assumed command of all the men at Hill 52. He redeployed, worked on the battered positions, and vigilantly sat out the night.18 Ninth Company elements defended Noguchi Hill, 800 meters south­ east of Changkufeng. By 5 A.M. on 7 August, Soviet troops facing the hill numbered 200 infantry, five tanks, and two rapid-fire guns. From positions set up the previous night along the lake, the Russians opened fire at dawn while 50 soldiers moved to attack with the tanks in support. Captain Noguchi's men poured fire on the enemy and caused heavy losses. But the Russians, who possessed superior support fire, fought their way forward until, after 40 minutes, they got within 70 meters' range. From a front-line trench, PFC Nakamura leaped out alone, charged into the Russians, and killed two before falling dead. The Soviet tanks disappeared into a dead angle near the lakeshore.

CONTINUATION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE

255

When the fog lifted at 6 A.M., the Russians on the southeast slope of Changkufeng fired down at Noguchi Hill with four heavy machine guns. Seven tanks, advancing anew from the gully northeast of Hill 52, came as close as 80 to 200 meters, deployed to encircle, and opened fire. By now, eight Japanese had been killed and five wounded; most of the light machine guns and grenade dischargers had been crippled and all three heavy weapons were out of action. Ammunition for the battalion guns was already expended, although Corporal Kaneko was credited with having knocked out at least two machine guns and having rendered two tanks inoperable. PFC Ariga took advantage of the cover provided by a crater, got close to the Soviet armor despite severe fire, and managed to blow up one tank. The Russians attacked again at 8 A.M., hurling grenades and yelling. A dozen tanks operated in support of two infantry companies. The Japanese responded with grenades; yellow and black smoke masked the heights and the scene was "extremely impressive." Captain Noguchi directed operations from the front and encouraged his troops. Desperate hand-to-hand combat raged along the sector for a half-hour until the Soviets fell back after suffering "huge losses." At 8:50, when Russian armor approached the defenses, Corporal Yugawa grabbed antitank charges improvised from grenades and dashed against the enemy. He blew up one tank, cut down two crewmen, and hurled explosives at a second tank, which exploded with a burst. Yugawa fell in turn and died a "human bullet."19 Russian machine guns and tanks still raked the Japanese from Chang­ kufeng. Captain Noguchi retrieved the casualties and concentrated in the second-line trenches, but there were only 22 men left. The Soviets held up, 200 meters away, while receiving steady reinforcements from the Changkufeng area, from which tank and heavy-machine-gun fire intensified. Captain Noguchi and his men "solidified their resolve to hold on to the positions"; at the same time the only surviving officer in the company, Lieutenant Kutsukake, was dispatched to regimental headquarters to report. Under murderous aimed fire, Kutsukake set out, but he suffered multiple serious wounds and fell at the western skirt of Noguchi Hill. At 10:40 A.M. the Russians assaulted with infantry from the southeast front and from the Changkufeng direction, aided by tanks from the zone be­ tween. Captain Noguchi sortied with his remnant, charged the Russians, and drove them off. In this fighting, however, he was shot in the chest and most of his subordinates were killed or wounded. Somehow the captain stayed on his feet. He and six survivors threw grenades at the Russians,

256

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

who were now behind the Japanese, and then he led a last charge, which got back to the highest positions. Once the enemy had been evicted, Captain Noguchi collapsed. Only three or four soldiers were in fighting condition. The captain begged them to report to Sato but, refusing to abandon him, the men managed to help him down to the rear. It was 11:30 A.M. Captain Noguchi's unit, which had fought bravely since the first combat on 6 August, had been destroyed. Of 78 officers and men, 40 lay killed and another 31 wounded. The hill had been lost. Meanwhile, Soviet bombardment of the Hill 52 district had been heavy, and phone contact with the regiment was severed. Suddenly, the indomit­ able Captain Noguchi appeared at headquarters and the regiment finally learned that the foe had penetrated the defenses. The bleeding captain pleaded for a counterattack and kept trying to return to the fight; K. Sato had to restrain him by giving him an order to leave for the rear. It was true that the position which Captain Noguchi had been occupying was the key point connecting Hill 52 and Changkufeng. But Sato reasoned that "if we held solidly to the latter hills, our defenses would never be in danger and it would be easy for us to retake Noguchi Hill at any time by concentrating fire from all the high ground and by employing artil­ lery, once we could spare strength."20 After the Russians' dangerous night assault of 6-7 August had been frustrated, the defenders on Changkufeng were not attacked from the ground in daylight although there were bombardments by superior artillery and frequent air raids. On the afternoon of the 7th, K. Sato received an order from Morimoto that all units which had been loaned to him should be returned immediately. Deeply concerned about securing hard-won Changkufeng, Sato dispatched some infantrymen and a machine-gun platoon, all under Shimomura, commander of the fresh 2nd Battalion, which had committed only one company. Lieutenant Sakamoto, Shimomura's aide, conducted the dangerous task of liaison between Chiang­ chunfeng and Fangchuanting under fierce bombardment. Directed to share in the "desperate defense" of the heights, the reinforcements set out at 6:15 P.M. "When we arrived at Changkufeng," says a survivor, "the dip at the foot was littered with dead and wounded; I had never seen so many. The red flag was flying when we got to the top."21 By 8:30 Shimomura had assumed command and undertook to defend the hill in concert with M. Sato, the battalion commander from the 76th Regiment already there.

CONTINUATION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE

257

K. Sato was ready to direct operations personally from atop Changku­ feng and instructed Ichimoto to act for him in his absence.

He had always wanted to share the dangers with his men. Now this crisis arose at Changkufeng and Hill 52. . . . Sato reached the heroic resolve to conduct a “battle of revenge" in behalf of the dead. ... He ordered his aide to maintain the records and left behind only those officers necessary to rebuild the regiment. Readying himself to fight to the death at Changku­ feng, Sato changed his underclothing and his uniform and bade farewell to the colors.22

Around sunset, however, Sato received a countermanding order from the brigade, and a report came from Changkufeng that “our troops' brave fighting has tided us over the crisis." Reassured, Sato proceeded to Hill 52 instead, cheered on Kojima and the soldiers, and examined the condition of the wounded and the heaped-up corpses. In the early hours, he returned to his command post, personally bearing the body of Hirahara, his slain battalion commander. In the meantime, around 11 P.M., the Japanese at Changkufeng detected a Soviet company assembled in a dip 150 meters ahead of the defenses. Shimomura ordered small-arms and grenade-launcher fire, which unmasked two companies. The latter responded with machine guns and attacked up the hill. Simultaneously, Russian artillery emplaced east of Khasan, as well as near Hill 29, fired wildly in the direction of Changkufeng. When one platoon of Soviet soldiers approached, Shimomura's troops let them move up until they were 40 or 50 meters away, then hurled grenades in unison. Numbering a battalion in all, the Russian forces fell back to the shores of Khasan by 2:30 A.M. As of evening on the 7th, regimental reserves numbered 30, including the last survivors under Ichimoto. These few men were able to retrieve only those who had been wounded severely in the fighting at Hill 52; this was done by 10:30 P.M. At Changkufeng and Hill 52, the corpses of Japanese and Russians remained strewn on the field, "a ghastly scene which characterized the entire line."23 Every phone wire had again been cut by Russian barrages. Signalmen struggled to repair the lines as soon as they were hit. One private swam the Tumen under fire and succeeded in restoring phone lines to the mountain artillery.24

258

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Soviet strength facing T. Sato's left sector had diminished greatly as of early 7 August, "probably because of the Russians' defeat the day before," according to the 73rd Regiment. The decrease in tank strength was particularly pronounced; it was down to a dozen, apart from two battalions of infantry. The focus of Soviet attention was Major Obo's right-wing battalion, which became involved in hand-to-hand fighting at dawn and again at twilight. This battalion's unsolicited prominence was thought to derive from the fact that its positions lay astride the boundary which the enemy was claiming; the key terrain cut Russian lines of communication to Changkufeng from the north. At 5:30 A.M. more than ten Soviet guns opened fire against Obo's battalion. An hour later, a Russian infantry battalion, accompanied by four tanks, attacked from northwest of Khasan. Two of the tanks were knocked out by rapid-fire guns; the other pair fled. The forwardmost infantry wave kept moving under the covering fire of artillery and a second line of troops. About 100 soldiers crept ahead as near as 30 to 40 meters. Kadokura brought up a reserve platoon and, when the Russians were feet away, at 6:50 A.M., he leaped from the positions and led a charge, supported by the battalion heavy weapons. The captain cut down several Soviet soldiers in a twinkling and his men felled another 50 in hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy's second line began to fall back while Russian heavy weapons and heavy artillery continued their fire. Toward the end of the infighting, Kadokura was hit by shellfire and fell dead. In Okuda's left-company sector, 30 Soviet soldiers advanced very close but were routed by machine­ gun fire.25 One battalion of Russian infantry, covered by artillery, launched an assault against Takenouchi's left battalion. Compared with the action on the right, this advance was unaggressive; the attackers held up at 400 to 500 meters and dug in. But since the fighting toward Changkufeng appeared to be growing urgent, ,T. Sato quickly sent reinforcements in accord with a brigade order. Tominaga adds that, on his own initiative, he had his battery conduct flanking fire against the Russian forces at Changkufeng. Their accurate firing dispersed two companies after a dozen shells hit.26 At 10 A.M. and at 3 P.M., Soviet fighters and bombers struck. While Rus­ sian artillery fire increased, enemy ground strength was built up in the area of Obo's battalion and reached a total of one infantry battalion and eight tanks. In the left-battalion sector, Soviet strength was estimated at 500 infantry and 13 tanks. Covered by tank fire, the Russian units on each wing constructed positions. Soviet actions were becoming "vigorous."

CONTINUATION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE

259

Predicting a serious assault that night, Morimoto ordered the units to be on guard. T. Sato was concerned, too, and at 8:55 P.M. enjoined the troops to be alert against infiltration between the battalions as well as via the river bank on the far left. Powerful Japanese artillery and fresh infantry were expected by morning. Russian artillery and machine guns resumed firing at 7:30 P.M., pre­ saging a new assault. When the range of the bombardment lengthened, 70 or 80 Soviet soldiers, "as expected," closed against the right-battalion front under covering fire by a company. Hurling grenades, the Russians dashed against the Japanese, who counterassaulted and grappled with them. The late dusk made it difficult to distinguish friend from foe. When Soviet fire from the rear eased, the Japanese "manifested their hand-tohand combat strength" and crushed most of the hostile first-line troops. Next, the second line was driven back to the heights in the rear. At about the same time as their attack against the right flank, the enemy struck with another company against Okuda's salient on the left. The company commander ordered his heavy machine guns to lay down flanking fire. He had the company concentrate all available weapons against the Rus­ sian infantry, who continued to creep forward, lobbing grenades and yelling. "They are trying to entice us,” was Okuda's guess. The captain called up his reserves and prepared to counterattack, but the Russians pulled back, leaving their slain behind. The Soviets built up again along the left front; by 11 P.M. a battalion was massed in the area of Yangkuanping. Artillery liaison Lieutenant Miyauchi, who had been working at sector unit headquarters since sun­ set to analyze intelligence received from the infantry, concluded that another night attack was in the offing and so advised the artillery force command post. Tanaka responded by ordering preparations for night firing by the mountain and heavy field artillery north of Nanpozan. Near 1 A.M., T. Sato asked for harassing fire against groupings around Yangkuanping. Japanese artillery honored the call promptly. A front­ line infantry commander recalls that first-line troops had been pulled back, fortunately, for two Japanese shells hit their now-vacated positions during the preparatory barrage. Whatever night attack intentions the Russians may have had were thwarted. They fell back, leaving behind one heavy and 11 light machine guns.27 Near midnight on 7 August, the 75th Regiment was heartened to re­ ceive "very fine rice balls" made by the Ladies' National Defense Society at Unggi; "our spirits rose considerably." More important, K. Sato learned

260

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

that elite units of the 74th Infantry were on the way and that 15-cm. cannon and field pieces were being dispatched by the Kwantung Army. Antiaircraft artillery was also coming to help the defenders cope with the fighters and bombers which were swarming unopposed over the front. At 10:30 P.M. on 6 August, Lieutenant Colonel Hiramuki, commander of the 5th Antiaircraft Regiment at Hoeryong, had received the division's order to depart for the battle zone. When Hiramuki inspected positions at Ryusen on the 7th, he was interested to observe that the battery had built dummy positions 300 meters south of the real gun site in response to repeated air raids that day. The 20th Depot Division was already sending antiaircraft guns and searchlight units to the front from Pyong­ yang in accordance with orders of 3 and 6 August. The depot antiair­ craft unit experienced serious difficulties unloading at Shikai. There was confusion at the station, which was "mobbed,” and the route along which the men and guns were supposed to advance was jammed by oxcarts re­ turning from supplying the front. The depot unit had to defer entering its firing site until after sunset on the 8th.28 Examining combat results on 7 August, the 75th Infantry estimated that there had been 900 Russian casualties in the right sector and that more than ten tanks and three heavy machine guns had been put out of action. The regiment itself had lost four officers killed and had four wound­ ed; another officer in Okido's unit had been wounded. In the entire right sector (which included 1,332 men in action), 140 had been killed and 180 wounded. Seven soldiers of the 75th Infantry were also listed as "missing in action but presumed dead." This entry, unusual for the Japanese Army, undoubtedly refers to men lost behind Soviet lines during Inokuma's night raid. Total casualties (including the missing), as a percentage of those listed as engaged, amounted to 25 percent for the right sector unit. On the 7th, the unit had lost 19 machine guns and 11 grenade dischargers.29 As of 6 P.M. on 7 August, Japanese intelligence estimated that the Russians had committed a grand total of 25 infantry battalions (up six from 6 August), 80 artillery pieces (up 10), and 200 tanks (no change). Situation maps show one Soviet infantry battalion east of Changkufeng, another north of Hill 52, armor and infantry in unknown strength east of that hill, and artillery positions from northeast to southeast of Khasan. In the Russian night attack against Changkufeng, it was believed, the foe had committed two companies, including riflemen and GPU elements, three mountain guns, tanks in the ferry area at Khasan, and additional

CONTINUATION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE

261

strong units concentrated south. On the 7th, spotters also observed seven large steamers entering Posyet and Khansi, as well as one 10,000-ton vessel at Yangomudy. At least 200 or 300 enemy soldiers in the Karanchin sector were working to strengthen positions. Units moving south from Novokievsk included 350 trucks, 60 tanks, and 400 troops. Heading north from the region of the battlefield were 100 trucks and 150 horse­ men. Meanwhile, on the front in eastern Manchuria, elements of the Kwantung Army's 8th Division had forcibly ousted a small party of Soviet "border trespassers."30 By 7 August the Soviet government was releasing sensational infor­ mation to the world press, bannered on page 1 by the New York Times'. "Foe Driven From Siberia, Soviet Army Announces—Big Guns Are Used —Moscow Says Artillery and Planes Aided in 'Cleansing' Border." A "victory" communique was released in Moscow on the 7th, employing "war terminology," Duranty observed. "Until a few weeks ago, they called Gen. Vassily Bluecher commander of the 'Special Far Eastern Army.' Then they said he was commander of the Far Eastern front. Now they spoke of . . . the First Army." Fighting on the Changkufeng front during the past three days had been bitter and had entailed many casualties, according to the Red Army. The number of troops engaged was consider­ able, and Shigemitsu's reference to "a local incident" no longer held true.31 At the same time, the foreign press picked up initial information from Japan that led to headlines seeming to bear out Soviet contentions: "Rus­ sians Drive a Wedge—Japanese Officers Concede Their Troops Were Cut Off by Enemy's Advance." The Japanese positions on Changkufeng were apparently "untenable." Foreign correspondents noted that, "to prevent arousing the people," the army was not allowing Japanese reporters to publish news of the incident freely. The authorities explained that while some might interpret this to mean that Japan feared to fight, "our whole military and diplomatic policy indicates only a desire for a peaceful set­ tlement." Nevertheless, there are errors, contradictions, or studied incom­ pleteness in the information that was made available. For example, a certain Japanese "military authority," on his return from the front, re­ layed a report that the Japanese had suffered no casualties on 7 August. Even more misleading was the public assertion made by unidentified Jap­ anese sources that the Soviet offensive on the 7th had been repulsed "by Japanese tanks and planes meeting similar Soviet military units."32 Appar­ ently, Korea Army Staff Officer Komatsu, during a trip to the battlefront,

262

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

had authorized a press statement on supposed air activity by friendly forces because he "could not bear the sufferings of the [Japanese] front-line troops."33 Iwasaki took immediate counteraction; headquarters hastened to insist that the Japanese side "did not use tanks, planes or artillery ex­ cept to defend themselves against Russian tanks," and stressed that it was Japanese policy "not to trespass beyond the border that is claimed by Russia, although the border that is claimed by Japan herself is now oc­ cupied by Russian forces."34 Only optimistic war ministry communiques emanated from Tokyo. Fifty Russian tanks had been destroyed or disabled between the 4th and 6th of August. But the remarkable contention was made that, as of evening on 6 August, the Japanese had had only five killed and a few wounded. Accounts publicized widely abroad, that the Russians had recaptured Changkufeng, drew derision from the war office on the 8th: "There has been no hand-to-hand fighting all week. The Reds never get that neat. They have been confining their attacks to artillery and airplanes." A Gaimusho spokesman was more forthright. Although it was the Russians who had been repulsed, "bitter hand-to-hand fighting resulted when Soviet troops, covered by an intensive artillery barrage, advanced on [Changkufeng] heights."35 NOTES 1. IGHQ Army Order No. 174, AGS Message No. 372, 6:35 P.M.; IGHQ Army Order No. 175, AGS Message No. 373; IGHQ Army Directive No. 226, AGS Mes­ sage No. 381, 7:45 P.M., 6 August 1938; also notification from Kwantung Army Headquarters; all in CS, Chokoho, pp. 66-70. 2. CS, Chokoho, pp. 76-77. Only two battalions were coming from Cho's regiment, according to the division. 3. K. Nakamura, Affidavit No. 2, paragraph 25 (Blakeney Collection). 4. AGS, Chokohd soan, pp. 169-170. 5. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938. 6. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 156-157, 163-164, 169. 7. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938; Jinchu bidan, p. 59. 8. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 1 56-157. 9. Tominaga interview. 10. The heroics of platoon leader Kanaoka are also described in Jinchu bidan, p. 59. 11. Jinchu bidan, pp. 217-219, 258-259, 301 -304, 316-317. 12. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 146-148. 13. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 147-148. 14. Ibid., p. 147; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938.

CONTINUATION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE

263

15. Hayano interview; also Miyajima interview. Hayano belonged to the 1st Machine Gun Company., 1st Battalion. By the cease-fire, Hayano's company had lost a dozen machine guns, including replacements brought by night from the divi­ sion and other battalions; seven weapons were wrecked permanently. 16. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid.; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 148. 19. Jinchu bidan, p. 228; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938. 20. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 149-150; Sato interview; Jinchu bidan, p. 227. 21. Horiguchi interview. 22. Lt. Baba in Jinchu bidan, p. 29. 23. AGS, Chokoho soan,p. 151; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938; Ichimoto interview. 24. Miyajima interview. 25. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 152. 26. Tominaga interview. 27. Takenouchi statement, BBSS Archives; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 155, 157. 28. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 158-161,170, 235-237; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938. 29. 75‘th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938. One officer in the Okido regiment was among the wounded, as we have seen. 30. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan. Chronology, 7 August 1938; ibid., pp. 171-172; JRD/JSM 11,3/A:31. 31. New York Times, 8 August 1938, p. 1. 32. Ibid., pp. 1,4. 33. Iwasaki statement, BBSS Archives. 34. New York Times, 8 August 1938, p. 4. 35. Ibid.; also see 9 August 1938, p. 8.

i

Developments of 8-9 August

The "punch" went out of the Russians in the Hill 52 sector after their "thorough defeat" on 6 and 7 August, but they continued to build up fire power, deploying heavy weapons and artillery observation posts. The bombardments grew accurate; even regiment and brigade headquarters lost their last dead angles. As of daylight on the 8th, two Soviet infantry battalions plus tanks were deployed on the Hill 52 front. Their main forces were distributed along a line 800 meters from the Japanese, and snipers and machine gunners held positions 200 or 300 meters away: "Each time they detected movement, they sniped at us and interfered with our observation." From 9 A.M. the Japanese sustained scattered artillery fire. At 1:30 there was also a bombing raid by 15 planes, but no casualties were incurred. Soviet guns pounded Hill 52 around 6:30 P.M., and the Japanese suffered four or five casualties, "but morale was generally high and we sought to strengthen and repair our positions throughout the night."1 On the Changkufeng front, which became the target of "rather serious" attention, Russian heavy guns opened slow fire after 5 A.M. from east of Khasan and from Maanshan. Through the night of 7-8 August, Soviet in­ fantry had been assembling near the lake crossing. At 5:30 A.M. a bat­ talion attacked from the salients to the right and left of Changkufeng, supported by machine guns firing from both sides of Khasan. A Japanese diarist jeered: "The moths are flocking to the flame!" After 7 A.M. two enemy heavy machine guns, trundled onto the rock where the red flag was planted, started firing blindly. Lieutenant Yanagihara, 5th Company com­

DEVELOPMENTS OF 8-9 AUGUST

265

mander, was wounded seriously by grenade fragments, "but he still shouted, 'Defend this ground to the last!' " A warrant officer took over and was wounded in turn, whereupon a sergeant assumed command.2 Russian troop strength increased beyond 11/2 battalions. The defenders were running out of grenades and had to resort to rocks, but by 10 A.M. the Soviet assault waves began to waver after having experienced five hours of fierce resistance. Supporting the Japanese lines had been barrages by grenade launchers, flank fire by a heavy-machine-gun platoon at Chiangchunfeng, and support by the mountain artillery. Around 10:30 the at­ tackers fled to Khasan. The battlefield quieted, but enemy snipers dug foxholes 300 meters away and kept up persistent fire, and infantry mounted repeated attacks in varying strength. During the morning combat, Shimomura's battalion alone suffered 36 casualties. When Suetaka sent his aide to find out what was needed, K. Sato replied: "Send observers to Chang­ kufeng and Chiangchunfeng, consolidate the rear by calling up reservists, quickly transport construction materiel to the front, and strengthen the positions. Since morning, the mountain gun and the two battalion guns at Fangchuantinghad engaged infantry and machine guns which had appeared on the middle of Changkufeng crest as well as in the Hill 52 area. The timely fire of these guns caused "severe losses," especially to Russian ob­ servation posts. But Lieutenant Maeoka, who was commanding the moun­ tain platoon from Changkufeng, was wounded badly at 10:30 A.M. The mountain battalion also fired at targets in the Changkufeng sector from the Korean side of the Tumen. At 1:20 P.M. the Russians pressed new attacks against Changkufeng from three sides, using a total of two companies and three tanks. Although they got close and attacked persist­ ently, they were driven off every time; these afternoon efforts were not too vigorous. Fighters strafed at low altitude and more than ten bombers attacked near 3 P.M., igniting fires in the village of Fangchuanting. The raids by planes and guns caused frequent cuts in signal lines again. Soviet cutoff fire was particularly intense at the Sozan crossing. Although badly wounded, the post chief, a PFC, swore to "share the fate of the phones." Hemorrhaging seriously and blacking out on occasion, he somehow kept communications open.4 At 6:50 A.M. on the 8th, Soviet forces in the left sector resumed their efforts until they were pinned down at 100 meters and had to dig in. T. Sato issued antiaircraft precautions: "Maintain natural cover—do not break off

266

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

boughs or pull out grass. Camouflage and concealment in and around trenches must be perfect. Walking in the open is forbidden; only passageways may be used. Excepting spotter posts, everybody must enter shelters from warning till all-clear." Meanwhile, T. Sato estimated that although enemy attacks were aimed mainly against Changkufeng, "there exists some danger that hostile forces will take advantage of darkness tonight to cross the Tumen near Yangkuanping and launch a sudden attack against our left rear, for actions in that area have become rather pronounced." He accordingly issued an order at 5 P.M.: "All of us, superiors as well as sub­ ordinates, must overcome our exhaustion, make our nighttime guarding rigorous, and leave the foe not the slightest opening" between friendly battalions or from the shores of the Tumen River. "Nighttime activities may only be performed by two men or more; never operate alone—even in 'unavoidable' situations."5 There was no Soviet attack in the left sector during the night of 8-9 August. Suetaka estimated on the morning of the 8th that the Russians were "trying to generate propaganda advantageous to them at home and abroad by staking their honor and seizing Changkufeng quickly. From the stand­ point of overall political tactics, it is therefore imperative to thwart their intentions." The enemy relied consistently on elements which remained on the crestline southeast of Changkufeng and served as a base; they must be deprived of that attack base. If his assault plans were to be successful, Suetaka realized, the 37th Brigade would require reinforcement. The first battalion-size elements of Cho's infantry were just arriving. As an initial step, Hanyu's battalion should cross the Tumen and join the brigade while the main body of the regiment, due that afternoon, should be ready to enter the lines. The division chief of staff issued an order in the name of Suetaka, stipulating that the division would secure its positions "while adhering to the great policy of nonexpansion."6 At 10:30 P.M. Morimoto speculated that the Russians "were hoping for the good fortune of being able to retake Changkufeng." Strict guard measures were enjoined.7 Even­ tually, before midnight, Suetaka got to see Cho at Seikaku station. The 38th Brigade Headquarters finally began to reach Kyonghun from Nanam on 8 August. While he was at Seoul, the 38th's newly appointed brigadier, Ono, had been asked specifically by the Korea Army not to expand the incident. The division may have had plans to divide the front into two brigade sectors, but the 38th Brigade exerted no command in-, fluence or operational control by the time of the cease-fire.8 Eagerly :

DEVELOPMENTS OF 8-9 AUGUST

267

awaited tactical reinforcements were reaching the front on the Sth, too. Hanyu's battalion officers arrived at Chiangchunfeng at 8:30 P.M. Fresh artillery reinforcements were moving into position: the field artillery battalion, a battery of 15-cm. cannon, and the antiaircraft units. At 3:30 P.M. Lieutenant Colonel Hiramuki, the 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment commander, instructed the gun and searchlight units to cover the skies over Changkufeng, Kucheng plain, and the main artillery sites. Whenever hostile aircraft entered effective range, the guns were to go into action. In the case of enemy artillery-spotting planes, gun crews were to fire even when there was only a single target. All of Hiramuki's units went into action during the afternoon, and the battery at Sozan claimed to have downed one plane. The dummy site drew a bombing run and several strafings. To implement Suetaka's request that the Russian foothold southeast of Changkufeng be wiped out soon, Morimoto had decided in the morning to employ the new battalion from Cho's regiment. But since Hanyu's unit was delayed by enemy fire, Morimoto had to turn to the reserve 76th Regiment. At 4 P.M. Okido was told to prepare an attack, using one in­ fantry battalion and an engineer squad. The mission was to take advantage of darkness to expel the foe remaining on Changkufeng, secure the heights in concert with the elements on the hill, and smash any serious attack at night.10 At 5 P.M. Okido issued his detailed order. Enemy elements were located near the cliff close to the northern top of Changkufeng. Apparently, hostile bases existed in scattered fashion on the southern slopes as well as a rather large base on the middle of Akahage (“Red Bald") Hill, for­ merly held by the Japanese company under Captain Noguchi. The regi­ ment was to drive those forces north of Hill 52. The 3rd Battalion com­ mander, Maj. Hashimoto Seishiro, was to direct both companies' assaults and, once the foe had been ousted, secure the locations until dawn, after which he would return to the reserve unit. Hashimoto gave orders to his own commanders on the slopes of Chiangchunfeng. In general, the weather was favorable to late twilight or night attacks: fair days, moonlit nights, dense ground fogs limiting visibility to 100-200 meters. Sunset was at 6:30, sunrise at 5. On the 8th, at 7:30 P.M., Hashi­ moto proceeded with his battalion staff to the foot of Changkufeng and conferred with M. Sato and Shimomura, the majors commanding the units with which he was to cooperate. The assault units moved out from Chiangchunfeng, but their timing was thrown off by a half-hour of artil­

268

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

lery checking fire from northeast of the lake. At 8:50 P.M. Captain Iwai's 10th Company, supported by a machine-gun platoon, attacked the rock corner on the east side of Changkufeng. After cutting down Soviet sentries, the Japanese rushed in; 40 or 50 Russian soldiers retreated toward Akahage. On that hill there had been only 20 or 30 Soviet troops to begin with, but their strength had been built up to two companies plus tanks and infantry guns. The Russians laid down violent small-arms fire, causing 17 Japanese casualties in a short period, after which 30 to 40 enemy soldiers sought to counterattack. The Japanese drove back this effort, readied their own offensive, and continued to launch close assaults against the heavy-machine­ gun nest at the rock corner. At the same time that Iwai's company moved forward, Captain Shidara's 7th Company jumped off with five attached demolition engineers. The 1st Platoon broke through the entanglements and cut down lookouts while the 2nd Platoon proceeded to mop up footholds on the north side—some ten Russian soldiers who dotted the slope at four locations. In the process, the company ran into the positions which Iwai had been attacking. Con­ siderations of terrain and enemy fire dictated a detour south of the ridge­ line. Shidara's men moved up behind Iwai on the right, where they joined Hashimoto's command. The battalion commander consolidated his lines and directed recon­ naissance preparatory to an attack against Akahage. Hours had been con­ sumed; Okido, at the command post, decided that it might be wiser to wait till daybreak and call for artillery support. Hashimoto then issued his own instructions from the eastern salient, cautioning his men to dig in well. Near 4 A.M. the redeployments were completed but construction did not progress because of the rocky terrain; the men were scarcely able to scoop out knee-high firing trenches by daybreak.11 On 8 August it was reported that the Japanese had knocked out eight machine guns and caused 200 Russian casualties in the right sector. Intel­ ligence judged Soviet overall strength, as of 8 P.M., at 27 infantry battalions (up two from the 7th) and 80 artillery pieces (same figure but a minimum estimate, according to sightings). In the category of armor there was a drastic change: instead of the 200 tanks believed to be forward on 7 August, only a few could now be observed in the front-line areas, and these mainly across the lake. Three Russian battalions were identified north of Shachao­ feng. Regimental battle maps indicate two enemy battalions west of Hill1 29 (facing Japanese-held Hill 52) and another Soviet battalion at Chang- \ kufeng itself, with three tanks in support at each locale. The Korea Army,

DEVELOPMENTS OF 8-9 AUGUST

269

however, heard from the 19th Division that, overall, the Russians had committed the 40th, 32nd, and 39th rifle divisions (the last unconfirmed), the 28th Cavalry Division, 170 tanks (20th Brigade?), and two air brigades centering on Spassk. This same day—8 August—IGHQ decided to dispatch Lt. Col. Akikusa Shun, an expert on Soviet intelligence, and some others to assist the local authorities in matters of anti-Soviet subversion and propaganda.12 Total Russian losses on the 8th were estimated to exceed 1,500. More than 100 tanks were claimed publicly, and it was "confirmed" that, since the 1st, six planes had been shot down, two of which had fallen behind Japanese lines. Classified sources list one Soviet prisoner taken on the Shachaofeng front and one deserter in the Huichungyuan sector.13 In Tokyo, the war ministry and the Gaimusho denied categorically that the Russians had retaken Changkufeng. Soviet troops had attempted to rush positions 600 feet from the crest at 2 P.M.; after 21/2 hours of furious handto-hand fighting, they were beaten off with presumably heavy casualties on both sides. Soviet tanks were reported moving north from Posyet Bay, "but it was questionable whether this was a withdrawal or a strategic move­ ment." From Unggi, an American correspondent reported new activity by the night of the 8th on the right flank of Soviet forces at Changkufeng; apparently, the Russians were preparing another offensive. The Japanese had again admitted a dangerous penetration on the northern wing, but it was now claimed that the Russian flank southeast of Changkufeng had been driven back on the night of 7-8 August. Daylong bombardments could be heard at Unggi, south of the Tumen.14 Right sector casualties were relatively light on 8 August: eight killed and 41 wounded, the 75th Infantry suffering five and 38 of these, re­ spectively. Officer casualties were proportionately high: two wounded in the 75th Regiment, one in the 76th Regiment, and a fourth in the moun­ tain artillery. Personnel rosters of the 75th Regiment, as of 30 July and 8 August, reveal a diminution of strength from 1,403 to 826, down 41 percent.15 The cumulative effect of Japanese losses and the scale of Soviet commitment troubled the Korea Army. Suetaka reported the following Japanese casualties had been ascertained: through 2 August—45 killed, 120 wounded; from 3 to 5 August—25 killed, 60 wounded; since 6 August —killed unknown, 200 wounded. Remarkably, the same casualty totals were released publicly by the war ministry on the night of the 8th.16 Nakamura sought to encourage the hard-fighting division by taking the last measure within his purview—authorizing transfer to the battlefront

270

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

of the only divisional combat unit yet uncommitted, an infantry battalion from T. Sato's regiment, still in Nanam. The division was advised at 11:50 A.M. on 9 August; Tokyo and Hsinking were notified immediately. Sue­ taka made the necessary arrangements, having already heard about the status of the awaited antiaircraft artillery and armored train reinforce­ ments.17 Unknown to the men at the front, the Changkufeng Incident was nearing an end after ten days of bitter fighting. K. Sato felt that, in general, matters had "gradually developed favorably" for the Japanese. Thus, the field ar­ tillery and 15-cm. cannon reinforcements finished emplacement on the night of 8-9 August and began ranging-in next morning. Nevertheless, Soviet observation posts had been advanced to the slopes on the southern foot of Changkufeng, and Russian target spotting was being performed "rather precisely." Although the 15-cm. unit had operated with a view to conceal­ ment, it sustained shellfire even before going into action. Shells were hit­ ting the west side of Changkufeng, and the command post areas were draw­ ing continuous fire.18 Early on 9 August Morimoto carried out an important decision—to re­ lieve the crippled 75th Infantry with Okido's regiment while retaining the sector unit setup.19 He was influenced not only by considerations of the chain of command but also by the 75th Regiment's losses. To prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the rotation, the process was to be con­ ducted gradually. Shortly after 7 A.M., K. Sato was told that the clean-up on the left wing had succeeded, but the attack on the right was continuing. Artillery reinforcements had entered combat. Okido would henceforth command K. Sato's right sector, while T. Sato would retain command of the left sector unit. Although the entire 75th Regiment was scheduled to go into reserve, K. Sato did not take action immediately; "at that time, front-line combat conditions did not allow a change in arrangements.''20 On the Hill 52 front, meanwhile, the Russians had held up 800 meters from the Japanese positions. At dawn on the 9th, elements moved forward to their advanced observation units, 200-300 meters away. On Fangchuanting, a Japanese warrant officer detected Soviet heavy machine guns, mor­ tars, and ground troops between Hill 52 and Changkufeng; he directed effective concentrations of fire by battalion guns. At 10:40 A.M. Soviet artillery opened intense bombardment from the slopes of Hill 29 and the direction of Maanshan and Gaho. The ranging was accurate and "matters ■> deteriorated to a point where we no longer possessed a bit of dead space." ■>

II

DEVELOPMENTS OF 8-9 AUGUST

271

The Russian forces in this sector—two battalions in all—drew closer, but in the afternoon the Japanese response checked the forwardmost attackers at 300 meters. At 12:30 the Russians resumed their artillery barrage, which lasted for almost four hours. The defenders lost 31 killed and had 35 wounded. In midafternoon K. Sato learned of a new crisis at Hill 52. Around 5:20 Lieutenant Takiguchi arrived at regimental headquarters, under very heavy fire, with a poignant message from Major Kojima: The enemy's barrages have been massive; most works have been smashed and our casualties are mounting. We are all eager to sortie rather than remain inactive and perish uselessly. But it would be unbearable for subordinates to take such ac­ tion as pushing across the border without sanction, in contra­ vention of superiors' intentions. Please provide us with in• 91 structions. Sato listened carefully to Takiguchi's report but, with tears in his eyes, de­ cided to order the unit to discard its notion and instead hold out stubbornly (some say, "die happily") in its present position. According to Tominaga: "The agony of the circumstances must have been like 'spitting blood' for [Sato]. It was a perfect example of our patience, forbearance, and nonen­ largement policy, for which we paid dearly."22 At 9:30 P.M. the regiment advised its units that the Russians apparently intended a night attack against Changkufeng. The troops were to defend their works tenaciously and interfere with the enemy's rear, using grenade launchers and automatic weapons. Friendly artillery would conduct cut­ off fire between Hill 52 and Changkufeng. One battalion from Cho's regiment had been concentrated near Fangchuanting in readiness to repulse attacks. Although the 75th Regiment was to assemble as bri­ gade reserve, K. Sato had been authorized to retain command of Inagaki's element at Hill 52 as long as the situation demanded. Sato was to come under the new right sector unit commander, Okido.23 Between 7 and 8 P.M. the Soviets laid down three more barrages. During that period, most of the Russian troops, whose earlier momen­ tum had ended 200 meters from the works, withdrew 500 meters under cover of artillery. Kojima's battalion neutralized enemy har­ assing fire and stayed on alert. That night, all the Japanese survivors labored on the battered defenses while evacuating their dozens of casualties.

