The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility during America's Exit from Vietnam 9781501703799

Citation preview

THE WAR AFTER THE WAR

THE WAR AFTER THE WAR The Struggle for Credibility during America’s Exit from Vietnam Johannes Kadura

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright © 2016 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2016 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kadura, Johannes, author. Title: The war after the war : the struggle for credibility during America’s exit from Vietnam / Johannes Kadura. Description: Ithaca ; London : Cornell University Press, 2016. | 2016 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015032524 | ISBN 9780801453960 (cloth : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Vietnam War, 1961–1975—United States—Public opinion. | Vietnam War, 1961–1975—United States. Classification: LCC DS559.62.U6 K33 2016 | DDC 959.704/310973—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015032524 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu. Cloth printing

10

9

8

7

6

5

4 3

2

1

To my parents, Dorothee and Bernd, with love

Contents

Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations in the Text

ix

Introduction: Contingency Planning in Turbulent Times

1

xi

1.

The Strategy of the Cease-fire

11

2.

The X Plus 60 Period

30

3.

The Collapse of the Equilibrium Strategy

53

4.

Going Down with Colors Flying

80

5.

Ford and the Fall of Saigon

102

6.

Beyond Defeat in Indochina

135

Conclusion: A Mixed Record

158

Notes Bibliographic Essay on the Different Interpretations of the Post–Paris Agreement Period Bibliography of Primary Sources Index

165

221 225 227

Ac know ledg ments

In researching and writing this book, I have accumulated numerous debts; it is my pleasure to acknowledge them properly. First and foremost, I would like to express my deep appreciation to Andrew Preston of Clare College at the University of Cambridge. Andrew read numerous drafts of the manuscript, and his constructive criticism and meticulous corrections were tremendously helpful. Without his mentorship and encouragement, I would not have been able to write this book. At Cambridge, Tony Badger and David Reynolds provided critical input and created an intellectually stimulating atmosphere. David Milne’s comments and feedback on my work were extremely helpful. I also profited immensely from the support of Andreas Etges, and I am very grateful for all his efforts on my behalf. I would especially like to acknowledge the friendship and support of Tom Tunstall-Allcock, whose comments on the early versions of the manuscript were highly beneficial. At Yale, John Lewis Gaddis was very supportive and introduced me to Mark Atwood Lawrence. Mark’s input and support at the beginning of the project were critical: he helped me find the topic of this book and organize my first research trip to the National Archives and, most important, introduced me to Andrew. In New Haven, Bryn Savage and David Gafron-Savage repeatedly let me stay at their home when I was on research trips and helped me through difficult times. Katun Luc, Benjamin von der Recke, and many other close friends were equally supportive. I am especially grateful for the friendship of Richard Horne, who indefatigably proofread many drafts of the manuscript. A former US marine, he has truly taken to heart the Marine Corps motto, Semper Fidelis. At Cornell University Press, my editor, Michael McGandy, had faith in the project, and his knowledgeable input greatly helped me improve earlier versions of the manuscript. During the writing of this book, I received financial and moral support from various institutions. The Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes awarded me a generous grant for three years. Yale’s International Security Studies center financed my first research trip. The Cambridge European Trust and the Parry Dutton Fund of Sidney Sussex College provided me with additional funding. While I was conducting research, archivists of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project were extremely helpful. My deepest gratitude goes to my family. My grandparents, Adelheid and PaulBernhard, who both passed away before this book could be published, encouraged ix

x

AC KNOW LEDG MENTS

me to finish my writing and supported me financially. My parents, Dorothee and Bernd, were always there when I needed them and shared memories about their own academic achievements, which did not always come easy. My dad’s knowledge about and enthusiam for history were as encouraging as they were entertaining. Most important, my parents miraculously managed to hold their spirits high in extraordinarily difficult times. Words cannot express how much I admire them and how grateful I am to have them as my parents. And last but certainly not least I would like to thank my love, Julie, for being in my life. Je t’aime, mon amour!

Abbreviations in the Text

ASEAN B-52 CBS CIA CREEP DRV F-5E FBI FY GI GVN ICCS JCS MACV MIA NLF NSC NSSM NVA POW PRC PRG SALT SAM SFRC UN USS USSR VC WSAG

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Boeing B-52 Stratofortress (strategic bomber) Columbia Broadcasting System Central Intelligence Agency Committee for the Re-election of the President Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) Northrop F-5E (fighter aircraft) Federal Bureau of Investigation Fiscal year Nickname for members of the US armed forces Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) International Commission of Control and Supervision Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Missing in action National Liberation Front National Security Council National Security Study Memorandum North Vietnamese Army Prisoner of war People’s Republic of China Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Surface-to-air missile Senate Foreign Relations Committee United Nations United States ship Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) Vietcong Washington Special Actions Group

xi

R ed

China

R er iv

Bla c

kR

ive

Democratic Republic of Vietnam r

Hanoi

Haiphong

Laos on ek M g r ve Ri

Vientiane

l Seventeenth Paralle (DMZ) Demilitarized Zone

Quang Tri Hue Danang

Thailand Kon Tum Pleiku

Cambodia

Bangkok

Republic of Vietnam Buon Ma Thuot

G

Phnom Penh

ul

f

of and ail Th

Xuan Loc Saigon

Sihanoukville

South China Sea

Poulo Wai

0 0

150 210

300 Miles

¨

Kilometers 420

MAP 1. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia with important sites for the 1973–75 period.

Ho Chi Minh Trail Advances March Seventeenth Parallel Z) Demilitarized Zone (DM

April

M

Quang Tri

Seventeenth Parallel

g on ek

Military regions I-IV

Hue

er riv

Danang

MR I

Kon Tum Pleiku

Buon Ma Thuot

MR II Nha Trang

MR III

Phnom Penh

Saigon Xuan Loc

¨

South China Sea

MR IV

0 0

80 115

160 Miles Kilometers 230

MAP 2. South Vietnam during the final North Vietnamese offensive in March– April 1975.

THE WAR AFTER THE WAR

Introduction

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN TURBULENT TIMES I just want history to be written correctly. Nixon to Kissinger, December 3, 1976

It was a moment of triumph. Shortly after President Richard Nixon addressed the nation to announce the Paris Peace Agreement and the cease-fire in Vietnam on the evening of January 23, 1973, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger called to congratulate him. True to himself, Nixon remained fixated on his political opponents: “Well, that kills them, you know. The ceasefire kills them, the independent government for South Vietnam kills them and they know that everything they said would not happen has been achieved.” “Exactly,” Kissinger replied. When Nixon mentioned the upcoming briefings before a dovish Congress, Kissinger’s belligerence was nothing short of the president’s: “I can kill them anyway.”1 Just over twenty-seven months later, things looked quite different. On April 29, 1975, while Operation Frequent Wind, the final airlift evacuation of Americans from Saigon, was in full swing, Kissinger, now secretary of state under President Gerald Ford, sat alone in the White House National Security Council office. “In that almost mystical stillness,” he later remembered, “I felt too drained to analyze the various decisions that had led to this moment of dashed hopes. But I reviewed them as if in slow motion.”2 As a dazed Kissinger tried to make sense of what had gone wrong, North Vietnam finalized its victory. On the morning of April 30, Soviet-made T-54 tanks of the North Vietnamese Army smashed through the gates of the Presidential Palace. South Vietnamese president Duong Van Minh, who had been in office for less than seventy-two hours, was arrested, and the exuberant victors renamed Saigon “Ho Chi Minh City.” South Vietnam was no more.3 1

2

INTRODUCTION

This book seeks to explore what happened during the “war after the war” in Vietnam and its aftermath. How could leaders in Washington proclaim in 1973 that they had successfully extricated the United States from the Indochinese quagmire while keeping South Vietnam intact when their ally crumbled under the communist onslaught less than two and a half years later? What had gone wrong? Not only did the bitter ending in Vietnam pose a serious challenge for policymakers in Washington who tried not to lose ground in the Cold War, but it also seemed to suggest that those who had seen the US engagement as ill fated from the beginning had been right all along. In fact, the search for culprits in the defeat in Vietnam became a highly personal matter for those involved in policymaking, as well as their critics. After all, Vietnam played a central role in how the world would come to see the legacies of Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford. To understand the last chapter of US involvement in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, it is important to look at how Nixon and Kissinger, the principal architects of Washington’s Indochina strategy in the late 1960s and 1970s, approached the Vietnam problem from the beginning. When Nixon entered the White House in 1969, US policy toward Indochina and US foreign policy more generally were fundamentally transformed. Most important, the new president and his national security adviser realized that they had to address the limits of US power. Vietnam had made this point unmistakably clear. At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger sought to maintain US credibility and leadership in the world. Essentially, the realist approach to foreign policy that Nixon and Kissinger introduced to the White House was a combination of old ends and new means. Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina strategy reflected this fact. In what came to be known as “Vietnamization,” they gradually reduced the presence of US troops and attempted to shift the responsibility for fighting the war onto Saigon’s forces. This approach was captured on a more general level in the Nixon Doctrine, which stipulated that the United States would support its allies against communist revolutions but would avoid direct military intervention.4 At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger relied on the so-called madman theory, a stratagem by which Hanoi, Moscow, and Beijing had to be tricked into believing that Nixon was ruthless and irrational (in particular, he might use nuclear weapons). Between 1969 and 1972, they also expanded the war in Indochina. In fact, during Nixon’s first eighteen months in office, he and Kissinger were hoping that the escalation of the war would lead to a military victory. While winding down the overall US presence, they greatly extended aerial bombardments of communist forces in Vietnam and its neighboring countries, threatened the North Vietnamese with massive military operations against the North (Operation Duck Hook), and, in April 1970, orchestrated an incursion into Cambodia. However, none of these measures proved successful, and, facing

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN TURBULENT TIMES

3

rising opposition at home, Nixon and Kissinger shifted their strategy by 1971 from seeking military victory to finding a negotiated end to direct US involvement in the war.5 Meanwhile, Nixon and Kissinger continued to pursue a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, culminating in the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements (SALT I) at the Moscow summit in May 1972, and Nixon’s historic visit to China earlier that year marked the beginning of improved relations with Beijing. According to the president and his national security adviser, these dramatic developments had the positive effect of making Vietnam appear less significant by comparison. At the same time, as Nixon and Kissinger saw it, the United States could not be seen as weak if it was to successfully deal with the communist giants. According to this reasoning, maintaining US credibility and projecting an image of strength necessitated ongoing support for South Vietnam. When, in the so-called Easter Offensive in March 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a large-scale conventional attack on the South, Nixon ordered an intense and ultimately effective air campaign in support of South Vietnamese ground forces and against targets in North Vietnam. Negotiations in Paris between Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Le Duc Tho, resumed in the summer and intensified in the fall. But the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in January 1973 did not materialize before Nixon had unleashed Operation Linebacker II, also known as the Christmas bombings, against targets in North Vietnam (the most intense bombing campaign since World War II), aimed at both bullying the North and reassuring the South Vietnamese, who feared being abandoned by the United States and so only grudgingly accepted the agreement.6 How did this dual approach to Indochina—the simultaneous expansion and contraction of the war—translate into a post–Paris Agreement strategy? Can one detect a coherent attempt to prevent South Vietnam’s downfall? Were the principal decision makers by 1973 merely seeking a cosmetic delay of Saigon’s collapse— a so-called decent interval—to avoid taking responsibility? Or did Nixon and Kissinger actually plan for permanent war to keep South Vietnam afloat? What role did domestic opposition to continuing US engagement play after the conclusion of the peace agreement? How important was Watergate for the cause of events? Finally, how did policymakers in Washington and around the world respond to the fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975? The War after the War seeks to address these questions and offers a new interpretation of Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s post–Paris Agreement Indochina policy that centers on the concepts of “equilibrium strategy” and “insurance policy.” It is argued here that the protagonists followed a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a multilayered fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of

4

INTRODUCTION

Vietnam and looking for the means to counterbalance possible defeat in Indochina in order to preserve US credibility. In other words, Nixon and Kissinger simultaneously maintained a plan A of further supporting Saigon and a plan B of shielding Washington against the negative fallout should their maneuvers prove futile. As this book will show, Nixon and Kissinger’s plan A was based on the concept of an “equilibrium strategy,” which in turn was closely linked to the highly ambivalent (and largely misrepresented) term “decent interval.” Rather than depicting the defeatist notion of an inevitable, anticipated communist victory, Nixon and Kissinger used the term to allude to their strategy to uphold the Saigon regime. They sought to gain time, make the North turn inward, and create a perpetual equilibrium. A central part of the strategy for Indochina was based on the idea of persuading Hanoi to refrain from any major offensive for a decent interval of some years. In order to accomplish this, Nixon and Kissinger sought to employ positive and negative incentives for Hanoi to abandon its plans for conquest: the prospect of the normalization of US–North Vietnamese relations and economic aid were meant to serve as carrots, while the possibility of renewed US bombings was intended to provide the necessary stick for successful deterrence. If South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu remained the master of his own house, the reasoning went, and US firepower stood as the guardian angel against an all-out invasion, the period of relative tranquility could strengthen the equilibrium and finally lead to a permanent live-and-let-live attitude on both sides. But although Nixon and Kissinger maintained this optimistic view toward South Vietnam’s long-term survival in early 1973, they coupled it with a more pessimistic outlook. By the time of the Paris Agreement, they had come to see that South Vietnam could fall despite their maneuvers. As a result, they did not base their Indochina policy solely on the equilibrium strategy but combined this approach with an insurance policy (plan B). Nixon and Kissinger’s ultimate goal was to remain flexible and keep their options open. As they saw it, domestic opposition to the war in the United States and a less-than-stable situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos required preparations for different contingencies. To achieve that flexibility, they implemented a dual strategy of deterring the North and promoting equilibrium while simultaneously deflating Vietnam’s significance in public and, above all, working on improved relations with Moscow and Beijing as a counterweight to possible failure in Indochina. Although a primary concern of this book is Washington’s Indochina policy from 1973 to 1976, it also seeks to locate this topic within the broader context of US foreign policy in the 1970s. Were there larger strategic patterns that prevailed during that period? What problems did Vietnam pose for détente? What chances,

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN TURBULENT TIMES

5

in turn, did détente and rapprochement provide for Indochina? How was Vietnam connected to other international crises? To be sure, policymakers in Washington were facing challenging times in the early and mid-1970s. Americans and the rest of the world witnessed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, a severe energy crisis, the flow across borders of capital and the emergence of multinational corporations, the rise of Western Europe and Japan as economic powerhouses, and increased influence of entrepreneurs and transnational, nongovernmental groups. Domestically, US citizens were unnerved by simultaneous inflation and high unemployment (stagflation), as well as a fundamental loss of trust in government as a result of Vietnam and Watergate. Although US foreign relations were marked by East-West détente and the reintegration of China into the international system, increased stability among the great powers was starting to create a backlash at home from both the Right and the Left, whose members demanded a return to US ideals in the conduct of foreign affairs.7 Vietnam was thus not the only international crisis policymakers in Washington had to manage, but it was certainly a central one. Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford evaluated Indochina (and other regional crises) first and foremost against the backdrop of Cold War great-power relations. The effects of Soviet-US détente, as well as the historic opening to China and the intensifying Sino-Soviet split, provided an essential backdrop for the war after the war in Vietnam. After regional containment of China had provided the rationale for US intervention during the first phase of US involvement in Vietnam, global US credibility was the primary concern of Washington’s Indochina hands in the first half of the 1970s.8 Still, unlike what one may suspect, the protagonists’ concern with great-power relations does not seem to have led to a simplistic understanding of the situation in Indochina. Despite the fact that US policymakers hardly cared for Vietnam for its own sake, Kissinger especially showed a clear and nuanced understanding of the Indochina problem, both in its complexity, as, for instance, with respect to the various factions involved in Laos and Cambodia, and in its simplicity: he knew that the future of South Vietnam effectively depended on whether Washington would be able to deter Hanoi from its plans for conquest. An additional crucial aspect of this book is the role domestic politics plays in shaping US foreign policy. Watergate, of course, is an important case in point. As this study shows, Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, and several observers were correct in stressing the importance of Watergate for the passage of inhibitive legislation on US military actions in Indochina in the summer of 1973. Had it not been for the dramatic revelations in the first half of that year of presidential abuses of power, Congress would probably not have had the necessary momentum to override Nixon’s veto of cutting funds for Indochina. At the same time, it is argued here

6

INTRODUCTION

that Watergate’s decisiveness in weakening the president’s standing and the passage of the cutoff did not altogether derail Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy (thereby absolving them of being responsible for Saigon’s fate). Rather, they followed through on their insurance policy, which had been in place well before the summer of 1973. Moreover, contrary to Nixon and Kissinger’s depiction, this study argues that Watergate was no unpredictable tragedy; it was the logical result of Nixon and Kissinger’s policymaking style.9 More generally, historians have correctly pointed out that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford paid significant attention to the effects of foreign policy decisions on their domestic standings. Political gains, above all in the run-up to presidential elections, were never far from the protagonists’ minds. However, this book maintains that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford had an equally strong sense of what they believed to be the US national interest. Although the first half of the 1970s was marked by ongoing erosion of the domestic Cold War consensus that had been shattered in the late 1960s, primarily by the divisive experience of Vietnam, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford remained convinced that US engagement in Indochina was the right thing. Rather than basing their Indochina policy and, more generally, their foreign policy on domestic considerations, they sought to balance political necessities with the perceived need to project an image of US toughness around the world.10 The antagonism between the White House, on the one hand, and Congress and parts of the US public, on the other, is closely linked to another component of the insurance policy for Indochina. After the 1973 congressional cutoff of funds for Indochina, Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, and their aides carefully orchestrated a blame campaign against Congress and the antiwar opposition in the larger public. To be sure, different concepts of morality clashed: Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s political opponents pointed to years of seemingly wasted bloodshed and the lack of democratic standards in Saigon and Phnom Penh; Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford stressed the need to stand by allies and honor commitments. It is reasonable to conclude that they genuinely felt that Congress’s ban on funds for Indochina was amoral and wrong.11 However, the cutoff also provided them with a welcome opportunity to wash their hands of Vietnam and put the blame for Saigon’s collapse on the administration’s critics. As Nixon put it in his memoirs, “The war and the peace in Indochina that America had won at such cost over twelve years of sacrifice and fighting were lost within a matter of months once Congress refused to fulfill our obligations.”12 In fact, what one may call the “stab-in-the-back” part of the Indochina story became a central element of Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s attempt to attenuate the pain of defeat in Indochina and preserve US credibility. Had it not been for the self-imposed restraints of US democracy, the argument

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN TURBULENT TIMES

7

runs, the Nixon and Ford administrations would have honored their commitment to Indochina. If Washington abandoned its allies, it was because it was forced to do so, not because it had grown soft on communism. Ford fully subscribed to this approach. Although Nixon’s successor deserves credit for bringing back a degree of normalcy to US society and overcoming some of the divisions caused by Nixon’s governing style, he contributed his fair share to the continuation of Washington’s Indochina policy. Rather than being a passive follower of Kissinger and lacking the ability to grasp complex foreign policy problems, such as Indochina, Ford, just like Nixon and Kissinger, held the clear conviction that Washington must see it through in Indochina, even if that meant going down with the flags flying. During Ford’s presidency, it was clear to most observers (including the president and Kissinger) that South Vietnam would most likely collapse in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, instead of cutting their losses, Ford and Kissinger continuously requested increased levels of aid, not so much believing that their requests would be granted as first and foremost trying to set the record straight. Although the idea behind the insurance policy was to move on from Vietnam, Ford and Kissinger sought to highlight that Washington’s principal stance of honoring its commitments had not changed. The overarching benchmark under Ford continued to be how foreign policy decisions would affect US prestige and credibility in the global Cold War.13 Although it does not appear that the 1970s were actually more affected than the previous or following decades by political violence or economic instability, historians generally agree that the decade was largely perceived as a period of crisis. For Americans, the 1970s were marked by a keen sense of their own limits and imperfections, politically, economically, and morally. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 provided an iconic image of US defeat and perfectly epitomized the overall feeling of disillusionment. Watching the pictures of desperate South Vietnamese trying to get on one of the last helicopters to leave the country, Americans felt a mix of shame and relief that the decade-long war had come to an end. Many Americans blamed their government, either for not achieving victory or for supporting an undemocratic ally for too long. In any case, in the memory of US citizens, the Vietnam War remained closely linked to dishonesty and abuses of power by the White House. Fittingly, in the middle of the decade, the collapse of South Vietnam and Cambodia underlined the perception of a profound crisis in the United States.14 This book tells a specific story—Washington’s endgame in Indochina—and is part of the extensive historiography of the Vietnam War. Beginning in the second half of the 1970s, two distinct schools emerged in the writings on the war. In what came to be known as the orthodox school, authors criticized US intervention in Vietnam as ill conceived and doomed to fail. Revisionist writers, on the

8

INTRODUCTION

other hand, argued that Washington’s engagement in Indochina had been a noble cause and proposed different strategies that supposedly would have led to US victory. To this day, the debate between orthodox and revisionist scholars continues, and the different schools provide a conceptual framework with which analyses of the Vietnam War can be assessed.15 In the literature on the war after the war in Vietnam, very few studies have focused on the post–Paris Agreement period; most accounts have portrayed the flawed agreement in early 1973 as determining subsequent events. At the same time, three prevailing interpretations of the Paris Agreement and its aftermath have emerged. Nixon, Kissinger, and their supporters claimed that they had achieved “peace with honor” in Vietnam and that the Paris Agreement marked the success of their military and diplomatic maneuvers to uphold an independent South Vietnam. According to their interpretation, the war was lost on the home front when Congress denied the administration the necessary means to provide critical ongoing support to Saigon. The historian Jeffrey Kimball refutes that notion and has advanced the so-called decent-interval theory as an alternative interpretation. According to Kimball, Nixon and Kissinger knew that the Paris Agreement would not hold and merely sought to gain time before the final collapse of South Vietnam, not least to shift the blame for defeat onto their political opponents. The political scientist Larry Berman has provided a third explanation, the theory of “permanent war.” He contends that Nixon planned to use the Paris Agreement as a pretext to justify ongoing bombing campaigns to keep the Thieu regime alive, and that only Watergate prevented him from carrying out that plan. As this book will show, all three existing lines of interpretation contain valuable observations but ultimately fail to adequately capture Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s approach to Indochina after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement.16 Although The War after the War goes beyond a mere synthesis of the existing analyses by introducing the concepts “equilibrium strategy” and “insurance policy,” it takes up arguments that have been made by both critics and defenders of Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s Indochina policy. As historian Gary Hess has pointed out, there is still little evidence of an emerging synthesis between the orthodox and revisionist schools on the Vietnam War, although it seems desirable to move beyond the divide, which is often ideologically motivated. This study attempts to do so. Because the controversial protagonists of this story—Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford—have been the focus of debates that sometimes have become passionate, it seems all the more necessary to avoid jumping to conclusions and to provide a balanced analysis. It is concluded here that Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, and their supporters have, in fact, highlighted some important points (for instance, the influence of Watergate on US policy toward Indochina), but they have conveniently

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN TURBULENT TIMES

9

neglected others (for example, in justifying the US engagement in Vietnam from hindsight).17 The War after the War focuses on the US side and does not attempt to tell the Vietnamese versions of the story, certainly a fascinating topic and promising for future studies. Although some scholars have made progress in this field, North Vietnamese and particularly South Vietnamese sources remain difficult to access. In any case, this study aims to illuminate the Nixon and Ford administrations’ decisions and motivations. Because of the nature of the making of foreign policy during the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford years, the spotlight will primarily rest on these key figures. Under Nixon, the centralization of power and decision making in the hands of a small and secretive circle was practiced to an unprecedented degree. Suiting their foreign policy strategy and reinforced by their personalities, Nixon and Kissinger regularly excluded the bureaucracy from the decisionmaking process. In Ford’s presidency, Kissinger remained the central figure of US foreign policy.18 While telling the story of the war after the war in Vietnam, this book shows how Indochina was linked to other crises in the first half of the 1970s. In addition to Watergate, the Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis constitute two important examples. But this book is linked to other analyses of the 1970s in an even more fundamental way. It helps readers understand how Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford attempted to maintain control of the ship in what Kissinger called times of upheaval. The pragmatic and flexible realpolitik that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford introduced to US foreign policy contributed to the fact that the United States maintained a leading role in the Cold War and a relatively high degree of control in what appeared to be uncontrollable times. Unquestionably, by the time Jimmy Carter entered the White House, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s realist approach to foreign affairs had fallen from grace, and détente had come under attack from both the Right and the Left. The premises of a more stable world system that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford had tried to build were discredited. Although Ronald Reagan was very different in style and purpose, he continued Carter’s approach by emphasizing US ideals for the conduct of foreign policy. In fact, the NixonKissinger-Ford realism of the first half of the 1970s was a unique episode in US foreign policy insofar as it consciously embraced the notion of US unexceptionalism and a realization of Washington’s limits. Perhaps this notion contributed in no small part to the fact that Americans quickly grew uncomfortable with realpolitik.19 Still, despite the obvious shortcomings of their approach (for example, the lack of respect for human rights) and the fact that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s foreign policy produced a backlash that lasted until the end of the Cold War, they

10

INTRODUCTION

offered a coherent strategy that addressed the challenges of an increasingly complex world. In fact, the analysis of Washington’s Indochina policy from 1973 to 1976 shows how Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford tried to use the multipolar, increasingly interdependent world system to the United States’ advantage by contextualizing Vietnam and thus reducing the importance of defeat.20 If Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s foreign policy deserves credit for its conceptual coherence—what Kissinger referred to as a philosophical deepening—it is worth noting that this coherence was in no small part based on the three men’s sense of the prevalence of contingency and uncertainty in foreign affairs. This general orientation of emphasizing the flow of events was perhaps best embodied by Kissinger, both as a scholar and as the preeminent diplomat of the 1970s. As a statesman, Kissinger observed, he was confronted with “a continual struggle to rescue an element of choice from the pressure of circumstance.”21 Vietnam, of course, was the prime example of this, and time and again Kissinger argued that the United States had to accept the fact that there was no easy way out of Vietnam once Washington had committed so many resources. The insurance-policy approach for the post–Paris Agreement period was precisely meant to address an uncertain future and obtain the best result under difficult circumstances.22 What Kissinger implied on a more general level was that the United States had to learn how to deal with its own limitations. In the first half of the 1970s, while the United States was struggling with accelerated globalization and its political, economic, and cultural effects, Kissinger, together with the two presidents he served, tried to maintain the United States’ leadership role in a rapidly changing international environment by stressing pragmatism and balance of power over idealism and human rights concerns. In that respect, Kissinger, Nixon, and Ford’s foreign policy stood in the tradition of other realists, such as George F. Kennan, and to this day Kissinger remains a prominent critic of what he considers an excessively values-driven foreign policy (for example, with respect to China). But although this constant maneuvering in the “national interest” gave back to Washington a much-needed sense of initiative and flexibility, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford ultimately failed to sell their realist approach to the American public. The story of Washington’s handling of the war after the war in Vietnam, which culminated in the fall of Saigon, highlights this fundamental tension. In the end, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s record is mixed. Not least for that reason, it remains a fascinating subject for historical inquiry.23

1 THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

On January 18, 1973, five days before Henry Kissinger initialed the Paris Agreement and Richard Nixon publicly proclaimed “peace with honor,” the two men discussed the various upcoming announcements on the phone. At this point, South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu had not yet given his final word on whether or not he would sign the agreement, but Nixon and Kissinger were determined to go forward in any case. “It’s got to end now, Mr. President, and it will one way or the other,” Kissinger said. “It’s over, huh,” Nixon replied. Concerning Nixon’s upcoming announcement, Kissinger advised, “I don’t know whether I would nail myself so much to the word lasting peace or guaranteed peace because this thing is almost certain to blow up sooner or later.” Nixon agreed, “Well, I think rather than lasting and guaranteed in relation to this in the inaugural I’m not going to speak of this specifically. I’m going [to] speak of this in conjunction with our whole policy as being a structure of peace in the world. See my point?”1 As this conversation shows, the president and Kissinger had no illusions about a mellifluous implementation of the Paris Agreement. In fact, at times they struck a rather pessimistic tone with respect to prospects for lasting peace in Indochina. Nixon’s allusion to the “structure of peace in the world” put the Paris Agreement into the context of Nixon and Kissinger’s overall realist foreign policy approach. In essence, this meant that although the fall of South Vietnam to communism was undesired, it could and must, if necessary, be counterbalanced in the global equation of power relations.2 In other words, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to be able to maintain an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam, but they were too realistic to place all their chips on that bet. In case of a communist victory in 11

12

CHAPTER 1

Indochina, an insurance policy had to be in place to ensure Washington’s dominance in the Cold War. The concept of an insurance policy for Indochina included the intentional avoidance of publicly committing the United States in plain language to enforcing the cease-fire and thus to guaranteeing South Vietnam’s survival. The effect of this well-chosen rhetoric was to distance Washington from the fate of the Thieu regime. If South Vietnam fell, the implications for the United States’ standing in the world had to be downplayed, and defeat in Indochina had to be counterbalanced elsewhere. As it turned out, in his January 23 address to the nation, Nixon did call for a lasting peace: “We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts. . . . The terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to.”3 However, Nixon did not say what exactly Washington would do to achieve that peace or how it would react should the cease-fire break down. That said, it is important to note that despite the existing pessimism and the notion of an insurance policy, the Paris Agreement did not mean surrender. To the contrary, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to use the agreement as an elaborate means of upholding their South Vietnamese ally. When, in late January, Nixon and Kissinger met with the South Vietnamese foreign minister, Tran Van Lam, who had stopped in Washington on his way home to Saigon from signing the Paris Agreement, the president said: We must have an even closer relationship as peacetime allies. The settlement will last only as long as our two governments go forward together. You can count on our continued military and material support and economic support. And spiritual support. We recognize only one government in South Vietnam. . . . We all have a responsibility to cool it now, however, China and the USSR will be urged to restrain their friends. . . . There is no good will on their [the North Vietnamese] side. I have no illusions about that. We must create a necessity. A carrot and a stick.4 To be sure, a prime motive of Nixon and Kissinger was to ease the minds of the South Vietnamese. Still, what Nixon told Lam was more than hot air. It was the affirmation of a post–Paris Agreement strategy to continue backing the Thieu regime as it had been conceptualized by Kissinger since 1971. Basically, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that they would be able to maintain a lasting equilibrium in Indochina that would leave South Vietnam intact. Kissinger had alluded to this strategy time and again with journalists, the South Vietnamese, and the Nixon administration. In early 1973, Nixon and Kissinger were cautiously optimistic that the preferred outcome could be achieved and South Vietnam would survive.

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

13

Equilibrium Strategy and “Decent Inter val” To understand Nixon and Kissinger’s plan A for the post–Paris Agreement period—their attempt to uphold South Vietnam—it is helpful to take a closer look at the origins and implications of a much-debated term: “decent interval.” According to the common understanding of “decent interval,” it depicted the period between the signing of the Paris Agreement and the collapse of South Vietnam. The historian Jeffrey Kimball most famously used the term to describe Nixon and Kissinger’s alleged attempts to secure a time buffer between US withdrawal and Saigon’s demise in order to disassociate Washington from a lost cause and preserve US credibility in the world system.5 However, as the analysis of the “decent interval” shows, the term as it was used at the time was clearly ambivalent in its connotation and hardly serves as proof that Nixon and Kissinger had contented themselves with a grace period before the fall of Saigon. To the contrary, it pointed to the existence of a strategy to achieve an uneasy but enduring equilibrium in Vietnam. The term “decent interval” may well have originated with Kissinger himself. Apparently, he scribbled the two words on his briefing book in preparation for his secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. His briefing book read, “We are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective realities shape the political future.” In handwriting, Kissinger added, “We want a decent interval. You have our assurance.” The text went on: “If the Vietnamese people themselves decide to change the present government, we shall accept it. But we will not make that decision for them.” 6 In the fall of 1971, Kissinger also used the alternative term “healthy interval” in a memo to Nixon in which he summarized the prospects for a postagreement Vietnam. “A negotiated settlement had always been far preferable,” he wrote. “Rather than run the risk of South Vietnam crumbing around our remaining forces, a peace settlement would end the war with an act of policy and leave the future of South Vietnam to the historical process. . . . We could heal the wounds in this country as our men left peace behind on the battlefield and a healthy interval for South Vietnam’s fate to unfold. In short, Vietnamization may be our ultimate recourse; it cannot be our preferred choice.”7 In the summer of 1972, Kissinger and Nixon again debated the future of Vietnam, including the notion of a “decent interval.” This time, the pessimistic implications were clear. When Nixon asked Kissinger about the effects of South Vietnam’s collapse on US foreign policy, the national security adviser replied, “If a year or two years from now North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we

14

CHAPTER 1

can have a viable foreign policy if it looks as if it’s the result of South Vietnamese incompetence.”8 In a press conference with foreign correspondents the following November, Kissinger was far less explicit. In fact, he denied the existence of “any specific interval after which we would no longer care if they [the North Vietnamese] marched in and took over South Vietnam.”9 Kissinger reiterated this point in early 1973. In a conversation with the journalist Rowland Evans, he criticized Evans for allegedly misrepresenting his negotiating efforts, as well as his relationship with Nixon: “Don’t fall for any of this crap that I had one line and the President made me shift it to another. That’s total unadulterated bull shit.” Evans replied, “I didn’t hear about that.” “Yeah, but you say I negotiated a decent interval.” Evans again denied the charges. “When the whole story comes out, it will be seen first that we were totally together at every stage,” Kissinger asserted. “And secondly, that the evolution of this position . . . it’s a very cold blooded game.”10 Kissinger’s briefing-book notes, as well as his comments to Nixon in 1971 and the summer of 1972, have been interpreted as smoking guns that supposedly prove that Kissinger (and Nixon) had come to accept the so-called decent-interval solution, that is, gaining enough time between US withdrawal and South Vietnam’s collapse so that Washington could not be held responsible.11 But the problem with the first document is that it can hardly pinpoint Nixon and Kissinger’s intentions. After all, the scenario in which they would accept an eventual communist takeover in South Vietnam that Kissinger outlined in front of the Chinese may well have been part of the strategy to win them over to persuade Hanoi to accept a negotiated settlement. Certainly, it smelled like a trick to Washington’s opponents.12 Whether Nixon and Kissinger were really willing to give up their goal of an independent South Vietnam cannot be deduced from that source. The problem with the second document lies in the actual meaning of “healthy interval.” As careful reading shows, “healthy interval” was probably not meant as a reference to the period between the fall of Saigon and the extrication of US troops. Instead, it is likely to have referred to the period between the signing of a settlement and either the implementation of a political solution between the Vietnamese parties or the renewed outbreak of hostilities. In fact, Kissinger did not elaborate on how he envisioned South Vietnam’s fate, but obviously the “healthy interval,” not Vietnamization of the war, was the preferred choice, which indicates that, in this scenario, Kissinger saw the best chances for the “historical process” to tilt in favor of South Vietnamese president Thieu. This reading is further supported by contextualizing the document within the Paris negotiations. Kissinger’s remarks reflected the dual-track formula that the administration openly endorsed at the outset of negotiations. According to that approach, the agreement would cover only military issues. Political matters would be left to the Vietnam-

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

15

ese to solve. Apparently, this constituted the context of Kissinger’s “healthy interval” statement.13 Although some of the aforementioned alleged “smoking guns” thus hardly smoke—to borrow one historian’s words—Kissinger and Nixon doubtless were familiar with the fatalistic connotation of the term “decent interval.”14 Furthermore, the document from the China trip suggests that Kissinger deliberately used that meaning of the term if it fit his purposes (as was the case when he was engaging in triangular diplomacy with the Soviets and the Chinese). Most important, Nixon and Kissinger’s remarks in the summer of 1972 show that the two men, at least at times, discussed their Indochina strategy much in the sense of the decent-interval theory.15 However, this was only part of the story. For example, rather than pointing to an exclusively fatalistic interpretation, the alternative term “healthy interval,” as it was used between Nixon and Kissinger in private, fit both men’s retrospective claims about their intentions: creating an indefinite equilibrium in Indochina that would ensure Saigon’s survival. As Kissinger explained in his book Ending the Vietnam War, he had no illusions about Hanoi’s reunification objectives. Thus, he first of all sought to gain time.16 According to Kissinger, the stated best-case scenario in early 1973 was to persuade Hanoi by the military stick and the carrot of economic aid to accept a “breather,” that is, a period without an all-out confrontation between Saigon and the communist forces. This period between the Paris Agreement and the possible resumption of large-scale fighting or the initiation of serious negotiations between the North and the South was what the terms “decent interval” or “healthy interval” literally referred to.17 According to Kissinger, he sought to exploit that period by strengthening South Vietnam and possibly even to make the North turn inward and give up its plans for conquest. If things worked out, the healthy interval would turn into an indefinite equilibrium. At its core, the idea was to prevent the dissolution of the cease-fire by deterrence. Should the North, however, decide to launch an all-out invasion, Washington would, according to the plan, step in with air and sea power.18 In other words, in that sense, the decent interval was part of the plan to secure South Vietnam’s survival. It did not exclusively depict the period until the anticipated and accepted fall of Saigon. Although Larry Berman is an adamant critic of Jeffrey Kimball’s analysis, he misinterprets the term “decent interval” much as Kimball has. When Kissinger spoke of a “long pull of 5-to-6 years” that he hoped the North Vietnamese would come to accept, it was another iteration of the breather or winning-time idea. Berman, however, somewhat confusingly seems to interpret Kissinger’s usage of this term as an expression of the national security adviser’s intentions in line with Kimball’s decent-interval theory.19 Moreover, Berman’s idea of a “permanent war”

16

CHAPTER 1

according to which Nixon and Kissinger planned on using the Paris Agreement as a pretext for further bombing campaigns does not capture the essence of the equilibrium strategy. Although Nixon and Kissinger were willing to resort to the use of military force in case of an invasion, deterrence, not all-out, perpetual war, was their real objective. Rather than gearing up for major bombing campaigns, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that the threat of renewed US military intervention would suffice. What Kissinger and Nixon later claimed to have been their intentions was essentially what they told the South Vietnamese at the time of the Paris Agreement. In the late fall of 1972 and January 1973, as Kissinger and Nixon tried to persuade Thieu to sign the Paris Agreement, they repeatedly reassured him that the real purpose of the agreement was to ensure ongoing US aid to South Vietnam and to provide a justification for retaliatory actions against the North should it try to overrun the South. In a series of meetings with South Vietnamese representatives, Kissinger made it clear that the administration’s basic objectives would not change with a peace agreement. Kissinger emphasized the mutual dependence of South Vietnam and the United States. According to the national security adviser, “It is essential to our credibility and to our whole foreign policy that your government and your people survive in freedom.”20 He also underlined that South Vietnam’s, as well as President Thieu’s, survival was a deeply personal issue to himself and Nixon.21 Kissinger explained that the agreement would create its own reality: in Vietnam it would constitute a de facto military stalemate, and in the United States it would help Nixon and Kissinger control congressional doves, rally public support, and make indefinite economic, military, and political support of South Vietnam very likely.22 According to Kissinger, a central strategic element of the post–Paris Agreement period was his and Nixon’s willingness to use military power unpredictably and against the popular will. Another tool was the use of triangular diplomacy to reduce the flow of supplies to the North.23 When, in early January 1973, Kissinger conferred with South Vietnamese representatives Tran Van Do, Bui Diem, and Tran Kim Phuong, he pointedly summarized his position and gave a clear explanation of the equilibrium strategy: We thought that if we could end the war honorably, with your government in office and with clear obligations in the agreement, that we would have so much authority afterwards that if we said that North Vietnam was violating the agreement, we could bomb them and no one would challenge us. . . . Who knows today about what the armistice was all about in Korea? If Korea is attacked, we would defend it. Why should we do this in Korea and not in Vietnam? There is no reason. . . . With

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

17

an army of over a million and controlling a large part of the territory, we think you can handle a ceasefire, at least for a long enough period until there are violations of the agreement. . . . We thought that in the name of an agreement we would be better able to help than in the name of war. That is our cold-blooded appraisal. . . . The only use of provisions is to give us a pretext to act. . . . The agreement buys time.24 The scenario Kissinger outlined to the South Vietnamese in the fall of 1972 and January 1973 was identical to what Nixon told Thieu in a series of letters during the same period. When it became apparent that Thieu feared being sold out and would not easily sign an agreement, an unnerved Nixon increasingly sought to put pressure on Saigon. He told Thieu that Washington would sign even without Saigon’s acquiescence. This would, in turn, practically mean the end of US–South Vietnamese cooperation. But Nixon, as ever, coupled the stick with a carrot. He made it clear that he did not wish to abandon the South. To the contrary, matching Kissinger’s statements, he emphasized that he sought to “defend freedom in South Vietnam in peacetime as we have worked . . . to defend it in conflict.”25 Thieu remained skeptical. Before his last-minute, grudging acquiescence to the Paris Agreement, the South Vietnamese president noted, “Concerning the refusal by Hanoi to withdraw its troops from SVN [South Vietnam] at the conclusion of the cease-fire, I must say very frankly that I do not find that the collateral clauses you mentioned constitute an adequate remedy to this situation.”26 Nixon conceded that the agreement was not ideal, especially in light of the large number of North Vietnamese troops in the South, but he also made it clear that it was needed to create a new basis for US–South Vietnamese cooperation. With an agreement, Nixon told Thieu, it was his “firm intention to continue full economic and military aid.”27 He concluded, “If we close ranks . . . and proceed together, we will prevail.”28 Nixon’s private commitment to the South was unambiguous. In his letter to Thieu in October 1972, Nixon added a final handwritten comment: “I am personally convinced it [the proposed agreement] is the best we will be able to get and that it meets my absolute condition that the GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam, i.e., South Vietnam] must remain as a free country. Dr. Kissinger’s comments have my total backing.”29 The president left no doubt about what he planned in case of violations by the North. He repeatedly promised that it was his intention “to take swift and severe retaliatory action.”30 In connection with that, Nixon told Thieu that the Christmas bombings were intended to show the North how he would respond to violations of the agreement.31 In fact, Nixon suggested to Thieu’s special adviser, Nguyen Phu Duc, and Ambassador Tran Kim

18

CHAPTER 1

Phuong that an agreement would constitute an irrefutable legal basis for direct US retaliation. He proclaimed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had contingency plans for air and other responses beyond anything that had previously been undertaken should the North violate the agreement.32 In essence, then, Nixon and Kissinger told the South Vietnamese that they viewed the Paris Agreement as a necessary move to continue backing the Thieu regime. Besides appeasing domestic pressure in the United States to end the war, the president and Kissinger sought to provide the South with a period during which Saigon could affirm its political control and enhance its military power. By using their bargaining chips with the North, including possible reconstruction aid, triangular diplomacy, and the threat of yet another massive bombing campaign, Nixon and Kissinger stressed that they hoped to turn the cease-fire into a permanent reality.

Optimism The obvious question that arises immediately is whether one should not dismiss all of Nixon and Kissinger’s claims about the equilibrium strategy as a mere ploy designed to deceive the South Vietnamese at the time and the American people thereafter. As it turns out, the historical record proves this interpretation wrong. In order to successfully derive this conclusion, though, one must carefully weigh the context of Nixon and Kissinger’s statements; what the two politicians said to each other in private serves as the most valid evidence of their intentions. In that respect, it must be noted that Nixon and Kissinger, between themselves, did outline the idea of the equilibrium strategy. Before and in early 1973, they made several remarks in private that indicated that they both believed that they were in a position to carry out the linchpins of the equilibrium strategy for Indochina, which in turn would provide South Vietnam with a good chance of survival.33 The concept of giving a period of respite to the South Vietnamese was what Kissinger presented to Nixon as the core element of his strategic vision for Vietnam. Given the domestic pressure to end direct US military involvement in Vietnam, a peace agreement appeared to be the best possibility to change the character of Washington’s support for South Vietnam. As Nixon’s remarks before the Paris Agreement indicated, he thought that he could indeed resort to the use of force should negotiations fail or the cease-fire come apart later on. In December 1972, Nixon made it clear that he believed that “no draftees to Vietnam, low casualties, etc, means the American people are not going to be shocked. They’re just disappointed, not enraged, by the settlement not coming off. . . . This is the right

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

19

FIGURE 1. Secretary of State William P. Rogers signs the Paris Agreement on January 27, 1973. White House Photo Office Collection (Nixon Administration), 01/20/1969–08/09/1974. National Archives Identifier: 194482.

track on public opinion.” In short, Nixon told Kissinger, the American people “don’t give a damn.”34 The single most unambiguous remark by Nixon to Kissinger that underlined the president’s view of the post–Paris Agreement period and showed his determination to make an effort to uphold South Vietnam occurred in early 1973. Nixon proclaimed, “And, understand, it [the conclusion of the agreement] isn’t irreversible if there was a horrible rate on the other side. . . . You do see what I mean. . . . We can do anything if there’s an invasion or that sort of thing. Then we can always send up people.”35 Kissinger did not disagree. To be sure, when Kissinger congratulated Nixon on the public announcement of the Paris Agreement in late January 1973, he and the president derived part of their feelings of success from the fact that they could present themselves as peacemakers.36 Still, their comments indicate just as much that they viewed the Paris Agreement as a major success in pursuing their goal of supporting South Vietnam. Nixon triumphantly proclaimed, “The ceasefire kills them [Nixon’s political opponents], the independent government for South Vietnam kills them and they know that everything they said would not happen has been achieved. . . . We got all the conditions that we laid out.” When Pat Nixon congratulated Kissinger, the national security adviser replied, “It was the President’s courage that carried

20

CHAPTER 1

us through this. . . . All the things they said could never happen—you can’t bomb them [the North Vietnamese] back to the table, you can’t get them to make concessions.” “Well, it took two strong hearts,” Pat Nixon responded.37 Obviously, Nixon and Kissinger did not, at that moment, consider the Paris Agreement to be an abandonment of Indochina. In early February, Kissinger gave Nixon an update on the Indochina situation. When Nixon inquired about the vice president’s trip to Saigon, Kissinger replied that he had done well by not seeking too much publicity. On the announcement of the upcoming meeting between the Americans and the North Vietnamese in Paris, Kissinger commented, “We just announce the next step. And we can do it in a fairly low key way but it just shows that the ball keeps moving.” As this statement shows, playing it low key constituted an important tactic in implementing the Indochina strategy. During the conversation, Nixon and Kissinger also discussed the situation in Laos, where they hoped to achieve a cease-fire as well. Nixon commented, “The main point is that anything that will shore up our allies. Basically, you’ve got to realize the other side is weak here now and if we can shore our guys up, they may last a hell of a lot longer than anybody thinks.”38 Because Washington and its adversaries had always regarded the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian theaters as closely linked, Nixon’s remark further underlined the optimistic stance on the Indochina situation. Various conversations in early 1973 between Kissinger and other high-ranking officials of the Nixon administration point in the same direction. For example, Kissinger told his deputy, General Alexander Haig, to make sure that Nixon would publicly reassure the South Vietnamese and warn the Chinese and Soviets in his cease-fire speech. As a matter of fact, those instructions somewhat contradicted the vaguer language about the prospects for peace that Kissinger had suggested to Nixon. One can imagine that he tried to present himself as a tough hawk to the notoriously hawkish Haig.39 However, Kissinger’s comments to his close aide, on whom both he and Nixon had relied heavily during the negotiations in the fall of 1972, indicate that Kissinger regarded it as essential that the administration implement its plan for further support to South Vietnam. Kissinger’s reliance on Haig was underlined by the fact that Kissinger told outgoing secretary of defense Melvin Laird that he wished to install the general as head of the Vietnam task force, despite some internal reservations at the Department of Defense.40 In conversations with Secretary of State William Rogers, White House press secretary Ron Ziegler, and the newly sworn-in secretary of defense, Elliot Richardson, Kissinger made it clear that he intended to back the agreement with force and expressed some optimism concerning Washington’s ability to shape future events.41

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

21

Numerous remarks that Kissinger made to journalists, politicians, and friends also indicate that he was prepared to implement the equilibrium strategy and that he felt that he was in a position to do so.42 In conversations with New York governor Nelson Rockefeller and conservative Republican senator Barry Goldwater, Kissinger reaffirmed the idea that it was not any particular clause in the Paris Agreement that mattered as much as Nixon’s plan to further support the South Vietnamese, with the agreement unifying the American people and constituting a new basis for public support.43 To be sure, Nixon and Kissinger tried to appease the political Right, and they used the conservative senators Goldwater and John Stennis to put pressure on Thieu to sign. On the other hand, Kissinger’s remarks just as much committed him to further involvement. The idea that the post–Paris Agreement strategy would pay off was captured in a conversation between Kissinger and former secretary of state Dean Rusk. Rusk remarked, “I realize, as you do, that there is a big question now about plans, both in Hanoi and Saigon, but I thought it [the Paris Agreement] was an extraordinarily professional job, and I congratulate you on it. . . . Do you have any hunches now about the prospect ahead about this agreement on Southeast Asia.” “I’ll know a little better in two or three weeks,” Kissinger replied, “I have a hunch that the North Vietnamese really want a period of quiet. I mean they are asking for things like economic aid which on a long term basis, which don’t make any sense, if they want to violate the agreement.” Rusk also expressed some confidence that “with a little luck maybe we can get something out of it that really makes sense.” Kissinger pointed to the other Indochina theaters. “Laos and Cambodia . . . will be the most vital test. If they get out of Laos and Cambodia, that will really de facto take care of many of our concerns.”44 In a conversation with the journalist Richard Valeriani the next day, Kissinger indirectly summed up his optimistic stance. “You know, there is such a psychosis that everything in Vietnam is bound to fail. That everybody keeps looking for things that must go wrong.”45 In addition to the statements that highlight Nixon and Kissinger’s intention to play an ongoing role in Indochina, their instructions to subordinates also point to the equilibrium strategy. When William Porter, soon to become under secretary of state for political affairs, said that the military leaders wondered whether they should take literally Article 20b of the Paris Agreement and withdraw from Laos and Cambodia as soon as the agreement was signed, Kissinger was adamant about not getting ready to leave until after a cease-fire had come into place. Till then, he instructed Porter, “They [the military] are to keep up the effort at a high rate.”46 He stressed the same point to Secretary Richardson.47 Kissinger’s instructions did comply with the protocols of the Paris Agreement, but his orders show that the use of military force was the ultimate leverage he

22

CHAPTER 1

relied on. When the cease-fire in Vietnam went into effect, Nixon and Kissinger continued to order the bombing of communist targets in neighboring countries. Besides constituting an attempt to stop North Vietnamese infiltration in the South and support anticommunist forces in Laos and Cambodia, the raids were also intended to signal to Hanoi that Washington would not tolerate serious cease-fire violations.48 In a related matter, Kissinger and Haig agreed that they would not support Secretary Richardson’s request to reduce the number of B-52s and tactical air wings stationed in Thailand. Kissinger commented that “there is no question about our staying tough. What I would like is a Defense Department that doesn’t send such crap over here.”49 Kissinger and Haig were both convinced that the need to show toughness was most critical after the sixty-day period of US withdrawal. With this issue in mind, Kissinger told the chairman of the JCS, Admiral Thomas Moorer, to keep air force combat aircraft in Southeast Asia but authorized him to move one aircraft carrier out of the area. Kissinger further directed that Moorer could redeploy two more carriers, leaving three carriers in the Indochina vicinity, but he ordered the third carrier to remain in place till mid-April, one month longer than Moorer had suggested. In any case, the removal of aircraft was made contingent on developments in Indochina, and Kissinger made sure that their level could quickly be increased again.50 What Nixon and Kissinger banked on, in addition to upholding their ultimate threat of renewed bombings, was the leverage of reconstruction aid to the North, as well as triangular diplomacy. Although Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Hanoi was intended to focus on the aid issue, the president and his national security adviser attempted to persuade the USSR and China to stop supplying the North Vietnamese. In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, Kissinger mentioned a communiqué that he had “redone a little bit to make it easier for you [the Soviets] not to send bombs into North Vietnam.” He jokingly added, “Which I know is your principal preoccupation.” Kissinger alluded to Washington being forthcoming in other areas in return for Soviet restraint in Vietnam. “I see what you do, fair enough,” Dobrynin replied.51 In a letter to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev that Nixon transmitted the same day, the president urged the Soviet Union to help implement the Paris Agreement. He wrote, “I am confident that you agree with me that restraint by all interested countries is of greatest importance.”52 Although Nixon refrained from seriously pressuring the Soviets, he put the settlement in Vietnam in the context of further cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. All told, then, Nixon and Kissinger began implementing their equilibrium strategy as soon as the Paris Agreement went into effect. This meant that although

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

23

Washington had ended its controversial leading role in Vietnam during the past decade, it would remain the vigilant and string-pulling superpower in the background. This, Nixon and Kissinger hoped, would enable Thieu to consolidate his power during the cease-fire period. Ultimately, they relied on their continuing ability to use air- and seapower as a threat or, if the North Vietnamese launched an invasion, as a decisive military asset. In early 1973, Nixon and Kissinger showed some optimism for maintaining such a position in the future and thus saw a chance to achieve a lasting equilibrium in Indochina.

Pessimism Nixon and Kissinger were not exclusively optimistic, though. In fact, they often struck a pessimistic tone when they were discussing the Indochina situation, both before and after the signing of the Paris Agreement. Nixon and Kissinger both knew that their attempt to maintain equilibrium in Vietnam could well fail, even if they circumvented domestic opposition to ongoing US engagement in Indochina. Although Nixon and Kissinger perceived the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in January 1973 as a successful move to further shore up Saigon, they were well aware that they had essentially bought time without resolving the conflict. Nixon and Kissinger’s appraisal of their ability to maintain the uneasy cease-fire indefinitely oscillated between belligerence and optimism, on the one hand, and damage control and pessimism, on the other. They crafted their approach to Indochina accordingly: if the equilibrium strategy did not work out, Nixon and Kissinger made sure that Washington would still be able to disengage from Vietnam. To counterbalance the loss of US prestige in the Cold War, an insurance policy was put in place. For one thing, it is interesting to note that Nixon and Kissinger were, to some extent, quite frank when they talked to the South Vietnamese. Although they certainly stressed an optimistic interpretation of the Paris Agreement with Thieu and his representatives, they also mentioned the possibility of failure. In his conversations with the South Vietnamese, Kissinger clearly stated that with a unanimous agreement, the chances for further aid were much better, but he would not give any guarantees.53 For instance, Kissinger told Tran Van Lam, “As I have said, the people attacking you in the US are also attacking us. If what we are doing jointly fails, it has to do with the whole integrity of American foreign policy.”54 In his book Ending the Vietnam War, Kissinger was equally clear about the possibility of failure: “Whether South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could have survived by their own efforts indefinitely had they received the assistance promised to them will never be known.”55

24

CHAPTER 1

In private, Nixon and Kissinger were much bleaker. Long before the conclusion of the Paris Agreement, they showed clear signs of pessimism about South Vietnam’s future. In the fall of 1972, less than two months after Nixon and Kissinger had made their unambiguous remarks about North Vietnam “gobbling up” the South, they reiterated their pessimistic assessment. Kissinger told Nixon that if it came to a settlement, “I believe that the practical results will be a ceasefire and . . . a return of prisoners.” “Then we’ll say screw them,” Nixon remarked. To which Kissinger replied, “And then they’ll go at each other with Thieu in office. That’s what I think.”56 Nixon and Kissinger’s agreement in January 1973 not to speak of a “lasting peace” pointed in the same direction. In another conversation between Nixon and Kissinger the same month, the president again seemed at least partly skeptical that the agreement would hold indefinitely. At that point, Nixon and Kissinger both agreed that the resumption of bombings was out of the question should Thieu decide not to go along with the signing of the agreement. “The question is not whether we resume bombing, but whether we quit doing the rest, see what I mean. It’s the peace that I’m talking about, it isn’t any resumption of bombing,” Nixon told Kissinger.57 Although the president was clearly referring to the present situation, his remarks highlighted a basic fact: it was by no means certain that political circumstances would allow the resumption of bombings at a later stage. How decisive such military action could be was yet another question.58 Other comments made by Kissinger to members of the administration and journalists further highlight the pessimistic stance. Talking to the journalist Marvin Kalb in late January 1973, Kissinger seemed torn. He told Kalb, “These maniacs [apparently referring to both Vietnamese sides], they’ll probably start the war again on the first of February. . . . But if they do, they’ll do it without me negotiating it. No, no; that’s not going to happen. No, no; this is for real. . . . You know, it may break down eventually but it isn’t—it’s just complicated enough so that it’s got to work for a while.”59 With General Haig, Kissinger maintained a tough line. But Haig and Kissinger also agreed that “the poor bastards [the South Vietnamese] are in trouble.”60 If anything, these comments made it clear that Kissinger and Haig knew that the South Vietnamese were in a tough position in defending their country. In early February, Kissinger’s remarks to the economist John Kenneth Galbraith, who seemed to believe that the war was really over, again oscillated between pessimism and hope. “Well, let’s see what these maniacs are going to do to each other when this—But I hope so. I mean, I hope for the sake of all of us that it will turn out that way [that the war would be settled with the Paris Agreement],” Kissinger said. “I think it may help us get together again. At least, to get a normal political debate started again.” 61

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

25

Because Nixon and Kissinger had come to see the real possibility of Saigon’s demise in the not-too-distant future, they prepared for that contingency as well. If the equilibrium strategy failed, the cease-fire came apart instead of becoming a permanent reality, and renewed bombings proved to be politically impossible or militarily futile, an insurance policy was indispensable. As part of this plan B, it would have to be stressed that, with the conclusion of the Paris Agreement, the United States’ obligations toward South Vietnam had been fulfilled. Washington could not be held responsible for Saigon’s internal weakness. If the North launched a massive invasion, a situation in which the question of US commitment would clearly be posed again, Nixon and Kissinger at least retained a degree of flexibility. As they repeatedly pointed out, there was no legal clause that compelled Washington to become reinvolved in the conflict. In early 1973, when Kissinger met with members of the Senate to discuss the Vietnam settlement, he conveyed precisely that idea, but he remained vague on a crucial matter: the threat of a resumption of bombings should the cease-fire break down. Kissinger emphasized that “it would be a mistake to make any general declarations as to what we will or won’t in any circumstances do.” In fact, he did not rule out the use of force. Still, seen in context, Kissinger’s remarks clearly conveyed the idea that this response was unlikely. First, the South Vietnamese were “able to handle any foreseeable threat so the question [was] therefore a theoretical one.” Second, if the diplomatic strategy worked, there would not be an invasion anyway. Third, Kissinger emphasized that under no circumstances would the administration get involved in the anticipated political contest between Saigon and the communists. He asserted, “It has been our goal for the last four years to disengage from the political struggle in Vietnam. This we have succeeded in doing. There is no possibility that we will intervene in the political struggle.” 62 In a second meeting that same day, Kissinger reiterated this message to members of the House of Representatives.63 In essence, Kissinger seemed to be saying that with the Paris Agreement, Washington had fulfilled its basic obligations toward South Vietnam. Thieu had not been abandoned; peace had come with honor. The United States would continue to help its ally by maneuvering in the background, but the era of military engagement was over. Kissinger’s refusal to comment on the administration’s reaction to a possible cease-fire breakdown, as well as his emphasis on disengagement, pointed in that direction. This notion was essentially captured by Kissinger’s denial of the existence of any binding commitment toward South Vietnam and the tangible distance he placed between the United States and the South Vietnamese. Asked about any commitments to the South to reintervene, Kissinger unambiguously replied, “We have made no commitments beyond the terms of

26

CHAPTER 1

the agreement.” 64 This stood, of course, in stark contrast to the scenario Nixon and Kissinger had outlined to the South Vietnamese.

Insurance Policy as Modus Operandi It seems reasonable to suspect that, pondering the pessimistic line, Nixon and Kissinger indeed wished to secure as much time as possible before Saigon’s demise. However, their insurance policy for Indochina went well beyond the concept of the “decent interval” brought forward by Jeffrey Kimball and his supporters. At bottom, Nixon and Kissinger sought to place Vietnam in the overarching Cold War context. According to this rationale, a communist takeover could be absorbed if Vietnam was, as Kissinger repeatedly emphasized during Nixon’s first term, merely “a small peninsula on a major continent” 65 and the rapprochement with China was “so great, so historic, the word Vietnam will be only a footnote when it is written in history.” 66 In other words, although Nixon and Kissinger feared defeat in Vietnam most for its impact on Cold War superpower relations and US credibility, they also perceived the overall context as a chance to deflate the importance of Vietnam. The two-track approach to Indochina, that is, further maneuvers to uphold South Vietnam and simultaneous disassociation from the ally, was by no means a coincidence. The combination of equilibrium strategy and insurance policy that formed the post–Paris Agreement strategy was the logical result of the ideas Nixon and Kissinger had outlined even before entering the White House. In 1967, Nixon published his article “Asia after Viet Nam” in the October issue of Foreign Affairs. In this article, Nixon attempted to put the war in Vietnam in context with the overall development of Asia. He pointedly opened the article by stating, “The war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision that it has distorted our picture of Asia. A small country on the rim of the continent has filled the screen of our minds; but it does not fill the map.” 67 In what followed, Nixon argued that, not least thanks to the US engagement in Indochina, the development of the noncommunist nations of Asia had been quite positive—a fact that needed to be capitalized on. In anticipation of what came to be known as the “Nixon Doctrine” in 1969, Nixon called for the formation of a “Pacific community,” based on the idea that the “primary restraint on China’s Asian ambitions should be exercised by the Asian nations in the path of those ambitions, backed by the ultimate power of the United States.” 68 The long-term goal of taming communist China and permitting it to become a member of the “family of nations” must in large part be achieved by Asians themselves since “the role of the United States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future.” 69

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

27

In his famous Foreign Affairs article of January 1969, Kissinger partly argued along similar lines. He asserted that “ending the war honorably is essential for the peace of the world,”70 and he expressed hope that prolonged negotiations between Washington and Hanoi would enable Thieu to strengthen his political control. Commenting on the halt to bombing that President Johnson had ordered before leaving office, Kissinger stated, “Hanoi’s fear of the consequences [of taking advantage of the bombing pause] is a more certain protection against trickery than a formal commitment.”71 Still, Kissinger also made it clear that the attempt at “nation building” in Vietnam had been a mistake and emphasized the limits of the US commitment. He noted that “once North Vietnamese forces and pressures are removed, the United States has no obligation to maintain a government in Saigon by force.”72 From the very beginning of Nixon’s presidency, then, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy on Vietnam followed the dual goal of bolstering the Thieu regime and extricating the United States from a foreign quagmire. On the one hand, preserving the United States’ reputation required further maneuvers to keep Thieu in power, such as the ambitious Vietnamization program. As Kissinger put it in 1969, “The commitment of 500,000 Americans has settled the issue of the importance of Viet Nam. For what is involved now is confidence in American promises. However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms ‘credibility’ or ‘prestige,’ they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness.”73 In other words, the credibility argument required ongoing US engagement. In that respect, the Nixon administration’s approach to Vietnam was quite similar to the ones of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. In fact, the analysis in 1965 of Johnson’s assistant secretary of defense, John T. McNaughton, still seemed valid, according to which the goals in Vietnam could be equated with a dominant 70 percent in protecting the United States’ reputation as a “counter-subversion” guarantor.74 Still, Nixon and Kissinger did not base their exit strategy exclusively on the success of these measures. The reference to the natural limits of the US commitment—generalized in the Nixon Doctrine—as well as Vietnam’s position in the global Cold War, provided a rationale to uphold the United States’ superpower status, even in case of a communist victory in Indochina. In the end, Kissinger asserted, it was the overall balance of power, not a particular field of contest, that mattered. Seen in that light, the simultaneous expansion and deflation of US engagement in Indochina under Nixon can be understood as a form of contingency planning: if plan A, the perpetuation of a noncommunist regime in South Vietnam, proved futile, then a plan B or insurance policy of disassociation and compensation could be redeemed.75 It has to be asked whether this approach was the best strategy available. Indeed, numerous lines of criticism have been launched against the duo’s general

28

CHAPTER 1

approach to foreign policy.76 Arguably, Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina strategy in particular showed some important structural flaws. An important problem with the two-track approach to Indochina was that further support to Saigon could easily be undermined by attempts to distance Washington from its ally. In other words, the equilibrium strategy and the insurance policy could easily collide. More generally, in spite of Kissinger’s objections, “perception” and “credibility,” which appeared to be at stake in Indochina, were rather vague terms that were quite hard to measure. As had happened during previous administrations, Nixon and Kissinger faced the task of distinguishing between vital and less essential threats to the global balance of power.77 On Vietnam, not everyone agreed with Nixon and Kissinger’s assessment, and critics charged the administration with blowing the importance of Indochina out of proportion.78 In addition to these problems, Nixon and Kissinger showed a significant degree of cynicism and deception in implementing their Indochina policy. This led to charges of moral corruption and undermined trust in the presidency. In the case of South Vietnam, cynicism existed not so much in voluntarily abandoning Saigon as in viewing the South Vietnamese solely in terms of US interests and avoiding an irrevocable commitment. Since Nixon and Kissinger could not easily sell to the American public the resulting idea of an insurance policy, they opted for the tactic of avoiding open conflicts and trying to tell everyone what they wanted to hear. This, in turn, had some negative effects: keeping the communists uncertain made sense, but both Thieu and the American public often felt, too, that Nixon and Kissinger were being dishonest with them.79 In spite of the weaknesses of their approach, Nixon and Kissinger chose to craft their Indochina policy the way they did because they felt that it provided them with much-needed maneuverability. As Kissinger noted, the lack of flexibility had been the central flaw of previous administrations’ Vietnam policies.80 In early 1973, the post–Paris Agreement strategy of combining the attempt to create a lasting equilibrium with the concept of an insurance policy was designed to provide Washington with responses for both an optimistic and a pessimistic reading of what lay ahead. Nixon and Kissinger were determined to avoid their predecessors’ mistake of being stuck with one course and made sure they kept their options open in Indochina. Although the notion of an insurance policy is central to understanding Nixon and Kissinger’s post–Paris Agreement strategy, it is important to note that in early 1973, the two men were not sure that they would have to resort to it. Rather, pessimism and optimism about the future of Indochina seem to have been quite balanced on Nixon and Kissinger’s side. On the whole, there is no decisive proof that points exclusively in one direction. To the contrary, optimism and pessimism at times appear to blend in the documents. True, the idea of a cease-fire break-

THE STRATEGY OF THE CEASE- FIRE

29

down was in the air in Washington, and Nixon and Kissinger’s remarks sometimes clearly seemed to suggest that things would eventually disintegrate. On balance, though, the majority of their statements from early 1973 point to an optimistic reading of the time ahead. With the Paris Agreement in place, Nixon and Kissinger believed that they were in a strong position, first, to gain an extended period of respite for the South Vietnamese and, second, to bomb should an invasion be launched. As both men conceded, this did not guarantee South Vietnam’s survival, but it constituted the best-case scenario as Kissinger had outlined it since 1971. If things continued well, the cease-fire would turn into a permanent equilibrium. Whatever the extent of antagonisms in Nixon and Kissinger’s relationship, they basically agreed on the post–Paris Agreement strategy for Indochina. Although, in the fall of 1972, Nixon had been infuriated by the amount of credit Kissinger gained for his negotiating efforts—which culminated in the national security adviser being awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize together with North Vietnam’s chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho—and Kissinger worried about his standing in the administration, the president and Kissinger appear to have shared common views on the strategy and prospects for South Vietnam.81 Kissinger probably deserved much of the intellectual credit for formulating the concrete stratagems of the post–Paris Agreement strategy. Still, as Kissinger always emphasized, Nixon was the ultimate decision maker who had ushered in the next chapter of US involvement in Indochina by observing the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, Nixon had shaped the strategic framework of simultaneous expansion and contraction to which the post–Paris Agreement strategy was linked.82 At times, Kissinger may have held a more realistic view of the Indochina situation, but there is no evidence that he exclusively entertained a pessimistic stance while Nixon believed that he could successfully continue backing Saigon.