272

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

On the Changkufeng front, the night attack on 8-9 August by Okido's regiment was supposed to clear out the Russians on the east, but it was the Soviet side which seized the initiative. At 3:40 A.M. on the 9th, the Russians attacked in strength from two directions. Several lines pressed forward, deployed in great depth and breadth. One platoon struck against the right salient at Changkufeng, with V/2 battalions to the rear. Another company advanced from the Khasan shore and linked up with the Soviets' right wing, while one more battalion came from the rear. At the outset, the Russians laid down machine-gun fire coupled with rifle grenade volleys. "When hostile forces glimpsed even the outline of a Japanese soldier, they would let loose with a burst of two or three automatic-rifle shots." In addi­ tion, Soviet artillery, especially three "nasty" mountain guns emplaced on the high ground east of Khasan, gradually smashed the Japanese positions, in conjunction with Russian battalion and antitank guns. Even so, the Japanese had one professional military criticism: "The foe did not develop any particular emphasis in the attacks; hence, they were not very effective." The unit commanders at Changkufeng felt that the moment when the enemy climbed the ridgeline and dashed in would provide the best oppor­ tunity to counterattack. As morning mists began to clear, however, the Russians fell back, leaving only snipers at the lakeshore. For another hour artillery pounded Changkufeng, Hill 52, and Chiangchunfeng. A pall of smoke covered the lines, but near 8 A.M. the Soviet guns let up. Shimomura's battalion found that 15 men had been killed that morning.24 Meanwhile, Hashimoto's battalion of the 76th Regiment had bogged down in its costly efforts to sweep firing points from the slopes of Chang­ kufeng and from Akahage. Sunrise found Hashimoto's mauled troops dig­ ging with little success while getting ready to resume the assault under artillery cover. Around 4 A.M. Hashimoto observed Soviet forces advancing into the dead angle between his men and M. Sato's battalion atop Chang­ kufeng. The Japanese were raked by crossfire and by barrages laid down by artillery and heavy weapons located at uncleared Akahage and east of Khasan. Casualties soared in the 10th Infantry Company and 3rd MachineGun Company. Both company commanders were killed; three platoon leaders were also slain and two wounded. In all, 53 officers and men were killed and 32 wounded. Hashimoto's troops tried to strike back on the south side of Changkufeng at 4:40 A.M., but, observing the "unexpectedly large enemy forces and the fact that our assault unit had almost exhausted its combat power," Okido concluded by 7:30 that "something had to be done." Since Hashimoto's assault "did not develop as expected," Okido -

DEVELOPMENTS OF 8-9 AUGUST

273

decided to use Cho's Hanyu battalion to threaten the Soviets' left rear.25 Near sunrise on 9 August, Cho finally arrived at the front from Shikai and went to see K. Sato southwest of Fangchuanting. "We appreciated his eagerness to render positive cooperation," Sato said later. Under fire, Cho moved to brigade headquarters at Chiangchunfeng and submitted a recom­ mendation for the attention of Suetaka: "Since the situation is urgent, Colonel Cho would like to reinforce the front lines by having his 1st and 3rd battalions cross the river."26 Russian bombardments resumed from 11:30 A.M.; the Japanese on Changkufeng endured fairly continuous shelling by field, mountain, and heavy artillery. Although Soviet troops mounted no new daytime attacks, Okido, noting that the foe was massing on the eastern slopes with a dozen heavy weapons (and six boats with rapid-fire guns on the lake), called for the right sector unit to smash any enemy attempt to retake Changkufeng. Hashimoto's battalion had sustained severe losses; 40-50 survivors were securing the slope on the southwestern side of the hill. Cho was to be pre­ pared to reinforce it if necessary. Particular care was to be taken to mini­ mize losses from air attack and bombardment.27 Throughout 9 August, the one attached mountain gun fired bravely under temporary command of a squad leader. At 3:20 P.M. the Japanese were hit by a very intense barrage from Hill 29. The mountain gun was damaged by shellfire and had to be moved to the foot of Fangchuanting. Tanaka had ordered his artillery to conduct long-range artillery neutral­ ization and communications-cutoff fire, and short-range neutralization as well as checking fire. "The accuracy of our artillery elements . . . had improved and the power of our guns had been enhanced greatly." A liaison officer from the newly arriving Kwantung Army armored train reached Tanaka's observation post at 10 A.M.28 On the left, from 5:30 A.M., T. Sato dispatched an antitank platoon, under cover of mist, to finish off immobilized Soviet tanks whose main armament was still operational and which had done some severe firing the day before. As the day wore on, spirits soared, for the men "heard the roar of friendly 15-cm. cannon laying down mighty neutralization fire against enemy artillery." Near 2:15 P.M. Russian troops were detected creeping forward in the woods 400 meters away on the right. Supporting mountain artillery wiped out this threat in short order.29 Suetaka decided to move his division headquarters to Seikaku and his combat command post to the Matsu'otsuho message center. "Anxiety about the Wuchiatzu sector to the north had diminished greatly," he

274

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

explained. "In addition, the entire strength of the division had already been brought to the front. Lastly, dealings with the Seoul and Tokyo levels had by now become rather secondary in importance." Suetaka could discern the steady, disturbing exhaustion of his front-line troops. On the other hand, newly arrived Cho was "raring to go." After re­ ceiving authorization from Suetaka, Cho allowed Nakajima's battalion to cross the river at Matsu'otsuho but kept Osuga's battalion on the Korean bank as division reserve.30 Since Tanaka had surmised that the Russians' intention was to direct their main offensive effort against the Japanese right wing, it seemed best to transfer the mountain guns to strengthen the right sector positions.31 The brigade order of 5:30 P.M. endorsed Tanaka's shift of defensive em­ phasis, particularly with regard to the artillery and the new elements from Cho's regiment. Morimoto added that the core of the Soviet assault force southeast of Changkufeng amounted to two infantry battalions.32 T. Sato accordingly ordered Obo's battalion to integrate its heavy fire power and "deliver swift fire in timely fashion." Soon afterward, Obo discerned a massed battalion of Russian infantry, who had been hauled up by trucks, on the northeastern skirt of Changkufeng. He unleashed every available weapon, organic and attached, at 7:30. The Soviets "seemed taken com­ pletely by surprise; they showed extreme bewilderment and dispersed in an instant. Okido had also taken early steps to carry out Morimoto's order. To Hanyu's battalion Okido assigned a special task: to go over to the of­ fensive against the foe's rear in case the Russians mounted encircling attacks at Changkufeng Hill. He ordered Hashimoto's battered battalion to concentrate at twilight on the western slope, "ready to wipe out at­ tackers without fail." Okido concluded with a word of caution: "Carry a lot of ammunition and grenades but travel lightly." From 7 P.M. Rus­ sian artillery fired violently for two hours against the crestline where Okido's command post was located and against the vicinities of the hamlet of Fangchuanting, Changkufeng, and Chiangchunfeng. At 1 A.M., when Okido was convinced that the crisis had passed, he ordered Hashi­ moto's battalion to retrieve casualties and weapons by daybreak. Sum­ marizing the past day's activities, Okido observed that "we had not been able to wipe out the foe on Akahage Hill, but we did break his night­ attack notion."34 Hanyu's battalion, meanwhile, arrived to support K. Sato, who had these welcome reinforcements guard his command ■'

DEVELOPMENTS OF 8-9 AUGUST

275

post and get ready for a sally between Hill 52 and Changkufeng. Sato was pleased to learn that most of the friendly artillery forces were rede­ ploying to assist the right wing. The right sector unit estimated that on 9 August it had caused 450 casualties, stopped five tanks, and knocked out one light artillery piece and seven heavy machine guns. Japanese casualties in the right sector had amounted to 28 killed and 43 wounded. Ammunition expenditures were considerably higher than on the 8th. As of 10 P.M. Japanese intelligence reported that Soviet forces in the forward areas totaled 27 infantry bat­ talions (the same as on the 8th), 100 artillery pieces (up 20), and very few tanks at the front (same). These estimates of the numbers of infantry and artillery committed by the Russians represent the highest, and final, figures for the Changkufeng Incident. Battle maps for the 9th show one Soviet infantry battalion and some tanks at Hill 29; another two battalions and more tanks on the Hill 52 front; two companies between Hill 52 and Changkufeng; and 11/2 battalions plus armor at Changkufeng.35 A New York Times headline reported, “Soviet Artillery Blasts Enemy on 4-Mile Front; Japanese Await Big Drive—Guns Fire All Day." The Associated Press correspondent at Unggi called Russian shelling "the most intensive since the fighting on the border started last month. Six-inch projectiles came over at a rate of at least six a minute." On the Korean bank of the Tumen, Hill 82 was hit by 30 shells. From Hill 52, a battery of Japanese mountain guns began firing eastward, apparently against on­ rushing tanks. Thereupon, the Russians laid down a "blanket of fire" against the hill; after a half-hour's bombardment, it was "scarred and smoking" from the impact of no less than 150 shells. Russian gunners were keeping the Tumen fords under fire, never letting up for more than two minutes. Columns of dirty water could be seen shooting up from the river like geysers. The source of Japanese return fire could not be ascer­ tained. Headquarters in Korea had not issued any communique giving the Japanese side of the Soviet contention that Changkufeng had been retaken by the Red Army. Nevertheless, the shelling suggested that "if the Japanese had been routed from the hilltop, they had returned to the positions, because they were subjected to heavy fire." According to Japanese officers, Russian reinforcements were being brought up, and it was expected that the enemy would soon take "still more vigorous measures."36 The war ministry ascribed particular significance to Rus­ sian concentrations in the Posyet area, for they appeared to mean

276

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

that the battlefront was about to be extended. By now, however, it was exorbitantly asserted, nearly 1,000 Russian corpses had been col­ lected at the front. "Units which attacked the Japanese sustained such heavy losses it was probably necessary to re-form their lines."37 NOTES 1.75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 8 August 1938. 2. Jinchu bidan, pp. 155-156. 3. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 8 August 1938. 4. Ibid.; Jinchu bidan, pp. 44-45; Miyajima interview. 5. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 178-182. 6. Ibid., pp. 188-190. 7. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 8 August 1938. 8. Ichimoto and Iwasaki interviews. 9. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 189, 195-196, 235-237. 10. Ibid., pp. 195-196. 11. Ibid., pp. 174, 210-213; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 8 August 1938. 12. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 190; CS, Chokoho, p. 78; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 8 August 1938; JRD/JSM 11,3/A:31. 13. Jinchu bidan, p. 25; Tokyo Asahi, 9 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid. (A.M.ed.),p. 2; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 8 August 1938. 14. New York Times, 9 August 1938, pp. 1,8. 15. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 30 July, 8 August 1938. 16. CS, Chokoho, p. 78; Tokyo Asahi, 9 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 17. K. Nakamura, Affidavit No. 2, paragraphs 22-24, 28 (Blakeney Collection); CS, Chokoho, pp. 50-51,78-79; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 191. 18. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shoho, 9 August 1938. 19. Ibid.; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 198-199, 204. 20. Sato interview; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 9 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, p.204. 21.75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 9 August 1938. 22. Tominaga in Jinchu bidan, p. 20. Akaishizawa attributes the painful decision to Morimoto. Chokoho, p. 211. 23. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 9 August 1938. 24. Ibid.; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 174-175. 25. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 212-214; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 9 August 1938. 26. Sato interview; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 225. 27. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 214-215. 28. Ibid., pp. 230-231. Tanaka referred to Seiyuzan, the coined name for Changkufeng; this is the only use of that name in orders that can be found. The coined name was based on K. Sato's daily training motto: sei (from the character

DEVELOPMENTS OF 8-9 AUGUST

277

for honesty), yu (bravery), and zan (mountain). See K. Sato in Jinchu bidan, pp. 4, 29. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 182-183. 30. Ibid., pp. 191, ?25-226. 31. Ibid., pp. 231-233. 32. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 9 August 1938. 33. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 183-184. 34. Ibid., pp. 215-217. 35. Ibid., pp. 191-192; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 9 August 1938. 36. New York Times, 10 August 1938, p. 1. 37. New York Times, 10 August 1938, p. 10. Also see Tdkyo Asahi, 10 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid., 11 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; Jinchu bidan, p. 26.

Attrition’s Toll

The 10th of August was the day before the cease-fire. As the 75th Reg­ iment put it, "New Japanese units were arriving continuously and the morale of our officers and men was high."1 During the night of 9-10 August, the 74th Infantry reinforcements crossed the Tumen steadily. In the early hours, Okido concluded that Soviet attack designs had been frustrated for the time being. The Hill 52 front was relatively calm. Soviet automatic weapons and riflemen were still deployed 200 to 300 meters from Japanese positions, at which they sniped selectively. Russian artillery was quiet, apparently as the result of the movement of the main Japanese artillery force to the right wing and the arrival of long-range guns. The 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting was the focal point of Japanese artillery activity. Firing began at 7:10 A.M., when four battalion guns engaged and smashed two Soviet mountain pieces. Consumption of shells on the 10th was quite heavy—343 rounds expended by the guns at Fangchuanting alone. Russian artillery, especially heavy guns, fired "rather briskly" against the Chang­ kufeng sector from morning. As for Soviet ground assaults, one company attacked at Changkufeng as early as 5:20 A.M. under cover of fog but was driven off after 40 minutes. The Russians struck again from three directions "in formidable strength" between 9 and 10 A.M. Morimoto, growing concerned about the danger of irruptions through gaps between Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, sent elements of Nakajima's battalion (from Cho's regiment) to Chiangchun­ feng. Since the right wing of the Russians atop Changkufeng was spilling onto the western slopes, at 10:30 A.M. Nakajima had his heavy rnachine guns and battalion guns lay down strong fire from the peak of Chiang­ chunfeng. Meanwhile, heavy weapons from the left sector were also con­ tributing to the repulse of the morning assaults.2

ATTRITION'S TOLL

279

A battalion of Soviet infantry attacked Changkufeng all afternoon. Fierce gunfire by the 75th Regiment at 2 P.M. routed troops massing on the slopes facing the red flag. "Considerable losses" were inflicted on 75 Russians sighted northeast of Hill 52. An enemy company on the Khasan shore and another two east of Akahage Hill were attempting to occupy positions from which to strike Fangchuanting with the support of two rapid-fire guns. Shimomura directed his machine-gun and grenade-discharger units to smash these forces, but whenever Japanese fire let up, the Russians returned to their construction—a sequence which recurred three times. Eventually, the enemy infantry managed to jump off, supported by artil­ lery. By 5 P.M. the Russians.had been repulsed by the energetic fire of Japanese small arms, battalion guns, and artillery. Soviet forces dispersed toward the lakeshore and Hill 52, leaving many corpses behind. The last important firing by Japanese battalion guns at Fangchuanting on the 10th was a mission against the eastern slopes of Changkufeng at 6 P.M. There­ after, the battle zone grew still. Shimomura commended his subordinates, gave specific instructions about necessary sleep as well as guard duties, and had the men strengthen the positions.3 Like Morimoto, Cho saw the danger of an irruption between Chang­ kufeng and Shachaofeng. At 10 A.M. he issued orders for an infantry company to occupy Chiangchunfeng crest and block any rush. The sector continued to attract barrages till 6 P.M. Japanese artillery responded and the region was curtained by smoke from the blasts. Antiaircraft batteries along the front saw considerable action from late afternoon and claimed to have downed two fighters. Fortunately, further antiaircraft reinforce­ ments were being received from the Kwantung Army, for a unit of Hiramuki's regiment lost half of its men on 10 August.4 In the left sector, T. Sato concluded that, to secure Changkufeng, it would be best to reinforce flank fire instead of concentrating on the direct attack or defense of the Changkufeng district. He therefore made arrange­ ments with Okido to borrow one machine-gun platoon and assign it to Obo. As of 5:30 A.M. on the 10th, enemy troops were still holding a line 300 meters from the positions of Obo's right battalion and 800 to 1,000 meters ahead of Takenouchi's left battalion. Shortly afterward, good news was received at the left sector command post: the last battalion of the 73rd Regiment was to have left Nanam at 4 P.M. on 9 August and would arrive in the near future.5 On the right wing of the left sector, the Russians facing Kadokura's company began to operate energetically from 9 A.M., advancing in two

280

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

lines, 150 meters apart, with a total strength of one company: two pla­ toons up, one platoon back. They were supported by forces on the high ground north of Khasan and on Akahage. Kadokura waited for the enemy to close to 200 meters before ordering his men to open up; particularly effective was the flanking fire by the machine-gun company and by ele­ ments of Okuda's company. Many heavy artillery shells were hitting the Japanese lines now, but defensive fire pinned down the attacking infantry for a while, 100 meters from the breastworks. Then 30 or 40 Soviet sol­ diers, covered by fire power, worked forward as close as 30 meters, hurl­ ing grenades and giving every indication of mounting a charge. The Jap­ anese responded with grenades. At the same time, the left-flank squad of Kadokura's company was being annihilated. Thus encouraged, Russian assault troops plunged close, whereupon Kadokura assembled his available men—a dozen or so, from the command teams and runners—and grappled with the foe at point-' blank range. An ammunition man joined in the melee and broke up the Soviet assault by ^Xpert use of hand grenades. The second echelon grad­ ually fell back 300 meters around 10:30 A.M. in the face of heavy fire laid down by the machine guns and Okuda's company. The Russians ap­ peared to be adjusting their deployment but made no further efforts to close. Shortly after the attack on Kadokura's company had started, a Soviet company began to advance on Okuda's company, but it too was checked, withdrew beyond range, and was redeployed. From midmorning, the heat was intense but water was extremely difficult to get. Tominaga explains: "My unit had no water supply facilities. Most of the purifica­ tion equipment had apparently been sent to China. We drank pond water, mainly. In emergencies we even mixed creosote with brackish Tumen River water."6 At Changkufeng, meanwhile, two or three enemy com­ panies were approaching the crest. Left sector raiding fire caused the Russians to flee. Probably the most important action taken by Morimoto on 10 August was the reorganization of the brigade front since he now possessed most of Cho's regiment. The intention was "to consolidate the lines, strengthen the right sector unit in particular, and accomplish changeovers to suit the combat situation.” At 11 A.M., K. Sato and Okido were told orally that the old right sector was being split into right and central sectors, to be commanded by ChO/and Okido, respectively. T. Sato would retain the left sector unit, K. Sato would command the reserves, Tanaka the artil- ’ lery force, and Kobayashi the engineers.7 »

ATTRITION'S TOLL

281

Okido had pointed out to Morimoto the need to prepare stocks of explosives and ammunition (hand grenades, in particular) for close-quarter combat use, to cut down losses at Changkufeng by means of sandbags and log fortifications, and to arrange for timely concentrations of heavy and light artillery by night or day against powerful forces assembling on the slopes in front. All of Okido's detailed recommendations and requests were honored. Now M. Sato's exhausted and dispersed battalion (from Okido's own regiment) was to be reassembled and elements were to be sent to occupy the heights 400 to 500 meters north of Changkufeng to assure flank defense of the slopes on the east side. Of particular interest to K. Sato was the portion of Okido's order of 8 P.M. which stipulated that Shimomura's battalion (from the K. Sato regiment) could continue its missions on Changkufeng temporarily "because of the battle situation." Despite an explicit order by Morimoto indicating that Cho's regiment was to take over defense of the Hill 52 area, 75th Regiment records assert that "implementation was postponed until the night of 11 August"—a delay which Okido had been prevailed upon to sanction, too. These decisions must have been influenced by regard for the pride of the hard-fighting 75th Infantry, still "achieving its mission”; the combat experience of K. Sato and the greenness of replacements; and the debt to the fallen. K. Sato also mentions a rumor that only his regiment was to be left across the Tumen, for the alleged purpose of assuming "responsibility." He was fully resolved to die.8 As 10 August wore on, Tanaka observed that Soviet artillery and planes grew vigorous while Russian infantry were "not at all energetic." Still, the accuracy of the Russian guns had decreased markedly as new Japanese batteries went into action. The infantry was exultant. "Soviet artillery around Gaho and Hill 29 was shaken by now, and hostile gunfire from other directions also became inactive."9 The Russians were apparently also suffering from a shortage of artillery ammunition, induced by earlier blind firing in profusion; they were now using practice shells. In Tanaka's judgment, it was imperative to compensate for the diminution in friendly artillery on the left after the preponderance of his mountain battalions had been transferred to assist the right sector. He recommended to Mori­ moto that the main body of the heavy artillery regiment be transferred to Sho-Sozan. In addition, he wanted the M-90 independent field artillery displaced forward to Nanzopan to conduct long-range firing and lay down checking fire in front of the defenses. Morimoto agreed.10 One artilleryrelated measure delighted the bone-weary Japanese soldiers. Two oxcarts

282

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

were set up on the peak of Fangchuanting as dummies for mountain guns; they obtained "considerable results" in drawing fire away from the men.11 After making arrangements for commitment of the last battalion of the 73rd Infantry (Yamazaki's 3rd), Suetaka left Matsu'otsuho for brigade headquarters at Chiangchunfeng, where he set up his own command post. At 2 P.M. he issued his "Combat Victory Operations Order of the Day": (1) This division will "become one," deriving a lesson from the great Kusunoki Masashige's loyalty at Chihaya castle, and will secure its positions tenaciously. (2) The entire unit is to be imbued with the conviction that the enemy's woes outnumber our own by several-fold. Morale is to be enhanced steadily, and everyone should carry out previous missions.12

Some interpret the hortatory language as proof that the bleeding division was almost destroyed and that Suetaka was seeking to encourage the rem­ nants by patriotic references (Kusunoki's legendary defense 600 years earlier) and by specific information (the arrival of reinforcements, men­ tioned elsewhere in the order). In this connection, the division learned of two significant developments on the 10th: the Kwantung Army's concen­ tration of strong forces on the east Manchurian borders facing the USSR, and Tokyo's decision to authorize Phase-2 mobilization of the 19th Divi­ sion, beginning 12 August.13 Japanese casualties in the old right sector numbered only nine men killed and 22 wounded on 10 August. The battalion guns pumped off 500 rounds. It was estimated that the Russians suffered 600 casualties plus five heavy machine guns knocked out. By now, the Soviets had com­ mitted their maximum infantry and artillery strength, 27 battalions and 100 guns, the same as on the 9th but up 17 battalions and 60 pieces since the 3rd. Japanese higher headquarters reported no tanks at the front, but 75th Infantry situation maps show some Russian armor still facing the Hill 52 sector.14 An American war correspondent said that the firing was so hot on the 10th, "it made yesterday's heavy bombardment sound like child's play." One observer counted 20 explosions within a half-minute, coming so close together that they sounded like thunder reverberating through the hills. Although Japanese officers insisted that their side was in possession

ATTRITION'S TOLL

283

of Changkufeng Hill, they admitted that Japanese casualties had grown heavier because of the accuracy of Soviet shelling. Losses were not as severe as might have been supposed, however, since the enemy did not time their charges with their barrages. Thus, the Japanese were able to lie low in trenches and meet the attackers with grenades.15 According to Russian spokesmen, 10 August had seen heavy fighting. Soviet officials acknowledged for the first time that the Red Army had crossed the Manchurian frontier. According to a Russian communique issued by “the staff of the First (Maritime) Army," Japanese troops had again staged a number of costly and unsuccessful assaults against Chang­ kufeng, which was “occupied by our troops." The deployment of Soviet forces followed the frontier "with the exception of the region of a name­ less heights [Shachaofeng?], where Japanese troops wedged into our ter­ ritory to a distance of 200 meters and our forces in turn wedged into Japanese Manchurian territory for 300 meters. On the whole section the exchange of artillery fire continues."16 Since Japanese units at the front were still on a peacetime footing, there were weaknesses in support structure. The 19th Division complained of an acute shortage of engineers, who were needed from the standpoint of ter­ rain as well as combat requirements. On the morning of 10 August, Seoul was asked for emergency dispatch of two or three engineer companies, preferably from the Kwantung Army because of the urgency. The Korea Army chief of staff contacted Tokyo immediately about “informal nego­ tiations" with Hsinking. In the evening, Kitano addressed another message to the command in which he asked for troop reinforcements and added that enhanced combat effectiveness was expected as the result of advancing the artillery sites. “But there are no engineers to construct roads. Kindly consider urgent assignment of two or three companies." The AGS lost little time in approving the recommendation. On the next day, Seoul was advised of the unofficial decision to assign the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade Engineer Unit from the Kwantung Army. Although the action came too late to be of combat application, there was no holdup in issuing the appropriate IGHQ order.17 Another concern dealt with railway support. On 10 August the Korea Army heard from the division that all South Manchurian Railway (SMR) employees in the area of the North Korean line had fled ("taken refuge") because of Soviet bombardments and aerial bombings. One military rail­ way company was needed to operate the trains, especially between Agochi

284

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

and Hongui. A Korea Army officer conferred promptly with the military consultant to the Korean railways bureau. They agreed that it would be better to "straighten out" the SMR internally before dispatching any mili­ tary unit.18 Despite the IGHQ order of 2 August that Nakamura conduct "combat emergency preparations" for the Najin fortress and for antiaircraft cover of the forward zone in accord with the wartime defense plan of 1938, the division grew anxious to obtain antiaircraft reinforcements. The requests were processed through Seoul. At 7 A.M. on 10 August, the Emperor, then at Hayama, sanctioned a mobilization order (do in rei) for a dozen antiair­ craft gun units. It is significant that, because of the scale of the Soviet aerial activities, the AGS decided to pull antiaircraft units from the North China Area Army and even from the (Inner) Mongolia Garrison Army, as well as from the Kwantung Army. (On 13 August the Kwantung Army also sent a ten-car hospital train to Agochi.)19 In practice, the various reinforcements were not put under the 19th Division but were retained under direct control of the Korea Army. Sue­ taka was to limit his sphere of command to air defense, billeting, supply, and railway transportation within the divisional zone.20 Reinforcements of engineers, antiaircraft gunners, and medical person­ nel were invaluable, but, of course, most of the fighting was done by in­ fantrymen. Of these there were far too few; as Nakamura admitted, by 9 August the division was "quite exhausted." In the old right sector alone, between 1 and 11 August, 268 officers and men were killed, 417 wounded. The rosters of the 75th Regiment had been reduced 48 percent since 30 July. The 1st Battalion was reduced to 170 men, from 401; the 3rd Bat­ talion to 196, from 392; the 2nd Battalion to 214, from 398. By rank, the regiment lost 50 percent of its majors, 100 percent of its captains, 78 percent of its 1st lieutenants, 43 percent of its 2nd lieutenants, 57 percent of its warrant officers, and 67 percent of its master sergeants. Particularly significant are the losses among battalion commanders (67 percent), company commanders (92 percent), and platoon leaders (64 percent). A 2nd lieutenant was commanding a battalion, a corporal was in charge of a company, and another corporal commanded a battalion gun battery. Platoons were ravaged. Of a total of 31 in the 75th Regiment, 14 had no commander; one was commanded by a private. The losses of attached units ranged from 16 to 18 percent in battalions of the 73rd and 76th regiments to 26 percent in the engineers and 78 percent in the mountain artillery platoon.21

285

ATTRITION'S TOLL

The Soviet Army estimated Japanese casualties at 600 killed and 2,500 wounded.22 Classified Japanese records provide a final toll of 526 killed and 913 wounded, or 21 percent of all forces listed officially as engaged.23 War ministry data released publicly showed only 158 killed and 740 wounded. This adjustment of the real killed-to-wounded ratio from 1:1.5 to only 1:5, apart from lowering the totals by 37 percent, undoubtedly derived from an effort to avoid suggesting enemy superiority in mechanized strength or the vulnerability of exposed, fixed positions to Soviet attack.24 The secret AGS data reveal the incidence of Japanese personnel losses by casualty-producing agent: shellfire, 37 percent; gunshot, 36 percent; hand grenades, 23 percent; aerial bombing, 3 percent; bayonets, less than 0.5 percent; miscellaneous, less than 2 percent. Japanese infan­ trymen incurred 24.7 percent casualties; engineers, 14.7 percent; medi­ cal personnel, 12.6 percent; artillery, 7.7 percent.25 The Soviet high command admitted casualties of 236 killed and 611 wounded.26 The best Japanese secret estimate was prepared by the Gaimusho: 1,200 Russians killed, 2,100 wounded seriously, and 2,200 wounded slightly, for a total of 5,500. The 75th Regiment placed enemy casualties in its sector at 5,020.27 On 16 August Korea Army Headquarters released a public estimate of 4,500 Soviet casualties.28 Suetaka used a figure of 3,000 in a conversation with an American reporter on 12 August, but after the incident he raised his public estimate to 4,500 and then to more than 8,000, on the basis of "further intelligence." Japanese sources make much of an alleged report to Moscow by Commissar Podlas which purported to admit 3,300 Soviet casualties by 8 August.29

NOTES 1.75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 10 August 1938. 2. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 200. 3. Ibid., p. 177. 4. Ibid., pp. 226-227, 237. 5. Ibid., p. 184. 6. Ibid., pp. 184-185; Tominaga interview. 7. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 200-204; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 10 August 1938. 8. Sato interview; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 10 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 204, 218-219. 9. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 10 August 1938. 10. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 204, 233.

286

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

11. An enemy shell had put a mountain gun out of action the day before, where­ upon Suko devised the dummies. Jinchu bidan, p. 124. 12. Sen Sho Saku Mei Dai O-go [(Suetaka Unit)Combat Victory Operations Order No. 0], 2 P.M., 10 August 1938, AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 192-193. The feat of Kusunoki in defending the mountaintop fortress of Chihaya during the civil war of 1333 A.D. "is one of the best-loved stories in Japanese history." Edwin 0. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 553. Kusunoki, remarkably loyal to the hard-pressed Emperor Go-Daigo, clung to Chihaya castle on Mount Kongo near Nara with a handful of retainers against the human waves belonging to the Hojo (Kamakura) Regency. The successful last-ditch stand at Chihaya contributed in no small way to the salvation of the imperial cause. 13. See ch. 24, pp. 289-290. Four more antiaircraft guns also arrived on the night of 10 August. 14. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 10 August 1938; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 193-194; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:31, 115. 15. New York Times, 11 August 1938, p. 6. 16. Ibid., pp. 1,6. For Japanese coverage, see Tokyo Asahi, 11 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; "Chokoho jiken no keika," Shokodan ho, No. 217 (November 1938), p. 21. 17. CS, Chokoho, pp. 70-71,80-81. 18. Ibid., pp. 71-72. 19. Ibid., pp. 72-75; Sawamoto, "Nikki," 10 August 1938; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:141-142. 20. CS, Chokoho, pp. 74-75. 21.75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, casualty charts; AGS, Chokoho soan, chart 4-1; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:120-122, 124-1 26. 22. Tass communique, 15 August 1938, in FRUS 1938, 3:482. 23. AGS, Chokoho soan, chart 4-1. A classified foreign office report uses the figure of 1,350 Japanese casualties—450 killed, 900 wounded. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 60-61. Harada heard from Konoe's secretary on 11 August that 1,200 Japanese fell. Saionji ko, 7:75. 24. War ministry announcement, 15 August 1938, in Tokyo Asahi, 16 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. A casualty ratio of 1:3 was considered acceptable. I am indebted to Iwasaki for the suggested explanations. 25. AGS, Chokoho soan, chart 4-2; JRD/JSM 11,3/A:123, 127. 26. See footnote 22. 27. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 60-61; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shoho, appendix (data for 30-31 July, 2-3, 6-11 August 1938). 28. Tokyo Asahi, 17 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. AGS records employ the same estimate. Chokoho soan, p. 248. Also see "Chokoho jiken no keika," p. 22; B. Nakamura, Man-So, p. 263; Jinchu bidan, p. 368; Akaishizawa, Chokoho, p. 215. 29. Sato estimates enemy casualties at 7,000. Suetaka's figures for 1938 are found in New York Times, 14 August 1938, p. 24; FRUS 1938, 3:482 (Peiping). He raised his estimates in Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 327, 328. For Podlas's report, see Jinchu bidan, p. 358; also ch. 26, p. 310.

Escalation or Break-off?

24

Every combat unit of the 19th Division was committed by 9 August. Nevertheless, the mauled and the fresh battalions amounted to a com­ bined maximum strength of only 12 infantry battalions and 37 artillery pieces (mainly 75-mm. mountain guns) without armor or aircraft. These forces had to cope with 27 enemy infantry battalions and 100 artillery pieces, including many long-range guns, as well as sizable tank and aerial units.1 It is Matsumura's educated guess that the Russians eventually com­ mitted a total of almost 15,000 infantrymen. Immediately after the cease­ fire, an American correspondent reported that Japanese data, "verified" through prisoners, indicated that the Russians had put in 20,000 infantry.2 Japanese forces, according to AGS records, were outnumbered 3:1. Man­ power documents indicate that from 7,000 to 7,300 men of the 19th Division were engaged on the Changkufeng front. In addition, there were 1,000 artillerymen and 2,000 soldiers obtained from special mobilization and the Kwantung Army, although these reinforcements arrived late and went under Korea Army command. Thus, Suetaka never had as many as 10,000 men to employ during the actual fighting.3 Casualties had been worse than expected; a sergeant in the 75th Infan­ try feels that, by 7 or 8 August, his depleted company constituted the last of the battalion, "nay, of the regiment." On the basis of the half­ strength alert set-up, says the division mobilization officer, the equivalent of a battalion was being lost each day in August; even though the division was made up of men well-known for tenacity, "we were falling into a critical extremity." To Inada, the front-line units seemed "on the verge of impotence." Nakamura told the war ministry and the AGS on 9 August

288

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

that seven company and two battalion commanders had been killed, and that "the situation of 1st and 2nd lieutenants, etc., approximates annihi­ lation."4 Every echelon—regiment, division, and army—voiced the need for troop replacements and reinforcements. The war ministry's release of 500 infan­ trymen from the 20th Depot Division in Seoul on 8 August was too little and too late, for the troops did not arrive until the 12th. On 9 August Nakamura asked the high command for "swift partial mobilization of some 2,000 reservists, including officers, in Korea." The Korea Army advised Tokyo on the afternoon of the 10th that the four line infantry regiments were down to 3,400 men. The 75th Regiment had been almost destroyed; only two or three officers were alive, and one company had only ten riflemen left. Considerable strength had been pulled out of the lines to haul weapons, ammunition, and rations. "When one contemplates a future war of attrition, it becomes imperative to reinforce the division, and quickly."5 By evening of 10 August, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the division chief of staff sent Seoul a very long and painful message which included the following points. Since 7 August the combat situation had grown "suddenly acute." Japanese casualties were being caused by the enemy's absolute aerial supremacy, powerful artillery bombardment, and grenade usage; Russian expenditure of ammunition was "lavish." Al­ though hostile assaults were being repulsed, the enemy was reinforced in­ cessantly, while some Japanese companies were down to 20 or 30 men and there was "considerable confusion." Many heavy weapons had been wrecked and ammunition was in short supply; although the central author­ ities and the Kwantung Army were assisting, the battle zone was remote and rather wide, roads were insufficient, logistical facilities were lacking, and the enemy interfered. While the artillery reinforcements were welcome, there were too few guns to neutralize the Russians. Front-line troops were resolved to "conduct exclusive defense to the last man in accord with orders," but the division's limited combat strength was being exhausted. The message concluded pessimistically and realistically:

There is danger of radical change in combat situation in few days if matters go on. ... It is estimated that this division has only one or two days left in which it can retain definite freedom of action—initiative to advance or retreat. Even if overall situation should develop to our advantage in next

ESCALATION OR BREAK-OFF?

289

three or four days, we ought to be patient from broader standpoint, and be satisfied with our achievement—that Japanese Army has manifested its strength against enemy till now. While we do retain freedom of action, it would be appropriate to solve incident now through speedy diplomatic negotiations. Such measures are entirely up to Korea Army and high command but, so far as division is concerned, there is no other way except of course to make desperate efforts to maintain occupation line for sake of mission. Please take these matters into sympathetic consideration and conduct appropriate measures urgently.6

It is unusual for an infantry division to proffer opinions about diplomacy, but such were the straits in which the 19th Division found itself by 10 August. Nevertheless, while the Korea Army "sympathized deeply with the tremendous sufferings and difficulties," no special actions were taken at this time because the only way was to "stick things out through des­ perate effort." Priority attention must be given to troop morale, positions, counterattacks, replenishing the front, and safeguarding transportation forward. "Measures to solve the incident should be left to the central authorities; the army and the division will concentrate their efforts with­ in the limits of what they themselves can do."7 On 10 August the high command took steps to provide replacements: 1,000 men from the 20th Depot Division, 1,500 from three divisions in Japan, and emergency dispatch of three company commanders and 30 platoon leaders. But the most important message was transmitted by the AGS at 9:50 P.M. on the 10th: in accordance with Imperial orders, the war minister was directing full mobilization of the 19th Division, effective 12 August. Inada says that the Emperor realized that, "once use of force was sanctioned, it would be inevitable for units on the spot to be consumed in combat, since they were on a peacetime footing." Thus, after Imperial sanction was granted on 10 August to mobilize 12 antiaircraft units, ar­ rangements were made for the war minister to be received in audience at Hayama after 4 P.M., and for the chief of staff and his deputy after 4:30. "The content of the report," Sawamoto noted, "dealt with mobilization of the 19th Division . . . but since it did not fundamentally alter the policy of nonenlargement of the incident, it was soon granted Imperial sanction." After Itagaki withdrew, Kan'in and Tada were ushered in. The AGS deputy reported on the situation first and then made his formal address to the

290

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Throne concerning such matters as reinforcement by a "portion” and movement of the IGHQ-controlled 104th Division to the border area in Manchuria. "Approval was granted; based upon which, several Imperial sanctions were received. Phase-2 mobilization (dkyu doin) of the 19th Division was authorized at about 8:30 P.M."8 According to Sugai, chief of the AGS mobilization subsection, at the outset of the Changkufeng affair the 19th Division had not anticipated that matters would "assume such dimensions" or that it would be neces­ sary to solicit Phase-2 mobilization. The latter "entailed quick call-up of reservists and horses located within [at least] a three-day trip from the barracks in Korea, and concentration to meet urgent requirements." The decision was reached so late and so easily that it affected only experts and not the ordinary officer. No one saw troop replacements at the front before the cease-fire; new officers were not received, either. Not until around 20 September were line units rebuilt gradually after pulling back to their stations.9 Imaoka sums up the mobilization question succinctly: It was put off constantly after not being approved by the Emperor at the beginning of the incident in July. Thus, our forces were expected to endure casualties until a cease-fire was reached. Mobilization must have been requested of the Throne because it was not clear when an armistice would be consummated and because the fighting strength of the divi­ sion was diminishing gradually. Since the cease-fire was nego­ tiated, fortunately, during the course of mobilization, it did not actually affect the outcome of the incident.10 Ever since the Russians had begun their major counteroffensives, the Japanese high command had been growing apprehensive. By 4-5 August it was concluded, with typical circumlocution, that "conditions at the battlefront have developed to a point which does not warrant optimism." In command circles a significant new outlook was developing:

We have saved our honor by driving off the enemy one time. Therefore, it is not necessary to cling to Changkufeng and : become involved in difficult, protracted defensive fighting,, especially with the decisive Hankow campaign in process. If a cease-fire is accomplished in timely fashion—good. But even

ESCALATION OR BREAK-OFF?

291

if it is not worked out, would it not be proper for the army voluntarily to pull back from the scene when some suitable opportunity is found?11

All the while, battle telegrams kept arriving from the division chief of staff. After the latest fighting, a clamor arose, in the army affairs section of the war ministry in particular, that "now was not the time to talk about the relatively insignificant 'honor' of the division, which had per­ sisted in dragging out the fighting from useless pride. It would be more advisable to pull back and not run the risk of causing a Soviet-Japanese war." Inada says: Tada and Tojo were concerned and asked me to cut off the affair opportunely by pulling back the front. I said that the time was not ripe—that we ought not to allow the division to feel that it had been defeated; after all, there were still four unused battalions, "so don't worry." Yet I must con­ fess that I was personally worried, which was why I took measures to redeploy IGHQ reserves. Suetaka was also con­ cerned privately but, having started things, he could hardly betray the fact that he was now in trouble.12

Preparations were made to issue the appropriate IGHQ order and di­ rective, whose intent would be that the time for withdrawal should be viewed in terms of the battle situation on the spot and the progress of diplomatic negotiations. The text of the Imperial order stated that, at an appropriate opportunity, the Korea Army commander was to assemble, on the right side of the Tumen, those forces which had been occupying the Changkufeng-Shachaofeng district and was to return them gradually to their original stations. According to the proposed directive, this sector of the frontier was to be guarded tightly, but, in gathering forces on' the right shore, aggravation of the dispute was to be avoided. The AGS Opera­ tions Bureau chief, Hashimoto, would oversee implementation of the directive. On 5 August, when the order was drafted, the central authorities were hoping that an agreement had been reached in Moscow. If so, everybody was eager to separate the opposing forces immediately. The rub lay in the possibility that an accord had not been achieved. Should the current lines

292

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

then be secured to the last, and the claimed boundaries retained by force? Or should it be reaffirmed that the territory belonged to Manchukuo but that the Japanese would pull out at an appropriate time and try not to expand the incident? It was decided to leave the matters of delivery and execution of the Imperial order to Hashimoto. The latter was of the opinion that "it would be proper to seek some momentary period . . . when a cer­ tain 'brightness' in the diplomatic parleys—no matter how slight—could be discerned." He had been going to leave for Korea as soon as entrusted with the directive from the AGS chief, but, as long as he judged that there might be a diplomatic settlement, he continued to delay his departure.13 It has been suggested convincingly that the postponement can be traced to the AGS operations staff. "Tough" younger officers in Inada's section insisted that Changkufeng must never be abandoned, even if most of the 19th Division had to be sacrificed. "A withdrawal effected without com­ pelling honorable justification would wreck the proud traditions of the army." Another consideration was the impression that withdrawal would make on the Soviet Army and the influence which this might have on Russo-Japanese relations. "These views became entangled with the course of the Shigemitsu-Litvinov conferences of 4 and 7 August, and no con­ clusion was reached." As a result, the Imperial order was not issued offi­ cially until 11 August, immediately after the cease-fire had been con­ cluded—which was the precise sequence some AGS officers had been recommending all along. Inada kept hoping the Russians would meet the Japanese halfway. If they did not, he was still going to try to pull out the 19th Division at an "opportune" time. But, if worse came to worst and the division was destroyed, IGHQ would take responsibility and end the affair.14 The high command, adopting minimal steps to help the sore-pressed division within policy limits, was gratified to learn that the activity of Soviet guns had been curbed a bit when the new long-range artillery finally went into action. In Tokyo, it was hoped that although the numbers of Japanese units in the line remained scant in terms of mission, the Korea Army's transfusion of the last infantry battalions might enable the divi­ sion to hold on a little longer. Consciously keeping off the escalator, IGHQ did initiate one further measure designed to anticipate an emer­ gency. The 104th Infantry Division, under direct IGHQ control, had been kept at Dairen in southern Manchuria and earmarked for use in the Canton operation. Inada took action to have this division diverted

ESCALATION OR BREAK-OFF?

293

to Chientao in southern Manchuria, adjacent to North Korea, to help cope with the Changkufeng emergency by supporting the 19th Division indirectly. The decision to redeploy was made on 9 August. The divi­ sion was to remain under IGHQ control as part of the general reserve. No operational mission would be issued yet; it was merely a matter of transferring the holding area to the frontier region. Movement east of the Hunchun River was prohibited.15 In the area of the Kwantung Army, the Soviet-Manchurian borders remained generally quiet and Russian forward movements were deemed negligible. Kwantung Army Headquarters watched developments closely, tightening frontier security and intensifying reconnaissance. Loose ties were maintained with the Korea Army, but the staff in Hsinking was con­ vinced that the only way to end the incident or lift the desperate pressure at Changkufeng was to menace the flank of the Soviet maritime province from the decisive eastern Manchurian front. Entering into consideration was the danger signal visible from a small but violent fire-fight near Suifenho on the 7th, when the 8th Division launched a dawn attack and drove out a dozen Soviet intruders who had been constructing field positions since the 5th. On 9 August the Kwantung Army commander decided to order Phase-1 alert of his units in the east, especially near the Tungning-Suifenho border. The 12th Division was to be reinforced by two of the Kwantung Army's five other divisions.16 In northern Manchuria, one infantry regiment was moved closer to the Amur border. Bomber aircraft units were also alerted. IGHQ immediately approved the Kwantung Army's concentrations. On 10 August Suetaka was delighted to learn the details from the Kwantung Army, whose two redeployed divisions were expected to be available from the 13th.17 While the Russians appeared to have no intention of engaging in all out war, they were not hurrying to settle the crisis by diplomacy and, at the front, were launching "reckless" counterattacks at an inconvenient location, probably with the intention of occupying positions which would be use­ ful for bargaining. The local Soviet military, having lost the hills at the outset, also must have been anxious about their prestige. The Kwantung Army's potential threat to the flank undoubtedly made the Russians nervous. Although the leading echelon of the 104th Division did not reach Hunchun until evening of 13 August, Japanese intelligence heard that the Red Army headquarters staff at Khabarovsk had detected the movements of Kwantung Army elements about 10 August and had been obliged to take counter­

294

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

measures: they reinforced positions along the eastern and northern Man­ churian frontiers, concentrated the air force, ordered move-up preparations by ground forces in the Blagoveshchensk district, and commandeered most of the motor vehicles in the Amur province. By shifting its main strength to the eastern front, the Kwantung Army was exerting, as intended, a silent pressure. The covert objective was to restrain and divert the Russians and to assist Japanese diplomacy, not to provoke war. Nevertheless, an American correspondent who visited the Changkufeng area in fnid-August reported privately that the "Kwantung Army was now massing large numbers of troops near the border and expected further trouble." Even Inada, who admits that the attitude of the authorities in Hsinking in 1938 was "very reasonable—in accord with common sense," has said that "although the Kwantung Army was claiming that it had moved its forces eastward only for reasons of security, it was actually looking for trouble."18 Antagonisms between Tokyo and Hsinking were scarcely cloaked. In 1937 the high command had frustrated the Kwantung Army's aggressive plans during the gunboat incident on the Amur; "face" had been lost with the Chinese and Koreans in Manchukuo as a result of the alleged bungling by the AGS. Then, in June 1938, the defector Lyushkov had been whisked to Tokyo without the Kwantung Army's assent. The vexed chief of staff in Hsinking supposedly retaliated in petty fashion to disconcert higher headquarters. According to one improbable account, Ishiwara went so far as to refuse to "budge" in support of the Korea Army after the Changku­ feng Incident erupted. "The people in Seoul claim jurisdiction over Hunchun prefecture," Ishiwara is said to have snorted, "so the incident is theirs. Any­ how, no large-scale hostilities are possible in such a cramped district.''19 Now, during the summer battles of 1938, the red flag was flying atop Changkufeng despite the 19th Division's bloody losses. The criticism of IGHQ's guidance, it has been credibly suggested, caused the Kwantung Army's dangerous evasion of central direction at the time of the Nomonhan crisis in 1939.20 Toward its weak neighbor in Korea the Kwantung Army rendered every support. Apart from its major demonstration in eastern Manchuria, the Kwantung Army promptly sent whatever reinforcements of artillery, engi­ neers, and other units that Seoul desired. Being also intimately involved in anti-Soviet military preparations, the Kwantung Army understandably wanted the latest and most authentic information on Russian Army theory and practice. The Changkufeng Incident furnished such a first-hand op­

ESCALATION OR BREAK-OFF?

295

portunity, and the professional observers sent from Hsinking were well received at the front. Military classmate ties contributed to the working relationships between the armies. As one division officer puts it, the teams from the Kwantung Army came as "friends,” not only to study the battle­ field by their respective branches of service but also to assist the front-line forces; "the Kwantung Army was increasingly helpful to us in settling the incident."21 Ugaki felt that the pressure of troop movements in Manchuria played a major part in the Russians' eventual decision to conclude a cease-fire.22 From Inada's viewpoint, it had been a "fine and useful demonstration against the USSR." Pinned at Changkufeng, the Russians did not or could not choose to react elsewhere, too. AGS officers believe that clear and consistent operational guidance furnished by Tokyo produced good re­ sults, although the fighting was very hard for the front-line Japanese troops because of the insistence on exclusive defense, the curbs on interference by the Kwantung Army, and the prohibition on the use of aircraft. It had been close, however. Only by conscious efforts at restraint had the small war at Changkufeng been kept from spilling over into neighboring areas.23

NOTES 1. AGS, Chokoho soan, chart 2-2; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:31, 117. 2. Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 165; W. R. Wills (CBS), 14 August 1938 (Seoul), in Jinchu bidan, p. 357. Tanaka thinks that Soviet forces totaled 30,000 men. IMTFE, Transcript, 22 May 1947, p. 22758. 3. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 248, chart 4-1; JRD/JSM TT,3/A:23. Supplementary data from Sugai, Inada, and Kitano interviews; K. Nakamura, Affidavit No. 2, paragraph 28 (Blakeney Collection); IMTFE, Transcript, 21 May 1947, p. 22718; ibid., 22 May 1947, p. 22747; Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 165. 4. Horiguchi (5th Company), Saito, Miyajima, Murakoshi (3rd Company), Ichimoto, and Inada interviews; CS, Chokoho, pp. 79-80. 5. CS, Chokoho, pp. 79-81. 6. Gogai ("Extra") received 10:04 P.M., 10 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 81-83. 7. CS, Chokoho, p. 83. 8. CS, Chokoho, pp. 81,83-84; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 194-195; Inada interview; Sawamoto, "Nikki," 10 August 1938. 9. Sugai interview; Sugai deposition, IMTFE, Defense Document No. 1319 (Blakeney Collection); CS, Chokoho, pp. 84-85; Inada, Iwakuro, S. Hata, Miyajima, Saito, Murakoshi, and Ichimoto interviews; JRD/JSM 11,3/A:144. 10. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," p. 18.

296

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

11. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. 12. Ibid.; Inada interview. Arao says that Suetaka "never sent any telegram begging for help, and this reassured us considerably." 13. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives; Inada, Hashimoto, and I. Hata interviews. 14. I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:89; Inada and I. Hata interviews. 15. IGHQ Army Directive No. 230, by AGS Message No. 452, 9:20 P.M., 10 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 87-88. 16. The 1 2th Division sector was Tungning-Suifenho. The two other divisions designated to reinforce the 12th were the 7th Division (from Tsitsihar) and the 2nd Division (from Harbin), redeployed just to the rear. 17. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 5-9 August 1938; ibid., pp. 194, 238-239; Tsuji, Nomonhan, p. 39; Iwasaki, Inada, Arao, N. Morita, Giga, and Sumi interviews; Tokyo Asahi, 8 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 18. Inada interview; Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives; CS, Chokoho, pp. 87-88; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 240; FRUS 1938, 3:483, citing AP correspondent (J. D. White), Peiping, 17 August 1938; New York Times, 15 August 1938, pp. 1, 6 (J. D. White, AP, Hsinking); Dispatch No. 270, American Consulate General, Mukden, 19 August 1938, NA 761.93 Manchuria/217. Also Sumi and Imaoka interviews. 19. When pressed about his lack of interest, Ishiwara allegedly revealed a reason: hostility toward "that mental defective, Tojo." Mori, Senpu nijunen, p. 75. 20. Tsuji, Nomonhan, pp. 36, 39-40; Inada and Hashimoto interviews. 21. Sasai, Noguchi, and Inada interviews; AGS, Chokoho s5an, p. 255. 22. Ugaki, Ugaki nikki, p. 320 (13 August 1938). 23. Hoshino, Mihatenu yume, p. 279; Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," pp. 16-17; Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 165; Inada, Arao, Kotani, Hashimoto, and Imaoka interviews. The controlled pressure also exerted on the Russians after 31 July by the Korea Army's own Hunchun garrison under General Yokoyama is described in AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 75, 239.

The Role of Diplomacy

The first pourparlers were attempted by the Manchukuoan-Japanese side through Russian consular authorities at Harbin on 14 July. The act­ ing consul general made no reply to Hsinking's protest; on the 19th he departed "on home leave as scheduled.” On 2 August the Manchukuo government protested again, but as late as the 8th authorities in Hsinking were still complaining that there had been no reply. The Russians were not so much rejecting the protests of Manchukuo, which they recognized de facto, as ignoring them.1 The focus of diplomatic attention shifted to Moscow.2 On 14 July Foreign Minister Ugaki wired instructions to the embassy to "demand urgent withdrawal of Soviet troops illegally occupying Manchukuoan territory” at Changkufeng. In the absence of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, Counselor Nishi Haruhiko went to see Boris Stomonyakov, dep­ uty commissar for foreign affairs, twice on 15 July. On his desk, the sec­ ond time, Stomonyakov had an album with photographs of maps showing boundaries according to the Hunchun agreement, the original of which Stomonyakov said was in the Russians' possession. The frontier was marked as the western line running along the crestline. Nishi detected something odd about the map. It was black-and-white photocopy, but the boundary was drawn in vermilion.3 The Gaimusho message had indicated that the Japanese government was claiming the frontier line of the old Russian AGS maps of 1911, east of Lake Khasan. After quickly checking, Nishi said he "firmly believed in the validity of our interpretation." The in­ terview broke up inconclusively, with the understanding that matters would be explored further; Shigemitsu was coming back soon, anyhow.

298

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

The Gaimusho told the press that since the USSR had "rejected” the Japanese government's protest, Tokyo would lodge a stronger demand. On 17 July the ministry wired another set of instructions to Nishi. He was to explain the basis for the Japanese contention concerning the boundary and request that Soviet forces in the disputed area be withdrawn to the line existing before 11 July. Ugaki also telegraphed Shigemitsu to cut short a trip and return to Moscow. When Shigemitsu flew in from Stock­ holm on 18 July, "the situation appeared to be pressing. I [Shigemitsu] was concerned, from the outset, lest awkward complications materialize, because the Soviet BGU buildup rendered negotiations far from easy." The instructions stated that unless the Russian "intruders" got out promptly, "any kind of development could be expected."4 In Tokyo on 19 July, Ugaki conferred at length with Itagaki about the situation at Changkufeng. The ministers decided to promote negotiations by dealing at the highest diplomatic level. On this basis, Ugaki wired new instructions to Shigemitsu. Demarcation of borders would be deferred temporarily, as would the question of indemnity for the killing of Corporal Matsushima. Prerequisite for discussions must be complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.5 Shigemitsu arranged to see Foreign Commissar Litvinov at 2 P.M. on 20 July and lodged a vigorous second protest. While the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities were continuing to exercise restraint, the ambassador was obliged to "state clearly that we have the right, and are ready—if cir­ cumstances so dictate—to take urgent and unavoidable measures at any time.” Litvinov countered with "completely indisputable" cartographic evidence, dating back to the authentic Hunchun agreement, which should "close" the case. A sharp exchange ensued, with Shigemitsu allegedly denigrating the Soviet unpublished maps. According to the Russians, his remarks were astonishing in their "disdain for official maps" and contained "a threat and intimidation, to which certain governments may actually yield"; but if Shigemitsu considered them to be a "good diplomatic medium, he must know that he will not find a successful employment of such means in Moscow." Litinov rejected the complaint about the "murder" of Ma­ tsushima, responded with a counterprotest, and complained about a recent disturbance which had occurred near the Soviet embassy in Tokyo. Shi­ gemitsu later wrote, "Eventually that day's negotiations. .. broke up with both sides adhering to their original stands." From Litvinov's vigorous

THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

299

statements, Shigemitsu derived the feeling that “the Soviet attitude was far more strong than at the time of the [Amur] incident in 1937." On 21 July Walter Duranty, the New York Times correspondent in Moscow, filed a forceful cable under the heading: "Japanese Threat to Oust 'Invaders' Defied by Soviet—Tokyo 'Won't Get Anywhere With That Stuff in Moscow,' Litvinov Warns Envoy."6 On the 27th Ugaki instructed Shigemitsu that the government was going to maintain "attentive silence" for a while.7 In the meantime, on 25 July, Litvinov told Alexander Kirk, the American charge, that although the Rus­ sians were in the right at Changkufeng, neither side wanted war.8 Litvinov indicated a willingness to examine any cartographic proofs that the Japanese might care to submit, and "he supposed that the Japanese government was now working on further representations. . . which would encourage some adjustment of the controversy." Domei agreed that Charge Constantin Smetanin's remarks at the Gaimusho on 23 July indicated that the USSR "did not desire to become involved in hostilities."9 The fire-fight at Shachaofeng oh 29 July and the Japanese night attack at Changkufeng on 31 July generated a flurry of diplomatic protests and counterprotests. Smetanin's remarks of 2 August struck the Japanese as "actually very routine and moderate. As a consequence the Japanese military authorities are hoping to settle matters quickly through diplo­ matic negotiations. The understanding would be that the army and the general staff agree to withdraw forces from Changkufeng if necessary."10 Shigemitsu, however, was apparently unenthusiastic about visiting Litvinov again; it was Secretary Miyakawa Funao who visited the foreign commis­ sariat on 2 August and tendered a new protest against the "outrageous activities" of Russian aircraft operating against noncombatant zones inside Korea.11 Escalation of combat in early August caused the Japanese government to try to break the diplomatic impasse while localizing the conflict. On 2 August Premier Konoe assured the Emperor that he intended to leave mat­ ters for diplomacy and to suspend military operations as soon as possible, an approach in which the command concurred. The Changkufeng dispute would be accorded priority, preceding overall settlements and the creation of joint commissions to redefine the borders. On the 3rd, after coordinating with the military, the Gaimusho advised Shigemitsu that the front-line situation had become "extremely critical" and a quick suspension of fighting

300

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

action should be proposed. Soviet and Japanese troops should be pulled back to the setup as of 30 July. Smetanin was received at the Gaimusho for two hours on 4 August. Akamatsu notes correctly that the initial ob­ jective of the Japanese side had been achieved by occupation of Chang­ kufeng crest, and Vice Minister Horinouchi Kensuke was therefore able to suggest a cease-fire. Smetanin reportedly replied along encouraging lines: "If Japanese forces will suspend offensive operations, fighting between the two parties will cease spontaneously"; it would make it easier for the USSR to accept the proposal if Japanese-Manchukuoan forces withdrew from Soviet territory. Horinouchi retorted that Smetanin ought to concentrate on transmitting the cease-fire proposal and eliciting a prompt reply.12 Apparently, Litvinov was not receiving Shigemitsu now. The ambassador reported to Tokyo, however, that the Soviet government was displaying "a very passive outlook. The attitude of the foreign commissariat shows that they are treating the incident as trifling. Public opinion in the USSR is extremely calm. I hope matters will be handled coolly in Japan." Shi­ gemitsu felt that the Japanese authorities would have to decide whether the Changkufeng affair entailed large-scale operations or could be handled as one of the series of frontier difficulties.13 In Tokyo on 4 August, the American ambassador, Joseph Grew, sensed "moderate optimism" at the Gaimusho but there was apprehension that, "as it is now the Soviets' turn to move, the decision for war or peace rests with Moscow." The Japanese populace evinced no desire for war and seemed to be calm.14 Finally, for 214 hours on 4 August, Shigemitsu got to see Litvinov again. To avert a major collision, Shigemitsu argued, the best procedure would be to suspend military operations on both sides and to restore the status quo ante; specific discussions ought to begin immediately. Since the frontier was so tense, the Japanese wanted a "practical" settlement separate from map and treaty discussions of juridical aspects. "Concrete" pourparlers could follow stilling of the guns. Litvinov terminated the meeting by re­ questing that Shigemitsu "avoid misunderstandings by accurately trans­ mitting his report on the conversation." The status quo ante which the commissar had in mind was the situation prior to 29 July, not the 11th, since the former was the date when Japanese soldiers had crossed the fron­ tier. When Shigemitsu "expressed a wish for the speedy regulation of the incident, I [Litvinov] said that would be fine, but so long as the Japanese did not withdraw their troops beyond the line marked on the map, we should reserve our freedom of action."15 That Shigemitsu and Litvinov. •

THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

301

had held an extended discussion heartened many diplomatic observers. Although their respective positions seemed as far apart as ever, the Japanese apparently were weakening while the Russians were stiffening. But the Gaimusho was optimistic and the Japanese press chose to conclude that Shigemitsu's persistence had produced results: Litvinov had not been so "arrogant” as usual, and the Soviet side had evinced "a certain degree of sincerity.” Japanese forces must still be occupying part of the border district or Litvinov would not have demanded troop withdrawals.16 In the midst of the Changkufeng Incident, the USSR intensified harass­ ing tactics against the last Japanese consulates located within the Soviet Union.17 Forty-eight hour ultimata to quit the country were delivered to the consuls at Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk on 3 and 4 August, re­ spectively. Although the Japanese government warned that it might retal­ iate, the Russians were unyielding. In Moscow, Litvinov again told Kirk on 5 August, "the Soviet government 'knew' that Japan did not desire a war with the Soviet Union,” but he added that "controversies would con­ tinue as long as the Fascist nations existed, unless combined action could be taken against them;. . . the only manner of dealing with those nations was to meet force or threat of force with the same weapons." Japanese authorities prohibited public disclosure of the Soviet eviction of the con­ sular posts "out of concern lest the populace be irritated thereby, since the Changkufeng Incident was then raging.”18 Coordinating sessions continued in Tokyo at governmental and high command level with an eye cocked on Moscow where, it was hoped, some "brightness" might emerge from the negotiations. Apart from meetings with cabinet members, Konoe sought political support for the Changku­ feng and China policies, and "general mobilization of the national spirit." At the same time, the command was secretly studying alternatives, including the relationship between the Moscow parleys and the wisdom of a unilateral military pull-back. The fact that war ministry officials were known to have met for 47z hours on 4 August caused an American correspondent to deduce that the Changkufeng problem was diverting attention from the campaign in China.19 Baron Harada heard that the Emperor had expressed anxiety and regret about the crisis, that Konoe had informed Ugaki, and that the latter, "humiliated," may have been prodding his staff to hasten the dragged-out process in Moscow.20 After Shigemitsu's long-awaited telegram arrived on 5 August, describing his parley of the 4th, lights burned at the Gaimusho into the night. Although

302

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

the transcript of the Litvinov-Shigemitsu conversation was far from encour­ aging, the Japanese government surmised that "the Soviet side has a disposi­ tion to cease fighting, provided that conditions are satisfactory." The Gaimusho staff labored on new directives for Shigemitsu, all the more im­ portant because the Russians were stalling at the very time the Red Army was bending every effort to retake Changkufeng. Coordination between the war, navy, and foreign ministers produced cease-fire conditions which were rushed to the Japanese ambassador on 6 August. Two alternate lines were proposed, to which both armies would pull back. After the creation of a buffer zone, discussions could begin concerning delineation of bound­ aries in the region of the incident. The Hunchun pact could be the basis for deliberations, demarcation to be effected by joint investigations on the spot in consultation with documents in the possession of Manchukuo and the USSR; the Japanese would serve only as observers.21 Shigemitsu conferred once more with Litvinov for 31/a hours on 7 August, "but no progress was made," he wrote. "Litvinov insisted that a clash could be averted only if Japanese forces pulled out, and that Soviet troops would never cross the border which they claimed as their own." Classified Japanese records interpreted Litvinov's position as reflecting the USSR's desire not to enlarge the incident, despite forceful Soviet adherence to cartographic claims and the thwarting of Shigemitsu's feelers "from all angles." Litvinov's positive reaction to the idea of the demarcation commission was seen as a good sign.22 But, from the Tass communique, foreign observers drew much stronger conclusions. An American report cabled from Moscow was titled, "Russia Threatens Severest Tactics—Litvinoff Informs Shigemitsu That Japanese Army Must Respect Soviet Border—Pact Must Be AcceptedFrontier Laid Down by Hunchun Treaty Cited by Commissar—Virtual Ultimatum Seen." It was reported that since the Kwantung Army [sic] might prefer "wider hostilities," Litvinov's statement to Shigemitsu could be regarded as "little less than an ultimatum: 'Either you call off your dogs or we will let loose our planes.' " Danger of escalation was discernible in Litvinov's protest against the Grodekovo affray on the east Manchurian border; he used vigorous language to warn the Japanese that the Russians had passed the point of protests.

It appears essential to declare that the Soviet government does not intend in the future to permit the unpunished, periodic killing and wounding of its border guards, nor the even tern-

THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

303

porary occupation of Soviet territory by Japanese forces; and that it fully intends... in similar instances, to use the most severe measures—including the use of artillery and aviation. Let the Japanese government oblige the Kwantung and Korea armies to respect the existing frontier. It is time to put an end to the endless “incidents" and clashes on the frontier. Litvinov had insisted that the fighting around Changkufeng could hardly be termed a frontier clash, since Japanese troops had been supported by artillery since their first attack. "It would therefore appear," he argued, "that there has taken place an attempt, in time of peace, to seize Soviet territory, or even to involve Japan in a war with the Soviet Union." The danger of the affray stemmed from this fact, to which the Japanese gov­ ernment ought to devote serious attention. On the more helpful side, Lit­ vinov told Shigemitsu that, on the basis of information available in Mos­ cow, no Japanese troops were left on Soviet soil. If so, Russian forces could also cease fire on certain conditions, namely, that there be no ad­ ditional shooting from Manchuria and that the Japanese Army make no new efforts to invade territory which, as had been demonstrated to the Japanese side on many occasions, belonged to the USSR.23 In Moscow, on 8 August, Pravda published the first major editorial devoted solely to the border fighting under the title, "Japan's Militarism Is Drawing Her into a War with the Soviet Union." Its arguments differed from those that Litvinov had indicated privately to American charge Kirk a few days earlier. Indeed, the foreign press in Tokyo heard that informed circles "considered adjustment of the fisheries question more important than the border disputes." Even in the Soviet capital, foreign diplomats were convinced that the length of the Litvinov-Shigemitsu conversation, however inconclusive, indicated that "both sides were anxious to liquidate the conflict peacefully if a settlement proved to be possible without loss of prestige. The importance of prestige, however, could not be underes­ timated."24

NOTES 1. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 53; ibid., SP No. 235, pp. 8-9, 11; FRUS 1938, 3:456; Tokyo Asahi, 3 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; Katakura interview. 2. For treatment of the Japanese ambassador's diplomacy during the Changku­ feng affair, see my "Shigemitsu Mamoru: The Diplomacy of Crisis," in Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941, ed. Richard Dean

304

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Burnsand Edward M. Bennett (Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1974), pp. 250-273. 3. That was the color by artificial light; ten years later, when Nishi saw the same or similar photo map at the Tokyo trial, the markings were yellow. Shigemitsu also thought the post factum markings produced by the Russians at the trial con­ stituted a "weak" or "painful” part of the USSR's case. Shigemitsu, Sugamo nikki, pp. 54-55 (15 October 1946). 4. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 52-54; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 280; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, pp. 345-346; FRUS 1938, 3:455-456; New York Times, 18 July 1938, p. 4; Shigemitsu, Gaiko kaisoroku, pp. 215-216; Shigemitsu, Showa no doran, 1:202; Nishi interview. 5. Tokyo Asahi, 20 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 6. Litvinov diary, 20 July 1938, IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, pp. 7759-7763; ibid., 22 May 1947, pp. 22803-22818; Gaimusho, SP No. 233, pp. 110-112; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 280; New York Times, 22 July 1938, pp. 1, 7. Shigemitsu rebuts Litvinov's allegations in Gaiko kaisoroku, p. 21 7, and Showa no doran, 1:203. 7. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 54-55; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 281. Ambassador Grew learned the same information on 25 July. FRUS 1938, 3:457. 8. Intelligence on which Litvinov and other high Soviet officials based their judgments of Japanese inner workings undoubtedly derived largely from scoops by master spy Richard Sorge and his Japanese operatives. See GSS, 1:49, 64-65, 379-380; 2:85, 140, 164-165, 340; 3:190, 263-264. 9. FRUS 1938, 3:458; New York Times, 24 July 1938, p. 22. 10. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:59. Also see Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 56; ibid., SP No. 235, p. 10; FRUS 1938, 3:459, 462. 11. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:58; FRUS 1938, 3:464-465. 12. Sawamoto, "Nikki," 1 August 1938; Kido, Kido nikki, No. 99, p. 48; CS, Chokoho, p. 45; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 281-282; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 56; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, p. 347. 13. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:58-60; Shigemitsu, Showa no doran, 1:203; Gaiko kaisoroku, p. 218. 14. FRUS 1938, 3:465-466. 15. Litvinov diary, 4 August 1938, IMTFE, Transcript, 22 May 1947, pp. 2282522836; FRUS 1938, 3:467-469; Gaimusho, SP No. 233, pp. 112-115; ibid., SP No. 312, p. 57. 16. FRUS 1938, 3:466-467, 469; New York Times, 5-7 August 1938; Tokyo Asahi, 7 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. 17. See my "Soviet Ousting of Japanese Consulates, 1937-38," Orient/West 9 (September-October 1964): 48-58. 18. Gaimusho archives (1938), S 1 3.1.3.0-6, pp. 755, 820-823; FRUS 1938, 3:470. 19. New York Times, 5 August 1938, p. 8. Also Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives; Inada interview.

THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

305

20. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:62. 21. Ibid., 7:68-69; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 57-58; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 113. 22. Shigemitsu, Gaiko kaisoroku, p. 218; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 58-59; ibid., SP No. 233, pp. 115-117; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 283. Also see Tokyo Asahi, 8 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3. 23. Litvinov diary, 7 August 1938, IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, p. 7817; ibid., 23 May 1947, pp. 22851-22862; Tass communique, Pravda, 8 August 1938, IMTFE, Defense Document No. 1616 (Blakeney Collection); FRUS 1938, 3:473-474; New York Times, 8 August 1938, p. 4. 24. New York Times, 7 August 1938, p. 29; ibid., 8 August 1938, p. 4; FRUS 1938, 3:473-474.

Achievement of a Cease-fire

Reports continued to reach the high command in Tokyo, around 8 August, that there had been severe fighting in the Changkufeng-Shachaofeng area, Soviet pilots were aggressive, and Japanese casualties were con­ siderable. Officials were growing nervous about Shigemitsu's deliberate mode of operation. Admiral Yonai, the navy minister, according to Ugaki, felt that Shigemitsu "has a fear of the [Japanese] army or, if not, that he .. . does not grasp the fundamentals of his instructions." Stronger and more direct language was necessary in the instructions sent to the ambas­ sador.1 Shigemitsu was reportedly pessimistic regarding Litvinov's attitude toward a cease-fire and toward responsibility for offensive action.2 The Gaimusho protested sternly to Smetanin on 8 August that "it went against humanitarianism for the Soviet side to go on bombing and bombarding, not only at the front but also against the innocent populace, despite the fact that we submitted a proposal designed to end the fighting."3 Japanese civil and military coordination proceeded ponderously al­ though Ugaki assured Harada that he would take necessary measures quickly. "It may become clearer in a few days," Ugaki said, "whether the Soviets are really serious about a cease-fire or whether they are doing this to check Japan during the China Incident, before Hankow is taken."4 The concrete conditions finally dispatched to Shigemitsu on 9 August introduced the proposal that both armies withdraw by a certain fixed distance behind the borders, such as one kilometer each. Shigemitsu was given leeway with respect to the border commission and demarcation questions within the context of the Hunchun pact. Shortly afterward, these terms were refined to facilitate negotiations.5

ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE

307

On 10 August Shigemitsu submitted the latest and most conciliatory Gaimusho proposals during a 2% hour conference with Litvinov. As a final compromise, I proposed that only Japanese forces withdraw one kilometer to avert combat for the time being; and that we then proceed to settle boundaries. . . . Litvinov, however, said the Soviet side would like to tender a new pro­ posal, and he thereupon submitted a plan whose content was identical with what I had been proposing earlier. This attitude of Litvinov struck me as odd, but I merely said, "I have no objections in general to your proposal. To give you a definitive reply, however, I'd like to ponder this for one or two hours.”6

When Shigemitsu returned to his embassy, he was carrying the draft of a provisional truce agreement to go into effect on the 11th at noon, mari­ time province time, and to be implemented by military representatives on the spot. After advising Tokyo by brief preliminary wire, Shigemitsu consulted Nishi and the service attaches. Since all were in agreement, the ambassador phoned Litvinov to say that there were no objections. "Thus did I verify that the Changkufeng Incident had been settled at last. Afterward that night all of the embassy staff and the attaches assembled in my study and we toasted the solution of the clash at Changkufeng." But the night was far from over. At about 11 P.M. the embassy received a phone call that Litvinov would like to see Miyakawa in behalf of the ambassador. The first secretary set out promptly. Anxious minutes went by at the embassy, Shigemitsu recalled. Finally Miyakawa returned, all excited, and rushed into my study, where we had been waiting. "Our troops need not withdraw!" he yelled, gesticulating wildly. Litvinov, it seems, had advised Miyakawa that, on the basis of orders from the Kremlin, it would not be necessary for the Japanese side to pull back unilaterally. I reported this news immediately to Tokyo.7

Gaimusho records say that Litvinov used the rationale, "for the sake of fairness." According to the commissar's diary, he had added that although "we do not insist on [the Japanese troops'] retreat. . . you may take them away—that will be better."8

308

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

When the confirming telephone call was duly placed by the elated Japanese, Litvinov asked Shigemitsu to see him. The ambassador arrived around midnight; Litvinov showed him the draft of a final accord.

1. Japanese and Soviet forces shall cease all military activities on 11 August at noon local time. Instructions to that effect are to be issued immediately by the governments of the USSR and Japan. 2. Japanese as well as Soviet troops shall remain on those lines which they occupied at midnight local time on 10 August. 3. For redemarcation of the por­ tion of frontier in dispute, there shall be created a mixed commission of two representatives from the USSR and two representatives from the Japanese-Manchurian side, with an umpire selected by agreement of both parties from among citizens of a third state. 4. The commission for redemarcation shall work on the basis of agreements and maps bearing the signatures of plenipotentiary representatives of Russia and China.9 Shigemitsu agreed to the inclusion of a Japanese commissioner on the "Manchukuoan delegation,” but he could not assent to the addition of a neutral umpire. Nor was agreement reached concerning documentation to be used by the frontier committee.10 From the Soviet capital, on 11 August, correspondents noted that the Soviets' latest communique was no longer identified as emanating from the "staff of the First (Maritime) Army" but was less ominously titled, "About Events in the Region of Lake Khasan." Moscow received the news of the truce with "gratification mingled with surprise.”11 Few realized that the USSR had taken the step of appeasing or at least saving face for the Japanese even after Shigemitsu had pleaded for and won a cease-fire. The world was told by the Russians only that spe­ cific overtures for cessation of hostilities had originated with the So­ viet authorities. In general, it is not difficult to guess why the Russian government, distracted by the European political scene and apprehen­ sive about a two-front war, agreed to a cease-fire at Changkufeng. To account for the Kremlin's last-minute concession regarding unilateral troop pullback is more difficult. Shigemitsu surmised that, contrary to what he was told by Tokyo, Soviet troops must have driven Japanese

ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE

309

forces from Changkufeng crest by 10 August, "thus reaching the line which they had, all along, been putting forth as their border. This indicated that the Soviet Army had already achieved its mission of defending the state frontier; so they may have wanted to make clear that they had no intention of advancing farther."12 Among other possibilities the Gaimusho suggested: (1) Although the USSR had requested the Japanese to pull back, the Russians were afraid Japanese forces would not agree to do so, which might have led to a reversal in the situation. (2) The Soviet side was apprehensive that the Japanese had advanced deeply into Russian territory, since the cease-fire called for only Japanese troops to withdraw. This contradicted propaganda that the Red Army had safeguarded the frontier perfectly and might have exerted a bad influence on the populace.13 At the battlefront, the Japanese troops had their own view of the military situation by 10-11 August. The closer the men were to the front, the more confident they seemed to be; the farther from the front, the more apprehensive and defeatist. K. Sato provides an excellent example of the "power of positive thinking." While inspecting his front-line units on 8 August, he evinced "more and more confidence of certain victory." As late as the 9th, when others were commenting on the "near annihilation" of his regiment, Sato was of the opinion that "in general, circumstances had gradually developed favorably," especially since new artillery was arriving. Although not oblivious to the grievous losses which his unit had suffered, he was convinced that his regiment had not failed.

On this terrain, I had confidence in the ability of our troops to take on odds of 1:20—quite different from the situation on the steppes when I was at Nomonhan next year. In my judgment, Soviet forces had lost heavily and were despondent. Unfortunately, it was the Korea Army and the AGS which were discouraged. There was actually not much fierce fighting after the 7th, and the Russians appeared to be getting ready for a cease-fire by the 10th. An impression of severity and of depression characterized newcomers, such as the [38th] Brigade commander [Ono] and 74th Regiment commander [Cho]. Considerable gloom and pessimism affected those who were thrown into a maelstrom of air bombings and artillery bom­ bardment as soon as they reached the front. Yet, the Russians

310

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

had lost about 7,000 men, and our intelligence intercepted a message from the local enemy commander to Blyukher [?] ' that Soviet casualties could be expected to double if the fighting 14 went on.

A search of Japanese documentation has uncovered the alleged Soviet report which Sato and others have mentioned: On 8 August the Far Eastern Red Army political bureau chief, General Podlas, reported to the central authorities about the unfavorable combat situation: "Marshal Blyukher issued orders to the 1st Army to retake Changkufeng before the second ses­ sion of the Supreme Soviet convened. Although our forces repeatedly launched powerful attacks against the hill, the situ­ ation is not favorable. Japanese troops are not only holding the positions tenaciously but their artillery—firing with extra­ ordinary accuracy and effectiveness—has hurt our tank units, and our forces have fallen frequently into difficulty. Not a few of our officers and men could not be relied on and the political bureau staff has had to mete out severe punishments. Our casualties have amounted to 3,300; if we continue fighting under these conditions, another 5,000 casualties will be incur­ red within five or six days."15

Contemporary AGS records agreed that front-line Russian forces were in trouble during the last few days of the fighting: "Both the 32nd and 40th rifle divisions had lost their power to go on attacking, and the armored brigade was apparently forced to withdraw its main body from the battle­ field from about 8 August because of severe losses."16 One of Sato's staff officers feels that Japanese heavy artillery reinforce­ ments were crucial. "They arrived and began ranging-in on 9 August. Next day they fired for effect. That did it! The cease-fire came right afterward." The brigade commander, Morimoto, admitted later that fighting had be­ come serious from 6 August and that the Russians had begun to improve their coordination and to correct their defects. After 8 August the exposed defenders were mowed down successively, and the morale of the combat troops began to deteriorate on the 9th. Still, Morimoto did not feel des­ perate, for the entire 74th Regiment had not been committed yet.17 The

ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE

311

plea wired by the 19th Division to higher headquarters on the night of 10 August, however, made the division's desperation apparent. "Anxious about the tragic situation," Kitano had passed along to the high command the unusual recommendation to obtain an immediate suspension of hos­ tilities. "Desperate defensive warfare—the final extremity," one division officer calls the situation, an assessment which was evident also in Suetaka's fervent sursum corda on the afternoon of 10 August.18 Tanaka asserts that Ugaki's success in settling the incident by a cease­ fire saved Japan from "exposing disgraceful aspects; this is illustrated by a statement of Suetaka . . . expressing his immense gratitude to the foreign minister: 'Thanks to you, the division escaped annihilation.' " At the Tokyo trial, Tanaka said that Suetaka reported victory at Changkufeng, "but actually, after the 8th of August, the fighting was not necessarily in favor of the Japan­ ese. If the fighting had continued without reinforcements, the results would have been unfavorable for [us] .”19 AGS materials agree that by 8 August many reports emanating from the battlefront implied that Japanese losses had been heavy and that "our forces were gnashing their teeth in vexation" at the restraints imposed in the face of bombings and barrages. There were no more references to the front-line troops' high morale. "Only in response to our specific questioning did we elicit a statement that troop morale 'did not warrant concern.' Putting everything together, we at the AGS were finally able to determine the limits of endurance under conditions of ex­ clusive [i.e., passive] defense." On the basis of these materials, Japanese military historians have spoken of "crumbling" Japanese defenses, posi­ tions "on the verge of collapse," and the apparent "demoralization" of the troops in the line.20 There has been considerable discussion of the accuracy of the statement that the 19th Division had "only a few days to live" by 10-11 August. A 19th Division staff officer remarks candidly: "If the Changkufeng affair had lasted one more week, the division would have been destroyed and I'd not be here today. So, from the viewpoint of the division, the cease­ fire was a salvation. The troops were clinging to the very last edge; they could have held on no longer."21 Ichimoto thinks that "we could have lasted another week or ten days. The 74th Regiment was en route, supplies were moving smoothly." Iwasaki is even more optimistic about the divi­ sion's staying power: "It was 'war' all right and at the end we did feel that the division's line strength would be consumed in 'X' number of days. But 'X' was not as low as seven to ten days, say. Even in Burma in 1944, a bat­

312

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

tered division could manage to hang on for two or three months." And, Ichimoto insists, even the 75th Regiment was not "annihilated" in the same sense as Japanese regiments engaged the next year at Nomonhan.22 Much of the variation in outlook depended on the unit and the locale. Ichimoto's battalion had been used for two strictly offensive operations and had been pulled to the rear immediately after each battle. "Other units had to endure a passive role; not authorized to attack, they had to endure bombings and barrages without seeing friendly planes or tanks, while their own artillery support was feeble. Mere sitting ducks, these units may have been a bit depressed." A light-machine gunner who entered combat at Changkufeng Hill as part of a fresh unit and only between 7 and 11 August comments that there were merely small clashes there till the last day, mainly involving enemy infantry and machine guns—"no charges or anything like that, now." Tominaga remembers only small-scale, indecisive ground actions in the left sector between 8 and 10 August; enemy tank and air attacks had diminished. Although the battery had been in action from 3 August, it had lost only one man killed and eight wounded out of 73 men, the least of any unit in the 73rd Regiment. Tominaga never felt that the exclusive-defense operations had become critical or that "we were on the so-called brink of death." A machine gunner at Hill 52 remarks confidently: "Enemy tanks drove us off the left corner twice, but we always retook the lost ground." In the lines, morale held up in general. Ichimoto says: We were all "crazy about fighting," having waited so long for an opportunity. "Chase the foe to Khasan and wipe him out!" was the feeling as soon as the alert was near. In combat the men were magnificent. Even soldiers who had lost legs remained high-spirited and shouted “Banzai!” The wounded bore their sufferings in silence and did not beg for water.23

Did the deterioration in the combat situation around 10 August imply defeat? "We at division headquarters," says a staff officer, "felt that it was neither a victory nor a defeat." An infantryman who fought till the end at Changkufeng and Hill 52 confesses that "on several occasions I did feel that our side might be losing. I certainly had no feeling of 'victory,' what with the men being killed one afteranother and the equipment going, as well as there being no food, water, or communications." The enemy was superior in materiel, an infantry platoon leader feels.

ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE

313

but when one is busy fighting, there is no concern about ''vic­ tory” or "defeat.” Although our casualties were severe, we thought our side was winning. Yet, when we ended up with­ drawing in the midst of things, we didn't know if we had won after all. Maybe, in the back of our minds, there was some feeling of having lost.24

When Sugai, an AGS mobilization specialist, visited Suetaka around 11 August, the atmosphere was "a bit gloomy or grim, since the combat has been miserable." Suetaka was "peppy, but one could detect features of grim determination." A war ministry officer remembers hearing from Suetaka in September that Japanese operations had not succeeded. Al­ though Changkufeng had been cleared once, "later our troops were pushed back 500 or 600 meters; the enemy's bombardments had been just too severe for our men to hold on." When Kotani visited Suetaka at Chiang­ chunfeng shortly after the truce, however, the general conveyed no feeling of defeat; the troops had fought well, morale was high, and Japanese posi­ tions atop Changkufeng had been retained to the last. Suetaka said the Russians had attacked the right wing from behind Khasan, and he had pulled back a little on that side but had held Changkufeng. General Hashi­ moto had no feelings of "emergency"; the struggle was difficult, but "this was not exactly a 'critical' situation." There was no thought of com­ mitting another division. A number of officers feel that it would be better to characterize higher headquarters' attitude toward the final stage of the fighting as one of worry rather than of defeat. "We at the Korea Army," says Iwasaki, "were not exactly nervous about the incident now, but we were certainly paying close attention to it.”25 Imaoka sums up the problem:

Despite severe imbalance between the antagonists in terms of manpower and degree of excellence of materiel and equipment, we did not suffer a catastrophe because we possessed certain geographical advantages. Still, by about the time of the final stage of the incident, our troops had apparently reached the limits of their endurance. If the fighting had lasted a bit longer, we might have experienced, at some place or other, a disaster such as occurred during the Nomonhan Incident in 1939. For­ tunately for us, the cease-fire intervened.26

314

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

The accord came at the "eleventh hour," adds the historian Hata.27 Some have assailed Suetaka's mode of command, his running things personally, though an able brigadier had been there since early August. Morimoto does not share the complaints. It was true that Suetaka often came to 37th Brigade Headquarters, but his handling was proper and sensible. An AGS visitor, impressed by Suetaka's combat guidance, terms the general's measures quite appropriate. Other observers, less affected by Suetaka's supposed powers of control, suggest that the question of arbi­ trary actions did not become important until afterward. Asked what he thought of Suetaka's handling of the situation, Inada replies that it could .be termed "fair." K. Sato's actions, after all, were "the 19th Division's problem, not IGHO's.''28 A little-known but significant influence upon the high command's policy was generated by the presence at the front of a special AGS ob­ server, Col. Terada Masao, the organization subsection chief. On 9 August there had been long and important conferences in Tokyo involving the war ministry and the AGS. One result was that Terada received telegraphic in­ structions on the 10th to maintain liaison with the local forces and to re­ port in timely fashion to IGHQ on the combat situation. The reply from Terada was immediate: he had an important recommendation and would like to return at once. At this time, Tokyo had been receiving a series of battle reports which were becoming "gradually pessimistic." Among the command, except for Inada and some subordinates, the resolution was crystallizing that it might become unavoidable to order a retreat. On the night of 10 August Terada returned to Tokyo with Lieutenant Colonel Yamamoto of AGS Soviet Intelligence. Yamamoto reported first: "Although Russian forces are mounting repeated and stubborn counter­ attacks, their offensive tactics are quite poor and their fighting strength is not very impressive. The overall situation is rather more optimistic than the telegraphed reports would convey."29 Then Terada made the dramatic request that the conference room be cleared except for those concerned directly. To this select group, Terada voiced an impassioned recommenda­ tion directly to Tada, that there be an immediate retreat by Japanese forces on the Changkufeng front. A Korea Army officer provides the background: "After Terada inspected the battlefront, he came away with a rather pes­ simistic impression. He had visited hospitals and talked with the wounded, and now felt that the incident should not be allowed to continue."30 Undoubtedly, the 19th Division's uncommon advice to the AGS, that

ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE

315

diplomatic measures were imperative, must have been reinforced and con­ veyed directly by Terada. A war ministry officer remains impressed by the fact that observers sent to the front from Tokyo reported universally on the severity of enemy aerial bombings.31 Later that night of the 10th, Hashimoto, Inada, and their staff studied the problem on the basis of Terada's recommendation, but they remained at a loss what to do. The younger officers of the Operations Section in­ sisted that retreat was improper; the atmosphere was "quite gloomy," according to Inada. Some of the officers pressed to unchain the 19th Division; others argued that the aim of reconnaissance in force had already been attained and that the time had come to withdraw. Inada adopted a middle-of-the-road position, calming his staff with the reminder that a cease-fire was in the offing and that the division could hold out for an­ other week.32 The slowness of communication across the many miles between Mos­ cow and Tokyo did nothing to alleviate nervousness in the Japanese cap­ ital during the night of 10-11 August. "After 10 days of tension," Ugaki wrote in his diary, "the struggle between the Japanese and Soviet armies on the USSR-Manchukuo border has reached the decisive brink."33 Com­ plicating the situation was the fact that, late on 10 August, the president of Domei news agency conveyed to Konoe a message from one of his Moscow correspondents. Purporting to sum up Shigemitsu's latest out­ look, the report stated that success in the negotiations seemed unlikely. The contents of the message were transmitted to Ugaki and Itagaki. Con­ sequently, Konoe and his associates spent a "fearful and depressed" night. Shigemitsu's own report, sent by telegram, was frustratingly slow in ar­ riving. Initial word concerning a cease-fire agreement came via Domei. It appeared that the truce conditions "did not necessarily coincide with the Japanese contentions," but, as Matsumura says, "Tokyo really had no energy with which to retort, having been 'shaken up' all night by the earlier wire from Domei." Horinouchi provided details:

We were glad that the Changkufeng Incident had been settled. But the night before the agreement was consummated [10-11 August], we were astonished to receive from Shigemitsu an official telegram whose tone was very grim and military sound­ ing. After that, the Euro-Asiatic Bureau as well as the foreign affairs specialists of the army and navy stayed up all night

316

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

working on countermeasures. It was a source of immense re­ lief when an unexpectedly good cable finally arrived next morning. But we surely could not have guessed how things were going to turn out!34

After definite information had been received from Shigemitsu, Harada happily called Kazami Akira, the prime minister's chief secretary, and Konoe himself. "Until the accord is implemented," said Kazami, "we shall have to be on the alert all day today." Konoe and Kazami seemed "a little relaxed anyhow."35

Inada had finally retired past midnight on 10-11 August, "agreement or no agreement." "I must have been dozing from fatigue when the jangle of the phone got me up. It was a message saying that a truce had been concluded the preceding midnight. 'Just as I had been expecting,' I said to myself, but I felt empty inside, as if it were an anticlimax." The call must have been an unofficial communication, perhaps the latest Domei news, since the records show that definitive word from the embassy in Moscow did not reach Tokyo until after 10 A.M.; attache Doi's report to the AGS came at about 11. This was extremely late in terms of getting Japanese troops to cease operations at 1 P.M. Tokyo time (or noon on the spot); a tardy Imperial order might undo the Moscow accord. Com­ plicating this matter of split-second timing was the fact that the first official telegram from Shigemitsu referred to unilateral Japanese with­ drawal by one kilometer. At the Japanese high command level, there was agitated discussion when initial word of these arrangements arrived. Inada speculated that on 10 August the Russians had staged persistent close-quarter assaults against Changkufeng and seized the southern edge eventually, although repulsed at all other points. "Moscow may have agreed to a truce that midnight because they expected that the crest of Changkufeng would be in their hands by then and that a fait accompli would have been achieved." Some officers argued that the Russian forces were suffering "quite badly and this caused the authorities' agreeability to a cease-fire." Most exasperating, however, was the provision stipulating a one-sided military withdrawal. Admittedly, such action had been under discussion by the AGS itself, particularly after Terada's sobering appeal of 10 August. It was another matter to have a Japanese withdrawal dictated by the USSR while Russian troops did not have to budge. Initial puzzlement and chagrin began to

ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE

317

yield to rationalization. The Japanese side seemed to have made a conces­ sion in the negotiations, but there must be significance to the phrase which said, "the line occupied by Japanese forces has been taken into due con­ sideration.” Japanese troops had presumably advanced to the edge of the frontier, while Russian soldiers had not come even close. Thus, it must be necessary to have the Japanese units withdraw first, to fix the boundaries, since it was the Japanese who had done the greater advancing. Such an in­ terpretation did not necessarily mean that there had been any concession by the Japanese side; to the contrary, did it not imply endorsement of the combat results in favor of the Japanese Army? Certainly, a unilateral withdrawal was not pleasant. "A pull-back was a pull-back, no matter how you looked at things—and we were the ones who were to do it," one of­ ficer remarks. "But the atmosphere in the command had been far from optimistic on 10 August; so we decided that it was unnecessary to com­ plain about this issue and we approved the agreement in general. Both the senior and junior staff levels seemed to be quite relieved."36 Even an alleged fire-eater at Seoul insists that news of the cease-fire filled him with relief.37 He was not alone.

NOTES 1. Harada, Saionji ko, 1:1G-T\. For Yuasa's complaints see Saionji ko, 7:72-74. 2. For a perceptive analysis by Kirk in Moscow on 9 August 1938 see FRUS 1938, 3:474-476. 3. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 283. 4. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:71-72. 5. Ibid., 7:74; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 59. 6. Shigemitsu, Gaiko kaisoroku, p. 219, and Showa no doran, 1:204. Also see Gaimusho, SP No. 233, pp. 117-121, supplement; ibid., SP No. 312, p. 60; B. Naka­ mura, Man-So, pp. 265-266; Tokyo Asahi, 12 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid. (A.M. ed.), p. 3; Litvinov diary, 10 August 1938, IMTFE, Transcript, 10 June 1947, pp. 23905-23911, 23918; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 283-284. 7. Shigemitsu, Gaiko kaisoroku, p. 219. 8. Gaimusho, SP No. 233, p. 121; ibid., SP No. 312, pp. 60, 71; Litvinov diary, 10 August 1938, IMTFE, Transcript, 10 June 1947, p. 23911. 9. The best sources for the final agreement are Slusser and Triska, Calendar of Soviet Treaties, p. 1 22; Degras, Soviet Documents, 3:298-299. 10. Litvinov diary, 10 August 1938, IMTFE, Transcript, 10 June 1947, pp. 2391023911; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, p. 348. 11. New York Times, 1 2 August 1938, pp. 1,8. 12. Shigemitsu, Gaiko kaisoroku, pp. 219-220; Showa no doran, 1:204.

318

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

13. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 71-72. Also see New York Times, 12 August 1938, p. 8. 14. Sato interview; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 8-9 August 1938. 15. Jinchu bidan, p. 358. I cannot vouch for the authenticity of this remarkable item, which emanated from the Japanese Army's Information Bureau; nor can I ascertain the time of K. Sato's first acquaintance with Podlas' alleged message. 16. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 248. 17. Miyajima interview; Morimoto statement, BBSS Archives. 18. Inada, Sasai, and Kitano interviews; CS, Chokoho, pp. 81-83. Also see ch. 23, p. 282, of this book. 19. Tanaka, Haiin o tsuku, pp. 53-54; IMTFE, Transcript, 22 May 1947, pp. 22747-22748. 20. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 8 August 1938; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:112, 115-116. 21. Sasai interview. 22. Iwasaki and Ichimoto interviews. 23. Ichimoto, Horiguchi, Tominaga, and Hayano interviews. 24. Hayano, Murakoshi, Otsuka, Sasai, and Tominaga interviews. 25. Sugai, Iwakuro, Kotani, Arao, Hashimoto, Tominaga, and Iwasaki interviews. 26. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," p. 47. 27. I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:89. 28. Morimoto statement, BBSS Archives; Kotani, Arao, Hashimoto, and Inada interviews. 29. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. 30. Tsuchiya interview. 31. Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 165. 32. Inada, "Soren kyokutogun to no taiketsu: Chokoho-Nomonhan jiken no zenbo hiroku," Chisei, supplement, no. 5 (December 1956), p. 284; I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:89. 33. Ugaki, Ugaki nikki, p. 320 (11 August 1938). 34. Matsumura, Miyakezaka, pp. 165-166; Harada, Saionji ko, 7:74, 78. 35. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:75-76. 36. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives; Inada and Arao interviews. 37. Tsuchiya interview.

Stilling the Guns

27

Even before Imperial sanction could be obtained for the truce, the line units had to be notified unofficially. In behalf of Tada, the AGS deputy, Inada telephoned Korea Army Headquarters at 10:40 A.M. on 11 August, appending the injunction that it was particularly necessary to be "pre­ pared against attacks if the enemy does not heed Moscow's control." The cease-fire was to go into effect at noon, but, since there was an hour's difference between maritime province and Tokyo time, Inada added that special precautions should be taken during that period "lest the foe take spiteful action then." After the Gaimusho sent a definitive report to the AGS, the high command contacted Seoul again at-11:20 A.M. in a mes­ sage confirming the truce as of noon by IGHQ order, but still calling for unilateral Japanese pull-back by one kilometer.1 The 11th of August was an awkward day to conduct liaison between the foreign ministry, the army, and the Throne, since the Emperor was leaving Hayama to visit naval installations in the Yokosuka area and the navy air unit in Chiba from morning. By the time a conclusive report on the cease-fire could be conveyed to the monarch, he was aboard the de­ stroyer Natsugumo at Kisarazu. Naval wireless facilities in Tokyo had to be used to transmit coded messages to Admiral Yonai, the navy minister, for delivery to the Emperor. This was done shortly before 2:45 P.M. Ac­ cording to Yonai, "His Majesty was very pleased and relieved when I re­ ported to him . . . about the conclusion of the truce accord." The appro­ priate Imperial order was approved promptly. But not until 3 P.M., two hours after cease-fire time at Changkufeng, did word of Imperial sanction reach the high command. Political scientists, particularly those interested in the workings of the Tenno system, will find it revealing that an inter­

320

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

national truce could be executed by the Japanese Army at Changkufeng prior to formal and specific approval by the Emperor.2 Although initial releases in Tokyo pictured the USSR as giving in to the Japanese, once the Gaimusho released an abridged text of the final Shigemitsu-Litvinov discussion, observers concluded that it was Japan which had made most of the concessions. The Tokyo papers issued no extras; they were devoting little space to the subject of the truce. The managing editor of "one of the greatest newspapers in Japan [admitted] he had been 're­ quested' to treat the news thus and to maintain a calm attitude." Some found it important that the Tokyo stock market failed to react favorably to news of the cease-fire.3 Many officials in Tokyo were unhappy with Shigemitsu's handling of the negotiations; the ambassador, in turn, was disturbed by the home government's opportunism and ignorance. He was thinking of returning to Japan to submit policy recommendations. Unex­ pectedly, he received a wire informing him that he had been appointed ambassador to Britain. Ugaki later claimed that this represented a promo­ tion because Anglo-Japanese relations were "very delicate and required expert handling," but rumors persisted that Shigemitsu was transferred because of displeasure with him in Moscow as well as Tokyo.4 If we are to believe that Litvinov's speedy assent was ascribable to his certainty that Russian troops would be in possession of commanding heights by midnight of 10 August, there must have been violent action at the front at that time. According to the Japanese war ministry, Soviet forces on the south side of Changkufeng did mount an attack from mid­ night, but the defenders managed to repulse the assaults with hand grenades, and the enemy pulled back in the morning. In the Hill 52 sector, the Rus­ sians advanced after sunset, approaching to 150 meters; by morning they had retreated 200 meters. There had been a Soviet night attack on the right flank of the Shachaofeng positions, involving one battalion plus machine guns and infantry guns. By morning the attackers had been driven back 200 meters. On the left wing at Shachaofeng, the night of 10-11 August was quiet; 1,000 meters intervened between the antagonists.5 The 75th Regiment reported no noteworthy action on the Hill 52 front before noon on 11 August, but at Changkufeng the Russians were not through. Around 8:30 A.M. three Soviet battalions took advantage of fog to approach within 400 meters. Concerting their efforts with three guns emplaced between Changkufeng and Hill 52, the Russians threw in three companies against the Japanese company on the right. Another two Soviet

STILLING THE GUNS

321

companies struck at the left-salient company as Russian artillery opened fire from east of the lake, Hill 29, and Maanshan. The enemy outflanked the left salient by a company armed with machine guns. A Japanese machine-gun platoon, its two pieces set up at Chiangchunfeng, ripped into the assault waves with flanking fire and "repulsed the foe in a twinkling," while artillery support fire also caused heavy casualties. Near 9 A.M. four Japanese battalion guns at Fangchuanting inflicted especially severe losses on a motorized formation observed northeast of Hill 52. At about this time, two Russian infantry mortars, transported across Khasan via ferry, opened fire from the lakeshore west of the crossing. Soviet shelling reached a climax around 10 A.M., whereupon the Japanese retorted with artillery of their own plus the 2nd Battalion guns aimed against the old Noguchi positions. The Russians "fell silent immediately" and retreated, leaving merely rapid-fire guns forward. Only some soldiers remained at the forwardmost locations on the slopes where the grass grew as tall as a man. After 10 A.M. Russian troops were observed mounting an enveloping of­ fensive against Changkufeng from three directions. Cho's regimental guns laid down flanking fire near 11 A.M. Somewhere between 10:30 and 11 A.M., then, the last Soviet ground offensive at Changkufeng was put to rout. Till the unexpected cease-fire, Japanese troops concentrated on strengthening breastworks. In the central sector, Okido reported that at dawn on the 11th, several lines of Soviet barbed wire, about 100 meters wide, were sighted near Noguchi Hill. "Probably our night attack on 8 August and our buildup afterward exerted a threat to the Russians. Although they had been in­ tending to mount an enveloping offensive against Changkufeng, using [Noguchi] hill as a springboard, now they have gone over to the defensive."6 In the left sector, Yamazaki's fresh battalion of the 73rd Regiment had begun to arrive. By 7 A.M., when the process of concentrating at the site of the reserves was completed, the battalion came under artillery fire. An hour later an enemy shell exploded on a squad of mountain artillery and killed every man. At 10 A.M., T. Sato was instructed to redeploy units, but this order had not been executed by the time the cease-fire was ordered.7 Morimoto noted that the enemy's front lines were located 30 to 100 meters from the defenses. "The Russians are continuing to assault us stub­ bornly while setting up entanglements and several lines of offensive posi­ tions." The Japanese would therefore conduct tenacious securing efforts around Changkufeng. Under the direct control of the division, Tanaka's

322

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

artillery force would fire mainly against the flanks of the hill and support the central sector. Other artillery would neutralize gun positions at Hill 29 while the right and left sector units assisted the Changkufeng defenses by concentrating heavy weapons against forces facing that front. The planned redeployment, directed by Morimoto, was to be accomplished gradually, depending on the situation.8 Three Japanese artillery batteries began test firing against the front facing Changkufeng from 10:30 A.M. and must have disrupted the Russians, who were deploying several lines of troops in that zone. The firing even caused some soldiers who were building attack positions near the peak to retreat to the foot of the hill. Okido "derived even greater confidence in the ability to secure Changkufeng as the result of the action of our artil­ lery." Still, he was of the opinion that friendly forces should be on guard against renewed attacks, not excluding the possibility that the Russians would blow up breastworks atop Changkufeng by such means as tunnels. According to the 75th Regiment, Japanese artillery was especially effective against targets located between Hill 52 and Changkufeng. As Tanaka put it, "Enemy barrages had been extremely violent, but when their field and mountain guns were smashed or rendered inoperable as the result of our effective and accurate firing, the Russians' bombardment grew not too active today. In addition to three mountain artillery battalions, one M-90 field artil­ lery battalion (two batteries of 15-cm. howitzers), and one 15-cm. cannon unit, Tanaka now controlled the 2nd Armored Train Unit from the Kwan­ tung Army. However brief their experience, the 10-cm. railway guns saw the first combat in Japanese Army history. At the Tokyo trial, Major Batarshin, a hero of the Soviet Union, claimed that the Japanese railway guns were in action as early as 31 July—six days before Tokyo's order for them to leave Harbin was actually received by Lt. Col. Morita Sutezo; The armored train fired a total of 51 shells at a range of 13,500 meters during two hours on the morning of 11 August. Apparently, the Russians never could pinpoint the firing site; enemy projectiles landed 1,000 meters short, hitting ground forces but not the train. When Morita was satisfied that his mission had been accomplished, he went back to Shinasan, taking shelter in a tunnel en route when Russian planes were sighted.10 On the heights 500 meters north of Changkufeng, a platoon from Okido's regiment was laying down flanking fire, which caused an enemy company-size force on the north slope of Changkufeng to pull back 800

STILLING THE GUNS

323

meters. The platoon leader reported that on the plain west of Khasan, at the foot of the slope, he could sight massed tanks, trucks, tractors, and towed vehicles. Some of the trucks had ascended the slopes and stopped near the peak. Probably, the vehicles had been sent up to supply ammuni­ tion and fortification materials.1 11 By 11 A.M. the Soviet artillery (whose fire had hitherto "withered away," in the 75th Regiment's words) suddenly unlimbered a crashing and sustained bombardment. Unknown to the Japanese, this must have been one last hour-long "salute"—which suggests that local Russian commanders by now knew about the Moscow decision to cease fire at noon.12 Based on his telephoned instructions from Tokyo, Nakamura had con­ veyed an emergency cease-fire order to the front. Tsuchiya phoned word to a Korea Army staff officer, Yoshida, who was at the division command post in Seikaku. Yoshida passed along the message at 11:40 A.M., but there were further difficulties. Telephone communication to the front had been cut off, and radio had to be used to reach Suetaka, who was still at Chiangchunfeng directing operations. Suetaka received word by 11:50 and relayed his own cease-fire instructions by phone to the line units as soon as possible. The division's "victory order," set at 11:55, concluded: "Elite troops are swift and precise in transmitting and executing orders. This is what I have stressed customarily and I expect all units will demon­ strate results [of their training] on this occasion."13 Finally, around 11:50 or 11:55, while Soviet artillery was roaring its final discharge, the cease­ fire message reached the men in the lines. According to Korea Army re­ cords, the Russian side stopped firing tardily, at about 12:10. "We imme­ diately followed suit and suspended our own fire; whereupon the battle­ ground grew quiet instantaneously."14 The seriousness with which the Japanese took the cease-fire is illustrated by Okido's instructions to the 76th Regiment: (1) From noon today we are forbidden to respond [i.e.,to take combat action] unless enemy commences hostile opera­ tions such as firing or charging. But even in case of hostile fire, you need not reply unless firing causes harm. (2) Steadily carry out combat preparations—establishment of positions, supply of ammunition—masked from foe. (3) Pay partic­ ular heed not to be deficient in concealment from air. ... All units are forbidden to engage in combat activities unless ex-

MAP 4. Changkufeng, Noon, 11 August 1938 (Ceasefire).

STILLING THE GUNS

325

pressly ordered to do so by me. It is imperative not to be remiss in combat preparations pending issuance of further orders. Nevertheless, construction work or advancing beyond present lines, even by a single soldier, is not authorized.

The orders were followed by an addendum based on Suetaka's express desires.

Orders were issued earlier by division commander concerning prohibition of combat actions; but there is always a tendency among units confronting foe at very close range at night to become jumpy and to speculate about hostile actions, thus rendering it easy to slip into combat. Consequently, it must be made thoroughly known, down to last soldier, that even if enemy snipes or if enemy patrols get close or if enemy units take action, we must not fire, etc. Furthermore, since situation is so delicate, it is imperative to report movements of Soviet forces on hourly basis at minimum.15

Japanese soldiers in the lines recall nothing special on 11 August. "We didn't hear about the truce till the last minute," says one, "and we had become so inured to enemy artillery we hardly noticed any 'last salute.' ' When the cease-fire order came, Sakata "honestly felt relieved to be still alive." Although Ichimoto does not recall the conversation, Suetaka later told the press, "When I phoned Ichimoto after the cease-fire agreement, he replied, 'Am I still alive?' " In Tominaga's battery, once the guns stopped firing, "We were all so fatigued we went to sleep till evening!"16 From Tokyo, on 11 August, it was reported that the Japanese side had suspended operations promptly at noon, as agreed, but that sporadic bursts of fire had continued to come from the Soviet side. Colonel Grebennik, when asked after the war whether the combat did end at noon, replied petulantly: "Yes, but not quite so. The fighting actually ceased at 12:05." According to him, the tardiness was the Japanese side's fault. Official Russian communiques registered no complaints in 1938. Tass confirmed that "as agreed . . . hostilities in the zone of Lake Khasan ceased ... at 13:30 local [maritime province] time."17 From the mention of 1:30 P.M., observers in Moscow reached an erroneous conclusion, and correspondents cabled New York, "Armistice Arrives An Hour and A Half Late."18 The

326

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

mistaken headlines stem only from the reporters' ignorance of local time in the maritime province. The Japanese press told readers that "the cease-fire bugle has sounded —the frontier is cheerful now, 14 days after the shooting began." All was quiet in the area of Changkufeng, where the sounds of firing ceased at noon "as if erased." The most intense period of stillness lasted only a few minutes and was followed by the excited chattering of soldiers, audible on both sides. Korea Army Headquarters spoke of the "lifting of dark clouds [and] return of the rays of peace." In Hongui, a Japanese combat officer told a Japanese correspondent: "Suddenly we noticed the insects making noise; the soldiers were delighted. Once the fighting stopped, Japanese national flags were hoisted here and there along our front. . .. After the Russians observed what we had done, they broke out red flags also, at various points in their trenches." Some Japanese soldiers were given cookies by Soviet medical corpsmen. At Hill 52, an infantryman remembers, the Japanese and the Russians were facing each other, 50 meters apart, that afternoon. "We just lay there and stared at each other for two hours, waiting grimly. But it was well past cease-fire now, and those same Russians finally started to wave at us. Later that day, when Soviet troops came to salvage their KO'd tanks, we 'chatted' in sign lan­ guage."19 After the cease-fire, Ichimoto, whose battalion had seen the most difficult fighting, stuck his head above the trench and waved hello to some Soviet officers. "They waved back. It gave me an odd sensation, for during the furious struggle I had considered them to be barbarians. Now I was surprised to see that they were civilized after all!" A rifleman at Changkufeng remembers swapping watches with an unarmed Russian across the peak.20 The Japanese front-line troops stayed in their positions confronting the Russians and conducted preparations for further combat while cleaning up the battlefield. Soviet troops also remained deployed as of the time of the cease-fire and vigorously carried out their own construction. The day after the cease-fire went into effect, Suetaka escorted an American reporter to the front. At Changkufeng,

carpenters were making wooden receptacles for the ashes of the Japanese dead. Funeral pyres still were smoldering. ... From our vantage point the lieutenant general pointed out long lines of Soviet trucks coming up in clouds of dust [which]

STILLING THE GUNS

327

apparently were made deliberately in an effort to conceal the trucks' movements, [probably designed] to haul supplies from the front. Soviet boats were pushing across [Khasan] . . . and Soviet soldiers were towing smashed tanks back from no-man'sland. On the Japanese side there was a pronounced holiday spirit. Soldiers, emerging from dugouts, were drying white undershirts on near-by brush and bathing in the Tumen River. The soldiers were laughing heartily. A few were trying to ride a Korean donkey near Changkufeng's scarred slope. The general pointed out three Soviet tanks behind the Japanese advance lines east of Changkufeng. He said the Russians had hauled back seventy others [on the night of 11 August]....... The writer was shown a barbed wire fence immediately behind a wrecked village on the west slope of Changkufeng which the general said the Soviet troops built at the beginning of the fighting. Possiet Bay also was pointed out, clearly visible across the swamp.21

The 75th Regiment estimated that Japanese fire had inflicted 170 Rus­ sian casualties by noon on 11 August, in addition to knocking out two heavy machine guns, eight trucks, and four wagons. A considerable amount of Soviet materiel and ammunition was reported to have been picked up by Shimomura's and Kojima's battalions that day. Two enlisted men were killed and one wounded in the 75th Infantry; another soldier was wounded in the 73rd Regiment.22 At 12:25 P.M. the AGS received a phone call from the Gaimusho, con­ firming the gist of the telegram about the cease-fire received near 11 A.M. from the embassy in Moscow. The confirmation was conveyed to Korea Army Headquarters by telephone. That afternoon, in Korea and in the battle lines, Japanese authorities were reluctantly preparing to withdraw their forces unilaterally as stipulated. Unexpectedly, at about 2 P.M., Iwasaki received a phone call in Seoul from AGS Lieutenant Colonel Arisue. It seemed that a new message had been received (from attache Doi) that the Japanese were no longer required to withdraw one kilometer. Tokyo was in the process of checking. Meanwhile, the army commander was at liberty to decide whether to conduct the pull-back or retain the present lines. The Korea Army decided that no official orders ought to

I

328

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

be issued until authentic word was received "since emergency steps to assure cessation of hostilities had already been taken anyway."23 One memorable scene was provided by K. Sato in the afternoon. He contacted Suetaka for permission to bring the 75th Regiment colors to the top of Changkufeng to venerate the Throne, extol the dead, and honor the living. At 5:30 the general granted approval, and Sato set out from the reserve site with the colors. Atop Changkufeng, Sato shouted the command to Shimomura and his drawn-up battalion. The troops faced southeast in the direction of the Imperial palace in Tokyo. "It was 6:20 now, with twilight approaching fast. As the officers and men revered the Throne, they were moved deeply and wept. Many Russian officers and men were looking up at the scene."24 Eventually, Tokyo advised Korea Army Headquarters by phone on 11 August that the pullback stipulation was in error. Japanese troops were to hold their lines as of midnight on the 10th, the same as the Soviet side. An AGS officer confided to his diary that "if the Russians had only stuck it out one more day, an atmosphere might well have been generated in Tokyo which would have led to our voluntary pullout," a retreat in practice. "But the denouement was accomplished as the result of Moscow's submission, and the Japanese nation and people were, after all, able to save face."25 After clarification of the problem of withdrawal, the author­ ities in Seoul, at 6:50 P.M., felt free to issue to the 19th Division the formal order which had been held in abeyance. (1) Cease-fire accord has been effected between diplomatic services of Japan and USSR. (2) This army ceases further military action against Soviet forces in Changkufeng-Shachaofeng district pursuant to IGHQ order. . . and will attend to details required of our forces on spot pursuant to IGHQ directive.... (3) 19th Division commander will immediately set up committee composed of three [field-grade] officers to implement truce agreement. . . . Necessary additional of­ ficers and men may be designated delegates or assistants to handle interpreting, etc. (4) Division commander will have committee chairman work out and confirm following matters in discussions with Soviet committee: (a) Both armies to have ceased combat from noon 11 August maritime province time, (b) Both armies to retain lines under present occupation. Neither side, however, to allow even one of its soldiers to

;

329

STILLING THE GUNS

cross its lines. In event Russian side does violate line, they will have to assume complete responsibility for any recur­ rence of trouble, (c) After agreement is reached, provide re­ spective numbers of men required to clean up battlefield, and also render each other necessary additional assistance. (5) Continue transportation of troops, weapons, ammunition, etc., which are being sent to replenish and supply division; but be careful not to provoke enemy. (6) Except in case of counterattacking serious and full-scale assaults, division will hereafter sternly prohibit use of force and exert caution in its actions.26 Having obtained formal Imperial sanction in midafternoon, at 5:50 P.M. the AGS wired Nakamura the full text of the necessary Imperial order: "Korea Army commander will concentrate those forces occupying Changkufeng-Shachaofeng area back to right-shore district of Tumen River when opportune and will afterward return them gradually to original duty sta­ tions at proper time. Tightly guard army front along Manchukuo-Soviet frontier. (2) Details to be provided by chief AGS."27 This order was the one antedating the Moscow agreement but calling for a voluntary pull-out by the Japanese—an order whose delivery Hashimoto and Inada had been "sitting on" for almost a week. The implementing IGHQ directive was issued two hours later: "(1) In assembling forces on right bank of Tumen, actions will be guided by immediate situation, except that aggravation of trouble will be avoided. Major General Hashimoto is to provide further in­ structions. (2) No units may be deployed on left bank of Tumen south of Shuiliufeng, exclusive of latter point."28 Then, at 10 P.M., a priority tele­ gram left Tokyo: "As result of further negotiations USSR has advised it has no objection to Japanese forces' remaining at present line of occupa­ tion. Kindly make necessary corrections in previous messages and convey this information to Hashimoto on his arrival."29 Thus, the last galling doubts about the need for the Japanese to withdraw unilaterally were dissipated officially.

NOTES 1. CS, Chokoho, p. 88; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 285-287. The IGHQ order number is 179. The Soviet government revealed the agreement at 2:30 A.M. on 11 August.

330

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

2. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:74-75. Sawamoto called it a "bustling day." "Nikki," 11 August 1938. Also see Tokyo Asahi, 12 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. Tenno is the Japanese word for Emperor. 3. New York Times, 12 August 1938, pp. 1,8. 4. Shigemitsu, Gaiko kaisoroku, pp. 218, 220-221; Harada, Saionji ko, 7:75-76; Ugaki, Ugaki nikki, p. 320 (11 August 1938); IMTFE, Transcript, 9 June 1947, pp. 23868-23872; Nishi, Doi, and Inada interviews. For Russian unhappiness with the ambassador, see my "Shigemitsu," Diplomats in Crisis, p. 251. 5. Tokyo Asahi, 12 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; "Chokoho ji ken no keika," Shokodan ho, p. 21. 6. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 220-223. Also see AGS, Chokohd soan, pp. 177-178, 227, 237; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 11 August 1938. 7. AGS, Chokohdsoan, p. 187. 8. Ibid., pp. 206-207. 9. Ibid., pp. 223, 234; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 11 August 1938. 10. IMTFE, Transcript, 30 October 1947, p. 32105; CS, Chokoho, p. 67; AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 234-235; JRD/JSM 11,3/A: 149-153; S. Morita correspondence with author. 11. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 223. 12. Tominaga interview; CS, Chokoho, p. 89. A foreign correspondent thought that the Russian "salvo to the incident" occurred on the afternoon and evening of 10. August, when the Soviets unloosed what was called their heaviest bombardment yet, "accompanied by an elaborate air display." Although "this was perhaps done with foreknowledge of the truce . . . the Japanese considered it as wanton and un­ necessary carnage." American Consulate General, Mukden, Dispatch No. 270, 19 August 1938, NA 761.93 Manchuria/217. 13. AGS, Chokohd soan, pp. 241, 286-287. 14. CS, Chokoho, pp. 88-89. For receipt of orders by regiments and brigade, see AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 208-209, 224-227; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 11 August 1938, attachment 3. 15. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 224-225. 16. Horiguchi and cited interviews. Ichimoto still cherishes the clipping of Suetaka's press conference, from Tokyo Asahi, 13 November 1941. Also see Tokyo Asahi, 12 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. 17. IMTFE, Transcript, 26 January 1948, pp. 38336-38337; FRUS 1938, 3:479. 18. New York Times, 12 August 1938, p. 8. 19. Hayano interview; Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 299, 303-307; Tokyo Asahi, 12 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2; ibid., 1.3 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3; New York Times, 12 August 1938, p. 1; B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 301 -302. 20. Ichimoto and Horiguchi interviews. Horiguchi, who showed me the Russian watch, snorts that it never kept time and was not made of pure silver. But at least he got to keep it; other traders had their "prizes" confiscated by seniors. 21. New York Times, 14 August 1938, pp. 1, 24. Tominaga adds, "When night fell [on 11 August], we were chagrined to see the Russians bring up tractors and haul away the heavy equipment, including more than ten tanks which we had knocked out on their side of the line." Tominaga interview.

STILLING THE GUNS

331

22. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 11 August 1938. For the last intel­ ligence on rearward movements, see AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 195. 23. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 285-287; CS, Chokoho, p. 89. 24. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 11 August 1938; Sato, Ichimoto, and Tominaga interviews. 25. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives; CS, Chokoho, p. 89. 26. Korea Army Operations Order No. 48, 6:50 P.M., 11 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 89-91. The ellipses contained references to IGHQ Army Order No. 179 and Directive No. 234. For more on the committee to implement the truce agreement, see ch. 28, pp. 332-333, of this book. 27. IGHQ Army Order No. 172, by AGS Message No. 466, 5:50 P.M., 11 August 1938 (received at 9:01 P.M. same day), CS, Chokoho, p. 91. 28. IGHQ Army Directive No. 224, by AGS Message No. 467, 7:55 P.M., 11 August 1938 (received at 11 P.M. same day), CS, Chokoho, pp. 91-92. 29. AGS Message No. 470, 10 P.M., 11 August 1938 (received at 11:05 P.M. same day), CS, Chokoho, p. 92.