2 THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

As stipulated by the Paris Agreement, January 28, 1973, marked the beginning of the first crucial phase of the cease-fire: within sixty days the withdrawal of US troops was to be completed, and US POWs were to be released. By the due date, those provisions were fulfilled. On March 29, a date also known as “X plus 60,” Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Frederick Weyand officially disbanded the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), once the unified command structure of more than half a million troops.1 The last few thousand US service personnel had been redeployed, and the only troops who remained stationed in Vietnam were 159 marine embassy guards and 50 military personnel attached to the newly established Defense Attaché Office. The North Vietnamese, for their part, had by then released all 591 US POWs, including some captured in Laos.2 But that was where the plain sailing ended. As the adversaries tentatively began implementing the Paris Agreement, there were strong indications that neither Vietnamese side was really interested in peace. President Thieu insisted on his policy of the “four noes”: no surrender of territory, no political concessions to the communists, no recognition of their party, and no commercial dealings with them. The continued infiltration of men and war materiel by the North indicated that, just as Nixon and Kissinger had surmised, Hanoi had not given up its ultimate goal of reunification under communist control. Still, for the time being, all sides saw the Paris Agreement as a useful or necessary framework to advance their goals. Despite accusing the other side of continual cease-fire violations, Saigon and Hanoi still professed to honor the agreement. In what came to 30

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

31

be known as the “war of the flags,” military activities centered on land-grabbing operations as both the Saigon regime and communist forces tried to extend their control over South Vietnamese territory. The Paris Agreement provoked those ongoing clashes because it left the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in place and featured a leopard-spot arrangement that left the zones of control undefined. Unsurprisingly, the control mechanisms created by the Paris Agreement proved inoperative. Both the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, comprising representatives of the major combatants, and the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), made up of Hungarians, Poles, Indonesians, and Canadians, had to be governed by the principle of unanimity, which resulted in deadlock.3 The Two-Party Joint Military Commission, comprising representatives of Saigon and the Vietcong’s political structure, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), which was supposed to deal with matters between the two South Vietnamese parties (specifically, determining areas of control) and was to supersede the Four-Party Joint Military Commission after the sixty-day period, met the same fate.4 The concept of a coalition government proved equally illusory. Talks between Saigon and the PRG, begun on March 19 in La Celle–Saint-Cloud outside Paris, only highlighted the incompatibility of the opposing views. As a result, the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, the coalition body called for in the Paris Agreement to supervise elections, never came into existence.5 In accordance with their analysis of the Indochina situation, Nixon and Kissinger had no illusions about a smooth implementation of the cease-fire provisions. They both believed that the Paris Agreement could serve only as a strategic framework, and its individual provisions did not carry much relevance in themselves. During February and March 1973, Nixon and Kissinger set out to use this framework in a concerted effort to implement the equilibrium strategy. Kissinger’s trip to Asia from February 7 to 20, which included visits to Thailand, Laos, North Vietnam, China, and Japan, was intended to reassure allies, induce Hanoi to adhere to the peace agreement and its related understandings, and consolidate the rapprochement with China.6 An important aspect of the discussions in Hanoi was the issue of US aid to the North, the major carrot that Nixon and Kissinger had to offer. Moreover, a large part of the talks focused on Cambodia and Laos (in Laos, unlike Cambodia, a cease-fire came within reach). However, Nixon and Kissinger remained convinced that ultimately it was the threat of military reintervention that could restrain Hanoi’s buildup in the South. Despite the fact that Kissinger clearly conveyed this message during his Hanoi trip, infiltration did not stop and led to several minicrises in late February and March. During that time, it was especially Kissinger who advocated military action in order to maintain the equilibrium strategy.

32

CHAPTER 2

During the X plus 60 period, both Nixon and Kissinger continued to show signs of optimism that the key elements of their strategy to uphold South Vietnam could work. Although this period could be described as moderately optimistic, doubts also lingered.

Kissinger’s Asia Trip When Kissinger left Washington on February 7, his first two destinations in Asia were Bangkok and Vientiane. The main purpose of the two visits was to reassure Prime Ministers Thanom Kittikachorn and Souvanna Phouma of a continued firm US posture in Southeast Asia. Kissinger observed that both leaders appeared “extremely distrustful of North Vietnamese intentions and [are] plotting their courses in the wake of the Vietnam settlement.”7 To ease Thai worries about an allegedly hasty US pullout from Southeast Asia, Kissinger reiterated the idea of the equilibrium strategy: Washington would couple the carrot of economic aid with the Thailand-based stick of deterrent airpower, which would hopefully set Hanoi on a more peaceful course. The air force would only gradually be withdrawn from Thailand, and only if the North Vietnamese abided by the agreement. Kissinger made it clear that Nixon was no dove and would forcefully police the Vietnam settlement. Moreover, he stressed the idea that tensions between the Chinese and the North Vietnamese in Southeast Asia could be exploited to create a regional balance. As Kissinger noted, Thanom was somewhat ambivalent on the issue of US bases in Thailand. On the one hand, the Thais counted on strong US action in case of communist cease-fire violations. On the other hand, the Thai prime minister was facing domestic opposition to the US presence based on the grounds that this would stir North Vietnamese and Chinese hostilities. As a whole, though, Kissinger concluded that the Thais were pragmatic allies who counted on US support, not least to fight their own communist insurgency.8 In Vientiane, Souvanna asked for US help in the cease-fire negotiations with the communist Pathet Lao, stressed the need for US pressure to ensure the withdrawal of the NVA, and asked Kissinger to raise the issue of Chinese road-building operations with Beijing. Kissinger’s analysis of the situation was rather somber. Souvanna was negotiating from a position of weakness and appeared to be willing to share power with the communists. In any case, Kissinger promised an increase in US air support while leaving the political issues to the Laotian parties.9 On February 10, Kissinger’s Boeing 707 landed at the Noi Bai military airfield fifty miles north of Hanoi, where the national security adviser was received by the chief North Vietnamese negotiator in the Paris peace talks, Le Duc Tho, and

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

33

was transferred to Gia Lam International Airport outside Hanoi. Driving from the outskirts into the city center, Kissinger noted that although the surroundings of the city resembled a lunar landscape because of the Linebacker II bombings, the city center had gone practically undamaged. Kissinger reported to Nixon that “the parts of the city that we have [seen] are quite attractive and very quiet as everyone moves about on bicycles.”10 In his final review of the Asia trip, Kissinger summarized his impressions of the North Vietnamese capital in a more dismal way. “The atmosphere in Hanoi was a mix of isolation, oppressiveness, paranoia, and ambivalence. There was a feeling of being cut off from the world, reflected in the quiet streets. . . . The mood in the spartan city was as oppressive as the soggy weather. . . . These qualities, plus the poverty of the place itself, would convince the uninformed visitor that the victors are sitting in Saigon.”11 The express purpose of Kissinger’s trip to Hanoi was to begin a new US–North Vietnamese relationship that would induce the North to refrain from disabusing “uniformed visitors.” Somewhat unsure about Hanoi’s intentions in arranging the visit, Kissinger had asked the CIA Vietnam specialist George Carver for an assessment before his departure. Carver suspected that Hanoi’s motives ranged from simple human curiosity to domestically motivated symbolism of a “communist victory” to concrete negotiations about US–North Vietnamese relations and US aid. According to Carver, the general idea Hanoi wanted to support was that Washington had contented itself with the Paris Agreement and would not reintervene. Moreover, Carver surmised that the North Vietnamese leaders would likely seek to irritate Saigon and noted that “one may legitimately wonder if Hanoi would not like to cultivate a measure of bilateral relations with Washington that could serve as a kind of anchor to windward if relations were to chill between Hanoi and (reciprocally) its two primary communist patrons, particularly Peking.”12 Whatever Hanoi’s motives, it became clear that its view of the Paris Agreement remained at odds with Washington’s. North Vietnamese prime minister Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho both stressed that they wanted a new US–North Vietnamese relationship, that Hanoi would scrupulously observe the Paris Agreement, and that the communists wanted to reunite the country peacefully. However, pressed by Kissinger on the matter of the ongoing infiltration of men and war machinery into the South, the North Vietnamese leaders simply denied such activities, declared that they were “civilian supplies,” and countered by accusing Saigon and Washington of cease-fire violations. Kissinger responded by making it unmistakably clear that the North had to make a decision: it could either use the Paris Agreement as a weapon for the conquest of the South, or it could refrain and rely on “historical evolution” to achieve its objectives. In the latter case, Washington would not intervene in the process, whatever its outcome. In the

34

CHAPTER 2

former case, though, Hanoi was headed for confrontation that could lead to massive US retaliation, as had happened in 1972.13 Kissinger elaborated on those two options for Hanoi in his final report to Nixon. He reiterated the linchpins of the equilibrium strategy: Washington had to induce Hanoi to accept a breather for a couple of years, which would in turn foster the coexistence of two separate Vietnamese states. He stressed that in his view, Hanoi had not made a decision regarding which course to pursue. His outlook was moderately optimistic: “I believe that with careful management, we have a chance to develop normalization with Hanoi so as to have the same stabilizing impact on Indochina as our process with Peking is having on Asia in general.”14 As he made clear, for the equilibrium strategy to succeed, “absolute discipline” in US performance was required. Kissinger later stated that leaving Hanoi, he was determined rather than optimistic about the prospects for normalization and believed that the North Vietnamese would sooner or later test Washington’s resolve.15 As his report to Nixon highlighted, Kissinger was prepared to go on with his complex maneuvers to achieve a lasting equilibrium. While negotiating, Kissinger kept up his tactic of coupling the stick with the carrot. The central positive inducement (besides dangling the general normalization of US–North Vietnamese relations) that Nixon and Kissinger had in mind was economic reconstruction aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The North Vietnamese leaders, who kept describing aid as a US obligation, were indeed eager to receive the $3.25 billion of projected payments over a five-year period, albeit without any conditions attached to it.16 Kissinger was quite frank about the difficulties the Nixon administration would have in securing aid in Congress. He explained in detail and at length the appropriations process and called for a cooperative North Vietnamese attitude. Still, Pham Van Dong suspected that Nixon and Kissinger’s willingness to grant aid was the essential point, not Congress’s. In any case, further concrete discussions were essentially postponed by referring the matter to the Joint Economic Commission to be established in early March.17 The second carrot that Kissinger repeatedly employed was the idea of US acquiescence in an eventual communist takeover by means other than a rapid conquest. As he had done with the North Vietnamese and the Chinese in 1972, and in line with Carver’s analysis of Hanoi’s motives for the visit, Kissinger was implicitly purporting that US interests were in line with the decent-interval theory: Washington did not care about a communist takeover as long as it happened after a sufficiently long period of tranquility.18 Still, Kissinger’s real message was well understood in Hanoi: the threat of US reintervention remained. As Pham Van Dong put it, “We wonder whether you want to return to the situations of the 1960s.”19

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

35

Kissinger never doubted that playing on these fears was Washington’s strongest leverage. Although he saw aid as an important part of his strategy and wanted to keep it bilateral in order to maintain as much influence on Hanoi as possible, he knew that the military card ultimately constituted the only real trump.20 The Laotian and Cambodian theaters, which were further important issues in the talks, exemplified that approach. As deliberations about the upcoming International Conference on Vietnam (which ultimately produced nothing more than a general endorsement of the Paris Agreement) indicated, Washington treated all of Indochina as one matter, whereas the DRV wanted to deal with the Indochinese countries separately.21 Still, the North Vietnamese professed that a cease-fire was about to be concluded in Laos, clearly showing that—unlike in Cambodia—they exercised considerable influence over the Pathet Lao. On the withdrawal of troops, though, they remained uncommitted. Kissinger meanwhile ordered the intensification of strikes in Laos and told the US ambassador there that “air action seems to be the only language the communists understand.”22 Back in Washington, Nixon maintained a view consistent with Kissinger’s. The president did again utter comments that seemed to reflect a pessimistic assessment of the Indochina situation. When, in early February, Vice President Spiro Agnew returned from South Vietnam, Nixon told him, as well as White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman, Military Assistant to the President Brent Scowcroft, and Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, that “we can’t guarantee any government in Cambodia. . . . We can’t keep giving them B-52s.”23 Putting this statement in a somewhat broader context, Nixon reiterated the substance of the doctrine that carried his name: Washington could not take care of all the world’s problems and did not deserve the entire world’s blame. Furthermore, the president remarked that getting aid for both Vietnamese sides in Congress would be tough. Possibly indicating some doubts, Nixon asked Agnew whether he believed that South Vietnam could survive. The vice president replied that he thought it could.24 All in all, though, the president for the most part upheld a tough and rather optimistic stance. Meeting with Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson, Scowcroft, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), for example, Nixon made it clear that he had prevented a complete withdrawal from Vietnam. He stressed that credibility with friends and foes had necessitated persevering in Vietnam and concluded, “I think the Nixon Doctrine has been largely misinterpreted. Mansfield, for example, thinks that it is a way to get out. It’s not; it’s a way to maintain our forces overseas but to get a decent effort from the countries supported, especially in terms of manpower.”25 Reporting to Kissinger on Nixon’s activities, Scowcroft remarked that the president believed that aid to North Vietnam would indeed be a hard issue in Congress but could be won by the administration. According to Scowcroft, Nixon was happy with maximum US air support in Laos. He observed that the

36

CHAPTER 2

president was, generally speaking, in a good mood, not least because of the return of the first groups of POWs, and that the senior staff ’s mood remained quiet and relaxed as well.26 Kissinger left Hanoi in mid-February. Complemented by a two-day stay in Hong Kong, his remaining destinations were China and Japan. Much like the stops in Thailand and Laos, the visit to Tokyo, last on the itinerary, was intended to reassure an important US ally. The visit to China was supposed to further capitalize on the historic opening to China that had been ushered in with Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing. Reporting back to Washington, Kissinger stated that the atmosphere in Beijing was the warmest ever and assumed that the Vietnam settlement had contributed to that fact. Kissinger’s exultation about the frankness of the talks with Premier Zhou Enlai and the apparent acceleration in USChinese rapprochement was furthered by a surprise late-night conversation with Chairman Mao.27 As with Zhou, Kissinger and Mao engaged in a comprehensive survey of foreign policy issues. According to Kissinger, the Chinese leaders shared the US perspective on most international issues or showed understanding for Washington’s perspective. As Kissinger informed Nixon, “We are now in the extraordinary situation that, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] might well be closest to us in its global perceptions.”28 He observed that the dominant theme of the talks was Chinese fear of Soviet intentions, which was, according to Kissinger, even more obvious than in 1972. Trying to further exploit the Sino-Soviet rift, Kissinger responded by suggesting that further rapprochement with Washington would constitute a suitable counterweight for Beijing against Soviet pressures. Chinese hopes for US-PRC collaboration against the USSR had, according to Kissinger, turned Washington and Beijing into “tacit allies.”29 On Indochina, Kissinger mentioned the need for restraint by all parties and the necessity for Hanoi to make a decision for war or peace. Elaborating on the overall situation in Southeast Asia, Kissinger again played on Chinese fears of the Soviets by insinuating that the USSR and India might want to unify Indochina under the rule of one country (obviously the DRV) and could try to set up an Asian security system ranging from Burma to Indonesia. Zhou and Kissinger also broached the issue of the expected cease-fire and Chinese road-building activities in Laos and discussed the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Cambodia, featuring a temporary coalition government and leading (possibly) to an eventual ouster of Lon Nol (though not necessarily to that of his party). Kissinger and Zhou agreed that Cambodia and the other countries of Indochina should eventually become independent, neutral states. Moreover, Kissinger made concrete promises of force reductions in Taiwan, which were related to

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

37

the withdrawal from Vietnam. The talks with the Chinese leaders were concluded with a joint communiqué and an agreement to set up a liaison office in each capital in May 1973.30 For all of Kissinger’s enthusiasm about the candor in his talks with the Chinese, his reports from Beijing back to Washington betrayed the second facet of the post–Paris Agreement strategy for Indochina (the first being the equilibrium strategy): the existence of an insurance policy. In his cables, Kissinger expressed strong concern about Secretary of State William Rogers’s public speculations about PRC intentions in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Kissinger repeatedly told Haldeman that “it is essential that release of the communiqué not get mixed up with Vietnam.”31 First, this showed that Kissinger was not willing to endanger the US-PRC relationship over Indochina. Second, the public separation of US-Chinese relations and Vietnam pertained to the idea of a backup plan as it had already been visible before the Paris Agreement: a good relationship between Washington and Beijing created a valuable opportunity to counter the potential defeat in Indochina (which would hardly be possible if US-PRC relations depended on Chinese performance in Indochina). As an annoyed Kissinger commented in an interview after his Asia trip, “I think it is just absurd coming back from China to spend 20 minutes on Vietnam.”32

An Ambivalent Triangular Diplomacy One could assume that behind the façade of public statements, Kissinger was forcefully advocating Chinese restraint. However, the record of his visit to Beijing indicated a more intricate approach. Although Kissinger apparently did try to convey the message that Beijing must refrain from supporting Hanoi’s possible drive for conquest and actually expected some moderation in PRC supplies to the DRV as a result, his remarks hardly amounted to a clear-cut choice, let alone a threat.33 Rather, Kissinger tried to sweet-talk the Chinese, stressing that Southeast Asia should be put into the context of overall US-PRC relations and again invoking the idea of US acquiescence in the decent-interval theory.34 The same velvet-glove approach was visible in a substantial part of the messages delivered to the Soviets. In the context of ongoing confrontations with Hanoi over the cease-fire in Laos, the smooth release of US POWs, and continued infiltration of the South in late February and early March, Nixon and Kissinger threatened Moscow with serious consequences should the Soviets continue to support Hanoi.35 Still, the menacing statement was coupled with a more conciliatory tone. Kissinger told Soviet representatives on March 5, “You know we had to spend the first month of the Administration finishing up the Vietnam war.

38

CHAPTER 2

And if that stays quiet we can devote this year to US-Soviet relations.”36 What is more, Nixon’s letter to Brezhnev after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement had, just as Kissinger had done in Beijing, only vaguely called for “restraint by all interested countries.”37 Thus, one must conclude that Nixon and Kissinger preferred to induce rather than deter Moscow in linking Vietnam to US-Soviet relations. This was even more the case in discussing the Indochina issue with the Chinese. Generally speaking, Nixon and Kissinger struck a rather moderate tone when they were engaging in triangular diplomacy with respect to Indochina. This approach was not new. At the height of the Easter Offensive in 1972, Kissinger largely refrained from linking Vietnam to détente, even though he and Nixon sought to pull out all the stops to impede Hanoi’s invasion. The same tendency had been visible before as well.38 Although they clearly sought to suppress or at least minimize Chinese and Soviet deliveries of war materiel to the DRV, they were not willing to seriously endanger détente with Moscow or rapprochement with Beijing. This pointed to a circular approach to détente and triangular diplomacy and highlighted a potential conflict: the Vietnam War had necessitated détente as a means to get out of a devastating quagmire, but at the same time, Nixon and Kissinger had sought and continued to seek withdrawal from Vietnam to pursue great-power relations in order to build a lasting “structure of peace.” Thus, détente and triangular diplomacy constituted a means as well as an end.39 Related to those somewhat conflicting considerations were Nixon and Kissinger’s coexisting beliefs that if Vietnam fell to communism, relations between the great powers would be endangered, while US-Soviet and US-PRC relations simultaneously provided a potential counterbalance for defeat in Indochina.40 Numerous statements by both the president and Kissinger highlighted both sides of the equation. As Nixon and Kissinger repeatedly stressed between themselves and to other members of the administration, unconditional withdrawal from Vietnam and the resulting loss of credibility would destroy the basis of US foreign policy, namely, a strong world leadership role vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and especially in their new relationship with China. If Washington did not emerge from Vietnam in a position of strength, triangulation would be bound to fail. “It is precisely your assertion of a responsible American world role and taking strong measures when necessary that has convinced the PRC that the US is a useful counterweight to the Soviet menace,” Kissinger told the president.41 Nixon concurred with Kissinger’s analysis and warned his cabinet that “if we fail there [Cambodia and Laos] the PRC will see us as a paper tiger.”42 In his conversation with Mao during his February visit, Kissinger had jokingly conjured up the same idea. When Mao claimed to have invented the English term “paper tiger,” Kissinger replied, “ ‘Paper tiger.’ Yes, that was all about us.”43 At the same

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

39

time, as Kissinger indicated to the Soviets and the Chinese, Washington had had to withdraw from Vietnam to turn to more important issues; he and Nixon kept referring to Vietnam as an “irritant” in the great game of US-USSR-PRC relations.44 Although in a narrow sense those remarks served as carrots to the communists, they fit into a pattern of downplaying the significance of the conflict and indicated the perceived potency of the international system to shield against the fallout from the Vietnam War. As Nixon put it, “China is bigger than ending the war [in Vietnam]. Russia [unclear] is bigger than ending the war. . . . So now, now that we have come this far, the real game is how do you build on these great initiatives.”45 If this interrelationship among different considerations appears complex, it nonetheless reveals a certain logic in Washington’s aims. With the big picture of great-power relations in mind, it has to be concluded that Nixon and Kissinger first and foremost sought to uphold a noncommunist South Vietnam (and, relatedly, some sort of favorable equilibrium in Laos and Cambodia) since détente and triangulation were perceived to hinge on US credibility, which in turn had become inseparable from the outcome in Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger had based their Indochina policy on this principle since the beginning of Nixon’s first term, and they continued to do so in early 1973. Still, this was only half the story. Because the president and his national security adviser had come to see the possibility of defeat in Indochina even before the Paris Agreement came into effect, they did not limit their talks with the Soviets and the Chinese to calls for an end of aid to Hanoi. Rather, on the basis of the insight that their effort to uphold Washington’s Indochinese allies might fail, Nixon and Kissinger sought to foster an atmosphere among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing that would be conducive to more grand accomplishments among the great powers, thus limiting Vietnam’s magnitude by comparison. In other words, the need for an insurance policy in Indochina made a forceful exertion of influence on the Soviets and the Chinese difficult if not impossible for Nixon and Kissinger. Hence, a placatory stance by default, though at times coupled with explicit threats, characterized Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomatic exchanges with Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, and in line with the insurance policy, Nixon and Kissinger continued to publicly distance Washington from the Thieu regime and remained rather vague or at least legally uncommitted with respect to enforcing the Paris Agreement. Kissinger instructed Scowcroft during his Asia trip, “Please talk to Haldeman on a personal basis and ask him to do his best to moderate the euphoric commentary coming out of Washington on the Vietnam settlement. In our present public posture we are staking too much on the settlement. This gives the Soviets an incentive to blow it up even before the conference is completed. We have a very complex period ahead of us.”46

40

CHAPTER 2

Although Kissinger’s statement clearly indicated a desire to play it low key with the American public (thus possibly putting the administration in a better position to use force) and a fear of Soviet manipulation, it again pointed in the direction of the insurance policy: by not staking too much on the Paris Agreement, Washington’s (perceived) obligations to enforce the settlement were greatly diminished. In sum, Nixon and Kissinger kept working on their insurance policy in both the domestic and the international arenas, even at a time when they were making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam by achieving equilibrium in Indochina. The ultimate purpose of all this was to remain flexible. Though potentially selfcontradictory—after all, Nixon and Kissinger knew that they desperately needed to capitalize on any leverage they had with the DRV—the approach to détente, triangulation, and the Indochina situation as a complex, interrelated web was intended to contribute to that flexibility.47 Nixon and Kissinger have been charged with neglecting regional complexities in favor of great-power relations.48 As the historical record shows, this judgment, at least in the case of Indochina, is wrong. Kissinger was especially familiar with the complicatedness of the situation in Indochina, for example, in regards to the different factions that were involved in Laos and Cambodia. At the same time, he did not let himself get distracted by these complexities from the main problem. He realized that South Vietnam’s survival ultimately depended on the success of American deterrence vis-à-vis North Vietnam. Furthermore, even if one treats cautiously the conclusions drawn in recent scholarship that triangular diplomacy did, in fact, have a major influence on North Vietnam’s war effort, the inclusion of great-power relations in the Indochina strategy made sense. The fact that inhibiting the flow of supplies to the DRV was only one (and not the central) reason for engaging in great-power relations in the Indochina context highlights this idea. As an important part of Nixon and Kissinger’s insurance policy, fruitful relations with the Soviets and the Chinese could help counterbalance the effects of Vietnam. The question remains what motives informed Soviet and Chinese strategies toward Indochina. Although both the Soviets and the Chinese clearly stated that they welcomed the peace agreement in Vietnam and announced accelerated cooperation with Washington with the Vietnam “irritant” being removed, they both followed their own agendas on Indochina.49 In his talks with Chinese leaders during the February visit, Kissinger had put great, albeit somewhat indirect, effort into conjuring up a common US-PRC vision of a partly neutral, multination Indochina. To some extent, Kissinger’s hopes were well founded. Since 1968, and continuously into the early 1970s, Beijing’s interests had started to depart significantly from Hanoi’s. With the worsening Sino-Soviet split, Chinese leaders saw Moscow

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

41

as a greater threat than Washington.50 As a result, they came to fear a Sovietbacked (North) Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. Moreover, Mao and Zhou wanted to preserve overall US power and prestige in order to contain the Soviet threat. Thus, in the early 1970s, they advocated a settlement in Vietnam that would save face for the United States. However, to thwart North Vietnamese resentment about a perceived Chinese “betrayal” and to impede closer DRV-USSR cooperation—which could undermine the very reason for China’s rapprochement with the United States—Beijing, in 1972 and 1973, stepped up its aid to the DRV to a record level.51 Additionally, China had to maintain its (self-)image as the leading supporter of communist revolution and national liberation in the world. With the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Chinese continued to support the North Vietnamese in their quest for final victory in Vietnam but advised Hanoi to accept a respite of several years in order to make US reinvolvement less likely. However, by that time, Beijing’s approach had clearly shifted from cooperation to containment. Although Mao and Zhou were willing to see a unified Vietnam under the North’s control, they sought to counter the DRV’s influence in Laos and, especially, Cambodia.52 Thus, Kissinger had reasons to hope for Chinese support of political settlements that would lead to the viable sovereignty of these two Indochinese states. Even with continued Chinese support to the DRV, mutual Chinese and US interests could, according to Kissinger’s vision, help bring about an (eventually permanent) equilibrium in Indochina.53 The Soviet approach to Indochina was equally marked by multiple considerations. Although Moscow’s aid to North Vietnam increased decisively from 1965 (especially in the field of sophisticated weapons systems) and eclipsed Chinese deliveries by 1968, Soviet leaders were somewhat ambivalent on support for the North Vietnamese war effort.54 In line with their ideological convictions, the Soviets believed in the righteousness of North Vietnam’s struggle for reunification, especially when it was threatened by the capitalist United States. From 1964, Moscow was willing to support the North Vietnamese cause, all the more so as it came to see the Vietnam War as a challenge to the global balance of power and the USSR’s reputation as a supporter of communist revolution. Moreover, with the widening Sino-Soviet split, Soviet leaders sought to undermine China’s influence in Southeast Asia by strengthening their own ties with Hanoi. In fact, Moscow did perceive some potential gains from their major antagonists (China and the United States) being mired in a protracted war, leading to strengthened Soviet positions in Europe and the Far East. Furthermore, the Vietnam theater served as a source of information about US weapons systems and as a testing ground for Soviet war materiel.55 However, despite these considerations, Moscow at no point was willing to jeopardize its basic goals of improved US-USSR

42

CHAPTER 2

relations and détente with the West. Thus, an overarching aim of Soviet policymakers was to promote a settlement in Indochina and get rid of the Vietnam “irritant.”56 That said, whatever long-term goals the Soviets and the Chinese were pursuing, the DRV, at the time of the Paris Agreement, could continue to count on aid from both communist countries. Most important, Hanoi remained fiercely independent. Although the North Vietnamese were clearly worried by the shifts in the international system, at no point did they become subservient to the Soviets or the Chinese. To the contrary, by savvy maneuvering, they worked toward securing maximum support from both communist sides.57 Arguably, Nixon, Kissinger, and specialists like Carver, in their enthusiasm for great-power relations, failed to see clearly the limits of triangulation’s effects in Indochina. In that sense, relations among the great powers might have served as a source of exaggerated optimism about implementing the equilibrium strategy, for despite Moscow and Beijing following their own agendas of détente and rapprochement, Hanoi was likely to be able to extract enough aid to remain a formidable threat to South Vietnam. Still, Nixon and Kissinger’s inclusion of great-power relations in their post– Paris Agreement strategy for Indochina made some sense. In addition to playing an important role in attempting to curb the flow of supplies to the DRV and, above all, in maintaining an insurance policy for possible failure in Vietnam, triangulation promised to create a favorable framework for the equilibrium strategy. If neither the Soviets nor the Chinese encouraged the North Vietnamese to strive for conquest in the short run, and the cease-fire created its own reality, a regional balance (including two Vietnamese states) that was acceptable to all great powers could possibly come into existence. In other words, if Washington managed to exploit a gain of time by further isolating the DRV, this could make it harder for Hanoi to embark on another major offensive in the future. Be that as it may, while including triangulation as a component, Nixon and Kissinger did not base their equilibrium strategy on it. Rather, a far more pressing issue consisted of Washington’s need to influence the situation on the ground in Indochina.

The Situation in Indochina When Kissinger departed Hanoi for China, he sent Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Sullivan to Saigon. Much like Vice President Agnew’s visit in late January and early February, Sullivan’s mission was to reassure Thieu of ongoing US support, brief him on the Hanoi visit, and observe the progress of the ceasefire. Reporting back to Washington, Sullivan concluded that the “fears and wor-

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

43

ries they [the South Vietnamese] expressed in October seem to have evaporated completely.”58 According to Sullivan, the military, political, and economic situation was favorable to the Thieu regime. Sullivan also expressed some hopes that the ICCS and the Four-Party Joint Military Commission would work more effectively in the future.59 This rather optimistic assessment of the conditions and prevailing mood in South Vietnam partly mirrored the reports of other officials, such as the vice president, US ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, and Kissinger’s aides John Negroponte and Philip Odeen.60 For example, in early 1973, Odeen observed that “GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam, i.e., South Vietnam] control of rural population appears to have improved spectacularly in December, increasing from 61 to 68 percent nationwide. . . . Most of the 32 percent of the population not under GVN control are contested. Enemy control was only 3.2 percent in December.” 61 Although Odeen warned that the data had to be treated with great caution since they were provided by the South Vietnamese, he concluded that there were encouraging signs of a working pacification program and an effective increase in government control.62 At the same time, Odeen made a strong case for the need to increase economic support to Saigon. As he pointed out, a prosperous economy could become an essential advantage for the Thieu regime in the political contest that lay ahead. A lack of additional appropriations, however, would force the South Vietnamese to continue unpopular moves, such as increasing taxes, maintaining high interest rates, and devaluating the piastre. In short, economic stability, while being a potential trump, hinged on additional US funds to compensate for the loss of money-spending GIs.63 As for political improvements, Kissinger reported to Nixon at the end of March that there were signs that Thieu was finally putting an end to corruption in his administration. Moreover, Kissinger noted, Thieu had successfully completed his “land to the tiller” program in which more than 1 million hectares of land had been distributed to 800,000 families of farmers. Furthermore, Kissinger recounted the observation made by the pro-Thieu chairman of the Lower House, Nguyen Ba Can, that Thieu would decentralize his government and enjoyed the support of a “silent majority” in the countryside.64 In other words, there were some signs, however ambivalent, that contributed to an optimistic view of South Vietnam’s future. Militarily, after 1968 the conflict became a conventional main-unit war between the NVA and South Vietnamese and US forces. In the post–Tet Offensive period, CIA-led South Vietnamese counterinsurgency efforts (often somewhat mistakenly referred to under the generic term “Phoenix program”) especially succeeded in devastating the communist shadow government in the South.65 Despite Vietnamization and the massive upgrading of materiel (under Operations Enhance and Enhance Plus),

44

CHAPTER 2

South Vietnamese forces (roughly 1.1 million men under arms in 1973) could not safeguard the country against a full assault from the North on their own.66 However, as the failed 1972 spring offensive had shown, a major communist onslaught could be repelled by combined US airpower and South Vietnamese ground forces.67 In early 1973, the “war of the flags” seemed to further support this analysis: it did not shift control in favor of the communists, and casualty rates remained conspicuously in favor of the Saigon regime, even without US combat support.68 Although the issue of popular support, especially in the countryside, continuously posed a problem to Saigon, in early 1973 there were signs that Thieu was successfully consolidating political control (if not support), not least among the rural population.69 Contrary to communist propaganda, widespread criticism of the Saigon regime did not mean that the population of South Vietnam was predominantly procommunist. The fact that a general uprising failed to materialize as a result of the Tet Offensive, which the North Vietnamese had hoped for, underlined that point. The communists themselves were well aware of that and, in early 1972, expressed some fear that Thieu would win a free election.70 Moreover, with the effective destruction of much of the Vietcong’s political infrastructure in the South and the main threat taking the form of a classic invasion, popular attitudes in the villages effectively did not matter.71 In the absence of an external onslaught, Thieu seemed able to hold the country together. In essence, though, stability in South Vietnam depended on two key issues: first, Nixon and Kissinger’s ability to secure additional funding from Congress, and second, their success in containing the roughly 150,000 North Vietnamese troops that had been implicitly permitted by the Paris Agreement to stay in the South. Nixon and Kissinger’s assessment of both factors was mixed. As for aid, they assumed that it would be tough to maneuver further appropriations for South Vietnam through Congress. Convincing Capitol Hill of aid to the DRV, the president and Kissinger knew, constituted an even bigger challenge.72 Still, funds for Saigon, at least in the short run, seemed manageable. Payments for fiscal year (FY) 1973 were secured under continuing resolutions.73 Moreover, Kissinger and his staff tried hard to come up with schemes that would allow them to allocate additional funds, such as declaring aid humanitarian and shifting development loan funds from other sectors to South Vietnam.74 In early 1973, Nixon and Kissinger expressed some confidence that they would be able to handle Congress on the issue of aid to both South and North Vietnam. At least during the critical period of one to two years, Washington should be able to provide Saigon with enough assistance.75 However, in the face of growing congressional opposition, it remained less than certain that Nixon and Kissinger would be able deliver indefinitely to Thieu on their promise of full economic support. It was this support, though, on

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

45

which South Vietnam clearly depended in the absence of a major shift toward economic self-sustainability.76 The presence of the NVA in South Vietnam led to an equally mixed assessment. According to Kissinger’s reckoning, the implicit acquiescence in the troops’ occupation of parts of the South, as implied in the Paris Agreement, reflected the military reality on the ground and was a necessary concession to achieve a peace agreement in the first place. More important, the presence of the North Vietnamese troops had to be seen in the context of the equilibrium strategy: with adequate military and economic assistance, the Thieu regime would be able to contain the present communist forces, short of a full-fledged invasion by the North, which Washington set out to deter. Nixon and Kissinger did not share some of their subordinates’ optimism about the effectiveness of the ICCS.77 Still, the terms of the Paris Agreement prohibited further North Vietnamese infiltration of supplies and troops into the South (except to replace damaged or wornout materiel) and thus provided the legal framework for enforcing the cease-fire and fostering long-term equilibrium.78 This optimism about containing the NVA militarily, though, did not fully address the issue of political pressure those troops would put on the Thieu regime. After all, in the contest for political domination, the communists retained a potentially powerful lever that could keep Saigon off balance. More to the point, even if Thieu proved able to shield his government from political pressure, the basic tenets of the equilibrium strategy contained a fair amount of uncertainty. What if the North decided to use its troops in the South for more than psychological pressure? Would Nixon and Kissinger be able to resort to the massive use of force? In fact, with the ongoing North Vietnamese infiltration, some uncertainty remained whether the North would go on the offensive sooner rather than later.79 Still, for the moment, the task was to give the equilibrium strategy a robust attempt: Nixon and Kissinger would try to get further aid for Saigon; they would seek to contain Hanoi with the aid carrot and the military stick; and some pressure would be put on Hanoi’s allies to decrease their support. Moreover, Washington would have to persuade Thieu to demonstrate at least a semblance of adherence to the Paris Agreement in order to curry favor with the American public and Congress.80 In the meantime, though, Nixon and Kissinger would keep up their insurance policy of gradually disassociating the United States from South Vietnam and deflating Vietnam’s overall importance. The fact that neither Nixon nor Kissinger visited Saigon after the signing of the Paris Agreement and that they procrastinated in arranging Thieu’s visit to the United States underlined this approach.81 In addition to the situation in South Vietnam, the Laotian and Cambodian theaters played a crucial role in Nixon and Kissinger’s equilibrium strategy. During

46

CHAPTER 2

Nixon’s first term in office, the expansion of the war into Vietnam’s neighboring countries had been a key element of Washington’s approach. In 1969, Nixon had ordered a major bombing campaign against targets in eastern Cambodia in order to stymie communist military operations. Additionally, in line with the madman theory, Nixon aimed to signal to the North Vietnamese that he was unpredictable and would not be bound by any restraints. To avoid public controversy, Nixon and Kissinger kept the bombings secret. In March 1970, the neutralist government of Cambodia, headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was overthrown in a coup by Prime Minister Lon Nol, a pro-US general. Seeking the opportunity to attack communist sanctuaries, a move the US military had long advocated, and to back Lon Nol, Nixon ordered US ground forces into Cambodian territory on May 1, 1970. Although the invasion led to a massive public outcry and heightened congressional opposition in the United States, it arguably bought vital time for Vietnamization and showed that Nixon was willing to make unpopular decisions if they suited his interpretation of US foreign policy interests. In February 1971, Nixon again expanded the war. Operation Lam Son 719, an incursion into Laos by South Vietnamese forces supported by US airpower, followed the same strategic reasoning as in Cambodia. This time, however, the South Vietnamese military’s continuing weakness was painfully exposed.82 A secret war in Laos that the CIA waged with the help of Hmong tribesmen, led by General Vang Pao, against the Ho Chi Minh Trail continued until early 1973.83 Nixon and Kissinger’s decision to move into Laos and Cambodia highlighted their twofold strategy of simultaneous augmentation and contraction of the US war effort. At the time of the Paris Agreement, the situation in both Laos and Cambodia remained unstable. All parties regarded the outcome in the different Indochinese countries as closely linked. North Vietnam’s continuing use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through Laos and Cambodia, underlined the strategic significance of the two countries. In fact, a strong case can be made that Washington’s failure to erect a barrier across southern Laos to cut the trail (in an extension of the Demilitarized Zone) constituted one of the major strategic mistakes of the Vietnam War.84 Although Lon Nol appeared somewhat optimistic about the Paris Agreement, Prince Souvanna Phouma, prime minister of the Royal Lao government that had been declared a US puppet by the communist Pathet Lao, predicted Hanoi’s eventual dominion over a united Vietnam.85 Nixon and Kissinger’s plan for Laos and Cambodia mirrored their approach to Vietnam: they tried to decouple a military cease-fire (and NVA withdrawal) from a political solution. First and foremost, the objective was to gain time. Nixon and Kissinger hoped that once a cease-fire took hold, a fragile equilibrium, possibly involving all Indochinese countries, could be turned into a permanent real-

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

47

ity.86 In the meantime, they ordered the expansion of air operations over Laos and Cambodia. The rationale behind this decision was threefold. First, as during the previous years, Nixon and Kissinger sought to interdict North Vietnamese infiltrations into South Vietnam. Second, they tried to back their allies, Lon Nol and Souvanna Phouma.87 Third, and most important, Nixon and Kissinger set out to implement the core of the equilibrium, namely, deterrence. As Nixon made clear in a cabinet meeting, “The purpose of bombing is not to get into a war in Cambodia, but to enforce the peace in Vietnam. We don’t want to encourage the Communists to go on the rampage again.”88 In Article 20 of the Paris Agreement, Hanoi and Washington had vowed to respect the sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, to end all infiltration, and to withdraw completely.89 However, the talks in February between Kissinger and North Vietnamese leaders highlighted that Hanoi was not willing to abide by these terms. By making withdrawal dependent on political solutions (an interpretation hardly permitted by the terms of the Paris Agreement), the North Vietnamese demonstrated that they would continue to exercise influence in Laos and Cambodia.90 Relations between Hanoi and its communist allies complicated matters. As the North Vietnamese leaders had indicated to Kissinger, the Pathet Lao seemed to follow Hanoi’s instructions, but Hanoi’s influence over the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk (who was in exile in Beijing and had become the titular head of the Khmer Rouge) appeared limited. The North Vietnamese repeatedly told Kissinger so, and the national security adviser somewhat acknowledged the fact (although he continued to believe that Hanoi could deliver more than it professed).91 In any case, as far as troop withdrawals were concerned, the onus for compliance with the Paris Agreement clearly lay with the North Vietnamese. Aware of the fact that legal clauses would have little impact, Nixon and Kissinger sought to convince Hanoi by military means.92 In the days leading up to the wobbly cease-fire in Laos, which came into effect on February 22 and essentially confirmed the 1962 Geneva accords, Nixon and Kissinger made sure to “really lay it on” the communists.93 Although the most immediate purpose of this “little Christmas bombing” (which continued even after February 22) was to halt a communist offensive and exert pressure to conclude the cease-fire, Nixon and Kissinger clearly intended to signal broader implications to Hanoi. Nevertheless, despite some temporary indications of withdrawals, Hanoi kept between 40,000 and 50,000 troops in Laos and expanded the Ho Chi Minh Trail.94 In Cambodia, Lon Nol declared a unilateral cease-fire (mainly to portray the communists as aggressors), but no progress toward a settlement was made, and US air operations continued on a high level.95 In early 1973, Nixon and Kissinger expressed some confidence that they would be able to handle the Laotian and

48

CHAPTER 2

Cambodian theaters. But although the cease-fire in Laos meant a small step toward equilibrium in all of Indochina, the situation in Laos and Cambodia remained essentially unresolved. Still, provided that a total communist takeover in those two countries could be prevented, the central question with respect to South Vietnam boiled down to whether Nixon and Kissinger would be able to eradicate the root of the problem: North Vietnam’s continuous attempt to keep open the option of military conquest by infiltrating its neighboring countries with troops and supplies.

Confronting Nor th Viet nam ese Cease- fire Violations In late February and March, the dispute over North Vietnamese cease-fire violations came to a head. Although the miniconfrontations between Washington and Hanoi were limited in scope and duration, they still proved decisive.96 As Washington attempted to come to grips with the problem of ongoing North Vietnamese infiltrations, members of the Nixon administration discussed how to deter Hanoi. The miniconfrontations then essentially put Nixon and Kissinger’s equilibrium strategy to a test. The historical record shows that during this period, Kissinger was one—if not the—leading “pragmatic hawk” in the administration. As opposed to the Departments of State and Defense, Kissinger (as well as his staff) had a clear understanding of how the military card should be used and, above all, that it should indeed be used. The period highlights Kissinger’s concern to implement the equilibrium strategy and his reluctance to shift fully to the insurance policy. Nixon, on the other hand, started to waver. By March, a new factor began affecting Washington’s Indochina policy: the unfolding Watergate scandal. At the end of February, two confrontations occurred. In addition to the air strikes against the Pathet Lao, after the Vientiane agreement, Washington and Hanoi clashed briefly over the release of US POWs (Hanoi apparently sought to protest the ongoing detention of communist prisoners in South Vietnam) and North Vietnamese installations of SAM-2 surface-to-air missiles at Khe Sanh. Washington responded by temporarily suspending troop withdrawals and mine-clearing operations in North Vietnam. Moreover, Ziegler made a statement demanding the unconditional release of the POWs (the other measures were not made public). Although Kissinger and Richardson agreed that the missiles were not the most pressing issue and should be treated in the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the POW return was critical.97 Kissinger wondered

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

49

how wise a confrontation on such a high level would be (to avoid the public perception of the Paris Agreement coming apart), but he and Nixon agreed that a very tough posture vis-à-vis the DRV was necessary.98 In fact, the president and Kissinger sought to exploit the POW issue to their advantage. As Nixon put it, “We now have an invaluable opportunity to revise the history of this war.”99 The most immediate tactic was to link the POWs to the North Vietnamese infiltrations of South Vietnam. According to Nixon and Kissinger’s calculation, public approval of a tough stance to secure the return of US prisoners—one of the few issues the public still cared about with respect to Vietnam—could be used to convey to Hanoi Washington’s resolve on any other cease-fire violation. As Nixon concluded, “We’ve always realized . . . in December, you know, if we could have made the POW the issue I could have gone on television, but we couldn’t. . . . But right now if it’s on the POWs and I say I’ll bomb them, we are going to bomb them until we get the POWs, by God the people would back you all the way.”100 Nixon and Kissinger were clearly ready to “do something pretty drastic” should the DRV continue to delay the return of the prisoners.101 But as they had anticipated, with Washington protesting strongly, the situation quickly cooled down, and the POWs were released on schedule. Although both Nixon and Kissinger kept making rather pessimistic remarks about the prospects for a long-term cease-fire and Kissinger continued to disassociate Washington from South Vietnam, the two men viewed the positive outcome of the POW crisis as a result of their toughness.102 Nixon stated again that he did not care the least bit about the Paris Agreement for its own sake, and Kissinger commented that “when our prisoners are out, then we are in great shape.”103 But although the return of the POWs was certainly a central short-term goal, seen in context, the comments did not point to US disengagement. To the contrary, much as with their retrospective comments about the Christmas bombings, Nixon and Kissinger encouraged each other in their hawkishness and, at least implicitly, reinforced their will to implement the equilibrium strategy. Quite often this took the form of vindicating their previous decisions to escalate, such as the Linebacker I and II bombings. Clearly, Nixon and Kissinger believed that those hard decisions had enabled them to reach the best agreement they could under the circumstances.104 In light of the continuing cease-fire violations, policymakers in Washington were discussing different contingencies and weighing their options. In late February, outlining possible DRV violations and different US response levels, officials at the Department of Defense concluded that the resumption of the Linebacker II bombings would probably end infiltration and could well force the North Vietnamese into compliance with the Paris Agreement. However, the

50

CHAPTER 2

Department of Defense analysts conceded that such measures posed a high political risk. Should the communists attack a populated area in South Vietnam, such as Hue, though, such measures would become politically feasible, it was argued.105 Kissinger’s aides, Richard Kennedy and John Holdridge, on the other hand, criticized the Department of Defense for overstressing the need to (militarily) “save” the Paris Agreement, which could—to paraphrase the famous saying of the Tet Offensive—lead to the unwanted event of its destruction. Moreover, they pointed to the lack of a strategy to win public support for or tolerance of military responses. Although Kennedy and Holdridge by no means ruled out the use of force, they clearly argued for finding ways to put pressure on the DRV within the confines of the Paris Agreement.106 As the North Vietnamese infiltrations continued unabated, though, Holdridge struck a more hawkish tone. In mid-March, he again criticized the Department of Defense, this time, however, for mentioning possible concessions to the DRV (like constructing airfields at the designated PRG resupply entry points) that could be coupled with coercive measures.107 In the same vein, Holdridge commented on the assessment by a special ad hoc group summoned by the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG).108 As Holdrige pointed out, the ad hoc group was somewhat pessimistic about the coercive effects of diplomatic measures alone while acknowledging problems with implementing strong military measures. Holdridge, on the other hand, seemed to argue for further attempts to deter Hanoi (albeit without jeopardizing the Paris Agreement). He concluded that the ad hoc group tended to downgrade politically feasable military measures, such as the bombings of NVA installations in Cambodia and Laos. Moreover, Holdridge asserted, the ad hoc group underestimated Saigon’s military capabilities in the South to counter the NVA buildup, as well as the psychological effects of a halt to US troop withdrawals and mine reseedings (under the Paris Agreement, Washington was obliged to conduct minesweeping operations in the North).109 In the end, Holdridge advised a gradually increasing response to the infiltrations, combining diplomatic (including “real pressure” on the PRC and the USSR) and military measures (ranging from increased bombings in Cambodia to sorties against targets in North Vietnam).110 In sum, Holdridge showed a clearer appreciation of the equilibrium strategy than officials at the Department of Defense or the ad hoc group: military measures should be used as a deterrent, while the Paris Agreement should be kept alive as a framework to achieve equilibrium. Kissinger’s recommendation to Nixon went along the lines Holdridge had advocated. After a WSAG meeting in mid-March, which had come to similar conclusions, Kissinger advised Nixon to order a two- to three-day period of intensive bombings of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos after the third but

THE X PLUS 60 PERIOD

51

before the fourth group of POWs would be released. Linking the suggested bombings to the post–Vientiane agreement strikes, the 1972 Spring Offensive, and the Christmas bombings, Kissinger strongly argued that this was the best move to change North Vietnam’s behavior and save the Paris Agreement.111 This conviction was, of course, nothing new. Confronted with the massive DRV buildup in early March, Kissinger became increasingly belligerent. In conversations with Nixon, Sullivan, Richardson, Chairman of the JCS Thomas Moorer, and General Alexander Haig, he argued for implementing tough deterrence measures and made it clear that the semblance of adherence to the Paris Agreement had to be maintained to win public support for punishments against Hanoi.112 Talking to the journalist Henry Trewhitt, Kissinger underscored an adamant stance. When Trewhitt remarked, “I have never bought the notion that Richard Nixon was seeking a fig leaf out of Vietnam, and I don’t think so now,” Kissinger responded, “That’s right. . . . He has not been going around saying that . . . he received an honorable peace to get it blown up now.”113 Although Kissinger remained evasive on the possibility of another Christmas bombing in the future, he conveyed the same message to the journalist Stewart Alsop. “The reason we are reacting so strongly is just to make sure they [the North Vietnamese] don’t misunderstand what’s going to happen if there’s an all out attack.”114 Although Nixon continued to show signs of belligerence, confirmed the need for deterrence, and called for a tough US posture in Indochina, he became increasingly ambiguous.115 Reporting to Kissinger, who had traveled on vacation to Mexico in late March, the national security adviser’s new deputy, Brent Scowcroft, recounted that Nixon had readily agreed to delay the strikes in Laos. Moreover, the president had expressed grave doubts about the likelihood of US reintervention in the future, thus questioning the equilibrium strategy.116 In early March, Nixon had already canceled a previous order to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail and had failed to act on Kissinger’s recommendations. Despite the fact that the missile buildup at Khe Sanh and in the Ashau valley continued, and the JCS now called for strikes there as well, Nixon continued to stall.117 As Scowcroft observed, Nixon had started again to see some positive aspects of the bombings, but “deep down he does not believe he ought to do it [bomb].”118 Meanwhile, the assessments Kissinger received from his aides also contained much pessimism. Again analyzing Hanoi’s intentions and possible countermeasures, the National Security Council (NSC) staffer William Stearman concluded that Washington would not be able to indefinitely postpone a large-scale resumption of hostilities and implicitly called the equilibrium strategy into question.119 To be sure, Kissinger himself had by no means shaken off pessimism completely. As he half-jokingly told Professor Eugene Rostow, “One of these days we’ll fall off the tight rope.”120 Still, he was determined to implement the

52

CHAPTER 2

deterrence strategy and viewed the situation as a major test that required a forceful response. Arguing against the Department of Defense’s ostensible attempt to prevent the strikes, Kissinger urged Nixon to go ahead with the bombings.121 Although, according to Scowcroft, “the counter-arguments [were] obviously having their impact [on Nixon],”122 and the president did somewhat surprisingly order a one-day strike in Laos, this measure did not match Kissinger’s recommendations about a more extensive campaign and its timing. Kissinger advised postponing the decision. He later suspected with some justification that Nixon had intended this response.123 In mid-March, Kissinger became aware of the impact that the unfolding Watergate scandal could have on the presidency and foreign policy. While he was in Mexico, Kissinger instructed Scowcroft to try hard to figure out what was on Nixon’s mind. Reporting back to Kissinger, Scowcroft juxtaposed updates on Nixon with the latest news about Watergate to highlight the president’s domestic problems.124 In light of this situation, Kissinger became increasingly concerned. Back in Washington, he tried to cover the White House’s back in talking to journalists, offered Haldeman some “good news” about China (obviously to counter Watergate publicity), and agreed with Nixon on the need to avoid a public debate about Vietnam.125 But Kissinger’s attempts to save the equilibrium strategy appeared more and more desperate. He told Nixon again that the other branches of the administration were trying to withdraw from Vietnam, but that a strong position was required. “We could be facing not only the collapse of ‘peace with honor,’ with all its domestic implications,” he warned, “but of the great power relationships which we have so carefully been building.”126 Although Nixon temporarily joined in the belligerence, he sounded rather dubious. “We’ve just got to have a little faith,” he told Kissinger.127

3 THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

The period between April and June 1973 marked the disintegration of the equilibrium strategy. The trend of Nixon’s increasing preoccupation with the unfolding Watergate scandal that had become apparent to Kissinger in March intensified in the spring and early summer. Although Kissinger vigorously tried to save the deterrence aspect of Washington’s Indochina policy, he realized in mid-April that Nixon’s predicament and lack of political capital would prevent him from ordering the necessary military response to address the continuing North Vietnamese cease-fire violations. In response, Kissinger grudgingly changed Washington’s strategy toward preparations for a possible major North Vietnamese assault on the South, rather than trying to forestall such an event by employing carrots and sticks. Barely three months after the signing of the Paris Agreement, the core concept behind the equilibrium strategy— trying to scotch the North’s plans for conquest at the earliest stage possible—lay in tatters.1 During this period, the domestic political situation in the United States continued to develop into a serious problem for Nixon and Kissinger on two intersecting fronts. First, Watergate, which had been smothered throughout the fall and winter of 1972 and had still seemed manageable to Nixon and his aides in early 1973, gained increasing momentum. Nixon’s approval rating peaked at 70 percent with the return of the last GIs from Vietnam in March, but it nosedived by 22 percent within a month. With the resignations of Nixon’s close aides John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman on April 30 and the defection of former White House counsel John Dean, Nixon’s approval ratings dropped to 53

54

CHAPTER 3

39 percent by July.2 Within a mere half year, Nixon had descended from the high point of his presidency to being in significant danger of losing his job. At the same time, throughout the spring and early summer of 1973, Congress’s long-standing opposition to US engagement in Indochina took the form of increasingly concrete measures to prevent Nixon and Kissinger’s post–Paris Agreement strategy from being carried out. In response to the returning POWs’ stories of cruel treatment during their captivity, Congress first removed the carrot of economic aid to Hanoi by passing the Byrd amendment.3 More important, the stick of the resumption of bombings was eliminated in late June. Although the effects of Watergate had already dealt an almost fatal blow to the equilibrium strategy in the spring, the irrevocable turning point occurred when Congress passed the second Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY 1973 and the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY 1974. Both pieces of legislation explicitly eliminated funding for combat activities in Indochina after August 15.4 Although Nixon and Kissinger knew, in early 1973, that the equilibrium part of their Indochina strategy would have to be implemented in the face of a hostile Congress and unfavorable public opinion, they proceeded with cautious optimism and banked on their ability to maneuver behind a smokescreen vis-à-vis both their communist adversaries and the American public. When Kissinger realized in April that the equilibrium concept was doomed, he made an increasing effort to stress the insurance-policy part of the overall Indochina strategy. Throughout the spring and early summer, the national security adviser continued to disassociate Washington from Saigon and downplay Vietnam’s significance with the American public, as well as with the Soviets and the Chinese. South Vietnamese president Thieu’s trip to the United States in April highlighted that approach. Moreover, Kissinger continued laboring hard to shift the focus to improving great-power relations. He and Nixon conceived Brezhnev’s visit to the United States in June as an opportunity to build on previous successes of détente, thus providing a counterbalance to Vietnam. In the context of Watergate, Nixon and Kissinger craved foreign policy success even more. The Year of Europe, which was meant to evoke a renascent transatlantic partnership, was another example. All in all, the period between April and June proved to be an explosive mix of foreign and domestic affairs.

The Thieu Visit In what Kissinger later referred to as “one of the saddest experiences of my period in office,” South Vietnamese president Thieu visited the United States in early April.5 That visit marked the first time Thieu had come to the continental United

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

55

States; before, US policymakers had sought to avoid provoking civil unrest by inviting the South Vietnamese president. However, with the departure of US combat troops from Vietnam, the situation had not changed much: rather than becoming a demonstration of unity, Thieu was largely shielded from the American public. Nixon and Kissinger did intend to encourage the South Vietnamese president and renew their pledge of support. Nixon reiterated, “In the event of [a] massive Communist offensive the American reaction would be sharp and tough.”6 However, Nixon’s comments were somewhat insincere. Not only had the president’s indecisiveness during the preceding weeks shown that a military reaction by Washington was becoming more and more unlikely, but Nixon also clearly exaggerated his willingness to support South Vietnam. In light of the back-channel talks with Moscow and Beijing, it was clearly misleading when Nixon told Thieu that he “conditioned our better relations with the Chinese and the Russians on the scale of their arms deliveries to North Vietnam.”7 Although Kissinger expressed great anger at the time and afterward that both the American public and most senior cabinet members, were unwilling to receive Thieu in a friendly, supportive manner, he and Nixon were far from naive about the situation.8 To the contrary, the president and Kissinger carefully continued to implement their insurance policy. Reacting to the South Vietnamese president’s recent comments in a French magazine implying that Washington could well reenter the war, Nixon told him that “our common enemies wanted President Thieu to say that the United States would have to come back in.”9 Clearly, Nixon tried to prevent Thieu from making public statements associating Washington in concrete terms with the South Vietnamese cause. In fact, Kissinger had advised Nixon to talk along these lines and had concluded that although general reassurance was required (including the promise of further aid), Nixon should not be specific in any way about a US military response to North Vietnamese aggression.10 As a result, the final communiqué for Thieu’s visit contained language that Washington and Saigon would maintain “vigilance” against possible communist aggression, but it by no means committed the United States to any concrete measures.11 In April, Nixon and Kissinger were no more willing to attach themselves to South Vietnam’s fate than they had been during the preceding months. In the same vein, Kissinger publicly continued to portray Washington’s intentions as further winding down US engagement.12 In other words, the disassociative component of the insurance policy continued to loom large. Similarly, rather than trying to counter the widespread unwillingness to welcome Thieu, Nixon and Kissinger actively tried to minimize Thieu’s exposure to the American public. The South Vietnamese president was received in the Western White House in San Clemente rather than in Washington; the state dinner was reduced to a small family gathering; and Thieu visited the capital only for a low-key dinner with the

56

CHAPTER 3

vice president.13 Upon Thieu’s departure, a worried Nixon told Kissinger to make sure that there would be no departure remarks, further underlining the concern of being perceived as too close to Saigon.14 Although Thieu remained outwardly relaxed, it was not lost on Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were unhappy with the reception and Kissinger’s personal handling of them. “I don’t think I’m going to get their medal of freedom,” he commented.15 If anything, the Thieu visit in April underscored that Nixon and Kissinger were pursuing their Indochina strategy in the context of an extremely challenging domestic situation.