Implementation and Pull-back

The Korea Army had intended that the 19th Division chief of staff head the cease-fire committee which was to meet immediately with Soviet counterparts on 11 August. With Col. Y. Nakamura were to go a Korea Army staff officer, Yoshida, and Hunchun OSS chief Tanaka. But long before this order reached the division, Suetaka decided on his own choices for the delegation. At 12:40 P.M. the following officers were di­ rected to form the truce team: as chief, Colonel Cho; as member-inter­ preter, Lt. Col. llgai Yoshio, who had come with the Kawame observer group from the Kwantung Army; as aide, 2nd Lt. Kozuki Norimasa. When Suetaka learned about the army's choices, he asked that his own be ap­ proved. Colonel Nakamura, for example, was on the Korean shore at the message center and was "terribly preoccupied." The Korea Army approved Suetaka's preferences.1 Cho's chairmanship has led to the careless conclusion that he must have been involved deeply in the fighting at Changkufeng. Actually, he did not arrive at the 75th Regiment command post until little more than 48 hours before the cease-fire went into effect, nor was he a Russian-language expert. Cho was designated, Suetaka is supposed to have explained, "because his uniform was the cleanest of the colonels'. After all, he had seen no com­ bat." Possibly, the general was jesting; Cho may "just have happened to be with Suetaka at Chiangchunfeng when the requirement to put together a truce committee arose in haste."2 The division's explanation was that Cho had started preliminary negotiations with the Russians two hours before the army's choices had been made known in the order of 6:50 P.M. Ugai had been assigned to the committee because there were no other

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

333

qualified interpreters; Kozuki was added because he was the only officer in the 74th Regiment who had studied Russian. Cho's instructions were to confer with representatives of the Soviet commander on the spot and to effect a detailed local agreement based upon the Moscow accord.3 At 3:35 P.M. on 11 August, in the Hill 52 sector, “high-ranking" military delegates bearing a white flag emerged from the Soviet lines and proceeded to Akahage Hill, 100 meters from the Japanese positions. Cho, as right sector chief, was notified. He sent three lieutenants to converse with the Russians; they learned that the Soviets wanted the Japanese to designate a time and place for a conference. This word was conveyed to Suetaka, who had already dispatched Lieutenant Kozuki to the heights east of Shachaofeng to contact the Russians. Around 4:20 the commander can­ celled Kozuki's mission and instructed Cho to reply that the delegation ought to convene near the peak of Changkufeng at 6 P.M. Cho set out promptly with several subordinates; they reached Changkufeng crest a little before 6.The Russians now said they wanted to meet the Japanese near the crestline southeast of Changkufeng, the excuse being that the peak was too far for them to go and that they could not arrive by the designated time. Cho took his team to the location requested by the Russians. There the Japanese found 13 Soviet soldiers and a heavy machine gun "on guard," but the Russian delegates had not arrived although it was 6:18. The irked Japanese clocked a further delay of two minutes before the Russian truce chief, Gen. Grigory M. Shtern, rode up on horseback with a party of eight. Both delegations saluted, the chiefs and team members identified themselves, and all shook hands. The Soviet team was made up of Corps General (3rd rank) Shtern, 38, chief of staff, Far East area army; Brigade Commissar Semenovsky (political major general), 37 or 38; Colonel Fedotev, 42; and Major Wabilev, about 30. Interpreting for the Russians was Alexei Kim. In Colonel Cho's opinion, "It was always necessary to take the initiative in dealing with the Soviets. So, even in such matters as shaking hands or conversing, he always did things first." During the exchange of greetings, Cho teased Shtern about his bandaged forehead. "A Japanese artillery shell got you, didn't it?" he asked. But Cho began formal discussions on a more dignified note: Cho: It is very much to be regretted that the Japanese and Soviet armies had to get involved in combat around Chang­ kufeng. Nevertheless, I laud the consummation of the Mos­

334

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

cow accord on the part of both governments. And, I must say, your forces were quite brave and patriotic. Shterrr. I agree with you. The Japanese Army, too, was courageous and strong.4 Regardless of why Cho had been chosen to head the cease-fire team, he enriched his colorful career as a result. Published Japanese versions boost the size of the Soviet escort to two machine-gun-armed companies and add that the Russians had ordered all front-line forces to be on strictest alert, ready to lay down massed fire against Japanese positions if the negotiations went unfavorably for the Soviet side. Cho, however, is said to have unsettled the "exaggeratedly armed" Russians by being armed with only his sword, a family treasure. An even more famous story about his calmness, or audacity, dates from this meeting. "I imagine you must have a number of matters to consult about," Cho said very politely to the Russians, "so please take your time. I myself am a bit tired from the recent period of fighting and should like to rest a while." Thereupon, Cho supposedly produced an air pillow, inflated it, and stretched out on his back on the "grisly battlefield." Falling fast asleep, he "proceeded to snore like thunder in the face of the enemy." Veterans though the Soviet officers may have been, "they were apparently dumbfounded by Cho's doughtiness." Apart from legendary aspects, it is the consensus of interviewees that Cho performed his main truce mission very well and dazzled the Russians by his "marvelous sangfroid."5 The first session with the Soviets began at 6:20 P.M. and ended at 6:45. Discussions were amicable and laid the groundwork for detailed negotiations on the next day. At 11 A.M. on the 12th, Suetaka provided Cho with a new set of signed instructions. The day's meeting was to have been con­ vened at noon but again the Russians delayed, this time for an hour. Around 1 P.M. the Soviet party showed up at the elementary school at Fangchuanting, escorted by Japanese soldiers sent to guide them. Shtern had replaced the bandage on his forehead by a patch. He wore a gray high-collared tunic and black trousers with a red stripe. Cho was in full uniform and was wearing black canvas sneakers. Salutes and greetings were exchanged. Rapid agree­ ment was reached concerning suspension of all combat activity, maintenance of battle lines as of midnight on the 10th, full responsibility for any resump­ tion of fighting, and the exchange of corpses. But there ensued a trading of charges of truce violation. The Russians insisted that, on the evening of the 11th, 40 Japanese soldiers, armed with machine guns, had advanced 100:

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

335

meters onto the northern slope of Changkufeng and confronted the Soviet side at a distance of four or five meters. Fedotev claimed: "I personally observed what the front-line units reported. It is an incontrovertible fact that Japanese forces did advance.” But secret Japanese annotations to the transcript insist: "There was no such action as the one alleged above, as attested by subsequent investigations.”6 According to a Polish hypothesis, the Russians fabricated the complaint about a Japanese violation to conceal their own failure to recapture Chang­ kufeng crest. But whereas Soviet sources imply that certain protests were lodged by Shtern's committee at the first local conference on 11 August, the Japanese Army's version is that the problem was aired on the 12th and the Japanese side lodged the main complaint. Early that morning, the Japanese front-line commander had reported that Soviet forces had ap­ proached gradually since the night before and yvere working on construction. At Changkufeng, the Russians had strung wire and extended nets against grenades. "Worst of all, they tried to plug our loopholes. Thus, there exists a dangerous situation. Kindly lodge a protest as soon as possible." Suetaka had asked a Korea Army staff officer to handle this problem. Yoshida went at 8 A.M. to the heights north of Changkufeng, where he conferred with the local Soviet commander. "The enemy's lawlessness was pointed out and a protest lodged, but Yoshida could not get the Russians to com­ mit themselves. He finally gave up and turned the matter over to the truce team." Yoshida judged that the main body of Soviet front-line forces had not been pulled out. Since the mutual objections could not be reconciled, Cho suggested joint on-the-spot inspection followed by map making. The Russians agreed.7 At the old battlefront the first truce meeting on 12 August terminated at 4 P.M. The teams proceeded to the southeastern slope of Changkufeng, which they reached by 4:30. It was decided to carry out surveys of the Hill 52 sector, where the setup was not clear. Semenovsky and a Soviet interpreter, and Major Tanaka with an interpreter of his own, set out promptly. On-the-spot investigations resulted in mutual certification of the fact that Hill 52 itself lay in Japanese hands and that the high ground northeast of the saddle of Hill 52 was occupied by Soviet troops; that the distance be­ tween the two sides was about 200 meters; and that the center of the sad­ dle was occupied by neither party. Next, the Soviet-Japanese teams went, via Manchurian territory, up to the peak of Changkufeng. Japanese troops could be seen occupying positions along the crest, from the highest point

336

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

on the north edge for 100 meters to the southeast. Soviet forces were busy constructing positions against the Japanese defenses, only five or six meters away. On the southern part, in particular, "the Russians had indulged in a number of wicked actions—such as crossing the ridgeline and setting up machine guns aimed at us, while the delegates had been in the process of conferring." Cho resumed the second round of discussions on 12 August with a re­ iteration of charges of demonstrable Soviet violation of the truce lines. Shtern retorted that Russian strength had merely been built up to counter the Japanese "violation." According to Cho, some misunderstanding on Shtern's part was involved. "You must have mistaken [our] soldiers hauling food, or those taking part in rotation, as reinforcements. It is only natural for both sides to commit errors or for clashes to erupt where two forces are confronting each other as close as we see here." Cho proposed an im­ mediate, mutual pull-back of forces to the situation as of midnight on 10 August, to be verified by representatives of both sides. Shtern was in full accord. Consequently, at 8 P.M. on 12 August "the Soviet side pulled back its front lines on the Changkufeng front to a point 80 meters below the crestline, while our forces withdrew the one company." A Japanese an­ notation sheds light on Cho's apparently spontaneous proposal: "By this time, the front-line commander at Changkufeng had already received orders from the division to withdraw his entire unit and had been preparing to do so. We took advantage of the situation and volunteered to suggest the move." But Japanese observers were not pleased with the extent of the Russian actions: "The Soviet side left 40 or 50 men behind on the northern part of the crestline. They called the men lookouts. So we vigorously called this to the Russian committee's attention. They yielded and pulled out another portion of their strength." The local delegates lengthily discussed the topic of exchanging the dead. Cho said that the Japanese would like to complete the process of retrieving the slain as soon as possible, from religious considerations. "Our side has tried to preserve the corpses of the Soviet soldiers we found, by using ice at first, and then with balm; but some may have deteriorated with the passage of time. All of your corpses, however, repose in wooden caskets." Shtern replied that the Russians were not sure about the number of Japanese dead who had been picked up or the places where they were burieTd. Con­ siderable time was required for such matters as investigations and diggings "the disinterment and transfer might give the impression of lack of respect

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

337

for the slain. Kindly understand." Cho then sought to obtain the return of the body of the Japanese military policeman, Corporal Matsushima, slain on 15 July. But Shtern answered that "we are unable to render any deci­ sion, on our own, concerning matters antedating 31 July. If the Japanese side is interested, kindly work this out with the Soviet government." The conferees returned to the problem of entering the precise deploy­ ments of the opposing armies on maps attached to a memorandum of agreement which had been hammered out. The Japanese proposed that two paragraphs be added:

1. Japanese forces are securing a line atop Changkufeng for a distance of about 100 meters. The Soviet Army has lookout soldiers along a line approximately 25 meters frontward from the right-hand-peak positions of the Japanese on that front, while the Soviet main body's front-line positions are some 70 meters frontward. 2. This attached map is not precise as to details.

At first, the Soviet delegation agreed but, after the Japanese had signed, the Russians balked. New versions of the memorandum had to be prepared. It was now 12:30 A.M. on 13 August, and the Japanese thought the marathon session was at an end when they asked the Russians to sign a new memorandum and attached map. Unexpectedly, the Soviet side refused. They claimed that the lines showing deployments had been entered on the map in pencil and that the memorandum was dirty—"hardly appropriate for official documents." The Japanese responded that supplies of station­ ery could not be expected on a battlefield. To improve appearances, how­ ever, the Japanese went over the penciled lines in ink and proposed the windup of negotiations. The Russians would not agree; the line in the vicinity of Shachaofeng had not been confirmed. "All right," said Cho, "let's go to the scene in question and carry out investigations, no matter how late the hour." The Soviets remained adamant; the battlefield was dark, and they would like to terminate proceedings for the day. Eventu­ ally, both parties agreed to meet again at noon. The Japanese managed to extract a definite promise that the Russians, as well as the Japanese, would have copied the basic text of the current memorandum and map attachment, "as is," in two copies per side. The signing was to be per­ formed on the southeastern slope of Changkufeng, the site of the first

338

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

ascent on 12 August. When the Japanese came down from the hill, it was 1:30 A.M.8 In a communique issued in Tokyo before noon that day, the war min­ istry embedded a victory announcement in the otherwise routine text: "Maps showing the locations of each army as of the time of the cease­ fire are to be signed on 13 August. We got the Soviet forces to admit that our army is in complete possession of Changkufeng top. ”9 (Italics added.) Japanese writers exulted. An AGS operations officer says that Cho's purpose was "to get the Soviet officers to sign the map—to prove the Japanese had 'won.' He succeeded."10 But a division staff of­ ficer who served on the truce committee recounts a different turn of events: "I was 'kidding around' with Soviet officers. On a map, I drew a line which purported to be the Japanese line of occupation but which was exaggerated. The Russians laughed and drew the real line for meI"11 An American correspondent who visited the battlefront concluded that the Japanese had gained a diplomatic victory, apart from having been able to occupy the crest of Changkufeng when hostilities ended, "which made them victors in a military sense," too. His reasoning was that, "al­ though the original Russian contention was that the boundary went through the crest of Changkufeng, by the truce arrangements the bound­ ary accepted by the respective forces was east of Changkufeng . . . and between the hill and the lake, which is east of the hill.''12 At 9 A.M. on the 12th, General Hashimoto had landed at Seoul air­ port from Tokyo, accompanied by Arao and Kotani. Delivery was made of the written text of previous telegraphed orders and directives concerning cessation of military action and gradual withdrawal of units. As Hashimoto recalls, his main purposes were to visit Suetaka, learn about the front-line situation at first hand, and convey Prince Kan'in's words of appreciation to the Korea Army. Arao reconstructs the mission:

After our forces had taken Changkufeng, the diplomats [sic] agreed that we were to pull back across the Tumen. I flew with the AGS team to Korea to oversee—to confirm that the fighting was over and the terms being executed. My duties were not to inspect as such but to insure that our wounded, supplies, and equipment would be withdrawn, and that only . then would the front-line units be pulled out. I recall reporting that the terms would be met and the agreements honored.13

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

339

Upon receiving information from the AGS overseers and after learning about the satisfactory conference held by the truce committee the night before, Nakamura issued his order at 12:40 P.M. on the 12th. At opportune time 19th Division will assemble in right bank Tumen area those units which had advanced to ChangkufengShachaofeng district; and will strictly guard Japanese [Ko­ rean] -Soviet and Manchukuo-Soviet frontiers. Units may not be deployed on left shore of Tumen east of but not in­ cluding Shuiliufeng. In connection with concentration of units from left to right bank of Tumen, efforts will be made to avoid aggravation of difficulties. Detailed guidance is to be provided by Major General Hashimoto and Colonel Iwasaki, who are scheduled to reach scene 12 August. All units will be careful not to provoke enemy.14 i On the same day, the AGS transmitted the text of an IGHQ order to re­ tain the 19th Division under control of the Korea Army commander even after completion of divisional mobilization. Until 12 August Japanese troops continued to make preparations against a resumption of fighting. But all headquarters officers knew better, and the "combat preparations" were presumably a device to keep up morale. Having conferred with Nakamura at Seoul, Hashimoto proceeded to the front by air. After his party reached the Matsu'otsuho message center, little time was lost in issuing the necessary divisional order implementing the army's instructions to bring troops back across the Tumen, not merely to bring one company farther down the Japanese side of Changkufeng Hill. Suetaka chose the format of another "victory order" to disseminate the word at 2 P.M.:

Thanks to brave and difficult combat of all ranks, from unit commanders down, this unit has been able to exalt authority and power of our empire by shattering Soviet forces' outra­ geous and illicit designs. Whenever we took offensive, we cap­ tured our objectives without fail; whenever we were on defen­ sive, we did not yield an inch of soil—throughout long span of some ten days, and in face of foe whose strength amounted approximately to three divisions, 200 tanks, 100 planes.

340

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

After these bold words, Suetaka proceeded: "Now, by army order, main body of our unit is to be concentrated on right bank Tumen. Morimoto's unit will leave elements along line extending via Chiangchunfeng to high ground southwest of Shachaofeng; said elements to keep eye on enemy.”15 Changkufeng is not mentioned. The main body of the division was to start pulling back across the river, with engineer assistance, at 6 P.M. via Sozan and Matsu'otsuho, covered by the artillery and antiaircraft guns. Weapons, ammunition, and materiel were to be hauled to the Korean shore, and the communications post left at Chiangchunfeng until the last units were out.16 Suetaka stayed at his command post all day, directing the process of pull-back and implementation of the truce. When Hashimoto and his party went to the command post around 7 P.M., withdrawal of the main body had just begun. Guarding the crossing, from positions near Chiang­ chunfeng, was Nakajima's battalion of the 74th Infantry. Except for the difficulties in getting the Russians to move back a bit, the evacuation pro­ ceeded smoothly; the main Japanese forces reached the right bank by 7 A.M. on 13 August. Suetaka remained at Chiangchunfeng in the morning before returning to his advance headquarters at Seikaku. At noon Tanaka's forwardmost artillery units fell back toward their new assembly sites. Once corpses had been exchanged between the Russians and Japanese in late afternoon, the covering battalion withdrew near 8 P.M., crossed the Tumen, and reverted to the 74th Infantry from divisional control. When the last forces were withdrawing from the vicinity of Chiangchunfeng, an officerled infantry team was dispatched there by Kanda's Kucheng garrison. This 11-man patrol maintained watch on the Manchurian bank until after 6 P.M. on 14 August, when it was ordered back across the river to Nanpozan.17

By now, the bitterly contested Changkufeng-Shachaofeng-Hill 52 dis­ trict was devoid of Japanese troops and corpses. Soviet forces held all high ground across the Tumen, including "valueless” Changkufeng itself, where the red flag flew. "The fallback was carried out in perfect military order,” the Japanese press assured the people. "Our army's discipline is very strict, as the world has been able to ascertain from our defensive combat perform­ ance. Subordinates carried out their orders to the last man." For public consumption, the Japanese command explained its motives in withdrawing. The cease-fire agreement in Moscow was followed by smooth arrangements concerning implementation on the spot. Thus,

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

341

the combat situation caused by the Soviet forces' illicit intru­ sions of July had come to an end. Consequently, we decided, entirely on our own volition, to pull back to the right shore of the Tumen. There we shall sternly keep an eye on the So­ viet side's execution of the accord, while counting on their sincerity. As soon as matters reach a point which can be called truly peaceful, our units will return to their ordinary set-up.18

Even the Japanese newspapers had to admit, however, that when in­ structions were received to leave the front lines, "which had been secured by precious blood," the pull-out was executed "amidst a flood of tears." "As we fell back," recollects Tominaga, "we had the certitude that our government would negotiate a settlement of the incident on a strictly equal basis. In practice, these hopes were dashed."19 Suetaka later pro­ vided this rationalization: After the cease-fire was negotiated, it became very disadvan­ tageous for our forces to remain in the battle zone from the viewpoint of logistics. It would have been particularly incon­ venient for us to take decisive counteraction if the foe began unlawful activities again. Therefore, we saw the necessity of moving out our troops and concentrating them in some key area from which we would be able to cut the enemy's throat in emergency. This was put into effect immediately, until there was not a man left facing the foe [across the Tumen]. Nevertheless, after the cease-fire, the enemy set up entangle­ ments along the frontier near the battlefield for a distance of about four kilometers. Behind the wire, they constructed powerful positions which took three weeks to complete. In addition, hostile forces opposite Kyonghun put up barbed wire along the borders for as far as 20 kilometers.20 Suetaka concluded feebly that these actions only proved how much the Soviet Army feared "the amazing attack strength of the Imperial forces." A typhoon pummeled the region of the Changkufeng battlefront on 13 August, bringing torrential rains and flooded rivers. Front-line troops engaged in handling their own logistical chores; no army counter­ measures were readily available. As for the Russians, the Japanese press featured reports emanating from Seoul that the Siberian armies were

342

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

facing an appalling crisis. The swampy maritime province, never notable for logistics, had become a morass; Russian units, in the midst of their pull-back, had bogged down—tanks, heavy artillery, and 20,000 infantry­ men. Routes of food supply were almost severed and the Soviet forces were facing starvation.21 Meanwhile, from noon on 13 August, the third daily truce conference was held, amid heavy rain, in front of the white-walled schoolhouse be­ tween Changkufeng and Hill 52. When the Japanese proposed signing the recopied memorandum, the Russians raised new objections; they now preferred to denote the front-line deployments in text instead of markings. The Japanese would not accept this proposal but agreed to examine a Russian draft. Differences became apparent. Cho asked that the new text be converted into lines on a map. According to the Japanese transcript, "changes had been made so as to favor the Soviet side" in several respects: (1) The claim that Soviet troops were in control up to the front lines on the saddle of Hill 52. (2) The fact that the Russians were regarding the front edge of their entanglements on the crestline, and the locations of their lookout men, as constituting their front lines on the southeastern crestline at Changkufeng. (3) The fact that points unfavorable to the Russians, on the Khasan shore north of Changkufeng, were not mentioned at all. (4) The fact that Soviet positions in the vicinity of Shachaofeng were pushed up to the heights southwest.22

When the Soviets would not yield to Japanese protests, Cho recommended termination of the parleys because the Russians were "very much lacking in sincerity." Shtern injected a complaint against an alleged Japanese truce vio­ lation on the 11th but obtained no satisfaction. Cho had had enough. He gave the Russians notice that the Japanese side desired to break off negoti­ ations; privately, he concluded:

The intention of the Soviets in attempting to secure an advan­ tageous set-up seems to represent not only an effort to report [to their superiors] that the combat situation favored them but also a desire to apply the line of occupation to purposes of frontier demarcation in the future. This would exert adverse

‘

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

343

effects upon subsequent diplomatic negotiations by our side. So far as we are concerned, we have more than achieved the purposes of the truce talks, and it is not possible to mark the precise front-line locations since our forces have also with­ drawn by now. The sketches themselves are not accurate.23

To the Russians, Cho said openly: "An attitude such as yours reflects an outlook tending to expand your own territory, even by only a step—which contradicts your country's slogan that you do not desire an inch of an­ other country's territory but will not yield an inch, either. We have no duty to determine frontiers." The Russian delegation, according to the Japanese,

entreated us, again and again, to go on with the negotiations. But we replied that matters were bound to end inharmoniously, no matter how many times we met or how many days we con­ sumed, unless basic policies were changed. Policy differences like these, we added, lay outside the purview of the mission assigned us. Therefore, we would have to report on the matter to the Japanese commander and await further orders.24

To the Soviets' question about a resumption of negotiations in the near future, the Japanese answered: "Possibly you will be notified after we have returned and rendered our report. Or else the discussions may be shifted to the diplomatic level if our government so requires." The Rus­ sians accepted the proposal to suspend local parleys. After expressions of goodwill, the conferees retired at 10:30 P.M. on 13 August, some nine hours beyond the commencement of talks that day. According to a Tass communique on the 15th, Japanese troops had withdrawn, "at the moment," from the protested 100-meter "inroad," but the proposal of the Soviet committee "to sign a protocol and map fixing the disposition of the forces of both sides was refused by the Japanese military representatives." The latter indicated that "another more authoritative commission" would probably be sent.25 The truce teams did not meet again. A Japanese member describes the mood of the Soviet group in general:

344

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

They weren't arrogant at all; I would call the Soviet military representatives rather mild. Local negotiations were conducted on an equal basis without real difficulties. This was different from the parleys at Moscow, no doubt, where our side was unfortunately somewhat weaker in its position. On the spot, the atmosphere was quite friendly and I was even able to josh with the Russians. No one says the Russians acted like "victors.” "Bold Cho must have sub­ dued them!”26 Even according to the Soviet side, the area of the conflict was "quiet at the present time.” Japanese publicists asserted that the dispute had been settled completely and the district had returned to its old tranquility. Based on information from the war ministry, foreign correspondents in Tokyo understood that Changkufeng Hill was now "completely unoccu­ pied, for the first time in more than a month”; the respective armies were said to have withdrawn pending completion of negotiations.27 One other event did take place locally on 13 August. Between about 5 and 7 P.M., bodies were exchanged at a point on the crestline southeast of Changkufeng in accord with the agreement reached the day before. The Soviet version indicates that the exchange occurred at the request of the Japanese delegation, with the assent of the Russian side. Numerous inter­ viewees are of the opinion that an equal number of corpses was exchanged, although this would have meant that only a couple of Russian dead would have been returned, if we accept statements that merely two Japanese corpses were sent back by the Soviets. Iwasaki says: At first, it was our understanding that two Japanese bodies had been left on Soviet territory, so we requested the return of that number. Afterward, we heard about the military police­ man [Matsushima] who had been killed before the incident. But we had asked for only two, and that was all we got back. This was typical of the USSR—"never give anything more than asked.”28

One Japanese officer remembers that about 40 Russian bodies were returned on 13 August, a number which almost coincides with what a Japanese correspondent wrote on the 6th:

.

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

345

At the village of Minami-Sozan, I went to the elementary school building. This was the point [in Korea] nearest to Changkufeng, only 200 meters to the skirt of that hill. Two or three Japanese soldiers took us reporters to a makeshift morgue adjacent to the school. In a building resembling a warehouse, I saw the corpses of 37 Soviet soldiers killed since 29 July. An American correspondent who was allowed to approach the Tumen near Hongui on 4 August was shown the corpse of "a white man dressed in a gray-green uniform—certainly not a Japanese uniform,” said to be the body of a Soviet pilot brought down on 1 August. Nearby was the house which contained 37 coffins.29 Interviewees who know anything about the corpses are unanimous in describing the treatment accorded them by the respective sides. The Japanese returned the Russian bodies "most reverently" in white wooden caskets adorned by fresh flowers, but the Japanese dead were returned naked, wrapped only in sheets. "When the Russians saw the way we had treated their slain," recalls one eyewitness, "they seemed touched. We had demonstrated to them that Japan was a more refined country than the USSR."30 On 16 August IGHQ decided that any further discussions of the return of missing Japanese personnel—and of the body of Corporal Matsushima— ought to be handled at the diplomatic level. The number of Japanese bodies not returned by the USSR is pinpointed by an entry in Litvinov's diary for 21 August: "Shigemitsu turned to the question of the remaining 19 bodies, and also the body of NCO Matsushima, about which the em­ bassy counselor [Nishi] had already had conversations with Mironov." Shigemitsu added, as a matter of quid pro quo, that the Japanese side wanted to turn over the Soviet airman's corpse which had been retrieved; would the commissar inform Russian local authorities accordingly?31 The subject of Japanese prisoners, or of Japanese casualties captured by an enemy, is always difficult to explore because of the ignominy of capture under any circumstances. Due to the constricted terrain in the Changkufeng sector, early Japanese seizure of high ground, and subse­ quent defensive operations, there was little likelihood that Japanese sol­ diers would be taken by the Russians, dead or alive. An officer who handled the exchange of corpses thinks no live Japanese prisoners were involved. Still, there were a number of Japanese penetrations and outflanking actions,

346

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

mainly by night, when Soviet forces might have picked up some Japanese; the 75th Infantry journal for 7 August lists seven enlisted men as "missing and presumed dead.” A Japanese unit commander estimates that two wounded soldiers may have been captured alive by the Russians.32 This rare admission is borne out by the revelation made to me that a Japanese infantryman listed as killed during the night combat of 6-7 August reap­ peared "miraculously" as a repatriate from the USSR fifteen years later. This soldier had been captured while lying wounded.33

NOTES 1. CS, Chokoho, pp. 89-90. 2. Tominaga, Ichimoto, and Iwasaki interviews. 3. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 288-290. 4. Ibid., pp. 290-292, 294. 5. Ito Kinjiro, "Gunjin 'washi ga kuni sa' " [The military's "local origins?'], Chuo Koron 53 (October 1938) :304; Ichimoto, Iwasaki, and Tominaga interviews. 6. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 293-298; CS, Chokoho, pp. 92-93; B. Nakamura, Man-Sot p. 268; Tokyo Asahi, 13 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. According to Rus­ sian accounts, Litvinov protested a Japanese violation to Shigemitsu on 12 August, demanding that the Japanese withdraw no less than 100 meters and warning that if they did not, the Soviets would consider the truce broken by Japan. The Japanese supposedly complied. FRUS 1938, 3:481. 7. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 296-299; Tokyo Asahi, 18 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3; FRUS 1938, 3:481; New York Times, 15 August 1938, p. 1. 8. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 301-308. Mutual signature of the truce memorandum was officially reported completed at 11 P.M. on 12 August, but the Korea Army record refers only to the document covering the cease-fire and separation of forces. CS, Chokoho, p. 96. 9. Tokyo Asahi, 14 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. 10. Arao interview; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, p. 348. 11. Sasai interview. 12. FRUS 1938, 17 August 1938, 3:482. Also see New York Times, 12 August 1938, p. 8; ibid., 14 August 1938, pp. 1, 24; Tokyo Asahi, 14 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; Jinchu bidan, p. 303. 13. Arao interview. Also Hashimoto and Iwasaki interviews; CS, Chokoho, p. 93; Jinchu bidan, frontispiece; Tokyo Asahi, 13 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3. 14. CS, Chokoho, pp. 85-86, 93-95. 15. Suetaka Unit Combat Headquarters Victory Operations Order Noi 5, 2 P.M., 12 August 1938, AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 242. 16. Ibid., pp. 242-245. 17. Ibid., pp. 246-247.

IMPLEMENTATION AND PULL-BACK

347

18. War ministry communique, 15 August 1938, in Tokyo Asahi, 16 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2; Jinchu bidan, p. 26. 19. Tokyo Asahi, 16 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2; Tominaga interview. Also see Jinchu bidan, p. 26; New York Times, 16 August 1938, p. 8; I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:91; Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 307-315. 20. Suetaka in Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 345-346. 21. Iwasaki interview; Tokyo Asahi, 18 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3. About 19 August the Korea Army disapproved the 19th Division's request to activate a provisional quartermaster company. CS, Chokoho, pp. 86-87. 22. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 308-311. 23. Ibid., p. 312. 24. Ibid., pp. 310-313. 25. Ibid., p. 313;Tass communique, 15 August 1938, cited in FfRUS 1938, 15 August 1938, 3:481 -482. 26. Sasai interview; also Iwasaki interview. 27. Tass communique of 15 August 1938; B. Nakamura, ManSo, p. 270; New York Times, 13 August 1938, p. 1; ibid., 15 August 1938, p. 1. 28. Jinchu bidan, p. 26; Tass communique of 15 August 1938; Iwasaki, Nakazawa, and Miyajima interviews. The exchange of bodies was supposed to have occurred at noon, according to a Domei report of 15 August. Tokyo Asahi, 16 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 29. Ichimoto interview; Tokyo Asahi, 14 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. B. Naka­ mura and an American correspondent heard separate but identical stories about the approximately 20 Russian corpses they saw at the Minami-Sozan morgue—soldiers said to have been slain during the Japanese capture of Changkufeng. B. Nakamura, Man-So, p. 297; New York Times, 5 August 1938, p. 8. As early as 2 August, the Korea Army had claimed publicly that more than 70 Soviet bodies had been found. Tokyo Asahi, 3 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. 30. Sasai interview. Also Iwasaki and Tominaga interviews. 31. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 16 August 1938; Litvinov diary, 21 August 1938, IMTFE, Transcript, 23 May 1947, p. 22909. Mironov was an official in the Soviet ministry of foreign affairs. 32. Ichimoto, Sasai, and Tominaga interviews; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho, 7 August 1938. 33. Nakazawa interview. The returnee belonged to Inokuma's 7th Company, mauled during the night raid behind Soviet lines.

Military Wind-up and Unfinished Business

On 16 August an Imperial order was transmitted to General Nakamura by Kan'in, the AGS chief. Reinforcements from North China which had been assigned to the Korea Army were to be returned. On the 18th Naka­ mura took steps to deactivate the augmentation from the 20th Depot Division and to release the hospital train sent by the Kwantung Army. On the same day, Suetaka decided to buttress defenses north of Chang­ kufeng by attaching a battalion from Cho's regiment to the garrison unit covering the Wuchiatzu district; on the 21st, BGU Commander Senda dispatched a fourth company there, too.1 The AGS, on the afternoon of 24 August, sent Nakamura the IGHQ directive "winding up" the Changkufeng Incident: "Korea Army com­ mander will appropriately return to duty stations those units assembled in right bank area of Tumen. For time being border guards may be strengthened with necessary elements. Care must nevertheless be taken not to provoke enemy."2 The Korea Army was also issued an IGHQ order calling for return to the Kwantung Army of the reinforcements of artillery, railway guns, and engineers.3 The final Korea Army oper­ ations order dealing with dissolution of the Changkufeng affair was prepared on 26 August. Suetaka was to leave behind a unit built around one infantry battalion and one mountain artillery battery, and have it come under the BGU commander of the 76th Regiment. The latter must maintain particularly strict guarding at Shuiliufeng and Wuchiatzu, without irritating the foe. Deployment of units on the left bank south of Shuiliufeng was prohibited. To maintain public

MILITARY WIND-UP AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS

349

security in Korea, necessary strength might be kept on the Korean side of the Tumen for the time being.4 In Tokyo, on the morning of 13 August, Ugaki had gone to the Meiji shrine to "report” on the cease-fire and to express his gratitude. At 10 A.M., when received in Imperial audience, he discussed the Changkufeng Incident. "I humbly regret to have troubled Your Majesty so unduly in connection with an unimportant affair on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier” at a time when the monarch was confronted by grave national problems. A long and winding road lay ahead before the incident as a whole was settled, but a good start had been made and "we are going to be even more careful in handling matters," although the Soviet regime "consists of devious, vicious scoundrels." After attributing the localization of the crisis wholly to the Emperor's beneficence, Ugaki mentioned several specific factors: the en­ durance of the Japanese forces, which "maintained splendid control and fought strenuously"; the partial mobilization and the shifting of Kwantung Army units to the eastern border; public opinion; and Soviet domestic difficulties. Thus, the USSR was shown that "our resolution was firm al­ though we desired peace and sought no escalation." While a similar policy had been decided at the time of the North China crisis in 1937, matters had deteriorated then. This time, Ugaki had interceded particularly with the war minister in behalf of localization, inasmuch as the basic problem seemed to be the dissemination of central intentions "down to the lowest branches" of the military.5 Recognition of the Japanese Army's performance was accorded by the highest authorities in the homeland. As soon as the fighting ceased, Kan'in transmitted a message of appreciation. The day after the cease-fire, the command in North Korea issued a generous communique: "We pay homage to the Japanese for defending themselves against 100 planes, 200 tanks, and 60 pieces of heavy artillery. Our admiration for the bravery of both armies is of the highest."6 On 14 August Changkufeng was officially but temporarily renamed Seiyuzan by the Japanese Army in Korea. At the 75th Regiment's cantonment at Hoeryong, a monument inscribed "Seiyuzan" was erected to commemorate the unit's victorious night attack.7 The Imperial family had returned to the palace on 12 August after two weeks at the villa in Hayama. At 2 P.M. on the 15th, Kan'in was received in audience and reported on the settlement of the crisis. Said the Emperor: "We are gratified by the fact that, during this incident at Changkufeng, Our officers and men achieved their mission fully and manifested prudence

350

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

and forbearance while confronting difficult circumstances with small forces. Our profound condolences to the casualties. Convey this message to the officers and men." A wire was dispatched promptly to Nakamura.8 With Imperial use of the wording "Changkufeng Incident," the nomenclature for the affair was fixed in Japan. When the cabinet met on 16 August, the decision was reached officially.9 On 14 August the Korea Army recommended to the high command that the Changkufeng Incident be regarded as part of the China Incident. During the cabinet session of the 16th, Itagaki also proposed that the fighting be termed an "incident" (jiken} for military and administrative purposes. The resultant governmental approval meant that army awards could be granted, the same as in the cases of the Manchurian and China "incidents," and the awards bureau could begin the process immediately. On 23 August IGHQ took the necessary steps. Awards were consequently given for the China Incident, "mixed" with those for Changkufeng. Some recipients were honored only for service in China, some only for the fighting at Changkufeng, and others for exploits in both. Newspaper ac­ counts of award ceremonies did not ordinarily identify the locale where the honor was won, but local papers played up area heroes. Inada says that when decorations were bestowed, 19th Division personnel were given first-class recognition. This led high-ranking officers of the Kwantung Army to criticize the central authorities for being lavish in order to "cover up the defeat at Changkufeng." (Italics added.) Others suggest that the local forces were rated so highly because they had been docile in heeding Tokyo. All of the deceased received the Order of the Golden Kite, as did at least two of the living officers—K. Sato (now a major general) and Ichimoto (now a lieutenant colonel). It has been said that Suetaka was promoted to army commander as a reward for his "success" at Chang­ kufeng, "although he was not cut out for that type of command.”10 The Japanese Army was touched by further evidence of interest and benevolence by the Imperial family. On 26 August the Empress provided bandages for the wounded and wrote poignant waka verse about comrades who had sacrificed their lives. Subsequently, on 21 November, Matsudaira advised Kido that Her Majesty had supplied cakes and had penned poetry which stemmed from her deep concern for the men suffering pain in the cold.11 Earlier, on 5 September, Suetaka had issued a glowing letter of com- . mendation to his 75th Infantry Regiment. At the end of October, when •• Hankow finally fell, Itagaki sent a telegram of appreciation to Suetaka I

MILITARY WIND-UP AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS

351

for the great contribution of his division, by which was meant the indirect pressure exerted from the north—"the resolute counterattacks [which] did not allow the enemy a modicum of leeway."12 In March 1939 it was decided to dispatch an Imperial aide to Korea to inspect the units which had been involved in the Changkufeng Incident, for "His Majesty ascribed importance to the defense of the North Korean district and had been meditating about the toil of the officers and men who had participated in the fighting."13 To this extent, the Japanese Army's travails were not forgotten. Supposedly, a frontier commission was an integral part of the Chang­ kufeng settlement. The inconclusive arrangements of 10 August were fol­ lowed by specific instructions to Shigemitsu as the basis for further dis­ cussions. Eventually, on 10 September, a ten-point draft agreement was reached. The main committee would be made up of a Japanese and a Manchurian on one side, and two Russians on the other. The geographical scope of the delimitation would be the area of current dispute, a distance of about eight kilometers. The basis for work would be the Hunchun agreement and attached maps, plus those treaties and maps which bore the signatures of Russian and Chinese plenipotentiaries. Along the accepted border, new midway markers would be erected 500 meters apart, with supplementary markers as necessary. Ditches would be dug as secondary features. The parties concerned were to defray the expenses of their representatives, technical costs of demarcation to be borne equally. Communiques might be released only after approval by both sides. The commission was to terminate work within two months of initiation.14 After this accord, however, an apparently insurmountable problem arose concerning the form the agreement should take. The USSR insisted on a bilateral treaty, but the Japanese wanted only a written understanding. The Japanese contended that there was danger that winter would disrupt the work of the commission unless it got under way promptly; a treaty would only serve to complicate matters. The Changkufeng Incident was essentially a problem between Manchukuo and the USSR, with Japan merely offering its good offices. A "ponderous" document such as a treaty would require domestic processing, such as privy council sanction, which would inevitably delay the work of any commission.15 According to the Gaimusho report, the Soviet side did not show much enthusiasm from the outset. Objective examination suggests that the obstacles were equally of Japanese making. A Kwantung Army staff expert reveals that Manchukuo government officials and he proceeded to Tokyo from Hsinking,

352

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

probably in autumn 1938, to conduct liaison on the subject of the border problem with the war ministry and the Gaimusho, the Soviet embassy, and other agencies. Unofficially designated a member of the proposed boundary commission, this officer investigated all materials bearing on the problem. Sometime after the studies had been initiated, a conference was held in the presence of Tojo and many other army leaders.

I reported that my investigations jibed perfectly with Soviet claims. War Ministry Colonel Tanaka Shin'ichi "exploded"; he arose without a word and stalked out. Tokyo now realized that in case the boundary commission set to work, the Japanese side would be placed at a disadvantage. Therefore, the whole problem of demarcation was "put on ice." which was why the commission was never established.16 Presumably, too, this was why some so-called evidence was trumped up by the Japanese at the frontier after the cease-fire: Japanese postwar histories reveal that, to strengthen the Japanese case, local military authorities faked machine-gun positions of the Red Army after the cease-fire at a point known to be 50 meters inside the Manchukuoan frontier at Shachaofeng. Abandoned corpses were laid out and photographs taken, "confirming" the Soviet intrusion.17 The neighboring Kwantung Army took a more direct and forceful in­ terest in the Changkufeng area. It was extremely displeased with the Korea Army's and higher headquarters' handling of the crisis. Nishi, however, in­ sists that Shigemitsu received an unusual telegram of appreciation from the Kwantung Army at the time the incident was settled. "It was rare indeed for a diplomat to be thanked by the military for anything," Nishi adds.18 Nevertheless, Hsinking regained operational control of the Hunchun sector of Manchuria from the Korea Army as soon as possible. Apparently, this shift had never been possible as long as Koiso was army commander, but Nakamura could not or did not resist a few months after the close of the Changkufeng Incident.19 Tsuji, then operations staff officer at Kwantung Army Headquarters, asserts that as soon as the transfer of defensive responsibility was effected, he reconnoitered the Changkufeng sector. In early March 1939, he pro­ ceeded with a photo team and a 40-man platoon to Changkufeng, then occupied by 200 Soviet troops. Enlargements of his photos, Tsuji says, . ; revealed a clear case of border violation on the part of the Russians; the £

MILITARY WIND-UP AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS

353

Kwantung Army rushed the pictures to the AGS, and the army commander asked for directives (with a view to taking back the high ground that spring).20 According to other sources, Tsuji visited the high command in Tokyo, shared his views with sympathetic staff officers (to the effect that conduct of the Changkufeng Incident had been a disaster for the Japanese), and brought word back to Hsinking that Inada approved the notion that the Kwantung Army ought to evict the Soviet "trespassers"by force. Ishiwara, deputy chief of staff, was dubious. Could such a vital matter, he queried the high command, really have been decided at the deputy AGS level in Tokyo? Inada could never have encouraged Tsuji. As the latter admits: "The answer came from Tokyo: 'Leave matters alone.' Naturally the AGS hushed things up to save face."21 But, apparently, the Kwantung Army did not abandon its irresponsible offensive plans, which contravened the heart of Japanese high policy. Sometime in early 1939, the new AGS deputy. General Nakajima Tetsuzo, dispatched a personal letter to Kwan­ tung Army Commander Ueda Kenkichi, at the express order of the AGS chief (still Prince Kan'in), enjoining the field army to call off any plans to recapture Changkufeng. As one Japanese historian puts it, the Kwan­ tung Army was suffering from "border defense neurosis," illustrated by Tsuji's aggressive activities.22 Soon enough, from mid-1939, the Kwantung Army would find itself locked in mortal combat against the Soviets and Outer Mongolians on the western front of Manchuria at Nomonhan; Chang­ kufeng would have to be forgotten for the moment. Japanese newsmen who visited Changkufeng in spring 1939 were "astonished to see a Soviet flag set up on the summit of the hill."23 The de facto arrangements reached between the Japanese and the Rus­ sians in September 1938 have remained in effect ever since. Unless some­ one again raises the dead cartographic issue, Korean natives will continue to be prohibited legally from sacrificing pigs or beating changgo atop Changkufeng. Presumably, the present-day North Korean People's Repub­ lic fell heir to the legacy of 1938, to their expense.