Domestic Opposition to the Indochina Policy The fact that Nixon and Kissinger were crafting their post–Paris Agreement strategy on Indochina without broad domestic support was nothing new. To the contrary, when Nixon took office as president in 1969, he inherited an unpopular war that had discouraged his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, from running for reelection.16 During the following four years, Nixon and Kissinger engaged in the difficult task of responding to unfavorable domestic conditions while simultaneously attempting to maintain the basic US goal of an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger addressed the problem with a twofold strategy. On the one hand, they started to wind down the US presence in Vietnam. On the other, they expanded the war to Laos and Cambodia (and later with the bombings of North Vietnam) and made a concerted effort to strengthen the South Vietnamese military, hoping at the beginning of Nixon’s presidency that these measures would lead to a military victory.17 The latter part of the strategy drew sharp opposition from both Congress and the American public. In 1969, antiwar sentiment rose when it became clear that Nixon’s invocation of an early end to the war was hollow. In Congress, Nixon was under attack by the Democrats. Moreover, public opposition reached new heights when, in October 1969, as many as 2 million Americans participated in the nationwide protest known as the Moratorium. The invasion of Cambodia at the end of April 1970 sparked another dramatic wave of protests, which escalated when National Guardsmen killed four students at Kent State University in early May. Congress responded by repealing the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which had provided a rationale for US involvement in Vietnam. Although legislation sponsored by Senators George McGovern and Mark Hatfield that would have required Nixon and Kissinger to withdraw all forces from Vietnam by the end of 1971 did not pass the more conservative House of Representatives, Congress enacted the

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

57

Cooper-Church amendment in January 1971 (the first version of the bill had failed to pass the House in 1970), which prohibited funding for the use of ground troops in Cambodia.18 To mute public and congressional opposition, Nixon and Kissinger devised several countermeasures, of which the continuous withdrawal of troops from Vietnam was only one stratagem. In 1969, Nixon introduced a random lottery system to the draft, thus making Selective Service less disadvantageous to the poor and minorities. Together with the diminishing need for troops, the lottery system put an end to the draft as an impetus for opposition. In January 1973, the system was changed further to an all-volunteer force. Moreover, in a major speech in early November 1969, Nixon appealed to the “silent majority,” a cleverly designed reference to allegedly patriotic but politically quiet Americans, to back his Vietnam policy. The maneuver proved successful and mobilized support for Nixon.19 Generally speaking, during Nixon’s first term in office, the president and Kissinger were under immense domestic pressure to bring the war in Indochina to a conclusion. However, shrewdly calibrating expansion and deflation, they managed to prolong the war largely on their terms despite domestic opposition, and congressional attempts to legislate US withdrawal proved futile.20 Moreover, in spite of the many congressional attempts to curtail the war, Congress continued to give Nixon full support by funding operations in Southeast Asia (as it had already done for Johnson). From 1965 through the end of 1972, approximately 95 percent of members of Congress present and voting approved war-related appropriations.21 With the signing of the Paris Agreement in January 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had some reason for moderate optimism about their ability to handle domestic opposition to their post–Paris Agreement Indochina strategy. First, congressional initiatives in the 1970–72 period had sought US withdrawal.22 With the signing of the Paris Agreement, this basic demand had been satisfied. Although Kissinger later called his expectations somewhat naive, he and Nixon understandably hoped that domestic opposition to US engagement would considerably diminish under the new circumstances, just as it had with the draft.23 In the spring of 1973, continuing congressional and public opposition to prolonged engagement in Indochina, which took the form of rising apathy and a desire to abandon Vietnam completely to its fate, made it increasingly clear to Nixon and Kissinger that they could not count on a rally-around-the flag effect with the signing of the Paris Agreement. However, in January and February 1973, high approval ratings for Nixon (67 percent in January) and a wave of congratulations for their successful negotiations, which the president and Kissinger received from friend and foe alike, at least temporarily reinforced the idea

58

CHAPTER 3

of an outmaneuvered opposition.24 Nixon and Kissinger’s basic reasoning that Americans would not care about low-key US engagement in Vietnam as long as no ground forces were involved in the fighting might well have been augmented by another experience: when Nixon had ordered the bombing of Cambodia in 1969, and the Pentagon correspondent for the New York Times, William Beecher, had begun writing about the event despite Nixon and Kissinger’s strenuous efforts to keep the bombing secret, the potential scandal had aroused no public interest.25 Additionally, Nixon’s landslide victory over George McGovern in the fall of 1972, which yielded a 23.2 percent margin of victory in the popular vote in Nixon’s favor, was clearly interpreted by Nixon and Kissinger as a mandate for their Vietnam policy. When Kissinger called Nixon to congratulate him on election night, he told the president, “[We] came up against their issue and turned it into an asset. . . . You made Vietnam your issue. . . . Year after year the media were harassing you, all the intellectuals were against you, and you come out and have the greatest victory I’m sure in terms of margin that anyone has had.”26 That said, Nixon and Kissinger knew that they were facing rising opposition in Congress. Despite their temporary exuberance about the election victory in 1972 and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in January 1973, Nixon administration officials were seriously concerned about Capitol Hill. In late 1972, for example, the National Security Council (NSC) staffer John F. Lehman analyzed the makeup and intentions of the Ninety-Third Congress and came to a rather bleak conclusion. Quoting the historian William Yandell Elliott, Lehman expressed the view that “following every American War ‘Congress normally tends to express its dammed up criticism in a series of sporadic explosions’ which have the overall effect of making ‘impossible the maintenance of a coordinated and disciplined policy.’ . . . There is every evidence that the 93rd Congress will seek to validate the Elliott thesis.”27 Still, even in case of an unresolved Vietnam situation, Lehman pointed out that “in the first year of a term . . . veto threats are much more credible. We can probably last the full year without legislation.”28 The facts on which Lehman’s analysis was based did indeed provide a source of pessimism: Nixon’s landslide had not produced the same results in the races for Congress, especially in the Senate. Although the Republicans took four formerly Democratic open seats in the Senate, the Democrats captured six Republican-held seats. Moreover, in the newly Democratic states, the Senate’s most radical freshman class in the twentieth century came to power.29 In the House, the Republicans gained only thirteen seats.30 However, the leftist National Coalition for an Effective Congress’s proclamation that the “mandate to Congress is at least equal to the president’s” seemed exaggerated.31 Despite some internal party misgivings about Nixon’s failure to adequately support Senate Republicans

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

59

during the election campaign, Republican senators had fallen in line with the administration on foreign policy in the run-up to the election.32 In fact, with McGovern’s nomination, which most Americans perceived as pitting a radical leftist against Nixon, much of Congress’s energy to end the war in Vietnam seemed exhausted.33 Nixon and Kissinger’s predominantly optimistic assessment of the congressional situation continued in early 1973. The Democratic caucuses again introduced antiwar legislation in the House and Senate in January.34 Commenting on the controversial Christmas bombings, which a close majority of Americans had still supported, Senator Mike Mansfield said, “There is no greater national need than the termination, forthwith, of our involvement in the war. . . . I do not know whether there is a legislative route to end this bloody travesty. I do know that the time is long since past when we can take shelter in a claim of legislative impotence.”35 But despite those rumblings, Nixon and Kissinger expressed the conviction that they would be able to handle Congress on Vietnam. Members of Congress themselves were also well aware of the fact that they had proved rather powerless with respect to Indochina.36 In February and March, signs accumulated that, though temporarily weakened, Congress’s opposition to Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy had not vanished. The congressional briefings after the signing of the Paris Agreement had already demonstrated to Kissinger that the issue of aid to Saigon and Hanoi would be an uphill battle. Moreover, it went without saying that reintervention in the war would draw the strongest opposition.37 Nixon and Kissinger knew that their Indochina strategy would thus require careful management. Furthermore, just as Lehman had pointed out, the Nixon administration was facing a larger historical trend of congressional attempts to restrict the monopoly of the executive branch over US foreign policy.38 In fact, many members of Congress had grown increasingly concerned about what the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. came to describe as the “imperial presidency”: under Nixon, the presidency had gone out of control, not least in foreign policy.39 However, precisely the fact that Congress was trying to change the historically grown supremacy of the executive branch regarding US foreign policy gave Nixon and Kissinger reason to believe in the manageability of the problem. During Nixon’s first term, means to guard the administration’s grip on foreign policy had proved to be quite effective. For instance, invoking executive privilege, Nixon had refused in March 1972 to provide a House Government Operations subcommittee with documents on US aid programs in Cambodia. Kissinger also cited executive privilege several times in refusing to appear before congressional committees.40 Furthermore, some of Nixon and Kissinger’s critics expressed strong doubts that it would be wise to considerably restrict the president’s war powers.41

60

CHAPTER 3

Most important, whatever congressional trends and initiatives Nixon and Kissinger were facing, the ultimate weapon for the implementation of their Indochina policy remained Nixon’s veto power. During his first term as president, Nixon had demonstrated that he was perfectly willing to use the veto to enforce his approach to Vietnam.42 In February and March 1973, as Nixon and Kissinger’s analysts of domestic politics saw congressional opposition to aid and war powers mounting, they advised employing the veto as a powerful threat.43 The president and Kissinger had reason to believe in the effectiveness of this measure: in January 1973, they could count on enough support to sustain Nixon’s vetoes of Vietnam-related legislation.44 Mansfield had acknowledged this fact. “We can pass resolutions, but we can’t end the war,” he admitted. “It’s really up to the President; we shouldn’t fool ourselves in that respect. We can cut off funds. Whether or not a majority . . . of the Congress would do it, I don’t know. If they did, it would be overturned, vetoed and that veto probably could not be overridden.”45 Throughout the first months of 1973, there were no clear indications that this situation was changing. Public opinion and media reporting somewhat paralleled the situation in Congress. The election victory of 1972, the conclusion of the Paris Agreement, quiet campuses, and high approval ratings all served as sources of optimism for Nixon and Kissinger and encouraged them to carry out their Indochina policy. In late 1972 and early 1973, there were indeed some signs that Nixon would be able to handle public opinion on the Vietnam War. A Harris poll in December 1972 showed that 59 percent approved of Nixon’s handling of the war. Moreover, 63 percent believed that Nixon was doing everything possible to end the war, and a majority thought that he should not sign an agreement that was disadvantageous to South Vietnam.46 Polls also showed that a slight majority supported the Christmas bombings.47 More important, according to a Gallup poll taken in December, 46 percent opposed a cutoff of funds for the war should no agreement be signed during the next two months (43 percent were in favor of the cutoff).48 However, on closer inspection, it was clear that the majority of Americans did not support an ongoing role in Indochina. In a poll taken in December, 60 percent expressed the view that it had been a mistake to send troops to Vietnam.49 Gallup polls in January 1973 showed that 80 percent were satisfied with the Paris Agreement, 58 percent believed that it was indeed a “peace with honor,” and 31 percent thought that the United States and South Vietnam had got the better deal, as opposed to 17 percent who believed that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) had gained favorable terms and 52 percent who expressed no opinion.50 However, polls in January also showed that although 41 percent believed that the peace would not last (as opposed to 35 percent who believed that it would) and 70 percent expected continuing North Vietnamese attempts to

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

61

conquer the South, 71 percent were against renewed bombings of the North, and 79 percent rejected the reintroduction of ground forces.51 The overall message was clear: the American public was simply fed up with Vietnam, no matter what would happen to the South.52 Meanwhile, leading newspapers continued to give broad coverage of antiwar sentiments in Congress and worried about the effects of Vietnam.53 According to the journalist James Reston, who analyzed the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in the New York Times, Vietnam had brought a decisive challenge to authority in the United States. Mentioning, among other things, the testimony of the Watergate burglars, Reston observed that there was “a kind of spiritual malaise” in the United States as a result of the Vietnam era. Although Reston concluded that “it may be that the destruction of many popular misconceptions in Vietnam will produce a more mature, if sadder, nation,” he questioned whether Nixon had really learned the lessons of Vietnam.54 To be sure, just as with Congress, public opinion provided a major reason for Nixon and Kissinger to wind down the engagement in Indochina and to conclude the Paris Agreement. During Nixon’s first term, however, the president and Kissinger had proved themselves able manipulators of public opinion.55 Drawing on this experience, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that they would be able to quietly pursue the equilibrium strategy by keeping Vietnam out of the limelight and, more or less, silently maintaining their deterrence and aid measures. High approval ratings for Nixon that resulted from the well-accentuated return of the POWs in March showed that, at least temporarily, they could stir public opinion in their favor on the issue of Vietnam. At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger knew that public opinion and Congress would continue to constitute a major threat to their Indochina policy. Consequently, the insurance policy was crafted with close attention to the domestic front. In sum, during the first months of 1973, public opinion and congressional antiwar initiatives seemed challenging but manageable to Nixon and Kissinger. Without a major crisis, the president and his national security adviser seemed able to keep their grip on Indochina.

Watergate and Developments in April During the summer and fall of 1972, the first bits of evidence surfaced that the break-ins at the Watergate hotel and office complex in Washington, D.C., in June had involved higher-ups in the Nixon administration. Most important during this phase, investigative reporting, spearheaded by the Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, established the link between Nixon’s Committee for the Re-election of the President (CREEP) and the break-ins. In October, an

62

CHAPTER 3

FBI investigation found that the burglary was linked to a massive campaign of spying and sabotage conducted on behalf of CREEP.56 However, when Nixon and his aides began implementing their cover-up, it seemed that the Watergate affair was well under control. Portraying the line of criminality as being cut off at a low level, Nixon’s aides successfully shielded the president. Although the public was somewhat aware of Watergate by the fall of 1972, it did not link the incident to the president. Watergate played no role in the election, and Nixon’s landslide victory seemingly pushed it out of the public’s mind.57 Although Judge John Sirica, who presided over the case, suspected the White House’s involvement in the plot, the cover-up did not start unraveling until the end of February 1973. For the moment, Kissinger still had reason to joke about Watergate.58 By the end of March, though, several revelations had turned Watergate into a major story that focused attention on Nixon’s close aides. Nixon’s wavering in response to North Vietnamese cease-fire violations highlighted his growing concern. Although the crisis had begun shaking up the implementation of the Indochina policy, the question still remained how decisive and lasting this shake-up would be. Much depended on Congress’s response to Watergate and how it would affect the passage of antiwar legislation. In early April, despite his increasing apprehension regarding the effects of Watergate on Nixon’s decision-making abilities, Kissinger continued trying to advocate the implementation of the equilibrium strategy. On April 2, the day Thieu commenced his visit to the United States, Kissinger again outlined possible military and diplomatic responses to the ongoing North Vietnamese infiltration. Nixon, who was busy planning countermoves on Watergate with Haldeman and Ehrlichman in San Clemente, merely put a check mark on Kissinger’s memo but did not engage further in the Indochina issue.59 When Kissinger and Nixon discussed the Byrd amendment, which prohibited the administration from giving aid to North Vietnam unless Congress specifically authorized it, Kissinger showed sensitiveness toward Nixon’s impulse not to confront Congress and recommended not taking up the issue. However, Kissinger stated, “That pushes us more into the military side.”60 Although Kissinger agreed with Nixon that this would be “much more” difficult to implement than the aid carrot and was refraining from pushing the president on the matter of bombings, he had not entirely given up promoting deterrence measures.61 In the second week of April, Alexander Haig, who had become vice chief of staff of the army, was sent on a fact-finding mission to Indochina, specifically to assess the deteriorating situation in Cambodia. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese were playing for time and stalled fixing a meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho in Paris to discuss the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Kissinger’s instructions to Haig mirrored the combination of his attempts to salvage the deterrence aspect of the Indochina strategy and his growing pessimism. Some-

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

63

what trying to temper the hawkish Haig, but overall sympathetic to the general’s approach, Kissinger cabled, “We certainly want you to convey the impression of firmness and resolve, but we all must be aware that the possibility exists that we may, in fact, be unable to deliver.” 62 Although, as a result of his trip, Haig was slightly more optimistic about the short-term survivability of the Lon Nol government, he worried greatly about the long-term outlook in Cambodia.63 Haig’s analysis of Cambodia highlighted the twofold approach that Nixon and Kissinger were following in that theater. On the one hand, they hoped to prop up the Lon Nol government against communist pressure. Haig’s call for the immediate replacement of the allegedly soft and less-than-able ambassador, Emory Swank, with a “dynamic, can-do, new ambassador” underlined that point.64 On the other hand, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig did not care about Lon Nol for his own sake. To the contrary, as Haig’s reporting showed, they were considering the possible removal of Lon Nol and his brother Lon Non or finding some sort of deal with the Chinese, thus preferably “squeezing Hanoi out of the Cambodian situation” while also decreasing Lon Nol’s influence.65 Haig’s reporting to Kissinger also showed that he and Kissinger were well aware of two conflicting analyses of the nature of the Cambodian insurgency within the intelligence community. According to Haig, the CIA favored an interpretation that stressed the indigenous character of the insurgency and concluded that Lon Nol would be unable to survive in the long run. The other interpretation, put forth mainly by military intelligence, suggested that the insurgency was dominated by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong elements.66 Not quite resolving this issue in his analyses, Haig reinforced Kissinger’s view that strong military action was needed to deter the DRV regardless of domestic repercussions (thereby implicitly stating that North Vietnamese forces played the crucial role in all of Indochina).67 At the same time, Haig sought to ease Kissinger’s mind. “I recognize that the typical heavy Haig hand concerning future actions may have generated some concern at your end. I do not believe I have committed us to any specific course of action.”68 In a highly illuminating report about his general insights on the Indochina situation, Haig pointedly summarized the linchpins of and assumptions behind the Indochina policy that Nixon and Kissinger were pursuing in the months after the signing of the Paris Agreement. According to Haig, the situation in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam was eroding because of North Vietnamese cease-fire violations. As a result, US credibility worldwide was in serious danger of eroding as well, which would jeopardize US relations with the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Haig concluded, “In sum, current events in Southeast Asia offer the ominous prospect of precipitously upsetting the finely balanced juxtaposition of regional forces which were conceived as a prerequisite to our accepting the terms of the January settlement.” 69

64

CHAPTER 3

Outlining possible responses, Haig summarized in the clearest terms the meaning of the equilibrium strategy and its relation to the insurance policy. He pointed out, “A strong case can be made that the essential minimum objective of current US policy in Southeast Asia involves the near term survival of the GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam, i.e., South Vietnam] for a period which would permit the dynamics of the situation in Asia to decouple the outcome of events in South Vietnam from US worldwide credibility.”70 Haig’s comments underlined that the concept of the decent-interval theory—postponing the fall of South Vietnam— continued to be a central part of Vietnam-related considerations, albeit in terms of a minimum objective (or part of the insurance policy). As his mention of the perceived regional balance in January showed, the equilibrium strategy—upholding South Vietnam by fostering a long-term balance in Indochina— could be understood as a maximum goal. In mid-April, as the situation in Indochina threatened to deteriorate further, Haig consequently focused on the minimum, insurance-policy objectives. Elaborating on US-USSR-PRC relations and the need to preserve US credibility by preventing a short-term North Vietnamese victory, Haig concluded, “In the longer term, it is this relationship [Washington-Moscow-Beijing], the dynamics of which offer every hope of decoupling the outcome in South Vietnam from the viability of US worldwide relevance and credibility, that must have time to flourish.”71 This idea precisely described Nixon and Kissinger’s rationale (and the central part of the insurance policy) of countering possible defeat in Indochina with improved great-power relations. As Haig concluded, upholding the Paris Agreement still provided the best justification for implementing the Indochina strategy and maintaining executive flexibility. Haig’s report, coupled with a wavering Nixon, reinforced Kissinger’s pessimism about the long-term prospects for Cambodia and, by implication, all of Indochina.72 Back in Washington, Haig gave a debriefing about his trip, but Nixon continued to postpone the decision to bomb. Instead, another Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) meeting was ordered to discuss the options. Following the WSAG’s recommendation, targets in Laos were struck in response to an NVA offensive; mine-clearing operations were also suspended. Moreover, Nixon decided not to withdraw any air assets, given the situation.73 During those days, Kissinger again forcefully outlined the concept behind the equilibrium strategy, tried to maximize its implementation, and expressed anger at the allegedly lethargic WSAG. Referring to Nixon’s views but at that point actually more reflecting his own desperate stance, Kissinger told Secretary Richardson, “The President feels that the only chance we have got is not to let the other guys calibrate the price that they have to pay at each stage. . . . It is not that we are mad, but it’s just they should have the feeling that when they get hit—that—that there are brutal

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

65

reactions. . . . We also want to do something violent enough so that the Russians and Chinese have a handle to talk to them [the North Vietnamese].”74 Kissinger hoped to be able to persuade Nixon to extend the deterrence measures and prepared to make the case for broadening the strikes in Laos. Echoing Haig’s report, Kissinger reasoned, “Whatever the cost may be, in my judgment it will be far less than the cost which we will have to pay if, because of our inaction now, the Agreement completely fails as a result of major North Vietnamese actions in the coming months.”75 Nixon, however, did not make the hard decision, favored by Haig and Kissinger, to extensively bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail and (possibly) infiltration routes across the Demilitarized Zone.76 Despite Kissinger’s continuous supportive efforts, the equilibrium strategy continued to disintegrate. Confronted with an increasingly unsettling domestic crisis, Nixon did not have the nerve to raise the stakes in Indochina. In mid-April, Leonard Garment, Nixon’s special consultant on domestic affairs, visited Kissinger and briefed him on the Watergate situation. Garment’s revelations corroborated Kissinger’s worst fears and even went beyond them. According to Kissinger, during the conversation with Garment, he realized for the first time that the scandal could “touch the President himself. . . . Watergate could destroy all authority.”77 The same day, speaking to Richardson, Kissinger commented on the Indochina situation, “If we’re ever going to let it deteriorate it’s better if there’s some separation between the agreement and it’s happening immediately afterwards.”78 Clearly, Kissinger’s advocacy of the equilibrium strategy was being overtaken by musings in line with the decent-interval theory. As a result of his conversation with Garment, Kissinger in fact ordered a shift in strategy during the next WSAG meeting. This shift amounted to a sea change in the Indochina policy. Instead of pressing for a prolonged bombing campaign, he suggested to the members of the WSAG to wait for an unambiguous North Vietnamese challenge in the future. When Kissinger realized that it would be impossible under the circumstances to urge Nixon to bomb effectively, he finally gave up on deterrence. The equilibrium strategy was broken.79 During the days after the meeting with Garment, Kissinger tried to get a more complete understanding of the worsening crisis. To discuss recent Watergaterelated developments, Kissinger met with Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Arthur Burns. None of the three men had access to all relevant details or comprehended the full picture, but they all shared a sense of impending disaster. This view was reinforced when Nixon asked Kissinger whether he should fire Haldeman and Ehrlichman.80 Kissinger’s response to these developments was multilayered. He clearly tried to back Nixon up. When he began to suspect the gravity of the situation, he attempted to downplay the matter and forestall a public debate on Watergate. For example, when

66

CHAPTER 3

James Reston wanted to set up an interview and mentioned the Watergate mess, Kissinger replied, “It’s just that the sensitivities are so great that I don’t want to rub salt in.”81 At the same time, Kissinger made it clear that he saw the public accusations against Nixon as irresponsible and linked to previous attacks on the presidency.82 During this period, Kissinger became increasingly aware that he, not the president, was effectively running foreign policy. Because Nixon was more and more preoccupied with Watergate, he simply requested brief updates from Kissinger on foreign policy.83 Although Kissinger complained that he could not get a meeting with the president and that Nixon needed to refocus on foreign policy, especially on Indochina, he readily accepted his increased authority.84 Other members of the administration took notice. Urging Kissinger to make foreign policy decisions (this time on Latin America), Shultz remarked, “I’m look [sic] to you as the proxy president more or less. I don’t really see how we can get to the President so he can decide it.”85 Despite his apparent leadership role in the field, Kissinger tried to give Nixon public credit for running a successful foreign policy.86 Moreover, Kissinger understood full well that this was not the time to confront the public with any major foreign policy crisis. As a result, he tried to keep Indochina a low-key issue.87 Additionally, Kissinger began complaining vehemently about the public’s focus on Watergate and expressed his concern about its effects on the US political system.88 But contrary to his analysis and shift in strategy, he denied that the scandal was having any direct impact on foreign policy yet. After giving a speech on the Year of Europe at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York, Kissinger complained to journalists that they were wrongly portraying his speech as having been on Watergate. Clearly, the national security adviser was trying to divert attention from Watergate (and Vietnam) and get the United States “back on track.”89 Behind the scenes, Kissinger did not display the calm he was trying to convey to the public. Although he partly tried to shield Nixon against pressing foreign policy matters and continued to flatter him on his (lack of) decision making, Kissinger could not help sounding alarmed when he briefed the president on the Indochina situation. Expressing his growing concern about the effects of Watergate, Kissinger told Nixon, “Mr. President, if we didn’t have this god damn domestic situation, a week of bombing would put them . . . this Agreement in force.” “Yeah. Well, we’ll still do it,” Nixon replied.90 But when the discussion turned quickly to the domestic situation, it became clear once again that Nixon saw himself in no position to carry out the controversial bombings.91 During the second half of April, Kissinger discussed the situation further with Garment and Haig. By then, he fully concurred with Garment’s view that “there may not be the possibility of keeping the President out of it [Watergate].”92 Wor-

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

67

ried as they were, Garment and Kissinger agreed that somehow the president had to be saved. As Kissinger remarked, “If this goes much further we won’t have a foreign policy left.”93 Talking to Haig, Kissinger reiterated his analysis of how the domestic situation affected the Indochina policy. “My problem is I don’t see how we can get anything done in this climate. I mean supposing we start bombing. This will crystallize all the Congressional opposition.” Haig agreed. “They [Congress] have now shifted from pragmatism to principle, so that they screw the President on this Water Gate [sic] thing.”94 In April, Kissinger’s assessment of the congressional challenges regarding the conduct of US foreign policy was mixed. There were indications that he and Nixon could still count on the president’s veto power as the ultimate trump in dealing with Congress. However, it also became obvious that the existing crisis between the legislative and executive branches was gaining new momentum as the coverup of Watergate continued to unravel. Not only was Nixon wavering on foreign policy decisions, but critics of the administration in Congress were also on the rise. The journalist Hank Trewhitt analyzed the effects of Watergate in a conversation with Kissinger. “The evidence on the Hill so far means that on substantive issues, such as vetos [sic] and so forth, it’s held firm,” Trewhitt confided. “I don’t know how that will be sustained.”95 Kissinger knew that congressional challenges would inevitably be directed at his and Nixon’s Indochina policy.96 Kissinger’s assessment was correct. In mid-April, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) began hearings on a war-powers bill sponsored by Senator Jacob Javits. The ongoing bombing campaign in Cambodia constituted the immediate backdrop of the debate. A report released at the end of April by Richard M. Moose and James Lowenstein, investigators for the SFRC, concluded that air strikes in Cambodia were coordinated from within the US embassy and gave additional fuel to the debate.97 Although the critics of Nixon and Kissinger in Congress still hesitated somewhat and continued to doubt that they could really prevent the administration from carry ing out its foreign policy maneuvers, they sensed that Watergate was giving them a unique opportunity to attack. For example, Senator William Fulbright, appearing on the CBS program Face the Nation, noted that the Watergate burglary had enabled Congress to act against executive infringements on its powers. As the cover-up unraveled, Congress set out to put the cuffs on Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy.98 The only chance Kissinger saw to contain the rising congressional challenge was to radically overhaul the administration. Although he refrained from overtly criticizing Haldeman and Ehrlichman with the president, Kissinger agreed with Joseph Alsop that “most of the people involved are perfect s——s.”99 In his conversations with Leonard Garment, Kissinger made it unequivocally clear that he agreed with Garment that radical surgery was required. Musing about Nixon’s

68

CHAPTER 3

options, Kissinger recommended “blood and total dissociation. A frontal attack on these guys saying I was betrayed by my closest friends. It was a horrible tragedy.”100 Kissinger worried that Nixon’s domestic advisers would refuse to take the blame on Watergate and would implicate the president in the cover-up.101 However, he expressed some hope that decisive action could prevent the worst. As Kissinger told Garment, “I think once this orgy is over, I think we may come out all right.”102 At the end of April, Kissinger did not know what Nixon planned on doing to counter the Watergate crisis until the president called his national security adviser to inform him that Haldeman and Ehrlichman would resign. According to Kissinger, Nixon was “nearly incoherent with grief” and said that “he needed me more than ever.”103 The next day, in what the New York Times called “an emotional appeal to save the integrity of the Presidency,” Nixon announced to the nation the resignation of his key aides, as well as the firing of White House Counsel John Dean.104 By then it was plain for everyone to see that Watergate had shaken the very foundation of the Nixon administration.

The Run-up to the Indochina Cutoff In the weeks after Haldeman and Ehrlichman’s resignations, the Watergate scandal grew despite Nixon’s attempt to contain the problem. At the same time, Nixon told Kissinger that he wanted to refocus on foreign policy and that they would get over the current domestic crisis.105 Kissinger continued to express similar hopes.106 However, things did not get better, and the press continued to sharply criticize the president. Moreover, Republicans in the Senate called for an independent investigation of Watergate, led by a special prosecutor. Meanwhile, additional revelations about the Plumbers’ (Nixon’s secret dirty-tricks unit) activities, specifically in relation to the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychoanalyst’s office, as well as former CIA director Richard Helms’s testimony about Haldeman and Ehrlichman’s request to the agency for cooperation in the coverup, further eroded Nixon’s credibility. The Justice Department’s case against Ellsberg (because he had leaked the Pentagon Papers) was dismissed because of the administration’s illegal activities.107 In a May Gallup poll, 96 percent of those surveyed stated that they had heard about Watergate, and 56 percent believed that Nixon had participated in a cover-up. Although 44 percent approved of the way Nixon was handling his job, 45 percent disapproved.108 In mid-May, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (more popularly known as the Ervin Committee, named for its chairman, Senator Sam Ervin), opened its televised hearings. During the following two months, the hearings would dominate the news and continuously weaken Nix-

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

69

on’s standing. Moreover, Elliot Richardson, by then Nixon’s designated attorney general, appointed Harvard law professor Archibald Cox as an independent special prosecutor in response to the Senate’s request. This posed another threat to Nixon.109 As Haig observed, “The environment here has shifted perceptively in the last couple days to the point where we now seem to be facing an issue of major ideological import. Watergate is in the process of being portrayed as a vast conspiracy by President Nixon and his administration. . . . What we may be seeing is the onset of a carefully orchestrated attack against not only the president but perhaps also against many facets of the entire manner for governing.”110 Meanwhile, Congress moved to pass concrete prohibitive legislation on Indochina. In early May, the Senate Democratic Caucus adopted a resolution that would end all funding for military actions in Cambodia. During the same week, the SFRC voted 13 to 3 to recommend a similar cessation of funds. Shortly after, the House voted 219 to 188 in favor of a supplemental appropriations bill for the Department of Defense that prohibited the use of funds for military activities in all of Indochina. This action marked the first time in six years that the lower chamber had passed an amendment to end the war.111 According to the New York Times, “The Watergate scandal appeared to contribute to the outcome, since the Administration had evident difficulty holding in line some Republicans and Democrats who have normally supported the President on his war policies.”112 Dismayed at the result, House Republican leader Gerald Ford remarked, “I have lost before and I will probably lose in the future. But I can’t help saying that this is a very, very sad day in the House of Representatives. The House which had a track record of strength and firmness, is now cringing and crumbling.”113 What made matters worse for Nixon and Kissinger was the apparent likelihood that the more dovish Senate would support the House’s initiative. As the Times further observed, “This would set the stage for a constitutional confrontation between the White House and Congress over the President’s war powers.”114 In fact, Senators Frank Church and Clifford Case sensed that the moment was right and proposed similar cutoff legislation in the Senate. Talking to Kissinger, Fulbright emphasized the connection between Watergate and surging opposition to the Indochina policy in Congress. The senator observed that the United States was still engaged in Indochina and remarked, “At some point you just have to sort of cut your losses, and this domestic scene surely ought to be convincing that we need to do it, in our own interest.”115 When Kissinger informed Nixon about his talk with Fulbright, the president noted, “On Southeast Asia, he’d [Fulbright] been this way whatever has happened. . . . You’ll find some more support develop, Henry, as we get along. . . . We’ll just knock their brains out.”116 Despite this apparent optimism and continuing belief in the effectiveness of the president’s veto powers, Nixon and Kissinger knew that Watergate had decisively weakened their

70

CHAPTER 3

standing vis-à-vis Congress. At the end of May, Kissinger’s staff observed on the upcoming continuing resolutions, “At the present time, we probably could not win a showdown vote. It will be necessary to go from week to week and hope that we are in a position to counterattack later in the legislative year.”117 In May, another Watergate-related issue became a primary concern for Kissinger. As further revelations about the 1972 break-in came to light, questions were also being asked to what extent Kissinger himself had been involved in the administration’s controversial activities. Criticism of Kissinger centered on the issue of wiretapping that he had ordered in an attempt to discover leaks in the wake of the secret bombing campaign in Cambodia in 1969.118 Kissinger responded to the accusations by angrily pointing to the fact that he had followed the legal procedures of previous administrations. Nixon concurred with this analysis and observed that covert wire surveillance had occurred with the highest frequency during the Kennedy administration.119 Moreover, Kissinger argued that the wiretapping issue was not related to Watergate. In that context, he even threatened to resign. “If we reach a point where we cannot distinguish the protection of national secrets by however painful methods from Watergate and my usefulness ever comes to an end, fine,” Kissinger remarked.120 As the Watergate issue widened in the spring of 1973, Kissinger made a concerted effort not to get enmeshed in the scandal. He repeatedly denied any knowledge of the Plumbers’ activities and sought to distance himself from Nixon’s domestic advisers.121 Although it may be true that Kissinger was to some extent shocked to learn about the scope and “stupidity” of the Plumbers’ activities, his own style of conducting foreign policy (including spying on subordinates) showed that the measures taken on the domestic front were by no means foreign to his mind-set. Thus, when Kissinger criticized Nixon, as he did in his talks with Garment, it was rather in terms of a bad “marketing strategy” than genuine moral repulsion (even if, as Kissinger suspected, the president had authorized Watergate). At the same time, this criticism again put distance between the national security adviser and any Watergate-related activities.122 In any case, Kissinger repeatedly conveyed the idea that the uncovering of the cover-up and the condemnation of the Nixon administration constituted the real immoral act because they threatened to destabilize the political system and the standing of the United States in the world.123 The question remains whether Kissinger privately knew more or, had he wanted to, could have known more about Watergate than he admitted and consequently could have somehow tried to positively influence Nixon’s decisions on handling Watergate.124 Perhaps the answer lies precisely in the way Kissinger conceived of Watergate: a public relations problem rather than an illegal act. As long as the scandal seemed under control, there was no need to be concerned or question

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

71

the conduct of government. When the cover-up quickly unraveled in the spring of 1973, Kissinger could by that time only try to alleviate Watergate’s reverberations, not prevent reverberations from occurring.

Extending the Insurance Policy In the spring of 1973, with Watergate gaining momentum, Nixon and Kissinger placed increasing emphasis on and hope in great-power diplomacy to contain North Vietnamese ambitions of conquest.125 They were seeking means to compensate for the increasingly less likely possibility of militarily deterring the North. Despite showing some persistent (and somewhat exaggerated) optimism about obtaining concrete results from the Soviets and the Chinese on Indochina, Kissinger was also doubtful that great-power diplomacy would really prove effective.126 Responding to Washington’s requests, the Soviets did give Nixon and Kissinger the impression that they were trying to restrain the Vietnamese communists,127 but they continued to underline the point that they saw the North Vietnamese as tough negotiating partners and that their influence with them was limited.128 In any case, the pressure Nixon and Kissinger were willing to put on Moscow to help on Indochina remained limited. In early May, reporting to Nixon on his trip to the Soviet Union to prepare Brezhnev’s upcoming visit to the United States, Kissinger stated that he had followed Nixon’s instructions and emphasized, “I hit hard on Vietnam peace agreement violations, serious consequences of DRV offensive and obstructionist behavior of Poles and Hungarians [in the International Commission of Control and Supervision]. . . . Relationship of Vietnam situation to Brezhnev trip to US can hardly be lost on Soviets.”129 But this and similar messages to the Soviets on Indochina did not change the basic truth that Nixon and Kissinger were unwilling to seriously endanger détente. The fact that Brezhnev’s visit was not linked to Indochina underlined the point. In addition to the necessity of having an insurance policy on Indochina, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to loosen the tightening noose of Watergate with another round of successful US-Soviet summitry.130 The Soviets, for their part, were fearful of US-PRC rapprochement, hoped for further progress on détente, and were somewhat startled about the magnitude of Watergate.131 As a result, they expressed their support of the Nixon administration and condemned “excessive” press reporting on Watergate. The overall tone of the high-level exchanges between Washington and Moscow in the spring of 1973 remained amicable, leaving the awkward impression that the Soviets were more supportive of Nixon and Kissinger than the American people.132

72

CHAPTER 3

FIGURE 2. President Richard Nixon meets with Henry Kissinger on May 13, 1973, in the Old Executive Office Building in Washington, DC. Getty Images.

Generally speaking, when the developments in April and May essentially eradicated the equilibrium strategy, Kissinger made an intensified effort to implement the insurance policy. Following the basic rationale behind the post–Paris Agreement strategy that Haig had again summarized in April, Kissinger sought to strengthen the means by which the effects on the United States’ standing in the world of an uncertain but increasingly likely North Vietnamese takeover of the South could be attenuated. Kissinger’s more frequent musings and allusions in line with the decent-interval theory (i.e., expressing the hope of having at least more time until the fall of Saigon) were coupled with the ongoing attempt to foster good relations between the great powers. Additionally, Kissinger continued to disassociate Washington from Saigon and to describe the Vietnam issue as an “irritant.”133 The Year of Europe initiative served a similar purpose insofar as it was part of the attempt to “move beyond Vietnam” and achieve foreign policy successes that could counterbalance possible defeat in Indochina.134 Kissinger’s aim was to craft a new Atlantic Charter that would define the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s goals and interests in the context of détente. However, the initiative ultimately proved unsuccessful both at home, with Watergate consuming the public’s

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

73

attention, and abroad, with the United States’ European allies remaining noncommittal about the idea of a new Atlantic Charter. Although Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State William Rogers traveled to Iceland in late May to hold a summit with French president Georges Pompidou and French foreign minister Michel Jobert, no substantial progress was achieved. By the summer of 1973, Kissinger realized that “the Year of Europe had lost its meaning.”135 After his trip to the USSR, Kissinger started another round of negotiations with Le Duc Tho in Paris. Nixon and Kissinger’s goal was to strengthen the Paris Agreement by obtaining an additional pledge by the North Vietnamese to comply with the terms reached in January. In May, while Kissinger was holding the first of a series of meetings with Le Duc Tho, Nixon acknowledged the national security adviser’s negotiating efforts. “Please express to your whole team my deep appreciation for their hard work against great odds,” he instructed Kissinger.136 After another two rounds of meetings in June, the negotiations concluded with the signing of a joint communiqué that included concrete timetables for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Reporting to Nixon, Kissinger stated that the communiqué basically achieved their goals. Highlighting the value of the communiqué on the domestic and great-power fronts, Kissinger concluded, “We have a document which we can use to retake the initiative in our Indochina policy. . . . We and the GVN have only to gain from a document that strengthens our ability to enforce the Agreement.”137 In fact, though, the practical results of the Paris communiqué were quite meager. As the preceding months had demonstrated to Nixon and Kissinger, treaties did not inhibit the North from continuing to encroach on the South. Although the framework of the Paris Agreement remained intact on paper, it could not replace the need for a solid deterrent. The negotiations also highlighted the continuing difficulties Washington had in keeping Saigon in line. Acting in a manner reminiscent of the run-up to the January agreement, Thieu opposed the terms of the communiqué. Although Nixon was unwilling to break openly with Saigon, he and Kissinger used the same kind of pressure they had used with the South Vietnamese before: if Thieu did not acquiesce, Nixon would not be able to justify further support for Saigon domestically.138 As had happened in January, Thieu finally relented. A central aspect of the US-DRV negotiations in May and June was the situation in Laos and Cambodia. On Laos, Kissinger obtained an understanding with the North Vietnamese that set a deadline for a political settlement and formation of a new government by July 1. Subsequently, all foreign troops were to be withdrawn within sixty days. On Cambodia, the more acute problem, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached a rather vague understanding that Washington and Hanoi “will exert their best efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement

74

CHAPTER 3

of the Cambodian problem.”139 Despite Hanoi’s claim that its influence over the Khmer Rouge was limited and concurrence on that point by some US analysts, Kissinger continued to believe that the North Vietnamese were able to deliver on Cambodia.140 In the spring and summer of 1973, he was trying hard to make progress on Cambodia with the North Vietnamese but ultimately knew that Washington would have to accept the best deal it could get. At the same time, Kissinger also made a concerted effort to bring about a settlement with the help of the Chinese. Playing on Chinese fears of a united Indochina under a Soviet-backed Hanoi and a delay in US-Chinese rapprochement, Kissinger sought to enlist Chinese support for ending the war and creating a neutral Cambodia. He informed Beijing that Washington would be willing to stop bombing in Cambodia and withdraw its advisory group. Moreover, the departure of Lon Nol could be arranged under the pretext of receiving medical treatment in the United States. In return, negotiations between the remainder of the Lon Nol faction and the communist side would commence. Meanwhile, synchronously with a separate Kissinger trip to China, the Americans would start talking to Prince Sihanouk in Beijing. If the plan worked out, Sihanouk would then return to Cambodia as the head of a coalition government, becoming the balance between the different factions. In essence, Kissinger envisioned a scheme similar to the one in Laos.141 In May and the first half of June, signs arose that the US and Chinese views on Cambodia were indeed compatible and that the Chinese would be willing to help find a solution. Reporting to Nixon, Kissinger was quite enthusiastic and showed some optimism that a settlement could be reached.142 In a broader view, in the spring and early summer of 1973, Washington’s China policy was not geared solely toward achieving equilibrium in Indochina. Rather, Kissinger tried to broaden US-PRC rapprochement—the formalization of USChinese relations began with the establishment of the liaison offices—and build on Nixon’s great foreign policy success of the opening to China. Although good US-PRC relations constituted a central element of the insurance policy for Indochina, US-Soviet détente was also a central element of the insurance policy. The inherent conflict between the two objectives—the Chinese remained alarmed about the continuance of détente—meant a tightrope walk for Kissinger and ultimately took momentum away from US-PRC rapprochement.143 Moreover, Watergate was overshadowing US-PRC relations in the spring and summer of 1973, just as with the Soviets. Although the Chinese reaction resembled that of Moscow, and Beijing professed that there were more important things to do and worry about than Watergate, Nixon and Kissinger feared that the scandal was undermining the position of strength that they perceived as essential to conducting successful triangular diplomacy.144 At the same time, Watergate rendered improved relations among the great powers even more desirable to Nixon and Kiss-

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

75

inger than they had already been in the context of the insurance policy for Indochina. Hence, despite Chinese reservations and the domestic turmoil that preoccupied Nixon and the American public, it was out of the question to cancel or postpone Brezhnev’s visit to the United States. The US-Soviet summit, held from June 16 to June 24 in Washington, Camp David, and San Clemente, produced multiple treaties on such issues as the peaceful use of nuclear energy and cultural exchanges. Most important, Brezhnev and Nixon signed the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement and discussed arms control and the road map for the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II). However, those results could remove the crucial fears of neither the Soviets (China, the situation in the Middle East, lack of progress on US-USSR trade relations) nor the Americans (Indochina and Nixon’s domestic standing).145 Despite some positive press coverage, Watergate continued to concern the American public. Upon Brezhnev’s departure, Kissinger summarized the problem as he saw it: “It’s a weird situation where, except for these tawdry things [Watergate], we could mark this as the turning point towards peace and away from Vietnam and everything else. Instead we’re jumping back into the mire tomorrow.”146 Clearly, he perceived Watergate as disturbing the implementation of the insurance policy, as well as further weakening Washington’s global standing in the Cold War. Thus, not only had Watergate ushered in the demise of the deterrence component of the Indochina strategy but, from Kissinger’s point of view, also had interfered with effectively countering the increasing likelihood of defeat in Southeast Asia.

The Cutoff By the beginning of June, the congressional situation with regard to Indochina looked as bleak as ever to Nixon and Kissinger. Focusing on Cambodia, Congress continued to prepare antiwar legislation. The White House aide William Timmons reported to Nixon that there were no fewer than five cutoff amendments pending in Congress.147 In response to the tightening noose, Nixon and Kissinger continued to complain vigorously about the lack of support for their Indochina policy. At the same time, Watergate preoccupied much of the thinking of both men. Nixon and Kissinger saw Congress’s rising opposition as reflecting a longstanding malevolence toward the Nixon administration and its foreign policy. The issue was not really Cambodia, Kissinger suspected, but their Vietnam policy during the previous years. In an attempt to discredit Congress’s actions, Kissinger claimed that because the war was over, cutoff legislation was utterly inappropriate.148 Invoking again the idea of “either friend or foe,” Nixon and Kissinger

76

CHAPTER 3

perceived attempts to legislate an end to US involvement in Indochina as a sort of revenge directed at them by traitorous and ungrateful members of Congress. “The real problem is this,” Nixon told Kissinger in the run-up to the Brezhnev visit. “They’re trying to fight over all the things we beat them on. We beat them on China, we beat them on Russia, we beat on the war [sic], and they said that none of those things would work, Henry, and they all worked and now they are dying.” Kissinger concurred. “It has not a thing to do with Watergate,” he complained. “Watergate just enables them to do those things they would have done anyway.”149 In other words, according to Nixon and Kissinger, Watergate was a catalyst but not the cause of Congress’s opposition. Nonetheless, in early June, when they were analyzing the situation, Kissinger again expressed the desire to somehow enforce the Paris Agreement despite the worsening domestic situation.150 To be sure, it was not yet clear that Congress would really be able to pass its antiwar legislation. Nixon, Kissinger, and their aides continued to hope that they could muster enough support to prevent a congressional blockade on Indochina.151 Summarizing his views on the Indochina situation, incoming US ambassador to the Philippines William Sullivan, for example, believed that some sort of equilibrium was still attainable. He concluded, “If we can achieve this balance, Indochina ought at long last to subside into the obscurity it so richly deserves.”152 Moreover, among the administration’s critics in Congress, there was a lingering doubt that they would be able to effectively prevent Nixon and Kissinger from carry ing out their foreign policy.153 However, despite the fact that Nixon and Kissinger at times expressed the hope to get over Watergate, refocus, and build on previous foreign policy successes, there was clearly a growing sense of pessimism. In this context, Kissinger continued to invoke notions of the decent-interval theory.154 Kissinger remained somewhat optimistic that a deal on Cambodia could be worked out with the help of the Chinese, but when he realized that Congress was determined to bring cutoff legislation to a vote, he tried to arrange a compromise. Rather than seeking a direct confrontation, Kissinger declared that he was willing to accept a “gentleman’s agreement” with Congress according to which the administration would stop bombing in Cambodia after two months. In return, Congress would dispense with attaching cutoff legislation to a bill.155 But Congress did not accept the deal. In late June, the House approved the Senate’s bombing cutoff through June 30, the end of the fiscal year. The provision was attached to a supplemental appropriations bill that provided $3.3 billion to keep various federal departments operating. The following day, the House voted 240 to 172 to extend through September 30 the proposed ban on the use of funds for raids in Cambodia. This time, the amendment was attached to a so-called continuing resolution that permitted federal agencies to operate into the new fiscal

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

77

year at a time when the necessary money was not yet approved. The House’s vote constituted the largest vote antiwar legislation had received since the beginning of the Vietnam War. Although the vote fell well short of the two-thirds majority that was needed to override a veto, it underlined a decisive shift in the House, which had previously been more supportive of the administration’s policies.156 As the battle over the cutoff legislation went on in the House, the strong influence of Watergate was again highlighted. When Jack Kemp, Republican representative from New York, proclaimed that “the president has to be credible all over the world,” Representative Wayne L. Hays, Democrat of Ohio, replied in an obvious allusion to the Watergate hearings, “Apparently the gentleman hasn’t been watching television lately.”157 Hays’s comment hit the mark. In late June, John Dean began testifying before the Ervin Committee. During his first testimony, Dean read a 245-page statement over almost seven hours. Describing his role in the cover-up and his dealings with Nixon and his aides, Dean concluded that “the Watergate matter was an inevitable outgrowth of a climate of excessive concern over the political impact of demonstrators, excessive concern over leaks, an insatiable appetite for political intelligence, all coupled with a do-it-yourself White House staff, regardless of the law.”158 Dean also recounted his meeting with Nixon in March in which he had described Watergate as a “cancer growing on the Presidency.” Dean’s testimony continued during the next four days and was framed by Senator Baker’s question: “What did the president know and when did he know it?” Clearly, Dean’s testimony put Nixon’s presidency at stake.159 Kissinger was well aware of this fact. In a conversation with Melvin Laird, who by then had become counselor to the president for domestic affairs, the two men expressed concern over the effects of the hearings on antiwar legislation. As Laird pointed out, “I think that we can probably sustain the veto. I don’t know what we’ll do from then. . . . This is all going to be tied up in the context of Watergate. That’s the problem with this damn thing the way it’s going. You understand that, don’t you, Henry, that we lost votes today because of that damn hearing yesterday.”160 Despite Dean’s highly damaging testimony and the fact that the federal government needed additional funds to continue operating, Nixon vetoed the supplemental appropriations bill. He stated that a total bombing halt would jeopardize the negotiating effort on Cambodia, undermine the Paris Agreement, and threaten US credibility. The same day, the House attempted to override the veto, but it fell 35 votes short of the required two-thirds majority. However, the House and Senate moved quickly to reintroduce the same cutoff legislation as an amendment to funding-related bills. Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield proclaimed that he intended to attach the rider to other bills “again, again and again until the will of the people prevails.”161 Although Nixon’s veto had demonstrated that Laird’s analysis was correct and Congress, at least in the short term,

78

CHAPTER 3

still could not muster the required votes to override the veto, Nixon and Kissinger knew that the president lacked the political capital to engage in a prolonged fight with Congress. Nixon’s approval ratings remained at a mediocre 45 percent (almost down to his all-time low up to that point of 44 percent). If the Brezhnev visit did provide at least a small boost to Nixon’s standing (as was usually the case when US presidents held summits with Soviet leaders), it meant that Nixon’s popularity had been even lower.162 In any case, the trend was not reversed and continued through the following weeks. In fact, as the Gallup organization commented on its data, the decline from Nixon’s high point in late January (68 percent) to his standing in early July (40 percent) constituted the sharpest decline for a six-month period recorded by Gallup since the mid-1930s.163 Under those circumstances, Nixon and Kissinger grudgingly acquiesced to a “compromise” on Indochina. In return for a six-week extension of the bombing campaign in Cambodia, Nixon would accept a cutoff effective on August 15. On June 29, the same day Dean finished his testimony, Ford announced to the House that Nixon would accept the August 15 bombing cutoff and refrain from further vetoes. When several Democratic representatives demanded proof of the statement, Ford made a telephone call to Nixon. When he returned to the floor, he confirmed Nixon’s commitment and added that he was referring to North and South Vietnam, as well as Cambodia and Laos. After Ford had spoken, the House, by voice vote, added North and South Vietnam to the provision, which had up to that point referred to Laos and Cambodia only, and passed the supplemental appropriations measure containing the clause 278 to 124.164 Led by Fulbright, the Senate also accepted the August 15 deadline by a 63 to 26 vote, despite complaints that it would sanction another six weeks of bombings in Cambodia. First, the Senate attached the compromise clause to the continuing appropriations measure by a 73 to 16 vote. Then, it also approved the supplemental appropriations measure by 72 to 14.165 Subsequently, despite Nixon and Kissinger’s strong reservations, the president signed into law the second Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY 1973 and the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY 1974, both to become effective on July 1, 1973. The relevant passage of the second Supplemental Appropriations Act read, “None of the funds herein appropriated under this act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam by United States forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other act may be expended for such purpose.”166 The Continuing Appropriations Resolution contained similar language. Nixon and Kissinger had no illusions about the consequences of the legislation for their Indochina policy. As Kissinger remarked, “It is getting impossible to do anything in Indochina. . . . That finishes us.”167

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

79

The April–June period highlighted three points that were critical for Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy. First, when Kissinger told the South Vietnamese at the time that Washington would have reacted militarily to North Vietnamese cease-fire violations in the spring had it not been for Watergate, he was telling the truth.168 When Watergate began seriously threatening Nixon’s presidency, he and Kissinger saw it as politically impossible to deter the North. Moreover, just as Nixon and Kissinger later maintained, it was Watergate that played the crucial role in the actual passage of antiwar legislation in June. In other words, despite the fact that opposition to Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy, as well as a broader trend in Congress to reassert its foreign policy powers, had long existed, it is unlikely that the cutoffs would have occurred without Watergate.169 Second, unlike Nixon and Kissinger’s portrayal of the incident, Watergate was neither a “petty crime” nor a “Greek tragedy.”170 To the contrary, it was a logical result of Nixon’s governing style. To be sure, previous administrations had also engaged in political espionage and had sought to discredit their opponents. However, as the revelations about Watergate demonstrated, an atmosphere of excessive suspicion and a “with-us-or-against-us” mind-set were distinct characteristics of the Nixon administration.171 Although Kissinger was one of the few people who remained largely untarnished by the scandal, his comments in the spring and summer of 1973 showed that if he criticized Nixon on Watergate, he did so only on tactical matters. His own record of conducting foreign policy in secret, political intrigue, and spying on subordinates underlined that the national security adviser was well matched with the president. Viewed from that angle, the far-reaching consequences of Watergate on Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy were to a large part self-inflicted. Third, generally speaking, the effects of Watergate on Indochina policy constituted just another example of the decisive influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. However, this fact should not lead to the conclusion that Nixon and Kissinger made their foreign policy more or less exclusively dependent on domestic considerations. Rather, as Nixon and Kissinger’s strategies before the Paris Agreement (expansion of the war to Laos and Cambodia, the Christmas bombings) and especially after it (the deterrence idea) highlighted, they tried to implement a potentially unpopular foreign policy they still believed was in the United States’ best interest. Only when Nixon and Kissinger were forced to realize that domestic constraints, as in the case of Watergate, had become too prominent to circumvent did they adjust their foreign policy agenda. No doubt, Nixon (by the nature of his position more so than Kissinger) always remained sensitive to the domestic political front. But as the first half of 1973 demonstrated, it took one of the most significant political scandals in US history to eliminate the option of military reintervention from Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy.

4 GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

By the end of June 1973, it appeared practically certain to most observers that it was only a matter of time until Washington’s allies in Indochina would begin to crumble. Nixon and Kissinger knew that with any meaningful deterrent removed by Congress and the equilibrium strategy in tatters, the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were doomed in the long run. What followed between the summer of 1973 and the summer of 1974 was a period of uneasy limbo. Although fighting between Saigon’s forces and the communists in South Vietnam intensified in late 1973 and early 1974, Hanoi, for the time being, refrained from launching another major offensive to crush the South. In Cambodia, negotiations involving Prince Sihanouk collapsed before they really began, and fighting continued between Lon Nol’s forces and the Khmer Rouge. Slowly but surely, the Khmer Rouge was gaining the upper hand. In Laos, an awkward cease-fire remained in place, but there was little doubt that without the possibility of Washington’s military support, the fate of the country lay in Hanoi’s hands. In November 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act over Nixon’s veto, curtailing the president’s ability to employ US forces abroad and making clear that renewed military intervention in Southeast Asia was out of the question. Commenting on Nixon and Kissinger’s response to the Indochina situation after the summer of 1973, the CIA officer and subsequent author Frank Snepp stated, “A psychology of almost manic indifference—a ‘gone with the wind’ syndrome, one State Department official called it—had replaced the obsession Vietnam once was.”1 Historians later agreed with Snepp that Vietnam ceased to be a major issue for Washington, not least because Kissinger seemingly supported 80

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

81

the view himself. In his account of the Vietnam War, Kissinger wrote, “As for Indochina, I observed it with the melancholy shown toward a terminally ill relative, hoping for a long respite and a miracle cure I was unable to describe.”2 But despite Nixon and Kissinger’s apparent preoccupation with non-Vietnamrelated matters in the 1973–74 period, the notion of a “gone-with-the-wind syndrome” is misleading. Rather, with the equilibrium strategy demolished, Nixon and Kissinger followed through on the insurance-policy aspect of their overall Indochina policy. Letting Vietnam sink into oblivion in the public’s eye, improving great-power relations, and postponing communist victory as long as possible (the concept of the decent-interval theory) were all stratagems that had already been introduced as part of the post–Paris Agreement strategy. By the summer of 1973, Nixon and Kissinger added the stratagem of shifting the blame for the anticipated fall of Saigon to Congress. Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger continued requesting large amounts of aid for Saigon and Phnom Penh. The idea they sought to convey was clear: the Nixon administration had done all it could to prevent a communist takeover of Indochina. US credibility, at least if it was equated with Nixon and Kissinger’s resolve, could be maintained. Potentially, the blame campaign would contradict the approach of playing it low key and shifting attention away from Indochina. But according to Nixon and Kissinger’s reasoning, preserving US credibility demanded both moving on from Vietnam and “setting the record straight.” To be sure, in the 1973–74 period, other trouble spots in the world claimed much of Kissinger’s (and what was left of Nixon’s) attention. In September 1973, the Chilean army, led by Augusto Pinochet, overthrew Salvador Allende’s leftist regime, an event that led to Allende’s death (he probably committed suicide). Although Washington could not be directly tied to the coup, the United States had, according to Kissinger, “created the conditions as great as possible” for the military junta to seize power.3 Two months later, in October, the Yom Kippur War shattered stability in the Middle East and nearly led to a confrontation between Washington and Moscow. In the aftermath of the war, Kissinger, in his new role as secretary of state, engaged in time- and energy-consuming shuttle diplomacy to facilitate the cessation of hostilities.4 Moreover, in response to the Yom Kippur War and Nixon’s support of Israel, Arab oil-producing countries simultaneously cut production and imposed an embargo on the United States that quickly raised the price of oil by 70 percent. The Arab measures caused the 1973 energy crisis, which strained transatlantic relations and added to the problems of an already unstable South Vietnamese economy.5 Watergate continued to loom large. Nixon remained preoccupied by the scandal; Kissinger was largely in charge of dealing with foreign policy, including Indochina. Most Watergate-related events during the period centered on

82

CHAPTER 4

the president’s refusal to hand over recordings of White House conversations, which promised to reveal the truth about Nixon’s involvement in the scandal, to the Watergate special prosecutor.6 Having lost all support from the public and even his own party, Nixon, who by then was facing impeachment, resigned on August 8, 1974.

The Postcutoff Situation Despite Kissinger’s public claims to the contrary and his continual attempts to reassure the president, he knew that because of Watergate and the related cutoffs in Southeast Asia, US foreign policy was not in good shape. As he explained to members of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in early August 1973, Watergate was a disaster that made everything harder. Somehow, Kissinger went on, the situation was still manageable (for example, in dealing with the USSR), but he concluded that “sometime someone will make a run at us.”7 In other words, although Washington’s credibility abroad was not yet entirely eroded, the United States sooner or later would be tested. As for the effects of the post–August 15 bombing cutoffs in Indochina, Kissinger had no illusions about the consequences. Meeting with his National Security Council (NSC) deputies in early August, Kissinger remarked, “The worst mistake I’ve made in four years is Cambodia. . . . We aren’t going to get anything out of Cambodia. We could have dropped nuclear bombs and it couldn’t have been any worse. . . . We are in the hands of the gods.”8 As Kissinger had made clear before, the real issue with Cambodia was the effects on South Vietnam. With the threat of US air operations removed, Hanoi could hardly be deterred in the long run. As in the first half of 1973, Kissinger may have seen somewhat more clearly than Nixon that the congressional ban on US military operations in Indochina constituted an irrevocable turning point. However, the fact that the prospects for Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam’s survivability as noncommunist countries were greatly diminished by the events on the domestic front was hardly lost on the president.9 Like Kissinger, Nixon regretted the passage of antiwar legislation. “This Cambodia thing is really, really shocking then,” he told Kissinger. “That was one where I must say we just got schnookered there, where Laird and Ford, of all people, you know, Laird misled me.”10 Kissinger reinforced Nixon’s claim that he had unintentionally made a mistake in allowing the passage of cutoff legislation and added, “But it was the John Dean week, Mr. President, and you wouldn’t have won it anyway.”11 Discussing the situation in Indochina in light of the bombing cutoff, both Nixon and Kissinger remained somewhat belligerent. They used the same kind

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

83

of tough language, reinforced each other on the idea that Washington should continue to deter North Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge, and fulminated against a pullout, just as they had done during the preceding months. “Well, we could still continue bombing. We’d probably even win,” Kissinger commented on the situation in Cambodia.12 Despite the congressional restrictions, some uncertainty and hope lingered. Nixon especially expressed the view that “the chances of the Khmers going in and cutting them up and so forth and then their collapsing are considerable. But let me say this. That isn’t going to mean the fall of South Vietnam. . . . We can’t get discouraged about any of those things.”13 However, in sum, there was a clear shift in Nixon and Kissinger’s comments toward assessing the situation along the lines of the decent-interval theory. Kissinger in particular reiterated his pessimistic reading of what lay ahead in Indochina. “I must tell you honestly I didn’t think it [the situation in Vietnam/Indochina] could hold beyond 1974,” he commented.14 Clearly, as much as they hated to admit it, Nixon and Kissinger’s hopes were focused on achieving their minimum goal in Indochina: delaying and counterbalancing the anticipated fall of South Vietnam. To make the best of the situation and achieve their minimum objectives, Kissinger and his NSC staff laid out plans for post–August 15 measures that could still be taken in Indochina. Together with the State and Defense departments, lengthy studies of the legal implications of the inhibitive legislation were prepared.15 In the process, Kissinger and his staff proved again to be the most hawkish. The national security adviser and his aides repeatedly accused the State Department and the Pentagon of being unimaginative in finding loopholes in the bills and of wanting to retreat.16 Opposing Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s plans, Kissinger urged Nixon not to withdraw any B-52 bombers from Southeast Asia since “further reductions now or in the immediate aftermath of the bombing cutoff would indicate American helplessness as a result of the congressional action and eliminate any doubt as to whether we would request bombing authority at a later time in Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, or North Vietnam.”17 Nixon agreed with Kissinger, who basically attempted to continue deterring the North Vietnamese by drawing on the reputation for tough and unpredictable action that he and Nixon had built up during the preceding years. However, deterrence had clearly become a bluff. To some degree, this bluff was working with the North Vietnamese in the 1973–74 period. Although the communist leaders in Hanoi watched the domestic situation in the United States closely, some uncertainty remained whether the Nixon administration would find a way around the congressional ban and reintroduce US airpower in case of a major offensive.18 Still, the situation was wobbly: Nixon and Kissinger knew that it was highly unlikely, if not impossible, that Congress would renew their bombing authority in Southeast Asia. Although the president and Kissinger sought to make

84

CHAPTER 4

it clear that they had done all they could in Indochina, Kissinger in fact advised against requesting new authority for air strikes from Congress. As he explained to Nixon, “The danger, Mr. President, if you ask for an extension and then get voted down, then the signal is even stronger.”19 Air operations in Cambodia and Laos that the Nixon administration concluded were still permissible under law were limited to unarmed and unescorted flights. Airlifts to Lon Nol’s forces, for example, were permitted only if the troops were in no direct contact with the enemy. Moreover, just as the deterrent of US airpower was practically an empty threat, the carrot of reconstruction aid to North Vietnam was a sham. In the fall of 1973, Kissinger continued trying to bait Le Duc Tho with the prospect of US aid, but as Kissinger’s counselor for economic affairs, Charles A. Cooper, aptly summarized, “The real problem is that we are proffering an imaginary carrot: Congress could reveal this fact if they take a premature interest in this issue.”20 Consequently, with carrots and sticks removed, Washington’s focus lay on attempting to provide adequate aid to its allies in Indochina as the only remaining means to influence the course of events. As for the domestic front, Nixon and Kissinger’s reading was by no means too pessimistic. Throughout the summer and fall of 1973, Watergate continued to diminish the president’s standing. Moreover, Congress passed further restrictive legislation and moved to slash funds for Indochina, making it crystal clear that it did not intend to change its approach to Vietnam. In late August, in the midst of the domestic turmoil, Nixon announced Kissinger’s nomination as secretary of state. The appointment was largely due to Watergate: with the loss of his close aides Haldeman and Ehrlichman and his public standing continuously declining, Nixon hoped to shore up support by putting the successful and respected Kissinger in charge of the State Department.21 Kissinger’s nomination as secretary of state, a position he would hold while also remaining national security adviser (making him the only person ever to have done so) underlined what had increasingly become apparent during the preceding months, not least in the context of Indochina: despite Nixon’s personal interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs, Kissinger was effectively running US foreign policy. During the two-week confirmation hearing in September, the issue of wiretappings during Nixon’s first term in office came up again. Kissinger stuck to his earlier explanation that he had somewhat participated in but had not orchestrated the wiretappings.22 Although Kissinger finally was confirmed by an impressive 78–7 vote in the Senate, the issue showed that Watergate-related matters continued to frame Congress’s dealings with the executive branch. Fearing that he still might get caught in the Watergate quagmire, Kissinger continued to disassociate himself from Nixon’s domestic maneuvers, even portraying himself as a possible victim of the Plumbers.23 However, Kissinger readily accepted increased respon-

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

85

sibility and public exposure as secretary of state and fully understood the mandate as being related to his helping the beleaguered president.24 As a result, Kissinger paid much attention to manipulating Congress (despite his public calls for improving relations between the executive and legislative branches) and timing foreign policy to domestic events, in addition to institutionalizing his actual foreign policy concepts.25 Nixon surely was in need of help. In mid-July, Alexander Butterfield, Haldeman’s deputy from January 1969 to March 1973, stated that Nixon had had a taping system installed in the Oval Office in order to secure material for his memoirs. This revelation constituted the most important piece of information that the Ervin Committee received during its investigation because the recordings promised to tell the truth about the charges against the president. In the following twelve months, the committee and the special prosecutor focused on compelling the president to hand over the tapes. Nixon might have survived any subsequent attempts at impeachment had he destroyed the tapes, underlined the principle of presidential confidentiality, and simply ignored any measures Congress and the courts wished to undertake, but he decided against such action. To the contrary, upon review, Nixon concluded that the tapes actually proved that Dean’s charges against him were wrong. Moreover, Nixon believed that the courts would uphold the concept of executive privilege, under which he could withhold information, and that the destruction of the tapes would amount to a confession of guilt.26 In October 1973, the domestic crisis came to another climax. Between August and early October, revelations about Vice President Spiro Agnew’s misconduct involving bribery, extortion, and tax evasion dominated the news, adding to Nixon’s domestic problems and further eroding public confidence in the president. In mid-October, after Agnew had finally resigned, Nixon nominated the Republican leader of the House of Representatives, Gerald Ford, for the office. Nixon was convinced that Ford was no real leader, especially when it came to foreign policy. Kissinger agreed. “Gerry Ford, fond as I am of him, just doesn’t have it,” he told the president.27 However, Nixon may well have speculated that precisely because of Ford’s relatively low profile and inexperience in foreign policy, Congress would hesitate to impeach the president.28 In any case, the tapes, not the vice presidential issue, constituted the real threat to Nixon. In late October, in what the Washington Post described as “the most traumatic government upheaval of the Watergate crisis,” which quickly came to be known as the Saturday Night Massacre, Nixon ordered the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, who refused to relent on demanding the release of the tapes.29 Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his deputy refused to carry out Nixon’s orders and resigned. The announcement by Nixon’s press secretary, Ron

86

CHAPTER 4

Ziegler, of the resignations, the eventual firing of Cox, and the abolishment by Nixon of the office of the special prosecutor caused a storm of public and congressional protest. As a result, Nixon was forced to retreat, accepted the appointment of a new special prosecutor, and promised to turn over the tapes. However, the president let it be known that some of the subpoenaed tapes did not exist. In spite of that latest ploy, the events in October made it clear that Nixon would not be able to maneuver indefinitely, not least because he was increasingly losing critical support from Republican newspapers and members of Congress.30 In his conversations with the president, Kissinger supported Nixon’s moves,31 but in speaking to journalists, he continued to distance himself from the president’s Watergate-related decisions.32 In sum, events in the fall of 1973 made it clear that the optimism to overcome Watergate that Nixon and Kissinger repeatedly showed was misplaced. The scandal was well into its final stages. In November, Congress dealt another blow to Nixon and Kissinger. After the passage of the bombing cutoffs for Indochina at the end of June, Congress moved to pass further legislation that would restrict the president’s war-making abilities on a more general level. In the summer and fall, the House and Senate passed versions of legislation proposed by Senator Jacob Javits, the so-called war-powers bill. Under the terms of the legislation, the president would be required to report to Congress any commitment of military forces abroad within forty-eight hours. Moreover, the president would have to stop employing US forces after sixty days (with a possible extension of thirty days) unless Congress authorized a continuation.33 Nixon, who vehemently opposed the measure, vetoed the bill. He and Kissinger argued that the legislation would put US national security interests at risk and was, in fact, unconstitutional.34 However, not only did the war-powers legislation find support among conservatives, most notably Senator John Stennis, but also Watergate again showed its hand.35 When he vetoed the bill, Nixon was facing the severe fallout from the Saturday Night Massacre, which had taken place just days before. In that context, Congress was in no mood to support the president.36 Liberal members of Congress saw a welcome opportunity to deal another severe blow to Nixon by exploiting the symbolic value of an overridden veto. This prospect outweighed doubts among Nixon’s critics that the bill would be not restrictive enough.37 In early November, Congress mustered the needed two-thirds majorities and overrode the veto. Again, Watergate had provided the critical momentum for the passage of antiwar legislation. During this time and afterward, the debate over the War Powers Act persisted. According to some liberals, the law was ineffective and even granted the president too much explicit war-making power. In fact, there was no instance in the following decades in which Congress successfully used the act and compelled the

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

87

president to withdraw forces. The power of the purse continued to prove much more effective.38 In any case, coupled with the bombing cutoffs at the end of June and the Watergate context, the War Powers Act made it clear that Congress would not permit Nixon and Kissinger to resume military operations in Indochina.39

Going Down Fighting During the second half of 1973, as it became clear that Congress would not reverse its approach to Indochina, Nixon and Kissinger moved to implement their insurance policy. Grudgingly, both men had come to content themselves with achieving their minimum goals in Indochina: postponing the fall of South Vietnam as long as possible and minimizing the negative fallout. This approach required keeping Vietnam out of the public’s eye and further disassociating Washington from its allies (and their anticipated defeat) in Indochina. Kissinger continued to publicly stress the idea that the war in Vietnam had actually (successfully) ended.40 The implications were obvious: the United States had fulfilled its basic obligations and could focus on more important things; the South Vietnamese had to figure out the rest on their own. In August, for example, elaborating on his anticipated trip to Beijing, Kissinger sought to downplay the importance of Vietnam-related matters in the bigger picture of great-power relations. Attempting to decouple his talks with the Chinese from Indochina, he told the journalist Hank Trewhitt that “Southeast Asia is not the key to the Sino-US relations.”41In the fall and winter of 1973–74, with the Middle East as the dominant foreign policy issue, Nixon and Kissinger were satisfied that Vietnam had virtually disappeared as a matter of public debate.42 Kissinger also continued to implement the insurance policy for Indochina in dealing with the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite the fact that, theoretically speaking, pressure on Hanoi’s communist allies was one of Nixon and Kissinger’s last sources of influence in Indochina, the president and Kissinger continued to place a higher value on improving relations with the Soviets and the Chinese. In July, after the bombing cutoff, Kissinger discussed Washington’s goals in Cambodia with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Rather than trying to put pressure on the Soviets to influence Hanoi (and thereby the Khmer Rouge), Kissinger invoked the spirit of détente and conveyed the idea that Washington was seeking to disengage from Cambodia.43 In private conversations, Nixon and Kissinger continued to stress the importance of détente, noting that they would keep seeking Soviet support against domestic critics and that détente had enabled them to settle the Vietnam War with honor in the first place.44

88

CHAPTER 4

Nixon and Kissinger placed equal importance on continuing the improvement of relations with China. In July, after the bombing cutoff, exchanges between Washington and Beijing temporarily took a turn for the worse. The Chinese retracted their earlier offer to mediate between Kissinger and Sihanouk in order to find a settlement for Cambodia. When Kissinger analyzed the situation with his NSC aides, his staffers seemed to agree that the Chinese message was purely a response to the bombing cutoff (Sihanouk, the reasoning went, had lost his value since there was no reason left for the Khmer Rouge to enter negotiations, and the fate of Cambodia would now be decided on the battlefield). Kissinger, however, showed great concern that Beijing’s reversal could signify a larger change in China’s policy toward the United States.45 The situation relaxed shortly thereafter when the Chinese let it be known that they still welcomed Kissinger to Beijing, indicating that no general shift in US-PRC relations was intended. In November 1973, Kissinger finally visited China. Subsequently, he told South Vietnamese representatives that “we [Kissinger and the Chinese] talked about the necessity of not settling issues by force. They agreed they would discourage military action by Hanoi. . . . They want to see a peaceful settlement.”46 However, the truth was that in his meetings with Mao and Zhou Enlai, Kissinger hardly discussed Indochina at all. What really mattered was progress on rapprochement. Although US-PRC relations were, in fact, approaching a standstill, Kissinger believed that his trip had underscored good relations with the Chinese.47 Clearly, Kissinger’s handling of the Indochina issue in dealing with the Soviets and the Chinese was a conscious decision. In September 1973, when the NSC staffer William Stearman advised Kissinger’s deputy, Brent Scowcroft, that Washington should approach Moscow and Beijing to put pressure on Hanoi and discourage a major North Vietnamese offensive, Scowcroft noted in handwriting on the memorandum that Kissinger “does not want to bring PRC + USSR in at this stage.”48 Kissinger, with Nixon’s approval, continued to implement the insurance policy for Indochina. With the bombing cutoffs, ongoing revelations about Watergate, and Congress invariably pushing for disengagement, Nixon and Kissinger sought to capitalize on foreign policy successes with the Soviets and the Chinese to take the heat off domestic opposition and counterbalance the anticipated defeat in Indochina. In response to the passage of cutoff legislation at the end of June, Nixon and Kissinger added another central stratagem to the insurance policy. Both men agreed that although it was desirable that Indochina disappear from the headlines, they had to make it unmistakably clear that the likely defeat in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam was Congress’s fault and not theirs. Consequently, in their official statements to Congress, as well as in conversations with journalists, Nixon and

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

89

Kissinger tried to put the blame for defeat in Indochina on Capitol Hill.49 In their later accounts of the endgame in Indochina, they famously stressed the same point.50 The message was clear: Nixon and Kissinger had done all they could to honor the commitment to Washington’s Indochinese allies and prevent a communist takeover of Vietnam. According to the argument, Watergate provided the pretext, but it was Nixon and Kissinger’s critics in Congress who plotted to terminate US involvement in Southeast Asia and finally succeeded in dooming South Vietnam (as well as Laos and Cambodia). In other words, Nixon and Kissinger had been betrayed on the home front. This line of interpretation was carefully planned and implemented by Nixon, Kissinger, and their aides. After the bombing cutoff, Scowcroft advised Kissinger, “Among the issues to be considered [is] the need to put the monkey squarely on Congress.”51 To be sure, the argument reflected Nixon and Kissinger’s genuine anger and frustration at the coming apart of the equilibrium strategy and their losing ground against Congress. However, the argument also served two clear purposes. First, it exonerated Nixon and Kissinger on a personal level. Both men repeatedly showed concern over how they would be seen by historians and future generations. As Nixon put it, “We’ve started a legacy there.”52 The task was to rectify and defend that personal legacy. Second, shifting the blame to Congress took the responsibility off the executive branch. In that respect, the blame stratagem became a definite part of the insurance policy: if the Nixon administration was not the culprit, US credibility—the central issue connected to Indochina— should not be seen as on the decline. The message to allies and opponents was that the nature of the US political system inevitably caused disruptions in foreign policy, as in the case of Indochina. However, Nixon had demonstrated that the executive branch still honored commitments and stood as a guardian angel against communist revolution. While Nixon and Kissinger, in line with the insurance policy, clearly tried to contextualize Vietnam and shift the public’s attention to other foreign policy successes, they also tried to put up a show for the record in order to maintain US credibility. Seen that way, the blame stratagem was related to one of the central reasons behind Nixon and Kissinger’s decision to prolong and expand the Vietnam War from 1969 to 1973. Apart from the objective to “win” the war in Indochina (i.e., guarantee South Vietnam’s independence) and, related to that, to implement the equilibrium approach, the use of force in itself was meant to show resolve and preserve US credibility. In other words, both by expanding the war and by blaming Congress, Nixon and Kissinger sought to demonstrate that the Nixon administration (and, by extension, the United States) had done all it could to prevent communist victory in Indochina. Nixon and Kissinger were both crystal clear on that point. Pondering the situation in Cambodia and the rest of Indochina after

90

CHAPTER 4

the bombing cutoff, Kissinger told Nixon, “I think if we have to go down, the record must show that we did everything.”53 Nixon agreed and, besides plotting with Kissinger on how to put the blame on Congress, instructed him to increase the raids in Cambodia before the bombing halt in mid-August would go into effect. “As long as we’re there lets [sic] don’t go out with a whimper,” he told Kissinger.54 The idea that US credibility could be shielded from defeat in Indochina if Washington demonstrated that it had done everything it could was not new. In fact, this part of the insurance policy demonstrated a certain degree of continuity between Nixon and Kissinger’s approach and that of preceding administrations. At the outset of the war, policymakers of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, such as John T. McNaughton and McGeorge Bundy, had advocated the so-called good-doctor theory, according to which Washington (the doctor) had to show a heroic effort to save South Vietnam (the patient). In this scheme, US credibility could be preserved even if the patient died.55 Nixon and Kissinger’s insurance policy showed that they maintained and implemented the good-doctor concept. As much as they hated the destruction by Congress of the equilibrium strategy, the legislature provided them with a convenient excuse that added a central element to the insurance policy. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger’s considerations in line with the good-doctor theory showed that, in the second half of 1973, they did not alter their approach to Indochina. Rather than exploring different options for an exit strategy (for example, ceasing to support Thieu and Lon Nol and seriously pushing for a negotiated end to hostilities even if it meant communist domination), they followed through with the insurancepolicy part of their Indochina strategy. In short, after the summer of 1973, Nixon and Kissinger were ready to go down with the flags flying.

The War Goes On While Nixon and Kissinger prepared to follow through on their insurance policy, hostilities in Indochina continued. Of the three countries involved, Cambodia constituted the most immediate problem for Washington. A State Department study prepared for Kissinger pointed out that “in the present situation neither side is able to win a decisive victory.”56 A communist offensive on Phnom Penh shortly before the August 15 bombing halt failed, and the government’s troops started to perform somewhat better after the summer of 1973.57 Moreover, the rainy season precluded any major communist offensive for the remainder of 1973. As a result, Kissinger’s pessimistic speculation that Cambodia could fall even in 1973 did not come true.58

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

91

However, as the State Department study correctly concluded, with the termination of US air support, “the situation will be placed in grave doubt.”59 After the August 15 deadline, Lon Nol’s forces were indeed in a dire situation. In addition to the lack of US air support, widespread corruption among Lon Nol’s officers and dependency on superior firepower rather than skilled tactics placed Phnom Penh at a disadvantage against the Khmer Rouge.60 As the fighting intensified in the fall of 1973, Lon Nol’s troops faced another problem: ammunition expenditures increased dramatically, and, again running into congressional opposition, the Nixon administration struggled to provide the necessary funding.61 Moreover, paralleling the situation in South Vietnam, the Cambodian economy lay in tatters. Agricultural and industrial production was constantly declining, the inflation rate was about 250 percent a year, and there were practically no exports. The Phnom Penh government depended totally on US aid.62 The Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, continued to tighten its organization. By the end of 1973, the party was in complete control of the military command, and political commissars gave instructions to officers.63 At the same time, relations between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese were worsening. Analyzing the Cambodia situation in a Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) meeting in early October, Kissinger and the representatives of the various branches of the administration feared that Hanoi could put its forces in to tip the situation in the Khmer Rouge’s favor (a situation in which they saw the possibility of South Vietnam stepping in to assist Lon Nol). However, as the CIA’s George Carver pointed out, “There’s this mutual hatred thing between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese.” 64 During the WSAG meeting, the question was also discussed whether there was still the option of starting a negotiating process that would involve Prince Sihanouk. Although Sihanouk’s position remained somewhat unclear to the WSAG members, they agreed that he did not really have a power base and that the Khmer Rouge would try to force an outcome on the ground.65 In fact, the Khmer Rouge never indicated an interest in negotiating, and whatever chance there might have been to force it into negotiations was thwarted by the August 15 bombing halt. Kissinger, in turn, was willing to seriously consider negotiations only from a position of relative strength.66 He brushed aside the proposal brought forward by Ambassador Emory Swank to drastically reduce support to the Phnom Penh government in order to induce the Chinese and the North Vietnamese to throw their weight behind negotiations. Instead, Swank, whom Nixon and Kissinger both greatly disliked, was recalled, and Deputy Chief of Mission Tom Enders was put in charge of the US embassy in Phnom Penh.67 Moreover, against the advice of the State Department, Kissinger did not attempt seriously to put pressure on

92

CHAPTER 4

China and the USSR on the Cambodia issue.68 This approach was consistent with Nixon and Kissinger’s insurance policy. The reasoning went that if Washington could not force a somewhat favorable outcome in Cambodia, it was better to go down fighting than to acquiesce to communist domination. In neighboring Laos, an unstable equilibrium remained in place. Although fighting almost completely subsided in the summer of 1973, progress on finding real accommodation between Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao was slow. In the summer, Kissinger’s NSC aides worried that Souvanna was in fact showing too much flexibility in the negotiations and advised a tougher position.69 In the meantime, the North Vietnamese kept their military presence in the northern part of the country and upgraded the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Apparently, Hanoi was playing a waiting game, hoping for a favorable change in Cambodia or South Vietnam that would then entail its complete control of Laos. Toward the end of 1973, though, signs arose that a coalition government could be formed, leading some observers to conclude that real accommodation was within reach.70 In South Vietnam, the second half of 1973 brought no progress. In October 1973, Kissinger, along with Le Duc Tho, received the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the Paris Agreement. When Kissinger congratulated Le Duc Tho, he tried to stress the idea that the United States and North Vietnam had ended the war, a task that could and should be completed in the future. Although Nixon was jealous of Kissinger for receiving the honor, the substance of the prize was somewhat ridiculous: Kissinger was well aware that things were not going well and that he had not reached a lasting peace. Talking to Dobrynin, Kissinger acknowledged that fact and cynically stated, “I would say anything that Lee [sic] Duc Tho is eligible for there must be something wrong with it.”71 Indeed, during the summer and fall of 1973, it became clear that the Vietnamese parties would not implement the Paris communiqué that Kissinger had signed with Le Duc Tho in June to reinvigorate the Paris Agreement. Although fighting between Saigon’s and communist forces decreased in the summer, no progress toward reconciliation or a political settlement was made.72 While Thieu stuck to his “four noes” policy, the North Vietnamese continued to infiltrate the South with men and supplies through a sophisticated network. By 1974, paved roads were leading right into the highlands from Laos.73 The International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) continued to be ineffective, and in August Iran replaced Canada, which had pulled out of the truce body in July, citing dissatisfaction with the lack of progress.74 Moreover, throughout the fall of 1973, the ICCS was practically inoperative because the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front (NLF) refused to pay their share of the costs.75

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

93

In late 1973, Thieu officially declared that the “Third Indochina War” had started.76 At the same time, North Vietnam’s leaders in Hanoi passed Resolution 21, which concluded that the prospects for revolution in South Vietnam were promising as never before and endorsed “continuous revolutionary violence” to topple the Thieu regime.77 In November and December, Saigon stepped up its military campaigns against communist forces. Although the North Vietnamese and the NLF fought back, they refrained from launching major operations. A joint intelligence study in December concluded that “the evidence of the past six weeks leads us to conclude that the chances of a major Communist offensive [before the end of May 1974] have diminished, although the odds are still close.”78 Although Hanoi had less and less reason to fear US reintervention, Kissinger’s deterrence bluff was still showing some effects.79 Shortly before Christmas, after written exchanges of accusations and counteraccusations, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho met again in Paris. During their talk, no progress was made, but Kissinger used the opportunity to maintain his bluff.80 If anything, the lengthy discussion showed that despite his preoccupation with the Middle East, Kissinger was not neglecting Vietnam. Rather, he was following a set strategy. With no real bargaining chips left, Kissinger was implementing the insurance policy and trying to postpone the fall of Saigon as long as possible. Meanwhile, the US ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham Martin, was waging a battle of his own. Recognized as a true hawk, Martin had been sent by Nixon and Kissinger to Vietnam in July with the explicit mission to “ensure the survival of the GVN [the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, i.e., South Vietnam].”81 In light of the bombing halt, this mission was somewhat a lost cause. But, focusing in large part on the task of providing South Vietnam with adequate US funding, Martin did all he could to answer Nixon and Kissinger’s call. The strategy he adopted to increase aid to Saigon was a tightrope walk: Martin portrayed Vietnamization as a great success and stressed the imminent chance of South Vietnamese self-reliance. Somewhat overoptimistically, he told Kissinger that “if we remain constant in our support, and determined to carry out the commitments we have made at the highest level, we have every right to confidently expect that the GVN can hold without the necessity of US armed intervention.”82 Kissinger shared Martin’s belief that Washington must provide adequate aid to Saigon, not least to demonstrate that the Nixon administration was doing all it could to support its ally. However, Kissinger knew that no matter how much Martin urged him to make support to South Vietnam his top priority, he was facing a hostile Congress.83 Lobbying for aid, Kissinger argued that aid was, in fact, part of Washington’s disengagement, and he also followed Martin’s line of stressing South Vietnamese progress, although the argument obviously would lead members of Congress to question why, in that case, more aid was needed.84

94

CHAPTER 4

Moreover, Kissinger sought to demonstrate that North Vietnam continued to get aid from China and the USSR to convince Congress that South Vietnam had to receive aid as a counterweight. The problem was that the US intelligence community did not know precisely how much aid North Vietnam was receiving. Despite the fact that China and the USSR did funnel considerable amounts of aid to Hanoi, the CIA director, William Colby, stated that the numbers would not show that more aid was being put into North Vietnam than into the South. Kissinger was not content and instructed Colby, “Go back to the drawing board.”85 In any case, Congress was not convinced. Military assistance alone had been $2.1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1973, but Congress approved only $1.4 billion for FY 1974.86 Moreover, in spite of Martin’s optimism, Kissinger knew that South Vietnam was continuing to face serious problems: the Thieu regime remained corrupt, the economy was performing badly (a fact augmented by the oil crisis that began in late 1973), and the military, whose morale remained shaky, continued to depend on crucial logistical and technical support that was provided by civilian US contractors.87 Even with adequate aid from Washington, the situation looked bleak.

The Yom Kippur War and the Oil Crisis In the fall of 1973, while the conflict in Indochina remained unresolved, another major crisis erupted in the Middle East. On October 6, 1973, the first day of the Israeli Yom Kippur holiday, Egypt and Syria, backed by a coalition of Arab states, launched a surprise attack on Israel in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Although the Egyptian and Syrian forces, which received Soviet military aid, made threatening gains in the first few days of the war, the Israeli Defense Forces, supported by a massive US airlift of supplies, successfully fought back and counterattacked. At the same time, several Arab countries imposed an oil embargo on the United States (and the Netherlands) in response to the US airlift. In late October, the crisis was on the verge of escalating to a global level, with the possibility of Moscow and Washington being drawn further into the conflict. However, the UN Security Council finally passed a cease-fire resolution that the opponents observed, and the crisis eased. After the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger extensively engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Israel and its Arab adversaries. Kissinger’s strategy centered on winning the trust of the Egyptians, convincing the Israelis that they must compromise, and keeping the USSR out of the region. By the early summer of 1974, Kissinger’s diplomacy had produced disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

95

Syria, respectively, a suspension of the oil embargo, the marginalization of the Soviets, and a clear US preeminence as a broker in the region. At least ostensibly, Kissinger had scored a major US and personal foreign policy success.88 Several key aspects of Kissinger’s handling of the Yom Kippur War highlighted links between the Middle East and Indochina crises. To begin with, in the second half of 1973 and 1974, it was the secretary of state and not the president who shaped and implemented the approach to both Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite the fact that Nixon agreed with and signed off on Kissinger’s basic strategy in both cases, he was first and foremost concerned with the fallout from Watergate.89 During the Middle East crisis, this preoccupation led to some tension between Nixon and Kissinger. Although Kissinger was willing to strengthen Nixon’s standing by producing a success in the Middle East, he strongly criticized the president (behind his back) for overselling the crisis in order to seek domestic political advantages. Discussing the Soviet threat of intervention in the Middle East, Kissinger told Alexander Haig, “He [Nixon] made Brezhnev a Khruschev [sic].”90 In essence, Kissinger feared that the maneuver could backfire on the domestic front, as well as threaten US-Soviet relations.91 More generally, just as in Vietnam, Kissinger’s (and Nixon’s) concern over the Middle East centered on US credibility in the Cold War context.92 When the Yom Kippur War broke out, Kissinger’s first call went to Dobrynin. Kissinger wanted to find out to what extent the Soviets were involved in the Arab attack, but he was above all worried about the implications for US-Soviet détente.93 At the same time, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig agreed that, just as in Indochina, Washington had to be tough.94 In fact, Nixon and Kissinger compared their support to Israel with the invasion of Cambodia in 1970.95 In essence, Nixon and Kissinger tried to maintain détente while attempting to minimize the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East.96 According to Nixon and Kissinger, the credibility problem behind the Middle East crisis thus paralleled the one in Vietnam, and Kissinger’s attempt at finding a solution also resembled, at least in part, his and Nixon’s post–Paris Agreement strategy: by engaging in diplomacy (including deterrence), he tried to weave a web of treaties and understandings that would create its own reality and lead to an equilibrium in the Middle East. Nixon explicitly underlined that link regarding the objectives in Indochina and the Middle East and stressed that in both regions Washington was seeking an “uneasy peace.”97As for the strategy for achieving equilibrium, Kissinger explained to Ziegler at the end of October, “Things here are working out . . . well and so complex that if they don’t blow sky high, the chances are two to one that they will work [sic].”98 In short, just as in Indochina, Kissinger saw the complexity of the regional crisis as working to Washington’s advantage.

96

CHAPTER 4

The extensive negotiating process with the different involved parties that Kissinger initiated bore a resemblance to Indochina, too. Kissinger compared the Arabs to the North Vietnamese, while he viewed the Israelis and South Vietnamese as being similarly obnoxious.99 The latter comparison was especially interesting because it showed that Nixon and Kissinger’s willingness to put some pressure on and talk disparagingly of their allies was by no means restricted to Vietnam. More important, as events in the Middle East showed, Kissinger’s diplomacy paid some dividends. Invoking their favorite poker analogy, Kissinger and Nixon agreed, with some justification, that with no cards they were “playing a pretty good game.”100 Eventually, Kissinger succeeded in ending the war, brokering agreements between the Arabs and the Israelis, and reducing Soviet influence. That said, those successes were not untainted: a stable peace in the area remained elusive (especially with the Palestinian problem and the West Bank), and the rise of US unilateralism in the Middle East at the expense of the Soviets was a catalyst for the decline of détente.101 However, the basic fact remained that in the Middle East, thanks to his maneuvering, Kissinger succeeded in creating a regional balance. Oil constituted an additional crucial link between the Middle East and Indochina. When the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries imposed their oil embargo on Washington in response to Nixon’s request to Congress for a $2.2 billion package of military aid to Israel, tensions rose first between Washington and its European allies. While the European countries felt that Washington neglected their concerns over oil (they were far more dependent than the United States on deliveries from the Middle East), Kissinger blamed the Europeans for letting themselves be blackmailed by the Arabs and not actively supporting the US position.102 But, perhaps more important, the increase in oil prices imposed an additional heavy burden on the already tarnished South Vietnamese economy. Although the Arabs did not cut off oil to South Vietnam, as some of Kissinger’s aides feared, the oil bill for Saigon had risen by roughly $125 million by March 1974.103 A sharp rise in inflation worldwide and the decrease of the US cash infusion compounded the problem. The result for South Vietnam was an annual inflation rate of 90 percent, high unemployment rates, further erosion of the military’s morale, and an increase in corruption.104 The most acute problem, though, was that, in light of fuel shortages and the Arab embargoes, Thieu’s ability to counter a possible North Vietnamese large-scale offensive (which, though considered unlikely, could not be ruled out in the 1973–74 dry season) could be seriously compromised.105 Important as they were, the parallels in strategic considerations and direct economic implications ranked second to yet another link between Indochina and the Middle East. In light of Nixon and Kissinger’s apparent helplessness with re-

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

97

spect to Indochina, the Middle East provided a more-than-welcome opportunity to add to the positive side of the Cold War balance sheet; the Middle East became part of the insurance policy for Indochina. In other words, Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts to secure a success by ending the Yom Kippur War and engaging in shuttle diplomacy was not so much an isolated, regional attempt at enhancing US credibility as it was a direct response to the increasingly bleak prospects for Indochina (as well as Nixon’s domestic standing). Rather than neglecting Vietnam in favor of the Middle East, Kissinger consistently implemented the insurance policy: if, after the summer of 1973, the course of events in Indochina could only be postponed but not reversed, the focus had to be on counterbalance. In short, Nixon and Kissinger tried to score a major success in the Middle East to compensate for the anticipated defeat in Vietnam and help ensure continuing US dominance of the Cold War US-USSR-PRC triangle.106

An Uneasy Dr y Season The turn of 1973 to 1974 brought no respite for Indochina. Although strategists in Washington continued to show cautious optimism that the North Vietnamese remained frightened of possible US reintervention, it was obvious that as far as Indochina was concerned, Nixon and Kissinger had become “paper tigers,” to use Mao’s famous words. After his meeting with Le Duc Tho in December 1973, Kissinger shared some of Martin’s positive outlook on Saigon’s military performance and its effects on communist strategy, but he did not seriously expect that the resumption of reconnaissance flights or the movements of aircraft carriers would deter the North Vietnamese in the long run.107 In February 1974, Kissinger pointedly summed up the general situation. Referring to the erosion of domestic support (most obvious in the case of Vietnam), he told the US emissary to China, David Bruce, “I get a lot of praise for great foreign policy but you and I know it is 90% bluff right now.”108 Meanwhile, in the spring of 1974, the so-called Rice War broke out when Thieu attempted to starve out the communist forces by denying them access to food supplies. At the same time, the communist leaders issued Central Office for South Vietnam Resolution 12, which informed their soldiers in the field that the Paris Agreement was merely a means to prepare for another war.109 Both Thieu and the communists had abandoned even the semblance of peace. Although neither side was able to make considerable military gains, the Rice War had negative effects on all of South Vietnam, exacerbating the economic and political problems of the Saigon regime. Protest among Buddhists and even Catholics increased, and the morale of the armed forces and the general population remained low.110

98

CHAPTER 4

Kissinger, making another link between Indochina and the Middle East, continued trying to improve Saigon’s military performance. A Department of Defense team that had evaluated the recent tank battles during the Yom Kippur War was supposed to share information with the South Vietnamese military.111 Moreover, in March, the first delivery of improved F-5E fighter aircraft was sent to Thieu (in violation of the Paris Agreement). But the South Vietnamese air force lacked trained pilots and ground support equipment, and the army continued to depend logistically on US contractors and, as US analysts conceded, was not as good a fighting force as the communists.112 Most important, in April 1974, communist forces in South Vietnam numbered approximately 280,000 (of which roughly 207,000 were regulars of the North Vietnamese army), which posed the continuous threat of being employed in a major offensive.113 Foreshadowing the events in the spring of 1975, a joint intelligence study concluded that “the adverse psychological impact [of a major communist offensive] might be more significant than the actual impact on the military balance.”114 On the diplomatic front, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho continued to exchange charges and countercharges without making any progress.115 Martin, meanwhile, pursued his aggressive approach of trying to elicit a higher level of US aid to South Vietnam. Maintaining his partly strategic, partly self-deluding optimism about Saigon’s prospects, he tried to put some pressure on Kissinger to fight for aid while condemning Congress and the liberal press.116 In Cambodia, the situation somewhat paralleled the one in South Vietnam. Although the dry season did not bring any dramatic changes, the Khmer Rouge could book a net gain of territory and population brought under its control. Moreover, the Khmer Republic’s economy continued to perform badly, political instability lingered, and the military’s morale was shaky. Furthermore, the question of US funding (especially for ammunition) remained a constant concern. As for the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk, by the early summer of 1974, had been practically sidelined while the communist leaders Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot consolidated their control. Most important, the Chinese formally guaranteed the Khmer Rouge military aid in an attempt to counterbalance the prospect of Soviet–North Vietnamese domination of Indochina. The struggle between the USSR and China over influence in Indochina was intensifying, making an end to the hostilities even less likely.117 In March 1974, John Gunther Dean was confirmed as US ambassador to Cambodia. From April to September 1973, Dean had been chargé d’affaires in Laos, where, in August 1973, he had helped avert a rightist coup against Prince Souvanna Phouma.118 While evacuation plans for the communist takeover of Phnom Penh were being worked out in Washington, Dean recommended “inter-

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

99

nationalizing” the Cambodian problem and called for a new, determined negotiating effort by Washington.119 However, with Kissinger, who was following his set strategy, this idea fell on deaf ears. In Laos, a coalition government was formed in April 1974 that made Laos perhaps the most hopeful case in Indochina.120 Still, the basic fact remained that much of Laos’s future depended on what happened in its neighboring countries. Kissinger’s approach to Indochina did not change during the first half of 1974. He tried, with some success, to calm both the South Vietnamese and the American public and continued to play the Vietnam tune in a low-key fashion. As Kissinger’s spokesman, Robert McCloskey, remarked in March, “It’s [referring to Vietnam] kind of been a benign subject.”121 At the same time, the discussion of Vietnam-related political maneuvers demonstrated that the idea of going down with colors flying remained in place: similarly to the larger picture, Kissinger’s aides argued on the issue of the NLF’s participation in a law-of-war conference that it might be best to “go down fighting.”122 Meanwhile, Kissinger continued to expand the counterbalance part of the insurance policy. Although the Middle East was demanding much of Kissinger’s attention and energy, and Washington’s investment in the region was starting to pay off, he also attempted to repair transatlantic relations and score additional successes in Latin America. Relations with the Europeans improved somewhat in the spring and summer of 1974 (formalized in the Atlantic Declaration), and Kissinger worked on a program for cooperation with Mexico and other Latin American countries.123 At the same time, Kissinger continued refraining from putting real pressure on the Soviets and the Chinese and made improved relations with the communist giants his primary concern. In early 1974, the South Vietnamese and the Chinese briefly clashed over the Paracel and Spratly islands. When Thieu requested a statement of US support, Kissinger and his aides made it clear that Saigon could not expect Washington to help on the matter. Good relations with the Chinese were more important.124 At home, Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy continued to draw congressional opposition. In March, Kissinger responded to a detailed query by Senator Edward Kennedy about US objectives in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and stressed Washington’s moral and historic obligation to support its Indochinese allies (although he also reiterated that no formal obligations existed).125 Moreover, to silence Senator Fulbright on Cambodia, Kissinger suggested putting some money into Arkansas, the senator’s constituency.126 Despite those maneuvers, Congress remained unconvinced. For FY 1974, Kissinger was able to secure some additional funds for South Vietnam, but appropriations for FY 1975 amounted to $700 million in military assistance, only half of the $1.4 billion that Nixon and Kissinger had sought.127

100

CHAPTER 4

In the first half of 1974, an additional foreign relations issue continued to strain Kissinger’s relations with Congress. Led by Senator Henry Jackson (the JacksonVanik amendment is explained in chapter 5), domestic critics of détente argued that Kissinger had conceded too much to the Soviets. Most important, Jackson sought to link the human rights issue of Jewish emigration from the USSR to the improvement of Soviet-US trade relations. Jackson’s stance constrained Kissinger in his attempt to deliver an important incentive to the Soviets (not least to counterbalance Moscow’s anger over the Middle East), and Brezhnev saw the matter as interference in the internal affairs of the USSR. As much as Kissinger needed good great-power relations for the insurance policy for Indochina, US relations with China stagnated, and détente had reached a deadlock, too.128

Nixon’s End In March 1974, Kissinger traveled to Moscow to prepare the third Nixon-Brezhnev summit. Against the backdrop of domestic opposition to détente and Nixon’s weak standing, Kissinger could not conclude anything substantive on such issues as arms limitation or the granting of most-favored-nation status to the USSR. When Nixon visited the Soviet Union in late June and early July, stagnation persisted. Through a number of minor agreements, Nixon and Kissinger were able to maintain the image of continuing détente, but unlike accomplishments during previous meetings, they achieved no major breakthroughs.129 During the summit, Vietnam was a nonissue. Scowcroft informed Martin, “I hate to disappoint you, but there was virtually no discussion of Vietnam in Moscow. . . . Sorry to be so cursory, but that is the way it was.”130 Clearly, keeping up an image of good US-Soviet relations to counterbalance any fallout from Indochina, as well as domestic problems, was far more important to Nixon and Kissinger than exerting any meaningful pressure on the issue of North Vietnamese infiltration. In fact, by the time of the Moscow summit, Nixon was hardly in a position to focus on Vietnam. Throughout the first half of 1974, he had employed various maneuvers to prevent the release of the incriminating tapes, but he was facing ever-growing, broad-based opposition that included Congress, the courts, the special prosecutor, and the press. Moreover, his public standing, already dilapidated, was continuously declining, and support from his own party was crumbling. The American people demanded that the president release the tapes and take responsibility for Watergate.131 During that period, Kissinger, alongside Nixon, maintained some hope that impeachment could be averted. At the same time, the secretary of state continued to distance himself from Watergate.132 Al-

GOING DOWN WITH COLORS FLYING

101

though he remained annoyed over the wiretapping issue and once more threatened to resign, Kissinger’s reputation, as before, remained largely untarnished.133 In late July, rejecting executive privilege, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Nixon must turn over the tape recordings of sixty-four conversations. On the day of the ruling, the House Judiciary Committee commenced the formal debate on impeachment. Shortly after, the committee passed the first of three articles of impeachment, charging obstruction of justice. During those frantic days, Kissinger maintained a low profile and kept himself busy with yet another foreign policy crisis, this time between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.134 There was, in fact, nothing Kissinger could do to save the president. In early August, Nixon, hoping for a miracle of public support, released transcripts of a smokinggun conversation that clearly showed that he had been involved in the Watergate cover-up. However, the national consensus was only reinforced by the incriminating evidence against the president. Facing the choice between resignation and impeachment, Nixon resigned on August 8, 1974.135 With Nixon’s departure from office, one of the two principal architects of US policy toward Indochina in the first half of the 1970s was exiting the stage. Nixon’s legacy included both the expansion and the contraction of US involvement in the Vietnam War. Together with Kissinger, Nixon had devised a strategy that aimed at maintaining US credibility in the Cold War, even in case of defeat in Indochina. Although Nixon’s increasing preoccupation with Watergate in 1973 and 1974 put Kissinger largely in charge of implementation, the president had defined the Indochina policy: Washington had to try to avert the fall of Saigon by deterring the North Vietnamese; if the measures failed (as it was clear they had after the summer of 1973), an insurance policy had to be in place. From the beginning of the coming apart of the cover-up until Nixon’s resignation, central aspects of the insurance policy for Indochina—good relations with the USSR and China, as well as attaining other foreign policy successes—became equally important to the president in attempting to reduce domestic opposition. In the end, Nixon’s domestic maneuvers proved unsuccessful. With Nixon’s departure, Kissinger remained firmly in charge of Indochina and foreign policy in general. Moreover, the American people looked to Kissinger to hold the government together. As Frank Mankiewicz, the 1972 Democratic presidential campaign director, remarked, “You’re the raft out in the sea and you are going to have to let everyone on.”136 With Kissinger staying in office, it was reasonable to assume that Washington’s Indochina policy would continue along familiar lines. The question remained whether the new president, Gerald R. Ford, would take command and introduce fresh impulses.

5 FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

The domestic and international situation Ford inherited from Nixon was extremely difficult. As the only chief executive who had not been elected either as vice president or as president, Ford faced the enormous tasks of reuniting the United States after the shocks of Watergate and reinvigorating an increasingly fragile international order. On the domestic front, in addition to having to restore public trust in the White House, Ford had to tackle concerns about US dependence on foreign oil, high inflation, and economic stagnation, as well as an unruly Congress. During his quarter-century career in the House of Representatives, Ford had developed a strong background in domestic politics, especially economic matters. Unsurprisingly, during his presidency he devoted much of his energy to domestic issues.1 At the same time, Ford’s challenges in foreign affairs were equally daunting, a fact that was compounded by congressional assertiveness. Although Nixon and Kissinger had managed to maintain a semblance of good relations with the Soviets and the Chinese, the heyday of détente and rapprochement was over. Moreover, Ford inherited a hot crisis in Cyprus and two smoldering ones in the Middle East and Indochina.2 Generally speaking, historians have tended to treat Ford as a mere extension of Nixon, and this has led to a shortage of nuanced analyses of how Ford tried to approach the domestic and foreign policy challenges he was facing.3 In the public mind, Ford is most often remembered for his controversial pardon of Nixon, which, to a large extent, cost him the election of 1976.4 However, by the mid-1990s, a reevaluation of the Ford presidency had commenced that stressed Ford’s central role in restoring trust in the US government and giving a sense of 102

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

103

normalcy back to the United States. Partly because of Ford’s self-depiction (for example, in his memoirs), those accounts put a strong focus on Ford’s domestic and economic initiatives and sought to highlight his achievement of reconciliation between the American public and Congress, on the one hand, and the White House, on the other.5 But as the Indochina example shows, that did not mean that Ford lacked an understanding of the international arena and completely depended on Kissinger as his foreign policy czar.6 Rather, the new president added his own style to the Indochina strategy by trying to walk a fine line between attempting to win back trust for the White House and actively continuing to implement the insurance policy.

A Familiar Approach to Vietnam On August 8, 1974, after having informed Ford of his decision to resign, Nixon briefed the incoming president about domestic and foreign affairs. On Indochina, Nixon urged Ford to continue a strong policy.7 Ford hardly needed to be persuaded. To the contrary, when he became president in August 1974, Ford brought with him clear convictions about the problems in Indochina and “what was right” in the United States’ national interest as he defined it.8 In the 1960s, when the war in Vietnam was escalating, he had steadfastly supported US engagement and had defended his point of view even against members of his own family. He later stated, “From the beginning of our involvement in the area, I had always thought that we were doing the right thing.”9 Opposed to Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara’s strategy of gradual escalation and convinced that the war was winnable, Ford, in his role as House minority leader, urged Johnson not to restrain military operations.10 Although, in June 1973, Ford—perhaps not fully realizing the consequences—had helped broker the passage of Congress’s bombing cutoff for Indochina, the new president was by no means a dove on Vietnam. Shortly after Ford had spoken with Nixon, he called Kissinger, expressed his full trust in the secretary of state, and urged him to stay in the new cabinet.11 Later that day, Ford and Kissinger met to discuss foreign policy issues, including Vietnam. Both men agreed that Ford needed to reassure Washington’s allies and project an image of strength to its communist adversaries around the world.12 To that effect, Ford met with various ambassadors directly after having been sworn in the next day. The new president made it a point to include South Vietnamese ambassador Tran Kim Phuong in the list of representatives he received individually on his first day in office. He told Phuong, “I assure you we will continue our policies and will try to continue them effectively. I know you have problems.”13

104

CHAPTER 5

As had been the case since the summer of 1973, the central debate regarding US support for Thieu (and, in fact, the first issue Ford tried to tackle when he became president) was over the level of military and economic aid to Saigon. For fiscal year (FY) 1975, the Nixon administration had requested $1.4 billion in military assistance alone. But in the summer and fall of 1974, Congress’s opposition persisted, and the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees (headed by conservative senators John Stennis and John McClellan, respectively) cut the amount down to $700 million. Moreover, economic aid was slashed from $650 million to $250 million.14 In addition to receiving the South Vietnamese ambassador, Ford sent a letter to Thieu to underline his continuing support. In the letter, Ford expressed some hope that he would eventually be able to obtain enough aid from Congress.15 However, because of his firsthand experience with congressional opposition to the Nixon administration’s Indochina policy, Ford knew full well that the legislature’s obstruction was his major problem regarding the implementation of his foreign policy. During a discussion about US-USSR relations, Ford told Kissinger, “If I were the Soviets, I would use the Congress.”16 Although he was not speaking directly in the context of Vietnam, his observation indicated that he understood the situation and had no unduly optimistic illusions about his ability to influence Congress. Rather than showing flawed judgment, the hope Ford expressed vis-àvis Thieu was meant to ease the South Vietnamese president’s mind. In fact, Ford was continuing Nixon and Kissinger’s attempts to help calm their Southeast Asian ally. As Deputy Chief of Mission Wolfgang Lehmann observed in Saigon, Ford’s reassurances had the desired effect. According to Lehmann, a speech that Thieu gave after having received Ford’s message “clearly reflected the sense of confidence the letter gave him.”17 In mid-August, Ford told Kissinger that he was considering going to South Vietnam.18 Although the idea was not put into action, the fact that Ford made Indochina one of his top priorities on taking office was thus again highlighted. On the same day, Ford delivered an address to a joint session of Congress and to the American public. He declared, “In Indochina we are determined to see the observance of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam and the ceasefire and negotiated settlement in Laos. We hope to see an early compromise settlement in Cambodia.”19Although Ford did not put Washington’s commitment in more concrete terms than Nixon and Kissinger had done before, he sought to convey a clear message of continuity. Against the advice of some of his associates, Ford was determined to show to the world that Washington was not abandoning its friends in Indochina.20 Meanwhile, Kissinger made further attempts to maintain the deterrence bluff vis-à-vis Hanoi. Quoting the president’s address, he informed Le Duc Tho that

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

105

“President Ford, as you must be aware, has been a firm supporter of President Nixon’s policy in Indochina for five and one-half years. . . . I must convey to you that President Ford is a man with a keen sense of American honor.”21 However, as had been the case since the summer of 1973, Kissinger knew that Washington’s hands were tied and that real deterrence had become impossible. This observation was reaffirmed by Kissinger’s aides, Richard Kennedy and William Stearman. The two National Security Council (NSC) staffers outlined various limited diplomatic and military actions that they believed were still available to Washington in order to threaten Hanoi (for example, flying regular reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam). However, Stearman and Kennedy concluded that “one thing we must keep in mind is that if our hand is forced we run the risk of seriously diminishing what credibility our residual Southeast Asia military presence does have. . . . The options listed above could in our opinion raise serious doubts in Hanoi as to our probable reaction to any major offensive actions.”22 In other words, Hanoi could easily call the deterrence bluff. Ford was also aware of Washington’s weak standing in Indochina. Although he may have hoped that the fall of Saigon would take some years to happen, he entertained no illusions about South Vietnam’s (as well as Cambodia’s and Laos’s) long-term prospects. Talking to Kissinger, Ford clearly conveyed a pessimistic view that paralleled Kissinger’s assessment. He inquired, “Can we paint an accurate and dire picture that if Vietnam goes down, the whole policy in Southeast Asia is in jeopardy?”23 Although Kissinger, more or less rhetorically, presented Ford with the option of taking advantage of the new presidency to wash his hands of Vietnam, he responded to Ford’s question by pointing to the potentially negative impact on US credibility. “The impact over three to five years is bad,” Kissinger concluded.24 In mid-September, Ford and Kissinger met with Ambassador Graham Martin to discuss Vietnam policy, above all the need for further aid. The meeting implicitly underlined Ford’s pessimism about Indochina. Although Martin gave his familiar analysis that Saigon could still be saved by playing for time and creating a lasting equilibrium and concluded that “there is no way we can lose Vietnam except throw it away here,”25 Ford was far less confident. The president expressed some hope that a recent turnaround of the Washington Post’s position on aid to South Vietnam showed what could be done to win over public and congressional opinion. However, Ford also noted that Martin’s analysis “doesn’t get broad enough exposure, and the opposition is at it every day.”26 In early September, during a discussion with Kissinger about the Middle East, Ford had made it clear how he judged the overall domestic mood: “I don’t think the American people will ever stand for another Vietnam.”27 Most important, during the months after his inauguration, Ford never brought up the issue of defying

106

CHAPTER 5

congressional restraints by launching military action in Indochina. This was simply not an option the president (or Kissinger, for that matter) was seriously considering; 1974 was very different from the spring of 1973. Thus, if one notes the clear limits within which the president was discussing his administration’s strategy (obtaining more aid) and takes Ford’s pessimistic comments about Vietnam’s future, as well as the domestic situation, into consideration, it is highly unlikely that, in the summer and fall of 1974, Ford shared Martin’s diehard optimism on Indochina. Whatever hopes the president may have entertained to win more aid for Saigon and Phnom Penh, the tone of his overall assessment of the Indochina situation showed that he knew that South Vietnam and, by implication, Laos and Cambodia were most likely doomed in the long run, with or without aid. At the same time, Ford, like Kissinger, was deeply concerned about the negative effects defeat in Indochina would have on US credibility. In mid-September, he and Kissinger met with a bipartisan group of congressional leaders. In his pitch for more aid to South Vietnam, Ford linked the situation in Indochina to the Middle East. The president urged the members of Congress, “Look at it in global terms: How can we be having a disaster in Southeast Asia while we are trying to negotiate in the Middle East?”28 No doubt, Ford and Kissinger both tried to wrest more aid from Congress in order to stabilize the Saigon government as much as they could and postpone communist rule of Indochina as long as possible. However, above all, Ford was determined to fight for higher aid levels to demonstrate that Washington was honoring its commitments while maintaining the Nixon administration’s line that there was, in fact, no legal commitment but rather a moral one. As Ford’s conversations with Kissinger underlined, the president and the secretary of state feared most that friends and foes would interpret Washington’s Indochina policy as a sign of US weakness. Implicit in this fear was the fact that Ford continued to see Indochina in terms of the global Cold War. Although many Americans did not agree with him, Ford believed that it was in the United States’ best interest to play an active role in foreign policy in general and to continue supporting Thieu in particular.29 To be sure, Ford was highly sensitive to domestic implications of foreign policy decisions. Just a few days after he assumed the presidency, for example, while he and Kissinger were discussing the prospects of getting another Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement with the Soviets, Ford commented, “That would help the election in ’76.”30 However, as Ford’s unwillingness to disassociate himself from Nixon and Kissinger’s Vietnam policy highlighted, those deliberations did not mean that the president was making foreign policy dependent wholly on domestic considerations.31 To the contrary, Ford had clear convictions about US foreign policy: he shared Kissinger’s belief that in the Cold War context, the United

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

107

States could simply not afford an isolationist stance and a retreat from its commitment to support anticommunist regimes. If Ford understood what was at stake in Vietnam, he also grasped Kissinger’s multilayered strategy toward the Indochina problem, namely, the insurance policy. There is no evidence Ford and Kissinger discussed Indochina using the exact term “insurance policy,” nor is there evidence that Kissinger informed Ford in detail about all the different facets of his and Nixon’s previous approach to Vietnam. Still, Ford was clearly on the same page as Kissinger. As his comments and concerns about the effects of Vietnam on US prestige and his administration’s response to the problem showed, Ford first and foremost conceived the Indochina strategy in terms of countering the negative fallout from the likely fall of Saigon. In other words, as Ford’s pessimism about South Vietnam’s long-term prospects, as well as the measures he ordered, demonstrated, he understood that the debate about Vietnam policy and how to elicit more aid was essentially not a debate about how to save South Vietnam but how to save US credibility. This had been the centerpiece of Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina policy ever since Congress had destroyed the equilibrium strategy in the summer of 1973. Most important, in the summer and fall of 1974, Ford, together with Kissinger, continued all the familiar aspects of the insurance policy.

Ford’s Implementation of the Indochina Policy Among the insurance-policy stratagems that Ford continued, putting blame for the Indochina mess on Congress was perhaps the most striking. Especially after the cessation of bombing in the summer of 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had readily agreed that the Nixon administration must wash its hands of Indochina and place the blame for the anticipated fall of Saigon on Congress. Ford, however, was not Nixon. First, unlike his predecessor, Ford was not particularly known for a “with-us-or-against-us” mentality. Instead, Ford had a reputation of amiability.32 Second, during his twenty-five-year career in the House of Representatives, Ford had emphasized compromise and had often arbitrated between the moderate and conservative wings of the Republican Party. His style had earned him a reputation as a conciliator.33 Third, and most important, Ford knew that his replacing Nixon as president implied a clear mission to overcome Watergate and reunify the country. In his memoirs, Ford summarized the circumstances under which he became president: “The years of suspicion and scandal that had culminated in Nixon’s resignation had demoralized our people. . . . I knew that unless I did something to restore their trust, I couldn’t win their consent to do anything else.”34

108

CHAPTER 5

All in all, Ford was a rather unlikely character in a rather unlikely position to continue Nixon and Kissinger’s political trench warfare. However, he quickly found his own style of implementing the blame stratagem of the Indochina policy. During the first weeks after he took office, Ford tried to set a positive tone in dealing with Congress on foreign policy matters, including Vietnam. For instance, in mid-September, during the discussion about foreign aid, Ford opened the meeting with the bipartisan congressional leadership group by alluding to his long association with the members of Congress and underlined the close cooperation he was seeking with Capitol Hill. “I wanted to get the leadership together to lay out the problems with you,” he remarked.35 Focusing on another Vietnam-related matter, he also tried to win trust from Congress and the American public and to overcome some of the divisions that had shaken the country: in mid-September, following Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s advice, he announced the Vietnam Era Reconciliation Program, a clemency plan for draft evaders during the Vietnam War. However, fewer than one-fifth of the eligible offenders, most of them living in exile in Canada, signed up for the program. Many of the antiwar exiles felt that Ford demanded an implicit admission of guilt on their part. Criticism was also voiced by the political Right, which opposed any such amnesty.36 Ford’s amnesty plan not only failed to arouse great enthusiasm but was also tainted by an additional flaw. The program was widely regarded as a means to sell another highly controversial case of clemency (and the most controversial action of Ford’s entire presidency): the pardon of Richard Nixon. On September 8, 1974, the president granted Nixon amnesty for all Watergate-related crimes. In so doing, Ford hoped to heal old wounds, open a new chapter with his presidency, and move the country beyond the shadow of Watergate. However, the pardon had quite the opposite effect: a majority of the American public was furious that Nixon would be able to escape punishment and even trial. Cynicism and suspicion of the White House resurged, and Ford’s approval rating dropped from 66 to 49 percent, the worst single plunge in the history of the Gallup poll.37 Whatever credibility Ford had when he took office had quickly evaporated. Until the end of his presidency, the Nixon pardon would haunt Ford.38 Although his actions had in part the opposite effect, Ford clearly tried to improve public and congressional perception of the White House. However, behind the scenes, Ford was less conciliatory. In early October, continuing Nixon and Kissinger’s blame strategy on Indochina, Ford told South Vietnamese foreign minister Vuong Van Bac, “I want to reassure you we will support President Thieu in every way—economically, politically, and diplomatically. Our problem is not us, but on the Hill.”39 To be sure, one of Ford’s main objectives was to calm the South Vietnamese and to convey the idea that he and his administration were continuing to support Thieu. Still, the president’s comment also reflected a posi-

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

109

tion of genuine opposition to Congress, as well as a willingness to villainize the legislature. In November, Kissinger and Ford discussed foreign policy, the need for Ford to show national leadership, and prospects for the 1976 election. Kissinger urged Ford to maintain a position of strength in US foreign policy. Underlining his view of the link between foreign policy and domestic politics, Kissinger argued that Ford could win the 1976 election if he strongly defended the US national interest. Ford agreed and commented, “I feel we must make strong decisions, whether they’re supported by Congress or not.”40 Clearly, reconciliation had its limits. There is no doubt that Ford saw a real necessity to help heal the nation and had a genuine desire to do so. Ford did not maintain a Nixonian agenda of further insulating the White House from Congress and the American public. He told Kissinger, “The Nixon shenanigans are one of the stupidest things in political history.”41 But as Ford’s conversations with Kissinger showed, the president shared his secretary of state’s fundamental beliefs about US foreign policy (including Vietnam) and the division of power between the legislative and the executive branch’s branches in favor of the latter. In other words, Ford did not transcend political power games but clearly took on his role as defender of the executive branch’s dominance of foreign policy. The administration’s Indochina policy highlighted the basic duality of Ford’s approach: he was trying to walk a tightrope between unifying the country and continuing to implement the foreign policy of the Nixon era. Along with his statements and actions during this time, Ford’s memoirs provide a solid example of his style of putting into action the blame stratagem of the insurance policy. Commenting on the argument between his administration and Congress about support to South Vietnam, Ford later wrote, “The Senators, I knew, were well-meaning, yet they were incredibly short-sighted. We couldn’t just cut and run.”42 Compared with Nixon and Kissinger’s comments, the tone of this statement was far less accusatory, but in substance, Ford ultimately attributed an errant perspective to Congress in its approach to Vietnam, too, thus continuing the blame strategy. Moreover, as Ford’s strategy to obtain additional aid for South Vietnam suggests, the president was well aware that his moderate image and good relations with Congress could function as a means to win concessions from the legislative branch on Indochina (if there were any means at all). Outlining the administration’s congressional strategy (including Indochina) and in line with the president’s comments on aid to Saigon, the NSC staffer Richard Kennedy advised Assistant for Legislative Affairs William Timmons, “The presence of a new Administration with strong ties in the legislature should make compromise solutions which are favorable to the Executive possible and practical. Actions should be based in the ‘spirit of compromise’ voiced by President Ford.”43 Shrouded by his

110

CHAPTER 5

reconciliatory rhetoric, Ford’s approach to Indochina displayed a calculating, even shrewd side of the president. If Ford’s conscious leveraging of his image, as well as his deliberate balancing between national reconciliation and continuation of the blame strategy, showed that he had developed his own style of implementing the Indochina policy, his relationship with Kissinger also suggests that he played an active role in shaping US foreign policy—a heretofore underrated fact. It is true that with the departure of Nixon, Kissinger gained an even more central position in conducting foreign affairs. In his double role as secretary of state and national security adviser, Kissinger was the central public figure in US foreign policy, somewhat stealing the limelight from Ford.44 Other key members of the president’s team, such as White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger (whom Ford had also kept on from the Nixon administration), did not pose a serious threat to Kissinger’s preeminence.45 Some observers indeed concluded that Kissinger was the United States’ foreign policy czar and that the country had to rely entirely on the secretary of state to run US foreign policy. For example, commenting on the future of US policy toward the USSR, William Fulbright told Kissinger, “You have got to educate him [Ford]”46 In fact, unlike Nixon, Ford had not developed a particular knowledge of, or interest in, foreign policy during his time in the House of Representatives but rather had focused more on economic matters.47 As Ford’s handling of the Indochina situation highlighted, the result was that the president did not introduce any new Vietnamrelated concepts or doctrines, as Nixon had done before. Rather, Ford relied on and continued to operate in the intellectual framework that Kissinger and Nixon had constructed during the previous years. Still, Kissinger’s visibility and intellectual preeminence did not mean that Ford was merely following his secretary of state. During his vice presidency, Ford had been increasingly exposed to foreign policy, regularly receiving national security and diplomatic briefings.48 Moreover, as Vietnam showed, Ford held clear foreign policy convictions. As a result, the new president was not at a loss when he assumed the leadership in US foreign policy. In fact, Kissinger repeatedly praised Ford for his self-assurance and aplomb and stressed the excellent working relationship between them.49 Giving the journalist Bruce Van Voorst his first impressions of Ford’s handling of foreign policy, Kissinger remarked, “He is an extremely active participant. . . . He has done it [conducting conversations with foreign leaders] extremely deftly and with his own approach. It is less direct than his predecessor.”50 Kissinger’s comments clearly reflected the secretary of state’s attempt to strengthen Ford’s back by giving him credit for the conduct of foreign affairs (thereby somewhat contradicting Kissinger and Nixon’s disparag-

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

111

ing earlier remarks about Ford and effectively distancing Kissinger from Nixon even further). However, as Kissinger’s similar comments to close associates showed, he seemed genuinely impressed by Ford’s leadership.51 Most important, despite his central role in US foreign policy, Kissinger continued to serve his president. As had been the case with Nixon, Kissinger remained highly attentive to Ford’s mood and opinions and never tried to openly antagonize the president. Had Ford not given his weight to the continuation of the Indochina policy, it is highly unlikely that Kissinger would have attempted to implement the insurance policy on his own. In short, Kissinger needed a boss, and Ford assumed that role.

Fall and Winter 1974–75 Although other foreign policy issues, such as the Middle East, Cyprus, the JacksonVanik amendment which linked the question of Jewish emigration from the USSR to the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, and the energy crisis, consumed much of their attention in the fall of 1974, Ford and Kissinger continued to implement the rest of the insurance policy’s stratagems (those other than the blame component). They played Vietnam low key, described Indochina as an irritant to more important foreign policy initiatives, and refrained from putting real pressure on the Soviets and the Chinese. In the meantime, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos remained in a state of awkward limbo. In August, responding to Kissinger’s letter to the North Vietnamese in which the secretary of state had stressed Ford’s commitment to Nixon’s Indochina policy, Le Duc Tho sent a sharp reply to Washington. Kissinger’s NSC staffers interpreted Tho’s message as a clear attack on the new president, as well as the secretary of state.52 US analysts suspected that Hanoi was shifting its strategy to a more military approach. Apparently, the North Vietnamese seriously doubted US reintervention and did not feel seriously inhibited by the Soviets and the Chinese in their attempts to further weaken the Saigon government through a step-up of military operations.53 Meanwhile, an increasingly frustrated Thieu appealed to Ford to honor the promises of ongoing US support. In September, he noted in a letter to Ford that it was “essential that the United States unmistakably demonstrates once again its attachment to a serious implementation of the Paris Agreement and its support for the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.”54 In late October, Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 213, in which Ford requested a detailed study by the different branches of the administration regarding the current situation in South Vietnam and possible US

112

CHAPTER 5

assistance to Saigon during the following five years.55 In response to NSSM 213, CIA director William Colby provided Kissinger with a lengthy analysis of the likely developments in South Vietnam. The resultant interagency intelligence memorandum concluded that “all intelligence agencies generally agree that Hanoi probably will not choose to mount a new 1972-style offensive in the current dry season (i.e., between now and June 1, 1975), although some escalation of NVA/VC [North Vietnamese Army/Vietcong] military activity is likely.”56 However, the authors of the study noted with equivalent weight that almost all intelligence agencies were expecting an all-out North Vietnamese offensive during the following few years. Moreover, according to the study, the majority of the intelligence community concluded that even without a major offensive, a significant increase in US aid was required to prevent a decline in the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces. All intelligence agencies agreed that although there was no imminent political threat to Thieu, “over the longer term, an indefinite continuation of hostilities and economic decline would cause pressures to mount for Thieu to step aside in favor of a new government which would be prepared to make negotiating concessions to the Communists.”57 In a supplemental response to NSSM 213 by the intelligence community, it was concluded that if the North Vietnamese mounted an all-out offensive in 1976—the US analysts believed that Hanoi could well try to coordinate the offensive with the presidential election in the United States—the South Vietnamese would at best lose considerable territory in the northern part of the country. In the “worse-case scenario,” it was argued in the study, the Saigon regime would be forced into an enclave position in most of South Vietnam, and the long-term prospects for the country would be seriously jeopardized.58 The NSC staffers William Smyser and William Stearman essentially supported the intelligence community’s analysis. Smyser again stressed that the administration’s hands were tied, but he noted that the deterrence bluff could work better than expected in the short run.59 Stearman added that “recent intelligence indicates that North Vietnam has been plagued by acute food shortages, corruption, lagging reconstruction, war weariness, and civilian and military indiscipline.” 60 As a result, Smyser and Stearman concluded that the North Vietnamese would probably not launch a major general offensive in 1975. Rather, they assumed, Hanoi would try to force Washington and Saigon to accept the North Vietnamese interpretation of the Paris accords.61 In fact, although there were some disagreements within the intelligence community, the overall analysis of North Vietnamese intentions by Washington’s Vietnam experts was correct. In August, the hawks in the North Vietnamese Politburo called for all-out war. Their belligerence was reinforced by Nixon’s resignation, which they believed would create new opportunities. In early

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

113

October, Communist Party first secretary Le Duan and his colleagues in the Politburo agreed on the somewhat ambiguous Resolution for 1975. According to the plan, communist forces in South Vietnam were to significantly increase the military pressure on Saigon. However, the North Vietnamese did not plan to conquer South Vietnam militarily in the near future. Instead, they hoped that Thieu would crumble under their pressure and make way for a weaker South Vietnamese political structure that would lead to communist dominance. In short, although Hanoi was stepping up the action, it stuck to its strategy of a more gradual communist takeover.62 In Saigon, Martin continued to be optimistic, sticking to his familiar assessment that the real problem lay in Washington. Analyzing the issue of South Vietnamese political opposition to Thieu, he concluded, “In short, nothing here is out of hand. . . . If you can successfully mount an all-out coordinated repeat coordinated effort to obtain the requested economic and military resources, we still hold that accomplishment of US policy goals can be assured.”63 However, Martin’s optimism was hardly justified. In spite of the signs pointing to short-term North Vietnamese restraint and Thieu’s grip on political power, the intelligence community and the NSC staffers rightly concluded that the mid- to long-term prospects for Washington’s allies in Indochina were bleak. In South Vietnam, there were no indications of economic self-reliance. Intelligence analysts concluded that “even assuming no marked decline in security conditions through 1980, major US economic support will be necessary at least until then to assure the survival of the Government of Vietnam (GVN).”64 However, Congress’s aid cuts in the fall of 1974 made it clear that financial support from Washington was most likely approaching an end. As a result, the South Vietnamese forces were seriously hampered in fighting the kind of war the Americans had taught them; costly, materiel-intensive operations (for example, air operations) had to be drastically cut down without adequate US funding. Moreover, the psychological impact of the aid cuts on South Vietnam was tremendous. In 1974, desertions in the military reached an all-time high of 240,000, and many South Vietnamese displayed signs of resignation and despair.65 Still, the most important problem remained the presence of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. In December 1974, intelligence analysts observed that “Communist military forces in South Vietnam are more powerful than ever before.” 66 As Ford and Kissinger knew—and Martin persistently neglected to acknowledge—Washington’s inability to effectively counter the communist military threat put Saigon at Hanoi’s mercy. The situation elsewhere in Indochina did not appear any better. Although the shaky political balance remained in place in Laos, the Khmer Rouge was tightening the noose on the Lon Nol government. At the end of August 1974, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the war in Cambodia was stalemated but that the

114

CHAPTER 5

government in Phnom Penh continued to depend totally on US financial support.67 In December, the Department of Defense came to the same conclusion, noting that a short-term military victory of the Khmer Rouge was unlikely.68 Still, when Congress imposed a $377 million ceiling for FY 1975 on assistance to Cambodia (of which $200 million was dedicated to military assistance), it became clear that US aid was petering out and that Cambodia’s long-term survivability was doubtful, even without a major Khmer Rouge offensive. Analysts estimated that without additional aid, Phnom Penh could run out of munitions by April 1975, and the economy would collapse by June.69Although the intelligence community concluded that a Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia would not significantly strengthen the ability of the North Vietnamese to wage war on Saigon (sufficient supply lines already existed through communist-controlled areas), Kissinger and Ford knew that the overall strategic and psychological impact on South Vietnam would be devastating.70 Throughout the fall and winter of 1974/75, the US ambassador to Cambodia, John Gunther Dean, kept advocating for the “internationalization” of Cambodia. Dean’s plan included an international peace conference that he came to believe provided the only way to achieve a controlled solution to the Khmer Rouge problem. In essence, Dean’s strategy boiled down to establishing a coalition government and getting the great powers engaged. According to Dean’s plan, Washington would accept the removal of Lon Nol and the return of Sihanouk to a key political position. Moreover, the Ford administration would try to obtain Chinese support and, in a second step, would engage the Soviets, the British, and the French as well. Dean believed that those steps would lead to negotiations with the Khmer Rouge and enable Washington to withdraw with dignity.71 Kissinger, however, did not agree with Dean’s proposal. Although the secretary of state and his NSC staffers had no great sympathy for Lon Nol, they believed that the Khmer president should be kept as a bargaining chip in dealing with the communists. Kissinger remained convinced that negotiations with the Khmer Rouge could be held only from a position of relative strength.72 As a result, he angrily dismissed Dean’s attempts to find a “compromise” solution.73 Subsequently, he disparagingly concluded, “Dean took it upon himself to alter national strategy from the improbable venue of Phnom Penh.”74 Although Kissinger’s attitude toward Dean was unnecessarily condescending, his analysis of the Cambodian situation was based on a compelling argument. Even if Dean’s plan (or a similar French initiative in late 1974) of orchestrating Sihanouk’s return had worked, it seems unlikely that the Khmer Rouge would have abandoned its aim of bringing all of Cambodia under its control and implementing its version of a communist revolution. A real diplomatic solution could be based only on a military balance on the ground.75

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

115

With no progress in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in sight, Ford and Kissinger continued to implement the insurance policy. Just as Kissinger had repeatedly done before, Ford portrayed Vietnam as an irritant to more important foreign policy initiatives. For example, the president told the Japanese prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, “Some in America became sour on the role of the US in Asia due to Vietnam. Now that that is settled, we are free to broaden and concentrate on a wider area.”76 Clearly, Ford tried to downplay Indochina’s continuing significance for US foreign policy toward Asia. In the same vein, Ford and Kissinger continued pursuing good relations with the Soviets and the Chinese rather than exerting real pressure on the communist giants to stop supporting the North Vietnamese. In their reassurances of the South Vietnamese, Ford and Kissinger conveyed the idea that they were tightening the screws on Hanoi’s allies, but that was hardly the case.77 In August, Kissinger’s deputy, Brent Scowcroft, delivered a message to the Soviets that expressed concern over the augmented level of communist military activity in South Vietnam.78 Moreover, responding to the anticipated step-up of North Vietnamese military operations, Kissinger advised Ford that “it would be useful, in your talks with Brezhnev, to indicate your concern over these developments.”79 However, as had been the case during Nixon’s presidency, Ford and Kissinger displayed a clear unwillingness to hold the Soviets accountable for sending supplies to Hanoi and to make US-Soviet relations dependent on Vietnam. In late October, when Kissinger held talks with the Soviets in Moscow, he did not pursue the matter of Vietnam; in November, during the Vladivostok summit, Indochina was not mentioned at all, in spite of Kissinger’s recommendation to Ford and Martin’s forceful lobbying for great-power diplomacy on Vietnam.80 With the Chinese, Ford and Kissinger’s approach also remained unchanged. In August, Kissinger expressed his concern over North Vietnamese military activities.81 Moreover, he continued trying to obtain Chinese help in finding a solution to the Cambodia problem. However, as had been the case before, the Chinese rejected the secretary of state’s blueprint for a cease-fire and a coalition government (without Lon Nol) and showed no interest in an international conference.82 In any case, as Kissinger’s China experts observed, he had made only some “mild overtures” to Beijing on the matter of Cambodia.83 By no means were Kissinger and Ford willing to risk US-Chinese relations over Indochina. Furthermore, as the NSC staffers Stearman and Smyser concluded, optimistic proposals for great-power diplomacy with the Chinese and Soviets as advocated by Martin were quite unrealistic: although in late 1974 there were in fact some indications that the Chinese and the Soviets were showing a certain degree of restraint in Indochina (and the NSC staffers hoped that Hanoi would thus be discouraged from starting a major offensive in 1975), neither Beijing nor Moscow

116

CHAPTER 5

was willing to seriously inhibit its communist allies in Indochina.84 In any case, Kissinger and Ford never pressed the issue. Instead, they hoped to make progress on détente with Moscow and rapprochement with Beijing. Good relations with the communist giants continued to constitute a far more valuable asset in the global Cold War, especially if defeat in Indochina had to be counterbalanced. The fact that Ford and Kissinger essentially continued Washington’s Indochina policy under Nixon was not lost on domestic observers of US foreign policy. In early November, the diplomatic correspondent Leslie H. Gelb concluded in the New York Times that although Ford’s personal feelings toward Saigon were not clear, he, together with Kissinger, was acting to sustain the commitment to South Vietnam. As Gelb noted, the battle over aid in the fall of 1974 showed that the new president was not willing to quietly abandon the Thieu regime.85 Indeed, the issue of aid to Saigon underlined the ongoing congressional opposition to the Ford administration’s Indochina policy and showed that the executivelegislative disputes over foreign policy were by no means concluded.86 In November, the midterm elections brought a devastating result for Ford and Kissinger. The Republicans lost forty seats in the House and four in the Senate.87 Ford faced other major problems on the domestic front, too. In the third and fourth quarters of 1974, the economic crisis (in part caused by the costly US engagement in Vietnam) was worsening.88 Moreover, he was increasingly coming under attack from the political Right. Partly linked to the economic downturn, which led some conservative critics to question his economic leadership, a movement of new conservatives gained more and more momentum. The neoconservatives opposed the president on both social and foreign policy issues. For example, right-wing advocates criticized Ford for appointing the moderate Nelson Rockefeller (a friend of Kissinger) as vice president, opposed the Vietnam amnesty program, and argued against détente with the Soviets and rapprochement with the Chinese.89 The political Right’s disapproval of closer relations with the two communist countries on the grounds that Washington was conceding too much tied in with increasing concern among liberals and conservatives alike about human rights and moral principles.90 In December, domestic opposition to détente came to a head when Congress passed the Trade Act of 1974, which made most-favorednation status for the USSR dependent on the easing of Soviet emigration laws. In the fall of 1974, the prospects for a second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) agreement and a renewal of détente had looked good, but US domestic opposition further eroded Ford and Kissinger’s policy toward the USSR.91 Moreover, Ford continued to suffer from the domestic fallout from the Nixon presidency. The pardon of Nixon had inextricably linked Ford in the public mind to his predecessor and his abuses of power, and an article in late 1974 by

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

117

the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh in the New York Times threatened to further erode public trust in the presidency. Hersh alleged that the CIA had conducted a massive domestic spying campaign against the antiwar movement and other dissidents during the Nixon administration.92 Kissinger worried that investigations of the CIA could have an effect worse than that of Watergate, and it was again underlined that Ford was facing a highly alert US public.93 The upshot of the domestic challenges was that Ford remained vulnerable at home, and the basic Cold War framework (including détente and rapprochement) into which the president and Kissinger tried to place their Indochina policy was increasingly under attack.