NOTES 1. CS, Chokoho, pp. 96-100; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 18, 21 August 1938. 2. IGHQ Army Directive No. 252, by AGS Message No. 593, 3:50 P.M., 24 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, p. 101.

354

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

3. IGHQ Army Order No. 190, by AGS Message No. 595, 4:01 P.M., 24 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 101-102. 4. Korea Army Operations Order No. 73, 2 P.M., 26 August 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 102-104; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 26 August 1938. f 5. Ugaki, Ugaki nikki, p. 320. 6. New York Times, 13 August 1938, p. 28. The wording of this communique, possibly issued by 19th Division Headquarters, leads Clark Tinch to draw the mis­ leading conclusion that "the Japanese commander tacitly admitted defeat—and doubtless exaggerated—when he praised his army." Tinch, "Quasi-War," p. 428. Also see AGS, Chokoho soan, p. iv. 7. Jinchu bidan, pp. 4, 26; Ichimoto interview. A news dispatch from Korea on 17 August substituted "ho" (hill) for "zan" (mount) and thus characterized Chang­ kufeng as "Seiyuho." Tokyo Asahi, 18 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3. 8. CS, Chokoho, p. 96. Also see Jinchu bidan, frontispiece, p. 26; Tokyo Asahi, 16 August 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. ii. 9. Suetaka in Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 325-326; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. i. 10. I. Hata interview. Also Inada, Imaoka, and Tominaga interviews; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 14, 23 August 1938; Tokyo Asahi, 1 7 August 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1. Ichimoto received his rare award for Changkufeng while serving in China in 1941; his local publicity was in Kanagawa. T. Saito mentions winning the Order of the Rising Sun. Suetaka became Twelfth Army commander (North China, 1938-1939) and Third Army commander (Manchuria, 1939-1941). 11. Jinchu bidan, frontispiece, p. 26. Waka refers to 31-syllable Japanese poems. 12. Ibid., pp. 2-3; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. iv. 13. Jinchu bidan, frontispiece (18 March 1939). 14. Full text in Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 63-65. The American embassy in Moscow understood, from the Japanese embassy, that matters concerning the pro­ posed commission were being relegated to a place of "relative unimportance." FRUS 1938, 14 September 1938, 3:484. 15. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, pp. 64-65. 16. Katakura interview; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, p. 348. 17. I. Hata etal., TSM 4/2:377, n. 3;Takenouchi statement, BBSS Archives. 18. Nishi, Kaiso no Nihon gaiko, p. 84; Nishi interview. 19. Tsuchiya, Sasai, Imaoka, and I. Hata interviews. 20. Tsuji, Nomonhan, pp. 40-41. Parenthetical addition from I. Hata interview; 21. Tsuji, Nomonhan, p. 41. 22. I. Hata interview. Also Katakura interview. 23. American Consulate General, Harbin, Dispatch No. 136, 7 April 1939, NA 761.9315 Manchuria/97.

K

Lessons WHAT THE USSR LEARNED

After the Changkufeng affair, Japanese officers claimed that the Soviets had dispatched tactical experts "to ascertain why their elite Far Eastern forces had not been able to achieve satisfactory results. They realize the urgency of this investigation in preparation for any great war." Specific­ ally, the AGS heard that on the day of the cease-fire, Blyukher had sent an investigative team of commissars under Romanovsky to the scene.1 Japanese experts on the USSR speculated that the experience at Chang­ kufeng ought indeed to have impressed the Red Army: "Our forces did seize the hill and hold it. After comparing the strengths involved . . . the Russians may well have had to modify their estimates." According to one Japanese commentator, improvements in political leadership were judged imperative by the USSR, gainsaying claims that the Soviet Army had been strengthened through the purge of alleged Japanese tools.2 A year or two afterward, another propaganda-conscious Japanese writer speculated about reactions of the Russian military to the experience of Changkufeng. The Red Army and the Soviet chieftains must be racking their brains. Why had they not been able to attain their objectives even after powerful assaults lasting ten days? Their forward elements had pushed forward under the supervision of all the Far East army officers under Mar­ shal Blyukher. Any pull-back was punished instantly, while advances and excellent performance were commended.3 But when the advancing troops got 20 or 30 meters away, they would hold up. Had the Red Army lost confidence in hand-to-hand combat? What was the meaning of desertions under the noses of superiors? "The Russians are going to make a new start in all aspects of their national defense establishment, utilizing their ex­ perience in the fighting at Changkufeng as the starting point. The manuals and regulations of all the armed services are going to be revised."4

MAP 5. Soviet Version of Events, 29 July-11 August 1938.

LESSONS

357

Soviet authorities would not agree on the last points. According to Erickson, "As a test of doctrine, the fighting confirmed the correctness of the basic principles embodied in the 1936 Field Service Regulations.” Nevertheless, "that 'inter-action,' for which Tukhachevsky had constantly pressed, had been lacking during the operations at Lake Khasan. The Soviet infantry paid dearly for this, as well as for the deficiencies in tactical training.''5 Defense Commissar Voroshilov admitted, "We were not suf­ ficiently quick in our tactics, and particularly in joint operations in dealing the enemy a concentrated blow."6 In the view of Mackintosh: The Soviet success at Lake Khasan was bought at the cost of heavy casualties and exposed serious defects in the mobiliza­ tion machinery and the training of troops. There can be little doubt that these factors checked to some extent the Soviet Government's overoptimistic estimate of its own military strength and cast doubt on the effectiveness of its policy of expansion in all fields of military organization.7

Gaimusho and Japanese public commentators claimed that the USSR made a number of major structural changes, militarily and administratively, on the basis of the painful lessons of 1938 and the leakage of secrets by Lyushkov. First, the Soviet authorities split the Siberian army into two by creating a 1st and 2nd Independent Red Banner Corps (Army), re­ spectively based in Voroshilov (or Vladivostok) and Khabarovsk. Shtern was assigned to be 1st Corps commander; Konev, 2nd Corps commander. Blyukher's ouster was thus confirmed, and he was liquidated on 9 No­ vember 1938. Stalin must have considered it dangerous to continue the Far East Army as a semiautonomous element; presumably to strengthen party influence, commands were placed under direct control of the Com­ missariat of National Defense. Second, Moscow modified the administra­ tive districts in Siberia. In October 1938 the Far Eastern territory was abolished, to be replaced by two administrative entities, the Khabarovsk territory (comprising most of the old area) and the maritime territory (centering on Vladivostok).8

JAPANESE LESSONS ABOUT THE RUSSIANS

One of the rare defenders of Inada's theory of reconnaissance in force had said that the idea did have a sound function: to confirm estimates of

358

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

the new Soviet Army, known only on paper till then. Viewed in this fashion, Japan's objectives were uncomplicated by diplomatic or political considera­ tions. "Except for this particular reason, it would have been nonsensical for Japan to have used force in such a wretched area as Changkufeng."9 An AGS officer adds: "The army was interested, of course, in learning about Soviet military tactics, weapons, and persistence by actually pitting its strength against them. In this sense the Changkufeng Incident would sound like strategic reconnaissance."10 Writing a year and a half after Changkufeng, an exultant Mainichi reporter observed that the greatest harvest from the incident was tangible Japanese experience in determining the fight­ ing strength of the Russians. Purchased with blood, this knowledge could provide valuable evidence for future combat operations. It was a question whether Changkufeng really possessed such strategic signi­ ficance as was claimed for it, but the Soviet policy of bluff could be interpreted as substantiating the weakness of the defenses of Vladivo­ stok. "The Russians used all kinds of new weapons at Changkufeng and tipped their whole hand. . . . But although mechanization of the Red Army had attained high levels with respect to quantity, their weak­ nesses in technique and quality were laid bare."11 Imaoka observes that since the Changkufeng Incident marked the first time that the Japanese and Soviet armies engaged each other in combat involving large strategic elements (divisional and above), Russian fighting strength was studied with keen interest. The Japanese did not rate the capacity of the officers or Soviet quality, in general, as especially high. Still, the Russians did possess quantitative abundance, and Japanese losses had been heavy because the enemy had fired masses of ammunition against fixed targets. Suetaka seems to have comprehended the scope of tangible Soviet strength in equipment and materiel, as shown by his comment: "I felt deeply that if the gap in manpower went beyond limits, it would be inevitable for our casualties to increase tremendously; this might even cause us danger in specific local areas."12 Few Japanese officers saw anything new in Soviet tactical methods, although considerations of mass were ever-present. Not only intelligence experts but the whole army worked on ways of coping with Soviet forces that would have the numerical advantage by 3:1. That the Japanese planned to win despite these odds suggests that they underrated the USSR, although it also demonstrates that Japan always expected to be outnumbered badly, as happened at Changkufeng. Severe casualties were to be anticipated, in

LESSONS

359

view of the "no win" policy imposed by Tokyo; authorization to commit planes and more artillery would have reduced losses. "All we experienced directly," remarks an infantry officer, "was one edge of Soviet combat power.” Most awesome was the "fantastic abundance" of hostile materiel, although the Russians could not deploy to surround the Japanese because of the geography. An AGS expert on the USSR summed it up: "We learned that Soviet strength was up to expectations, whereas Japanese arms and equipment had to be improved and reinforced."13

JAPANESE LESSONS ABOUT THE JAPANESE

Worded in a multiplicity of ways, the Japanese conclusion was that patient Imperial forces had won a great victory by defending the con­ tested border with flesh vs. steel and by limiting the Changkufeng In­ cident, till the end, against enemy hordes supported exclusively by planes and tanks. Japanese infantrymen admit that the combat soldiers did not savor their disadvantages. "All our materiel was inferior in quality and particularly in quantity. We had the impression that whereas we relied on muscle power, the enemy used engines. This rendered our fighting particularly hard, but we had full confidence in our spiritual strength [i.e., superiority]An infantry platoon leader remarks: "If necessary to fight, it was seen that the Japanese, when trained properly, possessed excellent, patriotic qualities." Still, an infantryman feels, the Japanese mode of combat at Changkufeng resembled that of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Even antiaircraft batteries, on occasion, were unable to engage planes, being outranged, and relatively few batteries were available.14 The ability of Japanese ground forces to bear the excruciating difficulties of passive defense was applauded widely in military and public circles. Hem­ med in by the Tumen enclave and prevented by orders from crossing the border, units on the Manchurian shore were compelled, as the result of terrain as well as orders, to restrict themselves to head-on struggle. Neither retreat nor advance was possible; neither was defeat, for the Russians were unable to break through the defenses frontally, despite overwhelming fire power and picked troops. Still, if the terrain had been more open, Japanese troops would not have suffered so terribly as the result of clinging to a "precise" hill frontier. Thus, the Japanese might have deliberately strayed across the border if only there had been the room for maneuver which

360

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

the Japanese were able to exploit at Nomonhan in 1939. Despite the price, Changkufeng afforded a chance to demonstrate the "unique Japanese specialty" in action: the prowess of the magnificent infantry, "queen of battles."15 Nevertheless, the Japanese mode of tactical operation, asserts Iwasaki, the Korea Army senior staff officer, was "the worst possible: fighting with hands tied." This meant that the Russians could fight "to their hearts' content," committing tanks and planes, and striking from all directions. A front-line infantry commander comments: "One's troops ought to be provided meaningful reasons for fighting and for dying happily. It is cruel to ask officers and men to meet masses of steel and to shed their blood without visible cause, and apparently because of inadequate combat pre­ parations." The cease-fire agreement was concluded "at just the right time," General Morimoto admitted.16 A secret report prepared by AGS analysts sheds light on the larger question of what the army thought it had learned about itself and the Soviet enemy.

In studying Changkufeng, one ought to bear a number of cautions in mind: (1) The incident broke out when we were concentrating on the holy war against China; severe limita­ tions on combat operations were imposed by the necessity to adhere to a policy of nonenlargement. (2) Apparently, the enemy also adopted a policy of localization while con­ tinuously attempting to recapture the high ground in the Changkufeng area. (3) Our forces employed units which were on Phase-1 alert from beginning to end; in terms of quality, the personnel were excellent—mainly active-duty types, from key men down. But our numbers were far in­ ferior, and our organization and equipment were not of the best. In addition, we committed no planes or tanks, where­ as the enemy used plenty. (4) The 19th Division was thorough, rigorous, and realistic in its combat training prior to the en­ gagement. (5) Battlefield terrain seriously limited the enemy's attacks, especially tank action. But while the Tumen restricted assaults against our flanks and rear, it hampered our own serv­ ices of supply, notably the provision of position construction materials.17

LESSONS

361

Still, the AGS analysts insisted, the Japanese Army derived many military lessons from the fighting at Changkufeng, quite apart from the aspect of "reconnaissance in force." Most particularly, Japanese intelligence profited from first-hand participation in operations. Nevertheless, a Korea Army staff officer complains, "If only the incident of 1938 had been studied intensively by Japan, a disaster such as occurred at Nomonhan in the next year would have been prevented."18

NOTES 1. "Chokoho jiken no keika,” Shokodan ho, p. 24; AGS, Chokoho soan. Chronology, 11 August 1938. 2. Jinchu bidan, p. 366; JRD, Japanese Night Combat, 1:46; Suetaka in Akaishizawa, Chokoho, p. 351; Arao interview. Also see my "The Lake Khasan Affair of 1938: Overview and Lessons," Soviet Studies 25 (July 1973): 51-65. 3. On 25 October 1938, according to Soviet records, unit citations were bestowed on the 40th Rifle Division (Order of Lenin), and the 32nd Rifle Division and Posyet BGU (Order of the Red Banner). Individual awards included Hero of the Soviet Union (26), Order of Lenin (95), and Order of the Red Banner (1,985). Another 4,000-plus individuals received the Order of the Red Star, Medal of Valor, and Distinguished Service Medal. Soren kyosanto, Dai nijisekai taisen shi, 2:9. For prewar Japanese estimates, see Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, p. 349; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 72. 4. Jinchu bidan, p. 76. 5., Erickson, The Soviet High Command, pp. 498, 499. 6. Mackintosh, Juggernaut, p. 101. 7. Ibid. 8. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 73; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, p. 349; Tomioka, Roshiya dai kakumei shi, 10:xv. The date of Blyukher's death is taken from Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 836. 9. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. 10. Miyashi interview. 11. Mainichi dispatch cited in Jinchu bidan, pp. 367-368 (8 April 1940). The Soviet Air Force did not use dive-bombing techniques. 12. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," pp. 46-47. 13. Tsuchiya, Iwasaki, Arao, Kotani, Sasai, and Ichimoto interviews. 14. Otsuka and Murakoshi interviews. Also Hayano and Inada interviews. 15. Giga, Tominaga, Sato, Saito, and Imaoka interviews. 16. Iwasaki interview; Takenouchi and Morimoto statements, BBSS Archives. 17. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 1-2. 18. Tsuchiya interview. Also AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 248; Arao interview; Hoshino, Mihatenu yume, p. 280; Tanaka, Haiin o tsuku, p. 53; I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:82, 94.

Questions of Causation and Cartography

31

PRIVATE VIEW AND RETROSPECT

In public, Japanese and Soviet publicists engaged in vituperative ex­ changes. Private room for doubt about the sanctity of the border issues can be detected even in classified Japanese documents. In a confidential report produced during September 1938, Gaimusho analysts observed that, as a consequence of the tension generated in the border zones, both the Japanese and Soviet armies had sought to occupy operational key points. If one accepted the contention that the watershed was the bound­ ary, "then our side has trespassed into Soviet territory by occupying four hills on the southern part of the eastern Manchurian border, while the Russians have invaded Manchukuoan territory by setting up positions on one hill (Norumiyama) as well as attempting to seize Changkufeng." Japanese as well as Soviet aircraft had violated opposing airspace due to military necessity.1 Classified army views were also argued soundly and moderately.2 Commenting on "maximum" Japanese boundary contentions, the historian Hata stresses that Shigemitsu "was in a tough spot." The Soviet side treated the Hunchun map as the only basic document, whereas the Gaimusho pursued disadvantageous tactics by claiming a line east of Khasan and relying on second-rate documentation. The combat occurred along the boundary of the Hunchun agreement, which "drove us into a corner." Contradictorily, local forces spoke of an invasion, on the vague assumption that the treaty line governed (i.e., the crestline amounted to the boundary). "But since a border line does not possess width, it was difficult to allege that the Soviet side had 'invaded' in principle." One

CAUSATION AND CARTOGRAPHY

363

could not establish positions on the ridgeline without trespassing across the line.3 With the benefit of hindsight, Japanese survivors tend to view cartographic problems in perspective. Some wonder why the Japanese military faked evidence at Shachaofeng after the incident. It was not impossible that the Russians had been honestly but too strictly trying to uphold a boundary which their own maps showed. "There was always room for self-reflection on our part too," confesses one candid inter­ viewee.4 A number of border incidents, including Changkufeng, are now seen as accidental ignitions, fanned by misinterpretation and misunder­ standing of intentions.

FOREIGN ESTIMATES: BRITISH, AMERICAN, CHINESE In Moscow, the British ambassador, Viscount Chilston, submitted a discerning dispatch to the foreign minister, Lord Halifax, in late August 1938, reviewing the course and import of the Changkufeng Incident. It was "not improbable" that Soviet border guards had been reinforced heavily in the badly defined area where Lyushkov had crossed into Man­ churia. Alarmed by this buildup in vacant but Japanese-claimed territory, the Korea Army frontier guards must have acted to drive away the "in­ truders." It was hard to believe that either party was guilty of what the other charged: of having deliberately provoked an incident to test enemy reactions or to foment war. The chief significance of the dispute, demon­ strated by the outcome, was that the Soviet government was unwilling to risk involvement in a major conflict. The reasons were military and, above all, internal. Although an effort had been made to represent the affair as a Russian success, no reliable evaluation of the military situation was possible since the releases of the opposing forces were so contradic­ tory. Chilston saw no reason to judge that Japanese forces had been par­ ticularly successful; from both sides' communiques, it was also obvious that the Japanese government's attitude was "far from intransigent." Still, "a display of weakness on the part of the Japanese does not neces­ sarily imply a display of strength on the part of their opponents." After all, the Soviet authorities had accepted a cease-fire when, as they ad­ mitted, Japanese troops occupied Russian soil despite the constant re­ frain that the Russians were determined to go on fighting till the last invader was ousted.

364

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Chilston was convinced that the only reason the Soviet government had not given way from the outset, as it had done during the Amur af­ fair of 1937, was that the Russians had good reason to suppose that Japan was not prepared to complicate the troubles in China by daring to undertake a second war simultaneously. Sensing a chance to acquire some prestige, domestically and internationally, by demonstrating firmness at little cost, the Soviet rulers may have decided on a course of action which enabled them to claim a diplomatic victory and "an impressive victory in the field for troops who had hitherto been denied an opportunity of demonstrating their much-advertised prowess, but may even have caused less acute observers to question the view that the Soviet government were in practically no circumstances prepared to fight." Eventually, the Rus­ sians had abandoned their firm attitude and accepted "a compromise no doubt as welcome to the Japanese as it was to themselves," probably because, as the crisis dragged on, there was less certainty that the Japanese would not fight under any circumstances. As Ambassador Robert Craigie had suggested from Tokyo, it was also possible that the Red Army's per­ formance in its "baptism by fire" at Changkufeng had not met the ex­ pected standard, thereby constituting a further deterrent. But with "Soviet honour having, for once, been saved," discretion prevailed in Moscow as in Tokyo, and the confrontation was allowed to dwindle to the propor­ tions of a border controversy, "which it had at one time seemed in danger of losing."5 Chilston's message crossed one sent by Halifax to the ambassadors in Moscow and Tokyo, suggesting that "a fairly specious case might be made out against either of the disputants as being responsible for the incident." Might not the Soviet government have sought to foment a diversion, thus relieving the pressure on China, in the belief that the Japanese were too committed on the mainland "to be ready to extend the war"? Changku­ feng Hill commanded the rail line which extended to the nearby port of Rashin; "it was suspicious that works were being constructed there at that moment." Yet, might not the Japanese have engineered the clash to test, on a small scale, the strength (or weakness) of the Red Army after the purges?6 From Tokyo on 4 October, Craigie suggested that respon­ sibility rested with the Russian instead of the Japanese authorities, and that the initiative may have been taken by the Russian local commander instead of the Soviet central government. Craigie judged that the Japanese Army had bested the Soviets and "had thus dissipated to a great extent the impression of military invincibility which the Russians had been

CAUSATION AND CARTOGRAPHY

365

seeking to build up in the Far East during the last few years." It was note­ worthy that the Japanese, who had not provoked the original clash, ob­ tained such results "by chance and not design, and that therefore it represented no more than the immediate military lesson of the incident." More significant, the Japanese government had evinced a "surprisingly reasonable attitude" during the negotiations, revealing "the real and urgent fear" of becoming engaged in full-scale war against the USSR.7 Halifax tried out a number of ideas. Were the Japanese "emboldened to think . . . they need not show more than the most perfunctory verbal respect for our interests," from the full consequences of which thinking the British had only been saved "by the nervousness engendered in Japan by . . . events on the Manchukuo frontier"? Such an interpretation might mean that Japan had been "considerably shaken by these frontier incidents and [was] now determined not to become involved with any Great Power unless there is serious trouble in Europe."8 The British ambassador in China, Archibald Clark Kerr, replied that Halifax's inferences did not differ greatly from his own; but Craigie doubted whether the Japanese government had been shaken by the Changkufeng affair. Naturally, the public thought that the Red Army had been forced to retreat, "but un­ doubtedly they desire to avoid major complications." In general, it re­ mained true that Europe's difficulty was Japan's opportunity.9 Kirk, the American charge in Moscow, believed that, apart from the easy explanation that the Changkufeng Incident had local antecedents, especially in view of the strategic value of the location in dispute, it was also possible that the Politburo "was interested in exploiting the effect throughout the world and in Central Europe in particular of a demonstra­ tion of force on the part of the Soviet Union." The charge also wondered whether, as the incident developed, the Japanese were not unwilling to test the state of Russian fighting capability and morale, and whether the Kwantung Army, in particular, was not ready to indulge in such a probe. Nevertheless, the Moscow negotiations had not revealed a sharp definition of Japanese policy, nor was accurate information available concerning the outcome of the combat or the battle efficiency of the Red Army. Such intelligence was imperative if the workings of Soviet decision makers were to be evaluated comprehensively.10 An American diplomat in Peking heard that Japanese military and ci­ vilians in Manchukuo generally did not connect the border crisis with hos­ tilities in China. Instead, it was thought that the fighting at Changkufeng derived from Lyushkov's derogation of the Soviet military. Russian Far

366

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

Eastern commanders had felt impelled to prove to Stalin that they were loyal and vigorous. They had to demonstrate also to the Japanese that reports of Soviet weakness were false and that the forces in Siberia were ready for anything.11 Some weeks later, in mid-October 1938, the British government re­ ceived confidential observations from Chiang Kai-shek. Japanese power and resources, according to the generalissimo, were by now "greatly spent” after encountering stout Chinese resistance during the past 14 months. Japan was in no position to handle another major conflict. Chiang suggested that this contention drew clear proof from "Japan's retreat in face of the comparatively firm stand by France [concerning Hainan] . . . and by the Soviet Union in the Changkufeng affair.”12

JUDGMENT FOR POSTERITY With respect to the "battle of the maps," the war crimes tribunal in Tokyo reached an unconvincing judgment about the cartographic problem and proffered a moralistic conclusion. Among the evidentiary documents submitted to the court were the Chinese and Russian texts of the Hunchun protocol of 1886 and the attached border map. "There is a slight discrepancy in the two texts in the detailed description of the boundary." (Italics added.) The jurists observed, "That there may have been some doubts at the time as to the exact location of the boundary cannot be disregarded; however, in the state of existing international law such doubt, if any, as existed would not have justified a resort to arms [by the Japanese]." On the question of culpability, the tribunal rendered a majority verdict that Japan was guilty of having launched offensive operations across the border of Manchuria in the vicinity of Khasan. The court saw connections between the conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact in 1936, Japanese operations in China since 1937, and the Japanese "resort to hostilities" against the USSR "in the east of Manchuria" in 1938. For unstated reasons, but pre­ sumably from systematic design, the Japanese had proceeded to reinforce their border guards with regular units in July until by the end of the month, approximately a full division of the Korea Army had been massed in a tiny sector probably not exceeding a frontage of three kilometers.13 While castigating Itagaki for "lying" to the Emperor in hisdesire to elicit Imperial sanction for resort to force, the judges said nothing about the Throne's rejection of such authority. Instead, it was asserted that the

CAUSATION AND CARTOGRAPHY

367

Japanese government had decided to "use prepared military power" as soon as the necessary coordination had been effected. The court judged that it was the Japanese side which had launched the first assault, in the nature of a reconnaissance, at Shachaofeng on 29 July in a strength "prob­ ably not exceeding one company." After the tiny Soviet outpost had been overwhelmed, Russian BGU reinforcements had ejected the Japanese. On the night of 30-31 July, the Japanese, with the main force of the division, had returned to the attack at Changkufeng: "the tribunal dan find no evidence that the initiative was taken by the Soviet troops, which alone would have justified the Japanese attack."14 By 11 August, with the as­ sistance of Soviet support forces brought up after hostilities began, the Japanese units "had been defeated and practically wiped out." At this point, the Japanese authorities had agreed to a cease-fire and the restora­ tion of the boundary to high ground in accordance with the Russian con­ tention. "From the evidence as a whole, the tribunal has come to the conclusion that the attack by the Japanese troops at Lake [Khasan] was deliberately planned by the general staff and by Itagaki as minister of war and was authorized at least [?] by the Five Ministers."15 The court surmised that the Japanese purpose had been to feel out Russian strength in the region or to seize the strategic ridge which over­ looked the lines of communication to the maritime province and Vladi­ vostok. Since the Japanese assault had been "planned and undertaken with substantial forces," it could not "be regarded as a mere clash between border patrols." The court was convinced that the Japanese had initiated the hostilities. Although the force committed was "not very large," the purpose and result, if the Japanese had succeeded, "are sufficient in the opinion of the tribunal to justify describing the hostilities as a war." (Italics added.) Additionally, in terms of international law and the at­ titude of Shigemitsu and Nishi during the early diplomatic parleys, "the operations of the Japanese troops were, in the opinion of the tribunal, clearly aggressive." That the Japanese had "failed" in their attack at Khasan "revealed the unexpected military strength of the USSR in the Far East." Japan's northward advance, which had been designed as the initial step toward realization of national policy, was only "deferred until a better opportunity presented itself. As the door of opportunity closed in the north, the southern gates began to open."16 The tribunal rejected the plea that the Changkufeng Incident had been amicably settled by agree­ ment between the governments concerned; no immunity was granted,

368

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

"nor was the question of liability, criminal or otherwise, dealt with." Therefore, the Shigemitsu-Litvinov accord could provide no defense against the criminal charges before the tribunal.17 Justice Pal, the member for India, dissented from the majority judg­ ment and filed a statement of his reasons, commenting on "the hopeless character of the prosecution case." Regarding the border incidents "relied on by the prosecution," Pal could see them only as "mere border incidents. I cannot spell any conspiracy out of them."18 The last word, albeit in a losing cause, was voiced when defense counsel derided the Soviet claim to "scientific accuracy" in defining the frontier: How could you "know" the boundary, down to feet and yards, when official markers were dozens upon dozens of miles apart—if standing at all? And if the Soviet forces were never allowed to cross frontiers which they allegedly knew so well, how could they have "wiped out a whole Japanese division," when apparently all the Japanese had to do to escape annihilation was to step one foot across [their own] border?19

The transcript reveals no printed or printable reply.

NOTES 1. Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 32-34. Also see Gaimusho, SP No. 234, pp. 10-12. 2. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 278-279. 3. I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2: 90, 377. Also see Hoshino, Mihatenu yume, pp. 276-278. 4. Takenouchi statement, BBSS Archives. Also Tominaga and Takumi interviews. 5. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (DBFP), 3rd series, 1938-1939 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), 8:38-40 (Moscow, 23 August 1938). 6. Ibid., 8:40, n. 5 (London, 19 August 1938). 7. Ibid. (Tokyo, 4 October 1938). 8. Ibid., 8:48-49 (London, 27 August 1938). 9. Ibid., 8:49-50 (Shanghai, 29 August 1938); ibid., 8:53-54 (Tokyo, 31 August 1938). 10. FRUS 1938, 14 August 1938, 3:480-481. 11. American consulate, Peiping, 1 7 August 1938, Dispatch No. 501, NA 761.93 Manchuria/200. 12. DBFP, 8:148-149 (Chinese Embassy, London, 17 October 1938). On the basis of a nonalienation agreement with China in 1895, France opposed Japanese.

CAUSATION AND CARTOGRAPHY

369

occupation of the strategic island of Hainan. By February 1939, however, Japanese forces had seized Hainan. 13. IMTFE, Transcript, 10 November 1948, pp. 49348, 49387-49392. 14. Ibid., pp. 49392-49394. 15. Allegedly during the conference of 22 July 1938. 16. IMTFE, Transcript, 10 November 1948, pp. 49394-49395,49405. 17. "In a matter of criminal liability, whether domestic or international, it would be against the public interest for any tribunal to countenance condonation of crime either expressly or by implication." IMTFE, Transcript, pp. 39853, 49403-49404. 18. IMTFE, Transcript, "Judgment of the Honorable Mr. Justice Pal," type­ script copy, 4:805, 808 (Blakeney Collection). 19. Defense Counsel George Furness's summation, 8 March 1948, typescript copy (Furness Collection). The Soviet witnesses who claimed that the Japanese 19th Division was wiped out included Major General Grebennik, IMTFE, Tran­ script, 27 January 1948, p. 38336.

Changkufeng in the Context of Limited War

The small war at Changkufeng fits precisely the definition of a con­ sciously limited operation and contributes to our knowledge of escalation and attrition. The incident erupted on the international scene in the year of the Munich crisis and the last stages of the Spanish Civil War. For the Soviet Union, the European pressures accompanied the violent Stalinist purges, which were spreading eastward and soon caused the defection of Lyushkov, the senior NKVD officer in Siberia. Less than a month after Lyushkov was in Japanese hands, trouble erupted in the Changkufeng area; three months after the cease-fire, Blyukher, old Bolshevik and marshal of the Soviet Union, was disgraced and dead. Rarely seen directly in lowintensity war, the Red Army and Red Air Force had gone into action against a major power. Some have argued that the USSR is unlikely to launch an offensive war unless convinced of impending attack upon itself. Changkufeng suggests that a fundamental distinction must be made be­ tween preemptive or offensive war and the possibility that the USSR does not exclude reconnaissance-in-force techniques, for which the Japanese were convicted legally with respect to their actions in 1938. But it is significant that Japanese AGS historians detected no evidence that the USSR and China, despite their various ties, acted in collusion or concerted their efforts beforehand in connection with the Changkufeng Incident. The affair seemed to have broken out, initially at least, because of uncer­ tainty regarding the boundary, although the Russian forces had "assuredly intruded into Manchukuoan territory.''1 Eventually, some 40,000 men were deployed on both sides in August in the struggle at Changkufeng,

CHANGKUFENG IN CONTEXT OF LIMITED WAR

371

pitting Soviet mobility and mechanization against Japanese exclusive defense of the high ground after the July offensive. The Japanese learned few or erroneous lessons from the Changkufeng affair; the Kwantung Army, for example, was convinced that everything had been handled badly in 1938 by the Korea Army and the high com­ mand. When a dispute arose in 1939 at Nomonhan on another border, lying between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo, the staff in Hsinking fostered irresponsible escalation. The USSR, however, learned in 1937 and 1938 that the Japanese Army seemed to respect only force. In 1939 at Khalkhin Gol, as the Russians termed it, the Soviet authorities drew the line and committed enormous and splendidly coordinated ground and air forces, under Zhukov's orchestration. While the Japanese disaster at Nomonhan turned history around by compelling Tokyo to look south instead of north, Changkufeng had sounded an alarm that was not heard.2 Similarly, all American military operations since World War II have been called atypical. Latter-day applications will be found by those studying the frontier disputes, such as the Sino-Soviet clashes at Damansky (Chen Pao) in 1969, which replaced the old Japanese-Soviet border confrontations. Just as the theory was propounded in 1938 that Russian frontier activities were a "signal” to the Japanese with respect to the latter's intentions in China, so there are observers today who detect similar signals in the cases of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Bangladesh in 1971. Thus, it has been sug­ gested that the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic could scarcely have failed to see the pointed analogy between the border warfare on the Ussuri and the situation in Czechoslovakia, where "escalating bor­ der activity preceded invasion." During the Indo-Pakistani conflict, "So­ viet willingness to 'open a diversionary action' in Sinkiang against China has been called "the strategic pin which was an important factor pre­ venting Chinese intervention and assuring the Indian victory.''3 By curious coincidence, the Japanese experience against the Red Army at Changkufeng occurred in a geographical sector adjacent to the locale of the small war between United States-United Nations forces and those of North Korea and the Chinese People's Republic, which broke out a dozen years later. Of additional significance is the fact that Stalin was the leader of the USSR not only throughout the Changkufeng Incident but also for three years after the initiation of the Korean War by proxy. It is useful to compare Stalin's techniques of 1938 and of 1950, when

372

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

the North Koreans, perhaps manipulated from Moscow, invaded the south in an unexpectedly risky venture. Not unlike the Kaesong-Panmunjon armistice parleys from 1951 to 1953 and the Paris talks between the United States and North Vietnam between 1968 and 1973, the SovietJapanese negotiations at Moscow in 1938 also reveal the workings of “talk and fight, fight and talk” diplomacy and the intertwining of polit­ ical, military, and propaganda factors. The contestants at Changkufeng are still great powers today. Although Soviet weaponry has advanced remarkably since 1938, Russian soldiery is surely of a stuff comparable to that of the brave men who fought the Japanese near Khasan. Dynamic and resurgent Japan, historical successor to the regime of four decades ago, remains a major member of the world community. Younger officers of both the Red Army and the Imperial Japanese Army in the days of Changkufeng are still in their 50s or 60s to­ day. The fighting at Khasan demonstrated that Japanese inflexibility and uninventiveness were stereotyped exaggerations, as the painful experience in the Pacific War would prove to the Allies. So far as Japan was concerned, the Changkufeng crisis illustrates the problems of civil control, or lack of control, of the military. The matter is of far more than academic interest to the United States, as shown by President Truman's removal of MacArthur in 1951 and by the Lavelle case in Southeast Asia in 1972, when an air force general falsified so-called protective reaction strikes against North Vietnam. In the case of Changku­ feng, the unfurling of the incident disclosed a unique feature of internal relationships between Throne, high command, and government. The Emperor proved to have played an unsung but surprisingly vigorous role in restraining escalation and exposing bungles on the part of military underlings.4 For, contrary to canards, no generalized conspiracy existed among the military leaders in Tokyo. Field commanders, realizing their responsibility and fearing the consequences, were obliged to justify any arbitrary action. Their apologiae were forwarded within the top-secret security system; obviously, there could be no thought of revelation to the public, domestic or foreign, then or later. Deception, if it existed, may have meant self-deception. Ration­ alizations can be devised to cover subordinates, maintain monolithic discipline, or satisfy superiors' expectations. Japanese military leaders were patriots and professionals. Outsiders may term some of these men misguided, but it is unfair to call them liars en masse, as was charged at the Tokyo trial. The example of Changkufeng illustrates another feature of limited war: the part played by tacit rules, in general, and the quality of self-imposed

CHANGKUFENG IN CONTEXT OF LIMITED WAR

373

sanctuary, in particular.5 During the Korean War, the Yalu River was the de facto boundary of military operations; it shielded Manchuria and North China from American penetration and MiG fighters from hot pursuit, and it cost MacArthur his command when he spoke of violating the guidelines. For their part, neither the Chinese Communists nor the Russians struck by air against vulnerable United Nations installations in South Korea or Japan. Again, during the long struggle in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, American and South Vietnamese planes had to fight no enemy aircraft in Laos, Cambo­ dia, or South Vietnam. In 1938 it was Tokyo which kept its air force under wraps. Whereas the Japanese had considered their objectives accomplished by clearing the hill complex, the Russians concluded that points in North Korea supporting Japanese advance elements need not be granted sanctuary. The Soviet decision was taken despite, or because of, the fact that no Japanese aircraft had been sighted in the region. The fight for Changkufeng Hill displays a number of similarities with the battle of Pork Chop Hill in Korea. In his famous study, operations analyst S.L.A. Marshall grasped the scale and tempo involved in contingency war:

On both sides. . . there were general conditions which radically limited opportunity in any local engagement. .. . The energy and fire spent by both sides is all out of proportion to the mea­ gerness of the stakes and the numbers of men who are actively fighting to seize or hold ground. It is as if both sides are at grips with something they can neither let go of nor hold.6

More recently, in Vietnam in 1969, Ap Bia, or Hamburger Hill, as the Americans called it, became the scene of eleven consecutive assaults by the 101st Airborne Division to seize it from the North Vietnamese. "The hill itself had no tactical significance,” admitted Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais, the divi­ sion commander, but he called Ap Bia "a gallant victory," partly because enemy losses had been over ten times greater. Antiwar critics retorted that it had been a "senseless and irresponsible" struggle for "godforsaken ridge lines."7 Under circumstances of warfare with such highly limited objectives as those at Changkufeng, Pork Chop Hill, Ap Bia, or Chen Pao, one wonders whether soldiers often die without purpose. It is an unhappy fact, Charles W. Yost asserts, that

374

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

while limited wars not crowned by "victory" have to be ended by a negotiated settlement, the character of that settlement is to a considerable degree determined by the military situation at the time it is concluded. Those who have died to keep that situation in balance substantially affect the settlement and, if they died for that purpose, have not died in vain.8 On one matter, Soviet, American, and Chinese chieftains agree: the push­ button, the missile, and the nuclear weapon have not rendered the soldier of 1938 obsolete. The Chinese People's Republic leadership stresses that "the spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb."9 The indispensability of the man with the rifle has been reaffirmed during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in Korea and the Middle East and at Khe Sanh, Hue, and Dong Ap Bia. This fact epitomizes the ultimate relevance of the investigation of that hot summer of 1938 when soldier Ivan grappled with soldier Taro for Changkufeng, hill of much blood.

NOTES 1. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 4. 2. See ch. 30, p. 361. 3. Richard Thornton, "The Soviet Union's 'China Policy,' 1949-72," The Intercollegiate Review 8 (Winter 1972-19731:105, 107. 4. For a sensational but spurious damnation of the Emperor's role, see David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York: William Morrow,1971). 5. See Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 48 ff. 6. S. L. A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, 1953 (New York: William Morrow, 1956), pp. 26-27. For a provocative statement by the commander of UN forces at Pork Chop, see Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, 7th US Division commander, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, etc., 24 May 1967 (US Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session), 7:358-359. 7. Neil Sheehan, "Letters from Hamburger Hill," Harper's, November 1969, p. 40 ff.; "Paratroop Commander Replies to [Senator Edward MJ Kennedy's Criticism of Battle for Apbia," New York Times, 23 May 1969, p. 3. 8. From review of David Schoenbrun, Vietnam: How We Got In, How to Get Out (New York: Atheneum, 1968), in Saturday Review, 11 May 1968, p. 31, 9. M. Rejai, ed., Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Anchor Books, 1970), p. 413.