Ominous Developments in Indochina With the turn of the year, the situation in Indochina deteriorated markedly. In mid-December, the North Vietnamese launched the first phase of their offensive. In late December, encouraged by early military successes and the acquisition of spectacular intelligence from within Thieu’s inner circle about Saigon and Washington’s analysis of Hanoi’s intentions, the North Vietnamese Politburo approved further escalation. Although the moderates in Hanoi were still worried about possible US reintervention and the effects of the offensive on North Vietnamese reconstruction efforts, the hard-liners, led by Le Duan, won the argument by pointing to the aid debate in Congress. According to Le Duan, it was a clear sign that the chances for a US military reaction were slim. The North Vietnamese decided to make the battle for Phuoc Long Province a test case for their assumptions. When Phuoc Long fell to communist forces in early January 1975 and Washington showed no signs of military intervention, the North Vietnamese adopted a more aggressive two-year plan for victory. Widespread attacks in 1975 were to be followed by a general uprising and liberation of South Vietnam in 1976. If favorable conditions arose earlier, total victory could possibly be sought in 1975.94 The Soviets agreed with Hanoi’s plans and promised to increase their shipments of supplies.95 Meanwhile, in Cambodia, the situation was also getting worse. On January 1, the Khmer Rouge embarked on a major dry-season offensive aimed at cutting the Mekong River supply route to Phnom Penh.96 A week later, Kissinger summoned the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) for an emergency meeting on the Indochina situation. Although Kissinger again pointed out that the Ford administration’s hands were essentially tied and that nothing could be done if the North Vietnamese called Washington’s deterrence bluff, he instructed the WSAG members to focus on obtaining from Congress a supplemental appropriation for South

118

CHAPTER 5

Vietnam and Cambodia. Kissinger stressed that it was not the time to consider what to do in case the supplemental appropriation was not granted and underlined that he had Ford’s complete support: “The President wants to do as much as possible to restore the situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia. He is very positive about that.”97 Shortly after, the administration announced that it would ask Congress for additional military aid for Saigon and Phnom Penh. In late January, Ford officially requested an additional $300 million for South Vietnam and $222 million for Cambodia. Moreover, Ford asked the legislature to lift the ceiling of $200 million for military assistance to Phom Penh.98 In their attempt to justify the aid requests, Kissinger and his NSC staffers faced a familiar problem, to wit, an analysis provided to Senator Sam Nunn by the Department of Defense conveying the idea that the North Vietnamese were receiving less military aid from the Soviets and the Chinese than Saigon was receiving from Washington.99Although the NSC staffers William Smyser and Clinton Granger had a point in arguing that the analysis was misleading (for instance, by not stressing the higher economic aid levels to Hanoi), the administration was clearly bending the data to make a case for more aid. In fact, by late January, some CIA analysts concluded that additional aid to Phnom Penh would not turn the situation around and that Saigon did not need the $300 million, at least not immediately.100 In any case, Ford and Kissinger were not primarily concerned about what their allies actually needed. As had been the case before, Ford and Kissinger hoped that additional aid would strengthen Saigon and Phnom Penh, at least in the short run. However, first and foremost, Ford and Kissinger attempted to further implement the insurance policy: the administration had to demonstrate to friend and foe alike that Washington was doing all it could to honor its commitments. As Kissinger’s dismissal of a rapid, concerted effort to develop alternative aid strategies during the WSAG meeting in early January highlighted, his clear priority was to formally request a considerable amount for aid. In short, the fight for aid above all constituted a means to set the record straight. Kissinger and Ford continued to follow their strategy of putting the blame on Congress and then appearing to be willing to go down fighting. Fear about the global effects of defeat in Indochina continued to dominate Ford and Kissinger’s considerations during the aid debate. Furthermore, they believed that congressional attempts to challenge the executive branch’s conduct of US foreign policy were taking a turn for the worse. US-Soviet relations had just taken a blow after passage of the Trade Act (which included the Jackson-Vanik amendment), and congressional opposition to the supplement for South Vietnam and Cambodia displayed that the legislature was determined to have a say on US foreign policy. In early January, during a discussion of the issue with

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

119

Ford, Kissinger angrily remarked, “We must put a stop to the disintegration of Executive authority on foreign policy.”101 Ford agreed. In January, when Kissinger briefed the president on Indochina and complained about Schlesinger’s alleged foot-dragging on Vietnam, Ford clearly sided with his secretary of state. He emphasized that he would fight for the supplemental appropriation and was in favor of limited deterrence measures, such as moving B-52 bombers to Guam or even supplying the South Vietnamese with mines (in defiance of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement).102 Discussing Indochina with members of Congress, Ford continued attempting to establish a positive atmosphere that transcended partisan considerations.103At the same time, he made it unmistakably clear that he stood behind the additional aid request in order to maintain Washington’s moral commitment to its allies in Indochina. Together with Kissinger and Vice President Rockefeller, Ford linked the issue of aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia to the situation in the Middle East, where Kissinger hoped to finally achieve a settlement between the Israelis and the Arabs. The president stressed that a loss of US credibility in Indochina would considerably weaken Kissinger’s hand in the Middle East and hurt Washington’s negotiating ability around the world. “Strength in one part of the world helps us in all other parts. We must have a global policy of standing by our friends,” Ford told the members of Congress.104 In a Cabinet meeting in late January, Ford summed up his position more bluntly and accentuated his leadership role: “I want it clearly understood that this Administration is clearly, firmly, unequivocally behind that [the Indochina supplemental appropriation]. We want it, we are going to fight for it and I want everyone behind it. I think it is vital and right, and I want no misunderstandings about that.”105 He again stated that Southeast Asia was no less important than the Middle East. Moreover, he supported an analysis in the Christian Science Monitor that agreed that the American people would develop a “guilt complex” if Washington failed to provide aid and Saigon fell to the communists. Ford summarized his position by stating, “We have a commitment and we are doing it because it is right. We believe in it.”106 As for Congress, despite his courting of the legislature, Ford essentially shared Kissinger’s point of view that “never in American history has Congressional government led to anything but disaster.”107 During their pitch to Congress for additional aid, Ford and Kissinger reiterated that with more funding, the South Vietnamese had a chance of defending themselves successfully.108 At the same time, Kissinger continued stressing that the effects of failure in Indochina would be devastating.109 However, Ford and Kissinger knew that, if anything, additional aid would provide only temporary relief, and by the end of January it was clear that even the short-term prospects of the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes looked bleak.

120

CHAPTER 5

Meanwhile, critics of the administration kept advancing the decent-interval theory. Summarizing his views of the recent developments in South Vietnam, Martin concluded, “With the fall on January 7 of Phuoc Long province and its capital to North Vietnamese troops we have arrived at a turning point in the history of the Paris Agreement.”110 Although he called for a strong statement by Ford and a concerted effort by the administration to implement a “truth campaign” to tell the American public about the “reality” in Vietnam, the ambassador also mentioned rumors about the decent-interval theory as brought forward, for instance, by the journalist Marvin Kalb. “This all is of course a gross misinterpretation of our government’s position,” Martin emphasized, “but this kind of talk is bound to be increasingly heard unless repeat unless we make declarations and take actions which palpably demonstrate that we view Hanoi’s challenge for what it is.”111 Briefing Ford on his meeting with the bipartisan congressional leadership at the end of January, Kissinger also brought up the decent-interval idea. He suggested that the president deny the existence of any “decent interval” and stress that the United States would inevitably be held responsible in case no aid was granted and South Vietnam was lost.112 Still, although they hated to admit it, by early 1975 Ford and Kissinger could at best hope to win additional time before Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane would succumb to communist pressure. Decent or not, the interval was coming to an end. In February, problems intensified. In South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese capitalized on the capture of Phuoc Long Province and positioned themselves for further attacks. The infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and war materiel climbed to unprecedented levels.113 In early February, Le Duan sent his military commander, General Van Tien Dung, to South Vietnam. While bidding farewell, the party first secretary reminded the general that if things went well, South Vietnam could even be liberated in 1975. In response to the North’s early victories on the battlefield and the absence of encouraging signs of additional aid from Washington, Thieu began contemplating plans for a military pullback to more limited and better-defensible enclave positions that some of his generals were advocating. In February, though, Thieu decided against giving up territory, not least because he feared an adverse US reaction.114 Meanwhile, Ford administration officials were feverishly attempting to win congressional permission for additional aid. In early February, Ford officially endorsed a plan brought forward by Martin in which Washington would provide Saigon with large-scale aid for a period of three years. After three years, the argument ran, the South Vietnamese would be economically independent.115 However, despite Ford, Kissinger, and Martin’s lobbying efforts, the congressional mood was not changing, and no progress on aid was achieved. To the contrary, eighty-two members of the Congress sent a letter to Ford expressing their con-

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

121

cern about the continuing US involvement in Indochina.116 As for the three-year aid program, even though some members of Congress showed interest in it, they were willing to discuss only a much-diminished level of financial support.117 As had been the case before, Kissinger and his NSC staffers put pressure on the intelligence community to produce the “right” kind of figures on the amount of aid the North Vietnamese were receiving from their allies. In late February, Stearman and Smyser advised Kissinger not to approve Colby’s data on aid to Hanoi. Stearman and Smyser concluded, “We are on the verge of again giving Congress misleading figures on Communist military aid to North Vietnam. If this is not stopped immediately, we will hand Congress a strong argument for slashing our requests for South Vietnam military assistance.”118 The NSC staffers again somewhat convincingly argued that a comparison between North and South Vietnamese aid levels quickly yielded an erroneous impression (depending, for instance, on how one included noncommodity items in the equation). Moreover, the needs of Saigon as the defending side were arguably higher than Hanoi’s. In any case, the Ford administration was clearly manipulating the data to suit its aid strategy, a fact Stearman and Smyser readily acknowledged.119 At the end of February, when a congressional fact-finding team, whose members Ford called “cowards” and Kissinger “hookers we can’t buy,” was sent to Indochina, those charades continued: to implement the “truth campaign” and make the case for more aid, Martin and the CIA station chief, Thomas Polgar, asked their subordinates to produce documents and provide briefings that justified the administration’s position.120 Developments in Cambodia were at least as discouraging as those in South Vietnam. In mid-February, the intelligence community completed an update of the National Intelligence Estimate on Cambodia’s prospects through August 1975. The estimate concluded that the military situation was critical and would deteriorate quickly if no additional US aid was forthcoming. But even with more aid, the study argued, Phnom Penh was unlikely to regain the overall advantage.121 By the end of February, the Khmer Rouge was consolidating its control of the Mekong River; a US airlift to the Pochentong airfield was the only supply line Phnom Penh could maintain with the outside world.122 The counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson, who visited Phnom Penh under NSC auspices in mid-February, supported the pessimistic analysis of Cambodia’s future and observed that “the Marshal [Lon Nol] was fanciful and seemed out of touch with realities.”123 Meanwhile, Ambassador Dean kept advocating the removal of Lon Nol and direct negotiations between Washington and Sihanouk in order to find a “controlled solution.”124Although Kissinger supported the idea of direct talks with Sihanouk, he continued to oppose Dean’s plan for removal of Lon Nol as the first

122

CHAPTER 5

step toward negotiations. According to the secretary of state (as well as his NSC staffers and Thompson), the basic problem remained that the Khmer Rouge would not negotiate as long as it was winning militarily and no real pressure could be brought on it.125 Commenting on Dean’s actions, Kissinger angrily told Ford that “we . . . have an Ambassador who has gone wild and is writing for the record.”126 By late February, Kissinger and Ford saw clearly that major changes in Indochina were imminent. Talking to the president, Kissinger concluded, “Cambodia is sort of disintegrating, regardless of the money. We may have the problem of liquidating Cambodia over the next two weeks.”127 Ford and Kissinger knew that South Vietnam’s overall prospects were not much better. To strengthen Thieu’s morale, Ford sent a letter to the South Vietnamese president in the wake of the request for supplemental aid. He reiterated that he would do all he could to help the South Vietnamese. “I remain hopeful that if we persevere we will yet reach our objective of a fair peace, a lasting peace, a peace which is consistent with the will of the South Vietnamese people and which justifies the sacrifices of the Vietnamese and American peoples,” Ford wrote.128 By then, more than ever, those were empty words, chiefly aimed at calming the South Vietnamese. Despite some small encouraging developments, such as Saudi willingness to provide South Vietnam with oil, Ford and Kissinger were well aware that they had made no progress on the central issues.129 Additional aid was not forthcoming, the North Vietnamese were scoring important military successes in the South, and, most important, US reintervention was out of the question. Although Ford and Kissinger still hoped to obtain additional aid and experts like Thompson were cautiously optimistic about South Vietnam’s prospects if additional funds could be secured, time was essentially running out.130 The effects Kissinger saw resulting from the anticipated fall of Saigon were grim. Although some of Kissinger’s interlocutors, such as former secretary of defense Robert McNamara, questioned Kissinger’s pessimism, he maintained that “if we lose Vietnam, Korea may go; Japan will shift and we will have bitter divisiveness here for years.”131 Ford agreed with Kissinger and, just like the secretary, blamed Congress for the Indochina problem. Commenting on Cambodia and the request for supplemental aid, Ford remarked, “If Cambodia gets knocked out of the appropriation, they will certainly collapse. But then it will be the Congress.”132 On Indochina, the president clearly showed no signs of making national reconciliation his priority. To the contrary, Ford readily and actively pursued the insurance-policy stratagem of blaming Congress and whitewashing the administration’s record. On March 1, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops officially began their campaign against Ban Me Thuot in the central highlands. Originally, the North Vietnamese general Dung’s sole mission in the South had been to capture the

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

123

city, but when NVA forces attacked Ban Me Thuot on March 10 and decided the battle in their favor by the following day, the North Vietnamese sensed their chance. Encouraged by their military success, the additional capture of vital intelligence, and some pressure from the approaching rainy season, Hanoi decided to extend Dung’s mission, push for the key city of Pleiku, and possibly even press for victory in 1975. Thieu’s next move played into the hands of the North Vietnamese. On March 13, the South Vietnamese president finally changed his mind and made the decision that many of his associates had favored for some time: he ordered his troops to withdraw from less vital areas of the country and to concentrate around Saigon. But although Thieu’s new strategy of “light at the top, heavy at the bottom” was not wrong per se, its execution was catastrophic. The withdrawal from Pleiku and Kontum (and thus from the entire highlands) on March 15 and 16 ended in chaos and panic, with the South Vietnamese commanding general abandoning his troops.133 Meanwhile, the Americans learned only gradually what was happening on the ground. On March 12, in a cabinet meeting, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger expressed the belief that South Vietnam could disintegrate just like Cambodia. For the time being, however, Schlesinger concluded, “In Vietnam we have a chronic, not an acute problem.”134 The same day, Stearman sent yet another appraisal of the Indochina situation to Kissinger that somewhat contradicted Schlesinger’s statement about urgency but still argued that Hanoi would opt for a gradual takeover. Reporting on the “ominous developments in Vietnam,” Stearman listed the recent communist military activities (including the unprecedented deployment of communist aircraft), high levels of infiltration, and trips of high-level Soviet and Chinese delegations to Hanoi. Stearman concluded, “When taken together, these signs indicate that the North Vietnamese spring offensive could be extremely intense and is probably designed to achieve a fundamental change in the balance of power in the South.”135 However, by mid-March, the previously correct US interpretation that Hanoi aimed for eventual control of the South through political means was being overtaken by the events in the highlands. It was not until March 17 that the CIA learned of the existence of Thieu’s new strategy of “light at the top, heavy at the bottom.” In the meantime, retreating South Vietnamese forces were being wiped out in the highlands and were also giving ground elsewhere. By March 20, Hue was under attack by the NVA, and further south, in Military Region 3, government forces were increasingly engaged by communist forces as well. As a result of the disastrous retreat from the highlands that did not provide Thieu with any additional forces, the South Vietnamese president’s concept of a strategic withdrawal was rendered null and void: Thieu was giving up territory but gaining nothing in return.136 Although Martin, who continued to be out of touch with the realities on the ground, downplayed the

124

CHAPTER 5

retreat from Pleiku, Polgar informed Washington that Saigon was facing a “general offensive.”137 Summarizing the CIA station chief ’s analysis, Scowcroft briefed Ford that “South Vietnam is in deep trouble because of North Vietnamese determination to bring about a military solution. Unless the present trends are reversed, within the next few months the very existence of an independent non-communist South Vietnam will be at stake.”138 The unraveling in South Vietnam and Cambodia continued with astonishing rapidity. By the end of March, Hue and Danang had fallen to the communists, and the North Vietnamese controlled all major cities of northern South Vietnam. Besides the impending military and political disaster, Thieu was facing a major humanitarian refugee crisis. The North Vietnamese leaders, on the other hand, had been as surprised as their opponents by their quick advance. By then there was no reason for internal debate; by late March, the decision had been made to seek military conquest in 1975. In Cambodia, collapse was even more imminent. In mid-March, Stearman and Smyser noted that there were indeed some signs that Sihanouk was willing to negotiate, and Washington could try to drive a wedge between the prince and the Khmer Rouge, albeit only if the communist dry-season offensive proved unsuccessful.139 However, it quickly became clear that the NSC staffers’ hopes were unfounded. With the Khmer Rouge advancing and Congress effectively ruling out additional aid, it was just a question of a few weeks until the fall of Phnom Penh. By the end of March, the evacuation of Westerners from Cambodia was well under way.140 Ford and Kissinger’s reaction to the final breakdown was predictable. Kissinger was informed of the developments in mid-March while he was conducting negotiations in the Middle East. When he returned to Washington, he first had to find out exactly how bad the Indochina situation was. Martin and high-level intelligence officials (including Colby) continued to paint an overly optimistic picture and alleged that Thieu could still retain a truncated South Vietnam around Saigon.141 As a result of the different analyses Kissinger and Ford received, there was some uncertainty about how and when the situations would unravel further. In late March, Smyser observed, “As you [Kissinger] know, we have done and said relatively little about the current NVA offensive.”142 As a reason for the administration’s hesitance to act, Smyser listed US uncertainty about Thieu’s strategy, wrong predictions from the CIA, bureaucratic inertia, frustration on the side of the administration about the congressional handcuffs, and failure to focus on the big picture in Indochina. Although Smyser concluded that, in the absence of strong statements by Ford and Kissinger, critics of the administration would gain strength for their decent-interval interpretation, in which Smyser did not believe, his analysis indirectly again highlighted the rationale behind the blame-stratagem

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

125

part of the insurance policy: he emphasized that Ford and Kissinger had to attempt to separate the perception of the Ford administration’s Indochina policy from the approach of Congress and the American public.143 In fact, Smyser was preaching to the choir. Despite the slow start and the contradictory predictions, Ford and Kissinger’s position remained clear, and, by and large, they had few illusions about the reality of the Indochina situation. In late March, during a meeting with members of the South Vietnamese Parliament who were visiting Washington, Ford reiterated that he was doing all he could to support Saigon and obtain further aid. He concluded the conversation by stating, “Keep up the good fight, and give to President Thieu and the others my best wishes for strength and freedom in the years ahead.”144 However, Ford and Kissinger knew full well that only a miracle could save Saigon and Phnom Penh. At the same time, Kissinger stated that he believed that Cambodia was finished.145 At the end of March, he told the president that the three-year aid plan that the administration had previously discussed no longer made sense. Kissinger concluded, “I say this with a bleeding heart—but maybe you must put Vietnam behind you and not tear the country apart again.”146 Ford and Kissinger both agreed, though, that avoiding further divisions in the United States excluded putting the blame on Congress. Using the rationale Smyser had summarized, Ford and Kissinger repeatedly instructed the administration to create the right kind of record and to hold the legislature responsible for the Indochina debacle. For example, Ford told Schlesinger, “We have to stand up and keep pushing [on additional aid]—make a public record that we meant what we said. The bad results are their [Congress’s] responsibility—not ours.”147 Ford and Kissinger’s blame strategy did not go unnoticed in Congress. In early March, Senator John Sparkman said of the administration’s Cambodia aid campaign, “It looks like they are now trying to blame the Congress.”148 In early April, complying with Smyser’s recommendation, Ford and Kissinger made strong public statements repeating the administration’s request for further aid and stressing Washington’s moral commitment to stand by its allies.149 By then, the appeals were truly rhetorical: in mid-March, the House and Senate Democratic caucuses, which constituted the majority in Congress, had voted against any additional aid to Saigon.150 As the NVA continued its blitzkrieg, Ford and Kissinger expressed frustration at their inability to act. In late March, Ford and Kissinger sent Army Chief of Staff Frederick Weyand on a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam. During his briefing of the general, Ford told Weyand, “We have talked options—they’re all on the tough side. We want your recommendation for the things which can be tough and shocking to the North. I regret I don’t have authority to do some of the things President Nixon could do.”151 When, during the same period, Thieu asked Ford

126

CHAPTER 5

FIGURE 3. President Ford meeting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, General Frederick Weyand, army chief of staff, and Graham Martin, ambassador to Vietnam, in the Oval Office on March 25, 1975. White House photograph courtesy of Gerald R. Ford Library.

for air support involving B-52 strikes, the president and Kissinger would clearly have liked to intervene militarily in Indochina and comply with Thieu’s request.152 But because they did not consider openly defying the law and recommitting US troops or airpower in Indochina, the continuation of the insurance policy was the only real option Ford and Kissinger considered. At the same time, fear about the impact of defeat in Indochina led to a renewed discussion among members of the administration of the so-called domino theory. According to the original concept, which President Eisenhower had formulated in 1954, defeat in Vietnam would trigger a chain reaction, and other Southeast Asian nations would fall to Soviet-led communism as well. Later, policymakers under President Kennedy questioned to some extent the geographic focus of the original domino theory and began stressing the impact on US credibility worldwide. By the time Nixon took office, the domino theory had been widely put into question. But although Nixon and Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy was based on the abandonment of Eisenhower’s idea of a monolithic, Soviet-led communism, they maintained the credibility argument as a rationale behind the engagement in Indochina.153 In March 1975, Ford referred to the domino theory in discussing the Indochina situation with the Republican congressional leadership.

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

127

Commenting on the effects of the Indochina situation on other Southeast Asian countries, he remarked, “The Philippines also are indicating they may reevaluate their policy [in addition to Thailand]. It is the best indication of the truth of the domino theory.”154 In the congressional leadership meeting, the president stressed the geographic aspect of the domino theory in a clear attempt to make the case for additional aid. However, as Ford’s numerous discussions with Kissinger had shown, for both men the domino theory translated above all into concern about the loss of US credibility in the global Cold War. In March, Ford and Kissinger often linked the Indochina situation to the Middle East, where they worried that an important domino might soon fall. The two men believed that Washington had to prove that it honored its commitments if negotiations were to be successful. Upon his return from the Middle East in late March, Kissinger quoted King Faisal of Saudi Arabia as saying that Washington’s abandonment of Saigon and Phnom Penh showed that the United States would let Israel go, too.155 Faisal’s assassination at the end of March, which put an end to the scheme of Saudi aid to South Vietnam, added to Ford and Kissinger’s concern. Although some international leaders challenged their notion of a decline of the United States’ international standing, Ford, Kissinger, and other principal members of the Ford administration remained convinced that the effects of defeat in Indochina on US credibility would be grave. In late March, former West German chancellor Willy Brandt told Ford that however the president chose to act on Indochina, the Germans would not question the United States’ leadership. The same day, in a conversation with Ford, Alexander Haig, now supreme allied commander Europe, drew the exact opposite conclusion, arguing that Germany was questioning US resolve as a result of Indochina.156 In late March, Smyser summarized the Ford administration’s concern about US credibility and tied it to the domino theory. “We can see, in Asia, in the Middle East and elsewhere that the domino theory still holds despite its detractors,” Smyser concluded. “We must think about what we can do, in Vietnam and elsewhere, to minimize the domino effect.”157

The Fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh In early April, with the northern part of South Vietnam under their control (and billions of dollars worth of abandoned US materiel in their possession), the North Vietnamese drew up plans for their ultimate objective: the conquest of Saigon. US intelligence analysts agreed that the situation in South Vietnam was critical. But, as before, there was considerable disagreement among the intelligence

128

CHAPTER 5

community about what exactly Hanoi was planning and what options remained for Washington. Polgar, who was fundamentally pessimistic about Saigon’s prospects, came to believe that a political settlement was Washington’s best hope, even if it was largely on communist terms. Polgar, in fact, argued for the removal of Thieu, who had lost all support in Saigon as a result of the catastrophic withdrawal from the highlands, in order to accommodate the North Vietnamese. Colby later predicted as well that a negotiated settlement could be achieved. Although the CIA analyst Frank Snepp was involved in the creation of Polgar’s reports to the CIA headquarters in Langley and shared the pessimism regarding Saigon’s prospects, he questioned Polgar’s plans for a settlement and believed that Hanoi would press for military victory.158 Martin, on the other hand, maintained that with additional US aid, Thieu would be able to defend the South Vietnamese heartland in and around Saigon and the Mekong Delta.159 Weyand and Smyser somewhat supported that view. In early April, Smyser stated that he was not yet prepared to write off South Vietnam.160 Simultaneously, reporting on his trip to South Vietnam, Weyand noted that Saigon’s chances for survival were marginal. However, he informed the president that the “South is planning to continue to defend with their available resources, and, if allowed respite, will rebuild their capabilities to the extent that United States support in materiel will permit.”161 Meeting with Ford, Kissinger, Martin, and Scowcroft, Weyand reiterated his overall conclusion: if there was to be any chance for success, the administration had to obtain $722 million in additional aid to Saigon.162 Neither Kissinger nor Ford really expected that South Vietnam could still be saved. Whatever slim hope they may have had that total loss could still be averted in the short term with additional aid was quickly evaporating. In a WSAG meeting in early April, Kissinger confessed, “Basically, then, nothing can be done.”163 Kissinger and Ford’s comments at the time, as well as their later writings, suggest that both men were following a rather pessimistic assessment of South Vietnam’s immediate prospects as supported by the CIA, Schlesinger, the State Department’s Philip Habib, the NSC staffer Clinton Granger, and Personal Photographer to the President David Kennerly (whose assessment Ford specifically mentioned in his memoirs).164 Ford and Kissinger knew that neither the developments on the ground in Indochina nor the domestic political situation in the United States warranted any real hope. At the same time, despite their pessimism, Ford and Kissinger remained the principal hawks on Indochina within the administration.165 The rationale behind Ford and Kissinger’s reasoning continued to be the insurance policy: if Indochina had to fall to the communists, it was best for Washington to go down fighting. As a result, they rejected the ideas of jettisoning Thieu or a quick US withdrawal and embraced Martin’s stalling on the evacuation of US citizens.166 In the same vein,

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

129

Ford and Kissinger strongly supported Weyand’s recommendation to request the $722 million, even though the congressional advisers thought that there was no chance of extracting the additional funds.167 Although part of their approach stemmed from practical concerns, such as the need to avoid panic and stoking anti-American resentment among the South Vietnamese, the credibility argument remained the primary motive for supporting the Thieu regime until the end. By early April, Ford and Kissinger’s moves to help the South Vietnamese (and the Cambodians) were clearly only symbolic. In addition to the decision to go ahead with the aid request, Ford and Kissinger continued to implement the familiar aspects of the insurance policy. Publicly, they kept conjuring up the grave effects of failure in Indochina on US foreign policy, thus putting the onus for defeat on Congress. At the same time, in line with previous attempts to downplay the overall importance of Vietnam in the Cold War, they stressed that defeat in Indochina was merely a setback and did not mean that the United States was relinquishing its world leadership.168 Moreover, they continued to prioritize good relations with both the Soviets and the Chinese. Although Kissinger tried to induce a restrained Soviet response to the developments in Indochina, he refrained from any harsh appeals to Moscow and Beijing.169 Détente and rapprochement were the primary means to divert attention from Vietnam and Cambodia. As Kissinger told the China specialist Winston Lord, “I think it’s a good time to remind people of our successes.”170 In early April, while they were discussing their next moves, Kissinger again presented to Ford the option of cutting loose from Indochina. In a private conversation, Kissinger suggested that Ford might consider telling the American people that he was not responsible for the Indochina problem, but Ford would have none of it.171 A few days later, they returned to the issue. Kissinger told Ford that Press Secretary Ron Nessen believed that the president should lead the way out of Vietnam. Ford remained steadfast and replied, “That is not the way I am. I couldn’t do it. If I were to go to the Hill, we should wipe our hands of it.”172 In the same conversation, Kissinger responded to a question by Ford by analyzing what previous presidents would have done. According to Kissinger, Kennedy would have withdrawn, while Johnson—against the recommendation of his advisers—would have stood his ground. As for Ford’s immediate predecessor, Kissinger argued, “Nixon may have bombed—he was vicious in these things.”173 Eisenhower, Kissinger had told Ford before, would have reacted much the same way as Johnson, making tough statements to the Soviets and the Chinese and redeploying US forces to Southeast Asia.174 Although Kissinger’s remarks were meant to encourage Ford to make a decision in favor of the “tough line” (i.e., pursue the aid request, refuse publicly to state that the US engagement was over, and not “negotiate surrender” with the North Vietnamese), his comments again

130

CHAPTER 5

implicitly highlighted their relationship in conceiving Indochina policy. Kissinger’s comments could well have been understood as criticism of Ford for not being tough enough. After all, in comparison with the picture Kissinger painted of Nixon and Eisenhower’s reaction, Ford’s “tough option” was rather soft. However, in the spring of 1975, Kissinger had time and again supported Ford’s view that military reintervention was out of the question. In fact, the options Kissinger laid out for the president were all within the overall framework Ford had (however implicitly) defined. Kissinger was not the man to push through a position that was either too soft or too hard from Ford’s point of view. Thus it was to a large extent Ford’s conviction and initiative that determined Washington’s response to the impending fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh. In the second week of April, Ford met with the NSC to discuss the administration’s next moves. Although all members of the NSC agreed that the prospects in South Vietnam and Cambodia were disastrous, opinion diverged on how Ford should best proceed. Schlesinger and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements advised him to request $300 million rather than the $722 million Weyand had recommended. Moreover, they suggested that he show strong leadership with Congress by admitting the hopelessness of the situation and turning the page on Indochina. Ford, though, wanted none of it. He told the NSC that he would request the higher aid figure, if only to set the record straight. Ford concluded, “I have spent a lot of time on this, now and even earlier, going back to 1952. I think our policy, going back to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, was the right policy.”175 Kissinger, of course, supported the president’s decision. Moreover, he took issue with Colby’s detailed analysis of the likely impact of defeat in Indochina on the rest of the world. Colby concluded that, generally speaking, foreign governments showed little surprise regarding the situation in Indochina and considered the recent developments the final phase of the US debacle. According to Colby, Washington should expect some negative fallout from Vietnam, for example, in the Middle East, but as a whole, friends and foes would not perceive that it signaled a decline in US power. Kissinger, on the other hand, argued that “especially in Asia, this rapid collapse and our impotent reaction will not go unnoticed. I believe that we will see the consequences although they may not come quickly or in any predictable manner.”176 Cambodia was the first Indochinese country to fall to the communists. On April 1, Lon Nol left the country on what was billed as a goodwill tour to Indonesia and Taiwan, but his departure had no effect on the situation. Shortly after, Ford authorized Dean to commence the final evacuation, Operation Eagle Pull, at his discretion. With the fall of Phnom Penh just a few days ahead, Sihanouk, through an intermediary in Beijing, let the Americans know that he

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

131

wished to uphold the Khmer government as a balancing factor.177 In the second week of April, discussing how to respond, Kissinger and Ford considered leaving Dean behind in Cambodia to pursue the Sihanouk angle, thereby potentially letting the ambassador be captured by the Khmer Rouge.178 But with Sihanouk backpedaling on his statement and Dean opposed to staying behind, the final evacuation was completed on April 12. Most of Phnom Penh’s leadership refused to be evacuated. Sirik Matak, the former Cambodian prime minister, informed Dean, “I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. . . . You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it. . . . I have only committed this mistake of believing in you [the Americans].”179 When the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh a few days later, Sirik Matak, along with the rest of the government members who had stayed behind, was murdered. In the second half of April, all that was left for Ford and Kissinger to manage regarding South Vietnam was the final evacuation. On April 10, Ford formally requested the $722 million Weyand had recommended and an additional $250 million for economic and humanitarian assistance. In a speech before a special joint session of Congress, the president endorsed US engagement in Indochina and warned the legislative body that Washington could not afford to abandon its allies. In his memoirs, Kissinger concluded that Ford was unapologetic and firm.180 However, the April 10 speech in fact highlighted the president’s approach of implementing the blame stratagem of the insurance policy while simultaneously attempting to mend domestic divisions. Ford had turned down an even tougher speech Kissinger had prepared for him, and although he justified his administration’s Indochina policy, he also delivered a strong appeal for national reconciliation: “Let us remember that our national unity is a most priceless asset. Let us deny our adversaries the satisfaction of using Vietnam to pit Americans against Americans.”181 In any case, Ford’s speech had no effect: the president drew no applause, and two freshmen Democrats walked out of the chamber. A few days later, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a rare move, requested a meeting with the president. The senators made it clear that they wanted the United States out of Vietnam as quickly as possible and that they would support funding only for the evacuation.182 The evacuation was no small task. Schlesinger and the Department of Defense, as well as lawmakers such as Senators Frank Church and Joseph Biden, pressed for a quick evacuation of Americans only, but Ford and Kissinger wanted to include South Vietnamese too.183 In fact, the issue of Washington granting asylum to Vietnamese refugees was as unpopular as additional aid: Americans opposed admitting the South Vietnamese by 54 to 36 percent.184 In mid-April, the Senate Armed Services Committee rejected Ford’s request and appropriated only $200 million, strictly limited to the evacuation of the remaining Americans. Moreover,

132

CHAPTER 5

Congress later voted against a $327 million bill to aid the refugees. Meanwhile, Ford continued campaigning hard to win public and congressional acceptance of the refugees. Eventually, thanks to the president’s determination, 120,000 Vietnamese refugees were admitted to the United States.185 Most critically during the final days of the US presence in Vietnam, Martin continued to stall and did not provide any detailed evacuation plans. Kissinger and Ford were, generally speaking, sympathetic to Martin—after all, the ambassador was trying to fulfill the mission they had given him. But because Martin was clearly out of touch with the realities on the ground and disobeying Kissinger’s orders to reduce the US presence, Ford and Kissinger were considering replacing him.186 Although they judged a similar French initiative useless, on April 19, Ford and Kissinger approached Moscow in order to obtain a cease-fire from the North Vietnamese, albeit sticking to the insurance-policy line of avoiding any tough pressure on the Soviets.187 They doubted that Moscow could actually control Hanoi sufficiently, but the Soviets did not really have to convince the North Vietnamese anyway: Hanoi wanted to regroup its forces and avoid any unnecessary provocation of the Americans. As a result, the North Vietnamese delayed their assault on Saigon until the end of April, and although they did not agree to a cease-fire, they made it clear that they would not interfere with the US evacuation.188 On April 20, Martin advised Thieu to step down. Although Kissinger later regretted the move, he and Ford had instructed Martin to approach the South Vietnamese president on the grounds that with Thieu gone and the North Vietnamese possibly engaging in negotiations, Washington might win a few days for the evacuation. The following day, Xuan Loc, the most important South Vietnamese stronghold just north of Saigon, was overrun. Thieu announced his resignation the same day, though not without venting his anger at Washington.189 “It is so easy to be an enemy of the United States, but so difficult to be a friend,” he proclaimed.190 With Saigon in its death throes, Ford and Kissinger kept vehemently complaining about the irresponsible Congress, US impotence, and the negative effects of defeat in Indochina on US foreign policy. Moreover, Kissinger kept arguing that the Paris Agreement could have worked had it not been for congressional restrictions.191 In principle, Ford continued to agree with Kissinger and his predecessor (commenting on Indochina, Nixon encouraged Kissinger in mid-April to go down fighting and confront Congress).192 Still, Ford also continued his balancing act between national reconciliation and a confrontational approach to Indochina. Kissinger was well aware that blaming Congress was potentially at odds with Ford’s attempt to heal the nation. “I know that this [confronting the Congress] is not in keeping with your policy of reconciliation, but I am being tough.

FORD AND THE FALL OF SAIGON

133

I just want the record to show that we asked for it [additional aid],” he told the president.193 Ford fully supported Kissinger. However, on April 23, the president delivered a speech at Tulane University in New Orleans in which he stated that as far as the United States was concerned, Vietnam was over.194 The university audience cheered, but Kissinger was furious because the phrase had been inserted by a counselor of Ford, Robert Hartmann, without the secretary’s prior knowledge. Although some of Ford’s White House staffers claimed that the speech amounted to a presidential declaration of independence from Kissinger, that was hardly the case. The Tulane speech again displayed Ford’s concern about national unity, but the president continued to share Kissinger’s views on foreign policy. In any case, the issue was purely tactical. In the context of the aid request and Ford’s earlier comments to Congress, the president had clearly contributed to the blame stratagem.195 In essence, Ford shared Nixon and Kissinger’s convictions about US honor and the executive branch’s right to shape US foreign policy. His particular contribution to Indochina policy was that he was able to calm the domestic divisions that had been caused by Watergate and Vietnam while giving no ground on the substance of Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy. The following day, Thieu left South Vietnam. His successor, Tran Van Huong, proposed negotiations to Hanoi, but when the communists rejected the offer,

FIGURE 4. A North Vietnamese T-54 tank, supplied by the Soviet Union, rolls through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon on April 30, 1975. AP.

134

CHAPTER 5

Huong quickly stepped down in favor of General Duong Van Minh, nicknamed “Big Minh,” who was to become South Vietnam’s last president. The day Thieu resigned, Washington had begun evacuating US citizens and some of those South Vietnamese who were especially endangered by collaborating with the Americans from Tan Son Nhut Airport in Saigon. The same day, the Soviets responded to Washington’s earlier approach and conveyed the somewhat vague message that the North Vietnamese would not interfere with the evacuation.196 Meanwhile, Ford met with the NSC to discuss the evacuation process. Although Ford and Kissinger shared Martin’s concern about panic and the possibility that some frustrated South Vietnamese might turn on the remaining Americans, the ambassador was still not complying with the president’s orders to reduce the US presence.197 The final phase of the evacuation began on April 28 (April 29 in Vietnam). As the result of a communist rocket attack on Tan Son Nhut and panicking South Vietnamese blocking the airfield, Ford ordered the implementation of Operation Frequent Wind, the final evacuation by helicopter. Kissinger and Ford agreed that, no matter how heart-sickening their decision, they must resort to evacuating only Americans.198 Because of mismanagement, the helicopter lift was briefly delayed, and there were shocking scenes of desperate South Vietnamese pushing to get into the US embassy to be evacuated.199 Apparently weeping, Kissinger agreed with Schlesinger that Martin, who continued to put South Vietnamese on the helicopters as well, was to be on the final chopper.200 With the last helicopters reaching the US flotilla in the South China Sea, Kissinger and Ford claimed that the final evacuation had been a success.201 Indeed, during the final hours of the airlift, almost 1,400 Americans and more than 5,500 South Vietnamese had been rescued, but many other South Vietnamese were left behind. There was no reason to celebrate. On April 30, with Hanoi refusing to discuss any terms, Big Minh had no choice but to surrender unconditionally. The United States and South Vietnam had lost the war.202 Although the striking images of the evacuation from Saigon painfully brought home to the American public that the decade-long war in Indochina had been futile, it remained to be seen how the world would react to the US defeat and whether the insurance policy would pay any dividends.

6 BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

For the remainder of Ford’s presidency, the regional focus of the administration was, for the most part, no longer on Indochina. Washington and Hanoi made no progress toward a normalization of relations, but other trouble spots, such as Angola, demanded much of Ford and Kissinger’s attention. Still, the two men continued trying to ease the effects of the US defeat in Indochina by reverting to the familiar aspects of the insurance policy. Most important, they tried to move beyond Vietnam by achieving additional foreign policy successes in relations with the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while simultaneously attempting to demonstrate to the world that the United States was no passive paper tiger. By the end of 1975, though, Washington’s relations with Moscow had taken a decisive turn for the worse, and rapprochement with Beijing was suspended. Although Ford and Kissinger were not willing to make major concessions to the Soviets or the Chinese in the wake of Saigon’s fall, domestic opposition to the Helsinki Final Act, the lack of success in reaching a second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT II), and the Angolan civil war contributed to the breakdown of détente. Most important, Ford and Kissinger’s foreign policy was coming under increasing attack at home from both the Right and the Left. By the time of the 1976 presidential election, Ford had dropped détente from his vocabulary, and Kissinger, the principal representative of the concept, had, at least in the eyes of Ford’s domestic advisers, become a political liability.1

135

136

CHAPTER 6

Dealing with Defeat During the first weeks of May 1975, at the request of the president, different parts of the Ford administration prepared papers on the effects and lessons of Vietnam. Analysts at the State Department were highly critical of the US engagement in Indochina. They stressed the limits of US power to influence events and argued that Washington should admit its inability to fully understand foreign societies, in particular in Asia. In addition to criticizing a Western-focused mind-set, the State Department specialists made several central observations: 1968 had been a better time to reach a political settlement than 1972; the USSR and the PRC had not been willing to seriously restrain Hanoi and could be expected to act similarly elsewhere; and unlike in Vietnam, Washington would have to ensure public and congressional support for its foreign policy undertakings in the future. Taking those points into consideration, the State Department paper argued that US foreign commitments should be limited and controllable, and that the “clear and numerous” lessons of Vietnam had to be applied to avert similar catastrophes.2 Military analysts at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) focused on what they considered key strategic lessons concerning the military leadership’s responsibilities. Somewhat similarly to the State Department’s analysis, the military analysts stressed that Washington’s attempt at nation building in South Vietnam had proved futile and had thus seriously compromised US military engagement. Moreover, the JCS specialists concluded that “when the option of military action is selected, America’s power should permit—and the American public’s demonstrated aversion to long, limited wars will probably dictate—that our objective be achieved quickly by the use of overwhelming force.”3 The National Security Council (NSC) staffers William Smyser and William Stearman objected to most of these conclusions and above all to the State Department’s analysis. Smyser and Stearman defended Washington’s engagement and strategic decisions in Indochina and argued that there were no absolute lessons of Vietnam. “It was a unique situation, geographically, ethnically, politically, militarily and diplomatically. We should probably be grateful for that and should recognize it, instead of trying to apply ‘the lessons of Vietnam’ universally as we once tried to apply ‘the lessons of Munich,’ ” they concluded.4 In brief, Smyser and Stearman criticized the State Department’s analysis for being too simplistic and inapplicable. The lessons that they did feel comfortable drawing included the observations that the US military had not been suited to the war in Vietnam, that domestic political groups would not long support foreign policy engagements that went against their basic convictions, and that Washington had to clearly communicate the realities of its undertakings to the American public.

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

137

Kissinger’s report to the president was based on Smyser and Stearman’s analysis. He argued again that there were not many lessons of Vietnam that could be easily applied elsewhere. While implicitly defending the US government’s position, Kissinger presented a detailed account of the military, diplomatic, and domestic political difficulties Washington had faced during its engagement in Vietnam. In line with the insurance policy, Kissinger concluded that, as a result of defeat in Vietnam, Washington would be compelled to take a much tougher approach to other foreign policy situations in order to restore US credibility. He ended on a positive note, arguing that US involvement in Indochina had not been in vain since it had prevented Indonesia from becoming communist in 1965, had preserved the US presence in Asia, had shielded US allies like Japan, and had bought ten years of time, before which the impact of the fall of Indochina would have been much greater.5 Although the observations expressed in Kissinger’s report were not completely wrong, it was, on balance, a rather questionable reinterpretation of Washington’s achievements that vindicated with hindsight the US engagement in Vietnam. In fact, Kissinger’s analysis reiterated Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew’s view that Washington had bought vital time for Southeast Asia’s noncommunist nations to develop.6 This argument was taken up and expanded by the former national security adviser, Walt Rostow, who had served under Lyndon Johnson. Most famously in the mid-1980s and 1990s, Rostow argued that US intervention in Vietnam had stabilized the emerging states belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which included Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei. Without the Vietnam War, Rostow’s reasoning went, ASEAN nations would have gone communist, and economic progress would have been thwarted. Rostow concluded, “We certainly lost the battle—the test of will—in Vietnam, but we won the war in Southeast Asia because South Vietnam and its allies for ten years were [quoting Lyndon Johnson] ‘holding aggression at bay.’ ”7 Vietnam revisionists, including Kissinger and Nixon, embraced Rostow’s argument as part of their postwar attempts to vindicate the US engagement in Indochina.8 In fact, the revisionist “buying-time” thesis and the notion that the US engagement in Vietnam had been a victory in disguise were highly misleading. Washington’s primary objective had never been to promote rapid economic growth for the ASEAN states. Rather, Washington had intervened in Vietnam because of its own perceived national interest in the Cold War. Rostow and others, with hindsight, changed the standards by which to measure the successes and failures of the Vietnam War. Moreover, central developments in Southeast Asia had no causal link to the US engagement in Indochina: the suppression of communism in Indonesia in the mid-1960s was essentially unrelated to the Vietnam War, and the

138

CHAPTER 6

founding, of ASEAN in 1967 was not made possible by the US presence in Vietnam but rather was rooted in the often anti-American nationalism of Southeast Asian leaders.9 If anything, the positive (economic) effects of the decades-long US engagement in Vietnam on other Southeast Asian nations were indirect and accidental. Although Smyser and Stearman’s analysis contributed to Kissinger’s questionable conclusions, it did not, in fact, lend itself very well to the victory-in-disguise argument; they observed that the positive effects of Vietnam were somewhat paradoxical and could be seen as the good side effects of a bad outcome in Indochina.10 In the final analysis, Kissinger and his NSC staffers’ attempts to avoid self-flagellation and stress the positive effects of Washington’s Indochina policy constituted an effort to ease the sting of defeat. Setting the tone of the Ford administration’s public position on the US engagement in Indochina, Kissinger and his aides added yet another aspect to the insurance policy. In the days after the fall of Saigon, the other parts of the insurance policy were continued as well. In early May, Kissinger told Secretary of the Treasury William Simon that the administration had to downplay the significance of Indochina. Kissinger emphasized that although they had to tell the American public about the negative effects of Vietnam, the overall message must be that the country was just a small part of the world, and that other foreign policy issues were more important.11 Moreover, Kissinger sought to counterbalance the negative fallout from Vietnam by evoking the Nixon and Ford administrations’ foreign policy successes, especially in US-Soviet relations. In early May, for example, Kissinger instructed the State Department’s director of policy planning, Winston Lord, to draft an upbeat speech that stressed the need to focus on détente.12 With the Soviets, who felt that Washington was not adequately appreciating their attempt to restrain the North Vietnamese during the final evacuation, Kissinger and Ford reaffirmed the desire to proceed with détente.13 Ford and Kissinger also sought to continue improving relations with the Chinese. At the same time, their major concern was to convince the Chinese that the fall of Saigon did not mean that Washington was a paper tiger. Kissinger’s China specialists argued that the US defeat in Indochina had “radically transformed the political context” in which Washington and Beijing were operating.14 According to the analysts, Kissinger had to try to project an image of strength despite Vietnam and the domestic political situation. Moreover, they concluded that Beijing did not want Washington to end the US presence in Asia altogether, but that the Chinese sought to maintain a counterweight to the perceived increase in Soviet influence. Although the China specialists advised Kissinger to play on those Chinese fears of Soviet expansionism to achieve further cooperation, it was equally noted that progress in US-PRC normalization was increasingly difficult, not least

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

139

because the Ford administration’s domestic critics of rapprochement could (somewhat correctly) claim that Beijing, unlike Washington, was not making any meaningful concessions. US intelligence during the first half of May supported the analysis brought forward by the China experts. The CIA confirmed that Beijing’s relationship with Hanoi was not altogether smooth and made the additional observation that the Chinese hoped that Washington would maintain its presence in Laos to help contain the Soviets.15 In a meeting with the Chinese liaison office chief, Huang Chen, Kissinger, as he had done before, depicted Indochina as an “irritant” to US foreign policy. Kissinger argued, “In many respects we are in a psychologically stronger period as we don’t have to debate Vietnam every week.”16 Although Huang agreed with Kissinger that Vietnam had been a burden, he lectured the secretary on the US mistakes in Indochina and urged Washington to learn the right lessons. Kissinger and Huang both reaffirmed the Shanghai Communiqué, and the Chinese representative supported strong ties between Washington and its allies in Japan and Europe. Still, he remained somewhat unconvinced of the image of a strong United States that Kissinger sought to convey and argued that the Ford administration had taken a very passive approach toward Moscow. Ford and Kissinger not only sought to convince their communist adversaries that Washington was still vigorous but also with equal emphasis attempted to reassure Washington’s allies. In early May, they met with several representatives of US allies in Asia and the Pacific. Their message was that Washington’s overall approach to the region had not changed: a US military presence would be maintained—in fact, military and economic assistance would be expanded. They specifically sought to reassure the South Koreans.17 Moreover, Kissinger stated that Washington would establish strong positions in Indonesia and the Philippines.18 In a meeting with New Zealand’s prime minister, Wallace Edward Rowling, Ford and Kissinger managed to alleviate some of their ally’s fears. Still, Rowling remarked that “for us, when the United States hiccups, we get a stitch. When you do more than hiccup, we get really ill.”19 In a meeting of Ford, Kissinger, and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, the implications of the fall of Saigon for US foreign policy toward Asia were the main topic as well. Responding to Kissinger and Ford’s questions, Lee argued that the Paris Agreement had not been doomed to fail. According to the prime minister, if the congressional bombing halt and Watergate had not occurred, the North Vietnamese had focused on reconstruction rather than conquest, and Thieu had emphasized economic development, South Vietnam could have survived. Although this analysis reinforced Ford and Kissinger’s interpretation of the developments in Indochina, Lee made it clear that they had to look to the future and not the past. Most important, Lee argued, Washington had to

140

CHAPTER 6

strengthen economic development in Southeast Asia in order to prevent the spread of communism.20 As the various reports on the lessons of Vietnam, as well as Ford and Kissinger’s exchanges with foreign leaders, demonstrated, the president and Kissinger continued to see US foreign policy as the domain of the executive branch and themselves as the defenders of the national interest. Rather than making their postVietnam policy toward Asia dependent on domestic considerations, they remained convinced that it was their duty to restore US credibility and maintain the upper hand in the Cold War. However, this did not mean that domestic considerations were negligible. For example, they continued to be concerned about Vietnam-related revelations and sought to block congressional attempts to acquire Nixon’s letters to Thieu in the run-up to the Paris Agreement (which contained the “secret promises” of US support).21 Moreover, in what the press called the “Year of Intelligence,” a Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church conducted investigations of the intelligence community, partly in the context of the CIA’s covert operations in Vietnam. Kissinger and Ford feared that, as a result, the CIA would become impotent. Furthermore, the revelations and the Ford administration’s attempts to counter them tied in with charges of secrecy and deception leveled against the White House.22 Although Ford and Kissinger remained concerned about the Democraticdominated Congress—referred to by Kissinger as the “McGovernite Congress”— they believed that public opinion toward US foreign policy was shifting. Reflecting on Capitol Hill’s intransigence, Ford told Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, “From a long-range point of view, the Congress is losing support with the public.”23 In fact, Ford and Kissinger were most concerned about challenges from the political Right, led by the emerging neoconservative movement and Ford’s challenger during the 1976 Republican presidential primaries, Ronald Reagan, that they had lost in Indochina and shown weakness vis-à-vis the Soviets and the Chinese. “Reagan told me he is getting standing applause for being tough,” Kissinger observed, “I think the pay dirt is on the right, not the left.”24 As a result, in addition to foreign policy considerations, Ford and Kissinger perceived a strong domestic impetus to project an image of US strength, not least in their approach to Indochina.25 Throughout this inaugural period of coming to terms with defeat in Indochina, Ford continued to share Kissinger’s basic outlook and actively supported the secretary’s attempts to counterbalance the international and domestic reverberations of the fall of Saigon. As for the executive-legislature relationship, Ford expressed great disappointment in the Ninety-Fourth Congress, which he labeled the least productive he had ever seen.26 Commenting on how the administration should respond to Congress’s request for the potentially damaging Nixon letters, Ford

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

141

told Kissinger in early May, “I want to be tough. That is the right side. Now that Vietnam is over, the public interest is not there—I think we should be firm.”27 Moreover, Ford dismissed criticism of the final evacuation from Saigon as the comments of “Monday morning quarterbacks” who did not appreciate the US military’s outstanding performance during the operation.28 Most important, Ford remained committed to reinvigorating US credibility in the Cold War. In midMay, an incident off the coast of Cambodia offered a welcome opportunity for the president to remind the world of US sturdiness and underline his leadership.

Losing a Countr y, Saving a Ship On May 12, Khmer Rouge forces seized the SS Mayaguez, a US container ship, in the Gulf of Thailand. As the merchant vessel, which was carry ing a load for the Department of Defense from Hong Kong to Thailand, passed Poulo Wai Island, about sixty miles off the Cambodian coast, Cambodian navy ships forced the Mayaguez to stop and took captive the crew of thirty-nine Americans.29 When Ford, Kissinger and their advisers learned of the incident, they convened an emergency NSC meeting. CIA director William Colby gave a briefing about the known facts. As Colby rightly stressed, tiny Poulo Wai Island had been claimed by both Cambodia and South Vietnam. Just a few days before, the Khmer Rouge had occupied the island, seized a Panamanian ship, and fired at other vessels. Colby explained, “The Khmer Communists were planning to occupy Cambodian offshore islands, probably to reiterate the Cambodian claim vis-à-vis the Vietnamese Communists. The occupation may provide an early test for future relations between the Khmer and Vietnamese Communists.”30 Colby emphasized that a major reason for the territorial dispute was potentially rich oil deposits in this part of the gulf. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger agreed with Colby. “Such information as we have indicates that the main purpose of the Cambodian forces in occupying the islands may have been to keep them from their brethren in South Vietnam,” he proclaimed.31 Clearly, the members of the NSC showed no simplistic misperceptions regarding the motives of the Khmer Rouge and did not believe that the communists were specifically attempting to provoke Washington. Rather than neglecting the regional background of the crisis in favor of a distorting Cold War mind-set, policymakers in Washington comprehended the dynamics that drove the various communist movements in Indochina.32 During the NSC meeting, Kissinger, who took a hawkish stance from the beginning, made it clear that he considered it most important how Washington’s reaction to the Mayaguez crisis would be perceived around the world. Although he did not neglect the regional origins of the crisis, he stressed that

142

CHAPTER 6

any US response would internationally and domestically be perceived within the context of the fall of Saigon. As Ford and Kissinger’s exchanges with the Soviets and the Chinese, as well as allies in the Asia-Pacific region, had shown, foreign leaders did actually wonder how US foreign policy, specifically in Asia, would be affected by the debacle in Indochina. In Europe and the Middle East, though somewhat ambivalently, US allies, including the British, the French, and the Israelis, had also begun questioning Washington’s resolve. The German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung had called the United States a “helpless Giant.”33 In Latin America, influential leaders in Chile and Venezuela had expressed disillusionment at the United States’ “diminished leadership.”34 Against this background, Kissinger’s argument that not only the lives of the American crew but also, and more important, the perception of US credibility were at stake found support among the members of the NSC. Kissinger argued that a visible show of force was necessary (although it should not appear as staged). In other words, in line with the insurance policy, he made it clear that the use of force for its own good was desirable. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller supported Kissinger’s view and compared the Mayaguez incident with the humiliating seizure of the USS Pueblo, a US surveillance ship, by North Korean forces in 1968. During the Pueblo crisis, the American crew had been held captive for almost a year until the Johnson administration had finally agreed to sign a letter of apology drafted by the North Koreans. Rockefeller made it clear that the Pueblo situation must be avoided at all costs. He concluded, “I think this will be seen as a test case. . . . I think a violent response is in order. The world should know that we will act and that we will act quickly.”35 Ford agreed with Rockefeller and Kissinger that strong action should be taken. Throughout the Mayaguez crisis, the president supported Kissinger’s analysis and remained a principal hawk and advocate of the insurance policy. In addition to underlining the persistence of the insurance policy, the Mayaguez incident highlighted the relation between foreign policy and domestic politics during the Ford administration. First and foremost, Ford, Kissinger, and their foreign policy advisers discussed options in terms of their implications for foreign affairs, namely, as they related to concerns about US credibility. Moreover, as the discussions among the NSC members showed, policymakers expected that a violent response to the Mayaguez crisis could well be unpopular, but they made plans for military action anyway. However, domestic considerations figured not far behind those attending foreign policy. First, as Kissinger’s analysis of the “lessons of Vietnam” had shown, policymakers perceived the credibility issue as closely related to the image Americans had of themselves. According to Kissinger, the Ford administration not only had to project toughness externally but also had to reunite Americans

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

143

at home if leadership in the Cold War was to be maintained. Ford shared this point of view. Second, when news of the capture of the Mayaguez reached Washington, Kissinger and Ford were discussing how best to exploit foreign policy for domestic political gains. With the presidential election coming up the following year, those considerations became even more important. They agreed that the possible Democratic candidates, as well as Ford’s challenger from the Right, Ronald Reagan, would be a disaster for the United States’ standing in the world. Kissinger remarked, “I could come out constantly making speeches, so it couldn’t be charged as politicizing foreign policy. I think your election is essential.”36 In fact, the Mayaguez incident occurred just as Kissinger was about to deliver speeches in St. Louis and Kansas City to sell the notion of the United States as a strong international player in the wake of Indochina. In Ford and Kissinger’s thinking, the Mayaguez crisis, if it were played well, could provide an excellent opportunity to put rhetoric into practice and score politically at home.37 In addition to highlighting the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics, Ford’s initial response to the Mayaguez incident showed again that, in the context of Indochina, the president was willing to deceive Congress and that executive-legislature cooperation was not his priority.38 During an NSC meeting, Ford pointed out that Congress’s inhibitive legislation from the summer of 1973, as well as the War Powers Act, posed problems for the implementation of a forceful reaction. To avoid controversy, the president instructed members of the NSC not to inform Congress about the plans for military action. In any case, Ford was determined to act. “I can assure you that, irrespective of the Congress, we will move,” he vowed.39 Although Ford made sure that his administration could claim to have complied with the War Powers Act (or at least with the administration’s interpretation thereof), he clearly did so for tactical reasons and not because he had opted for transparency and reconciliation. Although Ford and Kissinger favored a quick and decisive military response, they decided that the administration should attempt to establish indirect contact with the Khmer Rouge (Washington did not maintain diplomatic relations with the new Khmer regime). The main rationale behind this move was to counter possible accusations on the domestic front that a diplomatic solution could have been reached. Ford instructed Kissinger and the State Department to approach the Chinese as intermediaries to inform the Khmer Rouge that Washington was demanding the release of the Mayaguez and its crew. Beijing, however, refused to relay the message.40 At the same time, the Chinese vice premier, Deng Xiaoping, who was visiting Paris, stated that China could do nothing if Washington intervened militarily. The following day, a Chinese diplomat in Tehran told his US counterpart that Beijing was embarrassed by the seizure of the Mayaguez and that the Chinese were pressuring the Khmer Rouge to release the ship and the sailors.

144

CHAPTER 6

FIGURE 5. President Ford in a National Security Council meeting during the Mayaguez crisis on May 13, 1975. White House photograph courtesy of Gerald R. Ford Library.

The message was clear: Beijing had not supported the Khmer Rouge’s move, and Washington was receiving a green light for forceful action.41 The day after the seizure of the Mayaguez, the NSC convened several meetings to discuss the administration’s next moves. Although the exact location of the Mayaguez’s crew remained unknown to the Americans, US intelligence suggested that the crew had been moved to Koh Tang, an island thirty-four miles from the Cambodian shore. In an attempt to prevent the Americans from being taken to the Cambodian mainland, Ford ordered US aircraft to attack boats that were leaving or approaching the island. Although the president and the other members of the NSC dreaded the prospect of killing the crew through friendly fire, Ford and Kissinger agreed that the risk had to be taken. However, when Ford learned that a fighter pilot believed that he had seen Caucasians on a boat that had left Koh Tang for the mainland, he ordered that riot control agents be used to stop the boat but that it should not be sunk.42 The prime motive that guided Ford and Kissinger’s response remained the same. Kissinger concluded, “We should not look as though people can localize an issue. . . . I am thinking not of Cambodia, but of Korea and of the Soviet Union and of others.”43 Making a plea for strong action (including bombing the Cambodian mainland) and opposing a more moderate stance as brought forward by

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

145

Schlesinger’s deputy, William Clements, Kissinger argued that Washington should seek the opportunity to reinvigorate the idea behind the madman theory, a stratagem developed by Nixon and Kissinger according to which the president (and his administration) should convey the impression of being unpredictable and trigger-happy. Moreover, Kissinger argued that indecisive action would not help Ford with Congress. The president agreed and confirmed his earlier pledge not to be too concerned about congressional restrictions. In opposition to Schlesinger, Kissinger encouraged this position and remarked, “Some domestic cost is to our advantage in demonstrating the seriousness with which we view this kind of challenge.”44 On the evening of the same day, the administration informed congressional leaders that military force would probably be used to free the Mayaguez and its crew. The following day, Ford and Kissinger met with a bipartisan group of members of Congress to strengthen the impression that the administration was complying with the War Powers Act and Indochina-related laws. When Ford briefed congressional leaders on the imminent military operation against the Khmer Rouge, Senator Mike Mansfield expressed concern about air strikes against the Khmer navy and air force installations on the Cambodian mainland. In response, Ford argued that the air strikes were necessary to protect the US marines who were to assault the island and ship. Senator Clifford Case, author of the Case-Church amendment, agreed with the president. “The act wasn’t designed to condone piracy but for other purposes. I think the actions were proper,” Case commented.45 In justifying strikes against the Cambodian mainland and professing to make compliance with the law his priority, Ford was clearly deceiving Congress. In an NSC meeting before the president’s briefing of the congressional leaders, the administration members agreed that the Khmer planes stationed on the mainland did not really pose a great threat to the US operation, but that the argument should be made to Congress.46 During the same meeting, while discussing their congressional strategy, the members of the NSC implicitly conceded that they were not really consulting with Congress about their actions, as the War Powers Act demanded. Clearly, the administration was operating in a legal gray zone and was trying to find loopholes to avoid congressional restrictions. In addition to planning their domestic charades, the members of the NSC also expressed considerable doubt that the Mayaguez’s crew was still on Koh Tang Island. Although Washington did not know that the sailors had actually been moved to another island and that the Khmer Rouge was willing to release its hostages if it made sure that the US planes left, the observations of the US pilot suggested that at least part of the crew had been moved from Koh Tang Island. But Ford and Kissinger agreed that they had to capture the island anyway and

146

CHAPTER 6

portray military action as a rescue operation based on the assumption that the crewmen were on the island. As for the attacks on the mainland, Ford did not follow Rockefeller’s advice to use B-52s and instead ordered Navy jets to conduct “surgical” strikes. However, in principle, Ford agreed with Kissinger (and not with Schlesinger, who opposed any air strikes) that decisive action was desirable in order to set an example. Ford concluded, “Whether or not we find the Americans, you can strike.”47 Kissinger suggested that if the crew was not on Koh Tang Island, Washington should extend military operations against Cambodia, including the use of mines and strikes against airfields in Phnom Penh. The administration sent another formal warning to Cambodia through the United Nations, but the move was pro forma, and the timing and wording of the statement made it appear like an announcement of the imminent attack rather than an attempt to find a diplomatic solution.48 In the early morning of May 15, the rescue operation began with US helicopters taking off for Koh Tang Island from a base at Utapao in Thailand. Ford and Kissinger knew that the use of US bases in Thailand would cause problems with the Thai government and public (in fact, the Thai premier had told Washington that he would not permit the bases to be used for operations against Cambodia), but they made operational necessities their priority. Moreover, Ford and Kissinger expected the Thai leadership (particularly the military)49 actually to welcome a forceful reaction as a sign of reassurance in the wake of the fall of Saigon.50 The landing of the marines on Koh Tang Island did not go smoothly. Because of faulty and late intelligence, they were not expecting stiff resistance from numerous, well-entrenched Khmer Rouge. As the first helicopters reached the island, the Mayaguez and the crew were set free, but since the Khmer Rouge’s announcement did not say what had happened to the sailors, Ford ordered the military to proceed with the bombing runs on the mainland. When the crew was finally picked up by a US ship, the marines were still fighting on Koh Tang Island. Again making the case for the need to display US toughness, Kissinger argued that the air strikes should continue until the operation was completed as planned.51 To Ford and Kissinger’s chagrin, they subsequently learned that not all bombing runs had been properly carried out. They suspected that Schlesinger had not complied with the orders.52 Although Ford refrained from openly confronting his secretary of defense, Schlesinger’s apparent disobedience greatly irritated the president.53 Ford and Kissinger deemed the rescue of the Mayaguez and its crew a great success. So did the American public. Ford’s approval ratings in the Gallup Poll increased from 39 to 51 percent.54 As the president and Kissinger had hoped, the episode helped bolster Ford’s image as a strong leader. At least for the moment, the perceived success of the Mayaguez operation seemed, in part, to counter-

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

147

balance the traumatic departure from Vietnam. Moreover, with the president receiving congratulations from the Senate, Kissinger could rightly claim that the administration had scored in the ongoing executive-legislative struggle over dominance in foreign policy.55 However, domestic and international success for the Ford administration came at a high price: forty-one US troops were killed during the Mayaguez crisis—twenty-three alone as the result of a helicopter crash in Thailand that the administration disingenuously attempted to separate from the operation.56 Although insufficient training and bad communication caused the US casualties, Ford and Kissinger had not made the lives of the US soldiers (or sailors) their top priority in the first place. Kissinger and Ford decided to use Ford’s meeting with the shah of Iran to convey their rationale behind the Mayaguez operation.57 Following Kissinger’s recommendation, Ford indicated to the shah that the administration had used overwhelming force to demonstrate Washington’s resolve in Korea and elsewhere. The president concluded, “There were legislative restrictions imposed in the 1973 act and the War Powers Act, which some said meant the President couldn’t act. This showed we could and did and showed the world we weren’t hamstrung.”58 The shah was not the only world leader who was impressed. According to Kissinger, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt had also been greatly pleased with the US reaction.59 In Thailand, leftist protesters condemned the operation, and it was clear that Washington would have to comply with the government’s request to close its military bases. However, as the NSC had anticipated, Thai military leaders were quietly sympathetic to the operation.60 On the whole, Ford and Kissinger’s conscious decision to turn the Mayaguez incident into part of the insurance policy by making it a show of US force and the administration’s resolve partly paid off. Still, as Kissinger conceded in his memoirs, the effects of Washington’s defeat in Indochina had hardly been undone. The reality, he acknowledged, was that “we had entered Indochina to save a country, and that we had ended by rescuing a ship.” 61

Punishing Hanoi, Stagnation with Beijing With communist Vietnam, Ford and Kissinger took a tough, intransigent stance. During the final days of Saigon, the president and Kissinger had expressed some hopes that a unified Vietnam might be destabilized by infighting between proChinese and pro-Soviet factions.62 Unsurprisingly, they showed no sympathy toward Hanoi in the wake of the fall of Saigon. Rather than seriously exploring the possible gains from establishing diplomatic relations, Ford and Kissinger sought

148

CHAPTER 6

to punish Hanoi for its conquest of the South. Kissinger’s (unsuccessful) attempt to return the Nobel Peace Prize he had been awarded in 1973 underlined the deep feeling of bitterness toward Vietnam.63 When the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG) and Hanoi handed in applications to join the United Nations in July 1975, the Ford administration moved to block their attempt to gain international recognition and economic aid. In the late spring and early summer of 1975, Kissinger’s advisers had drawn up the strategy to link the admission of Vietnam to the admission of South Korea, fully knowing that the Soviets and the Chinese would most probably reject that proposal.64 When South Korea was not admitted into the UN, Washington vetoed Vietnamese membership in August 1975 and again in 1976. The Ford administration had one important remaining interest in its dealing with Hanoi: accounting for US MIAs. Hanoi, on the other hand, attempted to obtain desperately needed reconstruction aid from Washington. The basic conflict of positions that would remain in place throughout the remainder of the Ford presidency ran along these lines: Hanoi stated that normalization of relations could be achieved only if aid was granted; Washington argued that normalization must come without preconditions while making it clear that the Vietnamese had to drop their aid request and provide a satisfactory accounting of the MIAs if rapprochement was to happen at all.65 Although Ford and Kissinger were trying to find ways to obtain information on the MIAs from Hanoi, they were not willing to make any meaningful concessions to the communists. For its part, Hanoi contributed greatly to its international isolation by taking the moral high ground and arguing that Washington owed it reparation payments, which Nixon had told Hanoi would be forthcoming as part of the Paris Agreement deal. North Vietnamese prime minister Pham Van Dong’s response to a congressional letter that had raised the issue of the MIAs reflected Hanoi’s rigid tone. According to Pham, the first step toward normal relations had to be the “fulfillment of [Washington’s] obligation to contribute to the healing of the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction in the two zones of Vietnam.” 66 Regardless of Nixon’s alleged promise, the Ford administration could make a strong case that the Vietnamese communists were hardly in a position to invoke the treaty signed in 1973; after all, it had been Hanoi that, in a clear breach of the Paris Agreement, had conquered South Vietnam. In addition to the strategy of exchanging information on the MIAs for reconstruction aid, which the Ford administration presented as proof of Hanoi’s cynicism and ruthlessness, the measures that the North Vietnamese adopted when they came to power lent themselves well to charges of cruelty. Although the communists’ regime in Vietnam did not end in a bloodbath similar to that in Cambodia,

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

149

up to 65,000 Southerners were executed, and at least 200,000 others were sent to so-called reeducation camps.67 At the same time, the stream of Vietnamese refugees, many of whom risked their lives by trying to leave the country by boat, continued after the spring of 1975; as late as July 1976, the administration was still receiving reports that large numbers of Vietnamese were attempting to escape.68 Revisionist writers, including Nixon and Kissinger, later pointed to the communists’ harsh treatment of the Southerners as part of their attempt to characterize the US engagement in Indochina as a “noble cause.” 69 Meanwhile, in neighboring Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge continued its ideologically driven genocide. After the fall of Phnom Penh, the Ford administration had little precise information on what exactly was happening in Cambodia, but reports from refugees drew a gruesome picture. The US embassy in Bangkok rightly concluded, “Cambodia is under the control of a xenophobic collective leadership dedicated to attaining a radical change in the social, political, and economic makeup of the country in the shortest time possible.”70 At the same time, as Kissinger had correctly predicted in the spring of 1975, tensions between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese grew. Just as the secretary of state had surmised, the Khmer Rouge’s hostility, Hanoi’s claim to dominate Indochina, and China’s attempt to contain communist Vietnam would soon lead to war. In late 1978, the so-called Third Indochina War began with Vietnam overthrowing the Khmer Rouge regime and China retaliating with a brief but bloody border war.71 In Laos, Kissinger’s predictions proved right as well. With the fall of Saigon, there was no doubt that the Hanoi-backed Pathet Lao would rule the country. In the spring of 1975, Ford administration officials deliberated whether some sort of US presence should be maintained in Vientiane and whether aid should continue to be provided to the (already communist-controlled) government in order to retain some degree of influence.72 However, in June 1975, under pressure from Pathet Lao–led demonstrators, Washington closed its US Agency for International Development mission and suspended all shipments of aid.73 In December 1975, the Laotian communists dissolved the Provisional Government of National Union, which had been formed in 1974, and created the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.74 After coming to power, the Pathet Lao embarked on a revenge campaign against the Hmong tribesmen, who had formed the CIA’s secret army during the US military engagement in Indochina. As a result of the persecutions, as many as 100,000 Hmong were killed, and many more fled the country.75 During the remainder of 1975, Washington and Beijing made no real progress toward normalization. As Kissinger’s China experts had pointed out in May, various domestic and foreign policy issues stood in the way of improved relations. In regard to Indochina, Beijing had expressed an interest in containing

150

CHAPTER 6

Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism with the help of Washington (for example in Laos), while Kissinger’s advisers had explored the possibility of cooperating with China in Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge takeover.76 However, both Washington’s and Beijing’s positions remained somewhat contradictory. In spite of professing that with the departure of the Americans from Vietnam, an important obstacle to US-Chinese relations had been removed, Beijing seemed to be taking a tougher stance toward Washington in the wake of the fall of Saigon. In late May, the NSC staffer Richard Solomon concluded that Beijing’s major goal was to contain the Soviets, for example, by making a major effort to sustain Chinese influence in North Korea and Cambodia. According to Solomon, “This leads the Chinese to take propaganda and diplomatic stands which are antiAmerican in effect; but we believe that their primary purpose is to block the extension of Russian influence.”77 The issue of Taiwan remained the major obstacle to normalization. Beijing had correctly observed that the Ford administration had reemphasized its commitment to Taiwan after defeat in Indochina.78 In early July, Washington’s China experts pointed out that normalization with China “is now in conflict . . . with the immediate need to reassure key allies (and warn possible adversaries) in the wake of our Indochina setbacks. It is further complicated by the domestic political factors the President must consider as he faces re-election in 1976.”79 Interestingly, the lengthy study that had been prepared for Kissinger highlighted again how the insurance policy for Indochina had guided the Nixon and Ford administrations’ dealings with the Chinese. Washington had refrained in the past from applying real pressure to Beijing on the subject of Indochina since this could have endangered the “young normalization process.” Clearly, Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger had not been able to sacrifice good relations with the Chinese; rapprochement was needed as an important counterweight to defeat in Indochina. On the other hand, the short- to midterm goal of reassuring allies and deterring foes in the wake of the fall of Saigon made it impossible for Ford and Kissinger to make any meaningful concessions to the Chinese in 1975–76. Moreover, as the China experts had rightly observed, domestic pressures in the run-up to the 1976 election, especially from the Right, made progress toward normalization even less likely. Above all, Ford and Kissinger were concerned about challenges that they had been too soft on communism (Vietnam, like China in 1949, obviously exacerbated this fear). Taking these points into consideration, Kissinger told his advisers, “For political reasons it’s just impossible for the US to go for normalization before ’76. If there’s any one thing that will trigger a conservative reaction to Ford, that’s it.”80 For these reasons, any meaningful US-Chinese cooperation in Southeast Asia during the remainder of the Ford presidency was unlikely. One additional factor

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

151

that contributed to the somewhat murky situation was the discrepancy, on both the US and the Chinese sides, between worst-case scenarios and reasonable expectations on Southeast Asia’s future. In his dealings with the Chinese, Kissinger tried to stoke Chinese fears of a Soviet or Soviet-backed domination (through Hanoi) of Southeast Asia. The fate of Thailand and its relationship with Vietnam played a crucial role in this scenario.81 However, in the summer and fall of 1975, the CIA and the State Department strongly doubted that Soviet or Vietnamese expansion in the area would happen, at least during the following years.82 Although their ongoing support of the Khmer Rouge betrayed fear of Hanoi and Moscow, the Chinese, in turn, seemed to question whether the USSR would really be able to encircle them by establishing a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. In late September, during a meeting in the Waldorf Towers in New York, Chinese foreign minister Chiao Guanhua told Kissinger that the Mayaguez operation had been totally unnecessary. “In our view, the general situation in Southeast Asia is good,” Chiao said. He acknowledged that Hanoi had aspirations to dominate Laos and Cambodia “as a result of the influence of outside forces. But we doubt that it can succeed.”83 Kissinger’s NSC advisers were well aware of the limits of mutual US-Chinese interests in Southeast Asia. During Kissinger’s visit to China in October 1975, the Chinese had suggested that with Beijing’s help, Washington should seek an improvement of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.84 However, Stearman concluded, “The Chinese may be less worried about Hanoi than is generally assumed.”85 As a result of the rather weak common interests in Southeast Asia and the more general foreign policy and domestic political constraints that the Ford administration was facing in 1975–76, further rapprochement between Washington and Beijing was put on ice. In regard to Washington’s ability to influence events in Indochina, this meant that no new channels were opened. The Ford administration’s dealings with the region were more or less confined to isolating Hanoi internationally.

Assessing the Insurance Policy The overriding concern that remained for the Ford administration was US credibility. As the reaction by friends and foes to the fall of Saigon had shown, Ford and Kissinger were not altogether wrong in their prediction: US credibility had taken a blow. Focusing on the effects of the fall of Saigon on Southeast Asia, NSC staffers observed in July 1976 that the departure of US forces from mainland Southeast Asia had led to a vacuum to which the countries in the region had to adjust. The staffers concluded, “There is no doubt that the fall of Vietnam has

152

CHAPTER 6

caused some of our friends to reappraise their relationship with us, move closer to other powers in the region, and question the credibility of US commitments.”86 To be sure, no matter how uncontrollable Hanoi must have seemed to the Soviets, Moscow perceived the fall of Saigon as a success. Beyond Southeast Asia, the US defeat in Indochina had an encouraging effect on the Soviet leaders and provided an important impetus to exploit US weakness by intervening further in the Third World.87 Moreover, the North Vietnamese inspired revolutionaries around the world. For example, in another important link between Vietnam and the Middle East, the Palestine Liberation Organization sought to emulate Hanoi’s victory in its struggle against Israel.88 Ford and Kissinger sought to counter this trend in the Third World. The civil war in Angola, where Moscow and Washington supported opposing sides, provided an important example.89 The fact that the Chinese, who were also backing the anticommunist faction in Angola, questioned Washington’s resolve in the conflict demonstrated that Ford and Kissinger’s concern about US credibility was not merely an illusion. In December 1975, a high-ranking official at the Chinese liaison office in Washington remarked, “If this were indeed the case, the PRC, no longer convinced of US will and resolve to stem illegal Soviet advances and to honor its commitment to other nations, would have to reassess its own state of relations with the Soviet Union.”90 By 1976, when Congress had cut off covert funding for Angola, and Moscow’s allies had the upper hand in the conflict and had won additional victories in Mozambique and Ethiopia, it seemed that Washington, weakened by defeat in Indochina, was losing ground in the global Cold War against the Soviet Union.91 Still, the overall effects of Washington’s defeat in Indochina were quite limited. The strategic balance did not shift decisively in favor of the Soviets or the Chinese. Although US allies had expressed concern in the spring of 1975, the Western alliance remained intact despite the fall of Indochina.92 Moscow and Beijing did not completely reverse their policies of détente and rapprochement with Washington. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese abandoned the objective of improving relations with the United States as a result of the fall of Saigon. To be sure, the US defeat in Indochina did not create a favorable climate for détente and rapprochement insofar as it emboldened the Soviets and, at least in the shortto midterm, made it impossible for Ford and Kissinger to make meaningful concessions. However, the fact that no real progress in détente and rapprochement was achieved during the Ford presidency had more to do with the larger trends of US domestic opposition to accommodation of the communists, as well as increased tensions between Washington and Moscow as a result of the war in the Middle East. The Helsinki summit in the summer of 1975 further eroded domestic support for détente; both conservatives in Congress and Eastern European

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

153

ethnic groups criticized Ford and Kissinger for having accepted Eastern European boundaries as permanent.93 In Southeast Asia, the dominoes did not fall outside Indochina. The domino theory, in its earlier geographic sense, was proved wrong (in a psychological sense, it was somewhat true, although regional factors played at least an equally important role in determining events in Angola and elsewhere). According to Smyser, who analyzed the situation in Asia in July, most Asian nations were worried about possible North Vietnamese expansionism, as well as increased Soviet and Chinese activity. However, Smyser observed, “Most nations in Asia apparently believe that revolutionary warfare of the Vietnamese model, like a car accident, is something that happens to other people. Therefore, they do not feel quite as discomfited by some of the ‘lessons of Indochina’ as one might suppose they should.”94 Smyser argued that Korea, the Philippines, and to some degree Thailand were continuing to rely on Washington—they simply had no other option. In what he labeled the “reverse domino” effect, Smyser concluded that Malaysia, Australia, and Singapore were even turning more to the United States after the fall of Indochina. Whatever the impact of Vietnam on US credibility might be, Washington had remained a central player in Asia.95 How should one assess the insurance policy in light of the fact that Washington emerged tarnished yet relatively strong from the Vietnam experience? Were the different stratagems that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford employed in order to counterbalance the anticipated and then real defeat in Indochina successful? Considered narrowly, the answer would seem to be yes. Although, without the means of deterrence, the fall of Saigon could not be delayed for long, Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger did manage to control the damage caused by the US defeat. Above all, the clear focus on improved great-power relations that had marked Nixon’s approach and had remained an overarching objective when Ford took over helped ease the effects of Vietnam by limiting the war’s importance. Although the United States’ allies and adversaries perceived the fall of Saigon as a setback for Washington, the Soviets and the Chinese retained an interest in stable, if not good, relations with the United States. Without Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s clever use of triangular diplomacy and a continuing effort to keep détente and rapprochement alive, all major players in the Cold War would probably have perceived the US defeat in Indochina as far more important. The Soviets and the Chinese could have been tempted into a more aggressive stance, and, perhaps most important, the feeling of insecurity would have been drastically increased in Washington.96 By downplaying Vietnam and pointing to accommodation with Moscow and Beijing, a central part of the insurance policy, Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger had succeeded in deflating the significance of Indochina.

154

CHAPTER 6

But did the insurance policy really make a difference? If one takes into consideration Smyser’s observation that most of Washington’s allies in Asia (and, by spinning the argument further, around the world) simply saw no alternative to relying on the United States, it could be concluded that Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger’s insistence on using military force and requesting further aid to project an image of toughness—another central part of the insurance policy—was completely unnecessary: US allies would have acted in much the same way without Washington’s costly show of force. This idea ties in with the argument that the prolongation of direct US engagement from 1968 to 1973 and the maneuvers from 1973 to 1975 were simply a waste of lives and money.97 However, this argument essentially fails to understand the dynamic of the Cold War and the nature of Nixon-Kissinger-Ford foreign policy. Without the ongoing demonstration of toughness, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford would not have felt able to pursue and maintain a policy of improved relations with the USSR and China. In their study on the “lessons of Vietnam,” the NSC staffers Smyser and Stearman pointed out that “spectacular Communist triumphs in Asia would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to embark on a policy of détente with the PRC and the USSR.”98 A fast withdrawal from Vietnam at the beginning of the Nixon presidency thus seems difficult to imagine. Perhaps a more clear-cut retreat from Indochina, at least when great-power relations had been considerably improved by 1973, would not have made a huge difference for the overall strategic balance. By that time, however, the course was set. The idea of creating a stable international system with the other great powers by pursuing the dual strategy of cooperation and deterrence—both manifest in the insurance policy for Indochina—continued to be the overarching mind-set in Washington until the end of the Ford presidency. Although one can criticize Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger for not transcending the Cold War mind-set and for inflating regional conflicts into Cold War proxy wars, it must be said that the Soviets and the Chinese did much the same.99 In the world in which they were operating, Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger remained consistent in their approach to foreign policy, including Indochina. In that sense, it is hard to imagine the last two years of the US engagement in Vietnam without the accompanying saber rattling.100 In his July assessment, Smyser observed that another part of the insurance policy was paying dividends as well: foreign governments had realized that Congress was playing an important role in US foreign policy, but nobody doubted the preeminence of the executive branch.101 Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger had succeeded in maintaining the image of the White House as representing US interests in the world, in part by separating the executive branch from the legislature on the issue of Indochina.

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

155

Congressional attempts in 1975–76 to move toward normalization with Hanoi underlined the limits of the legislature’s power to shape US foreign policy. After the fall of Saigon, the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, chaired by G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery, had commenced talks with the Vietnamese and had indicated a willingness to make concessions in order to make progress on the MIA issue.102 However, Ford, Kissinger and their advisers objected. NSC staffers recommended in February 1976, “Allow the Executive Branch to regain control from the Montgomery Committee of our negotiations with Hanoi. In our view, the Committee is moving much too fast toward making major concessions to Vietnam without exacting any real results in return.”103 By early 1976, domestic political considerations had come to play an increasingly dominant role in Ford and Kissinger’s approach to Vietnam. With the presidential election approaching, Ford and Kissinger adopted a twofold strategy: publicly, they professed themselves ready to negotiate with Hanoi in order to prove their concern about accounting for the MIAs, but behind the scenes, they remained intransigent and unwilling to make concessions, not least to curry favor with conservative voters.104 Meanwhile, in 1976, earlier analyses about the balance of power in Southeast Asia were corroborated. According to the US ambassador to Malaysia, Francis T. Underhill, Washington was in fact ahead in Southeast Asia despite ending its military presence in Thailand.105 As Underhill pointed out, the ASEAN nations had reached a degree of stability that made Soviet or Chinese infiltration unlikely; US economic and cultural ties in the region remained strong. At the same time, by the beginning of the presidential primaries in 1976, détente with the USSR and progress toward normalization with China had become a major political liability for Ford. Ford’s trip to China in late 1975 and Kissinger’s visit with Soviet leaders in Moscow in early 1976 highlighted again the limits of great-power cooperation.106 Most important, Ford was coming under increasing attack domestically. “I never backed away from détente as a means for achieving a more stable relationship with our Communist adversaries,” Ford later explained. “But the situation that developed in connection with the presidential primaries and the fight at the convention made it necessary to de-emphasize détente.”107 Ford’s challenger from the Right, former California governor Ronald Reagan, continued to argue that détente had caused Washington to fall behind Moscow militarily. Trying to defend himself, Ford dropped the term “détente” from his speeches and replaced it with the more hawkish phrase “peace through strength.”108 The signing of the Helsinki Accords and Ford and Kissinger’s attempts to conclude a new SALT treaty with the Soviets provided conservatives

156

CHAPTER 6

with ammunition. So did Vietnam: the Right criticized Ford and Kissinger for not having done enough to help the South Vietnamese. Reagan also falsely charged that Ford would grant diplomatic recognition to Hanoi.109 Kissinger in particular became the target of both the Right and the Left. In an attempt to antagonize the president, Reagan frequently criticized the secretary of state and his central role in détente.110 In late October and early November 1975, following the recommendation of some of his domestic advisers, Ford reshuffled his cabinet. In what became known as the “Halloween Massacre,” Ford pushed Rockefeller to withdraw from the 1976 presidential ticket and, in addition to other major changes, replaced Kissinger as national security adviser with Brent Scowcroft. Although the secretary of state was closely identified with an increasingly unpopular foreign policy, Ford also sought to put himself more in the limelight in order to appear “presidential.”111 After Ford had, with considerable difficulty, beaten back the Reagan primary challenge in July 1976, he and Kissinger were optimistic about the election in November. Ford’s opponent, Jimmy Carter, was leading by 25 percent at the time of the Republican convention, but Ford made a spectacular comeback, and by late August Carter’s lead had slipped to 13 percent.112 Although Ford continued to close the gap, he ultimately failed to win the election. A high unemployment rate and the legacy of Watergate proved insurmountable problems. Polls showed that by a two-to-one margin Americans disapproved of Ford’s pardon of Nixon.113 Carter, on the other hand, appealed to the American public as a trustworthy Washington outsider who promised to fight dishonesty in government. Extending his criticism of the Ford administration to foreign policy, Carter often lashed out at Kissinger for his secret diplomacy and called for a “moral” foreign policy that focused on human rights.114 When, during a televised debate, Ford awkwardly claimed that there was no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Carter charged that the misstatement further underlined the amorality of détente.115 In the end, Ford lost the election by a narrow 57 electoral votes and 2 percent in the popular vote. During the election campaign, the Vietnam War was not a central issue. Perhaps because of the bipartisan involvement in the United States’ inglorious engagement in Indochina and the deep divisions the war had caused domestically, it was not until the end of the 1970s that Vietnam emerged as a major topic of discussion.116 The fate of the MIAs was the only Vietnam-related issue that figured prominently in the Ford-Carter debates (except for some attempts by both Ford and Carter to exploit the Mayaguez crisis). In the fall of 1976, responding to Carter’s pressure, Ford and Kissinger announced that they would hold direct talks with the Vietnamese over the MIA issue, although in private they remained hostile to Hanoi. The Vietnamese continued to attack the Ford

BEYOND DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA

157

administration verbally, calling the president “corrupt and reactionary,” and linked accounting for MIAs to reconstruction aid.117 However, Hanoi also maintained a serious interest in negotiations, somewhat softening its stance in the fall of 1976. Advances proved futile, though, when the Ford administration renewed its veto of Vietnam’s membership in the UN (Carter openly endorsed the move) and Hanoi stalled the onset of talks.118 Upon ascending to the presidency, Carter promised to usher in a sea change in US foreign policy. The new president was determined to (re)introduce morals and US ideals to the conduct of foreign affairs and to move beyond a focus on US-Soviet relations.119 Very soon, though, Carter encountered problems. USVietnamese negotiations over the MIAs, for instance, halted by 1978.120 Most important, détente eroded further under Carter, especially after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979.121 Still, the decline of détente had already been a central feature of the Ford presidency. For the insurance policy that had guided the Nixon and Ford administrations’ approach to Indochina, that meant that a basic pillar it rested on had begun to collapse: by 1976, détente no longer was a favorable counterweight to Vietnam. Underlying those developments was the larger trend of the American public’s rejection of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger’s realist approach to foreign policy. As the more hawkish stance toward the Soviet Union adopted by Carter during his last year in office was intensified under Reagan, toughness had again become the main principle in US foreign policy. Somewhat like Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger, Reagan aimed at creating an image of US strength. However, Reagan did not attempt to employ US military might to foster a more stable international system, nor did he seek to counterbalance defeat in Indochina by embedding Vietnam in the context of improved great-power relations. Instead, Reagan sought to shed what he called the “Vietnam syndrome,” fear of policymakers to order military interventions abroad, with the ultimate goal of winning the Cold War.122 The complex balancing of force and diplomacy, visible in the insurance policy for Indochina, had taken a backseat in Washington’s dealings with the world.

Conclusion

A MIXED RECORD A nation’s foreign policy inevitably reflects an amalgam of the convictions of its leaders and the pressures of its environment. Henry A. Kissinger, 1999

“They won. We lost. It is now their show,” a somewhat relieved George F. Kennan concluded on Vietnam in 1977. Commenting on Moscow’s and Beijing’s ongoing attempts to influence Hanoi, the famous US diplomat and historian dryly added, “Our attitude should be: you are heartily welcome to each other; it serves you both right.”1 Unlike Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford, Kennan had been an outspoken critic of the war in Vietnam.2 Although he first advocated gradual US extrication to preserve US credibility and prevent Asian dominoes from toppling, by 1969 he had come to support unilateral US withdrawal. For the “father of containment,” the Vietnam War marked a national catastrophe, highlighted the United States’ limitations, and served as a catalyst for his notion of the “decline of the West.”3 Although Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford shared many of Kennan’s beliefs as practitioners of realpolitik—emphasis on the national interest and a global balance of power over a value-oriented US foreign policy; a realization of US limits; and a fixation with US credibility—their approach to Indochina differed greatly from Kennan’s. To be sure, Kissinger had voiced criticism of the commitment of vast resources in Vietnam under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.4 But, unlike Kennan, who changed his position during the course of the war, Kissinger and the two presidents he served refused to make a clear break and withdraw completely from Indochina. As Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford saw it, they had inherited an unfortunate situation in Indochina, but to maintain US credibility in the Cold War, they had to honor US commitments and attempt to uphold South Vietnam, even if after the summer of 1973 their maneuvers were largely symbolic. 158

A MIXED RECORD

159

When Nixon entered the White House in 1969, he and Kissinger devised and implemented a dual-track strategy for Indochina that featured the winding down of the US military presence and a simultaneous augmentation of the war effort (including an attempt to strengthen the South Vietnamese military, the expansion of the war to Laos and Cambodia, and the conduct of large-scale bombing campaigns, aimed in 1969 and 1970 at winning the war militarily and, subsequently, at finding a negotiated end to direct US engagement with ground troops). By the time Nixon had commenced his second term and Kissinger had brokered the Paris Agreement in early 1973, they had clearly come to see the possibility of Saigon’s demise, despite their efforts of the previous four years. At the same time, though, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that they would be able to create an indefinite equilibrium in Indochina by employing positive and negative incentives to thwart North Vietnam’s aspirations to conquer the South. At times, Nixon, Kissinger, and their close advisers were optimistic that their ongoing attempts to contain Hanoi would be successful. Most important, they hoped that the Paris Agreement would prove to be a favorable framework to circumvent domestic opposition to US engagement in Indochina. In early 1973, before Watergate put Nixon on the defensive and gave Congress the necessary momentum to pass the bombing cutoff in the summer of 1973, it looked as if the president and Kissinger could well be able to continue providing critical support to Saigon. Clearly, during the first few months of 1973, Nixon and Kissinger were riding on a brief but intense wave of success—the president had just won a landslide election, Watergate seemed manageable, and the Paris Agreement left Thieu in office and enabled Nixon to proclaim “peace with honor.” Still, Nixon and Kissinger were far from ignorant or naive. They knew that Saigon could fall despite their maneuvers. In fact, the situation on the ground in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was both better than most critics of the administration admitted and worse than some officials insisted. On the one hand, Thieu was in rather firm political control; as a result of the pacification campaigns, the Vietcong’s infrastructure was all but destroyed; and the failed Easter Offensive, as well as the Christmas bombings, had shown that the communists remained vulnerable to US airpower. On the other hand, South Vietnam was far from being self-sufficient and continued to be dependent on US military and economic support. Moreover, the Paris Agreement left roughly 150,000 North Vietnamese troops in the South, which posed a formidable threat to the Thieu regime. In short, the situation in Vietnam and the United States warranted both an optimistic and a pessimistic prognosis of what lay ahead. Nixon and Kissinger’s comments in private reflected this mixed assessment, and they crafted their Indochina strategy accordingly. In addition to making a concerted effort to create

160

CONCLUSION

a lasting equilibrium that would leave South Vietnam intact, they pursued an insurance policy of disassociating Washington from the fate of Saigon, downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam, and, above all, working on improved relations with the Soviets and the Chinese to counterbalance defeat in Indochina. After the summer of 1973, when Congress passed legislation that made US reintervention virtually impossible, Nixon and Kissinger (and later Ford) emphasized two additional components of the insurance policy: shifting the blame for failure in Southeast Asia to Congress and antiwar critics and maintaining a tough posture (most obviously in their aid requests) even if it was a show for the record. Although very few academic studies have been specifically dedicated to the war after the war in Vietnam, there has been intense debate among historians and former policymakers about what Nixon and Kissinger were expecting at the time of the Paris Agreement. Did they believe that they had, in fact, achieved “peace with honor” (Nixon and Kissinger’s version)? Had they contented themselves with a “decent interval” until the collapse of Saigon (Jeffrey Kimball’s conclusion)? Or did they expect that the Paris Agreement would result in “permanent war” at an acceptable political cost (Larry Berman’s theory)? As we have seen, there is a degree of truth in all these interpretations. At the same time, taken individually, the different analyses paint a somewhat one-sided picture. Furthermore, one should not understand Washington’s post–Paris Agreement strategy as a mere combination of Kimball’s and Berman’s theories. Rather, as this study has shown, Nixon and Kissinger prepared for different contingencies and coupled their equilibrium strategy (plan A or maximum objective) with a multifaceted insurance policy (plan B or minimum objective). Although the “decent interval” was part of the insurance policy, it was first and foremost relations with Moscow and Beijing that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford attempted to employ for damage control. Washington’s post–Paris Agreement strategy for Indochina was the logical result of Nixon and Kissinger’s approach to Vietnam during the previous four years because it further combined retreat with ongoing engagement. A preoccupation with flexibility and contingency planning was an overriding concern. To be sure, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s Indochina policy (and, by extension, their overall foreign policy) was not flawless. Many critical authors have highlighted shortcomings in the Paris Agreement and the various stratagems Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford employed. However, as the historian Jussi Hanhimäki has pointed out, being flawed ultimately applies to all policymakers.5 This study has argued that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s Indochina policy is best understood as being based on a conscious recognition of flaws and limitations. For example, the National Security Council staffers William Smyser and William Stearman had a point when they observed after the fall of Saigon that

A MIXED RECORD

161

the Paris Agreement had left fundamental political issues unresolved, but that “it lies at the heart of diplomacy to make such agreements and if we stopped trying to make them we should wash our hands of the Middle East, of Berlin, and of many other places.” 6 In fact, Kissinger tried time and again to turn complex regional crises to the United States’ advantage and to let treaties, however imperfect, shape their own, more stable realities. Related to that was Kissinger’s observation that an increased focus on diplomacy to achieve Washington’s foreign policy objectives did not mean that military actions had become superfluous.7 Critics from the Left charged the Nixon and Ford administrations with relying too heavily and readily on force, but Kissinger was probably right when he insisted that a credible deterrent based on the threat of US military intervention was indispensable if, as was the case in Indochina, an ambiguous agreement was to have any chance of being observed. All in all, this book has concluded that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford responded to the enormous challenge of extricating the United States from Vietnam while maintaining a leadership role in the Cold War with a coherent, calculated, and, at least in a narrow sense, successful strategy. The Vietnam War had painfully driven home to Americans what it meant to be overextended, and Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford deserve credit for weighing ends, means, and contingencies in pursuit of the best possible result. To be sure, in the end, Kennan was right when he stressed that Washington had lost the war—a realization that no interval, decent or not, would have significantly changed—but the insurance policy that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford implemented helped ease the effects of defeat in Indochina. The fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975 provided a striking image of US crisis. But détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China had, in fact, changed the entire dynamic of the Cold War, making the impact of defeat in Indochina far less decisive. Although Washington had lost a battle in the global Cold War, neither friends nor foes ultimately questioned that the United States would continue to play a leading role in the world. Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s controversial Indochina policy, with its combination of withdrawal and display of steadfastness, contributed to this perception. As this study has argued, there is a strong case to be made not only that improved great-power relations helped Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford counterbalance defeat in Indochina, but also that this focus did not lead to a neglect of the region. In contrast to the work of some critical scholars, this study has shown that Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, and their advisers had a rather accurate and nuanced understanding of the different factors and factions at work in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. During the Mayaguez incident, for example, policymakers in Washington clearly grasped the Khmer Rouge’s regional motivations for seizing the ship but responded the way they did because it fit their overall strategic calculus.

162

CONCLUSION

The War after the War has also highlighted the role of domestic politics in shaping US foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford presidencies. Watergate, of course, was the most obvious and dramatic case in which a domestic crisis affected the conduct of foreign affairs. As this study has shown, Watergate decisively influenced Nixon and Kissinger’s Indochina strategy by eliminating the possibility of US military reintervention, which effectively led to the breakdown of the equilibrium strategy and an increased emphasis on the insurance policy. Moreover, many scholars have rightly concluded that domestic political considerations were never far from Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s minds and that they tried to exploit foreign policy decisions to their political advantage (for example, to counter the fallout from Watergate). However, as we have seen, this point has been somewhat overemphasized in the academic debate. Although domestic politics played a central role, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s approach to Indochina clearly shows that strong convictions about the US national interest and concern about Cold War credibility constituted the most important rationale. Rather than basing their Indochina approach on domestic considerations, they tried as much as possible to get away with an unpopular strategy. Ford’s handling of Vietnam is an important case in point. As we have seen, Ford played an active role in continuing the insurance policy and was not a passive follower of Kissinger. He fully subscribed to the idea that support for South Vietnam was in Washington’s interest and that US credibility was at stake. Despite his conciliatory reputation and the task of mending the nation after Watergate—a task Ford arguably lived up to—he agreed with Kissinger that Congress had to be made responsible for defeat in Indochina. Although Ford himself had been a member of Congress for a quarter of a century, he embraced his new role as president and did not even attempt to transcend the executive-legislative divide. This book has also highlighted the link between Washington’s endgame in Indochina and other foreign policy crises in the first half of the 1970s. The Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis constitute two important examples. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger’s handling of the Middle East resembled their approach to Indochina in many respects (for instance, in trying to create a complex network of treaties that would shape its own reality). Moreover, with their technology-focused, American-style military and an already shaky economy, the South Vietnamese were decisively hurt by the sharp increase in petroleum prices.8 Most important, for Washington, success in the Middle East promised to contribute to the insurance policy and provided a counterweight to defeat in Indochina. On a more general level, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s Indochina policy was linked to the overall foreign policy context of the first half of the 1970s insofar as policymakers in Washington attempted to preserve US credibility and leadership

A MIXED RECORD

163

in a world that seemed increasingly to question US preeminence. Their approach to Indochina shows how Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford tried to counter the widespread perception of a US crisis by engaging in multifaceted power games that blurred the lines between friend and foe and sought to balance inevitable defeats with newly achieved successes. In other words, they tried to turn an increased global complexity to Washington’s advantage and hoped thereby to maintain US leadership in the world. One can, of course, question the premises on which Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford built their approach to US foreign policy. Liberals stress the neglect of human rights or, as Fredrik Logevall and Campbell Craig have argued, claim that their concern with US credibility was an obsession built on unwarranted fear and a desire to gain domestic political advantages.9 Conservatives and neoconservatives, on the other hand, have criticized Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford for neglecting US ideals and letting the Soviets and the Chinese exploit the easing of tensions.10 Still, there is a strong argument to be made that Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford were not altogether wrong in their attempt to tackle the immense challenges of the early 1970s. Clearly, US policymakers needed to explore a new approach to US foreign policy after the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had failed to provide solutions for problems like Vietnam. And although Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford did not invent realism, they deserve credit for embracing the concept to reinvigorate Washington’s conduct of foreign affairs. At the same time, Kissinger was probably right when he observed, “For us to have launched the grandiloquent anti-Soviet crusade that our critics later (though not at the time) chastised us for not undertaking would have driven our domestic crisis out of control and jeopardized our alliances.”11 Moreover, though clearly ambivalent, the focus on US credibility is understandable given the fact that in a multipolar world a growing number of players (both nations and transnational groups) were determining how to position themselves vis-à-vis Washington.12 In other words, the phenomenon of increased interconnectedness in the 1970s underlined the psychological dimension in international relations (and, of course, economics) rather than making it less important. So were Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford tragic victims of their era who devised a wise foreign policy but were denied proper appreciation? The answer must be no. For one thing, as we have seen, the subsequent spin in their writings on the alleged achievements of their Indochina policy (the “buying-time” argument) does not stand up to historical scrutiny. In the same vein, Kissinger’s claim that the realist approach of the Nixon-Ford presidencies contributed greatly to Ronald Reagan’s “successes” in the 1980s seems misleading and self-serving.13 Rather than being a continuation of Nixon and Ford’s foreign policy, it is striking how similar Reagan’s approach was to that of Jimmy Carter, who attempted to conduct a

164

CONCLUSION

foreign policy based on allegedly universal norms.14 Most important, Nixon’s divisive style of running foreign affairs, epitomized by Vietnam (and linked to Watergate), which was to some extent continued (or at least not completely rejected) under Ford and perpetuated by Kissinger, contributed decisively to the fact that Ford and Kissinger failed to build a new national consensus behind détente, the Indochina policy, and, more generally, a realist approach to US foreign policy. Perhaps, then, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s foreign policy is best understood as a kind of treatment with a toxic medication. Although they were able to provide answers to some critical problems and reinvigorated US foreign policy, they failed to control the poisonous side effects of their approach. Their Indochina policy between 1973 and 1976 highlights this fundamental tension and provides an intriguing example of policymakers in Washington dealing with the United States’ limitations, as well as their own personal ones. It is a story that echoes to this day.

Notes

ABBREVIATIONS IN THE NOTES

CRS FOIA FRUS GRFL HAK Memcon NYT RNL Telcon

Congressional Research Service Freedom of Information Act Foreign Relations of the United States Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan Henry A. Kissinger Memorandum of conversation New York Times Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California Telephone conversation (transcript)

INTRODUCTION

1. Telephone conversation (telcon), Richard Nixon, Mrs. Nixon, Henry Kissinger, January 23, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter RNL). For a less explicit account, see Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 430–32. 2. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 550. 3. Ibid., 554. See also Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 473–562; and George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 336–37. 4. For the Nixon Doctrine, see, for example, Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 140–41; and Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31, 53–54. Jeffrey Kimball argues that the Nixon Doctrine did not represent a novel, coherent, or even intentional grand strategy. See Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 2006): 59–60. For Nixon and Kissinger’s combination of old ends and new means, see Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, “The Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5–7, 10. For an analysis that argues that Nixon’s, Ford’s, and especially Kissinger’s realism was characterized by conformity and was the product of its time rather than a novel achievement, see Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 5–6. 5. For the madman theory, see, for example, Jeremi Suri, “The Nukes of October: Richard Nixon’s Secret Plan to Bring Peace to Vietnam,” March 16, 2008, http://www.wired .com/politics/security/magazine/16-03/ff_nuclearwar?; and William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball, “Nixon’s Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969,” Cold War History 3, no. 2 (January 2003): 114–15, 148–49. For a critical assessment of Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy of combining US troop 165

166

NOTES TO PAGES 3–5

withdrawals with military escalation, see Robert J. McMahon, “The Politics, and Geopolitics, of American Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968–1972,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 471–83. For the strategic shift from seeking a military victory to finding a negotiated end, see David F. Schmitz, Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), xiii–xv, 41–104, 147–48. 6. Lawrence, Vietnam War, 143–59. See also Herring, America’s Longest War, 288–320; and Schmitz, Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, 135–43. 7. Historians have begun to highlight the pivotal role the “long 1970s”—roughly from 1969 to 1982—played in leading to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the globalized world we live in today. See, for example, Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), xii, xv; Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 4–5, 10; Niall Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 19–21; Charles S. Maier, “ ‘Malaise’: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 25–27, 44–48; Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (June 2000), http://historycooperative.org//journals/ahr/105.3/ah000807; Daniel J. Sargent, “The United States and Globalization in the 1970s,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 49–53; and David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945 (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 1–2, 695–702. In his account, Reynolds focuses on the coexistence of increasing global interconnectedness and its flip side, growing political, economic, and ideological divisions. For an account that highlights the importance of the 1970s for the end of the Cold War, see, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3–4, 7, 347. Friedberg argues that throughout the 1970s, the Soviets felt compelled to maintain a much higher military budget than the United States, which contributed to the USSR’s eventual demise. Odd Arne Westad argues that unilateral US and Soviet interventions in the Third World (including interventions in the 1970s) augmented international conflict and constitute a negative example of how to respond to an increasingly interconnected world. See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 406–7. Historians have referred to “the global shock of the 1970s” to depict the various crises. See, for example, Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Containing Globalism: The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 206–7; Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis?,” 16–21; and David Reynolds, America: Empire of Liberty (London: Basic Books, 2010), 477–78. For an analysis that stresses the importance of the oil crisis as a turning point, see Sargent, “United States and Globalization in the 1970s,” 51, 58–59. For an analysis that emphasizes that the loss of faith in government was replaced by an increased influence of entrepreneurs and the market, see Schulman, Seventies, 256–57. For the phenomenon of stagflation, see Maier, “ ‘Malaise,’ ” 27–28. For the significance of Watergate, see Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis?,” 3. For the backlash from the Right and the Left, see Lawrence, “Containing Globalism,” 212; Jeremi Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” in Schulman and Zelizer, Rightward Bound, 244; and Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 2003), 1–6, 260–62. Suri argues that détente preserved stability (against a disappointed, rebellious youth movement) at the cost of progressive change and ultimately alienated US citizens.

NOTES TO PAGES 5–7

167

8. See, for example, Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 56; Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 274–78; and Robert J. McMahon, “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (October 1991): 467–68. 9. See, for example, Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), 116–17; Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 486; and Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 249–50. In his account, Ford was not as explicit as Nixon and Kissinger, but he still stressed that Watergate prevented Nixon from responding forcefully to North Vietnamese cease-fire violations and congressional challenges to his foreign policy. For other authors who emphasize the importance of Watergate, see, for example, Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 104, 168–69; Randall Bennett Woods, J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 270; and Schmitz, Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, 143–44. For the argument that Watergate was not a tragedy, see, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 458–60, 485–86; and Reynolds, One World Divisible, 347–48. 10. For the idea that domestic political gains were an important motivation, see, for example, Thomas Alan Schwartz, “ ‘Henry, . . . Winning an Election Is Terribly Important’: Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations,” Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 2009 Presidential Address, Diplomatic History 33, no. 2 (April 2009): 173, 175, 177, 185–90; Melvin Small, “H-Diplo Article Review No. 225—Melvin Small on Thomas Schwartz,” April 30, 2009, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR225 .pdf; YouTube Fatal Politics Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/fatalpolitics; and Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 255. For an interesting, similar conclusion in the context of the French engagement in Indochina, see Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), xx. For an interpretation that does not concur with the preeminence of domestic political considerations, see Dominic Sandbrook, “Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate,” in Logevall and Preston, Nixon in the World, 88– 89, 92, 100–101. In an interesting study, Ken Hughes highlights the links among domestic politics, Vietnam, and Watergate. Hughes shows how Nixon’s manipulation for political gains of the Paris peace talks during the 1968 campaign (with the help of Republican fund-raiser Anna Chennault) and his fear of its revelation led to a paranoid mind-set and his willingness to cover up dirty work by whatever means necessary. This approach culminated in the Watergate scandal. See Ken Hughes, Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2014), x, 170–71. For the ongoing erosion of the Cold War consensus in the early 1970s, see Lawrence, “Containing Globalism,” 205–6. 11. For Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s view, see, for example, Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 56, 98–101, 530–31. For a description of their critics’ arguments, see, for example, Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” 236. 12. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), 889. 13. For authors who stress Ford’s reconciliatory achievements, see, for example, Richard Reeves, “I’m Sorry, Mr President,” American Heritage 47, no. 8 (December 1996): 53; Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 7, 357–59; and Barry Werth, 31 Days: Gerald Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and a Government in Crisis (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 329–30, 343–44.

168

NOTES TO PAGES 7–10

14. For the argument that the 1970s were not more crisis ridden than other decades, see Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis?,” 3–9, 20; and Maier, “ ‘Malaise,’ ” 26. For the perception of the 1970s as a time of crisis, see Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis?,” 14–15; and Logevall and Preston, “Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” 3–5. For the negative image of the Vietnam War, see, for example, Lawrence, Vietnam War, 164, 171–72; and Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 252–53. 15. For an excellent introduction to the different schools on the Vietnam War, see Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009). For an older but still helpful and concise introduction, see Hess, “The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War,” in America in the World: The Historiography of US Foreign Relations since 1941, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 358–94. See also David W. P. Elliott, “Official History, Revisionist History, and Wild History,” in Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives, ed. Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 277–78; and Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Too Late or Too Soon? Debating the Withdrawal from Vietnam in the Age of Iraq,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 592–96. For an example of a revisionist book that has stirred a huge controversy, see Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Thomas Maddux, ed., “Triumph Forsaken Roundtable Review,” http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/TriumphForsaken -Roundtable.pdf. 16. Please refer to the bibliographic essay for a detailed discussion of the existing body of literature on the post–Paris Agreement period. 17. For the analytical divide in general, see Hess, Vietnam, x, 209–10. For the same issue in the more specific context of Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “ ‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 675–76. 18. For an example of a study that focuses on the North Vietnamese side, see LienHang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). For the centralization of power under Nixon, see, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy in the Cold War, rev. and expanded ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 300–301; Snepp, Decent Interval, 579; and Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 2. For Kissinger’s role under Ford, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 273; and Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s, 280–81. 19. For Reagan and Carter, see Lawrence, “Containing Globalism,” 217; and Logevall and Preston, “Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” 6–7. For the idea of US limits and unexceptionalism, see Lawrence W. Serewicz, America at the Brink of Empire: Rusk, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2007), 1–2; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 277; Del Pero, Eccentric Realist, 151–52; and Henry A. Kissinger, “Between the Old Left and the New Right,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May/June 1999): 99–100, 103–4, 115–16. 20. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 275. For the idea that Kissinger tried to use globalization to the United States’ advantage, see also Jeremi Suri, “Henry Kissinger and the Geopolitics of Globalization,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 175, 187–88. 21. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 54. 22. For Kissinger’s analysis of the Vietnam problem, see, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 2 (January 1969): 218–19.

NOTES TO PAGES 10–14

169

23. For links between Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s realism and George Kennan, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 274, 305–6. See also Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 41. For Kissinger’s criticism of an excessively idealistic US foreign policy toward China, see Henry A. Kissinger, On China (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 491–92, 520–26, 529. For the protagonists’ failure to sell their realist approach, see Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, xvii; Sandbrook, “Salesmanship and Substance,” 100–101; and Del Pero, Eccentric Realist, 149–52. CHAPTER 1

1. Telephone conversation (telcon), Kissinger and Nixon, January 18, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter RNL). 2. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy in the Cold War, rev. and expanded ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 275. 3. Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, January 23, 1973,” in United States, National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1973 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 19. 4. Memorandum of conversation (memcon), the President, Kissinger, Tran Van Lam, Tran Kim Phuong, January 30, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 5. Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), xii. See also Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 27–29. 6. Quoted in Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 187. 7. Quoted ibid., 197–98. 8. Quoted in Thomas Alan Schwartz, “ ‘Henry, . . . Winning an Election Is Terribly Important’: Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations,” Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 2009 Presidential Address, Diplomatic History 33, no. 2 (April 2009): 174. 9. Quoted in Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 431. 10. Telcon, Kissinger and Rowland Evans, January 18, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 11. Kimball, Vietnam War Files, 186–87. See also Schwartz, “ ‘Henry, . . . Winning an Election Is Terribly Important,’ ” 175; Ken Hughes, “Fatal Politics: Nixon’s Political Timetable for Withdrawing from Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 501; YouTube Fatal Politics Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/fatalpolitics; and Melvin Small, “H-Diplo Article Review No. 225—Melvin Small on Thomas Schwartz,” April 30, 2009, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR225.pdf. 12. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 396, 405. See also Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 2001), 138; and Pierre Asselin, “Kimball’s Vietnam War,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (January 2006): 165. For an opposing analysis, see Jussi Hanhimäki, “Selling the ‘Decent Interval’: Kissinger, Triangular Diplomacy, and the End of the Vietnam War, 1971–73,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 1 (March 2003): 162, 166–67, 173, 175–78, 187. According to Hanhimäki, Nixon and Kissinger tried to sell the “decent interval” to the Chinese and the Soviets in 1971 and 1972 in order to reach a settlement in Vietnam. However, this analysis does not convincingly refute the notion that Kissinger was trying to manipulate the communists.

170

NOTES TO PAGES 15–17

13. For a similar analysis, see Asselin, “Kimball’s Vietnam War,” 165. 14. For the remark, see ibid., 166. 15. For additional evidence that points in the same direction, see Hughes, “Fatal Politics,” 498–506. 16. Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 455. 17. Ibid., 451–52. For further proof of this literal meaning of “decent interval,” see also Kissinger’s hints to the Soviets and the Chinese in 1972, which conveyed the same idea. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 396, 405. For a similar conclusion, see Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 50–53; and Asselin, “Kimball’s Vietnam War,” 165. 18. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 428, 456. For the deterrence idea, see ibid., 468. For the more general idea that deterrence was the centerpiece of Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, see Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Phoenix, 2000), 67. 19. Berman, No Peace, No Honor, 260–62. 20. Memcon, Kissinger, William Sullivan, Tran Van Lam, Bui Diem, et al., January 12, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 21. Memcon, Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Winston Lord, Nguyen Phu Duc, Tran Kim Phuong, November 30, 1972, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 105, RNL. 22. Memcon, Kissinger, Lord, Phuong, January 3, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. See also memcon, Kissinger, Sullivan, Lam, Diem, et al., January 12, 1973, ibid. 23. For Nixon and Kissinger’s willingness to use military power, see memcon, Kissinger, Sullivan, Lam, Diem, et al., January 12, 1973, ibid. For triangular diplomacy, see memcon, Kissinger, Sullivan, Lam, Diem, et al., January 23, 1973, ibid. 24. Memcon, Kissinger, Lord, Tran Van Do, Diem, Phuong, January 5, 1972, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. The date on the document is clearly a mistake and should read January 5, 1973. 25. Letter, Nixon to Nguyen Van Thieu, November 8, 1972, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 26. Letter, South Vietnamese President Thieu to President Nixon, January 21, 1973, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 9, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 1129–31. 27. Letter, Nixon to Thieu, January 14, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. See also letter, Nixon to Thieu, January 17, 1973, ibid. 28. Letter, Nixon to Thieu, January 20, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 29. Letter, Nixon to Thieu, October 16, 1972, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 30. Letter, Nixon to Thieu, November 14, 1972, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. See also letter, Nixon to Thieu, January 5, 1973, ibid.; and letter, Nixon to Thieu, January 14, 1973, ibid. 31. Letter, Nixon to Thieu, December 17, 1972, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. For the same idea, see also Backchannel Message from the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), December 30, 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 9, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, 875–78.

NOTES TO PAGES 18–22

171

32. Memcon, Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, Duc, Phuong, November 30, 1972, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 105, RNL. 33. For the idea that South Vietnam was given a chance of survival, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 57–58. 34. Quoted in Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 441. 35. Telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, January 20, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 36. For Nixon proudly considering himself a peacemaker, see Richard M. Nixon, Real Peace (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984), 1–14. For Nixon getting very emotional about having achieved “peace with honor” in Vietnam, see also H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1994), 572; and Kissinger, White House Years, 1471–76. 37. Telcon, Nixon, Mrs. Nixon, Kissinger, January 23, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 38. Telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, February 5, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 39. For Haig being consistently hawkish on Vietnam, see Roger Morris, Haig: The General’s Progress (London: Robson, 1982), 199–201. 40. Telcon, Kissinger and Melvin Laird, January 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 41. Telcon, Kissinger and William Rogers, January 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL; see also telcon, Kissinger and Ron Ziegler, January 27, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Kissinger and Elliot Richardson, January 31, 1973, ibid. 42. Telcon, Kissinger and Donald Marron, January 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL; see also telcon, Kissinger and Rowland Evans, January 24, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Kissinger and William Averell Harriman, January 25, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Kissinger and L. K. Jha, January 25, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Kissinger and John Osborne, January 29, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Kissinger and Tom Jarriel, January 30, 1973, ibid. 43. Telcon, Kissinger and Barry Goldwater, January 18, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL; see also telcon, Kissinger and Nelson Rockefeller, January 23, 1973, ibid. 44. Telcon, Kissinger and Dean Rusk, January 29, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. For Kissinger’s optimism regarding the prospects of a new US–North Vietnamese relationship, see also telcon, Kissinger and Paul Doty, February 2, 1973, ibid. 45. Telcon, Kissinger and Dick Valeriani, January 30, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. Kissinger was directly responding to an inquiry about the minesweeping procedures in North Vietnam, but his statement obviously implicated the entire peace agreement. 46. Telcon, Kissinger and Ambassador William Porter, January 25, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 47. Telcon, Kissinger and Richardson, February 7, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 48. For increased sorties in Laos after the cease-fire in Vietnam went into effect, see telegram 1446, Admiral Moorer to General Meyer, Admiral Gayler et al., “Future Operations in Laos,” January 27, 1973, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 97, RNL. The level of B-52 sorties was first increased to fifteen per day and then, in a second directive, doubled to thirty per day. The tactical air support limit of two hundred sorties given in a previous message was removed altogether.

172

NOTES TO PAGES 22–27

49. Telcon, Kissinger and Haig, January 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 50. Memo, Brent Scowcroft to Kissinger, February 3, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 97, RNL. 51. Telcon, Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin, February 2, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 52. Letter, Nixon to Leonid I. Brezhnev, February 2, 1973, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 495, RNL. 53. Memcon, Kissinger and Tran Van Do, Bui Diem, Tran Kim Phuong, et al., January 5, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 54. Memcon, Kissinger and Tran Van Lam, Pham Dong Lam, Nguyen Xuan Phong, Bui Diem, et al., January 22, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 55. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 500. 56. Quoted in Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 420. 57. Telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, January 18, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 58. On the question of the effectiveness of air campaigns, see Stephen P. Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 336. 59. Telcon, Kissinger and Marvin Kalb, January 25, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 60. Telcon, Kissinger and Haig, January 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 61. Telcon, Kissinger and Kenneth Galbraith, February 6, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 62. Memcon, Kissinger with members of the Senate, January 26, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. 63. Memcon, Kissinger with members of the House of Representatives, January 26, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. 64. Memcon, Kissinger with members of the Senate, January 26, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. 65. Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 275. 66. Quoted in Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of US Foreign Relations since 1897 (Oxford: SR Books, 2001), 396. 67. Richard M. Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (October 1967): 111. 68. Ibid., 123. For a discussion of the Nixon Doctrine, see Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 154. 69. Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” 114. 70. Henry A. Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 2 (January 1969): 234. 71. Ibid., 224. 72. Ibid., 230. 73. Ibid., 218–19. 74. Quoted in Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 88. According to McNaughton, preventing the fall of the Southeast Asian dominoes to communist China equaled 20 percent, while improving the lives of the South Vietnamese was worth only 10 percent. 75. For the notion of simultaneous expansion and contraction, see Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 143; and Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, “The Adventurous Journey of Nixon

NOTES TO PAGES 28–31

173

in the World,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12–13. 76. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 307–41. The major lines of criticism are that (1) linkage failed; (2) the global military balance of power shifted in favor of the USSR; (3) Nixon and Kissinger neglected pressing issues, except for China and the USSR; and (4) moral principles were corrupted. 77. Ibid., 284. 78. Kissinger, “Viet Nam Negotiations,” 218–19. 79. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 273, 302–4. See also Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 256–57. 80. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 273. 81. For animosities between Nixon and Kissinger in the period leading up to the Paris Agreement, see George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 320. For a more general account of antagonisms between the two, see ForaTv on YouTube, “Robert Dallek—Nixon vs. Kissinger,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DcYEOsuebzE. In his telephone conversations with journalists in early 1973, one of Kissinger’s main concerns was to emphasize that there were and had been no differences between him and Nixon. 82. Jeffrey Kimball persuasively argues that before 1969 it was actually Nixon, not Kissinger, who developed a coherent strategy for Vietnam. See Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 72, 97–100. More generally, some historians conclude that Nixon rather than Kissinger was the one who devised US foreign policy. See, for example, Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 654–55; and Jonathan Aitken, Nixon: A Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), 461–62. However, with regard to the post–Paris Agreement strategy, it seems reasonable to conclude that, at least in a narrow sense, it was to a large extent Kissinger’s brainchild. CHAPTER 2

1. On the term “X plus 60,” see Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 123. The term had been used during the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement when the date of the signing had yet to be agreed on. 2. Michael J. Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 63–64; Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 162; Marc Frey, Geschichte des Vietnamkriegs: Die Tragödie in Asien und das Ende des Amerikanischen Traums, 6th ed. (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2002), 214; Isaacs, Without Honor, 124. 3. Walter Scott Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace: Implementing the Paris Peace Accords, Vietnam, 1973 (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 151. 4. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 59; Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 112, 123–24, 132, 176–78. By early March, the communists were boycotting the field teams that were supposed to implement the cease-fire provisions. In any case, disputes in the Two-Party Joint Military Commission were to be referred to the impotent ICCS, rendering the body effectively inoperative. 5. For an assessment at the end of March of the various aspects of the cease-fire implementation, see memo, John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, March 21, 1973, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 114, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter RNL). For descriptions of the X plus 60 period,

174

NOTES TO PAGES 31–34

see Snepp, Decent Interval, 50–64; Isaacs, Without Honor, 71–101; and Robert D. Schulzinger, “The End of the Vietnam War, 1973–1976,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 205–6. 6. For Kissinger’s itinerary, see memo, Brent Scowcroft to Kissinger, February 6, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. The Asia trip was prolonged by one day. Kissinger returned to Washington on February 20. 7. Memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL. 8. Ibid. For an analysis of the Thai position, see Arne Kislenko, “US Relations with Thailand during the Vietnam War,” in America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives, ed. Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 217–19. Kislenko concludes that by 1973, Thanom was more committed to a military solution to the Indochina problem than Nixon was. 9. Memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL. See also memo, Scowcroft to the President, February 11, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. 10. Telegram HAKTO 33, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 11, 1973, “HAKTO I,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. See also Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 435–36. 11. Memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL. For Kissinger’s description of the Hanoi trip, see also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 433–52. For another account, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 261–69. Hanhimäki wrongly claims that Kissinger visited Cambodia during his Asia trip. 12. Telegram TOHAK 60, Scowcroft to Kissinger, February 9, 1973, “TOHAK II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. See also telephone conversation (telcon), Kissinger and George Carver, February 6, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 13. Memorandum of conversation (memcon), Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 11, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 113, RNL. 14. Memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL. 15. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 436–37, 451. 16. Ibid., 448–49. For Nixon and Kissinger discussing aid as leverage, see, for example, telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, February 20, 1973, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 10, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 130–32. 17. Memcon, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 12, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 113, RNL. The discussions in the Joint Economic Commission actually began in Paris on March 15. See Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 449. 18. Memo for the record, February 12, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 113, RNL; memcon, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 11, 1973, ibid.; and memcon, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 10, 1973, ibid.