Appendix Dramatis Personae In the cases of military or naval personnel, ranks are given as of the time of the Changkufeng Incident in 1938. An asterisk precedes the names of individuals interviewed for the present study. *ARAO, Maj. Okikatsu. AGS staff officer, 2nd Section (Operations). ARISUE, Lt. Col. Yadoru. AGS staff officer, 2nd Section (Operations). BABA, 2nd Lt. Tsuneo. Color bearer, 75th Infantry Regiment. CHO, Col. Isamu. 74th Infantry Regiment commander (Hamhung), 19th Division, since March 1938. Chief, Japanese truce delegation, August 1938. *DOI, Lt. Col. Akio. Military attache, Japanese Embassy, Moscow, since March 1938. FUJI'UCHI, 2nd Lt. 0. Liaison officer, 2nd Battalion, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. Killed 6 August 1938. FUSHIMI, Prince Hiroyasu. Chief of^Navy General Staff, 1932-1941. HANYU, Maj. Yoshinagd (Zenryo). 1st Battalion commander, 74th Infantry Regiment. HARADA, Baron Kumao. Private secretary to Prince Saionji. *HASHIM0T0, Maj. Gen. Gun. AGS 1st Bureau (Operations) chief, since January 1938. HASHIMOTO, Maj. Seishiro. 3rd Battalion commander, 76th Infantry Regiment. *HATA, Gen. Shunroku. Central China Expeditionary Army commander, since February 1938. HIRAHARA, Maj. Shizuo. 3rd Battalion commander, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 7 August 1938.

376

APPENDIX

HIRAMUKI, Lt. Col. Kujuku (Tsukumo). 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment commander. HISATSUNE, 1st Lt. Kunio. Regimental gun battery commander, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 6 August 1938. HORINO'UCHI, Kensuke. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, since April 1936. *ICHIMOTO, Maj. Yoshiro. 1st Battalion commander, 75th Infantry Regiment, March 1937-June 1938 and August 1938; attached to 75th Infantry Regiment Headquarters, July 1938 only. I HARA, Lt. Col. Junjiro. Staff officer (economic affairs and policies), Korea Army Headquarters. IKEDA, Seihin. Finance Minister, since May 1938. IKUE, 2nd Lt. Haruhide. Liaison officer, 3rd Battalion, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. Killed 6 August 1938. IMAGAWA, Capt. Shigeo. 1st Company commander, 1st Battalion, 76th Infantry Regiment. *INADA, Col. Masazumi. AGS 2nd Section (Operations) chief, since March 1938. INAGAKI, 1st Lt. Takeji. 1st Platoon leader and acting company commander, 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Wounded 7 August 1938. INOKUMA, 1st Lt. Hiroshi. 7th Company commander, 2nd Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 7 August 1938. ISHIWARA, Maj. Gen. Kanji. Deputy Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army. ISOGAI, Lt. Gen. Rensuke. Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army. ITAGAKI, Lt. Gen. Seishiro. War Minister, since May 1938. ITO, Capt. Hiroshi. 6th Company commander, 2nd Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Wounded 31 July 1938. *IWAKURO, Lt. Col. Hideo. Senior staff officer. Military Affairs Section, War Ministry. *IWASAKI, Col. Tamio. Senior staff officer (concurrently Press Officer), Korea Army Headquarters. KADOKURA, Capt. Tokuji. 7th Company commander, 2nd Battalion, 73rd Infantry Regiment. Killed 7 August 1938. KAMIMORI, Maj. Rokuro. 2nd Battalion commander, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. KANAI, Capt. Yuji. 1st Engineer Company commander, 19th Engineer Regiment, 19th Division.

APPENDIX

377

KANDA, Capt. Yasuo. 2nd Company commander (Kucheng), 76th Infantry Regiment Border Garrison Unit. KANE KO, Capt. Yosuke. 1st Battery commander, 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. KAN'IN, Prince Kotohito Shinno. Field marshal and Chief, Army General Staff, 1931-1940. *KATAKURA, Lt. Col. Tadashi. 4th Section (Manchukuo Affairs), Kwantung Army Headquarters. KAWAME, Lt. Col. Taro. Artillery expert and staff officer, Kwantung Army Headquarters. Chief of 26-man field team which studied Changkufeng battlefront, August 1938. KAZAMI, Akira. Chief Cabinet Secretary, since June 1937. KIDO, Marquis Ko'ichi. Minister of Health and Welfare, since January 1938. KITAHARA, Capt. Sadao. 1st Machine Gun Company commander, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 31 July 1938. *KITANO, Maj. Gen. Kenzo. Chief of Staff, Korea Army, since March 1938. KOBAYASHI, Lt. Col. Mokichi. 19th Engineer Regiment commander (HoeryOng), 19th Division. KOISO, Gen. Kuniaki. Korea Army commander, since 1936. Left Seoul, 18 July 1938, for reassignment to Tokyo. KOJI MA, Maj. Saburo. 1st Battalion commander, 73rd Infantry Regiment. KOMATSU, Lt. Col. Misao. Staff officer (logistics), Korea Army Headquarters. KONOE, Prince Fu'mimaro. Prime Minister, since June 1937 (reconstituted Cabinet, May 1938). *KOTANI, Maj. Etsuo. Staff officer, AGS 5th Section (Soviet Intelligence), 2nd Bureau (Intelligence), since April 1937. KOZUKI, 2nd Lt. Norimasa. Signal Team chief, 74th Infantry Regiment; aide to Japanese truce delegation, August 1938. KUBOTA, 1st Lt. Shigeru. 3rd Machine Gun Company commander, 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 7 August 1938. KUBOTA, Lt. Col. Takajiro. 27th Cavalry Regiment commander (Nanam), 19th Division. KURIYAMA, Warrant Officer Chugo. 1st Platoon leader and acting company commander, 2nd Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment.

378

APPENDIX

*KUSAKA, Capt. Ryunosuke, UN. NGS 1st Section (Operations) chief, since April 1938. KUTSUKAKE, 2nd Lt. Shohei. 1st Battalion gun battery commander, 75th Infantry Regiment. Wounded 7 August 1938. MAEOKA, 2nd Lt. Isamu. Observation Team chief, 1st Battalion, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. Wounded 8 August 1938. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo. Minister of Imperial Household Department, since March 1936. MATSUDAI RA, Baron Yasumasa. Chief secretary to Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. MATSUNOBE, 1st Lt. Mikio. 2nd Company commander, 1st Battalion, 76th Infantry Regiment. *MIYAJIMA, 1st Lt. Sei'ichi. Signal Officer, 75th Infantry Regiment. *MIYASHI, Maj. Minoru. AGS air staff officer. MIYA'UCHI, 2nd Lt. Seita. Liaison officer, 1st Battalion, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. MORI, Lt. Col. Gan (Iwao). Chief, Operations and Training, 19th Division. MORIMOTO, Maj. Gen. Nobuki. Transferred from command of 26th Infantry Brigade, 7th Division (Manchuria), to command of 37th Brigade (Hamhung), 19th Division; arrived at Changkufeng battlefront, 2 August 1938. *MORITA, Lt. Col. Sutezo. 2nd Armored Train Unit commander, Kwantung Army (Harbin). MURAKAWA, 1st Lt. Ryo. 2nd Battery commander, 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. *MURAKOSHI, Master Sgt. Kimio. 2nd Platoon leader, 3rd Infantry Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Wounded 6 August 1938. NAGAYAMA, 2nd Lt. Hiroshi. Platoon leader, 2nd Engineer Company, 19th Engineer Regiment. NAKAJIMA, Maj. Shigeo. 3rd Battalion commander, 74th Infantry Regiment. NAKAJIMA, 1st Lt. Shin. 3rd Company commander, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 31 July 1938. NAKAMURA, Maj. Gen. Aketo. Military Affairs Bureau chief, War Ministry, since April 1938. NAKAMURA, Gen. Kotaro. Replaced General Koiso as Korea Army commander, July 1938.

APPENDIX

379

NAKAMURA, Col. Yoshi'aki. Chief of Staff, 19th Division. NAKANO, Maj. Toshichi. 1st Battalion commander, 75th Infantry Regiment, since July 1938, after serving as regimental aide. Killed 31 July 1938. NARUKAWA, Capt. Masaru. 2nd Battery commander, 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. *NISHI, Haruhiko. Counselor of Embassy and Charge d'Affaires, Japanese Embassy, Moscow; on station since January 1937. NISHIMURA, 2nd Lt. Kaoru. 1st Battalion aide, 75th Infantry Regiment. NISHIMURA, Lt. Col. Toshio. Staff officer, AGS 2nd Section (Operations). *NOGUCHI, Capt. Kamenosuke. Staff officer, Kwantung Army Headquarters; expert on armor; member of Kawame inspection team. NOGUCHI, Capt. Shigeyoshi. 9th Company commander, 75th Infantry Regiment. Wounded 7 August 1938. OBO, Maj. Sakichi. 2nd Battalion commander, 73rd Infantry Regiment. *OGOSHI, Capt. Kenji. Staff officer, 2nd Section (Intelligence), Kwantung Army Headquarters. OKIDO, Col. Sanji. 76th Infantry Regiment commander (Nanam), 19th Division, since July 1938. ONO, Maj. Gen. Nobuaki (Senmei). New 38th Brigade commander (Nanam), 19th Division; did not reach Changkufeng battlefront until 8 August 1938. ONUKI, Master Sgt. Tomezb. Command Team chief and acting platoon leader, 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 31 July 1938. OSUGA, Maj. Minoru. 2nd Battalion commander, 74th Infantry Regiment. OSUGI, 1st Lt. Kunio. 5th Company commander, 2nd Battalion, 76th Infantry Regiment. Wounded 7 August 1938. ROKUTANDA, Maj. Sbkichi. 3rd Battalion commander, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. SAIONJI, Prince Kinmochi. Elder Statesman, Imperial adviser. SAITO, 2nd Lt. Mitsuru. Regimental Antitank Gun Battery commander, 75th Infantry Regiment. *SAITO, Maj. Toshio. Staff officer (mobilization affairs), 19th Division, since March 1937.

380

APPENDIX

*SAKATA, Capt. Hideru. 2nd Infantry Company commander, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment, since autumn 1937. Wounded 31 July 1938. SAKUMA, 2nd Lt. Masatoshi. 2nd Platoon leader, 2nd Company, 76th Infantry Regiment BGU. Wounded 29 July 1938. *SASAI, Capt. Shigeo. Staff officer (intelligence and operational preparations), 19th Division. *SATO, Col. Kotoku. 75th Infantry Regiment commander (Hoeryong), 19th Division, since October 1937. SATO, Maj. Matasaburo. 2nd Battalion commander, 76th Infantry Regiment. SATO, Col. Tamenori. 73rd Infantry Regiment commander (Nanam), 19th Division, since July 1938. *SAWAM0T0, Lt. Col. Rikichiro. Imperial Aide de Camp. SENDA, Lt. Col. Sadasue. Border Garrison Unit commander (Kyonghun and Kucheng), 76th Infantry Regiment. SHI DARA, Capt. Kanesaku. 7th Company commander, 2nd Battalion, 76th Infantry Regiment. SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru. Ambassador to Soviet Union, since August 1936. SHIMOMURA, Maj. Hajime. 2nd Battalion commander, 75th Infantry Regiment. SHIOZAWA, Capt. Yoshihei. 2nd Battery commander, 1st Battalion, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. Killed 6 August 1938. SHIROTAKE, 1st Lt. Toraji. 2nd Machine Gun Company commander, 2nd Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. SONODA, 2nd Lt. Sakuro. 3rd Battalion gun platoon leader, 75th Infantry Regiment; acting battalion commander after death of Major Hirahara. SUETAKA, Lt. Gen. Kamezb. 19th Division commander (Nanam), since April 1936. *SUGAI, Lt. Col. Toshimaro. AGS Mobilization Subsection chief, 3rd Section (Organization and Mobilization), Operations Bureau. SUGITA, 2nd Lt. Toshimitsu. Platoon leader, 1st Engineer Company, 19th Engineer Regiment. SUKO, Maj. Masao. 75th Infantry Regiment aide. SUZUKI, Lt. Col. Tadashi (Sei). 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment commander (Hoeryong).

APPENDIX

381

TADA, Lt. Gen. Hayao (Shun). Deputy Chief, Army General Staff, since August 1937. TAKAGI, Capt. Sokichi, UN. Research Section chief, Navy Ministry. TAKENO'UCHI, Maj. Shigeo. 1st Battalion commander, 76th Infantry Regiment. TAKESHITA, Capt. Shunpei. 10th Company commander, 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 7 August 1938. TANAKA, Col. Ryukichi. 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment commander (Nanam), 19th Division, since August 1937. TANAKA, Maj. Tetsujiro. Chief, Hunchun OSS Branch. TERADA, Col. Masao. AGS Organization Subsection chief, 3rd Section (Organization and Mobilization), Operations Bureau. TOJO, Lt. Gen. Hideki. Vice Minister of War, since May 1938. *TOMINAGA, Capt. Kametaro. Regimental Infantry Gun Battery commander, 73rd Infantry Regiment, since August 1936. TOMURA, Capt. Ushimatsu. 2nd Engineer Company commander, 19th Engineer Regiment. TSUBOI, 2nd Lt. Ichijiro. Platoon leader, 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. *TSUCHIYA, Lt. Col. Sakae. Intelligence staff officer, Korea Army Headquarters, since 1937. TSUJI, Capt. Masanobu. Staff officer (Operations), Kwantung Army Headquarters, since November 1937. UEDA, Gen. Kenkichi. Kwantung Army commander, since March 1936. UGAI, Lt. Col. Yoshio. Staff officer, Kwantung Army Headquarters; member of Kawame inspection team and of Japanese truce delegation, August 1938. UGAKI, Kazunari (Kazushige). Retired general; Foreign Minister, since May 1938. *USAMI, Lt. Gen. Oki'iye. Chief Imperial Aide de Camp, since March 1936. YAMADA, Capt. Teizo. 1st Company commander, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 31 July 1938. YAMAGUCHI, 1st Lt. Tokuji. 11th Company commander, 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment. Killed 6 August 1938. YAMAMOTO, Vice-Adm. Isoroku, UN. Vice Minister of Navy, since December 1936. YANAGIHARA, 1st Lt. Goro. 5th Company commander, 2nd Battalion,

382

APPENDIX

75th Infantry Regiment. Wounded 8 August 1938. YOKOYAMA, Maj. Gen. Shinpei. Hunchun Garrison Unit commander, from formation of unit in January 1938 under Korea Army control. 'YONAI, Adm. Mitsumasa, UN. Navy Minister, since February 1937. YOSHIDA, Lt. Col. Eijiro. Staff officer (training and education), Korea Army Headquarters. YOSHIDA, Maj. Hiroshi. 1st Battalion commander, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. YUASA, Kurahei. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, since March 1936.

Bibliography

In chapter notes drawing upon sources in this bibliography, a number of abbrevi­ ations and short forms were used.

AGS, Chokoho soan BBSS CS, Chokoho DBFP FRUS GSS I. Hata etal., TSM 4/2

IMTFE, Transcript Jinchu bidan JRD

JSM NA 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho SP Tokyo Asahi

Rikugun sanbo honbu. Chokohd jiken shi soan. Boeicho boeikenshusho senshi shitsu. Chosengun shireibu. Chokoho jiken no keii. Woodward, E. [_., and Butler, Rohan, eds. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers. Gendai shi shiryo. Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai. Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol. 4, pt. 2, ed. Hata Ikuhiko, Usui Katsumi, and Hirai Tomoyoshi. International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Transcript of Proceedings. Akinaga butai. Jinchu bidan. United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Chief of Military History. Japanese Research Division. Military History Section. Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Far East. Japanese Studies on Manchuria. [See JRD.] United States. National Archives. Hohei dai-75 rentai. Chokoho jiken sento shoho.

Gaimusho, numbered report. Asahi Shinbun\ (Tokyo edition).

JAPANESE SOURCES Akaishizawa Kunihiko. Chokoho [Changkufeng]. Tokyo: Koa Shobo, 1941. Author noncommissioned officer in 1st Company, 76th Infantry Regiment BGU; names fictionalized; censored.

384

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akamatsu Yusuke. Showa 13-nen no kokusai josei [The international scene in 1938]. Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Kyokai, 1939. Semiofficial. Akinaga butai [Akinaga unit]. Jinchu bidan [Field exploit accounts] . Seoul: n.p., 1939. My interviewee, Maj. Ichimoto Yoshiro, edited this censored album; Col. Akinaga Tsutomu was new commander, 75th Infantry Regiment. Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo edition). May-September 1938. Ashida Hitoshi. Dai niji sekai taisen gaiko shi [A diplomatic history of World War II]. Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1960. Boeicho boeikenshusho senshi shitsu [Defense Agency, Institute for Defense Studies, Office of Military History]. Kantogun [The Kwantung Army] . Vol. I: Tai-So senbi: Nomonhan jiken [Military preparations against the Soviets: The Nomon­ han Incident]. Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1969. Borojeikin, A. B. Nomonhan kusenki: Soren kusho no kaiso [Record of the Nomon­ han air fighting: Reminiscences of a Soviet air general]. Translated by Hayashi Katsuya and Ota Tako. Tokyo: Kobundo, 1964. Hayashi contributes long commentary: "Kaisetsu: Nomonhan senshi” [Commentary on the military history of Nomonhan]. "Chokoho jiken no keika" [Details of the Changkufeng Incident] . Shokodan ho [Officer group report], no. 217 (November 1938), pp. 10-29. This group was from Kobe regimental district; censored. Chosengun shireibu [Korea Army headquarters]. Chokoho jiken no keii [Particulars concerning the Changkufeng Incident], 30 August 1938. Transmitted to war minister, 27 September 1938. Gaimusho chosa bu dai san ka [Foreign Ministry, Research Bureau, 3rd Section]. Man-So tobu kokkyo shisatsu hokokusho [Report of inspection of the Manchurian-Soviet eastern borders], SP 232, September 1938. Inspecting official's name: Miura Kazu'ichi (my interviewee). joho bu [Information Bureau]. Chokoho jiken gaikoku shinbun roncho shu [The Changkufeng Incident: Foreign press comments], SP 233, September 1938 joho bu hensan [Information Bureau, comp.] . Sekai no ugoki: kokusai jijo [Movements in the world: The international situation]. Showa 13-nen ban [1938 no.]. Tokyo: Ryoeido, December 1938. ________ Nihon kokusai kyokai tokubetsu chosa bu [Japan International Association, Special Research Bureau]. Chokoho fukin kokkyo joyaku ko Konshun kaiyaku o chushin toshite [Documents relating to demarcation treaties concerning the Changkufeng area, including the Hunchun demarcation treaty], SP 234, prepared 1 August 1938. O-A kyoku dai ikka [Euro-Asiatic Bureau, 1st Section]. Ni-So koshoshi [Record of Japanese-Soviet negotiations], April 1942, by Tanaka Bun'ichiro. Reprint ed. Tokyo: Gannando shoten, 1969. To-A kyoku dai san ka [East Asia Bureau, 3rd Section]. Chokoho jiken to Manshukoku [The Changkufeng Incident and Manchukuo] , SP 235, September 1938. Gendai shi shiryo [Modern history documents]. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1962- . Zoruge jiken [The Sorge case], Vols. 1-3 (1962), ed. Obi Toshito; Ni-Chu

BIBLIOGRAPHY

385

senso [The Sino-Japanese conflict]. Vol. 8, pt. 1 (1964), ed. Shimada Toshihiko and Inaba Masao; vol. 9, pt. 2 (1964), ed. Usui Katsumi and Inaba Masao; vol. 10, pt. 3 (1964), ed. Tsunoda Jun (includes Tsunoda's commentary and Korea Army records); vol. 12, pt. 4 (1965), ed. Kobayashi Tatsuo, Inaba Masao, Shimada Toshihiko, and Usui Katsumi (includes Nishimura Toshio memoir). Harada Kumao. Saionji ko toseikyoku [Prince Saionji and the political situation]. 8 vols. + supplement. Tokyo: Iwanami, 1950-1952. Vol. 7 (1952) covers June 1938-June 1939; ch. 2 treats Changkufeng. Hata I kuhiko. Ni-Chu senso shi [History of the Sino-Japanese conflict]. Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1961. Hayashi Saburo. Kantogun to kyokuto sorengun: Aru tai-So johosanbo no oboegaki: Chdkoho Nomonhan Nisso senso no shinso [The Kwantung Army and the Soviet Far East Army: Notes of a certain anti-Soviet intelligence staff officer: The truth about Changkufeng, Nomonhan, and the Soviet-Japanese war]. Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1974. .Taiheiyo senso rikusen gaishi [Outline history of the ground battles of the Pacific war]. Tokyo: Iwanami, 1951. Translated as Kogun'. The Japanese Army in the Pacific War, in collaboration with Alvin D. Coox. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association Press, 1959. Hohei dai-75 rentai [75th Infantry Regiment]. Chokoho jiken sento shoho [Chang­ kufeng Incident detailed combat report], 1 October 1938. Covers period 29 July-11 August 1938. Hoshino Naoki. Mihatenu yume: Manshukoku gaishi [Boundless dream: An unofficial history of Manchukuo]. Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1963. Imaoka Yutaka. "Chokoho jiken" [The Changkufeng Incident], December 1961. (Handwritten.) ."Man-So-Mo kokkyo funso nitsuite no gaikan" [Survey of ManchurianSoviet-Mongolian border disputes], November 1961. (Handwritten.) ."Nihon no tai-So handan" [Japanese estimates of the Soviets], January 1962. (Handwritten.) Inada Masazumi. "Daihon'ei no rekishi: senso shido to sakusen shido" [IGHQ history: Combat and operational command]. Boei to Keizai 3 (September 1954): 23-29. ."Fuun no So-Man kokkyo" [Turbulent Soviet-Manchurian borders], in Soren kakumei yonjtinen [Forty years of the Russian revolution]. Tokyo: Jiyu Ajiyasha, 1957. ."Kantogun to Chokoho jiken" [The Kwantung Army and the Changku­ feng Incident] . Maru 10 (special edition) (January 1958): 46-51. ."Soren kyokutogun to no taiketsu: Chokoho-Nomonhan jiken no zenbo hiroku" [Confrontation with the Soviet Far Eastern Army: The whole secret record of the Changkufeng and Nomonhan incidents]. Chisei 5, supplement, (December 1956): 276-298. Inoue Kenkichi. "Kanko koryaku no gunjiteki igi" [The military significance of the reduction of Hankow]. Chuo-Kdron 52 (October 1938): 111-117. Itagaki Seishiro Kankokai [Itagaki Seishiro Publication Society]. Hiroku itagaki

386

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Seishiro [The secret record of Itagaki Seishiro]. Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1972. For statement by Inada Masazumi, see pp. 222-226. Ito Kei'ichi. Heitaitachi no rikugun shi [Army history at the soldiers' level]. Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1969. Ito Masanori. Gunbatsu koboshi [A history of the rise and fall of the militarists]. 3 vols. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Shinsha, 1957-1959. See vol. 3, Nichi-Bei kaisen ni itaru made [To the opening of the Japanese-American war] (1959). Kanafu Kizo. Kokkydron [Border treatise]. Tokyo: Nisshin Shoin, 1942. Kantogun sanbobu [Kwantung Army, Operations Bureau]. Chokoho jiken no Man­ shukoku minshin ni oyoboshitaru eikyo [Effects of the Changkufeng Incident on the Manchukuoan populace], December 1938. Kawabe Torashiro. tchigaya dai kara tchigaya dai e: saigo no sanbo jicho no kaisdroku [From Ichigaya heights to Ichigaya heights: Memoirs of the last deputy chief of the AGS]. Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1962. Kawamura Kiyoshi. Manshu kokkyo jijo [The situation on the Manchurian frontiers]. Hsinking: Manshu Jijo Annaijo, 1939. Kido Koichi. Kido nikki [The Kido diary]. Tokyo: Heiwa Shobo, 1947. Abridged and edited by Kyokuto kokusai gunji saiban kenkyukai [IMTFE Research Association]. _______ .Kido Koichi nikki [The Kido Kdichi diary]. 2 vols. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966. Excerpts and summaries from the original diary were translated by the staff of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East as "Kido Diary," IPS (International Prosecution Section) Document No. 1632, IMT (International Military Tribunal) No. 2 (type­ script). Koiso Kuniaki. Katsuzan koso [Snow tracks of the big bird on Mount Katsu]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Jigyo Shuppan, 1963. "Katsuzan" is a pen name; the mountain is in Yamagata, where Koiso was born. "Kokkyo mondai: Chokoho jiken to kokkyo mondai" [Border problems: The Changkufeng Incident and the border problem]. Chuo-Koron 53 (August 1938): 122-130. Kunimatsu Hisaya [Kyuya]. Kokkyo no hanashi [Border stories]. Tokyo: Kajitani Shoin, 1939. Manshukoku gensei [The present state of affairs in Manchukuo] . Hsinking: Manshukoku Tsushinsha, 1939. Masuda Tadao. Manshu kokkyo mondai [Manchurian border problems]. Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1941. Matsumura Shuitsu. Hodobucho nikki [Diary of an Information Bureau chief]. Tokyo: Nihon Shuhosha, 1952. .Miyakezaka: gunbatsu wa ikanishite umareta ka [The War Ministry: How were the militarists born?]. Tokyo: Tok6,Shobo, 1952. Miyakezaka: address of war ministry, Tokyo. Mori Shozo. Senpu nijunen [Twenty turbulent years] . 2 vols. Tokyo: Masu Shobo, 1945-1946. Nakamura Bin [Toshi]. Man-So kokkyo funsoshi [A history of Manchurian-Soviet ... border disputes]. Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1939. ~

BIBLIOGRAPHY

387

Nakamura Kikuo. Showa rikugun hishi [Secret history of the army during the Showa era]. Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1968. Contains transcript of conversa­ tion (pp. 292-320) with Kotani Etsuo, whom I also interviewed. Nakamura Kotaro. Affidavit No. 2, IMT Defense Document No. 1223 (Tokyo, 22 December 1947). Blakeney Collection, Tokyo. Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai [Japan Association for International Relations]. Taiheiyo senso e no michi [The road to the Pacific war]. 7 vols. and supplement. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1962-1963. Ni-Chu senso [The Sino-Japanese conflict], vol. 3, pt. 1 (1962), ed. Shimada Toshihiko and Uno Shigeaki (former for 1933-1937, latter for 1933-1939); vol. 4, pt. 2 (1963), ed. Hata Ikuhiko, Usui Katsumi, and Hirai Tomoyoshi (Hata for "Ni-Chu senso no gunjiteki tenbo (1937-1941)" [Military views on the Sino-Japanese conflict] and for chapter on Changkufeng). Nishi Haruhiko. Kaiso no Nihon gaiko [Recollections of Japanese diplomacy]. Tokyo: Iwanami, 1965. .Watakushi no gaiko hakusho: taikenteki kokusai kankei ron [A diplomat's white book: Views on international relations in the light of my experience]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1963. Okada Takeo. Konoe Fumimaro: Tenno to gunbu to kokumin [Konoe Fumimaro: The Emperor, the military, and the nation]. Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1959. Rikugun sanbo honbu [Army General Staff ]. Chokoho jiken shi soan [History of the Changkufeng Incident—Draft]. Shina jihen shi tokugo [History of the China Incident, special no.]., 2 vols. 15 October 1939. .Chokoho jiken shi [History of the Changkufeng Incident]. Shina jihen shi tokugo dai ichi kan [History of the China Incident, special no., vol. 1 ], 28 August 1943. Riyushikofu [Lyushkov], "Kyokuto sekigun ron" [A view of the Far Eastern Red Army]. Kaizo (September 1939), pp. 148-163. Partial translation in Contem­ porary Japan 8 (October 1939): 1022-1025, as "The Far Eastern Red Army," by General G. S. Lyushkoff. Saito Toshio. "Oetsu kyoki" [Weeping and sobbing], March 1958. (Handwritten.) Draft of an article prepared by Saito for submission to the military magazine Dokisei kaishi. Sawamoto Rikichiro. "Nikki" [Diary]. (Handwritten). Copy of excerpts for JulyAugust 1938. Shigemitsu Mamoru. Gaiko kaisoroku [Diplomatic memoirs] .Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1953. .Showa no ddran [The Showa era: Years of upheaval] . 2 vols. Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1952. Translated as Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace, trans. Oswald White, ed. Maj. Gen. F.S.G. Piggott. London: Hutchinson, 1958. .Sugamo nikki [Sugamo prison diary]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1953. Shimada Toshihiko. Kantogun [The Kwantung Army]. Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1965. Shishikura Hisao. "Nihongun no tai-So handan" [Japanese Army estimates of the USSR], February 1961. (Handwritten.)

388

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Soren kyosanto chuo iinkai fuzoku Marukusu-Renin shugi kenkyujo, ed. [MarxismLeninism Research Institute Attached to Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party]. Dai nijisekai taisen shi [History of World War II]. Vol. 2: Nomonhan jiken to Doitsu no tai-So sen junbi [The Nomonhan Incident and Germany's anti-Soviet war preparations]. Translated by Kawa'uchi Tadahiko. Tokyo: Kobundo, 1963. Translation of 1960 Soviet edition. Suetaka Kamezo. "Chokoho jiken no kaiko" [Recollections of the Changkufeng Incident]. In Akaishizawa Kunihiko, Chokoho [Changkufeng] , pp. 317-353. Tokyo: Koa Shobo,1941. Takamiya Tahei. Tenno Heika [H. M. the Emperor] . Tokyo: Kantosha, 1951. Tanaka Ryukichi. Haiin o tsuku: gunbatsu sen o no jisso [Pointing out the causes of defeat: The true story of the militarists' despotism]. Tokyo: Sansuisha, 1946. .Nihon gunbatsu anto shi [A history of the dark conflicts among the Japanese militarists]. Tokyo: Seiwado Shoten, 1947. Tomioka Sadatoshi, ed. Roshiya daikakumei shi [History of the Great Russian Revolution], 12vols. Tokyo: Roshiya Daikakumeishi Kankokai, 1958-1959. Vol. 9: Sutarin dokusai to daishukusei [Stalin's dictatorship and the great purges] (1959). Tsuji Masanobu. Nomonhan. Tokyo: Ato Shobo, 1950. Ugaki Kazunari [Kazushige]. Ugaki Kazunari nikki [The Ugaki Kazunari diary]. 3 vols. Edited by Tsunoda Jun. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1968-1971. .Ugaki nikki [The Ugaki diary]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1949. Abridged version. Usami Seijiro, Eguchi Bokuro, Toyama Shigeki, Nohara Shiro, and Matsushima Ei'ichi. Taiheiyo senso shi [A history of the Pacific war]. 5 vols. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1953. YabeTeiji. Konoe Fumimaro. 2 vols. Tokyo: Kobundo, 1952. Yoshihara Nori [Ku] . Nihon rikugun kohei shi [Japanese Army Engineers history]. Tokyo : Kudansha, 1958.

WESTERN SOURCES Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Institute of History. A Short History of the USSR. Pt. 2. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965. Beloff, Max. The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941. Vol. 2, 1936-1941. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. Berchin, Michel, and Ben-Horin, Eliahu. The Red Army. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943. Bergamini, David. Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. New York: William Morrow, 1971. Blumenson, Martin. "The Soviet Power Play at Changkufeng.” World Politics 12 (January 1960): 249-263. Cheng Tien-fong. A History of Sino-Russian Relations. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. New York: Macmillan, 1968.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

389

Coox, Alvin D. "Changkufeng: One Face of War." Orient/West 7 (September 1962): 77-88. ."Changkufeng and the Japanese 'Threat' to Vladivostok, 1938." Journal of Asian History 5 (1971): 119-139. ."Effects of Attrition on National War Effort: The Japanese Army Experience in China, 1937-1938." Military Affairs 32 (Fall 1968): 57-62. ."L'Affaire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Defector." Soviet Studies 19 (January 1968): 405-420. ."The Lake Khasan Affair of 1938: Overview and Lessons." Soviet Studies 25 (July 1973): 51-65. ."Maverick General of Imperial Japan" (Sato Kotoku). Army 15 (July 1965): 68-75. ."Qualities of Japanese Military Leadership: The Case of Suetaka Kamezo." Journal of Asian History 2 (1968): 32-43. ." Restraints on Air Power in Limited War: Japan vs. USSR at Changku­ feng, 1938." Aerospace Historian 17 (December 1970): 118-126. ."Shigemitsu Mamoru: The Diplomacy of Crisis." In Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941, pp. 250-273. Edited by Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett. Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1974. ."Soviet Ousting of Japanese Consulates, 1937-38." Orient/West 9 (September-October 1964): 48-58. .Year of the Tiger. Tokyo and Philadelphia: Orient/West Press, 1964. Japanese domestic and external affairs, except relations with USSR, 19371938. Craigie, Sir Robert. Behind the Japanese Mask. London: Hutchinson, 1946. Curtis, Monica, ed. Documents on International Affairs, 1938. 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1942-1943. Dallin, David J. The Rise of Russia in Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. .Soviet Russia and the Far East. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941. Degras, Jane, ed. Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press, 1948. .Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1941. 3 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951-1953. Vol. 3 (1953) treats 1933-1941. Dushenkin, V. "Fighting at Lake Hassan." Soviet Military Review, July 1968, pp. 44-45. Erickson, John. "Reflections on Securing the Soviet Far Eastern Frontiers: 19321945."- Interplay 3 (August-September 1969): 54-57. .The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941. London: Macmillan, 1962. Garder, Michel. A History of the Soviet Army. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Revised version of Histoire deTArmee sovietique. Paris: Librairie Pion, 1959. Supplementary material by John Erickson. Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Military Doctrine. Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1953.

390

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Goldman, Stuart D. "The Forgotten War: The Soviet Union and Japan, 19371939." Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1970. Grew, Joseph C. Ten Years in Japan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944. .Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945. Edited by Walter Johnson. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1952. Hidaka Noboru. Manchukuo-Soviet Border Issues. Dairen [Manchukuo] : n.p., 1938. Hishida Seiji. Japan Among the Great Powers: A Survey of Her International Relations. New York: Longmans, Green, 1940. See Section 77 for relations with USSR. Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1948. Ikle, Frank W. German-Japanese Relations, 1936-1940. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). Transcript of Proceedings, 1946-1948 (Mimeographed). Rejected and,accepted exhibits were made available to me in Tokyo by defense counsel, Ben Bruce Blakeney and George A. Furness. Cited as Blakeney Collection and Furness Collection. Jones, F. C. Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45. London: Oxford University Press, 1954. Kournakoff, Captain Sergei N. Russia's Fighting Forces. New York : International Publishers, 1942. See chs. 5 and 6 for battles in Far East, 1938-1939; author's rank derives from his military service in the White Russian armies during the Russian civil war, but his account is pro-Soviet. Laffan, R.G.D., and others. Survey of International Affairs, 1938. Vol. 3. Edited by Veronica N. Toynbee. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. Pt. 3, "The USSR," by F. Ashton-Gwatkin. , Liddell Hart, Basil H., ed. The Red Army. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956. See ch. 6, "The Great Purge," by Leonard B. Schapiro,and ch. 15, "The Soviet Army in the Far East, 1922-1955," by J. Malcolm Mackintosh. Lu, David J. From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: A Study of Japan's Entry into World War //. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Mackintosh, J. Malcolm. Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces. London: Seeker and Warburg, 1967. McLean, Donald B., ed. Japanese Infantry Weapons. Vol. 1. Forest Grove, Ore.: Normount Armament Co., 1966. McSherry, James E. Stalin, Hitler, and Europe. Vol. 1: The Origins of World War 11, 1933-1939. Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1968. Minear, Richard H. Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Moore, Harriet L. Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945. Morley, James William, ed. Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935-1940. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. The first volume to appear in series titled Japan's Road to the Pacific War: Selected Transla­ tions from Taiheiyo senso e no michi: kaisen gaiko shi. I translated and

BIBLIOGRAPHY

391

introduced Hata Ikuhiko's portion, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939" (pp. 113-178). New York Times. May-September 1938 (late city edition). Parrish, Michael,. "General G. M. Shtern: A Biographical Inquiry." Soviet Jewish Affairs 1 (1975): 73-76. Ponomaryov, B., Gromyko, A., and Khvostov, V., eds. History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1945. Compiled by A. Beryozkin etal. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969. Presseisen, Ernst L. Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958. Slusser, Robert M., and Triska, Jan F., with the assistance of others. A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959. Storry, Richard. The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism. London: Chatto and Windus, 1957. Tantum, W. H., IV, and Hoffschmidt, E. J., eds. Second World War Combat Weapons. Vol. 2: Japanese Combat Weapons. Old Greenwich, Conn.: WE, Inc.; 1968. Thiel, Erich. The Soviet Far East: A Survey of Its Physical and Economic Geography. Translated by A. Rockwood and R. M. Rockwood. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Thompson, Colonel Paul W. "Changkufeng: King of Border Incidents." Infantry Journal (August 1943): 59-60. Tinch, Clark W. "Quasi-War Between Japan and the USSR, 1937-1939." World Politics 3 (January 1951): 174-199. Titus, David Anson. Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. Toynbee, Arnold J. Survey of International Affairs, 1938. Vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pt. 5, "The Far East," by G. E. Hubbard. United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Chief of Military History. Unclassified monographs prepared by Japanese Research Division (JRD), Military History Section, Headquarters US Army Forces Far East. "Inter­ rogations of Japanese Officials" (n.d.); Japanese Night Combat, unnum­ bered monograph (1955): pt. 1— Principles of Night Combat, pt. 2—Ex­ cerpts from Japanese Training Manuals, pt. 3—Supplement, Night Combat Examples; Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria (Prior to 1943), Japanese Monograph No. 77 (1954); Japanese Operational Plan­ ning Against the USSR, Japanese Studies on Manchuria (JSM), vol 1 (1955); Japanese Intelligence Planning Against the USSR, JSM, vol 10 (1955); Small Wars and Border Problems, JSM, vol. 11 (1956): pt. 1—same title, pt. 2—Garrisons and Fortifications, pt. 3, bk. A—The Changkufeng Incident; "Statements of Japanese Officials" (n.d.); Study of Strategical and Tactical Peculiarities of Far Eastern Russia and Soviet Far East Forces, JSM, vol. 13 (1955). United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplo­ matic Papers, 1938. 5 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954-1955. The Far East, vols. 3,4 (1954, 1955).

392

BIBLIOGRAPHY

United States. National Archives. File 761.93 Manchuria/135, etc. (declassified). United States. War Department. Military Intelligence Service. Japanese Ground and Air Forces. Information Bulletin No. 14 (MID 461, 1 May 1942). von Lerch, Generalmajor a.D. Theodor. "Der Konflict in Ostasien." MHitarwissenschaftUche Mitteilungen (Vienna) 69 (October 1938): 836-847. "Der 'Zwischenfall' von Changkufeng" is treated on pp. 836-839. Woodward, E.L., and Butler, Rohan, eds. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. 3rd Series, vol. 8, 1938-1939. London: HMSO, 1955. Far Eastern portion commences with documents from 4 August 1938. Wu, Aitchen K. China and the Soviet Union: A Study of Sino-Soviet Relations. New York: John Day, 1950. Zaichikov, V.T. Geography of Korea. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952. Translated by Albert Parry from Koreia (Moscow, 1947).

A NOTE ON SOVIET SOURCES1

Soviet military historiography has somewhat ignored the activities of the Red Army during the period 1930-1940. In contrast to the Great Patriotic War (World War II), the campaigns in the Far East, the Winter War against Finland, and the invasion of Poland have received scant attention. The lack of adequate Soviet literature on Lake Khasan can­ not entirely be blamed on the limited extent and duration of the cam­ paign. The primary reason is perhaps that the campaign was carried out under the shadow of the great purges. Undertaken by the grand inquisi­ tor L. Z. Mekhlis, who was present during the hostilities, they were to dev­ astate the Soviet high command in the Far East. One does not have to agree with all of the far-fetched theories and inaccuracies of the Soviet defector B. Svetlanin in Dal'nevostochnyizagovor [Far Eastern conspiracy] (Frank­ furt, 1953) to see the basic outline of the terror caused by Mekhlis and his entourage. The most interesting and up-to-date account of the Soviet side ap­ pears in an article published in the No. 5, 1970, issue of the Novaia i noveshaia istoriia ("Nakanune vtoroi mirovoi voiny (mai 1938 g.—sentiabr' 1939 g.)" [On the eve of World War 11 (May 1938—September 1939)], pp. 3-27). The article, using archival sources, is part of the prewar memoirs of the late Mar­ 1. Provided by Michael Parrish, Director, School of Public Affairs Library, Indiana University. The Library of Congress system of trans­ literation is used in this note. For assistance with Russian-language sources, I also wish to thank Neil M. Heyman, Associate Professor of History, and Leland A. Fetzer, Professor of Russian, San Diego State University.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

393

shal M, V. Zakharov to be published eventually as a book. Zakharov, who from May 1938 served as assistant chief of the General Staff, was in a partic­ ularly favorable position to report the events. The Soviets obviously expected trouble in the Far East since, according to Zakharov, during 1938 their forces were increased by 105,800 men. He indicates that on August 2, 1938, the Politburo ordered Bliukher to take over the front-line command. Zakharov also mentions the presence of Mekhlis, but not his goon squads. Overall, Zakharov indicates that Soviet performance at Khasan was not satisfactory, although he tries to absolve Bliukher of some of the blame. It is interesting to notice that only two of the many books aind mono­ graphs devoted to Bliukher mention his role at Lake Khasan, despite his full rehabilitation. The entries for him in the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia (1962), Ukrainian Encyclopedia (1959), and the Large Soviet Encyclopedia (1970) fail to mention the Khasan incident. Another reason for the lack of literature is that so many of the Soviet military leaders at Lake Khasan have died. Besides Bliukher, Komkor (Corps Commander) G. M. Shtern, chief of staff of the Far East Army Group and later commander of the 39th Corps, and Kombrig (Brigade Commander) P. V. Rychagov, the commander of the air force, both fell victim to purges. Kombrig K. P. Podlas, commander of the Maritime Army, whose role in the Soviet chain of command remains vague, survived Stalin's prisons apparently to fall in May 1942 during the abortive Soviet counteroffensive near Kharkov. Col. N. E. Berzarin, commander of the 32nd Rifle Division, who was killed in a traffic accident in Berlin in 1945, is one of the most revered of the Soviet commanders, but, unfortunately, his biography by M. A. Levashov, Komendant Berlina [Berlin comman­ dant] (Moscow, 1965), is devoted to his career during World War II. The present colonel general of tank troops, D. A. Dragunskii, served as a lieu­ tenant at Lake Khasan; his autobiography, Gody v brone [Years in armor] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972) briefly mentions his participation. Other leading actors of the drama have left no records at all. Kombrig V. N. Sergeev, Shtern's predecessor as commander of the 39th Corps, and Col. A. P. Panfilov, commander of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade, both survived the purges and both appeared on the list of generals when this rank was introduced in the Red Army in June 1940. Sergeev's wartime career is not known, while Panfilov survived the war without any particu­ lar distinction in the rank of lieutenant general of tank troops. Neither of them has left a written record. Division Commissar P. I. Mazepov, the

394

BIBLIOGRAPHY

political commisar and head of the political department of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (Army Group), served in the beginning of World War II as the political commissar on the Briansk Front and achieved the rank of lieutenant general. Corps Commissar F. A. Semenovskii, who, despite his higher rank, was the commissar of the staff of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front, served as a political commissar of the 20th Army during the early days of World War II and lost his life in 1941 during the battle of Moscow. The present Army General G. I. Khetagurov was also at Khasan as an artillery commander. The future Army General M. M. Popov, who was Bliukher's assistant for fortifications, was in an exceptionally good position to observe the events. Unfortunately, Popov, who perhaps held more different high posi­ tions than anyone else during the Great Patriotic War, has not, to my knowl­ edge, left a record of his prewar memoirs, although various parts of his mem­ oirs have appeared as articles in magazines or in anthologies. His recent death makes the appearance of such memoirs even more remote. The prospect for the detailed Russian history of the Lake Khasan cam­ paign does not seem promising. The recent Soviet history of the Far East Military district (Krasnoznamennyi dal'nevostochnyi [Far East Red Ban­ ner] ) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971) adds some new tidbits of information but falls short of a detailed study. A biography of Mekhlis, desirable as it may be, is still unthinkable.

* Index

Agochi, 43, 44, 52, 79, 95, 97, 104, 202,218, 283,284 AGS. See General Staff, Army, Japanese Air Force: Japanese, 15, 28, 31,48, 177, 183, 189-191, 195, 196, 197n, 203, 210, 293, 373; Soviet, 120 (photo), 185, 187-189, 192, 193, 195, 204-209, 212, 213, 226, 247, 249, 256, 260-262, 273, 306, 312, 345, 360, 370, 373; bombers, 188, 189, 203, 204, 230, 233-235, 251,258, 260, 264, 265, 283, 315, 361 n; fighters, 189, 193, 194, 258, 260, 265, 279, 373; losses, 187, 192, 267, 269, 279; recon­ naissance, 38-40, 187, 191, 192, 194, 221,226, 233,267 Air raid shelters, 266 Akahage. See Hills, Akahage Akaishizawa, Corp. Kunihiko, BGU, 1st Co., 76th Inf. Regt., 89, 146, 148, 152, 157, 162, 169, 208, 244,245 Akamatsu, Yusuke, 92, 93, 300 Akikusa, Lt. Col. Shun, S/O, AGS 5th (Sov. intell.) sec., 269 Amagasa, M/Sgt. Seijuro, plat. Idr., 2nd Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 140, 142 Ammunition: Japanese, 149, 168, 239, 250, 255,256,274,281;

shortages, 234, 236, 240, 241; Soviet, 12, 281,288 Amoy, 22 Amur River, Incident (1937), 18, 24, 33,48,294,299,364 z Antiaircraft defenses, 42, 249, 260, 270, 279, 284, 289 Antitank defenses:. Japanese, close quarter, 157-159, 161,230, 232, 235, 255; guns, 159, 206, 231, 250, 252, 256, 258, 273; mines, 159; Soviet, 170, 272 Ap Bia. See Hills, Hamburger Arao, Maj. Okikatsu, 49, 50-55, 71, 72, 76, 86, 101, 109, 110, 178, 338,375 Ariga, PFC, 9th Co., 3rd Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 255 Arisue, Lt. Col. Yadoru, 31,33, 47, .48, 50-53,71, 101,327,375 Armor: Japanese, 26, 27, 29, 170, 261; Soviet, 89, 90, 93, 121 (photo), 128, 130, 134, 141, 145, 149-152, 157-163, 171, 174, 177, 204,206, 207, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 220, 222, 224-226, 229, 230-236, 238, 246, 251,255, 258,

*See Appendix for full identification of key Japanese military and diplo­ matic personnel.

396

260-262, 264, 265, 268, 269, 273275, 282, 312, 323, 342, 360; losses, 209, 230-236, 246, 250-252, 255,256,258,260,262, 269, 275, 310 Army, Soviet, xix, xx, 36,136, 189, 261,275, 283, 302,370 Artillery: Japanese, 27-28, 42, 52, 77, 78, 95, 103, 151, 157, 158, 160-163, 169, 171,205, 213, 221, 223, 224, 229, 233, 235, 249, 250, 254, 259, 260, 265, 267, 268, 270-274, 278, 279, 281,282, 285, 303, 309, 310, 321,322; heavy, 236, 243, 270, 281; moun­ tain, 52, 104, 235, 253, 257, 259, 265, 269, 273-275, 284; Soviet, 161- 164, 173, 174, 177, 199, 200, 204, 205, 207-209, 212-215, 218, 220-227, 229-231,233, 234, 247, 249, 251,254, 256-258, 261,262, 264, 265, 267, 268, 270-275, 278281.283, 321-323; heavy, 131, 146, 149, 245, 264, 270, 342; mountain, 51,251,260, 273, 278 Attacks: Japanese, 48, 50, 67, 68, 88, 89, 130-132, 135, 174, 241,250252, 254, 258, 259, 267, 272, 279,351; dawn,131, 160, 161, 168, 171; night, 48, 52,96, 106, 107, 128, 130-133, 135, 136, 138, 142, 150, 154n, 157, 160, 162, 168-170, 177, 226, 243-244, 250, 260, 267, 272, 299; position of, 111 n; river crossing, 48, 55n, 73, 95-97, 102, 103, 206, 273, 274; surprise, 48, 51, 103, 130, 244; Soviet, 90, 99, 135, 157, 158, 161, 162, 177, 204, 214, 237, 247.268.272.274.278.283, 288, 290, 293, 316; dawn, 234, 250, 320; night, 206, 207, 209, 214, 229, 234, 235, 246,256, 259, 260, 271,274, 320 Awards and decorations: Japanese, 208, 350; Soviet, 361 n

INDEX Baba, 2nd Lt. Tsuneo, 375 Barabash, 38 Barbed wire, 12, 15, 44, 45, 140-146, 236, 244, 268. See also Defenses, Soviet Batarshin, Sec. Ldr. Gilfan A., 50th BGU, 37, 196n, 322 Bayonets, 142, 144, 239, 243, 245, 253 Bezymiannaia, 87. See also Hills, Shachaofeng BGU. See Garrison units, border Blagoveshchensk, 301 Bluecher. See Blyukher Blyukher, Marshal Vasilii K., xix, 83, 204,261,310, 355, 357, 370 Borders, xx, xxi, 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 64, 79,84,92,100,110n,132,134, 177, 183, 184,227,229,271,293, 299, 302-303, 309, 352-353, 362, 363; commission, 302, 351,352. See also Ceasefire Boryaku. See Subversion Bosenko, xxiii. See also Hills, Fangchuanting Boundaries. See Borders Burma, 311

Cabinet, Japanese, 21,62, 63, 74, 75 Camouflage, 266 Casualties: Japanese, 88, 89, 90, 143146, 149-151, 157, 160, 163, 165, 167, 168, 174, 178, 188, 194, 203, 209, 214, 218, 222, 223, 225, 226, 230-233, 238, 239, 241-242, 244247, 250-257, 260-262, 264, 265, 268, 269, 271-275, 279, 280, 282285,286n,287, 288, 306, 313, 321,327, 358, 359; exchange of, 344, 345, 347n; retrieval of, 158; Soviet, 92, 158, 159, 167, 172n, 178, 187, 196n, 209, 213, 214, 218, 233-235, 241,244-246, 250, 252, 254, 255, 257-260, 265, 268, 269, 275, 276, 279, 282,285,

INDEX

310, 321,327;exchange of, 344, 345, 347n; retrieval of, 336 Cavalry, 12, 14-16, 88, 220, 222, 261 Ceasefire, 122-123 (photo), 125 (photo), 266, 278, 290, 292, 298, 300-303, 306-309, 316, 317, 319-321 323, 326-327, 332-340, 342, 343, 346n,363 Censorship, 301 Changchih, See Khasan, Lake Changgo, 3, 9, 353 Chang Hsueh-liang, xix, xxii Changkufeng, Incident, x, xiii, xv-xvi, xixyxxi, xxii n, 21,22, 29, 30-33, 37, 39, 40, 57-68, 71-80, 370-374; AGS policy toward, 29-30, 314317, 327-329, 338-340; diplomacy of, 297-303, 304n, 306-309. See also Hills, Changkufeng Changlingtzu. See Hills, Changlingtzu Chenpao. See Damansky Island Chiangchunfeng. See Hills, Chiang­ chunfeng Chiang Kai-shek, 366 Chientao, 15 Chihaya, Castle, 282, 286n Chilston, Viscount, 363, 364 China, Imperial, 5, 7 China, Incident, 19, 22-24, 27, 29, 36, 38, 39,47, 53, 57, 59, 60, 63, 71, 189, 192, 196, 306, 349, 350 China, Nationalist, 7, 22, 27, 28, 280, 350,364, 365, 370 China, People's Republic of, 371,373, Chita, 12 Cho, Col. Isamu, 135, 181,217, 249, 250, 266,267,271,273,274, 279, 280,281,309,321,332-336, 342,344,375 Chongjin, 189 Civil defense, 192 Chokoho, xxiii. See also Hills, Chang­ kufeng Clark Kerr, Archibald, 365 Code words, 132 Communications: Japanese, 73, 140,

397

154n, 160, 161, 169, 232, 234; Soviet, 15, 200 Conferences, Japanese: Five Ministers’ (19 July 1938), 57; (22 July 1938), 74, 75; (2 August 1938), 190; Imperial, 75 Consulates, 301 Craigie, Sir Robert, 364 Czechoslovakia, xix, 371 Damansky Island, xxi, 371 Decision making: Japanese, 64-65, 101,105, 107, 135, 181; Soviet, 41 Defenses: Japanese, xx, 59, 63, 84, 158, 203, 205, 222, 238, 261, 271,272,280, 281,311,312, 359; Soviet, 14, 29, 38, 52, 103, 131, 132, 139, 161, 162, 168, 170,237,279,301,321,322, 336; emplacements, 141-142, 144149, 151, 156-157, 160, 171,240, 244,268 Deserters, 269, 355 Diplomacy, Japanese, 7,28-31, 37, 40, 43, 47, 52, 59, 63, 72, 74. See also Gaimusho Dogs, sentry, 141, 171, 172n Doi, Col. Akio, 47, 48, 57, 58, 76, 316, 327, 375 Doinrei. See Mobilization Dokudan senko, 85, 96, 98, 106, 130 Domei News Agency, 33, 40, 193, 227, 299,315,316 Duranty, Walter, 91,204, 261,299

Embassy, Soviet (Tokyo), 91,352 Emperor, Japanese, 31,54, 57, 59, 60-67, 74, 178-180, 254, 284, 289,290,299,301,319,349351,372 Empress, Japanese, 178, 349, 350 Enforcers, Soviet, 236, 238 Engineers, 25, 42, 44, 48, 73, 79, 102,103,232, 247, 250, 251,

398

253, 267, 268, 280, 283. See also Units, 19th Engr. Regt. Erickson, John, xvi, 357 Escalation, xxi, 86, 87, 185, 191, 299, 302, 370. See also War, limited Estimates: British, 363-365, 392-394; Chinese, 366; Japanese, 363; inten­ tions and capabilities, 19, 28, 170, 189, 235, 294, 355; order of battle, 22, 51, 128, 130-131, 166n, 199, 203,204,218, 222,246, 260, 265, 268-269, 275, 282, 287, 293294; performance and quality, 171,203,222,272, 355, 358, 366; Soviet, 92

Fangchuanting. See Hills, Fang­ chuanting Fedotev, Col., 333 Finland, xix, xxii Fisheries, 303 Five-year plans, 3 Foreign Ministry, Japanese, See Gaimusho France, 366, 368n Frontiers. See Borders Fuji'uchi, 2nd Lt. 6„ 221,231,375 Fushimi, Prince Hiroyasu, 375

Gaho, 230, 251,270, 281 Gaimusho, 9, 12, 19, 29, 30, 36, 39, 45, 57, 58,61,66,91,92,97, 177,181,191,262, 269, 285, 292, 297, 298, 299-300, 301, 302-303, 306, 307, 319, 320, 327, 351,352, 357, 368 Garrison units, border: Japanese, 38, 42, 78, 79, 83, 86, 93,96, 99, 104, 128, 130, 199; artillery with, 77; Hunchun, 14, 15, 39, 55, 135, 199, 200, 296n; Kucheng (76th Inf. Regt.), 14, 51, 53, 73, 84, 89, 160, 208, 340; Kyonghun, 174; Soviet, 59th (Posyet), 19, 37, 39, 83, 177,298, 363

INDEX Gekokujo, 49, 102 General Staff, Army, Japanese (AGS), 12, 13,21,22, 23,30,32,33,47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 57, 60-62, 65, 67, 69n, 71-74, 75, 78, 85, 96, 100102, 105, 106, 128, 175, 178, 179,181,184,188,191,196, 210,212,219,223, 225, 227, 283-285, 287, 289, 292, 294, 295, 309,310,311 Germany, 24 Germany, East, xix Government, Japanese, 57, 58, 60, 61,74, 75, 76, 86, 177, 189, 190, 298-299 GPU, xxv, 36, 37, 260 Great Britain, 23, 320 Grebennik, Col. Kuzma, 59th BGU cmdr., 37,40,41,92, 325 Grenade launchers, 241,257, 265, 271,279 Grenades: Japanese, 240, 245, 250, 252, 253, 255, 257, 265, 274, 280, 283; Soviet, 238-241,245, 255, 259, 265, 272, 280 Grew, Joseph, 300 Grodekovo, 302 Haigen, 44, 95, 165 Halifax, Lord, 363-365 Hamhung, 135, 217 Hankow, 19,22,23,49,60, 98, 290,306, 350 Hanyang, 22 Hanyu, Maj. Yoshinaga (Zenryo), 266,267, 273, 274, 375 Harada, Baron Kumao, 30, 37, 57-59, 61,63, 66, 178, 180, 181, 184, 185, 189, 190,301,306, 316,375 Harayama, M/Sgt. Riyu (Osao), plat. Idr„ 1st MG Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 149, 233 Harbin, 31,37, 189, 297,322 Hashimoto, Maj. Gen. Gun, 21,31, 178, 195, 291,292,313,315, 329,338,339,340,375

INDEX Hashimoto, Maj. Seishiro, 267, 268, 272-274, 375 Hata, Ikuhiko, xviii, 50, 55, 78, 314, 362 Hata, Gen. Shunroku, 375 Hayama, 57, 178, 179, 181-183, 188, 190, 284, 289,319,349 High Command, Japanese, 11, 12, 14, 22, 32, 35, 37, 47, 50, 58, 62, 65, 67, 68, 75, 78, 80, 108, 110, 185, 189, 224, 294, 306; policy of, 314 Hills: Akahage, 232, 267, 268, 272, 274, 279, 280; Changkufeng, xi, xx, xxii, xxiii, 3, 4 (map), 9, 12-15, 18, 24, 25-28, 35-38, 41,44, 45, 276n; Japanese attack against, 128-136, 138-154, 156-165, 167171, 173-174, 177-179, 182; preparations to attack, 47-55, 95110; Soviet counteroffensives, 187-196, 199-215, 218-227, 229237, 239-262, 285, 310, 320-323, 327; Changlingtzu, 11; Chiang­ chunfeng, xxiii, 26, 51, 73, 74, 78, 83, 84, 86-89, 91, 104, 120, 128, 131-134, 138, 140, 151, 156, 157, 162, 193, 217, 220,256, 261,265, 267, 272-274, 278, 279, 282, 313, 323; Fangchuanting, xxiii, 12, 13, 26, 96, 102, 104, 133, 140, 205, 220, 225, 230, 233, 253, 254, 256, 265, 270, 271,273, 274,278,279, 282, 321; Hamburger, 373; Noguchi, 230, 233, 238, 244, 253, 254, 256, 311; Porkchop, 373; Shachaofeng, xxiii, 7, 9, 26, 47, 55, 78, 83-93, 95, 97-100, 102, 104, 105, 108, 128, ISO134, 157, 159, 160-164, 167-169, 171, 173-178, 182, 184, 188, 189,191, 199,200, 204,205, 207,208,212,213,222, 235, 236,242,268,269,278, 279, 283,299; Hill 24,157, 158, 164, 246; Hill 29, 206, 212, 213, 220,

399 224,225,229,230,251,268, 270,273,275,281,321,322; Hill 52, 5, 26, 37, 44, 95,96, 104, 131,138, 156,158, 159,164, 170, 171, 193, 194,203-208, 212, 215, 217, 220, 222, 224, 226, 229-234, 238, 239, 246,250257, 260, 264, 265, 267, 268, 270-272, 274, 275, 278, 279, 281,282, 312, 320, 326; Hill 82, 206,27b; Hill 147,91, 102, 104; Hill 203 (Russo-Japanese War), 149 Hirahara, Maj. Shizuo, 95, 96, 102, 104, 131, 137n, 138, 156, 158, 165, 167, 204-206, 209, 221, 230, 232, 238, 250-252, 254, 257, 375 Hiramuki, Lt. Col. Kujuku (Tsukumo), 267,279,376 Hisatsune, 1st Lt. Kunio, 158, 159, 164, 206,221,231,238,239, 247n,376 Hoeryong, 15, 43, 44, 50, 135, 195, 242, 260 Hongui, 26, 102, 191, 193, 223, 234, 284,326 Horinouchi, Kensuke, 181, 184, 300, 315,376 Hsinking, 18, 19, 35-37, 74, 75, 97, 189,214,223,224,249,270, 283,294,295, 297, 352 Huichungyuan, 83, 210, 211,218, 220,269 Hunchun, 3, 5, 8, 27, 40, 45, 75, 98, 131,135,294 Hungary, xix

Ichimoto, Maj. Yoshiro, 136, 239, 240,241-244,257,311,312,325, 326,350, 354n, 376 IGHQ, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31,32, 36, 42, 43,49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 73, 77, 78, 99, 100,210,211,269, 292,293, 350

400 IGHQ Army Directives: No. 204 (20 July 1938), 54, 55, 71,72, 74; No. 210 (26 July 1938), 78, 82n; No. 215 (1 August 1938), 182-183, 186n; No. 224 (11 August 1938), 329; No. 230 (10 August 1938), 291,296n; No. 252 (24 August 1938), 348, 353n IGHQ Army Orders, 31,32, 33, 50, 55,58, 75,85,182,183,219, 283,289,291,292,316,339; No. 154 (16 July 1938), 31, 78, 82n; No. 163 (1 August 1938), 182, 186n; No. 172 (11 August 1938), 329, 331 n; No. 174 (6 August 1938), 262n; No. 175 (6 August 1938), 262n; No. 179 (11 August 1938), 319; No. 186 (16 August 1938), 348; No. 190 (24 August 1938), 348, 354n; unnum­ bered order (30 July 1938), 183 lhara, Lt. Col. Junjiro, 376 Ikeda, Seihin, 59, 376 Ikue, 2nd Lt. Haruhide, 235, 376 Illumination, battlefield, 143 Imagawa, Capt. Shigeo, 89, 91,208, 376 Imamura, PFC, 2nd Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 153 Imaoka, Col. Yutaka, xvii, 32, 80, 86, 87,108,109,176,180, 183, 313, 358 Imperial audiences, 61, 182-183 Imperial General Headquarters, Japa­ nese, See IGHQ Imperial message, 349-350 Imperial sanction, 54, 55, 61,62, 6466, 72, 74, 75, 78, 85, 99, 105, 179,181,284,289, 290, 319, 329 IMTFE. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East Inada, Col. Masazumi, 21-31,35, 4750, 54, 58-60, 65, 67, 71,72, 7678, 101, 105, 109, 110, 114 (pho­ to), 176, 178-180, 183, 185, 190, 195, 199, 200,211,287, 289,

INDEX 291,294, 295, 314-316, 319, 329, 353,376 Inagaki, 1st Lt. Takeji, 141, 145, 151, 152,157,205,208,233,252, 271,376 Incident, 350; questions of responsi­ bility, xv, xx, xxi, 8-9, 12-14, 17, 19, 25, 57, 73, 86-87, 128, 180, 218, 362-368 Independent Red Banner Armies: 1st, 357; 2nd, 357 Infantry: Japanese, 43, 44, 72, 77, 79, 87, 97, 99, 100, 104, 135, 141,143,146,152, 157, 162, 207, 209, 225, 250-254, 256, 259, 266, 267, 274,279,281, 283-285, 293, 300, 359, 360; close combat, 268, 280, 281; hand-to-hand combat, 88, 143, 152, 240, 259, 269; rifleman's equipment, 154n; Soviet, 53, 54, 83, 84, 87, 88, 91,99, 128, 134, 152, 157, 159, 160-164, 171,199, 203, 205, 206,212,213,220, 222, 226, 229-238, 242, 245, 247, 251,252, 254, 255, 257-259, 261,262, 264, 265, 268-275,278281,283,285, 297, 298, 300, 342,355 Infiltration, 259 Inner Mongolia Garrison Army, 284 Inokuma, 1st Lt. Hiroshi, 240, 243246,260,376 Intelligence, Japanese, 11, 12, 25, 26, 38, 39,51,52,78,97, 111n, 128, 131,138,168,171,178,204, 210, 217, 222, 226, 246, 259, 260,268, 275,293,310,358, 361 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, xx-xxi, 5, 45, 66, 68n,75,85,87,92,311,322, 366, 367, 372 Iryoku teisatsu. See Reconnaissance in force Ishii, Sup. Pvt. Toshiharu, MG squad Idr, 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 251

INDEX Ishiwara, Maj. Gen. Kanji, 36, 294, 296n,353,376 Isobe, M/Sgt. Kenji, plat. Idr,. 7th Co., 2nd Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 240 Itagaki, Lt. Gen. Seishiro, 21,32, 51, 58, 59, 60-67, 71,72, 74, 75, 100, 115 (photo), 181-185, 188, 289, 298, 315, 350-351,376 Ito, Capt. Hiroshi, 102, 131, 156, 157, 161,165,221,238,240,245,376 Iwai, Capt. Tokuzo, C/O, 10th Co., 3rd Bn., 76th Inf. Regt., 268 Iwakuro, Lt. Col. Hideo, 376 Iwano, Capt. Yachio, Prov. Trnspt. Co., 19th Div., 102 Iwasaki, Col. Tamio, 16, 31,73, 76, 77, 174, 175, 182, 201,202,218, 219,262,311,313, 344, 360, 376 Iwata, PFC Shigeo, 2nd Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 153 Japan, xix, xx, xxi, 19, 24, 26-30, 32, 55,57, 58,60, 75, 84,91 Japan, Sea of, 194 Jiken. See Incident

Kabasawa, 232 Kadokura, Capt. Tokuji, 258, 279, 280,376 Kadowaki, Sgt. Daizo, plat. Idr., 1st Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 145 Kaesong, 372 Kaganovich, Lazar M., 91 Kamimori, Maj. Rokuro, 212, 221, 229,376 Kanai, Capt. Yuji, 376 Kanaoka, W/O Takeyoshi, plat. Idr., 1st Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 250 Kanda, Capt. Yasuo, 83, 84, 87-89, 104, 160-163, 208, 240, 377 Kaneko, Corp. Masaji, squad Idr., gun plat., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 255 Kaneko, Capt. Yosuke, 191,377

401

Kan'in, Prince Kotohito Shinno, 21,31, 51,54, 58, 60-67, 71, 100, 179,181,183,188, 289, 292, 338, 348, 353, 377; Imperial audiences, 182, 349 Karanchin, 261 Karuizawa, 180 Katakura, Lt. Col. Tadashi, 35, 36, 377 Kawame, Lt. Col. Taro, 93n, 223, 224, 294, 295, 377 Kazami, Akira, 58, 316, 377 Khabarovsk, 8, 12, 49, 203, 227, 293,301 Khalkhin Gol. See Nomonhan Khanka, Lake, 5, 8 Khansi, 26, 222, 261 Khasan, Lake, xx, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 19, 26, 39,41-43,66,73,75, 88,95, 128, 130, 131, 134, 141, 160,161, 163, 164, 170, 171, 177, 199, 200, 203, 205-207, 212, 220, 222, 224-226, 229-231, 234,238,244,251,257,258, 260,264, 265, 272, 279, 280, 297,313, 321 Kido, Marquis Ko'ichi, 59, 188, 190, 350, 377 Kim, Alexi, 333 Kimura, PFC, 250 Kirk, Alexander, 299, 301,303, 365 Kisarazu, 319 Kitahara, Capt. Sadao, 146, 147, 149, 151,377 Kitano, Maj. Gen. Kenzo, xvi, 14, 32, 73, 97, 102, 104, 105, 184, 201, 202,219,223, 224, 226, 227, 283, 311,377 Kobayashi, Lt. Col. Mokichi,96, 102, 103,280, 377 Kobayashi, M/Sgt. Zenbei, engr. plat. Idr., attached 75th Inf. Regt., 232 Kogeki busho. See Position attack Kogi. See Hongui Koiso, Gen. Kuniaki, 13, 14, 16-19, 29, 32, 35, 36, 76, 352, 377

402 Kojima, Maj. Saburo, 254, 257, 271, 327, 377 Komatsu, Lt. Col. Misao, 261-262, 377 Konev, I. S., 357 Konoe, Prince Fumimaro, 21,22, 57, 59,61,67, 74, 178, 180, 188-190, 299, 301,315,316, 377 Korea, xix, 3, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 24, 26, 27, 31,32, 33, 37, 44, 45, 47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 68, 72-75, 78, 79, 91, 104, 138, 158, 187-189, 192-195, 202, 204, 210, 211,219,220, 223,224,249,265,275, 293; North, 353, 372 Korea Army, xx, 12, 14-16, 18, 19, 27-32, 35-37, 39, 42, 43, 47-50, 52-54, 60, 65, 67, 71,73-79, 85, 86, 89-91,93, 97, 98, 100-102, 106, 109, 132, 173-177, 179, 182-184, 189, 191, 194, 199, 200-201,209, 210, 217-219, 224, 227, 249, 268, 269, 275, 283-285, 287-289, 293, 309, 313, 326-328, 363 Kotani, Maj. Etsuo, 31,33, 47-50, 52-55, 101,313,338, 377 Kozando, 15, 26, 203, 215, 222, 234 Kozuki, 2nd Lt. Norimasa, 332, 333,377 Kraskino. See Novokievsk Kubota, 1st Lt. Shigeru, 252, 377 Kraskino. See Novokievsk Kubota, 1st Lt. Shigeru, 252, 377 Kubota, Lt. Col. Takajiro, 377 Kucheng, 42, 44, 48, 51, 53, 73, 83, 88,91,95, 96, 102, 103, 107, 1.30, 133, 156, 162, 223, 267 Kuriyama, W/O Chugo, 146, 149, 151, 165,377 Kusaka, Capt. Ryunosuke, UN, 21, 30,58,378 Kusunoki, Masashige, 282, 286n Kutsukake, 2nd Lt. Shohei, 158, 255, 378

INDEX Kuznetzov, V. V., 37 Kwantung Army, xx, 12, 13, 16-19, 22-24, 26-29, 35, 36, 37, 48, 49, 54,59, 60, 93n, 97, 100, 101, 135, 178, 195, 203, 227, 249, 260, 261,279, 282-284, 287, 288, 293-295, 350-353 Kyonghun, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 79, 84, 89, 94n, 97, 102, 103, 110, 188, 193, 194, 200-202, 210, 217, 223, 225, 226,250,266

Lavelle case, 372 Lessons, 374; Japanese, 15, 147, 156, 169, 358-360, 365, 371,372; Soviet, 355, 357, 358, 361 n, 371, 372 Litvinov, Maxim, 38, 57, 292, 298303, 306-308, 320, 345, 368 Localization. See War, limited Logistics: Japanese, 23, 203-204, 288; Soviet, 15, 52, 241. See also Materiel Maanshan, 25, 206, 208, 222, 230, 246, 251,264, 270,321 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 372, 373 Machine guns: Japanese, 143, 149, 150, 167, 205,242, 251,252, 256,258,263n,268,278,279281,321; Soviet, 240, 241,244, 255, 259,264,265,270,272, 282,321 Mackintosh, J, Malcolm, 357 Maeoka, 2nd Lt. Isamu, 209, 253, 265 Manchouli, 38 Manchukuo, 3, 8, 15, 18, 19, 24, 29, 31,33, 36-39, 43, 45, 78, 91,92, 99, 183, 184, 187,214, 223. See also Manchuria Manchuria, 5, 9, 12, 26, 27, 29, 35, 37, 40, 41,44, 48, 51,54, 59, 64, 66, 71,73, 79,97,99, 100, 102,

INDEX 104, 131-133, 138, 189, 195, 213, 218,261, 282,290,293 Manchurian Incident, 25, 63, 65 Marco Polo Bridge, 57 Maritime Army, Soviet First, 283, 308, 357 Marshall, S. L. A„ 373 Materiel: Japanese, 145, 158, 209, 247n; Soviet, 167, 179, 327, 359 Matsudaira, Tsuneo, 63, 181,350, 378 Matsudaira, Baron Yasumasa, 378 Matsumura, Shu'itsu, 287, 315 Matsunobe, 1st Lt. Mikio, 134, 160162,164,378 Matsuo, PFC Tomisaku (Fusaku), 3rd Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 159 Matsu'otsuho, 96, 102, 103, 133, 202, 210,230,273,274,282, 339, 340 Matsushima, Corp. Shakuni, mil. police NCO, 37, 38, 41,298 Military Academy, Japanese, 21 Military Affairs Bureau, Japanese, 72 Missing in action, 260, 345 Miura, Kazu'ichi, 45 Miyakawa, Funao, 299, 307 Miyashi, Maj. Minoru, 196, 378 Miyashita, M/Sgt. Kiyoto, plat. Idr., 9th Co., 3rd Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 88, 89 Miya'uchi, 2nd Lt. Seita, 259, 378 Mobilization: Japanese, 61, 64, 65, 72, 74, 282, 284, 287,290; Soviet, 357 Morale, Japanese, 214, 226, 233, 240, 250, 264, 278, 309-312 Motorized units, Soviet, 38, 163,! 220,229,261,321,323 Mori, Lt. Col. Gan (Iwao), 111n, 378 Morimoto, Maj. Gen. Nobuki,98, 100, 109, 191, 213, 214, 217, 220-223, 229,238,242,250, 254, 256, 259, 266, 267, 270, 274, 278-281,310, 314, 321, 378

403

Morita, Lt. Col. Sutezo, 270, 273, 322,378 Moscow, 31,38,40, 41,47, 57, 75, 91,92, 177, 204, 214, 226,227, 261,285, 291, 297, 298, 299, 316, 320, 333-334 Moshlyak, Lt. I., 243 Moskalenko, Marshal Kyril, xxii Munich, 370 Murakawa, 1st Lt. Ryo, 191,378 Murakoshi, M/Sgt. Kimio, plat. Idr., 3rd Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 158, 159, 239-242, 378

Nagano, 135 Nagayama, 2nd Lt. Hiroshi, 141,142, 378 Najin, 12, 26,27, 189, 191, 193,284 Nakajima, Chikuhei, 190 Nakajima, Maj. Shigeo, 274, 278, 340, 378 Nakajima, 1st Lt. Shin, 104, 136, 143, 146-148, 151-153, 159, 378 Nakajima, Maj. Gen. Tetsuzo, General Affairs Bureau Chief, War Minis­ try, 353 Nakamura, Maj. Gen. Aketo, 21,378 Nakamura, Bin, 38, 93, 214 Nakamura, Gen. Kotaro, 14, 30-32, 43, 48, 49, 51,55, 71-73, 77, 78, 92, 99, 100, 101,104, 112 (photo), 132, 174-176, 182, 194196, 200-203, 211,217-219, 250, 269-270, 284, 287, 288, 291,339, 348,352, 378 Nakamura, Col. Yoshi'aki, 44, 73, 98, 107,219,332,379 Nakano, Maj. Toshichi, 96, 102, 103, 119 (photo), 130-134, 136, 138, 140, 142-144, 146, 153, 156, 158, 159,165,167,168,171,379 Nanam, 14, 42, 44, 80, 95, 98, 104, 108,135,200,210, 249,266, 270,279 Nanpozan, 163, 212, 235, 259, 281

404 Narukawa, Capt. Masaru, 95, 103, 104, 160-163, 165, 379 Narusawa, W/O Mineo, plat. Idr., 6th Co., 2nd Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 207,246 Natsugumo, 319 Navy, Japanese, 21,23, 26, 30, 181, 190 Navy Ministry, Japanese, 66, 181 Niigata, 194 Nishi, Haruhiko, 38, 297, 298, 307, 352,379 Nishimura, 2nd Lt. Kaoru, 146, 239, 240,243, 379 Nishizawa, W/O Gengo, gas officer, 75th Inf. Regt., 240 NKVD, xxvi, 11. See also GPU • Noguchi, Capt. Kamenosuke, 379 Noguchi, Capt. Shigeyoshi, 84, 87-89, 91,102,104,134,221,231,232, 238, 254-256, 267, 379 Nomonhan, xix, xxii, 179, 195, 294, 312,313,360, 361,371 Nonexpansion. See War, limited North China Area Army, 249, 284 Novokievsk, 12, 25, 26, 38-40, 194, 199,203,222, 261

Obo, Maj. Sakichi, 234, 258, 274, 279,379 Observation posts: Japanese, 266; Soviet, 264, 270 Offensives: Japanese, 50-52, 54, 55, 58-60, 64, 67, 71-72, 84, 86, 87, 96, 102, 104, 106-109, 128, 140, 142, 145, 157, 168, 268, 312; Soviet, 214, 227, 238, 250, 251, 259, 261,269, 274, 314,321, 370, 371. See also Attacks Ogoshi, Capt. Kenji, 35, 36, 379 Okido, Col. Sanji,98, 104, 135, 160,200,210,218,219,242, 250, 260, 267, 268, 270-274, 278-281, 322,379

INDEX

Okuda/Capt. Tatsuo, C/O, 5th Co., 2nd Bn., 73rd Inf. Regt., 258, 259, 280 Okumura, Sgt. Masatada, commd. team ch., 7th Co., 2nd Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 246 Okyu Doin. See Mobilization Ono, Maj. Gen. Nobuaki (Senmei), 227n,266,309, 379 Onuki, M/Sgt. Tomezo, commd. team ch., 2nd Co., 1st Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 143, 144, 146, 379 Operations, tactical: Japanese, 19, 45, 58, 63, 64, 78, 79, 83, 87, 88, 97, 104, 135, 156, 183, 218, 360; Soviet, 76, 168, 364. See also _ Attacks; Offensives . Oshima, W/O Busuke, plat. Idr., 7th Co., 2nd Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 245 Oshima, Lt. Col. Tasuku, attached 75th Inf. Regt. HQ, 165 OSS, xxvi. See also Tokumukikan Osuga, Maj, Minoru, 274, 379 Osugi, 1st Lt. Kunio, 252, 379

Paksikori, 26, 51,89, 234 Pal, Radhabinod, xxi, 368 Panfilov, Col. A., 243 Panmunjon, 372 Paris, 372 Peking, 57 Pentagon Papers, 177 Personnel, shortages of, 249, 257, 287,290 Pistols, Japanese, 154n Podgornaya, 8, 37 Podlas, Commissar, 285, 310 Poland, xix, 11 Position attack, 111n Posyet Bay, 12, 15, 26, 38, 39, 5153, 83, 200, 226, 227,261,269, 275 Posyet BGU. See Garrison units, border Press: foreign, 40, 91,204, 214, 227,

INDEX

261,275, 299, 303; Japanese, 7, 11,22, 29, 33, 38, 40, 41,68n, 91-93, 97, 189, 190, 193, 194, 223, 261,301,320, 326, 340,341, 344, 353, 357, 358; Soviet, 57, 192,261 Prisoners of war: Japanese, 245, 346, 347n; Soviet, 93n, 269 Propaganda: Japanese, 47, 58, 127 (photo), 269; Soviet, 126 (photo) Public relations, Japanese Army, 93 Pyongyang, 260

Radio, Japanese, 22 Raiders, night, Japanese, 243-246 Railway guns. See Trains, Japanese, armored Railways: Japanese, 12, 26, 50, 249, 283, 284; Soviet, 40 Reconnaissance: Japanese, 43, 45, 48, 51,54, 55, 74, 78, 79, 85, 88, 92, 102, 103, 128, 136, 138, 140, 141, 160, 168, 170, 203, 214, 268; Soviet, 83, 87, 98, 134, 160, 171 Reconnaissance in force, 25, 27-31, 47, 50, 109, 132, 315, 357-358, 361,370 Red Air Force, 370. See also Air Force, Soviet Red Army. See Army, Soviet Regulations, military: Japanese, 96, 137n; Soviet, 357 Reinforcements: Japanese, 55, 65, 78, 79, 89-91,240-243, 249, 253, 256, 258, 259, 267,273, 274, 278, 281-284, 287-290; Soviet, 14, 38-40, 89, 90, 128, 131, 133, 145, 149, 151, 157, 206, 215, 217, 218, 240, 244, 255,258, 275, 288 Reserves, military: Japanese, 265; Soviet, 241 Reservist Association, Japanese, 204 Revolution, Bolshevik, xix

405

Rifles: Japanese, 142-143, 154n, 239; Soviet, 242 Rokutanda, Maj. Sokichi, 163, 208, 379 Romanovsky, Commissar, 355 Russia. See Soviet Union Russia, Tsarist, 5, 7 Ryusen, 260

Saionji, Prince Kinmochi, 66, 379 Saito, 2nd Lt. Mitsuru, 158, 206, 230,231,243-246,252,379 , Saito, Maj. Tosh io, 45, 74, 85, 95, 106, 107, 175, 183,379 Sakamoto, 2nd Lt. Rinosuke, ADC, 2nd Bn., 75th Inf. Regt., 256 Sakata,