NOTES TO PAGES 34–37

175

19. Memcon, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 11, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 113, RNL. 20. For Kissinger’s views on aid, see telegram HAKTO 72, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 15, 1973, “HAKTO II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. See also memo, Scowcroft to the President, February 14, 1973, ibid.; memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL; telcon, Kissinger and Bill Sullivan, March 7, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL; and Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 456. 21. On US aims for the International Conference on Vietnam, which Secretary Rogers attended from February 24 to March 3, see memo, Kissinger to Nixon, February 23, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL. 22. Telegram HAKTO 117, Richard T. Kennedy to Scowcroft, February 20, 1973, “HAKTO III,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. For the North Vietnamese comments on Laos and Cambodia, see memcon, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 12, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 113, RNL. See also memcon, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 10, ibid.; and memcon, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., February 11, ibid. 23. Memcon, President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, H. R. Haldeman, General Scowcroft, Ronald L. Ziegler, February 10, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. 24. Ibid. 25. Memcon, President Nixon, Elliot Richardson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Scowcroft, February 15, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. 26. For Nixon’s view on aid, see telegram TOHAK 218, Scowcroft to Kissinger, February 16, 1973, “TOHAK V,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 30, RNL. For Nixon’s mood, see telegram TOHAK 95, Scowcroft to Kissinger, February 11, 1973, “TOHAK II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. 27. Memo, Kissinger to the President, February 17, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. For Nixon and Kissinger’s general fondness for Chinese leaders, see also Richard M. Nixon, Leaders (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982), 218. Odd Arne Westad argues that this fondness was based, at least in part, on a misperception of Chinese leaders, who actually had a very limited grasp of the world beyond China. See Odd Arne Westad, “The Great Transformation: China in the Long 1970s,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 77. 28. Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Asian Trip,” February 27, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 203–4. 29. Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 209. 30. On Chinese fears of the Soviets and Kissinger’s response, see telegram HAKTO 75, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 1973, “HAKTO II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. See also memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 15, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 32–33; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, ibid., 56–57; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 17, 1973, ibid., 117–122; memcon, Mao Tsetung, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16–17, 1973, ibid., 125–26, 137; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 18, 1973, ibid., 143–44, 154–58; and memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, ibid., 210–12. On Indochina and Southeast Asia, see telegram HAKTO 75, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 1973, “HAKTO II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29,

176

NOTES TO PAGE 37

RNL; memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 15, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 30; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, ibid., 57, 68–69; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 17, 1973, ibid., 88, 93–101, 110–11; memcon, Mao Tsetung, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16–17, 1973, ibid., 125; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 18, 1973, ibid., 141, 171; and memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 19, 1973, ibid., 186–189. On Laos, see memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, ibid., 67; and memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 17, 1973, ibid., 88–91. On Cambodia, see memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, ibid., 67, 72–75; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 17, 1973, ibid., 101; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 18, 1973, ibid., 166–68; memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Asian Trip,” February 27, 1973, ibid., 205–6; and memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, ibid., 217. On Taiwan, see memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 15, 1973, ibid., 27; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, ibid., 49–50; and memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, ibid., 219–20. On the joint communiqué and the liaison offices, see memo, Kissinger to the President, February 18, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 52; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 17, 1973, ibid., 85; memcon, Mao Tsetung, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16–17, 1973, ibid., 129; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 18, 1973, ibid., 140, 175–77; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 19, 1973, ibid., 179, 182; memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, ibid., 221; and memcon, Kissinger, David Bruce, et al., March 29, 1973, ibid., 231. Kissinger proposed that the liaison offices replace the US-PRC Paris channel, whereas important issues should continue to be discussed directly between the White House and the Chinese leaders. Kissinger suggested that diplomatic relations could be fully normalized by 1976. In any case, Nixon and Kissinger would remain firmly in control of US-PRC relations. For another account of Kissinger’s China visit, see Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 269–75. See also Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: 1982), 44–71. The journalist-historians James Mann and Patrick Tyler both highlight that the February 1973 visit to Beijing marked the high point of US-PRC relations during the era. See James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), 60–63; and Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, an Investigative History (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 149–52. 31. Telegram HAKTO 102, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 1973, “HAKTO III,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. See also telegram HAKTO 108, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 20, 1973, “HAKTO III,” ibid. Kissinger underlined the same point in his talks with Zhou Enlai. See memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 17, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 83. 32. Telcon, Kissinger and Ziegler, February 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 33. See telegram HAKTO 75, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 1973, “HAKTO II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. See also memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 15, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 30; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, ibid., 57, 68–69; memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 17, 1973, ibid., 88; memcon, Mao Tsetung, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16–17, 1973, ibid., 125; and memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 18, 1973,

NOTES TO PAGES 37–39

177

ibid., 141. For Kissinger’s expectations regarding a decline in Chinese supplies to the DRV, see memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Asian Trip,” February 27, 1973, ibid., 205; and memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, ibid., 216. 34. Memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 15, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 25. See also memcon, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16, 1973, ibid., 63, 65, 68; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 270. Kissinger also instructed David Bruce, chief-designate of the US Liaison Office in Beijing, to discuss Vietnam along the same lines. See memcon, Kissinger, David Bruce, et al., March 29, 1973, FRUS, 1969– 1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 232. 35. Memcon, Anatoli Dobrynin, Kissinger, March 8, 1973, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 495, RNL. 36. Memcon, Vladimir S. Alkhimov, Nikolai N. Inozemtsev, Kissinger, et al., March 5, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. 37. Letter, Nixon to Leonid I. Brezhnev, February 2, 1973, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 495, RNL. 38. Lorenz M. Lüthi, “Beyond Betrayal: Beijing, Moscow, and the Paris Negotiations, 1971–1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 75, 84, 86–88, 106. See also Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “An Elusive Grand Design,” in Logevall and Preston, Nixon in the World, 38; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 204–5, 207. For an opposite view that stresses that Nixon and Kissinger risked détente over Vietnam in the spring of 1972, see, for example, Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “ ‘Between the Storms’: North Vietnam’s Strategy during the Second Indochina War” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2008), 249. 39. For an analysis that stresses that détente and triangular diplomacy were the ultimate goals, see, for example, Hanhimäki, “Elusive Grand Design,” 33; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, xviii–xix, 258, 488–89, 491–92. For an interpretation that concludes that Vietnam was the primary reason for Nixon and Kissinger’s grand strategy, see, for example, Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, “The Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” in Logevall and Preston, Nixon in the World, 12. 40. Logevall and Preston stress that Nixon believed that “peace with honor” in Vietnam and détente with the USSR were mutually dependent. See Logevall and Preston, “Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” 13. 41. Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Asian Trip,” February 27, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 204. Kissinger obviously referred to the military action in Vietnam when he noted that the Chinese had clearly been impressed by the strong policies Nixon had implemented despite domestic opposition. See ibid., 207. According to Kissinger, a position of strength was also needed vis-à-vis Congress and the press in order to maintain a favorable PRC attitude toward Washington. See memo, Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, ibid., 223. 42. Memcon, Nixon, Agnew, et al., March 18, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. For related remarks that stress the need to stand firm in Indochina to uphold US credibility and protect the basis of Washington’s foreign policy, see also memcon, Nixon, Richardson, JCS, Scowcroft, February 15, 1973, ibid.; memo for the President’s Files, March 13, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1025, RNL; and memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL. 43. Memcon, Mao Tsetung, Chou En-lai, Kissinger, et al., February 16–17, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 135. 44. See, for example, Nixontapes.org, “Conversation No. 034-030, Nixon and Anatoly Dobrynin,” http://nixontapeaudio.org/afd/034-030.mp3. For similar statements to the Chinese, see, for example, memcon, Kissinger, Huang Hua, et al., January 3, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 4; and letter, Nixon to Zhou Enlai, January 3, 1973,

178

NOTES TO PAGES 39–41

ibid., 8. Hanhimäki also points out that Nixon used the term “irritant” during his February 1972 trip to Beijing. See Jussi Hanhimäki, “Selling the ‘Decent Interval’: Kissinger, Triangular Diplomacy, and the End of the Vietnam War, 1971–73,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 1 (March 2003): 162; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 258. It should be noted that, similarly to his argument about “selling the decent interval,” Hanhimäki seems to take Nixon and Kissinger’s statements to the Soviets and the Chinese at face value, arguably seriously neglecting to critically assess the sources. However, the usage of the term “irritant” was actually in line with similar remarks that Nixon and Kissinger made in private. 45. Memcon, Nixon and Kissinger, March 12, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 226. 46. Telegram HAKTO 95, Kissinger to Scowcroft, February 1973, “HAKTO II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. 47. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy in the Cold War, rev. and expanded ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 272–74. 48. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, xvii–xix, 488–89. See also Hanhimäki, “Elusive Grand Design,” 40–41; Hanhimäki, “ ‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 654, 670–71, 674–75; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 190; and Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 148–49. 49. For the Soviets’ attitude toward the Paris Agreement, see, for example, letter, Brezhnev to Nixon, January 27, 1973, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 495, RNL. For the Chinese attitude, see, for example, letter, Zhou Enlai to Nixon, January 6, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, China, 1973–1976, 12. For the idea that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese were willing to give up their national interests in Vietnam, see Eva-Maria Stolberg, “People’s Warfare versus Peaceful Coexistence: Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Struggle for Ideological Supremacy,” in Daum, Gardner, and Mausbach, America, the Vietnam War, and the World, 254–56. 50. For accounts of the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for Chinese foreign policy, see, for example, Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 238–76; and Lorenz Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1–14, 345–52. Lüthi concludes that ideological disputes and, linked to them, Mao’s increasing radicalization were the central cause of the Sino-Soviet split. According to Lüthi, the Vietnam War spurred the final collapse of the Sino-Soviet military alliance. See ibid., 339. See also Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “The Vietnam Decade: The Global Shock of the War,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 163–64, 168. For Kissinger’s most recent analysis of Beijing’s approach to Indochina, see Henry A. Kissinger, On China (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 344–45. 51. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 136, 196. See also Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship: China and the DRV during the Vietnam War,” in International Perspectives on Vietnam, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 135–36; and Xiaoming Zhang, “Communist Powers Divided: China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam War,” in Gardner and Gittinger, International Perspectives on Vietnam, 96. 52. This description of Chinese strategy toward Indochina is largely based on Zhai’s account. See Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 7, 193–222. See also Chen, Mao’s China, 2, 14, 235–37. According to Chen, China’s Vietnam policy was based on Mao’s aim to enhance China’s reputation as chief revolutionary and to mobilize the masses within China

NOTES TO PAGES 41–43

179

for the Cultural Revolution. The North Vietnamese, in turn, increasingly perceived a gap between Chinese rhetoric and actual support. For an analysis of Sino-Vietnamese discord in the Laotian context, see Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963–1975,” Journal of Military History 66, no. 4 (October 2002): 1163–66. For an analysis that concludes that in 1971–1972 Beijing’s acquiescence in the long-term independence of South Vietnam was still nonexistent, see Chris Connolly, “The American Factor: Sino-American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War, 1968–72,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 511–14. 53. For Kissinger’s exultation about China’s interests in Indochina, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 58–60. 54. On the amount of Soviet deliveries, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 247. 55. For the Soviet motives mentioned here, see Stolberg, “People’s Warfare versus Peaceful Coexistence,” 249–51; Ilya V. Gaiduk, “The Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations, 1964–1973: New Russian Evidence,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6–7 (Winter 1995–96): 251; Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 246–50; and Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (London: Westview Press, 1987), 100–102, 244–46. 56. Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 245, 248–49. See also Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 211; and Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986 (New York: Times Books, 1995), 263–64. 57. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 136, 218–19. See also Stolberg, “People’s Warfare versus Peaceful Coexistence,” 249; and Stephen J. Morris, “The Soviet-ChineseVietnamese Triangle in the 1970s: The View from Moscow,” in Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia, ed. Priscilla Roberts (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 413–14. For an analysis that concludes that Washington’s triangular diplomacy actually worked and, as a result, Beijing and Moscow denied Hanoi effective diplomatic support and military aid during the 1972 Easter Offensive, see Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 255–56; and Nguyen, “ ‘Between the Storms,’ ” 11–12, 253, 258, 262, 312. Lorenz Lüthi, on the other hand, concludes that although the DRV perceived especially US-PRC rapprochement as a ploy designed to bring about an unfavorable end to the war, their accusations against Beijing (and Moscow) were too exaggerated: China and the USSR continued to provide Hanoi with critical aid. See Lüthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 72–73, 106–7. 58. Telegram TOHAK 161, William Sullivan to Kissinger, February 1973, “TOHAK IV,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 30, RNL. 59. Ibid. 60. For Agnew’s assessment, see memcon, Nixon, Agnew, Haldeman, Scowcroft, Ziegler, February 10, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. For Bunker’s report, see memo, Kissinger to Nixon, March 9, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. For Negroponte’s impressions, see memo, John D. Negroponte to Kissinger, February 6, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 30, RNL. Although Negroponte reported on the allegedly optimistic mood in Saigon, he himself broke with Kissinger over the terms of the Paris Agreement, which he believed did not guarantee South Vietnam’s security. 61. Memo, Phil Odeen to Kissinger, January 24, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. 62. Ibid.

180

NOTES TO PAGES 43–44

63. Memo, Odeen to Kissinger, February 22, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. Nixon himself expressed great confidence in South Vietnam’s economy. See memcon, Nixon, Agnew, et al., March 18, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. 64. Memo, Kissinger to the President, March 31, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. 65. Mark Moyar. Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam, Bison Books ed. (London: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), xviii–xix, 244–54, 270–71. For the effects of the Tet Offensive, see James H. Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 79–85; and Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1993), 311–16. For scholars and officials arguing that in early 1973, Saigon’s control of South Vietnam was firmer and military performance better than some orthodox scholars have admitted, see also Mark Moyar, “Optimism and War,” New York Sun, September 18, 2007, http://www.nysun.com/opinion/optimism-and-war/62852/; Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 217–27, 375, 383, 385; Nguyen, “ ‘Between the Storms,’ ” 257–60, 262, 275, 306; Melvin R. Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 25–26; William Colby, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago, 1989), 318–32; Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 151–52; and George J. Veith, Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973–75 (New York: Encounter Books, 2012), 4–6. For a still valuable historiographical essay on different analyses that stress military factors, see George C. Herring, “American Strategy in Vietnam: The Postwar Debate,” Military Affairs, 46, no. 2 (April 1982): 57–63. 66. For Operations Enhance and Enhance Plus, see Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 91–92, 186. 67. See, for example, Colby, Lost Victory, 318–21; and Nguyen, “ ‘Between the Storms,’ ” 262, 275, 306. For a balanced account of Vietnamization that focuses on the differences between analyses during and after the war, see Scott Sigmund Gartner, “Differing Evaluations of Vietnamization,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29, no. 2 (Autumn, 1998): 243–62. 68. On casualty rates during the X plus 60 period, see chart, “Post Cease Fire Casualties (KIA), VC/NVA-RVN,” n.d., NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 107, RNL. 69. See, for example, Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 298–325; and Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 151–52. 70. Lüthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 78. 71. For a similar argument, see Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 325. 72. See, for example, memcon, Nixon, Agnew, et al., February 10, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. 73. For the continuing-resolutions process, see Edward A. Kolodziej, “Congress and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Years,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 32, no. 1 (1975): 175. Assistance to South Vietnam in FY 1973 totaled roughly $3.88 billion (the highest figure from 1955 to 1975). FY 1974 saw a sharp drop to roughly $1.6 billion. Especially, military assistance was reduced from $3.35 billion to $941.9 million. See Douglas C. Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development: South Vietnam, 1955–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 200. 74. Telcon, Kissinger and Sullivan, February 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. See also memo, Odeen to Kissinger, March 23, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL.

NOTES TO PAGES 44–46

181

75. Memo, Odeen to Kissinger, February 22, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. For an optimistic view on getting aid to North Vietnam through Congress, see telcon, Herb Klein and Kissinger, February 22, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. See also telegram TOHAK 218, Scowcroft to Kissinger, February 16, 1973, “TOHAK V,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 30, RNL. 76. For a rather pessimistic analysis of South Vietnam’s economy, see Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development, xvi, 12–21, 34–37, 69–71, 97. Dacy underlines the critical importance of US aid and concludes that in the end, South Vietnam failed to build an independent, self-sustainable economy. 77. Telcon, Richardson and Kissinger, March 29, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 78. For Kissinger’s optimistic public response regarding the NVA’s presence in the South, see, for example, memcon, Kissinger, Neubold Noyes, Crosby Noyes, et al., January 31, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. Nixon also stressed that the terms of the agreement had to be seen in the context of larger strategic realities that would ensure Thieu’s survival. See Stephen P. Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 332. In private, Nixon and Kissinger were more worried but hoped to address the issue with their equilibrium strategy. See Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 454–56. 79. Telcon, Thomas Moorer and Kissinger, February 6, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 80. Nixon and Kissinger clearly did not mind Thieu’s cease-fire violations (such as the continuing detention of civilian prisoners) per se but, to the contrary, encouraged exploitations as long as the public relations campaign was not put at risk. See memo, Holdridge to Kissinger, February 28, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 81. Kissinger later argued that the vice president’s visit to South Vietnam carried quite some prestige and that Thieu’s personal hatred of him would have made a trip unproductive anyway. See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 15. However, Nixon and Kissinger were well aware that Agnew’s visit in no way matched the symbolic value of their presence. Moreover, they readily agreed to postpone a meeting with Thieu to the spring. See, for example, telegram TOHAK 60, Scowcroft to Kissinger, February 9, 1973, “TOHAK II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. See also telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, January 31, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 10, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, 19–20. 82. For an account of the incursions into Laos and Cambodia, see, for example, George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 288–98; and Victor B. Anthony and Richard R. Sexton, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The War in Northern Laos (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1993), 342. 83. See, for example, Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 211–336; and Anthony and Sexton, United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 45, 363. 84. Norman B. Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987), xvii, xxi–xxiv, 259–63, 272–78, 298–300, 303, 306. See also Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 322–24. On the Ho Chi Minh Trail, see also Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 139; and John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1999),

182

NOTES TO PAGES 46–47

378. Prados argues that the Americans and the South Vietnamese actually tried to cut the trail but failed in their effort. 85. For Lon Nol’s view, see letter, Lon Nol to Kissinger, February 16, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 114, RNL. See also memcon, Lon Nol, Alexander Haig, et al., January 18, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 30, RNL. For Souvanna’s views, see summary of Agnew-Souvanna memcons, n.d., ibid. 86. On Laos, see telcon, the President and Kissinger, February 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. See also telegram HAKTO 83, Kissinger to Ambassador Godley, February 17, 1973, “HAKTO II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. On Cambodia, see memo, Kissinger to the President, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 125, RNL. For both theaters, see also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 444–46. 87. In Laos, sorties in support of the government took place mainly in the northern part of the country (including the Plain of Jars), while strikes against the Ho Chi Minh Trail were flown in the southern part. See Anthony and Sexton, United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, iii. 88. Memcon, Nixon, Agnew, et al., March 18, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. Kissinger corroborated this view. See telcon, Richardson and Kissinger, March 10, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Haig and Kissinger, March 15, 1973, ibid. 89. For the text of the Paris Agreement, see Asselin, Bitter Peace, 212–13. 90. In 1973, Hanoi withdrew almost all its troops who were directly supporting the Khmer Rouge. However, troops posted along the Ho Chi Minh Trail remained in place. See Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 155, 165. 91. Memo, Scowcroft to the President, February 14, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. For DRV–Khmer Rouge relations, see also Asselin, Bitter Peace, 61, 161; David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 2, 9–11; and William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, rev. ed. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002), 248, 285. For DRV–Pathet Lao relations, see StuartFox, History of Laos, 136. 92. For Nixon and Kissinger agreeing on the meaninglessness of legal clauses (with respect to the entire Paris Agreement), see, for example, telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, January 31, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 10, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, 15–18. 93. Telcon, Moorer and Kissinger, February 20, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. See also telegram HAKTO 20, Richard T. Kennedy to Scowcroft, February 10, 1973, “HAKTO I,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 29, RNL. For the terms of the Vientiane agreement, see, for example, MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, “Laos 1973: Wary Steps toward Peace,” Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (February 1974): 166–67. 94. For some indications of withdrawals and US sorties after February 22, see telcon, Kissinger and Moorer, February 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. See also Anthony and Sexton, United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 362. For an account of the implementation of the Vientiane agreement, see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955–1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 117–24. For expansions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, see Brown and Zasloff, “Laos 1973,” 173–74. 95. For ongoing air operations in Cambodia, see, for example, memo, Current Operations Branch, Strategic Operations Division to J-31, March 16, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam

NOTES TO PAGES 48–50

183

Subject File, Box 97, RNL. For an account of the continued fighting in Cambodia, see Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 154–60. 96. For an account of the confrontations, see Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 463–69. 97. On the SAM sites, see telcon, Kissinger and Richardson, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. See also Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 147–49. On the importance of the MIA issue, see also Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home, 4. 98. For Kissinger wondering about the wisdom of a high-level confrontation, see, for example, telcon, Sullivan and Kissinger, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 99. Memcon, Nixon, Richardson, JCS, Scowcroft, February 15, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. 100. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. See also telcon, the President and Kissinger, February 28, 1973, ibid. 101. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, February 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 102. For pessimistic comments, see ibid. See also telcon, Ziegler and Kissinger, February 28, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. For continued disassociations from Saigon, see telcon, Phil Geyelin and Kissinger, February 28, 1973, ibid. For Nixon and Kissinger’s belief in toughness, see telcon, the President and Kissinger, February 28, 1973, ibid. 103. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, February 28, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 104. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (London: Hutchinson, 1974), 421. Some studies have somewhat justified Nixon and Kissinger’s conclusion. According to Nguyen and Asselin, the North Vietnamese were ultimately not willing to negotiate seriously until the communist leader Le Duan realized the failure of the Easter Offensive. See Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, 298–99; Nguyen, “ ‘Between the Storms,’ ” 256–62; Asselin, Bitter Peace, xii–xiii; Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons, 320, 330; Robert E. Stoffey, Fighting to Leave: The Final Years of America’s War in Vietnam, 1972–1973 (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2008), 250; Lüthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 92–95, 107; and Robert Jervis, “The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and Buying Time,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 512–13. Moreover, Nguyen and Asselin both conclude that the Christmas bombings constituted a grave threat to the DRV and brought the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. See Nguyen, “ ‘Between the Storms,’ ” 303–4; and Asselin, Bitter Peace, 163–66. 105. Memo, Richardson to Kissinger, February 26, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 114, RNL. 106. Memo, Kennedy and Holdridge to Kissinger, March 29, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 114, RNL. 107. Memo, Holdridge to Kissinger, March 12, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. See also memo for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, March 10, 1973, ibid. In both memos, Holdridge commented in the first-person plural; thus the opinions he expressed are likely to have reflected those of other NSC staffers as well. 108. The ad hoc group included representatives of the Defense and State departments, as well as the CIA, the JCS, and the NSC. 109. The minesweeping operation code-named End Sweep was conducted from February 27, 1973, to July 27, 1973. See Stoffey, Fighting to Leave, 22, 255–68.

184

NOTES TO PAGES 50–52

110. Memo, Holdridge to Kissinger, March 12, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. See also memo, Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Kissinger, March 12, 1973, ibid. 111. Memo, Kissinger to the President, March 14, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. For the conclusions of the WSAG, see also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 463. 112. Telcon, Kissinger and the President, March 7, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Sullivan and Kissinger, March 7, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Moorer and Kissinger, March 7, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Richardson and Kissinger, March 10, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Haig and Kissinger, March 15, 1973, ibid.; and memcon, Kissinger, Richardson, Scowcroft, Daniel J. Murphy, March 16, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. 113. Telcon, Kissinger and Hank Trewhitt, March 14, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 114. Telcon, Stewart Alsop and Kissinger, March 14, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 115. For Nixon’s belligerence, see, for example, memcon, Nixon, Agnew, et al., March 18, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, RNL. For Nixon confirming the deterrence approach, see telcon, the President and Kissinger, March 7, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 116. Telegram TOHAK 43, Scowcroft to Kissinger, March 20, 1973, “HAK OUTGOING,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 31, RNL. See also telcon, Nixon and Haig, March 20, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 10, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, 152– 56; and telcon, Nixon and Scowcroft, March 20, 1973, ibid., 157–61. Although Nixon conveyed the idea that US reintervention would be unlikely after the return of the POWs, he again expressed the belief that an all-out invasion by North Vietnam would change the situation. Interestingly, Nixon and Haig used the term “insurance policy” while discussing how to respond to North Vietnamese cease-fire violations. 117. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 464–65. 118. Telegram TOHAK 69, Scowcroft to Kissinger, March 22, 1973, “HAK OUTGOING II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 31, RNL. 119. Memo, William L. Stearman to Kissinger, March 21, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 163, RNL. 120. Telcon, Eugene Rostow and Kissinger, March 13, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 121. Memo, Scowcroft to the President, March 21, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 31, RNL. See also telegram HAKTO 8, Kissinger to Scowcroft, March 22, 1973, “HAK INCOMING,” ibid. For Kissinger’s recommendations to Nixon, see also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 465–66. 122. Telegram TOHAK 69, Scowcroft to Kissinger, March 22, 1973, “HAK OUTGOING II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 31, RNL. 123. Telegram TOHAK 82, Scowcroft to Kissinger, March 22, 1973, “HAK OUTGOING II,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 31, RNL. See also telegram TOHAK 80, Scowcroft to Kissinger, March 22, 1973, “HAK OUTGOING II,” ibid.; and telegram HAKTO 8, Kissinger to Scowcroft, March 22, 1973, “HAK INCOMING,” ibid. Although Kissinger had made a strong case for the bombings in his March 22 cable, he had recommended putting off the strikes until the imminent return of the POWs. When Scowcroft informed Nixon of Kissinger’s recommendations, the president hastily ordered a one-day strike and hung up the phone. When a somewhat perplexed Scowcroft called the president back, Nixon readily agreed to postpone the strikes. For this episode, see also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 466.

NOTES TO PAGES 52–56

185

124. Telegram HAKTO 9, Kissinger to Scowcroft, March 22, 1973, “HAK INCOMING,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 31, RNL. See also telegram TOHAK 89, Scowcroft to Kissinger, March 23, 1973, “HAK OUTGOING II,” ibid. 125. Telcon, Rowland Evans and Kissinger, March 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Haldeman and Kissinger, March 28, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, March 29, 1973, ibid. 126. Memo, Kissinger to the President, March 30, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 113, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and the President, March 28, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 127. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, March 29, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. For Nixon’s temporary bellicosity, see also telcon, Kissinger and the President, March 28, 1973, ibid. CHAPTER 3

1. Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 468–69. 2. Dominic Sandbrook, “Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 96–97. 3. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982), 326–27. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 469. The torture of American prisoners in Vietnam actually ended in 1969. See Michael J. Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 297. 4. Richard F. Grimmett, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs since 1970 Involving US Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report for Congress RS20775 (Washington, DC, January 10, 2001), 2. See also Amy Belasco, Lynn J. Cunningham, Hannah Fischer, and Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Restrictions on US Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-funding Approaches, CRS Report for Congress RL33803 (Washington, DC, January 16, 2007), 31. 5. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 460. 6. Memo for the President’s Files, April 2, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter RNL). 7. Ibid. 8. For Kissinger’s disappointment, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 310–11. 9. For Thieu’s comments, see memo, Theodore L. Eliot to Kissinger, April 1, 1973, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 107, RNL. For Nixon’s comment to Thieu, see memo for the President’s Files, April 2, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 104, RNL. 10. Memo, Kissinger to the President, March 31, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 105, RNL. 11. For the final communiqué, see Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 462–63. 12. See, for example, telephone conversation (telcon), Bob Toth and Kissinger, April 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 13. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 460–61.

186

NOTES TO PAGES 56–58

14. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 2, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 15. Telcon, Secretary Peterson and Kissinger, April 4, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 16. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950– 1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 219, 248–51. 17. Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 138–40; David F. Schmitz, Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 147. 18. For accounts of restrictive legislation in 1970 and 1971, see Herring, America’s Longest War, 294–95; and Belasco et al., Congressional Restrictions on US Military Operations, ii. 19. Herring, America’s Longest War, 282–83. 20. For an excellent summary of the 1969–73 period, on which this account is largely based, see Lawrence, Vietnam War, 137–59. For a summary of congressional attempts to end US involvement, see Belasco et al., Congressional Restrictions on US Military Operations, 1–3. See also Joseph R. Fry, “To Negotiate or Bomb: Congressional Prescriptions for Withdrawing US Troops from Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 517–28; and Melvin Small, “Bring the Boys Home Now! Antiwar Activism and Withdrawal from Vietnam—and Iraq,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 552. 21. “. . . But They Still Approved the Funds,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 4 (January 27, 1973): 119. On congressional funding support in the early 1970s, see also Julian E. Zelizer, “How Congress Got Us Out of Vietnam,” American Prospect 18, no. 3 (March 2007): 30. 22. Julian E. Zelizer, “How Congress Got Us Out of Vietnam,” 30. 23. For Kissinger calling his hopes naive, see Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 453. 24. For the approval ratings, see Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends,” http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval -ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx. For praise for Nixon and Kissinger, see “Congress: Views on Reaching the End of the Tunnel,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 4 (January 27, 1973): 168. See also Randall Bennett Woods, J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 267. 25. William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, rev. ed. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002), 33–34. See also Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers (New York: Viking, 2002), 427. 26. YouTube, “Richard Nixon Tapes: Election Night 1972 (Henry Kissinger),” http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBLR8OeqimQ&feature=related. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 458. For the 1972 election being the high point of the Nixon presidency, see also Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 653. 27. Memo, John F. Lehman to Kissinger, December 15, 1972, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. 28. Ibid. 29. Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge, 2006), 186. See also “An Introspective and Angry Congress Begins Its Work,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 1 (January 6, 1973): 7. 30. Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, “House History: 93rd Congress (1973–1975),” http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/index.aspx. See also “The

NOTES TO PAGES 58–60

187

New Congress: Its Members and Its Mood,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 1 (January 6, 1973): 13. 31. Quoted in “The New Congress: Its Members and Its Mood,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 1 (January 6, 1973): 13. 32. Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 182. 33. Ibid., 183. For a similar, detailed analysis, see “Introspective and Angry Congress Begins Its Work,” 3. See also “Congressional Votes on Indochina War: 1966–1972,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 4 (January 27, 1973): 119. On negative views of McGovern’s positions, even by liberals such as Senator Fulbright, see Woods, J. William Fulbright, 266. 34. Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 2001), 221. See also Woods, J. William Fulbright, 266–67; Lorenz M. Lüthi, “Beyond Betrayal: Beijing, Moscow, and the Paris Negotiations, 1971–1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 104; “Congress Critics of War Threaten to Fight Funding,” New York Times (hereafter NYT), January 3, 1973, 1; “Pullout Sought,” NYT, January 4, 1973, 1, 24; and “Senate Democrats, 36–12, Back Action to End War,” NYT, January 5, 1973, 1. 35. Quoted in “Introspective and Angry Congress Begins Its Work,” 7. 36. Memorandum of conversation (memcon), Kissinger with members of the House of Representatives, January 26, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. For Congress being paralyzed on Vietnam in early 1973, see also Shawcross, Sideshow, 272; “Congress and the War: Conflicting Assessments,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 4 (January 27, 1973): 114; and Woods, J. William Fulbright, 270. For an apparently opposing interpretation that suggests that even in early 1973, Congress decisively set out to cut off funds for Indochina, see, for example, Lüthi, “Beyond Betrayal,” 96; and Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 72–73. 37. See, for example, “Vietnam: Reaching Agreement on ‘Peace with Honor,’ ” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 4 (January 27, 1973): 113. 38. On the broader congressional movement to restrict the executive branch’s power over foreign policy in the 1970s, see Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, xx–xxiv; and Robert David Johnson, “Congress and the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 81. 39. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), viii. For concerns among the members of Congress, see P. Edward Haley, Congress and the Fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia (East Brunswick, NJ: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1982), 15–18. 40. “Executive Privilege,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31, no. 1 (January 6, 1973): 5. On Nixon and Kissinger’s effective expansion of power over foreign policy during Nixon’s first term, see also “New Congress,” 13. For Nixon’s aggressive style with Congress, see also Sandbrook, “Salesmanship and Substance,” 86. For a more general analysis of presidential war-making powers and congressional responses, see William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 222–23. For the dominance that has grown over the course of US history of the executive branch regarding US foreign policy, see also Julian E. Zelizer, “Congress and the Politics of Troop Withdrawal,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 529–30. 41. Telcon, Dr. Kraemer and Kissinger, January 18, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 42. Memo, Kissinger to the President, June 22, 1972, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL.

188

NOTES TO PAGES 60–63

43. Memo, Lehman to Kissinger, March 28, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. For mounting opposition, see also memo, Richard K. Cook to Marshall Wright, March 8, 1973, ibid. 44. “Introspective and Angry Congress Begins Its Work,” 7–8. 45. Quoted in “Congress and the War,” 114. For members of Congress acknowledging in early January that there was no prospect of an immediate cutoff, see also “Senate Democrats, 36–12, Back Action to End War,” 1. 46. Asselin, Bitter Peace, 129. 47. A Gallup poll taken in December showed that 46 percent approved the bombings of Haiphong and Hanoi, while 45 percent disapproved. See George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972–1977, vol. 1, 1972–1975 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1978), 90. 48. Ibid., 92. 49. Ibid., 87. 50. Ibid., 93. 51. Ibid., 93–94. See also Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 462. 52. For a similar conclusion, see, for example, Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 61. 53. See, for example, “Some Leaders in Congress Fear a Short-Lived Truce,” NYT, January 25, 1973, 1. 54. “War Leaves Deep Mark on US,” NYT, January 24, 1973, 1. 55. For a more general argument that presidents often manage to change the national mood, see Melvin Small, “H-Diplo Article Review No. 225—Melvin Small on Thomas Schwartz,” April 30, 2009, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR225.pdf. 56. Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, “FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats,” Washington Post, October 10, 1972, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content /article/2002/06/03/AR2005111001232.html. 57. For the development of the Watergate story in the summer and fall of 1972, see Keith W. Olson, Watergate: The Presidential Scandal That Shook America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 58–68; and Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 3–5, 187–248. 58. Telcon, Ambassador Dobrynin and Kissinger, January 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 18, RNL. 59. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 466. 60. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 61. Ibid. For the aid tactic, see also telcon, Kissinger and McGeorge Bundy, April 4, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 62. Telegram TOHAIG 11, Kissinger to Alexander Haig, April 9, 1973, NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL. 63. Memo, Kissinger to the Oval Office, April 14, 1973, NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL. See also telegram HAIGTO 07, Haig to Kissinger, April 10, 1973, ibid. 64. Telegram HAIGTO 07, Haig to Kissinger, April 10, 1973, NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL. 65. Telegram TOHAIG 14, Kissinger to Haig, April 10, 1973, NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL; see also telegram HAIGTO 07, Haig to Kissinger, April 10, 1973, ibid. 66. Telegram HAIGTO 01, Haig to Kissinger, April 9, 1973, NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL.

NOTES TO PAGES 63–66

189

67. Telegram TOHAK 113, Haig to General Scowcroft for Kissinger, n.d., NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL. Haig again mentioned the possible resumption of Linebacker II if the DRV continued to violate the cease-fire. 68. Telegram HAIGTO 06, Haig to Kissinger, April 10, 1973, NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL. 69. Telegram TOHAK 113, Haig to Scowcroft for Kissinger, n.d., NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1020, RNL. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. See, for example, telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 10, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Joe Alsop and Kissinger, April 11, 1973, ibid. 73. Memo, Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, April 17, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 97, RNL. 74. Telcon, Kissinger and Secretary Richardson, April 16, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. For Kissinger denying again the idea of withdrawal in the context of the mid-April bombings, see telcon, Kissinger and Richardson, April 14, 1973, ibid. For Kissinger asking for a maximum bombing effort, see also telcon, Moorer and Kissinger, April 16, 1973, ibid.; and telegram, Under Secretary Porter to Ambassador Godley, April 16, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-91, RNL. For more comments in the same vein, including derogatory remarks about the WSAG, see also telcon, Kissinger and William Clements, April 16, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 75. Memo, Kissinger to the President, n.d., NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 114, RNL. 76. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 467–68. 77. Ibid., 468. See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 72–76; and Horne, Kissinger, 89–91. 78. Telcon, Richardson and Kissinger, April 14, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 79. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 468–69. Kissinger’s assistant, Peter Rodman, corroborated the view that April was the pivotal moment when, because of Watergate, Nixon lost his will to deter the North from further cease-fire violations. See Horne, Kissinger, 104. 80. Horne, Kissinger, 98–99. 81. Telcon, Scotty Reston and Kissinger, April 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 82. Ibid. 83. Telcon, Kissinger and the President, April 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 25, 1973, ibid.; telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 11, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 17, 1973, ibid. 84. For Nixon being so preoccupied with domestic matters that even Kissinger could not get a meeting, see telcon, Richardson and Kissinger, April 4, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. For Kissinger stressing the need for a meeting with Nixon on foreign policy, see telcon, Richardson and Kissinger, April 19, 1973, ibid. 85. Telcon, Secretary Shultz and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 86. Telcon, Ron Ziegler and Kissinger, April 23, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL.

190

NOTES TO PAGES 66–68

87. Telcon, Hank Trewhitt and Kissinger, April 20, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL; see also telcon, Dr. William Kintner and Kissinger, April 16, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Ziegler and Kissinger, April 12, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Ziegler and Kissinger, April 23, 1973, ibid.; and memcon, Jay Lovestone and Kissinger, April 25, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Memcons, Box 1027, RNL. 88. Telcon, Tom Braden and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Joe Alsop and Kissinger, April 21, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Rowland Evans and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, ibid. 89. Telcon, Maury Marder and Kissinger, April 25, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Phil Geyelin and Kissinger, April 25, 1973, ibid. For the Year of Europe speech, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 275–76. 90. Telcon, Kissinger and the President, April 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 91. Ibid. 92. Telcon, Kissinger and Garment, April 22, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 93. Telcon, Kissinger and Garment, April 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 94. Telcon, Haig and Kissinger, April 23, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 95. Telcon, Hank Trewhitt and Kissinger, April 20, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. For some optimism on the administration’s side about containing congressional challenges on war powers and Vietnam, see also memo, John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, April 11, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. For Watergate giving new momentum to the crisis between Congress and the White House, see also memcon, Jay Lovestone and Kissinger, April 25, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1027, RNL. 96. See, for example, telcon, Tom Braden and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 97. For the Moose-Lowenstein report, see Richard M. Moose and James G. Lowenstein, “US Air Operations in Cambodia: April 1973,” April 27, 1973, www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star /images/239/2390314001.pdf. 98. Woods, J. William Fulbright, 268–72. 99. Telcon, Joe Alsop and Kissinger, April 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. For Kissinger talking to Nixon about Haldeman and Ehrlichman, see telcon, Kissinger and the President, April 21, 1973, ibid. 100. Telcon, Garment and Kissinger, April 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and Garment, April 22, 1973, ibid. 101. Telcon, Garment and Kissinger, April 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Adam Walinsky and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, ibid. 102. Telcon, Garment and Kissinger, April 25, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 103. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 102–4. For Kissinger being kept in the dark about Nixon’s plans, see, for example, telcon, Garment and Kissinger, April 25, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL.

NOTES TO PAGES 68–70

191

104. See, for example, “Nixon Accepts Onus for Watergate, but Says He Didn’t Know about Plot; Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean Resign; Richardson Put in Kleindienst Post,” NYT, May 1, 1973, 1. 105. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, May 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 106. See, for example, telcon, Theodore White and Kissinger, May 15, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 107. For these events, see Olson, Watergate, 85–88. 108. Gallup, Gallup Poll, 126. 109. Olson, Watergate, 89–94. 110. Telegram TOHAK 58, Haig to Kissinger, May 17, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 35, RNL. 111. Woods, J. William Fulbright, 272. See also Horne, Kissinger, 169; and “House, by 219–188, Votes Down Fund to Bomb Cambodia,” NYT, May 11, 1973, 1. 112. “House, by 219–188, Votes Down Fund to Bomb Cambodia,” 1. Other journalists saw the same connection between Watergate and Congress’s legislation. See, for example, telegram TOHAK 71, the Situation Room to Kissinger, May 1973, “Evening Star Article,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 34, RNL. 113. “House, by 219–188, Votes Down Fund to Bomb Cambodia,” 1, 9. 114. Ibid. 115. Telcon, Senator Fulbright and Kissinger, May 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 116. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, May 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. For some optimism on Nixon’s side, see also Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: BasicBooks, 1994), 237. 117. Memo, Meeting with Congressional Leadership, May 29, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. 118. See, for example, telcon, Peter Lisagor and Kissinger, May 14, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 119. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, June 1, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and Stewart Alsop, June 2, 1973, ibid. 120. Telcon, Jerry Schecter and Kissinger, May 25, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and John Osborne, May 28, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Kissinger and Bernard Gwertzman, May 24, 1973, ibid. 121. See, for example, telcon, Kissinger and Stewart Alsop, June 2, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL; telcon, Ziegler and Kissinger, May 20, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Jack Anderson and Kissinger, June 1, 1973, ibid. For Kissinger distancing himself from Haldeman and Ehrlichman, see telcon, Ambassador Peterson and Kissinger, May 24, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Jerry Schecter and Kissinger, May 25, 1973, ibid. 122. Telcon, Garment and Kissinger, April 22, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and Garment, April 21, 1973, ibid. 123. See, for example, telcon, Joe Califano and Kissinger, May 2, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL; telcon, John Osborne and Kissinger, May 3, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Joseph Alsop and Kissinger, May 25, 1973, ibid. 124. Horne, Kissinger, 101–3.

192

NOTES TO PAGES 71–74

125. See, for example, telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL; and telcon, Kissinger and Joe Kraft, May 12, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 126. Telcon, Richardson and Kissinger, April 14, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. 127. Note handed to Kissinger by Dobrynin, April 10, 1973, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 496, RNL. See also telcon, Dobrynin and Kissinger, June 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 28, RNL. 128. Telcon, Dobrynin and Kissinger, May 16, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 129. Memo, Scowcroft to the President, May 9, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 32, RNL. For Nixon’s instructions, see memo, Scowcroft to the President, May 8, 1973, ibid. For Kissinger’s trip to the USSR, see also Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 277–80. 130. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, May 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 131. See, for example, telcon, Dobrynin and Kissinger, May 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 132. See, for example, telcon, Joe Alsop and Kissinger, June 15, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL; and telcon, Gwertzman and Kissinger, June 15, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, June 10, 1973, ibid. 133. See, for example, telcon, Joe Kraft and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. See also telcon, Dobrynin and Kissinger, June 10, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 134. See, for example, telcon, Marilyn Berger and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. For an analysis of the Year of Europe, see Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 275–77. See also Horne, Kissinger, 106–21. 135. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 192. 136. Telegram TOHAK 155, Scowcroft to Kissinger, May 1973, “TOHAK IV,” Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 36, RNL. 137. Memo, Kissinger to the President, June 11, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 124, RNL. See also memo, Kissinger to the President, n.d., ibid. 138. Telegram HAKTO 4, Kissinger to Scowcroft, June 12, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 105, RNL. See also telegram TOHAK 93, Scowcroft to Kissinger, June 8, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 37, RNL. 139. Memo, Kissinger to the President, June 11, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 124, RNL. 140. Statement on Cambodia, n.d., Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 38, RNL. Kissinger later admitted that he had overestimated Hanoi’s influence on the Khmer Rouge. See Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 470. 141. Telcon, Dobrynin and Kissinger, June 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 470–92; Henry A. Kissinger, On China (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 344–45; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 287–88. 142. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, June 11, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL.

NOTES TO PAGES 74–79

193

143. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 272–75. 144. See, for example, telcon, the President and Kissinger, June 11, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. For the Chinese reaction to Watergate, see telcon, Marc Childs and Kissinger, June 15, 1973, ibid. 145. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 283. 146. Telcon, Shultz and Kissinger, June 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and James Keat, June 26, 1973, ibid. 147. Woods, J. William Fulbright, 273. 148. Telcon, Richard Valeriani and Kissinger, June 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 149. Telcon, Kissinger and the President, June 10, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 150. Telegram HAKTO 13, Kissinger to Scowcroft, June 7, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 37, RNL. See also telegram HAKTO 20, Kissinger to Scowcroft, June 7, 1973, ibid. 151. See, for example, telcon, Jerry Schecter and Kissinger, June 4, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 152. Memo, William H. Sullivan to Kissinger, June 22, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 164, RNL. 153. Telcon, Fulbright and Kissinger, June 18, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. See also Woods, J. William Fulbright, 273. 154. See, for example, telcon, Professor Galbraith and Kissinger, May 25, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 155. Telcon, Secretary Clements and Kissinger, June 15, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. See also telcon, Melvin Laird and Kissinger, June 18, 1973, ibid.; telcon, Congressman Patman and Kissinger, June 25, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Valeriani and Kissinger, June 27, 1973, ibid. 156. For this account of the passage of the legislation, see “House Again Acts to Curb Bombing,” NYT, June 27, 1973, 1. 157. Quoted ibid. 158. Quoted in Olson, Watergate, 96–97. 159. Ibid., 96–98. See also Kutler, Wars of Watergate, 358–62. 160. Telcon, Laird and Kissinger, June 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 161. Quoted in “Test Intensifies,” NYT, June 28, 1973, 1. 162. Gallup, Gallup Poll, 133. 163. Ibid., 138–39. 164. “Nixon Agrees to Stop Bombing by US in Cambodia by Aug. 15, with New Raids up to Congress,” NYT, June 30, 1973, 1. 165. Woods, J. William Fulbright, 274. See also “Nixon Agrees to Stop Bombing by US in Cambodia by Aug. 15,” 1; and Belasco et al., Congressional Restrictions on US Military Operations, 6–7. 166. Grimmett, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs since 1970, 2. 167. Telcon, Dr. Schlesinger and Kissinger, June 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. 168. For Kissinger making the point with the South Vietnamese, see memcon, Tran Kim Phuong, Kissinger, William L. Stearman, June 11, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 105, RNL. 169. For authors who explicitly or implicitly support the notion that Watergate was decisive, see, for example, Berman, No Peace, No Honor, 9; Horne, Kissinger, 104, 168–69;

194

NOTES TO PAGES 79–82

and Woods, J. William Fulbright, 270. For authors who oppose that view, see, for example, Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 203; Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992), 487; Zelizer, “How Congress Got Us Out of Vietnam,” 34; Zelizer, “Congress and the Politics of Troop Withdrawal,” 538; and Ambrose, Nixon, 656–57. Dominic Sandbrook’s analysis, though cautious, goes in the same direction. See Sandbrook, “Salesmanship and Substance,” 99. 170. For Kissinger referring to Watergate as a petty crime and a Greek tragedy, see telcon, Kissinger and William Buckley, June 29, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL. See also telcon, Rowland Evans and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 19, RNL. For an excellent analysis that refutes the notion of a tragedy in the context of the Johnson administration, see Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 9. 171. Asaf Siniver argues that for the foreign policy sector, Nixon (and Kissinger’s) management style prevented the emergence of an effective crisis-management body in the bureaucracy. See Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and US Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 226–27. For the paranoid mind-set and the “with-us-or-against-us” mentality in Nixon’s inner circle, see also Ken Hughes, Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), 126–31. CHAPTER 4

1. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 96. 2. Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 493. 3. Quoted in Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 104. See also Mark Atwood Lawrence, “History from Below: The United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 277–79. 4. See, for example, Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 324–32. 5. For the oil crisis, see, for example, Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 347–53. According to Daniel Sargent, the oil crisis marked one of the most crucial events in the 1970s that forced Kissinger to address an increasingly interdependent world and acknowledge US limits. See Daniel J. Sargent, “The United States and Globalization in the 1970s,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 49–51, 58–59. 6. Keith W. Olson, Watergate: The Presidential Scandal That Shook America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 100–167. See also Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 383; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 332. 7. Memorandum of conversation (memcon), Kissinger, PFIAB, Brent Scowcroft, August 3, 1973, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Presidential/Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Memcons, Box 1027, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter RNL). See also telephone conversation (telcon), Rowland Evans and Kissinger, July 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 20, RNL.

NOTES TO PAGES 82–85

195

8. Memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft, et al., August 7, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1027, RNL. 9. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), 888. 10. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. 11. Ibid. 12. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. For Nixon and Kissinger maintaining that they would not back down, see also telcon, the President and Kissinger, July 13, 1973, ibid. 13. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. 14. Ibid. 15. See, for example, memo, T. C. Pinckney and William L. Stearman to Kissinger, July 24, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 97, RNL. 16. See, for example, memo, Scowcroft to Kissinger, July 15, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-94, RNL; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, July 13, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. 17. Memo, Kissinger to the President, July 24, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 97, RNL. See also memo, Scowcroft to Kissinger, July 21, 1973, ibid. 18. Memo, Stearman and Donald J. Stukel to Kissinger, November 1, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-95, RNL. For the bluff idea, see also memo, Kissinger to the President, July 24, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject File, Box 97, RNL. 19. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. For pessimism regarding the possibility that Congress would grant renewed bombing authority for Indochina, see also telcon, Kissinger and George Sherman, July 28, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Scowcroft and Kissinger, December 7, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. 20. Memo, Charles A. Cooper to Kissinger, December 6, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 116, RNL. For Kissinger’s overtures to Le Duc Tho, see telegram, Scowcroft to General Guay, October 20, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 127, RNL. 21. See, for example, Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 292–97; and Horne, Kissinger, 186–87. When he became secretary of state, Kissinger was the most admired person in the United States. See Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992), 13–14, 607–8. See also “Foreign Relations: A Super Secretary to Shake Up State,” Time, September 3, 1973, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910726,00.htm. 22. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 294–97. 23. See, for example, telcon, Kissinger and Meg Greenfeld, August 8, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL; and telcon, Bill Safire and Kissinger, September 21, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, RNL. 24. See, for example, telcon, Kissinger and the President, September 16, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, RNL; telcon, Kissinger and Secretary Shultz, August 22, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL; telcon, David Rockefeller and Kissinger, August 23, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, Alexander Haig and Kissinger, August 26, 1973, ibid.

196

NOTES TO PAGES 85–87

25. See, for example, telcon, Melvin Laird and Kissinger, August 27, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 8, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, RNL. 26. Olson, Watergate, 101. 27. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. See also telcon, the President and Kissinger, November 4, 1973, ibid. 28. Olson, Watergate, 116. 29. Carroll Kilpatrick, “Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit,” October 21, 1973, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/06/03 /AR2005112200799.html. 30. Olson, Watergate, 116–22. 31. See, for example, telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 32. See, for example, telcon, Scottie Reston and Kissinger, October 24, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 33. See, for example, Edward A. Kolodziej, “Congress and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Years,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 32, no. 1 (1975): 171. 34. Memo, David Gergen to Roy Ash, John Bennett, Haig, et al., October 19, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, RNL. See also memo, R. C. McFarlane to Kissinger, July 14, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. 35. For Stennis supporting the war-powers bill, see memo, McFarlane to Scowcroft, July 20, 1973, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 317, RNL. See also Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 191. 36. Randall Bennett Woods, J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 276. See also Olson, Watergate, 170; and Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 192–93. 37. Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 193. 38. Richard F. Grimmett, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs since 1970 Involving US Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report for Congress RS20775 (Washington, DC, January 10, 2001), 1–3. See also Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 519–20. 39. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950– 1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 328–29. See also Kyle Longley, “Congress and the Vietnam War: Senate Doves and Their Impact on the War,” in The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War, ed. David L. Anderson and John Ernst (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 306. 40. See, for example, telcon, Douglas Dillon and Kissinger, October 17, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 41. Telcon, Hank Trewhitt and Kissinger, August 22, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. 42. For Vietnam not being a much-debated issue, see, for example, telcon, the President and Kissinger, December 29, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. See also telcon, Kissinger and Bob Pierpoint, December 31, 1973, ibid. Those conversations are symptomatic for the period insofar as Kissinger does not bring up Vietnam at all. 43. Telcon, Dobrynin and Kissinger, July 11, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 28, RNL.

NOTES TO PAGES 87–91

197

44. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, December 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. See also telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 17, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 45. Memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger, et al., July 19, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1027, RNL. See also Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 288–89. 46. Memcon, Kissinger, Vuong Van Bac, Tran Kim Phuong, Robert H. Wenzel, December 7, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1027, RNL. 47. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 336–40. For Kissinger not putting any pressure on the Chinese, see also memcon, Kissinger, Huang Chen, et al., September 29, 1973, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1027, RNL. 48. Memo, Stearman to Scowcroft, September 8, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 164, RNL. 49. See, for example, telcon, John Osborne and Kissinger, July 16, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL; telcon, Bernard Gwertzman and Kissinger, July 26, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, John Mulliken and Kissinger, March 22, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 25, RNL. 50. See, for example, Richard M. Nixon, No More Vietnams (London: W. H. Allen, 1986), 165; Nixon, The Real War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980), 119; and Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 455. 51. Note, Scowcroft to Kissinger, July 10, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-91, RNL. For more planning on the blame strategy, see also memo, Pinckney and Stearman to Kissinger, July 23, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-94, RNL; memo, Lawrence S. Eagleburger to Kissinger, July 11, 1973, ibid.; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. For a critical analysis of the blame stratagem, see Jeffrey Kimball, “Out of Primordial Cultural Ooze: Inventing Political and Policy Legacies about the US Exit from Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 577–87. 52. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. 53. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 3, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. 54. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, August 9, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. See also memo, Scowcroft to Kissinger, July 15, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-94, RNL; and memo, Eagleburger to Kissinger, July 11, 1973, ibid. 55. For a discussion of the good-doctor theory, see Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 270–74, 329. 56. Memo, Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Kissinger, July 7, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-91, RNL. 57. William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, rev. ed. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002), 312. 58. For Kissinger’s pessimistic remark, see telcon, Pierpoint and Kissinger, August 2, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 21, RNL. 59. Memo, Eliot to Kissinger, July 7, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-91, RNL.

198

NOTES TO PAGES 91–93

60. Shawcross, Sideshow, 313–16. 61. Memo, Richard T. Kennedy to Kissinger, September 20, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-94, RNL. See also memo, Kennedy and Stearman to Kissinger, October 2, 1973, ibid. 62. Shawcross, Sideshow, 316–19. 63. Ibid., 319–20. 64. Meeting minutes, Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 2, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Minutes of Meetings, Box H-117, RNL. 65. Ibid. See also memo, Kennedy and Stearman to Kissinger, October 2, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-94, RNL. 66. For the Khmer Rouge’s position, see Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 237–38. For Kissinger’s approach, see also Shawcross, Sideshow, 285–86. 67. Shawcross, Sideshow, 286, 310–11. For a possible alternative approach in line with Swank’s suggestion, see also Isaacs, Without Honor, 237. 68. For the State Department calling for pressure on the PRC and the USSR, see memo, Stearman to Kissinger, July 9, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-91, RNL. 69. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, June 29, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-91, RNL. 70. MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, “Laos 1973: Wary Steps toward Peace,” Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (February 1974): 171–72. 71. Telcon, Dobrynin and Kissinger, October 16, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. For Kissinger congratulating Le Duc Tho, see also telegram, Scowcroft to General Guay, October 16, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 110, RNL. For Nixon being jealous of Kissinger, see telcon, Scowcroft and Kissinger, October 16, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 72. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, July 4, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 164, RNL. 73. John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1999), 371. 74. “Iran Is Accepted for Truce Body,” New York Times (hereafter NYT), August 15, 1973, 14. 75. See, for example, “Truce Unit Receives Funds from the US,” NYT, October 19, 1973, 2. 76. See, for example, Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 113. The term usually refers to the conflict between Vietnam, Cambodia, and China in 1978–79. 77. Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 163–64. See also Herring, America’s Longest War, 329–30. 78. Memo, George A. Carver to Scowcroft, December 18, 1973, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 568, RNL. 79. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, November 27, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 127, RNL. 80. Memcon, Le Duc Tho, Kissinger, et al., December 20, 1973, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 127, RNL. 81. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, July 11, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 164, RNL.

NOTES TO PAGES 93–95

199

82. Telegram Saigon 21418, American Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, December 26, 1973, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 568, RNL. 83. For Kissinger wanting aid, see telcon, Scowcroft and Kissinger, December 7, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. For congressional opposition, see, for example, memo, Kennedy to Kissinger, April 22, 1974, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, RNL; and memo, Charles A. Cooper to Kissinger, November 30, 1973, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 568, RNL. 84. For Kissinger’s arguments vis-à-vis Congress, see Talking Points for Secretary Kissinger: Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, April 24, 1974, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, RNL. For Congress questioning the need for aid, see Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 323. 85. Telcon, William Colby and Kissinger, April 23, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 25, RNL. For the intelligence community not knowing the amount of aid North Vietnam was receiving, see also memo, Pinckney and Stearman to Kissinger, July 23, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-94, RNL. 86. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 469. 87. For corruption in the Thieu regime, see memo, Stearman to Kissinger, July 2, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 164, RNL. For South Vietnamese economic problems, see memo, Cooper to Kissinger, August 3, 1973, ibid.; and memo, Stearman and Stukel to Kissinger, n.d., National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-95, RNL. For US contractors providing crucial services, see memo, Scowcroft to John Wickham, September 11, 1973, NSC Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 164, RNL. See also “Vast Aid from US Backs Saigon in Continuing War,” NYT, February 25, 1974, 1. 88. For this account of the Yom Kippur War, see Salim Yaqub, “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Logevall and Preston, Nixon in the World, 227–48; Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 302–31; and Horne, Kissinger, 227–364. 89. Asaf Siniver argues that the Yom Kippur War marked the central change in the balance of power between Nixon and Kissinger. According to Siniver, Kissinger emerged as the key player in US foreign policy. See Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and US Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4, 222–23. 90. Telcon, Haig and Kissinger, October 26, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 91. Ibid. 92. See, for example, telcon, the President and Kissinger, January 28, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. See also Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Containing Globalism: The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 208–9. 93. Horne, Kissinger, 229–31. See also Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 307. 94. See, for example, telcon, Haig and Kissinger, October 6, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, RNL; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 29, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 95. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 14, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 96. For Nixon and Kissinger trying to cut the USSR out of the Middle East, see, for example, telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 30, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL; and telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 12, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 25, RNL.

200

NOTES TO PAGES 95–99

97. Memcon, Nixon, Vice President Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Congressional Leadership, April 24, 1974, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1028, RNL. 98. Telcon, Ziegler and Kissinger, October 29, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL. 99. For Kissinger comparing the Arabs to the North Vietnamese, see telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 7, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, RNL; and telcon, Lord Cromer and Kissinger, October 6, 1973, ibid. For Kissinger and Nixon comparing their approach to Israel to their approach with South Vietnam, see telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 17, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 23, RNL; and telcon, Scowcroft and Kissinger, October 18, 1973, ibid. 100. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, October 8, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, RNL. 101. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 303–4, 331. 102. Horne, Kissinger, 347–50. 103. Telcon, Hubert Humphrey and Kissinger, March 23, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 25, RNL. See also memo, Stearman and Stukel to Kissinger, November 28, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-95, RNL. 104. Herring, America’s Longest War, 330. 105. Memo, Stearman and Stukel to Kissinger, November 28, 1973, National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-95, RNL. 106. For Nixon explaining the importance of the United States remaining number one in the Cold War, see memcon, Nixon, Cabinet Meeting, May 28, 1974, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1029, RNL. Hanhimäki argues that Kissinger neglected Vietnam in favor of the Middle East. See Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 303–4, 322–24. However, this argument does not take into account the notion of the insurance policy. 107. Memo, William R. Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, December 24, 1973, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 568, RNL. 108. Telcon, Ambassador Bruce and Kissinger, February 6, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. 109. Telegram, American Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, March 23, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. 110. Herring, America’s Longest War, 330. 111. Memo, Stearman and Stukel to Kissinger, n.d., National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-95, RNL. 112. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, April 2, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. 113. Memo, Kennedy to Kissinger, April 23, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. 114. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, April 2, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. 115. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, April 15, 1974, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 127, RNL. 116. See, for example, telegram Saigon 2867, American Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, March 5, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. 117. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 335–36. 118. “Pragmatic Envoy to Cambodia,” NYT, March 14, 1974, 8. 119. Telegram Phnom Penh 8209, American Embassy Phnom Penh to Secretary of State, June 16, 1974, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations,

NOTES TO PAGES 99–102

201

Box 127, RNL. For evacuation plans, see memo, Stearman and Stukel to Kissinger, n.d., National Security Council Institutional Files, Meeting Files, Box H-95, RNL. 120. MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, “Laos 1974: Coalition Government Shoots the Rapids,” Asian Survey 15, no. 2 (February 1975): 174, 183. See also Victor B. Anthony and Richard R. Sexton, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The War in Northern Laos (Washington, DC: 1993), 366–67. 121. Telcon, Kissinger and Robert McCloskey, March 21, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 25, RNL. For Kissinger trying to play Vietnam low key, see also memcon, Kissinger, Pierpoint, Bernard Kalb, et al., January 2, 1974, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1028, RNL. 122. Memo, Smyser and Harold H. Horan to Scowcroft, February 27, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. 123. Telcon, Mike Mansfield and Kissinger, February 1, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. See also telcon, Carlyle E. Maw and Kissinger, June 21, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 26, RNL. For improved relations with Europe, see Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 350–52. 124. Memo, Richard H. Solomon and Smyser to Kissinger, February 8, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. See also note, Scowcroft to Kissinger, n.d., ibid. 125. Letter, Kissinger to Senator Kennedy, March 25, 1974, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1028, RNL. 126. Telcon, Kissinger and Scowcroft, April 26, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 25, RNL. 127. For additional funds for South Vietnam in FY 1974, see memo, Cooper to Kissinger, June 24, 1974, NSC Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. For the FY 1975 figures, see Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 493–94. 128. See, for example, telcon, Paul Ziffren and Kissinger, January 23, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL. See also Horne, Kissinger, 386–88; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 340–44. 129. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 343–44, 352–56. 130. Telegram SCOTO 10, Scowcroft to Martin, July 1, 1974, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations, Box 127, RNL. 131. Olson, Watergate, 148. 132. See, for example, telcon, Kissinger and Gerry Warren, January 31, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, RNL; and telcon, Senator Javits and Kissinger, June 6, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 26, RNL. 133. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 356. For Kissinger threatening to resign, see telcon, Leslie Gelb and Kissinger, June 22, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 26, RNL. 134. Telcon, Rita Hauser and Kissinger, July 24, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 26, RNL. 135. Olson, Watergate, 159–67. 136. Telcon, Frank Mankiewicz and Kissinger, August 7, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 26, RNL. CHAPTER 5

1. For Ford’s background and his focus on domestic problems, see Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 1–13, 275, 351–52.

202

NOTES TO PAGES 102–103

2. Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 125. For Ford’s foreign policy challenges, see also “Ford’s Foreign Problems and Prospects: The View from Major World Capitals,” New York Times (hereafter NYT), September 2, 1974, 2. 3. For the argument that Ford was an “appendix to Nixon,” see, for example, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 283; and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy in the Cold War, rev. and expanded ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 272–345. For the same argument in the context of Vietnam, see, for example, Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 291–99; George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGrawHill, 2002), 332–40; Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 166–67; and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 307, 317. For a rare specific study of Ford’s Vietnam policy that essentially comes to the same conclusions, see T. Christopher Jespersen, “Kissinger, Ford, and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam,” Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 3 (August 2002): 446, 457–58. 4. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Moderate? Conservative? With Gerald Ford, Take Your Pick,” New York Times, December 31, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/weekinreview /31kirkpatrick.html?_r=2&oref=slogin. 5. See, for example, Richard Reeves, “I’m Sorry, Mr. President,” American Heritage 47, no. 8 (December 1996): 53; Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 7, 357–59; Barry Werth, 31 Days: Gerald Ford, The Nixon Pardon, and a Government in Crisis (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 329–30, 343–44; Douglas Brinkley, Gerald R. Ford (New York: Times Books, 2007), 1, 160; Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Gerald R. Ford’s Date with Destiny: A Political Biography (New York: P. Lang, 1989), xx; and Thomas M. DeFrank, Write It When I’m Gone: Remarkable Off-the-Record Conversations with Gerald R. Ford (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2007), 90, 242–43. The title of Ford’s autobiography is another telling example: A Time to Heal. 6. For an opposing view, see, for example, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 361–62; Julian E. Zelizer, “Détente and Domestic Politics,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 4 (September 2009): 659; Dale Van Atta, With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 475; and Richard Reeves, A Ford, Not a Lincoln (London: Arrow Books, 1976), 68–69. 7. Ford, Time to Heal, 28–29. 8. James M. Cannon, Time and Chance: Gerald Ford’s Appointment with History (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 393–95. 9. Ford, Time to Heal, 248. For Ford’s family not sharing his views on Vietnam, see ibid., 82–83. See also John Robert Greene, The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 219. 10. Ford, Time to Heal, 249. See also David L. Anderson, “Gerald R. Ford and the Presidents’ War in Vietnam,” in Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945–1975, ed. David L. Anderson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 186. 11. Telephone conversation (telcon), the Vice President and Kissinger, August 8, 1974, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 26, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter RNL). 12. Ford, Time to Heal, 33.

NOTES TO PAGES 103–108

203

13. Memorandum of conversation (memcon), Tran Kim Phuong, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, August 9, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973– 1977, Box 4, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter GRFL). 14. Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 493–94. 15. Telegram, Secretary of State to American Embassy Saigon, August 1974, “Presidential Message,” National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 495. 16. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, August 15, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 17. Telegram SAIGON 10605, American Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, August 13, 1974, “Presidential Message,” National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. 18. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, August 12, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 4, GRFL. 19. Quoted in telegram, Scowcroft to Colonel Oveson, August 19, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. 20. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 494. 21. Telegram, Scowcroft to Colonel Oveson, August 19, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. 22. Memo, Richard T. Kennedy and William L. Stearman to Kissinger, August 8, 1974, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Country Files: Far East, Box 569, RNL. 23. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, September 10, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 24. Ibid. 25. Memcon, Graham Martin, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, September 13, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 26. Ibid. 27. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Nelson Rockefeller, Scowcroft, September 6, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 28. Memcon, Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, Kissinger, Scowcroft, September 12, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 29. For Ford trying to counter isolationist tendencies in the United States (to a large degree stemming from the Vietnam experience), see Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 288–90. 30. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, August 12, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 4, GRFL. 31. Mieczkowski draws the same conclusion (that Ford did not betray his ideological convictions in order to gain politically) for the economic sector. See Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 351. 32. Ibid., 10. See also DeFrank, Write It When I’m Gone, 41–43. 33. Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 10. 34. Ford, Time to Heal, 124–25. 35. Memcon, Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, Kissinger, Scowcroft, September 12, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 36. For the amnesty issue, see memcon, Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, et al., September 16, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5, GRFL. See also Werth, 31 Days, 105–7, 194–97, 332. 37. See Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 30; and Conrad Black, The Invincible Quest: The Life of Richard Milhous Nixon (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), 988.

204

NOTES TO PAGES 108–112

38. Greene, Limits of Power, 203–4. 39. Memcon, Ford, Vuong Van Bac, Kissinger, et al., October 5, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6, GRFL. 40. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, November 10, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 7, GRFL. 41. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 42. Ford, Time to Heal, 255. 43. Memo, Kennedy to William Timmons, August 19, 1974, National Security Adviser, Legislative Interdepartmental Group Files, 1971–74 (1976), Box 3, GRFL. 44. Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 281. 45. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 362–64. 46. Telcon, Kissinger and Senator Fulbright, August 20, 1974, US Department of State, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Declassified/Released Document Collections, State Department Collections: Kissinger Telephone Transcripts, http://foia .state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp (hereafter FOIA Electronic Reading Room). 47. See, for example, Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 275. 48. Ibid. 49. See, for example, telcon, Kissinger and Henry Brandon, August 17, 1974, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 50. Telcon, Bruce Van Voorst and Kissinger, August 16, 1974, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 51. See, for example, telcon, David Rockefeller and Kissinger, August 22, 1974, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 52. Memo, William R. Smyser to Kissinger, August 28, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 18, GRFL. See also telegram, Oveson to Scowcroft, August 1974, National Security Adviser, KissingerScowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. 53. Telegram, Oveson to Scowcroft, August 1974, National Security Adviser, KissingerScowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. See also draft memorandum, August 9, 1974, “Vietnam: A Look at Hanoi’s Intentions,” National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 18, GRFL. 54. Letter, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to US President Gerald R. Ford, September 19, 1974, in The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents, ed. Mark Atwood Lawrence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 164. 55. National Security Study Memorandum 213, Kissinger to Secretary of Defense et al., October 22, 1974, National Security Adviser, National Security Decision Memoranda and National Security Study Memoranda: Copy Set, 1974–1977, Box 2, GRFL. 56. Memo, William E. Colby to Kissinger, November 18, 1974, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 57. Ibid. See also memo, Colby to Kissinger, November 18, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 18, GRFL. 58. Intelligence memorandum, January 2, 1975, “Key Judgments in the Intelligence Community’s Response to Part I of NSSM 213,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. See also memo, George A. Carver Jr., to the United States Intelligence Board, December 17, 1974, ibid. 59. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, October 22, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 18, GRFL. 60. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, November 16, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 18, GRFL.

NOTES TO PAGES 112–114

205

61. Ibid. See also memo, Smyser to Kissinger, November 23, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 13, GRFL. 62. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 120–23, 130–32. In his account, Snepp highlights the different conclusions that intelligence analysts drew from the Resolution for 1975. According to Snepp, the different judgments were in part due to the agendas of the observers. For instance, Snepp argues that the CIA station chief in Saigon, Thomas Polgar, was (like Ambassador Martin) stressing a pessimistic reading of the intelligence data in order to make a stronger case to Congress for additional aid to Saigon. According to Snepp, CIA director William Colby, on the other hand, stressed an overly optimistic reading. For Hanoi’s strategy, see also Hoang Van Thai, How South Vietnam Was Liberated: Memoirs, 3rd ed. (Hanoi: Gioi, 2005), 123–25; Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 19–20; and George J. Veith, Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973–75 (New York: Encounter Books, 2012), 85–89. 63. Telegram SAIGON 13668, American Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, October 28, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 21, GRFL. 64. Draft intelligence memorandum, January 2, 1975, “The South Vietnamese Economy and US Aid: Supplemental Response to Part I of NSSM 213,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 65. Herring, America’s Longest War, 331. 66. Memo, Carver to the United States Intelligence Board, December 17, 1974, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 67. Memo, Robert N. Ginsburgh to the Secretary of Defense, August 28, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, GRFL. 68. Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, December 14, 1974, “Cambodia Assessment,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 24, GRFL. 69. Memo, Kennedy and Stearman to Kissinger, January 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 24, GRFL. For the aid figures, see also memo, John E. Murphy to Kissinger, December 27, 1974, ibid. On top of the $377 million ceiling came a $75 million Military Assistance Program drawdown. 70. For the intelligence community’s assessment, see memo, Carver to the United States Intelligence Board, December 23, 1974, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. For an analysis of the importance of Cambodia for Washington’s attempt to uphold South Vietnam, see memo, Samuel R. Gammon to Scowcroft, August 16, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, GRFL; and memo, George S. Springsteen to Scowcroft, December 14, 1974, ibid. 71. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, September 13, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, GRFL. See also William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, rev. ed. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002), 325–28, 336, 339–40; and Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 520–21. 72. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 520–25.

206

NOTES TO PAGES 114–116

73. See, for example, telegram STATE 283043, Secretary of State to American Embassy Phnom Penh, December 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, GRFL. 74. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 521. 75. For Kissinger’s argument, see ibid., 518–19. For the French initiative, see Shawcross, Sideshow, 335–43. 76. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Kakuei Tanaka, et al., September 21, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6, GRFL. 77. Memcon, Kissinger, Phuong, et al., August 9, 1974, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam, Box 105, RNL. 78. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 383–84. 79. Memo, Kissinger to the President, November 23, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 18, GRFL. 80. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 385–86. For Martin’s lobbying efforts, see, for example, memo, Stearman to Kissinger, November 15, 1974, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 3, GRFL. 81. Draft note, August 8, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 4, GRFL. 82. Memcon, Chiao Kuan-hua, Huang Hua, Kissinger, et al., October 2, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 4, GRFL. See also Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 386; and Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 522–25. 83. Memo, Arthur Hummel, Winston Lord, Richard H. Solomon to Kissinger, September 27, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 4, GRFL. 84. For Stearman and Smyser’s analysis, see memo, Stearman to Kissinger, November 15, 1974, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 3, GRFL. For signs of Soviet and Chinese restraint, see memo, Smyser to Kissinger, November 23, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 13, GRFL; and memo, Smyser to Kissinger, December 6, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 18, GRFL. For Moscow and Beijing continuing to support the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge, see, for example, Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 386. 85. “US Goals in Saigon Have Ring of the 60s,” NYT, November 3, 1974, C4. 86. Ibid. See also “The Foreign-Aid Fight,” NYT, October 12, 1974, 3. 87. Ford, Time to Heal, 202. 88. Ibid., 220. 89. Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 282–83, 305–10. 90. For the human rights issue, see, for example, memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, December 3, 1974, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 7, GRFL. See also Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992), 607–8, 610; Jeremi Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s, ed. Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 228, 230, 237–38; Michael Cotey Morgan, “The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 245–46; and Andrew Preston, “Universal Nationalism: Christian America’s Response to the Years of Upheaval,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 316–18. 91. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 360–61.

NOTES TO PAGES 117–120

207

92. “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. against Anti-war Forces,” NYT, 22 December 1974, 1. 93. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, January 4, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, GRFL. 94. Snepp, Decent Interval, 133–41. For a North Vietnamese perspective on events in January–March, see the NVA major general Tran Cong Man’s account in Lawrence, Vietnam War, 165–66. 95. Andrew Downer Crain, The Ford Presidency: A History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2009), 150. 96. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 515. 97. Memo, Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger, January 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 24, GRFL. 98. Memo, Scowcroft to Roy Ash, January 13, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 515, 535. 99. Memo, Smyser and Clinton Granger to Scowcroft, January 17, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. 100. Snepp, Decent Interval, 145–46. 101. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, January 7, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, GRFL. 102. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, January 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, GRFL. See also memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, January 13, 1975, ibid. 103. Memcon, Strom Thurmond, William L. Scott, Ford, et al., January 27, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, GRFL. See also memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, et al., January 28, 1975, ibid.; and memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Leadership, et al., February 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. 104. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, et al., January 28, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, GRFL. 105. Memcon, Cabinet Meeting, January 29, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, GRFL. 106. Ibid. 107. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, February 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. 108. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, et al., January 28, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, GRFL. 109. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, January 30, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. 110. Telegram SAIGON 0267, American Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, January 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969– 1977, Box 34, GRFL. 111. Ibid. 112. Memo, from Kissinger, n.d., “Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership: January 28, 1975,” National Security Adviser, Legislative Interdepartmental Group Files, 1971–74 (1976), Box 3, GRFL. 113. Snepp, Decent Interval, 177. 114. Ibid., 150, 156–57. 115. Memcon, Ford, Martin, Scowcroft, February 15, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL.

208

NOTES TO PAGES 121–123

116. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, February 21, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 117. Memo, from Kissinger, n.d., “Meeting with Senators Church and Pearson: March 4, 1975,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 118. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, February 26, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 119. Ibid. 120. Snepp, Decent Interval, 159–66. For Ford and Kissinger’s comments, see memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, March 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. 121. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, February 19, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, GRFL. 122. Memo, Stearman and Granger to Kissinger, February 25, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 24, GRFL. 123. Telegram SAIGON 0668, Chargé Lehmann to Scowcroft, February 17, 1975, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 3, GRFL. 124. Telegram, American Embassy Phnom Penh to Secretary of State, February 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974– 1977, Box 4, GRFL. 125. Memcon, Kissinger, James R. Schlesinger, John Wickham, Scowcroft, February 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. For Stearman’s similar analysis, see memo, Stearman to Kissinger, February 7, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973– 1976, Box 12, GRFL. For Thompson’s conclusion, see telegram SAIGON 0668, Chargé Lehmann to Scowcroft, February 17, 1975, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 3, GRFL. 126. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, February 20, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. 127. Ibid. 128. Telegram, Secretary of State to Saigon, January 29, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 129. For Saudi aid to Saigon, see memo, Stearman and Robert Oakley to Kissinger, February 7, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 130. For Kissinger and Ford’s hope regarding aid, see memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, February 25, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973– 1977, Box 9, GRFL. For Thomson’s assessment, see memo, Kissinger to the President, March 10, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 131. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, March 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. Robert McNamara believed that Kissinger’s personal and negotiating position around the world was still very strong. See telcon, Kissinger and Robert McNamara, February 2, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 132. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, February 20, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, GRFL. 133. For this account, see Snepp, Decent Interval, 177–206. For an analysis of the military dimension of the beginning of the final North Vietnamese offensive, including a critical assessment of Thieu’s approach of “light at the top, heavy at the bottom,” see Veith, Black April, 172–202.

NOTES TO PAGES 123–127

209

134. Memcon, Ford, Members of the Cabinet (minus Kissinger), Scowcroft, March 12, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 135. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, March 12, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents, Box 17, GRFL. 136. Snepp, Decent Interval, 208–14. 137. For Martin’s comments on the retreat from Pleiku, see ibid., 199. 138. Memo, Scowcroft to the President, n.d. [March 18, 1975], National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. 139. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Scowcroft, March 10, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 140. Snepp, Decent Interval, 215. 141. See, for example, minutes, National Security Council Meeting, March 28, 1975, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. See also Snepp, Decent Interval, 226–28. 142. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, March 31, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. 143. Ibid. Smyser had criticized the notion of a decent interval already in the summer of 1974. See memo, Smyser to Kissinger, July 18, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), document 10, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d10. 144. Memcon, South Vietnamese Parliamentarians, Phuong, Ford, et al., March 25, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 145. Memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Smyser, et al., March 24, 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. 146. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, March 27, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 147. Memcon, Ford, Schlesinger, Scowcroft, March 14, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. For Kissinger’s similar comments, see, for example, memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Smyser, et al., March 24, 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. 148. Memcon, Ford, John J. Sparkman, Clifford P. Case, et al., March 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 149. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 536–37. 150. Ibid, 532. 151. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Frederick Weyand, Martin, Scowcroft, March 25, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. For similar comments by Kissinger, see, for example, memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Smyser, et al., March 24, 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 34, GRFL. 152. Crain, Ford Presidency, 151. 153. See, for example, Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 56; Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 220, 223; and Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 115. 154. Memcon, Ford, Republican congressional leadership, five cabinet members, March 18, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 155. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, March 24, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 156. For Brandt’s comment, see memcon, Willy Brandt, Ford, et al., March 27, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. For Haig’s conclusion, see memcon, Ford, Alexander Haig, et al., March 27, 1975, ibid.

210

NOTES TO PAGES 127–131

157. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, March 31, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. 158. Snepp, Decent Interval, 288–91, 439. 159. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 540. 160. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, April 2, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. 161. Memo, Weyand to the President, April 4, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. 162. Crain, Ford Presidency, 152. 163. Memo, Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger, April 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 25, GRFL. 164. For Ford’s later account, including Kennerly’s assessment, see Ford, Time to Heal, 253. See also Crain, Ford Presidency, 152. For Schlesinger’s views, see memo, Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger, April 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 25, GRFL. For Kissinger’s later account, including Habib’s point of view, see Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 538, 540. For Granger’s critique of Weyand and Martin, see memo, Granger to Scowcroft, April 5, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 19, GRFL. 165. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 534–35. 166. Ibid., 535. See also Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 275, 278. 167. For the congressional advisers’ analysis, see memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, n.d. [April 1975], National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. See also Henry A. Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 427. 168. Telcon, Kissinger and Ford, April 3, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 169. See, for example, telcon, Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin, April 10, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 170. Telcon, Kissinger and Lord, April 3, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 171. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 172. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. T. Christopher Jespersen argues that Kissinger’s bureaucratic infighting to a large extent prevented Nessen’s recommendations from being carried out. See Jespersen, “Kissinger, Ford, and Congress,” 457–58. However, as shown earlier, Kissinger actually informed Ford of Nessen’s point of view. The president simply was unwilling to follow Nessen’s advice. 173. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 174. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 175. Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, April 9, 1975, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 176. Ibid. 177. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 526–28. 178. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 11, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. 179. Quoted in Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 529–30. 180. Ibid., 538.

NOTES TO PAGES 131–134

211

181. Quoted in Ford, Time to Heal, 254. For the full text of Ford’s speech, see United States, National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1975 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975–77), Book 1, 459–73. 182. Ford, Time to Heal, 255. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 541–42. 183. Crain, Ford Presidency, 154. See also Kissinger, Crisis, 421, 425–26. 184. Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 294. 185. Ford, Time to Heal, 255–57. 186. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, GRFL. See also memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 15, 1975, ibid. For Kissinger and Ford’s sympathetic view of Martin, see, for example, memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 17, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 187. Interestingly, in a draft paper of Ford’s oral note to Brezhnev, one important sentence that implied that US-Soviet relations would suffer as a result of Vietnam was partially crossed out, thus essentially weakening the threat. See oral note, Ford to Leonid I. Brezhnev, n.d. [April 1975], National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 188. For Ford and Kissinger’s doubts regarding Soviet control of Hanoi, see telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 18, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. For Hanoi’s attitude, see Crain, Ford Presidency, 155. 189. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 543. 190. Quoted in Herring, America’s Longest War, 336. 191. See, for example, telcon, Schlesinger and Kissinger, April 21, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 192. Telcon, President Nixon and Kissinger, April 11, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 193. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 18, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 194. Gerald R. Ford, “Address at a Tulane University Convocation, April 23, 1975,” http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/750208.asp. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 545. 195. John Robert Greene unconvincingly argues that the Tulane speech constituted a significant break between Ford and Kissinger over foreign policy. See John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 140. Hanhimäki draws a somewhat similar conclusion. However, Hanhimäki argues that the break between Ford and Kissinger was not so much over foreign policy itself as it was over the use of foreign policy in domestic politics. See Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 395. For a similar conclusion, see also Brinkley, Gerald R. Ford, 91–93. In his account, Kissinger argues that the speech did not alter Ford’s approach. He correctly notes that Ford did not mention the speech in his memoirs at all. See Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 545. 196. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 545–46. 197. During the last days of Saigon, Martin, often using profanity and imaginative parables, bitterly complained to Kissinger about the pressure to reduce the American presence. See, for example, telegram SAIGON 0741, Martin to Kissinger, April 26, 1975, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 3, GRFL; Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, April 24, 1975, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 198. Telcon, the President and Kissinger, April 28, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room.

212

NOTES TO PAGES 134–138

199. For Kissinger complaining about poor performance during the airlift, see, for example, telcon, Bill Clements and Kissinger, April 29, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 200. Telcon, Kissinger and Schlesinger, April 29, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. See also Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 552. Martin left on what was meant to be the last helicopter, but a contingent of US marines had mistakenly been left behind and had to be evacuated after the ambassador had left. See Kissinger, Crisis, 542; and David Butler, The Fall of Saigon: Scenes from the Sudden End of a Long War (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1985), 462–69. 201. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Congressional Bipartisan Leadership, April 29, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 202. For a well-written, concise account of the final evacuation, see Crain, Ford Presidency, 156–59. For a more detailed account, see Snepp, Decent Interval, 451–568. For an account of the final days that focuses on the military side, see Veith, Black April, 464–93. CHAPTER 6

1. For this account, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), xx, 398. See also Julian E. Zelizer, “Détente and Domestic Politics,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 4 (September 2009): 661–65; and Jeremi Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s, ed. Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 242. 2. Memo, George S. Springsteen to Brent Scowcroft, May 9, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter GRFL). 3. Memo, Harry D. Train II to George S. Brown, June 24, 1975, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 10, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 961–68. Another paper prepared at the Department of Defense in the summer of 1975 was also highly critical of the US engagement in Vietnam and listed numerous critical theories pertaining to the question of what caused the collapse of South Vietnam. See memo, Francis J. West to James R. Schlesinger, July 22, 1975, ibid., 969–73. 4. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, May 10, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, GRFL. 5. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, May 12, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, GRFL. See also Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 556–60. 6. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, May 10, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, GRFL. 7. Walt W. Rostow, “Vietnam and Asia,” Diplomatic History 20, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 469–70. See also Rostow, The United States and the Regional Organization of Asia and the Pacific, 1965–1985 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 143–44. 8. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 561. See also Monica Crowley, Nixon in Winter: The Final Revelations (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 253; and Michael A. McCann, “A War Worth Fighting: How the United States Military Presence in Indochina from 1965 to 1975 Preserved Global Democratic Security,” in To Oppose Any Foe: The Legacy of US Intervention in Vietnam, ed. Ross A. Fisher, John Norton Moore, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 150–51. 9. Robert J. McMahon, “What Difference Did It Make? Assessing the Vietnam War’s Impact on Southeast Asia,” in International Perspectives on Vietnam, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner

NOTES TO PAGES 138–140

213

and Ted Gittinger (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 192–203. See also David Milne, America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 252–53. 10. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, May 10, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, GRFL. 11. See, for example, telephone conversation (telcon), Kissinger and William Simon, May 8, 1975, US Department of State, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Declassified/Released Document Collections, State Department Collections: Kissinger Telephone Transcripts, http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp (hereafter FOIA Electronic Reading Room); and memorandum of conversation (memcon), President Ford, Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, May 5, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 12. Telcon, Kissinger and Winston Lord, May 2, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 13. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Anatoly Dobrynin, Scowcroft, May 9, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. See also memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 6, 1975, ibid. 14. Memo, Philip Habib, William Gleysteen, Lord, Richard H. Solomon to Kissinger, May 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 13, GRFL. 15. Intelligence information cable, May 12, 1975, “Chinese Hope That the United States Will Maintain Its Presence in Laos at Current Level,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 7, GRFL. See also intelligence information cable, May 9, 1975, “Comments . . . on Sino-US Relations, Taiwan and Indochina,” ibid. 16. Memcon, Huang Chen, Kissinger, et al., May 9, 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 17. Memcon, Ford, Chung Il-Kwon, Hahm Pyong-choon, Scowcroft, May 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. For discussions among members of the Ford administration about the reaction to the fall of Saigon by Washington’s Asian allies and what the administration could do to reassure them, see also minutes of meeting, Kissinger, Robert Ingersoll, Joseph Sisco, et al., May 7, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), document 13, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12 /d13; and memo, Smyser to Kissinger, May 7, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC, 2011), document 14, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments /frus1969-76ve12/d14. 18. Telcon, Kissinger and Ken Fried, April 29, 1975, FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 19. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, W. E. Rowling, et al., May 7, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 20. Memcon, Ford, Lee Kuan Yew, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. Interestingly, Kissinger and Lee used the term “insurance policy” while they were analyzing foreign policy strategies of Indonesia and Thailand. 21. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 7, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 22. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 5, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. See also Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 428–33.

214

NOTES TO PAGES 140–143

23. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Dobrynin, Scowcroft, May 9, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. See also memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 7, 1975, ibid. 24. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 25. Cécile Menétrey-Monchau, “The Mayaguez Incident as an Epilogue to the Vietnam War and Its Reflection of the Post-Vietnam Political Equilibrium in Southeast Asia,” Cold War History 5, no. 3 (August 2005): 338–39. 26. Minutes, cabinet meeting, May 7, 1975, James E. Connor, Staff Secretary and Secretary to the Cabinet: Files, 1974–77, Box 4, GRFL. 27. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 5, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 28. Memo for the record, Ford, Kissinger, Republican Congressional Leadership, et al., May 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 29. For well-written accounts of the episode, see Andrew Downer Crain, The Ford Presidency: A History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2009), 163–68; and MenétreyMonchau, “Mayaguez Incident,” 337–67. For Ford’s account, see Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 275–84. For Kissinger’s account, see Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Renewal (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 547–75. 30. Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, May 12, 1975, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 31. Ibid. 32. Menétrey-Monchau argues that Washington wrongly perceived the seizure of the Mayaguez as a Khmer Rouge attempt to mock US honor. Paralleling Jussi Hanhimäki’s central claim about Kissinger, Menétrey-Monchau concludes that members of the Ford administration failed to understand the regional complexities of the crisis, were blinded by their Cold War mind-set, and continued to see communism as a monolithic entity. See Menétrey-Monchau, “Mayaguez Incident,” 340–41, 358; and Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War: Diplomacy after the Capture of Saigon, 1975–1979 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006), 30. However, the historical record does not support this interpretation. 33. Ford, Time to Heal, 275. 34. Memo, Stephen Low to Scowcroft, April 15, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents, Box 54, GRFL. See also intelligence information cable, March 27, 1975, “Factors Contributing to Carlos Andres Perez’ Aspiration to a Leadership Role for Venezuela in Latin America,” ibid. 35. Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, May 12, 1975, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 36. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 12, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 37. Menétrey-Monchau, “Mayaguez Incident,” 339, 341, 349. See also Michael J. Hamm, “The Pueblo and Mayaguez Incidents: A Study of Flexible Response and DecisionMaking,” Asian Survey 17, no. 6 (June 1977): 554–55; Chris Lamb, “Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 4 (Winter 1984–1985), 683; and Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986), 59–60. 38. Although Christopher Hitchens somewhat unconvincingly tries to hold Kissinger personally responsible, he rightly concludes that Ford and Kissinger misled the public during the Mayaguez incident. See Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger

NOTES TO PAGES 143–147

215

(London: Verso Books, 2001), x–xii, 23–24. Jason Friedman draws the opposite conclusion that Ford adequately informed Congress and made national reconciliation his priority. See Jason Friedman, “Gerald Ford, the Mayaguez Incident, and the Post-imperial Presidency,” Congress and the Presidency 37 (2010): 22–24, 28–29, 41–42. This analysis does not stand up to the historical record. 39. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 12, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 40. Ford, Time to Heal, 276–77. 41. Menétrey-Monchau, “Mayaguez Incident,” 343–44. See also Crain, Ford Presidency, 166. 42. Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975 (evening), National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. See also minutes, National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975 (morning), ibid. 43. Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975 (evening), National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 44. Ibid. 45. The Case-Church amendment was part of the congressional attempts to stop US military operations in Indochina by cutting of funds. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, et al., May 14, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 46. Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, May 14, 1975, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 47. Ibid. See also memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 14, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL; and Ford, Time to Heal, 279–80. 48. Menétrey-Monchau, “Mayaguez Incident,” 344. 49. Ford, Time to Heal, 276. 50. Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975 (evening), National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 51. Crain, Ford Presidency, 167. 52. Memcon, the President, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 16, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. See also Ford, Time to Heal, 284. 53. During the evacuation from Saigon, Ford and Kissinger had already suspected that Schlesinger was disobeying the president’s orders. See Bob Woodward, Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 30–31. 54. Crain, Ford Presidency, 168. See also Woodward, Shadow, 31. 55. Memcon, the President, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 16, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. For the senators congratulating Ford, see memcon, Ford, Mike Mansfield, John J. Sparkman, Clifford P. Case, et al., May 16, 1975, ibid. 56. Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War (New York, 2002), 313–14. 57. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 15, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 58. Memcon, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 16, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 59. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 24, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 12, GRFL. 60. Crain, Ford Presidency, 168. 61. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 575.

216

NOTES TO PAGES 147–150

62. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, April 25, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 63. Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, May 5, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. 64. Memo, Smyser and Hal Horan to Kissinger, May 30, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 27, GRFL. See also Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 33–34. 65. Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 31. See also Michael J. Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 5. 66. Quoted in Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 31. For an analysis that holds Kissinger primarily responsible for the failure to move toward normalization, see T. Christopher Jespersen, “The Bitter End and the Lost Chance in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford Administration, and the Battle over Vietnam, 1975–76,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 267, 284–93. Arguably, this analysis neglects the full extent of Vietnamese intransigence. For a more balanced analysis, see MenétreyMonchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 1–2, 13–15, 18, 235. 67. See, for example, Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 168–70; and Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 397–98. 68. Memo, Scowcroft to the President, July 10, 1976, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, GRFL. 69. See, for example, Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 554. See also Crowley, Nixon in Winter, 255–56. 70. Memo, Scowcroft to the President, May 10, 1976, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, GRFL. 71. For Kissinger’s correct predictions, see memcon, Ford, Kissinger, Republican Congressional Leadership, et al., April 22, 1975, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, GRFL. On the Third Indochina War, see, for example, Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War, a History of Indochina since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Collier Books, 1986); and Henry A. Kissinger, On China (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 344–48, 367–76. 72. Memo, by Smyser, n.d. [May 1975], “Laos: Background,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 27, GRFL. See also telegram 109710, Department of State to Embassy Laos, May 11, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), document 69, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d69; and memo, Stearman to Kissinger, June 6, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), document 74, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments /frus1969-76ve12/d74. 73. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, n.d. [June 1975], National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 27, GRFL. 74. MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, “Laos in 1975: People’s Democratic Revolution—Lao Style,” Asian Survey 16, no. 2 (February 1976): 193. 75. Lawrence, Vietnam War, 170. 76. For the advisers’ deliberations, see memo, Solomon to Kissinger, April 2, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974– 1977, Box 3, GRFL. For Chinese interests, see intelligence information cable, May 12, 1975, “Chinese Hope That the United States Will Maintain Its Presence in Laos at Current Level,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976,

NOTES TO PAGES 150–152

217

Box 7, GRFL; and memo, Smyser to Kissinger, July 15, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 77. Memo, by Solomon, May 23, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 7, GRFL. 78. Intelligence information cable, June 3, 1975, “Comments of Chinese Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-Hua on Sino-US Relations, Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, and Hong Kong and Macao,” National Security Adviser, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 7, GRFL. See also intelligence information cable, May 24, 1975, “Views of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Stalemated Relations with the United States,” ibid. 79. Memo, Habib, Gleysteen, Lord, Solomon to Kissinger, July 3, 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 80. Memcon, Kissinger, Habib, Lord, et al., July 6, 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 81. Memo, Richard B. Finn to Lord et al., July 16, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 82. Memo, Thomas J. Barnes to Kissinger, September 8, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. See also memo, Richard B. Finn to Lord et al., July 16, 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, GRFL. 83. Memcon, Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Huang Hua, Kissinger, et al., September 28, 1975, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, GRFL. 84. Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 150. 85. Memo, Stearman to Kissinger, October 16, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 13, GRFL. 86. Memo, by Barnes, July 23, 1976, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 87. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 158–60, 190, 193–94, 202, 206–7, 241. See also George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 341; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy in the Cold War, rev. and expanded ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 314–15, 348; Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “The Vietnam Decade: The Global Shock of the War,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 160, 168–72; and Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Containing Globalism: The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 211. For Kissinger making the same argument in his later writings, see Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982), 188. 88. Nguyen, “Vietnam Decade,” 170. 89. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002), 387–88. See also Thomas J. Noer, “International Credibility and Political Survival: The Ford Administration’s Intervention in Angola,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Fall 1993): 771–72. 90. Memo, Scowcroft to the President, December 28, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 13, GRFL. 91. See, for example, Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 348; James T. Patterson, Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore (Oxford: Oxford University

218

NOTES TO PAGES 152–155

Press, 2005), 104; and Niall Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 14. 92. Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 277. See also Lawrence, Vietnam War, 170–71; Robert D. Schulzinger, “The End of the Vietnam War, 1973– 1976,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 218; and Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Too Late or Too Soon? Debating the Withdrawal from Vietnam in the Age of Iraq,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 595. 93. Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War, 285. See also Sarah B. Snyder, “Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 21, no. 1 (2010): 87–88; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 594–95. 94. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, July 15, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 95. After visiting Southeast Asia in May and June, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Philip C. Habib, drew a somewhat similar conclusion. See minutes of meeting, Kissinger, Ingersoll, Sisco, Habib, et al., June 13, 1975, FRUS, 1969– 1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC, 2011), document 15, online ed., http://history.state.gov /historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d15. See also memo, Kissinger to Ford, June 13, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC, 2011), document 16, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d16. For more similar conclusions in the fall of 1975, see memo, Barnes and Solomon to Kissinger, September 11, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC, 2011), document 20, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d20; and memo, Lord to Kissinger, October 16, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-12 (Washington, DC, 2011), document 21, online ed., http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12 /d21. 96. For the importance of the perception of the US exit from Vietnam, especially by the great powers, see Robert Jervis, “The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and Buying Time,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 513–15. 97. See, for example, Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 204; and Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” 236. 98. Memo, Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, May 10, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, GRFL. 99. For a critique of Nixon and Kissinger that focuses on the Cold War mind-set, see, for example, Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 274–78. However, Craig and Logevall concede that the Soviets similarly saw the world in terms of Cold War power politics. See ibid., 317. See also Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1126. 100. For Kissinger stressing the importance of deterrence, see Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Phoenix, 2000), 67. 101. Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, July 15, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 102. Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 56–57. 103. Memo, Barnes to Scowcroft, February 11, 1976, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, GRFL. 104. Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 56, 61, 76. See also Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1996), 19–21; and Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home, 5–9.

NOTES TO PAGES 155–157

219

105. Memo, Barnes to Scowcroft, August 6, 1976, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, GRFL. 106. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 418–19, 422–24. 107. Quoted in Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 288. 108. Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 285–87. See also Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 284–88. 109. Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 316. 110. Ibid., 314–15. See also Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” 228. 111. Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 427–28. See also Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 6. 112. Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford, 325. See also Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 450. 113. Yanek Mieczkowski, “Gerald Ford’s Near Miracle of 1976,” American History 42, no. 6 (February 2008): 47. 114. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger, 2. See also Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 450; Snyder, “Through the Looking Glass,” 94–95; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1059; and Derek N. Buckaloo, “Carter’s Nicaragua and Other Democratic Quagmires,” in Schulman and Zelizer, Rightward Bound, 246–50. 115. Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 287–88. William Hyland concludes that ironically, the foreign policy record was Ford’s strength. See William G. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan (New York: Random House, 1987), 173. 116. Lawrence, Vietnam War, 172–73. 117. Memo, Milt Mitler to Russ Rourke, August 3, 1976, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 14, GRFL. See also memo, Scowcroft to Jack Marsh, August 7, 1976, ibid. 118. Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 71–76. 119. Robert J. McMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1995), 609–10. See also Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), 122; and Lawrence W. Serewicz, America at the Brink of Empire: Rusk, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007), 18. Kissinger later admitted that Nixon’s (and Ford’s) foreign policy was not grounded in familiar US principles. See Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 761. 120. Menétrey-Monchau, American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War, 16–17. See also Hurst, Carter Administration and Vietnam, 139–40; and Nguyen, “Vietnam Decade,” 161. Derek Buckaloo argues that Carter failed to follow through on his promise to ground US foreign policy in moral principles and move beyond Vietnam. According to Buckaloo, Carter did not transcend US fear of communism. See Buckaloo, “Carter’s Nicaragua and Other Democratic Quagmires,” 262–63. 121. See, for example, Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 348; Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 291; and Julian E. Zelizer, “Conservatives, Carter, and the Politics of National Security,” in Schulman and Zelizer, Rightward Bound, 265, 281–83. 122. Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 311–12, 322–23. See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 350–53, 375–77; Nguyen, “Vietnam Decade,” 163, 171; Zelizer, “Conservatives, Carter, and the Politics of National Security,” 269; Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 357; and Jeffrey Kimball, “Out of Primordial Cultural Ooze: Inventing Political and Policy Legacies about the US Exit from Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 580. By the late 1970s, the lessons of Vietnam were being widely discussed

220

NOTES TO PAGES 158–164

by academics, the media, and policymakers. See Lawrence, Vietnam War, 173–83. Foreign policy contexts in which the lessons were discussed included the Tehran hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and, later, the first and second Gulf wars. See, for example, Charles E. Neu, ed., After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), xi–xix; Robert K. Brigham, Is Iraq Another Vietnam? (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), xiv–xv, 167; William L. Stearman, “Lessons Learned from Vietnam,” Military Review, March–April 2010, 109–16; Arnold R. Isaacs, Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 65–102; Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 556–63; Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), 319–35; Lawrence, “Too Late or Too Soon?,” 589–600; and Jeffrey Record, “Leaving Vietnam: Insights for Iraq?,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 567–76. CONCLUSION

1. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Brown and Company, 1977), 96. 2. Robert J. McMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1995), 246–48. 3. Walter L. Hixson, “Containment on the Perimeter: George F. Kennan and Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 12, no. 2 (April 1988): 149–64. 4. See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 2 (January 1969): 218–19. 5. Jussi M. Hanhimäki “ ‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 675. 6. Memo, William R. Smyser and William L. Stearman to Henry A. Kissinger, May 10, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 20, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. 7. Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 460, 518–19. 8. Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 323. 9. Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 277–78. 10. Henry A. Kissinger, “Between the Old Left and the New Right,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May/June 1999): 109–16. 11. Ibid., 102. 12. For a related analysis that stresses the ambivalent influence of globalization on the United States’ superpower status, see Daniel J. Sargent, “The United States and Globalization in the 1970s,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 63–64. 13. For Kissinger’s claim, see Kissinger, “Between the Old Left and the New Right,” 115–16. 14. Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Containing Globalism: The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s,” in Ferguson et al., Shock of the Global, 217.

Bibliographic Essay on the Different Interpretations of the Post– Paris Agreement Period

The literature that specifically treats the aftermath of the Paris Agreement remains scarce. To be sure, this is first of all partly due to the unavailability of primary sources that were only recently declassified. However, there have been quite a few works by academics and journalists that have dealt with Nixon and Kissinger’s Vietnam policy and have at least partly covered the war after the war. Generally speaking, most of these accounts have concluded their commentary with the Paris Peace Agreement, which is predominantly seen as determining subsequent events. See, for example, Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), ix. See also Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 169, 184–85; and Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 357–60. Those works are complemented by memoirs and diaries of the protagonists of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford administrations that argue that the Paris Agreement rather opened a new chapter for Washington’s engagement in Indochina. See, for example, Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978). See also Nixon, No More Vietnams (London: W. H. Allen, 1986); Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Phoenix, 2000); and Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982). The existing body of literature can be assessed against the backdrop of three major lines of interpretation that have emerged since the 1970s. On the one hand, there has been Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford’s (as well as their supporters’) version of events. According to their “peace with honor” thesis, Washington and Saigon were actually winning the war militarily, and an independent South Vietnam could have been sustained after the Paris Agreement had it not been for the congressional cutoff of military and economic aid to the Thieu regime. With US help against an all-out invasion, they argue, South Vietnam would have had a good chance to survive, possibly until and beyond the erosion of communism in the late 1980s. In late 1972 and early 1973, when Kissinger was negotiating the agreement, he (and Nixon) did not anticipate the loss of presidential authority that later resulted from Watergate—after all, they had just achieved a landslide election victory. To the contrary, they were convinced, perhaps naively, that the American people would unite behind the agreement. See, for example, Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980), 119. See also Nixon, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 343–44; Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 428, 455–60, 468–69, 499–500, 551; Jonathan Aitken, Nixon: A Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), 457; C. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 1–8, 142–47; Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1999), xvii; Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), vi, 441; Anthony James Joes, The War for South Viet Nam, 1954–1975, rev. ed. (London: Praeger Publishers, 2001), ix, 135–36; and Sorley, Better War, 364, 373, 383–86. Although some of these authors are critical of Nixon and Kissinger, arguing that they abandoned Saigon, all of them portray the war as a noble cause and see the possibility of US victory. 221

222

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

On the other hand, the so-called decent-interval theory has provided an alternative explanation of Washington’s post–Paris Agreement behavior. According to this interpretation, which historian Jeffrey Kimball most famously advances and which has become conventional wisdom among many if not most scholars, Nixon and Kissinger did not believe that the Paris Agreement could work. Rather, the theory runs, they anticipated the fall of Saigon and hoped only to install a “decent interval” between US withdrawal and an inevitable communist victory in order to preserve US credibility internationally. Reflecting the administration’s supposedly cynical approach to foreign policy in general and Indochina in particular, Nixon and Kissinger were fully aware of the lack of popular support for an ongoing engagement in Vietnam. By the time of the Paris Agreement, they had contented themselves with securing the release of US POWs and shifting the blame for defeat to Congress and the liberal press. Freed from Vietnam, a related argument runs, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to move on with their real concern: détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. See Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, xii. See also Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 24–29, 185–87, 197–98; Kimball, “Decent Interval or Not: The Paris Agreement and the End of the Vietnam War,” SHAFR December 2003 Newsletter, http://www.shafr.org/passport/2003/december/kimball.htm; and Kimball, “The Case of the ‘Decent Interval’: Do We Now Have a Smoking Gun?,” SHAFR September 2001 Newsletter, http://www.shafr.org/passport/2001/sep/interval.htm. In regard to Kimball’s analysis, it should be noted that he argues that by the time of the Paris Agreement, Nixon and Kissinger had come to accept the possibility of South Vietnam’s collapse but continued hoping to avoid it. In any case, Kimball concludes that the “decent interval” was Nixon and Kissinger’s game plan, and he is the most prominent proponent of the decent-interval theory. For other scholars supporting this interpretation, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 204, 207, 225, 230–33, 258–59; Hanhimäki, “Selling the ‘Decent Interval’: Kissinger, Triangular Diplomacy, and the End of the Vietnam War, 1971–73,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 1 (March 2003): 162, 166, 185, 187–88; and Hanhimäki, “Some More ‘Smoking Guns’? The Vietnam War and Kissinger’s Summitry with Moscow and Beijing, 1971– 73,” SHAFR December 2001 Newsletter, http://www.shafr.org/passport/2001/dec/smoking .htm. See also Lloyd Gardner, “Richard Nixon and the End of the Vietnam War, 1969– 75,” in A Companion to the Vietnam War, ed. Marilyn B. Young and Robert Buzzanco (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002), 251–54; William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, rev. ed. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002), 260; Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 227; Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 453–55, 470, 620; William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 368–71; Thomas Alan Schwartz, “ ‘Henry, . . . Winning an Election Is Terribly Important’: Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations,” Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 2009 Presidential Address, Diplomatic History 33, no. 2 (April 2009): 175; Ken Hughes, “Fatal Politics: Nixon’s Political Timetable for Withdrawing from Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 497–506; YouTube Fatal Politics Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/fatalpolitics; Melvin Small, “H-Diplo Article Review No. 225—Melvin Small on Thomas Schwartz,” April 30, 2009, http://www .h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR225.pdf; and Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 259–60.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

223

The historian Marc Frey distinguishes between Nixon and Kissinger. According to Frey, Nixon believed that he could continue supporting Thieu. For Kissinger’s view, he follows the decent-interval interpretation. See Marc Frey, Geschichte des Vietnamkriegs: Die Tragödie in Asien und das Ende des Amerikanischen Traums, 6th ed. (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2002), 213. For a similar interpretation, see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992), 422. The journalist Arnold Isaacs’s analysis runs along somewhat similar lines. Isaacs concludes that there are no certain answers about the “decent interval.” Still, he suspects that while Nixon had both impulses (extrication and ongoing engagement), Kissinger’s view was probably in line with the decent-interval theory. See Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 69–70. For an analysis that is in line with the decent-interval theory but actually praises Nixon and Kissinger for this approach, see Robert Jervis, “The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and Buying Time,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 513–14. Ironically, the former CIA officer Frank Snepp, whose 1977 book Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002) introduced the term and its defeatist notion into the literature, actually makes a strong argument for an opposing interpretation. To be sure, Decent Interval is not uncritical: the account’s primary purpose was to uncover the shortcomings of the traumatic US evacuation in April 1975—a fact that explains Snepp’s ironic choice of title—and to expose the responsible policymakers. But in essence, Snepp’s analysis corroborates the Nixon and Ford administrations’ views. Snepp emphasizes that Kissinger, whom he considers the principal architect of Vietnam policy, did not merely seek a decent interval between the signing of the Paris Agreement and the fall of Saigon. Rather, he envisaged an equilibrium in which North Vietnam and South Vietnam would finally accept an indefinite stalemate. Supporting Kissinger’s claims, Snepp argues that US policy in Vietnam was not doomed to fail. He concludes, “As a former intelligence officer I must believe, perhaps naively, that right decisions taken at appropriate moments on the basis of accurate information might have averted the outcome, or at least have modified it” (Snepp, Decent Interval, 579). For Snepp’s analysis, see also ibid., 50–53. Kimball provides an explanation of Snepp’s actual point of view. See Kimball, “Decent Interval or Not,” and Kimball, “Case of the Decent Interval.” Mark Moyar has rightly pointed to the misrepresentation of Snepp’s argument in the secondary literature. See Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam, Bison Books ed. (London: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 360–61. However, Moyar does not discuss the decent-interval theory. Political scientist Larry Berman, who is an adamant critic of Jeffrey Kimball’s theory, offers yet another explanation of Washington’s approach to Indochina: the theory of “permanent war.” According to Berman, Nixon and Kissinger foresaw the dissolution of the cease-fire but sought to use the Paris Agreement as a pretext to continue backing Saigon with air- and seapower at an acceptable political cost. See Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 2001), 1–10. See also Larry Berman and Stephen R. Routh, “Why the United States Fought in Vietnam,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2003, 199–200. The problem with Berman’s book is that he remains too vague about the notion of “permanent war.” He argues that while Kissinger held a more pessimistic outlook on the ability to shore up public support and merely sought a “decent interval” (by using airpower for a “final” blow) between US withdrawal and Saigon’s collapse, Nixon planned for a stalemate, backed by continued bombing, that would keep South Vietnam afloat until the end of his presidency. For Kissinger’s alleged position, see Berman, No Peace, No Honor, 259–61. For Berman’s view of

224

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Nixon’s position, see ibid., 9, 246. For a similar overall idea, see also Seymour M. Hersh, Kissinger: The Price of Power; Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), 637–38. Although Berman’s analysis of Kissinger’s viewpoint thus actually seems to agree with that of the decent-interval school, the question arises in what way Nixon’s plan was really different: if his primary motive was to ensure South Vietnam’s survival until he was no longer in office (and thus could not be held responsible), Berman’s analysis could well be (mis)understood as another version of the decent-interval theory. For a similar argument, see George C. Herring, “Reviews of Books: Larry Berman, No Peace No Honor,” American Historical Review 107, no. 2 (April 2002): 574. The historian Pierre Asselin has criticized Kimball’s notion of the decent interval as well and has questioned the existence of “smoking guns.” See Pierre Asselin, “Kimball’s Vietnam War,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (January 2006): 164–66. The problem with Asselin’s account is that at times he actually seems to be arguing in favor of the decentinterval interpretation. See Asselin, Bitter Peace, xi, 16, 60, 86–87, 183–84. Berman criticizes Kimball’s alleged smoking guns in the same vein as Asselin. See Larry Berman and Jeffrey Kimball, “Letters: A Difference of Opinion,” SHAFR March 2002 Newsletter, http://www.shafr.org/passport/2002/mar/letters.htm. David Schmitz has convincingly argued that Nixon intended to continue backing Saigon with supplies and airpower after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. His analysis thus goes in the same direction as Berman’s theory. However, Schmitz’s work does not focus on Washington’s post–Paris Agreement strategy and does not specifically address the controversy over “decent interval” versus “permanent war.” See David F. Schmitz, Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 137, 143–46. In depicting the academic debate between Berman and Kimball, Hanhimäki has argued that the decent-interval and permanent war theories are not mutually exclusive. This conclusion implies the existence of different contingency plans on Nixon and Kissinger’s side, but Hanhimäki does not further develop the idea or propose an alternative explanation that transcends the Berman-Kimball debate. See Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “ ‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 665. For another analysis that is somewhat similar to Hanhimäki’s but even less developed, see Philip Zelikow, “Review of No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, by Larry Berman,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 156–57. Jeffrey Kimball has also analyzed Nixon and Kissinger’s exit strategy in terms of “best-” and “worst-case” scenarios. However, in line with his earlier writings, Kimball concludes that by the time of the Paris Agreement, Nixon and Kissinger saw a “decent interval” until the fall of Saigon as the best possible outcome. See Jeffrey Kimball, “Out of Primordial Cultural Ooze: Inventing Political and Policy Legacies about the US Exit from Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 584–86.

Bibliography of Primary Sources

UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan James E. Connor, Staff Secretary and Secretary to the Cabinet: Files, 1974–1977 National Security Adviser Files Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977 Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977 Legislative Interdepartmental Group Files, 1971–1972 (1976) Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977 National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1977 National Security Council Meetings File, 1974–1977 National Security Decision Memoranda and National Security Study Memoranda: Copy Set, 1974–1977 Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977 Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents: Selected Documents Arranged by Log Number, 1974–1977 Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California National Security Council Files Henry A. Kissinger Office Files Country Files: Far East–South Vietnam Country Files: Far East–Vietnam Negotiations HAK Trip Files Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons) Chronological File National Security Council (NSC) Files Country Files: Far East Alexander M. Haig Special File Presidential/HAK Memcons President’s Trip Files Subject Files Vietnam Country Files Vietnam Subject File National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) Meeting Files Minutes of Meetings NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Christian Science Monitor Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung New York Sun 225

226

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRIMARY SOURCES

New York Times Time Washington Post PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND GOVERNMENT REC ORDS

Anthony, Victor B., and Richard R. Sexton. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The War in Northern Laos. Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1993. Lawrence, Mark Atwood, ed. The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. McMahon, Robert J., ed. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays. 2nd ed. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1995. United States. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1974–1977. 6 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975–77. ——. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1969–1974. 6 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969–75. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Vol. 9, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010. ——. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Vol. 10, Vietnam, January 1973– July 1975. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010. ——. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Vol. 18, China, 1973–1976. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007.

Index

Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of, 157 Agnew, Spiro, 35, 42, 43, 85 Allende, Salvador, 81 Alsop, Joseph, 67 Alsop, Stewart, 51 amnesty, for draft evaders, 108, 116 Angolan civil war, 135, 152 antiwar movement, 4, 6, 56–61, 117 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 26, 137, 155 Atlantic Charter, 72–73 Atlantic Declaration, 99 Australia, 153 Beecher, William, 58 Berman, Larry, 8, 15–16, 160 Biden, Joseph, 131 Brandt, Willy, 127 Bretton Woods system, 5 Brezhnev, Leonid, 22, 38, 95, 100; Ford and, 115; US visit by, 71, 75, 78 Bruce, David, 97 Brunei, 137 Bundy, McGeorge, 90 Bunker, Ellsworth, 30, 42 Burns, Arthur, 65 Butterfield, Alexander, 85 Byrd amendment, 54, 62 Cambodia, 4, 80, 90; cease-fire in, 20–22; China and, 36, 41, 63, 74, 88, 91–92; equilibrium strategy for, 41, 45–48; fall of, 7, 124, 130–31; Ford’s policies on, 113–14, 117–18, 121, 124; genocide in, 149; Haig’s visit to, 62–63; inflation rate in, 96; “internationalization” of, 114; Kissinger on, 20–22, 35, 40, 73–74, 82–84, 121–22; map of, xiii; Mayaguez crisis and, 141–47; Nixon on, 82–84, 90; North Vietnam and, 21–22, 35, 73–74, 91, 98; US bombing of, 46, 47, 50, 58, 67, 74, 76, 78, 83–84, 90; US incursions into, 2, 56–57. See also Khmer Rouge Can, Nguyen Ba, 43 Carter, Jimmy, 9, 156–57, 163–64 Carver, George, 33, 34; on Cambodia, 91; on great-power diplomacy, 42

Case, Clifford, 69, 145 Chile, 81, 142 China, 36–37, 87–88; Angolan civil war and, 152; Cambodia and, 36, 41, 63, 74, 88, 91–92; Ford administration and, 115–16; great-power diplomacy and, 5, 37–42, 55, 63, 64, 71, 74; Khmer Rouge and, 98, 149, 150; Kissinger’s visits to, 31, 36–40; Laos and, 36, 41; during Mayaguez crisis, 143–44; Nixon visit to, 3, 36; North Vietnam and, 32, 37–42, 94, 118, 121, 151; Sino-Soviet split and, 5, 36, 40–41; South Vietnam and, 99; Taiwan and, 36–37, 150 Christmas bombings (1972), 3, 17, 33, 47, 49–51, 79; effectiveness of, 159; Mansfield on, 59; Nixon’s approval ratings after, 60 Church, Frank, 69, 131, 140 Clements, William, 130, 145 Colby, William, 112, 124, 128, 130; on Mayaguez crisis, 141; on North Vietnam, 94, 121 Committee for the Re-election of the President (CREEP), 61–62 Cooper, Charles A., 84 Cooper-Church amendment, 57 Cox, Archibald, 69, 85–86 Craig, Campbell, 163 Cyprus, 101, 102, 111 Dean, John (Nixon adviser), 53, 68; testimony of, 77, 78, 82, 85 Dean, John Gunther (Cambodian ambassador), 98–99, 114; evacuation of, 130–31; Kissinger on, 121–22 decent-interval theory, 4, 34, 37, 72, 81, 83; Berman on, 15; coining of, 13; equilibrium strategy and, 13–18, 65, 76; Haig on, 64; Kalb on, 120; Kimball on, 8, 13, 15, 26, 160 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). See North Vietnam Diem, Bui, 16–17 Do, Tran Van, 16–17 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 22, 87, 92, 95 domino theory, 126–27, 153, 158 Dong, Pham Van, 33–34, 148 Duc, Nguyen Phu, 17–18 Dung, Van Tien, 120, 122–23 227

228

INDEX

Easter Offensive (1972), 3, 38, 159 Egypt, 94–95 Ehrlichman, John, 62, 65, 67, 68; resignation of, 53, 68, 84 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 126, 129, 130 Elliott, William Yandell, 58 Ellsberg, Daniel, 68 Enders, Tom, 91 energy crisis. See oil embargo equilibrium strategy, 3–4, 21, 34, 45, 48–52, 62, 89; in Cambodia, 41, 45–48; collapse of, 53–54, 65, 72, 80; decent-interval theory and, 13–18, 65, 76; great-power diplomacy and, 39–42, 74–75; in Laos, 41, 45–48; in Middle East, 95–96; Sullivan on, 76; Thailand and, 31, 32 Ervin Committee, 68–69, 77, 85 Ethiopia, 152 Europe, 72–73, 99; US credibility in, 127, 142 Evans, Rowland, 14 Faisal, king of Saudi Arabia, 127 Ford, Gerald R., 78, 103–11, 136–41; approval ratings of, 108, 146; Cambodian policies of, 113–14, 117–18, 121, 124; draft amnesty program of, 108, 116; “Halloween Massacre” of, 156; Johnson and, 103; legacy of, 7, 10, 102–3; Mayaguez crisis and, 141–47, 156; Middle East policies of, 111, 119, 127, 132; Nixon pardon by, 103, 108, 116–17; realpolitik of, 9–10, 158, 161–63; reelection campaign of, 143, 155–57; Thieu and, 104–8, 111–13, 116, 122–34; USSR and, 115–17; as Vice President, 85; on Watergate scandal, 69, 109 “four noes” policy, of Thieu, 30 Four-Party Joint Military Commission, 31, 43, 48 Fulbright, William, 67, 69, 78, 99, 110 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 24 Garment, Leonard, 65–68, 70 Gelb, Leslie H., 116 Goldwater, Barry, 21 good-doctor theory, 90 Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN). See South Vietnam Granger, Clinton, 118, 128 great-power diplomacy, 37–38, 55, 71; effects of, 5, 161; equilibrium strategy and, 39–42, 74–75; Haig on, 63, 64 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 56

Habib, Philip, 128 Haig, Alexander, 20, 22, 24, 51, 95, 127; fact-finding mission of, 62–65; Watergate scandal and, 67, 69 Haldeman, H. R., 35, 39, 52; resignation of, 68, 84; in Watergate scandal, 62, 65, 67, 68 “Halloween Massacre,” 156 Hanhimäki, Jussi M., 160 Hartmann, Robert, 133 Hatfield, Mark, 56 Hays, Wayne L., 77 Helms, Richard, 68 Helsinki Accords, 135, 152–53, 155 Hersh, Seymour, 117 Hess, Gary, 8 Hmong people, 46, 149 Holdridge, John, 50 Huang Chen, 139 Huong, Tran Van, 133–34 India, 36 Indonesia, 36, 137 insurance policy, of Ford administration, 107, 115, 118, 122, 125–26, 129–32; Congressional blame and, 6–8; after fall of Saigon, 135, 153, 154; Mayaguez crisis and, 142, 147 insurance policy, of Nixon administration, 3–4, 12, 87–90, 93, 160; Congressional blame and, 6–8; Haig on, 64; as modus operandi, 26–29; during Watergate scandal, 71–75; Yom Kippur War and, 96–97 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), 31, 43, 45, 71, 92 International Conference on Vietnam, 35 Iran, 147 Israel, 96, 152; during Yom Kippur War, 9, 81, 94–96, 162. See also Middle East Jackson-Vanik amendment, 100, 111, 118 Japan, 31, 36, 122, 137 Javits, Jacob, 67, 86 Jobert, Michel, 73 Johnson, Lyndon B., 27, 56, 57, 129, 137; Ford and, 103; good-doctor theory of, 90; Pueblo incident and, 142 Kalb, Marvin, 24, 120 Kemp, Jack, 77 Kennan, George F., 10, 158, 161 Kennedy, Edward, 99 Kennedy, John F., 27, 70, 90, 126, 129 Kennedy, Richard, 50, 105, 109 Kennerly, David, 128

INDEX

Kent State shootings, 56 Khieu Samphan, 98 Khmer Rouge, 47, 80, 88, 90; China and, 98, 149, 150; final offensive of, 124, 130–31; Ford’s policies on, 113–14, 117–18; genocide by, 149; Mayaguez crisis and, 141–47; North Vietnam and, 73–74, 91, 98. See also Cambodia Kimball, Jeffrey, 8, 13, 15, 26, 160 Kissinger, Henry A., 27, 85, 137–38, 163; on Cambodia, 20–22, 35, 73–74, 82–84, 121–22; on China, 31, 36–40; Ending the Vietnam War by, 15, 23, 81; on Laos, 20–22, 31, 32, 35, 40, 73; Mayaguez crisis and, 141–47; on Nixon’s reelection, 58; on Nixon’s resignation, 101; Nobel Peace Prize for, 29, 92, 148; on Pinochet, 81; on POWs, 49; Reagan and, 140, 156; realpolitik of, 2, 9–10, 48, 158–63; Rockefeller and, 116; Watergate scandal and, 52–53, 62, 65–67, 70–71, 75, 79, 84–85; wire taps ordered by, 70, 84 Koh Tang Island, 144–46 Korea, 144, 147, 148; armistice in, 17; domino theory and, 153; McNamara on, 122; Pueblo incident in, 142 Laird, Melvin, 20, 77 Lam, Tran Van, 12, 23 Laos, 4, 92, 98; cease-fire in, 20–22, 37, 80; China and, 36, 41; equilibrium strategy for, 41, 45–48; Ford administration and, 149; Haig on, 63; Kissinger on, 20–22, 31, 32, 35, 40, 73; map of, xiii; North Vietnam and, 21–22, 35, 47, 92; US bombing of, 35–36, 46–48, 50–51, 64, 78, 84; US POWs in, 30. See also Pathet Lao Le Duan, 113, 117, 120 Le Duc Tho. See Tho, Le Duc Lee Kuan Yew, 137, 139–40 Lehman, John F., 58 Lehmann, Wolfgang, 104 Logevall, Fredrik, 163 Lon Nol, 36, 46–48, 80; defeat of, 91, 124, 130; Ford administration and, 113–14, 121–22; Haig on, 63; Kissinger on, 74 Lon Non, 63 Lord, Winston, 129, 138 Lowenstein, James, 67 “madman” theory, 2, 46, 145 Malaysia, 137, 153, 155 Mansfield, Mike, 35, 59, 60, 77, 145 Mao Zedong, 41, 97; Kissinger and, 36, 38, 88

229

Martin, Graham, 93, 94, 97, 98, 105–6, 113; on final Vietnamese offensive, 123–24, 126, 128; on great-power diplomacy, 115; lobbying efforts by, 120; on US evacuation, 132, 134 Mayaguez crisis, 141–47 McClellan, John, 104 McCloskey, Robert, 99 McGovern, George, 56, 58, 59, 140 McNamara, Robert, 103, 122 McNaughton, John T., 27, 90 Mexico, 99 Middle East, 161; Ford’s policies on, 111, 119, 127, 132; Palestinians in, 96, 152; Yom Kippur War in, 9, 81, 94–96 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 30 Minh, Duong Van, 1, 134 missing in action (MIA), 148, 155–57. See also prisoners of war Montgomery, G. V. “Sonny,” 155 Moorer, Thomas, 22, 51 Moose, Richard M., 67 Mozambique, 152 Munich agreement (1938), 136 National Coalition for an Effective Congress, 58 National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, 31 National Liberation Front (NLF), 92–93, 99 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM), 111–12 Negroponte, John, 42 Nessen, Ron, 129 New Zealand, 139 Nixon, Pat, 19–20 Nixon, Richard M., 26, 129, 140; approval ratings of, 53–54, 60, 68, 78; on Cambodia, 82–84, 90; China visit of, 3, 36; Ford’s pardon of, 103, 108, 116–17; realpolitik of, 2, 9–10, 158–63; reelection campaign of, 58, 61–62, 159; resignation of, 82, 101; on “silent majority,” 57; USSR visit of, 3, 100. See also Watergate scandal Nixon Doctrine, 2, 26, 27, 35 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 72–73 North Korea. See Korea North Vietnam: Cambodia and, 21–22, 35, 73–74, 91, 98; cease-fire violations by, 17–18, 48–53, 62, 63, 71; China and, 32, 37–42, 118, 151; Kissinger’s visit to, 32–36; map of, xiii; Pathet Lao and, 47, 92; US reconstruction

230

INDEX

North Vietnam (continued) aid to, 15, 21, 31, 34–35, 44–45, 54, 62, 84; USSR and, 37–42, 117, 118 nuclear weapons, 2; treaties on, 3, 75, 106, 116, 135, 155–56 Nunn, Sam, 118 Odeen, Philip, 42 oil embargo (1973), 5, 9, 81, 94, 95, 162 Operation Duck Hook, 2 Operation Eagle Pull, 130 Operation Enhance, 43 Operation Frequent Wind, 1, 7, 134 Operation Lam Son, 46 Operation Linebacker II. See Christmas bombings Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 147 Palestinians, 96, 152 Paracel Islands, 99 Paris Agreement (1973), 3, 8; implementation of, 11, 30–31, 73; Nixon on, 1, 11–12, 16–19, 31; Rusk on, 21; Thieu on, 11, 16–18, 140, 159; US withdrawal and, 57 Pathet Lao, 32, 46–48, 92; Ford administration and, 149; Hanoi’s influence on, 35, 47. See also Laos “peace with honor,” 8, 11, 27, 51, 52, 60, 87, 159–60 Pentagon Papers, 68 People’s Republic of China (PRC). See China “permanent war” concept, 8, 15–16, 160 Philippines, 76, 127, 137, 153 Phoenix program, 43 Phuong, Tran Kim, 16–18 Pinochet, Augusto, 81 Pol Pot, 98 Polgar, Thomas, 121, 124, 128 Pompidou, Georges, 73 Porter, William, 21 Poulo Wai Island, xiii, 141 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, 75 prisoners of war (POWs), 30, 36, 48–51; Congress and, 54; MIAs and, 148, 155–57 Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), 31, 50, 148 Pueblo incident, 142 Reagan, Ronald, 9, 143; Carter and, 163–64; Kissinger and, 140, 156; on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 155–56; on “Vietnam syndrome,” 157 Reston, James “Scotty,” 61, 66

“rice war,” 97 Richardson, Elliot, 20, 21, 35, 51; Kissinger and, 22, 48, 64, 65; resignation of, 85–86; Watergate scandal and, 69 Rockefeller, Nelson, 21, 119, 156; on Mayaguez crisis, 142; as Vice President, 116 Rogers, William P., 19, 20, 37, 73 Rostow, Eugene, 51 Rostow, Walt, 137 Rowling, Wallace Edward, 139 Rumsfeld, Donald, 110 Rusk, Dean, 21 Saudi Arabia, 122, 127, 162. See also Middle East Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 59 Schlesinger, James, 83, 108, 110, 119; on final Vietnamese offensive, 123, 128, 130; on Mayaguez crisis, 141, 145, 146, 147 Schultz, George, 65, 66 Scowcroft, Brent, 35–36, 39, 88, 89, 100, 115; on fall of Saigon, 124; on Laos bombings, 51; as national security adviser, 156; on Watergate scandal, 52 Sihanouk, Norodom, 46–47, 74, 80, 88, 91, 121; fall of Phnom Penh and, 130–31 “silent majority,” 43, 57 Simon, William, 138 Singapore, 137, 139, 153 Sino-Soviet split, 5, 36, 40–41 Sirica, John, 62 Sirik Matak, 131 Smyser, William, 112, 118, 121, 124–25; on domino theory, 127, 153; on final Vietnamese offensive, 128; on great-power diplomacy, 115; on lessons from Vietnam War, 136–38, 154; on Paris Agreement, 160–61 Snepp, Frank, 80–81, 128 Solomon, Richard, 150 South Korea. See Korea South Vietnam, 46; China and, 99; fall of, 7, 123–24, 127–34; inflation rate in, 96; maps of, xiii, xiv; oil embargo and, 122, 127, 162; US financial aid to, 16, 43–45, 93–94; Vietnamization program and, 13, 27, 43, 93 Souvanna Phouma, 32, 46–47, 92, 98 Sparkman, John, 125 Spratly Islands, 99 Stearman, William, 51, 88, 105, 112; on fall of Phnom Penh, 124; on fall of Saigon, 123; on great-power diplomacy, 115; on lessons from Vietnam War, 136–38, 137; on Paris Agreement, 160–61; on USSR aid, 121

INDEX

Stennis, John, 21, 86, 104 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 3, 75; Ford on, 106, 116, 135; Reagan on, 155–56 Sullivan, William, 42–43, 51, 76 Swank, Emory, 63, 91 Syria, 94–95. See also Middle East Taiwan, 36–37, 150 Tanaka, Kakuei, 115 Tet Offensive, 44, 50 Thailand, 31, 151; in ASEAN, 137; domino theory and, 127, 153; equilibrium strategy and, 31, 32; during Mayaguez crisis, 146, 147; US bases in, 22, 32, 155 Thanom Kittikachorn, 32 Thieu, Nguyen Van, 4, 8, 28, 93; during final offensive, xiv, 120, 123, 124; Ford administration and, 104–8, 111–13, 116, 122–34; “four noes” policy of, 30, 92; “land to the tiller” program of, 43; Paris Agreement and, 11, 16–18, 140, 159; resignation of, 132–34; “rice war” of, 97; US visit by, 54–56, 62; Vietnamization program and, 2, 13, 27, 43, 93; “war of the flags” and, 31, 44 Tho, Le Duc, 3, 32–33, 62, 84, 93; Ford administration and, 111; on implementing Paris Agreement, 73–74; Nobel Peace Prize for, 29, 92 Thompson, Robert, 121, 122 Timmons, William, 75, 109 Trade Act of 1974, 116, 118 Trewhitt, Henry, 51, 67, 87 triangular diplomacy. See great-power diplomacy Truman, Harry S., 130 Two-Party Joint Military Commission, 31 Underhill, Francis T., 155 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 36, 37–42, 71–72, 87; Afghan invasion by, 157; Angolan civil war and, 152; Ford administration and, 115–17; great-power diplomacy

231

and, 5, 37–42, 55, 63, 64, 71, 74; Jewish emigration from, 111, 116; Nixon visit to, 3, 100; North Vietnam and, 37–42, 92, 117, 118, 121; nuclear weapons treaties of, 3, 75, 106, 116, 135, 155–56; Sino-Soviet split and, 5, 36, 40–41; Watergate scandal and, 71; Yom Kippur War and, 94–95 Valeriani, Richard, 21 Vang Pao, 46 Van Voorst, Bruce, 110 Venezuela, 142 Vietcong, 31, 44, 63, 112, 159 Vietnam Era Reconciliation Program, 108 Vietnamization program, 2, 13, 27, 43, 93. See also South Vietnam Vietnam protests. See antiwar movement “Vietnam syndrome,” 157 “war of the flags,” 31, 44 War Powers Act, 67, 80, 86–87; Mayaguez crisis and, 143, 145, 147 Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), 50, 64, 65; on Cambodia, 91, 117–18 Watergate scandal, 48, 61–68, 159; effects of, 5–6, 8, 79, 162; Ford on, 69, 109; Haig on, 67, 69; Kissinger and, 52–53, 62, 65–67, 70–71, 75, 79, 84–85; Nixon’s resignation and, 82, 101; Nixon’s tapes and, 82, 85, 86, 101; Reston on, 61; Saturday Night Massacre during, 85–86; Soviet reaction to, 71 Weyand, Frederick, 30, 125–26, 128, 129 “X plus 60” period, 30–32 Year of Europe initiative, 72–73 Yom Kippur War, 9, 81, 94–96, 162 Zhou Enlai, 36–37, 41, 88 Ziegler, Ronald, 20, 35, 48, 85–86